

**U.N. PEACEMAKING EFFORTS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT:
THE ROLE OF NEUTRALITY**

A Master's Thesis

by

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To my parents

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ABSTRACT

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The object of this thesis is to find out how the United Nations (UN) can best achieve a successful outcome in its peacemaking efforts in civil conflicts; specifically it focuses on the question of neutrality or bias in the UN's peacemaking attempts. By largely using content analysis of UN resolutions and some basic statistics, the findings of this thesis show that the UN is less likely to be successful in the peacemaking of civil conflicts when it is biased. Furthermore, the UN is found more often to be biased than neutral in resolutions pertaining to peacemaking attempts in civil conflicts. These results indicate that, although the UN gains its legitimacy and role in the world from its perceived neutrality, this is not the case and this may have implications for its future intervention efforts in civil conflicts.

Keywords: United Nations, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Neutrality, Impartiality, Civil War, Intrastate War, Intervention

ÖZET

İÇ SAVAŞLARDA BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLERİN BARIŞ İNŞASI ÇABALARI: TARAFSIZLIĞIN ROLÜ

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Bu tezin amacı Birleşmiş Milletler (BM)'in iç savaşlardaki barışa ulaşma çabalarının nasıl başarılı olacağını araştırmaktır. Özellikle odaklanılan soru BM'nin barışa ulaşma teşebbüslerinde yanlı ya da yansız oluşudur. Genellikle BM Önergelerinin içerik analizi ve bazı temel istatistikler kullanılarak ulaşılan bulgular göstermektedir ki BM'nin yanlı olduğu durumlarda, iç savaşlarda barışı gerçekleştirilmekte başarılı olma olasılığı azalmaktadır. Ayrıca, BM'nin iç savaşlarda barışa ulaşma çabalarını yansız olmaktan çok yanlı yürüttüğü görülmektedir. Bu sonuçlar göstermektedir ki, BM dünyadaki rolünü ve meşruluğunu algılanan yansızlığından dolayı kazansa da gerçekte durum böyle değildir ve bunun gelecekteki iç savaşlara müdahale girişimlerine bazı etkileri olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Barış Operasyonları, Barış İnşası, İç Savaş

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Cold War, civil conflicts significantly increased, and a redefinition of national sovereignty led to increased expectations of the international community to intervene in the affairs of states. Especially in 1992, Boutros Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" made it possible for the United Nations (UN) to expand its role – including in peacemaking (Goodhand, 2006: 79). The UN is particularly important in civil conflict management due to its perceived legitimacy as an international organization, and its perceived neutrality. Although intervention has increased, there are mixed results and opinions on their success (Goodhand 2006: 81). Moreover, this means that there are differing views on neutrality in peacemaking/mediation. Peacemaking and in particular mediation is important for the resolution of civil conflict because it may offer a way out of intractability, by leading to a mutually acceptable outcome (Bercovitch, 2004). This research was driven by the question of what leads to a successful outcome of civil conflict mediation.

Reading Benson and Satana's study (2009), which focuses on the relationship between neutrality and success of UN peacemaking in international conflicts, led me to my interest in neutrality.¹ I was particularly interested in the mediation aspect of peacemaking. I thought that the question of neutrality would be interesting to study in terms of intrastate conflicts. After reading the literature on civil conflict and mediation, I found a gap that this study aims to help fill. Furthermore, most of the (limited) literature leans toward supporting non-neutral mediation, but there have been mixed results in the literature. Non-neutral mediation includes bias and impartiality. It is important that impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. Impartiality means being perceived as not showing favoritism to either side of the conflict (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 40), and being seen as having nothing to gain from supporting either side (Kydd, 2003: 598). I take the view that neutrality and not impartiality is necessary in order to reach a successful outcome; but while some studies show that neutrality is necessary (Goulding, 1999), others say that neutrality does not lead to a successful outcome, and that instead bias does (Bercovitch and Langley, 2003; Benson and Satana, 2009; Jonah, 1992; Kydd, 2003). Nonetheless, the role of the mediator, their "knowledge, legitimacy and credibility," is significant and may have an effect on civil war outcome (Goodhand, 2006: 132). The myriad of mixed results in this literature gave me the desire to examine what is really more successful and how to best achieve success due to the problem of deadly and intractable civil conflicts in the world.

Eight out of ten of the world's poorest nations are experiencing or have experienced armed conflict (Goodhand, 2006: 27); most of which are/were intrastate or had a considerable intrastate aspect. Moreover, most are complex and intractable

¹ Neutrality and bias are sometimes used interchangeably in this thesis. Bias, as I am using it, refers to the opposite of neutrality. Later on in this thesis I explain how I used a bias variable to measure neutrality.

conflicts, which have experienced failed peacemaking attempts and have become somewhat regionalized. The significance of frequent conflict in these states is that the poorest are highly susceptible to falling into a never-ending cycle, not only of violence, but of inadequate governance, humanitarian crises, and poverty or slow development (Goodhand, 2006: 28). Hence the answer to how the UN can best achieve a successful outcome in the peacemaking of civil conflicts is an important one.

Overall, this thesis hopes to answer the question: how does UN neutrality affect the likelihood of peacemaking success in civil conflicts? The proposed hypothesis of this study is: the more neutral the UN is in its peacemaking attempts in civil conflicts, the more likely that a mediation attempt will bear a successful outcome. I used the Armed Conflict Dataset from the Center for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute and Uppsala Conflict Data Program to get a list of all the civil conflicts from 1946-2006. After reading all of the UN resolutions passed in that period, I matched each resolution to each civil conflict from the above-mentioned list. Consequently, I used a simple content analysis technique to group language that implies neutrality and bias for each resolution per each conflict. I found success data from Bercovitch's "Mediation Project" as well as my own research based off of his criteria (in order to make it as uniform as possible). Although some studies have been done on the effects of mediator neutrality on the successful outcome of a conflict (Benson and Satana, 2009; Bercovitch and Langley, 2003; Jonah, 1992; Kydd, 2003), there has not been, to the best of my knowledge, a study on the effects of UN bias in civil war mediation.

The following chapter is the literature review, which outlines the major literature contributions thus far on peacemaking and mediation, and neutrality,

impartiality and bias in mediation. The third chapter is on theory. It makes the case for why the UN's neutrality in civil conflict peacemaking is necessary for a successful outcome. It also gives further insight into the literature as it relates to this argument. Chapter four is the methodology chapter. It explains how and why I conducted the research the way that I did: by using cases from the PRIO dataset, content analysis of UN resolutions, and success data from the "Mediation Project" and my own research. It describes how I collapsed the peacemaking and neutrality variables, and how I created the success variable. Also it discusses how I interpreted the data, namely the relationship between success and neutrality. Chapter five is about select cases, which are chosen because they are examples of why some cases are neutral and yet unsuccessful, or biased and unsuccessful. These include the cases of Somalia, Croatia and the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,² Israel and Burundi. The final chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes the final results of the study, its implications and my recommendations for future research on this topic.

² This is how the state is referred to in the UCDP/PRIO dataset.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to the UN's definition as stated in "An Agenda for Peace," peacemaking is: bringing conflicting parties to an agreement through peaceful means that are outlined in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations: Pacific Settlement of Disputes" (Ouellet, 2003). Peacemaking is a "diplomatic effort" that transforms violent conflict into "nonviolent dialogue" through "negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration" (Ouellet, 2003). Peacemaking is a political process, which aims to "address and resolve the root causes" of a conflict (Morphet, 1993: 184). It is intended not only to stop the conflict but also to maintain peace after it is established (Boutros-Ghali, 1993: 475). The decision for peacemaking generally comes from the UN Security Council (UNSC), who can "recommend ways to resolve a dispute or request the Secretary-General's mediation." The Secretary-General's role in peacemaking is a significant one. For example the Secretary-General might mediate by using its 'good offices' or by employing 'preventive diplomacy' (UN, 1998: 69).

Peacemaking is only one of the UN's three main approaches to conflict management, which also includes preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping (Regan,

1996: 338). Regan (1996: 341), like most scholars on conflict management, tends to concentrate on the use of force, or peacekeeping. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are essentially “two sides of the same coin.” One of the distinctions is that peacekeeping happens after violence breaks out, while peacemaking may occur either before or after (UN, 1997: 10). Many argue that peacekeeping cannot be effective without peacemaking as it addresses the root causes of the dispute (Ryan, 1995: 120). Peacekeeping is a temporary solution whereas any long-term solution depends on effective mediation (Ryan, 1995: 197). Both peacemaking and preventive diplomacy include mediation; however, the distinction is made that mediation taking place before the conflict erupts falls under preventive diplomacy, while mediation that takes place after a conflict emerges is considered to be part of peacemaking (Peck, 1996: 132). The Security Council generally intervenes in conflicts after violence has occurred, so peacemaking is more often used than preventive measures, even though many scholars argue that the focus should be on the latter (Peck, 1996: 221). Furthermore, the peacemaking scholarship is largely focused on mediation rather than the other approaches (negotiation, conciliation and arbitration), because it is most often used (Lewicki et al., 1992: 236).

This thesis will focus on one aspect of peacemaking in civil conflicts: mediation. First, the focus is on civil conflicts because they are considered to be deadlier and occur more often than international conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 1; Rothman and Olsen, 2001: 290). Furthermore, mediation is often more useful in civil conflicts and more often used than other forms such as arbitration, because it “allows for self-determination and cooperation among the disputants,” and the conflicts resolved by mediation often “lead to higher degrees of perceived fairness and satisfaction” among the disputants (Lewicki et al., 1992: 236). Roughly

speaking, peacemaking tries to find a solution to a ‘conflict of interests’ (Ryan, 1995: 106). It is argued that negotiation is the best way to do this, and when negotiation involves a third party, it is called mediation (Ryan, 1995: 108). The mediation literature within the more general conflict resolution literature is applicable to the study of mediation under UN peacemaking. Additionally, when discussing UN mediation this means peacemaking; but the term mediation may be used to differentiate it from other peacemaking approaches. Moreover, the major themes in the peacemaking mediation scholarship and the more general mediation scholarship are essentially the same.

One strand of the peacemaking literature examines the timing of interventions. This work has found that intervention occurs when there is a ‘threat to (international) peace’ – decided by the UNSC (Ryan, 1995: 156), which is outlined in the UN Charter: Chapter VII (Article 39). The UN has increasingly intervened in both international and civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Lund, 1996: 12), but in civil conflicts the UN tends to intervene in the most violent and intractable ones. The most violent cases also tend to be conflicts involving a struggle for government control and ideological issues (Miall, 1992: 124). Usually any mediation in civil conflicts occurs only after violence has already broken out (peacemaking), and many studies show that mediation is needed before the conflict erupts and escalates (preventive diplomacy) (Bercovitch and Derouen, 2005: 113). During the Cold War, the UNSC and the Secretary-General were restricted in any peacemaking efforts. They were rarely able to act and limited to the containment and management of a few selected conflicts, which were decided upon by the superpowers. It is argued that, because of this, the UN never developed the procedures and skills, which were needed in

order to successfully handle peacemaking and preventive diplomacy – especially in regards to managing civil conflicts (Peck, 1996: 3). In fact, the UN and other actors tend to avoid intervention in domestic conflicts until the situation is most serious; this is because of the long-established principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Miall, 1992: 63; Ryan, 1995: 156). Moreover, peacemaking endeavors in civil conflicts are random and uncoordinated (Rupesinghe, 1996: 157).

The more general mediation literature also examines the factors which lead a third party to mediate. Third party involvement, including international organizations, tends to be associated with the least deadly and the shortest-lasting conflicts (Benson, 2006: 5); others find that the higher the intensity of the conflict, the higher the likelihood of mediation (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 332; Derouen, 2003: 257). Benson (2006) indicates that actions short of the use of force (such as mediation) by the UN are determined by member state preferences, and that the use of force by the UN is better predicted by dispute intensity. Mediation history also matters (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 351; Pearson et al., 2006: 257-258), and so do duration of the dispute and the number of disputants (Derouen, 2003: 257). Ethnicity, violence and superpower involvement were found not to significantly influence UN involvement (Derouen, 2003: 257).

Another focus within the peacemaking literature on civil conflicts aims to discover the factors, which increase the likelihood of a successful outcome in civil conflict interventions. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) examined civil war and UN peacebuilding³ success from 1944-1997 and found that the termination of violence in

³ Peacebuilding occurs after peacekeeping and/or peacemaking has met its objectives (post-conflict). It aims to construct an environment which is capable of sustaining the peace that was created, that is, it aims to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict by addressing the “underlying economic, social, cultural

civil conflicts was mostly due to multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, and that UN mediation was not significant (Derouen, 2003: 252). Other findings show that peacekeeping has limited or no effect on civil conflict mediation success (Greig and Diehl, 2005: 639). In managing ethnic civil wars, it was found that UN mediation has a positive, yet insignificant impact on the outcome. It was found that, in civil wars fought over territorial autonomy, the role of a third party guarantor is significant in achieving a successful outcome (Pearson et al., 2006: 109). If a third party agrees to enforce the terms of a peace agreement in a civil war, the likelihood of success increased, whereas negotiations usually failed if there was no third party involved (Walter, 1997: 349). Yet most civil conflicts do not end in a full settlement (with UN involvement) (Derouen, 2003: 252).

Further results suggest that a neutral site for mediation is helpful, and when parties initiate mediation the likelihood of success increases, while when they oppose mediation the likelihood of success decreases. The cause and intensity of conflict also affect mediation success. Civil conflicts fought over secession and autonomy are less affected by mediation than wars over religion. Intensity has a negative impact on mediation success; previous mediation by the same person has a negative yet insignificant impact, previous disputes by the same parties have a positive yet insignificant impact (Bercovitch and Derouen, 2005: 108). Mediation that begins at the conflict outset before too many fatalities take place is especially important in civil wars (Bercovitch and Derouen, 2005: 113). Others argue that successful mediation outcomes depend on conflict ‘ripeness,’ that is, “moments at which crises are highly conducive to resolution by an outside actor” (Zartman, 2000; Zartman, 2001; Bercovitch, 2004). However, in certain case studies such as the civil conflict

and humanitarian problems” which led to the conflict in the first place (Boutros-Ghali, 2003: par. 56 and 57). According to the UN's view of peacebuilding, it generally occurs post-conflict (UN Peacebuilding Commission), although some literature may suggest that this is changing.

in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, this concept does not apply. Due to these contradictions, it is argued that there is no formula for civil conflict resolution success (Barber, 1992: 197).

Similarly, the general mediation literature examines what factors make a successful mediation outcome, and there is neither a consensus on what these factors are, nor a clear and uniform way of defining success (O'Connell, 2000: 820). Mediation success, like the decision to mediate, tends to be associated with the least deadly and the shortest-lasting conflicts (Benson, 2006: 5). International organizations such as the UN usually work with intractable conflicts and thus by selecting longer and more fatal conflicts they select those that are least likely to have a successful outcome (Frazier and Dixon, 2006: 394; Benson: 30). Furthermore if there is an agreement, it is likely that it will be limited and that it will not last for long, (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 332) which further complicates the problem of defining mediation success. The findings are also unclear if mediation is more likely to be successful if it uses "negative sanctions or positive incentives" (Schrodt and Gerner, 2004: 310-311). While it has proven to be helpful in decreasing violence when present, it is still not significant (Schrodt and Gerner, 2004: 322). The timing or ripeness of the conflict has also been cited as affecting mediation success (Lewicki et al., 1992: 235). The use of mediation itself tends to indicate a more intractable conflict because disputants could not solve it themselves in the first place (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 333). Despite this, over the years the UN has increasingly become involved in more conflicts and utilized more intrusive means of intervention even though these kinds of intervention are not proven to be linked to long-term success (Diehl et al., 1996: 699).

Mediation outcomes cannot be fully understood without examining the selection bias (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 333), since the decision to intervene depends on whether or not the mediation is expected to succeed (Regan, 1996: 352). While the decision for mediation is far from random, it is disputed what the reasons are exactly. Decisions to mediate in intrastate conflicts may include: “territorial acquisition; regional stability; protection of intervener’s diplomatic, economic or military interests; ideology; and the upholding of human rights” (Regan, 1996: 341). Mediation is a political process, which not only takes time and money, but is risky for everyone involved (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 331). Consequently, it is argued that the UN makes decisions based on the expected costs and risks of involvement (Gartner and Melin, 2007: 18). Due to the uncertainty surrounding the decision to mediate, the benefits of doing so and reaching an agreement/settlement must exceed the expected costs of the mediation, or it will not take place (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 332). Specifically, in the case of civil war the UN must decide if the costs are worth the risks (Derouen, 2003: 251). Findings show that the UN is more likely to intervene in civil conflicts in weaker states than in stronger ones (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003: 38).

The literature so far shows that mediation is important for civil conflict settlement. Consequently, the debate in the mediation literature over the neutrality of mediators and how neutrality affects mediation success deserves further attention. The mediator must prove to the disputants that it can act fairly (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 337), and thus the mediator must be acceptable to both sides of the dispute (Susskind and Babbitt, 1992: 48). In particular this is true of the UN (Jonah, 1992: 199); but neutral mediators, according to Young, are incapable of having any influence toward the termination of a conflict (Slim, 1992: 226). The majority of the

mediation literature on neutrality tends to suggest that mediator bias might actually be necessary in order to generate a successful outcome (Benson and Satana, 2009; Bercovitch and Langley, 2003; Kydd, 2003; Jonah, 1992). According to this logic, biased mediators are more effective than unbiased ones because in order to be effective, a mediator must be believed to be telling the truth. Unbiased mediators' interests lie in minimizing war, and thus they have stronger incentives to lie to each side in order to decrease the likelihood of fighting, so the parties will not find this believable. Instead, the mediator must appear to be on the disputants' side in order to be trusted by them (Kydd, 2003: 598). It is argued that principle mediators, such as the US, are more effective because of their interest/bias. Because they have an interest in the dispute, they are more likely and more able to provide incentives such as assistance and security guarantees in order to make concessions more appealing to the disputants and thus easier to achieve. In contrast, neutral mediators lack an interest in the conflict, and have fewer resources. Instead, they "provide forums for discussion and interaction" and "act as go-betweens when face-to-face discussions are problematic" (Pearson et al, 2006: 250).

It is argued that bias is necessary for some of the roles that mediators play, such as providers of information (Kydd, 2003: 608). Nonetheless, according to Kydd, bias is only useful in some cases, namely when the mediator shows a bias towards one side while having the ability to provide information to the other side. However, according to Benson and Satana (2009), this could mean that the UN is "the worst type of biased mediator." This is because, unlike with a superpower mediator, the UN does not have access to such information. So this bias appears to not provide any assistance in increasing the likelihood of dispute settlement. Instead, a biased stance may provide one side with credibility to continue the violence, and

also signal to the other side that the UN is not concerned with its interests (Benson and Satana, 2009).

Benson and Satana's study on international disputes reveal that, although peacemaking of the UN (including mediation) is intended to be a neutral undertaking, in about forty-five percent of disputes with peacemaking resolutions, the Security Council has used obviously biased statements against states involved (Benson and Satana, 2009). Those in favor of impartiality or even neutrality in intrastate conflict mediation argue that when biased actors such as powerful states (the US) or the UNSC engage in peacemaking and mediation, the chance of failure or unsustainable settlements increases. Others argue that in order to produce a successful mediation, leverage is necessary, and thus so are powerful actors because they are influential due to their ability to provide incentives. Studies have shown that some kind of leverage is necessary in mediation, and that peacemakers have several types of leverage: their own leverage; leverage from their allies; leverage; "leverage based upon internationally supported norms or regimes; leverage derived from within the conflict structure or battlefield itself; or leverage from the legitimacy and structure of an international or regional security institution" (Crocker, 2003: 1-2; 218-221; Bercovitch, 2004). The UN does not have the kind of leverage that the US has (like the ability to offer carrots and sticks); however, it does have its status as an international organization and its credibility. Its status and credibility are what allow its resolutions to be taken seriously by the world (Fretter, 2002: 98). For example, the UN helped to end twelve years of violent civil conflict in El Salvador, which was largely attributed to the Secretary-General's leverage, which was its moral authority as a peacemaker and the remarkable amount of international interest in ending the conflict (Burgerman, 2000: 81). In the case of South Africa, third-party mediation

demonstrated the significance of legitimacy incentives in civil conflict resolution – which is ignored in the existing literature (Glickman, 1997: 722). The ideas of ‘moral authority’ and ‘legitimacy’ refer to the UN’s representation of the world community, and imply that the UN should thus be neutral in its dealings.

The reasons behind the decision for mediation and the factors that lead to a successful mediation outcome differ between interstate and intrastate disputes (Pearson et al., 2006: 261). Thus, there is a need for further study of intrastate disputes, especially due to the significant increase in these disputes after the end of the Cold War. Although the majority of the mediation literature was previously focused on interstate conflict (Ryan, 1995: 108), the mediation scholarship has shifted its focus towards intractable conflict (i.e., civil conflict) (Pauling, 1986: 591). Along with the explosion in intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War, UN peacemaking in intrastate conflicts has also greatly increased. Several peaceful agreements have been established, either by UN mediation (and other forms of peacemaking) or by third parties which may act with the UN backing including El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Bougainville, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the North-South conflict in Sudan⁴ (UN, 2008). Still, in “An Agenda for Peace,” which cites the growing concern of intrastate disputes (UN, 1995: 30), the state is still considered the basis of the UN’s work and purpose (Ryan, 1995: 197). Interventions in intrastate conflicts only occur when the UNSC perceives an intrastate conflict to be a ‘threat to peace,’ which they determine based on their own interests (Ryan, 1995: 156). In examining its choices to mediate in some civil war cases and not in others, the UN shows a clear bias in mediation.

⁴ Although agreements were established, these conflicts should not all be thought of as successes.

Although the majority of the mediation literature argues that a biased mediator is a more effective one, the UN's authority is at least partially based on "a legitimate social purpose" (Cronin, 1998: 162). In fact the UN is often perceived to be the only conflict manager in the international system that acts independently, which is partly explained by its charter that mandates it to solve global problems such as conflict and security (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 335). Moreover it is argued that neutrality or at least impartiality is a necessary condition for peacemaking and peacekeeping success (Goulding, 1999: 56). Findings show that the degree of UN bias towards disputants affects the long and short-term success of any UN mediation in international conflict (Benson and Satana, 2009). This leads to curiosity about the effect of UN bias in mediating civil conflict.

Consequently, there is little in mediation literature on the effect of neutrality of third parties on the mediation decision and success. How does this bias affect the success of mediation efforts in intrastate cases? By looking at UN resolutions more closely, it is expected to find some insight into how prior bias affects the decision to mediate, and consequently the outcome of that mediation. The following chapter describes further points in the literature as it makes the case for the theory behind the hypothesis that the more biased the UN is in its peacemaking efforts in civil conflicts, the less likely that it will be successful.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The UN was intended to be a neutral body in international politics; however, there has been much skepticism during its lifespan over its *actual* neutrality. Moreover, civil conflicts have increased since the end of the Cold War; but while civil conflicts are most common, they are also the most difficult cases for the UN to remain neutral. Certain factors influence the degree of neutrality exhibited by the UN: such as the interests of UNSC members, the level of fatalities, and the overall strength of the disputants (Benson and Satana, 2007: 2). The level or lack of neutrality that the UN exhibits may influence the success of peacemaking efforts. The UN is generally more biased toward the state, and particularly if that state is “weak,” it is more likely to intervene (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003: 38). This likely decreases the chances of peacemaking success because the perceived bias delegitimizes UN efforts as a mediator. In order to present the logic behind the proposed hypothesis: when the UN is biased it is less likely to be successful in its mediation attempts of intrastate conflicts, it is necessary to look at how the international (state) system has evolved, with special attention towards the explosion of civil conflicts in the post-Cold War era and the subsequent changes in UN conflict

management, UN/mediator neutrality, and some examples of UN mediation in civil conflicts.

3.1. Motivations to Mediate v. the Effects on Mediation Outcomes

The majority of the work that is done on the UN and civil conflicts “focuses on comparing and contrasting cases in which the UN has taken action. This research tends to determine the motivation for UN action in civil conflicts according to two categories: 1) the security interests of the five permanent (P5) members of the Security Council and 2) idealistic humanitarian interests” (Benson, 2006: 5). Benson cites a contrast within some of the literature: where Jacobsen (1996) finds that clear interstate aggression or gross human rights violations within a state are a necessary condition for UN intervention, and that national interests play a minimal role, Neack (1995) finds that state interests trump those of the “global community” (the status quo is preferred). Neack argues that if a state’s interests lie in the continuation of the international status quo, they will thus support the status quo, and furthermore that IOs like the UN in particular are the main beneficiaries (Benson, 2006: 6).

While the reasons behind intervention are important, what is more interesting is how the reasons behind intervention affect the success of the outcome. By looking at the issue of UN neutrality, it is expected to find that bias not only affects where the UN will mediate in civil disputes, but further how it will affect the success of mediation outcomes.

So when does the UN intervene in internal cases? What factors lead the UN to decide to intervene and mediate or not? In order to find out how UN bias affects

mediation outcomes in civil conflicts, it is necessary to examine some of the reasons for intervention in order to look at the UN's bias. In examining interstate conflict, it was found that the UN "is more likely to take either action in conflicts in which either one or both of the states in conflict is also a supporter of the international order" (Benson, 2006: 21). "Pro-status quo disputants are the strongest predictors of UN action short of the use of force" (Benson, 2006: 26). This gives support to the idea that member state interests for the international status quo compel the UN to intervene (short of the use of force) (Benson, 2006: 27). Applying this logic to intrastate cases, the UN will likely be biased toward the state because of its interest in supporting the international status quo, and the long-standing belief in the sovereignty of states.

3.2. Sovereignty of States

When studying interventions in civil conflicts, one must examine how the international system has changed, how the principle of sovereignty has evolved and the historic link of the system to non-intervention in a sovereign state's internal dealings. The international system is based on the principle of sovereignty, which gives nations, in theory, exclusive powers within their own borders (Miall, 1992: 66). While it has been found that motivations for UN intervention include the interests of the UNSC P5, and also "idealistic humanitarian interests" (Benson, 2006: 5), the longstanding principles of sovereignty and non-intervention affect these interests. International norms have changed (partly due to the media's attention), including the attitude that something must be done to stop civil violence "that threatens regional

stability,” and also a “growing sense of moral responsibility... that the international community has an interest in strengthening human rights, democracy, and the rule of law” (Crocker et al., 2003: 7). Evidence of this can be seen in the overall increase of UN intervention in conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Lund, 1996: 12).

The UN was established to provide international peace and security, and thus its conflict management technique was designed to suit international conflicts, and it is not prepared to deal with the surge in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Miall, 1992: 66; Peck, 1996: 216). The responsibility for managing these conflicts of course lies with the state itself; however, “contemporary armed conflicts reflect the black-hole syndrome in failed ‘quasi-sovereign’ states too unable or unwilling to deal with spreading violence of their own making.” As a result, managing these conflicts has become an issue for the international community “that is still based on those principles of state sovereignty and non-interference that the new conflicts threaten to undermine.” It is thus not surprising when the international community fails to intervene in certain intrastate conflicts (Kim and Kim, 2004: 983-4). Possibly because the UN’s unit of analysis is still the state, the UN has thus been reluctant to “publicly confront” human rights abuses and war crimes; so it is argued that it is “inappropriate to use state-centric approach to UN involvement in civil wars” (Weiss, 1995: 203). Still, the state is the basic unit in international politics. International law and diplomacy, including the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of other states, are “designed to serve the state and the state system.” Furthermore, “the rights and obligations which exist in the international sphere are those that belong to the state, not the individual except possibly for the right to self-determination;” but even this “is generally recognized only within established territorial boundaries of existing states” (Thomas, 1993: 91).

It was found that the UN intervenes in internal affairs of a state when there is a denial of the right to self-determination, and gross human rights abuses; however, the UN certainly does not intervene in every instance of civil war over these issues. For example, the UN did not intervene in Nigeria during the Biafran War in 1967 when the Biafrans tried to secede, but it did intervene in the Congo in 1960-1964 when Katanga did the same. The difference was that the situation in the Congo posed a threat to international peace. Moreover, Belgian troops were involved in the Congo, and so were the interests of the UN permanent members, whereas the Biafran War was neither internationalized nor of sufficient interest (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 34). The UNSC consistently used, during its meetings, the concept of threats to international peace in regards to civil conflicts, which had international repercussions (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 36). The most widespread use of the concept of 'threat to peace' in UNSC meetings was in 1965-1968 and referred to the civil conflict in Southern Rhodesia, where it appeared that the root cause was the denial of self-determination of the black majority (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 37). The UNSC actually molded the concept of the 'threat to peace' in order to fit in the case of internal conflicts, only when the members perceived that those internal disputes had international repercussions, for instance refugee problems or regional security issues (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 39). Although the UN decides to mediate if there is a 'threat to peace,' this phrase is not used uniformly.

The concept of 'threat to peace' (UN Charter: Chapter VII, Article 39) had to be developed because of the growth of 'internecine conflicts' after World War II, including civil wars and internationalized civil wars (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 37). Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War the principle of non-intervention as it relates to the concept of sovereignty has evolved, with the UN intervening more

frequently (Lund, 1996: 12). The UN intervenes in civil conflicts when it has adapted the concept of ‘threat to peace’ based on the interests of member states (UNSC) (McCoubrey and White, 1995: 36). Thus, being based on these interests, there can be no actual, moral justification for intervention (Thomas, 1993: 92). While there is a consensus on many values, and especially the right of self-determination, the UN does not intervene on behalf of these values all of the time. It is clearly a biased adaptation of the concept, which is used primarily when it suits UNSC member states’ interests.

3.3. Post-Cold War Changes in the State System

The makeup of the international (state) system has changed. The statehood of much of the newer states formed after the 1960s (for example in Africa) contrasts with that of the older states in Western Europe. Western Europe experienced:

“long and bloody histories. They developed over several centuries in a conflictual and competitive international environment in which the majority of states disappeared” (Thomas, 1993: 99). Whereas in the so-called “third world,” statehood is still occurring and “occurring in the context of a comparatively benign international system... International law protects the arbitrary colonial boundaries and legitimizes former colonies as sovereign states. Thus the contemporary international system freezes into place artificial political constructs which lack domestic legitimacy whilst enjoying international legitimacy... The relative lack of geopolitical pressure means that these states have not been forced to interact with society the way Europeans did, resulting in domestic conflict in these newer states. It also means it will likely continue and ethnic conflict will persist.” (Thomas, 1993: 100)

The principle of sovereignty has likewise evolved to accommodate the changes in the international state system. By no longer viewing sovereignty as an “absolute,” the UN has been more likely to intervene in civil conflicts (Weiss, 1995: 196).

The explosion of civil conflicts has been the most significant trend since the end of the Cold War. Previously there was consistency and even predictability of international politics (Kim and Kim: 2004, 981). With waning bipolarity and strengthening multi-polarity in international politics, the surge in violent conflict around the world can be attributed to long-suppressed “undisciplined passions for sociopolitical change” (Rasmussen, 1997: 23). While the Cold War was driven by geopolitics and ideology, the recent civil conflicts are largely driven by “tribal, ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious differences” and they have been fought by national armies, guerilla groups, and armed civilians “with little discipline, ill-defined chains of command, and no clear front lines”(Rupesinghe, 1996: 157). Not only has the death rate soared in post-Cold War (largely internal) conflicts from 50% in World War II to 90%, but there is also the tremendous amount of some 26 million refugees and 24 million internally displaced people by the end of 1994 (Rupesinghe, 1996: 157).

Some other characteristics of intrastate conflict include: “fragmentation of societies, communication breakdowns... increased flows of refugees and internally displaced people, stereotyping and/or demonization of others, internalization of the conflict, and massive violations of human rights and severe breaches of humanitarian law, particularly against civilians” (Rupesinghe, 1996: 157). Some further insight into civil conflicts explains that:

“Each internal armed conflict is a unique mixture of structural and proximate causes embedded at all systemic levels: individual, societal, state, and regional. Causes of intrastate

armed conflicts that scholars have identified include: 1) lack of legitimacy, or state weakness; 2) intrastate separatist claims for self-determination with external support; 3) collapse of post-Second World War multinational empires; 4) revolutionary ideology; 5) political elite intransigence; 6) interstate claims on neighboring territories; and 7) superpower proxy wars.”

Because of the variation between cases, it is much too difficult a task to “attempt to pinpoint a single grand logic that captures all of these factors.” Additionally, civil conflicts, more than interstate wars, tend to be the most protracted and more difficult to solve, and more likely to re-ignite even after a peace agreement has been reached (Kim and Kim, 2004: 981). Also, few of these conflicts stay contained within state borders and moreover most of these internal conflicts have external support (Kim and Kim: 2004, 982).

3.4. Post-Cold War Changes in Conflict Management

There has been a change in the nature of conflict management since the end of the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the power structure within the international system has arguably changed to a multi-polar system, (with the EU, for example, playing a larger role among other industrialized states), which is “likely to lead to new patterns of conflicts and conflict management” (Miall, 1992: 167). Additionally there is now more of a consensus on certain values among the international community. The ideological conflict present in the Cold War has been replaced by a firm consensus around certain normative principles. For instance certain values such as “democracy, human rights, market-based economies, and the

peaceful resolution of differences” have been more clearly accepted by the international community (Lund, 1996: 11).

According to Grotius, the significance of sovereignty in international politics and international law was necessary for the preservation of states (Keohane and Murphy, 2004: 914). This also led to the institutionalization of international politics; however, this does not translate into progress per se. International institutions – like the UN – often reflect the interests of its most powerful states and non-state actors as well and thus are “often morally contestable” (Keohane and Murphy, 2004: 915). In fact international organizations only exist because of the institutionalization of state sovereignty in the early seventeenth century. Based on the principle of sovereignty, Grotius developed the idea of international law, which became the foundation for the international organization (Keohane and Murphy, 2004: 916). International organizations and collective security systems such as the UN were built upon “political and normative frameworks that define just and unjust behavior” (Cronin, 1998: 161). However, the rules, practices and even goals of international organizations change depending on the context of the period (Cronin, 1998: 162). For instance, the UN has changed its view of the principle of sovereignty (Weiss, 1995: 196).

It is suggested that contemporary IR can best be thought of as ‘late-Westphalian’ where international actors support the principle of sovereignty but “balance this with a commitment to universal moral principles that address injustices suffered by individuals or groups.” Kosovo was an example of why traditional Westphalian assumptions about sovereignty and non-intervention should be changed (Bacon, 2001: 83). Where the UN at the time of its establishment was based on the Westphalian principle of sovereignty of its member states, the post-Westphalian

world is balanced between sovereignty and human security. According to this view, large-scale human suffering is considered a threat to peace and security and thus is an obligation of the UN to intervene (Bacon, 2001: 92). While intervention was always considered to be taboo due to traditional notions of territorial sovereignty, in the post-Cold War world sovereignty is not absolute (Weiss, 1995: 196).

It could be argued that the UN is more likely to intervene in civil conflicts since the Cold War in order to protect these shared values which there were no consensus on before – such as human rights and the right to self-determination (Lund, 1996:12); however, the UN is largely biased towards upholding the territorial integrity of the international state system (Weiss, 1995: 196), and thus less likely to be biased against secessionist groups who seek to undermine it. I posit that the more biased the UN is, that is, the stronger its language is in its resolutions, the more likely it is to intervene and mediate. Support for this lies in the widely accepted fact that the UN intervenes in the most violent conflicts, the most intractable ones. The most violent cases also tend to be conflicts involving a struggle for government control and ideological issues (Miall, 1992: 124). It has been further shown that the UN responds to civil wars in weaker states (Gilligan and Stedman 2000: 38). Weak states can be defined as “countries with political-institutional deficiencies,” which have problems ensuring security (both internal and external), order and justice, and personal freedoms. Furthermore, power is usually “concentrated in the hands of state elites,” and is often characterized as being a “complex network of patron-client relationships;” thus the state cannot provide real security, order and justice or guarantee personal freedoms. Because of this, these kinds of states lack legitimacy (Sorensen, 1999: 29), and are prone to experiencing civil conflict (Sorensen, 1999:

30). The UN may be more likely to be biased toward these states and mediate in these cases in order to preserve the state system.

3.5. UN Neutrality

The UN was established in order to maintain international peace and security (Baehr, 2004: 927). The organization was intended to be a neutral organization, representing the international community. Its universal membership gives it a certain “legitimacy to respond to armed conflict anywhere that threatens international peace and security” (Kim and Kim, 2004: 984). However, there has been much criticism of the UN’s neutrality over the years, especially regarding the UNSC. The UN provides “collective legitimization to acts of governments... for instance, the public meetings of the Security Council are nowadays often used to give its stamp of approval to a consensus view that has been reached in private negotiations” (Baehr, 2004: 936). Although the UN has a universal membership, the organization is often viewed as a tool for the UNSC P5 members (Benson, 2006: 13). For example, during riots in Northern Ireland, Ireland requested UN intervention; however, the UK used its veto power in order to prevent any outside intervention due to its obvious interest in the conflict (Ryan, 1995: 156). Another example is the absolute neglect of the Kurdish conflict in many Middle Eastern states. The Kurds cannot find a “state sponsor” to suggest intervention (mediation) in any of these states where it is a significant minority although conflicts persist (Ryan, 1995: 191).⁵ There has not been any UN intervention in the conflicts either. Despite changes in the international context of

⁵ While the US may be responsible for a greater amount of rights granted to the Kurds of Iraq, this is after the fact that the US invaded Iraq and furthermore the invasion's aim was not on behalf of the Kurds (Zunes, 2007).

mediation, states still act on behalf of their national interests. As a result, the P5 encourages the UNSC “to come up with unworkable compromises based on member states’ conflicting interests” which presents problems for UN mediators, especially when they need support in order to ensure that parties will comply with peace agreements (Crocker et al., 2003: 55). Major powers such as the US often look toward the UN as the only international institutions that can legitimize intervention (Weis, 1995: 199). This is certainly not “fair,” even if it may be effective (Baehr, 2004: 936).

The concept of neutrality is not unique to modern international organizations such as the UN. The concept was initially developed at the start of the modern state system. During the Middle Ages it was unacceptable, even immoral, to remain neutral regarding interstate conflict because it was thought that the world was governed by “universally valid laws based on absolute justice” which made conflict between states the conflict between good and bad, right and wrong. Neutrality was connected with the concept of sovereignty, the chief concept “guiding” IR. The first writers on neutrality also wrote on sovereignty, noninterference, and independence, particularly Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1769). Over the years, neutrality became a precondition for mediation (Pauling, 1986: 34); however, “the role of the neutral mediator is delicate... peaceful and good intentions... are not sufficient for successful mediation – finding the proper moment, soberly diagnosing the situation, and obtaining the agreement in principle by both parties have proved much more crucial” (Pauling, 1986: 35).

Mediators are motivated to intervene in a conflict by their own interests (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 39). This means that the mediator already has a bias toward one side of the dispute from the start. The mediator’s impartiality, interests

and/or biases influence the mediation process; furthermore, different forms of bias affect the mediator's acceptability and effectiveness. Some argue for the mediator's impartiality – meaning not *showing* favoritism to either party; while others argue for neutrality – meaning no interest in how the conflict is resolved (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 40). The mediator should be neutral so as to be acceptable to both parties (Hopmann, 1996: 223). Fairness and trust lead to a successful settlement; whereas if there is a non-neutral mediator, the disfavored party is less likely to observe suggestions, disclose information, or to even accept the mediator in the first place. This can hurt any chances of a successful settlement (Carnevale and Arad, 1996: 41).

3.6. Success

There are various variables interacting during mediation, which can affect the effectiveness of mediation: “types of conflict; the phase of the conflict; readiness of combatants to come to a political settlement and to cooperate; mediator's relationship to parties; the political, military and economic, and moral resources that the mediator can deploy...” (Crocker et al., 2003: 61). Success can also depend on the resources and bargaining power of the mediator who has leverage to offer carrots and sticks. It is argued that this kind of mediation should be regarded as foreign policy, not third party intervention because there is no question of the mediator being impartial – they have a well-known political interest in the conflict (Pauling, 1986: 592). According to this view, biased mediators offer the best hopes of a successful settlement. However, in the Georgian-Abkhazian case, for example, the UN's obvious bias did not result in a successful settlement. Furthermore external intervention, especially by

an international organization like the UN, is likely to escalate a conflict particularly if there are biased reasons for intervention, which can affect the conflict by escalating one side of the argument (Peck, 1996:72).

No study has specifically looked at how the UN bias affects the mediation outcome in the case of civil conflicts. While in general UN presence might increase the likelihood of agreement, civil conflicts deserve specific attention because of their rate of occurrence and their particularities. Likewise, the specific focus on UN neutrality/bias deserves attention because the UN's bias and "pro-status quo orientation" might impede on its effectiveness as a mediator (Benson, 2006: 30).

3.7. Examples

Accusations of UN bias in the mediation of internal conflicts are commonplace, and most of these conflicts are still unresolved. An illustration of this is the case of Serbia, where the UN envoy offered a plan for the future independence of its Kosovo province. While this was largely acceptable and in the interests of the majority of Albanians, Belgrade rejected it. The proposal "did not mention 'independence' or address the loss of Serbia's sovereignty over the territory... but both sides said this was clearly what it implied." The Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica condemned the UN envoy, Ahtisaari, for "anti-Serbian bias." He rejected the plan and refused to meet with Ahtisaari the following week (Tzortzi and Robinson, 2007).

The Serbian case illustrates a state-perceived bias of the UN towards a minority or a secessionist group. The Serbian example supports the idea that it is

highly difficult and unlikely for the UN to remain neutral in civil conflict cases, and that this bias may negatively affect mediation efforts (Benson and Satana, 2009; Goulding, 1999: 56).

In the case of El Salvador and the FMLN, UNSC backing and impartiality gave the UN mediator legitimacy, and this led to a series of agreements between the disputants and ultimately ended the civil war (Crocker et al., 2003: 345). Originally the FMLN was concerned that the Secretary General's office was heavily under U.S. control and would not give its consent until "a parallel mechanism was devised to provide the Secretary General with a political base independent of the UNSC" (Burgerman, 2000: 68). The mediator assured the FMLN of the UN's commitment to impartiality and that the UNSC's role in negotiations would be limited (Crocker et al., 2003: 357). The integrity of the mediator proved to be a contributing factor to the mediation success (Crocker et al., 2003: 349)⁶.

In the Georgian-Abkhazian case, the UN was not an effective mediator. This is because the UN is not effective in mediating conflicts involving an existing state and a separatist region due to the UN's propensity to support the territorial integrity of its member states; therefore it has an automatic bias in favor of the state and against the authorities of the separatist region. In the Georgian-Abkhazian case, this tendency led to "stagnant" negotiations (Stewart, 2003: 25). The Abkhaz refused to sign any documents which referred to the territorial integrity of Georgia. This was the key obstacle to a peaceful settlement, but because of the UN's position on the territorial integrity of Georgia, it was a continued obstacle (Stewart, 2003: 14). In 1996 when the so-called "Friends of Georgia" (including the Russian Federation, USA, France, Germany and the UK) which was set up under UN auspices, became

⁶ Although Bercovitch classifies the case of El Salvador to be unsuccessful, the majority of the literature disagrees. I still use Bercovitch's classification because his reasoning for classifying it as such is uniform with the rest of his study.

involved in the mediation process, the Abkhaz officials often refused meetings with them and thus their interventions were of little success (Stewart, 2003: 15-16). The pro-Georgian bias was evident in the UN's requesting of Abkhaz concessions, while simultaneously not offering any to them (Stewart, 2003: 17). Because of this, the UN made no significant accomplishments in the conflict (Stewart, 2003: 18).

Benson and Satana (2009) find that "the majority of the biased resolutions occur in lower-level resolutions addressing and appealing conflicts as well as those in which one would clearly expect for there to be a bias expressed in the resolution (i.e., the case of economic or military sanctions)." It is expected that the bias expressed will negatively affect the mediation outcome when taking into account the problems associated with perceived-UN bias in mediation efforts. The El Salvadoran and Georgian cases demonstrate the likelihood of my hypothesis that: the more intense the UN's bias toward the state in resolutions concerning peacemaking, the less likely a successful mediation outcome.

In the following chapter I discuss the methodology behind this thesis. I describe the steps I took, why I chose to do them, and in what order. I start with how I selected my cases. Next I describe how I found my data on peacemaking, neutrality and the success of UN peacemaking attempts in intrastate conflict. Once I lay out the research design I analyze the data collected by using a simplified content analysis and discuss the results.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY & ANALYSIS

4.1. Research Design

This thesis is concerned with the question: how does UN bias or neutrality in its peacemaking efforts in intrastate conflicts affect the likelihood of success in mediation? It differs from most other studies on the UN and follows the Benson and Satana (2009) research design in that instead of using the dyad/year as the unit of analysis, it uses the conflict from the year it starts until it ends. The dispute as the unit of analysis is useful in indicating the general characteristics of an entire dispute (Benson and Satana, 2009).

The time period that I am looking at is from 1946-2006 because that is the time period that is covered by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset for internal conflict selection (Gleditsch et al., 2002). According to its definition, armed conflict is: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a

state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” Within this definition there are several elements which the UCDP operationalizes:

“(1) Use of armed force: use of arms in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in deaths.

(1.1) Arms: any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water etc.

(2) 25 deaths: A minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per dyad in an incompatibility.

(3) Party: A government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of organizations. UCDP distinguishes between primary and secondary parties. Primary parties are those that form an incompatibility by stating incompatible positions. At least one of the primary parties is the government of a state” (Gleditsch et al., “Codebook,” 2002).

Although there are other datasets on civil conflicts, such as the Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War Dataset, the criteria for inclusion of a conflict in the COW dataset is less agreeable with my conception of civil conflict. The COW dataset sets the threshold of battle deaths at one thousand in order for a conflict to be included in the dataset. I find that to be a rather high threshold. Since Eriksson and Wallensteen (2004) also argue that the UCDP/PRIO dataset is one of the most accurate sources of conflict data – for both intrastate and interstate – I chose to use this dataset.

I needed to find an appropriate way to choose which UN resolutions matched the civil conflict cases. In order to do this, I looked at all of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that occurred in the same year as the conflicts. If according to the UCDP/PRIO dataset the resolution came before or in some cases

after the end of a conflict, I did not code it. If on the other hand the conflict was ongoing, I coded it.

The selection of resolutions became somewhat complicated when the resolution was concerned with more than one conflict. This was the case for some internationalized civil wars and in the case of the former Yugoslavian conflicts. In such instances the same resolution was used for more than one conflict. At other times, the resolutions were not clear about which conflict it was targeting. In those instances further research had to be conducted through basic case studies in order to properly code them. In this way the UN resolutions were selected based on their applicability to the civil conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Şatana, 2008).⁷

4.1.1. Key Variables

My dependent variable is success of peacemaking attempts in civil conflicts. The success of a peacemaking effort can be determined by using Bercovitch's data on success from his "Mediation Project" (Bercovitch, 1997). I chose to use his data because, success being hard to quantify in the first place, he neither used too high nor too low a threshold for success. He measures success by no management, mediation offered, ceasefire, full settlement, and no success. This is important because for a long-lasting and intractable conflict, a ceasefire may very well be a success. At the same time, one ceasefire hardly qualifies as a success story. All of this information is shown in Bercovitch's data.

⁷ Partial data for this project was also collected and used by Şatana (2008).

I use simple tables in order to demonstrate the relationship between the neutrality and success variables – in order to best analyze the data that is at the center of this thesis. For that, I decided to create a dummy variable with values of ones and zeros for the success variable. I coded success as one if according to Bercovitch’s data it was a three, four, or five (3=ceasefire agreement, 4=partial agreement, 5=full settlement). If it was a one (offered only) or two (unsuccessful) in Bercovitch’s dataset, I coded success as zero. If it was coded zero (no management) in Bercovitch’s dataset, I further researched it. For the ones that Bercovitch had no success data on, I also researched those cases within the literature. Also, it is important to note that Bercovitch’s study only covers 1945 until 1996, whereas the PRIO dataset that I used covers 1946 to 2006 (Bercovitch, 1999; PRIO, 2007). So for the cases after 1996 I conducted the research myself, by using the same format as the Bercovitch (1999) study.

My independent variables are UN bias and neutrality. The UN’s bias or neutrality is measured by the UN’s standard language; for example, the UN may simply acknowledge a conflict and not mention any parties to the conflict, or refrain from criticism of the conflict or the sides. In this case the UN resolution is coded as “neutral.”⁸ If the UN mentions clear support or criticism of one of the parties involved in the internal conflict, the UN is either “against party A” or “against party B.” This information is also found in the UN resolutions. I compiled two separate datasets: one for UNGA resolutions, the other for UNSC resolutions. These resolutions are found in Adobe *Pdf* form at the UN website, which were converted into Microsoft Word format, and then were entered into the two datasets, to code the UN peacemaking (its presence or absence) and neutrality variables. The separation

⁸ I have strictly followed Benson and Satana (2009) criteria for coding the data as their criteria has been taken well by the mediation community.

of the data from the two UN bodies provides the ability to see some differences between them. For example the Security Council is more likely to be biased against rebels and not the state.

There are no control variables, which could affect the success of UN's peacemaking efforts, included in the dataset constructed. This is indeed a limitation, which stems from lack of systematic quantitative data collection in the mediation literature. In future research, it may be wise to look at the variables related to IO involvement; for example, resource mobilization, involvement of other IOs and coordination efforts, and the complementarity between mediation other approaches (Fisher and Keashley, 1991). Nevertheless, the central goal of this thesis is to operationalize and code the neutrality of the UN. Thus the limitation of the lack of control variables in this thesis is compensated by the collection of neutrality data through content analysis. The operationalization of the neutrality variable is discussed later in this chapter. I acknowledge the need to collect further data on possible control variables that affect the UN's mediation success.

4.1.2. The Process of Data Clearing

Starting with the UCDP/PRIO dataset, I dropped all of the international conflicts since this thesis only focuses on civil conflicts. Next I wanted to only focus on those cases in which peacemaking was present since that is what the thesis is concerned with, and I wanted also to know which of these cases were neutral and which were not. The presence or absence of a peacemaking mission and neutrality can be measured by the UN resolutions (both from the General Assembly and the

Security Council) through content analysis. I looked at the resolutions from the UN because they are good indicators of neutrality and peacemaking attempts for entire disputes.⁹

I then sorted all the data by year. I took the data from Excel and merged them in statistical software, STATA (because Excel cannot handle that kind of large data) (Hamilton, 2003:41-43). I used Stat Transfer (www.stattransfer.com) to convert the Excel file to a STATA format. Since STATA can only read one sheet at a time, I copy and pasted each of the three sheets to its own (single) Excel sheet. In other words, I took the three-sheet Excel file and made that into 3 one-sheet Excel files. The three STATA files were then merged into one.

After merging all of the data, I had several resolutions for each conflict with several codings of neutrality. I also had codings for not only peacemaking but also all kinds of actions of the UN, which are listed below.¹⁰

Address: coded 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as “address” and “reaffirm” in a conflict, otherwise 0.

Appeal: coded 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as call upon, recommend, urge, deplore, condemn, or appeal, otherwise 0.

Economic Sanction: coded 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as economic sanction, otherwise 0.

Military Sanction: coded as 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as military sanction, otherwise 0.

Peacekeeping: coded as 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as peacekeeping, otherwise 0.

Peacemaking: coded as 1 if there is at least one resolution coded as peacemaking, otherwise 0.

⁹ Due to insufficient data for conflict #194: Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbs in 1994, the following resolutions were dropped: 900, 982, 1004, 1010, 1019 and 1023.

¹⁰ Additional data were collected for Şatana (2008).

Since the scope of this thesis is only mediation as it is part of the peacemaking process, I dropped all the observations if peacemaking was coded as zero. I dropped thirty-three observations out of one hundred and five, leaving me with seventy-three observations. If peacemaking is coded as one, this does not always mean that the UN itself was the mediator. Sometimes the UN sends other mediators or formally supports others (like the African Union, AU). In fact, the UN often does not act alone but acts with partners – from international organizations like the AU to former US presidents like Jimmy Carter – in its conflict management endeavors (Goulding, 155-157).

After the peacemaking variable, I also had to collapse the neutrality variable. I did this (by hand) by taking the sum of neutral resolutions for each conflict and the sum of biased resolutions for each conflict, and specifically against state A and against state B. I took a careful approach to coding the neutrality variable. I only coded a case as neutral if in all instances the UN was neutral. In other words, if there was even one biased resolution, I coded neutrality as zero.

I had to create a success variable for the analysis. I did this by first matching up the cases that Bercovitch used in his study with my cases. For the Security Council, after getting rid of all the observations where peacemaking was zero, I was left with thirty-three observations. After doing the same thing for the General Assembly, I was left with twenty-three observations where peacemaking was coded as one.

It was hard to interpret any significant relationship between success and the number of neutral/biased resolutions. In other words a count variable for bias was difficult to interpret. So I created a dummy bias variable in order to better interpret this relationship. If there was at least one biased resolution for a case, I coded bias as

one. If all resolutions were neutral, I coded bias as zero. I also did this later for the General Assembly data. I decided to code any case with at least one bias resolution as bias because logically, if there are any biased resolutions, the UN cannot be considered neutral for that conflict.

4.2. Analysis of Security Council Data

Table 1 shows that twenty-four out of thirty-three (73%) of the cases where peacemaking attempts were made were unsuccessful compared to only nine (27%) successful peacemaking attempts.

TABLE 1. SUCCESS OF PEACEMAKING ATTEMPTS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

SUCCESS	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
0	24	72.73
1	9	27.27
Total:	33	100.00

Additionally, most cases do not have many neutral resolutions – which is less than expected considering the UN’s perceived or supposed neutrality. Table 2 shows that the UN is biased and successful in its peacemaking attempts in twenty-three percent of the civil conflicts, compared to thirty-six percent of not biased and successful conflicts. This means as bias increases, the likelihood of success decreases. The finding that the more cases are neutral is more likely to be successful

is supportive of my hypothesis that the more neutral the UN is in its peacemaking of civil conflicts, the likelihood of success increases. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. The explanation for this is that there are only very few number of cases and significance tests are not very meaningful with only thirty-three cases. That is also why I have not considered running a regression analysis and sufficed to examine the relationship with simple tables and case studies, which follow in the next section of this chapter.

TABLE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL BIAS AND SUCCESS IN PEACEMAKING

	NO BIAS	BIAS	TOTAL
NO SUCCESS	7	17	24
	63.64%	77.27%	72.73%
SUCCESS	0	5	9
	36.36%	22.73%	27.27%
Total:	11	22	33
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

* Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 0.6875$ Pr = 0.407

The conflict with the largest total of peacemaking resolutions is the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a total of thirty-six resolutions. Within the greater conflict of the breakup of Yugoslavia, there were more peacemaking resolutions directed toward Bosnia, and less toward Croatia. The conflict with the

smallest total of peacemaking resolutions are Iraq (against the Kurds) and Iran/Iraq, both with only one resolution and both are not neutral, but against the state. This could indicate a general pattern of UN member-state interests.

I was also interested in the connection, if any, between bias and success. The findings in table 3 show that the UN is generally biased against side B, the rebels, by seventy-three percent compared to thirty-three percent of biased cases against side A, the state. The Security Council is more biased against rebels, and this might explain the unsuccessfulness of cases. The general tendency for the UN to be more biased against rebels could be explained by the state-centered tendencies of the Security Council, as elaborated in the theory chapter.

TABLE 3. BIAS OF UN SC AGAINST THE STATE

NUMBER OF BIASED RESOLUTIONS AGAINST SIDE A	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
0	24	72.73
1	4	12.12
2	1	3.03
4	2	6.06
8	1	3.03
12	1	3.03
Total:	33	100.00

4.3. Analysis of General Assembly Data

Table 4 shows that out of twenty-three peacemaking cases from the General Assembly data, only one case was not biased (#90: Burundi); the other twenty-two (96%) UN peacemaking cases were biased.

TABLE 4. GA BIAS IN PEACEKEEPING ATTEMPTS

	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
NO BIAS (BIAS = 0)	1	4.35
BIAS (BIAS = 1)	22	95.65
Total:	23	100.00

Table 5 shows that there were also more cases, which were not successful (74%) than successful (26%); however there is no significant pattern.

TABLE 5. SUCCESS RATE OF GA PEACEMAKING

SUCCESS	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
0	17	73.91
1	6	26.09
Total:	23	100.00

Table 6 shows that twenty-seven percent of the cases were biased and successful compared to zero percent of unbiased conflicts and successful mediation attempts. As bias increases, the likelihood of success increases. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. The explanation for this is that again there are only very few cases and significance tests are not very meaningful with only thirty-three cases. There is only one case of non-biased conflict and that shows that the General Assembly is usually more biased than the Security Council – contrary to what most people think. Usually the literature says that the Security Council will be more biased because of the major powers (P5) in it, and they usually say that the General Assembly is not very decisive in the UN. However, apparently the General Assembly takes sides more clearly and more frequently than the Security Council.

TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GA BIAS AND SUCCESS IN PEACEMAKING

	NO BIAS	BIAS	TOTAL
NO SUCCESS	1	16	17
	100.00%	72.73%	73.91%
SUCCESS	0	6	6
	0.00%	27.27%	26.09%
Total:	1	22	23
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

* Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 0.3690$ Pr = 0.544

Furthermore table 7 shows that out of the twenty-three biased cases, sixteen were against the state compared to seven against the rebels. This shows that the General Assembly is more likely to be biased against states, whereas the Security Council is more likely to be biased against the rebels. This demonstrates a more state-centered view of the Security Council, made up of five major players, compared to the General Assembly, which has increased its total of member-states since the creation of smaller and newer states since the end of the Cold War. Many of these states are not major players in the international arena, and coupled with their short lives leads to a less state-centered approach and more of a collective one.

TABLE 7. BIAS OF GA AGAINST THE STATE

NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS AGAINST SIDE A	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	CUMULATIVE
0	7	30.43	30.43
1	4	17.39	47.83
2	1	4.35	52.17
6	2	8.70	60.87
7	2	8.70	69.57
8	1	4.35	73.91
10	1	4.35	78.26
15	1	4.35	82.61
17	1	4.35	86.96
19	1	4.35	91.30
21	1	4.35	95.65
144	1	4.35	100.00
Total:	23	100.00	

4.4. Case Analyses

4.4.1. Security Council Cases

Interestingly, the Security Council case with largest total of neutral resolutions was unsuccessful. This outlier is Somalia. This finding contradicts my hypothesis, as well as the general findings of my study. A possible explanation for this may be that UN was not altogether neutral. Although twenty-three out of twenty-five resolutions pertaining to it were neutral, those two biased resolutions could have significant implications. For instance, they may indicate a UN bias in action. The overall majority of neutral resolutions may not indicate a majority of neutral UN action or practice. This means that the Security Council bias in at least one resolution affects the action (making it biased), and so the likelihood of success decreases. Furthermore, both biased resolutions in the Somali case are against rebels. This could possibly indicate something. The Somali case demonstrates a fairly common criticism within the literature, about the relationship between UN resolutions and UN action.

As mentioned in section 4.2., the conflict with the largest total of Security Council peacemaking resolutions is the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and within the greater conflict of the breakup of Yugoslavia, there were more peacemaking resolutions directed toward Bosnia, and less toward Croatia. While several years are coded for some states and with mixed results, for the Security Council cases of Croatia, and (the Croatian Republic of) Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN

peacemaking resolutions were biased and unsuccessful each year. I further looked into these cases because of this and the fact that they were all connected.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Yugoslavian conflict was the first major civil conflict in Europe (Eknes, 1995: 112). It was also the first time that the EU was at the forefront of intervention, starting in 1991 (Eknes, 1995:109). At the start, the EU, US and Soviet Union prevented any UN involvement (Eknes, 1995: 113). Additionally, Chapter I (Article 2) of the UN Charter – “the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states” – contributed to a late UN response (Eknes, 1995: 114). For instance, when Slovenia requested UN assistance it was largely rejected due to the fact that it was not an independent state. EU-WEU failures led to the UN Secretary-General’s assistance in a ceasefire and arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Eknes, 1995: 113). By 1992 the recognition of the declared independence by Croatia and Slovenia made the conflict international, allowing for greater UN involvement – and Bosnian and Macedonian independence and the spread of conflict (Eknes, 1995: 114).

From the beginning, the international community lacked a clear political objective to the handling of the conflict: the right to self-determination versus the territorial integrity of the state (Eknes, 1995: 119). Furthermore, mediation efforts lacked political support from the states. For example, UN resolutions first upheld territorial integrity, even as plans were made to divide the republic. Moreover, the Security Council would “suddenly reverse previous decisions.” There was no international support to enforce the resolutions or for stricter punishment against uncooperative parties (beyond sanctions). Russia and the US stayed out, further undermining UN efforts (Eknes, 1995: 120). After much international criticism, in 1993 two mediation plans failed, leading to the EU-UN mediators replacement by a

contact group in 1994. The contact group, having major power involvement and having the ability to make more credible threats (Eknes, 1995: 121), was more successful. While the settlement may still be considered fragile, violence has ceased and institutional frameworks are in place (Serwer, 2003: 586). The contact group may have been biased themselves, but it can be argued that as individual states they had more leverage than the UN, which cannot afford to be biased. The UN's bias could have been unsuccessful due to the issue of leverage. While it was mentioned before in this thesis, the UN has its own form of leverage, but this type of leverage (its reputation and universal membership) may not allow for bias (Fretter, 98).

These conflicts illustrate the realist worldview, with states still at the center of international politics (Thomas, 1993: 91). The UN is still largely state-centered, and this is evident in its interests to mediate (Keohane and Murphy, 2004:915; McCoubrey and White, 1995:39).

There are two cases which I will look further into from the data on General Assembly peacemaking resolutions, Israeli case #37,¹¹ and Burundi; the Israeli case because it was both biased and not successful, and the case of Burundi because it was neutral but unsuccessful.

4.4.2. General Assembly Cases

The Israeli case supports my finding that bias does not lead to success. Bias has clearly hurt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. While most of the international

¹¹ This case is considered to be an internationalized civil war according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

community, the UN included, is biased against Israel, there are certain reasons why that bias is preventing any compromise or change on Israel's part.

Peacemaking resolutions for the Israeli case span from 1949 to 2005, and they are consistently biased against the state of Israel. As mentioned before, the UN may not have the kind of leverage that allows it to be biased and leads to a successful outcome. While it may condemn Israeli actions, settlements for example, there are no real consequences which would make Israel change its policies. Furthermore, US support of Israel prevents any real consequences from the UN or the international community.

The issue of Jewish settlements is a key issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although consistently condemned by the UN and the international community, expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories has continued over the years. While condemnations are one thing, the bias against Israel without any leverage to back up condemnations was unsuccessful. For instance, while a freeze was put on expanding settlements at Oslo, in 1996 after Netanyahu comes to power, that ban was lifted ("A History of Conflict;" "A History of the..."). Again in 2001 Israel is condemned by the EU and called on to dismantle the settlements ("A History of the..."), and in 2004 settlements expanded yet again ("History of the Palestine..."). With the Israeli side ignoring such a major issue in the negotiation process, it is not surprising that there is still no successful outcome. Perhaps the more neutral the UN could have been could have led to more trust building and more of a compromise, after all, the UN does not have the kind of leverage that allows it to be biased.

Unlike the large total of resolutions, spanning several decades, the data on peacemaking resolutions for Burundi only includes 1995. In these resolutions, the

UN was neutral, but still unsuccessful. Although this study shows that bias does not lead to success, neutrality alone cannot lead to a successful outcome if the UN is seemingly disinterested (and more interested in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, at that time).

Burundi in 1995 experienced resurgence in ethnic violence. Previous large-scale ethnic violence left 50,000-100,000 dead and a very limited effective response from the international community. Similar to Rwanda in ethnic violence between the same groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, Burundi was also similar to Rwanda in that there was little real reaction from the international community. While the UN and the AU called for more involvement in the conflict, any involvement must have support from the members of those organizations: states (“Crisis in Burundi...”). Around the same time, the UN was much more concerned with the Bosnian and Croatian cases, as is seen by the number of peacemaking resolutions for those conflicts. According to the PRIO dataset, the conflict in Burundi first started in 1965, stopped and did not start again until 1991, but this time lasted until 2006. The fact that there is only one year of that conflict in which peacemaking is mentioned may indicate a general disinterest in the conflict, which could be largely due to a general disinterest from the member-states (and a larger interest in Bosnia).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis examines the relationship between bias or neutrality and success in the UN's peacemaking attempts in civil conflicts. The thesis illustrates that, as hypothesized, the UN is actually less successful when it is biased in its peacemaking efforts in intrastate conflicts. Although the results are not statistically significant due to insufficient number of observations, they are nonetheless important in adding to the literature on neutrality/bias in mediation. It also indicates that there is no pattern for civil conflict between neutrality and success as seen in international conflicts, which shows that the same prescriptions for international conflicts may not be effective for civil conflicts.

While it may be perceived and expected that the UN should remain neutral in its interventions and that it gains its legitimacy and credibility from this, the results show that the UN is generally not very neutral in its peacemaking resolutions. Not surprisingly the results show that the Security Council is more likely to be biased against rebels, and the General Assembly is more likely to be biased against the state. This can be explained by the pro-status quo approach of the older, more established

states in the Security Council, compared to the composition of the newer and less powerful (individually that is) states in the General Assembly. This echoes the realist belief that the state still holds supremacy in international politics.

There were some limitations of this thesis. One of the issues is with the success variable. Success, as mentioned earlier, is not an easy concept to define in terms of conflict resolution and there is no consensus in the literature on how to do this. Bercovitch takes into account all of the various forms of success: ceasefire, partial agreements and full settlements, as well as when mediation was just offered, and instances of no success. I tried to replicate this as much as I could, but I think that there was not always sufficient data for some of the years for the cases that I researched myself. I could have dropped all the years that Bercovitch's study does not cover, which would have only covered 1946-1996. Since I already had a limited number of observations, this would not be a very efficient solution. So instead I decided to acknowledge the limitations as I pursued operationalization and data collection.

Another problem might be with my use of UN resolutions from both the Security Council and General Assembly to determine the presence of peacemaking and neutrality. The trouble with this is that from the discourse alone I do not argue that neutrality in language led to neutrality in action. Future research may want to study this relationship between UN discourse and UN action. With that information, one could determine how reliable the UN's discourse is as an indicator of its actions. I tried to tackle this problem as best as I could with a conservative approach to the neutrality variable, as outlined in section 4.1.2. Even if there were an overwhelming majority of neutral resolutions, if there was one biased resolution I coded neutrality

as zero. Furthermore I believe that the presence of a biased resolution would indicate the genuine action of the UN.

Due to a poor success record, the results indicate that the UN may not be equipped to deal with intrastate conflict. While other factors may be at play, the lack of neutrality is certainly not helping UN efforts in civil conflicts. This could account for the lack of successful peacemaking attempts. The fact that they are also generally biased attempts leads to the belief that perhaps neutrality, in the mediation of civil conflicts at least, has not been given enough credit for its effectiveness.

Yet neutrality may be difficult to attain in a system still dominated by realist conceptions of national interests. The UN may be criticized for this and it may strive to improve its neutrality rate, but until the international system experiences a dramatic shift, state interests will continue to prohibit neutrality and in turn affect the outcome of civil conflict management.

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APPENDIX A: CODEBOOK

Type: either 3 – civil conflict, or 4 – internationalized civil conflict.

ID: identification number for the conflict from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset.

Location: where the conflict took place.

SideA: the state involved in the conflict.

SideB: the other party, or rebels, on the other side of the conflict.

Year – Year6: the year(s) which there are peacemaking resolutions.

Success: dummy variable; either 0 – no, or 1 – yes.

Cneutral: total number of neutral peacemaking resolutions.

Cbias: total number of biased peacemaking resolutions (cagainstA + cagainstB).

CagainstA: total number of biased peacemaking resolutions against side A.

CagainstB: total number of biased peacemaking resolutions against side B.

Ctotal: total number of peacemaking resolutions.

Neutral: dummy variable; either 0 – no, or 1 – yes.

Bias: dummy variable; either 0 – no, or 1 – yes.

APPENDIX B: SUCCESS VARIABLE

For the success variable, I used Bercovitch's data; however, he did not have information for all of my cases, and so I had to further look into Angola, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Nicaragua for the Security Council Resolutions. I also looked further into Sierra Leone because, while he used it as a case, he did not give data for that conflict.

Cases: 190, 194, 195, 202 and 203 are all part of the Balkan conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and so they are all coded the same for success. Some of the cases in which Bercovitch did not have data on were out of his dataset's timeline, that is they occurred or mediation efforts occurred after 1996. A possible problem with Bercovitch's success criteria is that it is far more intense than many other studies, and some of the cases in which I had to research myself were not as intensely classified in other studies. Thus, for some of the sources that I used to classify success or not for these cases, are not the same standard as Bercovitch, and the extensive data that he has on his data is not matched by other studies.

For case #137: Afghanistan, there were numerous failed attempts to broker a peace agreement (Goodhand, 2006:130, 132), and the conflict against the Taleban persists. Success is coded as 0 (UNAMA, 2007; Franck, 1995: 9).

For case #131: Angola, it was a success in the sense that political settlement of the dispute and reconciliation was achieved – both due to the US's involvement and the UN. Thus coded as 1 (Crocker, 2003: 207-209).

For case #192: Angola, the Lusaka Peace Settlement, which was brokered by the UN and the Troika (Portugal, Russia, USA), established a ceasefire, provided for the disarmament of UNITA and the formation of a coalition government; however, this settlement did not last and violence resumed and the conflict is unresolved (Hare, 2003:643-644). Thus, success for this case is coded as 0.

For case #225: Cote d'Ivoire, in 2007 the conflict ended with a political settlement, a power sharing arrangement, and the integration of rebel forces with the national army (CIA: The World Factbook, 2008). Success is coded as 1.

For case #216: Guinea-Bissau, while mediation efforts led by ECOWAS and supported by the UN led to the signing of a peace agreement, it was short-lived ("Guinea-Bissau – History," 2007). While the peace agreement led to a UN peacekeeping mission and free and fair elections in 2000, another (albeit, "bloodless") coup took place in 2003 ("Country Profile: Guinea-Bissau," January 15, 2008). Success is coded as 0.

For case #186: Haiti, the conflict that erupted in 2004, which mediation attempts were made by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) with the support of the UN Secretary General, ("Costa Rican President..." February 27, 2004), but failed and were followed by the UN's peacekeeping mission ("Security Council authorizes..." February 29, 2004). Success is coded as 0.

For case #140: Nicaragua, the conflict is deemed to be a success based on its resolution in a political settlement and arrangements for power-sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003:325; Wehr and Lederach, 1991:90; Franck, 1995: 9), so success is coded as 1.

For case #187: Sierra Leone, the Lome Peace Accord of 1999 established a ceasefire, and a UN peacekeeping mission soon arrived; however the ceasefire was

fragile and in 200 the RUF (rebel group, sideB) captured UN peacekeepers. This ended with the UN imposing sanctions on RUF backers and restarted mediation efforts, brought in more peacekeepers, and continued to disarm soldiers on both sides of the conflict. Eventually the peacekeeping mission ended in 2005, completing the tasks given to it by the Security Council, and the peacekeeping mission is considered to be a success according to the UN (“Sierra Leone: A...” 2005). The Lome Peace Agreement was unsuccessful because of resumed fighting, but the second round of mediation which was subsequently launched by UNAMSIL (UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone) was successful. I coded success as 0 because the initial agreement which was part of peacemaking (compared to the peacekeeping mediation success) was unsuccessful.

I followed this same procedure for the General Assembly resolutions, where I used Bercovitch’s data on success where it was applicable, and researched those cases in which his study did not cover. The cases that were not included in his study include: Israel, Nicaragua, Republic of Korea, and South Africa, but for Nicaragua I could use the data on success that I researched for the Security Council resolution case. The Israeli cases in particular are interesting in the General Assembly data because there are two separate cases, one being successful and the other not.

For case #37: Israel, for years 1949, 1990, 1994 and 2003 I coded these same years as not successful in the Security Council resolution data. For years 1979, 1983, 1986 and 1989, there was not sufficient information on this case, and most information was about progress within the great Middle East peace process – for example progress between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and the start of an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983. 1993 is largely a success because of the Oslo Peace Process, with both sides agreeing that the other has a right to existence. 1995

is also considered successful because of the Taba Agreement. 1996 is considered as unsuccessful due to the increased violence, and Hamas' rejection of the Oslo peace process and other negotiations. 2000 was largely unsuccessful, with a deadlock in negotiations, especially due to competing claims on Jerusalem and Sharon's visit to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and the Al Aqsa Intifada. In 2001 Sharon, who disagrees with the Oslo process, wins the election and Israeli troops seize Gaza and divide it – which was the first time since Oslo. Suicide bombings and Israeli air strikes increase, so I considered 2001 to be unsuccessful (“A History of the Israeli...”). 2002 was unsuccessful because the West Bank was reoccupied and violence continued. In 2004 despite Sharon's disengagement plan to withdraw settlers in troops from Gaza and some parts of the West Bank, suicide bombings and Israeli air strikes increased, and the construction of the wall continued even after the ICJ decided it was illegal – making 2004 unsuccessful. In 2005 although violence increased after Abbas won the Palestinian election, Sharon and Abbas agreed upon a mutual ceasefire at a summit in Egypt, and settlers continued to be withdrawn – making 2005 successful (“A History of Conflict”). In total, I coded case #37 as unsuccessful.

For case #251: Israel, the intifada which began in 1987 and Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians continued into 1991 (“History of the Palestinian...”), so I considered 1990 to be unsuccessful. In 1998 Netanyahu signed the Wye River Memorandum, stipulating for Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank, which ended eighteen months of stagnation in the peace process. I considered this to be a success. In 1999, Israel and Palestine signed a deal to revive the peace process, and talks resumed, so I considered this also to be a success. In total, I coded case #251 to be a success.

A possible explanation for the differing results for the two Israeli cases could depend on side B. Case #37 has various side B's over the years, which could account for some years being successful and others not. For example, a change in leadership of side B could mean a change in their aims – which could negatively or positively affect the peace process with Israel. In case #251 there was a consistent side B – Hezbollah. This could possibly make it easier for the mediators to achieve a more successful outcome.

For case #32: Republic of Korea, in 1948 a diplomatic mission to provide good offices for the unification of the Korean Peninsula was established; however, by 1950 war broke out and the diplomatic mission became a peacekeeping one (“UN Commission on...”). Success is coded as 0 because war broke out and the UN's good offices stopped without accomplishing any progress on the unification of the peninsula.

For case #101 and #150: South Africa, the mediation efforts produced talks between the government and imprisoned and exiled ANC members (Nupen). They were successful due to a number of reasons including: timing, a favorable international setting, and the mediator (van der Merwe, 1998). Against this explanation, Leiberfeld argues that while it is difficult to evaluate the success of ‘track-two diplomacy,’ (Leiberfeld, 2002: 355) it is considered that significant progress was made to the pre-negotiation process from 1985-1990 (Leiberfeld, 2002: 370), and not because of the secret talks with imprisoned ANC leaders like Nelson Mandela (Leiberfeld, 2002: 356). Either way, both of these cases are coded as successful.