

# **TWO PATHS OF MODERNIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND EGYPT**

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*To my father and mother...*



## Abstract

Turkey and Egypt's modernization process dates back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The modernization and westernization processes continued in the aftermath of Egyptian independence (1922) and the declaration of the Republic (1923) in Turkey. One of the main outcomes of modernization in Turkey and Egypt was the secular policies, which were positioned in the center of state-religion relations.

After 1980, liberal political and economic developments triggered the social, economic and political transformation in Turkey and Egypt, which are two close allies of the Western countries in the Middle East. However, Turkey and Egypt's modernization processes gave different outcomes within three decades in term of democratization. By 2010, Turkey enjoyed the rise of democratic values while the military, one of the most prominent symbols of the secular regime, was losing its dominance in politics. A series of public demonstrations, known as "the Arab Spring", shook Egypt in late 2010, and caused the fall of the Mubarak regime.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to compare the modernization processes of Turkey and Egypt and their responses to change. I outline this study in two parts. First I analyze the social, economic and political developments of the two countries through their main political actors and institutions in a comparative perspective. Later, in case study part, I analyze the political actors that played a significant role in modernization and democratization: the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Milli Görüş* Movement and the AK Party. I also examine the socio-religious movement, the GM, and the MB through its social perspective. By doing this, I follow a parallel comparison pattern for the cases.

In this dissertation, I will adopt the comparative historical method. In order to achieve the objectives, I will do historical analysis and study the sociological-structural, ideological and political behavioral aspects of the cases. In terms of the data sources, this dissertation will include content analyses and tertiary sources.

**Keywords:** Turkey; Egypt; modernization; democracy; *Milli Görüş* Movement; AK Party; Gülen Movement; Muslim Brotherhood.

## Resumo

O processo de modernização da Turquia e do Egito, datado do século XVII, bem como o processo de ocidentalização, continuou a fazer-se sentir na sequência da independência do Egito (1922) e na proclamação da República na Turquia (1923). Um dos efeitos principais da modernização desses países teve repercussões nas suas políticas seculares, com particular ênfase nas relações estado-religião.

Após 1980, o desenvolvimento económico e político-liberal desencadeou transformações sociais, económicas e políticas nos dois países, ambos fortes aliados do Ocidente no Médio Oriente. Todavia o processo de modernização na Turquia e no Egito surtiu resultados bem diferentes ao longo de três décadas em termos de democratização.

Até 2010, a Turquia assistiu à ascensão dos valores democráticos enquanto o aparelho militar, um dos símbolos mais proeminentes do regime secular, foi perdendo o seu domínio em termos políticos. Por outro lado, várias manifestações públicas, conhecidas como “a Primavera Árabe” sacudiram o Egito em finais de 2010, provocando a queda do regime de Mubarak.

O objetivo desta dissertação consiste portanto em comparar os processos de modernização na Turquia e no Egito, assim como as suas respostas à mudança. Dividiu-se este estudo em duas partes: num primeiro momento, procedeu-se à análise dos desenvolvimentos sociais, económicos e políticos em ambos países, através dos seus principais atores e instituições políticas, numa perspectiva comparativa. Em seguida, no capítulo de estudo de caso, examinaram-se os atores políticos com papel predominante na modernização e democratização dos países; a Irmandade Muçulmana (IM); o Movimento *Milli Görüş* e o partido AK. Foram igualmente alvo de estudo os movimentos socio-religiosos, o Movimento Gülen e a IM, através da sua vertente social. Recorreu-se a um padrão comparativo paralelo para ambos os casos.

Nesta dissertação, optou-se pelo método histórico comparativo, pelo que, a fim de alcançar o objectivo proposto, procedeu-se à análise histórica e ao estudo dos



aspectos comportamentais sociológico-estruturais, ideológicos e políticos dos casos em estudo. Em termos de fontes de dados, esta dissertação inclui análises de conteúdo e fontes terciárias de pesquisa.

**Palavras-chave:** Turquia; Egito; modernização; democracia; Movimento *Milli Görüş*; Partido AK; Movimento Gülen; Irmandade Muçulmana.



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## **Abbreviations And Acronyms**

ADP – Arab Diversion Plan

AGD – Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (Anatolian Youth Association)

AK Parti – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

AMGT – Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı (European National Outlook Organization)

ANAP – Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

AP – Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)

ASU – Arab Socialist Union

CGP – Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Confidence Party)

CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CUP – Committee of Union and Progress

DİSK – Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions)

DP – Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)

DPT – Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State Planning Organization)

DSP – Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Leftist Party)

DYP – Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)

ECC – European Economic Community

ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council

EU – European Union

FIDH – The International Federation for Human Rights

FP – Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)

FJP – Freedom and Justice Party

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GKB – Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı (Turkish General Staff)

GMEI – Greater Middle East Initiative

GNA – Grand National Assembly  
HP – Halkçı Parti (Populist Party)  
HSYK – Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu (Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors)  
IDP – Intercultural Dialogue Platform  
IDP – Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi (Reformist Democratic Party)  
İDP – İslam Demokrat Parti (Islam Democrat Party)  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
ITU – Istanbul Technical University  
JWF – Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı)  
KİT – Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri (State-owned Enterprises)  
LR – Liberation Rally  
MB – Muslim Brotherhood (Jam’iyyat al-Ikhvan al-Muslimin)  
MBK – Milli Birlik Komitesi (Committee of National Unity)  
MÇP – Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)  
MDP – Milliyetçi Demokarasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party)  
MGK – Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (National Security Council)  
MGM – Milli Görüş Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi),  
MGV – Milli Gençlik Vakfı (National Youth Foundation)  
MHP – Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)  
MKP – Milli Kalkınma Partisi (National Development Party)  
MNP – Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)  
MP – Millet Partisi (Nation Party)  
MSP – Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)  
MÜSİAD – Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association)  
NDP – National Democratic Party  
NU – National Union  
ODTÜ – Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (Middle East Technical University)

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OYAK – Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu (Armed Force Pension Fund)  
PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)  
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization  
RCC – Revolution Command Council  
RP – Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)  
SCAF – Supreme Council of the Armed Force  
SCF – Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party)  
SHP – Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)  
SODEP – Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi (Social Democracy Party)  
SP – Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)  
TBMM – Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (T  
TCF – Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party)  
THKO – Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (People’s Liberation Army of Turkey)  
THKO – Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish People’s Liberation Army)  
TIDB - Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası)  
TİP – Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkey Worker’s Party)  
TOBB – Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Turkish Union of Chambers and  
Exchange)  
TOTTH – Türk Ocakları Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti (The Turkish Organization for  
the Study of Turkish History)  
TSK – Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Force)  
TTTC – Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti (The Society for the Study of Turkish  
History)  
Türk-İş – Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Workers’  
Unions of Turkey)  
TÜSİAD – Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industry & Business  
Association)  
TUSKON – Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Confederation of  
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey)

UAR – United Arab Republic

UN- United Nations

YDP – Yeniden Doğuş Partisi (Rebirth Party)

YSK – Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (High Election Board)





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## Introduction

### 1. Problem Statement

Modernization has been a long-lasting journey for Turkey and Egypt. The Turkish modernization process<sup>1</sup> dates back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The desperate situation of the Ottoman Empire led the its statesmen find solutions to the both its economic and political decline. The worsening situation, in addition to foreign interventions into domestic politics due to minority issues, led the Ottoman Sultans to launch serious reform and modernization (westernization) programs in military, state and economic areas, known as the *Tanzimat* (1839) and *Islahat* (1856) reforms (see Hanioglu, 2008). In this sense, the reformers began to imitate western-style institutions. In addition, many European specialists, educators and reformist were brought to the country in order to revise the Empire's apparently inexorable situation.

Egypt's modernization process began during Muhammad Ali's reign in parallel with the path followed by the Ottoman Empire. So the early modernization of Egypt led the Egyptian province to enter into a power struggle with the Empire; thus, the management of Egypt was given to the Muhammad Ali family. Until the destructive effect of the Suez Canal Project, Egypt temporarily kept its autonomy. Yet Muhammad Ali Pasha was considered the "founder of the Modern Egypt" due to the modernization process that was launched during this period (Dodwell, 2011; also see Goldschmidt, 2008 and Marsot, 2007).

The modernization and westernization processes continued in the aftermath of Egypt's independence (1922) and the declaration of the Turkish Republic (1923). One of the main outcomes of modernization in both Turkey and Egypt was secularism. While Turkey adopted secularism as one of the main pillars of the

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<sup>1</sup> In this dissertation, I consider modernization and westernization as similar concepts for the Turkish and the Egyptian cases in order not to drown in their semantic and conceptual differences. Moreover, these concepts in later years have also been considered as similar to democratization because the western countries have been the significant representatives of these terms. Regarding this consideration see Lipset, 1959; Neubauer, 1967.

Atatürk Reforms (see: Kili 1980; Kuru, 2011; Yavuz, 2009), the secularization, which was initiated during Muhammad Ali's reign continued under the secular nationalist Wafd Party government (Warburg, 1982; Marsot, 2007). The rising secular reforms and their implementation increased the religious opposition in both Turkey and Egypt. The 1925 Sheikh Said Revolt, which was suppressed by the state, shook the eastern part of Turkey, and Egyptian society welcomed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1928. Whereas the MB found the opportunity to enlarge its organization due to Egypt's multi-party structured constitutional monarchy, the religious opposition in Turkey remained under a single-party state oppression due to the state's defense mechanism against reactionaryism in parallel with their secular implementations. Ironically, Turkey welcomed a multi-party era in 1950, and the 1952 Egyptian Revolution established a single-party regime.

Egypt experienced the single-party era almost three decades after Turkey. This gap is significant. The modernization process in Turkey was started by the Kemalist regime immediately after the victory in the Turkish war of independence. Yet Egypt gained its independence from British control in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution. This gap explains the 30-year divergence as regards the single-party state, which was the tool for modernization in both cases.

While the rise of the Islamist groups after the 1960s in Turkey - particularly through the establishment of the *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) Movement-(MGM) affiliated political parties - the Egyptian government considered the MB, the most influential and organized Islamist movement of Egypt, as a threat to the regime. Yet the Islamists groups increasingly became the opposition in Turkey and Egypt, which both adopted a secular modernization process.

The liberal political and economic developments triggered the political, social and economic transformations in Turkey and Egypt, the close allies of the Western countries in the Middle East, after 1980. Turkey adopted liberal economic and political policies during Turgut Özal's governments (1983-1991). Egypt mostly followed economic liberalization and established close ties with the West, the United

States of America (USA) in particular. Yet the reactionaryism in Turkey, and the MB in Egypt, continued to be considered as threats. Further, the modernization (westernization) process remained on the political agenda, but the democratization became one of the foremost issues in both Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey and Egypt witnessed two significant incidents, which would affect the future democratic development of both countries. In 2010, Turkey passed a constitutional amendment that would fortify the democratization of the country and undermine the dominant position of the secular elites including the military in Turkish politics. Correspondingly, in late 2010, a series of mass public demonstrations originated from the neighboring countries (Tunisia, Libya) shook Egyptian society, and ended up with the resignation of the President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. One of the main reasons of for the uprising, also known as the “Arab Spring”, was the anti-democratic practices of the Mubarak regime.

Consequently, Turkey and Egypt responded to the modernization and democratization in two different ways by the 2010s. The state-religion relationship is one of the foremost determinants throughout the modernization and democratization process both in Turkey and Egypt. Thus, the Islamist political and social movements of Turkey and Egypt constitute the cases of this dissertation. In this regard, I take the *Milli Görüş* Movement, and later the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), and the Gülen (Hizmet – Service) Movement as the Turkish cases; and the Muslim Brotherhood as the Egyptian case. In considering the cases, I select the most influential social and political groups of these related countries. The MB addresses this criterion both in its political and social existence in the Egyptian case. For Turkey the separate social (GM) and political groups (MGM and AK Party) were appropriate to the case selection.

Although there are many works that have aimed to analyze the democratization and modernization of Turkey and Egypt not only as separate cases but also as comparative studies, this dissertation focuses on both political and social movements to discuss the different responses of the countries on the road to

modernization and democratization. Thus, this comparative study aims to contribute a different aspect through its case selection as a means of discussing modernization and democratization in Turkey and Egypt.

## **2. Focus of the Dissertation**

This dissertation configures two-stage analysis in order to achieve its objectives: firstly, the comparison of Turkey and Egypt's modernization and democratization process; and secondly, the comparison of the related cases of Islamic social and political movements. In order to deal with the country comparisons, I mainly focus on the policies, which caused the political, social and economic transformations. By doing this, I analyze the developments in context with the state-religion relations due to the reciprocal connection of the countries and cases. Considering the cases studies, I follow a symmetrical pattern to make comparisons of (1) the sociological and structural features, (2) ideological analysis, and (3) the political behavior of the cases.

The historical backgrounds, sociopolitical and economic developments of the countries constitute the first phase of this dissertation. Both countries necessitate a comprehensive historical analysis in order to understand the dominant codes that led to the modernization and democratization processes. The foremost studies dealing with the history of modern Turkey includes very early modernization and historical analyses of Turkey (Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1992). The main characteristics of these studies are that they consider the Ottoman legacy and its effects on Turkish modernization. While Feroz Ahmad's work focuses on the military influence over the Turkish politics, Bernard Lewis also analyzes the religious, cultural aspects and the Turkish community.

The keystone of the Turkish modernization was Atatürk's principles, which were lately, considered as Kemalism. The codes of the Turkish modernization were mainly shaped around these principles, namely: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Etatism, Secularism, and Revolutionism (Kili, 1980; Berkes, 1998;



Ahmad, 2003; Kongar, 2006; Uyar, 2007). Secularism became the one of the foremost determinants of Turkish modernization during the post-Ottoman era. The state institutions began to secularize rapidly and the understanding of secularism - indeed laicism - evolved into an insistent form that excludes the religion from the public sphere. Thus, the debates from which caused the state-religion relationship are based on the perception of Turkish secularism (Berkes, 1998; Kuru, 2011; Çağaptay, 2006; Göle, 1997; Yavuz, 2009). Regarding secularism, Kuru explains this perception as “assertive secularism” (2011).

Another significant issue considering Turkey is the state-military relationship (Ahmad, 1981; Heper, 1988; Sakkallıoğlu, 1997; Cook, 2007; Kuru, 2012). The leading cadre of the Turkish independence war comprised the republican regime; thus the military gained a great influence on Turkish politics. Yet this influence did not go beyond the most foremost figures of the independence movement such as Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü. State-military relations entered a new phase in the aftermath of the multi-party era. Although the 1960 military coup was a result of inter-party conflict, the rise of Islamist political identity brought a new dimension to state-military relations. From then on, the military became the protector of the secular regime against reactionaryism.

After the emergence of the political Islamist parties that took place in the late 1960s, Turkish politics welcomed new political actors - the MGM-affiliated political parties<sup>2</sup> aside from the CHP and the *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party – AP in Turkish), which was built upon the legacy of the *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party-DP). The rise of the Islamist parties came to the forefront of state-religion relations due to the secular structure of the Turkish state (Yavuz, 2003a; Jenkins, 2008; Eligür, 2010). State-religion relations shifted into another phase after 1980.

The *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party –ANAP in Turkish) emerged as a new political actor in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention. The ANAP

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<sup>2</sup> The *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party, MNP with Turkish acronym), and later the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party, MSP in Turkish).

became the winning party of the post-coup period, which was limited by the military management in regular political life. The ANAP followed global and liberal socio-political and economic policies under the prime ministry of Turgut Özal (Laçiner, 2001; Öniş, 2004). The social and economic transformation of Turkey gained impetus through Özal's liberal policies. Özal departed from statism and initiated privatization of state-owned enterprises, which increased the economic mobility of the country. The free market economy introduced new opportunities to Turkish society. Thus the mobilization of the periphery to the center accelerated.

Despite the closure of political parties including the Islamists, the ANAP's new pro-global policies led to the emergence of a "new bourgeoisie" (Yavuz, 2010). The newly-emergent "bourgeoisie" also affected Islamic mobilization. As a consequence of this, the fall of the ANAP after Turgut Özal's presidency (1989) led to the rise of the *Refah Parti* (Welfare Party – RP in Turkish), another MGM-affiliated political party, established after the 1980 military coup (Yavuz, 1997; Kuru, 2005). These developments positively affected the mobilization of Islamist social movements such as the Gülen Movement. Özal's liberal ideas and policies introduced a domestic opportunity structure to expand the Gülen Movement's network (Kuru, 2005).

While this socio-economical change ("the new bourgeoisie") brought the RP to the power after the 1995 national election (in 1996), the state-religion relationship reached turbulent times due to the secular opposition to Necmettin Erbakan's prime ministry. The following developments led to the 28 February military intervention (Kocabaş, 1998), which caused to the toppling of the REFAH-YOL<sup>3</sup> government; hence the "rising Islamist threat". However, the reaction of the secular state through civil, military bureaucrats and their sympathizers in the media and the business worlds led the Islamic actors to change their strategy, including their political discourse, which caused the emergence of a new political actor in 2010: the AK Party (Bulaç, 2010). The AK Party adopted "conservative democracy" (Akdoğan, 2004),

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<sup>3</sup> The minority government was formed by the RP and Tansu Çiller's Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party – DYP in Turkish) on 28 June 1996.

reinterpreted secularism (Kuru, 2010) and intended to create a new identity by embarking into Turkish political life while seeking security and legitimacy (Dağı, 2010).

The Gülen Movement (Yavuz, 2003b; Ergene, 2008; Sharon-Krespin, 2009; Ebaugh, 2010; Ergil, 2012), the other sufferer in “the 28 February Process”, had began to become visible in Turkish public opinion shortly before the incident. The GM, whose rhetoric includes such subjects as secularism, human rights, the rule of law and democratization, had priorities matching that of the AK Party, supported it indirectly through its media outlet (Kuru, 2003; Özdalga, 2003; Michel, 2005; Kuru, 2007). Unlike Despite the conviction that “*Feb. 28 will last 1000 years!*”<sup>4</sup>, the incident became a critical juncture, and “the 28 February Process” accelerated Turkey’s democratization process during the AK Party’s rule through its social, economic and foreign supporters (Kılınc, 2014). Yet the constitutional referendum held on 12 September 2010 not only brought more democratic reforms but also decreased the role of the military in the Turkish politics.

The modernization of the Egypt dated back to Muhammad Ali’s reign. Scholars who study the modernization of Egypt consider Muhammad Ali Pasha to be the “founder of modern Egypt” (Dodwell, 2011; Goldschmidt, 2008; and Marsot, 2007). The modernization of Egypt encountered 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman modernization reforms, the *Tanzimat* and *Islahat*. Like Ottoman modernization, Egypt also took Europe as a reference. European scientific developments of Europe were brought to Egypt together with European-style institutions including secular education institutions (Marsot, 2007).

Egypt came under massive European influence during the British invasion (1882-1922), which also raised awareness of nationalism amongst Egyptians. The rise of nationalism triggered the 1919 uprising against the British presence in Egypt, which ended the Egyptian declaration of independence in 1922. The continuing

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<sup>4</sup> The Chief of General Staff of the period Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu used this expression. See, [http://www.todayszaman.com/national\\_february-28-period-still-maintains-its-grip-on-turkey\\_168113.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/national_february-28-period-still-maintains-its-grip-on-turkey_168113.html). Last accessed on 30 October 2012.

westernization process in addition to secular implementations resulted in the emergence of the Islamist opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular (Mitchell, 1993; Wickham, 2002; Zahid, 2010; Wickham, 2013). The MB, which first emerged as a social movement, completed its expansion rapidly and became a multi-regional organization, turning into one of the most influential political oppositions in Egypt.

The MB increased its political participation by the 1940s as a natural result of its ideology, which was to establish an “Islamic state” (Mitchell, 1993; Wickham, 2013). In addition to its domestic political struggle held against the secular state and the British presence, the MB also supported the Palestine issue through its paramilitary unit, the “secret apparatus” (Mitchell, 1993; Zahid, 2010). Later, the involvement of the “secret apparatus” in some domestic violence conducted against the government without the permission of Muhammad al-Banna, the founder and the General Guide of the MB, caused the MB trouble across the country (Zollner, 2009). Although during the post-Banna era, the General Guides tended to manage the organization within the legal framework, the aforementioned attacks remained as a black mark, which caused difficulties in its relations with the state. For instance, despite the MB sides with the Free Officers during the 1952 Revolution, the movement was subject to heavy state oppression during the republican regime.

Another significant issue that caused inconvenience for the MB was the emergence of Sayyid Qutb and his ideology in the late 1960s. Qutb is considered one of the most influential figures of radical Islamism (Calvert, 2013). The state oppression and the execution of some of the foremost members of the MB including Qutb, increased the movement’s ideological separation. While the core cadres of the MB remained non-radical, some of the young members broke with the movement and set out on a radical path. Yet the MB stayed away from such radical ideologies and violence in order to increase its legitimacy in the eye of the Egyptian governments.

The post-1980 period was a crucial point in the Muslim Brotherhood’s paradigm shift. In the aftermath of the assassination of Anwar Sadat - the third

President of Egypt – by a radical Islamist during a military parade, the MB became a target shortly after Hosni Mubarak became president (Amin, 2011). Despite state repression, the MB decided to benefit from its all-legal rights, and thus showed a tendency to participate in the state's politics through independent nominees at parliamentary elections, the professional syndicates' elections and student unions (Fahmy, 1998; Wickham, 2002). Furthermore, through the end of the 1980s, the MB adopted a new political discourse that includes the democratic ideas, human rights and the rule of law (Harnisch, 2009; Wickham, 2011). The MB unusually made collaborations with other political parties including the Wafd Party, which has been one of the Brotherhood's foremost rivals since its establishment.

The MB increased its democratic demands by the early 1990s, when the Islamist radical groups emerged into Egyptian society (Dalacoura, 2011). In addition to its long-lasting and historical call for "Sharia", the MB began to call for democracy (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009). Thus the movement adopted another strategy to struggle without departing from its main purpose. Despite ideological moderation and staying away from Islamic radicalism and any violent terror attacks, the MB was once again faced with government oppression in the mid 1990s. The MB tried to continue its political participation under Mubarak's limited-multi-party system. It also dealt with waves of arrests, which affected thousands of members of society. At the same time, the legitimacy of the 1995 and 1999 elections began to be questioned, not only in the domestic but also the international arena (Soage and Franganillo, 2010).

The democratic demands of the Egyptian society increased due to the external developments launched in the aftermath of the "September 11" terrorist attacks against the USA. The USA's invasion of Iraq followed these attacks, for the purpose of "exporting democracy" (Schraeder, 2002). These external developments were supposed support from the opposition groups in Egypt, the MB in particular, as a leverage to demand more democratic rights. The democratic demands of Egyptian society in addition to external developments began to give some results. For the first time in the history of the republic the president had a rival in the 2005 presidential

election. However, the presidential candidate Ayman Nour was arrested immediately before them. The Mubarak regime aimed to manage the economic and political situation with various reforms. However, the rising domestic discomfort could not be prevented. Moreover, various youth opposition groups demanded democracy and human rights. For instance, groups such as “The April 6 (Youth) Movement” emerged in 2008. Finally, another significant external development, “the Arab Spring”, spread to the country in the late 2010s, and increasing demonstrations and civil uprising toppled the Mubarak regime.

I have tried to summarize the modernization and the democratization process of Turkey and Egypt above. As can be seen from the aforementioned sources, the majority of the analyses have been made mainly at country level through the main political actors and institutions by comparative perspective. Apart from these studies, only a few works include both Turkey and Egypt. One of these, Javaid Saeed’s *“Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey”*, (Saeed, 1994). Saeed’s work examines the relationship Islam and modernism. More recently, Steven A. Cook’s *“‘Ruling but not governing’. The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey”* focuses on the civil-military relations in aforementioned countries (Cook, 2007). In this dissertation, which focuses on the last three decades (1980-2010), I analyze not only the political actors who have had a significant role in modernization and the democratization - the MB, the MGM and the AK Party - but also the social religious movements, the GM and the MB, through social perspectives. Therefore, taking into consideration military-state-religion relations, this study introduces a new analysis of Turkey and Egypt’s modernization and their different responses in a religious socio-political movements perspective.

### **3. The Main Question, and Objectives**

The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the changing responses of Turkey and Egypt on their paths towards modernization and democratization.

### *Why Turkey and Egypt?*

Turkey and Egypt have similar modernization and historical patterns, such as the Sultanate regime, the constitutional monarchy, independence movements, military interventions, authoritarian regimes and military-originating ruling elites. More importantly, the states are the motor power of the modernization process, and they both introduce a ‘top-down’ modernization process within the different time periods. Thus, I chose Turkey and Egypt as the comparative cases of this dissertation.

In this regard, the main question of this study is:

*Why did Turkey and Egypt, which both have similar modernization patterns and historical backgrounds give different responses, demonstrate different types of changes and reach different outcomes in the context of state-religion relations during their modernization processes?*

In accordance with the main question, this dissertation follows similar patterns in order to compare the social, economic and political transformations of Turkey and Egypt in a broad sense in Part I. Part II draws a comprehensive analysis of the religious socio-political movements, the *Milli Görüş* Movement, the AK Party, and the Gülen Movement as the Turkish cases, and the Muslim Brotherhood as the Egyptian case. As noted earlier, if taking into consideration just one case for the comparison regarding Egypt seems disproportionate, the MB is the most proper case for this dissertation due to its having been Egypt’s most influential and strongest social movement and political opposition force.

Taking into consideration Turkey and Egypt (Part I), the objectives of this dissertation are the following:

- To explore historical, social, economic and political developments;
- To define state and civil actors, and institutions;
- To understand the dynamics of modernization processes;

- To analyze the position of the military in politics;
- To analyze state ideologies;
- To analyze state-religion relations;
- To compare Turkey and Egypt in accordance with the aforementioned issues.

Taking into consideration the cases of the *Milli Görüş* Movement – AK Party, the Gülen Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood (Part II), the objectives of this dissertation are the following:

- To analyze the emergence of the cases;
- To define key figures;
- To analyze the sociological and structural formation of the cases;
- To define and analyze of the ideologies of the cases;
- To understand the political behavior of the cases;
- To compare the cases in accordance with the aforementioned issues (Chapter 6).

#### **4. Research Methodology**

This study will follow the comparative historical method. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer define “*comparative historical analysis in a very broad sense, such that the tradition encompasses any and all studies that juxtapose historical patterns across the cases* (2003:10).” Comparative historical analysis has a significant and long-lasting place in the social science from Adam Smith to Karl Marx, and from Alexis de Tocqueville to Max Weber (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003:3).



The use of comparative historical analysis mainly focuses on “*comprehensive structures and large scale processes that provided powerful clues to the patterning of social life*” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003:5). Comparative historical analyses focuses on “big questions” which have large-scale outcomes such as modernization, revolutions, globalization and the evolution of societies (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003:5). In this regard:

*“Most basically, comparative historical researchers ask questions and formulate puzzles about specific sets of cases that exhibit sufficient similarity to be meaningfully compared with one another. Comparative historical researchers do not seek universal knowledge about all instances of a historically constituted population of cases.*

...

*Yet comparative historical analyst continue to ask such questions because of the poverty of universalizing theoretical approaches and because these questions lend themselves to research with significant analytic advantages (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 8-9).”*

Comparative historical analysis has three major features (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 11-13). Firstly, comparative historical research explains and identifies the “casual configurations” that create significant outcomes. Thus, the comparative historical inquiries focus on analysis and test the selected cases rather than introduce and reject any “casual analysis”. Secondly, one of the other features of comparative historical research focuses upon “*historical sequences and unfolding of the processes*”. The revolutions and state formations, for instance, can be shown in the examples that unfold “over time” and “in time”. Thirdly, comparative historical researchers “*engage in systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar and contrasting cases.*” Furthermore, comparative historical inquiry “*is no substitute for theory*”, and “*it can be applied only with the indispensable aid of theoretical concepts and hypotheses* (Skocpol, 1979:39)”. However, comparative historical

research maintains “*a valuable check*”, and it “*serves as a ideal strategy for meditating between theory and history*” (Skocpol, 1979:40).

Taking these points into consideration, I will draw the structure of this study around my research question, and compare the modernization processes of Turkey and Egypt and their responses to change. Thus, I will not adopt any theory. Instead I follow a parallel analysis amongst the cases. In this sense, I analyze the social, economic and political transformations of Turkey and Egypt in Part I, and examine the MGM – AK Party, the GM and the MB in accordance with (1) sociological and structural, (2) ideological and (3) political behavioral aspects.

On a country-specific basis, I will analyze, in a broad sense, the republican eras in Turkey and Egypt. On a case-specific basis, this dissertation will mainly focus on the period between 1980, the 12 September Military Intervention, and 2010, the 12 September Constitutional Referendum in Turkey; and 1981, the beginning of the Mubarak Regime, and 2011, the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt.

In considering the analysis, I have conducted field research in Turkey and Egypt. I conducted a fieldwork in Egypt between May-September 2012, yet I was unable to conduct any interviews with the Muslim Brotherhood due to the continuing political debates caused by the 2012 presidential elections. Although I was planning to conduct another round of field research in order to conduct interviews in Egypt, the outbreak of the 2013 military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the countrywide ban upon the Muslim Brotherhood made the second round of fieldwork impossible. In order not to disrupt the integrity of the study, I have not included any interviews, despite being in Turkey at various times between 2012 and 2014.

In terms of the data sources, this dissertation will include content analyses and tertiary sources.

## 5. Dissertation Outline

The structure of this dissertation is organized in two main parts consisting of six chapters, aside from the “Introduction” and “Conclusion” sections. Part I, entitled “Modernization and State-Religion Relations”, consists of two parallel chapters. Chapter I introduces the historical background and the social, economic and political transformation of Turkey since 1923. By doing so, I focus on the main actors, state and civil institutions, and state-religion relations. In Chapter II the same patterns will be followed for Egypt, particularly since 1952.

Part II covers the main purpose of this dissertation: the case studies and the comparison chapter. In terms of the cases, this study will adopt a similar patterns and each chapter is organized under three main sections: (1) Sociological and structural analysis, (2) Ideological analysis, and (3) Political behavior. In addition to this, each chapter introduces historical background and information about the key figures. In this sense, Chapter III covers The *Gülen (Hizmet)* Movement; Chapter IV examines The *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) Movement and the Justice and Development Party; and Chapter V analyses the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, Chapter VI introduces comparisons in accordance with the symmetrical patterns of the study regarding all chapters.

# **PART I - MODERNIZATION AND STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS**

## **Chapter 1: Turkey**

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section, I document the historical background of the Republic of Turkey. In doing so, I try to follow a chronological order. I analyze the social, political and economic transformations; and the political and social agents of these transformations in the second section. Finally, I analyze the ideas and ideologies that form them.

### **1.1. The Emergence Of The Turkish Republic**

In the aftermath of World War I, the Entente Powers occupied the Ottoman Empire and the lands of the empire collapsed. The British, French and Italian Forces arrived in Istanbul, the Empire's capital, in late 1918, after the Armistice of Mudros. The Sultan had begun to rule under the shadow of the guns, and he was not able to give any decisions without the approval of the British authorities. The parliament was also dysfunctional due to the invasion. Therefore, the independence movement had to be managed from outside the capital.

The milestone of the Turkish Independence Movement was Mustafa Kemal's arrival in Samsun on 19 May 1919. He was appointed by the Sultan as the inspector of the 9<sup>th</sup> Army in Anatolia with the permission of the British officials (Ahmad, 2003:80). Instead of his official duty, disarming the Ottoman armies, Mustafa Kemal led the national resistance in Anatolia by organizing the local and civilian forces.

The framework of the Turkish Independence Movement had begun to take shape with the Amasya Circular (22 June 1919). The declaration included the codes of the Turkish national struggle. A government based on national sovereignty was first mentioned during the Amasya Circular. It also declared that the future of the country was in danger, and that the Istanbul government did not fulfill the criteria necessary to bring about Turkish independence. The Istanbul government, in this context, was ignored for the first time. It was also indicated in the Circular that a Congress should be held in Sivas. While these developments towards ending the Entente Powers' occupation were occurring in Anatolia, Kazım Karabekir was assigned to arrest Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Orbay by the Capital during the national congress. However, he didn't follow orders, and instead joined the national struggle. (Lewis, 1968:248)

National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was formed after the national congresses, which were held in Erzurum (23 July – 17 August 1919) and Sivas (4 – 11 September 1919). The delegates of the Sivas Congress elected the Representative Committee (Temsilciler Meclisi) and Mustafa Kemal led the Committee until its center was moved to Ankara (Sadiq, 1976:523). The associations, which aimed to defend the nation, were reunited under the "Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia" according to the Congresses (Ahmad, 1992:49 and Lewis, 1968:249). After the Sivas Congress, the Istanbul government called for a national (parliamentary) election. The representatives nominated by the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia won seats in the Anatolian districts. Thus, the national resistance had the opportunity to become involved in the decision that the Istanbul government would take. The last Ottoman Parliament adopted the National Pact in a closed session (28 January 1920). According to the pact, the territory of the Turkish Nation was identified by the time of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. After this development the British forces invaded Istanbul on March 16, 1920 and dissolved the last Ottoman Parliament.

The Grand National Assembly (GNA) was established in 23 April 1920 after the British invasion. Mustafa Kemal was elected the first Speaker of the Parliament. The GNA became the de facto government holding executive powers, and Mustafa Kemal was considered the de facto President of the Government. The Turkish Independence War was led by the GNA under the command of Mustafa Kemal, and the national struggle continued until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

#### ***1.1.1. The Codes of the New Turkish State***

While the Grand National Assembly was conducting the independence movement, the code of the new Turkish state began to be revealed. The GNA drafted a short constitution (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye) in 1921, which consisted of 23 articles. What made this new Constitution so important was that it proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty for the first time (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009:10). According to the first Article, “*Sovereignty belongs to the nation unconditionally*”. This declaration was realized with the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate on December 1, 1922. This move constituted the first step towards an independent Turkish state.

Mustafa Kemal wanted to create a modern westernized Turkish state, and thus he refuted the Ottoman heritage. In this respect, he refrained from including any religious themes in the structure of the new Turkish state. The ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the problems of the old administration were excluded from the new form as well. The conservatives and oppositions thought differently (Şahingöz and Keleşyılmaz, 1996). They supported a constitutional monarchy, which preserved the existence of the Ottoman dynasty. They also stood for the continuation of the Caliphate. Halide Edip, a female novelist and political activist, believed that the Turkish nation was unable to create a nation-state due to physical and infrastructural inadequacies. Therefore, she proposed to that it stay under the American mandate until those deficiencies were resolved.

General Refet Bele and Rauf Orbay, who were with Mustafa Kemal during the Independence Movement, also had different ideas about the structure of the new

Turkish State. They shared their concerns with Mustafa Kemal in a private meeting. In a question to Mustafa Kemal about the Sultanate issue, Rauf Orbay stated his and his father's ultimate devotion to the Sultan. Similarly, Refet Bele stated, "*any administration but Sultanate and Caliphate cannot be even discussed*" (Ahmad, 1992:56-57).

After a long-standing peace talk, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed with the British Empire, the French Republic, the Kingdom of Italy, the Kingdom of Greece and their allies on 24 July 1923.<sup>5</sup> The capitulations, which gave economic, judicial and administrative privileges to foreigners, were abolished. The Treaty of Lausanne, to Lewis (1968:255), "*was substantially an international recognition of the demands formulated in the Turkish National Pact.*" Despite the diverse ideas about the future of the new Turkish state, on 13 October 1923 the GNA nominated Ankara to replace Istanbul as the new capital of the new Turkish state, in order to weaken the Ottoman dynasty and to end the current conflicts. It made a huge impact on conservatives who had a strong relationship with the old imperial capital. After the constitutional amendment, the Republic of Turkey was formed on 29 October 1923. Mustafa Kemal was elected the first president of the Republic of Turkey. The president also had the authority to assign the prime minister with this amendment.

### ***1.1.2. Atatürk's Reforms (1923-1930)***

In the aftermath of the proclamation of the republic, political and social structures began to transform in accordance with the principles of Atatürk's<sup>6</sup> Reforms (Kili, 1980: 383-387). The secular state ideology became dominant within both the political and social structures. The major transformation had occurred in the political structure.

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<sup>5</sup> For the full text of the treaty see: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty.en.mfa>.

<sup>6</sup> Atatürk means the father of the Turk. The Turkish Grand National Assembly gave it as the surname to Mustafa Kemal on 24 November 1934 according to the Law on Family Names, adopted on 21 June 1934.

The Ottoman traditions were rejected, and were substituted with the new political and social elements in order to create a modern Turkish state.

#### ***1.1.2.1. Political and Legal Reforms***

After abolition of the Sultanate and proclamation of the republic, the Caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924. Afterwards, the Sultan and his family were declared to be ‘persona non grata’ and were forced into exile. In 1924, the new constitution, based on the principle of a republican regime including political party system, was accepted. To prevent any religious intervention in politics, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was established April 1, 1924. Unlike the Ottoman era, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was separated from the Cabinet, and became a subsidiary institution of the Ministry of National Education. The section, which defined the “religion of the state”, was removed from the constitution on April 10, 1928. This was one the most important marginal steps taken to consolidate the secular state. In 1937, it was clearly stated that “*the republic of Turkey is a secular state*” in the constitution and the secular structure of the state became concrete (Ahmad, 1992: 53-63).

Atatürk made radical changes in the republican era. In abolishing of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, he aimed to solidify the structure of the new Turkish State because Turkish society was in absolute obedience to the aforementioned institutions. He intended to consolidate the new political institutions by erasing everything related to the Ottomans. Moreover, in order to prevent any possible military interventions into politics, the status of soldiers had been clarified by legal regulations. According to the law, military officials were forced to make a choice between being a politician and remaining as a soldier (Ahmad, 2003:86) Like the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Turkish General Staff was established and connected under the prime ministry.



It should be noted that the conflicts between the ulama (the religious scholars) and *Seyfiye* (the military members) caused political turmoil. This dispute caused vulnerabilities in the state management. Many *Islahat* (modernization) policies could not implemented due to their not having the consents of these institutions (for more info see Kara, 1998). As an Ottoman military official, Mustafa Kemal was well aware of this fact, and took his measures from the beginning.

In this sense, Atatürk chose a radical way to establish the new Turkish state due to the importance of the priorities. Atatürk also aimed to get rid of blurred political and social situations aiming such revolutionary actions (Öğün, 2007:285-286). Similarly Ahmad states that “*The Kemalists, on the other hand, wanted to a total social, economic and political transformation for the sake of westernization and modernity. In doing so, they radically reformed their tradition and patriarchal society* (Ahmad, 2003:84).” By being radical, Atatürk aimed to replace the chronic problems of the Ottoman era with new ones instead of healing them.

As with his political reforms, Atatürk also followed a radical way to establish the new legal system (Borckett, 1998:60). First, the *Mecelle* code (Ottoman Civil Code) was abolished. Then the Sharia courts were closed on 1924. The penal law was adopted from the Italian Penal Code on March 1, 1926 and the civil code was adopted from the Swiss Civil Code on October 4, 1926.

#### ***1.1.2.2. Social Reforms***

Modernization efforts also continued in the social and educational areas (Brockett, 1998:60). The Hat Law and the Dress Code Law were accepted on 25 November 1925. Accordingly, traditional Ottoman dress clothes and the ‘*fez*’ became illegal for the sake of modernization. The Courts of Liberation strictly punished people who didn’t follow these laws. Instead of the Ottoman Alphabet (an Arabic Alphabet adapted to Turkish) the new Turkish Alphabet based on Latin-scripts letters was adopted and accepted in accordance with the Adoption and Implementation of the

Turkish Alphabet Law, adopted on 1 November 1928. In addition, International Measure Units, new numerals, and the Gregorian calendar came into use. The Law on Family Names passed on June 21 1934, and all the bynames and titles, which came from the Ottoman culture, were prohibited on 30 November 1934.

The Turkish educational system was also radically transformed during the republican era. In 1924, the Madrasas, the higher educational institutions, were abolished and modern universities were adopted with the legal regulations. All educational institutions were unified under the Ministry of National Education with the Unification of Education Law on 3 March 1924 (MEB, 2013). Under this law secondary education institutions were unified, and any religious-based institutions were forbidden. In addition to political changes, with this reform, the new educational system formed the basis of secular thoughts.

The military and civil bureaucrats who managed the Kemalist transition believed in the necessity of the reforms to consolidate the replacement of ‘medieval thinking’. In their collective opinion, the people, who hold the power to save society from this mindset, had to be better equipped in all aspects of modern scientific and academic thought. The public could only introduce a counter-revolution against the reforms (Şaylan, 1974:74). Under the influence of this understanding, the reform movements were actualized upon the ideas of the ruling elites rather than the needs or demands of society. In this regard, the government took harsh measures to prevent the alleged counter-revolution.

In short, Atatürk’s reforms aimed to establish a modern Turkish State, with no bonds to the previous one. For the sake of modernity, not only all political but also social traditions were rejected. Instead, a modern one was intended to adapt the republican era.

### ***1.1.3. The Single-Party Era***

The *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party; CHP in Turkish) was the first Turkish political party to be established in the republican era. Mustafa Kemal founded the party on 9 September 1923. The Republican People's Party became the ruling party in the aftermath of the proclamation of the republic.

The CHP was the only political party in the political sphere. As a consequence of this condition, the unique-party political system caused the necessity of opposition in politics. Despite the existence of opponents within the party, an alternative political formation had not been tried. In this respect, the former members of the Republican People's Party established the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party; TCF in Turkish) with the permission of Mustafa Kemal, on 17 November 1924.<sup>7</sup>

In this sense, the TCF had adopted the principles of political and economical liberalism. The party program, in this respect, accused the ruling party of having totalitarian tendencies like as the Committee of Union and Progress had had (Tunçay, 1999:108). The TCF also declared that they would improve the national sovereignty and democracy. Besides, the party assured the dignity of the traditional values, including '*religious opinions and beliefs*'. After this declaration, Atatürk stressed his displeasure, and stated that it was unacceptable (Ahmad, 1992:56-57). Shortly after, due to an (necessary to mention that the Sheik Said Revolt was a Kurdish movement which tried to resist the secularization of the society. This allows for understanding what is the genesis of the Kurdish problem – both social (the traditional sheiks opposed the reforms) and “national” (the Turkish government focused a central political issue into a target population) insurrection in Anatolia named after Sheik Said, the TCF was shut down to ensure the authority of the government on 5 June 1925.

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<sup>7</sup> Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay.

However, the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party, SCF in Turkish) did not emerge as an opposition party. Due to the absence of any opposition into politics, the SCF was formed artificially in order to create a positive public image by the direction of Mustafa Kemal. Moreover, the ruling party supported the establishment of the SCF in order to tolerate public accusations, which stemmed from the 1929 global economic crisis known as the Great Depression (Tunçay, 1999:247-249). In this sense, Fethi Okyar, a former general, established the SCF with the directives of Mustafa Kemal on 12 August 1930.

The new party was hugely appreciated within society; so much so that it became a rival to the CHP. In a short time, the political tension rose before the general election (Tunçay, 1999: 265-268). Furthermore, the SCF's struggles - which were a clear objective of the 1930's election - proposed a new electoral system, created a wide public interest. Due to massive political resistance, Fethi Okyar took the decision to shut down the SCF 97 days after its establishment.

#### *The Strengthening of The One-Party System*

The efforts to achieve a transition to a multi-party system had not only failed, but also resulted in the strengthening of the single party regime. Atatürk's belief in the superiority of administration and his attitudes, which strongly criticized the principle of the separation of powers, were the other reasons, which increased the CHP's dominance in Turkish politics (Tunaya, 2007:211-212). Another factor that solidified the single party regime were the active roles played by the civil and military bureaucrats, who were the former government officials of the Ottoman rule. Their contribution on the road to independence allowed them to occupy prominent positions in the new government. In this regard, these eminent elites had carried an administrative approach, which allowed them to intervene in political life. When the old state evolved to the new republican regime, they transferred their own political understanding to the new era (Özbudun, 1995:7-9). Hence, the structure of the new state's political life continued to hold power in its hands.

On one hand, the elites stated that sovereignty was based on the will of the Turkish nation; on the other hand, the guardianship of the nation's benefits was only being given to the CHP. Thus, the sovereignty attributed to the nation could not go beyond the rhetoric, and the people were hardly ever given a place in the new state model, (Erdoğan, 1992:252). The guardianship of the ruling elites was considered essential for societies to achieve modernization faster and to prevent the backtracking of Atatürk's Reforms. In this sense, this was crucial for the survival of the revolution, and to be successful in the creation of a modern state. This tendency was also important in order to skip some phases of the revolution (Kışlalı, 1998:7). In another respect, the Kemalist rejection of the legacy of the past, which excluded the bureaucratic heritage, delayed the democratic transition until 1946 (Erdoğan, 1992:254).

This attitude caused certain groups to gain privileges in Turkish society, in which the so-called the middle class was not in existence. As in the Ottoman Empire, the coterie of elites was beginning to become powerful in the Republican era. In the aftermath of the fourth congress of the CHP, the general secretary Recep Peker emphasized state-party integration. It was believed that Peker made an attempt to move the party to a fascist line, which Atatürk blocked (Erdoğan, 1992:253; Uyar, 2007). Despite Atatürk's intentions and attempts to achieve transition to a multi-party system, the idea which was against the separation of powers found a place in the party program after following Atatürk's statement made during the closure of the SCF (Tunçay, 1999:311). Moreover, state-party integration peaked in 1936 with İnönü's circular. According to this circular, the Minister of The Interior became the General Secretary of the Party (CHP), and the governors became the party chairmen in related cities (Yetkin, 1983:131).

### ***1.1.3.1. The İnönü Era (1938-1950)***

On 11 November 1938, the day after Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü was elected president. The extraordinary congress was held in December. At the end of the congress, while Atatürk was declared as the "eternal leader", İsmet İnönü was given the title of "*Milli Şef*" (the national leader) (Ahmad, 2003:95). İnönü was also considered the lifetime leader of the Party by the congress. Owing to this title, the İnönü era was known as the Milli Şef Era.

Although İnönü strengthened his position in the party, it didn't prevent the formation of the intra-party opposition. Beside the CHP's oppressive rule, the economic instability increased the opposition in the party because the statist policies could not instigate a recovery from the inadequate economic conditions<sup>8</sup>. In addition to this, the tense atmosphere emanating from the Second World War, which started right after İnönü's presidency, and a possible war situation affected the poor economy. As a natural result of the economic recession, the opposition wing found an opportunity to increase their demands publicly.

İnönü, indeed, aimed to pass a multi-party system in order to eliminate the negative image of the single-party era. While doing this, he anticipated to form the new party's deputies from the current representatives of the parliament (İncioğlu, 2007:256). Thus, while the message that they were not excluded from politics was being given to the public, their participation was also kept under control. Yet, the formation of the new party did not develop as expected. Adnan Menderes, a leading figure of the prospective Democratic Party, criticized this fact. He stated that the government did not allow them to structure the party organization countrywide. He added that the selection of the party members had been confined and the new parties were intended to remain in opposition to the CHP for a long time (İncioğlu, 2007:257).

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<sup>8</sup> I will mention detailed information about statism in the following sections.

#### ***1.1.4. The Multi Party Era (1946-1960)***

President İnönü's statement about democratization on 7 June 1945 mobilized the opponents immediately. Four parliamentary members of the CHP, including Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, gave a memorandum, which was known "*the memorandum of the four*", to discuss about some democratic requests such as transition to multi-party system, free elections, freedom of the press and parliamentary control over the government in an open session. With the exception of these four members, the CHP rejected the memorandum unanimously (Eroğul, 1998:30). However, after the permission of the Ministry of Interior, which allowed the formation of political parties. The first was the *Milli Kalkınma Partisi* (National Development Party, MKP in Turkish) in 1945, under the leadership of Nuri Demirağ. Then, the *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party, DP) was formed in 1946 by the leading figures of the memorandum mentioned above. Celal Bayar became the chairman of the *Demokrat Party*.

#### ***The 1946 Election***

The Democratic Party had begun to expand its local establishment all around Anatolia within a short period of time. The expansion of the party occurred so rapidly because of the contribution of the people who lived in towns and villages. First of all, they had gathered and established party branches in their local areas; later connecting them to the head organizations in the cities on behalf of the DP. The rapid expansion of the DP caused anxiety amongst the Republicans over the upcoming municipal elections. Therefore the government passed a bill and rescheduled the 1946 election from September to May. The DP reacted to this bill, and decided not to participate in the elections (Karpat, 1996: 136-137). Besides the municipal elections, the government re-scheduled the general elections to an earlier time (from 1947 to 1946) as well. The Democrats fiercely criticized this decision because they were not ready organizationally for an early election. Unlike the municipal elections, they participated in the general elections despite being unready. The election was held on

the basis of an open ballot – secret counting. The DP won 62 seats. These incidents resulted in the significant opposing force of the Democrats in daily politics.

#### ***1.1.4.1. The Demokrat Party Era (1950-1960)***

The new Election Law, passed on 16 February 1950, was a landmark in Turkish political history. According to the new law, elections began to be based on the majority system and the secret ballot. In the following general election on May 14 1950, the DP won 408 seats in Parliament with 53 percent of the votes. On the other hand, the CHP had 69 deputies with 40 percent of the votes. Celal Bayar was elected the 3<sup>rd</sup> President of the Republic of Turkey on 20 May 1950. Contrary to his predecessors, Bayar refused to remain as the Party leader whilst holding the presidency, and he resigned from the Party leadership. To him “*the party leader cannot be the President*” (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976:66). Bayar assigned the new leader of the DP, Adnan Menderes, as Prime Minister. With the result of this election, the rule of the Republicans ended, and the single party period closed after 27 years.

From the beginning of the rule of the *Demokrat* Party, Turkish politics had continued with a high tension between ruling and the opposition parties. Kemal H. Karpat, a prominent Turkish Historian, summarized its period in power with these words:

*“The Democrats' rule began with promises of constitutional amendments and institutional innovations necessary to consolidate democracy. They promised to uphold all the reforms of Ataturk and to refrain from resuscitating any controversy over past events. However, they abandoned soon their promises and began to criticize the Republicans' policies since such criticism seemed to create, at the beginning at least, some sympathetic reaction among the public. The Democrats soon became concerned with their own power and attempted to consolidate it by depriving the Republicans of some privileges obtained during the latter's unopposed rule from 1923 to 1950 (Karpat, 1972:352).”*



In the first term of its rule, The DP government began to discharge high-ranking military officers including the Chief of the General Staff. Instead, the government assigned new military officers who had not had any close relations with the Republican People's Party. With the bill, which passed on August 8, the CHP's properties were confiscated and added to the treasury. These actions were intended to intimidate the opposition party (Karpas, 1972:353; Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976:87).

The DP had increased its votes from 48 percent to 57 percent in the following election (1954). The Democrats won 504 seats, the Republican won 31 seats, and the Nation's Party won 5 seats. Despite this landslide victory, the pressure on the opposition groups and the media had increased during the DP's second term. On one hand, a law passed right after the elections brought some restrictions on media; on the other hand, the new Election Law did not allow for re-electing the current deputies, who transferred to another party within the continuing term, for the upcoming elections (Ahmad, 1996:67). Ironically, with these implementations, the DP was becoming a party, which had an autocratic tendency, just as the CHP from which they separated for similar reasons.

In the 1957 election, in spite of losing 9 percent of the votes relative to the previous election, the DP won 424 seats, and continued its rule for another term. The Republicans won 178 seats with 41 percent of the votes. According to Karpas:

*“Although the Democrats won the elections largely because of the majority system, they had lost considerable popular support. Actually considerable support for the opposition came from those Democrats who opposed the growing dictatorial tendencies of their party leaders. These were the new middle-class groups who regarded the maintenance of a free and democratic system as the guarantee of their own power and safety (Karpas, 1972:356).”*

The government took new actions to control its opponents, including the media, the military, the bureaucracy and the Republicans. First, they had moved against state officials who voted in favor of the Republicans. Then they took some measures to limit what they considered to be harmful publications. Next, in order to determine whether the opposition party had undertaken disruptive actions before and after the election, the government passed a parliamentary resolution. Thus the distribution of advertisements and news would be taken under the government's control. Finally, the parliament's internal regulations brought limitation to the opposition's movement (Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976:173; Karpas, 1972:355). In parallel with the objections of the opposition, the government became more oppressive due to its having a strong position in government. Due to their being former CHP members, the leader cadre of the DP were aware of the power of the CHP. Thus the DP was acting aggressively in order to deal with the CHP.

#### *The Eve of the Military Takeover*

The *Vatan Cephesi* (Patriotic Front) was an organization established by the DP in order to impress non-committed voters. In time, the Democrats began to incite their supporters against the Republicans. The DP and the CHP pushed society to choose between them. The tension between the government and the opposition drastically worsened after the government ban, which did not allow the opposition to hold mass meetings. For instance, the government even used military forces to prevent İnönü's participation in a meeting. In 1959, the government's pressure resulted in the closure of newspapers and the arrest of journalists (Karpas, 1972:355).

At the Bursa Party Congress, İnönü pointed out in a speech that the government approached its end in January 1960. After this speech, the Democrats formed the Inquiry Committee with an extraordinary power to pursue the Republican's seditious actions. In this direction, the government aimed to investigate the opposition-military relations and the opposition-juridical organ's relations with this regulation. In a short

time, the reporting of news about daily politics was banned for a three 3-month time period. The government also passed a bill in order to strengthen the position of the Inquiry Committee (Karpas, 1972:356). According to the new law, the committee was able to arrest people who resisted the committee's actions.

İnönü protested about the committee and its actions in another speech: "...when conditions are complete, revolution becomes a legitimate right for the nation; for the citizen begins to think that no other institution or way exists to defend his rights... (Karpas, 1972: 356)." This speech was considered as an attack on both the unity of the parliament and the military by the government. On the other hand, Karpas believed that this speech was a warning. He stated, "He pointed out that Turkey had had to fight for a long time to transform the revolutionary Republican regime into a democratic system, and warned the Democrats that their attempts to establish a repressive regime would unavoidably lead to a revolution (Karpas, 1972: 356)."

After this speech, İnönü was banned from the Parliament's hearings for 12 days. In response to the ban, the opposition organized youth meetings in İstanbul and Ankara. In return to the youth meetings, the government declared a state of emergency. The imposition of the state of emergency did not stop the student movements whose increased protests caused the universities to close due to increasing protests (Ahmad, 1996:79; Karpas, 1972:357).

#### ***1.1.4.2. The 1960 Turkish Coup d'état***

The Land Forces Commander General Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to the Ministry of Defense on 3 May 1960. In the letter, Cemal Gursel demanded the resignation of the President, the establishment of a new cabinet and the abolishment of all anti-democratic laws. After this clear memorandum, on May 21, the Military Academy students organized a demonstration against the government (Eroğul, 1998:158).

On 26 May, a group of soldiers headed from Ankara to İstanbul in order to put into action the military takeover. İstanbul was divided into five regions among

soldiers. In order to control the communication networks, the Kadıköy Post Office, and then the Istanbul Radio station were taken under control. Without any resistance, İstanbul was taken over, and the military manifestation was declared in the early morning of May 27, 1960 by İstanbul Radio. At the same time in Ankara, the army forces moved to the *Çankaya Köşkü* (Mansion), the President's house, and took control of the Presidency. Consequently, the military takeover was announced nationwide in the early morning (Özdağ, 1997:197-201).

The control of the country passed to the *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (MBK, Committee of National Unity) right after the military takeover under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel. On 28 May, a group of professors began to prepare a declaration, which would give legitimacy to the coup d'état (Özdağ, 1997:247-251; Karpat, 1972:357). The other duties of the commission were to provide guidance to the MBK about the prospective policies. The group also worked on the new constitution's outline.

Karpat interprets the legitimization of the military intervention with these sentences below:

*“The professors' statement resembled the old fetva through which the Şeyhülislam had given religious sanction to government acts, including the change of power. It symbolized in a way the changes in philosophy and group alignment in Turkey.*

....

*The professors justified the revolution by emphasizing the destruction of the state order at the hands of an interest group, which is the new middle class. This view contrasted sharply with the military's assertion that the revolution did not aim at any social group. The revolution was actually a social upheaval of utmost importance. It represented the natural reaction of the traditional ruling groups around the state to the emergence of a diversified type of civilian order in which group interests dominated (Karpat, 1972:358)”.*

After the trial held on İmralı Island, the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were sentenced to death and hanged. The verdict, which was given for Celal Bayar, the President, was commuted from the death penalty to life imprisonment sentence due to his advance age.

### *Post – 1960 Military Intervention*

Political life returned to normality after the removal of the ban on political activities on 13 January 1961. After the closure of the DP, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) formed under the leadership of the Ragıp Gümüşpala within the next month, following the initiative of the former members of the DP on 11 February 1961. The Turkey Worker's Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP), which is accepted by trade unionists as being the first big socialist political party, was established soon after the AP (Sarıbay, 2001:57).

In the general election, which was held on October 15, there was no party with a sufficient majority to form the government alone. The CHP and the AP received about 36 percent and 34 percent of the votes respectively. Turkish political life welcomed a period of minority government for the first time in the republican era. The proportion of the votes that the AP received astonished the CHP and the military wings. The political parties were unwilling to form a minority government due to their different attitudes toward the military coup. However, they reached an agreement to form the government due to the military's continuing involvement in politics (Ahmad, 1996:210).

Süleyman Demirel, the 9<sup>th</sup> President of the Republic of Turkey, emerged in Turkish politics after the death of Gümüşpala. Demirel was elected the chairman of the AP in 1964. The first and the one of the most important of Demirel's achievements were to convince the military that the AP was not the successor to the DP. In this respect, he supported the de facto autonomy of the Turkish General Staff

(Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, GKB) by surrendering the idea of connecting the GKB under the Ministry of National Defense (Ahmad, 1996:231). In the following election (1965), the AP received the 52 percent of the votes, and came to power alone. The party remained in power until 1971.

#### ***1.1.4.3. The 1971 Turkish Coup d'état***

The Protests of 1968, participated in mostly by students and workers, had become influential in Turkey. A group of students in Ankara University began a boycott in early June 1968. In a short time, the boycotts spread to other universities in Ankara and İstanbul. Some students were killed in a student demonstration, which was held in front of the Turkish National Grand Assembly, on June 29 (Kayalı, 2000:179). Moreover, the workers' protests increased the tension nationwide.

Following the kidnapping of four American soldiers in Ankara by the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO) on 4 March 1971, the internal tension reached its peak. The activists demanded the release of the revolutionaries arrested in the demonstrations as the ransom. The security forces surrounded the ODTÜ (Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi - The Middle East Technical University), which was the organization base, in order to arrest Deniz Gezmiş, the leader of the THKO. The following day five people were killed and 26 were injured in a clash between students and the security forces (Birand, DüNDAR and Çaplı, 1997:213). Yet Deniz Gezmiş could not be found in the university. The university was closed indefinitely, and approximately 200 students taken into custody.

The release of four American soldiers was not enough to defuse the tension. The Chief of the General Staff, Memduh Tağmaç, summoned the Commanding Officers of the Army to Ankara in order to evaluate the recent incidents. The call of Tağmaç caused concerns among politicians regarding the possibility of a new military takeover. Therefore, Ankara became nervous on the eve of the military meeting. Unlike the commanders who were in favor of the coup, the Chief of the General Staff

Tağmaç thought that the coup was the last possibility. At the end of the meeting, the commanders decided to demand the resignation of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel with a *Muhtıra* (Memorandum) instead of the military take over on 12 March 1971 (Birand, DüNDAR and Çaplı, 1997:214-215). According to the Memorandum, the responsibility for the bad economic conditions and political turmoil were addressed to the government, and a new strong government was demanded. In addition, it was stated that due to the presence of probable continuing conflict, the military would take over the government. The Memorandum was also read in parliament. Süleyman Demirel declared the resignation of his government. The government of Nihat Erim, the interim regime government, ruled until regular elections, held on October 14, 1973.

In the aftermath of the 12 March Memorandum, Turkish Politics welcomed new political figures. After the fifth CHP congress, Bülent Ecevit became the new leader of the Party. This change increased the Republican vote in the 1973 election, but it was not enough to form a government alone. Instead of the AP, Ecevit formed a government with Necmettin Erbakan's *Milli Selamet Partisi* (the National Salvation Party – MSP) on 26 January 1974. The minority government ended on October 18 of the same year due to ideological differences. Another minority government, which was known as the first National Front Government, was formed under Demirel's leadership, joining with Erbakan's MSP and the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (the Nationalist Movement Party – MHP), Alparslan Türkeş a former colonel who was previously a member of the MBK. The coalition government ended on 5 June 1977 (Ahmad, 1996:311-313, 322).

### *Toward September 12*

The renewal of the election could not stop the internal disturbance. The collisions between the left and the right wings increased, and the formation of new governments did nothing but increase the tensions that already existed. One of the biggest

incidents, the ‘May Day Massacre’, occurred on May Day 1977. The meeting, which was held in Taksim Square, had started routinely under high security measures. Towards the end, the sound of gunfire, which caused a panic in the square, was heard. The turmoil resulted in 36 deaths, but the firearms caused only two. The rest were caused by congestion (Ahmad, 1981:19).

The Second National Front Government ended in 1978, and Ecevit formed the new government. In early 1978, the political terrorism increased in the country, despite Ecevit’s pledges to decrease the collision between the sides. According to Ecevit, the domestic violence was a result of the faults of previous coalition governments. Ahmad stated Ecevit’s opinion about the domestic violence in a BBC interview:

*“Under his government, he maintained, the rightists were getting frustrated because they were losing control of the state, and were therefore putting up their last resistance. This was, of course, a grave under-estimation of the Turkish right. Asked about the violence of the left, Ecevit agreed that there were violent elements among the gauchiste groups but they were reacting to the violence of the right rather than initiating it. He neither apologized for their violence nor approved of it, and under his administration, he said they were being arrested in equal numbers (cited from BBC in Ahmad, 1981:19).”*

By the middle of the year, even the security forces were unable to stop the domestic violence because the police department divided into two wings: the left and the right. On one hand, the political instability worsened the economic conditions; on the other hand, the polarization of the politicians became the root cause of social segregation. The ideological clashes had turned into the sectarian violence of the struggle between the Sunni and the Alevi<sup>9</sup> communities. Despite the increasing domestic violence, Ecevit did not want to declare a state of emergency. He believed that the terrorist attacks would have ended without sacrificing the rule of law (Ahmad, 1996:352-353).

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<sup>9</sup> Alevi’s are the representative of Anatolian version of Shia. For more info see Shankland, 2003.



The Turkish Military Forces had begun to warn the government at the end of the first half of 1978. In April 1978, the *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* (National Security Council – MGK) demanded that the government take new legal measures, and apply them immediately in order to stop the domestic violence (MGKGS, 63). The Ecevit government declared martial law for 13 cities on 25 December 1978 due to the increasing violence and unidentified murders. The government took the decision to call early elections on 14 October 1979. After the election, Demirel formed the new minority government. His government ruled until the 12 September Military Intervention.

#### ***1.1.4.4. 12 September Military Intervention***

The Military took over the administration of the country on September 12, 1980 on the behalf of the MGK (see, Ahmad, 1981; Heper, 1988). The MGK consisted of the Chief of General Staff, the Commanding Officers of the Army, and the General Command of Gendarmerie. After the takeover, the parliament and the government were dissolved. Countrywide martial law was declared, and to leave the country was prohibited. All people were subjected to a curfew order after 5 pm until the second directive. According to the declaration, the military takeover was made within the chain of command for the sake of re-establishing democracy, which could not control itself, and the authority of the state. It was aimed to end the anarchy and the terror situation around the country.

Apart from the political turmoil and instability, the Islamic revival was also considered one of the key reasons for the military takeover (Dodd, 1992:23; Ahmad, 1981:10). On 6 September 1980, Necmettin Erbakan and his followers organized a religious demonstration in Konya, one of the most conservative cities in Turkey. This was later cited as a motivating factor in the military intervention by its leaders. According to the MGK, when all adjustments were done, the administration would be transferred to the civilian authorities (MGKGS, 205).

The constituent assembly began to prepare the new constitution. After the referendum the 1982 Constitution was ratified on 9 November 1982 and came into effect on November 9, 1982. On the same day, Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, was elected president. The new constitution had a transitional period including the election of the new president, with the referendum held according to the Provisional Article 1 (Gözler, 2013). The MGK was re-formed as the Presidential Council for a six-year time period (Provisional Article 2). The existing politicians, including political party leaders and senior politicians, were banned from politics for a five-year time period (provisional article 4). This article was repealed by the referendum, which was held on May 17, 1987. Until the referendum, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan remained banned from political life.

#### *De-politicization*

One of the key features of the 1982 Constitution is that it adopted the less participatory form of democracy model, unlike the 1961 constitution (Dodd, 1992:10; Ahmad, 1985: 213-214). The constitution restricted the activities of political parties, non-governmental organizations and workers' unions (Gözler, 2013). Political parties were not allowed to establish representative offices out of the country. In addition to this, the laws did not allow the political parties to establish any kind of association to support their political agenda in the country. Moreover, any kind of political strikes, political lockouts, general strikes and general lockouts were included amongst other prominent statutory prohibitions. The 1982 Constitution also prohibited the non-governmental organizations such as associations & foundations, and worker's unions and syndicates from any political actions. In short, only political parties and elected politicians were allowed to make politics in the country. It's obvious with the new constitution that the society was intended to keep away from politics in order to prevent any bloody incidents such as those which occurred in the late 1970's.

#### ***1.1.4.5. Post -12 September Political Parties***

After the new constitution and the president were installed, the time came to design the political arena. The military regime intended to build a political structure different to that of the pre-coup period. The makers of the coup aimed to establish a political life containing limited political actors or political parties. In this respect, the MGK took the formation of new political parties under control, and rejected the majority of the requests for the proposal of political parties. Briefly, the MGK allowed a ‘limited multi-party’ political system (Sarıbay, 2001:64-65). Thus, the MGK banned the former political ideologies and designed Turkish politics according to their interpretations.

The *Milliyetçi Demokarasi Parti* (MDP – The Nationalist Democracy Party) was the first political party to be established after the 1980 military intervention. A retired General Turgut Sunalp, who was appointed by the MGK, established the MDP on 16 May 1983 (Çavdar, 2000:288). The MDP was accepted as the ‘state party’ since its foundation because the party program clearly referred to the concept of 12 September, the philosophy behind the military intervention. Moreover, President Kenan Evren addressed the MDP in his public speeches to encourage the people in favor of the party (Sarıbay, 2001:68-69).

In order to fill the gap of a leftist party, the MGK allowed the establishment of the *Halkçı Parti* (HP – The Populist Party) on 21 July 1983. Necdet Calp, the principal clerk of former Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, established the HP. As with the CHP, the HP also adopted the ‘six principals’ in the party program (Çavdar, 2000:289).

On 20 May 1983 Turgut Özal, the vice-Prime Minister of the interim government established the *Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP – The Motherland Party). The ANAP described itself as a conservative nationalist political party. Although the party program contained political conservatism, the ANAP was formed on the basis of

liberal economic policies (Çavdar, 2000:289). Politically, the ANAP adopted a moderate and unifying political discourse. At the same time, the founder of the party generated a combined political notion, which consisted of liberal, Islamist, democrat and nationalist ideas in order to fill the political gap left behind the closed political parties. Especially, the idea that the state should serve to its people increased the party's public image and received broad acceptance from society (Sarıbay, 2001:69-70).

On the other hand, the *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party – DYP), the *Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi* (Social Democracy Party – SODEP) and the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party – RP) were the other new established parties after the military takeover. Yet due to their organizational difficulties right before the election, they could not participate in the election. The DYP, SODEP and RP were known to have close ties with the banned political parties, the AP, CHP and MSP respectively.

The general election was held with the participation of the three political parties on 6 November 1983 after the 12 September military intervention, and Turkish political life began to return to normality. Contrary to the expectations of the MGK, the ANAP received 45.1 percent of the vote and won 211 seats. The MDP and the HP received 23.3 percent of the votes, with 71 seats and 30.5 percent of the votes and 117 seats respectively (TÜİK, 2014b).

The MGK's attitudes before the election played an important role in the conclusion of the elections. As noted earlier, the President clearly mentioned the MDP various times in his speeches. The Military's efforts to influence public perception during the pre-election period didn't work as intended. This case is only one of the underlying causes of the success of the ANAP. Another reason, which highlighted the ANAP's success, was the military origin of the HP's founders. The ANAP's civil structure influenced people more than its rivals.

Turgut Özal, the key figure of the decisions of the 24<sup>th</sup> January<sup>10</sup> and the leader of the ANAP, became the new Prime Minister after the military intervention. Due to the military's continuing influence on politics, Özal mostly dealt with the economic issues during the first term of his prime ministry. As Ziya Öniş noted (2004:117), his distinguished ability in managing the interim government period let him achieve an efficient transition and become a significant political figure. Öniş defines the features of the ANAP as: “*The political party that he helped to create was based on a hybrid ideology combining elements of liberalism, conservatism with strong Islamist connotations, nationalism and welfarism* (Öniş, 2004:117).” He was able to gain not only the support of the center but also the support of the periphery with his hybrid ideology.

#### ***1.1.4.6. The Minority Governments Period (1991-2002)***

Turgut Özal's political success carried him to the presidency. Özal was elected the 7<sup>th</sup> president of the Republic of Turkey after the incumbent president Kenan Evren. The ANAP, who won the previous two general elections, became the second party after Demirel's DYP in the 1991 elections. Although the DYP won the majority of the seats, it did not have enough to form the government alone. Besides the DYP and ANAP, Ecevit's *Demokratik Sol Parti* (Democratic Leftist Party – DSP), Erbakan's RP, and Erdal İnönü's SHP<sup>11</sup> (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti – Social Democratic Populist Party) won seats in the parliament. Hence, the minority government period began once again in Turkish politics after a decade. Süleyman Demirel became Prime Minister of the DYP – SHP minority government. Demirel continued his prime ministry until Özal's sudden death in 1993.

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10 The 24th January Decisions was a liberal economic stabilization program. For more info see, Öniş, 2004.

11 SHP was formed after the merger of the HP and SODEP (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi – Social Democratic Party) in 1985, and Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü, became the leader of the new party.

The rise of Erbakan's Islamist party, the RP, was one of the significant incidents, which happened during the minority government period. In the 1995 general election, the RP (21.4%) became the first party ahead of the ANAP (19.6%). With Tansu Çiller, who was elected the chairperson of the DYP after the post was vacated by Demirel's presidency, the DYP (19.2%) could not secure its leading position according to the 1991 election results.

Erbakan took the task of forming a government from the President, Süleyman Demirel. Having failed to form a government, Erbakan returned the task to the President. Mesut Yılmaz, the chairman of the ANAP, agreed with Çiller and formed the first ANAYOL minority government with the DSP's external support on 6 March 1996. Shortly after the ANAYOL government collapsed on June 6 due to political disagreement. Prime Minister Yılmaz submitted his resignation before the vote of confidence was taken against his government.

In the aftermath of the ANAYOL government, the tension of Turkish politics had been increased gradually. The pro-Islamic RP's leader took the task of forming the government once again from the President. Erbakan reached agreement with Tansu Çiller to form the RP – DYP (REFAH-YOL) minority government on June 28 1996. For the first time in Turkish Political history, a political party, which had Islamist discourses, came to power.

The military and the Turkish economy's secularist actors such as TUSİAD (Turkish Industry & Business Association) were against the formation of the new government. Even the negotiations to form a government with the RP had divided Turkish society into two parts, along Islamist and secularist lines (Yavuz, 1997:63). In addition to this, Erbakan's Islamic discourses and foreign visits to Islamist countries such as Libya, Iran, and Malaysia generated serious concerns in the secular wings including the military. These incidents had triggered the overthrowing the government due to civil and military pressures.

The Military gave a memorandum to the government on 28 February 1997, Due to the succeeding developments, Erbakan resigned on 18 June 1997. Soon after, the

Constitutional Court decided to shut down the RP on 16 January 1998 due to its violating the secular structure of the country, which is considered in the Constitution. Yet the closure trial was in progress, the *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party, FP) was established by İsmail Alptekin, who was known in to be line with the *Milli Görüş* Movement (MGM), on 17 December 1997. The deputies of the RP passed to the FP.

In the 1999 the Turkish citizens went to the polls for another early general election (TUIK, 2014b). According to the official results, the ANAP and the DYP stayed out of parliament due to the 10 percent election threshold. The DSP became the first party, receiving 22.19 percent of the votes. More surprisingly, the MHP, who were out of parliament in the previous term, won second place with 17.98 percent of the votes. The FP received 15.41 percent of the votes and took its place as the third party in Parliament.

The DSP's Bülent Ecevit formed the new minority government with the partnership of the MHP. During this period, Turkey endured a deep economic crisis that resulted in the bankruptcy of some banks due to mass corruption. Notably in 2001, during a MGK meeting, the discussion between the Prime Minister Ecevit and the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer caused a massive economic crisis.

The economic crises also re-shaped the political life of the country. In parallel with the economic developments, the Constitutional Court closed the FP on 22 June 2011. The separation between the 'traditionalist' and the 'reformist' wings of the MGM became concrete after the closure of the FP. While the traditionalist wing established the *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party – SP) on 20 July 2001 under the leadership of Recai Kutan; the reformist wing established the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AK Party) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the İstanbul Mayor banned from power after the 28 February incident.

The rising bad economic situation forced the Ecevit government to call early elections. The early parliamentary election was held on 3 November 2012. Only two political parties could pass the 10 percent threshold and join the parliament: The AK

Party and the CHP. The AK Party won 34.3 percent of the votes and secured 363 seats. On the other hand, the CHP took 178 seats, receiving 19.4 percent of the votes. The rest of the political parties could not manage to pass the threshold and stayed out of active politics. The AK Party ascended to power in the aftermath of the 2002 early elections<sup>12</sup>. Abdullah Gül formed the government, and became the prime minister.

## **1.2. Social, Political and Economical Transformation and The Elements of the Transitions**

In this section I analyze the structural factors; the political, social and economic transformation. Undoubtedly, the transformations of societies occur under certain demands resulting from the needs of the people or in line with the desires / purposes of the ruling elites. In this sense, I aim to analyze the multi-dimensional transformation of Turkey by taking into consideration historical factors, state and social actors.

### ***1.2.1. Structural Factors: Socio-economic Transformation***

Before mentioning the socio-economic changes after the Republican era, it is necessary to refer to the late Ottoman social structure to comprehend the changes properly. The Ottoman social structure consisted of two units: the rulers and the ruled (Göçek, 1996:20). The Sultan was at the top of the pyramid of the rulers, and his delegations served under his authority. The ruled - the subjects - were composed of artisans, merchants, peasants, nomads, religious minorities and foreign residents. This structure differed from other social stratification like cast system. Apart from the Sultan, it was not a hereditary-based system and the social structure allowed vertical transition between classes.

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<sup>12</sup>I will analyze the AK Party and struggle between the reformist and traditionalist in the fourth chapter. Thus, in order not to be repetitive I briefly mention the issue.



The Ottoman Empire was a multinational state, and the subjects were governed according to the Millet System. The word millet (nation), in fact, means a religious affiliation, and the word had its contemporary meaning – nation - in the last century (Ortaylı, 1995:86). An individual was subject to live the spiritual, administrative (also legal) and financial authority of the community (millet) in which he/she was born. The transition from one community to another was only possible in case of the religious conversion, which was rare and unwelcome (Ortaylı, 1995:86).

Millets weren't regarded as minorities, as in the contemporary world. Individuals living in their millet could continue to live their moral values and preserve their language, culture and traditions. Millets didn't have any struggles to prove their identities against majorities. They didn't have any concerns about being assimilated either. The relations among millets were limited; therefore, the conflicts between them were also limited (Ortaylı, 1995:86-87). As a result of the Millet System, the Ottoman Empire was able to rule many nations within a very large area.

According to Max Weber's classification, the Ottoman Empire was a traditional society that had a political system under patrimonialism (sultanism) (Weber, 1978:215-216). For the first time since the French Revolution, different ideas such as nationalism began to affect the Ottoman society (Lewis, 1968:53). Despite the millet system nationalism created separatist ideas among millets. In order to eliminate the separatist nationalist ideas, the Ottomans became a constitutional monarchy; thus the Sultan began to share absolute power with the parliament.

Following the long-lasting wars and changing boundaries, the socio-economic structure of the Ottoman Empire changed drastically. Especially during World War I, the Ottomans fought on many fronts against the Entente Powers. As a result of the WWI, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and the Ottomans were stuck in Anatolia. Moreover, struggles given against the occupying states at the time of Independence (Kurtuluş) War had exhausted the country.

In this respect, the newborn Turkish Republic was so different from the Ottoman Empire, socially, economically and, most importantly, politically. In this

section, I mostly state the socio-economic changes under three intervals: a) 1923-1950, b) 1950-1980 and c) 1980 to the present. In doing so, I mention political changes in the context of the immediate struggle. It is evident that the political structure was radically transformed from a monarchy to a republican regime following the Turkish Independence War.

#### ***1.2.1.1. 1923-1950***

The demographic structure of Anatolia, the main land of the Republic of Turkey, became a more homogeneous structure in religious perspective after the collapse of the Empire. The Muslim society, which lived in the lost territories, was moving to the remaining lands. In the aftermath of the 1878 Ottoman-Russia war and 1912-13 Balkan wars, the Ottoman population increasingly moved to the main lands (Kayam, 1993). Another migration wave occurred in the republican era in a different way: the exchange of populations. According to the Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923; *“Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged...”* (Article 3 Kayam, 1993).

What was the important aspect of the exchange of population? It was one of the most significant historical attempts on the road to the nation-state. Turkey not only aimed to get rid of an annoying issue (minorities), which had been used to intervene in its domestic politics by western countries, but also prepared the grounds to open the way to a nation-state with Muslim subjects (Kayam, 1993; Mardin, 1990:40). From the CHP's point of view, the more homogeneous society is in religious terms the easier its transition to a nation-state will be.

Şerif Mardin, a respected Turkish sociologist and political scientist, describes the center-periphery disconnection as being the main problem of Ottoman social and political life (1990: 32). The center was associated with the central government and

the ruling elites; the periphery consisted of the subjects and their religious and social institutions. The Empire dealt with such a diverse society by allowing them to live in a more decentralized environment (Mardin, 1990:33). Although the Ottoman Empire was different from a feudal state in terms of having a centrally-managed army, it didn't allow Ottoman society to merge with the center. The continuing presence and power of the pre-empire communities caused this disunity (Mardin, 1990: 33).

The strife between the center and the periphery was seen during the independence war. It came up as the center-periphery duality in the Grand National Assembly (Mardin, 1990: 48). This struggle had shifted its axis when the Kemalists became dominant and formed the new republic. Mardin points out the continuing presence of these groups in the early republican era (1990: 42). The existence of the groups caused a fear of division over "*the architect of Kemalism*" in Anatolia along the lines of their area of influence. Religious community leaders controlled the remaining groups in Anatolia regarding religion; therefore, the Kemalists opposed the secondary group<sup>13</sup> who carried out their religious activities (Mardin, 1990:49). Similar to Mardin's classification, Karpas mentions two different powers coalition groups (1964:51-52): The first, the group (modern) who controlled the government at national level consisted of "*military men, intellectuals, and professionals closely associated with the government*". The second group consisted of opinion (religious) leaders, landlords and former government officials at the local level.

The social change in Turkey began to shape under the shadow of this contention. While the center and periphery was maintaining its presence, the center had undergone an alteration, which was completely different to that inherited from its successor. The center had evolved at an important point: to be free from religious values. Therefore, the republic had been gradually built on secular values. The first step toward to a secular world was the abolition of the Caliphate (March 3, 1924). This move with the abolition of the Sultanate was one of the biggest blows to the Ottoman state legacy.

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13 Mardin defines the periphery groups as the secondary group of the Turkish society (1990:48).

The center and periphery theory was used first by Edward Shils (1975). He stated that the center enhances its impact over the periphery with the existence of a unified economic structure and an education system, which reaches all segments of a society. With the help of such elements, the center may increase its domain. The center also receives power from moral values and religious / secular beliefs. It also constitutes the origin of those beliefs and values.

In this respect, when we look at Atatürk's revolutions, it will be more meaningful to perceive the socio-economic changes in the early republican era. As I stated before, their characteristics differ to those of the Ottoman's modernization movements. In order to modify the center and remove the traces of the past, Atatürk took radical measures while he was implementing the reforms (Öğün, 2007). He did not prefer to repair the failing institutions / systems of the past. Instead, he built the republic in favor of westernization and wanted to create its own center.

One of the most important steps taken for the modernization of Turkey had been the change in the education system. Like all societies, which experience radical social changes and transformation, Turkey was in the process of establishing a national government and wanted to create a desired community. It therefore gave a special importance to education (Eskicumalı, 2003: 22-23). The law on Unification (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) of National Education was passed (March 24, 1924) and Ottoman-style education concept was abolished. Dervish Lodges (tekke and zaviye) run by religious institutions and madrasas (university) were closed and the educational system was unified under the Ministry of National Education. This closure also meant the secularization of education because all of the closed educational institutions had a mainly religious education curriculum.

Another move to secularize education was the adoption of the new alphabet. The Ottoman Alphabet, which consisted of the letters adapted from the Persian and Arabic alphabets, was replaced with the Latin alphabet (1928). These consecutively made reforms were aimed to halt the spread of the Ottoman mindset towards building a modern nation (Eskicumalı, 2003: 23). Besides these reforms, the Turkish

Historical Society (TTK) and Turkish Language Association (TDK) were established in 1931 and 1932 respectively.

Some of the purposes of the TTK were to examine the richness of Turkish culture and prove the contribution of Turks to world civilization. Moreover, new history books prepared to give Turkishness and Turkish historical consciousness to new generations of the republic. The remaining space (historical) after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was compensated for by extending Turkish history back to ancient times (Central Asia). The duties of the TDK, additionally, were to reveal the essence of the beauty of Turkish and to protect it against the deformation of foreign languages (Eskicumalı, 2003:24-25).

Other major improvements were associated with social life in the process of rebuilding the nation. In contrast with the Ottoman era, one of the most important reforms that the republic brought into social life was the role assigned to women. In the light of Atatürk's reforms, the status of women in social life had gradually been improved as a result of the newly-given rights. The right to elect and to be elected was given to women in 1934 for the first time in Turkish history.

The westernization efforts were not limited to the above-mentioned reforms. After an enacted law known as the Hat Law of 1925, all male citizens were forced to wear western style hats instead of the traditional fez. According to Ahmad's assessment, these enacted laws were 'iconoclastic' and "the slogan of radical Kemalists during these years was 'Let's smash the Idols'" (Ahmad, 1992:79). The subsequent developments supported this opinion. The following year, the Islamic calendar, a lunar calendar, which began with the date of migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, was abandoned and the Gregorian calendar was adopted. This transition was made not only to endorse the secularization but also integrate with the modern world. For the similar purpose, the weekend was changed to Saturday and Sunday.

The formation of the new republic was also supported by legal reforms (Lewis, 1968; Ahmad, 1992). The multiple legal systems based on the Millet System in the

Ottoman Era were exposed. The social structure of the early republican era was not a multi-religious one as before. In this respect the sharia courts were abolished in 1924. Instead of the Ottoman civil code, the Mejlle (Mecelle), the Swiss Civil Code, was adopted. The gap of the penal system was filled with Italian Penal Code. The necessity of a trade law was fulfilled with the Commercial Code, which was based mostly upon German and Italian codes.

As mentioned before, during the single-party era, there were two attempts to enact a transition to the multi-party system, in 1925 (TCF) and 1930 (SCF). The attempts, however, caused tremendous excitement among the public, the government did not welcome it stopped the government. In addition to the discomfort developments, two important events, the Sheikh Said Rebellion (Şeyh Said İsyanı) of 1925 (Olson, 2000; Brockett, 1998) and the Menemen Incident (Menemen Olayı) of 1930 were the other reasons for stopping the transitions. Although the Sheikh Said Rebellion was an ethnically-based rebellion (Kurdish), it was considered like the *Menemen* Incident to be a reactionary (Islamist) incident. Mardin explained that the Islamist periphery was identified with betraying of the secular purpose of the republic and accepted as a threat (Mardin, 1990:50). In short, it was the reflection of the continuing power struggle between the center and periphery in the early republican era.

The political and economic crises caused changes in the CHP's program and bylaws in 1931. The six principles, which were known as the principles of Kemalism, (also called The Six Arrows) were adopted after the third Grand General Assembly.

The state-party integration followed the six principals of Kemalism. Until the multi-party era, including İnönü's Presidency, the top to bottom modernization or management of the single party rule continued. The society was exposed to a Turkification policy, which will be analyzed in another chapter.

#### ***1.2.1.2. 1950-1980***

Karpat believed that the modernization and change in modern Turkey couldn't be accurately evaluated without understanding the family system, which is the “*nuclear unit of social organization*” (Karpat, 1964: 55). To him, the extended family system secures its position in the center of socio-economic and political life at the local level. He continues:

*“Leading families in rural areas and small towns, even those residing in provincial capitals, still maintain almost absolute control over the economic, social, and political life of their respective communities. The totality of these families, ranging from a few in small places to several hundred in larger towns, cannot be described as a social class or a feudal group. They do not conform fully to Western criteria in this regard. They are special interest groups, rooted culturally in Islamic traditions of social organization and leadership, adapting themselves to new economic and political conditions in order to maintain their supremacy (Karpat, 1964:56).”*

Being aware of the reality that Karpat mentioned, the DP focused on the local powers. The sudden rise of the DP in the local politics, and indeed, much more was related to the leading families and rich landowners (Dodd; 1992:20; Karpat, 1964; Mardin, 1990). The DP's policies, which paved the way for integration between towns and villages, had turned into a great support for the party. Unlike the CHP, the DP used the symbolic and cultural values in daily politics, and the party members frequently showed up in mosques and at religious ceremonies. The fact that the CHP took secularism into account and criticized what the DP had done integrated the DP with the periphery (Mardin, 1990:57-58). Therefore, as soon as Turkey welcomed the multi-party system, the power began to shift toward the periphery in favor of the DP.

Huntington defines this power transition as “*Green Uprising*” (Huntington, 1973:72-92). In a political system, which has a competitive multi-party structure, the urban opposition groups create their own way to create collaboration with the people living in rural areas to overcome their rivals, the ruling elites. Such an interaction between the “urban elites” and rural communities is a necessity for a stable politics in

modernizing societies. To him, “As politics becomes more and more urban, it becomes less and less stable (Huntington, 1973: 74). What happened in Turkey was one of the four possible forms of the ‘Green Uprising’.

The alteration began when the Democratic Party widened the diversification of the political elite in the parliament. According to the professions, the civilian government officials had the majority in parliament with 20-25 percent of the seats. Moreover, the number of military officials in parliament declined significantly in contrast to the single party era. After 1950, the dominance of the above-mentioned groups lost their position in parliament. For instance, while military officials had a ratio in the range of 15 to 20 percent before 1950, they could only reach a total of 16 percent of the seats in the two consecutive terms (1961 and 1965). The diversification of the birthplaces of the members of parliament was also another indicator of the alteration (Tachau and Good, 1973:554-555). After the multi-party period, the dominance of civilian government officials and the military gradually decreased.

In the aftermath of the 1960 military coup, especially with the rising economy, two new social groups emerged in Turkish politics due to the continuing social transformation. Firstly, the amount of available work increased in correspondence with the rising economy. As a result of this, the Confederation of Workers’ Unions of Turkey (Türk-İş) and the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DİSK) were established in 1967. Another significant structure, which arose owing to rapid industrialization, was the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSİAD). While the worker unions had a ‘*class-conscious*’ characteristic, TÜSİAD was characterized as a ‘*self-conscious industrial bourgeoisie*’ (Ahmad, 1992:134).

### *Demographic Transition and Urbanization*

Here I present the demographic transition of the country that stemmed from the rising industrialization and urbanization. Like other industrialized countries, the rising industrialization changed the demographic structure of the country, and as a natural



result of this, the leading political figures (parties) has varied since the multiparty era in Turkish politics. Although the newly migrated population could not achieve urbanization fully they have begun to determine the current politics. Ali Bulaç, a respected Turkish journalist and sociologist, explains the success of the AP, RP and the AK Party in the context of “the new urban class” (2010:113). The effects of the new migrated population on the politics began to be felt yet in the 1950s. Therefore, demographic transition and urbanization are one of the significant determinants that demonstrate the social, economic and political transformation of Turkey.

The economic growth was accompanied by different demographic transition after 1955. The 1955-1985 time-period is defined as the second phase of the demographic transition for Turkey (DİE, 1995:5). Although the birth rate was decreasing in this period due to social changes, the population growth continued in connection with the decreasing death rate. The population climbed from 24 million to 51 million in this period.

Urbanization was one of the other significant fast-growing realities that shaped society socially and politically in the industrializing Turkey. The lifestyle of the people and their choices began to alter in accordance with the economic changes. The birth rate and urbanization had inverse proportional correlation; therefore people who had migrated to cities tended to remain in small families. The urbanization caused the emergence of a new consumer society, which had different consumption habits from before (Ahmad, 1992: 135).

#### ***1.2.1.3. 1980 to The Present***

The society began to transform under the pressure of the coup makers, and the new political actor, Özal. While military consolidated its position by institutionalizing, at the same time they tried to maintain the de-politicization of society. Özal, on the other hand, introduced his liberal political and economic ideas to society. As Laçiner states, “...Özal’s policies, the periphery, villagers, workers and traditional religious groups entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their autonomy against the

*core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created industry (2009:160-161)''.*

As noted earlier, the policies of Özal “*based on a hybrid ideology combining elements of liberalism, conservatism with strong Islamist connotations, nationalism and welfarism (Öniş, 2004)*” maintained the mobilizing of the society in parallel with the global world. Consequently, after Özal’s pro-global policies Turkish society became an open society, and the periphery had the opportunity to participate in the Turkish economic; thus they began to represent themselves in every aspect of the social and political life.

### ***1.2.2. Economic Transformation***

The economic development of the society began to re-shape both the social and political structure of the country. As in the information I will mention below, in the aftermath of the destructive wars that had been fought since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the social and economic structure of the country had been devastated. During the single party era, economic life continued under the state guardianship, *etatism*, due to the long-lasting war conditions. From the very early years of the Republican era, industrialization became the main goal of the Turkish economy. In this section, I aim to analyze this transition in order to demonstrate its connections to the socio-politic changes of the country.

#### ***1.2.2.1. Before 1950***

When we look at the economic life of the country in the early republican era, it was hard to talk about the existence of any stable structure. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, it was hard to mention the existence of Turkish entrepreneurs in the economic life of the Empire (Mardin, 1990:94). The Republic of Turkey inherited an inadequate economic structure from the Ottoman Empire. The reasons for this cannot only be explained by long-lasting wars. The changing demographic structure

of the country was also one of the important parameters, which affected the economy negatively because the minorities - especially Greeks and Armenians - had dominated economic life.

According to a study (Toprak, 2002:599), in 1912, while 15 percent of the 18000 trade workplaces belonged to Turkish people, the Greeks and Armenians owned 49 percent and 23 percent of the trade workplaces respectively. In the aftermath of the population exchange, the majority of the population who steered the economy fled the country. In foreign trade, 4 percent of foreign enterprises, 3 percent of the transporting companies, 15 percent of the wholesales stores and 25 percent of the retail stores belonged to Muslim populations in 1922, according to other data. Moreover, Turks ran 12 percent of the manufacturing industry and 14 percent of the self-employed businesses in the early 1920's.

Due to the harsh economic conditions that existed in the country, the İzmir Economic Congress (Okyar, 1979; Finefrock, 1981; Toprak, 2002) had been held between 17 February and 4 March 1923 even before the declaration of the Republic of Turkey. Various people from different occupational groups, such as merchants, businessmen, farmers, workers, and bank employers were invited to congress in order to determine the economic policy of the new republic. Besides this, one of the other and most important aims of the congress was to find out the ways to ensure rapid economic development.

In the early years of the single party period, in the context of the decisions taken at the İzmir Economic Congress and to stir up the economy, the government followed a laissez-faire economic policy (Finefrock, 1981:375). *İş Bankası* (İş Bank) was founded in 1924 to meet the financial needs of the Turkish entrepreneurs. The government decreased customs taxes to provoke foreign trade. On the other hand, the taxes for importing goods were increased to create a secure environment for entrepreneurs in the domestic market. Having recently been founded, the Republic of Turkey had to cope with various problems such as infrastructure and the modernization of the country (Toprak, 2002:604). Due to *“the lack of preparation*

*and thinking in economic affairs*” these policies could only be followed until the Great Depression in 1929 (Okyar, 1979:327). During the 1923-1930 period, it was mainly seen that the “agricultural periphery” continuously developed apart from the industrial sector (Birttek, 1985:408).

After the World Great Economic Depression, the government was constrained to intervene in the economy due to insufficient economic growth and the failures of the entrepreneurs. As a result of the Great Depression’s destructive effects on Turkish foreign trade, the government created a monopoly on agricultural goods such as cotton, tobacco and cereals, which were predominantly important for both the Turkish economy and producers (Okyar, 1979: 327). The government adopted *etatism* (Birttek, 1985; Okyar, 1965) or statism (*devletçilik*), which called “*for artificial stimulation of the economy through government intervention*” (Finefrock, 1981:375). The main aim of *etatism* was to stimulate the economy in the existence of free enterprise, and then left the related fields to public sector when the market was ready (Okyar, 1965:101). The ideological purposes of *etatism* will be examined later in the dissertation.

The government pursued more structured policies with *etatism*, unlike the previous decade, which was called the “unplanned period”. Within this scope, the first five-year development plan was put into effect in order to realize rapid industrialization (1933). According to the plan (Birttek, 1985:413), the industrialization was based on the raw materials grown in the country. The industrial establishment, which was envisaged, to be built was mainly paper, textile, chemical industries and mine. Thus the *Sümerbank* (for textile, paper, etc), the *Etibank* (for mining), and the state-owned enterprises (KİT- Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri), were founded under an *ad hoc* law in 1933 and 1934 respectively. The intended industries were built in the underdeveloped areas in order to improve the economic conditions of the venues. The first attempts at industrialization did not impose an excessive burden on the state budget because they were covered by the state monopoly revenue, which was transferred to industry as investments (Birttek, 1985:414).

The government prepared the second-five year development plan in 1936 because of the fact that the first plan's objectives were accomplished before the estimated time. The main purpose of the second-five year development plan was to focus on the underground sources - specifically coal, iron and oil - to create sources for industrial activities (see Özyurt, 2011). The plan was adopted in 1938, but the outbreak of the Second World War and the continuing vigilance against the war put back the implementation of the plan. The probable war situation and long-term recruiting affected the economy negatively. The state sector, however, came to a deadlock by the late 40's, because of the massive bureaucratic control. As a result, the *etatist* idea deviated from its practical benefits (Birtek, 1985:415-416).

#### **1.2.2.2. 1950-1980**

The economic difficulties not only caused the demise of *etatism* but also resulted in the end of the single-party era. Although *etatism* did not result in the intended outcomes completely, its substructures allowed rapid economic development during the multi-party era. The government took advantage of the external resources in the economy differently to the previous period. Both the foreign aid which was taken under the Marshall Plan and the credits provided by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, led to significant economic development.

The impact of mechanization on agriculture, the agricultural price supports and agricultural loans gave impetus to agricultural sectors across the country. While the number of tractors used in agriculture was around 1000 in 1945, the total number of tractors reached over 42000 in 1960 (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009:108-109). Consequently the amount of farmland had increased 83 percent within the same period. The rising agricultural activities prompted the extension of the countryside to the market; therefore, urbanization steadily increased (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009: 91). The main characteristic of the urbanization of this period was mostly derived from the repellent effect of agricultural development instead of industrialization.

After the mechanization of agriculture, the needs of manpower in agriculture were reduced, and it triggered the rural-urban migration. Due to housing shortages and rent increases, this fact caused an unplanned urbanization (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009:126-127).

The industrial sector was positively influenced by agricultural developments and urbanization. The first step of import substitution industrialization in non-durable goods was accomplished. In addition to this, the localization of the production of durable goods that started in the *etatist* period was nearly completed. This industrialization was realized in two stages. Firstly, the occurrence of these achievements took place with the encouragement of private industry. For the promotion of private industry by ensuring internal and external credits, the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (TIDB in Turkish acronym) was formed by the directives of the World Bank (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009:111-112). Secondly, in order to improve the public sector, the government decided to increase the number of state-owned enterprises. In this sense, the government also increased the capital of current enterprises (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009:101).

Although there was economy growth during the first years of the multi-party era, because of the unplanned policies, the economic condition of the country worsened in the following years. At the end of the 1950s, because of external payment difficulties and high inflation levels, economic stability began to deteriorate. Turkey made an application to join the European Economic Community (ECC) shortly after its creation in 1959. Arguably, one of the most important reasons to be a part of the ECC was Turkey's current economic condition and the need to find a solution for the bad economic conditions. The ECC, however, accepted Turkey's application as an associate member, not a full member (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2007).

Although the unplanned economic policies were successful within a short time period, the economy became unstable in the long run. Therefore, with the constitutional arrangements and legal regulations made after the 27 May military

intervention (1960), a planned economy was implemented by the state (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009:145-146). Yet, the *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* (DPT, State Planning Organization) was formed within the framework of legal regulations.

The planned economy period (1963-1980) was also known as the import substitution industrialization period (Ahmad, 1992:133). As mentioned above, due to external payment difficulties, the aim was to manufacture imported goods domestically. This situation was also one of the features of the planned economy period. When this was being formulated, the economic and social structure of the country was taken into consideration in the first economic development plan adopted in 1963 (Kepenek and Yentürk 2009:147-150). Other major features of the plan were to resolve the issue of employment, to ensure the principles of social justice (equality of opportunity, to improve income equality, etc.) and to educate highly qualified scientists. As before, priority was given to industrialization.

The second and the third economic development plans were remained in force between 1968-1972 and 1973-1979 respectively. Between 1963-1974 especially, it could be said that the Turkish economy had financial stability; moreover, the country showed a rapid economic growth and industrialization. While Turkey had an economy, which was predominantly dependent on agrarian products with a small industrial sector, the contribution of industry in the GNP surpassed the agricultural benefits in 1973 (Ahmad, 1992:134).

Besides the policies implemented, ECC-Turkish relations brought an optimistic mood on economy. The political instability during the second half of the 1970s also affected the economy negatively.

#### ***1.2.2.3. 1980 to Present***

Turkey's economic policy fundamentally changed after the new economy policy, which is what the decisions taken on the 24<sup>th</sup> January in 1980 were known as. The government began to follow a series of new neo-liberal economy policies. The

industrialization based on import substitution was abandoned and export-oriented industrialization was adopted in its place. Turkey adopted the free market economy, in which prices are based on competition among private businesses and not controlled by the government.

Özal believed not only in political liberalism but also economic liberalism; thus he supported private enterprise. The economy boosted due to Özal's liberal policies. The average annual growth rate was 5.2 percent between 1980-1990, the second highest rate among the OECD countries (OECD, 2003: 33-34). Turkey's estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased from \$1,567 to \$2,791 between 1980-1990 (The World Bank, 2014). When we take a look at Turkey's foreign trade data (TurkStat, 2014), the volume of trade increased greatly with regard to exports rather than imports. Within the same time period, Turkey's export growth increased from \$2,910 million to \$12.935 billion. On the other hand, Turkish imports rose drastically from \$7,909 million to 22.3 billion. Therefore the ratio of export prices to import prices increased from 36.8 percent to 58.1 percent.

The improving economy not only helped to recover the "national confidence" lost in the last decade but also positively affected Turkish foreign policy. Turkey began to widen its influence over the region with its strong economy. Turkey had made a huge move towards becoming a regional power due to Özal's economic and political reforms (Laçiner, 2009:159-160).

#### ***1.2.2.4. 1991 to The Present***

The ANAP gradually lost power after Özal's presidency. Turkish political life would enter into another coalition period (1991-2002) with the forthcoming election. The political instability influenced the economy, which had already begun to worsen during Özal's second period. Especially after the 28 February post-modern military coup, Turkey was faced with massive economic crises. In the 2000s, due to the positive effect of the political stability, the Turkish economy gained an impetus under the AK Party government.



### **1.3. Actors and Interests**

In this section, I will argue the prominent political and social actors who influenced on Turkish politic and society during the republican era.

#### ***1.3.1. Elites and State Actors***

##### ***1.3.1.1. The CHP and the Kemalist Ideology***

As previously stated, the *Cumhuriyet Halk* Party was the first political party in the Republic of Turkey. The fact that the people who founded the republic were also the founders of the CHP gave the CHP a unique position in Turkish politics. The military elites who directed the independence war became the new elites of the post-Ottoman era. As a consequence of this, the Kemalist ideology, which aimed to establish a westernized country, became the state ideology, and the Kemalist elites (the CHP) became the main actors in Turkish politics until 1950. Due to the state-party integration mentioned earlier, I consider the CHP to be a state actor for the single-party period.

The secular notions of the Kemalist ideology many times contradicted with the religious people of the country. The new state aimed to establish a national identity over the society's residual religiosity. The new identity, however, was built step-by-step over the religious consciousness (Jenkins, 2008:90). In this regard, modernization was introduced from top to bottom in order to ensure the integrity of the state. The reaction of the republican elites to the religious society created its enemy: *İrtica* (reactionary), which means to “*oppose political or social progress or reform*” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). Yet, *irtica* has considered returning a religious state by Kemalists; therefore, the Turkish modernization based on secularism had

evolved as an assertive structure<sup>14</sup>. This understanding led to the start of a long-running tension between the secular and religious societies.

#### ***1.3.1.2. The Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)***

The *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (MGK) was established after the 1960 military coup. According to the MGK, which consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers related to the determining of the law and the Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, became a constitutional body with the 1961 constitution (Article 111). The President is the chief of the Council. The purpose of the council was to make decisions and to ensure co-ordination about issues related to national security matters.

After the 1960 military coup, while the CHP was losing its dominance into Turkish Politics, the influence of the Military over the MGK increased. Especially between 1960 -1980, presidents had been chosen from among military people, thus strengthening MGK's position in politics. Besides the Kemalist elites, the military elites emerged into Turkish politics with the rise of the National Security Council.

The MGK's dominance in Turkish Politics reached its peak after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état. The MGK<sup>15</sup> (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) ruled the country subsequently. It was transformed into the Presidential Council for a 6-year period with the 1982 Constitution. The council monitored the political transition during this period within the frame of the 12 September (the coup). On the other hand, the MGK has continued its existence as a *“the supreme coordination board which meets once every two months on a constitutional platform”* (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, 2014).

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<sup>14</sup> Ahmet T. Kuru, aside from its general definition, divides the secularism concept into two distinct types: passive and assertive secularism. While passive secularism allows publicly visible religion, assertive secularism prohibits religion from public sphere. For more information see Kuru, 2011.

<sup>15</sup> The acronyms are similar.

### ***1.3.1.3. The Constitutional Court***

As a supreme legislative body, the Constitutional Court was formed by the 1961 constitution. The court maintained its position with the 1982 Constitution. Particularly after the rising secularist-reactionary debates in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état the Constitutional Court played a substantial role in the closure of political parties. The Constitutional Court has sued 49 closure cases since its establishment, and 25 of these resulted in the closure of parties (see, Tülen, 2010).

Turkey experienced the closure trials in the early republican era and after the multi-party period. The party closure decisions given by the Council of the Minister or the Military officials after a military coup, which were mostly based on the securing of the unitary structure of the state. In this regard, the closure of TCF and SCF can be given as examples of maintaining the survival of the state. Although there were a few attempts before 1970, after the closure of the National Order Party (1971) the Constitutional Court increased its closures of political parties, which were opposed to the secular structure of the state.

According to the related article (68/4) which illustrates the activities and statutes of political parties in the 1982 Constitution, they are defined as “...*the indispensable elements of the democratic political life.*” This definition, however, seems to render an absolute immunity. In the following paragraphs a framework that defines what a political party cannot contradict is drawn by the constitution (Algan, 2011:812-13). In this respect, the majority of the closure cases that took place after the 1982 Constitution have culminated within the framework of two substantive points: the indivisible unity, and the democratic and secular structure of the state. The lawsuits against the *Refah* Party (1997), the *Fazilet* Party (1999) and the ruling party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma* Party (2008) were opened on the grounds of threatening the secular structure of the state (Hakyemez 2008).

These three cases were started in the aftermath of the Feb. 28, 1997 “postmodern coup” period, when the “reactionary” debate was its peak. The closure

trials began after the briefings on this subject, which were given by the General Staff to members of the judiciary, journalists and university rectors. The RP (1998) and, immediately after, the FP (2001) were closed due to anti-secular actions. Similarly the AK Party was accused of becoming the focus of these reactionary activities. Thus, the Turkish Constitutional Court became a state actor, which influenced internal politics, in addition to its legislative duties.

### ***1.3.2. Social Actors (Mobilizations)***

In spite of the existing of religious, non-religious and ethnic social groups, it's hard to mention any social groups who deeply affected Turkish politics and democratization process before 1990. I will not analyze the Kurdish minority, despite the fact that they are the most prominent and populous ethnic group in Turkey, because the state-religion relationship is the main theme of this study, and the ethnic issues are beyond its scope. Except for the 1925 Sheikh Sait Revolt, the Kurdish minority has not attempted any similar uprising. The PKK issue may come to mind. However, the formation of this separatist movement and its ideology does not represent the citizens of Kurdish origin. Whilst these citizens belong to the Shafi School of Sunni Islam, the PKK has a Marxist/Leninist ideology (for more detail see, N. Algan 2012). It should be noted that the Kurds have supported the Islamic-leaning political parties in many elections.

Similarly the Alevis are one of the other strong social groups (religious) that became visible in Turkish politics during the 1990s. The re-emerging of Alevis into Turkish politics can be explained in various ways. The reason related to our issue is that the close relationship between Alevis and the secular Kemalists (Erman and Göker, 2006:99-100; Shankland, 2003:156-159). As a minority religious group, the Alevis felt as if they were isolated from the society. Thus, the conflicts between the regime and the Sunni majority made Alevis closer to the Kemalists.

The Nur Movement (in our case I will deal with the Gülen Movement) and the National Outlook (one of its successors the AK Party), are in the center of state-religion relations, and have recently influenced Turkish politics and the democratization process. I will analyze these groups in the case studies in greater details.

### ***1.3.3. Military***

The Military has had an important place in Turkish politics since the Republic of Turkey was founded. The ruling elites of the Republic consisted mostly of the army members who participated in the War of Independence. When the government was formed, the army members were forced by law to make a choice between becoming a politician and staying in the army. As Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and the other prominent figures of Turkish politics such as Refet Bele, Fethi Okyar and Kazım Karabekir resigned from army and continued their political life as civilians. On the contrary, Fevzi Çakmak, resigned from Parliament and chose to stay as soldier (Ahmad, 1992: 53-63). Mustafa Kemal intended to reduce the military influence, which had challenged the Ottoman authority. The influence of the military on Ottoman politics had even caused of the massacre of some Sultans and their successors (see Önal, Afyoncu and Demir 2010).

The rise of the military influence began in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention. As mentioned before, with the establishment of the National Security Council, the military gained a position, which undermined the free-elected government's authority. The autonomous structure of the military strengthened during the political conflict, which caused regime crisis after 1970 (see, Sakallıoğlu, 1997). In addition, the military gained an economic power after the establishment of the OYAK (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu – Armed Force Pension Fund) in 1961. The pension fund reached over 260,000 members and became a huge business enterprise, which incorporated 60 companies and had 30,000 employees with \$15 billion total

sales by 2012 (Butler, 2012). The issues causing regime crisis varied according to political and social changes.

The early state reflex, which was to secure the indivisible unity of the state and the “reactionaryism” transformed into “*the fears of Islamism, Kurdism and Communism*” according to the current circumstances (see Kuru, 2012). The emerging communism threat, which rose in the aftermath of the 1968 protest, a socialist reaction of political repression, was minimized by the 1980 Turkish coup d’état. Hereafter the military tutelage was mostly based on the fears of Kurdism and Islamism. The coup makers designed the new era in parallel with strong and conservative state institutions (Sakallıoğlu, 1997:162).

As Kuru states that “*ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and the media, in addition to some segments of society, provided the Turkish military with the necessary political power and encouragement* (Kuru 2012:38)”. Thus the closed political parties and the rising political tensions (the post-modern coup) were the prominent outcomes of this partnership. In particular the political parties closed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the fears of Kurdism and Islamism.

The influence of the Turkish Army on politics can be explained with the state-centric and the institutionalist approaches. The effects of these approaches can be divided into two different periods: before and after 1960. In the first period the state-centric approach was more dominant. While the state was strong, the society was quite weak in this period (see Heper, 1985; Heper, 1988:5-7). In this era, which experienced state-party integration, the strong personalities of Atatürk and İnönü somehow took the military under control. This doesn’t mean that the elected state-elites and the military were not the state-centric actors. When the periphery (see Mardin, 1990) gained control over politics with the decline of single-party rule due to various reasons aside from İnönü, the military became more prominent in Turkish politics due to its takeovers.

After 1960, the military intended to consolidate its power by institutionalizing due to the declining state-centric mechanism. The institutionalization has a complementary effect on the state-centric approach. With the establishment of the NSC, the military gained a constitutional autonomy (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). Moreover, having a private education system extrinsic to the national education, and the autonomous status of the military judiciary gave important privileges to the military (Kuru, 2012:43-44). Linz and Stepan define this as military “prerogatives”, or “authoritarian enclaves” which are some of the obstacles to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996:15; also see Kuru, 2012 cited from Stepan, 1988).

Briefly, the Turkish military compensated for the decline of its state-centric position with institutionalism, and maintained a highly privileged position, which led to control of the state policies. Thus the military became one of the main actors in the country that was able to direct non-state actors such as the media and various segments of society (Kuru, 2012:38). For the sake of securing the state against the related fears mentioned above, the anti-democratic measures were taken easily.

#### ***1.3.4. Political Actors***

In terms of the case studies related to Turkey, I will consider mainly the political parties, which originated from the National Outlook tradition, including the ruling AK Party. Despite the fact that I will analyze them in detail under the related section, I shall consider the ANAP and the CHP as the other significant political actors that have influenced the post-1980 period.

First of all, Özal’s ANAP was a major breakthrough in Turkish politics. The significant change that Özal brought to Turkey had been a change in people’s mentality (Laçiner, 2009:166). The idea that Turkish people could achieve everything mobilized people from the wide segment of the society; from both center and periphery (Laçiner, 2009:160). As a result of this mobility, the periphery became

closer to the center. Thus Özal strengthened his rule against the military and bureaucratic elites.

Özal's own mentality and personality not only shaped its political life but also led him to success. In the direction of the restructuring of the state, Özal took measures to eliminate the problems resulting from the cumbersome structure of the bureaucracy. As a former bureaucrat, Özal was mostly suspicious of the bureaucracy, and he solved the bureaucratic problems by bypassing the bureaucrats, and followed his own path to reach the results (Laçiner, 2009). In summary, the state-centric understanding began to change in favor of the society.

Özal's democratic stances against Kemalism and its regime-dominating principles was a milestone for Turkish politics. Having had a different understanding of civilization and westernization to the Kemalists, he didn't have any skepticism about solving various problems, including security issues against western countries (Laçiner, 2009:166-171). Indeed, he believed that integration with the west would be of benefit to the state's security.

Secondly, the CHP is relevant to this study due to its being the main representative of the Kemalist ideology. Although the party began to transform and became a leftist party (see Emre, 2013), particularly during the post 1980 era, it maintained its ideological stance against the rising of Islamist politics. What makes the CHP significant in this study is its alliance with the military tutelage against the rising Islamism in Turkish politics. During the 28 Feb. period and the debates of the presidential election in 2007, this alliance revealed its existence alongside the anti-government demonstrations across the country, known as the Republic Protests. The participants of the protest carried banners on which was written "Duty to Army", in the hope of preventing to the Islamic-rooted candidate, Abdullah Gül becoming president.



## **1.4. Ideas and Ideologies**

The reform movements, which were also known as modernization movements, date back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In order to keep up with the economic and technological developments in Europe, the Ottomans implemented various reforms since that time. Especially after the French Revolution (1789), in addition to lost battles and the chronic economic problem, the Empire faced problems with minorities. The rising notion of nationalism and newly- emerging nation-states threatened the territorial integrity of the country. For the sake of holding the multi-national structure together and continuing the state, some ideas/ideologies showed up in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. These ideas were discussed among scholars in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century; among which were Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism (Karpas, 2001; Türkman, 2003; Gökalp, 2010; Akçura and Fehmi, 1981).

This part consists of two sections. In the first section, I will examine the ideologies referred to above. That will be useful to understand the official state ideology of the Republican period. Then I aim to demonstrate the ways, which were followed in order to consolidate the official state ideology, Kemalism. Since I have already looked at the related reforms in different chapters, I only state them briefly in order not to repeat them. It will be useful to refer briefly to these ideas in order to understand the official state ideology of the Republican period.

### ***1.4.1. Ideas and Ideologies in the Late Ottoman Era***

#### ***1.4.1.1. Pan-Ottomanism***

Pan-Ottomanism emerged in the Ottoman politics during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, at the time of Sultan Mahmud II (Akçura and Fehmi, 1981:4-5). This ideology constituted new forms of policies based without distinctions regarding nations, religions and sects, and thus the Ottoman people would be considered equal in terms of rights and duties. The idea lost its importance after the Franco-Prussian

War in 1870-1871 (Türkman, 2003:140). As a result of the war, Germany had been united after defeating France and becoming a nation-state.

Yusuf Akçura, in his 'Three Kinds of Policy'<sup>16</sup> (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset), "...the *Tanzimat policy of Ottomanism...had already failed both internal and external obstacles* (Akçura and Fehmi, 1981:2). To him, although Pan-Ottomanism seemed beneficial to the Ottoman Empire, the Turks would lose their importance in the state (Akçura, 1976:6-7). This was the internal obstacle, which caused Ottomanism to fail. Moreover, Russia and European countries could intervene in the internal politics of the state due to religious reasons, which were the external obstacle. It can be stated that the Kemalist aspects were the equality of subjects regardless of their religious and national backgrounds due to the concerns mentioned above.

#### **1.4.1.2. Pan-Islamism**

The unstoppable rise of nationalism and the nation-states in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century made Pan-Ottomanism impractical. The Ottomans sought another way out to stop the collapse of the country; hence they attached themselves to Pan-Islamism. In spite of the huge loss of lands, the Ottomans still had a big amount of land in which mostly Muslim populations live. Pan-Islamism is the idea of forming an Islamic Unity structure with Muslims around the world regardless of their races and nations (Akçura, 1976:7 and Lee, 1942:279). What made this idea attractive was that the Sultan was the Caliph at the same time (Akçura and Fehmi, 1981:2-3), so not only could he mobilize Muslims all around the world but he could also use the power of the caliphate in politics. Sultan Abdulhamid II used pan-Islamist ideas in politics for the first time.

Akçura believed that Pan-Islamism was hard to accomplish because it created conflicts amongst Ottoman subjects. Moreover, the idea divided the Turkish nation because it triggered religious and sectarian discord among Turks who lived in

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<sup>16</sup> Akçura's three kinds of policy consist of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.

Ottoman lands. Furthermore, the powerful states - Great Britain and Russia for instance - which had Muslim subjects prevented the implementation this policy (Akçura, 1976:7). After the dethronement of Sultan Abdulhamid II the state officials replaced Pan-Islamism with Pan-Turkism.

#### ***1.4.1.3. Pan-Turkism***

Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura are two of the most important figures in Turkish nationalism. Akçura's nationalist idea is based on racial and linguistic unity. The Union, by Akçura, will initially begin among Turks who lived in the Ottoman territory and those who were more or less Turkified. Then, the process will be the integration of Turks who live in Asia and Eastern Europe (Akçura, 1976:8).

In addition to these two elements (race and language) religion also found a place in Gökalp's nationalist idea (Türkman, 2003:140). Unlike Akçura's trilogy, there is no separation in Gökalp's ideals (Gökalp, 2010; Berkes, 1954), which are modernization, Islamization and Turkification. He states that Turkification and Islamization have no contradiction between each other; moreover, there is no conflict among these two ideals and the need for modernization. In that case, we should form "A Contemporary Islam Turkishness" by specifying the influence circles of these particular ideals (Gökalp, 2010:17). *According to Niyazi Berkes, Akçura figured out the future of Turkism before Ziya Gökalp* (as cited in Türkman, 2003:140).

#### ***1.4.2. The Secularization of Turkey: Kemalism***

The war situation of the country officially ended after the Treaty of the Lausanne. With the declaration of the Republic of Turkey the policies that the new Turkish state would follow became visible. Atatürk's Revolution, which is also known as the Kemalist reforms, was a multi-dimensional reform that aimed to re-shape the whole country from top to bottom. In this respect, the main purposes of the Kemalist

reforms were listed as: a) strengthening of the central authority b) nation building, and c) secularizing the state and society (Kili, 1980:384). The Atatürk reforms, which aimed at implementation for the sake of the specified purposes, had become a state ideology in a short time. The main spirit of the reforms was “to reach the level of the contemporary civilization”.

#### ***1.4.2.1. Atatürk’s Principles***

The state ideology was built over Atatürk’s principles (Kili, 1980; Berkes, 1998; Ahmad, 2003; Kongar, 2006), the aforementioned Six Arrows: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, *Etatism*, Secularism, and Revolutionism. In 1927 Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism and Secularism, and in 1935 *Etatism* and Revolutionism were introduced into the CHP’s party program. Thus, the Six Arrows formed and they were referred to in the Party’s logo (CHP, 2014). The principals were added to the constitution in 1937 and became one of its major provisions (Ahmad, 2003: 88).

Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik) is an ideology, which allows people to participate in governance by their representatives within the state organs. A republican regime is the best system to implement national sovereignty (Kili, 1980:387). What makes republicanism so important is its revolutionary way that leads the political and social changes of the new nation-state (Kongar, 2006:118).

Populism (Halkçılık) was the key concept of Republicanism. Before announcing the republican idea, Mustafa Kemal stated the populism, which rejects giving any privileges to any groups, families or clans in a society. By doing this he intended to prepare the ground for republicanism. The efforts against the Sultanate, Caliphate, imperialism and communism had shaped the principle of populism (Berkes, 1998:462). The populism is based on equality of people under the law. For the Kemalist concept, “*populism envisaged a social system based on work and*

*emphasized national unity both for national security and development* (Kili, 1980:389)’’.

*Etatism* (Devletçilik) is the principal by which the economic activities are run under state control due to lack of private enterprise and a weak economic structure. For Kemalism, *etatism* had an important role in building a contemporary nation-state. To Atatürk: “*Changing the rules of life in accordance with the times is an absolute necessity*”, and modern civilization depends on the changes in not only social and scientific lives but also in economic life (Berkes, 1998:464).

Revolutionism generated the main spirit of Atatürk’s reforms. When we take a look at the transformation, which started with the new Turkish Republic, we can see that it had a revolutionary character. Revolutionism was the way of Atatürk, which allowed for solving the chronic problems related to both society and the state (Mardin, 1990:139). In this context, the Kemalist regime had abolished the failing institutions with the ones which were required for the modernization of the country. Berkes expresses this situation as (1998:463): “*To reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations! That became the motif of the new ideology. The reforms to be undertaken would imply nothing but a total revolution – the appropriation of Western civilization.*”

Atatürk’s reforms, which brought radical changes, were implemented in two stages: (1) denial of the past combined with secularization, unification and nationalization, and (2) the transformation and consolidation of the Kemalist regime (Berkes, 1998:461). The implementations in the first stage were interrelated and complementary; therefore, it would be more appropriate to evaluate the parameters all together. The first phase can be defined as the preparation stage, which was the basis of the transformation and consolidation stage. Before mentioning the implementation stages, I’d like to focus on the character of Turkish nationalism (Milliyetçilik) and secularism (indeed *Laicism*) because these two parameters are the main constituent of the new republic and Kemalist ideology.

#### ***1.4.2.2. Nationalism and Secularism***

Turkish nationalism, which is secular, is not based on any ethnic nationality; however, it is neither Ottomanist nor Islamist. Although the Kemalist regime aimed to build a nation-state, ethnic nationalism was not used as an element, which excluded the non-Turkish society. Atatürk declared (as cited in Çağaptay, 2006:14): “the people of Turkey, who have established the Turkish state, are called the Turkish nation.” Instead of ethnic nationalism, the language and culture were taken as the catalysts of nationalism. The people who shared the similar culture and spoke the same language were accepted as Turkish nationals. The idea that the essence of national entity is based on culture was influenced by Ziya Gökalp’s nationalism doctrine. To him, a nation consisted of the people who spoke the same language, have received the same education; shared the same emotions, ideals, religion-morality and aesthetics (Mardin, 1990:203). Briefly “in Gökalp’s view, Turkish nationalism represented a cultural ideal and a philosophy of life which laid the basis for social solidarity (Parla, 1985:24).”

Secularism is the dominant notion and the key feature of the Atatürk’s reforms and the Kemalist regime. The nation-state was established, religion put aside and in its place, positive science was taken as basis of transformation. “*Science, the truest guide in life*” (as cited in Kili, 1980:384), one of the Atatürk’s sayings related to science, depicted its importance clearly. Within the framework of this mindset, secularism was widened at every step of life, and the regime replaced religion with the secular Turkish nationalism in the public sphere (Ahmad, 1992:61). In sum, “*Kemalist ‘secularism’ was meant to represent ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ against alleged Islamic ‘backwardness’ and ‘Oriental barbarism’*” (Yavuz, 2003a: 46”).

In the stages of the preparation phases, the new republic had begun to reject the institutions related to the Ottoman heritage. These denials were combined with nationalization and secularization; thus the dualism of the institutions was ended (Kili, 1980:384). This situation depicted the revolutionary (devrimci) feature of the Atatürk’s reforms. The secularization and nationalization of the institutions had been

realized gradually. The Caliphate and the Sharia Laws were abolished. With the adopted European style codes (civil, penal and trade) the judicial system was unified and secularized. Due to the more homogeneous demographic structure of the new Turkish state, the multiple structures of the legal systems of the past were removed easily.

The secularization and nationalization continued in educational areas. In order to unify and secularize the educational system, all Ottoman-style educational institutions were abolished (The Law of Unification of Education). The Ministry of National Education became the sole authority in state education, and civil society and religious organizations were prevented from opening schools. In the process of the construction of the nation-state, the government attached great importance to education. Furthermore, the language began to secularize and nationalize whilst the education system was being transformed. In 1928, the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet, and the purification process of the language was started. Thus, the ruling elites were disconnected from the traces of the past, which was considered to be a bulky heritage impeding progress towards westernization (Göle, 1997:50).

#### ***1.4.2.3. Consolidating the Regime***

In the second stage, the government aimed to transform the society and consolidate the Kemalist regime by implementing new policies and practices subsequent to the institutional transformation. It can be said that the early 1930s was the time when the process of the consolidation of the Kemalist regime began. In 1931, the Turkish Historical Society (THS), and a year later the Turkish Language Association (TLA) were established. The main purposes of these institutions were to unveil the ancient roots of the Turkish language and history. The ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and the ‘Sun-Language Theory’ emerged in parallel with these institutions to put forward the pre-Ottoman Turkish history and promote the Turkish nationalism (Çağaptay, 2004:86).

The Turkish Organisation for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Ocakları Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti - TOTTH) monitored ‘Turkish History Thesis’ studies. The committee continued its studies under the name of The Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti- TTTC) after the closure of TOTTH on 10 April 1931. The main objectives of the society were “*to disseminate Turkish national history 'to its real owners, the Turkish people'*” and “*to synthesize and build the study on, The Main Themes of Turkish History* (Çağaptay, 2004:87-88)”. Thus the missing historical aspect of the republican ideology was filled with the Turkish History Thesis (Mardin, 1990:204).

The topics such as “*the history of Turkish civilization, anthropological characteristics of the Turkish race, and Turkish language and literature*” were discussed via conferences, published books and studies to prove that “*the Turks were a great and ancient race*”. Moreover, these studies had reached such an extent that Atatürk was persuaded that the Turkish language was the origin of the Indo-European languages (Çağaptay, 2004:88). All these efforts, which aimed to ensure the revival of a Turkish consciousness, which dated back the Middle Asia, had begun to shift Turkish nationalism towards evolving an ethnic-based structure.

Another important implementation was conducted under the name of “the People’s House” toward the consolidation of the state regime. The People’s house was formed instead of the Turkish Hearts, which was established to spread Turkish nationalism in 1912. The People’s House was designated to perform the task, which was to impose “*the nationalist, secularist and populist ideas of the Republican regime*” on the people who lived in the countryside. In order to fulfill the task, the Houses were used as educational institutions, which served educational and cultural activities besides its political goals (Karpas, 1974:69; Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 68).

M. Asim Karaömerlioğlu explains the People’s House as the reason for the success of the Free Republican Party against the Kemalist regime (1998a: 68). He continued: “*This multi-party experience strengthened the culture of fear, a deeply rooted mentality in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republic, that times were*



*volatile and that the enemies of the Kemalist regime were consolidating their power for their 'separatist' goals.” Similarly, Karpas states “the survival of Turkey as a nation depended on the mass acceptance of these political principles which came to be considered synonymous with modernization itself (1974:68).*

In order to mobilize the masses, various sources such as books, published reviews, seminars, talks, and even libraries were provided / delivered by the Houses to a public audience (Karpas, 1974:70-71). The local press was also used as an instrument, which shaped the opinions of the public with published books and newspapers. The *Ülkü* (Ideal), particularly, the leading review was circulated by the Houses under the supervision of the CHP. The *Ülkü* designated the main policy of the Houses according to the principles of the Kemalist regime. In sum, “*the basic duty of the Ülkü, according to the letter, was to express the principles and ideas of the Republic in a scientific and persuasive manner (Karpas, 1974:72).*”

Similarly, the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) were established to strengthen the regime in the second half of the 1930s, in addition to the People’s Houses. The main goal of the Village Institutes was to transform the periphery accordingly to the center’s ideology. In this scope, the founders aimed to increase the center-periphery interactions in order to widen the state regime in the countryside. Beside these political purposes, the institutes were also used for economic objectives. Its aim was to end poverty by increasing agricultural productivity (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 47).

## **Chapter 2: Egypt**

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I document the historical background of Egypt until 2011, the 25 January Revolution. In the second, I analyze the political, social and economic transformation of the country and its state and social actors. In the last section of this chapter, I argue the ideas and ideological factors that shape both the state and the society.

### **2.1. The Historical Background of Egypt**

The Ottoman Empire ruled in Egypt until the British invasion of Egypt, 1882. It was not the first invasion attempt, which Egypt faced. Due to its strategic position during the colonial age, the French troops, under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, attempted to invade Egypt between 1798 and 1801. After the first invasion attempt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, who was a commander of Albanian descent, was sent to Egypt to defend Egypt against the French. After this unfruitful invasion, Muhammad Ali, who ended the domestic disturbance, was appointed as the Wali (Mayor) of Egypt in 1805. Egypt gained an autonomous political structure during the Mohammed Ali rule.

#### ***2.1.1. Khedivate (1867-1914)***

The Wali of Egypt received the “Khedive” title, which was considered as equal with the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh al-Islam in the state protocol, from the Ottoman Sultan in 1866. The title, which meant Grand Vizier in Persian, was given to Ismail Pasha and his reign after Ismail Pasha’s efforts to gain Egypt’s independence from the Ottoman Empire (Marsot, 2007:81). After the title, Egypt gained an autonomous

structure aside from the other Ottoman provinces. Thus the period between 1867 and 1914 was known as Khedivate.

The geo-strategic location of Egypt makes her important throughout history. The Suez Canal Project, which was a human-made waterway linking the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean via Red Sea, marked the peak of Egypt's strategic importance in the colonial era. The French architects prepared the Suez Canal Project during the failed occupation. The British considered the project impractical, thus they did not pay enough attention to it. Yet, the project was actualized by the Egyptian – French partnership after a 10-year construction period in 1869. The project had devastated the Egyptian economy; therefore, Egypt sold its shares in the Suez Canal to the British in 1875 due to accumulated debts.

The British invaded Egypt under the guise of protecting their shares in the Suez Canal. During this invasion, the British officials refrained from using any colonial terms so as not to offend the Egyptians. When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Germans, the British officials declared their protectorate over Egypt in 1914. The British also deposed Abbas, and Hussein Kamil took his place as the Sultan of Egypt.

In 1919, the occupation forces were assuming that the Egyptian people accepted British rule. Yet, the presence of British created a huge discomfort on the Egyptian society. Due to this and the harsh conditions experienced during World War I the Egyptians rose up against the British government. The Egyptians demanded complete independence in 1919 under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul, the founder of the Wafd Party (Goldschmidt, 2008:106-107). The British authority repressed the uprising, and sentenced Zaghlul to exile after this unsuccessful revolt.

### ***2.1.2. The Sultanate of Egypt (1922-1952)***

On February 28, 1922 the British Government recognized Egyptian's independence, and abolished the protectorate upon the request of the Egyptian people. The Sultanate

of Egypt was established, and Sarwat Pasha became the prime minister. Sultan Fouad became the first king of the Kingdom. The British government recognized the independence of Egypt but reserved four issues for further negotiations (Goldschmidt, 2008:115): “(1) *The security of British Empire communications in Egypt*, (2) *Egypt’s defense against foreign aggression or interference*, (3) *The protection of foreign interest and minorities in Egypt*, and (4) *The Status of the Sudan*. ”

Rising nationalism in Egypt resulted in an independent state with promulgation of a westernized constitution. Egypt, a former Ottoman territory, began to transform in the context of with these developments. Warburg defines Al-Azhar, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the secular nationalists (the Wafd Party), and the royalists as the parameters of the alteration of this new period (1982:131-132).

During the Kingdom, it was obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood had prominent influence over the socio-political life of Egypt. A schoolteacher, Hasan al-Banna, established the Muslim Brotherhood (see, Mitchell, 1993; Wickham, 2013; Zahid, 2010; and Zollner, 2009), the representative of the traditional Islam, on 1928. On the other hand, Al – Azhar, the historic religious institution of Egypt, also became powerful during the post-mandate period. During the British protectorate, they stood against both the British and the secular nationalists. Al-Azhar’s political stance and their tacit support to of the monarchy made them a royalist bastion.

Another prominent political grouping of the era, the nationalists did not use only nationalist arguments in their works. They also utilized religious discourse to promote their nationalist policies. In this regard, they intended to usher in their nationalist ideas with a book about the life of the Prophet Muhammad, referring to his ideas about nationalism. On the contrary, the book provoked religious sentiments, and the Islamic-oriented political understanding increased in Egyptian politics. Therefore, the westernized constitution and the secular nationalist ideologies could not attract the Egyptians. Moreover, Al-Azhar’s royalist policies provided profits in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood. In spite of any special efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood had

grass-roots support not only in the rural areas but also among the lower classes due to rising nationalism (Warburg, 1982:132).

#### ***2.1.2.1. The Free Officers Movement***

The presence of British forces in Egyptian lands was raising nationalism among the Egyptians. The treaty of 1936 was signed between the sides to lessen the rising of nationalism. According to the treaty, the UK would withdraw all its military forces from Egypt apart from a small force, which was enough to protect the goods of the British around the Canal Zone. Additionally the treaty considered the modernization of the military, and allowed for recruiting more native Egyptians into the army (Morsy, 1984:76-77). The British withdrew its military forces from Egypt but did not surrender control of its economic life. Thus the treaty did not make the expected impact. Moreover, legal privileges given to foreign investors raised discomfort among society regarding foreign presence in the country (DuBois, 1972:48).

In the aftermath of World War II, political turmoil rose in Egypt. Increasing violence, terror attacks and assassinations began to become common in post-war Egypt and the political violence continued until the Free Officers coup. For instance, in October 1945, the Prime Minister, Ahmad Maher, was assassinated. In addition, Prime Minister Nuqrashi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood as a result of a harsh confrontation in December 1948. A police officer who was believed to be a member of the MB, murdered Nuqrashi on 28 December 1948. Hasan al-Banna, the Supreme Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, was assassinated two months after the assassination of Nuqrashi (Stephens, 1971:88-89 and Gordon, 2006:26).

While these developments were happening in domestic politics, the early withdrawal of the British from Palestine according to the UN Partition Plan for Palestine triggered the political turmoil around the region. Israel took advantage of this abandonment and immediately after declared its independence (1948). The Arab States did not accept this declaration, and it set in motion the endless Arab- Israeli

conflict. Egypt and other Arab countries such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq attacked to Israel, thus the first Arab-Israeli War began. This war took a year, and Israel defeated five Arab states despite having less power than the Arabs. After the war, Israel had much more land than the UN proposal had already given them. Israel also gained the other part of Jerusalem from Jordan.

Some young military officers formed The Free Officers (Gordon, 1992; Stephens 1971; DuBois 1972; Gordon, 2006; Vatikiotis, 1978) as a secret society in parallel with these developments. According to Gordon, *“In the autumn of 1949 Nasser, four comrades from his Muslim Brotherhood cell and three other close colleagues formed an executive committee, with Nasser as its chief (Gordon, 2006:27)”*. In spite of the diversity of the comrades, the Free Officers did not pursue ideological purposes. Furthermore, the executive committee members would become the associates of the future the Revolution Command Council (RCC) (Stephens, 1971:90).

The executive committee adopted a decision to overthrow the government within five years in the 1949 secret meeting. According to the program, which can be defined as the Free Officers’ road map, *‘the struggle against imperialism’, ‘the withdrawal of British Forces’; ‘strong modern army and democratic parliamentary system’* were the prior aims of the movement (Stephens, 1971). In a newspaper interview with Al-Ahram, Nasser rendered information about the officers:

*“...the political ideas of the Free Officers differed, according to their temperaments and the family or social milieu from which they came.*

*...What we all wanted was to purged the army, rid the country of foreign occupation and establish a clean, fair government which could work sincerely for the good of people. Once in power, we found ourselves faced with the difficult problem of establishing a political, social and economic programme. It was necessary to improvise. We did our best. The divergence of political ideas then obliged us to separate from those who did not agree to apply the majority decisions of the Council of the Revolution and then those of the Government we set up (quoted in Stephens, 1971:112-113).”*

Anwar Sadat, the senior member of the Free Officers and the successor to Gamal Abdel Nasser, also defined their expectations with these words:

*“The problem was to get Egypt out of the Middle Ages, to turn it from a semi-feudal country into a modern, ordered, viable State, while at the same time respecting the customs of the people. On this last point, respecting the customs of the people does not mean chaining them down to a dead past, it means respecting the essential and invisible continuities in a nation’s life. We would conserve everything that did not impede the real progress of the community (quoted in Johnson, 1972:3).”*

#### *Towards the Revolution*

Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected the President of the Free Officers in 1951. Although it was a formal election, it was kept as a secret. In this context, in 1952, the Free Officers pushed the Wafd Party, the ruling party, to abolish the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 with Britain. Although the agreement seemed to be in favor of Egypt, the British dominance in the economy was still continuing. The workers’ strikes followed this request. Guerilla fights broke out in the Canal Zone. Extremely diverse opposition groups, from the communists to the Muslim Brotherhood attacked the British positions. These groups also began to increase gradually the numbers of volunteer units, which were used against both the government and the British. The British occupied Suez, Port Said and Ismailia as a response to the attacks of these volunteer units (Alexander, 2005:37). Before the attacks, it was obvious that these diverse volunteer units did not approve the policies of elites who were *“the traditional political parties whose leaders belonged mainly to the native ‘bourgeoisie’ of landowners, senior government officials, politicians and men of affairs (Vatikiotis, 1978:47)”*. The close ties between the government and the British were one of the main reasons for the attacks against the British positions.

The clashes, which occurred in the Canal Zone, were getting gradually more intense at the beginning of 1952. The guerilla forces attacked one of the British bases, located at Tel al-Kabir. The British chose to attack the police forces in response instead of the mobile guerilla forces. It was an easier target for the British; hence almost 50 policemen were killed at the end of the attack on January 25 (Alexander, 2005:38). A day after the British attacks against the auxiliary police forces, Egyptians filled the streets of Cairo to protest. The angry and mostly young crowd demanded “*an absolute boycott of the British; the despatch of armed forces to the Canal, and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union* (Alexander, 2005 39)”. The protestors set on fire some buildings; cinemas, hotels, banks and the King’s favorite sports club.

Normally, the aim of the Free Officers was to take the initiative some time in 1954 or 1955 in order to capture the administration and establish their regime<sup>17</sup> (Beeley, 1969:45-50). The increasing internal tension expedited the coup plans. Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to take action against the King on July 10, but he re-set the date for 5 August after taking his colleagues’ advice. Meanwhile, King Farouk made a move to replace his brother-in-law as the Minister of War. In addition to this, 14 of the Free Officers were arrested. Because of these developments, the date of the military coup was decided. The Officers were going to move on 22-23 July.

Before the Free Officers took the control, Peter Johnson mentioned the socio – political situation that transpired in Egypt (1972:3):

*“The excesses of the British military occupation, the crass interference of the British embassy in the political affairs of the country, the extravagant vacillations of King Farouk, the utter incompetency of the series of governments, the harsh control of the land by the descendants of foreign conquerors, the virtual monopoly of commerce by foreigners, the rout of the Egyptian army in Palestine a few years earlier--all had contributed to provoking Egyptians of all classes except the highest to seize control of their*

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<sup>17</sup> Mitchell in his work, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, states that the Free Officers considered taking action on 26 January 1952. First, the date was set for 25 March, and later the revolution occurred on 23 July (1993:101).



*own destiny. On a popular level, guerrilla actions against British bases, paramilitary formations in the cities and towns, and spontaneous street demonstrations were signs of the future.”*

The Free Officers took action earlier in the day. According to the plan, the Army Headquarters were occupied, and the airport in Almaza captured. The main communication units in Cairo such as the radio station and telephone terminal were occupied. The military coup begun earlier produced results immediately. The Free Officers took the G.H.Q at 1:45 a.m., and the Free Officers ordered all kinds of armored vehicles and soldiers to occupy the streets of Cairo. After Anwar al-Sadat’s radio announcement Egyptians flocked to streets in order to celebrate the coup. Alexandria, where the king had his residence, was occupied by 25th July (Beeley, 1969:51).

### ***2.1.3. The Arab Republic of Egypt***

In the aftermath of the revolution, the Revolution Command Council (RCC) took power until the declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 18 June 1953. General Muhammad Naguib became the first president of the republic. However, in a short time Naguib was forced to resign by Nasser, the commander of the 1952 Revolution. Naguib could not take part in the coup because he was being closely followed on the eve of the revolution (Beeley, 1969:52). Right after Naguib’s resignation, Gamal Abdel Nasser became the new president.

#### ***2.1.3.1. The Nasser Era***

In the first years of his regime, Nasser was faced with the dual challenge of consolidating the regime and settling the disputes with the British. In the following years Nasser pursued policies, which fulfilled the need to create a national and

independent Egypt. While he was building a new national order, he aimed to minimize the foreign influence in the country. In this respect, on one hand Nasser intended to remain non-aligned in order to avoid any foreign influences (Stephens, 1971:140); on the other, he struggled with the British existence in the country. With the issue of the Suez Crisis, which I will discuss later in detail, he not only aimed to end the existing situation but he also intended to test his power on the way to establish his own order (Baker, 1978:44).

Before mentioning the developments in the domestic politics of Egypt, I would like to demonstrate Nasser's understanding of the Egyptian Revolution. In *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1955), Nasser mentioned the types of revolutions, which Egypt was going through:

*"... we are going through two revolutions, not one revolutions. Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a political revolution by which wrests the right to govern itself from hand of tyranny, or from the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of classes, which settles down when justice is secured for the citizens of the united nation"* (1955:39-40).

In his book, Nasser frequently stated the importance of a united Egypt in which there is no egoism, hate, intolerance and freedom of expression and opinion (35-41). According to him, in order to be successful, *"the political revolution must unite all elements of the nation, build them solidly together and instill in them the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole country"* (Nasser, 1955:40). However, the path that Nasser followed was not the way that he stated in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*.

Vatikiotis explains this change in Nasser by his personality and behavior (1978:126). He believes that Nasser first of all intended to control the revolution exclusively. Second, he aimed to secure his control over the new Free Officers. And lastly, the establishment of the new officers became a crucial step to controlling the whole Egyptian state. In this regard, the Free Officers, led by Nasser, applied harsh

policies to keep the powerful groups under control and to consolidate their regime. They banned all political parties, and the Liberation Rally (LR) was replaced during the three-year transition period (Stephens, 1971:121). Moreover, the government put leverage on the strong groups, especially the Muslim Brethren (or Brotherhood). Anne Alexander, a journalist and researcher specializing in the Arab world, mentioned the size of the Muslim Brotherhood. She says it is claimed that the numbers of MB members were between 500,000 to one million during the late 1940's (Alexander, 2005:30). It was obvious that Nasser did not want to lose control in domestic politics due to the current disputes with the Britain and Israel. Hence he pursued harsh policies against his opposers.

Johnson summarizes the justification of the policies of the Free Officers in his article (1972:4):

*“The justification given for the banning of political parties was that the task of national consolidation which the "revolution" had set for itself demanded the unity of the Egyptian people, and a mass of conflicting political forces could only divert the people from rallying around the 'revolutionary vanguard'. In essence, then, the 'vanguard' sought to stop any form of class struggle in the name of national unity imposed and controlled from the top. The history of Egypt from 1952 to the present can best be understood in this context”.*

As mentioned above, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was claimed to have 1700 cells in the Egyptian countryside, was declared illegal in 1954 (Stephens, 1971:124). After crashing the Brotherhood, Al-Azhar expanded its influence in both political and social areas. The relation between the Nasser government and Al-Azhar were based on a conflict of interest. While *“Nasser and his colleagues needed the blessings of the ulama and their cooperation both at the center of government and in helping to mobilize the local imams and kuttub teachers to the support of their regime”* Nasser felt the need for a respectable institution which could be controlled by the government: Al-Azhar (Warburg, 1982:135).

Al-Azhar was filling the emerging gap left by the government's oppression of the Brotherhood. It was utilized because of the benefits brought by its influence. In the same way as the Brotherhood, the Free Officers delivered their messages through the society. In this context, they utilized the Friday Sermons in the villages, and intended to influence Egyptians through their religiosity. The total number of government officials in mosques almost doubled, reaching 12,357 as a result of this policy. Thus, the Nasser administration created the gospels of Nasserism among the imams (preacher) in order to deliver their "messianic messages" (Warburg, 1982:135-136).

As can be seen, Nasser, on one hand, surpassed the Muslim Brotherhood; on the other, he stuck with Islamic notions to consolidate his policies in the early years of his rule. In contrast to the MB, the Sufis preserved their positions due to the fact that they were also a religious organization. Moreover, the Supreme Sufi Council published a book, the Guide to Sufism, in order to justify the revolution of 1952. Similarly another book, which models the footstep of the Prophet Muhammad, was published to fortify Nasser's socialism (Warburg, 1982:136).

In the National Charter (I will mention this in the following chapters. Also see Stephens, 1971), 1962, *"Islam is the religion of the State, Arabic is its official language and the principles of the Islamic Shari'a are a major source of legislation* (Warburg, 1982:138)" On one hand, the government was seeking benefits through religious values; on the other, it began to establish the principle of a secular state by using the abovementioned values as a curtail. In this direction, the term 'Sharia' was removed from the provisional constitution in 1964. The secularization process of Egyptian society had gained speed smoothly.

### *Nasser and Foreign Politics*

Nasser followed a non-alignment foreign policy during his presidency within the framework of world politics. His first goal was to lessen the influence of the British

on the Egyptian politics and economy. By remaining non-aligned he did not allow any external intervention into domestic politics. However, the purpose of the 1952 revolution had revealed a sign of the actual foreign policy. As we can recall, '*The struggle against imperialism*' was one of the main themes of the revolution (Stephens, 1971). Thus, to stand aloof of all sides would be more logical for Egypt. As a sign of mistrust of western countries, he stayed in a close ties with Soviet Russia. The convergence of Egypt and Soviet Russia was a result of Nasser's quest for balance in foreign policy.

For the regional perspective, Nasser sought expansionist and interventionist policies in the Arab world. Yet his policy was not based on expansion of the territories. Besides, he sought Arabic unity and to be the leader of the Arab world. Nasser, indeed, gave a sign of his prospective foreign policy with the term 'Arab Circle', in his *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1955:54). He states "*We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world, not realizing our place therein and the role determined to us by that place*". He continued; "*Neither can we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much as part of us as we are part of it...*" In this sense, Nasser followed a Pan-Arab foreign policy in the Arab region.

Another reason for this nationalist foreign policy was the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nasser stated in his book that the Palestine issue was a national security issue for Egypt (Nasser, 1955). Thus he utilized the Palestine issue to lead the Arab world. He also established a radio station, "the Voice of the Arabs", which broadcast from an Arab country to other Arab countries in 1953. In time it became one of Nasser's most powerful weapons of Nasser among Arab countries (Stephens, 1971:145).

### *The Suez Crisis and The United Arab Republic*

Nasser became a leading figure in the Arab World. Apart from his efforts during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, his attitudes towards the British and Israel fortified his

position in the region. Nasser transformed his ideas into action immediately. In this direction, in 1956 Nasser declared that Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal Company in 1956. As noted earlier, Egypt was one of the two partners who constructed the Suez Canal, and the only one who could not profit from it; therefore, the Canal issue became a “deeply emotional national symbol” after it was lost to the British (Stephens, 1971:192).

Although Egypt was defeated by the coalition of Israeli, French and British Forces, with the support of the Soviets and Americans Egypt kept control of the Canal Zone. Accordingly, Egypt used the war as a plea for other nationalization processes in domestic politics. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Nasser’s prestige reached its peak in the Arab World. Nasser, indeed, intended to reap the fruits of this admiration very early. In this context, in 1958 Egypt and Syria established the United Arab Republic (UAR, see Nutting, 1972 and Stephens, 1971) and Nasser became the first president of the Union.

The formation of the UAR was not welcomed in the same way by each of the opposing sides in the Cold War. While the union created anxiety on the western countries including Israel, the Soviet Russia approved this union publicly. To them, Egypt was already non-aligned, and at least Syria would not fall into clutches of the western camp (Stephens, 1971:278).

The union did not last long due to a military coup attempt in Syria in 1961. The coup makers arrested the UAR high-ranking officials in Syria, including the vice-president Field Marshal Amer. Although the coup makers stated that they did not aim to break the Union, their demands requesting that the form of the UAR be changed were not accepted by Nasser. The night when he heard the news about the coup, Nasser later recalled, was one of the bitterest moments of his life (Stephens, 1971:339-340). After failing in its attempt to help the rebels holding the Syrian cities Aleppo and Latakia, Nasser lost confidence in the Union’s military operation capability.

Moreover, the relations between Egypt and the countries around the region began to worsen soon after the declaration of the “Arab socialist revolution” (Stephens, 1971:378; Nutting; 1972:280). The disputes were a clear reflection of the disapproval of the Arab countries towards Nasser’s political policies. Not only the Egyptian revolution but also the formation of the UAR increased the concern in those Arab countries, which were ruled by monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen. Moreover, the UAR forces became involved in the civil war in Yemen, although there was no border between Yemen and the UAR countries (see Hofstadter, 1973: 171-210). The policies that Nasser followed increased Egypt’s isolation amongst the Arab countries.

This failure also made Nasser’s religion-focused foreign policy inapplicable before it began, with the exception of the Israeli issue. He visualized the importance of the “Islamic Circle” surrounding the majority of the Muslim World from China to Africa in *Philosophy of the Revolution* (Warburg, 1982:139-140; see Islamic Circle in Nasser, 1955). Whilst Nasser was generating policies based on “Arab Socialism”, he always kept Islam and Socialism out of any confrontation.

### *The-Six-Day War*

The Arab-Israeli conflict gained a new dimension after the 1967 War (see Rabinovich, 1984; Stephens, 1971, and Hofstadter, 1973). Israel asserted its occupation of Palestine land including Jerusalem, and the Palestine refugee dilemma became an inextricable problem that has continued up until the present day. The Israeli forces heavily defeated the Arab coalition, which consisted of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The war ended in six days, thus it is also called the-six-day war.

The developments, which ended up with a war in the pre-war period, were various. One of the most prominent incidents were the systematic waves of Jewish migration waves to Palestine known as “Aliyah”, which dated back to 1882, and aimed to change the population balance in favor of Israel. This systematic settlement

policy increasingly applied after the first Arab-Israeli War, thus the changing situation raised conflicts between the two sides. As a result of this the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 (see Hamid, 1975). Thus the Palestine nation initiated its own resistance apart from Egypt. After the PLO came into being the tension between Palestine and Israel increased gradually.

One of the other reasons for the war was the water dispute issue between Israel and the Arab countries over the Jordan River and the Golan Heights. Israel put the National Water Carrier Plan into effect to resolve its own water shortage. In response to the Arabs declared the Arab Diversion Plan (ADP) in the same year (Shemes, 2004:1-5 and 36). A private army formed by the coalition Arab countries (the UAR, Lebanon and Jordan) was formed to protect the ADP. This measure was taken specifically because Israel had sabotaged the previous dam projects of Arabs. Arabs countermeasures increased the tension between the sides.

The Arab countries desired to change the streambed of the Jordan River in order to leave Israel at a disadvantage regarding the water supply issue. Besides its function as a water supply, the Jordan River takes an important place in religious terms for Jews because in the *Tanakh* (Hebrew Bible) it was mentioned as being in the territory of 'The Promised Land', given by God. Thus, due to its religio-strategic importance, Israel perceived the moves of the Arabs to be a vital threat (see Akçali and Kocamaz, 2013).

The relevant causes of the war related with Egypt were that Nasser's intention to recover the Egyptian economy and his eroded prestige by use of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, particularly over Jerusalem. A possible victory against Israel would strengthen his position in domestic politics, thus it prevented the rise of the opposition in Egypt. Furthermore, Egypt and also Nasser could preserve their leading positions among the Arab countries. The victory might also put Egypt forward as a leading figure in the Muslim World.

The Israeli Air Force destroyed the coalition state's air bases in sudden unexpected raids. The Arab coalition, whose air forces were also destroyed, could not



resist the Israeli forces. Therefore, the 1967 War ended on its sixth day. Israel captured the Sinai, and the Suez Canal became the new border between Egypt and Israel. Another boundary change occurred between Jordan and Israel, and the Jordan River turned into the new borderline. Moreover, Israel took control of the Golan Heights from Syria. Consequently, Israel enlarged her borders to four times the size they were before the war, and 21 percent of the Palestine lands remained under Arab control (Mansfield, 1991:237).

Nasser declared that he took the all responsibility for the “setback” after the Israeli defeat. He also announced that he would surrender his political position and would continue his life as an ordinary citizen (Stephens, 1971:506). After the declaration, millions gathered in the streets of Cairo and shouted “*Nasser, Nasser, don’t leave us, we need you*” (quoted in Stephens, 1971:507). The following day, Nasser withdrew his resignation and decided to continue in politics.

After the war, the Egyptian economy, which was already bad, had worsened. Nasser’s Egypt lost huge prestige not only in the Arab region, but also in the Islamic world. Above all, the Arab world understood that they could not ignore the Israeli existence in the region, and the Palestine issue became an inextricable problem, which has since occupied the world's attention.

#### **2.1.3.2. The Sadat Era**

After Nasser’s sudden death on September 28 1970, Anwar Al-Sadat became the third President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Under the Sadat administration, Egypt began to shift its policies not only in domestic politics but also in foreign politics. In domestic politics, Sadat stayed close to Islamic institutions in order to consolidate his regime against the leftist and Nasserist oppositions. The religious groups found an opportunity to strengthen their positions with the new government because of Sadat’s religious sensitivity. He also derived benefits from these ties in regional policies (Warburg, 1982:135).

As mentioned above, Sadat had given clues that he would not follow Nasserist policies. While Egypt was undergoing another war with Israel, he was seeking an alternative way to solve Egypt's chronic problems inherited from the previous era. Hinnebusch stresses the softening policies in the Egyptian politics during Sadat's Era, including the Israel issue (Hinnebusch, 1981:443-444). To him, while Egypt was an *"authoritarian nationalist populist state"* under Nasser's regime, it began to form itself as a *"post populist sociopolitical state"*. In spite of defending all threats against the strong presidency, Sadat intended to create a *'state of law and institution'* under his regime. He encouraged a controlled transition to pluralist and liberal policies instead of the old regime's policies. Despite this transition, Sadat forestalled any attempts to undermine his presidential control of the state; for example, the multi-party system.

Sadat also followed his policies in a very different way to Nasser's. Unlike Nasser's highly activist and interventionist style of presidency both in domestic and foreign politics, Sadat preferred flexible and tolerant policies towards the elite groups. Hinnebusch summarized the policy differences between Nasser and Sadat in his article (1981:445):

*"Nasir wanted to transform Egypt, even if this required running roughshod over vested elite interests; much of his activism and interventionism was a response to the natural tendency of these elites to resist and deflect his goals. Sadat accepts the status quo and with it the right of elite interests to defend and advance themselves incrementally, as long as this does not encroach on presidential prerogatives. Sadat was aware of the resentment in elite circles at Nasir's interventionist, domineering style. Part of his support from the elite has depended on maintaining a lower presidential profile in state and society".*

In this respect, Sadat began to work with a new constitution. The constitution, which was adopted on 11 September 1971, enlarged the individual freedoms such as religious rights, freedom of expression, and the press. Moreover, the new constitution

re-defined the Arab Socialism and substituted it with scientific socialism (Beattie, 2000:83). Most importantly, Sadat took a step to build a state in which the institution and the rule of law were the superior elements. Thus, the country's revolutionary mode was evolved upon a much more democratic path.

Furthermore, Sadat changed the structure of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). He let it represent a more diverse cross-section of people than before. The ASU's new general secretariat consisted of people who had diverse ideological backgrounds, from Marxists to the Muslim Brotherhood. He followed new policies, which adjusted regime-civilian relations. In a meeting with student representatives, Sadat declared that as the government they would allow student activities to become more independent. Soon after, the Interior Minister declared that over 130 political inmates would be released from prison. The government held out an olive branch to social movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, because the majority of the released inmates were members of the MB. It did this in order to increase its influence (Beattie, 2000:79-81; and Marsot, 2007:163). Sadat formed his new alliances to deal with Nasser's ideologies.

After the 1973 Arab – Israeli War (see next section), Sadat initiated a great effort to build peace and approach to the West. He ignited a transition to a new Egypt but in a controlled way. One of the prominent reforms that Sadat undertook was that of the National Democratic Party which replaced the Arab Socialist Union in 1978, right after the transition to a multi-party system, which was restricted to five political parties, for the first time since 1952. Ibrahim stated “*it seemed well-suited to the new economic liberalization, but it was also an overdue response to a demand of Egypt's middle classes*” (2002:139). In short, Sadat evolved Egypt's path from Arab Socialist Nationalism towards controlled liberalism, both politically and economically (Beattie, 2000:180).

### *Sadat and Foreign Politics*

Sadat was well aware that the Nasser's policy was isolating Egypt both in the region and world politics. In this sense, he apparently revealed that he would follow a different path to form a new Egypt, which is prosperous and peaceful. The signs of the change had appeared before the 1973 Arab – Israeli War. He delivered a message, which highlighted living together in peace, yet was not considered seriously by the USA and Israel due to the 1973 War (Ibrahim, 2002:38). When Israel Air Forces shot down thirteen Syrian jets in the same year, Sadat and his allies (Syria and Jordan) were quick to convene a meeting to determine the steps to be taken about the Israel issue (Marsot, 2007:156). Hence, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war overshadowed his message of goodwill.

While Sadat and his allies continued the preparations for war, the Saudis and the Soviets supported them from the back seat. The Saudis undertook the cost of re-equipping the armies, and the Soviets provided them with war missiles, including the training of the Egyptian soldiers in how to use the missiles (Marsot, 2007:157). However, Sadat had requested the immediate departure of Russian military personnel from Egypt before the war. Marsot claims that the reason for such a request was still unknown, but Sadat might have intended to gain American support to refrain from the war situation (2007:157).

Unfortunately the sides of the dispute fought in 1973. What distinguished this war from the others was that the Arab coalition aimed to get back the territories and to regain the prestige that they lost in the 1967 war, rather than eradicate Israel or capture Jerusalem. The 1973 War began under the influence of this understanding.

The Egypt-Syria coalition attacked the Israeli fronts located in the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights on one of the holiest day of the Jewish year: Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement. The Israeli forces were caught unprepared for these attacks, and in a short time period Egypt captured some of the Israeli defense lines across the Suez Canal and Syrian took control of the Golan Heights. Israeli forces made progress in

the second week of the war. When they were about to take the control of the war, the Soviets provided a huge support to save Egypt in October 20. Moreover, the Arab countries, which were not involved in the war, demonstrated their support for Egypt with the oil boycott (Rabinovich, 1984:58-59). Due to the intervention of the Soviets and the USA on the side of Israel the war ended uncertainly.

### *The Open Door Policy and The Israeli Peace*

In the late years of Nasser's presidency, his policies came to a deadlock. The state sector became a cumbersome structure, which was far from efficient. Agriculture could not be improved to the desired level due to lack of irrigation. The domestic market nearly came to an end. In addition to these troubles, due to the bulky and corrupted bureaucracy, the system reached an impasse. These conditions pushed Sadat to find a way to get the country out of this dilemma.

In this context, Sadat followed a different path, "*the open door*" policy (Infitah), after the 1973 war (see Beattie, 2000:147). As Aulas summarizes: "*The 'open door' policy (Infitah) followed trends already underway to restructure the system and escape from the serious crisis that had arisen. Officially proclaimed right after the October War of 1973, the Infitah was accompanied by a turning towards the West and away from the Soviet Union, dramatized by the earlier expulsion of Soviet military advisers and confirmed by the reliance on the United States as mediator...*(1982:6-7)". Sadat followed unique policies during his administration, and Egypt gradually approached the West.

As a result of these policy transitions, he accepted to actualize a peace agreement with Israel. The peace agreement was negotiated in the Camp David Accords from September 1978 to March 1979. At the end of this process, Egypt and Israel signed the peace treaty. Egypt was the first Arab state to officially recognize Israeli independence. In response Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula including the oil fields, with the condition of the disarmament of the Peninsula. Thus Egypt gained not

only political but also economic benefits from the peace agreement (Quandt, 1986:363-364).

The reactions to the Egypt-Israeli Peace were different in domestic and foreign politics. The Soviets officially gave a negative response to the peace agreement. The Majority of the Arab countries including Syria, Libya and the PLO condemned Sadat's peace initiative. On the other hand, the western countries including the USA and the European zone showed their appreciations of the peace. Although there were different opinions about the peace in domestic politics, the majority of Egyptian society was negative, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, the Marxists and leftist Nasserists harshly criticized the peace agreement developments. Moreover, the radical Islamists were accusing Sadat of treason in the case of Palestine (Beattie, 2000:228-236).

### *The Benefits of the Peace*

The Israeli peace was the fruit of Sadat's foresight. He was well aware that Egypt was isolated in the region due to Nasser's policies, and it was getting obvious that as an Arab state they could not stop the rise of the Israel. The 1967 war, indeed, was concrete evidence of this fact. Nasser therefore shifted the axis of the country towards to the West to end the Egypt-Israeli conflict, which might have cost him his political life. However, the Israeli peace brought about Sadat's end not only politically. On the anniversary of the October 1973 War in October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated during the military parade. The person who killed Sadat shouted, "*I killed the pharaoh!*" after his bloody attack. Thus, Sadat's era came to the end (Beattie, 2000:276).

An American correspondent revealed "*many people in Cairo expressed less outrage over the assassination than over the week's cancellation of movies, soccer games and regular television programming (including the popular series 'Dallas')*" (Baker, 1990:2). That was the attitude of the Egyptian people towards Sadat's

assassination. It was also a prominent clue as to how Egyptian people internalized the Israeli peace.

#### ***2.1.3.3. The Mubarak Era***

Air Chief Marshall and the Vice-President Hosni Mubarak elected the 4<sup>th</sup> president of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 14 October 1981 after Sadat's assassination. Unlike his predecessors Mubarak dealt with his rivals during the first years of his rule. In this respect he released the political prisoners who were arrested during Sadat's era as a gesture of goodwill in order to strengthen his position. Mubarak had struggled with two important issues when he became president. According to Steven A. Cook, the first one was that he was inexperienced; the second that he had strong rivals such as Mohamed Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala who stood in the way of his consolidation of power (Cook, 2012:153-154). In this sense, he followed moderate policies until he eliminated his rivals and consolidated his regime.

Mubarak's three-decade rule can be examined as three separate periods in itself. First, in his early years in office, Mubarak followed a softer policy than in the previous era. The first free parliamentary election during the republican era took place in Egypt in 1984. The free election was a sign that Mubarak had allowed political liberalization (Blaydes, 2011:68). Since 1984, apart from the National Democratic Party (NDP) no other political parties have allowed to participate in elections except for the religious-based political parties. Mubarak had complete control over parliament, thus due to the legal regulation other nominees could not meet the conditions to run for presidential election (Marsot, 2007:171).

Beside this, Mubarak's main misfortune was the economic situation of the country. He had inherited severe economic problems from his predecessors. In particular, Sadat's "open-door" economic policies had caused negative effects on the Egyptian economy despite their positive contributions. When Mubarak came to power, on contrary to her \$40 billion (approximately) gross domestic product, Egypt

had \$22 billion external debts (Cook, 2012:159). In correspondence to the increasing population, the economic growth remained weak. The external debt increased by more than double, reaching \$46 billion in 1988. This unrecoverable situation prompted Mubarak to seek solutions.

In this regard, Mubarak began to follow more pragmatic foreign policies to fix the economy and to pay the state's debts. He improved relations with the USA after the Israeli peace, and Egypt became the second highest-ranking US foreign aid recipient country after Israel. In addition to US foreign aid, which started in 1979, Egypt began to receive military aid from the US after 1986. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, *"between 1948 and 2011, the United States provided Egypt with a total of \$71.6 billion in bilateral foreign aid, including \$1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987 to the present"* (Sharp, 2013). In spite of the US foreign aid, the bad economic conditions forced Mubarak to sign an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Yet the state's debts were increasing gradually through the new debts incurred in order to pay the previous ones.

Apart from the US foreign aid, one of the Mubarak's most pragmatic moves was to participate in Operation of Desert Shield and Desert Storm alongside the USA against Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq. In the aftermath of this collaboration, Egypt's \$20 billion debts to US and Arab credit institutions were cancelled. The USA also persuaded the European creditor to forgive \$10 billion, half of Egypt's debts. Moreover, lower interest rate credits were provided to Egypt by the international market to improve her economy (Cook, 2012:161-162). The financial returns of the Gulf War to the Egyptian economy had been over \$30 billion of debt cancellation and hot money flow into Egyptian market with reasonable interest rates. Thus the USA and its allies largely compensated for the country's debt burden.

Apart from Nasser's 'Arab Socialism' and Sadat's 'open door policy' Mubarak did not attempt to set up any political or economic ideology except for the liberal *laissez-faire* and the open market. Besides these, he tried to find temporary solutions to solve Egypt's problems. He was in close relations with the USA, and followed



pragmatist policies rather than any ideologies. As noted above, he mainly dealt with the Egyptian economy. Eventually the bad economic conditions increased the democratic demands, and as I will discuss in the further chapters, Mubarak again tried to solve the problems temporarily, without any long-term plans.

In the second decade of his rule, Mubarak faced with another problem, the rise of Islamist extremism. In the early 90's, the fundamental terrorist groups, specifically Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, emerged into internal politics as a reaction to Egypt's pro-American and pro-Israel foreign policies. The origins of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya dated back Sadat's era when the student associations were at the peak of their power. These associations had a wide Islamic sphere of belief, which varied from moderate to extreme. The new generation of the Muslim Brothers followed different paths as well. The religious groups who followed the extremist way to enhance Islamic perception both socially and politically formed Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya towards the end of the Sadat Era (Dalacoura, 2011:112-113).

These fundamentalist groups targeted journalists, politicians and foreign tourists during their bloody campaigns. Roughly 1,300 people killed at the time of these attacks in the 1990s. The Egyptian government reacted to the Islamist extremists' attacks by taking various measures. For instance, the government conducted a campaign to inform the society about the illegitimacy of these violent attacks. In doing so, the highest religious authorities such as Al-Azhar, and the Grand Mufti of Egypt supported the government with their declarations. They pointed out that there was no place in Islam for the harming of innocent people. Moreover, the media, specifically the state-run ones, declared that the groups who carried out attacks on innocent citizens did not follow an Islamic path, in parallel with the declaration of the religious authorities (Cook, 2012: 165). Although the Muslim Brotherhood did not engage in any violence at that time, the government took some measures to weaken the movement. Furthermore, in a declaration, the Interior Ministry of Egypt mentioned that they did not consider the MB to be different from the other radical groups even though they were not any part of those terrorist attacks

(Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193). Obviously this declaration was made to prevent the resurgence of the MB among Egyptian society.

In the third decade of Mubarak's rule, the economic and political reforms came to the forefront of the country's agenda<sup>18</sup>. Indeed, the economic reforms had been a hot issue in Egypt for decades. Apart from this, the political reforms began to be discussed in the public sphere. One of the prominent reasons for that was the USA's invasion of Iraq for the purpose of "exporting democracy" (for exporting democracy see Schraeder, 2002). This development forced Mubarak to revise the current political situation of the country in accordance with the rising political reform demands which had already began in the second half of the 1990's and were being raised by the opposition groups including the MB, who were considered to be the Mubarak regime's major opponents.

The economic measures taken by the government maintained temporary economic growth during the second half of the 2000s. Egypt followed more liberal economic policies in this decade. Firstly, the government attached great importance to privatization. Privatization of the state-owned enterprises increased, and the government benefited from the privatized companies by almost \$7 billion. The number of employees in the state-owned companies had decreased by almost half, and the new number went down to under six hundred thousand (Cook, 2012:176). Secondly, the government decided to change the fixed exchange rate system in order to attract foreign investors and stimulate the economy in respect of economic liberalization. Thus, the government abandoned the exchange rate system, which was unified in late 1980 (Cook, 2012:176). Yet the further developments were contrary to the purpose of the intended results. The Egyptian exports became increasingly expensive compared to the world average as a result of the floating exchange rate.

The reflection of the liberal economic policies on the Egyptian economy showed their effects within a short time (United Nations, 2010). The GDP rate increased from 4.5 to 7.2 between 2004 and 2007, and the unemployment rate

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<sup>18</sup> I will discuss the political reforms in the following sections.

declined slightly more than 1 percent within the same period and remained above 9 percent. In spite of the official unemployment rate statistics, it was believed that the real rates could be about twice as high as the current data (Cook, 2012:176). The high population growth rate might be an indicator of the hidden unemployment.

On the other hand, the inflation rates increased from 11.3 percent to 18.3 percent between 2004 and 2008 after declining to 4.9 percent in 2005 (United Nations, 2010). Despite the temporary economic growth rate, the rising inflation and privatization put ordinary Egyptian citizens in a hard economic situation. The US Dollar had been overvalued relative to the Egyptian Pound, thus the purchasing power of ordinary citizens declined. While the Egyptian economy was growing relatively and unsustainably, the income distribution arose unequally. As a result, in one way, this unbalanced income distribution brought the end of the Mubarak regime afterwards of the mass public demonstration, which is commonly known as the Arab Spring. I will discuss this subject in the following section.

## **2.2. Social, Political and Economical Transformation and The Elements of the Transitions**

In this section I analyze the structural factors; the political, social and economic transformation. Undoubtedly, transformations of societies occur under certain demands resulting from the needs of the people, or in line with the desires / purposes of the ruling elites. In this sense, I aim to analyze the multi dimensional transformation of Egypt by taking into consideration historical factors, state and social actors.

### ***2.2.1. Structural Factors: Socio-economic Transformation***

The people of Egypt lived with a dilemma until 1952: the estrangement from their rulers. They were alienated from their rulers for a large part of their own history.

After the Arab conquest of Egypt during the Umar rule, the second caliph of the Muslims, the centuries-long Arabization and Islamization of Egypt began (Marsot, 2007:2). Egyptians had lived under the rule of the non-Egyptians. In this respect, the 1952 Egyptian Revolution was a milestone in Egyptian history.

The Arab Nationalism became a state ideology during the republican era. In fact the rise of the native Egyptians in internal politics had already begun with the previous developments. In this context, the roots of the Egyptianization of domestic politics stemmed from three different factors; the rule of the Wafd Party, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 23 July 1952 Egyptian Revolution.

First, as noted earlier, the prominent nationalist resistance, led by Zaghlul, coincided with the time right before the declaration of independence from British occupation. After the declaration of the constitutional monarchy in 1922, Zaghlul's Wafd Party came to power in 1924. What made this development notable was that Zaghlul was the first fellah<sup>19</sup> to occupy such a high position in Egyptian politics. Thereafter, he replaced the non-Egyptian elites, such as Turkish and Circassian bureaucratic elites, with Egyptians (Marsot, 2007:99). Thus, with this alteration the seed of the native Egyptian elites had begun to be planted.

The second prominent incident, which turned in favor of the native Egyptians, was the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. What compelled the British to negotiate an agreement was the rising demonstration series that shook Egypt in the last quarter of 1935 and early 1936. Specifically the Patriotic Front, which was formed from all political parties, introduced a plea to enhance the Constitution. During the reconciliations, the lack of an Egyptian military came to the fore. As a result of the negotiations, the modernization of the Egyptian Army including an increase in the number of military personnel was determined (Morsy, 1984:68, 76-77). This development allowed the recruitment of native Egyptians as civilian bureaucrats and soldiers in large numbers. Hence, the Egyptians found a substantial opportunity to fill

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<sup>19</sup> A Fellah is "a peasant or agricultural laborer in an Arab country (as Egypt)" (Merriam-Webster 2014).

the gap in the number of native Egyptians in the military. The army, strengthened in the favor of the people of Egypt, turned into the strongest premise of the Egyptian Revolution.

The Egyptianization of Egypt grew toward political and economic maturity in the aftermath of the military takeover and these developments: First, the constitutional monarch was replaced with a republican regime called the Arab Republic of Egypt. As discussed earlier, the Arab identity of Egypt was institutionalized by the new constitution. Although Egypt ruled various temporary constitutions until 1971, the Arab identity of Egypt had been mentioned steadily. After, the prominent figures of the Free Officers were appointed to high-ranking positions in the new regime. In parallel, the political elites of the old regime were removed from their positions.

#### *Nasser and Politics*

After of the Egyptian Revolution, Egypt began to transform politically, economically and socially. The new regime re-built the country from top to bottom. The first effort of the political transformation was the regime change. A bicameral presidential system was formed instead of the constitutional monarchy. In addition, the new regime was supported with a new constitution. According to Article 1: *“Egypt is an independent and sovereign Arab state. She is a democratic republic. The Egyptian people is a part of the Arab nation”* (quoted in Abdel-Malek, 1968:116). Thus the new constitution planted the seed of the nationalist policies into Egyptian politics. Arab nationalism had become a dominant element of the Egyptian politics from this point on during the Nasser era.

Egypt’s vague situation forced Nasser to re-evaluate its political and economic policies. As mentioned earlier, one of the prominent changes that Egypt had faced was this political shift. The Free Officers’ regime, which was without any ideology and long-term political plan, became stuck after a short time (Goldschmidt, 2008:144

and Vatikiotis, 1978:126). One of the main reasons for that was hidden under the founding philosophy of the Free Officers. At the beginning, they mainly focused on toppling the kingdom, whose origin was not from the people of Egypt. They addressed the other problem so as to eradicate the imperial influence of the British over Egypt. After reaching the purposes, the Officers faced with the problem of being without an ideology. Therefore, after unsuccessful policies such as the formation of the UAR, Nasser needed to change the many ideas that he stated in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Forming a state ideology and surpassing strong groups such as the MB were some prominent examples of this transition.

The evolution of Arab Nationalism had been affected by various incidents such as the UAR and insufficient economic developments. Specifically, the de facto dissolution of the UAR<sup>20</sup>, which diminished Nasser's prestige, had a tremendous effect upon his domestic policies. According to Robert Stephens, Nasser re-formulated Arab Nationalism with 'Arab Socialism' and "*passed from defensive to the attack*" (1971:343). He launched new socio-economic policies under the influence of this new formulation. Thus, the revolution that began without any ideological basis had its own ideology, which was never to compromise the liberation of the country.

Nasser, to Stephens, took three lessons from the failure of the UAR (1971:345). First, he believed that he was calm enough towards the action of the reactionaries, which proved that they were one of the imperialists' significant supporters. Second, the regime could not transform itself to struggle against the reactionaryism due to the paralyzing effect of the bureaucracy. Thus the state structure must be reconstructed. Third, Nasser thought that to allow the 'reactionary forces' to join the National Union had turned into a façade. Therefore, the National Union had to be prepared as an effective instrument of the revolution. This was the beginning of the changes that Nasser implemented.

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<sup>20</sup> The UAR officially came to an end on September 2, 1971, and the name of the country changed as the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Right after these developments, which concluded the consolidation of the Free Officer's regime, Egyptian politics went into another phase in which the state bourgeoisie emerged (Johnson, 1972:4). In this respect, some prominent people including politicians from the old regime, the Wafd Party and big landowners were arrested. The number of the people arrested reached 12,000; many of them were banned from politics, lost their civic rights and had their assets confiscated, including the landowners (Stephens, 1971:346). Amongst those who were arrested were many members of the Muslim Brothers and the Marxists. According to Nasser the reasons the arrests were that the MB had '*a secret army ready to descend on the people*', and the Communists followed the instructions of a foreign power (Stephens, 1971:348). Whereas Nasser was strengthening to the new state bourgeoisie, he was also dealing with the opponents of the regime.

#### *Nasser and the Economy*

Egypt also began to transform its economy with Nasser. As an agrarian society, Nasser's first achievement had been the Agrarian Reform. With the agrarian reform law, Nasser redistributed the farmlands to citizens. He aimed to evaluate the empty lands, which belong to big landlords who lived in urban areas, and give them to the people who lived in rural areas. According to the law, a former landlord was allowed to hold a maximum of 200 feddans (a unit of area which is equal to 1.038 acres). Thus, the rest of the lands could be distributed to the small farmers to revitalize agriculture across the country (Stephens, 1971: 116-117 and Hofstadter, 1973b: 45-47).

Besides evaluating the Egyptian lands, Nasser was aiming for two things at the same time with the Agrarian Reform. Firstly, with the redistribution of the lands, he was aiming to improve the status of the Egyptian farmers. Secondly and more importantly, he was aiming to alter the stratification of feudal society, which meant breaking the power of the current land bourgeoisie. In this context, 900,000 feddans,

almost 15 percent of Egypt's arable lands, were distributed to 1.3 million of Egypt's poorest men (Ibrahim, 2002:121).

Saad Eddin Ibrahim states that the Revolution of 23 July 1952 turned in to a “*fully-fledged social revolution*”, which transformed the structure of the society simultaneously with the character of the state. He continues: “*The July Revolution promptly forged a sociopolitical coalition of three social classes: the middle petite bourgeoisie, the urban working class, and the rural poor. The target enemy of this coalition was Egypt's upper-class landed bourgeoisie*” (Ibrahim, 2002:117).

Industrialization had been another challenge for the new regime. In order to recover from the country's harsh economic conditions, the government had intended to implement economic development plans for the following decade. Thus, the National Planning Committee was established in 1955, and right after that the two five-year plans were adopted, but only one of the plans could be implemented (Marsot, 2007:142 and Abdel-Malek, 1968:109).

The Egyptianization of the financial sector was the new Egypt's other prominent economic development. According to the law, which was promulgated in 1957, the government nationalized all foreign commercial banks and insurance companies. All foreign financial institutions were owned by Egyptian capital and placed under Egyptian management (Abdel-Malek, 1968:108-109).

At the end of 1962 all financial markets, heavy industries and the other significant enterprises became state-owned. Moreover, the government was obliged to accept the state's 51 percent participation, including the management, in small enterprises. By 1963, the industries, which were controlled by the private sector, declined from 56 percent to 20 percent in comparison with the previous year (Johnson, 1972:7). Thus the hegemony of the state bourgeoisie consolidated the old regime's bourgeoisie. In the aftermath of the new economic regulations, on one hand, the country's economy was turning its face toward the side of socialism; on the other, state capitalism was increasing (Marsot, 2007:143).



In short, the establishment process of the Nasser's regime can be summarized in four steps: "*the consolidation of the regime, the emergence of the state bourgeoisie, the hegemony of the state bourgeoisie, and contradictions in the capitalist system* (Johnson, 1972: 4-8)".

### *Sadat and Change*

In the context of state-religion relations, Sadat followed similar but less oppressive policies in comparison with the previous term. As noted before, he also aimed to gain benefit from diverse socio-political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to consolidate his position while he was struggling with the people who embraced the Nasserist policies. Sadat, in fact, was in need of a less intense internal politics to implement his vision instead of Nasser's former policies, including the agrarian reforms. Therefore, he adopted more paternal policies toward the Islamists.

In his inaugural speech, Sadat had given the clues about an alteration: "*There is an edifice we shall continue to build as we catch up with progress*" (Baker, 1978:132). Yet, the real politics did not let him implement what he wanted to do immediately. At least, for the external politics, he needed to stabilize the Israel issue to grab the attention of the Western countries.

Right after the war of 1973, Sadat dragged Egypt's path towards the west and carried out the "open door" policy to end Egypt's isolation in foreign politics. With the "open door" strategy, which was not only political, Egypt began to evolve Arab Socialism into pragmatic liberalism. Sadat's himself defined this transformation as '*The Correction of the Revolution*' (Cook, 2012:119; Baker, 1978:46-47). Accordingly, Sadat followed a moderate foreign policy in order to attract foreign investments. He even promoted the Israeli peace in this direction in spite of the domestic (Islamist and nationalist) and foreign (Muslim countries, in particular Arab states) pressure.

Sadat's "opening" strategy brought short-term economic progress with the arrival of foreign investors. The economic guarantees, which were given to foreign investors by the Law 43 of 1974, did not give the desired outcome in economic areas. Egypt continued to struggle with high budget deficit; however, Sadat's numerous liberal practices improved the private sector, and this resulted in the revival of the old bourgeoisie of the liberal age, which was the period of 1922 to 1952 (Baker, 1978: 149).

On the other hand, a series of social protests called the "Bread Riots" shook the country on 18-19 January 1977. A government announcement about reducing the subvention on staple foods such as sugar, gas and rice induced the mass street riots. Rather than the price correction, to Raymond William Baker, "*more fundamentally, the disturbances originated with the social strains generated by Sadat's open-door policy*" (1978:165). Similarly, the peace process with Israel and the close US relations increased public disapproval against Sadat's policy. The more Egypt grew close to the USA - the Israeli peace process in particular - the more she faced the rising extremist Islamic opposition (for more info see Kepel, 1985). The disapproval turned into antagonism in a short time. As a consequence of this a member of the Islamist group called "*Tanzim Al-Jihad*" assassinated President Sadat.

### *Mubarak*

Compared to the previous years, Egypt had a more stable situation in foreign policy during the Mubarak era. After the Israeli peace, Egypt did not face with a war situation such as what she had faced during the Nasser and Sadat eras. What makes this so important was the fact of Egypt's poverty, with which it had been struggling for decades. Being away from any war concern could have been an important opportunity to recover the economy and the elimination of poverty, which became chronic. On the contrary, the internal debts of Egypt increased by almost 50 percent

in the first half of the decade in spite of having 'rentier revenues' obtained from foreign aid, oil and the Suez Canal (Amin, 2011:57 and Soliman, 2012:43).

Apart from Sadat's liberal policies Mubarak followed a planned economy to clinch his power. In this regard, he preferred to launch centrally controlled economic programs and increase Egypt's close relationship with the USA. Galal Amin states that the reason for this close friendship was a result of the Israeli peace. In his opinion Mubarak had to do this because the Arab countries stopped granting financial support due to the Israeli peace agreement (Amin, 2011:57). The bad economy worsened after the decline of oil revenues due to the sudden drop of the oil prices in 1986. In the following year, Egypt had to adopt the IMF's Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program (Amin, 2011:60). This development was intended as a means to leave the current economic program and adopt liberal economic policies (Soliman, 2012:45). As noted earlier, in June 1990, prior to the first Gulf War, the foreign debts of Egypt exceeded \$47 billion and it reduced by around \$24 billion in four years (Amin, 2011:58; Cook, 2012:161-162).

In addition to the weak economic situation, Egypt struggled with another problem: the high rate of population growth. Between 1980-1990 the population of Egypt rose from 44.9 million to 56.3 million. Within the same period, the average population growth was over 2.25 percent according to the United Nations' World Population Prospects (cited in ESCWA, 2014). The population growth rate has not been under 1.5 percent since 1990. As a developing country, this fact increased the unemployment rate in Egypt amongst the young population.

As noted earlier, with the effect of the USA's invasion of Iraq, Egypt suddenly adopted liberal economic policies in 2004, when its population was around 70 million. By this time, Mubarak took under control of living standards by not allowing rapid price increases and sudden decreases in quality of life for the lower and middle classes (Soliman, 2012:46). After the newly adopted liberal economic policies, the American style shopping malls, hotels, and amusement parks American consumer style spread around Cairo. Continuing privatization and a relatively increasing growth

rate, did not reflect the lifestyle of the lower classes. As Cook stated, “...*high-end shopping centers, gated communities, private jets, and alleged progressive political change was a reality that only a privileged few actually enjoyed. To the vast majority, the plenty available at a place like City Stars is unattainable on wages that average a mere \$2,000 a year, not to mention those sixteen million Egyptians who live on about \$2 a day* (2012:175)”.

The obvious changes in the life standards of the different segments of the society consequently increased the social discomfort among the Egyptian society. Here this question comes to mind: What was the reason for this discomfort? It is obvious that Egypt had been struggling with poverty even before the republican era. Amin states that it was relatively easy to deal with the differences between people who lived in villages and cities. The government at that time kept the importing of goods under control so that everyone had to use same materials. This situation was also similar when people built or decorated their houses (Amin, 2011:70). Mubarak was also following the similar policies until he decided to adopt liberal economic policies. As a result of the changing mentality, the consumption pattern of society had been changed noticeably. The lifestyles of the lower and upper classes began to change, and the changing life standards became more visible. Thus, to deal with the lower class became much harder than before.

### *Mubarak's Reforms*

The developments occurred in the Middle East after the invasion of Iraq affected the authoritarian political structure of Egypt. The discourse of exporting democracy and the worsening economy caused an increase of democratic demands among Egyptian society. Additionally, the USA demanded a democratic transition from Egypt. Moreover, the liberal discourses of the Egyptian politicians both in economical and political arenas necessitated a much more democratic management in the country.

In this respect, the regime initiated some political reforms to implement a controlled transition to more democratic governance with the directions of Mubarak in the late 2006. For instance, the reforms re-define citizenship and allow for the establishing of new political parties (Najjar, 2011:10). There was another remarkable development concerning the presidential elections. Despite some restrictions, the new reforms allowed other candidates to run for the presidency apart from Mubarak.

The democratization drive of Egypt set up the constitutional amendments. One of the important changes that took places with these amendments was the secular definition of citizenship. The definition had a religious notion - "*Egypt is a Muslim nation*" - removed from the constitution, and replaced by a secular citizenship concept. 'Egyptian nationality' became the fundamental basis of the modern democratic Egypt (Najjar, 2011:10). This religiously- based definition was put in the constitution in order to reduce the reaction of the Muslim majority towards the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace under Sadat's presidency. Sadat's open door policy and the definition of the citizenship in the Constitution created social and economic inequalities among the Egyptian nation. Thus Egyptian nationalism took its final form and embraced the whole of Egyptian society without any religious references.

Furthermore, after the new legal regulations, amendments allowed for the forming of new political parties. The amendment requires that '*any political activity or political parties shall not be based on religious authority or foundation, or any discrimination on the basis of race or gender*' (Amended Article 5 cited in Najjar, 2011:11). Political analysts agreed that the main target of the amendment was to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood, who received 88 seats in the 2005 elections as independents. As noted above, Mubarak allowed the democratic transition in a controlled way.

Another reform brought significant changes to the presidential election. The new regulations led other nominees to run for presidential election. According to the Constitution, only the People's Assembly could nominate the President before the amendment. Since the National Democratic Party dominated parliament, no one else

could run for the presidential elections besides Mubarak. With the new amendment, a nominee who has an affiliation with a political party and receives the support of 250 elected officials may be able to run for the presidential elections (Cook, 2012:185 and Najjar, 2011:13). In spite of the legal regulation, there are still some restrictions in the new amendments. In order to nominate a candidate for presidency, the political party has to have a minimum of 3 percent of the seats in each assembly or 6 percent of the seats in one of the assemblies. Moreover, the political party has to be founded five years before the date of the nomination of its candidate (Najjar, 2011:13).

Yet another controversial issue against democratization was Egypt's Law of Emergency and Anti-Terrorism. During the 2005 Presidential Election campaign, Mubarak promised to enhance the law in favor of the citizens. However, the newly amended Article 179 did not indicate any signs that the government released this power based on the law. More importantly, the context of the amended article allowed for the bypassing of basic human rights, as mentioned in Articles 41, 45 and 45 of the Constitution (Najjar, 2011:14-15; Brown, Dunne and Hamzawy, 2007:2).

According to the law, civilians could be tried in military courts for committing ordinary crimes such as those involving mass demonstrations. Due to this emergency law, the government faced harsh accusations of human rights violations (for more information see, The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2010). Moreover, the government extended the state emergency law for two more years in 2008 despite the decreasing terrorist attacks around the country.

### *The 25 January Revolution*

In late 2010 a series of public demonstrations, which originated from Tunisia, shook the North African countries. In short time, these demonstrations turned into national uprisings and spread to Libya and then Egypt. As a result of the mass demonstrations, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali left the country. A civil war broke out in Libya, and the Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi lost the war against the

opposition powers supported by multi-national UN forces. Gaddafi was caught by the opposition soldiers and killed.

On January 25, 2011 the demonstrations spread to Egypt. The demonstrators gathered in Tahrir Square, the symbol of the Egyptian Revolution, demanding “*bread, freedom and social justice (human dignity)*” (BBC, 2013). Unlike Libya and Syria, the Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak, preferred to step down on 11 February, and left the control of the country under the Supreme Council of the Armed Force (SCAF). Ahmad Shafiq was appointed as Prime Minister by the SCAF, and Mubarak’s 30-year-long rule ended.

## **2.3. Actors and Interests**

In this section, I discuss the actors and interests that had an influence on Egypt’s political and social environments since 1952. Unlike the Chapter I (Turkey), this section does not include the political actors as a separate heading due to the fact that Egypt had a single-party political life between 1952 and 2011. As a state actor, the Egyptian Military has a significant place in Egyptian politics. Therefore, I analyze the military under a private heading due to its importance.

### ***2.3.1. The Elites, Political and State Actors***

Until the Tahrir Square demonstrations, which caused the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, the 4<sup>th</sup> President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, a single-party political structure ruled the country. Although the state passed into multi-political life in the late years of Sadat, due to the restrictions in the constitution, only the NDP could run for presidential election. Other political parties, which have no religious affiliation, could only run for the parliamentary elections as a result of their low representative powers.

Prior to 1962, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), composed of Free Officers, was the main political actor under Gamal Abdel Nasser's presidency. Nasser, his successors Sadat and Mubarak and their political parties were the sole political actors in Egyptian politics with the support of the army. Hence the regime was also the sole determinant of the state actors and the elites.

Right after the revolution, the new regime established the Liberation Rally (LR) as the political organization instead of banned political party within the three-year transition period, in order to fill the vacuum of political representation (Stephens, 1971:121). As expected, the LR replaced the new political organization, the National Union (NU) in 1957. After the unsuccessful Arab Union initiative, Nasser re-organized the NU because he "*believed the regime was facing a real crisis*" (Stephens, 1971:344). To him, the successful military coup in Syria would encourage people who wanted to isolate Egypt from the entire Arab world. Moreover, the rivals of the regime who oppose the socialist changes would like to benefit the coup and might take it as a model. In this respect, Nasser reformulated Arab Nationalism and socialism under the National Charter and transformed the NU into the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962; creating a new ruling body which comprised five of his close associates with whom he took part in Egyptian Revolution (Stephens, 1971:344).

#### **2.3.1.1. Elites**

The year 1962 was a milestone for Egyptian political elites. The declaration of the National Charter formed new policies in domestic politics, which were separate from the previous ones, as stated in *the Philosophy of the Revolution* by Nasser. As it can be remember Nasser said "... *the political revolution must unite all elements of the nation, build them solidly together and instill in them the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole country* (1955:40)". In this respect, Nasser followed policies, which had ties with various segments of the society including the Muslim



Brotherhood (MB). The MB was at the same front during the Egyptian Revolution, and Nasser needed them to diminish the power of the royalist elites.

As stated above, after the failed attempt of the Arab Union (the UAR), Nasser began to follow more intense initiatives. To Stephen, Nasser believed that the regime had failed to form a proper system, befitting the spirit of the Egyptian revolution. He thought what caused this unintended result was the bureaucracy and its paralyzing effects on the revolutionary changes. He had complained of the existence of reactionaries; therefore he decided to rebuild the Egyptian revolution on the basis of socialist ideas (Stephens, 1971:345). In doing so, Nasser replaced the Free Officers with the old allies and the bureaucratic elites, and appointed them to significant positions including ministries.

As I mentioned earlier, not only Egyptian politics but also the economy was reshaped according to this new Arab Socialist ideology. Nasser targeted the feudalist landlords and the reactionaries in order not to create another crisis against the regime. Within the framework of the new Land Law, the arable lands were distributed to the poor farmers. Thousands of people including most of the landlords who were also politicians such as the former Wafd Party Secretary-General Fuad Serag Ed-din were arrested. The government confiscated some of these landlords' properties as well as their fortunes (Stephens, 1971:345-346). Furthermore, after the nationalization law, the share of the private sector in the economy declined to 20 percent in 1963 (Johnson, 1972:7). The Arab Socialist ideology, in short, created its own state bourgeoisie in Egypt composed of military based elites.

Johnson states:

*“It should be noted that the accession to power of the state bourgeoisie as managers, planners, and regulators of major sections of the economy did not completely dispossess of the old bourgeoisie. Although relegated to the position of junior partner with regard to industry, commerce, and transportation, they continued to control agriculture, real estate, and significant portions on commerce and transportation (Johnson, 1972:7).*

Specifically under the Sadat presidency, the old bourgeoisie had the opportunity to enhance their position in the Egyptian economy. Sadat and his Infitah policies introduced an economic and political environment to the old bourgeoisie to help them to regain their power.

While Sadat was implementing his new policies, he was also diminishing the power of the Free Officers. Since he did not intend to follow Nasserist policies, accordingly he lessened the influence of the Free Officers with retiring or appointing more peripheral positions to them (Hinnebusch, 1981:446). Thus, Sadat's Infitah policies indirectly paved the way for a proper environment on the road to a revival of the old bourgeoisie during Mubarak's presidency.

#### ***2.3.1.2. Political Actors***

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the sole political actors of the regime were the presidents and their political parties. The political structure, which consisted of a single party, began its journey with the Liberation Rally (LR) in the republican era. The LR transformed into the National Union (NU) and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1957 and 1962 respectively during Nasser's presidency.

After the formation of the ASU, the Egyptian Revolution, which had no political view, obtained an ideology, Arab Socialism. Although the Arab Nationalism was the main spirit of the revolution, it emerged as a natural cause of the intense British control over Egypt. It should be noted that the Egyptian Revolution was not based on any ideological tendencies in terms of its occurrence besides the raising of Arab Nationalism.

Sadat established a new political party, The National Democratic Party (NDP), in parallel with his 'open door' policy in 1978. A year before, although Egypt passed to a multi-party system, the NDP remained the dominant political party. (Goldschmidt, 2008:216). Although the other political parties were allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections, the NDP continued its dominance over

Egyptian politics until 2011 when the party was compulsorily dissolved by the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in the aftermath of the mass public demonstrations.

### *Al-Azhar*

Al-Azhar became an important state actor after losing its civilian structure with government co-options (Sika, 2012; Barraclough, 1998). The regime used religion and religious institutions, as a tool for the sake of consolidating Arab socialism and Al-Azhar thereby emerged as a new state actor in the post-1962 era. One of the reasons that increased the importance of Al-Azhar for the regime was the dissolving partnership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the government. As mentioned before, the MB was an ally of the Free Officers on the road to revolution. As a result of political failures, Nasser intended to eliminate the MB due to its becoming the main center of reactionaryism. In other words, Nasser placed the MB among the groups who undermined the socialist revolution because of their reactionary reflexes. To Stephens, “*Nasser claimed that the Muslim Brothers had been arrested and tried because they had ‘a secret army ready to descend on the people’* (Stephens, 1971:347-348)”. The clashes between the regime and the Brotherhood enabled Al-Azhar to increase their influence in social environments. Additionally, Al-Azhar’s influence over society increased after it acquired secular faculties in addition to religious ones. Thus Al-Azhar had the opportunity to interact with secular segments of the society.

The collaboration between the government and Al-Azhar was an important way of undermining the *ulamas*. Warburg points out this dependence (1982:135):

*“The importance of the Azharite establishment was also demonstrated in the frequent visits of members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), including Nasser, to the shaykhs of al-Azhar, and their not less frequent attendance at the al-Azhar Friday prayers. The result of this dependence was the delay in reforms aimed at curtailing the independent status of the ulama. A brief look at some of these reforms indicates that the gradual undermining of*

*the ulama's independence started with the abolition of the family waqfs, as early as 1952. But the next blow came only in January 1956, when the officers felt secure enough to abolish the shari'a courts, and in 1957 to nationalize the waqf khayri (public endowments), thus undermining the economic basis of the Islamic establishment, and hence curtailing its influence even further. The abolition of the shari'a courts was, according to al-Ahram, blessed by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Taj of al-Azhar as a 'liberating step'. Even more humiliating, as far as the Islamic establishment was concerned, was the reform of al-Azhar itself, in 1961, turning it into a government-controlled university. This act, bitterly opposed by many of the helpless ulama, received the official blessings of Shaykh al-Azhar himself, Mahmud Shaltut, who denounced the opposition for using Islam as a profession while '... the new law includes a solution for every field... It wants Islam to be revived, ulama to be of strong faith, living for its sake and not by means of it...' "*

Another reason was that the government needed to create mainstays for its new ideology, Arab socialism. As a religious country, the best way to support the regime in Egypt would be with the hand of religious support. Therefore, the government intended to control the Al-Azhar in order to be able to mobilize Islamic symbols according to political circumstances. Briefly, *"The government needs Al-Azhar to bestow upon it a semblance of Islamic legitimacy* (cited from Alrawi, 1994 in Barraclough, 1998:237)". More importantly, the government needed a respectable religious institution not only to deliver the regime's messages but also to cope with another religious organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Besides the military and bureaucratic elites, the intellectual elites of Egypt were also shaped under the control of the government. Al-Azhar had a substantial role in this new formation because the government benefitted from Al-Azhar to struggle with the intellectuals who oppose them. The major role of Al-Azhar was to denounce the opposition (Barraclough, 1998:238). For instance, one of the prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb the writer of *Milestones* was condemned by Al-Azhar as "deviant" because of this book. Due to the tension between the government and the opposition, Al-Azhar became more visible in the public sphere

and fulfilled its duty with by denouncing the opposition or supporting the regime, both on political and social issues (Barracclough, 1998:238).

Al-Azhar undertook a similar mission in the aftermath of Nasser's presidency. The inclusion of religious groups made Al-Azhar less visible in Egyptian politics. Notably after the peace agreement with Israel, Egypt was faced with the rising of radical Islamist attacks against the government. Al-Azhar made statements to condemn the Islamist militant groups Islamic Jihad and Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya. Moreover, the government decided to place the control of all private mosques under Al-Azhar supervision in order to enlarge Al-Azhar's position against Islamist extremists (Barracclough, 1998:239).

#### ***2.3.1.3. Social Actors***

Apart from the religious social movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, other social movements have begun to emerge in the Egyptian society in the last decade. The Kifaya and the April 6 Youth Movement are the social groups which are able to mobilize the Egyptian masses. Due to their limited influence over society in contrast to the MB, within the scope of this study I will give some brief information about these groups, and leave the MB, one of the main cases of this study, to the second part.

##### *The Salafi Movement*

The *Salafis* (Wiktorowicz, 2006; Meijer, 2009 and Rubin, 2013) are Egypt's second strongest religious movement, which adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam. The emergence of the Salafis occurred when the Brotherhood began to follow a more cautious strategy as a result of the government repression in the 1970s. Young members of the MB strictly rejected the moderation of the movement, and those who

were against this prudent strategy left the Brotherhood and formed their ‘*own version of Islamism*’ (Rubin, 2013:38).

It should be noted that the *Salafis* and the Muslim Brotherhood have the same objective: to put into practice the principles of Islamic (Sharia) laws. The separation between them was about the path to success (Rubin, 2013:38). The MB chose a way without insurrection, based on their practices. They considered the way, which the fundamental groups followed, and reached the decision that they were able to achieve their goals without extremism. On the other hand, the *Salafis* were more prone to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (for Qutb and his understandings see Calvert, 2013), which referred to a revolutionary path.

In the aftermath of the 25 January demonstrations, the Salafis established the Al-Nour Party. In the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the Al-Nour Party received 21.69 percent of the votes and won 108 seats (EISA, 2012). Thus, the Salafis became the second strongest political figure in Egypt after the election.

### *The Kifaya*

As its name suggests, 300 intellectuals from different segments of the society established the Egyptian Movement for Change, widely-known by its motto “Kifaya” (Enough), with a consensus to point out the need for changes for Egypt prior to the 2005 elections (Oweidat, et al., 2010 and Carnegie Endowment, 2010a). Ahmad Baha’ al-Din Sha’ban is the key figure of the Kifaya Movement. The movement has emerged as an intellectual political coalition, which requests democratic changes alongside demanding an end to Mubarak’s rule. Although the movement did not achieve any significant political reforms, their action gained attention in the international media.

### *The 6 April Movement*

The 6 April Youth Movement emerged in 2008 as an online group on Facebook, one of the most famous internet social networking sites, to support the ongoing protests of industrial workers in the city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra (Carnegie Endowment, 2010b). Within a short time period, the movement had reached over 100,000 followers on social networks. Eventually, the strikes supported by the movement and held between 2008-2010, failed. The movement also had a substantial role in the January 25 demonstrations.

Ahmed Maher, one of the founders, made a statement after the overthrow of the Tunisian President Ben Ali. The Tunisia case, he said, “*led us to think about protesting against corruption, poverty and unemployment* (cited in Carnegie Endowment 2010b).” Like any other movements, the main purpose of the 6 April Youth Movement was to change the regime. Thus, after the successful 25 January demonstrations, the movement had obviously fulfilled its mission.

#### **2.3.1.4. Military**

The 1936 Anglo – Egyptian Treaty was a historical landmark for the Arab Republic of Egypt and the modern Egyptian military. The treaty allowed for the recruiting of more native Egyptians into the army during the military’s modernization process (Morsy, 1984:76-77). Thus an increasing number of the native Egyptians soldiers formed a secret organization, the Free Officers, against the monarchy due to its remaining under intense British influence. Eventually the Free Officers led the 1952 Revolution, and Egypt became a national Arab Republic governed by its people. Since then the military has had an importance influence over various segments of Egypt, such as the political, economic and social environments.

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) formed the government under the prime ministry of Muhammad Naguib in 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the vice-

chairman of the RCC, became the Minister of Interior. In the late 1954 the RCC emerged as an Egypt's undisputed ruling elite. The RCC members controlled the key ministries and Nasser appointed the trusted army officers to prominent bureaucratic positions to administer the civilian officers (Vatikiotis, 1978:158). Particularly after Nasser's presidency, Egyptian politics increasingly militarized as an instrument, which allows for the control of non-military institutions and society. Besides the president, the officers occupied the governorates of the majority of the Egyptian states. They also held high-ranking military and security positions throughout the country, in order to control "the local and regional level opposition activist" and activism (Cook, 2007:26). The perception that the army was the guardian of the "Free Officer's Revolution" legitimized the militarization of politics (Vatikiotis, 1978:160).

Politically, the control of the regime was intense until 1970. All cabinets since the 1952 revolution have been led by the Free Officers apart from one, Ali Mahir. He occupied the position for less than two months. Non-civilian prime ministers headed the rest of the cabinets so Nasser himself served as Prime Minister eight times during his presidency. In addition, all of the vice presidents were non-civilians under the rules of Nasser and Sadat. Moreover, the Officers dominated the Secretariat General of the Arab Socialist Union. While Officers occupied 75 percent of the positions in 1962, the ration decreased 42.9 percent by 1970 (Harb, 2003:278).

Specifically in the aftermath of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the confiscating of the foreign corporations and banking institutions, the socialist revolution passed the second stage. The Egyptian Military have had a huge influence on Egyptian economy apart from the politics since then. The new military-bureaucratic establishment emerged after the nationalization of the private sector and the Egyptian economy went under the control of the military (Vatikiotis, 1978:213). The regime established a dominant public sector after these developments. The public sector dominated medium and large-size industries, import, transportation and the finance sector by the 1960s. While the contribution of the public sector to all



investments in the Egyptian economy was 95 percent, they controlled 83 percent of all production in the country (Harb, 2003:278).

The military's position in Egyptian politics lessened during Anwar Sadat's presidency (1970-1981). Sadat followed his own political agenda, the Corrective Revolution, and abandoned Nasserist policies. Sadat needed to eliminate his Nasserist rival to implement his policies. Thus, in a short time overcame the influence of the Free Officers into Egyptian politics. As noted earlier, Sadat forced them to retire or appointed them to secondary positions (Hinnebusch, 1981:446). Moreover, Sadat decreased the number of military personnel in the government. In this respect, the non-civilian presence in the Council of Ministers decreased to 22.2 percent in 1972 (Harb, 2003:283).

Economically, Sadat's Open Door (known as *infitah*) economic policies affected the Army's roles in Egypt negatively. Sadat adopted liberal economic policies within the framework his new initiative, and this allowed the flourishing of a new separate economic bourgeoisie under his guardianship (Harb, 2003:283). In addition to his new political policies, this economic move not only lessened the Army's dominance in the Egyptian economy, but also consolidated his regime in spite of a strong military presence. As a consequence, he created his own allies to handle the opposition, including non-civilians.

The Egyptian Army has military and civilian industrial establishments in addition to its activities in agricultural areas. One of the most important reasons why Egyptian army was operating in such varied fields was the massive economic difficulties in the country. Having had adequate human resources and cheap labor forces, the military became a leveraging factor for the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, Nasser and Mubarak attributed a special importance role to the military's place on the path to economic growth and development. In the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution especially, the given objectives given to the military were far beyond economic and security concerns. Gotowicki states these objectives as "*deterrence, support for Egypt's regional role, military modernization, achieving*

*military self- sufficiency, maintaining a positive image with Egypt's population, effectively employing soldiers idled by a diminished defense requirements in an era of peace...” (1997).*

In the late 1970's, the National Service Project Organization (NSPO) was established as a subsidiary organization of the Ministry of Defense, to create a self-sufficient military in the aftermath of the budget cuts made due to the worsening economic situation, and as a requirement of the Israeli peace. Thus, as expected, the Egyptian army sought to diversify its industrial activities with the NSPO (Gotowicki, 1997). In this respect, the military facilities sought to benefit from manufacturing various products such as domestic appliances, clothing and pharmaceuticals.

After 1980, the Army engaged in intense agricultural activities, following the government's directives. The government believed that being self-sufficient in terms of agricultural productivity was also a national security matter, as was being self-sufficient in the military industries (Gotowicki, 1997). Correspondingly, the NSPO immediately began working in the fields of dairy products, livestock and fishery industries. Within a short time, the military was able to produce 18 percent of Egypt's total food output. In addition to this, the army became self-sufficient of in manufacturing 60 percent of the consumable products such as food and clothing (Gotowicki, 1997).

Besides its political and economic roles, the Egyptian army also has a social role for Egyptian society (Gotowicki, 1997). In accordance with the compulsory military service, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian young males are recruited. The military provides training for young soldiers in the sense of national identity and citizenship, and information related to modern life. While the army benefits from the conscripts as cheap labor, the conscripts gain a work ethic according to the types of work that they do. The army has such a comprehensive structure that it is able to remedy the problems of the country that are associated with infrastructure. Hence, the companies affiliated with the Egyptian army have the ability to build roads, bridges, schools, overpasses and other similar buildings (Harb, 2003:285).

In short, the Egyptian military has had a prominent influence on the Egyptian political, economic and social environments. In spite of the budget deficit in the late 1970's, with the help of the NSPO and the self-sufficiency understanding that existed in both military and non-military areas, the army preserved its position in Egyptian society. The number of employees in the Egypt defense industry, which is over 100,000; and the contribution of these facilities into Egyptian economy, which is worth about \$500 million a year, are definite indicators of the continuing influence of the Egyptian military (Harb, 2003:285).

The Egyptian army does not only have a presence in the political environment. Consequently, the military is one of the prominent actors, which infuses all segments of the Egyptian society.

## **2.4. Ideas and Ideologies**

Throughout modern Egyptian history, particularly during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Egypt was under the influence of three different ideologies: Islamism, nationalism (Pan-Arabism) and Arab Socialism. From having a Muslim majority population, Islamism; being governed by non-Egyptian rulers, nationalism, and later having revolutionary Egyptian rulers, Arab Socialism became prominent in Egypt during recent history. Although the governments embraced nationalism and Arab Socialism, Islamism could not find a place for itself in the political arena. The ruling elites of the country have banned or restricted to Islamists from the political sphere.

### ***2.4.1. Ideas and Ideologies before and after the 1952 Revolution***

#### ***2.4.1.1. Islamism***

Egypt has had a long modernization process, which dates back to Muhammad Ali's reign. Egypt had taken European countries as a model for various aspects such as political, economical and social issues. The secularization of the country was one of the natural reasons for this modeling. Especially after the declaration of independence from British authority, the Egyptian government followed more secular policies under the leadership of the Wafd Party. Thus, as a response to it, the Islamist notion emerged in Egyptian society.

An early representative of Islamism was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The organization was established in 1928 to evoke the Islamist revival against the destructive effects of the secular policies. Then in the republican era, other Islamist groups emerged in Egypt such as the Salafi Movement (see Wiktorowicz, 2006), Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad (see Dalacoura, 2011). Due to the secular notion of the Egyptian politics I will not discuss this issue in more detail. Moreover Islamism emerged in the Egyptian politics as ideological factions in the last quarter of the twentieth century (for more info see Berman, 2003).

#### ***2.4.1.2. Arab Nationalism (Arabism)***

The wave of nationalism affected the Arab region in the aftermath of the French Revolution. This nationalism began to form within the framework of new concepts such as '*patria*' and '*patriotism*' throughout the Arab region. One of the most prominent Arab intellectuals of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Rifa'ah Rafi'al Tantawi, internalized these concepts as '*watan*' (*patria*, motherland), and '*wataniyya*' (*patriotism*) (Dawn, 1991:4). In the early years of the twentieth century, the new version of Arabism was formed around Muhammad Abduh's (see Amir, Shuriye and Ismail, 2012) understanding of 'Islamic Modernism and Revivalism (Dawn, 1991:6).

Abduh's followers, Muhammad Rashid Nida and Abd' al-Rahman al-Kawakibi drew a more Islamic nationalist notion. According to Abduh's followers, Dawn states, humankind reached modernity with a very early understanding of Islam. Now (to them), the West borrowed these from the Muslim World, and the Arabs will get back the leadership of the world when the Muslims return to their essence (1991:8-9). As can be seen from the definition above, Arab Nationalism comprised Islamist components in its early formation because Islam originated from the Arab region. Thus, many concurrent nationalists in Europe recognized that Arabism and Islamism fortified each other (R. D. Lee, 2014:41). On the other hand, some Arab nationalists did not accept that Arabism was the birth of Islamic modernism. To them, like any other nationalist wave, Arabism also emerged after the political and social developments in Europe. Hence Arabism was secular because it was a European import (Dawn, 1991:10).

As I noted before, nationalism in Egypt began to gain shape when Egypt was a under the British mandate. The mandate raised nationalist sentiments and triggered the 1919 Revolution, which led to independence under the leadership of the Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd Party (see Chapter 3). The Wafd Party, which had a nationalist liberal ideology, became one of the important political actors of the Sultanate of Egypt (Goldschmidt, 2008:110-111). Despite the declaration of independence, the British preserved their control and influence over Egypt. In addition to this, the dissatisfactions of Egyptian society against the Sultanate resulted in the formation of the Free Officers Movement, which toppled the reign of Muhammad Ali in 1952.

Finally, until the 1952 Revolution, the Egyptian nationalism carried Islamic characteristics. I have already stressed one of the reasons for it. Another prominent reason that fortified this fact was the Palestine issue, which arose as a natural result of the first Arab-Israeli War and its prior conflicts. The Israeli declaration of independence (1948) increased the nationalist and religious sentiments not only in Egypt but also in the whole Arab region. The Palestine issue bound Arabism with

Islam in Egypt before Nasser's own interpretation of Arab nationalism, the Arab Socialism.

#### **2.4.1.3. Arab Socialism**

The Free Officers' Revolution was based on nationalist sentiments rather than a concrete ideology. Nasser also admitted this reality in *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1955), and he drew a vision with the term the 'Arab Circle' about the future of Egypt over nationalism. The nationalization of the Suez Canal (1956) and the formation of the United Arab Republic were a reflection of this vision. Eventually his nationalist policy was bankrupted after the Egyptian intervention into Yemeni politics. The lack of an ideology began to emerge gradually. Thus Nasser formulated his own Arabism, Arab Socialism.

It can be seen from the policies that Nasser pursued that his secular tendencies came to the fore. The abolition of sharia and the oppressive moves against the religious groups were some of the examples of this tendency. However, Islam and religious notions were utilized to support the formation of the Arab Socialism while the regime was struggling with the religious groups. To mobilize the public mass would be easier with the support of the religious discourses as a means of establishing a political vision.

Nasser aimed to solve many problems with the newly-formed ideology. The continuing economic struggles and his unsuccessful Arab expansionist politics pushed him to find a way out. He could follow neither the West nor the Soviets. This was because the anti-imperialist challenge was the main spirit of the Egyptian revolution, and notably "*Islam proved the failure of the suggested solutions to pragmatism and Marxism.*" (Enayat, 1968:151). Thus Arab Socialism had to be formed between the Capitalist and Marxist ideologies.

In this sense, the Arab intellectuals legitimized Nasser's Arabism with these words (Enayat, 1968:152):

*“Arab Socialism is based on a completely new balance. If we describe its position as the Excellent Mean between two extremes this should not be understood to mean that Arab socialism stands midway between Capitalism and Marxism [sic], because we are not talking of an arithmetical or geometrical mean. By the Excellent Mean we mean that Arab socialism stands midway between Capitalism and Marxism, but at the same time represents a jump forward with regard to these opposite poles... This balance between the two poles has asserted itself as an inevitable result of the evolution of universal thought which, according to dialectical logic, has proceeded from thesis to antithesis and then to a state in which the two opposites are reconciled. Thus Capitalism gave rise to Marxism, and then these two opposites gave rise to Arab socialism.”*

Here this question may come to mind: If Islam is capable of proving the failures of Pragmatism (or Capitalism) and Marxism, why did Nasser not adopt a much more Islamic ideology instead of socialism? The intellectual mentioned above, gave the answer to this question; implicitly stating that it was because of the ‘religionists’. As much as the regime fortified Arab Socialism with Islam, it also pointed out that *“the religionists did not meet the challenges”* (Enayat, 1968:151). This was undoubtedly an attempt to undermine any Islamist ideology in the process of forming its own ideology. As Enayat states, their fundamental purpose was to create *“a theory which is admittedly no more than an ideological rationalization of the policies adopted by the regime, on the basis of the above and other considerations, to carry out its reformist intentions.”* (1968:147). Thus, when Sadat followed a different policy, Arab Socialism fell into disuse.

#### ***2.4.2. The Secularization of Egypt***

The emergence of secularism in Egypt dates back to the early nineteenth century. The substantial separation of religious and political structures took place during the reign

of Muhammad Ali, who has been identified as the founder of the modern Egypt. His reformist ideas mainly shaped the institutional transformation in Egypt (Crecelius, 1980:54). In order begin carrying out the reforms; he needed to start consolidating his power. While Muhammad Ali was doing this, he mainly focused on the civilian and military bureaucratic ruins of the Mamluk, and the political influence of the ulama. Hence he deposed those who were against his rule. Specifically, Ali cut off the religious elite's sources of income in order to impoverish and break their influence.

The secularization of Egypt reached its peak during the reign of Khedive Ismail (1863-79). His frantic struggles to transform Egypt into "a part of Europe" opened all Egypt's doors to foreigners who would invest in new business, open western-style education institutions, and bring western life style to Egypt (Crecelius, 1980:58). He was also the first ruler who tried to diminish religious institutions in Egypt. As opposed to the dominance of Al-Azhar in the educational field, he supported the dervish orders in an attempt to diminish their strong position in the religious courts (Crecelius, 1980:58).

During the times of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty and the constitutional monarchy in the aftermath of independence, the secularization of Egypt continued gradually. The formation of the Muslim Brotherhood (I will examine in the second part) in 1928, therefore, was a religious reaction to the negative impact of secularization and westernization in society. From now on, the revival of Islamism emerged in Egyptian politics.

Despite the differences between the secular and Islamist discourses, the rising of nationalism against the monarchy and the British influence on Egypt occasionally put those groups together. Prior to and during the 1952 Revolution, the collaboration of different ideological groups became more obvious and they supported the Free Officers in this nationalist uprising.

The secularization of the Egypt passed into a new phase during the Free Officer's era because of the Islamic revival; that manifested by the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. This Islamic organization, which had a wide range



religious and political influence, posed a threat to the Officers who were looking to undertake the transformation of Egypt (Crecelius, 1980:63). In this respect all private or semi-autonomous religious institutions were taken into state control in order to prevent the religious groups benefitting from them. Henceforth, religion and the religious institutions, Al-Azhar in particular (see Crecelius, 1966), were used as tools of the Free Officers. The autonomous structure of Al-Azhar was reduced by the state's intervention. Notably, in 1961, the regime interfered with Al-Azhar's educational system and added some secular faculties. With the new Al-Azhar reform, the government had a strong tool to use against the ulama and other religious institutions that were opposed to the regime.

One important factor that differentiated the secularization process during the new phase from the previous era was the way in which religious institutions were used. In the previous era, secularization was seen as one of the prominent ways to facilitate the modernization of Egypt. However, during the Nasser era, secularization was used as a tool to undermine the Islamic revival, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, and to legitimate the ideology of the new regime. In this respect, Al-Azhar became more functional as a state apparatus both to support the state ideology and fill the gap left by the Muslim Brotherhood.

## **PART II – CASE STUDIES**

### **Chapter 3: The Gülen (Hizmet) Movement**

As Turkey's the most organized social movement, the Gülen, or *Hizmet* (Service) Movement has been in a prominent role of political and social transformation in Turkey for the last three decades. The Gülen Movement emerged in the 1960s as a Turkish, religious (Muslim) and humanitarian civil society in one of the foremost secular western cities of Turkey, İzmir. The Movement spread its impact throughout the country via educational institutions such as private schools and university preparation courses in the mid-1980s. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the movement began to establish educational institutions out of Turkey for the first time; in the Turkic republics during the early 1990s. By the 2000s, the Gülen Movement had turned into a transnational religious and social movement whose area of activities consisted of education, media, finance, humanitarian aid, international dialogue and health. Having a significant number of well-educated human resources, the Gülen Movement has emerged as Turkey's most powerful non-state actor, with the ability to set the country's political and social agenda.

By 2010, the Gülen Movement had become one of the most mentioned social movements in Turkey. How did the Gülen Movement develop from its base as a local religious society in Turkey – until the late 2000s an “assertive secular” country - to being a transnational organization? Moreover, to what extent has the movement become involved in political activities and what is its attitude towards democratization and modernization? This chapter draws an analysis in the context of these questions.

### 3.1. Historical Background of the Gülen Movement

The Gülen Movement began to form in the 1960s, following the initiative of M. Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish preacher, scholar, author, thinker, opinion leader and peace activist, also known as *Hocaefendi* ('esteemed teacher') amongst his followers and sympathizers. The Gülen Movement is considered as one of the sub-groups of the Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) Movement. M. Hakan Yavuz states that despite the fact that "*the conceptual framework and ideas*" of the Gülen Movements derived from Said Nursi's thoughts and writings, Gülen leads the movement in another way; expanding its supporters with a '*more praxis oriented*' method to transform society and institutions. He asserts, "*(the) Gülen Movement has been transformed by its own outcome (its teachers, schools, and media outlets) and by the means it uses to achieve its goals* (Yavuz, 2003b: 3)."

#### 3.1.1. The Life of Said Nursi and the Nur Movement<sup>2122</sup>

Before discussing the life of Gülen and the early history of the Gülen Movement, I'd like to touch on the Nur Movement and Said Nursi. Said Nursi (1877-1960) was an Islamic Scholar who lived in the late Ottoman Empire and the early republican era. Nursi is the author of the *Risale-i Nur (The Epistles of Light)* Collection, a six-thousand-page book series, which is a commentary on the Qur'an relatively different from classic Islamic exegesis, *tafsirs*. Rather than an ayah-by-ayah exegesis, the Risale-i Nur Collection copes with the doubts encompassing the basic principles of Islam, such as belief in *Allah* or the *iman* (belief) concept, which is one the main principles of the collections.

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<sup>21</sup> I would like to mention that I mainly benefited from the sources below, which are the comprehensive works about Nursi's biography, for the Life of Said Nursi. Thus, none of the information in this section reflects my personal ideas related Nursi's life.

<sup>22</sup> For the early biography of Said Nursi see, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Tarihçe-i Hayatı: Hayatı, Mesleği, Tercüme-i Hali* (Nursi 2010). For the English translation of the book see, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Vahide, 2011).

Said Nursi (also known as Said Kurdi) was born in a small village called Nurs in an eastern province of Turkey, Bitlis, in 1877. He was from a Kurdish family, the fourth of the seven children. His father, *Sofî Mirza*, was a villager and small landholder. He received his first education from his elder brother Molla Abdullah. Because there was no madrasah in Nurs, at the age of nine, Said moved to another village, Tağ, to participate in the madrasah of Molla Emin. Yet, he had been moving gradually to one madrasah to another until he arrived to Bayezid, a small town in Erzurum, in which he began his actual education under the guidance of Molla Mehmed. According to his followers, within three months Nursi had read, studied and digested a significant amount of subjects, which can take ordinary students between fifteen to twenty years to absorb, in context with the regular curriculum. He obtained his diploma at the end of this three-month period at the age of fourteen in Siirt. Molla Fethullah gave him the name of Bediüzzaman<sup>23</sup> (The Wonder of the Age) to Nursi during his days in Siirt.

Nursi's first engagement in politics coincided with his stays in Mardin. Here he recognized the problems that the Islamic world was facing. As Şükran Vahide noted, Nursi became aware of the Young Ottomans' struggle for freedom and constitutional government. Furthermore, Nursi asserted that the harsh internal and external conditions stemmed from despotism and absolute government (Vahide, 2005:21-22). Nursi, moreover, met two young students, one of whom was the follower of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in Mardin. Vahide advocates:

*“It is conceivable that the person Molla Said encountered who gave him guidance and the follower of Afghani were one and the same, if “the just and equitable way in politics” signifies the liberal values of constitutionalism.... No further explanation is given in the original reference in Nursi's biography to the meeting with the two dervishes. However, it was more specifically in*

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<sup>23</sup> In his later works Nursi stated (cited in Vahide, 2005:29): “I now realize that the name *Bediüzzaman*, which was given to me many years ago although I was not worthy of it, was not mine anyway. It was rather a name of the *Risale-i Nur*. It was ascribed to the *Risale-i Nur*'s apparent translator temporarily and as a trust.”

*connection with Islamic unity, or pan-Islam, that the other reference to Afghani in Said's works of the period is made, for which Afghani was most famous (Vahide, 2005:22)."*

Between the ages of 16 and 18 Nursi extended his knowledge with a variety of sciences, particularly the Islamic sciences such as *mantiq* (logic), *kalam* (science of discourse), *hadith*, and *tafsir*. In his Van years, Nursi established his own *madrasah*, which he called *Medresetü'z-Zehra*, in which both religious thought and modern sciences were combined. Furthermore, he was aiming to apply his project in Van, Bitlis and Diyarbakır, (Vahide, 2005:29).

Nursi went to the capital, Istanbul, in order to provide official financial support in 1907, a year before the declaration of the Constitutional Movement. He settled in İstanbul, the religious and cultural center of the Ottoman Empire, in 1908. In the same year he introduced his proposal, which consisted of his ideas about educational reforms to the palace, and was published in *the Şark ve Kürdistan Gazetesi* (The East and Kurdistan Gazette) soon after. The proposal was undoubtedly a challenge for the current education system, including the eminent figures of the Ulama, because the current education system had been in practice for centuries (Vahide, 2005:42).

At this point, besides Nursi's teaching, his ideas on education, which highly influenced the Gülen Movement, came to the forefront. As I discuss in the following sections, the educational institutions are the flagship practices of the Movement; a means to create "*the golden generation*" and interact with the outside world. In this sense, Vahide analyses Nursi's proposal with these words (2005:45):

*"The heart of Said Nursi's proposals lay in reconciling "the three main branches" of the educational system—the medreses or traditional religious schools, the mektebs or new secular schools, and the tekkes or Sufi establishments—and the disciplines they represented. The embodiment of this rapprochement was to be the Medresetü'z-Zehra, which has been mentioned*

*earlier. Nursi attached the greatest importance to establishing this university where the religious sciences and modern sciences would be taught side by side and “combined,” and pursued it till the end of his days.*

*The second main area of Nursi’s proposals lay in completely restructuring medrese education and were extremely modern in their approach. These consisted of what might be described as the democratization of the medrese system, and its diversification so that “the rule of the division of labor” could be applied.*

*A third area concerned the preachers, who “guided the general public.”*

During his early years in Istanbul, Nursi witnessed a complicated political environment. As noted earlier, in 1908 a constitution was adopted for the second time in Ottoman history after 1876; a year after, the Thirty-first of March incident (or revolt), which caused the fall of Sultan Abdulhamid II, occurred. During this tumultuous political atmosphere, Nursi’s stance was independent. Instead, Nursi pointed out his ideas for the favor of *İttihad-ı İslam* (Islamic Unity) to prevent the disunity of society (Vahide, 2005:67). Moreover, Nursi and some of his friends formed an association under the name *İttihad-ı Muhammedi*.

However, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government arrested Nursi on charges of calling for Sharia on May 1909. He headed east after the Martial Court acquitted him, and delivered his famous Damascus Sermon in the autumn of 1910. The following year he returned to Istanbul and participated in the last Rumelia Journey with the Sultan Mehmet Reşad and the Grand Vizier Hakkı Pasha. His initiations to establish the Medresetü’z Zehra was welcomed by the Sultan, and Nursi received one thousand gold liras in advance (Vahide, 2005:67). He returned to Van for the foundation of his project, yet at the outbreak of the World War I resumed his great endeavor. He participated in the war on the Eastern Front with his voluntarily militia comprised of his students, and fought against the Russians until captured by them. He compiled the *tafsir* of the *İşaratü’l İ’caz* during the defense of Van.

Nursi found a way to run away from the Russians due to the turmoil caused by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Nursi reached Istanbul via Eastern Europe in June 1918. He struggled against the British forces before and after the occupation of Istanbul. In August the same year, Nursi was elected one of the members of the newly-established the *Darü'l-Hikmeti'l-İslamiye*, which was formed to solve the problems of the Islamic world and “to combat attempts to discredit the religion of Islam” as a consultative council (Vahide, 2005:136). The council was closed when the Sultanate was abolished in 1922 by the Ankara government.

### *The New Said*

Nursi could not fulfill his duties in the *Darü'l-Hikmeti'l-İslamiye* full-time due to ill-health caused by the harsh conditions of his two-year captivity in Russia. During this period, Nursi underwent a spiritual awakening; thus, according to his statement the New Said was born due to this radical interior change (Nursi, 2010 and Vahide, 2005). Vahide states, “In various places in his works Nursi described in some detail the major turning point that then occurred, and we shall chart its course from these. Having begun in the second half of 1920, the mental and spiritual transformation was completed by the end of 1921 (2005:164).” During his internal showdown, Nursi had figured out that he had “filled his brain with the philosophical as well as the Islamic sciences”, and “the philosophical sciences were the means to spiritual progress and enlightenment (cited in Vahide, 2005:166).”

Nursi recounted that Gawth al-A‘zam, ‘Abd al-Qadir Geylane and the Maktubat (Letters) of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindî, known as Imam-ı Rabbane came to his aid at this time. He added that Geylane’s book “smashed my pride in the most fearsome manner. It carried out drastic surgery on my soul”. Moreover, Nursi said that he read Imam-ı Rabbane’s Maktubat, and “...I found that these letters were the cure for my ills. Only, the imam persistently recommended in many of his letters what he wrote in these two, which was: “Take only one qiblah!” That is, take one person

*as your master and follow him; do not concern yourself with anyone else* (Vahide, 2005:166).” Thereupon, Nursi vacillated between great Islamic scholars such as Imam Ghazali, Mewlana (Rumi), Imam-i Rabbane. *“While in this state, “it was imparted to the Old Said’s much wounded heart” that the one true master was the Holy Qur’an* (Vahide, 2005:166).”

In the early 1923, the Ankara government passed a bill signed by 167 deputies, proposing the founding of Nursi’s dream project, the Medresetü’z Zehra, and assigned 150,000 liras for 1923’s budget. Yet, even though the Unification of Education Law passed on 3 March 1923, a committee rejected the project on 29 November 1925. After the new passed-law, Nursi was sent into exile in Anatolia on April 1923 (Vahide, 2005:172).

Nursi spent his time in Mount Ereğli worshipping and concentrating on teaching the fundamental principles of the faith. He only went down from the mountain during wintertime and to attend Friday prayers at the mosque. He *“preferred to perform his worship, an important element of which was contemplation (tefekür), in high places and elevated spots preferred to perform* (Vahide, 2005:178).” In this sense, in a talk, he told one of his students: *“My aim is to build the foundations of belief firmly. If the foundations are sound, belief cannot be shaken by any upheavals* (cited in Vahide, 2005:178).”

While Nursi was residing in Van, the Sheikh Said Revolution broke out in the eastern part of Anatolia on 13 February 1925 as a response to the new Turkish government’s secular implementations. The perpetrator of the revolt, Sheikh Said, aimed to benefit from the high-prestige of Nursi for the uprising. In response, Nursi said (cited in Vahide, 2005:182):

*“The struggle you are embarking on will cause brother to kill brother and will be fruitless. For the Kurds and Turks are brothers. The Turkish nation has acted as the standard-bearer of Islam for centuries. It has produced*



*millions of saints and given millions of martyrs. The sword may not be drawn against the sons of Islam's heroic defenders, and I shall not draw mine!"*

Yet Nursi was forced into exile once more due to his being accused of being part of the revolt, and was forced to reside in Burdur in 1925. Nursi began to give his first lessons (*ders*) here every day after the afternoon prayer in here, and the lessons were collected later under the title First Door of the Risale-i Nur (*Nur'un İlk Kapısı*) (Vahide, 2005:185). The lessons and his writings began to be duplicated by and distributed to across the country. Thus the journey of the Risale-i Nur and his 25-year exile began. In 1926 he was transferred to a small town of Isparta, Barla to isolate him from society. During his exile, Nursi was deported to Isparta (1934), Eskişehir (1935), Kastamonu (1935), Denizli and Emirdağ (1943), Afyon (1947) and 20 months after again Emirdağ respectively.

#### *The Risale-i Nur*

The Risale-i Nur (Epistles Of Light) Collections, which focus on some main principles such as belief in God and the Hereafter, are a unique exegesis of the Holy Qur'an, as noted earlier. Nursi states in many of his writings that the Risale-i Nur is a strong exegesis, of which the Qur'an is the only origin. Giving similar definitions of the Risale-i Nur, Nursi also demonstrated its main objectives whilst referring to the Qur'an as the single source. For instance, in *the Rays* Nursi advocates "*the Risale-i Nur is valiantly struggling to diffuse the truths of the Qur'an in all directions, in this obstinate and atheistic age, no one can defeat it, which proves that its master, its source, its authority and its sun, is the Qur'an, heavenly not human speech* (Nursi, 2008a: 154)." In this respect, from various places external to himself, Nursi reflects the power of his writings onto the divinity of the Qur'an. Further, he states that the Risale-i Nur proves the principles of faith with concrete scientific evidence. Moreover, prior to its audience, the Risale-i Nur aims to convince its interpreter first, thereafter to address others (Nursi, 2007).

Nursi pointed out the importance of the community in various places. Rather than individualism and a life of solitude, Nursi stressed the importance of the community (cited in Vahide, 2005:170-171):

*“The present is the time of community. The collective personality of a community, which is its spirit, is firmer and more capable of executing the ordinances of the Sharê‘ah. The person of the caliph can only undertake his duties through relying on [such a collective personality]. If a collective personality, the spirit of a community, is righteous, it is more brilliant and perfect [than that of an individual]. But if it is bad, it is exceedingly bad. Both the goodness and badness of an individual are limited, but those of a community are unlimited. Do not spoil the goodness you have gained in the face of external [enemies] through internal badness. You know that your perpetual enemies and opposites and foes are destroying the practices and marks of Islam. Your solemn duty, therefore, is to revive and preserve them. Otherwise, unconsciously you will be helping the conscious enemy. Contempt for the practices and marks of Islam shows weakness of nationhood, and as for weakness, it does not arrest the enemy, it encourages him.”*

As can be seen from Nursi’s explanation above, while he was addressing the community, he also taught them a method by which they could devote their personal interests to favor of the community. In this sense, acting in accordance with a community not only helped to deal with enemies but also to achieve the required purposes during the inner journey to eternal happiness.

Moreover, according to Nursi, the essence of the Risale-i Nur “is not *tarikât* (sufi orders) but the *hakikat* (reality)”, and “*It is a light that leaks from the verses of the Qur’an*” (Nursi, 2007:170). Thus, Nursi drew a differentiation between “the way” of the Risale-i Nur and that of the others, particularly the Sufi Orders. However, he never rejects their essence. He mentioned that Imam-i Rabbani said: “*The final point of all the Sufi ways is the clarification and unfolding of the truths of faith*” (Nursi, 2008b: 33). In this sense, to him: “*A person without faith will not enter Paradise, but*

*very many will go there without Sufism. Man cannot live without bread, but he can live without fruit. Sufism is the fruit, the truths of Islam, basic sustenance* (Nursi, 2008b: 33)”. On the other hand, the Risale-i Nur, whose essence is the reality, offers an extremely easy way. *The Words* (one of the books of the Risale-i Nur Collections), mentions that, “*the mysteries of the Qur’an*” are “*a most appropriate medicine and salve for the wounds of this time* (Nursi, 2008b: 33). Therefore;

*“former times, through spiritual journeying from forty days to as much as forty years, a person could rise to some of the truths of faith. But now, if through Almighty God’s mercy there is a way to rise to those truths in forty minutes, it surely is not sensible to remain indifferent to it* (Nursi, 2008b: 33).”

### **3.1.2. The Life of Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen Movement**

Before discussing Gülen’s life and the Gülen Movement, I would like to draw attention to Nursi’s influence over Gülen and his followers. Although Gülen and his followers do not describe themselves as a being part of the *Nur* Movement, because they use Nursi’s teachings as one of their primary sources and organized through “sohbet circles” and students’ houses in the early years of the Gülen Movement, the movement has been considered to be part of the Nur Movement by Turkish society. Moreover, Gülen refers to Nursi while delivering his messages, in addition to other Islamic scholars such as Rumi and Alvarlı Efe.

#### *Gülen*

M. Fethullah Gülen was born in an eastern city, Erzurum, in 1941.<sup>24</sup> He was raised in a traditional family, and he spent his early childhood under the influence of

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<sup>24</sup> The birth date of Gülen is shown as 1938 in some sources. He noted that he rose his age legally in order to be a preacher after he won the state-preacher test. Gülen asserted that his age was written younger to his birth certificate (L. Erdoğan, 1995:49).

traditional Sufi orders. In his autobiography, *Küçük Dünyam (My Small World)*, Gülen gives information about his education. He stated that there was no primary school in his village, Korucuk; thus he received his earliest education from his mother (L. Erdoğan, 1995:25). In the following years, a primary school, comprising only a room, was established. Gülen said he attended this school for only two and a half years; dropping out due to his father's assignment to Alvar as a local *imam*. He finished his secondary education as an external student years later when he was residing in Erzurum as an external student (L. Erdoğan, 1995:33).

Aside from his limited formal education, Gülen continued his education through traditional ways such as madrasah and *tekke*. However, as he stated, Gülen did not received a regular education there. During his childhood, he received partly education from various people including the Alvarlı Efe, who, together with his immediate family members, had a special influence upon Gülen's inner life. As he stated, Gülen said that his total education duration was barely two years; yet, he always read books in his free time, which was his main source of education (L. Erdoğan, 1995:44).

As an opinion leader of a movement, which is considered as a part of the Nur Movement, Gülen neither met with Nursi nor received education directly from him although he reached Nursi's late years. His acquaintance with the Risale-i Nur took place after a visit made by some of Nursi's students to Erzurum. During their fifteen-day-long stay, Gülen was acquainted with Nursi's ideas and heavily influenced by his students, particularly Muzaffer Arslan. As Gülen noted, Muzaffer Arslan's attitudes and his life of simplicity touched his heart. He said that he found what he had been looking for, and he did not want to stay away from these people his entire life (L. Erdoğan, 1995:45). Particularly, according to one of Gülen memoirs, having been one of the people who were greeted by Nursi via a letter sent to an unknown recipient. Gülen began to continue following the Risale-i Nur *ders*' (L. Erdoğan, 1995:46).

Gülen moved to Edirne on the western border of Turkey at the request of his father when he was 17. Gülen's unofficial preaching life started in the *Ak Mescit* (the

White Masjid), Edirne. After successfully passing the state-preaching test, Gülen was appointed to Edirne as an official preacher in 1959 (L. Erdoğan, 1995:46). Apart from his official duty, he delivered small speeches in coffee houses, and distributed religious publications such as magazines and the Risale-i Nur. Gülen served four years in Edirne until he went to Ankara to fulfill his military obligation.

### *İzmir*

After military duty, he was appointed to İzmir, the third largest city in the country, in 1966. Besides his preacher duty, Gülen was also appointed principal of the Kestanepazarı Qur'an Course, which was affiliated with the Presidency of Religious Affairs. He began to give lectures to the students aside from his administrative duties. As much as his other duties, Gülen gave special attention to the education of the students. Additionally, as Gülen noted, he was authorized semi-officially to preach in the Aegean region. Even though he preached here at various times, he emphasized that he never allowed it to hinder the students' lessons (L. Erdoğan, 1995:101).

### *Summer Camps*

Gülen noted that it was not easy to find students interested in religious education in those days. After his duty in Kestanepazarı, Gülen and his colleagues worked hard to increase the number of students. As mentioned above, Gülen paid special attention to the education of the students and he aimed to discipline them with his teaching method. In this sense, Gülen proceed to organize summer camps to provide students with a religious education in places far away from the city center. In these camps, students subjected to read religious books including the Risale-i Nur and prayed in a very disciplined way (for more details about the summer camps see, Gülen, 1990). The first summer camp was organized with the participation of 70 students. In the following years the number of participants increased. For instance, in the third year,

the camp started with more than 300 students, and during the camp the number of participants exceeded a thousand (L. Erdoğan, 1995:105).

### *Işık Evler*

The first ‘houses of light’ (*ışık evler*) or, as they are commonly called in the Nur Movement, the *dersaneler*, were established in 1968 alongside the summer camps in order to accommodate university students. Nursi’s students established the *dersaneler*, prior to Gülen in order to write<sup>25</sup> and discussed Risale-i Nur regularly. They have a significant place amongst the Nur communities since they “*provided zones of religious socialization within the secular educational setting* (Ebaugh, 2010:36).” In those houses, students read and discussed the Qur’an and the works of Nursi. Aside from this, the students read Gülen’s writings and listened to recordings of Gülen sermons and preach.

### ***3.1.3. The Emergence of the Gülen Movement***

The formation of the ‘houses of light’ and the summer camps coincided with the worldwide rising of Marxist and radical leftist extremism, the consequences of which were felt in Turkey. The May 1968 events in France also had an effect. Due to the increasing tensions in the country the military issued a memorandum on 12 March 1971. As noted in the first chapter, afterwards of the kidnapping of four American soldiers in Ankara by the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu) THKO on 4 March 1971, the internal tension reached its peak, thus the military intervened in politics by requesting the government’s resignation. During this period, Gülen was also arrested and detained for around six months due to his support for religious activities.

Under these circumstances, Gülen worked to strengthen belief in God amongst people, particularly the younger generation. Indeed, this is the main spirit of

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<sup>25</sup> Risale-i Nur Collection was reproduced by hand writing.

Nursi's ideas and the Risale-i Nur. Nursi called these things that attacked faith and religion "*the wounds of this time*" (Nursi, 2008b). The formation of the 'houses of light' and the summer camps can be analyzed as the concrete outcomes of this understanding. The followers of Gülen's preaching were attracted by his ideas, and supported the formation of the 'houses of light' through their donations. With the formation of the 'houses of light' the university youth aimed to keep away from the attraction of the extremist fractions (Ebaugh, 2010:28). Ebaugh noted the functions of the 'houses of light' with these words:

*"Students learned and inculcated Islamic values of self-sacrifice and social responsibility. The dormitories served as shelters against alcohol and drug use, premarital sexual exploits, and involvement in communist, ultra-nationalist or other radical movements. Many conservative and religious parents encouraged their children to live in the dormitories as they attended university in the big cities in Turkey (2010:28)".*

These houses provided the qualified human sources of the services of the Gülen Movement and gave it its own educational philosophy.

Gülen was the first preacher whose sermons and preaching as were released as audio and video recordings (Ebaugh, 2010:29). These allowed Gülen's discourses to spread across the country. His advice encouraged his audiences, most of whom were "*low to middle income businessman*", and his followers provided their support both financially and personally to the movements within the framework of Gülen's preaching (Ebaugh, 2010:27).

Gülen was appointed to Edremit after the 12 March Memorandum in 1972. Two years later he was assigned to preach in central Manisa, another Aegean city. In 1975, Gülen began to deliver speeches in various conferences on various issues such as Darwinism, *Altın Nesil* (golden generation) and Qur'an and Science. He had continued to preach and deliver speeches in conferences in numerous cities in Turkey and Germany before and after he was appointed to Bornova, İzmir until the 12 September military intervention. Although his place of duty was to Çanakkale in 25

November 1980, due to his health condition he could not continue. Gülen retired from his preaching duty in March 1981.

### *The Gülen Movement's Schools and Media Outlets*

The Gülen Movement established two secondary private schools, the *Yamanlar* and the *Fatih Koleji*<sup>26</sup> (college), in 1982. The foundation of the *Özel Yamanlar Lisesi* (Yamanlar Private High School) was laid in 1973 in İzmir (Özel Yamanlar Eğitim Kurumları, 2014). The institution began to serve as a student dormitory free of charge in the 1975-1976 academic-year. In addition, the *Yamanlar* began to provide a university preparation course in 1978. Yet, in 1982, the *Yamanlar* accepted its first student and provided education in the English language with a state-approved secular curriculum. On the other hand, *Fatih Koleji* was established after the purchase of Özel Fatih Lisesi (Private Fatih High School), which was established by Fatih Draman in 1960 by Gülen-Inspired private enterprise (Fatih Koleji, 2014). The following year in Ankara, the Samanyolu Koleji (Milky Way College) was established. Other private schools followed these three. It should be noted that, beside private schools the movement also established various university preparation courses across the country. The foundation of these private courses spread relatively faster than the colleges.

When Turgut Özal became the prime minister after the 1983 elections, Turkey welcomed more liberal policies, not only in the political but also the economic sphere. His liberal ideas and policies introduced a domestic opportunity structure by which the Gülen-inspired schools were able to expand their network across the nation (Kuru, 2005:257). According to Ahmet T. Kuru, apart from the domestic opportunity structure, “*having a tolerant normative framework*” was the other effect on the rapid expansion of the Gülen Movement. Thus, in one hand Özal’s policies has been globalized the Turkey; on the other, it has impacted the emerging of domestic

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<sup>26</sup> Despite its original meaning, the college stands for secondary schools.



opportunity structure in Turkish politics which led to the expansion of the Gülen Movement (Kuru, 2005:259).

**Table 1.** The List of Gülen-Inspired Schools (By 2003).

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Number of Schools</i>	<i>Number of Students</i>	<i>Number of Turkish Teachers</i>
<b>Albania</b>	2	966	74
<b>Australia</b>	5	718	37
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	12	3023	338
<b>Bashkiria</b>	3	462	88
<b>Bosnia</b>	2	109	22
<b>Bulgaria</b>	4	523	123
<b>Chuvashia</b>	2	311	79
<b>Crimea</b>	2	218	47
<b>Dagestan</b>	5	938	123
<b>Georgia</b>	3	244	48
<b>Indonesia</b>	1	41	18
<b>Iraq</b>	4	184	26
<b>Karachai</b>	1	93	13
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	29	5684	580
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	12	3100	323
<b>Macedonia</b>	1	102	16
<b>Moldavia</b>	2	225	40
<b>Mongolia</b>	4	442	85
<b>Romania</b>	4	415	78
<b>Russia</b>	5	323	63
<b>Siberia</b>	4	438	101
<b>Tajikistan</b>	5	694	107
<b>Tataristan</b>	6	1802	217
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	13	3294	353
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	18	3334	210
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>27683</b>	<b>3209</b>

**Source:** Balci, 2003.

The Gülen Movement established institutions outside Turkey in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The expansion of the movement took place first in the former states of the Soviet Union, particularly the Turkic countries. Similarly Kuru, explains this expansion with the international opportunity structure (Kuru, 2005:261). To him, globalization has undermined “*the state monopoly on sociocultural and economic life in many countries.*” In addition, the movement has benefitted “*the conceptual and legal framework of transnational movements and nongovernmental organizations.*” The modern structure of these institutions, which armed with high-tech equipment and foreign languages, English in particular, has brought the success, and the success linearly has increased the expansion of the educational institutions.

The Gülen-inspired organization, the Teachers’ Foundation published its first journal, the *Sızıntı (Fountain)* monthly, as a science and cultural magazine in February 1979. Gülen began to write the editorial in the journal, the main purpose of which was to demonstrate that religion and science are compatible, and “*that knowledge of both was essential for successful education*” (Ebaugh, 2010:31).

Feza Publications<sup>27</sup> established the *Zaman (Time)* daily, which is the most circulated newspaper in Turkey<sup>28</sup>, in 3 November 1986 in Ankara. By 2009, the *Zaman* daily was printed in 35 different countries in ten different languages. The company founded the *Cihan (Universe)* News Agency in 1992, and the agency began to distribute news in 1994. *Aksiyon (Action)*, a weekly news magazine, was established in 14 December 1994. In early 2007 the group established its first English daily newspaper, *Today’s Zaman*, which is the third established English newspaper in Turkey.

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<sup>27</sup> For more information about Feza Publications see, <http://ik.zaman.com.tr/ik/menuDetail.action?sectionId=372>, (25 August 2014)

<sup>28</sup> According to Press Advertising Agency, the average daily circulation of the *Zaman* daily in June 2014 is 1,004,209. For more information see <http://www.bik.gov.tr/istanbul/haziran-2014-tiraj-raporu/>, (25 August 2014).

In 1993, *Samanyolu* TV (STV) was established under the affiliation of the *Samanyolu* Broadcasting Group<sup>29</sup>. The group established *Mehtap* (*Moonlight*) TV, a themed channel focusing on literature, politics, history and belief, in 2006 as a satellite-broadcast channel. In addition, the *Samanyolu* News Channel first broadcast in 2007. The group also has a kids-channel, the *Yumurcak* (*Brat*) TV, which began to broadcast by satellite in 2007. Aside from its national media outlet, the *Samanyolu* Broadcasting Group has TV channels beyond Turkey's border's of Turkey. The group established the *Hazar* (*Caspian*) TV, broadcasting in Azerbaijani, and *Ebru* TV, broadcasting in the USA. The group also has a channel, the *Dünya* (*World*) TV that broadcasts in Kurdish.

In parallel with its expansion throughout the world, the Gülen Movement also promotes peaceful coexistence. Through their educational and media institutions both inside and outside of the country, the movement explicitly stresses “love and tolerance”. In this regard, the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) was founded in 1994 “*to contribute to the society by enriching what already exists, yet at the moment we find ourselves in a somewhat forgotten culture of living together*” (JWF, 2014). The JWF founded six platforms under the umbrella of the foundation some of which are: Abant Platform, Intercultural Dialogue Platform (IDP), Dialogue Eurasia Platform (DA Platform), Medialog Platform, and Women's Platform. Gülen is the Honorary Chairman of the Journalists and Writers Foundation.

Abant Platform and the Intercultural Dialogue Platform can be said to be two of the most active platforms of the JWF. Abant Platform aims to draw a wide understanding of controversial issues such as democracy, globalization, secularism, human rights, Islam and Turkey with the participation of intellectuals through periodical meetings. The IDF aims to introduce suggestions and solutions on current international debates like terrorism and wars via organized events, with the contributions of scientist, religious leaders and intellectuals.

The Gülen Movement aims to contribute to democratic values through

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<sup>29</sup> For more information see; <http://www.samanyolu.tv/kurumsal/about-us>, (25 August 2014).

choosing to become integrated into Turkish society. In this sense, in the aftermath of the foundation of the JWF, Gülen became more visible publicly. Specifically, the activities of the JWF on intercultural dialogue, Gülen got together with Chief Rabbi of Turkey's Jewish community David Aseo, and Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew in 1996. During this period, Gülen carried out various meetings with prominent statesmen, businessman, artists, authors and journalists. Additionally, he delivered numerous interviews and comments via the media to promote mutual respect and understanding amongst the all constituents of Turkish society, which has suffered ideological bias for decades. On many platforms, Gülen reiterated his ideas about open society, democracy, human rights, secularism and tolerance (Gülen Institute, 2010). Notably, Pope Jean Paul II sent a celebration message to Gülen for the Ramadan Festival, one of the prominent religious holidays of the Muslim world, regarding his efforts at promoting intercultural dialogue in 1998. Further, Gülen and Pope met in the Vatican the following month to improve dialogue (Gülen Institute, 2010).

Apart from its education and media institutions, Gülen-inspired businessmen established the Asya (Asia) Finance Incorporated Company, an Islamic participation Bank in 1996. Asya Finance opened its first branch in İstanbul, and by 2010 had 175 branches nationwide (Bank Asya, 2014)<sup>30</sup>. Furthermore, Gülen-inspired Businessmen established another non-governmental non-profit organization, a business community called the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey, TUSKON, in 2005. TUSKON consists of seven regional federations, 202-business association with more than 50,000 business people members in Turkey (TUSKON, 2007). The organization aims to create a commercial bridge between Turkey and the countries in which the Gülen Movement has schools.

Moreover, the followers of the Gülen movement have founded service

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<sup>30</sup> “According to the Banking Law No.5411 put into practice in November 2005, “Special Finance Houses” has been transformed into “Participation Banks”, gaining the “bank” statute (TKBB 2014).” After this development, the Asya Finance became the Bank Asya.

projects such as universities, medical institutions and human relief & healthcare organizations aside from those mentioned above (Ebaugh, 2010: 92-103). First of all, the Gülen-inspired higher education institute, Fatih University, was established in 1996. The university began its educational life with four faculties, four institutes and two junior technical colleges (Fatih Üniversitesi, 2010). Next, particularly in Turkey's larger cities, İstanbul and Bursa for example, the Gülen Movement's hospitals were established. Third, the Kimse Yok Mu (Is anybody there?) Solidarity and Aid Association was established in March 2004. The association describes its mission: *"to build a more comfortable, serene and peaceful world while fighting poverty and attempting to eliminate social inequalities; To encourage our society to be more understanding and engaging with the notion of 'Humanitarian Aide' (Kimse Yok Mu, 2014)"*. Moreover, the association aims *"to protect innocent people in war-torn areas"*. Kimse Yok Mu, which is currently a consultative member of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), has 40 branches nationwide and has continued its activities in 110 countries. Its Educational and Clean Water Projects are ongoing, aside from its actual humanitarian aids (Kimse Yok Mu, 2014).

#### *The 1997 Military Memorandum*

Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Party was the biggest partner of Turkey's minority government during the mid-1990s, the time when Gülen made himself increasingly visible in the media. It was not very clear whether Gülen intentionally chose Erbakan's government to express his ideas and opinions publicly. It was certain that some segments of the society, particularly the Kemalists, were disturbed by the rising awareness of Islamist groups in Turkish public opinion. After a monthly National Security Council meeting, the council explicitly warned the Erbakan government in 28 February 1997. As noted earlier, Prime Minister Erbakan compulsorily signed an 18-point declaration about the fight against religious reactionaryism as a result of this controversial meeting. The 28 February process, which caused the resignation of the

Erbakan government, heavily affected the religious segment of society, including the Gülen Movement.

After the 28 February Memorandum, rather than confronting the military-sanctioned government, the Gülen Movement focused on its educational activities. Furthermore, it tried to develop friendly relations with the Kemalist wings, the CHP and the DSP. For the sake of political stability Gülen urged Erbakan to withdraw from office before the government's resignation in a newspaper interview<sup>31</sup>. During this period, Gülen visited the USA due to his health condition; yet, he felt compelled to stay in the USA due to the current political tension. Despite Gülen's exile, the movement did not abandon its legal struggle and continued with its activities to be integrated into the system.

#### *The Gülen Movement and AK Party*

The 28 February military intervention affected Turkey both politically and economically. Within a five-year period, the religious political parties affiliated with Erbakan's National Outlook, the *Refah* Party and *Fazilet* Party, were banned by the Constitutional Court. This situation awakened the opposition in the movement (Milli Görüş), and it divided into two wings: the traditionalist and the reformist. Economically, Turkey was faced with massive corruption and an economic crisis, which eliminated existing parties from Turkish politics in the following elections. As I will discuss in the following chapter, the AK Party adopted non-religious discourse and emerged into the political sphere. During the mid-2000s the AK Party's pro-EU and liberal politics once again introduced a political opportunity structure to the Gülen Movement. In short, the Gülen Movement increased its expansion in and out of Turkey.

The tacit agreement on two important issues made the Gülen Movement and the AK Party closer, in addition to their similar ideas on democracy and secularism

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<sup>31</sup> "Beceremediniz Artık Bırakın," *Hürriyet Daily*, 18 April 1997.

(Kuru, 2007:147). First, both groups support pro-globalization policies to the ‘advantage of globalization’s opportunities’. Explicit support of EU membership is a tangible sign of this fact. The second point is that the Gülen Movement and AK Party have similar tendencies with regard to interfaith dialogue. The AK Party’s reforms fortified the position of non-Muslim minorities (Kuru, 2007:148). These reforms allowed the non-Muslim minorities to open places of worship Turkey, and cancelled state surveillance over them. In summary, the Gülen Movement’s and the AK Party’s similar tendencies and ideas have made them allies in the attempt to build a more democratic Turkey.

### **3.2. Sociological and Structural Analysis**

The Gülen Movement grew from being a small local initiative to a multi-national network in less than three decades. The crucial question is how the Gülen Movement achieved this expansion in a country, which has been dominated by assertive secularists since its establishment. Certainly, Gülen’s quest to find the middle way was one of the prominent indicators of the expansion of the movement, which I will analyze in the context of its ideology. First of all, I seek the answer to this question in this section. Later I will introduce a sociological and structural analysis of the Gülen Movement.

Assertive secularism is a French model ideology, which prohibits religion from public sphere (Kuru, 2011). During the republican era, assertive secularism has been the dominant state ideology in Turkey. According to Kuru, the Gülen Movement is one of the influential opponents of assertive secularism in Turkey (2007:143). Kuru explains the expansion of the Gülen Movement through their pro-globalization policies. As noted earlier, Özal’s liberal policies and international developments and the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, created a domestic and international opportunity structure for the Movement, which led to the incredible achievements they undertook in a short period of time. (Kuru, 2005:259,261).

Besides Kuru, Joshua D. Hendrick explains the Gülen Movement's 'growth and impact' according to Max Weber's 'charismatic leaders' definition. According to the definition, charismatic leaders emerge during times of crisis. If there is no crisis, charismatic leaders lean to "create of illusion of crisis" (Hendrick, 2009:351). Hendrick also added that a charismatic leader has to prove himself by performing miracles, as Weber noted:

*"The charismatic hero derives his authority ... by proving his power in practice.... Most of all, his divine mission must prove itself by bringing well-being to his faithful followers; if they do not fare well, he obviously is not the god-sent master (cited in Hendrick, 2009:352)."*

Hendrick, on the contrary, states Gramsci's 'organic intellectual', which proves himself rational ways that must be "*through verifiable facts and supportive evidence*" (Hendrick, 2009:352). Later on, he advocates the expansion of the Gülen Movement in parallel with Weber's charismatic leaders definition through the evidence that Gülen followers framed:

*"Fethullah Gülen ... possesses powers that an average educated person, an average person with average intelligence, could not possibly imagine. It is God-given ... If you find a more learned person in the world I would like to meet him (cited in Hendrick, 2009:352)."*

Whilst I agree with the two explanations above, I do not find them adequate to explain the Gülen Movement's growth and impact. The peaceful messages of the Gülen Movement derive from its ideology. This is as important a factor as the explanations above in its emergence as a multi-national network. As the phrase goes, as much as a perfect salesman and market needs, the characteristic of the product is also a requirement for a commercial success. In parallel with this, Doğu Ergil states



what makes Gülen's teaching so attractive to his followers has three answers: "(1) *The Gülen Movement is an open circle*, (2), *It is on good terms with the authorities*, and (3) *It does not hold a coercive moral approach. Morality and moral laws are not enforced by external forces* (Ergil, 2012)." Apart from Kuru and Hendrick's explanations on the growth of the movement, these three explanations also come to the fore when making a comprehensive evaluation of the issue. Those characteristics of Gülen's teaching harmonized with "peace and dialogue" have brought about a massive expansion of the movement, in addition to his charisma and the domestic and international opportunity structure.

Since its first initiative in İzmir in the late 1960s, the Gülen Movement has been organized as local circles, which consist of businessmen, workers, and professionals throughout the country, from rural areas to big metropolis<sup>32</sup>. The very first gatherings took part in İzmir through the *sohbet* (reading and discussing) circles. In these *sohbet* circles, formed without any membership, participants aim "*to preserve their Islamic heritage while adapting to modernity formed circles around scholars and intellectuals who promoted various approaches such as focusing on Qur'anic studies, the blending of religious devotion with a mild form of nationalism, or individualized spiritual practices* (Ebaugh, 2010:47)."

As mentioned before, the *sohbet* circles have been a common tradition amongst the Nur Movements since Nursi. Thus Turkish society has become familiar with these local and small circles. Gülen also encouraged establishing *sohbet* circles in order to discuss his ideas/projects in addition to the main reason, *sohbet* (Ebaugh, 2010:47). For instance, the establishments of 'houses of light' were one of the most important outcomes of the *sohbet* circle (L. Erdoğan, 1995:114). Later on, the establishment of educational institutions including student's dormitories was realized in these *sohbet* circles.

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<sup>32</sup> The section of this chapter heavily draws Ebaugh's (2010) work, which is the recent research on the sociological analysis of the Gülen Movement; Ergene's (2008) work, which has comprehensive analysis of the movement; and Ergil's work (2012), which aims to analyze the Gülen Movement with the answer of 100 questions in various perspectives.

Gülen asserts *“This structure has never started as a movement, the grass root activities at the bottoms started as small and moved into big projects, from local to the global. In the reasonableness of these projects many people united, worked together and it became a movement (cited in Ergil, 2012).”* Gülen encouraged his followers to promote the society with active participation such as establishing ‘houses of light’ and educational institutions. The Gülen Movement has pursued a series of activities from local to global. Similarly, Ebaugh argues, *“Mr. Gülen in his early adult years was an active part of a cemaat around Nursi’s teachings and experienced the fellowship and effectiveness of this form of organization (2010:47).”* Consequently, in line with Gülen’s ideas, his followers, who are the participants of the local circles, have gradually built a multi-national movement.

### *The Local Circles*

The structures of the local circles are classified by two ways (Ebaugh, 2010:48): *“(1) according to location and neighborhoods; and (2) according to education and jobs”*. The people from similar jobs gather in small groups according to their locations. Ebaugh’s fieldwork, carried out in various Turkish cities, including İstanbul, Bursa and Ankara, verified this. The number of the participants varies. Whilst a longstanding circle gathers about 10-12 people, a group consisting mainly of newcomers meets with the participation of 20-25 people (Ebaugh, 2010:49). The circles events may also differ. Some groups read Qur’an, Risale-i Nur and Gülen’s works at their meetings; some groups may welcome a speaker. Aside from these, the groups also get together to share something related to their daily lives (Ebaugh, 2010:49).

Gathering according to similar job groups also provides the members of the circles with a kind of business network. As Ebaugh noted from a businessman (2010:49):

*“Being in the same type of business means that we have a strong basis for coming together and understanding one another. We also network and refer customers among us. Then we have a basis for discussing projects that need doing in our community and how we can help with these projects. We also see the results of our efforts which encourage us to be even more generous.”*

Doğu Ergil argues that the main goals of local circles gathering around Gülen from the very beginning was, *“in their own words”*, earning ‘the pleasure of God’ (2012). He continues that Gülen encouraged his followers *“to open dialog and develop cooperation and understanding, in order to support the education of the needy and decrease the conflicts between different faith groups (2012).”* As a result of this, aside from local enterprises, international enterprises emerged, with participating foreigners from these companies working in harmony *“seeking compatibility of the scientific with the moral, stressing common human values, speaking the Turkish language, mixing their culture with the Turkish culture, and reaching a world view that transcended the local (Ergil, 2012).”*

The emergence of the Gülen Movement is based on neither economic class nor any ethnic groups. Instead, *“the masses that it is based upon, vis-à-vis religious and social determinants, are neither oppressed nor excluded sections of society (Ergene, 2008).”* The community began to shape around a specific group of religious people, who enthusiastically follow the teachings and ideas of Gülen; from both the rural and urban, and also from the various economic levels. If any mention of social class is needed, it would be proper to point out the educated class who are the main actors of the movement (Ergene, 2008).

The Gülen Movement does not have an ordinary organizational structure, which determines the leadership, a bylaw or an organizational scheme, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood. There is no any official membership system, thus people’s support is actualized on a voluntary basis. Moreover, *“Gülen does not accept, nor give himself the title, ‘a societal leader or social leader’, which can be expressed in*

various forms”; yet he meets the description of a “leader of a civic society” (Ergil, 2012). Gülen describes himself as (cited in Ergil, 2012):

*“I am someone who tries as best as he could to practice his religion, not the one who is able to practice, but the one who trying to practice. For that reason, namely since I am unable to perfectly represent the religion, I could not be considered a man of religion. Secondly, the status of the man of religion as an intermediary between the servant and the Creator is in contradiction with the Islamic precepts. In Islam there are no clergyman. Everyone can be pious, and from this perspective no one can be different from no one else in status. Only in terms of practicing the religion, and in the eyes of God at that, some people might be better than others. But, in fact, people are, for sure, looking for a leader or an organization in the activities to be carried out or the services performed [in order to make them to be durable or reliable]... Today, some services which are falsely attributed to me are in fact certain things consisting of the services according to the circumstances of the country, carried out by the people who comprehended the value of the service for humanity. Nevertheless, it might be the case that they might have been inspired by some of my sayings or encouragements. But for some unknown reasons, people are looking for a leader behind this, as they do in every other cases.”*

Yet, it can be said that the movement consists of various autonomous communities, which operate in their professions according to the teachings and ideas of Gülen (Ergil, 2012). All organizations have their own administrative and financial structures. The movement, whose main area is education, began to establish other institution in various areas such as printed media, broadcasting, finance, medical, relief & healthcare through the collective donations of the contributors.

The funds of those institutions have been provided by the financial contributions of the followers. Ebaugh states that those contributions come from various local circles in varying amounts between five and twenty percent of the yearly income of the people involved (Ebaugh, 2010:54). Although there is no written convention, the amount of the donations can be made over twenty percent. In

addition, fund-raising organizations are another major way to contribute to Gülen-inspired projects (Ebaugh, 2010:54).

The rapid expansion of the Gülen Movement raised the question of how a social movement could be able to achieve such huge projects and whether the movement has been supported by foreign powers. Gülen himself explains where the support of these projects, specifically the Gülen-inspired schools, comes from (cited in Ergil, 2012):

*“Behind this project lie the support of the philanthropist people in all the villages, towns and cities of Turkey... and sweat of youthful teachers who work for a salary, equal to the amount of a scholarship, the youth yet graduated from the most prominent universities of Turkey. ... Up until now, not even a single proof was shown indicating the receipt of any amount of money coming from others places, while hundreds of these schools are established and operated in front of the eyes of everyone, openly.*

*The reason being that there is no funding resource other than the pure contributions of ... the sacrificing Anatolian men and women. ... This is a movement of volunteers, namely an enterprise of a civic society, which does not depend on any foreign power.*

*Those, who are unable to do anything without taking either several domestic establishments or a foreign nation behind them, might have difficulty to understand the movement of volunteers, which does not rely on anything other than the public’s attraction and approval and the grace of God. Those who do not know how to give without anything in return might not be able to conceive the notion of sacrifice in order to serve firstly their own nation but also humanity in general.”*

The motivation that drives the financial support is the institutions that have successfully realized their aims. Ergil states that according to Gülen’s understanding being transparent is really important in terms of the services (2012). Some people wonder where the sources’ funding come from, another group of contributors wonder where these sources go. Ergil referred to Gülen’s explanation that each school has

separate financing. The schools have been financed by wealthy businessmen or by the people in a Turkish city or town. The financial needs of the schools are met by the money collected, and transferred from the related schools by the members of the community who are responsible for the schools. Moreover, as private enterprises, the educational institutions have reached a financial capability to increase their investments and facilitate bigger modernly-equipped institutions. Thus the source of the funds can be explained easily; also the supporters have the opportunity to observe their contributions with their own eyes.

The developments and explanations above satisfy the movement's supporters. On the other hand, the people who oppose the movement assert that the movement "*controls 'gigantic' sum of money*" through various publications and media outlets (Özdalga, 2005:439). The opposing groups claim that Gülen works secretly for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because he has been residing in USA since 1999<sup>33</sup>. Moreover, the Gülen schools have been the subject of various academic works. In some works, for instance, the Gülen schools have been called missionary schools (Balci, 2009), and the Gülen is described as the government itself and described as the "Islamist danger" (Sharon-Krespin, 2009).

### **3.3. Ideology of the Gülen Movement**

From a few small local circles, the Gülen Movement has become an international institutional network whose activities vary from education to relief & healthcare. Due to its multidimensional activities, the question was posed as to what the Gülen Movement really is. Both on a national and international basis the movement does not fit any well-known descriptions in many aspects.

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<sup>33</sup> It should be noted that to accuse prominent people such as politicians, businessman, journalist and opinion leaders as being hidden members of foreign secret services is a popular stereotype amongst Turkish society and politics. To accuse someone as a traitor is another common stereotype. (see Akyol, 2014 for these stereotypes).

First, the emergence of the Gülen Movement does not stem from any resistance and opposition. In this regard, the movement is against any kind of terrorism and violence. Accordingly Gülen says: *“A terrorist cannot be a Muslim and a Muslim cannot be a terrorist. A Muslim can only be the representative and symbol of peace, welfare, and prosperity (Gülen, 2002a).”*

Second, despite its Islamic origin, the Gülen movement does not seek to establish an Islamic state based on the Sharia Law. As Ergil refers, *“the movement has no revolutionary intentions or any political agenda of any kind. Gülen is defending the real revolution which takes place within each and every individual (2012)”*. On the contrary, Gülen stresses the importance of democracy in many places, and believes that Islam and democracy are compatible. In an interview Gülen stated: *“I believe that Islam also would enrich democracy in answering the deep needs of humans, such as spiritual satisfaction, which cannot be fulfilled except through the remembrance of the Eternal One...(Gülen, 2005a)”*.

Third, the Gülen Movement pursues interfaith and intercultural dialogue, which is one of the most distinguishing features of the movement. Apart from Gülen-inspired schools, the activities around the interfaith and intercultural dialogue have opened ways for the movement to integrate with the international community. In this sense Gülen claims, *“Our ongoing activities are for the good of all humanity. They should not be considered limited to our own country, Turkey (Gülen, 1993:39)”*. In this regard, in order to make a proper ideological analysis it is important to define what the Gülen movement is.

If the thoughts and teachings of Fethullah Gülen are examined the questions come to mind whether Gülen is a Sufi, and whether Gülen founded a Sufi order (Michel, 2005:343). As noted in the previous sections, Gülen neither accepts nor calls himself as a religious leader (Ergil, 2012). In this regard, Gülen rejects the accusation that he has founded any Sufi order (*tarikat*). Furthermore, he responded that he has never been a part of any Sufi order. In this context, Gülen states (cited in Michel, 2005:344): *“The religious orders are institutions that appeared in the name of*

*representing Sufism six centuries after our Prophet, upon whom be peace. They have their own rules and structures. Just as I never joined a Sufi order, I have never had any relationship with one.”*

Yet Zeki Saritoprak asserts Gülen is “*a Sufi in his own way*” (Saritoprak, 2003). Given this justification, he gives examples from early Sufis - for instance, Rabia, Junayd, Ghazzali and Rumi - and he states they did not belong to any Sufi organizations. Although they did not have any *sheikh* (Sufi master) to follow, they were Sufis and “*they developed a spiritual basis for the later institutionalization of Sufism*” (Saritoprak, 2003:158).” In this sense, given that Gülen has not belonged to any Sufi order, he has his own way. Similarly, Ergene argues this question by referring to the structural features of the Gülen Movement. He states that the Gülen Movement has a religious identity, and he adds:

*“When we look at its structural characteristic and its global activities, however, we see that it also has a very wide vision and socio-cultural identity. The stress that we lay upon its religious identity centers on the Gülen Movement’s Sufi character although it is important to understand that it is not a Sufi ‘order’ (2008).”*

Ergene defines Gülen as a ‘modern Sufi’, and he asserts that Gülen’s Sufism should be examined to the individual level. Rather than the Sufi traditions, Gülen does not depend on an ascetic understanding. Gülen does not follow the form of the clergy because of the social notion of the Islam (2008). Accordingly, Gülen states (2006b: 164-165):

*“Sufism is the path followed by an individual who, having been able to free himself or herself from human vices and weaknesses in order to acquire angelic qualities and whose conduct is pleasing to God, lives in accordance with the requirements of God’s knowledge and love and in the resulting spiritual delight that ensues.”*



Marcia Hermansen outlines parallel arguments: *“Bekim Agai concludes that this is a misrepresentation because unlike classical tariqa Sufism, there is no requirement of initiation, no restricted or esoteric religious practices, and no arcane Sufi terminology that marks membership in the Gülen Movement”* (2005). On the other hand, Hermansen states (2005) *“Bassam Tibi deprecatingly referred to the Gülen movement as a Sufi tariqa including as a critique that Fethullah Gülen functions as the shaykh (Sufi master).”*

As seen from the explanations above, the general belief is that the Gülen Movement is not a Sufi order. Hermansen points out an alternative definition: *‘the cemaat’* (2005). Accordingly, Hermansen states, *“Agai then explores the applicability of the term “cemaat”, the Turkish equivalent of the Arabic jama'at (community), to the movement. Enes Ergene spends considerable time developing the organization and theoretical elements of the term cemaat and its applicability to Hizmet (2005)”*. In this regard, Ergene focuses on Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber’s works on ‘community’ and ‘society’, aimed to characterize the Gülen Movement, which *“is a movement that produces its own values”* as a modern community rather than any other classical definitions (2008).

Another issue that needs to be clarified is the relationship between the Gülen Movement (Gülen’s thought) and the Nur Movement (Nursi’s thought or the Risale-i Nur). It is a well-known fact that the Risale-i Nur’s and the Nursi’s ideas have a prominent importance in the Gülen Movement. Ergene asserts *“the Gülen Movement did not rise upon the values of a past movement or period of crisis (2008)”*. To him, the movement’s outcomes are its own products. He adds that there is neither any *“structural and religious spiritual dynamics”* nor any school of thought, which dominate the Gülen Movement (Ergene, 2008). Ergene stresses the connection of the Risale-i Nur with the movement:

*“One cannot deny the way that the Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) has fed the inner dynamics of the movement both in spiritual and intellectual terms. The Risale-i Nur is one of the set of books written on Islamic belief and faith in recent centuries which has had a great spiritual-social influence over the masses in Turkey. In that respect, its influence over the larger community of Turkish Muslims is clear evident. This set of books might not have the organizational framework that one can find in contemporary scientific works, but in the manner in which it treats the issues, and in the way that it offers fundamental solutions to human and social life, it affects the masses more quickly and deeply than other works. It not only stimulates belief and religious commitment, but it also inspires feeling of solidarity and cooperation. This is the contribution of the Risale-i Nur to the Gülen Movement (2008).”*

Thus, the Gülen movement has a unique character, which originates from itself. Gülen, indeed, noted earlier that this is “*a movement originating its own models*”<sup>34</sup> (Gülen, 2010).

### *Ideology*

As a multi-institutional organization, the Gülen Movement has values rather than a mainstream ideology. The ideas and methods that the movement follows take shape in accordance with its services. In this regards, Ergene asserts, “*the social and action-related dynamics of the Gülen movement have been shaped around Gülen’s strong spiritual character, his articulate teachings, and his broad sphere of social influence* (2008)”. Therefore, the followers of the Gülen Movement, including Gülen, declared that the movement does not have any ideology. ‘The formulation of an oppositional ideology,’ is a characteristic of the classical movements according to Ergene. As stated before, given that the emergence of the Gülen Movement did not occur against any type of opposition, the movement focuses on the solutions and alternatives rather

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<sup>34</sup> The original Turkish version of the article (“Örnekleri Kendinden Bir Hareket”) was published in *Sızıntı*, on August 2001. See, Gülen, 2001.

than to adopting an ideology (Ergene, 2008). Gülen notes *“ideologies are divisive rather than uniting. This is social and historical reality* (Gülen, 1998 cited in Saritoprak and Griffith, 2005:337).”

Undoubtedly, the Gülen Movement is a religious community. Gülen’s teachings are mainly shaped around the Orthodox Sunni Islam (the Qur’an and the Sunnah). Aside from this, although I stated earlier that the Gülen Movement is not a Sufi order, and that it has some differences from other Nur Movements, the teachings of Gülen have emanated from “the tradition of the Nakshibendi Sufi order” or *Tasawwuf*, and the teachings of Said Nursi (Özdalga, 2000:91). While Gülen was building his thought, he took these three traditions as a starting point.

The Prophet Muhammad and his life style is one of the important main themes of Gülen’s thoughts. The main themes of his thought ‘love and tolerance’ are derived from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. In this sense, Gülen says: *“If there is ever a person whom ignorance, unbelief and brutality hate the most, it is Muhammad, upon him be peace and blessings. Those who search for truth and thirst for true knowledge eventually will seek him out and embrace his path* (Gülen, 2006a: 7)”.

Gülen combined these traditions in line with the Prophet Muhammad, and he embraced an active model of service (*hizmet*). He states (2006a: 7):

*“Prophet Muhammad, upon him be peace and blessings, rejected indolence and lazy and esteemed labor as mode of worship and applauded the hard-working. He directed his followers to horizons beyond the age in which they lived and taught them how they could be the element of balance in this world.”*

One of the most distinguishing features of Gülen Movement is its ‘activism’. When the Gülen Movement’s services are considered, the diversity of its *hizmetler* can be evaluated the activist characteristic of their activities. Further, the variety of

the services that the Gülen Movement conducts also derives from one of the hadith of the Prophet: “*The best of mankind are those who are beneficial for others* (cited in Ergene, 2008). Thus, the movement does not act just as a religious community

Elisabeth Özdalga explains the active notion of the Gülen ideas, which also mainly shape the activities of the Gülen Movement, as “activist pietism” (2000:87). In doing so, Özdalga departs from Max Weber’s “in-worldly asceticism”. Accordingly, she asserts, “*Gülen's views have little to do with seeking political power or even traditional Islam but rather have more in common with Max Weber's ideas about "worldly asceticism."* The perspective taught by Gülen is based on activism, stirred up, as well as controlled, by pietism (2000:87)”. Özdalga describes this ‘activist pietism’ is “*a new feature in Turkish religious life*”; thus Gülen delineates a religious life that stretches beyond the mosques (2000: 87, 90).

#### *Ignorance, Poverty and Disunity*

If the Gülen Movement’s services are examined in overall, it can easily be seen that Nursi has not only influenced the inner lives of the movement’s followers but also has influenced the nature of its services. In answer to a question posed years ago, Nursi stated that “*ignorance, poverty and disunity*” were the enemy of the Islamic world (cited in Ergil, 2012). Similarly, Gülen pointed out the “ignorance” issue in his article, ‘*The Main Issues of The Islamic World and Solutions from Bediüzzaman*’ in detail (see Gülen, 1994). Gülen emphasized Nursi’s solutions under nine points in parallel with these three vices mentioned above. It can be said that these three problems draw the framework of the activities of the Gülen Movement.

First, to defeat ignorance, Gülen has initiated an education campaign with encouraging ‘*Anatolian men and women*’ to serve humanity through education. As remembered by Nursi’s project of the *Medresetü’z-Zehra*, Nursi recognized that the only way to deal with ignorance was education. In this regard, the Gülen Movement

has put into practice the Nursi's intention with its active and dynamic philosophy to solve the problem within the domestic and international aspects.

Second, about solving the problem of poverty, the movement established a relief & healthcare organization, 'Kimse Yok Mu' (Is Anybody There?), which operates in 110 countries (Kimse Yok Mu, 2014). Furthermore, to strengthen the medium-sized enterprises to contribute to the Turkish economy and to build economic bridges in the countries in which the movement operates the institution TUSKON was established. For instance, the volume of trade between Turkey and the African countries increased from \$750 million to \$7.5 billion between 2000 and 2011. The Financial Times drew attention to the role played by the schools of the Gülen Movement in this development (TimeTürk, 2013).

Thirdly, the Gülen Movement aims to defeat disunity through the themes of love, tolerance and dialogue. As noted before, the Abant Platform and other initiatives related to dialogue have pursued a more peaceful environment in an attempt to struggle with disunity. Accordingly, Gülen states, "*... while walking toward the future as a whole nation, tolerance is our safest refuge and our fortress against the handicaps that arise from schism, factions, and the difficulties inherent in reaching mutual agreement; troubles that lie waiting at every corner* (Gülen, 2006b: 33)". He continues, "*Our ongoing activities are for the good of all humanity. They should not be considered limited to our own country, Turkey* (Gülen, 1993:39." Briefly, Gülen summarizes the activities of the movement within the framework of all the issues above with these words: "*If we do not plant the seeds of love in the hearts of young people, whom we try to revive through science, knowledge, and modern culture, they will never attain moral perfection* (Gülen, 2006a: 24)".

### *The Dynamics of the Gülen Movement*

As mentioned earlier, Gülen's teachings and thoughts were shaped by three traditions: (1) Qur'an and the Sunnah, (2) "the tradition of the Nakshibendi Sufi

order”, and (3) Nursi and his teachings (Özdalga, 2000). The understanding of Gülen stemmed from these three traditions, and his interpretations have given meaning to the dynamics of the Gülen Movement. Although it is possible to extend the list, I briefly argue these dynamics under four titles according to the discourses and activities of the movement: (1) Dialogue and Tolerance, (2) To Act Positive (*Müspet hareket*), (3) Self-sacrifice and Altruism, and (4) Collective Personality (*Şahs-ı Manevî*). I keep this section as brief as possible and try to reflect these dynamics with the writings of Gülen.

*Dialogue and Tolerance* is one of the most distinguishing features of the Gülen Movement. The themes of ‘love and mercy’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘dialogue’ have been explicitly mentioned. As noted earlier, Gülen and his followers believe that any kind of disunity and conflict amongst nations can only be defeated by being tolerant and continuing the dialogue. Gülen mentions that, “*Tolerance is not something that was invented by us. Tolerance was first introduced on this Earth by the prophets whose teacher was God* (Gülen, 2006b: 37)”. In addition, the dialogue and tolerance understanding of the movements is universal and does not only include solving internal disputes. In this regard, Gülen points out that:

*“Islam, Christianity and Judaism all come from the same root, have almost the same essentials and are nourished from the same source. Although they have lived as rival religions for centuries, the common points between them and their shared responsibility to build a happy world for all of the creatures of God make interfaith dialog among them necessary. This dialog has now expanded to include the religions of Asia and other areas (cited in Ebaugh, 2010:31).”*

Additionally, he expresses tolerance in a more literary way (Gülen, 2006b: 37):

*“Be as vast as the oceans and take every soul to your bosom! Let faith keep you alert, cherish a never-ending affection for humanity, and leave no broken heart forgotten or ignored!*

*Applaud the good for their goodness, appreciate those who have believing hearts, and be kind to them. Approach unbelievers so gently that their envy and hatred melt away. Like a Messiah, revive people with your breath.”*

*To act positive* can be also defined to follow the middle way. ‘The positive action’ is one of the eminent methods that Risale-i Nur follows. In various places of his writings, Nursi stated that their duty was to act positive, which is “the patient and silent struggle” (Vahide, 2005:323). Likewise, Gülen mentions the importance of the positive action and strictly reject any extremist themed re-action. Gülen always seek for balance in every actions, and states that extremist understanding of modernity may have contradicted the extremist understanding of Muslim tradition (Kuru, 2003). In accordance with Gülen suggests, “*One should avoid going to extremes in one’s thinking and actions. Going the extremes is a lethal poison* (Gülen, 2006a: 99)”. Thus, Gülen suggests balanced actions both for the spiritual and physical lives, and between religion and science. Consequently, by acting positively, the Gülen Movement has an opportunity not only to expand its growth, but also to contribute to society in respect of democratic values, human rights and freedoms.

*Self-sacrifice, altruism and devotion* are the intellectual and active dynamics of the Gülen Movement, derived from Sufi culture (Ergene, 2008). As noted earlier, these dynamics are the reflection of one of the hadiths of the Prophet: “*The best of mankind are those who are beneficial for others.*” These dynamics are the indicator that the ‘religious motive’ and ‘social action’ act together in harmony (Ergene, 2008). Briefly, the these themes can be defined as living for others

Gülen understands devotion in a broad way. Apart from the financial charity, it includes time and effort. According to Gülen, universal projects cannot be realized by ordinary people (Gülen, 2006b: 103):

*“Sublime ideals, high objectives, influential and universal projects can only be realized by those who soar high, who remain firm, who proceed on their route steadily, who present a determined stance, and who are motivated by heavenly ecstasies. What we need now is not ordinary people, but rather people devoted to divine reality who think to a lofty degree; people who by putting into practice their thoughts lead, first of all their own nation, and then all people, to enlightenment and help them find God—in other words, dedicated spirits, people who think what needs to be thought, who know what needs to be known, who without hesitation practice what they know and who wander like Israfil, who is on the verge of blowing the last trumpet in order to prepare dead spirits for the Day of Resurrection, and who instill hope in everybody.”*

*Collective Personality* can be defined as a legal entity or the personality of a community. Regarding communities, the collective personality requires formal and informal togetherness (Kurucan, 2011). This formation represents the power, belief, ideas and behavior of a unified system (Ergene, 2008). It increases the power and efficiency of a community, and puts aside personal achievements and individuals in favor of the philosophy of the community. Moreover, the collective personality is another dynamic originating in the Sufi tradition, which has influenced the Gülen Movement. In terms of religious communities, the collective personality takes shape around religious principles to spread the ‘word of God’ (Ergene, 2008).

According to Gülen, every single person in the community works in accordance with a purpose, and acts like a member of an orchestra in harmony. The integration on the road to same direction brings about a significant brotherhood, which allows sharing not only the happiness but also the sadness of each person in the community (Gülen, 2006c: 121). Gülen also states the importance of ‘*the collective consciousness*’ and its power in many places and occasions. The collective consciousness is an eminent criteria for existing as a community (cited in Ergene, 2008):



*“Devotion to a collective personality means dissolving in the community and unifying with it. Community is a group of people who gathered around same thought and ideal... Being a community can only be attained by reaching collective consciousness. The collective consciousness dissolves the individual in its multidimensional composition, making it yet another of its dimensions; then no absolute individual remains...”*

*Collective personality of the community rapidly soars to higher spiritual ranks... This rise continues, as long as the community preserves its qualitative essence, to such pinnacles that sometimes a community represents the highest spiritual rank...”*

### *The Golden Generation and The Ideal Person*

In one of his articles, ‘*From Chaos to Order-I*’, Gülen portrays the features of this current age from his perspective (Gülen, 2005:105):

*“In this “red” period, when everywhere was pervaded by the thick dust and smoke of hopelessness, eyes shed tears of helplessness, hearts sighed when looking toward the faces that did not know shame, lamenting their feelings with a voice from their deepest self.”*

Later he asks: *“What else could you expect from those confused, who sailed forth into atheism; from those unthinking people, who praise and applaud everybody and everything; from those victims of their deeply sullied conscience, who are accustomed to bowing to that power?”*

Gülen states that overcoming ‘this moral misery’ enables the ‘Ideal Person’ and the ‘Golden Generation’. According to Gülen, those people will appear among us, yet the birth of this new generation will not be easy. He mentions the independent character of these people free from any extrinsic effects. In this sense Gülen mentions *“These new people will be individuals of integrity who, free from external influences,*

*can manage independently of others. No worldly force will be able to bind them, and no fashionable –ism will cause them to deviate from their path (Gülen, 2006b: 81)."*

Thus, educational institutions are of crucial importance in the Gülen Movement. Gülen believes that building an ideal generation is only possible through a true education. As much as traditional and spiritual values, the scientific education is as important as traditional and spiritual values in Gülen's educational thought. In this sense he states,

*"The light of the intellect is scientific knowledge while the heart of the spirit derives its light from religious [knowledge]. Scientific knowledge without religion usually causes atheism or agnosticism while religious knowledge without intellectual enlightenment gives rise to bigotry. When combined, they urge a student to research further and further research, deepening in both belief and knowledge (Gülen, 1997:320)."*

In short, the Gülen Movement creates its own values and ideology in accordance with the teachings of Fethullah Gülen. Staying away from any kind of –ism, including Islamism is one of the eminent features that distinguish the movement from other religious organizations and communities. To construct 'peace bridges' amongst people from any nation and religion is the ultimate purpose of the movement. In doing so, the movement believes that the only way to achieve this purpose is to reshape the society (world) from top to bottom through ideal people. The emergence of such generations will be actualized through the devotion of numerous volunteers, the "architects of soul" and "physicians of thought" described by Gülen (Ergene, 2008). Consequently, the Gülen Movement has been struggling to build such a unique generation.

### 3.4. Political Behavior of the Gülen Movement

As much as the movement increases its activity areas not only inside but also outside the country, the movement has been accused by the secular wing of Turkish society of pursuing hidden political purposes. Particularly during the 28 February period, although the Gülen Movement was not addressed directly, the military-dictated measures about to fighting reactionaryism included sanctions on the movement. More recently, the 24 August 2004 dated National Security Council (MGK) plan titled the “*Plan to Crack Down on the Fethullah Gülen Group in Turkey*”, was disclosed in late 2013 (Today's Zaman, 2014). Does the Gülen Movement really have a political purpose? What is the political behavior of the Gülen Movement under normal circumstances? How do they react against the offensive behavior of the state institutions? In this section, I will seek answers to these questions.

#### 3.4.1. Politics and The Gülen Movement

The Gülen Movement does not have any political constitution or close ties to any political parties. To spread the virtues of Islam, to act according to *tabligh* principles, to deliver God and His Messenger’s messages, and to meet the needs of modern times in context with Islamic thought are some of the main endeavors of the movement (Ergil, 2012). Gülen reflects upon their apolitical purposes in many places:

*“We move with the spirit our dear Prophet provided for us. ... Some people aim at establishing a state and the conquest of the whole world, we have none of that. No fruit of this world is expected, not even otherworldly rewards (cited in Ergil, 2012).”*

As noted earlier, in the aftermath of the foundation of the Journalist and Writers Foundation in 1994, the movement has begun to appear in the public sphere. The JWF organized the increasing activities of the Gülen Movement and became its

visage. Under the authoritarian secular environment, the movement formed its democratic resistance, which was based on participation (Bilici, 2006:17). Apart from this, the success of the Islamists in the 1994 local and the 1995 general elections increased discontent in the secular wing, including the military. The Movement's increasing visibility through different platforms coincided with the rise of the *Refah* Party (RP). Yet, the Gülen Movement followed pro-globalist policies, including integration with the European Union (EU). By contrast, the *Refah* Party adopted an anti-western and global political agenda due to its political Islamist interpretation. (Kuru, 2007:262,270).

### *Democracy and Secularism*

Since the very early beginning, the Gülen Movement has developed a pro-democratic and pro-secular framework. As mentioned above, Gülen stated that they have no intention to of establishing a state based on religion. In another place, in respond to the questions on 'Islamic understanding of state' and 'the place of state in Qur'an' Gülen made this explanation (cited in the Saritoprak and Ünal's interview, 2005:449-451):

*"In Islam, which is based on the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet, there is neither absolute monarchy nor classical democracy as known in the West; neither dictatorship, nor totalitarianism. In Islam, ruling means a mutual contract between the ruler and the subject and it takes its legitimacy from the rule of law, and from the principle of the superiority of the law. Accordingly, the law is above the ruler and the subject.*

...

*For Islam, an administration based on tyranny is illegitimate. Islam does not approve any kind of dictatorship. In an Islamic administration, those who are at the top have to obey the law like ordinary people: they cannot violate these principles and cannot act in their practice against these principles".*

Moreover, Gülen states, the rulers, the legislative and executive institutions have allowed creation of laws in accordance with Islam. In this context, “it is impossible to prove in any way that Islam opposes democracy” according to Gülen (Saritoprak and Ünal, 2005:450-451).

Apart from the explanation above, Gülen always stresses the importance of ‘rule of Law’, and ‘fundamental freedoms and rights’. He points out “All rights are equally important, and an individual’s right cannot be sacrificed for society’s sake (Gülen, 2006b: 221). In doing so, Gülen also reminds us of the six fundamental principles that Islam defends (Gülen, 2006b: 221):

- “1. Power lies in truth, a repudiation of the common idea that truth relies upon power.*
- 2. Justice and the rule of law are essential.*
- 3. Freedom of belief and rights to life, personal property, reproduction, and health (both mental and physical) cannot be violated.*
- 4. The privacy and immunity of individual life must be maintained.*
- 5. No one can be convicted of a crime without evidence, or accused and punished for someone else’s crime.*
- 6. An advisory system of administration is essential.”*

In many places, Gülen states that democracy is a “humane reality” and *‘there could be no turning back from democracy; yet, the current democracy could be improved’* (cited in Sönmez, 1998). Further, as stated in Article 5 of the Constitution, the democratic regime should be developed to meet all human “physical and metaphysical” needs.

Other than this, Gülen differentiates between secularism from laicism. According to Gülen, laicism is confused with secularism in Turkey. Gülen says, *“Secularism is worldly”*, and *“the people who understand laicism as secularism approach the issue in the form of worldliness* (cited in Sönmez, 1998).” Thus, the

administration is set with the themes without otherworldly. Gülen desires that people who have internalized democracy well should think about the solution to the problem of the confusion around the definition of secularism.

Gülen defines laicism as the separation of the religion and state. To him laicism protects religion in its ‘own position’. In this sense, the state should remain neutral on this issue. He continues that there are three types of laicism: judicial, political and philosophical (Sönmez, 1998). The Turkish laicism is judicial, and is considered to be vastly different to philosophical laicism. It is perceived to be the meaning of secularism. Thus, within the new perception, religion has been excluded from the system, the state. In short, the quest for the identification of laicism led the definition on a different course. However; according to Gülen, laicism dated back to olden times. Having had non-Muslim subjects, the early Turkish states, Seljuk’s and Ottomans particularly, more or less applied laicism in accordance with its real meaning. Thus, the minorities could practice their religions (cited in Sönmez, 1998). The early implementation of laicism led Gülen to a conclusion, which assures that the early states did not understand laicism as secularism. This also proved that laicism has place in Islamic thought because there were many legal regulations apart from the *sunnah*, *ijma* and *ijtihad*.

### **3.4.2. Political Behavior**

The Gülen Movement has followed a positive course and maintained good relations with the authorities and state apparatus (Ergil, 2012; Kuru, 2007; Bilici, 2006). The importance given to the state by Gülen and his anti-anarchist tendency has played an important role. In many places Gülen publicly states, “*We are in equal proximity to all parties. I am not saying equal distance; we are in equal proximity because all the followers and sympathizers of every party are our people. People’s parties and people’s political ideas are not barriers to our being friends with them* (Gülen, 2002b).”

Yet, within the scope of this study, during the last three decades the Gülen Movement has mostly dealt with conservative governments. As a consequence of domestic and international developments, the Gülen Movement has caught a growing trend that caused a confrontation due to the restrictions which came from the state institutions during the period known as the ‘post-modern military coup’, which began on 28 February 1997 (Bilici, 2006 and Kuru, 2007). The clashes between the secular state and the movement have originated from the position of the movement in the public sphere rather than politics (Özdalga, 2003:62).

It has been clear from the very beginning that the movement has stressed the importance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. They have shared their ideas related to the deficiencies of state institutions in this regard. The movement chose a tolerant way to stress them publicly without challenging the state. Accordingly, Kuru stresses Gülen’s moderate point of view as seeking ‘the middle way’ (2003). Kuru states that Gülen’s understanding of ‘the middle way’ is derived from his understanding of Islam. As noted earlier, Kuru also states that Gülen always seeks “*balance between materialism and spiritualism, between rationalism and mysticism, between worldliness and excessive asceticism, between this world and the next and inclusive of the ways of all the previous prophets* (2003).” He also stresses that the middle way is an important Islamic concept, and he continues by stating that Nursi’s understanding of the middle way - which “*define(s) the truly Islamic way as the middle way between the two*” - has mainly influenced Gülen’s understanding (cited in Kuru, 2003).

Similarly, Mücahit Bilici, discusses Gülen’s understanding of the middle way in context with the political perspective, and he asserts that “*Gülen positions his identity at the heart of conservatism, which is a middle way between nationalism and Islam* (2006:8).” Accordingly, Bilici calls the Gülen Movement “*arguably the most rational and sophisticated Islamic group*” due to its ability to benefit the authoritarian political environment through the understanding of its middle way. The

changing political environment of Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 Military coup provided the Gülen Movement with a ‘conservative corridor’ (Bilici, 2006:9).

Gülen had close relations with leading political figures Turgut Özal and Bülent Ecevit during their prime ministries in early 1980s and late 1990s, yet he never declared any explicit support for their parties publicly. Rather than any struggle against any of the governments, the movement has been in co-operation with the state authorities under any circumstances. Moreover, Gülen reserved his balanced political stance during the 28 February process. Due to the probability of a military coup, in an interview on a TV channel Gülen made a declaration to urge for the resignation of the current Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan for the sake of political stability.

#### *28 February*

The resignation of Erbakan did not decrease the political tension in the country. The Gülen Movement was faced with massive state pressure; consequently Gülen forced himself into exile, and he did not come back from the USA, where he initially went for his health condition. Gülen answered the ongoing discussions on his long-lasting exile by saying that it was “*to prevent unrest in my country*” (Zaman Daily, 2014). Yet the movement continued its balance-seeking policies, and did not make any negative attempt to jeopardize the integration of the movement with the system. At the time, the closure of the Gülen-inspired schools was at the forefront of the political agenda, Gülen suggested passing the schools to state authority so as not to halt the educational activities in the country (BBC Türkçe, 2014). He did not aim to come into conflict with the state authority. Consequently, after the February 28 Process the movement “*began to draw more and more upon the global discourses of human rights, multiculturalism and democracy*” through keep staying in the legal framework (Bilici, 2006:12).

Yet, during the AK Party’s establishment process in the early 2000s, the Gülen-inspired media, particularly the *Zaman* daily and the STV, gave an important



place to this process. Aside from their democracy and passive secularism, the movement and the AK Party had two issues in common: pro-globalization and the global economy (Kuru, 2007:147). Both sides support the EU process in accordance with their pro-global policies. During the AK Party's rule, the movement continued to support the government's policies on privatization and foreign investment. In this regard, the movement-affiliated media kept their policies on the agenda, and TUSKON and Bank Asya attempted to assist the government through their activities, such as bringing foreign investors and providing credit support to the foreign investors (Kuru, 2007:147).

In the second half of the 2000s, the political tension in the country increased prior to the presidential election. According to the distribution of seats in parliament, it was certain that the AK Party's nominee would be elected as the new president. The secular *ulusalcı* (ultra nationalist) wing, including the CHP and the military, developed an oppositional attitude towards the presidential election, which was due to be held in mid- 2007. The CHP organized demonstrations, the judicial bureaucracy sealed-off the election through the Constitutional Court decision, and the military made an online declaration on the official website of the General Staff. Moreover, the AK Party was faced with a closure trial in 2008. All of these occurred in the aftermath of the headscarf ban against teachers in public areas in 2006. The aforementioned incidents increased the support of Turkish society - including the Gülen Movement - for the AK Party. In the 2007 general election, the AK Party increased its vote from 34 percent to 46 percent. It should be noted that the AK Party election campaign promised a new civilian and more democratic constitution, which was one of the main notions behind the AK Party's electoral success.

Moreover, during the referendum campaign held on 12 September 2010, the Gülen Movement explicitly supported the AK Party's 27-point constitutional amendments, which included economic and social rights, individual freedoms, and judicial reforms. The referendum paved the way the prosecution of the military coup perpetrators (CNN, 2010). The referendum passed with 58 percent of the votes.

The Gülen Movement seemed to be more politically more active than in the pre-AK Party period. This increasing participation of the movement in politics began to be criticized, and the movement was accused of being active in politics contrary to their prior declarations, which expressed an inclination towards passive political participation. After the 2007 general election, the Zaman daily's chief editor, Ekrem Dumanlı, admitted the indirect support of the movement, and stated that the reason was to guard against the assaults on democracy (Dumanlı, 2007). The movement's sole explicit support of the AK Party's constitutional amendments referendum can be evaluated in the same manner, promoting democratic values and human rights, rather than supporting a political party.

The political behavior of the Gülen Movement is shaped in the context of the six principles mentioned above. Similarly, at various times, the Journalist and Writers Foundation (GYV in Turkish abbreviation), which can be considered to be the press office of the Gülen Movement, specifically explained the movement and its relations to political life. In this sense, the JFW made a declaration to clarify the Movement's political stance (GYV, 2012):

*"It is possible to define the main framework for the values that determine Hizmet's primary approach towards political parties as follows: democratization, ensuring religious freedoms, the attainment of well-respected standards set by international institutions including the European Union, and expending efforts to promote the rule of law and human rights and freedoms. To this end, it is possible for participants in the Hizmet movement, as part of their personal civic duty, to lend support to those political parties that engage in politics to reach the above goals."*

Before ending the section, I would like pay attention to a controversial issue regarding the infiltration of the supporters of the Gülen Movement into Turkish state institutions, especially the state bureaucracy, military and police forces. Having had huge educational institutions from kindergarten to university, the students graduating

from Gülen schools have applied for positions in Turkey's private sector and state institutions. On one hand, this situation has defined as "infiltration to state institutions" by the anti-Gülenists, who consider that *"The purpose behind that is to prepare the ground for a seizure of state power"* (Özdalga, 2005:439). On the other hand, Gülen has defended the movement against these accusations, stating that *"To urge fellow citizens to seek employment at state institutions is not called infiltration. Both the people urged and these institutions belong to the same country. ... It is a right for them to be employed in state posts"* (cited in Today's Zaman, 2010)". As can be seen the declaration, Gülen did not reject the existence of the supporters of the movement in state institutions. It is a well-known fact that the AK Party benefitted from the movement's human resources, particularly during its two-term government (2002-2011). As noted before, the movement did not deny its support, and stated that it was due to the democratic values that the AK Party intended to implement rather than the political party itself (Dumanlı, 2007; and GYV, 2012).

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have shown the emergence of the Gülen Movement and its sociological – structural, ideological and political behavioral analyses. The GM began to institutionalize via its education institutions by 1980, and due to Özal's liberal policies it benefitted from a domestic opportunity structure that led to its countrywide expansion. Its pro-global and pro-western policies, which explicitly stress the importance of "love and tolerance", together with intercultural and inter-faith dialogue, also allow for an international opportunity structure. Thus, the movement continued its expansion towards the international arena.

The Movement has conducted its policies and actions within the legal framework and refrained from any conflicts with not only local but also international authorities. However, the GM became one of the victims of the 28 Feb. Process and was directly targeted by the secular state during the post- modern coup. The

movement maintained its policy of refraining from any confrontation with the state; yet, the GM continued its struggle to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law, giving mostly its indirect support to the AK Party governments and their pro-global and pro-EU policies. The mutual benefits of the GM and the AK Party introduced a significant opportunity structure, which evolved the movement into becoming the strongest socio-religious movement in Turkey.



## **Chapter 4: The Milli Görüş (National Outlook) Movement and the Justice and Development Party**

Prior to the 1961 Constitution, which was considered more liberal than the previous ones, there were no ideology-based political parties or movements other than the state ideology, Kemalism. Yet the contradiction between the *Demokrat* Party and CHP was not based upon any ideological conflict. The DP's political struggle with the CHP stemmed from the dominant position of the CHP in the state bureaucracy, including the military. As a natural consequence of the non-ideological political environment, the constitution was formed in a very liberal way, which emphasized individual freedoms. In other respect, the ideologies including Islamism were represented individually in parliament until the 1961 Constitution. However, in the aftermath of the new constitution, the ideological groups from both right and the left had the opportunity to enlarge their organizational structures (Eligür, 2010:61). The emergence of the ideological movements and political parties occurred in this new period.

Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the *Milli Görüş* Movement (MGM), entered parliament as an independent deputy in 1969. In the following year, he established the *Milli Nizam* Party (National Order Party, MNP in the Turkish acronym). The Constitutional Court closed the MNP on the grounds that the MNP “*acted in violation of the secular character of the state and the principles safeguarding the Atatürk revolution*” after the 1971 military Memorandum (cited in Jenkins, 2008:131). However, the rise of the *Milli Görüş* Movement continued with another political institution, the *Milli Selamet* Party (National Salvation Party, MSP in the Turkish acronym), which became one of the partners of the coalition governments in

the mid 1970s. It should be noted the *Milli Gençlik Vakfı* (MGV – National Youth Foundation), which was affiliated with the MGM was founded in 1975.

Yet, after the 1980 military coup the, military forces closed the MSP. Erbakan continued his political life under the umbrella of the *Refah* Party (Welfare Party, RP in the Turkish acronyms).

In this chapter, I examine the political development of the *Milli Görüş* Movement under two different interpretations: (1) the traditionalists who are the old guard of the Milli Görüş Movements, and (2) the reformists, the founders of the AK Party. In doing so, I aim to depict the AK Party's political behavior, which has tendencies towards integration with the international system. My argument here is that the AK Party's moderate policies, which are different from any Islamist political ideology including the MGM, and struggles, have been conducted within the framework of the current political system. Aiming at integration with the international environment has led to the party's current success. This success has also contributed to the democratization process in Turkey.

In this chapter, I follow the same patterns as the previous chapter. After giving the historical background of the MGM and the AK Party, I analyze the sociological and ideological structure of the MGM and AK Party. Finally, I analyze the political behavior of the two groups.

#### **4.1. Historical Background of the Milli Görüş Movement and the AK Party**

The mastermind of the MSP (and at the same time the MGM) was Mehmet Zahid Kotku, a Nakshibendi leader of the İskender Paşa Cemaati (Sufi Order), which received its name from a mosque in İstanbul (Yavuz, 2003a: 207, and Jenkins, 2008:131). Yavuz argues, "*He (Kotku) understood the connections between macro socioeconomic forces and micro- level ethical issues at the individual level. He set the coordinates of the MGM by pinning down the search for identity and justice as*

*two principles animating vast sections of Turkish society* (Yavuz, 2003a: 207). In this sense, the Islamic formation, which envisaged to established, intended to base upon the themes: ‘Islamic identity, and justice’. Moreover, a mobilized group of people guided by the İskenderpaşa order, consisting merchants and community leaders carried Erbakan to the parliament in 1969 from Konya. Further, Kotku and his followers set the formation of the MGM, its ‘organizational model’ and the related connections (Yavuz, 2003a: 207).

#### ***4.1.1. Erbakan and His Political Life***

Necmettin Erbakan was born in Sinop, located near the Black Sea, in 1926. Erbakan finished his primary education in Trabzon. Mehmet Zahid Kotku, who was the İmam of the İskenderpaşa Mosque, brought Erbakan to Istanbul. Sheikh Kotku had a great influence on Erbakan’s moral maturity (Saadet Partisi, 2014). He continued his high school education in İstanbul, and later on graduated from Istanbul Technical University (ITU) in 1948 with obtaining mechanical engineer diploma. In his university years, Erbakan became a regular follower of discussions groups organized by the İskenderpaşa Sufi Order. After his graduation, Erbakan served as a faculty member at ITU. Erbakan went to Germany in 1951 and received his Ph.D. from the RWTH Aachen University. He also worked at private sector. Erbakan was elected the president of Industrial Division of the *Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği* (TOBB, Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchange) in 1966. Although he was elected president of the TOBB in 1969, he could not undertake this role due to the cancellation of the election (Saadet Partisi, 2014).

##### ***4.1.1.1. Political Life of Erbakan***

After the closure of the MNP, Erbakan continued his political life at the MSP. Süleyman Arif Emre, a member of the İskenderpaşa Sufi order, established the MSP,



and none of the MNP founders took part in its formation. According to Yavuz, the formation of the MSP was the idea of the generals who were opposed to the closure of the MNP. In order to diminish Süleyman Demirel's political dominance, these generals encouraged some of Erbakan's friends to form the MSP (Yavuz, 2003a: 209). Necmettin Erbakan, who was forced to flee the country in the aftermath of the military memorandum, became a member of the party in May 1973. He was elected chairman of the party immediately after the 13 September 1973 parliamentary election on 20 October. The MSP won 48 seats, receiving 11.8 percent of the vote (for the election result see TUIK, 2014a). Moreover, the party received 12.3 percent of the vote in the senatorial election and managed three seats. The CHP received 33.3 percent of the vote and secured 185 seats; on the other hand, the AP received 29.8 of the vote and won 149 seats in the parliament.

Erbakan's MSP became the CHP's government coalition partner in January 1974. The MSP held six ministries (Interior, Justice, Food and Agriculture, Trade, Industry and Technology, and the State Ministry of Religious Affairs) excluding the Erbakan's deputy prime ministry (Yavuz, 2003a: 210). The position of the MSP in the coalition government echoed positively amongst the country's religious community and the MSP became an image which promoted "*Muslim morality, Ottoman heritage, freedom of conscience*", and "*the modernizing of Turkey's economy through rapid industrialization*" (Yavuz, 2003a: 210)."

In 1974, the MSP-CHP coalition government was faced with an important foreign policy issue in the foreign politics: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The short-term military intervention occurred on 20 July due to the hostile actions of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, who aimed to re-unite the island under the control of the Greeks (Jenkins, 2008:133). After the intervention, Erbakan and the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit became national heroes. Additionally, people began to call Erbakan '*ghazi*', a religious term meaning the fighter of the faith (Yavuz, 2003a: 211). As the result of the invasion, the MSP-CHP coalition government collapsed because Ecevit intended to reap the benefit of the intervention for calling early election. Yet, the

opposition parties rejected the proposal thus the coalition government ended (Yavuz, 2003a: 211; Jenkins, 2008:133).

The First National Front coalition government formed under the Prime Ministry of Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the AP, with participation of the MSP on 18 September 1974. Erbakan again became the deputy prime minister; the party represented the six ministries including the interior and justice. The MHP and CGP (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi – Republican Confidence Party) were the other partners of the coalition government.

Despite the 1974 Cyprus intervention, the MSP lost support according to the previous elections, and received 8.6 of the vote and won 24 parliamentary seats in the 1977 early election (for the election result see TUIK, 2014a). The large number of *Nurcu*<sup>35</sup> votes shifted to the AP; therefore, the MSP lost a large amount of its popular support (Yavuz, 2003a: 211; Jenkins, 2008:134). Another participant in the 1974 intervention, Ecevit's CHP led the elections and received 41.4 percent of the votes, winning 213 seats. The AP was the other party, which increased its support in relation to the previous election. According to the official result, the AP received 36.9 percent of the vote and held 189 seats. Another successful party, the MHP, took 6.4 percent of the vote and 16 seats in the election.

Yet the CHP's success was not enough to form the government alone. After an unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition government, the AP established a coalition with the MSP and MHP. Erbakan became the deputy prime minister as before, and the MSP held seven ministries. The coalition government did not last long due to increasing domestic violence and the worsening economy. Turkish society divided into leftist, rightist, Alevi's and Sunni's due to the polarization effects of politics. The coalition government led by Demirel collapsed after the failure of the vote of confidence on 31 December 1977. Ecevit formed the new government with the support of the minority parties and independents on 6 January 1979. However, the Ecevit government also collapsed due to rising terrorism and the worsening economy.

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<sup>35</sup> The followers of Nursi's teachings.

Ecevit introduced his resignations in October of the same year, and another coalition government was established under the leadership of Demirel with the support of the MSP on 12 November 1979 (Yavuz, 2003a: 211; Jenkins, 2008:134). Thus, the military took over power because of political turmoil and terrorism on 12 September 1980.

#### ***4.1.1.2. The Refah Party***

In the aftermath of the 12 September 1980 military intervention, all current parties were closed, and their prominent members were banned from politics. After a short period, the military allowed political activities to recommence. Ali Türkmen established the *Refah* Party (RP – The Welfare Party), which adopted the MSP's political ideas, on July 1983. However, the military authority vetoed some of the founding members of the party - including Türkmen - due to their strong religious ties (Yavuz, 1997:71). Thus, the RP could not participate in the 1983 national elections, and the party could run in the 1984 local elections under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. The RP took 4.4 percent of the votes and won the Şanlıurfa and Van mayorships (Yavuz, 1997:71).

The political ban on the former politicians was lifted after the 1987 referendum. Erbakan and the other prominent political figures of the MSP occupied the leadership position after the referendum. In the following parliamentary election held in 1987, the RP received 7.2 of the vote, but did not manage to win any seats due to the 10 percent national threshold (TUIK, 2014b). However, the RP formed an alliance with *Milliyetçi Çalışma* Party (MÇP – Nationalist Action Party and the *Islahatçı Demokrasi* Party (IDP – Reformist Democratic Party) in the early parliamentary election in 1991. The alliance won 62 seats, receiving 16.2 percent of the vote (Yavuz, 1997:72).

The rise of the RP continued in the 1994 local election and the 1995 parliamentary election. In the local election held on March 27, the RP took 19.7 of

the vote and won the mayorship of the cities including two metropolises: İstanbul and Ankara. Consequently, the RP became an important figure in Turkish politics. In the 1997 parliamentary elections, the RP clinched its position and became the leading party in the election. The RP received 21.4 percent of the national votes and took 158 seats. Yavuz argues that the success of the RP in the local and parliamentary elections “marked a psychological break in Turkish history that was an outcome of the search for new state-society relations and the rearticulation of national identity (Yavuz, 2003a: 214)”. In this sense, some newspapers reported the RP’s success under such titles as “*The Other Turkey Wins the Election,*” and “*The Black Turks versus the White Turks,*” (cited in Yavuz, 2003a: 214).

The parties on the center-right, the ANAP and the DYP, won 19.6 and 19.2 percent of the vote and secured 132 and 135 seats respectively. The combined votes of the DSP and CHP, the left wing parties, were 25.3 percent (TÜİK, 2014b). The ANAP and the DYP formed a coalition government, which was also known as ANAYOL, under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz.

#### *The REFAH-YOL Government*

The ANAYOL coalition government was dissolved after the political conflict between the two parties. After the resignation of the Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Necmettin Erbakan took the task of forming the new government from President Süleyman Demirel. Soon after, Erbakan reached an agreement with Tansu Çiller, leader of the DYP, and the new coalition government, known as REFAH-YOL, was formed on 28 June 1996.

The formation of the new government under the pro-Islamist prime minister increased the tension amongst the Kemalist (secular) wing. It should be noted that soon after the election result TÜSİAD had made a declaration that they would hope for a possible coalition between the ANAP and DYP rather than RP’s partnership in the new government (Cumhuriyet, 1995). Even the possibility of the RP’s existence

in a prospective government had not been welcomed by the secular elites. Furthermore, Erbakan's Islamic political discourse and the party's anti-globalist and anti-EU ideas generated a reaction against the government. Despite all these, Erbakan's policies widened the distance between the government and the secular elites. Erbakan made his first official foreign visit to Iran. His first meeting was with the leader cadre of the Muslim Brotherhood. This move also excited the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and he urged to make a short visit to Ankara to request Turkish involvement in Egyptian politics (Yavuz, 2003a: 243).

Erbakan's Iran visit was followed by visits to Libya and Malaysia. The nationalist wings also criticized those visits alongside the secularists (Hürriyet, 2000). More importantly, as a response, of the west's economic alliance G7 (the group of 7), the D-8 (Developing Eight) was established, following the initiative of Prime Minister Erbakan. The D-8 moved particularly Turkey away from the West, which for centuries had been the 'traditional lane' on the road to modernization (Çandar, 1997).

Another issue that solidified the RP's anti-west policies was Erbakan's attitudes towards the USA and Israel. It was a well-known fact that Erbakan criticized certain Israeli policies at various times. Erbakan came to power right after the period when Turkish-Israeli relations were getting more intense through strategic agreements (Yavuz, 2003a: 243). The RP rule, therefore, created anxiety amongst the secular wings, the military in particular, as well as in the region.

### *The Post-Modern Coup*

The political tension peaked in Ankara after the "*Kudüs Gecesi*" (Jerusalem Night) incident, which was established by the major of Sincan, Ankara on 31 December 1997. The event was organized to protest Israeli occupation of Jerusalem. Notably, the Iranian Ambassador delivered a speech at that night. The military's immediate response came on 4 February 1997, and the military moved the tanks into Sincan for

a military parade (Milliyet, 1997). Çevik Bir, the Vice Chief of General Staff, asserted that they made “*a balance adjustment to democracy*” regarding the army’s respond (Özcan Ercan, 1997)

The National Security Council assembled on February 28 in order to evaluate recent developments in Turkey. The media kept the upcoming meeting in the daily agenda days before the meeting. The council declared a memorandum consisting of a list of decisions after the meeting. The Prime Minister Erbakan signed an 18-point declaration on March 5. The declaration stated that the Revolution Laws (Atatürk’s reforms) should be applied, the dress code should be upheld in all public areas including universities, and Qur’an courses and religiously-based secondary schools should be restricted and re-regulated. Moreover, the government should prevent the religious “fundamentalists” and their anti-secular actions. The decisions were taken by the National Security Council, and mainly contained regulations on religious affairs for the sake of securing secularism and the secular Turkish State (Karalı, 2001).

After the military declaration, the opposition parties gave a vote of confidence against the government. The opposition, however, failed to force out the government, and the government barely passed the vote of confidence on May 20. On the same day, the Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor, Vural Savaş, initiated a closure trial against the RP. In the aftermath of the trial, the workers’ unions called for the government’s resignation. The pressure on the government was increasing gradually. The military began to give briefings about “reactionary movements” to members of both the media and judiciary. In these briefings, the military referred to article 35, the Civil Service Code, and mentioned the use of force against the reaction if it is needed. During the briefings, new accreditation rules were applied to some media groups by the military (Kocabaş, 1998:91).

After the briefings, the media started to make news about the possibility of a military intervention (Doğan, 1997). The Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan submitted the government’s resignation to President Demirel on June 18 1998.

Without any military operations, both military and civilian (media, workers' unions etc.) pressures resulted in the resignation of the government; therefore, this incident has been called "*the postmodern military coup*" (Alkan, 2001).

The Mayor of İstanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from the RP, was banned from office, and sentenced due to a poem that he recited in a public meeting on December 27, 1997. The Constitutional Court closed the *Refah* Party on January 16 1998. Necmettin Erbakan and six other members of the party were banned from active politics for five years due to their actions against to the principle of the secular state. During the trial, Ismail Alptekin, who is affiliated with the MGM, established the *Fazilet* Party (Virtue Party, FP). Over 140 deputies of the RP passed to the FP. In the first ordinary party congress, Abdullah Gül, the leader of the reformist wing, and Recai Kutan, the leader of the traditional wing ran for the presidency. Recai Kutan became the new leader of the Party. However, the party was closed in 2001 for the same reason.

#### ***4.1.2. The Birth of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Party***

The Constitutional Court closed the *Fazilet* Party on June 22, 2011 due to the same accusation that caused the ban of the RP. After the closure, the split within the former party members became more concrete. Consequently, the traditionalists and the reformists formed their own political parties in 2001. On one hand, the traditionalists who followed the MGM formed the *Saadet* Party (the Felicity Party, SP in the Turkish acronym) under the leadership of Recai Kutan. On the other hand, the reformist wing formed the *Adalet ve Kalkınma* Party (the Justice and Development Party, AK Party in Turkish) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Unlike the political parties based on Erbakan's *Milli Görüş* tradition, the AK Party did not use any religious discourse in the party program<sup>36</sup>. The AK Party briefly defined its aims in the party by-laws as (AK Parti, 2014a): "*AK PARTİ considers the elements of nations will, supremacy of law, intelligence, science, experience, democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and ethics as the foundations of its political administration*. In this context, the AK Party defined its ideology as 'conservative democracy'.

The AK Party received 34.3 percent of the vote and became the winning party in the 2002 national election (TUIK, 2014b). The CHP, which stayed out of parliament after the 1999 election, received 19.4 percent of the vote. While the AK Party won 363 seats, the CHP won 178 seats due to the 10 percent election threshold. No other party except the AK Party and the CHP passed the threshold; therefore, both parties won a non-proportional number of seats according to their votes. Thus the AK Party had enough seats to form the majority government.

The AK Party Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not get elected because he was banned from active politics in 1998. As a result, Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister of the AK Party's government while Erdoğan held his position as the Chairman of the party.

How could Erdoğan become prime minister in 116 days although he could not participate in the 2002 election? It can be explained by his political good fortune. First, the Constitutional Court's decision in favor of Hasan Celal Güzel, a member of the *Yeniden Doğuş* Party (Rebirth Party, YDP) who experienced a similar situation to Erdoğan's, was also accepted as a precedent decision for Erdoğan's case (Hürriyet, 2001). This decision let Erdoğan become the chairman of the party. Second, after the constitutional amendment redesigned the eligibility requirement of deputies, Erdoğan's ban was removed. This amendment passed with the support of Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP. Finally, the Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (High Election

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<sup>36</sup> Due to secular structure of Turkish Constitution, the SP refers the aim of the party in the party by-law as 'ethics and spirituality'. For more detail please see, <http://www.saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/program/678> (accessed on November 12, 2014)



Board, YSK in Turkish) cancelled the election, which was held in Siirt and its provinces, because of the objection that had been made (AA, 2002). The election for Siirt was renewed on February 2, 2003, and Erdoğan was elected as one of its three deputies. After the official election result, Prime Minister Gül resigned; thus Erdoğan formed the new government and became Prime Minister.

#### ***4.1.2.1. The AK Party's Rule***

The AK Party government has ruled the country since 2002. As I will analyze in the next sections, the AK Party followed pro-EU policies in order to improve democratic values, as a conservative political party. The secular elites claimed that the AK Party was a religious party and had close ties with the MGM. This is because the majority of the party founders, including its chairman Erdoğan, were prominent political figures of the *Milli Görüş* tradition, and the party was established after the closure of the FP. In response, Erdoğan defined his party as a '*conservative democratic party*' and asserted, "*they took off the Milli Görüş shirt*" (Yüksek, 2003).

From its early years, the AK Party government adopted a series of EU integration processes to enhance democratic values in Turkey. In contrast to the MGM, the AK Party adopted pro-EU policies. In this sense, the government implemented several reforms in line with the Copenhagen Criteria in the hope of becoming a full member of the EU. The reforms began to pluralize Turkish democracy. Therefore the military influence began to decline after the new regulations on the structure of the National Security council (Kirişçi, 2004:45). In addition, with the new implementation, television and radio broadcasts were allowed in languages other than Turkish, and State Security Courts were abolished. The European Commission, in this regard, decided that Turkey had accomplished the political criteria necessary to become a EU member (Kılınç, 2014:315).

### *E-Coup*

The incumbency of the 11<sup>th</sup> President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was due to end on 16 May 2007. According to the distribution of parliament at that time, the candidate of the AK Party would be elected the new president. The AK Party's possible candidate appeared to be the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Right before the presidential election, the Turkish political agenda was busy with the secularism and headscarf debates. The secular wing did not agree that someone who from the *Milli Görüş* background should be elected president because the presidency (Çankaya) had a symbolic importance for secular Turkey. This objection was mainly based on the headscarf issue. In this regard, even the AK Party deputies were invited without their headscarf-wearing wives to the presidential reception organized for August 30, Victory Day, including the prime minister (Haber7.com, 2008). Çankaya was sacred for the secular wing, thus the president and his wife had to represent the secular image of Turkey.

The secular wing that was opposed to the prospective presidential nominee of the AK Party organized a series of protests called 'the Republic Protest' in the big cities of Turkey such as İzmir, İstanbul and Ankara in April and May 2007. The protestors showed their displeasure towards the developments and called the military "to duty". Moreover, President Sezer claimed in a speech, which he delivered to the military academies "*The regime has not been threatened so much in any period* (Hürriyet, 2007)." The meetings were supported by the participation of secular politicians, academics, artists and the NGOs.

Yet, the AK Party nominated the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate on 24 April 2007. The first round of the presidential elections was held on 27 April 2007. Abdullah Gül could not manage to achieve 367 votes, which was the minimum vote required to be elected president in the first two rounds. At midnight, a statement, which was later known as the "e-memorandum" or the "e-coup", was posted on the official website of the Turkish General Staff (TSK) regarding the presidential election. The statement asserted the TSK was the defender

of secularism would take-up its position when conditions were ready (Today's Zaman, 2012): *"It should not be forgotten that the TSK is a side in this debate and a staunch defender of secularism..."* and *"The Turkish Armed Forces are against those debates ... and will display their position and attitudes when it becomes necessary. No one should doubt that."* In response, the government said: *"It is regrettable that there were utterly incorrect statements about the relationship between the government and the General Staff. All of our state institutions should be more sensitive and careful,"* (Today's Zaman, 2012).

Aside from this, the CHP appealed the ongoing presidential election to the Constitutional Court immediately. The CHP's objection depended on the claim of Sabih Kanadoğlu, former Chief Prosecutor, about the parliamentary quorum required for a presidential election. Kanadoğlu asserted that a political party, which was unwilling to compromise for the presidential election would be legally blocked because the quorum was 367.<sup>37</sup> The CHP not only boycotted the presidential election by not participating, but also appealed it to the Constitutional Court. The Court gave its verdict and cancelled the election. The government in response called an early election.

The early national election was held on 22 July 2007. The AK Party raised its votes from 34.3 percent to 46.6, in contrast to the 2002 election, and won 341 seats. The CHP took 20.9 percent of the vote and 112 seats. Moreover, the MHP passed the national threshold by receiving 14.3 percent of the vote and secured 71 seats (TUIK, 2014b). The presidential election crisis was resolved by the contribution of the MHP. Abdullah Gül, who was nominated for the second time, received 339 votes and was elected the president at the third round. The conflict related to the parliamentary quorum was solved by the referendum on 21 October 2007 (Sabah, 2007).

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<sup>37</sup> See, Sabih Kanadoğlu, "AKP Tek Başına Seçemez," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 2006.

### *The Political Developments until the 2010 Referendum*

The electoral success of the AK Party in the 2007 early election was a natural outcome of the ultra-secularist reactions. Their attitudes against the headscarf and the presence of the AK Party rule turned into a national reaction at the election. As noted above, as much as the presidency had a symbolic importance for the secular elites, the headscarf issue also had similar importance from the opposite angle. In this direction, Ali Bulaç, a respected Turkish journalist, claimed that the secular wing aimed to prevent Abdullah Gül's presidency due to his wife's headscarf. According to Bulaç, nobody could claim otherwise because Gül was a former prime minister and recently the Minister of Foreign Affairs. If there had been any obstacle due to his personality, Gül would not have conducted these duties. It proved that the only problem stemmed from his wife's headscarf (Bulaç, 2010:293).

Moreover, the AK Party's successful governance was another element of its electoral success. The AK Party's pro-EU policies and the country's economic development brought electoral success despite the secular reactions. The average annual GDP growth was 6.96 on average between 2003 and 2007, and the government reduced inflation to a single-digit rate after stringent economy policies (for more detailed analysis see, Karagöl, 2013).

Another prominent element that led the AK Party to a successful election result was its election promise: the 'civil constitution'. The country has been ruled by the 1982 Constitution made after the 1980 military coup. Prof. Ergun Özbudun, a constitutional lawyer, stated that the current constitution did not suit the EU process, to which universal and democratic norms applied. He continued "*This constitution and the regime that it established is not a regime which has the West and European Union standards* (cited in Yıldırım kaya, 2010)". In the aftermath of the presidential election crisis the government began to mention the need for a civil constitution. The government election campaign was mainly based on a civil constitution and was supported by a wide range of the society. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the

Gülen Movement was one of the supporters of the AK Party in the 2007 national election due to this reason.

The AK Party was faced with a closure case on March 2008. The Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya appealed to the Constitutional Court to close down the AK Party on charges of its becoming “*a focal point of anti-secular activities*” on 14 March 2008 (Kenes, 2008)”. Yet the Constitutional Court reached its verdict, which was against closing the party on 31 July 2008. Apart from the presidential election crisis, the closure case against arguably a successful political party returned strong popular support. It should be noted that the AK Party prepared its defense against the closure trial with the EU criterias implemented previously (Şahin, 2008).

The AK Party reached the peak of its power with a series of constitutional amendments. As I will mention in the context of political behavior, this amendment brought various democratic reforms and caused the fall of military tutelage. The party prepared a constitutional amendment proposal on 12 May 2010 and introduced it to President Abdullah Gül, who approved the package and submitted it to a referendum. The 27-point constitutional amendments included economic and social rights, individual freedoms, and judicial reforms. More importantly, the referendum paved the way for the prosecution of the military coup perpetrators (CNN, 2010). The referendum was held on 12 September 2010, which was also a symbolic date due to the 12 September 1980 military coup. The constitutional amendment package passed with 58 percent of the vote. Ironically, the perpetrators of the 12 September military coup, including the former Chief of the General Staff and 7<sup>th</sup> President Kenan Evren, began their trial after the amendments (TRT Haber, 2014).

## **4.2. Sociological and Structural Analysis**

Until the 1960 military coup, the Kemalist ideology dominated the Turkish politics. Despite their moderate management in contrast to the CHP, the DP did not adopt any

different ideologies during their ten-year rule. However, two political parties, the *İslam Demokrat* Party (Islam Democrat Party, İDP) and the *Millet* Party (Nation Party, MP), were closed on the grounds of their reactionary activities during DP rule. Thus this example shows that the DP had similar tendencies to the CHP, who were against religiously-based parties. As noted before, the ideological political movements emerged in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention into Turkish politics. The new constitution that was written in 1961 allowed ideological diversification in Turkish political life due to its liberal structure. The emergence of the *Milli Görüş* Movement (MGM) occurred during this period. Although there were other Islamist political parties, what made the MGM unique was its wide and diverse institutional structure. Before mentioning this, I will discuss the sociological analysis of the MGM.

#### ***4.2.1. The Sociological Analysis of the MGM and the AK Party***

Unlike the other Islamic social movements, for instance the Muslim Brotherhood, the formation of the MGM and its ideology took shape after the emergence of the political parties MNP and MSP. In the case of MGM, the ideology followed the political institution. Consequently, the sociological support of the MGM emerged in line with the social and political activities of the MSP. Despite the fact that the İskenderpaşa Sufi order, Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku in particular, had influence on the MGM and its formation (Yavuz, 2003a: 207, and Jenkins, 2008:131), their (the İskenderpaşa Sufi order) popular support remained limited. The MGM received far greater support in contrast with the potential support of the İskenderpaşa Sufi order. The electoral success of the MGM in context with the MSP and the RP may give clues about the sociological analysis of the movement.

It should be noted that the oppressiveness of the Kemalist regime in line with the CHP rules created an opposition to itself. Arguably their rigid anti-religious implementations and reforms led Turkish society to support other political parties

when there were such opportunities available. The closure of the TCF and SCF during the single-party era was an explicit result and example of this disposition. Moreover, the huge popular support of the DP can be explained with this approach. Yet none of them were based on any Islamist political ideology, thus the MGM was the first case of an Islamist political party who received significant popular support. Even though there were many political parties in Turkish politics after 1960, the MSP's electoral success can be evaluated by the lack of Islamist parties.

The MSP won 11.8 percent of the vote in its first parliamentary election. The founding declaration, which mentioned the golden age of the Ottoman era, included a rejection of Westernization and an acceptance of the root of the current socio-economic problems, attracted Turkish society and led to this electoral success. Moreover, the diversity of the founding members, who were engineers, small businessmen, lawyers and white-collar workers, connected the MNP socially and culturally with Anatolian towns and villages. Furthermore, the support of the some Sufi orders and the Nurcus during and after the establishment process brought this electoral success, which allowed the MNP to become a small partner of the government (Yavuz, 2003a: 209). It should be noted that having been a İstanbul-based Sufi Order, the effect of the *İskenderpaşa* Order remained limited in the national elections.

The MSP's electoral success was based on the votes that came from the eastern and southeastern provinces of the country, despite the sectarian diversity. Yavuz asserts that the MSP's religious notion, their assertion of "rapid industrialization" and "*underlying competition over economic resources and government jobs*" attracted the voters who lived in the aforementioned areas (Yavuz, 2003a: 210). Yet, according to an election poll<sup>38</sup>, which evaluated the reason for MSP support, the party's religious structure was the major factor affecting the voters.

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<sup>38</sup> Eligur's data are based on Binnaz Toprak's work. For more info, see Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J.Brill, 1981), 97.

Erbakan's leadership came after the AP's deviation from its goals in the list of factors that influenced the MSP voters (Eligur, 2010:71).

Although the MSP received similar support from the eastern regions of the country in which Kurdish the population predominantly lived, in the 1977 elections the MSP's votes declined to 8.6 percent. The main reason for the MSP's loss of support was the fleeing Nurus votes. Moreover, Yavuz claims, "*The party did not offer any concrete solutions to the country's problems and was seen as being overly ideological* (Yavuz, 2003a: 211)". Having been one of the members of the coalition government had a significant influence on the creation of this perception.

#### **4.2.1.1. After 1980**

The military regime shut down the MSP and banned Erbakan in addition to other prominent political parties and their leading figures from active politics after the 1980 military intervention. The new Turkish-Islam synthesis was shaped by the military government owing to the negative influence of communism and the 1979 Iran Revolution, and it introduced an opportunity structure leading to "*the electoral success of the political Islam* (Yavuz, 2003a: 215)". Moreover, the positive effects of Özal's political and economic liberalization opened new corridors to the "conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie" and the "new class of Islamist intellectuals". In this context, the emergence of the new Islamist bourgeoisie has been strengthened by its position in the economy, and they began to represent themselves under the *Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), known as MÜSİAD. The new Islamist elites introduced their ideas through the printed and electronic media (Yavuz, 2003a: 215).

Özal's liberal policies and his industrialization thrust increased urbanization. In the early years of Özal, 1984, the urban population exceeded the rural population, and continued its increase in parallel with the economic development (Jenkins, 2008:154). The urban population has gradually become dominant over politics due to



rising urbanization. Furthermore, the dominant urban population has had an influence upon the rural voters' electoral choices (Bulaç, 2010:112). Thus, those voters had a significant role on the rise of the RP in the 1994 local and 1995 parliamentary elections.

#### **4.2.1.2. The AK Party**

After the foundation of the AK Party, Erdoğan rejected the accusation that the AK Party had any affiliation with the MGM (Zaman, 2003). As noted before, in the aftermath of the closure of the FP, the traditional wing of the MGM movement established the SP, and the reformist wing separated from them and formed the AK Party. However, according to the 2002 election result, in contrary to 34.3 percent vote of the AK Party, the SP only received 2.5 percent (Table 2).

**Table 2.** Electoral results in parliamentary elections (1995-2007)

<b>Parties</b>	<b>1995 (%)</b>	<b>1999 (%)</b>	<b>2002 (%)</b>	<b>2007 (%)</b>
<b>AK Party</b>	-----	-----	34,5	46,6
<b>ANAP</b>	19,6	13,2	5,1	-----
<b>CHP</b>	10,7	8,7	19,4	20,9
<b>DSP</b>	14,6	22,2	1,2	-----
<b>DYP</b>	19,2	12,0	9,5	-----
<b>MHP</b>	8,2	18,0	8,4	14,3
<b>RP/FP/SP</b>	21,4	15,4	2,5	2,3

**Source:** Turkish Statistical Institute, (TUIK, 2014a).

In the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis and massive corruption, the AK Party emerged as a new political alternative. Although the General Chair of the AK Party, Erdoğan, stressed at various times that the AK Party was a conservative democratic party, the party was considered pro-Islamist by the majority of Turkish society, the secular wing in particular (see, Kuru, 2005; Yavuz, 2003a; Eligur, 2010; Jenkins, 2008).

According to Table 3, the MGM's support (FP/SP) moved to the AK Party in the 2002 national elections. In addition to this, it can be seen from the table above that the votes of the center-right (ANAP and DYP) as well as those of the nationalists (MHP) in the 1999 election moved to the AK Party. Therefore, as a newly-formed party, rather than having a separate political base, the AK Party received the votes of the aforementioned political parties; in short, the votes of the center-right. The same pattern continued in the following national elections. In the absence of the ANAP and the DYP, the AK Party received 46.6 percent of the vote by securing its current support.

### *The New Urban Class*

Bulaç defines the AK Party as the “Power of Migration and the City” (Bulaç, 2010). He explains the popular support of the AK Party with “*the new urban class*” which has not yet been urbanized (2010:113). This new class migrated to the urban areas due to the lack of opportunities in rural areas and industrialization, and they have become the representatives of a wide range of society which consisted of voters from minimum wage workers to the newly-emerged businessmen. Yet, despite the excessive urbanization, the urban areas were unable to respond to these migrations. Thus, during this new urbanization, pre-modern, modern and post-modern subjects have begun to live together (Bulaç, 2010:113). More importantly, Bulaç asserts that ‘the periphery’ has gotten together with the middle class (“the new urban class”), and determined the new political actors (leader-party) as “big waves”. The successes of

the ANAP (1983), the RP (1995) and the AK Party (2002) were the examples of three waves. When the “new urban class”, which lives in suburbs, withdraws their support from the political actors - the ANAP, the DSP and the SP for instance - these political formations retreat from the political scene dramatically (Bulaç, 2010:114).

Although the AK Party received mostly the support of “the new urban class” in the 2002 elections (34%), in the following elections the party attracted a wide range of society. Because of the anti-democratic secular opposition, especially during the 2007 presidential election, arguably the AK Party’s good governance when compared to previous governments, and the need for a stable political life in context with the economic development turned into a massive support in favor of the AK Party.

#### ***4.2.2. The Structural Analysis of the MGM and the AK Party***

The MGM began to establish non-state institutions right after the formation of its legal political structure. The rapid organizational ability of the MGM had a prominent role to in the expansion of the movement. Although the MNP was founded in January 1970, the party established branches in sixty cities and almost fifty districts within a short time period (Eligur, 2010:67). When the closure of the MNP occurred a few months later, the MSP was established as quickly as the MNP. Owing to its strong organizational ability, after less than half a year, the party had founded branches in sixty cities and a hundred provinces (Eligur, 2010:69).

The MGM first established its own newspaper, *the Milli Gazete* daily (National Newspaper) in 1973. Then Necmettin Erbakan established the *Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı* (European National Outlook Organization, AMGT in Turkish) in 1976. The main purpose of founding the AMGT was to keep in touch with the Turkish worker migrants (Eligur, 2010:69). In the same year, the MGM founded the *Akıncılar Derneği* (Raider Associations, AK-DER in Turkish). The religious

university youths established the association, and in a few years the association expanded its branches across the country.

After the MSP became one of the partners in various governments established with the CHP, and later with the AP under the First Nationalist Front government, the MGM found the opportunity to expand its non-state organizations throughout the country. This expansion caused the MSP to hold the ministry of the interior. Thus, the movement found itself a “*de facto legal immunity against the prosecution for anti-secular activity*” (Jenkins, 2008:137). Moreover, the *İmam Hatip* Schools, which have a religious curriculum alongside the secular one and was one of the MGM’s symbolic institutions, were re-opened by the CHP-MSP government in 1974. Furthermore, during this period, the government established more schools, and by the late 1970s the number of *İmam Hatip* schools had increased more than 450 percent in four years (Jenkins, 2008:136). The MGM continued its educational activities mainly through the *İmam Hatip* schools. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gülen Movement, the MGM did not begin to establish its own schools on a large scale.

The *Milli Gençlik Vakfı* (National Youth Foundation, MGV in Turkish), which was the flagship organization of the movement, was established in 1975 to train youth generations in accordance with Islamic values and the Ottoman spirit. The MGVs undertook various services, such as hosting activities and providing scholarships and accommodation to poor students. By 1990s, the MGV had over 1500 branches throughout the country and was providing scholarships for tens of thousands of students. In addition, the foundation had around 150 dormitories (Jenkins, 2008:157). The MGVs were shut down by the decision of the Supreme Court in 2004 due to the long-lasting waves of the 28 February Process. At the time of closure, the MGV had 875 branches, 150 student dormitories, two day-care centers, and nearly 350 thousand members nationwide (Haber5, 2012). The MGVs continued its activities under the *Anadolu Gençlik Derneği* (Anatolian Youth Association, AGD in Turkish), which was established in 2002. It should be noted that

the MGM established a TV channel, TV5, which broadcast as a satellite TV station in 2008.

Aside from its party organization, no other non-state organization is affiliated with the AK Party. The party has conducted its activities through institutions affiliated with the party structure, such as the AK Parti Women's Branch and Youth Branch.

#### **4.3. Ideology of the MGM and the AK Party**

Two main facts influenced the emergence of the MGM: (1) the Kemalist reforms, and (2) the rise of the ideological political formations in Turkey. The MGM was not the first Islamic resistance against the decisive regime (Yavuz, 2003a: 212). The changing political sphere after the 1961 Constitution allowed the emergence of political movements based on political ideologies. The Islamic political ideas also emerged into Turkish politics, as well as socialist and Marxist ideas. In addition, the translation of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries prominent political Islamist figures' works, such as Muhammad al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abu l-A'la Mawdudi, influenced the formation of political Islamists ideas in Turkey (Eligur, 2010:61,62).

In this sense, as noted earlier, the Sheikh of the İskenderpaşa Sufi order, Kotku, was the mastermind of the formation of the MGM's first political party, the MNP. Although the contribution of the İskenderpaşa Cemaati re-built the MSP, the MGM evolved differently to a Sufi order. It can be said that Kotku's death right after the 1980 military intervention in the early years of the MGM made Erbakan the sole leader of the movement. Moreover, the political structure of the MGM did not allow a Sufi-style formation.

The MGM main ideology formed under the "*Milli Görüş*" (National Outlook), which later turned into a platform. The main objective of the movement was the revival of the "*Ottoman-Islamic liberal reformist tradition*" (Yavuz, 2003a: 212). Like the late Ottoman reformist the movement focused on a European-style

modernization, which includes the technological rather than cultural while preserving the Islamic culture and identity alongside their political institutions. In this sense, the “*Milli Görüş*” has four mainstays: culture, industrialization, education, and social justice; each of which was shaped by the Islamic principles (Eligur, 2010:66). The MGM aimed to revitalize the Ottoman-Turkish culture as a response to the positivist ideas of the Kemalist regime. In doing so, the movements focused upon culture as the essential feature instead of emphasizing religious motives (Yavuz, 2003a: 212). The MGM could not legally use the concept of religion because the movement’s political institutions dominated the ideas and its activities (Eligur, 2010:66). Similarly, according to Yavuz, the RP used “*the word milli (nation)*” instead of the ‘Islamic idioms’, and benefitted from the word *milli* as a shelter (Yavuz, 1997:75).

#### ***4.3.1. The RP and Adil Düzen (Just Order)***

During the RP period, the movement declared its political view in the RP’s 1991 and 1995 election statements. The RP’s explicit political perspective focused on two main issues aside from the importance of the elections: Western imitating political parties, and the concept of the “*Adil Düzen*” that was attached to the ‘*Milli Görüş*’ (Refah Partisi, 1991; and Refah Partisi, 1995). According to the statements, the existing political parties, whichever called itself right, the left, liberal, the nationalist or the conservative, were all imitators of the West. Yet, “*the basis of the Western mentality stemmed from the Ancient Rome; the basis of the Ancient Rome stemmed from the Ancient Greek; the basis of the Ancient Greek stemmed from the Ancient Egypt, the Pharaohs* (Refah Partisi, 1991:7)”. Therefore, they were all with the one who held the power. However, the *Milli Görüş* was always with the one who supported right rather than power.

Moreover, the RP stated that they were opposed to the EU process, which a West-based union. The statement read: “*This (EU) is a Christian Community. What is your business here?*” (Refah Partisi, 1991:59). In addition, the statement claimed that

the EU was a political Union, and each member had to leave its independence to the central authority. The ones who were in favor of Turkey's integration with the EU attempted to end the political life of the state, which was "*the sole independent Turkish state*" on earth, and this was against the constitution, the laws and the national will (Refah Partisi, 1991:59). Yet, the Turkish (Ottoman) history had prominent achievements in various areas, therefore Turkey did not need the West with regard to state governance (Eligur, 2010:67). In this sense, the movement was against Turkey's integration with the EU. As mentioned in the previous section, the RP put into practice this opposition and aimed to found an Islamic Union, the D-8.

The RP's anti-Western ideas did not just consist of the EU. Furthermore, the Party was against the idea of the "New World Order". To the party, the USA and the imperialist countries aimed to destroy Iraq, which did not bow to them, under this new concept for the sake of Israel's security. NATO, in this sense, was reformatted for the purposes of allowing unjust aggression against the Muslim countries and to provide the necessity support to the establishment of "the Great Israel". Consequently, Turkey was intended to be used as a tool for this purpose through "the Figurant Parties" (Refah Partisi, 1991:11-12).

According to the party statement, these West-imitating political parties were the main cause of the destruction related to moral crisis, such as family structures; fraud, corruption and drug abuse; anarchy and terror (the PKK case in particular); violations of human rights; the destruction of the state and the state idea; destruction in economic life and also in foreign policy (Refah Partisi, 1991:25-72). Thus, the solution to the aforementioned destructions was the "*Adil Sosyal Düzen*" (Just Social Order) based on peace and tranquility; freedom; justice, and welfare for every citizen. All those necessities would be achieved with the '*Milli Görüş*', which was the worldview of the Turkish nation.

Despite the RP against the West, their political proposal within the framework of "*Adil Sosyal Düzen*" was a form of "Islamic liberalism". It did not refer to Islam as the alternative. Yet, the RP aimed to harmonize the Islamic identity and its symbols

into the political sphere (Yavuz, 1997:76). Notably, Yavuz asserts “*The idea-making intellectuals in the party, such as Bahri Zengin and Abdullah Gül, do not define democracy on the basis of Islam; they regard Islam as a voice with in democracy* (1997:76). However, the RP’s leader Erbakan made a speech regarding the plurality of the legal system that allowed the citizen to choose the legal system in general principles according to their wish in the fourth congress of the party in 1993 (Jenkins, 2008:156). It should be noted that the proposal became the reasoned decision regarding the closure of the RP<sup>39</sup>.

Like democracy, the RP did not oppose laicism. Their main argument on laicism was its definition. According to Erbakan, only two countries had laicism in their constitutions: France and Turkey. In France, the definition and implementation of laicism were clear. On the other hand, laicism did not have a certain definition in Turkey. While laicism guaranteed the freedom of conscience and religion in France, it applied in the form of hostility to religion in Turkey (Erbakan, 2013). Thus, the RP, the MGM in particular, asked the real implementation of laicism, which was to protect religious freedom.

#### **4.3.2. The AK Party**

Since its establishment, the identity and the ideology of the AK Party has been questioned. Due to the earlier political involvements of the prominent founders, the AK Party was considered to be the successor to *Milli Görüş*. This consideration increased the skepticism of the secularist elites, and it reflected the tension between state and the government in the public spheres, such as the protocol meetings and the receptions as mentioned before.

*Is AK Party an Islamic party? Does the AK Party have any tie with the Milli Görüş Movement? Is the AK Party a liberal or a conservative party?*

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<sup>39</sup> See, Fikret Bila, “Erbakan’ın Suçu,” *Milliyet*, 28 January 1998.



The foundation process of the AK Party gives us some clues about the aforementioned questions. After the closure of the FP, the reformist wing of the MGM did not participate in the formation of the SP. On the contrary, the reformist wing intended to form a new political party through the participation of a wide spectrum of political figures rather than the former companions of the MGM. Erdoğan also invited various political figures that had a non-Islamic past. This was also a sign that the AK Party would not be stuck with the patterns of the *Milli Görüş*. The party leaders depicted the transformation through the political diversification of the first cabinet (Dağı, 2010:124). Thus, the politicians who had a center-right background became ministers in the first AK Party government.

In addition to the diverse political figures, the party rejected the accusations of its being an Islamic party and a continuation of the MGM. According to the declarations of the party's founders and its program, the AK Party was not defined as an Islamic party. The AK Party's leader Erdoğan stated, "*the AK Party represents a new political style, a new concept in Turkish political life*", which was the conservative democrat (R. T. Erdoğan, 2004). Apart from the conservation of the existing institutions, he referred to their understanding of 'conservatism' as the conservation of values. He continued by saying that their conservatism identity was against any kind of social and political engineering. In these regards, the AK Party left the traditional policies of the political Islamist, which rejects Western values and the West itself. In contrast to the political Islamists, the AK Party adopted pro-western and pro-global policies, and started the EU integration process the day after the election victory in 2002, as stated in the party program<sup>40</sup> (Radikal, 2002).

The comprehensive description of the "conservative democrat" was given in Yalçın Akdoğan's (a current deputy of the AK Party) works representing the view of the party (see, Akdoğan, 2004; and Akdoğan, 2010). According to Akdoğan, the "conservative democrat" political identity that the AK Party intends to develop resembles Anglo-American conservatism on a large scale. In addition, the quest for

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<sup>40</sup> For more information about the AK Party Program please see, <https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum>. Accessed September 22, 2014.

this political identity shapes with the reality of the socio-cultural features with the political environment (Akdoğan, 2010:67).

The parameters of the “conservative democrat” political identity are based on the culture of the consensus, limited and definite political power, and national sovereignty, constitutional and international norms (Akdoğan, 2010:61). In this sense, the conservative democrat identity encourages the differences in social areas addressing in the political ground through participatory democracy. The definite and limited political power provides a guarantee against the oppressive, aggressive and authoritarian political understanding from which the conservative democrat political idea refrains. Moreover, the basis of the political authority stems from the national will. The laws and the norms, which comply with requirements of the era, are the secondary source that comes after the national will.

Although the AK Party defines itself as “conservative democrat”, the AK Party is considered as an Islamic party by the external world (Bulaç, 2010:92). For instance, The Daily Telegraph pointed out the origin of the AK Party dating back to two closed parties, the RP and the FP (Bulaç, 2010:95). The MGM-originating political parties were also subject to a similar description, despite never calling themselves Islamist parties. Similarly, the AK Party’s supporters identified the party as ‘Muslim’ and ‘democrat’. In response to this identification, the party preferred to define itself as ‘conservative democrat’ in order not to have difficulties both in the domestic and international political arenas (Yavuz, 2004).

#### ***4.3.2.1. The AK Party’s Program and By-Laws***

As seen the information aforementioned, the AK Party has tendency to form its own political ideology under the theme of the ‘conservative democrat’. Yet the term ‘conservative democrat’ is seldom referred to in the AK Party’s program. Instead, the party points out the importance of the nation’s will: “*AK PARTİ acknowledges that the nation’s will is the unique determining power* (AK Parti, 2014a)”. In Article 4,

which is about the fundamental objectives of the party, the AK Party stresses its guiding elements as *“intelligence, science and experience”*. Thus, the party aims to point out its secular understanding in response to criticism directed against its affiliation with religion. Accordingly, the party program emphasizes that *“Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes (AK Parti 2014b)”*. The Article 4 continuous *“AK PARTİ considers the elements of nations will, supremacy of law, intelligence, science, experience, democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and ethics as the foundations of its political administration (AK Parti 2014a)”*.

The AK Party’s program explicitly supports secularism, and accepts it as *“a pre-requisite of democracy”*. In doing so, the party mentions that religion is an important institution, and the party defines secularism as *“an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience”* (AK Parti, 2014b). In this regard, the party program says:

*“Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions, and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace (AK Parti, 2014b)”*.

As seen the expression above, the party program defines secularism in a different way to the understanding of laicism.

The AK Party’s pro-west and pro-globalist policies in relation to foreign policy find a prominent place both in the party program and by-laws. The party considers the historical and geographical perspectives, and generates its foreign policy within this framework. On one hand, EU relations are put at the top of the foreign political agenda. In this sense, the party points out that *“Turkey shall rapidly fulfill its promises in its relations with the European Union and the conditions, which*

*the union demands of other candidate nations as well* (AK Parti, 2014b). It should be noted that the EU integration process has been strengthened by the hand of the government in the struggle against military tutelage through the reforms made in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria (see Kuru, 2012). Moreover, the party program emphasizes the importance of Turkey's relations with the United States, NATO, and the Russian Federation, including Turkey's neighboring countries of Turkey. On the other hand, the party stresses the importance of Turkey's ties with the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, the Middle East and Cyprus. In short, the whole world is considered in the foreign policy.

Briefly, the AK Party has aimed to establish its own political ideology within the framework of the 'conservative democrat' concept. The party rejected the accusation of being an Islamist party and having ties with the *Milli Görüş* Movement. Although the AK Party intended to establish a pragmatist political identity rather than a religious one, the supporters of the party have defined the party as 'Muslim Democrat' (Sarıbay, 2003; and Yavuz, 2004). Yet the party has different identities in accordance with its activity areas. In this sense, it can be said that the AK Party is "national and spiritual" in the cultural area, "pluralist democrat" in the political area, and 'liberal' in the economic area (Yavuz, 2004). Similarly Bulaç states that the AK Party has "liberal", "social democrat and even leftist", and "conservative" identities in terms of the groups that support the AK Party. Consequently, the AK Party is the sum of aforementioned identities (Bulaç, 2010:117).

#### **4.4. Political Behavior of the MGM and the AK Party**

In this section, first, I analyze the political behavior of the MGM, and later the AK Party. While I give a general discussion about the political actions of the MGM, I mainly focus on two periods, the 1970s and 1990s, in context with the MGM's strong political existence. The second analysis of this section covers between 2002 and 2011, from the first AK Party government to the 2011 referendum.

#### **4.4.1. The MGM**

As noted earlier, the emergence of the MGM took place as a response to the Kemalist reforms in parallel with the rising of political ideologies in Turkey in the 1960s. The MGM established its ideology over anti-western ideas. While the movement and its political organizations drew an anti-western agenda, they did not exclude the Western-originating technology and industrial developments. The movement referred to heavy industrialization in its political program as well as putting to the fore cultural and moral values, which dated back to the Ottoman era. Moreover, Erbakan used an old Ottoman vocabulary during the 1973 election campaign instead of the jargon of the Kemalist regime, which was adopted in the aftermath of the republic (Jenkins, 2008:132).

In contrast with the information mentioned above, the MSP, the second party of the MGM, made a coalition with the CHP, the flagship of Kemalist ideology. However, the political behavior of the MSP seemed ironic regarding the collaboration with the CHP, yet the presence of Ecevit can explain this political choice. Ecevit became the leader of the CHP after defeating İsmet İnönü, who considered himself the lifetime leader of the CHP and one of the prominent figures of the Kemalist regime. Moreover, Ecevit's ideas regarding the Atatürk taboo both in the party and Turkish politics might have affected the MSP's political behavior towards becoming a part of the government (Armağan, 2011).

Due to the closure of the MNP, the movement tended to be more cautious in its activities and political themes (Eligur, 2010:69). The movement maintained its activities within the party's buildings and refrained from any Islamic-themed discourses in the aftermath of the 12 March military memorandum. The MNP used anti-Semitic discourse. For example, Erbakan gave an anecdote about the government repression against the Islamic outbreak in 1909 with these words (cited from Jenkins, 2008:132): *"The Freemasons got a bunch of officers to form the Action Army, depose*

*Sultan Abdülhamit, destroy the Islamic Empire and transfer control of the world from the Muslims to the Jews.*” Throughout the history of the party, similar statements continued to be expressed.

Erbakan was elected chairman of the RP on October 1987 after the end of his political ban. By the 1990s, the main ideology of the movement and the emphasis on heavy industrialization remained on the political agenda. Specifically, the fall of the ANAP after Özal’s presidency led to the rise of the other political parties, including the RP. The rise of the RP continued after the 1994 local elections, and the RP became the leading party of the 1995 national elections, which led the RP to power in June 1996. Yet the RP’s pro-Islamic tendencies came up during Erbakan’s prime ministry. As noted before, Erbakan made his first foreign visits to Islamic countries and formed an Islamic economic union named D-8. Erbakan governments followed anti-Israel and anti-western policies, and the government’s rapprochement with the East, the Islamic states in particular, increased. This convergence raised the Kemalist opposition, the flagship of western modernization during the republican era, against the government. As a result, Erbakan was urged to leave the government by the 28 February process, and the Constitutional Court closed the RP on January 1998.

#### **4.4.2. The AK Party**

The division within the political wing of the MGM gained momentum in the aftermath of Erbakan’s five-year political ban. During the RP’s closure trial, Erbakan seemed to acknowledge the prospective closure of the party, and mentioned that in case of a ban on the RP they would change the signboard of the party (Bozkurt, 1997). After losing the intra-party leadership struggle, the reformist wing of the FP figured out that another party would not be the solution to politics when the Constitutional Court shut down the FP. From this point of view, changing the signpost did not seem to be enough for the reformist wing, and they sought a way out by establishing a new political party.

The changing political behavior of the AK Party can be understood explicitly from the process mentioned above. Since its establishment, the AK Party has followed different policies from the *Milli Görüş* tradition. In this sense, it can be said that two parameters shaped the policies of the AK Party. Firstly, the party left the religious discourses that the MGM followed, and secondly sought a path or an instrument, which legitimated its actions in the eyes of the secular wing and the international arena; namely the EU integration process, the Copenhagen Criteria in particular. While the AK Party declared that they were not the successors to the *Milli Görüş* tradition, they adopted a pro-western policy contrary to that of the MGM, and intended to fortify this transformation by following the EU's criteria. Within the scope of this study, I examine the AK Party's political behavior during two terms: before and after 2007.

#### **4.4.2.1. Before 2007**

As a newly-established political party, the AK Party needed to prove itself in the two parameters above. In this sense, from its very early years, the AK Party was in collaboration with a broad segment of the Turkish society in its efforts to consolidate democracy within the framework of the EU integration process. The increasing democratic values meant the decreasing of the Kemalist tutelage in Turkish politics. As mentioned earlier, the formation of the party and the composition of the first cabinet were prominent indicators of this broad participation tendency. The EU integration process had been in the AK Party's agenda all along. However, it was one of the party's main policies due to the reasons mentioned above. In this regard, the AK Party leader Erdoğan – it should be noted that he had not been the prime minister yet – began to visit EU countries right after the 2002 elections in order to receive support for the Turkey's EU integration process.

Through the EU integration process, the AK Party's leadership cadre explicitly mentioned democratization and secularism on various occasions. It is

obvious that the Copenhagen Criteria was a tool to diminish the power of the secular wings, which consisted of the civilian, military and bureaucratic elites. Yet while the AK Party emphasized democratic values, they did not introduce their own democracy model. Instead, the party modeled the democratic credentials of the Copenhagen Criteria. Regarding the democratization process, Yavuz asserts that the AK Party's understanding of democracy is based on the 'conservative democracy' that includes "*Sunni/Hanafi/ethnic-Turk homogeneous entity*" as an ideal type of a nation. However, the party had no policy on the Kurd and Alevi issues during this period (Yavuz, 2009: 100). Hence, it can be said that the AK Party does not internalize democracy. Also, by having a charismatic leader (Erdoğan) the party demonstrated an authoritarian tendency. The several times adjusted AK Party's bylaws was a clear indicator which showed this intention to establish a more disciplined party (Yavuz, 2009: 100-101).

Aside from its democracy articulations, the AK Party stressed its ideas about secularism, which differentiated it from the Kemalist understanding of laicism. According to scholars, the state's dominant laicism consideration is assertive (Kuru, 2011), and based on the "control of religion by the state" (Yavuz, 2009). Despite this dominant Kemalist understanding of laicism, the AK Party supported a different understanding of secularism, which puts individuals in the center of the debate rather than the state, and allows them to practice their religion without any restrictions (see Kuru, 2011). This tendency was a natural result of the debates between the Kemalist and the Islamic-leaning wings due to the Kemalist rejection of the religion from the public sphere.

On the other hand, like Özal and Demirel, Erdoğan asserted on various occasions "*Individuals cannot be secular, states are*" (Kuru, 2010:183; Today's Zaman, 2011). The leading cadre of the AK Party continuously stated that they were not opposed to laicism. However, laicism should have not limited individuals and extended to the public spheres. Thus it had to be defined in a liberal way that allowed the religious freedom of the individuals (Radikal, 2004). In doing so, the AK Party



aimed to demonstrate the party's positive stance on the secularism issue, and diminished the oppressive secular pressure upon the party. Yet, the discussions on secularism led to the 2007 presidential crisis, and shortly after the AK Party were faced with a closure trial as noted before.

The democratic reforms included not only Muslim society but also the country's non-Muslim minorities. In this regard, the government initiated reforms to enhance the legal rights of non-Muslim subjects. Moreover, the government secularized the Islamic concepts which existing in legal documents, such as "mosque", which was replaced with "place of worship" (Kuru, 2007:148). Similarly, the AK Party built its democratization policy grounds for the Copenhagen Criteria. While the AK Party carried religion to the public sphere through secularizing the concepts, the government utilized the aforementioned criteria as a legitimacy tool to reduce the dominant understanding of laicism.

#### ***4.4.2.2. After 2007***

The 2007 presidential election crisis was a critical juncture for the AK Party in the consolidation of its rule. As a result of the presidential election debates and the harsh opposition of the Kemalist secular wings, the military declared a memorandum on the General Staff's official web site on 27 April 2007. The AK Party government's uncompromising stance against the incident increased popular support for the party. Instead of accelerating the political conflict, the AK Party called an early election in parallel with the CHP's demand, which was one of the leading supporters of 'the Republic Protest' against the AK Party's presidential candidate. More importantly, the CHP claimed that the current parliament could not elect the new president two years earlier than the presidential election (Özçınar, 2005). To them, due to the national election threshold, parliament did not reflect the will of the nation because the AK Party managed 66 percent (363 seats) of the parliament with its 34 percent of the votes. Thus, the AK Party government aimed to unlock the presidential election

crisis through calling an early election and refreshing its support. As a result, although the AK Party received fewer seats (341seats) in the parliament in relation to the 2002 election, the party took over 46 percent of the votes. The MHP's election success as the third party, which managed to pass the election threshold, caused the loss of the AK Party's seats despite the landslide election victory.

There were two important incidents, which led to the consolidation of the AK Party's rule: the presidential election crisis and the AK Party's closure trial. First, as noted earlier, during the presidential election, the military issued a memorandum. Kuru asserts "The failure of the e-coup attempt meant the beginning of the declining military tutelage over Turkish politics" (Kuru, 2012:39). This was true because the military targeted the presidential candidate of the AK Party; however, the military was not only able to prevent the process but also led the AK Party to increase its popular support. Bulaç states that a month before the presidential election, the support of the AK Party was around 28.4 percent according to a poll, which was 6 percent below the 2002 election result (Bulaç, 2010:254). In the aftermath of the 2007 early election, the party increased its support to 46 percent due to the harsh opposition of the secular wing. Aside from the current political developments, the AK Party nominated some prominent former CHP members and received support from a wide range of society including the Armenian minority, prior to the 2007 early elections (Kılınç, 2014:315).

Another important development was the closure trial. What made the trial significant was that it occurred right after the national election in which the AK Party assured national support and reinforced its position in parliament in a democratic way. Yet the closure trial barely resulted in the party's favor, the Constitutional Court charged depriving it of financial assistance (Today's Zaman, 2008). Hence, the party left behind a tedious process and consolidated its position in Turkish politics.

The aforementioned incidents and the military's intervention into politics brought forward the need for a civil constitution, which was also one of the AK Party's prominent election pledges. In this regard, a group of constitutional lawyers

prepared a draft constitution under the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun, who was assigned by Prime Minister Erdoğan, in September 2007. Indeed, the closure trial was a reaction to this draft constitution. In the aftermath of the AK Party's landslide election victory, the formation of the "Second Republic" which defined itself against secularism and national identity, and proposed a de-Kemalist state (Yavuz, 2009:261). Moreover, the cancelation of the headscarf ban in universities increased the tension between the secular elites and the government after the preparation of the draft civil constitution.

### *The Fall of Military Influence*

During the presidential election crisis, another prominent development, which is known as the "*Ergenekon*" trial, triggered a shock wave in Turkish politics. The security forces found 27 hand grenades in a house located in Ümraniye, İstanbul. After the expanded investigation and the legal prosecution, the prosecutor of the trial prepared the indictment that accused the defendants of "*trying to prepare ground for a coup that will be held in 2009*" (Öztürk and Subaşı 2008). Some of the other charges against the defendants were "*to established an armed terrorist organization*", "*attempting to overthrow the government through the use force and violence to eliminate the state of the Republic of Turkey*", and "*to encourage people to revolt against the government*" (Bulaç, 2010:391; Open Source Center 2010). In the context of the trial, the first operation began on 22 January 2008, and a wide group of people, consisting of academics, journalists, and high-ranking military officers including the former Brigadier-General Veli Küçük, were arrested. Moreover, the unsolved murders and assassinations that had occurred since the 1990s were connected with the trial. The prosecution asserted that an illegal structure called the "*Ergenekon Terror Organization*" had a hidden structure in the army (Bulaç, 2010:394; Open Source Center 2010).

In 2010, another prominent trial, Balyoz (Sledgehammer) began after a report in the Turkish daily newspaper *Taraf* stated “*The name of the coup, Sledgehammer (Darbenin adı Balyoz)*” on January 20 (Taraf, 2010). According to the claims, a coup plot was planned under the name of “Operation Sledgehammer” by the leadership of Commander of the First Army General Çetin Doğan. The coup plot consisted of bloody plans such as attacking Fatih and Beyazıt mosques during Friday prayers. The prosecution immediately prepared the case file on the basis of *Taraf*’s report, and on 22 February over 40 people were arrested including Çetin Doğan, former Air Forces Commander retired Gen. İbrahim Fırtına, former Navy Commander retired Gen. Özden Örnek, and former First Army Commander Gen. Ergin Saygun (Sabah, 2010).

Indeed, long before the weekly news magazine *Nokta* claimed “We have survived two coups in 2004” in its cover on 29 March 2007 (Zaman, 2007). *Nokta*’s claims leaned on the diary of Gen. Özden Örnek, which was lately known as “the coup diaries (Darbe Günlükleri)”. According to the claims, two coups were planned under the names “Ayıışığı (Moonlight)” and “Sarıkız (Blonde Girl)” to overthrow the AK Party government. However, the current General Staff Hilmi Özkök prevented the coup plots. In the aftermath of *Nokta*’s news, the magazine was faced with a police raid, and the owner of the magazine declared that the magazine’s publication would stop due to the increasing pressures (Radikal, 2007). The *Nokta* incident and the aforementioned trials were explicit indicators of the fall of military influence in Turkish politics within a short time period. Thus, not only retired army officers but also officers on active duty were tried in the civilian courts. The untouchable image of the army had been shattered.

The final development that caused the fall of military tutelage was the 2010 referendum, which amended 24 articles of the current constitution. The constitutional referendum included a number of changes mainly around the issues of individual freedoms, economic and social rights, judicial reforms, and abolishment of the protection of coup leaders. The secular wing, including the CHP, was against the referendum because it would end the domination of the secular elites in the military

and judiciary (Kuru, 2012:50). Many of the privileges, which the military enjoyed, were abolished and the member structure of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the Constitutional Court were changed by the amendments. Turkish citizen voted 57.88 percent in favor of the constitutional amendments (YSK, 2010). While the CHP and MHP voted against the referendum, the BDP and the PKK called a boycott (BBC, 2010). Right after the referendum, two prominent Turkish business associations TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, called for a new constitution which promotes freedom of conscience and religion, solves the identity issue, and does not allow any tutelage in accordance with the separation of powers (Radikal, 2010).

### *Foreign Policy*

Apart from the EU integration process, the AK Party adopted a pro-western foreign policy, and established close relations with West, the USA and the NATO in particular. In this regard, the AK Party government aimed to be part of the USA's Iraq invasion in the very early months of its rule. Although Erdoğan was explicitly in favor of the motion, which asked for Turkish Parliament authorization to send troops abroad and allow for the deployment of foreign troops in Turkish territory, the TBMM dominated by the AK Party rejected the motion (Zaman, 2003). It should be noted that Erdoğan did not re-nominate significant numbers of the current deputies who had strong ties with the MGM as a result of the motion after the 2007 elections.

After the failure of the motion that allowed sending Turkish troops to Iraq, the government sent another motion to the TBMM on 5 September 2006, to authorize the sending of troops to Lebanon. The USA welcomed the motion, which passed with the support of 340 members of parliament (Hurriyet Daily News, 2006). Aside from the relations with the USA, what made the motion important was the characteristic of the Lebanon War. Israel was fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and during those days the Turkish government was criticizing Israel for using excessive power, particularly on the Palestine Issue, although the Turkish army enjoyed good relations with Israel

(Balcı, 2011:128). The motion passed due to the opposition's objections. Columnists had differing ideas about the motion. Some believed that the motion would be a shield for Israel (Bulaç, 2010:312) whilst others some supported it due to the increasing role of the country in the region (Çandar, 2006). Others state that the General Staff and the foreign ministry might have intended to strengthen relations with the West for the sake of national interests (M. Yetkin, 2006).

As noted before, the AK Party government followed policies, which established close ties with the USA and NATO. In this sense, the AK Party acted together with the USA within the scope of "the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI)"<sup>41</sup>. It was stated that the GMEI would promote peace in the Middle East and help to enhance socio-economic conditions of the region, including the issues of education and women's rights. On many occasions Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that he was one of the co-chairmen of the initiative. In response to criticisms posed by the opposition, Erdoğan stated that the initiative was dead before birth and there was nothing in it to obligate Turkey (Habertürk, 2009).

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I aimed to demonstrate the emergence of the *Milli Görüş* Movement and its early and later political journey in Turkish politics since the late 1960s. Just as in the other cases in part, I discussed the sociological-structural, ideological and political behavioral analyses of the MGM and its successor, the AK Party.

I intended to show the socio-economic transformation of Turkey that began during the post-1980 period within the framework of Özal's liberal policies, and its effect upon the formation of the "new urban class" or the "new bourgeoisie" which lay behind the political success of the MGM and its affiliated political parties, the AK Party in particular. As can be seen in Table 5, the increasing liberal economic developments also led to urbanization. Thus these inter-related developments

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<sup>41</sup> For more information about the Greater Middle East Project see, Nazemroaya, 2014.

mobilized the periphery to the center as an alternative power source, which has its own economic and political potential.

When the followers of the MGM overwhelmed the secular-state repression through a new political actor (AK Party), which also has a new political understanding with its tendency towards integration with the western world, they attracted the support of the vast majority of Turkish society. Consequently, their explicit pro-EU discourse and the support of Turkish society (“new urban class” or the “new bourgeoisie”) increased the democratic developments that led to the fall of the ultra-secularists, the military in particular.

## **Chapter 5: The Muslim Brotherhood**

In 1928, Hasan al-Banna and six colleagues established an Islamic society, the Muslim Brotherhood (Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), in Ismailiyya, a northeastern Egyptian city located on the west bank of the Suez Canal. In 10 years the society spread widely throughout Egypt and expanded its establishments in nearby Arab countries, initially Palestine, Syria and Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood turned into a prominent representative of Sunni Islam in the Arab world within a short time. Today, despite the military suppression in the aftermath of the 2013 coup d'état, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most powerful and organized non-governmental organization in Egypt.

It should be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood evolved from a locally-based society into a nationwide well-organized social actor which opposes authoritarian governments. Various questions can be posed to analyze this transition. However these are beyond the scope of this study. Therefore I will mainly argue the Muslim Brotherhood's ideas about democracy, and its contribution (if there is such) towards the attempt to establish democratic reforms in Egypt over the last three decades. In doing so, I will trace the sociological analysis, ideology and political behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood.

### **5.1. Historical Background of the Muslim Brotherhood<sup>42</sup>**

Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was born in 1906 in Mahmudiyya near Alexandria. His father was an Azhar-graduated local imam, a

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<sup>42</sup> In this chapter, I benefit heavily from al-Banna's autobiography, which deals with his personal life and the early history of the movement until 1940 el-Benna, 2007. I also frequently refer to Mitchell's work, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, for the ideology and organizational behavior of the movement before the 1952 period Mitchell, 1993. For more recent developments of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Wickham, 2013



teacher and a scholar in the Sunni tradition (Ikhwanweb.com, 2007). Banna received his first education from his father's "broad classical and traditional" thoughts (Mitchell, 1993:2). He joined the Arrashad (Guidance) Religious School; a *kuttab* school which also considered hadith aside from the regular religious education schedule between the ages of 8 to 12 (el-Benna, 2007:22; Ikhwanweb.com, 2007).

When the founder of the Arrashad Religious School, Shaykh Muhammad Zahran, could not continue to teach due to his personal affairs, Banna joined the teacher's training schools in Damanhur. According to his statement, the time period he spent there between 1920 and 1923 was one of the most precious times in his life. He spent much of his time praying, and became deeply involved with Sufism during these years (el-Benna, 2007: 44). He participated in the foundation of "the Society of Moral Behavior", composed of the school's students during his third grade year under the direction of a math teacher (also see; Mitchell, 1993:2). The aim of the society was to improve the students' manners and prevent them performing indecent actions. Banna stated that his early education at the Arrashad Religious School brought him to the forefront among other students, thus he was elected president of the society (el-Benna, 2007:23).

In his late years at the teacher's school, Banna and his friends decided to establish another society, the Hassafiyya, to prevent negativity in Mahmudiyya. He stated in his autobiography that the Hassafiyya Society for Charity was founded for two purposes (also see; Mitchell, 1993:2): firstly, to call people to superior moral values and prevent them doing religiously forbidden acts such as alcohol consumption, gambling, and also to fight against *bid'ah*, the innovative religious matters which have no place in religion, such as the acts observed on the day of mourning; and secondly, to struggle against Christian missionaries. And he pointed out that the Muslim Brotherhood would take its place in the community for the same struggles in the future (el-Benna, 2007:39).

After Banna graduated from the teacher's school, he went to Cairo to join the Faculty of Dar al-Oloum at Al-Azhar. He stayed in Cairo during the preparation exam

period and then returned back to his hometown. He participated in another exam to become a primary school teacher. Despite his outstanding success in both exams Banna preferred to continue his higher education, and therefore he moved to Cairo in 1923 (el-Benna, 2007:71). At the end of his first year, his family decided to move to Cairo because Banna's brother graduated from elementary school, and his father aimed to send him to Al-Azhar (el-Benna, 2007:79).

According to Banna's statements, there were not many societies involved in Islamic services during his early years in Cairo. Due to the existence of moral decline amongst people in Cairo, he aimed to form a student group consisting of the students of the Dar al-Oloum. The purposes of this group would be "to preach at masjids" first, and then to visit "coffee houses and public meeting places" to provide their services. Thereafter, the members of the group would visit prominent cities, towns and villages (el-Benna, 2007:84-85). Banna's main concern about the current situation of Egyptian society stemmed from an idea, "the liberation of mind", which became common in Egypt in the aftermath of World War I (el-Benna, 2007:89-90).

To him, this trend created a denial, which swept away everything before it and brought a defective understanding to society. Moreover, this trend made Turkey unrecognizable within a very short time period. While the country had been known as the place where the Amir al-Mu'minin (the Caliph, the Leader of the Muslim World) lived, it was transformed into a new country in which religion was prohibited from every segment of society (el-Benna, 2007:90). Hence, there was something there had to be done to revive Egyptian society. Banna was in a constant search to remedy the society's deficiencies.

Hasan al-Banna passed the oral exam at the end of the June 1927 and graduated from Al-Azhar. While he was expecting to be appointed to teach in a school somewhere close to Cairo, he was appointed to a small city Ismailiyya that he did not even know the location of (el-Benna, 2007:108). In his first 40-day live in Ismailiyya, Banna did not mingle with the crowd, and spent his time instead in the mosque-work (school)-home triangle. During this period he observed the local people, read, prayed

and mused. When he realized that the society of Ismailiyya split into groups due to differences of opinion, in order not to come between them he began to visit the “*coffee houses*” and gave small lectures there rather than in the masjids. He knew that people brought their disagreements to masjids, and that therefore it would be hard to stay in a neutral position between sides (el-Benna, 2007:112-114). Banna delivered speeches 10-15 minutes long in those “coffee houses” twice a week. He chose basic thoughts of Islam according to the levels of the audiences. He avoided the issues that might hurt the audiences at the time of these lectures (el-Benna, 2007:114).

### **5.1.2. The Formation of the Muslim Brotherhood**

Shortly after, as Banna stated, six brothers, who were inspired by his lectures, visited him on 28 March 1928 and said:

*“We have heard and we have become aware and we have been affected. We know not the practical way to reach the glory [‘izza] of Islam and to serve the welfare of Muslim. We are weary of this life of humiliation and restriction. Lo, we see that the Arab and Muslims have no status [manzila] and no dignity [harama] ... We are unable to perceive the road to action as you perceive it, or to know the path to the service of the fatherland [watan], the religion, and the nation [‘umma] as you know it. All that we desire now is to present you with all that we process, to be acquitted by God of the responsibility, and for you to be responsible before Him for us and for what we must do (Mitchell, 1993:8; el-Benna, 2007:132-133)”.*

Banna said: *“These sincere words highly affected to my soul. I could not get rid of this burden imposed on me... This is what I intend to gather people around it”* (el-Benna, 2007:133)”. That night they took an Oath to Allah together *“to serve Islam on the path of Islam as brothers* (el-Benna, 2007:133). Hence they decided to choose the name Muslim Brotherhood.

Banna and his six colleagues immediately rented a room of a flat to utilize as an office for educational purposes. The office that they named “the Tazhib School of Muslim Brothers” became a preparation school. They taught their new followers the basic thoughts of Islam, *hadith* (the teachings and sayings of Prophet Muhammad), the history of Islam, and the lives of *Salaf-e-Saliheen* (the companions of the Prophet). The number of the first group reached over seventy at the end of the 1927-1928 academic calendar (el-Benna, 2007: 134-135).

In its early years the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were from various professions such as teachers, farmers, craftsmen and government officials. The Brothers agreed to build a permanent headquarters for the organization, including a mosque nearby (el-Benna, 2007:145). In addition to the rapid growth of the organization, the ongoing mosque construction increased the charges concerning the Brotherhood and Banna himself. In this sense, the opponents accused Banna of various charges such as being a communist, a Wafdist, and a Royalist (Mitchell, 1993:10; el-Benna; 2007:154). After the construction of the headquarters, the Brotherhood established its first school, the Hira Islamic Institute. Shortly after, the Muslim Brotherhood established new centers out of Ismailiyya, in Ebu Savir and Port Said (el-Benna, 2007:)174, 178).

In the early years of the Society, Banna and his colleagues pursued a non-political and neutral path to serve to Egyptian society. They refrained from debates with any religious or political groups. First of all, as the members of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, they educated themselves and intended to be a good model for others, in the same way that Banna did during his first days of Ismailiyya, and they supported each other in difficult situations; hence it enhanced their solidarity.

### *Cairo*

In October 1932, Muhammad al-Banna was appointed to Cairo in accordance with his official orders. After settling in Cairo, the administrative board the Muslim

Brotherhood in Ismailiyya decided to transfer the Headquarters from Ismailiyya to Cairo. After Banna's arrival, the Society continued its constant growth with printed materials. Following the opinion that the General Guide's (al-murshid al-amm) pamphlets were not enough to deliver their *dawah* (inviting people to the Islamic faith), in May 1933 the Society published its first weekly magazine, *the Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, which would subsequently be converted to a newspaper under the same name. The founding of a political weekly magazine, the *Majallat al-Nadhir* followed this in May 1938 (Mitchell, 1993:13; el-Benna, 2007:263). According to Banna, by this time the Muslim Brothers had established fifteen branches in Egypt (el-Benna, 2007:263).

The general congress also coincided with these times. The main theme of the first general congress in May 1933 was the activities of the Christian missionary and how to prevent them. It was decided to found subsections affiliated with the societies of the Muslim Brotherhood to warn people and avoid them being deceived by the missionaries. Moreover, in relation to this the Brothers sent King Fuad a letter to draw his attention to the subject (el-Benna, 2007:284; Mitchell, 1993:13). The second general congress was held in Port Said a year later. The importance of the printing press regarding the work of the Islamic communities and spreading *dawah* was the main focus of the second congress. Therefore the Assembly of the General Council decided to establish a printing shareholding company, which would be open to members of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (el-Benna, 2007:297). Thus for Banna, the way to increase of the number of followers required fulfilling the necessities of the first stage, "*the stage of propaganda, communication, and information* (Mitchell, 1993:13)."

The Muslim Brothers held another three general congresses in the following years, 1935, 1937 and 1939. In the third congress, the General Assembly structured the Muslim Brotherhood's administrative management, and clarified the task limits of these structures (el-Benna, 2007:340). More importantly, the Assembly approved the initiation of the scout groups, which had been providing physical training to the

young members of the Society since its earliest times in Ismailiyya (el-Benna, 2007:341, 409). These scouts would be the nucleus of the Brotherhood's military units. Thus the Muslim Brothers began to evolve as a political actor.

The fifth general congress coincided with the tenth anniversary of the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1939. The General Guide, Muhammad al-Banna, made the opening speech and gave brief information about the Society's history, targets, and the committees. In this sense, Mitchell summarized how the Brotherhood defined their essentials and "*the definition of 'the Islam of the Brothers'*":

*(1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from based on its two primary sources, the revelation in the Qur'an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna; and (3) Islam applicable at all times at all places (1993:14)."*

For that purpose, the Assembly agreed to analyze the Egyptian Constitution and compare it with the Islamic management scheme in order to modify it with the principles that did not contradict Islam (el-Benna, 2007:415).

In the aftermath of the fifth congress, the General Guide, Banna, sent a letter containing fifty requests known as "*The Fifty-point Manifesto of the Muslim Brothers*", which would meet the whole needs of the *Ummah* (Muslim community), and include all the necessities for its development, to a diverse group of people such as kings, emirates, heads of government, and the opinion leaders of the Muslim World (el-Benna, 2007:384). The fifty-request letter consisted of three main parts. The first part that included ten clauses was about the political and judicial areas; the second group, which was the longest part, covered social and educational issues under 30 clauses; and the third group brought suggestions about economic issues (el-Benna, 2007: 384-391; for English version, see Wendell, 1978:126-130). In this regard, the solutions of the Muslim Brothers were generated as the definition of Banna "*the idea of the Muslim Brothers includes in it all categories of reform*

(Mitchell, 1993:14).” This was also the solid reflection of the idea that *Islam is applicable at all places*.

### **5.1.3. Political Violence (1945-1949)**

The Palace dismissed the ruling Wafd Party in 1944, and the Sa’dist party leader Ahmad Mahir Pasha was appointed as Prime Minister. In 1945, Banna and five other prominent figures of the Muslim Brothers declared their candidacies for the parliamentary election. Yet Banna and his friends were defeated at the elections although they considered a victory certain. Therefore the Brotherhood believed that the election was unfair (Mitchell, 1993:33). The increasing tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government after the election result entered a new era in the aftermath of the assassination of Ahmad Mahir Pasha, due to a declaration of war to the Axis Powers during the end of World War II. Although the assassination was carried-out by someone who was a member of the National Party, the situation worsened for the Society in Egyptian politics. Mahir’s successor, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, applied harsh policies on the organization. According to Mitchell, the Muslim Brothers consider the Nuqrashi government, which ruled between 1944 and 1945, “*as the beginning of the ‘great mihna’<sup>43</sup>, which carried them over the next three years to their period of greatest power* (Mitchell, 1993:34).”

In the 1930s, the presence of the British powers caused political violence, including assassinations against them due to nationalist tendencies. In the second half of the 1940s, political violence in Egypt ascended to its peak. The challenge between the Wafd and the Brotherhood gradually increased the political tension in Egypt, thus the political violence escalated under the influence of the political conflicts. To Mitchell,

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<sup>43</sup> “The use of the term *mihna* was probably intended to invoke the earlier persecutions of the conservative orthodox, especially Ahmad ibn Hanbal, at the hands of rationalist (Mu’tazila)-influenced caliphs of the Ummayyad and early Abbasid periods (Mitchell, 1993:34).”

this period was the last stage of the breakdown of the political system and the rule of law, which resulted in the revolution in 1952 (Mitchell, 1993:59).

As noted above, the assassination of Ahmad Mahir brought a turbulence effect into Egyptian politics. Concurrently, the Muslim Brotherhood's early scout groups and lately the 'Special Units' (secret apparatus), a paramilitary unit, were involved in their first attacks against the British positions and Egyptian Jewish groups in 1945. In 1948, the Unit also engaged in the killing of the prominent judge, Ahmad al-Khazendar, who sentenced a member of the Brotherhood to prison in relation to the attacks against the British (Zahid, 2010:76; Mitchell, 1993:62). Two members of the secret apparatus who assassinated al-Khazendar were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. Banna had been taken into custody, yet he was soon released due to lack of evidence. Although Banna did not want any conflict with the government, the movement was too big to control with one hand<sup>44</sup>, yet the Special Unit maintained its attacks in a way that undermined the influence of the Society, not only in political but also in social areas (Zahid, 2010:76). Consequently the government banned the Society's branches in Ismailiyya and Port Said, and arrested various members. In addition, after the incidents that I will mention below, the Muslim Brothers' headquarters in Cairo was also closed and the Society was banned under Nuqrashi's government right before his assassination.

Similarly, the nationalists pursued a series of political assassinations, which were known as '*the political assassinations case*' in this period against the British presence and its supporters in Egypt. In the late 1945 after Mahir's assassination, Nahhas Pasha was faced with an unsuccessful assassination attempt, which was organized by a young nationalist, Husayn Tawfiq. However, Tawfiq succeeded in killing a former Minister of Finance, Amin Uthman Pasha, who was alleged to be a

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<sup>44</sup> 1947 was the year that the Society had conflicts due to internal schisms. The seed of the internal conflict began when Banna appointed his brother-in-law, Abd al-Hakim Abidin, as his deputy, the secretary general in 1945. After Abidin took advantage of it, the presence of Abidin in the position caused anxiety among the members. Moreover, Banna's interventions to the Guidance Council in order to secure Abidin's position led to some of the oldest members' resignations (Mitchell, 1993:53-54).



British agent. It should be noted that Tawfig revealed his associates, including Anwar al-Sadat, in the list (Mitchell, 1993:59).

The political turmoil in the country peaked after the Egyptian military entered Palestine in May 1948 in the aftermath of the Israeli declaration of independence. The government declared martial law around the country. In addition to current internal political debates, the war with Israel caused clashes between sides in Egypt. The government was dealing with the country's Jewish population in the; on the other hand, and continuing the struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood. The government arrested prominent members of the secret apparatus on 15 November. Banna suffered isolation as a result of intense surveillance and the arrests broke the Society's communication chain (Mitchell, 1993:67). Soon after, a young member of the Society who wore an officer uniform assassinated Nuqrashi the Prime Minister on 28 December.

Banna's peace initiative with the government did not correspond in the same way. Nuqrashi's close friend, Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi, formed a new government. After a bomb attack against the courthouse in which the files of the secret apparatus were kept the government considered the Banna's peace efforts un-realistic. After this attack, Banna sent a letter to his followers stating that "*They are neither Brothers, nor are they Muslims*" (Mitchell, 1993:68). Furthermore, Banna made a public announcement that condemned these kinds of attacks and added that he would use his legal rights to sue those who linked those attacks with himself (Mitchell, 1993:69). On 12 February 1949, Banna was killed while he was near the Young Men's Muslim Association building. As Mitchell states, according to the long lasting investigations, indeed with little doubt, the assassination was a planned act, which was organized, or at least condoned, by the prime minister and executed by the political police. The suspects were sentenced after the reopening of the case in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution (Mitchell, 1993:71). The government increased security measures after Banna's death. When Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi left the office, more than 4,000 members

of the Brothers were under arrest in the military camps located at Tur and Uyun Musa.

#### ***5.1.4. The Muslim Brotherhood After Hasan al-Banna***

After the assassination of Hasan Al-Banna, the Brotherhood remained without leaders for a while. After a short while, the Society solved its succession crisis and prominent members of the Society elected Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi as the second General Guide. Some scholars believed that beside his charisma, his ability to reach out to the political actors was the main motive of al-Hudaybi's leadership (Zollner, 2009). In this regard, Al-Hudaybi was a senior judge, thus he had the capability to reach people who occupied key positions in the state.

Hassan al-Hudaybi imposed some conditions upon acceptance of the General Guide position. He was aware of the power struggle amongst the prominent figures of the Society, and furthermore, he would not occupy the position as the symbolic leader (Zollner, 2009:22). In this sense, he demanded to select his own nominees to the crucial position in the Society's management. In addition to this, al-Hudaybi generated another position, the Vice Leader (*Na'ib al-Murshid al-Amm*). More importantly, al-Hudaybi stipulated the dissolution of the military units. Some of the senior members of the Society believed in the needs of the Secret Unit for the future of the organization, thus this transition took place after lengthy discussions (Zollner, 2009:23). Al-Hudaybi tried to repair the mistakes of the past with the elimination of the secret apparatus. In this sense he said: "*There is no secrecy in the service of God. There is no secrecy in the Message and no terrorism in religion* (Mitchell, 1993:88).

The divergence in the issue of the dissolution of the secret apparatus within the Brotherhood became more visible after the government act of October 8 1951 that abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium of 1899. The Muslim Brotherhood announced the *Majallat al-Da'wa*, and showed its support to the government's act by declaring jihad against the British upon the government's

declaration. Yet soon after it was revealed that the *Majallat al-Da'wa* was not officially regarded as the journal of the Brotherhood. The confusion was caused due to the editor Salih Ashmawi's individual initiative (Mitchell, 1993:89).

In the aftermath of the clashes with the British, the nationalist protestors including students, most of whom sympathized with the Muslim Brotherhood, joined in volunteer battalions to fortify the clashes against the British in the Canal Zone. The battalions were armed by the government officials, who also trained them with the support of the Free Officers, according to the government declaration made on 14 November (Mitchell, 1993:89). As stated in al-Hudaybi declaration, the Muslim Brotherhood did not have any armed forces in the Canal Zone, and the Muslim Brotherhood had only aimed to deliver its messages peacefully. Despite the al-Hudaybi declaration, the Brothers did not make any contra-declaration that prevented their followers participating in '*the movement of the liberation battalions*'. In short, as Mitchell states, the General Guide not only depicted his antipathy to violence but also intended to protect the organization's future by keeping it away from violence. Moreover he let the followers act according to their personal wishes (1993:90).

#### ***5.1.4.1. The Muslim Brotherhood and the 1952 Revolution***

The clashes with the British in the Canal Zone, and the rising nationalism resulted in the military coup of the Free Officers on 23 July 1952. The Muslim Brotherhood had a significant role in the riots against the British and the 1952 Revolution. Right before the revolution, according to an alleged report, 33 percent of the Egyptian arm had connected with the Muslim Brotherhood. It was also a well-known fact that the Free Officers carried-out the struggle in the Canal Zone with the support of volunteer Brotherhood members. In the agreement of many observers, as Mitchell states, there was an explicit bond between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers. According to general opinion:

*“Without the enthusiastic support of the Moslem Brotherhood, Muhammad Naguib’s movement might already have met the fate of the half dozen Egyptian governments that preceded it in the year 1952. The Brotherhood was a full participant in Naguib’s coup last summer and much of his success since then can be attributed to ... their support (Mitchell, 1993:101)”.*

Aside from these ideas, Mitchell pointed out the counter-views: *“On the question of the ‘support’ of the Muslim Brothers, there is a little doubt; most Egyptian supported the revolution. ‘Participation’ in the coup, however, is another matter (1993:101).* According to military officials, the contribution of the Muslim Brotherhood was no more or less than that of any other groups. Moreover, officials declared that the direct support of the Brotherhood was announced only after the King was deposed, between 23 and 26 July. Mitchell himself states:

*“There was indeed none; Hudaybi remained in Alexandria, silent. The explanation of this fact appears to be not, as the government later suggested, that Hudaybi, from the first day, was fighting the revolution and dared not move until ‘his sovereign’ was stripped of power, but rather in the nature of the arrangement and the situation which surrounded the rebellion of the army officers, as it has been put, ‘on the backs of the Muslim Brothers’ (1993:102).”*

The Muslim Brothers declared their official support of the 1952 Revolution on 1 August as a written report, which expressed the gratitude of the organization as *“the blessed movement”*, consisting of the views of the Society about the multiple reforms related to social, economic and moral issues (Mitchell, 1993:105). Soon after, the General Guide, al-Hudaybi visited the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). A meeting with Gamal Abdul Nasser followed. The Muslim Brothers and the RCC announced their cooperation at the end of the meeting (Zollner, 2009:27).

The close friendship between the Muslim Brothers and the RCC did not last long. The Cabinet passed a law to abolish the political parties on January 1953. The Liberation Rally was established to fill the gap in political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood was also invited to join the party. They rejected the invitation so as not to lose their influence (Zollner, 2009:31). A year after, on January 1954, the Cabinet considered the Muslim Brothers to be a political party, thus the organization was dissolved by the Cabinet in pursuant of the 1953 Law. The Society was accused of trying “*to overthrow the present form of government under the cover of religion*”. Al-Hudaybi’s meeting with the British and the issue of the presence of the secret apparatus in the army were legitimate reasons for the closure, from the Cabinet’s point-of-view. The social institutions of the Society such as schools and health institutions were allowed to continue their operations under another name (Mitchell, 1993:126-127).

The closure also undermined the position of al-Hudaybi in the Society. The RCC, under the supervision of Nasser<sup>45</sup>, clearly supported al-Hudaybi’s opponents in order to control the Brothers. Some members, led by Abd al-Qadir Awda, the vice General Guide, requested the resignation of al-Hudaybi, arrested after the developments with other prominent figures. Some of them spoke out in favor of establishing a new religious organization under the leadership of Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, Hasan al-Banna’s father (Mitchell, 1993:128). In addition to these, another group of members strongly supported al-Hudaybi and his vision for the future of the society (Zollner, 2009:34). Yet, al-Hudaybi and some prominent figures of the Muslim Brothers, including Sayyid Qutb, the head of the Propagation of the Call Section, were released in February, and the RCC allowed the reunion of the Society under the condition that it keep away from politics (Calvert, 2013:190)

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<sup>45</sup> Although Naguib was the leader of the RCC, Nasser had undeniable influence over the RCC.

#### ***5.1.4.2. The Nasser Era***

The clash between the Muslim Brothers and Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged right before Nasser's presidency. After the incidents mentioned above, an assassination attempt upon Nasser was carried out while he was giving a speech in Alexandria to applaud the settling of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty on 26 October 1954.<sup>46</sup> The failed assassination attempt caused the demolition of the relations between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood. Although a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's secret apparatus undertook the attempt, the doubts continued as to whether they were involved or not because al-Hudaybi did not have any intelligence about the attack (Wickham, 2013:27; Zollner, 2009:36, and Calvert, 2013:192). Immediately after, Nasser derived political gains from this assassination against Naguib, and the Muslim Brothers utilized it as a brilliant political maneuver. Nasser pushed Naguib to resign from the presidency due to his plotting with the Muslim Brothers. State officials began to accuse the Brotherhood of being a terrorist organization (Zollner, 2009:36). Consequently, Naguib was put under house arrest, and the Brotherhood was crushed under the harsh policies of the Nasser regime.

General Guide al-Hudaybi and the members of the Guidance Council of the Muslim Brothers were arrested on 30 October. The government continued to hunt down the members of the Muslim Brothers across the country in the following month. At the end of the month, the number of arrested Brotherhood members reached over a thousand. The RCC established the People's Tribunals in order to proceed with the subsequent trials. The People's Tribunal announced its verdict - from imprisonments to death sentences - on 4 December 1954. Accordingly, seven high-ranking members, including al-Hudaybi and Abd al-Qadir Awda, were sentenced to die on the gallows. Al-Hudaybi's death penalty was commuted to house arrest by reason of his advance age. The rest of the death sentences were carried-out on 9 December (Calvert, 2013:192-194). The government subsequently dissolved the Society.

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<sup>46</sup> For more information about the re-settlement of the Treaty of 1936, see Mitchell, 1993: 136-137.

Government repression and harsh imprisonment conditions generated an ideological schism among the members, including high-ranking officials. Specifically the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, who spent his nine years in prison with the other Brotherhood inmates, influenced his colleagues, and he was considered as “*an established Islamist thinker who stood up the political authority*” amongst other things (Calvert, 2013:198).

Sayyid Qutb, in his later years, delivered his works under the influence of Abu l-A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid Abu Hasan Nadwi, Pakistani Islamic thinkers. Qutb developed his justification for “*the concept of God’s judgment and dominion*”, which was based on the Qur’an, to struggle with “the state sovereignty” that was under the influence of the “*Western-dominated global order*” (Calvert, 2013:215). In this sense his idea of *hakimiyya* (dominion) was based on God’s judgment. All sovereignty besides this one was not accepted. Qutb’s other concept, *jahiliyya* (ignorance), arises when Muslims do not follow the divine guidance of God (Calvert, 2013:217).

These two concepts became the justification for the Brotherhood’s radical struggles against the Nasser regime during the resurrection of the Society. Consequently, the concepts of Qutb constituted an ideological separation amongst the Brotherhood, and the groups who followed Qutb’s two concepts became more radical than the others. However, the core cadre of the Muslim Brothers rejected the way followed by the Qutbists in the work *Du’at la Qudat* (Preachers not Judges). Al-Hudaybi was not the author of this study, and aside from the Brotherhood’s core cadre, some theologians from Al-Azhar also participated in the work’s formation (Zollner, 2009:47).

In 1958, some of the imprisoned members of the Brotherhood whose sentences were short-term compared to the others were released. Moreover, Nasser also pardoned the General Guide, al-Hudaybi, on the grounds of his age and health conditions. Nasser’s softening policies towards the Muslim Brothers, according to scholars, stemmed from his political achievements (Zollner, 2009:39). As a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the termination of the British presence in

Egypt, Nasser was considered as a national hero not only in Egypt but also in the Arab world. Beside this, he consolidated his regime and eliminated all his rivals and opponents in the country. A proper explanation of Nasser's changing attitude against the Brotherhood might also be that he assumed that it was not a threat to his regime (Zollner, 2009:40). His objectives about Egypt that he mentioned in his *The Philosophy of the Revolution* might be another reasoning of this policy changes. He states:

*“If anyone had asked me in those days what I wanted most, I would have answered promptly: To hear an Egyptian speak fairly about another Egyptian. To sense that an Egyptian has opened his heart to pardon, forgiveness and love for his Egyptian brethren (Nasser, 1955:35-36).”*

The Muslim Brotherhood began to re-establish as two different groups. One group was shaped around Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, and another around Ali al-Ashmawi and Ahmad Abd al-Majid, the leader of the group that later known as the 'Organization 1965'. Thereafter, the two groups decided to re-unite. The leaders asked al-Hudaybi's permission to do this but it was still controversial, whether Hudaybi gave permission or not (Zollner, 2009:40) According to a letter written between the groups which showed 'the structure and division of duties', al-Hudaybi and Qutb were the two prominent contact people in the new organizational scheme. The letter ratified the connection among those formed to under the leadership of al-Hudaybi and agreed to forthcoming ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (Zollner, 2009:41 and see, Calvert, 2013).

As noted in the earlier chapters, Nasser's political failure, which came up in early 1960 both in domestic and international politics, forced him to re-evaluate his policies. He took some lessons from his policy failures, and in this regards, he became more oppressive towards the groups he defined as reactionaries (Stephens, 1971:345). In addition, the emergence of underground political groups took shape in



the frame of the riotous discourse of *Milestones*, a book of Qutb's, which incited a harsh government response (Calvert, 2013:254). The government crackdown on the Brotherhood began. Qutb had been taken to a military prison shortly after release from a nine-year imprisonment, and was held in a solitary confinement. In the aftermath of the trial, the court sentenced Qutb and his six colleagues to the death penalty on 21 August 1966 (Calvert, 2013:260). They were executed on 29 August 1966.

#### **5.1.4.3. The Sadat Era**

Anwar al-Sadat, the vice president, was elected as the new President of Egypt after Nasser's sudden death. Unlike Nasser, he followed a series of new policies such as *The Corrective Revolution* and *infitah* aside from Nasser's Arab Socialism. In this sense, as noted earlier he formed his new allies amongst different segments of society including the Brotherhood, against the Nasserists. Therefore Nasser restored relations with the Muslim Brothers, and intended to create "the Believing President" image contrary to the negative prestige of Nasser amongst the religious groups (Zollner, 2009:48).

The imprisonment members of the Brotherhood began to be released gradually since his the first year in power, and the rest of them were released after the general amnesty of 1975. Despite Sadat's moderate policies against the Brotherhood, the state ban remained in progress during his presidency. The Society was recognized neither as a political party nor as a social movement, thus the movement only had a "half official" position (Zollner, 2009:48). As a natural result of government control over the Society, the Brotherhood continued its activities in universities via student unions, and in the social environment via professional organizations such as syndicates. Al-Hudaybi was involved with the reformation of the organization, utilizing his "*moderate and conciliatory approach*" until his death on 11 November 1973 (Zollner, 2009:49).

The Brotherhood pursued two objectives under the new regime. First, they tried to regain their legal rights, which had been taken away from them by the previous government; and second, to re-construct the organization, which was destroyed by Nasser's harsh policies (Zahid, 2010:89). In this regard, the General Guide, Umar al-Tilsimani, who was appointed the Supreme Guide of the organization after al-Hudaybi's death in 1973, sued a legal case in October 1977 to end the government's ban on the organization. Sadat's political reforms, which allowed a multi-party system (even if it remained on paper) in 1976, were a hopeful development in the society's efforts to regain its legitimacy. This was important to prove the society's moderate stance on the dissolution of the groups had radical tendencies. However, the relations between the state and the society tensed-up again in the aftermath of Sadat's peace initiative with Israel. The society criticized the peace negotiations in its weekly magazine al-Dawa. The government started extensive arrests against those who protested the peace agreement, including the Brotherhood in 1981 (Soage and Franganillo, 2010:43).

#### *The New Generation in the Muslim Brothers*

The government's crackdown and the arrests made in large numbers caused a change in the Brotherhood's membership structure. During Sadat's presidency a new generation joined the Society and began to occupy the positions in its administrative structure. The new generation displayed differences from the old generation about various issues, such as the election of the leader, the state, the west and the paths that the organization should follow. The new generation changed the frame of the organization with its interpretation of Islamic politics and pragmatism (Zahid, 2010:93).

The formation of the student unions at the time of Sadat was the main bastion of the new generation. Having been forbidden from active politics, the Brotherhood re-constructed its formation via student unions at Egyptian universities. Due to its

interaction with various student unions from different ideologies, politics replaced spirituality at the forefront (Zahid, 2010:94). Thus the new generation was able to make new alliances even with the secular Wafd Party in the following years. Moreover, the organization's younger generation split to form their own political parties such as *Hizb al-Wasat*, due to their becoming tired of the "old guard's dogmatic approach" (Zahid, 2010:95).

#### **5.1.4.4. The Mubarak Era**

Hosni Mubarak followed Sadat's liberal economic and political policies when he became the president after Sadat's assassination. Like his predecessor, Mubarak released political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill in the process of consolidating his regime. Therefore Mubarak's liberalization took place in a controlled way, and he gradually broadened the state of emergency (Soage and Franganillo, 2010:43).

The Brotherhood maintained its moderate attitude during Mubarak's presidency. The society surpassed the government's political prohibition through its coalition with the existing political parties for the parliamentary elections. In the 1984 elections, the Brotherhood collaborated with the secular Wafd Party and secured eight seats out of 35 (Zahid, 2010:98; Wickham, 2013:47). It should be noted that after Tilsimani's death in 1986, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr was appointed the new Supreme Guide.

After quite some time the Brotherhood began to play an active part in Egyptian politics. In the 1987 election, the society made a triple alliance with the participation of the socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party. Despite the socialist Labor Party, the campaign slogan of the alliance was '*Islam is the Solution*' (al-Islam huwa al-Hall), thus the alliance was called the Islamic Alliance. Moreover, the alliance announced that they would form a Sharia (Islamic Law) application platform if elected (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191). The Muslim Brothers secured 37 seats

compared to the 60 alliance seats. After the 1987 election, the Brotherhood became the biggest opposition bloc in parliament (Wickham, 2013:53).

These two parliamentary elections span were a crucial period in which the Brotherhood developed its new political ideology, which I argue in the upcoming sections. The prominent figures of the organization, including the General Guide and Muhammad Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, son of Hasan al-Hudaybi and one of the future General Guides (2002-2004), stated the importance of the inquiry of democratic experiences insisting on the democratic implementation in the new issue of *Liwa' al-Islam*, the official magazine of the society (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191). The Brotherhood had gradually begun to publicly state the importance of democracy in the following years.

Aside from its indirect participation in politics, the Brotherhood expanded its of activity and paid special attention to the professional unions. The organization secured its first seats in the Doctors Syndicate and won seven out of 25 seats in 1984. By 1992 they held the majority of seats in the Doctors Syndicate. In 1987 the Society won 54 out of 61 seats in the Engineers Union. In the following year they secured all of the seats in the Union (Fahmy, 1998:552)

The Journalists and Lawyers Syndicates were the other prominent unions in which the Brotherhood had representatives. In the Journalist Syndicate, an active member of the society, Muhammad Abd al-Quddus, became a permanent member in the 1985 election. By 1995, the society held two of the 12 seats in the syndicate. In the Lawyers Syndicate, they managed to control the majority of the seats for the first time in 1992 (Fahmy, 1998:552). They were acting so cautiously in the union elections, thus in order not to confront the regime they left the general secretariats to an acceptable candidate (Zahid, 2010:44).

The majority of the political parties including the Brotherhood boycotted the 1990 parliamentary elections to protest a new law passed by the National Democratic Party. According to the new law, only individuals could participate in the elections,

not political parties (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:192). The government's non-democratic actions increased the democratic demand amidst society.

The government extended the state of emergency law by the early 1990s. The Brotherhood's success in parliamentary elections and the professional unions helped them to emerge as a de facto political opposition against the Mubarak regime. Moreover "*the dual call for democracy and shari'a*" solidified its political viability in comparison to other political parties against the authoritarian NDP government (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193). Because of its democratic demands and activities, the Brotherhood was exposed to political suppression. In addition to its success during the previous elections, the emergence of violent Islamist groups such as Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, and al-Takfir wal-Hijra became the main reasons for the government's oppressive measures. In response, the NDP government elevated the security measures and considered the Brotherhood as a dangerous organization. Furthermore, the Interior Minister of Egypt declared that the Egyptian government did not segregate the Brotherhood from those violent groups mentioned above (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193).

Aside from these, the early 1990s witnessed two significant developments in which the Brotherhood drew a high profile intervention. First, the Egyptian government decided to be a part of the United Nation Coalition against Iraq. The Muslim Brothers criticized the Egyptian government's participation in the first Gulf War in 1991 with a public statement. Moreover, the Doctor's Syndicate, which was controlled by the Islamists, organized a demonstration with the participation of over twenty thousand people (Wickham, 2013:77). In response to this, the government's oppression of the Brotherhood became stronger.

Second, Egypt witnessed an earthquake, which struck Cairo and the surrounding regions in October 1992. The Brotherhood responded to this natural disaster immediately, and provided to the affected areas various essential needs such as food, blankets, tents, and clothes through the Doctors and Engineers Syndicate that they led (Wickham, 2013:77). The Brotherhood performed a better service than the

government in the aftermath of the earthquake, thus increasing the tension between themselves and government officials. In this sense, the Minister of Interior, Abdel Halem Musa depicted his critics: *“What is going on there? Do we have a state within the state?”* (Wickham, 2013:77). Consequently, the mobilizing ability of the Brotherhood evoked government repression in the following years.

The 1995 parliamentary elections were held under these circumstances. Through the elections, the government initiated a series of arrests against Islamists, including 51 out of the Brotherhood’s 170 parliamentary candidates. As a result, thousands of those were arrested. Mubarak aimed to secure his candidacy for the following presidential election held in 1999 by securing one third of the seats that the opposition would probably win. According to the election result, the NDP won almost 94 percent of the majority in parliament. Consequently, the election became the most corrupt one held in the Mubarak regime until 1995 (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193; Soage and Franganillo, 2010:48).

As noted in the previous chapters, the opposition parties could not provide the conditions sufficient to nominate a presidential candidate due to the Egyptian political system. Thus the political struggles of the opposition groups could only be in the parliamentary elections. The political repression of the Mubarak regime continued during the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections. Government arrests of Brotherhood members increased. Despite all the pressures, in the 2005 elections the Brotherhood were able to win 17 seats (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193).

In the 2005 elections, the Brotherhood managed to win 88 seats, which was the most successful result in the Society’s history. Yet the NDP’s repressions, which resulted in over 1300 arrest during the election campaign, did not prevent the society’s success (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:193). In response, the Mubarak governments conducted a constitutional referendum in 2007. Within the framework of the constitutional amendments, the activities of political groups based on religion could be considered within the category of terrorism during the electoral process. Thus, for the following elections, the government secured its position against any

possible electoral improvements that the Brotherhood might make (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:194).

## **5.2. Sociological and Structural Analysis**

### ***5.2.1. Sociological Analyze***

Since its establishment in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the most effective organization in Egyptian society. Emerging in a rural area like Ismailiyya, the movement spread all around the Arab world within a short timespan. Compared to its entire history, the movement could only active in politics in the 1940s and the earlier times of the Egyptian Revolution in 1952. However, the Brotherhood has continued its activities in non-political areas with wide public support under massive political pressures. How did a social movement founded by a schoolteacher and his six colleagues in a small town become a multi-national organization? First, before giving the detail about the sociological analysis of the Muslim Brotherhoods, I argue a possible explanation of this question. Second, I argue the structural analysis of the society.

Despite the fact that there were not many studies on the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the existing works mainly explain the case within the perspective of social movement theory (Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002). Carrie R. Wickham focuses on Islamic activism in her work, *Mobilizing Islam*, which focuses on the Egyptian case. Wickham seeks the answer to the question “*why thousands of Egyptian graduates have chosen to participate in the nonviolent, reformist groups of the movement’s mainstream*”. Ziad Munson, in other respects, explains the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood within the framework of the theories of “*the concept of political opportunity structure in social movement theory*” and political Islam.

According to Munson, the problems stemmed from “*the strains of modernization, and especially Westernization*” which led to the emergence of the idea that to return to the Islamic understanding could be the solution to these problems. In this sense, many scholars have devoted the majority of their time to understanding the fact of political Islam in order to find the possible explanation of cases like the Brotherhood (Munson, 2001:491). In fact, Egyptian society imposed a wide series of modernization and westernization policies since Muhammad Ali Pasha, thus the policies, which could not bring about the solution to social problems such as poverty, induced the adoption of the religious ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood by the community. Briefly, the recent historical developments and the problems that I noted above generated a possible explanation for the rapid emergence of the Brotherhood within the scope of political Islam

Munson states, “*The concept of political opportunity structure in social movement theory offers a possible alternative explanation*” to analyze the emergence and rapid growth of the Brotherhood (Munson, 2001:495). The concept basically focuses on the interactions between a social movement and its political and social environment. Munson focuses on “three important themes” that shaped the development of the Muslim Brotherhood: (1) the British existence and domination in Egypt, (2) the ‘de-legitimization’ of the secular Wafd Party, and (3) the Israeli issue (Munson, 2001:496). Munson built his analysis around these three facts, which I have already discussed in the previous sections.

From here, I attempt to analyze the sociological structure of the Brotherhood to understand the dimensions of the Society’s activities. Aside from Munson’s conceptualization of the political opportunity structure, I believe the sociological structure of Egypt played a crucial role in the Brotherhood’s ideological growth, which I will explain in the next section.

One of the key features, which led a rapid nationwide expansion, was its locality. The massive British influence and having non-Egyptian rulers were two prominent factors, which mobilized the Egyptian masses. The other, maybe one of



the most important characteristic features of the movement, was that it was a classless organization. The founders of the organization, Banna himself and his six colleagues had no ties to any elite families. Notably, in the early years of the society, less-educated working-class people planted the seeds of a multi-national organization (Munson, 2001:496). Therefore, the organization, which stayed away from any ideological (religion based) debates with other groups, delivered its messages more efficiently to the masses.

**Table 3.** Urban and Rural Population of Egypt (1927-1960)

Year	Urban	%	Rural	%	Total
1927	3,715	26	10,367	74	14,085
1937	4,382	28	11,429	71	15,811
1947	6,202	33	12,604	67	18,806
1960	9,651	37	16,120	63	25,771

**Source:** Ibrahim, 2002.

According to the Table 3, almost 75 percent of the Egyptian population lived in rural areas at the time of the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood. As noted earlier, Muhammad al-Banna initiated his ideas for the organization after he was appointed to Ismailiyya, a town in the Canal Zone, which was heavily under western influence due to foreign settlements. Banna and his fellows began to teach people the very basic ideas of Islam rather than existing masjids<sup>47</sup>, and they communicated with people in public places such as coffee houses. Banna and his friends delivered their messages directly and they avoided undermining any other groups even if they had differing opinions on similar issues. Moreover, the increasing nationalist sentiments

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<sup>47</sup> In the very early years the masjids were not preferred especially stay away from any debates with the existing groups in Ismailiyya. Yet, the extensive use of mosques/masjids, soon after became one of the main reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brothers (Zahid, 2010:72).

and the attitudes of the foreign settlers helped them due to their being a national religious organization (for some sample cases see, el-Benna, 2007).

In the early years of the Muslim Brotherhood, the society increased its membership and built its network by personal relationships (Munson, 2001:491). During the Society's Ismailiyya years, new members went through a certain amount of religious training, visited nearby towns and delivered the organization's messages. According to the demands and the public's outlook, new branches were established in the nearby towns. With these expansions, the Society had the opportunity to interact with the public on an institutional level. During its early period, the society began to gain the support of the local *imams* (el-Benna, 2007).

The expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood gained speed after Banna's appointment to Cairo in 1932. The society also moved its headquarters to Cairo after Banna's departure. Despite being an urban-centered organization in the aftermath of the relocation, the society continued to be in interaction with '*the newly urbanized migrants*'. Munson describes this connection with '*the theory of anomie*': "*most of these urban newcomers were part of "urban villages" within the city that closely replicated the dense network of previous social relationships* (Munson, 2001:492). Yet, the society had a great opportunity to reach upper-class society. For instance, Hasan al-Hudaybi, the second General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, was a senior judge who was considered to be a member of the elite, when he became a member of the Brotherhood.

Most importantly, in Cairo the Brotherhood spread its ideas amongst universities, including Al-Azhar, the oldest and the most respectable educational institution in Egypt. Banna's connections with Al-Azhar, which led back to his student years, increased the organization's success in Al-Azhar. As seen in Table 2, the numbers of branch offices had reached 15 by 1932, and the Brotherhood reached an estimated 300 branch offices both in and outside Egypt by 1938. Although the exact numbers of members was uncertain, it was estimated that the Brotherhood had 300,000-600,000 members at the time of its peak period, 1946-1948. By 1949 the

society had reached an estimated 2000 branches. It was claimed that the Muslim Brothers had 500,000 members in this year (Mitchell, 1993:328).

The numbers of branch offices and members began to decline in the period of 1949-1954, between the assassinations of Banna and the Free Officer's repression. During the end of this period, the society's branch offices declined to 1,500, and the estimated members of the members dropped to some 200,000-300,000. Due to the political repression of the Society since then, it has been unable to state data about the estimated number of members. The society remained officially closed and was considered at various time illegal, for instance during the Nasser era.

**Table 4:** The Branch Numbers of the Muslim Brotherhood, (1929-1953)

Year	Branch Number
1929	4
1930	5
1931	10
1932	15
1938	300
1940	500
1949	2000
1953	1500

**Source:** Mitchell, 1993.

### ***5.2.2. The Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood***

Before the government prohibitions, the Brotherhood continued its activities on the basis of membership. A Muslim who intended to become a member of the society was required to sign a membership form and agree to pay the related dues in order to become an 'assistant (*musa'id*) member'. There were two other membership statuses according to Banna's description during the third General Congress in 1935: 'related'

(*muntasib*), and ‘active’ (*‘amil*) (Mitchell, 1993:183; see, el-Benna 2007). A member who attended the regular meetings and followed the Society’s directions in absolute obedience became a related member. Moreover, to be an active member, aside from his religious knowledge, a member had to be currently fulfilling certain “*Islamic obligations such as pilgrimages, fasting and contributions to the zakat*<sup>48</sup> *treasury* (Mitchell, 1993:183)”.

In 1945, in the aftermath of the new regulations, the membership was classified into two categories: “*tentative (that al-ikhtiyar) and active (‘amil* (Mitchell, 1993:183)”. In order to upgrade his membership, a new member had to fulfill the obligations for at least six months. Furthermore, the regulation was also adjusted to comply with the general conditions of the membership. In this regard, a candidate had to be (1) over eighteen years old, (2) noble and honest, (3) able to apprehend the society’s ideas, and (4) willing to pay monthly dues (Mitchell, 1993:183). Members who either did not fulfill or violated the duties and the principals of the organization were subject to discipline by the authority of the branch offices. It should be noted that the monthly dues of the members provided significant financial support to the Brotherhood.

During the Ismailiyya years, the Brotherhood continued its activities around Banna with a basic organizational structure. While the organization began to open new branches, those branches maintained their activities via the branch representatives who worked under Banna. Subsequently the Brothers in Ismailiyya offered Banna the opportunity to select a deputy chairman who could continue the leadership in his periods of absence so as not to be caught unprepared by his sudden transfer from his teaching duty in Ismailiyya due to ministry reassignment (el-Benna, 2007:210).

The organizational structure of the society diversified in direct proportion to the member numbers and the Brotherhood’s activities. In this sense, in the first

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<sup>48</sup> Zakat, an Islamic charitable donating given those, is given by those have a certain amount of income.

General Congress, held in 1933, the society began to form new activity areas apart from the branch offices, such as the Women's Branch and a branch that struggled with the Christian missionaries (el-Benna, 2007:276-284). The diversification of the society's organizational chart initially increased within the scope of its activity areas.

Banna proposed new legal codes for the Brotherhood, '*The Fundamental Law of Organization of the Muslim Brothers*' (*Qanun al-nizam al-asasi li-hay'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin al'Amma*), which were adopted on 8 September 1945 (Mitchell, 1993:163). Thus, the society's organizational structure (see, Figure 1), technical and administrative duties were re-organized in line with the previous experiences.

*The General Guide (al-murshid al-'amm)* (see, Mitchell, 1993:165-166), was the Brotherhood's highest authority. The *Murshid* was also the chairman of the two executive assemblies, the Consultative Assembly (*al-hay'at al-ta'sisiyya*) and the General Guidance Council (*maktab al-irshad al-'amm*). A candidate, who was 30 years old (lunar years of age), "*possessing the attributes of learning, morality, and practically*", and had at least five-year membership of the Consultative Assembly, fulfilled the conditions necessary for being the General Guide. The candidate who received three-quarters of the Assembly's votes was elected as the new *Murshid*.

*The General Guidance Council* (see, Mitchell, 1993:166-167) consisted of 12 members, three from the provinces and nine from Cairo, in accordance with the new codes. The terms required for membership were quite similar to the qualifications for being the General Guide. In this sense, a member of the Consultative Assembly of at least three years standing with "*moral, learned, and practical*" qualities, who was at least 30 years old (lunar years of age), could be a nominee for the Guidance Council. The councilors were elected for a two-year term, and could be re-elected. The councilors' mission started after swearing an oath upon '*The Fundamental Law of Organization of the Muslim Brothers*'.

*The Guidance Council* was one of the Brotherhood's executive bodies, which supervised and administrated its activities. Moreover, the Council was authorized to shape new policies and to execute them in accordance with the Society's constitution.

In this sense, the Council had authorization to create any “committees, sections, and divisions” to achieve the Society’s objectives.

*The Secretary-General* (see, Mitchell, 1993:167-168) was the head representative of the Guidance Council and the general headquarters (*al-markaz al-‘amm*) in terms of all legal, administrative and official operations. The Consultative Assembly elected the secretary-general from amongst the Guidance Council members. The duties of the secretary-general were to execute the policies of the Guidance Council, and to supervise and administer the tasks of all subdivisions of the technical operations and the field apparatus. The secretary-general was allowed to choose his own staff, and the Guidance Council appointed the staff assignments.

*The Consultative Assembly* (Mitchell, 1993:168-169) was responsible for the general supervision of the development of the organization. The assembly consisted of 100 and 150 members. For instance, the assembly had 147 members in its last year. The members of the Consultative Assembly were elected from amongst the active members who were older than 25 years old (lunar years of age). Apart from their high moral, cultural and practical features, the nominees had to have at least five-year membership of the society. The membership was based on ‘*regional representativeness*’. The Consultative Assembly was responsible for the “general supervision” of the organization’s developments, and to audit the election of the General Guidance Council members.

*The General Headquarters* (Mitchell, 1993:169-170) was the base of the technical operations and field apparatus. The General Guide, the General Guidance Council and the Consultative Assembly conducted their operations in the Cairo headquarters. The General-Secretary, his two secretariats and the General Guide were called “*the officials of the General Headquarters*”. The government confiscated the General Headquarters in the aftermath of the clashes with the society in 1948.

The technical operations and the field apparatus conducted the tasks given by the General Headquarters. The related tasks and the hierarchy can be seen in Figure 1. The organizational structure of the Brotherhood resembles the bicameral presidential

system. At the top, the General Guide as the President and the head of the executive; the General-Secretary as the Prime Minister; and the General Guidance Council and the Consultative Assembly as the upper and lower parliaments.

Yet in the aftermath of political repression, the Brotherhood lost its wide organizational structure. Since the Nasser era, the society struggled to stay alive. However, in the Mubarak era, the Brothers decide to struggle in every level of society within the legal framework. The decision also affected a revision of the Society's organizational structure. According to Wickham, "*..the Brotherhood had not released any documents on its membership, administrative structure, or mode of operations,..*", in the early 1980s (2013:71). The first information about the rebuilding of the organization was revealed by the government, based upon a document seized from Khayrat al-Shatir's office, a businessman and a prominent Brotherhood activist (Wickham, 2013:71). Accordingly, the Guidance Bureau expanded its member from 13 to 16. Similarly the members of the Guidance Council revised and the member numbers decreased to 75. Additionally, some new divisions were attached to the former structure such as 'Political Apparatus', 'the Planning Apparatus', 'the Committee on Elections and Parliamentary Affairs', 'the Committee on Human Rights', and so on. As Wickham noted, "*the creation of such new committees suggests an increasing specialization of roles and a reduction in the scope of the activities directly controlled by the Guidance Bureau and the Supreme Guide* (2013:71)."

### **3.3. Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood**

The emergence of the Society of Muslim Brothers occurred in a tumultuous political environment during the late 1920s. Aside from heavy foreign influence both politically and socially, the rising secularist ideas were a driving force for religious people to stimulate the awakening of Islam in Egyptian society. In this sense, the Society of Muslim Brothers was a concrete reflection of the ideas of Hasan al-

Banna's, the founder and the mastermind of the Society, whose ideas were brought to life systematically.

The ideological history of the Society can be discussed as two different periods: the Banna era (1928-1949) and the post-Banna era. The post-Banna era can also be analyzed in two different terms. In the first term (1949-1973), the new General Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb had a prominent influence upon the ideological development of the Society (for al-Hudaybi's ideas see, Zollner, 2009; and for Qutb's ideas see, Calvert, 2013). While al-Hudaybi followed an ideology, which was far away from violence, and refrained from any clashes with the state authority, Qutb's ideas somehow influenced the groups within the Society who had tendencies towards violence. It should be noted that neither al-Hudaybi nor Qutb officially supported any violent attacks. Although the second term of the post-Banna era may be considered similar to the previous term, the emergence of democratic ideology in the society forces me to evaluate it as a separate term.

### ***5.3.1. Al-Banna and the Ideology of the Muslim Brothers***

As noted the previous section, the conditions which Egyptian society was passing through mobilized religious people such as Banna. Additionally, Banna's characteristic of solving society's problems in an organized way was responsible for the creation of a huge organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Since his early educational life, Banna had been actively struggling to contribute something both morally and religiously to Egyptian society. In this regard, he led the formation of the Society for Moral Behavior whilst he was still in primary school (see, Mitchell, 1993:2, and el-Benna, 2007:23). Banna and his schoolmates forced each other to stay away from immoral actions in return for small fines. With the formation of the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden, which he established in his high school years with his Hassafiyya Brothers, Banna raised the level of his struggle (see, Mitchell, 1993:2, and el-Benna, 2007:39). The new society's target group was the



people of the town (Ismailiyya), and their main two targets were to prevent people from the forbidden acts such as gambling and the use of alcohol, and also to attempt to counter the influence of Christian missionaries. As Banna stated, the Society of the Muslim Brothers continued the mission of this society in the near future (el-Benna, 2007:39).

The formation of the Brotherhood, and at the same time its ideology, was formed by Banna in the context of the struggles mentioned above. Similarly Mitchell stated that “*Banna’s concern with the defection of ‘educated youth’ from the ‘Islamic way of life’ led him to seek the counsels of his religious and lay elders* (Mitchell, 1993:6)”. His only concern, in the meantime, was not only the youth people of the Egyptian society. Therefore, when he completed his education in al-Azhar, and was appointed to Ismailiyya as a schoolteacher, he analyzed the people of his new home, and sought some solutions. In this regard, he decided to take action after 40 nights full of thought in order to actualize one his close friend’s saying: “*A righteous person, wherever he goes, leaves a good impact on* (el-Benna, 2007:112)”.

Banna began to interact with the society alone to focus his ideas and contribute to the society. First, he analyzed and identified the factors that influenced the society, and he classified these elements under four titles: (1) the scholars, including religious (2) the Order (*tariqa*) Sheikhs, (3) the notables, and (4) and the meetings (el-Benna, 2007:122). While he delivered his messages he was always respectful towards the scholars and the Sheikhs, and established good relations with the eminent people of the society. By doing so he intended to reach the whole society, and refrain from coming between the groups. He definitely did not wish for his messages to become stuck between groups and become less influential due to the groups’ rivalry. He “*aimed to begin a general struggle (da’wa) based on science, morality, and jihad that are the elements of the inclusive invitation to Islam* (el-Benna, 2007: 124)”.

One of the memories mentioned by Banna in his autobiography gives us a clue about the philosophy he deployed during his religious struggle (el-Benna, 2007:126). In a night lecture right before the formation of the Brotherhood, Banna

met with a Sheikh whose name was Abdul Wahhab who was close to his age. After congratulating him on what he had done with his followers, Banna pointed out that his followers had also the same inadequacies as other Muslims: “not knowing their religion well enough and staying away from the consciousness of Islam.” Banna suggested to Sheikh Abdul Wahhab that he educate them within the framework of science, organizing, supervision, and the lifestyles of the *Salafi Saleheen*, the early Muslims. Science and organizational skills were the prominent elements of Banna’s philosophy of struggle. Thus, since his early life, he maintained his endeavors with a ‘collective struggle’ and knowledge of science or education.

In this regard, Banna began to educate the early students of the Society from various ages, and established educational institutions in which they could receive scientific and religious instruction. The institutions were built with the donations of those “who believed the *da’wa* truly”, and within the framework of the rule adopted by the Brotherhood they would not demand any financial support from people who had not comprehended the virtue of spending for the sake of the *da’wa* (el-Benna, 2007:175).

#### ***5.3.1.1. The Conditions of the Development***

The condition of the development of a society necessitates two crucial elements; first education, and second the adequate human factor, according to Banna (el-Benna, 2007:257-262). In this sense, to educate the *ummah* is a significant factor in teaching them their rights, and to direct them to pursue the way to obtain these rights. This process would build the theoretical and physiological groundwork of the society’s development. To him, the state, which aims to develop, should be considered as a school, in which the students are the people, and the teachers are the leaders who assist the students. In this school, the methods should be brief and goal-oriented, and the elected Methodists (leaders) should have received the required education. Banna categorically states that Jamal ad-Din Afghani and Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh built

the development of Egypt around this understanding. If Egyptian leaders had followed these principles, Egyptian society would have developed as a whole. Aside from this, it should be noted that Afghani and ‘Abduh had a significant influence on Banna’s ideas and his struggle.

To Banna, a society could not develop without having an adequate human factor (el-Benna, 2007:260-261). He emphasized religious and moral adequacy rather than a scientific one. If only the *ummah* was filled with the spirit of *jihad*, and carnal desires could be kept under control, society would achieve success. This would come after the eradication of non-Islamic tradition throughout the whole society. Banna also draws attention to another point. The pedagogues (leaders) should remove the distance between societies, and keep them in a close interaction whilst keeping them under discipline. The way to become a role model to society would be possible only under this condition. Briefly, to Banna, “*the Society Muslim Brothers emerged to explain these facts to the people* (el-Benna, 2007:259)”.

### *The Second Phase*

In May 1938, the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna wrote an article, which was like the organization’s manifesto, for the first issue of the society’s weekly magazine, *al-Nadhir* (see, el-Benna, 2007:265-271). The article indicated the main ideology of the Brotherhood during the previous decade, and gave clues about its prospective struggle. First of all, he stated that, as before, they would continue to take “*Islam, Prophet Muhammad and Qur’an*” as the sole reference in their endeavors. Second, he mentioned the “state understanding” of the society: “*Islam is not only divine service and but also leadership; religion and also state; spirituality and also action; prayer (salaah) and also jihad; obedience and also management; manuscripts and also sword; none of them cannot be separated from the other at no time* (el-Benna, 2007:266). The main ideology of the Brotherhood, “*Islam is applicable at all times and places*”, was reflected in those words.

After this clarification, Banna outlined the transition of the method of struggle that the society would follow from now on. According to him the Brotherhood had completed their first phase unharmed. As a newborn organization, due to continuing political tension throughout the country, the Muslim Brothers did not play any part in the political and social clashes, which was necessary under those circumstances in order not to deviate from the goal (el-Benna, 2007:267). Banna added that during this period the society endeavored in other areas in which to serve society more efficiently, such as those related to the condition of developments. The Brotherhood now had over 300 branches, which invited people to 'the right path'. It was therefore time to pass to the second stage, from the general invitation to the ad hoc one. Banna gave signs of beginning a more assertive struggle against people such as the eminent and the ruling elites; not only those in active politics but also the bureaucrats and the political parties who were responsible for the management of the country. He continued that they aimed to bring about an Islamic form of management, and would thus declare war on any leaders, political parties and committees who would not help them and issue bans in order to expedite this purpose (el-Benna, 2007:268).

Banna also mentioned the political stance of the society. He said that so far they were not part of any political parties and ideologies, nor were they hostile towards them. To him, their way was the way of Allah. Their sole leader was the Prophet, and they only accepted the path of the Book of Allah (Qur'an). In this sense, if they accepted their invitation, which was the teachings of Islam, they would be in any collaboration with them; however, if they rejected, they would refuse to be in any reconciliation with them. This included the state (el-Benna, 2007:269). Banna precisely defined the shifting of their method, which was to participate in politics because politics was a part of religion since Islam covered those who govern and the governed. There was no sin therefore in participating in politics during their struggle, according to Banna (el-Benna, 2007:269). In accordance with this as noted earlier, the Brotherhood sent "the fifty requests" which called for Muslims to return and bind tightly to Islam, to the eminent people of the Muslim world (for the fifty requests see el-Benna, 2007:384-391).

As can be understood from this, the ultimate target of the Brotherhood was to found an Islamic order, which would surround entire aspects of Egyptian society. So how could this be achieved? Peacefully or through violence? Banna clearly expressed the way of their struggle in a speech, which was delivered to the students of the Cairo University (el-Benna, 2007:402). Accordingly, Banna stated that the Brotherhood recommended peace and love instead war and clashes; to explain the situation by talking gently instead of with rudeness and harshness. These are the most important features that distinguish the Brotherhood from others. “This is what Allah thought to his Messenger (el-Benna, 2007:401): And speak to him with gentle speech that perhaps he may be reminded or fear [Allah] (Qur’an, 20:44).”

In addition, in the same speech, Banna classified their invitations as active and passive. He addressed the students by saying that trying to understand Islam as it is, then to act as required. To him, when they achieved this, there was only a duty remained; the social duties which were the active side of their invitations. On the other hand, when Banna mentioned the passive side of their invitation, he was also introducing what their attitude would be after reaching their goals. In this regard Banna said to them that the passive side was the administrative duties. Yet an individual was not the suitor for the administration; he was the suitor of the desired order. He closed by saying that their final destinations would be the *masjids* and *mihirabs*<sup>49</sup> (in order to pray) when the all objectives would be accomplished (el-Benna, 2007:402): “*So when you have finished (your duties), then stand up (for worship). And to your Lord direct (your) longing* (Qur’an, 94:7-8).”

Concisely, the ideology of the Muslim Brothers was formed under massive foreign and secular influence and their destructive effects over the Egyptian society (according to the Muslim Brothers). The ultimate goal of the organization is endeavoring to install Islamic order in Egypt. Although the method of the struggle has changed, the ultimate goal of the society remains the same until now. The phrase ‘Islamic order’ (*al-nizam al-Islami*) “*was sometimes loosely used to mean a ‘Muslim*

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<sup>49</sup> *Mihrab* is a niche or chamber in a mosque designating the *qibla*, the direction of Mecca to which Muslims turn to pray.

*state'; mostly, however, it referred to set a legal (not political) principles which were regarded as fundamental to Muslim society whatever the particular form of a political order (Mitchell, 1993:235)."*

It should be noted that although Banna was fond of a peaceful struggle, due to the British existence, the society was involved in violent attacks against the British subjects in the Canal Zone. Especially, the excessive expansion of the organization in Egypt, by 1949 the society had around 2000 branches, and 500,000 members (see Figure 1), the control of the whole organization became a troubled issue, as noted earlier. The operations of the secret apparatus carried-out against Egyptian statesmen without Banna's knowledge or approval, and Banna's reactions to the incidents (assassinations) were the concrete evidence of this fact (Mitchell, 1993:68).

### ***5.3.2. The Ideology of the Muslim Brothers in the Post-Banna Era***

In this section, I discuss the post-Banna era in two periods. The first covers 1949 to 1973, the time of the second General Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi. What distinguished this period was the society's ideological dilemma between being moderate and radical when under harsh political repression. Indeed the main objective, to found an "Islamic order", remained the same; the tendencies of the movement began to differentiate. On one hand were Hudaybi and his modest policies, which refrained from any conflict with the state, and he sought a firm alteration towards the Islamic order. On the other hand, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb were taken as mainstays by more radical groups. In the second period, from 1973 to the present, the Society continued its non-violent stance in addition to emphasizing democratic values, which was a prominent change in the history of the society.

### 5.3.2.1. The 1949-1973 Period

Since being elected General Guide, al-Hudaybi had embraced non-violent policies. In his early years he was struggled to dismiss the secret apparatus in spite of intense objections that caused the destruction of the unified image of the Brotherhood (Zollner, 2009:148). Therefore, as soon as he had consolidated his position in the Society, al-Hudaybi expelled Salih al-‘Ashmawi and his colleagues due to their rejection of the dismissal of the secret apparatus. They supported the existence of the secret apparatus because they deemed its existence crucial due to Nasser’s destructive policies against the Society.

In the aftermath of another government repression, which resulted in the hanging of some members of the Brotherhood including Qutb, the Radical wing began to focus on Qutb’s ideas, the concept of *jahiliyya* and *jihad*. According to this, the radical groups addressed “*a clear distinction between believers and unbelievers (kafir; pl. kuffar)*” which triggered a direct condemnation from the radicals of other religious groups including the Brotherhood (Zollner, 2009:149). Thus, the separation between the core cadre of the society and those who tended towards radical ideas became tangible.

Hereupon, al-Hudaybi delivered his book, *Du’at la Qudat* (Preachers not Judges) to refute this radical understanding. As Zollner noted, “*It was a joint project, composed by a circle of Brothers close to al-Hudaybi who was worked on the text in conjunction with scholars of al-Azhar. Among those participating in the writing process was Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, but most likely also Umar al-Tilmisani and Mustafa Mashhur*”, three prospective General Guides of the Muslim Brothers (Zollner, 2009:149). Hence, the Brotherhood’s modest approach continued after Hasan al-Hudaybi.

According to Zollner (2009:149):

*“It has been variously argued that al-Hudaybi’s writing Du’at la Qudat responds to concepts put forward by Sayyid Qutb in his final stage of ideological development. Yet the analysis shows that the book does not immediately target Sayyid Qutb. For one, Qutb is not once mentioned in the text. It could be argued that it was a tactical move to deliberately avoid naming him, since he was considered a martyr for the cause of the Brotherhood. But, as the historical context of composition evidences, it is most likely that al-Hudaybi saw it necessary to head a board of editors which wrote Du’at la Qudat as a reply to a radical conceptual construct which was developed by a marginal group within the Brotherhood in consequence of a second wave of mass arrests after 1965. It was in this situation that proponents of zealous activism raised their voices against the continuous state persecution. It was also in the environment of discourse among those imprisoned that al-Hudaybi saw it as necessary to provide guidelines which called for political moderation”.*

#### **5.3.2.2. The Post-1973 Period**

During this new period the Brotherhood shifted its political activity axis from passive to active. The General Guide Tilmisani’s understanding had a role in this transition. However the society’s old guard adhered to Banna’s ideas about active politics, and demanded that it keep a distance from party politics *“to prevent it from falling into the vicious trap of corruption, conflict and rivalry* (Zahid, 2010:91).” The old guard aimed to keep the Society away from the negative effects of political rivalry. Even when the Muslim Brotherhood was at the peak of its political activities in the 1940s it did not form a political party.

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Arab Socialist Union in 1976, although other political parties were allowed to participate in parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood could not get Sadat’s permission to do so. Instead Sadat offered the Brotherhood an opportunity to build a coalition with the other political parties, which was refused by Tilmisani (Zahid, 2010:92). The rising Islamist perception due to Sadat’s open-door policy and the peace initiative with Israel ruled out any coalition with secular groups on the grounds of securing the Brotherhood’s image.



Contrary to the uneasiness of the Sadat era, as noted earlier, the Brotherhood entered into coalition with the secular Wafd Party for the 1984 parliamentary elections. The society continued to use this method of flouting the political ban for the following elections as well. The rising Islamic radical groups and domestic violence caused unfavorable political developments for the Brotherhood. The government response to the violent groups resulted in a tumultuous political environment in Egypt. Despite its clear stance against the radical Islamists, the government considered the Brotherhood to be the same as those groups. This triggered another wave of political repression against the Society right after the expansion of the state's Emergency Law. From this point forward, the Brotherhood clearly articulated its global democracy and human rights demands.

#### *The Muslim Brothers and Democratic Ideology*

The terms democracy and democratic ideology were not placed in the Muslim Brothers' agenda – at least in practice - until the 1980s. The organization focused on achieving the goals of the organization that Banna declared (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:62): “(1) *Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor will deny.* (2) *The establishment of an Islamic state within this home- land, which acts according to the precepts of Islam, applies its social regulations, and advocates its sound principles.*” Banna's ideas included many democratic themes such as constitution, parliamentary system and the president (head of the state) in the modern sense, aside from its religious themes. Thus, before mentioning the emergence of the democratic ideology in the Brothers sphere, I will touch upon the state understanding of Banna, and the policies that he proposed.

Nonetheless Banna did not mention democracy as a word or a system. Instead he pointed out an Islamic state of government. He asserted that “*government is a bond of the bonds of Islam; it is one of the creeds and fundamentals, not the*

*branches. Islam is a government and enforcement; legislative and educative; law and judgment* (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:63).” In this system, the head of the (Islamic) state, the president, should be elected from amongst the Muslim community. He stated that responsibility for society and its management are down to the president in the Islamic system of government. Moreover, he proposed two forms of governmental system, such as those in Great Britain and the United States (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:64).

The constitution had a prominent place in the system of Banna’s Islamic state. To him, the constitution draws the outlines of the ruling structure of the country. It sets up the state institutions, their functions and purposes; explains their authorities and power limits; defines the rulers and their duties and responsibilities toward their citizens (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:65). Moreover, according to Banna:

*“The principles of Constitutional Rule could be concluded in the (1) protection of personal freedom of all types; (2) consultation; (3) obtaining the authority from the people; (4) the rulers be responsible before the people; (5) the rulers be judged on the basis of their actions; (6) the limits of each and every authority be clearly defined. All these principles, for any researcher, are completely conforming to the teachings of Islam, and its systems, and its foundations of government. Therefore, the Muslim Brethren believe that the system of Constitutional Rule is the nearest of all present ruling systems to Islam (cited in Khatab and Bouma, 2007:65)”.*

As seen in the proposal above, Banna introduced a constitutional state structure, which guarantees the “protection of personal freedoms” of the citizens, and is based upon the sovereignty of its people in the modern sense. It is clear that the projection he drew during the constitutional monarchy could only be understood in the 1980s. This might be explained by the fact that since Banna’s death, the organization has found itself in a difficult process involving the fight for survival. The continuation of society became the prior issue rather than digesting the teachings of Banna.

Additionally, Banna continued to define the Islamic system that he desired in line with the parliamentary system. While he was defending the parliamentary system he obviously aimed to depict the fact that Islam is not against a constitutional parliamentary system. Moreover, Banna's understanding of the constitutional government did not reject pluralism, according to Khatab and Bouma (2007:65). While he was proposing some forms of government, he never imposed a specific one. He was always asserting rational models, which did not oppose Islam. He supported his ideas with the *tawhid* belief, Allah's uniqueness. In respect of that, pluralism is not prohibited. Furthermore, he explained this fact one of the many quotations from the Qur'an: "*If God had so willed, He would have made you a single People*' (5:48)."

However, regarding the parliamentary system Banna pointed out an important matter: partisanship. Banna wrote:

*"...even if some say Partisanship is one of the pillars of the parliamentary representational system. But, in establishing this system [parliamentary representation], partisan- ship is tradition, not origin. Therefore, establishing this system without partisanship will not violate the fundamental origins of this system. On this basis, the foundations of the parliamentary system have nothing to conflict with the foundations of government laid down by Islam. In this view, this [parliamentary system] is not far from the system of Islam and not strange to it. On this basis, we also would say, with confidence, that the fundamental principles upon which the Egyptian constitution was established are not in conflict with the foundations of Islam; and not far from the Islamic system; and not strange to it (cited in Khatab and Bouma, 2007:66)."*

Khatab and Bouma, in line with Banna's views, pointed out that Banna left no place for radicals, emphasizing "*the essence of Islam's flexibility and compatibility with democracy* (2007,66)." In addition, they assert (2007,67): "(1) He also further assured his readers that the foundations of the Western parliamentary system were '*not far from the Islamic system or strange to it*'; and (2) He pointed out that the

*compatibility of Islam with modern secular democracy stems from the tolerance of the religion and its essence.*” Therefore, to Banna, the radicals had no option to accept the “*the compatibility of Islam with democracy*” (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:66).

Yet the emergence of democratic ideas amongst the Brotherhood took shape in the late 1980s. However, the Brotherhood’s democracy demand raises some questions about whether and how they integrate democracy and the Islamic rule (Wickham, 2011:205). Since in the recent past they had undertaken ceaseless attempts to realize their Islamic agenda. For instance, Moheb Zaki, a senior advisor at the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, accused of the democratic transition of the Muslim Brotherhood as being an act of *taqiyya* (an Islamic concept means dissimulation) (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:196). Zaki had doubts, saying that the Muslim Brothers support for democracy was merely “to gain popular legitimacy”.

I assume that this transition stemmed from Egypt’s political situation at the time. Not only the effects of the rising radical groups and the government repression, but also the Brotherhood’s intention to increase the radius of its actions. Similarly, despite all the skeptical questions regarding the Brotherhood’s ideological shifts, Wickham asserts that there is much convincing evidence that its democracy demand was not a “*massive, deliberate and orchestrated lie*” (2011:207). To Wickham, the society supported democratic values because they figured out that these values also serve their own interests (2011:207). Supporting democracy at that time enhanced their position both in domestic and international environments at the existence of radical Islamist groups conducting violence attacks against the government. Moreover, their strategic stance in supporting democracy provided them with a conclusive position in Egyptian politics in the presence of secular parties. Furthermore, to Wickham, Egyptian public opinion was the same on this issue, which made the Brotherhood accept the core values “*such as the principle of gender equality and endorsement of the full range of individual liberties guaranteed to*

*citizens in democratic systems in the west*” without internalizing them (2011:207).

Although I partly agree with Wickham’s ideas here, the democratic demands of the Brotherhood (which I will mention below) justified Wickham’s assertion. Thus the Brotherhood’s proposals are relatively more political.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s declarations about democracy began to be publicly revealed in early 1989. Its spokesman, Muhammad Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, wrote in *Liwa’ al-Islam*, a Society publication: “*(In Egypt) there is a certain degree of democracy; we (i.e. the Brotherhood) guard and hold on to it. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are complete. It is important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice* (cited in Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191).” One of the other prominent figures of the Brotherhood, Dr. Essam al-Erian, the Vice President of the Doctor’s Syndicate, made an assertive declaration about democracy: “*The Brothers consider constitutional rule to be the closest to Islamic rule... We are the first (in Egypt) to call for and apply democracy, and we are devoted to it until death* (cited in Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191).” When the Muslim Brothers most recent election campaign, the 1987 parliamentary election, was compared with this statement, the rapid ideological transition of the society raised doubts in Egyptian society. The aforementioned “*Islam is the Solution*” slogan was used during the election campaign. They also promised a “platform of implementing Islamic law if elected” (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191).

In 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood and nine opposition parties declared a 10-point statement listing their democratic demands. Accordingly (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:192):

*“(1) Commitment to the human rights and public liberties mentioned in shari’a and international law; (2) An end to the state of emergency and martial law; (3) A lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties; (4) The independent supervision of elections by the judiciary; (5) The adoption of the parliamentary system in which the executive power will be vested in the cabinet, which is selected from the party with the majority; (6)*

*Guarantee of the right of the People's Assembly to amend the budget; granting the Shura Council [i.e. the Upper House] powers of oversight and legislation; (7) Choice of the president through direct election from a list of several candidates, with a limit of two terms; (8) The compatibility of all legislation passed with shari'a, with emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own religious law in case of contradiction; (9) The independence of the judiciary; (10) Freedom of the press and media from government control and equal opportunities for all political parties in the official media."*

The 10-point list predominantly took place within the framework of political reform demands. The Brotherhood, as time progressed, justified this ideological transition with Banna's concept, *"the compatibility of Islam with democracy"*, and the views about the constitutional parliamentary system mentioned earlier. In this regard, Muhammad Abdel Kodos, the head of the Brotherhood's 'Prisoners of Opinion' and the Journalist Syndicate, revealed the Society's purpose in one of his statements. According to this the Muslim Brothers *"want to apply shari'a within the western democratic model, using an elected parliament to form legislation* (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:194)."

Despite the fact that the Brotherhood tried to legitimize its ideological transition, Egyptian society posed criticisms regarding this sudden transformation. Thus Mehdi Akef, the General Guide of the Muslim Brothers, defended the Society with the following words: *"This is questioning people's intentions. I do not accept doubts of our intentions from anyone. Our intentions are known and open. We demand full democracy and peaceful transition of power. We do not pay any attention to any person whosoever doubts this* (cited in Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:194)."

The critics pushed the Brotherhood to propose more conceptual approaches. In this sense, Abdel Kodos described the vision of the Brothers as a concept, "an Islamic civil state based within a western democratic system", which consisted of three elements: *"(1) the Islamic foundation (i.e. basing the state's structure on Islamic principles and the implementation of shari'a); (2) the civil state and its associated*

*political liberties; and (3) what some Brotherhood leaders refer to as 'western democracy' (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:197).*

Moreover, the Brotherhood drafted a political program around its Islamic state vision, which took shape with the sovereignty of God. The draft of the political program publicized various intellectual reviews and comments, and complied with the ideas of Banna, Qutb and Mawdudi (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:197). These ideas, of course, related to the implementation of sharia and the sovereignty of God. The program gave the answers to various questions about how the Brotherhood would realize its new political ideology. In this regard, the Brotherhood pointed out how the relations between its democratic concept and sharia would be. The mainstay of these explanations were based on Banna's views. Therefore I refer to the answers at the beginning of this section so as not to fall into repetition.

The draft program proposed an overall view on the social, economical, and cultural issues, aside from their political vision. Despite the fact that the program introduced solutions within the framework of democratic values, it still included a non-democratic vision about some issues such as the definition of the president (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:197). Due to its Islamic notion, the proposal precisely prohibited non-Islamic political figures – such as Christians - from being president. The prohibition not only limited religion, but gender. One of the program drafters, Muhammad Morsi, clarified “*that in Islam the president has some responsibility towards religion that requires he protect Islam and Islamic law – injunctions that require a Muslim male president* (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:199).”

#### **5.4. Political Behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood**

The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood was based on the Islamic revival among the Egyptian society. Despite the fact that the early messages of the Society included non-political notions, its main purpose: “*the establishment of an Islamic state within this home-land, which acts according to the precepts of Islam, applies its social*

*regulations, and advocates its sound principles...* (Khatab and Bouma, 2007:62)” led the society to become involved in politics right after its first decade. The society’s involvement in politics did not appear within the framework of any stable methods during its history due to different ideological aspects and long-standing government repression that has continued into the present. In this sense, I will discuss the political participation of the Brotherhood in particular times: (1) during the Banna era (1928-1949), and (2) the Mubarak era (1981-2010).

#### **5.4.1. The Banna Era (1928-1949)**

Including the Palestine issue, the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in politics was limited. The Society tended to be in contact with political figures to deliver its message or create awareness on some specific issues, such as the Christian missionaries and the Palestine cases. However, in 1939, in the Society’s new weekly magazine, al-Nadhir, Banna gave an indication of a more active political involvement in the near future in his speech at the fifth congress. He defined the Brotherhood as an ‘*inter alia*’ political organization (Mitchell, 1993:16; Zahid, 2010:74). On the grounds of purpose, the Brotherhood tended to shy away from any collaboration or conflict with any political parties. Banna expressed this fact with these words (cited in Mitchell, 1993:30):

*“My Brothers: you are not benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the heart of this notion to give it life by means of the Qur’an; you are a new light which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God; and you are the strong voice which rises to recall the message of the Prophet... If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say ‘We are voices of right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice.’ ... If they insist on*



*pursuing their oppression, say them, 'Peace be upon you, we will ignore the ignorant.'*"

The Muslim Brotherhood became actively involved in the Palestine issue both socially and politically. In this sense, the Society attempted to support the people of Palestine with various methods such as propaganda, talks, published materials, and the collection of financial aid. Additionally, the Society headquarters established an aid committee to manage support for the Palestine issue (el-Benna, 2007:367). According to the committee's decisions, its foundation would be announced to create awareness amongst Egyptians and the Muslim world. Moreover, the Brotherhood sent letters to the Egyptian Prime Minister and the Cairo Ambassador for the United Kingdom to share their concerns about the Palestine issue (el-Benna 2007:391-394). Consequently, after the Brotherhood's initiatives regarding the Palestine issue the Egyptian government decided to financially support Palestinian families (el-Benna, 2007:460).

The Brotherhood's heavy involvement in politics took place in the aftermath of the declaration of Hasan al-Banna, the Fifty-point manifesto of the Muslim Brotherhood, written for the tenth anniversary of the organization and published in one of its official publications, the *Majallat al-Nadhir*. As noted earlier, the Fifty-point manifesto, which introduced multidimensional solutions for the political, judicial, social, educational and economic issues of all Muslim societies was delivered to the eminent people and the leaders of the Muslim world (el-Benna, 2007: 384-391; Wendell, 1978:126-130). After this manifestation, as Banna states, the second phase of the Brotherhood's struggle, which included political involvements, began (see the previous section).

After the Second World War, the Muslim Brothers emerged as a prominent political figure in Egypt. In the sixth general congress of the Society, in January 1941, it decided to run for election "*at the proper time*" The dissolution of Parliament and call for a new election, in February 1942, coincided with the Society's

decision. Egyptian internal politics were in turbulence due to the effects of the Second World War. It was decided that seventeen members of the Brotherhood would be candidates for the upcoming elections, including Banna as a candidate for Ismailiyya district (Wickham, 2013:25; Mitchell, 1993:26). Banna withdrew his candidacy at the request of the Wafd Party government, and in return, demanded “(1) *freedom for the movement to resume full-scale operations; and (2) a promise of government action against the sale of alcoholic drink and against prostitution* (Mitchell, 1993:27).”

In October 1944, the Sa’dist minority government began its rule, which lasted until the January 1950 elections. The government was formed by the Sa’dist Party leader Ahmad Mahir Pasha, who started the preparations for the new election immediately. Banna based the Brotherhood’s campaign on their Islamic program (Mitchell, 1993:33). He chose to run in Ismailiyya, and his five colleagues opted for other areas. The election was held in January 1945, and none of the Brotherhood’s candidates were elected, which was surprising as they were expecting a clear victory. Consequently, the tension between the Brotherhood and the government began to increase.

After Ahmad Maher’s assassination, the Nuqrashi government - which was accepted as the beginning of *the great mihna* by the Brotherhood - brought them a three-year-long period, which was the strongest of their history (Mitchell, 1993:34). In this post-war period, Banna introduced the *Qanun al-nizam al-asasi li-hay’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin al’Amma*, the Society’s constitution, in the light of *The Fifty-point Manifesto of the Muslim Brothers* in 1945. According to Mitchell, the Brotherhood embodied “Ahmad Maher’s pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, at the same time pursuing nationalist reaction against the British presence in the country” (Mitchell, 1993:39).

The Society’s relations with the government continued at an inexplicable level of depth during this period. The relations were friendly during the Isma’il Sidqi Pasha government. Thus in 1947 Banna was invited to a royal banquet for the first time.

According to scholars, although it was hard to determine the close relations between the society and the government in 1946 and 1947, the Sidqi government benefited from the Brotherhood as an instrument against the Wafd Party and the communists (Mitchell, 1993:42). Conflict arose between the sides around the issue of controlling student groups in universities.

In the afterward of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, the Palestine issue became a critical problem in which the Muslim Brothers were involved. The Society had been eagerly supporting the Palestine issue since 1935. Aside from its financial and social support, the Brotherhood provided military assistance with its volunteer units. When the war broke out on 25 April 1948, these volunteer units participated alongside the Egyptian army. In October 1947, Banna called for *jihad*, and commanded the Brotherhood's branches to make preparations for the war against Israel. The well-trained secret apparatus, the first battalion, organized itself within a short time period, and participated in the war on 20 October. The number of its volunteer units of and their activities was unknown (Mitchell, 1993:57).

The Brotherhood's memorable achievement in the war was to assist the Egyptians that were surrounded by the Israeli forces in the place known as 'Faluja Pocket'; right after the second cease-fire was brokered in October 1948 (Mitchell, 1993:58). While the Brotherhood resided in the battlefield and helped to run supplies for the surrounded Egyptians, the Brotherhood members in Cairo pressured the government to increase the number of the volunteers to help the Egyptians in the field. The Nuqrashi government rejected the demand; yet the situation ended after the truce that followed (Mitchell, 1993:58).

1948 was an important year for the Brotherhood, not only in domestic politics but also in its foreign relations. Before starting to mention the internal politics, I would like to focus upon external developments; Yemen for instance. The Society's involvement in Yemen took part after Banna's demand to the crown prince "*to raise the Yemeni social level*" in February 1947 (Mitchell, 1993:61). The connection with

the Brotherhood and the “Free Yemeni Movement” was a well-known fact before the coup d’état made by Free Yemenis in February 1948. Moreover, in the aftermath of the military intervention, Banna urged Sayf al-Islam Ahmad, ‘the victorious Imam’, to solve the ongoing crisis under the arbitration of the Arab League (Mitchell, 1993:61).

Although the Society was at the peak of its power, it was not in full control. It was involved in violence in domestic politics, which was contrary to its philosophy aside from the attacks against the British subjects on the grounds of liberating Egypt. As noted earlier, the autonomous operations of the secret apparatus, which occurred without the knowledge of the Society’s leadership, including General Guide Banna, put the Brotherhood in a hard situation. The assassination of the respectable judge, Ahmad al-Khazinder, on 22 March 1947 by members of the Brotherhood’s secret apparatus, and the assassinations attempt against Nahhas Pasha in the following months, caused the government to turn against it (Mitchell, 1993:62-63). Hence, the government declared Martial Law two days before the military landing in Palestine. While the Brotherhood was helping the Egyptian forces in ‘Faluja Pocket’, the Nuqrashi government banned it in Egypt due to rising internal conflicts.

#### ***5.4.2. Post – Banna Era (1949-1981)***

The rising tension between the society and the government resulted in the assassinations of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi and Banna, who were assassinated on 28 December 1948 and on February 12 1949 respectively. The Brotherhood entered a period of constant decline. Although everything seemed back to normal at the time of the 1952 military coup as a supporter of the intervention, Nasser regime was much harder than the previous era. The Society received its worst hits during the Nasser presidency. Moreover, the Brotherhood experienced an ideological dilemma regarding radicalization as a defense mechanism to the government’s repressive measures, under the influence of Qutb’s teachings. Despite the easy political

conditions relative to the previous term, the Muslim Brothers did not find any environment in which to become involved in politics during the Sadat era. The struggles of the Society remained limited to the student unions and professional associations.

In short, the Brotherhood's political journey began as a local social organization. The current political and social circumstances of Egypt had shaped its political behavior until the Egyptian revolution. The Brotherhood's political stance developed against the secular Wafd Party's policies, British citizens, and their political and social interactions. Especially during Banna era, the Muslim Brothers refrained from any political interaction with the Wafd Party due to their secular outlook. Furthermore, in order not to abandon their stance towards non-participation in politics via a political party, the Brotherhood positioned themselves as being 'above -party'. However, the Brotherhood became involved in daily politics anyway due to their organizational purpose of establishing an Islamic order. Moreover, as noted earlier, despite the disagreement on the level of their support, the Society demonstrated a positive political stance in favor of the Free Officers during the independence movement.

#### ***5.4.3. The Mubarak Era (1981-2010)***

The political ban upon the Brotherhood continued during the Mubarak Era. The early years of Hosni Mubarak's presidency were a relative relief in comparison with the late years of Sadat. Despite their political ban, the Brotherhood became involved in politics during this period in two different ways. Firstly, the Society paid special attentions to professional unions such as Lawyers, Doctors, Journalists and Engineers Syndicates. Secondly and most importantly, they participated in parliamentary elections, forming alliances with existing political parties. Aside from this indirect

way of doing politics, by the second method, the Brotherhood had an opportunity to become involved in politics directly.

The Brotherhood's quest to participate in active politics gave its fruits concurrently both in the 1984 parliamentary elections and trade union syndicates. First of all, the Brotherhood won its first places in the Doctors Syndicate. After the 1984 elections, the Society secured seven out of 25 seats. In other respects, the Brotherhood managed to secure some seats in the 1984 parliamentary elections. The newly-changed election brought a 'party-list system' instead of an independent candidate system with an eight-percent threshold (Wickham, 2013:47). Upon the prohibition of the independent candidates, the Brotherhood overcame the new regulation, and also its political ban by forming coalitions with current political parties. In this regard the Brotherhood established an alliance with its long-time rival, the secular Wafd Party, for the 1984 parliamentary elections. As a result of this collaboration, the Brotherhood won eight seats, and returned to active politics after three decades.

The leaders of the Brotherhood stressed their strategy changes in various speeches. According to the General Guide Tilmisani, they (i.e. the Brothers) "*...set to looking for a lawful means to carry out activities without troubling security and challenging the laws* (cited in Wickham, 2013:47-48)". He also explained why the Brotherhood made an alliance with the Wafd Party in an interview made on November 7, 1983 (cited in Wickham, 2013:48):

*"When the Brotherhood talks of politics, they don't speak as political men but as Islamic du'ah (messengers of the da'wa, or call to God).... Some think that when we speak on political matters that this has nothing to do with religion and that this is the talk of parties, but this is not true, because the parties seek to achieve power and that is not our approach... We don't work for ourselves, we work for God."*

Likewise in another interview in the following year, Tilmisani pointed out *“the only thing the Brotherhood cares about is the spread of its ideas.”*, thus parliament was the only proper place to fulfill their purpose in an efficient way (Wickham, 2013:49).

Similarly, the Brotherhood increased its influence in the Doctors Syndicate. They secured seven out of 25 seats in the 1984 union election. In the following year, it was able to place its first member, Muhammad Abd al-Quddus, as a permanent member in the Journalist Syndicate. It established its domination of the Engineers Union in the aftermath of the 1987 election. The Society secured 54 of 61 seats in this election. Moreover, it captured the all of the Union’s seats in the following elections (Fahmy, 1998:552).

In the 1987 elections, the Brotherhood established an alliance with the socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party. Despite the diverse ideological origins of the triple alliance, the campaign slogan was decided as *“Islam is the Solution”* (al-Islam huwa al-Hall) - the Society’s historic notion - by the associates (Harnisch and Mecham, 2009:191). To give votes to Brotherhood was described by the Brothers as giving votes to *Allah* (Wickham, 2013:47). The alliance also decided to form a Sharia application platform as a campaign pledge. Due to the Islamic discourse and the pledges, it was called the Islamic Alliance. The pro-Islamist alliance secured fifty-six seats in the 1987 election, and the Brotherhood received thirty-six of the seats. Consequently, it became the strongest opposition group, one seat ahead of the Wafd Party in parliament (Wickham, 2013:47).

To make different alliances with different political parties revealed the Brotherhood’s pragmatist strategy. The changes raised questions as to whether the Muslim Brothers had gone off course. The eminent leaders of the Society asserted that to participate in politics did not mean change in direction. In this regard, Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, the General Guide, stated at *Li’wa’ al-Islam* in 1989 that *“I’ve said many times, we entered elections under the slogan ‘Islam is the Solution’”. How can it be said that we participate in the existing system when we are trying to change it in the*

*preferred manner –by changing institutions with institutions?” (cited in Wickham, 2013:48). In this context, Wickham states that the “...Brotherhood’s new strategy emphasized, electoral participation was not a substitute for the group’s da’wa mission, but a means to extend it into new domain (2013:48)”.*

The Brotherhood’s strong presence in the professional unions as well as its success in the parliamentary elections provided the Brotherhood with a significant political stance in the early 1990s. It continued its struggle without confronting state authority, and by improving its methods –including its political discourse - within the framework of requirements of the current political system. As I noted under the Brotherhood’s ideology of, it adopted a democratic ideology whilst challenging state repression and the negative effects of the radical Islamist groups. When its democratic demands came out, its members gradually increased their domain in the professional unions. In the Lawyers Syndicate it had managed to gain control of the majority of the seats by 1992. By the 1995, the number of members in the Journalist Syndicate increased to two out of every twelve (Fahmy, 1998:552).

The government’s response to the rising political effect of the Muslim Brothers was not delayed. First, prior to the 1990 elections, the regime made its first move and adopted a new election law. The law prohibited any candidates except political parties running for the parliamentary elections (Harnisch and Meham, 2009:192). The Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the parliamentary election with the support of various political parties as a reaction to the Mubarak regime’s new regulation. Secondly, in 1993 the Mubarak regime implemented another law to diminish the Brotherhood’s power in the professional unions. According to the new law, for a valid election the voter turnout must be a minimum of 50 percent. If the turnout did not exceed the threshold, the election would be held for a second time with a 33-percent turnout threshold. If the turnout did not exceed this, the government would appoint the administration of the related syndicate until the new elections were held (Zahid, 2010:121).



The government's repression of the opposition groups, particularly the Brotherhood peaked right before the 1995 parliamentary elections. The year 1995, which can be considered as the midpoint of the Mubarak regime, also separates the political behavior of the Brotherhood into two terms. In the first term, it patched democratic ideology into its existing ideology. As noted earlier, the eminent leaders of the Society asserted that there was no deviation from their main purpose, which was to establish an Islamic order. Aside from the ideological transition, the methods that the Brotherhood used to become involved in politics differed in a significant way from the second phase. As Wickham argued, the opposition groups, including the Brotherhood played a 'dual game' against the authoritarian regime (2013:57). First, the opposition groups played the 'electoral game' that aimed to increase their votes and secure seats in parliament. Second, in doing so, the opposition groups performed another game called 'regime game' which aimed to undermine the current regime by demanding and supporting a democratic transition. In this sense, it can be said that the Brotherhood participated in political life with the 'electoral game', and in the 1990s continued its struggle with the 'regime game' (Wickham, 2013:57). They began to play this game with their decision to boycott the 1990 elections.

It should be noted that the strategy that the Brotherhood pursued for the elections of the professional unions was also remarkable political behavior. Due to the government restrictions, it decided to challenge the regime in every area within the legal framework (Fahmy, 1998:554). In doing so it followed a cautious strategy in the professional unions. Although they ran in union elections to increase their numerical superiority, the Brothers many times leave the management someone who would not cause them any trouble in order not to frighten the state (Zahid, 2010). This strategy also can be thought of as the 'electoral game'.

In the last decade of the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood gradually strengthened its democratic discourse and demands against the state. The more it increased its political participation and democratic demands, the more it was subjected to government repression. Under these disadvantageous circumstances the

Brotherhood began to follow a new strategy in the 2000s, which consisted of three different paths (Wickham, 2013:96-119). First, it pursued a '*self-limiting*' method in the first three years of the new millennium. Due to the massive government repression which began in the second half of the 1990s and resulted in hundreds of arrests - including one of the Society's prominent figures, Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futouh - the Brotherhood refrained from any certain confrontation with the state. Therefore they selected their candidates from amongst people who were not well known outside of the related districts. In this way, the Brotherhood aimed to stay below "*the radar of the state security*" (Wickham, 2013:97). Moreover, the Society was also acting carefully about its campaign slogan during this period. Instead of using their well-known slogan, 'Islam Is the Solution', the Brothers preferred to continue with '*The Constitution Is the Solution*' (*Al-Dustour Huwa al-Hal*) as the new motto to demonstrate their engagement with the rule of law. To them, it did not constitute any problem unless Article 2, "*defined the principles of the Shari'a as the country's primary source of legislation*", remained in the constitution (Wickham, 2013:97).

Yet, the Brotherhood's leaders were not pushing the idea of forming a political party in spite of having strong support from within Egyptian society. In this sense, Abu al-Futouh reflected how cautious the Brotherhood was, and stated that they were not certain about whether to submit an application to the government to form a political party (Wickham, 2013:98). Moreover, Abu al-Futouh emphasized the 'self limiting' strategy of the Brothers with these words:

*"What the Muslim Brotherhood suffered in the past years and our stand in the recent elections provide a clear evidence that we prefer the public interest to self-interest. As much as we are interested in participating in political action, we care for the country's security and peace"* (Wickham, 2013:97-98).

The Brotherhood stated that its main purpose in politics was “*to participate in the system, not to overthrow it*” (Wickham, 2013:98). They continued to declare that they had no intention of changing the current constitution. Yet despite their controlled participation in politics, in the aftermath of the 2000 parliamentary elections the Society became the strongest single opposition group in parliament with 17 seats.

The Brotherhood pursued the same strategy in the professional unions’ elections and their boards. As noted earlier, the Brotherhood performed another ‘*self-restraint*’ strategy in the Lawyer’s Syndicate elections in 2001. The Brotherhood and the other parties agreed to form a ‘national slate’ for the upcoming elections. Accordingly, it decided to run for eight of the twenty-four seats. It should be noted that the Brotherhood had already dominated the syndicate for more than a decade (for more information see, Zahid, 2010, and Fahmy, 1998). In relation to this Abu al-Fotouh told a reporter (cited in Wickham, 2013:99):

*“We changed from wanting to dominate the syndicates to allowing more plural boards because even though we know we could win control easily with total Brotherhood slates we’d be excluding a lot of people. What we want out of our involvement in the syndicates is to give an Islamic democratic model, to show that it works in practice.”*

Second, in 2004-2005, the Muslim Brothers followed a more interventionist politics with a political opening, their new reform initiative. This coincided with the US President George W. Bush’s doctrine of “*exporting democracy*” (For more detail see, Schraeder, 2002). Wickham asserted that “*the text of the initiative was identical to the campaign platform of Mamoun Hudeibi, the former Supreme Guide, in the 2000 parliamentary elections* (2013:105)”. Whilst condemning the US invasion of Iraq, the proposal was framed in the context of “*a national Egyptian, Arab and Islamic demand*”. Once again the Brotherhood brought democratic demands into the forefront with the understanding that “*the people are the source of all authority*”. In

short, the demands were based upon 'the Construction of the Egyptian Person' by granting democratic and social freedoms (Wickham, 2013:105).

Finally, the third period began with a democracy protest, which was held in 2005 at the call of Kefaya and the three Egyptian secular opposition parties with the immediate participation of the Muslim Brotherhood. What makes this year important was that Mubarak had a rival for the presidential elections, Ayman Nour. It was the first time this had happened in Egypt since the Free Officer Revolution of 1952. As noted earlier, even though Nour was arrested right before the presidential elections, the opposition's demands for democracy reached their peak in 2005. In the same year, Egypt also witnessed the parliamentary elections. Wickham asserted that the Brotherhood's political behavior was between 'self-assertion' and 'self-restraint' during this period (Wickham, 2013:117):

*"The Brotherhood's campaign in the parliamentary elections of 2005 demonstrated the tension between its impulse toward self-assertion and its ingrained habits of self-restraint. Seeking to capitalize on the political opening created by external pressure, the Brotherhood ran 161 candidates, more than double the number it had run in 2000. Yet the Brotherhood also announced that it would not contest seats in districts where senior government candidates were running and, most important, would not contest more than one-third of the seats so as not challenging the NDP's two-third majority. That this restraint was a strategic choice is suggested by a Brotherhood study conducted at the time that showed the group could have run as many as 250 successful candidates. With input from the group's Central Elections Commissions, which oversaw the nomination of the candidates through the Brotherhood's regional administrative offices, the Guidance Bureau selected 161 candidates, with a list of alternates including members on the security establishment's 'black list'."*

As we can see from the details presented above, the political behavior of the Brotherhood has varied during the last three decades. Its political journey started when they decided to challenge every level of the regime by staying within the legal

framework. By the end of the first decade (1980s), the Society had adhered to the democratic demands and pluralist ideas, which became its dominant ideology. In the last decade, the Brotherhood has tended to be more cautious and pursued policies, which restrained their own power. In the second half of the last decade, as Wickham stated above, the participation of the other groups - most importantly secular ones - encouraged the Brotherhood to attempt democratic and political broadening without releasing the reins fully. The West's "*exporting democracy*" discourse also gave the Brotherhood courage to make democratic and political openings in Egyptian politics.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have discussed the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its sociological – structural, ideological and political behavioral analyses throughout its tumultuous history. The MB faced rapid decline in the aftermath of the Banna era due to the government repression, particularly during the republican era. In addition to its problematic relations with the state, the MB experienced ideological conflict in parallel with the rising state repression during the mid-1960s. Qutb's ideas, which influenced the Islamic radicalism in the country, triggered the ideological separation within the movement. The MB, which had already struggled to fix its negative image due to the irresponsible acts of its "secret apparatus" during its early period, also had to challenge the rise of Islamic radicalism in Egypt.

The new emerged radical ideas caused the dissolution in the Brotherhood. However, its changing pro-democracy ideas and proposals did not prevent the accusations that were addressed to it by the government due to the rise of radical Islamist groups in the post-1980 era. Despite this, the Brotherhood remained within the legal limits whilst conducting its political activities through making alliances and nominating independent candidates in the parliamentary elections. In order to refrain from the state aggression, the Brotherhood intended to limit its power in politics. Nevertheless, it did not mean to reduce the intensity of its political activism.

Even though the MB adopted a more democratic than political Islamist discourse, their main purpose “to establish an Islamic State” came to the forefront and caused accusations originating from the state. Furthermore, the newly-adopted “democratic” political discourse did not create repercussions amongst society, and the MB was faced with a sincerity issue. Eventually, the MB-affiliated FJP government lost a significant popular support on the eve of the military intervention due to its political Islamist discourse and actions.



## **Chapter 6: Two Paths of Modernization**

In this chapter, I compare the modernization processes of Turkey and Egypt in accordance with democratization in the cases of the Gülen Movement, the *Milli Görüş* Movement – the AK Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In doing so, I make the comparison to two extents: a broader comparison at the country level, and a comprehensive comparison within the framework of the cases. First, I focus on comparing political and socio-economic developments in the related countries at country level. Then I comparatively examine the case studies in reference to sociological and structural analysis, ideology and political behavior.

### **6.1. Country Comparisons: Turkey and Egypt**

Having been established after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and Egypt share a common historical background. The Republic of Turkey was formed as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire by undertaking all the economic and political burdens of the Empire in the aftermath of the independence war. Yet, the new regime rejected the political and social heritage of the Empire excluding the modernization – or the other word westernization – process. The new republic put western-style modernization in the center of the new state ideology with secularism. Egypt gained its independence from the British mandate in 1922, yet the new established Egyptian Sultanate remained under British influence. During this period, the Egyptian rulers continued the secular modernization and westernization process that stemmed from the early years of Muhammad Ali, who is considered as to be “the founder of Modern Egypt” (Dodwell, 2011; and Goldschmidt, 2008).



### 6.1.1. Socio-economic Developments

The changes in socio-economic situation give us important details of the modernization process of a country. Some scholars make a correlation between democratization and socio-economic developments as requisites of the modernization and democracy level of the countries. Seymour Martin Lipset, a respectable political sociologist, for instance asserts that “economic development” is one of the social requisites of democracy in his article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” (see Lipset, 1959). Lipset gives some financial values to point out the economic conditions of democracy. Despite the fact that I refer to modernization here, democracy is frequently mentioned with modernization and westernization in developing countries such as Turkey and Egypt.

**Table 5.** Socio-economic changes in Turkey and Egypt (1980-2010)

	1980		1990		2000		2010	
	Turkey	Egypt	Turkey	Egypt	Turkey	Egypt	Turkey	Egypt
<b>Population (Million)</b>	43,9	44,9	53,9	56,3	63,1	66,1	72,1	78,0
<b>Urban Population (% of total)</b>	44	44	59	43	65	43	71	43
<b>GDP (Billion \$)</b>	68,7	22,9	150,6	43,1	266,5	99,8	731,1	218,8
<b>GDP Growth (%)</b>	-2	10	9	6	7	5	9	5
<b>GDP PPP (USD)</b>	1,567	510	2,791	766	4,220	1510	10,136	2804

**Source:** World DataBank, World Development Indicators  
([www.databank.worldbank.com](http://www.databank.worldbank.com))

In this comparison section I argue the process of socio-economic changes regarding modernization of Turkey and Egypt rather than giving any data about their economy. As mentioned in Part I, both Turkey and Egypt followed similar statist economic policies in the early years of the republican regime (1920-1930 in Turkey; 1950-1960 in Egypt). According to the private sector's economic weakness at that time, this way was considered the proper one to achieve rapid economic development during that period. In contrast to previously-followed statist economic policies, economic development arguably began to take shape after each country adopted liberal economic policies in the 1980s. It is obvious that Turkey showed more economic development despite having similar demographic data and the lack of a valuable entity such as oil. I will explain how this fact affected the countries in different ways.

The changing economic situation has affected differently the social structure of the countries. While the urbanization gained impetus in Turkey, the urban population of Egypt remained remain stable during the last three decades despite Mubarak's liberal economic policies (Table 5). The changes in life standards; however, increased the discomfort amongst social segments. State control over exporting goods had concealed the differences between the life standards of the upper and lower classes. Therefore Egyptian society could not feel the economic and social differences, which would be one of the main reasons for the social discomfort in society. In short, liberal economic policies have made the gap of income distribution amongst Egyptians more apparent. Thus the visibility of different living standards has created the need to question Egypt's current political, social and economic situation. The 25 January demonstrations that ended the Mubarak regime were one of the foremost results of this social discomfort.

The economic liberalization of Turkey mobilized the periphery - the religious and conservative groups in particular - to the center (Figure 1), not only in economic but also political aspects. The emergence of the "new urban class" gained impetus in

the aftermath of the 1980 military coup through Özal's liberal socio-economic policies (see Bulaç, 2010). The political success behind the RP during the 1994-1995 elections and specifically the AK Party after 2002 is this "new urban class". It should be noted that having a more democratic political environment in contrast to Egypt has generated a different outcome in the Turkish case. This mobilization led the emergent groups to create their own economic establishments - the MÜSİAD for instance - and allowed the rapid growth of the religious movements, the Gülen Movement in particular. I would like to point out that unlike the Egyptian case, the moderate attitudes of the Turkey's religious groups has allowed relations with the state to become more sustainable. Therefore, the legitimate efforts of the religious groups in Turkey have prevented them from experiencing massive state aggression.

#### ***6.1.2. Political Comparison***

Turkey and Egypt had experienced constitutional monarchy before the republican regime. While the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy (*I. Meşrutiyet*) took place in 1878 in Turkey, Egypt welcomed after the declaration of independence in 1922. Thus, in both cases the existence of political parties and the political party experiences dated back to pre-republican eras. It should be noted that the Ottoman constitution lived very short. The Committee of Union and Progress (Turkish) and the Wafd Party (Egyptian) were some examples of the dominant political parties Turkey and Egypt during the pre-republican era.

In the republican era, Turkey adopted a parliamentary republic in which the president was elected by parliament<sup>50</sup>. Egypt, on the other hand, formed a semi-presidential system (bi-cameral) after the 1952 Revolution. The dominant position of the military was one of the most significant features of two new republics. As noted earlier, the Ottoman military elites had a prominent role in the establishment of the

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<sup>50</sup> After the referendum for constitutional amendment held in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential crisis, the election of the president has been through popular election.

Republic of Turkey. The first president (Mustafa Kemal) and the prime minister (İsmet İnönü) were two prominent figures of the Turkish independence war along with the other foremost parliamentary members. Similarly, the leading cadres of the Free Officers during and after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution such as Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar Sadat became the prominent political figures of the Arab Republic of Egypt and served as presidents. Moreover, the bureaucratic positions after the Egyptian Sultanate were filled with the Free Officers. Consequently, the military has had a big impact on politics.

Due to the constitutive role of the military elites in both countries, the military had a big influence on domestic politics. Having had relatively fewer non-civilian political figures at the top of the state, Egypt had a more stable state-military relationship than Turkey. Until the 25 January 2011 Revolution, the military-rooted presidents ruled Egypt; hence there was no significant power struggles between the military and the civilians. On the other hand, Turkey faced its first military coup in 1960 in the aftermath of the 10-year *Demokrat* Party rule. In the following periods, the military's 1971 political intervention was known as the 12 March Memorandum; in 1980 as the 12 September military coup; in 1997 as the post-modern military coup; and in 2007 the e-memorandum (see, Sakallıoğlu, 1997; Karpas, 1988; and Kuru, 2012). Aside from the 12 March Memorandum caused by the political turmoil, one of the main themes was the reactionaryism in the further military intervention. It should be noted that the 12 September 1980 military coup occurred in the aftermath of an intensive political terror period, yet the military acted right after a religious-themed demonstration held in Konya to criticize Israeli policies on Palestine in 6 September 1980. As noted before, the unsuccessful e-memorandum in 2007 triggered the decline of military tutelage in Turkey (see, Kuru, 2012).

Similarly, Egypt's first experience of a civilian presidency experience ended less than a year after the election of Muhammad Morsi, and Egypt faced a military coup in June 2013. The Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense, Gen.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi elected the 6<sup>th</sup> president of Egypt after the 2013 military coup that he commanded in June 2013.

The power of the military the politics was not only strong in the political spheres in the Turkish and Egyptian cases. The Turkish and Egyptian military reached substantial economic over power in connection with their dominance. For instance, the Egyptian state, which was dominated by the military bureaucrats, began to control the economy after the nationalization of the private sector under Nasser's presidency. In the aftermath of Nasser's economy policies a newly-emerged private sector began to be dominated by the new military-bureaucratic establishment (Vatikiotis, 1978:213). Moreover, by the mid-1960s the state-controlled private sector controlled 83 percent of production in the country (Harb, 2003:278). Likewise, OYAK was established in 1961 as a private pension fund, and became one of the country's biggest economic enterprises by 2010, with various companies operating from automotive to steel, and 30,000 employees. Having been exempt from any taxation and auditing of its private pension fund it became an economic giant with \$15 billion revenue (Butler, 2012).

Apart from the military interventions, the influence of military over politics shaped in an indirect way regarding the Turkish case in contrast with the Egyptian case. From the very early times of the republican era, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk forced the active military members to make a choice between involvement in politics and being army officers (Ahmad, 2003:86). By doing this, Mustafa Kemal aimed to prevent any direct military influence over Turkish politics; thus he intended to civilize the future state bureaucracy. The establishment of the Turkish General Staff was a natural result of this intention.

However, the influence of the military over Egyptian politics formed in a direct way because of the military-rooted presidents. Moreover, having been the main actors of the 1952 Revolution, the Free Officers dominated the state bureaucracy and the state economy with the support of the incumbent presidents, Nasser in particular. This fact led the military to obtain a significant position in Egyptian politics. The

2013 military coup, for instance, was an obvious indicator of the power of the military because the leader of the coup, Gen. Sisi, was an active minister in addition to his army duty. The military coup led by Sisi overthrew the freely-elected president, Muhammad Morsi, in less than a year by undemocratic methods.

A single-party period covered more than a quarter century of political life Turkey. Although there were a few weak attempts to pass to multi-party politics, the CHP had dominated the Turkish political arena since the DP's (established in 1946) rule in 1950. From now on, including the military (interim) government periods, the existence of the political parties has continued in Turkish politics. Similarly, Egyptian political life was dominated by a single ruling parties: the ASU established by Nasser, and later Sadat's NDP.<sup>51</sup> Although Sadat and Mubarak allowed a controlled multi-party system, the new political parties could only run for the parliamentary elections. The multi-party system was first put into practice after the mass public demonstrations, which led to fall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011. Thus, the more frequent military interventions in Turkey show that a civil society was emerging sooner than in Egypt because the ruling elite dominated by the military showed their reactions to the emerging civil society.<sup>52</sup>

### ***6.2.1. State-Religion Relations***

The state-religion relations have been a controversial issue both in Turkey and Egypt on the road to modernization (westernization) during the republican era. The religious groups were not allowed fully (in Egypt) or were allowed in limited way (during the early years of the Turkish Republic) to participate in real politics, and the regimes demonstrated a tendency to keep the religious groups under control. At various times the anti-western discourses of the religious groups were considered to be an obstacle

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<sup>51</sup> As noted earlier, the final form of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) took shape after the reorganization of the Liberation Rally (1952-1956) and the National Union (1956-1962). Finally, Sadat reformed the ASU under the name of National Democratic Party in 1978.

<sup>52</sup> As noted before, Yavuz calls this new civil society as "the new Bourgeoisie" (2010), and Bulaç similarly defines this as "the new urban class" (2010).

toward modernization. Thus, the Turkish and Egyptian governments followed policies that excluded religion and religious groups from the state and politics. Here the MGM-affiliated political parties may be seen as an exception. It should be noted that the party programs and objectives have not included any direct religious references.

In order to undermine the religious influence and sacred theme of the Ottoman reign and the caliph, Turkey adopted an aggressively secularist approach, which put any religious-themed elements out of the public sphere (see Kuru, 2011). The Kemalist ideology, which aimed to modernize the new Turkish state, was strengthened by secularism. In this regard, secularism found itself a concrete position in the CHP's Kemalist ideology and the constitution (1937). Thus any developments, incidents and formations affiliated with religion were considered to be reactionary. They were discharged from the public sphere and limited to private life by the regime. Briefly, the regime evaluated all these efforts, which was considered to be reactionary, as the "counter-revolution" against the Kemalist reforms (Şaylan, 1974:74)

However, there were no explicit secular policies within the scope of legal and political aspects, strong religious groups, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, were forced to exclude the political arena by the regime. Moreover, in the very early years of the Free Officers' regime, political parties were banned in order to secure the revolution against any possible internal conflict, and it was intended to be controlled and imposed from the top (Johnson, 1972:4). Although Egypt differed from Turkey in the context of its secular policies, she resembled Turkey in the way that the top-to-bottom reforms of its revolution were introduced. Despite the fact that Egypt followed policies that excluded religion and religious groups from the political system, the concept of sharia remained in the constitution. It should be noted that the emergence of secular policies dated back to the *Tanzimat* era in both Turkey and Egypt. Yet in the republican era Turkey implemented secular policies before Egypt.

One of the significant similarities regarding state-religion relations for both of the cases was the use of religious institutions as leverage whilst excluding the religion from the political sphere. Despite the legal establishment of secularism, in 1924 the regime formed the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) as a constitutional institution to control religious issues and to keep them away from the state. As noted before, after the implementation of the General Staff, Mustafa Kemal aimed to reduce the influence of the military in Turkish politics. Similarly the formation of the *Diyanet* also aimed to prevent any religious influence in politics. The Turkish government also controlled the mosques under state authority, and banned any religiously-affiliated institutions (*tekke* and *zaviye*) and schools in order to establish a modern Turkish state. Likewise the Egyptian government has benefitted from the presence of Al-Azhar to fill the gap that emerged after Nasser's regime discharged the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Azhar's independent position evolved into a government-controlled institution by the mid-1960s due to government interventions. Unlike Turkey's *Diyanet*, Al-Azhar became a political actor under the control of state authority. In this sense, Al-Azhar has been used as a religious leverage to undermine the other religious groups, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. More recently, Al-Azhar stayed behind General Sisi during the 2013 military intervention against the Islamist government of Egypt, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. It can be said that Turkey's *Diyanet* has not been active as Al-Azhar due to the Turkish state's assertively secular policies.

Finally, regarding state-religion relations, Turkey and Egypt significantly differ from each other in the context of having a state ideology. The Atatürk's reforms gradually adopted Kemalism as the state ideology, which became the dominant code of Turkish politics with the establishment of the republican regime. However, Nasser intended to form a state ideology known as Arab Socialism in order to strengthen his regime in the aftermath of failed policies both in domestic and foreign politics. Sadat left abandoned Nasser's ideas and policies in order to consolidate his regime and to undermine the Nasserists. Despite the fact that Mubarak



followed pragmatist liberal economic policies under his regime, he also did not intend to form any state ideology, which was accepted by a wide range of Egyptian society.

## **6.2. Case Comparisons**

Country comparisons are key to understanding the last three decades of Turkey and Egypt's modernization and democratization processes in terms of the contributions of religious socio-political movements. In this section, I build on the country analyses and compare the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the Gülen Movement (GM), and the *Milli Görüş* Movement (MGM) – AK Party within the framework of the patterns that I followed in the second part of this study.

### ***6.2.1. Sociological and Structural Comparison***

The MB, the GM and the MGM formed in order to protect their societies' religious values. The MB emerged in the late 1920s due to a reaction to the Western (British) influence upon Egyptian society. Thus, aside from improving the moral and religious values of society, the MB embraced an anti-western attitude. Likewise, more than three decades after the MB, the GM and the MGM emerged in parallel with the rise of destructive political ideologies – according to the religious perspective – such as socialism and communism in the late 1960s. Furthermore, the state's secular policies are the common reasons for the emergence of all religious socio-political groups.

The sociological bases of these three groups (here I consider the AK Party as the successor to the MGM) showed similar characteristic in the early years of their emergence when religion was subordinated to secular, westernizing ideas. Therefore the supporters of these religious groups consisted mostly of members of the periphery. By mentioning “periphery”, I do not intend to indicate mere geographical classifications such as “urban” or “rural”. Instead, I aim to emphasize the people who are considered peripheral not only geographically but also due to their remoteness from the power centers. Briefly, the sociological support of these groups can be

described as people from low-income groups and were not a part of the state management structure.

Yet, in the later period of their existence, the sociological support for these groups began to vary. The diversification of their support these religious groups have changed in relation to their ideological perspectives. Groups such as the MB and the MGM who stick with their ideology and adopt an attitude, which is closed to the global world, have found a concrete group of supporters, which I call the “nucleus base”. The “nucleus base” strictly follows the mainstream ideas/ideologies of the religious-social movements, and they have an ideological profile, which is closed to change. Thus the ideas of these groups are mainly addressed to their “nucleus base”, and the opposition groups/ideas within the group tend to find their own way. The intra-group separation can be seen either in positive or negative ways. The groups that separated from the MB due to their radical ideas and followed a more radical path can be described as having made a negative separation. Despite the fact that Islamic Jihad and Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya were not directly affiliated with the MB, the people with radical tendencies who separated from the MB found positions for themselves in such groups (Calvert, 2013). On the other hand, the people who became tired of the dogmatic ideas of the MB’s old guard formed the *Hizb al-Wasat* (party) (Zahid, 2010).

Similarly, the reformist wing of the MGM formed the AK Party in 2002; an illustration of a non-radical separation. This is because the AK Party left the ideas and policies that the MGM harshly rejected such as westernization (EU) and globalization, and increased its popular support in three consecutive elections. By the 2007 elections, the party managed to receive almost half the votes of the nation. On the other hand, popular support for the MGM remained around 2.3 percent during the same period (see Table 3). I would like to mention again that the AK Party received its support mainly from the “new urban class”

Similarly, the Gülen Movement has also enlarged its sociological base due to its ideology, which embraces both religious and non-religious subjects within

societies. The group, which had relatively more homogenous sociological support in its early years, has reached a wide range of sympathizers and supporters both inside and outside of the Turkey. Having been accepted a Nurcu movement by the society – and a neo-Nurcu movement by Yavuz (2003a) – the GM obtained much more support in contrast to the other Nurcu movements. By this, the GM’s pro-global policies and emphasis on peace and tolerance has had a significant role in its global expansion. Consequently, aforementioned examples proved that the idea/ideology of a religious socio-political group became one of the most important indicators of its sociological support.

All the cases examined display different structural features. Firstly, the Gülen Movement does not have any official organizational scheme. From its domestic to its international base, the local and non-official members of the organization support the movement. Although it is a well-known fact that the organizations operating in various fields from education to finance and media to humanitarian aids have close ties with the GM, there is no a central, official connection between the institutions and organizations. As mentioned in the related chapter the activities have been conducted under the auspice of private enterprises established by GM supporters and sympathizers. It should be noted that the Journalists and Writers Foundation has made an official declaration concerning the GM’s attitudes and activities, and media organs the such as *Zaman*, and *Today’s Zaman* dailies and STV run their activities in accordance with the GM’s priorities.

Secondly, the MGM has a less complex organizational structure due to the natural effect of its being run by a political party. Aside from its political structure, the MGM has conducted its activities in Turkey through its flagship non-governmental organization, the *Milli Gençlik Vakfı* since 1975<sup>53</sup>. Due to the assertive secular structure of the state, the MGM continued its activities in the party buildings in the early years of its formation after the closure of the MNP. As noted earlier, the movement delivered its messages to their supporters via the MGV’s local branches

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<sup>53</sup> As noted in the related chapter, the AGV was established right after the 28 February Process to replace the closed MGV.

and via its media outlets. On the contrary, the movement has conducted its activities more explicitly in Europe under the movement's name (AMGT) since 1973. On the other hand, the AK Party does not have institutions/organizations, which are affiliated with the party apart from its political structure.

Thirdly, the Muslim Brotherhood had the most complex organizational scheme amongst the other cases. In the very early years of the organization, the MB established its headquarters connected with the ongoing mosque construction. Having been a local initiative, the MB expanded rapidly, not only in Egyptian rural areas but also neighboring countries such as Syria, Jordan and Palestine as a consequence of British intervention (Table 4). What distinguishes the MB from the other cases is its organizational structure it was formed in parallel with a state structure, which was the MB's main aim: an Islamic state (Figure 1). It can be seen in Table 1 is that the organizational structure of the MB evokes a bi-cameral presidential system. Due to the rising clashes with the state, the MB's organizations including the headquarters were banned by the government in 1948. In the aftermath of this breakdown, the Brotherhood could not be organized as well as in the 1928-1948 era. The Nasser regime during the Republican era banned the MB once more. Despite the decreased state pressure under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes, the organization remained illegal. Yet the MB was allowed to publish a magazine, the *Al-Da'wa*, in mid 1970s (Wickham, 2002). After the 1980s it intended to participate in the political system without any political organization.

### **6.2.2. Ideological Comparison**

According to ideological aspects it can be seen that the MB and MGM followed an ideology that is shaped by political Islam. Both the MB and MGM have adopted a political way of strengthening Islamic values, which dominate the society and the state administration. The main goals of these two organizations are to increase the religious and moral values of society, and to struggle with the destructive effects of

modernization and westernization. Despite their anti-western ideas, there is no absolute rejection of the western world from either the MB or the MGM. Their main objectives are to address anti-Islamic cultural and moral values; thus they both welcomed the scientific contributions of the West.

The other major goal of the MB is to set up an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. While this purpose is explicit in the history of the MB, the MGM has not clearly declared this intention due to its legal political formation. Having had a political party structure, for the MGM even to refer to a probable foundation of an Islamic state is not possible in context with the constitution. Yet the discourse subjects - such as the “just order” - frequently mentioned by the MGM can arguably be connected with the purpose of regime change in Turkey. Moreover, the Constitutional Court closed the MGM-affiliated political parties, the RP and the FP, due to their being a threat to the secular regime. Furthermore, one of the reasoned decisions of for the closure of the RP was a speech of Erbakan’s about the need for a multi-legal system (Jenkins, 2008:156). This demand was interpreted as a call for an Islamic state.

The AK Party, on the other hand, has followed an ideology called “conservative democracy” by its founders, which explicitly differs from political Islam. While democracy, secularism, human rights and the rule of law are the foremost discourse of the party, the formulation of “conservative democracy” is the indicator of the party’s “Muslim” and “democrat” features. In order not to lose the support of the MGM’s voters, the founders of the party, who came mostly from the reformist wing of the MGM, generated this concept. They never rejected their Muslim identity, although the foremost cadre of the AK Party has been accused of being against the secular state and the MGM’s successor. Consequently, their political success proved that the concept, which the AK Party generated and their pro-global and pro-western policies have been accepted by Turkish society.

The politicians who separated from the MGM shifted their path in a much more moderate way that seeks an integration with present world conditions. Likewise the MB experienced a similar alteration during its history. As mentioned earlier, some

groups followed a more radical path whilst others established a separate political formation (Al-Wasat) due to their rejection of the current situation. Moreover, a significant alteration occurred within the movement itself. It refrained from any political conflict with the state and illegal activity that included violence during the time of the General Guide al-Hudaybi, a former judge. The MB not only continued its constructive policies under the Mubarak regime but also adopted more democratic discourses after late 1980s. So the MB's leadership cadre stated that it intended to participate in the current political system instead of overthrowing it (Wickham, 2013:98). In contrast to the AK Party case, which was formed by the former members of the MGM-affiliated political party, the changes in the MB did not bring political success. This is because the authoritarian structure of the Egyptian governments did not provide the proper political environment that Turkey has.

Unlike the MB and MGM, the Gülen Movement has not adopted a political ideology and path in order to achieve and maintain its goals, which are to create a “the golden generation”, and to contribute to world peace in accordance with “love, tolerance and dialogue” (see Gülen, 2006b). In this regard to educate society within the framework of love, tolerance and dialogue can be described as one of the main pillars of the GM. Therefore the movement has enjoyed a positive relationship with all authorities (legal/state) since the beginning both inside and outside of Turkey. Positive action (*Müşpet hareket*) has assisted the movement in handling accusations such as having a hidden agenda of establishing an Islamic state. In this direction, the movement outlines pro-secular policies and emphasizes the importance of democracy and the rule of law in the country. Apart from this, its pro-global policies also led the movement to expand its influence internationally and to integrate within the global scope.

One of the important common features of all these cases is their having non-violent ideologies. Here the MB's case generates some questions due to their early years and struggles. As mentioned in the related chapter, the existence of the “secret apparatus” and its activities that were mostly used against the British and Israeli

subjects got beyond the control of the general guidance due to the rapid expansion of the movement. Yet the teachings of Banna did not mention any violence. The later policies followed by the MB strongly proved its non-violent characteristic. The recent incidents, which have happened in Egypt since 2013, can be shown as a concrete example. Despite all the brutal state repression the MB has stayed away from violence. Similarly the MGM and later the AK Party and the GM have stayed within the legal framework despite the state and military repressions during the coup and memorandum times.

Finally, the importance given to education distinguishes the Gülen Movement from the other cases. I do not assert that the MB and the MGM do not care about education enough, yet what the GM has done so far has been mainly based on educational activities. In terms of opening educational institutions, the GM did not act hastily, and they waited until they educated their own personnel to work in these institutions. By doing so, while spreading their ideas and services, the GM followed a bottom-up strategy, which differed from the movements affiliated with active politics. In this regard, as a social movement, the MB shows similar characteristics to the GM. Yet aside from providing modern education to guide the students, its supporters appointments to specific positions such as the public sector differentiate them from the other cases. Thus, the Gülen Movement has been accused of staffing within the state in order to progress its hidden agendas.

### ***6.2.3. Comparison of Political Behavior***

The political behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood and the *Milli Görüş* Movement share similar characteristics, which can be explained within the framework of political Islam. Both movement aims to reach their goals through politics. The main goals of the MB are to provide Islamic awakening and establish an Islamic state. The MGM aims to revive the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and establish the “Just Order” that quests for social justice. The MGM’s frequent emphasis on the changing of the



current system (order-düzen) has been considered as a threat to secular state, which can be interfered as the establishment of an Islamic state.

The MB and the MGM ascribe holiness to their political activities. For instance, the MB gave the mighty message “*Give your vote to Allah, give it to the Muslim Brotherhood*” during an election campaign (Wickham, 2013:47). Similarly, the MGM leader Erbakan stated, “*If you do not serve the RP, none of your worship will be accepted*” in 1991 (Milliyet, 2001). During another national election campaign Erbakan said, “*It is not true Muslims who did not vote for us*” (Barlas, 1997).

Another similarity between the MB and the MGM is its adoption of anti-secular and anti-western policies. While the MB completely rejects the secular implements, which undermine religion and religious values (according to their understanding) and stresses the necessity of Sharia law, the MGM criticizes the definition of secularism (laicism) in Turkey and claims that it should be redefined according to its real meaning. Moreover, while both movements explicitly demonstrate their rejection of westernization and its culture they do not pose any questions regarding the scientific contributions and values of the western world. Anti-Israeli policies and discourses are another similarity between the MB and the MGM.

Having continued their activities under secular states<sup>54</sup>, the Muslim Brotherhood and the *Milli Görüş* Movement felt the need to be cautious while carrying-out their activities. The MGM, for instance, has used broad discourses to avoid reaction from the secular state. As noted earlier, the MGM frequently used the word “*Milli (national)*” as a shelter while delivering its messages (Yavuz, 1997). In addition, especially in the aftermath of the 1971 military intervention, the movement conducted its operational meetings in the official party buildings due to legal restrictions such as the Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which was considered as the basis of reactionary activities. Similarly, the MB began to use all of its legal

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<sup>54</sup> It should be noted that although the Egyptian constitution and the state did not mention the concept of secularism, the implementation of the state outlined a characteristically secular state by excluding religion from the it, apart from Al-Azhar.

rights to struggle with the regime, and restricted its power in the syndicates and the local elections during Mubarak's presidency in order not to be exposed to any state repression.

While the MB was using the "self-restraint" strategy, they generated new methods to participate in politics (Wickham, 2013). Aside from trying to be active in syndicates, they were drilling the political ban through independent candidates in parliamentary elections. By doing so, the MB refrained from any clashes with the regime through remaining within the legal framework and explicitly began to use democratic discourses referring to the importance of the rule of law and human rights. The MB exploited any possible legal occasions to undermine the repressive regime. The MB used the West's "exporting democracy" rhetoric as a legitimate tool to increase their demands for democratic values.

Similarly, the AK Party ruptured its ideological connection with the MGM and continued its political journey under the name of "conservative democracy". The party left behind the controversial discourses of the MGM and adopted pro-western and pro-global policies through keeping conservative values on the agenda. In this sense, the party has benefitted from the EU criteria to undermine the criticisms that were posed by the secular wing, and the military influence over the Turkish politics. As a newly-emerged political movement, the AK Party needed allies to facilitate its democratization and consolidation of power. Here the AK Party benefitted from the Gülen Movement. The media outlets of the GM supported the AK Party's EU and democratization process during the AK Party's first government period, specifically at the time of the 2007 presidential crisis and the AK Party closure case. The GM's support reached its peak during the 2010 Constitutional Referendum period, which consisted of various democratic implementations.

Finally, the Gülen Movement has begun to occupy the Turkish political agenda, particularly after the foundation of the JWF. Since then, the movement has insistently mentioned "love, tolerance and dialogue", and organized meetings, events and visits to contribute to world peace. In this sense, it initiated the "Intercultural

Dialogue Platform” within the body of JWF, and unlike the MB and the MGM, the GM has embraced pro-western policies. In context with domestic politics, the movement organized intellectual meetings under the JWF’s Abant Platform, with the motto “*Towards a shared mind, Common Denominator and Dialogue Seeking*” (Abant Platform, 2014). In the platform, various socio-political issues such as secularism, Islam, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and issues regarding minorities have been discussed by those skilled in related fields.

Despite being one of the main targets of the 28 February Process, the GM has continued its struggles and activities within the legal framework and has refrained from any conflicts with the state institutions within the pre-2011 period examined in this study. Furthermore, the movement has always sought opportunities to integrate with the current system through its domestic and international activities and has been in favor of democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. In this sense, the movement supported the AK Party’s democratic reforms in the domestic context, and the EU integration process in the context of foreignpolicy.

## CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I have demonstrated the different responses of the moderate socio-political religious groups to the changes leading towards modernization in the context of the democratization processes in Turkey and Egypt. Particularly I have sought answers as to why Egypt and Turkey gave different responses and what roles the socio-religious movement undertook in this transformation and democratization process. Unlike most of the research, which focuses on similar themes, I compared both social and political religious groups and their stances in these processes.

During these modernization processes, which would be lately equated with democratization, the socio-political religious groups have been suppressed by the state, and the state has generated reflexes against these groups by posing accusations of being anti-modernist and anti-secular. Consequently these socio-political religious groups formed their opposition under religious-themed political and social movements as a natural result of their intensely religious socio-cultural environments. Thus I compared the historical developments of Turkey and Egypt towards modernization (later democratization) within the framework of social, economic and political aspects. In doing so, I mainly focused on socio-economic and political developments, and in order not to deviate from the main theme of this dissertation I stuck with state-religion relations. In this regard, I chose the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Milli Görüş* Movement – AK Party, and the Gülen Movement as the research cases.

The aforementioned socio-religious movements took steps toward becoming integrated within the existing system; thus they evolved their attitudes in this direction. They embraced moderate stances and stayed away from any direct clashes with the state. The MB, in particular, showed significant progress and struggle with the state within the framework of its legal rights, including collaborating with secular parties, such as the Wafd Party. For the Turkish cases, with regard to political organization the MGM tended to integrate the political system into its moderate

Islamic discourse. The AK Party later carried the flag, leaving behind the MGM's main discourse through a wider political structure. Yet the GM remained apolitical while it integrated with the system, and supported political parties, the AK Party in particular, for the sake of the country's democratization. From here I seek the answer of the other question, as to why integration of the socio-political religious movements showed different responses in Turkey and Egypt.

I structured this dissertation within the context of the questions above, and followed the historical comparative method. In Chapter One, I examine the formation of the Republic of Turkey, and her modernization process in social, economic and political contexts. In Chapter Two, I followed the same pattern in order to analyze the developments in Egypt. In the following three chapters I analyzed the cases of this dissertation: (1) The Gülen (Hizmet) Movement, (2) The *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) Movement and the AK Party, and (3) The Muslim Brotherhood, within the framework of parallel patterns. In this sense, I made sociological and structural analyses and examined the ideologies and the political behavior of the cases in addition to providing their historical backgrounds. In Chapter Six, I submitted country and case comparisons.

This dissertation introduced a twofold-contribution in line with research questions. First, it showed that the excessive politicization of the religious social movements, including political parties, increased the tension with the state. The rise of the religious groups generated such offensive reflexes, which turned into massive state repression or military intervention. For the Turkish case, various political parties were closed down due to the accusations of the reactionaryism, and the MGM-affiliated political parties received the biggest blows from the secular state's defense mechanism. Similarly, the MB conducted its political participation via independent nominees in parliamentary elections, university student unions and professional business syndicates. The MB, indeed, was aware of the reality that they needed to be less visible in the political sphere. Although they intended to balance their power

specifically in the parliamentary elections and the syndicates in accordance with the policy of “the self-restraint”, they were not able to cease the state repression.

Despite the fact that it is out of the scope of this study, the 2013 Egyptian military intervention broke out due to the MB’s increasingly Islamist political discourse of the MB-affiliated president Muhammad Morsi, and the FJP political party. Apart from the military, which can be described the reflex of the Egyptian state; the opposition groups were also affected negatively by MB’s new political stance. On the other hand, the AK Party and its new non-Islamist political discourse dealt with the early accusations of the secular elites through the support of the other socio-political actors in the country, including the Gülen Movement. The AK Party’s pro-western and pro-global political discourse became a leverage with the EU integration process that could contribute to the democratization of the country.

The integration of the religious socio-political groups should not only be in the political arena because the solo political struggle cannot be enough to deal with such states that are dominated by the founding elites, like the Turkish and the Egyptian cases. The integration of the aforementioned groups should be fortified by economic and social aspects. As noted above, the sole political struggle of the religious socio-political groups was inadequate for handling the status quo, thus the political rise of these groups was halted due to various accusations – being reactionary in the Turkish case and being a radical Islamist organization (even terrorist groups) in the Egyptian case – by the ruling elites.

The main difference between the Turkish and Egyptian cases was that the emergent civil society (“new urban class” or “the new bourgeoisie”) and its alternative economic instrument such as MÜSİAD by 1990s and, TUSKON after 2000. While Turkey and Egypt were passing through political turmoil in the 1970s, which ended with a military intervention in Turkey’s case (1980) and the assassination of Egypt’s President Sadat (1981), the emergence of a new civil society led Turkey in a different direction to Egypt. This has a connection with the different levels of modernization process in Turkey and Egypt. This new civil society began to

forward the regime in Turkey towards a more democratic path. Although the emergence of the new socio-economic actors led the RP to power, the state's secular reflex intervened against the rise of the Islamists through an undemocratic method, the 28 February Process.

As seen in the developments mentioned above, despite its importance the emergence of the "new urban class" and its economic power was unable to maintain integration. The AK Party determined the main cause of this challenge and shifted its axis on a more global and westernized path. When the AK Party emerged it only introduced a new opportunity to the Turkish electorate with its charismatic political figures in a corrupted political environment. The prominent policies that the AK Party adopted, such as westernization, globalization and the EU integration process, had already been adopted by the other political parties. Therefore, the rising democratization in accordance with the EU Criteria's and the fall of military tutelage cannot be only explained by the success of the AK Party's political and economic policies.

From now on I assert the importance of the social-based support that became a conduit for the AK Party and its pro-western and pro-global political path. Here the Gülen Movement comes to the forefront because it provided that necessary social support. There are some facts that support my claim. The first is that the AK Party's unclear ideology and non-obvious popular support at both bureaucratic and social levels. When the AK Party came to power, it found significant human resources most of which believed to be linked with the GM, in the state bureaucracy despite these deficiencies. The second is the indirect support of provided by the GM through its media outlets, particularly during the times of crisis such as the 2007 presidential election period and the AK Party's closure trial. Furthermore, the indirect support of the GM turned into very direct support at the time of the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. Not only did the supporters of the Movement work in favor of the referendum, but also Gülen himself publicly clarified the Movement's support. Third, the Gülen Movement never rejected the accusations posed to it about the infiltration

of its supporters to the state. Once again Gülen declared that this was the natural right of the people of this land; thus it could not be defined as infiltration.

In short, under the liberalization of the economic and, to a lesser degree, political policies that were adopted after Turkey's 1980 modernization process of Turkey, and those of Egypt, gave different outcomes. On one hand, the MB chose an intensive political struggle to adapt to the current Egyptian system through its political Islamist discourse. Yet, the MB's moderation in its political discourse, which demanded democratization, human rights and the rule of law, did not elaborate upon the assertive attitudes of the Egyptian government against the movement despite their self-limiting efforts. Moreover, the inadequate political and economic reforms did not allow for the formation of such a new class, which could mobilize from the periphery to the center. Consequently, the public's social, economic and political discomfort turned into massive demonstrations known as "the Arab Spring" that led to the fall of the Mubarak regime. However, the consequent opportunity to help form a new democratic regime could not be exploited due to the repeated failures mentioned above. On the other hand Turkey began to respond to the social, economic and political developments, and a new class began to mobilize toward to the center with its economic and political power unlike Egypt. In addition to the new west-facing political stance and the non-religious discourse of the AK Party, the GM's educated human resources had a complementary role in the political and economic struggle for integration into the system. These two are the main elements that differentiate the Turkish case from the Egyptian case in the context of the repose of modernization (democratization



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## APPENDIX 1 - MAPS

**Map 1.** Map of Turkey



**Source:** Mapsof.net, 2014.


**Map 2.** Map of Egypt




Source: Shutterstock, 2014.

APPENDIX 2 - FIGURES

Figure 1: The Organizational Chart of the Muslim Brotherhood  
(Based on diagram in *Mitchell, 1993*)




**Figure 2. Urban Population (% of total) Comparison of Turkey and Egypt (1980-2010)**




**Source:** World DataBank, World Development Indicators  
([www.databank.worldbank.com](http://www.databank.worldbank.com))

**Figure 3. Population Comparison of Turkey and Egypt (1980-2010) (Million)**




**Source:** World DataBank, World Development Indicators  
([www.databank.worldbank.com](http://www.databank.worldbank.com))

**Figure 4. GDP per capita Comparison of Turkey and Egypt (USD)**



**Source:** World DataBank, World Development Indicators  
([www.databank.worldbank.com](http://www.databank.worldbank.com))

**Figure 5. GDP Comparison of Turkey and Egypt (\$Billion)**



**Source:** World DataBank, World Development Indicators  
([www.databank.worldbank.com](http://www.databank.worldbank.com))



























