



University of
BRISTOL

**NEW APPROACH TO RELIGION AND NEW TERM IN
TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY**

This dissertation is submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

Master of Science
in
International Relations

Candidate Number: 1448600

SPAIS MSc International Relations 2014/2015

University of Bristol
September 2015
Bristol, the UK

08.09.2015

**TO THE FACULTY EXAMINATION BOARD OF
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL**

This dissertation contains no plagiarism, has not been submitted in whole or in part for the award of another degree, and is solely the work of Bahadır Gümüş. I also hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct.

Word Count:14150

Bahadır Gümüş

ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been great debate over the apparent shift in Turkish Foreign Policy, away from its historically determined pro-European route as mapped out at the time of the founding of the Republic, and towards Muslim countries and the Islamic world.

These debates have focused on a number of distinct reasons to explain this fact in respect to the literature and to argue that in many senses these explanations are insufficient to understand the change in Turkish foreign policy in recent years.

The main claim of the paper is that the explanations for the current changes in Turkish foreign policy neglect an approach to religion and popular sentiment, as well as the use religion is put to by members of the Turkish elite. The dissertation argues that the newly emerged engagement of Turkish foreign policy with Muslim countries derives from domestic sources of foreign policy; in other words, the work historically demonstrates the owners of power, the approaches to religion of Turkish political elite as owners of power, consequences of these approaches and reflections of these consequences in terms of foreign policy in Turkey.

Following that, the paper states that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) is a milestone in terms of this process because in recent years, the AKP has adopted a completely new approach to religion. However, the roots of this new approach could be considered by another work. According to the paper, the crucial point is that the AKP has embraced distinct approach to religion and has created convenient environment to make its approach to religion dominant. Thereby, the work claims that the change in approach to religion that led to change in relations amongst Muslim countries and Turkey in recent years.

Lastly, it would be noted that alongside the other consequences, probably the most salient result of this process is decrease in relations with western countries and suspension of relations with the EU as apprehended by Kösebalaban (2013,p.****) This result could be accepted as particularly significant because, apparently, putting relations with western countries and the EU aside generates violations of human rights and freedoms, and losing ground of democratic values in Turkey.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I owe an immense debt to my supervisor. I benefited from Dr. Vernon Hewitt's, advices and helpful comments during this dissertation process.

Secondly, I must particularly thank my friends, my girlfriend and my family for their patience and support. Without them, though times could have been insurmountable.

Finally, I would like to thank University of Bristol and all members of SPAIS because of their endless effort.



Content

INTRODUCTION	1
METHODOLOGY	5
THE ROOTS OF WESTERN ORIENTED TFP	13
TOO WEAK TO EXPLAIN: SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSES AND ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS.....	23
THE AKP TERM AS A STARTING POINT	30
CONCLUSION	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY	43

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of modern nation states could be acknowledged as the most significant phase of mankind's history with regard to the literature. Undeniably, this process generated various consequences. The exile of religion from international relations would be described as one of the most salient consequences of this process. In other words, it would be stated that secularism has prevailed as a dominant law of international relations after this fundamental change in the history of humanity. Firstly, this paper is interested in religion and its effect on particularly Turkish foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process. However it must be noted that reasons, which determined the role of religion in international relations, are not the subject of this paper, hence they might be addressed by other research. The paper believes that religion performs a crucial role in foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process, particularly in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP).

Before focusing on how and why specifically TFP is the focal point of the paper, the methodology must be highlighted as the backbone to provide logical explanation. Thus, the first section is primarily about the methodology of the paper. First of all, the paper puts mainstream international relations (IR) theories aside because of their limited scopes. In order to make this argument clear the work sheds light on liberalism, neoliberalism, realism, neorealism and Marxism to comprehend their inabilities in terms of religion related issues. Beside other explanations that are provided to describe the limited scope issue, the views of Philpott (n.d.) and, Sandal and James (2010) could be defined as appealing because in their works, these scholars problematize the positivist tradition. Within the first part, it could be demonstrated that mainstream IR theories are clearly unable to handle religion related issues, so it could be argued that the role played by religion in foreign policy or foreign policy decision-making process needs to be looked by alternative paths.

Hence, the first part, as a result of this necessity, is concerned with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It would be pointed out that FPA is mainly interested in the repercussions of domestic politics and agents in terms of foreign policy in respect to the literature. Yet, the point that makes FPA more important is its coherence with constructivism. Actually, the relation between FPA and constructivism could be conceived as not inherent but supplemental. Apparently, Smith's point could be enlightening because Smith states that "foreign policy is what states make of it" (Smith, 2001, p.38) or it would be mentioned that foreign policy is constructed from the perspective of this tenet and that work adopts that the tenet to analyze TFP. However, it should be noted that the paper relies on constructivism that is represented by Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert rather than Wendt's view. The difference is that from Wendt's perspective, states are pre-given and the main aim of constructivism is to explain the constructed relation between these pre-given actors. But the other stream that is represented by Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert argues that rules, institutions, agents, discourse and choices are vital to determine foreign policy, in other words, foreign policy is the result of interrelation between the facts mentioned. Also, Hopf and Weldes who are from the constructivist tenet in FPA could be thought of as particularly remarkable with regard to the literature because they especially draw attention to the role of agents and their language in foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process.

Nevertheless, it would be stressed that Asad's point of view is substantially the main reason that triggered carrying out of the paper. Basically, Asad mentions that the power determines what the religion and religious are. According to his argument, religion is contextual and the context is regulated by the power so the power decides what the religion or religious is in a particular society. Yet, it could be claimed that Asad's argument is not helpful without FPA and constructivism if the research intend to explain or understand the role of religion in terms of foreign policy. The cooperation of constructivism, FPA and Asad's perspective could also be assessed

as useful because this way offers the opportunity to go further beyond narrow topics such as religiously motivated interest groups and actions or their influence over policy-makers. Eventually, how and why this cooperation ought to be established and be conducted is also considered in the first part.

At that point, it could be estimated that this cooperation is a genuine chance to examine the situation in which policy-makers or owner(s) of power have an approach to religion as contrary to the narrow topics. Also, that cooperation would be perceived as a means to figure out change in TFP that could be described as integration with Muslim countries in recent years. The work believes that the driving force of this change in TFP is a newly embraced approach to religion. In order to illustrate this new approach to religion Turkish political history should be examined. Thus, the second part mainly focuses on Turkish political history. Within this frame, the Turkish National Independence War could be taken into account as a turning point because this war announced the establishment of modern Turkey. Leaders of this period, their aims and their ideology are also explored within the second part. The point that must be emphasized is that these new elites devoted themselves to building a state that was based on secularism. Yet, their secularism perspective might be assessed as attractive because it relies on the “taming” of religion under state authority (Mardin, 2011, p.69). It would not be wrong to observe that this is the key to appreciation of the western oriented TFP from the perspective of the work.

Also, the paper argues that without an understanding of religion’s role behind this western oriented TFP, claims about developing relations with Muslim countries cannot be justified. So that, firstly, the second part concerns arguments of system level analyses to explain western oriented TFP and why they should be thought of as insufficient to grasp the main reason underneath western oriented TFP. Then rules, institutions, language and leaders are laid out by the second part to expose how elites of this new state gained power, sustained and reinforced it. Following that, to

understand the continuity of this western oriented foreign policy attitude that cannot be explained by the system level analyses and to understand how the Turkish armed forces have evolved as the “guardians” of modern Turkey. As the second part definitely demonstrates, the guardians of modern Turkey have protected the set of ideological principles that is acknowledged as the foundational principles of Turkey by constitution and is called Kemalism. The interesting thing, with regard to the literature, is that one of the most important principles of Kemalism is secularism. Eventually, the second part scrutinizes this approach to religion, which was shaped by the founders of modern Turkey as the holders of power, reinforcing and maintaining this approach as a reason that underlies the western oriented TFP.

Not surprisingly, system level analyses attempt to explain the newly emerged integration process with Muslim countries by using system level changes such as the Cyprus Crisis that culminated in invasion of the island by Turkish troops, the oil embargo in 1973 and security concerns. Alongside these arguments, there are some views that are based on arguments such as leaders and their preferences or increasing social movements especially after the new constitution in 1961, to express the integration process. Hence, relying on these arguments and why and how these arguments might be seen as weak or inconsistent to recognize developing relations with Muslim countries in recent years, shapes the third part. Briefly, that part mentions that main discourse, power, and the approach to religion remained in the same line that embraced secularism in these years so that these arguments cannot figure out the permanence of western oriented TFP and just provide occasional explanations.

Thereby, AKP's (Justice and Development Party) term appears as a research subject to examine integration with Muslim countries in terms of foreign policy. Initially, the fourth part sheds light on the relation between AKP and religion and in order to illustrate this relation, that part is interested in how AKP has reconciled with religion.

At the same time, it could be noted that the paper is not interested in why AKP embraces that approach to religion. Instead, the fourth section illustrates how AKP has diminished the role of the guardians in internal politics, become the dominant actor and changed the power dominant discourse. Additionally, to highlight these changes in domestic politics, that part displays constitutional and institutional changes as well as the successful performance of AKP in elections and the language of AKP's leaders. Beside these points, the section focuses on incidents that induced thinking of a "new turn" in foreign policy or integration with Muslim countries. Obviously, that part exhibits why AKP should be taken as the turning point in changing the nature of relations with Muslim countries. Briefly, that section puts the main argument of the work that a new approach to religion has been embraced by AKP and after developments that were created by AKP, led to integration with Muslim countries.

In short, the work argues that developing relations with Muslim countries in recent years can be understood by relying on the new approach to religion that is generated by AKP. Also, the paper claims that as a result of the developing relations, the relations with the EU and the western become the secondary in terms of the TFP. Thus, the democratic nature of the Turkish domestic politics and the individual rights and freedoms are affected negatively.

METHODOLOGY

Increasingly, developing relations with Muslim countries in recent years has led to discussions and this new attitude is mainly considered around a "new axis" or "shift in foreign policy" with regard to the literature. Although there are different perspectives that are based upon mainstream IR theories to find out this "shift in foreign policy", the paper argues that "the new axis" couldn't be defined only by relying on mainstream IR theories. So that this section, initially, demonstrates how and why just mainstream IR theories are not enough, especially while religion is part of the scene.

Afterward, that part relies on FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis), constructivism and cooperation between these two approaches in order to display how religion might have an effect over foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process. Alongside that reason, that part also poses why FPA and constructivism are important and why that paper specifically relies on FPA and constructivism to explain the role of religion in foreign policy. Lastly, the section adopts Asad's view about the relation between religion and power to overcome the limited scope of religion related works.

Despite the resurgence of religion, failure of the modernization thesis and increasing attention to religion related issues; the question of how international relations tackle religion still waits for a proper answer. However, it could be conceded that mainstream IR theories are not a convenient toolkit to explain religion related issues in international relations because of their scopes. To support that argument, John Anderson (2008,p.208) noted that realism, liberalism and Marxism could be conceived as unsuccessful in considering the importance of religion in terms of international relations. Also, in order to demonstrate the reason that underlies that argument, Anderson (2008,p.208) states that traditional realism has just diverted its attention to power, states, and interests so it puts ideas, values, culture and religion out of its circle of observation. Furthermore, it could be exposed that Sandal and James (2010) definitely applaud Anderson's approach because according to their view, states are key unitary actors for policy making and analysis, and they are in pursuit of power as rational actors with regard to realism. In short, it could be claimed that religion is not a relevant subject for understanding foreign policy according to the realist perspective.

Additionally, it could be highlighted that neorealism is not immune from this sort of blindness. As Sandal and James (2010) genuinely indicated, the international system is the most significant factor for neorealism and anarchy is a determining factor of

this international system. Within this system, the distribution of capabilities determines how a state could act in a given circumstance (Santal&James, 2010). Also states, as self-interested actors, seek to promote their own survival and relative gains (Santal&James, 2010). Therefore, it could be illustrated that both realism and neorealism are indifferent in terms of religion in international relations. Thus it might be noted that they are not convenient to examine religion and religious related issues in terms of international relations and foreign policy.

In addition, it is interesting to observe that liberalism and neoliberalism are not out of this cluster. At this point, Hewitt's approach could be particularly useful to demonstrate why liberalism is not a suitable way to observe religion in international relations. For Hewitt (n.d.), this inconvenience stems from fixed identities and interests because liberalism concedes that states as rational actors seek to utility maximization so that liberalism does not regard religion as a related factor in terms of international relations. Also, Philpott's argument could be taken as an example to support Hewitt's perspective. With regard to Philpott (n.d.), it is demonstrated that liberal theorists claim that moral ideas which are not derived from religion(s), liberal domestic regimes and international norms are at the heart of international relations and these factors can eliminate the negative effects of the pursuit of power and anarchy. More strikingly, it might be noted that in spite of considerable weight given to non-state actors and their role in international relations, neoliberalism also does not consider religion as a salient factor in international relations (Anderson, 2008,p.208-9). Thereby, it could be stressed that neither liberalism nor neoliberalism are interested in religion, so that they are not helpful to cope with religion and religious issues in terms of foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process.

At this point, it could be posed that the perspective of Philpott should be necessarily taken into account because his perspective offers alternative analysis of the

inabilities of IR theories. According to Philpott (n.d., p.76), “mainstream international relations theories-especially the liberal and realist traditions- are secular because its founding father described, celebrated and incorporated into their thinking a secularizing set of historical events”. In other words, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others portrayed a world where religion, religious practices and institutions had lost their power. Also, they suggested that politics continue without them (Philpott, n.d., p.76). Hence, it could be concluded that these philosophers, as founding fathers, have caused the indifference of IR theories in terms of religion.

However, in respect to the literature, this is not the end of the story because in their remarkable work, Sandal and James (2010) claim that the main problem is literally the positivist tradition. In accordance with their perspective, positivist traditions have not been open to examine variables such as culture, religion or identity even if they had explanatory power (Sandal&James, 2010). Also, Fox could be seen as a member of this stream because he asserts, “early social scientists established a tradition of seeking rational explanations and guidelines for human behavior to replace theocratic ones” (Fox, 2001,p.54). Yet, without Smith’s impressive work, this argument could still be hard to comprehend. Initially, Smith (2001, p.42) poses that positivism stresses the necessity of naturalism in the social world that means there is no difference between the natural world and the social world in terms of analysis. More importantly they think that separation among facts and values is fundamental with regard to Smith (2001, p.42). In other words, facts are theory-neutral and normative commitments should not play a role in what is acknowledged as knowledge or as fact. In a nutshell, it could not be wrong to argue that from this perspective, religion ought to be kept away from any kind of scientific endeavor. As a result of that approach, it could be exhibited that mainstream IR theories cannot provide an useful toolkit to understand religion in international relations and this derives from their positivist epistemology.

Genuinely, even though different explanations prevail in the literature, it could be assumed that mainstream IR theories are not able to help deal with religion related topics in international relations. So that, to find out the role of religion, especially in terms of foreign policy, looking into “boxes” might be contended as a better way because, as aforementioned, according to mainstream IR theories there is no room for religion in relations between the “boxes”. Thereby, this paper is interested in the approach of FPA.

Before mentioning the perspective of FPA and why FPA, it ought to be displayed that with increasing attention to religion for different reasons, scholars such as Haynes (2009), Fox (n.d.) or Anderson (2008) focus on religiously inspired views, interest groups, and actions or religion as a force influencing people’s worldviews and their effects on policymakers or effects at foreign policy level. As contrary to these scholars, it could be claimed that Asad’s view opens up the new way to scrutinize religion.

First of all, one of his most influential arguments is that there is no universal definition of religion, “not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive process” (Asad, n.d., p.116). Also, Frayer (2013, p.54) draws attention to the difference between ancient communities’ and contemporary societies’ approaches to religion in order to support this claim. However, the thing which makes Asad exceptional is that discursive and non-discursive conditions explain how symbols are constructed and why some of them are thought of as usual and authoritative while others are not (Asad, n.d., p.117). Yet, probably the most important feature of his argument is that power creates the conditions for living or experiencing the “truth” (Asad, n.d., p. 119). Asad explains why power is the determining factor by referring to Augustine. According to this view, coercion and

discipline are crucial for realization of truth and its endurance and power is the real owner of coercion and discipline (Asad, n.d., p. 119). Hence, it could be argued that religion depends on power, therefore a change in power leads to change in what the religion or religious is in a particular society with regard to Asad's perspective. Briefly, through Asad's view, a research about religion can get rid of highly limited topics in terms of international relations and foreign policy analysis. In other words, a change in power in a particular state can alter the approach to religion so that this change can trigger a particular type of foreign policy or a new turn in foreign policy in a particular state. Yet, it could be stated that Asad's view in itself is not enough to demonstrate that.

At this point, it could be denoted that methods of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and constructivism are important for this paper because they have the potential to fill the gaps of Asad's perspective in terms of foreign policy analysis. Initially, FPA could be conceded as important because, as noted by Kubalkova (2001,p.18), FPA attracts attention to actual people who build up governments and act on behalf of states. Also, the other important aspect of FPA is that it pays attention to nature and the impact of domestic politics (Kubalkova, 2001,p. 18). To make that argument clear, Smith (2001, p.38) makes the point that foreign policy is a sphere of preference: actors depict, determine, declare, and realize. Basically, as figured out by Smith (2001, p.38), "foreign policy is what states make of it". Obviously, it could be suggested that using particular words such as policy makers as "agents" or "making" of foreign policy poses adherence between constructivism and FPA (Kubalkova, 2001,p.19). Also, this coherence is not limited to just words as illustrated by Smith (2001, p.53).

However, it could be stated that there is no inherent harmony between FPA and constructivism. On the one hand FPA does see agents who act on behalf of the state decide, determine and conduct foreign policy in respect to Kubalkova (2001, p.18).

On the other hand Smith (2001, p.50) examined that as a constructivist, Wendt (1999) takes states as “pre-social” and “exogenously given”. This means that for Wendt, the role of social constructivist theories of international politics explains how ontologically prior and pre-given actors act as unitary actors. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that there is still hope for proper cooperation between FPA and constructivism.

Fortunately, Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert created a diverse sort of social constructivism with their impressive book in 1998. Within this frame, these scholars describe different social worlds where actors are conducted by language, rules, and choices (Smith, 2001, p.52). To stress the significance of language, Onuf (1998, p.59) poses that “saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is”. Furthermore, rules should be taken into account because they point out who are agents in society with regard to that perspective (Onuf, 1998, p.59). Following that, agents have goals and they act to achieve these goals that are characterized by the rules of the language-game, and these might cause the production of institutions depicting the relatively permanent pattern of expectations (Smith, 2001, p.53). Indeed, in order to understand what this constructivist tenet of FPA offers, scholars such as Ted Hopf and Jutta Weldes who study within that tenet could be highlighted.

Undoubtedly, it could be contended that Asad’s view is an opportunity to discuss religion out of limited arguments, but also that view itself is not able to provide an explanation of foreign policy decision-making. So that Hopf’s perspective could be assessed as vital. From his perspective, individuals construct themselves and “others” while they live in this constructed cognitive structure (Hopf, 2002, p.3-4). Hence, “every foreign policy decision maker is as much a member of the social cognitive structure that characterizes her society as any average citizen” (Hopf, 2002, p.7). Basically, as emphasized by Sjöstedt (2007), actors are both mirrors of

discourses and servants to strengthen them. But, the question is how these individuals or agents construct. According to Jutta Weldes (1998), the answer is quite clear: language does not only reflect the world, but also constructs the world as we experience it and operate in it. Thus, Weldes (1998) argues that the language that is used by policymakers does not exhibit policy problems or issues; rather, it vigorously generates the issues and problems with which policymakers confront.

Lastly, discourse, which is the other issue, should be considered within this frame. Probably the discourse is one of the most essential parts of the whole debate, whilst it is poorly comprehended. But to comprehend the discussion appropriately, it ought to be illuminated. Firstly, it is mentioned that “a discourse allows what can be said and what cannot, even creating the ‘common sense’ of a society” in accordance with Otuathail (2002). In fact, Milliken (1999) helps to improve our understanding by stating that discourse produces interests and preferences and additionally, sets the patterns for public consent for a certain course of action. Thereby, it could be asserted that there is a two-way relation between discourse and actors that is created via language. In brief, Asad mentions power and its determining role in terms of religion and that constructivist FPA clearly demonstrate how policymakers who hold power construct a certain understanding of religion in a particular state and how this construction becomes a dominant discourse and how policymakers as both depictees and choosers live in this frame and ultimately how these elements render plausible a certain type of foreign policy.

In conclusion, basically this paper relies on cooperation between FPA, constructivism and Asad’s perspective to understand how and why engagement with Muslim countries started in AKP’s term. To find that out, initially, the paper, as Asad suggests, sheds light on the power issue and the question of how change in power redefines the approach to religion in Turkey. At the same time, the language that is used by policymakers is determined by that work. Thus, it can be highlighted how a

certain type of discourse was created and how that discourse and agents constructed and produced each other perpetually during this term. Eventually, it is posed that how this construction made possible the change in direction of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP's term.

THE ROOTS OF WESTERN ORIENTED TFP

Initially, it could be stressed that recently emerging disputes about the “new axis” of Turkish foreign policy stemmed from the claim of departing from a western oriented foreign policy attitude. Thus, it could be examined that unless the western orientation of TFP is comprehended, the engagement claims cannot be illuminated. To explain this western orientation of Turkish foreign policy, system level analyses play a leading role with regard to the literature. For instance, scholars such as Karpat, Sander, Baskın, Demirağ and Çelebi stress security threats that are mainly defined by the former Soviet Union or communism, and economic inabilities of Turkey or the Middle East as an unstable region. Thereby, in order to explain the integration with Muslim countries, these scholars rely on reasons such as the Cyprus Crisis or OPEC's oil embargo in 1973 to examine the integration issue. Beside these claims, there are some arguments that consider domestic resources such as leaders and their foreign policy preferences or rising social movements. Why these arguments should be taken as unable to comprehend the engagement issue is going to be demonstrated within the next part. In this part, firstly, the paper seeks to demonstrate why system level analyses could be conceived as inadequate in order to understand the western orientation of TFP. Then, the paper relies on historically constructed power relations, agents, their language, rules and institutions and their influential roles to comprehend the western oriented TFP and the change in relations with Muslim countries.

First of all, apart from the disappearing threat from the former Soviet Union or insufficient economic performance of Turkish governments, why that foreign policy attitude demonstrates persistence or why relations with Muslim countries remained temporary could be taken into account as a noteworthy question. Demirağ and Çelebi's perspective could be seen as an answer because they argue (2011, p.ix) that domestic factors of states should be considered to provide a consistent explanation in terms of foreign policy. With this reason, it might be mentioned that changes in domestic level genuinely affect a foreign policy of a state with regard to Demirağ and Çelebi (2011, p.ix) but also it ought to be indicated that they do not trace this suggestion in their work. As exhibited before, whether deliberately or not, they prefer to follow system level analysis to justify the western oriented TFP. Thus, it could be suggested that research that focuses on domestic factors is needed to illustrate maintenance of that foreign policy attitude.

At this point, the way that is paved by Bilgin could be considered as significant because Bilgin comprehends threats or security issues completely different in comparison with other scholars. Threats or security concerns are shaped by choices, perceptions or identities so that they are not necessarily inevitable contrary to systemic analysis in accordance with Bilgin (2011, p.3). Thus, Bilgin's argument could be assessed as inspirational because it directly indicates the importance of agents as policy-makers, institutions, rules, discourse and language to establish the reasons that stand behind the western oriented TFP and engagement with Muslim countries. To do that, this part mainly sheds light on Turkish political history.

Undoubtedly, contributions that are provided by system level analyses might be acknowledged as influential but also neglect agents, their ideology and inclination or rules and institutions. In other words, these analyses inherit an attitude that was adopted by mainstream IR theories and conceive religion as irrelevant. So that, as in that case, they could be assessed as weak to figure out some important aspects of

cases such as maintenance or change. For this reason, within this part, the newly emerged Turkish state's elites, their ideology, preferences, and institutions, rules and language that were used by the elites and discourse are considered to provide proper explanation in terms of the western oriented TFP.

First of all, the Turkish National Independence War could be taken as the starting point because "Turkey's decision to fully integrate itself into the West was tied to Turkey's new Western identity constructed in the years following Independence War" (Bozdalıoğlu, 2008). Hale (2002, p.44) confirms that argument and notes that the way that was followed by this leadership could be seen to be quite unusual because secularism, modernism and Turkish ethnic identity rather than Muslim identity became the main pillars of this new state. Actually, it is hard to see Hale as unique in terms of this observation. In his remarkable work, Oral Sander acknowledges these features of the new identity and stresses that leaders of the resistance movement were affected by positivist philosophy while they were constructing that new identity (Sander, 2006, p.74). Similarly Hasan Kösebalaban (2013, p.46-7) mentions this effect of positivist philosophy over that movement's leaders.

At this juncture, it could be put under light, Atatürk, as leader of that national independence movement and founder of the new Turkish national state, played a leading role both in internal and international politics. First of all, it might be noted that Atatürk was the president of Turkey until his death on in 1938. But more strikingly, as illustrated by Akşin (2007, p.201, 206,213), Atatürk took many revolutionary steps and fundamentally changed Turkish society in terms of internal politics. Also, Atatürk clearly reflected the effects of positivist philosophy from the beginning of the new state to his passing away. For instance, according to Kösebalaban (2005), he favored a modernization discourse in which the secular-rational state model has been accepted, at least, as progressive and religion has been conceived as retrogressive. So that, in his other attractive work Kösebalaban

(2008) highlights that for Atatürk and his followers, modernization was an escape from conservative and conventional values linked with Islamic political and social values. To prove that argument, looking at Heper and Toktaş's work could be quite useful because Heper and Toktaş (2003) point out that from the perspective of Atatürk and his followers, the main reason that induced the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was "corrupted" Islam. In brief, it would be asserted that as the founder of modern Turkey, Atatürk had an approach to religion and according to this approach; religion was an obstacle in the way modernization of Turkey.

Furthermore, as noted by Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, "The foreign policy of the young Turkish Republic was devised and conducted under the leadership of Atatürk from 1923 until his passing on November 10, 1938" (Kibaroglu&Kibaroglu, 2009, p.18). So that, it would not be inaccurate to concede that Turkish foreign policy is not immune from Atatürk's ideology or particularly his approach to Islam. Also, this perspective is strongly supported by Tuncer (2011, p.25) who illustrates that Atatürk determined the main principles that were implemented by the Turkish state in TFP and followed carefully the harmony between his principles and the implementation process. As a result of this approach, while Turkey moved towards the West, it preferred to sustain low profile relations with Muslim countries and the Middle East instead of its cultural heritage with regards to Bozdağlıoğlu (2008). Briefly, it could be assumed that the legitimacy provided by the Independence War, particularly Atatürk as both a leader and an ideologist of the new state constructed the identity of the new state by excluding Islam from that new identity and the foreign policy is conducted by following the principle of the new identity.

Within that frame, the Sa'dabad Pact and the Entente Balkanique stand as important agreements in Atatürk's term in order to understand the dynamics of this term. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed the Sa'dabad Pact on July 8, 1937 (Çetinsaya, 1999). The Sa'dabad Pact could be assumed as important because as

heralded by the New York Times, Atatürk's individual effort was very decisive. But contrary to the New York Times view, it could not be defined as a successful agreement among Muslim countries. To make this clear, Kösebalaban (2013, p. 127) underscores that both the Sa'dabad Pact and the Entente Balkanique mirror the security concerns of Atatürk's term. Actually, the content of the Entente Balkanique, which was signed by Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania on February 9, 1934, utterly supports Kösebalaban's argument. According to this content, each country must respect the other's unity (UMI, n.d.). Briefly, at least, it could be put that even if these two agreements could not be thought of as proof of a Western orientated TFP, they would be seen as avoidance of developing relations with Muslim countries by relying on religion. At the same time, they cannot be perceived as proof of departure from western oriented TFP.

Furthermore, it would be stated that after Atatürk's passing, the approach to religion and primary tendency of TFP remained in the same line. İsmet İnönü who was one of the closest friends of Atatürk, became president and obtained the "National Chief" title after Atatürk's passing (Ünsal, 2013, p.71). Also, to draw attention to the continuity, Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu demonstrate that "the two had also shared perfectly the same ideals as well as the future of the Turkish Republic" (Kibaroglu&Kibaroglu, 2009, p.19). Additionally, it ought to be kept in mind, the CHP (Republican People's Party) governed Turkey as the main party until the DP's (Democrat Party) victory in the first democratic election. Yet, more strikingly, as emphasized before, besides the dominance of the CHP and presidency in domestic politics Hale exposes (2002, p.81) that vital decisions that were related to foreign policy were just discussed in the party caucus of the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP). In regard to literature, it could be contended that by this time, the approach to religion was not changed because as mentioned before, the ideology that defends secularism and the CHP as representative of that ideology and its power, the resources of that power were not changed or were not confronted with

challenge. Thereby, it could be claimed that the western oriented TFP and the approach to religion were protected.

After the Independence War, Turkey experienced a reinforcing and reproducing process of this modernization/westernization project. At the same time, it could be stated that secularism became one of the most salient foundational principles of that new state and the modernization/westernization (Akşin, 2007,p.189). Yet, more importantly it could be indicated that the project was incorporated with a power consolidation process of recently emerged elites. Findley, in his book about Turkish national history, sheds a quite important amount of light on the early era of modern Turkey and exhibits how that process was conducted. For instance, through the 1924 Constitution, TBMM (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey) was acknowledged as representative of popular sovereignty. However the president, who was Atatürk from 1923 to 1938, determined, despite of regular elections, all members of the TBMM (Findley, 2011, p.257). Moreover, until 1950 when the DP (Democrat Party) won the first free fair election after the transition to a multiparty regime, the CHP (Republican Peoples' Party) held on power as main party and the president was leader of that party according to the CHP's party code (Findley, 2011, p.257). More interestingly, as examined by Findley (2011, p.257), the interior minister was appointed as secretary general of the CHP while governors were named as the CHP's main representatives of the provinces. Subsequently, Findley (2011, p.258) indicates that Kemalism as an official ideology of that new state was generated during these years and this ideology was defined in the CHP's manifesto as "six arrows" which contain explicitly secularism (Findley, 2011, p.258). In short, these developments could be described as a part of both reinforcing and reproducing the modernization/westernization project and the power consolidation.

Indeed, it would be contended that this power issue deserves more attention because as discerned by Asad (n.d.) before, that power aspect is particularly

important because it establishes the role of religion. Also, as demonstrated before, that power, which belonged particularly to Atatürk and his friends, could be seen as a result of legitimacy that derived from the Independence War and the deliberately conducted consolidation process. But the important point is that, through that power, Atatürk and his friends constructed a structure with secularism as one of the most salient pillars of this newly emerged structure (Ünsal, 2013, p.71). At that juncture, it would not be wrong to figure out that their secularism perspective was quite different. With respect to that secularism approach, religion must be kept under control persistently and strongly by the state (Oran, 2011,p.22). Furthermore, especially Kösebalaban's view might be seen as alluring because he describes that secularist perspective as "exclusive secularism" that is explained by Kösebalaban (2013, p.44) as the removing of religious freedom completely. In fact, Kösebalaban goes further and claims that Kemalist approach to secularism aimed at the removing the social and political effects of Islam (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.114). Actually, even at the first glimpse, it is hard to classify Kösebalaban's point as weak or wrong. As indicated by Karpat (2012,p.196), the caliphate was abolished in 1924. Following that, the article that acknowledged the religion of the Turkish state as Islam in the constitution was removed in 1928 (Findley, 2011, p.252). Also, the establishment of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs) to control religion by the state and starting to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic alphabet could be seen as parts of that approach (Findley, 2011, p.252; Karpat, 2012, p.196; Mardin, 2011, p.64). Genuinely, these implications might be conceived as the "taming" and excluding of Islam from the public sphere as well as separation of it from cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire (Findley, 2011,p.256). In brief, it would be suggested that this new Turkish political elite as the holder of power determined a role for religion. With regard to this new role of religion, Islam must be kept under control and away from the public sphere by the state.

This new regime as the real owner of power constructed a discourse, which was compatible with the role cast for religion, via institutions, rules and language. To make this argument more meaningful, a short journey among Findley's lines might be enough because he records that the new regime banned the use of religion for political aims and classified this as treason by a code (Findley, 2011, p.251). Yet, this constructed discourse was enlarged by the education system alongside the other revolutionary implications thus, generations were educated in such way that they have perceived religion as a "harmful", "irrational" and "meaningless" tradition (Heper,1981, p.350). Thereby, Bozdağlıoğlu (2008) argues that the regime produced enough human capital and institutions to protect that discourse by using different means and "all of which remain devoted to secularism and to Turkey's Western orientation" (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008, p.72). In addition, Karpat, in his exceptional work, supports that idea by noting that secularism had deep roots in the newly generated Turkish elites' minds (Karpat, 2012, p.187). But, it ought be examined that the military and bureaucracy have had very special roles to preserve that discourse.

On the one hand, members of the Turkish army have been dominant in the political sphere from 1826 in respect to Findley (2011, p.193). On the other hand, according to Kösebalaban (2013, p.135, 357), this dominant role of the military relies on Atatürk and his friends who served as soldiers in the army of the Ottoman Empire, so this caused the military's especially powerful role in politics. Eventually, it could be denoted that the military consolidated its role in politics and arose as the owner of power through using different means. In other words, as indicated by Ünsal (2013, p.73) the military became the guardian of the regime. For example, in regard to Ümit Cizre (2005, p.73), if the budget that is destined for the military is the criterion to evaluate the power of the military, the Turkish military could be accepted as independent. Absolutely, only this criterion might not be seen as enough to prove the military as the owner of power. For that reason, coups, formal and informal arrangements could be considered to understand that power issue.

In fact, both Ünsal and Cizre pay attention to coups, which respectively were carried out by the military in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and stress the emerging constitutional arrangements after these coups. According to these authors, the arrangements in 1961 and 1973 especially led to a double-headed system. Within this framework, the cabinet shared its role with the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu¹ (MGK) while military justice system established as an independent system from formal justice system that prevents judging members of military in civil courts (Ünsal, 2013, p. 79; Cizre, 2005, p.68). Moreover, Ünsal emphasizes a point that could be assessed as specifically significant because it demonstrates how the military perceives itself as the “guard of the regime or Kemalist ideology”. That point is the military’s internal service code no.35 that announces “ the mission of the Turkish armed forces is to protect and look after Turkish homeland and established Republic of Turkey by the constitution” (Ünsal, 2013, p.93). Furthermore, for Cizre (2005, p.69), the military did not hesitate to enhance its power when it had a chance to do that, for instance, after the coup in 1980, the military reformed the MGK profile by a new constitution. Now, the government must give priority to advise of MGK in accordance with that new constitution (Cizre, 2005, p.69). More interestingly, it could be exposed that the military has not been alone in terms of protecting the regime. To prove that argument, Hale figures out that “the main national dailies and commercial TV companies strongly supported a pro-Western secularist position” (Hale, 2002, p.206). Additionally, Ünsal seems to acknowledge that argument by noting that, particularly during the so called “28 Şubat ” coup and presidential election in the 2007 judicial bureaucracy walked hand in hand with the military to sustain and protect the Kemalist regime and its secularism principle (Ünsal, 2013, p.80). In short, it would be regarded that the military took responsibility to sustain the Kemalist foundational principles, especially, secularism.

¹ National Security Council

Furthermore, the language which has been used by high profile members of the Turkish armed forces ought to be of concern because, as mentioned by Weldes (1998) before, it is genuinely part of the discourse constructing, reinforcing and reproducing process. On that point, a speech by General Büyükanıt who was Chief of General Staff from 2006 to 2008 could be taken as a convenient example that explains the role of language in that process. In October 2006, Büyükanıt said that “religiously motivated movements are clearly threats and all measures must be taken seriously against these threats” (Büyükanıt, 2006) in inaugural military academies. Besides this, the other important General of the Turkish Armed Forces, Başbuğ, who served as Chief of General Staff from 2008 to 2010 reminded that, “according to the second article of our constitution, republic of turkey is to a secular state” and, following that, argued “ secularism and Islam cannot live together” in an interview (Başbuğ, 2004). More strikingly, in order to represent the using of language and its effect, a memorandum that was put on an official website of the Turkish armed forces might be useful because this action occurred on response to AKP’s candidate for presidency. Indeed, at that date, the AKP was perceived as an Islamist party because of its founders’ Islamist background, so that it was seen as a threat to the secular regime of the Turkish state (Çınar, 2015,p.58). So, that memorandum could be considered to be important and according to that memorandum, the Turkish armed force is the defender of secularism and it is obliged to protect that principle (Ünsal, 2013, p.93). In short, it would not be wrong to note that these speeches are quite helpful to exhibit how the military construct a reality in terms of religion by using language.

Therefore, it would be clearly indicated that as a result of these arrangements the military got its own economic resources and justice system and obtained power to sustain Kemalist secularism. In other words, it would be denoted that these sort of arrangements inevitably reinforced military power and facilitated the accommodation and maintenance of inherently adopted approach to religion. Thus, as a

consequence of that process, Islam, Muslims and Arabs were increasingly associated with negative images and stereotypes such as backward, uncivilized and untrustworthy while as Atatürk mentioned, the West was defined as a source of civilization and/or modernization (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008).

Briefly, it could be suggested that contrary to system level analyses, not only changes at system level but also elites, their preferences and ideology, internal developments in the newly emerged Turkish state and eventually the approach to Islam led to western oriented TFP. Basically, it would be pointed out that “for some decades in the 20th century the Kemalist doctrine kept Turkey aligned on a Western axis” (Kaylan, 2015). Also, as illustrated by the paper, the military as tutelary of Kemalist ideology sustained the western oriented TFP or, at least, the military protected Kemalist principles to maintain the western orientation of TFP. That point would be taken as particularly important because, as mentioned before, the maintenance of the western oriented TFP cannot be just explained by systemic level analyses because they are not able to explore the effect(s) of religion over foreign policy attitude(s). In conclusion, change in the western oriented TFP could not only be considered as a result of system level changes. Rather, it would be thought of as a consequence of the new approach to Islam.

TOO WEAK TO EXPLAIN: SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSES AND ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS

At the beginning, it could be stated that system level analyses are not capable of defining integration with Muslim countries in the AKP's term because it only looks at system level changes such as economic stagnation, security concerns or the Cyprus Crisis with regard to literature. Basically, as mentioned within the last part, it ignores the internal resources of western oriented TFP. Also, as noted before, it would be asserted that the other tendency explains that integration by focusing on political

leaders and their preferences led to emerging Islamist movements because of new constitutional or social and political changes such as coups in respect to the related literature. But, these explanations could be conceived as occasional or temporary and cannot express the endurance of the western oriented TFP. In other words, these explanations cannot portray why the relations between Turkey and Muslim countries indicated development in AKP's term. Hence, in this part, in order to explain why the reason that lies beneath the integration could not be economic stagnation, security concerns, the Cyprus Crisis or political leaders, the paper concerns the especially dominant discourse and approach to religion in the historical process in terms of TFP.

First of all, after World War II, Turkey witnessed unprecedented changes, which must be emphasized in order to understand the further steps of TFP in terms of domestic politics. Transition to a multiparty regime and the demolishing of the CHP's dominance by the DP would be taken as salient examples of these changes. With regard to Zürcher (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.153), the victory of the DP was a revolution for Turkey because this meant the collapse of the CHP's main party regime. Yet scholars who work on Turkish foreign policy exhibit how tough it is to define that new term as a revolution in terms of foreign policy. For instance, Demirağ and Çelebi (2011, p. ix) or Kürkçüoğlu and Karaş (2011, p.181) focus on the DP's foreign policy and depict that foreign policy as being western particularly oriented towards the U.S.. The Soviet or communism threat could be mentioned as a main theme of these works to explain the western oriented foreign policy during the DP's term (Demirağ&Çelebi, 2011, p.viii). Also, scholars such as Kösebalaban or Oran seem to underpin that argument by applying important cases from history to explain that western oriented foreign policy during the DP's term. For instance, Kösebalaban (2013, p.495, 98) highlights obtaining NATO membership by Turkey in 1950, establishing CENTO, which included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom in 1954 and later, led to Turkey being perceived a as collaborator of

Western power in the region, supporting France during the Algerian Independence War (1954-62) and finally the usage of NATO military stations in Turkey by the U.S. to land troops on Beirut in 1958. However, the question is that if the DP's victory meant the end of the CHP's main party regime, how western oriented foreign policy was preceded during the DP's term. In fact, it could be seen as just a victory of the DP in the first democratic election rather than a revolution. As regarded by Cizre (2005, p.93), the DP was not a real threat for the regime and/or its secularism perspective. Rather, according to Cizre (2005, p.94) the DP embraced the regime's approach to Islam. Therefore, it could be concluded that founders and members of the DP shared the same secularist view with the CHP so that, while engagement with Muslim countries was not on the DP's foreign policy agenda, the western oriented foreign policy perspective survived.

Also, the coup that was carried out by the military caused the toppling of the DP's government in 1960 and a new constitution under military rule. The constitution that was invoked in 1961 came with expansion of freedoms and democratization so that Islamist movements became more visible in the policy process and public debates (Cizre, 2005, p.95-6). But, as found out by Kösebalaban (2013, p. 182-83), this constitution reinforced the power of the military and judiciary over legislation and execution, additionally, the military institutionalized its guardian role of providing protection for Kemalist secularism. In short, it could be stated that Islamist movements were not able to determine or change the dominant discourse both in terms of TFP and religion even though they became more visible. Hence, it might be asserted that the rising of Islamist movements cannot be perceived as the beginning of engagement with Muslim countries.

Moreover, scholars such as Karpas (2012, p.192), Sander (2006, p.233) and Kösebalaban (2013, p.196) point out that before, during and after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops, a feeling that Turkey was left alone emerged and prevailed

in Turkey so they argue that after this milestone, Turkey comprehended the importance of Middle Eastern countries. However, the vital point, which should not be overlooked, is that developing relations with Middle Eastern countries does not mean a change in policy towards Muslim countries (Sander, 2006, p.238). For example, after the instigation of Mescid-i Aksa, that is one of the most holy places for Muslims, King Hussein called an immediate meeting of Muslim countries in 1969 (Milliyet, 1969) but the Turkish president Sunay rejected to attend that meeting as president of a secular state (Fırat, 1997,p.246). The other related topic is economic problems caused by OPEC's embargo in 1973. As a consequence of this embargo, Turkey turned its face towards Middle Eastern countries as described by Kösebalaban (2013, p.219). However, with regard to the literature, it would be stated that Turkey's dependence on natural resources and economic weakness forced it to develop closer relations with Arab countries, but this does not mean a fundamental change in relations with Muslim countries. Thus, it might be supposed that instead of Turkey's loneliness or economic problems, discourse, language or agents' ideology stayed on the same line in terms of the approach to religion. Thereby, it would be assumed that these changes are periodic and mainly derive from practical reasons; in other words, they do not reflect a real shift in the Kemalist secularist perspective and Turkish foreign policy.

In accordance with the literature, when prominent leaders such as Demirel, Ecevit, Özal or Erbakan gained power, they tried to change or changed the western oriented Turkish policy and developed relations with Muslim countries. Firstly, it would be alleged that none of these leaders can be represented as the reason that created engagement with Muslim countries in TFP. During their terms, these leaders could not modify power relations or the dominant view about Islam and power. To provide a persistent explanation, considering Cizre's view might be a way because she is one of the most prominent scholars in terms of Turkish domestic politics. As an influential scholar Cizre (2015) notes that Demirel was never against Kemalist secularism that

puts religion out of politics. Also, the other valuable intellectual Çınar (2015, p.75) argues that Demirel's political line accepted staying in the frame that was drawn up by the "guardians". In addition, the guardians of the regime appeared on the stage again by another coup in 1971 when Demirel was prime minister. According to Findley (2011, p. 316), these coups were ways for the military, as the owner of power, to say directly to government(s) what they should do. Hence, it might not be inappropriate to claim that Demirel was far away from leading such engagement with Muslim countries because as seen, he was not the owner of the power to determine or change the official approach to religion.

In fact, Turkey experienced another coup that was conducted by the military in 1980. The thing that makes that coup more interesting is choosing Islam as a way to control extreme political movements (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.224). At the first glimpse, it might be seen as a change in discourse but these sorts of arguments are definitely shallow because it could be assumed that this new way was a new strategy, not a new approach to religion. Surely, Kösebalaban's view makes that point clear by reminding of Kemalist secularism which argues that religion must be kept under control by the state. According to Kösebalaban (2013, p. 224), that new way did not change this aspect of Kemalist secularism but also wanted to use religion to construct society. Thereby, it would be estimated that the attitude towards religion stayed on the same line so it cannot represent a birth of engagement with Muslim countries.

After that decisive incident, Özal swept to power in 1983. Özal was differentiated from other leaders because he implemented extraordinary policies both at internal and external levels. For instance, during his term, Turkey experienced economic liberalization as occurred in the Reagan and Thatcher terms (Hale, 2002, p.164). Yet, as Çınar (2015, p.125) claims, this economic liberalization did not mean democratization and defiance of the military power. Also, in order to justify Çınar's

view, Cizre (2005, p.71) stresses that without the permission of president Evren who was the leader of the coup in 1980 and former Chief of General Staff, Özal could not do what he did. But, the striking point is that Özal never attempted to change the institutional structure to reduce the power of the military with regard to Cizre (2005, p. 71). For this reason, Hale's point could be assessed as more important because it clearly enlightens the power issue and official approach to religion. According to Hale, Özal spent a quite salient amount of effort to convince the guardians that the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) is not a religious organization (Hale, 2002, p.171). Briefly, it would not be interesting to stress that contrary to scholars such as Kösebalaban (2013), and Uzgel (2013), developing relations with Muslim countries in Özal's term do not reflect a change in the western oriented TFP or a change in relations with Muslim countries.

Additionally, it might be of concern that the other noticeable leader was Ecevit in modern Turkish state history. The point that should be noted is that the invasion of Cyprus occurred when he was prime minister and was the person who closely experienced Turkey's loneliness in the international environment and argued to develop close relations with Arab countries to get rid of this loneliness (Oran, 2011, p.674, 78,79). The other attractive point about Ecevit is that he embraced third worldism (Hale, 2002,p.207). Consequently, not surprisingly, scholars such as Oran and Karpat assert Ecevit's term as the onset of developing relations with Muslim countries. Yet, Çınar's argument should not be underestimated because Ecevit was a member of the "acceptable politician" cluster that was determined by the guardians. In other words, it might be supposed that Ecevit did not represent resistance against the dominant discourse or main approach to Islam with regard to Çınar (2015,p.75). As a result, taking Ecevit's terms as the starting point of changing relations with Muslim countries could be described as inappropriate because he did not have enough power to change the main discourse and perspective about religion.

Apparently, the most appealing leader was Erbakan, who was clearly committed to Islamism in the intensively secular political environment. Erbakan's pro-Islamist party took office on 26 June 1996 and Erbakan was the new owner of the prime minister title (Hale, 2002, 197). Seeing Erbakan as Islamist is not inconvenient because during his election campaign in 1995, he described the EU as a "Christian Union" and instead of this Christian Union, he called for a Muslim Union. The other striking point is that Erbakan, as a prime minister, did not visit any western countries (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.264). In addition, Erbakan tried to follow a political agenda that was mainly shaped by referring to Islam in terms of internal politics (Çınar, 2015,p.42). Yet, the "guardians" did not hesitate to demonstrate their power and enforce Erbakan to cooperate with Israel (Kösebalaban,2013,p.67,8). For this reason, Israel was an indicator to demonstrate the superiority of secularism over Islamist identity because for Erbakan, Israel genuinely was an enemy, while for the guardians, as a result of the secular character of the Turkish state, Israel was only a state among others (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.267-68). After one year from his government being established, a coalition that was formed by the media, the military, elites and the business world put on pressure and led to the resignation of the government (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.270) and Erbakan's party was closed down by the Supreme Court because of its religiously motivated activities (Hale, 2002, p.198). As a consequence, even if Erbakan could have the potential to change the relations with Muslim countries, as clearly examined, the owner of power prevented this attempt, so that it could be taken as far away from being a representative starting point in terms of the integration with Muslim countries.

In conclusion, it could be assumed that the results of the Cyprus Crisis and oil embargo in 1973 do not seem to be enough to understand why relations with Muslim countries started to increasingly develop in recent years and why developed relations could not be sustained for a long time. Moreover, focusing on leaders could not be seen as helpful to answer the same question because, as demonstrated by coups,

none of them altered the primary discourse that was protected by the guardians and relied on Kemalist secularism. These arguments do not deeply scrutinize the approach to religion as a domestic resource of foreign policy to explain and express the western oriented TFP and the integration with Muslim countries. Thus, they cannot find out the reason why particularly the AKP's term could be taken as turning point.

THE AKP TERM AS A STARTING POINT

Whether Islamist or not, at least problems that have been defined by referring to Islam have been appropriated by the AKP since it swept to power. In other words, it could be suggested that being a Muslim is a part of AKP identity. Also, consecutive victories in elections have created chances to form a single party rule for the AKP from 2002 to 2015. Thus, it could be asserted that the AKP have had opportunities to modify the dominant discourse, power relations with guardians and eventually Kemalist secularism. Inevitably, these developments in domestic politics have changed foreign policy attitudes. Even if TFP, during the AKP term, could not be conceived as separated from western oriented foreign policy, it could be argued that a perspective that considers relations with Muslim countries has been added to TFP by the AKP. From the beginning, this paper focuses on the AKP's approach to religion to understand that foreign policy attitude. Also, within this part, the changing nature of power relations, change in discourse and perspective about religion are focal points.

Firstly, it could not be inconvenient to claim that relations with Muslim countries have had exclusive space in the AKP foreign policy agenda. To confirm that argument, Çağaptay (2007) underlines that the AKP has put a premium on ties between Turkey and Muslim countries and focused on solidarity with Muslim countries. The calling on

Turkey to retrieve its historic and geographic identity would be seen as a reason that underlies these premium ties (Danforth, n.d.). At that point, stressing the importance of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was a former foreign policy advisor of the prime minister and is now prime minister and R. Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the former prime minister and is now president, would be appropriate to understand the main ideological framework behind this scene. Also, Cornell (2012) suggests paying attention to Davutoğlu's works because Cornell confirms those works as guidance of Turkish foreign policy. Additionally, from Cornell's (2012) perspective, Erdoğan must be considered as the conductor of the policies that are drawn up by Davutoğlu's work. At that juncture, obviously, the question appears of how these works or policies emerged. According to Çınar's (2015, p.164) view, the definitive fact that constructs AKP's identity is its interpretation of what Kemalism is. With regard to this interpretation, Kemalism is a project that leads to a cultural alienation (Çınar, 2015, p.164). So that, to find itself and emerge again as a powerful state, Turkey must turn its face to its cultural, historical and geographical heritage (Davutoğlu, 2011, p.62). Apparently, the Ottoman Empire as well as Islam could be taken as a main source of this heritage. For example, to prove that argument, Davutoğlu (2011,p.55) contends that to appear in the Balkans strongly, Ottoman-Islam culture must be kept alive in this region. Shortly, it could be contended that AKP and its leaders have adopted a different approach to religion and relations with Muslim countries.

Following that, it could be claimed that from the AKP's perspective, Islam is precisely a part of Turkish society's identity and AKP is a piece as well as a production of this society. Thus, not surprisingly, this new approach to religion would be observed as a trigger that led to the change in relations with Muslim countries and the TFP main attitude. In a public speech, Davutoğlu denoted that "our religion and our identity are our pride" and these words could be taken to prove why a new approach to religion should be considered as a reason that brought change in relations with Muslim countries in the AKP term. Also, through referring to Davutoğlu's works, Grigoriadis

(2010) states that the Ottoman-Islam culture that is the origin of modern Turkey's identity and is a source of being a powerful state in accordance with Davutoğlu. Furthermore, Kösebalaban's observation could be expressed as bewildering because from his perspective, Islam is a philosophy of life for the AKP's leaders (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.280-81). This argument must be marked because it represents the difference between Islamism and the AKP approach to Islam. To enlighten that point, it could be mentioned that politics is not a means to serve Islam from the AKP perspective (Çınar, 2013, p.314). Hence, it might be examined that the outcome of this perspective is the distinction between the state and the individual. According to the AKP, a state could be secular but individuals do not need to be secular (Findley, 2011, p.360). Within this frame, political Islam was turned into a conservative democratic perspective (Kösebalaban, 2005). Thereby, it could be asserted that Islam is not identified as a reason that leads to obstruct the modernization process or leads to underdevelopment in this new term. Rather, as stressed by both Çınar (2013,p.309) and Kösebalan (2005), Islam became a way for association with neoliberalism and modernization in a different way. Also, it could be contended that this new approach to religion became a means to provide close relations with Muslim countries and revise the western oriented TFP (Kösebalaban, 2013, p.333, 301). Moreover, from Akdevelioğlu and Yeşilyurt perspective, reconciling with Islam opened new doors for Turkey to develop unfamiliar relations with Muslim (Yeşilyurt&Akdevelioğlu, 2013, p.384). In a nutshell, it would be conceded that the AKP has created a new rhetoric that embraces Islam and this rhetoric gave a chance for the AKP to improve relations with Muslim countries and change the TFP's western orientation.

Certainly, the AKP developed a new approach to religion but also it would be posed that this new approach to religion is not sufficient to change the dominant discourse, the primary stance of TFP or relations with Muslim countries. In regard to Asad (n.d), as emphasized before, power is surely a constituent to understand the role of religion

in a society. Initially, at the beginning, the AKP spent its time to prove that it is not an Islamist party and it avoided to conflict directly with the guardians (Çınar, 2015,p.46). But, it could not be of interesting to suggest that after victories in elections and perpetual single party governments, this assisted in transforming the dominant discourse that was determined by the guardians particularly in terms of religion. Çınar (2015, p.111) approves that point by stressing the successful performances of the AKP in elections to explain how the AKP became the real owner of power. But also, Çınar (2015, p.110-111) mentions the influence of the AKP's exceptional performance in foreign policy, stability and growth in the economy, improvements in conditions and qualities in education, health and transportation services, to describe how the AKP has stayed in government and got the power to change the discourse. According to Çınar (2015,p.111, 156), these developments provided the opportunity for the AKP to obtain power and as long as the AKP stayed as owner of the government, it acquired key positions and institutions in the state to use against the guardians. Also, it would be stated that constitutional and institutional changes followed that process. First of all, some members of the military were accused of plotting a coup against the AKP government and were judged by civil courts and this case contributed to a reduction of the guardian's power (Ünsal, 2013, p.99). Subsequently, the EMASYA protocol that provides overwhelming authority for commanders in provinces was removed (Çınar, 2015, p.97) and, structures of the YAŞ (Supreme Military Council) and the MGK were changed in favor of civil authority (Ünsal, 2013, p.103). Actually, the presidential election in 2007 could be seen as a turning point in terms of power relations. Barkey (n.d.), in his attractive work, reveals this case. The military issued a midnight memorandum on its own Internet site to block the AKP's candidate for the presidency because from the perspective of the military, the AKP and its candidate had an Islamist background so they were clearly a threat to the secular regime (Barkey, n.d.). However, after this incident, the AKP dissolved the parliament and called for an early election immediately. Eventually, the party increased its share of the vote to 47 percent (Habertürk, 2007). Briefly, it could

be evaluated that the AKP diminished the role of the military in domestic politics and got enough power by getting some key positions and institutions in the state, and generating constitutional and institutional reforms to replace the main discourse and approach to religion in its own way.

Making peace with Islam and changing the nature of the power relation with the guardians could be considered as the main pillars of the new term in TFP. Yet, it could be appraised that just emphasizing these pillars is not satisfactory to provide a convincing argument. Thereby, focusing on the AKP's acts in terms of foreign policy might be a way to construct a consistent argument. Seemingly, there are two main fashions to disclose the foreign policy attitude during the AKP term. According to these two fashions, Turkey played or wanted to play a mediator or conciliator role in relation with Muslim countries. Barkey endorses this claim by asserting that Turkey attempted to be a mediator or conciliator in many disputes in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus (Barkey, n.d.). But, for Ünsal (2013, p.209), Turkey would be taken as a mediator rather than a conciliator. Ultimately, it could be assumed that as conciliator or mediator somehow Turkey took its position as a Muslim country at almost every negotiation table on which problems of Muslim countries were debated. For instance, Turkey hosted Israel-Syrian talks in 2008 (Barkey, n.d.), and following that, convinced Syria to allow investigation of Hariri's assassination (Uzgel, 2013, p.364). Then, Turkey hosted meeting between the U.S., Iran and the P5+1 to negotiate Iran's nuclear program (Ünsal, 2013, p.209). More strikingly, to build trusting relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Turkey organized a meeting with these countries in 2007 (Ünsal, 2013, p.209). Additionally, in 2010, Turkey led the establishment of a consultancy mechanism that brought foreign ministries' officers of Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia together (Ünsal, 2013, p.401).

Also, Turkey and Palestine signed a free trade agreement in 2004 (Yeşilyurt, 2013, p.433). Yet, the most attractive turn was probably the relationship with Hamas. In

2006,AKP leaders met with prominent the leader of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, in Ankara (Yeşilyurt, 2013, p.430). After that incident, “Erdoğan stated in no uncertain terms that he did not consider Hamas a terrorist organization” (Radikal, 2010). Increasing relations with Palestine and Hamas could be thought of as particularly special because as mentioned before, sustaining relations with Israel was an indicator to represent Turkey’s secularist regime from the guardians’ perspective. But it would be assumed that the AKP has developed relations with a Muslim country or organization at the expense of relations with Israel.

Alongside this, Erdoğan termed Ahmadinejad a “friend” (Tait, 2009). This incident should be taken into account because it certainly demonstrates how the old western oriented TFP and approach to religion was demolished. “In the 1990s, Iran’s image in Turkey was associated with a ‘dark regime’ “ (Kibaroglu&Kibaroglu, 2009, p.154) as a result of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. This perception was clearly an outcome of the guardians’ secularist view so that during these years, Iran was a serious threat for Turkey (Kibaroglu&Kibaroglu, 2009, p.153-54-55). But, in the AKP term, Iran became one of the closest friends of Turkey. Besides hosting nuclear talks, in 2003, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement to create a common trade committee (Yeşilyurt, 2013, p.456). Shortly, it would be stated that TFP became a friend with its nightmare that was mainly derived from the Iran Islamic regime with regard to the literature.

Additionally, to illuminate developing relations with Muslim countries, looking at different variables might be advantageous. For example, the share of Gulf countries in foreign direct investments increased 3795 percent in 2005 and hiked to 1.7 billion dollars (Yeşilyurt&Akdevelioğlu, 2013, p.405). Furthermore, tourists who come from Middle Eastern countries jumped to 2 million in 2005 and in 2007, rose to roughly 2.5 million while these rates perpetually decreased in the second half of the 90s (Yeşilyurt&Akdevelioğlu, 2013, p.406). Yet, just looking at rates of tourists who are

from different countries in the Middle East is not meaningful, so news from the Turkish daily newspaper Star might be useful to clarify developing relations with Muslim countries in terms of tourism. Keleş (2015) from the Star heralded that according to the Global Muslim Travel Index, Turkey is the second most attractive Muslim country as a travel destination among OIC members. In addition, TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) that basically could be described as a means of Turkey's soft power might be another alluring example. In 2008, its budget was raised 10 times higher and Muslim countries had an important share in this budget by 2013 (TİKA, 2013.). Lastly, it could be posited that Turkey as either mediator or conciliator has provided extraordinary relations with Muslim countries and the acts mentioned can be taken as proofs of integration with Muslim countries in the AKP term, but also these acts can be seen as reflections of reconciling with Islam and getting power in foreign policy.

Consequently, contrary to the guardians' position, religion, particularly Islam, does not necessarily incorporate "bad" imaginations such as underdevelopment, chaos or corruption from the AKP perspective. Additionally, for this perspective, Islam is explicitly one of the most fundamental components of Turkish society as well as the AKP identity. Yet, with regard to the literature, the AKP cannot be depicted as an Islamist party because it is not in pursuit of establishing a state or society which is executed by Islamic rules but also as seen before, it believes in the presence of Islam in social life. Eventually, the AKP and its approach represent reconciliation with Islam. But this reconciliation is meaningless without change in the power relation in terms of domestic politics. As this section also clearly revealed, the AKP obtained power by carrying out constitutional and institutional reforms, staying in government, and exhibiting good performance in the service sector. Obtaining power substantially provided the means for the AKP to change dominant approach to Islam or discourse in favor of its new approach to Islam. Not surprisingly, TFP is not immune from these changes that occurred in domestic politics. Looking at acts in foreign policy during

AKP term uncovers winds of change. Muslim countries, now, became more visible in TFP with regard to these acts in foreign policy. Briefly, having power and changing the approach to Islam by the AKP inevitably produced building close relations with Muslim countries.

CONCLUSION

Definitely the work stresses that increasingly developing relations between Muslim countries and Turkey is the result of the new approach to religion that has been embraced by the AKP in recent years. Also, with regard to the work, system level analyses that stem from mainstream IR theories cannot figure out this fact because they perceive religion as irrelevant in the sense of foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process.

Thereby, to prove that argument the paper necessarily begins with methodology. Initially, the first section emphasizes mainstream IR theories and their limited outlook in terms of religion related issues. At that point, the paper argues that their epistemology, ontology and methodology do not allow them to examine religion as a fact that affects foreign policy and the foreign policy decision-making process with regard to the literature. Hence, according to the paper's perspective, in order to comprehend the role of religion in foreign policy, looking into the "boxes" rather than relations among the "boxes" is vital as FPA underscores. In respect to the literature, FPA draws attention to two important facts; domestic structures of state and agents who execute foreign policy on behalf of the state and that's why the paper accepts FPA as a useful way. Yet, just relying on FPA is inconvenient because FPA is not able to defeat limited arguments that are based upon religiously inspired interest groups and actions or the influence of religion on individuals' worldviews and on policymakers at foreign policy level. Indeed, the point that must be highlighted is what if leader(s), elites or individuals adopt a particular approach to religion? Asad's

piece is to answer this question because according to Asad, basically, power determines the approach to religion in other words those who have the power determine what the religion or religious is. Thus, within the first part, the paper stresses the crucial role of cooperation amongst Asad's perspective and FPA. Also, the first part believes in the necessity of another cooperation that is between FPA and constructivism. At that point, it must be noted that FPA does not necessarily believe in constructing foreign policy attitudes. Especially, Kubalkova, Onuf, Kowert, Hopf and Weldes are essential because these scholars stress the significance of agents, institutions, rules, language and discourse while the construction process occurs. In the first section, it is demonstrated that FPA cares about domestic sources of foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making process and constructivism supposes relations between agents, institutions, rules, language and discourse constructs a particular foreign policy attitude. So that the first section represents that the cooperation between FPA and constructivism make Asad's view useful because these two approaches help to understand how power can determine religion and how this approach affects religion.

Because of the methodology mentioned, first of all, the second section considers the western orientation of TFP. Understanding the roots of western oriented TFP is specifically critical because all discussions about the "new axis" of TFP or "shift in foreign policy" takes western orientation of TFP as the centre so they describe developing relations with Muslim countries as the "new axis" of TFP or "shift in foreign policy". Thereby, that part mention system level analyses and their explanations about the roots of western oriented TFP. Basically, the part claims that these analyses just regard security concerns and economic weakness of Turkey to discern western oriented TFP and they cannot explain the permanence of the western orientation of TFP although removing security concerns or economic weakness of Turkey. Also, that section plainly demonstrates that they are unable to explain the maintenance of western oriented foreign policy attitudes because they

are not interested in religion despite adopting secularism by the founding fathers of modern Turkey. As genuinely indicated by the second section, the elites of modern Turkey deliberately preferred to westernize/modernize Turkish society. Moreover, it ought to be kept in mind that this westernization/modernization process includes secularism that sets forth the state control over religion because from the elites' perspective, religion is the reason that might lead to underdevelopment, corruption or collapse of the state. Also, this ideological perspective was reinforced and sustained by using rules, language and institutions, and became the dominant discourse until challenged from the AKP. Ultimately, as stated by Bozdağlıoğlu (2008), Muslim countries were associated with inappropriate images and Turkey intentionally was kept away from Muslim countries. More strikingly, the Turkish armed forces have inherited that approach to secularism and as examined within the second section, have kept up the secularist approach by using and controlling different means. In short, the second part states that only relying on system level analyses to figure out western oriented TFP is not sufficient because they do not take the domestic roots of foreign policy into account, but as clearly indicated by that part, the elites' ideology and approach to religion play a vital role in the shaping of the foreign policy attitude.

The third section is based on two main issues: explaining engagement with Muslim countries by system level analyses and by other sources such as leaders or rising social movements with regard to the literature. The Cyprus Crisis and the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 are two primary pillars of system level analyses in order to analyze integration with Muslim countries. But even though Turkey's loneliness is a reality because of the Cyprus Crisis, in terms of international relations, after the crisis, Turkey sought to develop relations with just Arab countries. Additionally, this endeavor is clearly periodic and it does not reflect the change in the dominant discourse that embraced Kemalist secularism. Furthermore, similarly, after the OPEC incident, Turkey experienced developments in relations with Arab countries but this does not mean a change in relations with Muslim countries. Moreover, there is no

clear evidence to acknowledge the OPEC incident as a turning point in the sense of relations with Muslim countries in respect to the literature. Indeed, the third part indicates that the striking point is that what the reason is has led to mention about a “new axis” or “shift in foreign policy” in recent years as a result of developing relations with Muslim countries if these arguments are starting points. Thereby, the third part concludes that these arguments are neither useful nor sufficient to interpret integration with Muslim countries because they do not regard Turkish elites, their ideology, approach to religion, language or institutions and rules to describe developing relations between Muslim countries and Turkey.

As contrary to system level analyses, there are some arguments concerned with domestic resources to find out developing relations with Muslim countries with regard to the literature. Firstly, extended individual rights and freedoms by a new constitution in 1961 are put under the spotlight as a turning point by some scholars but despite increasing visibility of religiously motivated social movements by that date, these social movements were not able to change, influence or determine dominant discourse or foreign policy as demonstrated by the third section. Secondly, in regard to the literature, the other stream deals with leaders and their preferences to express engagement with Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the third part exhibits that the mentioned leaders did not have either enough power to create fundamental change or an aim to create a change in the dominant discourse, approach to religion or power relations. In short, the third part argues that these arguments cannot disclose why discussions began in the AKP term and why these discussions issued a “new axis” in TFP or a “shift in foreign policy” as a result of developing relations with Muslim countries. Also the other claim revealed by the third section is that these arguments definitely overlook the approach to religion to assess integration with Muslim countries.

Thus the final section suggests the AKP term as a subject or turning point to identify developing relations with Muslim countries. The first reason that underlies this suggestion is that the AKP has provided a new approach to religion. As contrary to Kemalist secularism, religion is not a reason for underdevelopment or corruption and religion is an essential component of Turkish society from the AKP's perspective. Hence, as examined by the fourth section, religion is both part of the AKP's and Turkish society's identity so it cannot be kept away from the public sphere. In fact, as mentioned before, without a change in the power relation, this change in approach to religion is not meaningful. But, the last section claims that the AKP also got the power, diminished the role of the guardians and modified the discourse by carrying out institutional, constitutional reforms and, performing achievements in education, health services, public transportation, the economy and foreign policy. Actually, the other important point as displayed by the paper is that as mediator or conciliator, Turkey increasingly has become a part of issues that were related to Muslim countries. This role is compatible with Davutoğlu's perspective. According to his approach, Turkey should develop relations with Muslim countries as a Muslim country because its religion is one of the most important sources of its power (Davutoğlu, 2011,p. 41). Also, AKP governments in foreign policy that illustrate how the AKP deconstructed the stance that led to staying away from Muslim countries have taken actions. Yet, there are two remarkable examples to understand this change. Firstly, Iran was marked as a dark regime because of its Islamist regime by the regime that was conducted indirectly by the Turkish armed forces, but Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan described President Ahmadinejad as a "friend" during the AKP term. Secondly, the AKP developed close relations with Palestine and Hamas and this means the collapse of the guardians' perspective that considered relations with Israel to prove Turkey as a secular state. Briefly, the final part contends that the AKP term is a starting point in terms of developing relations with Muslim countries because it made peace with Islam, in other words, embraced new approaches to

religion and it obtained enough power to change the main discourse in favour of its approach to religion; ultimately, it has changed the main attitude of TFP.

In conclusion, the situation is not comprehended by the different arguments because of changes in the approach to religion. The western oriented TFP is a result of the Kemalist approach to religion and then developing relations with Muslim countries is a consequence of the new approach to religion that has been provided, used and reinforced by the AKP. So the diverse arguments that have been mentioned cannot explain or understand the roots of western oriented TFP and developing relations with Muslim countries because they are not concerned with religion.

Lastly, it would be posed that because of the increase in the relations with Muslim countries, Turkey sticks into the regional politics as mentioned by Kösebalaban (2013, p.370). In other words, the relations with the western countries and the EU have decreased during that process so that the human right abuses and the authoritarian inclination of the political elites become more visible in terms of domestic politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, F. (2010). *Demokrasi sürecinde türkiye: 1945-1980*. İstanbul: Hil Yayın
- Anderson, J. (2008). Religion and international relations. In T., C., Salmon, & M., F., Imber (Ed.), *Issues in international relations* (pp. 207-218). New York: Routledge.
- Akşin, S. (2007). *Kısa türkiye tarihi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Kültür Yayınları
- Asad, T. (n.d.). *The construction of religion as an anthropological category*. Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~womrel/Rel433%20Readings/01_SearchableTextFiles/Asad_ConstructionOfReligionAnthroCategory.pdf
- Barkey, J., H. (n.d.). *The evolution of Turkish foreign policy in the middle east*. Retrieved from TESEV website: http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/Henri%20Barkey_final.pdf
- Başbuğ, İ. (2004, March 20). *Hem laik devlet hem ılımlı islam olmaz*. Retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ArsivNews.aspx?id=211069>
- Bilgin, P. (2011). Türkiye'nin güvenliğinde batı yönelimli dış politikaların oynadığı rolü anlamak. In Y., Demirağ, & Ö., Çelebi (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası: son on yıl* (pp.1-20). Ankara: Palme Yayınları
- Bozdağlıoğlu, Y. (2008). Modernity, identity and turkey's foreign policy. *Insight Turkey*, 10(1), 55-76

Büyükanıt, Y. (2006, October 2). *Büyükanıt'tan irtica uyarısı*. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/10/printable/061002_turkey_general.shtml

Çağaptay, S. (2007). Secularism and foreign policy in turkey: new elections and troubling trends. *Washington Institute Policy Focus*, 67, 1-27

Çetinsaya, G. (1999). Atatürk dönemi türk-iran ilişkileri:1926-1938. *Avrasya Dosyası* 5(3), 148-175

Çınar, M. (2015). *Vesayetçi demokrasiden "milli" demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Birikim Kitapları

Çınar, M. (2013). Dağıtıcı iktidar kardeşliği. In Uzgel, İ., & Duru, B. (Ed.), *AKP kitabı: bir dönüşümün bilançosu* (pp. 307-315). Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi

Cizre, Ü. (2005). *Müktedirlerin siyaseti: merkez sağ-ordu-islamcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Cizre, Ü. (2015, June 23). Merkez sağın kemalizme sadık lideri demirel. *Aljazeera Turk*. Retrieved from: <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/merkez-sagin-kemalizme-sadik-lideri-demirel>

Cornell, E., S. (2012). Changes in turkey: what drives Turkish foreign policy?. *Middle East Quarterly*, 19(1), 13-24

Demirağ, Y., & Çelebi, Ö. (2011). *Türk dış politikası: son on yıl*. Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık

Danforth, N. (n.d.). *Ideology and pragmatism in Turkish foreign policy: from Atatürk to the AKP*. Retrieved from:

http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/vol_7-no_3-danforth.pdf

Davutođlu, A. (2011). *Stratejik derinlik*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

Erdoğan, R.,T. (2010, June 04). *Hamas'ı terör örgütü olarak kabul etmiyorum*.

Retrieved from:

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_hamasa_sahip_cikti_direnis_orgutu-1000714

Findley, V., C. (2011). *Modern türkiye tarihi: islam, milliyetçili ve modernlik 1789-2007*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları

Fırat, M. (1997). *1960-71 arası türk dış politikası ve kıbrıs sorunu*. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi

Fox, J. (2001). Religion as an overlooked element of international relations. *International Studies Review*, 3(3), 53-73.

Fox, J. (n.d.) *The multiple impacts of religion on international relations: perceptions and reality*. Retrieved from

http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_064_1059--the-multiple-impacts-of-religion-on.htm

Framer, H. (2013). *Din sosyolojisi*. Ankara: DođuBatı Yayınları

Grigoriadis, I., N. (2010). *The davutođlu doctrine and turkish foreign policy*.

Retrieved from:

Habertürk (2007, July 23). *Genel seçim 2007*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.haberturk.com/secim2007>

Hale, W. (2002). *Turkish foreign policy*. London: Frank Cass Publishers

Haynes, J. (2009). Religion and foreign policy. In J., Haynes (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of religion and politics* (pp.293-308). New York: Routledge.

Heper, M., & Toktaş, Ş. (2003). Islam, modernity, and democracy in contemporary turkey: the case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Muslim World*, 93(2), 157-185

Heper, M. (1981). Islam, polity and society in turkey: a middle eastern perspective. *Middle East Journal*, 35(3), 345-363

Hopf, T. (2002). *Social construction of international politics: identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Houghton, P., D.(2007). Reinvigorating the study of foreign policy decision making: toward a constructivist approach. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3, 24-45.

Karpat, K. (2012). *Türk dış politikası tarihi*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları

Kaylan, M. (2015). *The 12 people who ruined Turkey*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.politico.eu/article/dirty-dozen-12-people-who-ruined-turkey-democracy-human-rights/>

Keleş, B. (2015). *Müslüman ülkeler içinde helal turizmin ilk adresiyiz*. Retrieved from

Star Daily newspaper website:

<http://haber.star.com.tr/ekonomi/musluman-ulkeler-icinde-helal-turizmin-ilk-adresiyiz/haber-1047838>

Keyman, F., E. (2009). *Turkish foreign policy in the era of global turmoil*. Retrieved from the SETA website:

<http://arsiv.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=7857&q=turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-global-turmoil>

Kibarođlu, M., & Kibarođlu, A. (2009). *Global security watch: a reference handbook turkey*. London: Praeger Security International

Kösebalaban, H. (2005). The impact of globalization on islamic political identity: the case of turkey. *World Affairs*, 168(1), 27-37

Kösebalaban, H. (2013). *Türk dış politikası*. Ankara: BigBang Yayınları

Kubalkova, V., Onuf, N., & Kowert, P. (1998). *International relations in constructed world*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Kubalkova, V. (2001). Foreign policy, international politics and constructivism. In V., Kubalkova (Ed.), *Foreign policy in a constructed world* (pp.15-38). New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Kubalkova, V. (2003). Toward an international political theology. In F., Petito, & P., Hatzopoulos (Ed.), *Religion in international relations: the return from exile* (pp.79-107). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kürkçüođlu, Ö., & Karaş, F. (2011). 2000 yılı sonrası türkiye'nin ortadođu siyaseti. In

Y., Demirağ, & Ö., Çelebi (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası: son on yıl* (pp.177-222). Ankara: Palme Yayınları

Mardin, Ş. (2011). *Türkiye, islam ve sekülerizm*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Milliken, J. (1999). The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 225–254.

Milliyet (1969). *Ortadoğu yine karıştı*. Retrieved from:

<http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1969/08/23>

Onuf, N. (1989). *World of our making: rules and rule in social theory and international relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Oran, B. (2011). 1980-90: dönemin bilançosu. In O. Baskın (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası cilt II: 1980-2001* (pp.9-33). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Oran, B. (2011). 1960-1980: dönemin bilançosu. In O. Baskın (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası cilt I: 1919-1980* (pp.655-680). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Otuathail, G. (2002). Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the united states' response to the war in bosnia. *Political Geography*, 21(5), 601–628.

Petito, F., & Hatzopoulos, P. (2003). The return from exile: an introduction. In F., Petite, & P., Hatzopoulos (Ed.), *Religion in international relations: the return from exile* (pp. 1-21). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sandal, A., N., & James, P. (2010). Religion and international relations theory: towards a mutual understanding. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(1), 3-25.

Sander, O. (2006). *Türkiye'nin dış politikası*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi

Sjösted, R.(2007). The discursive origins of doctrine: norms, identity and securitization under harry s. truman and george w. bush. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3, 233-254.

Smith, S. (2001). Foreign policy is what states make of it: social construction and international relations theory. In V., Kubalkova (Ed.), *Foreign policy in a constructed world* (pp.38-58). New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Tait, R. (2009). *Iran is our friend, says turkish pm recep tayyip erdoğan*.

Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/26/turkey-iran1>

Tuncer, H. (2011). Atatürkçü dış politkanın ilkeleri. In Y., Demirağ, & Ö., Çelebi (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası: son on yıl* (pp.21-36). Ankara: Palme Yayınları

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. (2013). Annual report: 2013.

Retrieved from:

<http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf>

Ungarisches Institut München (n.d.). *Pact of balkan entente between greece, roumania, turkey and yugoslavia*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19340209-2.pdf>

Uzgel, İ. (2013). Dış politikada AKP: stratejik konumdan stratejik modele. In Uzgel, İ., & Duru, B. (Ed.), *AKP kitabı: bir dönüştürmün bilançosu* (pp. 357-380). Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi

Ünal, Ü. (2013). 11 eylül olayı ertesinde AKP dönemi: dönemin bilançosu. In O. Baskın (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası cilt III: 2001-2012* (pp.13-248). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Weldes, J.(1998). Bureaucratic politics: a critical constructivist assessment. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42(2), 216-225.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yeşilyurt, N., & Akdevelioğlu, A. (2013). AKP döneminde türkiye'nin ortadoğu politikası. In Uzgel, İ., & Duru, B. (Ed.), *AKP kitabı: bir dönüştürmün bilançosu* (pp. 381-409). Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi

Yeşilyurt, N. (2013). Ortadoğu'yla ilişkiler. In B. Oran (Ed.), *Türk dış politikası cilt III: 2001-2012* (pp.401-462). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

