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**CONSTRUCTING NEO-OTTOMANISM: FROM  
RHETORICAL TO POLITICAL ACTION AND ITS  
AFTERMATHS**

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## ÖZ

### **TARİHİN MİRASI İLE YENİ POLİTİKALAR İNŞA ETMEK: AK PARTİ DÖNEMİNDE SÖYLEM, EYLEM VE ÖTESİ**

**ALPER ÇAKMAK**

İşbu doktora tezi, siyasal söylemin politika oluşturma süreçlerinde şimdije kadar hiç olmadığı ölçüde önemli rol oynadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bir diğer deyişle, Türk siyasi tarihinde siyasal söylemin siyasal politikalara tahvili sürecinde etkinliğinin bu derece görünür olduğu bir zaman yaşanmamıştır. Hatip tarafından stratejik ve faydacı bir yaklaşımla kullanılan siyasal söylemin, süregelen hakim düşünceyi yikan, buna alternatif düşüncesini hakim kılmak için söylem inşa eden, ve politika oluşturma süreçleri için rehber olarak işlev gören, tedrici olarak evirilen bir enstrüman olduğu argümanı savunulmaktadır. Bu noktada en önemli unsur, üretilen çeşitli siyasal söylemler içerisinde bu çalışmanın odak noktasının geçmişin hatırlası üzerine inşa edilen siyasal söylemlerin incelenmesidir. Geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilen söylemler ile ortaya konulan argümanların tarihsel-geleneksel meşruiyet ile güç kazandığı ve dolayısıyla siyasal uygulamaya geçirilme süreçleri ile ilişkisinin ortaya konulabileceği düşünülmektedir. Siyasal söylemin tez içerisinde oluşturulan şu ikili çerçeve ile uyumlu bir biçimde oluşturulduğu ve ifade edilebileceği düşünülmüştür: (a) yıkım / inşa etme / politika. (b) nüve / vizyon / politika. Bu çalışma, doğası gereği disiplinlerarası bir yaklaşımı sahiptir. Odak noktası insan bilincinden ziyade toplumsal gerçek olan ve toplumsal gerçek ön plana çıkarıldığında aktörlerin söylem pratiklerinin maddi kabiliyetleri ve yeterlilikleri bakımından değerlendirilmesine imkân kılan, söylemleri büyük ölçekli sosyopolitik çatışmaların ürünü olarak ele alan Eleştirel Söylem Analizi ve Söylem-Tarihsel Yaklaşım çerçeveleri bu çalışmanın yıkım ve yeniden inşa bölümlerinde kullanılan araçlardır. Anlatı-izleme yöntemi ise bir kronoloji içerisinde belirli bir konu üzerine bina edilen söylemin farklı siyaset alanlarında nasıl geliştirildiğini göstermektedir.

Tezde bu amaçla siyasal söylemin, mevcud durumun mevcudiyetini güçlendirme bakımından anahtar role sahip tarihi olay ve figür anlatımları üzerinden geleneksel bürokratik değerler dizisi ve ideolojisini yıkma, politikalarını hayatı geçirmek için meşruiyet alanları sağlamak amacıyla tarihi figürleri ve olayları alternatif okuma ile yeniden oluşturmak için kullanıldığı ortaya konulmaktadır. Bahse konu söylemin 2002-2007 yılları arasında nüveleri gözlemlenebilir olsa da, bu çalışma 2007 yılını çapa olarak kullanmaktadır. Zira Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) 2002-2007 yılları arasında iç ve dış politika alanlarındaki söylemleri ile hem dönüştürücü hem de hâkim –mevcud- durumu benimseyen bir dil kullanmıştır. Bu çalışmada geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilen siyasal söylemin kronolojik anlatı-izleme yöntemi ile incelenmesi, iç politikaya dair üretilen söylemin aynı bağlam, sosyopolitik ve kültürel çağrımlar ile dış politika söylemi olarak da kullanıldığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bir diğer deyişle, iç politikaya dair geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilmiş ahlaki bir siyasal söylemin anlatı-izlemesi, ardılı olarak üretilen dış politikaya dair geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilmiş ahlaki bir siyasal söylemi ortaya koymaktadır. İç politikada, geçmişin mirası üzerine bina ettiği bir siyasal söylem ile diğer aktörler arasında pozisyonunu belirleyen siyasal aktörün, bu söylemin kronolojik ardılı olarak uygun dış politika alanında da aynı söylemin bir türevini ürettiği ortaya konulmaktadır. Anlatı-takibi yöntemi yıkım ve yeniden inşa stratejilerinin öncelik ve sonralık bakımından sistematik yapısını ve iç / dış politika konularının söylem stratejilerinin bir aracı olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Eleştirel söylem çözümlemesi sonucu elde edilen en önemli bulgu, yıkım ve yeniden inşa söylemlerinin maddi kabiliyet ve yeterlilikleri -çalışmada maddi kabiliyet ve yeterlilikler sistemik kısıtlılıklar, güç ve güvenlik kaygıları olarak ele alınmaktadır- ölçüünde 1) sert / ayrılan ve ya 2) tedrici söylem özelliklerini göstermektedir. Bu tez, siyasal söylemin, Türk siyasal hayatı boyunca tanık olunmayan şekilde, devam eden ve gelecek politikalara meşruiyet alanı oluşturmak için stratejik ve güçlü bir araç olarak çalıştığını göstermektedir. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın siyasal söylemlerinin değişim ve dönüşüm söylemleri olduğu, bu söylemin beslendiği kaynağı ise Osmanlı medeniyeti / Osmanlı tarihi / kaynağı tarih olan siyasal ve kurumsal meşruiyet odaklı söylem olduğu savunulmaktadır. Tarihten beslenen bu gelecek söylemi mevcud duruma meydan okur, onu yeniden tasrarlar –kendine ait mevcud

durumu oluşturur-, ve devam eden ve gelecek politikaları için meşruiyet zeminini tekrar oluşturur. Bahsi geçen düzlemin dışındaki bazı aykırılıklara rağmen -Türk siyasetinde yararcı yaklaşımın sonuca ulaşmak bakımından yeterli şart olması durumunda- liderin söylemi tasavvur dünyasının bir yansımıası olarak geçmişten beslenerek geleceği yazma gayretlerini göstermektedir.

Bu çalışmanın kendine has özelliği ise söylem ve politika arasındaki ilişkiyi sistematik varsayımlar ile çeşitli örneklemeler özelinde söylem ve politika yapısını ortaya koymaya çalışması ve anlamlandırmasıdır. Bu çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu en önemli tez, söylem ve siyasa ilişkisinin sistematik varsayımlar bütünü üzerine kurulabileceği savunusudur. Çalışma ele alınan örneklemeler itibarı ile geçmişin mirası üzerine kurulu bazı siyasalar uygulamaya geçirilebilirken, diğerlerinin neden söylem düzeyinde kaldığı sorularına cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır. Çalışma söylem ve siyasa ilişkisinin seçili örneklemeler bağlamında sistematik varsayımlar ile ortaya konulabilir olduğunu savunmakta, bu bağlamda 4 ana unsuru bu ilişkinin temel ayakları olarak ortaya koymaktadır. 1) Alan 2) Sistemik kısıtlılıklar 3) Söylem Türü 4) Siyasa Türü. Bu çalışmada alan / saha kavramı geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilen söylemin oluşturulduğu alan/sahadır. Alan / saha bakımından söylemlerin ayrimı, söylemin içeriği bakımından yapılmaktadır. İki tür alan/saha ortaya konulmaktadır. 1) Normatif Alan 2) Reel-Politik Alan. Normatif alanda geçmişin mirası üzerine bina edilen siyasal söylem içeriği şu konuları içermektedir: İslam tarihi, medeniyet, insan hakları, adalet, Müslüman kardeşliği, İslam kardeşliği, etnisite üzerine bina edilen kardeşlik, kültürel akrabalık, ideal / evrensel değerler, mazlum halklar ve din kardeşliği. Söylem analizi itibariyle kar-zarar hesaplamaları ve salt ulusal çıkar mülahazalarının ortaya konulmadığı siyasal söylemlerdir. Reel-politik alanda geçmişin mirası üzerine bina edilen siyasal söylemin içeriğinde şu konular ön plana çıkmaktadır: Kar-zarar hesaplamaları, ulusal çıkar, güç ilişkileri. Sistemik kısıtlılıklar ise şu üç unsur ile tanımlanmaktadır: a) Diğer aktörlerin ilgili alandaki rolü ve bu rolün aktör söylemi ve siyasası üzerinde menfi / kısıtlayıcı etkisi, b) Güç ve Güvenlik Kavramları: Siyasal aktörün, -devlet, hükümet, parti ve ya lider- siyasal söylemle örtüsen siyasa oluşturma -söylemi siyasaya tahvil etme- gücüne ve konforuna sahiplik derecesi ve ya öz algısı c) Siyasal söylemin siyasaya dönüştürülmesinin ardılı olarak diğer aktörler ile muhtemel çıkar tartışmaları. Söylem türü, siyasal

söylemin oluşturulduğu saha/alan'a bağlı olarak iki türde üretilir. a) Ayrılan/Sert Söylem, b) Tedrici Söylem. Normatif alanda üretilen ve Normatif çağrımlar ile geçmişin mirası üzerine inşa edilmiş siyasal söylemlerin neredeyse tamamı Ayrılan / Sert Söylem özelliği gösterdiği gözlenmektedir. Bu söylem, içeriği göz önüne alındığında bürokratik iç/dış politika paradigmasından ayrılan, sert bir söylemdir. Reel Politik alan üzerine / içerisinde üretilen söylemler tedrici söylem özelliği göstermektedir. Tedrici söylem, geleneksel bürokratik iç/dış politika söylemlerinin bir devamı olarak nitelendirilebileceği gibi, bu tür siyasal söylemin anlatı-takibi analizi düşük seviyede değişimler toplamının sonunda daha büyük bir değişime yol açtığını ortaya koymaktadır. Tedrici söylemin, söylemi oluşturan aktörün, a) Güç ve güvenlik özalgısının diğer aktörlere nazaran daha az olduğu, b) rasyonel fayda-zarar hesaplamaları sonucu ayrılan söylem / ayrılan siyasa oluşturmanın faydaları – zararları-, tedrici söylem / tedrici siyasa oluşturmanın faydalarından –zararlarından- daha az –fazla- olduğunda geliştirildiği söylenebilir. Söylem terminolojisinin bir uzantısı olarak siyasa türleri de iki şekilde adlandırılmaktadır. a ) Sert / Ayrılan Siyasa b ) Tedrici Siyasa. Ayrılan Siyasa, geleneksel bürokratik paradigmanın - Türkiye birincil derecede aktör olmadığı olaylardan birincil derecede etkilenen ülkedir, bu sebeple birincil derecede aktör olmadığı olaylardan birincil derecede etkilenme durumunda muhtemel zararları azaltmak için kendi güvenliğini istikrarsız bölgeler üzerinden tanımlamamalıdır düşüncesi- oluşturduğu iç ve dış siyasalardan ayrılan ve uygulanan politika biçimini, politikanın hayatı geçiriliş hızı ve uygulama biçimleri bakımından sert siyasalar olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Tedrici siyasa, geleneksel bürokratik paradigmanın ürettiği siyasalardan tedrici fark gösteren, bazı örneklemlerde geleneksel bürokratik paradigmanın prensipleri içerisinde kalan, genellikle ardışık adımlar özelliği gösteren politikalar olarak tanımlanmıştır. Her bir adım, üretilen her bir politika bir önceki politikanın geliştirilmiş bir türevi olarak karşımıza çıkar.

Söylem ve Siyasal Gerçek ilişkisini inceleyen 3 ana akım şu şekildedir: Müzakereci Yaklaşım: Müzakereyi siyasallığın -siyasal problemlerin ve çıkar tartışmalarının- merkezine koyan yaklaşımdır. Diskur Teorisi: Çatışmayı siyasallığın merkezine koyan yaklaşımdır. Agonistik Yaklaşım: Uyuşmazlık ve görüş ayrılığını merkeze alan ve bunun siyasal gerçekliği anlamlandırmada daha sağlıklı

olduğunu ortaya koyan yaklaşımındır. Bu çalışma, söylem ve siyasal gerçeklik ilişkisini, söylem ve siyasa ilişkisine taşımayı amaçlamıştır. Şimdiye kadar ortaya konulan çalışmalar, söylem ve siyasal gerçek / siyaset ilişkisini ortaya koymuş, söylem ve siyasa ilişkisini varsayımlar düzeyinde ortaya koyamamışlardır. Siyaset / siyasal gerçeklik kavramları oluşturulan / üretilen somut politikalar ya da siyaset değil, dominant düşünce / güç ilişkileri / aktörlerin konumlandırılması gibi soyut gerçeklikleri içermektedir.

Çalışmanın son bölümlerinde ortaya koyulan varsayımlar şu şekildedir: 1. Varsayımlı: Moral / Normatif alanda oluşturulan söylemlerin tamamı Sert / Ayrılan Söylem özelliği gösterir. 2. Varsayımlı: Reel Politik Alanda oluşturulan söylemlerin tamamı Tedrici Söylem özelliği gösterir. 1. Varsayımlı Türevi: Normatif Alanda oluşturulan Sert / Ayrılan Söylemler Sistemik Kısıtlılıkların bulunmaması durumunda Sert / Ayrılan Politika / Siyasaya dönüştürülür. 2. Varsayımlı Türevi: Reel Politik Alan, alanın doğası gereği bulunan Sistemik Kısıtlılıklar sebebiyle hem söylem hem de siyasa bakımından tedrici özellik gösterir. 3. Varsayımlı: Normatif Alanda oluşturulan Sert / Ayrılan Söylem, Sistemik Kısıtlılıklar sebebiyle tedrici siyasa olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu varsayımlar şu konular ile test edilmeye çalışılmaktadır: I. (a) Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi (b) 'Monşerler' Meselesi, II) (a) Suriyeli Mülteciler Meselesi, (b) Malazgirt Zaferi Anmaları, (c) Bangladeş İslamcı Lideri Motiur Rahman Nizamının İdam Edilmesi, (d) Osmanlıca Öğretimi, (e) Kut-ül Amare Zaferi Anmaları, (f) İstanbul'un Fethi Kutlamaları, III) (a) Lozan Antlaşması, (b) Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesinde Uygur Türkleri, (c) Askeri Operasyonlar ve Bölgede Sert Güç Kullanımı, (d) Türkiye-İsrail İlişkileri, (e) Taksim Topçu Kışası, (f) Taksim Cami ve Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, (g) Kudüs Meselesi Bağlamında Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Eleştirel Söylem Analizi, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP söylem, politika, törelcilik, reelpolitik, tarih, miras, meşruiyet

## ABSTRACT

### **CONSTRUCTING NEO-OTTOMANISM: FROM RHETORICAL TO POLITICAL ACTION AND ITS AFTERMATHS**

**ALPER ÇAKMAK**

This thesis posits that discourse has almost never played such a determining role in policy-making; in other words, there has almost never been a day in Turkish political history when the efficacy of the discourse to be translated into policy is of such visibility. Hypothesizing the relationship between political discourse and policy is a quiet complicated and difficult attempt, one with, according to former studies, dependent on many variables and these variables have slim chance to emerge at the same time.

It is argued that the discourse, strategically and pragmatically employed by the rhetor, is an evolving instrument, deconstructing the dominant, reconstructing to establish self-dominance, and functioning as a guide for the policy-making. It is assumed and argued that the political discourse pursues the following sequence of generated strategies evolving in parallel with time in formulated twofold framework: (a) deconstruction / reconstruction / policy, (b) seed / vision / policy. The study employs a transdisciplinary approach as the nature of the thesis requires. The tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) are employed in the chapters examining the discourse of deconstruction / reconstruction.

To that end, it is argued that the rhetorical action is geared towards deconstructing the components of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm and ideology, deconstructing and reconstructing the key historical events and figures so as to provide a ground of legitimacy for actualizing the policy. Though the nucleus of such a discourse can be observed between 2002-2007, this study takes the date 2007 as the anchor, since the discourse and domestic & foreign policies of AK Party had posited, tracing the general pattern, an accommodationist (with the erstwhile dominant ideology and bureaucratic paradigm) character from 2002 to 2007. The thesis posits that the discourse, for the first time in Turkish political history,

functions as a powerful strategical tool to establish the ground of legitimization for the future policies. The discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is argued to be a discourse of change, a political discourse of transformative nature, nourished by the Ottoman civilization / Ottoman past / the political and institutional legitimacy of the Ottoman polity that is in totality called the grand legacy of history. The political discourse of future nourished by the history challenges and re-structures the status quo and re-invents the legitimacy ground for the ongoing and future policies. Notwithstanding the anomalous aspects (when the employment of pragmatic approach in Turkish politics is the sufficient condition), the discourse of the leader has shown the attempts to write the present in domestic and foreign affairs in tandem with the ideational world nourished by the past. The *sui generis* nature of this study is to introduce systematic hypotheses helpful in revealing case-dependent nature of the discourse and policy and giving a deeper understanding of the relationship between discourse and policy. These cases are going to seek answer to the reasons why some of the political discourse is translated into policy but others not, and why it is so in that particular manner.

**Keywords:** CDA, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, AK Party, discourse, policy, moralism, realpolitik, history, legacy, legitimacy.

## FOREWORD

Turkey, as an emerging regional and global power from 2000s and on, is in transformation with respect to its domestic and foreign policy. One determining aspect of this transformation is the role of political discourse conceived as a signal, even a banner activating the decision takers' positions and political actions. This aspect of tracing the novelties through the lens of discourse reveals a real change in the way the domestic and foreign policies are developed and put into practice. The interest of the study is firstly to explicate the role of discourse, significations entailed in and revealed through the discourse, the extent of the discrepancy between discourse and policy, and the reformulation of the discourse in the form of policy.

The seeds of the study lie on my subjective observation of the huge conglomeration of significations to which the political discourse appeals, and the translation of the political discourse into political action. The puzzle of the study establishing the foci of the study is: the relationship between the political discourse and policy and the nature of the relationship; how these two domains, the former as a product of the ideational world of the rhetor, the latter as a product of the structural limits of power and domination, are in intersecting, and even in interaction. The basic motive of the study is to figure out a complete synthesis between the political discourse and political action, though the former one is more of an unrefined and sometimes utopic nature, the latter one is more of an elaborated, reformulated and cultivated one. A series of academic studies and analyses on Neo-Ottomanism as a reformulation of the model prompted through the Ottoman past have emerged so far. However, I have observed that, despite the huge volume of studies on the discourse and political reality, none of these studies dwelled on the significations, connotations and expressive form of the political discourse that is incrementally translated into policy, though reformulated but preserving the nucleus of the suggestion. What is more, the discourse dwells not only on the Ottoman past but on the past that endorses the whole Islamic and Turkish civilization for which a generic catch-all phrase is employed: the grand legacy of the past.

This dissertation is dwelled on primary and secondary sources. The public speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are the primary data source validating the

analyses. The political discourse of R. Tayyip Erdoğan plays a significant role establishing the first-hand and factual material for the study. Though the basic sources of material are the speeches of the leader, references and supplementary views are certified throughout the study.

The study utilizes descriptive methodology, hugely dependent on the qualitative data and referring to the quantitative data when it is necessary to validate the qualitative argument. The nature of the data source drives the study to the theoretical framework demonstrated in the Chapter 1. The study is of two-pronged aspect: a) a systematic analysis of the systematically developed political discourse, b) tracing the patterns in the translation of the political discourse into political action. These two prompt the study to apply to a transdisciplinary conceptual framework. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) are the basic conceptual frameworks that will be drawn to figure out the wide spectrum of meanings and associations that the discourse entails. Constructivist Institutionalism and narrative-tracing methods enable the reader to assess the evolutionary form of the discourse as a signal of ideational world and “dynamic interplay of structure and agent and, indeed, material and ideational factors.”<sup>1</sup>

In the introduction section, the study introduces the basic motives and a general background of the subject. In Chapter 1, a theoretical framework is proposed to trace the evolutionary form of the discourse, and establish the extent of transfer from rhetorical to political action. The employed source of the data is also framed in the section. In Chapter 2, the two-pronged nature of the political discourse, deconstruction and reconstruction, is carved to identify the evolutionary form of the fundamental tenets nourishing the discourse. While deconstruction<sup>2</sup> refers to the discursive attack methods on the discourse of the preceding secular bureaucratic paradigm, reconstruction refers to the establishment process of the novel discourse and the discursive effort to make it dominant among the others. The discourse of deconstruction refers to the discursive attacks and condemn on the traditional

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<sup>1</sup> Colin Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism,” in **Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions**, eds. R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> The term “deconstruction” is employed to refer to the attacking and condemning nature of the political discourse, rather than the prevalent use of the term in structuralism.

bureaucratic paradigm's defense of the components of regime as a sacrosanct entity. The discourse of reconstruction refers to the reinvention of the new discursive paradigm nourished by the socio-cultural significations from the deep-rooted historical legacy. In Chapter 3, the study focuses on how the self of the politician is nourished by the grandeur of the history and ancestors' deeds extending beyond the Ottoman period. The self is written by the legacy of the past. The legacy of the past institutes the self as the appropriate teller and appropriate doer. The interest of this section is how socio-cultural significations of the discourse work in a way that the rhetor internalizes the collective memory and makes it a component of instituting the self. It also leaves a room for the analysis of the self-other dichotomy performed to mark the line of optimal distinctiveness.<sup>3</sup> In the last section of the chapter, the study focuses on the representations and figures that are non-semantic, in other words, non-rhetorical actions. This section of the dissertation figures out how the rhetor hoists the flag of representational superiority, incrementally obtained hegemonic status and how the discourse perceived by the hearers is put into (reformulated into practice) practice in various public spheres. Chapter 4 explains the relationship between discourse and policy. In this section, the preceding systematic study / analysis of discourse is argued out to be preliminary stage / prerequisite for the formulation of the policy. The plasticity of discourse to be transferred into political action is brought in the foreground, since there is no one to one relationship between rhetoric and policy. What is specific to that chapter is the proposition of a hypothesis identifying the nature of the relationship between discourse and policy. The intricate relationship argued out to exist in the transfer of the discourse to the policy is the focus of the Chapter 4. This section puts forward strategy hypotheses identifying case-dependent nature of the transition between discourse and policy. The intricacy is argued out to stem from the (by nature) distinction of the realms in which discourse and policy are produced. Policy is a reformulated entity of what the basic constituents and ideas that are maintained throughout the discourse. Discourse is, by nature, maintains more of a utopic character. Policy is, by nature, a refined form corresponding to the restrictions

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<sup>3</sup> Brewer, Marilyn B. "The social self: On being the same and different at the same time." **Personality and social psychology bulletin** 17.5 (1991): 477.

/ limits of the real world –structural limits of power and domination- and feasible within the reality. The transfer of the discourse to policy is a process of reformulation, through which the basic tenets of the discourse are visible in the political action. The medium of discourse is, by nature, is the realm of ultimate liberty, while the medium of policy is, by nature, an output of the discourse, processed by the structural outer limits of power and domination. The components of the hypothesis such as field / realm, systemic limits, avulsive discourse / policy, incremental discourse / policy are introduced to figure out the relationship between political discourse and policy, type of political discourse and the type of policy.

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Alper ÇAKMAK

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A</b>	Avulsive Discourse
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CDA</b>	Critical Discourse Analysis
<b>CI</b>	Constructivist Institutionalism
<b>CL</b>	Critical Linguistics
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>CU</b>	Customs Union
<b>CUP</b>	Committee of Union and Progress
<b>DHA</b>	Discourse-Historical Approach
<b><i>Diyatel İşleri Başkanlığı</i></b>	Directorate for Religious Affairs of Turkey
<b>DP</b>	Democrat Party
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FP</b>	Felicity Party
<b>FM</b>	Foreign Minister (Minister of Foreign Affairs)
<b>I</b>	Incremental Discourse
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
<b>JDP</b>	Justice and Development Party (also <i>AKP</i> or <i>AK Party</i> )
<b>M</b>	Moralist / Normative Realm
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of the Republic of Turkey)
<b>MGK</b>	<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i> (National Security Council)
<b>NMP</b>	Nationalist Movement Party
<b>NOM</b>	National Outlook Movement ( <i>Milli Görüş</i> )
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>O</b>	Systemic Limits / Outer Limits / Structural Limits of Power and Domination
<b>OIC</b>	Organization of the Islamic Conference
<b>P5</b>	Permanent 5 (Permanent Members of Security Council)
<b>PKK</b>	<i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</i>

<b>PM</b>	Prime Minister
<b>R</b>	Realpolitik Realm
<b>RPP</b>	Republican People's Party
<b>SC (UN)</b>	Security Council
<b>SCO</b>	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
<b>TEOG</b>	Turkish High School Enterance Exam
<b>TIS</b>	Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
<b>TİKA Agency</b>	Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
<b>TPP</b>	True Path Party
<b>TSK</b>	<i>Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri</i> (Turkish Armed Forces)
<b>U.S.</b>	United States (of America)
<b>WO</b>	No Systemic Limits / Tolerable Systemic Limits
<b>WP</b>	Welfare Party
<b>ZPP</b>	Zero Problems Policy

## INTRODUCTION

*“When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.”<sup>1</sup>*

In the recent years, it is becoming burgeoningly difficult to ignore increasingly determining role of discourse in Turkish political life. Discourse of grand legacy of history is too much tangible, visible and measurable to be discussed only as an imaginary discourse reflecting the dreams of leaders. Most of the political debates taking place in today’s Turkey have been run-products of the discourses of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu.<sup>2</sup> The discourse obtaining such a determining role in domestic and foreign policy-making is not a case mostly observed in Turkish political life. The idea behind the burgeoning significance of discourse is the belief that if something is once ‘mentioned’, it can be elaborated, debated, negotiated, more significantly as a corollary of this, translated into action.

No political discourse is exempt from the ideological underpinnings of the leaders who produce it. Though the discourse built upon the grand legacy of history is acknowledged as neo-Ottomanist discourse, what it entails is more than that can be limited to Ottoman history and civilization. The discourse constitutes an acting plot, a purview, a context represented in reformulated past, present and envisioned / imagined future. It constructs new political discourse and new policies dwelling on the grand legacy of the history. It simply entails a display of intentional order (placement) of events, relationship between the events, ideological underpinnings, and ideational reflection of the leaders, leaders’ attitudes, beliefs, attributions and values. The cultural context of the discourse is also an element of analysis since it

“comprises the broadest contextual circle which embraces all other possible contexts...the reference to, and the representation of, the shared knowledge of speakers, their conventions of conduct, belief systems, language metaphors and speech genres, their historical awareness and ethical and judicial principle.”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Katrin Bennhold. Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel, **The New York Times**. (2009, January 29), Available at: <[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html?_r=1)>

<sup>2</sup> The role of Ahmet Davutoğlu as the ideologue of neo-Ottomanism is the point of focus in the thesis. The study leaves place for the political discourse of Ahmet Davutoğlu to supplement the general argument.

These constituents of the discourse provide a confidential ground and legitimization for political-action, in other words, cultural context, being the premise of the discourse, is transferred to political context. The rhetorical action is turned into a political action through the construction and subsequent reconstruction of the discourse. Discourse does not only function as a seed of the political debates but also paves the way for constructing a political ground in which all the normative manifestations and institutions act accordingly. Hence the arguments on the neo-Ottomanist discourse, which is called the discourse built upon the grand legacy of history, as a tentative part of Turkish political life is becoming more and more visible once the political system and institutions are mobilized through a new phase which is in (almost) complete compatibility with the leaders' discourse.

Discourse is employed not only to represent the negative aspects of 'the other', to shame or silence the opponents, but also to construct a coherent political sphere and political system. The relationship between discourse-making and policy-making is constructed pace for pace. The discourse constructed in incrementally<sup>4</sup> developed speeches is employed as a legitimization for policy-making. The challenge of neo-Ottomanist discourse is to signify a return to the golden age of the past, not only through a constructed heroic discourse, but also through the policies that go beyond the 'chartered borders'.

As the nature of the topic demands, the study will critically examine the discourse (non-fictional semantics) reflecting the movement towards neo-Ottomanism through the public speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former being, by nature, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, the latter one as the ideologue. The objective of the thesis is to shed light upon how the discourse on the grand legacy of history is constructed throughout the years and more significantly how the discourse has become a reference point in policy-making. This thesis mainly seeks to address the following questions: How the talk (discourse) is translated into action? The answer to the aforementioned question is

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<sup>3</sup> Dan Ben-Amos. 1993. Context in Context. **Western Folklore** 52:215-216

<sup>4</sup> The incremental nature of discursive evolution and policy is going to be scrutinized in the chapter titled: "Discourse and Policy: Between Utopia and Reality".

sought through the following questions: 1) What is the relationship between political discourse and policy? 2) Is there any systematic relationship that can be hypothesized? 3) What is the function (deconstruction/reconstruction) of the political discourse and how do the functions evolve chronologically? 4) What are the types of political discourse? 5) What are the types of policy? 6) What is the relationship between the types of political discourse and types of policy?

The answer to the aforementioned question is expected to unfold the transformation at the epicenter of Turkish political life.

The peripheral questions to be answered in the present study is :(a) What are the non-fictional semantics and images that reflect the idealization and imitation of the Ottoman times during the last Justice and Development Party government period ? (b) To what extent are these images and non-semantics adopted in the service of political communication as a means of persuasion, silencing opponents or setting an agenda? Or are they employed haphazardly? The study is going to focus on the subject of discourse on the grand legacy of history as a cultural, social and political imagination since the image of the Justice and Development Party is an exemplary form of neo-Ottomanism as an academic and political argument, but ironically revealed, explained but also rejected<sup>5</sup> by Ahmet Davutoğlu and R. Tayyip Erdoğan. Almost no research has been found surveying the burgeoning relationship between the discourse-making and policy-making in Turkey regarding the term from 2007 to 2017. There is fairly limited number of studies dealing with the use of neo-Ottomanist discourse in Turkish political life through a discourse analysis method which is not the mere concern of the dissertation.

Three basic issues to be addressed here are the following: (1) Discourse analysis of political discourse on the grand legacy of history or non-fictional semantics as a means of deconstructing the traditional insight of history (2) Discourse analysis of semantics political communication in service of imagining-self

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<sup>5</sup> In an interview for Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence, Davutoğlu states that: “my speech during a visit to Sarajevo in 2009 on contemporary Turkish foreign policy has been misinterpreted as advocating a policy of neo-Ottomanism. I am not a neo-Ottoman. Actually there is no such policy. We have a common history and cultural depth with the Balkan countries, which nobody can deny”. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Davutoglu: I am not a Neo-Ottomanist (Q&A with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu), **Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence** (April 2011). Available at: <http://fellowship.birn.eu.com/en/alumni-initiative/alumni-initiative-articles-davutoglu-i-m-not-a-neo-ottoman> [02.07.2016]

as a means of persuasion, agenda-setting and the creation of an “imagined state”. (3) How the manifested images and representations serve the aims (if there is), and whether the intertwined nature of these representations and discourse are translated to the political action.

The image of the Justice and Development Party is an exemplary form of neo-Ottomanism. The neo-Ottomanist discourse is legitimized through the Justice and Development Party’s cadres’ acknowledgement of the Ottoman Empire as the golden era and the leader’s claim of adoration to the golden age. The acknowledgement is constituted through the references to the social, political and cultural order in the Empire as a remedy / panacea for the modern problems / ills of the Turkish Republic. The discourse constituting the acknowledgement of the Ottoman past reflects the ideological underpinnings of fastidious leaders underlining glorious events in imperial past rather than the military and political legacy of Atatürk.<sup>6</sup> This research is of significance as there is no study of how rhetorical action, semantic power, or non-fictional discourse is being systematically translated into political action and constructing the guide for the political discourse and policy patterns of Justice and Development Party.

Within this framework, what I will argue is the discourse built on the grand legacy of history, as a form of rhetorical action, is constructed through the subsequent discourses of Erdoğan translating the talk to action through the incremental steps (a) shaming and silencing the opponents through the JDP’s imagined association with the unifying features of Ottoman legacy (b) employment of the Ottoman past as a way of both integration and challenge to the global order (c) subsequent construction of the neo-Ottomanist discourse for the new social, political, institutional and cultural domains of New Turkey. The merit of this study stems from the idea that political history of Turkish Republic has never witnessed such a period of time when speech [rhetorical action/discourse] has such a vigorous and substantive effect on the policy-making.

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<sup>6</sup> Cooper verified the legacy of Atatürk through political, economic, institutional and “social element(s) of the Kemalist vision”. Malcolm Cooper. “The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-Making.” **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)** 78.1 (2002): p. 3

The key concepts generated to give a full-fledged portrait for the evolution of the discourse are: 1) seed, 2) vision 3) structural limits of power and domination 4) praxis. The source material, political discourse, is argued to posit an evolutionary nature in line with the chronology / date when the discourse was produced. The term, seed, is used to label the discourse, figuring out the ideological underpinning of the rhetor, not in a comprehensive way though. The discourse maintains more of an abstract nature than a concrete one. It is more of implications rather than direct appreciations or depreciations. It can be put as the first blossom on a cherry tree. The term, vision, is employed referring to the discursively developed form of the seed. The fundamental trait of vision is its evolved, more elaborate, more stressed and more sophisticated nature. It figures out the policy perspective with more of an abstract terminology than a concrete one. It is an in-between state of blossom and bloom. Solidification is the term generally observed as enhanced in tone with concrete references to the ‘others’ of the discourse. The form of the discourse can be put as the bloom on a cherry tree, not with cherry though. The term, structural limits of power and domination, is used to refer to the conditions in the outer world, outer limits that are able to influence the product –policy–, in other words, prevalent factors that are of potential to intervene in the relationship between discourse and praxis. It can be put as the weather conditions, to which the farmer has almost no option, but to obey or take palliative measures. The outer limits determine the amount and quality of the crop obtained. The last term is used to illustrate the embeddedness of the discourse and political practice. The praxis / policy are used to portray how the political discourse, evolved in time following the steps of seed-and-vision, accord with the political action / praxis. It is translation of the discourse, albeit reformulated considering the structural limits of power and domination in the areas of practicum, to the political practice. It can be put as the cherry, grown by courtesy of expediencies / despite the restrictive conditions in the area of practicum, on a tree.

The primary argument of the thesis is that discourse of grand legacy of history is turned into a rhetorical action challenging the dominant establishment, traditional bureaucratic paradigm. This dissertation analyzes the gradual emergence of a new discourse, constructed firstly to deconstruct the traditional discourse of the

traditional paradigm, secondly to transfer the discourse into concrete political action. Far too little attention has been paid to how the rhetoric (discourse) is constructed and translated into political action though the relationship between discourse and political reality is noted in a large volume of literature.

The discourse goes beyond the rumors and humors about the Kemalist system<sup>7</sup>, since it turns out to be an integral part of the policies of the ruling party. The traditional bureaucratic nature of the system is open to debate since it is more of a derived character established by the self-employed military guardians of the regime. Representations and non-fictional semantics are analyzed to determine the extent of a particular systematized political discourse (making use of various media) working in Turkish political life during the rule of Justice and Development Party. In general, these polemical movements in discursive production have intended to distance people from the imagined nation of the Turkish Republic that is the production of pro-tutelage circle.

The discourse is argued to work in two divergent ways for the addressee depending on the political orientation. Addressee of the discourse is expected to be persuaded, motivated and mobilized on the condition that the political orientation is towards Justice and Development Party. Addressee of the discourse is expected to be shamed or at least silenced if the case is ‘the others’<sup>8</sup>. However, in both cases mentioned, it is a pragmatic and systematized political communication tool aimed at deriving a political benefit aiming to institutionalize the eminent aspects of the discourse. At this point, the role of media and communication is at the epicenter of the political discourse that is strategically formed to mobilize the masses and appeal

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<sup>7</sup> Yael Navaro-Yashin, on the argument about secularists’ perception of Islamists in the public life and Welfare Party which is the predecessor of Justice and Development Party, making use of the term Islamist, not neo-Ottomanist, argues that “Islamist policy was the making of the secularists; it was a relational and reactive effect of secularists’ othering practices”. Navaro-Yashin, Yael. **Faces of the state: Secularism and public life in Turkey**. Princeton University Press, 2002. p.42. It is the rumors and humors of the secularists, Kemalists, Ataturkists that gave shape to the milieu of Islamist policy. Ironically, the centralization of the periphery through the Justice and Development Party’s governments relocates the roles of discourse production as will be evidenced through the discursive productions and new relational policy relocations of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu in the study.

<sup>8</sup> The others is penned as catch-all abstract phrase defining the whole opponents of Justice and Development Party regardless of their political party preferences or ideological orientations.

to the emotions. *Complete populism, excluding populism/anti elitist populism* and *empty populism*<sup>9</sup> are the three types of populism applied in the political discourse that works not only on behalf of the adherents but also to exclude the opponents. It is worth noting down that the political discourse that figures out a huge change from that traditional bureaucratic paradigm can also be evaluated as an output of populism that shows at least one of types above-mentioned.

The translation of the Ottoman past to integrate with the global order stems from the idea that Turkey, being the heir of Ottoman legacy, has geography of emotional ties<sup>10</sup> with the former Ottoman lands. The pax-Ottoman idea behind this vision assumes integration with the global, and incrementally challenging the established institutions of the global order. The self-representation of Justice and Development Party as the heir of the Ottoman ideational world is legitimized through the reformulation of the Turkish foreign policy (TFP) in regards to past Ottoman lands.<sup>11</sup> Hence the TFP rejecting to delineate its security through Middle East is transformed into the idea that it is only possible for Turkey to be the order-establisher country in the region if Turkey becomes a complete part of it.

Finally, I argue that the political discourse on the grand legacy of history is translated into political action which can be observed in the political, social and

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<sup>9</sup> See: Aalberg, Toril, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2017. "Comprehending Populist Political Communication". In **Populist Political Communication in Europe**, ed. Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck and Claes H. de Vreese, 3–11. New York: Routledge. Also see the full edited book: Aalberg, Toril, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2017. **Populist Political Communication in Europe**. New York: Routledge

<sup>10</sup> Emotional Geography (Spiritual Borders/Borders of Heart) (*Gönül Coğrafyası*) is the term introduced and used by Davutoğlu and Erdoğan referring to Skopje, Sarajevo in Balkans, Central Asia, Somalia and Tunisia in Africa, Palestine, Gaza and Iraq in the Middle East as the geography that Turkey's historical ties (Ottoman legacy) create geography of sentimental ties. In both the balcony speech on 7<sup>th</sup> June 2015 and 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2011, the same line of argument and reference to "emotional geography" can be observed in the Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's speeches respectively after election victories in the form of greetings to the prayers for the success of Justice and Development Party in the elections. Further analysis of the function of these speeches and the political action in harmony with the rhetorical action is the subject to be analyzed in the further chapters.

<sup>11</sup> Sabri Sayari, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s." **Journal of Palestine Studies** 26.3 (1997): 44. Web. Sayari refers to the Turkish foreign policy during the cold war period as "low profile" and as "discreet disengagement from its Middle Eastern environment". Ibid. Trying to make a clear distinction and the change in TFP with respect to the Middle East, Sayari underlines that "during cold war... Turkey avoided involvement in inter-Arab disputes, the Arab-Isreali conflict, and other regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War". Ibid.

cultural realms. The self-representation as the heir of grand past heritage creates an image that the political action is geared towards bringing the Golden Era of the Ottoman Empire back. Even if the political action does not fruit as expected, the failure to meet the expectations is covered through the continuous discursive claims to bring the golden days back.

The thesis is to posit that the discourse and the decision-making processes do not always correspond with what is expected from a neo-Ottomanist ideological underpinning. The thesis does not assert such an argument that the rhetor / discourse / decision-making processes are nourished by a single ideology. It rather posits that the use of ideology is issue-based. It is out of question that the issue-based use of such an ideology is not exempt from rationality, rational selection of issues to be nourished by the ideology / to nourish the ideology. The ideology may either be used to assist the *raison d'état* or to address the expectations of the masses through a projection of the glorious past to the future vision to which access is attributed as an ideal aspiration. Regarding the issue-based nature of the discourse, it could also be argued that when it comes to the protection of the national interest, *raison d'état* constitutes ideological axis upon which the political decisions and political discourse depend. The commonality of the political discourse can be questioned through reasoning: (a) What is the issue that is the case? (b) For whom the political discourse and political action is to be taken? This thesis does not take the ideology as a rigid / fixed category that forms the anchor of the study since the ideology is proliferated in different contexts such as issue-based, social groups-based and time-based forms. The thesis can also be read as a full-fledged strategical use of an ideology in order to make the unacceptable acceptable for the masses. The unacceptable policies forced by the rationale mechanism / *raison d'état* are transformed into acceptable forms and presented to the favor of the masses whose consent is gained through the grand legacy of history and the discursive address to the sense of longing for resurrecting the glorious grandfather. The study is based upon the basic knowledge that none of the theories of IR claims that the praxis of the state can be totally exempt from the self-help system in which it is the national interests that each state seeks. It is also not based upon the idea that each state completely seeks the national interest acting within the pure realist paradigm of utility maximization. The thesis is not interested

in whether the discourse is an extension of political objective to appeal to the emotions of the masses or truly reflecting the aspirational ideal of the leader. The thesis, trying to preserve an objectivizing distance, posits that whether the discourse is formed as a means of appealing to the masses, or depicting the aspirational ideal, none of those cases are exempt from the self-help system. The prominent aspect that the study is interested in is the scrutiny of probable gap between the rhetoric and reality. The gap can also be re-conceptualized as the gap between values and political action. Rhetoric reflecting the value of the rhetor encounters the constraints of the real world. The encounter may result in an inevitable reformulation of the values and normative discourse in the real world in different forms. On the one hand, the study posits the one-to-one translation of the discourse to the political action; on the other hand, it posits the reformulation of the values whose nucleus can be found in the discourse while being translated into political action since the outer world is of a transforming medium. The outer world is of two-pronged aspects. Considering the nature of the rhetoric, the outer world is generally reflected as a dependent variable that can be changed through the translation of the discourse into action. However, while translating the rhetoric / values to the action, both of the variables are independent variables, interacting with each other, transforming the translation of the values in a particular way rather than the other. None of IR theories claim the pure utility-maximization as the single mechanism behind the actions of the states. The study is penned regarding the involvement of both interests and values as the fundamental mechanisms fueling the actions of the states.

The constructed neo-Ottomanist discourse signifies re-instituting the Ottoman social and political model in the modern forms. A brief scrutiny on the new principles of TFP claimed to “project its sense of identity and history to its regional and global engagements” reflects the fragment of the emotional geography of the New Turkey.<sup>12</sup> The readmission of the pax-Ottoman lands into the Turkish foreign policy as the territories of emotional geography is represented as the base upon which the New Turkey is nourished in social, political and cultural aspects.

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<sup>12</sup> İbrahim Kalın. “Turkish foreign policy: Frameworks, values, and mechanisms”, **Sage Publications**, 2012, p. 8.

The neo-Ottomanist discourse obviously reflects the beliefs, norms, ideational world however it goes beyond the abstract and intangible aspect. This study is going to trace the solidification of the abstract discourse. A substantial change in harmony with the neo-Ottomanist discourse in Turkey has been taking place in regards to foreign-policy (1) and domestic policy; however the anchor of the study is case-dependency that figures out the type of political discourse and policy for each case. The cases are going to be analyzed in three different categories as in what follows: I. (a) Presidential System of Government, (b) The Issue of “*Mon chers*”, II) (a) Syrian Refugees, (b) Commemoration of the Victory of Malazgirt, (c) The Execution of the Bangladeshi Islamist Leader Motiur Rehman Nizami, (d) Ottoman Language Teaching, (e) Kut-Al-Amara Victory Commemoration, (f) the Conquest Celebration (The Conquest of Istanbul). III) (a) The Lausanne Treaty, (b) the Uyghur Turks in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, (c) Military Operations and the Presence in the Region, (d) Turkey-Israel Relations, (e) The Ottoman Military Barracks, (f) Taksim Mosque and Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim, (g) Al-Quds Question and Relations with Israel. The political discourse of these and closely related cases are going to be analyzed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and three different types of political discourse and policy relationship is going to be hypothesized in Chapter 4.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Debates on discursive evolution of the grand legacy of the past reproduced in the modern times comes out with the arguments of neo-Ottomanism that flourished when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, made his well-known statement at the World Economic Forum in Davos, addressing to Simon Peres, the 9<sup>th</sup> President of Israel: “when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill”. It was almost the first time that a Turkish Prime Minister acted as “the barometer of world public opinion.”<sup>13</sup> The reaction also raised the image in Turkish media that Turkey is in the process of “bethinking that it is Ottoman.”<sup>14</sup> The first attribution to the event was the representation of Erdoğan as the voice of the silenced nations.<sup>15</sup> However, some critics claimed that the statement was an imprint of Erdoğan’s pragmatism rather than his Islamic orientation. The statement was also evaluated as a fictitious plan (not spontaneous) to derive benefit from the Islamic populism before the upcoming local elections.<sup>16</sup> When Mavi Marmara, a humanitarian aid ship set off to break the maritime embargo on Gaza, was attacked by the Israeli military operation, Turkey asked for apology, compensation for 10 victims of the attack and easing of the maritime embargo on Gaza.<sup>17</sup> The event resulted in severing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel. Underlining the criticisms made to the Turkish government for making swift changes in foreign policy, Oran maintains that “it should not be forgotten that claims of an axis change owe a lot to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s harsh policy against

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<sup>13</sup> Ali Bayramoğlu, “Bir Başbakan, bir lider, bir duruş...,” **Yeni Şafak**, 31 January 2009. Bayramoğlu gives reference to a commentary made in NET, a Greek television channel. The most striking reaction was: “Erdoğan said something that most people in the world would like to”.

<sup>14</sup> Engin Ardiç, “Türkiye Osmanlı olduğunu hatırlıyor,” **Sabah**, 31 January 2009.

<sup>15</sup> The claim for being the voice of the silenced, and helping hand to the helpless people is prevalent in Erdoğan’s discourse: a Twitter post on January 18, 2015, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (@RT\_Erdoğan) wrote: “It is an honour for us to be relatives and friends to the ones without relatives or friends”. (*Kimsesizlerin kimi olmak bizim için şereftir*). Available at: [https://twitter.com/rt\\_Erdoğan/status/568137117861326848](https://twitter.com/rt_Erdoğan/status/568137117861326848)

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Prof. Dr. Nevzat Yalçıntaş, “One Minute Kurguydu,” **Radikal**, 20 July 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye-İsrail Siyasi İlişkileri (Turkey-Israel Relations)”. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-israel-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa> [May 25, 2016].

Israel.”<sup>18</sup> It raised questions on the practicality of the neo-Ottomanist ideas in Turkish foreign policy, and many critics still viewed this discourse as a dream manipulated pragmatically to agitate the sentimental tendencies of Muslim people towards the Golden Era, Ottoman past. When “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Turkish premier R. Tayyip Erdoğan on Friday to apologize for a raid by Israeli marines that killed nine Turkish activists”<sup>19</sup>, the representation of Turkey as the order-establisher state in the Middle East revived in Turkish media.<sup>20</sup>

Neo-Ottomanism envisions Turkey as a global power which is realized through revitalization of multilateral and bilateral relations with the countries once under the legal and political rule of the Ottoman Empire. It also refers back to an Ottoman social structure, a *millet* system.<sup>21</sup> Baskın Oran provides an in-depth analysis of neo-Ottomanism as a formula, in a nutshell, “reconciliation with the history of its own.”<sup>22</sup> Oran draws our attention to the views of the ones depreciating the Atatürkist foreign policy with strong and statusquoist ties to the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) due to the restrictive nature of the foreign policy practices<sup>23</sup>. Neo-

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<sup>18</sup> Baskın Oran, “Preface: A Proactive Policy with many Hunches on the Back,” in K. Öktem, A. Kadioğlu, M. Karlı, (eds.), **Another Empire ? A Decade of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party**, 2012, p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Martijn Beekman, “Israel's Netanyahu apologizes to Turkey over deadly flotilla raid.” **NBC News**, 22 March 2013. Available at: [http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/\\_news/2013/03/22/17416275-israels-netanyahu-apologizes-to-turkey-over-deadly-flotilla-raid?lite](http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/22/17416275-israels-netanyahu-apologizes-to-turkey-over-deadly-flotilla-raid?lite) [May 25, 2016].

<sup>20</sup> See İbrahim Karagül, “Forcing Israel to Apologize.. (*İsrail'e Özür Dilemek..*)”, **Yeni Şafak**, 23 Mar. 2013: 8.Print. Karagül, following the same line of argument, emphasizes “the change in the order which is the product of one century long plans”.

<sup>21</sup> Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, and Yosmaoglu İpek K, in the analysis of the ‘the millet system’, reformulated and presented as solution to today’s social problems, accentuated that: “The ‘millet system’ has served as a reliable framework for understanding the Ottoman political and social order without much concern for historicizing its definition. Despite the anachronism inherent in such unqualified use of the term, the ‘millet system’ endures in official histories of Middle Eastern and Balkan states as well as reference works on the Ottoman Empire. The ‘millet system’s’ appeal is due to a variety of reasons, the principal among which is its simplification of a relentlessly complex pile of historical facts into a manageable schema. Equally important is how the millet paradigm can also be presented as a lid that facilitated the preservation of a nation’s core elements throughout the ‘dark ages’ of Ottoman rule. Finally, and most relevant for the subject matter of this article, is the convenience it affords to participants and observers of post-Ottoman conflicts in attributing at least part of the blame to Ottoman peculiarities.” Yılmaz, “Fighting the Spectres of the Past” p. 682

<sup>22</sup> Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası Cilt II: 1980-2001**. İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul (2001). p. 514

<sup>23</sup> Ibid..

Ottomanism involves Islamic civilization, an identity emancipating itself from ethnocentrism, universal values of human rights, legitimacy of international institutions and the basic principles of the free-market. As noted by Çolak “neo-Ottomanists rejected the ethnic version of Turkish nationalism and reinterpreted Turkish identity on the basis of regional and religious grounds and cosmopolitan liberal values.”<sup>24</sup> The studies on neo-Ottomanism in Turkish political life does not take account of it as the subject of foreign policy and nor do they analyze how the rhetorical action is transformed into political action<sup>25</sup>.

The seeds of the debates on neo-Ottomanism first broke out during the rule of the Motherland Party. The last decade of the Cold War witnessed United States-Soviet relations at its worst when Gorbachev came to power. ‘Star Wars’ based upon developing technology and placing into space as an element of ‘strategic defense initiative’ were the steps against any enemy missile. Turkey, being aware of losing its geostrategic significance and balancing power during the climax years of Cold War, encountered with an unfolded neighborhood. US-Turkey relations came out of its Cold War context. Though the Kurdish conflict and the human rights violations in the southeastern of Turkey were still the areas of clash between US-Turkey, Turkey was perceived as a model for its neighborhood and as a remedy for instability in Caucasus and Balkans.

The Prime Minister and then President H. Turgut Özal, was a predominant leader in the presidency who surpassed the military-civil bureaucratic tutelage over the democratically elected government. Surpassing the military establishment during the policy-making processes signified a transformation from military as the guarantee of the regime to civil society and civil rule / popularly elected government

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<sup>24</sup> Yilmaz Çolak. "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey." **Middle Eastern Studies** 42.4 (2006): p.593.

<sup>25</sup> For the social vision of neo-Ottomanism, see Yilmaz Çolak. "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory", also see Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. "Türk or Türkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey's Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism." **Middle Eastern Studies** 43.3 (2007): 423-38, also see Fisher Onar, Nora. "Echoes of a universalism lost: Rival representations of the Ottomans in today's Turkey." **Middle Eastern Studies** 45.2 (2009): 229-241. Also see Aksan, Virginia H. "Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change." **International Journal**, 61.1 (2005): 19-38

as the guarantee of the democratic regime. Economic pragmatism and personalized foreign policy are the two terms characterizing Özal period. Personalized foreign policy allows for ‘bold moves’ which means circumvention of the foreign policy which is a product of years’ deliberation. Özal focused on regional cooperation prioritizing the economic means. Economic integration was considered as remedy for the regional conflicts which would lead to political cooperation due to the spill-over effect. The foreign policy was totally non-ideological equipped with the implicit use of the rhetoric of utilitarianism with an emphasis on the common history with the Middle East, natural affinities with the newly arising Turkic States, and assuming the political and military responsibilities of Euro-Atlantic ties. Özal believed that the guarantee for Turkey to increase the value of its assets as a regional power is possible through re-engagement primarily with European countries, the Middle East and new independent (new markets of) Turkic states in Central Asia by means of commerce and trade. Table 1<sup>26</sup> points to the burgeoning interest in engagement through trade.

Foreign trade by years, 1923-2015

(Thousand \$)

Yıllar Years	Exports		Imports		Balance of foreign trade	Volume of foreign trade	Proportion of imports covered by exports (%)
	Value	Change (%)	Value	Change (%)			
1983	5 727 834	-0,3	9 235 002	4,4	-3 507 168	14 962 836	62,0
1984	7 133 604	24,5	10 757 032	16,5	-3 623 429	17 890 636	66,3
1985	7 958 010	11,6	11 343 376	5,5	-3 385 367	19 301 386	70,2
1986	7 456 726	-6,3	11 104 771	-2,1	-3 648 046	18 561 497	67,1
1987	10 190 049	36,7	14 157 807	27,5	-3 967 757	24 347 856	72,0
1988	11 662 024	14,4	14 335 398	1,3	-2 673 374	25 997 422	81,4
1989	11 624 692	-0,3	15 792 143	10,2	-4 167 451	27 416 835	73,6
1990	12 959 288	11,5	22 302 126	41,2	-9 342 838	35 261 413	58,1
1991	13 593 462	4,9	21 047 014	-5,6	-7 453 552	34 640 476	64,6
1992	14 714 629	8,2	22 871 055	8,7	-8 156 426	37 585 684	64,3
1993	15 345 067	4,3	29 428 370	28,7	-14 083 303	44 773 436	52,1

TÜİK, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, Nisan 2016

TurkStat, Foreign Trade Statistics, April 2016

\* Data for 2015 is provisional.

The perception of military as the guarantee for Turkey to be a valued friend of the Western Alliance is replaced with the idea of “trading state”<sup>27</sup> guaranteeing the increase in the sphere of influence on the hinterland. Military establishment is of a

<sup>26</sup> Turkstat, Foreign Trade Statistics. Available at: [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt\\_id=1046](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046), [11 June 2016]

<sup>27</sup> Kirişçi illustrates the burgeoning significance of trade and economics as the signifiers giving shape to Turkish foreign policy. Kemal Kirişçi, "The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009) pp. 29-56.

historical legacy to have a say in Turkish politics and this legitimacy stems from the founding father's words. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk identified the military as the guardian of the new Republic:

“...the Turkish nation has...always looked to the military...as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals...When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country. ...The Turkish nation...considers its army the guardian of its ideals.”<sup>28</sup>

Military establishment of the Kemalist Regime represents itself as the guardian of the Republic however the idea of guardianship has also much to do with Sèvres syndrome.<sup>29</sup>

Özal had burgeoning interest in the Ottoman past, the idea of belonging in the Ottoman *millet* system as a way of overcoming the Sèvres syndrome and emancipating from the Kemalist paradigm of nation, and upon which the principles of foreign policy making are reformulated prioritizing integration. Sèvres syndrome provided an incurring domain of legitimization for military establishment as a purposive psychological instrument to preserve its role in the economic and social domains of Turkey. Starting from the Özal era, to Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, one can witness discursive references “to the past invoking a particular reading of history in order to legitimize their vision of political, economic, and social order.”<sup>30</sup> The neo-Ottomanist discourse is a challenge to the (so far) dominant policies of Kemalist establishment giving shape to the political and social spheres in Turkey. It is also a means of the struggle against the Kemalist establishment depending on a rupture with the Ottoman past which is still perceived as the reason of failure to create a

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<sup>28</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Speeches and Statements of Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1952), p. 226, as quoted in George S. Harris. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *The Middle East Journal*, 19 (Winter-Spring 1%5), 56n

<sup>29</sup> In this vein, Yilmaz, Şuhnaz, and Yosmaoglu İpek K. highlights the Sevres syndrome of the Turkish elites: “As a part of the Ottoman legacy, Turkey also inherited what might be called 'the Sèvres syndrome' reflecting a deep distrust also towards the intentions of the European states and a belief in possible conspiracies to dismantle the Turkish Republic.” Yilmaz, “Fighting the Spectres of the Past,” p. 689.

<sup>30</sup> Onar, "Echoes of a universalism lost," p. 229

common memory in terms of the social order, sense of belonging, and citizenship rights.<sup>31</sup> A trajectory to the past which constitutes appropriation of the Ottoman social order was tendered as a projection for formulating a “New Turkey”. In this vision, there is no emphasis on ethnicity, the ‘imagined community’ of the Kemalist ideology or first class citizenship for a particular ethnic identity. The dynamics of foreign policy in neo-Ottomanist paradigm is based upon multi-vocal societal dynamics and “increasingly determined by societal demands in the years to come.”<sup>32</sup>

The basic premise of neo-Ottomanism is that the Kemalist regime has failed to form a social and international order, but created rather unresolved social and international problems in regard to minorities, the Kurdish question, and Turkey’s poor relations with the Middle East<sup>33</sup>. Hence, neo-Ottomanist discourse sees the matter in the light of reformulated past and brings the idea on the table that “resolving some of Turkey’s contemporary cultural psychological problems (that) require reconciliation with the Ottoman past.”<sup>34</sup> It is also evident that neo-Ottomanist foreign policy requires continuous involvement in the issues connected to the *Pax-Ottomana* lands and an “ambitious drive” in foreign policy making.<sup>35</sup> Neo-Ottomanism, whose social and international premises are explained in detail (but

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<sup>31</sup> For further analysis of the rupture with the Ottoman past after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Yilmaz, Şuhnaz, and Yosmaoglu İpek K. stresses: “There was an ideological shift to a secular republic in the formative years of the Turkish Republic under Kemalist principles. In creating a new identity within the framework of a nation state, there was a strong attempt towards establishing a sharp break with the Ottoman past. Hence by emphasizing a non-adventurist and pacific line of foreign policy, Kemal Ataturk aimed to replace Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism by republicanism, territorial nationalism, and secularism. Despite significant aspects of continuity, there was a frontal assault on the political symbols and institutions of the Ottoman Empire.” Yilmaz, “Fighting the Spectres of the Past,” p. 688.

<sup>32</sup> Bülent Aras. “Turkish Foreign Policy And Jerusalem: Toward A Societal Construction of Foreign Policy.” **Arab Studies Quarterly** 22.4 (2000): p. 41.

<sup>33</sup> Western-orientation is a sacred principle in Turkish foreign policy since the elites did not want to identify Turkey’s security through the Middle East characterized as undemocratic, hot-boiling region and unstable. The words of Ataturk cited by Kılıç: “...We, Turks have always and consistently moved towards West...In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative.” Illustrates how TFP derives legitimacy from the founder father’s words in Western-orientation policy. Kılıç, Altemur. **Turkey and the world**, Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959. p. 49.

<sup>34</sup> Aksan, “Ottoman to Turk: Continuity,” p. 34

<sup>35</sup> Taspinar, Ömer. “The Old Turks’ Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy.” **Foreign Affairs** 86.6 (2007): p.114.

ironically rejected by Davutoğlu and Erdoğan as a tool for domestic and foreign policy making) “serves as a model for a new-generation of Turks from the Anatolian heartland who want to combine their geo-historical heritage with the Turko-Islamic confluence to restore their ties to Arab world and the wider Islamic East.”<sup>36</sup> Neo-Ottomanist discourse reveals a more embracing societal vision, an antidote to the nation-state paradigm, an attempt to transfer the Ottoman past to the projected image of the future of the Turkish Republic and “revive the long tradition (*qadim*) in a global way.”<sup>37</sup> The societal dimension of neo-Ottomanism is pragmatically used as a form of degrading the Kemalist imagined nation of Turkish Republic and representing its defenders as not at peace with the values or norms of Turkish society.

There is a large volume of published study of social scientists reviewing neo-Ottomanism in regards to its reflections on the TFP. There is a consensus among political scientists that neo-Ottomanism is of potential to be grasped as a modern form of imperialist agenda if the case is more than strengthening the ties with the countries established on the past Ottoman lands.<sup>38</sup> None of the scholars interviewed in these two volumes, Kemal Kirişçi, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Çağrı Erhan, Beril Dedeoğlu, Tayyar Arı, Faruk Sönmezoglu, Ersel Aydınlı, Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Meltem Müftüler Baç, Murat Karayalçın, İbrahim S. Canbolat, Kamer Kasım, and others, focus on the significations of neo-Ottomanism that is revealed in the discourse of the leaders, since, almost all of them, take it for granted that neo-Ottomanism is an agenda to direct the TFP with an emphasis on the negative impression potential that it may revoke the carefully elaborated design of the TFP.

In her detailed survey on the reflections of the intercultural perceptions and intercultural representations, Tekin<sup>39</sup> was able to show the discursive othering in the

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<sup>36</sup> Nawfal, Michel, and Cengiz Çandar. "Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu." **Journal of Palestine Studies** 42.3 (2013): p. 93.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>38</sup> Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadir Dinçer, and Mehmet Yegin. **Mülakatlarla Türk dış politikası**. Vol. 1. USAK Books, 2009.

<sup>39</sup> Beyza Ç. Tekin. **Representations and othering in discourse: The construction of Turkey in the EU context**. Vol. 39. John Benjamins Publishing, 2010.

construction of Turkey in the mind-set of the political / social actors in European Union (EU). The study provides an in-depth analysis of the intercultural perceptions focusing on the discursive representations / views of the European political / social actors on Turkey, and the constituents / background mechanism behind those representations and views show relevance to the discursive representations produced by the political / social actors in Turkey. The study is helpful to show the interdiscursivity, in other words, the discourse of the Turkish political / social actors cannot be thought exempt from the views of political / social actors of the EU received in the form of fabricated attributions.

In his useful examination of the Turkish case with regard to the relationship between political discourse and political hegemony, Küçükalı<sup>40</sup> selects thirteen governmental speeches given by the cadres of the government and focuses on the question how the various discursive strategies are employed to establish the political hegemony vis a vis the opponents. However this study used the speeches of the various political actors. The use of the speeches of various ministers and the prime minister seems to present an unsatisfactory exposition with respect to the question how discursive hegemony is, in evolution, established. The existing accounts fail to resolve the question how the discursive hegemony is established in an evolutionary form in parallel with time since the change in the tone of the discourse may just be personal political perspectives of different ministers who took offices in different periods. Due to the frequent change of offices and ministers and even the name of the ministries in Turkey, it is unclear whether these positions still persist. The study might have been more useful and convincing if the author had considered focusing on the evolution of the discourse of a single political actor with respect to constructing a hegemon status for the discourse and the self. Küçükalı also benefits from the discursive strategies / fallacious arguments presented by Wodak's extensive study<sup>41</sup>. These terms of fallacious arguments used by the political actors to convince the masses are also among the tools in use for this study.

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<sup>40</sup> Can Küçükalı. **Discursive Strategies and Political Hegemony: The Turkish Case**. Vol. 64. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2015.

<sup>41</sup> Ruth Wodak. **The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual**, Springer, 2009. p. 44.

In his thorough investigation into the tendencies of Turkish conservatism, Aksakal concluded that Turkish conservatism is performed in coherence with the imagined key-figures, in other words, the key conservative intellectuals such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Cemil Meriç, and Yahya Kemal are the recipients of the discourse popularized by the imaginings of the rhetors. The process of extracting recipient for the political rhetoric forces the conservatives to expunge the negative biographic sketch from the representation of these intellectuals. The rhetor causes the audience to forget the negative traits of the biographies, otherwise, with the potential to undermine the standpoint / ideological camp of the rhetor.<sup>42</sup> In the study penned to be groundbreaking, intellectuals and the fathers of thought claimed to found the bases of the Turkish conservatism are represented as the conglomeration of the fabricated views of the ones claiming themselves to be conservative. It deciphers the problematic relationship between the fathers of thought and the ones attributing themselves to the fathers, and how that attribution process eliminates the traits that are of potential to undermine the premises of the ideology that provides an inaccurate portrayal of the father of thought. Few writers have been able to draw on structured research on the question of how the fabrication of the fathers of thought would produce the fabrication of the tenets of the ideology. The analyzed political discourse may not be exempt from the problematic potential discrepancy between the real biographies of the fathers of thought and the ones emulating to them. However, it is not among the aims of the study to depict the extent of discrepancy between the attributed and the attributer. The aim is to illustrate to what extent the social significations attributed to the figure address and assist to the deep-seated beliefs of the masses.

In his recent article, Uzer<sup>43</sup> stresses the burgeoning effect of the Islamic and Ottoman discourses in Turkish political life and figures out the tactical swifts in political rhetoric ranging from Ottoman to neo-Kemalist discourse. However, Uzer

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<sup>42</sup> Hasan Aksakal. **Türk Muhafazakârlığı: Terennüm, Tereddüt, Tahakküm**, İstanbul, ALFA Yayınları, 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Umut Uzer. "Glorification of the Past as a Political Tool: Ottoman history in contemporary Turkish politics." **The Journal of the Middle East and Africa**, 1-19. (2018)  
doi:10.1080/21520844.2018.1539063

falls short of hypothetizing the background for reconstructing a new discourse, as the political discourse firstly deconstructs what had been dominant and fails to figure out the relationship between political discourse and policy.

The various views on neo-Ottomanism depend on different and extensive studies and perspectives carried out only on the imaginary aspect of the phenomenon, focusing on the motivations and factors of neo-Ottomanism merely as a source of inspiration, not far-reaching beyond the political actions that have occurred, not going beyond the discourse. It might be problematic to seek generalizability of much published research on this issue since it entails different aspects of Ottomanism, however the ones focusing on the discursive neo-Ottomanism do not seek the organic relationship between the discourse and the political action. In other words, gap in the literature is that though there are many different analysis of the reflection of the ideational world on the discourse, there are fairly limited number of researches up to now that have been, by nature, descriptive of the translation of the discourse to the political action.

The last but the most significant aspect of this study is the use of the term: neo-Ottomanism. The term is going to be used in an emancipated form from time-subject-context based limits. It is worth taking the note that the term is, in fact, a generic term symbolizing adoration (whether purported or not) to the past that is the reminder of the glories and golden days not only in the Ottoman history but also the Seljukian. It is used as a generic term since it, in more than many cases, refers to the grand legacy of history in which not only the glories but also the defeats are imprinted in the collective memory from which certain remedies are retrieved for the present malaises.

Almost none of these studies position the political discourse as a narration / story in continuous struggle against the dominant discourse, the evolution of the narration and burgeoning capacity of the narration in dominance, solidification of the political discourse into vision and, eventually but most significantly, the reformulation of the discourse into policy. Recent developments in the Turkish political life has enhanced the need for an analysis not only between the ideational world of the rhetor and discourse, but also the discourse and political action that is of public visibility, tangible results and extensional political matters of fact.

# CHAPTER 1

## 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

### 1.1. Theoretical Background for the Analysis of the Political Discourse

This study is aimed to demystify the strategies through which the relationship between the discursive and political action is produced. The classical rhetoric reveals three levels of oratory: “the judicial, the deliberative and epideictic.”<sup>1</sup> These levels, without any hierarchical and superior position attributed, present a useful comprehension for the analysis of the purposiveness imbued in the political discourse. The relationship between linguistics and what is defined as political is set through a division of the concept ‘political’ into three constitutive parts: polity, policy and politics.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of the study, entailing not only the discursive production but also the translation of the discourse to the political action, and its aim to reveal a more comprehensible ground for the students of the Turkish politics, requires the employment of an interdisciplinary approach. The main data of analysis is “the political discourse (that) is the discourse of politicians.”<sup>3</sup> Reisigl states policy and politics as an inextricable part of the same cluster, however draws a bold line between their functions:

“The dimensions of policy and politics both relate to political action, albeit in a different way. Policy concerns the content-related dimension of political action. It regards the formulation of political tasks, aims and programs in different fields of

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<sup>1</sup> H. A. Schild, "Beratungsrede." **Hist. Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Bd 1** (1992): 1142. and Plett, Heinrich F. **Einführung in die rhetorische Textanalyse**. Buske Verlag, 2001. Cited in Martin Reisigl. **11. Rhetoric of political speeches**. Vol. 4. Walter de Gruyter, 2008. p.244.

<sup>2</sup> Küçükali, **Discursive Strategies and Political Hegemony**, p.57.

<sup>3</sup> Teun A. Van Dijk, "Political discourse and ideology." **Paper for Jornadas del.-1999** (2002). p.20

policy, such as foreign policy, domestic affairs, social policy, cultural and educational policy, economic policy, family policy etc.”<sup>4</sup>

The foci of the study would reveal how, for instance, the policy strengthening the ties with the geographical, linguistic and political past would necessitate the introduction of the Ottoman Turkish language into the schedules of high-schools or increasing the number diplomatic missions in the countries that used to be under the legal and political rule of the Ottoman Empire. Another case would be the open-door policy adopted for the Syrian refugees and the discursive reconceptualization of the financial cost of Syrian refugees as a way of asserting the identity of grandsons of Ottomans shouldering the burden of the victims of the Syrian Civil War.

Another aspect of “*politics* concerns political processes, i.e. the question of how and with whose help politics are performed... Its main purpose is to assert oneself against political opponents, in order to make a specific policy possible.”<sup>5</sup> As far as the focus of the study concerns, the case would be the discursive reconstruction / rewriting of the political history. Positioning of the self is discursively achieved against the standpoints of the opponents and the discourse is in service of positioning the standpoints of the opponents as the main reason of the malaises of the present. One further example would be the discursive conflict between the main opposition and the incumbent party. On the one hand, the Syrian Civil War and Syria is contextualized as quagmire; on the other hand, the leaders of the incumbent party would call the area as the blessed, sacred and praised lands.<sup>6</sup> The clash of the labels

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<sup>4</sup> Martin Reisigl, **11. Rhetoric of political speeches**. Vol. 4. Walter de Gruyter, 2008. p.246.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> In that vein, Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that “As people in Gaza always say, all the aggrieved people are trusted to our protection by Allah, and Allah be my witness, we will protect these aggrieved people forever, we will never leave the cause of Philistine and Gazza alone. Some will claim that we need to be unbiased, and not be engaged in ‘the marshland’ of the Middle East, but we call Damascus Noble Damascus, and we call Mecca and Medina our Kaaba, Baghdad our brother, and Kirkuk the city of saints. The Middle East is not a marshland, but the land that established civilization with divine inspiration. It is the centre of Hira, Jerusalem, and Cairo. We won’t let the opponents call the Middle East a quagmire where the prophet’s divine inspiration took place. We will raise a novel torch of civilization from the Middle East, with the help of Allah”. Ortadoğu Bataklık Dedirtmeyiz. (2014, July 2014). **Aksam**. Retrieved May 01, 2015, from:<<http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/ortadoguya-bataklik-dedirtmeyiz/haber-326134>> Gazzelilerin bize söylediğ gibi bütün bu mazlumlar bize Allah’ın emanetidir ve Allah şahit olsun ki o mazlumlara sonuna kadar ezeli ve ebedi olarak sahip çıkacağız ve hiçbir yerde Filistin, Gazze davasını yalnız

as the reflections of the two distinct perceptions on the region brings about the clash of delegitimizing and legitimizing discourses; and the legitimization of the incumbent government is constructed through a discursive strategy nourished by the grand legacy of history.

The rhetorical self-positioning of the actors in the incumbent government in the form of self-attributing the identity of Ottoman grandsons legitimizes the probable policy preferences and leaves a room for the implementation of the discursive arguments. The identity of Ottoman grandsons is not utilized to portray the self but also to the masses in favor of most of the incumbent party's policy preferences. The attribution of the aforementioned identity to the masses strengthens the ground for policy-making, and increases the persuasiveness and credibility. The convinced masses are expected to support the policy preferences that are the run-products of the self-attributed identity of the actors, ironically, the consent of the masses stems from identity that is constituted by the discursive attributions by the actors to the grand legacy of history.

As to turning to the nature of the political discourse as the focus of the study concerns, borrowing the term “fields of action” cited from Heiko Girneth<sup>7</sup> re-conceptualizing Bourdieu's terminology “places of social forms of practice”<sup>8</sup>, Reisigl furthers the categories of political discourse into eight various fields:

“(1) the lawmaking procedure; (2) the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will; (3) the party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions and will; (4) the interparty formation of attitudes, opinions and will; (5) the organization of international and (especially) interstate relations; (6) political advertising; (7) the political executive and administration; and (8) the various forms of political control.”<sup>9</sup>

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bırakmayacağınız. Birileri tarafsız olalım diyecek belki, belki birileri Ortadoğu bataklığına bulaşmayalım diyecek ama biz o bataklık dedikleri Şam’ı, Şam-ı Şerif bilmışız, o bataklık dedikleri Ortadoğu’da ki Mekke’yi Medine’yi Kabe bilmışız, o bataklık dedikleri Ortadoğu’da ki Bağdat’ı kardeş bilmışız, o bataklık dedikleri Kerkük’ü aziz bilmışız, Ortadoğu bataklık değil, insanlığı ayağa kaldırın o aziz vahyin merkezidir, Hira’nın merkezidi, Beytül Dağı’dır, Kudüs’tür, Kahire’dir.

<sup>7</sup> Heiko Girneth. "Texte im politischen Diskurs. Ein Vorschlag zur diskursorientierten Beschreibung von Textsorten." **Muttersprache** 106 (1996): 66-80.

<sup>8</sup> Pierre Bourdieu. **Sozialer Raum und Klassen**. Leçon sur la leçon. Zwei Vorlesungen. Frankfurt/Main. p. 74.

<sup>9</sup> Reisigl, 11. **Rhetoric of political speeches**. p.246.

The study illustrates Turkish politics as a domain within which various mental models are competing to alternate the hegemon, to establish and maintain hegemon status over the other mind-modellings, i.e. a domain of legitimacy wars. The discourse of the politician is assumed to reflect the ideological underpinnings of the producer, and “in the production of the semantic representations of a discourse, a speaker includes propositions from her or his mental model”<sup>10</sup>. The competing mental models are the demonstrations of the conflicting ideologies. Each competing ideology is programmed to preserve the interests of the in-group that can be identified as the adherents of the ideology. In that vein, Van Dijk maintains that “ideologies are in part self-serving, and developed and applied in such a way that group members’ social cognitions and practices are geared towards the maintenance of overall group interests.”<sup>11</sup>

The study is run through various themes and contexts which require scope-based analysis of the discourse reflecting “cognitive representations and strategies involved during the production or comprehension of discourse.”<sup>12</sup> The scope-based design of the study is not intended to underline the context-baseness of the political discourse, since it goes beyond the context in which discourse is produced and reflects the aim to translate the past identities to construct the present national identity, deconstruction of the dominant ideology, replacement of an alternative ideology, reconstruction of the forgotten memories and assistance in translating the discourse to solid political action. The topics of the discourse may show correspondence with the socio-political contexts; however a context is strategically used to construct an overall mental model of the rhetor to be operationalized, established and dominant in cultural and socio-political spheres through different forms and visibilities to be discussed in the proceeding chapters.

The discourse constitutes the interplay of “contexts that are not ‘out there’, in ‘reality’, but personal mental constructs and interpretations of a communicative

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<sup>10</sup> Dijk, “Political discourse and ideology.” p.18

<sup>11</sup> Teun A. Van Dijk. "Social cognition and discourse." **Handbook of language and social psychology** (1990): p. 177.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.164.

event”<sup>13</sup>. Delanty & Rumford claim that the discourse is produced within a specific mode of expression, limits and constraints of the world in which competition among various understandings of the world is constant.<sup>14</sup> The significant catalyst behind the mentioned mechanism is the sources of culture such as worldviews, imagined realities (what imagination makes of reality), cultural models and the legitimacy of the past used by the social actors to legitimize and identify their present situations and positions.<sup>15</sup> Adapting from what Wendt writes: “It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize”<sup>16</sup> the rhetorical and political actions of the actors. The nature of the discourse is defined as a product of socio-cultural imaginaries, what is more, discourse, is a product of the socio-cultural imaginaries, at the same time, a tool for re-production, multiplication, and proliferation of the socio-cultural imaginaries. Castoriadis argues about the role of images and figures constituting the social imageries -what I would call socio-cultural imageries, socio-cultural self-imaginings meaning what socio-cultural imageries make of the reality, the reflection of the reality on the socio-cultural imageries:-

“compositions of images or figures can be in turn, and often are, themselves images and figures and thus also new supports for significations. The social imaginary is, primordially, the creation of significations and the creation of the images and figures that support these significations.”<sup>17</sup>

Castoriadis employs a further argument following the similar vein:

“A large part of the significations of a society - those that are, or can be made, explicit - are also instituted, directly or indirectly, through its language. At the same time, however, the ensemblization or the identity organization of the world

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<sup>13</sup> Dijk, “Political discourse and ideology.” p.18

<sup>14</sup> Gerard Delanty, and Chris Rumford. **Rethinking Europe: Social theory and the implications of Europeanization**. Routledge, 2005

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.16.0

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Wendt. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." **International organization** 46.2 1992, p.397.

<sup>17</sup> Cornelius Castoriadis. **The imaginary institution of society**. Mit Press, 1997. p.150

instituted by society occurs through legein (distinguishing – choosing – positing – assembling – counting - speaking).<sup>18</sup>

The study is not based upon the categorization of election speeches, ceremonial speeches, inauguration speeches and party group speeches that are basically called genres of political speeches since the foci of the study is how the model and the idea as run-product of the mind-model of the actor is formulated, re-contextualized in the present and functionally and strategically developed through cross-texts (recurring discourses), the speech channeled to a policy in various fields. The categorization in the study of the sub-genres of political speeches would hinder the chronological processing of the narrative. The cross-relatedness and the cross-references in the discourses produced by the rhetor in different sub-genres / domains appear to be the basic and major barriers against the categorization.

### **1.1.1. Othering to Institute the Self**

One of the significantly burgeoning motives of the political speeches is othering; and discursive dimension can be evaluated as follows: “opposed standpoints of the political Others are systematically attacked and those of the political in-group defended.”<sup>19</sup> Dijk furthers the argument reflecting the dynamics of incorporating the discursive strategy: “naming (the) group and treating them...as if they were single.”<sup>20</sup> Othering is a tool of identifying the existing or perceived differences from what one cannot be.<sup>21</sup> Discursive references to the otherness (to the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.151

<sup>19</sup> Teun A. Van Dijk. "What is political discourse analysis." **Belgian journal of linguistics** 11.1 (1997) , p. 29.

<sup>20</sup> Flood puts light on “ideological essentialism depending heavily on the linguistic and conceptual practice of naming groups and treating them or their surrogate institutions, associations, and cultures, as if they were single, transhistorical beings endowed with particular personalities, dispositions, moral qualities, beliefs and attitudes which can be known to the speaker/writer.” Christopher Flood. **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. Vol. 1433. Psychology Press, 2001, p.139.

<sup>21</sup> On the relationship between identity and difference, Seyla Benhabib posits that “since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and

attributions to which the referring social / political actor claims immunity) create a distinction between the rhetor and the referenced entity. The discursive attributions bring about a problematic that is of complicated nature. The attributed features are, in fact, a representation of how the referred is recognized by the referrer. In the words of Connolly: “My identity is what I am and how I am recognized rather than what I choose, want or consent to.”<sup>22</sup> The discursive attributions are not necessarily geared towards the kernel characteristics of the referred since the perceptions and recognitions of the rhetor play a crucial role in building up the core of the attributions.

These discursive attributions of the rhetor are both in service of mitigating the positive traits of the other, but also delineating the positive aspects of the self. It is, in a nutshell, a process of self-creation. The dynamic behind the creation of the self is dependent on the principle of relatedness, or principle of reciprocity. The self-creation through the existence of the other, through differentiation from the attributed characteristics of the other, cannot be achieved without the principle of relatedness. Difference is actualized through a relation to what one is not / cannot consider herself / himself to be. It is the connection between referred and referrer through which the self-actualization of the referrer is accomplished. Constructivists posit the forge of the identities in the form of what Smith writes “paired conflicts”<sup>23</sup> that is an inspiring term for dealing with the nature of the relationship.

The theme of othering in discourse may be present in an election (rally) speech, however, the rhetorical figures used in othering and positioning the Self, in other words, the terms, significations, connotations, metonyms and metaphors might be strategically developed in another speech that can be categorized under the category of inauguration speeches. The interrelatedness of the speeches produced in

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necessarily a politics of the creation and difference” Seyla Benhabib. **Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political**. Princeton University Press, 1996. p.3.

<sup>22</sup> William E. Connolly. **Identity, difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox**. U of Minnesota Press, 2002. p. 64.

<sup>23</sup> Smith gives a full-fledged picture of the nature of relation: “They are in fact often forged through opposition to the identities of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often demonstrates”. Anthony D. Smith. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)**, vol. 68, no. 1, 1992, p 75. [www.jstor.org/stable/2620461](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2620461).

various media presents a major barrier for processing the development of the discursive tools assisting the argument. The categorized study of the political discourse would impede the pursuit of the rhetorical development of a particular idea or policy preferences. In each discourse, one can observe the strategic development of the linguistic and discursive references to past, attributed qualities and character of the referred antagonists.

### **1.1.2. The Function of the Political Discourse**

The study based on the assumed competence of the discursive hegemony of identities deals with three basic steps: deconstruction, reconstruction, and policy. The discourse of deconstruction can be conceptualized, in a nutshell, as the deconstruction of the privileged and autonomous ideational institutions of the other camp, traditional bureaucratic paradigm represented as the cause of the malaises of the present, discrediting the aloofness towards the still common social imaginaries whose source is the deeds of the past. The motive of the deconstruction is the rhetor's deepening of the critical eye to the already institutionalized premises of the erstwhile dominant ideology.

Another motive of deconstruction is the rhetor's awareness that the hearers of the discourse tend to condemn the totality as the cause of the ills in the present. In a similar vein, the society sees a change in the totality as the single remedy for the problems of the present. The rhetor addresses to the hearers "who exhibit a strong propensity to hold collectives responsible"<sup>24</sup>, hastily generalizing a particular problem to the total of the milieu in which they live. The premises of the dominant ideology giving shape to the formal institutions are perceived as a "life in a stable community (that) needs to be jostled or shaken up."<sup>25</sup> The social / political actor "might seek to challenge, revise, reinterpret established practices because of the idea

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<sup>24</sup> Connolly. **The terms of political discourse.** p.193

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.180

that the quiescent atmosphere confines and oppresses the inhabitants.”<sup>26</sup> The term of ‘challenge’ corresponds with what is termed as ‘deconstruction’ in this study. The terms signifying verbal meanings such as ‘revise’, ‘reinterpret the established practices’ corresponds with what is termed as reconstruction in the thesis.

The reconstruction episode of the rhetor dresses him into what Henry Kariel calls “transactional mode” in other words, rhetors dress into the mode of the artist. As an exemplary for the transactional mode: “In the transactional mode, the artist will confront the present state of things - himself included - but not accept it as it appears to be, as complete, as having ended.”<sup>27</sup> The statusquo presents a challenge for the rhetor and it is the social and political institutions of the present that are perceived as the instigators of the malaises of present. In that vein Kariel highlights the state of the artist that can also be attributed to the state of the political / social actor: “He treats the present as ambiguous and proceeds to contradict it, violating what is so clearly the case.”<sup>28</sup><sup>29</sup> Reconstruction can be conceptualized as the discursive resurrection of the past identity, discursive alternation of the already autonomous discourse of the other camp, representing the resurrected identity pertaining to the past as a panacea for the malaises of the present, and transforming the beholders of the past to the grandsons and owners of the present through the social imaginaries and significations whose source is in the past. The discourse of reconstruction presents a profoundly discernible alternative through the re-visiting, re-considering and re-interpreting the source present in the history that can present a legitimate appeal to the masses. The common appeal to the history stems from the “shared understanding …and responsibility … deeply embedded in our language and relationships.”<sup>30</sup> The reconstruction phase is left with more rooms when nourished by

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.180

<sup>27</sup> Henry S. Kariel, "Neither Sticks Nor Stones." **Politics & Society** 3.2 (1973), p.189.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> In that vein, Davutoğlu makes a claim that represents how the cadres of the Justice and Development Party perceives the present: “The last century was a parenthesis for us. We will close this parenthesis.”. **Anadolu Ajansı**, (2013, 3 May), “Saraybosna’yı Şam’a Bağlayacağız” Available at: <http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/139145--kimsenin-topraginda-gozumuz-yok>

the habitat of shared conceptions and assisted with a discursive action lodged with the shared significations. Though the policy is a self-revealing term related to the executive and administrational decisions and implementations, the study is aimed to set a full-fledged relationship between discourse and policy, namely, how the discourse is translated into policy. A reformulated relationship between mental model-policy is figured out by Connolly: “This connection between conceptual revision and political change, once grasped, can deepen our understanding of the intimate relationship between thought and action.”<sup>31</sup> Though it goes unmentioned above, the interlocutory, deconstructive, and reconstructive role of the discourse and the role of discourse paving the way for legitimization and hegemony are going to be the foci of the study.

### **1.1.3. Tools of Discourse Analysis**

The study benefits from critical perspective, critical linguistics (CL) or critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a method for crystal-clear positioning of the complex relationships of “dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language”<sup>32</sup> and the discourse-historical approach (DHA). CDA has been a helpful instrument in decoding the strategies of othering, in other words, defining a group and the members / adherents of the group as the perceived enemy. The premises of discourse-historical approach are employed to bracket out “the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance.”<sup>33</sup> Language is posited as a means of “maintain(ing) power by the use powerful people make of it.”<sup>34</sup> Related to the nature and features of the discourse, Wodak posits that it is:

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<sup>30</sup> Connolly, **The Terms of Political Discourse**, p.195.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.180.

<sup>32</sup> Ruth Wodak, and Michael Meyer, eds. **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. SAGE, 2009. p.2

<sup>33</sup> Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak. “The discourse-historical approach (DHA).” **Methods of Critical Discourse Studies**. London: SAGE (2015): p.88.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.88.

“A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action, Socially constituted and socially constitutive, related to a macro-topic, linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view.”<sup>35</sup>

Clarifying the tools of analysis and conceptions of the DHA, there are five questions employed as a tool borrowed from Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl for the discourse analysis:

“(1) How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically? (2) What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena / events and processes? (3) What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? (4) From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? (5) Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated?”<sup>36</sup>

The focus of the study in the deconstruction and reconstruction sections is to demystify the relationship between the rhetor and the social / political actors. The competence for hegemony between the ideologies of the rhetor and the perceived and reflected representatives of the old-establishment is unraveled with the help of the above-mentioned tools.

The political discourse is replete of attributions: on the one hand the self is attributed with the positively perceived features; the fallacious position<sup>37</sup> of the opponents is highlighted. The political discourse to be studied is imbued with abstractions when it comes to the normative evaluations. The positively perceived normative evaluations are attributed as the properties pertaining to the self. The source of the political discourse is bound to the history. The discursive and inter-discursive references to the *kadim* tradition and normative values build up the main argument and source of assistance to the position of the rhetor. The deconstruction of the ideational constituents of the dominant ideology is the primary goal of the

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p.89.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>37</sup> Categorized as false in regards to the perspective of the rhetor.

discourse. The mental model of the rhetor channeled to the discourse entails “*proposals* for revision in some dimensions of (the rhetor’s) concepts carrying similar import for political practice.”<sup>38</sup>

As mentioned in the preceding pages, the main objective of the thesis is to deepen the understanding of the relationship between mental-model, discursive production and policy. Defining the deficits of the system he / she is born into, the rhetor strategically takes the role of an error diagnostics. That role is an attempt to indicate the fallacious, unfounded and artificial premises of the dominant ideology. It is worth noting down that the attributed characteristics / adjectives (fallacious – unfounded - artificial) are the pointers for the perspective of the rhetor. The study employs theme-based scope. That method of the study helps to trace how the recurring topic / phrase / theme in respective speeches are intensified and how the positive characteristics of the dominant ideology are mitigated. The discursive process of reconstruction also reveals how an overtly expressed idea is intensified: a) emancipated from abstraction, b) white-clear discursive deliberation c) translated into action. The ideational world of the rhetor is 1) to expunge the Turkish nation and Turkish state from the perceived ‘fallacious’, ‘unfounded’ and ‘artificial’ components of the dominant ideology 2) to reconstruct a ‘novel’ ideology fulfilling the need to inspire from the history.

The word, action, refers to the political action / policy, in other words, refers to the product of the translation of the discourse, though discourse is also a product of the *praxis*. “Actions and practices are constituted in part by the concepts and beliefs the participants themselves have.”<sup>39</sup> Adapting the idea of Connolly to the study, it is not only the beliefs and concepts that give shape to the practice (discourse production), it is also the beliefs and concepts that the masses have that structures the *praxis* in the pre-production phase. Even though the rhetor is the enactor of the political discourse, it is the beliefs and concepts of the hearer that is the architect. It is not only the rhetor that channels his / her ideological underpinnings, beliefs and attitudes to the style of the discursive production but also the hearers’ needs, interests

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<sup>38</sup> Connolly, **The Terms of Political Discourse**, p.180.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p.36

and hunger for greatness that carves the decoration of the speech with the columns, motifs and domes.

Wodak posits the discursive strategies that can be determined as the anchors of the analysis:

“(a) referential/nomination functioning to construct in-groups and out-groups, (b) predication to label the social/political actors either in an appreciative way or deprecatorily, (c) argumentation to justify the positive attributions of the self, negative attributions of the politically out-groups, discredit the negative attributions to the self by the out-group, and positive self-attributions of the out-groups, (d) perspectivization for an opaque depiction of the position of the rhetor, (e) intensification / mitigation deconstructing / changing the epistemological components of the dominant ideology.”<sup>40</sup>

In this study, these anchors are applied for the analysis of the political discourse, for instance when the notions of Ansar and Muhadjir are introduced by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the self-portrayal of the rhetor and discursively negative representation of the European social actors and the political opponents (Republican People’s Party) are going to be analyzed through the concepts of argumentation. The discursive strategy of argumentation includes various recurring / revolving themes / subjects that can be applied to any political discourse analysis. Ruth Wodak exemplifies some of the arguments used by the political / social actors for legitimization of further policies<sup>41</sup>:

**Topos of Burdening** - if an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it.

“As Turkey, since the first day of the crisis, we have stood with our Syrian brothers and kept our gates open to them, and so will we. We have put one extra plate on our tables for them. We currently accommodate 3 million Syrian and Iraqi refugees within an understanding of *Ansar* and neighborhood. And Allah is rewarding this sharing and solidarity with so much more.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>41</sup> All of the definitions are borrowed from: Wodak, **The Discourse of Politics in Action**, p. 44. Almost all of the samples are the samples to be analyzed in the proceeding chapters with the related context through which all the samples takes the rightful meaning.

**Topos of Reality** - tautologically infers that as reality is as it is a particular action should be performed.

“We won't do what a handful of looters have done. They burn and destroy ...They destroy the shops of civilians. They destroy the cars of civilians.”<sup>43</sup>

**Topos of Numbers** - if sufficient numerical / statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed.

“Nowadays, Turkey hosts 3 million refugees. Our expenditure for the refugees is over 20 billion dollars. 3 billion euros (was) promised by the EU to Turkey for the refugees [expenditure], however 179 million euros have been delivered so far. The overall support from the international community stalls at 455 million dollars.”<sup>44</sup>

**Topos of History** - because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation.

“What did they do to us in the history? They showed us the Sèvres in 1920 and then persuaded us to agree to the Lausanne in 1923. Afterwards, some have tried to pass off the Lausanne as a victory. All is obvious. And now you see the Aegean, don't you? We gave away at the Lausanne the islands that you could shout across to. Is that the victory? Those places used to belong to us. There are still our mosques and sanctuaries. However, we are still talking ‘What will the continental shelf be? What will it be in the air, or at the sea?’ We are still struggling for this. Why? Because of the ones that were at the table in Lausanne.”<sup>45</sup>

“The issue of the Presidential System of Government is not an outcome of any ordinary preference or any personal ambition. Hundreds of years' experience, grief

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<sup>42</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at 9<sup>th</sup> International Student Meeting”, İstanbul, 15 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43945/we-have-stood-with-our-syrian-brothers-since-the-first-day.html>

<sup>43</sup> “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dismisses Turkey protestors as vandals,” *The Guardian*, 9 June 2013, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-protesters-looters-vandals>

<sup>44</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at International Conference on Science and Technology”, Ankara, 03 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52484/burden-of-the-refugee-crisis-has-been-laid-on-a-few-countries.html>

<sup>45</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the 27th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex”, Ankara, 29 September 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52444/27th-mukhtars-meeting-at-the-presidential-complex.html>

and accumulation lie behind the Presidential System of Government. There is no need to look far away, Turkey's last quarter century alone lays bare the necessity for this change.”<sup>46</sup>

**Topos of Threat** - if specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about them.

“Where we will end up is the conditions of the Sèvres treaty if we happen to stop during this critical period when the world is being tried to be reshaped. Turkey is putting up its biggest struggle since the War of Independence.”<sup>47</sup>

**Topos of Urgency** - decisions or actions need to be drawn/found/done very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event beyond one's own reach and responsibility.

“This struggle of ours is not an ordinary struggle. We have 16 martyrs while nearly 200 DAESH members were killed there. We could no longer stand still in the face of those who pose a constant threat to our country and we are doing what should be done. Simultaneously with all these steps, we are also conducting diplomacy. We are holding talks with Russia, the U.S., Iran, Iraq, Gulf States, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. And only after all these steps has this operation been launched.”<sup>48</sup>

**Topos of Difference** - only indirectly expressed and presupposed disagreements and conflicts:

“Turkophobia is mounting. Islamophobia is mounting. They are even scared of migrants who take shelter. They are scared of everything that is not from there. They are hostile to everything that is not from there.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at a Mass Opening Ceremony in Malatya”, Malatya, 18 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/71075/cumhurbaskanligi-sisteminin-arkasinda-yuzlerce-yillik-birikim-var.html>

<sup>47</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Mass Inauguration Ceremony of the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs”, Ankara, 22 December 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/68472/turkey-is-putting-up-its-biggest-struggle-since-the-war-of-independence.html>

<sup>48</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Mass Inauguration Ceremony of the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs”, Ankara, 22 December 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/68472/turkey-is-putting-up-its-biggest-struggle-since-the-war-of-independence.html>

<sup>49</sup> “Europe will drown in its own fears: President Erdoğan,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, 15 March 2017, Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/europe-will-drown-in-its-own-fears-president-Erdogan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=110856&NewsCatID=510>

## **Topos of Comparison:**

“France massacred an estimated 15 percent of the Algerian population starting from 1945. This is genocide. If the French President Mr. Sarkozy does not know about this genocide, he can ask his father Pal Sarkozy... (who) had served in the French legion in Algeria in the 1940s, I am sure he has many things to tell his son about the French massacre in Algeria.”<sup>50</sup>

“Nowadays, Turkey hosts 3 million refugees. Our expenditure for the refugees is over 20 billion dollars. 3 billion euros (was) promised by the EU to Turkey for the refugees [expenditure], however 179 million euros have been delivered so far. The overall support from the international community stalls at 455 million dollars.”<sup>51</sup>

**Appeal to Emotions:** The politicians appropriate the concerned discursive strategy and the relationship between the self and the masses in a similar form: “As social actors, we evoke different types of emotions to legitimize our actions or words, and elicit a behavioral or mental response from our interlocutors.”<sup>52</sup>

“Turkey is bigger than Turkey. ...we cannot be confined to 780 thousand square kilometers because our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart. Our brothers in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hasakah, Aleppo, Homs, Misrata, Skopje, Crimea and the Caucasus might be outside our physical boundaries, but they are all inside the boundaries of our heart. They are in the middle of our heart.”<sup>53</sup>

“*Complete populism* (reference and appeals to the people, anti-elitism, and exclusion of out-groups, *excluding populism* (only references and appeals to

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<sup>50</sup> “Erdoğan accuses France for committing ‘genocide’ in Algeria,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, 23 December 2011, Available at: <http://www.hurriyedailynews.com/Erdoğan-accuses-france-of-committing-genocide-in-algeria.aspx?pageID=238&nID=9852&NewsCatID=338>

<sup>51</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at International Conference on Science and Technology”, Ankara, 03 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52484/burden-of-the-refugee-crisis-has-been-laid-on-a-few-countries.html>

<sup>52</sup> Antonio Reyes., "Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions." **Discourse & Society** 22.6 (2011): 788.

<sup>53</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Ceremony Held to Commemorate the 78th Anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Passing to Eternity”, Ankara, 10 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/58944/yuce-milletimizle-birlikte-engelleri-asacak-ve-muasir-medeniyetler-seviyesinin-ustune-cikacagiz.html>

the people and exclusion of out-groups)/*anti elitist populism* (reference and appeals to the people and anti-elitism) and *empty populism*<sup>54</sup> are the types of populism that the political discourse that is termed as avulsive political discourse is replete of the meanings appealing to the people.

**Hasty Generalization** - making generalizations about characteristics attributed to a group without any evidence.

“Whoever leaves out our last 200 years, even 600 years together with its victories and defeats, and jumps directly from old Turkish history to the Republic, is an enemy of our nation and state.”<sup>55</sup>

The assumed modus operandi between political discourse and policy, as it also applies to the scope of the thesis, is illustrated in what follows. The figure also indicates how the study is narrowed with respect to the political discourse nourished by the legacy of history and how the chronological narrative tracing method reveals the stages of deconstruction, reconstruction and policy. It is also given that the study does not differentiate between political discourse related to foreign policy or political discourse related to domestic policy. The analysis of the political discourse is based upon the idea that one particular political discourse in one particular field prompts the rhetor to transfer similar political discourse in another field for the sake of continuity and compatibility.

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<sup>54</sup> Aalberg, “Comprehending Populist Political Communication”. 3–11. Also see the full edited book: Toril Aalberg, **Populist Political Communication in Europe**.

<sup>55</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory”, Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>




Figure 1. 1. Hierarchical Illustration of the Modus Operandi in Discourse and Policy Relationship

## 1.2. The Nature of the Data Source

The primary source material of this thesis is the political discourses of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The source of data does not have a feature of exclusiveness and paucity. The thesis does not focus on the materials that are not open to the public when the speech is made / discourse is produced, since the thesis is based on the assumption that there is an inextricable relationship between the hearers and the rhetor. I therefore surveyed the whole open sources such as the official website of the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, the official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, the official website of Justice and Development Party, the official website of Turkish Grand National Assembly, newspapers, parliamentary speeches, rally speeches, election speeches, Mukhtars meeting at the Presidential Complex and well-known post-election (balcony) speeches.

The survey of the texts can be categorized in two levels. The first level is the search of the transcription of the speeches in Turkish. The second level is to find the official translation of the texts or the daily published newspapers in English whose

translation of the speeches is not declared to be untrue or false, in order to avoid any intermingling effect of the author's perspective fallacy during the author's own translation. It is evident that the language of the political discourse is Turkish. And the source material used here is mostly the official translation. The thesis acknowledges that the official translations are also the translations in which the meanings may be lost. In order to solve that problem, the author of the thesis, as a native of Turkish language, goes back to the original text in Turkish and checks the omissions if there is. If there is any omission in the English translation of the political discourse, the omission is foot noted. This study also acknowledges the fact that a political discourse related to foreign affairs also addresses to the emotions of the Turkish public. Some of the political discourses related to foreign affairs have even much more to do with appealing to the emotions of the Turkish public rather than addressing to the foreign correspondents. In such case, it has been observed that the official websites do not provide the translation, may omit some parts of a long speech or omit/tame the language/words that may harm the relations. In order to solve that kind of problem, the study resorts to the newspaper and official news agency translations. In both cases concerned, the study acknowledges that it is a caveat for the study to dwell on the English translations for the discourse analysis. As the author whose native language is Turkish, the best method was to watch and check the political discourse on online platforms in order to assess any distortion in the translation of the political discourse. The study resorts to author's translation when the official English translation is not available at the time when the research is conducted. There are only three texts translated by the author. If the translator is the author, additional footnote information is provided in order to explain the idioms peculiar to Turkish culture. The use of official translation also contributes to the objectivizing distance as the author's translations would hinder that aspect. Even the official translations of the text may not be self-revealing. The one, who is not accustomed to the history of Turkish political life and Ottoman Empire, may find it difficult to orient herself / himself to the text that may impede the full-comprehension. The study does have additional texts that are referenced or implied in the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches so as to provide a comprehensive understanding of the conglomeration of significations entailed in the discursive text.

The focus of the thesis is the speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; nevertheless the speeches of the main opposition party, the spokesperson / leader of the coup as the representative of the pro-tutelage / dominant ideology are given as assistance to the analysis of the degree of dialogue / monologue, interdiscursivity / intertextuality operating in the speeches. The additional texts are either utilized as a tool of analysis for R. Tayyip Erdoğan's speech or given in the footnotes to give a comprehensive account of the implied 'things'<sup>56</sup> in the speech. The references and implications are also pointers to the influence of the Turkish political history on the rhetor's discursive production. The selected speeches are indicative of the position of the rhetor. The selected and additional texts are also purposive in giving a full-fledged portrait of an actor who is also a product of the dominant ideology, an actor deconstructing the pro-tutelage premises of the political history and reconstructing the alternative ideology and producing policies. The additional texts also provide the dialogue of the rhetor with the other texts, highlighting the stance of the rhetor in relation to the other positions. So as to provide a comprehensive background for the unfamiliar readers of the study, additional information is given to familiarize with the significations and connotations that a particular idiom may entail.

### **1.2.1. The Scope**

The texts cover the years 2007 – 2017<sup>57</sup> (2<sup>nd</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> terms of the Justice and Development Party governments) that is suitable for the question of how the discourse has been evolving. The date anchors / time scope of the study are selected regarding the space that the study would allow as the preceding years are characterized mostly with accommodationist policies and rhetoric of the Justice and Development Party. A chronological survey of the data is conducted that is purposive in order to trace the broadening circle of a theme in respective discourses. The thesis follows a chronological analysis of the discourses in order to test the assumption

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<sup>56</sup> The speeches of President R. Tayyip Erdoğan are imbued with references and implications to the key historical figures, politicians, events, or a term that are of purposive nature, corresponding to the negative and positive associations in the minds of the hearers/commoners.

<sup>57</sup> From 10 August 2014 on, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the 12<sup>th</sup> President of Republic of Turkey elected, for the first time, by popular vote.

whether the political discourse on a particular theme is in an evolutionary form or different themes are utilized haphazardly. The thesis is based on the structure of thematic frames. There are mainly two layers the speeches are categorized in accordance with. The first layer can be called the discursive strategy and function. The second layer is the chronological order.

### **1.2.2. Design of the Study**

The study follows the aforementioned ordering: deconstruction, reconstruction and policy. The first layer is the aforementioned discursive strategies to be presented and analyzed in the thesis. The second layer is the thematic frameworks. The thematic frameworks such as '(de)constructing and rewriting the history', 'structuring the self' etc. is the second layer of analysis. With regard to the design of the source material, the determining nexus in the selected speeches is the following: 1) the date of the discourse / deconstruction / theme, 2) the date of the discourse / reconstruction / theme, 3) the type of the discourse / policy / structural limits of power and domination. The speeches are, at first, allocated in accordance with deconstruction / reconstruction / policy. The second phase of categorization is the thematic framework to which each particular speech constituting the mentioned discursive strategies pertains. The last phase is, so as to illustrate the evolutionary form of the discourse, chronological sequencing of the speeches. 1) The dating of the discourse helps us to identify the reproduction and evolution of the discourse from the former discourse to the latter ones. 2) The distinction among deconstruction / reconstruction / policy helps us to identify the extent of commonality of the discursive strategies employed to deconstruct the constituents of the dominant ideology, reconstruction of the alternative ideology nourished by the significations and connotations from the adored nostalgia, and the extent of the relation of the discourse to empower the policymaking. 3) The grouping of the political discourse in terms of various thematic frameworks provide a better account for the socio-political spheres to which the discourse and policy is related. Though the study benefits from the field of political communications; it covers the commentaries and editorials of

daily newspapers and academic papers / books of the politicians only as a supplementary source of data to put light on the political debates. One further aide to the reconstruction is the non-discursive spheres whose sources and basic motivations are analyzed in the last section of the Chapter 3. As the foci of the study is the relationship between discourse and policy, it is going to handle discourse, as a sign of the utopia / ideational world of the rhetor, the policy as the ultimate output of the translation of discourse to the policy through the structural limits of power and domination. These limitations are going to be deciphered through references to the daily newspaper commentaries, academic articles and books.

The section above depicts how the primary material (discourse) of the study is categorized and analyzed. So as to indicate the coherence and discrepancies between discourse and policy, the study attempts to give a theoretical framework that is helpful in figuring out hypothesis for an understanding of a complicated relationship. This part of the study is based upon the assumption that the discourse of the rhetor reflects the utopia of the rhetor. This section defines two types of cases: Moral case and Realist case. If the case is a moralist case: The utopia is transferred into the policy without any change on the condition that the structural limits of power and domination is less than the actor's power. It is expected to be refined or transformed on the condition that the structural limits of power and domination do not provide a convenient realm of practice. If the case is a realist case: the discourse follows minor changes from traditional language, and policy follows minor, incremental changes whose sum in a realist world is expected to produce a large change from the traditional policy. The last part of the study mainly deals with the transfer of the discourse to the policy. It defines basically three types of cases: a) Outer Limits / Realist Realm in which both the discourse and policy follows either an incremental evolution, or sticks to the status quo, existing policy, b) Without Outer Limits / Moralist Realm in which both the discourse and policy follow an avulsive / drastic changes from the traditional bureaucratic foreign policy language / policy, c) Outer Limits / Moralist Realm in which the discourse shows a drastic evolution, rejects the traditional bureaucratic foreign policy language but the policy follows incremental / minor changes in the short term whose sum would reach the ultimate target in the long term.

Layers of Discourse	Thematic Framework	Narrative Processing
Discourse of Deconstruction	Defy the pro-tutelage readings of history and the reverberant sensitivity of the military-bureaucratic establishment	From 2007 to 2017
	Reminding the victory of Kut-Al-Amara	From 2007 to 2017
	Re-contextualizing the adored history	From 2007 to 2017
	Re-considering the Founding Father	From 2007 to 2017
	Discourse of discrediting the inspiring figures of the establishment	From 2007 to 2017
Discourse of Reconstruction / Rewriting	Myth Writing	From 2007 to 2017
	Structuring the identity/orienting the self	From 2007 to 2017
	Reconsidering the <i>Kadim</i> & Islamic creed	From 2007 to 2017
	Revisiting Key Historical Events Marking the Self through the Grand Legacy of the History.	From 2007 to 2017

Table 1. 1. The Ordering of the Discourse and Analysis Design

## CHAPTER 2

### 2. (DE?)CONSTRUCTING AND REWRITING THE HISTORY: FIGURES AND EVENTS

*“Writing history is as important as making history. If the writer doesn’t remain true to the maker, then the unchangeable reality transforms into a confusing matter for humanity.”<sup>1</sup>*

M. Kemal Atatürk

This chapter proceeds methodically on the assumption that examining imagined representations of key historical figures and affairs consolidating an alternative reading of the modern Turkish history is the chief essence to understand the extent of the influence of Ottoman admiration re-writing the history within the political perspective introduced. Before examining the elements of discourse and policy relationship, one major issue that is apposite to study is the discursive forge to deconstruct and reconstruct the tenets / components of Turkish history and political culture. The main emphasis of the chapter is to reveal a) discourse of deconstruction, and b) discourse of reconstruction, through resort to the tools of CDA and DHA. This chapter makes use of the narrative-tracing method and attempts to frame a systematized framework that follows a) deconstruction and b) reconstruction. The single most striking result of the method is that the focus of the chapter is how the chronologically successively produced political discourses follow the aforementioned line. A clear benefit of the focus is the political discourse related to foreign and domestic policy is given a place in the chapter as long as it falls into what is termed as deconstruction and reconstruction. It is not the domain to which discourse is related, but the function of the discourse that matters.

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<sup>1</sup> Hasan Cemil Çambel, **T.T.K. Belleten**, Volume: 3, Issue 10, 1939, p. 272

The reformulation of the past is constructed through a political discourse rewriting the history and re-inventing a novel political history. The question of how “attributing a meaningful past to a structured present”<sup>2</sup> is realized within the political discourse is going to be elaborately scrutinized. Collingwood refers to the role of mind-set of an historian as a mechanism establishing his position among different facts of history, following the same line of thought, he argues that “the facts of history are nothing, interpretation is everything.”<sup>3</sup> The political discourse inevitably reflects the ideological underpinning of the producer. The writing process “depends on the angle from which something, that is, anything, is viewed.”<sup>4</sup> Historical truth is constructed depending on the standpoint in which the producer positions himself as “what may appear to be a historical truth is in fact a repercussion of ideologically motivated reconstructions of time.”<sup>5</sup> The competition between two constructed readings of history reveals two different types of ideologically infused versions of Turkish history, one being the discourse of grand legacy of the past infused with abundantly visible Islamic, Ottoman and historical elements, the other one, secularist writing, emancipating the Turkish history from the once dominant Islamic and Ottoman institutions and deposing the dominant effect of religious institutions on what makes the Turkish nationhood.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Jonathan Friedman, “Myth, History, and Political Identity.” **Cultural Anthropology**, vol. 7, no. 2, 1992, p. 194. [www.jstor.org/stable/656282](http://www.jstor.org/stable/656282).

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Carr, Edward Hallett, Richard J. Evans, and Richard J. Evans. **What is History?**. Hounds-mill: Palgrave, 2001. p. 30. Robin George Collingwood, and Willem J. van der Dussen. *The idea of history*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Marco Portales, "Writing History: Subjective Authoritativeness." **New Literary History** 18.2 (1987): 461

<sup>5</sup> Ana Maria Alonso, “The effects of Truth: Representation of the Past and the Imagining of Community” **The Journal of Historical Sociology**, 1, 1, March 1988 p.35.

<sup>6</sup> In a study unraveling the complicated relationship between discursive strategies and establishing/maintaining political hegemony, Küçükali underlines that the merit of Republican People’s Party, RPP, (CHP) represents an anchor of the positions in Turkish political history, RPP, being the founder party (then called *Halk Firkası*), represents foci to which all the other political actors take position and give negative or positive references and attribution. Küçükali also gives a comprehensive account of the history of the single-party rule of Republican People’s Party still influencing the political actors’ discursive and political action. Though focus of the study is Justice and Development Party government, it leaves a vast room for the analysis of the history of RPP, and two main reasons are posited: “Firstly, the CHP history has shaped overall Turkish political history

The reformulation, the discursive attempts to rewrite the history is not a new phenomena. From the 1980 coup d'etat till today, there has been an accumulation of discursive attempts to revise, re-interpret and re-read the history and appropriate it in accordance with the political objectives that is also fueled with the right-wing populist discourse. The past has been, in other words, what the right wing parties and leaders have made of it. Thus, it is worth noting that the attempts to appropriate the history in order to alternate and dominate the legitimacy struggles retrieved from the past is not a new phenomenon. These attempts already date back to the beginning of 1980s since then the power of the right wing parties in Turkish political life has been burgeoning. Turkish history appreciated in a particular way in the discourse is simply what R. Tayyip Erdoğan makes of it. The political discourse is of descriptions deconstructing and constructing the history, in compliance with what Dijk underlines:

“the type of description must be in our favor, in our interest, or in any other way contribute positively and persuasively to our self-presentation and impression management, or conversely, contribute to the negative presentation of our opponents, enemies or others in general.”<sup>7</sup>

The next chapter is going to give a full-fledged analysis of the self-presentation; here the focus is the deconstruction of the negative representation / deconstruction of the constituents of the opponents. In a similar vein, the political discourse re-writing the selected historical figures and events is assumed to contribute to the positive representation of the producer and the negative representation of the referred establishment. The discourse produces an alternative way of reading either the context or key figures of a selected historical case. The political discourse alternating the history is an “endeavor fraught with the advantages and drawbacks of human subjectivity.”<sup>8</sup> It is the reflection of the rhetor’s mental models, ideological

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since it became the founder party of the Turkish Republic and ruled the country as a single party until 1950. Secondly AKP discourses heavily rely on the criticism of the CHP”. Küçükali, **Discursive Strategies and Political Hegemony**. p.15.

<sup>7</sup> Teun A Van Dijk, "Opinions and ideologies in the press. Approaches to media discourse, ed. by Allen Bell and Peter Gerret, p. 44." (1998).

underpinnings and personal biography that constitutes the subjectivity in deconstructing and rewriting the history. The historical case to be the subject of the political discourse is critically important since it is a key to the constituted images, beliefs, values and norms that make a nation what and how it is.

The Ottoman adoration prompts the question of whether the adored nostalgia is one of the types of constructed versatile of histories. The favor of the rhetor's ideology is a determiner in selecting among those constructed versatile histories. This part of the thesis is limited to the study of the Ottoman imagination and identification of the leaders and cadres, regardless of whether the adored and portrayed Ottoman past recurring in the discursive action is also a product of the versatile and multi-vocal constructed histories. The multi-vocal and versatile constructions of key historical figures and key historical events are employed by the orator as assisting and helpful as the constructed or foregrounded characteristic of an event or a figure is. The speech is geared towards deconstructing on the condition that the socio-cultural significations of the historical figure is loaded and been utilized as a source of legitimization for policy. The speech is geared towards reconstructing on the condition that the socio-cultural significations attributed to the historical figure is loaded and been utilized as a source of legitimization for a certain policy / adopting a particular type of view rather than the others. The position / camp / ideology / ideational world and biography of the historical figure are the fundamental determining factors to become a tool of the discourse in the form of *topos* of history. These features of the historical figure typify the political discourse either as a source of seeking legitimacy, or in the form of discrediting in order to pave the way for the self-orientation / position. The reader of the study should hold in mind that the material source of the rhetor is a type of [among the others] constructed socio-cultural significations attributed to a historical figure. The adore of each camp, either from secular or conservative circle, prevents a thorough study / full-fledged picture of a key historical figure or an event on the condition that the socio-cultural significations erstwhile attributed to the historical figure or an event is the source of existence and legitimacy. Hence, a rhetor, either from conservative or

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<sup>8</sup> Marco Portales, "Writing History: Subjective Authoritativeness." **New Literary History** 18.2 (1987).p. 465.

secular camp, is not expected to give a full-fledged picture / portrait of a key historical figure or an event since the erstwhile constructed and attributed socio-cultural significations are the epistemological and ontological sources for the social / political actors / groups concerned. When the constructed and erstwhile attributed socio-cultural significations are more nourishing to the defended position, the reality that the historical figure or the event does not entail the traits attributed, is overwhelmed by what is imagined in the ideational world of the social / political actor. Unraveling the reality would mean the deconstruction of the erstwhile dominant socio-cultural significations and an attack to the ontological source of the ideological camp concerned. It is, most generally speaking, the key historical events and figures that are purposively selected. However, in the layers of both deconstruction and reconstruction, the key historical figures and events are manifested in the format that is erstwhile constructed and loaded with socio-cultural significations. The discourse of the social / political actors is nourished on the fabricated histories and fabricated bibliographies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk or Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, the former as the idol of the secular, the latter as the idol of conservative camp. A longitudinal study on Turkish conservatism reports that “memory deletion” (*unutturma*) and “forgetting” (*unutma*) are the main mechanisms of recruiting the socio-cultural significations of the society.<sup>9</sup> One question that needs to be asked is the extent of applicability of the aforementioned tools not only for the conservative circle but also the others. A much more systematic and comprehensive approach would be to show the helpfulness of these mechanisms to the interest of all the ideologies and ideational world of the ideologues molding the Turkish political culture. The study of Aksakal would appear to be over ambitious if these mechanisms are limited to the practices of a single camp. The limitation would also bring about a tacit acknowledgement that these practices are limited to the Turkish conservative circle (a kind of stigmatizing), which would hinder the multi-faceted and multi-dimensional aspect of how these mechanisms are utilized when the imagined biographies of the ideologues is in service of the position. The political discourse is constituted by (depending on whether the orator is from conservative /

<sup>9</sup> Hasan Aksakal. **Türk Muhafazakârlığı: Terennüm, Tereddüt, Tahakküm**, İstanbul, ALFA Yayınları, 2017.

secular camp) not only the delineation of the conservative circle on the purposive bibliographies of the conservative ideologues, but also the mitigation of the non-attributable and non-inspiring bibliographies. It is not only the delineation of the purposive bibliographies of the secular ideologues, but also mitigating non-attributable / non-purposive bibliographies. Purposiveness and non-purposiveness are the aspects measured through the helpfulness of the selected parts of the referenced bibliographies to the interests of the social / political actor. Among the versatile fabricated histories, the social / political actors tend to select the type mitigating and erasing the possible and (sometimes real) negative attributions. If the fabricated histories are in service of the position of the rhetor, the euphemistic values attributed to the material source of the defended camp are utilized in the discourse. The addressee of the discourse is expected to carry / inspire from the identical euphemistic values that the referenced idol / figure has been claimed to have performed or at least the symbolic meaning is associated with him / her.

The Camp of Social / Political Actor	Ideologues & Key Figures & Key Historical Events	General Patterns: Mitigation & Delineation
Camp A <sup>10</sup>	If the case is: Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp A	Delineation of the potential positive aspects that would contribute to the argument / position of Camp A.
	If the case is: Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp A	Mitigating the potential negative aspects that would negatively contribute or disprove the argument / position of the Camp A.
	If the case is: Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp B	Mitigating / deleting the positive aspects that would negatively contribute or disprove the argument / position of the Camp A
	If the case is: Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp B	On the condition that some aspects are fueling the argument / position of the Camp A, or of the potential to signify that the reality is different from what is represented or attributed, the social / political actor delineates aspects such that represented by the Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp B

<sup>10</sup> Camp A or Camp B stands for competing camps and applicable to any two competing for hegemony in Turkish political culture.

The Camp of Social / Political Actor	Ideologues & Key Figures & Key Historical Events	General Patterns: Mitigation & Delineation
Camp B	If the case is:  Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp B	Delineation of the potential positive aspects that would contribute to the argument / position of Camp B.
	If the case is:  Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp B	Mitigating the potential negative aspects that would negatively contribute or disprove the argument / position of the Camp B.
	If the case is:  Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp A	Mitigating / deleting the positive aspects that would negatively contribute or disprove the argument / position of the Camp B.
	If the case is:  Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp A	On the condition that some aspects are fueling the argument / position of the Camp B, or of the potential to signify that the reality is different from what is represented or attributed, the social / political actor delineates aspects such that represented by the Ideologue & Key Figure & Key Historical Event of Camp A.

Table 2. 1. Patterns of Mitigation-Delineation by Social / Political Actors

Layers of Discourse	Discursive Strategies	The Role of the Rhetor
Discourse of Deconstruction	Delineation of the Positive Traits / Components of Camp A Appreciatorily	A Vocalist of the Camp
	Delineation of the Positive Traits / Components of Camp B Deprecatorily (Rhetor takes the role of unmaker)	Unmaker
	Delineating the Negative Traits / Components of Camp B Deprecatorily	A non-conformist Error Diagnostics
	Mitigating the Negative Traits / Components of Camp A (The rhetor causes the audience to forget the negative traits attributed to the components of Camp A)	Deletion of the Negative Attributions / Traits of the Camp A.
Discourse of Reconstruction / Rewriting	Discursive Evolution on the Appreciatorily Delineated Positive Traits / Components of Camp A	Developer / Evolver
	Delineation of the Positive Traits / Components of Camp B Deprecatorily	Unmaker
	Delineating the Negative Traits / Components of Camp B Deprecatorily	Legitimacy Seeker Overpowering / Domineering
	Mitigating the Negative Traits / Components of Camp A (The rhetor causes the audience to forget the negative traits attributed to the components of Camp A)	Overpowering / Domineering
	Writing Myth	Hero / Myth Writer

Table 2. 2. Patterns of Mitigation-Delineation by Social / Political Actors

## 2.1. Pro-Tutelage vs Neo-Ottoman Readings on the History of The Turkish Republic

The criticism of the established images of key historical figures, triumphs and victories reveals the first stage of rewriting the history. The critical tone employed in the discourse is aimed to deconstruct the established and ongoing imagining of the ‘official history’.<sup>11</sup> During the establishment period of Turkish Republic, the ideology of Turkism functioned as a unifying power which was perceived necessary for building a new nation-state.<sup>12</sup> Ironically, the criticism of the official history, which is another structured reading of history, is illustrative of the discursive competition of representations between two types of constructed readings of history.

Two competing imaginations of the Ottoman past and the key figures in modern Turkish history are based upon the clash of secular reading and neo-Ottomanist & Islamist reading of history. Throughout the chapter, President Erdoğan’s rhetoric is going to be referred with the terms: pro-nostalgia that is based upon the grand legacy of the past, and the competing imagination as secularist and pro-tutelage or traditional bureaucratic paradigm. It is worth taking note that these terms are used without borderlines, not sealed for a specific use and are used interchangeably and do not imply any change in lexical meaning except for the intentional and linguistic emphasis to be made. Islamist view on the Ottoman grandeur as an object of admiration competes with the image of the secularists whose

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<sup>11</sup> The term ‘official history’ is used intentionally as a reference to the history books in service of nationalistic ideas set out as a component of nation-building programme.

<sup>12</sup> Ersanlı, underlining the primary role of history books as an instrument of nation building mechanism, posits : “Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity was to be legitimized first through history books. Within the first and second History Congresses convened to develop and finalize the cultural enterprise of the Kemalist Revolution, in 1932 and 1937, there were two trends. The leading current, based on pragmatic politics, was to take Turkic origins to pre-historical and early historical periods; it dealt mostly with hasty archaeological and anthropological explanations. Thus, proponents of this current believed that the early material past could be linked to Mustafa Kemal's victory over Anatolia, again based on the National Pact of 1920. The Ottoman past, especially the Middle Ages, was isolated from national history except for the Ottomans' military- political victories. Polarization was accentuated by the theory of drought in Central Asia. Europe was obviously chosen as the crucial cultural-political geography for Turkish identity. However, neither the Turks of Central Asia nor the European peoples were taken up independently”. Büşra Ersanlı, "History Textbooks as Reflections of the Political Self: Turkey (1930s and 1990s) and Uzbekistan (1990s)." **International Journal of Middle East Studies** 34.2 (2002): 340.

perception of the Ottoman past can simply be characterized as a ‘preceding period of calamity’. The attempt to disclaim the official history defies the secularist reading dethroning the effect of the grand legacy of the past and key figures in Turkish political culture. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a politician politically nourished and receiving support by more religious, less-educated, downtrodden circles of the Turkish society, peasants, low and middle class people<sup>13</sup> that can simply be termed as the periphery of the Turkish society, transfers the neo-Ottomanist and Islamist reading of history to the center, challenging the established secularist, pro-tutelage, traditional bureaucratic paradigm reading of history. Corrigibility of history as an overarching subject of the discourse is represented in the neo-Ottomanist reinterpretation / rewriting of Turkish history.

The political discourse functions as an element identifying the self of the producer with the Ottoman past. The self-identification with the Ottoman past creates a dichotomous relationship within the discourse adopting the “strategy of polarization, ‘ideological Augare’: (1) Emphasize our good properties/actions. (2) Emphasize their bad properties /actions. (3) Mitigate our bad properties / actions. (4) Mitigate their good properties/actions.”<sup>14</sup> On the one hand, the imagined ‘we’ is associated with a self-identification with the Ottoman grandeur, ‘they’ is (in most of the cases) going to be associated with the pro-tutelage establishment self-identified as the followers of

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<sup>13</sup> KONDA’s Election and Electorate Analysis published on 18 June 2015 highlights the relationship between “the education-level and voting behaviour of Turkish electorate: “the voting rate of the Ak Parti increases as the educational level decreases. However, it seems that the Ak Parti voting rate has also radically dropped in the lowest educational cluster in which the Ak Parti used to receive a voting rate as much as 70 percent... It is observed that the Ak Parti continues to be the leading party among middle school graduates.”. p. 83. Differentiating between four different income level groups as “Lower Class, Lower Middle Class, New Middle Class, Upper Class”, the survey posits that “there is a significant difference within the four income groups in terms of preference for the Ak Parti or CHP. However, differently from the educational level, even though the CHP voting rate increases in the higher income groups, the Ak Parti is observed as the leading party in each income group”. p. 85. The research illustrates the relationship between religiosity and voting behavior: “We take it as a fact that as the religiousness level increases, the probability of being an Ak Parti voter increases and the probability of being a CHP voter decreases. The rate of those who define themselves as religious (who try to fulfill the requirements of religion) is 61 percent. Half of the 60-percent religious cluster stated one week before the election that they would vote for the Ak Parti... 60 percent of the 12-percent devout cluster stated that they would vote for the Ak Parti.” pp. 91-92. “June 7 Election and Electorate Analysis”, **KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık**, 18 June 2015, Available at: <http://www.konda.com.tr/en/raporlar/KONDAJune7ElectionandElectorateAnalysis.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Dijk, “Opinions and ideologies” p. 33.

the Atatürk's principles, heirs of the pro-tutelage ideology apparent in the form of Kemalism and the guardians of the heritage received from the founding father. A typical feature of the discourse of deconstruction and reconstruction is *complete populism* as these discourses attempt to appeal to the emotions of the people, underline the negative points of the out-groups, delete the negative traits of what is labelled as in-group, exclude the tutelage mechanisms of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm, and condemn the political performance for the present situation.

The new import of the alternative history reading constitutes re-making, re-writing and re-creating the imagination of the already imagined historical figures or events. The neo-Ottomanist discourse presenting an alternative reading of history is an attempt whose deep motive is to re-construct the rejected, abstained and dismissed historical depth. The political discourse motivated to re-construct the historical ties of the Turkish Republic is fueled by the feeling of protest against the dethroned position of the Islamic motives and Ottoman key figures and event. It is a rhetoric protesting the ongoing, dominant, imagined and erstwhile structured history whose legacy stems from another secular protest against the 'preceding days of calamity' of Ottoman Empire. The legitimacy of the secularist imagination of the history is established on the rejection of Ottoman past labelling it as the 'preceding calamity'. The secular perspective of history writing was based upon the estrangement and emancipation of the history of the Turkish Republic from the history of Ottoman Empire. Identical polemical and deconstructive imaginations are also employed in Erdoğan's rhetorical action calling for reconciliation and identification with the past that collects the Ottoman, Islamic and even ancient Anatolian history. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, through the introduction of an alternative perspective on the Ottoman past, represents the reconciliation as a remedy for social conflicts between Islamists and secularists and a unifying bond empowering the sense of belonging especially for the former.<sup>15</sup> The rhetoric also involves a criticism of the secularist imagination of

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<sup>15</sup> Mardin puts light on the historical relationship between the periphery and center: "The Republican People's Party, the Party of the Kemalists, successfully established discipline among its members. When an opposition party was formed whose activities coincided with a Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government wide powers for two years. Although there was no link between the Party and the revolt, the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. It was suppressed the same year because of what were said to be its links with "religious re-action," and indeed this, more than "Kurdishness," had been the central theme of the

history overlooking the glorious deeds in Ottoman past and associating the Golden Age of Ottoman Empire with the darkness of Middle Ages. Undermining the potent reading of history, as the discourse of deconstruction alternates the erstwhile dominant ideology, the discourse of reconstruction builds up a dominant perspective on history which redefines the content and determines the positions of the key historical figures. These key historical figures and events are the recipients of the discourse that help us to identify the aforementioned discursive strategy of deconstruction / reconstruction / policy in the form of increased public visibility.

## **2.2. Introduction of the Commemoration of Kut-Al-Amara, Re- Imagining the Sick Man of Europe<sup>16</sup>**

This chapter is going to shed light upon how the memorial days and key figures are included into the Turkish politics as a recipient of the new present receiving its source from the historical legacy and how celebration of military victories are re-suited as a ritualistic adherent of national celebrations. The historical legacy should not be thought exempt from the religious legacies (which) “leave a distinct and lasting imprint on contemporary values.”<sup>17</sup> The noteworthy point in the analysis of Erdoğan’s discourse on Turkish history is to take regard of Carr’s words: “To learn about the present in the light of the past means also to learn about the past in the light of the present.”<sup>18</sup> The introduction of a commemoration is, as put in a simplistic formula by Halas, “memory creat(ion), or reproduc(tion) of the dominant commemorative narration. Therefore, remembrance is usually ritualized, subject to a clear moral message.”<sup>19</sup> Besides the potential message to be given to hearers,

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revolt”. Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” **Daedalus**, vol. 102, no. 1, 1973, p. 182.

<sup>16</sup> *Sick Man of Europe* is both a historical and modern term extensively used in European political discourse referring to the economic, international, military downfall of the states in the EU. It is also evident that the term has evolved and been used for more trivial subjects such as the states in stagflation, low economic growth, or military and diplomatic failure.

<sup>17</sup> Pippa Norris, and Ronald Inglehart. "Islamic culture and democracy: Testing the clash of civilizations' thesis." **Comparative Sociology** 1.3 (2002): p. 235.

<sup>18</sup> Carr, **What is history?**, p.86.

introduction of the commemoration of Kut-Al-Amara Victory into the schedule of political life is a challenge to the view of Ottoman defeat as a total failure at the end of the First World War. The present perspective of the political / social actors is the crucial source assisting the hearers of the discourse to relearn the past in the light of the rhetor's mental model. Introduction of the commemoration of the Kut-Al-Amara as a ritual of the Turkish political life is full of socio-cultural significations and imageries addressing to the common thoughts and feelings of the audience. It is also a reflection on how an Islamist in the present views the late Ottoman history. Erdoğan's discourse, in contrast to the secularist perspective, re-writes / re-invents / re-interprets / revises the history of Turkish Republic through the employment of the Ottoman past as the focal point to set out.

Erdoğan, speaking at the opening ceremony centenary of Kut-Al-Amara Victory, “Whoever leaves out our last 200 years, even 600 years together with its victories and defeats, and jumps directly from old Turkish history to the Republic, is an enemy of our nation and state.”<sup>20</sup> <sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup>. The discourse is a typical avulsive

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<sup>19</sup> ELŻBIETA HAŁAS., “Symbolic Construction of ‘Solidarity:’ the Conflict of Interpretations and the Politics of Memory.” **Polish Sociological Review**, no. 170, 2010, p. 228. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/41275150](http://www.jstor.org/stable/41275150).

<sup>20</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory”, Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>

<sup>21</sup> One of the knowledgeable Turkish scholars of history, İlber Ortaylı, argues that it is not People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*), one-party rule but Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) responsible for obliterating the narration of Kut-Al-Amara Victory from the history books in the syllabi of both primary and high-schools. Though the standpoint of the attacked group is not evident in the discourse, ironically, the motive of the discourse is geared toward Justice Party. The irony stems from the image of Justice Party signifying the source of inspiration and touchstone for the conservative right wing parties in Turkish political life.

<sup>22</sup> Along with the introduction of Kut-Al-Amara Victory to the annual official commemoration, Victory of Malazgirt was introduced on 26 August 2016, as another official commemoration with the call of R. Tayyip Erdoğan. The call and the increasing importance attached to the commemoration / celebration of the Victory of Malazgirt is of both symbolic and visible public significance. “We will be in Malazgirt on August 26 [2017] to mark the Victory of Malazgirt and from then on we will be sowing the seeds of 2071 by being in Malazgirt on every August 26...The AK Party is a party which serves as the architect of all these achievements with the strong bridge it has built between the past and the future. We have a big responsibility; yet, we also harbor the means, will and determination to shoulder this burden with our nation's support and Allah's help. What we only need is to always keep in mind where we have come from, where we stand, and where we are going to. Rest assured, as long as we don't go astray off our path, it is easy for us to overcome the obstacles that are put in our way.” R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the 16th Anniversary of the Foundation of the

discourse of deconstruction, making a drastic change from the discourse of traditional bureaucratic paradigm. Wodak posits that one of the genres distinguished by the classical rhetoric is “the judicial (*genus iudiciale*)...judicial oratory is focused temporally on the past, and thematically on justice or injustice, and its function is to accuse or defend.”<sup>23</sup> In line with the limits of judicial oratory, the discourse accuses the erstwhile ideology reading the Turkish history through restricted lenses. The hegemony of the secularist aloofness to the Ottoman and Selukian history is accused and the accusation is employed to introduce another type of hegemony, through a counter discourse identifying secularist aloofness as a justification for the re-introduction of the ceremonies and the glorification of the past. The speech employs the discursive strategy of hasty generalization categorizing the people with the state of aloofness towards the Ottoman past as the enemies of the nation. The logic of the discourse is designed to pin Republican People’s Party / then People’s Party as the scapegoat, the actor initiating the mitigation of the victory of Kut Al-Amara. There is, as Wodak posits, regarding İlber Ortaylı’s argument, *trajectio in alium*, “strategically employed in rationalisations, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimiser reversals and so on, consisting of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else.”<sup>24</sup> Though the victimizer is Justice Party, the speech strategically changes the victimizer, opaquely attributes to the secularist establishment or does not mention it since the political party of the rhetor is also established on the legacy and heritage of right and national outlook parties<sup>25</sup>.

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Justice and Development Party (AK Party)” Ankara, 14 August 2017. Available at:  
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/80175/adalet-ve-kalkinma-kavramlari-birer-deniz-feneri-gibi-bugun-de-yolumuzu-aydinlatiyor.html>

<sup>23</sup> Ruth Wodak, **Discursive construction of national identity**. Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p.70.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak. **Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism**. Routledge, 2005. p.74.

<sup>25</sup> The pictures of Necmettin Erbakan, former prime minister of Turkey, and the leader of the political parties such as: National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party and Felicity Party, Turgut Özal, the former prime minister and president of Republic of Turkey and the leader of Motherland Party, and Adnan Menderes, the former prime minister and leader of the Justice Party executed by the military junta after the 1960 coup d’etat, are employed in national party congresses of AKP.

The ceremonial meeting is named as “A Forgotten Victory, Kut-Al-Amara”, which paves the way for a debate on the responsibility to remind the victory of Kut-Al-Amara. The name of the meeting negatively renders the responsibility to the so-far dominant history reading perspective of secularists. Following the same line of argument, Erdoğan stresses that it is the 600 years that makes what Turkish nation is and holds the ones dethroning the Ottoman legacy, restricting the history of Turkish Republic within 100 years’ and Turkish history responsible for obliterating the victories and defeats in the past. Erdoğan dissociates himself from the secularist reading of history, and tries to incorporate the Ottoman history, not only the victories but also the defeats, as the inextricable part of the history of Turkish Republic. The rhetoric implies a denunciation on the secularist perspective disassociating the Ottoman history from the Turkish Republic. Identifying the ones rejecting the Ottoman history as a full part of the Turkish Republic as ‘the enemy of nation and state’ is more than a discursive strategy emphasizing the bad properties of the others since it stems from the perception that it involves disassociation of the Turkish Republic from Islam and Ottoman political and social order whose credentials are expected to serve as an antidote for all the social, ethnic and political problems in modern Turkish Republic.

In a similar vein, Erdoğan maintains: “I reject an understanding of history that takes 1919 as the start of one-thousand year history of our nation and civilization.”<sup>26</sup> The chronological narrative tracing method reveals the burgeoning avulsiveness in deconstruction. The speech labels the social / political actors with an understanding of history taking 1919 as the starting point deprecatorily (predication). The social and political actors with such an understanding are constructed as the political / social out-groups (nomination). Such an understanding of history is represented as a cognitive deficit / discredited self-esteem. Cognitive deficit and low self-esteem are the negative attributions of politically positioned out-groups (argumentation). The rhetor through a nomination of the position of ‘the other’, positions himself as the

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<sup>26</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory”, Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>

heir and also the enactor of hundreds of years' legacy (perspectivation).<sup>27</sup> The speech does not have a correspondent / specific actor to whom the discourse is addressed. The discourse is an exemplary form of avulsive discourse produced in a moral realm, literally and avulsively rejects the dominant view. The target person of the discourse is not evident; it is, in other words, abstracted. *Complete populism* is the recipient of the political discourse that discredits all the correspondents of the discourse, namely the ones favoring the traditional bureaucratic paradigm.

It condemns an understanding of history, assumed to be present in the still-autonomous ideology. The reference to the 'civilization' implies a holistic view of history writing, which provides an instrument of 'one thousand year history' serving as a tool rich in references for political action. The chance to find a reference point in history helps in strengthening the image that Justice and Development Party is an exemplary form and heir of the one thousand year of historical legacy. The references provide a ground of legitimacy for political action. Erdoğan refers to "our civilization", implying "a vague Turkish civilizational tradition; with this he sometimes refers to the Islamic civilization, the Muslim people or cultures of the Middle East and Balkans."<sup>28</sup> Reference to one thousand year of historical legacy also provides a rhetorical action reaching beyond the borders of the Turkish Republic, namely the former Ottoman lands in the Balkans and the Middle East:

"What have we done, however? We have almost worked to cover our own history with a black cloth. We have almost worked to bury our own history. Those who have bypassed many victories of ours with just a few words, as if these victories didn't belong to us, have both gravely disrespected our ancestors and inflicted a severe harm on future generations."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>28</sup> Nurullah Ardiç. "Civilizational Discourse, the 'Alliance of Civilizations' and Turkish Foreign Policy." **Insight Turkey** 16.3 (2014), p. 102

<sup>29</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory", Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>

Topos of history constitutes the main argument of the speech in which the avulsive deconstruction is targeted against the historical aloofness. The understanding overlooking the teachings of the one thousand years' experience is discursively attacked. The phrase 'black cloth' condemns the outcome of that aloofness. The political actor takes the role of error diagnostics, expunging the black cloth from the history as an actor from within the history, an actor indoctrinated with the erstwhile dominant teaching of history. The rhetor positions himself as an actor to diagnose the malaise of alienation from one thousand years' experience in terms of political and social practicum. The hearers of the discourse are expected to dispense with / omit the aloofness towards the history, and uncover and benefit from one thousand years of experience. Erdoğan maintains emphasis on the good properties of the incorporation of the one thousand year history into the collective memory giving shape to the perspective of the future generations, working against the process of alienation of Turkish citizens from the Ottoman grandeur. Dressed into black cloth, covered, buried and evaluated as a source of embarrassment, one thousand year of history is, through a political discourse mechanism, transformed into a source of inspiration for the future generations and something to be proud of, and a source for the sense of belonging for all the members of the society self-perceiving as the grandsons of Ottomans. Kut-Al-Amara is represented as a source of inspiration and hope since "an Anglo-Indian force was cut off and surrounded at Kut-Al-Amara" notwithstanding the fact that it was the last days of Ottoman Empire / the Sick Man of Europe.<sup>30</sup> Through the discursive dethronement of the so far dominant secularist perspective on history writing, Erdoğan positions himself as the neo-Ottomanist author of the history of Turkish Republic with a religious emphasis.

Throughout the discourse, Erdoğan complains about the sealed history of the Ottoman Empire, and the rhetoric is designed to break the seal through "a common mode of discourse viable for use among the community of its users."<sup>31</sup> Reformulating the history of Turkish Republic as a continuation of the one thousand year of history is a challenge to the secular doctrine focusing on non-Islamic, pre-

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<sup>30</sup> David R. Woodward, "The Middle East during World War One." **BBC History**, (2011)

<sup>31</sup> Lenn E. Goodman, "Context." **Philosophy East and West** 38.3 (1988) p.310.

Islamic Turks as the basis of Turkish Republic and an ideology to be indoctrinated. The date of Kut-Al-Amara victory is also pregnant with meaning since it deciphers the Sick Man of Europe, as the Ottoman Empire was known in a demeaning and even mocking manner, able to surround the Anglo-Indian forces, namely bringing the super power of the day to their knees.<sup>32</sup>

The indoctrination of the secularist elites is based upon stripping the Turkish history from the Islamic elements or connotations, namely the secularization of the historical heritage. Erdoğan makes a tacit reference to the studies of Turkish Historical Society, Turkish Historical Congress in 1932, Sun Theory of the origin of languages (*Gi̇nes Dil Teorisi*)<sup>33</sup>, the institutions playing a crucial role in ‘emancipating’ the Turkish history from the domination of Ottoman or Islamic victories, and holds these institutions responsible for ‘covering our own history with a black cloth’, ‘having bypassed many victories of ours with just a few words’ and ‘disrespecting our ancestors and inflicting a severe harm on future generations’.

Erdoğan criticizes that the secularist construction of history has retained the historical depth of Turkish Republic within the borders, in other words, the scope of Ottoman historical legacy in the Middle East, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe is downplayed.<sup>34</sup> Education has been a useful instrument in raising future generations with some beliefs rather than the others. Erdoğan criticizes the secularist education system, for the history courses either mitigates or downplays the victory of Kut-Al-Amara, in Erdoğan’s words, ‘bypassing many victories of ours with just a few

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<sup>32</sup> It is a popular idiom in Turkish if not most, but many of the glories of the past are described with: “To bring someone to their knees”/“*Dize getirmek*”.

<sup>33</sup> As cited in Bilsel, İbrahim Necmi Dilmen states in a speech in 1937: As a result of the scientific analysis of the Turkish language, it is now proven that our mother tongue is not different from the Indo-European and Semitic languages, and that Turkish is the main source (*ana kaynagi*) of all languages of culture (*kültür dilleri*). The Turkish language thesis that has uncovered this substantial truth is called Sun Language Theory (Gunes-Dil Teorisi). S. M. Can Bilsel, ""Our Anatolia": Organicism and the Making of Humanist Culture in Turkey." **Muqarnas** 24 (2007), p.225.

<sup>34</sup> Erdoğan’s main criticism can be comprehensively understood regarding the studies to link the modern Turkish history to the ancient history of Anatolia, which emphasizes the pre-Islamic period in Anatolian lands, and does not leave any room for the Islamic character. Erimtan verifies the secularist construction of history as “construction of a ‘new’ Turkish historical persona, embodied by the Hittite Empire”. pp:142. For a further understanding of the new Republic studies in rewriting Turkish history, see: Erimtan, Can. "Hittites, Ottomans and Turks: Ağaoglu Ahmed Bey and the Kemalist construction of Turkish nationhood in Anatolia." **Anatolian Studies** 58 (2008), pp.141-171.

words'. The discourse takes a critical attitude of the secularist indoctrination of history "concerned with the acquisition of beliefs."<sup>35</sup> What Erdoğan suggests is not something more or less than what his preceding secularist elites had done. The rhetor figures out his deep-awareness that the official history, bypassing the heritage of Ottoman history, is deficit in equipping the members of the nation with an identity to be fully internalized.<sup>36</sup>

Erdoğan simply presents an alternative, constructed neo-Ottomanist, Islamist history endorsing the grand legacy of the past doctrine concerned with the acquisition of some beliefs rather than the others to supersede the erstwhile more or less dominant secular view. Islam is of a focal position differentiating the two perspectives. On the one hand, Islamic history of the Turks constitutes the focal point in neo-Ottomanist political discourse rewriting the Turkish history, the preceding and dominant reading of history is based upon settling the pre-historic Anatolia as the forebears of the modern Turkey.<sup>37</sup> The discourse brackets out Erdoğan's belief in the falsity of the secularist system by picking a case like Kut-Al-Amara as the primary component of his political discourse. The rhetor aims to deconstruct the authoritativeness of secularist elites and takes the role of an indoctrinator which had been the role that his secularist predecessors had played. The role of the indoctrinator, as would be explanatory for the employment of particular discourse rather than the other(s), is underscored by McCauley: "The indoctrinator must gain acceptance for his beliefs by argument and persuasion. He must at least seem to be presenting a case. He will, of course, present his case to suit his aims."<sup>38</sup> Just as

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<sup>35</sup> H. McCauley, "Education and Indoctrination." **The Irish Journal of Education / Iris Eireannach an Oideachais** 4.2 (1970) , p.131.

<sup>36</sup> Büşra Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları (2003).

<sup>37</sup> For a comprehensive account of the attempts by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to forge a new history, see: Semavi Eyice, "Atatürk'ün Büyük Bir Tarih Yazdırma Teşebbüsü: Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları", **Belleten, Cilt.XXXII.**, Sayı.128., Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayımları, Ankara 1971, s. 509-526. For a further understanding of the discursively attacked and deconstructed preceding history perspective: Afet İnan, "Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi", **Belleten, Cilt.III.**, Sayı.10., Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayımları, Ankara 1939, s. 243-251.

<sup>38</sup> McCauley, "Education and Indoctrination." p.131.

framed by McCauley, Erdoğan paves the way for increasing the persuasive and positive attributions of his arguments selecting a case, Kut-Al-Amara, which is of Islamic and Ottoman significations / connotations for the conservative people in Anatolia since it is a victory of Arabic troops as a full part of Ottoman community (*iimmet*) against the imperialists, in other words, a picturesque discourse reflecting the subjects of the Sick Man of Europe. Erdoğan, reflecting his Islamist character, in line with his Islamist predecessors, makes use of Kut-Al-Amara as a “defense of the broader idea of Islamic community (*iimmet*) while rejecting various forms of nationalism.”<sup>39</sup> The case of Kut-Al-Amara is also a signifier for deficiencies in history teaching which is presented as the heritage of the secularists’ indoctrination.

Following the same line of thought, Erdoğan maintains:

“Just a century ago, there was no difference between Bursa and Skopje just as Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus, Aleppo, Salonica, Batum and Kardzhali didn’t have any difference. For example Mosul used to be considered as a part of Anatolia rather than Iraq even by the English. However, political schemes aimed at drawing artificial borders according to oil resources and taking advantage of Ottoman State’s pluralistic structure separated these lands from each other. Our physical borders might have been separated but our spiritual borders have never been separated.”<sup>40</sup>

The cities of Bursa, Skopje, Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus, Aleppo, Salonica, Batum and Kardzhali are represented as an integral part of Anatolia. “Spiritual borders” and “artificial borders” are the two competing concepts, the former one signifying the emotional ties with the former Ottoman lands, the latter one, as represented in the discourse, is a product of the imperialist greed for more power. In Atatürk’s Memorial Day speech, Erdoğan maintains:

“Turkey is bigger than Turkey. ...we cannot be confined to 780 thousand square kilometers because our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart. Our brothers in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hasakah, Aleppo, Homs, Misrata, Skopje,

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<sup>39</sup> Fulya Atacan, "A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities." **Middle Eastern Studies** 37.3 p. 111

<sup>40</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory”, Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>

Crimea and the Caucasus might be outside our physical boundaries, but they are all inside the boundaries of our heart. They are in the middle of our heart.”<sup>41</sup>

The discourse functions through nomination of the people living in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hasakah, Aleppo, Homs, Misrata, Skopje, Crimea and the Caucasus as the ‘brothers’ that constructs a discursive in-group (nomination). Appealing to the emotions is the main dynamic of the discourse. It covertly labels the ones deprecatorily who do not have the sensibility to embrace the people living in pax-Ottoman lands (predication). The inclusive language represents the rhetor as the one shouldering the burden of the ‘brothers’, internalizes a foreign affair and defines it as a domestic affair (argumentation). The position of the rhetor is opaquely depicted as the protector of what is referred as ‘brothers’ (perspectivation). The discourse deconstructs non-intervening, passive and cautious foreign policy putting the status-quo above the change; (deconstruction). Recalling pre-Ottoman and Ottoman era, Seljuki times, the discourse reveals that the current borders of Turkish Republic are not an obstacle against establishing ties of love with the former Ottoman lands.

Erdoğan establishes two kinds of relationship with respect to the former Ottoman lands. He identifies the relationship of the imperialist powers vis a vis the former Ottoman lands in the form of pure interest maximization and greed for power. Turkey’s relationship, meanwhile, is identified as a relationship based upon normative values such as emotional borders, ties of love, spiritual borders which is driven by an ambitious humanitarian perspective and normative basis. Hence the argument reflects upon a time when the capitalist imperialist powers did not have a determining role in drawing the limits of international politics. The discourse emphasizes the artificiality of the current borders since they are simply represented as a product of the capitalist imperialist powers. These borders, according to Erdoğan, are not natural borders, and the cities mentioned throughout the speech point out the legacy of history vision for lifting all the artificial barriers in the region and people getting mixed. A further study scrutinizing the discourse of “borders of

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<sup>41</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Ceremony Held to Commemorate the 78th Anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Passing to Eternity”, Ankara, 10 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/58944/yuce-milletimizle-birlikte-engelleri-asacak-ve-muasir-medeniyetler-seviyesinin-ustune-cikacagiz.html>

heart” as a term strategically employed and discursively developed is the foci in one of the sections in this chapter.

The discourse takes a critical view of the idea that Turkey ought to secure itself from the Middle East, which is underwritten into the consciousness of Turkish citizens illustrated in the lamenting lyrics of a folk song: “A new rush on the field, grows up with no fruit, the ones passing away in Yemen, one Mehmed, one is Memiş.”<sup>42</sup>

Before boarding on the plane to South Africa to attend the Socialist International Congress, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party, maintains the role of the political actor invoking to the shared memory in the folk song and claims in 2012: “The prime minister says Turkey will maintain its stance over Syria. I hope this will not lead Turkey into a swamp.”<sup>43</sup> <sup>44</sup> In a similar vein with the lament of above-mentioned lyrics of the folk song, the discourse of the main opposition party can be claimed to be translation of the lyrics of the folk song to the political discourse on the elite level. The leader of the main opposition party positions through an adjusted distance towards the region. The leader of the opposition party simply insists on not defining Turkey’s security through a region which is in constant ethnic and sectarian conflicts, turmoil and chaos. This view posits that Turkey is a country primarily influenced by the surrounding crisis areas though it is not the primary actor, therefore the security of the state should not be defined by intervening in the surrounding crisis areas. In other words, the area of crisis should not be an element with the potential to impede the stability of Turkey.

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<sup>42</sup> From a folk song: Yemen Türküsü: “Tarlalarda biter kamış, Uzar gider vermez yemiş, Sol Yemen'de can verenler, Biri Memet biri Memiş”.

<sup>43</sup> “CHP leader slams PM over Syria policy letter,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 30 August 2012, Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=517&nid=28953>

<sup>44</sup> The competing discourse of “swamp” / “quagmire” and “noble” / “sacred lands” have turned out to be the signifiers in affiliating the members of the camps to the convenient political category. The political category is employed to refer to the group of similar attitudes to a particular case. In that vein, Stevenson stresses: “The representation of a particular language variety as iconic of a particular social group may be used discursively both to assert and to erase the existence of the group as a distinct entity, and this often results in contradictory stances even amongst those who share an interest in sustaining the presence of the group.” Patrick Stevenson, **Language and Social Change in Central Europe: Discourses on Policy, Identity and the German Language: Discourses on Policy, Identity and the German Language**, Edinburgh University Press, 2010. p.164.

Rupture with the traditional Turkish foreign policy paradigm is discursively represented as a rupture with 300 years' of western orientation<sup>45</sup>, mono-cultural foreign policy, the policy of non-intervention in the neighbors' domestic affairs and abstaining from performing any act that may endanger its security. Defining Syria as a quagmire is an attempt to force the government to the maintenance of traditional detachment and blind-eye policy to the problems in the region recalling the traditional bureaucratic foreign policy paradigm. In a more general context, the image of the old Ottoman lands, especially the Middle East, are associated with betrayal since it is "argued that the West - which in this context means largely Britain - had local materials at hand with which to manufacture an Arab nationalism."<sup>46</sup>

Erdogan's discourse, simply an argument against the counter-argument on the same theme, projects the extent of the discrepancy between the positions the ruling and opposition parties take:

"They name their dog Arab to sever the ties. They have always presented the Middle East as a dark world, a swamp.<sup>47</sup> Why did not we play important roles in the management of those places? We were a great state and we had to undertake big responsibilities. Today, a 100-year-old political party in Turkey defines the Middle East as a 'swamp'. One of the boundaries drawn by the WWI is this language. We must comprehend this fact"<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>45</sup> Throughout the study, West/Western/Westerners/Western-mindedness are the terms to refer to countries in Europe and the USA, the people living in aforementioned countries and the dominant perspective that can be simply but also superficially termed as Positivism.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Mango, "Turkey in the Middle East." **Journal of Contemporary History** 3.3 (1968) p. 226

<sup>47</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan conceives the terms such as "swamp", "quagmire" referring to the Middle East as hazardous rhetorical devices of referral. Musolff figures out three slightly different influences of metaphors and analogies on the user: "a) that metaphors/analogies (mis-)lead and commit users to certain practical political consequences; (b) that users may not even be aware of the commitments they have entered into by subscribing to a particular metaphor; and (c) that it needs politicians like her to "minimize" the impact of metaphors by guiding the populace back to the realm of practicalities". Andreas Musolff, "Metaphor and political discourse." **Analogical Reasoning in Debates about Europe. Basingstoke** 14 (2004). p. 31. Though R. Tayyip Erdogan seems to comply with (c) as he tries to minimize the effect of hegemonic metaphor, it is worth noting that the metaphor/analogy is alternated with another one, the "populace" is still one the foreground.

<sup>48</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, "The Speech at the opening ceremony of Recep Tayyip Erdogan University 2014/15 academic year", Rize, 11. October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3334/we-have-to-build-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow-in-unison-in-our-universities.html>

The argument of the antagonist is slightly distorted (*straw man fallacy*) through a hasty generalization. The word ‘they’ and the habit of ‘naming dogs Arab’ is uttered in a coalescence as though the habit only pertains to a specific social-group and not the others. The subjective pronoun, they, is the object of avulsive discourse of deconstruction. *Excluding populism* performs as the tool of political discourse as it addresses not only to the Turkish public opinion, but also excludes the elites from the legitimacy struggles by discrediting their view on the Middle East. The perspective of opposing camp on the past Ottoman regions and the past Ottoman *tebaa* is the macro-discourse of the speech. The tools of both referential / nomination is used “to construct in-groups and out-groups.”<sup>49</sup> It mainly defines the duality in which the opposing camps are defined. The ones who call the Middle East swamp / quagmire is defined as the opponents to be discursively attacked taking full regard of the aforementioned claim of the leader of the Republican People Party. The discourse employs a hyperbolic expression (always) to delineate the unceasing character of the discursive disreputable conduct. The discourse self-nominates the rhetor with the personalized authority to position the political discourse of the opponents as a non-conscientious act.

A prominent discursive instrument employed in the discourse is argumentation “to justify the positive attributions of the self, negative attributions of the political and social out-groups, discredit the negative attributions to the self by the out-group, and positive self-attributions of the out-groups.”<sup>50</sup> The negative representation of the opposing camp is achieved through the attribution of the disreputable conduct of naming the dogs ‘Arab’ to social habits of the political out-group.

The discourse entails an implicit social criticism. It attacks the aloofness or the opponents’ critical stance targeting a particular part of *Ottoman millet / tebaa*. The rhetor, with the critical expression of the opposition party developed against the foreign policy preferences of the government in the region, directly quotes Kemal

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<sup>49</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

Kılıçdaroğlu's statement of 'quagmire / swamp'. The statement of the leader of main opposition party is discredited, discursively represented as a type of non-conscientious labelling on the region. The discourse represents the opponents calling the Middle East as quagmire / swamp as another disreputable conduct and discursively constructs the opponents without the expected sensibilities that a large number of commoners in the society are claimed to share.

The discourse is elaborated through the tool of perspectivation "for an opaque depiction of the position of the rhetor."<sup>51</sup> The position of the opponents is defined within the one hundred years of experience; nonetheless the actor discursively constructs the self with a sensibility reflecting hundreds of years' experience. The language of World War I (WWI) is attributed to the language of the main opposition party, mitigating the image of RPP as the founder and the guardian party of the Turkish Republic, "deconstructing the epistemological components of the dominant ideology."<sup>52</sup> The chronology of the narration shaming the opponents' discourse of quagmire with respect to the Middle East illustrates the furthering of the identical discursive strategy:

"For them, Africa is not a place with which we have deep-rooted relations and which provides opportunities, but just a place which teems with civil wars, crises and chaos. They see quagmire when they face the south of Turkey and see entangled challenges when they face the east of Turkey. They suppose crying as 'Turkey's axis is shifting. Turkey is turning its face to east.' to be a foreign policy analysis. However be sure that Turkey has achieved all its successes and reforms despite a handful of these incompetents. Their aim is not to clear the way, but to block and sabotage the way."<sup>53</sup>

The discourse starts with an object pronoun 'them' that functions to exclude the other ideological camp through a model of constructed 'we'- 'they'. The object pronoun, them, constitutes the object of the avulsive political discourse of deconstruction through which the object is definitely attacked and affected. The actor

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Speech at the 3rd Phoenix Award Ceremony, held by Yeşilay (the Turkish Green Crescent Society)", İstanbul, 04 March 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/40048/zihinlerini-yabanci-baskentlerin-emrine-verenler-oz-guven-sahibi-dis-politika-iddiasindan-rahatsiz-oluyor.html>

nominates the self as the one with the legitimation to attack on the image (which is the worst among many) of a particular identity in the eyes of the opposing camp. The discursively opposed political / social actors are represented as the ones constituting the Arab identity with negative significations and attributed imageries. Within the realm of competing discourses, the cross-perceptions between Arabs and Turks play a significant role *inter alia*. The space of the study does not allow a thorough and multi-level analysis of the construction of the negative and positive cross-perceptions between Arabs and Turks.<sup>54</sup> Cross-perceptions and intercultural interactions between these two different identities are exemplary forms of self-fulfilling prophecy, a negative attribution to the Ottoman military rule utilized in the construction of Arab identity finds its reflection in attribution of the act of betrayal to the Arab identity, - “Arabs because of extended Turkish hegemony over the Arab world as well as the country's pro-Western policies and Turks because of Arab betrayal of the Ottoman Empire in joining with Great Britain in World War I.”<sup>55</sup>

The interdiscursivity existing in both discourses makes thematic references to the cross-perceptions, the historical cases and fears from the past are selected by both of the camps with a full tender of the degree of utility, in other words, the more the degree of utility, the more room for making it a recipient of the discourse. The discourse condemns ‘them’ who select the historical cases and emotions assisting the negative representation of an identity. It endeavors to mitigate the negatively constituted social imagery (by the erstwhile dominant ideology), and positions himself as the actor to reconstruct the relations on an already existing deep-rooted basis. The discourse is mainly aimed to deconstruct the pro-tutelage perceptions teemed with negative attributions to the Middle East and Arabs, and these perceptions render the epistemological constituent of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm. Africa, being transferred from Ottoman Africa as a source for deep-rooted

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<sup>54</sup> Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, 'Qira'a li-Ta'rikh al-Dawla al-'Uthmaniyya wa-'Alaqatiha bil-'Alam al-'Arabi', **Studies on Turkish Arab Relations**, Annual 1986 (Istanbul: TAIV, 1986) pp. 91-93. For a more comprehensive discussion of this subject see, Ulrich W. Haarmann, 'Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab image of the Turk from the Abbasids to Modern Egypt,' *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, No.20 (1988), pp.175-96.

<sup>55</sup> Graham Fuller, "Turkey's strategic model: Myths and realities." **Washington Quarterly** 27.3 (2004) p. 59.

relations for today, in other words, historical-ties being a source of inspiration and promise, the discourse of Erdoğan stresses “the position, power, authority or moral superiority of (his) sources.”<sup>56</sup>

The discourse not only discredits the traditionally detached character of TFP towards the region advocated by the opposition leader, but also uses the Ottoman past as an instrument and source for resolving the problems and reconstructing the contemporary relations. The historical knowledge that North Africa was under the legal rule of Ottoman Empire is used as a proof for Africa, imagined as an Ottoman Africa, which is used to make the argument of self-confident foreign policy more acceptable for the recipients.

### 2.3. Discourse of History during Gezi Park Protests

The use of avulsive discourse of deconstruction and reconstruction is related to the point whether the issue is perceived as a moral one or not. The claim to revive the history is perceived as a moral case in which the rhetor employs avulsive discourse of deconstruction or reconstruction. An exemplary form of neo-Ottoman public visibility is posed in the case of Erdoğan’s vow of re-building the Ottoman military barracks in Istanbul, Taksim Square. “We will rebuild the (Ottoman era military) barracks,” claimed Erdoğan and this vow is a recurring theme in the respective years in various media of political discourse.<sup>5758</sup> The symbolic significance of the Ottoman military barrack in Gezi Park dating back to the image of the Ottoman military barrack in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s mind, as cited in Singer, can

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<sup>56</sup> Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse and manipulation.” **Discourse & Society** 17.3 (2006) pp. 359-383.

<sup>57</sup> “Erdoğan defies unrest, vows to rebuild Ottoman barracks,” *English Al Arabiya*, 1 June 2013. Available at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2013/06/01/Dozens-injured-after-violent-protests-at-Istanbul-s-Taksim-Square.html>

<sup>58</sup> The same sentence, almost in the identical words and in a similar form of address, is reproduced in 2016. See: “Erdoğan vows to ‘rebuild’ the Ottoman military barracks in İstanbul’s Gezi Park,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 18 June 2016, Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Erdo%0111an-vows-to-rebuild-ottoman-military-barracks-in-istanbuls-gezi-park.aspx?PageID=238&NID=100645&NewsCatID=338>

be traced in Erdoğan's interview: "the master and his ordeals helped us, like no other, to make sense of history and the present."<sup>59</sup> Singer argues that there is a dichotomous perspective on the Ottoman barracks in Taksim square as a symbolic value in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's imagination, since the barracks were the heart of the rebellion during the 31<sup>st</sup> March incident. 31<sup>st</sup> March incident is simply an Islamic rebellion recalling the days of Sheria rule against the secular character of the Ottoman constitutionalism. Hence the barracks were of Islamic association being the symbol of resistance and protesting against the secular institutions of constitutionalism. Farhi makes it clear that the rebels asked for the "full implementation of the *Şeriat*" and the removal of the Young Turks and some prominent officers who were hard secular, western-minded, pro-constitutionalist.<sup>60</sup>

Farhi also states:

"it was decided to recruit a special task force made up of regular units of the Third (Salonica) Corps and the Second (Edirne) Corps, as well as volunteer units (*Milli Taburlar*). The force was to close in on the capital, punish the ringleaders of the revolt, and re-establish the authority of the Constitutional Government. The task force was later to be called the Operation (Movement) Corps (Hareket Ordusu)."<sup>61</sup>

Singer underlines the point that "Necip Fazıl described this force as a band of 'capulcus of Macedonian origin' using the same Turkish word Erdoğan would use to describe the Gezi Park protestors."<sup>62</sup> Erdoğan's naming [*capulcu* obviously adopted from the language of the master, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek<sup>63</sup>] of the group (Gezi Park

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<sup>59</sup> Sean R. Singer, "ERDOĞAN'S MUSE: The School of Necip Fazıl Kisakurek." **World Affairs** 176.4 (2013) p. 82

<sup>60</sup> David Farhi. "The *Şeriat* as a Political Slogan: Or the 'Incident of the 31st Mart'" **Middle Eastern Studies** 7.3 (1971) p.277

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Singer, "ERDOĞAN'S MUSE," p.86

<sup>63</sup> The re-contextualization of the master's (Necip Fazıl Kısakürek) language signifies the re-contextualization of the experience of the master, mental model of the master and transferring it to the present. Van Dijk argues for the complicated relationship between the personal experiences and mental models: "These personal mental representations of people's 'experiences' of such social practices called *models*. Models are mental representations of events, actions, or situations people are engaged in, or which they read about. The set of these models represents the beliefs (knowledge and opinions) people have about their everyday lives and defines what we usually call people's

protestors) is a strategy pursued in harmony with the collective memory / socio-cultural significations appealing to the feelings of conservative circle in Turkish society functioning as a reminder of the 31<sup>st</sup> March. The naming of the protesters as *çapulcu* was another example of the *complete populism* as the rhetor defines the protestestors as out-group and discredits their legitimacy through discursive exclusion whose source is retrieved from the past meanings retrieved from the ordeals of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.

During the Gezi Park protests against Erdoğan's statement to re-build the Ottoman military barracks, Erdoğan called these young people "bums, drunks, and rodents."<sup>64</sup> Calling these young protesting group *çapulcu*, Erdoğan maintains his discourse: "We won't do what a handful of looters have done. They burn and destroy ...They destroy the shops of civilians. They destroy the cars of civilians."<sup>65</sup> The label of looters (*çapulcu*) on the Gezi Park protestors reveals the aspect of intertextuality and the re-contextualization of the past perceptions between the defenders of *Seriat* and constitutionalists. Since the case is perceived as a moral case, the historical Ottoman military barracks to be resurrected in the same place, the discourse figures out a typical avulsive discourse of deconstruction by making use of the subjective pronoun, they, which is the object of deconstruction. The political discourse may also be claimed to be aimed at "transforming the youth groups into 'folk devils'."<sup>66</sup> Erdoğan, adopting the master's label on the defenders of constitutionalism, poses himself as the leading figure in a politically constructed realm, positions himself as the primary protector of the Ottoman and Islamic memory against the secularist protestors "naming (the) group and treating them...as if they were single."<sup>67</sup> Erdoğan creates a conscious allegory, coupling the old Ottoman military and the project of

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<sup>64</sup> 'experiences'." Teun A. Van Dijk, "Discourse analysis as ideology analysis." **Language and peace** 10 (1995) p.50.

<sup>65</sup> Singer,"ERDOĞAN'S MUSE," p.82

<sup>66</sup> "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dismisses Turkey protestors as vandals," *The Guardian*, 9 June 2013, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-protesters-looters-vandals>

<sup>67</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, ed. **Discourse and communication: New approaches to the analysis of mass media discourse and communication.** Vol. 10. Walter de Gruyter, 1985. p.4.

<sup>67</sup> See footnote 64 in Chapter 1.

Ottoman military barrack as a symbol of Islamic spatial visibility in the most well-known square of Istanbul, Taksim. Another coupling is the association made between the protestors, labelled as ‘looters’ (*çapulcu*) and the Operation Corps (*Hareket Ordusu*). Erdoğan’s discourse is aimed to orient the public opinion to the way that the protestors were not with civilians, on the contrary, utterly against them.

The prime factor of including the political discourse, policy on Gezi Park to be analyzed in Chapter 4 is to illustrate how the modern problems, events and issues are perceived through the glasses of the past events and figures.

#### **2.4. An Ottoman Officer and the Founding Father: Ghazi Mustafa Kemal vs Atatürk**

Critical discourse analysis requires that the rhetorical power concerned is delved into through a re-construction of the power relations between the owner of the semantic power and the addressee through a represented context in which “the receiver of a sentence message is now presumed to have enough to go on that he or she can seek to establish what relation was affirmed, denied, wished for, and so forth among what objects.”<sup>68</sup> As a way to promote the collective memory of an Ottoman past, the first step taken is the rendering coalescence of Mustafa Kemal - Ottoman officer, and of the Kemalist establishment as a failure in the domestic and international arena. This section of the thesis examines the function of the political discourse with an understanding of Mustafa Kemal, who had been an Ottoman citizen until he was 42, and M. Kemal Atatürk who lived as a citizen of the Turkish Republic for 15 years. The function of the political discourse can be grasped in a more comprehensive way regarding the legitimacy struggle between 42 years and 15 years of M. Kemal Atatürk.

The term justice is already a potential allusion to the Ottoman era and, “the name of the party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) reflects in the Turkish public

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<sup>68</sup> Goodman, “Context.” p.316.

consciousness and in its core outlook its identification with the Ottoman past.”<sup>69</sup> The Kemalist regime is depicted as a failed project in the sense that it has not achieved a common memory shared by all the citizens of Turkey, regardless of their ethnic and sectarian basis. Another failure is represented as its misguided foreign policy. Traditional bureaucratic foreign policy paradigm is based upon the idea of “peace at home and peace in the world”<sup>70</sup> which is criticized through semantic power with the basic negativities that it is status-quoism which is the source of submission, passive, non-intervening, non-involving, disinterested, reactive, resolved, disengaged and conservative foreign policy.

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<sup>69</sup> Alexander Murinson, “The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy.” **Middle Eastern Studies** 42.6 (2006) p. 947

<sup>70</sup> On the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Foreign Policy During Atatürk’s Era is stated: “In this framework, the foreign policy vision adopted by Atatürk, the goal specified with the words of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and the resolute policies he followed in this direction may constitute the most significant factors that have enabled the Republic of Turkey to reach her current position. Following closely international developments, diplomacy and foreign policy starting from his young ages, Atatürk knew that the Republic of Turkey would attain a well-deserved position among civilized nations. This was his dream at that time. He knew that this dream could only be achieved with an effective foreign policy and foreign relations founded on a solid basis. For this reason, foreign policy and Turkey’s position in the international arena have always been a high priority for Atatürk. He thought that Turkey’s future depended on a healthy vision to be adopted in this framework. Atatürk also viewed that Turkey’s future was tied to resolute policies to be followed in this direction. These views dominated Atatürk’s opinions and thoughts. Atatürk approached every kind of issue primarily with rationalism and realism. In this context, his foreign policy vision arose on the same principles as well. Thus, foreign policy stance adopted during the difficult National War of Independence, was first of all consistent with the main goal of establishing an independent Turkish State within national borders. This attitude, which rejected adventurous and expansionist inclinations without compromising independence, left its mark on a set of developments that secured the unconditional independence of the Republic of Turkey”. In this framework, the foreign policy vision adopted by Atatürk, the goal specified with the words of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and the resolute policies he followed in this direction may constitute the most significant factors that have enabled the Republic of Turkey to reach her current position. Following closely international developments, diplomacy and foreign policy starting from his young ages, Atatürk knew that the Republic of Turkey would attain a well-deserved position among civilized nations. This was his dream at that time. He knew that this dream could only be achieved with an effective foreign policy and foreign relations founded on a solid basis. For this reason, foreign policy and Turkey’s position in the international arena have always been a high priority for Atatürk. He thought that Turkey’s future depended on a healthy vision to be adopted in this framework. Atatürk also viewed that Turkey’s future was tied to resolute policies to be followed in this direction. These views dominated Atatürk’s opinions and thoughts. Atatürk approached every kind of issue primarily with rationalism and realism. In this context, his foreign policy vision arose on the same principles as well. Thus, foreign policy stance adopted during the difficult National War of Independence, was first of all consistent with the main goal of establishing an independent Turkish State within national borders. This attitude, which rejected adventurous and expansionist inclinations without compromising independence, left its mark on a set of developments that secured the unconditional independence of the Republic of Turkey.

The discourse works out to position historical figures such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a product of the Ottoman Empire. The imagining of Atatürk, espousing him as an Ottoman officer, produces an antithesis figure, which is antithesis of the image of Atatürk constructed by Atatürkists and Kemalists.<sup>71</sup> One exemplary form of constituting a portrait of Mustafa Kemal is evident in a speech in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in 2011:

“Ghazi Mustafa Kemal gave an order to İsmet İnönü concerning the restoration of Konya Alâeddin Mosque because it had been used as a barn. And İsmet İnönü did not restore and clean it. Then Atatürk passed away. And now it is our responsibility to restore the place. Do you have any information about this event?.”<sup>72</sup>

The discourse is an avulsive discourse of deconstruction, -as the addressee of the discourse is the representatives of Republican People’s Party in parliament seats- attacking on the opponents’ fabrication of Atatürk. It is also an avulsive discourse of reconstruction as it presents an alternative image of Ghazi M. Kemal. It is an avulsive discourse of reconstruction as it appropriates M. Kemal Atatürk setting out from the ideational world of the self. The *topos* of history is employed to deconstruct a key figure, İsmet İnönü, and in that respect the discourse is utterly avulsed from the traditional discourse of bureaucratic paradigm. The speech makes use of the significations attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and portrays a Mustafa Kemal assisting the policies of the government. The portrayed Mustafa Kemal is operationalized as a figure giving legitimization to the policies of the rhetor. Erdoğan replaces the Atatürkists’ imagining of ideal Atatürk with a cross imagining of

<sup>71</sup> Though the terms ‘Atatürkists’ and ‘Kemalists’ are used interchangeably in the daily life, ‘Atatürkism’ and ‘Kemalism’ are two distinct terms in Turkish political life. Özyürek puts light on the distinction between these two terms: “in contemporary Turkey it is common to make a distinction between Kemalism and Ataturkism, the former referring to a more left-wing, nationalist, anti-Islamist, and antineoglobal interpretation of the leader's teachings and the latter to a more right-wing, authoritarian understanding”. Esra Özyürek, “Miniaturizing Atatürk: Privatization of State Imagery and Ideology in Turkey.” *American Ethnologist* 31.3 (2004): 375.

<sup>72</sup> Author’s translation from the original text: “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Konya Alâeddin Camisi'yle alakalı İnönü'ye talimat veriyor “Burayı restore ettir.” diye çünkü ahır olarak kullanılıyordu... ve temizletmiyor, restorasyonunu yaptırmıyor. Ebediyete intikal ediyor Atatürk ve orayı restore ettirmek de bize kalıyor. Bundan haberin var mı?”. TBMM Tutanak Portalı, 24. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 7. Birleşim, 11 Temmuz 2011. Available at: [https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak\\_B\\_SD.birlesim\\_baslangic?P4=20993&P5=H&page1=50&page2=50](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20993&P5=H&page1=50&page2=50)

Atatürk. The ideal Atatürk of Atatürkists and Kemalists is reflected as a product of what has been associated with the image of Atatürk since 1938. Throughout the discourse opposing the Atatürkists' imagined Atatürk, "opposed standpoints of the political Others are systematically attacked and those of the political ingroup defended."<sup>73</sup> Throughout the discourse, Atatürkists or Kemalists are defined as self-employed guardians of the regime, discrediting their defense of Atatürk's ideals. Erdoğan maintains:

"Atatürk's ideals, character, dignified stance as an Ottoman officer and his emphasis on national will on April 23, 1920 have always been disregarded. That's why his life should be rid of all patterns and taught and learned with complete clarity. Gazi's immortal character will be revealed explicitly only then."<sup>74</sup>

The word 'patterns' signifies the image of Atatürk constructed by Kemalists and Atatürkists. The discourse names the narrow-minded understanding of Atatürk's legacy through the word 'patterns'. The discourse benefits from the attributed deficits in understanding the founding father, and these discursively represented deficits provide a tool of intensifying the arguments with high-utility for the proposed alternative understanding of the founding father. The word also signifies the use of broad legacy of Atatürk by the elites defining themselves as Atatürkists. The discourse is aimed to reverse the Atatürk-inspired elites' perception and reflections of Atatürk. The discourse involves negative representation of Atatürkists and Kemalists' imagining of Atatürk as a figure whose ideals are transferred in patterns which are implied to be archaic, out of date and crystallized.

The imagining of Ottoman Empire as a 'preceding calamity' by the protutelage is rejected in the discourse through an association of Atatürk as an Ottoman officer since Atatürk is espoused, in the discourse, as a figure of Ottoman product. The Ottoman origin of Atatürk, as a figure emphasizing the national will, is used so

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<sup>73</sup> Dijk, "What is political discourse analysis." p.29.

<sup>74</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk's passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History", Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

as to empower Erdoğan's ongoing rhetoric on the national will.<sup>75</sup> The emphasis on 'national will' is a significant aspect of most of the discourses employed by Erdoğan. There has almost not been any speech of the rhetor in which the concept of national will goes untouched. *Topos* of people, the conception that a decision should / should not be taken if people are in favor / not in favor of it is of vital utility as a primary discursive strategy. As a component of the political discourse, 'national will' provides a ground of legitimization for his political actions / policy. Erdoğan's perception of democracy, prioritizing and espousing the national will as the essence / kernel of democracy is also criticized since prioritization of national will carries the risk of overlooking the other properties of democracy. Many critics handles the term of national will as Erdoğan's deficit in the perception of democracy<sup>76</sup>. The discourse does not "seek to reverse the broad legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk"<sup>77</sup>, but seeks to reverse and deconstruct the broader legacy of what has been constructed by the people who define their political orientation, ideology, as Kemalist or Atatürkist.

Erdoğan maintains the discourse with a peripheral argument aiming at delegitimizing the Republican People Party defining itself as the founder party of Turkish Republic<sup>78</sup>: "I regrettably see that there are people who still fail to

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<sup>75</sup> 'National will' is a significant property of Erdoğan's pragmatic discourse, reducing democracy to a simpler bond of ballot box which is used for the ongoing popular support given to his party and rule.

<sup>76</sup> Sinan Ülger criticizes Erdoğan's perception of ballot box as the only solution and the mere legitimacy ground to problems of the country. Ülger states that "he started to act as if this large popular mandate were sufficient for his government to adopt laws without giving any serious consideration to opposing views... At the core of the current tension is Erdogan's belief that in a country that has free and fair elections, any disaffection with the government's policies should be articulated through the ballot box. This rather shallow interpretation of democracy is problematic for a large section of Turkish society. For the Taksim protesters, the right to peaceful dissent is an inalienable part of any modern democracy. As important as elections may be, a democracy cannot be reduced to nothing more than elections". see: Sinan Ülger, "Erdoğan's fetishism of the national will" **Politico**, 6 December 2013, Available at: <http://www.politico.eu/article/Erdogans-fetishism-of-the-national-will/>

<sup>77</sup> Fradkin and Lewis argues that Erdoğan's rhetoric "seeks to reverse the broad legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, however the argument concerned seems to be over-simplified. The line of argument imprints a negative representation of the secular elites who have constructed their own Ataturk whose Ottoman origin is almost completely eliminated. The oversimplification is maintained in the representation of Atatürk and Erdoğan as political figures: "The warrior Atatürk warned against the allure of military victories, the politician Erdoğan invokes them". Hillel Fradkin, and Libby Lewis. "ERDOĞAN'S GRAND VISION: Rise and Decline." **World Affairs** 175.6 (2013) p. 42

<sup>78</sup> Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, **CHP Tarihi**, 30 January 2015, Available at: [https://www.chp.org.tr/Haberler/0/chp\\_tarihi-54.aspx](https://www.chp.org.tr/Haberler/0/chp_tarihi-54.aspx)

understand the Ghazi's messages, with the inheritors of the political party the Ghazi himself founded being on the top of the list.”<sup>79</sup> The discourse of avulsive deconstruction is targeted to the understanding of the main opposition party whose founder is M. Kemal Atatürk. The discourse revolves around a discursive fallacy, *trajecto in alium*, “strategically employed in rationalizations, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimizer reversals and so on, consisting of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else.”<sup>80</sup> The out-group is nominated as the ones who ‘fail to understand the Ghazi’s messages’. The referential strategy reveals the competence of two different understandings of the Ghazi. In this case, the rhetor’s understanding condemns the other camp and claims the legacy of the Ghazi which the other camp is represented to have no right to claim. The discourse defines the institutionalized form of the other camp as ‘the political party the Ghazi founded’ that is an opaque reference to the RPP. The self of the rhetor is represented with the cognitive ability to grasp the principles of Ghazi (appreciative), whereas opposition party is represented in a total downfall (deprecatorily).

The representation of the self as the genuine follower of Ghazi’s messages is used to “justify the positive attributions of the self” and discredits the image of the opposition party as the single political party representing ideals of the Ghazi. The argumentation is revolved around the idea that RPP is in betrayal to the real meaning of the Ghazi’s messages. The position of the rhetor is opaquely depicted as the one defending the non-fabricated messages of the Ghazi (perspectivation). The defense of the non-fabricated messages of the Ghazi represents the Ghazi of the other camp as an artificial idol, while intensifying the legitimization of the rhetor’s discourse.<sup>81</sup> The history writing, alienating the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman history, or defining the latter as preceding calamity and Kemalists’ portrayal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is introduced into the political discourse of the rhetor as two-pronged issue.

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<sup>79</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Ceremony Held to Commemorate the 78th Anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Passing to Eternity”, Ankara, 10 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/58944/yuce-milletimizle-birlikte-engelleri-asacak-ve-muasir-medeniyetler-seviyesinin-ustune-cikacagiz.html>

<sup>80</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p.73.

<sup>81</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

The discourse constructs an alternative realm in which Ataturk is reunited with his Ottoman origin, which is restructuring the image of founding father of Turkish Republic as an Ottoman officer and Ghazi and that image is used to support the argument of the political communicator: Turkish Republic is continuation of Ottoman Empire with all the rights, privileges, deeds and responsibilities thereunto appertaining. In other words, reflection of Ataturk as an old Ottoman officer and the founding father constructs a ground appeal to the imperial grandeur.

The image of the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the various understandings of him produce a multi-vocal imaginings even within either the conservative or secular camps<sup>82</sup>. This multi-vocal aspect leaves a ground of legitimation to re-interpret / revise / develop an outsider eye to the official ideology / imagining of key historical figures.

## 2.5. Discourse on Coups and Coup Attempts

The political discourse employed is not only restructuring the image of Ataturk, but also stresses the negative properties of the military officers self-delegating the legitimacy of Ataturk in service of the coups or coup attempts. Referring to the secularist elites' interpretation of Ataturk, Erdogan's discourse takes a further critical tone:

"Right after Ghazi Mustafa Kemal passed away on November 10, 1938, everyone tried to form an understanding of him in accordance with their own world view, ideology and interests. I am sorry to say that many attempts that damaged our national unity, solidarity and even our democracy, have been legitimized by exploiting Ataturk's glorious memory."<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> For a comprehensive account of the multi-vocality in imaginings of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk within the same camp, see Taha Akyol. **Ama Hangi Ataturk.** Doğan Kitap, 2008. The studies out of the official ideology cannot be restricted to the studies or political discourse of the conservative circle in Turkey. As an exemplary form, please see: Baskın Oran. **Ataturk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi Ideoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme.** Dost Kitabevi, 1988.

<sup>83</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, "The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Ataturk's passing held at Ataturk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History", Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

The ones who are ‘trying to form an understanding of Mustafa Kemal, and ‘exploiting his glorious memory’ are nominated as the opposed political out-groups. It is a typical avulsive discourse of deconstruction attacking on the traditional praxis, fabricating M. Kemal Atatürk for the sake of its own interests. The words, ‘ideology’, ‘interests’, ‘exploit’, ‘damage’, ‘an understanding’ label the opposed out-groups indulging in fabricating different portrayals of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk deprecatorily. The discourse positions the self as the defender of the ‘democracy’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘national unity’. It positions the rhetor as an actor that is also a product of the system, working from within to avulsively deconstruct the premises of the dominant system / ideology. The othering mechanism within the discourse revolves around differentiating the self from the pro-tutelage establishment and it is that differentiation that makes the outline marking of self. The public orator takes the role of a commoner from the public, defending interests of the public against the ones exploiting the legacy of Ghazi, and this act is discursively represented as a total ‘treason’ to the interests of the commoners. Erdoğan criticizes various representations of Atatürk in service of reinforcing the producer’s position and ideology. The erstwhile dominant representation of Atatürk being used by a particular group is reflected as a reason for the military coups damaging the democracy.<sup>84</sup>

The discourse of Erdoğan is an attempt firstly to emancipate the representation of Atatürk from the pro-tutelage military elites, and deconstruct the image that military is the guardian of the regime, reworded by Kenan Evren in a speech given to the parliament as the head of the state legitimizes the military coup:

“our nation will never deviate from the way he (Atatürk) has designated, will not place its confidence in anyone else and will keep and safeguard his accomplishments and principles, always inspired with this trust and perseverance. It was with the strength drawn from this understanding that the Turkish Armed Forces realized the 12 September 1980 operation; an operation which has been patronized and supported wholeheartedly by our entire nation with the exception of certain traitors and misguided people who have attempted to sacrifice the integrity and the security of our country for their self-interests. In full consciousness of the same understanding

and without yielding to any possible internal and external pressure, the Turkish Armed Forces will carry on this historical task which has no other purpose than the restoration of the supremacy of the state authority and its laws, to re-establish the functionality of democracy and its institutions which have been rendered ineffective by anarchy and terror, and to be able to render to the nation the security and happiness that she deserves.”<sup>85</sup>

Kenan Evren, as the representative of the Turkish Armed Forces, provides a legitimization to persuade the Turkish nation that the coup is not a deviation from principles of Atatürk, but maintenance. The rhetor seeks to justify the position as the defender of the Atatürk’s principles. The discourse represents the coup as a task whose responsibility drawn from the legacy of the past. The revolving theme, *topos* of history, is evident in the speech; however the teachings of the history are replaced with the principles and the way designated by Atatürk. It is not the history, but the path of Atatürk that is represented to force the Turkish Armed Forces to take specific actions to be performed. The political agenda of the coup *d'état* is claimed not to change the direction that ‘he has designated’. The discourse is of an inclusive strategy defining the whole nation as the supporters of the coup. The speech intensifies and assists the epistemological constituents of the ideology of the tutelage.<sup>86</sup> It is not a speech aimed to deconstruct something, but a speech to re- consolidate and re-conciliate the constituents of the already dominant ideology. The discourse employed by Erdoğan is replete of representations aimed to emancipate Atatürk’s ideals from the military officers (military establishment) self-employing and representing themselves as the guardians of the regime.

Atatürk’s legacy being a parcel and atomized part of the military officers’ discourse in defense of secularism can be seen as a hard backlash to the government in a memorandum written by Yaşar Büyükanıt, then chief of the Turkish military, on 27<sup>th</sup> April 2007, during the presidential election process:

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<sup>85</sup> Kenan Evren, “SPEECH DELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE HEAD OF STATE GENERAL KENAN EVREN IN THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE OCCASION OF “ATATÜRK YEAR””, Ankara, 5 January 1981, Available at: <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/11/574/7191.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

“Those who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.”<sup>87</sup> The speech employs a well-known idiom of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the use of the idiom leads the speech to the fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam* that is the “misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence (Latin *verecundia*) for authorities. This fallacy consists of backing one's own standpoint by means of reference to authorities considered to be or passed off as being competent, superior, sacrosanct, unimpeachable and so on.”<sup>88</sup>

Labelling the ones opposing the idiom of the founding father as the perceived enemies, the speech maintains another fallacy, *argumentum ad populum or pathetic fallacy* “encompassing more or less populist appeals to ‘masses’ of people, to ‘mobs’ or ‘snobs’. It consists of the appeal to the prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the *vox populi* instead of relevant arguments.”<sup>89</sup> The speech gives a full-fledged picture of the Turkish Armed Forces positioned as the defenders of the inheritance of the legacy of the founding father. The word ‘unchangeable’ is a referential word utilized to elaborate the emphasis on the secular character of Turkish state. It also attributes the role of the guardianship to the Turkish Armed Forces when it comes to the fundamental characteristic of the Turkish Republic. The rhetor increases the tenability of his standpoint through a reference to the legacy of Atatürk. The memorandum was evaluated as a soft attempt to intervene in the presidential election process and e-memorandum since it firstly appeared on the official website of Turkish Armed Forces General Staff. The co-existence of the attempt to preserve and even fortify the heritage of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is represented as the common motive. Both of the texts revealed by the military officers, self-delegating themselves as the heirs of the legacy of Atatürk, reflect an unavoidable disagreement between military and the government, the former one abstaining from negotiation and mediation. The discourse of Kenan

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<sup>87</sup> “Excerpts of Turkish Army Statement” **BBC NEWS**, 28 April 2007. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm>

<sup>88</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p.72.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p.72.

Evren passes over in silence the honorific name, Atatürk. Reference to Atatürk as Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, can be observed as an attempt to secure the image of the founding father from the Kemalist orthodoxy and imagining him as an Ottoman officer who is the victorious leader of the Independence War with a popular support. On the one hand, Evren's discourse represents the coup as a phase to re-secure the principles of the founding father and to consolidate the democratic regime, on the other hand it prefers to employ the image of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal as a reminder of his military origin.

Erdoğan emphasizes that these phases exploited the glorious memory, legacy and the image of Atatürk to legitimize wrongdoings of military regime. The discourse points out the proliferation of Atatürk image as a means to legitimize any political action. Though the discourse implies that there are as many images of Atatürk as needed by the political actors, ideologies and interests, Erdoğan, being aware that he needs his own Atatürk, attempts to construct an imagery serving to his Islamic and neo-Ottomanist ideals in a coherent way<sup>90</sup>. It is worth noting down that Erdoğan's construction receives its source from his own deconstruction of erstwhile dominant images of Atatürk constructed and aggrandized by the secular elites and intellectuals.

An Islamist fabrication of Atatürk image is introduced in the political discourse in service of discrediting that of elites' envisioned Atatürk. Erdoğan maintains the same line of argument:

“While there is only one Atatürk, we have had to witness the fabrication of different versions of Atatürk that undermined his immortal character. The most obvious and significant obstacle before understanding Gazi Mustafa Kemal truly is fabrication of two versions of , one that belongs to before 1938 and one after 1938.”<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Multi-vocal imaginings of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk leaves a room for all the social / political actors to re-invent their own Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in service of the ideational world / policy / legitimacy seeking. I would prefer to call this: the competition to purport the self as the best guardian / representative / enactor Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's legacy.

<sup>91</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk's passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History”, Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

The term ‘fabrication’ refers to the image of Atatürk as an artificial entity and avulsively deconstructs the constructed Atatürks. It also refers to the imagined totalities which pertain to the attributed character of Atatürk that is even idolized and transformed into superhuman entity. The self-appointed guardians of the regime produced the self-styled images of Atatürk in service of any political argument to be used as an instrument or point of reference against any imminent threat of national unity and secularism. Kemalists’ claim on the self-identification with the way Atatürk designated is depicted as an artificial self-styled imagery. Kemalists’ self-identification as the heirs and followers of Atatürk’s path is represented as an artificial self-attribution leading to artificial story-making of the founding father. Self-identification with being a Kemalist or Atatürkist is claimed as a cover over the political practice, not a reality. The reference to the period after 1938 signifies the representation of Atatürk image without his existence.

The discourse generates an alternative reading of history, deconstructing the preoccupation with estrangement with the Ottoman past, re-introducing it as a crucial part of Turkish Republic. “October 29, 1923 is the resumption of 1071 Malazgirt Victory, universal Ottoman Empire founded in 1299 and the Conquest of 1453. Our victory at Çanakkale and Kut Al Amara, our national struggle at battlefronts are the preface of the Republic.”<sup>92</sup> Key historical victories are artfully figured in the form of avulsive discourse of reconstruction as a means of invoking for Turks a revived grandeur heritage which is represented as a guide for understanding the present and setting a future agenda. Kut Al Amara, Çanakkale, Malazgirt and the Conquest of 1453 are represented as the constituent parts of the collective memory. The discourse rejects the understanding of ‘nationalized history’ which has ‘imprisoned’ the Ottoman grandeur. Touching on what is untouched by the texts of official history gives the role of being in the vanguard for a new understanding of history. The political discourse, grounded on the legacy of Ottoman past, gives Erdoğan the role

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<sup>92</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk’s passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History”, Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

to squeeze the power into his hands to lead the change in writing and reading history through a neo-Ottomanist and Islamist perspective.

Throughout the discourse rewriting the Turkish history, the speech employs Erdoğan as a reminder for Ghazi Mustafa Kemal as an Ottoman officer, as a voice for the forgotten victory of Kut-Al-Amara and as a pioneer in reviving the Conquest of Istanbul through increased public visibility. The discourse employs the “strategy of positive self-representation and negative other-representation” and imprints the distinction of neo-Ottomanist perspective from the history writing seeking the Turkic roots.<sup>93</sup> Describing the key historical events as a preface of Turkish Republic is a daring attempt to hinder the alienation of the Turkish public from the Ottoman past. The rhetor instrumentalizes the discourse to make the addressee “identify with what the rhetor says.”<sup>94</sup> The form of address can mainly be described as shaming and trivializing the ongoing dominant format of history writing and uncovering the pro-religious neo-Ottoman nostalgia. Erdoğan, referring to the declarations of the self-appointed guardians of the coups in recent history, maintains:

“Oppression of and occasional interventions to national sovereignty in our recent history and efforts to legitimize these attempts by exploiting Atatürk’s name have been a misfortune for Atatürk’s memory. Furthermore, trying to preserve the status quo by exploiting Atatürk’s name is disrespect for Atatürk’s memory.”<sup>95</sup>

The discourse presents another exemplary form built around a discursive fallacy, *trajecto in alium*, “strategically employed in rationalisations, in the discursive construction of scapegoats, in victim-victimiser reversals and so on, consisting of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else.”<sup>96</sup> The ones who are ‘oppressors’, ‘intervening in national sovereignty’ and ‘exploiting the name of Atatürk to legitimize their actions’ define out-group. This speech, *prima facie*, is a

<sup>93</sup> Dijk, “Opinions and ideologies” p.38.

<sup>94</sup> Barbara Johnstone, **Discourse Analysis**, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008. p.124

<sup>95</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk’s passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History”, Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

<sup>96</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p.73.

discourse of defining an enemy outside, i.e. an enemy state. However the goal of the speech is to bracket out the militarized and securitized domains in Turkish political life, in other words, demilitarization of the Turkish politics and deconstructing the enemy state perception constructed by the militarized state (nomination/referential). The rhetor, as the leader of a party whose cadres are famous for the traditional aloofness to the legacy of Atatürk, is fully aware that the discursive rewriting the legacy of Atatürk carries the potential of criticism to be made by the political adversaries. The rhetor creates an analogy defining the out-group indulged in exploiting the name of the founding father (predication). This type of analogy, while discrediting the ongoing aloofness of the conservative circle to the legacy of Atatürk, names the political-out group with the attribution of 'exploiter'. The rhetor represents the self as the authority with the legitimacy to bracket out the covered truth (argumentation). The position of the rhetor is situated against the tutelage, as the guardian of the national-sovereignty, democratic system and emancipator of the legacy of Atatürk from the hands of exploiters (perspectivation). The run-products of the coup d'état regimes are mainly the constitution, militarization of the political system, securitization of issues that pertain to political realm / social life, and a democratic system replete of democratic deficits. Militarization and reading the political events through the lenses of security form the epistemological components of the dominant ideology. The discourse does not only attack on the aforementioned political-out group but also deconstructs epistemological components of it.<sup>97</sup>

The military's self-styled adherence to the ideals of Atatürk is represented as a guarantee for western mindedness, progress, territorial integrity and contemporaneity. The strategy of negative-other representation is manifested through the association of Atatürk-inspired military interventions with status-quo. The discourse adopts the discursive strategy of othering, juxtaposing a dichotomous relationship of civilian-military politics.<sup>98</sup> The political discourse about the self-

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<sup>97</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>98</sup> Sarigil posits the civilian and military relationship as two domains opposing each other, two clusters involving and hindering each other from within and without. For more information on the institutional bargaining process between civil-military powers, see: Zeki Sarigil, "Bargaining in institutionalized

identified followers of Atatürk's principles is replete with disclaimers. The discourse deciphers that the self-styled and self-employed guardians of the regime are, in fact, the guardians of status-quo. The term, "exploitation", used in the speech goes too far that the guardians of the memory of Atatürk and the regime are represented as 'a prey' on the democracy and the memory of Atatürk. The strategy of negative-other representation is utilized to eliminate the legitimacy of the military which represents itself as an established power perpetuating and validating the national unity. Referring to the oppression and occasional interventions, the speech retains the critical attitude of the discourse employed by military officers after the coup.

To exemplify a further understanding of the purposiveness in Erdoğan's representation of the military interventions as the guarantee of the continuation of status-quo, the colonel Alparslan Türkeş made the following statement with a declaration on the radio on 27 May 1960 after the coup was successfully operated:

"Honorable Fellow Countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from irreconcilable situation which they have fallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above party and impartial administration. Our initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort any aggressive act against personalities, nor will it allow others to do so. All fellow countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the principles of law. For the elimination of all our hardships and for the safety of our national existence, it is imperative that it should be remembered that all our fellow countrymen belong to the same nation and race, above all party considerations, and that therefore they should threat one another with respect and understanding without bearing any grudge. All personalities of the Cabinet are requested to take with the Turkish armed forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by law. We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbors and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principle of "peace at home peace in the world" set by the great Atatürk. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we are faithful to them. We repeat: Our ideal is "peace at home, peace in the world."<sup>99</sup>

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settings: The case of Turkish reforms." **European Journal of International Relations** 16.3 (2010) pp. 463-483.

<sup>99</sup> Cihat Göktepe. "1960 'revolution' in Turkey and the British policy towards Turkey." **Turkish Yearbook of International Relations** 30 (2000): pp.161-162. Available at: <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/670/8531.pdf>

The opposed point in the discourse is completely based upon an abstraction: ‘irreconcilable situation’, ‘hardships’, and ‘the sense of grudge’. The political in-groups, ironically, are not the domestic in-groups. The in-groups in the speech seeks to provide international legitimacy through references to ‘allies’, ‘friends’, ‘neighbors’, the legacy of Atatürk, loyalty to the western alliance and international community, ‘NATO’, ‘CENTO’ (referential/nomination). The speech is based upon the salient argument that Turkish Armed Forces takes the responsibility to peacefully establish and maintain the order. The legitimacy of the intervention stems from the need to end the afflicting conflict of the political camps. The role of the Turkish Armed Forces carved in the discursive sphere leaves no room for the possibility of non-intervention, in other words, Turkish Armed Forces is represented as the single power to re-establish the order. The speech seeks the support of the international community and declares loyalty to the international treaties of rights. It seeks to discredit the image of the probable atrocities of the coup d'état regime (argumentation). The rhetor guarantees the continuation of the commitment to the traditional anchors, treaties of the international community, universal values and western alliance (perspectivation).

‘Peace at home, Peace in the World’ motto is translated into the foreign policy as “non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of all countries in the region.”<sup>100</sup> The social conflicts and historical facts are interwoven in the discourse establishing the coup as a legitimate power for sorting out the social cohesion. The statement made after coup represents the military as a legitimate actor taking a watchful role over the regime. The addressee is supposed to accept the context of the discourse which is reflected as an unquestionable reality as the military rule is represented as the re-establisher and follower of the basic tenets of the founding father. “The use of context...work(s) as narrative and backgrounding and who noted the “uncritical” acceptance of particular

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<sup>100</sup> William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis." **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)** 68.4 (1992) p. 681.

representations of history and social reality as “background facts” in analyses.”<sup>101</sup> Stressing the foreign policy anchors as NATO, CENTO, and abiding by United Nations Charter, the statement seeks to foster international legitimacy and recognition. The speech, crudely retaining the oath of allegiance to the self-styled principles of Atatürk leaves no ample room for any alternative foreign policy objectives. The oath of allegiance is not only to the motto of Atatürk, but also to the status quo. Emancipating the principles of Atatürk from being an instrument of the status-quoism, the statement by Erdoğan associates himself as the one bringing the memory of Atatürk to light and comprehension in the literal sense. It is obvious in Türkeş’s statement that the crystallized tenets of Atatürk are utilized as a practical instrument to “reach the level of contemporary civilization.”<sup>102</sup> The legacy of the founding father is represented as a standpoint of the military establishment. The struggle of memories about the historical figure is, in fact, a struggle between the way establishment and the way politician wants to use it. The use of the term “New Turkey” is in need of a proof by a historical figure like Atatürk, since it is a daring challenge to the military and civil bureaucratic establishment.<sup>103</sup>

The tone of criticism is constructed in a following speech: “Those using Gazi Mustafa Kemal as a symbol of status quo, appeasement policy and animosity towards national will, will understand that they are wrong in the concept of new Turkey which was first used by Atatürk.”<sup>104</sup> Erdoğan simply appropriates Atatürk’s expression to justify the position which is one of the memories at work. In other words, Atatürk’s expression of New Turkey is “appropriated” as a component of the

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<sup>101</sup> Jan Blommaert, **Workshopping: Professional vision, practices and critique in discourse analysis**. Academia Press, 2004. Cited in Blommaert, Jan, and Chris Bulcaen. "Critical discourse analysis." **Annual review of Anthropology** (2000) p.456.

<sup>102</sup> Muasır medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşmak.

<sup>103</sup> Catch-all phrase employed throughout the study is: traditional bureaucratic paradigm.

<sup>104</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk’s passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History”, Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

“legitimacy struggles.”<sup>105</sup> Associating Atatürk with his discourse is an attempt to undermine the ownership claim of the bureaucratic and military establishment (pro-tutelage administrators). It deconstructs the ideological components of the opposed groups expressing and justifying their positions through the position of Atatürk. The criticisms of the opposed groups on the discursive use of ‘New Turkey’ is discursively rejected through *argumentum ad verecundium*, namely supporting the position of the rhetor through a reference to the words of the authority of the opposed groups. This is a valid, competent and qualified argument since the authority is the founding father who also founded the RPP. The appropriation of the term, New Turkey self-attributed as a good action in the political discourse, and the appropriation of the putsches attributed as a bad action of the pro-tutelage administrators are two competing notions “assigning the full control and responsibility for their acts.”<sup>106</sup>

The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, being an asset to the proclamations of the interventions into the national will, is transferred as Gazi Mustafa Kemal as an appropriated asset to the discourse of New Turkey. The association in the discourse mitigates a bad property, which is Islamist Parties’ distanced attitude to the legacy of Atatürk. The struggle of the collective memories of different ideological motives is not only for the appropriation of the historical figure, but also the expression of “New Turkey”. The appropriation of the political discourse by Erdoğan underlines the bad properties of the appropriation by the putsches. Putsches and pro-tutelage bureaucratic and military establishment is “the perceived “enemy” responsible for all

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<sup>105</sup> Jansen makes use of the term “legitimacy struggles” and defines two different modes: a)“appropriation by capture” b) “resurrection”. The former one refers to the legitimacy of the historical figures whose influence has always been felt. The latter one refers to resurrection of the historical figures whose names were intentionally discredited for a period of time by means of political instruments. Both President Erdoğan and military establishment are in the same camp, appropriating the legacy of Atatürk by the capture of his memory, but the ways they appropriate his legacy are appropriated in self-employed style in service of the political motives. Robert S. Jansen, “Resurrection and Appropriation: Reputational Trajectories, Memory Work, and the Political Use of Historical Figures.” **American Journal of Sociology**, vol. 112, no. 4, 2007, p. 985.

<sup>106</sup> The framework of “good acta” and “bad acta” is highlighted by Dijk, in full: “Good acta will usually be self-attributed to Ourselves (or our allies) and bad acta other-attributed to the others and in both cases these groups are assigned full control and responsibility for their acts”. Dijk, “Opinions and ideologies,” p. 43.

social ills.”<sup>107</sup> The distinction between the appropriations of New Turkey expression is discursively constructed by Erdoğan:

“By the expression, new Turkey, Gazi Mustafa Kemal meant the Turkish State founded on April 23, 1920, just like we attributed. This expression, new Turkey, was used after the intervention of May 27, 1960. However, they meant by this a Turkey detached from its roots, democracy and national will, a Turkey which would violate Atatürk’s memory and disrespect the concept of new Turkey, in the name of Kemalism. Our aspirations for a New Turkey arise from the essence, spirit and enthusiasm of April 23, 1920, just like Mustafa Kemal intended.”<sup>108</sup>

The expression of ‘New Turkey’ is assisted through *argumentum ad verecundiam* that is “the misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence (Latin *verecundia*) for authorities”<sup>109</sup> that is posited in the form of avulsive discourse of deconstruction. This fallacy consists of “backing one’s own standpoint by means of reference to authorities considered to be or passed off as being competent, superior, sacrosanct, and unimpeachable and so on.”<sup>110</sup> The discourse reveals conflicts over the meaning of New Turkey since the significations of the term reveal the discord of the memories and prospection. The competence of the concepts attributed to the term leaves the meaning unsettled and vague. The focus of the speech related to the term is to make it clear that the term is not an import from discourse of the coup, but from the discourse of the founding father. This is a form of what William E. Connolly calls “(proceeding of) the conceptual contests in politics.”<sup>111</sup> Two competing assigned meanings on the expression of ‘New Turkey’ are nominated as the out and in groups that are discursively nominated in abstraction. The discourse reveals the competition of the assigned meanings, in other words, it depicts the competence for

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<sup>107</sup> D’Amato, Anthony A. “Psychological constructs in foreign policy prediction.” **Journal of Conflict Resolution** (1967) p. 296.

<sup>108</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the ceremony of remembrance for the 76th anniversary of Atatürk’s passing held at Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History”, Ankara, 10 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3280/our-aspirations-for-a-new-turkey-arises-from-the-spirit-of-april-23-1920-just-like-mustafa-kemal-intended.html>

<sup>109</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and discrimination**, p.72.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid..

<sup>111</sup> Connolly, **The Terms of Political Discourse**, p.192.

recruiting an expression and assigning a meaning to it in compliance with the political objectives.

The discourse targets an actor that is non-existent / in abstraction and that conversation targets assigning a meaning to the expression. The expression is assisted through the wide legacy of Atatürk, whose expressions are perceived as the inextricable part of the foundation philosophy of the Turkish Republic. The non-existing actor addressed in the speech is already a defamed actor in abstraction. The speech is an attempt to emancipate the expression from the authorship of a defamed actor. The ascribed meanings of expression of ‘New Turkey’ used ‘after the intervention of May 27, 1960’ are discredited and replaced by the expression of ‘New Turkey’ used after April 23, 1920. The orator positions himself with the meaning that is depicted as ‘essence’, whose legacy dates back to April 23, 1920.

The political history is re-contextualized purposively binding the aspirations of the Justice and Development Party cadres to the mood of aspiration in April 23, 1920. The referenced date constitutes the kernel of the motivation to deconstruct / revise / re-interpret the premises of the dominant ideology established. Juxtaposing the properties of cautious foreign policy such as status-quo, appeasement policy and animosity towards the national will, the discourse objects to the tamed form of foreign policy represented by the pro-tutelage administrators as a heritage of Atatürk’s vision.

## **2.6. Borders of Heart: Discrediting Lausanne Treaty & Negotiators**

Lausanne treaty is another historical point of dispute opened by Erdoğan, in 29 September 2016, during a speech delivered at 27<sup>th</sup> mukhtars meeting at the presidential complex. Tracing the narrative, a similar discourse is bolstered by Erdoğan without any reference to Lausanne or the catchphrase of “borders of heart”. Chronological processing of the narrative reveals how the term of borders of heart is contextualized and re-contextualized, elaborated and how it is used to discursively include the potential and perceived brothers. The term also reveals the influence of the political history on the present discourse. It also presents how the political history is discursively translated to today’s political discourse as a way of alternating and

delegitimizing the traditional patterns of TFP and traditional bureaucratic structure and its attributed paradigm.

On 20 January 2008, Erdoğan creates an inextricably linked salience:

“With respect to our ties of love and our spirit, we are the members of the love that cannot be confined to these lands. We are the successors of the excitement that cannot be restricted to these lands. We are the members of a goal that cannot be restricted to these lands.”<sup>112</sup>

The words ‘members’ and ‘successors’ construct an imaginary link with the past. The rhetor positions the self as the successor of the inspiring past that cannot be constrained within the present borders of the Turkish Republic. The discourse employs the rhetorical figure, *argumentum ad populum or pathetic fallacy*, “the appeal to the prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the *vox populi* instead of relevant arguments.”<sup>113</sup> Constructing around the idea of being restricted by the physical borders, Erdoğan states that

“What did they do to us in the history? They showed us the Sèvres in 1920 and then persuaded us to agree to the Lausanne in 1923. Afterwards, some have tried to pass off the Lausanne as a victory.”<sup>114</sup> All is obvious. And now you see the Aegean, don’t

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<sup>112</sup> Abdurrahman Tığ, İsak Baydaroglu, Sakiye Erdem (eds). **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın konuşmalarından tematik seçimeler**, (Ankara: Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı, 2010).

<sup>113</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p. 72.

<sup>114</sup> As the main concern of the study is between discourse, (as a utopia, in other words, a reflection of the rhetor’s ideational world), and reality, (which is the outer limits), the official statement on the 94<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty conceptualizes the treaty as a “victory”: “We are today celebrating the 94<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the founding document of the Republic of Turkey. The heroic victory of independence, which our august nation achieved despite all the poverty and impossibilities, was registered in the fields of diplomacy and international relations with the Lausanne Treaty. With the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish nation tore up the Sèvres, which took aim at its one thousand-year existence on these lands, and made the whole world acknowledge the fact that it would make no concession on its independence. As it did yesterday, our country is today as well fighting for its survival against various attacks on its existence. Our entire nation’s unwavering adherence to its independence - men and women, the elderly and the young alike - just like a century ago, constitutes our biggest source of power in our fight for survival. The resistance that was put up against the July 15 bloody coup attempt, the first anniversary of which we commemorated last week, once again manifested how determined our nation is and what risks it stands ready to take to protect its homeland, independence and will. All the individuals of the 80 million gathered and clamped together around the principles of ‘ONE STATE, ONE NATION, ONE FLAG, ONE HOMELAND’ in the face of the invasion attempt that was tried to be staged at the hands of terrorists dressed in military uniforms. Turkey will continue its march toward its goals, taking courage from its values, principles and the bravery of our august nation. On the 94<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, I remember our Republic’s founder Ghazi Mustafa Kemal and his comrades-

you? We gave away at the Lausanne the islands<sup>115</sup> that you could shout across to. Is that the victory? Those places used to belong to us. There are still our mosques and sanctuaries. However, we are still talking 'What will the continental shelf be? What will it be in the air, or at the sea?' We are still struggling for this. Why? Because of the ones that were at the table in Lausanne."<sup>116</sup><sup>117</sup>

We-They-Some creates a nexus referential format. The in-group, 'we' is constructed in abstraction. 'We' is not a reference to the people. It is neither a reference to the land. It is an in-group utilized in abstraction leaving room for referring to people, land and power, civilization and culture. 'We' is an abstracted term that figures out the extent of *excluding populism* that marks the line between the in-group and out-

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in-arms with respect, and wish Allah's mercy upon all our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for our homeland and independence." R. Tayyip Erdoğan, 94th Anniversary of Lausanne Peace Treaty, Ankara, 24 July 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/80026/lozan-baris-antlasmasinin-94-yil-donumu.html>

<sup>115</sup> Aegean Islands Question, Dodecanese, starts with the occupation of Italy after the resistance faced in Tripoli (*Trablusgarp*). Section XI (Libya, Aegean Islands), Article 122 of Sèvres Treaty (August 1920), declares: "Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all rights and title over the following islands of Aegean Sea: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Pscopis (Tilos), Misirios (Nisyros), Calymnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Sini (Symi) and Cos (Kos) which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Costellorizzo." Lausanne, in Article 15 states that "Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all her rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Pscopis, (Tilos), Misirios (Nisyros), Calymnos (Kalymnos) Simi (Symi) and Cos (Kos) which are now occupied by Italy, and also over the island of Costellorizzo" Britain, Great. "Turkey No. 1 (1923)." **Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs**. Vol. 1923. 1922. p. 692. On 19<sup>th</sup> October 1939, the alliance pact between three following states: France, Britain and Turkey, Turkey is certified with the freedom to occupy the Aegean Islands. On 10<sup>th</sup> February 1947, Section V, Article 14, Paris Treaty puts: "(1) Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter, namely Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Pscopis (Tilos), Misirios (Nisyros), Calymnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Sini (Symi) and Cos (Kos) and Costellorizzo as well as the adjacent islets. (2) These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized. (3) The procedure and the technical conditions governing the transfer of those islands to Greece will be determined by agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Greece and arrangements shall be made for the withdrawal of foreign troops not later than 90 days from the coming into force of the present Treaty".

<sup>116</sup> The discourse refers to İsmet Pasha, then İsmet İnönü, as the liable of (as the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan names it) the losses in Lausanne Treaty. Regardless of his role during the Turkish Independence War, criticism of İsmet İnönü and his policies unleashed by the conservative parties in Turkish political life is a way to mitigate and undermine the legacy of the Republican policies during the first 27 years (1923-1950) of the Turkish Republic (consolidation period of the modern Turkey). The sources of the clash between the conservative right wing and left-wing Republican circle is the fundamental difference with respect to the attitude towards the place of religion in public sphere, statist/liberal economic model, in other words, redefinition of the role of the state in social and economic life.

<sup>117</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Speech at the 27th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex", Ankara, 29 September 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52444/27th-mukhtars-meeting-at-the-presidential-complex.html>

groups. As a typical discourse of *excluding populism* type, it refers to the Turkish public opinion, attempts to emancipate the Turkish public opinion from the taboos of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm, and condemns the out-group responsible for today's Aegean continental shelf question between Turkey and Greece.<sup>118</sup> The antagonist of the speech is the Entente Powers, depicted as the ones showing death (the Sèvres) in order to persuade Turkey to settle for malaria (Lausanne)<sup>119</sup>. Lausanne which is the guarantee and founding document of the Turkish Republic is represented as the malaria, the lesser of two evils (*ehven-i şer*). The social and political actors presenting the lesser of two evils as a victory are referred as 'some'. The discourse employs *fallacies of ambiguity, equivocation, amphibole or clarity* that "consist of surreptitiously changing the interpretation of an ambiguous utterance or of intentionally playing with ambiguous, polysemic meanings for the purpose of weakening the antagonist's arguments and standpoint, and for strengthening one's own arguments and standpoint."<sup>120</sup> The speech combines the 'giving away' and 'Lausanne' and condemns and puts the responsibility over the 'some' who present it as a victory. The speech does not give an opaque and full-fledged picture of the de-facto and de-jure state of Aegean islands. This ambiguity regarding the de facto and de jure authority in the Aegean Islands in the speech represents the antagonists with the full responsibility to give away the lands belonging to the Turkish Republic.<sup>121</sup> 'Mosques' and 'sanctuaries' are the words that have manifold significations. The rhetor points out that the Aegean islands retain the cultural and civilizational traits that belong to 'us', Those words are also expected to appeal to religious sentiments of the hearers. The sources of the political conflicts with Greece today are transferred as a tool of guilt and blame put on the negotiators of Lausanne (*trajecto in alium*). This speech discredits the negative attribution of incapacity to solve the political

<sup>118</sup> See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Delimitation of the Aegean Continental Shelf" Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-delimitation-of-the-aegean-continental-shelf.en.mfa>

<sup>119</sup> *To show death in order to persuade the one to settle for malaria.* It is a well-known idiom whose father is Süleyman Demirel, the 9<sup>th</sup> President of Turkish Republic, the former party leader of TPP. "Ölümü gösterip, sitmaya razı etmek".

<sup>120</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p. 74.

<sup>121</sup> For a brief historical account of Aegean Islands see: Hüsnü Özlü. "Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Balkan Savaşları'nda Ege Adaları'nın İşgali Süreci." (2012) pp. 9-32.

problems, decreases the expectation from the rhetor to solve the problem, and intensifies and justifies the negative attributions of the out-group represented as scapegoats.<sup>122</sup> The discourse decontextualizes the issue of Aegean islands and continental shelf and re-contextualizes it as a source of dissenting to the negotiators of the Lausanne.

Erdoğan refers to the terms of peace at Lausanne, in Article 15 stating that

“Turkey renounces in favor of Italy all her rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis, (Tilos), Misiro (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos) Simi (Symi) and Cos (Kos) which are now occupied by Italy, and also over the island of Costellorizzo.”<sup>123</sup>

Erdoğan criticizes the ones attending the Territorial and Military Commission, Ismet Pasha, Munir Bey, Colonel Tevfik Bey, Shevket Bey and Nusret Bey. The minutes of the commission reveals Ismet Pasha’s defense on the subject concerned as:

“Ismet Pasha said that Aegean and Mediterranean Islands which depended geographically on Asia Minor, were of great of importance for the peace and security of Anatolia; they included small islands close to the coast, situated in territorial waters, and larger islands. The small islands in territorial waters could seriously threaten the peace of Asia Minor and formed an integral part of that country; they must remain under the Turkish sovereignty on this account, and also because they were situated in Turkish territorial waters.”<sup>124</sup>

Erdoğan’s discourse, mitigating the defense of the negotiators, is of a direct criticism to the result of the negotiations in the commission, the discourse reflects a belief that the thesis put into words by Ismet Pasha, was not sustained enough. The discourse reflects a comparative view on Lausanne and Sèvres, and defines the former one as the lesser of two evils rather than a pure victory. Brown makes a clear distinction between Lausanne and Sèvres and the distinction puts forward a reflection of Lausanne as a victory compared to the conditions to be enforced with Sèvres:

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<sup>122</sup> Wodak, **Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>123</sup> Great Britain, "Turkey No. 1 (1923)." **Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs**. Vol. 1923. 1922. p. 692

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., pp. 95-96.

“In 1920, the Sultan’s government, under the pressure of the Allied Powers in Constantinople, was constrained to accept Enos-Midia boundary which left to Turkey only so much of European territory as was represented by Constantinople, a small hinterland for the protection of the capital. In 1923, Turks received back approximately their old boundary line with Bulgaria and Western Thrace which remained with Greece, including the Holy City of Adrianople, which holds the tombs of the early Sultans. In 1920 they agreed to surrender Smyrna with a large outlying district to the Greeks though retaining a fictitious sovereignty subject to extinction by a plebiscite to be held under the auspices of League of Nations. In 1923 they retained this territory without any restrictions whatever. In 1920, they agreed to an independent Armenia and ultimately to an independent Kurdistan. The treaty of Lausanne makes no mention of either.”<sup>125</sup>

‘Emotional Geography’, ‘Borders of Heart’, ‘Geographies with Ties of Love’, ‘Emotional History’ ‘Spiritual Borders’ are the catchwords used interchangeably by the rhetor as a means of implying that physical borders of Turkish Republic simply mismatch with the ideational world of the rhetor. The narration of the borders of heart is developed in such a discursive strategy that matches the concept of borders of heart with the concept of oppressed and aggrieved brothers:

“Yes, we can draw borders around our state but not our heart because the history commands us, Allah commands us not to do so. Inside our heart, there are our oppressed brothers and sisters in Syria, Iraq, Myanmar, Turkistan as well as our aggrieved brothers and sisters in Bosnia, Africa and across Europe.”<sup>126</sup>

The speech employs *topos of authority* and *argumentum ad verecundiam*. There are two authorities, ‘history’ and ‘Allah’ referenced that are employed to reconstruct the novel position. The prominent character of the speech is referencing to the abstract authorities that opaquely positions the rhetor as the bearer of what the history and Allah commands. The standpoint of the rhetor is assisted through abstracted authorities forging the embracement of the ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. The people referenced as in-group in the speech are referenced as the ‘brothers’ and ‘sister’. These words build up a discourse with the rhetorical figures assisting the notion of

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<sup>125</sup> Philip Marshall Brown, “From Sevres to Lausanne.” **The American Journal of International Law**, vol. 18, no. 1, 1924, p. 113.

<sup>126</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at 35th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex”, Ankara, 19 January 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70772/kendimiz-ve-gonlunu-bize-cevirmis-kardeslerimiz-icin-guclu-kalmak-zorundayiz.html>

kinship. The countries in the discourse are evidently a reference to the past Ottoman lands.

The context-dependency of the discourse triggers the use of a discourse in quest for a legitimization for policymaking. The context (ISIS in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq) in which the discursive strategies are operationalized forges the discourse. The political history provides a kernel source of legitimacy to the objectives in future policies:

“Turkey will take part in the Mosul operation and hold a seat at the table. It is out of the question for us to remain outside. Because there is history in Mosul for us. If those gentlemen wish so, they can read *Misak-ı Milli* (The National Oath) and better understand what history we have in Mosul.”<sup>127</sup>

The discourse of the rhetor is nourished by the legitimacy that is achieved through discursive re-contextualization of a historical document. The National Pact is reproduced in different meetings and re-contextualization as a component of the political history as a perspective in service of legitimization for the policy-making to be analyzed in the last chapter:

“Should we fully comprehend the National Pact, we can realize what responsibility we have in Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, if we don’t know the National Pact, we cannot understand what responsibility we have in Iraq or Syria. It is for a reason that we say ‘we have a responsibility in Mosul. Therefore, we will be both at the table and in the field.’”<sup>128</sup>

The rhetor politically positions the self as the performer of the burdens / privileges of the historical responsibility. The rhetor makes a further reference to National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) to reconstruct the ‘new’<sup>129</sup> position and legitimize the ideational

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<sup>127</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the International Istanbul Law Congress”, İstanbul, 17 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/53664/turkey-will-take-part-in-the-mosul-operation-and-hold-a-seat-at-the-table.html>

<sup>128</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at a ceremony held at the Beştepe Culture and Congress Center”, Ankara, 18 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/55683/misak-ı-millyi-kavrarsak-suriye-ve-iraktaki-sorumlulugumuzun-ne-oldugunu-anlariz.html>

<sup>129</sup> ‘New’ is introduced to assist the new position through the grand legacy of history, in other words, through the transfer of what exists in history.

world represented. Referring to the past Ottoman lands, ancient (kadim) cities of Aleppo and Mosul, the discourse makes use of an Ottoman document as a harbinger for the legal and political rights to be used by the Turkish Republic: “no one should fool himself / herself by claiming that these are just internal affairs of the countries in question,” and underscored that when Syria and Iraq is the focal point of discussion, “Turkey’s historical and legal rights must also be taken into account.”<sup>130</sup>

The discourse proposes an Ottoman document, National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*), ratified on 28<sup>th</sup> January 1920 by Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) as a guarantee for the protection of legal rights to be exerted. The discourse is constructed distinguishing Turkey’s interest in the Syria and Iraq from the ones who ‘have an eye on the lands of these countries’. The discursive neo-Ottomanist reading of history makes a clear distinction between the imperialist greed for more power and the Ottoman rule. Following the similar line of argument the rhetor maintains:

“Whenever we talk of historical and legal rights, and bring up Lausanne, some come out and ask ‘do you have an eye on Iraqi and Syrian lands?’ And today I saw some newspapers report that ‘Erdoğan said the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) and thus stirred the pot.’ It is not me that says so, it is the history. Are we to forget such a reality that was noted down by the history? Are we not to speak of these truths? We don’t have an eye on anyone’s lands. On the contrary, we are against those who have an eye on the lands of these countries. We are against those who are stoking ethnic and sectarian dissensions to trigger new conflicts in these countries. As I have always said, our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart. From Europe to the depths of Africa, from Mediterranean to the limitless steppes of Central Asia; our brothers living in these geographies are all within the boundaries of our heart. To us, the Balkans are one half of our heart and the Caucasus the other half. While this is the case, how can we regard those that insistently work to exclude us from developments in Iraq and Syria as well-intentioned? You will come from tens of thousands of kilometers away and intervene by declaring yourself to be entitled to do so on the grounds of the invitation of the Central Government. Okay but I have a 911-km border on one hand and a 350-km border on the other. Moreover, these borders are under constant threat and hundreds of my people have died a martyr’s death there. Given all this, how can you still expect us to say, ‘you can enter freely’? Such a thing is out of the question. How can I see Aleppo different from Gaziantep, Hasakah from Mardin, Mosul from Van! Be noted that we can

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<sup>130</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the 29th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex”, Ankara, 26 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/55785/turkiye-irak-ve-suriyede-yasanan-her-gelismenin-icinde-mutlaka-yer-alacaktir.html>

explain this crooked understanding neither to our grandchildren nor to our ancestors.”<sup>131</sup> <sup>132</sup>

A treaty with a grand legacy, the Lausanne Treaty, is not presented as founding document of the Turkish Republic, but rather something impeachable, and in need of a revision. The impeachable document is employed in avulsive reconstruction of the position of the rhetor. The alternative document that is presented through the rhetorical figure of *argumentum ad verecundium* is the National Pact that is of a legacy whose source is the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. The alternatively referenced document is of the significations reminding the losses in the alternated document. The discourse positions the in-group, bearers of the grand legacy of ‘history’, ‘National Pact’. The in-group is referenced to be the defenders of the countries/people whose lands are exposed to ‘stoking ethnic and sectarian dissensions to trigger new conflicts in these countries’. The circle of in-group is dilated including the victims of the ethnic and sectarian conflicts. In a nutshell, the in-group refutes the standpoint of those who ‘come from tens of thousands of kilometers away’. The discourse is a typical anti-imperialist discourse and the rhetor abstains from distorting the picture or twisting the words while referencing to the region. The discourse functions to construct an out-group ‘who are stoking ethnic and sectarian dissensions to trigger new conflicts in these countries’ and the media that does not give a full-fledged picture of what he means. The political actors ‘that insistently work to exclude (Turkey) from developments in Iraq and Syria’ are deprecatorily referenced within the speech.

The speech includes a *rigged question*: ‘how can we regard those that insistently work to exclude us from developments in Iraq and Syria as well-intentioned?’. Rigged questions are described as a type of fallacy existing in the

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<sup>131</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the 29th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex”, Ankara, 26 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/55785/turkiye-irak-ve-suriyede-yasanan-her-gelismenin-icinde-mutlaka-yer-alacaktir.html>

<sup>132</sup> The discourse on “borders of heart” is reformulated on a speech delivered on 15<sup>th</sup> July Commemoration ceremony on July 15 Martyr’ Bridge: “Turkey is not merely what it appears to be”. *Türkiye göründüğünden ibaret değildir*. Author’s Translation. 15.07.2017, Speech at 15<sup>th</sup> July Commemoration Ceremony.

discourses of political or social actors<sup>133</sup>. Rigged questions can exist in a situation when “one asks … questions containing one or more presuppositions that are open to discussion, that presuppose a … starting point or that … impute something to someone.”<sup>134</sup> The rhetorical figure employs a question whose presuppositions are evident. The hearers of the discourse are expected to understand that it is a rhetorical question. Lausanne signifies a counter-proof of what the rhetor tries to construct; however the rhetor perceives it as irrelevant to the ills of the region. The self is positioned as the defender of the people in ‘the depths of Africa, from Mediterranean to the limitless steppes of Central Asia’; ‘the brothers’ living in ‘Balkans’ and ‘the Caucasus’. The Lausanne treaty opened up for discussion in the discourse is a declaration of the urgent need for redefinition of the national interests, whose actualization is not possible within the national borders. The discourse sides with the people in the region, redefining the national interest, associates the interest of the people in the region with the national interest of Turkey. The discourse alludes to the mismatch between the national borders and borders of security. The rhetor draws the security borders of Turkey extending -outside of- the national borders, referring to ancient *-kadim-* cities of Mesopotamia. Combining the ancient cities such as Aleppo, Gaziantep, Hasakah, Mardin, Mosul and Van, discourse yields to a complete history narration nourished by an emotional reminiscence -appealing to the emotions of historical belonging- of the Ottoman nostalgia.

The Ottoman past, succinctly realigned with a Kantian application of “proceed(ing) in the disputes”<sup>135</sup> even if the inauguration of the order-establishment

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<sup>133</sup> In our case, it is not possible to make use of it as a fallacy, but analysis of the question concerned as a type of rhetorical figure employed in the political discourse is more handy and revealing. Hence the negative adjectives articulated by the author are going to be eliminated.

<sup>134</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p. 73.

<sup>135</sup> President Erdoğan’s discourse attests the Ottoman nostalgia as a possibility for a solution of the modern problems. The discourse represents the Ottoman past on the assumption that as if it is the strongest option (among many others) to establish a regional order. Kantian approach to the envisioned world order, in other words, the idea of federation of free states is reflected (on an assumption) as though it is possible to achieve and sustain it. Kantian approach to the process of opening a new perspective to the world order is stressed: “(Principle of Right) recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal federal state may be inaugurated, so we should therefore assume that it is possible (*in praxis*). Immanuel

in the region cannot be realized –*praxis*–, the secondary object of proceeding in the disputes is represented at the present in the form of responsibility for the nostalgic sensibility. The discourse illustrates the generous-faced / multi-faceted national interest seeking nature of the foreign policy as a historical necessity for the one ruling the Anatolian peninsula. The Ottoman regional order, downplaying the race and ethnic-sectarian conflicts, is transferred and thus attested as a remedy for the post-nation-state disorder that is fraught with conflicts and failing to recover its natural zones of economic, political and social interaction. The discourse, self-congratulating the constructed / imagined history is infused with the febrile exuberance of the Ottoman past assuaging the regional problems fraught with sectarian and ethnic conflicts at the beginning of the post-nation-state period.

In a speech at a mass inauguration ceremony, on 22 December 2016, Erdoğan furthers a similar argument in a different context:

“Where we will end up is the conditions of the Sèvres treaty if we happen to stop during this critical period when the world is being tried to be reshaped. However, we are a nation that still feels the sorrow of our losses at the Lausanne. Let me be clear, Turkey is putting up its biggest struggle since the War of Independence. This is a struggle for one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state.<sup>136</sup> Unlike the former ones, we are today faced with asymmetric attacks. Terror organizations are just the pawn in this fight. Our real struggle is against the powers behind them.”<sup>137</sup>

The prominent rhetorical theme employed in the discourse is the *topos of threat* or *topos of danger*. The term, ‘conditions of Sèvres Treaty’ signifies a perennial and undying syndrome. The capacity of the term to arise the state of syndrome for the commoners in society reveals that the Sèvres Treaty utilized in a

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Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784), in Hans Reiss, ed., **Kant: Political Writings**, H. B. Nisbet, trans., 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

<sup>136</sup> Four inextricable principles uttered in almost every speech by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2014 includes: “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state”. These four principles are associated with the apparent symbolism of Martyrdom and the massacre of pro-Morsi protestors in 2013 in Rabia al-Adawiya Square whose significations became visible for all the Muslim Brotherhood movement outside Egypt. Erdoğan adopts the four-fingered hand-gesture, associates it as a sign of his own R4BIA/ four inextricable principles.

<sup>137</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Mass Inauguration Ceremony of the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs”, Ankara, 22 December 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/68472/turkey-is-putting-up-its-biggest-struggle-since-the-war-of-independence.html>

political discourse is a reality that exists among our collective linguistic memory, that is:

“our common stock of words embody(ing) all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon-the most favored alternative method.”<sup>138</sup>

It means that “if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them.”<sup>139</sup> The perceived danger or threat is ending up with the Sèvres treaty. It can also be argued that the discourse appeals to the emotions of feeling insecurity and re-visiting the days of calamity before and during the War of Independence. The aspect of common appealed emotions and beliefs to the term reveals that this term is also a type of “common idioms” that “are adapted not to facts, but to beliefs. If these beliefs are widely accepted; if they are intimately connected with the fears and the hopes of the community in which they occur ... - then the language representing them will be regarded as most successful.”<sup>140</sup> The use of the *topos* of danger or *topos* of threat is reinforced through a use of “common stock of words / common idiom”. Referring to the Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria against Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS), it is made clear that the increased military engagement in the North Syria is not a result, but as part of the Turkey’s growing regional influence. Turkey uses not only the soft power but also the hard power to achieve the regional objectives. The discourse maintaining that it is not the terrorist organizations that Turkey deals with, but the powers behind them emphasizes the continuation of the pivotal role of Turkey between influences of the Western powers and the self-actualized east. Underlining his position to name Lausanne treaty as a loss worth feeling sorrowful, the argument sets the scene in such

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<sup>138</sup> Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address.” **Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society**, vol. 57, 1956, p. 8. *New Series*, [www.jstor.org/stable/4544570](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544570).

<sup>139</sup> Reisigl, **Discourse and Discrimination**, p. 77.

<sup>140</sup> Paul Feyerabend, “Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem.” **The Review of Metaphysics**, vol. 17, no. 1, 1963, pp. 51-52., [www.jstor.org/stable/20123984](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123984).

a way that if Turkey fails to carve a primary role in the Middle East, it will also fail to re-suit the condition of Lausanne.

## 2.7. Discourse Going Beyond the Alleged History: Myth Writing

The discourse of rewriting the history goes beyond imagining the history of Turkish Republic through a perspective where the authority is positioned. The dominant competition between the pro-tutelage and pro-nostalgia readings of the history of Turkish Republic is replaced with another dimension of competition between pro-Western and supremely positioned pro-nostalgia readings of the world history. The samples represent a rhetor in discursive reconsidering of the myths about the science in Ottomans tendered inimical to the present dominant ideology's understanding of the place of science in Ottomans. The discourse to be analyzed holds the key for depicting the force of imagination in political discourse as a means of the support to the political objectives in the rhetor's mind. One of the objectives in writing the myths is to deconstruct validity of the vast and dominant literature of secularist Turkish scientists/scholars reflecting the Ottoman detachment from the natural sciences and it is depicted as an exemplary form of erstwhile conflict between religion and scientific knowledge.<sup>141</sup>

Another objective is to restore the socio-psychological, cultural malaise of feeling inferior and to eradicate the perceived enemy humiliating the Turkish culture from the mind-set of the hearers of the discourse. The myth discursively produced by the politician serves to position the remembrances of Ottoman Empire to its rightful place. The memory of the Ottoman past is represented as a by-product of what the rhetor would later call in this section, in broader terms, Turkish civilization and culture.

One of the well-known secularist Turkish scholars Celal Şengör, referring to the Pîrî Reis map compiled in 1513, asserts that the map is a message of contemporaneity by the science-thirsty, smart and industrious mariner for the

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<sup>141</sup> Representation of the Ottoman aloofness and reserve towards the scientific research is through various recurring themes and cases have been one of the useful instruments to criticize the conservative circles who already feel proud of the self-identification with Ottoman identity. It can also be read as a way of portraying the secular Turkish Republic to triumph over the conservative argument of magnificent Ottoman era and magnificent Ottoman figures.

Ottoman society in which the tradition of science does not exist.<sup>142</sup> The title of the chapter, The Piri Reis Map Reconsidered: Story and Fact (*Piri Reis Haritası'na Yeniden Bir Bakış: Masal ve Gerçek*), reveals Turkish secularist scholars' perspective on the Story and Fact, the alleged contrast between the inferior status of science in Ottoman society in relation to authority and the individual and rare challenges within such a confined habitat. Şengör basically criticizes the generalizability of such rarities as an instrument of the portrayal of the scientific research level in natural sciences in Ottoman society often ascribed by the conservative intellectuals in Turkish Republic. The Reality, asserted by Şengör, is the problem of overlooking the aloof attitude of the avowedly Islamic rule to the scientific innovations, the generalization of the rarities and ascribing them to the scientific development level in Ottoman society. Various portrayals of Ottoman authorities becoming a prey of ignorance are unfolded through reading the minds of the Ottoman elites. The portrayal of an Ottoman diplomat imagining the Mediterranean Sea as an inland sea is an attempt to win a further field in the debates of contemporary and resetting relationship between science as a product of secular thought and religion.<sup>143</sup> Şengör stresses that there is no relationship between the Ottoman intellectual space and the scientific research, the former is depicted as highly restrictive, the latter one is perceived not as a product of Ottoman society but as a product of rarities despite the authorities and Ottoman society<sup>144</sup> in deep ignorance and aloofness.<sup>145</sup>

In a similar vein, Muazzez İlmiye Çığ, in the famous book Atatürk is Reasoning<sup>146</sup>, (*Atatürk Düşünüyor*) which is based upon “on behalf of thinking”<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> In Şengör's own words: “Bu harita, bilim geleneği olmayan Osmanlı toplumunda, bilime susamış zeki ve çalışkan bir denizcinin toplumuna vermek istediği bir çağdaşlık mesajıdır”. A. M. Celal Şengör, **Bilgiyle Sohbet: Popüler Bilim Yazları** (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayımları, 2014), p. 141.

<sup>143</sup> Şengör figures out an exemplary event: In 1770, when French Envoy, Kont St. Priest notified that the Imperial Russian Baltic fleet was set out to attack, the Ottoman officer responded that Mediterranean Sea is an inland sea hence there is no threat awaiting, and that answer given to the envoy reflects the degree of Ottoman authorities becoming preys of ignorance. *Ibid.*, p.147.

<sup>144</sup> Şengör makes use of the word “society” (*toplum/cemiyet*) interchangeably with the word “gemeinschaft”. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-159.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

through a self-identification of the author with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Though it is not Atatürk but the author reasoning, the title of the book makes an ideological claim of positioning through the vast legacy of the founding father. One emblematic figuration of the religious class with the single authority to act on the issues concerning not only the religion but also the other public spheres is a recurring idea. The author selects various cases such as not performing quarantine in the shipping vessels since it is acknowledged as a ritual of non-Moslem (“*gavur adet*”) and causing thousands of deaths for years<sup>148</sup>, not only to exemplify the problematic relationship between religious authorities and scientific thinking, but also to gain political legitimization against the perceived rival ideologies of Islamism and neo-Ottomanism. Another case reflects the contrast between secular Turkish elite’s fancy for science and Ottoman elite’s aloofness. The ban on the first modern university (*darıülfinun*) for 27 years due to the attempt to perform an experiment to show that living things cannot live without air since it is perceived as an intervention into God’s commands figures out how a secularist Turkish writer perceives the conflict between the Ottoman *ulama* and secular/modern education, religious creed and secular worldview.<sup>149</sup>

The mentioned conflict in the mind-set of Turkish secularist scholars and writers cannot be deemed exempt from the erstwhile effort to relocate the competing and embedded spheres of religion and science.<sup>150</sup> Bertrand Russel, examining the

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<sup>146</sup> Instead of Atatürk is Thinking, I translated the title of the book as Atatürk is Reasoning, (*duşünmek* may correspond to *to think*) since the book is based upon an imagined and assumed reasoning of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in different but also recurring/anachronic themes. The book is set on a pronged portrayal of two figures. The author’s stream of consciousness in her sick bed is associated with that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his sick bed and the author takes the role of the spokesperson on behalf of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

<sup>147</sup> The phrase, on behalf of thinking, entails a slightly negative connotation alluding to secularist Turkish science popularizers’ tendency to self-employ oneself with a duty to speak on behalf of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and utilize vast legacy of his thoughts and principles.

<sup>148</sup> Muazzez İlmiye Çığ, **Atatürk Düşünüyor**, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayıncılığı, 2007), p. 131.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> One of the studies unraveling and deconstructing the image of Ottoman aloofness toward science and quite illustrative of the continuous and organic relationship between science and Ottomans: See: Shefer-Mossensohn, Miri. **Science Among the Ottomans: The Cultural Creation and Exchange of Knowledge**. , 2015.

spheres of conflict, describes the embedded competition as a “prolonged conflict in which...science has invariably proved victorious.”<sup>151</sup> Turkish secularist scholars and writers follow the similar vein regarding the nature of the selected cases reflecting “the conflict between authority and observation.”<sup>152</sup>

The question of compatibility between Islam and modernism / science is not solely problematized and critically dealt by the secularist scholars. The question of constructed enemies of religion and to what extent these enemies are constructed are still pivotal questions for the scholars of religious studies. The identical question also uttered by the conservative circle. The socio-cultural significations of the Muslim communities are attributed to / originate from the Islamic creed. The surmounting rational knowledge arising from scientific development cannot be attributed to the explanation of Koran or Islamic creed. In other words, Koran or Islamic creed is not (not assumed / expected to be) an explanatory tool for rational knowledge. The non-attributable aspect of philosophy and rational knowledge as a production of science to the religion has been pivotal cause of being perceived as the enemies of religion. This perception is translated into a kind of ban on science and rational knowledge. The ban resulted in a tacit acknowledgement of incompatibility between religion and rational knowledge. The traditionalizing of the perceptions, and translation of the constructed traditions as an inextricable part of the religion (as though the constructed tradition pertains to the essence of religion) are the recurring themes employed among the science popularizers of conservative circle. A survey such as that conducted by Bilgili has shown that the aloofness of the Ottomans cannot be generalized to the collectives, giving a full-fledged portrait of a late Ottoman intellectual, Ismail Fenni, arguing against the laws of ban on the introduction of Darwinism into the schedules of schools with the open mind-set that false theories is of the potential to contribute to the development of scientific knowledge.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Bertrand Russell, **Religion and Science**, No. 165. Oxford University Press, USA, 1997, p.7.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p.16.

<sup>153</sup> Alper Bilgili, “An Ottoman Response to Darwinism: İsmail Fennî on Islam and Evolution.” **The British Journal for the History of Science**, vol. 48, no. 4, 2015, pp. 565–582., doi:10.1017/S0007087415000618.

The speech introduces as a remedy / panacea to the socio-political complicated issue concerned. The rhetor creates a myth, obviously taking side with the compatibility of Islam with rational knowledge, imagining an Islamic civilization, transferring the scientific and technological development level of the civilization as a political argument to the present, takes the role of “mythmaker identifying himself ... as the representative of the group and the interpreter of its interests.”<sup>154</sup> The selected narrative paves the way for constructing a model of Islam compatible with science and observation. It is simply assumed to be a “model of and a model for reality.”<sup>155</sup>

Referring to the concept of mythmaking as a means of constructing the political discourse of the rhetor, it is useful to consult Flood’s description of the term emancipated from the mythologized aspect of the political myths: “mythmaking is an everyday practice which permeates the discourse of the political communicators.”<sup>156</sup> Erdoğan constructs a political myth posing the “authority when it is communicated in an appropriate way, by an appropriate teller or set of tellers, in an appropriate set of historical, social and ideological context.”<sup>157</sup> Erdoğan, being the most appropriate teller with the aforementioned power of deconstructing and reconstructing the historical events and figure and re-imagining positions of the historical events and the figures with respect to the position of the rhetor, is the only appropriate teller as the content and the form of the discourse depicts set of ideas adhered to his neo-Ottomanist and Islamist ideological underpinnings.

The narrative can be read as an address to the emotions of the hearers through a myth that is beyond the scientific inquiry as put by Cassirer regarding the phenomenology of propensity towards mythical thinking:

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<sup>154</sup> Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p.53.

<sup>155</sup> Bruce Lincoln, **Discourse and the construction of society: Comparative studies of myth, ritual, and classification**. Oxford University Press, 2014. p.24

<sup>156</sup> Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p.275

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., p. 44

“a mere glance at the facts of mythical consciousness shows that it knows nothing of certain distinctions which seem absolutely necessary to empirical-scientific thinking. Above all, it lacks any fixed dividing line between mere “representation” and “real” perception, between wish and fulfillment, between image and thing.”<sup>158</sup>

However, relating to the topic of discussion, it can also be read as a piece of political discourse “interwoven with an ideologically loaded argument articulated explicitly by the addresser of the discourse.”<sup>159</sup> The discourse is if evaluated within a specific context, produced in a fast breaking meeting attributed a high level of significance during the Ramadan. In a broader context, the production of the epitomized myth can be observed as a means of awakening the audience, the discourse hinting the glorious days of the Muslims. The analysis of the discourse on the Muslim space explorers to succeed in stepping on America is an exemplary form of modern political myths that “are narratives of past, present or predicted political events which their tellers seek to make intelligible and meaningful to their audiences.”<sup>160</sup> The discourse entails a narrative/story which is of significance for the specific social group addressing to the feeling of adore and longing for the glorious deeds of the past. The discourse cannot be situated dependent on the context and scope of the production. It maintains the identical character retained, strategically and functionally used within the discourse on the Syrian refugees.

“Optimal distinctiveness”<sup>161</sup> that can be described, in a nutshell, as the optimum condition of retaining more difference in self-modalities than the retained similarities to the others is the foci within the discourse that assists the sense of self-esteem of the members of the re-structured social identity. The optimum difference from the others makes for the idea that the structured social identity is unique securing the distinction between what we can do is what others cannot.

The imagining of the Muslim civilization with a high level of scientific and technological development conveys a very practical message to the religious Turkish

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<sup>158</sup> Ernst Cassirer, **The philosophy of symbolic forms**. Vol. 146. Yale University Press, 1955. p.36

<sup>159</sup> Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p.134

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p.41

<sup>161</sup> Brewer, "The social self: On being the same and different at the same time." p. 477.

citizens: We did it and we (Muslims) can do it again. There are two objectives in the mind of the rhetor: (1) To dismiss the social psychology of feeling inferior (*we* cannot do it but *they* can).<sup>162</sup> Moving on to the second objective it is worth mentioning that the process of structuring the perceptions is a reciprocal process, and the addressor, President Erdoğan views Orientalism as a prominent factor determining the Westerners' reading of the East:

“Orientalism still determines West's view of the East. To a significant portion of Westerners, Easterner means representative of backward ideas, primitive customs and closed mentality living in the darkness of the Middle Age. Expectations and troubles of the East, the cradle of the oldest civilizations and cultures of humanity, have no place in the values scale of this understanding. No matter how far you advance in economy, culture, politics and trade, you can never escape being second class in the eye of the West.”<sup>163</sup>

(2) To end the debate of incompatibility of Islam and scientific development. The dichotomous relationship between *we* / *they* and Islam / backwardness are the debates taken for granted both by the addressor and addressees of the discourse. What makes it meaningful is the address of the discourse to the imagined level of development existing in the nostalgia. The discourse appropriates the Muslim identity and dismisses the view of Islam as the reason behind the Muslims' backwardness.

The speech can also be read as an attempt to emancipate the hearers from the ideational world of orientalism. It is an attempt to transform the hearers' mind and liberate from the idea, Todorov writes: “The Koran does not incite the believer to advance in civilization any more than it teaches them to cultivate freedom, in that it

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<sup>162</sup> Elaborating on the discursive means to tackle the problem of “what should have occurred” and “what occurred”, in other words, the discrepancy between the ideal and reality, Flood stresses that “if it absolutely has to be accepted that things have turned out differently from what should have occurred, then ways can normally be found to explain that *their* success is purely temporary and that it occurred for reasons which did not reflect any intrinsic virtue on the part of their group or their cause”. Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p. 138.

<sup>163</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the 16th EXPO and 20th International Business Forum held by the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD)” İstanbul, 09 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/58926/batinin-doguya-bakisini-hitoryantalizm-anlayisi-belirliyor.html>

is inferior to Christian doctrine.”<sup>164</sup> A careful attention needs to be paid to the objective of the discourse and the feeling that the discourse corresponds to. It signals a call for emancipation from the Western-centric reading of the world history, and entails a discursive attempt to save the minds of the audience from what is presented as the worldwide alleged historical fact. The myth writing aspect of the speech challenges the orientalist view of positioning Koran in a hierarchically inferior status. It is a challenge to the view that constitutes the components of the orientalist thinking as Chateaubriand writes: “In the book of Mahomet there is neither principles of civilization, nor precepts which can raise the character: this book preaches neither the hatred of tyranny nor the love of freedom.”<sup>165</sup> The speech is an attempt, from within the civilization inferiorly positioned, to counter the ideational world of the orientalist corpus in service of transforming the minds of the hearers to the enlightenment by the unraveling of the covered truths. The speech is also an attempt, objecting arguments of Passerini, Finnegan, Stevenson respectively<sup>166</sup>, to challenge epistemology of myth-writing as the motivation to construct such myths is to alternate what is perceived impossible to have been achieved by Islamic civilization as the told myth is told for the first time and the concern of the myth-telling is to create a myth to be retold and followed by the next generations. Unraveling his belief in the success of the Muslim explorers is an attempt to reconstruct the social psychology of self-confidence to be resurrected from the deep-rooted tradition regarding the social and historical circumstances. Through the discursive attempt to resurrect the self-confidence, the rhetor takes the role of a “culture hero completing the world, making it habitable for man, thus bringing culture.”<sup>167</sup> The attempt to

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<sup>164</sup> Todorov Tzuetan, “Nous et les Autres la reflexión française sur la diversité humaine.” *Paris. Edit. Seuil* (1989). p. 400. cited in Tekin. **Representations and othering in discourse**, p.46.

<sup>165</sup> “Il n'y a dans le livre de Mahomet ni principe de civilisation, ni précepte qui puisse éléver le caractère : ce livre ne prêche ni la haine de la tyrannie, ni l'amour de la liberté”. cited in Beyza Ç. Tekin, Representations and othering in discourse, p.47.

<sup>166</sup> Stevenson inspired from Passerini and Finnegan, writes: “The (re)telling of myths in particular has an important function in discursively sustaining a sense of cultural continuity and communality that endures across periods of major social change, for common ‘memories’ do not simply represent ‘shared knowledge’ but are felt as ‘collective experiences’” Stevenson, **Language and Social Change**, p.165.

resurrect an identity equipped and fueled by the self-esteem is accomplished through “shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other collective identities.”<sup>168</sup>

The discourse dissociates itself from the Eurocentric and supposedly shared feeling of superiority, in other words, emancipates itself from the Eurocentric story of success, and transfers the feeling of superiority to the addressees through another story/myth from the history of Islamic civilization:

“It is alleged that the American continent was discovered by Columbus in 1492. In fact, Muslim sailors reached the American continent 314 years before Columbus, in 1178. In his memoirs, Christopher Columbus mentions the existence of a mosque atop a hill on the coast of Cuba.”<sup>169</sup>

The main recipient of the discourse is the memoirs of Christopher Columbus. The memoirs are re-contextualized in the present as an evidence for the re-settlement and the avulsed discursive reconstruction of the ‘facts’ about the past. The discourse acknowledging the superior position of the Islamic civilization in the 12<sup>th</sup> century addresses to the way the legacy of Islamic civilization constitutes and sustains the addressees. Muslim explorers discovering America and being a part of the Columbus’ memoirs is a story contributing to the feeling of self-esteem linked to the cultural identity, namely, inheritance of the Islamic civilization shared by the addressees. It also assures a motivational ground to emancipate the addressees from widespread intra-cultural self-perception of inferiority complex.

The rhetor is aware that the hearers of the discourse are in need of ‘post truth’. The post truth constructed in the minds of the hearers is an attempt to bring up a culture through which the self-esteem of the masses can be nourished. The sentiments of belonging to the Islamic civilization and the sense of pride are expected to overwhelm the episteme. The stories in the speech reveal ‘post truths’ that presents an alternative to the truth, which is the production / reflection of the

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<sup>167</sup> Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p.30

<sup>168</sup> Smith, “National Identity,” p. 75.

<sup>169</sup> “Muslims discovered America, says Turkish President,” **The Guardian**, 16 November 2014. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/muslims-discovered-america-Erdogan-christopher-columbus>

alleged facts. The sense of trust to the rhetor gains the upper hand over what the conclusion of fact presents. An objective fact is alternated through a story, within which the hearers are expected to seek the real truth implied to be covered up by the inventors of the objective facts dominating the episteme. It also reveals the burgeoning influence of rhetorical figure of appealing to emotions as a tool of increasing the level of credibility. The degree that the scientific development has reached has presented a problem of distance to the minds of the masses. It has become impossible for the masses to grasp the whole bunch of knowledge produced each passing day. This causes an increase in the gap between the scientific reality / knowledge (alleged truth) and the beliefs / opinions of the masses. Therefore, the knowledge that addresses to the emotions of the hearers presents a purposive market, through which the masses restore the self-esteem and overcome the inferiority complex without consulting the alleged facts, even imputes the alleged fact as an ill-intentioned act to the dominant ideology.

The discourse is designed as a panacea for the mind-set of the audience to emancipate from the ills stemming from the lack of self-confidence, an antidote to the inferiority complex felt towards the West when it comes to technological developments. The components building up the mythically structured story are “the intricate, highly variable relationship between claims to validity, discursive construction, ideological marking, and reception of the account by a particular audience in a particular historical context.”<sup>170</sup> The question of validity, through an intertextual reminder of the golden era of the Muslims, is addressed through a reference to another historical fact, launching ships in the Golden Horn after transporting them across land as an alleged genius strategy for the conquest of Istanbul. The validity of the myth of a Muslim explorer to step on America is realized through another historical deed, forcing the particular audience to associate and identify two historical contexts with each other. The political communicator does not hesitate to define the ills of contemporary Muslims forgetting what is masked and even covered up. The discourse of Erdoğan, going beyond the official history of Ottoman Empire, is building up symbolic appropriation of an event through a mythic

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<sup>170</sup> Flood, **Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction**. p.7

representation of the impossible, criticizing the retreat of the contemporary historians from the debate of it as a concealed and masked historical fact. The representation of an Ottoman to put the first step on the continent is an attempt to deconstruct concealed, harbored, and framed Islamic history. The discourse pictures out a scene of Muslim explorer able to build up a ship and putting the first step on the continent. The discourse is an attempt to emancipate the dominant social psychology from that of Hamlet's inferiority complex taken for granted in the case of *we / they* dichotomous relationship.<sup>171</sup> The story told about the past is an attempt to legitimize the superior aspect of Islamic civilization dominating the history for ages, and discredit the secular argument that religion with a set of belief system and ideas is the reason behind the backwardness of Muslim societies. The discourse does not only deconstruct the contemporary image of being Muslim, often associated with backwardness, ethnic and sectarian conflicts, but also is set to project an image of the future, transferring the myth as a lighthouse for the future successes.

The political narrative employs the structured myths as a means of constructing a realm of competing narratives.<sup>172</sup> The competing narrative to be constructed against the alleged history is an attempt to create another frame through which the political communicator creates a formula for the possible conflicts the discourse would reveal. The context to which the narrative is referred is the glorious ages of Islamic civilization. The discourse is going to refer to the times when Islamic civilization was of superior position in regard to technological and scientific advancement. The rhetor constructs “a framework for action” in which the addressees of the discourse “understand the social and political worlds in which they

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<sup>171</sup> I am Hamlet without Hamlet. I am a dance-hall without music. I am a spool (for who considers a spool?). I stand out on earth's green lawn like a slab stone. I am drab as putty A brick in a Chinese wall; A blur, a speck, a mote. I am less than the square-bearded ones now mummified Who raised the pyramids And carved the sphinx. I am a small person In a small room In a small house In a small town In a small country In a small world In a gigantic Universe. I am one wool strand in a gray garment's close weave. I wander about in the Valley of Hope forgotten Through blackness streaked with gray, While Time, Mad and exultant, Whirls through me like a demon!

<sup>172</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said refers to the term competing narratives of different civilizations and states that: “Narratives of competition between Islamic and Western civilizations derive their subject matter both from the geopolitical tensions of the present and from the politicized cultural legacies of the past”. Funk, Nathan C., and Abdul Aziz Said. “ISLAM AND THE WEST: NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION.” **International Journal of Peace Studies**, vol. 9, no. 1, 2004, p. 5

live, and explain the conflicts in which they are involved.”<sup>173</sup> The narrative frames a competitive duality between Western and Islamic civilization, placing the addressees of the discourse as the contemporary agents of Islamic civilization to revive the glorious ages. Discovery of America, a sign for the extent of technological and scientific development of shared memories by the members of Western civilization is replaced with another framework in which the mission of Columbus was achieved by the Muslim explorers and the Western civilization was an inferior rival.

The discursively constructed myths are in service of positioning the civilization among the ones affecting the fate of the humanity:

“We should rediscover and rebuild our national and cultural values, which reflect the native Turkish culture and arts, against cultural alienation and imperialism through a universal perspective. That a cultural product is in a native and national form never hinders it from bearing a universal meaning and message... The humiliation campaign deliberately conducted for a period in the past against our culture and faith was aimed at erasing and eradicating this valuable asset of ours. Yet, the jewelry doesn’t lose its value just because it has mud splattered on it. Likewise, Turkish culture still preserves its place among the most valuable, oldest and profoundest cultures of the world. What falls on us is to revive and carry into future our culture by reinterpreting it in the light of the needs of our day.”<sup>174</sup>

The views on the Turkish civilization and its by-products are represented as a humiliation campaign and the discourse leaves it obscure whether it refers to the secularist science popularizers in Turkey or Eurocentric perspectives on Turkish culture and civilization. The discursive emphasis on the native and national form works out to identify the sources of humiliation as the out group and discursively reconstructs the main constituents of the culture with being native and national. The myth-writing delegates the rhetor to discursively attack on the out-group that is the perceived enemy of the Turkish civilization, and have a claim on reviving and reconstructing the Turkish civilization and culture.

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<sup>173</sup> Marc Howard Ross, 2002. "The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond." In Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, eds., **Understanding September 11**, p. 303, cited in *ibid.*, p.3.

<sup>174</sup> Erdoğan. R. Tayyip. “The Speech at the 3rd National Cultural Council”, İstanbul, 03 March 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/72201/we-should-set-new-cultural-goals-for-ourselves-in-accordance-with-the-2023-vision.html>

The discourse analysis of the president reveals an intrinsic formula: deconstruction and reconstruction of historical key figures and events. The design of the discursive action is based upon the deconstruction of the established imagination (pro-tutelage bureaucratic and military establishment) and reconstructing another one replete of latent values and principles of the rhetor's ideological underpinnings. This chapter has figured out the two phases of the political discourse. The first stage was deconstruction, namely, discursive attack on the constituents of the dominant ideology. This stage can be evaluated as a preliminary stage to the reconstruction stage. The components of the ideology are discredited and delegitimized through discursive attacks. The defenders of the dominant ideology are represented as the enemies of the sacred memory of the founding father, M. Kemal Atatürk. Their representation in the political discourse is the self-employed followers of the founding fathers who exploited his legacy so as to assist the self-political objectives. In the reconstruction stage, the preliminarily deconstructed components of the dominant ideology are alternated with the socio-cultural significations nourished by the history, collective memory, heroisms, martyrdom, and Islamic credentials.

This chapter figured out the deconstruction and re-construction of the key historical actors and events, vehemently reviving the memories of the glorious deeds to recover the cognitive culture from the perceived dominant deficits. The symptoms of the deficits in the cognitive culture are represented as the main cause of the failure in reaching the socio-political objectives through constructing a nation. The discourse hampers the ills of social, political and historical constructs brooding over the socio-political domain of the Turkish Republic, and constructs a reformulated framework within which the addresses are consolidated. The re-introduction of the commemorations of forgotten histories with all the remembrances and memories is not only an attempt to diversify the national days of pride but also an attempt to ratify the self as the legatee of the Ottoman past.

## CHAPTER 3

### 3. STRUCTURING THE SELF CONSTRUCT: SELF IMAGINED OTTOMAN

*Groups without coherent stories were vulnerable to fragmentation; those with them were capable of acting collectively.<sup>1</sup>*

#### 3.1.1. The Components of Instituting the Identity

The preceding chapter has shown that the discourse of deconstruction and reconstruction follows a systematic line, the basic components of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm is attacked, deconstructed and reconstructed in the successive discourses. This chapter chiefly examines how the rhetorical action is set out to establish the political image that Justice and Development Party as the only political party claiming to represent the Ottoman identity and how association with the Ottoman past is asserted in discursive and political action. It is also aimed to show how the self of the rhetor is entitled as the appropriate teller. In this chapter, most of the political discourse is functionally targeted at reconstruction, and even the political discourses that are quasi deconstruction<sup>2</sup> are functionally discourses of reconstruction as they mark the line between the self and the others.

The focus of the chapter is the discourse that is “narration(,) in our sense is constitutive not only of action and experience but also of the self which acts and experiences.”<sup>3</sup> The political discourse, by nature, being replete of socio-cultural

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<sup>1</sup> David Carr, “Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for Continuity.” **History and Theory**, vol. 25, no. 2, 1986, pp. 117–131. **JSTOR**, [www.jstor.org/stable/2505301](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505301).

<sup>2</sup> Although the content of the discourse figures out a political discourse of deconstruction, it is functionally a discourse of reconstruction.

<sup>3</sup> Carr, “Narrative and the Real World,” p. 126

references that are the components of instituting the self, is a type of narration, articulated by an appropriate teller. Since the stories, narrations performed through the political discourse “belong as well to the audience to which it is told.”<sup>4</sup>

The following pages discuss the idea of self-imagined Ottoman through empirical data extracted from the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches including the related representations and figures in official ceremonies. The political discourse to be examined is mainly set for remaking, reconstructing and reviving the Ottoman past as a means of identity / image construction of the leaders. The role of the array of discourses strategically employed for self-portrayal is recognized as a key factor in constructing the identity, not only for the Self but also re-structuring the significations for the hearers. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as Weber writes, assisted by “the traditional legitimacy”, is an exemplary form of “the pure charismatic type of a president chosen by a plebiscite.”<sup>5</sup> The language unraveled in the political discourse of the leader crucially yields itself to the structure of the self-construct of the political party. The analysis of the discourse in service of self-portrayal is neglected in the studies of Turkish politics. The peripheral but an assisting question that the chapter seeks to answer is how the Ottoman past serves as an instrument in the way the leaders / politicians portray / present themselves and the way they assert their images. The Ottoman past is reproduced through discursive allusions embedded throughout the political discourse reviving the sense of belonging and re-achievement of the glorious days of the past.

Structuring the self-construct is not solely from the power of single expression giving an explanation that serves to clarify the political identity, but also the extent of elaboration on the subject. The discourse of the leaders constructs the image and the identity portraying a particular, a part of the leaders’ multifaceted ideological underpinnings, personality and “an aspect of an individual’s identity.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Max Weber, **Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology**. Vol. 1. Univ of California Press, 1978. p.219

<sup>6</sup> Cristina Archetti. **Politicians, personal image and the construction of Political identity: A Comparative Study of the UK and Italy**. Springer, 2014. Politicians, personal image, p. 29. Archetti

The discourse is a helpful instrument in projecting “a persona (that) is a particular self-image, part of a multitude of personae, or self-image that can be construed from our overall personality, or mental life.”<sup>7</sup> This chapter is also going to reveal that persona is what the rhetor makes of the political discourse.

This study is not interested in whether the image as a product of the discursive action is purported or actual, and not in a moralistic search for distinguishing between the veneer and substance, in other words, it has no interest in bracketing out the guise of the leaders, not set out on an assumption on whether the leader carries the particular and highly controversial political identity or not. It is not based upon the outmoded assumption that the addressee of the discourse is easily deceived or duped by the images and portrayals presented.<sup>8</sup> In the pages that follow, the analysis is assumed to trace the evolution of the significations thereunto (discourse) appertaining.

This chapter of the study does not seek to detect, locate or debug the ideologies of the press which directly or indirectly affects the way how the identity of politician or the political party is constituted and portrayed.<sup>9</sup> It does not seek to locate the competence of various languages (based on the ideology of the press) through which the press seeks to portray the politicians. The self-portrayal of the political leaders or the presentation of political parties can be purported, but it does not necessarily mean that each representation is not actualized and does not refer to the substance / essence. It does not mean that the rhetor does not effectuate it, or effectuates it. It is worth noting down that these are not among the questions of the chapter.

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maintains in full: “Self-presentation is an aspect of an individual’s identity, and this, in turn, is the outcome of the constellation of relationships in which this social actor is enmeshed”. Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Sadoski, “Imagination, Cognition, and Persona.” **Rhetoric Review**, vol. 10, no. 2, 1992, p. 272

<sup>8</sup> Archetti sets up the invalidity of outmoded views: “The book ultimately shows that the moralistic stand about the supposed deleterious effect of appearances on democratic politics – with the relative dismissal of politicians as liars and the public as passive and ignorant consumers of glossy images – is the outcome of a very selective and, ultimately, shortsighted view of politics”. Archetti, **Politicians, personal image**, p. 89.

<sup>9</sup> Dijk, “Opinions and ideologies,” p.22. Dijk underlines the effect of press constituting and transforming the representation of political parties or politicians or a specific event in particular way: “The ideologies of journalists somehow influence their opinions”. p.22.

The main purpose of the chapter is to seek an answer to the questions of how the political discourse of historical legacy is structuring the leaders' self-portrayal and how it serves as a motive for the leader presenting Turkey as the heir of Ottoman Empire with all the expected / assumed services, privileges, duties and responsibilities thereon appertaining.

Significations from the past are the components of instituting the self. The grand legitimacy of the past socio-cultural significations paves the way for legitimization to portray the self as the purported legitimate agent to write the present and the future. The discourse of portraying the self as grandsons of Ottomans is primarily the transfer of the Ottoman Empire's responsibilities and moral motives into discursive action, in a nutshell, acting like Ottoman. The political discourse is not only in service of the rhetor's self-portrayal but also in forging a renewed identity for the addressees. The hearer of the discourse, with all the codes and positive significations attributed to the socio-cultural imagery of acting Ottoman, fulfills the need to become a part of a distinctive and prestigious social identity.<sup>10</sup> It is "the elements of invention and artefact" discursively structuring the identity of being the grandsons of Ottomans assisting the above mentioned Weberian charisma of the leader.<sup>11</sup> Such a discourse, "as *an articulatory practice* which constitutes and organizes the social relations" is assumed to increase the historical awareness of the Turkish citizens and strengthen the ties with their historical forebears.<sup>12</sup> Acting like Ottoman is an exemplary form of carrying the banner of Islam and Ottoman legacy, performing what is exactly expected, and that expectation addresses to the deep-seated beliefs of the conservative circle in Turkey. The political discourse portraying the Ottoman identity is based upon the presupposition that the Ottoman legacy presents an obligation, not an option. It presents a market in which some options are out of the boundaries of the crown of feeling, being, bethinking and acting Ottoman.

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<sup>10</sup> Wodak, **Discursive Construction of National Identity**. p.71.

<sup>11</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Immigration and national identity: constructing the nation." **Review of International Studies** 22.03 (1996): 238.

<sup>12</sup> Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics**, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985) p. 129

The strategies of rhetorical action to structure the self-construct proliferate in “contexts (that) are not ‘out there’, in ‘reality’, but personal mental constructs and interpretations of a communicative event.”<sup>13</sup> It is the mental constructs and the ideological underpinning of the leader invoking the matter for discussion and cultivating the common remembrances loaded with socio-political significations. The political discourse by a politician reflects the mental modelling of the self. Cultivation of the self is accomplished through a leader as a central figure in the party foregrounding the moral motives entailed most possibly in a related emotive discourse based upon an ethical ground.<sup>14</sup>

The political discourse appropriating the Ottoman past as an ingredient to political identity-formation is fetched in the form of references to the Ottoman past as a panacea to the deficits, socio-cultural and political malaises of the present. The grand legacy of history, which is largely derived from the Ottoman past, is an immanent memory that is of a crucial role in marking the lines of the self: “Practices of self-representation are also practices of memory: the narrators reflect on their past experience and reshape it at the same time. This is where the relationship between memory, narrative and identity becomes evident.”<sup>15</sup> It is the peripheral emotive rhetorical responses functioning to emphasize the moral dimension / re-establishing the moral principles and to normalize the level of relations with other states and to present the political party as the purported heir of the Ottoman identity. The discourse associates the Ottoman past with what can be modelled as good, yet “much of (the effect of good) may testify to the relationship between beliefs and attitudes, which is central to all ethics.”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Dijk, “Political discourse and ideology.” p.18

<sup>14</sup> Regarding the normative and hortatory nature of the discourse, appealing to Stevenson’s words would be a remedy to the probable relationship between ethics, normative discourse and emotive nature of the discourse: “For the contexts that are most typical of normative ethics, the ethical terms have a function that is both emotive and descriptive”. Charles L. Stevenson, **Ethics and Language**. Yale University Press (1944) p. 84.

<sup>15</sup> Heidi Armbruster, and Ulrike H. Meinhof. "Storying East-German pasts: Memory discourses and narratives of readjustment on the German/Polish and former German/German border." (2005) p. 57.

<sup>16</sup> Charles, **Ethics and Language**. p. 87

The preliminary engine functioning as a catalyst behind the Ottoman self-construct is the discourse of “claim to rule as just Muslim Sultans.”<sup>17</sup> The rhetor’s political discourse transfers the Ottoman Sultan’s rule whose source of justice is invoked in Islam as a discursive remedy to the ills of the modern foreign and domestic domains. The discourse of self-identification with Ottomans portrays a just claim, a just portrayal of affairs, a just balance between two sides of the conflict and a just remark on the perceived threats to the imagined order. The discursive presentation of the leader as a grandson of Ottoman entails the transfer of the imagery of Ottoman Sultans as just rulers to the present day in the form of moral motives “(that) have to do with obligations, keeping promises, paying what is owed, and being considerate of other’s wants, needs and feelings.”<sup>18</sup>

The moral motive presented in the political discourse, following the examples of Ottoman Sultans following the teachings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad, is an exemplary form of the general notion of benevolence or beneficence (*ihsan*) set as a preliminary principle for peace through interpersonal other-regarding.<sup>19</sup> The moral motivations feature a kind and lenient regard of the goodness of others, or betterment of others’ conditions and “some internalization or obedience to a set of (sacred) guidelines.”<sup>20</sup> It is the Islamic teaching of benevolence (*ihsan*) and lenience that functioned as a prominent guideline for the alleged just rule of the Ottoman Sultans. It is the just rule of the Ottoman Sultans that functions as a

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<sup>17</sup> Albert Hourani, "How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?." **International Journal of Middle East Studies** 23.02 (1991): p. 130.

<sup>18</sup> Nathan Teske, “Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political Explanation.” **Political Psychology**, vol. 18, no. 1, 1997, p. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Muhammed Abu Nimer highlights the remedial effect of Islamic teachings on interpersonal or social/political conflicts: “Islam yields a set of peacebuilding values that, if consistently and systematically applied, can transcend and govern all types and levels of conflict, values such as justice (adl), beneficence (ihsan), and wisdom (hikmah) which constitute core principles in peacemaking strategies and framework”. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam.” **Journal of Law and Religion**, vol. 15, no. 1/2, 2000, p. 220.

<sup>20</sup> Teske maintains in full: … moral motivations involve two interrelated aspects: (1) some sort of consideration for the well-being of others and (2) some internalization or obedience to a set of guidelines, that require us, at least in some portion of our lives, to transcend our natural attentiveness to our own personal desires. Teske, “Beyond Altruism,” p. 72.

catalyst behind the discourse of moral-motivations that reflect the extent of rhetor's internalization of the Ottoman identity. The moral objectives aided by the Islamic teaching and Ottoman guidelines are employed in neo-Ottomanist discourse contributing to the portrayal of the rhetor as the performer of the deep-seated tenets. The discourse does not intend to instill a new doctrine of the Ottoman tenets and Islamic creed to people, but rather it brings the masked but also envied tenets to light.

The notion of benevolence is invoked in various forms such as global aid system, developing the ways to stand with neighbors and relatives, the defense of universal rights of human, carving a role contributing to the honor of humanity, humanitarian diplomacy, an active role in appeasing the refugee dramas and open-door policy through an understanding of history molded with mercy and compassion. The terms, brotherhood and kinship with reference to the ill-treated people, create a typology, classification of types that have characteristics in common, either with respect to ethnic affiliation or once being a part of the subjects (*tebaa*) of Ottoman Empire. Rather than polished diplomatic language, and even taking the risk of being undiplomatic, the political discourse sides with the historical guideline, defines itself as the grandson of Ottomans and appropriates the Ottoman benevolence in service of the vulnerable people's needs.

The Islamic creed constitutes the source of the moral, ethic, normative objectives in the discourse which contributes not only to the structure of leader's self but also plays a significant role in portraying the leader's political identity as an agent of morality. Appealing to the shared public sphere of Turks and Jews in Ottoman society and Ottoman invitation to the Jews under threat of Inquisition in Spain, the discourse refers not only to the benevolent nature of the Islamic Ottoman rule but also to the patronage as a symbol of Ottoman might. The alleged historical fact deepens the persuasiveness of the discourse and points out a culturally meaningful relationship between the Ottoman power and benevolence. This culturally meaningful intellectual environment about the Sephardim owes a lot to the overwhelmingly conservative science popularizers or columnists' representation of the Ottoman lands to host the Spanish-Jews<sup>21</sup> ranging in number from 75.000-

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<sup>21</sup> J. Michelet figures out the horrible scene that the political discourse would appeal to: "Spanish people hadn't experienced anything like this since the upheaval of the Albigensian crusade. In a span

200.000. In that vein, the benevolence of the Ottoman rule figures out the aspect of continuity in extending hospitality: “Jews had found refuge in the Ottoman dominions for many decades before the expulsion...thousands had fled eastward and had been well-received in the Turkish provinces.”<sup>22</sup> The might of Ottomans is portrayed in service of benevolence, an inclination to perform kind and charitable acts, a gift given out of generosity towards the aggrieved non-Muslims.

Erdoğan, being criticized for the emotive discursive action, addressed to Israeli government, “We are speaking as the grandsons of Ottomans who treated your ancestors [Jews] as guests in this land [Turkey] when they were expelled from Europe”<sup>23</sup><sup>24</sup>. The discourse is assisted with the deep-rooted belief that is acknowledged through the historical documents. One illustrative document<sup>25</sup> depicting the guest-host relationship is Isaac Sarfati’s (the letter of Rabbi Isaac Sarfati<sup>26</sup>) letter as a pedigree to the Jews living in Central Europe: “Turkey was a

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of ten years, nearly one million Jews and Moors were burned alive, drowned or died from hunger and poverty. Inquisition placed torture chambers with a statue of Jesus at the doors of once humane Sevilla City, in which poor wretched souls were burned alive every other day. The smell of burning flesh and constant moaning coming out these barbarian places were truly unbearable. But nobody saw the faces of those waiting on death row. It had been recorded that in one city alone more than two thousand men and women were burned alive in 1481. The Inquisition had a total of 14 courts across Spain. During the reign of top Inquisitor, Torquemada (1480-1498) Spain looked like a giant oven” Jules Michelet, *Rönesans*, Western Classics, İstanbul, 1989, p.163 cited in Bayram Nazır, **Ottoman hospitality and its impact on Europe**. Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO), 2008. p.27.

<sup>22</sup> Abram. L. Sachar, (1967). **History of the Jews**. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. p.221

<sup>23</sup> “Rise of the Turkish crescent,” **Aljazeera and Agencies**, 27 October 2009, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/03/200934165449939647.html>

<sup>24</sup> The discourse is a reminder of the Ottoman hospitality that appeals itself to other historical discourses: “All those Jews living in my country listen! If you ever dream of a country life amongst fig trees and vineyards, come to Istanbul” by Fatih Sultan Mehmed. Moshe Sevilla-Sharon, **Türkiye Yahudileri: Tarihsel Bakış**. Hebrew University, 1982. Cited in Nazır, **Ottoman Hospitality**, p.15.

<sup>25</sup> To protect the objectivizing distance of the study, one further but still supportive discourse assisting that of Rabbi Isaac Sarfati is by Rabbi Eliya Kapsali: “*Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II had ordered everyone to treat the Jews kindly. Anyone caught harming the new immigrants would be punished by hanging*”. Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> “I have heard of the afflictions, more bitter than death, that have befallen our brethren in Germany of the tyrannical laws, the compulsory baptisms and the banishments, which are of daily occurrence. I am told that when they flee from one place a yet harder fate befalls them in another . . . on all sides I learn of anguish of soul and torment of body; of daily exactions levied by merciless oppressors. The clergy and the monks, false priests that they are, rise up against the unhappy people of God ... for this reason they have made a law that every Jew found upon a Christian ship bound for the East shall be flung into the sea. Alas! How evil are the people of God in Germany entreated; how sad is their

country where nothing was lacking. Everyman could spend his life unmolested under his fig tree and his vine.”<sup>27</sup> The ancestors of the Jews are referred as guests. The speech presents a market of alternatives among which the Ottoman ancestors had the chance to choose. However, it highlights that treating the ancestors of the Jews as the guests is not an option but a must of the benevolent character. The speech attributes the identity of Ottoman to the self, nominating the rhetor with the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the aggrieved people. The speech gives evidence from the history, a case depicting the full-fledged picture of Ottoman benevolence when the Jews were the victims. The case is employed to assist the argument that once upon a time the grandsons of Israelis were victims, and now Israelis create new victims. The speech lays a legitimacy ground for the denunciations of the rhetor on the Palestine-Israel conflict. The benevolence of the Ottoman ancestors is cloned in the speech addressing to Israel to perform some actions and omit the others.

### **3.1.2. We Are Grandsons of Ottomans: Self-Appointed Identity as a Means of Grounding Legitimacy**

The cloning of the Ottoman benevolence justifies the image of bethinking Ottoman, meriting to the ancestry. The rhetoric invokes a domain of established culture in which the benevolence proliferates in the form of legitimate ground, righteousness, justice and objectivity. The rhetor, President Erdoan, with the

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strength departed! They are driven hither and thither, and they are pursued even unto death... Brothers and teachers, friends and acquaintances! I, Isaac Zarfati, though I spring from a French stock, yet I was born in Germany, and sat there at the feet of my esteemed teachers. I proclaim to you that Turkey is a land wherein nothing is lacking, and where, if you will, all shall yet be well with you. The way to the Holy Land lies open to you through Turkey. Is it not better for you to live under Muslims than under Christians? Here every man dwell at peace under his own Dine and fig tree. Here you are allowed to wear the most precious garments. In Christiendom, on the contrary, you dare not even Denture to cloth your children in red or in blue, according to our taste, without exposing them to the insult or beaten black and blue, or kicked green and red, and therefore are ye condemned to go about meanly clad in sad colored raiment . . . and now, seing an these things, O Israel, wherefore sleepest thou ? Arise! And lease this accursed land forever!” Cited in Bernard Lewis, **The Jews of Islam**. Princeton University Press, 2014. pp.135-136.

<sup>27</sup> The author, Babinger claims that even if a piece of these depictions in the letter of Isaac Sarfati is true, the Ottoman land must have been a “paradise”: Franz Babinger, **Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time**, Vol. 96. Princeton University Press, 1992. p. 412.

Islamic and historical credentials in his perpetual political discourse attempts to reformulate the relationship differing from the traditional Turkish-Israeli relations.<sup>28</sup>

The rhetor structures the political identity of the self primarily through the notion of benevolence, an influential humanitarian state. It is not only the notion of the benevolence, but the discourse replete of significations from the Ottoman past constituting an overall realm within which structuring the political self is actualized. Discursive employment of the Ottoman heritage proliferate the extent of meanings to be appropriated in an inexhaustible number by the addressees (not only Israeli elites but also the Turkish public). Turkey is displayed as the owner of the legitimacy to speak not only on behalf of tyrannized and subordinated Muslims, but also all the ill-treated people with a blind-eye to the religious orientation. The prominent aspect of the political discourse with emotive connotations embodies the Islamic creed of benevolence as a must for true and fair rule. The discourse is not unrelated with the deep-seated self-perception of the conservative circle as the grandsons of Ottomans.<sup>29</sup>

One of the preliminary analysis of the influence of social demands on foreign policy was reported as “societal constructivism that...(advocates a position in which) the values, norms and principles of the society constitute the main inputs in foreign policy formulation process.”<sup>30</sup> It simply focuses on the formation of identities and change in the interest of the nations. The discourse is situated at a level with a proposition that carries an effective address to the sentiments of the Turkish public. The political discourse structuring the political identity is constructed on a reciprocal basis with social demands. The relationship between the discourse of portraying political identity and the way society reflects on the self creates a kind of “the

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<sup>28</sup> Security is dominant factor in the traditional pattern of Turkish-Israeli relations. For a comprehensive account of the security as a determining factor in the relations with Israel, see: Meliha Altunisik, "The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in the post-Cold War era." **Middle Eastern Studies** 36.2 (2000) pp. 172-191.

<sup>29</sup> Evocative of Ottoman past and identity, symbols and emblems are more and more visible in public life. Users of social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, with an affiliation/orientation to Justice and Development Party and Nationalist Movement Party (center-right and right wing parties) describe themselves as The Grandson of Ottomans (*evlad-i Osmanlı*).

<sup>30</sup> Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem," p. 32.

chicken or the egg dilemma". The comprehension of the dilemma is possible regarding the sociological source: a societal approach to the leader idolization, the leader-centered party organization, party-sympathizers / adherents to the aforementioned organization with political identities taken for granted and the unquestioning adherents only questioning the political identities of the opposing camp.

On the proliferation of the contested concepts that are also helpful in self-portrayal, Connolly argues that there are some limits to the concepts and "the availability of these limits does not ensure that each party<sup>31</sup> will recognize them nor that all who acknowledge them will be forced to accept a single interpretation of each contested concept"; however the effect of these limits is profoundly violated through if the hearer of the contested concept defines himself as a party-sympathizer / adherent. The party sympathizer is already in a quest for identification with an identity. The mood of representation by the leader of the party needs to be taken for granted by the unquestioning adherents (sympathizers) who are, by nature, ready. One can also argue that it is the values and deep-seated beliefs of the conservative circle determining the Turkish foreign policy and it is the people's values that the leader takes cognizance of while performing a related discursive action.

The term, heritage, is employed as the source of reproducing the examples of Ottoman hospitality<sup>32</sup> to the refugees and those examples are the political sources strengthening the image of the actors as the grandsons of Ottomans. As to the question of Syrian refugees, the discourse of the president mitigates the possible problems to be created by the Syrian refugees in Turkish society, and emphasizes the benevolent nature of open-door policy.<sup>33</sup> The discourse on Syrian refugees does not leave any suspicion on the point that hosting the Syrian refugees is not an option but

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<sup>31</sup> It is used interchangeably with the word: participants.

<sup>32</sup> Ottoman history is replete of stories depicting the tolerant, benevolent and hospitable nature of the past, an exemplary form of this is Sultan Abdülmecid's view on the refugees seeking asylum in the Empire's land: "*I may give up my crown and throne, but I will never handover those innocent people who seek asylum in my country*". Nazir, **Ottoman Hospitality**, p.14.

<sup>33</sup> Open-Door policy is presented in the political discourse as receiving the refugees with open arms (*kucak açmak*) that foregrounds the humanitarian dimension mitigating the probable social problems.

a necessity and urgency. The discourse foregrounding the hospitality refers to specific terms directly related with the Islamic creed and secondarily with the ancient (*kadim*) Anatolian tradition:

“As Turkey, since the first day of the crisis, we have stood with our Syrian brothers and kept our gates open to them, and so will we. We have put one extra plate on our tables for them. We currently accommodate 3 million Syrian and Iraqi refugees within an understanding of *Ansar* and neighborhood. And Allah is rewarding this sharing and solidarity with so much more.”<sup>34</sup>

The speech employs what Van Leeuwen would call “*moral evaluation*”, that is, “legitimation by (often very oblique) reference to value systems”<sup>35</sup>. The speech reveals “the common sense cultural-knowledge” and it is only “the common sense cultural knowledge” that enables the analyst to recognize the moral dimension of the speech.<sup>36</sup> The moral dimension of the discourse is hinted in the words such as ‘brothers’, ‘an extra plate’, ‘Ansar’ and ‘neighborhood’. The socio-political significations vested in these words rewards the speech with the legitimacy for further action. The significations in these words also call the hearers of the discourse to show optimal level of loyalty to perform the vested identity. What the discourse distills from open-door policy is the character that builds up an instance for nominating the self as the owner of the moral values / principles-normative principles and the agent translating the abstract / binding values to the *praxis*.

The speech refers to the notions of being Ansar to the Muahdjirs. The encounter and mutual relationship between these two groups is conveyed in a story-telling manner. The story is replete of the social significations defining the

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<sup>34</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The Speech at 9<sup>th</sup> International Student Meeting”, Istanbul, 15 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43945/we-have-stood-with-our-syrian-brothers-since-the-first-day.html>

<sup>35</sup> Theo Van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in discourse and communication." **Discourse & Communication** 1.1 (2007): 92.

<sup>36</sup> In full, Van Leeuwen underlines the significance of common-sense cultural knowledge and the need for a historical narrative tracing is put as an inextricable part of the study: “...it is not possible to find an explicit, linguistically motivated method for identifying moral evaluations of this kind. As discourse analysts we can only ‘recognize’ them, on the basis of our common-sense cultural knowledge. The usefulness of linguistic discourse analysis stops at this point. Historical discourse research has to take over.” Leeuwen, “Legitimation in discourse,” p.98.

boundaries of expected manners / etiquettes. It is an exemplary form for a particular type of mythopoesis<sup>37</sup>, “*a moral tale*”, in which “protagonists are rewarded for engaging in legitimate social practices, or restoring the legitimate order.”<sup>38</sup> The moralism in the speech assisted with Islamic credentials<sup>39</sup> is a negation of a policy dwelling on the pure cost-benefit calculations of realism. Both of the groups are vested with the responsibility to fulfill the expected *praxis*. The concept of morality dominating the political discourse provides legitimization for the furthering of the social practices. The encounter of the social actors is described as a sanctified state.

The Ottoman legacy saddles the modern Turkey with the responsibility to host the Syrian refugees. It is not the claim to the history of modern Turkey with the debts and sins, but the grand legacy of history beyond the history of Republic that is related to the political discourse. Rather than formulating the expenses of Turkey for the Syrian refugees in an ambiguous expression, the rhetor mentions the total financial cost of Syrian refugees on Turkish economy as a sign of benevolence,

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<sup>37</sup> Leuwen highlights two kinds of mythopoesis, moral tales (stories), and cautionary tales (stories). Leeuwen, “Legitimation in discourse,” p. 105

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan’s political discourse regarding the crisis and humanitarian tragedies in the region is anchored on Holy Quran, Hadith and The Sunna through which the torch of Islamic civilization is believed to light: An exemplary form of Sunna as a way to conduct diplomacy between Islamic states and the governance of the state: “The notion of council, the understanding of conducting affairs by consultation have been our method of operating since Prophet Muhammed. I would like to emphasize that TBMM was established in such an understanding on April, 23 1920. The 38th Verse of Surat Ash-Shuraa was written on the wall behind the podium of TBMM on April, 23 1920. It is very meaningful that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and PUIC were also established in such an understanding. It is also very valuable”. The Holy Quran provides guide in the the solution of problems: “We may speak different languages, we may be from different geographies or of different ethnicities. Our sects may be different. The earlier speeches I just listened to, are the outcome of a shared wisdom and collective thought. We all are a part of an ummah that stands united as brothers under the peace banner of Prophet Muhammed, in the light of the Holy Quran. There are such issues that everyone goes silent only the Holy Quran speaks”. Hadith, as the practices/deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, is forming another basis in the solution of central questions: “There are such problems that everyone goes quiet only the Hadith-i Sharif speaks. There are such critical, painful incidents, for which countries have to set aside their interests, their sectarian differences, forget all their disagreements and artificial disputes and revive the spirit of unity, solidarity and brotherhood. We are going through such extraordinary times as the Islamic geography and followers of Islam”. For an exemplary full-text of the discourse, see: R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at the 10th Session of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Member States Conference”, Ankara, 21 January 2015. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3403/today-is-the-day-to-be-one-to-be-united-and-to-be-brothers-in-the-light-of-quran.html>

which serves the positive-self representation and negative-representation of the anti-refugee discourse discrediting the standpoint of the opponents.

The rhetor's discourse on the refugees is also an attempt to mark the outline of the self through the gap between two definitive positions, the incumbent government policies and the proposal of the main opposition party: In a public meeting speech for the general election rally in the city of Mersin (a southern city in Turkey), Kılıçdaroğlu claimed in April 2015, that Republican People Party is going to repatriate all Syrians when it comes to power: "We are going to send back our Syrian brothers. I'm sorry". The discourse assists the self with conscientious act, whereas the main opposition party is, albeit indirectly, labelled as the enactor of a non-conscientious proposal.

The chronological processing of the narrative reveals the sum of dynamics behind the open-door policy for the Syrian refugees: "Whether they give it or not, we will fulfil our humane, conscientious and Islamic responsibilities towards those people who escape from bombs. This is very important in that it attests to the stance this august Turkish nation has adopted throughout history."<sup>40</sup> The role of Ansar, constructed with all the significations and codes of ancient (*kadim*) Anatolian culture, Islamic and Ottoman legacy creates a socio-cultural imagery, through which the hearers of the discourse are clothed with the conception of Ansar. The conception of Ansar, with a correspondence with the glorified past, functions as a source of self-esteem. As Mole notes "identities can be and are used by elites for instrumental purposes, they do also meet an inherent need for meaning and self-esteem in the population below."<sup>41</sup> With the phrase, "stance adopted throughout the history", the rhetor engages the hearers of the discourse with what Leuween calls "common-sense cultural knowledge" whose source is in the social practices and sanctified deeds in the past.<sup>42</sup> The speech creates a reminder from the history through which a

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<sup>40</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Speech at International Conference on Science and Technology", Ankara, 03 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52484/burden-of-the-refugee-crisis-has-been-laid-on-a-few-countries.html>

<sup>41</sup> Richard C.M. Mole, ed. **Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics**. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 5

<sup>42</sup> Leeuwen, "Legitimation in discourse," p. 98.

meaningful position for the receivers of the refugees is ascribed. The ascribed meaningful position clothes the receiving society with a meaningful identity that increases the sense of pride since the source of the identity is labelled appreciatorily.

The receiving society is vested with the responsibility to enact the role appertaining to the socio-cultural heritage. The cost of dealing with the entrants is portrayed as a source of pride, in service of full-fledged picture of fulfilling the responsibilities of the historical assets and legacy: “As our expenses on refugees have exceeded 10 billion dollars, the support from the international community stalls at 455 million dollars.”<sup>43</sup> The role of Ansar, expected to be performed by the members of the social group, with “the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” illustrates the fact that people prefer to have a positive self-image and see their in-group in a positive light and positively distinct from other groups.<sup>44</sup> The refugee camps, resettling, temporary shelter and housing, food and the probable infrastructure investments are not portrayed as the attributed contingent damages of the Syrian damages.<sup>45</sup> The financial cost of the refugees is formulated as a claim to be the owner of all the duties and responsibilities ascribed by the historical assets. The financial reserve for contingencies is not de-emphasized in the discourse about Syrian refugees, but rather it is presented as a compliance with a clause/surah of the Koran praising the ones taking all the responsibilities of the emigrants.

The concepts of Muhadjir (*muhacir*) and Ansar (*ensar*), are of significations and connotations retrieved from the comments on the surah of the Koran and ascribed meanings of the concepts when the prophet was in Medina. The concept of

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<sup>43</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The Speech at the opening session of the World Humanitarian Summit”, Istanbul, 23 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44026/kuresel-yardim-sistemini-yeniden-ele-almamiz-gerekliyor.html>

<sup>44</sup> Henri Tajfel, (ed.) (1978) **Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in The Socialpsychology of Intergroup Relations**. London: European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, p.63.

<sup>45</sup> Van Dijk gives a comprehensive account of the discourse about refugees and how the political discourse addresses to the dominant social perception of refugees: “Defining refugees as a problem is classic topos of anti-immigrant discourse —and probably a dominant category in a socially shared anti-foreigner attitude, which in turn is based on a racist ideology. Most of the cognitive representations derived from such an ideology describe Us in positive terms, and Them in negative terms. One way of doing this is to represent the Others in terms of a Problem-for-Us at all social levels: jobs, housing, welfare, crime, attitudes, and so on”. Dijk, “Political discourse and ideology,” p. 27.

ansar (*ensar*) comes from the theme of helper (*nâşir*), muhadjir (*muhacir*) means an emigrant, one that emigrates. The full-fledged rhetorical address to the emotions of hearers reminds of Reyes' arguments on the *topos* of emotions or discursive addressing to the emotions as a way of legitimizing the further policies, otherwise, carrying the potential to provoke the masses to the pitch of resentment:

“Social actors appeal to emotions to construct, impose, debate or legitimize certain perceptions of reality, contributing individually to form their community’s vision of social behavior. In other words, emotions are generally predictable and the relationship between social behavior and emotions is part of our cognitive understanding of reality, yet emotions have the potential of distorting that same cognitive understanding of reality.”<sup>46</sup>

In that vein, the employment of the term, ansar, is in service of portraying the Turkish society receiving the victims and aggrieved people with open arms, sanctifying the role carved for the receiving society. The identity of being ansar is burdened on the shoulders of addressees, which is not an option but an obligation for the structured social identity: grandsons of Ottomans. The social identity of grandsons of Ottomans reverses the negative perception of the increasing financial cost to a source of pride; consideration of the Others’ aloofness towards the Syrian refugees is regarded as aloofness to mercy and compassion.

As to the types of moral evaluations touched on above, Leuwen defines “another common method of expressing moral evaluation, the analogy – comparisons in discourse almost always have a legitimatory or de-legitimatory function.”<sup>47</sup> The activity of the self is distinguished from the activity of the others that is loaded with the negative attributions. The negative attributions to the (in)active stance of the others forces the self to be active. One the one hand, the active stance of the Turkish Republic is associated with the positive values; the inactive stance of the other states and international institutions is loaded with negative values. The self is represented as the enactor of the positive values. The members of the social identity positively collate their own positions regarding that of the Others.

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<sup>46</sup> Reyes, "Strategies of legitimization," p. 788.

<sup>47</sup> Leeuwen, "Legitimation in discourse" p. 99.

As to the appreciation of the discursive reference to the aforementioned concepts, Al-Anfal, the surah with 75 ayahs is at the heart of our understanding in order to understand the link between religious significations and codes inscribed on the socio-cultural imageries and self-imageries to which the members of the social identity are assumed to act in coherence: “But those who have believed and emigrated and fought in the cause of Allah and those who gave shelter and aided - it is they who are the believers, truly. For them is forgiveness and noble provision / And those who believed after [the initial emigration] and emigrated and fought with you - they are of you. But those of [blood] relationship are more entitled [to inheritance] in the decree of Allah. Indeed, Allah is Knowing of all things.”<sup>48</sup> The concepts of muhadjir (*muhacir*) and ansar (*ensar*) in Koran are replicated in the political discourse to assist the main goal of ascribing a role to the Turkish nation. The discourse is based upon the dichotomy of Us and Them, however the lexical meaning corresponding to the former one is ansar, and the latter is muhadjir. The binary relationship throughout the discourse is to put emphasis on the nature of the relationship that is interconnectedness. One further memory that is at work as the baggage of the discourse is the hadith of the Prophet Mohammed: “A believer is like a brick for another believer, the one supporting the other.”<sup>49</sup>

It goes without saying populist radical rights parties’ political discourse against the refugees but worth holding in mind, the discourse differs from the dominant political discourse in Europe.<sup>50</sup> The dichotomy of Us and Them is located

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<sup>48</sup> Al-Anfah 8/74-75

<sup>49</sup> Buhârî, Salât, 88; Müslim, Birr ve Sîla, 65.

<sup>50</sup> For a better understanding of the typologies of populism and right-wing parties and the populist radical right parties’ enemy perceptions and even enemy constructions, with examples from several European countries, the current position of the radical right parties with respect to the process of defining refugees as a problem and a threat to the order of the society, representations of the refugees as the agents stealing the jobs of the host society, state policies underlining the temporary nature of the refugees’ stay in the host country, see: Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Also see: Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik, Brigitte Mral (editors), *Right-Wing Populism in Europe*, Bloomsbury, 2013. And also see: Cas Mudde and Christobal Rovira Kaltwasser (editors), *Populism in Europe and the Americas*, Cambridge University Press, 2012. Turkish politicians are already familiar with the European obstinacy towards the refugees and invited guest workers. Germany urgently needed young healthy men who would form the labor-force during the recovery period after the Second World War hence treating them as guest-workers, symbolizing the temporariness of their stay in the host country. Turkish immigrants in Germany are virtual

as a dichotomy in the discursive format, however the function and the meaning of the dichotomy is nourished by the Islamic creed that two parts that needs to be together to come into something. The dichotomy of muhadjir and ansar is not a discourse of exclusion, but inclusion underlining the aspect of people in need and kinship. The nature of the discourse is of a hortatory characteristic.

The demonstrated relationship between ansar and muhadjir is an exemplary form for the code of conduct for intra-Muslim communities and intra-personal relationship within a Muslim society constituting a precedent for the subsequent Muslim communities. Both of the concepts reveal the sacrosanctity of hosting the refugees, with the herald and praise of Islamic creed and the prophet Muhammad. The discourse is not constructed within an environment notably hospitable to the anti-foreigner sentiments. The source of the hospitable environment with the legitimacy retrieved from the grand legacy of history is the focus of the following pages.

### **3.1.3. Constituents of Bethinking Ottoman: Islamic Creed and Ancient (*Kadim*) Anatolian Culture**

The conception of the civilization in which the rhetor self-positions rejects the conception of a civilization that is linear, deterministic in negating the unknown and uncertainties with a rigid rationale based upon the dichotomy of yes and no, leaving no room for the probabilities and uncertainties. The rhetor positions the discourse tacitly stipulating the amalgam of Islamic creed and ancient (*kadim*) Anatolian culture. In other words, the discourse discredits the structure of the mind-set that is a production of the Western civilization running like clockwork with a fixed organization.

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immigrants; German governments did not define Germany as a permanent host of immigrants between 1970s-1980s. However one can argue that due to the extreme force of push-factors such as economic and political instability in Turkey and the fact that the immigrants were of lower- socio-economic status in the home country, Germany meant a new life and new opportunities for them. Turkish immigrants had been “initially called *Framderbeiter*, or foreign/alien workers, were later labeled *Gasterbeiter* or guest workers, denoting in the German meaning of the term their alien or temporary status” Claus Mueller, “Integrating Turkish Communities: A German Dilemma”, **Population Research and Policy Review**, Vol:25 (5), 2003, p. 420.

Cultivating on the ground of hospitality peculiar to Anatolian lands, it is motivated and nourished not only by the Islamic creed but also the ancient (*kadim*) tradition of host-guest or friend-guest relationship (*tanrı misafiri*) dating back to ancient Greek. The respondent of the discourse is not an environment hospitable to the anti-foreigner sentiments (Xenophobia), but an environment in which Xenophobia is replaced by *xenia* and *ansar* and *muhadjir* relationship. The discourse resorts to the established (by the ancient and religious guidelines) sentiments of hospitality to foreigners and *ansar* and *muhadjir* as the guide words. One of the cultural products in Anatolian lands is the notion ordering all the believers to comprehend all the nights as though it was Laylat al-Qadr, each guest (without any acquaintance) as if he / she was Hızır -deus ex machina-.<sup>51</sup> Laylat al-Qadr is the night when the Koran first appeared to the prophet Mohammad. It is believed that blessings of Allah are on earth and all the sins of the ones who repent and ask Allah for forgiveness are forgiven. Hızır<sup>52</sup> is a well-known immortal figure believed to come in time of need. The motive in the discourse is an amalgam of the Islamic and ancient Anatolian culture. Different interpretations and constructions of Hızır can be found in different cultures, mythologies, religions with various imaginings, but with quite similar functions, attributions and significations. The term, *xenia*, gives a comprehensive account of the value of hospitality, and demonstrates the general pattern of the code of conducts between the guest and the host.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> This is a translation of a guidance defining the positions between the believer and religion, and expected roles and codes of conduct between the guest and the host. The subsequent order of the suggested and expected guest and host relationship with the degree of piety (taqwa) advised to the believer figures out the level of significance attributed to the code of conduct and the expected roles of host and the guest. “*Her geceni Kadir, her geleni Hızır bil.*” The guidance is of some other variations such as “*Her olayı hayır bil, her geceni Kadir bil, her geleni Hızır bil*”. Interpret each happening favorably, comprehend each night as if it was Laylat al-Qadr, each guest as if he/she was Hızır.

<sup>52</sup> For a comprehensive account of the place of Hızır and elusive associations attributed in the Turkish folk, see: Warren S Walker, and Ahmet E. Uysal. “An Ancient God in Modern Turkey: Some Aspects of the Cult of Hızır.” **The Journal of American Folklore**, vol. 86, no. 341, 1973, pp. 286–289. **JSTOR**, [www.jstor.org/stable/539158](http://www.jstor.org/stable/539158).

<sup>53</sup> For various scenes of hospitality in the ancient texts, see: Mark W. Edwards, “Type-Scenes and Homeric Hospitality.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-), vol. 105, 1975, pp. 51–72. For a specific scene in Odyssey: “Ulysses arriving at the house of Eumæus, is hospitably entertained, and spends the night there”. **The Odyssey of Homer**. Baldwin, 1820. p. 203

Xenophobia is a result of the calculation of the perceived costs-benefits when the perceived costs of refugees are above the perceived benefits, even when the perceived costs are more than the real costs. However the Islamic creed and ancient Anatolian culture notably preaches the value of hospitality, the former one figuring out the world as a stage in which different people with different color, ethnicity and languages meet and know each other, the latter stressing the value of hospitality since a guest might be either sent by gods, or be a god, and if not treated with hospitality, the host is to face a debacle. If the host complies with the expected social codes of conduct, blessing and fertility is the assumed consequence. The lexical meaning of *tanrı misafiri* (the guest of God) is a person visiting without any acquaintance<sup>54</sup>. Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi's verse envisions the ideal intra-community codes of social conduct and hospitality through the employment of a part in need of another part to form a full part of something: "We are all angels with only one wing, and we can fly only by embracing each other."<sup>55</sup>

One of the prominent components of the Anatolian Islamic culture is the role of Sufism emphasizing the unity and interconnectedness as a way to be complete in self. It represents a different understanding from, in a nutshell, a clockwise working<sup>56</sup> of the western philosophy, in which, one has to choose between one particular thing, if not, the other thing. However, the ancient Anatolian tradition represents the idea of both the thing X and the thing Y at the same time, while the thing X and the thing Y are contradictory to each other in Western philosophy. The idea of interconnected is also reflected in marbling art (*ebru*), the art representing the degree of interconnectedness that is another subject of analysis for other studies.

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<sup>54</sup> Türk Dil Kurumu. **Türkiye'de halk ağzından derleme sözlüğü**. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1963.

<sup>55</sup> "Bizler tek kanatlı melekleriz, ancak birbirimize sarılarak uçabiliriz." Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi

<sup>56</sup> One motive of this clockwise working in western philosophy can be sought in the religious sources. Quite interestingly, the Book of Johannes, The John's Gospel starts with an emphasis on the word "logos" that is full of appeals to the God Apollo, as the symbol of "logos" and in dichotomy with the God Dionysus, as the symbol of energy and action in fever. The John's Gospel starts with the words in the prologue: "In the beginning was the Logos (Word), and the Logos (Word) was with God, and the Logos (Word) was God". John 1:1.

The number of refugees, 3 million, is expected to signify a threat to an anti-foreigner environment, counterfactually the number of refugees indicates the degree of great diligence bestowed on the issue. As to the appreciation of the discursive reference to the aforementioned friendly environment for the foreigners, Al Hujurat, the surah with 49 ayahs gives a comprehensive account and an answer to the question why Xenophobia does not have such a fruitful ground to be cultivated: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.”<sup>57</sup> The discourse is based upon an imagined seesaw, the state or quality of democracy and human rights being located on one side and culture, civilization and the grand legacy of history on the other.<sup>58</sup>

The discourse reflects the hallmark tenets of the culture and civilization downplaying that of democracy and human rights. It also demonstrates that the primacy of the tenet of culture and civilization stems from the innate ability to be effectuated. The central emphasis of the discourse, vindicated in a manner simplifying the issue hence its complexity and nuance is almost entirely overlooked, is on the narration of dualities. Erdoğan’s narrative emphasizes necessity of the human rights and democracy perspective, perceiving them as a panacea to the Syrian crisis defined as a tragedy of the innocent civilians, but intentionally jettisons the states claiming to be the advocates of universal values through utilizing the tool of analogy comparing the stance of other states and Turkey in terms of financial burden and the number of refugees.

The narrative has powerful implications that need to be noted down. The traits of obliviousness are attributed to the out-group in the forms of alienation from the self, detachment from the outside reality and indifference to human tragedies. As a corollary to the understanding, the out-group, ironically those who wrote the

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<sup>57</sup> Al-Hujurat 49/13.

<sup>58</sup> The metaphor of seesaw dwelling on the stylistics is borrowed from: “The see-saw must compensate for emphasis on one side by lessening emphasis on the other. Putting more weight on one side of the see-saw leads to a change in the nature of the other side”, Michael Burke, **The Routledge Handbook of Stylistics**. Routledge, 2014. p. 431.

universal declaration of human rights, is defined as a category nourishing the anti-foreigner environment and racist ideology. The out-group is portrayed as a captive of the rise of right wing parties nourished with the racist ideology, Us-Them distinction and the sentiment of resentment in populist right wing parties' discourse that mobilizes the political actors to follow the suit.<sup>59</sup> The discourse of Erdoğan pictures the rise of racist environment and political discourse increasingly sacrificing the humanitarian and human rights perspective with respect to tragedy of humanity.

The discourse on the Syrian refugees reflects a socially constituted discourse, in other words, a discourse that is nourished on the socio-cultural significations (though, perhaps purported) and that socially constituted discourse is an attempt to socially constitute hearers vested with the tenets whose source is in the deep-seated beliefs.

### **3.1.4. The Celebration of the Conquest of Istanbul Revisited**

The commemoration of the conquest of Istanbul, attributed as a milestone in Turkish history, reveals a plethora of Ottoman imaginations, ranging from figures dressed in Ottoman military costume (Janissaries' dressing) and military anthems. The increase in the public visibility of the Ottoman imagination is a way of escalating the domains replete with various forms of address in service of the portrayal of the party and its affiliates. The increased public visibility of the commemorations of Istanbul is a form of "forged construct."<sup>60</sup> These "forged constructs" of the past are utilized to strengthen the purported self-portrait of the political parties. These constructs involving the representations of the Ottoman past also are of the components constituting the nation as a sum of the grandsons of Ottomans.

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<sup>59</sup> For a recent and comprehensive analysis along these lines See: Pippa Norris, **Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market**. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

<sup>60</sup> "Forged Constructs" is a term borrowed from Mole's account of the constructivist approach to the nation-building processes: "Constructivists view nations and national identities as constructs, forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives". For further understanding of the role of constructs in nation-building and identity politics, see: Richard C.M. Mole, ed. **Discursive constructions of identity in European politics**. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 5

The grandsons of Ottomans are expected to bethink themselves of the obligations arising from the legacy of being a grandson. It is the imagined role of the leader that motivates her/him to put a milestone in Turkish history into the public life. Bethinking oneself of Ottoman grandsons is not a constraint performance. Once a political actor self-portrays the Ottoman identity, he / she is expected to follow the suit in other domains. In order not to fall into trap of double standard and to strengthen the self-portrait of the leader, acting like Ottoman and carrying the banner of Islam and Ottoman legacy in one political domain urges one to act in a similar pattern in other domains. The price of assuming the Ottoman identity is acting with Ottoman psyche and intelligence with all the bestowed responsibilities. In contiguity, the actor performs secondary and further actions after the primary action is put into practice in a single domain. As Wodak writes:

“A discourse about a specific topic (un/employment) can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics spread to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked with each other.”<sup>61</sup>

In an identical vein, bethinking Ottoman in one particular political domain urges the political party and the leader to move on carrying out the identical character and performance in another that is more or less linked to the former one in terms of the socio-cultural meaning. The discourse legitimized through the grand legacy of history in a particular area, in parallel with the principle of computational fluid, affects the tone of discourse and the nature of policy to be adapted in a different field.

A discourse replete of common cultural codes whose source is proudly claimed to lie in the past, forces the rhetor to adopt a similar stance with similar arguments in a completely different context and political discourse. The obligation to carry out the identical performance in different policy-making procedures has nothing to do with cause-effect relationship, since these two political domains in which different forms of bethinking Ottoman are publicly visible, might be totally

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<sup>61</sup> Wodak, **The discourse of politics in action**, p.40.

unrelated regarding the scope of the policy, but has much to do with the need to abide by the consistency and coherence with the discursive guidelines.

Commemoration of the conquest of Istanbul, which dates back to the beginning of 1950s, as an invention by Istanbul Conquest Society, is celebrated with “performance(s) and a different form of public visibility”<sup>62</sup> such as speeches by the politicians, fireworks, sanctification of the conquest through religious references. The conquest of Istanbul is of Islamic connotations since it is believed that it was the *hadith*<sup>63</sup> by the Prophet Muhammed: “Surely, Constantinople (Istanbul) will be conquered (by my community); how blessed the commander who will conquer it, and how blessed his army”. This *hadith* predicting the conquest of Istanbul is an intangible proof for the spiritual value in the Turkish-Islamic belief.

Erdoğan, after the commemoration illustrating the glorious conquest of Istanbul, underlines the religious aspect of the conquest:

“A life that is spent without seeing and living Istanbul is incomplete. Istanbul is important since it was honored with the herald and praise of our beloved Prophet. I celebrate the 563rd anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul, which is one the most magnificent victories of history ushering in a new age while closing another one.”<sup>64</sup>

Celebration of the conquest of Istanbul is a way of alternating the secularist eye on history, perceived as emancipation from the judgement of the secular reading. The Islamist Parties, such as Welfare Party, National Salvation Party made use of the glories of Ottoman history to introduce an “alternative history that contests secular Turkish national history.”<sup>65</sup> As argued by Çınar:

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<sup>62</sup> Alev Cinar, "National History as a Contested Site: The Conquest of Istanbul and Islamist Negotiations of the Nation." **Comparative Studies in Society and History** 43.2 (2001) p. 371.

<sup>63</sup> In Islamic theology, hadiths form a body of traditions linked to the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, functioning as a supplement and explanation to the creeds of Quran with the name of Sunna.

<sup>64</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at an event held to celebrate the 563rd anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul”, Istanbul, 29 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44175/conquest-of-istanbul-is-one-of-the-most-magnificent-victories-of-history.html>

<sup>65</sup> Cinar, "National History as a Contested Site," p. 365.

“Islamist performances of history serve to construct an alternative national identity which is Ottoman and Islamic; evoking a civilization centered in the city of Istanbul, as opposed to the secular, modern, Turkish Republic centered in the capital city of Ankara.”<sup>66</sup>

In line with the identical argument, Erdoğan emphasizes that “if you erase Istanbul, poets are left without inspiration and words, and poems incomplete. Should you attempt to write history without mentioning Istanbul, your ink dries up and pen becomes blunt”<sup>67</sup>. Istanbul is directly associated with the civilization, the source of inspiration and a fertile land for art. Istanbul, as imagined in Erdoğan’s mind, is the source of civilization. The dichotomy of Ankara and Istanbul is incorporated into the rhetoric in covert. The imagining of Istanbul as the ancient (*kadim*) center of civilization and the new center of finance<sup>68</sup> is aimed at renouncing Ankara as the center of the nation-state despising the Islamic and Ottoman spatial and cultural character. The discourse constructs the old capital as a new one that would convey the spirit of Islam and Ottoman. The discourse also appeals itself to the image of Istanbul, as the shelter for the tyrannized people reminding the calls<sup>69</sup> of Rabbi Isaac Sarfati, Rabbi Eliya Kapsali and that of Ottoman Sultans, Sultan Mehmet The Conqueror, and Sultan Bayezid II.

### 3.1.5. Marking the Gap between Self / Other Nexus: Outlining the Self

One form of self-portrayal is the discursive institution of the identity through a self / other dichotomy that is a crucial factor in the forge of the self-representation. The self is portrayed through purporting not only what one is, but also what one is not and cannot be. The marking of the outline of the self is an act of defining the

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at an event held to celebrate the 563rd anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul”, Istanbul, 29 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44175/conquest-of-istanbul-is-one-of-the-most-magnificent-victories-of-history.html>

<sup>68</sup> See “Istanbul named among top future financial centers,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 13 March 2016, Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/istanbul-named-among-top-future-financial-centers-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=96369>

<sup>69</sup> It refers to the above-mentioned calls to the tyrannized Jews in Spain.

lines within which the self is operationalized. It is within those lines that the self takes a stance purposively expressive in what the components of the self are. The kernel of the self is identified through the attributions to the adverse. These attributions may touch on the essence, albeit in a number of forms touching on either the fringes or the fabricated attributions. Even the process of creating the fabricated attributions is not devoid from an ontological fact, relation with the other. The referrer has to form a domain of relationship with the referred; therefore, inspired from what Smith writes “paired conflicts”<sup>70</sup> I would call the relationship as such: ‘the dissonant partners’. The reason for picking up a label like ‘partners’ is an overt sign for the nature of the relationship, two dissonant parts, inextricably nourishing and delineating the lines of the each-other, which assists the distinctiveness and the gap in between.

The referrer instrumentalizes the alleged or fabricated attributions of the referred without the consent of the referred to structure the boundaries of the self, to position the self and to forge a consistent identity. The fabricated / existing attributions in the mood of discordance with the others may, at first, seem as an act for positioning the other, in fact, it is more of an act of marking, outlining the lines of the self.<sup>71</sup> The portrayal of the self is also an attempt to denaturalize the characteristics of the other, that is, an act to forge the self through the naturalization of the self-made attributions to the self. In the case of othering in discourse, the references of the referrer are not to the Ottoman past / grandeur, but to the significations of the Ottoman grandeur. The gap between the position of the rhetor and the opponent increases as much as the extent of opponents’ aloofness to the significations of the Ottoman grandeur increases. Those significations are deep-seated ontological and epistemological facts whose source is the culture, religion, history, ideational world and collective imagination.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” p. 75.

<sup>71</sup> For a comprehensive account of the self/other relationship, see: David Campbell, **Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity**. U of Minnesota Press, 1992.

<sup>72</sup> For a full understanding of the role of the role of history as a source for “social imaginaries”, see Tucker Jr, Kenneth H. “From the imaginary to subjectivation: Castoriadis and Touraine on the performative public sphere.” **Thesis eleven** 83.1 (2005) pp. 42-60.

It is not the erstwhile dominant ideology's history and ideational world, but the mode of the rhetor's (that is peculiar to the rhetor) history and ideational world that produces and constitutes the gap. The history and the ideational world produced and constituted in the same vein with the beliefs, attitudes, views and ideological underpinnings of the rhetor is the domain through which the gap is constituted and imagined. It is the speech leathered with the significations from history that delineates not only the self and the other, but also the gap in between. The gap is discursively utilized to mark the lines of differences between the self and the othered / othering entity.

The political discourse that marks the line between the self and the others is replete of *complete populism* and *anti-elitist populism*<sup>73</sup> as the tools empowering the discourse emphasizing the line between self-and the others, figuring out the differences between the self and the others, pointing out that the difference pertaining to the self are what pertains to the people, underlining the negative points of the out-groups, delete the negative traits of what is labelled as in-group, exclude the tutelage mechanisms of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm, and condemn the political performance for the present situation. If the political discourse marking the line between the self and others, correspondent of the discourse is not only foreign correspondents, but also Turkish public opinion. It may even be argued that the discourse that is replete of populism is primarily addressed to the Turkish public even though it is a political discourse related to foreign policy and foreign correspondents.

One and probably the first exemplary form of the discourse of othering delineating the outline of the self is the famous speech in Davos panel in 2009:

“Mr. Peres, you are a senior citizen and you speak in a loud voice. I feel that your raised voice is due to the guilt you feel. But be sure that my voice will not be raised as yours. When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill, I know very well how you hit and killed children on beaches. In your country there are two former prime ministers whose comments on Gaza are important for me. You had prime ministers who said: We relish the opportunity to enter the Palestinian lands on tanks. I condemn those who clap for these atrocities, because I think that cheering the murderers of children and humans is in its kind a crime against humanity. First, the

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<sup>73</sup> Vreese, “Populism as an Expression,” p. 427.

sixth of the Ten Commandments in the Torah says "You shall not kill" but in Palestine people are killed. And second, which is a very interesting issue; Gilad Atzmon [a Jew himself], says Israeli barbarity is far beyond any usual cruelty. Aside from this, Avi Shlaim, Professor of Oxford who performed his military duty in the Israeli army says in the *Guardian* that Israel has become a rogue state. (Pointing to Peres) He spoke for 25 minutes, but you only let me speak for 12 minutes. This is not acceptable.”<sup>74</sup>

The constructed in groups of the avulsive discourse is ‘the hit and killed children’, ‘Gaza’, ‘Palestinians’ (nomination). The in-groups in abstraction is the Ten Commandments in the Torah. The speech involves different types of authorities, in this way, the rhetor employs the *topos of authority* with multi-dimensional authorities to pave the way for legitimization and justification of the argument. Along with the above mentioned authority in abstraction, Gilad Atzmon (the language and labels of a Jew) is employed to assist the basis of justification. The *topos of authority* continues entailing the criticisms of the Israeli administration, Avi Shlaim, an academic from the most reputable university. All in all, the speech is constituted by two types of authorities, one in abstraction, the other, concrete knowledgeable personalities. The argument / criticism of the latter one is assisted with the institutions such as *Guardian* and Oxford University, whose reputation and credibility is an assisting source that provides Erdogan with a grand legitimacy to use the discourse of the authorities. The grand legitimacy stems from the use of socio-cultural and intellectual significations nourished by the religious creed of the antagonist. The speech employs *argumentum ad hominem*, “which can be defined as a verbal attack on the antagonist’s personality and character (of her or his credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, competence and so on)”<sup>75</sup> to label Mr. Peres as the antagonist to be attacked, deprecatorily defined (predication). The *topos of authority* nourishes the argument of the rhetor in a multi-dimensional way; however the prominent contribution is to produce a testimony. The testimonials of the authorities do show that the discourse is not Muslim rhetoric. It is not a product of Muslim mind-set, view or perspective on the Israeli government. The employment of Jewish

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<sup>74</sup> “What Turkish PM, Tayyip Erdogan told Shimon Peres in Davos,” **Axis of Logic**, 3 February 2009. Available at: [http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article\\_29547.shtml](http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_29547.shtml)

<sup>75</sup> Wodak, **The discourse of politics in action**, p.44.

authorities to assist the core of the argument forecloses the probable debates of antisemitism or criticism of anti-Semitic language. The discourse never falls into the trap of ambiguity in defining the antagonist. The argumentation of the speech justifies both the representation of the self as the defender against the atrocities and discredits the others labeling them as the ones clapping the atrocities (argumentation). The rhetor positions the self as the enactor denouncing the suppressive and disgraceful acts attributed to the antagonist's policies (perspectivization). The rhetor attempts to delegitimize the antagonist's policies and seeks legitimization of his position through the socio-cultural significations notably nourished by the religious creed and intellectual viewpoints. The de-legitimization is accomplished by giving off signals for producing testimony to the statement; the testimony is a product of the epistemological constituents of the antagonist's religious significations (intensification / mitigation, deconstructing/changing.)<sup>76</sup>

In December 23, 2011, in a conference hosted in İstanbul, titled Change in Muslim Societies and The Role of Women, Erdoğan addressing to a bill at the French parliament covering the criminalization of the denial of "Armenian genocide"<sup>77</sup>, argues for the benevolent nature of Ottoman rule foregrounding the character of adopting the ethical rule in principle as a form of discursive refutation to the claims of "Armenian genocide". The speech is based upon two pronged discursive strategy. The discourse situates the Ottoman history as a product of in-group to be defended, and locates the history of France as the political other. Erdoğan touches the fringes of the modern history of France in Algeria invoking the image of an inhuman meddling against the Algerians:

"France massacred an estimated 15 percent of the Algerian population starting from 1945. This is genocide. If the French President Mr. Sarkozy does not know about this genocide, he can ask his father Pal Sarkozy... (who) had served in the French legion in Algeria in the 1940s, I am sure he has many things to tell his son about the French massacre in Algeria."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>77</sup> "Armenian genocide" is regarded as one of the significant issues introduced into the political agenda of Turkey by European Union as a part of pre-requisite for the homework that "Turkey should recognize its past in an objective manner".

The strategy of predication is employed in the form of a transparent predicate, in which the evaluative negative traits are attributed to the French President and his lineage.<sup>79</sup> The discourse makes use of *argumentum ad verecundiam*, however the referenced competent figure is an ironical authority. The referenced authority is one of the soldiers in Algeria in 1961 when the repression was tenable<sup>80</sup>. The discursive defense discrediting the bill covering the criminalization of the denial of Armenian genocide is challenged through the fallacy of *tu quoquo*, in other words, the bill is regarded as a criticism of the Turkish political history, and that criticism is turned back on the addressee asserting that the opponent involved in the same / similar or even worse than addresser's deed. The ironical authority is employed as a reference to strengthen the argument and shame the political opponent. The political outgroup attacked through discursive action is represented with deficit of benevolence (*ihsan*). The speech, selecting the confrontation of the western and eastern civilizations, garners the benevolent aspect of the rule within Islamic culture as a support to the power of the political discourse. The negative aspects of the overall French confrontation with the Muslims are geared towards the bill at the French parliament through a self-nomination for performing the discursive defense of the lineal succession. On the one hand, the history of the defied outgroup is transferred to the present garnering the support to the representation of opposed group with a stigma of legitimacy to legislate the concerned bill, on the other hand, the construction of the self is achieved through an association with the Ottoman past and the Ottoman benevolence towards the non-Muslims. The second prong of the speech is illustrative of a rough exemplary form and counterpart of Ottoman benevolence. In similar vein, Erdoğan reminds of the letter of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to King Francis

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<sup>78</sup> “Erdoğan accuses France for committing ‘genocide’ in Algeria,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, 23 December 2011, Available at: <http://www.hurriyedailynews.com/Erdoğan-accuses-france-of-committing-genocide-in-algeria.aspx?pageID=238&nID=9852&NewsCatID=338>

<sup>79</sup> Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>80</sup> The President Hollande acknowledged the massacre of Algerians in a public speech: “On October 17, 1961, Algerians who were protesting for independence were killed in a bloody repression. The Republic recognizes these facts with lucidity,...I pay homage to victims fifty-one years later.” “France’s Hollande acknowledges 1961 massacre of Algerians”, **Reuters**, 17 October 2012. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-algeria-idUKBRE89G1NE20121017>

that constitutes the self-understanding of the leader and how his modelling of the self is associated with the style of Ottoman rule:

“I, sultan of sultans, king of kings, the shadow of God who bestows the crown to the monarchs on earth, the supreme ruler of the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the Balkans and Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Damascus and Halep, Egypt, Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem, and all of the Arab dominions, and Yemen, and the sultan and the supreme king of many nations, I am the son of Sultan Selim Khan and grandson of Sultan Bayezid Khan, and you, King Francis, are the governor of the French province. You have sent to my Gate, the sanctuary of many kings, a letter by the hand of your faithful servant Frangipani. He has made known to me how the enemy overran your country, so you are now a captive. You have asked aid, for your deliverance. All this your saying having been set forth at the foot of my throne, which controls the world. Your situation has gained my imperial understanding in every detail, and I have considered all of it. There is nothing astonishing in emperors being defeated and made captive. Keep your heart content and do not grieve. In these situations our glorious predecessors and illustrious ancestors, may God keep alight their tombs, never ceased from making war to drive back their foe and conquer his lands. We ourselves have followed their path; we have at every time conquered provinces and citadels both great in strength and in difficulty of approach. By night as well as by day our horse is always saddled, and our saber ever girded on. May God the Most High advance righteousness! May His will, whatsoever it portends, be accomplished. For the rest, ask it from your envoy and be informed. Know that it will be as said.”<sup>81</sup>

Strategies of political discourse in service of representing Justice and Development Party as the single political party to appropriate itself to the Ottoman identity proliferate in reviving, reconstructing and resurrecting the Ottoman / Islamic past. The Ottoman past embodying the might and benevolence is represented as the savior of the addressee’s predecessors. The discourse becomes a real site of shaming the addressee through posting alleged historical facts. The father figure in the previous discourse is the father of French president who worked in French legions as an agent of the French colonialism.<sup>82 83</sup> Juxtaposed reading of these two father figures reveals

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<sup>81</sup> English Translation of the letter is retrieved from: “Reminding of Sultan Suleiman Letter to France”, **Pakistan Defence**, 4 June 2012. Available at: <http://defence.pk/threads/reminder-of-sultan-suleiman-letter-to-france.184952/>

<sup>82</sup> Erdogan tries to differentiate the approach of The Turkish Republic from that of European colonizers that is a notable component of the collective memory in African people. The rhetoric is, in tandem with the developing relations with a discursive intensification on win-win. On 24 January 2017, a piece of discourse with the use of ‘harsher’ words illustrative of the evolutionary nature of the rhetorical strategy, Erdogan states: “We know quite well who has exploited Africa and what sufferings it has endured in the past,” R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The Speech at the Turkey-Mozambique Business Forum”, Mozambique, 24 January 2017. Available

the attempt to dissociate the Ottoman history from the European history.<sup>84</sup> The Ottoman father figure and the benevolence of the Ottoman ruler are employed in the

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at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70820/turkiye-son-donemde-ekonomi-alaninda-bir-basari-hikyesi-yazdi.html>

<sup>83</sup> Unmasking the ones approaching with an understanding of colonialism, this particular exemplary discourse aligns with the win-win approach: "I believe our entrepreneurs and investors will do a lot of things in Madagascar and they will act on a basis of win-win, not in an understanding of colonialism, because there has never been such an understanding in our culture or values throughout our history." R. Tayyip Erdogan, "The Speech at a joint press conference with President Rajaonarimampianina of Madagascar", Antananarivo, 25 January 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70829/we-act-in-an-understanding-of-win-win-not-colonialism.html>

<sup>84</sup> Throughout the discourse of marking the gap between the self and other, the self is equipped with the legacy of the Islamic civilization. The practice of these states is depicted as the imperial greed and the source of prosperity that is still remembered by the people living in those countries: R. Tayyip Erdogan claims: "When we look at history, we see states like the Seljuk Empire, Ottoman Empire, Andalusia and the Mughal Empire are remembered for their unique contributions to scientific, cultural, artistic and political life". The self is based upon the legacy remained from the glorious history. The discourse is situated under the banner of Islamic civilization replete with legendary stories of success and the light of legacy inherited from the Ottomans: He further stated: "When we travel around the world, we see a pure legacy left by these states through edifices, foundations, madrassas and libraries built by them. Although centuries have gone by and some administrations have used oppression to erase the traces of them, you can still see the spark in people's eyes, warmth in their hearth and words of love coming out of their mouth when you say the Ottomans. Those people remember a civilization that built and revitalized that ruled with justice not a civilization that oppressed, massacred, destroyed and exploited. And they say this is what the Ottomans were. This is a very precious and rare legacy very few nations are blessed with". Marking the lines of the Other, the political discourse focuses on the imperial past through frequent references to the words such as: exploitation, pillaging, sorrow, oppression, intimidation, massacres and genocide as means of intensifying the negative attributions to the Other, in that way, destroying the constituents of the Other's ideology, negating the human rights and democracy claims through reference to the above-mentioned deeds in the imperial history. In that vein, Erdogan states: "The history of those countries that lecture Turkey about human rights bear the stain of blood, tears, genocide and massacre in Africa. The colonization of the continent that began in the 16<sup>th</sup> century with slave trade reached its peak in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1890, 90% of Africa was under the occupation of a handful of European countries. I would like to underline this: it was under the occupation of a handful of European countries. Who were they? Belgium in Congo, Germany in Namibia, Britain and France in other countries exploited and pillaged all resources of the continent for years under the claim of bringing civilization. And in doing so, they committed very serious genocides. Today, when we lift the curtain of magnificence we witness in western capitals, we see tragedy and sorrow of millions of Africans. Under the elegant pavements of Berlin, Paris, Brussels are lives, blood, efforts of Africans. Shiny notions like civilization and modernization they abuse to exonerate this period are not sufficient to cover up the massacres". The discourse directed to Sarkozy, is replicated, in a similar perspective but an evolved form and tone, to Germany just after the decision to ratify the bill in German Parliament acknowledging the "Armenian genocide". In a small piece of discourse, one can observe the motive of discrediting the components of the Other's modern discourse on human rights, universal values and democratic values: "Germany! I am telling again: first, you give an account of the Holocaust. How you decimated, killed over 100 thousand Namibians in Namibia, you should give an account of that, too. You are the last country to hold a vote on the so-called Armenian genocide. Besides, we do not have such a problem with our history. Our history is not a history of massacres. Our history is a history of mercy and compassion. That is the difference between us. Today, the same Berlin, disregarding this dark blot in its history, houses the German Parliament that accused us of committing

discourse to distinguish the Ottoman policies of expansion from the colonial policies. Contra discursive strategy of negative-representation of the others, the past of the other is utilized to consolidate the security of the structured socio-cultural imaginary. Though studying the discursive representations of the other leaders of Justice and Development Party is not within the scope of this study, regarding the point of discussion, it would leave a gap in the study unless the study leaves a room for Ahmet Davutoğlu's<sup>85</sup> defense of Neo-Ottomanism. In an interview with Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post, Davutoğlu delineates the representation of the other as a source of legacy for self. "Britain has a commonwealth with its former colonies. Why shouldn't Turkey rebuild its leadership in former Ottoman lands in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia?"<sup>86</sup>. The discourse portrays the actors on power with the rule of AK Party as the agents to discursively combining the mental strategies and Ottoman totality. The preceding chapter reflects the thorough analysis of the discourse extending the beginning of national consciousness erstwhile limited to the modern history of Turkey. In that vein, the leaders' self-portrayal as the grandsons of

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genocide against Armenians. What a grave contrast! I would like to share something very thought-provoking said by the founding President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, father of Uhuru Kenyatta: 'When the Missionaries arrived, the Africans had the Land and the Missionaries had the Bible. They taught us how to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land and we had the Bible.' What a cunning scheme!" For the full text, see: R. Tayyip Erdogan, "The Speech at a graduation ceremony at Sebahattin Zaim University", İstanbul, 05 June 2016. Available at:

["https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44286/our-history-is-a-history-of-mercy-and-compassion.html](https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44286/our-history-is-a-history-of-mercy-and-compassion.html)

<sup>85</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu is an old academic of International Relations and an ambassador. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs between the years of 2009-2014. He carried the leadership of Justice and Development Party and Prime Ministry from 2014 to 2016. He resigned from the office in 2016. Now working as a Justice and Development Party Member of Parliament for Konya. There have been a great number of academic studies unraveling the influence of Davutoğlu's ideas on Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). For a more comprehensive evaluation of how Davutoğlu's ideas affected the TFP and how the new TFP differed from the old paradigm, see: Bülent Aras, "Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey's Rising Soft Power." **SETA Policy Brief**, 15 (2008). also see: Bülent Aras, "The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, no.4 (2014): 404-418. Also see: Svante E. Cornell, "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy." *Middle East Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 13-24. Also see: Bilge Criss, and Pınar Bilgin. "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East." **Middle East Review of International relations** 1, no. 1 (January 1997). Also see: Galip Dalay, and Dov Friedman. "The AK Party and the Evolution of Turkish Political Islam's Foreign Policy." **Insight Turkey** 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 123-139. Also see: E. Fuat Keyman, "Davutoğlu 'Pan-İslamist' mi." **Radikal**, 27 August 2014. Also see: Daniel Pipes. "Stratejik Derinlik' Batı'yı İkinci Plana Atıyor." **Radikal**, 29 October 2009.

<sup>86</sup> Jackson Diehl, "Turkey's vision of an Ottoman Commonwealth," **Atlantic Council**, 6 December 2010. Available at: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/turkeys-vision-of-an-ottoman-commonwealth>

Ottomans also entails the representation of the nation as “a fiction and a principle organizing actual social relations.”<sup>87</sup> The employment of the letter by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent portrays the rhetor as a follower of the same path. Structuring the self-construct is a two-pronged process. Identified with a key historical identity and by nature being a member of a nation, leaders’ self-construct is also in service of how nation’s self-perception and self-image is fixed. The discourse of self-portrayal is of a retroactive disposition, both embracing the Ottoman identity and unmasking the attitudes of the precedent leaders abstaining from Ottoman imagery. It is based upon the amalgam of the Islamic creeds and Ottoman motives. Islamic creeds and the self-nominated obligation of coherence with the Ottoman motives constitute a pedigree for the political identity to be constructed. The amalgam is represented as the constituents of what makes a nation how it is. Regarding the perspective of the addressees (public) of the discourse, Islam and Ottoman past is utilized to increase “the will [of the member of the nation] to value the heritage [of the remembrances].”<sup>88</sup>

The discourse, outlining the mark between the self and the other, is a strategic attempt to re-institutionalize the relations between Turkey and the others. It signifies a rupture from the nature of the relations institutionalized within the forms of traditional bureaucratic foreign policy paradigm. The discourse is pragmatically and strategically employed as a tool of changing the patterns of the relationship and transforming it into a conception of mutual respect on the basis of equal win-win understanding. The strategic use of discourse assists the perception that the official position is favorable to the masses. The discourse reveals the sense of rampart against the fervent criticisms [ever hot-points] on the democratic deficiencies and minority rights in Turkey. In this respect, Erdoğan’s discourse of rampart assists the enthusiastic role carved for the new foreign affairs practices of Turkey. It is also a strategic rampart against the decisions to the disadvantage of Turkey taken in EU parliament, Commission and the Council of Ministers. Another basic motive of the discourse is to intensify the image of the self through the discursive guardianship of

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<sup>87</sup> Laclau, **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy**, p. 129

<sup>88</sup> Ernest Renan, **Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?**. Fayard/Mille et une nuits, 1997. p.18.

the independence and sovereignty that establishes a rampart against perception of Turkey as a proxy state of the Western Alliance. Regarding the nature of it, the discourse is more than a manifest discourse (discourse of manifestation), but depicting a characteristic of protest, a discourse of rupture. Primary objective of the manifesting discourse is the outlining the distinctiveness with regards to violation of human rights. The emphasis of the manifest is the duplicity in assessing the human rights violations. It is also a discourse condemning the hypocritical attitude of the EU institutions when it comes to the execution of a Muslim political leader, Motiur Rehman Nizami<sup>89</sup>. Erdoğan isolates himself from the western attitude and highlights the need to break the link between the self and the others:

“I want to share the grief of Motiur Rehman Nizami, I am faithful. Motiur Rehman Nizami neither committed any crime, nor he deserved this fate to be hanged. We await just decisions from the leadership of Bangladesh for lasting peace and stability in the country. We keep ourselves aware of such incidents of injustice and hate against Muslim around the world. As Motiur Rehman Nizami wrote in his letter ‘I am leaving. And leaving a legacy’. The fearless character in such a murderous situation of death holds a distinguishing meaning for him and us. He was a human being, none forced him to submit to his slavery and he gave a lesson of violence against humanity O’ Brethren, these ignorant people think they decide our future but they don’t realize that these decisions are made in eternity. I ask them. Who are you?... May Allah bless the Motiur Rehman Nizami...We have recalled our ambassador from Dhaka and he is reaching Istanbul shortly. And do not forget. The final place for tyrants is hell.”<sup>90</sup>

“Weren’t you against executions?” Erdoğan said. “There was no noise (from the EU) because the person who was executed was a Muslim.”<sup>91</sup> The speech entails Islamic creed as a crucial legitimating entity for the political action to be taken. It is the socio-cultural significations throughout the discourse that identifies and institutes the components of the self and marks the outline between the perception of the self and

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<sup>89</sup> Motiur Rehman Nizami is an executed Islamist leader in opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami, from Bangladesh.

<sup>90</sup> 12 May 2016, President R. Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech at Yerli Düşünce Derneği.

<sup>91</sup> “Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Condemns Execution Of Bangladesh Jamaat-E-Islami Leader Motiur Rahman Nizami,” **NDTV**, 12 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/turkeys-erdogan-condemns-execution-of-bangladesh-jamaat-eislami-leader-motiur-rahman-nizami-1405524>

the others. One socio-cultural code as the fundamental motif of the discourse in the case of Motiur Rehman Nizami, is the religious fellowship<sup>92</sup> <sup>93</sup> assisting the defense of R. Tayyip Erdoğan on behalf of Nizami.

The significance of democracy, democratization, standing with the people's will is a recurring topic in the rhetor's narration. The *topos* of people's will is not arbitrary. It recurs after the coup on 3 July 2013 in Egypt that ousted the first popularly elected Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi. Wodak's strategies of discourse are going to be employed so as to give a clear depiction of the positions of all parties designated throughout the discourse:

"I have stood against the coup attempt in Egypt since the beginning. As a politician and a country that believe in democracy, it was not possible for us to approve a coup attempt. Actually, coming events cast their shadows before. What happened? Those coup-makers have sentenced hundreds of people to death so far. Lastly, they sentenced President Morsi, who had been elected by winning %52 of the votes, to death. I have always said on international platforms that I do not accept Sisi as the President of Egypt. I say the same thing today. To me, the President of Egypt is Morsi, not Sisi. I said this at the General Assembly of the United Nations. They even reserved us seats at the same table but I did not sit there. I would have contradicted myself if I did. I would not be a democrat. I ask those who claim to defend democracy in the world; what kind of a democrat are you? What kind of a democracy is this? Why don't you say something against these death sentences if you believe in democracy? Capital punishment is forbidden in the European Union. Why

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<sup>92</sup> In Turkish: "*Din Kardeşliği*": "Only believers (the faithful) are brothers". (Hujurat 10). "Ancak mü'minler kardeşirler" (Hucurât, 10)

<sup>93</sup> Upon the persecution of Muslims in Burma, Myanmar, in daily increasing numbers, the sensitivity on the issue is stated by R. Tayyip Erdoğan: "I will raise the issue of Myanmar at the U.N. General Assembly in the broadest manner. We will speak this issue with the leaders there. In the meantime, as the OIC term president, I have discussed this issue with nearly 20 world leaders. Some of these talks have yielded or will yield results. However, not everybody has the same sensitivity. Let them not; but, we will fulfill our duty." R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The speech at AK Party's Çatalca district branch", İstanbul, 04 September 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/83338/humanity-remains-silent-to-the-massacre-in-myanmar.html>

In that vein, after thousands of Muslims flooding to the Bangladesh to secure their lives, aids by AFAD and the Turkish Crescent (*Kızılay*) were given to the disposal of the refugees in Bangladesh. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu will visit Bangladesh on 7-8 September 2017 in order to offer our support and observe the on-site conditions of approximately 120.000 Rohingya refugees who have been forced to flee to Bangladesh by the recent developments in northern Rakhine State of Myanmar and Rohingya refugees who have previously been sheltered there. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu is expected to meet Bangladeshi authorities and representatives of the international aid organizations in Dhaka, visit the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar city at Myanmar border and deliver humanitarian aid. No: 280, 6 September 2017, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Bangladesh Available at: [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-280\\_-sayin-bakanimizin-bangladesi-ziyareti-hk\\_en.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-280_-sayin-bakanimizin-bangladesi-ziyareti-hk_en.en.mfa)

don't the EU member countries raise their voices and say something against these death sentences. They make statements that do not have a direct addressee or subject. It is very thought-provoking. They say capital punishment is not right. Morsi was elected with %52 of the votes. We expect you to make a statement about that. Our Foreign Ministry has taken these steps. I would like to reiterate that we will take these steps at the United Nations and follow this matter on international platforms.”<sup>94</sup>

The constructed out-groups tracing the discourse are what follow: Sisi, coup-makers, silent democrats, capital punishment and the EU member countries. The constructed in-groups of the discourse are: hundreds of people sentenced to death, Morsi, democratic values and popular election (referential/nomination). In his critique of the out-groups, R. Tayyip Erdogan, though resorts to use the terms democracy/democrats, it represents a vocal criticism of the silence of those who are expected to raise their voice by virtue of the values of which those claim to be defenders. The particular language of bias in constructing the out-group discursively asserts the undemocratic nature of them, as the rhetoric positions the out-group in a contradictory position to the self as the self is positioned as a democrat. The reference to the particular out-group reflects an irrevocable broken links with not only the putschists but also those who are blindfolded to the policies of putschists. It is the blindness of the democratic institutions to the policies of a third party, not to the Republic of Turkey that constitutes the main motivation of the discourse and the foreign policy to be effectuated. Defenders of democracy are the main political/social actors labelled deprecatorily. The characteristics attributed to the concerned social/political actors are ‘silence’, ‘aloofness to the atrocity’, ‘hypocrisy’, ‘duplicity’ and ‘double standard’. The characteristic of being a democrat and acting like a democrat is appropriated to the rhetor so as to negate the out-group’s attitude as the claimed political identity (democrat) is not in parallel with the political attitude (aloofness) (predication). The features positively attributed to the self are: ‘defender of a popularly election’, ‘coup opponent’, ‘democrat’, ‘vocal critique of the coup-makers’, ‘the actor asking democratic institutions and international platforms to take a shared understanding of the incident’, ‘seeking democratic legitimacy to recognize

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<sup>94</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The speech at the joint press conference he held with Chairman Ivanic of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo”, Sarajevo, 20 May 2015. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/32184/mursiye-verilen-idam-kararinin-uluslararasi-arenada-takipci-olacagiz.html>

the correspondents' and 'vocal barometer of the sincerity' (argumentation). The position of the leader is clearly depicted as what follows: taking a principled stand as a democratically elected political actor defending another democratically elected actor, democratization period in Egypt, and people's democratic will (perspectivation).<sup>95</sup> The discourse negates the "epistemological components" of the democratic institutions such as respect to the people's democratic will, democratization process and popular election results. The Self attributed with a principled stand is an attempt both to intensify the self as a democrat and to deconstruct the image of democrat identity of the democracies regarding their aloofness to the coup and coup-makers (intensification / mitigation).<sup>96</sup> In other cases, the discourse goes even beyond the religious fellowship, and visits the notion of fellowship of humans<sup>97</sup> and kinship solidarity. Fellowship of humans is employed to

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<sup>95</sup> The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "Turkey and Egypt share deep-rooted relations, based on close historical, cultural and social ties. Starting from the earliest stages of the Tahrir Revolution back in January 2011, Turkey supported the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people and steps towards democratization in Egypt. Nevertheless, the coup that took place on 3 July 2013 and led to the ousting of the first democratically elected President, Mohammed Morsi, and the consequent derailment of the natural progress of the democratization process of the country, has adversely affected the relationship between Turkey and Egypt. Based on a principled stand on the issue, Turkey advocates the view that Egypt's long term political and economic stability and development can only be achieved by respecting people's democratic will without exclusion." Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey-Egypt". Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-egypt.en.mfa> [25.03.2018]

<sup>96</sup> Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>97</sup> Following the main argument of this study, the notion of "fellowship of humans" is constructed through the grand legacy of the history. Prof. Dr. Cevdet Erdöl has recently uncovered a document from the Ottoman archives, portraying Abdulhamid Khan as a helper to the people in need regardless of the ethnic, religious and geographical traits. The story of the document is about Abdulhamid Khan learning the Great Hinckley Fire in USA causing hundreds of death and his order to aid without any delay: "It is the will of Sultan Abdulhamid II that the Ottoman State sends 300 Liras in aid to those in the Northwestern region of America who have been affected by the forest fire. The order has been communicated to the Ottoman Treasury and Foreign Affairs Officials. In the official communication from the office of the Grand Vizier numbered 1775, on September 9th, 1894, a note has been made from the accounting department that the amount is to be paid from the Treasury. That being said, any financial aid requests to the Ministry of the Interior have been exhausted for the current year, and as such, with regards to the financial aid in question, we give permission for the amount to be added to this year's budget, even though it may cause a small deficit." Translated by *Ottoman Imperial Archivee*. Amerika'nın kuzeybatı tarafındaki ormanların yanmasından dolayı zarar görenlere yardım için Osmanlı Hükümeti tarafından 300 lira gönderilmesi Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in emri gereğidir. Emir Maliye ve Hariciye Nezaretlerine tebliğ edilmiştir. Emrin acilen yerine getirilmesi hususunda yazılan 9 Eylül 1894 tarih ve 1775 numaralı Sadaret tezkeresi üzerine havale edildiği Muhasebe'den yazılan derkenardaki bilgi üzerine, söz konusu meblağın ödenmesi için Maliye Nezareti tarafından işlemde bulunulması tabiidir. Ancak Dâhiliye Nezareti bütçesine dâhil edilen atiyye tertibi bitmiştir. Bu yüzden bahse konu olan meblağın bu seneki bütçe açığına ve tertibi fazlasına ilâve edilerek

discredit the pro-Western view of man. France, though a member of the EU and bound by the EU *acquis communautaire*, decided on the expulsion of Roma migrants in the summer of 2010, targeting the migrants that flooded to France when Bulgaria and Romania became member states in 2007.<sup>98</sup> The policy is a bristling case for R. Tayyip Erdoğan, as the involuntary expulsion of Romani affronts to the notion of fellowship of humans. The speech, with a persistent emphasis on the “optimal distinctiveness”<sup>99</sup>, maintains the fundamental difference between the self and the Western understanding. It introduces the fellowship of humans notion as a negation of EU *acquis communautaire*. It also downplays the Western understanding and demonstrates the humanitarian deficit and illustrates the understanding of the self as the real proprietor of it. In that vein the rhetor claims:

“We love the created because of the Creator.<sup>100</sup> We are not minions of a pro-Western understanding. They cannot view you like we do. They include a chapter concerning Romani people in the *acquis* of the EU but then they deport them. We have seen many examples of this in the member countries of the EU. They still do that. What happened to the Romani people having a place in the *acquis* of the EU? Why are you throwing them out? Is this how you approach humans? Yes, this is the West's view of man. They cannot view man like we do. We are currently accommodating 1.7 million Syrian refugees<sup>101</sup> in Turkey while there are 130 thousand Syrian refugees in the whole Europe.”<sup>102</sup>

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karşılanması hususunda izin vermenizi talep ediyoruz. 20 September 1984, BOA, DH-MKT, 286-32, Bâbiâli, Nezâret-i Umûr-ı Hariciye, Terceme Odası

<sup>98</sup> For a comprehensive account of the inter-community perceptions at work in the media on the expulsion of Roma migrants, see: Shayna Plaut, “Expelling the Victim by Demanding Voice: The Counterframing of Transnational Romani Activism.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, vol. 37, no. 1, 2012, pp. 52–65. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/23210902](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23210902).

<sup>99</sup> Brewer, “The social self,” p.477.

<sup>100</sup> Yunus Emre, a Turkish poet and mystic, whose words still constitute the socio-cultural codes of Anatolian land and people's mind-set: “I love the created because of the Creator” has been frequently used by R. Tayyip Erdoğan as a symbol of his understanding of non-discrimination against any citizen regardless of the ethnicity, religion, language and social class they belong to.

<sup>101</sup> The number of Syrian refugees in Turkey on 06/02/2015 as the speech was given on that date.

<sup>102</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Great Romani Award”, Bursa, 06 February 2015. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/3431/we-will-strongly-defend-the-rights-of-our-romani-brothers-not-only-in-turkey-but-also-all-over-the-world.html>

The in-groups of the discourse is the notion of fellowship of humans, the self while the out-group nominated is Western understanding of human, the *acquis communautaire*, and the EU policy-makers (referential/nomination). The self is predicated as the owner of the straight path while the out-group is predicated deprecatorily through a discursively full-fledged deficit in understanding of human and human rights (predication). The self is constructed through the positive characteristics as the true owner of the human rights, rejecting the discrimination and social reprisals and espousing the mystic belief refuting pervasive prejudice and humiliation. The out-group is depicted as a paralyzed organ, unable to put what is on the paper into policy (argumentation). The rhetor sides with the Romani people and defends the chapter concerning the Romani people in the *acquis* to be put into practice and invites the EU to act in accordance with the requisites of being a transnational organization (perspectivation). The words, “We love the created because of the Creator” intensify the supplementary baggage of the discourse due to alleged references invoked. The *acquis* of the EU is portrayed as the negation of the member states’ practices on the national-level. Human rights, regarding the epistemological constituents of the EU foundation philosophy, are portrayed as statute-barred. The *rigged questions* employed in throughout the speech are employed to “deconstruct the epistemological components”<sup>103</sup> of the EU. The rigged questions are also downplaying the abstract authourity as a null and void entity through *argumentum ad verecundium* (intensification / mitigation deconstructing / changing the epistemological components of the dominant ideology).<sup>104</sup> The deficit in understanding human tragedies is ascribed to policy-makers’ mind-set and the policies as a result of this.

The notion of kinship solidarity, in other words, the perception of the people with the same ethnic identity as the ones kidnapped from the main body, is another theme constructing the gap between the self and another ‘other’.

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<sup>103</sup> Ruth Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. p. 73.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid..

“First of all, I would like to express that Turkey stands by the Uyghur Turks in China just like it stands by all its brothers and kin. We voice the problems<sup>105</sup> concerning our brothers living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at the highest level and will continue to do so. Our Foreign Ministry has conveyed our sensitivity regarding this matter to the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China. We will also draw our counterparts’ attention to this issue during our visit to China.”<sup>106</sup>

The discourse is of more diplomatic and refined form, taking to the solution of the problem through diplomacy. The self is defined as the voice of the problems of the kin. This part of the study is an exemplary form for how the discourse is evolving with respect to the tone, the use of words and elaboration. The references in the discourse are of direct addressees and entail almost no abstraction. The motive of the discourse is the objective of re-conceptualization of two-equal partners, and calling the counterpart to pay respect to reciprocity in sovereignty rights.<sup>107</sup> The peripheral function of the discourse is outlining the mark between the self-other. This mark functions as the line of distinction through which the mind-set of the Turkish public taught to be inferior is transformed. The reason why the discourse outlining the mark between Turkish and EU authorities can be evaluated as a strategic tool is the forged

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<sup>105</sup> Van Wie Davis gives a comprehensive account of the deep-rooted problems of Uyghur Turks living in Xinjiang and systematic discrimination policies of the People’s Republic of China with the words: The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur sporadically, and the groups that claim responsibility are frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing. Although some of the Uyghur groups make claims that are difficult to substantiate, the Uyghur grievances against the Chinese government have a long history. Some of the newer elements include Turkey’s unofficial support and Muslim funding and training from abroad. The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang tamps down violence in the short run, but it fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the long run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to the public order by mobilizing police, but this decade, they have been increasingly used to deal with “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” A heavy police presence exists in Xinjiang” p.16 ELIZABETH VAN WIE DAVIS, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China.” **Asian Affairs**, vol. 35, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15–29. **JSTOR**, [www.jstor.org/stable/27821503](http://www.jstor.org/stable/27821503).

<sup>106</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Meeting with foreign ambassadors, serving in Ankara, at an iftar (fast breaking) table”, Ankara, 09 July 2015. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/32895/cumhurbaskani-Erdo%0111an-buyukelcilerle-iftar-yapti.html>

<sup>107</sup> The tone of the political discourse geared towards the EU shows parallelism with the domestic policies and their negative perception discursively uttered by the EU authorities and institutions. A comprehensive account of the EU perceptions on Turkey before and after the presidential System referendum process is given by İnat whose insightful work gives a full-fledged picture of the reciprocity of factors (the role of domestic factors both in Turkey and the EU member states) in the burgeoning tensions: see: Kemal İnat, “Anti-Turkey Sentiment in Europe during the Referendum Process.” **Insight Turkey** 19.2 (2017): 43.

pioneering role for Erdoğan armored to question EU's eligibility to monitor Turkey's eligibility for EU. Such a strategy portrays Erdoğan as a leader who does not take the 57 years'<sup>108</sup> constellation of advices and arguments<sup>109</sup> for granted. The interdiscursivity is a significant aspect in the analysis of the discourse against the EU authorities. The seeds of marking the outline of difference are (as observed above in the address to the Sarkozy) transformed into a form of discursive attack on the antagonist. Upon a press conference by Martin Schulz, the former president of European Parliament (EP) between 2014-2017, brings Turkey's EU accession up for public discussion through introduction of sanctions against Turkey and a popular referendum in each EU member state concerning the accession of Turkey to the Union, Erdoğan makes an address intensifying the sense of independence and sovereignty:

“What are you [Schulz]? The president of a parliament is there ... But since when have you had the authority to make decisions for Turkey? Look at this impudent man saying ‘we’ll impose sanctions.’ How can you, who have refused to take Turkey into the EU for 53 years, find the authority to make such a decision?”<sup>110</sup>

The political out-group is the addressee of the discourse. It is not abstracted. The discourse is directed to the persona through whom a specific kind of ‘ethos’ is attacked. The ‘ethos’ of the addressee is referred as discriminatory, biased and thinking the self as superior (nomination/referential). The predication working in throughout the discourse labels the antagonist as ‘impudent’, behaving out of the codes / limits of propriety and good manners. The use of the adjective ‘impudent’ labels the political actor deprecatorily in a crystal clear discursive attack (predication). The discourse of Erdoğan employs the strategy of outlining

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<sup>108</sup> Since Ankara Agreement on the 9<sup>th</sup> May, 1950.

<sup>109</sup> Cyprus Issue, Minority Rights, Kurdish Issue, Armenian Issue and Democratic Deficiencies are the prominent hot-points almost always on the table.

<sup>110</sup> “Erdoğan hits back at Schulz, hints at Turkish referendum on EU membership bid,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 14 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Erdoğan-hits-back-at-schulz-hints-at-turkish-referendum-on-eu-membership-bid.aspx?PageID=238&NID=106124&NewsCatID=510>

distinctiveness. The self is portrayed as the agent defending the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic, discrediting the agents perceiving themselves with the right of taking decisions on the future of the Turkish Republic (argumentation). The rhetor nominates the self-position as the guardian of the sovereign and independent character of the Turkish Republic. The personification of the EU is more evident regarding the Turkish version of the speech. The translation of the discourse obscures the meaning that is of focal point in discussion. The rhetor makes use of the Turkish words “*kapida bekletmek*” that literally means: ‘to keep someone waiting in front of the door’. This term is generally used for the depicting the sense of unwillingness felt by the self in regard of the attitude of the other part concerned, in other words, identifying the ‘persona non grata’ attitude of the EU towards Turkey. It is a Turkish phrase commonly used in interpersonal relations in daily life. It also represents an act out of the social etiquette, in other words, something to feel sorry for. The EU is represented as a person with the right to accept or decline Turkey, disregarding the institutions, ministers and the officials. The rhetor delegating himself as the guardian of the independence and sovereignty of Turkey justifies the structure of the discourse through personification of the EU. The relationship between the EU and Turkey is represented as a relationship between two equal people with all the human feelings attributed to the nature of the relationship (perspectivation). The discourse is a concrete attack on the orientalist view whose epistemological constituents are questioned. The hierarchical relationship of authority-servant is completely deconstructed in quest for an equal partnership not only on the formal documents but also the minds (deconstructing).<sup>111</sup>

### **3.1.6. Contemporary Turkey: Contemporaneity Retrieved from the Legacy of History**

The undeniable role of non-discursive and discursive means assisting the image of the self as the appropriate teller in the eyes of public exists in the form of

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<sup>111</sup> Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**. p. 73.

images, figures, representations and potential symbolisms. The constructivist view on the symbolisms working within non-discursive spheres figures out that it is the symbols and symbolisms nourished by different interpretations<sup>112</sup> of the memory that activate the image of the self.

On the 18<sup>th</sup> April, 2017, Justice and Development Party (JDP - AK Party) group meeting at the Turkish Grand National Assembly witnessed a group of young men chanting in chorus “Long Live ! Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Long Live!”<sup>113</sup> The conservative young men watching the group meeting as the audience at the balcony of Turkish Grand National Assembly, the hall makes a replica of a march exhibiting the sentiments of the Turkish public to the founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The melody of the march had already been familiar to the Turkish mind-set since it echoed the famous march of İzmir, swapping the grand name of Mustafa Kemal Pasha with the leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in lyrics following the same rhyme, rhythm and melody.<sup>114</sup> Witnessing the AK Party supporters with such a re-contextualized march lyrics figured out, in one way among many others, conservative mind in quest for a modern father, in fact, a new founding father from their own circle, positioning the natural leader of the party as a new founding father of the new Turkey. The reciprocity of these imageries follow the similar patterns of myth-making within the reigning forms of mythical thinking, in other words, the applicable forms of myth-making are in service of / at the disposal of masses for any adored figure or leader. These forms are ever-purposive regarding the output, regardless of the input. A figure (input) stands (or be stood) in its complicated identity and identifies (be identified) a position against any difference, it is the masses that choose to make a myth out of it or not, and the forms through which these myths are produced show poor difference from the forms through which the myth of the antagonists of the figure had been produced.

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<sup>112</sup> Those different interpretations of memory can also be called ‘conflicts of memory’ in the sense that the identical historical event or figure is amalgamated to produce different type of recipe, each adaptable to be in service of the standpoint of the beholder.

<sup>113</sup> In Turkish verse: “Yaşa, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Yaşa!”.

<sup>114</sup> In Turkish verse: “Yaşa, Mustafa Kemal Paşa Yaşa!”

Cassirer makes use of the term “mythical stage”<sup>115</sup> through which the minds of the hearers make of the tenets of the myth:

“It is not the quality of these categories but their *modality* which distinguishes myth from empirical-scientific knowledge. The modes of synthesis which they employ to give the form of unity to the sensuous manifold, to imprint a shape on disparate contents, disclose a thoroughgoing analogy and correspondence. They are the same universal forms of intuition and thought which constitute the unity of consciousness as such and which accordingly constitute the unity of both the mythical consciousness and the consciousness of pure knowledge. In this respect it may be said that each of these forms, before taking on its specific logical form and character, must pass through a preliminary mythical stage.”<sup>116</sup>

The identical forms of mythical thinking and myth-making are applied, though not in a factual but in logical forms, to the figures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The chanting of the group is a replica, a re-visit of the fruitful forms of myth-making. The forms meaningful for a secular mind can also be fruitful for a conservative mind making a myth out of a conservative figure. It is the identical “preliminary mythical stage”<sup>117</sup>, as Cassirer writes it, making a myth out of the figure, along with the similar perceptions, identical attributions and references. In that vein, it would not be over ambitious in its claim that it is the persona / adored leader to whom the participants of the meeting show more adherence than to the verities.

The self-positioning of the leader is gradually transformed into a quest for a new father. What matters most for the adherents is more likely to be the principles and rules that are meaningful through the personality of the leader. What the march proposes to the hearers is the appropriation of a march, somewhat more meaningful for the secular circles in Turkey, to a leader of a political party that defines itself as “conservative democrat.”<sup>118</sup> İzmir March reflecting the Turkish nation aspiring for

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<sup>115</sup> Cassirer, **The philosophy of symbolic forms**. p.60

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Akdoğan, a former minister of state, defines the position of AK Party in Turkish political spectrum as “conservative democrat”. For a comprehensive account of the views of ideologue: Yalçın Akdoğan, **AK Parti ve Muhafazakâr Demokrasi**. Vol. 13. Alfa, 2004.

the integrity and security of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, the re-contextualized one symbolizes aspiring for an alternative principles and reforms that would reestablish the lost link with the history<sup>119</sup> as the other line of the march follows with the lyrics: “He will write Ottoman Empire on the Turkish flag.”<sup>120</sup> That kind of a representation certifies the efficacy of the extent of reconstruction process. This part of the study is more interested in how an alternated father figure, is more and more visible as the father of the conservative circles, than how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has come to be perceived as such, however, the quest for an alternative father is a vivid phenomenon though the attempt for a complete association of the resurrection of a father figure with positioning the party leader as a father figure may not be quantified. An implication of such an incident is the possibility that the hearers of discourse and the observers of the political projects claim to be witnessing the resurrection of the glorious days. It is not only by the political leaders but also the public, leaving abundant room for determining the highly complicated relationship whose product is the representations and figures through which the hearers and observers' mind make associations.

In his major comparative study tracing the construction of father figures, Jansen employs the term “legitimacy struggles” in two pronged aspects. One of these aspects is the “appropriation by capture”, the other one is the “resurrection”<sup>121</sup>. The former one is the employment of the historical figures, in other words, the father figure, in a form that is in service of the self-political objectives. The father figure is appropriated in such a way that the introduction of a change / a new thing is made legitimate / acceptable through prevalent references to the appropriated biography of the father figure. The latter one is self-revealing on the point that the father figure to be the point of reference and introduced as a grand legitimacy source has been politically mortal, in other words, ill-represented and discredited since the biography

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<sup>119</sup> In her thorough survey of the Turkey's relationship with the Middle East, Hale concluded “Atatürk's determination to end the link between the Turkish state and the notional leadership of the world Islamic community symbolized by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924”. Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East,” p. 681.

<sup>120</sup> In Turkish verse: “*Osmanlı yazdıracak Türk bayrağına*”

<sup>121</sup> Jansen, “Resurrection and Appropriation,” pp. 953–1007.

of the father is not expedient for appropriation, to be an apparatchik of the regime in circulation. Inspired from Jansen's employment of the term "resurrection", the argument in this section is the "resurrection" of not only the father figures, but also the incomplete projects of the fathers. The resurrection and introduction of the novelty is read through the lenses of the Max Weber's "community of memories" which,..., constitutes the ultimately decisive element of "national consciousness."<sup>122</sup>

The case of Marmaray, a rail connection between the Asian and European sides of Istanbul, represents a dream of the father figures and presented as a dream of a century<sup>123</sup>, as it was Abdülhamid Khan and Sultan Abdülmecit who were the ideologues of the project and the first to formally pen it. The patriarchal order of the Turkish society facilitates the use of both "resurrection" and "appropriation by capture" in establishing and maintaining the self-position in "legitimacy struggles". The expediency of the biography of the father determines the extent of the utility. The more novel the political motives / agenda are effectible through the transfer of the past to the present, the more need for reference to the appropriated portrait of the father figure is felt. The biography of Abdülhamid Khan and Sultan Abdülmecit is expedient for hoisting the leader with the banner to resurrect their heritage. The most striking observation, though not the single, to emerge from the inauguration ceremony is the adore of the fathers, resurrecting the dreams of the fathers, discursively representing the dream of the fathers as the dreams of the self, and revisiting the past to reinvent the projects of the present. The appropriation of the father figure to the needs of the present is a common praxis by the leaders seeking legitimacy for the cultural, social and political reforms / novelties. It is not a single admiration / adore / reverence of the leaders to the past deeds of the father figures, but *raison d'état* formulating resurrection of the re-conceptualized biographies as a

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<sup>122</sup>Weber, **Economy and Society**, p. 903

<sup>123</sup> In the opening ceremony of Marmaray, Erdoğan says: "May God rest Sultan Abdülmecit and Abdülhamid who not only dreamed this project, the opening ceremony of which we celebrate now, but also wrote, turned it into a plan, project. I would like to express my gratitude to our statesmen, politicians; bureaucrats in particular to Gazi Mustafa Kemal who endeavored for the sake of Istanbul and Turkey, carried Turkey to these days, contributed to this Project". Fatih Municipality, "Marmaray", The Dream of a Century, Has Come True," 06 November 2013. Available at: <http://www.fatih.bel.tr/en/content/8403/marmaray-the-dream-of-a-century-has-come-true/>

means of representing the self as the heir of the father, and obtaining a grand legitimacy ground in the eyes of the masses<sup>124</sup>, otherwise a reformist agenda may lapse without the legitimization derived from the masses' deep respect to the father figures.

The transfer of the communicative construction of history to the present is building up a public visibility, images and figures through framing the Ottoman in the Turkish Republic in the form of Presidential Complex, playing the Ottoman military anthems (*mehter marşı*) as a part of the welcoming ceremonies for the head of the other state and figures dressed in Ottoman and sixteen Turkic states' military clothing.<sup>125</sup> This section of the study scrutinizes the non-discursive spheres of politics and public visibilities as a pointer of how these non-discursive images and figures are used to assist the discursive strategy and how the discursive strategy influences the public visibilities. Daily modalities of cognitions, symbolisms, debates, representations and these tenets being a formula for the sides in the public debates are the foci of this section. The welcoming ceremonies for the head of other states with the Ottoman military anthems and soldier figures dressed as in historical Turkic states are the manifestations of how the self is represented to hoist the banner of the historical legacy. This section, due to the limitation of the space, consults to the images and representations certifying the position of the rhetor through references.

Another exemplary form of this visibility is the Presidential Complex (*külliye*). The word “complex” (*külliye*) is a form of Ottoman architecture entailing not only the departments of administrational branches but also the departments of social services. The word, complex is also illustrative of the spatial dimension of the structure entailing 1150 rooms, 1124 offices of specialization constituting most of it, thus being one of the grandioso of its kinds in the world. The architecture of the

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<sup>124</sup> This may not apply to the case of Marmaray that is thought to be a part of the solution for the highly populated city, Istanbul. An exemplary form of this would be the introduction of the Presidential System whose legitimacy is sought in the history and the practices of the adored fathers. The following pages will touch on the issue.

<sup>125</sup> “Erdoğan meets Abbas with military dress show,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 12 January 2015. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Erdoğan-meets-abbas-with-military-dress-show.aspx?PageID=238&NID=76853&NewsCatID=510>

palace is a product of the inspiration from the Ottoman and Seljukian forms and motifs that pays respect to the skillfully experimentation of maximum efficacy of space and the spatial symmetry. The rhetor makes use of the word complex “*külliye*” defining the structure. The term “*külliye*” is self-revealing since it refers to the Seljukian and Ottoman structures involving not only the administrative but also the social services ranging from asylum for the insane to mosques.<sup>126</sup> The word, *külliye*, is more of a social aspect, than a political one. The use of the term implies that the place belongs to the people, citizens and evacuates the state as the true owner. The tiles, mosque and construction materials of the structure are pedigreed from the Ottoman and Seljukian style of architecture addressing itself to the collective memory of the masses whose deep-rooted adore of the grandeur of the past is still vivid. A longitudinal examination of the representations and figures might be a good subject of further study for other interested scholars as the focus of this study is the semantic and its reformulation in the form of policy.

The forms of mythical thinking have been framing the political discourse, and interestingly these forms are applicable to address both to the “soldiers of Mustafa Kemal” and the “grandchildren of the Great Khan.”<sup>127</sup> The forms of mythical thinking and the way these forms are framed are the major aspects of how the political discourse and the related representations are produced. The transfer of the past as a remedy for the potential social and political reactions to reforms / novelties is a traditionalized form through which *raison d'état* is practiced. Teachings of the history are the preliminary stages of learning, and the current political practice is presented as the lesson, nucleus of what the grand legacy of history presents.

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<sup>126</sup> The Presidential Complex signifies a reformulation of the system of government, rupture with the preceding system and the paradigm: “This Presidential Complex, we are in, symbolizes that the people own the Republic, not an organization or a group. Our nation is the owner of the Republic now and its symbol is the Presidential Complex. You can see the Seljuki traces outside. You can see the Ottoman traces inside. Because Ottomans did not like living in small places”. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Cumhuriyetin sahibi milletimizin kendisidir, sembolü de cumhurbaşkanlığı külliyesidir,” Ankara, 28 October 2015, Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/35788/cumhuriyetin-sahibi-milletimizin-kendisidir-sembolu-de-cumhurbaskanligi-kulliyesidir.html>

<sup>127</sup> The political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history is supported with the placards illustrating the invention of the political lineage as such: Abdülhamid, (M. Kemal Atatürk), Adnan Menderes, Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, R. Tayyip Erdoğan. It is termed as an invention as such a political lineage had not been appropriated before 2007.

It is the history, as the hortatory nature of it burdens upon the shoulders of the contemporary people, establishing the legitimacy ground. Islamic credential of treating the Ottoman *tebaa* with the religious freedom without discrimination constituting the main recipient of legitimization, Sultan Abdulhamid legitimizes the opening of the Ottoman Parliament, in the opening ceremony speech in 1876 through discursive references to the ancestor, the ever father figure of the Turkish history, Fatih Sultan Mehmet:

“We all know that our ancestor Fatih Sultan Mehmet gave importance to freedom and he let freedom of choosing religion and persuasion to people. His predecessors also followed him and they never prejudiced the freedom of religion and persuasion. As a natural consequence of this justice, different classes of our citizens could have preserved their own language and persuasion. Preservation of ethnical identities, languages, and religion of our subjects is a natural result of this justice that no one could deny”<sup>128</sup>.

The opening speech is replete of significations referring to the father, and Sultan Abdülhamid represents himself as the heir, carrying the banner of the fundamental principles of freedom established by the father. The Ottoman Parliament, being one of the apparatus of the political modernization, is legitimized through the past.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Also providing verse in Turkish: “*Ecdâd-ı izamımızdan Fatih Sultan Mehmed Han merhumun te’mîn-i hürriyet ve serbestî-i din ü mezheb hakkında gösterdiği müsâ’adat cümlesi malûmudur. Sair eslâf-ı izamımız dahi o isre sülük ile hiçbir vakitde serbesti-i âyin ü mezhebe halel getirmemişdir. Altı yüz seneden beri sunuf-i teba ‘amızın milliyetlerini ve lisan ü mezheplerini muhafaza eylemeleri dahi bu kazîyye-i âdilenin netice-i tabiiyyesi olduğu kâbil-i inkâr değildir.*” Coşkun Yılmaz, ed. **II.**

**Abdülhamid: Modernleşme Sürecinde İstanbul.** İstanbul 2010 Avrupa Kültür Başkenti, 2010.  
Available at: [http://www.bulentari.com.tr/indexTr/Upfiles/pdf/18\\_12\\_2011\\_15\\_50\\_37.pdf](http://www.bulentari.com.tr/indexTr/Upfiles/pdf/18_12_2011_15_50_37.pdf)

<sup>129</sup> Karpat, in his impressive study, concludes that Islamism and Caliphate are the basic means to secure the reforms of the Tanzimat era and the agenda for the introduction of novelties in the cultural, social, economic and political spheres. These reforms are the means to integrate the state that would pave the way for the modern Turkish Republic. Karpat even suggests that the novel form of the reformist agenda had been a useful instrument to be used for democracy in the modern new state. Karpat also point out that Abdülhamid argued against the conservative Islamists and Seyhulislamate, Islamism, establishing a pointer for his pragmatism to introduce new things. The reforms of the Abdülhamid Era were founded on the grand legitimacy retrieved from the Islamic arguments, thus caliphate is established as the central institution, not because of Abdülhamid’s Islamist ideational world, but the Islamist ideational world and medium provides a grand legitimacy ground for guiding the Muslim *tebaa* living in the Ottoman lands. For a comprehensive account, see: Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, And Community in The Late Ottoman State*. Oxford University Press, 2001.

The grand legitimacy lying in the past is of a high utility, an attributed functional role to introduce the ‘new things’. The introduction of a “new thing” is certified and coded through references to the mythical history. The discourse of present seeks refuge under the wings of the past through re-contextualization and re-conceptualization of the Sultan Abdülhamid Khan’s speech in the opening speech of Ottoman Parliament. Erdoğan follows the same pattern of reasoning and the political discourse and policy is introduced almost utterly through the same logic. The modern discourse is re-contextualized as it is produced in defense of the introduction of the Presidential System by the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:

“The new constitution won’t be serving only a specific person, party or office. This constitution will serve our entire nation. Whoever feels responsibility towards the nation should participate in this process. Likewise, the presidential system won’t be a practice that is only for once and one person. Just as the parliamentarian system had left its mark on this country for a quarter of century during single-party era and 70 years during multi-party era, the presidential system will do the same job as well until our nation needs a new system. The presidential system is not new to us, it is traditional for us.”<sup>130</sup>

The new system is re-conceptualized through the emphasis on the democratic character of the system. Downplaying the one-man character in the system of the Ottoman governance is not an obstacle against seeking the legacy of the tradition since the nucleus of the system, the existence of a president, is ample for invoking the significations related to the past & tradition.

A similar emphasis of downplaying the one-man rule character of the Ottoman political system is also demonstrated through references to the deficits of the parliamentary system. The rhetor, President R. Tayyip Erdoğan, argues for his classic critique of the parliamentary system:

“The issue of the Presidential System of Government is not an outcome of any ordinary preference or any personal ambition. Hundreds of years’ experience, grief and accumulation lie behind the Presidential System of Government. There is no

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<sup>130</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a mass opening ceremony of new facilities in Eyüp district of Istanbul”, İstanbul, 06 May 2016. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43887/presidential-system-is-not-new-to-us.html>

need to look far away; Turkey's last quarter century alone lays bare the necessity for this change.”<sup>131</sup>

The rhetor appeases the social eruption of potential emotions when the masses face a novelty through the transfer of the past in a re-contextualized fragment to the present. Riezler: “characterizes the kind of fear which in times of crisis befalls the ordinary citizen as ‘fear of the unknown.’”<sup>132</sup> It is the extent of knowledge about something identifying the extent of the fear. In that vein, Riezler offers an explanatory relationship between fear and knowledge: “The particular relation of our knowledge to our ignorance gives a particular color to our fear.”<sup>133</sup> The political discourse, so as to eliminate the factor of ignorance, transfers the collective memory so as to pave a legitimacy way to actualize what seems new to the hearers.

The hypothesis is: The less the degree of knowledge, the more the degree of fear. The political discourse replaces the dependent variable, ‘the degree of knowledge’ with the ‘collective memory’ and eliminates the potential of fear against the novelties. The collective memory is the dependent variable entailing the manifold socio-cultural significations loaded with positive analogies and connotations such as glorious days, heroism, martyrdom<sup>134</sup> and sirat-al-mustaqeem (the single straight path). The discourse is based upon the assumption / even the knowledge that the hearers of the discourse adore the father figures / the tradition as the product of these father figures / and the past as the guide for the future. The mythical nature of the past reminds me the poem by Mithat Cemal Kuntay, titled “*Tarih Hocasına*”,

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<sup>131</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a mass opening ceremony in Malatya”, İstanbul, 18 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/71075/cumhurbaskanligi-sisteminin-arkasinda-yuzlerce-yillik-birikim-var.html>

<sup>132</sup> Kurt Riezler, “The Social Psychology of Fear.” **American Journal of Sociology**, vol. 49, no. 6, 1944, p. 489. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/2771546](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2771546).

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> A significant component of instituting the non-discursive sphere is the deep-respect for the martyrs. A sample form of it is the introduction of the commemoration 15<sup>th</sup> July as a victorious day of securing the democracy. The monument for the memory of martyrs of 15<sup>th</sup> July at the 15<sup>th</sup> July Martyrs Bridge is a symbolic form that is of public visibility. See: “Monument at bridge entrance tribute to July 15 coup victims,” *Daily Sabah*, 18 June 2017. Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/istanbul/2017/06/19/monument-at-bridge-entrance-tribute-to-july-15-coup-victims>

To History Teacher

Tell me our fathers a little bit maybe  
In need of that myth, count tales in history,  
With a growing mountain like chest when he lies,  
His shadow grows long, swallows the earth when he rises,  
Enemies are more courteous than mistresses,  
Waiting hand and foot, there in service ten royalties,  
After each death, it resursects in all scenes!  
In need of that father though it is a lie?  
Tell me our fathers a little bit maybe,  
In need of that myth, count tales in history.<sup>135</sup>

The past is mythical in the sense that it represents a typical story of success that the masses have long aspired for. It is not only the figures but also the traditional norms and historical forms that have been continuously produced and reproduced via the invariable forms of mythical thinking.

The role, the past or a father figure functions in introducing new things is the association of political action introduced for social and political malaises of the present with the utopia of the social order attributed to the past. The mythical or utopic characteristics attributed to the past eliminate the fear in the minds of the hearers, since the introduced novelty is a transfer from the glorious days and this transfer is assumed to bring the Golden Days back. Political discourse consults the biographies of either the attributed fathers or historical events. The reference to the biography is not (cannot be) based upon an overall exposure of the biography but an appropriate teller may pick up the most appropriate part of the biography or may foreground some aspects of the biography and downplays or omits the others, that is, appropriated biography. The appropriated biography of the attributed father is

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<sup>135</sup> The English verse is the author's translation..

Tarih Hocasına  
Anlat bana bir parçacıkecdâdımı anlat  
Muhtacım o efsaneye tarihe masal kat  
Yattıkça büyür dağ gibi bir gövdesi varmış  
Kalkınca üzər gölgəsi dünyayı tutarmış.  
Düşmanları müstefreşelerden yumuşakmış.  
On saltanat el pençe rikabında uşakmış?  
Öldükçe yaşarmış yeniden hadiselerde!  
Muhtacım o ecdâda yalandır deseler de?..  
Anlat bana bir parçacıkecdâdımı anlat,  
Muhtacım o efsaneye tarihe masal kat..

Mithat Cemal Kuntay

resurrected to legitimize the introduction of what is novel, the Ottoman parliament. Hobsbawm observed that movements have often “backed their innovations by reference to a ‘people’s past,’ . . . and to the heroes and martyrs.”<sup>136</sup> The reference to the past, heroes and martyrs is more than a pure reference to the past, heroes and martyrs since the referrer, reference and referenced are replete of, sometimes overloaded, symbolisms and significations through which the innovations are nourished. It is those symbolisms and significations and sometimes overloaded attributions in the deep-rooted beliefs of the masses that eliminates the fear of unknown since these symbolisms and significations are the amalgam of the knowledge in collective memory. The referrer, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Islamic ideational underpinnings and being the most appropriate teller, the reference, to historical legitimacy, the referenced, the golden-days of Ottoman grandeur are the constituents of the discourse introducing something new, a reform, or practicing a reformist political agenda. The political discourse employs the father figure, as a nucleus of the historical baggage, to make the masses associate the novelties with what is already existing in their past. The objective of such a discourse is to appease the resistance of a traditional / conservative society to the change. The novelty is presented in such a way that changes the sense of ‘unknown’ through a reformulation of what is in the past to which a meaningful sense of success is attributed. A novelty is inevitably an ‘unknown’ that is potential to invoke the sense of fear produced against the novelty, for preserving what is accustomed.

The use of historical figures, namely, fathers by the leaders still remains important to put light on the modern and still sound relationship constructed as a way to legitimize the novelties, to appease the sense of ‘unknown’ through the simple formula inspired from Weber’s notion of traditional legitimacy:

- a) We already did it b) It exists in our past c) We are already familiar with it
- d) There is nothing unknown e) There is nothing to be afraid of
- f) We were successful when we had it g) We can do it again h) We can be successful again.

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<sup>136</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, and Terence Ranger, eds. **The Invention of Tradition**. Cambridge University Press, 1983. p. 13

A novelty is introduced in a reformulation of the cultural memory that is employed to accomplish the above specified objectives: to invoke the masses towards espousing the novelty since it is already a reformulated version of what was practiced by the attributed and eluded / adored historical figures / fathers. The prominent reason behind the utilization of history as a source of legitimacy lays in its claim of impeachability. The glorious days pertain to a father figure, whose authority, in the present, is still almost unquestionable. These father figures and glorious days of the past are mostly enshrined in the political discourse and representations while the referenced glorious days and father figures, in general, depend on the ideological orientation of the referrer and the masses.<sup>137</sup>

Before naming the recently constructed Eurasia Tunnel<sup>138</sup>, public debates on naming the tunnel was a boiling hot topic. Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications opened an online platform, calling the citizens to vote for the name of the tunnel. Two grand names were foregrounded. One was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the other one, Sultan Abdülhamid Khan. The popular support of these two grand names was illustrative of the passion for their own father in two main circles' in Turkey, the former one secular circle, the latter one, conservative circle. The naming of a grand infrastructure project turned out to be a competition domain for the fathers. It can also be read as a manifestation of the already discursively and hence ostensibly existing "narrative competition"<sup>139</sup> between two sides with secularist and conservative orientations with distinctive memories peculiar to the ideological camp. One, among many others, suggestion of the poll result was the conservative mind in quest for alternating 'their own founding father'. The element distinguishing between defenders of these two well-known slogans is the state of the father being politically dead due to the ostensible rejection of the dominant regime (Sultan Abdülhamid Khan) or still alive but appropriated to be in service of the political objectives of the self-employed followers (M. Kemal Atatürk). The basic

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<sup>137</sup> The perception of the masses depends, to a great extent, on the appropriateness of the teller. The more appropriate a teller is cognized, the more tendency to address the deep rooted beliefs of the masses is the formula in a nutshell.

<sup>138</sup> In Turkish: "Avrasya Tüneli"

<sup>139</sup> Anne Kane, Constructing Irish national identity: Discourse and ritual during the land war, 1879–1882. Springer, 2011.

element distinguishing the case of Sultan Abdülhamid Khan is the quest for resurrecting an alternative father figure to be effectuated through re-conceptualizations, analogies, allegories, re-affirming the truthfulness of the past deeds, and using discursive significations, putting the blame on the ones responsible for killing their own founding father.

Almost a similar but ever-hot theme of the Turkish politics is the question of whether Hagia Sophia<sup>140</sup> should be converted to *Ayasofya* Mosque<sup>141</sup> again. In his thorough analysis of Hagia Sophia, Özkmekçi proposes Hagia Sophia as an imagery appealing to and with the capacity to mobilize both the Turkish political parties with right orientation and the conservatives as a domain symbolizing the status of the religion not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in the preceding Byzantine Empire<sup>142</sup>. All father figures, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, Sultan Abdulhamid Khan and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, symbolize words / catchphrases that are impeachable, qualifications that are far more than enough, and a grand legacy assisting the enshrined nature of these names. These names are enshrined by the ‘sons of Ottomans’<sup>143 144 145</sup> and ‘soldiers of Mustafa Kemal’<sup>146</sup> consecutively. The

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<sup>140</sup> Sultan Mehmet The Conqueror’s curse on Hagia Sophia is believed to be persisting on those who changed the function of the foundation (*vakıf*): “All the things I have explained and designated here have been set down in written form in the foundation charter in the manner appointed; the conditions may not be altered; the laws may not be amended; they may not be diverted from their original purpose; the appointed rules and principles may not be diminished; interference of any sort in the foundation is interdicted, like Allah’s other interdictions... May the curse of Allah, the angels and all human beings be upon anyone who changes even one of the conditions governing this foundation”. Ahmet Akgündüz, Öztürk, S. Baş, Y. **Ayasofya Mosque: From Church to Museum**, The Ottoman Research Foundation, Istanbul, 2006.

<sup>141</sup> On 14.12.2015, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, a historian, a representative of Nationalist Movement Party submitted a bill on the conversion of Hagia Sophia to Mosque (MHP) at the TGNA: *Ayasofya'nın Cami Olarak Yeniden İbadete Açılmamasına İlişkin Kanun Teklifi*. Halaçoğlu, as a former head of the Turkish Historical Society refers to “illegality” of the current status of Hagia Sophia and puts it forward as the basis of the introduced bill: “No such status exists with regard to the Hagia Sophia, here, there is clearly an illegality,” “Turkey’s nationalist party seeks prayers in the Hagia Sophia,” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 09 November 2013. Available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-nationalist-party-seeks-prayers-in-the-hagia-sophia.aspx?PageID=238&NID=57632&NewsCatID=338>

<sup>142</sup> Inanç, M. Özkmekçi, “Türk Sağında Ayasofya İmgesi”, in; Kerestecioğlu, İnci Özkan, and Güven Gürkan Öztan. **Türk sağı: mitler, fetişler, düşman imgeleri**. İletişim, 2012.

<sup>143</sup> “Osmanlı Torunu” or “Evlad-ı Osmanlı”

status of Hagia Sophia as a museum, as maintained by Özermekçi, is a magic formula for a source of mobilizing the public debates, constructing a concrete step towards achieving a concrete target.<sup>147</sup> Defense of the status-quo for Hagia Sophia may come to questioning the impeachable authority, an allegedly ever-father figure, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, since questioning the validity of the father's words would come to questioning the impeachable position of the past with all the significantly meaningful significations attributed by the collective memory.

Each of these public debates dwells on a particular story, appealing to a particular interest, with a capacity to compel the masses. Francesca, for instance, has written the most complete synthesis on the subject relating the power with the story: "A different answer to the question of how a story comes to dominate policymaking is that one story does not dominate policymaking. Rather, power lies in particular kinds of stories."<sup>148</sup> These debates whose constituents are the stories replete with symbolisms and representations are, ones among many, manifestations of the power struggle, since the glorious narrative is assumed to bring the power along, or the power fueling the discourse / narrative is expected to dominate the one that is less fueled by the narrative symbolisms that are, as Polletta mentioned above, is the source of the power.

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<sup>144</sup> An exemplary form of reformulating and transferring the symbolisms, myths and representations to everyday political life of the 'grandsons of Ottoman': "A group of Turkish voters cast their ballots in a national referendum wearing traditional Ottoman clothing. The men, women and at least one child turned up at a voting station in Strasbourg, France, dressed in elaborate robes and head-gear". This incident can be argued out to be a product of a rarity, however it is illustrative of the extent of espousing the manifold significations introduced through the political discourse, symbolisms and representations and policies that are perceived to be a source for instituting the new self-identity whose prominent characteristic is self-esteem. See the link for the full image of the Turkish voter dressed in Ottoman imagery at the poll station: "Turkish voters wear Ottoman dress at polling station," *Euronews*, 08 April 2017. Available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2017/04/08/turkish-voters-wear-ottoman-dress-at-polling-station>

<sup>145</sup> One further factor assisting the self-esteem is R. Tayyip Erdoğan's words persistently used to address the sympathizers in various open-public platforms: "Rest assured we will stand tall and never bow down." "Dik Duracağız, Dikleşmeyeceğiz". The voters of Justice and Development Party take it as a catchphrase and a sign for overcoming the preceding period as a product of inferiority complex.

<sup>146</sup> A famous catchphrase / slogan distinguishing the rallies and meetings of the Republican People's Party from the others: "Mustafa Kemal'in Askerleriyyiz".

<sup>147</sup> Özermekçi, "Türk Sağında Ayasofya İmgesi".

<sup>148</sup> Francesca Polletta, et al. "The Sociology of Storytelling." **Annual Review of Sociology**, vol. 37, 2011, p. 120. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/41288601](http://www.jstor.org/stable/41288601).

Turning back to the exemplary forms of mythical thinking, a corresponding symbolism of ‘4’ is another tenet in representations. The symbolism employs the embodiment of four basic principles securing the national unity and brotherhood of Turkey, R4BİA: “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state.”<sup>149</sup> The main principles defined for securing the future and survival of the state, extracted through the similar forms of mythical thinking, are four principles. Though the principles are completely different, the production of four basic principles for the integrity of the country is an identical praxis that had been defined by the ancestor / Grandfather. The political analogy circles around the symbolism of *four* as Sultan Abdulhamid Khan had defined *four* pivotal elements in integrity echoing the emphasis of the impeachable nature of these principles: “first, Islam; second, the maintenance of the house of Osman; third, the protection of the Haram al-Haramayn; and fourth, the maintenance of Istanbul as the capital city.”<sup>150</sup> Both Erdoğan and Abdülhamid Khan underline that missing one of those would mean missing the national unity, integrity, brotherhood and solidarity.<sup>151</sup> The symbolism of ‘four’ is transferred from one hundred years past as a remedy to the malaises of the present. Despite the far-fetched nature of the argument, the symbolism of four may be a product of the mythical stage and mythical thinking, hence an extension, reformulation and refinement. It is, in a nutshell, political transformation of a numeric symbol. The political discourse reproduced through the forms of mythical thinking embodies the identical symbolism and represents the self as the heir. One further exemplary form of discursive and non-discursive transfer from the grand legitimacy of history is the notion of “local and

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<sup>149</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a symposium on Presidential System, held by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) at Haliç Congress Center”, İstanbul, 11 February 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70984/tek-millet-tek-bayrak-tek-vatan-tek-devlet-icin-evet.html>

<sup>150</sup> India Office Political and Secret Home Correspondence, L/P&S/3/239, vol. 52, p. 937, Acting Consul Moncrieff to Lord Granville.

<sup>151</sup> Solidarity is a historically invested term embedded with / dwelling on the “collective memory” and “constructions” for the political objectives. For a comprehensive account of a constructionist perspective on the symbolisms working within the grand legacy of Solidarity, see: ELŻBIETA HAŁAS, “Symbolic Construction of ‘Solidarity:’ the Conflict of Interpretations and the Politics of Memory.” **Polish Sociological Review**, no. 170, 2010, pp. 219–232. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/41275150](http://www.jstor.org/stable/41275150).

national.”<sup>152</sup> Though it may seem a far-fetched assumption, the ancestor and nucleus of this notion can be found in Abdülhamid Khan’s notion of “the son of the homeland”<sup>153</sup><sup>154</sup>.

Conventional media and social media play a crucial role in comprising the representations and symbolisms. Regarding the conventional media, a more comprehensive study would include the analysis of all the pieces appeared on the columns of the daily assisting the creation of associations between R. Tayyip Erdoğan and the Ottoman Sultans. The associations are fueled not only by the popular debates or the references of the modern political discourse but also a large volume of published columns on the daily newspapers and books<sup>155</sup> between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Sultan Abdülhamid Khan. A considerable part and most popular of these works entail a comparative outlook between two periods, the rule of Sultan Abülhamid Khan and the rule of AK Party, R. Tayyip Erdoğan. The role of media in shaping the image of the leaders in a negative way is portrayed as a cynical, one hundred years’ practice of the conventional media. The foci of these works is to put light on the similarities in the negative attributions made through the foreign and domestic media (mostly the newspapers’ headlines) to Abdülhamid Khan and R. Tayyip Erdoğan. These representations through the media, one among some others<sup>156</sup>, assist in instituting the self of the leader as a heir politically acting within

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<sup>152</sup> In Turkish: “*Yerli ve Milli*”

<sup>153</sup> In Turkish: “*Memleket Evladi*”

<sup>154</sup> Necipoğlu depicts a father, replicating the act of adored father, (father of power): “Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, for example, commissioned a ceremonial helmet to match in design and ostentation a similar helmet belonging to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V”. Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the magnificent and the representation of power in the context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal rivalry.” *The Art Bulletin* 71.3 (1989) pp. 401-427.

<sup>155</sup> One instance illustrative of the identicality of the slanders on R. Tayyip Erdoğan and Sultan Abdülhamit Khan is Ahmet Anapali’s column. Anapali stresses the identicalness of the mentality producing the negative attributions. The point in the column is: since the mentality is the same, the form of the negative attributions made to R. Tayyip Erdoğan and Sultan Abdülhamit Khan is the same. The negative attributions of the present are demonstrated as an extension of the one century old habit of the opponent conventional media. Ahmet Anapali, “100 Yıllık İftira ve Sultan Abdülhamid Erdoğan Benzerliği “2”,” **haber7com**, 16 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.haber7.com/yazarlar/ahmet-anapali/2258840-100-yillik-iftira-ve-sultan-abdulhamid-Erdogan-benzerligi-2>

the same format of the father, and Weberian combination of traditional and charismatic leadership dwelling on the grand historical heritage. While the forms of opposing the leader show parallelism before and after one hundred years, the expedient structures of mythical thinking also help in generating the associations between the adored father and the adored leader, the latter one rendered as an akin extension of the former one.

The increasing visibility of the official Ottoman military bands playing *mehter* marches is another subsidiary to the representations instituting the components of the self. The feelings of grandeur in the Janissary military music band accounts for the collective memory whose revisit would motivate and mobilize the emotions of the masses. Ottoman military music used to instill horror and insecurity for the enemy troops, courage and motivation for the Ottoman ranks, is translated into modern public sphere addressing to the collective memory, performing as a signal of enthusiasm to return the golden days, maintaining the cause (*dava*) in the eyes of the hearers. The increasing number of appeal to the Ottoman military band and music may be regarded as an effort to continue the heritage and an agenda to make it a part of everyday life. It is, one among many others, of two pronged aspects: it is a representation appealed to revisit / reinvent<sup>157</sup> a public tradition, a revisit of the cultural memory component to construct a public image of

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<sup>156</sup> Regarding the nature of the Ottoman military band, Bowles claims: "In the Turkish tradition, the standard, or banner, and the military band, or *mehter*, were the two inseparable components of the Ottoman military machine. What was often referred to in the West as 'Janissary music' was the symbol of pomp and majesty as well as of bellicosity and sheer might". Edmund A. Bowles, "The Impact of Turkish Military Bands on European Court Festivals in the 17th and 18th Centuries." **Early Music**, vol. 34, no. 4, 2006, pp. 533–559., [www.jstor.org/stable/4137306](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137306).

<sup>157</sup> Though the form of the music, lyrics and verse, is the same, the band is employed in various public spheres such as: inauguration ceremonies, national holidays and official ceremonies of meeting the heads of other states. Not only Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) but also Presidency of Turkish Republic has a special *mehteran* band. The use of old marches and folk music has become more and more visible through the assistance of serials such as *Payitaht Abdülhamid*, and *Diriliş Ertuğrul*, serials on the national public broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, (TRT), the former with the well-known Ottoman military marches, the latter associated with *Dombira*, which is not only an old Turkic musical instrument but also the name of the famous song transferred from the that of Arslanbek Sultanbekov. The song, *Dombira*, is so much associated with R. Tayyip Erdoğan since an election song was produced with the same notes and melody with different lyrics addressing to the personality of R. Tayyip Erdoğan. In 2017, after three Gulf states decided to cut the ties with Qatar, Turkey took side in favor of Qatar through compensating the basic needs, Tamem Althani thanked R. Tayyip Erdoğan with the same song: آم ن دم ن آزىز. "@RT\_Erdoğan Teşekkür Ederim ❤️ [pic.twitter.com/x9UuV7KnTB](http://pic.twitter.com/x9UuV7KnTB)." **Twitter**, 9 June 2017, [twitter.com/TamemAlthani/status/873245681619783681](http://twitter.com/TamemAlthani/status/873245681619783681).

the self. The last but not the least, ritualism is made a close extension of the components of instituting the self.<sup>158</sup> Those rituals reflect what a leader does with his/her past.<sup>159</sup> The rituals nourished by the collective memory are also the means of creating a collective memory.<sup>160</sup>

Regarding above-analyzed parti-colored and multi-faceted constituents of instituting an adored self, Stevenson writes: “articulating our sense of self and identity is not an act of discovery but of composition – the self is not lurking ‘out there’, awaiting revelation, it is assembled in the course of autobiographical narration.”<sup>161</sup> Throughout the Chapter, it is shown that the autobiographical narration of the rhetor is either the narration of the history of the camp upon which the credentials and the ideology stand, or the narration of the history of the opposite camps in a discursive form of negating<sup>162</sup> the positive aspects and delineating the

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<sup>158</sup> After the victory of the national referendum transforming the government system from parliamentary regime to presidential regime, R. Tayyip Erdoğan visited the tomb of Sultan Yavuz Selim to unveil his caftan. The ritualism is a form of instituting the self as the true owner of the heritage of the Ottoman heritage. The symbolic significance of the Sultan Selim’s caftan (diadem) stems from his victorious campaign from *Mercidabik Muharebesi* with the caftan as the symbol invoking the caliphate. Daily Sabah gives the momentary representation of the ritual, on one side R. Tayyip Erdoğan, on the other, İsmail Kahraman, the President of Turkish Grand National Assembly: <https://www.dailysabah.com/arabic/history/2017/04/18/rdogan-returns-the-caftan-of-succession-to-his-original-place-after-an-attempt-to-smuggle-it-by-gulen-terrorist-organization> For further exemplary forms of ritualism in the form of visits to tombs of the past leaders such as Turgut Özal, Adnan Menderes, Necmettin Erbakan and Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, please see: Habertürk. “Erdoğan’dan Referandum Sonrası Dikkat Çeken Ziyaretler.” [www.haberturk.com](http://www.haberturk.com), **Habertürk**, 17 Apr. 2017, [www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1464255-cumhurbaskani-Erdo%0111an-turgut-ozalin-anmatorenine-katildi-menderesin-kabrinin-ziyaret-etti](http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1464255-cumhurbaskani-Erdo%0111an-turgut-ozalin-anmatorenine-katildi-menderesin-kabrinin-ziyaret-etti).

<sup>159</sup> Le Goff, in the same vein, stresses: “Memory is what is transferred from the past into the present reality of a group, i.e., what a group does with its past” Jacques Le Goff, 1992. *History and Memory*. New York: Columbia University. p.95: Cited in HAŁAS, “Symbolic Construction of ‘Solidarity’”

<sup>160</sup> The political movements define cornerstones for their own biographies. The cornerstone of the self-biography is transferred as a cornerstone for the history of the nation and state since the self is already represented as the rightful heir of the historical legacy. e.g. The monument for the memory of martyrs at the bridge of 15<sup>th</sup> July at the 15<sup>th</sup> July Martyrs Bridge is a significant form of it with public visibility. 15<sup>th</sup> July, the failed coup attempt, and securing the democratic rule, is a significant cornerstone in the biography of Justice and Development Party, and it is also transferred as significant component of instituting and writing the glorious history of the nation and state and making it a part of a Turkish political history and culture. It is loaded with symbolisms and significations and positioning the nation as the author of the history. The martyrs and the notion of martyrdom are the rightful components of the collective knowledge as the saviors of democracy.

<sup>161</sup> Stevenson, *Language and Social Change*, p.138.

<sup>162</sup> It is the act of negation that makes existence of the self-camp more meaningful.

negative features. The components of the self, adopting from the language of Stevenson, are assembled to form what the self is. The assembled self is crystallized and strengthened through the act of negating what is positioned as the opponent of the self. Following the argument of Stevenson, it can also be argued that the components of the opposing camp are picked up by the rhetor and the assembled pieces form a convenient enemy to which any discursive attack function as assisting glue for the assembled components of the self. Fathers and grand credentials retrieved from the religion and history are the sources employed forging a self that is, simply, needed to actualize what is in the reformist agenda, introduce massive novelties in the cultural social, economic and political mediums. A modern change / reform find its source in the history. A rational / modern change is legitimized through the composition of the myths that are epistemologically resurrected through stories and tales counted in the scenes existing in the past. It is the legacy of stories and tales, though they belong to pre-modern era, which makes the modern reformist agenda possible.

Table 3. 1. Two Samples in Time Interval Comparative Analysis of the Leader's Discourse: History, Africa / Middle East

Discourse of History	Stage	Time
Turkey is one of the central countries constructing the history. <sup>163</sup>	Seed	2003
Turkey's becoming an order-establisher country, is not an optional issue, but an historical obligation. <sup>164</sup>	Vision	2009
What did they do to us in the history? They showed us the Sèvres in 1920 and then persuaded us to agree to the Lausanne in 1923. Afterwards, some have tried to pass off the Lausanne as a victory. All is obvious. And now you see the Aegean, don't you? We gave away at the Lausanne the islands that you could shout across to. Is that the victory? Those places used to belong to us. There are still our mosques and sanctuaries. However, we are still talking 'What will the continental shelf be? What will it be in the air, or at the sea?' We are still struggling for this. Why? Due to the ones that were at the table in Lausanne. <sup>165</sup>	Solidification	2016
The issue of the Presidential System of Government is not an outcome of any ordinary preference or any personal ambition. Hundreds of years' experience, grief and accumulation lie behind the Presidential System of Government. There is no need to look far away, Turkey's last quarter century alone lays bare the necessity for this change. <sup>166</sup>	Policy	2017

<sup>163</sup> Tığ, **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın konuşmalarından**, p. 300

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., p. 302

<sup>165</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Speech at the 27th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex", Ankara, 29 September 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52444/27th-mukhtars-meeting-at-the-presidential-complex.html>

Discourse on Africa / Middle East	Stage	Time
Turkish government has placed a special value to the relations with African countries. We are not unaware of the potential that Africa has. We are not deaf, disinterested and insensitive to the problems of Africa. <sup>167</sup>	Seed	2007
As you know, European Union applies Schengen. If they can apply it there, we can also apply it as the brother countries in the Middle East. <sup>168</sup>	Vision	2011
They see quagmire when they face the south of Turkey and see entangled challenges when they face the east of Turkey. They suppose crying as ‘Turkey’s axis is shifting. Turkey is turning its face to east.’ to be a foreign policy analysis. However be sure that Turkey has achieved all its successes and reforms despite a handful of these incompetents. Their aim is not to clear the way, but to block and sabotage the way. <sup>169</sup>	Solidification	2016
Our efforts to come up with indigenous solutions to Africa’s and our African brothers’ problems will continue. Turkey is not only the voice of Africa, it also holds a leading place in technical and humanitarian aid to Africa besides diplomatic support. <sup>170</sup>	Policy	2017

<sup>166</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a mass opening ceremony in Malatya”, İstanbul, 18 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/71075/cumhurbaskanligi-sisteminin-arkasinda-yuzlerce-yillik-birikim-var.html>

<sup>167</sup> Tığ, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın konuşmalarından, p. 303.

<sup>168</sup> “Erdoğan'dan Orta Asya'da Ortaklık Çağrısı.” **Hürriyet**, 2 February 2011. Available at: [www.hurriyet.com.tr/Erdogandan-orta-asyada-ortaklik-cagrisi-16916935](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/Erdogandan-orta-asyada-ortaklik-cagrisi-16916935)

<sup>169</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the 3rd Phoenix Award Ceremony, held by Yeşilay (the Turkish Green Crescent Society)”, İstanbul, 04 March 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/40048/zihinlerini-yabanci-baskentlerin-emrine-verenler-oz-guven-sahibi-dis-politika-iddiasindan-rahatsiz-oluyor.html>



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<sup>170</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Turkey-Tanzania Business Forum”, Tanzania, 23 January 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70805/turkiye-afrikanin-sesi-olmaya-devam-edecik.html>

## CHAPTER 4

### 4. DISCOURSE AND POLICY: BETWEEN UTOPIA AND REALITY

The relationship between discourse and reality can be contemplated by approaching the relationship between truth and good in which the human element (and the conditions / frames / limits created by the human) plays a crucial role in the ironic journey of reaching the good by setting out from what is truth. Political discourse, as a form of mythos and establishing the ethos of the political ideology through the mouth of the leader, may form the most significant obstacle against obtaining the truth as the political discourse is nourished by the conventional norms and the stories appealing to those conventional norms. The political discourse, mythos, functions as the carrier of the ideas / beliefs of the ideology by virtue of the imagination. Political discourse as a form of myths is a reflection of socialization, in which a member of the society feels the need to be in compatible with the ethos of the society. The codes regulating the treatment of the guests is a product of traditions internalized by the members of the society who live with the knowledge and ideas whose truthfulness cannot be proved. Regarding Plato's argument on the political discourse as a legitimate form of lie<sup>1</sup>, it can be argued out that the utopian nature of the discourse is not necessarily an extension of the truth. The political discourse, as a form of mythos, is also a form of *raison d'état*.<sup>2</sup> The political discourse may not reflect the truth even though, before the discourse is produced, it is acknowledged that the transfer of the discourse into policy will not fruit what is presented as truth in the discourse.

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<sup>1</sup> "Indeed for those who govern our state, if for anyone else at all, it is appropriate to tell lies because of our enemies or our citizens in order to benefit the state, but all the rest must avoid having anything to do with such a thing". Plato. **Republic**. Book III p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> Hikmet-i Hükümet / Devlet Akli

The preceding chapters have shown how the discourse systematically deconstructs the dominant ideology and reconstructs its own as an alternative and situates the self as the appropriate teller and doer. However, no investigation has been made so far regarding how the reconstructed political discourse is translated into policy. This chapter proceeds methodically on the assumption that examining the thorough meanings, rhetoric, narratives and context consolidating the construction of new Turkish foreign and domestic policy is severely the chief essence to comprehend it as the narrative / discourse is expected to constitute the nucleus of the expected policy outcome. It attempts to reveal the modus operandi of the relationship between discourse and policy that can be applied in the study of other case countries and politicians with respect to domestic and foreign policy. However, the relationship between discourse and policy outcome needs to be gauged to figure out a complete assessment of the components participating in it.

As the aim is to illustrate the relationship between political discourse and policy, it should be noted down that policy process is not produced in a vacuum, or it is not only the political discourse that defines the way for the policy. As the political discourse is produced in a vacuum, that is the production of the rhetor's mind, is related to "what ought to be" however; the policy is related to "is". In this part, "ought to" and "is" are going to be brought together in investigating the relationship between political discourse and policy. The fundamental claim of E. H. Carr on political science is on the identical line: "Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place."<sup>3</sup> The political discourse –utopia- and policy –reality- are the two facets and the study attempts to figure out a sound relationship between them. Policy production is a structured process within the framework of dominant ideologies in which the political actors / institutions produce particular political discourses to seek or further their particular interests.

This part of the study never overlooks both the social relations within the dominant ideologies and the institutions producing discourse seeking to advance

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<sup>3</sup> Edward Hallett Carr. "The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations." (1946). p. 10.

their interests. It should be noted down that the relationship between political discourse and policy cannot be comprehended and established without underlining the fact that the relationship is highly dependent on the cost-benefit calculations and utility maximization and the factors of material capability / capacity, and power / security. The political discourse analysis assists the study in revealing how those structures interact and lead to a particular type of policy. The peripheral aim of this section is to introduce a systematic look to the policy process / production by filling the gap in the traditional analysis of the policy process. A comparative overview of the discourse and policy is adopted to configure the discourse as a product of utopian / idealist nature, and the policy as a product of discourse reformulated within the restrictions of the outer world that is defined as the structural limits of power and domination. Discrepancy between political discourse and reality can be put in three forms that each figures out slight difference from the others: a) politicians may fall into trap of gross distortion of the outside reality, b) intentionally negating the conditions of the outside word to pave the way for introducing a reform to the established order of the things, c) political discourse as a sign of a utopia.

This chapter employs specific foreign / domestic policy cases in which the political discourse that is based upon the grand legacy of history is assumed to be an idealist pedigree for the aftermath political action. As to the nature of the discourse, it can be described as more of a utopian, unrestricted and unrefined nature. Discourse, as a reflection of the ideational world of the rhetor, is produced in a realm that can be utterly emancipated from the limits of the outside world. The outer world, simply characterized as the structural limits of power and domination whose disregard is assumed to cause security dilemma, constitutes the limits through which the discourse is worked up / processed. The established structure of the outside world constitutes the limits that may also have the potential to lead to load deformation. Policy is the product of what is processed from political discourse and worked up through the established structures of the outside world. Policy is what political discourse makes of the structural limits of power and domination. The basic hypothesis of this chapter is: the more the discourse is of less potential to interfere with the limits of the established structure of the outside world, -the structural limits

of power and domination- it is more probable to translate the discourse into policy without any need to be refined, reformed and restructured. In other words, the less conflict the principles claimed by words have with the outer world, the less these principles and words are expected be handicapped. Discourse is confronted with less limitation in being translated into policy if the assumed translation is of less potential to violate the structural limits of power and domination. Outer world is more convenient for the direct translation of the discourse into political action in tandem with the less degree of power and domination. The degree of restrictiveness existing in the form of systemic limits increases the degree of corrigibility of the discourse in the form of policy.<sup>4</sup>

The chapter is going to employ figures, with the abovementioned nexus: the type of discourse, the level of structural limits of power and domination and type of policy. The analysis in these figures will attempt to figure out how the ideas entailed in the discourse are changed -in the form of policy- by the degree of limitation within the established structures of outside world. In his comprehensive study of the political ideas and political reality, Herz attempts “to demonstrate how these phenomena are connected with the security and power situation and to show how theories that disregard this connection turn inevitably into utopia.”<sup>5</sup> Herz stresses “power” and “security” as two dominant factors constituting the nature of the

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<sup>4</sup> As a corollary of the relationship between ideational world (discourse) vs policy, idea vs reality, two dissimilar political thoughts and the contrary arguments should be left room, as discourse is an entity that is more meaningful within Political Idealism and the outer world limitations and policy as a product of these limitations are the entities that are more meaningful through the comprehensive understanding of the conception of Political Realism: “These two types of political thought are characterized by their dissimilar reactions to this irrational basis of societal and political relations. Political Realism recognizes the facts as well as the effects of the security dilemma and bases its theories and assumptions upon these phenomena. Although forms of government, structures of international relationships, and all the other political phenomena and developments vary in detail according to circumstances, Political Realism knows that fundamental traits are determined by the prevalence of factors connected with the urge for security and the competition for power. Political Idealism, on the other hand, starts from the contrary assumption that a harmony between the interests, rights, and duties of men and groups in society, and between the individual and the “general” good exists, or that it may eventually be realized. Political Idealism thus assumes power to be something that can be channeled, utilized for the common good, and mitigated or perhaps eliminated altogether from political inter-relationships. In this manner political life, although at present ripe with conflict, violence, and injustice, can be adapted in the future of the rational and harmonizing aims of Political Idealism.” Herz, John H. “Political Ideas and Political Reality.” **The Western Political Quarterly**, vol. 3, no. 2, 1950, p. 162. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/443481](http://www.jstor.org/stable/443481).

<sup>5</sup> Herz, “Political Ideas and Political Reality.” p. 162.

established outer world structure. The figures, inspired by the Herz's concern, attempt to figure out the effect of the “power” and “security” convenience degree on the formulation of the policy. Power and security notions are of four-fringed aspect: in domestic policy, power is the power of the incumbent government while security is the possibility of harming the government image in the eyes of the electorate while, in foreign policy, power is the power of the state as an actor seeking to salvage the national interest, and security is the perceived ability to tolerate probable harms, sustaining the status-quo and securing the expected utility. Three types of transfer are expected: a) direct translation of the discourse into policy. b) a refined translation of the discourse into policy, which secures the basic claim with the probable absence of the other aspects, the basic tenet of the discourse exists in the policy, though the others are omitted as a product of processing stage. c) Discourse cannot be translated into policy due to the restraining factors of security and power; as the violation of the structural limits of power and domination is rationally calculated to damage the power and security of the actor, the perceived potential risk of translating the discourse into policy is more than the perceived potential danger of maintaining the status-quo.

Each policy is wedged between the utopian elements of the discourse and diminishing restrictions of the outer world. The discourse assumed to be an output of the ideational world of the rhetor is actualized in a new form ascertained by the limitations of the outer world that is policy, which is argued out to be / exist / be actualized between utopia and reality.

Before moving to the intrinsic theme fragmenting the relationship between discourse and policy, the basic assumption of the chapter is the personalized foreign policy / personalized domestic policy embodied around R. Tayyip Erdoğan. D'Amato posits two types of decision-makers, Avulsive (A) and Incremental (I), and defines “the A-type exhibit(ing) the tendency to come up with a decision that would produce a large change in existing policy” while the latter is formulated as “behaving incrementally.”<sup>6</sup> These two terms are going to be employed in the analysis of the

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<sup>6</sup> Amato, “Psychological constructs,” p.305.

relationship between political discourse and policy. R. Tayyip Erdoğan is argued out to portray both Avulsive (A) Incremental (I) types. The type of policy and discourse is argued out to be dependent on the nature of the case. In other words, the nature of the discourse and policy is case-dependent. It can also be claimed that a determining factor can be the content which is whether the case falls into the realm of moralism or realism. The main argument in this chapter is to figure out that there are three types of policy fields. Starting with the first two in which the leader is assumed to show either Incremental or Avulsive character in both discourse and policy (a) *Avulsive Discourse / Avulsive Policy* – b) *Incremental Discourse / Incremental Policy*, one is termed as 1) *Outer Limits / Realm of Realpolitik*: a case with outer limits to which realist discourse and political action is perceived to be necessary in which relatively minor policy changes are extended over a period of time either to stick to the existing policy or to obtain a drastic change in the long run through the sum of these minor changes in political discourse and policy, the other one is termed as 2) *Without Outer Limits / Realm of Moralism*: a moral case or a case perceived as one to which a moral, normative, and value-based discourse and policy need to be made in which avulsive discourse and policy are adopted. The last one is a case, 3) *Outer Limits / Realm of Moralism* that is a moral case / perceived as a moral case with outer limits that create undeniable obstacle against not in avulsive discourse but in drastic policy shifts. In the last case one can observe avulsive discourse, but incremental development of a policy. In *outer limits / realist realm* the actor is involved in a realist cost-and-benefits calculation, the aftermath result of such a calculation is: the actor does not have sufficient power to make a drastic discursive or policy shift from the status-quo, or making a drastic change in the current policy or official discourse is assumed to cause harm on the security of the actor. In *without outer limits / realm of moralism*, the basic assumption is the following: though a drastic change may result in burden on the economy or other fields in the short term, the actor assumes sufficient power, and perceives tolerable threats to security and realizes the worded principles discursively based on ethical, moral, normative and religious motives. In *outer limits / realm of moralism*, the actor defines a target

whose accomplishment is only possible by incremental policy changes, which mean minor changes whose sum will give access to the drastic change in the long term on the condition that no rapprochement is actualized though the actor is anchored to the realm of moralism and bound by the avulsive words, a drastic change in the status-quo is perceived to be more harmful to the security or it is not sustainable and endurable with respect to the power of actor.

So as to put the argument into a theoretical fragment - as can be understood from the analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3- R. Tayyip Erdoğan tends to show A-type (Avulsive) tendency in discourse and political action when it is a moral, normative, and value-based case without any structural limits of power and domination. In other words, it is argued that when it is perceived as a case without outer limits to which a moral, normative and value-based discourse and policy need to be taken, we can observe discourse and policies as run-products of A-type. Turning to the I-type (Incremental), it is argued that R. Tayyip Erdoğan tends to adopt progressive / incrementally developed (even cautious) discourse and policies when the content of the case is perceived to demand realpolitik rather than moral one as the structural limits are calculated to jeopardize the security or the power of the actor to confront the establishment / as structural limits are not at his / her disposal to make drastic changes within it.

A number of exemplary cases to be analyzed are what follows: I. (a) Presidential System of Government, (b) The Issue of “*Mon chers*”, II) (a) Syrian Refugees, (b) Commemoration of the Victory of Malazgirt, (c) The Execution of the Bangladeshi Islamist Leader Motiur Rehman Nizami, (d) Ottoman Language Teaching, (e) Kut-Al-Amara Victory Commemoration, (f) the Conquest Celebration (The Conquest of Istanbul). III) (a) The Lausanne Treaty, (b) the Uyghur Turks in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, (c) Military Operations and the Presence in the Region, (d) Turkey-Israel Relations, (e) The Ottoman Military Barracks, (f) Taksim Mosque and Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim, (g) Turkey-Israel Relations in terms of Al-Quds Issue.

#### **4.1. The Hypothesis for the *Modus Operandi* of the Relationship between Discourse and Policy**

The most significant assertion of the study is the investigation of the relationship between discourse type and policy type and how the relationship between materialistic grasp of international relations –also policymaking- and political discourse can be posited. Kenneth Waltz, the prominent ideologue of the neo-realism, stressed that “the theory isolates one realm from others in order to deal with it intellectually”<sup>7</sup>. The realms that are isolated in the theory as given are the roles of beliefs, ideas, normative and ideological values whose one form of output is political discourse. In order to posit the evolution of the discourse in the form of policy, the study adopts the terms of systemic limits / outer limits and power and security concerns, and resuscitates the role of political discourse interior affairs and international relations as an assisting alternative way to the picture. The study is not limited to foreign or domestic policy as the discourse based upon the grand legacy of history is produced and systematically employed not only in domestic policy but also foreign policy. The strategies of discourse and policy can be demonstrated by a simple proposition as in what follows: Two types of structures can be defined for the outer world limits / systemic limits with respect to the definitive nature of the outer limits:

O: structural limits -power and domination existing in the structure-, outer limits that are definitive, specifying the nature of the discourse and policy. It refers to the international and domestic structures that, by nature, exist and whose disregard impedes the power and security of the actor.

PS: power and security are the tools or factors at the disposal of the actor. PS is included in “O” as the capacity of the actor to enact a policy is almost completely dependent on the ability to confront the limits in “O” with respect to the capacity of them. PS is a fixed value specific to the time-context.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics** (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 8.

WO: systemic limits, structural limits and outer limits that are not (perceived to be) definitive in the nature of the discourse and policy. In such a case without outer limits, the actor is the sole doer, and the sole actor to be influenced by the results of the policy. The actor may produce policy regardless of the other states' policies, or the policy of the other states can only be in a supplementary form to the policy of the concerned actor.

Let there be two case types:

M: the content is perceived as a moral case requiring a discursive and political action as the act of the aggressors is against the instructions of the Islamic history, civilization, human rights, justice, democracy, normative values, democracy, peaceful neighborly relations, religious-brotherhood, kinship etc.

R: the content is perceived as a case falling into the realm of realpolitik as the political action aggressing the structural limits is thought to fruit less than the act of sticking to status-quo.

It is worth noting down that whether the case is an M case or R case, for the cases to be subject in the study, the rhetor produces a discourse that is dependent on the grand legacy of the past.

There are two different kinds of strategies applied separately to the nature of the discourse and policy depending on the above-mentioned factors.

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<sup>8</sup> ps is not only the real power and security of the actor / government / state but also the perceived power and security of the actor / government / state. It can be argued that whether it is perceived or real, the power and security of the actor / government / state may have changed from 2007 to 2018 and it is a variable that is constantly changing, however, this part of the study, studying the incremental nature of the discourse /policy takes each discourse / policy dependent on a specific time context. Thus, as the formulas to be introduced are retrospectively explanatory, the ps of the actor is a constant variable specific to the time each discourse and policy was produced. For instance, one can trace the incremental development of policy in the case of introduction of the Presidential System. Each of the policy introduced belongs to a specific time-context in which that degree of policy-making was to be actualized and further policy were perceived to jeopardize the power and security of the actor. It is argued that the actor did not have / did not perceive itself to have the ps to introduce a drastic systemic change in 2007. It should be noted that ps is a constant variable eliminating the time-dependent changes that are separately shown in examining the development of the policy and discourse.

I: discourse or policy demonstrating an incremental / gradual evolution or sticking to the status-quo.

A: discourse or policy demonstrating a drastic / avulsive type – change from the traditional bureaucratic paradigm.

The first hypothesis reflects the factors leading to incremental nature in discourse and policy:

$H^1 \{I; R|O|I\}$  is incremental evolution in discourse and policy or sticking to the existing discourse and policy under the systemic / structural / outer limits as these limits are perceived to threat the security and power of the actor if a drastic / avulsive action is taken, or a drastic change from the status-quo in discourse or policy is calculated to be intolerable with respect to the security and power.

The following one demonstrates the factors leading to avulsive nature in discourse and policy:

$H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$  is avulsive / drastic change in discourse and policy structural limits of power and domination are tolerable, and is not perceived to be a threat to the security and the power of the actor.

The following two strategies are divided, as the nature of the discourse and policy show discrepancy:

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse if the case is perceived as a moral case.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / choosing relatively minor (incremental) policy changes.

The simple and symmetric suggestion helpful in understanding the complicated relationship between discourse and policy in a framework can be figured out in what follows:

The Nature of Case	Discourse	Policy	e.g.
Outer Limits / Realpolitik	Incremental	Incremental	Presidential System
Without Outer Limits / Moralism	Avulsive	Avulsive	Syrian Refugee Crisis & Open- Door Policy
Outer Limits / Moralism	Avulsive	Incremental	Turkish-Israeli Relations

Table 4. 1. A Framework for Case-Dependent Nature Political Discourse and Foreign / Domestic Policy

The political discourse is approached as a prominent sign of the decisions taken by the rhetor. Deconstruction of the legitimacy ground for the tamed foreign policy paves the way for personalized foreign policy formulated as the diminished effect of the foreign policy bureaucrats and burgeoning effect of the government in defining the foreign policy. Personalized foreign policy puts light on the question of how Turkish foreign policy has changed and why it has done so in a particular manner. Erdoğan's personalized character in foreign / domestic policy making, perceiving his legitimate authority by the consent of national will, are crucial for understanding the bold shifts in foreign and domestic policy when the case is perceived as a moral one. The head of the government, being the head of the executive body, perceives the authority consented by the national will self-sufficing in taking bold moves in decision-making processes of foreign policy / domestic policy as the persona with the highest authority entrusted by the national will with protecting the national-interest. Including the systemic restraints the configuration for a case falling into moralism without outer limits / systemic limits is expected to as what follows:




Figure 4. 1. Moralism without Structural Limits of Power and Domination




Figure 4. 2. Realism with Structural Limits of Power and Domination




Figure 4.3. Moral Case with Structural Limits of Power and Domination




Figure 4.4 Discourse & Policy in Realism with Structural Limits of Power and Domination

In cases with realpolitik and structural limits of power and domination, the political discourse takes an incremental nature as the avulsive political discourse is assumed to risk the structural limits of power and domination. The dominant political discourse of the case requires the rhetor to adopt a political discourse sticking to the structural discursive limits of the realm. An avulsive political discourse disregarding the structural limits of power and domination is assumed to be dominated and eliminated by the discourse of the society, opponents, scholars, non-governmental organizations. An avulsive political discourse disregarding the structural limits of power and dominations and materialistic understanding in international relations is assumed to lead to more costs than the benefits.

The first case, related to *realist realm with outer limits*, is the introduction of the Presidential System, in which the components of the parliamentary regime have been incrementally transformed into the new government regime as the actor is the incumbent government, and the power to realize such a drastic change is perceived to be impossible. Abdullah Gül, the former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, was nominated for the parliamentary election of the president of Republic in April, 2007. This paragraph is going to figure out the structural limits of power and domination. The first outer limit is the bureaucratic elites who “put forward an argument that the two-thirds majority was not only the decisional quorum but also the necessary quorum for the opening of the session.”<sup>9</sup> The CHP adopted the argument and forwarded the case before the Constitutional Court. During the constitutionality review process of the court, Yaşar Büyükanıt, the Chief General of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), wrote the following memorandum on the official website of the TAF:

“In recent days, the problem that came to the fore in the presidential election process is focused on a debate concerning secularism. This situation is followed with concern by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). It should not be forgotten that the TAF is party in this debate and the firm defender of secularism. Furthermore, the TAF will express its position and attitudes openly and clearly whenever it is necessary.

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<sup>9</sup> William Hale, and Ergun Ozbudun. **Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism In Turkey: The Case of The AKP**, Routledge, 2009.

The TAF maintains its unswerving determination to fully perform its duties given to it by laws to protect these features.”<sup>10</sup>

Abdullah Gül, as the first President of Republic with a prospective head scarfed first lady, carried a symbolic potential to undermine the principle of secularism presiding the receptions with a head scarfed wife as the head of state and military staff. Bureaucratic elites constitute the main obstacle / outer limit against the election of an AK Party candidate. Though there is no quorum specified in Turkish constitution regulating the minimum number in the parliament for the meeting to be held for the presidential election, the constitutionality review of the court of constitution, on 1.5.2007, accepted the claim of the bureaucratic elites and the CHP, and specified 367, 2/3 majority of 550 as the minimum number for the meeting for the presidential elections.<sup>11</sup> The outer limits were not limited to bureaucratic elites in judiciary or the arguments and constitutional claims of the main opposition party. Huge meetings with great numbers of popular participants titled ‘Republic Protests’<sup>12</sup> were held in various major cities in Turkey ‘so as to secure the principles of Republic, specifically secularism’. In 2007, the election of the President of Republic by popular vote is introduced in the referendum<sup>13</sup> after a small opposition party (Motherland Party)

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<sup>10</sup> Translated in Hale, Islamism, democracy and liberalism, p. 39.

<sup>11</sup> Constitutional Court decision,.. E. 2007/45, K.2007/54, 1 May 2007, **Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)**, 27 June 2007, no. 26565. Available at: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/06/20070627-17.html>, accessed on 22.11.2017: “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin eylemli içtüzük değişikliği niteliğinde olan 27.4.2007 günlüğü, 96. birleşiminde alınan 11. Cumhurbaşkanı’nın seçiminde gözetilmesi gereken toplantı yeter sayısı ile ilgili kararının Anayasa’ya aykırı olduğuna ve İPTALİNE, Haşim KILIÇ ile Sacit ADALI’nın karşıyoları ve OYÇOKLUGUYLA, 1.5.2007 gününde karar verildi”. “The decision taken by the GNA on April 27, 2007 regarding the appropriate quorum required to move forward with the balloting in the first round of the selection process for the 11th President of the Republic represents a change in the rules of procedure, which we deem unconstitutional.” Translated in: Aslı Bâli, “Courts and constitutional transition: Lessons from the Turkish case.” **International Journal of Constitutional Law** 11.3 (2013): 666-701.

<sup>12</sup> Cumhuriyet Mitingleri

<sup>13</sup> Özbudun and Hale gives the full content of the proposal: “The proposal involved the shortening of the legislative period from five to four years, the popular election of the President of the Republic for a maximum two five-year terms, and an amendment to Article 96, according to which the meeting quorum shall be one-third of the full membership for all businesses ‘including elections.’ The amendment package was designed with a view to prevent the re-occurrence of the parliamentary deadlock in the election of the President.” Hale, **Islamism, democracy and liberalism**, p.40.

leader's call, Erkan Mumcu<sup>14</sup>, to bring a referendum before the people to solve the systemic deadlock through popular vote. The results of the referendum approved the next election of the President of Republic by popular vote. The adoption of the amendment through referendum paved the way for the second systemic step, a popularly elected president with a support of more than fifty percent of total votes, in transforming the parliamentary regime to the presidential system. The second step in transforming the parliamentary regime to the presidential system was: R. Tayyip Erdoğan being elected as the first president of Republic by popular vote in 2014. The predominant character of the leader assisted in re-interpretation of the constitution's concerned article and alternating the traditional custom / practice with the new practice as run-product of the promises in the election rallies. Although the Turkish Constitution states that "The President is the head of the State"<sup>15</sup>, and in the section related to executive function of the same article, "To preside over the Council of Ministers or to call the Council of Ministers to meet under his/her chairmanship whenever he/she deems it necessary", it had generally been the prime minister presiding over the Council of Ministers in traditional practice. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, as a predominant political character, incrementally left the traditional practice, and started to preside over the Council of Ministers in Beştepe, in which the new Presidential Complex is located. The referendum on April 16, 2017, totally transformed the parliamentary government regime into presidential system. In fact, it was the transformation of the de facto state to de jure. The incremental transformation of the systemic change can also be argued to be supported by the voters as R. Tayyip Erdoğan incrementally showed discursive challenges in the election rallies that he would not be an ordinary, usual or routine President if elected.

#### **4.1.1. Discourse and Policy on the Presidential System of Government**

Realist Realm with Outer Limits / O

Discourse: Incremental / I

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<sup>14</sup> "The only way to transform the system, from bureaucratic state to democratic state, is to elect the president of Republic by popular vote". Erkan Mumcu, Star TV, Interview 6, 21 February 2007.

<sup>15</sup> **The Turkish Constitution**, Article 104

## Policy: Incremental / I

The hypothesis of the strategy for discourse and policy:  $H^1 \{I; R|O|I\}$

### Text 1:

“The issue of the Presidential System of Government is not an outcome of any ordinary preference or any personal ambition. Hundreds of years’ experience, grief and accumulation lie behind the Presidential System of Government. There is no need to look far away, Turkey’s last quarter century alone lays bare the necessity for this change.”<sup>16</sup>

### Text 2:

“Some people mistake this system for the one in the US. No, ours is named Turkish-type presidential system of government. Yes, we are coming with a different system.”<sup>17</sup>

Outer Limits: As mentioned above, the arguments of the bureaucratic elites and opposition party carrying the argument to the court of constitution, the e-memorandum made public on the official website of the TAF, Republic Protests held in various major cities in Turkey and the unconstitutionality judgment of the court of constitution are the primary outer limits in 2007. The number of Justice and Development Party representatives in the Turkish Grand National Assembly was 316 which was not adequate either to bring the constitutional change to referendum (three-fifths) or legislate (two-thirds) as the Article 175<sup>18</sup> in Turkish Constitution states. A constitutional referendum was possible only by a support from the representatives of another political party, which was Nationalist Movement Party

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<sup>16</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a mass opening ceremony in Malatya”, İstanbul, 18 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/71075/cumhurbaskanligi-sisteminin-arkasinda-yuzlerce-yillik-birikim-var.html>

<sup>17</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The speech at a mass-inauguration ceremony in Aksaray”, Aksaray, 10 February 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70981/hizli-karar-almak-icin-yonetim-sistemimizi-degistirmekten-baska-caremiz-yok.html>

<sup>18</sup> Amendment to the Constitution shall be proposed in writing by at least one-third of the total number of members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Bills to amend the Constitution shall be debated twice in the Plenary. The adoption of a bill for an amendment shall require a three-fifths majority of the total number of members of the Assembly by secret ballot. Available at: [https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution\\_en.pdf](https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf)

(NMP) (*MHP*) declaring support to the Presidential System of Government that provided adequate number of yes votes in the TGNA to bring the constitutional change to referendum. The amendments were the product of negotiations between Justice and Development Party and Nationalist Movement Party (NMP). Some minor samples of change are: From Presidential System (AK Party) to the Presidential Government System (*MHP*) From President (AK Party) to President of Republic (*MHP*).

Policy: The policy follows an incremental development. Each political and constitutional deadlock is overcome through an incremental step whose sum is assumed to produce a further step towards the ultimate objective. The amendment introduced in referendum for popular election of the president was endorsed with the majority of votes, %68.95 yes votes and %31.05 no votes. The election of R. Tayyip Erdogan in 2014 as the first popularly elected President of Republic and incremental adoption of a novel practice of presiding over the Council of Ministers and the Presidential Complex being located as the center of administration with more than one thousand offices have incrementally paved the way for the transformation of the system. Presidential Government System (*Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi*) was introduced to the Turkish political system after the referendum held in the 16<sup>th</sup> April, 2017. The new system, apart from the differences in the use of Presidential Government System rather than Presidential System (with an emphasis on the Republican nature via the term “*cumhurbaşkanlığı*”) has nothing to do with the US type Presidential System, but one that can be called ‘a la Turca’ type of government system that is completely in line with the discourse.

#### **4.1.2. Discourse and Policy: “*Mon chers*”**

Realist Realm with Outer Limits / O

Discourse: Incremental / I

Policy: Incremental / I

The hypothesis of the strategy for discourse and policy:  $H^1 \{I; R|O|I\}$

Discourse and Outer Limits: Following the same line of thought with Özal with respect to the relations with the secondary actors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referring them as “*mon chers*”<sup>19</sup>, Erdoğan does not believe in the expertise of the bureaucrats to keep in step with his personalized foreign policy leaving room for ‘bold moves’ in foreign policy decisions. The existing policy rejecting the unilateral, autonomous and proactive engagements is a long-term deliberated and elaborated format of the MFA and the National Security Council (NSC) as the supervisor of the policies. The cadres occupied overwhelmingly by what Erdoğan calls as “*mon chers*”, is deployed with a new generation of bureaucrats without formal training in the MFA. Criticizing the policy adopting blind-eye to the former lands/predecessor states of the Ottoman Empire, the rhetoric paves the way for a foreign policy to be characterized as personalized foreign policy leaving room for more regional activism in the old territories of Ottoman Empire, in other words, political interventionism based upon an agenda whose premise is the grand legacy of history. Erdoğan produces the elements of his mental models throughout the discourse, defining the period before Justice and Development party as old Turkey, and the people efficient in TFP as detached from what the history teaches. The rhetoric on “Old Turkey” is a way of alienating Turkish public from the nation-state paradigm of the Turkish Republic. Erdoğan refers to the secularist and western-oriented diplomats as *mon chers* (*monşerler*)<sup>20 21 22</sup> whose meaning is negatively transferred to the officials who

<sup>19</sup> “Geniş vizyonu, hayali olanlar, bu büyük Türkiye'yi görür anıtlarlar. Bunu 81 vilayet ve dünya anladı. Ama Ankara'da bazıları bunu anlayamadı. Diplomasideki monşer eskileri anlamadı. Bunlar monşer geldiler, monşer gidiyorlar. Siyasete de böyle devam ediyorlar. Bazıları bundan rahatsız oluyor. Niye? Eğer monşer eskisi değişilsen, bu işin hakkını ver. Bu ülkenin kaderine olumlu katkıda bulun biz de alkışlayalım” “Erdoğan: Monşer Geldiler, Monşer Gidiyorlar.” **MİLLİYET HABER**. 13 February 2009. Available at: [www.milliyet.com.tr/Erdoğan--monşer-geldiler--monşer-gidiyorlar-siyaset-1059445/](http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Erdoğan--monşer-geldiler--monşer-gidiyorlar-siyaset-1059445/)

<sup>20</sup> To have an understanding on the question how the negative connotation (aloofness of the ambassadors towards the values of the common people) on the *term* constructed through the political discourse is adopted by the media: see: Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Şu monşerler meselesi,” **Taraf**, Feb. 4, 2009; also see: Aziz Üstel, “Buzlu Viski İç Geçer ‘Monşer’ ciğim!” **Stratejik Boyut**, June 11, 2010; also see: Emre Aköz, “Monşerliğin lüzumu yok,” **Sabah**, June 23, 2010; also see: Talip Küçükcan, “Monşer değil Büyükelçi,” **Star Gazetesi**, Jan. 25, 2010.

<sup>21</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan perceives those diplomats as the ones whose mind is oriented towards the status-quo of the last few centuries. The discourse seeks the diplomats able to adapt to the changing global order that is discursively put as: “The order that has ruled the world in the last few centuries is now crumbling. The sufferings we go through, the crises that follow one another are a precursor of a new wave of change. We must make the best of this process. Always keep in mind that Turkey is the hope

are hawkish proponents of status-quo, removed from the society, predicated on a single ideology and resisting the radical change and the aloofness of the ambassadors to the common values of the Turkish nation that infringes the Avulsive (A) type of decision-taking. The discourse reflects a typical political-exclusion of the *mon chers* accused to be soft in relation with the interlocutors.<sup>23</sup> <sup>24</sup> Just like Özal, Erdoğan

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of the Islamic world. And you are the hope of Turkey." R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "Turkey is the hope of Islamic world," Istanbul, 28 April 2016. Available at:  
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43790/turkey-is-the-hope-of-the-islamic-world.html>

<sup>22</sup> For the impact of the discourse on the retired ambassadors see: Damla Aras, "Turkey's Ambassadors vs. Erdoğan." **Middle East Quarterly** 18.1 (2011) p.47.

<sup>23</sup> For a further understanding of the ideological, at least ideational world rupture between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ambassadors, and the perception of the ambassadors by the conservative circles, please see: Damla Aras, "Turkey's Ambassadors vs. Erdoğan." **Middle East Quarterly** 18.1 (2011) p. 47.

<sup>24</sup> In the convention of ambassadors in 2011, Davutoğlu states that "I don't want you to speak with a weak voice. You should never show submission. We will raise our voice against any imposition" Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Dışişleri Bakanı Sn. Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun IV. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açış Konuşması, 23 December 2011. Available at: [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakan-sn\\_-ahmet-davutoglu\\_nun-iv\\_-buyukelciler-konferansi-acis-konusmasi\\_-23-aralik-2011.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakan-sn_-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-iv_-buyukelciler-konferansi-acis-konusmasi_-23-aralik-2011.mfa) Placating the bureaucratic reaction to the change, the discourse asks for a renewal. "Speaking with a weak voice" symbolizes the "old Turkey" and the diplomats whose formative years have been molded by the traditional policy norm what is often called the 'Sevres syndrome', hence an endeavor to secure a place of partnership and alliance for Turkey in the Western world. This gives an inevitable impulse to employ a tamed, non-offensive, reactive, refined language compatible with the prevalent fear that Turkey is surrounded with domestic and foreign enemies. The source of this accusation is based upon a perception that Kemalist diplomacy was not daring enough and bureaucracy is playing a bulwark role even if the case is a total systemic change, the end of the Cold War paradigm. Davutoğlu endeavors to establish a mission for the diplomats as "the judges" of the international arena which conveys a sense of confidence and self-esteem. The independence of the Turkish Republic is emphasized by expressions like "raising voice against any imposition" intended to change the Sevres syndrome imprint on the diplomats as a "collective fear that Western interest in Turkey is animated by a will to undermine the country's territorial integrity" Nora Fisher Onar, "Neo-Ottomanism, historical legacies and Turkish foreign policy." *Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series* (2009) p. 4. Sevres syndrome is characterized by the sense that there is still an abyss between Turkey and its neighbors. That Turkey is surrounded with enemies is seen as a psychological characteristic whose premises are represented to have formed a submissive, uninvolved, disinterested and cautious foreign policy. As a way to reinforce the argument of "New Turkey" that is independent, proactive and "whose agenda is not set by others, but by Turkey setting the agenda for the world" in Erdoğan's words, Davutoğlu re-imagines a break with the old establishment. Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. "Türkiye, Artık Gündemi Belirlenen Değil, Gündem Belirleyen Bir Ülke Oldu." *Twitter*, Twitter, 21 July 2013, [twitter.com/rt\\_Erdoğan/status/359023833769971712](https://twitter.com/rt_Erdoğan/status/359023833769971712). For instance, discussion of the "IMF" has two potential allusion / implication: (1) debt, economic crisis, intervention of an international institution into domestic politics, loss of independence (domestic policy), (2) submission to the dictates of international institutions and a state of dependency in foreign policy. The conspiracy theories in Turkish media are equipped with presenting IMF as an instrument of "siege paranoia" Michelangelo Guida, "The Sèvres syndrome and "Komplot" theories in the Islamist and Secular Press." *Turkish Studies* 9.1 (2008): 37-52.

makes it clear that the main political problem of his party is to meet the need for huge transformation hence bureaucracy is simply perceived as a major barrier.

Policy: After the critique of R. Tayyip Erdoğan in 2009, the ambassadors incrementally appointed out of the formal training in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the following:

Tuncer Kayalar: Nairobi Ambassador, Appointed in 2009.

İbrahim Akça: Appointed in 2011, Ambassador to Nicosia

Musa Kulaklıkaya: Appointed in 2011, Ambassador to Nouakchott

Dr. Kani Torun: Appointed in 2011, Ambassador to Mogadishu (Somalia)

Zekeriya Akçam: Appointed in 2012, Ambassador to Jakarta

Niyazi Tanılır: Appointed in 2012, Ambassador to Podgorica.

Ömer Faruk Doğan: Appointed in 2012, Ambassador to Yaounde

Yusuf Ziya Özcan: Appointed in 2012, Ambassador to Warsaw

Abdulkadir Emin Önen: Appointed in 2007, Ambassador to People's Republic of China

Hasan Murat Mercan: Appointed in 2017, Ambassador to Japan

Ayşe Hilal Sayan Koytak: Appointed in 2017, Ambassador to Kuwait

#### 4.2. Discourse and Policy: Moralism without Outer Limits




Figure 4. 5 A Hierarchical Order of Discourse and Policy in Moralism without Structural Limits of Power and Domination

A typical case, *moralism without outer limits*, in which meanwhile Avulsive (A) type of discourse and policy can be observed in policies developed specific to the open-door policy, just after the Syrian Civil War, as a significant example. The discourse follows a drastic change from the statusquoist foreign policy, in other words a perpetuated blind eye role to the vicinity and former territories, pursuing an active role in receiving and meeting the basic needs of the Syrian refugees. It is a typical Avulsive type of policy as it is a moral, normative, and value-based policy actualized in an avulsed manner. It is completely avulsed from the traditional bureaucratic foreign policy that is characterized to be non-involving, neutral, reactive and aloof to the internal affairs of the neighbor states, and also claimed to be rooted in the grand legacy of history. The foremost case of study is R. Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse on the Syrian refugees. A deep analysis of the political discourse on the Syrian refugees was put throughout the introduction and first two section of the

Chapter 3. As mentioned above, adapted from Herz's argument, 'security' and 'power', are employed as the foremost factors intervening in the translation of the utopia / what is ideal into real life practices. Power is going to be employed as Northedge writes it:

"the capability of a person or group to make his or its will felt in the decision-making process of another person or group (...) A state may be said to have power in the international system when another state recognizes that it cannot be ignored when issues have to be determined."<sup>25</sup>

Power, in the Table 6, is handled as economic power, ability to meet the basic requirements for the livelihood of the refugees such as: food needs, non-food items, shelter in the short term / accommodation in the long term, and utilities / free-of-charge public and health services. The term, security, is employed to address either a security issue, or an issue that is securitized. As mentioned above, anti-refugee attitude of the EU members is an attempt to secure the prosperity of the people, or to prosper the securitization of the issue. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, emphasizing the capacity to cope with the probable expenditures accompanied by the discourse of solidarity and collective memory, perceives the outer limits as the members of the EU whose discourse against the refugees amounts to the prosperity of the securitization of the issue. The discourse reflects the capacity of Turkey to meet the needs of the refugees while the outer world is perceived as an agent securitizing the problem. The analysis of the R. Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse on the refugees has figured out the attempt to allay the probable security concerns. The prominent factor determining the nature of the policy of the Turkish Republic for the Syrian refugees is the nature of the case: *moralism without any outer limits*. As the case is evaluated within the frame of moralism, the discourse is developed in an avulsive manner. As the economic power to realize its will is at the disposal of Turkey, the policy shows almost the same avulsive nature as it appears in the adoption of open-door policy just after the Syrian Civil War.

#### **4.2.1. Discourse on Syrian Refugees and Syrian Refugees Policy**

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<sup>25</sup> Frederick Samuel Northedge, ed. **The Use of Force in International Relations**. Faber, 1974. p. 12

Moralism without Outer Limits / WO

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Avulsive / A

The hypothesis for discourse and policy relationship:  $H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$

Text 1:

“As Turkey, since the first day of the crisis, we have stood with our Syrian brothers and kept our gates open to them, and so will we. We have put one extra plate on our tables for them. We currently accommodate 3 million Syrian and Iraqi refugees within an understanding of *Ansar* and neighborhood. And Allah is rewarding this sharing and solidarity with so much more.”<sup>26</sup>

Text 2:

“With all due respect, but we are not to be fooled<sup>27</sup>. For a certain point, we will endure; but then we will do what is necessary. We have made people get into the buses in Edirne and turned them away. Once is okay, twice is okay, but then we open the doors and wish bon voyage.”<sup>28</sup>

Outer Limits: The cost of the Syrian refugees on the Turkish economy and the unfulfilled financial support promised through EU-Turkey Refugee Deal created political unrest. The discourse is based upon the topoi of ‘humanitarianism’, ‘responsibility’ [as a run extension of the above analyzed notions of religious

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<sup>26</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at 9<sup>th</sup> International Student Meeting”, İstanbul, 15 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43945/we-have-stood-with-our-syrian-brothers-since-the-first-day.html>

<sup>27</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan makes use of the Turkish word “*enayı*” that means someone to be tricked easily, it is not of as rough meaning as that of stupid or fool.

<sup>28</sup> Turkish version retrieved from: R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “TÜGİK Genel Kurulu’nda Yaptıkları Konuşma”, Ankara, 11 February 2016. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/38794/tugik-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma.html> “*Şu ana kadar 10 milyar dolara yakın bu mülteciler için para harcamiş olan Türkiye’ye, bu mülteciler için sen ne kadar destek verdin? 455 milyon dolar. Ayıptır ayıp. Bu Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı bu iş için kurulmadı, kapayı aç. Dünyadaki diğer ülkelerin kabul ettiği mülteci sayısı ne kadar? Bakıyorsun bazıları 100 tane almış, öbürü 300 tane, 500 tane, bin tane... Bizim alnımızda enayı yazmıyoruz kusura bakmayın, bu işin hakkı neyse bunu yapın. Biz bir yere kadar sabır gösteririz, ondan sonra da gereği neyse bunu yaparız. Herhalde otobüsler boşuna durmuyor, uçaklar boşuna durmuyor, gereği neyse ondan sonra o yapılır.*” English version from: “We Are Not to Be Fooled.” **MİLLİYET HABER**, 11 Feb. 2016, Available at: [www.milliyet.com.tr/we-are-not-to-be-fooled-en-2193118/en.htm](http://www.milliyet.com.tr/we-are-not-to-be-fooled-en-2193118/en.htm) <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/we-are-not-to-be-fooled-en-2193118/en.htm>

brotherhood, neighborhood and kinship] and common history and culture. The political discourse is never against the Syrian refugees, but indirectly instrumentalizes the tragedy to address the deficits of the international community with critical tone on the blind-eye policy. Text 2 points out the *topoi* of ‘reality’, as Syrian refugees are likely to lead to burdening on the Turkish economy, as Turkey is the single country regarding the European continent receiving more than three million refugees that is ten times more than that of top two receiving EU members.<sup>29</sup> This case is crucial in illustrating the fact that the cases with moral content are not exempt from outer limits, however, the outer limits, it can simply be fragmented as finance in this case, are perceived to tolerable by the actor, or the actor assumes power to overcome the financial burden and weight on the society, or assumes that the avulsive discourse addressed to the receiving society would emancipate public opinion of the receiving society from the potential danger or threat to the society and economy as the rhetor has already positioned himself / has already been positioned by the hearers as an appropriate teller that paves the way for an avulsive policy as the rhetor is not only an appropriate teller but also an appropriate doer.

Policy: Open-door policy has been adopted by Turkey. 3.106.932 registered Syrians are hosted in Turkey and 25 billion dollars expenditure. 80.742 children were registered for the primary school for the first time. 508.846 children were enrolled in a school in total. Public health care free-of-charge has been provided for the Syrian refugees. 953.466 refugees have gone an operation. 1.143.393 case in-hospital medical expenses have been met and 25.919.550 cases given clinic service for outpatients. 224.750 Syrians were born in Turkey. Approximately 225.000 Syrian refugees were provided with professional training and certificate programs on foreign language, computer use and carpet weaving. Turkey spent 0.75 percent of its GNI in humanitarian aid programs, ranking the second country in the world after US, regarding against its GNI. According to AFAD data made public on 22 December 2017 regarding the Syrian refugees provided with temporary accommodation center

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<sup>29</sup> According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 4.8 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria. Meanwhile about one million have requested asylum to Europe. Germany, with more than 300,000 cumulated applications, and Sweden with 100,000, are EU’s top receiving countries.

services, 17850 Syrians in Hatay are accommodated in containers and tents, 24543 Syrians in Gaziantep, 79576 in Şanlıurfa, 26732 in Kilis, 4142 in Mardin, 22.713 in Kahramanmaraş, 15.065 in Osmaniye, 8965 in Adiyaman, 26.180 in Adana, and 9.533 in Malatya.<sup>30</sup>

#### **4.2.2. Discourse on the Victory of Malazgirt: Reflection of the Ideational World (Discourse) and Policy**

Moralism without Outer Limits / WO

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Avulsive / A

The hypothesis of the strategy for discourse and policy:  $H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$

The case is evaluated within the framework of moralist realm as it entails:

- a) the topoi of culture, history, responsibility
  - 1) The victory of Malazgirt as a constituent of the collective memory and culture.
  - 2) The victory of Malazgirt as a component of the collective memory and history.
  - 3) The sense of responsibility to remember and comprehend the victory of Malazgirt.

Text 1:

“Whoever leaves out our last 200 years, even 600 years together with its victories and defeats, and jumps directly from old Turkish history to the Republic, is an enemy of our nation and state.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, Geçici Barınma Merkezleri, 22 November 2017. Available at:  
[https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/22\\_11\\_2017\\_Suriye\\_GBM\\_Bilgi\\_Notu.pdf](https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/22_11_2017_Suriye_GBM_Bilgi_Notu.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a Commemoration Ceremony Held on the Occasion of the Centenary of Kut Al Amara Victory”, Ankara, 29 April 2016. Available at:  
<http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/43805/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html>

## Text 2:

“We will be in Malazgirt on August 26 [2017] to mark the Victory of Malazgirt and from then on we will be sowing the seeds of 2071 by being in Malazgirt on every August 26...The AK Party is a party which serves as the architect of all these achievements with the strong bridge it has built between the past and the future. We have a big responsibility; yet, we also harbor the means, will and determination to shoulder this burden with our nation’s support and Allah’s help. What we only need is to always keep in mind where we have come from, where we stand, and where we are going to. Rest assured, as long as we don’t go astray off our path, it is easy for us to overcome the obstacles that are put in our way.”<sup>32</sup>

**Outer Limits:** There is no limitation against the introduction of commemoration of the Victory of Malazgirt as it is of significations appealing to the collective memory, history and culture. The opposition parties, MHP and CHP, the former is a nationalist party, and the latter ultra-nationalist and nationalist tendencies are not expected to make arguments against the discourse and the policy. The grand legitimacy of the one thousand years of history is the basis of the policy. Any opposition to that kind of marking the victory of Malazgirt is of potential to be perceived as aloofness to the glories in one hundred years of history.

**Policy:** The commemoration event marking the Victory of Malazgirt was held in Malazgirt on 26 August 2017.

### **4.2.3. Discourse on the Execution of Motiur Rehman Nizami and Policy**

The second case selected is Bangladeshi leader, Motiur Rehman Nizami, an executed Islamist leader in opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami. The case is significant as we have argued that the values, morals, ethics and norms, in such a form whose source lies in the deep-rooted legacy of history and largely in Islam, are reformulated in the form of foreign policy decisions taken against such incidents. The case is also significant in deciphering the seesaw of moralism and realism. The case not only points out a moral reaction against an unfair decision and ill practices but also the temporariness of the moralism as the real world forces the actors to take standpat

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<sup>32</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The speech at a ceremony marking the 16th anniversary of the foundation of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)”, Ankara, 14 August 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/80175/adalet-ve-kalkinma-kavramlari-birer-deniz-feneri-gibi-bugun-de-yolumuzu-aydinlatiyor.html>

policy measures in the long term. The temporariness of the foreign policy measures does not make the moral motives reduce in value but functions as a formidable sign for the actors' anchor of policy-making in the short-term. Although the outer limits and the discourse interact / counteract in different ways, the case justifies the assertion of the moralism in the short term (for three months). While the short term response figures out the a policy fueled with moral motives, the long term stands as a middle way between improving bilateral relations between Turkey and Bangladesh and severing the ties. The case Motiur Rehman Nizami is evaluated as *moralism without outer limits* as the execution of the Bangladeshi leader is perceived to fall into the realm of moralism. Both the discourse and the primary diplomatic measures taken as a reaction to the ill-practice reflect an avulsive manner. It is worth noting down that categorizing the discursive and diplomatic reaction as a case of moralism without outer limits is valid for the primary stage.

Moralism without Outer Limits / WO

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Avulsive / A

The hypothesis of the strategy for discourse and policy:  $H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$

Text:

"I want to share the grief of Motiur Rehman Nizami, I am faithful. Motiur Rehman Nizami neither committed any crime, nor he deserved this fate to be hanged. We await just decisions from the leadership of Bangladesh for lasting peace and stability in the country. We keep ourselves aware of such incidents of injustice and hate against Muslim around the world. As Motiur Rehman Nizami wrote in his letter 'I am leaving. And leaving a legacy'. The fearless character in such a murderous situation of death holds a distinguishing meaning for him and us. He was a human being, none forced him to submit to his slavery and he gave a lesson of violence against humanity O' Brethren, these ignorant people think they decide our future but they don't realize that these decisions are made in eternity. I ask them. Who are you?... May Allah bless the Motiur Rehman Nizami...We have recalled our ambassador from Dhaka and he is reaching Istanbul shortly. And do not forget. The final place for tyrants is hell."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> 12 May 2016, President R. Tayyip Erdoğan's speech at Yerli Düşünce Derneği.

Outer Limits: Discourse above and Policy 1 below is going to depict how an avulsive discourse is directly translated to avulsive policy in the context of moralist realm. However, Discourse and Policy 2 also point out how the discourse and policy is wedged between moralism and realpolitik. The hypothesis above,  $H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$  is explanatory in the relationship between Discourse and Policy 1. That's why the case is categorized in the realm of moralism without outer limits considering the relationship between Discourse and Policy 1 as the focus is moralist discourse and policy as a sign for adopting a moral diplomatic response. However, the relationship between Discourse and Policy 2 can be hypothesized in a different strategy: If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change in discourse from the bureaucratic, non-involving, neutral, passive, statusquoist foreign policy if the case is perceived as a moral case.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed or turns back to former status-quo since aggressing the outer limits would produce uselessness or disadvantage than sticking to them / choosing relatively minor (incremental) policy changes. Here, let the hypothesis be reformulated as direct tracing from the Discourse to Policy 2 creates a discrepancy from the four strategies shown-above and requires a reformulation:  $H^5 \{A; M|O|I\}$ : an avulsive discourse is produced in moralist case, however the outer limits in international relations incrementally forces the actor to endorse an incremental policy that justify the transition to the former state.

Policy 1: Turkey recalled Turkey's ambassador (Devrim Öztürk) to Bangladesh on 12 May 2016.

Policy 2: Turkey sent Turkey's ambassador (Devrim Öztürk) back to Bangladesh after three months on 12 August 2016.

#### **4.2.4. Ottoman Language Teaching: Discourse and Policy**

Moralism without Outer Limits / WO

Discourse: Avulsive / A

## Policy: Avulsive / A

The hypothesis of the strategy for discourse and policy:  $H^2 \{A; M|WO|A\}$

The case is evaluated within the framework of moralist realm as it entails:

- a) The topoi of culture, history, civilization and responsibility,
- b) Regarding improve the ability to read the periodicals, old books, gravestones and chronicles, an attempt to uncover the collective memory.

Text:

“There are those who don’t want Ottoman [language] to be learned and taught. This is a very big danger. Whether they want it or not, Ottoman [language] will be learned and taught in this country. There are those who are uneasy with this country’s children learning Ottoman. But it is actually nothing stranger than ‘ageless Turkish.’ With it, we will learn realities. They say, ‘Will we teach children how to read gravestones?’ But a history and a civilization is lying on those gravestones.”<sup>34</sup>

Outer Limits: The main opposition party in the parliament, feud over the introduction of Ottoman Language courses into the schedule, however the reaction of the opposition party was more of an encouraging nature rather than deterring one as the arguments<sup>35</sup> were based on the revival of the Arabic Alphabet, Republican ideals and the principles of M. Kemal Atatürk rather than the arguments related to the education system, the aim of the Ottoman Turkish course, the target students of the course and the staff. Another opposition party in the parliament, HDP, (People’s Democratic Party) opposed to the regulation as it was evaluated as another type of indoctrination on the Kurdish children. İlber Ortaylı, a veteran historian, underlined the lack of qualified cadres in Turkish education system to teach Ottoman language.

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<sup>34</sup> “Ottoman Language Classes to Be Introduced ‘Whatever They Say,’ Vows Erdogan.” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 9 December 2014. Available at: [www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ottoman-language-classes-to-be-introduced-whatever-they-say-vows-Erdogan.aspx?PageID=238&NID=75329&NewsCatID=338](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ottoman-language-classes-to-be-introduced-whatever-they-say-vows-Erdogan.aspx?PageID=238&NID=75329&NewsCatID=338).

<sup>35</sup> Akif Hamzacebi, spokesman for the main opposition CHP in parliament argues: “Erdoğan’s concern is not teaching the Ottoman language...His real aim is a settling of accounts with secularism and the Republic,” “Erdoğan actually wants to revive the Arabic alphabet in Turkey”. Another opposition politician: Selahattin Demirtas “Even if your whole army comes, they can’t force my daughter into Ottoman lessons” “Erdoğan’s Ottoman Language Drive Faces Backlash in Turkey.” **Reuters**, Thomson Reuters, 9 December 2014. Available at: [www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-education-ottoman/Erdogans-ottoman-language-drive-faces-backlash-in-turkey-idUSKBN0JN1X020141209](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-education-ottoman/Erdogans-ottoman-language-drive-faces-backlash-in-turkey-idUSKBN0JN1X020141209).

Ortaylı also claimed that the main debate should be on the target addressee of the Ottoman language.

Policy: According to the regulation<sup>36</sup> by The Board of Education and Discipline issued on 29.07.2016, The Course of Ottoman Turkish in High-School Level is introduced into the schedules of the students in the 10<sup>th</sup> degree to be continued in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> degrees.

#### 4.3. Discourse and Policy: Moralism with Outer Limits




Figure 4. 6 A Hierarchical Order of Discourse and Policy in Moralism with Outer Limits

##### 4.3.1. Discourse on the Lausanne Treaty: Reflection of the Ideational World (Discourse) and Official Statement (Policy)

Moralism with outer limits: M|O

Discourse: Avulsive / A

<sup>36</sup> Talim Ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı. “Geçmişten Günümüze Kurul Kararları,” 27 March 2013. Available at: [ttkb.meb.gov.tr/www/gecmisten-gunumuze-kurul-kararları/icerik/152](http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/www/gecmisten-gunumuze-kurul-kararları/icerik/152). [25 March 2018]

## Policy: Incremental / I

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse if the case is perceived as a moral case.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / choosing relatively minor (incremental) policy changes.

The case is categorized in the realm of moralism as it (is):

- a) belongs to history,
- b) endorses the topoi of justice and history and
- c) a historical document discursively narrated relying on the baggage of critical literature of conservative circle with regards to “the topos of ‘pro bono publico’ (‘to the advantage of all’), the topos of ‘pro bono nobis’ (‘to the advantage of us’), and the topos of ‘pro bono eorum’ (‘to the advantage of them’)”<sup>37</sup>.

Text:

“What did they do to us in the history? They showed us the Sèvres in 1920 and then persuaded us to agree to the Lausanne in 1923. Afterwards, some have tried to pass off the Lausanne as a victory. All is obvious. And now you see the Aegean, don’t you? We gave away at the Lausanne the islands that you could shout across to. Is that the victory? Those places used to belong to us. There are still our mosques and sanctuaries. However, we are still talking ‘What will the continental shelf be? What will it be in the air, or at the sea?’ We are still struggling for this. Why? Due to the ones that were at the table in Lausanne”.<sup>38</sup>

Outer Limits: Discourse on the Lausanne Treaty invokes the ideational world of the rhetor while the official statement on 94<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Lausanne Peace Treaty acknowledges it as a victory. The discrepancy between the discourse and the official statement is not a contradiction, but actually a reflection on the fact that translation of the discourse into policy, sometimes, stays unfulfilled. In this case, as

<sup>37</sup> Wodak, **Methods for critical discourse analysis**, p.74

<sup>38</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “The Speech at the 27th Mukhtars Meeting at the Presidential Complex”, Ankara, 29 September 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/52444/27th-mukhtars-meeting-at-the-presidential-complex.html>

Lausanne Peace Treaty is an internationally acknowledged founding document of the Republic of Turkey, it is impossible to gainsay the document since such an official gainsay would have other negative implications in the international relations and diplomacy.

Policy: The policy on the Lausanne Treaty is also a narrative, an official statement celebrating the anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty. It reveals how the ideational world of the rhetor is wedged between avulsive and incremental strategy of discourse/policy making. It also reflects that the rhetor sticks to the status-quo though the Discourse can be evaluated as avulsive in nature it is shut out from the translation of it to the policy and restricted to the erstwhile critical tone of Ismet Pasha specific to the conservative circle in Turkey and the tales and rumors as a run product of the critical baggage. “We are today celebrating the 94<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the founding document of the Republic of Turkey. The heroic victory of independence, which our august nation achieved despite all the poverty and impossibilities, was registered in the fields of diplomacy and international relations with the Lausanne Treaty. With the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish nation tore up the Sèvres, which took aim at its one thousand-year existence on these lands, and made the whole world acknowledge the fact that it would make no concession on its independence. As it did yesterday, our country is today as well fighting for its survival against various attacks on its existence. (...) The resistance that was put up against the July 15 bloody coup attempt, the first anniversary of which we.”<sup>39</sup> The official statement made public on the official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey stresses the incrementalism, sticking to the status-quo.

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<sup>39</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The message President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued on the occasion of the 94th anniversary of the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty”, 24 July 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/80026/lozan-baris-antlasmasinin-94-yil-donumu.html>

### **4.3.2. Discourse on the Uyghur Turks in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Reflection of the Ideational World (Discourse) and Official Statement (Policy)**

Case Content: Moralism with outer limits

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Incremental / I

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse if the case is perceived as a moral case. Discourse figures out an avulsive (a) nature as it is related to normative values such as kinship, historical and cultural affiliations and brotherhood.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions List would give more harm to relations with the international institutions than sticking to it. The policy figures out an incremental (i) nature as is bound by the international law and regulations.

The case is categorized in the realm of moralism as it (is):

- a) a case of kinship. Uyghur Turks are perceived as the 'kidnapped brothers'<sup>40</sup>. The notion of kinship assists the idea of normative-value based actions that are, by nature, represented as the duties that have to be fulfilled. It is the normative values such as kinship, brotherhood, relatives and ethnic identification that formulate the content of the case and the discourse in an avulsive nature.

Text:

"First of all, I would like to express that Turkey stands by the Uyghur Turks in China just like it stands by all its brothers and kin. We voice the problems concerning our

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<sup>40</sup> The same wording was also applicable to the perception of the EU members regarding the Eastern Europe countries. The EU, in the process of enlargement to the eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, referred to these states as the 'kidnapped brothers' and the process as the reunion with the 'kidnapped relatives'. It was, for certain, a discourse stressing the cultural and religious kinship supporting the argument of enlargement in the eyes of the masses in the member countries. The kinship notion assists the notion of historical duties and normative values as the basic motive behind the enlargement.

brothers living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at the highest level and will continue to do so. Our Foreign Ministry has conveyed our sensitivity regarding this matter to the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China. We will also draw our counterparts' attention to this issue during our visit to China.”<sup>41</sup>

**Outer Limits:** Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is a group whose members are Uyghurs, an ethnic minority in the region, and with terrorist activities mostly in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, was listed in UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions List in 2002.<sup>42</sup> It needs to be noted that Turkey's decision is not a decision that can be taken independently. A change in the national terrorist list means impeaching the international law. Once the UN's list includes a terrorist group, Turkish Republic has no other choice, but to update it accordingly as a requisite of the membership, otherwise, it would mean impeachment of abiding with the decisions taken by UN Security Council and subsidiary organs of counter terrorism.

**Policy:** Turkish Republic recognized Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement in the terrorist list in 2002. Sticking to the status-quo (i), [making no change in the terrorist list] is a responsibility of abiding by the international law.

#### **4.3.3. Discourse on the Military Presence in the Region: Concurring Discourse and Policy**

Moralism with outer limits

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Incremental / I

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<sup>41</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at Meeting with foreign ambassadors, serving in Ankara, at an iftar (fast breaking) table”, Ankara, 09 July 2015. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/32895/cumhurbaskani-Erdogan-buyukelcilerle-iftar-yapti.html>

<sup>42</sup> United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, “SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES”. **United Nations**, Available at: [www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement](http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement).

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{a; m|o|a\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse if the case is perceived as a moral case as the stance of the rhetor is not neutral, passive, non-involving or aloof to the ongoing war and a neighbor failed state.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{i; m|o|i\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / choosing relatively minor (incremental) policy changes. The policy follows incremental steps in this case. Turkey established safe zones in Jerablus, al-Rai, Dabiq and al-Bab, however the discourse on Manbij and Raqqa has failed to be actualized as Turkey is not the single actor in the region but a part of power / super powers to assist the dominant position in Syria who seek to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of existence in the region. Turkey attempts to take a crucial role in the region both securing the self-interest, and to fulfill the humanitarian duties stemming from the grand legacy of history, culture, kinship and religious identification.

Text 1:

“How can we ignore the developments in Syria and Iraq? How can we turn a blind eye to what is going on in the Caucasus or the Balkans? How can we stand idly by in the face of the ongoing restructuring efforts in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea? As I always say, you cannot be at the table unless you are in the field. And if you are not at the table, you are on the menu; in other words, you are eaten. Therefore, we are present in the field. We will continue to be in the field more strongly. As long as we stay in the field, no one can keep us outside the table or put us on the menu.”<sup>43</sup>

Text 2:

“After Al Bab is about to be over, the period following that will be Manbij and Raqqa.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “Address to a large crowd of citizens in Erzurum”, Erzurum, 12 April 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/74743/you-cannot-be-at-the-table-unless-you-are-in-the-field.html>

<sup>44</sup> “Erdoğan: Turkish Army Will Press on to ISIL-Held Raqqa.” *Turkey News / Al Jazeera*, 12 February 2017. Available at: [www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/Erdo%0115151375.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/Erdo%0115151375.html).

### Text 3:

“Clearing an area of over two thousand square kilometers of terrorists, we established safe zones in Jarabulus, al-Rai, Dabiq and al-Bab. Therefore, over 100 thousand Syrian brothers and sisters of ours could return to their homeland, which they had missed for a long time...We offered to do the same thing in Manbij, as well, but our strategic partners are stalling. We offered them to do it together in Raqqa, but they opted to partner with the YPG terrorist organization. Then we said, ‘ok, that is your call.’ And now they are in action. We will see what will do.”<sup>45</sup>

### Text 4:

“Turkey will take part in the Mosul operation and hold a seat at the table. It is out of the question for us to remain outside. Because there is history in Mosul for us. If those gentlemen wish so, they can read Misak-ı Milli (The National Oath) and better understand what history we have in Mosul.”<sup>46</sup>

Outer Limits: Keyman gives a comprehensive account of the environmental challenges of Turkey between 2015-2017:

“(i) the profound refugee influx and crisis, whose numbers have exceeded six million regionally; (ii) an ongoing war against ISIS, which can be defined as ‘more than a terror organization, less than a state’ –a brutal and inhumane terror organization on the one hand and a self-proclaimed Islamic state; (iii) the ‘failed state’ problem in Syria and Iraq and its widening throughout the MENA; (iv) the intensified geopolitical power games staged by great powers to strengthen their hegemonic positions, to exert their influence and to maximize their interests; (v) the emergence of new forms of war and violence varying from proxy wars to suicide bombers; and (vi) the increasing power of sectarian identity claims widening and deepening the devastating human tragedy to an unimaginable degree.”<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Addressing citizens in the Harran district of Şanlıurfa following a fast-breaking dinner (iftar)”, Şanlıurfa, 23 June 2016. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/77680/suriyedeki-gelismeler-bir-tehdit-olusturursa-firat-kalkaninda-ne-yaptiysak-aynisini-yapariz.html>

<sup>46</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the International Istanbul Law Congress”, İstanbul, 17 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/53664/turkey-will-take-part-in-the-mosul-operation-and-hold-a-seat-at-the-table.html>

<sup>47</sup> Fuat Keyman "A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive "Moral Realism"." **Insight Turkey** 19.1 (2017). pp. 59-60.

These environmental challenges are termed as outer limits, each taking a role in reformulating the discourse into policy, and each posits a motive to reshape the foreign policy with respect to the regional problems.

Turkey is a state admitting to the League of Nations concerned decision on Mosul. When ISIS took the control over the region in 2014, it was the largest city under control. In 2016, Iraqi armed forces, pesmerge –the regional armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG, and regional militias reinforced by the USA-led coalition forces ended the control of the ISIS over the region. The structural limits of power and domination are simply the following: the national interest of Iraq, the interest of the KRG, the USA, the ISIS, Iran backed militias and Iran. Translation of the political discourse into policy means the violation of the manoeuvre field in the structural limits of power and domination. The political discourse cannot be translated into policy as the relative gain to be obtained from such a policy cannot be regarded at the expense of the other actors as Turkey is not the single actor seeking the interest. Another reason for the political discourse not to be translated into policy is the following: After the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the region, including the Northern Iraq, has become a battlefield in which the balance of power games are worked through the proxy armed groups. Whenever one state increases its power in the region, the others make coalitions to prevent it and nobody is allowed to have hegemony. The structural limits of power and domination allows for rational actors doing something providing more benefits that outweigh the costs, goal-seeking organisms in purposive behavior striving for the ends toward which they are impelled by the past and present social and political characteristics.

Policy: Turkey's Operation Euphrates Shield to eliminate the probable risks stemming from proxy wars, the presence of ISIS beyond the Syrian borders and to eradicate the infiltration of the suicide bombers. ISIS control over Jarabulus, al-Rai, Dabiq and al-Bab has been eradicated by TAF however the outer limits such as the US collaborating with YPG to eradicate ISIS in Raqqa ward off what is worded as “extending over”. The policy-making of the United States and the YPG are the exemplary forms of outer limits. A direct translation of the discourse into policy is

assumed to jeopardize the institutionalized Turkish-American Relations and confronting a terrorist group armed by the United States.<sup>48</sup>

After the military operation against ISIS in Jarabulus, al-Rai, Dabiq and al-Bab, Turkey focused on other terrorist organizations such as YPG and PYD.

Text 4 reveals an avulsive political discourse declaring the intention of military operation in Mosul. The source of the discourse is history. However, no military operation is performed concerning Mosul as the structural limits of power and domination are not convenient. The avulsive nature of the discourse and the incremental use of hard power justify the hypothesis given above:

Let us put 3 different political discourses produced within 3 months:

Text 5:

“It is us that has a 911-km-long border with Syria. There is no other country that has such a long border. It is our cities that are constantly harassed and threatened. We have discussed these issues many times with Mr. Putin and the coalition powers. By coalition powers, I mean the U.S. first and foremost, and Germany and France. We have discussed this issue with them many times and continue to do so.”<sup>49</sup>

Text 6:

“Syria’s political unity and territorial integrity as well as exclusion of terrorist elements that target our national security from the process will continue to be among our priorities as Turkey. No one should expect us to come together with a terrorist organization that targets our national security under the same roof or at the same platform.”<sup>50</sup>

Text 7:

“Just like we give no respite to the separatist terror organization within our borders, we are determined to defeat them beyond our borders. In the coming days, we will

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<sup>48</sup> “We are reviewing pending adjustments to the military support provided to our Kurdish partners in as much as the military requirements of our defeat-ISIS and stabilization efforts will allow to prevent ISIS from returning,” said Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon, 26 November 2017.

<sup>49</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “A press conference at Istanbul Atatürk Airport before leaving for Russia”, İstanbul, 13 November 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87315/turkey-has-always-stood-by-its-brothers-and-sisters-in-the-region-in-difficult-times.html>

<sup>50</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at a press conference in Sochi, Russia, following the Trilateral Summit on Syria”, Sochi, 22 November 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87440/exclusion-of-terrorist-elements-from-the-process-in-syria-is-our-priority.html>

continue the operation – first step of which we took with Operation Euphrates Shield -- to clear our southern border from terror with Afrin.”<sup>51</sup>

The chronological tracing of the political discourse helps to reveal the incremental nature of it.

#### **4.3.4. Discourse and Policy: Turkey – Israel Relations**

Moralism with outer limits

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Incremental / I

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse if the case is perceived as a moral case as the stance of the rhetor endorses the notion of religious brotherhood.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / tilting towards incremental and relatively minor policy changes.

Text 1:

“Mr. Peres, you are a senior citizen and you speak in a loud voice. I feel that your raised voice is due to the guilt you feel. But be sure that my voice will not be raised as yours. When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill, I know very well how you hit and killed children on beaches. In your country there are two former prime ministers whose comments on Gaza are important for me. You had prime ministers who said: We relish the opportunity to enter the Palestinian lands on tanks. I condemn those who clap for these atrocities, because I think that cheering the murderers of children and humans is in its kind a crime against humanity. First, the sixth of the Ten Commandments in the Torah says "You shall not kill" but in Palestine people are killed. And second, which is a very interesting issue; Gilad Atzmon [a Jew himself], says Israeli barbarity is far beyond any usual cruelty. Aside from this, Avi Shlaim, Professor of Oxford who performed his military duty in the Israeli army says in the Guardian that Israel has become a rogue state. (Pointing to Peres) He spoke for 25 minutes, but you only let me speak for 12 minutes. This is not acceptable.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “The Speech at the AK Party Tokat Provincial Congress”, Tokat, 14 January 2018. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/89078/guney-sinirimizi-terorden-arindirma-operasyonunu-afrinle-devam-ettirecegiz.html>

<sup>52</sup> “What Turkish PM, Tayyip Erdoğan told Shimon Peres in Davos,” **Axis of Logic**, 3 February 2009. Available at: [http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article\\_29547.shtml](http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_29547.shtml)

Outer Limits: Historical Limits: Palestinians as ‘the Arabs of Palestine’, refused to cooperate with the mandatory of Britain. In 1930s the big rebellion was crashed by U.K. Regarding the separation plan: Israel-Arab, Arabs of Palestine claimed that the UN did not have the authority to give such a decision, and a newly born state in 1948 defeated all the Arab states attacking it. Gaza Strip came under the Egyptian military control and West Bank under Jordan. Signing cease-fire agreements allowed Israel to become a member of the UN in 1948. In 1950s, Menderes, Israel and Iran held secret negotiations to prevent the Soviet influence in the Middle East. When Israel was born, Gaza was under the control of Egypt and West bank under the control of Jordan. Palestine was in complete array that resulted in refugees. In ‘Fair settlement of refugee problem’, no reference was made to Palestinians till 60’s. In 1962, when Egypt-Syria Union collapsed, ‘El Fatah’ became a visible actor arguing that ‘Palestine should be liberated by the Palestinians. ‘El Fatah’ became known worldwide when it made its first attack after they attempted to divert the route of the water from Jordan to Israel. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with Arafat taking the lead in the organization created a situation like a state within a state as the organization was active firstly in Jordan then in Lebanon. Turkey became the first country in recognizing PLO. In 1970s, PLO became recognized as the representative of the Palestinians. Until 1977, Labor Party was on power in Israel. Labor Party defined the lands the UN asks Israel to withdraw as ‘administered lands’. The later incumbent government defined West Bank as ‘liberated land’ which shows the evolution of the terminology in a stronger path that affected Turkey’s attitude. Annexation of Jerusalem and Golan Heights coincided with the military coup in Turkey that resulted in severing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel. In 1990s, after Gulf Crisis and proposal of ‘new world order’ framed by the US, father Bush took the initiative of a conference in Spain to find a solution to Arab-Israel conflict. Arafat was persuaded to accept resolution 242 and massive pressure was put upon Israel. Madrid Conference in 1991 and secret meetings in ‘Oslo Accord’ to achieve developing mutual thrust, vacation of lands by Israel, settlement of borders, status of Jerusalem and refugees. The Madrid and Oslo accords played a crucial role in picking the relations up between Turkey and Israel.

This pick up in the relations resulted in military and free-trade agreements between Turkey and Israel in 1996, such that Israel and Turkey carried out joint military exercises in Konya plain, ironically then, one of the parties in coalition was Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), a pro-Islamist party whose leader was Necmettin Erbakan.

Turkey is the first Muslim state to recognize Israel. Though it has evolved in ups and downs, 90s witnessed Turkey-Israel in intimate military cooperation. Turkish foreign policy tilted towards the support of Israel in key issues. Geostrategic dimension and geostrategic considerations after the Cold War play a crucial role in the factors of continuity. The conflict resolution processes between Israel and Palestine is another factor of continuity. The public opinion about Israel in Turkey is another one. Regarding the ethnic lobbies and their effects on the congressional politics, Jewish lobby in U.S. plays a crucial role in deterring what Armenian lobby draws from it.

**Policy:** In 2007, Israel naval blockade on Gaza Strip led to the shortage of basic needs such as food and medicine. More than one thousand Palestinians were killed and injured in the attacks lasting three-weeks in Gaza in 2008-2009.

Erdoğan makes his famous speech and slams Peres in Davos, in 2009.

After the Mavi Marmara incident, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed, Ankara immediately called the ambassador of Tel Aviv. Turkey asked for apology from Israel as the primary condition to normalize the relations. The ambassador of Israel was announced persona non grata and expelled from Turkey.

In 2013, thanks to the press by the US president, Barrack Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Erdoğan. Israel also accepted \$20 million compensation for the injuries and deaths. The apology was accepted by Turkey on the condition that the naval blockade on Gaza Strip is incrementally eased.

#### **4.3.5. Discourse and Policy: The Ottoman Military Barracks, Taksim Mosque and Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim**

Moralism with outer limits

Discourse: Avulsive / A

## Policy: Incremental / I

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse as the case is perceived as a moral case as the position of the rhetor posits that rebuilding the Ottoman military barracks in Taksim is an attempt to revive the forgotten history.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / tilting towards incremental and relatively minor policy changes.

Text 1: "We will rebuild the (Ottoman era military) barracks."<sup>53</sup> (2013)

Text 2: "Atatürk Cultural Center will be taken down."<sup>54</sup> (2013/2014)

Text 3:

"One of the subjects that we have to be brave about is Gezi Park in Taksim. I am saying it here once again: If we are to preserve our history, there was a historical building. We will reconstruct that historical building. Whether its name be history museum or city museum, we should construct this there. We have very interesting thoughts regarding its content."<sup>55</sup> (2017)

## Outer Limits: Gezi Park Protests.

Council of State decision (6 June 2013) on stay of execution concerning the pedestrianization project of Taksim.

Policy: a) Taksim Mosque started to be built on 9 February 2017.

- b) The new project for Atatürk Cultural Center was promoted on 6 November 2017.
- c) Ottoman military (artillery) barrack project in Taksim is pending.
- d) Taksim pedestrianization project has been completed.

<sup>53</sup> A focus on the lexical analysis of the discourse does not reveal the extent of avulsiveness. However; the discourse is avulsive as it was produced in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests though it was not evident whether R. Tayyip Erdoğan meant the rebuilding of the military barracks in the shopping mall or not. "Erdoğan Defies Unrest, Vows to Rebuild Ottoman Barracks." **Al Arabiya English**, 1 June 2013. Available at: [english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2013/06/01/Dozens-injured-after-violent-protests-at-Istanbul-s-Taksim-Square.html](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2013/06/01/Dozens-injured-after-violent-protests-at-Istanbul-s-Taksim-Square.html).

<sup>54</sup> Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim became a symbolic medium during the Gezi Park protests with the posters and placards covering the building.

<sup>55</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, "Speech at the publicity meeting of a 10-volume work entitled 'The Great Istanbul History from Antiquity to the 21st Century' ", İstanbul, 18 June 2016. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/44441/history-is-a-compass-that-shapes-our-future.html>

#### **4.3.6. Discourse and Policy: Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Question and Relations with Israel**

Moralism with outer limits

Discourse: Avulsive / A

Policy: Incremental / I

If the focus is on the discourse:  $H^3 \{A; M|O|A\}$  is the drastic change shown in discourse as the case is perceived as a moral case as the position of the rhetor endorses the notion of historical legacy and Islamic civilization.

If the focus is on the policy:  $H^4 \{I; M|O|I\}$  however the policy is incrementally developed as aggressing the outer limits would fruit less than sticking to them / tilting towards incremental and relatively minor policy changes.

Text 1:

“Mr President, Al-Quds is Muslims’ red line...This might result in cutting diplomatic relations with Israel. We once again warn the US against taking such a step which would only deteriorate the problems in the region; this cannot happen, you cannot take this step.”<sup>56</sup>

Text 2:

“Al-Quds Is the Apple of All Muslims’ Eyes. Any approach that disregard this historical fact –no matter who it comes from- will end in frustration and disaster. Regional peace, calm and security is too important to be sacrificed for domestic political calculations. The only way to stability in the Middle East is through the establishment of an independent State of Palestine within the 1967 borders with East Quds as its capital.”<sup>57</sup>

Text 3:

“Taking such a step is tantamount to throwing the region into a ring of fire. If Mr. Trump says ‘Might makes right’, he is wrong. Being mighty does not mean being right. Right makes might.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at the AK Party’s Parliamentary Group Meeting”, Ankara, 05 December 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87594/al-quds-is-muslims-red-line.html>

<sup>57</sup> R. Tayyip Erdoğan, “Speech at a joint press conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan”, Ankara, 06 December 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87617/al-quds-is-the-apple-of-all-muslims-eyes.html>

Text 4:

“Al-Quds cannot be left to the mercy of a country which has been imposing state terror on Palestinians for years. The fate of Al-Quds cannot be handed over to an occupying state which seized the lands of Palestinians in 1967 without any regard for law or ethics. That would be handing the lamb over to a wild wolf. Al-Quds is the apple of our eye. 1-Quds is our first kiblah. Everybody must know that Al-Quds is our red line. Al-Quds is the red line for the entire Islamic world consisting 1.7 billion people. One half of our hearts beat for Mecca and Medina, the other half beats for Al-Quds. The decision is a complete provocation.”<sup>59</sup>

Text 5:

“You don’t have the authority to do this. Palestine has been under uninterrupted occupation since 1947. Israel is an occupying state. Israel is a terror state. Hey Trump, we can’t make the mistake you have made. We would have expected from you to share this thought of yours with us beforehand. Currently, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey is the Summit Chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, you should have shared this with us and you cannot take such a step without first sharing it with us.”<sup>60</sup>

Outer Limits: The basic assumption of the hypothesis is that Turkey is not going to cut the diplomatic relations with Israel due to the systemic limits. Please see the outer limits section of Discourse and Policy: Turkey – Israel Relations above for a comprehensive account of historical depth of the relations and the systemic limits as a result.

Policy:

Step 1. “President Erdogan invites the OIC to convene for an extraordinary summit to promote coordination and joint action among Islamic countries in the face of these sensitive developments relevant to Al-Quds’ status and regional peace. President

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid..

<sup>59</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “Speech at the closing ceremony of the Innovation and Entrepreneurship Week”, Ankara, 09 December 2017. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87661/amerikanin-kudusle-ilgili-kararinin-bizim-nazarimizda-hicbir-hukmu-yoktur.html>

<sup>60</sup> R. Tayyip Erdogan, “Speech at a mass opening ceremony in Sivas”, Ankara, 10 December 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87674/kuduse-sirtimizi-donmemiz-kendimizi-inkr-etmemiz-demektir.html>

Erdogan host(ed) OIC Extraordinary Leaders' Summit in Istanbul on (13 December 2017)"<sup>61</sup>.

Step 2. Istanbul Declaration On "Freedom For Al Quds" Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference primarily stated that "1) We reject and condemn the US Administration's unlawful statement regarding the status of Al Quds."<sup>62</sup>

Step 3. On 21 December 2017, Turkey voted in favour of the resolution regarding the status of Jerusalem.<sup>63</sup>

A summary of the above argument about the modus operandi of the political discourse type and policy is presented in the interacting and self-reinforcing configuration as in what follows below. The main implications of the figure are: a) a discourse produced in / for a moral case without structural limits of power and domination tends to show avulsive type of discourse and avulsive policies b) a discourse produced in / for a moral case with structural limits of power and domination tends to show avulsive discourse but incremental policy c) the discourse

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<sup>61</sup> İbrahim Kalın, "Speech at a press conference at the Presidential Complex", Ankara, 06 December 2017. Available at: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87615/presidential-spokesperson-kalin-the-oic-will-convene-for-an-extraordinary-summit-on-al-quds-upon-president-Erdogans-call.html>

<sup>62</sup> Organization of Islamic Cooperation, "ISTANBUL DECLARATION ON "FREEDOM FOR AL QUDS" EXTRAORDINARY ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE," 13 December 2017. Available at: <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=1698&refID=1073>

<sup>63</sup> By an overwhelming majority, Member States in the United Nations General Assembly on Thursday "demanded" that all countries comply with Security Council resolutions regarding the status of Jerusalem, following an earlier decision by the United States to recognize the Holy City as the capital of Israel. Through a resolution adopted by a recorded vote of 128 in favour to nine against (Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Togo, United States), with 35 abstentions, the 193-member Assembly expressed "deep regret" over recent decisions concerning the status of Jerusalem and stressed that the Holy City "is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations in line with relevant UN resolutions."

Action in the Assembly today follows a failed attempt by the Security Council on Monday adopt a similar text reflecting regret among the body's members about "recent decisions regarding the status of Jerusalem," with a veto from the United States, a permanent member of the Council.

Ahead of that failed resolution, Nickolay Mladenov, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, told the Security Council that the security situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory had become more tense in the wake of US President Donald Trump's decision on 6 December to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Subsequently, Yemen and Turkey, in their respective capacities as Chair of the Arab Group and the Chair of the Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, requested the President of the General Assembly to "urgently resume" the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly in accordance with the so-named 'Uniting for peace' procedure.

produced in / for a case of realpolitik with structural limits of power and domination tend to show incremental discourse and incremental policy. Lastly, it needs to be noted down that with a small sample size, caution must be applied, as the findings might not be transferable to all of the political discourse that are not based upon the legacy of history. It is possible to hypothesise that these conditions are more likely to occur in the transfer of the political discourse that is nourished by the legacy of history.

Another significant point that needs to be made clear is that the avulsive political discourse that is generally produced in moralist/normative field, show the different discursive types of populism: *Complete populism, excluding populism/anti elitist populism* and *empty populism*<sup>64</sup>. The avulsive political discourse related to foreign policy is, in fact, a political communication tool that strategically makes use of one of the above-mentioned tools in order to appeal to emotions of the masses and mobilize them. All of them appeal to the understanding of people as “people can take different meanings; this discursive vagueness allows populists to unite diverse audiences under one label”<sup>65</sup>. In other words, an avulsive political discourse related to foreign policy is a political discourse addressing to the domestic politics. Some cases such as Syrian Refugee Crisis and Open Door Policy, Al-Quds Question and Turkey-Israel Relations, Discourse on the Military Presence in the Region, Discourse on Uyghur Turks in Xianjang Uyghur Region, Discourse on the Execution of Motiur Rehman Nizami can even be claimed to be more of addressing to domestic policy and public opinion in Turkey rather than foreign policy and global public opinion. The most significant anchor of these types of populism is the appeal to the people.

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<sup>64</sup>Aalberg, “Comprehending Populist Political Communication”. 3–11. Also see the full edited book: Toril Aalberg, **Populist Political Communication in Europe**. Also see: Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave. “Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties’ Discourse in Belgium.” **European Journal of Political Research** 46 (3): 319–45. 2007. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x

<sup>65</sup> Vreese, “Populism as an Expression,” p. 427.




Figure 4. 7. Organizational Structure of the Hypothesis: The Role of Nature of the Case & Systemic Limits in the Discourse and Policy Relationship

\* Systemic Limits in a realist case produce incremental discourse of deconstruction, incremental discourse of reconstruction and incremental policy that either sticks to the status-quo or makes gradual and relatively minor changes in the existing policy whose sum is expected to produce a large change in the long term.

\*\* Systemic limits in a moralist case produce incremental policy that either sticks to the status-quo or makes gradual and relatively minor changes in the existing policy. The discourse of deconstruction and reconstruction retains the character of avulsiveness that shows a drastic change from the erstwhile existing discourse.



## CONCLUSION

The primary limit employed in the study is the focus on the political discourse that dwells on the grand legacy of history. The source of material in the study is the political discourse of the rhetor that is nourished by the significations retrieved from the legacy of history. In other words, the prominent characteristic of the analyzed material is the political discourse prioritizing the legacy of history. This study is set out on the assumption that there is a relationship between political discourse built on the grand legacy of history and policy and the nature of the relationship can be posited.

Another caveat is what follows: As the original political discourse is in Turkish, the source material of the thesis is mostly the official translation. The author acknowledges that the official translations are also translations in which the effect of the translator is valid. Seeking a solution for the problem, the author, as a native speaker of Turkish, re-checks the original text in Turkish and checks the potential distortions. On the condition that there is any distortion or omission, the changes are deep noted. Another significant point about the translation is the fact that some the political discourses related to foreign policy serve to fuel the emotions of the masses within Turkey. Some of such political discourses have even much more to do with mobilizing the opinions and emotions of the Turkish public than world opinion. In such cases, the official website may choose to omit, tame the language/words that have potential to severe the relations. As a solution for such problem, the author resorts to the translations of the newspaper and news agency. Regarding the abovementioned factors, relying on the English translations for the discourse analysis might seem as a caveat for the study. As a native Turkish speaker, the author of the study has sought further solutions to the problem by watching the speeches on the online platforms in order to assess any distortion/change in the translated text. The videos of the public speeches also help reveal the references to former political speeches, the political context and the nuances in the tone and stress on the words. Additional information about the implications of specific words/terms – ones with

prime significance in Turkish- employed in the speech is also provided in the foot notes.

The basic motivation behind employment of the political discourse built upon the grand legacy of history is the assumption that significations related to history in the political discourse paves the way for historical / traditional legitimacy. The rhetor's capacity to dominate the discursive sphere is increased through the employment of discourse established upon the grand legacy of the past. In other words, the political action leaning on continuous popular support to be actualized and maintained is strengthened through the justification in history. The reformulation of the history and retrieving legitimacy from the past is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to the period after 1980 coup when the accumulation of discursive attempts to appropriate the history fueling the legitimacy ground for the introduction of the modern agenda has been burgeoning.

The target of the study is to give a proposition attempting to give a framework to the complicated relationship between political discourse and political action. For this study, the Critical Discourse Analysis was used to explore the subsurface of the political discourse. It was decided that the best method to adopt for this investigation was Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as it is employed in order to focus on the social reality, and as the method is a useful tool in revealing the material capabilities and material competence of the actors with respect to the actors' discursive production. The political discourse, also the political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history, is assessed as a run-product of higher-extent socio-political conflicts in Turkish political culture.

The study employs narrative-tracing method that sets out a clear chronological figuration of the political discourse assessed as related to a specific policy topic. Narrative-tracing is also a helpful instrument in tracing the evolution of the political discourse related to specific topic. Regarding the restraining demand of the narrative tracing method, the study does not employ compartmentalization with respect to discourse on foreign policy or domestic policy fields.

One further help of the narrative-tracing method is the systematic evolution of the political discourse: Deconstruction, Reconstruction, Instituting the Self as the Appropriate Teller. In Chapter 2, the transition from the political discourse of deconstruction to reconstruction is clearly set out which is followed by the instituting the Self as the appropriate teller in the Chapter 3. Deconstruction of the pro-tutelage, traditional bureaucratic paradigm policy prevails in dissensus or conflictual political discourse produced in foreign or domestic policy fields. The same condition also applies for the reconstruction phase.

This study puts the function of the discourse at the center of analysis. As mentioned above:

“A discourse about a specific topic (un/employment) can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. Discourses and discourse topics spread to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked with each other.”<sup>1</sup>

What applies to the focus of the study is not the discourse that is produced related to foreign or domestic policy but the chronologically traced thread of discourses that are functionally related. In this study, chronological narrative-tracing analysis of the political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history posits that the political discourse linked with domestic policy is functionally similar to the political discourse related to foreign policy. The chronological narrative tracing of a moral political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history produced in relation to the domestic policy is followed by a consecutive moral political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history produced in relation to the foreign policy.

The political actor, positioning the self among the other political actors in domestic affairs with the political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history, is observed to produce a derivation of that political discourse related to foreign

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<sup>1</sup> Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action*, p.40.

affairs. These are the basic findings in the study retrieved through the use of CDA and narrative tracing methods: Narrative tracing method posits that the political discourse produced related to a specific topic is chronologically developed in a consecutive similar / different political topic. Narrative tracing method also posits that the political discourse sustains a function that is chronologically opted to evolve: deconstruction and reconstruction. The narrative-tracing method also posits that the phases of deconstruction and reconstruction follow a pattern that is applied to the foreign and domestic policy. The evidence from this study suggests that –with the help of narrative-tracing method- the political discourse of the rhetor follows a systematic pattern, a) discursive deconstruction of what is perceived to pertain to the traditional bureaucratic paradigm, b) discursive reconstruction that primarily alternates the dominant ideology, institutes the self as the appropriate teller, marks the difference between the self and others, dominates the discursive legitimacy conflicts and institutes the self as the appropriate doer.

It is argued that discourse and policy are two products of two distinct realms: political discourse –as a reflection of the ideational world of the rhetor- is produced in somewhat a vacuum that is of minimally influenced by the structural limits of power and domination whereas the policy is extensively constituted by them. Political discourse is produced in a vacuum of ideas, beliefs, and ideational world and values whereas the policy can be produced as long as the conditions in the real world are convenient. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) posits that discourses of deconstruction and reconstruction are produced in the form of avulsive or incremental discourse in line with the degree of the actor's material capabilities and capacity to overcome or endure the limiting factors that are termed as the systemic limits – structural limits of power and domination- and power/security concerns in the study.

This study came out with the question of how that the relationship between political discourse and policy can be settled within a basic framework with respect to the following cases: I. (a) Presidential System of Government, (b) The Issue of “*Mon chers*”, II) (a) Syrian Refugees, (b) Commemoration of the Victory of Malazgirt, (c) The Execution of the Bangladeshi Islamist Leader Motiur Rehman Nizami, (d)

Ottoman Language Teaching, (e) Kut-Al-Amara Victory Commemoration, (f) the Conquest Celebration (The Conquest of Istanbul). III) (a) The Lausanne Treaty, (b) the Uyghur Turks in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, (c) Military Operations and the Presence in the Region, (d) Turkey-Israel Relations, (e) The Ottoman Military Barracks, (f) Taksim Mosque and Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim, (g) Al-Quds Question and Relations with Israel. Taken together, these results retrieved from these cases suggest that the relationship between political discourse and policy can be hypothesized built on the four main elements: a) The Realm / Field, b) Systemic Limits, c) Discourse Type, d) Policy Type. Throughout this dissertation the term Realm/Field referred to the field in which the political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history is produced. The division of the political discourse according to the field is achieved through the content analysis of the narration. Two types of realms distinguished in the study are the following: Moralist / Normative Realm, and Realpolitik. The political discourse that is built on Moralist / Normative Realm is asserted to entail the following topics: Islamic history, civilization, human rights, justice, Muslim brotherhood, religious brotherhood, kinship, cultural kinship, universal values, and tyrannized people. The analysis of the discourse posits that that kind of political discourse, almost, does not entail the cost-benefit calculations and interest maximization concerns. The political discourse that is built on Realpolitik Realm is posited to argue with the following topics: national interest, interest maximization, power relations and conflicts. One further element was the systemic limits that are the other actors operative in the field and their negative influence on the political actor's discourse and policy. The study introduces the power and security terms in operating within the generic term, systemic limits: the self-perception of the political actor (state, government, political party or leader) to maintain the material capability, capacity and comfort to realize the political action as a translation of the political discourse. It also refers to the possible interest conflicts among the political actors by virtue of the translation of the political discourse to the political action.

Another important finding was that the type of political discourse produced dependent on the Realm / Field: a) avulsive discourse; b) incremental discourse. The

results of the discourse analysis process indicate that the almost all of the political discourse based upon the grand legacy of history produced in the moralist / normative realm show the characteristic of avulsive discourse. That type of political discourse is, regarding the content of the discourse, is strongly avulsed from traditional discourse of bureaucratic paradigm. This finding, while preliminary, suggests that the incremental discourse is produced within the realpolitik realm / field. Notwithstanding the fact that incremental discourse can be noted as an extension of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm discourse, the finding retrieved by narrative tracing of the incremental discourse shows that the sum of the incremental discursive incremental / relatively minor steps are assumed to result in a major change in the discourse produced ultimately. Hence, it could be conceivably hypothesized that incremental discourse is produced when the producer / the political actors' security and power perception is relatively lower than the other actors. It can therefore be assumed that the rhetor, considering the pure cost and benefit calculations, produces incremental discourse when the costs of the avulsive political discourse is more than that of incremental discourse, or the benefits of the avulsive political discourse is less than that of incremental discourse. As argued above, the rhetor is restrained by the overwhelming influence of the systemic limits and power / security concerns in realpolitik realm; hence it is not possible for the rhetor to emancipate his discursive mental model from the rational cost-benefit calculation in such a realm.

It is therefore likely that such connections exist between the political discourse and policy as there are two types of political action distinguished: a) avulsive policy, b) incremental policy. Avulsive policy is the political action that is avulsed from the traditional bureaucratic paradigm policies in terms of policy type, policy form and policy rate. Incremental policy shows a relative change from the traditional bureaucratic paradigm policy, maintaining the principles of the traditional policy and formulated in the form of successive steps, each succeeding step is noted as a relatively evolved form than that of the former. It may be the case therefore that these variations are not used to explain the relationship between political discourse and political reality but the political discourse and policy. Deliberative approach sets

the deliberation at the center of the political arena, prioritizes the negotiation among the various political discourses and the result of the deliberation defines the political reality. Discourse Theory and Agonistic Approach sets the conflict at the center of the political arena, the victorious discourses establish the dominant one. Three approaches attempting to explain the relationship between political discourse and political reality are unable to demonstrate a systematically hypotizable relationship between political discourse and policy. The findings related to political discourse and policy relationship suggested that:

H1: The political discourse produced within the moralist / normative realm demonstrates avulsive type of discourse.

H2: The political discourse produced within the realpolitik realm demonstrates incremental type of discourse.

Derivation of H1: The political discourse produced within the moralist / normative realm demonstrates avulsive discourse and policy without systemic / outer limits.

Derivation of H2: The political discourse produced within the realpolitik realm demonstrates incremental type of discourse and policy due to the systemic / outer limits.

H3: The political discourse produced within the moralist / normative realm demonstrates avulsive type of discourse, but incremental type of policy due to systemic / outer limits.

The abovementioned findings of the dissertation underscore the role of the content of political discourse, structural limits of power and domination as a signal for the kind of policy type to be realized. The dissertation highlights the hypotheses developed to posit the interaction of two factors belonging to two different realms, exogenous factors and ideas. The dissertation suggests that the types of future policies would depend on the content of the political discourse and dominance of exogenous factors. The less exogenous factors are dominant, the more room to transfer the political discourse into policy. It is possible to hypothesise that these

conditions are more likely to be valid as long as the political discourse is nourished by the legacy of history.

These findings will doubtless be much scrutinized, but there are some immediately dependable conclusions for the political discourse that does not derive its legitimacy from the history, historical figures and symbols. This study limits itself with the political discourse built upon the grand legacy of history. All of the texts entail a reference to the grand legacy of the history either in excerpts appearing in the study or in other minutes of the identical texts. Other scholars may find it interesting to study the relationship between political discourse and policy without any focus on the content of the discourse. However, more research on this topic needs to be undertaken before the association between any political discourse and policy is more clearly understood. Research questions that could be asked include the political discourse and policy relationship without the limit of historical legacy. An exemplary discourse and policy relationship for such a study would be the statement of R. Tayyip Erdoğan: “I hope TEOG<sup>2</sup> will be abolished immediately”<sup>3</sup> in September 17, 2017, TEOG was annulled by the government in September 19, 2017. Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended focusing on long-term governments’ political discourse and policies in other countries. So as to apply a similar framework of deconstruction, reconstruction and policy, it is a better idea to focus on the one party government on power not less than eight years. Further research should be done to investigate the role of history, key figures and key symbols in the political discourse and how these topics affect the legitimacy of the political discourse.

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<sup>2</sup> Turkish High School Entrance Test

<sup>3</sup> “Turkish High School Entrance Test Annuled by Governement.” **Hürriyet Daily News**, 19 Sept. 2017. Available at: [www.hurriyedailynews.com/turkish-high-school-entrance-test-annuled-by-governement-118125](http://www.hurriyedailynews.com/turkish-high-school-entrance-test-annuled-by-governement-118125) [06.04.2018]

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## Education

İstanbul University, Social Sciences Institute, Political Science and International Relations, Ph.D., 2013-2019.

Boğaziçi University, Social Sciences Institute, High Honors in European Studies, M.A., 2011-2012.

Boğaziçi University, Faculty of Arts and Science, English Language and Literature, B.A., 2006-2011.

Maltepe Anatolian High School, Language Department, 2002-2006.

## Professional Experience

Okan University, Foreign Languages Department, Lecturer, 2016-2017

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## Publications

Çakmak, Alper. M. Ali Sevgi. (2018) "Four Migration Stories: Four Turkish Migrants – Four Sui Generis Portraits in Germany." **Insight Turkey**, Doi:10.25253/99.2018EV.02

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