


# **Of the Soul and Emotions: Conceptualizing ‘the Ottoman individual’ through psychology**



Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Faculty of History at the University of Oxford

Word count: 82,410

Seyma Afacan  
St Antony's College

Trinity Term 2016

**Thesis Abstract**  
**Of the Soul and Emotions: Conceptualizing ‘the Ottoman individual’ through  
psychology**

Seyma Afacan  
St Antony’s College

DPhil Thesis  
Trinity Term 2016

Faculty of History  
University of Oxford

This thesis examines late Ottoman discourses on the soul and emotions as reflected by a large corpus of psychological literature under the umbrella of *ilm-i ahval-i ruh* (the science of the states of the soul, psychology) in relation to the rise of the rhetoric concerning the ‘new man’ – an imaginary ‘Ottoman individual’ educated in ‘new schools’ to be in complete harmony with Ottoman modernization. It posits that the ‘new man’ was subjected to a process of design as a producing unit whether in possession of a soul or not, while the conceptual framework of the ‘individual’ was being formulated.

The secondary literature on Ottoman modernization has illustrated intellectual efforts for designing the ‘new man’ in relation to the formation of national identity. In doing so it has focused on the process of indoctrination and the dissemination of normative accounts. Drawing on that literature, this thesis intends to complicate the picture and look beyond the normative accounts. By approaching the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a psychological argument and revolving the story around the metaphors of ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’, it aims to display the influence of the scientific and technological changes that shaped the material as well as the intellectual culture these authors experienced. In an attempt to go beyond what lies beneath the national and religious underpinnings of the imagined ‘new man’, this thesis maintains a tight focus on the psychological writings of four intellectuals - all

of whom gave serious thought to the debate about the soul: Abdullah Cevdet, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Baha Tevfik, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç. By shifting the centre of focus of the rhetoric about the ‘new man’ from national or religious identity formation to the pressing concerns about economic and technological progress, it shows an Ottoman entanglement with science and technology and a deeper Ottoman inquiry into the conceptual framework of the individual. Accordingly it argues that the psychological literature on the soul and emotions bears testimony to the acute concern for how to integrate individuals into the frenzy of progressive discourses in the late Ottoman Empire. This concern constituted common ground among intellectuals from different backgrounds. Yet they held different understandings of the notion of progress and often gave different answers to deeper philosophical questions pertaining to the new man’s soul, emotions, will, and relations with collective units. Such complexity demonstrates that multiple trajectories were possible before national identity formation took concrete forms in a much later context, and that transnational patterns of ‘constructing the subjects’ through psychological studies played an equally important role.

**History Faculty Extended Abstract**  
**Of the Soul and Emotions: Conceptualizing ‘the Ottoman individual’ through psychology**

Seyma Afacan  
St Antony’s College

DPhil Thesis  
Trinity Term 2016

Faculty of History  
University of Oxford

This thesis is concerned with late Ottoman conceptualizations of the soul and emotions in relation to the rhetoric concerning the ‘new man’. The secondary literature on Ottoman modernization has traditionally approached the emergence of the rhetoric of the ‘new man’ in the second half of the nineteenth century within the context of national identity formation. It identified the ways in which state formation contributed to this process via changes to school curriculums, including the revision of some of the old course subjects, such as morality, and the introduction of new subjects such as gymnastics, anthropology and citizenship. As the literature has shown, such courses, with huge scope for normative discourses, were used as tools for indoctrination, starting from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century parallel with the process of Ottoman modernization. Drawing on this literature, this thesis aims to question whether intellectual discourses were limited to such normative accounts of nation making, or there was a deeper Ottoman entanglement with the conceptual framework of the individual in the face of the new scientific tools for constructing subjects? It seeks answers in a much-underexplored literature on modern psychology, wherein one expects to see intensive engagement with conceptual issues. In doing so, this thesis aims to show syncretic formulas and fluctuations in intellectual discourses with respect to national and religious ideologies, and a large degree of integration into the global processes of ‘constructing subjects’ through psychological studies. Accordingly

it argues that the desire for making economic and technological progress was a common ambition among intellectuals from various backgrounds. Yet they shared different conceptualizations of the term progress, the soul, will, and relations between individual and collective entities. Accordingly the path ‘to constructing the nation’ was long, non-linear and transnational in many ways.

As the handful of secondary literature has displayed, we know very little about psychology’s trajectory in the late Ottoman Empire and its relevance to social, economic, and political dynamics. We have yet to acquire a good understanding of the transformations of key psychological concepts – such as the soul, will, and emotions – in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, with respect to the gradual dominance of scientific thinking and Ottoman modernization. Literature on the history of psychology in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican era is restricted to a small number of articles written by psychologists. In these articles, psychology’s Ottoman past is presented as a transitional phase between traditional psychological perspectives and the post-1930s period. Yet there is a large psychological corpus written by well-known Ottoman intellectuals whose interest in psychology has not been problematized by the secondary literature so far. This dissertation endeavors to fill this gap in the literature. In doing so it provides a microcosmic insight into the trajectory of modern psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire from 1869 onwards in relation to a myriad of technological, social and political changes and the rhetoric of the ‘new man’.

Between the 1870s and 1920s psychology went through a period of transition from metaphysics, moral sciences, and religious thought, to the sciences. In the meantime it was a home to a variety of disciplines from mesmerism to eugenics. In the late Ottoman Empire it remained as a volatile tool for intellectuals to speculate about

human nature with a degree of scholarly authority. Following the first mentioning of psychology as a course subject in the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869, a number of textbooks and journal articles on psychology were written. In the late nineteenth century medical schools became a major venue for the promotion of biological materialism with a major focus on the works of Ludwig Büchner. The early texts on brain physiology produced in the medical academy in the 1890s stressed the need for adopting medical knowledge about human psychology with a mechanistic and deterministic view of human nature as an imperative of making economic and technological progress. This was when the brain was put forward as a tool for a design. With the foundation of *Darülfünun* (today's Istanbul University) in 1900 and the start of the first psychological lectures, a number of textbooks were published with the overwhelming interest in 'French spiritualist philosophy' and psychology through the works of Émile Boirac, Paul Janet, and Georges Fongreive. In the second constitutional era the debate about human nature was animated with respect to the soul, will, emotions and the concept of individual. This coincided with the spread of evolutionary ideas through the works of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel, while interpretations of the laws of evolution were being used redundantly in the press as magic solutions to every problem. In the relatively liberal atmosphere of the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918), psychology began to be discussed in relation to the concept of the individual and his/her liberties more openly, instead of being confined to abstract debates about human nature. Before the domination of professionals in the 1930s, psychology remained as a scholarly tool for intellectuals to speculate about human nature and develop the conceptual framework of the individual along the way.

By focusing on a period wherein psychology was an elusive tool to speculate about emotions, mental phenomena, human nature, and the soul, the thesis seeks to hear the voices of the relevant intellectuals more loudly and self-reflexively. In an attempt to simplify a largely unknown psychological literature, this thesis focuses on the psychological writings of four intellectuals - all of whom gave serious thought to psychology and brain physiology: Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç. In doing so it aims to give voice to the most preeminent figures in each period and representatives of the debate about the soul in a chronological yet non-linear and non-progressive way. Abdullah Cevdet's publications on brain physiology formed the basis of psychological studies in the 1890s. Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and Baha Tevfik published two of the earliest modern psychology books in the Second Constitutional Era. Mustafa Şekip Tunç was one of the first psychologists with a formal degree in psychological studies from abroad, who wrote extensively about psychology from the 1920s onwards. While they were flirting with allegedly strict identities as materialist, spiritualist, or Islamist, they actually went beyond the limits of one-sided, dichotomous thinking.

In delving into the complexity of psychological ideas and grasping major intellectual concerns this thesis focuses on two major metaphors: 'man as machine' and 'man as animal'. In doing so it aims to shift the centre of focus from internal Ottoman political and ideological toolset to the context of post-Industrial Revolution transformations and medical developments. The 'man as machine' metaphor dates back to Antiquity. Yet mechanism took the influence of physiological approaches further within the framework of materialism, physiological determinism, Darwinism, and positivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As an imperative of scientific thinking, mechanism promoted mechanical laws behind human nature and

fleshed out complex human behaviour. Scientific rhetoric about man's place in nature coincided with and was supported by the spread of industrial developments and major changes in the material culture. Major medical developments, the spread of evolutionary theories and the expansion of scientific authority blurred the boundaries between animals and humans, feeding into the 'man as animal' and 'man as machine' metaphors. In this era, Evolutionism's search of 'man's place in nature' involved important insights into human psychology and went hand in hand with the recent medical discoveries in brain physiology and the anatomy of the nervous system.

In the Ottoman case, the metaphors of 'man as machine' and 'man as animal' represented Ottoman entanglement with science and technology at the intersection of the development of psychology and the debate between materialism and spiritualism. The conceptual framework of 'the Ottoman individual' was nourished by such heated discussions in the context of post-Industrial Revolution transformations. Intellectual concerns for making technological and economic progress and efforts for designing the 'new man' in accordance with changes in the material surface constituted the backbone of psychological studies.

In an attempt to go beyond the dichotomous thinking, this thesis draws attention to pressing intellectual concerns about making economic and technological progress and a large sphere of influence of medical and scientific developments of the era. Ergo, instead of presenting the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a combat zone split between two camps along religious lines, this thesis posits taking it as a psychological venue to conceptualize 'the Ottoman individual'. In delving into the surfacing of the concept of the individual as a key concept of psychological thinking in the Second Constitutional Era, it is important to refer to the recently animated literature on the development of a new Ottoman work ethic along liberal lines and the

ways in which the concept of productivity was moralized. As this thesis argues, modern psychology was to a large extent fed by the debate between materialism and spiritualism in the Ottoman case. Accordingly *man* was being designed as a ‘producing unit’, whether with a soul or not, by using medical and scientific developments as tools for legitimation.

Each chapter of this thesis sheds light on a different phase in the trajectory of psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire in a chronological yet non-linear way. Chapter one takes educational modernization as a major force behind the start of the discipline of psychology, and focuses on authors’ efforts to indigenize it. It also presents the discipline of psychology as a meeting point for old and new, philosophical and physiological, materialist and spiritualist, Western and local perspectives of man in the late Ottoman Empire, with a large room for interpretation. In doing so it puts the accent on the variety of sources available to intellectuals in imagining man, which eludes the grasp of any one-sided and dichotomous interpretation.

The second chapter investigates the birth of biological materialism at medical schools in the late Ottoman Empire. It focuses on Abdullah Cevdet’s materialist publications on brain physiology from the 1890s onwards - largely influenced by Büchner- and unpacks a list of new conceptualizations such as mind training (*idman-ı dimağ*), mechanism (*mihanikiyet*), universal determinism (*icabiye-i külliye*), mind industry (*sanayi-i akliye*), and mind evolution (*tekamül-i dimağ*). In doing so, it emphasizes the influence of technological change in the material surface and Büchner’s mechanistic views of human nature on Abdullah Cevdet’s writings against the backdrop of the predominance of economic concerns and the rise of a new work ethic. It argues that Abdullah Cevdet’s interpretation rendered the human body and soul as objects of progressive discourses to be understood, simplified, and shaped.

The third chapter examines the emergence of modern psychological literature under the roof of the *Darülfünun*, with an overwhelming interest in ‘French spiritualist philosophy’ and psychology in the Second Constitutional Era. By focusing on Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s psychological writings largely influenced by Boirac, it shows the ways in which psychology became a site for discussing the relationship between the concept of progress and human nature and challenging scientific determinism with a scholarly authority. Scrutinizing Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s formulation of the soul as a ‘conservation site’ against ‘fake progress’, it presents his efforts for searching for alternative ways of making progress without losing traditional and religious values.

The fourth chapter deals with the ways in which the popularization of ‘scientific’ views of man went hand in hand with the surfacing of the rhetoric of emotional control in ‘materialist’ circles. It investigates the relevance of Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology and rhetoric of emotional control - by utilizing Haeckle’s monism and Paul Dubois’s theory of emotions - to the late Ottoman intellectual climate against the backdrop of the spread of liberal thought in the Second Constitutional Era. It treats Baha Tevfik’s ‘psychological’ theory of emotional control as part of a series of efforts to define relations between individual and collective units.

The fifth chapter examines the ways in which the interplay between psychology and Bergsonian spiritualism in the *Darülfünun* in the early 1920s contributed to the development of the conceptual framework of the individual and an alternative understanding of the idea of progress. In particular it presents Mustafa Şekip Tunç’s use of psychology and stress on passions for defending individual liberties against the backdrop of the spread of science to understand and determine man and society in the early 1920s. Ultimately it argues that the interplay between spiritualism and psychological thinking under the roof of *Darülfünun* helped

intellectuals advocate individual liberties against the backdrop of the War of Independence.

As this thesis contends, intellectual interests in scientific and medical developments were strongly linked with myriad changes in the late Ottoman political and social milieu. This dissertation shows the benefit of combining intellectual history with the history of science and the history of medicine. In putting these together, one can integrate global science discussions with internal Ottoman dynamics instead of treating Ottoman intellectuals and ideas as free-floating entities driven by national or religious agendas solely. This is the key to understanding how scientific and medical ideas were subjected to a process of reinterpretation and how key psychological concepts were transformed in the process of indigenization.

## Acknowledgements

I have written this thesis during a long period of intense learning that has been made possible by a myriad of people. Firstly I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. Mark Harrison, Dr. Sloan Mahone and Dr. Laurent Mignon. I have benefited from their guidance about the direction the thesis should take every step of the way and they have contributed immensely to my intellectual development. Their patience and motivation have been invaluable.

I would also like to thank my thesis examination committee members Prof. Benjamin C. Fortna and Prof. Ruth Harris for giving me such valuable feedback and thought provoking suggestions. Besides my supervisors and the examination committee members, I have been fortunate to receive great deal of help from several notable historians. I am grateful to Adam Mestyan, Ahmet Ersoy, S. Akşin Somel, Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Celia Kerslake, Cengiz Kırılı, Y. Hakan Erdem, Margrit Pernau, Mehmet Alkan, Özgür TÜresay, Philippe Bourmaid, Pietro Corsi, Sait Özervarlı, Seyfi Kenan, and Zafer Toprak for always being accessible, and broadening my research with different perspectives at various phases of this project. My sincere thanks go to Cemal Kafadar, who provided me an opportunity to join The Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University during the spring of 2014. More than anyone, his support and inspiration filled me with the lure of engaging history ‘with love, contemplation and intense labor’. In a similar vein, I would like to show my deepest gratitude to Prof. Ute Frevert and The Center for History of Emotions at The Max Planck Institute for Human Development, for providing me with such an intellectually stimulating working environment as a Postdoc researcher and contributing to my intellectual growth immensely. There has also been one teacher and mentor in my life without whose help and faith I would never have

managed to pursue my academic goals and write this thesis: Vangelis Kechriotis, whose early departure is heartbreaking.

In my daily work I have been blessed with a supportive group of companions. I am grateful to my friends Saliha Metinsoy, Evrim Akbulut, Irmak Erdoğan, Paola Cubas Barragan, Agrima Bhasin, Marina Klavina, Anushree Banerji, Andy Flower, Tomislav Marsic, Tania Saeed, Arthur Vissing, Ezgi Vissing, Nihan Toprakkıran, Selçuk Bedük, Eren Özel, İpek Tabur, Akif Ercihan Yerliođlu, Eda Özel, Zeynep Aydođan, Özkan Akpınar, Uđur B. Bayraktar, Carlos Zuniga Nieto, Makoto Harris Takao and Magdalena Baljan who amused, inspired and strengthened me through engaging conversations in various ‘libraries of Babel’ where the boundaries between the personal, intellectual and political are very thin. I have been lucky to discuss different parts of the thesis with Alp Eren Topal, Ben Young, Ebru Aykut, Fabian Steininger, Fatih Artvinli, Jawdath Jabbour, Mustafa Altuđ Yayla, Kutlughan Soyubol, Nurçin İleri, Peter Hill, Seçil Yılmaz, Şahika Karatepe, Ulaş Karakoç, Yavuz Aykan, and Yavuz Sezer, whose valuable comments and advice have contributed to my research immensely. In particular, I am grateful to my close friends Kerem Tınaz and Başak Kilerci for their thoughtful and gracious support, discussing each and every detail of our research and organizing conferences together. My special thanks go to Brant Moscovitch and Graham Jevon for not only sharing the same DPhil experience with me side by side under the same roof for years, but also for enriching my life with their love, unconditional support, friendship and fun. I am especially thankful to my dear friends and ‘sisters’ Ayşegül Kapkaç, İzlem Ocak and Zeynep Geçgin, for always being there, while taking such crucial and courageous steps along the way of academic and personal development. Writing this thesis has

been a truly life changing experience for me and I am grateful to all my friends for sharing it with me.

My thanks must go to the Welcome Unit for the History of Medicine, the Department of History, and St Antony's College at the University of Oxford. I am furthermore indebted to various institutions and their personnel, including the Middle Eastern Center and Bodleian Library at Oxford, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and Widener Library at Harvard University, The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, Atatürk Library in Istanbul, Istanbul Beyazıt Library, The Boğaziçi University Libraries and the Center for Islamic Studies in Istanbul. I have also greatly benefited from the generous financial support of the Ministry of Education in Turkey and thank my scholarship advisor Mesut Ayar for always being supportive and accessible.

Above all, I am most grateful to my family for providing me with assistance, unconditional love and spiritual support in all aspects of my life and motivating me to pursue my goals with passion.

## Table of Contents

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>'Man as Machine' and 'Man as Animal' in the Context of the Post-Industrial Transformations</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>The Soul and/or the Body Machine: A Glimpse into the Debate between Materialism and Spiritualism in the Late Ottoman Empire</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>The Secondary Literature and Portraits of Individual Thinkers</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Primary Sources and Methodology</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Overview of Arguments</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>CHAPTER I: SEARCHING FOR THE SOUL IN SHADES OF GREY: CLAIMING PSYCHOLOGY'S PAST IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Psychology as a Meeting Point</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Claiming Modern Psychology's Ottoman Past</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>Physiological Perspectives or Materialism</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>At the Crossroads of Spiritualism and Psychology</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>CHAPTER II: IDLE SOULS, PROGRESSIVE BRAINS IN A MIND INDUSTRY: THE BIRTH OF THE 'MAN MACHINE' AT THE MEDICAL SCHOOL</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>Dissemination of Scientific and Mechanistic Views of Man in the Second Half of the 19th Century with a Critical Look at 'Ottoman Materialism'</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>Mind Training in a Mind Industry</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>CHAPTER III: MAN, NOT A MACHINE, NOT AN ANIMAL: HUMAN SOUL AS A 'CONSERVATION AREA' AGAINST 'FAKE PROGRESS'</b>	<b>138</b>

<b>Interplay between Spiritualism and Psychology in the Second Constitutional Era</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>The Soul as a Conservation Area against 'Fake Progress'</b>	<b>158</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>168</b>
<b>CHAPTER IV: EDUCATED ANIMAL, CONTROLLED EMOTIONS: AN INVENTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL</b>	<b>170</b>
<b>The Spread of the 'Man as Animal' Metaphor in the Second Constitutional Era</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>A Case Study of 'Politics of Emotion'</b>	<b>183</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>CHAPTER V: THE EXTENSION OF MACHINERY VERSUS PASSIONATE INDIVIDUALS</b>	<b>203</b>
<b>The Rhetoric of Freedom, Emotions, and Spiritualism at the <i>Darülfünun</i> in the early 1920s: An Alternative Understanding of Progress?</b>	<b>207</b>
<b>'Passionate Individuals'</b>	<b>219</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>233</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>235</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>242</b>

## List of Figures

FIGURE 1. MEDICAL STUDENTS WITH A CADAVER AT <i>MEKTEB-İ TIBBİYE-İ ŞAHANE</i> BY ABDULLAH BROTHERS (1880-1893)	29
FIGURE 2. EŞEK MECMUASI, 4 (30 TEMMUZ 1327 / 12 AUGUST 1911), P.1.	30
FIGURE 3. DARÜLFÜNUN, LITERATURE FACULTY, ŞEHBAL, 55 (9 HAZİRAN 1327 / 28 JUNE 1911)	147

## **Note on Transliteration and Translation**

In the transliteration of texts from the Arabic script to the Latin script, I mainly used the current Turkish usage for the words that are in the official dictionary of Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association). For those are not, I used â, û and î to represent for Arabic letters ع, و, ى. Unless otherwise indicated, translations and transliterations are mine and available for consultation in the footnotes. I did not change the spellings and punctuations of the primary sources.

## Introduction

In 1913, Davudzâde Molla Mustafa Nazım set out his vision of a ‘new man’ in an imaginary Ottoman Empire of the 23<sup>rd</sup> century, in *Rüyada Terakki* (Progress in a dream) – one of the first science fiction novels produced in the late Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> *Rüyada Terakki* starts with a dream of the protagonist Nazım, who is anguished by the position of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), in which he meets his grandfather Molla Davut. In this dream Molla Davut takes his grandson to the 23<sup>rd</sup> century to convince him that the future of the Ottoman Empire is bright. Nazım is surrounded by advanced technology, such as sleeping and flying machines, and ten-story factories, most of which are based on the protagonist’s own sketches in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For Nazım, men are like machines and the ‘new men’ of the 23<sup>rd</sup> century will finally achieve perfection (*insan-ı kamil*).<sup>2</sup> Taken from their families and educated in ‘delivery and nurture rooms’ (*tevlit ve terbiyehaneler*) since birth, these perfect machines come to maturity at the age of five.<sup>3</sup> Wearing similar clothes, walking on the streets in an orderly manner, the ‘new men’ are immune to demonic desires and egotism, thanks to childhood indoctrination by a written moral code. Free of craving for coffee, tea or cigarettes ‘they work relentlessly’, which they consider a virtue.<sup>4</sup> Impressed by this ‘new man’ of the 23<sup>rd</sup> century, Nazım converses with his friend

---

<sup>1</sup> Davudzâde Molla Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki ve Medeniyet-i İslâmiyeyi Rüyeyet* (Istanbul, 1913). A transliteration of this text from the Arabic script to the Latin script can be found in Davudzâde Molla Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki ve Medeniyet-i İslâmiyeyi Rüyeyet*, transliterated by Engin Kılıç (Istanbul 2012). For an analysis of *Rüyada Terakki* in relation to some other Ottoman science fictions in the same era: Seda Uyanık, ‘Osmanlı-Türk Anlatılarında Bilime Yönelişin Mantığı ve Gelecek Tasarıları’ (19. Yüzyıl Sonu ve Erken 20. Yüzyıl) (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki*, transliterated by Engin Kılıç, pp. 56-61. The concept of *insan-ı kamil* refers to a long tradition of defining ‘the perfect man’ within an Islamic framework: Arnaldez, R., ‘al-Insân al-Kâmil’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 30 June 2016.

[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/\\*-COM\\_0375](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/*-COM_0375)

<sup>3</sup> Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki*, transliterated by Engin Kılıç, pp. 98-102.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Tahir, and they hit upon the idea of a ‘mind repair shop’ (*kafa tamirathanesi*) to fix ‘sick minds’. They wish they could come up with the idea of ‘mind repair shop’ on July 24, 1908 (July 11, 1324), the day of the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period.<sup>5</sup>

The period between 1912 and 1921, the ‘Ten Year War’, was a ‘transitional period’ marked by major discontinuities and continuities in terms of the ideological foundations of the developing ‘Turkish’ identity, and a study of the period calls for careful analysis and contextualization.<sup>6</sup> In brief, Turkish nationalism became evident in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and solidified during the First World War.<sup>7</sup> Even for the post-Balkan War period, ‘national culture’ went through major fluctuations and transformations: ‘the policies that the government tried to apply during the war [WWI] changed’, as K rođlu explains, while the intellectual participants of ‘national culture’ were not always subject to ‘hegemonic ideology’, and Turkish nationalism with a secular tendency gained an upper hand only after Arab revolts in 1917.<sup>8</sup>

It was towards the end of this period that Refik Halid Karay wrote his critical short story *Hülya Bu Ya* (A dream, it is), depicting a newly established regime along national lines and its new capital Ankara, from an understandably different ideological perspective to Molla Davuzade’s *Rüyada Terakki*. Written in 1921, *Hülya Bu Ya* describes the new capital through the eyes of an American traveller Jon Hülya, who is amazed by the technological advancement of Ankara, much exceeding that of America at the time. Individuals are very much on the agenda in this new Ankara, with X-rays

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 145.

<sup>6</sup> Erol K rođlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: literature in Turkey during World War I* (London, 2007), p. 46. Zafer Toprak defined the First World War as a ten-year period first in *Toplumsal Tarih*: Zafer Toprak, ‘Cihan Harbi’nin Provası Balkan Harbi,’ *Toplumsal Tarih*, 104 (2002), pp. 45-6.

<sup>7</sup> For a careful periodization with a focus on the issue of education see Mehmet Alkan, ‘II. Meşrutiyet’te Eğitim, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Milliyetçilik, Militarizm veya “Militer Türk-İslam Sentezi”’, in Ferdan Ergut, ed. *II. Meşrutiyet’i Yeniden Düşünmek* (Istanbul, 2010) p. 64.

<sup>8</sup> K rođlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity*, p. XI.

that peer into people's souls and classify them, health machines exchanging sick hearts, livers and brains with artificial ones, and 'man-making machines' (*adam makinesi*) producing grown human beings from sperm in a week. It is the land of machinery: 'They even make humans through machines. Here it is all about machinery, everything that happens here... Machines, machines again, machines forever.'<sup>9</sup> In this story the 'Turkish patriots' (*Türk milliyetperverleri*) have constructed a new 'city of progress at the heart of Anatolia', wherein people awake when their sleeping machines decide that they have enough sleep, playing a national song written by Ziya Gökalp: 'Bunnies sleep, Turks don't / Very little time, too much to do / Don't sleep Turk, Don't sleep / Open your eyes, plough your field.'<sup>10</sup>

The early Republican era, the period that followed, witnessed deeper changes with the implementation of the Turkish modernization project – one of the 'most successful models of a universally defined modernization process' and one of the strongest examples of nation-building.<sup>11</sup> It involved a series of policy changes in the political, legal, economic, social and cultural spheres, starting with the new Constitution of 1924 and reaching its zenith with the Turkish national identity formation of the 1930s, an authoritarian phase.<sup>12</sup>

The secondary literature on Ottoman modernization has dealt with the rhetoric of the 'new man' primarily in relation to state-building efforts. As it has shown, the concept of a 'new man' was widely discussed by Ottoman intellectuals within the framework of education and envisionings of a new society. As a hardworking,

---

<sup>9</sup> 'İnsanları bile makinelerde vücuda getiriyorlar... Burada herşey, hepsi, olan biten ne varsa hep: Makine, yine makine, daima makine!' Refik Halid Karay 'Hülya Bu Ya...' transliterated by Özlem Alpin, ed. *Türk Bilim Kurgu Öyküleri* (Istanbul, 2003), p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> 'Tavşan uyur, Türk uyumaz / Çalışmaya vaktimiz az / Uyuma Türk! Uyuma Türk! Gözünü aç, tarlanı kaz.' Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle, 1997), p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London, 2010), pp. 232-5.

efficient, practical disciple of progressive discourses, the imaginary ‘new man’ educated in ‘new schools’ would be in complete harmony with the scientific and technological developments with which he was surrounded.<sup>13</sup> In line with these efforts, child education, which had entered into the state agenda during the *Tanzimat* era, started to be taken more seriously, with more active policies for control of the school curriculum, a stress on the idea of citizenship and more concrete visions of the ‘new man’ in a ‘new life’.<sup>14</sup> As the secondary literature has shown, new subjects in the late Ottoman Empire, such as morality, citizenship, anthropology, and gymnastics, were used as tools for indoctrination.<sup>15</sup> Creation of ‘productive citizens’ and the ‘shaping of the industrious body’ through morality books, for example, became one major answer to the question: ‘what sort of model citizen’ was suggested for the nation?<sup>16</sup>

How would the case of modern psychology – as an underrepresented subject in the secondary literature – contribute to what we already know about the rhetoric of the ‘new man’? Drawing on the secondary literature, this thesis tells a story of

---

<sup>13</sup> *Haluk’un Defteri*, *Haluk’un Amentüsü*, and *Şebnem* by well known educationist poet Tevfik Fikret (1867- 1915) are the most commonly referred examples of the rise of a new literature on ‘new man’ in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century: Mehmet Kaplan, *Tevfik Fikret: Devir, Şahsiyet, Eser* (Istanbul, 2013), pp. 163-178. For a glimpse into intellectual discussions about new man in the second constitutional era: Mustafa Gündüz, ‘Son Dönem Osmanlı Aydınlarında Yeni Birey ve Yeni Toplum’, in *Osmanlı Mirası Cumhuriyet’in İnşası: Modernleşme Eğitim Kültür ve Aydınlar* (Istanbul, 2010), pp. 188-218.

<sup>14</sup> Füsün Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet’ten bugüne Türkiye’de vatandaş eğitimi* (Istanbul, 2004), p. 30.

<sup>15</sup> The literature on Ottoman educational modernization is well established and developed. It makes significant contributions to the history of Ottoman modernization by highlighting the state agenda behind curriculum changes and educational reformations. For a general overview: Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the state and education in the late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2002); Aksin S. Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908 : Islamization, autocracy and discipline* (Leiden, 2001). According to Fortna morality courses and textbooks were subjected to state agenda: Benjamin Fortna, ‘Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman “Secular” Schools’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32/3 (2000), p. 370. Zafer Toprak closely analyzes the case of citizenship courses through the example of *Rehber-i İttihad*: Zafer Toprak, ‘80. Yıldönümünde “Hürriyetin İlanı” (1908) ve “Rehber-i İttihad”’, *Toplum ve Bilim*, 42 (1988), pp. 157-173. A selection of the examples of the same subject goes as follows: Zafer Toprak, *Darwin’den Dersime Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji* (Istanbul: 2012); Sanem Yamak Ateş, *Asker Evladlar Yetiştirmek, II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde beden terbiyesi, askerî talim ve paramiliter gençlik örgütleri* (Istanbul, 2012).

<sup>16</sup> Melis Hafez, ‘The Lazy, the Idle, the Industrious: Discourse and Practice of Work and Productivity in Late Ottoman Society’ (PhD thesis, The University of California, 2012). Hereby I thank Fabian Steininger for drawing my attention to this important PhD thesis for the field.

imagining the ‘new man’ through psychology as part of the progressive discourses. It asks what the emergence of metaphors such as ‘man-making machines’, ‘mind repair shop,’ and ‘machines, which have reached perfection’, can tell us. It seeks answers in a large corpus of psychological literature written by intellectuals from the 1870s onwards under the umbrella of *ilm-i ahval-i ruh* (the sciences of the states of the soul, psychology), which claim to approach the soul, the brain and emotions from a ‘scientific’ angle. By revolving the story around the metaphors of ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’, the thesis intends to shift the centre of focus from the ideological toolset, which has been studied extensively, to other intellectual concerns, such as imagining man in accordance with new material culture under the pressing concerns of technological and economic progress. In doing so, it interrogates whether there was a deeper Ottoman inquiry into the conceptual framework of the individual in the face of the new scientific tools for constructing subjects, or intellectual discourses were confined to normative accounts of nation making. By examining the case of modern psychology, wherein one anticipates seeing intensive engagement with conceptual issues, it endeavors to amplify syncretic formulas and fluctuations in intellectual discourses with respect to national and religious ideologies and a larger degree of integration into the transnational processes of ‘constructing the subjects’. It endorses the interpretation of seeing psychology as a tool for nation making in a transnational context: ‘Modern nationhood was thus given meaning as a psychological reality, a product of transnational science’.<sup>17</sup> Along the way, psychological ideas produced by ‘fathers’ of a new scientific psychology were

---

<sup>17</sup> Akira Iriye, Rana Mitter, ‘Foreword’ in Glenda Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics, 1870-1919* (New York, 2006), p. x. For the ways in which transnational and global history could constitute an alternative to national history see Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke, 2013). Hereby I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Ruth Harris for encouraging me to think more deeply about transnational history.

circulated transnationally while distinct understandings of the soul, emotions, and will were produced.

As Toprak argues, the history of social and human sciences in the late Ottoman Empire is vulnerable to later political agendas.<sup>18</sup> Intellectual products of these periods deserve close attention, leaving room for alternative interpretations and remaining sensitive to contextual and conceptual changes. In an attempt to perceive deeper conceptual transformations, this thesis is concerned with what lies beneath the national and religious underpinnings of this ‘imagined new man’. In doing so, my intention is not to exclude the process of state formation, conflicts about political ideologies, and questions pertaining to religion. It would certainly be naïve to underestimate these. I would, however, like to complicate the picture and see what is beyond the normative accounts. Accordingly, instead of telling the story of the ‘construction of a nation through psychology’, I propose to pay attention to the complexity of psychological ideas in a transnational context and to imagery of the ‘new man’ which had currency before the discussions about nationalism took concrete forms in the much later early Republican context.

Current literature on the history of psychology in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican era is limited to a handful articles written by psychologists whose major focus is the post-1930 era. As a general pattern, psychology in the late Ottoman era is seen as a transitional phase between a concise and essentialist version of traditional Ottoman psychological perspectives, and the post-1930s period. There is, however, a large psychological corpus written by well-known intellectuals before the field in Turkey came to be dominated by professional psychologists, with their more standardized view as it became established in the early 1930s. However, their interest

---

<sup>18</sup> Toprak, *Darwin'den Dersime*, p. 12.

in psychology has not been problematized by the secondary literature hitherto. This dissertation aims to fill this void in the literature, and to trace the trajectory of modern psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire from 1869 onwards in relation to major technological, cultural, social and political changes and the rhetoric of the ‘new man’. It does not intend to be an orthodox history of psychology in this period, which lacks key elements in standard history of psychology such as institutions, laboratories and psychologists with formal education. The dissertation instead focuses on a period wherein psychology was an elusive tool used to speculate about emotions, mental phenomena, human nature, and the soul – categories in which modern psychology has by and large lost interest.<sup>19</sup> In doing so, it seeks to hear the voices of the relevant intellectuals more clearly and self-reflexively, as they speculate about the soul and emotions in the midst of late-imperial turmoil, expressing their ideas and concerns through the debate between materialism and spiritualism.

In searching for the ways in which intellectuals made sense of human nature in a disenchanted world of science and technology through the metaphors of ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’, the thesis intends to analyse the intellectual discourses on the soul and emotions at the intersection of modern psychology and the debate between materialism and spiritualism. In an attempt to go beyond the dichotomous thinking, it approaches the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a psychological debate, deployed by intellectuals with the aim of developing the philosophical and conceptual foundations of the ‘new man’ in accordance with major

---

<sup>19</sup> Modern psychology certainly was one tool among many others for ‘imagining new man’. As has been shown recently, many other mental health related disciplines such as psychiatry and psychoanalysis entered into the scene and were put in practice in this era for ‘shaping the nation’ for example. There is a growing literature on mental health related subjects: Rya Kılıç, *Deliler ve Doktorları: Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Delilik* (Istanbul, 2014); Fatih Artvinli, *Delilik Siyaset ve Toplum: Toptaşı Bimarhanesi (1873-1927)* (Istanbul, 2013); Ycel Yanıkdağ, *Healing the Nation: prisinors of war, medicine and nationalism in Turkey, 1914-1939* (Edinburgh, 2014); Kutlughan Soyubol, ‘The Sciences of the Soul: The Emergence of Psy-sciences and the Modern State in Turkey’ (PhD thesis, CUNY Graduate Center, 2016)

scientific and technological changes in their environment. It focuses primarily on four thinkers, all of whom gave serious thought to psychology and brain physiology: Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik, Ahmed Hilmi, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç.

Central to my choice of these thinkers is to give voice to the most preeminent figures in each period with a large degree of self-reflexivity, going beyond mere translations. More importantly, they at the crossroads of psychological thinking as well as the debate between materialism and spiritualism are representatives of the debate about the soul in a chronological yet non-linear and non-progressive fashion. Abdullah Cevdet's materialist publications on brain physiology formed the basis of psychological studies in the 1890s. Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi wrote one of the first modern psychology books studied at *Darülfünunin* in the Second Constitutional Era. Baha Tevfik's book – which he wrote together with Ahmed Nebil – was one strong alternative to Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi's version. By putting together these two works, one could get a sense of demarcation lines of the discussion with respect to psychological theories as well as the debate between materialism and spiritualism in the Second Constitutional Era. Mustafa Şekip Tunç was one of the first Ottoman psychologists to obtain a formal degree in psychology from abroad, and one of the strongest representatives of the spiritualist ecole in the 1920s.<sup>20</sup> To my surprise, I found that while they were toying with allegedly strict identities as materialist, spiritualist, or Islamist, they actually produced their own unique syntheses, going beyond the limits of one-sided, dichotomous thinking.

---

<sup>20</sup> Given the novelty of the topic and the limitations of the secondary literature, this thesis studies individual thinkers and devotes each chapter to a different thinker. In doing so, it aims to avoid generalizations and impose personal biases on a novel subject as much as possible. While choosing these four intellectuals, I intended to put together those who gave serious thought to both psychological thinking and the debate between materialism and spiritualism. Obviously, there were many other intellectuals, who produced psychological works along similar lines such as Hoca Tahsin, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Mustafa Satı Bey Mehmet Ali Ayni, Rıza Tevfik, Mehmet İzzet, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, Ali Haydar Taner, and İbrahim Gövsa. Given the scope of a PhD Thesis, these intellectuals only appear as side characters in chapters. Yet they definitely deserve more space in a future project.

The desire for making economic and technological progress was one common thread among these intellectuals. Altogether they imagined the ‘new man’ through psychology as part of the progressive discourses. Therefore the new man’s soul and emotions were subjected to intellectual discussions, while the conceptual framework of the ‘individual’ was being formulated. Yet it is important to remember that these intellectuals had different conceptualizations of the terms progress, soul, will, and the relations between individual and collective entities. Accordingly the path ‘to constructing the nation’ was, in many ways, long, non-linear, and transnational. Along the way, intellectuals engaged intensely with conceptual issues about the soul and emotions, and produced syncretic formulas by using the metaphors of ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’ at the intersection of modern psychology and the debate between materialism and spiritualism.

### **‘Man as Machine’ and ‘Man as Animal’ in the Context of the Post-Industrial Transformations**

‘Individual originally meant indivisible. That now sounds like paradox.’<sup>21</sup> According to Williams the departure from ‘the sense of essential indivisibility’ of human nature, to the modern usage of ‘individual’ as in inherent opposition to the ‘general’, has a long social and political history.<sup>22</sup> For Williams this transformation can be traced back through the logic and biology of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which culminated in evolutionary biology and political thought in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23</sup> This is not to say that the *individual* in dualist forms consisting of the body and the soul – whether in unity or not – had not conceptualized even earlier than this. Philosophy of mind was a major venue for

---

<sup>21</sup> Raymond Williams, *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society* (New York, 1985), p. 161.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

conceptualizing man as a sum of multiple components, which from René Descartes (1596-1650) onwards has tended to fragment, paving the way for mind-body dualism. Yet the idea of the ‘fragmented individual’ whose fragments – human and animal, biology and will, the body and the soul – are strictly defined and artificially engineered in relation to a general unit is a modern concept from a *biopolitical*<sup>24</sup> perspective, used effectively in both totalitarian and liberal regimes.<sup>25</sup> Leaving aside the long discussion about how and in which ways the ‘fragmented individual’ helps states regulate individuals through *biopower*, – i.e. ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy’<sup>26</sup> – it is important to see the influence of material, political, and economic conditions on changing conceptualizations of human nature. The metaphors of ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’ therefore should be contextualized and problematized in the light of such a complex web of interactions. The context of post-industrial transformation is a good start in delving into the ways in which these metaphors came into being, with the debate between materialism and spiritualism consequently gaining new meanings.

‘The turn towards mechanism’ in making sense of the laws of the body and the universe dates back to Antiquity, before natural philosophy developed mechanistic

---

<sup>24</sup> Michel Foucault defines *biopolitics* as: ‘... the attempt, the starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problem posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race... We know the increasing importance of these problems since the nineteenth century, and the political and economic issues they have raised up to the present.’ Michel Foucault ‘Course Summary’ in Michel Senellart (ed), *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79*, tr. Graham Burchell (New York, 2008), p. 317.

<sup>25</sup> See for example Timothy Campbell, *Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben* (Minneapolis, 2011).

<sup>26</sup> Foucault defines *biopower* as: ‘a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18<sup>th</sup> century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called *biopower*.’ Michel Foucault, ‘One’ in Michel Senellart (ed), *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78*, tr. Graham Burchell (London, 2007), p. 16.

views of human nature and the universe.<sup>27</sup> The ‘man as machine’ metaphor made its appearance in human anatomy and philosophy before the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>28</sup> Yet with La Mettrie’s concept of ‘man as machine’ a purely material and naturalistic angle on mental phenomena took central place in biological materialism. In his *L’Homme Machine* (Man a machine; 1748) the French physiologist and biological materialist Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-51) developed the metaphor of ‘man as machine’. As Plotkin observed, in so doing he extended Descartes’s ‘Cartesian beast machine to account for the human mind as well.’<sup>29</sup> In other words: ‘Humans are machines; and we are animals’.<sup>30</sup>

Scientific discussions about man’s place in nature were accompanied by the spread of industrial developments and major changes in the material culture, with the machine industry, railways, and factories. These brought ‘a mechanical dimension to life’ in every segment, and a new set of ‘industrial perceptions’.<sup>31</sup> In facing the sometimes fatal consequences of the industrial revolution, machine metaphors were often used as a symbol of asymmetrical power relations on a global scale. Technological advancements in textile manufacture, mining, machinery, metallurgy, steam power, chemicals and machinery ran alongside extremely poor working conditions, famine, and exploitation. Before Marx scrutinized the ways in which man was degraded ‘to the level of an appendage of a machine’ in *Capital*, workers put this into words, with the idea that ‘they wish to make us tools or implements or machines’ forming part of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century English machine-breaking movement called

---

<sup>27</sup> E. R. Truitt, *Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art* (Philadelphia, 2015), p. 2. Hereby I thank Yavuz Sezer for drawing my attention to this book.

<sup>28</sup> One of the first works with detailed illustrations of dissection and a depiction of human body as a fabric, *De humani corporis fabrica libri septem*, dates back to 1543: Andreas Vesalius, *On the Fabric of the Human Body*, tr. W. F. Richardson and J. B. Carman, 5 vols. (San Francisco, 1998-2009).

<sup>29</sup> Henry Plotkin, *Evolutionary Thought in Psychology: a brief history* (Oxford, 2004), p. 16.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Constance Classen ‘Introduction: The Transformation of Perception’, in Constance Classen, ed. *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Age of the Empire, 1800-1920* (London, 2014), p. 12. Hereby I thank Nurçin İleri for bringing this to my attention.

*Luddism*.<sup>32</sup> The machine industry had significant public consequences, with establishing ‘scientific and technological foundations of the civilizing mission’ in colonies becoming treated as ‘measures of European superiority and as gauges of the abilities of non-Western peoples’.<sup>33</sup> It also brought new understandings of time and space, as On Barak suggests in *On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt* – a study of the cultural history of technology in Colonial Egypt.<sup>34</sup> While ‘Egyptians embraced the materialist language of their country’s managers’,<sup>35</sup> technology was the major backdrop for ‘the devil’s appearance as an emblem of alienating swiftness and efficiency.’<sup>36</sup> Technological modernization did not however bring a one-sided relationship of imposition or resistance, according to Barak. It rather brought its own temporality, which was organically reconfigured through daily interactions, embodied by the question ‘How long is five minutes?’ in Egyptian time.<sup>37</sup>

The spread of industrial developments coincided with and was supported by major medical developments and the expansion of scientific authority. As Hobsbawm aptly puts it, ‘Educated men of this period [third quarter of the nineteenth century] were not merely proud of their sciences, but prepared to subordinate all other forms of intellectual activity to them’.<sup>38</sup> The idea of evolution linked the natural sciences ‘to the human or social sciences, though the latter term is anachronistic’.<sup>39</sup> In this era, the spread of evolutionary theories blurred the boundaries between animals and humans, feeding into the ‘man as animal’ metaphor. The notion that living organisms could have gradually changed in line with the changes in the crust of the earth, which had

---

<sup>32</sup> E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966), p. 832.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, 1989), p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> On Barak, *On Time: Technology and temporality in modern Egypt* (Berkeley, 2013).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (London, 1977), p. 294.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

developed following the developments in geology towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, reached its climax with publication of *On The Origin of Species* (1859) by Charles Darwin (1809-1882).<sup>40</sup> Evolutionism's investigation of 'man's place in nature' included important insights into human psychology<sup>41</sup> and was strongly supported by the recent medical discoveries in brain physiology and the anatomy of the nervous system.<sup>42</sup> One major outcome of Darwinian evolutionism was the surfacing of a naturalistic view of intellectual faculties, which had long been considered 'exalted faculties' of man, and a 'characteristic of humans' surpassing animals.<sup>43</sup> Darwin's ideas were mediated through the work of different scientists and philosophers such as Spencer and Büchner, thus acquiring different meanings: 'The implications of Darwin's theory for the understanding of human beings were picked up very early in many countries even before they had been outlined by Darwin himself.'<sup>44</sup>

It was primarily Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who addressed the implications of Darwin's theory in relation to a theory of progress under the umbrella of psychology. An English biologist, philosopher, anthropologist, and sociologist, Spencer developed a comprehensive theory of evolution stretching from human biology to social units. Darwin 'wrote more on plants than on animals and more on animals than on man. Spencer [however] was particularly concerned with man', in an attempt to find a scientific ground for his theory of progress.<sup>45</sup> Although the first

---

<sup>40</sup> 'Transformist ideas' started to be expressed in Europe circa 1800: Pietro Corsi, Before Darwin: Transformist Concepts in European Natural History, *Journal of the History of Biology*, 38 (2005), pp. 67-83. The developments in the field of geology helped 'transformist ideas' spread long before Darwin: Pietro Corsi, The Importance of French Transformist Ideas for the Second Volume of Lyell's Principles of Geology, *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 11/3 (1978), pp. 221-44.

<sup>41</sup> Robert M. Young, *Darwin's Metaphor: Nature's Place in Victorian Culture* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 57-78.

<sup>42</sup> J. Wayne Lazar, 'Brain Physiology and the Mind in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences*, 21 (2012), pp. 343-65.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 343-4.

<sup>44</sup> Eve-Marie Engels and Thomas F. Glick, 'Editors' Introduction', in Eve-Marie Engels and Thomas F. Glick, eds. *The Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe*, 2 vols. (London, 2008), i, p. 9.

<sup>45</sup> Young, *Darwin's Metaphor*, p. 18.

edition of *The Principles of Psychology* (1855) had less of an impact, the second edition earned him the title of ‘the first evolutionary psychologist’ albeit ‘in a limited sense’ in the 1870s.<sup>46</sup> This involved a theory of learning based on the Lamarckian idea of acquired characteristics: ‘learning by an individual might be incorporated into the characteristics of a species, that is, its instincts.’<sup>47</sup> By the same token, he argued in ‘Progress: Its Law and Causes’ that Lamarck’s ‘functionally produced modifications’ were able to trigger evolutionary transformations in societies, through the principles of progress.<sup>48</sup> From single organisms in nature to daily life, the principle of ‘the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous’ for the better was applicable everywhere, including social, political and economical organizations,<sup>49</sup> which nourished the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’.<sup>50</sup> In tandem with the development of the idea of evolution, ‘an inherent principle of development to higher forms became the primary sense’ of the term *progress*,<sup>51</sup> which then became inextricably linked with science.<sup>52</sup> It was then that man was subordinated to progressive discourses formulated within an allegedly scientific framework.

The spread of crude reductionism in biological materialism gave a simplistic texture to the evolutionary debate. Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899) became one of the spokesmen and popularisers of recent scientific theories, including the incontestability of natural laws, biological materialism, Darwinism, and naturalism. Büchner was a German physiologist who

---

<sup>46</sup> Plotkin, *Evolutionary Thought in Psychology*, p. 24.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>49</sup> Herbert Spencer, ‘Progress: Its Law and Causes’, *The Westminster Review*, 67 (1857), pp. 445-7, 451, 454-6, and 464-65.

<sup>50</sup> Stretch of the use of evolutionism in Spencer’s hands reached its zenith with the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ and laid the foundation of social Darwinism: ‘This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called “natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.”’ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, 2 vols. (London, 1864), i, pp. 444-5.

<sup>51</sup> Williams, *Keywords*, p. 244.

<sup>52</sup> Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, p. 316.

together with Karl Vogt (1817-1895) and Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893) promoted a variant of materialist philosophy in Germany. Their version of materialism was usually categorized as ‘mechanical’, ‘bourgeois’, ‘scientific’, and ‘vulgar’.<sup>53</sup> His book *Kraft und Stoff* (Matter and Force) gained much popularity up to the First World War, with twenty-one editions and seventeen translations into foreign languages – including Ottoman Turkish, the latter published in 1911 by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil.<sup>54</sup> Much of its popularity was due to its simplicity and superficiality, resting on the success of the natural sciences.<sup>55</sup> It ‘combined the contradiction of lowering man to the dust by showing him to be nothing but another animal, while lifting him to the skies and singing his greatness as ruler of the world.’<sup>56</sup>

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, mechanism added another layer to the domination of physiological approaches, resonating with the task of understanding and designing man using the tools offered by materialism, physiological determinism, Darwinism, and positivism. It emerged as a part of a ‘package’ of scientific thinking which postulated mechanical laws behind human nature in order to demystify complex human behaviour. According to Hughes, one of the reasons why positivism, naturalism, and materialism came to be used almost interchangeably at the time was their common roots in mechanistic and reductive approaches to societies and human nature, which led to a great deal of terminological ambiguity.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, many of the reactions to positivism, materialism, and naturalism lacked a profound

---

<sup>53</sup> Michael Heidelberger, ‘Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner’, in Edward Craig, ed. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2 (London, 1998), p. 48.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 172.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>57</sup> H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reconstruction of European Social Thought 1890-1930* (New York, 1961), pp. 37-8.

understanding, and intersected on a straightforward problematization of mechanistic views.<sup>58</sup>

Science and technology soon faced a ‘romantic challenge’. Laments for the soul and spiritualism in different forms became important parts of post-Industrial Revolution romanticism in the form of the distaste of machinery. In his *A Mechanical Age* (1829), Scottish philosopher and commentator of the age of Romanticism Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) defined this age as ‘the age of machinery’ in which Industrial Revolution had transformed men into machines. The soul and the spiritual realm were claimed to be the ultimate losers in the infiltration of machinery into internal sphere. ‘Man the machine had ceased to be a controversial claim.’<sup>59</sup>

Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal and spiritual also. Here too nothing follows its spontaneous course, nothing is left to be accomplished by old natural methods. Everything has its cunningly devised implements, its pre-established apparatus; it is not done by hand, but by machinery... Equally mechanical, and of equal simplicity, are the methods proposed by both parties for completing or securing this all sufficient perfection of arrangement. It is no longer the moral, religious, spiritual condition of the people that is our concern, but their physical, practical, economical condition, as regulated by public laws. Thus is the Body-politic more than ever worshipped and tendered; but the Soul-politic less than ever.<sup>60</sup>

Evolutionism brought with it a concern about establishing man’s superiority to animals, and a number of ethical questions: ‘The separation of mind and free will from the course of material nature lies at the bottom of our traditional idea of responsibility and of the spiritual aspect of man. Thus it seemed that our systems of morality and of law, as well as of the hopes and punishments of man, were at stake.’<sup>61</sup> Spiritual experiences, for instance, were convincing enough for Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), the discoverer of ‘the theory of natural selection independently of Darwin,<sup>62</sup> to

---

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Roy Porter, *Flesh in the Age of Reason* (London, 2003), p. 374.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas Carlyle, ‘Signs of the Times’, *Edinburgh Review*, 98 (1829), pp. 439-59.

<sup>61</sup> Young, *Darwin’s Metaphor*, p. 9.

<sup>62</sup> Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, p. 305.

break ‘with the Darwinian theory of the descent of man from apes’.<sup>63</sup> Germany in particular became a home to romanticism in search of ‘a commitment to some sort of existence beyond reductionism’.<sup>64</sup> ‘The ontological criticisms of modern materialistic scientism’ flourished and reached its pinnacle with *vitalism* as developed within Henri Bergson’s mysticism in France.<sup>65</sup>

Psychology in its transition from philosophy of mind to the field of sciences became an important venue for establishing human beings’ superiority to animals and tackling the moral questions. After the need for psychology to tear itself away from philosophy to attain scientific status, stated early on by psychologists such as Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839-1916) and Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) in the 1870s, the field in fact became dominated by a theme of coexistence between old and new, material and spiritual, physiological and intuitive perspectives.<sup>66</sup> For a period it served as a meeting point for a number of sciences and pseudo-sciences concerning human nature and biology, such as scientific racism and eugenics on the one hand, and mesmerism, hypnotism, psychic studies on the other. The ‘eclectic’ psychology of philosopher Victor Cousin (1792-1867) was developed by Hippolyte Taine and Paul Janet (1823-1899). Janet in particular became the spokesman of ‘the so-called French “spiritualistic school”, for which, psychology was central to philosophy.’<sup>67</sup> This understanding enjoyed a large degree of influence over psychological studies even long after Ribot started his experimental studies.<sup>68</sup> While notable philosophers and

---

<sup>63</sup> J. J. Ravetz, ‘Criticisms of Science’ in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price, eds. *Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective* (London, 1977), p. 75.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>66</sup> Two of earliest texts, which raised the need for psychology to separate itself from metaphysics were Taine’s *De l’intelligence* (1870) and Ribot’s *La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine* (1870): Jacqueline Carroy and Regine Plas, ‘How Pierre Janet Used Pathological Psychology To Save The Philosophical Self’, *Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences*, 36/3 (2000), p. 231.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Françoise Parot, ‘France’ in David Baker, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 232-3.

psychologists such as William James (1842-1910) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941) cooperated with the British Psychic Association, they also maintained psychology's roots in philosophy.<sup>69</sup> This granted these pseudo-sciences a form of scholarly, if not scientific, authority, until they fell from grace and were gradually expunged from the discipline in the 1920s. Psychology also granted thinkers a great deal of flexibility in synthesizing various perspectives when speculating about human nature and the 'new man'. The debate between materialism and spiritualism remained as one major current while psychology had yet to be freed from its roots in philosophy.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire became part of the 'great disenchanted garden' through the increasing visibility of technology and the growing interest in scientific ideas.<sup>70</sup> Throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire went through serious changes in the economic, social, and political spheres, directed towards state centralization and increasing integration into the world economy. These changes were aimed ultimately at weakening the state's 'domestic rivals – urban guilds, tribes, and provincial notables – while maintaining its place in the new world order'.<sup>71</sup> Increasing state control was not experienced to the same degree everywhere within the empire, and it rather took the form of negotiation with intermediaries instead of eradication.<sup>72</sup> The *Tanzimat* Era (1839-1876) was the scene of enlargement of 'the scope, responsibility and sheer size of' the government by the 'Men of the *Tanzimat*', westernizing bureaucrats who brought a key change to 'the

---

<sup>69</sup> Francesca Bordogna, *William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science and the Geography of Knowledge* (Chicago, 2008), pp. 99-114. For more information see Frank Miller Turner, *Between Science and Religion: The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England* (New Haven, 1974).

<sup>70</sup> The phrase 'great enchanted garden' is used by Weber for traditional society in opposition to that of modern: Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston, 1971), p. 270.

<sup>71</sup> Donald Quataert, 'The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914', in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 762.

<sup>72</sup> Huri Islamoğlu, 'Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitution of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires', in Huri Islamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue, eds. *Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India and the Ottoman Empire* (New Delhi, 2009), p. 113.

Ottoman mode of governance' amid growing concerns about constituting 'the public and public opinion'.<sup>73</sup>

The Crimean War (1853-1855) has usually been pinpointed as the starting point of the empire's greater integration into the industrializing world and significant technological changes in its material conditions, starting with a 170-mile line electric telegraph (installed in 1855) between Edirne and Istanbul.<sup>74</sup> Following the use of telegraph in the 1840s in Britain and the United States, France in 1851, Russia and Greece in the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire started to use this technology in the 1860s.<sup>75</sup> In 1851 a seaport company, as well as the first Ottoman corporation, *Şirket-i Hayriye*, was founded and steamboats became part of 'Istanbul's sea traffic' in growing numbers.<sup>76</sup> In 1863 Sultan Ahmet Square witnessed a novel turn in the usual Ramadan celebrations, with the first fair open to foreign participants and a new building devoted to machines.<sup>77</sup> Rising numbers of factories opened in the 1850s, which brought new problems such as industrial pollution.<sup>78</sup> The city landscape changed drastically throughout the nineteenth century, with major signifiers of urbanization such as increasing numbers of apartments for the classes newly emerging due to mass migration to the city.<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Cengiz Kırılı, 'Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire', in Setenay Shami, ed. *Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York, 2009), p. 286. For more information: Cengiz Kırılı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde 'Havadis Jurnalleri' 1840-1844* (Istanbul, 2009).

<sup>74</sup> Yakup Bektaş, 'The Sultan's Messenger: The Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880' *Technology and Culture*, 41/4 (2000), p. 675.

<sup>75</sup> Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, p. 76.

<sup>76</sup> Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1993), pp. 83-7.

<sup>77</sup> Rifat Önsoy, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumî-i Osmanî', *Bellekten*, 47 (1983), p. 208. For more information: Sevilay Kasap, 'Sergi-i Umumî-i Osmanî, 1863' (MA, Marmara University, 2003). Hereby I thank Cafer Sarıkaya for drawing my attention to this thesis and providing me with a copy.

<sup>78</sup> İlber Ortaylı, 'Istanbul in the Industrial Age', in Afife Batur, ed., *Dünya Kenti İstanbul – İstanbul World City* (Istanbul, 1996), pp. 54-8; 'Eyüp'te Sanayi ve Çevre Kirlenmesi', in Tülay Artan, ed., *Eyüp: Dün/Bugün* (Istanbul, 1993), pp. 124-8.

<sup>79</sup> Ayşe Özil, 'Skyscrapers of the Past and Their Shadows: A Social history of urbanity in the late Ottoman Istanbul', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 21/1&2 (2015), pp. 92-3.

Amidst such changes in the technological scenery, discussions on science were heated. For chronicler Ahmed Lütfi Efendi a new rifle ‘with 100 shots in a minute’ and a paddle steamship produced in Britain as well as the new telegraph line between America and Britain, were all part of ‘some strange events’ which took place in 1866.<sup>80</sup> Open lectures on science became part of the usual Ramadan celebrations in Sultan Ahmet Square in the 1870s. Chemist Derviş Paşa’s open lecture on physics and chemistry, with a short demonstration of electricity and air, was reportedly attended by an estimated 300 people.<sup>81</sup> A petition was sent to the sultan to permit the petitioners to see the ‘strange and unusual phenomena of the material world’.<sup>82</sup> Münif Paşa, however, was disturbed by the ‘ignorant crowds’ taking experiments lightly and treating them as sources of play and fun.<sup>83</sup>

In Yalçınkaya’s account this was a period wherein the debate about science ‘became increasingly rich’, and in which intellectuals were expected to contribute. It was just after this, in the 1860s, that the “new elite” started to import the moral and political connotations of knowledge and ignorance into arguments on science rather straightforwardly’.<sup>84</sup> In the 1880s this discussion gained momentum, and became heated due to the multiplicity of opinions: ‘This was the world of Darwinism, Maxwell’s electromagnetism, new calculations and debates about the age of the Earth, the periodic table, dynamite, the phonograph and electrification.’<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup> Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, transliterated by Münir Aktepe, 11 (Ankara, 1970), p. 76.

<sup>81</sup> Emre Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I: Osmanlı Döneminde Darülfünun 1863-1922* (Istanbul, 2009), p. 66.

<sup>82</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, ‘Darülfünun Tarihçesine Giriş: İlk İki Teşebbüs’, *Belleten*, 54/210 (1990), p. 709.

<sup>83</sup> Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 67.

<sup>84</sup> According to Yalçınkaya ‘debating about science’ in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century served the purpose of defining a set of qualities of new ‘men of science’ therefore was akin to identity and morality formation: Alper Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots: Debating science, state and society in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire* (Chicago, 2015), p. 124.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

From the 1870s onwards, scientific views of man became important parts of science discussions. In the early 1870s human biology became part of the open lectures, as shown by an advertisement listing for experts with a command of the ‘senses and the sensations of muscle movement, blood circulation, respiration, the heart and the brain, death and life’ published in *Mecmua-ı Fünun* (Journal of sciences).<sup>86</sup> From the 1860s onwards two medical academies (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* [Imperial medical school; founded in 1827, but having remained ineffective before the change of the curriculum from French to Turkish] and *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye* [Civil medical school; founded in 1867] became a hotbed of popular scientific views of human nature such as biological materialism and evolutionism. Its graduates played important roles in drawing attention to human physiology and biology in intellectual life, while publicizing scientific determinism and biological materialism. In 1903 a new and spectacular building for the Imperial Medical School designed by French architect Alexandre Vallaury was built in Haydarpaşa. In 1909 it became home to two medical academies which were merged.<sup>87</sup> The Imperial Medical School, together with the Sirkeci train terminus built in 1890, and the Office of Public Debt building designed by Vallaury in 1897 in a ‘revivalist architecture’ style (Western-style buildings with Islamic decorative motives), represented various efforts through administrative and technological means for coping with expanding Western activity and influence in the city landscape during the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1908).<sup>88</sup> The medical advances in particular were a showpiece for what educational modernization had intended to achieve, as well as a subject of popular interest for

---

<sup>86</sup> İhsanoğlu, ‘Darülfünun Tarihçesine Giriş’, p. 726.

<sup>87</sup> Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, pp. 221-31.

<sup>88</sup> Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern Istanbul* (New York, 2009), p. 57.

Abdullah Frères, Ottoman photographers of Armenian descent and international fame, to photograph.



**Figure 1. Medical students with a cadaver at *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* by Abdullah Brothers (1880-1893)**

The Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918) witnessed a boom in press publications wherein technology was one of the most popular subjects, as ‘one element in rhetorics of modernization that were themselves rooted in an often-vague notion of the scientific’.<sup>89</sup> To put it simply, ‘machines were everywhere’ in the press as indicators of progress.<sup>90</sup> According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken two key words of the Second Constitutional Era were ‘progress’ (*terakki*) and ‘evolution’ (*tekamül*). In an attempt to solve ‘Ottoman problems’ with a strictly defined ‘Western terminology’, these terms and interpretations of the laws of evolution were being used redundantly – according to Ülken – as ‘magic solutions’ to every problem with no room for

---

<sup>89</sup> Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany, 2011), p. 315.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* p. 293.

discussion and ‘philosophical sophistication’.<sup>91</sup> For some, technological developments were the solution to current problems and were assigned more importance than politics.



**Figure 2. Eşek Mecmuası, 4 (30 Temmuz 1327 / 12 August 1911), p.1.**

Mechanic: Do you have any idea how much horsepower is needed to carry this rumble?

Donkey: This rumble can't be measured by horsepower. Ask me in 'donkey power' if you want to have an answer.<sup>92</sup>

Technology was a common theme in Baha Tevfik's satirical magazines such as Eşek (Donkey) with a highly critical stance towards the government. Here in this cartoon a train carries the assembly with great difficulty and much of the weight is due to the 'rumble' deputies make. Although technology is key to making progress and 'moving forwards', political disputes are the main obstacle.

Growing mechanization and industrialization in this era had a direct influence on social life. Studying the impact of 'European economic penetration' on Anatolia through popular resistance with a micro approach to social history of popular protest,

<sup>91</sup> Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1992), p. 303.

<sup>92</sup> 'Makinist: Bu kadar gürültüyü çekmek için bu makinenin kaç beygir kuvvetinde olduğunu bilir misin!.. Eşek: Bu gürültü beygir kuvvetiyle ölçülmez, kaç eşek kuvvetindedir? De de cevap verelim!' *Eşek Mecmuası*, 4 (30 Temmuz 1327 / 12 August 1911), p. 1.

Quataert shows the ways in which growing industrialization affected socio-economic life in Anatolia.<sup>93</sup> Mechanization in the factories and advances in technology, for example, had a direct socioeconomic impact on the labour force through new bonds in workplace.<sup>94</sup> Unfortunately, we have very limited knowledge of the ways in which changing material conditions in post-Industrial Revolution settings affected imageries and perceptions of space, time, and life in the late Ottoman period. Yet there is a significant literature forcing us to think more about the cultural and social influences of technology. As Wishnitzer underscores, the introduction of mechanical clocks, for example, changed the ‘temporal culture of late Ottoman society’ from the bureaucratic office to the Bosphorus ferry.<sup>95</sup> Standardization of the time was achieved only partially, and ‘state-time’ did not always adjudicate temporal culture in every segment of social life. Yet ‘time-tabled minds’ with ‘a more comprehensive mindset, one that stressed the centrality of efficiency, punctuality, and regularity for the future of the Ottoman state’ were developed through state apparatus such as the military and schools.<sup>96</sup> One study which deserves attention is İleri’s PhD thesis approaching ‘transformations of night life not only as a site of modern state formation policies centered around competing aims of development, progress, socialization, control and surveillance but also as a multifunctional space of new social expression articulated through the everyday life of the urban population’.<sup>97</sup> İleri observes significant change in Istanbul’s nocturnal life with transformations in ‘social and physical landscape of the city’, including the development of lighting technology, ‘a spectacular element,

---

<sup>93</sup> Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908* (New York, 1983).

<sup>94</sup> Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, pp. 64-7, 74-80, and 80-90.

<sup>95</sup> Wishnitzer defines temporal culture as: ‘a historically created system of time related practices, conventions, values and emotions that structures the temporal dimension of social life and fills it with meaning’ in Avner Wishnitzer, *Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Chicago, 2015), p. 7.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>97</sup> Nurçin İleri, ‘A Nocturnal History of Fin De Siècle Istanbul’ (PhD thesis, Binghamton University, 2015), p. IV-V.

disciplinary instrument, and a social-economic issue that transformed the nocturnal space of Istanbul, physically, socially and mentally'.<sup>98</sup> These studies open up a new way of approaching technology as a social phenomenon with direct impact on daily lives in the context of industrial technological transformations.

In the context of such transformations, intellectual products bear the stamps of the major changes in the material landscape; and so do conceptualizations of human nature – two of the most relevant being ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’, as we have already remarked. Notions of mental health were also a part of the package of the new technological perceptions. Relying on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s analysis of the relations between capitalism and desire, turning body into a desiring machine,<sup>99</sup> On Barak draws attention to the increasing visibility of man/machine analogy in Egypt in the 1920s.<sup>100</sup> Drawing on the alternative readings of a cluster of impacts of scientific and technological changes in daily life as well as intellectual products, this dissertation aims to approach the debate between materialism and spiritualism as one major stream in the response to the Industrial Revolution, and as an engine of different conceptualizations of human nature such as ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’. There is a significant secondary literature on the debate between materialism and spiritualism in the late Ottoman Empire, and this has been essential for the development of the themes in this dissertation. In this literature psychology only appears sporadically and very briefly. Revisiting the debate between materialism and spiritualism with a careful eye on psychology helps us link Ottoman intellectuals to the global post-Darwinian scientific discussions about ‘man’. It could also lead us to question whether religion was the only or the main concern behind the intellectual

---

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 199 and 126-201.

<sup>99</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, 1983).

<sup>100</sup> Barak, *On Time*, pp. 223-5.

interest on the discussions about the soul, as has been claimed in the secondary literature.

## **The Soul and/or the Body Machine: A Glimpse into the Debate between Materialism and Spiritualism in the Late Ottoman Empire**

It is known that materialism – a strange philosophical doctrine – has widely spread in Europe. Its strangeness requires finding its consequences strange, too. The number of its followers has expanded, as it blindly rejects nature and spiritualism and easily convinces those who are ignorant and with very little or wrong information on pure material essence of nature. Yet at the end of the day materialism detaches its followers from all human ties and makes them malefactors, enemies against their own ‘selves’ and against all living creatures – by reducing human beings to the level of animals and separating them from human values.

Yes! Detached from all human ties!

It devalues and abolishes all human ties including motherhood, paternity, fraternity, by equating marriage to slavery, and by equating relations between men and women to mating between animals. If this spreads, all humanity could become a pack, God forbid.

Yes! Malefactors, enemies against themselves and against all living creatures! If people lose human ties such as motherhood, paternity, fraternity what happens to other types of humane and civilizational relations between friends, townsmen, and people of the same kind. Human kind is supposed to obey the law and conform to the norms to maintain social order. That’s why the spread of this strange doctrine brings more malefaction. It also brings more suicide – what I see as hostility and treason towards one’s self.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> ‘Malumdur ki Avrupa’da ‘maddiyûn’ denilen bir hikmet-i garibe erbabı gittikçe çoğalıyor. Hikmetteki garabet intaç eylediği semerât hakkında da enzâr-ı istiğrâbı celb ediyor. Zira bu hikmet tabîyâtı da maneviyatı da ale’l-amyâ reddedivererek sırf maddiyattan ibaret bulunan mahiyetini malumat-ı nakisa ve kâsıra erbabına ve hele cühelaya kolayca öğrettiğinden onu kabul edenler pek çoğalıyor ise de netice-i hâlde insanlığı o ünvandan beklenen fezâilden bi-tecrit âdeta behîmiyet menzilesine indirmesiyle erbâbını kâffe-i alâik-i beşeriyeden mücerret ve bütün mükevvenat aleyhine ve hatta kendi nefesine bile düşman bir canı edip bırakıyor. Evet! Kâffe-i alâik-i beşeriyeden mücerret! Zira ana babalık evlatlık kardeşlik gibi alâiki o kudsiyet-i kadimesinden ıskat eyledikten maada izdivacı sâfderûrâne bir esaret hükmüne koyarak menle ve münasebat-ı rical ve nisvânı da vuhûşun ve tuyûrun münasebat-ı hayvaniyesi suretine ifrâğla validiyet ve mevludiyeti ve binaenaleyh uhuvvet ve sair gûne karabeti hükmen dahi ortadan kaldırıyor. Bu hâlin taammümü lazım gelse mâzallahü teâlâ heyet-i içtimaiye-i beşeriye bir köpek sürüsüne dönecek! Evet! Bütün mükevvenata ve hatta kendi nefesine bile düşman bir canı! Zira insanlar arasında analık, babalık, evlatlık kardeşlik gibi alayık ve münasebat-ı tabiyye kalmadıktan sonra dostluk, hemşehrlik, hem-nevlik gibi münasebat-ı insaniye ve medeniye mi kalır ki, nev-i beşer yekdiğerinin hukuk-ı maddiye ve maneviyesine riâyet eylesin de devâir-i içtimaiye-i medeniyede intizam ve inzibat kalsın? Onun için bu hikmet-i acîbenin çoğaldığı yerlerde cinayetler çoğalıyor. İntiharlar da çoğalıyor ki, işte kendi nefslerine adâvet ve hıyanet demek dahi budur.’ Ahmet Mithat, *Ben Neyim? Hikmet-i Maddiyye Müdafaa* (Istanbul, 1307/1891-2), pp. 1-5.

It is telling that Ahmet Mithat (1844-1912) is a key figure at the outset of both the materialist as well as the anti-materialist Ottoman literature. He had an ‘unstable’ relationship with materialism, with a major U-turn circa 1876.<sup>102</sup> As the author of the first materialist and evolutionist articles such as ‘Duvardan Bir Sada’ (A voice from the wall), and ‘İnsan’ (Human being), he indeed deserves the credit for the dissemination of scientific theories of man in the early 1870s.<sup>103</sup> Interestingly, he is the author of one of the first refutations of materialism, as quoted above, which he ironically named *Ben Neyim? Hikmet-i Maddiyeye Müdafaa* (What am I? Defense of materialist philosophy). Among ‘the Young Ottomans’ sent into exile in 1873 for allegedly dissident activities, Ahmet Mithat was pardoned in 1876 long before his friends Ebuzziya Tevfik (1849-1913) and Namık Kemal (1840-1888).<sup>104</sup> According to Mardin, this was when Ahmet Mithat went through a major conversion.<sup>105</sup> Namık Kemal received a letter from his uncle about Ahmet Mithat’s release: following Ahmet Mithat’s articles sent from exile, he was given the task of writing a refutation of Christianity in return for his release.<sup>106</sup> He had already written about the compatibility between science and Islam – not Christianity – when delving into man’s place, therefore he was knowledgeable of the subject. After being released, Ahmet Mithat distanced himself from the Young Ottomans and remained in close touch with state authorities, often being rewarded during the reign of Abdülhamit II. Following his expression of dislike for materialism on different occasions after being pardoned, Beşir Fuad’s tragic death by cutting his wrists in 1887 again put him in the spotlight about materialism. This was the poetic introduction of Ottoman materialism into the

---

<sup>102</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* (Istanbul, 2008), p. 58.

<sup>103</sup> Atilla Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm* (Istanbul, 2006), pp. 152-65.

<sup>104</sup> For more information on the ‘Young Ottomans’: Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: a study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas* (New Jersey, 1962).

<sup>105</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 58.

<sup>106</sup> Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1944), ii-1, p. 418.

secondary literature, namely Beşir Fuad's tragic suicide, as put into words by Ahmet Mithat.

Beşir Fuad's suicide was indeed dramatic, turning his suicide into an experiment by taking notes while slowly dying. It became a captivating prologue for some of the secondary literature, depicting the alleged depression which materialism caused among some late-Ottoman intellectuals, and the 'mania' of science-loving practice. However, as Poyraz highlights, it would be inaccurate to say that he 'cut his veins and took notes describing his deteriorating condition until he lost consciousness *in order to* prove that life was no more than a scientific phenomenon'.<sup>107</sup> After all, Beşir Fuad's suicide letter sets forth the serious 'mundane' reasons behind his decision.<sup>108</sup> His suicide overshadowed the influence of his ideas in the mainstream narrative of Ottoman science discussions. As a graduate of the War Academy (*Harbiye*), which was strong in science,<sup>109</sup> Beşir Fuad (1853-1887) contributed to the spread in the Ottoman Empire of popular scientific and philosophical trends of the time such as materialism, naturalism, and positivism.<sup>110</sup> His writings boil down to the supremacy of science, putting together 'ideas of Comte, Bernard, Büchner, Letourneau, Lewes, Littré, Spencer and Voltaire'.<sup>111</sup>

More than potential personal reasons for Beşir Fuad's decision to end his own life, I find Ahmet Mithat's interpretation of it more relevant to late Ottoman science

---

<sup>107</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioglu, 'Blueprints for a Future Society: Late Ottoman materialists on science, religion, and art', in Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy* (London, 2005), p. 37 cited in Serdar Poyraz, 'Science versus Religion: The Influence of European Materialism on Turkish Thought, 1860-1960' (PhD thesis, The Ohio State University, 2010), pp. 55. (Italics are Poyraz's) Here Poyraz refers to Hanioglu's more recent article, "Blueprints..." wherein Hanioglu claims as such. Yet this interpretation first appeared in *Young Turks in Opposition* wherein Hanioglu actually cites Orhan Okay's interpretation. Hereby I thank Professor Benjamin Fortna for drawing my attention to this transition and Hanioglu's reference to Okay. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York, 1995), p 16.

<sup>108</sup> Poyraz, 'Science versus Religion', pp. 55-6.

<sup>109</sup> M. Orhan Okay, *İlk Türk Pozitivist ve Naturalisti: Beşir Fuad* (Istanbul 1969), p. 61.

<sup>110</sup> According to Mardin, Fuad's understanding of positivism corresponded to 'attributing great importance to material things' - in a general and popular sense - rather than Comtean positivism: Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 59.

<sup>111</sup> Hanioglu, 'Blueprints for a Future Society', p. 37.

discussions, in a way that lets us see the foundations of the mainstream approach to ‘Ottoman materialism’. Ahmet Mithat and Beşir Fuad, according to Mardin two of the most influential thinkers in the 1880s, were so close indeed that Beşir Fuad addressed his suicide letter to Mithat.<sup>112</sup> This letter starts with a remark, *Mezardan Bir Sada!* (A voice from the grave!).<sup>113</sup> This was a reference to Ahmet Mithat’s article ‘Duvardan Bir Sada’ (A voice from the wall), containing materialist remarks written in 1871 as if from the mouth of a brick. In this article the piece of brick – once a human being, before its transformation to soil, flowers, and then cement – equates death to the end of ‘the machinery of life’.<sup>114</sup> ‘Laughing’ hard at those ‘mosquitos’ who would misinterpret his death as a sign of failure in defending science against ‘poets’, he asks Ahmet Mithat to make arrangements for the continuation of this debate via another representative.<sup>115</sup> Expressing his commitment to science, he plans his suicide conforming to scientific methods, hence his choice of injecting chlorate cocaine into his blood vessels instead of other method – say, shooting himself. His body is to be donated to a medical school, his last wish goes. In a self-reflexive manner, he speaks about his on-going depression as the reason for his suicide, which he had had in mind for the last two years. Having observed some signs in himself of ‘*delire du persecution*’ – his mother’s genetic mental illness, as diagnosed by head psychiatrist at Toptaşı Mental Asylum, Dr. Louis Mongeri – Beşir Fuad seeks comfort in joy and overspending. Feeling trapped between his wife and mistress, he finds solace in death, as otherwise he might spend more money and leave his children in debt, alone.

Ahmet Mithat is not convinced that these are the main reasons, however: Beşir Fuad still had one thousand and five hundred lira – enough by Ahmet Mithat’s

---

<sup>112</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 58.

<sup>113</sup> Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Beşir Fuad*, transliterated by N. Ahmet Özalp (Istanbul, 1996), p. 35.

<sup>114</sup> Ahmet Mithat, ‘Duvardan Bir Sada’, *Dağarcık*, 4 (1288/1872), pp. 99-100.

<sup>115</sup> This refers to a long discussion about emotions, literature and materialism as will be explained in chapter four.

standards – and it was not a hundred percent certain that he would inherit his mother’s illness.<sup>116</sup> Instead he points his finger to materialism, and attaches a refutation of materialism to his commentary on Beşir Fuad’s suicide letter. His love for his friend is to last forever, unlike that of Beşir Fuad, since Ahmet Mithat is a believer and not a materialist, as he repeats several times in his letter. Ahmet Mithat’s response, entitled ‘Criticisms’, continues with two other parts: ‘Reconsideration of [his] suicide along with a refutation of materialism’ and ‘Lesson to be drawn from this calamity’: ‘Who is to blame for this incredible result and calamity? There’s no doubt that it is this superstitious philosophy. Is there any reason to look for another explanation other than this superstitious philosophy, what they call materialism, being a material evidence to refute?’ he concludes.<sup>117</sup>

Completely disassociating himself from materialism as well as Beşir Fuad’s attitude towards life, Ahmet Mithat continued his career as the author of one of the first books refuting materialism and promoting ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument – including a commentary on and partial translation of John Draper’s *History of the Conflict between Science and Religion* (1875). In his interpretation the conflict was merely between Christianity and science, whereas Islam and science were in complete harmony. As Yalçınkaya argues this translation had a lot to do with politics, as it ‘became a work that legitimized the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit II by proving the superiority of Islam over Christianity.’<sup>118</sup> Ultimately, Yalçınkaya concludes, it was part of the effort at ‘creating the new Ottoman individual’ through the image of hardworking, frugal, and obedient individual as depicted in many of Ahmet Mithat’s

---

<sup>116</sup> Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Beşir Fuad*, transliterated by N. Ahmet Özalp, pp. 59 and 65.

<sup>117</sup> ‘Ya bu netice-i müdhişe ve faciadan dolayı mesul kimdir? Hiç şüphe yok ki o hikmet-i batıla! Öyleyse, materyalizm denilen hikmet-i maddiyeye, yine maddi bir bürhan-ı ibtal olmak üzere, bu su-i akıbetten başka bir şey aramak lazım gelir mi?’ Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>118</sup> M. Alper Yalçınkaya, ‘Science as an Ally of Religion: A Muslim appropriation of the “conflict thesis”’, *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 44/02 (2011), p. 163.

novels.<sup>119</sup>

J. W. Draper's *History of Conflict between Religion of Science*, a masterpiece of the 'conflict thesis', saw frequent use in the early historiographies of science written in the heyday of the evolution debate. Recent historiography has come to a more dynamic and sophisticated understanding of the changing relationship between science and religion, going beyond a single crude narrative of power struggle or harmony. In particular historians of the British case, the geographical heart of the evolution debate, offer a dynamic view of this debate. Young, for example, insists that any one-dimensional model, be it conflict, cooperation, or coexistence, obscures the complexity of this relationship, in which science and religion are inseparable aspects of the same context.<sup>120</sup> In a more recent example Bowler depicts a more dynamic, changing relationship. Ultimately each model – conflict, co-existence, and cooperation, mainly as 'three chief modes of relationship' – needs to be seen as 'the strategy of a particular interest group' with certain followers and investments.<sup>121</sup>

Unfortunately our understanding of the relations between science and religion in the late Ottoman Empire is far from complete. Influenced by the modernization paradigm, the secondary literature tends to take a conflictual relationship between science and religion for granted at times. The modernization paradigm is based on a unified thread of development in a linear and progressive fashion from 'traditional to modern societies', with a rigid separation between science and religion as well as the material and spiritual spheres.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Young, *Darwin's Metaphor*.

<sup>121</sup> Peter J. Bowler, *Reconciling Science and Religion: The debate in early twentieth century Britain* (Chicago, 2001), p. 8.

<sup>122</sup> Bernard Lewis's book *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (1968) is one of the earliest and the most criticized examples of modernization paradigm and continuity argument. In this work he presents a linear modernization process relying on dichotomies between science and religion, tradition and modernity. This classical approach was, to a large extent, adopted by eminent scholars whose seminal works have shaped young scholars' interests.

Discussion in recent historiography of science has come to a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between science and religion in the late Ottoman Empire. Calling into question the modernization paradigm's supposition of an allegedly conflictual relationship, it has drawn attention to the 'Islam as science-friendly' argument. In response to Ernest Renan's famous lecture 'Islam and Science' (1883), presenting Islam as an obstacle to progress, the 'Islam as science-friendly' argument was developed by 'Muslim' scholars such as Cemaleddin Afghani (1838-1897) and Namık Kemal. Praising the times when the Islamic world was 'the centre' of scientific development and presenting it as compatible with science became common strategies for intellectuals to cope with the discourses of underdevelopment in the then Muslim territories – including the Ottoman Empire – and to make connections with the cumulative history of scientific achievements.<sup>123</sup> It was within this framework that Yalçinkaya approached Ahmet Mithat's liberal translation of John Draper, as one example among many, wherein the conflict thesis between Christianity and science was transformed into a model of 'harmony between Islam and science' in the process of being translated into Ottoman. Given the widespread presence of the 'Islam as science-friendly' argument, I would draw attention to the limitations of the widespread accusations of anti-religiousness directed at materialism, evolutionism, and positivism in the late Ottoman Empire. Ahmet Mithat's efforts at the reconciliation of science and religion, which run alongside a strong resistance to materialism, epitomize the boundaries of expression of materialist and anti-Islamic remarks as set by the hegemonic discourses of science determined largely by the state – whose influence was very much evident on the long-lasting debate about materialism and spiritualism in the Ottoman Empire up until the collapse.

---

<sup>123</sup> Yalçinkaya, 'Science as an Ally of Religion', p. 178.

The term materialism (*maddiyyun mezhebi*) was often used carelessly by its detractors as a pejorative term, corresponding to atheism irrespective of the actual relevance to the major pillars of materialist thought. In the Ottoman case this refers to the ‘disciplinary use’ of the term ‘materialist’ for marking the tacit boundaries of scientific activity.<sup>124</sup> The example of Hoca Tahsin is a case in point. His air experiment causing the death of a pigeon, his evolutionist publication *Tarih-i Tekvin Yahut Hilkat* (The history of human existence or creation), and his medical approach to psychology set out in *Psiholoji yahut İlm-i Ruh* (Psychology) called his religious faith into question for his contemporaries as well as in the secondary literature. Yet he repeatedly expressed his faith: ‘In fact I comprehend God Almighty better than those who are against me. Because I obey him with comprehension.’<sup>125</sup> The secondary literature has tended to interpret the prevalence of the use of the term ‘materialist’ for derogatory purposes as a hint at the large number of ‘secret materialists’ among men of science, an interpretation that is hard to refute or support as it lacks historical evidence and involves mind reading. I tend however to take these as signs of strong impediments to the development and spread of a solid, openly expressed materialist identity among Ottoman intellectuals. Within these limits Beşir Fuad, for example, shied away from clearly expressing his devotion to materialism. He once depicted himself as ‘a lover of science’: ‘If I am to be labelled, call me a lover of science, hence it fits’.<sup>126</sup> In his long suicide letter he claimed his philosophical stance was obvious to his friends and which Ahmet Mithat had interpreted as materialism, although he himself did not openly express it – another sign of self-censoring practice, even on the

---

<sup>124</sup> Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*, p. 179.

<sup>125</sup> For an overview of Hoca Tahsin’s take on religion and the secondary literature on the subject: Şeyma Turan, ‘Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları: (1869-1900)’ (MA thesis, Marmara University, 2010), p. 29.

<sup>126</sup> ‘Bana mutlak ünvan vermek istiyorsanız “bilim dostu” deyiniz ki uygun olsun. Kendimce bu ünvan her türlü övünmeye değerdir.’ in Parkan Özturan, ed., *İlk Türk Materyalisti Beşir Fuad’ın Mektupları* (Istanbul, 1989), p. 27.

death bed. Instead he, together with Baha Tevfik, seldom referred to Islam as a source of legitimation in his narratives, even though they were deemed in the secondary literature to be pure materialists with strong reactions against Islam. These limitations are important to remember the contextual differences between the ‘Ottoman materialists’ and early Republican ruling elite with respect to secularism.

Due to such limitations, I argue, the religious and ideological side of the debate between materialism and spiritualism has remained dry, limited, and agenda-oriented. Within these limitations, however, intellectuals carried out a rather richer discussion about human nature, which I see as akin to the disenchantment of the world in which these intellectuals lived. Whether the soul was constituted of matter, whether there was a connection between the brain and the soul, whether there was such a thing as free will, whether passions and emotions were to be suppressed, were the questions anyone faced when dealing with scientific views of man in the post-Darwinian world. Ahmet Mithat was not the only one who found answers in psychology and brain physiology, as he delved into in *Ben Neyim?*.<sup>127</sup> The entrance of modern psychology into the Ottoman Empire was very much indebted to the debate between materialism and spiritualism, as in many other countries – although perhaps within much less strict boundaries. And he was not the only one who saw the tension as revolving around the ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’ metaphors. What he was opposed to in *Ben Neyim?* was reducing the soul to a product of the body machine (‘the life of the soul is a product of the functions of the body machine’<sup>128</sup>) and reducing human beings to a pack, a gang of dogs.<sup>129</sup>

---

<sup>127</sup> Ahmet Mithat, *Ben Neyim? Hikmet-i Maddiyeye Müdafaa*, pp. 66-122.

<sup>128</sup> ‘Ruh Nedir? Nereden Gelir? Vücudunuzu teşkil eden o masnu makinenin işlemlerinden ibaret bulunan ve hayat denilen şeyin kâfe-i melekâtıyla zahirde tecelli hükmünden ibaret.’ Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

## The Secondary Literature and Portraits of Individual Thinkers

The foundational basis of a broader narrative on the history of psychology, history of emotions, debates on human nature and the soul has not been produced yet. However there is a rich literature on the history of ideas, history of philosophy and intellectual history in the late Ottoman Empire to be able to follow the entrance of modern psychology into the Ottoman Empire. Even though the history of ideas and Ottoman intellectual history seem to have fallen from grace, leading scholars have produced seminal works on the subject. Hilmi Ziya Ülken's *Türk Tefekkür Tarihi* (The History of Turkish Thought) published in 1933-34 as a high school and university textbook, is a magnum opus, which has not been surpassed.<sup>130</sup> There is an important literature on the history of ideas and philosophy in the late Ottoman Empire, which this thesis is indebted to.<sup>131</sup> Thanks to this literature, essential knowledge of arguments, and masterpieces of materialist and spiritualist thoughts are known to us. However it is important to remember that some of this literature was developed in the late 1960s in schools of theology therefore is imbued with certain agendas such as nationalism, and religious conservatism. These have at times turned the topic into a battleground where almost a fight against materialism in defence of Islamic theology and/or 'Turco-Islamic' culture has taken place.<sup>132</sup> By the same token alleged dichotomies between

---

<sup>130</sup> Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (İstanbul, 1992).

<sup>131</sup> See for example Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Türkiye'de Ruhçu ve Maddeci Görüşün Mücadelesi* (İstanbul, 1967), Mehmet Akgün, *Materyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (Ankara, 1988), Remzi Demir, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Türk Felsefesi: Philosophia Ottomanica: Eski Felsefe* (Ankara, 2005), Rahmi Karakuş, *Felsefe Serüvenimiz*, (İstanbul, 1995), Mustafa Korlaelçi, *Pozitivizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, (İstanbul, 2003), Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Osmanlı Düşünce Dünyası* (Ankara, 2011), Neşet Tok, *Türkiye'de Antimateryalist Felsefe (Spiritüalizm), İlk Temsilciler* (İstanbul, 1996).

<sup>132</sup> By limiting this discussion to the bifurcation of 'Ottoman spiritualists' as defenders of Turco-Islamic values, and 'Ottoman materialists' as their intrinsic enemies – or alternatively as carriers of Westernization/modernization – this literature occludes the complex arguments themselves, and ignores the major global scientific and technological changes to which these intellectuals were being exposed. See for example Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Türkiye'de Ruhçu ve Maddeci Görüşün Mücadelesi* (İstanbul, 1967). This book is based on Bolay's thesis for a master's degree at Theology School, Ankara University. Nationalist and religious agendas have either explicitly or implicitly presented materialism as a corruption of cultural, nationalist, and religious values. Bolay starts with Muslim theologian and

Islam and science or tradition and modernity, have at times been taken for granted with no interest in the differences among the ‘materialists’ or ‘spiritualists’ vis-à-vis Islam, or in materialism’s role in the process of popularization of science in the Ottoman Empire or indeed in the wider world.

From the 1980s onwards, Şükrü Hanioglu has immensely contributed to the field by providing the debate about materialism with an analytical framework in relation to Ottoman modernization. Hanioglu first contributed to this literature with his PhD thesis *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Doctor Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker and His Times) which was published in 1981.<sup>133</sup> Hanioglu has, furthermore, opened up a new discussion regarding Ottoman intellectuals’ approaches towards the relations between modernization and religion. He, in his more recent articles “*Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic*” and “*Blueprints for a Future Society Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion and Art*,”<sup>134</sup> has emphasized the importance of ‘Ottoman Materialism’ in the development of official ideology and secularism in Turkey; and drew links between these two.

Religion needless to say is at the heart of the debate between materialism and

---

philosopher Ibn Arabi’s proverb: ‘The worshippers of the matter are similar with those who drink the sea water. The more they drink, the thirstier they feel’. He continues with expressing his concerns about the ‘side affects of antireligious trends such as socialism, materialism and positivism’. Bolay, *Türkiye’de Ruhçu Maddeci Görüşün Mücadelesi*, p. 6. *Pozitivizmin Kıskaçında Türkiye* (In the Clutches of Positivism), as one of the very few books on the influence of positivism in Turkey written by Erol Özbilgin in 1994, portrays that the tone would often be so value loaded and one sided when writing about materialism, positivism and Darwinism. Although Özbilgin as a doctor of history provides a good introductory book on the entrance of positivism to Turkey, keeping equal distance to historical subjects therefore objectivity does not seem as his main concern. Materialism, similar to other ‘dangerous subjects’ such as Positivism and Darwinism, has been considered as a threat to Turco-Islamic culture. The secondary literature on the subject was and has still been constrained by certain agendas such as nationalism, and religious conservatism which have at times turned the topic into a battle ground where almost a fight against materialism in defence of Islamic theology and/or ‘Turco-Islamic’ culture has taken place. Erol Özbilgin, *Pozitivizmin Kıskaçında Türkiye* (Istanbul, 1994).

<sup>133</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1981).

<sup>134</sup> Şükrü Hanioglu, ‘Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic’, *Studia Islamica*, 86 (1977), pp.133-158; “Blueprints for a Future Society, Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion and Art”, (ed. Özdalga, E.) *Late Ottoman Society, The Intellectual Legacy*, (Newyork, 2005) pp.28-116.

spiritualism. Accordingly it has been the primary concern of the secondary literature in approaching materialist and spiritualist writings in the Ottoman Empire. Yet this thesis aims to show that there was more to it. In the global context the debate between materialism and spiritualism was tightly linked to new scientific conceptualizations of human nature and the birth of modern psychology in the post-Darwinian context, as much as it was linked to religious thought. Infact when psychology went through a period of transition from the house of metaphysics to the team of sciences from the 1870s onwards, a new set of questions about human nature surfaced outside the field of religious thought. Therefore in an attempt to fill the void in the secondary literature, to show that religion was not the only concern of intellectuals in dealing with the debate between materialism and spiritualism, and to remain loyal to intellectual's intention to do 'scientific' psychology, this thesis keeps a tight focus on the subject of psychology and gives much less weight to the role of religion therein.<sup>135</sup>

In an attempt to go beyond the dichotomous thinking, this thesis takes a biographical approach and focuses on Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik as materialists, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and Mustafa Şekip Tunç as spiritualists. In doing so it aims to develop a new look at intellectuals' contributions to the debate between materialism and spiritualism and keeps a tight focus on their contributions to the foundation of modern psychology in the late Ottoman era. Luckily there is a great deal of biographical work on these thinkers, which provides this thesis with a foundation.<sup>136</sup>

Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) has been assigned a key bridging role in the historiography of the modernization paradigm and the continuity thesis. Born in Arapkir to a family of Kurdish origin, and joining the *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye* in

---

<sup>135</sup> A complete understanding of the conceptual transformation of the notions of the soul, will and emotions would necessitates factoring in the role of religion, as should be done so in a future project.

<sup>136</sup> See for example Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet*, Rıza Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı Üzerine Edebi ve Felsefi Bir Araştırma* (Izmir, 1996), Zekeriya Uludağ, *Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi ve Spiritüalizm* (Ankara, 1996).

Istanbul in 1889, Abdullah Cevdet was a prolific Ottoman intellectual, medical doctor, poet, and translator. He published over 72 books and edited a journal *İctihad* (Reinterpretation) for 28 years (1904-1932).<sup>137</sup> His writings contributed to the late Ottoman intellectual milieu by pushing the boundaries of one-dimensional and dichotomous thinking on science and religion, as well as modernity and tradition, which has called his sincerity into question in modern eyes. Şerif Mardin's thick and thorough chapter on Abdullah Cevdet in *Political Thoughts of the Young Turks* (1964) constituted the base of later scholarship. In this chapter Abdullah Cevdet primarily appears as a social doctor – a term Abdullah Cevdet himself coined – who gave some thought to the makings of a social transformation through education with a reductionist view of society inherited from biological materialism.<sup>138</sup> Abdullah Cevdet indeed represents the typology of medical school graduates whose firm belief in science overran into active support for modernization and participation in politics.<sup>139</sup> His founding of the *İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti* (Committee of Ottoman Union) – the nucleus of the *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress – CUP), a major opposition group to the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) – in 1889, together with his medical school friends İbrahim Temo, İshak Sükûti, Hikmet Emin, and Mehmed Reşid, gives him an important place in political history.<sup>140</sup>

The birth of the CUP movement from the ashes of biological materialism under the roof of *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* (Imperial medical school) provides the secondary literature on Ottoman political history, secularism, and Westernization with

---

<sup>137</sup> For a list of Abdullah Cevdet's publications and biographical information: Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1981), pp. 415-19.

<sup>138</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, pp. 225-54.

<sup>139</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York, 1995), pp. 18-23; Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, p. 23.

<sup>140</sup> For more information on the Young Turks: M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford, 2001); Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969).

a poetic opening story.<sup>141</sup> The medical sciences indeed gave physicians an authority to profess on social issues in the late Ottoman Empire, problematize them, and approach society as a patient to be cured.<sup>142</sup> Şerif Mardin delves into the concept of the ‘social doctor’ and refers to the spread of a medical approach to society among men of medicine.<sup>143</sup> Furthermore Şükrü Hanioglu extends our knowledge on the intellectual climate at the medical academy and makes important efforts to reveal the sources of biological materialism in the late Ottoman Empire. *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Dr Abdullah Cevdet, as a political thinker and his era) and *Blueprints of a Future Society* trace the sources of biological materialism, such as Feuerbach’s biological materialism followed by Büchner.

Politics and religious ideology are the main focus of Hanioglu’s interpretation of Abdullah Cevdet, which was developed when the modernization paradigm was the common current in historiography and the alleged clash between Islam and science was taken for granted. This leads to a degree of inconsistency in approaching Abdullah Cevdet’s synthesis between Islam and science. In his *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* Hanioglu treats Abdullah Cevdet’s synthesis between Islam and materialism as a strategic and agenda-oriented move ‘with a stipulation of making use of Islam only’.<sup>144</sup> This interpretation has fuelled a long

---

<sup>141</sup> One of the first studies on Abdullah Cevdet approaches his thought as a nucleus of Kemalist ideology: Frank W. Creel, ‘The Program and Ideology of Dr. Abdullah Cevdet: a study of the origins of Kemalism in Turkey’ (PhD thesis, The University of Chicago, 1978); One of the most frequently cited examples in support of this argument belong to a conversation between Abdullah Cevdet and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Following the Kemalist Revolution, Abdullah Cevdet was invited by Atatürk for a visit. Later on Abdullah Cevdet reported that Atatürk told him: ‘Doctor, until now you have written about many things. Now we may bring them to realization.’ Cited in M. Şükrü Hanioglu, ‘Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic’, *Studia Islamica*, 86 (1977), p. 147.

<sup>142</sup> According to Salgırlı ‘social doctor’ typology became more visible in the early Republican era: Sanem Güvenç Salgırlı, ‘Eugenics as Science of the Social: A case from 1930s Istanbul’ (PhD thesis, Binghamton University, 2009), pp. 12-64.

<sup>143</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, pp. 9-23.

<sup>144</sup> ‘İslamiyetten daima bir araç olarak yararlanmak şartıyla’, in Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, p. 139. Here Islam appears as a tool for social progress and

discussion about whether or not Abdullah Cevdet's synthesis of Islam and materialism was genuine, which I find inconclusive.<sup>145</sup> This question, however, determines how we treat the end product. It begs the further question of whether or not Abdullah Cevdet's synthesis of Islam and materialism is to be treated as part of the 'Islam as science-friendly' argument. In an effort to contextualize Abdullah Cevdet's formula, Hanioglu draws attention in *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* to the influence of Egyptian religious scholar and liberal reformer Mahmud Abduh's synthesis of Islam and science, an interpretation I endorse.<sup>146</sup> Yet in *Blueprints* – in which he studies the materialist writings of Abdullah Cevdet, Beşir Fuad, and Baha Tevfik – he treats the synthesis of materialism and Islam differently:

These thinkers imagined a future society founded upon a modern and scientific religion independent of divinely imposed obligation or sanction. Their various attempts to unite science with Islam could easily be mistaken at first glance for Islamist arguments in favour of the reconcilability of Islam and modern science. Thus it is by no means a coincidence that many reviewers of Ottoman materialist journals erroneously took them to be Islamist organs 'merely defending the interests of Islam'. But in fact, Ottoman materialists and Ottoman Islamists were approaching the problem from opposite orientations, and their prescriptions bear little resemblance to each other.<sup>147</sup>

Unfortunately Hanioglu here does not explain why they were approaching the problem from opposite orientations, even though it would be vital for coming to grips with the role of Islam in science writing if they were. Central to my questioning is to put the emphasis on Abdullah Cevdet's efforts to reconcile Islam and science – which in my interpretation exemplifies the influence of the 'Islam as science-friendly' argument in engendering syncretic thought, contrary to the dichotomous thinking of

---

political opposition (bir toplumsal ilerleme ve siyasi muhalefet aracı), in Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, p. 129.

<sup>145</sup> Cemil Meriç's critical review of Hanioglu's PhD thesis sparked a long discussion. In 2005 this discussion reached its zenith with nationalist and conservative wings' demands for the change of the street named after Abdullah Cevdet. For a summary: Tanıl Bora, 'Cemil Meriç: Tutarsızlığın Verimi', *Hece*, 157/1 (2010), pp. 179-90.

<sup>146</sup> Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, p. 137.

<sup>147</sup> Hanioglu, 'Blueprints for a Future Society', pp. 27-8.

the modernization paradigm.<sup>148</sup>

This dissertation is rather concerned with Abdullah Cevdet's contributions to the dissemination of scientific views of man. Accordingly, chapter two studies Abdullah Cevdet's materialist writings on the brain through the latest popular scientific trends in his time such as biological materialism and evolutionism – an area which has been considered to be 'instrumental to alleged ulterior political and ideological purposes', and hence overshadowed by the secondary literature. In delving into the dissemination of scientific views of man through these trends, this dissertation focuses in chapter four on Baha Tevfik as a second materialist figure. Baha Tevfik's scientific writings have not been considered to be primarily politically driven, therefore freed the meaning of 'science loving' from the tutelage of political realm. In the Second Constitutional Era, when Abdullah Cevdet's interest departed from biological materialism to more societal issues, it was Baha Tevfik who carried the flag of scientific truth. His use of materialism shows us that materialism was a part of a package of scientific tools for making sense of human nature and the world, including evolutionism, and, for some Ottoman intellectuals, monism. It was a popular and weighty subject in and of itself with no need for further ulterior motives.

Literary critique, writer, poet, intellectual, and philosophy schoolteacher, Baha

---

<sup>148</sup> The limits of syncretic thought in Abdullah Cevdet's formula however went as far as to publish *Tarih-i İslamiyet*, a translation of Reinhart Dozy's *Het Islamisme (Islamism)* wherein the prophet is depicted as mentally deranged. This book as expected caused serious reactions. It laid the foundations of accusations against Abdullah Cevdet of counterfeiting and being dishonest in making favorable comments about Islam for example by praising and publicizing Rumi very often. See Reinhardt Dozy, *Tarih-i İslamiyet*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Mısır, 1908), Abdullah Cevdet, *Dilmestî-i Mevlana ve Gazali'de Ma'rifetullah: Ruba'iyat-ı Gazali, Urfi'de Şiir ve İrfan* (Istanbul, 1921). For more information on the repercussions of Abdullah Cevdet's translation of *Tarih-i İslamiyet*: Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, pp. 325-30. It is indeed puzzling to have both works as part of the same list of publications by the same author. Abdullah Cevdet however repeatedly expressed his sincerity about his praisal of 'true' Islam, which in my interpretation shows the wide range of syncretic thought and his very liberal interpretation of Islam. See for example: Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, pp. 139-40.

Tevfik (1884-1914) was one of the most ardent supporters of materialism, monism, and evolutionism, and according to Hanioglu held the most sophisticated understanding of materialism and philosophy in the late Ottoman Empire.<sup>149</sup> Baha Tevfik was born in 1884 in Izmir. Following the 1908 Revolution he moved to Istanbul.<sup>150</sup> Together with his close friend Ahmed Nebil he founded the *Teceddüd-i İlmi ve Felsefi Kütüphanesi* (Library of scientific and philosophical renovation).<sup>151</sup> This publishing house soon became a venue for men of science such as Baha Tevfik, Suphi Ethem, Memduh Süleyman, and Ahmed Nebil to come together and publicize evolutionism much more extensively in the relatively freer atmosphere of the Second Constitutional Era. In a very short time he publicized eleven books from a range of disciplines such as literature, philosophy, science, and psychology, which he considered to be closely interrelated. His corpus reminds us that the ‘Ottoman materialists’ were not homogenous in their political and social views, nor was there one single version of materialism in the world. Drawing on this difference and on Hanioglu’s nuanced understanding, I would rather present Baha Tevfik as a contributor to the worldwide process of the popularization of science through materialism, monism, and evolutionism.

The subject of spiritualism has been equally affected by the modernization paradigm, through the efforts at reducing distress in the face of scientific determinism to ‘Islamism’. ‘*Islamist*’ is a problematic term, scrutinized by İsmail Kara in the 1980s when the modernization paradigm was the common current.<sup>152</sup> In his later studies he

---

<sup>149</sup> Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a Future Society’, p. 65.

<sup>150</sup> For an extended version of Baha Tevfik’s biography: Rıza Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı Edebi ve Felsefi Eserleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Izmir, 1996), pp. 11-38.

<sup>151</sup> Even though some sources doubted whether Ahmed Nebil was only a penname for Baha Tevfik or a real person, there is enough evidence to prove that he was a real person and a good friend of Baha Tevfik: Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı*, pp. 143-146 and 221-3.

<sup>152</sup> For Kara’s understanding of ‘Islamist’ thought and a list of thinkers whom he deemed to be Islamists: İsmail Kara, ed., *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler, Kişiler* (Istanbul, 1986).

draws attention to the distress which the dissemination of positivist, materialist, evolutionist, and scientist trends (advocated by Baha Tevfik in the 1910s) caused among a group of intellectuals such as Babanzade Ahmed Naim (1872-1934), Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır (1878-1942), İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1869-1946), Mehmet Ali Ayni (1868-1945), and Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi (1862/63-1914), whom he groups together as ‘Islamists’ due to their religiosity.<sup>153</sup> However, as Karakuş argues, these intellectuals did not share a homogenous understanding of Islam. On the contrary, they disagreed with one another on the tenets of Islamic theology and philosophy.<sup>154</sup> As Kara also maintains, their writings actually bear the stamps of their time period, and thus should be historicized, instead of being treated as espousing the essential pillars of Islamic theology and culture.<sup>155</sup> Hence the clear need to revisit the term ‘Islamist’ – and to use it very carefully – when studying their philosophical writings. By the same token, reducing a whole literature of anti-materialism to religiously grounded reactions would be simplistic, inward-looking, and oblivious to the rise of problematizations of scientific determinism on a global scale.

Drawing on the popularity of the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument, revisionist historiography reveals a number of cases wherein ‘Muslim’ intellectuals gave full support to the dissemination of scientific ideas and modernization in their own ways. Sait Özervarlı’s study on İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Amid Bein’s study on Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, and Serdar Poyraz’s PhD thesis draw attention to the efforts of those who were labelled Islamists at creating syntheses between Islam and science, as

---

<sup>153</sup> Kara draws on ‘Islamists’ writings in *Sebilürreşad*, a journal that served as a platform for intellectuals with religious concerns, and translations. In *Sebilürreşad* the opening remark of a series of philosophy articles presented ‘positivist, materialist, evolutionist and scientist’ trends as harmful ideologies which readers needed to be warned about. According to Kara, given that the consensus as to the need to appropriate Western science and philosophy to make progress had already been reached, these intellectuals engaged in an effort to ‘civilize and develop [the Ottoman Empire] without losing religious values’. İsmail Kara, *Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak* (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 28-32.

<sup>154</sup> Rahmi Karakuş, *Darülfünun’dan Üniversite’ye Türkiye’de Felsefe* (Istanbul, 2003), p. 47.

<sup>155</sup> İsmail Kara, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında* (Istanbul, 2003), p. 53.

well as modernity and tradition.<sup>156</sup> As this literature reveals, reactions to materialism, positivism, and evolutionism did not necessarily take an Islamic tone. Neither did they stem from religious concerns only.

It is indeed important to include intellectuals with religious concerns within scientific circles and to consider alternative intellectual interpretations in relating to scientific and modernist discourses. Contributing to the revisionist literature, I would draw attention to the state support and investment for the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument and criticisms of materialism, rather than taking intellectuals as free-floating independent entities with religious concerns. There is enough evidence to show that the *Darülfünun* (today’s Istanbul University) also made a systematic effort to publish and teach psychology and philosophy books with a critical approach to scientific determinism during the Second Constitutional Era. With this in mind, chapter three studies Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s synthesis of psychology and spiritualism, since his anti-materialist publications were mostly interpreted as religiously grounded. Instead, it presents him as a *Darülfünun* member who was integrated into global anti-western and anti-scientist discourses and was concerned about the loss of human mystery in the face of scientific determinism. Factoring in the state’s role would help us see the disproportionately powerful position of anti-materialists circles vis-à-vis materialists,

---

<sup>156</sup> According to Özervarlı, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, the author of a new Islamic theology book with a novel understanding, problematized both cultural Westernization and religious conservative traditionalism, thus promoted a middle way: M. Sait Özervarlı, ‘Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’s Religious Thought Against Material Scientism’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39 (2007), pp.77-102; Amit Bein puts the accent on an influential late Ottoman intellectual and a spiritualist, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, who despite being a part of modernization movement on his own way, advocated that Islamic tradition should most certainly be preserved: Amit Bein, ‘A “Young Turk” Islamic Intellectual: Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and the Diverse Intellectual Legacies of the Late Ottoman Empire’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39 (2007), pp: 607-25; Similarly Serdar Poyraz maintains that ‘... the discussion among the intellectuals of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods was not about “modernity” on the one hand versus “tradition” on the other. It was about the proper strategy for the appropriation of modernity in a non-European setting.’ Poyraz, ‘Science versus Religion’, p. 104.

while not reducing Ahmed Hilmi's problematization of scientific determinism to religiously grounded reaction alone.

Ahmed Hilmi, also known as Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi (1862/63-1914), was an Ottoman intellectual who was simultaneously critical of materialism, the anti-religious tendency of his time, and the religious establishment, which 'Islamist' as an identity cannot capture.<sup>157</sup> He worked briefly in Istanbul and then in İzmir at the Post Office. After that he went to Beirut to take up an unknown government post and then returned to İstanbul in 1901. He was very critical of the Hamidian regime, which brought him together with the Young Turks. He did not shy away from responding to the myriad changes in the political regime and supporting oppositional movements through his writings, which led him to be exiled several times.<sup>158</sup> Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he returned to Istanbul where he started publishing his weekly magazine *Hikmet* (Philosophy/Wisdom) in 1910, and died in 1914.<sup>159</sup> In his writings he mainly emphasized the importance of benefiting from science, religion, and philosophy altogether, as he saw them as complementary and vital.<sup>160</sup> His most famous refutation of materialism, *Huzur-ı Akl-ı Fende*

---

<sup>157</sup> Even though Ahmed Hilmi's year of birth appears as 1865 in some of the secondary literature, Ekici by his extensive use of archival material, corrects this mistake: Mehmet Zeki Ekici, 'II. Meşrutiyet Devri Fikir Adamı Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Hayatı ve Eserleri' (PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 1997), p. 23. For more information on Ahmed Hilmi's biography and contributions to spiritualism: Zekeriyya Uludağ, *Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi ve Spiritüalizm* (Ankara, 1996).

<sup>158</sup> He is also known as Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi as he acquired the names Filibeli (from Filibe) and Şehbenderzade (the son of a consul). Due to limited archival material, there is confusion about certain important parts of his biography such as his educational background and government posts. Yet Ekici makes a thorough study on his biography: *ibid.*, pp. 21-52.

<sup>159</sup> Ahmed Hilmi's journal *Hikmet* was published as a weekly between 21 April 1910 and 28 September 1912 for 77 issues. For a selection of articles published in *Hikmet*: Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, transliterated by Ahmet Koçak (Istanbul, 2005).

<sup>160</sup> His work *Üss-i İslam* captures his take on the relations between science, philosophy and religion the best: 'Science, philosophy and religion satisfies three main needs of humans. The first one satisfies their curiosity and helps them earn a living. The second nourishes their minds and the third nourishes their souls and the hearts. Denial of any of these needs would be a sign of sickness and going astray caused by the negligence of the needs of human nature.' The original goes as follows: 'Fen, felsefe ve din beşeriyeti müftekir kılan üç nev ihtiyaçtır ki birincisi ile maişet ve merakını, ikinci ile aklını ve üçüncü ile ruh ve kalbini gıdalandırır. Bunlardan birini inkar fitrat-ı beşerin ihtiyacını anlamamaktan mütehasıl bir dalalet, bir marazdır.' Ahmed Hilmi, *Üss-i İslam* (Istanbul, 1332/1914), p. 11. For Ahmed Hilmi's

*Maddiyyun Meslek-i Dalaleti* (Materialism, as a fallacious school of thought from the point of science and reason) <sup>161</sup> was written against Celal Nuri's favourable commentary on Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* and Nuri's promotion of scientific determinism. <sup>162</sup>

In detailing our understanding of the interplay between spiritualism and psychology under the roof of the *Darülfünun*, the fifth chapter studies Mustafa Şekip Tunç's amalgamation of Bergsonian spiritualism and psychology. In doing so it aims to show a degree of continuity in the symbiosis between spiritualism and psychology at the *Darülfünun*. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1886-1958), an intellectual, academician, journal writer, and painter, was one of the first intellectuals to receive an education in psychology abroad and was one of the founding fathers of the discipline. Born in Istanbul in 1886 to a bureaucrat family, a graduate from the civil school in 1908, Tunç took up government posts in Üsküp and Kosova. Psychology and teaching were his passions and he did not find the civil posts he was doing enjoyable and fulfilling. <sup>163</sup> In 1912 he made his appearance in psychological studies in the magazine *Yeni Mektep* (New school) with journal articles about psychology and an intellectual dispute about the definition of intelligence with Mustafa Satı Bey (1880-1969), a leading intellectual who was already known as one of the founders of pedagogical studies in the Ottoman Empire. <sup>164</sup> Shortly after leaving his civil service career, he went to Geneva on a government scholarship to study psychological sciences at the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute. In 1919, when he returned to the Ottoman Empire, he started working as a

---

understanding of 'multilayered' truth (*hakikat*) comprising three of them: Poyraz, 'Science versus Religion', pp. 127-61.

<sup>161</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *Huzur-ı Akl-ı Fende Maddiyyun Meslek-i Dalaleti*, transliterated by Sadık Albayrak (Istanbul, 1974).

<sup>162</sup> Celal Nuri, *Tarih-i İstikbal* (Istanbul, 1915).

<sup>163</sup> For more information: Hayrani Altıntaş, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç* (Ankara, 1989), pp. 1-11; Yakup Yıldız, 'Mustafa Şekip Tunç ve Felsefi Görüşleri' (PhD thesis, Marmara University, 2010).

<sup>164</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, p. 179.

tutor in psychological studies at the *Darülfünun*, which was going through a transformation in order to adapt to changing educational standards. He immersed himself in the cultural and intellectual life of Istanbul under the British occupation and he came together with leading members of the Ottoman literati at taverns and coffee houses in Istanbul. These gatherings gave birth to a new magazine, *Dergah* (The lodge), on which this thesis concentrates, rather than the later part of his life in the early Republican era.<sup>165</sup> Tunç translated into Ottoman Turkish more recent psychological literature by Théodule-Armand Ribot, William James (1842-1910), Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), and Henri Bergson, in addition to writing a number of psychology textbooks with a more up-to-date view of psychology. These were accompanied by a number of journal articles – mixing psychology, spiritualism, and philosophy with political and social affairs.<sup>166</sup> His dispute with Ziya Gökalp was the last notable psychological discussion before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and gave psychology a role in theorizing the concept of individual vis-à-vis collective interests.

Over the course of the Republican revolutions, Tunç kept his distance from active politics and maintained his post at the *Darülfünun* when the university went through a reform in 1933. He continued to publicize Bergson and psychology until his death in 1958 in Istanbul. At the heart of late Ottoman as well as early Republican intellectual life, Tunç continued bringing psychological and philosophical subjects to intellectuals' attentions and updated them with contemporary discussions on these in the early Republican era as well. One important analytical framework for reading Tunç's early writings on Henri Bergson is 'Political Bergsonism', developed by Nazım

---

<sup>165</sup> *Dergah* was published between 15 April 1921 and 5 January 1923 every other week and had 42 issues in total.

<sup>166</sup> For a list of Tunç's publications: Altıntaş, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç*, pp. 11-23.

İrem as a nucleus of what he interpreted as an ‘alternative Kemalism’.<sup>167</sup>

This thesis presents Tunç’s use of Bergsonian spiritualism as the last phase of an ongoing discussion about materialism and spiritualism in defining man in a natural flow – rather than the dawn of an ‘alternative Kemalism’ in a different political setting. In doing so it depicts a degree of continuation between Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and Mustafa Şekip Tunç in problematizing scientific views of man under the roof of the *Darülfünun* in the 1910s and 1920s – two thinkers who did not share a similar basis in religion.<sup>168</sup> In the mainstream historiography Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s spiritualism has been categorized as religiously oriented; Mustafa Şekip Tunç has been categorized as a Bergsonian spiritualist whose spiritualism was by no means motivated by religion. Instead I would rather present them as *Darülfünun* professors and Istanbul intellectuals who followed the symbiosis between spiritualism and psychology despite the differences in their stances on religion. Focusing on the *Darülfünun* would add an institutional dimension to the dissemination of spiritualism and perhaps be a less loaded way of ‘indicating the continuity and change of approaches by providing an overall picture of intellectual movements and tendencies with their impact on Istanbul as the central cultural city, without generalizing the issues’, as Özerverlı suggests.<sup>169</sup>

Here ‘encyclopaedism’ comes in handy as a term, coined by Mardin, used in depicting intellectuals’ efforts to introduce a variety of topics to the masses via

---

<sup>167</sup> Nazım İrem, ‘Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism’ (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, 1996); ‘Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34/1 (2002), pp. 87-112; ‘Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40/4 (2004), pp. 79-112; ‘Bergson and Politics: Ottoman Turkish Encounters with Innovation’, *The European Legacy*, 16/7 (2011), pp. 873-82. This literature will be discussed in detail in chapter five.

<sup>168</sup> The continuity between Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç was first mentioned by Hilmi Ziya Ülken in a short piece about Mustafa Şekip Tunç with a focus on the difference they had in their approaches to religion. This is important to remember. But it starts a long discussion as to whether or not religion or anti-scientism ignited their interest in spiritualism and problematization of materialism. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, ‘Artist Mustafa Şekip’, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç Jübilesi* (Istanbul, 1944), quoted in Altıntaş *Mustafa Şekip Tunç*, pp. 102-8.

<sup>169</sup> M. Sait Özerverlı, ‘Intellectual Foundations and Transformations in an Imperial City: Istanbul from the late Ottoman to the Early Republican Periods’, *The Muslim World*, 103 (2013), p. 534.

publications similar to encyclopaedia entries.<sup>170</sup> Accordingly I would propose thinking of these four intellectuals as often-provocative ‘Ottoman encyclopaedists’ flirting with a large range of intellectual sources – be it biological materialism, evolutionism, or spiritualism – in order to share their intellectual passions, rather than ‘men of ideology’ – committed disciples of strict ideologies or soldiers of orthodox, rigorous identities. The importance of this lies in the efforts to resist the biases in the secondary literature putting materialist, monist, evolutionist writings in the box of ‘anti-Islamic weaponry’ with no second thought and no perceived further use, as if it were abnormal and untimely to talk about such popular scientific and philosophical trends in the late Ottoman era. Nor was spiritualism in need of an Islamic essence in order to be born. ‘Speaking about science’ had a number of different uses, some of which were irrespective of religion. One of them was to circulate popular ‘scientific’ theories of man when developing the conceptual framework of ‘individual’.

The foundations of this approach lie in a recently animated literature at the intersection of political economy and intellectual thought. Closely studying traveller accounts, eye-witness narratives, and archival documents, Özveren for example puts the term *homo æconomicus* into circulation in Ottoman studies. In doing so he challenges the representations of *homo levanticus* conceived in numerous travelogues as the opposite of *homo æconomicus*, and depicting the ‘economic behaviour of locals’ in Levant ‘before and during the arrival of *homo æconomicus* in the late Ottoman Empire.<sup>171</sup> In particular Kılınçoğlu’s recently published book *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire* throws a new light on late Ottoman intellectual history by giving precedence to intellectuals’ economic concerns: ‘the issue of the salvation of the empire, which haunted the nineteenth and the early twentieth century

---

<sup>170</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Düşünceleri*, p. 225.

<sup>171</sup> Eyüp Özveren, ‘Economic Agents, Rationality and the Industrial Setup: The Advent of Homo economicus in the Representations of Levant’, *History of Economic Ideas*, 14/3 (2006), pp. 9-34.

Ottoman reformist mind, was tightly linked to the question of economic development and an accompanying societal transformation in capitalistic term.’<sup>172</sup> For Kılınçoğlu ‘economic concerns regarding the formation of human capital and the preservation of national wealth constituted one of the main factors’ which shaped the Hamidian intellectual currents and served in the development of an ‘Ottoman capitalist spirit’, *homo Ottomanicus*, and a rhetoric about a new work ethic at an intellectual level.<sup>173</sup> Along similar lines, Melis Hafez greatly illustrates the ways in which ‘work and productivity were moralized’ as part of the development of ‘the moralistic discourse of an “Islamic work ethic”’, in her PhD thesis tracking the establishment of a binary between work and laziness in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 to 1920.<sup>174</sup> In her interpretation, such processes contributed to the ‘shaping of the industrious body’ and the development of ‘new concepts of self and the body of the political subject’.

The debates about the ‘new man’ therefore cannot be detached from the concern for developing a new work ethic along liberal lines, in tandem with the increasing integration of the Ottoman economy into the global market relations. From a Foucauldian perspective, the notion of ‘governing individuals’ through means of *biopolitics* – which includes psychology<sup>175</sup> – has a lot to do with the birth of *homo aeconomicus*, ‘economic man’:<sup>176</sup> ‘someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of their environment and which responds to this in a non-random way, in a systematic way, and economics can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature of responses to environmental variables.’<sup>177</sup>

---

<sup>172</sup> Deniz T. Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire* (London, 2015), p. 193.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 99-109.

<sup>174</sup> Hafez, ‘The Lazy, the Idle, the Industrious’.

<sup>175</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 270.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 268.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 269.

Accordingly, instead of taking the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a battlefield divided between two camps along religious lines, I would propose taking it as a means to conceptualize the individual as an answer to pressing concerns about economic and technological progress in accord with the changing material conditions with which intellectuals were surrounded in the context of the technological transformations coming in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Modern psychology was to a large extent fed by this debate and was born out of such intellectual concerns in the late Ottoman Empire.

## **Primary Sources and Methodology**

In the late Ottoman Empire psychology remained a volatile tool, used from the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869 onwards to speculate about human nature with a degree of disciplinary authority. Largely because of this volatility, the sources that we are dealing with here have various contents such as the soul, hypnotism, materialism, evolutionism, brain physiology, education, and pedagogy. According to Nuri Bilgin's bibliography, there are 86 'Turkish psychology books' in Arabic script published before the alphabet reform in 1928.<sup>178</sup> It is however controversial whether they qualify as what we consider as the discipline of psychology in a modern sense. I would say that most of these sources do not. Yet they reflect the evolution of psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire before scientific psychology born in the West came to dominate the field with a standard view. For the sake of simplicity, I would categorize these books into four groups in a chronological manner:

The first group comprises the first modern psychology books, which are of a hybrid nature merging a classical Greco-Islamic perspective with scattered references

---

<sup>178</sup> Nuri Bilgin, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Psikoloji Bibliyografyası* (Izmir, 1988), pp. 26-30. There is one more bibliography, which was published long before Bilgin's: Sami Kayral, *Türkçe Psikoloji Eserleri Bibliyografyası* (Istanbul, 1953).

to Western philosophy of mind and brain physiology. Even though they largely resemble metaphysical treatises on the soul, still in use in the late Ottoman Empire, the authors' claim to be introducing 'modern psychology' is significant. They are of great importance in representing the transitional phase of psychology and a more organic and gradual detachment from its metaphysical past. Here the authors' claim to be doing modern psychology matters the most in how to categorize them, in my interpretation, hence the use of the term 'first modern psychology books'.

The second category of sources comprises physiology/brain physiology books written by intellectuals and medical doctors who were categorized as 'materialists' in the literature. Primarily Abdullah Cevdet's works on brain physiology published from the 1890s onwards reflect a tension about mechanistic views of human nature. This tension boiled down to the question of whether mental phenomena were governed by the soul or neural activity. Psychology in this work appears inadvertently, often as a subcategory of physiology. The influence of evolutionism and German Feuerbach biological materialism is apparent.

The third category of sources comprises psychology school textbooks published in the Second Constitutional Era following the start of psychology education at the *Darülfünun*. These were largely written by *Darülfünun* scholars utilizing Western school textbooks. Authors however enjoyed a large degree of flexibility when interpreting, modifying, and commenting on the originals, which were mostly French school textbooks with spiritualist remarks. Baha Tevfik, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, and Babanzade Ahmed Naim are among the most prominent authors. This is the most reflective era, when intellectuals more openly speculate about emotions, the concepts of individual, free will, and the soul.

The last category of sources is direct translations of psychology books published from the 1920s onwards in tandem with increasing standardization of the field. Upon the return of the first professionals, such as Mustafa Şekip Tunç, İbrahim Gövsa, Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, and Mehmet İzzet, psychology started to gain a more standard perspective. In the 1930s, psychology education became institutionalized following the foundation in 1937 of the first experimental psychology institute with a laboratory and a library.<sup>179</sup> The first psychological association and the first psychology journal were founded the following year.<sup>180</sup> This enabled the birth of institutional and applied psychology in a significantly different context, with which this thesis is not concerned.

## **Overview of Arguments**

As the handful of secondary literature on the history of psychology in Turkey has shown, we know very little about its trajectory, major bones of contention, demarcation lines, and significance in relation to late Ottoman social, economic, and political dynamics.<sup>181</sup> In an attempt at simplifying a largely unknown psychological literature at such a preliminary stage and translating it as much as possible into late Ottoman intellectual dynamics, this thesis focuses on the psychological writings of Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç, who were the foundational figures for the debate between materialism and spiritualism, as well as modern psychology in different periods. By putting together a largely unknown psychological literature with their numerous other writings in the form of

---

<sup>179</sup> For more information as to German speaking scientists including Wilhelm Peters who were forced to leave Germany see Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, eds. *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge, 1996).

<sup>180</sup> Aydan Gülerce, 'Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads', in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, p. 560.

<sup>181</sup> For a discussion about the secondary literature on the history of psychology in the late Ottoman Empire see chapter one.

compilations and journal articles, it investigates psychology's role in their thought as well as in the late Ottoman intellectual milieu.

Starting with a discussion about the secondary literature on modern psychology, the first chapter gives a glimpse into the trajectory of psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire with a special focus on the first modern psychology books published following the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869. In doing so it takes educational modernization as a major catalyst of the start of the discipline, as well as authors' efforts to indigenize modern psychology. It draws attention to the variety of sources available to intellectuals in conceptualizing man. It also introduces the discipline of psychology as a meeting point for old and new, philosophical and physiological, materialist and spiritualist, Western and local perspectives of man in the late Ottoman Empire, with a large room for interpretation while it was in the making. Ultimately it argues that such a variety and complexity of psychological thought eludes the grasp of any one-sided and dichotomous interpretation.

The second chapter studies the role of biological materialism in the process of medical modernization and dissemination of scientific views of man, with a special focus on Abdullah Cevdet's materialist publications on the brain from the 1890s onwards. It proposes presenting biological materialism – developed in medical schools – as a necessary and natural step for the dissemination of scientific views of man and brain physiology. By subjecting the masterpieces of 'Ottoman materialism' written by Abdullah Cevdet between 1890 and 1917 to close reading, it unfolds a list of new conceptualizations such as mind training (*idman-ı dimağ*), mechanism (*mihaniyet*), universal determinism (*icabiye-i külliye*), mind industry (*sanayi-i akliye*), and mind evolution (*tekamiül-i dimağ*). Ultimately it argues that the human body and soul

became objects of progressive discourses to be understood, simplified, and shaped against the backdrop of the predominance of ‘the question of economic development and an accompanying societal transformation in capitalistic terms’ and a new work ethic in the late Ottoman era.<sup>182</sup>

The third chapter studies the birth of modern psychological literature under the roof of the *Darülfünun*, in the context of the overwhelming interest in ‘French spiritualist philosophy’ and psychology in the Second Constitutional Era. As a case study it subjects Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s book *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Psychology) to a close reading on the basis of its being the first known modern psychology book studied in *Darülfünun* classrooms in the early 1910s. Delving into Ahmed Hilmi’s formulation of the soul as a ‘conservation site’ against ‘fake progress’ within the context of the interplay between spiritualism and psychology in the *Darülfünun*, it shows the ways in which psychology became a site for debating the relations between the concept of progress and human nature and criticizing scientific determinism with a scholarly authority. Ultimately it argues that the interplay between spiritualism and psychology helped Ahmed Hilmi contribute to global anti-western and anti-scientist discourses which aimed to save man from the scientific invasion which surfaced through the ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal’ metaphors. His efforts were part of the search for ‘the proper strategy for the appropriation of modernity’ and for how to make progress without losing traditional and religious values.<sup>183</sup>

The fourth chapter studies the ways in which the popularization of ‘scientific’ views of man run alongside the surfacing of the rhetoric of emotional control in ‘materialist’ circles. In particular it delves into Baha Tevfik’s psychological writings,

---

<sup>182</sup> Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 193.

<sup>183</sup> The term ‘appropriation of modernity’ is used by Serdar Poyraz in challenging the dichotomy between modernity and tradition: Poyraz, *Science versus Religion*, p. 3.

nourished by monism, and evolutionism. Baha Tevfik delved into the concept of the ‘individual’, while formulating one of the first psychological theories of emotional control. Accordingly free and conscious individuals were expected to manage their emotions in a newly designed moral system. In pursuit of the question of the relevance of Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology and rhetoric of emotional control to the late Ottoman intellectual climate, it explores the spread of liberal thought and the rising tension between individual and collective interests in the Second Constitutional Era. Ultimately it argues that Baha Tevfik’s ‘psychological’ theory of emotional control was part of a series of efforts to define relations between individual and collective units within the limits of liberal thought and establish a new understanding of ethics as a major catalyst for transforming society.

The fifth chapter explores how the interplay between psychology and Bergsonian spiritualism in the *Darülfünun* in the early 1920s contributed to the development of the conceptual framework of the individual and an alternative understanding of the idea of progress in the late Ottoman era. In particular it studies Mustafa Şekip Tunç’s use of psychology for defending individual liberties against the rise of Ziya Gökalp’s social theory of collectivism in the early 1920s through *Dergah* magazine. When translated into late Ottoman intellectual dynamics, Tunç’s use of psychology displays the growing tension around the use of science to understand and determine man and society in the process of Ottoman modernization. This tension cherished a rhetoric of individual freedom, emotions, and spiritualism within a psychological framework, which translated into an alternative definition of the concept of progress in opposition to scientific determinism. Ultimately it argues that the interplay between spiritualism and psychological thinking in this period provided

intellectuals with a sphere to speak up for individual liberties within a ‘conservative’ framework.

## **Conclusion**

By studying a selection of modern psychology and brain physiology books published by intellectuals who engaged in the debate between materialism and spiritualism, this thesis aims to make sense of the growing intellectual interest in modern psychology from the 1869 onwards. By approaching the debate between materialism and spiritualism as one major global psychological discussion of the post-Darwinian era, it strives to shift the centre of attention from the role of Islam in the late Ottoman intellectual milieu to new scientific tools of imagining and designing man at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – including psychology. When translated into late Ottoman intellectual dynamics, this debate served for imagining and designing a ‘new man’ in accordance with the material changes intellectuals were surrounded with in the context of post-Industrial Revolution transformations and in response to burning concerns about economic and technological progress – or so this thesis argues.

## **Chapter I: Searching for the Soul in Shades of Grey: Claiming psychology's past in the late Ottoman Empire**

When İbrahim Gövsa, a psychology graduate with a diploma from the Rousseau Institute, was introduced to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1928, the first question the founding father of the Republic of Turkey asked was about the essence of the soul from the point of psychology. Gövsa replied by saying that psychology was no longer enquiring into this question. Atatürk in response laughed and ridiculed psychology for not doing anything substantial, if it did not deal with the essence of the soul.<sup>184</sup> Gövsa's answer exemplifies the intellectuals' efforts to promote a 'new' psychology detached from philosophy and scholastic thought. Whether they succeeded in bringing home this 'new' psychology with universal scientific standards is controversial. Even in 1933 Albert Malche (of the Rousseau Institute) criticized the quality of psychological education at the *Darülfünun* for still being theological.<sup>185</sup> However, modern psychology's long past in the late Ottoman Empire shows the richness of the sources of psychological knowledge available to intellectuals who produced their own subjective and syncretic interpretations out of them, before the foundation of 'scientific' psychology. The question of the essence of the soul was considered of immense importance.

The years between the 1870s and 1920s has been considered the period of transformation for psychology, during which it prepared to leave the house of metaphysics, religious thought, and moral sciences to join the team of sciences. Although the establishment of modern psychology as an academic profession in

---

<sup>184</sup> İbrahim Alaattin Gövsa, 'Ona Dair', *Acılar* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 17-20.

<sup>185</sup> Aydan Gülerce, 'Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads', p. 560.

universities came in Turkey in the late 1930s, it began to be discussed as a new ‘scientific’ field in the Ottoman Empire as early as 1869 as part of the Ottoman Education Regulation. During the process of educational modernization and the adoption of new disciplines, psychology appeared as a new subject and a new topic of interest in textbooks and journal articles, even though by modern standards it did not take the form of ‘scientific psychology’. How are we to approach these textbooks and articles written by intellectuals with a claim to be doing modern psychology despite lacking any formal education in it? Are we to dismiss them on the basis of being metaphysical, or not qualifying against the standards of ‘scientific psychology’? If not, what then does a long discussion about the soul in a non-Western context with a claim to be doing modern psychology tell us?

This chapter – and indeed the entire thesis – have the intermediary task of studying the discourses on the concept of *ruh* in Ottoman Turkish. To avoid terminological ambiguity it sticks to the term ‘soul’ throughout the thesis and eschews some of its equivalents such as ‘psyche’ and ‘spirit’. ‘Psyche’ in particular is a loaded term, with more up-to-date psychological connotations, especially after its conquest of psychoanalysis with the help of conscious and clear usage by psychoanalysts.<sup>186</sup> The soul, however, was at the heart of materialistic or spiritualistic conceptualizations of human beings – bounded in the past by changing scientific and religious interpretations – before the disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and psychology became sharper. In other words, ‘soul’ was a bridging term between psychological studies and the debate between materialism and spiritualism. By adhering to the use of the term ‘soul’, corresponding to *ruh*, this thesis aims to highlight one of its central claims: that the debate between materialism and

---

<sup>186</sup> See for example, Carl G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, tr. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull, 6 vols. (Princeton, 1976), VI, p. 463.

spiritualism, revolving around different understandings of the soul, nourished psychological thought as well as intellectuals' imagery of man in the late Ottoman Empire.

This chapter gives a glimpse into the trajectory of psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire during this transitory period. In doing so it aims to draw attention to the richness of sources then available to intellectuals in contemplating man, and to present psychology as a meeting point for a wide range of perspectives on man – old and new, philosophical and physiological, materialist and spiritualist, Western and local – in the late Ottoman Empire, with a large room for interpretation. Such richness and complexity of psychological thought are beyond the grasp of any one-sided or dichotomous explanation.

### **Psychology as a Meeting Point**

Dealing with psychological works produced before the foundation of 'scientific psychology' in a non-Western context is a demanding task in many ways. To begin with it requires an understanding of the foundation of psychology as a modern scientific discipline in the West – not in an opposition to, but rather as a product of its long-established roots in philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

Herman Ebbinghaus's epigram 'psychology has a long past but a short history' has retained its place in the opening remarks of numerous books on the history of psychology since 1908, as it beautifully concretizes the long heritage of psychological thought in different forms before it took its modern shape.<sup>187</sup> From Aristotle onwards, mental phenomena have been associated with the soul, be it in multiple forms arranged

---

<sup>187</sup> Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Psychology: an elementary text-book* (Boston, 1908). This book was translated into Ottoman by Efendîzade Eşref Şevketî and Mustafa Şekip Tunç: Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Ruhiyyat*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1914); Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Muhtasar İlm-i Ruh*, tr. Efendîzade Eşref Şevketî (Istanbul 1333/1917); Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Mûlahhas Ruhîyat*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1919).

in a hierarchical order (such as nutritive, perceptive, and rational souls), dependent on the physical body in a monist form or separated in a dualist form: ‘The single most important advance Aristotle presents over his predecessors is his rejection of the soul as a special kind of substance – an immaterial entity which “inhabits” the body’.<sup>188</sup> With Descartes’s *The Passions of the Soul* and *The Description of the Human Body* the question of mind–body dualism occupied philosophers of human nature in different forms for a long time when dealing with major metaphysical questions of the soul. Otto Rank’s saying, ‘To write a history of psychology is to write a history of the soul, which no less than the story of humankind from its beginning’, is therefore applicable to studies dealing with old psychological forms under the umbrella of philosophy of mind primarily before the field was dominated by professionals in 1920s.<sup>189</sup>

In depicting the transition from the ‘science of the mind’ rooted in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, to ‘scientific psychology’ with observational, empirical, and experimental methods, the mainstream historiography has often produced a narrative of overnight transition based on a simple distinction between old and new. This foundational myth was to a large extent established by Edwin Boring (1886-1986), the founding father of experimental psychology as well as its historiography, in his foundational text *A History of Experimental Psychology* (1929). There was a degree of resistance to experimental psychology worldwide, however, which extended the transitional period of psychology and enabled the coexistence between old and new forms for a long time. In some old established places, such as the University of Oxford, there was no teaching of experimental psychology until 1936.<sup>190</sup>

Recent scholarship raises important concerns about the foundational myths of

---

<sup>188</sup> Michael Durrant, ‘introduction’, in Michael Durrant, ed., *Aristotle’s De Anima in Focus* (London, 1993), p. 7.

<sup>189</sup> Otto Rank, Gregory C. Richter, E. James Lieberman, Psychology and the Soul, *Journal of Religion and Health*, 35/3 (1996), pp. 193-201.

<sup>190</sup> Leslie S. Hearnshaw, *The Shaping of Modern Psychology* (London, 1987), p. 125.

experimental psychology, such as the strict division between experimental and intuitionist methodologies.<sup>191</sup> Hatfield for example blurs the line which American experimental psychologist Boring drew between Western psychological thought of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the mid 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, as for Hatfield ‘psychology was considered by a great many eighteenth century authors to be a science’.<sup>192</sup> The Western psychological legacy of the 18<sup>th</sup> century is therefore to be seen as an effort for ‘remaking the science of mind’ instead of being dismissed by orthodox historical definitions of science.

By the same token, *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967*, by Mitchell Ash, one of the pioneering revisionist historians of science and psychology, draws attention to the co-existence of old and new methodologies and the multiplicity of methods available to psychologists at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In doing so it depicts the world of psychologists as rich and multifarious. Taking up the subject of the development and reception of holistic thought from the angle of the social history of ideas, Ash highlights ‘a middle path between idealism and positivism, represented most prominently in America by William James, John Dewey, on the Continent by Henri Bergson, Dilthey and Edmund Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*’.<sup>193</sup> By centring the story around the actual thinkers and psychologists – instead of treating ideas as free-floating entities detached from their contexts – Ash gives a more realistic understanding of dissemination of psychological ideas through organic and complex

---

<sup>191</sup> The myths of experimental psychology were to some extent established by American experimental psychologist Edwin Boring. Boring’s *Psychologist at Large* is written in the form of a first person narrative of psychological communities joined by leading psychologists at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century from William James to Titchener. In ‘Human nature versus Sensation’ for example Boring depicts the intellectual climate in psychological studies in a polarized fashion in which he is a partisan: ‘There is a basic dichotomy in systematic psychology, a dichotomy in which James was on one side and I (especially then) on the other.’ This dichotomy according to Boring was caused by the birth of experimental psychology and different proposals for psychological methodologies. This encapsulates how well entrenched the dichotomous thinking was in the field at the turn of the twentieth century. Edwin Boring, *Psychologist at Large: An Autobiography and Selected Essays* (New York, 1961), p. 194.

<sup>192</sup> Gary Hatfield, ‘Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science’, *University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-94-13*, p. 7.

<sup>193</sup> Mitchell G. Ash, *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the quest for objectivity* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 68.

relations.

Psychology indeed was a home to a variety of methods and disciplines at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, best captured by the first international congresses of psychology between 1889 and 1905 which put together a wide range of ‘psychological studies’ from parapsychology, mesmerism, spiritualism, phrenology, and physiognomy to experimental psychology. The first international congress of psychology was organized in 1889 in France,<sup>194</sup> following the foundation of the first laboratory for psychological research by Wundt, the German physician and psychologist,<sup>195</sup> in 1879 – a moment which is by and large taken to represent the foundation of psychology as an independent ‘science’ of the human mind separated from biology and philosophy. Ribot, the well-known French psychologist, in his opening lecture, accordingly proposed investigators in all countries juxtapose physiological and pathological observation and experiment with the older introspective method.<sup>196</sup> Even though there were a number of papers on mesmerism, parapsychology, and psychic studies in the first congresses, the fifth congress organized in Rome, in 1905, was the last one to which psychics were accepted as presenters.<sup>197</sup> The exclusion of such pseudo-sciences and forms of spiritualism was a result of the domination of a scientific perspective on human nature. More importantly, this process was a gradual one, enabling the co-existence of old and new approaches for a while; and leading to confusion as to the nature of the discipline and its relationship with science.

One strategy to grasp such a degree of complexity is to contextualize psychological ideas within the social and cultural atmosphere they were born into. As

---

<sup>194</sup> Ludy T. Benjamin and David Baker, ‘The Internationalization of Psychology: A History’ in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, pp. 2-5.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Here Benjamin and Baker consult ‘*The Congress of Physiological Psychology*’ by William James who quoted Ribot’s opening lecture. See William James, *The Congress of Physiological Psychology*, *Mind* 14 (1889), pp. 614–6.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

Matthew Thomson suggests, it is indeed important to see psychological concepts as products of dynamic and complex processes of the dissemination of ideas. In *Psychological subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health in Twentieth Century Britain* Thomson describes his intention as ‘a desire to write a history that situates psychology within its broader culture and therefore necessarily pushes beyond such disciplinary boundaries’.<sup>198</sup> This requires one to investigate the process through which psychological knowledge was being appropriated, internalized, and indigenized, instead of seeing it as mere translations or imports from the West.

Another strategy is to acknowledge the efforts for indigenization in dealing with translations, especially in non-Western contexts. Historians of science, medicine, and psychology in non-Western countries are bound to deal with a dichotomous literature divided between Western and local knowledge. This bifurcation however ignores the ways in which a particular set of knowledge is subjected to a process of reinterpretation and reproduction, generating something new and syncretic. In the much wider context of the dissemination of scientific ideas, recent scholarship has come to a more refined understanding of the role of translations in the process of indigenization of knowledge within the framework of relativism. Since the publication of Khun’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) the idea of the commensurability of paradigms has been challenged severely. In other words, whether or not scientific activity relies on a universal framework, and whether scientific theories in different languages could really correspond to one another, are subject to discussion within the framework of relativism. What is apparent is ‘the need for greater attention to the local factors involved in the translation of scientific concepts across borders’ when discussing the circulation of scientific theories across the globe –

---

<sup>198</sup> Matthew Thomson, *Psychological Subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health in Twentieth Century Britain* (Oxford, 2006), p. 3.

in particular outside the European and Anglo-Saxon world.<sup>199</sup> This would perhaps help challenge the tendency to ‘see “receiving” culture as purely passive – its responses limited to either faithful receipt of the original or regrettable incomprehension’, as Elshakry suggests.<sup>200</sup>

## Claiming Modern Psychology’s Ottoman Past

As Baker maintains, a deeper understanding of psychology’s trajectory in mainly non-Western contexts requires a careful historical analysis of local contexts and circumstances as well as deeper international insight.<sup>201</sup> Our knowledge of the trajectory of psychological knowledge in the late Ottoman Empire is very sparse. A handful of articles on the history of modern psychology written by psychologists briefly touch upon the names of certain textbooks and interested intellectuals.<sup>202</sup> Yet these have an overwhelming focus on the modern era, and the lack of historical contextualization often leads to misinformation and the adoption of a problematic approach to psychology’s Ottoman past.<sup>203</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup> Marwa S. Elshakry, ‘Knowledge in Motion: the Cultural Politics of Modern Science Translations in Arabic,’ *Isis*, 99/4 (2008), p. 701.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 703.

<sup>201</sup> Ludy T. Benjamin and David Baker, ‘Concluding Thoughts on Internationalizing the History of Psychology’ in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, pp. 616-9.

<sup>202</sup> For some of the earliest articles: Sabri Özbaydar, ‘Cumhuriyet’in ilk 50 yılında Türkiye’de Psikoloji,’ *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılına Armağan* (Istanbul, 1973), pp. 219-22; Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, ‘Psychology in Turkey,’ *International Journal of Psychology*, 29/6 (1994), pp. 729-38. Aydan Gülerce has written the most recent articles which touch upon psychology’s Ottoman past as well: Aydan Gülerce, ‘History of Psychology in Turkey as a Sign of Diverse Modernization and Global Psychologization’, in Adrian C. Brock, ed., *Internationalizing The History of Psychology* (New York, 2006); ‘Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads’, in David Baker, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 547-71. Sertan Batur develops a critical approach to historiography and raises important questions: Sertan Batur, ‘Türkiye’de Psikoloji Tarihi Yazımı Üzerine,’ *Toplum ve Bilim*, 98 (2003), pp. 255-64; ‘Psikoloji Tarihinde Köken Mitosu ve Georg Anshütz’ün Hikayesi,’ *Toplum ve Bilim*, 102 (2005), pp. 168-88; ‘Türkiye’de Psikolojinin Kurumsallaşmasında Toplumsal ve Politik Belirleyenler,’ *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107, (2006), pp: 217-30.

<sup>203</sup> There is a recently growing literature on psychology’s Ottoman past thanks to recent graduate studies: Şeyma Turan, ‘Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları: (1869-1900)’ (MA thesis, Marmara University, 2010); Nihat Köse, ‘Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Öncesi Bazı Telif Psikoloji Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme’ (MA thesis, Fırat University, 2013); Tarık Tuna Gözütok, ‘Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin’in *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür* Adlı Eserinin Türk Psikoloji Tarihindeki Yeri’ (MA thesis,

One common tendency is to adopt a dismissive attitude to the direct relationship between the late Ottoman social and cultural context and psychological knowledge. For instance Vassaf, in his article ‘A Fight For Independence’, makes some hasty conclusions and states that psychology in Turkey was ‘rather a product of our dependence on the West, than a product of our own needs’. For him the story of the years of development of psychology in Turkey reflects the lack of any organic relation between science and society:

‘Psychology in Turkey and many other Third World countries has not developed through such a dialectical interaction between science and society. Rather, it is the result of an ‘export-import’ relationship between the industrialized and urbanized countries of the West and the peripheral Third World, a dependency-promoting relationship that continues to be encouraged by the present state of affairs.’<sup>204</sup>

In a similar attempt at presenting psychology as a Western import, a handful texts on the history of psychology in Turkey provide us with a foundation myth based on the arrival of George Anschütz, a German émigré professor who taught experimental psychology briefly at the *Darülfünun*.<sup>205</sup> Recently Sertan Batur challenged this ‘foundational myth’, however, by showing how little a mark Anschütz’s short stay left on psychological education in the Ottoman Empire, and how

---

Ankara University, 2013). See also Rifat bin Mehmed Emin, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür*, transliterated by Tarık Tuna Gözütok (Konya, 2014). (Hereby I thank Gözütok for providing me with a copy of his thesis and book.) These theses provide important descriptive information about some of the early psychology books namely: *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* by Ali İrfan, *Psikoloji yahut İlm-i Ruh* by Hoca Tahsin, *Gayeti'l Beyan fî Hakikati'l İnsan yahut İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* by Yusuf Kemal, *İlmi Ahvali Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür* by Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin, *Psikoloji İlmi Ahvali Ruh* by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil. Yet they within the limits of master’s theses lack a profound theoretical, comparative and historical approach with broader scope and greater insight into psychology’s role in the late Ottoman intellectual milieu. This PhD thesis intends to fill this void in the literature.

<sup>204</sup> Gündüz Vassaf, ‘Turkey’, in A. R. Gilgen and C. Gilgen, eds., *International Handbook of Psychology* (Westport, 1987), pp. 486-7 cited in Sertan Batur and Ersin Aslıtürk, ‘On Critical Psychology in Turkey’, *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 5 (2006), p. 22.

<sup>205</sup> The foundational basis of a broader narrative on ‘the history of psychology in the Ottoman Empire’ has not been accumulated yet. There is also one major controversy about where to start. For example According to Kağıtçıbaşı, modern psychology was established by Dr. George Anschütz who was invited to *Darülfünun* in 1915. However, according to Sertan Batur, Dr. Anschütz’s stay in the Empire for three years can only be marked as the establishment of experimental psychology. For Bartun the above-mentioned two courses and many other books bore witness to the existence of psychology long before 1915. Batur, *Psikoloji Tarihinde Köken Mitosu ve Georg Anschütz’ün Hikayesi*, pp. 168-88.

very little we know about the history of psychology therein. Aydan Gülerce also proposes paying more attention to ‘indigenous psychological phenomena’ and ‘socio-cultural constructions of personhood and subjectivity’.<sup>206</sup> By the same token, as Batur and Ersin argue within the framework of ‘critical psychology’, drawing clear lines between the West and the ‘receiving’ culture of psychological knowledge neglects ‘the direct relationship between psychology and the needs of social politics of the ruling classes’.<sup>207</sup> A clearer understanding of the ways in which psychological knowledge was reproduced in the face of local social, cultural, and political dynamics requires a closer look at intellectual efforts at indigenization, fusing new Western psychological knowledge with old established Greco-Islamic perspectives on the soul.

Before the entrance of Western psychological theories, there was a long established tradition of human psychology which rested on Greco-Islamic perspectives, and these were in use in the late Ottoman Empire. The traditional Greco-Islamic perspective on human psychology rested on the concepts of *ruh* and *nafs*, which came to be used often interchangeably for the spirit and the soul.<sup>208</sup> In the Quranic usage *nafs* means ‘self’ or ‘person’ and *ruh* means ‘special angelic messenger’, ‘special divine quality’. It also means ‘breath of life’, which Allah blew into Adam when giving life to his body.<sup>209</sup> In post-Quranic usages of *nafs* and *ruh*, the Platonic tripartite theory of the soul and Aristotelian understandings of human soul as presented in *De Anima* were adopted.<sup>210</sup> In time they were reproduced and transformed by philosophers such as Kindi (801-873), Farabi (872-950), Avicenna (980-1037),

---

<sup>206</sup> Aydan Gülerce, ‘Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads’, p. 555.

<sup>207</sup> Batur and Aslıtürk, ‘On Critical Psychology in Turkey’, p. 22.

<sup>208</sup> I. R. Netton, ‘Nafs’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 14 November 2014.

[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM\\_0833](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM_0833)

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

Gazali (1058-1111), and Fahreddin Razi (1149-1209) who developed the Greco-Islamic tradition of human psychology.<sup>211</sup> The field of Science of the Soul (*İlm-i Nefs* or *İlm-i Ruh*) as a sub-section of the Science of Morals (*İlm-i Ahlak*) was a traditional venue for developing different understandings of the relations between body and soul, free will, and the powers, faculties, as well as ‘illnesses of the soul’ (*Emraz-ı Nefsaniye*).

During the *Tanzimat* era, these theories were very much part of the intellectual milieu. Leading intellectuals of the era such as Münif Paşa and Namık Kemal worked on some of these sources.<sup>212</sup> Avicenna’s theories on the soul were still in circulation. Abdurrahman Sami Paşa for example translated *Ruh* (The soul) by Avicenna from Arabic into Ottoman Turkish, which came out in 1862 in *Rumuz’ül-Hikem*.<sup>213</sup> Abdülkerim Efendi, one of the first Ottoman students sent to Europe to study the sciences, was one of the spokespersons of the classical Islamic theories from logic to psychology. His *Risale-i Ruh-ı İnsaniye* (Treatise on the human soul) shows that traditional theories of the soul were still in use. In this short treatise Abdülkerim Efendi treated the relations between the body and the soul and denied the separate existence of the body from the soul by utilizing Fahreddin Razi’s treatises.<sup>214</sup>

Towards the end of the *Tanzimat* era, psychology came into play as a subject to be taught in a modern university, specifically the *Darülfünun* (today’s Istanbul University). Even though it had the foundations of a modern university, the *Darülfünun* did not properly come into operation until 1900, and the story of its

---

<sup>211</sup> For more information: Ayman Shihadeh, ed., ‘The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought’, *The Muslim World* 102/3-4 (2012), pp. 413-616; for a comparative perspective between Gazali and Avicenna on the Soul: Ayman Shihadeh, ‘Al Ghazali and Kalam: The conundrum of his Body-Soul Dualism’ in Frank Griffel, ed., *Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazali. Papers Collected on His 900<sup>th</sup> Anniversary*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2016), pp. 113-41. Hereby I thank Jawdath Jabbour for drawing my attention to this article.

<sup>212</sup> For more information see Mustafa Ülger. ‘Hoca Abdülkerim Efendi’nin Felsefi Görüşleri’ (PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2007), pp. 56-7.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 228-35.

foundation goes back to the *Tanzimat* era, during which several preparatory steps were taken such as sending successful students abroad, preparing course books for new subjects, and organizing open lectures for the general public.<sup>215</sup> Psychology and pedagogy were part of these new subjects. One of the first articles about pedagogy – *Ehemmiyet-i Terbiye-i Sıbyan* (The importance of child education, 1862) by Münif Paşa – and psychology – *İntihar* (Suicide, 1866) by Kırımlı Doktor Aziz Efendi – were published in *Mecmua-ı Fünun*.<sup>216</sup> These open lectures sowed the seeds for the foundation of the *Darülfünun*, which became concretized with the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869.

Psychology became part of Ottoman modernization with the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869 as part of the *Darülfünun* curriculum – notwithstanding there is no evidence indicating that the relevant article of the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869 was implemented. This regulation was prepared under the influence of the French Minister of Education, Jean Victor Duruy, who had a more secular approach to education, and presented natural sciences (*fünun*) and education (*maarif*) as the basic sources of welfare, industrial economic development, and progress.<sup>217</sup> As well as its impact in psychological studies, it marked a turning point in Ottoman educational policy by integrating existing schools in the capital and provinces into a centralized system with one set of laws.<sup>218</sup>

---

<sup>215</sup> For more information about educational modernization before and during the Tanzimat Era: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı, 150 Yılında Tanzimat* (Ankara, 1992), pp. 339-59; for more information about students who were sent to Europe: Adnan Şişman, *Tanzimat Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri, 1839-1876* (Ankara, 2004).

<sup>216</sup> Münif Paşa, *Ehemmiyet-i Terbiye-i Sıbyan, Mecmua-i Fünun*, 1/5 (1279/1862), pp.176-85. For a Latinized version: Cavit Binbaşoğlu, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türk Eğitim Tarihi* (Ankara, 2009), pp. 149-55. Kırımlı Doktor Aziz, 'İntihar', *Mecmua-i Fünun*, 4/39 (1283/1866), pp. 218-28 and 4/40 (1283/1866), pp. 250-5.

<sup>217</sup> S. Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, autocracy, and discipline* (Leiden, 2001), p. 86.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

Psychology in the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869 is referred as *ilm-i nefis*.<sup>219</sup> It falls under the heading of the literature and philosophy faculty, which combines major subjects of philosophy (*hikmet*) such as logic, morality, Islamic theology, and literature such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish, French, and Latin, in an effort to combine traditional and modern disciplines. This regulation ushered in a new era in which a number of psychology books, mostly named *ilm-i ahval-i ruh* (Psychology – The sciences of the states of the soul), were published. Even though Ottoman intellectuals' efforts to develop a standard philosophical and scientific terminology encompassing psychological terms in Ottoman did not bear much fruit, intellectuals to a large extent translated the soul, *âme*, as *ruh*, and psychology, *psychologie*, as *ilm-i ahval-i ruh*, *ilm-i ruh*, or as *ruhiyat* (by forming new terms around the concept of *ruh*) and seldom as *ilm-i nefis*.<sup>220</sup>

Failure to form a standard terminology ran alongside a degree of flexibility which authors enjoyed in choosing different perspectives to be adopted and themes to be included in their books. Large numbers of these early books lack a homogenous perspective or terminology. The authors did not use a proper referencing system and enjoyed a degree of autonomy in deciding which sections to take from the authors that they desired to translate. Psychology at the intersection of philosophy, the Science of Morals, and physiology served as a round table for the intellectuals to discuss a number of questions that they saw as related: the existence of the soul, the relation

---

<sup>219</sup> For a full list of the courses: Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversitesi Tarihi I*, p. 87.

<sup>220</sup> Babanzade's *İlm-i Nefs* appears as an exception in which Babanzade made it clear that he preferred this term to *İlm-i ahval-i ruh*: Georges Fonsgrive, tr. Babanzade Ahmed Naim, *Mebadi-i Felsefe'den Birinci Kitap İlm-i Nefs* (Istanbul, 1331/1915). For a transliteration of this book from Arabic script to Latin script: Babanzade Ahmed Naim, *Felsefe Dersleri*, transliterated by Cahid Şenel and M. Cüneyt Kaya (Istanbul, 2016). I am grateful to Jawdath Jabbour for drawing my attention to his recent book. Babanzade gave some thought to philosophical terms and strove to correct misleading translations of his time as a part of *Istilahât-ı İlmiye Encümeni* (Commission of Scientific Terminologies), which was founded in 1913 to establish a standard scientific and philosophical terminology in Ottoman. For more information see İsmail Kara, *Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak, Modern Felsefe ve Bilim Terimlerinin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (Istanbul, 2001).

between body and soul, the role of religion in understanding man, the nature of science, whether science should be used in governing societies, and so on.

Following the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869, lectures on human physiology, hygiene, the nervous system, digestion, and blood circulation, were organized.<sup>221</sup> There is no evidence that psychology began to be taught as a separate discipline in the *Darülfünun* when opened for a year in 1870. Soon after that the *Darülfünun* was closed down again.<sup>222</sup> Up until the start of the psychology course at the *Darülfünun* in first decade of the 20th century, and the subsequent boom in psychological publications the decade after that, only a handful psychology books were published. These books are in a hybrid form, putting together traditional, religiously coloured psychological perspectives and scattered Western psychological / philosophical theories. They concretize intellectuals' extensive efforts to indigenize psychology albeit seemingly 'importing' a new discipline.

Following the second attempt to open the *Darülfünun* in 1874, which was again short lived, the first known psychology school textbook with the approval of the Ministry of Education was published. In 1878, Yusuf Kemal, a state officer and translator in the *Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye* (Foreign correspondence office) and scribe in the Ottoman Embassy in Rome with a high command of French, published *Gayeti'l Beyan fî Hakikati'l İnsan yahut İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (The highest explanations on the reality of man or the science of the states of soul). Given his post, it is likely that he might have been given the task of writing a psychology book using Western sources in response to

---

<sup>221</sup> An open lecture named *Emcaz-ı Ekalim* (Temperament and climate) is often cited as the first open lecture about psychology by the secondary literature. However, given that the literature is full of misinformation about psychology's Ottoman past, we lack content information of the lecture and its title is not necessarily directly related with psychology, I rather not take it for granted. So far I have not come across with the content of the lecture in major journals of the era such as *Mecmua-ı Fünun* and *Takvim-i Vekayi*, wherein some of the lectures were published. This however needs further investigation. For the list of open lectures including *Emcaz-ı Ekalim*: Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 96.

<sup>222</sup> The foundation of the *Darülfünun* was first mooted in 1847 and there were three major attempts to found it in 1863, 1870, and 1874. It was founded in 1900. For detailed information: *Ibid.*, pp. 43-262.

the need to write a course book. In the ministry's approval note this work was presented as a compilation based on the translations of Western philosophers, even though it did not actually go into the details of Western psychology or philosophy of mind in the 1870s.<sup>223</sup> On the contrary, in terms of content it bears great resemblances with other treatises of the soul, such as Sırrı Giridî's *Ruh* (The soul).<sup>224</sup> It differs from traditional treatises on the soul, however, as regards the title, the structure of the book, and references to Western philosophers of mind as sources of legitimation. *Gayeti'l Beyan fî Hakikati'l İnsan yahut İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* concretizes the intention to indigenize Western psychology and philosophy of mind, as well as the duality which characterized the period, merging old and new in different degrees. It merges Western philosophical theories of the soul with traditional psychological theories in an attempt to introduce psychology as a new modern discipline. The book revolves around the theories of the soul from a metaphysical view: the soul has an unchanging and immortal (*layemut*) nature, therefore never loses its identity and the sense of self (*hiiviyet, ene*). However it is in need of consciousness (*vicdan*) to discern its own existence, which remains the same regardless of time, past or present. Its transcendentalism is bound to unity, action, and movement. The human soul ultimately is a – simple and abstract – God Command.

It is not surprising that one of the most visible efforts at the indigenization of psychological literature uses sources imbued with Islamic content in order to avoid religiously grounded criticisms. Dealing with the concept of the soul in relation to religion, psychology, and physiology was a hazardous and difficult task. Texts pertaining to the soul were subjected to close state examination. To begin delving into the concept of the soul was considered illicit by some Quran interpreters,

---

<sup>223</sup> Turan, *Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları*, pp. 54-65.

<sup>224</sup> Sırrı Giridî, *Ruh* (Istanbul, 1305/1888). This book shows that traditional perspectives of the soul were still part of the intellectual and publishing world in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

on the basis of the verse: ‘They ask thee (O Muhammad) about al-ruh (*soul*), and say: *al-ruh min amri rabbi* (the spirit is from the divine command), and you are brought but little knowledge’.<sup>225</sup> According to some theologians, this verse rendered the soul forever mysterious, and studies of the soul unnecessary or fallacious. As Eğribozi remarked in the preface of *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Psychology), this interpretation to some extent still exerted control over authors at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>226</sup> Furthermore, negating the eternity and transcendence (*beka ve kadim*) of the soul was considered to be sufficient reason for a book to be banned, and Haralambos Efendi’s *Mevcudiyet-i Ruh* (The existence of the soul) failed to pass the censor specifically for this reason in 1900.<sup>227</sup>

Another common strategy to indigenize new psychological knowledge was to integrate them into the long-established tradition of *İlm-i Ahlak* (Science of morals). A stress on morality in the process of educational modernization was a common theme in many different places in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. For instance, psychology in a scholastic form was used intentionally to support official discourses of morality in Spain during Spanish educational modernization.<sup>228</sup> In the Russian case, state policies to reform society and to modernize education did not aim at ruling out religion; on the contrary, the ‘secular’ school regulation clearly presented religion as ‘the foundation of the Russian system’.<sup>229</sup> To give another example from the Chinese case, traditional

---

<sup>225</sup> I. R. Netton, ‘Nafs’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 14 November 2014.

[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM\\_0833](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM_0833)

<sup>226</sup> Ali İrfan Eğribozi, ‘İfade-i Meram’, in *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), pp. 3-5.

<sup>227</sup> BOA. MF MKT 528/42 (13 Cemaziyelevvel 1318 / 8 September 1900).

<sup>228</sup> Jorge Castro, Enrique Lafuente, and Belén Jiménez, The Soul of Spain: Spanish Scholastic Psychology and the Making of Modern Subjectivity, 1875-1931, *History of Psychology*, 12/3 (2009), pp.132-56.

<sup>229</sup> Fortna, ‘Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman “Secular” Schools’, p. 371.

Confusion classics constituted the backbone of new school curriculum when adopting foreign educational models.<sup>230</sup>

In the Ottoman case, the symbiosis between Science of Morals and psychology is particularly telling during the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909), when the Ottoman government made conscious efforts to highlight a moral content fed by indigenous cultural and religious components while appropriating a Western system of education. As a 'fighting back' strategy inspection of school curriculum entered into the state agenda and religious cultural components were stressed more in the late 1880s.<sup>231</sup> As Deringil demonstrates the curricula of higher and lower education units were revised with the aim of inserting additional hours of religious instruction.<sup>232</sup> In this era there was only a handful of psychology books published, according to Bilgin's *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Psikoloji Bibliyografyası*.<sup>233</sup> This could be explained by the fact that the foundation of the *Darülfünun* was postponed until 1900. In the meantime psychology instead emerged as a subsection in morality books or in a hybrid form which merged Science of Morals with rudimentary references to western philosophy of mind or psychology instead.

Rifat bin Mehmed Emin, for example, made efforts to stress the compatibility of Islamic philosophers such as İmam Gazali, İbn Rüşd, Fahreddin Razi, and Seyyid Şerif with psychologists such as Gabriel Compayré, Henri Maryon, and Elie Rabier whom he deemed contemporary.<sup>234</sup> Rifat bin Mehmed Emin was an Islamic morality

---

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, pp. 202-47.

<sup>232</sup> The curricula of primary (*İbtidaiye*) and secondary (*Rüşdiye*) schools, higher secondary /middle schools (*İdadi*), Civil Service School (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*), Imperial Military Academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*), the School of Medicine (*Tıbbiye*), the School of Engineering (*Mühendishane*) were revised. In the case of Galatasaray Lycee for example the director stated that Latin and Philosophy courses should be removed and nothing related with the lives of European philosophers should be taught. Selim Deringil, *Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, 1998), pp. 94-5.

<sup>233</sup> Bilgin, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Psikoloji Bibliyografyası*, pp. 26-30.

<sup>234</sup> Turan, 'Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları', p. 13.

teacher at the *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Imperial High School) between 1878-1903, and wrote a psychology course book, *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-ı Tefekkür* (*Psychology and the Methods of Thought*).<sup>235</sup> This text was very much in line with the concept of the soul as set out in one of the major books on the Science of Morals, *Ahlak-ı Alaî*, distinguishing two forms: animal soul, which is common both to animals and human beings, and the human soul which is known as *nefs-i natıka*. *Ahlak-ı Alaî*, by the prominent sixteenth-century Ottoman moralist Kınalızâde Ali, bequeathed the synthesis of Aristotelian and Islamic understandings of human psychology to the late Ottoman intellectual milieu.<sup>236</sup> Kınalızade's book synthesized *Ahlak-ı Nasiri* by Nasiruddin-i Tusi (1201-1274) with Avicenna's *eş-Şifa*. 'Nefs' for Kınalızade was a priori knowledge, an abstract entity, capable of understanding itself. In his understanding of the soul, Kınalızade employs an Aristotelian model which distinguishes the plant (*nefs-i nebati*), animal (*nefs-i hayvani*), and human soul (*nefs-i insani*). By giving considerable attention to the *emraz-ı nefسانیye* (illnesses of the soul), as Oktay points out, he employed medical terminology and portrayed Science of Morals as *Ruhani Tıp* (Medicine of the soul).<sup>237</sup> His book remained in use in the classrooms at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The first lectures on modern psychology blended Islamic ethics and contemporary Western psychology, as in the cases of Salim Sabit Efendi (who was sent to Europe as a part of a government education project) and Rifat bin Mehmed Emin who taught Science of Morals using Kınalızade's *Ahlak-ı Alaî*.<sup>238</sup>

---

<sup>235</sup> Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin, *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-ı Tefekkür* (Dersaadet, 1311/1894).

<sup>236</sup> Kınalızade Ali Çelebi, *Ahlak-ı Alaî*, Mustafa Koç, ed., (Istanbul, 2007); Ayşe S. Oktay, *Kınalızade Ali Efendi ve Ahlak-ı Alaî* (Istanbul, 2005).

<sup>237</sup> Oktay, *Kınalızade Ali Efendi ve Ahlak-ı Alaî*, p. 104.

<sup>238</sup> Turan, *Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları*, p. 13.

Islamic morality, and particularly individual morality as a sub-section of it, has a psychological aspect as it praises ‘good’ character and virtues.<sup>239</sup> In due course, psychology as a new subject entered some Islamic morality courses, as in the case of Abdurrahman Şeref’s book *İlm-i Ahlak* (The science of morality), a course book taught at higher secondary/middle schools circa 1900.<sup>240</sup> This book has an entry for *İlm-i ruh* (Psychology) as the science of the soul and a subcategory of *İlm-i hikmet* (Philosophy)<sup>241</sup> and this entry is separate to the chapter on the traditional views of the faculties of the soul.<sup>242</sup> *Semerât-ı Akıl* (Fruits of the mind), by Civil School graduate and schoolteacher İbrahim Edhem, is another example of the merge between the science of morality and psychological subjects such as the mind and intelligence. It represents the prevalent moral approach to mental phenomena and the tendency to place psychological subjects into advice literature genre during the reign of Abdülhamit II.<sup>243</sup>

It is not surprising to see that a number of Islamic morality teachers developed an interest in psychology in this era.<sup>244</sup> For example Ali İrfan Eğribozi, the author of one of the key course books of Islamic morality during the Hamidian era, which Fortna presents as a typical example of the era, also wrote a psychology book, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*. In doing so he simply turned a morality book into a psychology course

---

<sup>239</sup> The study of ethics had a general Islamic structure combining pre-Islamic Arabian tradition, Quranic teaching with non-Arabic elements of Persian and Greek origin with the help of cumulative efforts from Islamic philosophers such as Gazali, Tusi, Devvani: R. Walzer and H. A. R. Gibb, ‘Akhlaq’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 14 November 2014.

<[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ak-h-la-k-COM\\_0035](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ak-h-la-k-COM_0035)>

<sup>240</sup> This book was taught at Mekteb-i Sultani and Mekteb-i Mülkiye according to Mevlüt Uyanık, Aygün Akyol. For a transliterated version from the Arabic script to the Latin script: Abdurrahman Şeref, *Ahlak İlm-i*, transliterated by Mevlüt Uyanık and Aygün Akyol (Ankara, 2012).

<sup>241</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak* (Istanbul, 1316/1899), p. 31.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-7.

<sup>243</sup> İbrahim Edhem, *Semerât-ı Akıl* (Istanbul, 1303/1886), p. 20.

<sup>244</sup> Rifat bin Mehmed Emin was not the only teacher who showed interest in psychology and morality. In the in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries a number of morality teachers such as Rifat b. Mehmet Emin, Ali İrfan Eğribozi, Baha Tevfik, and Babanzade Ahmet Naim wrote both morality and psychology books as Erdem shows: Hüsameddin Erdem, *Son Devir Osmanlı Düşüncesinde Ahlak* (Istanbul, 2006).

book.<sup>245</sup> In the preface, Eğribozi stated that he actually intended to write another Islamic morality book, yet changed his plans as he, as an old man, was afraid of dying before he could complete the book. As a solution he had transformed the book into a psychology book by adding a few new chapters on psychology and brain physiology. It is also interesting that the term ‘psychology’, *ilm-i ahval-i ruh*, does not appear in the entire text, except for the title. This shows that modern psychology was born into the rich heritage of traditional perspectives of the soul and to a certain extent became subordinated to Islamic morality in its early years.

The use of psychology for ethical and didactic concerns was not only limited to classrooms. The reading public was also subject to them. Ahmet Mithat’s ‘İlhamat ve Taglitat: Psikoloji yani fenni menafi-i ruha dair bazı mülahazat’ (‘Inspirations and errors: some reflections on psychology – which means the positive science of the soul’) is one of the first examples of a series of journal articles on psychology with a heavily scholastic and didactic content.<sup>246</sup> Ahmet Mithat (1844-1912), writer, journalist, and popularizer of Western culture, began publishing this article in 1878 in *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (Interpreter of truth), a famous journal of the time. *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* was a school for young journalists and writers and a major tool for the spread of modern knowledge and culture among the reading public. Although Ahmet Mithat claimed to introduce psychology as a new modern discipline, which he defined as ‘the positive science of the soul’ (*yani fenni menafi-i ruh*), he merged scholastic content with human physiology. ‘İlhamat ve Taglitat’ depicts man as torn between two main

---

<sup>245</sup> Ali İrfan Eğribozi, ‘İfade-i Meram’, p. 3-5.

<sup>246</sup> Ahmed Mithat later on published *İlhamat ve Taglitat: Psikoloji yani fenni menafi-i ruha dair bazı mülahazat* as a book. He also published *Çocuk: Melekat-ı Uzviye ve Ruhiyesi*, a translation of Gabriel Compayré’s *The Child: Capacities of the Body and the Soul*, and *Nevm ve Halat-ı Nevm* in which he studied the relations between sleep and consciousness: Ahmet Mithat, *İlhamat ve Taglitat: Psikoloji yani fenni menafi-i ruha dair bazı mülahazat* (Istanbul, 1302/1885); Gabriel Compayré, *Çocuk: Melekat-ı Uzviye ve Ruhiyesi*, tr. Ahmet Mithat (Istanbul, 1902); Ahmet Mithat, *Nevm ve Halat-ı Nevm* (Istanbul, 1881).

motivations – inspirations (*ilhamat*) perceived as coming from God and errors (*tagligat*) perceived as coming from the *nafs* (the lowest self, greedy ego) – and aims to help readers win this battle.<sup>247</sup>

### **Physiological Perspectives or Materialism**

A significant change in content and the entrance of physiological subjects came with Hoca Tahsin's book *Psiholocya* (Psychology) – an exemplar of the juxtaposition of medical developments on the brain and Science of Morals.<sup>248</sup> Hoca Tahsin explained the soul through the former theory by utilizing Kınalızade's *Ahlak-ı Alaî*, and explained human biology (specifically the brain and spinal cord) using modern medical knowledge. He had become familiar with scientific perspectives on the soul during his stay in France, one of the main sources of influence on Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats in the process of educational modernization. During Hoca Tahsin's second stay in Paris between 1862 and 1869, French psychology was in the process of 'demystifying nature' and 'naturalizing the human being' due to the entrance of positive and experimental psychology.<sup>249</sup> French readers had already been informed about the idea of 'positive' psychology due to the popularity of Auguste Comte and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. In the beginning of the 1860s the French translations of Darwin's, Spencer's, and Claude Bernard's ground-breaking books came out, laying the basis of experimental psychology.<sup>250</sup> By proposing a more positivistic psychology in pursuit of a scientific grounding for the field, Hoca Tahsin

---

<sup>247</sup> Ahmet Mithat, *İlhamat ve Taglitat*, pp. 36-50.

<sup>248</sup> Even though it was published in 1891-92 by one of Hoca Tahsin's students, it was written sometime between 1873 and 1881. The year 1873 was mentioned in the book and Hoca Tahsin died in 1873. For a short summary of the book Ömer Faruk Akün, Hoca Tahsin, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 18 (1998), pp. 198-206.

<sup>249</sup> Parot, 'France', p. 230.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

fueled an ongoing discussion about materialism and spiritualism in psychological studies in the late Ottoman Empire.

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Ottoman intellectuals became more acquainted with the sea change caused by Darwinism. In this era a group of graduates of higher schools engaged in an effort to popularize scientific and philosophical trends of the time such as evolutionism, materialism, and positivism. Post-Feuerbach German popular materialism of the mid-nineteenth century, spearheaded by Ludwig Büchner, Jacob Moleschott, and Karl Vogt, had a big influence over Ottoman intellectuals, as Hanioglu illustrates.<sup>251</sup> Key to this were the ‘man as machine’ and ‘man as animal metaphors’, built upon De La Mettrie’s concept of *L’Homme machine*. This influence was put into words by stating that consciousness was a function of neural matter. This was partly as a result of tacit or explicit limitations on the development and free expression of some claims of materialism, scientism, and positivism, which would be deemed antireligious.

Within these boundaries a group of Ottoman intellectuals spearheaded by Beşir Fuad, Abdullah Cevdet, and Baha Tevfik played a pioneering role in promoting physiological perspectives on human nature through biological materialism. Beşir Fuad wrote one of the first popular physiology books *Beşer* (The human being), utilizing Bernard’s *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine*. It is important to note that the book was published by ‘Pocket Library’, printing concise essays for the general public and Beşir Fuad intended to make physiology explicable to the general audience by using simple language.<sup>252</sup> In this work Beşir Fuad draws an analogy between the human body and a machine. His article ‘Mebhas-ı Kihf ve Netayici’, (The skull and its effects), which seems to have used Ludwig Büchner’s

---

<sup>251</sup> Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a future society’, pp. 28-116.

<sup>252</sup> Beşir Fuad, *Beşer* (Istanbul, 1303/1886) pp. 9-10.

*Kraft und Stoff*, presents recent medical findings about brain physiology with the aim of disproving scholastic views of the soul.<sup>253</sup> Abdullah Cevdet wrote five books on the brain between 1890 and 1917 for the reading public – as will be explained in detail in chapter two. He published *Fizyolociya-ı Tefekkür* (Physiology of thinking), the first partial translation of *Force and Matter* by Büchner in 1890 [1308], when traditional theories of the soul were an integral part of classroom teaching and textbooks.<sup>254</sup> The full translation of *Force and Matter* was made by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil in 1911. Given that in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century psychology was still not established as a separate field and was not detached from traditional perspectives, the statement that consciousness was a function of neural matter served as a medical statement. It was Baha Tevfik who used psychology extensively in the Second Constitutional Era – as will be explained in detail in chapter four.

### **At the Crossroads of Spiritualism and Psychology**

Psychology started to be discussed at the *Darülfünun* in relation to philosophy when it was founded in 1900, after a couple of unsuccessful attempts. In 1900 Emrullah Efendi, a well-known Ottoman intellectual and minister of education, was given the task of teaching *hikmet-i nazariyeden ilm-i ahval-i nefis* (psychology as part of philosophy).<sup>255</sup> It is unclear whether Emrullah Efendi merged psychology and philosophy in his courses or aimed to detach psychology from its philosophical past. The name of the course and his compilation based on lecture notes, *İlm-i Hikmet* (Philosophy), wherein *İlm-i Ahval-i Nefs* (psychology) constitutes one section in a

---

<sup>253</sup> Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, pp. 111-12.

<sup>254</sup> To give one example Rifat bin Mehmed Emin stated that he taught the chapters on the soul of Kınalızade's *Ahlak-ı Alai* in the classrooms: Turan, 'Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları', p. 71.

<sup>255</sup> Mustafa Ergin argues that Emrullah Efendi started in 1910, yet Kara shows that he started in 1900. In *İkdam* magazine the list of courses and tutors including psychology under the name *ilm-i ahval-i nefis* was published on 18 August 1316 / 31 August 1900: İsmail Kara, 'Modern Türk Felsefesi Tarihinde Öncü Bir İsim Emrullah Efendi ve *İlm-i Hikmet* Dersleri', *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8 (2005), p. 98.

large philosophy book, suggest otherwise.<sup>256</sup> Shortly after that, psychology was removed from the program, although Emrullah Efendi continued teaching *ilm-i hikmet ve tarih-i ilm-i hikmet* (philosophy and the history of philosophy).<sup>257</sup> These suggest that for a long time psychology remained closely connected with philosophy as a course subject.

In the Second Constitutional Era the *Darülfünun* became a center for the interplay between psychology and spiritualism through a series of translation efforts. The first known dedicated psychology textbook taught at the *Darülfünun* was written by Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi in 1911 based on a French textbook, *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* (Elementary courses of philosophy) written by Émile Boirac, which I see as a turning point in psychological education. In the subsequent decade, a number of psychology textbooks were published, most of which were course books written by *Darülfünun* faculty members such as Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Mehmet Ali Ayni, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, and Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır. In this era, the works of French philosophers with more spiritualist tendencies such as Émile Boirac, Paul Janet, and Georges Fonsgreive were translated or utilized in compilations. Different sections of a French elementary school course book, *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie*, by Boirac, were translated by different authors many times.<sup>258</sup> Émile Boirac (1851-1917) was a French philosopher and parapsychologist, whose studies contributed to mesmerism and hypnosis at the height of spiritualism in late nineteenth century France. He came to be very popular in the Ottoman Empire, even though he

---

<sup>256</sup> Emrullah Efendi, *İlm-i Hikmet* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), pp. 81-160.

<sup>257</sup> There is no mentioning of psychology in 1902 and 1903 programs: Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 282-83. Emrullah Efendi's name however is mentioned as a tutor of philosophy courses in 1908 curriculum even though *ilm-i nefis* is not on the list: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Darülfünun: Osmanlı'da Kültürel Modernleşmenin Odağı*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2010), ii, pp. 546-7. In 1913 curriculum psychology is mentioned as *ilm-i nefis* together with logic, morality, philosophy and pedagogy under the umbrella of philosophy: *Ibid.*, p. 548.

<sup>258</sup> Émile Boirac, *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie conforme aux programmes du 31 mai 1902* (Paris, 1906).

does not seem to have had a big impact on French spiritualist psychology, unlike Paul Janet and Victor Cousin. The psychology section of Boirac's *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* was partially translated by Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi first in his *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Psychology) as will be explained in detail in chapter three.

Increasing interest in philosophical and psychological subjects in the early 1910s came along with a growing concern about terminological ambiguity. In 1913, *Istilahât-ı İlmiye Encümeni* (The commission of scientific terminologies) was founded to create a standard terminology for scientific and philosophical concepts in Ottoman Turkish.<sup>259</sup> While taking part in the commission, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Mehmet Ali Ayni, and Elmalılı Hamdi made important contributions to the accumulation of psychological terminology in Ottoman. Others such as Baha Tevfik started writing philosophical dictionaries individually.<sup>260</sup>

In the early 1920s the *Darülfünun* turned into a more intellectually stimulating environment in tune with Western academic standards, upon the return of young scholars with degrees from Europe – some of whom had been financed by the government. Behind the process of increasing scholarly quality there was a series of government policies, one of which was to invite German émigré professors with the aim of bringing new disciplines with modern standards to the *Darülfünun*.<sup>261</sup> In 1915 Dr Georg Anschütz (1886-1953) a professor of experimental psychology, who had worked with Alfred Binet in Paris in 1909 and Wilhelm Wundt in 1912 in Leipzig, started working at the *Darülfünun*.<sup>262</sup> However, to what extent Anschütz took his position seriously and deserved to be labelled as the founder of psychology in Turkey

---

<sup>259</sup> İsmail Kara, *Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak, Modern Felsefe ve Bilim Terimlerinin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (Istanbul, 2001), p. 40-9.

<sup>260</sup> For individual efforts to translate philosophical and scientific terms into Ottoman Turkish see for example: Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe Kamusu, Yirminci Asırda Zeka*, 1/5 (5 Mart 1328 / 18 March 1912).

<sup>261</sup> For more information: Mustafa Gencer, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve Alman Ruhu* (Istanbul, 2003).

<sup>262</sup> Emre Dölen, *İstanbul Darülfünun'unda Alman Müderrisler* (Istanbul, 2013), pp: 146-59.

is controversial. The number of interested students in his psychology classes was very low and the language barrier was an important obstacle.<sup>263</sup> During his stay for three years he did not produce more than a single article, and due to the language barrier his courses were not effective.<sup>264</sup> Regardless of whether Anschütz had any impact, the decision to invite German professors reveals the intention to attain a universal level in teaching psychology and to launch a 'scientific psychology'.

In fact, psychology teaching gradually became more fruitful thanks to returning psychologists and pedagogues. Ali Haydar Taner (1883-1956), who studied pedagogy and psychology at the Jena Institute in Germany, returned to Turkey in 1910 and became influential in planning the national curriculum upon the declaration of *Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu* (The law of unification). During Anschütz's stay Taner assisted Anschütz and took up the task of teaching experimental psychology after his departure. İsmail Hakkı Baltacıođlu (1886-1978), having finished his tour of Europe (France, England, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium) to learn recent turns in pedagogy and handcraft, returned to Istanbul in 1911 and started to work at the *Darülfünun* in 1913.<sup>265</sup> Halil Nimetullah Öztürk (1880-1957), who studied philosophy at Sorbonne University, started teaching philosophy and sociology at the *Darülfünun* in 1910. Mehmet İzzet (1891-1930), another Sorbonne student (who did not seem to have completed the program), started working at the *Darülfünun* in 1919.<sup>266</sup> Towards the end of the second decade of the 20th century, three graduates of the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute, Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1886-1958) İbrahim Alaaddin Gövsa (1889-

---

<sup>263</sup> Batur, 'Psikoloji Tarihinde Köken Mitosu ve Georg Anschütz'ün Hikayesi', pp. 168-88.

<sup>264</sup> Anschütz, Georg: 'İnsanların Ahval-i Ruhîyeleri Arasındaki Ferdi Farklar Hakkında Tetkikler', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/ 5 (1916), pp. 475-80. His courses were accompanied by Cevdet Nasuhi's physiological psychology course at the Faculties of Theology and Literature at *Darülfünun* and assisted by Ali Haydar Taner: Batur, 'Psikoloji Tarihinde Köken Mitosu ve Georg Anschütz'ün Hikayesi', p. 171.

<sup>265</sup> İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıođlu, *Hayatım* (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 220-37.

<sup>266</sup> Coşkun Değirmenciođlu, *Mehmet İzzet* (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 1-20.

1949), and Rahmi Balaban (1888-1953), returned to the Ottoman Empire and engaged in an effort to uplift the quality of teaching in psychology and pedagogy. In 1924, shortly after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the philosophy section of the literature faculty was run by professors who were specialized in their courses. Accordingly, related courses were taught by these professors: general psychology by Ali Haydar Taner; psychology by Mustafa Şekip Tunç; logic by Nimetullah Öztürk; morality by Mehmed İzzet; and pedagogy by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu.<sup>267</sup> Staff of the *Darülfünun* sociology and philosophy departments (such as Mehmet Emin Erişirgil and Necmettin Sadak, Mehmet Ali Ayni, Mehmet İzzet), and three Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute graduates Mustafa Şekip Tunç, İbrahim Alaaddin Gövsa (1889-1949), and Rahmi Balaban (1888-1953), contributed immensely to the development of psychological literature and specialization in the 1920s and 1930s, as will be studied in chapter four.

In this era, intellectuals and philosophy students became more acquainted with contemporary psychological trends. William James, Alfred Binet, Théodule-Armand Ribot, and Édouard Claparede were some of the most popular psychologists among Ottoman intellectuals. However, psychology remained in close touch with its traditional counterpart, philosophy, for a longer time. Effective use of the experimental laboratory would not come until 1937.<sup>268</sup> A new trend in psychological thinking, putting together psychology and Bergsonian spiritualism, was spearheaded by Tunç, as will be explained in chapter five. Bergsonian spiritualism was a continuation of the spiritualist understandings of the first decade of the century, as spearheaded by Babanzade Ahmed Naim and Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, in so far as the problematization

---

<sup>267</sup> M. Taner Tarhan and Ömer Faruk Akün, 'Edebiyat Fakültesi', in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 10 (1994), p. 401.

<sup>268</sup> Gülerce, 'Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads', p. 560.

of scientific determinism and mechanistic views of human nature and society are concerned. However, one significant difference should be remarked: Bergsonian spiritualism did not revolve around religion. Şekip Tunç started to publish his journal articles about Bergsonian spiritualism, psychology, the limitations of scientific methodology, and the importance of the concept of freedom in the journal *Dergah* (The lodge). Bergsonian spiritualism provided some other *Dergah* writers (such as Mehmed Emin Erişirgil and İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu) with a framework to criticize the limitations of science. This criticism was on a par with similar movements, in different parts of the early 20<sup>th</sup>-century world, spearheaded by philosophers such as William James, Henry Sedgwick, Henri Bergson, and Carl Jung in the form of Bergsonism, psychology, spiritualism, and psychical research.

In 1933 a major educational reform involving the closure of the *Darülfünun* was implemented, following another education report by a Swiss educationist, Albert Malche. Upon Malche's report, the *Darülfünun* went through a reform and it was replaced by Istanbul University.<sup>269</sup> Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953), the author of the rise of scientific philosophy, proponent of empiricist philosophy and an exile from Nazism, came to the university together with thirty-two other German professors. Reichenbach stayed in Turkey until 1938, when he moved to the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Upon his arrival the department went through certain changes directed towards establishing a more empiricist philosophy.<sup>270</sup> For psychological studies, Wilhelm Peters, a German psychologist from Jena University, was hired.<sup>271</sup> This resulted in the foundation of the first experimental psychology

---

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, p. 464-7.

<sup>271</sup> For more information as to German speaking scientists including Wilhelm Peters who were forced to leave Germany: Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, eds, *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge, 1996).

institute with a laboratory and a library, in 1937.<sup>272</sup> The first psychological association and psychology journal (*The Journal of Experimental Psychology*) were founded the following year. This enabled the birth of institutional and applied psychology in a significantly different context after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, which deserves to be analysed on its own terms and would be the subject of another project.

## **Conclusion**

In its prolonged break-up from philosophy, and with its large margin for different interpretations, psychology provided intellectuals with a rich framework to develop different imageries of man. Psychological publications starting in 1876 took hybrid forms between old and new information, in close touch with the religiously coloured Science of Morals. With Hoca Tahsin's approach to psychology, biological explanations gained more visibility. From the 1910s onwards the *Darülfünun* dominated psychological discussions, with a clear tendency towards the French spiritualist school represented by Victor Cousin, Paul Janet on the psychological front, and Bergson in philosophy. Psychology education remained philosophical and metaphysical in the late Ottoman Empire, and revolved around different conceptualizations of the soul articulated through the debate between materialism and spiritualism. This debate did not take crude bifurcated forms, however. It instead remained an open space for intellectuals to make sense of philosophical, psychological, and physiological theories, rather than being an open battlefield characterized by bold assertions; this was largely due to the barriers to making anti-Islamic remarks, as will be discussed in the next chapters.

---

<sup>272</sup> Gülerce, 'Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads', p. 560.

The principal defect of all materialism up to now - including that of Feuerbach - is that the external object, reality, the sensible world, is grasped in the form of an object or an intuition; but not as concrete human activity, as practice, in a subjective way. This is why the active aspect was developed by idealism, in opposition to materialism - but only in an abstract way, since idealism naturally does not know real concrete activity as such.

Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*

## **Chapter II: Idle Souls, Progressive Brains in a Mind Industry: The Birth of the ‘Man Machine’ at the Medical School**

In the historiography of Ottoman modernization, Ottoman materialism has been considered to be the carrier of full-fledged modernization, Westernization, and secularization in an allegedly inherent opposition to tradition and religion. Accordingly, Abdullah Cevdet has been assigned the role of the one of the masterminds of the Republic of Turkey’s state ideology, seen in a narrative of linear progress as the ultimate outcome of Ottoman modernization. This ideologically loaded framework puts a heavy burden on Abdullah Cevdet’s early materialist writings in the 1890s, even though they were born into a completely different political and social context. In doing so it overlooks the popularity of scientific theories of man following the outbreak of evolutionism, which connected Ottoman intellectuals with their counterparts in the rest of the world, as well as the actual uses of these scientific texts and the authors’ attempts to silence the anti-religious content of materialism. This chapter keeps a tight focus on these texts, and shifts the centre of focus of Ottoman materialism from allegedly hidden political agendas to more immediate down-to-earth concerns about economic and technological deterioration. It therefore asks a rather simpler question: How do we make sense of the promotion of a literature on brain physiology in a reductionist and materialist fashion as the solution to Ottoman

economic and technological deterioration? What does the circulation of mechanistic conceptualizations of human nature such as ‘man as machine’, ‘brain as a fabric’, and ‘mind as a clock’, as parts of a ‘mind industry’ tell us? ‘The brain is a new talisman’, said Abdullah Cevdet. It was the key to making progress, while questions of the soul in his view were time-consuming, idle, and irrelevant to the burning economic problems.

Starting with a glimpse into Ottoman medical modernization and the wide circulation of popular science literature in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this chapter discusses the role of biological materialism in the process of the dissemination of scientific views of man in the late Ottoman Empire. It proposes taking biological materialism – which surfaced in the medical academy, shedding its antireligious stance – as a necessary and natural step in the dissemination of scientific views of human nature and brain physiology. By a close reading of the masterpieces of Ottoman materialism written between 1890 and 1917 by the medical doctor and prominent intellectual Abdullah Cevdet, it uncovers a list of new conceptualizations such as mind training (*idman-ı dimağ*), mechanism (*mihaniyet*), universal determinism (*icabiye-i külliye*), mind industry (*sanayi-i akliyye*), and mind evolution (*tekamül-i dimağ*). Ultimately it proposes an alternative interpretation of the use of materialism: against the backdrop of the challenge of economic development ‘in capitalistic terms’<sup>273</sup> in late Ottoman intellectual thought, the human body and the soul became objects of progressive discourses to be understood, simplified, and shaped conforming to the rhetoric of a new work ethic. In this framework the soul was considered to be idle, while the brain was suitable for new designs. Here lies one of the most important

---

<sup>273</sup> Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 193.

implications of writing about brain physiology in a reductionist and materialist fashion: subjecting Ottoman individuals to progressive projects.

### **Dissemination of Scientific and Mechanistic Views of Man in the Second Half of the 19th Century with a Critical Look at ‘Ottoman Materialism’**

The secondary literature on medical modernization in the Ottoman Empire at times leaves historians of science and medicine with a cumbersome terminology and the task of revisiting the modernization paradigm with a tighter focus on the role of medicine. In this respect, the present chapter proposes that Ottoman medical modernization was not as progressive and linear as it claimed to be, nor was Ottoman materialism necessarily in an inherent clash with Islam.

The conventional narrative of Ottoman medical modernization usually begins with Mahmud II’s famous speech announcing the language of instruction at the *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* (Imperial medical school) to be French, a short while after its foundation in 1827. This is alleged to be a hallmark of ‘Westernization’: ‘Dear students, I have ordered construction of a magnificent building for a medical school and named it the Imperial Medical School. I have prioritized this school over other schools on the basis of its sacred duty of the preservation of human health. Here instruction will be in French.’<sup>274</sup> In Niyazi Berkes’s seminal book *The Development of Secularism*, for example, ‘Mahmud’s *anti-traditionalistic* spirit was particularly apparent and persistent in the School of Medicine’.<sup>275</sup> The medical academy was the

---

<sup>274</sup> ‘Çocuklar, iş bu ebniye-i aliye-i Mekteb-i Tıbbiye olmak üzere teşkil ve terkip ederek Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şahane tesmiye ettim ve burada beka-ı sıhhat-ı beşeriye hizmet-i azizesine muvazebet olunacağından bu mekteb-i sair mekteplere tercih ve takdim eyledim. Bunda Fransızca olarak fenn-i tıbbi tahsil edeceksiniz.’ in Rıza Tahsin, *Tip Fakültesi Tarihçesi (Mirat-ı Mekteb-i Tıbbiye)*, Aykut Kazancıgil, ed. (Istanbul, 1991), p. 10.

<sup>275</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London, 1998), p. 115.

embodiment of ‘how far in *advance* of the eighteenth century Mahmud was’, specifically considering its francophone curriculum.<sup>276</sup>

Underneath this historiography lies the modernist claim of equating modernization to the ‘bureaucratic organization of society’ and taking modern Western statecraft to be an ideal type from the outset.<sup>277</sup> Accordingly, the story of modernization in non-Western countries is narrated through themes of negation and inadequacy, expressed by a long list of ‘lack of’s. Medical modernization and the foundation of the *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane* did indeed display an element of Westernization. When the *Tıphane-i Amire* (School of medicine) was transformed into the *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane* in 1839, Austrian physician Charles Ambrois Bernard was appointed as the head of the school with the aim of reforming education along Western lines.<sup>278</sup> This was however experienced collectively by non-Western countries. Egyptian medical modernization, for example, started with the appointment of French physician Dr Clot in the 1820s.<sup>279</sup> There was a large degree of interaction and intercommunication within the non-Western world - primarily between Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tahrán and Istanbul - on such issues, going beyond one-dimensional paradigms of West vs. East.<sup>280</sup>

Ottoman medical modernization took much longer than expected to bear fruits. The school intended to provide cutting-edge and intensive training. Before specializing in internal medicine courses such as internal diseases, dermatology, gynaecology, neurology, paediatrics, surgery, and forensics, students were given four

---

<sup>276</sup> Ibid., p. 113; (Italics are mine).

<sup>277</sup> For a discussion on the role of the ‘bureaucratic organization of society’ in the Ottoman Empire: İslamoğlu, ‘Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitution of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires’, pp. 110-15.

<sup>278</sup> Osman Şevki Uludağ, *Tanzimat ve Hekimlik* (Istanbul, 1940), p. 2.

<sup>279</sup> The date of the foundation of the school is controversial and is stated as 1825, 1826 and 1828 in different sources: Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 179.

<sup>280</sup> İhsanoğlu, *Darülfünun*, i, pp. 445-6.

years' foundational education in sciences such as inorganic chemistry, geology, dissection, organic chemistry, physiology, and pathology.<sup>281</sup> This was supported by applied medicine, patient visits, as well as dissection practice, which was allowed on non-Muslim bodies from 1838 onwards.<sup>282</sup> This effectively postponed the opening of the school to 1843, when the program produced its first graduates. The numbers however remained significantly low: sixteen for the first term and ten for the next.<sup>283</sup> The language barrier continued to be a serious problem, resulting in this strikingly low number of graduates. For a long time students with no basis in French – primarily Muslims – were unable to follow its courses.<sup>284</sup> For medical modernization to be effective and produce a substantial number of physicians, one therefore needs to wait until the last quarter of the nineteenth century – after the foundation of *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye* (Civil medical school) in 1867, whose language of instruction was Ottoman Turkish from the outset; and the change of curriculum from French to Ottoman Turkish in *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* in 1870. In 1909 these two schools were merged under the roof of a new building in Haydarpaşa, which had been used by *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane* since 1903.

Even in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, these schools were unable to produce a sufficient number of graduates to fulfil the need for physicians in the empire, which resulted in the integration of traditional practitioners. For example in

---

<sup>281</sup> Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 232.

<sup>282</sup> Ceren Gülser İlikan Rasimoğlu, 'The Foundation of a Professional Group: Physicians in the nineteenth century modernizing Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908' (PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2012), p. 173. For more information on forensic medicine: Polat Oğuz and Cem Uysal, History of Forensic Medicine in Turkey, *Legal Medicine*, 11 (2009), pp. 107-10. One important study to mention is Ebru Boyar's PhD thesis which approaches forensic medicine from a social history perspective through close analysis of rural arson and poisoning cases: Ebru Aykut, 'Alternative Claims on Justice and Law: Rural Arson and Poison Murder in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Ottoman Empire' (PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011).

<sup>283</sup> Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, p. 180.

<sup>284</sup> Spitzer for example reported in 1838 - eleven years after the foundation of the school and 4 years after the foundation of Tıbhane-i Amire and Cerrahhane – that the number of students who were able to follow courses was only fifteen out of 80 in total due to language barrier: Yeşim Işıl Ülman, 'Journal de Constantinople'a Göre Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şahane'nin Galatasaray Dönemi' (MA thesis, İstanbul University, 1994), p. 34.

the *1873 Salname* (Yearbook) there were 962 medical school students in total.<sup>285</sup> In the *1883 Salname*, this number rose to 1150.<sup>286</sup> Between 1913 and 1914 there were 592 civil and 306 military medical school graduates enrolled in the program.<sup>287</sup> Following the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) this number dropped to 551.<sup>288</sup> In due course, traditional medical practitioners were given licenses, an example of ‘breaking barriers between modern and traditional medicine’ according to Ebrahimnejad.<sup>289</sup>

Central to this line of understanding is to resist to the lure of the foundational narrative and ‘modern’ façade of *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane*, and to see the more gradual and organic process that lay behind Ottoman medical modernization. Fortunately, recent historiography of medical development in non-Western contexts provides more cutting-edge perspectives to guide us through medical modernization. The nature of processes of indigenization of medical knowledge, and the co-existence of old and new and Western and non-Western medical forms, are major themes which historians of science and medicine in non-Western contexts should not overlook. One solution proposed by Hormoz Ebrahimnejad is to focus on the *process* of modernization and the *forms* of hybridization, ‘rather than perceiving modernisation as a “transplantation” of modern Western medicine out of Europe’:

A ‘process’ of modernization on the other hand, posits as a force resulting from the articulation or interaction of individual projects, strategies, politics, as well as cultural and economic factors. This is why, for instance, reform projects could never be implemented as they were planned by the colonial agents or committed missionaries... By substituting ‘project’ with ‘process’ as the object of study, the whole perspective of examining the history of medicine changes. While for former the modernity–tradition dichotomy or

---

<sup>285</sup> Mehmed Ö. Alkan, ed., *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim İstatistikleri, 1839-1924*, VII (Ankara, 2000), p. 21.

<sup>286</sup> There were 497 students at *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane*, 151 students at *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane İdadisi*, and 502 students at *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Mülkiye*: Ibid., pp. 34-5.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., p. 269.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., p. 284.

<sup>289</sup> Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, ed., *The Development of Modern Medicine in Non-Western Countries: Historical perspectives* (London, 2009), p. 11.

opposition between modern and traditional or Western and non-Western medicines, become irrelevant due to their interaction, accommodation and co-ordination, although spasmodic and marked by instances of resistance and conflict, within the framework of the reconstruction of modern medicine.<sup>290</sup>

Medical modernization in the Ottoman Empire was also a long ‘process’, rather than a ‘project’. For a long time traditional and modern approaches to medicine were both sidelined: ‘Despite much argument to the contrary, it seems clear that the age of modern medicine in the Ottoman Empire did not arrive circa 1800 but had its beginnings only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.’<sup>291</sup> Throughout the nineteenth century, the level of medical treatment and the care of patients remained ‘at a relatively *pre-modern* level’ in the Ottoman Empire, both ‘in the near east no less than in Europe and America.’<sup>292</sup> It is therefore important to see this as a long and gradual process, falling somewhere in between ‘full-fledged modernization’ and ‘traditionalism’.

One important consequence of the process of medical modernization was a dissemination of scientific views of man through a long process of reinterpretation, indigenization, and hybridization. One important task of historians of science and medicine is therefore to resist biases and gain a clear view of the ways in which medical knowledge was subjected to a process of reinterpretation – one such bias being the assumption of a clash between science and religion. Revisiting the alleged clash between the medical and religious worlds is a good place to start, and an important preliminary step towards delving into the phenomena called ‘Ottoman materialism’. Rather than taking materialism to be a direct or indirect attack at Islam, this chapter proposed to take it as a necessary and natural outcome of medical modernization and the dissemination of scientific views of man.

---

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>291</sup> Rhoads Murphy, ‘Ottoman Medicine and Transculturalism from the Sixteenth through the Eighteenth Century’, *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 66/3 (1992), p. 379.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

Mahmud II's speech usually goes together with a traveller account of *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane* by Scottish writer and traveller Charles Macfarlane (1799-1858). On visiting the site, having recovered from the first shock of finding a botanical garden, a natural history museum, and dissection being carried out, he initiates interaction with the students:

As we entered, these Mussulman students were talking and laughing, were handling the black human flesh with as little scruple as if it had been mutton or lamb, and were working away with scalpels that were shorter than our silver fruit-knives. I asked one of them whether all this were not somewhat contrary to his religion. He laughed in my face and said: 'Eh! Monsieur, ce n'est pas au Galata Serai qu'il faut venir chercher la religion!' One of the Greek students who was accompanying me enjoyed the Turk's sally very much, and assured me that in this College they all became philosophers a la Voltaire. I had reason to believe that they went far beyond or below Voltaire. 'You see' said one of the professors 'how we extirpate prejudices! Did you ever expect to see Turks opening and cutting up a human body?' I replied 'No?' and, feeling rather sick, walked out of the room and into the garden.<sup>293</sup>

This account for many bore testament to the 'infidelity' of Ottoman medical school students, as it came to be entitled by MacFarlane in his memoir. His visit to *Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane* resulted in one of the most detailed and perhaps most commonly used traveller accounts of the surprising experience of 'Muslim students' with science. It is supported by his growing surprise in the face of materialist books in the school library:

It was long since I had seen such a collection of downright materialism. A young Turk, seemingly about twenty years of age, was sitting cross-legged in a corner of the room reading that manual of atheism, the 'Systeme de la Nature'! Another of the students showed his proficiency in French and philosophy, by quoting passages from Diderot's 'Jacques le Fataliste', and from that compound of blasphemy and obscenity, 'Le Compere Mathieu'. Les Turques se civilisent. Yes! With a vengeance! And quite a la Francaise. And when they are thus civilized, what next? I saw a few works in German, and there appeared to be a few translations of English medical books, but the bulk was wholly French. Cabanis's 'Rapport de la Physique et du Morale de l'Homme' occupied a conspicuous place on the shelves. I no longer wondered it should be commonly said that '*every student who came out of Galata Serai, after keeping the full term came out always a materialist, and generally a libertine and rogue.*'<sup>294</sup>

---

<sup>293</sup> Charles MacFarlane, *Turkey and Its Destiny*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1850), ii, pp: 268-9.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271.

This passage, full of generalizations, has frequently been used in the secondary literature as testimony to the role of the medical school in the ‘development of secularism’ and the escalation of the clash between modernity and Islam. According to this account, science-loving medical school students who allegedly became alienated from their culture and abruptly lost their link with tradition as soon as they entered the medical school, then galvanized the Ottoman elites into action and catalyzed Ottoman modernization – all in a linear and progressive manner. Within this framework, Ottoman materialism was presented as a side-effect of educational modernization.

In the context of medical modernization and the dissemination of scientific views of man, materialism was one tool for thinking about human nature in a way that was in tune with the scientific findings available at the time. Put simply, materialism is the view that the world is composed of matter, and is intrinsically opposed to mind-body dualism.<sup>295</sup> In a little more depth, it is defined as: ‘The theory or belief that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications; (more narrowly) the theory or belief that mental phenomena are nothing more than, or are wholly caused by, the operation of material or physical agencies.’<sup>296</sup> As a philosophical position, materialism has a long history, going back at least to Greek atomism, and has taken many different forms since then: *inter alia* atomism, physicalism, historical materialism, dialectic materialism, biological materialism, and mechanical materialism.<sup>297</sup> Conceptually it is closely related to naturalism, monism, positivism, and evolutionism, which often leads to terminological and conceptual ambiguities between these views.

---

<sup>295</sup> Simon Blackburn, ‘materialism’, in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 12 January 2016.

<http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2232/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-1958?rsk=r5gSVk&result=1951>

<sup>296</sup> ‘Materialism’, in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 14 August 2015.

<http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/114925?redirectedFrom=materialism#eid>

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

Much of what is referred to in the secondary literature as materialism, evolutionism, or naturalism was part of the process of the dissemination of scientific views of man and nature, and thus represent discussions that were underway before the existing classifications between disciplines were established. The sciences pertaining to man that are in use today have a long history behind them, marked by shifting conceptualizations and different disciplinary boundaries to those we have now. By around 1700 a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques were in use under the umbrella of ‘the study of human and animal function or physiology’, such as the anatomical and experimental tradition of Harvey, the iatromic trend launched by Paracelsus, and the mechanistic approach to physiology.<sup>298</sup> Throughout the 18th century medicine, physiology, anatomy, and anthropology constituted a sum of views and treatments in understanding man – as well as other living beings. Anthropology in its origin, for example, was defined as ‘the science that treats of man, is divided ordinarily and with reason into Anatomy, which considers the body and the parts, and Psychology, which speaks of the soul.’<sup>299</sup> Physiology only started to achieve a degree of independence from medicine between 1790 and 1821.<sup>300</sup>

This amalgamation is best captured by a call by physiologist and philosopher Pierre-Jean Georges Cabanis (1757-1808) to his colleagues to establish ‘the science of man and society’ in the new Class of Moral and Political Sciences of the French National Institute in 1796. His principal work *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l’Homme* (On the relations between the physical and moral aspects of man) not only formed the basis of physiological psychology but also represented the ‘blending of

---

<sup>298</sup> John E. Lesch, *Science and Medicine in France: The Emergence of Experimental Physiology, 1790-1855* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 16.

<sup>299</sup> Caspar Bartholin and Thomas Bartolin, ‘Preface’, in *Institutions Anatomiques de Gaspar Bartholin, augmentées et enrichies pour la seconde fois tant des opinions et observations nouvelles des modernes*, tr. Abr. Du Prat (Paris, 1647).

<sup>300</sup> Lesch, *Science and Medicine in France*, p. 13.

medical and philosophical traditions’ as being a common current of the time.<sup>301</sup> This book, considered the bible of materialism in Macfarlane’s account as well as in the secondary literature on late Ottoman materialism, was actually one of the key texts of the sciences of man and biomedicine from a monist perspective.<sup>302</sup>

This interconnectedness is best captured by Williams’s work *The Physical and the Moral*, adopting a careful historical approach which remains faithful to the ways in which man was considered to be and treated as a subject of inquiry: ‘For about a hundred years French medicine sheltered an intellectual tradition that contemporaries knew under the rubric “la science de l’homme” but that I have tried to capture in my title by referring serially to anthropology, physiology and philosophical medicine.’<sup>303</sup> The term ‘medical science of man’, according to Williams, captures the complexity and interconnectedness among different disciplines in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. It aimed ‘to investigate not body, mind or feeling in isolation but instead the “relations between the physical and the moral”’.<sup>304</sup>

When Ottoman intellectuals engaged in an effort to introduce popular Western scientific discussions to the Ottoman reading public, they processed and reinterpreted a large corpus on ‘sciences of man’ written over a large time span. Science became an important part of late Ottoman modernization, as shown at an intellectual level by the foundation of science societies in the 1850s. Since the publication of the first medical journal *Vekayi-i Tibbiye* (Medical events) in 1849 and the foundation of *Cemiyet-i Tibbiye-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman medical society) and its magazine *Gazette Medical d’Orient* in 1856, a number of medical and scientific journals were written to

---

<sup>301</sup> Martin S. Staum, *Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution* (New Jersey, 1980), p. 8.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Elizabeth A. Williams, *The Physical and the Moral: Antropology, physiology, and philosophical medicine in France, 1750-1850* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 1.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

introduce new subjects such as pathology, paediatrics, gynaecology, and physiology, to people who were unable to read foreign languages.<sup>305</sup> New scientific societies such as *Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmiyesi* (Beşiktaş science society), *Tıbbiye Cemiyeti* (Medical society) were founded with particular courses of open lectures and lists of publications intended to popularize new sciences.<sup>306</sup> *Encümen-i Daniş* (The assembly of knowledge) was founded in 1851 with forty members specializing in different subjects for preparing books to be taught at new institutions.<sup>307</sup> Upon the dismissal of *Encümen-i Daniş*, *Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman scientific society) took up the task of preparing course books.<sup>308</sup> This was a civil society founded by Ottoman statesman Münif Paşa (1830-1910) in 1861. *Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye* published a monthly journal *Mecmua-i Fünun* (The journal of sciences), which played the role of the famous 'French *Encyclopédie* of the eighteenth century' by introducing new subjects and by promoting modern and positive views.<sup>309</sup>

As the secondary literature on social Darwinism, anthropology, and materialism in the Ottoman Empire has informed us, leading intellectuals such as Ahmet Mithat, Ebuzziya Tevfik, and Şemsettin Sami published extensively on the

---

<sup>305</sup> For the list of medical periodicals: Gönül Dinç, 'A Study on Medical Periodicals Published in Turkish in Arabic Alphabet', *Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları*, 5 (1993), pp. 96-131. For an early example from the 1860s: Gönül Dinç, 'Tuhfetü'l-Tıb, as a pioneer periodical of the medical history', *Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları*, 10 (2001), pp. 21-37.

<sup>306</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, '19 yy. Başında Kültür Hayatı ve Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmiyesi', *Bellekten*, 51 (1987), pp. 801-20.

<sup>307</sup> Kenan Akyüz, *Encümen-i Daniş* (Ankara, 1975). *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti* was founded in 1857 by replacing the preceding department *Mekatib-i Umumiye Nezareti* to develop the educational reforms. Mahmud Cevad, *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihçe-i Teşkilat ve İcraatı* (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 31-2.

<sup>308</sup> Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye'nin Kuruluş ve Faaliyetleri*, *Osmanlı İlimi ve Mesleki Cemiyetleri* (Istanbul 1987), pp. 197-220.

<sup>309</sup> The journal was published monthly between 1862 and 1867 except for one year between 1865 and 1866. In total it was published for forty-seven issues. This journal according to Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, a well-known novelist and essayist of Turkish literature, played the role of the famous French *Encyclopédie* of the eighteenth century by introducing new subjects and by promoting modern and positive views: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Ondokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1956), p. 154.

place of man in nature from the views of recent scientific theories.<sup>310</sup> Ebuzziya Tevfik wrote *Buffon* to introduce Comte De Buffon to his readers.<sup>311</sup> This was followed by Şemsettin Sami's two major pieces about scientific views of man: *İnsan* (Man) and *Yine İnsan* (Man again).<sup>312</sup> These dealt with the subjects of the emergence of man in the universe, human ancestors, variety of human kind, and evolution of mind from an evolutionary perspective, by utilizing recent theories of *ilm-i beşer* (anthropology) and *ilm-i arz* (geology). In doing so, however, he kept the discussion within certain limits: 'Neither do we present man as an animal or a plant as materialism suggested, nor do we comply with Sufism.'<sup>313</sup> Ahmet Mithat gave clear support for evolutionism in an article series in *Dağarcık* (Repertoire).<sup>314</sup> Having presented human being as a subspecies of animals, indeed one of the weakest, in *İnsan* (Human being), he moved on to the question of man's origin in *Dünyada İnsanın Zuhuru* (The emergence of man in the universe).<sup>315</sup> In this short piece he merged a Lamarckian understanding of evolutionism with the ancient Islamic concept of the *nisan*, similar to the monkey and placed just below the category of human beings in a hierarchical manner.<sup>316</sup> He concluded by giving clear support for evolutionism:

I believe that human beings initially were not like quadrupedal nisan like monkeys that we see now. They rather were like nisan with two legs. Like any other animal, they also had different kinds, black and white with different chemical compositions.

---

<sup>310</sup> For an overview of the anthropological literature in the Ottoman Empire: Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Popülizm, 1908-1923* (Istanbul, 2013), pp. 49-76.

<sup>311</sup> Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Buffon* (Istanbul, 1299/1883).

<sup>312</sup> Şemsettin Sami, *İnsan* (Istanbul, 1299/1879); *Yine İnsan* (Istanbul, 1303/1886).

<sup>313</sup> 'Biz bu risalede ne maddiyununun fikrine tabi olarak insanı adeta enva-ı hayvanattan bir nevi veyahut bir nebat ad edeceğiz ve ne de tasavvufun dediklerini söyleyeceğiz.' Şemsettin Sami, *İnsan*, p. 5.

<sup>314</sup> Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, pp. 152-65.

<sup>315</sup> Ahmet Mithat, 'İnsan', *Dağarcık*, 2 (1288/1872-3), pp. 40-9; 'Dünyada İnsanın Zuhuru', *Dağarcık*, 4 (1288/1872-3), pp. 109-17.

<sup>316</sup> F. Viré, 'Kird', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 24 March 2016.

[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/kird-SIM\\_4386](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/kird-SIM_4386)

They must have left the world of quadrupeds with their disposition of ‘seeking, searching beings’ with rivalry and evolved into what history has presented us as the first man in a period of many thousand years.<sup>317</sup>

Our understanding of the ways in which Ottoman intellectuals internalized this long tradition and subjected texts into a process of reinterpretation is currently very limited. This means that we must undertake a close reading of the texts that were translated and reproduced. One thing we can say for sure, however, is that a presumption of a total exclusion of religious discourses from the medical schools would be far from reality. Especially during the reign of Abdülhamit II, imbuing them with Islamic content was a common tool in the indigenization of medical texts of Western origin. As Yalçınkaya reveals, there were a number of physicians and students at medical schools who engaged in an effort to ‘construct Islam as a scientific religion’,<sup>318</sup> synthesizing biology and the Quran while also complaining about moral corruption in society.<sup>319</sup> Given the state support behind the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument, it is not surprising to hear such voices much strongly through the print culture. These examples, according to Yalçınkaya, show that ‘The official discourse of the last two decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century combined the themes of the past decades and rendered science a topic that could not be discussed without overt references to morality’.<sup>320</sup> Accordingly, what came in the mainstream historiography to be seen as ‘a superficial scientific attitude along with insights based on German popular

---

<sup>317</sup> ‘Benim itikadımca insanlar hayat zuhurunda şimdi görmekte olduğumuz nisnaslar gibi dört ayak üzerinde yürür bir nevi mahluk değildi. Yine iki ayak üzerinde yürür bir nevi nisnas idi. Her hayvanda olduğu gibi bunların dahi siyahı ve beyazı veyahut simyaca mütenevveleri vardı. Bunlar hilkat ve cibiliyetlerinde cesed-i vücu[d] (sic) olan istidad ve fevkaladeleriyle beraber rekabet dahi cibiliyetlerinde meknuz olduğundan uzun uzadıya cesed-i vücu[d] (sic)ları bir çok tecrübeler üzerine bitedic bahâyim alemini bırakarak kim bilir kaç bin seneden şimdiye tarihin bize ‘birinci adamlar’ diye haber verdiği ve dağlarda ve ormanlarda ve mağaralarda mütefarik ve perakende bir suretle tayis eylediklerini hikaye eylediği adamlar derecesini bulabilmişlerdir.’ Ahmet Mithat, ‘Dünyada İnsanın Zuhuru’, *Dağarcık*, 4 (1288/1872-3), p. 116.

<sup>318</sup> Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*, pp. 186-8.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

materialism, particularly among the students of the Imperial Military Army and School of Medicine', indeed remained as a 'marginal perspective' at the time, or so Yalçinkaya concludes.<sup>321</sup> In this process, he argues, the typology of the 'confused materialist' as a newly emerging problematic character in the eyes of the state served as a disciplinary tool.<sup>322</sup> Biological materialism, which developed in the medical schools by giving up its antireligious roots, was a necessary and natural step in the dissemination of scientific views of human nature and brain physiology.

Taking up the task of questioning the preconceptions of mainstream historiography and contextualizing materialism as a tool in the dissemination of scientific views of man from where Yalcinkaya leaves off, this chapter aims to subject Abdullah Cevdet's 'materialist' publications to a close reading. In doing so it aims to arrive at a detailed understanding of the use and new shape of materialism in Abdullah Cevdet's hands, instead of thinking of him as a passive recipient of materialism in a crude sense.

To begin with, there seem to be multiple different interpretations of materialism – which in general was named *maddiyyun mezhebi*, *materyalizm*, and *dehriyyun* – in Ottoman Turkish. Celal Nuri, for example, expressed his dislike for the term 'materialism', as it brought to his mind the image of 'corpses without souls'. Nuri had a different understanding of materialism which 'unlike common assumptions, was not only about nonliving matters.'<sup>323</sup> Further complicating the picture, in philosophy and science writings materialism was often conceptualized in relation to a number of different philosophical and scientific currents, such as naturalism, idealism,

---

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., p. 165. In Yalçinkaya's definition 'confused materialists' were those who were considered to be 'ignorant of Islam and vulnerable to European philosophies as well as prone to immorality and in particular, disobedience to the sultan.' Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>323</sup> Celal Nuri, *Tarih-i İstikbal* (Istanbul, 1936) p. 39 cited in Hatice Çöpel, *Celal Nuri İleri'nin Din Anlayışı* (MA thesis, Selçuk University, 2010), p. 33.

spiritualism, and evolutionism, each of which had a large potential for terminological ambiguities. In Şemsettin Sami's *Kamus-ı Fransevi* (French dictionary) 'materialism' was accompanied by 'naturalism' (*tabiyyun*): 'the belief in nothing but matter, materialism and naturalism (*maddiyyun, tabiyyun ve dehiyyun mezhebi*)'.<sup>324</sup> In Babanzade Ahmed Naim's understanding, materialism was contrasted with *tasavvuriye* (idealism): 'Idealism [*tasavvuriye mezhebi*] is often contrasted with materialism. Accordingly it corresponds to the belief in non-material phenomena.'<sup>325</sup> Coming from an intellectual who actually publicized materialism extensively, Baha Tevfik's definition was the most detailed and perhaps closest to everyday usage: 'The belief that everything including the soul is composed of the matter. In materialist thought the soul was a brain function. The brain secretes thought, just like stomach secretes gastric juice.'<sup>326</sup> His definition was along the lines of biological materialism. Similarly, for Şerafeddin Mağmumi the controversy between materialism and spiritualism boiled down to cerebral activity: 'The major controversy between materialism [*maddiyyun*] and spiritualism [*ruhiyyun*] stems from the claim whether the cerebral activity is consisted of the soul or not. Refraining from engaging with this debate, I would only say: it is the brain, which sees, hears, smells and tastes.'<sup>327</sup>

Biological materialism indeed was the key form of materialism in the late Ottoman Empire, as in the case of Abdullah Cevdet as well. His strong support for

---

<sup>324</sup> 'Maddiyattan başka bir şeye inanmamak meslek ve itikadı, maddiyyun, tabiyyun ve dehiyyun mezhebi' Şemsettin Sami, 'Materialiste', *Kamus-ı Fransevi: Fransızca'dan Türkçe'ye lügat kitabı*, 3rd edn. (Istanbul, 1322/1905), p. 1426.

<sup>325</sup> 'Bazan da *materialisme* yani *maddiye mezhebi* mukabili olarak istimal olunur. Ve bu ıstılaha gore tasavvuriye mezhebi maddeden başka bir mebdin de vücuduna kail olan mezahibin ismi olmuş olur.' 'Tasavvuriye Mezhebi' in İsmail Kara, Babanzade Ahmet Naim Bey'in Modern Felsefe Terimlerine Dair Çalışmaları, *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 4 (2000), p. 266.

<sup>326</sup> 'Maddiye [Matérialisme]: Ruh da dahil olmak üzere her şeyin aslını maddeye irca etmek mesleğidir. Maddiye mesleğinde ruh denilen şey dimağın bir vazifesi ad olunur: Mide nasıl usâre-i mideviyye ifraz ederse dimağ da tefekkür husule getirir.' Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe Kamusu', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, 10 (undated), p. 167.

<sup>327</sup> 'Maddiyyun ile ruhiyyun arasında hükümferma olan muaraza –ki esası, faaliyet-i dimağiyenin "ruh" dan ibaret olup olmadığı iddiasından ibarettir- karışmaktan ictinâben derim ki "gören, işiten, koku ve lezzet duyan" beyindir.' Şerafeddin Mağmumi, *Vücut-ı Beşer* (Istanbul, 1839), p. 257.

imbuing science writings with Islamic content and silencing anti-religious content, gave his understanding of materialism a different shape. A closer look at his use of ‘materialism’ reveals a process of transformation of major materialist texts into popular brain physiology books.

Aside from journal articles and sketches of materialist thoughts published here and there, Abdullah Cevdet at an early stage of his career published seven pieces which for his time were notably courageous, and which earned him the title of materialist. He did not write directly about his understanding of materialism, but he used it to support his concoction of biological materialism, evolutionism, physiology, and anthropology, often with an Islamic touch. The pinnacle of his synthesis of materialism and Islam was *Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sanihaları* (Sciences and philosophy and philosophical ideas), which consisted of an amalgamation of materialist proverbs with Islamic hadith and Quranic verses.<sup>328</sup> With multiple additions between 1891 to 1912, *Fünun ve Felsefe* in the end turned into a large compilation of philosophical ideas about science from a large selection of sources from La Metrie, Voltaire, and Napoleon, to Namık Kemal, the Bible, and the Quran.<sup>329</sup> Ludwig Büchner was an important source of inspiration for Abdullah Cevdet, not only shaping his views of materialism but also his evolutionism. These two were indeed strongly intertwined, as expressed by *Goril* (Gorilla).<sup>330</sup> Largely taken from *Aus Natur und Wissenschaft* by Büchner, Abdullah Cevdet discussed the similarities between the gorilla and humankind from an evolutionary perspective. He ended with an endnote to the readers that this discussion was in line with the Prophetic hadith of

---

<sup>328</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sanihaları* (Kahire, 1906).

<sup>329</sup> Hanioglu gives a detailed account of the history of the publication of *Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sanihaları* in his preface to its recent transliteration in Latin alphabet: Hanioglu, ‘Abdullah Cevdet Bey ve *Fünun ve Felsefe*’, pp. 11-29.

<sup>330</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Goril* (Ma'muret'ül-Aziz, 1311/1894).

acquiring wisdom and truth.<sup>331</sup>

The rest of his materialist works I categorize together on the basis of being directly concerned with the brain. His first publications in the year 1892/3-1308, when he was a medical school student – two books *Dimağ* (The brain) and *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür* (Physiology of thinking) – constituted the basis of his further work on the brain which he continued until 1919.<sup>332</sup> His first work *Dimağ* is a 46-page pamphlet about brain physiology and the relations between the brain and the mental faculties. It claims to solve the mystery of mental faculties and disproves accounts of the soul as a mysterious unknown metaphysical seat of mental faculties. *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür* (Physiology of thinking) is a short pamphlet with examples of the links between psychological and physiological phenomena, citing the centrality of the brain in mental faculties, based on the chapter ‘Thinking’ in *Kraft und Stoff* (Force and matter). Later on he translated two more chapters, ‘Consciousness’ (*Vicdan*), and ‘Thinking and the Brain’ (*Tefekkür ve Dimağ*), from *Kraft und Stoff*, and an anonymous letter refuting Paul Janet’s claims about the uncertainty of the relationship between the brain and thinking, and extended this book in 1911, naming it *Fenn-i Ruh* (Sciences of the soul).<sup>333</sup> In 1895 he published an extensive work on brain physiology *Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sihat-i Dimağ ve Melekât-i Akliyye* (Physiology and hygiene of the brain and mental faculties), his first comprehensive work on brain physiology, largely relying on Guyot-Daubés’s *Physiologie et Hygiène Du Cervau et des Fonction Intellectuelles* (Physiology and hygiene of the brain and intellectual functions).<sup>334</sup> In 1919 he published his final work, a second edition of *Dimağ ve Melekât-i Akliyyenin*

---

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>332</sup> İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Dimağ: Dimağ ile Ruh Arasındaki Münasebat-ı Fenniyyeyi Tedkik* (Istanbul, 1892-3/1308); Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür: Mehazımın Esası C(K)raft und Stoff Ünvanlı Kitabın Tefekkür Bahsidir* (Istanbul, 1892-3/1308).

<sup>333</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1911).

<sup>334</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sihat-i Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyye* (Dersaadet, 1312/1895); Guyot-Daubes, *Physiologie et Hygiène Du Cervau et des Fonction Intellectuelles* (Paris, 1890).

*Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sıhhası* (Physiology and hygiene of the brain and mental faculties) with seven more chapters displaying his new interest in psychology, pedagogy, and education.<sup>335</sup>

As Hanioglu illustrates, Büchner's biological materialism was key to 'Ottoman materialism'.<sup>336</sup> Büchner was a key figure of post-F Feuerbach German popular materialism in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. His works were published by the triumvirate of materialism Beşir Fuad, Abdullah Cevdet, and Baha Tevfik. Beşir Fuad in his article *Mebhas-ı Kihif ve Netayici* (The skull and its effects), which seems to have used Ludwig Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff*, presented recent medical findings about brain physiology with the aim of disproving scholastic views of the soul.<sup>337</sup> A full translation of *Kraft und Stoff* was made by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil in 1911.

In the process of the reception of Darwinism in Europe, Büchner's understanding of materialism played a key role in many countries and was subjected to different interpretations in different regions. *Kraft und Stoff* soon became very popular, with twenty-one editions and seventeen translations up until the First World War.<sup>338</sup> Europe surely was not the only place where these discussions were carried out. Before Abdullah Cevdet introduced Büchner to the Ottoman reading public (who, unlike the medical students, were not able to read his widely read books from their French translations), Şibli Şumayyil had already presented him to the readers in Arab lands as part of a package of scientific thinking via Büchner's commentary on Darwinism in 1884.<sup>339</sup> These were the key texts of scientific thinking in many countries during the process of the dissemination of popular scientific works. Just like Darwinism,

---

<sup>335</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-i Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sıhhası* (Istanbul, 1335/1919).

<sup>336</sup> Hanioglu, 'Blueprints for a future society', p. 29.

<sup>337</sup> Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 112.

<sup>338</sup> Michael Heidelberger, 'Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner', in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, pp. 48-51.

<sup>339</sup> Marwa Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950* (Chicago, 2013), p. 110.

Büchner's writings acquired different meanings and interpretations in different parts of the world as part of a collaborative effort towards the 'internationalization of science'.<sup>340</sup> It therefore functioned as a pamphlet popularising recent scientific theories and the incontestability of natural laws, in the process of the 'reception' of the pillars of scientific thinking such as Darwinism, materialism, naturalism across the world.

In an attempt to correct common knowledge as to human nature, the soul and the body, Abdullah Cevdet made important contributions to the originals through selections and additions, and turned his books into a medical doctor's update about recent medical developments which ought to be learned by the public. He included many additional references to physiologists and psychiatrists of his time and from the past, such as Jean Pierre Flourens (1794-1867), Jean Baptiste Maximien Parchappe de Vinay (1800-1866), Jean Gabriel-Francois Baillarger (1809-1890), as well as two Ottoman medical doctors Kırımli Aziz Bey (1840-1878) and Mazhar Osman Usman (1884-1951). In the middle of serious discussions about physiology, he tied these discussions to important figures of Ottoman literature and culture such as Rumi (1207-1273), Ömer Hayyam (1048-1131), and Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan (1852-1937), and gave examples from everyday life. He employed poems or local sayings to explain medical phenomena. For example a single line 'when your mind is embellished with my face' (*zihnine nakş olmus iken suretim*) from a poem by Namık Kemal was used to explain 'a mechanical process of remembering' in the context of perception and memory.<sup>341</sup> These additions served the purpose of making readers feel at home and allowing them to follow the exposition, rather than enriching the content.

Biological materialism in Abdullah Cevdet's hands turned into a statement

---

<sup>340</sup> This term was used by Elshakry to refer to a process of Westernization of science. See Marwa Elshakry, When Science Became Western, *Historiographical Reflections*, *ISIS*, 101/1 (2010), pp. 98-109. For more information on the dissemination of Darwinism: Thomas F. Glick and Eve Marie Engels, eds., *Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe* (New York, 2008).

<sup>341</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sihhası*, p. 271.

welcoming a medical approach to human psychology, and it would be unimaginable to think of Ottoman intellectual life as isolated from the wider process across the world. In other words, given that in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century psychology was still not established as a separate field, this statement – that consciousness was a function of neural matter – served as a *medical* statement. In his narrative this medical statement formed the basis of physiological psychology, which he dealt with thoroughly in a chapter of his last book. In *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası* (the second edition of his previous *Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhat-ı Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyye* – a compilation based on *Physiologie et Hygiène Du Cervau et des Fonction Intellectuelles* by Guyot-Daubés) Abdullah Cevdet wrote seven new chapters including *Ruh İlmine Bir Nazar* (A glimpse into the science of the soul), which celebrates the foundation of modern psychology: ‘Psychology of today is a separate discipline resting on experimental methodologies, hence fully integrated into the realm of sciences.’<sup>342</sup> Psychology, as an experimental and scientific field, was based on brain physiology.<sup>343</sup> In this chapter he used the term ‘physiological psychology’ (*fizyopsikolociya*<sup>344</sup>) and presented blood circulation (*kan deveranı*) and nerves (*asab*) as the main sources of mental faculties.<sup>345</sup> In doing so, he utilized physiologist Angelo Mosso’s studies on increased blood flow to the brain during mental activities,<sup>346</sup> as well as the *Disease of Memory: An Essay in the Positive Psychology* by Théodule-Armand Ribot.<sup>347</sup> With reference to Ribot, whose studies served as the foundation of psychology as an empirical field, Abdullah Cevdet introduced the concept of *tecalüb-i*

---

<sup>342</sup> ‘Bugün psikolociya tamamen tecrübi, fennî bir sahaya dahil olmuş ve başlıca bir ilim teşkil etmiştir.’ In Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası*, p. 397.

<sup>343</sup> ‘Kitabın ibtidâsında söylemiştim, dimağ ve melekât-ı akliyyenin fizyolocyası ve hıfz-ı sıhhası, ilm-i psikolociyanın medhal ve rehberi makamındadır.’ Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası*, p. 397.

<sup>344</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası*, pp. 247-54.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid., p. 401.

*efkar* as an Ottoman equivalent of *Association des idées*.<sup>348</sup> Following the popular trend of explaining psychological phenomena (including emotions and mental illnesses) in a physiological context, he reminded the reader of the role of instincts in love and other emotions with reference to Piere Jean George Cabanis. Although he did not go into the details, he drew his reader's attention to Cabanis's *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man (Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme)*, in which they would find the physiological basis of love and moral sentiments.<sup>349</sup>

In the 1910s, new literature on psychological, pedagogical, and psychiatric studies drew on the statement that consciousness was a function of neural matter, and the promotion of 'scientific man'. 'Materialist' publications had opened a new path for subjecting the concept of the soul to scientific investigation, which could have eased the pressure on the next generations when delving into the concept of the soul. Mustafa Satı Bey, known as one of the founders of pedagogy, for example, wrote a series of journal articles called *Mebahis-i Ruhiye* (On the soul) in order to study psychological (*ruhi*, pertaining to the soul) phenomena through the methods of the positive sciences.<sup>350</sup> In doing so he proposed the argument that all psychological phenomena stemmed from the nervous system.<sup>351</sup> Mazhar Osman, the founder of psychiatric studies in the Ottoman Empire, started his *Tababet-i Ruhiye* (Psychiatry),

---

<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p. 403.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>350</sup> Mustafa Satı Bey was not the only intellectual who saw pedagogy and psychology closely related. Indeed the interplay between pedagogy and psychology was appealing to a number of Ottoman intellectuals. One of the earliest texts putting them together was written by schoolteacher Milaslı Gad Franco in 1911. For Franco the development of pedagogy was closely related with that of psychology as a new modern science: Milaslı Gad Franco, *Tettebbuat: İlm-i Terbiye ve İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Izmir, 1327/1911), p. 5.

<sup>351</sup> 'Velhasıl bütün ahval-i ruhiye: ihtisas, ihtiyar, taakkul, muhakeme... hep dimağın ve cümle-i asabiye'nin vücut ve faaliyetine mütevâkıftır.' Mustafa Satı Bey, 'Mebahis-i Ruhiye - I', *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası*, 3/9 (1 Eylül 1325 / 14 September 1909), p. 75. For more information on organicism, conceptualizations of human nature and society in *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası*: Atilla Doğan and Haluk Alkan, eds., *Osmanlı Liberal Düşüncesi: Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası* (Istanbul, 2010), p. 45-61.

one of the first texts of psychiatric studies, by presenting the soul as a product of cerebral activity<sup>352</sup> and clarifying his empirical approach: ‘We are not going to talk about metaphysics or philosophy. “Our science” is based on experiment and experience’.<sup>353</sup> In doing so Mazhar Osman did not shy away from giving the most commonly used ‘materialist’ examples, such as drawing an analogy between thought and black bile, both of them seen as products of bodily organs.

In taking biological materialism born in the medical schools as a necessary step towards founding a medical ground for the sciences of man, it is important to take into consideration that it did not go so far in Abdullah Cevdet’s hands as to negate the existence of the soul explicitly. As for Abdullah Cevdet’s stance on the existence of the soul, I disagree with Hanioglu’s interpretation that Abdullah Cevdet took a step that was so forceful as to imply that ‘to believe in the immortality of the soul, for example, was absurd’ in *Fenn-i Ruh*.<sup>354</sup> On the contrary, Abdullah Cevdet shied away from openly rejecting the existence of the soul and left the answer open. What he rejected clearly in *Fenn-i Ruh*, however, was *ispirtizma* – trying to communicate with the spirits – which he saw as quite prevalent at the time.<sup>355</sup> This recent trend, as Abdullah Cevdet mentions, was also widely spread in Europe.<sup>356</sup> In the Ottoman context, men of

---

<sup>352</sup> ‘Dimağımızın kırsı faaliyeti ruh demektir.’ Mazhar Osman, *Tababet-i Ruhiye* (Istanbul, 1908), p. 12.

<sup>353</sup> ‘Biz bu kitapta felsefeden ve metafizikten bahsedecek değiliz. İlmimiz görgü tecrübe üzerine müsteniddir.’ *Ibid.*

<sup>354</sup> Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a future society’, p. 43.

<sup>355</sup> Accordingly he started *Fenn-i Ruh* by ridiculing the ‘delirium of *ispirtizma*’ in Istanbul. ‘Elime kalemi aldığım şu anda İstanbul halkı bir humma ve hezeyan içinde yanıyor. İspirtizm! İspirtizm! Payitahtın bir buçuk milyon ahalisine medeniyet ve irfan yollarında, rehberlik edebilecek binlerce genç, ve ihtiyar masa tahriki ve *ispirtizm* mucizâtı ile meşgul ve hayretzededir. Dün akşam devlet-i aliye-i Osmaniye'nin erkanından bulunan bir kadim dostumun hanesine gitmiştim. Bu zat-ı mütenevvi malumat ve tenbih cihetiyle, şark ve garp ahvaline vukuf ve haysiyetiyle mevcut bir cümlemizin en zenginidir. Ali-i makam dostumu iki çocuğuyla beraber ellerini bikemâl cedid üç ayaklı bir masa üzerine koyarak “ya ruh sen filanın ruhu isen söyle” demekle meşgul bulduğum zaman hayretim dehşetle karışık bir hayret oldu...’ Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, p. 4.

<sup>356</sup> At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century psychic studies and parapsychology were considered as parts of psychology. For example some important philosophers and psychologists such Jung, Freud, Henry Sedgwick contributed to the Society for Psychical Research in Britain before a merely medical approach

science like Mazhar Osman for example tried to ‘correct such unscientific common knowledge’.<sup>357</sup> In his preface, as Hanioglu mentions, Abdullah Cevdet gave an answer regarding the existence of the soul by referring to certain symbolic discussions in Islamic theology, which I do not think is tantamount to claiming the ‘absurdity of the soul’. In my interpretation as to the existence of the soul, he gave an example of the Sufi understanding of the unitary nature, in which the human soul becomes one with God after death:

He who knows his soul, verily knows his Lord’ and ‘know your self to know the God.’ For how long are we not going to develop and show any signs of consciousness and common sense to a mature degree that is required to grasp the wisdom behind these words. Emin el-Amt’e Ebu ‘Ubeyde bin al Cerrah, a companion of prophet Mohammed, answered the question of ‘What happens to the soul when one deceases?’ with a counter question: ‘What happens to the light of the candle when its oil freezes?’ The soul is immortal. Like the eternality of the light of the candle in every place and time when the conditions of the light are met... It is not correct to say that the universe has come into being with life’. Life does not contain or is contained. The universe is a totality of the life and the life itself. Aren’t eternal existence in the past and the future, life and permanency the names of the eternality, immortality of the being? Then what is to gain from occupying one’s mind with looking for some other exclusive immortalities and externalities?’ I curse the circumstances which led me to speak about the sciences dealing with the Brain and The Soul, and Consciousness whose relevance to social matters are only indirect.<sup>358</sup>

---

dominated. In the Ottoman Empire a number of journal articles were written to promote ispiritizma in tandem with the rising interest in parapsychology as related field to psychology at the turnoff the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One example to this would be international conferences of psychology which accepted papers on parapsychology delivered by psychics as to the existence of the soul until 1905. British Association of psychic studies studying parapsychology with the contribution of a number of reputable psychologists such as Jung, Freud, Henry Sedgwick would display different conceptualizations of science and its boundaries at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For more information see: Frank M. Turner, *Between Science and Religion, The Reactions to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England* (London, 1974).

<sup>357</sup> See Mazhar Osman, *Spiritizma Aleyhinde* (Istanbul, 1910).

<sup>358</sup> ‘Man arafa nafsahu fekat arafa rabbahu ve arifi nefsike taarifi rabbin. Hikmet-i bâliğasını idrak edecek bilâğ-ı şuur ve bülûğ-ı akli ne zamana kadar izhar etmeyeceğiz veya edemeyeceğiz? Ashab-ı kirâmdan Emin el-Amt’e Ebû Ubeyde bin al Cerrah (r. a.) hazretleri: “İnsan öldüğü vakit ruh nereye gider?” diye vârid olan bir suale: “kandilin yağı donduğu vakit şule nereye gider?” cevabını vermiştir. Ruh ebedîdir: Şerâit-i iştiâlin müctemian mevcut olduğu her zaman ve mekanda şulenin ebediyet-i mevcudiyeti gibi. “Kainat, hayat ile tûlûdur” demek doğru değildir. Hayat ne zarftır ne de mazrûftur. Kainat külliyet-i hayat ve mahz-ı hayattır: Kıdem, beka, hayat , subût, zat-ı vücut olan bu lâyetenâhiyetin, bu ezeliyetin, bu ebediyetin, lâyüzâl sıfatlarından değil midir? Bu halde başka küçük münhasır ebediyetler, lâyefeneiyetler [lâyetenâhiyetler] (sic) aramakla itiâb-ı zihin etmekte ne münâsebat, ne faide vardır. Dimağ, ruh, vicdan, elh mebahisi gibi menafi-i içtimaiyesi dura-dur olan doğrudan doğruya bir menfaat-i ameliye-i içtimaiye tezmin etmeyen bir bahs-i ilmi ile iştigale beni sevk

I would interpret this passage as an effort to avoid confronting the existence of the soul, and as a delicate way of dismissing metaphysics as time-consuming and inessential. Similarly on the equation of the soul and matter, as the backbone of materialism, he avoided taking a clear stance. He maintained that: ‘These examples [of a clock and a train, i.e. the symbols of mechanistic view of human nature] might show that the soul consists of matter. [But] delving into something and digging up are not so important. It’s enough to say that the soul is by all means related with the body.’<sup>359</sup>

This begs the questions of what sort of materialism we are speaking about and what was the use of materialism if its antireligious claims were silenced? Materialism is a loaded and shifting term, and therefore should be used very carefully if we are not to fall into the trap of anachronism, and of projecting existing definitions and connotations back on to the past. In the late Ottoman Empire, I would suggest, such published discussions were strictly subjected to self-censorship. In the case of Abdullah Cevdet biological materialism served mainly for show his strong commitment to science. For example, concerning the motto of biological materialism ‘the brain secretes thought as the stomach secretes gastric juice, the liver bile, and the kidneys urine’, appearing in the secondary literature to depict the vulgarity of Cevdet’s understanding of materialism, Abdullah Cevdet toned down his assertion of this sentence. Instead his translation goes as: ‘Yes! All psychic [psychological] manifestations are dependent upon mental faculties of the brain. The brain doesn’t secrete thought. It would not be licit to draw an analogy between an act of cognition

---

eden ahvale lanetler ederim.’ Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>359</sup> ‘Bu misal ruhun terkiib-i maddi ile teşkil ettiğini gösterebilir. İstiknâh-ı meseleye girişmek az mühimdir. Şu kadar teykin etmek revadır ki ruh ile beden murtabit bir halde bulunmaktadır.’ Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ*, p. 46.

and secretion.<sup>360</sup> It is thought-provoking that even Büchner in his later works toned down his assertive claims on materialism, and reduced them to the level of promoting a strong belief in science in the post-Darwinian world, as noted by Gregory in *Scientific Materialism*.

It seems to me that there's but one thin [the free-thinker] cannot do without: it is the recognition of a natural world order existing by itself and tied together by the law of cause and effect, plus the acknowledge of a scientific world-view based on that recognition and on the results of science (Wissenschaft). This world view need not be materialistic or spiritualistic, realistic or idealistic monistic or dualistic, it need be only natural... The individual gaps which our scientific knowledge leaves open in the continuity of creation will be filled out more and more in time, and where this filling out is hopeless, the gaps will have to be bridged over by the interferences of reason.<sup>361</sup>

This would help us leave room for different and changing interpretations of biological materialism. It was part of the package of scientific thinking at the time and had long been a foundational element of the 'sciences of man' and medical fields. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, it was therefore to be expected and timely that it be born in the medical academy.

This is not to dismiss the literature on 'Ottoman materialism' or undermine the importance of translating 'the bible of biological materialism' in the Ottoman Empire. My intention is to show that biological materialism – which surfaced in the medical academy by shedding its antireligious character – served as the foundation of medical views of man, and that Abdullah Cevdet as a medical doctor made significant efforts for that cause, which ought not to be overshadowed by his 'allegedly ulterior political and ideological motives'. His materialist publications, which have been interpreted as tools for undermining the role of Islam in Ottoman society, do not contain direct

---

<sup>360</sup> 'Evet! Bütün tecelliyât-ı ruhiye Manifestation Psychique dimağın cevahiri asabiyesinin vücut ve faaliyetleriyle kaimdir. Dimağ, tefekkür ifraz etmez. Bu fiili idrakî bir madde-i müfrezeeye teşbih asla caiz olamaz.' Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür: Mehazımın Esası C(K)raft und Stoff Ünvanlı Kitabın Tefekkür Bahsidir*, p. 14.

<sup>361</sup> Ludwig Büchner, *Im Dienst der Wahrheit. Ausgewählte Aufsätze aus Natur und Wissenschaft*, tr. in part as *Last Words on Materialism* by Joseph McCabe (London, 1901) cited in Gregory Frederick, *Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Dordrecht, 1977), p. 145.

antireligious remarks, therefore I find it convoluted to take them as ‘anti-Islamic weaponry’. This reflects the limitations on the birth and/or free expression of anti-religious forms of materialism in the Ottoman Empire. Within these limitations, his materialism surfaces as a product of a series of efforts towards medical modernization and integration with biomedicine. Therein lays the importance of scientific determinism and mechanistic views of human nature, as will be examined in the next section.

Undeniably, his use of materialism was not detached from the late Ottoman intellectual, social, and political scenes. However instead of engaging in mind-reading, speculating about what else he might have said in a more open environment, or seeking potential political meanings attached to his ‘materialist texts about the brain with no anti-religious remarks’, I would rather propose we take note of what he *did* say. To this end, the second section subjects the prefaces of Abdullah Cevdet’s books to a close reading, wherein human bodies, souls, and brains were subjected to ‘progressive’ discourses to be understood and shaped through a mechanistic understanding of human nature in response to burning economic concerns.

## **Mind Training in a Mind Industry**

In 1910 our exports to Bulgaria were about 21,840,000 franks. Bulgaria however sold us agricultural and industrial products, which cost about 32,652,000 franks. Therefore it earned 10 billion 568 franks in a year...

There is no power or goodwill which could prevent any group of servants of God, whose transportation relies on tumbrel, from serving and being defeated by another group of servants of God who use railway, electricity, telephone, and telegraph... Civilized nations are invading us through economic power. Economic invasion is more disconcerting than military invasion. We are deeply concerned. We are seriously worried. Serious worries require radical solutions. We need serious and radical solutions.<sup>362</sup>

---

<sup>362</sup> ‘Daha dünkü Bulgarya’ya biz 1910 senesi zarfında 21, 840,000 Franklık mal satmışız, Bulgaristan ise Türkiye’ye 32,652,000 Franklık zirai ve sanayi mal satmıştır. Demek Bulgarya bizden fazla olarak 10 milyon 568 frank almıştır... Öküz arabalarıyla icra-i münâkale nakil eden bir zümre-i ibadullah, her işinde şimendiferler, elektrikler, telefonlar, telsiz telgraflar kullanan bir zümre-i ibadullaha ibâd

How do we explain a book consisting of Büchner's chapters 'Thinking', 'Consciousness' (*Vicdan*), and 'Thinking and the Brain' (*Tefekkür ve Dimağ*), with a preface about Ottoman economic and technological deterioration with respect to decreasing imports and increasing exports in comparison to the 'newly born' state of Bulgaria?<sup>363</sup> It is indeed telling that Abdullah Cevdet ended his criticism of *İspirtizma*, dealing with metaphysics through psychic séances, which he deemed a waste of time, by drawing attention to the importance of the economy. His choice of Bulgaria, which was 'building up an impressive modern army' and 'growing in wealth' after its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, displays his distress at being bypassed by a former Ottoman territory.<sup>364</sup> Taking part in industrial transformations and competing in the global market economy through achieving scientific and technological progress was necessary to keep the empire abreast with its counterparts. For this reason, in his preface to *Fenn-i Ruh*, Abdullah Cevdet drew his readers' attention to the severity of the economic deterioration, which he considered to be more detrimental than any military occupation, and asked them to share his passion for making progress.<sup>365</sup>

I earnestly ask our governors and some men of letters – those who deserve to be considered as governors in the eyes public – and particularly each and every citizen to give full attention to the reform of our agriculture, industry

---

olmaktan köle, esir, mağlub cizye-i kedar olmaktan kurtaracak bir kuvvet ve merhamet kainatta mevcut değildir... Mîlel-i mütemeddin bizi iktisaden istila etmektedir; bir memleket için işgal-i iktisadi işgal-i askeriden daha ziyade cây-ı endişedir: Endişemiz büyüktür? Derdimiz büyüktür, büyük dertler büyük devalar ister büyük ve cesur devalara ihtiyacımız büyüktür.' Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, p. 11-2.

<sup>363</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, p. 6.

<sup>364</sup> For a glimpse into Ottoman Bulgarian relations in the post independence period see Hasan Ünal, Ottoman Policy during the Bulgarian Independence Crises, 1908-9: Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria at the Outset of the Young Turk Revolution, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34/4 (1998), p. 138.

<sup>365</sup> 'Mîlel-i mütemeddine bizi iktisaden istila etmektedir, bir memleket için işgal-i iktisadi işgal-i askeriden daha ziyade cây-ı endişedir: Endişemiz büyüktür? Derdimiz büyüktür. Büyük dertler büyük devalar ister büyük ve cesur devalara ihtiyacımız büyüktür.' Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, p. 12.

and commerce and to keep pace with contemporary progress in education, humanity, navy and aviation.<sup>366</sup>

Similarly in *Fizyolociyya-i Tefekkür*, Abdullah Cevdet starts with making a distinction between old thinkers (*hükema-ı salife*) and new thinkers (*hükema-ı ahire*), depending on their answers to the question of whether thinking was a product of the soul or the brain.<sup>367</sup> Old thinkers who still saw the soul as the source of thought were turning a blind eye to contemporary scientific facts and were becoming less relevant to the scientific discourses of their time. For Abdullah Cevdet, old thinking with its overemphasis on divine affairs (including the soul) and its neglect of science, was not contributing to the empire's salvation. Accordingly he starts his book by praising technologically developed countries in which new thinkers with a new scientific mindset enabled inventors such as Benjamin Franklin to be born.<sup>368</sup> According to Abdullah Cevdet, instead of pursuing metaphysical discussions and ignoring scientific facts, one ought to cultivate a more intellectually stimulating environment, which could bring about technological development. His motivation behind writing about brain physiology in this context was to call on the Ottoman public to participate in the global scientific discussions collectively, and to develop a new society which would cherish science as much as he did.

Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) is not only the inventor of the lightning conductor. He is also the author of *The Way to Wealth* (1751), with its simple economic messages for the masses, and *Advice to a Young Tradesman* (1748) known

---

<sup>366</sup> 'Valilerimize ve vilât ve evveliyâ-ı millet olan ehl-i kalemimize, ehl-i kalem sîfata layık olan ehl-i kalemimize ve bilhassa ayrı ayrı her vatandaşına kemalsüzeş ve ihlas ile rica ederim: bütün matmah-ı nazarımızı ziraatimizi, sanayimizi ticaretimizi ıslah ve ihya etmek mekâtibimizi medârisimizi müessesât-ı ilmiyemizi beriyemizi bahriyemizi, havâiyemizi asr-ı terakkیات ile mütênâsib bir hale koymak olsun.' Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>367</sup> Abdulah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür*, p. 12.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-5.

for its well-known opening phrase ‘Time is money’, which Weber considered to be ‘the spirit of capitalism’.<sup>369</sup> From the 1860s onwards, Ottoman intellectuals were familiar with the work ethic of Benjamin Franklin. Indeed his *The Way to Wealth* was translated into Ottoman Turkish several times for ‘promoting a capitalist work ethic among Ottomans through very simple and practical messages, such as the vital importance of hard work, knowledge and skills, the significance of managing wealth as well as acquiring it, the harmful effects of wasteful and conspicuous consumption, and many others.’<sup>370</sup> *Sevda-yı Say-ü Amel* (Love of hard work and effort) by Ahmet Mithat is one of the most frequently cited examples of the ways in which a work ethic along the lines of ‘liberal economic values’ resonated with Ottoman intellectuals and was promoted extensively by them.<sup>371</sup> In Wigen’s interpretation, such examples display the intellectuals’ duties of educating ‘orderly and educated individuals [who] are more successful economically and socially, thus providing harmony and prosperity to the community’ and to the state.<sup>372</sup>

From the 1860s onwards, the rhetoric of economic progress went hand in hand with that of the importance of science and technology, best exemplified by the writings of the spokesman of economic liberalism in the Ottoman Empire, Sakızlı Ohannes.<sup>373</sup> Sakızlı Ohannes developed his ideas of private initiative and economic liberty in response to chronic capital shortages during the nineteenth century.<sup>374</sup> While adopting

---

<sup>369</sup> Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London, 1992), p. 16.

<sup>370</sup> Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 31. *The Way to Wealth* was first translated by Reşad Bey as *Tarik-i Refah* in 1869, and then by Hocasaryan in 1908: Benjamin Franklin, *Tarik-i Refah*, tr. Reşat (Paris, 1286/1869); Benjamin Franklin, *Tarik-i Servet ez Hikmet-i Rikardos*, tr. Bedros Hocasaryan (Dersaadet, 1286/1870). For more information: *Ibid.*, 31-2.

<sup>371</sup> Ahmet Mithat, *Sevda-yı Say-ü Amel* (Istanbul, 1296/1879).

<sup>372</sup> Einar Wigen, ‘The Education of Ottoman Man and the Practice of Orderliness’, in Margrit Pernau, et al., eds. *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford, 2015), p. 119. Hafez also treats *Sevda-yı Say-ü Amel* in relation to the development of a new work ethic and the concept of self-help: Hafez, ‘The Lazy, the Idle, the Industrious’, pp. 34-6.

<sup>373</sup> Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 45-7.

<sup>374</sup> Sakızlı Ohannes, ‘Makineler’, *Mebâdî-i İlm-i Servet-i Milel* (Istanbul 1297/1880), pp. 84-95. For more information: Eyüp Özveren, ‘Ottoman Economic Thought and Economic Polics in Transition:

a Ricardian free-trade position, he put the emphasis on the significance of machines for maximizing production, through the translation of ‘On Machinery’ in *Principles of Economy and Taxation*.<sup>375</sup> For Namık Kemal, the well-known poet as well as one of the first intellectuals who considered economic deterioration as the major problem for the empire and proposed a solution in a free-market economy, a short visit to London was sufficient to grasp the depth of ‘progress’.<sup>376</sup> In 1872 he wrote about the things he had seen in London, from the magnificence of the parliament building to the factories, mines, and libraries, when describing what progress was in a journal article.<sup>377</sup> Cavid Bey, who served as the Minister of Finance under the governments of the Committee of Union and Progress, combined a social Darwinist terminology of survival of the fittest with liberal economic policies in *İlm-i İktisat* (Economics).<sup>378</sup> In this era ‘progress’ – together with ‘evolution’ – was a term frequently used in intellectual accounts which would jump abruptly from economic to social and political issues when discussing how to transform society.<sup>379</sup>

According to Mardin, what distinguished Abdullah Cevdet from some of his contemporaries was the precedence he gave to reforming minds rather than the political sphere. In other words, while other intellectuals and the Young Turks were aiming to start in the political sphere to make reforms, Abdullah Cevdet aimed to start from people’s minds.<sup>380</sup> Progress and the individual were two key concepts at the heart of his approach to social reformation. While he distanced himself from the heart of the political opposition movement and active politics, he developed his

---

rethinking the nineteenth century’, in Michalis Psalidopoulos and Maria Eugénia Mata, eds. *Economic Thought and Polics in Less Developed Europe* (London, 2002), pp. 136-8.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., 138.

<sup>376</sup> Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Liberalizm, 1860-1990* (Istanbul, 1992), pp. 43-52.

<sup>377</sup> Namık Kemal, ‘Terakki’, *İbret* (23 Teşrinievvel 1288 / 5 November 1872), pp. 1-3.

<sup>378</sup> Çavdar, *Türkiye’de Liberalizm*, pp. 83-7.

<sup>379</sup> Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, pp. 278-87. According to Doğan this constituted the nucleus of ‘Social Darwinism’, a term I would hesitate to use in this context and period.

<sup>380</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 242.

understanding of social revolution. His theory went along with an imagination of new individuals in a new spiritual setting, as objects of ‘progressive discourses’ whose brains were to be tamed and shaped through education. His idea of progress ran alongside a reductionist and mechanistic view of human nature, treated as a guidebook to shaping Ottoman minds. His materialism accordingly equated human intelligence to a ‘clock, which needs to be fixed’.<sup>381</sup> Surrounded by new technology and the new material culture, driven by a wish for technological development, Abdullah Cevdet delved into the machine metaphor.

Since Descartes’s promotion of the ‘animal machine’, the machine metaphor has been an important part of philosophical studies of human nature. In Descartes’s understanding the bodies of animals and humans were complex machines, yet humans with their language, consciousness, and mental states, have souls, and therefore were not simply machines – unlike the animals. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century the idea of mechanism came to be closely associated with materialist philosophy.<sup>382</sup> While mechanical and historical materialisms became separated from the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the former came to be used often when dealing with human physiology.<sup>383</sup> One of the hallmarks of the association between mechanism and materialism and its application to the conceptualizations of human body came from the French philosopher and one of the earliest biological materialists Julien Offray de La Mettrie, with his concept of *L’homme Machine* in 1748. La Mettrie developed the metaphor of ‘man as machine’ and applied mechanical principles to consciousness, emotions, will, intelligence, and the moral sense.

---

<sup>381</sup> Ibid., p. 243. This is a metaphor Mardin uses very briefly. Even though Mardin does not elaborate on it, it is an important point of inspiration for this chapter. Hanioglu as well delves into the influence of Julien Offray de La Mettrie on Ottoman materialism: Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a future society’, p. 29. Hafez also studies the use of machine metaphor in pedagogy and morality books in relation to the efforts for ‘producing productive body’: Hafez, ‘The Lazy, the Idle, the Industrious’, pp. 116-8.

<sup>382</sup> Williams, *Keywords*, p. 202.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid.

Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, mechanism added another layer to the process of the domination of physiological approaches, issuing in the task of understanding and designing man using the tools provided by materialism, physiological determinism, Darwinism, and positivism. In the second half of the nineteenth century, with significant breakthroughs in the studies of nervous system, the medical approach came to dominate this discussion. When Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) confronted Descartes for limiting automation theory to animals and bodily movements in his famous speech ‘Animals are automata’, Ivan Sechenov, ‘the father of Russian physiology’, had already presented all the conscious and unconscious phenomena as reflexes in terms of their structures.<sup>384</sup> Huxley used for the first time the term ‘conscious automata’ to refer to the principle of determinism as the sole operant principle of human decision-making. In this famous talk he maintained that ‘the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata.’<sup>385</sup> William James’s article ‘Are we automata?’ was a response to conscious automation theory. In this article James postulated that consciousness did have causal power within a psychological framework.<sup>386</sup>

In making sense of the spread of mechanistic terminologies in psychological literature towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, I endorse Todes’s interpretation of Russian Nobel-prize-winning physiologist Ivan Pavlov’s (1849-1936) studies in physiology and classical conditioning, which he named the ‘physiological factory’.<sup>387</sup> Todes draws attention to the role of machine metaphors such as the chemical factory

---

<sup>384</sup> Ivan Pavlov called Sechenov ‘the father of Russian physiology’. Ivan Sechenov published *Reflexes of the Brain* in 1863: Daniel P. Todes, *Pavlov’s Physiology Factory: Experiment, Interpretation, Laboratory, Enterprise* (Baltimore, 2002), p. 254.

<sup>385</sup> Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘On the Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata and Its History’, in *Method and Results: Essays by Thomas Henry Huxley* (New York, 1901), p. 244.

<sup>386</sup> William James, ‘Are We Automata?’, *Mind*, 4 (1879), pp. 1-22.

<sup>387</sup> Todes, *Pavlov’s Physiology Factory*.

and the digestive machine in Pavlov's works, whose theory of conditioning laid the foundation for behaviourism in psychology. Inspired by Karl Marx and Max Weber, Todes proposes a link between 'Pavlov's physiological factory' and the Industrial Revolution: 'Ideas are inherent to any productive process, whether in a workshop or a factory, in manufacturing or in science. They may animate all participants in the work process or the manager alone; they may be codified in a manual or simply embedded in technologies and the organization of labor – but they are always an important force of production.' Accordingly since 'metaphors in scientific thinking' had great relevance for production processes, Pavlov's 'physiology factory' could be interpreted as a product of the Industrial Revolution, from small workshops to large factories.<sup>388</sup>

Technological changes to the world in which these intellectuals actually lived surely shaped their intellectual conceptualizations and envisionings. Against the backdrop of growing industrialization, increasing use of technologies such as railways and telegraphs, and prevalent discourses on economic deterioration, the spread of machine metaphors could be seen as an outcome of the intellectuals' entanglement with a fast-changing technological world and the pressure to keep up with it. In the development of psychology in the Ottoman Empire, mechanism (*mihanikiyet*) became an important part of psychology and physiology books from the late nineteenth century onwards.<sup>389</sup> In Hoca Tahsin's *Psiholoji yahut İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* the 'alive machine' was a pigeon with a damaged spinal cord, which was only capable of reflexive movements. In Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin's *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür*, the human body was equated to a machine: 'God almighty is the inventor of this exalted machine. If a single part of it were disabled, no physician would find a

---

<sup>388</sup> Ibid., pp. 60-5.

<sup>389</sup> Turan, Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları, pp. 85 and 204.

cure, no matter how famous he would be. He can't fix it.'<sup>390</sup> This refers to the 'God as the watch maker' metaphor, a teleological argument of natural theology, which became more prevalent with the scientific revolution: if we are designed as machines, God was the ultimate designer, as design implied a designer.<sup>391</sup> This metaphor symbolizes efforts at finding a middle ground between the acceptance of physiological and theological principles, as also exemplified by Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin.

At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the brain and nervous system started to appear more often in popular science journals in relation to the machine metaphor and technological imagery such as the telegraph and the factory. The image of the telegraph sending messages through electricity, was a commonly used example when referring to the central nervous system.<sup>392</sup> In his article 'The Philosophy of the Brain' published in *İctihad*, Dr Kadri Raşit (Anday) depicted the human body as similar to a country with organs functioning like factories.<sup>393</sup> The brain in this country was responsible for communication, similar to 'telegraphs and phones'. Ethem Necdet drew an analogy between neural tissue (*nisc-ı dimağ*) and a factory which produced thoughts, sensations, and beliefs: 'Neural tissue is a factory. Thoughts, sensations and beliefs are the products of this factory. What will be passed on to the next generations is the factory, not the product. Therefore we should strive for developing the factory,

---

<sup>390</sup> 'Bu ali makinenin mucid-i hakikisi Cenab-ı Kadir-i Mutlaktır. Bir yerine cüzi sakatlık ârız olursa en meşhur hekim-i hâzıklar bir çare bulamazlar. Ve tamir edemezler.' Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin, *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür*, p. 35. This term also appears in other psychology books written by Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and Mustafa Şekip Tunç with the aim of defining automated human behaviour in a generic sense in the 1910s and 1920s. But the extent to which it could explain human behaviour is controversial for Ahmed Hilmi and Tunç. See: chapter three and chapter five.

<sup>391</sup> For an overview of the argument: David Deming, Design, science and naturalism, *Earth-Science Reviews*, 90 (2008), pp. 49-70.

<sup>392</sup> See for example: 'Dimağın kısm-ı kışrîsi yani telafîfi ve burada mevcut olan hücerât-ı asabiye adeta elektrik batariyesi, telgraf merkezidir.' Mağmumî, *Vücut-ı Beşer*, p. 257.

<sup>393</sup> Muallim Doktor Kadri Raşit, 'Dimağ Hakkında Felsefe', *İctihad*, 9/2 (March 1909), p. 330-1.

instead of filling our brains with unnecessary information.<sup>394</sup> In this article Ethem Necdet haphazardly linked mechanical neural activities (*mihaniki faaliyet-i asabiyeler*) with psychological, social, and economic considerations, and attributed to the former a leading capacity in shaping the rest. With that haphazard link in mind, he reminded his readers, from an evolutionary perspective, of their duty to improve their brains so that these extended brain capacities could be transmitted to the next generations. Such conceptualizations were products of the motivation to find solutions to social, economic, and technological problems in the scientific and medical fields.<sup>395</sup>

The machine metaphor and brain analogies continued to appear in the popular press up until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as will be touched upon in the following chapters. Abdullah Cevdet's works on the brain in the early 1890s laid the foundations of this literature, with his more extensive use of the term mechanism (*mihanikiyet*), and a clear-cut formula for how to make most effective use of the brain 'machine'. He used the term *mihanikiyet* in one of his earliest works: *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür*.<sup>396</sup> Later on in *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası* he delved further into this concept, giving a definition in the glossary: 'movements of various kinds which were needed for any mental or physical action'.<sup>397</sup> Largely reliant on Dubois, he approached mechanism as a key concept of collective operation, resting on a conceptualization of human psychology that considered mechanism, universal determinism, mind training, mind evolution, and mind industry all as parts of one

---

<sup>394</sup> Ethem Necdet, 'Nisc-i Dimağın Tekamülü', *İctihad*, 84 (12 Kanunuevvel, 1329 / 25 December 1913), pp. 1863-6. Ethem Necdet worked extensively on evolutionism and wrote one of the first books on the subject: Doktor Edhem Necdet, *Tekamül ve Kanunları* (Istanbul, 1329/1913).

<sup>395</sup> 'Faaliyat-ı ruhiye içtimai hayatın ilk şartı, ilk sebebidir. İçtimai hayatın ilk unsuru iktisadi hayattır. Cemiyetin hayat-ı tagaddisi teksirini aile teşkilatını vücuda getirir. Ondan bedîyât, itikadât, ulum ve funun doğar. Hissiyat i[t]jikadât (sic) ve efkârın faaliyeti itiyâdâtın ahlakın zuhuruna hâdim olur. İtiyâdâtın ve ahlak, faaliyetle bir hukuk bir hayat-ı adliye vücuda getirir. Bu ise bir şekl-i siyasi doğurarak, berke gibi teşkil-i içtimaiyi ikmal eder. Bütün bu hadisatta vahdet-i merbûtiyet, mücessemmiyet âşikârdır.' Ibid., p. 1866.

<sup>396</sup> Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür*, p. 32.

<sup>397</sup> 'Bir fiil-i akli veya bedeninin tahsili için icrası lazım gelen harekât-ı metnûa.' Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası*, p. 451.

another.

Guyot Daubes's *Physiologie et Hygiène Du Cervau et des Fonction Intellectuelles* was designed as a key to making the best use of brains, putting together almost all the sciences and philosophies in pursuit of that cause, from anthropology to evolutionism merged with scientific racism. This book contains examples of scientific racism and phrenology, depicting 'natives' as half animals, mentioning educated students of working-class families whose heads grew in size after a few years of education, and referring to the big hats sold in Paris as signs of superior French intelligence – all which would look farfetched and insulting to most modern eyes. It puts together a mechanistic view of human nature with the theory of evolution and the idea of determinism. In this theory the key to change was through mind training. Largely reliant on the term 'mechanism', this book proposed a way to develop brain capacity and traits which could be transmitted to future generations. Accordingly Abdullah Cevdet wrote a preface to *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sihhası* calling attention to those who would dare to produce 'more distinguished and enlightened brains.'

The brain is a new talisman. Heaven or hell, calamity or blessing, rise or stagnation, life or death, brightness or darkness of humanity is enshrined by it. It is only teachers, thinkers, poets and writers, who can govern the souls by their ideas, can make use of this talisman. Therefore it is the task of distinguished and enlightened brains to produce more distinguished and enlightened brains. It shall always be!<sup>398</sup>

Drawing on the idea that exercise strengthens muscles, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sihhası* promotes the idea that brain capacity and size could be developed: 'Mind training [*idman-ı dimağ*] increases the weight and capacity

---

<sup>398</sup> 'Dimağ bir 'genç mutalsım'dır. Beşeriyetin cennet ve cehennemi, saadet ve felaketi, su'ûd ve sukutu, hayat ve memati, nur ve zulmeti hep, bil-kuvve, orada meknuzdur. Bu 'tılsım'ın anahtarı ancak muallimlerin, mürebbilerin, fikir ve kalemleriyle ruhlar üzerinde hükümdarlıkları müsellim olan mütefekkirlerin, şairlerin, ediblerin, muharrirlerin ellerindedir. Mümtaz ve münevver dimağları çoğaltmak mümtaz ve münevver dimağların vazifesi vekarı işte ancak budur, her yerde ve her zaman bu olsun!' Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sihhası*, p. 7.

of the brain as well as enlarges the skull size. Therefore mind training could be seen as similar to muscle exercises.’<sup>399</sup> In addition, with reference to Herbert Spencer, it maintains that one could also make further modifications of the brain through ‘a mechanical physiological law’.<sup>400</sup> The idea of evolution was at the heart of this reasoning. Reliant on Guyout Daubes, Abdullah Cevdet linked the concept of mind training with that of mind evolution (*tekamül-i dimağ*): traits developed would then be transmitted to the future generations.<sup>401</sup> Studying brain physiology was therefore as important as learning education from a societal approach.<sup>402</sup> This process was called ‘mind industry’ (*sanayi-i akliyye*), seen as a collective process of developing mental faculties that would be transmitted to following generations. Combining mind training with mind evolution provided him with an educational or pedagogical toolbox, which for him was the quickest way to make social progress. The main significance of mastering the knowledge of brain physiology before anything else was to have a guidebook to human nature, to define and adjust human beings, and to render them objects of social change.

Designing a new individual through education was an important concern among Ottoman intellectuals, including Abdullah Cevdet. As a follower of the liberal thought of Prince Sabahattin, he valued the concept of the individual immensely and

---

<sup>399</sup> ‘İdman-ı dimağî, dimağın hacim ve veznini artırır, aynı zamanda başın ve saatının tezâyidini intaç eder, bu cihetle idman-ı dimağî pek iyi idman-ı adelfiye benzetilebilir.’ Ibid., p. 280.

<sup>400</sup> ‘Meşhur filosof Herbert Spencer mebânî-i ilm-i ruh *Principes de Psychologie* ünvanlı kitabında idman-ı dimağîyi tekml-i akliyi ve akli itiyatların tesirlerini, ekseriya görülen müsellim olan mihaniki bir kanun-ı fizyolocya üzerine kurulmuş bir kazıyye ile izah ediyor: ‘Bir cihaz-ı asabınin içinde bir inkılab-ı zerrevî mevcesi geçtiği zaman cihaz-ı asabi de az çok bir teadül *modification* husule getirir, bir halde ki bir inkılab zerreyi mevcesi diğer fakat aynı cins bir mevce-i sabıkâdan daha ziyade sürat ve suhuletle o cihaz-ı asabiden mürur eder.’ Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid., pp. 75-101.

<sup>402</sup> ‘Sanayi-i akliyeden hülâsa dimağîye mesele-i mütenasınım mütalaası da ehemiyetce ilm-i terbiyeden aşığı değildir. Buna müteakip hususi bir idman ile ve istidad ve kabiliyetlerin irsen intikali sayesinde melekelerimizin tekamülüne aid meseleler gelir.’ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

gave some serious thought on to how to raise free individuals, even though his understanding of training was mechanistic and simplistic. In the later parts of his career he endorsed French social psychologist and anthropologist Le Bon's understanding of education.<sup>403</sup> In his translation of *The Psychology of Peoples* (1895) – *Ruh el-Akvam* (1907) in Ottoman – he coined the term 'social doctor' (*tabib-i içtimaiye*) as a way of appealing to intellectuals to approach social problems from a medical angle and carry out 'a political and social rehabilitation' by way of science: 'I translated this book with the aim of showing the anatomy and physiology of nations [*akvam*] to those who want to be social doctors of a nation [*kavm*] and play leading roles in social matters. Engaging in a national rehabilitation without obeying the incontestable social rules that this book comprises, is as meaningless and juvenile as being a medical doctor without knowing anatomy and physiology, I believe.'<sup>404</sup> Le Bon held a 'deterministic conception of social individuals, who are taken to be incapable of any autonomous action',<sup>405</sup> which formed the basis of Abdullah Cevdet's reductionist view of social change.

Le Bon's idea of education was based on the principle of indoctrination as education, seen as 'an art of transforming one's good conscious actions into unconscious, automated ones' – a motto Abdullah Cevdet used repeatedly.<sup>406</sup> This was

---

<sup>403</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought', in Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society*, p. 21.

<sup>404</sup> 'Büyük küçük zimâm dârân umur-ı halk olanlar ile bir kavmin tabib-i içtimaiyesi olmak isteyenlere uzviyet-i akvamın teşrihini, fizyolocyasını göstermek üzere bu kitabı tercüme ettim. İtikadımca bu eserin ihtiva ettiği nusûs-ı kavânin-i içtimaiyeye mutâ olmaksızın ıslah-ı müllek ve millet meydan-ı sab ve mübarekinde görünmek, teşrih ve fizyolocya bilmeksizin tabiblik davasında bulunmak kadar abes ve tıflânedir.' Gustave Le Bon, *Ruh 'ül- Akvam*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Mısır, 1907), p. 7. Abdullah Cevdet extensively worked on Le Bon and translated some of his other works into Ottoman: Gustave Le Bon, *İlm-i Ruh-ı İctimaî*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul, 1924) and Gustave Le Bon, *Avrupa Harbinden Alınan Psikolocyai Dersler*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul, 1918).

<sup>405</sup> Peter Wagner, *The Languages of Civil Society* (Berghahn, 2006), p. 91.

<sup>406</sup> 'Terbiye şuurla tefekkür ve temil ile yapılan amal-ı müstahsene-i tefekkürsüz, temilsiz, şuursuz olarak icra olunan efal ve harekât sınıfına geçirmek sanattır.' Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hifz-ı Sıhhası*, pp. 349-50.

supported by a negation of free will. In Cevdet's formula, sensations (*ihsasat*) determined actions. He held that even though we think we choose our actions, these actions actually obeyed (*münsak*) our sensations (*ihsasat*).<sup>407</sup> Therefore, for him, human beings were not free. Abdullah Cevdet coined the term *icabiye-i külliye* as an Ottoman equivalent of the French term 'universal *détérminisme*', and argued: 'One could not think of material and mental phenomena freed from these deterministic universal laws.'<sup>408</sup> In order to support his views on volition, he gave an example of a patient who acted contrary to his wish and drew the attention of interested readers to Ribot's *The Diseases of the Will*.<sup>409</sup> In this example he pointed out that physiological phenomena could cause one to act against one's will, and therefore determined human behaviour.

The evolution of Abdullah Cevdet's interest in human bodies, starting from brain physiology, flirting with scientific racism, phrenology, and anthropology, and ending in social psychology and a search for social uplift, answers the question of what was the use of examining the brain from a materialist point of view. It became the carrier of science, and it was rendered a tool for economic and technological development. Accordingly it was promoted as a key to civilization:

Teachers, students, writers, educated people, in a nutshell those who rely on their nerves and brain instead of muscles and banditry and those who prefer a humane life to a swinish, barbarian one, ought to read this book closely. It's a

---

<sup>407</sup> 'İnsan hür müdür? Bu hekimlerin çok münakaşa etmiş oldukları kadim bir meseledir. En sade efal mesela efal-i münâkise ele almırsa hürriyetin mevcut olmadığı âşikârdır... Fakat badel-mülâhaza icrasına karar verdiğimiz bir işe giriştiğimiz vakit o işi karar verdiğimiz veçhile yapmakta, başka türlü yapmamakta hakikaten muhtar olduğumuz zan olunur. Lakin bu bir vehimdir. Vaki muhakemelerle karar veririz. Muhakemelerimizi, üzerlerine adeta hiç hüküm ve nüfuzumuz olmayan hissiyat delaletiyle icra ederiz. Çünkü hissiyat varlığımızın en az akli ve en ziyade uzvi olan kısmını teşkil eder. Kararlarımızı tecâlib-i efkâr neticesi olarak ittihaz ederiz. Halbuki bu tecâlibler idaremiiz altında vaki olur zannında bulunduğumuz zaman bile münsakî bir surette husule gelir. Bundan istinbât olunur ki irade-i cüziye yoktur, bütün fikirlerimiz bütün efalimiz icâb-ı *déterminédir*.' Ibid., pp. 410-12.

<sup>408</sup> 'İcâbîye-i külliye *Détérminisme universel*'in bu kanunun hükmünden hariç cismani ve hatta akli mâvakaa tasavvur olunamaz.' Ibid., p. 412.

<sup>409</sup> Ibid., p. 311.

compilation of many other books published in the West.<sup>410</sup>

Central to my choice of Abdullah Cevdet as a starting point in writing an intellectual history of psychology in the Ottoman Empire is the fact that he formulated a new terminology in Ottoman to postulate mechanical rules of human behaviour. Discussions about mechanical rules were at the heart of the development of psychological thought in the Ottoman Empire, as reflected in the subsequent psychology books which this research will address. Abdullah Cevdet's texts on brain physiology were the starting points of this process. By writing a detailed account of mechanistic explanations of human nature, he formulated his physiological psychology and a new psychological view of human nature, which some of his colleagues briefly touched upon in their journal articles. This new terminology, revolving around machine metaphors – such as mechanism, mind industry, and neural tissue as a factory – began to be used and was considered to be worthy of study by some Ottoman intellectuals.

Given the pressure intellectuals felt in the face of economic and technological deterioration, a desire to make progress in these fields and the increasing visibility of technology would influence intellectuals to create a vocabulary that could define human beings in accordance with the technology that they wished to develop. The use of terms such as 'mechanism', 'factory', or 'mind industry' displays the emergence of a new conceptualization of human beings as objects of social change and of

---

<sup>410</sup> 'Doktor Abdullah Cevdet Bey'in taze bir eseridir. Maarifi Umumiye nezareti tarafından müessis telif ve tercüme kütüphanesinin 105 inci ve (kütüphane-i ictihad) 42'nci kitabıdır. 476 sahifelik ve 56 kıta şeklin ve bir lugatçaya muhtevidir. Tercüme-i etfale ve tedrisat-i diniyyeye hasr olunan mübahese pek mühim ve yeni bir nur-ı ihtiva ediyor. Muallimler, şakirtler, muharrirler, merbiler, hasılı adelerinden ve haramiliklerinden ziyade sınırlarına ve dimağlarına istinad eden ve hayvani hayattan ziyade insani ve akli bir hayat yaşayan her fert bu kitabı sabır ve dikkatle okumalıdır. Eser yazılırken garpta mevcut nevi eserin pek çoklarından istidat ve iktibas edilmistir. Ve bu asar, kitabın nihayetinde gösterilmiştir. Pahası her yer için posta ücretiyle beraber 60 kuruştur.' *İctihad*, 139 (30 Teşrin Sani 1337 / 30 November 1921), p. 2932.

progressive projects, leaving no room for metaphysical and philosophical explanations of their nature. The choice of this degree of reductionism reflects the intellectuals' excitement in being exposed to a long tradition of mechanistic and reductionist views of human nature and the need to digest it in a short period of time. This framework rendered humans as adjustable mechanistic units with no volition, via the concepts of mind training, universal determinism, and mechanistic explanations of human psychology.

## Conclusion

A short anecdote about a cemetery, which Abdullah Cevdet narrated in his travel accounts, encapsulates his very practical attitude towards the relationship between economy and a number of things considered sacred.<sup>411</sup> Passing through a poorly groomed and muddy Muslim cemetery near the Samsun municipality, reminds him of another cemetery in Plovdiv:

I have been to Plovdiv, Bulgaria two and a half months ago. There was a beautiful garden at the municipality. As I was told by my Muslim hosts, the garden used to be a Muslim cemetery. According to the story Bulgarians offered 2000 lira for selling the land of the cemetery. When Muslims turned down this offer Bulgarians replied: 'My dear, moving a cemetery and relocating the remains are permissible in Islam. We will build a new cemetery for you outside the city and take care of the relocation of the remains'. The Muslims insisted on declining the offer. In less than two months a Russian general got appointed for reclamation and reorganization of the land. This time with a whip he brought the Muslim notables together in the cemetery by force and said 'Here we go. Break the tombstones!' He made the Muslims break the tombstones, carry them in pieces and in the end he sold them without making any payment whatsoever to the Muslims.<sup>412</sup>

---

<sup>411</sup> Ersin Müezzinoğlu, 'Doktor Abdullah Cevdet'in Samsun, Giresun, Ordu ve Trabzon Seyahat Notları', *Turkish Studies*, 7/3 (2012), pp. 1843-57.

<sup>412</sup> 'Bundan bir buçuk iki ay evvel Bulgarya'nın Filibe şehrinde bulundum. Dilber bir belediye bahçesi vardı. Misafirleri bulduğum Müslüman efendiler bana hikaye ettiler: Burası Müslüman mezarlığı idi. Bulgaristan teşekkül ettiği vakit iki bin lira mukabilinde bu mezarlığı belediyeye satmalarını Müslümanlara teklif etmişler. Müslümanlar kabul etmemiş. A canım sizin şeriatınızca nakl-i kubur caizdir. Müslümanlar kabul etmemekte ısrar etmişler. Aradan iki ay geçtikten sonra bir Rus generali Bulgaristan da bazı tensikat ve teşkilat icrasına memur olarak gelmiş. Elinde kırbaç olduğu halde Müslümanların eşraf ve azasını toplamış mezarlığa doldurmuş haydi bakalım kırın şu taşları demiş. Taşları bu Müslümanlara kırdırılmış arkalarıyla taşıtıp taşları satmış ve Müslümanlara da bir para vermemiş.' Transliterated by Müezzinoğlu, in Müezzinoğlu, 'Doktor Abdullah Cevdet'in Samsun,

In this anecdote I see the cemetery's remains as symbolic of all the 'sacreds' of the past which lay in the way of progress, and which for Abdullah Cevdet needed to be left behind. As an answer to the questions of how far one should go in embracing science, what to be sacrificed and what was worth preserving, Abdullah Cevdet was convinced one should go as far as possible. This position, in Abdullah Cevdet's account, was not at the expense of religion, which explains the Bulgarians' reminder to the Muslim villagers that moving a cemetery was permissible in Islam. In his commitment to science he was not disrespectful of religious concerns, and this needs to be taken into consideration. Yet he did not have the same level of patience for other sorts of 'sacreds', which were destined to be lost in a fast-changing world, whether voluntarily or by force.

In an environment in which progress was considered to be one of the most important concerns of an intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet gave thought to how it could be achieved. Mastering brain physiology came to be associated with progress, as opposed to old, established, ambiguous, unknown, and metaphysical understandings of the soul. The brain, in opposition to the soul seen as an elusive, ambiguous, and idle metaphysical concept, was promoted as a concrete device determined and controlled by natural laws. This acquisition of knowledge of the brain was the key to controlling, changing, and adjusting the minds of the Ottomans who could serve the collective purpose of making in social, economic, and technological progress. This aspect of his works has been neglected due to the secondary literature's overemphasis on Islam and materialism. However, Abdullah Cevdet did not put the accent on Islam or on materialism in these works. This neglect has overshadowed Abdullah Cevdet's preference for making progress over 'human uniqueness', which adds another

---

Giresun, Ordu ve Trabzon Seyahat Notları', p. 1845.

dimension to our understanding of Ottoman intellectual discussions with respect to  
‘the question of economic development in capitalistic terms’,<sup>413</sup> and the rhetoric of  
new work ethic.

---

<sup>413</sup> Kılınçoğlu, *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 193.

The “beautiful soul”, lacking an actual existence, entangled in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity of that self to externalize itself and change itself into an actual existence... It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being by action and an existence; and in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world, and persists in its self-willed impotence to renounce its self which is reduced to the extreme of ultimate abstraction, and to give itself a substantial existence, or to transform its thought into being and put its trust in the absolute difference. The hollow object which it has produced for itself now fills it, therefore, with a sense of emptiness. Its activity is a yearning which merely loses itself as a consciousness and becomes an object devoid of substance, and rising above this loss, and falling back on itself, finds itself only a lost soul. In this transparent purity of moments, an un-happy, so called “beautiful soul.” Its light dies away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves into thin air.

Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

### **Chapter III: Man, not a machine, not an animal: Human soul as a ‘conservation area’ against ‘fake progress’**

In 1910 Ahmed Hilmi wrote one of the rare Ottoman examples of an allegorical novel, *Amâk-ı Hayal* (In the depths of imagination), based on a spiritual journey of Raji, a well-educated young man going through an existential crises of meaninglessness, emptiness, and personal dissatisfaction.<sup>414</sup> Raji’s journey starts with the question of the nature of the soul. Having found the *İsprit Cemiyeti* (Psychic association) inadequate to answering his questions, he finds solace in conversation with Mirror Dede, whom he meets in a local cemetery. Soon Raji leaves his previous life, marked by distraction and alcohol and driven by rationalism and scepticism. In the depths of his inner journey, struggling to find the meaning of life, Raji at one point

---

<sup>414</sup> Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Amâk-ı Hayal: Raci Beyin Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 1326/1910). For a translation of *Amâk-ı Hayal* into English: Ahmed Hilmi, *Awakened Dreams: Raji’s Journey with the Mirror Dede*, tr. Refik Algan and Camille Helminski (Putney, 1993).

ends up in Manisa Asylum. There his friend Sami writes to him, saying: ‘As if this obscurity, this material existence, these visible illusions are not enough to crush one’s spirit and put one’s conscience in turmoil, do you want to run after spiritual phantoms, too?’ To this Raji replies:

Dear Sami,

I received your letter. Leaving the depths of dreams for five or ten minutes, I came out into this world, this dark hole. My boy!... Yes my dear friend, I am looking for the ghosts that are hidden behind these illusions. What a pity. I can’t find them. Actually it’s not that I can’t find, I don’t know how to explain... There is not much to be said about scientific truth... I looked for a solution to my difficulty within the world of science but could find none there. Then I fell into a strange world of science but could find none there. Then I fell into a strange world. Perhaps those I found in this world would be able to convince many another conscience, but not mine. My heart’s eyes can see the distant universes, which telescopes cannot find. I am able to be in contact with enlightening stars whose essence our comrades have not yet even discovered. My eyes can see the darkened celestial bodies, which hide from man’s investigations – because I do not need light. I have become such a spirit that qualities like distant or near, dense or subtle, have no significance for me. Materiality is the prisoner of my command, and spirituality is helpless before my will.<sup>415</sup>

Raji’s mystical imaginative world was so wide as to take him into profound conversations with key spiritual figures including Buddha and Zoroaster, with reference to a variety of philosophical subjects from love to logic. And such was Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi’s intellectual world. Raji’s visit to Manisa Asylum, where he comes back together with his spiritual mentor after a brief period of separation, symbolizes the convergence of the mental and spiritual worlds. Surrounded by ‘harmless mad ones’, doctors, and ‘gendarmes’ in a place where madness is both a ‘catastrophe’ as well as a ‘blessing’, Raji sets his soul free by declaring materiality to be a ‘prisoner of his command’, and the ‘strange world of science’ useless.<sup>416</sup> Falling between psychological and spiritual phenomena in the depths of imagination, Ahmed Hilmi subjects human nature to scientific investigation. He gives Raji the role of investigating and embodying the ‘truth’ in both worlds, mental and spiritual. In an

---

<sup>415</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *Awakened Dreams*, p. 84.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 88-9.

attempt to find a middle path between mechanistic views of human nature and the neglect of scientific explorations of human nature, Ahmed Hilmi merges psychology and spiritualism with the world of scientific determinism.

This chapter delves into Ahmed Hilmi's formulation of the soul as a 'conservation site' against 'fake progress' within the context of the interplay between spiritualism and psychology in the *Darülfünun* in the Second Constitutional Era. It shows the ways in which psychology became a site for debating the relations between the concept of progress and human nature and criticizing scientific determinism with a scholarly authority, while some intellectuals with religious concerns were searching for 'the proper strategy for the appropriation of modernity' and how to make progress without losing traditional and religious values.<sup>417</sup>

This chapter is broken into two sections. The first section delves into the 'interplay between psychology and spiritualism', in Ahmed Hilmi's formula, under the roof of the *Darülfünun*. In an attempt to unfold what this interplay could mean when translated into late Ottoman dynamics, the second section focuses on his two major concerns: (1) to contribute to global anti-Western and anti-scientist discourses, against the backdrop of constant warfare which the Ottoman Empire was experiencing; and (2) to save man from the scientific invasion, which was undermining human authenticity through the metaphors of 'man as machine' and 'man as animal'. In doing so it aims to provide a detailed understanding of spiritualism and anti-materialism in the Ottoman Empire, which has long been reduced to thinkers' personal religious stances. Ultimately it presents one episode, among others, in which man was

---

<sup>417</sup> The term 'appropriation of modernity' is used by Serdar Poyraz to challenge the dichotomy between modernity and tradition. According to Poyraz, Ahmed Hilmi in his approach towards modernity and tradition did not aim for accepting or rejecting one of these entirely. This process according to Poyraz can be named as searching for 'the proper strategy for the appropriation of modernity.' Poyraz, *Science versus Religion*, p. 3.

becoming an object of progressive discourses in response to the major material and technological changes with which the intellectuals were surrounded.

## **Interplay between Spiritualism and Psychology in the Second Constitutional Era**

Much of the difficulty in speaking about spiritualism, and concepts of the spirit and the soul, lies in the different interpretations of and changing relationships between science and religion through time. Drawing on the most recent literature on different forms of spiritualism, however, it does seem safe to assert that the equation of spiritualism with religion, and placed in an inherent opposition to science, would be narrow and incomplete. Spiritualism is defined as ‘a tendency towards or advocacy of a spiritual view or estimate of things’ and ‘the exercise of the mental or intellectual faculties, or their predominance over body’.<sup>418</sup> It is a notion just as complex as materialism, discussed in the previous chapter, and again needs to be used carefully with a strong concern for historical accuracy. It is closely linked with conceptualizations of the universe and human nature through the concepts of the soul and spirit. Spirit is ‘the animating and vital principle in man (and animals), that which gives life to the physical organism, in contrast to its purely material elements, the breath of life’.<sup>419</sup> It is often used to correspond to the concept of the soul, with religious connotations in Abrahamic traditions such as the breath of life – thus God, to give life to Adam, blew the soul into him.<sup>420</sup> However, in a general philosophical sense spiritualism is ‘a characteristic of any system of thought that affirms the

---

<sup>418</sup> See ‘Spiritualism’, in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 13 June 2016. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/186901?redirectedFrom=spiritualism#eid>

<sup>419</sup> ‘Spirit’, in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 13 June 2016. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/186867?rskey=TvpRBe&result=1#eid>

<sup>420</sup> I. R. Netton, ‘Nafs’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 14 November 2014. [http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM\\_0833](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nafs-COM_0833)

existence of reality imperceptible to senses', which includes a large selection of diversified philosophical doctrines. It has been compatible with different philosophical positions such as dualism, monism, theism, atheism, pantheism, and idealism, as long as 'they allow for a reality independent from and superior to matter'.<sup>421</sup>

At the turn of the 20th century, talking about 'a crisis of science' was part of a 'larger problem of modernity' according to Fritz Ringer.<sup>422</sup> It was a result of the 'perception that traditional values were in crisis', which was prevalent in Europe and the United States. Positivism, scientism, materialism, and scientific determinism were open to fierce criticism in this period.<sup>423</sup> This rendered spiritualism an alternative platform from which to challenge strict definitions of science, and to appeal for them to be more inclusive of spiritualistic activities. In the English case, for example, a good number of influential thinkers promoted spiritualism as opposed to scientific materialism, and perceived spiritualism as in harmony with (actual) scientific thought in England.<sup>424</sup> Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), the British naturalist, biologist, and anthropologist, who is known for developing a theory of evolution before Darwin, is a good example of this synthesis. For Wallace, as Turner argues, 'spiritualism was actually scientific because the spiritualistic experiences were immediate and empirical.'<sup>425</sup> Similarly, the English economist and philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) founded the Society for Psychical Research together with other eminent philosophers in order to undertake scientific research on psychical or paranormal activities. Notable philosophers and psychologists such as William James, Henri

---

<sup>421</sup> 'Spiritualism', in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed online on 13 June 2016.

<http://global.britannica.com/topic/spiritualism-philosophy>

<sup>422</sup> Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 375 cited in Mitchell G. Ash, *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the quest for objectivity* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 2.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> For more information: Turner, *Between Science and Religion*.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

Bergson, and Carl Jung cooperated with the society. According to Sidgwick the main problem originated from the prejudices of scientific men:

We believe unreservedly in the methods of modern science, and were prepared to accept submissively her reasoned conclusions, when sustained by the agreement of experts; but we were not prepared to bow with equal docility to the mere prejudices of scientific men. And it appeared to us that there was an important body of evidence – tending *prima facie* to establish the independence of soul or spirit – which modern science had simply left on one side with ignorant contempt; and that in so leaving it she had been untrue to her professed method and had arrived prematurely at her negative conclusions.

<sup>426</sup>

Psychology was central during this heyday of spiritualism. William James, the American psychologist and philosopher, who was trained as a physician and became a founding member of the American Society for Psychical Research, provided a report of the first congress of psychology held in Paris. This revealed that psychology was at the heart of such discussions, as well as constituting a meeting point for a number of different disciplines.

The first meeting was on Tuesday, Aug. 6, and morning and evening sessions were continued during the week. Five sub-sections were formed to discuss special subjects and bring them before the general sessions in the afternoon. One of these sub-sections debated the Muscular Sense; another, Heredity; another, Hypnotism; the fourth, a project for an international census of Hallucinations on lines proposed by the English Society for Psychical Research; whilst the fifth dealt with the subject of Abnormal Association of Sensations of one kind with those of another, M. Gruber of Jassy having reported a very extraordinary case of ‘coloured hearing’ ... Professor Ribot was present on the first day, and gave the opening address, on the status of contemporary psychology; showing in simple but impressive words how it advances by combining physiological and pathological observation and experiment with the older introspective method, and urging the investigators of all countries to share in the work now become common.<sup>427</sup>

French ‘spiritualist psychology’ was a global meeting point for ‘French spiritualist philosophy’ and psychology, which Ottoman intellectuals followed closely

---

<sup>426</sup> Quoted by Turner in *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>427</sup> William James, ‘The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris’, *Mind*, 14/56 (1889), pp. 614.

while preparing their modern psychology school textbooks.<sup>428</sup> This was also where the tension between old and new psychological perspectives was felt most severely, due to the well-established tradition of the French spiritualistic school.<sup>429</sup> At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, French psychology was oscillating between the old / spiritualistic / philosophical psychology nourished by Victor Cousin's theory of 'spiritualisme / eclecticism', and Théodule-Armand Ribot's experimental psychology. Victor Cousin (1792-1867), one of the representatives of French spiritualism, developed his own philosophy named 'spiritualisme' or 'eclecticism' in an opposition to the 'evil philosophies' of his time such as empiricism and materialism.<sup>430</sup> His spiritualist psychology, developed by Hippolyte Taine and Paul Janet, continued to enjoy influence over psychological studies even long after the start of experimental studies by Ribot.<sup>431</sup> When experimental psychology as a term began to be circulated, it actually involved 'experimental methods' of psychic séances during the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>432</sup> Henri Bergson, as a latecomer, contributed to the interplay between psychology and French spiritualist philosophy with his concept of *élan vital*, 'a vital impulse or life force' and 'an original impetus of life supposed to have brought about the variations which during the course of evolution produced new species'.<sup>433</sup> This started a revival of French spiritualism and *vitalism* at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which lasted for a while.

---

<sup>428</sup> The term 'spiritualist psychology' for the development of psychological studies in France is used in Jacqueline Carroy and Régine Plas, 'How Pierre Janet used pathological psychology to save the philosophical self', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36/3 (2000), pp. 231-40. For more information see F.C.T. Moore, 'French Spiritualist Philosophy', in Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway, eds. *Nineteenth century Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order*, 8 vols. (New York, 2014), ii, pp. 161- 75.

<sup>429</sup> Parot, 'France', pp. 232-3.

<sup>430</sup> Doris S. Goldstein, "'Official Philosophies" in Modern France: The Example of Victor Cousin', *Journal of Social History*, 1/3 (1968), p. 260.

<sup>431</sup> Parot, 'France', pp. 232-3.

<sup>432</sup> Jacqueline Carroy and Régine Plas, 'The Origins of French Experimental Psychology: experiment and experimentalism', *History of the Human Sciences*, 9/1 (1996), p. 74.

<sup>433</sup> 'Élan vital', in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 15 June 2016.

<http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/60105?redirectedFrom=elan+vital#eid>

Unfortunately, our knowledge of spiritualism in the late Ottoman Empire is mostly limited to the spread of anti-materialism, which the secondary literature has interpreted as merely religiously coloured. However, bits of information here and there point to a larger range of interest in spiritual matters, from psychic phenomenon to psycho-spiritual matters, in the Ottoman Empire, while it was also on rise in many other places in the first decade of the new century. *Spiritism* – in the form of psychic séances to communicate with spirits – for example, is often referred in the primary sources as common as plague and delirium (*humma ve hezeyan*). As Türesay indicates, the year 1910 witnessed a boom in publications about psychic matters and a large interest in spiritism among the Istanbul literati.<sup>434</sup> Ahmed Hilmi for example presented magnetism, hypnotism, and psychics as signs of the spiritual power of human beings, which were to be investigated scientifically, and wrote an article series in the magazine *Şehbal* (Feather) to delve into spiritual phenomena and spiritism.<sup>435</sup>

The idea of communicating with spirits was also a subject of refutation for men of medicine, and a common topic of ridicule in satirical magazines.<sup>436</sup> Abdullah Cevdet's preface to *Fenn-i Ruh* (The sciences of the soul) starts with his disappointment with his educated close friends who participate in séances, which were now so absurdly common as to prompt him write about the soul from the point of science.<sup>437</sup> An advertisement published in *Hande* (Laughter) – a satirical magazine

---

<sup>434</sup> Özgür Türesay, 'Spiritism in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1910' (upcoming article) p. 9. Hereby I thank Türesay for providing me with an earlier version of his article and sharing his important insight into this novel subject. Türesay's study is part of a new research project: 'New Religiosities in Turkey: Reenchantment in a Secularized Muslim Country?' (acronym: NEORELIGITUR), of the Orient-Institut Istanbul (OII) and the Centre d'études turques, ottomanes, balkaniques et centrasiatiques (CETOBAC) at the EHESS in Paris.

<sup>435</sup> 'Manyetizm, telkin gibi isimler verilen tesir-i miktânîs, elektrik-i asab, tasarruf ve iradenin eşkâlinden başka bir şey değildir.' Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, p. 281. Ahmed Hilmi wrote an article series about *ispirtizma* named 'Eski Fikirler Yeni Şekiller: Ulum-ı Garibe ve Spiritizma' in *Şehbal* in issues between 22 and 34 -except for 23 and 31- between 1 Eylül 1326 / 14 September 1910 and 1 Şubat 1326 / 14 February 1911.

<sup>436</sup> Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, pp. 218-20.

<sup>437</sup> Here Abdullah Cevdet refers to *ispirtizma*, communicating with the soul as plague and delirium

Baha Tevfik wrote in – satirizes the false expectations of approaching the issue scientifically: ‘*Hande* predicts the future scientifically. Every Friday we conduct magnetism experiments in our Magnetism & Mental and Spiritual Clinic. Every problem is to be solved through communicating with the spirits.’<sup>438</sup> It was not only men of medicine who reacted to spiritism. While men of medicine such as Abdullah Cevdet and Mazhar Osman reacted severely to it on the basis of damaging science, some like Kişedarzade İsmail Fethi and Kasabzade Hüseyin Avni problematized it within an Islamic framework.<sup>439</sup> Therefore, anti-spiritism actually constituted a point of intersection for both groups, which one-sided narratives of a conflict between religion and science could never grasp.

Rising interest in spiritism overlapped with the start of psychological education at the *Darülfünun*. There are a good number of examples indicating that French spiritualist psychology was systematically promoted as *Darülfünun* policy. Although psychology appeared in the 1869 Ottoman Public Education Law as a subject, it was put into practice by Emrullah Efendi as part of his design for educational reform. In 1910 Emrullah Efendi, a well-known Ottoman intellectual and minister of education, was given the task of teaching philosophy (*hikmet-i nazariye*) at the *Darülfünun* due to his interest in that subject as well as psychology.<sup>440</sup> Shortly after, in 1910, he published his lecture notes in *Sebilürreşad* and a year later collated them in a book: *İlm-i Hikmet* (Philosophy).<sup>441</sup> In this book there is a separate section on psychology, which shows

---

(*humma ve hezeyan*). After expressing his surprise to see some of his very educated friends to waste time with séances, he explained the main reason for people’s belief in *ispiritizma* as their ignorance about the scientific knowledge of the brain. Accordingly he defined *ispiritizma* as ‘a fire and darkening of the brain’ which according to him was very common in Istanbul. Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh*, p. 4-5.

<sup>438</sup> ‘Hande ilmî ve fennî bir surette fala bakar, manyetizma tecrübeleri ve emraz-ı asabiye-i ruhaniye tedavihanesi idarehanemizde her hafta cuma günleri manyetizma tecrübeleri yapılmaktadır. Ervah ile istişare olunarak her türlü müşkülât hal olunur.’ *Hande*, 1 (22 mart 1326 / 4 April 1910) p. 7.

<sup>439</sup> Türesay, ‘Spiritism in the Ottoman Empire’ pp. 15-20.

<sup>440</sup> Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, pp. 313-14.

<sup>441</sup> Emrullah Efendi, *İlm-i Hikmet*.

that the plan to teach psychology at the *Darülfünun* was put into practice.<sup>442</sup> The next year, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi taught psychology at the *Darülfünun*.



**Figure 3.** *Darülfünun*, Literature Faculty, Şehbal, 55 (9 Haziran 1327 / 28 June 1911) Faculty staff, including Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi second to the left on the second row, with students.

Ahmed Hilmi claimed that he had been asked to write a modern psychology school textbook to be studied at the *Darülfünun*.<sup>443</sup> Upon this request, he wrote the first edition in 1910. In 1911, he published a revised second version, to be read by the general public, and added a new chapter on physiology entitled *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh-ı Umumi* (General psychology), having decided that ‘a good understanding of psychology requires at least a basic knowledge of physiology’.<sup>444</sup> In this section he treats nerves (*asab*), instincts (*sevki tabii*), senses (*ihsasât*), and reflexes (*harekât-ı*

<sup>442</sup> It is unclear which psychology books Emrullah Efendi utilized since the book lacks references to original sources. However it is clear that he aimed to import Western psychology and philosophy of mind, as the book does not treat traditional views of psychology.

<sup>443</sup> Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), p. 1.

<sup>444</sup> ‘Mebâhis-i ruhiyeyi güzelce telakki edebilmek için, fizyoloji mebâhsine, velev ki zübdeten olsun, vakıf olmak icab eder.’ Ibid., p. 1.

*münakise*) with reference to mechanistic explanations of human nature, and the differences between animals and humans. This time he aimed to reach a wider audience outside the university.<sup>445</sup> Starting from June 1911 he published certain chapters of this book as newspaper supplements, which shows that psychology was considered a subject that could attract the attention of a general readership. *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* was indeed read by some members of the public, whose complaints about its overly concise and unclear content were also mentioned in the journal.<sup>446</sup>

*İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* by Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi is one of the first known modern psychology books, written with an intention of excluding traditional perspectives on the soul.<sup>447</sup> Aside from the first chapter, which Ahmed Hilmi added – and with which this chapter primarily deals – the book largely derives from a Western psychology school textbook: the psychology section of *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* (Elementary courses of philosophy) by Émile Boirac.<sup>448</sup> It consists of three parts: an introduction,<sup>449</sup> six chapters for which he mainly utilized the psychology section of *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* as the original source, and a separate chapter on physiology, namely General Psychology.<sup>450</sup>

---

<sup>445</sup> ‘Eserden memul olan istifadenin yalnız darülfünun-ı talebe-i mümtazesine has ve münhasır kalmaması için, mümkün mertebe vazıh ve sade bir lisanla yazılmasına çalışılmıştır.’ Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>446</sup> A note to the readers was published in the journal addressing the readers’ complaints about how brief and intricate the book was. The note promises to publish a new version with more examples, yet the book did not go through a new publication process. *Hikmet*, 43 (9 Şubat 1911), p. 1.

<sup>447</sup> The copies that we have today at Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi and Milli Kütüphane are incomplete, either because he did not finish writing this book or the complete copy has gone missing. The sixth chapter External perception (*Alem-i haricînin zabt ve fehmi, La perception extérieure*) ends abruptly on the sixth page. This indicates that either Ahmed Hilmi might have aimed to translate the whole book but did not complete it or the copy that we have is incomplete. The original source from Boirac includes four more chapters *La vie affective et active, Les inclinations, La volonté et le caractère, Le physique et le moral* in which Boirac studies volition and ethics in detail.

<sup>448</sup> Unfortunately the copies that Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi and Milli Kütüphane hold do not give any reference to Boirac.

<sup>449</sup> This introduction contains three sub sections, as follows: the definition, content and categorizations of philosophy and science, the content and classification of sciences, and his newly added section General Psychology (*İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh-ı Umumi*).

<sup>450</sup> Émile Boirac, *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie conforme aux programmes du 31 mai 1902* (Paris, 1906).

Émile Boirac (1851-1917), French philosopher and parapsychologist, is known as one of the first philosophers to use the term ‘déjà vu’, in *La Revue Philosophique* in 1876.<sup>451</sup> His studies contributed to mesmerism and hypnosis and he conducted a number of psychic experiments.<sup>452</sup> He wrote *La Psychologie Inconnue* (Our hidden forces: an experimental study of psychic sciences) and *L’avenir des Sciences Psychiques* (The psychology of the future) to expand psychology and psychical research. To what extent Boirac’s studies on the psychic movement had relevance to or influence on late Ottoman intellectual life is unknown and would be a topic of future interest. However, his *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* was surely one of the most popular books in philosophical circles in the empire, as it was translated into Ottoman a number of times by different authors.<sup>453</sup>

In *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* Ahmed Hilmi described psychology as a scholarly discipline which should take over the task of maintaining an elusive and superior image of human beings, in response to the gradual removal of classical Islamic theories and the loss of the sacred view of humanity as an ‘exempted’ creature. Ahmed Hilmi was one of the strongest mouthpieces of Islamic mysticism<sup>454</sup> among late Ottoman intellectuals, keeping an equal distance from religious bigotry as from what he deemed misuses of science.<sup>455</sup> In his journal *Hikmet* (Wisdom)<sup>456</sup> he penned a

---

<sup>451</sup> Alan Brown, *Deja Vu Experience: Essays in Cognitive Psychology* (New York, 2004), p. 11.

<sup>452</sup> M. Brady Brown, *Unruly Spirits: The Science of Psychic Phenomena in Modern France* (Champaign, 2010), p. 63.

<sup>453</sup> Émile Boirac, *Felsefe yahut Hikmet-i Nazariye*, tr. Mehmed Emin Erişirgil (Istanbul, 1913); *İlm-i Mantık*, tr. Reşad Nuri [Güntekin] (Istanbul, 1915); *Felsefe – Hikmet*, tr. İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (Istanbul 1917).

<sup>454</sup> In his understanding Islamic mysticism means the Islamic knowledge, and the doctrine of truth (*meslek-i kavim*). It ‘comprises the reflection and different stages of religious thought and the knowledge accumulated and evolved in a thousand years.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, p.192. For a general definition of *Tasavvuf* and its historical background: L. Massington, et al., ‘Tasawwuf’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 25 April 2014.

[http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/tasawwuf-COM\\_1188](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/tasawwuf-COM_1188)

<sup>455</sup> In Fezzan he became a follower of the religious order of the *Arûsiyya*, a sect founded in Tunisia in the fifteenth century: Abdullah Uçman, ‘Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi’, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 38 (2010), p. 424.

series of journal articles treating Islamic mysticism with a focus on a mystical religious understanding of human nature centred on the concept of the soul, *ruh*.<sup>457</sup> For him, Sufism and psychology were actually parallel to one another, as both of them placed ‘man’ in the centre of the Universe. In his first reference to Islamic philosophy in *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, for example, he drew an analogy between Gazali’s formulation ‘from the work of art to the artist (creator)’ (*eserden müessire usulü*, in Islamic philosophy) and Victor Cousin’s statement, ‘the first step I took to understand, it was my soul that I came across.’<sup>458</sup> However, instead of merging these two, like his predecessors did, he wrote a separate work, *Tasavvuf-ı İslami ve Fünun-ı Cedide ve Felsefe* (Islamic Sufism, and the new sciences and philosophy), in which he treated theories of the soul through a metaphysical and subjective framework.<sup>459</sup> These two books intersect at only one point. In *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, where, according to him, scientific explanations are not adequate to illuminate unconscious (*gayrı vicdani*) phenomena, he draws the interested reader’s attention to his *Tasavvuf-ı İslami ve Fünun-ı Cedide ve Felsefe* through a footnote, where they may learn more about the ‘mysteries of man’ in a separate treatment.<sup>460</sup>

---

<sup>456</sup> His journal *Hikmet* was published as a weekly between 21 April 1910 and 28 September 1912 for 77 issues.

<sup>457</sup> *Hikmet* is a loaded term which does not have a ready made definition. According to Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, *hikmet* means a motive for existence, a point of knowledge and wisdom, and a system of philosophy in Ottoman. James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Constantinople, 1890), p. 798. According to Goichon it in the classical understanding also means science – together with wisdom, and philosophy – and symbolizes the unity between philosophy and spiritual knowledge. In some cases it also includes science. See Goichon, A.M.. "Hikma" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds. Accessed online on 28 June 2014. [http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/hikma-SIM\\_2861](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/hikma-SIM_2861). However in Ahmed Hilmi’s text, science is clearly separated from spiritual wisdom and philosophy, for which he uses the terms *ilim* or *fen*. Thus throughout the chapter I will use both wisdom and philosophy when referring to the original term *Hikmet*, to maintain the unity between philosophy and wisdom in his account.

<sup>458</sup> ‘Anlamak için attığım ilk hatvede ilk tesadüf ettiğim şey kendi nefsim idi.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, p. 19.

<sup>459</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, pp. 181-317.

<sup>460</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, p. 49; ‘Esrar-ı Âdem’, *Hikmet Yazıları*, pp. 263-99; ‘Fen Nokta-ı Nazarından İnsan Hakkındaki Efkâr-ı Felsefiye’, *Hikmet Yazıları*, pp. 224-63. In these articles he

This separation is linked with his understanding of scientific methodology, in a new ‘era of experiment and scientific philosophy’ (*tecrübe ve hikem-i fenni devresi*), which he concretized with reference to Francis Bacon.<sup>461</sup> According to Ahmed Hilmi, since Bacon established the scientific methodology and empiricism following the discoveries of Bruno and Galileo, assumptions, dogmas, and metaphysics did not have any scientific/objective value outside the subjective sphere. In this new era, a claim for scientific authority required experimentation (*tecrübe*) and analysis (*tahlil*); therefore metaphysical thinking could only be exercised through subjective terms with no scientific claims. Rather than diminishing the importance of the latter, this drew clear lines between these two activities, and facilitated compartmentalized, parallel ways of attaining the truth. In this process, Islamic philosophy and theology were the first to be excluded, as far as scholarly discussions were concerned. Considering that psychology was the study of mental functions and behaviours of human beings, this had a very important implication for ‘understandings of man.’

A preface to *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, which would have provided more insights into Ahmed Hilmi’s motivations for writing this book, is missing; but a passage in the first chapter discussing the concept of the exempted creature (*müstesna mahluk*) reveals at least one of his motivations. With respect to the gradual removal of Islamic philosophy and theology from the domain of science, Ahmed Hilmi stated that the sacred importance attributed to man, which distinguished it from other living beings, had lost its credibility. In other words, he defined what was being lost from the viewpoint of science as the incontestability of the virtue of human beings:

The conceited understandings of man – as an exceptional creature governed by its own laws and exempted from the universal laws [*kavânîn-i alem*], are no longer accepted from the point of science and philosophy/wisdom [*fen ve*

---

advocated that due to the inexplicability of some concepts such as the soul and volition, human beings could not be fully understood and would always remain mysterious to some degree.

<sup>461</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, p. 181.

*hikmet*]. These sort of conceited understandings were replaced by more scientific and real ideas. These [scientific and real ideas] are also accepted and have basis in Islamic philosophy/wisdom [*hikmet-i İslamiye*] in accordance with their importance. It is indisputable that human beings (who are capable of being moral, who distinguish arrogance, who search for the reality of being/body [*asl-ı vücut*], and who differentiate arrogance from the truth) are more special and honourable than animals. However this speciality and honourableness do not mean that he/she is exempted from being a part of a totality of being/body [*cümle-i vücut*] (a part which declares the ever self existent [*kayyûmiyyet-i zatîye*] and the eternal [*daimî*]) and exempted from the [universal] laws and classifications [*kavânînin hüküm ve tasrifinden*].<sup>462</sup>

Ahmed Hilmi did not delve further into the concept of an ‘exempted creature’ as a product of a ‘conceited understanding of human nature’, but it would be wrong to assume that by ‘conceited understanding of man’ he was referring to theological or Islamic philosophical understandings of human nature. On the contrary, he made it clear that ‘more scientific and real’ ideas were compatible with Islamic philosophy/wisdom (*hikmet-i İslamiye*).<sup>463</sup> What he is referring to here is the neglect of the universal laws and classifications, which he saw as rooted in the past. Conforming to the boundaries he aimed to set between metaphysics and psychological activity, he reserved this question for his other works; such as *Tasavvuf-ı İslami ve Fünun-ı Cedide ve Felsefe*, instead of elaborating how ‘these [scientific and real ideas] were also accepted and had a basis in Islamic philosophy’ in *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*.<sup>464</sup> In *Tasavvuf-ı İslami ve Fünun-ı Cedide ve Felsefe* Ahmed Hilmi discusses the relations

---

<sup>462</sup> ‘İnsanın kavânîni âlem haricinde ve kavaid-i vücut ve hudûşaşâz bir şekilde müstesna bir mahluk olduğuna dair evveleri deveran eden efkâr-ı mağruranenin bugün huzur-u fen ve hikmette hiçbir yeri kalmamıştır. Bu gibi müteazzımâne efkâr yerine daha fennî ve hakiki fikirler kaim olmuştur ki: Bunların hikmet-i İslamiyece de kıymetlerine göre cây-ı kabulleri vardır. Şüphe edilemez ki: Ahlak-ı hasene ile müzeyyen olmak istidâdını taşıyan, idrak-ı bâlâpervâzî asl-ı vücudu aramaktan korkmayan ve hiddet ve hakkı ikrar eden insan, küremizde yaşayan hayvanattan mümtaz mükerrerdir. Lakin bu imtiyaz ve mükerreriyet, onun cümle-i vücuda dahil olmaması ve (kayyûmiyyet-i zatîyetin huzur-ı daimîyesini mulen olan) kavânînin hüküm ve tasrifinden hariç kalması demek değildir.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, p. 26.

<sup>463</sup> Similarly he did not explain what he meant by ‘a part which declares the ever self existent (*kayyûmiyyet-i zatîye*) and the eternal (*daimî*)’. It would not be farfetched to think that he might have been referring to God, given his religiosity, which he might have seen as a source of human’s speciality. However as he left this term open, this cannot be taken for granted. What he explicitly stated is only limited to human beings’ superiority to animals regardless of the source of it.

<sup>464</sup> Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, pp. 181-317.

between the new sciences and Islamic mysticism, and studied human uniqueness within a religious framework through the concepts of the soul and ‘mysteries of man’.<sup>465</sup> With this passage he celebrates the entrance of psychology and its authority to study universal laws and classifications while presenting human beings as different from animals.

His attitude was one step ahead of some other Sufis of his time, such as Mustafa Safvet Efendi, a deputy from Urfa in the Ottoman as well as the Turkish Parliament (also known for his proposal for the abolition of the caliphate in his continuing deputyship in the Republican Assembly), who sought a remedy through a Sufi framework. For Mustafa Safvet Efendi the belief in the virtue and superiority of human beings over animals and machines rendered Sufism antithetical to physiological reductionism and gave it a new responsibility. In his journal *Tasavvuf* (Islamic mysticism), he argued that Sufism’s new task was to facilitate studies on human nature with an accurate foundation of the realities of man (*hakikat-ı insaniye*), and to refute ‘superstitions [*hurafat*] like Darwinism which confuse human beings with animals’.<sup>466</sup> Ahmed Hilmi instead found a new tool for re-establishing the virtue of human beings, more in touch with the ‘reality’ of his time. His concern about losing the virtue of human beings must to a large extent have been fed by his religious beliefs. But he clearly did not see Sufism as the only tool for defending the virtue of human beings. His choice to write a psychology book displays his acknowledgement of scientific authority in his own way, in response to the gradual exclusion of Islamic philosophy and theology from the domain of scholarly works, the void supposedly to

---

<sup>465</sup> Ibid., pp. 263- 80.

<sup>466</sup> ‘Nisb-î pâk-î insaniyi silsile-i hayvaniye karıştıran Darvinizm nazariyyeleri gibi hurafâtın münâzarâtını münacat-ı aleyh-i insaniye arasından külliyyen bil-iskat ile alem-i İslamiyyetin ezvâk hususiye-i maneviyyesinden safâ’yı vicdan ile lezzet-yâb irfan olmak tasavvufun meslek-i mahsus-ı muktezasındadır.’ Şeyh Mustafa Safvet Efendi, ‘Hakikat-ı İnsaniye’, *Tasavvuf* (25 Mart 1327 / 7 April 1911), p. 1.

be filled by psychology. Psychology and metaphysics were two distinct spheres with different methodologies and tools for revealing the mysteries of human nature.

Psychology is concerned with the state of being and transformations of the soul as well as psychological phenomena. Here the soul does not correspond to the spiritual essence, which is the substance of life. It corresponds to human personality pertaining to consciousness, ruling senses, thoughts, and volition. Therefore the soul is divided into two: (1) the soul as a metaphysical being, which is about the essence of the soul – This is to be studied through sciences of the soul, different than psychology as the sciences of the states of the soul. – (2) the soul as pertaining to psychological phenomena as mentioned above. The former is based on reason, while the latter is based on observation and experiment.<sup>467</sup>

The mysteries of the soul were to be solved by metaphysics, therefore he was not going to delve into it in *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*: ‘Here we are not going to delve into the essence of the soul as it is a metaphysical subject’.<sup>468</sup> For more information, however, interested readers could have a look at his chapter ‘The Mysteries of Man’ (*esrar-ı adem*) in *Tasavvuf-ı İslami ve Fünun-ı Cedide ve Felsefe*, in which he dealt with the concept of the soul from the viewpoint of Sufism. It is controversial to what extent Ahmed Hilmi remained faithful to this distinction. However, he certainly welcomed the foundation of the field of psychology on a scientific basis at the expense of detachment from metaphysics. This brought forth the question of how science viewed human beings, which added new layers to discussions on materialism, science, and religion.

---

<sup>467</sup> ‘İlm-i ahval-i ruh, ruh-ı insaninin, ahval, tahvilat ve hadisatından bahs eder. Burada ruh, hakikat-ı hayat olan esas-ı manevi manasını müfid değildir. Hissiyat, tefekkürât ve iradât gibi hayat-ı vicdaniyesi nazarı mülâhazaya alınan şahs-ı insanidir. Bu sebeple mebbas-ı ruh iki kısma inkisâm eder. Birisi mâfevkettabîyeye aid olan kısımdır ki, o ruhun hakikatinden bahistir, biz ona "ilmi ruh" namını vererek ilm-i ahval-i ruhtan tefrik edeceğiz, diğeri ise balâdaki tarif mucibince ruhun hadisatından bahs eyler. Mâfevkettabîyeye dahil olan ‘ilm-i ruh’ aklidir. İlm-i ahval-i ruh ise tedkik ve tecrübe üzerine mübtenîdir.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, p. 21.

<sup>468</sup> ‘Felsefe-i mâfevkettabîyeye ait mebâhisten olduğu için biz burada mahiyet-i ruhtan bahsedecek değiliz.’ Ibid., p. 27.

In delving into the use of psychology for refuting scientific determinism, and the consistent choice of psychology books influenced by French spiritualist philosophy, it is important to factor in a degree of state support and encouragement. At the least we could say that the *Darülfünun* academics writings' served the purpose of counterattacking a totalizing view of science, on a par with counterparts in Europe such as Paul Janet, Émile Boirac, and Georges Fongreive in France. This in my interpretation hints at the development of a *Darülfünun* orthodoxy as an (official) shelter for promoting philosophy and psychology with a spiritualist tendency.

To begin with, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi was affiliated with the Ministry of Education as a philosophy teacher; in addition, he claimed to be one of the spokesmen of the commission which was planned by the Ottoman government to write refutations of Abdullah Cevdet's *Tarih-i İslamiyet*.<sup>469</sup> When the commission could not be gathered, Ahmed Hilmi decided to write a refutation individually. His refutation was soon accompanied by many other refutations, also written individually. He claimed that he had been asked to write a psychology book, as a model for which he unsurprisingly chose one of the key school textbooks of French spiritualist psychology. *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* became such a popular book that its different chapters were translated into Ottoman a number of times.<sup>470</sup> Babanzade Ahmed Naim, a professor at the *Darülfünun* and a member of *Dar-ül Hikmet-il İslamiye* (The academy of higher Islamic studies), published Paul Janet's articles criticizing scientific determinism in *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* (The

---

<sup>469</sup> *Tarih-i İslamiyet* is a translation of Reinhart Dozy's *Het Islamisme (Islamism)* by Abdullah Cevdet, which caused serious reactions on the basis of presenting the prophet as mentally deranged. As a result the ministry of education intended to form a commission to write refutations. See Ahmed Hilmi, 'Önsöz', *İslam Tarihi* (Istanbul, 2005), pp. 25-31. Ahmed Hilmi's claim for being a part of this commission is supported by an archival document: BOA. MF MKT 1149/4 (15 Şubat 1325 / 28 February 1910).

<sup>470</sup> This might be explained as a matter of practicality, given that *Darülfünun* library held a copy. However I see a more continuous and systematic interest in French spiritualistic psychology and philosophy going beyond the influence of Boirac.

journal of the faculty of literature).<sup>471</sup> His translation of Fonsgreive's *Psychology (İlm-i Nefs)* was also published at the Imperial Printing House (*Matbaa-ı Amire*) as part of the Ministry of Education Library of General Education (*Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Telif ve Tercüme Kütüphanesi*).<sup>472</sup> Theologian and another member of the Academy of Higher Islamic Studies Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır published *Metalib ve Mezahib, Metafizik ve İlahiyat* (Demands and doctrines, metaphysics and theology), his translation of *History of Philosophy* by Paul Janet and Gabriel Séailles, thanks to donations by those he called 'science lovers with great virtue who were sent by God'.<sup>473</sup> Mehmet Ali Ayni was a professor at the *Darülfünun* and translated a text written by an unidentified author named E. Rabo upon the ministry's special order.<sup>474</sup> This text included Ayni's and the original author's remarks about the harms naturalism, positivism, and materialism inflicted on society, and the need for an alliance between spiritualism and psychology.

Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil's book *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, however, was not as fortunate. In issue 17, *Piyano* (Piano) magazine, published by Baha Tevfik, asked readers whether they would be interested in having a psychology book designed. Psychology after all could greatly contribute to 'everything from intellectual gatherings to daily conversations and science' and 'without psychology one can not exchange ideas, write letters, let alone novels or poems', the advertisement goes.<sup>475</sup> It

---

<sup>471</sup> Babanzade Ahmed Naim, 'Felsefe Bir İlim midir?' , *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/1 (1332/1916-7), pp. 71-96; 'İkinci Ders: felsefenin yeni birkaç tarifi' , *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/1 (1332/1916-7), pp.197-221, 'Üçüncü Ders: felsefede mısdağ', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/5 (1333/1917), pp. 508-33.

<sup>472</sup> Georges L. Fonsegrive, *Mebadî-i Felsefe*'den Birinci Kitap, *İlm-i Nefs*, tr. Babanzade Ahmed Naim (Istanbul, 1333/1915). For more information about Babanzade's translations: İsmail Kara, *Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak*.

<sup>473</sup> 'İlim dostu bazı fazıl kimselerin ilahi sevk ile kitabın basılma masraflarını üstlerine almaları bugün bu eserin yayınlanmasına izin verdi.' Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, *Metalib ve Mezahib, Metafizik ve İlahiyat*, Muhtar Yazır and Ayhan Yalçın, eds. (Istanbul, 1978), p. XXIX.

<sup>474</sup> It is written as 'و ب ا ر'.

<sup>475</sup> 'Her yerde her mecliste, her musâhebede, her fende psikolojinin büyük bir dahili vardır. Psikolojisiz ne roman yazılır, ne şiir, hatta ne mektup yazılır, ne de görüşülür.' *Piyano*, 17 (undated), p. 200.

then it asks interested readers to contact *Piyano* magazine, as they need five hundred copies to be sold to cover the expenses; otherwise they could not afford to publish it, as they would ‘rather not be a spokesman of a rich publisher’, it concludes.<sup>476</sup> Eventually Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil did get their version published. However, no record has been found to show whether their version was approved by the Ministry of Education and taught in classrooms. It was Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, however, who was asked to write a psychology book to be taught at the *Darülfünun*.

As explained before, during the Hamidian era the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument was promoted as a state education policy. The foundation of new Western-style schools and science education were balanced by an increased Islamic theology content in the curriculum.<sup>477</sup> ‘Disciplining’ of new generations entered the state agenda to preserve the Islamic identity of the empire. Books about science and religion were checked regularly and those supporting reconciliation were allowed.<sup>478</sup> The Sultan gave awards (*taltif*) to authors in support of this theory, such as Al-Jisr.<sup>479</sup> New religious courses were introduced and antireligious remarks were not allowed, and the palace asked for the names of the students with weak morals.<sup>480</sup> Although the first few years of the Second Constitutional Era witnessed a degree of change in educational policies, religion was soon integrated into the mainstream again with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1911, as a co-worker with rising nationalism.<sup>481</sup> There was thus long-established support for the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ model, of which Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi was a great representative. Spiritualist psychology continued to be a part of *Darülfünun* classrooms in the 1920s, taught by professors with no explicit religious

---

<sup>476</sup> ‘Zengin bir kitapçının yazıcı-ı menfaati olmak da arzu etmiyoruz.’ Ibid.

<sup>477</sup> Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, pp. 94-5.

<sup>478</sup> Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*, p. 174.

<sup>479</sup> Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic*, pp. 132- 7.

<sup>480</sup> Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*, p. 174.

<sup>481</sup> Alkan, ‘II. Meşrutiyet’te Eğitim’, p. 64.

concerns, as will be explained in chapter five. One could therefore suggest that to some degree there was a wish to maintain traditional frames of mind as opposed to a strong emphasis on science, as the main vehicle for social transformation by the *Darülfünun* body.

More importantly, having acknowledged that religion could constitute one reason – among many others – for some thinkers to dislike ‘positivism, Darwinism, materialism and atheism’, I would disagree with maintaining an exclusive focus on it. Instead I would suggest that there were anti-scientist, anti-Western, and anti-mechanistic concerns behind the psychological productions in a spiritualist vein, as will be delved into below through the example of Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi.

### **The Soul as a Conservation Area against ‘Fake Progress’**

Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi theorized the concept of ‘fake progress’ within an anti-Western and anti-colonial framework. In his understanding, ‘Western civilization was to be appropriated through a process of selection and adaptation’, doing justice to progress in a real sense.<sup>482</sup> In his writings he deals mainly with ‘the proper strategy for the appropriation of modernity’ and how to make progress without losing traditional and religious values. Focusing exclusively on one part of his writings would overshadow the importance he attributed to the interaction of contemporary means of knowledge acquisition and religion. He criticized some religious scholars for not following contemporary levels of human knowledge and causing cultural, educational, and moral decline.<sup>483</sup> At the same time, he was critical of the spread of antireligious tendencies and copying Western social and cultural practices. These were outcomes of excessive

---

<sup>482</sup> Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi, *Taklitle Medeniyet Olmaz!* (Istanbul, 1962), p. 7.

<sup>483</sup> Bein, ‘A “Young Turk” Islamic Intellectual’, p. 613.

modernization and symptoms of ‘fake progress’. Accordingly he drew attention to the necessity of finding the balance between the dualities of his time:

There are two impediments for reaching the contemporary level of progress and development: 1) Stagnation, hostility towards progress, bigotry and negligence against the idea of evolution and not acknowledging the needs of the era... These are all examples of negligence to the essential needs of life, which can be multiplied. 2) To be content with a superficial level of knowledge, to mimic superficially, to assume that one, like a puppet master, can make a society leave its hereditary and natural traits and gain new ones, not to be able to differentiate the candied show of civilization from its real substance. These are analogous to ‘fake medicine’, which would only kill the patient. The war cry of this nation therefore should be: neither bigotry / negligence of the idea of evolution, nor vulgar mimicking. This is because fake progress is equally dangerous and as fatal as hostility towards progress.<sup>484</sup>

This discourse resonated to some extent with many other *Darülfünun* scholars such as Babanzade Ahmed Naim and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, who, according to Özdiç, engaged in an effort to highlight the importance of reason and volition as symbols of freedom in contributing to the discourses on reform and in fighting against orientalist discourses of Islamic fatalism.<sup>485</sup> Such interpretations were part of efforts by intellectuals with religious concerns to contribute to the discourses of progress and a ‘new understanding of man’ in Ottoman modernization.<sup>486</sup> Philosophy was one area for delving into different definitions of progress. By the same token, in his preface to his translation of *Histoire de la Philosophie* by Paul Janet and Gabriel Séailles,

---

<sup>484</sup> ‘Benim içtihadıma göre bu milleti gelişen terakki ve tealiye vakt-i lazımda vusuldan men edecek esbâb iki kısım-ı mühime ayrılabilir: (1) Tevakküfperestlik, terakkiye adavet, tekamül fikrine karşı cahilane bir taassub, ihtiyâcât-ı mübrem-e-i zamanîyi taktir etmemek ki bunların cümlesi şerîta-ı hayat ve bekamızı anlamamak cümlesiyle zîde edilebilir. (2) Malumat-ı sathi ile kanaat, sığ bir taklid, bir heyet-i içtimaiyi kukla giydirir gibi, irsî ve fitri ahvalinden hemen tecrit ederek yeni bir takım ahval ile mütehallik etmeyi mümkün sanmak, âlem-i medeniyetin alayış-i ebleh firibinden ciddiyâtını tefrik etmemek ki bunların cümlesi ‘hastayı sahte tababetle tedavi edeyim derken öldürmek’ cümlesiyle zîde edilebilir. Binâberin bir milletin nara-ı cihad ve cidali ne taassub-ı cahilane, ne taklid-i amiyane feryadı olmalıdır. Zira bir millet için adavet-i terakki ne kadar mehleke ve katil ise, sahte terakki de o derecede mehleke ve katildir.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *Allah-ı İnkâr Mümkün müdür?* (Istanbul 1327/1910-11), ç.

<sup>485</sup> Rıdvan Özdiç, *Akıllık, İrade Hürriyet: Son Dönem Osmanlı Dinî Düşüncesinde İrade Meselesi* (Istanbul, 2012).

<sup>486</sup> It should be noted that intellectual discussions on new understandings of man were not limited to intellectuals with religious concerns. For example according to Nazım İrem, another group of intellectuals, whom he calls Kemalist conservatives, dealt with new understandings of man in the 1920s and 1930s. These discussions will be studied in detail in chapter five to answer the question whether or not there was a continuity. Nazım İrem, Turkish Conservative Modernism Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34/1 (2002), p. 99.

Elmalılı Hamdi explained his understanding of alternative progress as ‘rather than rendering the values of the past redundant, upgrading them with modifications and new discoveries’. This according to Özervarlı was an effort at formulating ‘an alternative modernization’ and ‘achieving the ideal combination’ between old and new elements.<sup>487</sup> Drawing on this, I would present Ahmed Hilmi’s understanding of fake progress as one attempt at being a part of ‘progressive circles’ in his own way. The soul came to represent his hesitations in the face of a fast-changing world, and was conceived of as a ‘conservation area’.

On one level the interplay between spiritualism and psychology helped Ottoman intellectuals to be part of global anti-Western and anticolonial rhetoric. This was a matter of preserving the ‘inner’ sphere of a culture, in the way that Chatterjee has analysed modernization in non-Western contexts and Ayşe Kadioğlu has applied it to the Ottoman context.<sup>488</sup> While the material sphere (i.e. technology, economy, and in some cases the political system) was subject to full-force Westernization and modernisation, the spiritual sphere (cultural, religious, traditional matters) aimed to remain intact. The dichotomy between Western materialism and Eastern spirituality became a common theme in late Ottoman literature. The soul in this framework came to signify the inner strength of the ‘underdeveloped’ against the ‘developed’.

Against the backdrop of constant warfare after the Balkan Wars, a romantic literature of the soul blossomed which came to symbolize the power derived from one’s own self. Regardless of the type of agenda, be it nationalist or religious, the soul was simply identified with the power to resist and to contribute to a higher cause, irrespective of the specific motive. One among many is a piece published in

---

<sup>487</sup> Özervarlı, ‘Intellectual Foundations and Transformations in an Imperial City’, p. 526.

<sup>488</sup> Ayşe Kadioğlu, ‘Milliyetçilik-Liberalizm Ekseninde Vatandaşlık ve Bireysellik’, in Tanıl Bora, ed. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi*, IV (Istanbul, 2002), pp. 284-92.

*Sebilürreşad* in 1911 by Abdullah Fehmi, an Ottoman intellectual specialized in Islamic Law, and also the father of the Republic of Turkey's third president Celal Bayar. According to Abdullah Fehmi, 'All sensations and spiritual power in unity distance themselves from the bondage of change and are drawn to a centre, that is the centre of conscious, personality, self, in brief, the soul.'<sup>489</sup> The sense of selfhood produced by the soul was the main tool with which one could win the constant struggle between good and evil, mind and sensations, free will and instincts. For him, because the soul was stronger than the body, human history was full of chivalry, martyrdom, virtue, liberty – in short, self-sacrifice for a higher cause. Human beings were still mysterious, as claimed in a poem entitled *İnsan* (Human) published in *Sebilürreşad* by Naim Hazım Ülkü Onat (1889-1953) – a linguist and school teacher who became a deputy in the first parliament of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and also known as the inventor of Mustafa Kemal's surname Atatürk (Father of the Turks).<sup>490</sup> Naim Hazım expressed his excitement in the face of the power of mankind, despite biological limitations. Even though people at first sight seemed 'embodiments of weakness and impotency' and 'small corpses, mortal bodies' who 'cannot – even – survive hunger and thirst', in reality they held immense power: 'Who are you? O human! You have a great capacity; when one looks closely, you have a unique virtue indeed; you pour out the rain from the sky; you lift the mountains in just one move; It is because your soul is bigger than the sky and the earth.' It was the soul, according to Naim Hazım, from which humans took their strength, engendering ambition, ardour, curiosity, and an irresistible drive for progress.

Ahmed Hilmi put some serious thought into theorizing why the spiritual sphere (culture, tradition and religion) was richer and had to be protected. The human body

---

<sup>489</sup> Abdullah Fehmi, 'Beka-ı Ruh', *Sırat-ı Müstakim* (8 Eylül 1327 / 21 September 1911), 7/159, pp. 42-3.

<sup>490</sup> İbn Naim Hazım, 'İnsan', *Sebilürreşad* (17 Mayıs 1327 / 30 May 1911), 1-8 / 195-13, p. 237.

and the soul turned into a site of negotiation concerning the limits of the scientific invasion. His use of spiritualism put him in touch with a global anti-Western rhetoric. Ahmed Hilmi actually devoted considerable space and importance to Indian spiritualism, going so far as to present it as ‘the start of the theories of the soul’. Ahmed Hilmi quotes a long letter written by an Indian ascetic Koot Hoomi entitled ‘The Weaknesses of European Sciences’ (*Avrupa Ulumunun Zayıf Noktaları*). Koot Hoomi, in fact a fictional character, claimed to have inspired the foundation of the Theosophical Society in 1875 in the United States, to establish a universal brotherhood of humanity and to study the unexplained laws of nature and powers of man.<sup>491</sup>

Ahmed Hilmi’s quotation from Koot Hoomi goes as follows:

For us the importance of your science is limited to its moral consequences and its services to humanity. Yet can one really think of any other science which is as useless to humanity and morality as the material [natural] sciences are, and which has a foundation as egotistic and ambitious as that of the material [natural] sciences? Then I shall ask you: what is the benefit of the discoveries Faraday and Tyndall have made for humankind and the love of humanity?<sup>492</sup>

After this question, in a footnote, Ahmed Hilmi backs up Koot Hoomi’s question about the effects of sciences on social life: ‘Koot Hoomi has a right to ask this question. Amazing technological developments have run alongside gradually increasing moral and material misery, rather than aiming for social happiness.’<sup>493</sup> Social happiness, however, was considered to be related with preserving the inner part

---

<sup>491</sup> Gordon Melton, ‘Theosophical Society’, *New Age Encyclopedia* (Michigan, 1990), pp. 458-61

<sup>492</sup> ‘Sizin ulumunuzun bizce olan ehemmiyeti, yalnız verebilecekleri netâyic-i ahlakiye ve faide-i insaniye itibar ve haysiyetiledir. Lakin ahlak ve insaniyet için, sizi iştigal eden, ulum-ı maddiyeden daha lüzumsuz ve bu ilimler kadar fikri enaniyet ve ihtiras üzerine mübtenî olan umul-ı tasavvur edilebilir mi? Size sorarım ki Faradi'nin, Tyndall'in keşfiyat ve ihtirâtından hubb-ı insaniyet fikrine, beşeriyete ne faide vardır?’ Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, p. 276.

<sup>493</sup> ‘Koot Homi’nin bu suali sormaya hakkı vardır. Ulum-ı maddiyetin terakkiyât-i hayret bahşası, heyet-i içtimaiye-i insaniyece saadeti müstecvib olmadıktan maada günden güne sefalet-i maddiye ve maneviye çoğalmaktadır.’ Ibid. Here Koçak transliterates Koot Homi as Fothoma and Kuvvet-i Huma. Yet having seen the original and read about the importance of Koot Homi for his era, I transliterate it as Koot Homi.

of a given culture or nation. This puts Ahmed Hilmi in touch with an anti-Western and anti-colonial discourse, with a critical stance towards perceived misuses of science and technology.

There were degrees to the intellectuals' demands for the use of science as a tool or a map of social change. For Ahmed Hilmi, one needed to be careful about 'misuses' of science as a pretext for different interests, and social transformations ought to be in harmony with already established traits of a society. In particular, Herbert Spencer's and Charles Darwin's observations about 'natural laws and principles of evolution' were significant in understanding the role that environment, heredity, and habituation played in social units. Yet he considered the applications of the biological theories of Darwin to social units as one of the reasons why 'Western societies' had turned into a 'machine' with no room for spiritual components such as morality and religion.<sup>494</sup>

The machine metaphor refers to another concern of his, which has been neglected in the secondary literature. As explained in the previous chapter, the term 'mechanism' (*mihanikiyet*) was used extensively in the Ottoman context, such as by Hoca Tahsin and Abdullah Cevdet in their first works on brain physiology and psychology. In Ahmed Hilmi's understanding the negation of the soul involved reducing intelligence to sensations, sensations to instincts, and ultimately human beings to animals (driven solely by instincts). This implies that reductionism, as an epistemological position generating a strong belief in causal laws that are considered capable of explaining everything from human nature to the universe, was an important part of the disseminations of popular scientific works and biological materialism in the

---

<sup>494</sup> Ahmed Hilmi in his preface to *Hangi Meslek-i Fennîyi Kabul Etmeliyiz?* discusses why one should not mimick West and not embrace these theories fully in order to preserve cultural and religious authenticity: Ahmed Hilmi, *Hangi Meslek-i Fennîyi Kabul Etmeliyiz? Darülfünun Efendilerine Tahriri Bir Konferans*, (Konstantiniye, 1329/1913-14). For a Romanized version of the first couple of pages, see Hasan Lütfî Ramazanoğlu, ed. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İslam Düşüncesinde Arayışlar* (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 11-3.

Ottoman Empire – and it was this that Ahmed Hilmi set out to problematize. Underneath Ahmed Hilmi’s problematization of materialism, I argue, lies a strong dislike of mechanistic views of the universe and human nature. Psychology was a venue to delve into the latter more specifically.

For Ahmed Hilmi, science was a limited activity that required the use of experimentation and analysis within its limitations. Accordingly it had limitations for revealing the truth of human nature. In his *Psychology* he theorized a set of norms to establish a ‘balanced’ relationship with science, revolving around the principle of overstatement (*ifrat*) and understatement (*tefrit*) in scientific activity, an expression explicating Ahmed Hilmi’s search for a medium between the rejection of scientific methodology and taking it as the only tool to explain everything.<sup>495</sup> Science (and philosophy) were to be balanced between overstatement and understatement:

When overstatement and understatement [*ifrat* and *tefrit*] are not accepted in any field, they are completely rejected in philosophy and science. Thus we are completely against extrapolating certain assumptions which cannot be proven and are unknown to humans, from scientific truth. Yet, we are also against the neglect of [scientific] discoveries and scientific truth, which is of great importance.<sup>496</sup>

In finding the balance between *ifrat* and *tefrit* in scientific activity and answering the question of where to set the boundary, mechanistic explanations of human nature emerged as key to determining whether one had gone too far. For him, because ‘assumptions and science were antithetical’ (*zan ile fen bir araya gelmez*), sensibility, consciousness, and human intelligence cannot be explained by mechanical forces. Extrapolating from the theory of instincts used in ‘explaining simple animal

---

<sup>495</sup> *İfrat*, *tefrit* and *müfrit* come from the same root of *fert* which means abundance. *İfrat* means excess, and *tefrit* means deficiency in an action. *Müfrit* is the person who exceeds due bonds. *Müfritler* is the plural form of *müfrit*.

<sup>496</sup> ‘İfrat ve tefrit hiçbir işte makbul değilken, bittabi hikemiyât ve fennîyâtta bütün bütüne merdûddur. Binâberin hakâik-ı fennîye-i üzerine ısbatı gayrı kabil ve vicdan-ı âdemiye mugâyir faraziyât inşasının şiddetle aleyhindeyiz. Lakin keşfiyât ve hakâyık-ı celile-i fennîyeye göz yummanın da aleyhindeyiz.’ Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, p. 27.

behaviour' to that of human behaviour was an example of overstatement (*ifrat*) of scientific activity, for Ahmed Hilmi:

Those who go to the extreme [*müfritler*], assume a mechanical process merging intelligence, memory and recollection. 'Assumptions' are not enough to reach any conclusion as to such an important issue. Science and assumptions are antithetical. Also animal intelligence, which is below the average, would not be adequate to understand human intelligence, the basis of mind. It is because what is mysterious as to human intelligence is not its quantity but its quality. Similarly it would not convincingly explain and solve the mystery to argue that the nature has spent billions of centuries to transform mechanical forces [*kuvve-i mihanikiye*] to the forces of sensations [*kuvve-i his*] and to this level of intelligence. Because what is mysterious about these is related with the questions of how and why a phenomenon, which does not manifest itself in any mechanical form, could come into being, instead of the question of how long it took it to come into being. The principles for humanity and the principles of life will always remain unknown. It's because even if there are certain general principles abiding 'the knowledge of human beings' [*marifet-i beşer*] as Spencer argues, there is an eternal and more general knowledge above that which is unknown.<sup>497</sup>

Seeking a mid-path between differentiating man from animals and accepting the universal laws was a case in point, and which, I believe, was to some degree representative of his era. What would establishing boundaries between metaphysics and scientific activity mean? It serves the purpose of challenging a totalizing view of science while maintaining one's place in the circle of 'science lovers' and the 'frenzy of progress'. The most general and closest definition for those who go to the extreme (*müfritler*) would be intellectuals who adopted an 'inclusive attitude' – i.e. defining a new, almost dogmatic world-view based on science in the 19<sup>th</sup> century while producing popular scientific works – as was very common at the time. Given that materialism was widely discussed by the Ottomans, and that Ahmed Hilmi wrote a

---

<sup>497</sup> 'Yine müfritler diyorlar ki: zeka, hafıza ve hatıra ile müterâfik bir kabîl-i iştial-i mihanikiyet zan olunuyor. Bu derece mühim bir meselede 'zan' kâfi değildir. Zan ile fen bir araya gelemmez. Keza zeka-i insaniyi izah için hayvanat-ı mutavassıttadaki ekall derecedeki zekayı irâe de kâfi değildir. Zira muamma olan zekânın kemiyeti değil, keyfiyetidir. Keza kuvve-i mihanikiyenin kuvve-i his ve zekâ derecesini bulması için tabiatın milyarlarca asır sarf-ı mesai ettiğini söylemek de izah ve ref müşkül için kâfi değildir. Zira muamma mihanikiyette mütezâhir olmayan bir keyfiyetin ne kadar müddette zuhur ettiğinde değil, nasıl ve niçin zuhur ettiğindedir. Beşeriyet için esaslar ve bu meyanda esas-ı hayat daima meçhul kalacaktır. Zira Spencer'ın dediği gibi marifet-i beşer herhangi umumiyete vasil olsa, onun da fevkinde daha umumi ve binnihâye bir gayrı kabîl (inconnaisable) marifet vardır.' Ibid., pp. 41-2.

number of refutations of it, it would be a source of overstatement (*ifrat*) in scientific activity. Darwinists would be another useful category, since he ends his criticism of *ifrat* with a reference to the idea of evolution in the quotation above. In his understanding, Darwin's theory of evolution (*Darvin'in transformisme ve tekamül nazariyeleri*) had explained the roles of instincts as hereditary animal drives for the protection of life<sup>498</sup> but was not adequate to explain anything deeper than this, nor to answer ultimate decisive questions.<sup>499</sup> However, although for him the mysteries of the brain would one day be unravelled by science, unconsciousness, consciousness, sensibility, and the relations between the soul and body would remain mysterious and unknown to science, since they were unobservable (*gayri kabil-i tedkik*). These concepts were exactly where the mystery began and mechanistic explanations would end: 'Here comes the enigma and complication, as the mystery of life starts from here. How do sensibility and consciousness, which have no relation with mechanical force what so ever, come into being?'<sup>500</sup> He presented psychological concepts such as volition, intellect, consciousness, and sensibility as opposites of mechanistic behaviour, and as the main difference between animals and humans.

His problematization of mechanism went along with the 'man as machine' and 'man as animal' metaphors. In his understanding, mechanism (*mihanikiyet*) set the boundary between animals and human beings: 'Animals are machines capable of giving mechanical responses to external force [stimulus]. This cannot be falsified since it is proven by scientific experiments. However this fact has been taken to extremes

---

<sup>498</sup> 'Sevk-i tabii muhafaza-ı hayattır, demiştik. Bu bir hakikat-ı müsbetedir. Her hayvanın sevk-i tabiisi bi-zarûre, 'Fatalement' zuhur etmekle beraber, o hayvanın muhafaza-ı hayatı için en muvaffak, en makul ve en sehl olan surettir.' Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>499</sup> 'Gayet basit görülen bu usul-ı izah [Darwin'in transformisme ve tekamül nazariyeleri], ulum-ı tabiiyedeki efkâra muvaffik ise de, maâteessüf hemen hiç bir şeyi izah edemiyor, son 'niçin'ler cevapsız kalıyor.' Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>500</sup> 'İşte bütün muamma ve müşkülât buradadır, zira esrar-ı hayat burada baş gösteriyor. "Vicdan ve hassasiyet" denilen ve kuvve-i mihanikiye ile keyfiyeten hiç bir münasebeti olmayan bu hâlet nereden geldi?' Ibid., p. 41.

while being extrapolated and applied to other things.’<sup>501</sup> This was represented as the catalyst of the most primitive animal and human behaviours, such as instincts and reflexes. As far as instincts (*sevk-i tabii*) and reflexes (*harekât-ı münakise*) were concerned, the human soul was no more developed than that of animals, as there was no involvement of any mental activity or freedom (*hürriyet*).<sup>502</sup> Mechanism therefore set the boundary between animals and humans, as humans (unlike animals) were capable of going beyond mechanistic activities. Intellectual capacities (such as self-awareness, consciousness, reasoning, memory, judgment, and observation) and volition were the main reasons why mechanistic views of human nature were unable to provide a full explanation of human psychology:

These [animal behaviours] are mechanistic behaviours [*harekât-ı mihanikiye*], lack the power of fluent expression [*bekî*] and do not involve volition. Animals do not know the past, or cannot have the concept of future. They cannot help but perform such actions. They lack the capacity to advance or lessen certain actions based on volition and intelligence. In that sense, they are no different than a clock.<sup>503</sup>

The concept of volition was the most significant part of the discussions about mechanism and science. It posed a very simple question: To what extent are human beings free, i.e. free to choose, free to go beyond their biological limits. Ahmed Hilmi’s *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* should be considered as a cornerstone in the problematization of scientific determinism in the late Ottoman intellectual milieu, through which he preserved humanity as a special case – superior to animals because

---

<sup>501</sup> ‘Her hayvan, en ehemmiyetsiz bir kuvve-i hariciyenin tesiriyle iştiâl eden bir kabîl-i iştiâl-i mihanikiye demektir. Buraya kadar olan meşrûdât tecârib-i katiye-i fennîye üzerine müesses olduğu için hiçbir şey denilemez. Lakin bundan çıkarılan istidlâlâtta ifrat ve tesellük gayreti görülüyor.’ Ibid.

<sup>502</sup> ‘Bunlar gayrı safî ihsasâtla müterâfik harekât-ı münakise ve sevk-i tabiiye’dir. Bunlarda hürriyet, hasse-i zekâvât yoktur ve adeta vicdanen bile gayrı mahsus gibidirler. Demek ki, bir nevî harekât-ı mihanikiye olup bu gibi efâlde ruh-ı insani, ruh-ı bahîmîden henüz tamamiyle mümtaz ve mütemeyyiz değildir.’ Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>503</sup> ‘Bunlar harekât-ı iradiye değil, bekî bir keyfiyete malik harekât-ı mihanikiyedir. Hayvan maziye bilmez, istikbali düşünemez. Yaptığı efâli yapmamak elinden gelemmez. Hayvan, sırf irade ve zeka ile, yaptığı efâli terakki ettirmekten, tedenni ettirmekten acizdir. Bu hususta onunla bir saatin, bir makinenin hiç bir farkı yoktur.’ Ibid., p. 36.

of self awareness, will-power, a capacity to push beyond conventional biological limits, and a mysterious quality which made them unpredictable. In other words, humans could not be understood or conditioned using scientific laws.

Ahmed Hilmi's understanding of psychology promoted a view of human nature as not capable of being explained fully by science, not entirely limited by physiological phenomena, and as ultimately different from animals. It served the purpose of maintaining the complexity and mysteriousness of human nature with a scholarly authority, and took responsibility for proving the unique qualities of human beings in opposition to scientific determinism. From Ahmed Hilmi's perspective, the discipline of psychology was a scholarly tool for setting certain boundaries to scientific activity, and explaining human nature and social dynamics. His principles of overstatement and understatement in scientific activity exemplify that there were different degrees of commitment to science and different ways of integrating oneself into the scientific and progressive circles of the time. His conceptualization of human nature as ultimately unknowable to science and different from that of animals exemplified the Ottoman intellectuals' efforts to welcome psychology by using the frameworks that they already had. These frameworks and concerns about the role of science fed into the development of psychology in the Ottoman Empire.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has studied Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi's understanding of psychology with respect to the intellectual discussions about science and progress in the Ottoman Empire. Set against the backdrop of Ottoman modernization, the late Ottoman intellectual milieu was animated by a discussion about the role of science in understanding man and society. This discussion on one level had great relevance to a

new debate intellectuals were engaged in in the Ottoman Empire: that of defining a new understanding of man in relation to the discourses of progress, and the scientific invasion of man. On another level it integrated Ahmed Hilmi into global anti-scientist rhetoric in the heyday of a ‘crisis of science’. He attempted to turn the human soul into ‘a conservation area’ to be saved from scientific determinism, ‘fake progress’, mechanization, and Western domination.

The search for an alternative modernization through ‘laments of the soul’ within a conservative and spiritualist framework reached its pinnacle with the spread of *Bergsonism* among the late Ottoman intellectuals in the post–First World War and the War of Independence period, as will be studied in chapter five. In the following decade, this discussion gained more romantic and literary features, as intellectuals gathered around the magazine *Dergah*, which dealt with poetry, spiritualism, and philosophy, as well as psychology. In this framework, psychology played a key role in criticizing scientific determinism and scientism. This continuity will reveal that intellectual discussions about the concept of progress and scientific determinism were akin to different understandings of human nature in response to the changing material culture intellectuals were exposed to and growing concerns about technological and economic progress. These concerns fuelled the development of psychology in the Ottoman context.

In the nineteenth century, psychology invented the normal individual.  
Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Our Selves*

## Chapter IV: Educated Animal, Controlled Emotions: An Invention of the Individual

‘Now I understand that real love starts after the age of 80, a type of love that is beyond lust, passion and jealousy.’ Nail leans on the couch, lights his cigarette. Enis sits down at the piano and plays a waltz: ‘When Love Blossoms...’ Mesmerized by the tune, poor old men fail to notice the irony of the song.

Torn between the fire of useless love and perpetual divine love, they ponder: ‘Now that they do not have any lust, it’s time to make love with eternal and absolute affection. No more jealousy between them...’

The melody of passionate love spreading like waves from the piano answers to this feeling: If only love could be detached from egoism...<sup>504</sup>

Baha Tevfik

Through an unusual love story between an old homosexual couple who decide to fight jealousy together, Baha Tevfik rewrites the rules of love in *Aşk, Hodbinî* (Love, egoism) from an immoralist framework.<sup>505</sup> Stigmatizing ‘lust, passion and jealousy’, he depicts how love should ideally be experienced and expressed. By leaving the story open ended, he also leaves to the readers the question of whether love in reality could be completely detached from such selfish feelings – lust, passion and jealousy. In his psychological writings, however, he takes a step further, and adopts a firmer stance on love: it is pathological and needs to be cured for individual and collective health. And its cure lies in the domain of psychology, as a new modern science of controlling one’s sensibility, regulating feelings, and ultimately transforming society.

---

<sup>504</sup> Anlıyorum ki aşk-ı hakiki bilhasa sekseninden sonra başlayacak. Şehvetsiz, hırssız, hatta kıskançsız bir aşk... Nail bir koltuğa yaslandı. Cigarasını yaktı. Enis piyanosuna oturdu. Yeni bir vals çalmaya başladı. Aşk çiçek açarken! Zavallı ihtiyarcıklar! Nagamâtıyla mest oldukları bu valsın mana-ı müstehzisine dikkat edemediler. Hiçbir ihtiyaca mukabil olmadığını farz ettikleri felatuni bir aşkın sine-i har ve samimiyesinde gittikçe artan bir aşk-ı manevi ile uzun müddet düşündüler: Mademki şehvetleri yoktu, artık bişaiye ve ebedi bir muhabbetle sevişeceklerdi... Yekdiğerini kıskanmayacaklardı bile... Piyanodan dalga dalga taşan ahenk-i şiir âlûd garâm bu hisse cevap veriyordu: Ah eğer aşkı hodbinî’den ayırabilmek mümkün olsaydı!...’ Baha Tevfik, *Aşk, Hodbinî, Piyano*, 8 (4 *Teşrin-i Evvel* 1326 / 17 October 1910), p. 92.

<sup>505</sup> Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı Edebi ve Felsefi Eserleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma*, p. 50.

In the secondary literature, Baha Tevfik is known as one of the first intellectuals who helped materialism and anarchism come to the fore in late Ottoman intellectual life.<sup>506</sup> In an attempt to unfold his views on science and the concept of individual with a clearer and less loaded terminology, this chapter instead focuses on another domain: his use of psychology. It approaches his under-studied psychological writings from the perspectives of the circulation of global scientific and philosophical theories of man (through evolutionism, materialism, monism) and late Ottoman intellectual discussions about the concept of the individual.

This chapter focuses on the Second Constitutional Era, during which the popularization of ‘scientific’ views of man went hand in hand with the rise in materialist circles of the rhetoric of emotional control, primarily by Baha Tevfik. It asks what was the relevance of Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology and the rhetoric of emotional control in the late Ottoman intellectual climate. Against the backdrop of the spread of liberal thought and the rising tension between individual and collective interests, Baha Tevfik delved into the concept of the ‘individual’ while formulating one of the first theories of emotional control within a psychological framework. Accordingly, free and conscious individuals were expected to manage their emotions in a newly designed moral system.

This chapter is broken down into two sections. The first section examines the popularization of scientific views of man and the metaphor of ‘man as animal’ in relation to psychology in the Second Constitutional Era. The second section presents Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology as a case study of the politics of emotion revolving around the rhetoric of emotional control. In particular it shows the ways in which his

---

<sup>506</sup> There are two comprehensive monographs on Baha Tevfik: Mehmet Alkan, ‘Siyasal Düşünce’nin Dünyevileşmesi: İlim’den Bilim’e Geçişin Kritik Evreleri Osmanlı Materyalizmi ve Baha Tevfik’ (MA thesis, Istanbul University, 1988); Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı, Edebi ve Felsefi Eserleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma*. Also his canon is approached from two main angles: anarchism and materialism, both are crucial for this chapter as will be discussed below.

extensive use of psychology helped him develop a conceptual framework of the individual against the backdrop of the spread of liberal thought and the rising tension between the individual and the collective.

## **The Spread of the ‘Man as Animal’ Metaphor in the Second Constitutional Era**

In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.<sup>507</sup>  
Charles Darwin

The history of evolution involves a large network of scientists and intellectuals, working around the world from the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, and going beyond the influence of the bible of evolutionism, *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Two leading proponents of the idea of evolution prior to Charles Darwin were Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), Charles Darwin’s grandfather, and Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), the French natural scientist. The famous geologist Charles Lyell’s *The Principles of Geology* (1832), while revealing the gaps in Lamarck’s theory of evolution, showed the need for a more consistent evolutionary theory and prepared the audience for Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* when it came out.<sup>508</sup> Darwin was part of a group of scientists including Thomas Henry Huxley, Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker, Charles Lyell, and Alfred Russel Wallace, who all helped Darwin stand behind his work in the face of criticisms, and helped the theory reach a degree of popularity and acceptance by the 1870s. The idea of evolution transcended Darwinism, while being transmitted to

---

<sup>507</sup> Charles Darwin, *Origin of Species* (London, 1859), p. 488.

<sup>508</sup> For more information: Michael Bartholomew, ‘Lyell and Evolution: An Account of Lyell’s Response to the Prospect of an Evolutionary Ancestry of Man’, *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 6/3 (1973), pp. 261-303.

different parts of the world by scientists and philosophers such as Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899), and Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919).<sup>509</sup>

In the Ottoman Empire, prominent science journals touched briefly upon evolutionary ideas in geology and anthropology from the 1860s onwards, as explained in chapter two. In the 1890s Abdullah Cevdet in particular started to publicize the biological materialism of Büchner. This rested on the discovery of the central role of the brain in mental faculties, which laid the foundations for medical studies as well as psychology. As a theory, however, it was rather old-fashioned, and was often criticized for being too narrow, mechanical, simplistic, and ‘vulgar’.<sup>510</sup> In the Second Constitutional Era, Baha Tevfik strengthened this foundation by a more sophisticated and up to date view of human nature and the universe, supported by evolutionism. This sophistication went along with the spread of scientific views of man and the ‘man as animal’ metaphor, as well as psychological publications in response to the need for school course-books. Baha Tevfik merged psychology with materialism, monism, and evolutionism, and provided psychological studies with a scientific basis in the Second Constitutional Era.

Following the abolition of long-established censorship, and in line with the rising interest in science, Baha Tevfik promoted popular scientific trends in the relatively freer environment of the Second Constitutional Era, and went beyond unrefined uses of the theory of evolution. In 1910 he founded the Library of Scientific and Philosophical Renovation publishing house, with a claim to put together ‘new science’ and ‘new philosophy’. This publishing house, together with *Felsefe Mecmuası* (Journal of philosophy), which Baha Tevfik also founded, became two major venues for his friends with equal passions in science, evolutionism, and

---

<sup>509</sup> Eve-Marie Engels and Thomas F. Glick, eds. *The Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe*, I (London, 2008), p. I.

<sup>510</sup> Michael Heidelberger, ‘Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner’, p. 48.

materialism, such as Ahmed Nebil, Suphi Ethem, Memduh Süleyman, and Fikri Tevfik. They took the dissemination of scientific discussions in the Ottoman Empire to a new level by publishing the first separate works on leading evolutionists, materialists, and monists such as Charles Darwin, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Ernst Haeckel, and Ludwig Büchner.<sup>511</sup>

The Library of Scientific and Philosophical Renovation made great effort to speed up its publications. The main motivation for Baha Tevfik to work as fast as possible was the belief in the role of the dissemination of scientific and philosophical ideas in making progress.<sup>512</sup> They were already lagging behind their counterparts. By the time the Library of Scientific and Philosophical Renovation was founded in 1910, the centennial of Darwin's birth and the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the publication of *On the Origin of Species* had already been celebrated. Editions of *On the Origin of Species* had already made in French, German, Italian, Hungarian, Danish, Russian, Polish, Spanish, Dutch, Norwegian, Japanese, and Chinese.<sup>513</sup> Similarly, by 1904 *Kraft und Stoff* (1855), 'one of the most popular and polemical books' of the German materialist movement, 'had already gone through twenty-one editions and had been translated into all major languages'.<sup>514</sup> Up until the First World War it had been translated into seventeen foreign languages,<sup>515</sup> and the Turkish translation was one of the

---

<sup>511</sup> For a short review of Darwinism in the Ottoman Empire: Mehmet Alkan, 'Osmanlı Darwinizmi', *Cogito, Darwin Devrimi: Evrim*, 60/61 (2009), pp. 333-8. For a longer account: Atila Doğan, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm* (Istanbul, 2006).

<sup>512</sup> 'Sırası geldikçe tekrar ediyoruz ki memleketimize ciddi ve esaslı kitaplara muhtaçtır. Fen ve felsefesiz içtimai ve ne de siyasi hiçbir terakki husule gelemeyeceği gibi bunlar da yekdiğerinden ayrı vücut bulamazlar!....' Baha Tevfik, in Fikri Tevfik, *Hüceyre: Hayatın Esası* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), p. I.

<sup>513</sup> Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic*, p. 6.

<sup>514</sup> Emmanuel Hirsch, *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europäischen Denkens*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. (Gutersloh, 1964), 5:585 f. cited in Hans Schwarz, *Vying for Truth Theology and the Natural Science: From the 17<sup>th</sup> Century to the Present* (Göttingen, 2014), p. 24.

<sup>515</sup> Michael Heidelberger, 'Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner', p. 48.

latecomers.<sup>516</sup> This was not the first appearance of Büchner in Ottoman publications. He had begun to be discussed in popular science journals as early as the 1870s, and the first partial publication came out in 1890, translated by Abdullah Cevdet. However, by the time Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil's translation came out – selling 2,250 copies in less than two years, as Baha Tevfik claimed<sup>517</sup> – it was already an aged and old-fashioned reference book in the popular scientific literature.

The three main subjects that the Library of Scientific and Philosophical Renovation valued most highly, and most aimed at promoting, were cell biology (biology), materialism, and evolutionism.<sup>518</sup> Biology was the backbone of his writings, whether philosophical or scientific. The translation of *Matter and Force* was indeed a great contribution to materialism, but it had already been worn out by its supporters and opponents in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. The defining yardstick for the group that came to be seen as 'materialists' in this era was evolutionism, a much newer and more popular subject for intellectuals.<sup>519</sup> A number of books pertaining to evolutionism were published in this period. Subhi Edhem published *Darvenizm* (Darwinism) and *Lamarckizm* to fill the void in the curriculum and help students learn the laws of evolution.<sup>520</sup> He also wrote extensively about evolutionism in *Felsefe Mecmuası*, and published one of the first natural science dictionaries.<sup>521</sup> Ahmed Nebil and Baha Tevfik published major masterpieces of Ernst Haeckel such as *The Riddle of the*

---

<sup>516</sup> Louis Büchner, *Madde ve Kuvvet*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul, 1911). For more information on Büchner's understanding of materialism: Gregory, *Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century*. For a glimpse into its spread through Şibli Şumayyil's translations into Arabic: Marwa Elshakry, 'American Evangelism in Late Ottoman Beirut', *Past and Present*, 196 (2007), p. 213; *Reading Darwin in Arabic*.

<sup>517</sup> Louis Büchner, *Madde ve Kuvvet*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, transliterated by Ali Utku and Kemal Kahramanoğlu (Istanbul, 2012), p. 16.

<sup>518</sup> Baha Tevfik, in Fikri Tevfik, *Hüceyre*, p. I.

<sup>519</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, pp. 240-1.

<sup>520</sup> Subhi Edhem, *Darvenizm* (Manastır, 1327/1911); *Lamarckizm* (Dersaadet, 1330). For more information on Subhi Edhem: Remzi Demir, 'Subhi Edhem Bey'in Bilim Tarihi ve Bilim Tarihi Bilinci', *Bilim ve Ütopya*, 139 (2006), pp. 52-7.

<sup>521</sup> Subhi Edhem, *Ulum-ı Tabiiyye Lugatı* (Istanbul, 1917).

*Universe (Kainatin Muammaları)* in *Felsefe Mecmuası* and *Monism (Vahdet-i Mevcut)* as a separate book.<sup>522</sup> Another book published by the Library of Scientific and Philosophical Renovation was *Darwin Mesleğinin İhtiva Ettiği Hakikat ve Hatalar* (The strength and weaknesses of Darwinism) by Memduh Süleyman, based on Eduard von Hartman's analysis of *Darwinism* with his reservations about the theory.<sup>523</sup> This hints at Memduh Süleyman's intentions to promote a sophisticated discussion of evolutionism in all its aspects, rather than being a steadfast devotee of Darwinism.

At the center of the new popular scientific trends, particularly evolutionism, lay the question of what science could say about human beings today and in the past. The place of human beings in the world was discussed deeply in the Darwinist circles and came to the Ottoman Empire as part of the evolutionist package. Psychology began to appear more often in science and philosophy journals, usually in relation to evolution and materialism. To give a couple of examples: an article series entitled *Ruhiyat* (Psychology) published in *Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası* (New journal of new philosophy), referred to Lamarckian evolutionism as the beginning of psychology.<sup>524</sup> In *Tabiat* (Nature), another science magazine published in 1911, translations of Haeckel's articles were followed by Ragıp Hulusi's translation of experimental psychology articles by Wilhelm Wundt, the German physician and the founding father of modern psychology.<sup>525</sup>

The question of what science would say about human beings brought some Ottoman intellectuals and interested readers closer to their counterparts in the wider world, who had been preoccupied with this question from an evolutionist framework

---

<sup>522</sup> Ernest Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud: Bir Tabiat Aliminin Dini*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, (Istanbul, unknown date); *İnsanın Menşe-i Nesli Beşer*, tr. Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul, unknown date).

<sup>523</sup> Eduard Hartmann, *Darwinizm: Darwin Mesleğinin İhtiva Ettiği Hakikatler ve Hatalar*, tr. Memduh Süleyman (Istanbul, 1329/1913).

<sup>524</sup> *Ruhiyat*, *Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası*, 2 (30 August 1911), p. 8.

<sup>525</sup> Ragıp Hulusi, Wundt'un Felsefesi, Psikoloji ve Ahlaka Dair, *Tabiat*, no.1 (10 Temmuz 1327 / 23 July 1911), p. 9.

for a longer time. Baha Tevfik, for example, shared the passion of Thomas Henry Huxley – English biologist and the author of *Man's Place in Nature*, who was known as 'Darwin's Bulldog' for his support of Charles Darwin – for exploring the place of man in the world. Baha Tevfik's preface to *İnsanın Menşei* (The descent of man) by Ahmed Nebil, a translation of a conference paper presented by Haeckel, starts with a quote from Huxley:

'The biggest challenge for humanity is to understand the place of man in the world vis-a-vis other things. It is at the heart of each and every question pertaining to human beings. Where does mankind come from? To what extent we enjoy autonomy in relation to nature? To what degree does nature control us? These questions preoccupy anyone with an interest in nature and would arouse curiosity like no other thing.'<sup>526</sup>

Among the leading evolutionists and materialists, Ernst Haeckel's influence on Baha Tevfik was felt most strongly. Haeckel was a monist, a metaphysical view which takes reality as a unified whole and all existing things as part of a single concept or a system, including the body and the soul.<sup>527</sup> In Baha Tevfik's understanding monism was formed as a rejection of the separation between the 'sciences pertaining to the soul' and the 'sciences pertaining to matter'.<sup>528</sup> Intrinsically, it left more room for psychological studies. In Haeckel's terms psychology was 'placed on a new and monistic basis' which refuted the 'older mystical conception of the soul'.<sup>529</sup> It was psychology's task to show how the soul, as a function of the brain, was in harmony with evolution. In this new understanding emotions such as pleasure, pain, love, and hate were expressions of 'the power of attraction' and the 'repulsion of atoms' as well as 'expressions of the soul'. Comparative psychology was a great tool to perceive the

---

<sup>526</sup> Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime', in Haeckel, *İnsanın Menşei, Nesl-i Beşer*, p. 9.

<sup>527</sup> 'Pluralism and monism', in *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Accessed online 09 November 2015 <http://global.britannica.com/topic/pluralism-philosophy>.

<sup>528</sup> Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime' in Haeckel, *Vahdet-i Mevcud*, p. 26.

<sup>529</sup> Ernest Haeckel, *Monism As Connecting Religion* (London, 1895), pp. 48-9.

evolutionary steps ‘in the development of the soul in the animal kingdom’, as he explained in *Monism*, translated into Turkish by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil:

Our human body has been built up slowly and by degrees from a long series of vertebrate ancestors, and this is also true of our soul; as a function of our brain it has gradually been developed in reciprocal action and re-action with this its bodily organ. *What we briefly designate as the ‘human soul,’ is only the sum of our feeling, willing, and thinking*—the sum of those physiological functions whose elementary organs are constituted by the microscopic ganglion-cells of our brain. Comparative anatomy and ontogeny show us how the wonderful structure of this last, the organ of our human soul, has in the course of millions of years been gradually built up from the brains of higher and lower vertebrates. *Comparative psychology teaches us how, hand in hand therewith, the soul itself, as function of the brain, has been developed.*<sup>530</sup>

Haeckel’s canon is a case in point to see the reciprocal relationship between popular scientific views of man and the development of modern psychology; and so is Baha Tevfik’s canon. In the Ottoman case, this relationship is most apparent in Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology as a way to understand the mysteries of human nature. Starting from his student years at *Mülkiye* (The civil school), Baha Tevfik held a deep interest in psychology, which yielded a number of books such as the course book *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Psychology), the section on psychology in *Teceddüd* (Renovation), and the section of Psychology in *Muhtasar Felsefe* (Concise philosophy). As early as 1904 he published articles on psychological subjects such as consciousness, sensibility, and the differences between psychology and physiology, in the journal *İzmir* (Smyrna).<sup>531</sup> These articles, which might possibly have been taken directly from a Western psychological textbook, reflect a great deal of competency on the subject as well as his determination to supplement modern psychology with traditional psychological views. These constituted the nucleus of the textbook *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*.<sup>532</sup> *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* is a 203-page course-book,

---

<sup>530</sup> Ibid. p. 77.

<sup>531</sup> Baha Tevfik, ‘Mebâhis-i Felsefe: Psikoloji’, *İzmir*, 398/44 (18 Kanun-i Evvel 1320 / 31 December 1904), p. 5.

<sup>532</sup> Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, undated).

consisting of four sections – sensibility (*hassasiyet*), volition (*iradat*), thought (*fikret*), and the relations between the soul and matter. It is unfortunately undated, yet it must have been published between 28 November 1910 and July 1911, utilizing the works of Émile Boirac, Alfred Fouillée, Élie Rabier, Théodule-Armand Ribot, and René Worms.<sup>533</sup>

According to Ülken, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil was much better and more modern than its predecessors and contemporaries, even at the onset.<sup>534</sup> This mainly stems from its clear rejection of Islamic philosophy and theology, which could easily be discerned as a glance. As reflected by Ali İrfan's version of *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*, Islamic philosophy and theology were still considered to be part of the discipline in the early 1910s.<sup>535</sup> However, it had already worn out its welcome. As Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi's version of *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* shows, the necessity of cutting out theological references for a psychology book to be considered 'modern' and 'scientific', instead of metaphysical, was apparent to some Ottoman intellectuals. This came to culmination in *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil.

By Baha Tevfik's standards, however, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* did not include the most cutting-edge research and knowledge in psychological studies, and therefore was not as modern as it should be.<sup>536</sup> Because of the limitations of the textbook style, and the standard practice of imitating Western textbooks, *Psychology's* link with Western philosophy was not completely severed. For Baha Tevfik, Émile

---

<sup>533</sup> Even though it is hard to be conclusive about when it was published, it must have been published between 28 November 1910 and 28 July 1911. On 28 November 1910 *Piyano* readers were asked their interest in 'the first book on psychology, not even inadequate or misleading' in *Piyano*, 17, (15 Teşrin-i Sani 1326 / 28 November 1910), pp. 200-1. On 28 July 1911 *İctihad* readers were informed about this book as 'the first scientific book on psychology' –the earliest advertisement of this book I have seen: *İctihad*, 27 (15 Temmuz 1327 / 28 July 1911), p. 797.

<sup>534</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, p. 244.

<sup>535</sup> Ali İrfan, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*.

<sup>536</sup> Baha Tevfik, 'Bir İki Söz', *Muhtasar Felsefe* (Istanbul, 1331/1913), p. 4.

Boirac for example was an old-fashioned philosopher.<sup>537</sup> Yet his *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie* was in frequent use both in Ottoman and French classrooms, which secured his place in the ‘list of authors to be consulted’ for *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*. By the same token, for a careful reader with deep knowledge of Baha Tevfik’s and Ahmed Nebil’s take on philosophy and science, like Şükrü Hanioglu, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* was disappointing for its neglect of human physiology. As Hanioglu remarks, one actually ‘would have expected Baha Tevfik to prefer physiological psychology advanced by Helmholtz, Donders and Fechner or the evolutionary psychology developed by Romanes and Morgan’.<sup>538</sup> This hints at the limitations of the school textbook style in the Ottoman Empire, which Baha Tevfik explained by his search for objectivity. He claimed that instead of indoctrinating students with their personal views on human nature, they ought to remain objective – which possibly would have been a mistake for a textbook in need of the ministry’s approval.

Nevertheless, there were certain beliefs and personal biases which they would not have compromised. *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* actually contains important materialist and monist remarks, which were placed very subtly in the chapters *The Human Soul* and *Relations between Matter and the Soul*. Following in the footsteps of Abdullah Cevdet, for example, they refuted the metaphysical understanding of the soul and linked mental faculties exclusively to cerebral activity:

As it appears today psychology is divided up into three main branches: emotions, free will, and thoughts. These are called faculties of the soul [mental faculties]. This division and the terminology are used for practical purposes only. These are traits and faculties of the body, which consists of matter and there is no such metaphysical essence called the soul.<sup>539</sup>

---

<sup>537</sup> Ibid.

<sup>538</sup> Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a future society’, p. 74.

<sup>539</sup> ‘Artık anlaşılmiştir ki psikolojide yalnız üç büyük şube vardır: Hissiyat, İrade, Fikret. Bu üç kuvvete "melekât-ı ruhiye" namı verilir. Fakat bu taksim, bu melekât yalnız kolay anlaşılacak maksadıyla ihdas edilmiştir. Yoksa bunlar maddeden müteşekkil olan cismimizin evsaf ve kuvvetleri olup ruh namıyla bir cevher-i mâfevkettabîyye yoktur.’ Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *Psikoloji*, p. 41.

Sugarcoating monist ideas of the soul with psychological theories, Ahmet Nebil and Baha Tevfik challenged dualist views of psychology. Dwelling on Pierre Jean George Cabanis's theory of the relations between the soul and matter, they criticized Descartes's dualism and Victor Cousin's understanding of psychology. The soul and matter were in unity: 'in order to explain a mutual influence between body and the soul, we must believe in the unity of all the elements in universe. This means that the body and the soul are formed from the same ultimate substance and that we need to demolish the old ideas of Descartes and Cousin.'<sup>540</sup>

Memduh Süleyman and Suphi Ethem also supported the alliance between psychology and monism, and indeed took this to a larger audience through popular science magazines and books. Memduh Süleyman, for example, wrote a series of articles on psychology starting with a monist take on psychology:

One should not think of the soul as separate from the body like Dualists and majority of the public would think. On the contrary the soul is united with the body. Spiritual life is dependent on the material flow to the protoplasm, the vital basis of matter. And all psychic phenomena are subordinated to the general laws of material reality.<sup>541</sup>

Similarly, Suphi Ethem challenged dualist understandings of human nature in *Hayat ve Mevt* (Life and death), one of the first books to approach life and death as products of physical and chemical processes. For him, Descartes's dualism went hand in hand with spiritualism.<sup>542</sup> However, the claim that 'thought was a product of the

---

<sup>540</sup> 'Delâil-i mukanna ile sabit olan ...ruh ile cismin tesirâtı mütekâbilesini izah etmek için Descartes ve Cousin'in bu nazariyat-ı âtıklarının tamamıyla yıkarak kainatta mevcudun vahdaniyetine yani ruh ile cismin, aynı mevcudun bazı şerait-i tahtında az çok tahvil etmiş cevherleri olduğuna inanmaklığımız icab eder; diyebiliriz.' Ibid. 143.

<sup>541</sup> 'Ruh denilince tenaiye mesleği Dualisme taraftarlarının ve esker avamın zan ve kabul ettiği gibi vücuddan ayrı bir kuvvet zan etmemelidir. Ruh bilakis vücud ile beraber bulunur. Zira hayat-ı ruhiyedeki hâdisatın kafesi cismin madde-i zi hayatiyesinde yani protoplazmasında vakî olan istalat-ı maddiyeye merbuttur. Ve hâdisat-ı ruhiyenin cümlesi madde kanun-ı umumiyesine tabidir.' Memduh Süleyman, Felsefe Dersleri, *Rubab*, 76 (26 Eylül 1329 / 9 October 1913), p. 450.

<sup>542</sup> Subhi Edhem, *Hayat ve Mevt* (Istanbul, 1329/1913), pp. 18-24.

soul seated in a specific part of the brain', a central claim of some forms of spiritualism, was already refuted by science.<sup>543</sup>

Monist views of the soul were akin to the metaphor of 'man as animal', promoted by evolutionism and psychology. Drawing on evolutionist interpretations of protoplasm, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* ends with a chain of evolution wherein human beings are presented as complex animals. In opposition to Descartes's dualism and the rejection of the animal soul, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* establishes materialist laws of monism which apply to both animals and humans: 'Psychological dispositions – whether inborn or acquired – are bound by material dispositions. The close connection between the body and the soul shows this once and for all.'<sup>544</sup> Drawing on evolutionist theories of protoplasm, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* ends with the 'man as animal' metaphor supported by evolutionary views of man. Plants are transformed into animals and animals are transformed into the most complicated animals, with imagination, thought, consciousness, and reasoning:

As for animals, because they were unable to extract food from the soil they were forced to move around on land. Thus they evolved from plants. This is how they developed organs to move and to sense which evolved into the central nervous system for establishing direct contact with the environment. Once this system was formed, it was gradually evolved into various organs and brought into existence the most perfect animal. Subsequently the central nervous system formed the brain, which founded the basis of the sense of consciousness. Afterwards the five senses, which had been present in protoplasm in a disorderly and primitive form, took a concrete and perfect form. The evolution of senses developed and took the forms of imagination, thought, and the sense of reasoning finally.<sup>545</sup>

---

<sup>543</sup> 'Tefekkür dimağın mahsülü değil, bu uzvun maverasında mahfi bir ruhun eseridir sözü çürümüş bitmiştir.' Ibid. 25.

<sup>544</sup> 'Tabî-i ruhiye gerek ciblî ve gerek kısbî tabî-i maddiye tabidir. (Ruh ile cismin münasebet-i umumiyesi) bunu isbat eder.' Baha Tefvîk and Ahmed Nebil, *Psikoloji*, p. 200.

<sup>545</sup> 'Hayvanat ise, bilakis netice-i teşekkülâtı olarak gidasını yerden alamadığından gezip dolaşmaya mecbur kalmış ve bunun için nebattatân ayrılmıştır. İşte onun vücudundaki aza-ı hareket ve aza-ı his, bilhassa cümle-i asabiye vücut bulmuş ve sahibini muhitiyle münasebatta bulunduracak bir (uzuv merkezi) teşkil etmiştir. Bu azayı müteaddide bir kere teşkil ettikten sonra artık günden güne tekmile başlamış ve kaide-i ihtiyacı takip ederek hayvanatın en mükemmelleri hasıl olmuş ve bilahere uzuv merkezinin de dimağ şekline girmesiyle bir takım havas-ı vicdaniye husule gelir ki artık protoplazmada karışık ve ibtidai bir halde bulunan havas-ı selase tamamıyla kesb-i vuzuh ve mükemmeliyet etmiştir. Havasın tekmili ise evvela tahayyülden başlayarak tasvire ve nihayet muhakeme-i tasdikîyeye kadar ilerlemiştir.' Ibid., p. 203.

This conclusion rendered *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* a platform to promote the ‘man as animal’ metaphor from an evolutionary perspective. This validates the suggestion that questions pertaining to human nature and popular philosophical ideas of the universe were of great concern to some Ottoman intellectuals. Indeed, there was an ongoing fierce discussion from the 1870s onwards, which this thesis is tracing through the trajectory of psychology. These discussions were not divorced from late Ottoman intellectual, social, and political dynamics. In fact they were closely related. Psychology made its appearance as a tool for legitimation in late Ottoman intellectual writings strikingly soon after its recognition as a modern science in the global literature. In Baha Tevfik’s formulation, the symbiosis between evolutionism, materialism, monism, and psychology came with a rhetoric of emotional control formulated within the framework of liberal thought, as will be discussed in the next section.

### **A Case Study of ‘Politics of Emotion’**

‘Love is a form of sensibility. And sensibility, in any form, is pathological.’<sup>546</sup>  
Baha Tevfik

Against the backdrop of rising tensions between individual and collective interests, Baha Tevfik, as a follower of Prince Sabahaddin’s theory of individualism, gave serious thought to the idea of anarchism. This served in the development of a more thorough understanding of the concept of the individual, in support of this anti-authoritarian stance. Making extensive use of psychology, he delved into the intricacies of the ‘individual’ while developing one of the first theories of emotional

---

<sup>546</sup> ‘Aşk bir hassasiyettir. Ve her hassasiyet marazdır.’ cited in Baha Tevfik, ‘Aşk-ı Marazi’, *Piyano*, 7 (20 Eylül 1326 / 3 October 1910), pp. 69-70.

control within a psychological framework. Free individuals were seen as responsible for their emotion management in a newly designed moral system.

The liberal atmosphere of the 1908 Revolution was replaced by a strong sense of disappointment among intellectuals following the consolidation of CUP power. Following the events of 31 March,<sup>547</sup> the CUP Government closed down many different opposition parties, such as the Liberal Union Party (*Ahrar Fırkası*) influenced by Prince Sabahaddin's theory of decentralization.<sup>548</sup> The 1912 elections, known as 'the Big Stick Election' (*Sopalı Seçimler*), validated the government's inclination towards authoritarianism.<sup>549</sup> The end of Balkan Wars in July, which was a prelude to the First World War, saw the beginning of a more authoritarian and nationalist phase during which every segment of social life was the target of planning.<sup>550</sup> This coincided with an era of liberal economic policies following the appointment of Mehmed Cavid Bey, an ardent supporter of Ottoman economic liberal thought, as the Minister of Finance, after the 1908 revolution.<sup>551</sup> According to Çavdar, a liberal economy became one important economic policy of the CUP government until the end of the First World War, when it was taken over by the National Economy.<sup>552</sup> Prince Sabahaddin extensively publicized liberal economic policies, individualism, and private initiative, under the umbrella of a newly founded discipline: sociology. Prince Sabahaddin (1879-1948) was an Ottoman intellectual and a member of the royal family, whose ideas inspired the opposition to the CUP Government.<sup>553</sup>

---

<sup>547</sup> Sina Akşin '31 Mart Olayına Değın Sabahattin Bey ve Ahrar Fırkası' *AUSBFD* 17/13 (September 1972), p. 548.

<sup>548</sup> For more information on Ahrar Fırkası: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, I (Istanbul, 1998), p. 175-8.

<sup>549</sup> For a more detailed perspective to 'CUP authoritarianism': Baran Hocaoglu, *2. Meşrutiyet'te İktidar Muhalefet İlişkileri, 1908-1918* (Istanbul, 2010).

<sup>550</sup> Feroz Ahmed, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London, 1993), p. 31.

<sup>551</sup> Çavdar, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, pp. 152-61.

<sup>552</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>553</sup> For more information on Prince Sabahaddin's contributions to the Young Turk movement with nuanced periodization and contextualization: Stefano Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman*

He developed his theory of decentralization, private entrepreneurship, and individualism as a solution to what he deemed the ‘core problems of the Empire’, such as reliance on public service, strong economic control, collectivism, and the enslavement of the elite.<sup>554</sup> The idea of decentralization did not seem appealing to the majority of CUP members, whose fear of the dissolution of the Empire pushed them over the edges of the other extreme, nationalism.<sup>555</sup> However, Prince Sabahaddin’s liberal and individualistic stance, in opposition to the collectivist tendency of the Young Turk movement, ushered in a fruitful discussion as to where to draw the line between collective and individual interests. According to Mardin, Sabahaddin’s theory involved four main elements: 1) a model of the ideal human being; 2) An educational theory for creating the ideal human being; 3) an imagined society, which could sit easily with the ideal human being; 4) a social method of analysis for unfolding the structure of existing societies.<sup>556</sup> In other words, when society was first analyzed as a unit of social analysis by Prince Sabahaddin it ran alongside his imagination of an ideal man, which in turn surfaced through his commitment to individualism and liberal thought.

The clash between individual and collective interests for a while concerned intellectuals including Baha Tevfik, as reflected by numerous (unfairly neglected) journal articles and books. *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimâiye Mecmuası* (The journal of economics and social sciences), for example, was a venue for intellectuals to discuss the relations between individual, society, and state with reference to John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer within a liberal framework.<sup>557</sup> Herbert Spencer in particular was

---

*Empire: The Young Turks on the Challenges of Modernity* (London, 2015). Hereby I thank Professor Benjamin Fortna for drawing my attention to this book.

<sup>554</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, pp. 291-303.

<sup>555</sup> Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, pp. 82-124.

<sup>556</sup> Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 294.

<sup>557</sup> Doğan, *Osmanlı Liberal Düşüncesi*, pp. 97-111.

given special importance in intellectual accounts whose works on the theory of religion, morality, as well as the relations between the individual and the state were discussed and translated into Turkish in this era.<sup>558</sup> As Mehmed Münir points out in his translation of *Vazı-ı Kanunların Hataları* (The sins of the legislators), a chapter of *Man versus the State* by Herbert Spencer, it was timely and vital to speak about individual freedom in the Second Constitutional Era, as ‘demolishing the palace of despotism and erecting an assembly would not bring along individual freedom effortlessly.’<sup>559</sup>

Baha Tevfik was not a central figure in the late Ottoman intellectual era, due to his critical approach to established norms and dominant discourses of his time, such as collectivism and nationalism, as well as his harsh criticism of the existing literature. Among his close friends in Izmir he was known to be ‘sarcastic and skeptical’, and in the late Ottoman intellectual circles as argumentative and polemical.<sup>560</sup> Perhaps for this reason his sudden death was passed over in silence and did not attract much media attention. His childhood friend Ömer Seyfettin was among a handful of intellectuals who wrote letters of condolences after his death. In this letter Seyfettin called Baha Tevfik ‘a fantasizer with great potential but no purpose’– speaking as someone who had just found his life’s purpose in Turkish nationalism.<sup>561</sup> Baha Tevfik was critical of

---

<sup>558</sup> See for example: Herbert Spencer, *Vazı-ı Kanunların Hataları*, tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün (Istanbul 1327/1911); *Kavanin-i Tabiiye*, tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün (Istanbul, 1327/1911); *Fikri ve Ahlaki Terbiye* tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün (Istanbul, 1340/1924). See also: Sylvan Drey, *Herbert Spencer’in Din ve Ahlak Hakkındaki Nazariyesi*, tr. Mehmet Münir Erteğün (Istanbul, 1327/1911); Mehmed Safvet Engin, *Spencer’in Felsefesi* (Istanbul, 1928).

<sup>559</sup> ‘Hürriyet-i ferdiyenin tesisi yalnız istibdad sarayının yıkılması ve onun yerine meclis-i umumi yapılmasıyla müesser olamaz.’ Mehmed Münir Erteğün, in Herbert Spencer *Vazı-ı Kanunların Hataları*, p. 1.

<sup>560</sup> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Ömer Seyfettin Bey’, *İkdam* (10 Mart 1336 / 23 March 1920) cited in Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı*, p. 18.

<sup>561</sup> Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik’in Hayatı*, pp. 36-7. *İctihad* journal published by Abdullah Cevdet defended Baha Tevfik by showing the great purpose of his life: ‘His translation of *Matter and Force* stands alone as a disproof of his alleged “purposelessness” in life, even if we are oblivious to his other contributions’. *İctihad* 109 (5 haziran 1330 / 18 June 1914), p. 168.

nationalism and became a fierce defender of individual rights, going so far as to praise anarchism, in the sense of valuing the individual above everything in his environment.

The secondary literature on anarchism reminds us of the importance he attributed in his final years to individual freedom as opposed to increasing government control and visibility – rather than supporting anarchism per se in an orthodox sense. This literature revolves around Baha Tevfik’s book *Felsefe-i Ferd* (Philosophy of the individual), a heteroclitic compilation consisting of articles on diverse subjects such as education, physiology, ethics, philosophy, officialdom, marriage, socialism, and anarchism. In the end he manifests his sympathy for anarchism: ‘I expect anarchism to reign in the future.’<sup>562</sup> *Felsefe-i Ferd*’s transliteration into modern Turkish by Burhanettin Şaylı came out with an ambitious title: *Anarchism in Ottoman Language*, which started a discussion on whether Baha Tevfik’s as well as Şaylı’s use of the term ‘anarchism’ is a stretch or not.<sup>563</sup> According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Baha Tevfik uses the term ‘anarchism’ freely and vaguely, with no reference to major anarchist thinkers (such as Prince Kropotkin (1842-1921), Mihail Bakunin (1814-1876), and Max Stirner (1806-1856)).<sup>564</sup> Similarly, Mehmet Alkan and Rıza Bağcı disagree with the use of the term.<sup>565</sup> Laurent Mignon keeps a tight focus on the ways in which Baha Tevfik used and defined such terms in order to avoid historical anachronism.<sup>566</sup> He first enumerates the points on which Baha Tevfik converges with anarchist thought – such as criticism of officialdom, power, and nationalism – and then reminds us of Baha Tevfik’s vague definition of anarchism: ‘Anarchism means to keep individual alive and to destroy any

---

<sup>562</sup> ‘Ben bu yeni asrın içinde anarşizmi görüyorum.’ Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd* (Istanbul, 1914), p. 119.

<sup>563</sup> Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd: Anarşizmin Osmanlıcası*, transliterated by Burhanettin Şaylı (Istanbul, 1997).

<sup>564</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, p. 240.

<sup>565</sup> Alkan, *Osmanlı Materyalizmi ve Baha Tevfik*, p. 35.

<sup>566</sup> Laurent Mignon, ‘Osmanlı Özgürlükçülüğünün Peşinde: Baha Tevfik ve Felsefe-i Ferd’i’, in *Ana Metne Taşınan Dipnotlar: Türk Edebiyatı ve Kültürlerarasılık Üzerine Yazılar* (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 25-34.

force against individual as well as his/her unique traits. Anarchism means to eradicate any authority over individuals other than natural law and to reveal the principle of struggle for life with all its truth.<sup>567</sup> Considering these, Mignon concludes, *Felsefe-i Ferd* actually represents a search for individual freedom in the late Ottoman intellectual era, thus adding to our understanding of the late Ottoman intellectual milieu. One last thing to add would perhaps be the fact that anarchism in this passage is contrasted with socialism, in a general sense of prioritizing collective interests over that of the individual.<sup>568</sup> One could therefore safely assume that Baha Tevfik's use of anarchism stands for his vision of a future that favours the individual against the rise of collectivist tendencies.

One striking question, however, arises: How could someone as passionate about individual freedom as Baha Tevfik develop a theory of emotions which went as far as to promote indoctrination through education. As will be seen in the next chapter, Mustafa Şekip Tunç's search for individual freedom against rising collectivism in the early 1920s went hand in hand with a romanticized view of passions and a spiritualist understanding of an individual with full autonomy. In the case of Baha Tevfik, however, individual freedom came with a stipulation of self-control and emotional management based on psychological rules, as if one must learn to 'become individual' in a social unit, through education and psychology. This is perhaps the closest to what we call 'a case study of politics of emotion'<sup>569</sup> and what we defined in the introduction

---

<sup>567</sup> 'Anarşizm demek ancak ferdi yaşatmak ve ferde, ferdin meziyyât-ı husûsiyesine mübâriz tek mil kuvvetleri mahveylemek demektir. Anarşizm demek ferdin üzerinde kavânin-i tabiiyeden başka bir kanun bırakmamak, mübareze-i hayat destur-i muazzamını bütün çıplaklığıyla meydana çıkarmak demektir.' Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, p. 118 cited in Mignon, 'Osmanlı Özgürlükçülüğünün Peşinde: Baha Tevfik ve Felsefe-i Ferd'i', p. 33.

<sup>568</sup> 'Bence sosyalizm, fert ve meziyyât-ı ferdiye aleyhine hayat-ı cemiyeti takviyeye çalışan bir meslek-i içtimaiyedir.' Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, p. 117.

<sup>569</sup> 'Politics of emotion' is an old term in social constructionist perspectives to emotions. See See L. Abu Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge, 1990). Solomon Robert C. Midwest Studies, *Philosophy*, 1998, 22/1, pp.1-20. Sara Ahmed in *Cultural Politics of Emotions* brought back the term 'politics of emotion' for further investigation by examining relationships between emotions,

as *biopolitics*, and the ways in which the individual is to be indoctrinated through psychology, as if he or she is a rational being whose behavior can be predicted and shaped. It is thought-provoking that this formula comes from an intellectual with serious reservations about rising nationalism in the Ottoman Empire,<sup>570</sup> a counter example to the efforts at limiting indoctrination to national agendas in the Ottoman case. Neither did he have a clear political agenda for the future of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>571</sup> This hints at the influence of liberal thought, which Baha Tevfik internalized in his own way in making sense of the concept of the individual as a rational being in a new moral system. Accordingly he developed one of the first extensive examples of emotion theory in developing the conceptual framework of the individual within the boundaries of liberal thought.

Since the publication of Febvre's *Sensibility and History* in the late 1930s, the changing discourses of what and how to feel have been subjected to historical inquiry.<sup>572</sup> From the 1960s onwards the field has been dominated by the social constructivist approach – i.e. taking medical and cultural knowledge of emotions as collectively and culturally constructed through all sorts of means including print culture, as the market economy expanded and replaced traditional life and production.<sup>573</sup> Subjecting changing 'emotional regimes' in the 18<sup>th</sup> century French intellectual world to historical investigation, William Reddy more recently fused

---

language and bodies as producers of social relationships and 'the rhetoric of the nation': Sara Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York, 2004).

<sup>570</sup> Mignon, 'Osmanlı Özgürlükçülüğünün Peşinde: Baha Tevfik ve Felsefe-i Ferd'i', pp. 30-3.

<sup>571</sup> According to Alkan Baha Tevfik was not a member of the socialist party and indeed he took a distance to active politics: Mehmet Ö. Alkan, *Düşünce Tarihimizde Önemli Bir İsim: Baha Tevfik ve Düşünce Tarihimiz, Tarih ve Toplum*, 52 (1988), p. 234.

<sup>572</sup> Lucien Febvre, 'Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past', in Peter Burke, ed. *A New Kind of History* (London, 1973), pp. 12–26.

<sup>573</sup> Michel Foucault, Thomas Szasz, and Nikolas Rose are the most noted thinkers of the constructivist approach. See Thomas Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (New York, 1961); Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: a history of insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York, 1973); *The Birth of the Clinic* (London, 1976); *Mental Illness and Psychology* (New York 1976); Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Our Selves: psychology, power and personhood* (Cambridge, 1996).

intellectual history with the history of emotions and the history of psychology in *The Navigation of Feeling Emotions*.<sup>574</sup> In doing so he opened up the field of the history of emotions to further studies adopting an interdisciplinary approach. These studies remind us that psychological diagnosis and emotional rhetoric are to some degree products of their time. More importantly, they provide us with a framework of making sense of the rhetoric of emotional control in the late Ottoman Empire produced by ‘Ottoman materialists’, primarily Baha Tevfik.

Behind the development of emotional rules with an alleged scientific authority, there is a long history of efforts to move discussion of the emotions and passions from the philosophical domain to the medical and psychological. Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Men and Animals* was a milestone in subjecting emotions to close examination, seeking a connection between mental states and neurological movements in animals and human beings.<sup>575</sup> For him, emotional expressions were remnants of evolution. This was followed up by William James’s article ‘What is an emotion?’. James challenged the idea of taking emotions as mental phenomena which caused physical changes in the body. For him, ‘bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact ... [and] our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion’.<sup>576</sup> In other words emotion is the sense of a bodily change. In *Psychology of Emotions* Theodule Ribot made a distinction between ‘intellectualist’ and ‘physiological’ theories of emotion: while the former based emotions on intelligence, the latter – also followed by Ribot – linked emotions to biological conditions. In this work Ribot drew on the physiological perspective in order to sketch a pathology of each emotion:

---

<sup>574</sup> William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: a framework for the history of emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

<sup>575</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Men and Animals* (London, 1872).

<sup>576</sup> William James, ‘What is an Emotion?’, *Mind*, 9/34 (1884), pp. 189-90.

The doctrine which I have called physiological (Bain, Spencer, Maudsley, James and Lange) connects all states of feeling with biological conditions, and considers them as the direct and immediate expression of the vegetative life. It is the thesis, which has been adopted, without any restriction, in this work. From this stand point feelings and emotions are no longer a superficial manifestation, a simple efflorescence, they plunge into the individuals' depths, they have their roots in the needs and instincts, that is to say in movements.<sup>577</sup>

In the Ottoman case the 'materialist front' took the leading role in subjecting emotions to medical examination, with a tendency to present emotional expressions and experiences as medical problems. The medical school was a center for such perspectives as typified by the medical doctor Şerafeddin Mağmumi, whose medical dictionaries were in frequent use by students. In his medical dictionary *Vücut-ı Beşer* (Human body), Mağmumi defined any sort of mental as well as 'love-related' (*aşkî*, pertaining to love) activity as a biological response caused by cerebral activity.<sup>578</sup> His 'medical approach' came with the price of 'pathologizing love' from an allegedly medical framework in his article *Aşk Belası* (The trouble of love):

What is love? Whatever they say, love is semi madness. It is caused by constant thinking creating a thin fluid layer on the surface of the brain, the center of the mind and comprehension. This represses anxiety-provoking thoughts, vital for sound judgments, therefore creates love madness. What is madness anyway? Isn't it just a blood flow to the head, the center of mind and comprehension, because of overthinking the same issue?<sup>579</sup>

This was followed by a discussion about realism/naturalism and romanticism in literature, which became a hotbed for the stigmatization of emotions in the late Ottoman intellectual era. This started with Beşir Fuad's biography of Victor Hugo, published in 1885, and his commentary on the alleged bad influence and low quality

---

<sup>577</sup> Théodule Ribot, *Psychology of Emotions* (London, 1897), pp. VII – VIII.

<sup>578</sup> Mağmumi, *Vücut-ı Beşer*, p. 258.

<sup>579</sup> 'Aşk nedir? Kim ne derse desin aşk yarım cinnettir. Menbâ-ı akıl ve fetânet ve merkezi ihtisas olan dimağın, tefekkürât-ı daima ile sathını ince bir tabaka-ı mâyia kaplamasıdır. Bu da akla kararı ayırt etmeye vasıta olan tasavvurât-ı devir endişâneysi men eyler ki işte aşkın hali tevlidîsi bu suretledir. Zaten cinnet nedir? Bir nokta üzerine sarf-ı efkâr ederek kanın şiddetle kehvare-i akıl ve izan olan kafaya yürüyüş etmesine sebebiyet vermek değil mi?' Şerafeddin Mağmumi, 'Bela-ı Aşk', *Başlangıç* (Istanbul, 1888), p. 22.

of romanticism in comparison to Emile Zola and realism.<sup>580</sup> Drawing on an alleged opposition between poetry and science, Beşir Fuad stipulated that literature must be in accord with the ‘scientific realities’ of his time such as positivism, determinism, and physiology.<sup>581</sup> This discussion has been approached by literary historians from the perspective of the tension between literature and science, as well as the implications of ‘vulgar materialism’ for literature by Hanioglu.<sup>582</sup> It was indeed related to the set of complex relations between science, materialism, literature, poetry, and physiology drawn up by Beşir Fuad. Beşir Fuad’s final articles against romanticism and poetry, attached to his suicide note sent to his friend Ahmed Mithad Efendi – who blamed Fuad’s suicide on Western philosophy and materialism – are reflective of this mishmash.<sup>583</sup> What I would like to draw attention to is another component of this discussion started by Beşir Fuad, which was developed by Baha Tevfik: presenting emotional expressions and experiences as medical problems. Beşir Fuad made an effort to demystify the emotions and present them as chemical phenomena within a materialist framework. He adopted a medical approach to emotions starting from the heart: the human heart was a bodily organ, rather than the reason why we ‘love, cry, hope, hate’.<sup>584</sup> Similarly, the secretion of tears was about brain physiology and therefore was to be approached as a medical phenomena.<sup>585</sup> With this debate, the stigmatization of emotions reached a wider public and psychology was used as a source of legitimation in intellectual discussions.

---

<sup>580</sup> Beşir Fuad, *Victor Hugo* (Istanbul, 1885). For more information: Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, Handan İnci, ed. (Istanbul, 1999).

<sup>581</sup> Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, pp. 138-98.

<sup>582</sup> Hanioglu, ‘Blueprints for a future society’, pp: 35- 7.

<sup>583</sup> Ahmet Mithat, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 77.

<sup>584</sup> ‘Sevdiren, ağlattıran, ümid ettiren, kin bağlatan hep kalp değil midir?’ ‘Kalp’, tr. Beşir Fuad, *Envar-ı Zeka*, 15, p. 401. This essay was translated from an unidentified German scientist by Beşir Fuad.

<sup>585</sup> Okay, *Beşir Fuad*, p. 113.

Following in the footsteps of Beşir Fuad, Baha Tevfik took over the task of criticizing poetry and romanticism in the Second Constitutional Era, supplying a firmer underpinning fed by psychology. In *Edebiyat Katiyyen Muzırdır* (Literature is absolutely harmful), one of the most contested articles in his series against literature and romanticism, he made every effort to prove ‘scientifically’ that literature was an outcome of a psychological illness: ‘Without hesitation, we should conclude that literature is nothing but an epidemic, a contagious brain disease.’<sup>586</sup> For him poetry came out of pleasure and grief, both of which were caused by sensibility, and were therefore ‘abnormal’ and pathological from the point of view of psychology. They were no different to serious medical diseases such as syphilis, with no chance of complete recovery and a high chance of being transmitted on to the next generation. A poet therefore was no different to someone with tuberculosis.<sup>587</sup>

Baha Tevfik was not entirely against the use of literature and poetry. For him there were examples of ‘useful’ literature and poetry, as in the case of his friend Şair Celis, ‘the one and the only Turkish poet’, who knew ‘how to express science and philosophy through poetry’.<sup>588</sup> What actually made literature harmful was its affinity with the emotions and its disaccord with reality, in Baha Tevfik’s formulation. Accordingly he penned a number of short didactic stories and made use of literature to show the pitfalls of excessive emotions.<sup>589</sup> In *Nail’in Mağçubiyeti* (Nail’s embarrassment), he ridicules acts of bravery and advises children to behave sensibly,

---

<sup>586</sup> ‘Ve bila tereddüt hükmolunur ki edebiyat umumi ve müstevlî bir maraz-ı dimağiden başka bir şey değildir.’ Baha Tevfik, ‘Edebiyat Katiyyen Muzırdır’, *Piyano*, 9 (11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 24 October 1910), p. 94.

<sup>587</sup> Baha Tevfik, ‘Edebiyat Katiyyen Muzırdır’, *Piyano*, 10 (18 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 31 October 1910), p. 106.

<sup>588</sup> Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Edebiyat ve Şair Celis*, transliterated by Kemal Kahramanoğlu and Ali Utku (Konya, 2014), p. 15.

<sup>589</sup> For a summary of his short stories: Bağcı, *Baha Tevfik*, pp. 48-55.

putting the words in the mouth of a schoolteacher.<sup>590</sup> In *Gül ve Bülbül* (Rose and nightingale) he unfolds the concept of love and stigmatizes selfishness through a story of a rose and a nightingale which concludes with the sorrow of the latter.<sup>591</sup> True love ought to be freed from lust, passion, and jealousy, as we see in *Aşk, Hodbinî* (Love, egoism): ‘Now I understand that real love starts after the age of 80, a type of love that is beyond lust, passion and jealousy.’<sup>592</sup> In another story, *Kıskançlık* (Jealousy), love at last enters into the domain of mental health: the cold-hearted and free-spirited protagonist consults a friend, who introduces himself as an expert on mental health, about the intricacies of passionate love, and thus learns how to govern his as well as the loved one’s excessive emotions.<sup>593</sup>

The character of the ‘expert on mental health’ as the person who is in charge of love affairs is telling, as it typifies the rising interest in medical approaches to love. It is not a coincidence that one of the first books about ‘pathological forms of love’, *Aşk-ı Marazi* (Pathological love) by Dr Nazım Şakir, came out in this era.<sup>594</sup> This was a popular subject according to Dr. Şakir, given the spread of ‘pathological forms of love’ and the rising interest in medical explanations about love. In this book he merges philosophical and literary theories of love with psychiatric cases such as love among hysterics, superior degenerates, and imbeciles, covering different forms like erotomania, fetishism, masochism, and sadism. The next year, M. Arif welcomed psychological approaches to love in *Aşk Nedir?* (What is love?). He rejected traditional tools for making sense of love, such as philosophy, for being ‘frivolous’,

---

<sup>590</sup> Baha Tevfik, ‘Nail’in Mahçubiyeti’, *Çocuk Duygusu*, 18 (3 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 / 4 December 1913), pp. 6-8.

<sup>591</sup> Baha Tevfik, ‘Gül ve Bülbül’, *Çocuk Duygusu*, 18 (3 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 / 16 October 1913), pp. 3-4.

<sup>592</sup> ‘Anlıyorum ki aşk-ı hakiki bilhasa sekseninden sonra başlayacak. Şehvetsiz, hırssız, hatta kıskançsız bir aşk...’ Baha Tevfik, ‘Aşk, Hodbinî’, *Piyano*, 8 (4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 17 October 1910), p. 92.

<sup>593</sup> Baha Tevfik, ‘Kıskançlık’, *Teşvik*, 1 (1 Temmuz 1326 / 14 July 1910), pp. 2-4.

<sup>594</sup> Nazım Şakir, *Aşk-ı Marazi* (Istanbul, 1326/1910).

and criticized psychiatric approaches for being old-fashioned.<sup>595</sup> According to Arif, the most cutting-edge perspective on love was the theory of obsession and this came from psychology.<sup>596</sup>

Psychology's authoritative voice in emotional matters was heard most clearly in Baha Tevfik's studies. For Baha Tevfik, emotions were to be approached from a broad range of disciplines such as psychology, physiology, and psychiatry, with a special focus on the term 'sensibility' (*hassasiyet* in Ottoman, *Sensibilité* in French). *Aşk-ı Marazi* (Pathological love), for example, was for him an important yet unsuccessful attempt, lacking profound physiological and psychological insight into emotions and sensibility.<sup>597</sup>

'Sensibility' is generally defined as the ability to receive sensations, susceptibility to a pleasurable or painful impression, and excessive sensitiveness in emotion.<sup>598</sup> It is actually a complex word, which according to Williams went through a transformation in the 20<sup>th</sup> century from the word 'sentimental', as in 'emotional or emotive' experiences, to a more unifying meaning corresponding to 'a whole way of perceiving and responding'.<sup>599</sup> Baha Tevfik refrained from giving a concise and neat definition of the term 'sensibility'. However, it appears to stand for any sort of thoughts, emotions and behaviors which were automatic, i.e. beyond control and deliberate use. On a more general level, Baha Tevfik defined sensibility as *thoughts*, which were well rooted and strong enough to affect one's brain and physical entity,<sup>600</sup>

---

<sup>595</sup> M. Arif, *Aşk Nedir?* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), p. 4.

<sup>596</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>597</sup> Filiz Başaran, Baha Tevfik'in Mecmuacılığı (MA thesis, Niğde University, 2010), p. 327.

<sup>598</sup> 'Sensibility', in *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1<sup>st</sup> edn. Accessed online on 10 November 2015.

<http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/175969?redirectedFrom=sensibility#eid>

<sup>599</sup> Williams, *Keywords*, pp. 280-3.

<sup>600</sup> 'Düşüncelerin kökleşmesinden ve iradesiz şekilde beyin ve maddi yapımız üzerinde etki meydana getirebilecek bir hale gelmesinden ibarettir.' Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak*, transliterated by Faruk Öztürk (Ankara, 2002), p. 43.

and as *passions*, which were cheap and disgraceful enough to dehumanize people.<sup>601</sup> In a more formal psychological context, he divided this into two: emotions (*tesirat*) and inclinations (*temayülat*), which were used with passions (*ibtila*).<sup>602</sup> In practical terms, one simply needed to learn how to control one's sensibility in order to be healthy and happy. And this problem was contagious, and already widespread: in literature, in morality, and in the mind.

His theory of sensibility was influenced by Paul DuBois (1848-1918), the Swiss neuro-pathologist, medical doctor, and one of the pioneers of psychotherapy. DuBois is the author of *The Influence of the Mind on the Body*, a study of the direct relationship between mind and the body from a monist perspective, *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*, one of the first psychotherapy books based on the influence of the mind over the body, and *Self Control*, a self-help book for how to control sensibility and achieve happiness.<sup>603</sup> Although most of his works are today forgotten, his ideas were popular at the time. In fact, his 'rational approach to neurotic disorders' through 'persuasion theory' has been accepted as the beginning of cognitive therapy as it has come to be used today, and therefore does not sound strange to modern ears.<sup>604</sup>

*Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî* (Renovation of science and literature) – one of Baha Tevfik's thickest books, with three parts, Psychology, Logic, and Literature, and eighteen chapters – starts with an exchange of letters between Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil.<sup>605</sup> Baha Tevfik expresses his uneasiness in presenting a book that is partly

---

<sup>601</sup> 'İnsanı insanlıktan çıkaran en adi ve sefil tutkular' ve 'istenç dışı düşünceler, hareketler' Ibid. p. 41.

<sup>602</sup> Baha Tevfik, 'Mebâhis-i Felsefe: Psikoloji', *İzmir*, 398 (18 Kanunuevvel 1320 / 31 December 1904), p. 5.

<sup>603</sup> Paul Dubois, *The Influence of the Mind on the Body* (New York, 1906); *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders* (New York, 1905); *Self Control* (London 1909).

<sup>604</sup> Theodore Millon, *Masters of the Mind: Exploring the Story of Mental Illness from Ancient Times to the New Millennium* (New Jersey, 2004), p. 394.

<sup>605</sup> Baha Tevfik, *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî* (Istanbul, 1327/1911).

translated from a particular source and partly compiled from a number of Western sources, as his own work.<sup>606</sup> Ahmed Nebil comforts his friend, saying that this is the standard way of disseminating and owning Western ideas. In *Psychology*, the first part of *Teceddüd*, six out of eight articles are direct translations from Paul Dubois's *Self Control*, to whom Baha Tevfik only refers as the author of the first article. In the rest, he endorses and appropriates Dubois's theory of self-control.

Central to Dubois's theory of self-control is the idea that one needs to learn how to regulate one's emotions through correct education in order to be happy, balanced, and efficient. It starts with Dubois's sorrow for his patients: 'Man is the only animal who does not know how to live.'<sup>607</sup> His intention is not to judge his consultees, yet he could not help but say to himself: 'All this need not have been and should no longer be possible.'<sup>608</sup> For him, one needs to learn to control the emotions by way of reason, in order to be happy, and not to be enslaved by emotions. Dubois, in the chapter 'Thought', and Baha Tevfik in the chapter 'The Mechanism of Thought', explain the rules of automatism in thought and the association of ideas. According to them, these rules render good education determined by the principles of psychology a vital tool to condition thoughts efficiently and to program individuals to be happy. The first rule is not to be enslaved by feelings and to control emotions by reason.

What is the significance of Baha Tevfik's and Dubois's use of psychology, in comparison to any other normative/prescriptive tools for making sense of mental health? Needless to say there were different tools for emotional regulation (i.e. tools for shaping, evoking, or suppressing an emotion) such as advice manuals of mental health care. Emotions were often considered to be in conflict with traditional moral orders, and therefore morality involved a great deal of emotional regulation, which in

---

<sup>606</sup> Ibid, pp. 5-6.

<sup>607</sup> Dubois, *Self Control*, p. 3

<sup>608</sup> Ibid.

the Ottoman case was in frequent use.<sup>609</sup> Self-help literature was on the rise in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as part of the morality discourses which became concretized in Ahmet Mithat's novels, some of which imparted ideas of the control of emotions in a strict sense. According to Wigen this was part of efforts to create 'a bourgeois sociability' in line with liberal economic values and principle of hard work.<sup>610</sup> However, the novelty of Baha Tevfik's approach lies in his use of scientific authority to be conclusive and definitive on emotional regulation, in which respect he drew on the fields of mental health, primarily psychiatry and psychology. Ottoman materialism was thus a useful source for providing science with an immense alleged authority.

At the crossroads of materialism and psychology lay one of the most burning questions of post-Darwinian science and philosophy: whether man was capable of steering his own actions. Indeed, a great deal of the conflict between spiritualist and materialist views of human nature boiled down to the question of freewill. Baha Tevfik, in comparison to Abdullah Cevdet, gave less credit to crude physiological determinism with no room for psychological phenomena. Unlike many of his contemporaries, such as Abdullah Cevdet, Beşir Fuad, Ernst Haeckel, and Ludwig Büchner, he did not see psychological phenomena as subjugated to physiology. However he was also a determinist, as he stated in *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh*: 'Our thoughts and actions are subjugated to determinism, and a causal relationship yet these are regulated by psychological principles instead of material principles'.<sup>611</sup>

---

<sup>609</sup> Ronald De Sousa, 'Emotion', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta, ed. Accessed online on 17 November 2015.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotion>

As mentioned before Islamic morality, particularly individual morality as a sub section, has a psychological aspect as it praises 'good' character and virtues and in due course, psychology as a new subject entered in some Islamic morality courses. See chapter one.

<sup>610</sup> Wigen, 'The Education of Ottoman Man and the Practice of Orderliness', pp. 115-8.

<sup>611</sup> 'Mamafih arzularımızın şedid bir "cebriyet" in tabii olduğu kabul edilmekle beraber bu cebriyetin maddi olduğu hiçbir vakit iddia edilemez. Telif-i beyn:- bütün bu mutalaalar ve iddialar hülâsa edilirse

Accordingly, both physical and psychological phenomena were determined by sensibility and thoughts:

Those who say that determinism only applies to the physical side of human beings would add that psychological experiences of human beings give us a sense of freedom and freewill. But this is just an illusion. Man feels free and conceives himself with freewill unless there is a physical obstacle limiting his desires such as an illness. However he is subjugated to the constraints of his sensibility and pre-determined consequences of his thoughts of which he is not aware.<sup>612</sup>

The idea of determinism thus strengthens the belief in the transformative power of education, given that for Dubois ‘education is entirely founded upon the idea of determinism’.<sup>613</sup> As Dubois in ‘Moral Clear-sightedness’ and Baha Tefvik in ‘Terbiye ve Nefis Terbiyesi’ (Education and education of the ego) explain, ‘the only liberty that man enjoys’ is the ability to obey the feelings, passions and the motives of reason.<sup>614</sup> And the only way to fight this determination is through correct education, reprogramming individuals to feel and reason in a morally accepted way. This formula gives psychology a special role as the science of programming individuals, curing sensibility, and reclaiming society. In addition, it moves psychology into the field of medical sciences and gives it a determinist authority. In the hands of Baha Tefvik, psychology turned into a tool for ‘managing individuals’ with a clear definition of what the individual is, a deliberate and open agenda to regulate his/her feelings, and an alleged authority granted by science. This was a step toward transforming society through determinism and a new secular morality regulated by psychology.

---

anlaşılır ki sebepsiz hiç bir psikoloji hadisesi mevcut değildir. Lakin bu sebep de psikolojinin olup maddi değildir. Zihnî bir hadise kendinden evvelki hadisenin tesiri dahilindedir.’ Baha Tefvik and Ahmet Nebil, *Psikoloji*, pp. 71- 2.

<sup>612</sup> “‘Fikri cebriyet insanların yalnız herakât-ı maddiyelerinin tedkikinden ileri gelir’ diyenler bu sözlerine tecarüb-i ruhiyemizin bize bir fikr-i hürriyet ihtiyar bahş edeceğini de ilave etmişlerdir. Fakat bu bir hayalden başka bir şey değildir. Eğer insan benî nevin mumânitinden yahut hastalık vesaire gibi maddi bir mâniden dolayı arzularından mahrum olmazsa cidden kendini hür ve muhtar zanneder. Lakin diğer taraftan hassasiyetinin elcaât-ı zaruriyesine yahut tefekkürâtının netayic-i katisine tabi olmuştur. Orasını anlayamaz bile.’ Baha Tefvik, *Teceddüd-i İlmi ve Edebi*, p. 57.

<sup>613</sup> Dubois, *Self Control*, p. 89.

<sup>614</sup> Dubois, *Self Control*, p. 113; Baha Tefvik, *Teceddüd-i İlmi ve Edebi*, p. 69.

Designed as a morality school textbook in response to the need for modernizing the school curriculum, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak* (The issue of sensibility and new morality) is reflective of Baha Tevfik's understanding of how to transform society based on science.<sup>615</sup> According to Baha Tevfik, old metaphysical views of morality fed by Islamic theology and 'old school Western' philosophers such as Aristotle, Epicurus, Kant, and Paul Janet were no longer useful. The new morality ought to give individuals the strength to control their sensibility, instead of making moral judgments about right or wrong: 'Morality rather than determining what is good or bad, deals with yielding determination to do good deeds whose goodness is confirmed and avoid bad deeds whose badness is as clear as day.'<sup>616</sup> This could only be achieved through a scientific perspective on morality based on a combination of new sciences, primarily physiology and psychology. While physiology was expected to reveal the realities of the human body, psychology's mission was to cure sensibility.<sup>617</sup> Accordingly, he asked his readers to 'reclaim their morality and ego, hide and eliminate bigotry and hasten to embrace the truth, boycott unhealthy and sentimental thoughts' in order to transform and regulate society.<sup>618</sup> This brought his formula of 'transforming society through psychology' to completion, and highlighted his normative/prescriptive use of psychology'. At the very least it represents a process in which man was expected to learn how to become an individual by conforming to Baha Tevfik's liberal thought, through the rules of emotional control determined by the 'science' of the soul, psychology.

---

<sup>615</sup> Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak* (Istanbul, 1910).

<sup>616</sup> 'Ahlak iyiyi kötüden ayırmaktan çok, iyi olduğu kesinlik kazanan eylemlerin yapılması ve kötülüğü apaçık derecesine uzanan eylemlerin ise yapılmaması kararlılığını takviye ile uğraşır.' Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak*, p. 33.

<sup>617</sup> 'Gözümüzün terbiyesi için fenn-i asaba, hassasiyetimizin terbiyesi için ruhiyata mecbur ve muhtaç kalacak ve onlardan toplayabildiği malumat ile, bu derme toplama vesak ile insaniyete hadim olmaya çalışacak!' Baha Tevfik, *Muhtasar Felsefe*, p. 139.

<sup>618</sup> 'Her şeyden önce ahlakımızı, nefsimizi ıslaha, tutuculuğumuzu gizlemeye ve yok etmeye, gerçeği büyük bir muhabbetle sevmeye acele edelim. Hasta ve duygusal düşünceleri boykot edelim.' Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd*, p. 94.

## Conclusion

Baha Tevfik was not the only intellectual who referred to emotions in a demeaning tone in his short stories. His childhood friend Ömer Seyfettin wrote a story entitled *Kıskançlık* (Jealousy) in which the protagonist, Ahmet Süfran Bey, causes a monkey's death of jealousy and despair, through his invalidation of the monkey's feelings. Ahmet Süfran Bey is a young womanizer who has been sent from Istanbul for a period of retreat, and along the way is given a rare white monkey. The poor little monkey cannot resist developing strong feelings for his owner Ahmet Süfran Bey, and in the end attacks a beautiful girl he is speaking with. Ahmet Süfran Bey beats up the monkey, and it leaves the house and starves itself to death. Ahmet Süfran Bey, who 'has never experienced the sense of jealousy in his life', wonders sadly whether monkeys feel jealousy, noting that some animals can be deeply affected by 'irrational' emotions. Ömer Seyfettin, as a regular attendee of science conversations among the Izmir intelligentsia, was familiar with Darwinism, the narrative of evolution, and the role of monkeys therein. In fact, he was one of the first intellectuals to mention Darwinism in a story. In *Kesik Bıyık* (Shaved moustache) he sarcastically asks 'whether we actually come from monkeys' when ridiculing the tendency to unreflectively follow Western fashion.<sup>619</sup> This hints at a wider use of the rhetoric of 'emotional control' among Ottoman intellectuals as regards developing rational individuals, and suggests a line of further research. However, it is beyond doubt that the rhetoric of 'emotional control' and the stigmatization of 'excessive' emotional experiences and expressions resonated with some intellectuals. As an Ottoman

---

<sup>619</sup> Ömer Seyfettin, 'Kesik Bıyık', in Ali İhsan Kolcu, ed. *Türk Öykü Dağarcığı*, (Erzurum, 2006), pp.152-54. For more information on the influence of Darwinism on Ömer Seyfettin: Ergi Deniz Özsoy, *Ömer Seyfettin'deki Darwin, Cogito Darwin Devrimi: Evrim*, 60-61 (2009), pp. 359-65.

materialist, Baha Tevfik played a leading role in theorizing ‘emotional control’ within an allegedly ‘psychological’ framework imbued with scientific authority.

This chapter has aimed at presenting Baha Tevfik’s use of psychology in one of the first full theories of ‘emotional control’ against the backdrop of the rise of liberal thought and the tension between collective and individual interests. Taking his literature on science/materialism as revealing Baha Tevfik’s devotion to science, and that on anarchism/liberalism as revealing his love for individualism, it has presented his use of psychology as an attempt at regulating/shaping individuals through science for the creation of rational individuals.

## Chapter V: The Extension of Machinery versus Passionate Individuals

In 1921, Mehmet Emin Eriřirgil, an Ottoman scholar of philosophy and sociology, penned a journal article in *Dergah* magazine (The lodge) concerning a conversation he had overheard between a philosophy student and a medical student. In this conversation the medical student, in response to the former's protestations that psychological phenomena could not be explained solely through brain physiology, was recklessly and repeatedly asking: 'What difference would this make?'<sup>620</sup> For Eriřirgil, discerning the separate existence of psychological phenomena (*ruhi hadiseler*) would make a significant difference to the sciences, as well as to nurturing, political and social life, and to one's world-view. The denial that psychological phenomena had an existence separate from physiology would have serious consequences, such as overshadowing the separate existence of the soul, subordinating freedom to instincts, casting altruism as unnatural to human beings, and stigmatizing beliefs and ideas arising from psychological needs (*ihdiyacet-i ruhiye*).

'Discerning the separate existence of psychological phenomena' (*ruhi hadiseler*) had long been a weighty question for late Ottoman intellectuals, stretching back well before Eriřirgil's comments in *Dergah* magazine. This question maintained its importance in the final years of the late Ottoman Empire through the promotion of Bergsonian spiritualism, primarily in the writings of Mustafa řekip Tun. One of the first intellectuals to have received education in psychology abroad and one of the founding fathers of the discipline in Turkey, Mustafa řekip Tun (1886-1958) synthesized Bergsonian spiritualism and psychological thought. In this period Bergsonian spiritualism, in symbiosis with psychology, served the purpose of

---

<sup>620</sup> Mehmed Emin [Eriřirgil] 'Ne ıkar?' *Dergah*, 31 (20 Teřrinievvel 1337 / 2 November 1911), p. 4.

developing a rhetoric of individual freedom, emotions, and spiritualism, and underpinned the conceptual framework of the individual and liberty in the final years of the late Ottoman Empire – as this chapter will explain.

*Dergah* magazine's use of Bergsonian spiritualism in interplay with psychology has mainly been studied by the secondary literature within the framework of 'conservatism' and the nucleus of 'an alternative Kemalist modernization'. Nazım İrem in particular puts the accent on the political implications of Bergsonism and treats Mustafa Şekip Tunç as a Bergsonian 'conservative', along with *Darülfünun* professor of pedagogy and former *Dergah* writer İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886-1978), leading novelist and columnist Peyami Safa (1899-1961), political deputy and *Darülfünun* professor of history Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939), and *Darülfünun* professor of philosophy Hilmi Ziya Ülken (1901-1974).<sup>621</sup> Being 'liberal in their cultural outlook, yet republican in their political orientation', they ultimately challenged as well as redefined the dominant political ideologies of the era: such as 'unionism' for the period before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey which was dominated by the Party of Union and Progress, and 'Kemalism' for the first decades of the Republic.<sup>622</sup> According to İrem, 'the first and deepest' cleavage among the 'republican elite' that surfaced in the early 1930s came from 'Republican conservatives' and dated back to *Dergah* magazine. The cleavage between 'Kemalism' / 'unionism' and 'conservatism' emanated from the latter's problematization of scientism, 'politicized positivism', and high-speed modernization from a Bergsonian framework. Accordingly, the 'new vision of conservative modernity' formed an

---

<sup>621</sup> İrem, 'Bergson and Politics: Ottoman Turkish Encounters with Innovation', p. 876.

<sup>622</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 877. İrem uses Kazancıgil's definition of Kemalism, for what we understand as an amalgam of 'the ideas associated with laicism, nationalism, solidarity positivist political theory and the 19<sup>th</sup> century scientism': Ali Kazancıgil, 'The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism' in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey* (London, 1981), p. 37 cited in İrem, 'Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a national quest for cultural renewal', p. 87.

alternative to ‘the dominant version of Kemalism’ and hence formed ‘an alternative Kemalist modernization’.<sup>623</sup> In this formulation Tunç is given the role of being ‘responsible for founding the common philosophical aspirations of Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s so-called ‘liberalism’, Baltacıoğlu’s ‘traditionalism’, and Safa’s ‘conservatism’.<sup>624</sup> Ultimately, however, they ‘together with Kemalism tended to postulate the most distinctive features of “modern” political and economic life, namely the modern nation-state, capitalist market and citizenship’.<sup>625</sup> Despite their reservations ‘about scientism, “politicized positivism” and high-speed modernization’, they were devoted to the idea of progress, and Tunç particularly so.<sup>626</sup>

This framework is very important for recognizing the development of conservative interpretations of science and progress through Bergsonian spiritualism in the process of Ottoman modernization and the early Republican era. However, it runs the risk of projecting a much later phase shaped by the Kemalist ideology back onto the late Ottoman past. In İrem’s periodization, ‘Turkish politics entered a new phase’ in 1923 and ‘the newly established nation state, based on the positivist foundational ideology known as Kemalism’, was crystallized in 1929.<sup>627</sup> To be more specific, following the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, and the ratification of the new constitution in the same year, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), run by Kemal Atatürk, started a new authoritarian phase in 1925 with the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Order. The media and the educational institutions were used to spread the ‘Kemalist’ ideology which was directed in the 1930s towards secularism,

---

<sup>623</sup> See Nazım İrem, ‘Bir Değişim Siyaseti Olarak Türkiye’de Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakarlık: Temel Kavramlar Üzerine Değerlendirmeler’, in Ahmed Çiğdem, ed. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, V* (Istanbul, 2009), p. 116; İrem, ‘Bergson and Politics: Ottoman Turkish Encounters with Innovation’, p. 876-8.

<sup>624</sup> İrem, ‘Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism’, p. 92.

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>626</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>627</sup> İrem, ‘Bergson and Politics: Ottoman Turkish Encounters with Innovation’, p. 876.

nationalism, and cultural modernization, and which the secondary literature on the construction of national identity has studied in detail.<sup>628</sup> Thus the need is apparent for micro studies on the influence of Bergsonian spiritualism in developing alternative definitions of science and progress in the process of Ottoman modernization, before ‘Kemalism’ as such came into being.

With this in mind, the present chapter delves into the ways in which the interplay between psychology and Bergsonian spiritualism in the *Darülfünun* in the early 1920s contributed to the development of a conceptualization of the individual and a conservative understanding of the idea of progress in the late Ottoman era. It proposes to place Mustafa Şekip Tunç’s use of spiritualistic psychology in *Dergah* magazine, formed in an opposition to Ziya Gökalp’s alleged scientism and collectivism, as the final episode of an ongoing debate between materialism and spiritualism from the 1870s onwards, instead of reading it in reverse. When translated into late Ottoman intellectual dynamics, Tunç’s use of psychology reflects the growing tension around the use of science to understand and determine man and society in the process of Ottoman modernization. This tension cultivated a rhetoric of individual freedom, emotions, and spiritualism within a psychological framework, which translated into an alternative definition of the concept of progress in an opposition to scientific determinism. Ultimately, spiritualism and psychological thinking in this period provided intellectuals with a sphere within which to eulogize individual liberties from a conservative perspective.

Revolving around the role of psychology in Mustafa Şekip Tunç’s canon in the early 1920s, this chapter consists of two sections: the first section studies the interplay

---

<sup>628</sup> See for example Bozdoğan and Kasaba, eds. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*; Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (Istanbul, 1991).

between psychology and spiritualism in the 1920s at the *Darülfünun* with a special focus on Mustafa Sekip Tunç's use of Bergsonism, while the second discusses the relevance of Tunç's synthesis of psychology and spiritualism to the late Ottoman intellectual world.

### **The Rhetoric of Freedom, Emotions, and Spiritualism at the *Darülfünun* in the early 1920s: An Alternative Understanding of Progress?**

Against the backdrop of the rising interest in psychology as an educational tool, anti-determinist and spiritualist trends resonated with a number of psychology and philosophy professors at the *Darülfünun* at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Interest in spiritualist psychology against the 'scientific invasion' of man had already been expressed by *Darülfünun* staff in the early 1910s, as explained in chapter three. When classical French spiritualists of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such as Paul Janet and Victor Cousin, began to be criticized by *Darülfünun* teachers for not meeting contemporary academic standards, new and more contemporary translations filled the gap in the literature.<sup>629</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç took the leading role, and delved into the makings of emotions through the works of Théodule-Armand Ribot and William James, and spiritualism through the works of Henri Bergson. The rhetoric of freedom, emotions, and spiritualism was used extensively against scientific determinism and for creating an alternative definition of the concept of progress.

At the end of the first decade of the 20th century, and the beginning of the second, the *Darülfünun* literature faculty integrated itself more fully into the global scholarship. Education was a major arena in the early 1920s for extending the

---

<sup>629</sup> See for example Mehmed Emin Erişirgil, 'İki Eseri Felsefi Sebebiyle', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 2/3 (3 Teşrin Evvel 1339 / 3 October 1923), pp. 159-74.

influence of psychology, making use of psychological ideas in educational programs and uplifting the psychological education of early psychologists. Three early psychologists and pedagogues, İbrahim Gövsa (1889-1949), Mustafa Rahmi Balaban (1888-1953), and Mustafa Şekip Tunç played important roles in raising psychological studies to more contemporary standards, and spreading the anti-determinist emancipation message of Rousseau Institute within late Ottoman education studies.

The Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute had become a major source of inspiration soon after its foundation in 1912. The Rousseau Institute was a private school of the sciences of education in Geneva, which soon turned into a hub for students and tutors of pedagogy, child psychology, and psychology from all around the world.<sup>630</sup> It was founded by Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920), professor of psychology at the University of Geneva, Édouard Claparède (1872-1871), a Swiss neurologist who was Flournoy's cousin, and Pierre Bovet (1878-1965), professor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Neuchâtel. Adolphe Ferrière (1879-1960), one of the founders of progressive education and a teacher of moral education, accompanied them from the beginning. After 1921, when Jean Piaget (1869-1890) started working at the institute, it became one of the world's most important hubs for pedagogy and psychological studies, and for studies on psychology of religion and moral education.

<sup>631</sup> It was at the heart of the leading circles of educational and psychological sciences.

Théodore Flournoy was inspired by William James' pragmatism, and Claparède was equally engrossed by John Dewey's 'democratic' and free approach to education.<sup>632</sup>

---

<sup>630</sup> The school soon turned into a hub for students from different countries such as Poland, Spain, Algeria as well as the Ottoman Empire who helped dissemination of the idea of active education and pragmatism. In 1929 it became united with the University of Geneva literature faculty and it is still effective. For more information see Joan Soler i Mata, 'The Rousseau Institute of Geneva's influence on and presence in Catalan pedagogy in the first third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century', *Catalan Social Sciences Review*, 1 (2012), pp. 60-8.

<sup>631</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>632</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63. For more information on Dewey's influence on Turkey: Sabiha Bilgi and Seçkin Özsoy, 'John Dewey's Travelings into the Project of Turkish Modernity', in Thomas S. Popkewitz, ed.

The Bergsonian concept of *elan vital* and his understanding of volition were in frequent use by Adolphe Ferriere.<sup>633</sup>

Named after Rousseau for approaching education as a science centering on the student instead of the teacher, the school soon became the symbol of ‘active education’. Claparede in his own words aimed to ‘ensure the progress and development of the science of education’ and ‘to guide [the students,] not to indoctrinate’.<sup>634</sup> Adolphe Ferriere defined the active school as ‘the school of spontaneity’, which ‘reflects the tendency toward freedom that is found at the bottom of all human spirits.’<sup>635</sup> The institute was characterized by its own style in educational understanding, putting more emphasis on individualization and the student’s personal work, marinated in the pacifist and international spirit of Geneva up until the 1930s.

The principles of active education, individual-centered learning, and pragmatism resonated with a number of Ottoman intellectuals from the late nineteenth century onwards. John Dewey and popular educational principles of active education and learning by doing were major sources of inspiration for Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915) in developing his understanding of ‘new education’, which he put into practice in one of the most reputed high schools of the empire, the Galatasaray High School.<sup>636</sup> His principle of raising students ‘free in thought, free in wisdom, free in conscience’ is part of the Galatasaray legacy, and still has currency today in discussions of individual, intellectual, and political freedom in education in Turkey.

---

*Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and Traveling of Pragmatism in Education* (New York, 2005), pp. 153-81.

<sup>633</sup> Mata, ‘The Rousseau Institute of Geneva’s influence on and presence in Catalan pedagogy in the first third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century’, p. 65.

<sup>634</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>635</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>636</sup> For Dewey’s influence on Tevfik Fikret: Seyfi Kenan, ‘II. Meşrutiyet’le Gelen Yeni Eğitim Arayışları: Tevfik Fikret’in Yeni Mekteb’i ve Eğitim Felsefesi, in Zekeriya Kurşun, Cemil Öztürk, Yasemin Tümer Erdem, and Arzu Nurdoğan, eds. *100. Yılında II. Meşrutiyet: Gelenek ve Değişim Ekseninde Türk Modernleşmesi Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 22 Ekim 2008 Bildiriler* (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 275-85.

With the help of Gövsa, a deputy and member of the Board of Training (*Talim ve Terbiye Heyeti*), and Balaban, a deputy and the head of the Council of Compilation and Translation (*Telif ve Tercüme Encümeni*), this particular understanding of education made space for itself in the education, pedagogy, and psychology literature. A deputy as of 1927, Gövsa published more about practical matters such as Binet testing, psychology and education for village Tutors, and poetry for children as educational tools.<sup>637</sup> Balaban translated his most immediate sources of inspiration at the Rousseau Institute, such as Claparede's *Experimental Pedagogy and the Psychology of the Child* (*Çocuk Ruhiyatı ve Tecrübi Psikoloji*), John Dewey's *L'enfant et L'école* (a collection of Dewey's articles in French with a preface by Claparede), and Adolpe Ferrière's *Education in the Family*.<sup>638</sup> The interest in John Dewey and the Rousseau Institute continued and took more concrete forms in the early Republican era through educational reforms.<sup>639</sup>

The search for the tools of free education ran alongside an anti-determinist discourse at the *Darülfünun* based on a concoction of Bergsonian spiritualism, psychology, and discourses on emotions. Developed largely by Mustafa Şekip Tunç, although it resonated with other *Darülfünun* members as well, this concoction constituted the basis of the 'free individual'. In Tunç's understanding psychology was strongly connected to spiritualism, these being two siblings dealing with the same

---

<sup>637</sup> For Gövsa's psychological publications: Alfred Binet and Dr. Simon, *Çocuklarda Zekanın Mikyası*, tr. İbrahim Alaaddin Gövsa (Istanbul, 1915); İbrahim Alaaddin Gövsa, *Freud* (Istanbul, 1927).

<sup>638</sup> Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, *Çocuk Ruhiyatı ve Tecrübi Psikoloji* (Istanbul, 1339); *Çocuk ve Mektep* (Istanbul 1339/ 1923); *Ailede Terbiye* (Istanbul 1930).

<sup>639</sup> John Dewey was the first educationist to write a report on education upon being invited in 1924, soon after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. According to Bilgi and Özsoy, concepts of 'public interest', 'common good' and 'social organism', the main pillars of Dewey's education theory, were appealing to early Republican elite, which gave Dewey a central role in the development of national education. His ideas of education colored major new and inherited educational projects of the early Republican era such as the Turkish Hearts (founded in 1908), The People's Houses (founded in 1932) and Village Institutes (founded in 1940): Bilgi and Özsoy, 'John Dewey's Travelings into the Project of Turkish Modernity', p. 161. Towards the end of the 1920's Rousseau Institute professors, Pierre Bovet and Adolphe Ferrière were invited to Istanbul a number of times for speaking at conferences as well as for writing education reports. Albert Malche as well played important roles in the university reform in 1933.

subject from different angles: the soul (*ruh*). He wrote a number of journal articles mixing psychology, spiritualism, and philosophy with political and social affairs – some of which were compiled later in his career in *İnsan Ruhu Üzerinde Gezintiler* (Journey to the soul) and *Ruh Aleminde* (In the domain of the soul).<sup>640</sup> He held a very romantic, elusive understanding of the soul, best captured by his poem *The Soul*: ‘A fairy with no shadow / Different than anyone else / Bathing in a thousand pools / An ardour in flutter./ ...Am I shrine to you? / Or are you a burial robe to me? / I would not know, but you would / If I belong to you or to myself.’<sup>641</sup> For him, due to this elusiveness, the soul had to be approached in many different ways – from art to philosophy, spiritualism to psychology. The major routes of his intellectual journey to the soul were through psychology, philosophy, and Bergsonian spiritualism.<sup>642</sup> Spiritualism’s duty in this framework was to provide psychologists with ‘non-mechanical tools of reflection’ in order to be able to understand ‘pleasures, hopes, creative forces, orders, goals, plans’ in life, seen as the proofs of why an exclusively scientific, mechanistic, and physiological methodology was inadequate to understand human nature.<sup>643</sup>

The search for a common ground between spiritualism and psychology reflected the late Ottoman/early Republican intellectuals’ criticisms of physiological determinism, a position to which both Freud and Ribot had made contributions. The intellectuals had had an interest in Freud’s psychoanalysis since 1917, going so far as

---

<sup>640</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç *İnsan Ruhu Üzerinde Gezintiler* (Istanbul, 1943); *Ruh Aleminde* (Istanbul, 1945).

<sup>641</sup> ‘... Gölgesiz bir perisin / Kimseye benzemezsin. / Bin havuzda yıkanan / Çırpınan bir hevessin. / Ben mi senin türbenim, / Yoksa sen kefenim mi? / Ben bilmem sen bilirsin, / Senin miyim benim mi?’ Mustafa Şekip Tunç, ‘Ruh’, quoted in Altıntaş, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç*, p. 121.

<sup>642</sup> Peyami Safa, ‘Mustafa Şekip Tunç Sanatkar ve Filozof’ quoted in Altıntaş, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç*, pp. 114-6.

<sup>643</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, ‘Théodule Ribot’, *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2/6 (Mayıs 1338 / May 1922), pp. 128-52.

to organize a committee run by İbrahim Gövsa.<sup>644</sup> But although Mustafa Şekip Tunç was fond of psychoanalysis for its explorations of the depths of the human soul and the concept of love, he was critical of Freud for his exclusive emphasis on primitive aspects of human nature.<sup>645</sup> Ribot was one of the major representatives of the physiological perspective on human psychology and the break with metaphysical approaches in late Ottoman intellectual thought.<sup>646</sup> Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839-1916) was one of the first psychologists to launch physiological studies of memory and emotions, with his cutting-edge approaches to the topic.<sup>647</sup> Ribot's experimental psychology at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was in opposition to philosophical psychology as nourished by Victor Cousin's theory of 'spiritualisme/eclecticism', which as explained in chapter three was reflected in Ottoman psychological writings in the first decade of the 20th century. On a personal basis, Mustafa Şekip Tunç was critical of Ribot for 'not being able to grasp any non-mechanical phenomena because of being blinded by scientism'. For him Ribot was 'similar to his contemporaries, a product of scientism' and 'captured by a sense of content preventing him from acknowledging anything but science in searching for the truth.'<sup>648</sup> This in his understanding engendered a 'materialist invasion of psychology', and shattered psychology's well-entrenched bonds with philosophy and spirituality.<sup>649</sup>

Tunç, however, supported Ribot's attempts to approach emotions within the

---

<sup>644</sup> For more information on the first psychoanalytical texts: Coşkun Taştan, ed. *Türkiye'de Psikanaliz Hakkında En Eski Metinler*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2011).

<sup>645</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Froydizm: Psikanalize dair beş ders* (Istanbul, 1927), p. 1-5.

<sup>646</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç was not the only intellectual who developed an interest in Ribot's psychological studies and translated his works into Ottoman. Nebahat Hamit's translation of *The Diseases of the Will* with a short introduction by Tunç for example came out in 1926: Théodule-Armand Ribot, *İrade Hastalıkları*, tr. Nebahat Hamit (Istanbul, 1926).

<sup>647</sup> 'Theodule-Armand Ribot', in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed online on 21 April 2016.

<http://global.britannica.com/biography/Theodule-Armand-Ribot>.

For more information: German E. Berrios, *The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive psychopathology since the nineteenth century* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 335-9.

<sup>648</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Théodule Ribot', p. 147.

<sup>649</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

framework of psychology and physiology. As explained above, emotions started to appear more often in popular medical texts and magazines in the Second Constitutional Era. Baha Tevfik took leading roles in theorizing why emotions were pathological and needed to be suppressed within a psychological framework, utilizing Swiss neuro-pathologist and medical doctor Paul DuBois's theory of self-control. At an early stage in his career Mustafa Şekip Tunç translated two of Ribot's works, *Psychology of Emotions* (1897) (*Hissiyat Ruhiyatı*, 1919) and *Essai sur les Passions* (1906) (*İhtiraslar Üzerine Bir Tecrübe-i Kalemiye*, 1920), and much later another, *Creative Imagination* (1906) (*Yaratıcı Muhayyele*, 1932). Ribot's works provided Mustafa Şekip Tunç with a strong case to refute the narrative of 'pathological love' even though he problematized Ribot's physiological determinism in his journal articles. *Hissiyat Ruhiyatı* starts by challenging the neglect of emotions as objects of scientific and psychological inquiry, given that they play such crucial roles in human lives.<sup>650</sup> *Essai sur les Passions* challenges the traditional perspective of presenting emotions as pathological and instead proposes taking them as objects of physiological and psychological inquiry.<sup>651</sup>

William James (1842-1910), the American philosopher and psychologist, as well as being a close friend of Henri Bergson, was another source of inspiration for studies on emotions at the crossroads of psychology and spiritualism. The students of the Rousseau Institute including Balaban, Tunç, and Gövsa, studied James's works. Balaban wrote his first work on William James, a concise version of three chapters of James's *Principles of Psychology* (namely 'Habit', 'Instinct', and 'Will') while he was still a student at the Rousseau Institute.<sup>652</sup> William James was popular for his

---

<sup>650</sup> Théodule Ribot, *Hissiyat Ruhiyatı*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1927), p. 5.

<sup>651</sup> Théodule Ribot, *İhtiraslar Üzerine Bir Tecrübe-i Kalemiye*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1920), p. 3.

<sup>652</sup> Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, *İtiyad* (Istanbul, 1919).

contribution to the American pragmatist school together with John Dewey, and for his contributions to the psychology of emotions together with Carle Lange. The ‘James-Lange theory’ proposes that physical stimulation incites the experience of the emotion, contrary to the general assumption that the experience of an emotion causes a bodily response such as rising blood pressure: ‘My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.*’<sup>653</sup> His theory therefore revolved around physiology. For Tunç, however, William James’s emphasis on physiology went hand in hand with his comprehensive understanding of experience, treating physiological, spiritualist, as well as religious phenomena as ‘the valleys of the most delicate, psychological and spiritualist experience’, in his words.<sup>654</sup>

More than William James, Henri Bergson was a major source of inspiration for Tunç. A French philosopher with a Nobel prize in literature, Bergson became one of the most ‘controversial’ philosophers in the world – particularly between 1907 and 1914.<sup>655</sup> His influence was felt strongly in anti-materialist and anti determinist discourses in non-Western countries such as Egypt and Mexico.<sup>656</sup> Bergson (1859-1941) is the author of seminal books such as *Time and Free Will* (1889), *Matter and Memory* (1889), *Creative Evolution* (1907), and *Laughter* (1901). He was a latecomer to the French psychology debate, and his era constituted the highest and final phase of

---

<sup>653</sup> William James, ‘What is an Emotion’ *Mind*, 9/34 (1884), pp. 188-205. (Italics and emphasis are James’s).

<sup>654</sup> ‘Yalnız James’in ve bilhassa İngiliz lisanının tecrübe kelimesinden kast ettiği mana yalnız fizik yani cismani tecrübe olmayıp en ince en ruhi ve ruhani vadideki tecrübelerde bu mefhumun hududuna dahildir.’ William James, *Terbiye Muhasebeleri*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1339/1923), p. 12.

<sup>655</sup> R.C. Grogin, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France, (1900 – 1914)* (University of Calgary Press, 1988), p. ix.

<sup>656</sup> Omnia El Shakry, The Arabic Freud: The Unconscious and the Modern Subject, *Modern Intellectual History*, 11/1 (2014), pp. 100-12; Guillermo Hurtado, The Anti-Positivist Movement in Mexico, in Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and Otávio Bueno, *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy* (Malden, 2010), pp. 82-5.

the concurrence of metaphysics and psychology.<sup>657</sup> His theory involved important insights into psychology with the aim of providing introspective psychology with an empirical base and refuting Ribot's theory that memory was located in the nervous system rather than the soul. Yet his contributions to psychology, unlike his predecessors', were overshadowed by the scientification of the field.<sup>658</sup> Bergson's critique of mechanistic views of causality supported those who felt suffocated by the victory of the mechanistic principles of evolutionism, positivism, and materialism – including Tunç.<sup>659</sup>

Tunç had a life-long interest in Bergsonian philosophy, starting in the dark days of the First World War. He had his moment of epiphany when he read Bergson for the second time, which gave him solace and sense of liberation even as the fall of the Ottoman Empire was approaching. Soon he translated the articles 'Life and Consciousness', 'The Soul and the Body' and 'Phantasms of the Living and Psychical Research', from Bergson's *Mind-Energy*, in *Dergah*. As an avid devotee of Bergson he continued in the early Republican Era by translating the masterpieces of Bergsonian philosophy such as *Laughter* and *Creative Evolution* into Turkish.<sup>660</sup>

Tunç gives a self-reflective account of his discovery of Bergson in *Bergson ve Kudret-i Ruhîyeye Dair Birkaç Konferansı* (Bergson and a few of his talks on spiritual power), discussing the ways in which it deepened his understanding of philosophy and psychology. For Tunç, Bergson was 'a heroic philosopher' who saved him from his 'past irresoluteness and inertia by giving his soul the joy of life', and 'urging him into

---

<sup>657</sup> Grogin, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France*, p. ix.

<sup>658</sup> Ibid.

<sup>659</sup> Pascal Engel, 'Psychology and Metaphysics from Maine de Biran to Bergson', in Sara Heinamaa and Martina Reuter, eds. *Psychology and Philosophy, Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought* (Finland, 2009), pp. 241-45.

<sup>660</sup> Henri Bergson, *Gülme*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1945).

action'.<sup>661</sup> The philosophers he had read previously were like specialists in 'science inspection' and 'system building' who did not speak to his heart: 'I could not immerse myself in philosophical doctrines, which took me away from my instincts, senses, excitements, passions and volition to an observatory established on mind and intellect with limited telescopes and mechanical lenses generating nothing but thought and contemplation.'<sup>662</sup> Such doctrines could only create a split between the heart and intellect. In an attempt to bring heart and intellect together, as well as art and philosophy, he turned to examine psychology more closely. His readings of Bergson helped him challenge mechanistic views of human nature and realize the deepest psychological truth embedded in the soul and emotions.

Bergsonian philosophy provided a new set of answers to ultimate questions about human nature, creativity, duration, intuition, and life, which resonated with a large number of intellectuals in the late Ottoman Empire. In Mustafa Şekip Tunç's hands, these answers constituted an alternative understanding of progress and evolution which revolved around psychology. This, in my interpretation, constitutes a final episode in the debate about materialism and spiritualism which had lasted since the 1870s.

In opposition to mechanistic views of human nature and the world, Tunç delved deeply into the idea of progress, which he deemed central to the development of humanity: 'Progress is a philosophical idea born out of human consciousness about the evolution of humanity. Where does life come from? Where is it going? The moment these two questions were asked, we started to develop human consciousness.

---

<sup>661</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Bergson ve Kudret-i Ruhîyeye Dair Birkaç Konferansı* (Istanbul, 1339/1923), p. 3.

<sup>662</sup> 'Beni sevk-i tabiilerimden his ve heyecanlarımdan, ihtiras ve iradelerimden uzaklaştırarak teleskopları münhasıran akıl ve zekadan yapılmış bir rasathaneye bırakan ve burada da gözüme yalnız tefekkür-i sarfe veya mihanikiyet adesesini dayayarak temaşaya davet eden bir felsefe ile bir türlü kaynaşamamışım.' Ibid., pp. 3-4.

The more human consciousness evolved, the more importance was given to the idea of progress.’<sup>663</sup> In doing so he held an alternative understanding of progress to mainstream definitions, which postulated a linear scientific and technological progress. This understanding, according to İrem, involved an ‘institutionalization of the modern nation-state structures, expansion of the capitalist market and a corresponding new division of labour in society’, as they served ‘the great historical progress’.<sup>664</sup> In Tunç’s view, however, progress had to be organic and come naturally.

For Tunç, the major technological and scientific improvements taking place between the 1870s and the 1890, such as the invention of the telephone and dynamo, or the development of the first rabies vaccination, revealed that science was indeed capable of shaping life and society entirely.<sup>665</sup> This caused metaphysics to fall from grace, and in some interpretations founded the basis of ‘scientism’ (*ilimcilik*).<sup>666</sup> In Durkheim’s and Comte’s understandings, according to Tunç, linear progress was taken for granted due to such technological and scientific development; but in doing so they reduced humans to the level of animals, and thus took the human element out of progress. Psychological phenomena – primarily instincts, passions, and desires – were the major driving forces behind human progress, which could in no way be explained by such mechanistic views:

What we know for sure is that man in no way agrees to conceptualize himself

---

<sup>663</sup> ‘Terakki fikri, hayat ve beşeriyetin oluşuna karşı duyulmuş şuurun tevellüt ettiği felsefi bir meseledir. Hayat nereden geliyor, nereye gidiyor? İşte iki sual ki, beşeriyetin bunlara karşı şuur peyda etmesiyle başlamış ve bu şuur derinleştikçe terakki meselesi de ehemmiyet kesb etmiştir....’ Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Terakki Fikri: Menşei ve Tekamülü* (Istanbul, 1928), p. V.

<sup>664</sup> İrem, ‘Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism’, p. 106.

<sup>665</sup> Tunç, *Terakki Fikri*, pp. 165-6.

<sup>666</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166. Scientism indeed is a problematique term, which needs to be carefully defined while using. According to *Oxford English Dictionary* scientism in its critical uses could mean ‘notions or beliefs deriving from other sources, such as religion, should be discounted’ as well as ‘the view that the methodology used in the natural and physical sciences can be applied to other disciplines such as philosophy and social sciences’. In between these two definitions, there is a whole range of different relations one could establish between science and religion in his/her own subjective worldview. Therefore throughout the thesis I avoid using this term, unless it is used in the primary sources - as in the example of this chapter. See ‘Scientism’, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. Accessed online on 14 July 2015. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2355/view/Entry/172696?result=1&rskey=7rVWTa&>

as an extension of a mechanistic unit – be it in a single or collective form. Even if he accepts this in theory, his sensations and volition always act contrary to this presupposition. It's because of this that man in no way is able to sacrifice his wishes and desires for a mechanistic theory of human nature, life and collective units, which is not even verified. That's why no historical narrative, no philosophical doctrine and no sociological analysis would silence the forces of desires and thoughts... Therefore all of these forces undoubtedly vitalize the idea of progress.<sup>667</sup>

The forces of human desires and thoughts, however, could only be understood through Bergson's idea of creative evolution, according to Tunç. In *Creative Evolution* Bergson proposed an alternative to Darwin's idea of evolution by highlighting the concept of *élan vital* – vital impetus, humanity's 'natural creative impulse'. Accordingly, creativity was the main source of life and of psychological freedom. This concept helped Tunç develop an alternative understanding of progress while integrating himself into a worldwide anti-mechanist and anti-determinist framework.

The visit of Keyserling to the *Darülfünun* on March 3 1927, to deliver a speech about the side-effects of modernist discourses and to promote his book *The World in the Making*, hints at a greater interest in global anti-modernist circles at the *Darülfünun*. According to Mustafa Şekip Tunç, the ideas of the Baltic German philosopher Count Hermann von Keyserling (1880-1946) were listened to with 'an unprecedented interest and excitement' by *Darülfünun* members, and were absorbed by the readers of *Hayat* (Life) magazine via Mustafa Şekip Tunç's pen in an article series.<sup>668</sup> The 'world in the making' as a modernist critique revolves around the

---

<sup>667</sup> 'Muhakkak olan vakıa şu ki, insan kendini gerek fert ve gerek cemiyet halinde mihanikiyet aleminin bir cüzi gibi addetmeye bir türlü razı olamıyor. Buna fikren razı olsa da his ve iradesiyle behemehâl aksini yapıyor. Çünkü hayat, insan ve cemiyetlerin mihanikiyetleri - eğer varsa - tamamen malum olmadan insanın canlı arzu ve emellerini bir nazariye uğruna feda etmesi mümkün olmuyor. İşte bunun içindir ki hiçbir terakib-i tarihi, hiçbir felsefe, hiçbir morfolojik içtimaiyat, arzu ve mefkûrelerin insiyakı kuvvetlerini susturamıyor... İşte bütün bu amiller çarnaçar terakki felsefesini yaşatıyor.' Ibid., pp. 168-9.

<sup>668</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Doğan Dünya', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 1/16 (17 March 1927), pp. 7-8; 'Kayserling', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 1/18 (31 March 1927), pp. 5-6; 'İstikbalin Hırısı ve Ona Götüren Yol', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 20 (14 April 1927), pp. 7-8; 'Ekümenik Halin Manası', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 22 (28 April 1927), pp. 6-8.

metaphor of the chauffeur as ‘the technicalized savage’,<sup>669</sup> the embodiment of a ‘modern mass spirit’<sup>670</sup> wherein old cultural types disappeared, meaning vanished, and tradition died out. The chauffeur metaphor, in Tunç’s understanding, was a reference to the ‘man as machine’ metaphor, discussed from Descartes up to Charlie Chaplin’s film *Modern Times*, as well as in *Darülfünun* classrooms, and read much later by *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) magazine readers.<sup>671</sup> In this setting, psychology was seen as a major tool for revealing the mystery of individual consciousness and sub-consciousness, from where one could start developing a deeper understanding of history and the current state of affairs, according to Keyserling. The deeper historical understanding would help one find a remedy for the present world crises and develop a more refined understanding of progress.

### **‘Passionate Individuals’**

In August 1937, fourteen years after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Şekip Tunç and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu delivered two papers at the 9th international congress of philosophy, known as the ‘Descartes Congress’, held in Paris. The congress started with a text sent by the honorary President of the International Congress of Philosophy, Henri Bergson:

I am old enough to have been able, when already no longer young, to be at the side of our dear and admirable Xavier Len when founded the Congress of Philosophy. It was also during an international Universal Exhibition, in 1900. Some were surprised at the idea of introducing among the tools, machines and other material product of civilization an exhibition of world thought in its highest and most abstract forms. In reality, Xavier Leon must have foreseen what subsequent events have shown only too well: that our most marvelous discoveries and inventions will turn against us if we are not careful to dominate them, that the increasing size of the body of humanity will simply render it incapable of walking unless it is accompanied, for its direction and even support, by a surplus of moral energy. *The political, economic, social*

---

<sup>669</sup> Count Hermann Keyserling, *The World in the Making*, tr. Maurice Samuel (New York, 1927) p. 229.

<sup>670</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>671</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, ‘İnsan Nasıl Bir Makinedir?’, *İnsan Ruhu Üzerinde Gezintiler* (Istanbul, 1943) pp. 231-3.

*and international problems that face us today only translate, each in their own way, this now monstrous disproportion between the body and soul of the human species, the soul tossing about inside a body that is too big for it, having been unable to expand in turn....*<sup>672</sup>

Bergson's absence must have saddened his devotees at the congress, among which sat Mustafa Şekip Tunç as another admirer of the concept of the soul and one of his most fervent disciples in Turkey. Tunç's affinity with Bergson yielded a large literature on him in Ottoman Turkish and in modern Turkish. With this literature, Tunç aimed to help his readers find spiritual strength for combatting the side effects of modernization; for defeating the materially superior enemy during the Balkan Wars (1913-1914), the First World War (1914-1918), the occupation of Istanbul (1920-1923), and the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923); as well as for founding the Republic of Turkey in the face of severe economic constraints. Having seen the popularity of Bergson in the time of national struggle in all these phases, at the congress Mustafa Şekip Tunç pointed to Bergson as the source of spiritual and moral strength behind the Turkish revolution: 'Turkey is rebuilding itself in accordance with Bergson's theory'.<sup>673</sup> Another paper from Turkey delivered by Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, with a PhD from Strasbourg University and a dissertation on Ziya Gökalp's sociology, praised the importance of Gökalp's Durkheimian determinist sociology for the development of modern Turkish moral philosophy.<sup>674</sup> These two interpretations represent the co-existence of two different schools of thought in early 20<sup>th</sup> century French and Ottoman intellectual thought: spontaneous and anti-rational Bergsonian spiritualism on the one hand, and determinist Durkheimian positivism on the other.<sup>675</sup>

---

<sup>672</sup> Henri Bergson, 'Message to Descartes Congress, 1937', in Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey eds. *Key Writings* (London, 2002), p. 372. (Italics are mine).

<sup>673</sup> 'M. Bergson'un formülüne göre Türkiye kendi kendini yaratmaktadır.' cited in Yakup Yıldız, 'Mustafa Şekip Tunç ve Felsefi Görüşleri' (PhD thesis, Marmara University, 2010), p. 49.

<sup>674</sup> For the full text of Fındıkoğlu's paper: Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, 'Action et réalité en sociologie', *Travaux Du IXe Congrès International De Philosophie, Congrès Descartes*, 10 (1937), pp. 129-32.

<sup>675</sup> For a revisionist perspective to the polarization between Bergson and Durkheim: Alexander Tristan Riley 'Durkheim Contra Bergson? The Hidden Roots of Postmodern Theory and the Postmodern Return

In the Ottoman case this cleavage boiled down to the question of the role of science in Ottoman modernization. It reflects the growing tension around the use of science to understand and determine man and society in the process of Ottoman modernization. Tunç's synthesis of psychology and spiritualism was part of the efforts to develop the conceptual framework of the individual in the process of Ottoman modernization, which reached its climax with the dispute between Ziya Gökalp and Mustafa Şekip Tunç in the early 1920s via *Dergah* magazine, as will be discussed below.

Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the war literature generated further interest in spiritualism and psychology. As Zafer Toprak aptly puts it, for the Ottoman Empire the First World War in reality lasted for a decade and consisted of three phases: the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913, the First World War between 1914 and 1918, and The War of Independence between 1919 and 1922.<sup>676</sup> The Istanbul intelligentsia was in 'a greatly intensified emotional state of mind', as reflected by the sentimental tone of articles pertaining to politics.<sup>677</sup> Under occupation the city became a nest of rising social movements, protests, and gatherings. This ushered in a new cultural era in which a patriotic, nationalist, and anti-Western framework dominated intellectual products, and these were being used as a means of war propaganda. Psychology for example became a part of open lectures at the military school to teach students how to be mentally and emotionally tough.<sup>678</sup> In this environment the term 'spiritual' – in inherent opposition to 'material' – came to represent the inner strength

---

of the Sacred', *Sociological Perspectives*, 45/3 (2000), pp: 243-65. For a reflection of this discussion to the late Ottoman Empire: Baltacıoğlu, *Hayatım*, p. 62.

<sup>676</sup> Zafer Toprak, 'Cihan Harbinin Provası: Balkan Harbi', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 10 (2002), pp. 45-6. For more information see Richard C. Hall, *Balkan Wars 1912 -1913: Prelude to the first World War* (London, 2000).

<sup>677</sup> Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda*, p. 48.

<sup>678</sup> *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruhtan Bir Parça* (A glimpse into psychology) for example is consisted of an open lecture at the military school given by military school teacher İ. Hakkı: İ. Hakkı, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruhtan Bir Parça: His, Fikir, İrade, Seciye* (Istanbul, 1924). Even though in Nuri Bilgin's bibliography İ. Hakkı is presented as İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, this information seems misleading given that İ. Hakkı signs the book as military school teacher and colonel.

against Western powers and modernization within a Bergsonian framework. Bergson's promotion of the concepts of freedom, creativity, vitality, and authenticity against materialism and mechanism was appealing to some Ottoman intellectuals, particularly the *Dergah* writers. 'Politicized Bergsonism' was, as İrem argues, used 'as a liberation philosophy heralding the victory of the creative nationalist forces against the mechanical civilization of the West, represented by the occupying forces.'<sup>679</sup>

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, for example, depicted the war of independence as a war between vitality, the Bergsonian concept of human dynamism, and 'statistics'. Peyami Safa equated the tension between the material/rational and spiritual/mystical to the Western and the Eastern when narrating the warfare and foundational years of the Republic of Turkey in hindsight.<sup>680</sup> For him the solution was to find the equilibrium and to compensate by giving more importance to the spiritual side. The *Darülfünun* was a venue for the spread of such discourses. İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıođlu, for example, told his students to look out of the window of a *Darülfünun* classroom, and asked whether or not they were able to see the spiritual power, the energy going beyond the material limitations. And he continued: 'one day the power of 'meaning', [the spiritual power], is going to combat material emptiness'.<sup>681</sup>

Safa's *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Reflections on the Turkish revolution) draws an analogy between the East and West and between mysticism and rationality. Peyami Safa (1899-1961) was a leading novelist and columnist as well as a close friend of Tunç. For him one of the most salient changes between the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first two decades of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was a shift from a crude belief in positive sciences to a search for a synthesis between the rational and mystical trends. In this book Safa looks for a synthesis between the bifurcations of the era: between the East

---

<sup>679</sup> İrem, 'Bergson and Politics', p. 873.

<sup>680</sup> Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Ankara, 2010), pp. 5-6.

<sup>681</sup> Baltacıođlu, *Hayatım*, p. 240.

and the West, positive science and mysticism, materialism and spiritualism. For Safa the era of the crude belief in positive sciences was coming to an end. In this framework, the bifurcation between the West and the East was expressed through a spiritualist and psychological terminology. In his contribution to Safa, Tunç brought a psychological framework into play in his preface to *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* by drawing an analogy between ‘autism’ as a psychological illness and scientific determinism, ‘the sickness of European rationalism’. In his preface to Safa’s historical account he defined the tension between the ‘material/rational and spiritual/mystical’ as ‘the sickness of European rationalism’, a side-effect of scientific determinism and ‘autism’ caused by ‘overthinking’ and excessively relying on ‘intelligence’.<sup>682</sup>

In 1921, when Tunç was taking part in *Dergah* magazine, Ottoman intellectual life was dominated by Gökalp’s social and political theory, with a new vision for a ‘new life’ for the nation. According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, what brought *Dergah* writers together was a feeling of solidarity amid warfare and foreign occupation, as well as opposition to two phenomena: 1) excessive reliance on science in the forms of positivism, scientism, and materialism; 2) the collectivist aspect of Ziya Gökalp’s social and political theory as encapsulated by his famous motto: ‘No individual but society, no rights but duty’ (*Fert yok cemiyet var, hak yok görev var*).<sup>683</sup>

Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) was an ideologue of Turkish nationalism and the holder of the first chair of sociology at the *Darülfünun*, whose formulation of Turkish nationalism constituted a real turning point in the crystallization of a national identity in his time. He entitled his social-political theory ‘Turkist, Islamist, Westernist Modernism’, which he summed up as: ‘We are of the Turkish nation [*millet*] of the

---

<sup>682</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, ‘Peyami Safa ve Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar’, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, pp. 7-12.

<sup>683</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, pp. 375-82.

Islamic religious community [*ümmet*], of Western civilization [*medeniyet*].’<sup>684</sup> His synthesis of allegedly competing elements (Turkishness, modernization, Islam) to form the basis of a nationalist identity received criticism from several intellectuals of different backgrounds due to its eclectic nature. According to Ülken, virtually every contemporary intellectual trend found something to praise as well as to attack in Gökalp’s theory; and it was not to be passed over in silence due to its popularity.<sup>685</sup> ‘Bergsonians’, including Tunç in Ülken’s categorization, praised Gökalp’s use of spiritualistic and romanticist elements in his theory, fostering the feeling of national solidarity. However, they were critical of the positivistic aspects of his theory. Specifically, Tunç’s critique reduced to the question of to what extent science should be used to shape society.<sup>686</sup>

In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, Tunç used psychology in an inherent opposition to Ziya Gökalp’s alleged scientism, which Tunç called *ilimcilik*. Alongside Ziya Gökalp’s efforts to supplant psychology with sociology, the question of where to set the boundary between the individual and the collective came to be discussed in psychological terms. This discussion symbolizes how the ‘scientific invasion of man’ led to subjecting the individual to grand projects to change society by way of science, which the term ‘scientism’ perhaps best captures. In Tunç’s formula, scientism represented the loss of individual autonomy and the submersion of the self in the collective. The individual was under serious attack: his/her freedom was taken away,

---

<sup>684</sup> Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 24.

<sup>685</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, pp. 375-82.

<sup>686</sup> However, holding different opinions about the role of individual and science in Ottoman modernization did not threaten Gökalp’s and Tunç’s mutual respect for one another, as Tunç expressed many times at the Committee of Education (*Heyet-i İlmiye*) - where they first met in 1923 and worked together to determine the pillars of national education for the future generations along with other prominent educators of the time such as Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, İbrahim Alaattin Gövsa. To what extent the decisions taken in the committee were implemented swiftly is a matter for further research. Yet it would not be far fetched to claim that their intellectual exchanges about education, science and the individual had a degree of transformative power, given Gökalp’s large sphere of influence and deputyship as well as their membership in the committee. See Baltacıoğlu, *Hayatım*, pp. 288- 93.

the mind was shaped, the passions were ignored, and the soul was confused with intelligence. This displays the role of psychology in providing a framework to conceptualize the individual as a political and social actor in the process of Ottoman modernization.

Intellectual life following the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) was shaped largely by growing nationalization, demographic change, as well as planning nourished by Ziya Gökalp's social and political theory. The Balkan Wars had a huge psychological as well demographic impact, leading to the development of Turkish nationalism. The trauma of being defeated by the former Ottoman subjects in the Balkans started a period of 'national emergence,' which ended all ideological disputes in favour of the rise of Turkish nationalism.<sup>687</sup> With the loss of the Balkan territories about 2.5 million Muslim Turkish people immigrated from Balkans to Anatolia.<sup>688</sup> Against this backdrop, Ziya Gökalp's theory of nationalism rose to prominence, being in tune with the policies of the Committee of Union of Progress (CUP) which sought demographic planning and social control over individuals.<sup>689</sup>

There was an economic aspect to Gökalp's theory. According to Toprak, Gökalp's formula was a product of an on-going discussion concerning how to keep up with the Industrial Revolution. This gave rise to the notions of solidarism (*tesanütçülük*), national economy, and 'interventionist' (*müdehaleci*) economic policy in the Second Constitutional Era, when liberalism was falling from grace.<sup>690</sup> In an environment wherein sociology was emerging as 'the' solution to economic and social problems, Gökalp's formula was an alternative to the individual-centred sociology and liberal thought of *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimâiye Mecmuası* (The journal of economics

---

<sup>687</sup> Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*, p. 148.

<sup>688</sup> Toprak, 'Cihan Harbinin Provasi: Balkan Harbi', pp. 45-6.

<sup>689</sup> Ahmed, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 31.

<sup>690</sup> Zafer Toprak, Psikoloji'den Sosyoloji'ye Türkiye'de Durkheim Sosyolojisinin Doğuşu, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 238 (2013), pp. 22-32

and social sciences).<sup>691</sup> This journal approached society as a biological unit and fused psychological and sociological terminologies. Ziya Gökalp's formula, however, put an end to the domination of psychology over sociology and formed the basis of the discipline in a Durkhemian fashion, by taking collective units (instead of individuals) as objects of science. In opposition to Gökalp's formula, German romanticism, French spiritualism, and more specifically Bergsonism came to be used as shields against determinism in the late Ottoman intellectual era, in parallel with the rise of spiritualism in the global context, according to İrem.

Soon after running into Şevki Bey, the Minister of Education, at the Committee of Union and Progress headquarters and accepting his offer to start working at the *Darülfünun* in 1913, Ziya Gökalp stated that educational principles should be determined by sociology – and no longer by psychology.<sup>692</sup> Ziya Gökalp was not the first intellectual to immerse himself in the makings of society, but he was the first intellectual to develop a strong theory of Turkish nationalism by using a 'scientific' discipline, sociology (*hikmet-i ictimaiyye, ilm-i hikmet-i ictimaiye, ilm-i ictimai, ictimaiyyat* in Ottoman Turkish).<sup>693</sup> Interest in sociology began in a bifurcated form in the Second Constitutional Era, split between a more individual-centred understanding of society based on Herbert Spencer's psychology and the organicism promoted by *Ulum-ı İktisadiye Mecmuası*, and Ziya Gökalp's Durkheimian sociology prioritizing collective interests over individual.<sup>694</sup> In a short period of time the latter prevailed, and this ended the domination of psychology over sociology. As Özavcı points out, with

---

<sup>691</sup> For a selection of articles in Latin alphabet: Doğan and Alkan, *Osmanlı Liberal Düşüncesi*. Articles about the relations between psychological and sociological phenomena were mostly written by Satı Bey.

<sup>692</sup> Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, p. 187. For Ziya Gökalp's influence on the *Darülfünun*: Dölen, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I*, pp. 363- 66.

<sup>693</sup> Zafer Toprak, 'Osmanlı'da Toplumbilimin Doğuşu', *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* (Istanbul, 2001), p. 310

<sup>694</sup> Zafer Toprak, *Psikolojiden Sosyolojiye, Türkiye'de Popülizm (1908 -1923)* (Istanbul, 2014), p. 72; 'Psikoloji'den Sosyoloji'ye Türkiye'de Durkheim Sosyolojisinin Doğuşu', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 238 (2013), pp. 22-32.

Ziya Gökalp's promotion of Durkheimian sociology the question of how the individual was to be 'conceptualized as a political and social actor' became more pressing.<sup>695</sup> Tunç brought psychology to the table to find an answer to this question.

In 1921, when Mustafa Şekip Tunç started writing his articles in *Dergah*, Ziya Gökalp was preoccupied with organizing lectures in Malta, where he had been sent into exile together with other 'war criminals'. He was delivering lectures on sociology, and trying to convince his friends that sociology was no different than mathematics.<sup>696</sup> With Ziya Gökalp's efforts to supplant psychology with sociology, sociology gained popularity and became seen as the science of designing a new society. Against this backdrop, the clash between psychology and sociology became the carrier of another division voiced by Tunç: the individual vs. the collective.

Central to Tunç's critique was Gökalp's collectivism, encapsulated by his famous motto as noted above, 'No individual but society, no rights but duties'. This motto continued to be used by the Republican People's Party until the 1950s. In the secondary literature it was often approached from the angle of Turkish nationalism and 'solidarist corporatism'. In Heyd's analysis, this motto signifies Ziya Gökalp's totalitarianism and nationalism, and is accompanied by a poem written by Ziya Gökalp from the mouth of a soldier whose final line is: 'with closed eyes, I carry out my duty.'

<sup>697</sup> In Parla's interpretation, 'No individual but society' lies at the heart of the 'solidarist' and 'corporatist' model Ziya Gökalp endorsed.<sup>698</sup> In this framework, according to Parla, 'the sum is greater than the numerical total of individuals; it has its

---

<sup>695</sup> Hilmi Ozan Özavcı, 'Differing Interpretations of la conscience collective and the Individual in Turkey Emile Durkheim and the Intellectual Origins of the Republic', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 75/ 1 (2014), pp. 113-36.

<sup>696</sup> Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Mütareke ve Sürgün Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 2010), pp. 118-21.

<sup>697</sup> Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1950), p. 124. Unlike Heid, Parla argues that Gökalp's system did not lead to submersion of the self in the collective. Parla, *Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 46.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid.

own reality and prerogatives vis-à-vis individuals, which created his [Ziya Gökalp's] solidarism. Individuals' pursuit of their interests, as well as their private property and enterprise are considered legitimate in so far as they serve social solidarity and do not violate the public interest – an entity on its own merits.'<sup>699</sup> His collectivism served in the creation of national identity. As Zürcher aptly puts it, he was influenced by Durkheim 'whose ideas on the supremacy of society over the individual he took up, though he replaced "society" with "nation": an ardent nationalist, Gökalp believed the nation (*millet*) to be the natural social and political unit'.<sup>700</sup>

Serving the same national cause from a different angle, however, Tunç proposed that the focus should be on the individual as the basis of society: 'It is easy to say "no individual but society". Yet in reality it is meaningless and could only be attained for a short period of time through despotism. Society should be attentive to individuals' needs, lest revolutions or revolts break out often.'<sup>701</sup> This, therefore, was a question of the type of governance one foresees, as Tunç states in a journal article he wrote following Gökalp's death:

Ziya Bey like Durkheim believed that society is a sui generis phenomenon. For him one's identity was determined by social norms with respect to moral, scientific, aesthetic, religious and judiciary affairs. The individual was no more than a physiological creature. The collective consciousness could give this creature a social identity through force and pressure. In this sense conceptually speaking society is more important and weighty than the individual. Having accepted that the individual is subordinate to society, society ought to indoctrinate individuals with its own consciousness and ought to impose a collective will on individuals by way of force until they actually fit into the society. Due to these assumptions about the relations between individual and society, Ziya Bey became a supporter of strong governance. For him government was equal to the collective will. Therefore any kind of government with a list of ideals could have had the right to impose its will on individuals.<sup>702</sup>

---

<sup>699</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>700</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, 2004), p. 131.

<sup>701</sup> 'Fert yok cemiyet var demek sözde kolay olsa da fiilde anlamsız bir söz veya iğreti bir istibdatla idare edilecek bir yapmacıktır. Cemiyet sık sık ihtilallerle sarsılmamak istiyorsa fertlere karşı kulağını dört açsın.' Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ruha Bir Dikkat', *Dergah* 1/4 (1 Haziran 1337 / 1 June 1921), p. 52.

<sup>702</sup> '...Durkheim gibi Ziya Bey de cemiyetin nev-i şahsına has bir şey olduğuna inanmıştı. Ona göre ahlaki ilmi bedii dini hukuki şahsiyet ancak cemiyet idi. Fert ise garîzî bir mahluktan başka bir şey değildi. Bu mahluku içtimai bir şahsiyet yapan içtimai vicdanın cibr ve tazyiki idi. Bu itibarla cemiyet

The question of whether or not Ziya Gökalp's theory was authoritarian has been discussed in the secondary literature, and still is open to interpretation.<sup>703</sup> In Mustafa Şekip Tunç's interpretation, however, it definitely *was* authoritarian; in fact it went together with social indoctrination and the submersion of the self in the collective. Ziya Gökalp had a list of 'ideals' and a comprehensive plan for the future of the nation, which he introduced in his book *Yeni Hayat* (New life).<sup>704</sup> His theory was based on the split between culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*) similar to the postcolonial split between the inner and outer domains of Chatterjee's 'Provincializing Europe'.<sup>705</sup> While the outer domain – civilization – refers to universal values, the inner domain – culture – refers to a set of distinct ideals for a particular society. As Kadioğlu highlights, these ideals laid the foundation of the official identity and it was sociology's task to determine 'what the Turkish people already possessed or lacked to be a modern nation'.<sup>706</sup> Ziya Gökalp held the belief that the Turkish sociologist's task was to study 'the laws governing the order and the progress of societies and, by doing this he should try to ameliorate, in terms of these laws, the pathological factors which have arrested the growth of the national life and should give a normative orientation to the evolution of the nation'.<sup>707</sup>

---

fertten fazla ve yüksek bir varlıktı. Bu mevzu kabul edildikten sonra cemiyet kendi vicdanını fertlere telkin edip bunları kendisiyle mütecânis bir hale getirinceye kadar iradesini bir "vazife" halinde fertlere tahmil ve cibr etmek lazımdı. Tabiri diğerle bu kıvama vasıl olmak için "fert yok cemiyet var hak yok vazife var" düsturları cemiyet iradesinin prensipleri olmalıydı. Çünkü fertler esasen la-içtimai idi. Cemiyet ise esasen içtimai olduğundan fertleri vesayet ve vilayeti altında bulundurmaya iktiza ederdi. Cemiyetle ferdin tabiyatı esasiyeleri hakkındaki bu faraziyelerdir ki Ziya Bey'i hükümetçi yapmıştı. Onca hükümet cemiyetin iradesi idi. Binaenaleyh fertler üzerinde iradesini geçirmeye azmetmiş mefkûreci herhangi bir hükümet meşruydı.' Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ziya Bey'deki ve Prensip ve Mefkûre Sadakati', *Milli Mecmua*, 24 (5 Teşrinisani 1340 / 5 November 1924), pp. 385-86.

<sup>703</sup> Parla, *Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 46.

<sup>704</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler* (Selanik, 1910).

<sup>705</sup> Ayşe Kadioğlu (1996) 'The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity', *Middle Eastern Studies* (32 -2), pp.177-193.

<sup>706</sup> *Ibid.* p. 183.

<sup>707</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, tr. Niyazi Berkes (London, 1959), p. 166.

In Tunç's interpretation, belief in science's ability 'to govern society' and 'to give a normative orientation to the evolution of the nation' was a misuse of science, which men of letters should be careful about.<sup>708</sup> The major point of difference between Ziya Gökalp and Mustafa Şekip Tunç therefore lies in the concept of scientism, the application of physical laws to living entities as part of the broader project of governing man and society. As explained before, in *Dergah* magazine Tunç distinguished the non-mechanical phenomena from the mechanical. He was allured by non-mechanical phenomena which seemed to transcend the boundaries of causality and determination, and had an inherent dislike for anyone who was 'captured by a sense of content preventing him from acknowledging anything but science in searching for the truth', i.e. those whose ideas were a product of scientism. Ziya Gökalp's theory also contained certain spiritual components in generating the sense of national belonging. He too was inspired by Bergson to some degree, and even utilized his ideas in his writings. Yet such spiritualistic components in Ziya Gökalp's theory sat uneasily with the rest of it, which relied on positivism and was highly deterministic. For Tunç, the line between mechanical and non-mechanical phenomena was clear and firm. While mechanical phenomena were to be studied and determined by science, there was no room for determinism when dealing with non-mechanical phenomena such as life, society, and human psychology.<sup>709</sup> Ziya Gökalp's sociology was a product of the very same misuse of science, started from the misapplication of mechanistic and chemical phenomena to the psychological, as he expressed in *Dergah*:

The psychological phenomenon has just started to be studied and explained through its own separate tools of investigation. For example when the psychological phenomenon was first started to be studied as a scientific discipline it was, as Herbert [Spencer] did, subjected to the laws of gravitation, a theory of a branch of mechanics, dynamics. Subsequently

---

<sup>708</sup> Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İlmin Mebde-i veya Umdeleri İtibarıyla Kıymeti', *Dergah*, 1/5 (20 Haziran 1337 / 20 June 1921), p. 27.

<sup>709</sup> Ibid.

following the breakthrough Lavoisier made in chemistry, the psychological phenomenon started to be subjected to chemical laws. As a result psychological phenomena were no longer considered to be equal to mechanical phenomena. Instead they started to be considered as chemical reactions. In fact, even though the latter is more developed than the former, in both frameworks the human soul is yet to be freed from being subjected to the laws of the inorganic matter. As a matter of fact, the type of sociology Ziya Gökalp developed under the influence of Durkheim is nothing but an application of chemistry to social phenomena in a similar fashion.<sup>710</sup>

Having established that Ziya Gökalp's formula was an abuse of science, he then moved onto speak about the soul and its reflections: i.e. the passions. He penned a series of articles about passions in his column *Ruhiyat* (Psychology) in *Dergah*, such as 'Passions in Politics', and 'The Benefits of Passions' in which he mixed the psychology of Ribot and the spiritualism of Bergson with his opinions about everyday politics. He began his series of articles with a note to the readers intended to explain his agenda:

Because passions have lately become a major subject of complaint in political discourses, it is necessary to untangle them for the reading public. It is such a vast subject that one single article would not be enough to cover it all. Yet I am convinced that this subject is of great interest to all of us. Therefore I decided to write a series of articles about passions, which I hope you enjoy reading.<sup>711</sup>

He ended each article with a message to the reader to approach passions from the angle of psychology, the modern science of human beings, to be able to see the benefits of passions for collective purposes as well as to overcome the old-fashioned

---

<sup>710</sup> 'Maneviyat sahasındaki ilimlerin hadiseleri kendi evsaf ve mahiyetleri dairesinde tetkik ve ona göre izah olunmaya henüz yeni başlanmıştır. Mesela ruhi hadiseler ilmî bir surette tedkik olunmaya başladığı zaman – Herbertta [Spencer] görüldüğü gibi – en evvel mihanik ilminin dinamik kısmı olan "cazibe" kanunuyla izah edilmek istendi... Bilahare Lavoisier'in kimya ilminde gösterdiği dahiyane muvaffakiyet üzerine ruhi hadiseler kimyevi hadiselerle mukayese ve bunların kanunlarıyla izah olunmak istendi; ve artık ruhi hadiseler mihaniki hadiseler tarzında görülmeyip kimyadaki imtizac hadisesi gibi bir kaynaşmadır zan olundu. Filvaki bu tıflıdı görüş evvelkine nispetle daha ustalıklı ise de yine ruh-ı beşer cematat kanunları ile izah olunmaktan kurtulmamıştı. Hatta Ziya Bey'in Durkheim'ı takiben yaptığı içtimaiyat, kimyanın içtimai hadiselerine aynıyle tatbikinden başka bir şey değildi.' Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Hakiki Hürriyet', *Dergah*, 3/1 (16 Mayıs 1337 / 16 May 1921), p. 37.

<sup>711</sup> 'Son zamanlarda siyaset-i dahiliye münakaşalarında daima ihtiraslardan şikayet edildiğine nazaran bu babda efkâr-ı umumiyeyi muhimimâ imkan tenvir etmek icab ediyor. Mevzu hayli vâsi olmak itibariyle bir makaleye sığacak gibi değildir. Yalnız meselenin hepimizi şiddetle alakadar edeceğine kani olduğum için mevzuyu bir kaç makale tahsis etmenin can sıkımayacağını ümit ediyorum.' Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İhtiras Nedir?' *Dergah* 11/1 (20 Eylül 1337 / 20 September 1921), p. 162.

commonsensical disapproval of passions. For Tunç, passions were the most immediate products of the human soul, the source of human authenticity, uniqueness, and freedom. These articles served the purpose of refuting Ziya Gökalp's sociology which submerged the individual in the collective. Indirectly, this reminded us of the importance of human authenticity and the importance of the individual in a collective setting:

Scientific knowledge is limited to our interactions with the external world, therefore is analogous to intelligence, the concrete and deceased form of the soul. However the soul goes beyond the boundaries of intelligence. Beyond these boundaries there is such a dynamic, feverish universe, which could never stand still. If there was no fever and dynamism on the basis of the soul, how could intelligence come into being? ... It comes as no surprise to see those who are addicted to intelligence and logic condemn ambition and passions. They attack ambitions and passions to eliminate ignorance and spread knowledge. But who on earth could really get rid of ambitions and passions? With three simple rules? For how long are you going to suffocate people by rendering their souls up to intelligence. Ambition is the most dynamic and developed force and passion is its irresistible sibling, solid and firm. Yes, these could at times harm social harmony. So what? While on the one hand social life restricts and orders them through laws and customs, human nature pursues its passions on the other. As neither passions, nor social harmony is to be annihilated, the conflict between individual and society is unavoidable. It is easy to say 'No individual but society'. Yet in reality it is meaningless and could only be attained for a short period of time through despotism. Society should be attentive to individuals' needs, lest revolutions or revolts break out often.<sup>712</sup>

In Tunç's formulation, mechanistic views of human nature, materialistic

---

<sup>712</sup> 'İlim, alem-i hariciyle münasebetimizden teşekkül ettiği için ruhumuzun katılmış ve ölmüş tıpkısıdır ki biz buna "zeka" veya akıl diyoruz. Halbuki ruh yalnız akıldan ibaret değil. Bu kabuğun altında öyle bir alem var ki her dakika kaynıyor ve bir saniye bile değişmeden yaşayamıyor. Ruhun temelini teşkil eden bu ateş ve hararet olmasaydı zeka hangi kuvvetle ve hangi saikle vücut bulacaktı?... Akılperest ve mücerred mantık mübtelâsı ahlak alemlerinin hırs ve ihtirasları mezmûm göstermeleri pek tabiidir. Bunlar cehaleti izale ve malumatı ikame edeceğim diye hırs ve ihtiraslara hücum ederler. Fakat hangi baba yiğittir ki bunları ortadan kaldıracak? Üç zavallı mantık? Sen ruhu yalnız akıldan ibaret gördükçe daha ne kadar insanları bunaltacaksın!.. Halbuki hırs yataın en zinde ve en mütekâmil kudreti ve ihtiras ise bunun gayrı kabil mukavemet bir hale gelmiş sabit ve muayyen şeklidir. Filvaki bunların hayat-ı ictimaiye için mukid ve muzır şekilleri olabilir. Fakat bu neyi ispat eder? Hayat-ı ictimaiye bunlara karşı kanun ve örf-i ahlakiyeleri hazırlayadursun. Tabiyati beşer de bir taraftan kendi ihtiraslarını yaşayacaktır! Bunların hiçbirisi imha edilemeyeceği için cemiyetle ferdin, fert ile cemiyetin mücadeleleri gayrı kabil ictinâbtır. Fert yok cemiyet var demek sözde kolay olsa da fiilde anlamsız bir söz veya iğreti bir istibdatla idare edilecek bir yapmacıktır. Cemiyet sık sık ihtilallelerle sarsılmamak istiyorsa fertlere karşı kulağını dört açsın.' Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ruha Bir Dikkat', *Dergah*, 4/1 (1 Haziran 1337 / 1 June 1921), p. 52.

psychology, Durkheimian sociology, and Ziya Gökalp's version of sociology were next of kin. The common ground between them was the error of confusing the human soul with inorganic matter. Classifying materialism along with Durkheimian sociology on an abstract level as abuses of science, this interpretation suggests a lineage between materialism in the Ottoman Empire as spread primarily by Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik, and Ziya Gökalp's use of positivism. This lineage gave psychology the leading role when discussing the limits and nature of science. On the surface these were intellectual exchanges about psychological and sociological theories, yet on a deeper level they were about the deliberate and systematic attempts to shape society as well as individuals' minds. Discourses on human nature – such as whether man was no more than a physical creature, or whether the soul was subject to the laws of inorganic matter – were very much part of the efforts at designing a new society on the path to Ottoman modernization. Due to the wide extent of scientism – easily extending its influence from the domains of science to that of the individual, the social, and the political – such writings about human passions, souls, and emotions bore the stamps of their authors' social and political visions. Tunç's use of psychology against Ziya Gökalp's theory constituted the last phase of efforts to define a 'new man' – in this case in the form of the 'individual' – in relation to new society in the process of Ottoman modernization. Tunç gave psychology the role of going against the 'loss of individual autonomy' and submersion of the self in the collective in the process of Ottoman modernization.

## **Conclusion**

Until his death in 1958, Mustafa Şekip Tunç penned a number of articles against the slogan 'No individual but society', which continued to be used as the motto of the

Republican Party until the multiparty regime in 1950.<sup>713</sup> In other words, the dispute about the relationship between the individual and society, which emerged through the exchange in *Dergah* between Ziya Gökalp and Mustafa Şekip Tunç in the early 1920s, remained heated for three decades. With Tunç's and Ahmet Ağaoğlu's disputes in *Kadro* magazine in the early 1930s, the relations between the individual and the collective and the issue of social control over the actions of individuals began to be discussed within the framework of Turkish nationalism and Kemalism.<sup>714</sup> 'Individualism' and 'liberalism' were the key notes of this discussion, which revolved around the *Dariülfünun* reformation in 1933.<sup>715</sup> Although this discussion held a significant place in developing the conceptual framework of the individual in relation to science during both the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, the center of attention has mostly been the early Republican Era.<sup>716</sup> By contrast, this chapter has directed its gaze at Mustafa Şekip Tunç's contribution to the discussion in the late Ottoman Empire, before it took more concrete forms in a much later phase. As far as his contributions are concerned, I would say, psychology served as a tool to negotiate the relations between individual and collective within an alternative understanding of progress, and to cherish a rhetoric of individual freedom, emotions, and spiritualism. This negotiation ultimately helped intellectuals develop the conceptual framework of the individual, and speak up for individual liberties within a 'conservative' framework.

---

<sup>713</sup> See for example Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Kişinin Değeri', *Türk Düşüncesi*, 2/9 (1 Ağustos 1954 / 1 August 1954), p. 163.

<sup>714</sup> Mustafa Türkeş, 'Kadro Dergisi', *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm* (Istanbul, 2002), p. 466.

<sup>715</sup> For more information: İrem, 'Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism', pp. 177- 81.

<sup>716</sup> One important example is Özavcı's article whose focus on the concept of 'individual' constitutes an important source of inspiration for this chapter. See Hilmi Ozan Özavcı, (2014) 'Differing Interpretations of la conscience collective and the Individual in Turkey Emile Durkheim and the Intellectual Origins of the Republic', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (75 – 1), pp.113-36. Also see the section 'The Cultural Construction of the Individual' wherein İrem delves into state investment in the creation of 'the new Turkish personality' especially in the 1940s: İrem, 'Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism', pp. 111-14.

## Conclusion

In 1932, twenty-one years after the publication in the Ottoman Empire of *Rüyada Terakki* (Progress in a dream), Aldous Huxley challenged the narrative of progress and looked at its obverse side in *Brave New World* – one of the strongest dystopian narratives concerning ‘where we end up’ after a period of mechanization and industrialization en route to a totalitarian regime. It is no coincidence that both *Rüyada Terakki* and *Brave New World* turn on the idea of education and indoctrination through psychological methods – whether primitive or not. Similar to the ‘delivery and nurture rooms’ (*tevlit ve terbiyehaneler*) in *Rüyada Terakki*, with their children who are taken from their families from birth and educated for ‘perfectness’, artificially fertilized babies in *Brave New World* are indoctrinated by the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning. That Huxley’s psychological methods are much more complicated is explained by the developments in the field of psychology and the associated methods of conditioning that had occurred over the two previous decades: “‘Yes, everybody’s happy now,’ echoed Lenina. They had heard the words repeated a hundred and fifty times every night for twelve years.’<sup>717</sup> Due to these techniques, ‘happiness’, which stands for the inner stability of isolated citizens of the Utopia, is finally achieved at the expense of individual authenticity and emotions, in a mechanized, industrial, and fully progressed *Brave New World*. In this new world, happiness is reduced to ‘sheer consumerism, just as “politics” in the brave new world is degraded to conformism... In this utilitarian world, everybody has to be “socially useful.”’<sup>718</sup>

Grandson of English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘Darwin’s bulldog’, and brother of the winner of the Darwin Medal of the Royal Society and president of the

---

<sup>717</sup> Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (London, 1952), p. 70.

<sup>718</sup> Bülent Diken, ‘Huxley’s Brave New World - and Ours’, *Journal for Cultural Research*, 15/2 (2011) pp. 153.

British Eugenics Society, Sir Julian Huxley, Aldous Huxley was no stranger to science discussions. Neither was ‘his interest in both science and mysticism’ a family rebellion.<sup>719</sup> On the contrary, it was in harmony with changing perceptions of science at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century:

He [Aldous Huxley] in fact observed a crucial stage in the scientists’ conceptualization of science and in his work assessed its significance for the rest of culture. The consequence of science’s cultural dominance, the reductionism and materialism it spawned, disturbed Huxley as much as his Modernist peers. What also concerned him was not science’s power but its limits, radical internal limits that scientists and philosophers were beginning to expose.<sup>720</sup>

This thesis has aimed to shed a new light on the Ottoman intellectuals’ incorporation into this period of negotiation of the limits of the domination of scientific knowledge at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with a special focus on the debate between materialism and spiritualism and the development of psychological thought. There are three points which in conclusion I want to emphasize: 1) That the subject of ‘designing individuals’ through science, in particular psychology, had a global aspect, and therefore should not be understood through an exclusive focus on late Ottoman internal dynamics and politics; 2) That the concept of progress was one of the most widely discussed parameters of imagining a ‘new man’ for the four intellectuals studied here; 3) That we are yet to have a profound understanding of some important and loaded concepts, such as the soul, will, and progress, which could be approached through the means of conceptual history in the future; 4) That bifurcated views of late Ottoman intellectual life divided along religious lines are rendered unable to grasp the debate between materialism and spiritualism, as, contrary to our biases, the relevant intellectuals often appear to be diverse and prone to syncretic thought.

---

<sup>719</sup> June Deery, *Aldous Huxley and the Mysticism of Science* (London, 1996), p. 3.

<sup>720</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

A glance at the discussion on the relations between science and religion, and particularly the debate between materialism and spiritualism, in the contemporary global framework, reveals that the Ottomans were not the only group reacting against materialism (or, more specifically, mechanistic views), and nor was spiritualism in need of an Islamic essence to be born. Therefore, although an understanding of internal Ottoman dynamics (i.e. Ottoman modernization and late Ottoman understandings of Islam) is required to contextualize this debate, so is a reference to the zeitgeist. The sources the intellectuals used in their translations and compilations are testimony to their familiarity with the global aspect of this discussion.

Progress is a troublesome and elusive concept, and one with which initially I was not expecting to deal. But it emerged as a key concept in each chapter in depicting where science touches the individuals' life in an age of massive transformations; hence the choice of it as one major common thread tying all the chapters. On one level it refers vaguely to any change for the better, and therefore its meaning is open to interpretation. In my interpretation, however, this vagueness is even more telling. When the sense of urgency in the face of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire dominates other concerns, the message becomes clear: one must hurry, rush into change, and focus on the goals of economic and technological change in order to save the empire. I find this sense key to understanding the often syncretic intellectual accounts we have discussed, merging ideas which might to modern eyes appear contradictory to one another, and putting intellectuals from different backgrounds together.

In 1923 *Dergah* writer and *Dariülfünun* professor of philosophy Mehmed Emin Erişirgil wrote an article entitled 'Can we not come together under the umbrella of progress?', in an effort to reconcile two major groups: conservatives (*muhafazakarlar*)

and liberals (*liberaller*).<sup>721</sup> Erişirgil first identifies the problem: ‘They say we have lost the sense of togetherness, after the triumph of the war of independence. We are on the verge of an eclipse of thought. However we need to work full-force to build up the country. This eclipse would prevent us from enjoying our freedom, which we earned, and immersing ourselves in our country, which we saved by hands armed with guns.’<sup>722</sup> As a solution he then suggests tuning in to both groups: conservatives are the ones who oppose the idea of ‘breaking with the institutional heritage of the country’: ‘After all why would we abandon our old established institutions and supplant them with new ones, which we don’t know what to expect from, instead of reprogramming them en route to progress?’<sup>723</sup> Liberals are the ones who aim to reach the target in a short time: ‘What is the point of reckoning and thinking deeply about obstacles, if we have an idea about “perfect” institutions in principle or see such examples in countries we aspire towards? Reforms are products of firm beliefs. Progress cannot be achieved by preservation. It necessitates eradication, reconstruction, reforms and revolutions.’<sup>724</sup> And Erişirgil asks, ‘I wonder if we can find an all-inclusive concept, a glue among different currents and ideas?’ The middle ground in his interpretation was ‘to protect our social institutions and customs from radical changes’, and ‘not to resist the natural evolution of these’. The middle ground between these two camps, as well as the glue among the intellectuals, was the concept of progress.

---

<sup>721</sup> Mehmet Emin [Erişirgil], ‘Terakki Etrafında Birleşemez miyiz?’, *Mihrab*, 2 (1 Kanunuevvel 1339 / 1 December 1923), pp. 33-7.

<sup>722</sup> ‘Diyorlar ki, İstiklal Harbi muazzam zaferleriyle bitince, eski “birlik” düşüncesi kalmadı. Düşüncede perişanlık başladı. Halbuki memleketin bütün kudretini toplamak suretiyle yapılacak imar işi var, fikirlerdeki bu perişanlık, kurtardığımız istiklalden hakkıyla istifade edememeliğimiz, hatta silahla kurtardığımız vatani yaşayamamalığımıza sebep olacak.’ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>723</sup> ‘Hem ne için bugünkü sosyal kurumlarımızı hedeflediğimiz gayeye sevk ederek terakki yolu dururken, onları bırakıp, nasıl inkişaf edeceği belli olmayanları onun yerine ikame edelim.’ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>724</sup> ‘Madem ki, mükemmel olan müessese şeklini aklen buluyoruz, yahut mükemmel dediğimiz cemiyetlerde görüyoruz, artık şu veya bu engeli hesap etmeye ne engel var?... İnkılaplar kuvvetli bir azmin mahsulüdür... Terakki böyle muhafaza ile değil, yıkmak, yenisini yapmakla, yani inkılap ve ihtilallerle mümkündür.’ *Ibid.*

Erişirgil wrote this article right before the start of the massive transformations en route to the Turkish modernization project. The question of whether the concept of progress served as a common ground among intellectuals in the early Republican Era is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as I argue, the concept of progress did serve as a common ground in the late Ottoman era for intellectuals from different backgrounds, and in particular for Abdullah Cevdet, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Baha Tevfik, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç.

What does the emergence of progress as a common theme mean when translated into late Ottoman intellectual dynamics? In making sense of it, I propose we view this discussion from the perspective of the rise of the liberal and capitalist spirit, which came to dominate the intellectual environment, and the invention of *homo oeconomicus* in the late Ottoman Empire. Drawing on recent literature on the rising discourses of productivity, history of economic ideas and political economy in the late Ottoman Empire revolving around the intellectuals' economic concerns, I would conclude that *man* was being designed as a 'producing unit', whether with a soul or not. Instead of taking materialists and spiritualists as two opposing camps on a battlefield, I would see them as engaged in building a conceptual framework for the individual as an answer to their economic and technological concerns, and in line with the changing material conditions they were surrounded with in the context of industrial and technological transformations. The idea of progress, I believe, put these intellectuals together in the process of defining a 'producing unit' as part of a new work ethic, in the face of the urgent question of how to save the empire.

However the concepts of 'fake progress' or the 'side-effects of progress' indicate the existence of different definitions of progress with different parameters. Furthermore, certain tensions about the meanings of the soul, will, and emotions, as

well as the relationship between individual and collective entities, reflect a deeper Ottoman inquiry into the concept of the ‘new man’ beyond the normative accounts. This shows the need for conceptual thinking in treating late Ottoman intellectual products and the need for further enquiry as to what laid beyond normative accounts. The literature on modern psychology is one major venue for going beyond normative accounts of national indoctrination, encouraging conceptual exploration and tracking transnational influences of science and technology. The role of Islam is another factor worth exploring for a fuller understanding of the conceptual transformations of psychological notions in the late Ottoman Empire. This is beyond the scope of this thesis, but will provide an important avenue for future research.

In keeping a distance from efforts to link the discussions of the ‘new man’ to the formation of Turkish national identity, I aim to leave room for numerous alternative intellectual interpretations along the way and the role of transnational processes of circulation of psychological ideas. In my interpretation, nation-formation constituted only one side of the subject of ‘designing individuals’. There were many other sides as well. It is telling, for example, that the theme of indoctrination surfaced most crudely in Baha Tevfik’s writings about emotions, he having been critical of nationalism in the Second Constitutional Era. Any narrative based exclusively on the rise of nationalism would tend to miss this plurality. The subject of ‘designing individuals’, however, had a lot to do with the zeitgeist, as well as the use of mental-health-related subjects. More importantly, there were different parties advocating different opinions during this transition.

Because of the urgent pressure to save the empire, intellectual thinking became home to syncretic thinking and a variety of opinions, transcending the grasp of one-sided dichotomous thinking. Considering this variety, we are perhaps still far from

having a complete understanding of ‘Ottoman materialism’. For example, to what extent did the handful of Ottoman intellectuals whom the scholarship sees today as ‘Ottoman materialists’ share the same understanding of materialism with one another and with their counterparts in the wider world? And to what extent did they generate a homogenous movement and tradition? Furthermore, given the prevalence of the ‘Islam as science-friendly’ argument, and the state support behind it, biological materialism developed at the medical schools did not take on an anti-Islamic tone. On the contrary, intellectuals seem to have developed a number of strategies ‘to get Islam out of the way’ while speaking about science and materialism. Similarly, the need for science in making progress was apparent to intellectuals with an interest in spiritualism, and therefore anti-materialism did not take the form of hostility towards science. I would therefore present materialism as a philosophical doctrine which enabled these thinkers to negotiate the definition of science and its boundaries in understanding and shaping society. In other words, it was related to the multiplicity of understandings of science, and the debate over its limitations in defining and shaping human nature and society. Materialism did have an effect on Ottoman intellectuals. So did evolutionism, positivism, and naturalism, as recent popular scientific topics in the post-Darwinian world of which Ottoman intellectuals were not oblivious. Indeed, it was expected and timely to talk about such popular scientific and philosophical trends given their popularity. Psychological thought in the late Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was nourished by these negotiations of the boundaries and meaning of science. When translated into late Ottoman dynamics, the debate between materialism and spiritualism became a psychological debate enabling intellectuals to conceptualize the ‘new man’ in line with major scientific and technological transformations in their environment, or so I have argued.

# Bibliography

## Manuscript and Archival Sources

Prime Ministry Archives (BOA – Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Istanbul, Turkey  
BOA. MF MKT 528/42 (13 Cemaziyelevvel 1318 / 8 September 1900).  
BOA. MF MKT 1149/4 (15 Şubat 1325 / 28 February 1910).

## Newspapers and Periodicals

Where articles are titled, the source has been included in the section on Printed Sources. Where articles, book advertisements and cartoons consulted are not titled, the source has been listed below:

*Dergah*  
*Eşek*  
*Hande*  
*Hikmet*  
*İctihad*  
*Piyano*  
*Şehbal*

## Printed Primary Sources

Abdullah Cevdet, *Dilmestî-i Mevlana ve Gazali'de Ma'rifetullah: Ruba'iyat-ı Gazali, Urfi'de Şiir ve İrfan* (Istanbul, 1921).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimağ ve Melekât-i Akliyyenin Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhası* (Istanbul, 1335/1919).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Fenn-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1911).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sanihaları* (Kahire, 1906).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya-ı Tefekkür: Mehazımın Esası C(K)raft und Stoff Ünvanlı Kitabın Tefekkür Bahsidir* (Istanbul, 1892-3/1308).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Fizyolocya ve Hıfz-ı Sıhhat-i Dimağ ve Melekât-ı Akliyye* (Dersaadet, 1312/1895).

Abdullah Cevdet, *Goril* (Ma'muret'ül-Azîz, 1311/1894).

Abdullah Fehmi, 'Beka-ı Ruh', *Sırat-ı Müstakim* (8 Eylül 1327 / 21 September 1911), 7/159, pp. 42-3.

Abdurrahman Şeref, *Ahlak İlmi*, transliterated by Mevlüt Uyanık and Aygün Akyol (Ankara, 2012).

Abdurrahman Şeref, *İlm-i Ahlak* (Istanbul, 1316/1899).

Ağaoğlu, Ahmet, *Mütareke ve Sürgün Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 2010).

- Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Ondokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1956).
- Ahmed Hilmi, *Awakened Dreams: Razi's Journey with the Mirror Dede*, tr. Refik Algan and Camille Helminski (Putney,1993).
- Ahmed Hilmi, *Hangi Meslek-i Fennîyi Kabul Etmeliyiz? Darülfünun Efendilerine Tahriri Bir Konferans*, (Konstantiniye, 1329/1913-14).
- Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, transliterated by Münir Aktepe, 11 (Ankara, 1970).
- Ahmet Mithat, *Ben Neyim, Hikmet-i Maddiyeye Müdafaa* (Istanbul, 1307/1891-2).
- Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Beşir Fuad*, transliterated by N. Ahmet Özalp (Istanbul, 1996).
- Ahmet Mithat, 'Duvarın Bir Sada', *Dağarcık*, 4 (1288/1872), pp. 99-100.
- Ahmet Mithat, 'Dünyada İnsanın Zuhuru', *Dağarcık*, 4 (1288/1872-3), pp. 109-17.
- Ahmet Mithat, *İlhamat ve Taglitat: Psikoloji yani fenni menafi-i ruha dair bazı mülahazat* (Istanbul, 1302/1885).
- Ahmet Mithat, 'İnsan', *Dağarcık*, 2 (1288/1872-3), pp. 40-9.
- Ahmet Mithat, *Nevm ve Halat-ı Nevm* (Istanbul, 1881).
- Ahmet Mithat, *Sevda-yı Say-ü Amel* (Istanbul, 1296/1879).
- Ali İrfan Eğribozi, 'İfade-i Meram', in *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), pp. 3-5.
- Alfred Binet and Dr. Simon, *Çocuklarda Zekanın Mikyası*, tr. İbrahim Alaaddin [Gövsa] (Istanbul, 1915).
- Anschtz, Georg: 'İnsanların Ahval-i Ruhîyeleri Arasındaki Ferdi Farklar Hakkında Tetkikler', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/ 5 (1916), pp. 475-80.
- Babanzade Ahmed Naim, 'Felsefe Bir İlim midir?' , *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/1 (1332/1916-7), pp. 71-96.
- Babanzade Ahmed Naim, *Felsefe Dersleri*, transliterated by Cahid Şenel and M. Cüneyt Kaya (Istanbul, 2016).
- Babanzade Ahmed Naim, 'İkinci Ders: felsefenin yeni birkaç tarifi', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/1 (1332/1916-7), pp.197-221.
- Babanzade Ahmed Naim, 'Üçüncü Ders: felsefede mısdağ', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 1/5 (1333/1917), pp. 508-33.
- Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *Psikoloji İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, undated).
- Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak* (Istanbul, 1910).

- Baha Tevfik, 'Aşk-ı Marazi', *Piyano*, 7 (20 Eylül 1326 / 3 October 1910), pp. 69-70.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Aşk, Hodbinî', *Piyano*, 8 (4 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 17 October 1910), p. 92.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime', in Fikri Tevfik, *Hüceyre: Hayatın Esası* (Istanbul, 1327/1911), p. 3.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Bir Mukaddime', in Ernest Haeckel, *İnsanın Menşei, Nesl-i Beşer*, tr. Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul, unknown date), pp. 8-18.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Katiyen Muzırdır', *Piyano*, 9 (11 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 24 October 1910), p. 93-4.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Edebiyat Katiyen Muzırdır', *Piyano*, 10 (18 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / 31 October 1910), p. 105-7.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe Kamusu', *Yirminci Asırda Zeka*, 1/5 (5 Mart 1328 / 18 March 1912).
- Baha Tevfik, 'Felsefe Kamusu', *Felsefe Mecmuası*, 10 (undated), p. 167.
- Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Edebiyat ve Şair Celis*, transliterated by Kemal Kahramanoğlu and Ali Utku (Konya, 2014), p. 15.
- Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd: Anarşizmin Osmanlıcası*, transliterated by Burhanettin Saylı (Istanbul, 1997).
- Baha Tevfik, *Felsefe-i Ferd* (Istanbul, 1914).
- Baha Tevfik, 'Gül ve Bülbül', *Çocuk Duygusu*, 18 (3 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 / 16 October 1913), pp. 3-4.
- Baha Tevfik, *Hassasiyet Bahsi ve Yeni Ahlak*, transliterated by Faruk Öztürk (Ankara, 2002).
- Baha Tevfik, 'Kıskançlık', *Teşvik*, 1 (1 Temmuz 1326 / 14 July 1910), pp. 2-4.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Mebâhis-i Felsefe: Psikoloji', *İzmir*, 398/44 (18 Kanun-i Evvel 1320 / 31 December 1904), pp. 5-6.
- Baha Tevfik, *Muhtasar Felsefe* (Istanbul, 1331/1913).
- Baha Tevfik, 'Nail'in Mahçubiyeti', *Çocuk Duygusu*, 18 (3 Teşrin-i Evvel 1329 / 4 December 1913), pp. 6-8.
- Baha Tevfik, 'Mebâhis-i Felsefe: Psikoloji', *İzmir*, 398 (18 Kanunuevvel 1320 / 31 December 1904), p. 5.
- Baha Tevfik, *Teceddüd-i İlmî ve Edebî* (Istanbul, 1327/1911).

- Beşir Fuad, *Beşer* (Istanbul, 1303/1886).
- Beşir Fuad, *Şiir ve Hakikat*, Handan İnci, ed. (Istanbul, 1999).
- Beşir Fuad, *Victor Hugo* (Istanbul, 1885).
- Bergson, Henri, *Gülme*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1945).
- Bergson, Henri, 'Message to Descartes Congress, 1937', in Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey eds. *Key Writings* (London, 2002), p. 372-6.
- Boirac, Émile, *Cours Élémentaire de Philosophie conforme aux programmes du 31 mai 1902* (Paris, 1906).
- Boirac, Émile, *Felsefe yahut Hikmet-i Nazariye*, tr. Mehmed Emin Erişirgil (Istanbul, 1913).
- Boirac, Émile, *İlm-i Mantık*, tr. Reşad Nuri [Güntekin] (Istanbul, 1915).
- Boirac, Émile *Felsefe – Hikmet*, tr. İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (Istanbul 1917).
- Büchner, Ludwig, *Im Dienst der Wahrheit. Ausgewählte Aufsätze aus Natur und Wissenschaft*, tr. in part as *Last Words on Materialism* by Joseph McCabe (London, 1901).
- Büchner, Ludwig, *Madde ve Kuvvet*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul, 1911).
- Büchner, Ludwig, *Madde ve Kuvvet*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, transliterated by Ali Utku and Kemal Kahramanoğlu (Istanbul, 2012).
- Caspar Bartholin and Thomas Bartolin, 'Preface', in *Institutions Anatomiques de Gaspar Bartholin, augmentées et enrichies pour la seconde fois tant des opinions et observations nouvelles des modernes*, tr. Abr. Du Prat (Paris, 1647).
- Celal Nuri, *Tarih-i İstikbal* (Istanbul, 1915).
- Carlyle, Thomas, 'Signs of the Times', *Edinburgh Review*, 98 (1829), pp. 439-459.
- Compayré, Gabriel, *Çocuk: Melekat-ı Uzviye ve Ruhîyesi*, tr. Ahmet Mithat (Istanbul, 1902).
- Darwin, Charles, *The Expression of the Emotions in Men and Animals* (London, 1872).
- Daubes, Guyot, *Physiologie et Hygiène Du Cervau et des Fonction Intellectuelles* (Paris, 1890).
- Darwin, Charles, *Origin of Species* (London, 1859).

- Davudzâde Molla Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki ve Medeniyet-i İslâmiyeyi Rüyet* (Istanbul, 1913).
- Davudzâde Molla Mustafa Nazım, *Rüyada Terakki ve Medeniyet-i İslâmiyeyi Rüyet*, transliterated by Engin Kılıç (Istanbul 2012).
- Doktor Edhem Necdet, *Tekamül ve Kanunları* (Istanbul, 1329/1913).
- Dozy, Reinhardt, *Tarih-i İslamiyet*, translated by Abdullah Cevdet (Mısır, 1908).
- Dubois, Paul, *The Influence of the Mind on the Body* (New York, 1906); *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders* (New York, 1905).
- Dubois, Paul, *Self Control* (London 1909).
- Drey, Sylvan, *Herbert Spencer'in Din ve Ahlak Hakkındaki Nazariyesi*, tr. Mehmet Münir Erteğün (Istanbul, 1327/1911).
- Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Buffon* (Istanbul, 1299/1883).
- Emrullah Efendi, *İlm-i Hikmet* (Istanbul, 1327/1911).
- Elmalılı Hamdi [Yazır], *Metelib ve Mezahib, Metafizik ve İlahiyat*, Muhtar Yazır and Ayhan Yalçın, eds. (Istanbul, 1978).
- Engin, Mehmed Safvet, *Spencer'in Felsefesi* (Istanbul, 1928).
- Erişirgil, Mehmed Emin, 'İki Eseri Felsefi Sebebiyle', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 2/3 (3 Teşrin Evvel 1339 / 3 October 1923), pp. 159-74.
- Ethem Necdet, 'Nisc-i Dimağın Tekamülü', *İctihad*, 84 (12 Kanunuevvel, 1329 / 25 December 1913), pp. 1863-6.
- Franklin, Benjamin, *Tarik-i Refah*, tr. Reşat (Paris, 1286/1869).
- Franklin, Benjamin, *Tarik-i Servet ez Hikmet-i Rikardos*, tr. Bedros Hocasaryan (Dersaadet, 1286/1870).
- Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Amâk-ı Hayal: Raci Beyin Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 1326/1910).
- Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Hikmet Yazıları*, transliterated by Ahmet Koçak (Istanbul, 2005).
- Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Istanbul, 1327/1911).
- Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, 'Önsöz', *İslam Tarihi* (Istanbul, 2005), pp. 25-31.
- Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Üss-i İslam* (Istanbul, 1332/1914).
- Fonsgrive, Georges, tr. Babanzade Ahmed Naim, *Mebadi-i Felsefe'den Birinci Kitap İlm-i Nefs* (Istanbul, 1331/1915).

- Haeckel, Ernest, *Monism As Connecting Religion* (London, 1895).
- Haeckel, Ernest, *Vahdet-i Mevcud: Bir Tabiat Aliminin Dini*, tr. Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, (Istanbul, unknown date).
- Haeckel, Ernest, *İnsanın Menşe-i Nesli Beşer*, tr. Ahmed Nebil (Istanbul, unknown date).
- Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Muhtasar İlm-i Ruh*, tr. Efendîzade Eşref Şevketî (Istanbul 1333 1917).
- Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Mülâhhas Ruhiyat*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1919).
- Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Ruhiyyat*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1914).
- Hermann Ebbinghaus, *Psychology: an elementary text-book* (Boston, 1908).
- Hartmann, Eduard, *Darwinizm: Darwin Mesleğinin İhtiva Ettiği Hakikatler ve Hatalar*, tr. Memduh Süleyman (Istanbul, 1329/1913).
- Huxley, Aldous, *Brave New World* (London, 1952).
- Huxley, Thomas Henry, ‘On the Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata and Its History’, in *Method and Results: Essays by Thomas Henry Huxley* (New York, 1901), pp. 199-251.
- İ. Hakkı, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruhtan Bir Parça: His, Fikir, İrade, Seciye* (Istanbul, 1924).
- İbn Ömer [Abdullah] Cevdet, *Dimağ: Dimağ ile Ruh Arasındaki Münasebat-ı Fenniyyeyi Tedkik* (Istanbul, 1892-3/1308).
- İbn Naim Hazım, ‘İnsan’, *Sebilürreşad* (17 Mayıs 1327 / 30 May 1911), 1-8 / 195-13, p. 237.
- İbrahim Alaaddin [Gövsa], *Freud* (Istanbul, 1927).
- İbrahim Alaattin [Gövsa], ‘Ona Dair’, *Acılar* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 17-20.
- İbrahim Edhem, *Semerât-ı Akıl* (Istanbul, 1303/1886).
- İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Hayatım* (Istanbul, 1998).
- James, William, ‘Are We Automata?’, *Mind*, 4 (1879), pp. 1-22.
- James, William, ‘The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris’, *Mind*, 14/56 (1889), pp. 614.
- James, William, ‘What is an Emotion?’, *Mind*, 9/34 (1884), pp. 189-90.
- James, William, *Terbiye Muhasebeleri*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1339/1923).

James, William, The Congress of Physiological Psychology, *Mind* 14 (1889), pp. 614–6.

‘Kalp’, tr. Beşir Fuad, *Envar-ı Zeka*, 15, p. 401.

Karay, Refik Halid, ‘Hülya Bu Ya...’ transliterated by Özlem Alpin, ed. *Türk Bilim Kurgu Öyküleri* (Istanbul, 2003), pp. 11-22.

Keyserling, Count Hermann, *The World in the Making*, tr. by Maurice Samuel (New York, 1927).

Kırımlı Doktor Aziz, ‘İntihar’, *Mecmua-i Fünun*, 4/39 (1283/1866), pp. 218-28 and 4/40 (1283/1866), pp. 250-5.

Kınalızade Ali Çelebi, *Ahlak-ı Alaî*, Mustafa Koç, ed., (Istanbul, 2007).

Le Bon, Gustave, *Ruh’ül- Akvam*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Mısır, 1907).

Le Bon, Gustave, *İlm-i Ruh-ı İctimaî*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul, 1924).

Le Bon, Gustave, *Avrupa Harbinden Alınan Psikolocyai Dersler*, tr. Abdullah Cevdet (Istanbul, 1918).

M. Arif, *Aşk Nedir?* (Istanbul, 1327/1911).

MacFarlane, Charles, *Turkey and Its Destiny*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1850).

Mazhar Osman, *Tababet-i Ruhiye* (Istanbul, 1908).

Mazhar Osman, *Spirtizma Aleyhinde* (Istanbul, 1910).

Mehmed Emin [Erişirgil] ‘Ne Çıkar?’ *Dergah*, 31 (20 Teşrinievvel 1337 / 2 November 1911), p. 4.

Mehmet Emin [Erişirgil], ‘Terakki Etrafında Birleşemez miyiz?’, *Mihrab*, 2 (1 Kanunuevvel 1339 / 1 December 1923), pp. 33-7.

Memduh Süleyman, Felsefe Dersleri, *Rubab*, 76 (26 Eylül 1329 / 9 October 1913), p. 450-1.

Milaslı Gad Franco, *Tetebbuat: İlm-i Terbiye ve İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh* (Izmir, 1327/1911).

Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, *Çocuk Ruhiyatı ve Tecrübi Psikoloji* (Istanbul, 1339).

Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, *Çocuk ve Mektep* (Istanbul 1339/ 1923); *Ailede Terbiye* (Istanbul 1930).

Mustafa Rahmi Balaban, *İtiyad* (Istanbul, 1919).

- Mustafa Satı Bey, 'Mebahis-i Ruhiye - I', *Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası*, 3/9 (1 Eylül 1325 / 14 September 1909), pp. 71-87.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Bergson ve Kudret-i Ruhîyeye Dair Birkaç Konferansı* (Istanbul, 1339/1923).
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Doğan Dünya', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 1/16 (17 March 1927), pp. 7-8.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ekümenik Halin Manası', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 22 (28 April 1927), pp. 6-8.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Froydizm: Psikanalize dair beş ders* (Istanbul, 1927).
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Hakiki Hürriyet', *Dergah*, 3/1 (16 Mayıs 1337 / 16 May 1921), p. 37.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Kayslerling', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 1/18 (31 March 1927), pp. 5-6.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Kişinin Değeri', *Türk Düşüncesi*, 2/9 (1 Ağustos 1954 / 1 August 1954), p. 163.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İhtiras Nedir?' *Dergah* 11/1 (20 Eylül 1337 / 20 September 1921), p. 162.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İlmin Mebde-i veya Umdeleri İtibarıyla Kıymeti', *Dergah*, 1/5 (20 Haziran 1337 / 20 June 1921), p. 27.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İnsan Nasıl Bir Makinedir?', *İnsan Ruhu Üzerinde Gezintiler* (Istanbul, 1943) pp. 231-3.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *İnsan Ruhu Üzerinde Gezintiler* (Istanbul, 1943).
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'İstikbalin Hırısı ve Ona Götüren Yol', *Hayat Mecmuası*, 20 (14 April 1927), pp. 7-8.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Peyami Safa ve Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar', *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, pp. 7-12.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Terakki Fikri: Menşei ve Tekamülü* (Istanbul, 1928).
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Théodule Ribot', *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2/6 (Mayıs 1338 / May 1922), pp. 128-52.
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Ruh Aleminde* (Istanbul, 1945).
- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ruha Bir Dikkat', *Dergah*, 4/1 (1 Haziran 1337 / 1 June 1921), p. 52.

- Mustafa Şekip Tunç, 'Ziya Bey'deki ve Prensip ve Mefkûre Sadakati', *Milli Mecmua*, 24 (5 Teşrinisani 1340 / 5 November 1924), pp. 385-86.
- Münif Paşa, 'Ehemmiyet-i Terbiye-i Sıbyan', *Mecmua-i Fünun*, 1/5 (1279/1862), pp.176-85.
- Namık Kemal, 'Terakki', *İbret* (23 Teşrinievvel 1288 / 5 November 1872), pp. 1-3.
- Nazım Şakir, *Aşk-ı Marazi* (Istanbul, 1326/1910).
- Ömer Seyfettin, 'Kesik Bıyık', in Ali İhsan Kolcu, ed. *Türk Öykü Dağarcığı*, (Erzurum, 2006), pp.152-54.
- Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Ankara, 2010).
- Ragıp Hulusi, Wundt'un Felsefesi, Psikoloji ve Ahlaka Dair, *Tabiat*, no.1 (10 Temmuz 1327 / 23 July 1911), p. 9-15.
- Rıza Tahsin, *Tıp Fakültesi Tarihçesi (Mirat-ı Mekteb-i Tıbbiye)*, Aykut Kazancıgil, ed. (Istanbul, 1991).
- Ribot, Théodule, *Hissiyat Ruhiyatı*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1927).
- Ribot, Théodule, *İhtiraslar Üzerine Bir Tecrübe-i Kalemîye*, tr. Mustafa Şekip Tunç (Istanbul, 1920).
- Ribot, Theodule-Armand, *İrade Hastalıkları*, tr. Nebahat Hamit (Istanbul, 1926).
- Ribot, Théodule, *Psychology of Emotions* (London, 1897).
- Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin, *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür* (Dersaadet, 1311/1894).
- Rifat bin Mehmed Emin, *İlm-i Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür*, transliterated by Tarık Tuna Gözütok (Konya, 2014).
- 'Ruhiyat', *Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası*, 2 (30 Augustos 1911), p. 8.
- Sakızlı Ohannes, 'Makineler', *Mebâdî-i İlm-i Servet-i Milel* (Istanbul 1297/1880), pp. 84-95.
- Sırrı Giridî, *Ruh* (Istanbul, 1305/1888).
- Subhi Edhem, *Darvenizm* (Manastır, 1327/1911).
- Subhi Edhem, *Hayat ve Mevt* (Istanbul, 1329/1913).
- Subhi Edhem, *Lamarckizm* (Dersaadet, 1330).
- Subhi Edhem, *Ulum-ı Tabiiye Lugatı* (Istanbul, 1917).

- Spencer, Herbert, *Fikri ve Ahlaki Terbiye* tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün, (Istanbul, 1340).
- Spencer, Herbert, *Kavanin-i Tabiiye*, tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün (Istanbul, 1327/1911).
- Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Biology*, 2 vols. (London, 1864).
- Spencer, Herbert, 'Progress: Its Law and Causes', *The Westminster Review*, 67 (1857), pp. 445-7, 451, 454-6, and 464-65.
- Spencer, Herbert, *Vazı-ı Kanunların Hataları*, tr. Mehmed Münir Erteğün (Istanbul 1327 1911).
- Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi, *Taklitle Medeniyet Olmaz!* (Istanbul, 1962).
- Şemseddin Sami, 'Materialiste', *Kamus-ı Fransevi: Franszca'dan Türkçe'ye lügat kitabı*, 3rd edn. (Istanbul, 1322/1905).
- Şemsettin Sami, *İnsan* (Istanbul, 1299/1879).
- Şemsettin Sami, *Yine İnsan* (Istanbul, 1303/1886).
- Şerafeddin Mağmumi, 'Bela-ı Aşk', *Başlangıç* (Istanbul, 1888), p. 22-38.
- Şerafeddin Mağmumi, *Vücut-ı Beşer* (Istanbul, 1839).
- Şeyh Mustafa Safvet Efendi, 'Hakikat-ı İnsaniye', *Tasavvuf* (25 Mart 1327 / 7 April 1911), p. 1.
- Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, 'Ömer Seyfettin Bey', *İkdam* (10 Mart 1336 / 23 March 1920).
- Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, tr. Niyazi Berkes (London, 1959).
- Ziya Gökalp, *Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler* (Selanik, 1910).
- Ziyaeddin Fındıkoğlu, 'Action et réalité en sociologie', *Travaux Du IXe Congrès International De Philosophie, Congrès Descartes*, 10 (1937), pp. 129-32.
- Printed Secondary Works**
- Abu Lughod, Lila, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge, 1990).
- Adas, Michael, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, 1989).
- Ahmed, Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London, 1993).
- Ahmad, Feroz, *The Young Turks: the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969).

- Ahmed, Sara, *Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York, 2004).
- Akün, Ömer F., Hoca Tahsin, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 18 (1998), pp. 198-206.
- Alkan, Mehmet Ö., 'II. Meşrutiyet'te Eğitim, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Milliyetçilik, Militarizm veya "Militer Türk-İslam Sentezi"', in Ferdan Ergut, ed. *II. Meşrutiyet'i Yeniden Düşünmek* (Istanbul, 2010) pp. 57-85.
- Alkan, Mehmet Ö., Düşünce Tarihimizde Önemli Bir İsim: Baha Tevfik ve Düşünce Tarihimiz, *Tarih ve Toplum*, 52 (1988), pp. 233-41.
- Alkan, Mehmed Ö., ed., *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim İstatistikleri, 1839-1924* (Ankara, 2000).
- Akşin, Sina '31 Mart Olayına Değın Sabahattin Bey ve Ahrar Fırkası' *AUSBFD* 17/13 (September 1972), pp. 541-60.
- Akyüz, Kenan, *Encümen-i Daniş* (Ankara, 1975).
- Altıntaş, Hayrani, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç* (Ankara, 1989).
- Ateş, Sanem Y., *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek, II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde beden terbiyesi, askerî talim ve paramiliter gençlik örgütleri* (Istanbul, 2012).
- Artvinli, Fatih, *Delilik Siyaset ve Toplum: Toptaşı Bimarhanesi (1873-1927)* (Istanbul, 2013).
- Ash, Mitchell G., *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the quest for objectivity* (Cambridge, 1995).
- Ash, Mitchell and Söllner, Alfons, eds, *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Bağcı, Rıza, *Baha Tevfik'in Hayatı Edebi ve Felsefi Eserleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Izmir, 1996).
- Barak, On, *On Time: Technology and temporality in modern Egypt* (Berkeley, 2013).
- Bartholomew, Michael, 'Lyell and Evolution: An Account of Lyell's Response to the Prospect of an Evolutionary Ancestry of Man', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 6/3 (1973), pp. 261-303.
- Batur, Sertan, 'Türkiye'de Psikoloji Tarihi Yazımı Üzerine', *Toplum ve Bilim*, 98 (2003), pp. 255-64.
- Batur, Sertan, Türkiye'de Psikolojinin Kurumsallaşmasında Toplumsal ve Politik Belirleyenler, *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107, (2006), pp: 217-30.

- Batur, Sertan, 'Psikoloji Tarihinde Köken Mitosu ve Georg Anshütz'ün Hikayesi', *Toplum ve Bilim*, 102 (2005), pp. 168-88.
- Batur, Sertan and Aslıtürk, Ersin, 'On Critical Psychology in Turkey', *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 5 (2006), pp. 21-41.
- Bein, Amit, 'A "Young Turk" Islamic Intellectual: Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi and the Diverse Intellectual Legacies of the Late Ottoman Empire', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39 (2007), pp: 607-25.
- Benjamin, Ludy T. and Baker, David, 'Concluding Thoughts on Internationalizing the History of Psychology' in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, pp. 616-9.
- Benjamin, Ludy T. and Baker, David, 'The Internationalization of Psychology: A History' in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, pp. 2-5.
- Bektaş, Yakup, 'The Sultan's Messenger: The Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880' *Technology and Culture*, 41/4 (2000), pp. 669-96.
- Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London, 1998).
- Berrios, German E., *The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive psychopathology since the nineteenth century* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Bilgin, Nuri, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Psikoloji Bibliyografyası* (Izmir, 1988).
- Binbaşoğlu, Cavit, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türk Eğitim Tarihi* (Ankara, 2009), pp. 149-55.
- Bolay, Süleyman H., *Türkiye'de Ruhçu ve Maddeci Görüşün Mücadelesi* (Istanbul, 1967).
- Bora, Tanıl, 'Cemil Meriç: Tutarsızlığın Verimi', *Hece*, 157/1 (2010), pp. 179-90.
- Boring, Edwin, *Psychologist at Large: An Autobiography and Selected Essays* (New York, 1961).
- Bowler, Peter J. *Reconciling Science and Religion: The debate in early twentieth century Britain* (Chicago, 2001).
- Bordogna, Francesca, *William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science and the Geography of Knowledge* (Chicago, 2008).
- Bozdoğan, Sibel and Kasaba, Reşat, eds. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle, 1997).
- Brown, Alan, *Deja Vu Experience: Essays in Cognitive Psychology* (New York, 2004).

- Brown, M. Brady, *Unruly Spirits: The Science of Psychic Phenomena in Modern France* (Champaign, 2010).
- Bilgi, Sabiha and Özsoy, Seçkin, 'John Dewey's Travelings into the Project of Turkish Modernity', in Thomas S. Popkewitz, ed. *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and Traveling of Pragmatism in Education* (New York, 2005), pp. 153-81.
- Brummett, Palmira, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany, 2011).
- Campbell, Timothy, *Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben* (Minneapolis, 2011).
- Carroy, Jacqueline and Plas, Régine, 'How Pierre Janet used pathological psychology to save the philosophical self', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36/3 (2000), pp. 231-40.
- Carroy, Jacqueline and Plas, Régine, 'The Origins of French Experimental Psychology: experiment and experimentalism', *History of the Human Sciences*, 9/1 (1996), pp. 73-84.
- Castro, Jorge, Lafuente, Enrique, and Jiménez, Belén, 'The Soul of Spain: Spanish Scholastic Psychology and the Making of Modern Subjectivity, 1875-1931', *History of Psychology*, 12/3 (2009), pp.132-56.
- Chadwick, Owen, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990).
- Classen, Constance 'Introduction: The Transformation of Perception', in Constance Classen, ed. *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Age of the Empire, 1800-1920* (London, 2014), pp. 1-25.
- Corsi, Pietro, 'Before Darwin: Transformist Concepts in European Natural History', *Journal of the History of Biology*, 38 (2005), pp. 67-83.
- Corsi, Pietro, 'The Importance of French Transformist Ideas for the Second Volume of Lyell's Principles of Geology', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 11/3 (1978), pp. 221-44.
- Cevad, Mahmud, *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihçe-i Teşkilat ve İcraatı* (Istanbul, 2001).
- Çavdar, Tefvik, *Türkiye'de Liberalizm, 1860-1990* (Istanbul, 1992).
- Çelik, Zeynep, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1993).
- Deery, June, *Aldous Huxley and the Mysticism of Science* (1996, London).

- Deming, David, 'Design, science and naturalism', *Earth-Science Reviews*, 90 (2008), pp. 49-70.
- Demir, Remzi, 'Subhi Edhem Bey'in Bilim Tarihi ve Bilim Tarihi Bilinci', *Bilim ve Ütopya*, 139 (2006), pp. 52-7.
- Deringil, Selim, *Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, 1998).
- Değirmencioğlu, Coşkun, *Mehmet İzzet* (Istanbul, 1987).
- Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, 1983).
- Diken, Bülent, 'Huxley's Brave New World - and Ours', *Journal for Cultural Research*, 15/2 (2011) pp. 153-72.
- Dinç, Gönül, 'A Study on Medical Periodicals Published in Turkish in Arabic Alphabet', *Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları*, 5 (1993), pp. 96-131.
- Dinç, Gönül, 'Tuhfetü'l-Tıb, as a pioneer periodical of the medical history', *Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları*, 10 (2001), pp. 21-37.
- Doğan, Atila, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm* (Istanbul, 2006).
- Doğan, Atila and Alkan, Haluk, eds., *Osmanlı Liberal Düşüncesi: Ulum-ı İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası* (Istanbul, 2010).
- Dölen, Emre, *İstanbul Darülfünun'unda Alman Müderrisler* (Istanbul, 2013).
- Dölen, Emre, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi I: Osmanlı Döneminde Darülfünun 1863-1922* (Istanbul, 2009).
- Durrant, Michael, ed., *Aristotle's De Anima in Focus* (London, 1993).
- Ebrahimnejad, Hormoz, ed., *The Development of Modern Medicine in Non-Western Countries: Historical perspectives* (London, 2009).
- El Shakry, Omnia, 'The Arabic Freud: The Unconscious and the Modern Subject', *Modern Intellectual History*, 11/1 (2014), pp. 89-118.
- Elshakry, Marwa, 'American Evangelism in Late Ottoman Beirut', *Past and Present*, 196 (2007), pp. 173-214.
- Elshakry, Marwa S., 'Knowledge in Motion: the Cultural Politics of Modern Science Translations in Arabic', *Isis*, 99/4 (2008), pp. 701-30.
- Elshakry, Marwa, *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950* (Chicago, 2013).

- Elshakry, Marwa, When Science Became Western, *Historiographical Reflections*, *ISIS*, 101/1 (2010), pp. 98-109.
- Engel, Pascal, 'Psychology and Metaphysics from Maine de Biran to Bergson', in Sara Heinamaa and Martina Reuter, eds. *Psychology and Philosophy, Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought* (Finland, 2009), pp. 234-47.
- Engels, Eve-Marie and Glick, Thomas F., 'Editors' Introduction', in Eve-Marie Engels and Thomas F. Glick, eds. *The Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe*, 2 vols. (London, 2008), i, pp. 1-22.
- Erdem, Hüsameddin, *Son Devir Osmanlı Düşüncesinde Ahlak* (Istanbul, 2006).
- Febvre, Lucien, 'Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past', in Peter Burke, ed. *A New Kind of History* (London, 1973), pp. 12-26.
- Fortna, Benjamin, 'Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman "Secular" Schools', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32/3 (2000), pp. 369-93.
- Fortna, Benjamin, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 202-47.
- Foucault, Michel, 'Course Summary' in Michel Senellart (ed), *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79*, tr. Graham Burchell (New York, 2008).
- Foucault, Michel, *The Birth of the Clinic* (London, 1976).
- Foucault, Michel, *Madness and Civilization: a history of insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York, 1973).
- Foucault, Michel, *Mental Illness and Psychology* (New York 1976).
- Foucault, Michel, 'One' in Michel Senellart (ed), *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78*, tr. Graham Burchell (London, 2007).
- Frederick, Gregory, *Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Dordrecht, 1977).
- Gencer, Mustafa, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve Alman Ruhü* (Istanbul, 2003).
- Goldstein, Doris S., "'Official Philosophies" in Modern France: The Example of Victor Cousin', *Journal of Social History*, 1/3 (1968), pp. 259-79.
- Gülerce, Aydan, 'History of Psychology in Turkey as a Sing of Diverse Modernization and Global Psychologization', in Adrian C. Brock, ed., *Internationalizing The History of Psychology* (New York, 2006).

- Gülerce, Aydan ‘Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads ’, in David Baker, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 547-71.
- Gündüz, Mustafa, ‘Son Dönem Osmanlı Aydınlarında Yeni Birey ve Yeni Toplum’, in *Osmanlı Mirası Cumhuriyet’in İnşası: Modernleşme Eğitim Kültür ve Aydınlar* (Istanbul, 2010), pp. 188-218.
- Grogin, R.C., *The Bergsonian Controversy in France, (1900 – 1914)* (University of Calgary Press, 1988).
- Hall, Richard C., *Balkan Wars 1912 -1913: Prelude to the first World War* (London, 2000).
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, ‘Abdullah Cevdet Bey ve Fünun ve Felsefe’, in Abdullah Cevdet, *Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sanihaları*, transliterated by Ali Utku and Nevzat Yanık (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 11-29.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, *Atatürk, An Intellectual Biography* (New Jersey, 2011).
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1981).
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, ‘Blueprints for a Future Society: Late Ottoman materialists on science, religion, and art’, in Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy* (London, 2005), pp. 28-117.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, ‘Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic’, *Studia Islamica*, 86 (1977), pp. 133-58.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford, 2001).
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York, 1995).
- Hatfield, Gary, ‘Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science’, *University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-94-13*.
- Hearnshaw, Leslie S., *The Shaping of Modern Psychology* (London, 1987).
- Heidelberger, Michael, ‘Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner’, in Edward Craig, ed. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2 (London, 1998), pp. 48-51.
- Heyd, Uriel, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1950).
- Hobsbawm, E. J., *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (London, 1977).

- Hughes, H. Stuart, *Consciousness and Society: The Reconstruction of European Social Thought 1890-1930* (New York, 1961).
- Hurtado, Guillermo, 'The Anti-Positivist Movement in Mexico, in Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and Otávio Bueno', *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy* (Malden, 2010), pp. 82-95.
- Glick, Thomas F. and Engels, Eve Marie, eds., *Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe* (New York, 2008).
- Gül, Murat, *The Emergence of Modern Istanbul* (New York, 2009).
- Gülerce, Aydan, 'Turkey: A Case of Modernization at Historical, Political, and Socio-cultural Cross-roads ', in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology*, pp. 547-71.
- Iriye, Akira, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke, 2013).
- Islamoğlu, Huri, 'Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitution of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires', in Huri Islamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue, eds. *Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India and the Ottoman Empire* (New Delhi, 2009), pp. 109-47.
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, '19 yy. Başında Kültür Hayatı ve Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmiyesi', *Bellekten*, 51 (1987), pp. 801-20.
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, 'Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye'nin Kuruluş ve Faaliyetleri', *Osmanlı İlmi ve Mesleki Cemiyetleri* (Istanbul 1987), pp. 197-220.
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, *Darülfünun: Osmanlı'da Kültürel Modernleşmenin Odağı*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2010).
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, 'Darülfünun Tarihçesine Giriş: İlk İki Teşebbüs', *Bellekten*, 54/210 (1990), pp. 699-738.
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, *Tanzimat Öncesi ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışı, 150 Yılında Tanzimat* (Ankara, 1992), pp. 339-59.
- İlber Ortaylı, 'Eyüp'te Sanayi ve Çevre Kirlenmesi', in Tülay Artan, ed., *Eyüp: Dün/Bugün* (Istanbul, 1993), pp. 124-8.
- İsmail Kara, ed., *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler, Kişiler* (Istanbul, 1986).
- İrem, Nazım, 'Bergson and Politics: Ottoman Turkish Encounters with Innovation', *The European Legacy*, 16/7 (2011), pp. 873-82.

- İrem, Nazım, 'Bir Değişim Siyaseti Olarak Türkiye'de Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakarlık: Temel Kavramlar Üzerine Değerlendirmeler', in Ahmed Çiğdem, ed. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, V* (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 105-117.
- İrem, Nazım, 'Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34/1 (2002), pp. 87-112.
- İrem, Nazım, 'Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40/4 (2004), pp. 79-112.
- Jung, Carl G., *Psychological Types*, tr. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull, 6 vols. (Princeton, 1976).
- Kadioğlu, Ayşe, 'Milliyetçilik-Liberalizm Ekseninde Vatandaşlık ve Bireysellik', in Tanıl Bora, ed. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi, IV* (Istanbul, 2002), pp. 284-92.
- Kadioğlu, Ayşe, 'The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity', *Middle Eastern Studies* 32/2 (1996), pp. 177-193.
- Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem, 'Psychology in Turkey', *International Journal of Psychology*, 29/6 (1994), pp. 729-38.
- Kara, İsmail, 'Babanzade Ahmet Naim Bey'in Modern Felsefe Terimlerine Dair Çalışmaları', *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 4 (2000), pp. 189-279.
- Kara, İsmail, *Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak, Modern Felsefe ve Bilim Terimlerinin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (Istanbul, 2001).
- Kara, İsmail, *Din ile Modernleşme Arasında* (Istanbul, 2003).
- Kara, İsmail, 'Modern Türk Felsefesi Tarihinde Öncü Bir İsim Emrullah Efendi ve *İlm-i Hikmet* Dersleri', *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8 (2005), pp. 93-123.
- Karakuş, Rahmi, *Darülfünun'dan Üniversite'ye Türkiye'de Felsefe* (Istanbul, 2003).
- Kaplan, Mehmet, *Tevfik Fikret: Devir, Şahsiyet, Eser* (Istanbul, 2013).
- Kayral, Sami, *Türkçe Psikoloji Eserleri Bibliyografyası* (Istanbul, 1953).
- Kazancıgil, Ali, 'The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism' in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey* (London, 1981).
- Kenan, Seyfi, 'II. Meşrutiyet'le Gelen Yeni Eğitim Arayışları: Tevfik Fikret'in Yeni Mekteb'i ve Eğitim Felsefesi, in Zekeriya Kurşun, Cemil Öztürk, Yasemin Tümer Erdem, and Arzu Nurdoğan, eds. *100. Yılında II. Meşrutiyet: Gelenek ve*

- Değişim Ekseninde Türk Modernleşmesi Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 22 Ekim 2008 Bildiriler* (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 275-85.
- Kılıç, Rüya, *Deliler ve Doktorları: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Delilik* (Istanbul, 2014).
- Kılınçoğlu, Deniz T., *Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire* (London, 2015).
- Kırlı, Cengiz, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde 'Havadis Jurnalleri' 1840-1844* (Istanbul, 2009).
- Kırlı, Cengiz, 'Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire', in Setenay Shami, ed. *Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York, 2009), pp. 177-203.
- Köroğlu, Erol, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: literature in Turkey during World War I* (London, 2007).
- Kuntay, Mithat C., *Namık Kemal*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1944), ii-1.
- Lazar, J. Wayne, 'Brain Physiology and the Mind in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences*, 21 (2012), pp. 343-65.
- Lesch, John E., *Science and Medicine in France: The Emergence of Experimental Physiology, 1790-1855* (Cambridge, 1984).
- Mata, Joan Soler i, 'The Rousseau Institute of Geneva's influence on and presence in Catalan pedagogy in the first third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century', *Catalan Social Sciences Review*, 1 (2012), pp. 58-87.
- Mardin, Şerif, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* (Istanbul, 2008).
- Mardin, Şerif, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (Istanbul, 1991).
- Mardin, Şerif, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: a study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas* (New Jersey, 1962).
- Melton, Gordon, Theosophical Society, *New Age Encyclopedia* (Michigan, 1990).
- Moore, F.C.T., 'French Spiritualist Philosophy', in Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway, eds. *Nineteenth century Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order*, 8 vols, (New York, 2014), ii, pp. 161- 76.
- Millon, Theodore, *Masters of the Mind: Exploring the Story of Mental Illness from Ancient Times to the New Millennium* (New Jersey, 2004).
- Murphy, Rhoads, 'Ottoman Medicine and Transculturalism from the Sixteenth through the Eighteenth Century', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 66/3 (1992), pp. 376-403.

- Müezzinoğlu, Ersin, Doktor Abdullah Cevdet'in Samsun, Giresun, Ordu ve Trabzon Seyahat Notları, *Turkish Studies*, 7/3 (2012), pp. 1843-57.
- Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Our Selves: psychology, power and personhood* (Cambridge, 1996).
- Oğuz, Polat and Uysal, Cem, History of Forensic Medicine in Turkey, *Legal Medicine*, 11 (2009), pp. 107-10.
- Okay, M. Orhan, *İlk Türk Pozitivist ve Naturalisti: Beşir Fuad* (Istanbul 1969).
- Oktay, Ayşe S., *Kınalızade Ali Efendi ve Ahlak-ı Alaî* (Istanbul, 2005).
- Ortaylı, İlber, 'Istanbul in the Industrial Age', in Afife Batur, ed., *Dünya Kenti İstanbul – Istanbul World City* (Istanbul, 1996), pp. 54-8.
- Özavcı, Hilmi O., 'Differing Interpretations of la conscience collective and the Individual in Turkey Emile Durkheim and the Intellectual Origins of the Republic', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 75/1 (2014), pp.113-36.
- Özbaydar, Sabri, 'Cumhuriyet'in ilk 50 yılında Türkiye'de Psikoloji', *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılına Armağan* (Istanbul, 1973), pp. 219-22.
- Önsoy, Rıfat, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Katıldığı İlk Uluslararası Sergiler ve Sergi-i Umumî-i Osmanî', *Bellekten*, 47 (1983), pp. 195-235.
- Özdiñç, Rıdvan, *Akıllık, İrade Hürriyet: Son Dönem Osmanlı Dinî Düşüncesinde İrade Meselesi* (Istanbul, 2012).
- Özerveranlı, M. Sait, 'Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period: İzmirli İsmail Hakkı's Religious Thought Against Material Scientism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39 (2007), pp.77-102.
- Özerveranlı, M. Sait, 'Intellectual Foundations and Transformations in an Imperial City: Istanbul from the late Ottoman to the Early Republican Periods', *The Muslim World*, 103 (2013), pp. 518-34.
- Özil, Ayşe, 'Skyscrapers of the Past and Their Shadows: A Social history of urbanity in the late Ottoman Istanbul', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 21/1&2 (2015), pp. 75-94.
- Özsoy, Ergi D., Ömer Seyfettin'deki Darwin, *Cogito Darwin Devrimi: Evrim*, 60-61 (2009), pp. 359-65.
- Özturan, Parkan, ed., *İlk Türk Materyalist Beşir Fuad'ın Mektupları* (Istanbul, 1989).
- Özveren, Eyüp, 'Economic Agents, Rationality and the Industrial Setup: The Advent of Homo economicus in the Representations of Levant', *History of Economic Ideas*, 14/3 (2006), pp. 9-34.

- Özveren, Eyüp, 'Ottoman Economic Thought and Economic Polics in Transition: rethinking the nineteenth century', in Michalis Psalidopoulos and Maria Eugénia Mata, eds. *Economic Thought and Polics in Less Developed Europe* (London, 2002), pp. 129-45.
- Parot, Françoise, 'France' in David Baker, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 228-55.
- Plotkin, Henry, *Evolutionary Thought in Psychology: a brief history* (Oxford, 2004).
- Quataert, Donald, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908* (New York, 1983).
- Quataert, Donald, 'The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914', in Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, eds. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 759-945.
- Ramazanoğlu, Hasan L., ed. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İslam Düşüncesinde Arayışlar* (Istanbul, 1999).
- Rank, Otto, Richter, Gregory C., E., Lieberman, James, 'Psychology and the Soul', *Journal of Religion and Health*, 35/3 (1996), pp. 193-201.
- Ravetz, J. J., 'Criticisms of Science' in Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price, eds. *Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective* (London, 1977), pp. 71-89.
- Redhouse, James W., *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Constantinople, 1890).
- Reddy, William, *The Navigation of Feeling: a framework for the history of emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).
- Riley, Alexander T., 'Durkheim Contra Bergson? The Hidden Roots of Postmodern Theory and the Postmodern Return of the Sacred', *Sociological Perspectives*, 45/3 (2000), pp. 243-65.
- Ringer, Fritz K., *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).
- Roy Porter, *Flesh in the Age of Reason* (London, 2003).
- Schwarz, Hans, *Vying for Truth Theology and the Natural Science: From the 17<sup>th</sup> Century to the Present* (Göttingen, 2014).
- Shihadeh, Ayman, ed., 'The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought', *The Muslim World* 102/3-4 (2012), pp. 413-616.

- Shihadeh, Ayman, 'Al Ghazali and Kalam: The conundrum of his Body-Soul Dualism' in Frank Griffel, ed., *Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazali. Papers Collected on His 900<sup>th</sup> Anniversary*, 2 vols, (Leiden, 2016), pp. 113-41.
- Solomon Robert C. Midwest Studies, *Philosophy*, 22/1 (1998), pp.1-20.
- Somel, S. Akşin, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, autocracy, and discipline* (Leiden, 2001).
- Sluga, Glenda, *The Nation, Psychology and International Politics, 1870-1919* (New York, 2006).
- Staum, Martin S., *Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution* (New Jersey, 1980).
- Szazs, Thomas, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (New York, 1961).
- Şişman, Adnan, *Tanzimat Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri, 1839-1876* (Ankara, 2004).
- Taglia, Stefano, *Intellectuals and Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Young Turks on the challenges of modernity* (London, 2015).
- Tarhan, M. Taner and Akün, Ömer Faruk, 'Edebiyat Fakültesi', in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 10 (1994), p. 401.
- Taştan, Coşkun, ed. *Türkiye'de Psikanaliz Hakkında En Eski Metinler*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2011).
- Todes, Daniel P., *Pavlov's Physiology Factory: Experiment, Interpretation, Laboratory, Enterprise* (Baltimore, 2002).
- Türkeş, Mustafa, 'Kadro Dergisi', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm* (Istanbul, 2002), p. 464-76.
- Tunaya, Tarık Z., *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, I (Istanbul, 1998).
- Thomson, Mathew, *Psychological Subjects: Identity, Culture, and Health in Twentieth Century Britain* (Oxford, 2006).
- Thompson, E. P., *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966).
- Toprak, Zafer, '80. Yıldönümünde "Hürriyetin İlanı"(1908) ve "Rehber-i Ittihad"', *Toplum ve Bilim*, 42 (1988), pp. 157-173.
- Toprak, Zafer, 'Cihan Harbinin Provası: Balkan Harbi', *Toplumsal Tarih*, 10 (2002), pp. 45-6.
- Toprak, Zafer, *Darwin'den Dersime Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji* (Istanbul, 2012).

- Toprak, Zafer, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi* (Istanbul, 2001).
- Toprak, Zafer, Psikoloji’den Sosyoloji’ye Türkiye’de Durkheim Sosyolojisinin Doğuşu, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 238 (2013), pp. 22-32.
- Toprak, Zafer, ‘Psikoloji’den Sosyoloji’ye Türkiye’de Durkheim Sosyolojisinin Doğuşu’, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 238 (2013), pp. 22-32.
- Toprak, Zafer, *Türkiye’de Popülizm (1908 -1923)* (Istanbul, 2014).
- Truitt, E. R., *Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art* (Philadelphia, 2015).
- Turner, Frank M., *Between Science and Religion, The Reactions to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England* (London, 1974).
- Türesay, Özgür, ‘Spiritism in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1910’ (upcoming article).
- Uçman, Abdullah, ‘Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi’, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 38 (2010), p. 424.
- Uludağ, Osman Ş., *Tanzimat ve Hekimlik* (Istanbul, 1940).
- Uludağ, Zekerriyya, *Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi ve Spiritüalizm* (Ankara, 1996).
- Ülken, Hilmi Z., ‘Artist Mustafa Şekip’, *Mustafa Şekip Tunç Jübilesi* (Istanbul, 1944).
- Ülken, Hilmi Z., *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1992).
- Ünal, Hasan, ‘Ottoman Policy during the Bulgarian Independence Crises, 1908-9: Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria at the Outset of the Young Turk Revolution’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34/4 (1998), pp. 135-76.
- Üstel, Füsün, *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet’ten bugüne Türkiye’de vatandaş eğitimi* (Istanbul, 2004).
- Vassaf, Gündüz, ‘Turkey’, in A. R. Gilgen and C. Gilgen, eds., *International Handbook of Psychology* (Westport, 1987), pp. 486-7.
- Vesalius, Andreas, *On the Fabric of the Human Body*, tr. W. F. Richardson and J. B. Carman, 5 vols. (San Francisco, 1998-2009).
- Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London, 1992).
- Weber, Max, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston, 1971).

- Wigen, Einar, 'The Education of Ottoman Man and the Practice of Orderliness', in Margrit Pernau, et al., eds. *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 107-26.
- Williams, Elizabeth A., *The Physical and the Moral: Antropology, physiology, and philosophical medicine in France, 1750-1850* (Cambridge, 1994).
- Williams, Raymond, *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society* (New York, 1985).
- Wishnitzer, Avner, *Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Chicago, 2015).
- Yalçınkaya, Alper, *Learned Patriots: Debating science, state and society in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire* (Chicago, 2015).
- Yalçınkaya, M. Alper, 'Science as an Ally of Religion: A Muslim appropriation of the "conflict thesis"', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 44/02 (2011), pp.161-81.
- Yanıkdağ, Yücel, *Healing the Nation: prisinors of war, medicine and nationalism in Turkey, 1914-1939* (Edinburgh, 2014).
- Young, Robert M., *Darwin's Metaphor: Nature's Place in Victorian Culture* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 57-78.
- Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, 2004).
- Zürcher, Erik J., *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London, 2010).
- Zürcher, Erik J., 'Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought'.in Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy* (London, 2005), pp. 14-28.

### **Unpublished Theses**

- Alkan, Mehmet Ö., 'Siyasal Düşünce'nin Dünyevileşmesi: İlim'den Bilim'e Geçişin Kritik Evreleri Osmanlı Materyalizmi ve Baha Tevfik' (MA thesis, Istanbul University, 1988).
- Aykut, Ebru, 'Alternative Claims on Justice and Law: Rural Arson and Poison Murder in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Ottoman Empire' (PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011).
- Başaran, Filiz, 'Baha Tevfik'in Mecmuacılığı' (MA thesis, Niğde University, 2010).
- Creel, Frank W., 'The Program and Ideology of Dr. Abdullah Cevdet: a study of the origins of Kemalism in Turkey' (PhD thesis, The University of Chicago, 1978).

- Çöpel, Hatice, 'Celal Nuri İleri'nin Din Anlayışı' (MA thesis, Selçuk University, 2010).
- Ekici, Mehmet Z., 'II. Meşrutiyet Devri Fikir Adamı Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Hayatı ve Eserleri' (PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 1997).
- Gözütok, Tarık Tuna, 'Rifat Bin Mehmed Emin'in *İlmi Ahval-i Ruh ve Usul-i Tefekkür* Adlı Eserinin Türk Psikoloji Tarihindeki Yeri' (MA thesis, Ankara University, 2013).
- Hafez, Melis, 'The Lazy, the Idle, the Industrious: Discourse and Practice of Work and productivity in late Ottoman Society' (PhD thesis, The University of California, 2012).
- İleri, Nurçin, 'A Nocturnal History of Fin De Siècle Istanbul' (PhD thesis, Binghamton University, 2015).
- İrem, Nazım, 'Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist Conservatism' (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, 1996).
- Kasap, Sevilay, 'Sergi-i Umumî-i Osmanî, 1863' (MA, Marmara University, 2003).
- Uyanık, Seda, 'Osmanlı-Türk Anlatılarında Bilime Yönelişin Mantığı ve Gelecek Tasarıları' (19. Yüzyıl Sonu ve Erken 20. Yüzyıl) (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, 2011).
- Köse, Nihat, 'Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Öncesi Bazı Telif Psikoloji Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme' (MA thesis, Fırat University, 2013).
- Salgırlı, Sanem G., 'Eugenics as Science of the Social: A case from 1930s Istanbul' (PhD thesis, Binghamton University, 2009).
- Soyubol, Kutlughan, 'The Sciences of the Soul: The Emergence of Psy-sciences and the Modern State in Turkey' (PhD thesis, CUNY Graduate Center, 2016).
- Turan, Şeyma, 'Osmanlılarda İlk Modern Psikoloji Kitapları: (1869-1900)' (MA thesis, Marmara University, 2010).
- Ülman, Yeşim I., 'Journal de Constantinople'a Göre Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şahane'nin Galatasaray Dönemi' (MA thesis, Istanbul University, 1994).
- Yıldız, Yakup, 'Mustafa Şekip Tunç ve Felsefi Görüşleri' (PhD thesis, Marmara University, 2010).
- Poyraz, Serdar, 'Science versus Religion: The Influence of European Materialism on Turkish Thought, 1860-1960' (PhD thesis, The Ohio State University, 2010).
- Rasimoğlu, Ceren Gülser İlikan, 'The Foundation of a Professional Group: Physicians in the nineteenth century modernizing Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908' (PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2012).

Ülger, Mustafa, 'Hoca Abdülkerim Efendi'nin Felsefi Görüşleri' (PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2007).

### **On-line Reference Sources Consulted**

*Encyclopedia Britannica*

(<https://www.britannica.com/>)

*Encyclopaedia of Islam*

(<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2>)

*The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*

(<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430>)

*Oxford English Dictionary*

(<http://www.oed.com/>)

*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

(<http://plato.stanford.edu/>)