

**ESDP,
The Controversial Issue between
Turkey and the EU:
Different Security Concepts**

Hakan Cavlak

101608005

Social Sciences Institute
Department of European Studies

Istanbul Bilgi University

Istanbul April 2004

**ESDP,
The Controversial Issue between
Turkey and the EU:
Different Security Concepts**

By

Hakan Cavlak

101608005

APPROVED BY:

Emre Gönen, Ma:

.....
(Thesis Supervisor)

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Serhat Güvenç:

.....

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Murat Borovalı:

.....

DATE OF APPROVAL:

.....

Abstract

In 1998, Britain and France, two major military powers within the EU, have initiated the ESDP process. This policy area would be an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the second pillar of the EU, and requires the absorption of the WEU. The disagreement between Turkey, a European but non-EU member of NATO, and an Associate Member of the WEU, and the EU has started at this point; because, Turkey, with this new structuring and institutionalizing of European security, experiences erosion on its influence on European affairs. Furthermore, it is also perceived in Turkey that the new arrangement would hurt some vital international interests of Turkey around her territory as well as her domestic security. From the European point of view, the main objection to Turkey's attempt is the question "why should a non-member country be involved in the EU's "domestic" decision –making mechanisms," as well as the scepticism if Turkey really will enhance the security of Europe. ESDP is one of the policies of the EU and the EU should have the exclusive right of decision-making and implementing it; and Turkey is just in the middle of the world's most insecure regions and has its own insecurities. This problematic issue would be discussed in this thesis with a constructivist approach. It will be argued that security identities of the parties are different and this difference constitutes the main reason of disagreement.

Özet

1998 yılında Avrupa Birliği'nin iki önemli askeri gücü olan İngiltere ve Fransa Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP) sürecini başlattı. Bu politika alanı AB'nin Ortak Dış ve Savunma Politikasının ayrılmaz bir parçası olacaktı ve Batı Avrupa Birliği'nin (BAB) bu süreçte ortadan kaldırılması gerekiyordu. NATO'nun Avrupalı ama AB üyesi olmayan ve BAB'ın Ortak üyesi olan Türkiye ile AB arasındaki sorun işte bu noktada başladı; çünkü Türkiye, Avrupa güvenlik sisteminin bu yeni yapısal ve kurumsal şekliyle Avrupa'da ciddi bir etki erozyonu yaşayacaktı. Bunun yanında, bu yeni durum Türkiye'de Türkiye'nin sınırları çevresindeki bazı uluslararası çıkarlarını ve kendi iç güvenliğini zedelediği şeklinde algılandı. Avrupa tarafında ise Türkiye'nin bu konuda yaptığı girişimlere “neden AB üyesi olmayan bir ülke AB'nin kendi iç karar alma mekanizmasına dahil edilsin?” sorusuyla karşı çıkıldı, ayrıca Türkiye'nin Avrupa'nın güvenliğine gerçekten bir katkısı olup olmayacağı şüphesi de bu muhalefette önemli bir etkendi. Avrupa'nın bu durumu değerlendirmesi şu şekilde özetlenebilir: AGSP, AB'nin kendi politikalarından birisi ve böyle bir alanda karar almak AB üyelerine özel bir haktır; Türkiye dünyanın en güvensiz bölgelerinin tam ortasında ve kendi iç güvenlik sorunları var. Bu tezde bu tartışmalı konu yapısalcı bir yaklaşımla incelenecek; her iki tarafın birbirlerinden farklı bir güvenlik kimliğine sahip oldukları ve bu farklılığın ortaya çıkan bu anlaşmazlığın temel nedeni olduğu ileri sürülecek.

Contents	01-02
-----------------	--------------

Introduction	02-11
---------------------	--------------

Chapter 1: The problematic Issue between Turkey and the EU:

ESDP	12-33
-------------	--------------

- **St. Malo: From ESDI to ESDP** 13-14
- **ESDP as an Institution** 15- 16
- **Decision-making in the ESDP** 16-18
- **Operationalization of the ESDP** 19-20
- **European Rapid Reaction Force** 20-23

Chapter 2: The Bases of the Disagreement	24-47
---	--------------

- **An Overview of the Debate and the former structure of European Security** 24-28
 - Associate Membership in WEU 28-31
- **Turkey's Demands** 31-33
 - Legacy of WEU 31-32
 - Importance of NATO 32-33
- **Responses of the EU** 33-47
 - Decision-making Autonomy 34-36
 - Proposals for Reaching an Agreement 37-40
 - The Role of Identity 40-45
 - Turkey as a Security Consumer 45-47

Chapter 3: Security Concept of Turkey_____48-55

- **Geopolitics_____49-51**
- **Sèvres Syndrome_____51-52**
- **Changes in Turkish Security Discourse_____52-55**

Chapter 4: European Concept of Security _____56-75

- **Liberal Power Europe_____57-60**
- **Threat Perceptions of Europe_____60-65**
- **The Conceptual Bases of the Change in European Security
Concept_____65-69**
- **The Different Security Concepts of Turkey and the EU_____70-75**

Conclusion_____76-81

- **What is ESDP? _____76-77**
- **What is the disagreement all about? _____77-79**
- **What is Turkey's security concept? _____79-79**
- **What is the concept of security in the EU and its difference from
Turkey's?_____80-81**

Bibliography_____82-93

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, the security structure of Europe has changed fundamentally. The great threat from east has disappeared. The big enemy, the Soviet Union, dissolved and lost its influence on Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, the rival defense organization against the West, the Warsaw Pact, has vanished. NATO, which had been established on the basis of these threats, has lost its main aim. However, it has rearranged itself considering the new environment and developed new objectives and focused on the secondary tasks of the Cold War era, such as peace keeping, humanitarian aid and regional conflict preventing. Nevertheless, the United States, the most influential and operational power in the NATO, acts reluctantly when faced with the events that do not affect its interests directly and those that do not threaten its security, such as the Yugoslavian wars.¹

As a consequence of these developments, European allies of the NATO have initiated European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the framework of the NATO and reactivated the Western European Union (WEU) to link the EU and NATO. These developments and the idea of a EU with a military arm in order to enhance the integration and make its voice heard in world affairs, have led to the initiation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

¹ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 'European Defence: Challenges and Prospects' speech delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 11 June 2001.
<http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010611a.htm>

In 1998, Britain and France, two major military powers within the EU, have initiated the ESDP process. This policy area would be an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the second pillar of the EU, and requires the absorption of the WEU. The disagreement between Turkey, a European but non-EU member of NATO, and an Associate Member of the WEU, and the EU has started at this point; because, Turkey, with this new structuring and institutionalizing of European security, experiences erosion on its influence on European affairs. Furthermore, it is also perceived in Turkey that the new arrangement would hurt some vital international interests of Turkey around her territory as well as her domestic security. From the European point of view, the main objection to Turkey's attempt is the question "why should a non-member country be involved in the EU's "domestic" decision –making mechanisms," as well as the scepticism if Turkey really will enhance the security of Europe. ESDP is one of the policies of the EU and the EU should have the exclusive right of decision-making and implementing it;² and Turkey is just in the middle of the world's most insecure regions and has its own insecurities.

However, the military capabilities of the members of the European Union are not enough to handle all kinds of tasks which might occur in the future. So, they requested from NATO the guaranteed usage of its assets if NATO itself does not wish to be involved. This was a critical point of the disagreement between Turkey and the EU. NATO is an institution where all decisions are made by unanimity, which means a veto of a member state would prevent the organization to reach a decision. Turkey, as a full member of NATO, had vetoed the initiative of the EU member states, in order to create a space of maneuver while dealing with the EU.

To sum up, on the one hand, the EU wants to have its own defence and security structure and wants to use NATO assets when it is necessary. On the other hand, Turkey wants to participate in this structure to secure her interests and prevent an exclusion from Europe. In order to reach this aim, she uses her influence within the NATO.

² Heisbourg, F. (2000) "European Defense takes a leap forward", *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer, p.10

The remarkable point here is both sides have vital interests concerning each other. On the one hand, Turkey wants to be a member of the EU in order to improve its economic development, democracy and wealth and to conclude its century, even centuries old Westernization project. On the other hand, Turkey, with its very significant connections to the regions that contain world's most important energy resources and its very influential and operational military power, is very essential for the EU to reach its aim to be a global power and have a considerable military arm. So the first interesting point is, if Turkey wants to be a part of the EU, why does she create troubles for the EU. If the EU wants to be a global power and a strong military, why does it not include Turkey in this structure? The second interesting point is, Turkey is an official candidate of the EU membership, which implies sooner or later she would become a member of the Union? So, from the EU side, why are they insisting on not including a possible future member into the structure? From the Turkish side, why is she insisting on special arrangements, if she will become a member of the EU?

Although there are some attempts to reach an agreement from both sides, the problem is still not solved. The main aim of this thesis would be to assess and explain the reasons behind this disagreement. So, the central research question of this thesis is: ***What are the bases of the disagreement between the EU and Turkey on European Security and Defence Policy?*** In order to assist me to answer my central question, I have formulated my secondary questions, which are:

- 1- What is ESDP?
- 2- What is the disagreement all about?
- 3- What is Turkey's security concept?
- 4- What is the concept of security in the EU and its difference from that of Turkey's?

My dependant variable is: *Relations between Turkey and the EU on European Security and Defence Policy*. These relations entailed a disagreement among the parties and I will use *the disagreement on ESDP between Turkey and the EU as an intervening variable*. To explain the situation, my *explanatory or independent variable would be the difference*

between Turkish and European security concepts. So, my first hypothesis is: the disagreement occurred because the security concepts of Turkey and the EU are different from each other. The second one is: they will reach an agreement because the different security concepts of the parties are socially constructed notions, which means they are open to be changed. These notions are the product of social conditions, so change in those conditions would also lead to changes in security concepts.

Constructivist approach has been chosen in order to explain and interpret the evidences in this thesis. The two arguments of constructivism could be stated as such: 1- Structures of international life are primarily based on ideas and not exclusively material; 2- these structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior.³ Also, according to Hopf, constructivism contains two mainstream approaches: Systemic constructivism and normative constructivism.⁴ The former seeks to account for interstate identity structures and the latter focuses on states' adherence to international norms.⁵

I will apply the former one, 'systemic constructivism', on my thesis. This approach is best exemplified by Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*. In his book Wendt points out that "identities are constituted by both internal and external structures."⁶ Yet, when it comes to the daily life of international politics, he describes it as "an ongoing process of states taking identities in relation to others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result."⁷ Additionally, despite the fact that identities are resistant to change, Wendt argues that identity change is possible through process of social learning; in short, process of interaction between 'ego' and 'alter', during which social learning occurs, and can lead to the transformation of an actors identity.⁸ He points out in his formerly written article that, "A fundamental principle of

³ Piccoli, W. (2003) 'European Integration in Turkish Identity Narratives: The Primacy of Security' Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th CGES Graduate Student Conference, Georgetown University, 21/22 March, p. 6.

⁴ Hopf, T. (2002) *Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999*. Published by Cornell University Press., Ithaca

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics* published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.224.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 21

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 326-35

constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.⁹ He also states “Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations”.¹⁰

So bearing the basic assumptions of constructivism in mind, I want to demonstrate briefly how Turkish and European identities reshaped after the Cold War, and the effect of these changes on their security concepts and their treatments to each other. End of the cold war marks fundamental changes in Europe; especially the concept of security and defence has been altered very significantly. The collective defence concept against Eastern bloc and Soviet Union has been dismissed and a collective security concept has taken its place as the core strategic value of the post-cold war Europe. According to Europeans, after the cold war, concrete threat disappeared, which means there would be no attack, against Europe from outside the borders of the EU in the conventional sense¹¹. Thus, their security concepts have been shaped according to that assumption. So, it could be argued that, the new security understanding of Europe, although not very clear, can be formalized as keeping the “backyard” safe and stable in order to prevent non-conventional attacks, such as terrorism, and provide stability, such as preventing illegal immigration, drug trafficking and avoiding ethnic based conflicts¹². Therefore, the new conceptualization of security could be labeled as a shift from collective defence to collective security¹³.

On the other hand, the end of the cold war has affected Turkey in a very different manner. Turkey’s place in Western security system has changed considerably since the end of the cold war. Uncertainty appears as the most influential aspect of this new era and

⁹ Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 396-7.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 397

¹¹ Howorth, J. (2002) ‘Why ESDP Is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance?’ paper prepared for International Security Forum (ISF).

¹² Giegerich, B. (2003) ‘European Security and Defence Policy: In Search of a Strategic Concept’ Paper Presented at 7th Graduate Student Conference, BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March 21 – 22.

¹³ Aybet, G. and Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000) ‘Transformations in Security and Identity After the Cold War: Turkey’s Problematic Relationship with Europe’ *International Journal, Autumn*, p. 568

its avoidance seems to be very difficult. In the days of the global strategic confrontation between East and West, Turkey was the pivotal element of NATO's southeastern flank. It contributed to the security of the Europe and its national security was guaranteed by its inclusion in the alliance. However, in this new order, Turkey is being challenged to find a place. For its allies and partners this will decide, whether it will continue to be an asset of Western security policy or, if and to what extent, it may become a liability¹⁴.

Turkey's security concept only partially overlaps with the European one. Turkey generally shares the European security considerations, as can be deduced from its unconditional consent to the WEU document on European security¹⁵. It is sure that the new security risks also affect Turkey and that the country is important in confronting them. Turkey has involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in former Yugoslavia, peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. It has also an influential policy against illegal immigration and drug trafficking, and even preventing ecological damage has become an element of Turkey's security policy¹⁶.

However, this security perception does not completely fit Turkey's. Turkey still perceives conventional threats. This perception could be divided into two: International threats, such as direct intervention from its neighbors, namely Greece, Syria and even Russia, and indirect influences from outside to instabilize the domestic order; and internal threats, such as Kurdish separatism and fundamental Islam. Although the latter one is labeled internal, in the discourse of Turkish political elite, it is common to connect it to some "Foreign Centers". If one considers the geopolitical location of Turkey, it would be obvious that such perceptions of threat are not baseless. Surrounded with tremendously unstable regions and countries, Turkey's concerns cannot be taken as extreme threat perceptions. Furthermore, Turkey has had historical disagreements, even hostilities with most of her neighbors. So up to this point, it could be argued that their identities, which

¹⁴ Kramer, H. (2000) 'A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States' *published by Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., p. 202*

¹⁵ Kramer, H. (2000) p. 207

¹⁶ Avoiding a human and environmental damage in the Turkish straits has become an important argument for Turkey's choice of bringing Caspian oil to the world market through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

they have developed since at the end of the Cold War, determine their concepts of Security.

Beyond the difference in security concepts, after the cold war the idea of Europe constructed along historical and cultural lines is an attempt to redefine Europe in terms of Christianity, ethnicity, and race.¹⁷ “Turkey’s “Europeannes” becomes questionable because of the resurfacing of perceptions of the ‘Turk’ as the other of European identity.”¹⁸ These perceptions of Europeans have also entailed some debates in Turkey on the Westernness of the Turks. The already powerful anti-Western thoughts in Turkey have gained more acceleration after the anti-Turkish tendencies grew up in Europe and this certainly affected Turkey’s attitude towards Europe as well as the public opinion.¹⁹ To sum up, there is a great project of Westernization of the Turks and they want to improve it by gaining full membership of the EU. However, as a result of their history, they tend to perceive any policy made in Europe affecting Turkey negatively as exclusion. In fact, most of the time, these policies do really exclude Turkey. So, identities of Turkey and Europe, which have been reshaped after the Cold War, do not only determine their security concepts, but they also affect their treatments of each other.

I have organized my chapters according to my secondary questions. So, each chapter answers the related secondary question. The sum of their answers would then be the answer of the central question. In the first chapter, the ESDP would be introduced. Presenting ESDP, which is the field where the disagreement occurred, is very essential to understand the events between Turkey and the EU on this issue. If one does not know what the ESDP is, it would be very difficult to grasp the whole debate. So it would be appropriate to start an introduction of ESDP. In this chapter, I will give a very brief history of the attempts to construct a political and military structure within the EU/EC. Then, I will point out the important breakthroughs of this policy: St Malo Franco-British Summit as the initiation of the ESDP as a EU policy or conversion of NATO’s ESDI into ESDP, Cologne Summit of the EU as the institutionalization of this policy field and

¹⁷ Aybet, G. and Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000), p.569

¹⁸ Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000) ‘Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,’ *Turkish Studies* Vol. 1, pp. 21-36.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Helsinki EU summit as the operationalization of ESDP. After that, I will demonstrate the decision-making structure of ESDP, where the debate between both sides gets most intensified. Finally, I will reveal the European Rapid Reaction Force, which is the tangible part of this policy.

In second chapter, I will try to address the debate between the parties. I will highlight the arguments of both sides with the help of evidences and place the former structure of European Security, specifically the Associate Membership of Turkey in WEU, in order to compare what rights and responsibilities Turkey had before and what will she loose after the proposed restructuring. Then I will put the Turkish demands and the response of the EU to these demands with a special focus on the role of the identity, which has a significant influence on this debate. This chapter would be an integral part of this thesis because it contains the evidence of the disagreement; so before interpreting the debate, it would be appropriate to understand what the disagreement is.

The third chapter will deal with the security concept of Turkey. First, it will be argued that the security discourse of states gives away their security concepts. Then, I will assess the security discourse of Turkey under three subtitles: Geopolitics, distrust and changes in discourse. The importance of Turkey's security concept would be understood if my first Hypothesis is remembered. In my hypothesis, I argue that the difference in security concepts between parties is the reason behind the disagreement. So the security concept of Turkey and the bases of it would constitute one of the basic aspects of the argument of this thesis.

In the fourth chapter, I would place the EU's security perceptions and I will try to find out the overlapping and different parts with Turkish security understandings. In this chapter, I will first present what the Europeans understand from security and what their aim is in constituting a structure based on security concerns. Secondly, I will make a comparison between the security concepts of parties in order to demonstrate the differences and similarities between them. Finally, I will evaluate the findings and try to discover whether their conceptualizing of security is compatible or not. The European

concept of security is one of the integral aspects of the argument of the thesis together with Turkish security concept. Obviously, to make a comparison and to reach a conclusion, perceptions of both sides have to be taken into consideration. And a final assessment is appropriate in order to verify my arguments before concluding the thesis. After the fourth chapter, I will conclude the thesis with a general evaluation of the text.

CHAPTER 1: THE ESDP

The plans for a common European military are almost as old as the European Community itself. As early as 1950, France proposed to create the European Defense Community with a common army and a European Minister of Defense. However, the other European powers had no interest for the plan at the time and the French National Assembly itself refused the plan by 1954.

The European Community returned to the issue of common foreign policy in the early 1970s and agreed to create the European Political Cooperation group to coordinate the member states foreign policies. However, the European Political Cooperation agenda was not incorporated into the founding documents of the European Community and its voluntary nature made it rather inefficient.

As the European countries realized that greater cooperation is necessary to match the US influence, the importance of common foreign policy increased. The Single European Act of 1987 incorporated foreign and security policy cooperation into the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty of 1991) introduced Common Foreign and Security Policy as the "second pillar" of the European Union.

The basis of a true security and defense role for the EU can be noticed in the Amsterdam Treaty, which brought the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks -humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making - into the EU framework and stated that the EU can 'avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the Petersberg Tasks'²⁰ making security and defense a legitimate concern of the EU. This provision was significant in the sense that it had put WEU in a subordinate position with the regard to the cases where the EU would avail itself of WEU. By this way, a strong relationship between EU and WEU

²⁰ Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union, www.europa.eu.int

was formed through the establishment of an organic link between the two organizations and naming the WEU as the defense arm of the EU, as far as matters having a security and defense dimension are concerned. This was exactly the point where the involvement of the WEU nations except for the Full Members came to the fore as a problematic issue. The outcome of this process has been the establishment of a common security and defense policy in the framework of the CFSP as defined by the union treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

1- St.Malo: From ESDI to ESDP

*The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage... This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP... To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises... In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means - European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework.*²¹

However, the real turning point for the initiation of a true security and defense policy for the EU came only after the Franco-British St.Malo Summit of December 1998. At St.Malo, France and Britain decided to push the EU's role in security and defense further and questioned the need for the existence of WEU as an independent organization.

St.Malo is a real turning point in the sense that the efforts towards the realization of ESDI in the framework of NATO has been replaced by policies aimed at the creation of a European-only presence in the fields of security and defense apart from NATO. After the

²¹Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, See Schake, K., Bloch, A. L. and Grant, C. (1999) 'Building a European Defense Capability', *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring), pp.23-24 for the full text of the Declaration.

St. Malo Declaration, discussions regarding the European security and defense have begun to be channeled into the EU framework. ESDI has been replaced by ESDP, former representing the general understanding while the latter signifying the creation of a policy inside the EU. For the first time in the EU history, St. Malo has made reference to the necessity of “an *autonomous capacity* for conducting its [EU’s] objective of a common foreign and security policy”.²² While emphasizing the continued commitment to NATO, it left open the possibility of a European military action outside NATO framework. In the mean time, however, EU ambition to take the responsibility of cases is limited to the ones falling under the purview of the Petersberg tasks and will do so only when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. The table below indicates the essence and general structure of the Franco-British St Malo declaration:²³

<p>Aims</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The Europeans must be able to act without US participation</i> - <i>The aim is to create an operational European defence capability</i> - <i>To focus on political will and effective military forces</i> <p>Institutional Issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>The governments have no reservations concerning institutional issues</i> - <i>The Transatlantic Alliance remains the primary institution for territorial defence, US engagement in Europe, and pan-European defence and security</i> - <i>NATO is the organization to be Europeanized</i> - <i>The EU should have a defence competence</i> - <i>The EU should absorb WEU’s security functions and some defence functions</i> <p>Procedures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Intergovernmentalism must be the decision-making method for defence</i> - <i>Governments must retain their national veto</i> - <i>No involvement of supranational institutions in defence decisions</i> - <i>The Europeans must have free access to national assets committed to NATO when the US does not want to participate in missions</i> <p>Practical Measures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Creation of a European strategic air transport, satellite, and reconnaissance capability</i> - <i>Enhanced policy planning and military early warning unit</i> - <i>European-led intelligence-gathering and capacity to analyze information</i>
--

²² Ibid.

²³ Source: Forster, A. and Wallace, W. (2000) ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in Wallace, W. and Wallace H., eds., ‘Policy Making in the European Union’ p. 486

2- ESDP as an Institution

*“One of the challenges for the ESDP is the establishment of an institutional framework, which may effectively translate the political resolve of the EU member states into swift and sound decisions to launch military operations. EU deliberately has chosen the second pillar as the launching platform for their new European defense capacity. It is argued that a close link with the CFSP and the EU’s single institutional framework may increase the new capacity’s effectiveness and may also strengthen the CFSP with the presumed legitimacy of the EU.”*²⁴ In other words, the ESDP needs to be institutionalized within the EU framework and closely linked to the first pillar of the EU in order to be efficient and legitimate. This problem has found its solution in Cologne EU Summit.

“Cologne EU Summit of 3-4 June 1999 has initiated the institutionalization stage of the ESDP by identifying four main bodies to be set up within the EU, which are the General Affairs Council (GAC), Political, and Security Committee, (PSC), Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff (MS).”²⁵ These bodies correspond to the respective institutional mechanism of NATO, which was conceived to be an influential factor in facilitating the effective functioning of the bilateral cooperation between NATO and the EU. One of the most significant aspects of the Cologne Summit is the decision of the full integration of WEU into the EU. With this decision, WEU has fulfilled its mission and put an end to its functionality in May 2000 apart from certain areas.

With the establishment of the institutional bodies responsible for the EU policies on security and defense and the disintegration of the WEU, status of the non-EU European NATO members, which are Associate Members to the WEU, has become more problematic. However, Cologne EU Presidency Report on the ESDP put an emphasis on the significance of the development of “...satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU Member States to ensure their *fullest possible involvement* in

²⁴Van Staden, A. (eds.) (2000), *Towards a European Strategic Concept* (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.), p.9

²⁵ Andreani, G. (2000) ‘Why Institutions Matter’, *Survival* (Vol.42, No.2, Summer), pp.85-86

EU-led operations, *building on existing consultation arrangements within WEU.*”²⁶ Although, the expression of ‘satisfactory’ is used in this text, it seems that it has not satisfied the so called non-EU European allies, in our case Turkey seems to have problems still.

*“We ‘EU members’ want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations. We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent in this endeavour.”*²⁷ The key phrase in this text is ‘the fullest possible extent’ in my opinion, because although it sounds positive, I think, it has a limiting nature and it also implies implicitly that the control of the arrangements would be in the hands of the EU as the boss of this process.

3- Decision-Making in the ESDP

Decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP have a central essence to understand the ESDP. It gives one of the most important clues to interpret the nature of that policy. As Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet suggests, The ESDP and CFSP decision-making structures based on four principles:

“– Strict intergovernmental elements continue to dominate the CFSP. The principle of absolute retention of sovereignty manifests itself by requiring decisions to be unanimous.

– Secondly, the last two changes in the Treaty anchored the principle of shared sovereignty in the CFSP in order to make its decision-making more efficient. Here, the absolute sovereignty of individual states was given up and thereby the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP weakened. This principle is primarily connected with

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Cologne European Council Declaration On Strengthening The Common European Policy On Security And Defence, Annex III, www.europa.eu.int

opening up the possibility of qualified majority voting in the Council and of constructive abstentions on CFSP resolutions.

– Thirdly, a new principle was introduced into the CFSP at Amsterdam and Nice. This principle brought a new Europeanized rationality to the CFSP, without attempting a transfer of sovereignty at the EU level. The principle is best described by the term ‘brusselizing of the CFSP’. This neologism has in the past been used with widely differing meanings. In what follows, however, the term will denote exactly that process which does not have recourse to the Community methods of the First Pillar, and yet denationalizes the CFSP by diminishing the roles of the Member States and of intergovernmentalism. Thus Brusselizing the CFSP means that while the relevant competencies do remain ultimately at the disposal of the Member States, the formulation and implementation of policy will be increasingly Europeanized and Brusselized by functionaries and services housed permanently at Brussels. This will be interpreted as a new form of governance of the CFSP, as borne out by the naming of the Council’s Secretary General as the High Representative (HR) of the CFSP, the enlargement of his services, and lately the standing presence of the newly established Political and Security Policy Committee at Brussels as well as some of the ESDP structures.

– Fourth and finally, the CFSP decision-making system contains in itself elements of the supranational principle. The cooperative authority of the Commission and the EP as well as the recent beginnings of Pillartranscending strategies have increasingly linked the First and Second Pillars of the EU together in the execution of foreign policy. This is an expression, albeit limited, of the validity of the supranational principle in the CFSP.”²⁸

These principles would help to grasp the complex decision making structure of the ESDP. As it could be observed, decision making in the ESDP is highly intergovernmental. The PSC and other bodies of the ESDP will be set up in Brussels, but they will be in charge of the Ministers of the Member Countries, which means the sovereignty of the nation states would be preserved. Furthermore, the supranational bodies of the EU, namely the Commission and the European Parliament, has been excluded from this structure which also stresses the intergovernmental nature of the ESDP. So it could be argued that decision-making in the ESDP is in the scope of first and third definition of the classification made by Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet. It is intergovernmental but it has been Brusselized in order to enhance the efficiency of the ESDP.

²⁸ Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2002) ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union’ *European Foreign Affairs Review* vol. 7, pp. 260–261

The main bodies identified by the Cologne Summit to be set up within the EU will form the core decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP. At the ministerial level the General Affairs Council will be in charge. This council is currently composed of foreign affairs ministers. The Cologne communiqué refers to joint meetings to be held with defense ministers.²⁹ However, there is no consensus reached on Defense Ministers sitting alone in an EU defense council³⁰. This situation reflects a lack of internalization of this policy by the EU's single framework of decision-making.

The Political and Security Committee will be the body that prepares the decisions of ministers.³¹ It should both take over from the Political Committee in its functions of steering the common foreign and security policy, and managing its new defense side.³² A military committee will formulate advice on military matters, to be then integrated with other policy considerations and channeled to ministers by the PSC.³³ A military staff of 130 officers will inform and prepare deliberations of the Military Committee and PSC on defence related issues³⁴. This decision-making structure seems more like NATO's rather than EU's decision-making composition. However, it is understandable since the ESDP will deal very much with NATO.

Furthermore, it has to be indicated that all ESDP decisions require unanimity. A veto of a single member country would stop the procedure. However, it is up to Member States to participate or not in actual crisis interventions³⁵. In other words, the nature of decision-making in ESDP is based on intergovernmental principles, however it is softened by the option of opting out.

²⁹ Andreani, G. (2000) 'Why Institutions Matter' *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, p.85

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Information from the Web page of the Council of the European Union, <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en> , reached at 02.06.2003

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet G. (2002), p. 266

4- Operationalization of the ESDP

Operationalization of the ESDP has been a more painful process when compared to the relatively smooth process of institutionalization. St.Malo, has for the first time referred to the development of the relevant autonomous military capabilities for the EU in order to fulfill its functions within the scope of the Petersberg tasks. Cologne EU Presidency Conclusions has apparently emphasized the desirability of the development of such a capability for the EU. Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999, on the other hand, has taken a major step when it introduced the principles and guidelines for the formation of a European military capability by the year 2003.³⁶ This difficulty to reach a final agreement on the operationalization of the ESDP is mainly relied on the differences between security and defense policies of the member states. Obviously, all of the member states of the EU have well-rooted foreign and security understandings and policies which they consider vital to their interests and ,even in some countries, to their existence. Although, as a consequence of the fundamental changes in world politics, they had reached an agreement on the necessity of a security policy, it was very difficult to narrow down the gap between their understandings of security and defense.

Additionally, financial and technical shortcomings of the EU member states creates a considerable obstacle to operationalize the ESDP. EU showed its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises during the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Nice in December 2000. However, EU's declared goal of being able to deploy 60,000 soldiers – the kind of force that could serve as peacekeepers in hot spots like Bosnia and Kosovo – will require up to 180,000 soldiers because of rotation needs.³⁷ Main shortfalls are known i.e. strategic lift and tactical transport, surveillance, command, control, intelligence and sophisticated

³⁶ See Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, www.europa.eu.int, particularly Art. 27 and 28 for the details of the structure and formation of the military capability.

³⁷ Missiroli, A. 'Defence Spending in Europe: Is Europe Prepared to Pay for Improved Capabilities?' paper given at the Conference on ESDP organized in Paris on 13-15 December 2001 by the Cicero Foundation, www.iss.eu.int

combat capabilities³⁸ and creating a pool of that size is a long and costly task, implying a major budget re-ordering³⁹. In other words, infrastructural and professional necessities, which need large investments, constitute a huge barrier to the EU to reach its declared goal concerning ESDP.

In this respect, recourse to the NATO assets has become indispensable. At this point the contribution offered by the six non-EU European NATO members to the EU's new Rapid Reaction Force gains a special importance.⁴⁰ "The EU in this context wants that *pre-identified NATO capabilities* and common assets to be made available to the EU for the duration of the EU-led operations and that it will have a *guaranteed permanent access* to the planning capacities of NATO."⁴¹ However, these requests of the EU have not been realized yet, even created crisis between the EU and related parties, especially with Turkey.

5- European Rapid Reaction Force

The EU will use the ERRF both apart from, but also in conjunction with, other international organizations. The ERRF could deploy at the request of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. The ERRF also could share expertise and resources with NATO, but it would not deploy in response to a request from the alliance.

Because of the overlap in membership among the NATO and the EU, and the multiple duties they have sustained, the EU will need to ensure that the ERRF will not cause to be redundant other military arrangements. The EU created the Capabilities Development

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ Alpo Rusi M. (2001) 'Europe's Changing Security Role' in Gartner, Heinz (eds), *Europe's New Security Challenges* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.), p.118 see the quotation from James P. Thomas for a future projection regarding EU capabilities: "The EU is unlikely to achieve a truly autonomous defense capability in the next 10-15 years which would allow it to carry out medium-sized combat operations such as Kosovo without the US"

⁴⁰ Aybet, G. (1999) 'NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security', *Sam Papers* Vol.4, pp.4-5 source: www.mfa.gov.tr

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Mechanism (CDM), which will specifically take on the task of avoiding duplication between the EU and NATO and enhance communication between the two organizations.⁴²

In addition, the European Council approved intensifying interaction with the United Nations to ensure that EU training is compatible and enhances U.N. military and civilian crisis management.⁴³ Because the ERRF might go beyond the European arena, it may need to rely on U.N. guidance and knowledge in the future.⁴⁴

Besides, strengthening Europe's own strategic capabilities, leaders at Helsinki Summit also proposed military requirements. EU Member States will need to work to improve several areas: the coordination of monitoring and early warning systems; the opening of existing joint national headquarters to officers from other Member States to promulgate the sharing of information; creating a European air transport command; increasing the number of national troops that would be readily deployable; and improving air and sea-lift capacity.⁴⁵

When a military operation takes place, it will happen under an EU Joint Action, which means, actions taken will remain under the political and strategic control of the EU, even when NATO or other organization's assets are used.⁴⁶ First, the Political and Security Committee asks the Military Committee to request an "Initiating Directive" from the Military Staff. The Military Staff then drafts a document and gives it to the Military Committee. After the Military Committee adds comments, the Committee returns it to the PSC. The PSC must approve of this document, at this stage deemed the "Initial

⁴²Von Sydow, B., Speech delivered to the European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2001. http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=15903 reached at 01.06.2003

⁴³ General Affairs Council, 'EU-U.N. Co-operation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management – Conclusions' 11 June 2001. http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=15873 reached at 01.06.2003

⁴⁴ Riggle, S. and Mosegaard, J. (2001) 'EU Reinforces Links with the U.N.' *European Security Review*, March, p. 5).

⁴⁵ Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Planning Directive,” which gives the guidelines for military action.⁴⁷ The host country also will need to accept the action. This is the point that could become controversial once EU leaders are faced with real crises. Therefore, policy-makers involved with European crisis management will want to give more consideration to the political obstacles they might meet when the time comes to make decisions regarding intervention. The entire process could take a considerable amount of time. European leaders in Brussels formalized plans for an EU Exercise Programme that will test whether these command structures will function effectively.

The cohesion of EU Member States in carrying out ERRF missions will be critical. Ultimately, national governments decide whether to contribute their troops to a particular ERRF deployment. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, Member States that opt out of an action need not fund it in the instance of military operations. Consequently, strong political will and cooperation will be important for sharing resources and moving forward with such missions.

In November 2000, just before the Nice Summit, EU Member States pledged military contributions to the ERRF, which enabled the EU leaders to estimate that they could have access to 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships for the ERRF by 2003.⁴⁸ Usually, it is desirable to have three times the number of troops needed in the field to permit rotation and to sustain a year-long presence. Therefore, the ERRF is still, on this account, 80,000 troops short. Furthermore, states already are having difficulty with their informal equipment pledges. This could make it difficult for the ERRF to live up to its 60-day deployment goal for quite some time.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Sköld, T. (2000) ‘States Pledge Resources for Crisis Management’ *European Security Review*, No. 3, December, pp. 2-3.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson has encouraged European countries to increase their defense spending.⁴⁹ EU Member States may be able to meet the military requirements of the peacekeeping section of the Petersberg Tasks, but it will be more fragile for the EU to collect the military resources for peacemaking, which could include separating parties already engaged in combat.⁵⁰ European leaders might find ways to make their current military structures more efficient so they can sufficiently contribute to the ERRF without substantially increasing defense spending.

So, in this chapter the ESDP and its components have been assessed. First a brief history has been given then its initiation, institutionalization and operationalization have been explained. At the end a short presentation of the ERRF has been placed as the actual area of the ESDP. After presenting the ESDP, in the following chapter I will demonstrate the debate between Turkey and the EU on ESDP including a general overview of the disagreement, demands of Turkey and the response of the EU.

⁴⁹ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 'European Defence: Challenges and Prospects' speech delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 11 June 2001. <http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010611a.htm> reached at 01.06.2003. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, defense spending by European NATO members declined by 5% from 1998 to 1999 in constant US dollar terms (International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 38).

⁵⁰ Gourlay, C. and Jensen, F. (2000) 'The European Parliament's 'Maximalist' Vision of CESDP,' *European Security Review*, December, p. 4.

CHAPTER 2: THE BASES OF THE DISAGREEMENT

Turkey maintains that a coherent security policy for a region, and especially for a continent, can only be established with the inclusion of all the significant security actors in the region. A holistic approach to European security, therefore, requires the participation of all European security actors in a framework such as the one established by the WEU.⁵¹

EU, on the other hand, does not respond to Turkish demands towards participation both in the institutional dimension as regards to the decision-shaping, decision-making and implementation phases and of the operational phase in a proper manner satisfactory for Turkey.

As for the institutional dimension of the ESDP, Turkey maintains that, as a non-EU European NATO member, it is left in a disadvantageous position in the new project when compared to its previous achievements in other contexts such as the WEU and NATO. Especially after the inclusion of the WEU into the EU in line with Amsterdam Treaty provisions, Turkey has found its status deteriorated. Turkey demands certain rights in the newly emerging bodies of the ESDP ranging from full participation in decision-making of the operations with NATO assets to enhanced consultation in peace-time and crisis time and finally the right to raise its concerns in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU-only operations in Turkey's geographic proximity and areas of national interest. Furthermore, Turkey does not want Greek Cypriot Administration to be able to access to NATO assets and capabilities in case it becomes a member of the EU.⁵²

⁵¹ Cebeci, M. (1999) "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations With Special Reference To Turkey" *Occasional Papers* (Brussels: Western European Union,), p.2 source: www.weu.int

⁵² Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by EU Council at the Feira Summit in July 2000 on ESDI and CESDP (www.mfa.gov.tr)

Cologne European Council promises to ‘...put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to *the fullest possible extent in this ‘ESDP’ endeavor.*’⁵³ This represents an attempt to address the discrimination against non-EU NATO members such as Turkey. Helsinki European Council, on the other hand, maintains that “... appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, *while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy*, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to the EU military crisis management.”⁵⁴ It puts Turkey, as a non-EU European NATO member, into the same basket with other states such as candidates for full membership to the EU. Feira Council meeting in June 2000 concluded that the EU, in the final analysis, would seek “a single inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned ... can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU”⁵⁵. EU proposed regular meetings between the EU and 15 non-member states (15 + 15) together with the EU+6 format. Turkish dissatisfaction with the EU+15 format and the participation level introduced in the Feira Summit is expressed in the following official declaration:

“The participation issue of the European Allies to the EU-only operations is dealt within the same category with the non-EU and non-NATO third countries and the Washington Summit decisions determining the NATO-WEU framework as the basis for future cooperation is not taken into consideration. EU does not respond to the developments in the Washington Summit in the same manner. It is utmost important that Turkey is included into the deliberations of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff as soon as possible. Feira decisions are far enough to satisfy Turkey especially in the issue of participation to the crisis management.”⁵⁶

Thus, Turkey declared “Turkey would consider the demands of the EU from NATO on a case-by-case basis and in line with its national interests and European security.

⁵³ Cologne EU Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, www.europa.eu.int

⁵⁴ Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, www.europa.eu.int

⁵⁵ EU Feira Presidency Conclusions, Annex I - Presidency Report On Strengthening The Common European Security And Defence Policy, Appendix 1

⁵⁶ Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] published by Turkish Ministry of Defence. Internet Source: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#BEYAZKITAP> reached at 11/06/2003

Automatic availability of the NATO assets and capabilities to the EU is thought to be unacceptable for Turkey. Feira decisions are not regarded as a viable basis, which can lead Turkey to change its current opinions.”⁵⁷ This note clearly points that decisions made in Feira Summit are not compatible with the national interests of Turkey and she would insist on her arguments.

When it comes to the functioning of the institutional mechanisms of the ESDP in case of an operation, first of all it is worth mentioning that there are three different types of probable military operations in which EU may involve i.e. NATO-led operations, EU operations using NATO assets and finally EU-only operation if NATO as a whole is not engaged. According to the principles laid down at Feira for the participation of the non-EU European allies; in EU operations undertaken with NATO assets, non-EU European NATO members would participate automatically, “*if they so wish*”, whereas in the EU-only operations, they would simply “*be invited*” to be involved, if the Council see it as appropriate. In the emerging ESDP, all non-EU members would be involved ‘up-stream’ i.e. in decision-shaping which entailed information, consultation and pre-planning and ‘down-stream’ i.e. implementation, but decision-making proper and political control would pertain exclusively to the EU members.⁵⁸

An additional institution that can be activated is the “Committee of Contributors”. This committee will consist of “third countries”, including Turkey, and will play a key role in the day-to-day management of an operation and will have consultations with the Operation Commander, the EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee. However, this level of participation in only the day-to-day management of an operation does not satisfy Turkey, which looks for further rights in all phases of decision-making leading to the ESDP operations, including the peace-time arrangements, especially in those cases where Turkey has a vital interest.

⁵⁷ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by EU Council at the Feira Summit in July 2000 on ESDI and CESDP (www.mfa.gov.tr)

⁵⁸ Missiroli, A. (2002) “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP”, *Security Dialogue* vol.33, no.1, March, p.15

Concerning the operationalization of the ESDP, EU lacks many of the assets and capabilities needed for the fulfillment of the Petersberg tasks and there is neither prospect of the development of them in the near future given the current level of defense spending in the EU countries nor the will to do so due to the concerns of duplication. This makes the reliance of EU on NATO assets and capabilities inevitable and essential.

“In order to avoid duplication of forces, the EU requests the authorization to have *automatic and uninterrupted access* to the military assets of NATO. However, the NATO Charter requires unanimity amongst members in order for such an authorization to be given to the European Army. At this point, Turkey, as a non-member of the Union, has made it clear that it would not give its unconditional approval to such a request, which would mean losing its control over the use of NATO assets in the future military operations of the EU. This is because Turkey fears that EU-led operations may well contradict its supreme national interests.”⁵⁹

When it comes to the Turkish demands, rather than the dialogue consultation and cooperation offered at Feira and repeated at Nice, Turkey, at the initial stages of the evolution of the ESDP had sought a decision-making role akin to that of full member states in the preparation and execution of any EU crisis exercise or crisis operation in which its forces take part.⁶⁰ Turkey argued that the arrangements under discussion did not comply with Alliance deliberations and did not offer adequate guarantees to non-EU European allies compared with those awarded by the WEU. Due to the insufficient means of participation arrangements offered by the EU, Turkey has intended to use its position in NATO concerning the operational phase of the ESDP. In this respect, Turkey vetoes the deal between EU and NATO aiming to realize the automatic access of the EU to the pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities for the EU-only operations. In order to

⁵⁹ Kibaroglu, M. (2002) “Turkey’s Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq”, *Insight Turkey* Vol.4, No.1, January-March, p.51

⁶⁰ Teriff, T. (2001) “European Security and Defence Policy after Nice”, *Briefing Paper* No.20, April, p.4

clarify what Turkey lost, assessing the Associate Membership in WEU would be appropriate.

1- Associate Membership in WEU

The WEU had various types of membership. These were namely; Full Member, Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner status. Different members had different levels of involvement in WEU and as a result they had different rights and obligations. The flexible and multiple membership structure of WEU “prevented the creation of and perception of insiders and outsiders in the overall institutional set-up of the organization.”⁶¹ Thus, this situation provided a harmony in the WEU, since every participant entered into this organization by their own will and they have been very well informed about their position before participation. Additionally, WEU had become considerably passive after the establishment of NATO, it can be argued that this situation also assisted to provide the harmony within WEU.

Associate membership is a status created by the Declaration on WEU (Declaration No. 30) attached to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Through this Declaration, the non-EU European members of NATO were invited to become WEU Associate Members. Their status was later defined in a detailed way in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Declaration on Associate Membership made in Rome on 20 November 1992⁶². The Associate membership of Turkey, Norway and Iceland became effective in 1995. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were also invited to become WEU Associate Members in March 1999 and subsequent to their acquisition of full membership in NATO their status became effective in May 1999. These attempts could be interpreted as gathering all of the European powers under a single security framework other than NATO. The main idea, in my opinion, behind this attempt is clearly an intent to decrease the dependency of European security to the US.

⁶¹ Tocci, N. and Houben M. (2001) ‘Accommodating Turkey in ESDP’ *CEPS Policy Brief No. 5, (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies)*, p. 4

⁶² For all WEU documents referenced in this thesis see www.weu.int

Associate Membership is a non-modified Brussels Treaty status, in that associate members were not endowed with full membership rights by that treaty and their status only consisted of non-Article V activities⁶³. In other words, they were neither under Article V guarantee, nor held responsible for Article V missions⁶⁴. Notwithstanding, the Associate Members could participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies under certain conditions⁶⁵:

- a) Their participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in article VIII of the Modified Brussels Treaty
- b) At the Request of a majority of the Full Members, or half of the Full Members including the Presidency, participation might be restricted to full Members.
- c) Associate Members had the right to speak and submit proposals, but they did not have the right to block a decision unanimously agreed by Full Members.

The Rights of Associate Members within WEU and their participation to WEU institutions and Working groups could be demonstrated as such:

- Associate Members were linked to the Planning Cell through special arrangements and could appoint liaison officers to the Cell.
- They could nominate “Forces Answerable to WEU” (FAWEU) on the same basis as Full Members.
- They had the right to be consulted and informed on WEU operations in which they were interested.
- They would be directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were used within the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).
- They were connected to the WEU telecommunications system.

⁶³ Cebeci, M. (1999) ‘A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-making for EU-led Petersberg Operations, with special reference to Turkey’ *Occasional Papers*, No. 10, November. Source: http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ10.html#_ftnref2 reached at 10/06/2003.

⁶⁴ Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty: “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”

⁶⁵ Cebeci, M. (1999)

- They could participate in the activities of the Satellite Center and were regularly informed about WEU's space activities.
- They could participate the Working groups of WEU such as the Transatlantic Forum, EUROCOM, EUROLONGTERM and Western European Logistics Group with decision-making power.
- And the Associate Members of WEU still have full rights and responsibilities with regard to the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).⁶⁶

The rights and responsibilities of Associate members clearly indicates that they are almost as decisive as full members in the WEU institutional framework. They can participate in every structure and activity of WEU. They have only been limited by not having a veto power on the decisions made unanimously by full members and non-participation in council meetings in the case that full members vote them out by majority. Apparently, those provisions that limit the associate members are not very functional or frequently used ones. They might probably be used in very exceptional cases, otherwise frequently use of these provisions would harm the harmony in WEU.

Parliamentarians from Associate Members were fully involved in the work of the WEU assembly, although the Associate Members did not contribute to the Assembly's budget. However, the Associate Members were contributing to the WEU budget⁶⁷. This also demonstrates that almost equal footing of associate members with full members have a concrete endorsement in financial terms.

Associate Members' financial contribution to WEU budgets reflects their degree of involvement in WEU affairs. It should be noted, conversely, that the Observers and the Associate Partners are not required to make any financial contributions to the WEU budget (except for the military operations to which they commit forces)⁶⁸. This

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Cebeci, M. (2003) 'CESDP: A Turkish Perspective' p. 148 at <http://selene.uab.es/ce-documentacio-europea/ECDR/chap7.pdf> reached at 10/06/2003

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 149

responsibility explains the difference between the Associate Member, and Observer and Associate Partner statuses with regard to their involvement in the decision-making process. The obvious differences between status of Associate Members on the one hand and Associate Partners and Observers on the other are apparently entailed by the NATO membership of the formers⁶⁹. This is also an indication of NATO's indispensable role in European security framework.

2- Turkey's Demands

2a- Legacy of the WEU

One of the main pillars of Turkish position in the ESDP is based on its previous status in the WEU. As mentioned in the previous section, Turkey, as an Associate Member of the WEU, was entitled to participate in the institutional and operational mechanisms of WEU to a high extent. Turkey maintains that previously reached agreements have to be respected and honored, and therefore, even in the wake of the fading away of WEU and integration of its functions into the EU, Turkey's status in WEU has to be transferred to the EU framework. This concern is repeatedly emphasized in official Turkish declarations, as is the case in the White Book of the Ministry of Defense, which puts the matter as follows:

"Turkey has always been defending its position to participate in the ESDP initiative effectively and play an active role as a result of its desire to preserve the already achieved rights. In this respect, one of the most important aspects is the preservation of the acquisitions within the WEU and put it into an institutional framework which will provide the full participation of the non-EU European allies in the new project inside EU."⁷⁰ This statement clearly puts that Turkey will not agree with the EU on any position that grants less rights and responsibilities compared to its previous position in

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] published by Turkish Ministry of Defence. Internet Source: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#BEYAZKITAP> reached at 11/06/2003

WEU. Turkey considers its rights in WEU as achieved rights and it has no intention to give up its former position in European security framework.

Turkey strongly believes that the *acquis*, which was accumulated within the WEU, should be preserved and further developed on a contractual basis so as to ensure full participation of non-EU European allies in the new structures to be established within the EU.

In this respect Turkey asks for:

- The participation, on a regular basis, in day-to-day planning and consultations on matters related to European security, as is the case within WEU.
- Full and equal participation in the process leading to decision-making on all EU-led operations drawing on collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation.
- Participation in the decision shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.⁷¹

As it can be seen, Turkey insists on its previous rights in WEU and does not want to be excluded from any security action which might occur in the scope of ESDP and NATO. Turkey considers any kind of exclusion as a vital problem and fears to be marginalized in European security arena.

2b- Importance of the NATO

Turkey consistently emphasizes the *acquis* developed within the NATO framework as far as the emerging ESDP project, and its relationship with the transatlantic security cooperation. Moreover, Turkey consistently makes reference to its contribution to the

⁷¹ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the ESDI, 14 February 2000 (www.mfa.gov.tr)

European security in all phases of the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War era under the NATO umbrella.⁷²

Washington Summit Communiqué of April 24, 1999 occupies a significant place in Turkish arguments and makes an important contribution to the strength of the Turkish case vis-à-vis the EU. After welcoming ‘the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defense by the Amsterdam Treaty’ and ‘acknowledging the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action’; Washington Summit Communiqué emphasizes the importance of ‘ensuring the *fullest possible involvement* of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, *building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU*.’⁷³ Decisions taken at Washington Summit have been repeatedly stressed in the ensuing North Atlantic Council meetings.

Turkey maintains that since many of the members of the EU are also the members of NATO, they have to respect the decisions that they have taken within NATO framework. This stresses the importance of the availability of proper mechanisms, that will ensure the fullest possible level of participation of non-EU European NATO members in EU-led crisis management activities.

3- Responses of the EU

EU has been trying to develop mechanisms to meet the demands of non-EU European NATO members concerning their participation in EU-led crisis management operations in general and that of Turkey in particular. There are different aspects of EU’s attitude towards Turkey, which sheds a light on the current situation as far as the ESDP is concerned. EU’s general approach towards Turkey has for a long time been in a negative

⁷² Oymen, O. (Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO) (2001) ‘Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security’ *European Foreign Affairs Review* vol. 6, pp. 401–405.

⁷³ Washington Summit Communiqué, Art.9, “The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington”, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium, p.16

manner, underestimating Turkey's value as a strategic asset. However, with the Helsinki Summit decisions, official position of EU has begun to change. While emphasizing the will of the EU to become an international actor capable of preserving its own interests through institutionalization and operationalization of the ESDP; Helsinki is, on the other hand, can be regarded as the confirmation of the potential contribution of Turkey to such an EU by declaring Turkey as eligible for full membership, thereby making the boundaries of the European identity clear.⁷⁴ Developments after Helsinki has been perceived as a reflection of the positive attitude of the EU towards Turkey in general and its participation in the ESDP in particular, which introduced new mechanisms to make Turkey get rid of its concerns regarding the institutional and operational functioning of ESDP. There are even arguments among the Turkish political elite that one of the reasons behind the renewed interest in Brussels in integrating Turkey into the Europe is the potential role that she may play in the ESDP.⁷⁵ However, Turkey's participation in the ESDP still continues to constitute one of the most problematic areas in Turkish-EU relations.

There are certain considerations of the part of the EU in general and some of the members in particular, which play an important and decisive role in the determination of the EU policy towards Turkey, as far as Turkey's participation in the European security system in general and in particular in the newly emerging ESDP mechanism.

3a- Decision-making autonomy

“Non-EU members need to recognize that the EU is not simply a trading bloc or merely a particularly tight international organization. The process of European integration is of a quasi-constitutional nature. It is fated to develop a security and defense dimension and some discrimination between members and non-members is by definition inevitable. The

⁷⁴. Karaosmanoğlu, A. L. (2001) “Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri”, *Doğu Batı*, No. 14, pp.161, 163-164

⁷⁵ Tank, P. (2001) “Turkey as a Special Case for the EU: Will The Generals Retreat from Politics?”, *Security Dialogue* Vol.32, No.2, p.224

objective should therefore be to reduce the negative impact of discrimination rather than pretending that it can be eliminated entirely.”⁷⁶

EU favors that a distinction between members and non-members is inevitable and the decision-making autonomy of an organization has to be respected by all. According to this line of thinking, WEU mechanisms cannot be carried directly to the EU realm. Especially the differentiated membership status, which is considered as the main reason behind the inability of the WEU to perform its functions in a proper way and may also lead to a similar paralysis in the EU framework should it be directly transferred.⁷⁷ Moreover, an important aspect of Turkey’s position within WEU framework arises from the fact that those arrangements were not treaty-based and never gives a shared political control, but rather limited to operational components.⁷⁸ WEU granted the associate membership status only through a Council decision and it was not integrated into the WEU Founding Treaty. Accordingly, this makes Turkish position weaker and EU regards itself entitled to neglect the associate membership status.

According to the EU, preservation of the decision-making autonomy of the union is a matter of principle and Turkey’s desire to fully participate in the decision-making mechanisms of operations undertaken with or without recourse to NATO assets in areas of national concern for Turkey and its immediate neighborhood, is unacceptable in this respect.⁷⁹ Turkey, on the other hand, has insisted on the irrelevance of the elaboration of ESDP only as an institutional mechanism. For Turkey, security in Europe is indivisible

⁷⁶ Heisbourg, F. (2000) “European Defense takes a leap forward”, *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer, p.10 See Schieb, T. (2001) “Turkey and ESDP: Current State of Affairs”, *Insight Turkey* Vol.3, No.3, July-September, p.37 for a similar argumentation

⁷⁷ See McKenzie, M. M. (1998) “The Construction of the European Pillar: Beyond the Status Quo?” in Mary M. McKenzie, and Peter H. Loedel, (eds.), *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests and Institutions* (London: Praeger Publishers), pp.107-108. Simon Duke, (2001) “CESDP: Nice’s Overtrumped Success?” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *Kluwer Law International* Vol.6 and Charles Grant, (1999) “From St.Malo to Washington”, *World Link*, March/April, for the elaboration of the implications of the differentiated membership status of WEU and its transfer to EU.

⁷⁸ Missiroli, A. (2002) p.12

⁷⁹ Kibaroglu, M. (2002) p.52

and requires a concerted approach extending beyond the realm of a certain organization and necessitating the involvement of all of the important actors.

“What Turkey would urge is that the idea of ESDP should not be contemplated solely on the logic of integration and institution building but as a genuine and realistic response to the strategic facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment. Turkey believes that security is indivisible and confirmed its readiness to support ESDI in operational as well as political terms.”⁸⁰

Turkey maintains that harmonious inter-state relations in Europe can best be achieved through widening participation in political, security and economic frameworks. Instead of emphasizing the decision-making autonomy of the EU and institutional priorities; elaborating on the nature of the joint decision-making mechanisms will be more useful.⁸¹ Since ESDP is not about European strategic independence but about a more coherent European contribution to crisis management, it is utmost important that all of the significant actors in Europe have taken part in this project to the fullest possible extent.⁸² In this respect, ESDP endeavor must not be a particular project limited by the institutional boundaries of EU but rather has to be embracing all the interested actors in the European security environment who seek to make a contribution.

Another important aspect of irrelevance of the insistence on decision-making autonomy and low level of participation for the non-EU European allies is the likelihood of “an EU military intervention going out of control at one point during the conflict and paving the way for an Article V contingency.”⁸³ This would pull the non-EU members of NATO including Turkey into the conflict. Such a development will make the discussions on the institutional autonomy of EU outdated, which will require NATO to take the lead in an operation originally thought to be EU-only.

⁸⁰ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the European Security and Turkey (www.mfa.gov.tr)

⁸¹ “Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisi”, www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/uluslararasi/guvmimarisi.htm

⁸² Lord George Robertson, (2001) “Turkey and ESDI”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.1, January-March, p.47

⁸³ Kibaroglu, M. (2002) pp.51-52

3b-Proposals for Reaching an Agreement

Numerous proposals have been put forward which aim to find a solution for the participation issue of the non-EU European NATO members in general and Turkey in particular in the institutional and operational phases of the newly emerging ESDP project of the EU. These proposals vary in a range from the incorporation of the differentiated membership status of the WEU into the EU to a precise agreement governing only the second pillar of the EU like that of Schengen for the third pillar.⁸⁴

Turkey has consistently emphasized that the goal must be a unitary system for crisis management, covering non-EU allies as well as non-NATO EU members, a unitary structure, which could prevent the creation of dividing lines in ESDP.⁸⁵ According to Turkey, inclusiveness must be the general rule. Others emphasize the importance of the attainment of a large overlap in membership between NATO and EU, a key principle for the maximization of influence and achievement of a stable division of labor necessitated for the realization of the successful security architecture.⁸⁶

Although the only way of a satisfactory alternative for Turkey towards the realization of the ideal of full enjoyment of participation rights in ESDP mechanisms is the full membership, there has to be a transitory framework in which Turkey find answers to its concerns and thereby opening the path for a cooperative relationship between EU and NATO.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ For a detailed analysis of various proposals for a solution see Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, "Accommodating Turkey in ESDP", *CEPS Policy Brief* (No.5, May 2001) Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue* (Vol.31, Iss.4, 2000) Münevver Cebeci, "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations With Special Reference To Turkey" *Occasional Papers* (Brussels: Western European Union, 1999), source: www.weu.int

⁸⁵ "Turkish General Staff View on ESDP", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001), p.95

⁸⁶ Rühle, M. and Williams, N. (1996) "The Greater Union's New Security Agenda: NATO and EU" in Franco Algieri eds. *Managing Security In Europe: The European Union and Challenge of Enlargement* (Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers) p.96

⁸⁷ Bağcı, H. (2001) "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler" in Bal, İdris ed., *21.Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım), p.611

Ankara Document: A Major Breakthrough

British-US joint initiative to reach a favourable solution to the problem of participation of the non-EU members of NATO in general and Turkey in particular in the ESDP, which will lead to the removal of Turkish veto towards the access of EU to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities and thereby initiate the process of operationalization of the ESDP, has matured through the year 2001 and became fruitful in December 2001. US and UK evaluates the ESDP project as a strategic cooperation initiative, rather than an integral part of the European identity, that must involve all the significant actors in that security environment. In this respect, Turkey, which exhibited its staunch support to the war against international terrorism in its participation in the ISAF, should not be alienated from a security cooperation project that aims to manage European security issues.

When it comes to the details of the Ankara Document, it can be said that a solution was found by paying due attention to Turkey's serious concerns and to its supreme interests, primarily in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was given guarantees by the US and the UK that the European crisis management missions could not be used in contingencies involving the Aegean as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, bilateral issues between NATO allies will not be a legitimate concern of EU i.e. EU would not intervene in problems between Turkey and Greece, both in the Aegean and in Cyprus.⁸⁸ Ankara Document is a satisfactory basis for Turkey and EU since it offers, Turkey, on the one hand, an enhanced consultation in peace-time and an active participation in the operational phase in the operations where NATO assets are used together with paying attention to its national concerns in areas of geographic proximity where Turkey has a national interest. On the other hand, it does not prejudice the decision-making autonomy of the EU. Therefore, Turkey has defined the outcomes of

⁸⁸ Kibaroglu, M. (2002) "Turkey's Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.4, No.1, January-March), pp.52-53

this trilateral initiative as a *concrete and valid basis*, which will pave the way for the further development of EU-NATO relations in all aspects of security.⁸⁹

In return, British paper accepted the concept of assured access for the EU to some pre-determined NATO assets. Turkey has long been opposing the assured access of EU to NATO assets and capabilities. However, a breakthrough could be achieved by finding a middle ground. NATO assets and capabilities that can be utilized by EU are classified under two broad categories, namely strategic and non-strategic. Thus, EU has been given the right to an automatic access to those assets and capabilities in the non-strategic category, whereas demands by the EU to use strategic ones will be dealt by the NATO Council on a case-by-case basis.

However, this agreement has not been realized through EU legal mechanisms yet due to the Greek opposition inside the EU. Greek position stems from its opposition to the nature of the Ankara Document as a whole. Greece, while emphasizing once again the decision-making autonomy of the EU, rejects any discriminatory attitude towards one of the non-EU European allies. Furthermore, according to Greek position, any guarantee to be given has to be reciprocal i.e. EU must not be the only side to assure Turkey but rather Turkey has to give certain assurances for not to use these rights as a means to affect the inner functioning of the EU in a negative manner as far as the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP is concerned.

*We [Greece] reject the one-sided Ankara text. Without amendments which satisfy our aims and secure our interests, no text will be accepted," Simitis said. "The security of the EU, and even more importantly the security of our country, cannot be the subject of ... uncertain regulations."*⁹⁰

Thus, operationalization of the ESDP was not fully realized due to the Greek veto of the British proposal in the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001) and Sevilla Summit (June 2002). Therefore, in Laeken and Sevilla, Europe's leaders were able to declare their

⁸⁹ "Türkiye'den AGSP'ye Destek", [Turkey's support for ESDP] *Finansal Forum*, December 3, 2001

⁹⁰ "Greek barrier to ESDP causes disappointment in Brussels", *Turkish Daily News*, 17 May 2002

common security and defense policy operational only ‘to conduct some crisis management operations’, not the whole scope foreseen in Petersberg tasks.⁹¹

Finally, conclusion of an agreement has been declared in December 16, 2002 on ESDP between EU and NATO. The Declaration reads as follows: ‘the European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP...’ while ‘NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, *assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities...*’

According to Ugur Ziyal, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of the concerns of Turkey have been taken into consideration in this deal and particular demands, regarding the participation level of Turkey in ESDP mechanisms and status of the Greek Cypriot Administration in ESDP after its likely EU membership have been met.

3c- Role of the ‘Identity’

“Western Europe has become in Karl Deutsch’s terms a ‘pluralistic security community’ where there exists a long-term expectation of ‘peaceful change’ among its members. The Western security community has acquired legitimacy in terms of a Gramscian hegemony, and it has been able to project this through a system of interlocking institutions. But the reign of this hegemony has little to do with the projection of force. The strategic culture of this hegemony reigns through values. Those values are democracy, human rights, free markets and overall stability in the sense of a lack of violence instigated by social/domestic forces that could disrupt the functioning of these values.”⁹² In other

⁹¹ “Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it and following the military and police Capability Improvement Conferences held in Brussels on 19 November 2001, the Union is now capable of *conducting some crisis-management operations.*” reads the Laeken EU Presidency Conclusions, www.europa.eu.int

⁹² Cited in Gülnur Aybet (2000), *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy* (London: MacMillan Press.), p.35

words, Western Europe, after World War II, has turned into a security community which is mainly based on values such as democracy, human rights and economic stability. This is apparently a true judgement which has concrete evidences throughout the 60 years history of post-war period. Additionally, there are no signs or expectations about this situation to be changed in the foreseeable future.

“European Union may be characterized as a ‘security community’, a concept initially introduced by Karl Deutsch to denote a transnational region distinguished by a growing ‘we’ feeling and common role identity between its members. Post-Cold War European security context has witnessed a change in the definition and scope of security. In response to the end of the Cold War, European integration has begun to be perceived as an enhancement of multiple identities.”⁹³

According to the adherents of this line of thinking, ESDP process cannot be limited to strategic and military considerations, as far as Turkey’s emphasis on its strategic importance and military strength in supporting its position in ESDP is concerned. ESDP is not just a military tool of the EU but rather it is a vehicle to launch the values inherent in the European identity to the regions within the scope of the crisis-management operations in the areas concerned. From this point of view the breakdown of the Cold War order entails above all a possibility of spreading Western, liberal values and ideas to the newly liberated countries in Eastern and Central Europe. In this respect, the question of which countries belong to Europe has to be answered, but geographical location in itself cannot provide the answer to a question of cultural identity and belonging.⁹⁴ A good example of this is the coming inclusion of Cyprus into the EU, which is obviously not in Europe in terms of geography.

⁹³ Quoted in Lisbeth Aggestam, (2000) “A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role of Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU” in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.), pp.91-93

⁹⁴ Behnke, A. (2000) “Recognizing Europe: NATO and the Problem of Securing Identities” in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* Published by MacMillan Press Ltd., London, pp.52-56

“Order among European states was generated by agreement on not only international values but also domestic values of a social and cultural nature. This alternative source of order operates at the societal level rather than the level of the independent sovereign state. It is the cultural logic of ‘us and them’, and of collective identity of group consciousness. Buzan posits the concept of ‘societal security’ alongside that of ‘state security’. Whilst the latter has ‘sovereignty as its ultimate criterion’, the former is seen as being ‘held together by concerns about *identity*.’”⁹⁵ The problem of identity constitutes one of the three major obstacles of Turkey before its accession in the EU, together with economic and political problems. In my opinion, identity problem is the most significant one among others, since most of the applicant countries also have major economic and political problems they are much closer to full membership than Turkey.

Although Turkey has been in the European state system for more than hundred and fifty years and has soil in the geographically defined European continent, Turkey is hardly perceived as a European country. This can be interpreted as the different religion of its people and its position in history as an ‘other’ against Western European countries constitutes this perception. Turkey and especially its predecessor Ottoman Empire have mostly represented and lead another culture, which was mostly perceived as a hostile civilization against the West. However, contrary to this perception, since early 19th century and especially after the end of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has made an immense progress to be westernized and it is now much closer to the West than the East in terms of politics, economy and also culture. Especially, in terms of economic system, a long standing market economy and a customs union with the EU, Turkey is clearly more harmonized and open to enhanced harmonization with the EU member states than most of the other candidate countries. Thus, I can argue that today Turkey is more European than most of the candidate states or at least as European as them.

EU’s main motive, according to the policy makers and scholars who give a prior position to identity, behind the initiation of an ESDP project is not the military considerations

⁹⁵ Quoted from Neumann, I. and Welsh, J. (1991) “The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.13, No.4, p.328

alone, but rather the maintenance of the European identity by responding to the emerging threats within the European security environment, both inside and in the periphery, together with the attempt to enlarge the boundaries of this security community by exporting the values inherent in the European integration project.

In this respect, they point to the inability of Turkey to understand and evaluate these developments in European integration process in general and ESDP in particular. This led to Turkey's attachment to traditional line of policies stressing only the country's strategic and military importance for a greater role and place in this project, neglecting the relevance of *identity* in the ESDP project. Furthermore, Turkey has certain problems concerning the acquisition, internalization and the projection of the values inherent in the European identity.⁹⁶ However, it has to be bear in mind that the current EU members are living in a security community and there is not a concrete military threat against them. One of the Turkey's main motives behind its attempt to join the EU is not carrying its own insecurities and current security understanding into the EU realm, but rather to be a part of the security community and be able to convert its security conceptualization alongside the countries of Western Europe.

“The idea of exploiting the military capabilities and the geopolitical assets of a country in exchange for full membership essentially misses the core rationale behind the process of European integration...The mechanisms for establishing peace and security in Europe have drastically changed. They still view the EU through the classical lenses of an alliance of states. The military focused security discourse has characterized Turkish-European relations for so long. It is argued that EU aims to exploit Turkey's strengths i.e. NATO membership, military capability and geostrategic position.”⁹⁷

As a natural persistence, proponents of this point of view proposes that the participants of the European integration process in general and the ESDP project in particular has to enjoy the same level of responsibilities as the members, concerning the ability to acquire

⁹⁶ Jung, D. “Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?” *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute*

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.5

and project those values such as democracy and human rights. On the other hand, there are arguments that Turkey shares the same level of awareness as to the importance of the values⁹⁸ in the European integration process. However, Turkey has not been able to reflect this understanding into reality either by legislative amendments needed to integrate those principles into the Turkish legal system or by taking the necessary steps towards the implementation of the already accepted ones.

The existence of the term ‘identity’ in the terminology used in the European security, for instance the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), has also attracted a certain degree of attention. According to the adherents of this line of thinking, discussions in Turkey regarding ESDP have been neglecting the close relationship between the ESDP and the ‘European Identity’. The issue is dealt only within the scope of decision-making processes and the level of Turkish participation in these processes. The essence of the problem, on the contrary, arises from the relationship between the ‘legitimacy of the ESDP’ and the ‘European Identity’ and Turkey’s being unprepared to accept and internalize the ‘European Identity’.⁹⁹ Unlike NATO, where strategic considerations outweigh the democratic criteria; identity and legitimacy issues enjoys a primary position in the EU integration process. The main goal of the EU is to form a democratic, peaceful and stable community of states and individuals. ESDP will be a primary actor in this respect by reflecting this identity, comprised of liberal and democratic values, to the unstable regions. While being aware of Turkey’s geo-strategic importance, military strength and huge potential in its region, EU prefers to keep Turkey in the threshold of ESDP due to the democratic deficits. Therefore, the real concern for EU is not the participation of Turkey in the ESDP decision-making mechanisms but rather an issue of ‘European Identity’ and ‘legitimacy’.¹⁰⁰ However, the concept of ‘European Identity’

⁹⁸ Ergüvenç, S. (1999) “Turkey: Strategic Partner of the European Union” in Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, *Turkey and European Union: Nebulous Nature of Relations*, Published by Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, p.12. Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] published by Turkish Ministry of Defence. Internet Source: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#BEYAZKITAP> for a reflection of the official standing in the issue of value projection.

⁹⁹ Karaosmanoğlu, A. L. (2001), pp.157,163

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 166

itself is still an obscure notion. Although, there are several and serious attempts to determine it such as indicating democracy, human rights and market economy as the bases of this identity, the interpretations of these notions also vary from country to country. Additionally, in my opinion, those concepts are insufficient to constitute a comprehensive identity such as European Identity. Even in the case, democracy, human rights and market economy constitutes European Identity, Turkey is not lacking them completely, it is just a matter of time for Turkey to enhance and implement them. One of the main policies of Turkey for several years, especially after 1999 i.e. Turkey's recognition as an official candidate, is to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, which is the key of European Identity, and Turkey has made an immense job during the years and still working hard by the year 2003.

3d- Turkey as a Security Consumer

Turkey has been identified, by some circles in Europe, as a 'security consumer' since it is neighboring certain areas of concern for the European security, which makes Turkey a liability for the EU by serving as a platform to export those problems and instabilities into the EU realm¹⁰¹. Many of the issues of Turkish foreign and security policy may pose a threat should it be internalized by the EU. Thus, there are remarks supporting to keep Turkey in the threshold of the emerging ESDP project. By this way these problems will not be taken into the European security framework and more importantly, Turkey will serve as a barrier in preventing the dissemination of these security threats into the European realm¹⁰².

Turkey is perceived as a threat to the European security due to its geographical proximity to the problematic regions. According to these circles, Turkey's uneasy relations with the Arab states in general and its neighbors in particular, its direct involvement in the Cyprus problem and the remaining potential of a new escalation of tensions with Greece,

¹⁰¹ Onis, Z. (2003) 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era' *Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No. 1, p.21

¹⁰² Karaosmanoglu, A. (1996) 'Europe's Security Parameters' paper delivered at the Conference on Turkey and Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition: A Comparative Study with a View to Future Membership to EU, Bilkent University, Ankara, 9 March.

considerable stakes in Central Asia, and direct exposure to the instabilities in the Caucasus may bring new security headaches to the Union.¹⁰³

They argue that what Turkey has been unable to do until now is to 'seek new ways of reinstating Turkey's value for building security in Europe'. Thus, Turkey has failed to adopt a broad understanding of security and became stuck to the significance of military security. This is why during the 1990s it has become increasingly difficult to present Turkey as an 'asset' to this 'civilian power' of EU. Turkey has also failed to become a producer of economic and political security as a result of various stalls in the democratization process and its underdeveloped economy.¹⁰⁴

While EU puts greater emphasis on the non-military dimensions of security, Turkey continues to adopt a more strategic way of thinking. For instance, illegal immigration is conceived as one of the most important issues that threatens stability and security within the European Union. In this respect, Turkey has been considered as the country that serves as a corridor for the flow of great masses from the Middle Eastern and Asian countries to Europe¹⁰⁵. Many circles within the EU, British PM Tony Blair being the most significant one, have been accusing Turkey for being unable to take the necessary precautions in order to prevent illegal immigration. This can be regarded as an example for the idea that Turkey currently is unable to produce the kind of security that EU looks for. However, unlike NATO, EU's main strength in security realm, as it was the case during the Cold War years, lies in the management of non-military dimensions of security rather than the military realm.

¹⁰³ Müftüler-Bac, M. (2000) 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies' *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 4, December, p.490. See Lesser, I. O. (1993) 'Beyond Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West' in Fuller, G. and Lesser, I. O. eds., 'Turkey's New Geopolitics' published by Westview Press, Boulder, for a similar analysis of threat of Turkish-Greek relations for EU.

¹⁰⁴ Bilgin, P. (2002a) 'The Making of the "Mediterranean" Region: Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era' paper presented at the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, March 20-24, p.48

¹⁰⁵ Gozen, R. (2002) 'Turkey's Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP in a Broadening Security Architecture in Europe' Report prepared for NATO Research Fellowship Programme, June, Ankara

Unlike NATO, the primary agenda of EU is to project the values inherent in European integration process to the east, but not only through the utilization of military force but rather by means of political, social and economic instruments of security. With these facts in mind, Turkey has to proceed further in order to overcome the boundaries of Cold War and try to find ways to reinstate the potential of Turkey for European security management in this new era. In fact, Turkey has the potential to play a key role in this new framework but it failed to present its position leading to the perceptions of Turkey as a security consumer country in certain circles. Continuous emphasis of its importance as a security producer in terms of military security will not be to the advantage of Turkey in the light of the current trends in European integration process in general and European security project in particular.¹⁰⁶ So, at this point the security perception of Turkey is significant and has to be understood. In the following chapter I will evaluate the security concept of Turkey through her security discourse.

¹⁰⁶ Bilgin, P. (2002a) pp.47-48

CHAPTER 3: SECURITY CONCEPT OF TURKEY

Security discourses of states give away their conceptualization of security. They play a significant role in shaping the security policies and practices of states in that they close off certain possibilities while opening up others. They lay the groundwork for the practices of politicians, soldiers and ‘ordinary people’ by providing assumptions on which they operate the norms with which they judge.¹⁰⁷ Security conceptualizations of states necessitate certain security policies and practices. For example, military-focused and state-centered conceptualizations of security justify the use of military instrument in response to crises while marginalizing conflict resolution techniques as instruments of foreign and security policy.

Multiple discourses on security compete with each other within states. Widespread discourses get to shape the security policies and practices of states, whereas some others may seek to influence policy-making. Security discourses, according to Ronnie Lipschutz’s, “*are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests besiege them.*”¹⁰⁸ Thus, security discourses give away not only the security conceptualizations of states, but also their self-representations and identities.¹⁰⁹ According to this definition, analysis of Turkish security discourse would not only reflect its understanding of security, but also it would give very important clues about its identity.

¹⁰⁷ Dalby, S. (1990) ‘Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics’ published by Pinter, London.

¹⁰⁸ Lipschutz, R. (1995) ‘On Security’ in *On Security*, p.8, Published by Columbia University Press, New York

¹⁰⁹ Bilgin, P. (2002a)

1- Geopolitics

The widespread discourse on security in Turkey has been the discourse of the policy-making elite since the foundation of the republic.¹¹⁰ The geopolitical location of Turkey has always been the justification of this situation. One of the retired generals of Turkish military has stated “*If Turkey is famous for something that is its tough neighborhood.*”¹¹¹ Also consider the following statements of the “White Paper” of Turkish Ministry of Defence, which stresses the geographical location of Turkey:

- The Middle East and the Caspian Basin, which have the most important oil reserves in the world,
- The Mediterranean Basin, which is at the intersection of important sea lines of communication,
- The Black Sea Basin and the Turkish Straits, which have always maintained their importance in history,
- The Balkans, which have undergone structural changes as the result of the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and
- The center of the geography composed of Caucasia, which has abundant natural resources as well as ethnic conflicts, and Central Asia.¹¹²

In the preface to the White Paper, the Minister of National Defence Sabahattin Cakmakoglu explains the significance of this geographical position by noting “*Turkey is located in the center of a region full of instabilities and uncertainties, such as the Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, where the balances are in process of change.*”¹¹³ In fact, most of the developments after the Cold War have occurred in Turkey’s neighborhood (such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the formation of new republics, the break-up of Yugoslavia, Bosnian war, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and first and second Gulf Wars). So the 1990s proved Turkish policy-makers’ belief that Turkey’s

¹¹⁰ Bilgin, P. (2002b) ‘Rethinking Turkey’s Security Discourse: The Challenge of Globalization’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Boston, MA, August 29-September 1.

¹¹¹ Erguvenc, S. (1998) ‘Turkey’s Security Perceptions’ *Perceptions*, Vol. 3, June-August, P. 32

¹¹² Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] published by Turkish Ministry of Defence. Internet Source: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#BEYAZKITAP> reached at 11/06/2003

¹¹³ Cakmakoglu, S. *Preface* in Beyaz Kitap

geopolitical location acts as a constraint on the policy choices available to Turkey to be true. Defence Minister Cakmakoglu's statement that *"unstable situation in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, our neighbors' policy toward Turkey and our 8,300 kilometers long coasts entail us to develop our national security policy in this way."*¹¹⁴, demonstrates the rationale behind the conviction of Turkish policy makers that geography is more central than politics in shaping the security conceptualization and policies of a country. The intensity of these kinds of assumptions, in turn, causes a relative lack of debate on Turkey's security conceptualization. Turkish policy-makers as well as some academicians have underlined the 'givens' of Turkey's national security concerns as if to suggest that the process of formulating national security policy involves merely looking at Turkey's geopolitical location and planning for contingencies.¹¹⁵ Following academic text is a good example for it: *"Turkey is a country surrounded by reality. Indeed, the realist understanding of international relations, which was erected upon an 'anarchical' external environment in which states' primary objective is 'survival' may, on a broader scale, explain the motives behind the Turkish foreign and security policy."*¹¹⁶ Such expressions clearly demonstrate that the geography of Turkey is pre-given and fixed and it is a source of insecurity.

The same geographical location could also be seen as an opportunity. For instance, Cevik Bir (who was then the Deputy Chief of General Staff) has expressed his views as such: *"The new risks and challenges that could affect the whole western world have transformed Turkey from a 'flank' to a 'front state'. Turkey is one of the few Western countries whose importance has increased in the post-Cold War period."*¹¹⁷ White Paper of the Ministry of Defence also uses such representations of Turkey's geography as bordering 'the most important oil reserves in the world,' located at 'the intersection of important sea lines of communication' and neighboring the 'abundant natural resources' of Central Asia and Caucasia. Yet, a retired general of the Turkish Military point that:

¹¹⁴ 'Defence Minister Says No Problem with National Security.' *BBC Monitoring International Reports*. Internet source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk> reached at 11/06/2003

¹¹⁵ Bilgin, P. (2002b)

¹¹⁶ Cited in Bilgin, P. (2002b) p. 9

¹¹⁷ Bir, C. (1998) 'Turkey's Role in the New World Order', *Strategic Forum* 135. Internet resource: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum135.html> reached at 11/06/2003

*“such geography might be considered as an asset, were it not to create a reciprocal sensitivity which in turn necessitates vigilance and obliges Turkey to keep a strong defence. This is to say that, from a different perspective, Turkey is seen squeezed on the margins of several regions.”*¹¹⁸ As seen, he states that if the geography of Turkey does not create threats, it could also be seen as an asset. To sum up, the geopolitics of Turkey has a big impact on the country’s security discourse. Furthermore, the geographical determinism in the security conceptualization, which is often stressed by policy-making elite, undermines the political character of conceptualizing security.

2- Sévres Syndrome¹¹⁹

As noted above, the widespread discourse on security in Turkey has been the discourse of the policy-making elite since the early years of the Republic. Geographic determinism is one of the ingredient elements of this discourse. Another ingredient element is the so-called ‘Sevres Syndrome’. This term is used to mean the distrust for outsiders, fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory¹²⁰. This concept has its roots at the end of the First World War. After, the defeat of Ottomans, the allied states had forced Ottomans to ratify the Treaty of Sevres. Not surprisingly, as a totally defeated country, they have signed it. This treaty has attempted the partition of Turkish heartland and tried to share it between victorious countries, as well as between some minorities. The emergence of a new Turkish Republic and official disappearance of the Ottoman Empire made this treaty invalid. However, distrust for outsiders, fear of abandonment, and fear of loss territory remained as the legacy of that unimplemented treaty. This syndrome is what has made the Turkish Republic a ‘security oriented’¹²¹ or a ‘security-first’¹²² state. “The founders of the republic were, after all, the top military brass and civil servants of the Ottoman Empire, who had experienced steady territorial losses for more than a century. The

¹¹⁸ Erguvenc, S. (1998), p. 35

¹¹⁹ Jung, D. (1999) ‘Turkey at Crossroads’ Copenhagen Research Institute (COPRI) Working Paper, Internet source: <http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm> reached at 11/06/2003

¹²⁰ Candar, C. (2000) ‘Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey,’ in Morton Abramowitz ed., published by The Century Foundation Press, New York, and p.124.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 123

¹²² Cizre, U. (2000) ‘Politics and Military in Turkey into the 21st Century,’ European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper, no. 2000/24

distrust for outsiders stemmed from that Ottoman experience and was deeply embedded in the ruling elite of the new state.”¹²³ This legacy characterized the security discourse of Turkey’s policy-makers during the republican period. The example of the General Secretary of the National Security Council Tuncer Kilinc, who made remarks to the effect that the EU has not helped Turkey in any issue related to Turkey’s national interests; that Turkey will never be admitted into the EU; and that it should start looking for alternative partners elsewhere¹²⁴. These words, although their commitment to Westernizing Turkey, provide support for the argument that the traditionalist elite in Turkey has continued to harbor a certain distrust of the West¹²⁵. Even, some of these elites go so far as labeling the West as a disintegrative power which is determined to divide Turkey, some others pointed that adoption of EU conditionality would entail insecurity in Turkey¹²⁶.

3- Changes in Turkish Security Discourse

The security discourse of Turkey experienced some amendments and changes under the impact of NATO’s changing security concerns and the pressures from the EU through the accession process. In January 1998, Turkey’s Chief of Military Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi in his speech at a seminar organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pointed that the concept of security had to be broadened beyond its military-focus to include the political, economic and social dimensions. He maintained that there are two categories of threats: *“The first category includes illegal trafficking of arms and drugs, international terrorism and condoning of terrorism in cases where it is considered as war of independence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and environmental damage. The second category includes ethnic conflicts, intolerance, radical nationalisms and all kinds of separatism, and human trade in the form of migration.”*¹²⁷ Karadayi continued that these new risks and threats were more dangerous, because there was no longer a single identity of the enemy. Instead, the

¹²³ Candar, C (2000), p. 123

¹²⁴ Bilgin, P. (2000b), pp. 12-13

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.13

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ ‘Ekonomist Asker’ [Economist Military Officer] *Milliyet* 27/01/1998

new security environment was characterized by a range of threats posed by multiple actors. These opinions of Karadayi marks an important shift in Turkish security discourse while including some aspects consistent with the European security discourse. Consider, for instance, NATO's New Strategic Concept established just after the Cold War: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe."¹²⁸ In this sense, remarks of Karadayi seem consistent with NATO's strategy.

However, adding new aspects to concept of national security without leaving the former ones, in other words, broadening the security agenda had created an anxiety in domestic political arena. It has been suggested that it constitutes an obstacle on the road to integration with the EU. This anxiety has been voiced by Mesut Yilmaz (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Turkey-EU relations at that time). He argued that integration of Turkey to the EU has been delayed by the "national security syndrome". This syndrome, maintained Yilmaz, prevented changes in constitution and other reforms demanded by the EU. According to him, the problem was not only that Turkey's national security perception was too broad compared to that of the EU, but also, national security was defined behind closed doors.¹²⁹ Indeed, Gencer Ozcan has remarked that by the end of 1990s, it had become 'difficult to find a political and societal topic that does not concern national security.'¹³⁰ Contrary, approaches of the Turkish General Staff and Minister of Defence to national security were mainly based on two assumptions. First, they assume that Turkey's national security concept is pre-determined by its geopolitical

¹²⁸ 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8/10/1991. Internet Source: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b911108a.htm> reached at 12/06/2003

¹²⁹ Anavatan Partisi Genel Baskani Mesut Yilmaz'in 7. Olagan Buyuk Kongre'yi Acis Konusmasi' [Mesut Yilmaz's Address to the 7. Congress of the Motherland Party], 04/08/2001. Internet source: <http://www.anap.org.tr> Reached at 12/06/2003

¹³⁰ Ozcan, G. (1998) 'Doksanli Yillarda Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dis Politikasinda Askeri Yapinin Artan Etkisi' [The increasing Influence of the Military on Turkey's National Security and Defence Policy in the 1990s] in *En Uzun Onyil: Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve dis Politika Gundeminde Doksanli Yillar*, [The Longest Decade: Turkey's National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda in the Nineties.] Ozcan, G. and Kut S., eds., published by Boyut Yayinlari, Istanbul, p.90.

position and domestic structure and these factors do not leave much room for discussion. Second, both suggest that national security is far too important and delicate an issue to be discussed outside the National Security Council meetings.¹³¹ Consider, for instance, Defence Minister Cakmakoglu's answer to a question whether there was a problem in Turkey's conceptualization of national security: "According to my point of view, there is no problem. National security policy does not consist of personnel assessments. It is developed by taking into consideration Turkey's strategic position and its neighbors."¹³² The statement of the Turkish General Staff: "it was more appropriate to discuss issues, which are about the prosperity and happiness of people, on platforms which are not tainted with political interests"¹³³ is also consistent with the expression of Defence Minister.

These kinds of debates between politicians, officials and soldiers were not common in Turkish political arena before 1990s. The heavy ideological influence of the Cold War, coup of 1980 and legacy of the quasi-anarchy of 1970s had avoided debates, especially, on national security. However, this practice and conceptualization of security emerged as a huge obstacle while country tried to receive the EU membership.

Turkey's and the European Union's security cultures have evolved differently during the Cold War in that by the beginning of the 1990s they became ignorant of each other's security concerns. From the perspective of the Turkish political elite, the EU membership is very beneficial for Turkey as long as the EU does not cause insecurities for Turkey. Consider the following words of a Turkish general: *"EU membership is in our favor. But, if the EU is going to take over the market, diminish the national industry, govern the bureaucracy from Brussels, make conflicting demands on Cyprus, the European Army, PKK and Armenian issues, and refuse to admit Turkey unless these demands are met, I would say 'it is trying to divide up Turkey and is putting forward these conditions so as*

¹³¹ Bilgin, P. (2002b)

¹³² 'Defence Minister Says No Problem with National Security.' *BBC Monitoring International Reports* Internet source: www.bbc.co.uk reached at 11/06/2003

¹³³ 'Turkish General Staff Issues Statement on National Security Concept' *BBC Monitoring International Reports* Internet source: www.bbc.co.uk reached at 11/06/2003

not to admit Turkey.”¹³⁴ These elite is also aware of the insecurities in the long-term if Turkey fails to join the EU, but they also consider the reforms demanded by the EU as threatening for Turkey’s national security. Although they are aware of the unhealthy consequences that await Turkey if it fails to join the EU, their worst-case scenario is rather different. They are worried that Turkey would make all reforms demanded by the EU and the EU would still deny their membership.¹³⁵ So, military would lose its capability to handle the threats against Turkey.

Additionally, the difference between Turkey and the EU is not necessarily the size of the security agenda. For instance, Umit Cizre points that: “Regarding the redefinition of security, a careful comparison between Karadayi’s stand and that of Javier Solana’s shows striking differences. For Solana, ‘today, the meaning of the concept of security is very broad. An important part of it still covers naturally the classic meaning. But beyond that, it embodies a new security concept in terms of economy, democracy, human rights and ecology which stem from the understanding of a new society.’”¹³⁶ As seen, the difference is also in the content of the conceptualization of security. The distinction could be clarified by the terms of people-centered versus state-centered approaches to security.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ ‘Orgeneral Kilinc: Avrupa Bize Uymaz,’ [General Kilinc: Europe is not suitable for us] *Radikal* 19/06/2002.

¹³⁵ Bilgin, P. (2002b), p.20

¹³⁶ Cizre, U. (2000), p.20-21

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 20

Chapter 4: European Concept of Security

During the Cold War, the European Community (the EC) as it then was, was not considered an actor in international security either by its members or by outsiders. Although some member states wanted it to play a role in the field of security, the EC was considered an international economic and political actor, but not a security actor.¹³⁸ In cold war era, the EC/EPC (European Political Cooperation—predecessor of the CFSP) presented itself as firmly in the Western camp.¹³⁹ The main threat to international security came from the Eastern Bloc, but it was less likely to consider conflicts all over the world from the perspective of superpower competition, and more likely to consider the conflicts on their own merits. There was a fundamental acceptance of global economic interdependence as the basic framework of modern international relations.¹⁴⁰ Emphasis was placed on the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, which went beyond the political considerations about the East– West context, i.e. spheres of influence. The view was that peace and security were most likely to be ensured by not seeing regional conflicts as expressions of the superpower contest.¹⁴¹

There was an emphasis on liberal values, human rights in particular, and strong support for organizations, which furthered these. This led to a stress on civil aspects of foreign policy. The Community underlined moral persuasion as opposed to force in the broad sense of the word as a means of furthering its aims and of contributing to international conflict resolution. In spite of considerable economic weight, the general approach was not one of linkage between economics and politics. Although there was a political element in the Union's external economic diplomacy, there were important pressures, which worked against constant linkages.¹⁴² Moreover, the Union made a virtue out of its

¹³⁸ Larsen, H. (2000) 'Concepts of Security in the European Union After the Cold War' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, p. 337

¹³⁹ Hill, C. (1990) 'European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model or Flop?' in Reinhard Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of Europe as an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 125

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 127

¹⁴² Ibid., p.128

lack of military power. This was linked to a commitment to mediation in international conflicts and to treating the long-term causes of conflicts rather than the symptoms.

Until the 1980s the European Political Cooperation did not deal with security questions, but in the 1980s security questions entered the EPC agenda. In the 1981 London declaration, it was made clear that the EPC could discuss political aspects of security and the Single European Act in 1986 led to the inclusion of economic aspects of security. This was not, however, presented as a break with the civil power profile.¹⁴³ With the TEU, all aspects of security were understood as being within the remit of the Union, although defense was only understood as a potential future part of it.

After the Cold War, the new international situation placed the European Union (as of 1993 with the entry of the Maastricht Treaty into force) in the position of a security actor in the changed European security architecture. This was due to its strong organization and attractiveness for potential members. EU's increasing security role was taken up at the two intergovernmental conferences, which revised the Union's basic treaties in the 1990s. The Treaty on the European Union, finalized in Maastricht in 1991, entered into force in 1993 while the second revision was finalized in Amsterdam in 1997 and entered into force in 1999. The Maastricht Treaty stated that the EU could deal with all aspects of security, and the EU's formal access to military means was a subject that was on the agenda of both intergovernmental conferences. The post-Cold War situation thus made the EU's security considerations more relevant, both from an EU perspective and from the perspective of the EU as an international actor.

1- Liberal Power Europe

The question of whether Europe – and more particularly the EU – has a strategic sense of purpose and the value of military force is easy to reject because of the obvious differences in national point of views, ranging from countries such as France and Great Britain maintaining that force must be used to defend interests to countries such as

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 131

Austria, Finland, and Sweden arguing that force must be restrained as much as possible. These considerations seem true, however Francois Heisbourg state that they are not absolutely correct:

- “First, the differences between the two ends of the spectrum are narrowing;
- Secondly, the center of gravity of the spectrum is moving to greater, not lesser, acceptance of participation in operations involving the use military force.”¹⁴⁴

The EU is fundamentally liberal. It advocates democracy, the rule of law, and individual freedom. Article 2 of the treaty on the European Union lays out the collective vision. The EU will “promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and achieve balanced and sustainable development, while also maintaining and developing the Union as an area of freedom, security, and justice”. According to this definition, the Union assumes a role in world politics of not merely defending its interests but of ‘asserting its identity’.

This same liberal emphasis is found also in the texts of the European Convention preparing a new treaty. The draft treaty of October 2002 first spells out key values: human dignity, fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, respect for obligations and for international law.”¹⁴⁵ It then asserts, among other things, that the EU must promote a “common foreign and security policy, and a common defense policy, to defend and promote the Union’s values in the wider world.”¹⁴⁶

In the previous paragraphs it is obvious that the EU assumes a role of implanting its values abroad. As Arnold Wolfers suggests, the EU has both “possession goals” and “milieu goals.”¹⁴⁷ The former relates to possessions – and the defense of these – which is

¹⁴⁴ Heisbourg, F. (2000) “European Defense – making it work,” *Chaillot Paper* 42, September, section II. 3.

¹⁴⁵ European Convention. 2002. *Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence*, Brussels, December 16, 2002, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00461en2.pdf> reached at 07.07.2003

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Wolfers, Arnold. 1967. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cited in Rynning, S. (2003) ‘A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st Century Geopolitics.’ From ECPR workshop no. 12: “Conceptualizing the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy: New Questions and New Approaches” Helene Sjursen and Claire Piana, Edinburgh.

clearly the case for the EU as it wishes to safeguard and promote the achievements of fifty years of integration. The latter is present as well because, as emphasized, the EU wishes to make the world a better place by transforming illiberal regions into liberal ones. In other words, the EU would feel safer if the surrounding world looked more like the EU itself.¹⁴⁸

The means to promote these aims are mainly understood as economic and political.¹⁴⁹ The formulations about creating a common defense are mostly linked to the need to strengthen 'European identity', which will then promote peace, stability etc. Defense is not linked directly to strengthening peace and stability. When it comes to solving concrete problems, the discourse does not stress the importance of military means or defense. No direct link is made between 'consistent action' and defense or military means. In the discourse, the development of the 'genuine external identity' is primarily linked to the problems that Europe must be able to contribute to solving.¹⁵⁰ The development of a military or defense capacity is linked rather to developing the 'European identity' or increasing the EU's political weight, but rarely directly linked to the practical or more general problems that Europe has to confront.¹⁵¹ In concrete policy articulations, the defense elements are, therefore, not integrated in the arguments about conflict resolution. The references to defense are, rather, linked to attempts to create a capable European identity. They do not primarily refer to defense as a way of enhancing the Union's possibility to engage in concrete endeavors to solve problems.¹⁵² When it comes to furthering its concrete policy aims in the world, the EU is, thus, still very much a civilian power in its self-understanding. Civilian means are articulated as the main means to solve problems in the world.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ Rynning, S. (2003) 'A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st Century Geopolitics.' From ECPR workshop no. 12: "Conceptualizing the EU's Foreign and Security Policy: New Questions and New Approaches" Helene Sjursen and Claire Piana, Edinburgh

¹⁴⁹ Rummel, R. (1997) 'The CFSP's Conflict Prevention Policy', in M. Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Records and Reforms* (London and Washington, DC: Pinter) p. 107.

¹⁵⁰ Larsen, H. (2000), p. 345

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Reflection Group's Report, 1995. SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21), 5 December.

¹⁵³ Rummel, R. (1997)

However, the Council texts often have a very multiple character in relation to defense. The reference to use of military means sometimes seems like the articulation of another discourse than the dominant one: military means are necessary for EU external action to be credible.¹⁵⁴ This is, of course, a result of the negotiation of meaning between actors in the EU, including states, with a different understanding of the scope of defense within the Union. If we look at the discourses of the EP, the Commission, Germany or France, we find a relatively clear commitment to a defense capacity within the EU as part of the European identity and the weight that this gives in concrete problem solving. On the other side of the spectrum, we find the UK, Denmark and Ireland, who stick on to different discourses on the role of the Union in the field of defense, converging on one point: development of an EU defense is not a natural part of an EU foreign policy identity.¹⁵⁵ The Council texts in this respect can be seen as influenced by the different discourses at play in the negotiation of meaning at the Union level: one that stresses the unambiguous link between a genuine identity and a defense capacity within the Union and one that does not.

However, as it has been mentioned previously, these two spectrums are narrowing and the center of the gravity moves toward the use of military force as a means for problem solving. A good evident for this argument can also be seen clearly in the security strategy document¹⁵⁶ released by the Council at December 2003, which is first in the history of the EU. In this document firstly the threats which have been perceived by the EU were defined, the objectives and policies addressing those threats were demonstrated. Although not the only way of intervention, the use of military force and assets have been pronounced openly in an official EU document. For instance: *“Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”*¹⁵⁷ Here it is seen that the EU may intervene to threats or potential threats with “robust” means, which obviously means military intervention. Additionally, the necessity of expanding the military

¹⁵⁴ Agenda 2000, 1998. *Progress Report to the European Council*, 9000/98, 10 June.

¹⁵⁵ Larsen, H. (2000), p. 346

¹⁵⁶ “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, *European Security Strategy*, published by the European Council, Brussels, 23 December 2003.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 11.

capabilities has been expressed in that document, which can be seen in the following passage: *“To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more effective use of resources are necessary.”*¹⁵⁸ The intended increase in military capabilities can easily be interpreted as the EU has the intention to use its military forces for future possible crisis.

2- Threat Perceptions of Europe

The end of the Cold War constituted an important challenge to established security and defence policies and perceptions of security in Western Europe. With the collapse of the Warsaw pact, the perceived threat on which much of West European security and defence policies had been built since the end of the Second World War disappeared almost overnight. It now seemed increasingly unrealistic to suggest that West European states' security was challenged by an “enemy state”. Moving away from the emphasis on defending the territory of the nation-state from an external military threat, discussions on security and defence policy increasingly began to focus on so-called non-territorial threats and to refer to an “enlarged” security concept.¹⁵⁹ Thus, the way in which the definition of security was specified started to change. In response to the question of “security for whom”? it was no longer self-evident that the answer was the state. Neither, the response to the question of “security for which values” was it a given that this would be the territorial integrity of the state.¹⁶⁰ Increasingly, the focus turned from the state to the individual as the “referent object” of security.¹⁶¹ As to the values to be defended, these were no longer only the territorial integrity of the state. In fact, in several instances, this integrity was challenged in the name of principles of human rights. However, the most important changes to the specifications of security had to do with the types of threats that Western Europe was expected to have to face. As a result of these changes a

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ Sjørusen, H. (2001) ‘New Forms of Security Policy in Europe’ Arena Working Papers WP 01/04. Internet source: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_4.htm reached at 07.07.2003

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

debate also developed about the legitimacy of the use of military means outside the territory of the nation state, with the aim of protecting international norms and rules.¹⁶²

So, it would be appropriate to place the dangers or threats to European security while analysing the security discourse of the EU. Within this discourse, the EU is constructed as the primary referent for security, although the referent is sometimes widened to Europe as a whole. In the EU discourse, it is possible to identify five threats to which the EU has to respond.¹⁶³ The first four of the dangers relate specifically to Europe. If these dangers are not countered they may constitute existential threats to European security.

End of EU integration

First is the end of EU integration, including a stop to the implementation of treaties and the EMU. Continued EU integration is connected to security as the following examples from the official text indicate:

*A prime objective to be achieved...: maintenance of strong European integration and cooperation ...as, together with the organizations responsible for European security and national policies, they are both a guarantee of peace and prosperity for the citizens of the Union ... this guarantee is not perpetual and ... it would be a grave error to underestimate the Community's main contribution ...namely a shared view of life that has ruled out war as a means of settling differences.*¹⁶⁴

In this citation integration is equated to peace (and other things) and is linked to the ruling out of war. In the two quotations below, the crucial link between EU integration and security is even more direct:

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Larsen, H. (2000), p. 341

¹⁶⁴ Reflection Group's Report, 1995, p.5

*The EU is attached to the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security ... The EU contributes to this process, by actively pursuing the objectives of European integration and enlargement.*¹⁶⁵

*The fundamental aim of Union is to further peace, security and stability amongst the Europeans themselves ... It is difficult to put figures on peace, stability and the economic aspects, but they are of crucial importance for both the CEECs and the Union's present members.*¹⁶⁶

Instability in Central and Eastern Europe

Instability in Central and Eastern Europe is seen as a danger to European security. The primary solution to this potential instability is the enlargement process of the Union, part of which is the need for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) to adapt to EU standards. It has been given a security aspect to enlargement in the discourse: 'the Union is determined to work towards stability and peace on the continent of Europe, by preparing for the accession of the associated European countries',¹⁶⁷

The security of Europe connected both to the enlargement and the integration of the EU. The discursive connection between the security of enlargement and of EU integration is the risk that the first might jeopardize the latter through a weakening of the momentum of European integration.¹⁶⁸ The understanding that developed within the Union in relation to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference was that this conference and the ensuing treaty were primarily addressing this problem. Within the discourse the two first dangers were closely linked.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ EU Presidency intervention at the UN General Assembly (26 September 1995).

¹⁶⁶ Commission Report about Enlargement, 1995, p.6

¹⁶⁷ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Cannes (26– 27 June 1995, p.1); cf. Presidency Conclusions,

European Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993, p. 12); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council (9– 10 December 1994, p. 3); cf. Presidency Conclusions, European Council (15– 16 December 1995, p. 22).

¹⁶⁸ Presidency Conclusions, European Council (21– 22 June 1993, p. 12).

¹⁶⁹ Reflection Group's Report, 1995, p.4

Instability in Russia

In Council documents, Russia is not presented as a military threat. It is, rather, presented as a power whose instability might constitute a danger to European security. Stability, peace and security in Europe are linked to Russia's political, economic and social development. An unstable, undemocratic development in Russia is seen as jeopardizing European security:

*The successful completion of these elections and the consolidation of democracy in Russia will contribute to strengthening peace, stability and security in Europe.*¹⁷⁰

*...Russia must be brought into the European security structures, and the development of democratic structures in the country is central to that. EU's (good) relationship with Russia is seen as 'essential' for a stable European development. Instability in Russia or a break-down of EU-relations with Russia might threaten European security.*¹⁷¹

Instability in the Mediterranean

An unstable Mediterranean also constitutes a threat to Europe. Peace, stability and prosperity in the region are crucial to security in Europe:

*The Mediterranean basin constitutes an area of strategic importance for the Community. Peace, stability and prosperity in the region are amongst the highest priorities of Europe ... The Council supports the establishment of an Euro-Mediterranean area of political stability and security. The reinforcement of the political dialogue must be based on the respect of democracy, good governance and human rights.*¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Florence (21– 22 June 1996, p. 4, annex); cf. Conclusions of the European Council (15–16 December 1995, p. 38, Annex).

¹⁷¹ Presidency Conclusions, European Council (26– 27 June 1995, p. 11); Presidency Conclusions, European Council (15–16 December 1995, p. 37). Conclusions of the Presidency from the European Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993, p. 6, Russia).

¹⁷² European Council, Essen (9-10 December 1994)

The threats perceived from CEEC, Russia and Mediterranean. It is instability in these regions, which creates anxiety in Europe. However, Mediterranean seems more uncertain and unpredictable comparing to CEEC and Russia. Moreover, instability in CEEC and Russia seen as problems occurs within Europe, but the instability in Mediterranean perceived as an external threat. Thus, the approach of the EU differs concerning these regions. The potential danger from CEEC is dealt by enlarging the EU and incorporating these states in the institutions and prosperity of the EU. Russia also would be integrated with Europe, perhaps not in whole institutional structure of Europe but in the new Security architecture of Europe. In spite of this, the Mediterranean and its dangers are dealt by more traditional ways such as state-to-state relations and cooperation agreements.

Non-Geographical Threats

The final category of threats identified in EU discourse has little or no geographical base. It consists of elements like terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, nuclear proliferation, ecological risks and strong migratory pressures:

*Paramount importance of the common struggle against international organized crime, terrorism and the threat posed by drugs.*¹⁷³

Even though the threats are diffuse and non-geographical, they are described in terms which locate them outside the EU itself: the action against some of these dangers (terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking) is linked up with a strengthening of the EU's internal cohesion and external border.¹⁷⁴ The emphasis on terrorism has been increased since the 11 September attacks in US.

¹⁷³ European Council (9– 10 December 1994, p. 19). About terrorism specifically cf. Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council (15–16 December 1995, p. 20) and Presidency Conclusions, European Council (12– 13 December 1997); cf. Reaction Group's Report (1995, p. 3).

¹⁷⁴ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Florence (21– 22 June 1996).

3- The Conceptual Bases of the Change in European Security Concept

As it has been argued in this thesis, the disagreement on the ESDP between Turkey and the EU mainly based on their distinct conceptualisation of security. Up to now, their security conceptualisations have been demonstrated while analysing their discourse on security. In this section, it would be tried to formulate the change in security understanding of the EU after the Cold War.

If the discussion is about security concepts of states or other political entities, starting with the Westphalian model would be appropriate to formulise the distinct security concepts. This system of International relations is still the dominant approach to understand international security policies, although the validity of it has experienced considerable erosion after the end of the Cold War. According to this model, striving for security is in many ways the ultimate concern of the foreign policies of states. This is linked to the assumption of anarchy in the international system. There is no superior authority that can 'lay down the law' from a more independent or objective position than the individual states. The international system is, in other words, seen to be in a 'state of nature'.¹⁷⁵ In such a system, politics is a struggle for power where each state must look after its interests as best it can and with all available means. Questions of values or of morality are considered to have little or no place in such a system. They belong to domestic politics. Held articulates the characteristic features of the Westphalian model as follows:

“1. The world consists of, and is divided by, sovereign states which recognise no superior authority.

2. The processes of law making, the settlement of disputes and law-enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states subject to the logic of ‘the competitive struggle for power’.

¹⁷⁵ Sjursen, H. (2001)

3. Differences among states are often settled by force: the principle of effective power holds sway.
4. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
5. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts are a 'private matter' concerning only those affected; no collective interest in compliance with international law is recognised.
6. All states are regarded as equal before the law: legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of power.
7. International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and peoples is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows national political objectives to be met.
8. The minimisation of impediments on state freedom is the 'collective' priority",¹⁷⁶

During the Cold War the security and defence policies of West European states were to a large extent formulated according to the logic of the Westphalian model. However, after the Cold War, as mentioned several times in the thesis, this system of security is experiencing a fundamental change in the EU. However, Turkey perceives the world politics still from that point of view. It has been demonstrated in third chapter that threat perceptions of Turkey is clearly conventional. The interesting point here is that approximately fifteen years ago, most of the European countries were sharing more or less the same considerations with Turkey in terms of conceptualisation of security. Security concept of Europe, in particular the EU, has been transformed ultimately in

¹⁷⁶ Held, D. (1993) 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitant Order?' in David Held (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy: North south, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 29.

these fifteen years. The changes in the concept of security also led to changes in the perception of what instruments might be most appropriate in security policy. The favoured instrument of the Cold War was the military; this is no longer necessarily considered the most efficient or appropriate instrument to maintain security. Much of the discussion on security policy in Western Europe was a discussion about how to reallocate resources from security to other policy objectives. As Sjursen puts it “To the extent that military means were still considered important, most West European states did in the 1990s begin considerable changes to the way in which they structured their armed forces and their strategic doctrines.”¹⁷⁷

The changes to the concept of security should not however be seen as the exclusive result of the end of the Cold War. They must be understood in the context of broader changes in the European system of states. Also, these “alternative approaches” to security were not new with the end of the Cold War.¹⁷⁸ However, it was only with the end of the Cold War that these ideas gained a wider acceptance.

A principal consequence of these broader changes to the international system is that the privileged status of the state is challenged. With these challenges to the state the very basis upon which security policy has been built is also questioned. It is possible to note “three conditions”¹⁷⁹ that illustrate the internal and external challenges to the state. “Firstly, the emergence of new issues at the international political agenda in Europe. Following from this, the conventional hierarchy of policy issues that gives priority to security and defence issues also seems to be abandoned. The second condition is the emergence of new transitional, supranational, economic, and political and security actors in addition to the state, at the European level. What many of these actors have in common

¹⁷⁷ Sjursen, H. (2001)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

is that they do not have a territorial base and that they act without reference to a specific national interest. A consequence of this change is that it has become more difficult for the state to control economic and political activities across national borders. Various groupings may, to varying degrees, seek to defend their interest through European institutions outside the nation state. The third condition is the strengthening of a normative and legal dimension in the international system. In a complex international system characterised by interdependence, order is the result of a network of agreements and international institutions and not exclusively of a balance of power. Such networks of international institutions cover a wide spectre of themes from environmental issues and human rights to defence issues.”¹⁸⁰ As a consequence, decisions on international issues are no longer left exclusively in the hands of national governments. Norms and rules at the international level do increasingly influence state behaviour and set standards for appropriate behaviour both between states and within states.

These challenges to the state constitute an opportunity to open the questions of the basis on which security policy should be formulated. When the referent object of security – the nation state - can no longer be taken as a given, the legitimacy of a security policy that relies exclusively on national security is also questionable. Therefore, the question of the basis on which the European security policy should be developed – which interests, values, norms should be promoted and protected comes to the fore. The normative dimension to security policy becomes visible.

To summarise, security policy in Western Europe now seems to hold three dimensions: “The first dimension is the traditional conception of security and defence policy where the purpose is to defend the territory of a nation state or a group of states from a clearly identified external military threat. The second dimension considers the idea of mutual interdependence between states. Thus national security is seen to depend on overall international stability and respect for international norms. With this dimension the focus in security and defence policy thus shifts towards non-territorial security threats. Sources of insecurity are often not considered linked to other states but to issues such as ethnic conflicts, international crime and terrorism. The third dimension points to social and

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

economic imbalances, humanitarian crises, and environmental disasters as larger security challenges than military threats.”¹⁸¹ Consequently, it could be claimed that the tendency in the European security agenda has been to move away from the first dimension of territorial defence and towards the third dimension of an enlarged security concept.

4- The Different Security Concepts of Turkey and the EU

As it has been mentioned several times in this thesis, the EU is a civilian and normative power. “Its civilian power is boost by the huge economic resources of its members and its normative power stems from its ability to determine the confines of normalcy and appropriate state behavior in global international society.”¹⁸² The best example of the EU acting as a normative power is the ongoing accession process in which it simply appears to have a power of attraction in the eyes of those states that want to join.¹⁸³ Candidate countries are encouraged by the EU to adapt their socio-economic and political structures to existing EU norms. In this way, it is hoped, the structural causes of potential instability and conflict will disappear. Thus, Turkey’s chances of membership within the EU will be slight if the Turkish elites fail in their efforts to transform their country along the lines of the EU model. The danger of exclusion will be higher if the country’s security concept continues to privilege strategic dimension at the expense of the EU’s civilian and normative security identity.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Oguzlu, H. T. (2002) ‘The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey’s Membership in the European Union’ *International Journal*, Autumn, p. 591.

¹⁸³ Manners, I. (2000) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Working paper for Copenhagen Peace Research Institute(COPRI). Internet Source: <http://www.copri.dk/publications/WP/WP%202000/38-2000.doc>, reached at 07.07.2003

In 1990s Turkish foreign and security policies displayed a failure to move closer to Europe's security identity. Moreover, it has demonstrated persistence on the well-established strategic security understanding. In this timeline, Turkey became gradually estranged from the EU in terms of security.

First, the EU and Turkey diverged on the definition of the nature of conventional threats to security. Turkey continued to regard developments in Russia and Middle East as possible sources of conventional threats to its security.¹⁸⁴ As mentioned previously, EU members on the other hand shared the view that today's world posed no conventional threat to Europe's security. Therefore, many European security analysts believed that Turkey's inclusion within the EU might increase conventional threats to European security because Turkey lies at the center of many zones of instability. Its hard security understanding might bear the risk of bringing the EU into open conflict with one of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors.¹⁸⁵ For many EU members, new threats and risks to European security lie in the unstable regions on the peripheries of Europe. Problems that might come from the unhealthy domestic structures of the countries in these regions include immigration to the developed European countries, ethnic intrastate wars, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, organized crime etc. This supports the view that in the security referents within post-Westphalian Europe, society and individuals have gradually replaced the nation state.¹⁸⁶ In Turkey, on the other hand, the elite continue to view the Turkish state and its territorial integrity as the main objects of security.

In addition to their partial differentiation in terms of conventional and non-conventional threats, the EU and Turkey have also diverged in their approaches to terrorism. Turkey sees various kinds of terrorism as one of the greatest threats to its national and global security interests and prefers to rely on conventional military capabilities and military co-

¹⁸⁴ Bazoglu-Sezer, D. (1992) 'Threat Perceptions in Southern Europe: the Case of Turkey' in Laszlo Valki, ed., *Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines*, (London: Macmillan), pp. 227-37

¹⁸⁵ Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999) 'The European Union and Turkey' *Survival*, no. 41, pp. 41-57

¹⁸⁶ Sjursen, H. (2001)

operation with the US and Israel to contain those threats.¹⁸⁷ The EU has adopted a rather more selective approach both to the definition of terrorism and the means of dealing with it. The EU refuses to treat all sorts of anti-Western and anti-Regime political activities as terrorism. When the EU does define an activity as terrorism, it tends to struggle with it through “engagement” rather than “containment”.¹⁸⁸ For many Europeans, if the socio-political roots of terrorism are not destroyed, terrorism will never be eradicated.¹⁸⁹

Another difference can be found in attitudes towards NATO and transatlantic relations. For Turkey, membership in NATO is its most important security guarantee. Thus, Turkey’s major post-Cold War security concern has to do with NATO’s collective defense characteristic and the possibility of the strength of article 5 commitments. Would Turkey continue to feel secure in a NATO that included Russia and various central and east European countries and that had become a collective security organization rather than a collective defense organization? Turkey assumed that NATO would evolve into a loose collective security organization once it opened the way for new members from the East.¹⁹⁰ Because the Turkish elite saw the emerging European security structure as part of a European attempt to construct an autonomous foreign and security policy identity that would transform the EU into a global geopolitical security actor, it was imperative for Turkey to become a contractual party to it. With this perception in mind, it is not difficult for the Turkish elite to evaluate non-membership in this new arrangement from a ‘self-other’ dichotomy or as exclusion.¹⁹¹

However, the Turkish elite misread the situation. The EU has been eager to develop its own autonomous military capability not because of a desire to defend against conventional security threats to the continent or to extend European influence to other parts of the world to challenge other global military actors, namely USA. Rather, it wants to prevent unconventional security risks and challenges from disrupting the stability and

¹⁸⁷ Kibaroglu, M. (2002) ‘Turkey’s Threat Perceptions from the East: a Roadblock in its march toward the West’ in Ali Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan, eds., *Turkey’s Security Perception and the European Union: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities*, (The Hague: Kluwer).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Forster, A and Wallace, W. (2001) ‘What is NATO for?’ *Survival*, No. 43, pp. 107-22.

¹⁹¹ ‘The Turkish General Staff View on ESDP’ (2001) *Insight Turkey* No. 3, pp. 87-95

the prosperity of the continent.¹⁹² When the rationale for establishing the ESDP is attributed to these modest goals, which gave priority to the low end of the Petersberg tasks, the EU would see no reason to extend an invitation to Turkey just because Turkey is a NATO member with geopolitical and sophisticated military assets.¹⁹³ From this point of view, the European members of NATO see NATO military capabilities of having great potential to help the embryonic European Rapid Reaction Force. They want NATO to function in the European arena not to protect Europeans from a conventional source of threat but to intervene possible crises that might erupt on the peripheries of the continent until such time as the EU could mount its own army in the field.¹⁹⁴ So, it can be argued that the EU needs time to establish a well functioning security policy and NATO is required to fulfill the gap during this process. Turkey is aware of this situation and she insists on being involved and influential in the existing and newly developing structure of European security.

Because of the EU's negative stance on its participation in the mechanisms of ESDP, at least on the basis of Turkey's Associate Membership in the WEU and NATO's Washington Treaty of April 1999, Turkey has long been vetoing the EU's right of assured access to the assets of the NATO.¹⁹⁵ Its approach to this issue is from the traditional security-identity nexus: if Europe no longer welcomes Turkey's participation in European security institutions, then Turkey's European identity will further erode. This will in turn worsen Turkey's security concerns to such an extent that Europe might be considered a 'threat' rather than a 'security provider.'¹⁹⁶

One of the fundamental differences between the EU and Turkey on security concept is the approach of each one about the use of military force to deal with terrorism and other non-conventional security threats. EU members are inclined to use military power only if such action would contribute to strengthening socio-political structures in unstable

¹⁹² Kapstein, E. B. (2002) 'Allies and Armaments' *Survival*, No. 44, pp. 141-55.

¹⁹³ Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000) 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies' *Security Dialogue*, No. 31, pp. 489-502.

¹⁹⁴ Oguzlu, H. T. (2002), p. 594.

¹⁹⁵ Missiroli, A. (2002) 'EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP' *Security Dialogue*, No. 33, pp. 9-26.

¹⁹⁶ Oguzlu, H. T. (2002), p. 595.

regions. For them, the use of the military does not constitute an end in itself in eradicating structural conflicts around the peripheries of the continent, but rather as a means to pave the way for the efficient implementation of 'structural development.'¹⁹⁷ Thus, efforts to endow the EU with a military capability would not mean that the EU is inclined to take on the role of a military security actor on global scale, but it might rather use military means to accomplish civilian goals. The EU hopes to provide at least a minimum degree of internal stability, defined as the absence of militarized warfare, before investing in structural development.¹⁹⁸

When Turkey both broadened the range of issues that it sees as threats to its national security and narrowed its perspective to deal with them to largely military means, the use of force as an instrument in dispute settlement became more likely, at least in initial stages.¹⁹⁹ This can best be seen in Turkey's new military doctrine, which has moved from territorial defense to forward defense. One of the most important components of the doctrine is the forward deployment of Turkish troops in pre-emptive manner.²⁰⁰

Not only do Turkey and the EU diverge on the perception of threats to European security and stability from outside the EU borders; they also differ on the possible contribution of Turkey's membership to the distinctive security identity of the EU. While the majority of the Turkish elite argue for membership on the grounds that Turkey's inclusion would contribute to the multicultural and inclusive European identity, as well as its geopolitical needs, a great many in European circles speak loudly against Turkey's inclusion on the ground that its membership would seriously challenge the cohesiveness and homogeneity of the European identity.²⁰¹ Turkey's membership becomes a possible threat because to them the main security referent of contemporary Europe is the highly interdependent and

¹⁹⁷ Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001) 'Beyond the EU-NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture' *International Affairs*, No. 77, pp. 584-603.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Jung, D. (2001) 'Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?' Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper No. 35, p.13. Internet source: <http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm> reached at 07.07.2003.

²⁰⁰ Hickock, M. R. (2000) 'Hegemon Rising: the Gap between Turkish Strategy and Military Modernization' *Parameters: US Army War College*, No. 30, pp. 105-120.

²⁰¹ Oguzlu, H. T. (2002), p. 596.

functionally well-developed integration process within the EU. As mentioned in the previous section, as long as the EU integration project is conceived of as the main basis of security in Europe and as long as it is based on efforts to prevent the fragmentation of the EU,²⁰² Turkey's inclusion might seriously undermine those efforts. When Turkey's foreign policy approach to its neighbors is combined with its non-European cultural and social characteristics, it is quite possible that Europeans might see Turkey's inclusion in the EU as a fragmenting influence.

However, the influence of the EU on politics of Turkey should not be underestimated. As known, Turkey is an official candidate for EU membership. As a result of its candidacy and its strong will to be a member of the EU, Turkey have made and is still making progress on the way to fulfilling the conditions for full membership.²⁰³ The main goal for Turkey is, like other candidate states, to accomplish the so-called Copenhagen criteria of the EU, which comprises basically of humanitarian, legal and economic requirements. While fulfilling these conditions, the distinctions between the security concepts of Turkey and the EU would be narrowed, if Turkey can manage to internalize Copenhagen criteria in its political culture properly. As mentioned, Turkey considers the EU as a very significant security provider, both external and internal. Thus, fulfilling the conditions of the EU rapidly and becoming a full member of the EU has a paramount importance for Turkey's security. It should be taken into consideration that the EU has achieved the transformation of European security from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian model approximately in 15 years. Turkey can also succeed in achieving this in such a short timeline, if a clear vision for the full membership is provided by the EU. In other words, the main source of the hesitations to transform the security understanding in Turkey is the obscurity in EU membership. It should be noted that Turkey, if it can internalize the norms of the EU and succeed in the harmonization process with the EU, would be able to contribute to the project of Great Europe extensively.

²⁰² Waeber, O. (1995) 'Identity, Integration and Security' *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 48, pp.389-432.

²⁰³ Six legal packages have been adopted in Turkish parliament in order to harmonize its laws with the EU and reach the Copenhagen Criteria. The seventh one is still under discussion but it would probably be adopted.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, I have organized my chapters according to my secondary questions, which have assisted me to answer my central question, which is “*What are the bases of the disagreement between the EU and Turkey on European Security and Defence Policy?*” In conclusion I will ask these questions again and answer them briefly in order to clarify the arguments and findings of the thesis.

What is ESDP?

Basically, ESDP is the security policy of the EU. It has its roots in the initial periods of the EEC, but it has taken its current form after the Amsterdam treaty (1999). The Amsterdam Treaty, which introduced the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks, can be considered as the starting point of the ESDP as an institutionalized, operating and separate policy area of the EU.

However, the real turning point for the initiation of a true security and defense policy for the EU came only after the Franco-British St.Malo Summit of December 1998. In St.Malo, France and Britain decided to push the EU’s role in security and defense further and questioned the need for the existence of WEU as an independent organization.

St.Malo is a real turning point in the sense that the efforts towards the realization of ESDI in the framework of NATO have been replaced by policies aimed at the creation of a European-only presence in the fields of security and defense apart from NATO. After the St. Malo Declaration, discussions regarding the European security and defense have begun to be channeled into the EU framework. ESDI has been replaced by ESDP, former representing the general understanding while the latter signifying the creation of a policy inside the EU.

Cologne EU Summit of 3-4 June 1999 has initiated the institutionalization stage of the ESDP by identifying four main bodies to be set up within the EU, which are the General Affairs Council (GAC), Political, and Security Committee, (PSC), Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff (MS).

Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999 has taken a major step when it introduced the principles and guidelines for the formation of a European military capability by the year 2003.

As a result of these developments, the EU has developed a concrete policy area on security issues within the framework of the EU. However, ESDP still has problems. Military capabilities of the EU countries and coordination of the their troops in an operation constitute the main problems of the ESDP.

What is the disagreement all about?

The main argument of Turkish side is, on one hand, Turkey has some substantial rights in the WEU, which are far more than the rights that have been offered by the EU to Turkey within the ESDP framework. On the other hand, since ESDP is a EU policy, Turkey as a non-member country would not have the same rights with the member countries. Building upon these arguments, a disagreement between Turkey and the EU has started, especially after the year 2000.

One of the main pillars of Turkish position in the ESDP is based on its previous status in the WEU. Turkey, as an Associate Member of the WEU, was entitled to participate in the institutional and operational mechanisms of WEU to a high extent. Turkey maintains that previously reached agreements have to be respected and honored and therefore, even in the wake of the fading away of WEU and integration of its functions into the EU, Turkey's status in WEU has to be transferred to the EU framework.

The other point that the Turkish position is based upon, Turkey consistently emphasizes the *acquis* developed within the NATO framework as far as the emerging ESDP project and its relationship with the transatlantic security cooperation is concerned. Moreover, Turkey consistently makes reference to its contribution to the European security in all phases of the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War era under the NATO umbrella.

The EU, on the other hand, stresses the decision-making autonomy of the member states in the ESDP. According to the EU, preservation of the decision-making autonomy of the union is a matter of principle and Turkey's desire to fully participate in the decision-making mechanisms of operations undertaken with or without recourse to NATO assets in areas of national concern for Turkey and its immediate neighborhood, is unacceptable in this respect.

One of the main concerns about this issue in the EU is the "identity" problem. According to Europeans, ESDP process cannot be confined to strategic and military considerations, in so far as Turkey's emphasis on its strategic importance and military strength in supporting its position in ESDP is concerned. ESDP is not limited to the boundaries of a military tool, but rather it enjoys legitimacy as a vehicle to project the values inherent in the European identity to the regions within the scope of the crisis-management operations in the areas concerned.

Although the parties have different approaches on ESDP, there have always been initiatives to reach a compromise. The major one of these attempts was the so-called Ankara document, which has been proposed by British and US governments. In this document, it can be said that a solution was found by paying due attention to Turkey's serious concerns and to its supreme interests, primarily in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was given guarantees by the US and the UK that the European crisis management missions could not be used in contingencies involving the Aegean as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, bilateral issues between NATO allies will not be a legitimate concern of the EU. However, this agreement has not been realized through EU legal mechanisms yet due to the Greek opposition inside the EU.

Turkey has accepted this proposal and declared that Turkey agrees on arrangements based on this document. However, there is still no concrete agreement on this issue because of the Greek opposition in the EU.

What is Turkey's security concept?

As I argued in my hypothesis, the main obstacle to reach a satisfactory agreement is the different concepts of security held by Turkey and the EU, that originate from their different identities. In order to verify this hypothesis, I first examined the security concept of Turkey.

The security concept of Turkey can be analyzed under three headings: Geopolitics, Sevres Syndrome (mistrust) and Changes in Turkish security discourse. Geopolitics in Turkish security discourse, since the foundation of Republic, holds a substantial place. It has always occupied the central position of Turkish foreign policy making and it has always been perceived as given. According to this conceptualization of security, Turkey is at the middle of the most unstable and unpredictable regions of the world, so it has to be always aware of its surrounding regions in order to respond properly and efficiently to any kind of threats from these regions.

The other significant discourse that marks the security conceptualization of Turkey is the so-called Sevres Syndrome. This can be explained as mistrust toward the entire world and their collaborators inside the country. According to this approach, Turkey should never trust the outsiders and always behave in a sceptic way.

Finally, I have demonstrated the changes in Turkish security discourse. Under the effect of NATO's changed security strategies and the pressures from the EU, Turkish security discourse came closer to Europe's. Turkey started to mention some environmental issues, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and collective security instead of defense in its security discourse. This can be interpreted as an initial convergence of security concepts of Turkey and the EU.

What is the concept of security in the EU and its difference from Turkey's?

In the final chapter, firstly, I have tried to examine the security concept of Europe and secondly, I tried to display the differences between Turkish and European conceptualizations of security.

European security concept has evolved into a liberal one after the end of the Cold War. The paramount values of the EU are: human dignity, fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, and respect for obligations and for international law. The EU's main foreign policy action is to spread these values across its borders and all over the world in order to provide the dominance of these values and prevent probable threats because of the lack of these values. In other words, the EU is aiming at promoting and defending its values in order to protect itself from the unstable and undemocratic countries surrounding Europe.

Five threat perceptions can be identified in Europe's security concept: the end of the EU integration, instability in Central and Eastern Europe, instability in Russia, instability in the Mediterranean area and non-geographical threats. The first four of the dangers relate specifically to Europe. If these dangers are not countered they may constitute existential threats to European security.

After identifying the threats to European security, I have tried to demonstrate how the security conceptualization of Europe evolved from a Westphalian understanding of security to post-Westphalian one. In this section, it has been argued that after the disappearance of conventional threats to its territories, Europe's security concept has converted from a state-centric understanding to a people-centric one.

After those considerations, the differences between Turkish and European security concepts have been displayed. It has been demonstrated that as well as the threat perceptions, the means to avoid them are quite different in both of the parties. First of all,

as mentioned several times, the EU is a liberal power and it has a strong tendency to solve foreign or international problems by civilian and normative means. For example, the problem of terrorism should be solved by the destruction of its socio-political and economic roots, not with military means. However, for Turkey, it should be solved by military means.

In terms of threat perception, Turkey still perceives conventional threats from its neighbors and from domestic anti-regime and separatist groups to its territorial integrity and regime. On the other hand, in Europe, those kinds of threat perceptions almost completely disappeared. Instead, the stability around its borders and global drug trafficking, international terrorism and the pressure of the immigration from underdeveloped regions of world are at the center of security discourse, although they have serious differences in their approaches to these threats. Policies of the members of the EU against Iraq problem was a very clear example for this kind of distinctions on security understandings among European countries.

Finally, I can conclude that, although their conceptualization of security is different, it is in a process of convergence. Turkey and the EU can reach a final agreement on ESDP. As it could be observed, Turkish security discourse gives the signs of being more people-centric like the EU's, such as policies against illegal immigration, drug trafficking, international terrorism and even environmental threats. And the means, which are intended to use against threats by the EU, are coming closer to that of Turkey's. This tendency can be seen clearly especially after the Iraq war and terrorist attacks at Madrid; and the security strategy document of the Council is a concrete evidence for this tendency. However, although there are signs of convergence the security concepts of parties are still not same and it should be bear in mind that Europe has achieved this conceptualization of security in approximately 15 years and still there is no clear agreement on that. If the EU gives a clear perspective for full membership to Turkey, it is very predictable that Turkey would reach or at least come very closer to this concept of security within a few years.

Bibliography

Primary Sources (e.g. Official Documents, Speeches and Views and News Pieces)

Agenda 2000, (1998) *Progress Report to the European Council*, 9000/98, 10 June

Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union, www.europa.eu.int

Anavatan Partisi Genel Baskani Mesut Yilmaz'in 7. Olagan Buyuk Kongre'yi Acis Konusmasi' [Mesut Yilmaz's Address to the 7. Congress of the Motherland Party], 04/08/2001.

“Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisi” [European Security Architecture], Turkish Armed Forces Publication, www.Tsk.Mil.Tr/Genelkurmay/Uluslararası/Guvmimarisi.Htm

Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] published by Turkish Ministry of Defence. Source: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#BEYAZKITAP>

Cologne EU Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, www.europa.eu.int

Commission Report about Enlargement, 1995

‘Defence Minister Says No Problem with National Security.’ *BBC Monitoring International Reports*. Internet source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk>

‘Economist Asker’ [Economist Military Officer] *Milliyet* 27/01/1998

European Convention. 2002. *Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence*, Brussels, December 16, 2002, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00461en2.pdf>

EU Feira Presidency Conclusions, Annex I - Presidency Report On Strengthening The Common European Security And Defence Policy, Appendix 1

EU Presidency intervention at the UN General Assembly (26 September 1995)

General Affairs Council, 'EU-U.N. Co-operation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management – Conclusions' 11 June 2001.

http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=15873

“Greek barrier to ESDP causes disappointment in Brussels”, *Turkish Daily News*, 17 May 2002

Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, www.europa.eu.int

Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the ESDI, 14 February 2000
(www.mfa.gov.tr)

Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by EU Council at the Feira Summit in July 2000 on ESDI and CESDP (www.mfa.gov.tr)

Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the European Security and Turkey
(www.mfa.gov.tr)

Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, See Schake, K., Bloch, A. L. and Grant, C. (1999) 'Building a European Defense Capability', *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring), pp.23-24 for the full text of the Declaration

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 'European Defence: Challenges and Prospects' speech delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 11 June 2001. <http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010611a.htm>

'Orgeneral Kilinc: Avrupa Bize Uymaz,' [General Kilinc: Europe is not suitable for us] *Radikal* 19/06/2002.

Presidency Conclusions: European Council, Helsinki (10-11 December 1999)

Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Florence (21– 22 June 1996).

Presidency Conclusions, European Council (15– 16 December 1995)

Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Cannes (26– 27 June 1995)

Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Essen (9-10 December 1994)

Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Copenhagen (21– 22 June 1993)

Reflection Group's Report, 1995. SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21), 5 December

'The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8/10/1991. Internet Source: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b911108a.htm>

'Turkish General Staff Issues Statement on National Security Concept' *BBC Monitoring International Reports* Internet source: www.bbc.co.uk

"Turkish General Staff View on ESDI" (2001) *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June

“Turkiye’den AGSP’ye Destek”, [Turkey’s support for ESDP] *Finansal Forum*,
December 3, 2001

Von Sydow, B., Speech delivered to the European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 12 June 2001.

http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news_read.asp?iInformationID=15903

Washington Summit Communiqué, Art.9, “The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in
Washington”, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium

Secondary Sources (Books and Articles)

Books and Book Chapters:

Aggestam, L (2000) “A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role of Conceptions and
the Politics of Identity in the EU” in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.),
Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda (London: MacMillan Press
Ltd.,)

Alpo R. M. (2001) ‘Europe’s Changing Security Role’ in Gartner, Heinz (eds), *Europe’s
New Security Challenges* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers)

Aybet, G. (2000) ‘A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of
Legitimacy’ (London: MacMillan Press)

Bağcı, H. (2001) “Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler” in Bal, İdris ed., *21.Yüzyılın
Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım)

Bazoglu-Sezer, D. (1992) ‘Threat Perceptions in Southern Europe: the Case of Turkey’ in
Laszlo Valki, ed., *Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines*, (London:
Macmillan)

- Behnke, A. (2000) "Re-cognizing Europe: NATO and the Problem of Securing Identities" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* Published by MacMillan Press Ltd., London
- Candar, C. (2000) 'Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey,' in Morton Abramowitz ed., published by The Century Foundation Pres, New York
- Dalby, S. (1990) 'Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics' published by Pinter, London.
- Erguvenc, S. (1999) "Turkey: Strategic Partner of the European Union" in Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, *Turkey and European Union: Nebulous Nature of Relations*, Published by Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara
- Forster, A. and Wallace, W. (2000) 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' in Wallace, W. and Wallace H., eds., 'Policy Making in the European Union'
- Held, D. (1993) 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitant Order?' in David Held (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy: North south, East, West* (Cambridge: Polity)
- Hill, C. (1990) 'European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model or Flop?' in Reinhard Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of Europe as an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press).
- Hopf, T. (2002) 'Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999. Published by Cornell University Press., Ithaca
- Kibaroglu, M. (2002b) 'Turkey's Threat Perceptions from the East: a Roadblock in its march toward the West' in Ali Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan, eds., *Turkey's Security Perception and the European Union: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities*, (The Hague: Kluwer)

Kramer, H. (2000) 'A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States' published by *Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.*

Lesser, I. O. (1993) 'Beyond Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West' in Fuller, G. and Lesser, I. O. eds., 'Turkey's New Geopolitics' published by Westview Press, Boulder.

Lipschutz, R. (1995) 'On Security' in *On Security*, p.8, Published by Columbia University Press, New York

McKenzie, M. M. (1998) "The Construction of the European Pillar: Beyond the Status Quo?" in Mary M. McKenzie, and Peter H. Loedel, (eds.), *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests and Institutions* (London: Praeger Publishers)

Neumann, I. B. (1999) 'Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation' (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)

Ozcan, G. (1998) 'Doksanli Yillarda Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dis Politikasinda Askeri Yapinin Artan Etkisi' [The increasing Influence of the Military on Turkey's National Security and Defence Policy in the 1990s] in *En Uzun Onyil: Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve dis Politika Gundeminde Doksanli Yillar*, [The Longest Decade: Turkey's National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda in the Nineties.] Ozcan, G. and Kut S., eds., published by Boyut Yayinlari, Istanbul

Ruhle, M. and Williams, N. (1996) "The Greater Union's New Security Agenda: NATO and EU" in Franco Algieri eds. *Managing Security In Europe: The European Union and Challenge of Enlargement* (Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers)

Rummel, R. (1997) 'The CFSP's Conflict Prevention Policy', in M. Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Records and Reforms* (London and Washington, DC: Pinter)

Van Staden, A. (eds.) (2000), *Towards a European Strategic Concept* (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael,)

Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics* published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Wolfers, A. (1967) *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cited in Rynning, S. (2003) 'A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st Century Geopolitics.' From ECPR workshop no. 12: "Conceptualizing the EU's Foreign and Security Policy: New Questions and New Approaches" Helene Sjursen and Claire Piana, Edinburgh.

Articles and other Scientific Papers:

Andreani, G. (2000) 'Why Institutions Matter', *Survival* (Vol.42, No.2, Summer)

Aybet, G. and Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000) 'Transformations in Security and Identity After the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe' *International Journal, Autumn*

Aybet, G. (1999) 'NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security', *Sam Papers* Vol.4. source: www.mfa.gov.tr

Bilgin, P. (2002a) 'The Making of the "Mediterranean" Region: Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era' paper presented at the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Mediterranean

Programme, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University
Institute, Florence, March 20-24

Bilgin, P. (2002b) 'Rethinking Turkey's Security Discourse: The Challenge of
Globalization', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association (APSA), Boston, MA, August 29-September 1

Bir, C. (1998) 'Turkey's Role in the New World Order', *Strategic Forum* 135. Internet
resource: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum135.html>

Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999) 'The European Union and Turkey' *Survival*, no. 41

Cebeci, M. (2003) 'CESDP: A Turkish Perspective' at [http://selene.uab.es/ce-
documentacio-europea/ECDR/chap7.pdf](http://selene.uab.es/ce-documentacio-europea/ECDR/chap7.pdf)

Cebeci, M. (1999) "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of
WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations With
Special Reference To Turkey" *Occasional Papers* No. 10, November (Brussels: Western
European Union)

Charles Grant, (1999) "From St.Malo to Washington", *World Link*, March/April

Cizre, U. (2000) 'Politics and Military in Turkey into the 21st Century,' European
University Institute (EUI) Working Paper, no. 2000/24

Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001) 'Beyond the EU-NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings
of a European Strategic Culture' *International Affairs*, No. 77

Erguvenc, S. (1998) 'Turkey's Security Perceptions' *Perceptions*, Vol. 3, June-August

Forster, A and Wallace, W. (2001) 'What is NATO for?' *Survival*, No. 43

Giegerich, B. (2003) 'European Security and Defence Policy: In Search of a

Strategic Concept' Paper Presented at 7th Graduate Student Conference, BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March 21 – 22.

Gourlay, C. and Jensen, F. (2000) 'The European Parliament's 'Maximalist' Vision of CESDP,' *European Security Review*, December

Gozen, R. (2002) 'Turkey's Delicate Position between NATO and the ESDP in a Broadening Security Architecture in Europe' Report prepared for NATO Research Fellowship Programme, June, Ankara

Heisbourg, F. (2000a) "European Defense takes a leap forward", *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer

Heisbourg, F. (2000b) "European Defense – making it work," *Chaillot Paper* 42, September, section II

Hickock, M. R. (2000) 'Hegemon Rising: the Gap between Turkish Strategy and Military Modernization' *Parameters: US Army War College*, No. 30

Howorth, J. (2002) 'Why ESDP Is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance?' paper prepared for International Security Forum (ISF).

Jung, D. (1999a) "Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?" *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)*

Jung, D. (1999b) 'Turkey at Crossroads' Copenhagen Research Institute (COPRI) Working Paper, Internet source: <http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm>

Karaosmanoğlu, A. L. (2001) "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", *Doğu Batı*, No. 14

Karaosmanoglu, A. (1996) 'Europe's Security Parameters' paper delivered at the Conference on Turkey and Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition: A Comparative Study with a View to Future Membership to EU, Bilkent University, Ankara, 9 March.

Kapstein, E. B. (2002) 'Allies and Armaments' *Survival*, No. 44,

Kibaroglu, M. (2002a) "Turkey's Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq", *Insight Turkey* Vol.4, No.1, January-March

Larsen, H. (2000) 'Concepts of Security in the European Union After the Cold War' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3

Lord George Robertson, (2001) "Turkey and ESDP", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.1, January-March

Manners, I. (2000) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' Working paper for Copenhagen Peace Research Institute(COPRI)

Missiroli, A. (2002) "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", *Security Dialogue* vol.33, no.1, March

Missiroli, A. (2001) 'Defence Spending in Europe: Is Europe Prepared to Pay for Improved Capabilities?' paper given at the Conference on ESDP organized in Paris on 13-15 December by the Cicero Foundation, www.iss.eu.int

Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000a) 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,' *Turkish Studies* Vol. 1

Muftuler-Bac, M. (2000b) 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies' *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 4, December

Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2002) 'The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union' *European Foreign Affairs Review* vol. 7

Neumann, I. B. and Welsh, J. (1991) "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society", *Review of International Studies*, Vol.13, No.4

Oguzlu, H. T. (2002) 'The Clash of Security Identities: The Question of Turkey's Membership in the European Union' *International Journal*, Autumn

Onis, Z. (2003) 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era' *Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, No. 1

Oymen, O. (Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO) (2001) 'Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security' *European Foreign Affairs Review* vol. 6

Piccoli, W. (2003) 'European Integration in Turkish Identity Narratives: The Primacy of Security' Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th CGES Graduate Student Conference, Georgetown University, 21/22 March

Rynning, S. (2003) 'A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st Century Geopolitics.' From ECPR workshop no. 12: "Conceptualizing the EU's Foreign and Security Policy: New Questions and New Approaches" Helene Sjursen and Claire Piana, Edinburgh

Schieb, T. (2001) "Turkey and ESDP: Current State of Affairs", *Insight Turkey* Vol.3, No.3, July-September

Simon Duke, (2001) "CESDP: Nice's Overtrumped Success?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *Kluwer Law International* Vol.6

Sjursen, H. (2001) 'New Forms of Security Policy in Europe' Arena Working Papers WP 01/04. Internet source: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_4.htm

Sköld, T. (2000) 'States Pledge Resources for Crisis Management' *European Security Review*, No. 3, December

Tank, P. (2001) "Turkey as a Special Case for the EU: Will The Generals Retreat from Politics?", *Security Dialogue* Vol.32, No.2

Teriff, T. (2001) "European Security and Defence Policy after Nice", *Briefing Paper* No.20, April

Tocci, N. and Houben M. (2001) 'Accommodating Turkey in ESDP' *CEPS Policy Brief No. 5*, (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies)

Waever, O. (1995) 'Identity, Integration and Security' *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 48

Wendt, A. (1992) 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics' *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 2