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LEBANON CASE

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
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ÖZET

Bu tez, Birleşmiş Milletlerin (BM) Lübnan'da UNIFIL adı verilen Barışı Koruma Harekâtında (BKH) karşılaştığı temel güçlükleri Çatışma Çözümleme "Conflict Resolution" teorisi yardımıyla tespit etmeye çalışmaktadır. Tez aynı zamanda, gelecekte icra edilecek BKH'ları için UNIFIL deneyiminden dersler çıkarmayı da hedeflemektedir.

Lübnan zorlu arazi yapısı, derin etnik ve dini çatışmaları, özellikle Suriye ve Israil'in süregelen askeri müdahaleleri göz önüne alındığında Orta Doğu'nun en sorunlu ülkelerinden biridir. Gayet iyi bilinmektedir ki, bölgede barışın tesisinde en önemli güçlük, tarafların uzlaşmayan taleplerinin yanı sıra, güçlü devletlerin çıkarlarının da yer aldığı Arap-İsrail çatışmasıdır. UNIFIL'in yardımlarıyla İsrail-Lübnan ilişkilerinde bazı gelişmeler kaydedilmesine rağmen, bölgedeki güvenlik durumu halen kalıcı bir barış için yetersizdir. Özellikle Mavi Hat (Blue Line) üzerinde hassas barış durumunun korunması için, İsrail Güvenlik Güçleri ve Lübnan Silahlı kuvvetleri arasında UNIFIL birliklerinin varlığına halen ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.

UNIFIL tecrübesi; diplomatik başarılar olmaksızın BKH'nın sadece geçici bir önlem olduğunu ve Lübnan gibi birbirini etkileyen pek çok problemin yaşandığı bir ülkede bu tip harekâtların başarılı bir sonuç sağlayamayacağını göstermiştir. O aynı zamanda, direniş veya terörist grupların aktif bir şekilde müdahil oldukları "devletlerarası" çatışmaların sona erdirilmesinde barışı koruma operasyonlarının yetersiz kaldığını da göstermektedir. BM bu tip çatışmalara BKH'ları ile müdahaleden kaçınmalı ve diğer Çatışma Çözüm yöntemlerini tercih etmelidir.

ABSTRACT

Under the light of Conflict Resolution theory, this study seek to address some of key challenges facing the United Nations peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Lebanon, which called UNIFIL. It also aims at drawing lessons from the experiences of UNIFIL for future PKOs.

Lebanon, with its challenging territory, deep-rooted ethnic and religious conflicts, and continuous military interventions especially from Israel and Syria, is one of the most difficult countries in the Middle East. It is well known that the most important obstacle for the establishment of peace in this region is the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which there are many the interests of the major powers, as well as incompatible demands of the parties. Despite some improvement in relations between Israel and Lebanon with the assistance of UNIFIL, the security situation in its area of operations still remains unsatisfactory for a durable peace. In order to maintain the delicate peace across the Blue Line, the presence of the UNIFIL troops between the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF), and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is still needed.

UNIFIL experience has shown us that without diplomatic breakthroughs, PKO is only a palliative measure and could not produce a successful outcome in Lebanon where many problems affecting each other. It has also pointed out that PKO is inadequate in terms of terminating interstate conflict in which different armed resistance or terrorist groups continue their fervent activity. The United Nations should avoid intervening in these types of conflicts by means of PKOs and prefer other Conflict Resolution methods.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

After World War II, the establishment of the United Nations (UN) seemed to be a promising beacon of hope for war-weary nations; a new center of the international community that would be capable enough to deal with all possible international disputes before they posed threats to international peace and security. However, the organization, which is based on the collective security system, did not operate as envisaged, due to Security Council rivalry that existed between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Hence, the concept of peacekeeping operations (PKO) was invented under the effect of the Cold War period. During the Cold War, proxy wars between small-power nations were triggered in order to thwart an irreversible nuclear war between the superpowers. Because of this, the power struggle between superpowers could have less expensive, safer way of exercising hostility, in lieu of direct conflict among them (such as the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Vietnam War, as well as the civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria). Ultimately, such proxy countries had to foot the bill and they had to endure all casualties and damages while the superpowers demonstrated a show of force on someone else's territory. The rivalry between the East and the West after World War II gave birth to biased or favorable governments in third countries on behalf of their own interests. These secret interventions continued as direct or indirect economic and military support by the superpowers (Wallensteen, 2004). Lebanon will be the focus of this dissertation hereinafter, as this nation is one of examples of these proxy nations.

Originally created by the Security Council in March 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was the 13th peacekeeping operation since the first truce monitoring mission was introduced in 1948, and has been one of the most challenging operations that has lasted nearly 40 years. What makes this operation stand out particularly within the international community is its ongoing complex and political structure stemming from both centuries old disputes among the parties as well as some historical western circumstances.

Many historians have acknowledged Lebanon as having significant importance in the region as a cradle of early civilization situated in the eastern Mediterranean. This small country includes all the features and controversies found in the Middle East. For example, Lebanon is not only home to diverse Christian and Moslem communities, but also many sectarian differences in each religion such as Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic on the Christian side and Druze, Shiite and Sunni on the Islamic side. The plurality of sectarian composition creates an enormous effect and pressure within the Lebanese Government as well as its other official functioning institutions. At first glance, besides ethnic diversity, religious and sectarian enmity and amity among them are the salient characters in this small country. All these sectarian factions are also able to acquire support from outside powers, turning Lebanon into a miniature model of Middle East conflicts. In addition to chronic confrontations between Christian and Moslem groups, internal strife amongst sects compounds problems in Lebanon. In the Lebanese Constitution, sharing power in the administration is realized according to the population's percentage or divisional majority of sects. Consequently, Lebanese democracy has been dysfunctional throughout its history. Besides Lebanon's economical weaknesses and unstable political structure, the lack of a strong national army has hindered it from

dealing with the internal and external threats that draw the country towards continued economic and political turmoil.

Many problems in Lebanon emanate not only from its flawed structure or from the inception of independent movements, but also from the early days of the Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. After the establishment of Israel, Arabs-Israeli wars caused hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugee to flow into neighboring Arab countries, including Lebanon. Palestinians that had to leave their lands never give up their struggle with Israel. In 1978, Palestinian militias from various refugee camps such as those located in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border, intensified guerilla attacks on Israeli territory. Israel's retaliated so severely that its army occupied almost all of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. In addition to high civilian casualties, schools, hospitals, roads, airports and other vital infrastructure in Lebanon was destroyed by Israeli bombardment and air raids during the operation.

Right after this development, the UN Security Council passed a resolution by which Israel was invited to unconditionally withdraw its military forces from southern Lebanon. Furthermore, the UN Security Council decided to deploy a peacekeeping force called UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon) to Lebanon in order to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli security forces and to restore the Lebanese Government's authority in this area. With the exception of a 10-km-wide security zone inside the Lebanese border, Israel withdrew its security forces from Lebanon three months after the Security Council resolution and control of the evacuated area was handed over to the UNIFIL peacekeeping forces. However, the presence of UN peacekeeping boots on the ground could not bring ultimate peace and security to the country as the power struggle amongst Lebanese groups and conflicts between Palestinian militia groups and Israeli Security Forces continued.

During the UNIFIL operation, the Palestinian militias gave up neither their continuous assault on Israel territory nor did the Israeli security forces halt their military attacks against targets in Lebanon. The Palestinian militia attacks had given the Israeli side justification for their retaliation on Lebanon. On the one hand, the huge destruction in Lebanon by careless Israeli bombardment caused great anger among the Christian community. They insisted the Palestinians were the ones responsible for all calamities happening in Lebanon, therefore, they wished them to be exiled from the country as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Moslem community generally supported the Palestinians as they considered the Palestinians an oppressed nation that was treated cruelly in their homeland, thus the Moslems in Lebanon felt obliged to provide them with vital support for their survival. Moreover, they complained about Israel's sloppy military actions, arguing these attacks were crimes against humanity and international law because it was a collective punishment. These uncompromising perceptions among the Lebanese community deepened the rift between Christians and Moslems, hence the escalation in conflict amongst their armed militia groups. This uncontrolled situation brought the country to the verge of secession.

The situation in Lebanon promptly drew the attention of the international community with different interests and attitudes, so the problem of a local conflict between two countries turned into an international dilemma. Most of the Arab world, especially Syria, Iran, Egypt and Jordan, the US, France and the UK were the first to be involved in the fray. Of course, the UN and the Security Council continued efforts to maintain peace in Lebanon through its peacekeeping forces and other diplomatic means. In addition to this international effort, Syria, through the Taif Accord and its close historical ties with Lebanon, eagerly accepted to deploy its military forces to

Lebanon as the part of Arab Deterrence Force to put an end to the clashes between the Christian, Moslem and Palestinian communities there. However, these initiatives from the international community could not bring sustained peace to Lebanon because of the inseparable Palestine problem in the Middle East.

In 1982, Israel retaliated militarily against Lebanon in response to the Palestinian attack on the Israeli Embassy in London. The Israeli Army transited through the UNIFIL's forces as it moved northwards to Beirut. However, this time, the situation on the ground was different, as Israeli forces faced more effective resistance from armed militia groups. As the Israeli military operation continued, the Palestinian militia and Hezbollah guerilla counterattacks leveled serious Israeli troops casualties, while neither the Lebanese Army nor Christian militia groups opposed these movements, preferring to use this turmoil and exploit the opportunity by enlarging their area of control rather than defending their country against the aggressor. Meanwhile, assassinations, kidnappings and bombardment continued unabated against prominent leaders, politicians, foreigners and international organizations. Furthermore, the armed militia groups also targeted UNIFIL forces in their area of operations, causing UN casualties with their artillery and mortar attacks.

When the Israeli Army sieged Beirut, many Palestinian armed groups and Syrian military forces (as part of the Arab Deterrence Force) were trapped in the city. When they resisted against the Israeli operation on the ground, heavy Israeli bombardment and air raids wreaked havoc on the city and vital infrastructure, thousands of civilian lives were jeopardized as well. With the mediation of the US, the parties agreed that the Palestinian militias would be evacuated from Beirut and allowed to move to other Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen. The operation was supervised under the auspices of the Multinational Peace

Force (MNF) comprised of different units from the USA, France and Italy. The evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas was conducted as planned, but later on, Israeli security forces entered West Beirut, thus violating the agreement by controlling unarmed Palestinian refugee camps rather than keeping away from the city. Unfortunately, defenseless refugee camps controlled by Israeli security forces were attacked by Lebanese Christian militia groups and more than 1,000 people were killed at the Sabra and Shatilla Camps. This tragic event plunged the country into new chaos and triggered flareups between Moslem and Christian groups.

Conflict between Christian and Moslem groups escalated once more prior to the presidential election of 1983. Realizing the security situation in Lebanon was deteriorating, President Gemayel persuaded the US to increase its military presence in Beirut as the overall situation steadily worsened and the maintenance of the peace agreement between the warring parties was practically impossible without support of powerful western countries, including the US. Gemayel asserted that these uncontrolled developments might provide the suitable opportunity for a Communist coup and persuaded the US to get involved. After US political pressure, Israel acceded to sign an agreement with Lebanon to withdraw its army from Lebanese territory providing that all Syrian military forces be withdrawn at the same time. With the invitation of the international community and fresh Security Council resolutions, Israel reluctantly withdrew its forces from Lebanon, with the exception of a 20 km-wide security zone on the Lebanese side.

With the support of the USSR, Syria did not admit to the withdrawal proposal, asserting they were not occupation forces like Israel; on the contrary, they were the part of the Arab Deterrence Force legally invited by the Lebanese Government. Israel did not wait any longer and began withdrawing its forces from Lebanon as a security

measure, then the new conflicts between the Christian and Moslem militia groups rekindled over control of areas evacuated by the Israeli forces. The withdrawal of Israeli forces did not bring peace to the Lebanon as clashes among rival groups continued. In October 1983, 241 American and 58 French soldiers of the Multinational Peace Forces were killed by a bomb attack on the MNF HQ. Considering these heavy casualties, the multinational peace forces were evacuated from Beirut.

New negotiations between Israel and Lebanon got underway in December, 1984 at the UNIFIL HQ under the observation of the UN. After this development, in February 1985, the issue was tabled at the bilateral negotiations between the US and the USSR as a part of traditional diplomatic means during the Cold War era. The same year, a peace agreement among the Shiite, Druze and Christian groups was made through the initiative of Syria, in which the equal representation of Moslem and Christian communities in the government was proposed. The civil war, which resulted from a rivalry in the Lebanese presidential election, ended in 1990 with Syrian help, thereafter the new Lebanese Government was reestablished to deal with problems and take control of the county.

After the collapse of the Israel-supported Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) and the pressure of Hezbollah forces, Israel withdrew its remaining troops from southern Lebanon in 2000. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wanted to increase the number of UNIFIL forces to control better its area of responsibility. The assassination of former Prime Minister Refik Hariri sparked huge anti-Syrian rallies in Lebanon in 2005, whereupon the new Lebanese Government called upon Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon completely. On March 17 of the same year, Syria withdrew 4,000 troops and set a date for its complete withdrawal. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah

entered Israel and captured two Israeli soldiers. In retaliation for the kidnapping, Israel launched a major military operation on Lebanon, which caused high civilian casualties, and severe damage to the country's vital infrastructure. After a 34-day war, a UN brokered ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel went into effect on August 14. UNIFIL deployed in Southern Lebanon to control the area from which Israeli security forces had withdrawn. The mission given to UN peacekeeping forces was to monitor military activities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces. Adopted on August 11, 2006, UNSC Resolution-1701 changed UNIFIL's mandate and rules of engagement. The resolution boosted UNIFIL strength from 2,000 to 15,000 personnel to assist the Lebanese Army in deploying and taking control of Southern Lebanon. In addition to fulfilling its original mandate, UNIFIL would monitor the cessation of hostilities and extend its assistance to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons. Moreover, the resolution encouraged and enabled peacekeeping forces to take all necessary actions, including opening fire, in their area of responsibility to protect the civilian population, UN personnel and facilities. UNIFIL has continued to perform its duties provided by UNSC Res.No.1701 up to the present.

In summary, as home to such internally and externally complex factors, Lebanon is unique and one of the most challenging countries in the Middle East, where a myriad of threats to international peace and security exist. Thus, the UN PKO is entering its fourth decade as it maintains its vital presence.

1.2. Statement of the Research Problem

The UN has been trying to mitigate international problems by means of diplomatic ways and PKOs before they become a serious threat to regions and to

international peace and security. The Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the case of Palestine, is known to be contagious and has spill-over effects to other Arab nations and Lebanon as well. While the UNIFIL operation has been conducted since 1978, it is unfortunate UN involvement has not brought durable peace to this country.

It should be noted that many important changes in the region and in the world have taken place during this 39 year-long UN mandate in Lebanon. For example; the Cold War ended, the USSR collapsed, some governments of neighboring Arab countries with close relations with Lebanon were toppled, and most importantly, the civil war in Syria is still ongoing. In spite of all these changes and the duration, the UNIFIL operation seems to have continued and some UNIFIL missions remain unaccomplished so far. This study tries to find an answer why the UN PKO in Lebanon has not brought peace to this country so far, despite the strong desire and efforts of the international community.

1.3. Objective of the Study

I have a hypothesis on the dissertation that UN should not intervene in a conflict in which uncontrolled armed groups are actively operating. If this conflict is intertwined with deeply rooted causes and regional problems, the expectation for peace through only a peacekeeping force is almost impossible. The purpose of the study is to confirm my hypothesis through the results derived from the analysis of the 39 years-long UNIFIL operation.

While providing a review of this unique peace operation in Lebanon, this study also aims to reach some conclusions and lessons learned which shed light for future PKOs. Furthermore, answers to subsequent questions will be analyzed; what may have been done to render the UNIFIL operation more efficient and effective, and

how this peacekeeping operation may have been conducted differently to reach the goals earlier which were spelled out in the UNIFIL charter. The operation in Lebanon can be used as a laboratory to decide what sort of PKO could better meet operational requirements for the success of similar UN involvement in the future. Therefore, the typology of this case study is constructed on the basis of its purpose.

1.4. The Significance of the Study

The distinctive characteristic of this study is the duration of the operation that spanned the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, therefore the differences in understanding the international security and collaboration between the East and West can be easily realized.

The incidents in Lebanon, including all of the conflicts and contradictions that existed concurrently in the Middle East, rendered it very difficult for this peacekeeping operation to overcome. Undoubtedly, the UN could easily handle all types of peace operations if it could only obtain a peacekeeping capacity and flexibility that would bolster the organization enough to deal with such formidable disputes. Hence, the conclusions and lessons learned from the UNIFIL operation is so important and valuable from a feedback standpoint.

Therefore, this study is expected to benefit researchers, scholars and decision-makers at the UN HQ in setting up a framework to overcome the challenges of UN PKOs in the future. Furthermore, this study is expected to contribute to the current knowledge of peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution. Finally, it is hoped that the conclusions would encourage further research and study in the area of UN PKOs.

1.5. Research Design

The study is well aware of the fact that the start of PKOs was based on events that occurred in the Middle East almost 70 years ago. The conflict that occurred in Lebanon in 1978 plunged the UN into a very complex international dispute and this continual UN involvement after almost 40 years does not seem that a lasting peace could not been realized in this country without the UN presence on the ground. To understand the problem better, the background and causes which brought about UN involvement into the conflict will be highlighted and analyzed. Furthermore, while the study tries to expose difficulties faced by the UNIFIL and common challenges to UN PKOs, it also proposes applicable strategies against these kind of challenges to ensure a sustainable peace by means of PKOs.

1.6. Instrument for Data Collection

The general instruments used for data collection were books, articles, magazines, journals, newspapers and the internet. Other specific instruments were; UN Security Council resolutions, representatives' comments and criticisms at the meeting of UN General Assembly, the Secretary General's letters, reports and recommendations as well as situation reports filed by the UNIFIL commander.

1.7. Reliability of Instruments

In order to ensure the validity of these instruments used for data collection, they are subject to scrutiny and are preferred to have been accepted by respectable academic circles. As information with indications and traces of bias or prejudice are eliminated, events are also crosschecked with different and independent sources for a fair assessment.

1.8. Method of Data Analysis

In addition to descriptive and comparative methods, the knowledge and data have been analyzed qualitatively to reach rational comments and conclusions. Decisions taken by the Security Council and their implementation by UNIFIL on the ground have been evaluated by considering that day's conditions and developments in Lebanon, the region and the world in general.

1.9. Scope of the Study

The scope of study encompasses the UN intervention in Lebanon after some serious developments that posed a threat to international peace and security. The common challenges and problems existing in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Palestine case as well as the perpetual internal conflict in Lebanon are beyond of the scope and the study has never aimed at finding solutions or making suggestions for such problems. The study purely and simply intends to point out what was done right, what was done wrong on this UN initiative by taking this particular case in Lebanon into consideration and put forward some recommendations to make PKOs more effective.

The study examines events and practices of the UN PKO in Lebanon between 1978 and 2010. Although this peacekeeping operation is still underway and seems to have become a routine UN operation, radical developments transpiring in its neighboring country, Syria as well as the region in general have had a crucial impact on Lebanon. As these developments have made it difficult to make a credible academic assessment, the study needed to be terminated in 2010.

1.10. Limitations

Although, researchers would have preferred to visit the country, case in point and to interview with relevant persons face-to-face, and to make one's own observations on the ground, but the general security situation is still risky in Lebanon to do this, especially for unprotected foreigners, therefore, the study was completed with these limitations.

1.11. Outline of the Study

After the **Introduction Chapter**, **Chapter Two** presents a framework for analysis of the problem, based on the theory of conflict resolution. In this chapter, the UN peacekeeping missions and their evolution from the past to the present are reviewed by considering their legal aspects. The balanced and essential theoretical explanations in this chapter will be used to advance the purposes of this dissertation. The Lebanon case is an instance of theoretically defined conflict models that may contribute to the construction and validation of theoretical propositions as well.

Chapter Three provides an overview on Lebanon and the causes of the conflicts which lead to UN involvement. In this section, the internal and external actors to the conflict and their ever-changing relations will be reviewed. **Chapter Four** uses a survey of operational experience in Lebanon from 1978 to the present. **Chapter Five** analyses the whole UNIFIL operation in the light of the concept for UN missions. The political and diplomatic background of the UNIFIL will be analyzed as well. In this chapter, the lessons learned from the 39-year-long PKO experience in Lebanon will be refined in terms of a number of significant failures as well as a

number of notable successes. **The Final Chapter** aims at reaching some conclusions and answers of how this peacekeeping operation could be conducted differently to accomplish the missions. What were the wrong methods should have been avoided for the success of the PKO in Lebanon.

2. CONCEPT AND TERMINOLOGY

This dissertation is a theory-guided case study, therefore a balanced and essential theoretical explanation will be used to advance the purposes of the study. In order to better understand the issues of the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Lebanon, which will be explained in the subsequent chapters, a sufficient essential knowledge will be provided on the theory of war, the concept of conflict resolution and the birth of the PKO and its evolution. In this chapter, a literary review about relevant concepts and theories will be made and the study will further highlight the evolution of the PKO on its long journey from emergence in 1948 to the present as the experience of 39-year-long peacekeeping operation in Lebanon includes not only features of the Cold War period but of the post-Cold War era as well.

2.1. Theory of Conflict Resolution

Although conflicts and wars have continued throughout history, the search for peaceful settlements in conflicts has continued as well. Once a conflict has transformed into war, the choices on the table become fewer and from that moment, the parties will pursue absolute victory rather than a solution (Wallensteen, 2004). However, there should be solutions which could satisfy parties in conflict without concurrent shame of defeat. A lot of politicians, scholars and researchers have sought to improve the knowledge of conflict, which helps us in deciding how to manage and resolve conflict (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & Zartman, 2009).

The emergence of the concept of conflict resolution into international politics dates back to the 1950's-1960's when the Cold War predominated the agenda almost everywhere in the world. As it is known, conflict can be described, in the most general sense, as violence behavior or hostile attitudes due to interfering interests

between parties over scarce resources. In addition to antagonistic interests surrounding political and economic issues among parties, historical and ideological hostilities also play an important role in conflict. As such, conflict resolution can be considered as the ability or ingenuity for producing a peaceful solution from such a desperate situation.

2.1.1. Theory of war and peace.

In the most general sense, war is violence which kills people, destroys resources or culture of nations, ruins the environment and traumatizes communities (Levy & Thompson, 2011). What else could be worse than this? However, human beings have long experience with wars and conflicts which occur amongst individuals, groups, communities and nations as well (Fetherston, 1994). Meanwhile, war is assumed one of the oldest problem-solving methods throughout history. However, as Kenneth N. Walts points out that wars resemble earthquakes, with no victors in the end. Therefore, the ultimate purpose should be reaching a jointly established, viable peace. Most of cases have showed us that, after horrible consequences and destruction of war, only hostility and hatred remain, rather than triumph or pride amongst the warring groups. On the contrary, peace means prosperity, relief and safety for individual, societies and nations. Therefore, accomplishing a peaceful settlement of an international dispute before experiencing the suffering of war is more important than gaining an absolute victory.

Philosophers, scholars and leaders suggest numerous ideas and theories that explain the causes of war and propose remedies for the maintenance of peace. Some of them tried to find the causes of war in human nature, distribution of resources, environmental factors, types of societies, kind of governments, and the mechanism of international systems. The extensive debates go on for centuries whether human

beings are naturally competitive or compromising. J.W. Burton argued that the absence of basic human needs was one of the main reasons for all kind of conflicts.

Some of the theories that explain the mechanism of conflict, assume that conflict is contingent and it depends on the existence of some incidental conditions. One of these, contingency theory, explains the relationship between violent behavior and the environment in which people live. If the negative factors of the environment disappeared, violent human tendencies in conflict could be removed as well (Fetherston, 1994). With a similar view, the contingency theory accepts that the elimination of violence in conflict could be accomplished by regulating environmental factors and putting different aspects of the environment forward for consideration. Meanwhile, the inherency theory predicts that communities and groups inevitably tend towards violent conflict because of invariable environmental factors.

Nicholas J. Spykman was another scholar who attempted to explain the state's actions through human behavior, arguing that "International relations are relations between individuals belonging to different nations… international behavior is the social behavior of individuals or groups aimed at… or influenced by the existence or behavior of individuals or groups belonging to a different state."

Realism is one of the prominent and long-lasting dominant theories of international politics which explain the causes of war and consider war as something impossible to avoid in interstate relations.

The realist theory asserts that nations are the only players in the international system. According to realists, the main cause of war is an anarchic nature of international politics because there is no higher authority above the nations to regulate their relations. Within the anarchic international arena, one party reacts to what

another party is doing, which causes counter actions, eventually leading to escalate a conflict (Wallensteen, 2004). This accelerating cycle inevitably leads nations to war. In this anarchic environment, none of the nations are safe so they seek ways to be safe. The simple answer to this question is to maximize relative power over other nations because only power can provide security over other nations, which is the best way of guaranteeing survival. Being stronger is a relative situation in which others must be weaker than you, hence they strive to increase their power, leading to an endless competition for power among nations. Nations struggle not only to become the most powerful actor in the international arena, but also to ensure no other nation can attain such a position. Realists argue that nations always consider each other as rivals, therefore they are pessimist on the expectation for international cooperation. They are prudent, suspicious, and respectful of the lessons learned from history (James & Robert, 2001). Naturally, conflicts and wars are inevitable results of such a competitive international environment. Although cooperation between nations seems difficult to achieve, they cooperate by forming temporary alliances against common enemies. Kenneth Waltz argues that nations operate in a self-help system in which they can rely on no one but themselves for security. However, the self-help idea seems almost impossible for most nations, thereby they are in search of forming alliances, according to their common interests. Of course, these alliances are established for a limited time only because nations' interests are always changing and today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy or vice versa.

In an anarchic international system, nations with strong offensive military potential may easily resort to this capability to solve disputes with other nations because this is the easier and faster way for powerful ones. Moreover, nations cannot trust each other and cannot be certain of the real intention of other nations.

Considering the impossibility of establishing a reliable and transparent information system among nations, it is likely that nations may miscalculate or misinterpret the intention of their adversary that fosters suspicions. They regard each other with suspicion and indeed, they fear each other in this unreliable international system. These assumptions can influence state decision makers to behave aggressively and hastily in order to hurt or destroy their potential adversary at the first opportunity. In an international environment pictured like this, it seems reasonable to argue that interstate relations mainly tell us stories of war rather than peace.

Despite the realist assumption that conflict and war are inevitable among nations, numerous thinkers and scholars have opposing ideas that there are many plausible ways to prevent war and maintain peace in the international system.

One of these is the critical theory, which denies the realist view about the self-centered behavior of the state. The critical theory does not care about whether human beings are good or bad, instead, they believe people are variable. Critical theorists assume that individuals have “software programs” in their heads which direct them how to think and behave. To alter the mindset, they argue it is possible to replace the realist software package with a new one that includes communitarian norms, thus nations could cooperate with each other (Mearsheimer, 1994). The core view of the critical theory is based on the concept of the institution. As indicated by Alexander Wendt, the aim of the critical theory is to establish an international system in which nations feel themselves as an indispensable part of a rational whole. In essence, they hope to establish an international community where nations behave in a way based on common norms or institutions that support collective security (Lebow, 1994). They believe that the state can relinquish thinking and acting within the frame of realism by changing the regulative norms of the system. The critical concept aims at creating a

world in which it is possible to realize peace other than close cooperation among nations. According to the critical theory, a state's behavior can be altered from prejudiced realist perspective by changing how we think and how we discuss about world politics. They want to transform the international system into a world society where incentives for nations consist of norms of trust rather than self-interests. The critical theorists believe that realist understanding can be made passive by challenging its discourses and undermining its justifications. Thereafter, it will be possible to create a viable peace system by designing a future society that is to be the end goal of change. Considering the pessimist nature of realism which has no prospect of preventing war, Cox (1987) argues that "the aim is to seek out contradictions within the existing order, since it is from these contradictions that change could emerge" (p. 393). Furthermore, all nations are aware that the security of each state is the responsibility of all nations, hence nations would not act in their own self-interests. In this new community, nations believe that national interests are international in nature, thereby, members of the community would not fight each other. Instead, they prefer to settle disputes in other peaceful ways.

Like realism, liberalism assumes that the international system is anarchic and its main players are the self-interested nations. Nevertheless, they do not assume that a supranational authority is the only way by which to enforce rules over nations, hence security can be guaranteed by means other than power. However, liberalist theories argue that international institutions can realize international cooperation and regulate the international system via liberal democratization, liberal economic interdependence and liberal institutionalism. Rather than address directly the important question of how to prevent war, liberal institutionalism explains the reasons and advantages of cooperation among nations. Many policymakers and academics

believe that this institution seems promising to enhance international peace and stability. Cooperation among nations in dealing with economic, political and environmental issues is a successful way to provide benefit for partners and to reduce the possibility of war. However, the theory has little to say directly how to enhance the international security rather; it prefers to point out what incentives, benefits and interests they can get from this cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994). According to American political scientist John Mearsheimer, economic liberalism and free trade politics are the source of prosperity, so wealthy nations become more peaceful. They tend to reinforce international peace and cooperation for prosperity. In a similar way, confidence in democratic norms and values makes war almost impossible for democratic nations because leaders in democracies are constrained by the separation of powers and additionally citizens and NGOs have a serious effect on the decision of war. Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions not only constitute centers of cooperation among nations, but also have important roles for international stability. Nevertheless, considering the anarchic nature of the international system and nations' self-centered manner, liberal institutionalists do not want to deal directly with assailants and victims by changing fundamental norms of state behavior (Keohane, 1988). Instead, they prefer to show how rules can work to deal with the cheating problem while maximizing nations' gains and welfare. Rule structures can raise the amount of information to parties in the system so that they can take protective measures against a potential risk in advance. In summary, the liberalist theory does not provide a substantial basis for understanding the international system and is insufficient in dealing with security and military issues. This liberalist theory was proved inadequate in international relations for maintaining peace and preventing World War II.

2.1.2. The quest for perpetual peace.

As defined by Dixon, conflict is a universal and inevitable feature of social life. If it is so, conflict must be channeled within a set of norms that fosters discussions of difference and proscribes violence as a means settling disputes (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009).

The thought of preventing wars and averting their grief and destruction has kept philosophers, scholars and leaders busy for centuries. They have strived for solutions by explaining the ways of decreasing the possibility of war and increasing the chance of peace. Indeed, efforts for understanding the nature of conflict are quite old and go back to antiquity.

The works of Dante were based on the idea that the creation of unified Christian nations may provide suitable conditions for preventing wars and maintaining durable peace (Ackermann, 1999). In his book published in 1306, French lawyer and intellect Pierre Dubois pointed out that the establishment of a permanent advisory board amongst sovereign princes in Europe could provide peace and prevent wars. While French author Emeric Cruce (1590-1648) called for a perpetual assembly of princes to arbitrate interstate disputes with the authority to take sanctions and enforcement measures, another French writer, Charles Irenee Castel de Saint Pierre (1658-1743) proposed an international organization (a European Confederation) for maintaining peace and security. Influenced by Charles Irenee Castel's work, the famous French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), wrote an essay entitled 'Perpetual Peace' (1761). In it, Rousseau laid out the necessary conditions and functions for the success of this federation in Europe. In his book, German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) pointed out that an alliance between sovereign nations could maintain perpetual peace by means of universal democracy

and international cooperation. In his book A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace, which was published posthumously, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) made a similar suggestion to lay out a perpetual treaty among all nations in Europe to reduce military forces and establish a common court for resolving international disputes.

These aforementioned intellectual developments have been put into practice more or less, paving the way for the realization of international cooperation to maintain peace and security. Originally, the idea of an international organization was based mainly on the set of Christian tenets and essential normative values derived from the French Revolution. However, universal humanitarian values and democratic rights came to the forefront later on and they eventually took precedence over sovereignty.

War and peace are the significant points of interest that bind interstate relationships. The general peace accord which was negotiated to a great extent in Westphalia after the destructive 30 Years' War laid the foundation of a new anti-hegemonial commonwealth of nations. The peace treaty of Westphalia established the legal basis of modern statehood and essential rules of modern world politics (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). Almost all scholars of international relations arrive at the consensus that the emergence of sovereign nations onto the scene of history began with the Westphalian state system in 1648. In order to maintain relationships among nations and sustain international collaboration, sovereign nations became the main independent actors of the international system. Through this agreement, all rulers and princes in Europe recognized each other's right to rule their own territory, free from external interference. It also limited their political power within territorially delimited states. The Westphalian treaties manifested some key principles of the new society of nations which was jointly endorsed by the participants (Watson, 2003). These are: 1)

the principle of the sovereignty of nations[1] 2) the fundamental right of political self-determination 3) the principle of legal equality between nations 4) the principle of non-intervention of a state in the internal affairs of another state. The overall ideas of the new Westphalian order influenced the subsequent settlements foundations and principles of both the League of Nations and United Nations. Although the UN Charter modified the Westphalian system, state sovereignty could preserve its basic ground in international politics. Nonetheless, with the growing impact of globalization, the idea of sovereignty and its real life implementation started to be questioned after the second half of the 20th century. Globalization encourages scholars and policymakers to redefine the concept of Westphalian sovereignty because it impedes international initiatives for addressing supranational conflicts and tragedies (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Although the new perspective in regards to state sovereignty already respects sovereign powers and national governments with their authority to rule within their own territorial space, the concept of sovereignty is being transformed. Scholars and thinkers opened this concept up for discussion. According to them, sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct for states and the international community should not be a mere spectator to genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing within a failed state. In the globalizing world, some normative values such as human rights, human security, identity and minority rights are gaining importance. Moreover, a new form of internal conflicts which also pose a threat to international peace and security, require different conflict resolution methods rather than traditional ones. The struggle between Westphalian and post-Westphalian concepts is ongoing because this issue is closely relevant as to whether the security of

[1] Sovereignty means a state or government has an entitlement to supreme, unqualified and exclusive political and legal authority within its border. There are three noticeable features on the definition; a term of Supreme, there was no legal or political authority over the state. Unqualified means that rulers within the territory had complete authority over their vassal. Exclusive, in so far as no ruler had the right to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other nations.

state or the security of universal humanitarian values should be given priority (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2010). Every nation has a different idea of sovereignty. Some of them do not allow eroding the concept of state sovereignty with the Westphalian perspective while others tend to be in favor of the post-Westphalian aspect for maintaining better international peace and security. Although no consensus exists among nations on this issue, the post-Westphalian approach tends to be more preferred. After the international community's failure to respond to tragedies that occurred in intrastate conflicts, the notion of the 'Responsibility to Protect' was proposed as an item for the UN's agenda. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out in his report in 2000, "if humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to a gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?." The post-Westphalian supporters have argued that sovereignty is not an absolute right and some nations may misuse this claim when they fail to protect its citizens from mass atrocity crimes and human right violations. Five years later, the African Union declared it had the right to intervene in a member state where organized war, crime, genocide and crimes against humanity were committed systematically. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report with a radical redefinition of state sovereignty. The report defined that sovereignty is not only a right, but also a responsibility for the state to protect its people from of human rights violations. If a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, said responsibility should be transferred to the international community as an international responsibility. In such cases, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures authorized by the Chapter VII of the UN Charter through economic sanctions and

military intervention. However, military intervention is an exceptional measure and must have some additional criteria.[2]

The ICISS report was unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit; over 150 UN member states have acknowledged their responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide and mass atrocities, and take steps to prevent such crimes (Bellamy et al. 2010).

2.1.3. Concept of Conflict Resolution

In his book Jim Wallis (1994) states that "War is a decision to go for victory rather than resolution. Peacemaking is an attempt to resolve the source of the conflict and restore a situation of balance, thereby eliminating the need for victory and defeat" (p. 205).

Although the quest for finding a way to bring conflict under control and resolve or manage disputes is quite old, the concept of conflict resolution is the relatively young political science that has a close relationship with psychology, sociology and international relations, which began to emerge in the 1950s (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk & Zartman, 2009). Considering the tremendous destructive impact of nuclear weapons, the East-West contention in that period was so high, that the existence of Mankind was in jeopardy. Essentially, conflict resolutions benefit from the outcome of contemporary peace research, which sets out to highlight the causes of war and finds ways to eliminate the violence (Wallensteen, 2004).

[2] Just cause: there must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or likely to occur". Last resort: all other measures besides military intervention have already been taken into account but only military action seems to work in that situation. Right intention: the main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering. Proportional means: military means must not exceed what is necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. Reasonable prospects: the chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention. Right authority: the military action must be authorized by the UN Security Council.

A preliminary definition of conflict resolution and its outstanding features will be put forward first before proceeding further. The term *conflict* is derived from the Latin word *confligere*, which means 'to strike together' (Bercovitch et al., 2009, p. 4). Conflict is the result of opposing interests involving scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration. A conflict has generally been defined as a situation in which two or more parties strive to acquire the same resources simultaneously. Conflict is a perception of incompatibility between two or more actors and the range of behavior associated with such perceptions (Bercovitch, & Jackson, 2009). As reported by Bercovitch et al. (2009) L. C. Coser points out that "conflict is a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals" (p. 4). Common points in the aforementioned definitions of conflict are; parties moving against each other, and that is not a hidden action that must be performed overtly with violence or coercive behavior, and issues in conflict that tell us what the conflict is about.

Prejudices or miscommunication between parties are other factors that most likely cause a conflict with regard to their needs, goals or interests, thus it can be said that conflict can be managed and resolved without violence. Although all conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved, how to manage or control a conflict can be learned as it is a field of scientific research. Certainly, one of the most important scholars in this area is M. Deutsch, whose countless research studies have tremendous value to the science. His concept is vital in understanding the processes in conflict that create the effect of cooperation and rivalry between parties. As defined by Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus (2011), all human beings have an instinct to act positively towards situations that are beneficial and move away from those that are harmful (p. 25). According to the situation, human beings tend to take a cooperative attitude towards

their loved ones and competitive behavior to those they hate, of course love and hate are closely related to perceptions of actors in conflict. Bercovitch et al. (2009) argues there is a strong correlation between perception and attitude. They state that attitudes are determined by a person's perception and conform to his image of his surrounding environment: "what they see may appear veridical, but in reality it is only so because their needs, values, expectations and cognitive processes create the world which they perceive" (p. 8). This mental process has an important effect on the parties' decisions about how they see and understand the dispute in conflict. As is indicated above, perception is abstract rather than tangible so it can be changed depending on the conditions and time. If the parties' perception can be altered with the involvement of third parties, their competitive or uncompromising attitudes may also be changed into cooperative ones, this is the way in which third parties have expectations to come up with a solution for peace. This is the departure point for the conflict resolution.

Generally speaking, conflicts and wars are characterized by chaos, disturbances, turmoil and animosity between two or more entities which are engaged in mutually hostile actions to harm or control each other (Harvey and Mor, 1998). Behind every decision of conflict is a logical calculation made by the actors. Before escalating a dispute into conflict, they need to make a loss-and-gain analysis. One side makes a calculation for starting violence with the expectation of victory while the other side evaluates its defending capability against this attack. As time passes and the offensive side is unable to win the war, its initial calculation needs to be revised because the expected advantages from victory are reduced as the cost of war increases, making the war difficult to continue (Wallensteen, 2004). If the party feels that a chance of victory is fading away as time goes by and the conflict turns into a 'hurting stalemate' for both sides, it means an appropriate time for resolution is

imminent. They do not want to endure any more destruction and sacrifice for naught, hence this situation is likely to be ripe for a change of attitude from conflict to conciliation. Nonetheless, the parties in conflict cannot accomplish this transition on their own, so third-party involvement is essential at this point. If a ceasefire agreement between the parties can be realized, the third-party will offer more convenient conditions for conflict termination initiatives and besides, parties will have an opportunity to re-evaluate the situation in detail.

Before proceeding any further, it will be best to provide some definitions of conflict resolution. A conflict resolution is when conflicting parties resolve to live together in peace, and/or solve their main incompatibilities and decide to refrain from use of force and violence against each other through an agreement (Wallensteen, 2004). Micheal Lund (1996) points out that conflict resolution should focus on the effort to increase cooperation between parties by addressing the underlying incompatibilities in conflict, fostering mutual trust and finding a way to keep them interacting. The key elements in his definition are to enhance the possibility of cooperation and to promote mutual trust by keeping the lines of communication open. In most cases, the parties in conflict cannot create a suitable climate for conflict resolution on their own, therefore a third-party involvement is the *sine qua non* of conflict resolution.

Usually, parties in conflict with incompatible positions may resort to violence for imposing demands on their opponent by injuring or destroying each other. In such cases, the first thing to do regarding conflict resolution is to impose some priority measures to eliminate or reduce violent. The means of conflict resolution may be conducted by parties in a conflict or by third parties with no profit or interest to intervene, in order to remove or reduce violence and to achieve consensus on

important conflicting issues. A political agreement on a acceptable joint solution between the parties that aims at ending the violence, or holding of a series of dialogue meetings, or the reduction of hostile acts can be seen as measures of success of the process (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009). Bercovitch et al. (2009) point out that conflict resolution is about methods that can improve the understanding of conflict, help in reducing violence, and enhance the chance of success of the political effort to harmonize interests. As such, conflict resolution is a helpful effort which aims to protect and improve both human life and essential resources. At the same time, it can demonstrate that conflicting goals can be attained by making the goals of parties compatible to each other without resorting to violence. The conflict resolution methods are capable of revealing that the conflicting actors and outsiders with goodwill can find there are alternative ways to accomplish reconciliation between parties rather than the use of armed forces. However, parties in conflict cannot see the existence of other options that may satisfy them for their aims. Therefore, they may need help from third parties that have no stake or interest in getting involved in such conflict. Third parties can provide actors with convenient conditions which they can review the situation and make rational calculations that may facilitate the resolution process to terminate said conflict.

As defined by the normative political theory, conflict is a competitive struggle in which there can only be one victor. On the contrary, the need-based conflict resolution theorists developed a cooperative approach to conflict resolution, focusing on fundamental human needs. The characteristics of issues in conflict have important effects on producing solutions in the process of conflict resolution, for example: if a recommended solution could produce almost equal rewards for both actors, which is called the *win-win* conflict model (A wins, B wins), in which conflict is minimum.

Meanwhile, conflict will be maximum when reward for one actor comes at the expense of the other (A wins, B loses), we called it the *zero sum* conflict model. It could be easily expected that cooperation or compromise between actors is very limited or impossible with the *zero sum* model of conflict as only one side gains a victory, while the other side will suffer defeat in this competition. Of course, the conflict models are not limited to these two types, when rewards in conflict are not equal for each party, some additional motivation would encourage them for cooperation, such as another reasonable gain in exchange for the other side's reward, existence of common interest, and acceptable benefits from the main profit (Bercovitch et al., 2009). The ultimate goal of the conflict resolution is to bring about a permanent solution to the conflict by addressing the root causes of the dispute. By taking the formation of solution into consideration, it can be argued that the process is not a unilateral enforcement for a course of action, but rather for jointly shaping a solution with the participation of all relevant parties.




Figure 1. Analysis of Incompatibility (Wallensteen, 2004, p. 37).

Conflict resolution paints a clear picture in which the fighting parties can reach an agreement that solves the underlying causes of conflict, mutually ends all

violent actions so parties accept each other's existence in peace. Mitchell's conflict model consists of three parts: attitude, behavior and situation that interact and create conflict between actors (Mitchell, 1989). His conflict model simplifies the complex interactivity among the components of the triangle in understandable way (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005).

Bercovitch (2009) has also underlined the importance of psychological factors in conflict called attitude, which defines the actors' determining tendencies and reactive ways in the situation. Meanwhile, Galtung argues that conflict is not a static situation, but a dynamic process in which components constant change and influence each other (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011). Galtung articulates the relationships among conflict, violence and peace by using three overlapping and integrated triangles which make it easy to comprehend (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011).

In his first triangle, comprised of contradiction, attitude and behavior, he points out how escalation and de-escalation situations depend closely on changes of these three elements. Conflicting parties struggle to pursue their interests by organizing around this structure. As they advance their hostile attitudes and conflicting behavior, the intensity of the level of conflict changes accordingly. The second triangle explains the distinction between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. The last triangle indicates peace endeavors such as peace building, peacekeeping and peacemaking in return for violence. Galtung has also preferred to define peace under two categories, the first one is 'negative peace,' the end of a direct violence situation, the other one is 'positive peace,' in which structural and cultural violence have been overcome successfully.

It is generally accepted that conflict is not a static situation but rather a dynamic process in which intensity levels of violence constantly change over a conflict's life cycle. Of course, there is a close relation between the intensity level of violence in conflict and the method of conflict resolution to be implemented. In parallel with the phases of conflict, conflict resolution techniques must be differed accordingly. As indicated by Bercovitch et al. (2009), conflict resolution would be in different types of actions, according to the phases of conflict such as prevention, management, resolution, and transformation. Moreover, A.B. Fetherson also explained the four major strategies under conflict management; avoidance, prevention, settlement and resolution (Fetherstone, 1994).

As explained by Fetherston (1994), conflict resolution is a strategy of non-coercive third-party intervention in order to terminate violence in favor of all parties in conflict. The outcome of this intervention should address the underlying problems and accomplish some degree of satisfaction for the parties. There are some roles for interveners which would be categorized with regard to the outcome of the intervention.

Mediation is the most common form of third-party role for conflict settlement. For successful intervention, parties should be eager to accept an offer of help from third-parties to settle their conflict or resolve the incompatibilities between them without the use of force (Bercovitch et. Al., 1991). The goal of mediation is to reach an agreement with the parties in which negotiations can begin. Generally, respectable and credible persons for both sides, high rank officers, political leaders, statesmen or unbiased international institutions, such as UN, are convenient for mediation between conflicting parties in order to help them resolve dispute or make a settlement.

Negotiation is another third-party intervention which is based on face-to-face interaction with the parties in conflict. It is a friendly dialog with disputants to get beneficial outcomes, to gain some mutual advantages and to overcome the problem by satisfying their interests. Parties in conflict who defy and distrust each other do not have good mood for negotiation therefore a third-party has to involve in their dispute as negotiator. Negotiator listens to each side's claims and tries to arrange a new combination of their common or complementary interests.

Conciliation is another means of conflict resolution. As it is defined by van der Merwe, when parties are unable or unwilling to come together to negotiate the issues between them, conciliation is useful tool to facilitate exchange, to suggest possible solutions and to assist them in reaching a mutual agreement (Fetherstone, 1994). Conciliator can meet with parties separately or together to resolve differences in their arguments. He/She tries to improve communication by interpreting issues differently, encourages them to explore possible solutions and to give them support in finding a mutually acceptable outcome. In academic circles, there are different views about whether conciliator should propose non-binding alternatives for settling the dispute or not.

Consultation is another means of third-party intervention which enables parties to handle their problem in a positive way. It occurs in the form of problem-solving work-shops, in which consultant works with parties to improve communication, point out basic discrepancies and facilitate finding for a jointly acceptable solution. Meanwhile, facilitation is a process of improving communication by which parties develop understanding each other and issues in conflict. Contrary to conciliator, facilitator is not supposed to suggest solutions for conflict.

The parties to a dispute retain decision-making authority in the means for the settlement of international disputes mentioned above. They may accept or refuse a proposed settlement according to their own evaluation. Meanwhile, arbitration and judicial settlement have a binding effect over parties because they accept the decision authority of applied post in advance. Parties in dispute have to set up the procedure of arbitration to handle their debate. However, the İnternational Court of Justice or other standing tribunals, pointed out and accepted by the parties, have the authority of decision on dispute.

After getting over the obstacles of the Cold War, the UN has established some measures to strengthen implementation of the Conflict Resolution which include new sanctions, and enforcement measures. These instruments have significantly contributed to success of peace process.

Over time, scholars and researchers put forward numerous conflict models but a number of them which supported empirically, appeared to stand out. The notable common feature of these models is that conflict is portrayed as cyclical in terms of its intensity. In general, conflict is a reoccurring cycle, like a sinusoidal wave that escalates from stable peace into war, thereafter it de-escalates into relative peace (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005). When we look at upside-down "U" conflict curve, escalation and de-escalation phases can be easily seen by dividing it into two main parts.

Taking into account the variation of strategies in both groups, some measures must be taken prior to conflict while others can be implemented after conflict. What is important here is to decide correctly about when, how and which kind of measures and strategies for conflict resolution should be implemented. As it is obviously clear

that, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution are the strategies that applicable in different phases of a conflict. On one hand, conflict prevention measures are more convenient for the early phases prior to violence has become obvious. Preventive measures are designed to resolve, contain and manage conflict so that dispute do not escalate into violence. Meanwhile, conflict management measures come into play, after conflict has become open, to limit, mitigate or contain a conflict without solving it. As indicated by W.Zartman, conflict management efforts should go towards eliminating violent actions and reducing its intensity to be dealt with on the political level that means, conflict management creates the basement for efficient conflict resolution. Conflict resolution could also be applied in all phases; right after conflict is manifest, including the de-escalation phase. Therefore, it can be said that conflict management and conflict resolution are different concepts but they are closely interrelated, so both of them can be used to handle same conflict but at different phases (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005).

A conflict cycle model presented below illustrates conflict process and conflict prevention, management and resolution measures in the same composition (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005). As it is noted, the conflict curve rises from stable peace to conflict, thereafter war (escalation phase) and it starts to descend from climax of conflict to relative peace (de-escalation phase).

2.1.3.1. Conflict Cycle Model.




Figure 2. Conflict cycle model (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005, p. 37).

On the left side of the model are five levels of conflict intensity (stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis phase and war phase) and whole process is also divided into nine phases (structural prevention, direct prevention, conflict management, crisis management, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, conflict management, peace building and peace consolidation). In the escalation phase, the pattern ascends from stable peace up to war, whereas, the diagram is reversed in the following de-escalation phase, shifting from war to stable peace. Throughout the pattern, prevention, conflict management, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building, and peace consolidation measures are implemented gradually in parallel with the intensity of violence in crisis.

Conflict prevention measures are applied before the onslaught of conflict because the aim here is to prevent a conflict from occurring in the first place. Preventive measures are implemented to reduce tension and create trust between the

actors. Sanctions, coercive limitations and diplomatic initiatives are other preventive measures that could be used as well.

Conflict management can be applied to reduce tension and prevent further escalation when a violent conflict is assumed likely. In this stage, involvement of regional and international institutions such as the UN, NATO, the EU or the AU may provide positive results.

What is certain is that conflict has progressed through several stages. Although the stages can differ from case to case, there is consensus regarding the main stages of a conflict and the strategy should be applied accordingly. This partition can be categorized as follows:

STAGE	STRATEGY
Pre-violence	Conflict prevention
Escalation	Crisis/Humanitarian intervention
Endurance	Peacemaking and relief work
De-escalation	Peacemaking and peacekeeping
Post-violence	Peace-building/transformation

Figure 3. Stages and strategies of a conflict. (Ryan, 2000)

Conflict prevention is the deployment of a UN preventive force to a possible conflict area prior to violence. A preventive deployment benefits from the presence of a UN military force, just because of its deterrence capabilities with a Security Council resolution. Only a quicker and more efficient reaction from the UN can accomplish desired results.

Humanitarian intervention involves extensive humanitarian activities and is mostly called upon when internal strife is still underway. It initiates civilian relief

programs and delivers emergency aid and supplies to the people under UN protection. One of the intended goals of this operation is the establishment of safe havens with no-fly zones to protect defenseless civilian from attack.

Neither prevention measures nor conflict management can be engaged during the war stage. Parties in conflict mainly engage military instruments to destroy their opponent's resistance or capability to fight.

It is important to note that conflicting parties are generally reluctant to accept external goodwill involvement for preventing military conflict until they experience war weariness or a hurting stalemate which parties have to accept to end conflict (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005). It is likely to be a ripe moment for involvement in terms of conflict resolution if both actors in conflict are uncomfortable with the current situation and see no chance to win the struggle (Wallensteen, 2004). At this point, the parties may agree to a ceasefire to bring a halt to unnecessary destruction and pain. If the conflict can be controlled by either a ceasefire or a peace agreement, separation of conflicting forces becomes important to avoid the re-escalation of violence by one side's inadvertent or intentional action. It is important to note here that external initiatives with the assistance of UN PK forces can accomplish such an invaluable task to provide convenient situations for other diplomatic initiatives (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005).

Measures for the peace-building phase will be available for implementation when the conflict is brought under control and the violence is calmed down further. If peace-building can be accomplished successfully, we can proceed to the next step, the peace consolidation phase, to realize an inclusive peace.

As such, real life conflict is more complex and complicated than the aforementioned conflict cycle model. In protracted disputes, i.e., Cyprus, Lebanon, India / Pakistan, Israel / Palestine, the conflict cycle reoccurs over and over again until it is ultimately resolved. In this case, the conflict model below will look like a wave of U-curves that fluctuate between war and peace up to the time when the conflict is eventually resolved (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005).

2.1.3.2. Re-occurring Cycle Model.




Figure 4. Re-occurring cycle model. (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

Of course, in reality, not all waves of conflict are identical, therefore, re-escalation of conflict can happen any point throughout the de-escalation stage. Sometimes, the conflict pattern swings unevenly between unstable peace, open conflict, crisis and war without coming up with a solution. In parallel with wave fluctuation, logical sequence of prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution measures have to be changed, whereas different kind of actions need to be taken to deal with conflict.




Figure 5. Fluctual cycle model. (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

2.2. The UN and Conflict Resolution

As argued by Kenneth Boulding, if war was the outcome of the sovereign state system, then it might be prevented by a reform in the field of international organization (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011).

The UN was established by 51 countries, under the auspices of the victorious nations World War II in 1945. The basic functions of the organization are; to achieve cooperation between nations, to revive worn-out economies, to realize collective security for ensuring international peace and security, and to establish some institutions with legal and advisory functions. Despite some contradictions, the organization was created by victorious nations, based on the principle of sovereign equality for all members and was intended to play a regulatory role, with special emphasis on peace and security (Aksu, 2010).[3] As mandated in Article 2 of the Charter, member nations are committed to solve their interstate disputes through peaceful means in order to maintain international peace and security. The nations have renounced the use of force or threaten each other in their international relations. Moreover, member nations have committed to provide the UN with every support and

[3] In his book, he emphasized that the tension between "state-centric" and "human-centric" principles exists. Principles of territorial integrity and self-determination may prove irreconcilable. Principles of non-intervention and human rights may come into conflict.

to comply with its decisions whenever any action is taken by the organization in accordance with the charter.

The purposes of the UN are laid out in Article 1 of the Charter. They are; to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. It must be noticed that in addition to some economic and social goals, the UN was established as the most essential international body for peace and security, which is based on the collective security system.[4] This distinguished aim and purposes of the UN are mandated in Article 1 of the Charter; "to maintain international peace and security, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". By taking the concept of conflict resolution into account, the organization has two salient responsibilities; to accomplish cessation of armed conflict, and help parties in conflict settle their dispute by peaceful means (Merrills, 1998). For this reason, it would be better to categorize the purpose of the UN, in regard to maintaining international peace and security, under two headlines. The first one describes the missions that must be accomplished via "effective collective measures." The UN will prevent threats to peace at first by stopping something bad from happening. Thereafter, the UN will try to remove threats to peace by forcing an

[4] John T. Rourke, Mark A. Boyer, International Politics, they assert collective security is based on four principles: first, all countries forswear the use of force except in self-defense; second, all agree that peace is indivisible, an attack on one is an attack on all; third, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace; fourth, all agree to supply whatever resources to defeat aggressors and restore the peace.

offender to relinquish its action, in case of a failure of preventive measures. Another case the UN has to deal with under the collective measures is to suppress acts of aggression, or breaches of peace. By doing so, the UN shall inhibit the development of action likely to create an imminent threat to international peace. As mentioned above, there is a substantial threat to peace in both cases which requires some concrete measures to be taken immediately by the international community.

The second group of the UN missions to be conducted via peaceful means is to settle international disputes which are likely to lead to a breach of international peace. The Charter advises the peaceful means to success this group of mission in compliance with the principles of justice, international law and international adjustments. In this situation, there is no military attack or direct threat to international peace, but some possibilities which may create risks for peace in the time to come.

Six principal organs are stated in the UN Charter, namely the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice (Taylor & Groom, 2000). UN organs which play crucial roles in the peaceful settlement of disputes, that is, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary General are mentioned as follows.

2.2.1. The General Assembly

The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the UN and is comprised of all member nations. The General Assembly is not continually in session, all members, each with one vote, convene once a year at the Ordinary General Assembly. The General Assembly has the authority to discuss and make

recommendations on any issue within the scope of the charter. The assembly may also discuss any questions in regards to the maintenance of international peace and security, then, if deemed necessary, it may call upon the attention of the Security Council to situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security.[5] Moreover, the General Assembly tables recommendations for promoting international cooperation in economic, social, cultural, educational and health areas. It approves the UN budget and elects the members of the UN organs.

2.2.2. The Security Council

The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The council is comprised of 15 members, five of which are permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 10 non-permanent members which are elected by the General Assembly. The council's decisions on procedural matters are made by nine affirmative votes, while decisions on substantive matters require nine votes without a veto of the permanent members. The authority and responsibility of the council derives from Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the UN Charter.

The essential functions of the Security Council are; to maintain international peace and security, to call upon the parties of a dispute to settle it peacefully, to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international tensions and suggest some solutions or methods to compromise or reach an agreement, to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression and to recommend what action needs to be taken, to call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures to prevent further deterioration of the situation, to call on members to take

[5] Article 12: While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation on this dispute or situation unless the Security Council requests so.

measures recommended by the council, to resort to the use of force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security, to encourage the peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional organizations and authorize them for enforcement actions (The United Nations Department of Public Information. 2000). To summarize, the main function of the Security Council consists of making recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes as is highlighted in Chapter VI, taking coercive measures as spelled out in Chapter VII, and coping with threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression (Malanzuc, 1997).

Whenever an issue is tabled for discussion by the Security Council, the council first recommends parties to try to reach an agreement through peaceful means amongst themselves and may also suggest some solutions. In some cases, the council undertakes investigation or mediation. When disputes tend towards hostility, the council needs to bring them together to terminate their aggressions as soon as possible. The council may issue a ceasefire invitation to prevent further escalation of the conflict. The Security Council may dispatch military observer or peacekeeping forces to help reduce international friction, keep conflicting forces apart, and create suitable conditions in which diplomatic initiatives and other peaceful settlements can be easily applied. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is authorized to decide on enforcement measures, including sanctions, arms embargoes, or direct military actions. Although the council is to be the main unit for the maintenance of international peace and security, it does not have any direct instrument to fulfill this primary responsibility.[6] Therefore, restoration of peace depends on international cooperation and support.

[6] After the foundation of the UN, a directive was given to the military committee to establish an UN Army which must be ready for use at the disposal of the Security Council. However the Soviet Union

According to Article 24, member nations confer at the Security Council whose primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN and to carry out its duties. When the Security Council considers that the presented issue is a threat to international peace and security, it is considered a problem not only for the council, but for all member nations as well. Article 25 encumbers the members of the UN to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Although, the council is the only body with the authority to issue binding resolutions that are also a part of the mediums for conflict resolution, there has been some debate in literature whether the decisions of the Security Council taken under Chapter VI have a binding effect on member nations (Malanczuk, 1997).

Chapter-VII allows the Security Council to take enforcement measures which range from economic sanctions to military interventions against a state whenever deemed necessary for international peace and security. Article 43 of the Charter provides that all members endeavor to make available to the Security Council, on call and in accordance with a special agreement, armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

The authority of the Security Council is not limited to nations, in that it can act against non-state actors such as insurgents, rebel groups, mercenaries, or even individuals (López-Jacoiste, 2010).

However, scholars share the assessment that the veto power of the permanent members inhibits the Security Council from implementing any enforcement measures

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was disturbed by the active attitude of the USA for the establishment of the UN Army and they worried about the force that might be a new front line on the western side, resulting with Russia withdrawing from the talks and the study ending in 1948.

against them, as well as making decisions for action, in terms of international peace and security.

2.2.2.1. Pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI).

Articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the Charter put forward the words "peaceful means" in its all functions.[7] Besides the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly are the main organs of the UN with regards to settling disputes peacefully. An international dispute may be brought to the attention of the UN by a state, the Secretary-General, the Security Council or the General Assembly, but it is under the authority of the Security Council whether to accept a dispute on its agenda.[8]

Chapter VI empowers the council to make recommendations for international peace and security. According to Article 33, the parties in dispute shall seek a solution via negotiations, enquiries, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their choice. The Security Council may call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means and may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. As emphasized in Article 37, if the parties fail to settle their dispute through means indicated in Article 33, they might call upon the council to get involved. Should the Security Council decide the ongoing dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it will recommend the means of adjustment, as indicated in Article 36, or other means of settlement it deems appropriate for the situation. The General Assembly may discuss and recommend measures regarding the maintenance of international peace and security under Articles

[7] Article 1(1), to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes… Article 2(3), All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means…

[8] Article 11(2), The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the UN, or by the Security Council, or by a state…

10, 11, 12, and 14 of the Charter, except as confined in Article 12.[9] Although there is no legal obligation for member nations, the General Assembly may make recommendations and appoint fact-finding missions to scrutinize the disputed situation for its decision-making process. Moreover, conducting an impartial query is also good way to reduce tensions between parties of a conflict (Malanzuc, 1997).

2.2.2.2. Collective Security and Enforcement Action (Chapter VII).

2.2.2.2.1. Collective Security.

As it is seen in the UN Charter, maintenance of international peace and security is based primarily on the 'collective security' system rather than doctrines of 'self-help' or 'balance of power.' Before reviewing the concept of collective security, it is necessary to consider what is meant by security. Walter Lippmann argued, "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). As it is understood from his definition and Johan Galtung's description, security is not the absence of conflict or war (negative peace), but rather being in a situation of positive peace. Member nations can feel themselves in an environment of confidence and solidarity. According to customary international law, a state whose right has been violated by another state has a right to resort use of force against that state as enforcement action. With the same perspective, Article 51 recognizes the legality of an individual or collective self-defense right of a state.[10] However, an individual nation's right to self-defense is not enough of a deterrent to dissuade an aggressor from attacking, as is often the case.

[9] The General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council requests so.

[10] Article 51: Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Except superpowers, it is hardly possible for many nations to have the military capability to respond to all potential threats and attacks by themselves. Meanwhile, collective self-defense may trigger a counter-reaction, hence it may further complicate security problems rather than promote safety. In order to stop this drive for everlasting security in global politics, collective security is the main purpose of the UN. Based on the experiences of the League of Nations, an advanced collective security system of the UN is considered strong enough to maintain durable peace and security that is beneficial for all member nations. However, individual members must abandon the use of force, except self-defense, and hand it over to the organization, which is able to take all necessary enforcement actions against the aggressor.

The theory of collective security directly addresses the issue of how to maintain peace. The main idea of collective security is that an attack on any state is an attack on every state. In other words, collective security is a system in which each state accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to partake in a collective response to threats against and breaches of peace (Robert & Zaum, 2013). Therefore, it will be possible to strongly resist against a powerful aggressor collectively through which the assailant could be dissuaded from the use of force to solve a problem in its favor. The important deterrent factor of the collective security system is mainly based on the reality that aggressor will have to struggle with coalition's vectorial powers and its plethora of military forces. To work the collective security system successfully, states must trust each other with a legally binding commitment to respond to aggression whenever and wherever it might occur (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991). Confidence is a *sine qua non* condition of the success of the collective security system, therefore the other nations in the system will oppose offensive moves, no matter what happens.

As emphasized at the outset, peace was to be maintained through the cooperation and harmony of the Security Council nations, as envisaged in the UN Charter. However, the Cold War conditions caused a major disappointment for the UN because the collective security system, which is the most important feature of the UN, was paralyzed due to the East-West rivalry. When the abuse of the veto right by the major powers blocked the Security Council, thus posing a serious threat to peace, the UN General Assembly took the initiative on 3 November, 1950, when it bypassed the Security Council to adopt 'the Uniting for Peace' Resolution 377. The justification of this resolution was that if the Security Council failed to carry out its responsibility to maintain international peace and security because of the lack of unanimity amongst the permanent members, the General Assembly should consider the matter immediately. The General Assembly may make appropriate recommendations to the member nations for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. This authority of the General Assembly is based on provisions stated in Articles 11 and 12.[11]

That said, the system of collective security is not an automated international military reaction against aggressors. Timely planning and integrated execution of a collective response to an attack are still problems that must be overcome in the system. Meanwhile, as the decision-making process involved in taking collective action may take a long time, urgent support or necessary assistance would be too late for an attacked member. The reliability of the collective security system depends on the promise of member nations to commit to common action, but there is no guarantee

[11] Article 11(2): The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security… Article 12: While the Security Council is exercising any dispute or situation, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation on the matter unless the Security Council request (contrary meaning of this article is that is Security Council cannot deal with the issue somehow, the General Assembly can do it)

to prevent them from abandoning their promises. Nevertheless, states might not be entire certain of other state's commitments and nations in the system tend to pass the buck and get other nations to pay the price of confronting an aggressor (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). For that reason, nations embarked on a quest for alternative collective security systems on a regional basis, which have caused the UN collective system to weaken. The US and western powers paid more attention to regional defense organizations than they have the UN. Under the environment of uncertainty of the Cold War, some western nations decided to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, under the auspices of the US. As a military reaction to the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, eight communist nations led by the USSR banded together under the Warsaw Pact. These kind of regional security organizations reduced the credibility and effectiveness of the UN collective security system. Members of such organizations demonstrated more loyalty and commitment to their regional organization than the UN, rendering the system ineffective.

2.2.2.2.2. Enforcement Action (Chapter VII).

Whenever the Security Council reaches the conclusion there is a serious threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression, Chapter VII furnishes the council with the required enforcement authority. The council is the only body authorized to issue binding resolutions which are also part of the instruments for conflict resolution. Traces of the collective security system and the implementation of enforcement measures can be seen in UN Charter Articles 48 and 49, which stipulate that measures and actions deemed necessary must be decided only by the Security Council.[12]

[12] Article 48: The action required for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the UN or by the Security Council in some cases. Article 49: The members of the UN shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

The wording of Article 39 is quite clear in that the Security Council is entitled to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international order. Once the Security Council discerns that a case poses a threat to international peace and security, or a breach of peace or act of aggression has occurred, it can choose coercive measures in the course of action stipulated in Chapter VII. According to Article 40, the council may call on parties to comply with necessary provisional measures, such as halting the conflict, a ceasefire agreement, or the mutual withdrawal of forces to prevent events which may suddenly flare up and get out of control. These decisions are referred to as recommendations rather than binding resolutions, therefore complying with these recommendations does not mean parties accept or refuse any rights or claims. As with Article 41, with the exception of the use of armed force, the Security Council may decide what measures are to be taken to reinforce its decisions. The council may call upon member nations to apply some sanctions such as; “the interruption of economic relations and rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Indeed, unless a state is weak, sanctions are unlikely to achieve a successful result as most economic damage targets civilians, rather than the delinquent government (Merrills, 1998, p. 247). As a last resort, Article 42 provides the most serious enforcement measures in which collective action targets an aggressor when a serious threat to peace takes place. If the Security Council considers that all measures taken thus far are deemed inadequate to obtain the desired result, “it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The important point that should be mentioned here is which forces will be available for military operations when needed as the UN has no standing army of

its own.[13] Article 43 foresees that member nations should undertake their commitments with regard to collective security by providing their national armed forces and necessary assistance at the council's disposal. However, in order to provide the council with national armed forces and other assistance, a special agreement between a desired member state and the Security Council should be concluded and ratified by competent national authorities and organs. It is clearly understood from the interpretation of Article 43 that the Security Council could not order member nations to participate in military coercive action. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Security Council has been limited by the member nations' voluntary provision of military forces and their assistance.

Unfortunately, the intense rivalry which arose between the superpowers after the end of World War II, a situation which could not envisaged at the establishment of the UN, rendered the security system inefficient. All the measures explained above are subject to the veto power of the Security Council's permanent members. However, the first implementation of collective security was realized with the enforcement of the US-led UN operation in which member nations took part in a common action against the aggressor North Korea in 1950.

Hopes were raised for the UNSC after the Cold War with the realization of more effective collective security functions in order to establish and maintain order in the world. The disappearance of the political bloc and rivalry led to closer cooperation amongst the permanent members of the Security Council. China and Russia, in

[13] After the foundation of the UN, a directive was given to the military committee to establish a UN Army which must be ready for use at the disposal of the Security Council. The United States, which was one of the proponents of the UN Army, declared that 40,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen would be allocated to this force including an aircraft carrier battle group. The Soviet Union was disturbed by the active attitude of the US for realizing this army and they worried about the force that might be a new front line on the Western side therefore she withdrew from the talks and the study ended in 1948.

particular, have preferred to abstain at the council's session rather than use their right to veto. Moreover, the Security Council has begun to consider some domestic situations such as civil wars or serious violations of human rights as threats to international peace and security.[14]

2.2.3. The Secretary-General

As explained in Article 97, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Therefore, a candidate for this post has to gain the confidence of both the General Assembly and Security Council as well. The main functions of the Secretary-General are to fulfill missions entrusted by organs of the UN, to act as the chief administrative officer of the organization[15] and to bring any matter which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council.[16] The Secretary-General is not only an administrative officer but also has important political roles in settling international disputes. The Secretary General calls on the parties to negotiate amongst themselves, and calls for a ceasefire if fighting has already broken out. He tries to promote conciliation and negotiation; he may appoint a personal representative to a dispute who carries out his /her duty as a goodwill ambassador. Upon the request of the Security Council, he conducts an inquiry and dispatches observers or a fact-finding mission to learn the truth (Luard, 1968). The Secretary General has the responsibility to implement and control peacekeeping operations, as authorized by the Security Council.

[14] Some operations under Security Council resolutions during the post-Cold War era; Iraq (1990), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1993), Haiti (1994), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).
[15] Article 98
[16] Article 99

Considering the role of the main organs of the UN, its functions in terms of maintaining peace and security can be classified into three categories. The first is; the peaceful settlement of international disputes stipulated in Chapter VI of the Charter. The second one, Chapter VII, provides the framework for enforcement measures that can be taken within the collective security system to deal with threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. While there is no explicit description in the UN Charter, but developed *in situ*, the third category, that of peacekeeping operations, is the distinctive instrument of the UN to handle international disputes. Considering the importance of peacekeeping operations for this dissertation, the third one will be reviewed under a different heading.

2.3. The Birth of PKO and Its Evolution

After overcoming the obstacles of the Cold War, the UN invented some measures to deal with problems that were considered a threat to international peace and security. In addition to traditional diplomatic initiatives, some new instruments were introduced to strengthen application of the Conflict Resolution, which included economic and political sanctions, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. These instruments have significantly contributed towards implementing and sustaining a peace process.

Although the term ‘peacekeeping’ was first used in the 1950s, the control of political violence has a longer history. The code of conduct that nations have jointly developed to deal with international peaace and security, as well as the creation of shared norms regarding the legitimacy of warfare were early international management ways for violence (Bellamy et al., 2010). Wallensteen (2004) proposed some practical methods in the negotiation phase to transcend the incompatibility

between conflicting nations. He states that “Within the conflict resolution mechanism, postponing issues or the creation of timetables is one of them. By keeping a strategically important decision as the final agenda item, it may become indistinct” (p. 186). This process may take longer; keeping parties away from a new conflict is another important mission for peacekeeping forces during this vulnerable period.

2.3.1. The birth of peacekeeping.

The UN PKO developed from the competitive conditions of the Cold War in which two superpowers sustained their rivalries through the UN or third world surrogates (Charters, 1994). The East-West rivalry during the Cold War put constraints on the UN’s envisaged function for collective security system involvement in international disputes. Security requirements of the Cold War obliged the UN to find another exit strategy to overcome real life challenges. Therefore, the PKO was put into practice within the framework of principles of the UN Charter as a new collective security system instrument. It was an improvised international response to the threats against maintaining peace and security (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). After the initial implementation, it was believed that the PKO could be an efficient instrument in maintaining peace and security. As pointed out by Durch (1993), the PKO evolved as an assistive implementation tool to the collective security which could not performed by the UN as planned.

The PKO has made an undeniably positive contribution to conflict resolution. Diehl asserts that PKOs are best situated for use after some measure of conflict resolution (Diehl, 1994). Actually, the early PKOs were conceived as measures to be implemented after a peace agreement between conflicting parties. Although the PKO is unable to solve an international dispute on its own, it is a highly effective tool for implementing a ceasefire or maintaining the status quo. The PKO helps to preserve a

ceasefire or does not permit an escalation of conflict in which diplomats can buy enough time and a suitable atmosphere for peaceful settlements. Through a PKO, the international community offers help to disputing parties, depending on their willingness to accept it. However, the final decision in term of war or peace depends on the conflicting sides, rather than peacekeepers (Charters, 1994). It means that the PKO is not an international intervention to impose any solution despite the desire of parties to start a conflict. It is worth noting that although a peacekeeping mission is unable to solve disputes among major powers which are members of the Security Council, it enables third-party intervention in disputes between minor powers, by aiming at preventing wars from breaking out or stopping them once they have begun Mearsheimer, 1994). This kind of intervention has high standing because the UN peace force is deployed there with a strong message from major powers of the international organization.

It would be better to start this heading with an official definition of peacekeeping, but the terms “peacekeeping” or “peace operation” are used nowhere in the UN Charter. However, there have been many PKO definitions made by diplomats, academics or journalists, according to the implementations of peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, there has always been a gap between the dictionary definition of the PKO and real world activity (Charters, 1994. Therefore, starting from its first application, some significant features of the PKO must be put forward prior to reviewing its definitions and evolution.

The history of UN peacekeeping began with the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. It was the first UN observer operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was set up by the Security Council in the Middle East in 1948. Although, following the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the functions of the mission

changed according to conditions, this unarmed observers mission continues to the present day to help stabilize the region. The considerable characteristics of the mission, which were based on the conditions at that time, i.e., the existing truce agreement and the consent of the parties, hence the definition of this peacekeeping mission was made accordingly. Nonetheless, the UNTSO remains an observation mission rather than a peacekeeping operation.

According to UN sources, the first armed UN peacekeeping force, under the UN flag, was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed to Egypt during the Suez Crisis, in 1956. The important point here is that the actual practice of UNEF-I established basic tenets for subsequent PK missions. Kelman stated the connection between theory and practice is that theory is used in practice, then tested in practice and finally theory is generated by practice (Sandole & Van der Merwe, 1993). It means that the PKO is not the application of a definition or a concept, but rather the definition of the peacekeeping implementation, which thereafter forms a basis for the peacekeeping concept. Therefore, every PKO has contributed towards evolving the concept of peacekeeping.

Due to the Cold War deadlock in the Security Council, the UNEF operation was authorized by the General Assembly following the Suez-Sinai War of 1956. There was a serious threat in the Middle East but the UNSC could not deal with this issue on account of the veto privilege of some member nations (France and the UK were amongst the conflicting parties). The General Assembly put this important conflict on its agenda by considering Resolution 377, which gives the General Assembly the authority for taking the initiative get involved in any issue in order to

maintain international peace and security.[17] After General Assembly Resolution 998, the peacekeeping force (UNEF-I), comprised of 6000 troops from 10 countries, was tasked to monitor the withdrawal of Israeli, French and British troops from Egyptian territory.

As highlighted earlier, five basic principles and standards for subsequent PK missions have been set forth from the practice of UNEF-I. These are the main principles by which subsequent UN peacekeeping operations are organized (Fetherstone, 1994).

- Consent of the disputing parties to establish the mission.
- Impartiality and non-intervention (i.e. the force does not participate in conflict)
- Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.
- Voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force.
- Day-to-day control of the peacekeeping operation by the Secretary-General.[18]

Considering the absence of a common definition of peacekeeping, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's description is quoted here; "Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilian as well." Moreover, Jett (2000) reports that the International Peace Academy

[17] The United Nations Charter, Article 11
[18] The command and control of the PKOs runs from the UN Security Council through the UN Secretary-General and his representatives on the theater to the military contingents provided by member nations.

defined a PKO's role as "the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within nations, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational force of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace" (p. 14).

2.3.2. Evolution of the PKO.

Peacekeeping is an instrument to deal with international conflicts, hence it evolves in parallel with changes in the nature of conflicts. No doubt the UN PKO has undergone many changes since its inception in parallel with the changes and requirements in global politics as well. Tension or cooperation between the superpowers has streamlined the PKOs or has rendered the peacekeeping efforts inactive therefore the evolution of the PKO will be reviewed under two main sections.

2.3.2.1. PKO in the Cold War.

Even though establishment of the UN appeared to be a promising start for international peace and security, agreement and cooperation among the victors could not be realized after the war. The great expectation, which was created by the foundation of the UN for peace and security, turned quickly into a disappointment. The political confrontation and rivalry between two blocs dominated every area of the UN, and most significantly in the Security Council. Thus, the most important function of the organization of securing peace came to a standstill.

After the grief of World War II, contrary to all prospects, ideological and historical rivalry rendered the Cold War an existential battle. It was waged between capitalism and socialism, democracy and dictatorship, liberation and imperialism (Wallensteen, 2004). However, the risk of an inadvertent nuclear war refrained the major powers from direct military conflict among themselves. Meanwhile, other types

of power struggles, shows of force, local conflicts and wars were waged by their proxies. Considering the difficulty of cooperation and harmony among the superpowers, the international community needed to generate additional means of conflict resolution in order to prevent the risk of a local conflict escalating into nuclear war. Therefore, the peacekeeping concept was invented for such a requirement within Cold War conditions.

Most of the PKOs during the Cold War were created to bring smaller conflicts to a conclusion, preventing them from escalating which may have led to a direct military conflict between the US and Soviet Union (Durch, 1993). Generally, the aims of these operations were the separation of the warring parties, monitoring of a ceasefire agreement, and unbiased mediation between the disputing parties. The UN PKOs of the Cold War were primarily put in place when a ceasefire was agreed upon after an aggression or conflict. In other words, they aimed at controlling violence and maintaining the status quo for a suitable environment could be created for diplomatic initiatives and pacific settlement.

The process of decolonization was another important factor which changed the political arena of the UN, and in terms of international peace and security, brought about a major area of concern. In many areas, independence was achieved at the end of long, bloody struggles while it was realized peacefully in some regions. More than 50 new nations achieved their independence from colonial powers between 1945-1960. While this period also coincided with the toughest years of the Cold War era, the UN did not have enough experience with the issue of the international conflict resolution. Undoubtedly, the decolonization movement was influenced by the East-West competition and it made international politics more complex. These new independent nations with significant natural resources or strategic locations created

areas of interest for the superpowers. Although the US mainly supported the concept of self-determination, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were concerned that socialist rhetoric might sound too good to these poor countries, whereby communist parties supported by the Soviet Union might grab the political upper hand in these new nations. Therefore, the superpowers started to provide aid packages, military-technical assistance, and even the occasional military intervention to align a government with them. In addition to economic and political problems, these newly decolonized countries faced internal demands for autonomy, and even for independence as of their multi-ethnic, fragmented religious structures might have turned these demands into violent conflicts and wars among them.

During the Cold War, the UN underwrote 15 PKOs between 1948 - 1988, six of which were unarmed military observer missions, while the remaining were armed peacekeeping missions. As explained before, these PKOs were conducted to avert direct military conflict between the US and Soviet Union. Regional instability and armed struggles over the control of governments which might had led to radical changes in Third World countries, were in favor of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the Western Bloc encouraged the UN to undertake more PKOs to foster regional stability. The first PKO was UNEF-I, deployed to the Sinai Peninsula after the Suez Crisis in 1956. The next PKOs were different from the UNEF and each other. While each PKO is unique, the UN has shaped the structure and function of PKOs, parallel to the conditions on the ground and the parameters of international politics. Its unwritten specifications and flexibility of its ad-hoc structure have allowed PKOs to exist and grow until now. The nature of the PKO in this era was determined by the Westphalian mentality in which the domestic realm of a state was beyond international intervention. Hence, during the Cold War the PKO was bound by the

norms of the international system such as non-interference in the internal affairs of nations, which was enshrined in the UN Charter as well. The PKOs of this era were based on three principles; the consent and cooperation of state/nations, impartiality between the parties, and non-use of force except self-defense. As it is understood that these PKOs did not play a direct role in resolving causes of conflict, but rather to maintain the status quo.

PKOs went through several distinct phases during the Cold War era. According to Wiseman (1993), PKOs could be categorized into five separate phases (p. 265). (1) The Nascent Period, 1946-1956: Several observer missions were set up during this decade. Although these missions were not referred to as peacekeeping operations at that time, they played crucial roles for the observance of agreements between parties. Apart from the observer role, these kind of missions provided officers with valuable experience for subsequent PKOs. (2) The Assertive Period, 1956-1967: This decade began with the exemplary UNEF-I PKO was followed by seven more peacekeeping missions, four of which were observer missions and three were PKOs. Each of these operations established precedents and provided experiences for follow-on PKOs. (3) The Dormant Period, 1967-1973: Though there wasn't a lack of conflicts to act upon, no new peacekeeping operations were launched during this period (Fetherstone, 1994). As pointed out by H.Wiseman, there were three possible reasons for this. First, the UN did not act until a crisis has reached an internationally threatening stage. Second, the new Organization of African Unity was trying to benefit from its own regional security measures. Third, the conflict between superpowers prevented UN action in their spheres of influence. (4) The Resurgent Period, 1973-1978: Conflicts in the Middle East prompted the creation of three new PKOs during this era. United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), in 1973, in the

Sinai. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), in 1974, in the Golan Heights. And the subject of this thesis, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was the last major UN PKO launched in 1978. The Middle East was a crucial area of interest for the United States and the Soviet Union. The US considered PKOs as a way to help assure the security of Israel, while the USSR saw them as a way to lessen the cost of defeat to its Arab allies (Jett, 2000). (5) The Maintenance Period, 1978-1988: This decade was determined as the second period of dormancy as no new PKOs were introduced in this period, while the existing PKOs were maintained. The increased tensions between East and West could be considered as the main reason behind their continuation. Moreover, according to Fetherson (1994), the Reagan Administration's attitude toward the UN was less than cooperative and even dismissive. In this term, there were also no new conflicts in the Middle East. The UNIFIL was already in Lebanon when the Israeli incursion occurred in 1982, but the presence of UN forces on the ground could not prevent this attack.

All these aforementioned UN efforts were conducted within the framework of traditional peacekeeping operation concepts.

2.3.2.2. PKOs in the Post-Cold War.

The international arena underwent an important transformation after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Hopes for a better and more peaceful world were raised with the end of the bipolar rivalary between the USA and Soviet Union, which previously removed any optimistic expectations in international relations.

International politics during the Cold War did not permit the UN to deal with international security issues on the cooperative basis envisaged in the Charter. Although, it was assumed that all serious security problems would have been handled

in the UN, the East-West rivalry after the end of WWII hindered the UN from performing this function. The collapse of the USSR caused significant changes in the world politics which was called the 'end of the Cold War.' The confrontational relations between the superpowers during the Cold War gave way to compromise and coordination, albeit for a limited period of time, within the UN. These political developments created an extremely promising environment for the maintenance of international peace and security. The nature of conflict also changed in this period, becoming more complex than in the Cold War and requiring more effective responses from the international community. It encouraged the UN to develop and expand the tasks of PKOs. Contrary to the traditional PKO, the new role of the UN peacekeeping was to address the root causes of a conflict as much as possible. It involved the building of political conditions for a viable peace rather than interposition between belligerents. A new peacekeeping mission was also to help people who suffered from hunger, poverty and disease or from the ravages and oppression of civil war. Although basic human needs such as providing food, shelter, medical supplies and a secure environment are fundamental human rights which must be guaranteed by the state, there was no government authority on the ground to carry out such vital functions. International community witnessed similar desperate situations as in the case of the Iraqi Kurds in 1991 and Somalia in 1992 (Mingst and Karns, 2000).

The absence of a peacekeeping doctrine or theory provided the international community with the freedom to act and the flexibility for different challenges they faced. According to Bellamy et al. (2010), the post-Cold War era PKOs underwent a triple transformation. First, there was a quantitative transformation. In this period, the UN conducted more PKOs than it had undertaken in the previous 40 years.

The reality was that the demand for UN effort to promote international peace and security increased in the post-Cold War era. The number of UN PKOs (including observer missions) initiated between 1948 -1988 (40 years) rose from 15 to the 54 new PKOs started up during the quarter century after the Cold War (1989-2014). That means almost four times more PKOs were created in this era than previous one.

In pointing out another reality for this uptrend, Jett (2000) argued that the increase in number of PKOs after the Cold War resulted from the convergence of three factors. The first factor, the Soviet Union and the United States gave up using the UN as a forum for their rigorous rivalry in this new era. Rather, they tended to cooperate in international problems which might pose a threat to international peace, and to use the UN as the only effective instrument to deal with them. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the only remaining superpower, whereas the United States and its western allies provided leadership for the UN's efforts. The end of Cold War enabled permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate for dealing with international conflicts, ushering in a new era in UN activities that began with the Gulf War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council specified the very strict resolution under the measures of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized the use of force for the first time in its history.

The second factor was that the features and number of conflicts also changed dramatically. The wars in this period were waged between ethnic and religious groups rather than nations. The end of the Cold War contributed towards enhancing the demand for self-determination and increasing ethnic strife, especially in the communist-dominated regions. Moreover, many civil wars erupted and law and order collapsed within failed African nations, and millions of people were displaced due to devastating state policies, corruption, misgovernments, and natural disasters. As it

was highlighted, the nature of post-Cold War era conflicts changed, in which regular armed forces, state boundaries, defense lines, and civil settlements diminished in importance. The distinction between troops and civilians disappeared and cities and population centers were more important than territorial nations. Although, the proportion of civilian deaths in armed conflict had been around 50% since the 18th century, it increased to 73% in the 1970's and was close to 90% in the 1990's (Sivard, 1974). Civilians are tactical targets rather than troops, and fear, brutality, and murder have become common methods to establish dominance (Fetherstone, 1994). The main effort of the PKOs in this term was necessarily focused on the issue of human suffering.

Wars were waged by groups with ethnic or religious identities that were referred to as terrorists, guerillas or insurgents in the past. They never hesitate to use all kinds of violence without moral and legal hindrances to achieve their goals. As it was pointed out by Nordstorm and Martin (1992), "civilians, rather than soldiers are the tactical targets and fear, brutality, and murder are the foundation on which control is constructed" (p. 262). In most cases, the UN or regional organizations have faced difficulties in finding the authority responsible for the horrific actions of group/groups.

The third factor for the increase in the number of PKOs was undeniably the effect of public opinion under policy makers which would not let political leaders ignore humanitarian tragedies that occurred far from their homes. The development of information technology called "the CNN effect" makes us more aware of humanitarian disasters caused by conflicts. People tend to call upon their governments to do something about protecting innocent civilians and ending all the suffering. The

CNN effect pressures governments and international organizations to take immediate enforcement actions to bring these internal conflicts to a definitive end.

The second transformation of the PKO was a normative one. There was a growing belief among some member nations that the post-Westphalian concept must be promoted for stable peace and security.[19] The reality is that the globalized and interdependent world moves beyond the Westphalian system in which the primary principle is only the respect for state sovereignty (Ryan, 2000). The security of universal humanitarian values should have the priority over the security of state. That approach inevitably caused erosion on the concept of state sovereignty. The post-Westphalian approach was accepted more at the global level after the Cold War because intrastate conflicts increase six times more than interstate wars (Dzuverovic, 2012). As UN involvement in intrastate conflict increases in this new era, tensions between sovereignty and human rights escalates as well. International society explicitly recognized that nations have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If a state fails intentionally in this responsibility, the international community has a duty to take necessary action.[20]

This transformation process has led to the emergence of second- and third-generation PKOs, which include not only military and political aspects, but social, humanitarian and environmental dimensions as well.

These transformed or integrated PKOs realized during the early phase of the post-Cold War era (1985-90) were called ‘Second Generation Peacekeeping,’ which

[19] The Post-Westphalian concept argues that sovereignty is not an absolute right if a state fails to protect its citizens from mass human right violations.
[20] The 2005 World Summit was held from 14 to 16 September at the UN Headquarters in New York with the participation of more than 170 Heads of States Governments. The World Summit Declaration was issued by the UN on 20 September 2005.

includes some new peacekeeping missions except enforcement actions. Second-generation peacekeeping operations which performed with the post-Westphalian approach have been more complex and different from traditional ones. They address a much wider range of tasks, such as disarmament or demobilization of warring groups, repatriating refugees, the implementation or monitoring of human rights agreements, electoral assistance, supervising the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the creation of new institutions to maintain law and order (Warner, 1995).

The other group, the “Third-Generation” peacekeeping, which contains enforcement activities, is much more difficult to reconcile with the original aims of traditional peacekeeping because it lacks the basic tenets of consent, impartiality and non-use of force (Duffey, 1998). These kinds of PKOs call for well-trained and equipped troops with the financial and political international support behind them. After the increase of conflicts in Africa and Middle East, the UN was being called on to terminate violence by using unprecedented military force, something that was never envisaged by the founders of the UN Charter. However, the inadequate military capabilities of the peacekeeping forces to deal with problems and the lack of will to fight in support of humanitarian operations have become the main obstacle for third-generation PKOs. Moreover, countries that contributed troops were also reluctant to risk the lives of their soldiers for someone else’s problems as these kinds of peace operations were much more risky than traditional ones. Therefore, in order to succeed, a UN enforcement effort required the support of at least one major council member without the opposition of permanent members.

The final peacekeeping transformation was a qualitative one. After the growing proliferation of civil wars in Africa and increasing conflict in the Middle East, the UN was being called on to terminate violence immediately by bringing more

means to bear than ever before. These were different challenges never envisaged by the founders of the UN Charter. The only thing for sure was that the traditional PKOs were unable to meet the demands posed by the post-Cold War world; therefore, something new had to be done. The UN was asked to perform complex tasks that were different from traditional missions. Considering the harmony on the Security Council, the concept of collective security became important once again to deal with the security problems they faced. The methods of peacekeeping were tailored to conform with the requirement of conflicts and situations in which they were deployed. In accordance with features of conflicts and demands of operation, various types of peacekeeping actions were employed.

The balance between the changing security environment and the potential of the UN to maintain international peace and security enforced those in charge to further develop the operational and doctrinal aspects of PKOs. Only three major reports, which will be mentioned here, were produced to meet these demands. These were An Agenda for Peace, The Brahimi Report and Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1999) submitted his report entitled An Agenda for Peace to the Security Council in 1992. In it, the secretary-general presented the integrated proposals for more effective and efficient UN activities. The report provided his recommendations on how to strengthen the UN's capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.[21] Although the positive

[21] He argued for preventive deployment of UN peacekeeping missions where previously the UN had not been able to act quickly. In the past, UN forces had been sent only after a conflict had occurred and a ceasefire had been agreed on. Preventive deployment meant that UN forces could be dispatched quickly, at the earliest warning of serious trouble. The other concept he proposed was "peace enforcement," a rapid-reaction capability. Combat-ready units provided by member nations would fill the gap between traditional UN peacekeeping units and large-scale operations, such as those authorized by the UN during the Korean War. Such units from member nations would be available on call and

improvements in international relations enabled the UN to meet challenges successfully to peace and security, the unity of nations was threatened more by ethnic, religious, social, and cultural strife. Boutros Ghali argued that in the light of those changed circumstances, the organization's aim should be the following:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence resulted;
- Where conflict had erupted, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that had let to conflict;
- Through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace where fighting had been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts; rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife, and building of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- To address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.[22]

The Secretary General provided definitions for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building which were used in his report. Preventive diplomacy was action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to

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would consist of volunteers. These troops would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces. He called for as many countries as possible to make available up to 1,000 troops on standby basis. This readiness to act would itself be a form of deterrence or preventive diplomacy. This also came from Article 43 of the Charter, under which "all members" undertake to make available to the UNSC, on call and in accordance with a special agreement…"

[22] http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm (An Agenda for Peace, The Report of Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992)

limit the spread of the latter when they occurred. Peacemaking was action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in the UN Charter's Chapter VI. Peacekeeping was the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Post-conflict peace-building was action to identify and support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In his report, the Secretary General implied that the organization must be ready to carry out missions in less permissive environments without the consent of parties. About the use of force, Boutros-Ghali explained it was the core of the concept of collective security that, if peaceful efforts failed, measures authorized by Chapter VII should be used in conjunction with the decision of the Security Council in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. He proposed a solution for the use of force and peace enforcement units: "the UN has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain ceasefires. This task can exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectation of troop contributing nations. Enforcement units have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. In fact, nothing is more dangerous for a PKO than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, because the structure of a peacekeeping force is not established capable enough to use force when required.

With regard to post-conflict peace-building; after a civil war some measures should be included in peace-building efforts such as disarming the warring parties,

restoration of order, disarmament, repatriating refugees, training for security personnel, monitoring elections, the protection of human rights, strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting the process of political participations.

Turning to cooperation with regional organizations, the Secretary General pointed out they could lighten the burden of the UN and provide great service if their potential could be used in correlation with the purposes and principles of the UN.

Following the failures of the UN PKO in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in January 1995, Boutros-Ghali presented another report entitled Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. In his report, the Secretary General stated there was a need to find new ways to overcome crisis as we have lived in different environments since the end of the Cold War which was still not fully understood. Despite the expanding role of the UN, there have been dramatic changes in wars; parties to a conflict usually fight not only with regular armies, but with also militias and irregular armed civilians without substantial command. As the demands for more complex and formidable PKOs increased, a lack of sufficient resources and political support became more apparent, decreasing the UN's capacity to respond effectively to requests for involvement. The current new types of conflict require us to be delicate, adaptable, capable and courageous enough in order to address the root causes of conflict. It also demands strong international commitment for cooperation and solidarity to sustain international peace and security. The Security Council calls on member nations to honor their commitments to the UN. The Secretary General, on the supplement, articulated many issues with regard to peace and security and made a comprehensive review about what has changed since his earlier report An Agenda for Peace. Other areas he mentioned in the report were; instruments which could be used by the UN for conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,

post-conflict peace-building, enforcement, sanctions, and accessibility of financial and logistic resources. The Secretary General also highlighted the need for a standing logistical reserve.

Upon Secretary-General Kofi Annan's request, a report of the panel on the future of PKOs was prepared in 2000. The panel was chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, who was to give his name to the report, the Brahimi Report. The main aim of the panel was to present specific, concrete and practical recommendations for implementing better PKOs in the future. Resolutions were mainly based on the political, military and administrative difficulties faced by the UN while conducting peacekeeping operations during the 1990's. The report focused on the issues which identified four specific areas. 1) Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations. 2) The UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively. 3) Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting PKOs. 4) Peace operations and the Information Age. One of the important recommendations of the report was the absolute necessity to get clear and achievable mandates from the Security Council. The UN does not wage war but once deployed, UN forces should be in a position to "confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them." He recommended the mandate must authorize the use of force when necessary therefore well-equipped and trained forces should be used against current threats. As he pointed out in his report, enforcement action required the commitment from a coalition of willing nations with authorization of the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is highlighted in the report that politics and logistic support from member nations have a fundamental effect on the success of peacekeeping operations. In the

face of an increased workload, the report insisted on the restructuring and strengthening of the secretariat, in particular the Department for PKO.

The last UN report to be mentioned here is The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Secretary-General Kofi Annan pronounced the establishment of a high-level panel to develop a plan for UN peacekeeping activities in 2003. Producing its report in December 2004, the panel provided an analysis of future threats and potential challenges to international peace and security and recommended some changes necessary to ensure UN collective actions. Despite some failures, the panel report emphasized that PKOs were important instruments in controlling conflicts that had the potential to threaten international peace and security. The report argued that in a rapidly changing world, the line between peacekeeping efforts under Chapter VI and peace enforcement activities under Chapter VII was getting more blurry; therefore, the most benign environment where peacekeeping forces were deployed could turn into a hostile one (Johnstone, Tortolani, & Gowan, 2005). The high-level panel indicated that the use of force must be inevitable under certain conditions to terminate mass human rights abuses within the state. The discussions on the panel caused increased indirect political pressure on nations to adopt the idea of the "Responsibility to Protect" against genocide and systematic crimes.[23] The panel called for developed members to constitute greater logistical capacity at the disposal of the UN when necessary. The panel welcomed some initiatives of regional organizations such as European Union and African Unions, to establish deployable capacities and troops that can contribute for maintaining peace and security because it

[23] During a historic gathering of world leaders in New York for the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly (World Summit) in 2005, heads of state and government agreed to the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

is unlikely that the demands for rapid reaction forces cannot be met by the UN alone (Johnstone, Tortolani, & Gowan, 2005).

2.4. The Use of Force in UN PKOs

The significant provision relating to the prohibition of the use of force was referred in the UN Charter. As explained in Article 2(4), member nations shall refrain in their relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. It is important that the prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter is only for member nations, not for the organization. Meanwhile, as part of the collective security system, the authority to use of military force was given to the UN monopoly under the regulation of Article 42. That was not an unlimited privilege given to the council, rather the authorization of the use of force was framed by the objectives of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As explained before, traditional PKOs have the authority to use force in their self-defense granted by the Security Council under Chapter VI. Meanwhile, the use of force in UN operations for enforcement aims was hereby deemed legal via Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Another important point must be emphasized here is that the extent and intensity of military force will be big enough for the purpose of enforcement.

Although the Security Council has never commanded itself such an enforcement operation, it has delegated its authority to member nations or a coalition to do so (For example, the 1950-53 Korean War, 1991 Gulf War).[24] The UNSC prefers mostly to delegate power to member nations who have options to either act individually or as a coalition with other nations and a regional organization.

[24] The UN Army and Military Staff Committee could not establish as envisaged in the UN Charter.

As the use force during some UN peace operations has caused unexpected consequences and traumatic experiences in the past, i.e., in Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1993-95), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), the Security Council has generally been hesitant to allow military units under its command to use of force. During the war in Bosnia, the actual situation on the ground to be seen 'doing something' for the establishment of 'safe havens' did not take into account the military implications of this duty to protect those havens. It was not a peacekeeping mission that could be conducted by lightly-armed peace keeping forces. The mandates from the UNSC on the use of force were always very general in nature that left considerable room for interpretation (Weinberger, 1983). Many vital questions remained unclear on the mandate of who should decide when force should be used and for what purpose (Sarooshi, 1999). On the contrary, being excessively hesitant to use force in some cases (as experienced in Rwanda and Srebrenica) was a grave mistake for UN peaacekeeping forces which badly damaged the UN's reputation due to this unnecessary diffidentness (Chesterman, 2004).

The experience of UNIFIL shows that use of fore has been a difficult problem for the traditional PKO. From its establishement in 1978, UNIFIL has been involved in a number of confrontations involving use of force (Erskine, 1989). As explained before, traditional PKOs were based on some basic principles; consent of parties, impartiality and non-use of force except self defense. Actually, contradiction between the use of force in self-defense and use of force in defense of aims of the peacekeeping mission always existed even in the first PKO.

Changes in the world of politics and nature of conflicts after the Cold War dictated some alterations on these tenets. As time passed, the world became a less stable place, hence the concept of peacekeeping needed to become more complex and

peacekeeping forces needed keep pace with these changes, therefore they were transformed from traditional observers into robustly mandated sizeable forces which were capable enough to fulfill enforcement operations. However, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement became unclear in many UN operations. The UNSC has preferred to solve this problem by expanding the interpretation of 'self-defense' to include 'defense of the mission,' which allows enforcement of the mandate, even if the operation was authorized under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That was especially evident in the case of the UNIFIL, in which relative force was used to prevent the force from being deemed ineffective due to the lack of cooperation from the conflicting parties (Fink, 1995).

According to Findlay (2002), there has generally been a close relation between the use of force and enforcement action in the PKOs, hence a new doctrine is needed which conflates both of them. When an agreement reached between conflicting parties via a proper peace enforcement operation, military force must be used against violators if necessary. They do not intend to defeat a party in conflict, but rather to enforce it to comply with the decision of the Security Council and with its previously accepted commitments (Findlay, 2002). He also suggested that a show of force might have been enough to persuade the factions to respect UN authority. Warren Zimmerman, the last US Ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, said, "Diplomacy without force against an adversary without scruples is useless." A remarkably similar comment was made by the International Commission on the Balkans: "Diplomacy not backed by power is tantamount to hollow gesturing" (Findlay, 2002, p. 271).

As PKOs have evolved throughout the post-Cold War period, second- and third-generation PKOs have diverged from the golden rules of traditional PKO (consent, impartiality, non-use of force) which have been brought into question. The

consent of parties to a conflict was assumed indispensible for PKOs. But over time, it is understood that failed nations tend to abuse sovereingty against their responsibilities. The 'Responsibility to Protect' clause recommends that if a state fails, the international community through the Security Council decision will act without the consent of the parties. Regarding impartiality, as explained in the Brahimi Report, if a party to a peace agreement is explicitly violating its provisions, continuation of the UN's equal treatment to all parties leads to ineffectiveness at best and complicity with evil at worst. "No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of the UN peacekeeping in the 1990's than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor."[25]

The use of force in self-defense was also interpreted more broadly as new requirements rose. For example; preventing peacekeepers from being disarmed, their military camps from being besieged, their mission activities stipulated in the mandate hampered. Furthermore, the unilateral right of humanitarian intervention, and commonly accepted rules of the Responsibility to Protect became other justifications for the use of force later on.

Normally, a state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within its borders. However, in some cases where basic governmental functions, law and order have collapsed, the UN has assumed administrative authority in a post-conflict environment which may include a monopoly of the use of force. For example, after the military success in Iraq, widespread looting, revenge killings, bomb attacks and resistance movements revealed that the UN's plans to rebuild the institutions of a defeated or collapsed state must be ready in advance (Chesterman, 2004). In the

[25] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305 (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations known as the Brahimi Report)

absence of an effective government in Congo, ONUC had to assume responsibility of law and order functions for some time. Similar situations were experienced in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as well.

The legal basis for use force by the UN can be found under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in which the authority of the Security Council, including the use of military force, has been explained. Of course, the authority to use force in order to fulfill their mission must be defined clearly in the UN mandate, which is tailored according to conditions on the ground it is deployed. Trevor Findlay (2002) suggests that the line between peacekeeping and enforcement operations must be clear to avoid confusion in the future. Therefore, all Chapter VII mandates should make it explicit that the UN is obliged to protect civilians at the risk of human right abuses or other forms of attacks.

Meanwhile, Licklider has pointed out that not only have civil wars become more common and violent since the end of the Cold War, they are also less likely to be resolved by negotiation (Licklider, 1995). It is important to note here that in many civil wars, it is difficult to find credible authorities or parties which are aware of their responsibilities to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Therefore, most intrastate conflicts have necessitated that PKOs have some deterrent or enforcement instruments available in order to terminate human tragedies encountered, rather than respecting the principles of the traditional PKO.

It means that in some cases, UN PKOs are required to have intimidating military instruments to end humanitarian suffering as soon as possible rather than living at the mercy of conflicting parties.

Actually, enforcement actions were beyond the scope of the PKO which involved direct military action to ensure compliance with Security Council

resolutions. Enforcement activities, including the use of force, have been the most controversial among the other types of PKOs because a third-party in this case has to use force in order to compel peace despite the will of the parties to fight. There is no need to get the consent of the conflicting parties, which is the main difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, it should be noted here that the use of force must be authorized by the Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter for its legality.

As enforcement actions are close to war, the force must be well-trained, heavily equipped (such as tanks, attack helicopters and combat aircraft) to enforce the Security Council's decision. The hardest part of the peace enforcement operation is to decide on the use of force because that is the most risky option for political leaders in their careers. No political leader would dare to take such a decision unless their national interests are under direct threat.

In light of the information above, it is clear the use of force in PKOs require complementary political support from the major powers, especially from permanent members of the Security Council and effective regional actors to achieve success. It has been clearly observed thıs far that PKOs with the support of the United States have gone forward, while others have suffered from a lack of such support (Durch, 1993).

3. LEBANON AND THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The ancient history of Lebanon between 3000 and 2500 BCE features the glorious civilization of the Phoenicians, they made great achievements in the areas of maritime, navigation, trade, agriculture and craftsmanship. Moreover, they invented the first money and alphabet. The Phoenicians were not a warrior or military power, but rather a naval and trading power in the region. Having established many small city-nations rather than larger kingdoms, they were also skillful at politics as well. They always preferred to compromise with stronger neighbors by paying for peace and their freedom rather than war. The Phoenicians were subjugated by powerful empires such as the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, Roman empires, respectively. By the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE, Lebanon had fallen into the hands of the Arabs. Islamic nations, such as the Omayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, and Mamelukes ruled this region in turn. Subsequently, the Ottomans conquered this region in 1516 and its control lasted more than four centuries. At the end of World War I, the defeated Ottoman Empire had to give up Lebanon and Syria to a French mandate in 1920. Six years later, the French promulgated the foundation of the Republic of Lebanon, which was under their protection. As described on the Lebanese constitution, it was a 'united, independent, indivisible and absolutely sovereign state.' According to the constitution, political power belonged to the Lebanese nation, which was divided between Christians, Sunnis and Shiites. The first government of independent Lebanon was formed after the general election in September, 1943. The French reacted to this *fait accompli* quite sternly, as they did not recognize the unilateral declaration, and arrested a number of prominent Lebanese politicians, including the president, the prime minister and cabinet members. The extreme response of the French authorities united the Christian

and Moslem leaders for independence. As a result of internal resistance and pressure of the international community, especially from the United States and Britain, the French were obliged to release the prisoners in November, 1943. Lebanon joined the UN in 1945 and the real independence of Lebanon was declared when the last French troops left the country a year later.

Due to the fragmented composition in the Lebanese community, the following years proved difficult for Lebanon to accomplish national unity across the country. Although politicians tried to use the 'Arab' or 'Lebanese' identity for national unity from time to time, the main dimension of citizenship was never based on people's legal or political identity, but rather religion or ethnicity. Actually, this endless turmoil stems from Lebanon's formidable religious, sectarian, ethnic and cultural makeup. Supported and provoked by external powers, Lebanon's ethnic and religious groups have been embroiled in a constant struggle for domestic power throughout history. Meanwhile, to keep this strategically important Middle Eastern territory under control, powerful nations from outside have tried to get various Lebanese groups under their protection. The Lebanese could not manage to unify in order to live together in peace and prosperity and they failed to maintain non-violent relations among social groups, which led to them being exploited by outsiders and used for their self-interests.

The important breaking point in Lebanese history was the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 when more than 150,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon as Israeli troops advanced upon their territory. Every subsequent Arab-Israeli war resulted in hundreds of thousands of Palestinians seeking refuge in Lebanon. The existence of a large number of Palestinians in Lebanon caused divergence and controversy between Christian and Moslem politicians. Insisting on different foreign policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict

not brought about only political turmoil in the parliament and government, but also armed conflicts amongst their militia groups, including Palestinian militias. This armed struggle for political power crippled Lebanon's vulnerable democracy and dragged the country into a civil war in 1975, which left 44,000 deaths, 180,000 wounded behind and many thousands of others displaced inside and outside their homeland. Meanwhile, the worst consequence of the civil war was the interminable hatred and hostility between the Christian and Moslem communities.

The activities of the PLO militias in southern Lebanon were a threat to Israel, whereas the Israeli Defense Forces frequently used this pretext to launch military strikes to keep them away from the northern Israeli border (Urquhart, 1987). In 1978, a group of Palestinian militias from Lebanon attacked Israeli territory, killing 36 civilians. Israel retaliated by launching a military operation to establish a security-zone Lebanese territory that would be free of guerilla bases. The Israeli Army occupied almost all of southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River, except for the vicinity around Tyre, which remained under PLO control. Upon this development, the UN Security Council passed a resolution which called upon Israel to immediately withdraw its military forces unconditionally from southern Lebanon.[26] The UN Security Council decided to deploy a peacekeeping force called UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon) in Lebanon in order to supervise the withdrawal of Israel security forces and restore Lebanese Government authority in this area.

[26] The Israeli invasion occurred just as US-sponsored Israeli-Egyptian talks had reached a critical phase. Washington did not desire the Middle East peace process interrupted due to the Israeli occupation of another Arab territory.

3.1. History, Geography and Demographic Features of Lebanon

3.1.1. History of Lebanon.

3.1.1.1. From ancient times to independence.

Between 3,000 - 450 BCE, a seafaring people called the Phoenicians had established small independent kingdoms along the shores of today's Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Each city was noted for trade, maritime, fishing, and agriculture. Although cedar, olive oil and wine were outstanding exporting products, the Phoenicians were better known for their culture and new inventions such as the alphabet and money. The Phoenicians were not a warrior or invader race with a strong army, but rather were peaceful and congenially humorous. Although their richness and amity generally aroused their powerful neighbors, the Phoenicians managed to compromise with them and continue their existence and business in exchange for their tithes. When it came to the Imperial era, the Phoenicians were subjugated by powerful empires such as the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Macedonians and Romans from 2,000 BCE to the 6th century CE (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). Under the Orthodox Byzantine Empire, in addition to intellectual and economic activities, Christianity also flourished in this region. However, Lebanon's mountainous and inaccessible topography provided isolated sanctuaries for different groups. Some of them fled from repression, while others wanted to practice their religions freely (Collelo, 1987). Over the centuries, this remote geography permitted the groups to preserve their age-old customs and culture. From the early 5th century onwards, the Christians of Lebanon preferred to follow the disciples of St. Maron and they became Maronites.

Islamic armies conquered the Lebanese coastal region when they defeated Byzantines at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636. Lebanon became the part of Islamic

Province of Sham. Christian, Maronites, Jews and other non-Moslems were allowed to worship as long as they paid tithes to the Moslems, and Arabic became the official language in this region. Omayyads, Abbassids, and Fatimids ruled the region in turn. During the Omayyad era, some Arab tribes were placed in the coastal region against future attacks from the Byzantines. Islam spread rapidly in Lebanon as a result of this policy which was continued by the Abbassids. During the Fatimid era, a new Islamic sect called Druze emerged in the mountainous areas of Lebanon. The Maronites and Druze are two important religions that have played very important roles throughout Lebanese history. Later on, the Seljuqs invaded Damascus, a portion of Lebanon, and the Holy Cities of Palestine in 1055. The Seljuqs supported the idea of 'Sunnism' against the effects of the Druze in this area (Turk Diyanet Vakfi, 2013). During the Mameluke period, the first Crusader kingdom was established in 1098 and Lebanon was divided between two crusader kingdoms, Tripoli and Jerusalem during the following two centuries. This period marked the rise of the Maronites, who entered a union with the Church of Rome. During the Crusades, the Maronites provided French soldiers, who comprised of the largest group of the Crusader Army, with huge support and help. Consequently, the King of France issued the Maronites an edict in response to their service, declaring that the Maronites would always be under his patronage (Karal, 1983). After the departure of the Crusaders, the Maronites came under attack from the Mamelukes, who controlled the entire region for more than two centuries. Lebanon's demography changed in favor of the Sunni Moslems during the Mameluke rule.

It is worth noting that as we review the history of Lebanon up to the time it became an independent state, almost all its rulers preferred to conduct their

administrative affairs regarding Lebanon by way of Syria as they considered Lebanon to be a province of Syria.

When Ottomans conquered Syria from the Mamelukes in 1516, they appointed a Lebanese ‘Amir’ who directed his region with certain autonomy under the control of the Damascus governor. The first Lebanese ruler was Amir Fakhr ad Din I (1516-44), who was from a feudal Druze family. Under the auspices of the Ottomans, Fakhr ad Din II reinforced his own army and accomplished economic development. He also tried to unite the different religious groups as one Lebanese community. However, these successes encouraged him to attain independence for Lebanon and he made a secret agreement with Ferdinand I against the Ottomans. Informed of this conspiracy, the Ottoman ruler ordered the governor of Damascus to overthrow Fakhr ad Din II. The new Lebanese ruler was Bashir II, from a Sunni family, Shihabs. Because of the defeat of Druze families and Damascus’ repression over them led to rising Maronites predominance. When a great number of the Shihab and Abillama families converted to Christianity, Emir Bashir Shihab II became the first Christian (Maronite) ruler. As a consequence, the Maronites were economically and politically strengthened by benefitting from their rule while the Druze fell from grace. This acute power and taxation imbalance led to an escalation of community tensions, and bloody conflicts occurred between the Druze and Maronites between 1841-60. In addition to the chaos that ruined the country’s economy, seeds of enmity were planted between the two communities, with atrocities and massacres committed on both sides during these conflicts.

As a consequence, the Ottomans abolished the ‘Amir’ system and launched a new system called ‘Double Qaimaqamate’ with consent of France, the UK, Austria, Prussia and Russia in 1842. Lebanon was divided into two administrative districts: the

northern district under a Christian deputy governor, and the southern district under a Druze deputy governor, they were to be responsible to the Ottomans governor of Beirut (Collelo, 1987). But it wasn't long before this partition of Lebanon proved to be a mistake. Increased intolerance and enmity among the religious sects was also stoked by outside powers. For instance, the French supported the Christians, the British supported the Druze, while the Ottomans fomented strife to boost their control (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). The conflict between the Maronites and Druze became widespread until it culminated in a civil war between Christians and Moslems in 1860. Thousands of people, most of whom were Christian, lost their lives (Turk Diyanet Vakfi, 2013). Despite taking some serious measures, the Ottomans could not manage to prevent European intervention in this issue. As protector of the Maronites, the French took the initiative and dispatched 7,000 troops to Beirut.

An international commission represented by Ottoman, France, United Kingdom, Austria, Prussia and Russia convened in Beirut to discuss the problem in 1860. They decided to change the administration system in Lebanon, by appointing an Ottoman Christian governor called 'Mutassarifah' from Istanbul with the approval of the European powers. The governor was provided internal autonomy and he had an advisory council composed of Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni and Shiite members (Salibi, 1988). Lebanon had a moderately peaceful climate and its economic and social life began to flourish during this period. The Mutassarifah system continued successfully until the Ottoman Empire joined sides during World War I in late 1914. After the Ottomans were defeated in the war, the British and French divided the Ottomans' Arab provinces in the Middle East according to the

Sykes-Picot Agreement.[27] This agreement assigned France a mandate on Syria and Lebanon, while British had a mandate on Iraq, Jordan and Palestine.

It would not be an exaggeration if we assert that the creation of Greater Lebanon constituted the basis of all problems they faced in the future. The Maronites had a clear majority of the population in Mount Lebanon (The Christian constituted 80% of the Lebanese population and the remaining 20% were Moslems). In response to pressure from the Maronites, the French announced the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920, which included some parts of Syrian provinces. As it is seen on the map below (Figure 6), Greater Lebanon encompassed the red areas, including the Bekaa, Wadi el-Taym, Jabal Amel, Sur, and Tripoli, which were mainly Moslem dominated regions (Figure 7). Considering the new demographic landscape, all the Christians communities together barely constituted a majority in Greater Lebanon (Salibi, 1988). However, the Maronites kept pressing their demands despite being outnumbered by the Moslem presence of the newly annexed provinces from Syria. Although, the new partition between Syria and Lebanon was thought to be favor of the Maronites while their population decreased to 30% in the country. This situation leaded to sectarian and religious strife for power struggle.[28] Meanwhile, a significant amount of the Moslem population was easily persuaded or provoked by other Arab countries as political leverage in order to keep Lebanon unstable (Salibi, 1988).

[27] The Sykes-Picot Agreement: a secret convention made during World War I (9 May, 1916) between the British and French, with the assent of Imperial Russia for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

[28] The religious identity, rather than nationality or ethnicity, became an important aspect in Lebanon. The political system called “confessionalism” in the country was based on the population rate of each sect. The highest offices were reserved for representatives from certain religious communities.




Figure 6. The map of Greater Lebanon. The red areas stand for the new territories annexed from Syria (taken from Mideastwire Blog, https://mideastwire.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/liban-fcv_07-09-2012_web__cle099ac2-1.jpg).

Some sources assert that despite the French's input regarding the geographic boundaries of the new Lebanon, the Maronites insisted and convinced the French authorities to include the heavily Moslem areas that became greater Lebanon, seen in red on the map. Of course, this enlargement also brought about the change in the

breakdown of the population, in favor of the Moslems. These demographic changes would constitute the center of political debates in the coming decades.




Figure 7. The map of the sectarian distribution in Lebanon (taken from http://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwio5a3WgLnLAhUFOJoKHRWdA2EQjRwIBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcatalog.flatworldknowledge.com%2Fbookhub%2F2657%3Fe%3Dbergle_1.0-ch08_s04&psig=AFQjCNEFNyTGD9rabTvIHzE0sFH6E7imAg&ust).

Six years later, the State of Greater Lebanon was reconstituted as the Lebanese Republic under French protection and the first Lebanese constitution was promulgated as well. The first census was held in 1932, the results of which played a determining factor in selecting major political seats. The president was to be a Maronite-Christian, the Prime Minister, a Sunni-Moslem, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a

Shiite Moslem, according to the proportion of basic religions in the population. Under the Constitution, the French high commissioner continued to exercise supreme power. Three days after the adoption of the constitution, Charles Dabbas, a Greek-Orthodox was elected as the first president of the Lebanon (Collelo, 1987).

Upon outbreak of World War II, the French high commissioner suspended the Lebanese constitution in 1939. British and Free French troops invaded Syria and Lebanon in 1941. As a result of the insistence of Lebanese political leaders and international pressure, the delegate general under General De Gaulle, General Georges Catroux proclaimed the independence of Lebanon in the name of his government (Collelo, 1987). The United States, Britain, Soviet Union, some Arab and Asian countries recognized the independence. Although the French technically recognized its independence, they continued to exercise authority on the territory of Lebanon. General elections were held in 1943, and the new Chamber of Deputies elected Bishara al Khuri as president. He appointed Riyad as Sulh as prime minister and asked him to form the government. The Chamber of Deputies amended the Constitution and abolished the mandate unilaterally (Salibi, 1988). The French's reaction was quite harsh, they arrested a number of prominent Lebanese politicians, including the president, the prime minister and cabinet members. This extreme response of the French authorities' provoked the Christian and Moslem leaders to unite to expel the French. In the face of internal resistance and increasing international pressure, especially from the US and Britain, the French were obliged to release its prisoners on 22 November, 1943. That day has since been celebrated as Independence Day. The foundation of the Republic of Lebanon was based on the 'National Pact'[29] in

[29] The National Pact laid down four main principles. 1) Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. The Christian communities were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the Moslem communities were to protect the independence of Lebanon and prevent its merger with any Arab state.

1943, which was an unwritten agreement between the most prominent Christian and Moslem leaders, Khuri and Sulh. Although Lebanon became a member of the UN in 1945, the last French troops didn't leave the country until 31 December, 1946.

3.1.1.2. From independence to Civil War.

When the first Arab-Israeli war burst upon the scene in 1948, many Palestinians were forced to leave their country. The Lebanese-Christian politicians did not want more than 180,000 Palestinian refugees to integrate with Lebanon and they tried to get rid of them as soon as possible. The Palestinians were forced to live in refugee camps under great duress and poverty (Rabinovich, 1985). Meanwhile, Palestinians had always maintained an important place in Lebanese politics since then.

By 1950, Moslem opposition increased against the Lebanese Government as they demanded fairer political representation in the administration. The balance between religious communities in Lebanon was accepted by the National Pact of 1943, which was based on 1932 Census data. The Moslems criticized the government, claiming the Christians, who alleged they were the majority of the population, occupied the most important posts disproportionately. Although the Moslem community asked for a new census to prove their numerical superiority, the Christians refused unless the new census was to include Lebanese emigrants who were mainly Christians (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004).

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2) Although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its official language, it could not sever its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, which had helped it attain such a notable degree of progress. 3) Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab nations, should cooperate with other Arab nations, and in case of conflict among them, should not take sides with one state against another. 4) Public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be given to competence without regard to confessional considerations. Moreover, the three top government positions should be distributed as follows; the president of the republic should be a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni Moslem; the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shiite Moslem. The ratio of deputies was to be six Christians to five Moslems.

When the Suez crisis began in 1956, President Camille Chamoun refused to take a stand in Lebanon against the UK and France despite of the Moslems' insistence. This crisis tainted England's and France's reputation, while Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser increased his popularity in the Arab world. After the Suez Crisis, Nasser became the symbol of pan-Arabism. When Egypt and Syria converged politically as 'The United Arabic Republic' in 1958, the Pan-Arab movement reached its climax and pro-Nasser demonstrations spread in the Arab countries. Although, Nasser was quite an impressive and charismatic leader in the eyes of the Arabs in Lebanon, Lebanese-Christian politicians stayed away from this understanding, they considered that cooperation and close ties with the West were only way to ensure the country's independence. This period of unrest led to friction between President Chamoun's indifference to Pan-Arab desires and prominent Moslem leaders' (such as Canpolat, Karami, Selam) sympathy to the Arab world, rather than the West (Collelo, 1987).

The developments and events that occurred in the Middle East, especially, the union of Syria and Egypt, escalated the debates between Chamoun and Pan-Arab dissidents. Actually, the beginning of events stemmed from Chamoun's ambition for re-election as president, which needed a constitution amendment. Chamoun's supporters received an absolute majority in the 1957 election, in which some prominent non-Christian leaders and pan-Arab politicians were not elected therefore the opposition accused them of rigged. This tension in the Lebanese community increased further with the assassination of Maronite Nasib al-Matni, a columnist of the anti-Chamoun Al Talagraph daily and conflict ensued amongst armed militia groups. Soon after these events, the conflicts plunged out of control and expanded throughout the country. Although it was an uprising or common opposition against

Pjresident Chamoun's lawlessness, he requested the assistance of the United States to maintain his political power by arguing that Lebanon's independence was threatened by international communism. He summoned the British and French ambassadors and explained how serious the situation in Lebanon was, claiming that revolting Moslems in Lebanon were provided Soviet arms from Syria. The US had to accede to this demand by taking the situation in Iraq into consideration.[30] According to the bilateral agreement of 15 July, 1958 between the US and Lebanon, which was the part of Eisenhower Doctrine, 15,000 American troops were dispatched to help Lebanon. These forces did not get involved in civil conflicts but prevented rebels from obtaining aid from abroad. With the intervention of the US, the 1958 crisis came to end without further escalation. Around 2,000-4,000 casualties were incurred during the skirmishes, primarily in the Moslem areas of Beirut and Tripoli (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004).

Although plenty of western sources have preferred to describe these bloody conflicts as a civil war between Christian and Moslems in 1958, this did not reflect reality, which showed there was a power struggle among the political actors and their supporters rather than religious conflicts. Actually, the conflict occurred among pro-Chamoun Maronites, anti-Chamoun Emile Edde and the remaining part of the country (dissident Maronites, Melchites and Moslems). Among the opposition group, there were four former foreign ministers, his predecessor Bishara Khoury, the army commander, two future presidents and the Maronite Patriarch (Gilmour, 1983).

At the end of this crisis, the Lebanon parliament chose the Commander of the Armed Forces, General Fuad Shihab as President in 1959. Under his successful

[30] A group of officers led by Brigadier General Abd aal-Karim Quasim overthrew the monarchy in Iraq on 14 July, 1958. Although they were inspired by pan-Arab thinking, the Western world and US Government regarded this sudden military coup as a Soviet advance in the Middle East.

leadership, Fuad Shihab enabled stability in the country, invigorated the economy, made reforms with feudal values and enabled greater representation of religious sects by increasing the number of parliament deputies.

Although Lebanon remained neutral during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, she could not prevent a new wave of Palestinian refugees who sought protection in neighboring Arab countries and Lebanon. There were many armed Palestinian guerillas amongst the refugee groups as well. As the number of refugee camps increased in Lebanon, Palestinian guerrillas began conducting raids into Israel from these border camps. Each time, Israel responded immediately and harshly to these attacks to provoke and encourage Lebanese politicians to deal with this problem themselves. Arab countries with a bone to pick with Israel acknowledged the Palestinian guerilla attacks as self-defense and supported them indirectly.

Encouraged by Syria, Palestinian guerillas launched armed attacks against Israel from Lebanon. As retaliation, Israel launched an airstrike on Beirut International Airport in 1968, destroying 31 airplanes belonging to the Lebanese airlines. Upon Israel's harsh reaction, Christian politicians in Lebanon wanted to take strict measures against Palestinians in the country and they tried to limit their movements. The Lebanese Army tried to suppress the Palestinian militia groups. Lebanese Moslem politicians and neighboring Arab countries reacted to this situation, claiming Israel conducted an open military attack on an independent, sovereign country against international law and regulations, but the Lebanese Government preferred to oppress the wretched Palestinian population instead of fighting against Israel.

Clashes between the guerrillas and Lebanese Army occurred when the latter attacked some guerrilla camps in order to limit their freedom of movement. In an effort to defuse tensions in the country, negotiations were held between Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami, which resulted with the Lebanese commander-in-chief and Yasser Arafat signing the Cairo Agreement on 2 November, 1969. Although, the agreement was to limit guerrilla operations against Israel from southern Lebanon, Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon were granted legal recognition. The agreement provided refugees with the right to work, to form self-governing committees and to use arms to defend themselves against Israeli commando raids. The Palestinian Resistance Movement[31] (PRM) assumed the daily management of these refugee camps, providing health, educational and social services as well as security.

With the justification that Palestinian groups in Jordan were involved in a failed coup against the King of Jordan, Hussein in September, 1970, the Jordan Army launched a military operation against the Palestinian guerillas during which more than 3,000 armed militias were killed. Most of the refugees and armed militiamen from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were expelled from Jordan to Syria and Lebanon. After their expulsion, the PLO regrouped in Lebanon, where they made an alliance with Moslem-leftist political parties and politically active Shiite groups. This situation further increased the political abyss between Christian and Moslem parties in Lebanon as the government was too weak to impose controls on the Palestinians. Clashes between Phalangists and Palestinian guerillas as well as pro-guerilla Moslem

[31] The PRM was a political movement with its militia power to defend the rights of the Palestinians who were forced to leave their country by Israeli armed forces.

protests spread across the country.[32] However, the Lebanese Government tried to alleviate the unrest by imposing measures against the protestors, initiating new social and economic programs, and negotiating with the guerilla groups (Collelo, 1987).

As a retaliation to Israeli attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon which increased tensions between Lebanon and Israel, and pressure of the army to suppress Palestinian militia groups the guerilla infiltration caused the disintegration of the Lebanese Army[33] along sectarian lines, which meant the government had no legal instrument strong enough to intervene in events.

In the early 1970's, Lebanon was full of guerilla actions, Israeli retaliations, anti-government demonstrations, strikes and economic problems such as runaway inflation and unemployment. Palestinian guerillas increased their 'hit-and-run' attacks on northern Israel and Israel retaliated by assaulting the PLO's camps in southern Lebanon. Within this mutual conflicting environment, Israeli military retaliations caused massive damage to Lebanon's already insufficient infrastructure and many civilian losses as well. Under these circumstances, the Lebanese Government was crippled because of incompatible political understanding and preferences between its Christian and Moslem politicians. The problem was that the decisions of parties had something which frightened the Christians or Moslems, in terms of the future of the country.

In 1973, armed conflicts between Palestinians and Lebanese soldiers in Beirut spread throughout the country, which led to the government having to declare martial

[32] The Phalange Party, a Christian right-wing political party, was founded in 1936 as a Maronite paramilitary youth organization by Pierre Jumayyil (who modeled it on fascist organizations he observed while in Berlin as an Olympic athlete). The Phalange (Kataib in Arabic) was authoritarian and very centralized party and its leader was all powerful. It quickly grew into a major political force in Mount Lebanon.

[33] The Lebanese Army was dominated by Christian officers at high posts. Although there were some brigades, the majority of his soldiers were Christians, most of the units were composed of Sunni, Shiite and Druze soldiers.

law. There were also Palestinian guerillas from Syria involved in the clashes between the guerillas and the Lebanese Army in Lebanon. While the turmoil continued in Lebanon, the President of Syria, Hafez al-Assad said on 26 August, “Syria and Lebanon are one country and one nation, but they have two governments,” indicating just how much political influence Syria had on Lebanon.

The clashes in Lebanon at that time could not be categorized as a conflict between the Lebanese Army and the PLO or as Christian versus Moslem. The true composition of the warring factions was far more complex. It is possible to divide the conflicting parties into two main groups. The side in favor of maintaining the status quo, comprised of the Maronite militias of the Jumayyil, Chamoun, and Faranjiyah clans, was known as the Lebanese Front (LF). The other side wanted to change Lebanon’s political system. Known as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), they were led by Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party[34] (PSP); this group included the PSP, a variety of leftist militias and Palestinian guerillas.

[34] Founded in 1949 by members of various sects who were proponents of social reform and progressive change, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) had been represented in the Chamber of Deputies since 1951. The party flourished under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. He appealed to the Druze because of his position as zaim, to other Moslems who were disenchanted with the traditional political system, and to members of some other sects who were attracted by his secular and progressive rhetoric.

3.1.2. Lebanon's geography.



Figure 8. A physical map of Lebanon (taken from https://www.google.com.tr/imgres?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fupload.wikimedia.org%2Fwikipedia%2Fcommons%2F6%2F6c%2FLebanon_Topography.png&imgrefurl=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FGeography_of_Lebanon&docid=G2LmKPBY0JTchM&tbnid=slIN_EeCZ96e8M%3A&w=1636&h=1804&ved=0ahUKEwj-6tqyooTMAhUG3iwKHYghArsQMwgfKAAwAA&iact=mrc&uact=8)

Compared to other nations in the region, Lebanon is a small country (10,400 km^2), and possesses no remarkable natural resources. Situated on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon is bound to the north and east by Syria, to the south by Israel and to the west by the Mediterranean.[35] The name 'Lebanon' is derived from the Aramaic word 'white,' because of its snow-covered mountain peaks.

[35] While borders with Syria were set by France in 1920 and then accepted by Syria, the borders with Israel (Palestine) were decided through an Anglo-French agreement in 1923. Indeed the borders mean nothing to inhabitants who were nomadic tribesmen living in temporary homes (tents or other portable shelters), moving from one place to another, depending on the seasons and movements of their livestock. Crossing the border is part of their daily business. The first physical border line (barbed

Lebanon's geography, mountains and other physical features divide the country into sections, each having their own character and distinctive population. Religious and ethnic communities have been able to build and hold their own territories. Throughout the centuries, they have enjoyed living to maintain their traditions, laws, and religious beliefs in autonomy (Rubin, 2009).

3.1.2.1. Landscape.

In looking at the map of Lebanon, four major geographical features stand out: the coastal strip, the Lebanon Mountains, the Bekaa Valley, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.

The Lebanon Mountains cover most of the country, which have also provided isolation and security to several religious sects throughout history. Running parallel to the shore, these mountains shield the Bekaa Valley and Anti-Lebanon Mountains from maritime influences, so these areas get less precipitation and humidity. Situated southeast of Tripoli, the highest peak of the Lebanon Mountains reaches over 3,000 m.

Towering over the border with Syria, the Anti-Lebanon mountains are almost equal in length and height with the Lebanon Mountains. The Anti-Lebanon mountains receive more precipitation, much of which appears as snow. Like those of the Lebanon Mountains, its peaks are covered with snow for much of the year. Meanwhile, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains are more arid, less productive and less populated.

Situated between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains, the Bekaa Valley is about 180 km. long and 10 - 16 km. wide, with an average elevation of 760 m. The

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wire) was erected in 1938 to prevent smuggling or terrorist movements. The controversy surrounding the borders with Israel is still ongoing.

valley has a Mediterranean climate, wet and snowy in winter and dry and hot in summer. The region receives limited rainfall because the Lebanon Mountains hinder precipitation coming from the sea. Nevertheless, the melted snow runoff from the mountains creates plenty of small rivers, making the Bekaa Valley one of the most fertile regions of the Middle East.

The flora in Lebanon differs from region to region, ranging from sub-tropical area to the desert. The most famous native plant, the cedar, is the emblem of Lebanon and the symbol of the nation's flag. Native of Lebanon, this was the most famous tree in all of antiquity. The most valuable cedar timber shaped the economy of ancient Lebanon. The Phoenicians used these trees to build their ships, as well as trade and build their mighty civilization. The cedars were cut from the snow-covered peaks, transported west to the coastal ports, and exported throughout the world. The remaining cedars today survive in the mountainous areas at an altitude of more than 2,000 meters.

3.1.2.2. Climate.

Regarding the diverse topography, the weather varies quite considerably from region to region. Lebanon has three different climate zones; the coastal strip, the mountains, and the Bekaa Valley.

The coastal strip has cool, rainy winters and rather hot, humid summers with little or no rain. The Lebanon Mountain range concentrates the summer heat and humidity on the coast to a stifling degree (Carte, Dunston, & Thomas, 2008). While the weather on the coast is warm and dry during the spring and autumn, heavy rainfall can be seen between October and April. The mountains offer a typical alpine climate. The summers feature a wider range of temperatures and less humidity. The fresh

breezes keep the summer heat at bay which is why many people head up into the mountains to escape the heat. Meanwhile, the altitude of the mountains produces colder winters with more precipitation and heavy snow which falls on the higher peaks from December to May. Like those of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, snow covers the highest peak of the Lebanon Mountains for much of the year.

The Bekaa Valley sits in the middle of Lebanon's two massive mountain ranges. Well-irrigated by two rivers, the Litani and the Orontes, the valley has hot, dry summers and cold, dry winters with snow and frost. Because it is set between two parallel mountain ranges, the wind can blow fiercely through the valley during winter.

3.1.2.3. Rivers.

Compared to neighboring Arab countries and Israel, Lebanon is a water rich country. As Lebanon's longest and widest river, the Litani River rises from the southern Bekaa Valley and runs south, makes an abrupt turn to the west before reaching the Mediterranean. It has been used to produce hydroelectric power, providing drinking and irrigation water to the country. The Orontes River, also known as the Assi River, flows northwards between the parallel ranges of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains through Syria and Turkey before falling in the sea. It is mainly used for irrigation and agricultural purposes. The source of the Barada River, which waters Damascus, is a spring in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.

Although Lebanon has many rivers and streams, they are not navigable; they rise in the spring due to the increased precipitation and descend with the lower water levels during the summer.

While the water dispute between Israel and Lebanon is ongoing, Lebanon accused Israel of illegally diverting and stealing water from the Litani, during its 1978-2000 occupation of southern Lebanon.

3.1.2.4. Roads.

The country's infrastructure and transportation facilities were severely damaged during the Lebanese civil war and Israeli invasions.



Figure 9. Lebanon road map (taken from http://www.mapsofworld.com/lebanon/road-map.html).

3.1.3. Demographic structure.

The last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932, and no other census has been made since then. As all data used today is based on different projected estimates or unofficial statistics, figures regarding Lebanon's demographic makeup do not comply with each other and are given differently in various sources. As of 2015, the population of Lebanon was estimated to be 6,184,701 (The World Factbook: Lebanon, 2017). As for its ethnic breakdown, Lebanon's population is

ethnically homogeneous; Arab (95%), Armenian (4%) and other ethnic backgrounds comprise the remaining 1%.[36] Despite the ethnically Arab majority in Lebanese community, they could not accomplish national integrity because many conflicts have resulted from religious sectarianism and political differences, rather than ethnic diversity.

Although the languages spoken in Lebanon include Arabic, French, English and Armenian, Arabic is overwhelmingly used in public spaces.

As one of the most educated populations of the Middle East, 94% of the Lebanese people are literate (Male 96%, Female 92%) (The World Factbook: Lebanon, 2017). It has also a relatively young population, with 42% less than 24 years of age. Despite all the wars, Lebanon's life expectancy is quite high. The birth-rate is 14.59 per '000, while the death-rate is 4.88 per '000.

Lebanon is a democratic republic with a parliament, a cabinet, and a president, although power is divided along religious lines. Because the balance of power was adjusted during the 1943 National Pact, in which key political posts were distributed according to religious groups (depending on the data of 1932 census). The system is known as 'confessionalism.' It gave the Christian sects, especially the Maronites, a predominance that ended up becoming a main issue for political disputes. The President, the head of state, is a Maronite Catholic; the Prime Minister, the head of government, is a Sunni Moslem; the Speaker of the House, is a Shiite Moslem who presides over Parliament. However, Moslems increased their political power through the Taif Accord in 1989.

[36] Many Christian Lebanese do not identify themselves as Arab but rather they prefer to be called Phoenicians.

Lebanon is considered the world's richest country in terms of sects. Those who ruled over these territories throughout the centuries never tried to impose a single religion on the people. The Lebanese constitution officially recognizes 18 religious sects that have their own courts and traditions about family law.[37] Upper religious identity, Christian or Moslem, is not an absolute factor for Lebanese people in determining their political preferences. Different sects within the same religion have rarely united. On the contrary, alliances or friendships have taken place between sects of different religions (Gilmour, 1983). The two main elements of Lebanese community, the Christian and Moslem populations were nearly equal when it was founded as an independent county in 1943, and the whole political structure which called "confessionalism", was built on this equation (Gilmour, 1983).[38] However a higher birth rate among Shiite Moslems and a considerable number of emigrants among the Christians has since upset this balance (Maktabi, 1999).[39] New political claims from the Shiite group, which constitutes the poorest segment of the Lebanese community, have cranked up the tension and struggle among those who want to keep the status quo and their vested political advantages. According to the 2015 estimate, the breakdown is as follows; Moslem 54% (27% Sunni, 27% Shiite), Christian 40.5% (21% Maronite Catholic, 8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 6.5% other

[37] These are the 18 religious communities officially acknowledged by the state: Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Ismailia, Jewish, Latin Catholic, Maronite Catholic, Melkite Greek Catholic, Protestant, Sunni, Shiite, Syrian Catholic and Syrian Orthodox. (Non-recognized religious communities are Baha'i, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormon, Hindu, and Buddhist.

[38] Confessionalism is a system of government that allocates political power among a country's communities whether religious or ethnic, according to their percentage of the population. It became the basic principle in Lebanese life. As it was pointed out by Saeb Salam, a former prime minister that "for the Lebanese, religion serves as a passport, a cheque, a privilege and a certificate of competence. It is difficult to overestimate the effect of man's religion on his life and career in Lebanon." Because of the principle enshrined in the National Pact that each sect must have its fair share of power, confessional membership was often more important for someone applying for a state appointment than his actual qualifications.

[39] She argues that while 35% of the total Christian citizenry were emigrants, only 9% of the total non-Christian citizenry were emigrants. In other words, 85% of the emigrant citizenry was Christian while Moslem emigrants constituted only 15% of the total emigrant population.

Christian), Druze 5.6% (The World Factbook: Lebanon, 2017). Figure 10 shows the regions where the different religious groups are concentrated.




Figure 10. Breakdown of religious groups (https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&ved=0ahUKEwjeyq7W2o7MAhVEcA8KHTa0DF8QjRwIBw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fobiatlebanon2011.wordpress.com%2F&psig=AFQjCNEtfD9QSbMUQag2dwS7dPKCaEo7nA&ust=1460742408656189)

As mention before, data regarding Lebanon's demography is not based on updated official information, but rather on estimates as conducting a new census has been a very sensitive issue due to sectarian divisions in Lebanon. The 1932 census had a crucial role in the state-building process of Lebanon; political representation and citizenship identity was also based on its findings. The restrictive citizenship

policy performed by the Maronite-dominated regime until the civil war of 1975 was understood as a way to maintain political superiority in this ethnically and religiously divided community (Maktabi, 1999). The civil war in Lebanon could be regarded as an attempt in order to adjust the existing political power distribution to current demographic realities. The political life in Lebanon, the political representation on the government and key posts was also based on the findings of the 1932 census. Although Lebanon is a democratic republic, the parliament, cabinet and presidency are divided along religious and sectarian lines, therefore demographic realities have played a significant role in this country's political scene.

3.2. Internal and External Actors

It was revealed by the civil war that the Lebanese Government and its political system were unable to function in the face of serious problems. Since the civil war, the state sovereignty had been irreversibly tarnished, law and order had collapsed, the government's authority lost all credibility, and the basic infrastructure and economy were left in tatters. Domestic political debates as well as the interests of external actors made the conflicts worse in Lebanon. While the Syrian regime managed to maintain its decisive influence in Lebanese affairs through its military presence as a part of the ADF, Israel and Syria preferred to use Lebanon as a buffer state and battleground, and Palestinians wanted to use Lebanese territory as a safe logistic and training base for guerilla attacks on Israel (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). As Mona Ghali wrote, had external actors not intervened, the conflicting parties would have been able to arrive at an acceptable political settlement much sooner in Lebanon (Durch, 1993). While all the external actors in this conflict had some interest at stake, their intervention caused the intra-Lebanese conflict to expand to the regional level, making it all the more complicated in the process.

3.2.1. Internal actors.

One of the factors that deem Lebanon a distinctive country is the diversity of its people. These different characteristics which stem from their historical knowledge and experience of the people and communities are the basis for political disputes in Lebanon. If necessary, these are the generalizations which reflect the broad political attitudes of the each religious group in Lebanon. The Christians, mainly Maronites, were traditionally nationalist and western-oriented Lebanese; the Greek Orthodox were heterodox and leftist, the Sunni Moslem were Pan-Arab nationalist; the Druze were parochial; whereas the Shiite were the largest and poorest religious group, the majority of whom were largely silent peasants (Rubin, 2009).

3.2.1.1. The Lebanese Army

The Lebanese Army had 19,000 troops before its disintegration in early-1976. Lebanon had a one-year mandatory conscription system for males over 18 years old (Khalidi, 1979).

After its independence, the Lebanese Government preferred to keep a small army because of its political structure. The Christians feared that Moslems might use the army for a military coup in order to grab political power in the country. Another concern was that a strong Lebanese Army would have been used in an Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, the Moslems were also worried that a large army mainly commanded by Christian officers and generals could be used as an instrument to pressure the Moslem community. In addition to these concerns, leaders of ethnic/religious communities enjoyed having their own armed militias and they did not want to wrestle with a well-equipped, strong army that would erode their personal power.

The officer breakdown of the army was that 65% of the postings were for Christians, with the remaining 35% were allocated for Moslems. Furthermore, while the Christians mainly dominated the operational and intelligence branches, the ratio of commanding officer posts was also in favor of the Christians. In addition to all these, the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Military Intelligence were assigned to Christians. Considering the Christian-dominated Lebanese Government, the Moslems were not pleased about this composition and they did not feel safe at all.

Before the civil war, the Lebanese Army had about 100 tanks and an equal number of armored personnel carriers. It also had about 75 artillery pieces as well as an equal number of anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank missiles (Khalidi, 1979). The Lebanese Navy only had five patrol boats under Maronite officer command. The Air Force had some 24 aircraft which did not fly sorties during the civil war.

The civil war accelerated the disintegration of the Lebanese Army. The first move came from Moslem dissidents, a Sunni Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatip announced the establishment of the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) and that they would no longer take orders from Maronite commanders. Afterwards, the Army of Free Lebanon (AFL) was founded in Beirut under the command of Maronite Colonel Antoine Barakat, who declared his loyalty to President Frangieh. The remainder of the Lebanese Army tried to maintain its neutrality during the civil war. In the face of these events, the government's ability to maintain and control order was rapidly undermined.

After the 1982 Israeli invasion, the Lebanese Government decided to have a strong, unified army for the security of the country. The rebuilding plan aimed at creating a 12-brigade, 60,000-man army, equipped with French and American arms,

and trained by French advisers. In addition, they planned to rebuild their Navy and Air Force and increase the Internal Security Force to a strength of 20,000 troops (Collelo, 1987).

3.2.1.2. The Lebanese National Movement (LNM)

The LNM was a broad coalition embracing the entire Moslem-Leftist opposition during Lebanon's civil war years. While the demand for a revolution in the status-quo was their shared objective, both the Maronite and Moslem confessional establishment became their common enemy. Stated in a joint program adopted in August, 1975, their common goals were to establish a new political system based on truly democratic participation which provided social justice for all Lebanese people, regardless of their sectarian identity (Khalidi, 1979). The LNM was headed by Kamal Jumblatt, a prominent Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party. Apart from their strategic ally, the PLO, the LNM included several Lebanese political parties and groups such as the Progressive Socialist Party, the Amal Movement (a Shiite party), substantial numbers of Christians, particularly from the Greek Orthodox sect as well as Pan-Arab parties. The movement also had a considerable number of militia forces. The Palestinian armed groups had around 8,000 fighters prior to the Israeli invasion in 1982. The Progressive Socialist Party had over 5,000 fighters and the Amal Movement fighters were estimated at about 3,500. Hezbollah was another Shiite political party with over 4,000 fighters which operated mainly in southern Lebanon. Other members of this camp included; the Syrian Nationalist Party (800-1,000 fighters) whose support mainly came from Orthodox Christians, the Communist Party (600-700 fighters), the Independent Nasserite Movement, which was a predominantly Sunni Moslem party (its militia forces, Al-Mourabitoun, which were particularly

powerful in Beirut's Sunni Moslem neighborhoods, had 3,000 fighters) (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 16).

3.2.1.3. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).

Founded by a prominent Druze leader, Kamal Jumblatt in 1949, the PSP party's program defended secularism, social reforms and progressive change in the Lebanese political system. Although the party has had a mainly Druze base, it embraces Moslems who reacted to the traditional political system and Christians who have been attracted to the party's secular and progressive rhetoric (Collelo, 1987). The PSP has been represented in parliament since 1951 and the leader of the party, Kamal Jumblatt played many active roles in Lebanese politics until his assassination in March, 1977. The PSP's militias did not hesitate to fight against the Lebanese Army and Christian, particularly Phalangist, forces during the civil wars of 1958 and 1975. A close relation was continued between the Syrian Army and PSP militias, who were supplied with Syrian weapons for many years.

3.2.1.4. Independent Nasserite Movement (INM).

The INM was a secular, pan-Arab nationalist political organization created in 1958. The movement became inspired by the ideals of Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and the core ideology of the movement was summarized by its slogan; "Liberty, Socialism, and Unity". The members of the INM were predominantly Moslem; its membership was composed of 45% Sunni, 45% Shiite, 10% Druze, as well as minor numbers of other Lebanese sects (Rolland, 2003, p. 145). The INM had a militia force of 3,000 fighters called 'Murabitun,' which was the main ally of the Palestinian movement against the Phalangist troops. They fought with Palestinians against the Israeli Defense Forces in the 1982 invasion and with PSP militias against the Lebanese Army in the Shuf Mountains in 1983. However, collaboration with the

PSP did not last long, as it was made redundant by the joint PSP-Amal campaign in 1985.

3.2.1.5. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP).

As one of the oldest multi-sectarian parties in Lebanon, the LCP was founded in 1924. Although the French authority banned activity of the LCP and declared illegal in 1939, the ban was lifted in 1943. Indeed, the party did not gain considerable politic influence on Lebanese politics until 1965. To overcome their politic isolation, the party decided to become a member of Lebanese National Movement under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. The LCP was legalized by Jumblatt during his tenure as Minister of Interior in 1970. The LCP's importance enhanced by its well-trained militia forces, which played active roles in the fighting of 1975-76, in organizing the 1973-74 workers' strike and student protest movements of the early 1970s (Rolland, 2003). The party's popularity began to wane in the 1980s, when they fought with the Islamic Unification Movement, a fundamentalist Sunni movement, in Tripoli and with Amal militias in West Beirut.

3.2.1.6. The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).

The party was founded as a secret organization by Antun Saadah, a Greek Orthodox, in 1932. The SSNP was based on fascist ideology and the organization and began to flourish in the years after independence. It was one of the most influential multi-sectarian and secular parties in Lebanon. The SSNP was a countrywide organization with Christian and Moslem members. The main goal of the party was to re-establish a historic Greater Syria including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and part of southern Turkey. They used the acts of violence to achieve its objectives and declared a revolution in Lebanon in 1949, after which the party was outlawed by the government, its leader executed, and thousands of members imprisoned. After

1960, the party underwent profound ideological changes and it became a leftist organization, with a number of its members joined the Lebanese National Movement and fought alongside the PLO during the 1975 Civil War.

3.2.1.7. Amal.

The Amal Movement was founded in 1975 by Imam Musa al-Sadr to promote the rights of the Shiite community in Lebanon. Amal was a secular party and its program did not aim at creating an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Because of this, the party preferred to establish a close cooperation with Syria rather than Iran. Amal claimed that the confessional system was the only reason for all problems faced in Lebanon, therefore it needed to be repealed as soon as possible. Imam Musa's fields of discourse concentrated on the impoverished Shiite community in Lebanon. He was not in favor of conflict but rather called upon peace and equality amongst all Lebanese religions and sects. Amal was not content with being a political party in the system, but operated as a charity organization to assist the needy who were in poverty with economic and social problems. Meanwhile, the movement gave all deprived people a helping hand regardless of their religious affiliation, thus broadening the scope of the party. Although the movement had its own militia forces, Imam Musa refused to get involved in the fighting during the civil war of 1975. However, this passiveness caused disillusionment amongst the PLO and its allies. Moreover, it was widely criticized by the Shiite majority, which was eager to support the Palestinian cause. The Iranian Revolution triggered an understanding of the social unity and solidarity among the Shiite community in Lebanon, whereby a greater number of Shiites began to rally around the Amal movement. Feeling uneasy about the growing strength of Amal in southern Lebanon, the PLO's militia force tried to hinder the progress of the Amal movement in that area (Collelo, 1987). However, Amal

succeeded in becoming the most powerful party within the Shiite community across the country. There is no doubt that Sadr's personality played an important role in achieving this success. Musa al-Sadr disappeared mysteriously during a visit to Libya in 1978. It is believed that he was killed intentionally by the Libyan authorities.

Under the leadership of Nabih Berri, the Amal Movement participated to the 1985 Tripartite Agreement brokered by Syria among the leaders of the Maronite, Druze and Shiite communities. The agreement approved and supported the existence of Syrian military forces in Lebanon to help terminate the Lebanese civil war. In addition, Syria and Amal had a common interest in preventing the return of PLO forces in southern Lebanon because guerilla activities in this area provoked Israeli retaliations that cause serious destruction and the loss of life in Lebanon (Osoegawa, 2013).

The secular policy and moderate approaches of the Amal movement were strongly criticized by some radicals who later founded another party as an alternative called Hezbollah. Although both these parties tried to emphasize the impoverished conditions of the Shiite community and promote their socio-economic means with equal political rights, they competed against each other for being Lebanon's premier representative of Shiite community.

3.2.1.8. Hezbollah.

It was established by a group of Shiite clerics in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran used its Islamic rhetoric more for exporting its revolution to other Arab countries in order to enhance its political influence in the region. Hezbollah maintained close ties with Iran in their struggle against the Israeli Defense Force. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran

dispatched some of its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon in 1982. Iran also set up training camps for Hezbollah militias in Lebanon and provided them with arms, logistic support and funds (Byers, 2003). Significant military success of Hezbollah fighters against Israeli forces enhanced the party's perceived popularity as a resistance movement amongst the Lebanese community.

Promoting the economic and political rights of the Shiite community, expelling Israeli and Western forces from Lebanon and the creation of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon were among the objectives of Hezbollah. The party knew very well how to gain the people's support, organizing in poor neighborhoods, slums and suburbs and giving the people what the government was unable. Meanwhile, Hezbollah did not refrain from using force to achieve its goal of competing with Amal for leadership of the Shiite community. Hezbollah militias launched attacks on the Israeli Defense Forces and its ally, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), as well as foreign powers in Lebanon.

The reality was that the Shiites were politically under-represented and economically strapped, almost 85% lived in the rural region of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[40] They were constantly caught in the middle of fighting between Israel and the PLO. Therefore, many of them had to migrate to the slums of Beirut known as the 'belt of misery,' in order to escape the dangers of the conflict environment. The poor, desperate masses in the suburbs of Beirut became a breeding ground for Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups. Hezbollah worked well like a charity organization, they provided social services and medical care for the disabled, widows, orphans and the poor. They operated hospitals, clinics, schools, soup kitchens, shelters and housing. All these facilities and services were run

[40] The Shiites believed that their representation was not commensurate with their actual numerical size.

professionally and were made available for Moslems and Christians alike. There were many Christian and Druze doctors and teachers who worked in these centers. These kinds of public assistance and relief actions increased the reputation and prestige of Hezbollah among the Lebanese community (Byers, 2003). Keeping away from the sectarian conflict was another positive factor which raised Hezbollah's reputation in Lebanon.

The *raison d'etre* of Hezbollah was to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon either by persuasion or by force. For this reason, in addition to the military success of expelling Israeli and Western forces from Lebanon, they accomplished their legal activities in the political arena. The party managed to become a key power-broker in determining important political decisions. Though Hezbollah has been represented in Parliament since 2009, it was designated a terrorist organization by Western nations, Israel, and some Arab countries.

3.2.1.9. The Lebanese Front (LF)

The Lebanese Front emerged as a political power in Lebanon under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel in 1976. It was a right-wing coalition of Maronite Christian parties in Lebanon and their armed militia forces for creating a joint front against the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The LF enjoyed having most powerful official positions (the presidency and the command of the army) in Lebanon's administrative system. They embraced the idea of Lebanese Christian nationalism which set out to fight against challenges from radical Moslems and international communism.

The front consisted of the Phalangist Party, the National Liberal Party and some Christian militia forces (Rubin, 2009) (such as Marada Brigade,[41] Tigers Militia,[42] the Guardians of the Cedars,[43] Al-Tanzim).[44] İt also included intellectuals, academics, journalists, diplomats, and religious leaders who benefited from the existing Lebanese system. Besides its 18,000-man militia force, the power of the LF was due to the alliance of major Christian parties. After the assassination of Bachir Gemayel in 1982, the LF faced a violent leadership struggle and political changes which caused serious rifts among the allies. Towards the end of the 1980's, Samir Geagea, leader of the LF, preferred an anti-Syrian position and promoted the political ties with Israel.

3.2.1.10. Phalangist Party.

This party was established by Pierre Jumayyil as a Maronite paramilitary organization in 1936 (Collelo, 1987). He took an example from the German National Socialist party while founding the Phalangist party. Phalangist ideology emphasized the 'Phoenician' identity rather than pan-Arabism and they maintained an anti-communist and anti-Palestinian stance.

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[41] The Marada Movement was a Lebanese political party and a Maronite Christian militia organization. It was also known as the Zgharta Liberation Army. The Marada Brigade was established by Suleiman Frangieh, Ex-President of Lebanon, in 1976 and commanded by his son. They fought against the PLO and LNM forces.

[42] Tigers Militia was the military wing of the National Liberal Party (NLP). It was organized under the auspices of Camille Chamoun, the ex-President of Lebanon, in 1976. With 3.500 warriors, the Tigers Militia achieved to become the second largest militia force in the Christian Lebanese Front.

[43] The Guardians of Cedars was a far-right ultranationalist Lebanese political party with 3,000-6,000 militia force. It was founded by Etienne Saqr in the early 1970s. The party got famous in 1976 when the Palestinian refugee camp, Tel al-Zaatar in Beirut was brutalized and assaulted by its militias. The Guardians of Cedars fought against the PLO, Shiite and Druze militias to defend the Christian towns in South Lebanon in 1985.

[44] Al-Tanzim was an ultranationalist, secret Christian military organization. It was formed by an extreme right-wing group, they called for the Lebanese people take up arms to defend the country against threats from Palestinians. They recruited young men and women who were Christian volunteers and trained them in the secret camps (15,000 persons were trained by the end of 1980). They were also supported by the Lebanese Army and supplied their fighters with weapons from Israel.

The party got a chance to bolster its power by means of its well-equipped and well-trained militia during the 1958 Civil War.[45] It was generally regarded as an important ally of Israel and its militias were supplied militarily mainly by Israel with weapons and other logistic supports. After the invasion of southern Lebanon In 1982, Bachir Gemayel was elected President via Israeli political pressure. However, he was assassinated three weeks later and succeeded by his brother, Amine Jumayyil. With the death of Pierre Jumayyil, the leading role of the party declined further, and many prominent members left the party. Afterwards, the party broke into several rival factions and lost its influence on the Lebanese political system.

3.2.1.11. National Liberal Party (NLP).

This party was established as a Maronite organization by Camille Chamoun, former President of Lebanon in 1958 (Rubin, 2009). It was an important right-center political party that was mainly supported by Christians in Lebanon. The power of the party was also based on its armed militias, the 'Tigers,' the military wing of the NLP. The free-market economy, maintaining its status-quo policy, anti-communism, and close ties with the West constituted the main ideologies of the party. The party had 60,000-70,000 members and was represented in the parliament in the early-1970s.

As a result of increasing conflicts of interest within the Lebanese Front, the Phalange militias, under the command of Bachir Gemayel, launched a surprise attack on the Tigers and defeated them in 1980. After this incident, the political and military significance of the NLP declined whereupon the party lost much of its power in compared to the 1960's and 1970's upon the death of Camille Chamoun in 1987 (Nisan, 2015).

[45] At the beginning of the civil war, the party had as many as 65,000 members, including 10,000 militiamen.

3.2.1.12. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Palestinians have been an important factor in determining the political agenda in Lebanon since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. 140,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon after the establishment of state of Israel. Their numbers swelled after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1970 expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.[46] The Palestinian refugees rose by about 400,000 in Lebanon by 1987 (Collelo, 1987). They did not come Lebanon for obtaining sanctuary or secure area but to have a place for continuing the struggle to achieve their political goals as well.

Established in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the political and paramilitary organization of the Palestinians with the aim of liberating Palestine through armed struggle. Palestinian armed groups numbered around 8,000 guerillas prior to the Israeli invasion in 1982 (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003, p. 15).

The Palestinian commando attacks launched from Lebanon into Israeli territory and Israeli reprisal attacks in Lebanon, which increased in the late-1960's, constituted serious political and security problems for the Lebanese Government . Israeli military retaliation caused violence, the loss of lives and property, the displacement of civilians and economic instability in Lebanon. While this turmoil fanned the existing religious tension in the community and confusion of Lebanese political structure, it also brought about discontent and fear amongst Lebanese society. The Lebanese authority took Palestinian refugees under surveillance and clashes between Lebanese Security Forces and Palestinian militias began occurring in some areas. Signed between Yasser Arafat and the Commander of the Lebanese Army

[46] After the allegation that Palestinian groups in Jordan were involved in a failed coup towards King of Jordan Hussein in September, 1970, the Jordan Army launched a military operation against the Palestinian guerillas and more than 3,000 armed militias were killed. Most of the refugees and armed militiamen from Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were expelled from Jordan to Syria and Lebanon.

on 3 November, 1969, the Cairo Agreement's objective was to regulate the military presence of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, and was accepted by the Lebanese cabinet and the parliament. Many politicians as well as academics believe this agreement removed the Palestinian cause away from the Arab world and provided Palestinian guerillas a sanctuary in Lebanon to mount military raids against Israel (Durch, 1993). Lebanon's fragmented political structure and its weak army allowed the Palestinians to act with impunity, but their freedom of action in Lebanon further deepened sectarian division in Lebanese society. Meanwhile, the majority of Christian community, and particularly the Maronites were angry with the Cairo Agreement, believing that the agreement was a betrayal of Lebanese sovereignty. It also legitimized the PLO's military position in Lebanon, which enabled them to create a state-within-a state in the south. The Palestinian guerilla raids against Israel and their counter-attacks on Lebanese territory greatly disturbed the Lebanese people, particularly the Christians and Shiites residing in the south. The presence of Palestinians and their activities in Lebanon forced the Lebanese people to choose sides. The Lebanese Moslems generally regarded the Palestinians as people in need of protection. As Kamal Salibi wrote, the average Moslem in Lebanon saw the Palestinian guerilla presence as a form of security, believing that "to let down the Palestinians was tantamount to letting down the Moslem Lebanese cause" (Salibi, 1988, p. 54). Although such a perception amongst the Moslem community ignited support to the Palestinian cause, this was likely to aggravate the existing dynamics within the fragile country (Brynen, 1990).

Lebanon provided the Palestinian movement with the political and military sanctuary until the Israeli invasion in 1982. Israel launched a major military operation against Lebanon in response to the Palestinian guerilla attack on Israel's embassy in

London. When the Israeli Army besieged Beirut, many Palestinian armed groups were trapped in the city. When they resisted against the Israeli operation on the ground, heavy Israeli bombardment and air raids rained havoc on the city and vital infrastructure, thousands of civil lives were jeopardized as well. With the mediation of the US, the parties agreed that the PLO headquarters and its militia groups would be evacuated from Beirut and moved to other Arab countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen. This incident reduced but did not end the effectiveness of the PLO in Lebanon as the Palestinians continued to expand their organization across the country and maintain their armed struggle with Israel.

According to ordinary Lebanese Christians, the Palestinian armed presence aggravated the existing contradictions of the Lebanon's confessional system and its existence was one of the main obstacles for a unified Lebanon. It was the guerilla raids which provoked Israel to retaliate and other Arab countries to intervene in Lebanon. The Lebanese people did not want their country to be a battleground for regional powers and superpowers. As Brynen (1990) wrote "some people believed that both Lebanon and the PLO were likely to become pawns in politics and diplomatic rivalry between US and USSR on the one hand, and Arab nations and Israel, on the other" (p. 258).

3.2.1.13. The South Lebanon Army

The South Lebanese Army's (SLA) anti-PLO, pro-Israeli militia structure was formed under the command of a rebel Lebanese officer, Major Saad Haddad (Rubin, 2009). When the Lebanese Army began to disintegrate due to the 1976 Civil War, Major Haddad announced that his battalion, named the Free Lebanon Army (FLA), was no longer under the Lebanese Army chain of command. Its military strength of 5,000 troops at the beginning of 1980 decreased later on. To increase personnel

resources, the SLA imposed a one-year conscription in the area under its control. Its primary missions were; to protect the Christian villages from militia assaults, and to fight against the PLO and other Shiite militias (Amal and Hezbollah) in the south.

The FLA was a close ally of Israel and its fighters were trained, equipped and supported by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). During the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 1978, the FLA accompanied their operation and served as an auxiliary force of IDF. Upon this explicit betrayal, some units from FLA returned to the Lebanese Army and Major Haddad renamed the rest of the FLA forces the 'South Lebanon Army (SLA).'

Just prior to the full withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces in 2000, Israeli forces began to hand over the occupied Lebanese territories to SLA. However, it did not take long for Hezbollah to get these areas back from SLA when local Shiite Moslems returned to their homes. It was seen that SLA was almost nothing as a military force without Israeli patronage in this area because the Lebanese Government and many people considered SLA as a traitor and collaborator. As Hezbollah militias took the control of SLA's area, members of SLA had to flee to Israel to escape punishment. Others who could not flee were arrested and tried by the Lebanese authority.

3.2.2. External actors.

After independence, Lebanese foreign policy was based on amicable relations with all nations. However, a delicate domestic balance existed between the desire of the Christian community to maintain close ties with the West and the aspirations of the Moslem side to unify the Arab world. Lebanon could not escape from being a battleground for superpowers during the Cold War because of its geographic location,

which was on the axis of the East-West conflict. Meanwhile, Lebanon had to endure the burden of the Arab-Israeli wars because of its pluralistic society. Before making a decision, Lebanese statesmen had to consider external actors, including Syria, Israel, Iran, the Palestinians as well as its domestic political balances.

3.2.2.1. Syria.

In terms of geographical integrity, many rulers throughout history considered Syria and Lebanon one territory and they did not separate them until 1920. Under the French mandate, the two sister republics, Syria and Lebanon, shared the same currency and customs services, but had their own national flags and were administered by separate native administrations under the French High Commissioner from Beirut (Salibi, 1988). Then, Lebanon was separated from Syria as a sovereign entity and both became independent nations following World War II. Although Syria and Lebanon were independent countries, they traditionally have had strong cultural, economic and politics bonds. Syria managed to maintain its friendship with different Lebanese Christian parties and groups and Moslem alike, according to its national politics. However, Syria's close interest in Lebanon occasionally turned into political and economic intervention in its domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Lebanese groups also used Syria's attitude or remarks on Lebanese internal political issues as an enforcement tool against their opponents (Winslow, 1996).

Syria's position became the important determining factor whenever the Lebanese Government made decisions about the status of Palestinians in Lebanon. Even though Syria was reluctant to allow Palestinian guerilla attack Israel from its territory, there was no Syrian condemnation whenever such activity ensued from Lebanon (Collelo, 1987). President Hafez al-Assad knew very well that the presence

of strong, effective Palestinian guerilla forces in Lebanon would be a big headache for Israel.

Syria also opposed the fragmentation of Lebanon because of the civil war between Moslems and Christians (Deeb, 2003). When Christian militia forces were defeated and the Maronite partition trend became more apparent, the Syrian regime increased its military pressure over the National Movement and the PLO (Winslow, 1996). President Assad feared the establishment of a Christian Maronite state following the civil war in Lebanon would become another Israel on its western border. Meanwhile, Syria resisted the possibility of the founding of a radical Islamic or a socialist state in Lebanon. The West and most of the Arab countries alike feared a leftist takeover in Lebanon because it might generate subversive currents throughout the region (Khalidi, 1979).

In light of the aforementioned consideration, Syria did not hesitate to gradually get involved in the developments from the beginning of Lebanon's civil war. As the Assad regime perceived very well, the cost of non-intervention would be much higher for Syria, which acted as a credible mentor between the conflicting parties to arrange ceasefires and formulate reconciliation proposals. Finally, the long-lasting military intervention of Syria in Lebanon occurred after its diplomatic failure.

Following up the deteriorating situation in Lebanon, an Arab League Summit was held in Cairo on 25 October 1976, this time with larger participation. At this meeting, they decided to set up a Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) with a force of around 30,000 soldiers to enforce the ceasefire in Lebanon and implement decisions of the meeting. With 27,000 Syrian soldiers, the ADF provided Syria with international justification for the existence of its military forces and their activities in

Lebanon (Collelo, 1987). Syria used cooperation or conflict methods against different Moslem and Christian actors in Lebanon to get the situation under its control. By the 1980s, Syria was the indispensable external actor in Lebanon that controlled much of the country, but was unable to influence the course of events. However, Syria's power was not unlimited in Lebanon, as the attitude of many external and internal parties, such as Israel, France, the US, the USSR, the Multinational Force, and the UN reduced Syrian influence for a time. That said, Syria also preferred to use Lebanon, which was mainly under its control, for the low-intensity conflict with Israel and for the interest of the Assad regime. Indeed, there was grave doubt that Syria had the intention to make peace with Israel and end conflict in Lebanon (Deeb, 2003).

3.2.2.2. Israel.

When the founding of the state of Israel was announced in 1948, Lebanon joined with other Arab countries to resist militarily against Israel. Subsequent to the Arab nations' humiliating defeat, Lebanese politicians tried distancing themselves from Arab-Israeli disputes due to the country's absence of a considerable army.

Two main factors that determined Israel's policies versus Lebanon were the Palestinian guerilla attacks from Lebanon and the presence of a remarkable number of Syrian military troops in Lebanon (Collelo, 1987). Particularly, the PLO increased its strength in southern Lebanon after the 1975 civil war and it began to launch attacks on Israel more frequently. Israel's retaliatory attacks on Lebanese targets as well as the Palestinians were quick and devastating. Israel was eager to demonstrate to the Lebanese Government and people the high cost of hosting Palestinian fighters (Khalidi, 1979). Israel launched many relentless raids and air strikes against the Moslem-dominated towns and suburbs. Moreover, Israeli Special Forces conducted a raid on Beirut International Airport, destroying 31 civilian aircrafts in December

1968. Israel expected that as the retaliatory strikes escalated, the Lebanese Government would be forced to take punitive actions against the Palestinian militias in south.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) conducted its first invasion of southern Lebanon after a PLO guerilla raid into northern Israel killed 37 people in 1978. The aims of 'Operation Litani' were; to disrupt the main routes of Palestinian guerilla attacks, and annihilate their logistic centers and camps as much as possible (Durch, 1993). A number of incidents deriving from Israel's disregard for the safety of the civilian population and public works' infrastructure (schools, hospitals, power grids, roads, bridges etc.) contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon.[47] However, Israel's wantonness in causing extreme damage during its operation forced the Lebanese Government to take more serious measures against the PLO's hostile acts on Israeli territory. Despite the resolution of the UNSC for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, the Israeli Defense Force established a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and maintained this area through its Lebanese proxy (the Southern Lebanese Army) after its withdrawal. The Israeli invasion also led to the establishment of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[48]

Another Israeli occupation in Lebanon occurred in 1982, which caused the creation of the Multinational Force (MNF), comprised of troops from the US, Britain, France and Italy.[49] However, Israel's mission was tougher this time around as Lebanese Shiite groups, which were seriously affected by the invasion, turned into a formidable enemy against the IDF. After the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah

[47] Israel escalated the level of threats against Lebanon to the point that to destroy Lebanon's basic infrastructure. Upon this, Lebanon called on the international community to make every effort to compel Israel to desist from making further threats against Lebanon and attempting to destabilize it.
[48] The United Nations Security Council Res.No.425, adopted on March 19, 1978
[49] The MNF also supervised the evacuation of Palestinian guerillas and PLO headquarters from Beirut.

became the center of the Shiite resistance movement against Israel's military intervention in southern Lebanon.

3.2.2.3. Iran.

Iran's politics influence on Lebanon increased following the success of Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. The messages of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and highest-ranking Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, reverberated through Lebanon's downtrodden Shiite community (Collelo, 1987). The existence of a strong, united Shiite community in Lebanon with admiration and loyalty towards Iran were amongst Iran's national interests. Therefore, Iran provided Hezbollah with economic and financial support which was used to meet the demands for economic relief and social services in Lebanon's Shiite-dominated shanty towns. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran dispatched a contingent of Pasdaran in order to provide medical facilities to the local people in the Bekaa Valley.[50] Hezbollah's success in running hospitals, paying families' school fees and food expenses, and participating in housing repairs caused the removal of supporters from the Amal Movement, another Shiite organization which was an important Lebanese ally of Syria. The increased military and political importance of Hezbollah in Lebanon provided Iran an opportunity to enhance its political power in the region, including Lebanon. Concurrently, Hezbollah, with its powerfully armed militias under the control of Iran, was an indirect instrument of pressure on Israel.

3.2.2.4. The United States.

After its independence, Lebanon's had a generally decent relationship with the US. This was because the United States made a big contribution to bring France's

[50] Pasdaran, the Army of the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces established after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Their main role is to protect the country's Islamic system and prevent it against internal/external intervention or military coup.

mandate over Lebanon to an end (Salibi, 1988). To a major extent, the presence of the Lebanese community in the US played an important role in fostering relations. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, an American Marine Force was dispatched to Lebanon in order to demonstrate solidarity with the Chamoun regime against a possible Communist conspiracy in the 1958 Civil War (Collelo, 1987). Although this American troops never engaged in this war, President Chamoun's political dissidents and other Arab nations not only perceived this deployment as an interference in Lebanon's internal affairs, they were also displeased with America's attitude towards them. With the encouragement of the Lebanese Americans, the US overtly provided the Maronites economic and financial support whenever needed.

The US continued to closely follow the political situation in Lebanon as a part of that country's overall Middle East policy. Throughout the Cold War period, the US supported Lebanon's independence and its territorial integrity to keep this country in the Western sphere. In addition to its political, military and economic support to Lebanon, the US was effective in taking the decision at the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and in creation of UNIFIL.

Meanwhile, in sharing the same concerns with its ally, Israel, the US administration was not pleased at all with the size and effectiveness of the PLO in Lebanon. Therefore, Washington tried to get the PLO's activities limited to its haven in Lebanon and to keep Israel away from Palestinian militia harassment (Khalidi, 1979). When the course of events put Lebanon in a difficult situation in 1982, the US mediated between the PLO and Israel to evacuate PLO guerillas from Beirut. With the help of Washington, the negotiation ended successfully and the PLO fighters and its command group's departure was completed under the Multi-National Force supervision (Cobban, 1985).

3.2.2.5. The Soviet Union.

Lebanon had amicable relationships with the Communist Bloc and Soviet Union as well as with the West. Likewise, Moscow was also sympathetic to both the National Movement and the Lebanese Communist Party (Collelo, 1987). However, the USSR did not prefer to get heavily involved in problems taking place in Lebanon and risk a conflict with the West over this small country. Meanwhile, Socialist rhetoric did not have much influence over the Lebanese community due to the strong 'confessional system' in the community, the lack of a substantial working class and a rooted historical background with the West.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union did not flinch in providing military support to leftist groups such as the Socialist Progressive Party, the Communist Party and the PLO during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 and later on. However, Moscow was also confused about what to do because of the Syrian-Palestinian dogfight and the conflicting cross currents within the National Movement and Palestinian factions (Khalidi, 1979).

3.3. Events towards the UN Involvement

3.3.1. The 1975 Civil War.

With the escalation of conflicts amongst the parties, the chain of incidents leading up to the Lebanese civil war is described below in brief.

On 13 April, 1975, several armed Palestinian militias attacked the Phalangists in a church in Beirut, killing some people. The Phalangists retaliated immediately by ambushing a busload of Palestinian passengers, killing 27 and wounding 20 (Deeb, 1980). It was more than symbolic the Lebanese Civil War had been sparked by this incident, also known as the 'Ain al-Rummana Massacre.' This incident rekindled

fighting between the Phalangists and Palestinians. On 16 April, 50 civilians were killed and 100 wounded on both sides of fighting between Palestinians and Phalangists in Northern faubourg, Beirut.

On 19 May, the village of Dekwaneh suffered 25 civilian deaths and more than 100 wounded in four days of mortar fire from the Tell el Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp. On 23 May, the Lebanon National Movement (LNH) and the Palestinian Resistance Movement[51] (PRM) went on a general strike to overthrow the government which it accused of being responsible for the bus attack.

Syria was deeply concerned about the escalation of events in Lebanon and accepted the failure of its diplomatic efforts to lower tensions between the parties. The Lebanese cabinet resigned with Syria's intervention. Prominent Moslems politicians and Syria wanted to avert the Phalanges Party from the new cabinet despite its insistence. On 15 July, Israel attacked the villages of Akrub and Nebatiye in the south in order to ease the pressure off the Phalangists, who were caught in a tough situation in Beirut. The Phalanges Party declared it would support the movement favoring secession of the country if not included in the newly-established government (Odeh, 1986). Phalangist militias intentionally escalated clashes in order to impose the idea of being part of the Moslem side of the government, while the Palestinians were trying to calm the situation in order to support political initiatives to form a new government without the Phalanges Party. Phalangist militias attacked the Siya District of Beirut on 24 June, 1975, which was followed by attacks on Karantina, a Shiite district with a high Palestinian population, four days later (29 June). On 1 July, a new government was set up under Karami's presidency, with the Phalangist Party left out

[51] The Resistance Movement originated as a number of small groups of refugees in the 1950's. Having grown both politically and militarily, it had become one of the key factors in determining the issues of peace and war in Lebanon particularly and the Middle East generally. Their leaders had taken over the PLO before 1968.

of the cabinet.[52] Fighting spread to Tripoli and Zgharta in northern Lebanon on 7 July. Israeli air strikes concentrated on Palestinian refugee camps throughout July. Law and order in Beirut was completely destroyed, with no legal authority but bombing, kidnapping and killing (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). Fighting concentrated on Beirut's city center and commercial districts, which sustained heavy damage during August. In parallel with the community's polarization, Beirut was actually divided between Christians and Moslems.




Figure 11. Beirut during the Civil War (taken from http://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjRwrOzqtzLAhUEvBQKHcZTDWwQjRwIBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lebanonwire.com%2F0805MLN%2F08050933STR.asp&psig=AFQjCNFjBNPh8NOwwLJpyuY8HHF-7M35_g&ust=1459012186322964

Many Lebanese considered that the conflict would soon abate, as with many crises experienced in the past. Having considering the widespread heavy loss of life

[52] Having served as Prime Minister eight times, the traditional Sunni leader of Tripoli, Rashid Karami was one of the most important political figures in Lebanon.

and massive destruction, they realized at the beginning of the civil war, that this was a serious affair (Collelo, 1987). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Karami and President Franjiya could not agree on how to use the Lebanon Army to prevent fighting.

After the fighting flared out of control, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam arrived in Beirut on 19 September. Through his efforts, a National Dialogue Committee was formed by Moslems and Christians with equal participation (Gilmour, 1983). The most distinguished Christian and Moslem politicians joined in this meeting to find a way for reconciliation among the parties. Debates at the National Dialogue Committee were focused on two issues; the first concerned confinement and control measures to be imposed on the Palestinian groups in Lebanon. This topic was tabled for debate by the Phalangists and their allies by emphasizing the nation's territorial sovereignty. According to the Phalangists, nobody would have any problems if the Palestinians were not been in Lebanon. The second issue was brought up by the National Movement group, which insisted on carrying out political reforms primarily because they believed it was the main reason for all problems faced in Lebanon. At the end of the meeting, they decided to establish three sub-committees for economic, social and political reforms. However, leader of the Phalanges party, Pierre Gemayel, openly opposed any amendment on the Lebanese constitution despite of the National Movement's continuing insistence. Two months after its establishment, the National Dialogue Committee meetings were terminated with no result due to ongoing fighting and the uncompromising attitudes of the parties.

In November, fighting intensified in the towns of Zahla, Damur and particularly Beirut. Mutual aggression ran rampant when Palestinians attacked to Damur, a predominantly Christian village, followed by a raid conducted by Phalangists and Christian militias against Kantina and Al-Maslakh, with dense

populations of Palestinian refugees and Shiites (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). As Christian forces seized and destroyed these slum areas, enabling them to implement a *de-facto* division in Beirut, almost all the Moslems living there had to flee to West Beirut. The same situation was valid for Christians who lived in the west side of the city under Moslem militia control.

However, the Lebanese Front understood it could not achieve its targets by threatening to divide country, because Arab countries found such a solution unacceptable and the National Movement's had sufficient military power to prevent them. They decided to change tack by internationalizing the problem and spreading the crisis across the Arab countries. Like Syria, Saudi Arabia strongly rejected the idea of division wanted Arab countries to get involved in the Lebanese quagmire. According to Saudi statesmen, such a situation in Lebanon could only be alleviated through the efforts of Syria government (Odeh, 1986).

Violent clashes continued across the country despite all the political efforts and negotiating between the warring parties. Phalangist militias set up roadblocks in Beirut, seized over 350 Moslems, murdering them all on 6 December, 1975, a date which went down in history as 'Black Saturday' (Collelo, 1987). This incident triggered a vicious cycle of revenge and retaliation. From this point on, whenever a fighting group seized a district from their rivals, people who followed other religions in that area were routinely killed for forcing them to flee (Collelo, 1987).

On 11 January, Phalangist militias and their alliances blockaded the 'Dubay Palestinian Camp' 15 miles outside Beirut. In order to alleviate pressure in that area, LNM and PRM forces launched a counterattack on Beirut and Zahla. During these conflicts, the LNM accused the Lebanese Army of cooperating with the Phalangists

and fighting on their side against the Palestinian militias in Zahla. It was crucial the Lebanese Army maintained neutrality in the Civil War, but the army's disintegration was imminent as it was composed of Moslem and Christian units. Following these developments, Syria began mediating among the parties to ensure a ceasefire and to preserve stability. Comprised of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian military officials, the Tripartite High Military Committee was established and a ceasefire was declared once again (Rabinovich, 1985). However, as the power of militias grew, it was getting more difficult to keep them under control, in that low-ranking militias could easily violate the ceasefire just for fun.

However, major problems such as the establishment of a national reconciliation cabinet and the disintegration of the Lebanese Army remained unsolved in the country. In an attempt to overcome the political bottleneck, President Franjiya declared the Constitutional Document[53] on his return from Syria. The document was something that contained constitutional changes based on the unwritten agreement among all political parties in the National Pact in 1943. With this change, the prime minister would not be chosen by the president but the majority of the parliament. Although the document reasserted the custom of reserving major political posts for specific religious sects, it provided equal representation in the parliament between Christians and Moslems. Moreover, it strengthened the position of the prime minister by stipulating he was to be chosen by a majority vote of the members of the Chamber of Deputies rather than by means of a presidential appointment. Although the Constitutional Document was established with a consensus amongst prominent

[53] The Constitutional Document was prepared by President Franjiya in response to demands for political reform in the country in line with claims from mainly Moslem and Shiite leaders, as well as Syria. The document was an attempt to amend the Constitution of Lebanon based on the realities in 1926. With these changes, the position of the Lebanese parliament became stronger against the president and equality between Christians and Moslems was confirmed.

leaders in Lebanon politics, neither the National Movement nor the Falangist Party was satisfied. This was because each side would desire to use the opportunity for getting more benefits through these constitutional amendments.

At the beginning of 1976, the LAF was on the verge of disintegration. At the behest of the Minister of Defense, the Lebanese Air Force, which was manned mostly with Christian personnel, conducted a heavy bombing run over the leftist position of Ad Damur. This event was regarded as a grave mistake and an open violation of the neutrality of the Lebanese Army during the Civil War. In response to this hostility, Moslem troops in the Lebanese Army mustered under the command of Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, who declared the formation of the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) (Cobban, 1985). Many young army officers and soldiers from the Lebanon Army supported him and signed up in this army. However, the remaining part of the army fought on the side of the Phalangists and National Liberals, and Franjiya's militias (Deeb, 1980). In order to prevent the disintegration of the Lebanese Army, Brig.General Aziz al-Ahdab[54] attempted a coup d'état, calling upon Franjiya to resign and accusing him of misusing his political dominance over the army. However, his power was unable to force Franjiya out of office. On 25 March, troops from Lebanon National Movement (LNM), the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) and Lebanon Arab Army (LAA) launched an attack on the presidential palace. The president abandoned his palace and fled to Junich Port. This unexpected alliance among the LNM, PRM, and LAA concerned Syrian politicians even further and they decided to react strictly against this alliance. Because the potential of the alliance was strong

[54] Brigaider Aziz al-Ahdab was a son of Lebanon's first Sunni prime minister. He had been closely associated with former President Shihab throughout much of his carrier. Ahdab received general support from Moslem and LNM leaders. However the Phalangist party and other Christian militia groups were against him.

enough to control the whole country, which meant that Lebanon might be divided between Christian and Moslem factions.

After fighting spread throughout the country, President Franjiya called in Syrian troops. In this stage, the role of Syria was boosted because no foreign countries except Syria were capable of putting an end to the civil war in Lebanon. As previously mentioned, after Saudi Arabia, Jordan also shared the idea that Syria must interfere in this struggle to stop any more bloodshed. Although France's proposal of sending troops to Lebanon was only welcomed by the Palangist Party, despite strong rejection of Moslem leaders, King Husain of Jordan and other Arab countries encouraged Syria to intervene in Lebanon (Deeb, 1980). However, any foreign intervention could worsen the situation, because such a military force sent by Israel, France, the US or other Arab countries would be perceived by the parties as occupiers, which might not contribute to a solution. Therefore, the international community was of the consensus that only Syria could help Lebanon confine and terminate this bloody war.

Two important events facilitated Syria's intervention in Lebanon. The first occurred on 27 May, when the sister of Kamal Jumblatt, who resided in Beirut's eastern area of operations under the control of the Palangist militias, was murdered. The Palangists were held accountable for that murder. Fighting between the parties intensified and spread across the country after this killing. Second, the Lebanese Arab Army attacked the villages of Al-Quibbiyat and Andaqt in the north. When the people living in these towns pleaded Syria for help, Syria immediately deployed a military force of 2,000 soldiers to the Akkar region and 4,000 soldiers to Zahla in the Bekaa Valley on 1 June 1976 (Cobban, 1985).

The first reaction to Syria's military intervention in Lebanon came from Israel, which declared that the Israeli Army would not allow Syria to pass its red line in Lebanon. Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia gave Israel assurances the intervention would pose no threat on the condition approval for the framework was obtained from the US and European countries. Considering its special relationship with Lebanon, Syria's President Assad sent his Minister of Foreign Affairs to France. During this visit, France approved the role of Syria in the Lebanese Civil War, as well as an agreement to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Deeb, 1980). Some other countries, as well as the USSR did not react to the presence of Syria military forces in Lebanon. Recent events proved the Lebanon crisis was bound so closely to regional and international actors, it was practically impossible to disengage them through the country's own internal dynamics (Rubin, 2009).

Convening in Cairo to discuss the Lebanese crisis, the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League approved the role of Syria in Lebanon on 8 June. The establishment of an Arab Security Force was also decided upon which would replace the Syrian troops. Soon after that meeting, the Prime Ministers of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait endorsed the Cairo decisions at a conference held in Riyadh. In accordance with the decisions taken at the Cairo meeting, military forces from Libya and Algeria arrived in Beirut. As a part of the Arab Security Force, Libya's military troops replaced the Syrian troops at Beirut International Airport. While this handover ceremony was taking place, the National Liberal Party and Phalangist Party militias launched an attack on the Palestinian Camps of Jisr al-Basha and Tal-al Zatar on 22 June. With this attack, the Christian front wanted to threaten the PLO in order to prevent them from interfering in Lebanese affairs. Despite the persistent call from the Arab League for a ceasefire, the battle lasted until the fall of the Tal-al Zatar camp on

12 August. The right-wing extremist Christian militia group, the Guardians of the Cedar[55] was accused of massacring many civilian inhabitants following the capture of Tal-al Zatar. It was reported that 2,500 Palestinian fighters were killed and over 12,000 refugees had to flee the camps, which were completely razed afterwards government (Odeh, 1986).

Syria's impartial attitude towards the warring parties changed as the LNM and PRM racked up consecutive military successes, because they thought that a one-sided absolute victory might bring about an actual secession in Lebanon. The Syrian Army tried to balance the fighting groups and curb the growing military success of the LNM and the PRM. The intervention of Syria which sided with the Maronites and Phalangists and attempted to control the Palestinians, satisfied Israel and European nations, as well as the Christian front in Lebanon. In the same manner, Syrian troops kept the pressure on the National Movement and PLO forces rather than the assailant groups during the siege of the Palestinian camps government (Odeh, 1986).

After these attacks, Jumblatt, traditional Moslem politicians and the leader of the PRM attempted to convene a summit conference, they complained about the inactivity and silence of the Arab countries against this wildness. Although they hoped that the Arab countries and the USSR would have exerted pressure on Syria to stop its attacks to PLO, no result was obtained in this matter. Meanwhile, the Phalangist Party and right-wing Christian politicians were trying to drive a wedge between the LNM and Syria.

[55] The Guardians of the Cedars appeared as an armed militia group in the years of Lebanese Civil War. They defended the Lebanese identity against pan-Arabism with anti-Palestinian discourse. The group joined other Christian Lebanese militias in 1976 to form the Lebanese Front which aimed at the expulsion and liquidation of Palestinians in Lebanon.

As the fall of Tal-al Zatar escalated clashes across the country, the positions of both the National Movement and the Resistance Movement hardened further against the Lebanese Front, as they announced the establishment of the Popular Liberation Forces.[56] With support of Lebanon Arab Army, their armed militia groups launched a massive attack on Mt. Lebanon which was under Maronite control. The capture of Mt. Lebanon by the Popular Liberation Forces was a great defeat for the Lebanese Front.

Israel tried taking advantage of the situation by filling the political and military void in southern Lebanon for security reasons in late-August. On 1 September, the Israeli Army deployed fresh troops to Aynabel to secure the Christian towns in this region. During this operation, Israeli forces were supported and escorted by armed Christian militias. Meanwhile, Arab Foreign Ministers met several times in order to terminate the conflict in Lebanon, but to no avail.

On 23 September, Syrian forces, assisted by the Lebanese Front's Christian militias, conducted a vicious attack on NM and PRM forces on Mt. Lebanon, resulting in withdrawal of the Popular Liberation's forces. The takeover of this region created great joy and satisfaction among the Maronites, Christians and Israel. After this development, the new President Elias Sarkis praised the role of Syria and explained that Syria's military existence in Lebanon was an obligation for law and order in the country and they would remain in Lebanon until the government decided otherwise (Deeb, 1980). The interests of Syria and the Lebanese Front overlapped for a period, which enhanced the legality of the presence of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. Meanwhile, some Arab countries became more concerned about the Syrian military operations against Palestinian militias and the National Movement forces.

[56] Under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, it was formed as an all-inclusive front including traditional Moslem leaders, moderate Christian leaders, and the National Movement.

Despite the all the efforts of President Sarkis, it was not possible to bring the all fighting parties together to enforce a ceasefire and bring the situation in Lebanon back to normal. Because each conflicting party, such as Camille Chamoun and his party, the NLP, had a hidden agenda and uncompromising objective of wanting to escalate the Civil War to push the Syrians further away from the National Movement and Palestinian Resistant Movement. The extreme rightist militias, such as the Guardians of the Cedars, and the Phalangist Party wanted to expel all Palestinians from Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Progressive Socialist Party, headed by Kamal Jumblatt, wanted to halt the Syrian military operations against them and if that could not be possible, prevent them from remaining in Lebanon much longer, by using the Arab League.[57] When it came to the PRM's objectives, they hoped to be an indispensable political and military actor in Lebanon and they wanted to continue their battle with Israel from this front. They believed that Syria's position would be changed soon and Syria would support their justified war against Israel. Both Jumblatt and Arafat insisted that the Arab Security Force should be increased in size, and that more Arab countries should send troops in order to make it more effective (Deeb, 1980).

On 16 October, the Arab leaders from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon and the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat came together in Riyadh to force Syria and the other parties to accept a ceasefire. The leaders declared to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and they recognized the PLO as only representative of the Palestinian people. The Phalangist Party was not happy about the results of the meeting because the legitimacy of the military presence of the

[57] The Arab League was founded in 1945 in Cairo. It is an intergovernmental organization, a voluntary association of independent African and Middle Eastern countries which are mainly Arabic speaking. The purposes of the league are to strengthen ties among the member nations, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests.

Palestinians in Lebanon was accepted by the Arab League Summit. Israel also concerned about the decisions of the meeting and began to take a more active role in the conflicts in the southern Lebanon to prevent a return of the Palestinian militias to this area. The Israel Army helped the forces of the Lebanese Front by bombing emplacements of the NM and PRM in southern Lebanon which escalated the civil war once more. As Lebanon slipped into utter chaos, the Arab League Summit was held in Cairo on 25 October, this time with greater participation. At this meeting, they decided to set up a Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force[58] (ADF) of approximately 30,000 troops to enforce the ceasefire and implement the decisions of the meeting.

As for the result of the nearly two-year long Lebanese Civil War, over 40,000 people died and about 100,000 were wounded during this bloody revenge (Corm, 1988). Much of Beirut was reduced to rubble and the city was divided into Christian and Moslem parts via the Green Line. Approximately 700,000 people, over 80% of them Moslems, were displaced from their homes to more secure places within Lebanon and a similar number, mostly Christians, left their country due to horror of the war (Winslow, 1996). Meanwhile, the years of civil war proved that the country's Christians and Moslems (Sunni, Shiite and Druze) could not be reduced by force, no matter what state they were. It also demonstrated that neither side could easily force its idea or demands on the other (Salibi, 1988).

In late-November, the ADF achieved a relative calm across the country and with the exception of the south, began to control most of the conflict areas in Lebanon. Although Lebanon managed to survive the Civil War, there was nothing left

[58] It was an intervention force composed from the Arab countries including Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Libya. The ADF initially consisted of 30,000 troops of which 25,000 were provided by Syria. The mandate of the ADF was to dissuade the conflicting parties from resorting to use of force again, maintaining the ceasefire, collecting heavy weapons, and supporting the Lebanese Government in preserving its authority.

in the end but mostly destroyed infrastructure, a divided country, a desperate government in the face of massive economic and social problems, not to mention a permanent Moslem-Christian enmity.

Although there was harmony and cooperation between Syria and the Sarkis administration, this was totally dependent on external and internal situations in the country. In trying to disarm the Lebanese Christian militias to exert its authority over them, Syria faced strong reaction and resistance from both the Sarkis administration, and the militia groups. As the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations improved the process, Syria's rapprochement with the PLO was not welcomed by the Lebanese Christian groups, whereas Syrian-Lebanese relations cooled (Collelo, 1987). The Lebanese Government was using Israel to counterbalance the dominant position of Syria in Lebanon (Deeb, 1980).

Meanwhile, a region without the government authority in which mostly Christian residents lived began to emerge along the southern border with Israel. After the Israeli overt military and logistic support for the Christian militias in the southern Lebanon, Syria changed its position and ended conflict with the Palestinian groups, a move which was welcomed by the Moslems and PRM.

Meanwhile, Israel was trying to bolster the security situation in southern Lebanon to prevent guerilla infiltrations from this area. In 1977, Israel supported the establishment of the 'Free Lebanon Army (FLA)' under the command of Major Saad Haddad.[59] The name of this force then changed to the 'South Lebanon Army (SLA)' and reached a strength of 3,000 troops. This force was a natural ally of Israel and it

[59] The FLA was mainly composed of Christian factions from the Lebanese Army. It was established in response to the Lebanese Arab Army. In the beginning, the FLA's force was 2,000 soldiers in four battalions and each battalion had armor, infantry and artillery companies. They obtained necessary equipment from Lebanese Army reserves and Israeli military aid. They allied with the Christian rightist militias from the Lebanese Front and batted against the LNM, LAA and PLO guerillas.

helped to establish a security zone along the northern border of Israel for expelling Palestinian fighters and protecting the Christian population in the area. Intense conflicts between FLA with the support of other Christian militia groups, and Palestinians in the south caused the large-scale destruction. 200,000 people (one-third of the population) predominantly Shiite Moslems migrated from this area to other regions in Lebanon (Collelo, 1987). The 'Shtawrah Accord' was negotiated with representatives of Lebanon, Syria and Palestinians to resolve the situation in regards to Palestinian guerilla activities in the southern area of operations, which also a main concern of Israel, in July and August 1977 (IPB USA, 2013). According to this agreement, the Syrian position as the ADF in Lebanon was confirmed. After the withdrawal of the Palestinians 15 km from Israeli border, the Lebanese Army would occupy this region and the ADF would be responsible from southern coast line. However, implementation of the Shtawrah Accord proved difficult as the Palestinians did not want to evacuate the security zone completely. Also, the Lebanese Army was not strong enough to completely control the area, and Israel was concerned about Syria's increased influence in the region. Although Israeli politicians were not pleased with the outcome of the policy, they did not allow the Syrian forces (ADF) to deploy south of the 'red line,' which enabled PLO militias to move freely in that area (Cobban, 1985). The PLO's aim was to maintain control of the entire southern Lebanon and use this area as a military base for their attacks on Israel without any restriction. Meanwhile, this region was also the home to a Shiite Moslem population and the continuous hit-and-run fighting between the PLO and Israel turned their area into a battlefield. The Shiites resented the Palestinian militias for their provocations which caused and justified Israeli retaliatory strikes in this area. They hated

Palestinians even more when Israel intensified its raids over southern Lebanon, forcing the Shiite community to flee their homeland to the suburbs of Beirut.

Although it was generally accepted that the Lebanese Civil War ended in early-1977, clashes amongst the armed militia groups continued from time to time. Kemal Jumbatt, the socialist aristocrat who headed the Druze community and Lebanon's leftist coalition was assassinated on 16 March, 1977 (Cobban, 1985). This event triggered revenge attacks by Druze militias on Christian towns as mutual violence escalated once again throughout the country. Bombs continued to explode, assassinations were conducted and hostilities intensified, particularly in southern Lebanon (Winslow, 1996). Syrian-Lebanon relations further deteriorated as a result of skirmishes between the Syrian-led ADF and the Lebanese Army in East Beirut. This situation worsened when Syrian forces heavily bombed the Christian part of Beirut in early-1978. The Maronites and Phalangists, with the support of Israel, were no longer obedient to Syria as they began to act autonomously in their areas of control. Meanwhile, Israel increased its support and assistance to the FLA and Christian militias in southern Lebanon and encouraged Major Haddad's forces to move against the PLO in order to rid themselves of the Palestinian presence in this area. In the north of the Lebanon, the Maronites were struggling to oust Syrian forces with help of Israel. Their aim was to establish a Christian-dominated enclave state in the south. In retaliation for these hostile collaborations, Syria escalated the pressure on them by increasing artillery bombardments on East Beirut, while bolstering its relations with Moslem forces and the PLO.

3.3.2. Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1978 and UNSC resolution.

On 11 March, 1978, a Palestinian guerilla group from southern Lebanon raided Israel and hijacked two buses on the Haifa-Tel Aviv Highway, and then they killed 37 Israelis (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).[60] Three days after this incident, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered southern Lebanon in order to rid the area of Palestinian guerillas and establish a security zone in this region. The IDF invaded the southern part of the country up to the Litani River, except Tyre and its surrounding areas, with over 25,000 soldiers led by two division commanders (Cobban, 1985, p. 161).




Figure 12. Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

[60] The statement to the press by Prime Minister Begin on the massacre of Israelis on the Hafia-Tel Aviv road, 12 March 1978,

On 15 March 1978, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong letter of protest against Israel to the UN Security Council. In response to the Israeli operation, the UNSC passed Res.No.425/426 calling for Israel to cease its military operation immediately and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. The council also decided on the formation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to enforce the resolutions (Winslow, 1996). The resolution voiced the expectations of international community in the face of the serious threat against peace and security in that region: “The Security Council; taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and the Permanent Representative of Israel, having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, is gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace, convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

- Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
- Calls upon Israel to immediately cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
- Decides, in the light of the request of the Lebanese Government, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its

> effective authority in the area, the Force (UNIFIL) to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States."[61]

The Carter administration did not want to endanger its forthcoming plan on the overall Middle East settlement. Hence they needed to put some distance between itself and Israel to hinder the Arab community's accusation of being a collaborator with Israel for this military operation. The territorial integrity of Lebanon was also a main concern for the US because a possible disintegration of this country might tear the whole region apart. Another important fact was that a long-lasting Israeli occupation would only complicate the current situation even more in Lebanon.

Although the Israeli military operation aimed at capturing most of the PLO militias located in south, Palestinian guerrillas succeeded in retreating from their operation area to north of the Litani River. During this operation, many Lebanese civilians were killed by careless artillery fire and Israeli air strikes, which also caused huge property damage, causing thousands of people to leave their homelands. From this aspect, the Israeli invasion seemed to punish Lebanese civilians and Palestinian guerillas alike (Khalidi, 1979). After three months, the IDF's operation in Lebanon left approximately 2,000 dead, most of them Palestinian and Lebanese civilians (Cobban, 1985), and about 265,000 internally displaced people (Winslow, 1996).

The first UNIFIL troops arrived in Lebanon on 23 March 1978, and week later were able to set up headquarters in Naqoura, which was a relatively more secure area, due to the continued fighting between Palestinian and Christian militias (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, & Williams, 2015). However, the presence of UN forces in this area did not result in an immediate end to hostilities between the conflicting parties.

[61] The United Nations Security Council Res.No.425, on 19 March 1978.

The parties reacted differently to the UN decision. According to the Palestinian side, the resolution could not be applied because it did not mention the Palestinians and it completely ignored their presence in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the PLO leadership accepted the ceasefire after a meeting between the UNIFIL commander and Yasser Arafat, on 28 March 1978. Although the UN resolution did not condemn the invasion, it made Israel very uneasy. By impeding Israel's military objectives, the resolution prevented the IDF from achieving what was originally planned in its military operation. Meanwhile, this intervention could have been a model for other Israeli occupied territories. The establishment of UNIFIL was not welcome by Syria, because the UN military existence in Lebanon could reduce the importance of the ADF's and therefore Syria's role (Khalidi, 1979).

After creating a security zone between Israel and Palestinian strongholds, Israel announced its withdrawal plan from Lebanon. The Israeli forces began to withdraw on 4 April 1978, and took two months to complete this action (Winslow, 1996). Rather than to UNIFIL, the IDF handed over its positions to its ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which under the command of Major Saad Haddad (Winslow, 1996). When looking at the events, it could be said that the UN involvement was unable to bring peace quickly in this region, on the contrary the sides continued fighting one another. Syrian and Palestinian forces began to fight against Israeli-backed SLA. Meanwhile, Christian militias, Palestinian guerillas, SLA and Israeli forces fired on UNIFIL peacekeepers. The Syrians were trying to hinder the impact of Israel on Lebanon by hitting its allies. The Phalangists were struggling to increase their control over the Maronite and other Christian communities while the Lebanese Government was attempting to deploy its army in the south. In sum, the UNIFIL

found itself in a place where combinations of power consolidation and proxy fighting prevailed (Winslow, 1996).

4. UNIFIL'S OPERATION

There were some important factors influencing the decision to establish the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNIFIL). No doubt the most decisive factor was the unpredictable and disproportional Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978. The other factor was the inability of the Lebanese Government to assert its authority in southern Lebanon, mainly dominated by Palestinian forces at that time. It was seen as impossible to achieve peace and order in Lebanon without intervention by the international community in order to break this vicious circle of violence. Adopted five days after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the UN Security Council Res.No.425/426 delved into the expectations of the international community and what the UNIFIL was expected to accomplish in Lebanon.

When the first troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978, there were three broadly defined purposes facing the UNIFIL: confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces; restoring international peace and security; and assisting the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (UNIFIL Background - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, n.d.).

We can find the details of the UNIFIL mission in the Secretary-General's report about the implementation of UNSC Res.No.425.[62] According to the UNIFIL Terms of Reference (TOR) given by Secretary-General (Secretary-General), the force will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities.

The Secretary-General (Secretary-General) explained his consideration on the report by saying that there were three essential conditions that must be met for the

[62] Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res.No.425, S/12611, 19 March 1978

UNIFIL to be effective. Firstly, it must have the full confidence and backing of the UNSC. Secondly, it must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties in the conflict. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

The Secretary-General's guidelines for the UNIFIL operation are as follows;

- The force will be under the command of the UN, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of UNSC.
- The command in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by Secretary-General with the consent of UNSC.
- The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General.
- The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It shall not use force except in self-defense, which includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the UNSC.
- In performing its function, the force will act with complete impartiality.
- It should be recalled that UNIFIL will have to operate in an area which is quite densely inhabited. UNIFIL cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the government of the country in which it is operating. It is assumed that the Lebanese Government will take the necessary measures to cooperate with UNIFIL in this regard.

- The Secretary-General envisaged the operation in two stages. In the first stage, the force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. Once this is achieved, it will establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In the second stage, it will supervise the cessation of hostilities, and take all measures deemed necessary to ensure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

- The force will represent interim measures until the Lebanese Government assumes its full responsibilities in southern Lebanon.

The Secretary-General assumed that both parties, Israel and Lebanon, will give their full cooperation to UNIFIL during the operation.

4.1. Force Structure, Units and Mandate

It is important to first highlight that UNIFIL was established through American initiatives because it was the priority of the US to forge a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Therefore, the troops and headquarters moved quickly to the mission area in Lebanon, with the first units arriving in the area just five days after UNSC Res.No.425.[63]

Ghanaian Major-General Emmanuel Alexander Erskine (1989), UNTSO's Chief Staff, was appointed as commander of UNIFIL on 19 March 1978. French Brigadier General Jean Coq was Deputy Force Commander. General Erskine set up his headquarters at Naqoura in southern Lebanon. At the beginning, the force was envisaged to have more than five battalions with necessary logistic units (around

[63] The Swedish and Iranian Companies detached from UNEF-II and UNDOF moved to their areas, the French advance party landed at Beirut. The movement control detachment and a signal detachment of the Canadian Logistic unit from UNEF-II

4,000 troops) to fulfill its responsibilities. Furthermore, an appropriate number of military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) would be assigned to assist the UNIFIL during its mission. A company of the Swedish Battalion from the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF); military observers and one reinforced company of the Iranian Battalion from the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were transferred to the UNIFIL in order to make it operational without delay. The force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months. On 3 May, 1978, the Security Council approved Res.No.427 which increased the strength of UNIFIL from 4,000 to 6,000 troops upon the recommendation of Secretary-General (United Nations Official Document, n.d.).

As for the expenditure, the estimated cost of a force of 4,000 troops was approximately $68 million for a six-month period, of which the assembly cost was $29 million and ongoing cost for the six-month period was $39 million. The cost of the UNIFIL was considered as expenses of organization to be borne by the members, in accordance with Article 17 of the UN Charter.

The organization chart of the 1978 UNIFIL can be seen below.




Figure 13. The organization chart of the 1978 UNIFIL

The UN force consisted of eight Infantry Battalions (from France, Irish, Norway, Fiji, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal and Iran), Combat Support and Logistic Support units.[64] Moreover, the UNIFIL was assisted by 36 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

4.2. Deployment and Operations In Lebanon

Although the UNIFIL was established by American initiatives, it was being left to its own devices without overt support from the US (Verrier, 1981). After the civil war, the complexity of the Lebanese situation made this peacekeeping operation harder for newcomers without guidance and background information which the UN

[64] The Irish and Norwegians arrived in Lebanon with armored personnel carriers to protect themselves and heavy weapons to make noise. Meanwhile, the Fijians and Nepalese had little more than their rifles. The French arrived in a place and situation for which they were totally unprepared. The Nigerians, Senegalese and Iranians had the advantage of varying types of contact with Lebanon.

secretariat could have distributed. Therefore, the knowledge and experience of Lebanon gained by the UNTSO and UNMO became more important for UNIFIL's early days.

As it is seen on the map of the 1978 UNIFIL deployment (Figure 14), PLO commandos had to infiltrate through these troops if they planned to attack Israel from Lebanon. However, Commander of the IDF Lieutenant-General Ben-Gal did not believe that UNIFIL could keep the PLO out of the south therefore he kept the 'fabian policy' on withdrawal. By early June, in negotiations between the Secretary-General and Salah Khalat, second-in-command of el-Fatah, he made a commitment saying that "we have to rule out operations against Israel from Southern Lebanon, but we are planning raids from Syria, Jordan, and the sea."




Figure 14. The map of the 1978 UNIFIL deployment.

However, a partly operational UNIFIL had to share its area of operation with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon in April and May, 1978. Therefore, the IDF's withdrawal from the area was necessary for allowing the UNIFIL to carry out its tasks given by the UNSC. The Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo was instructed by the Secretary-General to immediately contact the governments of Israel and Lebanon for withdrawal of the IDF and the establishment of the UNIFIL area of operations (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). Indeed, the situation on the ground for UNIFIL would deteriorate after the Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, the Christian militias were encouraged by Israel to stay in the 10 km. security zone. As it would be seen later, the IDF's absence in this area created a power vacuum and triggered events that the Christian militias and PLO began to intensify their pressure on UNIFIL troops and they started firing at each other to dominate the evacuated regions (Verrier, 1981). Meanwhile, Israeli authorities were reluctant to cooperate with General Erskin and they refused to provide the UNIFIL with their minefield maps. All UNIFIL troops were in constant danger of land mines, whose detection and removal was difficult except by hand. On 2 April, a Swedish soldier was killed, and another seriously wounded when their vehicle was blown up by a mine. During the first six months of the operation, eight members of UNIFIL were killed and 52 injured as a result of firing incidents and mine explosions.[65]

As a result of UN political pressure on Israel, on 6 April 1978, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Forces submitted a plan for an initial withdrawal of IDF to General Siilasvuo. However, the Secretary-General expressed that the Israeli plan was not satisfactory since Res.No.425 called for Israel "to withdraw forthwith its forces

[65] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL for the period 19 March to 13 September 1978, S/12845

from all Lebanese territory" unconditionally. The withdrawal plan occurred as scheduled and all the positions evacuated by IDF were handed over to UNIFIL. Another withdrawal phase occurred on 30 April, involving a more extensive area than previous one was taken over by UNIFIL troops. Upon the IDF's withdrawal, UNIFIL tried to consolidate its effort to control these new areas where it was deployed.

The main objectives of the UNIFIL were to supervise and monitor the ceasefire, and to ensure that no unauthorized armed personnel entered its area. In order to achieve this goal, the UN troops set up observation posts and checkpoints in its area and conducted patrols along key highways. They used modern military equipment, such as night-vision binoculars, strong searchlights, sophisticated ground surveillance radar, and early warning systems. Uniformed and armed personnel stopped at the checkpoints or caught by patrols were escorted out of the UNIFIL zone. Meanwhile, UNIFIL did not inhibit the freedom of movement for innocent civilians who could enter its area with a valid identification cart. Nevertheless, it was very easy for PLO militias to slip through UNIFIL checkpoints unarmed and, once inside the area, they could get weapons and ammunition from caches. Militias with their weapons could also infiltrate into the UNIFIL's area through uncharted trails which could not be explored by UNIFIL. Therefore, despite all measures and vigilance taken by UN troops, the UNIFIL could not stop all such infiltrators and their attacks against Israel and its ally. The UNIFIL's failure to curb the PLO attacks would lead to Israel strengthening Major Haddad's De Facto Forces, making it reluctant to cooperate with the UNIFIL.

However, the UNIFIL's presence on the ground and measures taken for implantation of the mandate were not welcomed by Haddad's forces and the PLO.

The UNIFIL's tougher measures to deter and contain, infiltrate and particularly, confiscate their captured weapons aggravated PLO's militias. UNIFIL's attempts at preventing infiltration sometimes led to tense situations at checkpoints with exchanges of fire between armed groups and UN forces. In most incidents, armed militias tried to intimidate UN troops and to retaliate by ambushing UNIFIL soldiers, patrols. On 3 May 1978, the PLO ambushed a French patrol, one was wounded. A firefight broke out immediately after the ambush, with the French suffering further casualties, three UN soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, including the Commander of the French battalion (The UN Department of Public Information, 1996).[66] On 1 May 1978, PLO militias' attempt to infiltrate UNIFIL positions, resulting in two Senegalese soldiers being killed and one wounded. A day after this event, two PLO were killed when UN troops were fired on.[67] On 18 and 19 April, Haddad attacked UNIFIL's headquarters at Naqoura with artillery, machine guns, and mortars that killed seven UN soldiers. Despite all these incidents, it was the UNIFIL which held its ground and it responded vigorously to those attacks. In considering the previous experiences in the Middle East, armed groups in that area were surprised to encounter UN soldiers who determined to defend themselves and their missions.

Under the pressure of the UN, the Israeli Government declared its decision to withdraw the IDF from the remaining occupied territory in Lebanon by 13 June 1978. However, the last phase of the Israeli withdrawal created major problems for the UNIFIL. Contrary to the previous three phases, rather than the UNIFIL, IDF handed over most of its positions directly to Major Haddad's De Facto Forces, which had

[66] The PLO kept quiet about their losses at this incident.
[67] After these events, Yasser Arafat gave some assurances to Secretary-General Waldheim that these kinds of incidents would not recur.

been equipped and trained by the Israelis, on 13 June.[68] However, following the Israeli withdrawal, Major Haddad threatened to use force against the UNIFIL if it attempted to gain wider deployment into the evacuated area, whereas he refused to turn the area under his control over to the UNIFIL.[69]

In order to fulfill its mandate, the UNIFIL needed to be deployed in its area of operation which included the regions controlled by Major Haddad's forces (The UN Department of Public Information, 1996).[70] Otherwise it would be impossible to carry out its missions assigned by the UN Security Council; such as, maintaining the ceasefire, preventing hostilities, and assisting the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority in this area,. Despite negotiations held with parties and the UNSC's repeated calling, no common ground could be found and the UNIFIL encountered serious difficulties. The Security Council's efforts to dissuade the PLO from attacking Israeli territory and Israel from retaliating were to no avail. Hostile actions continued in UNIFIL's area of operation, there were constant and destructive exchanges of fire between opposing forces. After these incidents on the ground, a sufficient reserve force (with strong fire support weapons) under UNIFIL commander that could move quickly from one threatened point to another, and the value of Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) against PLO and Christian militias became very apparent.

Although the UNIFIL persisted in its main objective to be fully deployed into the evacuated area, an interim agreement was reached with the De Facto Forces

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[68] The Lebanese Government previously announced that Major Haddad was a commander of the Lebanese armed forces in the south and he was instructed to facilitate UNIFIL's mission and deployment.

[69] On 5 September 1978, Lebanon informed the Secretary-General that the commanders of the "de facto Lebanese forces" were to be considered as having no authority to act on behalf of the Lebanese Army, and to negotiate with the UN.

[70] The strength of De Facto Forces was estimated about 1,500 troops in June 1978. They were formed around a nucleus of some 700 former Christian soldiers of the Lebanese Army, to which were added smaller groups of Phalangists.

through the assistance of the Israeli Army. According to the agreement, UNIFIL troops would get partial freedom of movement on the main roads in the area which Major Haddad's forces controlled. That was limited to five days a week for resupplying its installation and personnel rotation. UNIFIL helicopters could fly over the enclave when necessary, provided they received Major Haddad's permission in advance. However, Major Haddad would retaliate by arbitrarily closing the roads to UNIFIL personnel and vehicles in his area. Sometimes, De Facto Forces harassed the locals in the UNIFIL zone by shelling and residents were intimidated if they continued to cooperate with the UN forces. In some cases, special teams from the De Facto Forces infiltrated into the UNIFIL zone to abduct persons accused of aiding and abetting for PLO or even blowing up their houses. The UNIFIL continued to lodge protests with Israeli authorities regarding these kinds of crimes and the pressure on the locals which was under UN protection.

The De Facto Forces continued to test the UNIFIL's reaction and determination; they made several attempts with armed groups, supported by tanks to set up positions within the UNIFIL zone. Whenever this attacks occurred, UNIFIL sent reinforcements to surround them, while also employing other peaceful ways, and negotiating with military and political authorities to have those positions removed.[71] In most cases, De Facto Forces did not hesitate to act in a hostile manner against the UN troops. A UNIFIL vehicle was stopped by the DFF near the village of Bint Jubayl and three soldiers of the Irish battalion were kidnapped on 18 April 1980. Despite every effort made by UNIFIL, they murdered two of them and wounded the other

[71] The De Facto Forces established five encroachment positions in the UNIFIL zone until July, 1980, all of which were located in important areas that controlled the main roads.

one.[72] Following this incident, the De Facto Forces launched heavy shelling at UNIFIL headquarters on 24 April 1980; the Security Council only condemned this hostile act via Res.No.467 (UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, n.d.).[73] Although General Erskine (1989) knew very well that the only way to put an end to such hostile attacks was to use force against the assailant, it could not be applied due to mandate restrictions and risks of heavy casualties on both sides. Therefore, it was decided to seek a negotiated solution through the Israeli Government. However, the Israelis were reluctant to intervene and have Major Haddad's position removed as Israel considered the presence of his forces in that area crucial for Israel's security. General Erskine bluntly stated that the UNIFIL had no other choice than to compromise with the militias in this situation.

These incidents above showed that the UNIFIL should have had some enforcement instruments to oblige armed groups not under control of any legitimate power or state to obey the decisions taken by the UNSC. Their uncompromising attitudes and irresponsible behavior not only kept the UNIFIL from fulfilling its mission, but also put the lives of innocent civilians under the protection of the UN at risk. From a purely military aspect, the leadership team of armed groups and their communications and logistics hubs would be primary targets for their defeat. Another important factor that should be considered during the operation was to avoid collateral damage on unintended targets and non-combatants. These problems might have been alleviated had the UNIFIL been provided with the necessary physical and diplomatic means to enforce the groups who hindered the implementation of the UN mandate.

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[72] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 12 June, 1980, and Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 18 April, 1980.

[73] The Security Council condemns the deliberate shelling of the headquarters of the Force and more particularly the field hospital, which enjoys special protection under international law.

Unless the UNIFIL received the full political backing of the superpowers, nothing in the political and security situation would change, and only frustration would remain.

As it was said, handing over the control of the border area to the De Facto Forces (DFF) made full deployment of the UNIFIL and restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government impossible in the whole area of operation.[74] Moreover, the UNIFIL found itself between the PLO, and De Facto Forces (DFF) established and supported by Israel. Because, the UNIFIL zone was located in southern Lebanon between the PLO's strongholds to the north of the Litani River and the DFF, south of the river. There was a gap of about 15 km. between them with the river acting as a physical barrier that separated the opposing sides. Despite all the political effort, Washington refused to exert pressure on Israel for handing over their evacuated areas to the UNIFIL rather than to the Christian militias. General Erskine (1989) was convinced that Israel would not let him fully deploy UNIFIL troops in its area as the Israelis believed that a bunch of blue berets could not keep the PLO out of southern Lebanon. Hence they strengthened the DFF in the 10-km security zone. In this connection, there was no other way except the cooperation of all parties, which was an essential element for the UNIFIL to function effectively.[75] In addition to these activities, Israeli forces conducted raids into the UNIFIL zone on several occasions in search of Palestinian militias, which led to confrontation between UNIFIL troops and the IDF. In some cases, the armed elements from both sides did not hesitate to execute hostile activities such as hijacking, firing at vehicles and patrols and ambushes against

[74] UNIFIL sought to extend its deployment in the border area. It established 14 observation posts in the De Facto Forces area and successfully insisted on patrolling through it. The IDF resented and tried to obscure UNIFIL patrols, even resorting to mine-laying to prevent them from doing so.
[75] The effectiveness of the UNIFIL depended on the cooperation of all the parties concerned. But the UNIFIL had problems in getting both the De Facto Forces and the IDF to cooperate, so that it could fully deploy in its entire area of operation.

the UNIFIL. However, these kind of tensions were generally resolved through negotiations.

Meanwhile, the UNIFIL continued to support the UN emergency relief and reconstruction program for southern Lebanon. It included; distributing food to the locals, surveying and repairing utilities, providing health services to civilians, supplying fertilizer for agriculture, rebuilding and repairing school buildings, and providing school equipment. The UNIFIL medivac unit provided medical treatment for civilians in emergency cases. However, the deliberate actions of the De Facto Forces to harass the UNIFIL in its efforts to fully implement UNSC Res.No.425 frequently endangered the security of the local people in the UNIFIL's sphere of operation. Despite the efforts made through the interdiction of Israeli authorities to put an end to such activities, Major Haddad's seemed equally determined to continue them.

Christian militia-related Incidents occurred on an almost daily basis in November, 1978. UNIFIL installations in the southern part of the central/eastern sector, and the eastern area of operations of the eastern sector were harassed by shellings. In the area under the control of the DFF, patrols and supply vehicles were shot at, stopped at roadblocks and threatened, in a coordinated effort to deter them from carrying out their mission. The actual deployment of UNIFIL was seen on the map (Appendix-B).

As for the composition and deployment of the force, the Iranian infantry battalion was withdrawn in late-January and the French infantry battalion in mid-March. A fresh Dutch infantry battalion of 800 of all ranks arrived at the mission area

in early-March., whereas a Ghanaian contingent was assigned to the UNIFIL in September, 1979.

4.2.1. 1979, the UNIFIL HQ under fire.

By 1979, there were frequent exchanges of weapons fire between PLO and DFF units over the UNIFIL zone. PLO's heavy artillery and rockets could easily reach villages in northern Israel, such as Nahariyya, Maalot, Metulla and Qiryat Shemona. Meanwhile, De Facto Forces installations were reinforced with enough IDF tanks and artillery capable of blanketing PLO camps in fire. Major Haddad's forces also harassed civilian settlements in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Lebanese de facto armed groups also threatened to shoot civilians if they were not forthcoming with support. Whenever fighting intensified between the DFF and the PLO, Israeli forces would enter the fray with their heavy weapons in support of the DFF, whereupon PLO would direct their heavy artillery and rockets at targets in northern Israel which would provoke violent reprisals by the Israeli armed forces The UN Department of Public Information, 2009). Israeli retaliatory strikes in Lebanon were not limited to only PLO targets, but included many important infrastructures across the country vital for innocent civilians. In some cases, Israel deployed special forces or warplanes into southern Lebanon to destroy specific PLO targets. The UNIFIL could not take direct action to prevent or stop them while these mutual attacks continued. The actual deployment of the UNIFIL is seen on the map (Appendix-B).

The Lebanese Government increased its civilian administrative presence in the south, including public employees, teachers, medical personnel and civil servants, etc. Additionally, the Lebanese gendarmes in southern Lebanon were reinforced to bolster security in the villages. In parallel with this developments, reconstruction efforts were

under way in the UNIFIL sphere of operation with the cooperation of relevant UN agencies. Specific actions were taken by the Lebanese Government with UN assistance to meet urgent requirements such as utilities, telephone facilities, repairing schools, restoring health services and repairing roads. The Lebanese Government also provided assistance to the population in southern Lebanon. In particular, it distributed food to some 47,000 families.[76]

Meanwhile, the UN and UNIFIL intensified their efforts to consolidate the ceasefire and put an end to the DFF's harassment of the UNIFIL and locals. In this context, the emphasis was focused on the need to undertake necessary diplomatic contacts to enlist Israeli governmental cooperation. Concurrently, talks were held between Arafat and the Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs were conducted on the matter of PLO and UNIFIL cooperation.

With regard to returning authority in the area to the Lebanese Government, the deployment of 500 Lebanese Army personnel in southern Lebanon began in April. This unit was to be under the operational control of the UN Force commander. However, Major Haddad expressed strong opposition to move a Lebanese Army contingent into southern Lebanon. He reinforced De Facto Forces positions within the UNIFIL area of deployment and around UNIFIL Naqoura HQ with tanks and heavy mortars, threatening to fire at UNIFIL and Lebanese Army units if the move occurred. Meanwhile, the UN Chief Coordinator General Siilasvuo contacted the Israeli authorities to secure their cooperation and assistance ahead of the planned move of the Lebanese Army. The Security Council Chairman and representatives of countries that contributed troops approached the Israeli Government in support of the UN

[76] The report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, S/13026

efforts. Israel responded by agreeing to cooperate with the UNIFIL to facilitate the implementation of this move. In connection with the move of the Lebanese Army contingent, De Facto Forces launched a series of unprovoked attacks on UNIFIL premises and its headquarters at Naqoura.[77]

Armed militias attempted numerous times to infiltrate the UNIFIL's field of operations as well as several cases of hijacking UNIFIL vehicles and firing at UNIFIL personnel. Two Fijian soldiers were killed and four were wounded during these attacks. Subsequent to that incident, four Norwegian members of a medivac team died when their helicopter crashed after hitting a power line. There were countless exchanges of heavy munitions fire across the UNIFIL area of operation between the DFF and PLO north of the Litani. Most of these exchanges were initiated by the DFF, whereas Israeli artillery was also involved in some of them.

The UNIFIL underwent some operational changes in order to better contain attempts of infiltration and incursion. Additionally, the force tried to augment its surveillance and detection capability at checkpoints, observation posts and patrols. Considering the continuing infiltration and incursion attempts, the difficulty of terrain, the limited number of troops and an increasing number of civilians moving freely in densely populated areas, it became necessary to widen the use of surveillance devices in UNIFIL operations. The number of night-vision binoculars and stronger searchlights were increased in the UNIFIL zone. Furthermore, sophisticated ground surveillance radars provided the UNIFIL with a medium-range early warning system.[78] Armored personnel carriers were provided to a number of contingents as a

[77] The report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, S/13381
[78] The report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, S/13495

further measure to improve the force's operational capability and its reaction time to incidents. The UNIFIL also continued its efforts to establish an adequate security zone around its headquarters at Naqoura.

The essential problem faced by the UNIFIL from the start stemmed from its inability to assume complete and peaceful control of its sphere of operations to restore the Lebanese Government's authority in the entire area. The assumption upon which Res.No.425 was based indicated this process would be in the best interest of all the parties involved in conflict and that UNIFIL would therefore have their full cooperation in fulfilling its mandate. However, the UNIFIL was able to establish 19 positions in the area of operations under the control of the DFF. The crux of the problem was the intransigence of the De Facto Forces, which apart from refusing to cooperate with the UNIFIL in the further deployment of the UN force, it continued its attempts to encroach upon the UNIFIL zone and restrict the freedom of movement required by UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel. The four positions set up by the DFF in the UNIFIL zone were a source of constant tension and instability. The DFF forced the inhabitants of certain villages to join their ranks and oppose the UNIFIL, never hesitating to resort to shelling when they refused to comply, inflicting casualties and damages. Since the DFF were known to be supported and supplied by Israel, the UN sought the intercession of the Israeli authorities at various levels to curb hostile activity against the UNIFIL. Although the Israeli authorities assisted the UNIFIL in resolving some specific issues, they avoided exerting pressure over the DFF by using their credits and effects on them.

Another problem arose from continued attempts by the PLO's armed elements to infiltrate the UNIFIL zone. Although the PLO assured its cooperation with the

UNIFIL, its infiltrations continued. Therefore, the DFF, with the assistance of Israel, tried to justify its encroachment and other activities as legal defensive measures against activities of the armed elements. This was a vicious circle which needed be broken in the interest of all concerned, towards the full implementation of Res.No.425.

The degree of suspicion, fear, violence and even fatalism which prevailed in this afflicted part of the world posed a tremendous obstacle to the UNIFIL forces. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General strongly emphasized on his report to UNSC that despite all difficulties the UNIFIL faced, any move to withdraw or reduce the UN force at this juncture would be extremely dangerous not only for the UNIFIL sphere of operations but also elsewhere in the region. The UNIFIL's presence was indispensable in preventing an uncontrollable escalation of conflict and the saving of lives of innocent people.

4.2.2. 1980, the De Facto Forces (DFF) escalated the tension in the UNIFIL area of operations.

Especially in April 1980, the DFF escalated the tension by its attacks on UNIFIL troops. The DFF opened fire on the Irish position, killing a soldier and wounding two others. On the morning of 8 April, one Fijian soldier died from injuries sustained in artillery fire. On 12 April, DFF opened heavy fire on UNIFIL HQ at Naqoura, causing extensive damage to its installations and equipment, including the hospital and four helicopters.[79] On the morning of 18 April, three soldiers of the Irish battalion were detained by the DFF en route to their observation post (OP), shooting and wounding one soldier and taking the other two away. Despite every effort made by the UNIFIL to obtain the release of the two captured soldiers, they were

[79] Special Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, 16 April 1980, S/13888

murdered.[80] During these incidents, the DFF sealed off all roads in the enclave to UNIFIL traffic. Although the DFF lifted the restrictions in late-April, the Irish and Senegalese contingents were denied the use of these roads. The DFF also continued to harass the observation posts (OP) along the Israeli-Lebanon border. These posts were frequently broken into, equipment destroyed or stolen and observers were prevented from performing their duties. The actual deployment of the UNIFIL was seen on the map (Appendix-B).

The Secretary-General desperately explained on his report that the situation of the UNIFIL was so serious, the Force could not effectively carry out the responsibility entrusted to it by the Security Council. After these unprovoked attacks of the DFF, the Security Council met urgently and adopted Res.No.467, on 24 April 1980 (see Appendix C). In it, the Security Council seriously stressed "the mandate of the Security Council would allow the Force to use its right to self-defense, which included resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties." The council condemned all acts of hostility against the UNIFIL that led to loss of life and injuries among the personnel of the Force and the UNTSO, disrupted communications, as well as destroyed property and materiel. The Security Council also censured the deliberate shelling of the UNIFIL HQ and more particularly the field hospital, which had special protection under international law.

In August 1980, some developments within and adjacent to the area of operation of the UNIFIL caused a dangerous escalation of tension in the area. After a concentration of IDF troops and vehicles in the area of Al Khaim, on 18 August, the IDF and DFF started shelling Beaufort Castle (a UNIFIL position) and the

[80] The special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the Security Council, 16 April 1980, S/13888

surrounding areas, additionally six IDF jets dropped about 12 bombs on the same location. While the shelling and bombing continued, an IDF company conducted an operation in the villages of Arnun (north of the river) and Kafr Tibnit. The commander of the UNIFIL protested to the Israeli authorities and the Lebanese Permanent Representative resorted to the President of the Security Council, saying that the IDF military operation resulted in at least 25 killed and 26 wounded, as well as heavy destruction of houses and property. On the same day, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General, on which he protested against the Israeli attack, indicating that Israeli artillery fire on Arnun resulted in the deaths of four civilians and the wounding of five; in addition, 12 Palestinian fighters were killed, 11 wounded and three missing. A representative from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN expressed that the aim of operations was to hamper terrorist organizations and prevent them from embarking upon attacks against Israeli settlements and also to destroy their artillery and mortar nests which shelled Israeli's northern settlements and Major Haddad's enclaves. They alleged that the villages of Kafra and Yatar within the Dutch battalion sector were full of terrorists. The villages of Haddatha and Ayta az Zutt in the Irish battalion sector were under heavy mortar fire during this operation.[81]

Upon these incidents, the Secretary-General tasked new military observers from UNTSO to the area of operation, thus increasing the number of observers from 36 to 74. General Erskine was in continuous contact with the parties, negotiations and consultations were held by the UNIFIL to reduce the risk of confrontation and armed clashes. UNTSO military observers continued to man the five UNTSO observation

[81] The special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the Security Council, Aug. 1980, S/14118

posts along the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Demarcation Line. In addition, five UNTSO teams assisted the UNIFIL in carrying out its mandate: namely, a team based in Metulla, which served as liaison to the IDF and DFF; a team based in Tyre, serving as liaison with the local PLO representative, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and AMAL (Lebanese Shiite armed organization); and three mobile teams, whose function were to prevent and investigate incidents.

Meanwhile, the continuous efforts were made in 1980 towards the reactivation of Israel-Lebanon Mix Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in accordance with Res.No.467 of 24 April 1980. In that resolution, the council requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting of ILMAC for the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty over all its territory. However, Israeli representatives did not accept the convening of the ILMAC, declared that it was no longer valid and that they would welcome a meeting with representatives of the Lebanese Government rather than the ILMAC. Meanwhile, the Lebanese delegation insisted that the Armistice Agreement was still valid.[82] In this context, the Lebanese representative complained about the establishment of the IDF position in Southern Lebanon and incursions by IDF personnel into Lebanese territory.

Despite all the measures taken by UNIFIL up until December, 1980, 23 UN soldiers died and 78 were wounded in armed clashes since it was deployed to Lebanon. At the end of the year, the UNIFIL was still prevented from making further progress towards fully implementing the objectives of Res.No.425.

[82] After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the set of armistice agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria. The agreement established the armistice line between Israel and its neighbors which was known as the Green Line. The agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed on 23 March 1949 on the Lebanese-Israel border.

The UNIFIL also continued to maintain regular contacts with the Governor of Southern Lebanon regarding the restoration of a Lebanese civilian administrative presence in the area and the provision of humanitarian assistance to the locals. Although the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura provided health services to Force personnel, the battalions' medical centers continued to treat the locals as required. The vaccination program for children in the UNIFIL zone was run by the Lebanese Ministry of Health.

4.2.3. 1981, acts of hostility against UNIFIL and the locals.

The Irish Lieutenant-General William Callaghan replaced General Erskine as Commander of the UNIFIL on 15 February 1981. The Nepalese battalion was deployed in the northern sector and the Ghanaian battalion was withdrawn from the north in mid-1981. During the year, there were frequent, heavy exchanges of fire between the DFF in the enclave and armed elements stationed in the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani. On a number of occasions, IDF personnel joined the DFF in the firing. Although these volleys were fired over and across the UNIFIL zone, on many occasions shells fell near UNIFIL positions and firing continued in all sectors throughout the year.

While movement of IDF personnel was generally confined to the enclave, they committed a serious incursion into the UNIFIL zone on 1 April 1981, when IDF soldiers entered the village of Tulin in the Nigerian sector, blew up three houses and kidnapped two civilians. In that incident, a Lebanese soldier was killed and a brief firefight occurred between the IDF and a combined Nigerian and Lebanese Army patrol. On 3 March 1981, the DFF opened a six-hour long barrage of tank fire into the village of Al-Qantara, in the Nigerian battalion sector. In this incident, a Nigerian

captain and a corporal were killed and 11 Nigerian soldiers were injured. Another tank barrage from DFF positions into the village of Yatar in the Dutch sector caused damage to property. These hostile acts continued into 15 March from DFF positions in which many civilians were killed and wounded. Furthermore, throughout April and May, IDF conducted a number of air operations against targets north of the Litani and adjacent to the UNIFIL zone.

Upon these occasions, the Secretary-General got in touch with the Israeli authorities, urging them to make all possible effort to bring an end to the irresponsible behavior of the DFF. The Chief of Staff (COS) of IDF, General Eirtan, sent a message to the commander of UNIFIL expressing his sorrow for the UNIFIL casualties. He told to do everything possible to avoid a recurrence of such a tragedy.[83]

These activities, as other violent incidents in the region, inevitably affect the task of UNIFIL by making even more difficult the UNIFIL's efforts to secure and maintain a ceasefire between armed elements to the north and west of its area, and the DFF with IDF to the south. UNIFIL and the UN Secretary-General made constant efforts to reinforce the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, because increasing tension had the effect of escalating the danger of conflict in the area.

Meanwhile, one of the main functions of UNIFIL was to assist the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon. The deployment of a Lebanese battalion in the UNIFIL zone was an initial step in this process. UNIFIL continued to strengthen and make more effective the Lebanese presence, both civilian and military, in the area of operation. With new deployment in

[83] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL to the Security Council, 15 June 1981

the year, the strength of the Lebanese Army in the south was increased by more than 700 and by June 1981, the Lebanese contingent was 1350 strong.[84]

The population in the UNIFIL zone lived and worked in relatively calm and increased with the arrival of the relatives from more troubled regions of the country. This was an important indication of success of the UNIFIL. However, its deterrent capability and a clear definition of the UNIFIL area of operations were able to render the mandate more credible, more effective and more implementable. Another challenge was Israel's preemptive attacks that threatened the safety of the UNIFIL and its peacekeeping missions.

Mid-July 1981 witnessed a serious outbreak of hostilities affecting areas outside UNIFIL control, which led to an influx of people from other parts of Lebanon seeking safety in the UNIFIL zone. A particularly vicious cycle of hostilities occurred between 10 - 24 July, 1981.[85] The UN headquarters were closely involved in the area of negotiations leading up to a ceasefire. In this context, the Security Council convened on 21 July to adopt Res.No.490,[86] which called for an immediate end of all armed attacks. A ceasefire agreement was implemented on 24 July 1981 as a result of the UN and US efforts.[87] The governments of Israel and Lebanon endorsed Res.No.490. The PLO declared that it would abide by the resolution as well.

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[84] According to the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, within the limit of 1500 Lebanese soldiers were allowed into the south.

[85] On 10 July, Israeli aircraft began strikes against targets in southern Lebanon, north of the UNIFIL zone. This led to exchanges of heavy firing between the armed element and the DFF. Widespread Israeli air strikes continued on 13 - 14 July. The PLO fired into the enclave and northern Israel. On 15 July, there was a particularly heavy exchange of artillery, mortar and rocket fire. On 16-17 July, Israeli naval vessels joined in the firing, which was intense in all sectors. On 16 July, Israeli aircraft attacked and destroyed bridges on the Zahrani and Litani rivers. On 17 July, they attacked Beirut, causing heavy loss of life and damage to property. Exchange of fire in all sectors, air strikes and naval bombardment continued until 24 July.
On 17 July 1981, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. The council appealed to all concerned to revert immediately to the ceasefire and launched an urgent appeal for an immediate end to all armed attacks.

[86] Appendix-C: The UNSC Res.No.490 (1981)

[87] Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East, 11 November 1981

However, a dissident PLO group led by Mr. Ahmed Jebril continued to fire sporadically at targets in the enclave. General Callaghan strongly protested those violations of the ceasefire to the PLO command. Chairmen Arafat replied that it was due to a misunderstanding and the PLO was determined to abide by the ceasefire. Another problem that threatened the ceasefire was that Israel continued to fly reconnaissance flights over southern Lebanon. PLO protested these overflights as serious violations of the ceasefire agreement. However Israel refused to stop such observation flights that not included by the ceasefire agreement.

The ceasefire was also important for the UNIFIL, as Secretary-General stated in his annual report in 1981 “no ceasefire, peacekeeping operation, or other expedient for containing the conflict can, in the end, prevent new outbursts of violence as long as the basic elements of the problem are not tackled in negotiations involving all parties concerned.”

Despite intensive and persistent efforts, the UNIFIL did not receive the degree of required cooperation from the parties to enable the force to fully carry out its mandate. In addition to encroachments and hostile acts against the UNIFIL, confrontations with armed groups and forces operating in the UNIFIL zone continued to occur.

On 9 October 1981, the Chief of Staff (COS) of UNIFIL was ambushed by unidentified persons while travelling between Tayr Zibna and Jwayya. The COS and his driver were wounded in this attack. On 1 November, armed elements of the LNM opened fire on the Dutch position west of Siddiqin. At the same day, a vehicle from the Irish battalion was ambushed by the same group who opened fire for stopping them. Although the DFF removed their position from Jabal Basil, they attempted to

establish another position at Tiri in the Irish battalion area. The position was surrounded by the Irish battalion and was not allowed to take root. However the DFF continued to encroach upon the UNIFIL zone, they sealed off all the roads in the enclave to the UNIFIL in November 1981, including those linking Naqoura with Israel to the south as well as the Tyre - Beirut road to the north. The same day, the main water pipeline from Israel to Naqoura was blown up by the DFF. About 250 UNIFIL civilian staff members were stranded at UNIFIL HQ without water supply and suitable accommodations. Road blocks were removed following negotiations with the IDF and DFF.[88]

Despite continuing administrative and logistic difficulties, a number of measures were introduced to alleviate problems facing the UNIFIL. Equipment maintenance was another problem because the vehicles comprised more than 40 different makes and 80 models, some of them 20 years old. The plan to use maintenance facilities in Lebanon could not realized as required. The communication equipment acquired from the stock of the UNEF was installed. Therefore the automatic telephone system linking UNIFIL HQ with all battalions, with Beirut and with UNDOF was completed. Meanwhile, there was too much unexploded ordnance and too many mines in the UNIFIL zone. A French engineering company defused 160 shells, mines and grenades and neutralized 187 cluster bombs. It also cleared 20,000 square meters of minefields and destroyed 4,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition within 6 months in 1981.

4.3. 1982, The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee) and its aftermath

[88] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL to the Security Council, 11 December 1981

With the influence of the ceasefire, the general situation in southern Lebanon became much less tense. During this period of relative quiet, Amal, a Shiite political movement with an armed militia force, became more active in southern Lebanon. Tension flared between Amal's followers and PLO and the pro-Palestinian Lebanese National Movement. Serious clashes broke out among the groups in January and April 1982 in the Senegalese sector.

In early-April 1982, tension in southern Lebanon escalated, not due to any ceasefire violations, but as a consequence of events elsewhere. On 21 April and 9 May 1982, Israeli aircraft attacked PLO targets in southern Lebanon causing many casualties. Following these attacks, PLO fired rockets from the Tyre pocket into northern Israel. Although, intense efforts were made by the UN to restore the ceasefire, the situation in the area remained extremely volatile.

On 3 June 1982, an attempt was made to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom. Israel blamed the PLO for this incident and assumed it as just cause for a counterattack.[89] Israel launched a massive bombarding raid against PLO targets on 4 June which caused a heavy loss of life and destruction. Subsequent to those Israeli attacks, intense firefights broke out between the PLO and IDF with the DFF over the UNIFIL zone. On the same day, both the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council urgently appealed to all parties to give up hostile actions and make every effort to restore the ceasefire (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). However, the mutual fire continued unabated on 5 June in the area, including intense Israeli air raids in the vicinity of Beirut and Damur, and shelling by a Israeli naval vessel in the Tyre area. The day after, the UNSC

[89] The Israeli Ambassador to Britain was injured, not by a PLO group but by their most bitter rivals in the organization, a terrorist faction led by Abu Nidal that had splitoff from the PLO (Lebanon: a country study, 1987, p.201)

unanimously adopted Res.No.508 (1982) by which it called upon all the parties to the conflict to cease all military activities and accordingly Res.No.509 demanded Israel to unconditionally withdraw all its military forces.[90]

While the Israeli cabinet convened and voted to authorize an invasion, it set strict limits on the extent of the incursion. The IDF was to advance no further than 40 km, the operation was to last only 24 hours, Syrian forces were not to be attacked, and Beirut was not to be entered (Collelo, 1987).

Actually, the military tension between the IDF and PLO in Lebanon surged in early-June and turned into open conflict on 4 June 1982. On that day, Israeli aircraft conducted air raids around Beirut, including the Sabra Refugee Camp, which created heavy loss of life and destruction. In southern Lebanon, an intense exchange of fire started between positions of the armed elements (on the one side PLO and LNM's forces, on the other side the IDF and DFF). On 5 June, heavy exchanges of artillery fire continued and intensive Israeli air-strikes reported in the area of Hasbaya, Chateau de Beaufort, Nabatiyah, Aichiye and Arnun. On the same day, there were Israeli air raids in the vicinity of Beirut and Damur, additionally Israeli naval vessels joined in the exchanges of fire in the Tyre area. After consulting the UNSC, the Secretary-General called for all parties to adhere strictly to the ceasefire and refrain immediately from any hostile act likely to aggravate the situation.[91]

On 6 June 1982 at 10.30 hours, Lieutenant-General Rafael Eitan, the Chief of Staff of IDF, met with General Callaghan at Metulla in northern Israel. General Eitan informed that the IDF would launch an offensive military operation into Lebanon within half an hour, at 11.00 and would pass through UNIFIL positions. He advised

[90] Appendix-C: The UNSC Res.No.508 (1982)
[91] The report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, 11 June 1982

General Callaghan that the UN troops would not impede the advance of IDF units. Upon this conversation, General Callaghan protested in the strongest terms at this unacceptable course of action. In the aftermath of the meeting, he gave instructions to all UNIFIL units that in case of any attacks, they would block advancing IDF forces, take defensive measures and stand their ground unless their safety was seriously imperiled (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).

IDF ground forces (five divisions and two brigades) crossed into Lebanon and some of them entered the UNIFIL zone at 11:00 hours on the same day. They advanced along three main axes; on the western axis two divisions converged on Tyre and proceed north along the coastal road headed to Sidon; in the central sector a division moved towards Akiya Bridge and conquered the Palestinian-held Beaufort Castle, and linked up with the western forces in a pincer movement toward Sidon; and in the eastern sector, through the Chouba-Chebaa area.

In accordance with General Callaghan's instructions, UNIFIL troops made every effort to take some measures in order to stop or hinder the advance of IDF in its area of operation. Despite the efforts taken by UNIFIL troops, the massive IDF attacks could not be impeded by their light defensive weapons therefore UNIFIL positions en route to the invasion were bypassed within 24 hours.

The IDF's operation focused mainly on the PLO forces and their bases, therefore the PLO was forced to fight alone against Israeli attacks. Amal leaders declared their militias would not clash against the IDF and would surrender their weapons if necessary. The Shiites in the southern Lebanon were very uncomfortable about the situation under Palestinian domination. Shiite, Druze and Christian villagers welcomed the advancing Israeli forces (Collelo, 1987). However Palestinian militias

put up a formidable resistance against the IDF, particularly in the vicinity of Tyre and Sidon inflicting high casualties upon the Israeli forces as they advanced, impeding their progress. Meanwhile, the IDF was further hampered because the Palestinian refugee camps accommodated a large number of civilian non-combatants who provided the Palestinian fighters asylum. The Palestinian guerillas fiercely resisted the IDF who attempted to subdue the camps. This led the IDF to resort to saturation bombing in order to neutralize the camps. After the matter of camp was overcome, the IDF stood poised to move against Beirut. Fighting occurred not only between the PLO and IDF, but also between the Syrian and Israeli armies in the Bekaa Valley. The axis of advance in eastern Lebanon put two Israeli divisions up against the Syrian Army near the strategic Beirut-Damascus Highway. The IDF could not proceed further against the entrenched Syrian positions without close air support but the Syria's air defense systems threatened the Israeli Air Force. A Israeli surprise air strike destroyed the Syrian air missile batteries and they shot down 29 Syrian aircraft in one day and 50 more later without a single loss. This air battle provided the IDF with absolute air superiority in Lebanon and left Syrian ground forces exposed to air attack. On June 6, the UNSC unanimously adopted Res.No.509 (1982),[92] demanding that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, and all parties strictly observe the ceasefire.[93] However with increasing political duress, Israel and Syria agreed to a truce under the auspices of the UN on June 11.

[92] Appendix-C: The UNSC Res.No.509 (1982)

[93] On the evening of 7 June, Arafat informed the Secretary-General that PLO had decided to abide by the UNSC resolution. However Israel declared that the operation had been ordered because of the intolerable situation created by the presence in Lebanon of a large number of "terrorists" operating from that country, threatening the lives of civilians, and that any withdrawal of Israeli forces prior to the conclusion of concrete arrangements which would permanently and reliably preclude hostile action against Israel's citizens was inconceivable.

The Secretary-General commented on the Israeli invasion in his report of 14 June 1982 to the UNSC. Perez de Cuellar explained his concern that the Israeli side would not apply a ceasefire against the Palestinians, which meant that bombarding in the Beirut area and elsewhere would continue. The situation in the area of civilian population was desperate due to heavy bombarding therefore urgent humanitarian relief operations by appropriate organizations and programs of the UN system were barely moving forward. The ceasefire could not applied successfully and the UNIFIL had insufficient capacity for monitoring violations of the truce agreement, forcing the Secretary-General to appeal to the Israeli Government for cooperation and assistance in the urgent humanitarian effort.

Although the USSR abstained from voting on every resolution concerning the UNIFIL, they condemned the Israeli invasion of 1982 and called for a withdrawal from Lebanon.[94] However, Moscow avoided the danger of direct involvement in Lebanon and preferred instead to exploit the propaganda value of resorting to the UNSC to exert pressure on the Israelis to withdrawal. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's influence and credibility were undermined when it failed to meet appeals from the PLO and Syrian for support (Murphy, 2007).

The UNIFIL, like all other PKOs, was based on certain assumptions and conditions rather than its military superiority on the ground. The foremost principle of the PKO was the non-use of force, except in self-defense. The force was not meant to engage in combat to attain its goals; it had a strictly limited strength, armed only with light defensive weapons. For that reason, some fundamental conditions had to be met before establishment of the force; first that it must function with the full cooperation

[94] Since 1978, the Soviet Union disagreed with the UN mandate for the UNIFIL in assisting with the return of the effective authority of the Lebanese Government and furthermore, they criticized the mandate for the absence of a time limit on the force's stay in Lebanon.

of the parties and, second that it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council and, third that the parties would fully abide by the decision of the council. In the event of non-compliance, the Security Council and member nations would be able to act decisively to ensure respect for the council's decisions. However, in the UNIFIL case, these conditions were not met, and it was faced with inadequate cooperation and hostility throughout its existence.

As Secretary-General pointed out in his report; it was obvious recent developments had radically altered the situation in which the UNIFIL was established in 1978. First of all, the UNIFIL area of operations had fallen under the control of the IDF and it had to operate behind Israeli lines. Considering those conditions in which the UNIFIL could no longer carry out its missions mandated by the UNSC, the Secretary-General instructed the commander of the UNIFIL, as an interim measure, to ensure that all UNIFIL troops and military observers continued to man their posts unless their safety was seriously imperiled, and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the locals to the best of their ability.[95] Some adjustments regarding UNIFIL troop positioning considered as non-essential in the new situation were made. UNIFIL troops operated observation posts and checkpoints and conducted patrols in sensitive areas to prevent hostile actions and to ensure the security and safety of the locals (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). They continued to hinder infiltrations and incursions of armed groups into the UNIFIL zone. However they could not control or intervene in the movement of Israeli forces, hence the only thing they could do was to monitor the IDF's activities within its area of responsibility and report to the Secretary-General.

[95] These interim tasks were endorsed by the Security Council on 18 June, when it decided, by UNSC Res.No.511 (1982), to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for an interim period of two months.

In the days following the Israeli invasion, the UNIFIL extended its protection and humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its zone. No doubt that the presence of the UNIFIL provided an important stabilizing and moderating influence in southern Lebanon during this difficult period. There were obviously interim tasks, pending decision by the Council on the status of the UNIFIL. The conditions prevailing in Lebanon in mid-June also hampered logistics support of the force. Further difficulties were created by the restriction of movement of the UNIFIL which was imposed by the IDF. The UNIFIL had limited use of the coastal road north of Naqoura up to its Tyre quarters. Similarly, UNIFIL helicopter flights were severely restricted, therefore important logistic support activities of the UNIFIL had to be halted.

During this period, the Israeli forces searched houses, confiscated weapons and detained persons in the UNIFIL area of operations. There were also incidents in which Israeli soldiers raided UNIFIL installations, destroyed UNIFIL checkpoints, fired close to UNIFIL positions or blocked roads in its area of responsibility. These hostile actions were strongly protested to the Israeli authorities. At the end of June, a new armed group equipped and controlled by the Israeli forces appeared in parts of the UNIFIL zone. Referred to by Israeli Army as 'national guard' or 'civil guard,' these armed persons who were recruited from the locals attempted to establish checkpoints and patrol the villages. In some locations, their lack of discipline led to friction with the other inhabitants. As they were not recognized by the Lebanese Government, the UNIFIL took action to curtail their activities. The force continued to resist attempts by the De Facto Forces (later called the South Lebanon Army 'SLA'[96])

[96] After Israeli invasion in 1982, the DFF was referred to as SLA. The SLA was under the command of Major Haddad until he died in 1984 and General Antoine Lahad replaced him. Israel continued to train and fund SLA in return for their effort to prevent the return of PLO guerillas in the area. The SLA's

to operate in the UNIFIL zone, although in some instances they were only able to enter that area with IDF assistance.[97]

UNIFIL humanitarian teams were able to assist the population of Tyre through the distribution of food and water and dispensing of medical aid. Basic foodstuffs and milk for children were distributed to the locals and Palestinian refugees. Water supply was organized in many places, especially in and around the Palestinian refugee camps. But these efforts were halted in Tyre by the Israeli authorities on 16 June.[98] Due to the Israeli operation, there was a considerable increase of population inside the UNIFIL zone which was provided with food, potable water and medical assistance by the UNIFIL, in cooperation with UNICEF. There was a significant increase in the number of surgical operations conducted at the UNIFIL hospital, most performed on Lebanese civilians who sustained injuries from shell fragments or mines.

4.3.1. The Sabra and Shatila Massacre.

The IDF moved quickly through southern Lebanon, encircling west Beirut by mid-June and initiating a three-month siege of Palestinian and Syrian forces in the city which was under heavy Israeli bombardment. President Reagan's special envoy, Philip C. Habib strived hard to arrange a settlement between Israel, the PLO and Syria. He succeeded in August 1982 and he came to an agreement with the parties for the evacuation of PLO guerillas and Syrian troops from Beirut. The agreement also envisaged the deployment of a MNF during the evacuation period. Upon the request

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2500 fighters were Maronite Christians (40%), and Shiite Moslems (60%), although Christians comprised the majority of the officer staff. With the rise of Hezbollah, the Shiites aimed at liberating the Southern Lebanon from Israel and SLA. (Elizabeth Thomson, South Lebanon Army, Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004)

[97] The report of the UN Secretary-General to the UNSC on UNIFIL, dated 13 August 1982.

[98] In the second half of June, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief organizations were able to commence relief work in the Tyre pocket. The UNIFIL continued to cooperate with the organizations by providing transport, storage facilities and procurement support.

of the Lebanese Government, the MNF which was consisted of units from the US, UK, France and Italy arrived in Beirut in late-August, 1982.[99] Besides overseeing the evacuation of PLO forces from west Beirut, the mandate given to MNF was to serve as an 'interposition force,' separating the IDF from the Lebanese people and to assist the Lebanese Army in restoring the authority of the Lebanese Government over Beirut. The MNF's diligence and neutrality during this period was the key for initial success which enhanced the optimism and hope among the Lebanese people. Taking advantage of this conflict-free environment, more than 5,000 Lebanese Army troops were deployed in Beirut and the government began to build a strong national army. Lebanese optimism increased when Israel Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon resigned after the investigation of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre. His successor, Moshe Arens, wanted the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon in order to avoid antagonizing the US.

On 23 August, the Lebanese parliament elected Bachir Gemayel as president. Israel was satisfied with attaining two main goals of its operation; by ushering in Bachir Gemayel as president and evicting the PLO from Beirut. Israel's remaining aim was to sign a durable peace treaty with Lebanon that would entail the withdrawal of Syrian forces and prevent the PLO from returning into Lebanon after their withdrawal (Collelo, 1987). When the evacuation ended, on 10 September, the US Marines withdrew from Beirut, followed by the other members of the MNF. The Lebanese Army began to move into West Beirut as Israel withdrew their troops from the front lines. However, the new president Bachir Gemayel was assassinated on 14

[99] The US, France, Italy and Britain dispatched contingents of 1400, 1500, 2200, 100 troops respectively. Each contingent retained its own command structure, and no central command was created for them. The French contingent was assigned responsibility for the port area and West Beirut. The Italian contingent occupied the area between West Beirut and Beirut International Airport, which encompassed the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps. The US Marines returned to Beirut on September 29, where it took up positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport, adjacent to the IDF front lines.

September by a bomb that went off at Phalange HQ in Beirut. Despite its commitment to pullout, the IDF entered into West Beirut for a short time after this incident. While the Israel Army was in control of West Beirut, the brutal massacres were conducted by the Phalangists and Christian militiamen in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila on 16 September.[100] Following the assassination of Bachir Gemayel and the tragic events in Beirut, the parliament met again on 22 September to elect Amin Gemayel, who had disapproved of the Israeli presence in Lebanon, as new president of Lebanon. In order to strengthen the situation and show support for the Lebanese Government, the Multi-National Force (MNF) returned to Beirut at the end of September.[101]

4.3.2. 1983, The IDF withdrew but kept a security zone in southern Lebanon.

Under the patronage of the US, new Lebanese Government entered into negotiation with Israel for a peace treaty which primarily put forward the withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon. Israel also declared its willingness for a durable agreement with Lebanon. On 17 May 1983, an agreement was signed by the representatives of Lebanon, Israel and the US. The US did not want Syria involved in the agreement negotiations, but intended to get Syrian endorsement after it was signed. Israel insisted on a simultaneous withdrawal with Syrian forces. It was an agreement which aimed at ending the state of war between two countries since 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The treaty stipulated a gradual withdrawal of the IDF providing that the Lebanese

[100] According to the report of the Kahan Commission established by the government of Israel to investigate the events, the IDF monitored the Phalangist radio network and fired illumination flares from mortars and aircraft to light up the area. Over a period of two days, Christian militiamen massacred some 700-800 Palestinian men, women, and children.

[101] President Reagan also said in an interview with the Washington Post on December 16 that "we think the time has come now" for the armed forces of Israel, Syria and the PLO to leave Lebanon.

Army established a security zone in south Lebanon along the Israeli border.[102] It also included numerous articles regarding measures which were specified to prevent PLO fighters from infiltrating Lebanese territory. According to the agreement, the Lebanese Army would take over areas evacuated by the IDF. However, the agreement got strong reactions from Lebanese Moslems and the Arab world. They opposed the agreement with Israel on grounds that it would take Lebanon into the Israeli orbit, undermine Syrian-Lebanese relations, and weaken the Arab struggle for Palestinian rights.[103] It was also considered an unconditional submission of Lebanon and perceived as treason among the Arab world. Although this treaty was mediated by the US and approved by Parliament on 17 May, 1983, it was not signed by the President, hence it was never enforced.[104] Meanwhile, Israel insisted on full implementation of the agreement, and declared that if not, they would redeploy its troop in Lebanon and unilaterally establish a security zone in south Lebanon with Major Haddad's SLA.[105]

It was Syria that vehemently opposed the agreement because it called on Syrian forces to withdrawal from Lebanon. The National Salvation Front (NSF) was a coalition consisting of many sects, including Druze, Shiites, Sunni Moslems, different Christian groups and Left-wing political parties. As it was seen, these groups along with Syria controlled much more territory than the Lebanese Government. The NSF opposed not only President Gemayel and his government, but also the US and

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[102] During the negotiation period, Israel demanded the integration of Major Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA) into the regular Lebanese Army to ensure the safeguard of its northern border.

[103] Lecture and Working Paper Series (2003 No.3), The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990, American University of Beirut, November 2003, pgs.20-21

[104] Although Gemayel defended his 17 May agreement with Israel, he refused to sign it saying that "I refuse to be targeted as a traitor every time this issue comes up".

[105] On 20 July, US State Department Spokesman, John Hughes, commented on the Israeli cabinet's announcement that US policy was the full withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. "Any partial withdrawal, therefore, should be within the framework of that objective and should not complicate the very difficult tasks facing the government of President Gemayel of Lebanon." On that day, President Gemayel was in Washington for a five-day visit. He told a gathering of the National Press Club that Israel's decision of a partial troop pullout from Lebanon "could endanger the entire peace process and 17 May Agreement."

Israel.[106] The optimism among Lebanese people in late-1982 disappeared, as bombing and armed attacks between rival groups resumed in mid-1983.

Meanwhile, activities on the UNIFIL side as of January, 1983 were as follows; there were nine battalions under the Force command: Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal (Appendix-B shows the deployment map).[107] Additionally, the UNIFIL was assisted by 72 military observers from the UNTSO. Upon the Secretary-General's request, the UN Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months with Res.No.529 of 18 January, 1983 (see Appendix C). The Israeli invasion operation in Lebanon increased the restrictions imposed on the UNIFIL, the troops of which were not allowed to access Tyre and Sidon via the coastal road. Similarly, fight clearance for UNIFIL helicopters were denied by the Israel Defense Force. Searching and demolishing or defusing unexploded mines and bombs in the UNIFIL zone continued. During the Israeli invasion, a number of local inhabitants were detained by the IDF. A series of incidents involving the De Facto Forces occurred in the UNIFIL zone. These included abducting soldiers, hijacking of vehicles, removal of equipment and firing close to UNIFIL positions. Through intensive contact with Israeli authorities at various levels, the abducted soldiers were released, and hijacking vehicles and most equipment was returned. The IDF also continued the recruitment and arming of selected villagers in the UNIFIL zone. Sometimes, fatal fire-exchange occurred between those groups and UNIFIL units because of their irresponsible behavior. During 1983, the UNIFIL continued humanitarian assistance to a number of

[106] Assad's intention was to force President Gemayel to abandon US, French and Israeli support and became dependent on Syria again.

[107] The Nepalese Government informed the Secretary-General it was unable to continue its participation in the UNIFIL after 28 October 1982. The Finnish Government informed that they were willing to provide a replacement contingent of equivalent strength for service with the UNIFIL. Upon that change, the Norwegian Battalion was assigned to the Nepalese Battalion zone and the Finnish battalion was deployed in the zone held by the French Battalion.

displaced persons and locals in its zone by cooperation with UNICEF and ICRC. This was mainly logistic support for health care, education services and water supply. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities continued to prevent the UNIFIL from extending humanitarian assistance outside its area of operation, although Lebanese Government officials requested such assistance.[108]

In early-September 1983, the IDF completed its evacuation from the Shuf Mountains to south of the Awali River because of continuous attacks from Moslem guerilla groups. The power vacuum created by the Israeli withdrawal rekindled clashes between Phalangist and Druze militias at Bhamdun.[109] On 6 September, the Lebanese Government officially complained to the US and European governments that the Syrian and Palestinian troops were attempting to overthrow the Lebanese Government and take control over the country. At the same time, the Lebanese Army was positioned to defend the cities of Suq al Gharb and Khaldah to prevent Druze forces and Progressive Socialist Party militias from invading Beirut. The Druze fighters blockaded Dayr al Qamar, with its 40,000 Christian residents and 2,000 Phalangist militias.[110] While the Lebanese Army was confronting Druze forces in the cities above, a US Navy warship shelled Druze positions and helped the Lebanese Army hold the towns until a ceasefire was announced on 25 September, 1983 (Collelo, 1987). However, despite the ceasefire, attacks against the IDF and MNF increased in severity. The Shiite Superior Council called for resistance against the Israeli occupation on 16 October 1983.

[108] The report of the UN Secretary-General to the UNSC on UNIFIL, dated 12 October 1983.
[109] A town located on the Beirut-Damascus Highway on the edge of the Shuf Mountains.
[110] President Reagan ordered an additional 2,000 US Marines, aboard three naval vessels, to be sent to Lebanon's coastal waters. This increased the number of marines on ships offshore to 2,600.

4.3.3. The most deadly terrorist attack against the MNF.

On 23 October, the US and French military headquarters were attacked by explosives-laden trucks, killed 241 and wounded 70 US Marines and 56 French soldiers dead, 15 wounded. On 4 November, an Israel headquarters in south Lebanon was attacked in which 61 Israeli soldiers were killed, an attack claimed by Islamic Jihad.[111] Following the US bombing attacks on Syrian forces in Lebanon on December 4, the US Marine positions at Beirut Int'l Airport came under heavy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire from the Druze zone.[112] A day after this incident, the USSR's official press agency TASS resolutely condemned the US bombing raid on Syrian positions in Lebanon and they warned that "the US Government ought to be aware of the fact that US armed interference in Lebanon, the aggressive actions of the US against Syria constitute a serious threat to peace in the Middle East, and beyond the region" (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004, p. 56).

According to President Assad, the presence of the PLO in Lebanon was also creating a risk for Syrian forces to become a possible target in the mounting IDF attacks. He planned to force Arafat and the PLO to evacuate from Lebanon in order to reduce international pressure against Syria. Firstly, Arafat was declared *persona non grata* in Syria and had to leave Damascus on 24 June, 1983. It was a clear message to Israel that Assad was willing to expel Arafat and his forces from Lebanon, if the Israelis could in turn forget about the 17 May Agreement (Deeb, 2003). Assad also did not want the PLO to partake in the peace process as it could render the Syria position insignificant, and for this, he had the support of all dissident Palestinian organizations. A blockade of the PLO forces in Tripoli by anti-Arafat factions aided by Syria was condemned and protested by many Arab countries. In early-November,

[111] In retaliation, the US 6th Fleet struck Syrian positions and French launched an air strike against Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions.
[112] The attack lasted more than four hours and left eight marines dead.

they called on an immediate ceasefire in Tripoli and urged the conflicting parties to stop their bloodshed. Finally, the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat had to accept and evacuate his forces from Lebanon to preserve the national unity and Palestinian cause (Legum & Shaked, 1983). On 20 December 1983, Arafat and his 4,000 guerillas, withdrew from the port of Tripoli aboard five Greek passenger liners under the UN flags.

4.3.4. 1985, Israel unleashed its proxy (DFF) against UNIFIL.

Meanwhile, events occurred in the UNIFIL zone in Southern Lebanon were as follows; some Israeli policymakers considered the Shiites in southern Lebanon as their natural allies. As the Israel and Shiites did not want to see the PLO in southern Lebanon again, some Israeli authorities believed that a Shiite buffer state in the south could contribute towards the security of northern Israeli territory.[113] However, these expectations were never realized. With the rise of Hezbollah, the Shiites turned to be a formidable foe by vehemently resisting the IDF and SLA in south Lebanon. In early-1985, the Shiite militias inflicted a growing number of casualties on the IDF, which forced them implement the first stage of withdrawal from the Awwali River to the Litani River earlier than planned. Although the IDF hastened its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 1985, Israel preserved a 5-10 km.-wide security zone along the border inside Lebanon.[114] In April, 1985, the Secretary-General initiated a new effort through his personnel representatives. His objective was to sort out the arrangements of the UNIFIL deployment to these evacuated areas in consultation with Israeli and Lebanese authorities. However, these efforts were to no avail as the IDF conducted the third phase without any change in May and June. Despite the commitment, the

[113] Indeed, about 50% of the SLA was Shiite, and the IDF armed and supported several Shiite groups in the South.
[114] Israel handed over this area to the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and some 150 Israeli combat troop with 500 military advisers remained in this southern strip of Lebanon until the year 2000.

established security zone was handed over to the SLA, not the UNIFIL.[115] In these conditions, the UNIFIL was unable to carry out its mandate provided by the UNSC in its Res.No.425. Moreover, in that part of its area of deployment which overlapped the 'security zone,' the UNIFIL found itself confronted with many positions manned by the IDF and/or SLA (Appendix B). Meanwhile, Israeli forces with the SLA were able to continue its operations in these areas. They conducted a number of cordon-and-search operations against Shiite villages in the UNIFIL zone and they shelled these villages on some occasions, causing the destruction of property and acts of violence against the population.




Figure 15. Israeli Security Zone and the UNIFIL Area of Deployment

[115] In November 1984, the Secretary-General convened a conference of military representatives of Lebanon and Israel with a view to expediting the withdrawal of IDF and discussing security arrangement in southern Lebanon after the withdrawal. The conference was held under the UN auspices at UNIFIL HQ at Naqoura, lasted in January 1985, but produced no result. On 14 January, 1985, Israel pronounced a plan for the unilateral redeployment of Israeli forces in three phases. However, after the completion of the third phase of the Israeli redeployment, Israel handed over the security zone to the SLA.

On 17 April, 1985, the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of the UNIFIL for a further six months via Res.No.561. As of October, 1985, the composition of the UNIFIL was as follows; eight infantry battalions from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands and Norway. HQ camp command; Ghana and Ireland. Logistic Units from France, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, there were 75 military observers from UNTSO (see Appendix C). After the completion of the Israeli withdrawal, the commander of UNIFIL continued negotiations with Israeli authorities to get the IDF and SLA forces to evacuate all their positions in the UNIFIL zone as a first step for UNSC Res.No.561 (see Appendix B). On 16 July, the SLA withdrew from just three positions, and no further evacuation occurred.

Notwithstanding their efforts, the situation in the security zone was very tense. The Lebanese resistance and Shiite groups launched frequent attacks on Israeli troops within and outside the UNIFIL zone of deployment. These attacks were small arms, rockets, roadside bombs attacks, and a number of suicide bomber attacks as well. Meanwhile, the SLA and other irregular armed groups imposed restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel at security zone checkpoints.[116] A number of confrontations occurred when the UNIFIL denied unauthorized armed personnel passage through its checkpoints.[117]

As was emphasized on the Secretary-General's report at many times before, Perez de Cuellar shared his observations with the UNSC in his 1985 report. He stated that "the main problem is to achieve a situation in southern Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal in which international peace and security can be assured and normal conditions progressively restored. The best means of achieving that would be an

[116] The SLA personnel did not hesitate to act in a hostile attitude against the UNIFIL, they fired on a fully marked UN ambulance with its lights flashing, killing a Nepalese soldier on the way to Tallet Huqban.
[117] On June 7, near Al Qantarah in the Finnish sector, 23 Finnish soldiers were detained by SLA at their checkpoint. They were released unharmed eight days later.

orderly takeover by the UNIFIL from the Israeli forces with the ultimate aim of restoring Lebanese sovereignty in the area. Although the Israeli Government announced its withdrawal from Lebanon in June, they made it for self-defense purposes, maintaining that a "security zone" north of the Israeli-Lebanese border would be manned by the SLA, assisted with IDF. In fact, the security zone attracted increased opposition and caused a spike in violence in the area. It was under constant attack by Lebanese resistance. According to the Secretary-General, the level of violence in southern Lebanon was limited to some extent, because of the presence of the UNIFIL. Leaders of Amal and other Lebanese groups were cooperating with the UNIFIL in the area evacuated by the IDF. Perez de Cuellar evaluated that under these conditions, the situation south of the Litani was dangerous and the UNIFIL might find itself between hostile forces unless the UNSC could do more to influence the parties.[118]

As the Secretary-General previously stated, the UNIFIL was a PKO, not an enforcement action and it required the cooperation of the parties in conflict to fulfill its mandate. An essential cue for the UNIFIL to begin deployment to the international border was the Israeli Government agreement to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory and to abandon its concept of the so-called 'security zone.' Following the adoption of UNSC Res.No.587, discussions were resumed with the Israeli authorities in a further attempt to achieve the above objective.[119] Meanwhile, Israeli authorities reiterated they had no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. Their objective was to protect Northern Israel against attacks launched from Lebanon. Until Lebanon could produce an effective government with which Israel could agree on a permanent security

[118] The report of the UN Secretary-General to the UNSC on UNIFIL, dated 10 October 1985
[119] Following serious incidents that occurred in September 1986, when five UNIFIL personnel were killed and 31 wounded, the UNSC adopted Res.No.587 on 23 September, 1986. Despite the resolution and considerable efforts, the Force's situation did not improve during the rest of the year.

arrangement, Israel would continue to work with any Lebanese party interested in preventing ‘terror’ in the south of Lebanon and the north of Israel. The Israeli authorities recognized that the UNIFIL had tried to assist in bringing stability to the area and it had performed a useful role. According to the Israelis, peacekeeping forces were most effective when they served as buffers between two nations that shared a commitment to pacify their common border. However, this was not the case with Lebanon and peacekeepers could not be asked to combat ‘terrorists.’ That role must be left to governments and the people in the area of turmoil. Israel would continue to cooperate with the UNIFIL, but it would also maintain security arrangements deemed necessary to defend its northern border. That was the reason why Israel could not agree to a complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. However, Israeli authorities stated that they remained ready to give serious consideration to the UN’s proposal to secure their northern border.

No doubt that the deployment of the UNIFIL to the southern border might not had brought an instant end to all violence in this area. However, if it could have deployed on the border, the UNIFIL would have been in a position to carry out its mandate of restoring peace and security by ending all hostile acts across the border. This would have also contributed towards restoring authority of the Lebanese Government in the area.

4.3.5. 1986, Amal militias increase its attacks on UNIFIL.

The change of command at the UNIFIL occurred on 7 May 1986, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan relinquished his command to Deputy Force Commander, Brig.General Jean Pons, who remained in charge of the Force until 1 June, when Major-General Gustav Hagglund assumed command.

By August 1986, a remarkable increase was observed in armed attacks against the UNIFIL. On 11 August, 1986, two men, one of whom was the leader of the Amal Movement in southern Lebanon, were shot by a sentry of French contingent in a confrontation at a UNIFIL French battalion checkpoint near the village of Abbasiyah. Both men died shortly afterwards. The following day, Amal militias retaliated by attacking nine different French battalion positions. A total of 17 French soldiers were wounded during these attacks. The UNIFIL positions in the south continued to come under attack from time to time until late-August, not only in the French sector, but in the Fijian, Finnish, Irish and Nepali sectors as well. A remote-controlled roadside bomb killed an Irish lieutenant on 21 August. After cooperating with Lebanese authorities and Amal leaders, tensions in the area leveled off. However, despite those efforts, another serious incident occurred on 4 September, when three French soldiers were killed in the French battalion sector by a remote-controlled bomb near the village of Jwayya.[120] On 13 September a remote-controlled roadside bomb near the village of Bafliyah was triggered near an armored patrol of the French battalion, killing a French soldier and wounding three others.[121] To improve the security of the French contingent, the UN Secretary-General authorized redeployments with the recommendation of the UNIFIL Commander, within the Force's area of responsibility.[122]

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[120] The special report of the UN Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 18 September 1986.

[121] Upon heavy militia attacks over the French contingent, the French Government decided to withdraw part of the Logistic unit from the UNIFIL. The Swedish Government agreed to make additional troops available to replace the French personnel. In September, 1986, when about half of the French battalion was redeployed to Naqoura. As a temporary measure, most of the area vacated by French troops was taken over by companies from Nepalese, Finnish and Ghanaian battalions. (Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 12 January, 1987)

[122] These measures were the redeployment of about half the French battalion to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura to act as the Force's mobile reserve; the concentration of the remainder of the French Battalion in and around Jwayya; the transfer of certain positions in the eastern part of the French sector to Finnish and Ghanaian battalions; deployment of a Nepalese company to take over positions in the western part of the French sector.

Another source of danger to UNIFIL personnel surrounded the intensifying conflict between IDF/SLA and armed groups attacking the security zone, which also overlapped a considerable part of the UNIFIL zone. Attacks by armed groups against the security zone, always resulted in retaliatory action by the IDF and SLA. This often included indiscriminate shelling of villages wherever the attacks occurred. UNIFIL personnel were under serious risk in such retaliatory exchange of fire. After intense attacks on the UNIFIL, the Force commander took various measures to improve the security of his troops. HQ instructed UNIFIL troops to be alert for possible attacks against them and to take necessary precautions. The measures instructed by the command group were as follows:

- A crash program to provide reinforced shelters for those positions which did not already have them and to accelerate a program for improving the physical defenses of all positions,

- The closure of certain vulnerable positions and redeployment of their personnel to strengthen the remaining positions,

- New instructions to all units to take special precautions against possible attacks on their positions,

- Additional instructions relating to duty travel in the UNIFIL's area and restrictions on movement personnel for recreational purposes.[123]

What made the implementation of these measures was that the UNIFIL was widely dispersed at some 214 positions throughout southern Lebanon and that security measures could provide only partial protection to get a determined attack stopped.

[123] The special report of the UN Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 18 September, 1986.

Despite all this, the leaders in Lebanon expressed unequivocal support for the presence of the UNIFIL and implementation of UNSC Res.No.425. Many public statements were made in support of the UNIFIL in Lebanon. Similarly, they insisted on the need for Israel to withdraw its forces and dismantle the security zone to avoid deterioration of the situation in Lebanon. The Syrian government also expressed its support for both the UNSC Res.No.425 and UNIFIL. They also blamed Israel for its constant refusal to withdraw the IDF from Lebanese territory. Syria urged the UNSC to assume responsibility and authority based on the charter in this matter. Meanwhile, the Israeli Government reaffirmed its position in Lebanon in which they wanted to ensure the security of Northern Israel and had no intention for the IDF to remain in Lebanon indefinitely. However, Lebanon's prevailing circumstances deemed they had no alternative but to maintain the 'security zone.'[124] In stating they did not want the UNIFIL to be withdrawn, they were not prepared to take a risk with their security in order to keep it in place. Thus, they would not withdraw their forces from all Lebanese territory to comply with Res.No.425.[125]

4.3.6. The UNIFIL's inability to fulfill its mandate.

In this circumstance, it was suggested that in considering UNIFIL's inability to fulfill its mandate, changes needed to be made in the mandate. It had to be remembered that as a PKO, UNIFIL could not use force except in self-defense and

[124] Israel continued to maintain its security zone in southern Lebanon, which was manned by the SLA and elements of the IDF. The boundaries of the security zone were not defined but determined by positions maintained by the IDF and SLA in southern Lebanon. The security zone embraced the entire area adjacent to the international border, part of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors, the area of deployment of the Norwegian battalion and extensive areas to the north of the UNIFIL zone. Within this area, the IDF and SLA maintained 21 positions, of which 18 were manned permanently. The SLA frequently fired from its positions in the security zone into inhabited areas, which were within the UNIFIL zone. The UNIFIL confirmed that these attacks caused some civilian casualties. The UNIFIL repeatedly protested to the Israeli authorities about these incidents and the UNIFIL itself was also subjected to hostile acts by the SLA and IDF and in most cases, the firing against the UNIFIL was unprovoked and deliberate.

[125] Israel's determination to maintain its 'security zone' provoked equally determined resistance from various armed groups in Lebanon and it led increasing violent conflicts in the area.

therefore was not in a position to enforce the Security Council's will. Like all PKOs, its effectiveness depended on the voluntary cooperation and consent of the parties to the conflict, and the governments contributing troops. In theory, the Council could revise the Force's mandate or terms of reference that would win the cooperation of all, if necessary. However, the possibilities were very limited in practice. The Secretary-General accepted that changes in UNIFIL's mandate would be unlikely to resolve its present difficulties. Meanwhile, the force commander advised the Secretary-General that having been established some years ago and in indifferent circumstances, many of UNIFIL's checkpoints and positions had limited operational value, and in some cases, were difficult to defend. However, the Force commander recommended that some UNIFIL battalions without armored personnel carriers be supplied with them in order to afford better protection. He also believed that armored vehicles could give the desired mobility, flexibility and protection, as well as facilitating lower casualties in any armed conflict. According to an assessment of the Secretary-General, in these circumstances it was unlikely for the UNIFIL to prevent its area of deployment from being used for hostile activities. However, the UNIFIL would continue to make an important contribution towards peace and stability in southern Lebanon. The only solution to alleviate the situation and terminate the suffering of the civilian population of southern Lebanon was dependent on the complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon and deployment of the UNIFIL to that area.[126] The Secretary-General emphasized that it was essential for the international

[126] As indicated by the Secretary-General, the UNIFIL could play the role originally assigned to it for restoring international peace and security. The Secretary-General also recommended that the UNSC should take urgent action to unblock the present impasse and make substantial progress towards implementation of Res.No.425, which would be the best way of improving the security of UNIFIL personnel.

community to continue the implementation of the UNIFIL's mandate which given by the UNSC Res. No. 425.[127]

4.3.7. 1987, the assassination of Prime Minister Karami.

1987 was the worst year for assassinations, abductions and car bombings which became commonplace in Lebanon. The favorite targets for these terrorist attacks were famous political-religious leaders (regardless of faith), western diplomats-civilians and journalists. On 1 June, 1987, the Prime Minister of Lebanon Rashid Karami was blown out of the sky in his helicopter.[128] An indispensable political actor for his connection between establishments and revisionist groups in Lebanon, Karami was killed reportedly because he refused to sign the annulation of the Cairo Agreement that had been passed by the cabinet on 21 May.[129] Abduction was another terrorist act that continued to dominate daily life in Lebanon the same year. According to official statistics, 14,000 people had been abducted, of which 10,000 were murdered between 1975 – 87 (Rabinovich & Shaked, 1989). In this wave of violence, it was not entirely clear who was trying to get what by carrying out these kinds of terrorist acts in Lebanon. However, the one thing clear was that many armed factions and groups were trying to take credit for all this murder and mayhem.[130]

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[127] According to the Secretary-General, three elements in UNIFIL's mandate were essential for its success; the withdrawal of IDF, the restoration of international peace and security, and the return of the Lebanese Government's authority in the area.

[128] Known for his conciliatory politics in Lebanon, the 65-year-old Sunni Moslem Mr. Karami was regarded as an independent Arab nationalist who maintained a strong pro-Syrian position during Lebanon's grueling civil war. On several occasions, he backed military intervention by Damascus in an effort to curb bloodshed. Karami was the only one killed in the blast, the other assistants and crew members were wounded. The Lebanese Army was blamed for his death because he was travelling in an army helicopter.

[129] On 21 May, 1987, the parliament abrogated the Cairo agreement of 30 November 1968 which legitimized the existence of the armed PLO in South Lebanon. The abrogation was part of package in which the agreement of the 17 May 1983 with Israel was also abrogated.

[130] In addition to the regular splinter groups such as the Islamic Resistance Movement; a Hezbollah militia up against the SLA and IDF; and the Sunni Popular Liberation Army, fighting in Beirut; there were factions of regular movements and militias, i.e., various Palestinian camps and of the Lebanese Baath; Communists; and Syrian Social National Party; Radical wings of Hezbollah, like the Revolutionary Justice Organization and Islamic Jihad (for the Liberation of Palestine); the Lebanese

Meanwhile, the most destructive struggle over the Palestinian refugee camps occurred during the 1986-87 season.[131] The Shiite Amal group entered the fray against the PLO over the matter of who controlled the camps in Lebanon. The leader of the Amal movement, Nabih Berri was ready to make a power grab in southern Lebanon because the Palestinian camps were in his way. He viewed the camps as a barrier between the Shiite sectors of Beirut in the East and Amal's stronghold in west Beirut (Winslow, 1996). Although, Syria and Iran tried to work out an arrangement amongst the Hezbollah, Amal and Palestinians, they could not manage because they were fighting over the same turf. The Palestinian cause to fight Israel was not in the interest of the Amal at that time and Nabih Berri did not hesitate to provoke disputes among the Palestinian factions, exacerbating the situation inside the camps. Although the Amal besieged the Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon and in West Beirut, it was unable to defeat the PLO. Despite the deplorable conditions in the camps, the PLO militias managed to defend their camps after a bitter struggle. In 1987, the Amal claimed that Libya secretly deployed around 300 soldiers to Sidon in order to reinforce the PLO. Afterwards, the Amal imposed a blockade on the refugee camps in Tyre and Sidon on 27 June. They prevented all aid convoys from reaching the Palestinian camps in West Beirut in which civilians faced starvation as the humanitarian situation steadily worsened. However, this was a futile conflict, as the Amal did not get what they wanted, losing credibility and suffering heavy casualties in the interim. A Syrian contingent arrived at the southern outskirts of Beirut and

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Liberation Front (Christian Nationalist); Islamic Resistance Coalition of Shi'a; the Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Prisoners; the Eagles Front of the Resistance to Khomeinite Imperialism in Lebanon; the Oppressed on Earth; the Organization of Truth against the False Biqa Section; the Organization for the Defense of Free People; and the Lebanese Liberation Battalion for Tripoli. (Winslow, 1996, pp. 262-263)

[131] The "Camps War" was a constant feature on the political agenda in Lebanon since 1985, remained throughout 1987 and three main camps in Beirut; Sabra, Shatilla and Burj al-Burajneh were destroyed. The tear 1987, PLO forces intensified the conflict with Amal movement, meanwhile, Hezbollah increased its activity against the SLA in the South and against foreigners in Beirut.

interposed themselves between the Amal and Palestinians to bring an end to the camp wars. A ceasefire agreement between the parties was achieved on 11 September, with a subsequent initiative to end the fighting (Rabinovich & Shaked, 1989). Considering the report of the Secretary-General, the UNSC expressed its concern about the continuing escalation of violence in certain parts of Lebanon, particularly in and around the Palestinian refugee camps, which directly affected the civilian population of the camps, by ratifying Res.No.594. The council called on the parties concerned to observe an immediate ceasefire and permit access to these camps for humanitarian purposes.[132]

4.3.8. 1988, the failure to elect a new President.

When we look at the overall political situation in Lebanon, the presidential election and clashes between the Amal and Hezbollah were the prevalent events of 1988 (Rubin, 2009). The presidential elections generally caused turmoil in political circles. The excitement amongst the Lebanese people during the election period was a means of verification for the country's political system. Local political circles and neighboring countries, mainly Syria and Israel, alike were closely interested in who was to become the next president. Meanwhile, the election period was always fraught with tensions and escalated discussion across the country. The desire to elect a new president meant all Lebanese political and religious groups remained faithful to the notion by which Lebanon's political unity and existence were symbolized by a president. Although presidential authority was often overrode by members of the cabinet, the presidency was always a focal point of the political discussion in the country. The government of Lebanon remained frequently crippled and the president was criticized by the Maronite community for his inability. In the face of intense

[132] Appendix-C, UNSC Res.No.594 (1987)

political disputes and violent incidents in 1987, the Lebanese Government remained a nominal body and the cabinet was unable to convene for quite some time. On 4 May 1987, Rashid Karami resigned from the office of prime minister to explain his dissatisfaction with the current political situation. However, Karami resumed his post in late-May and was assassinated on 1 June. President Gemayel appointed Salim al-Huss, as 'interim prime minister' until the end of the year. The failure to elect a new president occurred in September 1988 when President Amin Gemayel's term expired. With no candidate chosen to replace him, Amin Gemayel appointed a military government, led by the Commander of the Lebanese Army, General Michel Aoun. Under these conditions, Lebanon had two competing governments with no head of state, one of which was Michel Aoun's Israeli-backed military government in West Beirut, and the other was Salim al-Huss' Syrian-backed civilian government in East Beirut.[133] Meanwhile, neither government had the power to control much of the people or territory.[134] In addition to this crisis, even before Amin Gemayel's term expired, General Aoun had been put in charge of B'abda Palace, the official residence of the President of Lebanon. There were sporadic clashes across the Green Line in Beirut between the two Christian forces, Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (LF) and Gemayel's Phalangists. While Syria was supporting Geagea's LF, Iraq was also providing with arms for the purpose of containing Syria over Lebanon.[135]

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[133] According to the constitution, President Gemayel's appointment had no legal and political precedent as the post of Prime Minister was reserved for the Sunni Moslem community according to the 1943 National Pact. Meanwhile, the Chamber of Deputies was unable to convene because of the widespread violence in the country. The parliament had remained unchanged since 1972, no elections had been held and the same members of parliament kept their seats for 17 years and 22 of 99 members had died.

[134] The Aoun Government received popular support from both the Christian and Moslem communities. The Salim al-Huss Government enjoyed support from the Lebanese political elites, as well as from the major militia groups, including the Lebanese Forces (LF).

[135] Saddam Hussein would be superior to Israel as an arms supplier for General Aoun's Christian forces because everyone knew that Saddam did not covet Lebanese territory. Washington was also content with the situation and believed that Saddam was the only one who could ease the Syrians out of Lebanon, and reconstitute the country under General Aoun.

As fighting increased between the LF and Aoun's forces, politics tension in Lebanon mounted throughout 1988 and 1989. When Prime Minister al-Huss removed General Aoun as head of the Lebanese Army in February 1989, Aoun refused this decision and launched a military attack through Beirut by sealing off the illegal militia ports which were important supply hubs especially for the LF.[136] These incidents led to another wave of violence in the Lebanese conflict around Beirut, as Syria focused its effort to eradicate the Aoun problem and launched an 'all-out attack' on his enclave forcing him to surrender or flee to abroad.

4.3.9. 1989, new-elected President Rene Moawad was assassinated three weeks into his term.

This last round of civil war which continued throughout 1989 and into 1990, led to persuade a number of Lebanese parliament deputies to meet in the Saudi city of Taif in September, 1989. The meeting was convened by the Arab Higher Tripartite Committee (HTC), which was comprised of the Saudi, Algerian and Moroccan foreign ministers. They tried to work out an agreement for a new Lebanese constitution.[137] Negotiations ended on 22 October, 1989 and the parliament ratified the agreement on November 4, they also elected Rene Moawad as President of Lebanon the following day.

As a response to the Taif Accord, President Aoun declared the parliament had no legal authority to make such an agreement and that he would block the implementation of the agreement. The Lebanese Parliament called on Syria to impose

[136] Aoun's decision was indefensible and it caused a serious confrontation with Syria. He also blamed the US for not saving Lebanon and the French for not being loyal its historic ties to the country.
[137] The new formula they agreed upon was intended to accomplish the following: 1) establish a Chamber of Deputies with membership divided equally between Moslems and Christians 2) retain the Office of President for Christians 3) make it impossible for the President to legislate independently of the council, i.e., subject to a Sunni veto 4) produce a Council with a Prime Minister selected by the Chamber, presided over the President who would have no vote. In addition, the Syrians were formally committed to an eventual withdrawal from Lebanon as soon as political conditions made it possible for them to do so. (Winslow, 1996, p. 274)

decisions taken at the meeting in Taif to Aoun by using military force. The term of President Rene Moawad lasted less than three weeks as he was assassinated in Beirut on 22 November 1989, and replaced by Elias Hrawi.[138] The parliament extended its own term until the end of 1994 and instructed Hrawi to form a new cabinet. General Aoun insisted on occupying the presidential palace and demanded Syria had to draft a clear timetable for their withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Syria's reply to this demand was to deploy 10,000 additional troops to Lebanon. Samir Geagea, the commander of LF, declared his loyalty to President Hrawi, by giving Aoun five days to vacate the Presidential Palace. A final confrontation between General Aoun's forces and the Syrian Army was imminent as the Israeli bombardment and the Amal-Hezbollah conflict continued in Lebanon.

4.3.10. 1990, the end of the Cold War and the invasion of Kuwait.

In late-January 1990, a very destructive exchange of fire erupted between Aoun's and Geagea's forces across the Maronite area, lasting for 18 days, and causing many casualties on both sides.[139] On 9 March, General Aoun accepted a ceasefire, declaring the war was over. On 21 September, 1990, President Hrawi called upon General Aoun to join the conciliation process to terminate the civil war, but Aoun maintained his rigid stance. He believed Syrian forces would never leave Lebanon until they were forced out. However, Syria's position was strengthened in August, 1990 when Saddam Hussein, Aoun's primary external supporter invaded Kuwait.[140] The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led Washington to show tolerance towards Syria for its

[138] Elias Hrawi was known as an anti-Syrian politician in the past, but was won over to the idea of cooperating with Damascus in trying to end Lebanon's self-destruction.
[139] Although Geagea's forces were able to control of about ⅔ of the Maronite enclave, including the ports and the coastal area North to Jubayl, Aoun's forces were more numerous and better equipped. Michel Aoun had about 15,000 soldiers under his command, 250 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, 200 artillery pieces and 200 heavy mortars, versus Samir Geagea, who had about 12,000 soldiers and less than half amount of equipment than Aoun.
[140] Benjamin MacQueen, Political Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World, The Islamic Studies Series, Melbourne University Press, 2009, p.47

right to control the situation in Lebanon. On 10 October, 1990, President Hrawi officially asked for Syrian assistance in expelling Aoun from the Presidential Palace. On 13 October, Syria launched an extremely powerful attack with its ground and air forces that completely routed Aoun's forces and forced the General to escape to the French Embassy.[141] On 19 December, 1990, the Lebanese Government started to implement the Taif Accord, with the al-Huss cabinet resigning later on to make a reconciliation government possible, as foreseen in the agreement (Winslow, 1996). The new cabinet was established under the Umar Karami, son of the former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, on 23 December.[142]

The year 1990 could be considered as the beginning of the end of the Cold War that had an impact on the Middle East, one of the important theaters of the Cold War. As recounted above, there was some hope for the Lebanese people that a window of opportunity would be opened for a durable peace in the country. Because, the Cold War in the Middle East meant non-democratic leaders who were encouraged and supported by Washington or Moscow were allowed to govern their turf as they wished.

When we look at the incidents occurred in south Lebanon during the same period above, two issues were paramount in this section. First was the fighting between Amal and Hezbollah and the second was the escalating Palestinian-

[141] It was the bloodiest single engagement of the entire war. During the clash 750 troops from Aoun's forces died, Syria claimed that its army lost 460 soldiers in the assault.

[142] The Taif Accord aimed at the establishment of Lebanese Government's authority over its entire territory, which was promised on the creation of a national unity government, the disarming of militias, the creation of an internal security force and the restoration of the Lebanese Army. However, the status of Hezbollah as an armed militia was ambiguous in light of its role in relation to the agreement, which mentioned "non-Lebanese militias" and their disarmament but nothing about the requirement to expel non-Lebanese armed forces. The Taif Accord also did not call for the expulsion of the Syrian Army. On the contrary, it tasked Syria with a major role in the re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty. The agreement called for the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation by referring to UNSC Res.No.425. In this context, the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL were given a mandate to extend Lebanese sovereignty, and to ensure the full withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. Thus, the existence of Hezbollah was considered a legal force to expel the Israeli presence from Lebanon.

Hezbollah's attacks against SLA-Israeli forces in the security zone. The Amal and Hezbollah had also external supporters, while Iran was maintaining its implicit partnership with Hezbollah, Syria and Amal had explicit relationship for a long time.

In the south, the armed resistance groups, Amal and Hezbollah, continued to launch attacks against the IDF and SLA. Meanwhile, there were reports of IDF and SLA military operations against these armed groups from the security zone where the UNIFIL was not deployed. They fired frequently at civilians as well as UNIFIL targets within their range. The situation in that part of the UNIFIL zone remained very tense and most of the inhabitants left their homes to travel to other villages. The UNIFIL provided convoys for them during their movements. The IDF and more frequently the SLA fired deliberately at, or close to UNIFIL positions and vehicles on a nearly daily basis. Many UNIFIL soldiers were wounded from such gunfire. A number of incidents that occurred between UNIFIL and armed elements, mainly stemming from the denial of passage to armed militias at UNIFIL checkpoints, became most serious in the context of operations against the IDF or SLA.

An abduction that occurred within the UNIFIL area of operations came to the fore in 1988. Serving as chief of the military observers of the UNTSO assigned to UNIFIL, US Lt-Col. William Richard Higgins was abducted on 17 February, 1988. Immediately, the Secretary-General strongly condemned his abduction and pulled all strings to locate him and secure his release. UNIFIL staff also remained in contact with all local leaders and parties. On 29 July, 1988, the UNSC adopted Res.No.618 that condemned the abduction of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, demanded his

immediate release and called upon member nations to use their influence in any way possible to promote the implementation of the resolution.[143]

The Secretary-General (Secretary-General) repeatedly addressed letters to the President of the UNSC in which he pointed out Israeli encroachments on the Israeli-Lebanese border. In response to his letters, the Security Council considered these violations and drafted resolutions by which it strongly deplored repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory and all other measures against the civilian population. It demanded Israel to cease all acts of encroachment upon Lebanese land, air and territorial waters, which impeded the effective authority of the Lebanese Government. However, all these draft resolutions were not adopted owing to a negative vote of one of its permanent members. Similarly, on 10 May, 1988, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by six members by which it would have condemned the recent invasion by Israeli forces of southern Lebanon, called once again for the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and for the cessation of all acts that violated the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of its civilian population, and reaffirmed its call for strict respect for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. This draft resolution was not adopted because of a negative vote of one of its permanent members.

On 29 July, 1988, the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of the UNIFIL for a further six months via Res.No.617.[144] That year, the UNIFIL had some 5850 troops,

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[143] After the kidnapping of Higgins, some statements were issued in Beirut in the name of different groups threatening to execute him for alleged espionage and retaliation for Israeli attacks against Lebanese and Palestinian targets. Col. Higgins was held hostage for a year and half. He was tortured and murdered in 1990 (the exact date of his murder is uncertain). His body was recovered on 23 December, 1991, by a military observer from UNTSO.

[144] Appendix-C, The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. It re-emphasized the TOR and guidelines of the Force, which approved

provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Sweden (see Appendix B). A group of UNTSO observers assisted the force in the performance of its tasks. UNIFIL Commander, Major-General Hagglund left his post on 30 June 1988, to be replaced by Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden. The situation in the UNIFIL zone was one in which Israel continued to control an area in southern Lebanon manned by the IDF and SLA. Therefore, the UNIFIL remained unable to extend its area of operation to the border between Israel and Lebanon as envisaged by UNSC Res.No.425. Activities from IDF/SLA positions often involved the use of heavy artillery, tank and mortar shelling and Israeli helicopter gunships. Fire from IDF/SLA positions resulted in many explosions close to, and sometimes on top of UNIFIL positions and vehicles. Firing at close to the UNIFIL's positions was a result of action by other armed and resistance groups near these positions. Several other incidents between the UNIFIL and armed elements mainly stemmed through denying passage of armed individuals through UNIFIL checkpoints, which resulted in threats against Force personnel. Meanwhile, many Lebanese civilians were abducted from their villages and expelled from the Israeli-controlled area by the SLA.[145] Senior UN representatives in the area tried to work out these incidents by coordinating with Israeli authorities for permission for their return to their homes. The UNIFIL consistently protested to the IDF about such expulsions.[146]

Meanwhile, the UNIFIL pursued its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance as much as it could. Within available resources, this was mainly done in the medical and healthcare areas and in support to welfare institutions, using funds supplied by

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via Res.No.426 and called upon all parties concerned to fully cooperate with the force for the full implementation of its mandate. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Lebanese Government and other parties directly involved on the implementation of the resolution.

[145] The abduction of civilians inside the UNIFIL area of operations was a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and a clear disrespect to the UN as well.

[146] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL to UNSC, dated 24 January, 1989

troop-contributing governments. In addition, UNIFIL medical centers in the area of operation treated a large number of civilians at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura. The Force maintained close cooperation with Lebanese authorities, as well as with the UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs. Consultations between the Force commander and the coordinator of the UN Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon were continued that would benefit the inhabitants of southern Lebanon.[147]

At this stage of the conflict in the south, the Secretary-General summarized the situation on his report mentioning on the Israeli perspective. Israel continued to refuse to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Its security zone became a focus of attack by those whose aimed to attack IDF itself directly and by those with the goal of liberating Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation. Retaliatory raids by Israel into this area made the prospects impossible for international peace and security. The failure to elect a new president and the subsequent presence of two rival governments in Beirut prevented UNIFIL from making any progress towards fulfillment of its task which was to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Israeli authorities reiterated that they had to maintain their current position in Lebanon. They said that the IDF presence was necessary for ensuring the security of northern Israel as long as the Lebanese Government was unable to exercise effective authority and prevent its territory from being used to launch attacks against Israel. They did not consider that UNIFIL or other PKOs could assume this responsibility.

[147] Meanwhile, UNIFIL had some difficulties in obtaining and using the land and buildings that required for its operation. These difficulties were due to two factors; the increased demand for land and dwellings resulting from the influx of population into this safer area; and arrears in the payment of rent by the government of Lebanon to the landlords concerned. This problem had to be solved by the Lebanese authorities.

4.3.11. The assessment of the UN Secretary-General on UNIFIL.

Despite these negative developments as described above and continuing inability of UNIFIL to carry out its mandate, the Secretary-General explained his point of view on his report, dated 24 January 1989. Javier Perez de Cuellar said that it would be understandable for the UNSC to question the presence of the Force in Lebanon. However, the Secretary-General had four countervailing considerations which UNSC had to take into account while making its decision on the renewal of UNIFIL mandate. First, as the UNSC repeatedly confirm its conviction that the solution to the problem of south Lebanon laid in the implementation of the Res.No.425 by which the Council decided to establish the Force. Second, despite the difficulties in fulfilling its original mandate, UNIFIL played a valuable role in controlling violence in its area. To withdraw UNIFIL would risk an unpredictable conflagration in this volatile region. Third, UNIFIL provided humanitarian support to the civilian population in its area. Moreover, the people in this area considered the presence of the Force to be essential for their security and their returning to home. Finally, the continued presence of UNIFIL was seen by the people of Lebanon as a symbol of the international community's commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of their country. Most of Lebanese political leaders stated that the withdrawal of UNIFIL would make it more difficult to achieve national reconciliation. The UNSC took this persuasive argument into consideration and decided to extend UNIFIL's mandate for further period of six month via Res.No.630.[148]

[148] Appendix-C, The council also expressed its concern at the recent deterioration of the situation in Lebanon which left many victims among the civilian population. The Security Council urged all the parties to put an immediate end to the confrontations, to respond favorable to the appeals launched for an effective ceasefire and to avoid any action that might cause a further escalation of tension in the area.

Following these developments, the Security Council brought the issue to the General Assembly meeting by a report dated 17 November, 1989. On the report, the member of the UNSC expressed their grave concern at the recent deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, which left many victims among the civilian population and caused considerable material damage. In view of the threat that this situation posed to peace, security and stability in the region, they expressed encouragement and support for all ongoing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Lebanese crisis. The members of the council also urged all parties to put an immediate end to the confrontations to respond favorably to the appeals launched for an effective ceasefire and avoid any action that might further heighten the tension. They reaffirmed their support for the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon at the meeting.[149]

With Res.No.648 (1990), the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months (see Appendix C). The members of UNSC reaffirmed their profound concern over the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel and called upon all parties to do their best to ensure the effective reinforcement of the security of the members of the Force. UNIFIL itself maintained its efforts to improve the security of its personnel and positions. As attacks increased against UNIFIL with distressing casualties, the safety of the Force personnel was a matter of continuing concern to Secretary-General and he explained his thought; “it is inexcusable that the UN peace keepers should be subjected to constant threats and danger”. The Secretary-General again appealed to all parties concerned to cooperate with UNIFIL with a view to ensuring the security of its members and helping them to carry out the task entrusted to them by the Security Council. He pointed out that significant efforts were

[149] Report of the Security Council to General Assembly, dated 17 November, 1989.

undertaken to further improve the security of UNIFIL personnel and facilities and all these measures were subjected to be modified or updated where and when deemed necessary. Relocation of the Norwegian battalion headquarters to a defensible compound near Ibl ai-Saqi was completed in 1990. The security and defense of the Naqoura camp and headquarters of the Irish battalion were improved. Positions throughout the UNIFIL zone of deployment were reinforced with protective measures. New armored personnel carriers (APCs) were procured with a voluntary contribution received from the Japanese Government.

Throughout the year, the UNIFIL remained unable to extend its area of operation down to the Israeli-Lebanese border (the armistice demarcation line), as envisaged in UNSC Res.No.425. Israel continued to control an area in southern Lebanon manned by the IDF and SLA and known to the UNIFIL as the 'Israeli Controlled Area' (ICA). It included territory adjacent to the international border, part of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas north of the UNIFIL area of operations (see Appendix B). Within this area, the IDF occasionally imposed stricter control over movement between the ICA and the rest of Lebanon. While this involved the closure of roads, for some villages it meant a disruption of economic and social links with their neighbors. Any inhabitant in the ICA wishing to travel to other parts of Lebanon had to purchase a travel permit from IDF. On several occasions, UNIFIL personnel witnessed the abduction of young men for service in SLA. This forced recruitment also involved threats and other punitive actions against the families of young men who were reluctant to join SLA. Israel also played an important role in the economic and social life in the ICA. More than 2000 Lebanese workers were permitted to cross daily to their jobs in Israel, this was regarded as a privilege granted mainly to the

families of men serving in the SLA. Israeli products were imported into the ICA and several towns and villages were linked to Israeli water and telephone utility networks. Israel financed the improvement of roads and had doctors on call at hospitals in the ICA. Although all these activities seemed beneficial to the locals, it caused a growing disquiet at this deepening Israeli occupation.[150] The consequence of this policy was that the ICA was becoming increasingly separated from the rest of Lebanon.

In August, 1990, Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait unexpectedly and a few days later he announced that Kuwait was annexed as the 19th province of Iraq. President Bush saw the invasion as a threat to the region and to the oil resources on which of the world depended. The Washington administration decided to defend Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries from further Iraqi attacks, then expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a military force. Afterwards, the American-led international coalition was formulated to that end. American forces ended the war relatively quickly and Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait, totally routed.[151] The United Nations Iraqi-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established following the adaptation of UNSC Res.No.689 on 9 April, 1991.[152] The Secretary-General instructed the UNIFIL to deploy personnel, on a temporary basis, to help establish the UNIKOM by providing vehicles and equipment for two rifle companies.[153]

4.3.12. 1991, Hezbollah escalated the violence in southern Lebanon.

The UNSC decided to extend the mandate of the UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months with Res.No.684 (see Appendix C). Hostilities between armed

[150] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL to the UNSC, dated 24 July 1990.
[151] Hillel Franklin, Lewis Libby, The First Gulf War and Its Aftermath, 14 October, 2015
[152] UNIKOM's task was to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-Kuwait border, deter violations and report on any hostile action.
[153] The UNIFIL contributed 450 troops of all ranks, comprising of a headquarters, a supply company and three rifle companies. The deployment of personnel, vehicles, and equipment by land and air was completed on 28 April, 1991. Moreover, UNIFIL military and civilian personnel were provided with NBC weapons protective equipment.

groups and IDF/SLA in southern Lebanon intensified in early-1991. There was an increase in attacks from Lebanese resistance groups against IDF/SLA positions in the ICA and in retaliatory action from the opposite side. Firing indiscriminately from SLA positions into villages also affected the UNIFIL as many of its positions were situated near population centers (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).

The UNIFIL continued to repel armed elements attempting to operate within its area of deployment. On 3 July, 1991, UNIFIL troops apprehended three armed elements preparing to fire Katyusha rockets into the ICA. They were handed over to Lebanese Army and the rockets were destroyed by the UNIFIL. A large quantity of ordnance found in the UNIFIL area of operations was destroyed. At times, the UNIFIL's insistence in searching vehicles and denying passage to armed elements through its checkpoints led to harassment and threats against UNIFIL personnel.

There was frequent random firing from IDF/SLA positions into villages within the UNIFIL zone, causing casualties and heavy damage in the villages of Tiri, Haddathah, Shaqra, Majdal Zun, Al Mansouri and Al Qulaylah. On June 4, Israeli fighter jets attacked Palestinian and Lebanese targets east of the port city of Sidon. Though the UNIFIL continued to the best of its ability to prevent its zone from being used for hostile activities in accordance with its mandate, the IDF's unprovoked and deliberate artillery attacks into the UNIFIL zone caused civilian deaths, injuries and material damage. Following these incidents, the UNIFIL continued to press Israeli authorities to end the shelling of civilian targets and withdraw the SLA from certain positions that attracted attacks by armed elements. Meanwhile, the government began to implement the Taif Accord throughout Lebanon, outside the ICA, declaring its intention to dissolve and disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias by

September, 1991. Significant steps were taken in parts of southern Lebanon outside the UNILIL's area. After four days of fighting the Lebanese Army, PLO guerillas in southern Lebanon agreed to abandon their bases and surrender their weapons to the authorities. Lebanese Forces (LF) turned over ports, barracks and their heavy weapons to the Lebanese Army as they withdrew from the Beirut into the Kisrawan Hills. The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was not unconditionally cooperative in handing over its weapons, but redeployed away from Matn, near Beirut, to the Shuf mountains (Winslow, 1996).

Another important part of the Lebanese Government's plan was to accomplish the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL was also mandated to assist the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the area. Significant progress was achieved on 6 February 1991, when Lebanese Army troops began deploying in the south for the first time in 16 years. The Lebanese Army was reinforced with two battalions in the Tyre pocket. The UNIFIL continued to discuss arrangements with Lebanese authorities for the gradual transfer of responsibility to the Lebanese Army in the area where currently controlled by UNIFIL troops.[154] For this purpose, a joint Lebanese Army-UNIFIL Working Group was established to create a comprehensive program. Envisaged that it would proceed in parallel with the movement south towards the border and the progressive withdrawal of Israeli forces from the ICA, thus enabling the implementation of UNSC Res.No.425. These positive developments improved the prospects that the UNIFIL would be able to carry out its mandate, which included aiding the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Through Res.No.701, the UNSC decided to extend the mandate of the UNIFIL for a further six months. The Security Council also

[154] It was not an easy issue when Lebanese Army troops attempted to take control of the PLO outpost as the armed fight broke out between them; 19 people were killed and 60 wounded.

reaffirmed its commitment to the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. The Council reiterated its full support for the Taif Accord and commended the Lebanese Government for the recent successful deployment of its army in the Sidon and Tyre regions in the process of extending its authority over all Lebanese territory.

While there were more amiable relations between Syria and Lebanon during President Hrawi's term, the Assad Government demanded a special long-term relationship with Lebanon. This was realized on 22 May 1991, when Hrawi and Hafez al-Assad signed a treaty of cooperation between the two countries. However many parties criticized the agreement, viewing it as a context for more Syrian interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs. The two countries also signed a security agreement calling for coordination in all military and security matters including intelligence sharing.[155] Following the end of Gulf War and the break-up of the USSR, another important political development in the Middle East was impending. The initiative launched by the US to support an active negotiating process in which all relevant parties would participate led to a comprehensive, lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiation. The UNSC agreed that an international conference, at the appropriate time, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Diplomatic efforts culminated in agreement by the parties to enter into the negotiating process. Under the sponsorship of the US and the Soviet Union, an invitation was issued to Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and a Joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for a peace conference to convene on 30 October, 1991, in

[155] The treaty between Syria and Lebanon was ratified by the Parliament on 17 September, by which brotherly interests of the two countries would be cared for by joint committees.

Madrid, Spain. Thus, the representatives had the opportunity of representing their claims in face-to-face talks around the table with the Israelis.[156]

4.3.13. 1992, a new parliament was elected.

In 1992, one of the most important events in Lebanon was the general election, the first held since 1972. The election for a new parliament of 128 members was conducted in August and September but it was boycotted mainly by the Christians, and backed by a few Moslems. They argued that the election had to be postponed until after the departure of Syrian troops to the Bekaa, according to the Taif Accord.[157] However, the election was conducted as planned without any violence. President Hrawi appointed Rafiq Al-Hariri as his prime minister on 22 October, 1992.[158]

In the southern part of the country, the tension escalated and the number of casualties rose during the same time. The clashes between the armed elements and IDF/SLA increased in the area and neighboring part of UNIFIL. The use of roadside bombs against IDF/SLA was intensified in which many SLA personnel were killed and injured. The retaliation action from IDF/SLA positions was mainly artillery fire, tank rounds into and around population centers close to where the bombs were detonated. In the UNIFIL area of operations, the village of Tibnin, Majdal Silm, Brashit, Haddathah, Ayta Zutt and Qabrikha, all in the Irish battalion area were particularly affected. Faced with such intense shelling and air-strike, the civil populations in the villages under attack fled for their safety. UNIFIL, many of whose

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[156] The report of the Secretary-General to General Assembly, Situation in the Middle East, 15 November 1991

[157] Although the deadline for Syrian forces to be redeployed to Bekaa was late-September, 1992, it never happened.

[158] Hariri was the most prominent figure in Lebanese politics. As Lebanon's prime minister, he was widely credited with getting the country back on its feet after the devastating civil war. He held the Office of Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until he resigned in 2004. He was assassinated on 14 February, 2005 in Beirut. His death had profound implications in Lebanon, triggered the Cedar Revolution and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country after 29 years.

positions were located in or close to the population centers was affected by these hostilities. On 25 October, five Israeli soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb in the Norwegian battalion sector. IDF/SLA responded with air strikes and shelling against targets north of the UNIFIL zone. At least two persons died as a result of these attacks. In retaliation, Hezbollah elements fired rockets into northern Israel, killing one civilian and wounding five Israelis. After this incident, the IDF reinforced its positions across the border. Situation was getting worse in the southern Lebanon, following the Israeli air raid in the Beqa Valley, on 8 November 1992, in which four persons were killed and four wounded. The armed elements launched a retaliatory rocket fire into Israel and the ICA. Israeli artillery responded with heavy shelling into the targets in southern Lebanon, IDF increased the military preparation and also deployed its reinforcements up to the Lebanese border.

4.3.14. The UNIFIL's humanitarian assistance.

UNIFIL continued to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities and to do all it could to protect civilians caught up in the conflict. UNIFIL troops detonated mines, roadside bombs and unexploded remnants of war and dismantled ordnance in the area of deployment. It maintained to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area. Such assistance took the form of water, clothes, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. In addition, medicines and equipment to schools were provided. UNIFIL medical centers provided care for an average of 4000 civilian patients per month.[159] The force cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, the UN agencies and program operating in Lebanon, the ICRC and NGOs. UNIFIL was also in contact with the

[159] Meanwhile, the UNIFIL faced the difficulty in meeting its requirements of land and premises for its installations, observation posts, and checkpoints. The main reason for this was that the Lebanese Government failed to reimburse the owners of properties being used by UNIFIL.

governors of southern Lebanon and Nebatiyeh to facilitate the formulation of economic, social and humanitarian activities by UN development agencies and NGOs in the UNIFIL area of operations. Meanwhile, Israel continued its road construction program in the ICA, which enhanced the IDF's ability to deploy its troops rapidly into Lebanese territory. In addition to the SLA, the Israeli authorities established a security unit composed of armed Lebanese civilians in the ICA which was referred as General Security Service Lebanon (GSSL). The elements of GSSL continued their efforts to establish civil administrations in Chebaa, Kafr Hammam and Kafr Chouba.[160] Despite the expectation of international community for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, Israel continued to maintain the SLA and to consolidate its hold over ICA which was increasingly becoming separated from the rest of Lebanon. In response to this expectation, Israeli authorities explained that following the Arab-Israeli peace talks all problems between Israel and Lebanon would be dealt with bilateral talks within the framework of the peace process, including the interpretation and implementation of Res.No.425 and subsequent resolutions of the UNSC.

4.3.15. 1993, Israel launched 'Operation Accountability'.

In early-1993, mutual attacks escalated tensions in the area to new heights. There were reports of attacks in which armed elements employed rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and AT-3 anti-tank missiles against IDF/SLA positions north of the Litani. Roadside bomb attacks continued within the ICA. The IDF/SLA employed artillery, mortars, tanks, and aircraft in responding to such attacks, or initiating action themselves, often firing into villages such as Brashit, Kafra, Reshidiyah Camp, Al Qulaylah, Zibin, Tyre and Frun. Protests regarding the

[160] Movement between the ICA and the rest of Lebanon was strictly controlled and ICA remained largely dependent on Israel for economic assistance. An estimated 3000 jobs in Israel were held by Lebanese from ICA. Access to such jobs was controlled by the SLA and GSSL.

deliberate firing in close proximity to UNIFIL positions were lodged with Israeli authorities. Hostilities in the UNIFIL area of operations drew attention to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon which continued despite UNSC's repeated calls for Israel's withdrawal. As a consequence, UNIFIL was unable to make progress towards the implementation of its mandate in this area.

The UNSC extended the UNIFIL's mandate for six months with Res.No.803 (1993). Major-General Trond Furuhovde of Norway took over as Commander of the UNIFIL from Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden on 22 February 1993. The UNIFIL continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to enter or operate within its area of deployment. This stiff stance caused to increase the number of dangerous confrontations between armed elements and UNIFIL's troops. In parallel with the agreement with the Lebanese authorities for the progressive transfer of responsibility to the Lebanese Army, certain parts of the Ghanaian battalion sector, including the villages of Marakhah, Jinnata and Yanub were handed over to the Lebanese Army in February.

The volatility and unpredictability of the situation in southern Lebanon continued throughout the year in 1993. Seven Israeli soldiers were killed during one exchange of fire. In retaliation for these casualties, Israel launched 'Operation Accountability' on 25 July 1993.[161] Israel maintained a seven-day long air, artillery, and naval bombardment of southern Lebanon in order to curtail Hezbollah activities in this area. The effects of the heavy bombardment were so severe this time, Israel found itself in a difficult position in the international arena. According to reports, 130 Lebanese were killed, and 525 wounded (The UN Department of Public Information,

[161] Operation began on 25 July, with an Israeli Air Force fighter jet raid and massive artillery fire at the area where Hezbollah positions were installed. The operation severely damaged Lebanon's civilian infrastructures, driving tens of thousands of people from the area, rendering them refugees which would translate into pressure on both Lebanese and Syrian Government s to curb Hezbollah activity.

1996, p. 107). Furthermore, a large number of houses were decimated, including schools and hospitals, and about 250,000 Lebanese became refugees. Israeli Prime Minister Izhak Rabin said that the bombardment was intended to drive civilians north to Beirut where they would force the Lebanese Government to stop Hezbollah (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). Following the establishment of a ceasefire on 31 July 1993 and after the consultation with the UN, the Lebanese Government sent an army unit to the UNIFIL zone for the purpose of maintaining law and order.[162] Although these bombardments were followed by a lull, in September attacks and reprisals resumed in the South again.[163]

During the exceptionally heavy Israeli bombardment, the UNIFIL did its best to limit the conflict as much as possible. It also did what it could to protect the inhabitants from the impact of violence. In carrying out its tasks, the UNIFIL was severely hampered by weapons fire directed at its own positions and personnel. There were two particularly serious armed incidents: one, on 27 July 1993, when the Nepalese battalion headquarters was bombed by Israeli aircraft, causing extensive damage and three injured soldiers from the Nepalese battalion; on 27 December 1993, Israeli troops directed tank fire at a UNIFIL patrol near Blat, killing a Norwegian soldier and seriously wounding another.[164] Special humanitarian efforts were made during and after the bombardments of July 1993. In August, the Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs travelled to the area to assess the situation and coordinate humanitarian assistance provided by the UN system. During these efforts, the UNIFIL provided support on the ground, clearing rubble to facilitate the repair of

[162] The unit, which comprised of some 300 all ranks, deployed at the garrisons of Qana, Jwayya, Arzun and Bir as Sanasil.
[163] Operation ended on 31 July, with an unwritten understanding between Israel and Lebanon, reached through the American and Syrian intermediaries.
[164] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on the UNIFIL dated 20 January, 1994

houses, schools, hospitals, and other facilities in coordination with the Lebanese authorities. The UNIFIL also managed to provide assistance to the local people within its area of deployment. This was in the form of medical supplies, water, clothing, blankets, food, fuel, electricity work, repairs to buildings damaged as a result of Israeli gunfire.[165]

4.3.16. 1994, UNIFIL troops under Hezbollah attacks.

In February 1994, the Lebanese Army established two permanent checkpoints inside the UNIFIL zone of deployment for the purpose of controlling the influx of goods into the country. The Lebanese Gendarmerie and customs authorities set up temporary checkpoints from time to time within the UNIFIL's area for the same purpose. The force continued to cooperate with the Gendarmerie on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order. Meanwhile, the presence of the Lebanese Army in the UNIFIL zone proved helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. Meanwhile all across the Lebanon, the government remained committed to implementing of the Taif Accord in order to dissolve and disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias outside the ICA.[166] However, the agreement permitted Hezbollah to keep its weaponry, unlike other militia groups, due to its classification as a 'resistance group,' rather than militia. The UNSC decided to extend the UNIFIL mandate for a further period of six months by its Res.No.895 (see Appendix C). The composition of the UNIFIL was as follows; nine infantry battalions from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Poland. The UNIFIL deployment was shown on the map in Appendix-C. IDF/SLA continued their attacks and

[165] In addition, water projects, equipment or services for schools and gifts of supplies to social services and needy people were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing governments. UNIFIL personnel also contributed $20,000 dollars for humanitarian work.
[166] On 21 April, 1994, the Lebanese Government dissolved and banned the Lebanese Forces (LF), arresting more than 100 of its members, including its leader, Samir Geagea. He was acquitted of the church bombing charge.

retaliatory firing against armed elements employing artillery, mortars, tanks, and aircraft. There were numerous cases of firing at towns and villages which caused casualties and damage amongst the local civilian people. The UNIFIL kept extending humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area by cooperating closely with the Lebanese authorities.

The UNIFIL also continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to use its area for hostile purposes. Dangerous confrontations between the UNIFIL and armed elements ended frequently with casualties on both sides. One of the most serious incidents occurred on 3 June 1994, when a UNIFIL patrol encountered armed Hezbollah elements in the Fijian battalion sector. An exchange of fire ensued in which one Fijian soldier died, one of the armed elements was killed in that incident. Following that clash, a number of Fijian positions and the Camp of the Force Mobile Reserve came under intense fire from armed elements, resulting in injuries of two Fijian soldiers. In the evening of the same day, two Fijian soldiers at the checkpoint came under fire from a passing vehicle, killing one and wounding another.[167]

4.3.17. 1995, the exchange of fire between the IDF/SLA and Hezbollah.

The UNSC decided to extend the UNIFIL's mandate for a further six months through Res.No. 974 (1995) (see Appendix C). As of July 1995, the UNIFIL comprised of about 5000 troops from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Poland. In addition, the force employed a staff of 524 civilians.[168] Deployment is shown in the Appendix-B map. Major-General Trond Furuhovde of

[167] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on UNIFIL dated 20 July, 1994

[168] The force maintained 45 checkpoints to control movement on the roads within the UNIFIL area of operations. Additionally, 95 observation posts to monitor movement, and 29 posts which combined the functions of control and observation. Each post was assigned responsibility for ensuring hostile activities were not undertaken. Moreover, UNTSO military observers maintained five observation posts and operated five mobile teams in the area under Israeli control. These UNTSO observers served under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander.

Norway ended his tour of duty as Force Commander with Major-General Stanislaw F. Wozniak of Poland succeeding him on 1 April 1995.[169] The UNIFIL maintained close contact and cooperation with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance regarding the rotation of UNIFIL troops and increasing volume of logistics activities in Beirut. Through Res.No. 974 (1995), the UNSC reiterated its support the Taif Accord and for sustained efforts of the Lebanese Government to consolidate peace, national unity and security in the country, while successfully carrying out the reconstruction process. The council commended the Lebanese Government for its efforts to extend its authority in the south of the country in coordination with the UNIFIL.

Throughout 1995, there were cases in which both of parties continued to fire at civilian targets, causing tensions in the area to flare up frequently. These incidents were generally incited by the IDF/SLA's indiscriminate firing at populated areas and villages. In retaliation, the Islamic Resistance fired rockets into northern Israel. In some occasions, the armed elements launched their attacks from the vicinity of villages in the UNIFIL area of operations, which drew retaliatory fire from the ICA. The UNIFIL continued close contact with both sides, urging them to respect the non-combatant status of civilians. It maintained to make every effort to limit the conflict and to protect the locals from hostilities (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). With Res.No. 974, the UNSC expressed its concern over the continuing violence in southern Lebanon, regretted the loss of civilian life, and urged all parties to exercise restraint. It also condemned all acts of violence committed particularly against UNIFIL troops, and urged the parties to put an end to them.

[169] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on UNIFIL dated 19 July, 1995

4.3.18. 1996, Hezbollah's attacks lead Israel to launch 'Operation Grapes of Wrath'.

In 1996, the continuing exchange of fire between the IDF/SLA and Hezbollah further deteriorated the situation in southern Lebanon. On 8 April, a bomb exploded in the village of Bra'shit, which killed a boy and wounded several others. Hezbollah accused Israel of planting the explosive device. As a consequence, Hezbollah declared that hitting of northern Israel would be considered a part of their right to self-defense and a part of their duty to protect their people (Deeb, 2003). Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, causing considerable material damage and wounding many people. On 11 April 1996, Israel launched an attack called "Grapes of Wrath Operation" in southern Lebanon, Beirut and the southern coast. The aim of the operation was to uproot positions and bases of Hezbollah, which was conducting attacks on settlements in northern Israel. Over 15 days, between 150 and 200 Lebanese were killed, another 300 to 400 were wounded, and between 400,000 - 500,000 Lebanese fled north to avoid the fighting. According to reports, 50 Israelis were wounded and 20,000 evacuated from northern Israel. On 18 April 1996, Israel began shelling Qana, a village to the north, 100 civilians were killed and 150 wounded. During the operation, Israel continued deliberately firing at populated areas, towns and villages. Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak said that the Lebanese Government had to act responsively and take charge of the situation. He announced that "the Lebanese Government is the one that will have to find a solution, and as it was able to disarm all other militias, it will have either to disband Hezbollah or to find another way to quell its activities."[170]

[170] Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak by Yisra'el Segal, Jerusalem Israel Television Channel 1 Network in Hebrew, April 12, 1996

Following these incidents, the UNSC adopted Res.No.1052, on 18 April, 1996. Gravely concerned with all attacks on civilian targets including residential areas, and at the loss of life, the council was worried about actions which seriously threatened the safety of the UNIFIL and impeded the implementation of its mandate, deploring in particular the 18 April 1996 incident, in which shelling resulted in heavy loss of life among civilians in the Force zone. The council called for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties and supported ongoing diplomatic efforts to this end. It also called upon all parties to respect the safety and security of civilians.[171] Through Res.No. 1068, dated 30 July, 1996, the UNSC expressed its concerns over the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and possible consequences against peace and security in the region. The Council reaffirmed the necessity to respect the Geneva Conventions, in particular provisions related to the protection of civilians during armed conflict and the responsibility of parties to ensure full compliance with the provisions. The US-sponsored ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah were finalized on 26 April, 1996. As part of the agreement, the two sides agreed not to fire on civilian populations and an observer group established to report violations of the agreement.[172] The deal also recognized Hezbollah's right to resist Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

Lebanon's 11th parliamentary election was held between 18 August - 15 September, 1996. Although many Lebanese, mainly Christians, boycotted the

[171] The UNSC also called upon all concerned to respect the UNIFIL's safety, security, and the freedom of movement of and allow it fulfill its mandate without any obstacle or interference. The council invited member nations to offer humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the population and assist the government of Lebanon in the reconstruction of the country.

[172] A day before the agreement, more than 150 civilian Lebanese were killed and much material damage was inflicted.

election, the openness was also questioned. In November 1996, Refiq Hariri was appointed by President Hrawi to form a new Lebanese Government .[173]

The results of Israel's destructive military operation against Lebanon were also discussed at the UN General Assembly. The UNSC presented its report on this issue to the General Assembly on 13 November, 1996.[174] The Council strongly condemned the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, which brought about a high toll of civilian casualties, led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the massive destruction of Lebanese infrastructure. Israeli bombardments of the archaeological and cultural sites and monuments in the city of Tyre, which were internationally protected, were strongly criticized. The UNSC noted the military actions by the Israeli armed forces against the electricity power stations and residential areas were premeditated and carefully planned. The council called upon Israel to cease its military action immediately against the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. The UNSC requested the Secretary-General to launch a massive plan of action to assist the Lebanese Government in overcoming the hardships resulting from aggression in order to allow it to sustain its reconstruction efforts. The council also called for UN agencies to carry out their responsibilities towards humanitarian needs of the Lebanese civilian population. On the report, the council pointed out that Lebanon was entitled to appropriate compensation for the destruction it suffered and held Israel responsible for adequate compensation for such destruction. As a result of this negotiation, it was hoped that progress could be made towards resolving the situation in Israel-Lebanon relations. However, no progress could be achieved.

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[173] A year ago, the Lebanese Parliament made an important constitutional amendment by which the authority for extension of the presidential term was given to the parliament. Thereby, President Hrawi's term of office was extended for three years on 19 October, 1995.

[174] Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, 13 November, 1996

4.3.19. 1997-1998, Hezbollah increased its attacks in the Israeli-Controlled Area.

In 1997, hostilities continued between the IDF, its local Lebanese auxiliary, the SLA on one side, and armed elements on the other side.[175] The UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and protect civilians from the violence. It strived to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities and to defuse situations that could lead to escalation. It also continued to extend humanitarian assistance and support to the civilian population with medical care, food, clothes, engineering works and the distribution of educational material and equipment to schools within its area of deployment.[176] Following the agreement of 26 April, 1996, between Israel and Hezbollah which entailed the respect security of inhabitants in villages, gunfire incidents into populated areas decreased significantly, compared to the past. As a result of the Secretary-General's endeavors, UNSC Res.No.1058/1068, which pertained to the safety of UNIFIL troops, Israel committed that it would respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions and similarly, the Islamic Resistance assured that it would not conduct operations in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions.[177] Although both sides showed more restraint in this regard, the IDF/SLA continued to carry out random search operation across the ICA, especially in the village of Rshaf, At Tiri, Et Taibe, and Deir Siriane, and made several arrests. Israel maintained its air raids at a high level throughout 1997, the majority of which were conducted to the north of the Litani. As a new development, the IDF and SLA began using roadside bombs beyond the Israeli Controlled Area (ICA). Consequently, civilian casualties increased from roadside bombs planted and detonated by both IDF/SLA and armed elements.

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[175] Armed elements were generally known as the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Moslem Hezbollah organization in which some of former militias from the Amal movement and the PLO took part.
[176] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC regarding the UNIFIL dated 20 January, 1997.
[177] The monitoring group was established according to the understanding of 26 April, 1996 and it continued to meet at the UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, to consider complains by all parties.

During 1998, armed elements maintained constant pressure and attacks on the IDF/SLA in the ICA, engaging in attacks to their convoys, planting roadside bombs and rocket attacks. Israel allegedly offered to withdraw from the security zone if Lebanese authorities could guarantee the area would not be used for attacks on Israel. The Lebanese Government rejected the offer, calling instead for unconditional withdrawal and maintaining that no security guarantee would be provided without a comprehensive peace treaty between Israel, Lebanon and Syria (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004).

The UNSC extended the UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months via Res.No.1151 (1998). The same year, UNIFIL had 4,480 troops from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway and Poland. The force was assisted in its tasks by 55 military observers from UNTSO. In addition, the UNIFIL employed 455 foreign and local civilian staff. UNIFIL troop deployment is shown on the map (Appendix-B). Major-General Jioji Konousi Konrote of Fiji took over the command from Major-General Stanislaw F. Wozniak in late-September, 1997. Throughout 1998, the situation in southern Lebanon remained volatile and continued to give cause for serious concern. The level of mutual hostilities rose in parallel with the increase in the number of civilians killed or injured, many of whom were killed or wounded by commonly used roadside bombs planted by the IDF/SLA and armed elements. As the number of attacks conducted by armed elements against the IDF/SLA increased, retaliatory IDF/SLA military operations intensified as well. The IDF conducted air raids, mainly against targets north of the Litani. Despite commitment from the IDF and Hezbollah that they would respect the safety of UNIFIL personnel, both sides continued firing to very close to the force positions, putting UNIFIL personnel at risk. In the second half of 1998, the IDF conducted two large-scale operations north of the

Litani. On 5 August, the IDF troops were landed west of Nabatiyah to detonate explosive devices which killed Hezbollah members. On 5 September, after landing at the Lebanese coast at Ansariyeh, an IDF unit was ambushed by armed elements in which 12 Israeli Navy SEALS were killed (Rubin, 2009). Israel continued to launch air attacks against Hezbollah targets north of the Litani. Meanwhile, the Israeli Navy continued to impose restrictions on Lebanese fishermen within Lebanese territorial waters. The UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and protect civilian population from the violence. It did its best to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities and to defuse situations that could lead to escalation. However, the force encountered hostile reactions by both armed elements and the IDF, while carrying out its function in its area of deployment. Meanwhile, the UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, as well as the ICRC and NGOs operating in Lebanon.

On 15 October 1998, General Emile Lahoud was elected president by a unanimous vote in the National Assembly. Although Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and his supporters boycotted the Assembly, Lebanese President, Elias Hrawi and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad agreed to back General Lahoud as the new president. Protesting the extension of the president's power, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri resigned from office, and Salim El-Hoss was appointed in his place in December, 1998.

4.3.20. 1999, Israeli air strikes vs. Hezbollah rockets.

Hostilities continued between the IDF/SLA and armed elements in which civilians were killed and injured during 1999. The IDF continued its practice of conducting preemptive artillery bombardments and air raids in the UNIFIL area of

operations, near Shaqra, Zibqin, Brashit, Yatar, Rishkaniyah and Tallet Huqban.[178] Roadside bombs continued to be used frequently by both sides in the area, which caused so many death and injuries.

The UNIFIL's mandate was extended for further 6 months via Res.No.1223 (1999).[179] The UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and protect the civilian people from fighting. It maintained its struggle to prevent its area of deployment from being used for hostile activities and to avoid situations from further escalation. The force was also deployed to provide a measure of protection to villages and to farmers working in the fields. Nevertheless, civilians were killed or injured due to the IDF/SLA's careless or deliberate firing. The force also encountered hostile reactions from both sides while carrying out its mission.[180]

Within the ICA, Israel continued to maintain a civil administration and security service. The infrastructure in this area was improved with funds provided by the Lebanese Government. Israeli civilian contractors removed topsoil from the Al-Marj area and transported it to Israel, until the UNIFIL intervened. The significant development in the southern Lebanon was the withdrawal of the SLA from the Jezzin enclave in late-May and early-June, 1999. This town returned under full control of Lebanese authorities after 17 years.[181]

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[178] The armed elements mainly employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, rockets, and explosive device. IDF/SLA used artillery, mortars, tanks, helicopter gunship, aircraft and explosive devices.

[179] Appendix-C. At the end of November, an Indian battalion was deployed in the east sector, replacing the Norwegian unit, which departed the UNIFIL after more than 20 years of service. See Appendix-B, Deployment Map.

[180] An Irish soldier was killed and two were wounded by IDF/SLA mortar fire near Brashit, on 31 May. In another incident, a Polish and a Norwegian soldier were injured due to firing on the UNIFIL positions.

[181] Reducing the area under Israeli control occurred for the first time since 1985. Jezzine was a predominantly Maronite Christian town.

However, the situation in the UNIFIL area was still volatile. Armed elements became more assertive and increased their operations in the vicinity of villages and UNIFIL positions. In retaliation, the SLA fired into these villages, targeting UNFIL positions. In June, the UNIFIL issued a public warning that the situation threatened to spin out of control. IDF artillery gunfire and air raids into Qabrikha and Yatar caused severe civilian casualties. Subsequent to these incidents, Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel, injuring seven Israeli civilians. Subsequently, the Israeli Air Force attacked power station and telephone relay station targets in Baalbek and Beirut. 10 Lebanese civilians were killed and 50 wounded in these air raids.[182] In retaliation, Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets into Qiryat Shemona, in northern Israel, killing two civilians. These events were proceeded by other exchanges in which deaths and injuries occurred on both sides.

As stipulated in the agreement, the UNIFIL obtained a commitment from the IDF to respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions and received assurances from the Islamic Resistance that it would not operate in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. However, during the tense period described above, these commitments were frequently breached by both sides. The UNIFIL was targeted and a number of personnel were killed and others were injured, which were strongly protested to the pertinent authorities.[183] The international status and security of UN personnel had to be respected, as was repeatedly stressed in the UNSC resolutions.

The Israeli public was also discontent with the seemingly endless conflict in southern Lebanon and protested for an immediate unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The maintenance of the security zone on Lebanese territory exacted a high

[182] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on the UNIFIL dated 21 July, 1999.
[183] UNIFIL was directly targeted on several occasions. On 31 May, an Irish soldier was killed and two wounded by a mortar round fired from IDF/SLA positions. On 10 June, they also fired again at the UNIFIL position near Haddathah and 10 days later IDF/SLA's tanks fired at a UN camp in Tibnin.

cost from IDF personnel. In 1999, Ehud Barak was elected as Prime Minister with his promise to withdraw Israeli forces to the international border (Rubin, 2009).

4.3.21. 2000, Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanon and the UNIFIL's redeployment.

The Security Council extended its UNIFIL mandate for a further six months via Res.No.1288 (see Appendix C).As of January 2000, the UNIFIL comprised of 4,500 troops from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Nepal and Poland, employing an additional 460 civilian staff and assisted by 51 military observers from UNTSO. Major-General Jioji Konousi Kenrote handed over the UNIFIL command to Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng on 1 December, 1999. The UNIFIL deployment is shown on the map in Appendix B. The Islamic Resistance, Amal Movement as well as the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad continued their operations against IDF/SLA positions. In response to these attacks, the IDF/SLA fired artillery rounds and conducted air raids on the detected targets in the area, in which a number of civilians were killed or injured.[184] The most violent exchange began on 3 May, when the IDF/SLA shelled a Lebanese town resulting in two civilian deaths. This was followed by rocket fire by armed elements into Israel, which caused the death of an Israeli soldier and 26 civilians wounded in Qityat Shimona. On 5 May, Israel conducted air raids and struck three power stations near Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and Tripoli, in which a dozen civilians were reported injured. Between January and May, a total of 24 civilians were killed and 108 were injured.[185]

On 17 April, 2000, Israel officially notified the Secretary-General that it would withdraw the IDF from Lebanon by July, 2000. The Secretary-General informed the

[184] On 16 December, 1999, 15 school children were injured, some of them seriously, in Arab Salim, where mortar rounds fired by the IDF/SLA impacted on the schoolyard. The IDF issued a public apology for this shelling.
[185] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 16 June, 2000

Security Council of this notification and initiated preparations to enable the UN to carry out its responsibilities under Res.No.425/426. With Res.No.1310, the UNSC welcomed the developments in the UNIFIL zone that Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with the resolutions (see Appendix C). The Secretary-General asked his Special Envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen and the UNIFIL commander to meet the governments of Israel and Lebanon and other concerned nations in the region.[186] During this mission, the Special Envoy and his delegation reviewed the requirement established under Res.No. 425/426 and discussed how those resolutions could be implemented.[187] At each of the meetings, they received assurances of full cooperation from their interlocutors.

The UNIFIL confirmed that the IDF/SLA began evacuating its positions on 16 May, much sooner than anticipated. Beginning on 21 May, large crowds of Lebanese, accompanied by armed elements entered villages in the ICA, as the IDF/SLA retreated from their positions in great haste. As of 24 May, Israeli forces vacated almost all their positions in Lebanon and were in the process of withdrawing from their remaining positions to the Israel-Lebanon border.[188] This final phase turned into an undignified rush for the border as the SLA collapsed. A considerable amount of military equipment was left behind and fell into Hezbollah hands (Rubin, 2009). The SLA disbanded, and many of its personnel together with their families crossed into Israel. Others surrendered to the Lebanese authorities. Detainees held at Al-Khiam Prison were freed when it was opened by the local people on 22 May. On 25 May, the

[186] They also met the governments of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. The delegation also met with the PLO. The Secretary-General consulted the situation with the pertinent member nations, including those contributing troops to the UNIFIL.
[187] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 22 May, 2000
[188] Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the security zone began in mid-May. and was conducted without prior consultation with SLA. Israel was concerned that had this sensitive information been shared with SLA, in which there was many Shiite personnel, it would easily reach Hezbollah.

Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, David Levy notified the Secretary-General that Israel redeployed its forces in compliance with UNSC Res.Nos.425/426.

Between 24 May-7 June, a UN team travelled to Israel, Lebanon and Syria to delineate a border line to which Israel needed to withdraw its forces to implement the resolution. However, there was no international boundary agreement concluded among those countries.[189] For the practical purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal, the UN needed to identify a line to be adopted which conformed to Lebanon's internationally recognized boundaries. The UN would identify physically on the ground which was necessary to confirm the IDF's withdrawal. In its consultations with all the parties, the UN stressed it was not seeking to establish an international border. After several discussions with the parties concerned, the UN prepared a map based on the best available cartographic and other documentary evidence given from Israel and Lebanon for marking the line, named the 'Blue Line,' on the ground relevant to the purpose of confirming the withdrawal. Although, Israel had several reservations on the map, it decided to accept the line for the purpose of its withdrawal, based on the consistent statements by the UN that the line would not be interpreted as the international boundary. The work was completed on 7 June, and the Secretary-General reported to the UNSC that the UNIFIL had completed the verification process and confirmed that the IDF had withdrawn from Lebanon, in compliance with Res.No.425 on 16 June.[190]

[189] The international boundary between Israel and Lebanon was established pursuant to the 1923 agreement between France and Great Britain entitled the 'boundary line between Syria and Palestine from Mediterranean to El Hamme.' This line was reaffirmed in the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement signed on 23 March, 1949. there were several subsequent modifications mutually agreed upon by Israel and Lebanon.

[190] Lebanese Government insisted that presence of IDF in northern Ghajar was a breach of its complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon in accordance with its obligation under the resolution.

After withdrawal of the IDF, the military and security situation in the former Israeli controlled area was calm and relatively stable, as the guns fell silent after more than two decades.[191] Lebanese forces destroyed a number of abandoned IDF/SLA positions. The salient presence of armed elements decreased throughout the area and their checkpoints were removed. In general, the armed elements were acting in responsible and disciplined manner.[192] The UNIFIL maintained a visible presence by means of proactive patrolling, which had a very beneficial and calming effect on the security situation and was welcomed by the locals. It continued to strive its utmost to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to create the conditions for the restoration of the effective authority of the Lebanese Government in this area. UNIFIL troops also engaged in humanitarian assistance by supplying water, medical treatment and food to needy families.

The UNIFIL monitored the area by means of ground and air patrols and observation posts. Both sides undertook their commitments to respect the line of withdrawal and to act responsibly to avoid any incidents that might lead to an escalation of tensions in this sensitive area. They maintained effective liaison with the UNIFIL, taking prompt action to rectify any violations or incidents brought to their attention.

The reintegration of the relatively underdeveloped area vacated by the IDF posed a heavy burden upon the Lebanese economy. The UN Development Program (UNDP) worked with Lebanese authorities to develop and rehabilitate the area. Immediate needs were drinking water to villages that were previously supplied by

[191] There were reports of some stone throwing and shooting incidents at the Fatma/Metulla border gate, in which two Lebanese civilian were injured by IDF rubber-bullet rounds on 28 May. There were also reports of injuries on the Israeli side of the fence. UNIFIL repeatedly asked Lebanese authorities and local leaders to intervene to end this potentially dangerous activities.
[192] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 16 June, 2000.

Israel, medical services, electricity, sewage system, housing and road networks. After more than two decades of hostilities, the clearing of mines and unexploded ordnance was an important concern which posed a serious hazard, especially in connection with the force's redeployment. Although the IDF provided the UNIFIL with maps of mined areas, the majority remained unmarked. The UNIFIL also assisted in humanitarian demining activities and set up an information management system for mine action. There were a number of incidents reported that civilians, mainly children, were killed or maimed by mines and ordnance.

As explained in the Secretary-General's report, UNIFIL troops would be deployed in the area vacated by Israeli forces after the withdrawal of the IDF.[193] Thereafter, the UNIFIL would strive its utmost to help prevent the recurrence of fighting and create conditions for the restoration of the effective authority of Lebanese Government s in this area. Through Res.No.1301, the UNSC also endorsed the understanding that the UNIFIL would fully deploy and function throughout its area of operation and that the Lebanese Government would strengthen its presence in the area by deploying additional troops and internal security forces (see Appendix C). Lebanese authorities informed the UN they would resume the responsibilities of a state and reestablish local civilian administration functions in the area previously occupied by Israel. On 9 August, 2000, the Lebanese Government deployed a joint Security Force of 1000 of all ranks which began conducting patrols and roadblocks in Marjayoun and Bint Jubayl. Lebanese security services established a strong presence in Naqoura, and the police resumed operations in key villages. The government made progress in resuming local administration in the villages. However, Lebanese authorities were reluctant to take control of the area near the Blue Line, hence the

[193] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 22 May, 2000.

Hezbollah assumed this responsibility rather than official units. Hezbollah monitored the Blue Line and maintained public order and provided social, medical and education services in some villages.

The Secretary-General informed the council that the existing six infantry battalions would have to be reinforced with two mechanized infantry battalions and an engineer component, and provided with additional armored personnel carriers in order to enable the UNIFIL to carry out its task after the withdrawal.[194] If the resources requested were not made available, the UNIFIL would be rendered unable to cover its full area of operation, and would be capable of providing only a limited presence in those areas.[195] In late- July and early August, the UNIFIL redeployed southwards and up to the Blue Line. The process of assisting Lebanese authorities in securing land and premises for new positions performed smoothly. Meanwhile, the UNIFIL vacated the area to the rear and handed it over to Lebanese authorities in order to free the capacity needed for the move south.[196] The UNIFIL deployment is shown on the map in Appendix B.

A serious incident occurred on 7 October, 2000 in which about 500 Palestinians and supporters approached the line at Marwahin to demonstrate against Israel. As the crowd attempted to cross the Israeli border fence, Israeli troops opened fire, killing three and injuring some 20. A few days later, Hezbollah launched an attack across the Blue Line about three km. south of Shaba and took three Israeli soldiers prisoner. Hezbollah stated that the attack was made to secure the release of 19 Lebanese prisoners held by Israel.

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[194] The force would also require two additional helicopters with its crew members, and a number of engineer detachments specialized in explosive ordnance disposal, mine reconnaissance and mine clearing operations. Additional logistics capability would also be required to support this increase.
[195] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 20 July, 2000.
[196] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 31 October, 2000.

4.3.22. The dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the Blue Line

Although there were some violations of the Blue Line, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained generally calm and stable.[197] Such violations were largely the result of Israeli construction work on a technical fence along the line. The greatest cause of concern remained the attacks across the line in the Shaba Farms area which had potential to threaten regional stability. This area was the main source of dispute between Lebanon and Israel while determining the IDF's withdrawal line. Since November, 2000, the Lebanese Government asserted that the Blue Line was not valid in the Shaba Farms area and claimed the right to use every means, including force against Israeli forces occupying it.[198] On 16 February, 2001, Hezbollah killed an Israeli soldier and wounded two others via a bomb placed in the Shaba farms area, on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. Israeli forces retaliated with heavy mortar and artillery fire into the vicinity of Kafr Shuba. On 14 April, Hezbollah struck an Israeli tank with a missile, killing one and wounding three Israeli soldiers. In retaliation, Israeli forces opened artillery fire and conducted an air attack on a Syrian radar position near Beirut.

The UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs operating in Lebanon. It continued its commitment to assist the civilian population with medical care, water projects, equipment or services for schools and supplies of social services to the needy. Mines

[197] Nevertheless, reckless behavior of Lebanese demonstrators on the Blue Line drew at times an overly harsh response from Israeli soldiers and led to casualties.

[198] Shaba Farms area is in the foothills of Jabal ash-Sheikh (Mount Hermon) Southeast of Kafr Shuba (see Appendix B, Map 21). When UN team was trying to identify a line for confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Lebanese Government informed the UN Special Envoy that certain farmlands in the Shaba area located outside the area of operation of UNIFIL as defined since 1978 would be claimed by Lebanon in the context of the requirement under Res.No.425 that Israel withdraw from Lebanon. Therefore the Shaba farms area was left outside the Blue Line. Meanwhile, UN considered the Shaba farms area to be Israeli-occupied Syrian territory, on the basis of the information regarding the international boundary available to the UN in delineating the Blue Line of withdrawal.

in the area remained a serious hazard for the local people and the UNIFIL. Mine detection and clearing activities were continued with effective coordination between Lebanese authorities and UN agencies. The UNDP continued its support for the development and reconstruction works in southern Lebanon. While the Lebanese Government began to strengthen the civil administration in the south, communications, health and welfare system, postal services began integrating with the rest of the country. The Lebanese Army was not deployed along the Blue Line which was monitored by Hezbollah. In some instances, Hezbollah acted as the surrogate for civil administration by providing social, medical, and educational services to the locals. On several occasions, Hezbollah personnel restricted the UNIFIL's freedom of movement and interfered with its redeployment.[199]

Regarding the UNIFIL's reinforcement efforts, an engineer battalion from the Ukraine arrived in the area on 20 July, 2000. A small mine clearance unit from Sweden bolstered the mine-clearing capacity. Finland provided 64 APCs, and Italy 2 additional helicopters. The UNIFIL deployment is shown on the map Appendix-B. As reported by the Secretary-General, the UNIFIL essentially completed two of three parts of its mandate. It confirmed the withdrawal of the IDF and assisted the Lebanese Government to return its authority in the area vacated by Israel. However, the UNIFIL was not in a position to compel the Lebanese Government to take the last step by deploying its army and administration down to the Blue Line. The UNIFIL now focused on the remaining part of its mandate; the restoration of international peace and security. For this purpose, it maintained the ceasefire along the Blue Line through patrols and observation and close contact with the parties and continued to rectify violations and prevent the escalation of incidents. Considering the conditions in the

[199] Hezbollah erected its observation post adjacent to UNIFIL positions, putting the security of UNIFIL troops at risk.

region, its observer functions could not be conducted by unarmed observers alone. The Secretary-General notified the UNSC that there needed to be a combination of armed infantry and unarmed observers, therefore Kofi Annan recommended that two additional infantry battalions and a group of UNTSO observers should be provided.[200]

4.3.23. 2002, UNIFIL efforts on the Blue Line and its demining operation.

The Security Council extended the UNIFIL mandate for a further six-month period via Res.No.1391 (2002). In June 2002, the UNIFIL comprised of 3,628 troops from Fiji, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Ukraine. The UNIFIL deployment map is in Appendix-B. Major-General Lalit Mohan Tewari was appointed as Force Commander. UNIFIL operations were focused on the Blue Line and the adjacent area where it continued its efforts to maintain the ceasefire through patrols, observation from fixed positions and close contact with the parties in order to rectify violations, resolve incidents and prevent escalation.[201]

Tensions flared across the Blue Line after violent incidents occurred in April. These events coincided with the escalation in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territory. Hezbollah conducted a campaign of attacks, firing anti-tank missiles, mortars, Katyushas, and surface to air missiles on IDF positions in the Shaba farms area during the same period. IDF retaliation targeted the area from which Hezbollah fire had emanated, primarily in the vicinity of Shaba and Kafr Shuba. On 12 March, 2002, some militias infiltrated Israeli territory and attacked civilian vehicles near Shelomi, killing five civilians and an Israeli soldier. The militant attacks steadily

[200]The Secretary-General envisaged that in connection with the reconfiguration of UNIFIL deployment, the Force's area of operation would be divided into two sectors. The bulk of the troops would be deployed in protected positions close to the Blue Line and tasked for patrolling throughout the line. The unarmed military observers of UNTSO would be entirely mobile which enable them to undertake patrolling, to carry out investigations and liaison functions. For security reasons, observers would be accommodated alongside the infantry.

[201] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 12 July, 2002.

continued in April at Qiryat Shemona, Alma ash Shab, Ghajar, and Avivim. The problem was that as the Lebanese Army would not be deployed along the Blue Line, Hezbollah maintained its visible presence in this vacuum near the line through its network of mobile and fixed positions. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Government continued to maintain the position that as long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, the Lebanese Army would not be deployed along the Blue Line. The UNSC called on the Lebanese Government to take more steps to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces (LAF).

During this period, UN Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen and Secretary-General Representative Staffan de Mistura engaged in concerted diplomatic activity to deescalate the violence. The UNIFIL increased its patrols and the force commander intervened personally with the parties on the ground to contain incidents. Lebanese authorities pledged to take measures to control 'unidentified elements' and continued to maintain the legitimacy of 'resistance' activities in the Shaba farms area.[202] Unjustified Israeli air incursions into Lebanese airspace continued on almost daily basis throughout the year. These aerial incursions caused great concern to the civilian population, particularly low attitude +Mach flights over populated areas. Hezbollah began responding to these airspace violations with anti-aircraft fire. The Secretary-General warned the parties that Israeli airspace violation and Hezbollah anti-aircraft fire had the potential to aggravate tension in the area and he called on Israel to cease

[202] The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN sent a letter to the Secretary-General on 19 April 2002, it reiterated the Lebanese position that "while affirming the right and duty of the Lebanese Government, the resistance and the people to liberate the Shaba farmlands using all legitimate means," the Lebanese Government was "committed to keeping the situation along the Blue Line from Naqurah to the Shaba farmlands under control."

over flights and respect the sovereignty of Lebanon.[203] With Res.No.1428, the UNSC also implicitly condemned Israel for these violations saying, "the Security Council condemned all acts of violence, expressed great concern about the serious breaches and the air, sea and land violations of the Blue Line, and urged the parties to put an end to them and to respect the safety of the UNIFIL personnel.

With Res.No.1391, the UNSC welcomed the contribution of the UNIFIL to operational demining, encouraged further assistance in mine actions by the UN to the Lebanese Government in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in south, and the council also commended donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions. The UN continued to coordinate international assistance to the Lebanese Government for mine action in southern Lebanon.[204] The presence of a large number of minefields along the UNIFIL area of operations remained a matter of serious concern. Israel handed over supplementary data about the minefields in the southern Lebanon to the UNIFIL on 30 April and also cooperated in matters of technical assistance to the UNIFIL. Although this information was conveyed to the Lebanese authorities, a number of civilians died and maimed as a result of exploding mines and ordnance.

4.3.24. 2003, the UNIFIL's attempts by liaising with the parties to maintain calm.

In early-2003, the situation within the UNIFIL area of operations was generally calm, the parties exercised restraint and avoided escalation. Nevertheless, tension between Israel and Lebanon remained high and the relative calm along the

[203] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 16 January, 2002.
[204] United Arab Emirates contributed the UN mine efforts in Lebanon with private mine-clearance companies.

Blue Line was an uneasy one. While violations of the line were intensified in the Shaba farms, the situation in the UNIFIL zone turned tense during the second half of the year. The main sources of tension were; the continuing Israeli violations of the Lebanese airspace, and Hezbollah's anti-aircraft fire towards northern Israeli villages. Although the UN frequently called upon Israel to cease these airspace violations, Israeli incursions over Lebanon continued. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's anti-aircraft rockets caused serious damage to civilian structures in Qiryat Shemona and even Menahem.[205]

The UNIFIL continued to contribute the restoration of international peace and security through observing, monitoring and reporting on developments in the area of operation, liaising with the parties to maintain calm. The UNTSO also supported UNIFIL in the fulfillment of its mandate. It remained focused on maintaining the ceasefire through mobile and air patrols along the Blue Line for correcting violations, resolving incidents and preventing escalation. On a few occasions, Hezbollah denied UNIFIL patrols access to some areas near the Blue Line. The Lebanese authorities generally intervened to enable the Force to carry out its mandated tasks. The map on Appendix-B shows the UNIFIL deployment in 2003. Following UNIFIL's reconfiguration, two battalions from India and Ghana continually monitored the approaches to the Blue Line through observation and patrolling from 21 military positions close to the Blue Line supported by 19 intermediate and depth positions.[206] These activities were supported by both UNIFIL helicopter patrols and activities of the Observer Group in Lebanon. Through their coordinated activities, the UNIFIL had

[205] On 28 April, parts of shrapnel from anti-aircraft rocket caused damage to a UNIFIL post.
[206] Two years later, a UN survey over the structure and mandate of UNIFIL recommended that the situation in the area could not support a change in UNIFIL's mandate or another reconfiguration of the force. It was ratified by UNSC Res.No.1614 (2005)

the ability to investigate and verify operationally sensitive issues, establish liaison with the parties to the conflict and thereby reduce tensions on the Blue Line.[207]

A ceasefire breach in the Shaba farms area occurred on the 21 June, when the Hezbollah fired mortar rounds at an IDF position in Kafr Shuba. The IDF retaliated with artillery and mortar fire directed at Hezbollah positions.[208] Demonstrators on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line gathered periodically on Sheikh Abbad Hill, east of Hula and Fatima gate west of Metulla, to throw rocks towards across the line Israeli positions. The UNIFIL intervened at times to prevent crowds from approaching the line in a provocative manner. The Lebanese Joint Security Forces and Lebanese Army continued to operate in the area evacuated by Israel. They maintained a more visible presence along the Blue Line, and the Lebanese Army constructed a series of obstacles along the line to block access to it.[209]

Another matter of serious concern in the UNIFIL zone of deployment was the presence of a large number of minefields mainly concentrated along the Blue Line. A number of civilian casualties were recorded as a result of exploding mines and ordnance. Collaboration between the UN, Lebanese Government, and various donors made possible the progress in demining activities in southern Lebanon. The UN continued to coordinate international assistance to the Lebanese Government through the UNDP. With the success in demining, advocacy efforts began emphasizing socio-economic needs to rehabilitate formerly mine-affected areas. The Mine Coordination Center (MCC) in Tyre facilitated the partnership of the UN, the United Arab Emirates

[207] It was important to note that there were no formal links between Israel and Lebanon, therefore UNIFIL was principal source of Liaison on military matters between the countries.
[208] One Lebanese civilian was killed and two others injured by this IDF fire.
[209] Nevertheless, the Lebanese Government continued to maintain its position that as long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, Lebanese Army would not be deployed along the Blue Line.

and the National Demining Office of the Lebanon Armed Forces.[210] Resource support for the national mine action effort was provided by Australia, China, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Ukraine, the UK, the US, and the EU. The UNIFIL continued to provide assistance to civil population in the form of medical care, water projects, equipment or services for school and supplies of social services to the needy. It also cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, in particular the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), UNICEF and the ICRC.[211]

4.3.25. 2004, The return of Lebanese Government's authority throughout the south and demands for the withdrawal of the Syrian Army.

As of June 2004, the UNIFIL comprised of around 2,000 troops from France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. It employed 405 civilian staff and was assisted by 51 UNTSO military observers. The UNIFIL deployment map is seen on Appendix-B. Major-General Lalit Mohan Tewari ended his tour of duty as Force commander, handing over command of the UNIFIL to Major-General Alain Pellegrini. The UNSC extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of six months via Res.No.1553 (2004). The UNIFIL continued to contribute towards the restoration of peace and security through observing, monitoring and reporting on developments in its area of operation and liaising with the parties to maintain calm. With Res.No.1524 (2004), the UNSC encouraged the Lebanese Government to continue its efforts to facilitate the return of its authority throughout the south,

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[210] The Operation Emirates Solidarity Project cleared over 4 million square meters and over 33000 anti-personnel mines, some 1500 anti-tank mines and 1700 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Another demining Project funded by the Government of Greece was initiated in the Nebatieh area. The Lebanese Army engineer regiment cleared areas along the Blue Line in the vicinity of Markabe and Abbasieh.

[211] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 23 July, 2003.

including the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces. The council stressed the importance of the Lebanese Government continuing to extend the measures and called on the government to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including along the Blue Line. The Security Council called on the parties to ensure the UNIFIL was accorded the freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation (Appendix C). Meanwhile, international pressure began to increase over Syria and the Lebanese Government to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. On 13 March, US authorities demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guards contingent from Lebanon at once.[212] However, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad explained his views in an interview with the Middle East News Agency that Syrian troops would continue to stay in Lebanon until a final Mideast peace settlement was reached and Israel was no longer a threat in the region (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004).

The situation in southern Lebanon bore a considerable risk that hostile acts could escalate and easily lead the parties into conflict. It remained a matter of deep concern that Israel persisted in its provocative and unjustified air violations of Lebanese territory. While Israeli air strikes on Hezbollah or other positions inside Lebanon posed a serious danger to civilians, Hezbollah's retaliatory firing of anti-aircraft rockets across the Blue Line was also a violation that posed a direct threat to human life. As the Secretary-General pointed out on his report that one violation of the Blue Line could not justify another.[213] Kofi Annan stressed the need for all parties to fully abide by their obligations under the UNSC resolutions, to exercise restraint,

[212] The head of the Maronite Church said publicly that Syria had to quit Lebanon and international body had to intervene to stop foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs.
[213] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 21 July, 2004.

and to respect the withdrawal line in its entirety in order to avoid deterioration of the situation on the ground.

Although the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations was relatively calm during the first half of 2004, numerous incidents and exchange of fire between the parties in the Shaba farms area increased the tension later on. Moreover, roadside explosive devices along the Blue Line adjacent to the IDF patrol route strained relations between Israel and Lebanon. In noting the discovery of explosive devices planted along the Blue Line, the Secretary-General said their presence undermined stability and endangered lives on both sides of the line, including those of UNIFIL personnel.[214]

Incidents between Hezbollah and IDF tended to set off a chain of escalating exchanges, elevating tensions for period of several days at a time. Israel continued to use air incursions to violate Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity which remained a matter of concern in the area. It also caused to elevation tension and disruption of fragile calm along the Blue Line. As Israeli airspace violation in Lebanon continued, Hezbollah continued to react with anti-aircraft fire directed at Israeli villages, resulting in deaths and injuries on both sides. On 20 January, Hezbollah's attack on an IDF position killed an Israeli soldier. A day later, Israel launched an air strike on a Hezbollah position near Shaqra. Following Israeli air violations of the Blue Line, Hezbollah began a heavy attack on IDF positions using rockets and mortars in the Shaba farms and adjacent area. The IDF retaliation in the vicinity of Shaba and Kafr Shuba involved aerial bombs, mortars and artillery, with one mortar round dropped close to an UNIFIL position. The following day, the IDF

[214] Although the UNIFIL would continue to work with the parties to facilitate the verification of such devices when they were found, the neutralizing of explosive devices was the duty of the parties. The UNIFIL would continue to lend them its liaison support in this regard.

used helicopter gunships against armed elements preparing to fire rockets into Israel near Hula.[215] On 5 May, Israel conducted more than 20 sorties over Lebanon and Hezbollah subsequently fired several anti-aircraft rockets into the Israeli village Shelomi. The Lebanese Army also responded to this attack, firing anti-aircraft rounds from Jezzin. The IDF reacted with air strikes against two Hezbollah positions in southeast of Tyre. The day after this exchange, Hezbollah launched an attack on IDF positions in the Shaba farms. The IDF responded immediately with gunfire targeted on Hezbollah positions.[216] On 7 June, unidentified elements, presumably Palestinians, fired four rockets towards Israel from a location less than 500 meters from UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura. In retaliation, over 20 Israeli jets flew over southern Lebanon and close to Beirut. Later that night, the Israeli Air Force conducted an air strike on a Palestinian installation near Naameh, 15 km. south of Beirut.[217] The tit-for-tat pattern of fire in reaction to over flights appeared to resume in July. Some Israeli aircraft flew out to sea and entered Lebanese airspace north of the UNIFIL area of operations, thus avoiding the direct observation of the UNIFIL. The Secretary-General called repeatedly upon the governments of Israel and Lebanon to cease all violations of the Blue Line and refrain from actions carrying significant potential for escalation and threatening the stability of southern Lebanon.

The first municipal election in southern Lebanon after the invasion was held on 23 May, 2004 without any major disturbances. There was high turnout, with the vast majority of seats won by the Hezbollah and Amal.[218] This successful election also demonstrated the Lebanese Government's capacity to exercise its authority through

[215] Two Palestinians were killed and one wounded in this incident.
[216] One Israeli soldier was killed and five wounded by this Hezbollah fire. Israel also fired three smoke rounds into a UNIFIL position.
[217] It was the first Israeli air attack in the vicinity of Beirut since the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in May, 2000.
[218] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 21 July, 2004.

the activities of the Joint Security Force. The Lebanese Army and Joint Security Force continued to operate in southern Lebanon, with the force intervening on several occasions to control demonstrations and take other restrictive measures at the Israeli technical fence. The Lebanese authorities reaffirmed that the Joint Security Forces' task was to safeguard stability and calm and to prevent any attempt to undermine security in the area.[219] The integration of the formerly occupied zone with the rest of the country, including infrastructure, health and welfare system, as well as postal services and communications continued at a slow pace. Official local governing structures generally exercised their authority in the area.

Lebanese President Emil Lahoud's term in the office was set to expire in November, 2004.[220] However, on 3 September, 2004, the Lebanese Parliament approved to extend his term by three years by a vote of 96 to 29 members.[221] Although it was widely contended in Lebanon, asserted by UNSC Res.No.1559, that the extension of President Lahoud's term was the result of direct intervention of Syria.[222] However, both the Lebanese and Syrian Government s denied Syrian complicity on the extension.[223] Moreover, the Secretary-General explained his view on the report that "as noticed with Res.No.1559, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the disbandment and disarmament of militias would end that sad chapter of

[219] Nevertheless, the Lebanese Government continued to maintain its position that, so long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, Lebanese armed forces would not be deployed along the Blue Line.
[220] According to the Lebanese Constitution, the parliament was required to meet at least a month before the expiration of the president's term to elect a successor.
[221] In accordance with Lebanese constitutional rules, the Chamber of Deputies had voted to allow one-time extension of the terms of sitting president in 1947 and 1995.
[222] On 28 August, White House Press Secretary McClellan urged Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs, saying that Lebanon should be free to make its own choice without pressure or interference from any outside party. The same day, the German and French Foreign Ministers implied the same comment in public.
[223] Following the extension of President Lahoud's term, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri resigned on 20 October. He was replaced by Omar Karami who was widely perceived as favorably disposed towards a Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon.

Lebanese history."[224] Although UNSC Res.No.1559 called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the Lebanese Government objected to the characterization of Hezbollah as a Lebanese militia, and referred to it as a "national resistance group" that had as its goal the defense of Lebanon and the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanese soil, namely the Shaba Farms.[225]

The UNIFIL continued to provide assistance to the Lebanese civilian population in the area of operation and it cooperated humanitarian efforts with the Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, ESCWA, UNICEF, ICRC and other organizations functioning in Lebanon. The presence of a large number of minefields in the UNIFIL area of operations still remained a matter of serious concern. UNIFIL continued with its operational demining activities and conducted the mine education for school children. Collaboration between UN, the Lebanese Government, and various donors continued to yield impressive landmine clearance results in southern Lebanon.[226]

In late 2004, international pressure for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon began to increase again. The new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey Feltman stressed Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory.[227] On 21 September 2004, Syria began a long-awaited redeployment of its troops in Lebanon in the face of heavy international pressure for Damascus to end the political and military domination of its neighbor (Rassemblement Canadian Pour le Liban, 2004). Syrian forces evacuated

[224] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 01 October, 2004.
[225] In the same resolution, UNSC called also upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.
[226] The Operation Emirates Solidarity, funded by the U.A.E., was successfully completed on 24 May, 2004. Within two years, they cleared 5,000,000 m2 of contaminated land and destroyed 60,000 mines.
[227] Similarly, a senior US diplomat, William J. Burns, urged Syria's president to withdraw his country's troops from Lebanon and stop interfering in Lebanese affairs. This message delivered at a time when American-Syrian relation was particularly strained.

four small posts situated on a hilltop in Aramoun, about 15 km. south of Beirut, as part of the troop pullback towards the Syrian border.[228]

Although the situation in early2005 seemed relatively quiet, it was shattered by a Hezbollah roadside bomb attack on an IDF convoy in the Shaba farms area on 9 January, which killed an IDF soldier and wounded three others. The ensuing military reaction by the IDF resulted in the death of a UN military observer and the injury of another.[229] By Res.No.1583 (28 January 2005) the UNSC strongly condemned this incident and urged the parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other UN personnel.[230] On 17 January, another Hezbollah roadside bomb exploded on the Israeli side of the Blue Line, damaging an IDF vehicle without any casualties. IDF immediately launched a series of artillery shells into Lebanon around Kafr Shuba and Frum. Israeli air incursions into Lebanon continued, sometimes they involved a considerable number of aircraft which often generated sonic booms over populated areas which escalated hostilities and brought about armed exchanges between Hezbollah and the IDF.[231]

4.3.26. 2005, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

On 14 February, 2005, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 20 others were killed in a heinous terrorist attack in Beirut. His assassination set off dramatic political changes in Lebanon. By Res.No.1595, the UNSC reaffirmed its unequivocal

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[228] On 26 October, the French Government also urged the new Lebanese Government to implement UNSC Res.No.1559, which called for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and respect its sovereignty.

[229] Several minutes after the roadside explosion on 9 January, two UN military observers and a Lebanese interpreter, on patrol north of the Blue Line in the same vicinity, came under IDF tank and machine gun fire. A French observer was killed and a Swedish observer was injured. They were on foot and wearing UN insignia and blue berets.

[230] As the Secretary-General repeatedly warned the parties that the security of UN personnel would depend on the parties. It was incumbent upon them to ensure the safety and security of the UN personnel in the area.

[231] Meanwhile, there was a Lebanese air violation by a Hezbollah drone. They announced that they would operate the drone in response to Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace.

condemnation of the terrorist attack and decided to establish an international independent commission to assist the Lebanese authorities in investigating all aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.[232] On 28 February, Prime Minister Omar Karami resigned. However, 10 days later, President Lahoud asked Mr. Karami to establish a new government. Mr. Karami conditioned the formation of such a new government should be a "national unity government" to include the opposition. The opposition voiced their demands; that an independent international investigation into the assassination of Mr. Hariri be set up, that the heads of Lebanese Security Agencies resign, and a complete withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Mr. Karami could not form a new government and resigned again on 13 April, 2005. President Lahoud tasked Najib Mikati with forming a new government. He formed a new government with the support of opposition bloc on 19 April. Prime Minister Mikati declared that new election would be held on 29 May, 2005.[233]

After a number of protest staged by the opposition, a large rally in support of Syria and its presence, organized by Hezbollah, occurred in Beirut on 8 March. However six days later, an even larger demonstration staged by the opposition was held in Beirut. Meanwhile, increasing instability was prevailing across the country and bomb attacks intensified in Beirut. The aim was to intimidate the Lebanese people

[232] Having examined the report of the international independent Commission, the UNSC issued Res.No.1636. On the resolution, the Security Council took note the extreme concern of the Commission that there was converging evidence pointing at the involvement of both Lebanese and Syrian officials in the terrorist act of 14 February and that was difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such complex assassination could have been conducted without their knowledge and that there was probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate Mr. Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials. The Security Council also endorsed the Commission's conclusion that it was incumbent upon the Syrian authorities to clarify a considerable part of questions which remained unsolved.

[233] Prime Minister Mikati stated that his government was to be a "symbol of moderation and national unity" and it would have three primary goals; to prepare for the forthcoming parliamentary election, to cooperate with the international independent investigation commission, and to address the economic situation and build confidence in Lebanon.

who were determined to decide the future of their country free from violence. On 13 April, a number of public events occurred with participation of large segments of Lebanese society to reaffirm the national unity of Lebanon.

On March 2005, President Bashar Al-Assad pledged in a speech before Parliament that Syria was going to withdraw its forces in Lebanon completely to the Bekaa Valley, and then to the Lebanese-Syrian border.[234] President Assad also expressed his unequivocal commitment to the full implementation of Res.No.1559 and reiterated his intention and commitment to the Secretary-General during the meeting in Algiers on 21 March, 2005.[235] The Syrian plan envisaged that the withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon would be conducted in two stages; the first stage would be the relocation of all military forces into the Bekaa Valley by late-March, 2005. A second-stage of withdrawal would lead to a complete and full withdrawal of all Syrian forces and intelligence apparatus, which would be completed by 30 April at the latest. The details of the withdrawal plan would be prepared by the Syrian-Lebanon Joint Military Committee. Following these developments, the Secretary-General dispatched a UN mission to verify a complete withdrawal of all Syrian troops from Lebanon.[236] Representatives of the Lebanese Government assured the Secretary-General that Syrian forces had progressively withdrawn and that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) gradually assumed responsibility for the vacated areas. The Syrian Government sent a letter to the Secretary-General dated 26 April, 2005, stating that it had completed a full withdrawal of its troops and intelligence apparatus.

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[234] According to the Syrian Government, there were a total of about 14,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon including non-uniform military intelligence officials.
[235] The Secretary-General report on the implementation of Res.No.1559, dated 26 April, 2005.
[236] A preliminary probe confirmed that there was ongoing movement to withdraw Syrian troops from Bekaa Valley into Syria in implementation of the second stage of the full withdrawal from Lebanon, between 8 - 10 April, 2005.

The term of Lebanon's Parliament would expire in late-May, 2005. It was held over a four-week period in May and June with no major incidents. In the current context, the holding of free and credible elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules without any foreign interference took on even greater degree of importance and priority.[237] The successful conduct and the outcome of elections were expected to strengthen government structures and authority in the area. It would also provide the conditions for improvement in the socio-economic situation in the south.[238] The Anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad Hariri, son of the murdered former Prime Minister, won control of Parliament at the elections. However celebrations were dampened by new assassinations against anti-Syrian critics as Lebanon's nascent democracy was threatened by a tit-for-tat bombing campaign.

UNIFIL operations were concentrated along the Blue Line. The Force remained focused on maintaining the ceasefire between the parties. It also continued to maintain close contact with the parties with a view to correcting violations, resolving incidents and preventing escalation. UNTSO supported the UNIFIL in the fulfillment of its mandate. However, the situation in the Shaba farms area contained the considerable risk that any hostile act would easily escalate and lead the parties into conflict. The Lebanese Government continually asserted that the Blue Line was not valid in the Shaba farms area, therefore Hezbollah continued its fight to liberate this area from Israeli occupation.[239] During the month of May, the IDF and Hezbollah continued gunfire exchange, while Hezbollah mainly targeted artillery and mortar rounds at the IDF positions in the Shaba farms area. The IDF responded with artillery,

[237] International governmental and non-governmental electoral observers were invited by the Lebanese Government to monitor the election.
[238] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 21 July, 2005.
[239] However, this position was incompatible with the UNSC resolution. The Council recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in fulfillment of Res.No.425.

tank and mortar fire impacting Hezbollah's strongholds in Ghajar and Kafr Shuba. On 29 June, the observation tower of a UNIFIL position was hit by IDF tank fire and an aerial bomb impacted close to two other UNIFIL positions. Throughout these hostilities, the UNIFIL was in close contact with the parties, urging them to exercise maximum restraint. The Force intervention contributed to avoid further deterioration and prevent incidents from getting out of control. The Secretary-General repeatedly called upon the Lebanese and Israeli Government s to cease all violations and fully respect the Blue Line. As the Secretary-General reminded the parties that one violation could not justify another. Furthermore the air activity from both sides posed a significant risk to UNIFIL helicopter patrols along the line. On 4 March, two Katyusha rockets in Markaba were discovered by a UNIFIL patrol, which were then defused and removed by Lebanese security forces. A heavy exchange of fire between Hezbollah and IDF across the Blue Line occurred on 21 November, 2005. On 27 December, unidentified armed elements fired four Katyusha rockets from the vicinity of Addaisseh Village toward Israel. Thereafter, a large group of Hezbollah fighters infiltrated the village of Ghajar and launched an assault on the IDF position inside the village, south of the Blue Line, which was vacant at the time. This was followed by an attempt to attack the main IDF position on the eastern outskirts of the village.[240] The ensuing Israeli retaliation was heavy and included aerial bombing. On the Lebanese side, the bridge north of Ghajar was destroyed by an Israeli air strike.[241]

The Lebanese Government continued to exercise the capacity demonstrated so far to exert its security authority through various activities of the Joint Security Force,

[240] Four Hezbollah fighters were killed during the exchange of fire with the IDF. There was significant damage to civilian property in the village.
[241] 12 Israeli soldiers and an unidentified number of Hezbollah fighters were wounded in the exchange of fire. A number of Hezbollah positions close to the Blue Line were destroyed and there was significant damage to some IDF positions and equipment.

including prompt responses to specific incidents. The Lebanese Army was deployed in areas far from the Blue Line and Gendarmerie units conducted some mobile patrols and maintained some checkpoints in the area of operation. These circumstances made it possible for Hezbollah to be visible close to the Blue Line.[242] The UNSC repeatedly urged the Lebanese Government to extend measures to ensure the return of effective governmental authority throughout the south, including deployment of additional Lebanese armed forces there.[243]

Economic development of the south remained a pressing need and it was strongly linked to peace and security. The Secretary-General urged the Lebanese Government, international donors, UN agencies and NGOs to bolster their efforts towards the continued economic rehabilitation and development of the south.[244] The UNIFIL maintained to provide humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese civilian population with medical care, water, food, and some social services for the needy. UNIFIL assistance was provided from resources made available by troop contributing countries and donations by individual nations. The UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, ICRC, UNICEF, and other organizations and agencies in Lebanon.

The presence of a large number of minefields in the UNIFIL area of operations remained a matter of serious concern. The UNIFIL continued with its operational demining activities and conducted mine education for school children. Following an

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[242] Hezbollah's establishments were adjacent to IDF and UNIFIL positions and, at times, to carry out attacks across the Blue Line.

[243] The UNSC explained its dissatisfaction on the situation in southern Lebanon via Res.No.1559 that "the Council gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory and reaffirmed the importance of the extension of the control of the government all its territory.

[244] Economic development of the south was inextricably linked with peace and security. However, economic aid was slow in coming. Therefore, the Secretary-General called upon the international donors, UN agencies and NGOs to increase their efforts to work towards the economic rehabilitation and development of southern Lebanon.

increase in civilian mine casualties in the area along the Blue Line, the joint mine team composed of the UN and Lebanese Army initiated a program to repair damaged or missing minefield fencing and erect new fencing where required.[245]

A fragile political and security situation continued to prevail in southern Lebanon. The greatest cause for concern were the Hezbollah attacks across the Blue Line, deliberate acts in direct breach of the resolutions of the Security Council and led to a heavy exchange of fire between the Hezbollah and IDF. This exchange inside the village of Ghajar posed great dangers for the civilian population of the village.[246]

Persistent Israeli air incursions, violating Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, remained a matter of concern. The air violation also elevated tension and disrupted the fragile calm along the Blue Line. However, Israel continued to maintain its claim that these over flights were conducted for security reason. Although, the UN Secretary-General regularly called on Israel to cease these air violations which stood in overt contradiction to Resolution 425 and 1559.

The serious breaches of the ceasefire underlined the urgent need for the Lebanese Government to act and extend its full authority throughout the south down to the Blue Line and to deploy its armed and security forces to maintain law and order, and ensure a calm environment. However, the Lebanese Army continued to operate at a distance from the Blue Line, hence control of the line and its vicinity remained with Hezbollah.[247] Under such circumstances, they maintained a visible presence in the area, with a permanent observation post, temporary checkpoints and

[245] During the year, approximately 10 kms. of minefield frontage along the Blue Line posing a direct threat to the civilian community was marked and fenced by the joint team.
[246] The Secretary-General appealed to the parties to exercise utmost restraint so as not to endanger civilian lives on either side of the Blue Line and reminded them that one violation could not justify another.
[247] The Lebanese Army command stated it could not yet guarantee fully effective border control, but affirmed that its capacity increased gradually and that it had the will to establish its effective control over Lebanese borders.

patrols, some of its positions were in close proximity to UNIFIL positions, constituting a threat for the UN personnel.

As for the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias; they continued to exist and operate within Lebanon and challenge the government. Although there were Palestinian militias in Lebanon, the most significant was Hezbollah.[248] Surely, the existence of militias impeded the extension of the Lebanese Government's control over all of its territory. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that dialog with parties other than the Lebanese authorities was indispensable in order to realize the implementation of the mandate to disarm and disband all militias as per Res.No.1559. As emphasized by the Secretary-General in his report, Hezbollah leaders explained their willingness to disarm through design of, and Hezbollah's integration into a broad national defense strategy mechanism for the protection of Lebanon.[249] The Lebanese Government objected to the characterization of Hezbollah as a Lebanese militia, referring to it as a legitimate 'national resistance group' that justified its existence as a "resistance" movement by Israel's ongoing occupation of the Shaba farms area. Meanwhile, Hezbollah also functioned as a political party with representation in Parliament.[250] Furthermore, it continued to have strong support among the locals and maintained a significant non-military presence. They engaged in the democratic political process of opinion formation and decision-making but did not possess an autonomous armed operational capacity outside the authority of the state. Hezbollah agreed to support all contacts undertaken by the

[248] Chairman Mahmud Abbas stated that the PLO was committed to cooperate with the Lebanese Government for the purpose of implementing Res.No.1559, but did not have full authority over all Palestinian groups in Lebanon.
[249] Letter of the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated 19 April, 2006.
[250] In the context of the current political situation in Lebanon, Hezbollah leaders stated their commitment to the stability and national unity of Lebanon. However, they made a promise to maintain their armed stance vis-à-vis Israel.

Lebanese Government to "establish the Lebanese identity of the Shaba farmlands and to determine the borders in accordance with procedure and principles approved by the UN." Hezbollah recognized that a process pursued by the Lebanese Government to achieve the delineation of the border between Syria and Lebanon was the only legitimate way to restore Lebanese sovereignty over the Shaba farms.[251] Meanwhile, representatives of the Syrian Government repeatedly stated that the Shaba farms area was Lebanese and not Israeli-occupied Syrian territory, as determined by the UN on the basis of the so-called Blue Line. In this context, the Secretary-General called on the Lebanese Government and Syria to take urgent steps under international law to delineate their border. Its current status as Israeli-occupied Syrian territory remained valid unless and until both nations took steps under international law to alter that status.[252]

4.4. The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006

As of June, 2006, the UNIFIL was comprised of 1,990 troops, from China, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Ukraine.[253] Moreover, the UNIFIL employed 408 civilian staff, 306 of whom were recruited locally. The Force was also assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of the UNTSO. A map of the UNIFIL deployment is shown in the Appendix-B. The UNSC extended the UNIFIL mandate for a further period of six months via Res.No.1655.[254]

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[251] The UN reaffirmed that the border delineation agreement for the Shaba farmlands was concluded between Lebanon and Syria, which deposited with the UN, and it cannot be considered Lebanese land, but continued to be defined as Israeli-occupied Syrian territory.

[252] As regards delineation of the border in the Shaba farms area, a bilateral meeting between Lebanon and Syria would be held for sovereignty of the Shaba farms to be transferred from Syria to Lebanon.

[253] With effect from 16 April, the Ukrainian engineering and demining contingent was replaced by a contingent from China.

[254] Appendix C, The Council also condemned all acts of violence which resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides and urged the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act of provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide by their obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other UN personnel.

A tense political climate prevailed in the UNIFIL area of operations in early-2006. Since 2001, the UNIFIL had completed two parts of its mandate (i.e. confirmed the withdrawal of the IDF and assisted Lebanese authorities as they returned to the area vacated by Israel). The UNIFIL focused on the remaining part of its mandate, the restoration of international peace and security, by observing, monitoring and reporting on developments in its area of operation liaising with the parties to maintain calm and order. The UNSC expressed, in successive resolutions, its support for continued efforts by the UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the Blue Line, through patrols and observations from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties, with a view to correcting violations and preventing the escalation of incidents. Furthermore, the UNIFIL also provided humanitarian assistance to the local people in its area of operation.

On 28 May, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Lebanon launched eight rockets from the vicinity of Aynata across the Blue Line into Israel. The rockets impacted an IDF position in Upper Galilee, causing material damage. IDF retaliated with air strike against military installations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, near Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. This incidents also triggered a major exchange of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Blue Line. The IDF responded with air strikes and heavy artillery, mortar and tank fire against Hezbollah positions in the area from which Hezbollah fire had emanated. The UNIFIL was in close contact with the parties during the exchange of fire with a view to arranging a ceasefire and preventing further escalation.[255] Meanwhile, according to the decision of the National Dialogue

[255] In the course of exchange of fire, UNIFIL recorded a number of cases of IDF firing close to UNIFIL positions in Hula, Alma ash Shab, and patrol base Hin of the Observer Group. It also recorded a number of incidents of Hezbollah small-arms fire from vicinity of some UN positions. These acts were serious concern because they endangered the lives of UN personnel and property, hence the UNIFIL strongly protested the incidents to both sides.

on 14 March, 2006, the Lebanese Government stated that Palestinian militias outside the refugee camps would be disarmed within a six-month period and that the problem of arms inside the camps would also be dealt with.[256] This decision was very welcomed by UNSC Res.No.1680, which called for further efforts to disband and disarm all militias and fully restore government control over all Lebanese territory.

Although, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained tense and volatile most of the time until July, it changed completely on 12 July, when hostilities broke out and the area was plunged into the most serious conflict in decades. The crisis started when Hezbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory towards IDF positions in the area of the Israeli town of Zarit. Meanwhile, Hezbollah fighters crossed the Blue Line into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol. Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers, killing three others and wounding two more. The captured soldiers were taken into Lebanon. Subsequently, a heavy exchange of fire ensued across the Blue Line between Hezbollah and IDF, it was heaviest in the areas west of Bint Jubayl and in the Shaba farms area. Lasting 34 days, this Israeli offensive operation was also called the '2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.'[257] In addition to airstrikes on Hezbollah positions, the IDF targeted numerous roads and bridges in southern Lebanon within and outside the UNIFIL area of operations.[258] Afterward, at least one IDF tank and a platoon crossed into Lebanon in the area of Hezbollah attack in an attempt to rescue the captured soldiers. An explosive device detonated under a tank, killing four more IDF soldiers. Eight IDF soldiers were killed in fighting that ensued

[256] The National Dialogue stressed the responsibility of Lebanon to protect the Palestinian camps on its territory from any aggression and to improve the conditions of people living inside and outside refugee camps in Lebanon.
[257] The conflict started on 12 July, 2006, and continued until the UN-brokered ceasefire of 14 August, 2006.
[258] IDF stated that those attacks were to prevent Hezbollah from transferring the abducted Israeli soldiers.

during an attempt to retrieve the four bodies.[259] That night, the IDF issued a warning to the UNIFIL that anyone, including UN personnel, moving close to the Blue Line would be shot at. A day later, the Lebanese Government requested the UNIFIL to broker a ceasefire. Israel responded that a ceasefire would be contingent upon the return of the captured soldiers. Israel continued to conduct large-scale airstrikes on infrastructure and strategic targets throughout Lebanon, including Beirut Int'l Airport, the ports, various Beirut suburbs and town further north along the coast and in the Bekaa Valley. The Beirut-Damascus Highway and other routes connecting Lebanon to Syria were also bombed. Many fuel depots and petrol stations were destroyed. Hezbollah rocket attacks hit many towns in northern Israel and reached as far south as Haifa and Tiberias, some 35 km. from the Blue Line, causing civilian casualties and damaging buildings.[260] Meanwhile, 18 Lebanese civilians, including women and children, were killed on the road between Al Bayyadah and Shama villages as they were fleeing from Marwahin. The following day, the UNIFIL evacuated 283 inhabitants from Marwahin to Tyre.

On 15 July, the UNIFIL was informed by the IDF that Israel would establish a 'special security zone' between 21 villages along the Blue Line and the Israeli technical fence. The IDF informed the UNIFIL that any vehicles entering the area would be shot at. This security zone was also within the UNIFIL area of operations which would make it impossible to support, whenever necessary, many UNIFIL positions that were located in the zone. Furthermore, it would prevent UNIFIL from fulfilling its mandate based on the UNSC resolutions. The UNIFIL requested the IDF

[259] Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 21 July, 2006.
[260] The reported number of Israeli casualties amounted to 12 IDF soldiers and 13 civilians. On 15 July, IDF announced via loudspeakers to the residents of Ayta ash Shab and Marwahin that they should vacate their villages. A large group of villagers from Marwahin approached the UN observation post and requested shelter and humanitarian assistance. Two UNIFIL APCs were stationed in Marwahin for the villagers' protection.

to authorize ‘windows’ to patrol the Blue Line and to allow the passage of logistics convoys to supply its position within the special security zone. Since 12 July, the hostilities and conflict radically changed the circumstances in which the UNIFIL was operating and the environment conducive to UN peacekeeping mission no longer existed. UNIFIL personnel were confined to their positions, and during the heaviest exchange of fire had to take shelter in bunkers.[261] Three UNIFIL positions, near Marwahin, At Tiri, Hula, were hit by IDF fire.[262]




Figure 16. Israeli special security zone (taken from https://www.google.com.tr/search?q=Israeli+special+security+zone+2006&biw=1366&bih=673&tbm=isch&imgil=o-twg4FgWcQKzM%253A%253BUM9ts2JG2iCEGM%253Bhttps%25253A).

[261] UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mandate facing a situation where the Force was restricted from carrying out even basic activities, such as the ability to resupply its positions, to conduct its regular air and ground patrols, and to carry out search and rescue operations.
[262] No personnel were injured but major damage was sustained.

Repeated IDF airstrikes hit the city of Tyre and its residential areas where about 150 UN personnel and their dependents lived. Despite repeated request to Israeli authorities, a building in which a UNIFIL staff member and his family were residing was hit and collapsed on 17 July. A UNIFIL search-and-rescue effort had to be cancelled due to damaged roads. In this situation, UNIFIL's humanitarian assistance to the locals was barely possible. In these circumstances, with all the constant firing along the Blue Line, where roads and bridges and other critical infrastructure were obliterated and the freedom of movement was continuously impeded, the UNIFIL could not resume its work in an effective way. A cessation of hostilities would be essential for this to be possible. Therefore, the Security Council had to consider all possible options for a future arrangement in south Lebanon.

At the end of the Israeli offensive operation against Lebanon, the objectives of this aggressive military operation were not achieved, and it was severely criticized by many military and politics circles. According to Achcar and Warchawski, the 33-Day War that Israel waged unsuccessfully against the Hezbollah compensated for the humiliation of the Six-Day war in Arab minds. Furthermore, it set off a major crisis in Israel, where Lebanon confirmed its image as Israel's Vietnam.[263] More than 4,000 rockets were fired at northern Israeli towns and villages, this was the first time the Israeli home front was under constant attack for so long.[264] Despite heavy casualties, the IDF failed in its attempts to stop the bombing, whereas the end of the war did not leave Israel in a controlling position.[265] Israel was badly scalded by the war, which

[263] Gilbert Achcar, Michel Warchawski, The 33 Day War: Israel's war on Hezbollah in Lebanon and its consequences, New York, 2015, p.4

[264] Hezbollah continued to launch an average of over 150 Katyusha rockets a day against Israeli cities, towns, and villages. Those attacks also succeeded in forcing a fourth of Israel's population away from their homes until the end of the war (Feldman, 2006).

[265] Hezbollah Leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah insisted that the number of Israelis killed was far higher than anticipated, resulting in Israel's surprisingly harsh response.

had an adverse effect on the way in which Israelis viewed their leaders, their army, and even the future of the state within the hostile region that surrounded it (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008).

According to Lebanese Government sources, the IDF shelling across the Blue Line and airstrikes resulted in the death of more than 250 Lebanese civilian and a far larger number of wounded. An unspecified number of Hezbollah fighters were killed and injured.[266] The UNIFIL estimated that approximately 50% of the locals vacated the villages in the south. Due to the severely damaged civil infrastructure, around 1,000,000 Lebanese were displaced. During the intense fighting in July and August, five UN personnel were killed and 16 injured. The UNIFIL mission was closely coordinated with the Lebanese authorities to address the humanitarian needs of those who remained in the villages.[267]

Additional progress was made by the Lebanese Government with significant deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the south of the country for the first time in three decades.[268] Moreover, Lebanese troops took up positions along the eastern part of the Blue Line, and deployed in significant numbers along Lebanon's Syrian border. These were important steps in progress towards the fulfillment of the requirements of Res.No 425.[269] A number of specific measures for the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be implemented in the southern area, particularly across the Blue Line.[270] The establishment of an area free of any

[266] Most of the sources stated that more than 1000 Lebanese and 165 Israelis were killed during the conflict.
[267] UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities established a joint coordination center for humanitarian activities in two locations, Tyre and Marjayoun.
[268] On 7 August, the Lebanese cabinet decided to send 1,500 soldiers to the south across the Blue Line.
[269] However, disbanding and disarmament of all militias and the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon was not be implemented in full.
[270] Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of Res.No.1559, dated 19 October, 2006.

armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Lebanese Government and the UNIFIL, between the Blue Line and the Litani would constitute an important step towards the disarming of all militias in Lebanon.[271] The UNIFIL also supported the Lebanese Government through the establishment of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to assist the Lebanese Navy in securing its territorial waters.[272] The Maritime Task Force was another achievement to assist the Lebanese Government for extending its authority over the territory and securing its territorial waters.[273]

4.4.1. UNSC Res.No.1701, new UN troops for UNIFIL and extension of its mandate.

After taking into account of the Secretary-General's reports, the UNSC unanimously approved Res.No.1701 that was intended to resolve the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict following intense negotiations (see Appendix C). A day later, the decision of the Security Council was approved by the Lebanese Government and by the Israeli cabinet the following day. The council called for a full cessation of hostilities by Hezbollah and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations.[274] It also called upon the parties the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers and similarly, the release of Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel. The Security Council welcomed the unanimous decision ratified on 7 August, 2006 by the Lebanese Government to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in southern Lebanon as the Israeli Army withdrew behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the UNIFIL to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese

[271] It would also define a political process and clear timeline for the full disarmament of Hezbollah in the sense of the completion of its transformation into a solely political party. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah stated on 22 September, 2006 that "we are not saying that these weapons should remain forever. It is not logical for these weapons to remain forever. There is bound to be an end to them."
[272] For the first time, the council decided to include the Maritime Task Force as part of UN PKO.
[273] The Task Force consisted of four frigates, 10 fast patrol boats supported by helicopters and two logistics support ships with hospital facilities.
[274] The ceasefire took effect at 8 AM on 14 August, 2006, after increased attacks by both sides.

armed forces into the region. Meanwhile, the council called on the international community to take immediate steps to extend financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including the safe return of displaced persons. It also called on all parties to comply with the responsibility to ensure that no action was taken contrary to the decision for humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. The UNSC requested the Secretary-General to develop proposals for delineation of the international border of Lebanon, including the Shaba farms area, which was one of the most significant ongoing concerns for regional security. The council decided that all nations shall take the necessary measures to prevent; a) the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, and paramilitary equipment, b) the provision of technical training or assistance, maintenance or use of prohibited items.[275]

The Security Council also decided in order to supplement and enhance the Force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the UNIFIL force strength to a maximum of 15,000 troops to carry out its mandate under Res.No.425/426: a) monitor the cessation of hostilities, b) accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces as they deploy throughout the south, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon, c) coordinate its activities with the Lebanese Government and Israel, d) extend assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, e) assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in taking steps towards the establishment of the area, f) assist the Lebanese

[275] These prohibitions shall not apply to arms, material, training or assistance authorized by the Lebanese Government or by the UNIFIL.

Government to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent.

In support of a request from the Lebanese Government to deploy an international force to assist it exercise its authority throughout the territory, the UNSC authorized the UNIFIL to take all necessary actions in its area of deployment to ensure that its area of operation was not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and the freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

As recounted above, the Res.No.1701 made some significant changes on the UNIFIL mandate which converged the traditional peacekeeping with the second generation PKO. The new mandate provided the UNIFIL with the authority to use force for not only self-defense but also in defense of the mission, furthermore it also gave the Force additional tasks for humanitarian support. Although Res.No.1701 was clearer than other resolutions in relation to the UNIFIL, it was also difficult to understand how it would be implemented, such as 'to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the creation of a demilitarized zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River' (Murphy, 2008, p. 10). However, the expectation to disarm the Hezbollah was not realistic.

As reported by the Secretary-General, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were deployed in the area south of the Litani and along the Blue Line. The UNIFIL also helped the LAF to ensure the area was free of armed personnel, assets and

weapons other than those of the Lebanese Government and those of UNIFIL.[276] The LAF and UNIFIL conducted coordinated operations in the Kafr Shuba area and in Wadi Zibquin for clearing unauthorized arms, ammunition and mines. The LAB continued to monitor and control entry points into the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line through checkpoints and patrols. Given the considerable military presence of the LAF and UNIFIL south of the Litani, senior commanders of both forces were concerned that it would be difficult for unauthorized armed personnel to establish any new military capacity in that area. At the same time, unarmed personnel, suspected of being affiliated to Hezbollah, continued to monitor UNIFIL activities at various points throughout its area of operation. Meanwhile, the LAF and Lebanese authorities were responsible for preventing any hostile or armed action against the UN Force from outside the UNIFIL area of operations in Lebanon.

In regard to the UNSC's decision for an arms embargo, Israel claimed that hundreds of arms shipment to Hezbollah, including rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense system had crossed the Lebanese-Syrian border since the end of the 2006 conflict.[277] Syria strongly contradicted these allegations, asserting with the mounting media speculation that Israel was sending weapons to some Lebanese groups aligned with 14 March Movement. In line with these mutual allegations, the Secretary-General pointed out in his report that confidence building measures were urgently

[276] The LAF established a considerable number of permanent positions and checkpoints and commenced patrols in the area.

[277] With regard to Israeli charges of weapon smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanese authorities requested evidence to be provided to allow experts to verify the allegations. However there was no specific information and evidence to be investigated. Meanwhile, Syrian authorities informed the UN that Syria deployed an additional battalion and doubled its border guards to prevent smuggling between its territory and Lebanon. They repeatedly denied any involvement in arms trafficking in Lebanon. Both governments proclaimed that they continued to improve the measures for border control, including equipment, methods, capacity and training. They pointed to their efforts and full cooperation in enforcing the weapon embargo imposed via Res.No.1701.

needed to strengthen the Lebanese-Syrian border regime.[278] The Secretary-General also called upon the member nations and relevant organizations to redouble their efforts in support of Lebanese Government in this regard.[279]

The UNIFIL established a mechanism for liaison and coordination with the LAF and IDF, which was very effective in addressing military and security issues.[280] That was a key element of the UNIFIL's efforts to maintaining stability in southern Lebanon and providing an essential forum for negotiation of matters which required the cooperation of all three parties. In many occasions, the UNIFIL informed the LAF which took prompt action either to detain perpetrators or to confiscate forbidden materials. Lebanese authorities reported that they had undertaken a variety of measures to secure their borders and entry points in order to prevent illegal entry arms and related material into Lebanon.[281]

Following the decision of the UNSC to supplement and enhance the UNIFIL force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, deployment was implemented in the area of operation between the Litani and the Blue Line. Battalions from France, Italy, and Spain were deployed into the UNIFIL area of operations by 15 September, 2007, joining the battalions already in place from Ghana and India and increased the overall strength of the UNIFIL to over 5,000. Moreover, France deployed an engineer unit, and Belgium and Luxembourg deployed a Level-2 hospital and an engineering unit. Italian air resources were bolstered with the deployment of

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[278] The Secretary-General report on the implementation of resolution1701, dated 14 March, 2007.
[279] Meanwhile, there was ongoing bilateral assistance provided by the German Government in helping Lebanon enhance its border security capacities.
[280] Although coordination and liaison between the UNIFIL and IDF were generally good, the UNIFIL Commander was unable to establish direct contact with senior IDF representatives for much of the time during the incidents, or any future incidents that could be quickly resolved before they escalate.
[281] The Secretary-General dispatched a team of border police experts as requested by the Lebanese Government to review measures and to assess the need for technical assistance. The team reviewed security measures at Beirut Airport, seaport of Beirut and Tripoli, and a few smaller ports along the coast, and entry points with Syria. The team made some recommendations in order to enhance their improvement and security capabilities.

an extra helicopter, bringing the total number of helicopters to five. The second phase of the UNIFIL augmentation contained the further deployment of four mechanized infantry battalions from France, Indonesia, Italy and Nepal and one infantry unit each from Malaysia and Qatar. The French composite battalion was to assume the role of quick reaction force. Finland, Ireland and Turkey deployed engineering units and another would arrive from Portugal. China would deploy one Level-2 hospital, in addition to its existing engineering company. The Dominican Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania were expected to deploy military police companies.[282]

As of November 2006, UNIFIL strength stood at 10,500 ground troops, 1,750 naval personnel and 51 military observers from UNTSO. With the deployment by the LAF of four brigades to southern Lebanon, the number was expected to be sufficient to carry out the mandate.[283] In this regard, the LAF was the peacekeeping partner of the UNIFIL and the success of the UN force was tied to the capabilities of the LAF. In his letter to the UNSC, the Secretary-General also commended the effort of the Lebanese Government to extend its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces and encouraged the LAF to continue providing full and timely assistance to the UNIFIL. After its augmentation, the new structure of UNIFIL would be; the command of UNIFIL was exercised by the Force Commander who was also head of the UN mission in the area.[284] Two sector headquarters, West and East, were established in Tibin and Marjayoun. Each of the sectors was commanded by a brigadier general and would consist of four mechanized infantry battalions and a signal company. In addition, a quick reaction force would be based in Frun. UNIFIL's

[282] Letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, dated 1 December, 2006,
[283] However, significant resources would continue to be required in the area of engineering, transport and movement control, communications, supply and medical, and administrative support.
[284] On 2 February, 2007, Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) took over the command of UNIFIL from Major-General Allain Pellegrini (France).

air assets, provided and operated by Italy, were based at the Force HQ. The UNIFIL would also have six engineering units, as well as two Level-2 hospitals and one Level-1 hospital. A UNIFIL office for coordination and joint planning with the LAF, the Ministry of Defense and other relevant Lebanese authorities was set up in Beirut. Another UNIFIL office would be established in Tel Aviv for liaison and coordination with IDF headquarters, the Ministry of Defense and other relevant Israeli authorities.

The presence of a large number of unexploded cluster munitions which were used by the IDF during the 2006 conflict continued to be greatest cause of concern in the area.[285] The UN Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon recorded 854 cluster bomb-strike sites and civilian victims increased by the day in the area.[286] Despite repeated UN efforts, Israel could not provide the UNIFIL with detailed firing data on its use of cluster munitions.[287] The UN Mine Action Coordination Center in South Lebanon estimated that an area of over 38,000,000 m^2 was contaminated by land mines and cluster bombs. As a result of the joint efforts of the LAF, 16 UNIFIL teams and 61 UN-contracted and bilaterally funded clearance teams, a total of 40% of the surface and 21% of the sub-surface was cleared and more than 132,000 unexploded cluster bombs were destroyed.

4.4.2. 2007, a regrettable bomb attack against the UNIFIL.

The military and security situation in the UNIFIL area of operations was generally stable in early-2007. Although, the parties strongly emphasized their

[285] Cluster Bombs posed grave risks to civilians or unintended targets long after a conflict ended and they were too costly to locate and remove. Cluster munitions were prohibited at the international convention in Dublin, Ireland, in May, 2008. The convention entered into force and became binding international law for ratifying nations on 1 August 2010.
[286] As of October 2007, 25 civilian were killed and 185 injured by cluster bombs. 13 members of the mine clearance teams were killed and 32 injured by cluster bomb incidents.
[287] However, the maps provided by Israel indicating the locations of cluster bombs were incomplete and inaccurate. When the Lebanese Government questioned the accuracy of the maps that Israel previously provided, inasmuch as 37 locations known to be contaminated by cluster bombs were not marked.

commitment to Res.No.1701, there was no greater progress on key issues that were vital to the achievement of a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution. According to the Secretary-General, the unsolved issues were; the captured Israeli soldiers and the Lebanese prisoners, the Shaba Farms and the halting of Israeli over-flights.[288] On the evening of 7 February, the IDF conducted a mine clearance operation north of the fence on Israeli territory. When the LAF fired warning shots, the IDF countered with intensive fire towards LAF positions. Following this incident, the Force Commander convened a tripartite meeting with representatives of the IDF and LAF to reduce tension in the area. In March 2007, a considerable increase in the number of bombings and assassinations in Beirut threatened and scared the Lebanese community. At the same time, anti-government demonstrations in Beirut occasionally led to violent clashes between supporters of the opposition forces and those of the government.[289] The UNSC reiterated its full support for a legitimate and democratically elected Lebanese Government, called for full respect of the democratic institutions of the country, in conformity with its constitution, and condemned any effort to destabilize Lebanon. The council further called upon all Lebanese political parties to show responsibility with a view to preventing, through dialogue, further deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, and reaffirmed its strong support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon.

4.4.3. The disputed border on the Shaba Farms area.

The affirmation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity was inextricably linked to the delineation of its border with Syria, especially in the Shaba

[288] Meanwhile, the Lebanese Prime Minister listed his frustration as the continuing Israeli over-flights, the rising civilian tall caused by Israeli cluster bombs and the slow progress on the issue of the Shaba farms.

[289] The Lebanese opposition against the cabinet consisted of the Amal, Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as President Lahoud.

farms area, which would also contribute the stability of the region. President Assad decided to activate the Border Committee with Lebanon in order for the delineation and demarcation of borders between two nations. With regard to the Shaba Farms, Syria informed the Secretary-General on March 2007 that "Israel's withdrawal from the area is essential, it being understood that the border will be demarcated following complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan." Moreover, Syrian senior officials stated that the Shaba farms were to be considered Lebanese.

Israeli air violation of the Blue Line continued on an almost daily basis, which was a serious breach of Lebanese sovereignty and of Res.No.1701. The Israeli Government asserted that over-flights were necessary security measures that would continue until two abducted Israeli soldiers were released unconditionally. Considering the potential repercussions of continued violations of Lebanese sovereignty via Israeli over-flights, the Secretary-General asked the Israeli Government to halt its policy of over-flights, which were also violation of Res.Nos.1559/1701.[290]

The Secretary-General also highlighted another concern over a growing threat from extremist Islamic groups, who reportedly found safe haven in Palestinian refugee camps, to the presence of UN in Lebanon.[291] However, the LAF through the bloody confrontation in Nahr al-Bared defeated the terrorists of Fatah al-Islam, which was a major threat to the country's stability and sovereignty. Furthermore, the Secretary-General noted in his report of the many reports of suspected Hezbollah armed elements constructing new facilities north of the Litani and in the Bekaa

[290] The Lebanese Government also asserted that Israel's continued occupation of the northern part of Ghajar constituted another breach of the Blue Line and a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
[291] In the aftermath of the twin bus bombing on 13 February, 2007, in which three killed and 21 injured, the Internal Security Force arrested a number of members of the Fatah al-Islam group. Lebanese officials believed that Fatah al-Islam shared ideological tenets with Al-Qaida.

Valley.[292] The Secretary-General called on all those parties with the ability to influence Hezbollah to support its transformation into a solely political party, consistent with the requirement of the Taif Accord. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's arms continued to pose a challenge to the government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force to reassert sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

As for the country's political situation, the parliamentary majority represented by the 14 March Alliance continued to maintain that President Lahoud's presence in the office was illegitimate. His extended term would be coming to an end In the coming months of 2007. A new president would have to be elected in a free and fair electoral process according to the constitutional rules without foreign interference or influence.[293]

In mid-2007, the situation along the Blue Line remained tense and fragile. On 17 June, a serious breach of the cessation of hostilities since the end of conflict occurred when two rockets landed in the Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona, causing damage but claiming no casualties. Such incidents posed a direct challenge to both the new security arrangement in southern Lebanon and to the stability of the country as a whole. One of the most regrettable incidents regarding the UNIFIL occurred when a bomb attack killed six peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent on 24 June 2007.[294] No group claimed responsibility for the attack. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora condemned the attack and extended condolences to the UNIFIL.

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[292] The Secretary-General report on the implementation of Res.No.1559, dated 07 May, 2007.

[293] However, the prevailing security conditions in Lebanon forced many members of Parliament to reside permanently abroad or in seclusion under extremely tight security. These situations undermined the democratic institutions of Lebanon and crippled the political functions of the parliament which was the center of the solution for problems.

[294] On 24 June, a Spanish battalion patrol was hit by a car bomb on the main road between the towns of Marjayoun and Khiam. Six Spanish soldiers were killed and two others were injured.

Hezbollah also denounced the attack, stating that it only hurt the people of Lebanon. For the better protection and security of UNIFIL personnel, the Department of PKO engaged in ensuring that UNIFIL was well-equipped with additional assets, including detection and jamming equipment, and remote-controlled explosive devices. They were also looking into the possibility of the deployment of UAVs to mitigate risk to the UNIFIL and the LAF as well.

Some ground violations along the Blue Line occurred inadvertently because the exact location of the Blue Line at the site was unclear. The UNIFIL urged both parties to act with restraint and refrain from activities that would contribute to tension along the line. Moreover, both parties orally agreed to the UNIFIL proposal to mark the Blue Line.[295] Upon the Secretary-General's suggestion, another important step was taken by the parties for liaison and coordination arrangements. It stipulated that the LAF and IDF must ensure that an officer at the rank of General, or his deputy, could be contacted at all times by the UNIFIL Force Commander so that any incident can be quickly resolved before it escalates.

In an effort to extend its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces, the Lebanese Government maintained four infantry brigades south of the Litani, operating 145 positions. They monitored and controlled entry into the UNIFIL area of operations across the Litani through permanent checkpoints and patrols. They also requested UNIFIL assistance in building a military road parallel to the Blue Line in order to improve monitoring capabilities. At the same time, the UNIFIL continued to implement its mandate to assist the LAF in ensuring that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani was free of unauthorized armed personnel,

[295] Lebanon officially accepted the UNIFIL proposed technical process for marking the Blue Line which would build trust, decrease tension and contribute a reduction in incidents and inadvertent violations of the Blue Line. UNIFIL started to mark the line with both the LAF and IDF, a six kilometer portion of the Blue Line in the western sector, in the area of Alma Ash Shab was completed.

assets, weapons, infrastructure or related material. In that context, the UNIFIL conducted more than 400 patrols per day throughout its area of operation, night surveillance on suspected activities by armed elements. Furthermore, the LAF and UNIFIL commenced coordinated patrols in different locations within the area of operation.[296] Although, the UNIFIL did not detect any illegal transfers of arms south of the Litani, discoveries of weapons and ammunition within the UNIFIL zone indicated that there were still weapons in this area and persons prepared to use them.[297]

By June 2007, UNIFIL strength reached 11,113 ground troops deployed in two sectors with headquarters in Tibnin and Marjayoun, and 2,000 personnel serving in the Maritime Task Force, as well as 179 staff officers at UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura and 21 National Support Elements.[298] The UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of UNTSO and employed 706 civilian staff. Approximately 340 troops from the Republic of South Korea were expected to deploy to the area in July. In conclusion, UNIFIL troops reached a high level of operational readiness which allowed them to react promptly to incidents throughout its area of operation. This effective deployment significantly expanded peacekeeping force helped to establish a new security environment in southern Lebanon and maintain the cessation of hostilities.

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[296] UNIFIL maintained over 60 positions and a number of temporary checkpoints and observation posts, including in villages and populated areas. At the same time the LAF continued to maintain 4 brigades and artillery regiment. The LAF had over 100 checkpoints and permanent positions and conducted approximately 60 patrols a day.

[297] Coordinated operations undertaken by the LAF and UNIFIL led to the discovery of abandoned arms, ammunition, explosive devices and bunkers. They found an ammunition dump and 17 rockets in the vicinity of El Dardeis, a cave with 100 mortar bombs in the vicinity of Mazraat Islamiye, two rocket launchers in Pchaf, a cave containing mines, mortars and detonators in the Kafr Shouba area.

[298] The Maritime Task Force continued to focus on performing maritime interdiction operations in Lebanese territorial waters in order to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related material. Since it assumed its mission in mid-October 2006, more than 10,000 ships were hailed and queried, and the Lebanese authorities in port inspected 40 suspicious ships.

After May 2007, Lebanon continued to experience political crisis and instability. The security condition combined with the political stalemate created a climate of enduring crisis, with adverse effects felt more widely on Lebanese society and the economy. In the context of prolonged political crisis and the challenge from militias constrained and tarnished the authority of the Lebanese Government. Political tension focused primarily on the demand of the opposition, consisting of the Amal, Hezbollah, and the Free Patriotic Movement, to establish a national unity government, and finding a successor to President Lahaud, whose term was slated to end in November 2007. As fighting between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam escalated, a significant number of bomb attacks and assassinations across the country occurred as well.

In May 2007, an explosion in the Beirut neighborhood of Ashrafiyeh killed one and wounded 12. On 5 June, an explosion in Beirut left 10 people maimed. Two days later, a bomb killed one person and wounded three others near a town north of Beirut. On 13 June, a car bomb killed a former judge, a Parliament deputy, and nine others. On 19 September, a car bomb killed another Parliament Phalange Party deputy, and seven others. In reducing the governing coalition's majority in the Parliament, these assassinations of members of the ruling coalition not only further deteriorated the situation, but also appeared to be a systematic attempt to upset the political balance in the country. In addition to these attacks against politicians and civilians, the UNIFIL was also attacked twice; once on 24 June, as recounted above, which killed six Spanish soldiers, and the other on 16 July, which damaged a UN vehicle.[299] According to the Lebanese Prime Minister, interrogations of detained

[299] On 16 July, an IED was detonated by remote control next to a UNIFIL Tanzanian Military Police Checkpoint, in the area of al-Qassmiyeh along the Litani, causing material damage to the vehicle but

members of Fatah al-Islam and captured software data indicated that Lebanese sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence would continue to suffer further infringements.[300] Despite its limitations, the Lebanese Government and LAF made significant progress towards extending the government's authority over all Lebanese territory and disarming and disbanding all militias with their successful struggle against Fatah al-Islam. On 20 May, 2007, fighting erupted between Fatah al-Islam and the LAF in and around the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Northern Lebanon.[301] The fighting ended 15 weeks later on 2 September, when the LAF declared victory over the militant group. It left 168 LAF soldiers and over 222 militant dead, hundreds of soldiers, militants and civilians injured, with more than 200 militants arrested. However, the group's leader and a number of other militants escaped.[302]

Despite the quiet atmosphere in the UNIFIL area of operations, Israel continued to violate Lebanese airspace towards the end of 2007. Some of these violations were at low attitude, exceeding the sound barrier over populated areas in southern Lebanon. Tensions were heightened again when the LAF opened fire on

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no injuries. No one claimed responsibility but a preliminary result of the investigation pointed to a militant group with links to Fatah al-Islam.

[300] The Prime Minister Fouad Siniora informed the Secretary-General by his letter that Fatah al-Islam's goals were to destabilize the whole country by bombing government and business institutions, to mount attacks against the UNIFIL in order to threaten participating countries and jeopardize the implementation of Res.No.1701. They also planned to topple the democratically chosen government, jeopardize a democratic election of a new president, and create conditions that would impede progress in the setting up of special tribunal to investigate the assassination of Mr. Hariri. He also believed that members of Fatah al-Islam "who came from Syria illegally through the Lebanese-Syrian border controlled by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, whose headquarters was located in Damascus. They were closely associated with and supplied with weapons, ammunitions and provisions from Syria". Against these allegations, the Syrian Government sent a letter to the Secretary-General and strongly rejected the assertions made by the Lebanese Prime Minister. They stated that Syria observed with great regret that some of Lebanese with foreign support aimed at distorting the image of Syria, inciting the Security Council against Syria. They also launched misleading media campaign which distorted the facts and harmed the spirit of the historic fraternal relations between two countries.

[301] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 24 October, 2007.

[302] In the course of the fighting between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam, more than 32,000 Palestinian refugees were displaced from Nahr al-Bared camp.

Israeli aircraft on 25 October, 2007, which also raised the security incident occurrences in the area.[303] Considering the potential repercussions of continued Lebanese sovereignty violations through Israeli over-flights, the Secretary-General demanded the Israeli Government to halt its over-flight policy, which were also a violation of Res.Nos.1559/1701.[304]

Meanwhile, the UNIFIL maintained close relations with the locals in providing humanitarian assistance, including medical services, veterinary assistance, engineering and construction work and mine clearance. Both military and civilian components of the UNIFIL maintained regular contacts with local authorities and community leaders to increase understanding of UNIFIL activities and operation on the ground and to address their concerns. In this way, relations between the UNIFIL and locals continued to foster, especially through the work undertaken by the Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units and Civil Affairs Teams. The implementation of Quick-Impact Projects which providing to be critical instrument for assisting local communities. The Force Commander initiated a series of meetings with community leaders throughout the UNIFIL area of operations, which boosted trust and confidence within the local communities.[305]

Despite the Secretary-General's repeated notice to the Lebanese Government, the question of Hezbollah's disarmament remained at the hub of political debate.[306] According to the Israeli Government, Hezbollah remained at a level higher than

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[303] The Israeli Government asserted that over-flights were a necessary security measure that would continue until two abducted Israeli soldiers were released and respect for the full arms embargo was shown.

[304] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 30 October, 2007.

[305] Nevertheless, UNIFIL patrols faced a number of stone-throwing incidents, mainly by local youths.

[306] As the Secretary-General repeatedly pointed out in his reports that the strong and effective armed presence of Hezbollah had an adverse effect on the efforts of the Lebanese Government to extend its exclusive authority over the entire territory of Lebanon, in accordance with the UN Res.No.1559 and 1701.

during the previous year's conflict. Israel alleged that Hezbollah's long-range rocket force was stationed in the area north of the Litani. They had a supply of hundreds of new-generation rockets which had a range of 250 km., enabling them to reach Tel Aviv.[307] Israel stated that all these weapons in Hezbollah's control constituted a strategic threat to security and to the safety of its citizens. Israel also claimed that the transfer of these sophisticated weapons continued across the border from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah.[308] Following these accusations, the Secretary-General recommended an establishment of common border force within the context of the pilot project led by Germany along Lebanon's border with Syria. The force would be responsible for the surveillance and control of Lebanon's northern border with Syria for preventing the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and other prohibited material through permanent and mobile observation points.[309] The Secretary-General pointed out in his report that without an effective and integrated border management system to prevent smuggling of weapons, munitions and personnel, Lebanon's security and sovereignty would remain inclined to the abuses.[310]

4.4.4. 2008, the UNIFIL continued its humanitarian assistance activities in its area of operation.

The cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon continued to hold and the military and security situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained generally quiet in 2008.[311] The UNIFIL and LAF continued their work to ensure that the area between the Litani and the Blue Line was not utilized for hostile activities

[307] Israel also claimed that Hezbollah tripled its Shore-to-Sea missiles and established an air defense unit armed with ground-to-air missiles.
[308] On 8 October, 2007, the Lebanese Prime Minister sent a letter to the Secretary-General indicating that significant amount of weapons were transferred from Syria during the July, 2006 War, which were made available to some parties with close ties to Syria.
[309] The common border force was expected to be fully operational by November, 2007.
[310] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 30 October, 2007.
[311] However, the control by the IDF of northern Ghajar continued to be a source of tension.

and was free of any unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons. As of November, 2008, the UNIFIL's total military strength was 12,770 personnel, with a civilian strength of 318 international and 656 local staff members, and supported by 51 UNTSO military observers. An infantry unit from Malaysia, comprising 230 troops was deployed with the French UNIFIL battalion in Sector West towards the end of October.[312] The concerted cooperation between the UNIFIL and LAF contributed significantly to general calm that continued to prevail in the Force's area of operation. The UNIFIL maintained 63 permanent positions and operated 150 observation posts on a daily basis. In addition, LAF troops operated more than 100 checkpoints and observation posts, as well as 50 patrols per day.[313] Together, the UNIFIL and LAF operated six joint checkpoints along the Litani, as well as two checkpoints and four patrols along the Blue Line. Thus, the combined presence of the UNIFIL and LAF ensured the effective control in the area. The security and safety of UNIFIL personnel remained a priority. Some specific threat warnings emanated from militant extremist groups, including Al-Qaida. Joint efforts and cooperation with the Lebanese authorities and LAF continued to ensure that security threats to the UNIFIL regularly reviewed all its procedures and focused on mitigating risk to its personnel, assets and installations while ensuring mandate implementation.[314]

The public's overall attitude towards the UNIFIL remained generally positive. The CIMIC components, the UNIFIL civil affair and public information components also continued to work to inform the locals about the UNIFIL mandate. In addition, the UNIFIL continued to carry out humanitarian assistance activities, as well as

[312] A Force protection company of 150 personnel to secure the expanded Naqoura HQ compound, as well as 50 additional personnel within the Force headquarters support company and 75 international military police all provided by Indonesian deployed to the UNIFIL in late-November.
[313] The two Forces also conducted seven counter-rocket launching operations in 2008 and increased vehicle checks in the area of operation.
[314] In this regard, in addition to electronic countermeasures to jam explosive devices, the UNIFIL started to use micro-UAVs to enhance Force protection and personnel security.

participate in a number of community events, encompassing art, sports and the environment. However, a number of serious incidents raised tensions whenever they occurred in the area. The continuation of targeted assassinations in Lebanon added to tensions throughout the country. The scope of targets widened to include the UNIFIL outside of its area of operation, the army, the security forces and the diplomatic community.

Although the Israeli Government and Lebanon generally respected the Blue Line in its entirety and avoided any military action that could lead to an escalation, Israeli aircraft continued to violate Lebanese airspace. The Israeli Government maintained its claim that the flights were conducted for security reasons, pending an improved security regime along the Lebanese-Syrian border, and full enforcement of the armed embargo as per UNSC Res.No.1701. The Lebanese Government continued to protest these over-flights, which were absolute encroachments on Lebanese sovereignty. It also caused tension among the locals, in addition to undermining the credibility of the UNIFIL and LAF.

During the 2008 political crisis regarding the presidential election, which impeded the normal functioning of the legitimate constitutional institutions, Lebanon continued to deal with violent confrontations between opposing parties.[315] The political deadlock among the parties generated armed violence that led to a number of fatalities and injuries. The election of President Sleiman on 25 May, 2008 was a significant step forward in the reactivation of Lebanon's constitutional process, to which all parties recommitted themselves. Thus, the parties agreed to refrain from the use of weapons to settle internal political disputes, which was for the political interest of all Lebanese.

[315] The office of the president of Lebanon had remained vacant since 24 November, 2007.

Meanwhile, political assassinations and explosions continued to be a main source of concern for political stability in Lebanon. The proliferation of weapons and existence of armed groups which continued to operate in the country were a direct threat to the stability of Lebanon and the region. There were allegations of widespread militia activities, rearming and paramilitary training on all sides of Lebanon, which constituted a serious challenge for the government. As the Secretary-General pointed out in his report, the emergence of extremist elements and foreign fighters based largely in and around Tripoli would threaten security and stability of the country and the region as well.[316] The most significant Lebanese militia was the armed component of Hezbollah, furthermore several Palestinian militias were operating in and out of the 12 refugee camps in Lebanon. Despite the Taif Accord and UNSC resolution that called for the disbanding and disarming of militias, there was still no tangible progress.[317]

4.4.5. No tangible progress in the disarmament of militia groups in Lebanon.

In this context, the issue of Hezbollah's weapons continued to be central to the political debate in the country.[318] Their presence as a separate military asset and infrastructure was a fundamental challenge to the government's attempts to consolidate the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese state and obstructed constructive dialogue on political and security issues. The Lebanese President and Prime Minister reiterated their vital interest in extending the Government's authority over all Lebanese territory. Against the government's earlier claims on the status of

[316] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 October, 2008.
[317] The armed violence in May demonstrated that the militia groups outside the control of the government posed a serious threat to the stability of Lebanon. Hezbollah and other armed groups engaged in heavy clashes in many areas throughout the country, resulting in loss of life, injuries, damage to property and general instability.
[318] Hezbollah's substantial military capacity distinct from the Lebanese state was a direct contravention of the UNSC Res.Nos 1559/1701.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Government declared on 12 August that "the right of Lebanon, through its people, army and its resistance in liberating and regaining Shaba Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills and the Lebanese part of Ghajar, or recover them and defend Lebanon and its territorial waters in the face of any enemy and by all available and legitimate means." This ministerial statement also confirmed the government's commitment to all the provisions of Security Council resolutions which emphasized the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon and the monopoly by the Lebanese Government on the use of force from its territory. Moreover, the Secretary-General called on Hezbollah to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions, and urged Syria and Iran to support its transformation into a political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accord and Res.No.1559.

On 6 May, 2008, the Lebanese Government declared Hezbollah's secure communication network separate from the state's system "illegal and unconstitutional" and announced the dismissal of the chief of security of the Beirut International Airport. In protest, Hezbollah closed all roads leading to and from Beirut Airport and other principal roads in parts of the capital. Hezbollah stated that its actions would continue until the Lebanese Government cancelled its decisions. Immediately after, exchanges of fire between members of the opposition and pro-Government forces began in Beirut. The violence escalated and spread across the country which brought it to an effective standstill. Hostilities continued until 14 May, 2008 and led to 69 dead and more than 180 wounded.[319] On 11 May, the League of Arab States convened an emergency meeting. It decided to dispatch a delegation to Beirut and condemned the use of armed violence to solve the problems. On 14 May, a

[319] During the clashes, many human right violations were reported, including illegal detention and ill-treatment, civilian deaths, instances of summary execution, destruction of private property, and attacks on the media and freedom of expression.

Ministerial Committee went to Lebanon and held discussions with the parties for ending the crisis.[320] On 15 May, the Lebanese Government abolished its decisions of 6 May. Shortly afterwards, the Arab Committee announced a common understanding that called for calm on the streets and the withdrawal of all armed elements.

The agreement also called for a Lebanese National Dialogue to begin a day later in Doha, the capital city of the State of Qatar, aiming to seek consensus on the issues of a national unity government and new electoral law, thereby making possible the election of a President. The Lebanese political leaders met in Doha on 16 May. After intense discussions, they reached a comprehensive political understanding on 21 May, and leading to the election of General Michel Sleiman as President of Lebanon on 25 May.[321] The Doha Agreement was a political framework in which the Lebanese leaders decided to cooperate in seeking political stability and security. However, the combination of mistrust among the parties, political competition in the parliamentary elections, and the presence of militias obstructed the full implementation of the Doha Agreement and might lead to tensions and possible further insecurity and instability in Lebanon. Therefore, despite the reconciliation agreement in Doha, a series of violent clashes continued in and around Tripoli, which were both sectarian and political in nature. The militia attacks also targeted to the Lebanese armed forces.[322] All these events were stark warning for the government that if militia activities in Lebanon continued like this, its unforeseeable consequences could damage the government's

[320] The Ministerial Committee of Arab Foreign Ministers headed by the Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jasseim Al-Thani, and by the Secretary-Gneral of the League of Arab States, Amre Moussa.

[321] On 11 July, President Sleiman issued a decree forming a new cabinet, and a day after the cabinet received the vote of confidence from Parliament. President Sleiman visited Syria on 13-14 August and during his visit both countries reached a series of agreements including a memorandum for establishing normal diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon.

[322] On 13 August, an IED was detonated at a bus stop in Tripoli, killing 15 people, including 10 soldiers. On 29 September, another terrorist attack targeted the LAF in Tripoli, killed four soldiers and two civilians and wounded 32, 18 of them soldiers.

monopoly on the use of force in the country and could make upcoming parliamentary election impossible.

On 11 July, President Sleiman issued a decree forming a national unity government, headed by Fouad Siniora. In accordance with the Doha Agreement, the 30-member Cabinet included 16 seats allocated to the Parliamentary majority, 11 seats for the Opposition and the remaining 3 for the President.[323] On 30 September, the Lebanese Parliament adopted a new electoral law based on the agreement in Doha in May, 2008. This new law prepared the way for holding of parliamentary elections in early-2009. In September, President Sleiman also chaired the National Dialogue, gathering the 14 Lebanese leaders who took part in the signing of the Doha Agreement.[324] The National Dialogue agreed upon a six-point communiqué to resolve security tension in the country. All participants admitted to enhance the chances of the success of the dialogue and to refrain from any form of political or armed provocation. They committed to take serious action in order to create a condition towards reconciliation among all factions in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government took some steps to support the security measures. It committed to improve the monitoring capability of the land borders to prevent unauthorized flow of weapons, munitions and personnel into country. The LAF undertook a temporary redeployment of troops from southern Lebanon in order to address the security concerns in the north of the country.[325] As mandated in UNSC

[323] In accordance with prior practice, the new cabinet also reflected the confessional structure of the country. On 12 August 2008, Parliament expressed confidence in the new cabinet by an overwhelming majority.
[324] Parliament Speaker, Nabih Berri; Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora; Leader of the Future Movement, Saad Hariri; PSP leader, Walid Jumblatt; FPM leader, Michel Aoun, Representative of Hezbollah, Mohammad Raad; Lebanese Forces leader, Samir Geagea; Kataeb Perty Leader, Amine Gemayel; and four members of Parliament who represented different religious groups.
[325] The Lebanese authorities assured the UNIFIL Force Commander the deployment would be limited in scope to avoid negative effects in the UNIFIL area of operations.

Res.No.1701, all nations shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon and the Council called upon the Lebanese Government to secure its border to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent.[326] The general porosity of the Syrian-Lebanese border, which rendered illegal flows possible, remained to be a main concern for Lebanese authorities. Furthermore, the permanent presence of paramilitary infrastructures belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah al-Intifada, which straddle the border, gave such groups de-facto control across the border.[327]

Meanwhile, there were some positive developments in relations between Lebanon and Syria and the initiation of a process of normalization between two neighbors of mutual respect. The two nations took concrete steps towards improving their relations, namely the activation of the joint committee to delineate their common border, joint actions to improve security arrangements along that border, reviewing bilateral relations objectively in ways that met the interests of both countries, as well as trade and economic cooperation.[328] The Lebanese Cabinet endorsed the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Syria at the ambassadorial level on 21 August. On 14 October, President Bashar Al-Assad responded to the Lebanese Government's endeavor by signing a similar decree for establishing normal diplomatic relations with

[326] Res.No.1701 specified all member nations were requested to take the necessary measures to prevent such sales or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft.
[327] Lebanon could not manage to enhance the overall security of its border in any significant manner suggested by the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team. The Syrian Government continued to deny any involvement in breaches of the arms embargo and the Syrian Army intensified its deployment along the northern Syrian-Lebanese border to thwart smuggling activities.
[328] Both countries decided to revive the study of the Joint Committee for delineating the common borders. The
Secretary-General strongly supported their intention to make progress on the border matter and expected its materialization in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed.

Lebanon.[329] Undoubtedly, these developments would help to ensure stability and progress in their bilateral relationship, thus promoting stability in the region as well.[330]

The issue of abducted Israeli soldiers and the Lebanese detained in Israel was also resolved. Following grueling negotiations between the UN facilitator and the two sides, a humanitarian agreement was signed on by Hezbollah and Israel on 2 July. The two Israeli soldiers who were captured by Hezbollah fighters in 2006 were repatriated in exchange for Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners that were in Israeli custody.

4.4.6. 2009, mutual violations across the Blue Line and parliamentary elections.

Overall, the situation in the UNIFIL's area of operation remained generally stable as the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon continued to hold during 2009. Notwithstanding this, a number of serious incidents and violations occurred across the Blue Line and in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani. These events reflected the continuing fragility of the situation and its potential to deteriorate.

In all these instances, the UNIFIL maintained close liaison and coordination with the parties on the military level.[331] It urged the parties to exercise maximum restraint, with a view to preventing a flare-up of the situation, and brought the incidents to the attention of the tripartite mechanism. Moreover, regular exchanges between the UNIFIL and LAF senior commands were maintained, ensuring a closely

[329] Both countries agreed that the embassies would be established in Beirut and Damascus by late 2008.
[330] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 October, 2008.
[331] Coordination and liaison with the IDF and LAF remained efficient. The UNIFIL Force Commander maintained effective relations with his counterparts, as well as with other senior Israeli authorities. The UNIFIL also continued with its liaison team with two officers at the IDF Northern Command HQ in Zefat. Meanwhile, the LAF maintained liaison officers at UNIFIL Naqoura HQ and Sector HQs, while the UNIFIL continued to have a liaison officer stationed at LAF HQ South Lebanon (Tyre).

coordinated strategic approached to the activities of the two forces.[332] During the periods of heightened security alerts, the UNIFIL and LAF also further intensified their coordination and operational activities. In addition, the Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon maintained close contact with the parties at the diplomatic and political level and sought to address acute instances of tension. Undoubtedly, the UNIFIL continued to play a crucial role in ensuring peace and stability in southern Lebanon, as well as full respect for the Blue Line. Sporadic incidents and violations were promptly addressed through the liaison and coordination arrangements between the UNIFIL and the parties. Monthly tripartite meetings, chaired by the Force Commander with senior representatives of the LAF and the IDF, continued to be a critical element of the UNIFIL liaison and coordination effort in order to identify and address security and military operational issues with said parties and reinforce the cessation of hostilities. Violations were discussed and the UNIFIL made available to the parties its investigation reports regarding the incidents.[333]

As of 18 February, 2009, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 12,560 personnel with around 1,000 civilian staff members.[334] The Danish Government agreed to deploy a multirole logistical company to the UNIFIL to replace that of Poland. Moreover, one company each from Indonesia and Nepal were to be deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations in December. Meanwhile, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued its dual mandate of carrying out maritime interdiction operations to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related material, as well as training the Lebanese Navy. However, the Maritime Task Force was reduced from 12

[332] LAF deployment in the UNIFIL area of operations remained unchanged, comprising of three brigades with a strength of approximately 5,000 troops. In addition, the LAF provided control north of the Litani over access points to the UNIFIL zone.
[333] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 2 November 2009.
[334] Report of the Secretary-General on the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 3 March 2009.

to nine vessels since December, 2008.[335] Since the beginning of its mission in October 2006, the Maritime Task Force hailed and queried over 27,800 ships in its area of operation.[336] Lebanese Navy and Customs officials inspected the vessels to verify there were no unauthorized arms or related material on board. The Lebanese Navy continued to contribute to the maritime interdiction operations inside its territorial waters, while the Maritime Task Force assumed a monitoring role.[337]

On 7 June 2009, parliamentary elections were held in a free and fair manner in Lebanon with international and local observers. According to official results, the 14 March Alliance won 71 seats while the 8 March Alliance won 57 seats.[338] President Sleiman nominated Saad Hariri, the leader of the parliamentary majority as Prime Minister. However, the failure to reach an agreement on a power-sharing formula between majority / minority for the formation of a government of national unity prompted Mr. Hariri to resign on 10 September. The President re-designated Mr. Hariri Prime Minister on 15 September. After long-running consultations and negotiations, the Lebanese legislature endorsed the Hariri Government. On 19 December, Prime Minister Hariri made his first visit to Damascus where he met President Al-Assad for extensive talks. Both sides emphasized a clean slate and the summit marked an important milestone in the normalization of relations between the two nations.[339]

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[335] It was comprised of two frigates, three corvettes, three patrol boats, and one support vessel.
[336] 78 inspections conducted on vessels were identified as suspicious.
[337] The maritime contributor nations assumed the leadership of the Maritime Task Force for three-month periods, since EUROMARFOR ended its one-year term on 28 February, 2009. Italy handed over the leadership of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to Germany in late-August.
[338] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 21 October, 2009.
[339] Lebanon and Syria completed the establishment of full diplomatic relations and both countries begun to operate embassies in each other's capital for the first time since their independence.

4.4.7. Continued Israeli violations against Lebanese sovereignty.

Despite the overall calm, a number of violations of Lebanese sovereignty and UNSC Res.No.1701 occurred during the year. The IDF continued its occupation of the northern part of Ghajar Village and an adjacent plot of land of the Blue Line. Furthermore, daily intrusions of Israeli aircraft and UAVs into Lebanese airspace continued at a high level. The UNIFIL and Lebanese Government protested these over-flights after every instance.[340] There were also several minor ground violations of the Blue Line and incidents, mainly by Lebanese shepherds who unintentionally crossed the Blue Line accompanied by their livestock. These continuing ground violations by the locals underlined the importance of the visible marking of the Blue Line. UNIFIL continued to make steady progress in marking the Blue Line with the LAF and IDF.[341] Meanwhile, work continued on the LAF project to build a road parallel to the Blue Line with UNIFIL engineering assets providing supports. Construction work commenced on four of the 11 connecting road links. It was expected that demining and construction work on the 11 links would take two years to complete. The eventual completion of this road project would provide the UNIFIL and LAF with increased access and mobility along the Blue Line.

Although the stance of the locals towards the UNIFIL remained generally positive, some incidents showed the continued importance of the Force's Public Information activities. The public outreach sought to engage the press and local communities and to ensure their understanding of the UNIFIL mandate and its daily operational activities. While the UNIFIL managed to exercise the freedom of movement through its area of operation, its patrols were temporarily stopped by local

[340] The Israeli Government maintained that the over-flights were necessary security measures, citing an alleged lack of enforcement of the arms embargo.
[341] The parties agreed to mark the line in four sectors totaling 40 kms. The UNIFIL demining teams supported this project by clearing minefields and unexploded ordnance along the Blue Line.

civilians attempting to hinder UNIFIL movement in pursuing civilians carrying hunting rifles.[342] However, these kind of incidents were brief and resolved with the assistance of the LAF. There were also a number of instances of Lebanese civilians, mostly children and youths, throwing rocks at UNIFIL patrols.[343]

A series of explosions went off in the early morning of 14 July, 2009, near Khirbat Silim, northeast of Tibnin in Sector West of the UNIFIL zone. Findings of an investigation conducted by the UNIFIL in coordination with the LAF indicated they were caused by the deflagration of stored ammunition. A number of indications suggested the depot was under the control of the Hezbollah and that it was not abandoned but rather actively maintained.[344] It was clear these kinds of unauthorized assets and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani constituted a serious threat to the stability of Lebanon. Another incident occurred on 12 October, when a fire possibly caused by an explosion broke out in a residential building in the village of Tay Falsay. These incidents highlighted the importance of intensifying the efforts of the LAF, assisted by the UNIFIL, to discover and remove weapons and related material that might still be present in the area; to ensure no armed elements remained in the area; and to prevent the possible smuggling of weapons across the Litani.

Tensions in the area shot up suddenly with two consecutive rocket attacks. On 11 September 2009, two rockets launched across the Blue Line near the village of Al-Qulaylah, six km. south of Tyre landed in an agricultural area near the Israeli town of Nahariya. The IDF immediately responded with artillery fire directed towards the

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[342] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of - Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 2 November, 2009.

[343] After an explosion in a village, the UNIFIL investigation team, accompanied by LAF officers, was prevented by Lebanese civilians. During this incident, stone throwing by the civilians resulted in 14 UNIFIL injured personnel and 18 damage UNIFIL vehicles.

[344] In the aftermath of explosions that occurred on 15 and 18 July, civilians attempted to obstruct the freedom of movement of the UNIFIL by throwing rocks which resulted with injured UNIFIL peacekeepers.

rocket launch site. Neither the rocket attack nor artillery fire caused any injuries. The UNIFIL and relevant Lebanese authorities launched an investigation to identify and apprehend the perpetrators. The second incident occurred on 27 October when a rocket was fired across the Blue Line from the general area of Houla (East Sector). The rocket landed in an agricultural field to the east of Kiryat Shemona in northern Israel. The IDF responded with artillery fire lasting 25 minutes. The following day, the UNIFIL and LAF discovered the rocket launch site as well as four additional rockets at the site, but no suspects were identified. Consequently, the UNIFIL and LAF intensified patrolling, reconnaissance and search activities in the area of operation, focusing on possible rocket launching positions.[345]

Besides the UNIFIL's operational activities, its humanitarian assistance activities were supported by a number of new social media channels. The provision of humanitarian, infrastructural and capacity-building support, particularly through the activities of troop-contributing countries and the implementation of quick-impact projects founded through the UNIFIL budget continued to help build the locals' confidence in the mission and its mandate. In this regard, civil affairs and civil-military cooperation components undertook a series of environmental initiatives during the year, working in cooperation with international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations. The LAF also assumed primary responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian clearance operations as from 1 January 2009 through the Lebanese Mine Action Center. Coordination of the clearance operation in south Lebanon was managed by the Mine Action Center from its regional center in Nabatieh. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center worked in support of UNIFIL clearance and explosive ordnance disposal assets and as a liaison between the

[345] With regard to the rocket attacks, the UNIFIL was not in a position to determine from the available evidence whether the rockets were smuggled into o already present in the area of operation.

Lebanese Mine Action Center and the UNIFIL.[346] The UN Mine Action Coordination Center maintains to liaise between the UNIFIL and Regional Center. During 2009, 14 additional cluster bomb strike locations were identified on the ground, with the total number of locations to date registered at 10,876. Strike site data was received from Israel in May, 2009 which indicated 282 potential strike locations were not previously identified.

There was no tangible progress with respect to disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon. As events demonstrated in May 2008, armed groups and militias posed a serious threat to the sovereignty and stability of the Lebanese state. They created an atmosphere of intimidation incompatible with the conduct of a state's normal democratic process. The Hezbollah maintained a substantial paramilitary capacity and infrastructure separated from the state. The continual presence of the Damascus-headquartered PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifadah, outside the refugee camps posed a threat to the Lebanon's stability and sovereignty. Therefore, it was essential for the Lebanese Government to dismantle and disarm Palestinian groups outside the refugee camps. Despite the agreement reached at the National Dialogue session of 2006 that outside Palestinian camps would be disarmed, there had not been any progress made towards disarming of Palestinian militia groups. The PLO leadership reiterated its call for Palestinians in Lebanon to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and its law and security requirements. However, some Palestinian refugee camps continued to provide safe haven for those who sought to escape the authority of the state.

[346] In April 2009, the UN Mine Action Coordination Center relocated from its base in Tyre to Naqoura to better support UNIFIL.

4.4.8. 2010, Enhanced cooperation between the UNIFIL and LAF, and the concern over Hezbollah's Military Arsenal.

Though there remained a degree of tension, the situation in early-2010 between Lebanon and Israel remained stable, with no overt confrontation or conflict. The overall situation in the area of UNIFIL's operation remained stable and the cessation of hostilities continued to hold.

The IDF continued their occupation of the northern part of Ghajar village and an adjacent area of land north of the Blue Line during the year. Intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and UAVs continued almost daily, violating Lebanese sovereignty and Res.No.1701. These over-flights inherently escalated tension and increased the possibility of security incidents, as demonstrated a few times when the LAF opened fire on Israeli aircraft intruding in Lebanese airspace.[347] Meanwhile, violations of the Blue Line by Lebanese shepherds, especially in the vicinity of the Shaba farms area and the village of Ghajar, owed to the lack of evidence on the ground and contradictory statements by the parties.[348]

The UNIFIL and LAF expanded their coordinated activities and enhanced cooperation to control the area of operations. Both forces maintained their installations and continued daily operational activities, including UNIFIL helicopter patrols. The two forces continued operating joint checkpoints along the Litani, as well as at other randomly selected locations in the area of operation.[349] They also conducted an average of 15 anti-rocket-launching operations a day and daily

[347] The Lebanese Government also protested against the air violations and demanded that they stop without delay. Meanwhile, the Israeli Government maintained that the over-flights were necessary security measures and the implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions.
[348] The marking the Blue Line continued in four sectors totaling 36 km. 40 markers were installed and 23 were under construction. The UNIFIL demining team supported this marking project by clearing minefields to allow access for measuring coordinates and the construction of Blue Line markers.
[349] In response to occasional heightened security alerts, the two forces intensified their cooperation and coordination activities. This included increased troop presence in sensitive areas, as well as intensified anti-rocket-launching activities.

coordinated foot patrols along the Blue Line. The UNIFIL continued to assist the LAF in establishing an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani. Both forces continued to take intensive, coordinated measures specifically aimed at ensuring there were no armed elements in the area, discovering and removing any weapons and related material possibly present, and preventing the probable smuggling of weapons across the Litani.

The Israeli Government claimed that the Hezbollah not only continued to build up its military presence and capacity, largely north of the Litani, but also inside the UNIFIL area of operations using some private village cottages. In cooperation with the LAF, the UNIFIL immediately investigated any claims regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons in the area whenever specific information was received.[350] The LAF Command reconfirmed that it would act immediately on receiving evidence of unauthorized armed personnel or weapons in the area and put a stop to any illegal activity in contravention of Res.No.1701, and relevant government decisions concerning the illegal presence of armed personnel and weapons south of the Litani.[351]

During 2010, the UNIFIL and LAF conducted a considerable number of exercises. In addition, the UNIFIL and LAF land and maritime forces were involved in an amphibious and artillery exercises. The Maritime Task Force also continued to provide regular training to the Lebanese Navy at sea and on land.[352] Although the

[350] According to its mandate, UNIFIL could not search private houses and properties unless there was credible evidence of violation of Res.No.1701, including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location.
[351] The UNIFIL was neither provided with, nor found evidence of the smuggling of arms into its area of operation. Furthermore, the UNIFIL routinely checked previously discovered facilities of armed elements in the area of operation, including bunkers and caves, but did not find any indication they were reactivated or any new military infrastructure in its area of operation.
[352] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 26 February 2010.

LAF gradually assumed greater security responsibility in the UNIFIL area of operations and Lebanese territorial waters, it was essential for the LAF and naval components to receive critically required equipment and technical support.[353]

4.4.9. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force

The Maritime Task Force continued to conduct its mandate in the area of maritime operations. Lebanese Navy personnel continued to demonstrate their increasing ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations and control Lebanese territorial waters through the use of coastal radar. However, Lebanese Navy maritime operations were restricted due to the lack of vessels. Incidents along the line of buoys continued to occur, with IDF navy units dropping depth charges and firing flares and warning shots along the buoy line.[354] The IDF stated that these were security measures employed as a matter of procedure whenever Lebanese fishing vessels approached the line of buoys. The UNIFIL had no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which the Lebanese Government did not recognize.[355]

The presence of armed groups in Lebanon operating outside the control of the state constituted a challenge to the ability of the state to exercise full sovereignty and control over its territory. Their existence also highlighted the need for the Lebanese Government and LAF to exercise monopoly on the use of force throughout Lebanon. However, Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continued to operate in the country outside the government's control. The armed component of Hezbollah remained the

[353] At the beginning of August, the LAF increased their deployment level in the UNIFIL area of operations from three to four brigades.
[354] The IDF continued to conduct naval patrols inside the Lebanese territorial waters, along the so-called line of buoys that unilaterally installed inside the Lebanese territorial waters. Israel claimed that the line of buoys approximated the southern limit of Lebanese territorial waters. Lebanon did not recognize this line that was installed unilaterally and considered that action to be another violation of Lebanese sovereignty and Res.No.1701.
[355] Both parties raised in the tripartite forum the need for security mechanism to prevent incidents from occurring in the area of the buoy line.

most significant and most heavily armed militia in the country. In addition, a series of armed Palestinian groups were also operating in the country in and out of the refugee camps. The Lebanese Government also declared its commitment to implementing decisions taken by the National Dialogue in 2006 and 2009 to disarm Palestinian groups outside the refugee camps. The Secretary-General called upon the Lebanese Government to take measures to this effect. During 2010, there was no tangible progress towards disbanding and disarming militias, as stipulated in the Taif Accord and Res.No.1559. It was important the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon could be achieved through a Lebanese-led political process. In this context, President Sleiman chaired a new session of the Committee of National Dialogue on 19 August. The participants reaffirmed the importance of national consensus and the consolidation of political and security stability in the country. They committed themselves to the decision that had been approved by previous committee sessions, in particular those related to the disarmament of Palestinian groups outside the camps.

Some serious incidents confirming these challenges occurred in Lebanon during the latter half of the year. The alleged leader of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, Abd al-Rahman Awad, and his deputy died in a skirmish with the LAF in the Bekaa Valley on 13 August.[356] On 24 August, heavy armed clashes erupted between supporters of Hezbollah and the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (Al-Ahbash), a Sunni group that was a political ally of the opposition, in the Beirut neighborhood of Burj Abi-Hider. These clashes, which resulted in three deaths, including a senior Hezbollah official, rapidly spilled into adjacent Beirut neighborhoods. The use of machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades in the fighting provided a stark reminder of the widespread proliferation of weapons in Lebanon and

[356] He had been sentenced in relation to number of bomb attacks and killings over the past three years.

the risk that posed to the maintenance of domestic stability. On 7 September, tension rose in the Ain al-Hilwel Palestinian refugee camp, when a group believed to have sympathies for Al-Qaida publicly threatened to assassinate a local Fatah leader responsible for security cooperation with Lebanese authorities.

Although the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations was relatively stable, the most important and dangerous incident occurred when direct fighting broke out for the first time in four years between the LAF and IDF on 3 August, 2010.[357] This incident illustrated the fragility of the security environment across the Blue Line and raised the possibility of a serious escalation between the parties. On 3 August, an exchange of fire between the LAF and IDF occurred in the vicinity of El Adeisse, with loss of life on both sides. However, following this incident, the sides reconfirmed their commitment to the cessation of hostilities and implementation of Res.No.1701.[358] According to the UNIFIL investigation; while Israeli troops were cutting trees in close proximity to the Blue Line, LAF and UNIFIL personnel were immediately deployed along the main road in El Adeise. The UNIFIL called on the LAF not to open fire and proposed that the IDF delay work for a day and for the UNIFIL to carry out the work. However, both parties rejected the proposal of the UNIFIL as they immediately assumed combat positions, aiming their weapons at each other. When a Lebanese soldier fired into the air, an exchange of fire broke out, lasting around three hours. Another important point in this incident was that the identification of the Blue Line in 2000 was for the practical purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, without prejudice to future border agreements.

[357] Accidentally firing incidents across the Blue Line had occurred before. For example, on 23 July, shots were fired from an IDF position across the Blue Line in the direction of the Lebanese village of Ayta ash-Shab (Sector West). The IDF later informed UNIFIL that the shots were caused by an accidental weapon malfunction.

[358] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 01 November, 2010.

When the line was identified by the UN, the Secretary-General urged the parties to do their utmost to prevent violations of the Blue Line, to act with maximum restraint and to refrain from taking any measures near the Blue Line that could lead to misunderstandings or be perceived by the other side as provocative.

Except some minor incidents, the local attitude towards UNIFIL remained generally positive as UNIFIL CIMIC and Civil Affairs units maintained close contacts with local communities. The provision of humanitarian, infrastructural, capacity-building and vocational training supported through the activities of troop-contributing countries and projects funded from the UNIFIL budget continued to strengthen relations between UNIFIL and the locals.[359] However, there were a number of incidents when Lebanese civilians, mostly youths, threw stones at UNIFIL patrols. On 9 January, 2010, a group of civilians threw stones at the UNIFIL and LAF, causing damage to a number of vehicles in the vicinity of Dayr Qanun An-Nahr. On 3 July, 2010, Lebanese civilians restricted the UNIFIL's freedom of movement in the vicinity of the village of Tulin (Sector West). The repeated denial of freedom of movement of the UNIFIL and the subsequent assault on UNIFIL personnel and vehicles and the stealing of weapons, all prevented the UNIFIL from carrying out its duties and violated Res.Nos.1701/1773. The UNSC issued a statement deploring the incident of 3 July and the UNIFIL commander held meetings with the Lebanese political and military leadership, as well as with local leaders and authorities.[360] While the Lebanese Government issued a public statement supporting the UNIFIL, the Force commander received assurances the UNIFIL would continue to enjoy its freedom of movement in its area of operation.

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[359] Local authorities also expressed their concern about road and property damage from UNIFIL operational activities.

[360] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 01 July, 2010.

As for a liaison arrangement with the parties, the Lebanese Council of Ministers endorsed a strategic dialogue mechanism between the UNIFIL and LAF to set up a permanent coordination committee that would be granted the authority to seek assistance as necessary from officials in ministries, public administration and institutes on 21 September, 2010.[361] The new system formalized a strategic dialogue mechanism aimed at carrying out analyses of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of the UNIFIL in conjunction with those of the LAF, with a view of identifying LAF requirements to carry out tasks mandated in Res.No.1701.[362] In addition, the UNIFIL and LAF maintained regular interaction at the operational and tactical levels. This included daily liaising at relevant levels by means of a LAF liaison officer at LAF headquarters for the South Litani Sector in Tyre. The UNIFIL and IDF also maintained regular and efficient liaison and coordination. The UNIFIL Force Commander maintained effective relations with his Israeli Defense Force counterpart and other senior Israeli authorities. The UNIFIL continued to place liaison officers at the IDF Northern Command HQ.[363]

While delineation and demarcation of the border was a bilateral issue between Lebanon and Syria, such delineation was also necessary to enable Lebanon resume a position to extend its control and exercise full sovereignty over all of its territory. Meanwhile, UNSC Res.Nos.1701/1680 requested the Lebanese Government to delineate the common border, a critical element in guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity. Nonetheless, no progress was made on the delineation of the

[361] Prior to this decision, the UNIFIL and LAF held premium meetings at the operational level focusing on how to further reinforce cooperation between joint deployments south of the Litani.
[362] The strategic dialogue aimed to identify the LAF requirements for implementing tasks mandated in Res.No.1701, and facilitate the gradual transfer of responsibilities from UNIFIL to the LAF.
[363] However, no progress was made in establishing a UNIFIL Office in Tel Aviv yet.

borders between Syria and Lebanon, particularly in the area of Shaba Farms, during 2010. Syrian officials continued to affirm their recognition that the Shaba Farms area was Lebanese, but they insisted that Israel must withdraw from there before the border could be delineated in that area. Despite the Secretary-General's repeated request, Israel did not respond on this issue and continued to occupy this area.

4.4.10. 2011, roadside bomb attacks on UNIFIL convoys and the formation of a new government.

As on 31 October 2011, total military strength of the UNIFIL was 12,500. The force had also over 1,000 civilian staff members and was supported by 53 military observers from UNTSO.[364] The Irish battalion completed its deployment in late-June and reached full operational capability within its area of responsibility. That deployment enabled the French battalion to complete its merger into the Force Commander's reserve, which became an important asset at the disposal of the UNIFIL Commander. Additional military personnel from Malaysia were deployed in October. The Danish multirole logistic company would be replaced in November by an Austrian multirole logistics company. An additional Indonesian vessel joined the maritime task force in October, and Brazil would deploy a flagship to the maritime task force by mid-November.[365]

In 2011, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained generally stable. Both parties maintained the cessation of hostilities and contained any incidents through established security arrangements, particularly via the UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanism. However, sporadic tensions and incidents occurred in the meantime. On 15 May, the most deadly incident in the Blue Line occurred when the

[364] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 19 October 2011.
[365] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 14 November, 2011.

IDF opened fire against Palestinian demonstrators that reached the Israeli technical fence in the area of Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon, killing seven civilians and injuring 111.[366] The LAF deployed in the area and tried to prevent the demonstrators from approaching the fence and Blue Line. The firing of live ammunition resulted in a significant number of casualties that was not commensurate with the threat to Israeli soldiers. Prior to these demonstrations, the UNIFIL reinforced its position in the area, but did not deployed its troops on the ground during the incident, based on the LAF's assessment and a request to avoid close contact with demonstrators so as not to potentially aggravate the situation. The UNIFIL conducted helicopter patrols, the LAF did not ask for UNIFIL assistance. While the IDF called on UNIFIL to intervene on the ground once the protestors reached the fence, the LAF insisted the UNIFIL keep away to avoid additional friction.

In preparation for imminent events to commemorate the anniversary of the 1967 War in early-June, the UNIFIL convened a special meeting of the tripartite forum on 2 June. The LAF decided to forbid demonstrators from entering the area south of the Litani and declared the area a restricted military zone. The LAF also imposed strict security measures by deploying along the fence between KafrKila and El Adeisse villages, particularly at the Fatima Gate. The UNIFIL ensured a greater presence of its troops on the ground along the Blue Line. Moreover, Palestinian organizations cancelled demonstrations along the Blue Line. On 5 June, there were two small gatherings along the Blue Line, which were swiftly dispersed by the LAF.

[366] Around 8,000-10,000 refugees participated in the event. While the majority of demonstrators commemorated the day peacefully at a site away from the Blue Line, around 1,000 protestors left the main gathering and, crossing through a minefield, moved towards the Blue Line and Israeli technical fence. At the fence, they unearthed anti-tank mines, threw stones and petrol bombs across the fence and attempted to climb it and bring it down. Following a verbal warning and firing into the air, the IDF then directed live fire at the protesters at the fence.

On 27 May 2011, a convoy of UNIFIL was struck by a roadside bomb in the main coastal road north of Saida, wounding six UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Italian contingent. On 26 July, another UNIFIL logistics convoy was hit by an explosion caused by a roadside bomb south of the town of Saida. Six peacekeepers serving with the French contingent were injured. This marked the second time a UN convoy was directly targeted in the same area in less than two months. No group claimed responsibility for the attacks, which demonstrated the persistence of terrorist threats against the UNIFIL, especially along its main supply route outside its area of operation. The UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities held several meetings to discuss the need for additional security measures. The LAF would reinforce its presence in key locations along the UNIFIL's main supply route and accompany all UNIFIL convoys north of the Litani. In addition, Internal Security Forces patrols would focus their activities along the coastal road, especially in the vicinity of Saida. For its part, the UNIFIL implemented its own mitigation measures designed to complement the measures taken by the Lebanese Government.[367]

On 1 August, a brief firefight between the IDF and LAF occurred while IDF soldiers conducted a foot patrol in the valley along the Wazzani River. The IDF maintained that its soldiers neither crossed the river nor the Blue Line at any point during the action. Upon receiving notification, the UNIFIL immediately dispatched a patrol to the site to monitor the situation and intervene as required. The Deputy Force Commander communicated with his counterparts urging the restoration of calm.[368] On 11 December, a rocket fired in the direction of Israel from the area of Qaysiyah

[367] The UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk management measures, and applied safety awareness training for its personnel and force protection works for installations and assets. The UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities continued to cooperate to ensure all security threats were addressed appropriately.

[368] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 14 November, 2011.

Valley (Sector West), at a distance of approximately 10 km from the Blue Line, struck a home in the Lebanese village of Houla, injuring a woman. On 29 November, 2011, two rockets were fired across the Blue Line from the area of Rumaysh (Sector West), from a location about 5 km north of the Blue Line, without any casualties. The first rocket landed near Kefar Veradim, the second one in the vicinity of Netua. The IDF immediately responded with artillery fire. There were also several ground violations of the Blue Line, mostly inadvertent, by Lebanese shepherds tending livestock in the Shaba Farms and Kafr Shouba areas, and by farmers harvesting olives in their fields near Blida. All these actions of inadvertently crossing the line led to a rapid rise in tensions in the area. The UNIFIL continued to work with parties to curb all such aggressive activities and urged them to exercise maximum restraint and inform the UNIFIL of any such violations.[369] Aiming weapons was another source of risk that could escalate tensions on both sides of the Blue Line.

There were a number of allegations being pointed, when required and possible, UNIFIL interposed its soldiers between the LAF and IDF to curb further escalation. All these aforementioned incidents demonstrated the situation along the Blue Line remained fragile and was likely to remain so until the outstanding issues between Lebanon and Israel were resolved in accordance with Res.No.1701. Meanwhile, it was imperative both parties remained fully committed to the cessation of hostilities; fully respect the Blue Line in its entirety; continued working with the UNIFIL on constructive confidence-building measures along the Blue Line, including visibly marking the Blue Line; and worked to strengthen liaison and coordination mechanisms. The parties must also avoid the use of live rounds in any circumstances,

[369] The concern continued in the area due to the lack of tangible progress of a visibly marked Blue Line. The UNIFIL urged both sides to overcome the impassé and to proceed in a constructive and pragmatic manner regarding contentious points on the ground.

except where clearly required in immediate self-defense. Meanwhile, there were also other actions that each party was obliged to carry out. For Israel; the withdrawal of its IDF soldiers from the northern part of Ghajar and the adjacent areas north of the Blue Line and the full cessation of violations of Lebanese airspace.[370] For Lebanon; exercising effective authority over all Lebanese territory and ensuring the implementation of government decisions and mandate of Res.No.1701 with respect to an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government and the UNIFIL.[371]

The UNIFIL and LAF continued to collaborate closely, and sought to further expand and enhance their coordinated activities. Both forces maintained their daily operational activities, including at least 35 coordinated activities per day and operating 70 jointly located checkpoints along the Litani. Although the UNIFIL generally enjoyed its freedom of movement throughout its area of operation, some incidents impeding the movement of the UNIFIL, endangering the safety and security of peacekeepers continued to occur.[372] The primary responsibility for ensuring the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel in their area of operation laid squarely with the Lebanese authorities. The Secretary-General called on the Lebanese authorities to take firm, resolute action against the perpetrators. Effective measures needed to be taken to curb and prevent all incidents that impeded the freedom of

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[370] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 01 July, 2011.

[371] The UNIFIL continued to provide assistance to the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons. However, the UNIFIL countered individuals carrying hunting weapons inside the area of operation. Some occasions, at homecoming ceremonies and funerals, several individuals were found to be carrying AK-47s or similar types of weapons, and shooting them into the air. The LAF and UNIFIL worked together to curb all hunting activities. This proactive action led to the LAF detaining several individuals and confiscating their weapons.

[372] On 26 June, near Shaqra; on 27 June, near Srifa; on 29 June, near Khardaly Bridge on the Litani; on 31 July, near Haanin; on 13 September, near Ayta ash-Shab, UNIFIL patrols and convoys were stopped and assaulted by a crowd of civilians. In some cases, UNIFIL personnel were slightly injured, vehicles damaged, and some equipment, GPS devices, cameras and maps were taken from them.

movement of UNIFIL and endangered the safety and security of peacekeepers. Despite these incidents, the attitude of the locals towards the UNIFIL remained generally positive. UNIFIL, CIMIC teams worked to mitigate friction between the locals and UNIFIL, and to ensure a timely response to any concerns or complaints.[373] As a matter of high priority, the UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures, ensured personnel safety awareness and other security training. UNIFIL continued to enhance physical security measures regarding force protection studies for installations and assets.[374]

Lebanon was left without a government during the first half of 2011. In six months leading to the formation of the new government by Prime Minister Mikati, political polarization deepened and Lebanon grew increasingly susceptible to regional political tumult, especially that which transpired in Syria.[375] The absence of political authority generated institutional paralysis and a deterioration of security condition in the country. In addition, it halted the process for the implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. However, Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced the formation of a new government on 13 June, composed of 30 ministers, a majority of which were members of the 8 March Alliance. Mikati's government won a vote of confidence in the Parliament on 7 July.[376]

With regard to disarming militia groups, the maintenance of substantial military capacity by Hezbollah and weapons by other armed groups outside the

[373] The CIMIC teams continued their regular liaison and activities, including a series of sports, cultural, and children's festivals with the locals during the summer holidays.
[374] UNIFIL continued to implement its own risk mitigation measures. In an effort to reduce UNIFIL traffic on the main supply route from southern Lebanon to Beirut, UNIFIL was using a UN-Contracted coastal vessel to transport military personnel and equipment between Beirut and Naqoura ports.
[375] Violent incidents and demonstrations of solidarity or protest in relation to the evolving situation in Syria began to take place in Lebanon. Some gatherings involved the use of weapons as demonstrated by clashes that occurred in Tripoli and Jabal Mohsen on 17 June.
[376] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 19 October, 2011.

control of the Lebanese state continued to pose a serious challenge to the country's sovereignty. Hezbollah continued to acknowledge that it maintained a substantial military arsenal for only defensive purposes against Israel. Meanwhile, despite a decision taken by the National Dialogue of Lebanese leaders, no progress was made regarding to dismantling military bases maintained by the PFLP-GC and the Fatah al-Intifada.[377] The security situation in the Palestine refugee camp of Ain el-Hilweh remained precarious. Heavy clashes between armed factions erupted in Ain el-Hilweh following an assassination attempt against the military commander of Fatah on 5 - 6 August.[378] Furthermore, a rise in the number of security incidents that occurred throughout the year highlighted the threat to Lebanon's sovereignty posed by armed groups. On 12 September, fierce clashes involving the use of heavy weapons occurred between militants of Hezbollah and armed Palestinians at the outskirts of Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut, leaving several people injured. On 19 September, 16 people were wounded in an armed clash that erupted between two local families in the Saida district.

The unrest and violence in Syrian towns since early-April, 2011 continued to impact Lebanon in different ways. The crisis in Syria remained a central and polarizing concern for Lebanese actors and had a significant impact on the political and security situation in Lebanon. Several thousand people fled violence in Syrian towns close to the border. The Syrian Army also conducted a number of cross-border actions, including shooting across the border into Lebanese territory, targeting individuals attempting to flee from Syria. On other occasions, Syrian troops

[377] The Secretary-General complained rightfully that under three Prime Ministers and two Presidents, there was regrettably no tangible progress on this issue.
[378] A school of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugee in the Near East (UNRWA) was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, causing material damage. The President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, visited Lebanon between 16 - 19 August and stressed Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had no need for weapons and must abide by Lebanon's domestic laws.

conducted incursions into Lebanon from both the eastern and the northern borders, some of which extended three km. into Lebanese territory.[379] On one occasion, on 4 October, Syrian armored personnel carriers raided the border area near the village of Arsal, causing substantial property damage. All these incidents occurred in areas where the border was not delineated or demarcated, or even under dispute in some places. Undoubtedly, the profound political crisis in Syria further hindered progress towards the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and Syria.[380]

4.4.11. 2012 regional implications and spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis.

In 2012, there was prevailing stability across the Blue Line and UNIFIL's area of operation.[381] However, the Lebanese Government expressed grave concern over repeated incidents of cross-border fire, incursions, abductions and arms trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border. Syrian Armed Forces were responsible for frequent incidents of cross-border shelling, incursions across Lebanon's borders, as well as an air strike. On 23 October, at least 11 Lebanese citizens were killed and more than 40 were injured as a result of cross-border shelling. The LAF reported intercepting weapons destined for Syria. Meanwhile, Tripoli remained a particular focus for Syria-related violence. Fierce fighting broke out on 28 July, 2012 and again between 19 - 25 August between the neighborhoods of a predominantly Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh and a predominantly Alawite Jebel Mohsen left at least 18 people dead and over 80 injured. The Lebanese Security Forces adopted a more robust posture and deployed to contain the violence and restore order in Tripoli.

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[379] These incursions and ongoing political and human rights crises brought the potential of igniting further tensions inside Lebanon.

[380] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 14 November, 2011.

[381] The few minor incidents along the Blue Line were handled effectively through UNIFIL liaison and coordination channels.

On 27 September, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon met with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati in New York. They emphasized the need to preserve the security and stability of Lebanon in the light of the regional implications and spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis. Prime Minister Mikati highlighted the need for greater international support to help Lebanon provide the necessary humanitarian assistance to growing number of refugees from Syria.[382] Meanwhile, the number of Syrian refugees seeking assistance in Lebanon rose sharply owing to the incidents of domestic violence in Syria. As at 23 October, UNHCR estimated that more than 100,000 Syrian refugees were receiving assistance in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the turmoil and violence also worsened the general security situation in Lebanon. Assassinations and terrorist attacks against Lebanese political and religious figures continued to prevail.[383] Considering the relatively calm situation in the UNIFIL area of operations, the LAF had to redeploy an additional three battalions to the affected areas outside the UNIFIL zone, owing to developments elsewhere in Lebanon.[384]

The UNIFIL worked with both parties to prevent violations of the Blue Line, using its liaison and coordination arrangements. The UNIFIL called on the LAF to increase its presence and monitoring activities, reminding both parties they were obliged to prevent all violations that arose on their side of the Blue Line.[385] Meanwhile, the Blue Line marking was perceived as a valuable confidence-building

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[382] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 14 November, 2012.

[383] On 19 October, Lebanon was shaken by a terrorist attack which killed Brigadier-General Wissam al-Hassan, the Head of Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces, responsible for investigating domestic and external terrorism and espionage and ensuring the security of prominent political figures. The UNSC strongly condemned the attack and demanded an immediate end to the use of violence against political figures. This political assassination led to an outburst of serious violence and called for the government to resign. General Hassan's death triggered further fighting in Tripoli, leaving at least 7 dead and over 20 injured.

[384] At that time, the strength of the LAF in the UNIFIL zone was approximately two brigades and one battalion. However, the UNIFIL maintained full security control of its area of operation by increasing its operational activities, including its patrols.

[385] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 28 February, 2012

tool, and the way to provide clarity to troops on the ground and the locals about the precise location of the Blue Line.[386] Steady progress was made in the process of visibly marking the Blue Line and both parties agreed that marking in the Meiss al-Jabal area was a priority.[387]

The UNIFI strength was around 11,500 in early-2012. Portugal and Timor-Leste personnel finalized their withdrawals from the UNIFIL by late-June. Spain withdrew its mine-clearance team capabilities and intended to progressively draw down its contribution to the UNIFIL. Following the withdrawal of a German supply ship in July, the total strength of the Maritime Task Force, currently operating with a Brazilian flagship, was eight vessels and two helicopters.[388]

The situation in the UNIFIL's area of operation remained cautiously calm and stable. As the LAF deployed some troops from south of the Litani sector to reinforce its efforts along the northeastern border, the UNIFIL increased operational activities in its area.[389] Both parties welcomed the general calm that continued to prevail along the Blue Line. For the parties to sustain the prevailing quiet, it was essential to avoid provocative actions and inflammatory rhetoric, to exercise utmost restraint and to prevent hostile activity from being initiated from their respective territory.[390] Meanwhile, the stability and calm along the Blue Line was of mutual interest for both parties, as they took advantage of the security environment established through the

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[386] However, the IDF continued its occupation of the northern part of the village of Ghajar, and made daily intrusions into Lebanese airspace, which were absolute violations of Lebanese sovereignty, as well as Res.No.1701.

[387] As of October 2012, the total number of points for marking stood at 257. UNIFIL deminers cleared access to 228 points. Some 150 markers were constructed and 138 verified by both parties.

[388] The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out its dual mandate of conducting maritime interdiction operations and training the Lebanese naval forces.

[389] However, the LAF assured the UN that this was a temporary measure and that the troops would be sent back to the South as soon as the situation allowed.

[390] For a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution, major obligations must be demonstrated by each party. Israel had to withdraw its forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and cease all violations of Lebanese airspace. Lebanon must also make further progress towards exercising effective authority over all Lebanese territory, preventing the use of that territory for hostile activities.

work of the UNIFIL and LAF.[391] As the Secretary-General repeatedly noted that the security and stability of Lebanon were also closely linked to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. They were also heavily dependent on other regional developments, including those relating to the crisis in Syria.[392]

The UNIFIL generally enjoyed the freedom of movement throughout its area of operation. Nevertheless, on some occasions, the UNIFIL faced some restrictions to its freedom of movement in its area of operation, which in some instances endangered the safety and security of UN peacekeepers. A group of civilians threw stones, blocked roads and confiscated UNIFIL's military items.[393] These incidents required the LAF's intervention to bring an end to these kind of attacks. Despite these events, UNIFIL relations with the locals remained generally positive. Regular liaison and outreach activities focused on conflict management and confidence-building measures and on providing community services. Following recommendations made in the strategic review, UNIFIL continued to enhance cultural awareness and conflict sensitivity through programs organized for peacekeepers.

The Hezbollah and other groups' arms outside the control of the state continued to restrict the Lebanon's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.[394] Hezbollah representatives repeatedly asserted that their arms

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[391] Nevertheless, unidentified armed groups attempted twice to launch rockets from Lebanon into northern Israel, coinciding with the timing of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel between 14 - 21 November, 2012.
[392] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 14 November, 2012.
[393] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 20 April, 2012
[394] On 3 October, three Hezbollah militants were killed and several other people were wounded as a result of explosion at a depot for ammunition in the Bekaa town of Nabi Sheet. That incident was a stark reminder of risk posed by the presence of ammunition held by non-state actors, particularly in densely populated areas.

would not be used in a first strike against Israel, but they threatened to launch rocket attacks on multiple targets across Israel in the event of an Israeli attack on Lebanon.

The maintenance by Hezbollah of sizeable sophisticated military capabilities outside the control of the Lebanese Government remained a matter of grave concern. It also created an atmosphere of intimidation in the country and represented a key challenge to the safety of Lebanese civilians and the government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The Secretary-General also urged Hezbollah not to engage in any militant activity in Lebanon and called upon the leadership of Hezbollah to disarm and limit its activities to that of a Lebanese political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accord and UNSC Res.No.1559.[395] According to the Secretary-General, the best way to address the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah, was through a Lebanese-led political process, although this process could not make enough headway until external actors ceased their military support to Hezbollah.[396] In this context, the Secretary-General warmly welcomed President Sleiman's effort to reconvene the National Dialogue and the 11 June Baabda Declaration, in which Lebanese leaders committed not to permit the use of Lebanon as a security zone, base or channel for the passage of arms and armed personnel to Syria.[397]

On 20 September, 2012, President Sleiman presented a paper setting out an initial version for a comprehensive national defense strategy, including in respect to the arms held by Hezbollah. The paper placed the strategy within the framework of

[395] The Secretary-General called upon the Lebanese Government and LAF to take all necessary measures to prohibit Hezbollah from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the state. Additionally, the adaptation of border management strategy which would enable better control of Lebanon's borders and prevent the illegal transfer of arms in both direction.
[396] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 28 June 2012.
[397] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 17 October 2012.

national and international legal instruments, including Res.No.1701. It highlighted the need to strengthen the LAF and looked for agreements around the principle of the exclusive right of the LAF to use of force and, frameworks and mechanism for control and use of Hezbollah's arms until such time as the LAF were so strengthened. As they agreed, the disarming and disbanding of all militia groups was a necessary element to complete the consolidation of Lebanon as a sovereign and democratic state.

Following the meeting, the Secretary-General encouraged President Sleiman and Prime Minister Mikati to implement decisions taken by the National Dialogue, such as the dismantling of Palestinian military bases maintained by PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada outside the refugee camps.[398] The proliferation of arms outside the control of the state remained a threat to domestic stability and public safety, as highlighted by the fighting in Tripoli in July and August. A foiled assassination attempt was made on Boutros Harb, a prominent Member of Parliament on 5 July. On 9 August, the former Information Minister, Michel Samaha was arrested for his involvement in smuggling explosives from Syria, as as part of an alleged plot against targets in Lebanon with the aim of provoking confessional strife.[399]

4.4.12. The deteriorating situation in Syria poses dangerous implications for Lebanon's stability.

The ongoing turmoil in Syria had affected Lebanon for over a year, increasing political polarization and concern that the unrest in Syria could have negative consequences for Lebanon's stability. The Syrian crisis caused a significant increase

[398] Meanwhile, the Secretary-General explained his concern on the situation of Palestinian refugees in the camps in Lebanon. He urged the Lebanese Government to improve the unremittingly miserable living conditions of the refugees, including easing their employment and donor members to support the UNRWA and its vital work in proving services to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

[399] Syrian General Ali Mamlouk and Colonel Ali Adnan were identified as suspects by a Lebanese military court in the same case with plotting to assassinate political and religious figures in the country and planning terrorist attacks.

in the flow of refugees into Lebanon.[400] Meanwhile, there was a significant increase in shelling incidents and incursions by Syrian forces, some of which targeted Lebanese villages along the border.[401] The LAF stated that it would not allow any party to use Lebanese territory for the purpose of drawing Lebanon into the developments of neighboring countries, and it renewed its determination to defend Lebanese territory and confront any violation.[402] The Secretary-General also called on the Syrian Government to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with the UNSC resolutions.[403] As indicated by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in his report dated 17 October, 2012, "it is imperative not to led Lebanon to be drawn into regional turmoil. Lebanon must no longer be used as a battleground for actors seeking to advance their own interest at the county's expense or to destabilize the region.

Following a meeting with Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati, the Secretary-General stated that effective measures would be taken in order not to draw Lebanon into the Syrian crisis. Because, deliberate attempts at destabilizing Lebanon by provoking sectarian conflict underscored the importance of continued international support for the Lebanese state and LAF to prevent the country from being drawn into regional events.[404] In particular, domestic tensions increased significantly across Lebanon between groups with diverging positions on the Syrian crisis, leading to armed clashes that resulted in deaths and injuries in the north of the country. There

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[400] As of 23 October, the UNHCR estimated it was assisting 100,000 Syrians refugees in Lebanon and estimated the number would exceed 120,000 by late-2012.
[401] From 1 January until 30 June 2012, seven shelling incidents were reported in northern Lebanon, against 31 incidents for the month of July alone. For the first time, missiles fired by Syrian warplanes hit a remote area on the edge of the Lebanese town of Arsal on 17 September.
[402] Both the Lebanese President and Prime Minister protested Syrian Army shelling and other violations at the political level for the first time throughout diplomatic channels.
[403] As indicated by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in his report dated on 17 October, 2012, "it is imperative not to let Lebanon be drawn into regional turmoil. Lebanon must no be used anymore as a battleground for actors seeking to advance their own interest at the county's expense or to destabilize the region.
[404] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 17 October, 2012.

were also credible reports suggesting involvement by Hezbollah and other Lebanese political forces in support of the parties in the conflict in Syria.[405] Meanwhile, Lebanon witnessed cross-border clashes and shelling, arms smuggling, an influx of thousands of refugees, deadly Alawite-Sunni clashes, and politically motivated assassination attempts which destabilized the country.[406]

4.4.13. 2013, Unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL Area of Operations continued to threaten the security situation.

Although the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations at the beginning of 2013 remained relatively calm, the rest of Lebanon was punctuated by high tension related to the Syrian crisis. Both parties continued to work with the UNIFIL to maintain the current calm, and minimize and halt violation.[407] Nevertheless, there were two serious incidents to note; a ground incursion on 7 August by the IDF north of the Blue Line and ensuing military action by the Hezbollah; and a rocket attack from Lebanon against Israel on 22 August, which was followed by a retaliatory strike by the IDF the next day. These incidents represented a serious breach of cessation of hostilities, which had potential to escalate. On 7 August, four personnel were injured in an explosion in the Lebouneh area north of the Blue Line. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the explosion. On 22 August, four rockets were fired towards Israel from a site southeast of Tyre in southern Lebanon, in the UNIFIL area of operations, two of which caused material damage at Gesher Haziv. The Abdallah Azzam Brigade claimed responsibility for the firing of the rockets. On 23 August, 2013, the IDF

[405] A number of funerals were held in Lebanon for members of Hezbollah killed in fighting in Syria in areas near the Lebanese border.
[406] Syrian shells landing in or close to Lebanese villages in the northern region of Akkar caused the temporary displacement of local citizens and refugees, material damage, injury and loss of life. Cross-border attacks occurred in the eastern Bekaa region. On 17 September, a Syrian aircraft dropped bombs in the Khirbet Daoud area near the Bekaa town of Arsal. On 5 July, an opposition Parliament deputy, Boutros Harb, was targeted in an assassination attempt in the building housing his office in Beirut.
[407] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 27 February, 2013.

bombed a site adjacent to the PFLP-GC base at Naameh, south of Beirut, causing material damage but no casualties. The UNIFIL took a number of measures aimed at preventing and mitigating any potential incident or flare up in tensions across the Blue Line that could be prompted by regional developments.[408] These incidents indicated there were still unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations. Lebanon and the LAF had to make further progress towards exercising effective authority over Lebanese territory, preventing the use of its territory for hostile activities, and ensuring the implementation of government decision and mandate of Res.No.1701.

Israel continued to allege that Hezbollah had built up its military presence inside populated areas in southern Lebanon and that unauthorized weapons were transferred into Lebanon, including into the UNIFIL area of operations.[409] On 7 August, the IDF provided the UNIFIL with coordinates of alleged Hezbollah military sites in the Lebouneh area. The UNIFIL shared this information with the LAF. In August, the LAF discovered 7 rockets and artillery shells in the area of Ra's Al-Ayn to the south of Tyre. On 21 August, there were reports the Lebanese Security Forces had stopped a truck carrying rockets into Lebanon. On 29 September, the LAF announced the confiscation of a truck carrying ordnance near Arsal.[410]

Meanwhile, the Syrian conflict continued to serve as the backdrop for violence in Lebanon, and there were some major terrorist attacks. The proliferation of arms outside the control of the state continued to threaten Lebanon's stability. An extended

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[408] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 October, 2013. The UNIFIL held a tripartite meeting on 28 August, which was followed by separate letters from the UNIFIL commander to both parties, in which he impressed upon them the need to remain focused on implementing all the provisions of Res.No.1701, especially with regard to preserving the cessation of hostilities.

[409] In response to these allegations, the LAF stated that it would act immediately to put a stop to any illegal activity in contravention of Res.No.1701 and relevant government decisions.

[410] Representatives of the Israeli Government expressed concern at the prospect of the transfer of chemical or advanced weapons system to Hezbollah, including surface-to-surface, surface-to-sea, and surface-to air missiles. Hezbollah denied allegations and said that it had no intention of acquiring them.

period of fighting which began on 19 May, caused at least 36 fatalities and injured over 200 people. Despite a pause in fighting, other incidents of shootings and grenade throwing in the city caused a further four deaths and injured others. On 28 May, three soldiers were killed in an attack on a checkpoint in the Bekaa town of Arsal. On 3 June, a Sunni Sheikh survived an assassination attempt in Sidon. On 23 - 24 June, armed clashes in Sidon between supporters of a Salafi cleric and the LAF left at least 16 soldiers dead and over 50 others wounded.[411] Between 29 June - 2 July, three people were killed and 10 injured in Tripoli as a result of a new cycle of violence between the residents of the predominantly Sunni neighborhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the neighboring Alawite area of Jebel Mohsen. Two bombing attacks occurred on 9 July and 15 August, 2013 in Beirut's southern suburb of Rouweiss, which killed at least 24 people and injuring more than 300. On 23 August, car bombs were detonated simultaneously adjacent to two mosques in Tripoli, killing at least 40 people and injuring more than 500.[412] On 21 October, violence flared up again between the Bab at-Tabbaneh and Jabel Mohsen districts of Tripoli, causing at least 16 more fatalities and injuring more than 50. These violent incidents were also a reflection of the widespread proliferation of weapons held by non-state actors and the significant threat such weapons posed to domestic peace and security.

The conflict in Syria continued to have a serious impact on Lebanon; in direct cross-border violence, in broader threats to stability and security, in the deeper political polarization of the nation and in terms of fiscal cost and economic and social

[411] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 26 June, 2013.
[412] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 October, 2013.

pressure.[413] However, ever since it began, the LAF played a crucial role in preventing violence and maintaining stability along the borders of Lebanon and within the country. The UNSC and the Secretary-General called upon the Syrian Government and all parties fighting there to cease violations of the border and to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[414] Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Syria led a sustained influx of refugees seeking shelter in Lebanon, with more than 800,000 refugees, of which almost 80% were women and children. Many of them lived in substandard accommodation and lacked access to basic services, including clean water and sanitation. Humanitarian partners started implementing a winterization program to mitigate additional challenges posed by colder temperatures. The UNHCR, the World Food Program and partners began targeting their assistance to the most needy and vulnerable, based on a recent vulnerability assessment.[415] Similarly, tensions stemming from overcrowding, competition for employment, rising prices and other factors resulting in part from the influx of Palestine refugees displaced from Syria continued in Palestinian refugee camps.

The continued involvement of Lebanese citizens in the Syrian conflict was a deep concern, including Hezbollah's acknowledged and high-profile role in the fighting there.[416] Such participation in the conflict in Syria had serious political and security implications. The Secretary-General called for all Lebanese parties to step back from getting involved in the Syrian conflict, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration. The Lebanese Government tried to find a way for preventing

[413] Cross-border shelling and shooting from Syria into Lebanon caused severe casualties and material damage. On 19 July, artillery fire from Syria injured a number of Lebanese citizens. Additionally, the air strikes by Syrian helicopters continued throughout the year. On 7 October, a Syrian Army helicopter fired at least four missiles near Arsal.
[414] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 13 November, 2013.
[415] This aid program called for more than $1.6 billion in funding to address refugee needs in Lebanon until the end of the year, of which 44% was funded.
[416] On 17 August, Hezbollah publicly acknowledged its involvement in the fighting in Syria.

a dangerous spillover of the conflict across the Syrian borders. Security incidents throughout Lebanon, including terrorist bombings, further highlighted the fragility of the domestic environment and the need for Lebanese authorities to intensify efforts to prevent the illegal use of weapons in the country, impose law and order, and prevent a return to impunity. Lebanon witnessed devastating terrorist incidents during 2013. On 9 July, a car bomb exploded in Bir al Abed, a mainly Shiite suburb of Beirut, injuring 53 people. On 15 August, a car bomb explosion killed 27 people and injured 363 in Roweiss, another mainly Shiite suburb of Beirut. An unknown group calling itself the Brigades of Aisha, claimed responsibility and threatened further attacks. On 23 August, two car bombs exploded shortly after Friday prayers outside two mosques in Tripoli, killing 26 people and injuring 825 others.[417]

Considering security, humanitarian and economic challenges in Lebanon, the formation of a new government became increasingly urgent.[418] Following the resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati and his cabinet on 22 March, 2013, President Sleiman appointed Tammam Salam as designated Prime Minister on 6 April.[419] Prime Minister Mikati and members of his government remained in office in a caretaker capacity while the new Prime Minister continued with all parties to form a new government.

Meanwhile, the UNIFIL continued to work with the parties to avoid any aggressive activities or violations which might cause the escalation of tensions in the area. In this regard, the tripartite forum remained the key mechanism for the UNIFIL and the parties to address security and military operational issues, including ensuring

[417] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 October, 2013.
[418] Success in forming a government and progress in preparing for parliamentary election in the coming period became even more important.
[419] After 11 months, the new Lebanese Government was formed under the leadership of Prime Minister Tammam Salam on 15 February.

full respect for the Blue Line in its entirety. It provided strategic-level liaison and coordination and offered a platform through which the UNIFIL could facilitate practical arrangements and localized understandings on the ground between the LAF and IDF that would remove possible points of friction, defuse tension at potential flashpoints, stabilize the situation and build confidence.[420] Meanwhile, the continued occupation by the IDF of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line violated Lebanon's sovereignty and bore a potential risk for conflict. Through Res.No.2115, the UNSC urged the Israeli Government to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with the UNIFIL and in accordance with the resolution. The UNIFIL was waiting for a response from Israel regarding security arrangements to facilitate the withdrawal of the IDF from Ghajar.[421]

4.4.14. 2014, the conflict in Syria, as the backdrop for violence in Lebanon: extremist groups affiliated with Al-Qaida, ISIL and Nusra Front attacked the LAF and Hezbollah.

Following a time of relative calm after the formation of the government, Lebanon witnessed further challenges to its security situation during 2014, including five terrorist attacks involving IEDs and car bombs that killed at least three people and injured dozens more. There were also at least 15 attacks by the Syrian Air Force on the around the Lebanese town of Arsal, close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. Cross-border shootings, shellings and rocket attacks from Syria into Lebanon

[420] The visible marking of the Blue Line continued to be an essential confidence builder that helped to calm tensions in some areas. Thus, the visible marking of the Blue Line progressed through the work of the UNIFIL and the parties.

[421] The UNIFIL proposed a plan for withdrawal of the IDF from northern Ghajar to both parties on 25 June, 2011. The LAF conveyed their approval on 19 July, 2011, while the IDF indicated the proposal would require the approval of the government .

regularly occurred, causing death and injury.[422] President Michel Sleiman maintained his calls for all Lebanese parties to disassociate themselves from the war in Syria and to respect their commitment to the principles of the Baabda Declaration.[423] Another political crisis on the presidential election emerged in Lebanon. Since the end of President Michel Sleiman's term in office on 25 May, 2014, the Lebanese Parliament did not manage to elect a new president due to a lack of quorum.[424] A prolonged vacancy in the highest office of the state brought about worsening the situation of confidence and stability in Lebanon.[425]

Despite the growing regional security concerns and a number of serious incidents across the Blue Line, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained relatively stable during the year. This stability was the result of the presence of the UNIFIL and existing liaison and coordination arrangements with the LAF and IDF. They continued their commitment to safeguard the cessation of hostilities through active engagements with the UNIFIL and their willingness to participate in the winding down of conflict and the confidence-building mechanism in a constructive manner. However, there were also other actions that each party had to take separately in order to improve the security situation in the area. For Israel, they included the withdrawal of the IDF from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line, which was long overdue, and the full cessation of Lebanese airspace violations, which exacerbated tensions in the UNIFIL area of operations and had the

[422] During the year, there were repeated incidents of shootings, cross-border shelling and rockets fired into Lebanon from Syria, causing a number of injuries and material damage. There were over 48 air strikes by Syrian aircraft which killed six Syrian and injured over 38 others around Arsal. There were over 45 incidents of shelling and 17 rockets fired into Lebanon.
[423] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 7 October, 2014.
[424] In accordance with the constitution, Prime Minister Salam assumed the power of the Presidency, in the absence of a President.
[425] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 26 June, 2014.

potential to trigger a serious incident.[426] Meanwhile, it was important that Lebanon made further progress towards exercising effective authority over all Lebanese territory, preventing the use of its territory for hostile activities and ensuring the implementation of government decisions and mandate of Res.No.1701 with respect to an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government and the UNIFIL.

Notwithstanding the prevailing stability along the Blue Line and in the UNIFIL area of operations, the UNIFIL was threatened by heightened tension in the area as a result of the outbreak of the Gazza conflict in July and August, 2014. During this period, nine rockets were fired from Lebanon towards Israel, of which six rockets impacted in Israel and the IDF responded with artillery fire.[427] In addition, there were two serious incidents in the Shaba Farms area (Sector East). On 5 October, a LAF soldier was injured by an IDF soldier in a shooting incident near the Blue Line close to a UNIFIL observation post in the Shaba Farms area. On 7 October, in the same area, an IDF vehicle was hit by an explosion of an IED south of the Blue Line, which injured two Israeli soldiers.[428] The IDF retaliated with artillery fire into Lebanon in the Kafer Chouba area (Sector East). In each instance, the quick intervention by the UNIFIL and positive engagement by both Lebanon and Israel through UNIFIL liaison

[426] By its Res.No.2172, the UNSC urged the Israeli Government to expedite the withdrawal of its army from Lebanon without further delay in coordination with the UNIFIL.
[427] The firing of rockets from southern Lebanon towards Israel created serious breaches of the cessation of hostilities. Israeli's retaliatory fire with artillery shells into Lebanon was both dangerous and in contradiction to the expectations of the UN in the context of the cessation of hostilities.
[428] Hezbollah publicly claimed responsibility for the explosion, which it linked to the death of one of its number, who was killed in the blast of an alleged Israeli monitoring device on 5 September in Adloun, in Lebanon.

and coordination channels helped to contain the situation and prevent further hostile activities.[429]

As of October, 2014, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 10,520, from 38 troop-contributing countries, bolstered by 880 civilian members, 56 military observers of the UNTSO.[430] The UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plan and risk mitigation measures and conducted safety awareness training for its personnel and force protection works for its installation and assets. Cooperation ensued between the UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities in ensuring that all security threats were addressed appropriately. Generally, the UNIFIL enjoyed freedom of movement throughout its area of operation. However, on some occasions, UNIFIL patrols encountered aggressive or unfriendly behavior from civilians. In two cases in Zibqin (Sector West) and Shaqra, the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was hampered and its equipment was confiscated.[431] UNIFIL continued bilateral discussions with both parties on practical solutions for specific areas along the Blue Line, with the aim of further mitigating tensions and enhancing security.[432] To that end, the UNIFIL and LAF continued efforts, through the strategic dialogue, to enhance coordination with donors providing assistance to the LAF to enable it to fulfill the mandated task under Res.No.1701.

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[429] In spite of these serious incidents, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of Res.No.1701 and working with UNIFIL to mitigate tensions and preserve the general calm along the Blue Line.

[430] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 5 November, 2014.

[431] Notwithstanding these incidents, the UNIFIL's relations with the locals remained largely positive. UNIFIL undertook regular outreach and liaison activities with civilian local authorities and community leaders. UNIFIL troops continued to provide medical, dental, veterinary and humanitarian assistance to the locals.

[432] The UNIFIL managed to make progress with the parties in establishing visible markers along the Blue Line as one of the Force's main confidence-building activities. UNIFIL and the LAF continued to carry out their coordinated activities. The UNIFIL conducted on average 11,000 actions monthly (including patrols, checkpoints and observation task), approximately 10% of which were conducted in close coordination with the LAF.

The impact of the Syrian conflict on the security and stability of Lebanon was unmistakable. On 2 August, 2014, following the arrest in Lebanon of a commander of a Syrian group affiliated with Al-Qaida, extremist groups, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Nusra Front, attacked the LAF and Internal Security forces in Arsal, which caused some 100 fatalities and numerous injuries when it was all over on 7 August.[433] The militants withdrew to positions in Arsal, taking hostage over 30 LAF soldiers and personnel from the Internal Security Forces.[434] The LAF and security forces were deployed robustly around Arsal to contain violence and to prevent further incursions.[435] Syrian militant groups also attacked Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa near the Lebanese-Syrian border. On 20 September, the Nusra Front claimed responsibility for an explosive device at a Hezbollah checkpoint near Khraibeh that reportedly killed three people. On 5 October, Nusra Front militants from the Syrian town of Assal al-Ward attacked a Hezbollah position near Brital, killing at least eight Hezbollah fighters.[436] There were serious clashes in late-October in Tripoli between the LAF and armed militants.[437] The LAF and security forces apprehended a number of suspects for allegedly preparing terrorist attacks and seized bomb-making material. On 28 June, the LAF discovered a cave in Fnideq in the Akkar region that contained explosive devices ready to be detonated. On 29 June, the Security Forces arrested three groups of individuals for allegedly belonging to cells preparing suicide bombers for attacks in

[433] The militant groups entered the town precipitating five days of deadly fighting with the LAF that ended with the withdrawal of the militants to the outskirts of Arsal together with a number of captured security personnel.
[434] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 7 October, 2014.
[435] On 5 August, a bus carrying Lebanese soldiers was attacked at Mallouleh and 7 soldiers were injured. On 23 September, a soldier was killed when gunmen opened fire on a LAF barracks in Al Beddawi. Two soldiers were killed by unknown gunmen on 9 October and 17 October, respectively.
[436] Hezbollah publicly acknowledged its continued involvement in the fighting in Syria. Other Lebanese participated in the fighting in Syria alongside the Syrian opposition and also for ISIL.
[437] There were also a number of clashes between the Nusra Front militants and Hezbollah.

Lebanon.[438] The heavy deployment of the LAF in Tripoli and the continued implementation of the Government's security plan in that city eased tensions, but there were serious clashes with militants towards the end of 2014.[439]

The incursion into Lebanon by violent extremist groups, report of arms trafficking and the movement of armed militants across the Lebanese-Syrian border highlighted the need of the Lebanese security authorities for greater capabilities to address such threats and to control the border.[440] The number of the Syrian refugees was over 1,125,000 in 2014, including 53,000 registered refugees in the UNIFIL area of operations.[441] Since the clashes in Arsal, there was a series of raids by the Security Forces on informal refugee settlements to apprehend suspected militants following attacks against security forces.[442] On 25 September, the LAF conducted a raid on an informal settlement near Arsal, during which numerous shelters were destroyed by fire. Although most local communities continued to provide sanctuary to Syrian refugees, tensions increased significantly in some locations, including the UNIFIL area of operations. Since October, 2014, restrictions on the entry of Syrian nationals at official border crossing were in effect. At the same time, the government took decisions to facilitate the renewal of residency from within Lebanon and, for a limited period, to waive fines imposed on those who were illegal or overstayed. The flow of

[438] The judicial authorities continued to charge and prosecute members of extremist groups. On 7 July, 28 people were charged with belonging to ISIL. On 14 August, the so-called Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade, which had claimed responsibility for a number of attacks and had posted inciting, sectarian messages was exposed as being a Twitter account run by an individual from Baalbek.
[439] The violence caused the deaths of at least 10 civilians, 12 soldiers and a number of militants. Over 90 soldiers and 60 civilians were injured. The LAF recovered three vehicle borne IEDs and various types of ammunition and explosives and arrested over 160 militants.
[440] On 14 August, the Lebanese Government approved a grant of $4 billion from Saudi Arabia. Immediate additional assistance for the LAF was forthcoming from member nations.
[441] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 5 November, 2014.
[442] The LAF continued to work robustly to contain threats emanating from extremist armed groups along the border with Syria. There was violence in and around the town of Arsal, including car bombs and attacks on the LAF. Lebanese soldiers and security personnel continued to be held hostage near Arsal by the Nusra Front and the ISIL.

humanitarian assistance to Lebanon remained substantial, but the shortfall resulted in program cuts.[443] The situation for Syrian women and children refugees continued to be extremely difficult. 82% of refugees were women and children, and vulnerable women refugees continued to be exploited through coping mechanisms for survival, including prostitution, early marriage and sex in exchange for assistance.[444]

4.4.15. 2015, UNIFIL's positive relationship with locals and its strategic dialogue plan with the LAF.

The situation in the UNIFIL area of operations and along the Blue Line remained generally calm, despite the tense regional context and following the serious breach of cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and

Israel on 28 January. 2015. Hezbollah launched several anti-tank guided missiles from the area of operation of the UNIFIL towards an Israeli military convoy south of the BL, in the vicinity of the Shaba Farms area.[445] Two Israeli soldiers were killed and several other soldiers and civilians injured in the attack. During the subsequent fire by the IDF into Lebanon, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed, and the UNSC condemned his death in the strongest terms.[446] The Secretary-General addressed the developments directly with both Prime Minister Tammam Salam and

[443] There were approximately 43,000 Palestine refugees from Syria. The restrictions imposed by the Lebanese Government continued since May, 2014, to result in the denial of entry to the majority of Palestine refugees fleeing Syria. Those seeking to transit through Lebanon often faced obstacles and delays at the border.
[444] The Secretary-General appealed to the international community to recognize fully the unique burden Lebanon borne in hosting the largest number of refugees from Syria and the need for sustained international efforts to assist them and to share the burden. Heightened tensions that arose in some host communities were a cause for concern, as was a serious shortfall in funding and the impact that it was having on program both for refugees and communities hosting them.
[445] Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack, which was in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike on the Golan Heights which killed 6 Hezbollah members on 18 January.
[446] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 27 February, 2015.

Benjamin Netanyahu, calling for a return to calm and for all concerned to act responsibly.[447]

The UNIFIL remained closely engaged with the LAF and IDF as events developed, urging both sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid any further escalation of the situation and restore the cessation of hostilities. This incident of 28 January and Hezbollah's claim of responsibility demonstrated that unauthorized weapons were present in the UNIFIL area of operations in violation of UNSC resolutions. The LAF had primary responsibility for ensuring the area between the Blue Line and the Litani was free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons at all times in accordance with Res.No.1701.[448]

There was a major terrorist attack targeting the Alawite community in Tripoli on 10 January, which caused a number of casualties.[449] Cross-border shelling and shooting from Syria into Lebanon continued, causing some injuries and material damage. There were also a number of airstrikes by Syrian aircraft over Lebanese territory. The LAF reported continued smuggling of weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border.

The UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plan and risk mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities, while continuing to provide security awareness training to its personnel and their dependents. Stringent security measures remained in force in a part of Sector East. The UNIFIL continued generally to enjoy freedom of movement throughout its area of operation. However,

[447] The UNSC expressed its deep concern on the 28 January incident via Res.No.2236 (2015). It underlined the risk that such events could lead to a new conflict that none of the parties could afford.
[448] In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL could not search for weapons in the South, and could not enter or search private property unless there was credible evidence of violation of Res.No.1701, including an imminent threat of hostile activity from that location.
[449] On 10 January, a double-suicide bombing reflected the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon. The attack, claimed by the Nusra Front, targeted the Alawite community of Jabal Mohsen and killed nine people and injuring 37 others.

UNUFIL personnel experienced a few incidents of obstruction of movement, including two occasions on grounds they were not escorted by the LAF. In addition, there were four incidents of aggressive behavior towards peacekeepers while they were conducting operational activities.[450]

The mission's movements along its main supply route to Beirut were impacted by armed clashes within the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein El Helweh during the month of August. The protests by civil society groups in relation to a proposed waste disposal site within the area of operation, the coastal road between Tyre and Naqoura was blocked by anti-government protesters on 26 August, causing some limited disruption to the Mission's movement. The UNIFIL liaised closely with Lebanese authorities to address related security concerns.[451]

The relationship with the locals largely remained positive. The UNIFIL commander conducted regular public outreach with local authorities, religious leaders, and civil society, and received consistent reassurances from local interlocutors of their determination to cooperate with the UNIFIL to keep the situation in the area of operation calm. The UNIFIL also continued to implement quick impact projects with local communities and CIMIC initiatives by its contingents.

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[450] On 5 October, 2015, a civilian vehicle blocked the path of a UNIFIL vehicle in the vicinity of Kafr Dunin (Sector West). They fired at the UNIFIL vehicle but it managed to proceed and reach a UN position. In other incidents, on 25 June, a group of 10 civilians in two vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Ayta Ash Shab (Sector West) and, during an ensuing confrontation between the peacekeepers and civilians, UNIFIL equipment was stolen. On 1 October, some 60 civilians blocked a UNIFIL patrol in Yatar (Sector West) and tried to forcefully open the patrol vehicle to search for photographic equipment. UNIFIL strongly protested all incidents to the LAF, asking for full investigation and recovery of any stolen property.

[451] The security situation in the Palestinian camps was relatively calm, with the exception of Ein el-Hillweh camp, where two people were killed on 18 June when fighting broke out between two groups. On 26 July, a prominent member of the Palestinian joint security force was assassinated in the camp. From 22 - 27 August, heavy clashes between various factions broke out, leading to at least six deaths and many injuries.

The parties continued to engage the UNIFIL at all levels in a constructive and positive manner and utilized the Mission's liaison and cooperation arrangements to safeguard the cessation of hostilities, ensure respect for the Blue Line and promote security and stability in Southern Lebanon.[452] The UNIFIL facilitated a number of planned activities in sensitive areas close to the Blue Line through effective liaison and coordination with the parties.[453]

The UNIFIL maintained its support of the LAF in the implementation of the strategic dialogue plan, which was an integral part of the LAF's capabilities development plan and complimented the efforts of the International Support Group for Lebanon. In that context, the UNIFIL promoted military assistance by international donors to the LAF in the UNIFIL area of operations, on the basis of their equipment needs for tasks mandated under Res.No.1701.

Meanwhile, the UNIFIL continued to facilitate regular tripartite meetings, which remained the only forum in which the representatives of the LAF and IDF met to address security and military operational issues relating to the implementation of Res.No.1701.

With Res.No.1701, the UNSC decided that all members should take necessary measures to prevent the sale or the supply of arms and related material. The resolution also called upon the Lebanese Government to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms. Israeli representatives consistently alleged there were significant ongoing arms transfers to the Hezbollah

[452] Despite the many attempts from the UNIFIL, there was no progress towards the establishment of a UNIFIL liaison Office in Tel Aviv.

[453] The UNIFIL liaised with the parties to ensure the smooth conduct of vegetation clearing works and repairs the technical fence by the IDF, which occurred in the vicinity of El Adeisse (Sector East) on 26 August. The UNIFIL also undertook the cleaning of the drainage channels near the Blue Line, aimed at preventing flooding of agricultural fields in the vicinity of Kafr Kela (Sector East).

across the Lebanese-Syrian border and that Hezbollah had amassed an arsenal of over 100,000 missiles and rockets, many of which were located in civilian residential areas.[454]

The maintenance of arms by the Hezbollah and other groups outside the control of the Lebanese state continued to restrict the state's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reiterated publicly that the Hezbollah had a substantial and sophisticated military capacity apart from the Lebanese state, which it served as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel.[455] Furthermore, the Hezbollah remained engaged in fighting in the Qalamoun region of the Syria, and acknowledged publicly its role in the battle for control of the Syrian border town of Zabadini.[456] Other Lebanese citizens were also reported to join groups that were fighting in the Syrian conflict, including the ISIL and Nusra Front.[457] The presence of these armed extremist militants in various parts of the country was also deeply worrisome.

With regard to the disarmament of militia groups, there was no tangible progress in the issue. Since the adoption of UNSC Res.No.1559 (2004), no specific steps were taken to tackle that crucial issue, which laid at the heart of the sovereignty

[454] They alleged the Hezbollah attempted procuring sophisticated weapons and stated that Israel would act to prevent Hezbollah from obtaining such systems. The UN took those allegations seriously but was not in a position to verify them independently.
[455] In a statement to the Security Council on 12 July, 2016, the Israeli Representative stated Hezbollah never stopped its military build-up and enhanced its military arsenal, asserting that the group now possessed more than 120,000 rockets and missiles. He further asserted that Hezbollah had transformed the villages of southern Lebanon into terror outposts by placing rocket launchers and strong missiles in civilian areas.
[456] No doubt the involvement of Hezbollah and other Lebanese elements in the fighting in Syria seriously jeopardized the stability and security of Lebanon.
[457] At least five Lebanese citizens were reported killed fighting for ISIL. On 5 October, an IED exploded in the Lebanese town of Shtura next to a vehicle carrying Hezbollah fighters towards Syria. The blast caused an unknown number of casualties.

and political independence of Lebanon.[458] Whereas several groups across the Lebanese political spectrum possessed weapons beyond government control, the armed component of the Hezbollah was the most significant and heavily armed Lebanese militia in the country.[459]

The maintenance of arms by Hezbollah and other groups posed a serious challenge to the state's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.[460] Several Lebanese groups and individuals continued to speak out against the maintenance of the Hezbollah's military arsenal, which they considered to be a destabilizing factor in the country and a factor that undermined democracy. Many Lebanese considered the existence of such arms as an implicit threat for use within Lebanon for political reasons.[461]

In addition, several Palestinian armed groups continued to operate in the country in and out of the refugee camps. No progress was made on the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. The existence of these bases continued to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the state to effectively monitor and control part of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

4.4.16. More than 1.000.000 Refugees in Lebanon.

Lebanon continued to host the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, with 1,168,000 registered refugees from Syria. In addition to the negative impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon's security and stability, Syrian refugees also

[458] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 7 October, 2015.
[459] Contrary to others, the Hezbollah continued to claim its military capacity and its arms served as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel.
[460] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 16 April, 2015.
[461] The Secretary-General repeatedly expressed his concern to Lebanese leaders about the serious risks armed groups posed to the stability of country and the region.

created a huge burden on the Lebanese economy. Conditions for the refugees in Lebanon continued to deteriorate.[462] Restrictive residency measures for Syrian nationals continued to prevent admission to Lebanon which exacerbated their humanitarian circumstances.[463] The UN continued its dialogue with the Lebanese Government on ways to facilitate the legal residency of refugees and access to livelihood opportunities in the country. Despite the new pledges, funding to meet growing needs remained limited, particularly as the winter season approached. Funding shortfalls caused a 50% reduction in food assistance to Syrian refugees.

Regarding the presidential election, many Lebanese remained concerned by the continued failure to elect a new president. The cabinet of Prime Minister Salam continued to govern within the constraints caused by the persistent vacuum in the presidency.[464] Though the parliament was called into session several times since May 2014, it failed to convene to elect a new president, due to the lack of a quorum caused by the boycott of the sessions by parliamentarians from the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah.[465] The Secretary-General explained his concern over the vacuum in the presidency which was responsible for weakening Lebanon's institutions and its ability to respond to the substantial challenges it faced. He urged all Lebanese leaders

[462] From the UN point of view, the host communities needed further support from the international community and refugees must continue to be protected against forcible return. The Secretary-General encouraged member nations, including regional donors, to fulfill their burden-sharing responsibilities by contributing generously.
[463] Approximately 70% of refugees were living below the poverty line. Refugees remained at risk of eviction from their dwellings and faced increased challenges in residing legally in Lebanon, making them vulnerable to arrest. They were forced marriages, survival sex and growing concerns relating to child labor.
[464] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 7 October, 2015.
[465] Talks between representatives of the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Forces did not move forward with respect to an agreement over a candidate.

to adhere to the constitution of Lebanon and to the Taif Accord and the National Pact, and to rise above partisan politics and act in the national interests of Lebanon.[466]

During the year, calm and stability generally prevailed in the UNIFIL area of operations and along the Blue Line, due in large part to the commitment and efforts by the parties in close coordination with the UNIFIL to maintain the cessation of hostilities and eliminate instability amidst the evolving regional security dynamics. However, the situation in southern Lebanon was fragile and the risk for escalation remained.[467] The UNIFIL further intensified its involvement in areas along the Blue Line aimed at preventing conflict and building confidence. The Secretary-General also encouraged the parties to redouble their efforts to find points of agreement for the visible marking of the Blue Line through constructive engagement with the UNIFIL.[468]

The absence of progress regarding the Shaba Farms area in accordance with Res.No.1701 remained a source of concern. Developments on the ground continued to show the potential for destabilization that came from not addressing that issue.

The occupation of northern Ghajar and adjacent area of the Blue Line by the IDF continued.[469] The Secretary-General reminded Israel that it had an obligation to withdraw its armed forces from the area, in accordance with the resolution.[470] He

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[466] Lebanese citizens and civil society held a series of demonstrations demanding efficient services, transparency, and more effective governance. In the wake of demonstration, leaders of all political factions and co-chaired by Prime Minister Salam and speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met on 9 September focusing on the issue of the vacuum in the Presidency. The dialogue between the Future Movement and Hezbollah continued, and contributed to calming of tensions between communities.
[467] Upon the request of the Lebanese Government, the UNSC decided to extend the implementation of UNIFIL until 31 August, 2016 (UNSC Res.No.2236)
[468] Localized arrangements on the ground facilitated by UNIFIL could help to strengthen the current calm and stability along the Blue Line, but local solutions could not substitute for a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the conflict, as envisaged in Res.No.1701.
[469] Without a doubt, the UNSC was capable of compelling Israel to end its occupation and to ensure that Israel withdrew immediately and unconditionally from Ghajar as soon as possible.
[470] By Res.No.2236, the UNSC also urged the Israeli Government to expedite the withdrawal of its army from Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL.

urged Israeli authorities to take steps to that end and encouraged them to make further use of the Mission's presence and liaison and coordination apparatus to facilitate a smooth and secure withdrawal from the area. Furthermore, Israel continued to violate Lebanese airspace on an nearly daily basis. Meanwhile, the presence of unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations was another source of concern.[471]

4.4.17. 2016, the Syrian refugees created a huge burden on Lebanese security and economy.

As of 2016, the UNIFIL comprised of 10,561 military personnel and 820 civilian staff. In addition, 48 military observers of the UNTSO were under the operational control of UNIFIL.[472] The situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained generally calm during the year. Tensions rose among communities in the Shaba Farms area during construction projects conducted by the IDF south of the Blue Line.[473] Prior to a protest, UNIFIL and LAF personnel engaged closely with the local communities to mitigate tensions and prevent incidents along the Blue Line. On 21 August, during the gathering, 100 individuals, led by a local Parliament deputy, crossed south of the Blue Line despite warnings by personnel from the LAF and UNIFIL. The LAF and the IDF personnel remained at some distance from the Blue Line.[474] Demonstrators returned north of the line shortly afterwards, without

[471] The Secretary-General called on the Lebanese authorities to take all actions to ensure that there were no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the UNIFIL zone.
[472] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 4 November, 2016.
[473] On 19 August, approximately, 200 individuals, including a number of journalists, gathered in the vicinity of UNIFIL position, South of Shaba village, to protest against works by the IDF to prepare a drivable track in the disputed Shaba Farms area, south of the Blue Line, which had commenced on 7 August.
[474] This sort of conflict was mostly caused by the uncertainty of the Blue Line. The UNIFIL continued its efforts with the parties to mark the Blue Line visibly on the ground.

incident.[475] Meanwhile, Israel continued its occupation of the village of Ghajar and there was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shaba Farms area.

Despite numerous meetings and parliamentary sessions, the presidential seat of Lebanon remained vacant for over two and a half years. The Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah continued to boycott parliamentary sessions.[476] Following a joint meeting with Prime Minister Salam in September 2016, the Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General and representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council in Beirut called on all Lebanese parties to enable government institutions to function effectively and proceed with the election of a president.[477] On 31 October, Parliament elected Free Patriotic Movement founder Michel Aoun as President of Lebanon, and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri was designated as Prime Minister on 3 November, 2016.[478]

1,035,000 Syrian refugees were registered with the UNHCR, including 48,000 in the UNIFIL area of operations as of 31 October, 2016. At a meeting held on 20 September, Prime Minister Salam highlighted severe problems posed by the refugee crisis to the country's stability, security, economy and public services, emphasizing that Lebanon could not cope with such an "existential challenge" alone.[479] Despite the

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[475] Most other Blue Line violations were committed by shepherds with their flocks in the Shaba Farms and Bastrah area (Sector East), and by farmers cultivating their fields in the Rumaysh area (Sector West). Additionally, Lebanese civilian construction workers crossed south of the Blue Line while laying drainage pipes and paving an access road to a well in the Blinda area (Sector East).

[476] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 22 April ,2016.

[477] In his address to the General Assembly on 22 September, 2016, Prime Minister Salam noted that Lebanon was undergoing a severe political crisis, the apex of which was the inability of Parliament to elect a president. He stressed that the crisis had led to quasi-paralysis of the legislative authority and to a slowdown of the work of the executive, and had negative repercussions on the state's economy.

[478] The Secretary-General urged all Lebanese leaders to resort to constructive dialogue in negotiating a compromise agreement to end the political and institutional crisis. He also called upon all parties to refrain from encouraging or engaging in any discourse that could fuel political or sectarian tensions at this sensitive time.

[479] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 21 October, 2016; The Secretary-General called upon member nations to renew efforts to support Lebanon in ensuring respect for its obligations under those resolutions as the best way to advance the country's

level of international assistance, self-reliance among the refugees was not achieved and they survived on the bare minimum, exhausting their limited resources.[480]

The UNIFIL generally enjoyed its freedom of movement throughout the area of operation. However, it encountered unfriendly behavior and obstruction of movement, predominantly in Sector West. In the most serious incident, during the night of 28 August, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a group of more than 40 individuals in Bint Jubayl (Sector West) claiming the patrol took photographs of the community. A standoff with the crowd occurred, during which the patrol was subjected to threatening behavior, and some of vehicles' tires were deflated. The situation was resolved with the assistance of the LAF. In another incident on 28 September, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol observed from a distance nine men in civilian dress, carrying cameras and wooden sticks, violating the Blue Line north east of Kfar Kila. These same men then ran towards the Observer Group vehicle, surrounded it, and damaged the car by throwing rocks and using their sticks.[481]

The relations between the UNIFIL and the locals remained positive and the mission regularly met with its representatives. In addition to holding separate meetings with religious and municipal representatives, the UNIFIL continued to implement quick-impact projects focused on improving access to basic services, facilitating the economic and social development of the local communities and

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long-term prosperity and stability as a democratic state. The Secretary-General encouraged member nations, including regional donors, to fulfill their burden-sharing responsibility by expeditiously implementing the disbursement of pledges made at the conference held in London on 4 February, 2016 and earlier commitments made at the Kuwait donor conference held on 3 March, 2015.

[480] More than 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon lived below the poverty line, marked by precarious food intake and nutrition and housing issues. Some 30% of the Lebanese population also lived below the poverty line and 10% were in extreme poverty.

[481] The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander emphasized to LAF interlocutors that the UNIFIL mandate required it to have freedom of movement throughout its area of operation. The LAF strived to ensure that the locals understood that UNIFIL could and had to patrol unimpeded on its own in the area of operation.

promoting the empowerment of women. Furthermore, UNIFIL contingents provided the locals with medical, dental, and veterinary assistance.[482]

UNIFIL conducted an average of 13,337 operational activities, in close coordination with the LAF, each month throughout the area of operation, including patrols, checkpoints and observation tasks.[483]The UNIFIL and LAF continued to conduct foot patrols in villages and urban areas, providing opportunities for regular direct contact between the peacekeepers and locals.[484]

4.4.18. The activities of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.

Comprised of two frigates, three corvettes and two fast patrol boats, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force conducted maritime interdiction activities and provided training for the Lebanese Navy in accordance with its mandate. The Maritime Task Force hailed 2,039 ships and the Lebanese authorities inspected and cleared 516 vessels during 2016. The UNIFIL conducted a total of 312 joint exercises, workshop and training courses with the LAF, of which 209 were conducted with their Navy, contributing towards enhancing operational capabilities and effectiveness.[485] The Maritime Task Force maintained a visible presence in the southern maritime operations area of operations to prevent tensions between Israel and Lebanon.[486]

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[482] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 22 April, 2016.
[483] The LAF maintained two brigades in the area south of the Litani. In the light of the tense security situation along the border with Syria, the LAF maintained a reinforced presence in the northeastern part of the UNIFIL area of operations, including Shaba Village and Arqub area. During the tension in the Shaba Farms, the LAF temporarily deployed reinforcements. As part of a rotation of troops in the Sector East of the UNIFIL area of operations in October.
[484] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1701, dated 4 November, 2016.
[485] İncluding maritime interdiction, the use of coastal radar, boarding and medical support, as well as mutual understanding of operations.
[486] The UNIFIL did not have a mandate to monitor the line of buoys installed unilaterally by Israel and not recognized by Lebanon or the UN. The IDF continued to carry out frequent maintenance activities at the buoys, at times with divers. On several occasions, IDF patrol boats south of the line of buoys fired machine gun or flares and dropped explosive charges to turn away Lebanese fishing boats.

4.4.19. UNIFIL's relations with Israeli and Lebanese authorities.

The UNIFIL commander was in frequent contact with Lebanese and Israeli authorities and facilitated two tripartite meetings for ways to explore concrete solutions to local sources of tension and contribute towards building trust between the two sides.[487] The parties also addressed activities considered provocative by the other side. A key objective of the UNIFIL's engagement, through the tripartite mechanism, was to assist the parties in finding mutually agreed security arrangements and confidence building measures to mitigate the scope of tensions or incidents in sensitive areas along the Blue Line.[488] Nevertheless, tensions occasionally increased in the vicinity of the Blue Line when the IDF conducted studies in the Shaba Farms area, south of the Blue Line, in August 2016. The UNIFIL immediately requested details on the nature, purpose and scope of the studies, requesting the IDF to allow time for coordination with the LAF.[489] These incidents were the result of unsuccessful studies for the delineation of the disputed borders of Lebanon.[490] The Force Commander remained in contact with both sides, with a view to finding an agreed upon and coordinated way forward, reducing tensions in the area on the Lebanese side

[487] The parties consistently conveyed and demonstrated their commitment to the implementation of Res.No.1701 and to respect and maintain stability along and across the Blue Line in the tripartite forum in bilateral meetings with the UNIFIL. During the meetings, the parties had an opportunity to address ground and air violations.
[488] The UNIFIL encouraged the LAF and IDF to use more proactively the established liaison mechanism to share information on planned activities and deployments, in particular in sensitive areas along the Blue Line.
[489] The LAF protested strongly to the UNIFIL against work which it considered to be located inside the nature of the terrain and change its features.
[490] In its Res.No.1701, the UNSC requested the Secretary-General to develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border was disputed or uncertain, including the Shaba Farms area. In liaison with Lebanon, Syria and Israel, the Secretary-General opened the "seven-point plan" of Lebanon for discussion but he could not take this issue forward.

and preventing incidents. The UNIFIL maintained an enhanced presence in the area and intensified its monitoring activities.[491]

The war in Syria continued to have a significant impact on Lebanese security and stability. Lebanon was under continuous pressure as the country faced a tense regional environment and needed to preserve itself from the impact on domestic situation. The Hezbollah remained openly engaged in the conflict in Syria, and it was reported that other Lebanese Sunni individuals also joined the Nusra Front and ISIL in the Syrian conflict.[492] The situation along the Syrian border remained tense, the LAF continued its operations against threats and infiltration attempts from armed extremists. Clashes with militants, including ISIL and the Nusra Front, concentrated around the towns of Arsal, R'as Ba'albak, Zahlah and Al-Qa'ah.[493] On 27 June, suicide bombers blew themselves up in the northeastern border town of Al-Qa'ah, killed 5 people and injured 19 others, triggering concerns about the risk of sectarian tensions.[494] There had been no claim of responsibility for the attack in a Christian village in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian conflict. Prime Minister Salam publicly asked residents to refrain from "chaotic self-defense."[495] The situation in the border areas remained fragile, with the LAF engaged in ongoing operations against ISIL and Nusra Front militants.[496]

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[491] The LAF also monitored the situation for preventing further violations of the Blue Line and maintaining calm among the population.
[492] In his speech on 24 June, Hassan Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah would increase its presence in Aleppo and remain engaged in the fighting there. He noted that it was not possible to separate Lebanon from developments in the region, particularly in Syria and Iraq.
[493] Hezbollah also continued to engage in fighting with ISIL and the Nusra Front in the border area.
[494] It was planned to incite the Christian community to take up arms in self-defense and stoke the fire.
[495] Although, a number of Syrian refugees were arrested in raids as the LAF undertook widespread operations in the area, Interior Minister stated that the attackers were not from among the Syrian refugees, and concerns regarding retaliatory attacks against refugees did not materialize.
[496] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 21 October, 2016.

Despite the continued robust performance of the LAF along the Syrian border, incidents demonstrated that the delineation and demarcation of Lebanese boundaries and border security remained the essential element for guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity.[497] The complex security situation along the Syrian-Lebanese border in the current circumstances, including continuing reports of cross-border fighting, and human- and arms trafficking, further underlined the urgency of demarcating the border.[498] As it was, the bilateral nature of border delineation progress on the matter remained an obligation of the two countries, in accordance with UNSC Res.Nos.1680/1559.[499]

The relative calm situation continued to prevail in the UNIFIL area of operations and across the Blue Line, due to the commitments and efforts of both Lebanon and Israel and their overall close coordination and cooperation with the UNIFIL. Building upon the continued commitment of Lebanon and Israel to implement Res.No.1701, the Secretary-General encouraged both parties to consider mutual confidence-building measures and steps that could help sustain the calm and stability that had prevailed over the past decade.[500] Rhetoric by any party threatening to use force would undermine the relative calm and stability over the years might exacerbate the risk of tension or miscalculation that could easily lead to conflict in the area.

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[497] In its Res.No.1701, the UNSC requested the Secretary-General to develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border was disputed or uncertain. The reactivation of the Lebanese-Syrian border committee, as suggested by President Assad, was a step in the right direction. However, this process was stopped after the conflicts in Syria.

[498] Cross-border violations of the Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity continued on the eastern and northern borders as a direct result of the conflict in Syria.

[499] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No.1559, dated 23 April, 2016.

[500] In the current violent and unstable regional context, the Secretary-General urged both Lebanon and Israel not to lose sight of the central objective of a permanent ceasefire as envisaged in the resolution, which remained the best guarantee for long-term stability.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah's open acknowledgement of possessing a growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons remained a serious concern. In this circumstance, it will be vital to ensure the national defense strategy and other outstanding elements of the resolution be addressed in the framework of the national dialogue.[501] Implementing earlier decisions of the national dialogue was also overdue, specifically those concerning the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and dismantling the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. [502] [503]

The Secretary-General expressed his concerns about the dangerous implications of the deteriorating situation in Syria for the future stability of Lebanon. The uncertainty of the direction of the Syrian conflict put Lebanon at a risk of becoming collateral damage in this regional crisis and made it all the more urgent to shield Lebanon from its impact. The risk of radicalization amongst segments of the Lebanese and refugee populations, combined with the availability of arms outside the control of Lebanon, posed risks to the country's stability.[504]

While the UNSC welcomed the effort of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including the UNIFIL, under close review, it underlined the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping

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[501] There was no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia groups. No political steps were taken to tackle that crucial issue, which laid at the core of the sovereignty of Lebanon.

[502] The Secretary-General repeatedly expressed his concern to Lebanese leaders about the serious risks armed groups posed to the stability of the country and region.

[503] The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continued to challenge the ability of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty over its territory. No progress was made with regard to dismantling the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada in the country. Their presence undermined Lebanese sovereignty and governmental authority and made the delineation of the border more the delineation of the border more difficult. It also posed a serious challenge to the effective control of the eastern border between Lebanon and Syria.

[504] The Secretary-General welcomed the Government's decision to work in collaboration with the UN to develop a national plan of action for the prevention of violent extremism in Lebanon.

deployment (see Appendix C: UNSC Res.No.2305). In Res.No.2305 (2016), the UNSC requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of UNIFIL, examining the structure of its military and civilian components and related resources, in an effort to ensure that the Force was configured most appropriately to fulfill its mandated task.[505] As pointed out by the Secretary-General, the political and economic stability of Lebanon was a matter of regional and international interest requiring collective attention, and the UNSC also consistently demonstrated to insulate Lebanon from regional crisis. It was also important that regional partners, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, to use their influence constructively in order to help shield Lebanon from the spillover of regional conflicts.[506]

[505] In that regard, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO) would consult with a number of member nations and troop-contributing countries, as well as UNIFIL, on the best way forward.
[506] As world leaders came together at the General Assembly to discuss the urgent issue of refugees and migrants, the Secretary-General called upon all member nations to bolster their assistance to help Lebanon cope with the impact of the crisis.

5. ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION

Some rules of the Conflict Resolution, as well as the UN Charter pertaining the UNIFIL operation commitment will be discussed in this chapter. Several possible answers to the following questions will be examined in regards to what may or may not be done to make it operate effectively. Other factors dealing with peacekeeping operation effectiveness, such as the will of the UN member states and particularly the determination and collaboration of the major powers of the Security Council, will be taken up in this part. No doubt, there are limits as to what can be done as a UN Peacekeeping Operation force in the Middle East, one of the most troubled regions in the world where conflicts of interest among the powerful states have occurred throughout history.

On the other hand, it is possible to say that despite the huge transformation world politics have been put through over the last four decades, one of the most difficult UN PKOs featuring all the Cold War and Post-Cold War era attributes, that of the UNIFIL operation, has yet to fully accomplish its objectives. In that case, the troubles experienced in Lebanon did not stem from tailoring the UNIFIL according to the new world order, but rather from the complexity of the problems surrounding a myriad of debilitating factors that have directly or indirectly afflicted the Middle East. The external interventions were another important factor that played a role in provoking, prolonging and ending the conflicts among the armed groups. To some extent, the UN could influence the external factor but was unable to completely control it. There were important factors beyond the scope of the UNIFIL that had a critical impact on the success of the peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon (Jett, 2000). In addition, problems were exacerbated by deficient support of the host nation and its lack of authority in the UNIFIL's area of deployment.

Many dangers to which UNIFIL personnel were exposed resulted from a discrepancy between its terms of reference (TOR) and the situation on the ground. The TOR included the requirement that UNIFIL "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence in fighting and ensure its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind." This requirement was based on the assumption that Israel would withdraw its forces and that the UNIFIL would operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. Despite constant efforts to bring about such a withdrawal, Israel's unfortunate refusal to commit to such an action invalidated that assumption ever since the UNIFIL came into existence.[507] The continuing Israeli occupation and the presence of pro-Israeli DDF provoked armed resistance by various groups in southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL's activities in fulfilling its mandate brought about a growing risk of confrontation with the armed groups that aspired to attack the IDF and DFF. While there were many sporadic attacks against UNIFIL troops not claimed by individuals or armed groups, intensifying attacks from armed groups against the IDF and DFF within the security zone posed even more worrying risks to the UNIFIL. Because there was overlap between a part of UNIFIL's area of deployment and Israeli security zone. Attacks by armed groups against the security zone almost always resulted in retaliatory actions by the IDF and DFF. This often included indiscriminate shelling of villages in the proximity of where the attack occurred. The risk for UNIFIL personnel was that they were caught in such formidable retaliatory fire.

Indeed, it was the subsequent invasion operations in 1982 and 2006 that put the UNIFIL troops in a difficult and perilous position. As it was, the UNIFIL was stationed in the area of operation where there was active resistance against the IDF

[507] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 18 September, 1986

and in which the latter was engaged in active countermeasures.[508] For that reason, the UNIFIL had no right to impede Lebanese resistance against the occupying force. Furthermore, the mandate did not include instructions to prevent this kind of legitimate right of resistance. Even in these circumstances, the UNIFIL properly did the best it could to limit violence and protect the civilian population. However, as a traditional peacekeeping force, the UNIFIL was powerless whenever either party was bent on confrontation.

There is a general consensus in the literature as to what makes up the key factors in the success of an UN PKO, identifying common interest among the conflicting parties, the political will to construct joint policies based on it, and the strong support for the UNSC's permanent members. In this regard, the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon can be criticized for the UNSC's failure to construct a mandate that addressed the problem and for the lack of political will of the permanent members of the Council, particularly from the US. The UN needed more US support for successful peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace building operations, particularly during the post-Cold War era. Without strong political will, support and adequate resources, the UNIFIL would be at the mercy of the conflicting parties. However, the UN faced an uphill battle in getting this support from Washington whenever Israel was a party to the conflict and did not respect resolutions put forward by the UNSC, asking the US to veto those resolutions. They were convinced that they had "the US veto in their pocket." If one of the conflicting parties disregarded the resolution of the UNSC, the result was doomed to failure whenever the other party executed the same action. While this continued insolence resulted in the degradation of the authority and

[508] Report of the Secretary-General on the UNIFIL, dated 20 July, 1996

credibility of the UNSC, all its resolutions were deemed ineffective and could not be implemented as required[509].

One of the most difficult issues facing UNIFIL troops under continued attacks in a hostile environment was how to interpret and implement the use of force as described in the mandate. After the incidents between the UNIFIL and various armed groups in which UN peacekeepers were killed or injured, the rules regarding the use of force were debated among UNSC members and the troop contributing countries (TCC). Some countries indicated a willingness to consider tougher rules of engagement (ROE) for the UNIFIL.[510] In response to the helplessness of the UN, the Lebanese Government also demanded a more dynamic interpretation of the use of force for the UNIFIL.[511] Similarly, the Israeli Government also supported the idea that a stronger peacekeeping force would be able to deal more efficiently with the armed elements in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, concerned that such step might bolster the possibility of unexpected confrontation between UNIFIL troops and Israeli forces, the US was opposed to this view. It could have caused the dangerous escalation in Lebanon and evolved the tense situation into full-blown combat, which nobody wanted. On the one hand, the reticent practice of the use of force could damage the UN's credibility, its reliability on the ground and humiliate UNIFIL troops. On the other hand, the use of excessive force might cause serious casualties on the other side, shifting the UNIFIL into enemy status, in which its peacekeeping role could no longer be carried out. However, the important point was that the UNSC should have

[509] Despite the reality that the UNSC is composed by the strongest military states, it is difficult to understand why its resolutions were ineffective against Israel.
[510] France expressed a readiness to strengthen the UNIFIL's capacity and it also stressed that this measure must be seen in the context of the security of its personnel.
[511] In his letter on 7 May, 1979, the permanent representative of Lebanon to the UN asserted that "in the light of the tragic experiences since 1978, UNIFIL should gave a greater military credibility." It also enable the force to discourage any challenge and prevent attacks on its personnel therefore UNIFIL would not be in a position of inferiority.

provided UNIFIL with the means of carrying out its mission with confidence. Furthermore, the mandate and the UNIFIL guidelines did not exclude more forceful action with regard to its right of self-defense.[512]

5.1. Was The UN Intervention Earlier?

The success or failure of a PKO can be predetermined even before the deployment of the force to the theater. As the UNSC Chairman stated, the following factors should be taken into account when the establishment of a PKO was under consideration: a) Whether a situation is likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security, b) Whether regional organizations are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation, c) Whether a ceasefire exists or the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement, d) Whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated, e) Whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably ensured (Jett, 2000, p. 37). However, the Security Council initiated the UNIFIL operation with great haste, without being provided with the aforementioned factors. This initial strategic mistake could not be rectified later and constituted a major obstacle to the political and military activities of the United Nations.

As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3 “Concept of Conflict Resolution,” some basic rules and circumstances for a resolution must be met to get a successful end in conflict.[513] Wallensteen (2004) states that:

> If the party feels that a chance of victory fades as time passes and conflict turns into a “hurting stalemate” for both of them, that means an appropriate

[512] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No. 425, dated 19 March 1978

[513] The conflict resolution is a situation in which conflicting parties resolve to live together peacefully, and /or solve their main incompatibilities therefore, they decide to stop use of force and violence against each other by an agreement.

> time for a resolution is imminent. They do not want to bear more destruction and sacrifice for nothing, hence this situation is likely to be a right time for change of their attitude from conflicting into conciliation. Nevertheless, parties in conflict cannot accomplish this transition process by themselves so a third party (the UN Security Council) involvement is essential at this point. If a ceasefire agreement between the parties can be realized, a third party will have more convenient conditions for conflict termination initiatives and furthermore, parties will have an opportunity to re-evaluate their situation in detail. (p. 46)

As it is understood above, the theory stipulates two particular components to determine the most appropriate time for the involvement of the third party in a conciliation process; losing the chance of military victory and facing a hurting stalemate.[514] From this point of view, it could be said that the fighting between the IDF and PLO did not reach its peak, therefore, UN involvement was quite early.[515] There was almost 24 hours between the US proposing it and the Council adopting its mandate and guidelines.[516] The establishment of the UNIFIL was rushed and its mandate was obscure and unachievable as well.[517] As indicated by Findlay (2002), "the hasty establishment of the UNIFIL precluded adequate, advance planning and a careful examination of the military and political factors which were necessary for the successful execution of the mandate and for precision in operational guidelines" (p. 106). Similarly, Diehl (1994) pointed out that "peacekeeping operations may be best suited for use after some measure of conflict resolution, rather than the traditional pre-

[514] If the success of the UN mission was depend on the loser's willingness to accept defeat, neither Israel nor the PLO could be expected to be a loser.
[515] However, there were other considerations the UNSC took into account for its early involvement.
[516] Skogmo, B. International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988, Lynne Reinner: London, 1989, p.55
[517] With the pressure from Lebanese Government and the US and helped by British Chairman of the Security Council, the decision to deploy the UNIFIL was unusually rapid.

resolution deployment" (pp. 105-106).

A peacekeeping force should be there for what had been agreed. However, when the UNIFIL deployed to the area of operations, there was no agreement accepted by the conflicting parties, whereas the UNIFIL found itself in the middle of a clash among the armed groups. Furthermore, powerful members of the Security Council did not take an assertive stance on the Israeli invasion and violence but merely deployed and supported the UNIFIL mission to the area as soon as possible. However, those same powers in the Security Council ignored requests from the Lebanese side to bring pressure to bear on Israel to fulfill its obligation to implement the relevant resolution in full.[518] In assuming responsibility of a daily peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, the Secretary General issued an implementation report to the UNSC by highlighting some important points for getting things in order on the ground. But the instruction on paper would not be able to correct this strategic fault made at the start of the UN operation.

Right after the Israeli military operation in 1978 in the southern Lebanon, the Security Council engaged in this serious conflict, which had a potential spillover effect in the region.[519] Within days, the council adopted the US-sponsored Res.No.425, which called for an end to violence, the protection of civilians, respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. Furthermore, it decided on the establishment of the UNIFIL for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its effective

[518] The letter of the permanent mission of Lebanon to the UN addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the UNSC, dated 28 June, 2010.

[519] It was seen as almost impossible to achieve peace and order in Lebanon without an interruption of the international community.

authority in the area (see Appendix C).[520] These resolutions exhibited how the Security Council had expectations to come up with a solution for this conflict.[521] However, some difficulties stemmed from the content of the resolution and mandate of the UNIFIL existed from the beginning of this PKO.[522] In addition, the UN secretariat hurriedly drafted the mandate without considering some essential conditions for the success of the peacekeeping operation.[523] First of all, it was not certain whether this operation was based on Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.[524] Despite emphasizing the threat to international peace and security, the resolution did not invoke the specific wording of Chapter VII (Findlay, 2002). Moreover, the UNSC failed to define clearly the UNIFIL's area of operations, therefore it was unclear who would prepare the ground before the deployment of the UN troops by coordinating with the Lebanese Government, Israel and other conflicting parties. Another important shortcoming was that there was no authority to commit to the role of 'Host Nation Support' in South Lebanon, the region where UNIFIL would serve.

Following the Security Council Res.No. 425, the Secretary General submitted his report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.[525] In the report, the Secretary General outlined three essential conditions that had to be met to render the UNIFIL effective. These could be assumed as indispensable factors for the

[520] It was adopted by 12 votes, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union).
[521] There were some important factors influenced the decision to establish UNIFIL. The first decisive factor was the unpredictable and disproportional Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. The other one was inability of the Lebanese Government to enforce its authority on southern Lebanon, which was dominated mainly by Palestinian forces at that time.
[522] There was no such an agreement on which all the conflicting parties agreed; no consensus among the parties to commit their cooperation and support to the force in facilitating its work; and the borders of the area of operation dedicated to the UNIFIL were not clearly defined.
[523] The consent of the conflicting parties was not secured before UNIFIL deployment, the Rules of Engagement for all UN troops was not clear, and the host nation support, logistics, communications, command and control issues needed to be solved in advance.
[524] Without referencing Chapter VII, by using this customary formulation, the UNSC intended to reduce the involvement of troop-contributing countries, which would have been much less willing to put their soldiers at the UN's disposal had they been given more offensive tasks.
[525] Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of Security Council Res.No. 425, dated 19 March, 1978.

success of the UNIFIL operation. The first and most important of these conditions was that the UNIFIL must have the full confidence and backing of the Security Council at all times, particularly of the permanent members that proposed the establishment of the UNIFIL in the first place (Murphy, 2007). Secondly, the UNIFIL must operate with the full cooperation of all pertinent parties.[526] It was also based on the assumption that all conflicting parties would take the necessary steps to comply with the decisions of the UNSC.[527] Thirdly, the force must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. Moreover, the Secretary General pointed out that the UNIFIL required the freedom of movement, communications and other facilities deemed necessary to perform its tasks.[528] Neither the aforementioned essential conditions, nor the consent of the parties were ever fully met. Furthermore, neither the PLO nor DFF were eager to support the UN troops when it came to these issues. The UN Peacekeeping Force should not have been dispatched to Lebanon until there was a clear understanding and political will between Israel and Lebanon. Without a viable political process before the deployment of UNIFIL, the real consent of the parties could not be provided. However, the planners at the UN Headquarters in New York had a wrong expectation regarding the deployment time of the peacekeeping force. In the beginning, the prevailing view among the members of the Security Council was that a peacekeeping force was to be deployed to the field as soon as possible and the other issues would have fallen into place over time. But, as was to be seen, such a misconception stuck the whole UNIFIL action in a dead-end.

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[526] While the UNSC failed to support the UNIFIL as required, the conflicting parties were reluctant to cooperate with the UNIFIL as well.

[527] Indeed, all assumptions upon which the UNIFIL were based proved to be insufficient, inappropriate or untenable. (Heiberg, M. Peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), Paper no.453, Oslo, Nov. 1991, p-3)

[528] From time to time, the Lebanese armed groups and local people impeded the UNIFIL'S freedom of movement. On the other hand, after the Israeli invasion in 1978, the IDF and pro-Israeli DFF were obstructing the movement of UNIFIL troops within its area of operations until the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000.

5.2. The Use Of Force

One of the most controversial issues throughout the UNIFIL operation was the 'use of force.' It was spelled out in the mandate with dry, formulaic language that had little relation to the reality on the ground. In the Secretary General's implementation report, the main principles of using force were explained as follows; "the force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character and shall not use force except self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council." A peacekeeping force should not have an open-ended mission but a clear mandate to assist in the implementation of the UNSC resolution. It seems that the conflicting statements of the Security Council on the use of force left the responsibility of the heavy consequences that would come about to the unit commanders.

The line between the use of force in self-defense on PKOs and on Peace Enforcement Operations is not so clear in practice. In most cases, it depends on subjective variables that are difficult to predict. During the operation, there will be no authority or time to determine the situation where peacekeepers have the right to use force within the acceptable boundaries of self-defense.

A traditional peacekeeping force should not rely on the use of force to fulfill its mission. However, when a party to a conflict fails to give the necessary cooperation, a decision must be made regarding what degree of force, if any, may be resorted to in the circumstances. It was decided in the early days of the UNIFIL mission that its operational effectiveness would be curtailed in order to adhere to the principle of non-use of force (Murphy, 1999). There were occasions when UNIFIL troops were outraged by the violent activities of both the DFF and PLO and it used

force as a last resort in self-defense. There were other occasions when it failed to do so and invited further harassment.[529] In this context, it was assumed that any armed action carried out for the requirement of the mandate might bring about an undesirable full-scale conflict and nobody could guess what the consequences might have been.[530] Furthermore, the use of force also had the potential to spiral out of control and could drag UNIFIL troops to the brink of war. The experience of the UNIFIL showed how the principle of non-use of force had been controversial and difficult to apply in practice.[531] This was also exacerbated by the ambiguities in the mandate and lack of support from the UNSC.

5.3. The Attitudes of The Parties in Regards to UN Involvement

Since the beginning of the UNIFIL operation, the Secretary General continuously called on the states in the region to support and encourage the conflicting parties to take constructive steps towards consolidating the cessation of hostilities and improve the struggle for a viable solution in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Arab states that had political and economic influence over Lebanon did not allow the Lebanese Government to determine an independent policy related to its own issue. On the contrary, they wanted to make Lebanon a new front-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[529] UNIFIL troops had to defend themselves against attacks from different militia groups in their area of deployment.
[530] An instance occurred in April 1979, when Ghanaian UN troops returned fire in response to widespread Israeli shelling of the UNIFIL's area of operations. UNIFIL counter-fire led to the death of a member of Haddad's forces. In retaliation, the Israeli-supported DFF fiercely attacked the vulnerable UN HQ at Naqoura.
[531] However, the UNIFIL demonstrated that it was possible to use force in self-defense and retained impartiality.

Reactions regarding UN involvement and the UNSC resolution of the parties varied.[532] The Lebanese Government welcomed the Security Council's decisions and announced that it would abide by the provisions of the Security Council resolution and cooperate with the UN/UNIFIL as required. As a matter of fact, while Lebanon was not a party of this conflict by deliberately doing things harmful against its neighbor, however it was unable to prevent PLO attacks from its territory into Israel because of continuing domestic problems and political vulnerability stemming from the civil war. Since the civil war in 1975, the Lebanese government no longer had authority in the south, and armed groups took advantage of the vacuum in this area. Thereby, there were no host-nation support activities in this area, which was an important factor for a successful PKO.

Israel was bothered by the Security Council's decision, because the resolution impeded the IDF from achieving its military objectives.[533] Israeli authorities considered the UN peacekeeping forces would be entirely useless in the effort of bringing peace and security in this region. They believed that a bunch of Blue Berets could not keep the PLO out of southern Lebanon thereby they strengthened the DFF as an auxiliary of the IDF in the security zone.[534] Consequently, until the Israel's full withdrawal in 2000, the conflict in southern Lebanon continued as a proxy fight between the DFF and PLO/Hezbollah.

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[532] To Israel, the UN was a veritable war machine created for condemning, isolating and undermining the Jewish state. To the Arab World, the UN was an organization feudally dependent on the US in which pro-Arab resolutions in support of the Palestinian cause were never implemented. (Boutros-Ghali, 1999)

[533] Although Israeli authorities aimed at capturing most of the PLO militias based in the south, Palestinian guerrillas succeeded in retreating from the operation area to north of the Litani River. Palestinian armed groups stayed there until an UN-led ceasefire agreement was signed. Once the IDF withdrew, they returned to southern Lebanon and continued their attacks on Israel. Therefore, the Israeli operation was unable to achieve its main objective of neutralizing or eliminating the PLO threats permanently from Lebanon.

[534] Israeli authorities saw that the PLO's guerillas had been bypassed by the much more militarily capable IDF, leading them to believe the UN peacekeepers could not halt PLO activities in the area.

Syria did not welcome the establishment of the UNIFIL because the UN military existence in Lebanon might have reduced the importance and effectiveness of the Arab Deterrence Force, and therefore of Syria. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government did not file a direct objection to the UNSC's resolutions and acted as if it was eager to cooperate with the UN.

On the other hand, the resolution failed to address the underlying causes of the problem by ignoring the existence of displaced Palestinians and their armed militias in Lebanon, an inseparable component in the conflict equation on the ground. The PLO was a dominating factor in southern Lebanon and it was under no state authority. While the PLO leadership accepted the ceasefire and cooperated with the UNIFIL, those who opposed the presence of UN troops in southern Lebanon used this cooperation as propaganda.[535] The important point here was that it was the Lebanese people who paid the price for a long time for the PLO's irresponsible and provocative behavior against Israel.[536] Most of the Shiites and Christian Lebanese objected to the PLO's operations in southern Lebanon and they wanted the militias out of Lebanon.

Another group dissatisfied with the existence of the UNIFIL was the pro-Israeli DFF.[537] This armed group, which was supported by Israel, and lacked authority and discipline, was the element that put the UN operation in harm's way, since it was deployed within the UNIFIL Area of Operation.

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[535] It also provided the DFF with an ideal excuse for refusing to allow the UNIFIL to deploy in the area under their control.

[536] During the Israeli military operation, approximately 2,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians were killed and injured by careless artillery fire and Israeli air strikes, with about 265,000 people having to abandon their homelands. This aggressive military operation of Israel seemed to punish civilians rather than Palestinian guerillas.

[537] The DFF was a Israeli-sponsored Christian militia organization and they were strongly dependent on Israeli support. They not only prevented a further deployment of the UNIFIL in the enclave, they also attempted to establish additional encroachments in the UNIFIL area.

According to the UN resolution, the IDF's withdrawal from all Lebanese territory was an essential condition in allowing the deployment of the UNIFIL to the area and carry out its mandated tasks.[538] Only in this way could the UNIFIL have separated the parties and kept PLO militia groups away from the border with Israel. However, the UNIFIL area of deployment in southern Lebanon was not only occupied by the IDF, but was also contested by the PLO and Maj. Saad Haddad's De Facto Forces (DFF).[539]

5.4. Direct Attacks on UNIFIL Troops by The Conflicting Parties

Though it was not one of the parties fighting in the region, the UNIFIL was subject to direct attacks by armed groups such as the IDF, the DFF, the PLO, the Amal and the Hezbollah. UNIFIL troops applied passive defense and protection measures during such attacks and trying to put pressure on places that opened fire with counter-fire. The UN and Security Council were unable to put an end to the attacks of these groups using all their means. This insufficiency was perceived as the weakness of the UN, and the UN's credit and trustworthiness fell in the eyes of the countries in the region. They could not undermine the UNSC's credibility and endangered the security of UNIFIL personnel, had the UN taken serious measures immediately against assailants and the states behind them. The UNIFIL troops would not have been humiliated or targeted by the armed groups had the UNSC demonstrated a robust posture when required.

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[538] The general nature of southern Lebanon's terrain was ideal for armed militia activities; hilly with many ravines and gullies with citrus groves along the coast.

[539] The IDF's withdrawal began on 4 April, 1978 and lasted two months. Despite the first three execution phases, the IDF handed over its positions in southern Lebanon to the DFF rather than UNIFIL. The presence and resistance of the DFF within the UNIFIL area of operations limited the scope of the mission and the ability of the peacekeeping forces to carry out its mandate. As long as the DFF remained in southern Lebanon, UN peacekeeping forces would not get control of its area of operation and the chances of successful implementation of its mandate would be reduced. On the other hand, the DFF was considered to be a servant of Israel and a strong challenge to Lebanon's sovereignty by the PLO and other Lebanese armed groups. The presence of the DFF provoked the PLO's attacks in this area and the UNIFIL was not able to prevent Palestinian armed groups from infiltrating this area.

There were many armed groups operating in the UNIFIL's area of deployment. At times, serious conflict occurred between these groups and UNIFIL troops. In order to prevent incidents which could escalate the tensions, the UNIFIL tried to contact the representatives and leaders of these groups. The daily life of the local people in the south was also heavily disrupted by ongoing conflicts among these armed groups. Constant shelling also damaged already inadequate infrastructure in residential areas, with interruptions in utility services badly affecting all basic public service, schools and hospitals. The Islamic Resistance, Amal and PLO militias continued their attacks against IDF/DFF positions in southern Lebanon. In response to these attacks, the IDF/DFF fired artillery and launched air raids on detected targets in the area, in which a number of civilians were killed or injured. UNIFIL troops were also seriously affected by these counterattacks and suffered casualties. UN peacekeeping forces took appropriate protection measures against this hostile fire. In the face of these attacks against the UNIFIL, the Secretary General presented a list of immediate measures proposed by the force commander, including regrouping UNIFIL positions, and contingents, a crash program for additional reinforced shelters and increase reliance on Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs).[540]

Occasional major confrontations between the UNIFIL and IDF/DFF demonstrated the dangers of escalation which caused many deaths and injuries as well as destruction of property. In such cases, UNIFIL troops gave priority to the security of its personnel rather than mission executions. After the increase in casualties, some troop-contributing countries were prepared to consider tougher rules of engagement for the security of UNIFIL personnel.[541] They believed a robust peacekeeping force

[540] The Security Council approved his plan and authorized the Secretary General to proceed.
[541] The ambassador of Fiji tendered the strongest endorsement of revising the rules of engagement to permit greater use of force.

with stronger deterrent capability and defense equipment could provide UNIFIL troops with assurance while dissuading assailants from attacking.[542] The Lebanese Government also favored having a stronger UNIFIL in terms of military capacity. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the UN asserted, "The military option should not be foreclosed by the exclusive use of the limited diplomatic option. In the light of the tragic experiences, we think that the UNIFIL should have a greater military capability." On the contrary, Washington was strongly opposed to these views, worrying that such steps would lead to increase confrontations between UNIFIL troops and Israel.

The Secretary General also eventually convinced the UNSC that the UNIFIL should have Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) for defensive action, which also could provide the troops with protection against small-arms fire and land mines. With regard to acquiring heavy weapons, the Force Commander Major General Gustav Hagglund of Finland thought differently, saying what the UNIFIL needed were not heavy weapons, but cooperation of the local population and consent of the parties concerned. "It was not a force that would wage war on any conflicting parties and the mission was not expected to achieve by force what must be realized through negotiation and consensus". However, he believed that the UNIFIL's strategy should be to avoid violence by being able to deploy a quick reserve force when deemed necessary.[543] Whenever UNIFIL troops were threatened with an attack by pro-Israeli forces or armed groups, this reserve force would be able to move quickly to the tense area or other special tasks when required. On the other hand, UNIFIL battalions got

[542] Some troop-contributing countries began to equip their peacekeeping forces with heavy weapons and armored personnel carriers for protection. There were military advisors who proposed to bring some features of the peace support operation to UNIFIL's capability.
[543] The UNIFIL Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) was a substantial, rapid force, with the protection of APCs, anti-tank guided missiles, heavy machine guns and 120 mm. mortars.

caveats from their governments that placed restrictions on their rules of engagement and situations in which they could act robustly and rapidly during a crisis (Gowan, 2007). The force commander had little impact on the national contingents in the field, which took considerable divergent approaches to how tough or cautious they needed to be.

5.5. The Cooperation and Negotiation with the Parties

As reported by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) Galtung states that:

Actors in conflict have struggled to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals by resorting to violent means for imposing demands on its opponents. After some failed attempts that aimed at 'zero-sum' solutions, the convenient conditions for third party mediation may be prepared towards a reasonable solution. Mediation is the most common form of third party role for conflict settlement. For successful intervention, parties should be eager to accept an offer of help from a third party to settle their conflict or resolve incompatibilities between them without reverted to the use of force.

Third parties can provide conflicting actors with favorable conditions for mediation and cooperation in which a solution may be jointly shaped with the participation of all relevant parties.[544] Considering the dynamics of conflict, third parties try to come up with a compromising point in which both sides can make rational calculations that may satisfy them (win-win solution) (Wallensteen, 2004).

If there is a single key element to the success of peacekeeping, it is the cooperation of conflicting parties. If they are determined to continue fighting, there is

[544] With the diplomatic assistance and convenient conditions for negotiation, the parties can make rational calculations and produce acceptable proposals which may facilitate the resolution process for ending the conflict.

nothing the UN force could do in this regard and no peace to keep (Jett, 2000). As it was seen, the UNIFIL made positive short-term contributions to peace on the ground, helping the parties implement a ceasefire agreement and confirming the withdrawal of the IDF. The UNIFIL successfully maintained its mediation activities at the operational level. With a view to maintaining calm along the Blue Line, the parties continued to participate in tripartite meetings. Whenever any incident or violation occurred in the area, the UNIFIL maintained close liaison and coordination with the parties on the military level.[545] It urged the parties to exercise maximum restraint, with a view to preventing an escalation of the situation, and brought the incidents to the attention of the tripartite mechanism. Such meetings were the appropriate mediums to address outstanding issues in respect to implementing Res.No.1701, and the easing of tensions along the Blue Line. Implementing the tripartite meeting and establishing the liaison office at the headquarters of the LAF and IDF, the UNIFIL tried to use Conflict Building Measures to avoid an unintended, uncontrolled escalation in the area as neither side had any confidence in the other, and no wish to talk together. Another difficulty for the UNIFIL here was its obligation to coordinate with armed groups that lacked authority and discipline within the conflicting parties.[546]

However, a minimal degree of confidence in each other was indispensable for the conflicting parties to iron out mutually acceptable outcomes (Mason & Siegfried, 2013). In such a highly hostile atmosphere, any behavior of the other side could be interpreted as being hostile and a violent reaction to this behavior could destroy the

[545] Chaired by the Force Commander with senior representatives of the LAF and the IDF, the monthly tripartite meeting continued to be the critical element of UNIFIL liaison/coordination and essential mechanism to identify and address security and military operational issues with the parties, as well as reinforce the cessation of hostilities. While violations were discussed, the UNIFIL made its investigation incident reports available to the parties.

[546] It was unlikely that such implementations could produce immediate results for the protracted conflicts where no political will existed for negotiation.

fragile calm in the area. No doubt that the UNIFIL did not intend to deal with the root causes of the conflicts, but to build measures for turning hostile relationships into more accommodating ones. Force commanders remained in contact with both sides with a view to find an agreed and coordinated way forward, to reduce tensions, and to prevent incidents in the area of operations. However, to achieve these results, all conflicting parties needed to abide by the agreed measures and they needed help to make the UNIFIL's mission easier.[547] Otherwise, the initial collaboration among the parties could easily revert back to a conflict environment. Before the effects of the peacekeeping operation vanished, other diplomatic means of the Conflict Resolution needed to be implemented by UN, but this could not be realized (Sambanis, 2008). Michael Lund pointed out that the Conflict Resolution should have focused on the effort to increase cooperation between parties by addressing the underlying incompatibilities in conflict, fostering mutual trust and finding a way to keep them interacting (Lund, 1996). However, the underlying problems between Israel and Lebanon were so deep and complex that it could not be expected for a typical PKO to solve these problems and bring a viable peace. It was impossible to treat the problem between Israel and Lebanon separately from long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflicts. Therefore, the UNSC stressed many times in its resolutions that "a lasting peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all territories occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War".

"The effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation depends on the cooperation of the conflicting parties." A close cooperation of all conflicting parties with the

[547] Unfortunately, the continued unilateral actions by the IDF undermined the tripartite meetings and the ability of the UNIFIL to maintain calm in its area of operations. Despite the fact that the UNIFIL was on the ground in the coordinator/mediator between the conflicting parties, the IDF continued to violate Lebanese sovereignty in contravention of the provision of resolutions. The Representative of Lebanon complained to the UN there had been nearly 6.945 air, sea and land violations of Lebanese sovereignty committed by the IDF since the adoption of Res.No.1701.

UNIFIL was essential for the success and security of the UN operation. However many of the parties were reticent to cooperate with the UNIFIL as required, despite their initial commitment. Their expectations were to see immediate results in their favor if they furthered cooperation with the Force. Of course, the presence of the UNIFIL in the area was not a guarantee for the parties to end the violence and hostility amongst them.[548] The UN peacekeeping forces were not there to solve each and every problem, but rather to provide a window for political negotiation with the assistance and cooperation of the parties. The success of the peacekeepers depended on the full cooperation of the main actors such as Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and their allies.[549] However, with the exception of the Lebanese authorities, the reality was that neither Israel nor Syria cooperated with the UN as required, hence the UNIFIL had to confront undisciplined armed groups, especially the DFF and PLO. Israel did not hesitate to unleash its proxy (the DFF) against the UNIFIL and local people in southern Lebanon, whenever PLO attacks occurred.[550] On the other hand, Syria continued to support and equip the PLO guerrillas in their attacks on Israeli targets and DFF positions. Although all of this was known in the Security Council, serious steps were not taken for their prevention.

5.6. Re-Occurring Conflict Cycle Model in Lebanon

In the protracted dispute between Israel and Lebanon, the conflict cycle is chronic. The behavior pattern in this conflict model constantly changes between war and peace up to the time when the conflict is eventually resolved (Swanstorm &

[548] Existing since 1948, the Palestinian problem has had the potential to destabilize not only Lebanon, but the Middle East as a whole.
[549] The Secretary General personally urged all concerned to extend cooperation to the UNIFIL so that it would be able to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted upon it by the Security Council.
[550] The UNIFIL was constantly harassed and indiscriminately shelled and fired upon by the IDF and DFF. The DFF frequently impeded the UNIFIL's movements in the area of operations, which prevented UN troops from carrying out their missions.

Weissmann, 2005). Sometimes, the conflict pattern fluctuates between unstable peace, open conflict, crisis and war without having a solution. The conflicts between Israel and Lebanon show a repetitive feature. If incidents and military tensions between the IDF and LAF or other armed elements could not be resolved immediately by the UNIFIL, they tended to escalate easily, and following a period of violence, a precarious peace might return to the area with the effort of the UN. This was a recurring pattern throughout the UNIFIL operation. Despite the power and authority of the UNSC that was able of breaking this vicious circle via different instruments, a viable peace could not be achieved for some reasons that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. The climax points of the fluctuations in Lebanon case are as follows; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1978), another Israeli invasion (1982), the Operation Accountability (1993), the Operation of the Grapes of Wrath (1996), the Israeli-Hezbollah War (2006), numerous Israeli violations against Lebanese sovereignty, and PLO, Amal and Hezbollah attacks against Israel. In parallel with the fluctuations, the logical sequence of prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution measures had to be changed, hence the different kind of actions that needed to be taken by the UNSC to deal with conflict. At this point, it is possible to say that the failure to apply the UN diplomatic initiatives and conflict resolution methods laid at the deep-rooted of the problems in the Middle East, including Lebanon. For that reason, a lasting peace has yet to be achieved in this region.

5.7. Mandate

Since there are no provisions within the UN Charter for PKOs, all legality for a PKO is based on the mandate given to it.[551] The UNSC sets the parameters of the

[551] Final Report on the In-Depth Evaluation of Peacekeeping Operation: Start Up Phase, UN Office of Oversight Services, March 17, 1995, paragraph 11

operation when it determines its mandate. The mandate can doom a PKO to failure if it sets objectives that cannot be achieved, especially if it has insufficient resources to achieve those objectives. A mandate can also suffer from excessive ambiguity or from leaving the parties themselves with too much to accomplish on their own. In other words, a mandate can suffer from being unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak (Jett, 2000). Sometimes the UNSC does this intentionally, in that the mandate tends to reflect the political play in the Council. They are acting either in accordance with their own interests or on the basis of a faulty assessment of the situation. From this point of view, it can be said that the UNIFIL mandate was far from the realities on the ground. Washington used the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon as a fig leaf to disguise its unwillingness to take stronger action against Israel. There was a considerable gap between the resolutions of the UNSC and the will to execute them. In such a situation, only the full cooperation and consent of the conflicting parties (Israel, Lebanon, pro-Israeli DFF, PLO and Hezbollah) would enable the success of the UNIFIL mandate. On the other hand, like Syria and Iran, the US had other interests in play, and it did not care much whether the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon was successful or not.

After a Palestinian commando attack in northern Israel that resulted in the deaths of 37 Israeli civilians, the IDF launched a major military operation in southern Lebanon in March, 1978. Subsequently, the UNSC issued the first mandate for the UNIFIL via Res.No. 425.[552] If the UN was deploying a peacekeeping force elsewhere, it meant that the major powers in the UNSC were closely interested in the case (Sambanis, 2008). It was known that the US led the deployment of the UNIFIL in the

[552] The Council decided to deploy the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to southern Lebanon with three main objectives as set forth in Res.No. 425; a) confirming the withdrawal of the IDF, b) restoring international peace and security, and c) assisting the Lebanese Government in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

UNSC. However, what motivated Washington to act was the concern over the success of the US-led Egypt-Israel peace effort, rather than the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL's mandate ended up being so general, that it brought about the uncertainty of purpose and irresolution in its execution. Only when further discussions and consultations were held with conflicting parties that revealed profound disagreement could the mandate be tailored accordingly. However, the ill-defined reference to the UNIFIL's area of operation and lack of initial consensus with the parties were the most serious flaws in its mandate.[553] Furthermore, some missions given to UNIFIL were not convenient for traditional peacekeeping operations[554].

Although UNIFIL mandates were renewed regularly every 6 months, the concept of the UNIFIL operation had to be adjusted a few times. The first arrangement was made following the 1982 Israeli-Lebanese War, when the UNIFIL positions were overrun and the UNIFIL's functions were primarily limited to humanitarian assistance to the people in its area of operations. After Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon to the Blue Line in 2000, the UNIFIL resumed its military function without DFF harassment within the dedicated area of operations. The second adjustment occurred in 2004; the UNSC adopted Res.No.1559, which reiterated its strong support for Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence. Furthermore, the Council; a) called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon[555], b) called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, c) supported the extension of the control of the

[553] The UNIFIL area of deployment was contested not just by these two states but also several Lebanese and non-Lebanese forces; the PLO and Israeli-supported DFF.
[554] As defined on the resolution 425, UNIFIL deployed to the southern Lebanon for restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.
[555] It was implicitly referring to Syrian forces because Syria maintained its forces in Lebanon since 1976, upon at the request of Lebanese President Frangieh. The deployment was transformed into an Arab Deterrent Force sanctioned by the League of Arab States with the participation of forces from other Arab countries.

Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory, d) declared its support for a free and fair electoral process in the upcoming presidential election without foreign interference or influence. The final modification was realized following the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, via Res.No.1701, when the UNSC significantly enhanced the strength of the UNIFIL, expanding the original mandate to include some 2nd-generation peacekeeping missions, such as; a) to monitor the cessation of hostilities, b) to accompany and support the LAF as they deployed throughout the south in parallel with the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, c) to coordinate these activities with the Lebanese Government and Israel, d) to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, e) to assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment of the Blue Line and the Litani area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons, f) to assist the Lebanese Government in securing its borders, ports and airports to prevent illegal entries.

These changes in the concept of UNIFIL operation would also point out some indications about the transformation from a traditional PKO into a 2nd generation PKO. However, the operation initially designed as a traditional PKO strained to meet the expectations of a 2nd generation PKO later on. It would have been better to first terminate the UNIFIL operation, then design and deploy a new UN force to the area as a peace enforcement or peace building force with a new mandate. Even though the number of UNIFIL troops was raised after Res.No. 1701, with the exception of the first four items, it could not be expected for the peacekeeping force to fulfill the tasks of its mandate as long as Hezbollah forces continued to be present in the area. All these missions above could only be accomplished by a state's armed forces, backed by the assistance of a UN peacekeeping force.

5.8. Invasion of Lebanon Again in 1982

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 was seen by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. While the UNIFIL continued its mandate in Lebanon, Israel repeated its attempt to invade the country twice more, in 1982 and in 2006. The occupation of the "area of deployment" of a peacekeeping force by another state was unprecedented in the history of the UN, rendering invalid all known peacekeeping principles and rules.

While Israel carried out frequent military operations during this period, including shelling, air attacks, two large-scale incursions into Lebanon and an extended occupation of the southern part of the country, it could not realize its objectives and could not fully secure its northern borders.

Israel launched an invasion of Lebanon following an assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador to the UK, in June 1982. After intense exchange of fire between the IDF and PLO in southern Lebanon, the IDF moved rapidly, passing through the UNIFIL positions to besiege Beirut. Through Res.No.509, the UNSC demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Lebanon. Although the UNIFIL had neither the capacity nor authority to impede the Israeli incursion, just prior to the IDF's forward movement, Force Commander General Callaghan gave instructions to all UNIFIL units that in case of attack, they would block advancing IDF forces, take defensive measures and stay at their positions unless their safety was seriously imperiled (The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). In accordance with General Callaghan's instructions, UNIFIL troops made every effort to take measures to stop or hinder the advance of the IDF in its area of operation. Despite their efforts, the massive IDF attacks could not be

impeded with light defensive weapons whereas the UNIFIL positions were all overrun within 24 hours. In commenting on the Israeli invasion in his 14 June 1982 report to the UNSC, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar explained his concern that the Israeli side would not apply a ceasefire against the Palestinians, which meant that the siege in the Beirut area and elsewhere would continue. During the Israeli invasion, the UNIFIL remained behind Israeli lines for three years with just a limited role for providing modest humanitarian assistance to the local population. The situation in the area of civilian population was desperate due to the heavy Israeli bombardments, seriously hindering urgent humanitarian relief operations by the pertinent organizations and programs of the UN. The ceasefire could not applied successfully and the UNIFIL had insufficient capacity to monitor violations of the truce agreement, leading the Secretary-General to appeal to the Israeli Government for cooperation and assistance in the humanitarian effort. That was the right course of action for the UNIFIL and it could not have taken further action.

Despite Res.Nos.508/509, in which the UNSC called for all the conflicting parties to cease immediately all military activities in Lebanon and for Israel to withdraw all its forces from Lebanon, the IDF continued its progress. However, Security Council's resolutions and calls were not enough to stop the Israeli violations in Lebanon. It was necessary that the UNSC, especially the US which continually supported the Israeli policy in the region, gave full support to UNIFIL in fulfilling its mandate. By this way, the UNSC's resolutions could be put into effect seriously, and the UN could carry out its commitment to the maintenance of the international peace and security (Shehadi & Mills, 1988). Following the IDF's forward operation, the UNIFIL troops remained behind the Israeli forces hence it had no role to carry out for

the execution of the mandate given by the UNSC.[556] Inside the UNIFIL area of operation, there was a considerable increase of population because of the Israeli operation. During this period, UNIFIL provided protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population as much as possible, until partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces in 1983.[557] UNIFIL humanitarian teams were able to assist the local population by distributing of food, water and dispensing medical aid.[558] But these efforts were also halted by the Israeli military attacks in the same areas.[559] Despite all these difficulties and risks, the humanitarian support activities were the main accomplishments of UNIFIL and the way towards good relations with the locals.

The IDF moved quickly through southern Lebanon and pushed the PLO forces out of its way to Beirut, encircling Palestinian and Syrian forces in the city, which was under heavy Israeli bombardment. The international community was involved again to evacuate the PLO guerillas besieged in Beirut. In August, 1982, the US took the lead in achieving an agreement for the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut and the deployment of a MNF comprised of troops from the US, France and Italy to oversee the evacuation. Although, evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut ended a part of the problem, the other radical Shia groups, Amal and Hezbollah filled the power vacuum in southern Lebanon.[560] On the other hand, the presence of the Israeli

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[556] Although, UNIFIL troops continued to hinder infiltrations of armed groups into its area of operations, these types of attacks did not occur during the IDF operation.

[557] Under the patronage of the US, new Lebanese Government entered negotiations with Israel for a peace treaty, which focused on the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. Israel also declared its willingness for a durable agreement with Lebanon. An agreement was signed by Lebanese, Israeli and U.S. representatives on 17 May, 1983.

[558] Basic foodstuffs and milk for children were distributed to the local and Palestinian refugees. Water supply was organized in many places, especially in and around Palestinian refugee camps.

[559] In the second half of June, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief organizations were able to commence relief work in the Tyre pocket. The UNIFIL continued to cooperate with these organizations by providing transport, storage facilities and procurement support.

[560] Although the UNSC called on Lebanon to take more steps to ensure a return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of its armed forces, the Lebanese

occupying force constantly provoked the Lebanese population, which wished to see their country free of foreign occupiers.

5.9. Hezbollah's Rockets and the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006

The exchange of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah intensified again in early-2006. In response to Israeli artillery fire and air strikes, Hezbollah continued to launch cross-border rocket attacks into Israel. Civilian casualties rose as the IDF increased its counterattacks on detected Hezbollah positions, most of which were in populated areas. Israeli authorities were determined to terminate the rocket threat as rapidly and effectively as possible through air strikes, no matter what the cost.[561] However, this was an endless vicious cycle, and Hezbollah and Israel were locked in a desperate conflict environment that seemed inextricable, as neither party was willing to ask for help from outside to end this conflict.[562]

In mid-July, Hezbollah militias crossed the Blue Line into Israel, ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting two others. Subsequent to this attack, Israel launched a major military operation into Lebanon, which lasted 34 days. However, the Israeli forces had a far harder time taking on Hezbollah than against the PLO in the 1970s. While Hezbollah targeted the IDF and Israeli towns with its Katyusha rockets, Israel continued a heavy bombardment on the Hezbollah positions from the ground and air. Moreover, the IDF destroyed much vital public works infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, power stations, numerous roads and

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Government continued to maintain the position that its army would not be deployed in the south as long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel.

[561] Israel's struggle against the sporadic rocket launched on populated areas was understandable, hundreds of thousands of Israelis living in the north Had been terrorized by them for years.

[562] Nevertheless, Israel welcomed UNSC Res.No.1559, which called for the disarmament of Hezbollah. By means of UNIFIL assistance, UN diplomatic initiatives might facilitate the deployment of the LAF to southern Lebanon, which could extend the control of the Lebanese Government in the area and keep the Hezbollah militias away from its border with Israel.

bridges in southern Lebanon, within and beyond the UNIFIL area of operations.[563] Right after this conflict, the Secretary General maintained regular contact with Israeli and Lebanese authorities, as well as other relevant parties. He repeatedly called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Despite being impeded by ongoing violence, the UNIFIL continued to carry out its mission of providing humanitarian and medical assistance to desperate civilians. After intense negotiations, Res.No.1701 adopted by the UNSC on 11 August, 2006, boosted UNIFIL military troops to 15,000 and expanded its original mandate.[564] For the first time, the UNSC also decided to include the Maritime Task Force as part of the PKO. Additional progress was made by the Lebanese Government, which made a significant deployment of its army to the south after 30 years.

On 15 July 2006, the UNIFIL was informed by the IDF that Israel would establish a "special security zone" between 21 villages along the Blue Line and the Israeli technical fence. The IDF informed the UNIFIL that any vehicles entering the area would be considered as enemy targets. This security zone was also within the UNIFIL area of operation, which rendered it impossible to support, whenever necessary, many UNIFIL positions that were located in the zone. Furthermore, it would prevent the UNIFIL from fulfilling its mandate based on the UNSC resolutions. The UNIFIL requested Israel to authorize 'windows' to patrol the Blue Line and to allow the passage of logistic convoys to supply its position within the special security zone. Since the onset of the Israeli operation, the hostilities and

[563] More than 1,000 Lebanese, 165 Israeli civilians were killed and about 1,000,000 Lebanese were displaced during the operation. UNIFIL troops were also affected by the conflict, with five UN personnel killed and 16 others wounded.

[564] The new mandate also included some additional tasks; accompanying and supporting the LAF as it deployed throughout the south as Israel withdrew from Lebanon, extending its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and assisting the Lebanese Government in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of contraband arms or related materiel.

conflict radically altered the circumstances that the UNIFIL operated within, whereas the environment conducive to UN peacekeeping mission no longer existed. UNIFIL personnel were confined to their positions, and had to take shelter in bunkers during the heaviest bombardments. Three UNIFIL positions, near Marwahin, At Tiri, Hula, were hit by IDF fire.[565] In such a hostile environment, the UNIFIL continually reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures, ensured personnel safety awareness and other security training. The UNIFIL continued to enhance physical security measures regarding force protection works for installations and assets. In this situation, the UNIFIL could barely moved forward in providing humanitarian aid to the local population. With constant firing along the Blue Line, with roads and bridges and other critical infrastructure severely destroyed and with the freedom of movement continuously impeded, the UNIFIL was unable to resume its work in an effective way.

5.10. The Taif Agreement

One of the important steps in resolving the conflict in Lebanon was the Taif Agreement, realized as a result of efforts by the League of Arab States and the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 22 October, 1989.[566] Besides reform plans to restructure the Lebanese political system, the Taif Agreement aimed at the establishment of Lebanese Government's authority over its entire territory, based on disarming the militias, and restoring the Lebanese Army. The agreement emphasized the special relation between Syria and Lebanon. In the name of Lebanon's security, Syria was granted intervention in Lebanon to protect its own interests.

[565] The city of Tyre and its residential areas where about 150 UN personnel and their dependents lived were repeatedly targeted by IDF airstrikes. Despite repeated appeals to Israeli authorities, the residence of a UNIFIL staff member and his family was destroyed on 17 July. A subsequent UNIFIL SAR effort was called off due to road damage.

[566] The agreement was negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in September, 1989 and approved by the Lebanese Parliament on 4 November, 1989.

The Section-3 was the most striking part of the agreement as it called for taking all steps necessary to liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation as per Res.No.425. The LAF and UNIFIL were given a mandate to extend Lebanese sovereignty and ensure full withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. However, the statement that all necessary steps be exercised to remove the Israeli presence was also used by the Hezbollah to legitimate its status as an armed resistance movement outside state authority.[567] Although there were provisions in the agreement calling for the full disarmament of militia groups in Lebanon, there were loopholes that allowed the Hezbollah to maintain its armed forces as a resistance group against Israeli occupation (MacQueen, 2009). The Security Council reiterated its full support for the Taif Agreement and commended the Lebanese Government for the recent successful deployment of its army in the Sidon and Tyre regions as it extended its authority over all Lebanese territory. Nonetheless, no tangible progress could be achieved, despite the Taif Agreement and UNSC resolution that called for the disbanding and disarming of militias. Moreover, the Secretary General called on the Hezbollah to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions, and urged Syria and Iran to support its transformation into a political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Agreement and Res.No. 1559. The Secretary General also urged the Hezbollah not to engage in any militant activity in Lebanon and called upon the Hezbollah leadership to disarm and limit its activities to that of a Lebanese political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Agreement and UNSC Res.No. 1559.[568]

[567] Lebanese authorities asserted that the Hezbollah was a response to Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory, especially when Israel insisted on threatening new military action against Lebanon.
[568] The Secretary General called upon the Lebanese Government and the LAF to take all measures necessary to prohibit the Hezbollah from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the state, as well as the adaptation of a border management strategy which would enable better control of Lebanon's borders and prevent the illegal transfer of arms in both directions.

5.11. Humanitarian Assistance and Community Outreach Activities

An area considered the most successful for UNIFIL was the humanitarian assistance activities in its area of operations. The destruction and severe damage created by the conflicts forced tens of thousands of people in the area to abandon their homes. To provide the basic humanitarian needs and security for the people who stayed in their homes was a priority task of UNIFIL.

In connection to the Israeli ground operations and bombarding, the Lebanese Government requested the UN to issue an international appeal to meet urgent humanitarian requirements resulting from heavy destruction. The UNIFIL continued to provide assistance to the Lebanese civilian population in the area of operation and it intermediated humanitarian efforts between the Lebanese authorities, UN agencies, ESCWA, UNICEF, ICRC and other organizations functioning in Lebanon.[569] Relief supplies and equipment provided to southern Lebanon flowed through the UNIFIL base at Tyre to the units for distribution in the field. After the fighting, the UNIFIL supported the operations of several UN agencies such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, and UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East in providing assistance to local and international NGOs. In addition, the UNIFIL repaired roads that were bombed out with the modest means at its disposal. However, UNIFIL's efforts were severely hindered by the sustained IDF bombardments. UNIFIL trucks and APCs, which engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the locals, were often delayed or stopped as a result of firing by Israeli artillery and aircraft, despite IDF assurances that all UNIFIL humanitarian missions would be facilitated.

[569] It included all kinds of relief supplies, distribution of food, medical care, SAR for persons trapped in damaged buildings.

The presence of countless minefields in the UNIFIL area of operation remained a constant matter of concern. After more than three decades of hostilities, clearing all the mines and unexploded ordnance was a large and urgent task for UNIFIL. Although the IDF provided the UN with maps of mined areas known to them, the majority remained unmarked. The UNIFIL established a Regional Mine Action Coordination Center to manage the mine clearance activities and to conduct the mine awareness education. A liaison office involving all the actors in southern Lebanon was set up in close coordination with the national authorities. Collaboration between the UN, the Lebanese Government, and various donors continued to yield impressive landmine clearance results in southern Lebanon.

The UN called for the international community to consider further assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. The Lebanese Government greatly appreciated the economic and social program and humanitarian assistance, including “quick impact projects” and emergency medical services, provided by the UNIFIL to Lebanese citizens in its area of operations.

Outreach activities included efforts to promote good relations between the mission and local communities and to ensure the protection and freedom of movement. It also contributed to the full deployment of the LAF in southern Lebanon and expanding the authority of the Lebanese Government in the south.

5.12. Initiatives to Strengthen the LAF

As stated in Res.No.425, the most important steps to be taken in order to end the problems with Israel and to achieve lasting peace is for the Lebanese Government to reinstate its authority in the southern area of the country. The presence of a strong army is needed in the area in order to realize this aim. The control and authority of the

Lebanese Government in the southern Lebanon is a factor that concurrently enhances the safety and duties of UNIFIL.

The UN stressed the importance of international assistance aimed at bolstering the capacity of the LAF and Security Forces to defend Lebanese sovereignty and widen the authority of the government to throughout the entire country. The Lebanese Government also pledged to expand the capacity and presence of the LAF in southern Lebanon and the deployment of Lebanese battalions in the UNIFIL area of operations was an initial step in this process. This deployment made a great contribution towards the security of the UNIFIL and its freedom of movement. As it was, the primary responsibility for ensuring freedom of movement to UNIFIL personnel in said areas lies with the Lebanese authorities. Although the overall attitude of the local population towards the UNIFIL remained positive, some incidents of unfriendly behavior towards its patrols and personnel continued to occur.[570] The Secretary General called on Lebanese authorities to take firm, resolute action against perpetrators to curb and prevent these incidents that impeded the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and endangered the safety and security of peacekeepers.

The Strategic Dialogue between the LAF and UNIFIL was a means not only to strengthen the capacity of the LAF in assuming greater security responsibility in southern Lebanon, but also to move towards a viable ceasefire. The UNIFIL also continued to strengthen cooperation with the LAF and sought to further expand and enhance their coordinated activities, such as patrols, checkpoints, training exercises and drills. All efforts were focused on making the LAF stronger and more effective in the south, including the UNIFIL area of operations. In that context, the UNIFIL and

[570] Some of these incidents included throwing rocks, blocking roads and confiscating UN property, such as cameras, geographic information systems, communication equipment and maps.

LAF agreed to establish a 'model brigade' dedicated to the sector south of the Litani, in the UNIFIL area of operations as a concrete step towards enhancing the capacity of the LAF in implementing Res.No. 1701.[571] In order to strengthen the LAF, additional supplies of arms and ammunition, access to modern surveillance and communications equipment, and training in the use of such equipment were needed, leading to the Secretary General to call on member states to meet these requirements. Border surveillance was another priority for the Lebanese Government, which also required technical assistance and close cooperation with its neighbors.

The UNIFIL also supported the Lebanese Government through the establishment of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to assist the Lebanese Navy in securing its territorial waters. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued its dual mandate of carrying out maritime interdiction operations to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related material, as well as training the Lebanese Navy. Lebanese Navy personnel continued to demonstrate their increasing ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations and control Lebanese territorial waters through the use of coastal radar.

5.13. Disbanding all Lebanese and Non-Lebanese Militias

Although reaching a permanent peace in Lebanon required the disbandment of all armed groups, it was almost impossible, not only militarily, but also politically. As a result of efforts by the League of Arab States, an agreement was signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia on 22 October, 1989, which called for national reconciliation and spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. This year-long plan included the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,

[571] The letter from the Secretary General addressed to the president of the Security Council regarding the strategic review of UNIFIL, dated 8 March, 2017.

their weapons were to be turned over to the State of Lebanon within six months. In the agreement, Syrian and Lebanese Governments decided that Syrian forces would be deployed to Bekaa.[572] However, the Hezbollah was excluded from this category. The Lebanese Government objected to the categorization of the Hezbollah as a Lebanese militia, referring to it as a "national resistance group" whose goal was to defend Lebanon from Israel, and expel Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, namely the Shaba farms.[573]

The Secretary General repeatedly expressed his concern to Lebanese leaders about the serious risks armed groups posed to stability of the country and the region. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that a dialogue held with parties other than Lebanese authorities was indispensable in order to realize the implementation of the mandate to disarm and disband all militias, as stipulated in Res.No.1559. Although the Lebanese Governments made remarkable efforts in reducing the number of militias, several armed elements remained in the south. Regarding Palestinian armed groups, they were banned to exit their refugee camps with weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces posted outside the camps strictly enforced this regulation.

As emphasized by the Secretary General in his report that Hezbollah leaders also explained their willingness to disarm through the organization's integration into a broad national defense strategy mechanism for the protection of Lebanon. On the other hand, the Hezbollah also functioned as a political party with representation in Parliament. Furthermore, it continued to have strong support amongst the local population and maintained a significant non-military presence. Its engagement in the democratic political process of forming opinions and making decision could not have

[572] The Syrian-Lebanon Treaty of Cooperation signed in May, 1991 reiterated the same provision.
[573] The Lebanese Government informed the Secretary General the fragile security situation in southern Lebanon, the risk to Lebanon's stability and the lack of a comprehensive regional peace process would make it difficult to implement Res.No.1559 immediately and fully.

authorized them to possess an autonomous armed operational capacity outside the state authority.

Despite the Secretary General's repeated notice to the Lebanese Government, the question of the Hezbollah's disarmament remained at the center of political debate. According to the Israeli Government, Hezbollah's military capacity remained at a higher level than a year before.[574] In stating all the weapons in Hezbollah's control posed a strategic threat to security and to the safety of its citizens, Israel also claimed that the transfer of sophisticated weapons continued from the Iranian and Syrian border to the Hezbollah. Following these accusations, the Secretary General recommended an establishment of common border force within the context of the pilot project, led by Germany, along Lebanon's border with Syria.[575] The Secretary General pointed out in his report that without an effective and integrated border management system to prevent the smuggling of weapons, munitions and personnel, Lebanon's security and sovereignty would continue to be at greatest risk.

Moreover, the Secretary General called on the Hezbollah to comply with all relevant UNSC resolutions, and urged Syria and Iran to support its transformation into a political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Agreement and Res.No.1559.

5.14. Extension of the Authority of Lebanese Government over all Lebanese Territory

Ever since Res.No.425 (1978), the UNSC declared its support for the extension of the control of the Lebanese Government over all Lebanese territory.

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[574] Israel alleged that the Hezbollah's long-range rocket force was based in the area north of the Litani. They supplied hundreds of new generation rockets with a range of 250 kilometers, enabling them to strike Tel Aviv.

[575] The force would be responsible for the surveillance and control of Lebanon's northern border with Syria to prevent smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and other contraband from permanent and mobile observation posts.

Although some troops from the LAF were deployed to the southern part of the country in accordance with relevant resolutions and the Taif Agreement since the end of the civil war, the Lebanese Government was unable to extend its authority over the entire country until Israel fully withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon.[576] On the other hand, according to the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March, 1949, Israel and Lebanon would not deploy its military forces to the border frontier regions of the two countries. In imposing limits on the numbers and types of the military forces, the agreement stipulates that the Lebanese Government is permitted to deploy up to 1,500 troops in southern Lebanon. Notwithstanding the area around the Blue Line remained tense because of IDF violations, Lebanon held a peaceful municipal election in the south in May, 2004, regarded as another step towards in establishment of the its civil administration in southern Lebanon. In order to prevent a possible conflict with the IDF, the LAF was not deployed along the Blue Line, but UNIFIL troops still maintained these areas under their control.

5.15. Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Unity and Political Independence of Lebanon

Although the Security Council constantly called for Israel and Syria to show respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence, it was widely alleged in Lebanon that the Syrian military presence and intelligence officials provided Syria with considerable leverage over Lebanese domestic affairs. Undoubtedly, the presence of Syrian military forces in Lebanon prevented the Lebanese Government from taking an independent decisive position in resolving its own problems. In fact, Syria did not want to consider Lebanon as an independent country since its establishment in 1943. Despite the closeness of official

[576] However, after the withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon in 2000, the Hezbollah established checkpoints in these evacuated areas, with movements of UNIFIL personnel and Lebanese officials were also restricted at times by the armed elements.

ties between Lebanon and Syria, two countries never had formal diplomatic relations, there were no reciprocal embassies in Damascus and Beirut until 2010.

On the other hand, Israeli forces consistently violated Lebanese territory at all times by crossing its borders and by flying into Lebanese airspace.[577] The IDF continued its occupation of the northern part of Ghajar Village, and made daily intrusions into Lebanese airspace, which were absolute violations of both Lebanese sovereignty and the resolutions. Unjustified Israeli air incursions into Lebanese airspace continued throughout the years. These air incursions caused great concern to the civilian population, particularly supersonic low attitude flights over populated areas. Although the Israeli Government claimed these over-flights were carried out for security reasons, the Hezbollah also insisted that their attacks were a part of their legitimate self-defense rights in response to unjustified Israeli encroachment. In order to stop that chaotic situation, the Secretary General repeatedly urged the parties advising that "one violation does not justify another."

Other Israeli violations took place within the territorial waters of Lebanon. The IDF continued to conduct naval patrols inside Lebanese territorial waters, along the so-called line of buoys that were unilaterally planted inside Lebanese territorial waters.[578] Nonetheless, while it did not recognize this line was installed unilaterally, Lebanon considered this action to be another violation of its sovereignty and Res.No.1701. The IDF continued to carry out frequent maintenance activities at the buoys, at times with divers. On several occasions, IDF patrol boats south of the line of buoys fired machine guns or flares and dropped explosive charges to turn away Lebanese fishing boats, which caused tensions to escalate between the two states.

[577] They frequently penetrate deep into Lebanese territory and generate sonic booms over populated areas.
[578] Israel claimed that the line of buoys approximated the southern limit of Lebanese territorial waters.

However, the UNIFIL did not have a mandate to monitor the line of buoys. As mandated by the UNSC, UN supported the Lebanese Government through the establishment of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to assist the Lebanese Navy in securing its territorial waters.[579] This task force maintained a visible presence in the southern maritime operations area to prevent tensions between Israel and Lebanon.

[579] The Maritime Task Force was another achievement to assist the Lebanese Government in extending its authority over its territory and securing its territorial waters.

6. CONCLUSION

In considering Lebanon's challenging territory, deep-rooted ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as all the constant external interventions, UNIFIL is one of the most exhausting and frustrating but relatively successful peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN in Lebanon. It is a well-known fact that the most important obstacle for establishing peace in this region is the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which there are many interests of the major powers, as well as incompatible demands of the parties. These are the reasons the Secretary General called on the international community, and particularly the US, to intensify efforts in extending its political support to the Lebanese Government as well as to the peace process between Israel and Lebanon, and the Middle East at large. In the light of experiences it can be said that perpetual peace could come to the region only if this problem was completely resolved through diplomacy rather than by a different peacekeeping operation alone.

Had the problem only existed between Israel and Lebanon, it might have been cleared up long ago. However, the dispute between Israel and Lebanon has been a part of the Arab-Israeli conflict within the scope that is the Middle East. Therefore, the same power vectors would be valid in the struggle for the conflict resolution in Lebanon. External intervention has played a significant role in Lebanon case. Interventions, particularly from its regional neighbors have also been the key element in sustaining the prolonged conflict in Lebanon. This intervention included the supply of arms, financial support and the supply of fighters for the conflicting parties. Syria and Israel did not hesitate to intervene militarily in support of one group or another, which hindered the PKO from achieving its objectives (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2003). Furthermore, the religious and sectarian fractures in Lebanese society facilitated these

external interventions. While various Western actors patronized several Christian militia groups; the South Lebanon Army (SLA) or the DFF supported by Israel; the PLO and Amal were backed by Syria; and Hezbollah was promoted by Iran. However, these external supports were not enough to make any one party victorious. Despite several attempts, the Lebanese political parties could not independently reach a national reconciliation on their own in order to terminate the violence.[580]

As it is known, the UN came into being after World War II considering the failure of the League of Nations, the UN was designed and equipped with two main mechanisms to preserve international peace and security. The first was the collective security system and the second, a set of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.[581] The obligation of member states to settle their disputes through peaceful means, and to refrain from the threat or use of force were the main principles for the UN's approach to conflict resolution. The success of the system depended on the fulfillment of the member states' commitments on this issue. On the other hand, the UNSC does not need the consent of the parties to deal with any conflict if it poses a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, it can enforce its decisions whenever the parties are reluctant to comply. In some cases, the UNSC may need to recourse a binding decision, as an important leverage, to compel the parties to accept a peaceful solution.[582] However, the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council do not allow the use of this leverage effectively, especially when the interests of the major powers are in question. In other words, the UN tends to work

[580] The government composition continued to reflect the sectarian formula for power sharing and included members that were sympathetic to the side opposing the government.
[581] The essence of the concept of collective security is that the threat of collective force will deter aggressors, or failing deterrence, and that the actual employment of collective measures will defeat them.
[582] Normally, the UNSC only recommends the terms of settlement when it is satisfied that the parties themselves have exhausted all peaceful ways and the dispute is likely to escalate and endanger international peace and security. If the UNSC decides to enforce its specific solution to the conflict, it may employ coercive methods. such as imposing sanctions or authorizing a military action.

vigorously on issues only when hegemonic leadership or a dominant coalition emerges, in essence, in cases where great power interests are directly affected (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009).

Over time, the UN Conflict Resolution practice has had to adapt to changes according to the international environment. One of the most important adaptations has been the emergence of peacekeeping. The PKO is based on principles of impartiality, consent of the parties, and the non-use of force except in self-defense. Its main role is to contain and defuse conflicts, thereby provide a convenient climate for diplomatic negotiations or mediation. Although, the PKO has always had a good reputation for resolving conflicts, for all intents and purposes, it may become a substitute for a settlement, a perpetual treatment of symptoms rather than causes (Merrills, 1998). This is exactly what has taken place in Lebanon for the past 39 years. The UNIFIL has been there, not to solve all problems, but to provide a window for political/diplomatic initiatives. Its success depends on the political process, which goes way beyond what military force can achieve. Again, it is important to emphasize that the PKO is not designed to end a conflict on its own, hence other methods of the conflict resolution have to be applied to solve disputes that lie at the root of the conflict.[583] Nevertheless, expectations of the international community have always been higher than its potential.[584] Despite all its inadequacies, the UN PKO is still one of the more successful multilateral initiatives for maintaining international peace and security.

[583] Peacekeeping can deal only with the proximate causes of conflict rather than their underlying causes.
[584] There is a common tendency to consider a peacekeeping operation as some kind of panacea for all international conflicts.

Without a UN presence, it is too difficult to control incidents that are apt to explode unexpectedly in this volatile region. The experiences so far have proven the road to peace in the Middle East is always long and complicated, but the arrival of the Blue Helmets has always contributed towards improving the situation. Nonetheless, the UN alone cannot overcome the formidable challenges and problems of the Middle East. The international community can leverage more resources from regional and other organizations to meet the growing demand for peacekeepers (Le Roy, 2009).

The reality was that the UN had contributed to the decolonization of a majority of Arab countries and the creation of the state of Israel. However, despite the enormous effort of the international community, the Palestinian problem has yet to be resolved and it represents the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The hundreds of UNSC resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly only served to sharpen a crisis of confidence regarding the UN (Boutros-Ghali, 1999). From this aspect, the basic problems of the UNIFIL operation have been much more political than operational. The UNIFIL's failures have been caused more by breakdowns in the promises and diplomatic support of the operation than by any inadequate performance of the peacekeeping force on the ground. As indicated by Skogmo (1989), "the tragedy lays not so much in the inability of the UN to keep peace as its mandate requires, as it does in the global community's inability to provide it with the opportunity and support it needs to perform this function" (p. 286).

As the subject of this dissertation, Lebanon has also played a central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1978. The story began with the establishment of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in the early '70's, which also became a security issue for Israel as well. The tension escalated along the Israel-Lebanon border especially after

the relocation of PLO guerillas from Jordan to southern Lebanon. The PLO commandos began to infiltrate from Lebanon into northern Israel, and the IDF intensified its reprisals against the PLO's camps located in Lebanon. In response to a Palestinian commando raid resulted in many Israeli casualties on 11 March 1978, the IDF occupied the southern Lebanon within a few days. The Israeli invasion did not come as a surprise and many commentators had predicted a large-scale IDF action against the PLO. On 15 March 1978, the Lebanese Government lodged a strong protest to the UNSC against the Israeli occupation. On 19 March, the Council adopted Res.Nos.425/426 in which it called upon Israel to cease its military action immediately and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. It also decided on the immediate establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The force was charged with the responsibility of confirming the IDF withdrawal, for the restoration of international peace and security, and for assisting the Lebanese Government in establishing its authority in the south. The extraordinary diplomatic game at the UNSC resulted in the hasty establishment of the UNIFIL without the consent of the conflicting parties, which was the main source of troubles that lasted throughout the operation.[585] Jett (2000) asserts that if there is one single key element to successful peacekeeping, it is the cooperation of the conflicting parties. If the parties to conflict are determined to continue fighting, then there is no peace to keep. Besides having to defend itself against attacks from different militia groups within its area of operation, the UNIFIL was also obstructed and directly attacked by PLO guerrillas and pro-Israeli DFF militias. That was not an acceptable condition for a traditional peacekeeping force to carry out its mandate.

[585] The force could not be deployed only at the request of the host nation, but on the basis of an agreement between the parties to conflict.

Despite three major IDF operations and two large-size invasions in Lebanon, Israel could not achieve its objectives it set for itself at the beginning.[586] The Israeli invasion and reprisal strategy did not contribute to the solution and was accepted by neither Lebanon nor the UN. Although, Israel ejected the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, the conflict intensified even more with new actors, the Amal and the Hezbollah in the area, because it evolved beyond its alleged initial causes. Even if it was not accepted by the Israeli authorities, the reality was that apart from the UNIFIL and LAF, there were no instruments for Israel's security concern. However, Israeli authorities had difficulty accepting this fact until the full withdrawal of the IDF in the year 2000.

It is a truism to say that an action to protect international values and peace would be more likely if that action coincided with the interests of the major states. Hence, success of the UN operations can only be expected if undertaken by a superpower. No doubt that the role of the United States continues to be of prime importance in the Middle East. However, we can say that the US did not press the parties as much as it should have in coming up with a viable solution, that it didn't encourage Israel, which it could have easily persuaded, and that it turned a blind eye on the problems at hand.

Consequently, in determining which of the aspects of the UNIFIL operation, which has continued for the past 39 years, could be deemed successful, which areas could be considered failures, developing the right ones and taking lessons in order to correct the wrong ones will shed light on achieving the goal of this thesis.

There must be some criteria at hand for evaluation of success or failure of a UN mission. Although there is no common definition on the success of peacekeeping

[586] The Litani Operation in 1978, the Accountability Operation in 1993, and the Grapes of Wrath Operation in 1996. The Lebanon War of 1982 and the second war of 2006.

operations, some scholars have tried to set criteria for its evaluation. According to Diehl (1994), these are the criteria for evaluating a mission's success; a) whether the purpose stated in the mandate was fulfilled, b) specific accomplishments of the mission such as; number of people fed, disasters avoided, and ceasefire achieved, and c) the impact of the peacekeeping operation on the local population. Since most of the criteria are based on abstract concepts, it is almost impossible to make an assessment on which ones are commonly agreed upon. Durch (1993) argues for examining the mission in terms of whether it contributes to containing conflict and the underlying causes. More specifically, he asks whether the operation fulfilled its task as set forth in the mandate and whether it was effectively planned and executed. Although a PKO does not claim to solve underlying problems of a conflict, his emphasis on the tasks stipulated in a mandate can be considered as a correct approach (Druckman et al., 1997). With a normative approach, Robert C. Johansen stresses values including world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering. Bratt lists four distinct criteria for measuring success; a) completion of a mandate, b) facilitation of conflict resolution, c) containment of conflict, d) limitation of casualties (Bratt, 1996, p. 64). It is also important to recognize that almost every peacekeeping mission may be influenced by factors outside the control of the peacekeepers. As recounted above, it is difficult to decide on a proper standard. Another possible method of evaluation is that judging a mission against conditions that existed prior the UN intervention against an estimate of what would have happened without any mission. On the other hand, some studies on this issue confirmed that mission success is bound to Security Council commitment, the absence of external support for armed groups, successful diplomatic efforts, and a low degree of antagonism (Pushkina, 2006).

In taking the particular circumstances of the UNIFIL into account, the following criteria are considered more appropriate for evaluation:

a. Mandate performance

1) Withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon: the UNIFIL verified IDF withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 1978, 1983, 2000 and 2006. However, the IDF continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

2) The resumption of Lebanese Government authority in the south: That was another mission given to the UNIFIL deemed non-appropriate for a PKO.[587] It also requires further cooperation and collaboration with the other UN agencies, the Lebanese Government and LAF. Based on these abstract criteria, it is quite difficult to determine exactly whether this task has been completed or not.

b. Facilitation of the conflict resolution

1) Negotiation and mediation: UN diplomacy and UNIFIL assistance in the negotiation between the conflicting parties facilitated the resolution process for producing acceptable proposals to the problems.[588] The need for UN advocacy efforts, and engagement with political and military coordinators in Lebanon and Israel continued towards a permanent ceasefire. However, there is a common agreement in the literature that the success or failure of mediation is mainly determined by the causes of conflict rather than the actors.

2) Liaison and coordination: Successfully implementing the tripartite meeting and establishing liaison offices at LAF and IDF, UNIFIL headquarters

[587] However, assisting the deployment of the Lebanese Army troops to southern Lebanon, the UNIFIL partially contributed to the progress in establishing of the authority of the Lebanese Government.
[588] However, both sides had to keep the political will to negotiate with each other.

contributed in the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in order to prevent any uncontrolled escalations in the area.[589] The liaison mechanism enabled military representatives of the UNIFIL to directly reach the national authorities in expedited fashion.[590]

c. Limitation of casualty and conflict containment

1) Limiting violence: As the intermediary between the IDF and LAF, the UNIFIL helped prevent escalation of tensions along the Blue Line and maintain calm in its area of operations. Monitoring the situation in the area and reporting all violations to the UNSC enabled the Council to take deterrent measures against assailants, which, on paper, would prevent recurring incidents.

2) Mine clearance: There was too much unexploded ordnance and too many landmines in the UNIFIL area of operations which were of crucial concern and posed a serious hazard for both the local population and the UN military personnel. By establishing the Regional Mine Action Coordination Center, the UNIFIL enabled all endeavors to be effectively led from a single center.[591] With international support, UNIFIL demining teams were very successful in clearing minefields and unexploded ordnance along the Blue Line.

3) Reducing human suffering and increasing humanitarian aid: The humanitarian assistance activity conducted in its area of operations was considered

[589] The monthly tripartite meeting, chaired by the Force Commander with senior representatives of the LAF and the IDF, continued to be a critical element of UNIFIL liaison and coordination and essential mechanism to identify and address security and military operational issues with the parties and to reinforce the cessation of hostilities. Violations were discussed and UNIFIL made available to the parties its investigation reports on the incidents.
[590] Despite many attempts, the establishment of a UNIFIL liaison Office at the Ministry of Defence in Tel Aviv could not be realized yet.
[591] The center conducted the mine awareness education activities not only for the military personnel but also for the local people and children.

quite successful. After Israeli invasion operations and large-scale bombardment in southern Lebanon, the UNIFIL was tasked with distributing humanitarian aid to the desperate local population in its area with the support of other UN agencies, NGOs and international organizations.[592] Whenever Israel launched such military operations, the affected civil population inside the UNIFIL area increased considerably and their needs for relief materials increased proportionally. In this situation, UNIFIL humanitarian teams struggled to assist the local population through the distribution of food, potable water and the dispensing of medical aid. They also provided support on the ground by clearing away rubble to facilitate the repair of houses, schools, hospitals, and other facilities in coordination with the Lebanese authorities.[593] The local people were grateful to the UNIFIL for these humanitarian aid and its support.

d. The restoration of international peace and security

1) The demarcation of the Blue Line: There was no international boundary agreement between Israel and Lebanon.[594] For the practical purpose of confirming the IDF's withdrawal, the UN needed to identify a line to be adopted, which conformed the international boundaries, but it was not an attempt to delineate the national border. This would only be a technical line that would prevent the dispute and conflict between two states. The UNIFIL gradually completed the demarcation of the Blue Line with the consent of the parties over a ten-year period. However, since

[592] Such assistance took the form of water, clothes, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. In addition, medicines and equipment to schools were provided.
[593] This support also included medical supplies, water, clothing, blankets, food, fuel, electricity work, and repairs to buildings damaged as a result of Israeli bombardment.
[594] After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, a set of armistice agreements were signed between Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The agreement established the armistice line between Israel and its neighbors which was known as the Green Line. The agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed on 23 March, 1949 on the Lebanese-Israel border. Despite continuous efforts to reactivate the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in order to delineate the border between two states in 1980, Israeli authorities opposed this study and nothing was done.

2000, the Lebanese Government asserted the Blue Line was not valid in the Shaba Farms, which continued to be a potential contentious area between the two countries.

2) The safe return of displaced people: The people in the area considered the presence of the UNIFIL essential for their security and their safe passage home. The UNIFIL was regarded by the local population as a symbol of the international community's commitment to supporting and protecting them. The UNSC mobilized member states and international agencies to take immediate steps to extend financial and humanitarian assistance to facilitate safe passage home for the displaced people.

In taking all these matters into consideration, we need to find an answer to the following questions; 1) Why hasn't the UNIFIL PKO been withdrawn after 39 years? and 2) Why has it yet to bring lasting peace to the region? The answer is quite simple. There is still no peace in the Middle East to be preserved. There is only a PK force playing a role as an interposition force between the conflicting parties and a Security Council optimistic for peace that will subsequently fall into place on its own. Establishing peace between Israel and Lebanon is not the task of UNIFIL, but rather of statesmen and politicians who have the political will and awareness for consensus. It is glaringly clear that the actors and conditions in the region are still not conducive for reconciliation and peace. The long-drawn out existence of the UNIFIL has created an adverse effect by not allowing these conditions to mature. For this reason, trying to find an absolute success or failure under the PKO that has assigned to the region for nearly four decades will be an effort made in vain.

The problem does not have to do with insufficient numbers of soldiers, arms, vehicles or possibilities or a weakness in the chain of command of the UNIFIL as a force. The problem lies in the Arab-Israeli dilemma that has engulfed the entire

Middle East and constitutes the basis of the conflicts. Peace in the region will only be possible if the Arab-Israeli problems, including the Palestinian issue, are resolved. For this reason, the expectation the UNIFIL will soon complete its mission is a dream.

As indicated by Jett (2000), while the UN can be faulted on occasion for not managing the PKO element better than it has, there are other significant factors that affect the chance of success. While these are beyond the UN's control, this body can attempt to influence them if it is willing to recognize the need to do so. The principal external factors can be listed as follows; the conflicting parties, the country's internal dynamics and resources, its neighbors, and regional powers (Jett, 2000).

However, the study I conducted for my thesis has revealed the following conclusions;

- It is not appropriate to deploy peacekeepers to the region without the parties prepared and willing to settle for peace. The peacekeeping force must not be deployed to the region without the minimum requirements for success prepared in advance. Hasty interventions cause both unnecessary casualties and the UN's loss of reputation.

- The mandate must be clearly defined and avoid general expressions. Bold expectations and exaggerated missions should be kept out of the mandate. Missions beyond its capability could be interpreted as the apparent inability of the UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate. This causes ambivalence and confusion for the boots on the ground as well as harming the credibility and reputation of the UN.

- The ‘intrastate’ conflicts are very risky for PKOs for intervening in. Particularly, PK forces should not be deployed to internal conflict zones where armed ‘insurgents’ and groups partake in terrorism activities. PKOs are certainly not suitable for interfering in such problems. The UN should choose Peace Enforcement operations to intervene in such areas. However, the risks of using land troops in such operations should be reassessed carefully.

- If terrorist activities and internal conflicts continue unabated in neighboring countries of the region where the PK force is to be deployed, it should be taken into account that UN forces may be affected by this threat, whereas the ‘force structure’ should be tailored accordingly.

- The conflict zone brings with it some serious vital hazards, and UN personnel should use all available modern and technological protective gear. While developing troop contributing countries (TCC) providing troops with limited military equipment to PKO, it could not be accepted as a reason for the inadequacy of the UN peacekeeping force in the operational area. The UN have to maintain minimum military capability and safety standards for all their units.

- Regarding success, unnecessary insistence should be avoided and units should not be eroded by causalities. The PK mission should be terminated if acceptable success is not achieved within a reasonable period. The plan ‘B’ should be ready to be implemented at a moment’s notice to ensure a secure evacuation from the hazardous environment for the UN’s reputation and the peacekeeper's safety.

- To prevent the unnecessary personnel casualties and collateral damage that conflicts create, advanced technological equipment, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and surveillance satellites, rather than military personnel should be used in implementing the mandate tasked by the Security Council.

- The use of force is the most critical and important aspect of PKOs. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the units should not only be determined by the national authorities of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), but should also allow the on-site UN force commanders to intervene on a personal level. Because, they are the ones who closely monitor the situation on a real-time basis.

- While using force, the response and self-defense must be gradual and proportionate, and backed by the support of the UNSC.

- The logistical support lines of the PKO should not be under the control of conflicting parties, and the flow of provisions of the UN troops should not be left to the mercy and tolerance of the parties. The support promised in Host Nation Support (HNS) activities should be fulfilled without any hitches.

- Finally, it is important to emphasize that UN peacekeepers should avoid conflicts in which radical armed groups are actively operating. As it was pointed out by former US President Bill Clinton, “the UN must learn when to say No!” and March 1978 was the correct time to say “No” for UN peacekeeping involvement in southern Lebanon.

Although the UNIFIL is often blamed for failing to resolve the protracted problem in Lebanon, the force does not have the mandate or tools to deal with the root

causes of the conflict. Indeed, it is up to the conflicting parties to take the opportunity provided by the presence of the UNIFIL in order to achieve a durable peace. However, it is important to emphasize the fact that the UNIFIL operation can be considered a successful PKO that has helped to improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people, to build confidence between the states and continue to avoid the resumption of hostilities along the border between Israel and Lebanon.

Last, but not least, this study is expected to benefit researchers, scholars, and decision-makers at the UN Headquarters in establishing a framework to overcome the challenges of the upcoming UN PKOs. Furthermore, the lessons taken from the experiences in Lebanon would contribute to the progress of the current knowledge of PKO and the theory of conflict resolution. It is also hoped that the conclusions would encourage further research in the area of UN PKO, which is one of the most important instruments for maintaining international peace and security.

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
Appendix A: Abbreviations

- ADF: Arab Deterrent Force
- AOO: Area of Operation
- AOD: Area of Deployment
- APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier
- CR: Conflict Resolution
- CBM: Confidence Building Measures
- CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation
- COS: Chief of Staff
- DFF: De Facto Forces
- DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- HNS: Host Nation Support
- IDF: Israel Defence Forces
- ICRC: International Committee of Red Cross
- ICA: Israeli Controlled Area
- LF: Lebanese Front
- LAF: Lebanese Armed Forces
- MTF: Maritime Task Force
- NGO: Non Governmental Organization


- PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization
- PKO: Peacekeeping Operation
- PE: Peace Enforcement
- PB: Peace Building
- PSP: Prograsive Socialist Party
- ROE: Rules of Engagement
- S-G: Secretary General
- SLA: South Lebanon Army
- SSNP: Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- TCC: Troop Contributing Country
- UNSC: UN Security Council
- UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon
- UNICEF: UN Children's Emergency Fund
- UNDP: UN Development Programme
- UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization
- UNOGIL: UN Observer Group in Lebanon
- UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Appendix B: Structure of UNIFIL and Deployment Maps


Map 1 (UNIFIL Deployment as of March 1978)




Map 2 (UNIFIL Deployment as of December 1979)




Map 3 (UNIFIL Deployment as of June 1980)




Map 4 (UNIFIL Deployment as of June 1981)




Map 5 (UNIFIL Deployment as of June 1982)




Map 6 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1983)




Map 7 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1984)




Map 8 (UNIFIL Deployment as of October 1985




Map 9 (UNIFIL Deployment as of April 1986)




Map 10 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1987)




Map 11 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 1988)




Map 12 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1990)





Map 13 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1992)





Ouadiya
Habbush
Marhbiya
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOUN
Kafer Tibnit
Arnaoun
Chateau de Beaufort
Yohmor
El Qlaiaa
Cheqra
El Khiam
KHIAM
El Mari
NORHATT
Hasbaya
Chebaa
Kafer Chouba
Majdal Sbams
Ett Taiba
Kafer Kila
Misgav Am
Kefar Gil'adi
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
Base
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиц
Posición provisional


Map 14 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 1993)





Habbūsh
Aichiyé
Mourhbiyé
Kaoukaba
ATĪYAH
TAḤTĀ
Mazra'at Quaẓaiyé
Mahmoudiyé
Hasbaiya
Kafer Roumane
Blat
MARJAYOUN
Ebel es Saqi
Râchaiya al Foukhar
NORBATT
Kafer Tibnite
Khallaq
Tell Dibbine
Chebaa
Arnaoûn
El Qlaïaa
El Khiam
Kafer Choûba
Chateau de Beaufort
Kheube
KHIAM (OGL)
El Méri
Yohmor
Litani
Deir Mimess
Ett Taibe
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Qabrikha
Misgav'am
Bani Hayyan
Markabe
Kefar Gil'adi
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Houle
Ramin
Shaqrah
Meiss ej Jebel
Blida
Aytarun
Ramot Naftali
مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
Base
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联军部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНП Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联军部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНП
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa
موقع لقوات الدفاع الاسرائيلية و/او "جيش لبنان الجنوبي"
以色列国防军和（或）"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"


Map 15 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1994)




Habbūsh
Aichiyé
Mourhbiyé
Kaoukaba
Hasbaiya
Mahmoudiye
Blat
SN HQ
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOÛN
Ebel es Saqi
Rachaiya el Foukhar
NORBATT
Kafer Tibnite
Khardali
Tell Dibbine
Chebaa
Arnaoûn
El Olaiqa
El Khiam
Kafer Chouba
Jisr
Chateau de Beaufort
Kheube
KHIAM (OGL)
El Mer
Yohmor
Deir Mimess
Majdal Shams
Ett Taibé
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Misgav'am
Bani Hayyan Markabe
Kefar Gil'adi
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Houle
Ramin
Shadrah
Meiss ej Jebel
Dibâ
مركز مراقبة
瞭哨所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary posi
Position tempor
Временная поз
Posición provisi
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联军部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНП Запад и Севе
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联军部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между ра расположения батальонов ВСО
Límites entre batallones de la Fuer
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"
Israeli Defence Forces
and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israélienn
et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"


Map 16 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 1995)





Habbūsh
Aichiye
Kaoukaba
Mourhbiye
Mazra'at Ouazaiye
Blâte
HQ
NORWAY
Hasbaiya
AN NABAṬĪYAH AT' TAḤTĀ
Mahmoudiye
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOÛN
Ebel es Saqi
Râchaiya el Foukhâr
Chebaâ
Kafer Tibnite
Tell Dibbine
Khardala
NORBATT
Arnaoûn
El Qlaiaâ
Qa'qa'iyat al Jisr
Chateau de Beaufort
El Khiam
El Méri
Kafer Choûba
Zawtar ash Sharqiyah
Khaube
KHIAM (OGL)
Akiya
Yohmor
Deir Mimess
Litani
Ett Taibé
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
At Qantarah
Qabrikha
Misgav'am
Tūlin
Kefar Gil'adi
Bani Hayyan
As Sawwanah
Markabe
MAR (OGL)
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Khirbat Silm
Majdal Silm
Houlé
Safad
Shaqrah
Ramin
Meiss ej Jebel
Zutt
Yaḥun
Künin
33° 20'
مركز مراقبة
觀察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
檢查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de contrôl
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو


Map 17 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 1996)





Cartographic Section
Habbūsh
Aïchiyé
Mourhbiyé
Mazra'at Ouazaïyé
Kaoukaba
Blāte
HQ
NORWAY
Hāsbaïya
Mahmoudiyé
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOÛN
Ebel es Saqi
Bāchaïya el Foukhār
Kafer Tibnite
Teil Dibbine
Khardala
NORBATT
Chebaa
Arnaoûn
El Qlaïaâ
El Khiam
El Meri
Kafel Choûba
Chateau de Beaufort
Khaubé
KHIAM (OGL)
Yohmor
Litani
Deir Mimess
Majdal Shams
Ett Taïbé
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Qabrikhā
Misgav'am
Kefar Gil'adi
Bani Hayyan
Markabe
MAR (OGL)
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Houlé
Ramin
Shaqrah
Meiss ej Jabel
Blida
33° 20'
31°06'30"N
300
290
مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de contrôl
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límitee de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces
and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position


Map 18 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1997)




Cartographic Section
Habbūsh
Aichiyé
Mourlbiyé
Mazra'at Ouazaïyé
Kaoukaba
Blate
HQ
NORWAY
Hasbaiya
Mahmoudiyé
Kafer Roumane
MARJAYOÛN
Ebel Ces Saqi
ESTONIA
Bachaiya el Foukhar
Kafer Tibnite
Tell Dibbine
Khardale
NORBATT
Chebaa
Arnaoûn
El Qlaiaa
El Khiam
El Meri
Kafer Choûba
33° 20'
Jisr
Chateau de Beaufort
Khoûbe
KHIAM (DGL)
Yohmor
Litani
Deir Mimess
Ett Taïbe
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Qabrikha
Misgav'am
Kefar Gil'adi
Bani Hayyan
Markabe
MARK (OGL)
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Houle
Ramin
Shaqrah
Meiss ej Jebel
مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de contrôl
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte


Map 19 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 1998)




N NABAṬIYAH AT' TAḤTĀ
Mahmoûdiyé
Kafer Roumane
Mazra'at Ouazaïyé
Blâte
HQ NORWAT
Hâshaïya
MARJAYOÛN
Ebel es Saqi
Rächaïya el Foûkhâr
Kafer Tibnite
Tell Dibbine
Khardala
NORBATT
Chebaa
Arnaoûn
El Qlaïaa
El Khiâm
El Méri
Kafer Choûba
'qa'iyat al Jisr
Zawṭar ash Sharqiyah
Chateau de Beaufort
Khoûbé
KHIAM (OGL)
Yohmor
Litani
Deir Mimess
Ett Taïbé
Al Qantarah
Kafer Kela
Metulla
Majdal Shams
Misgav'am
Gabrikhā
Kefar Gil'adi
Bani Hayyan
As Sawwanah
Markaba
MAR (OGL)
QIRYAT SHEMONA
Majdal Silm
Houlé
Ramin
Shaqrah
Meiss ej Jebel
Yarun
Kunin
Blida
Aynata
310000N
33° 20'
300
290
مركز مراقبة
观察所
1-24
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
1-28
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de contrôl
قاعدة
基地
6-4
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和（或）"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces

Map 20 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 1999)





Habbūsh
Kafer Roumâne
Aïchîyé
Mahmoûdiyé
Mourhbiyé
Mazra'at Ouazaïyé
Kaoukaba
HQ INDBATT
Blâte
Râsbayyâ
Marj 'Uyûn
Ebel es Saqi
Râchaïya el Foukhâr
Kafr Tibnît
Khardala
Tell Dibbîne
INDBATT
Shab'â
Arnûn
Al Qûlay'ah
Al Khiyâm
Kafer Choûba
Chateau de Beaufort
Khîeubé
KHIAM (OGL)
El Mérî
Yohmor
Dayr Mîmâs
33° 20'
Majdal Shams
Al Qantarah
Itt Taïbé
Kafer Kela
Metûlla
Qabrikhâ
Misgav'am
Bani Hayyan
Kefar Gil'adi
Markabâ
MAR (OGL)
Qiryat Shemona
Hûlâ
Ramin
Shaqrah
Mays al Jabal
Blîdâ
310
300
290
مركز مراقبة
观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación
نقطة تفتيش
检查站
Check point
Point de contrôle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de contrôl
قاعدة
基地
Base
Base
База
Base
موقع مؤقت
临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional
الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza
حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte
وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»


Map 21: Line of Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon, “Blue Line”




Map 22 (UNIFIL Deployment as of October 2000)


UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL
LEBANON
ISRAEL
SYRIAN
Mediterranean Sea
INDBATT
FINBATT
GHANBATT
IRISHBATT
NEPBATT
FIJIBATT
KHIAM (OGL)
MAR (OGL)
RAS (OGL)
HIN (OGL)
LAB (OGL)
Marjayoun
Al Khiyam
Kafr Shuba
Hasbaiyya
Harat al Hart
Shwayya
Ibl as Saqy
Al Ghajar
Majdal Shams
Zawtar ash Sharqiyat
Tibnin
Shqra
Mays al Jabal
Bint Jubayl
Aytaroun
Bilda
Ramot Naftali
Yiftah
Dishon
Yesud Hama'ala
Alma
Sede Eliezer
Pinhaniya
Avivim
Yir'on
Baram
Dovev
Yarun
Fassut
Rmaich
Ayta ash Shab
Dibil
Rashaf
Haddathah
Brashit
Bayt Yahun
At Tiri
Bay Lif
Ramyah
Yarin
Marwahin
Shihin
Shama
Majdal Zun
Al Bayyadah
Al Mansuri
Al Hinniyah
Al Qulaylah
Ayn Baal
Dayr Qanun
Ar Rashidiyah
Shabrikha
Yahun
Qana
Tayr Zibna
Kafra
Barish
Sthur
Tyre
Felsayh
Tayr Harfa
Alma ash Shab
Hanita
Shelomi
Naharyia
Rosh HaNiqra
Nakoura
Yaara
Adamit
Bloumiera
Sheitula
Even Menahem
Eilon
Qabrikha
At Tayyabah
Addaiseh
Kfar Kila
Metulla
Misgav Am
Kefar Giladi
HaGoshrim
Margaliyyot
Maranara
Qiryat Shemona
Marjayoun
Al Qulaylah
Khirbat Silim
Majdal Silim
Tulin
Frun
Kfar Dunin
Tibnin
Haddathah
Brashit
Mays al Jabal
Shqra
Bayt Yahun
Rashaf
At Tiri
Bint Jubayl
Aytaroun
Bilda
Ramot Naftali
Yiftah
Dishon
Yesud Hama'ala
Alma
Sede Eliezer
Pinhaniya
Avivim
Yir'on
Baram
Dovev
Yarun
Fassut
Rmaich
Ayta ash Shab
Dibil
Rashaf
Haddathah
Brashit
Bayt Yahun


Map 23 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2001)




Map 24 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2002)




Map 25 (UNIFIL Deployment as of January 2003)


UNIFIL DEPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL
联黎部队的部署情形
وزع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
LEBANON
SYRIA
ISRAEL
INDBATT
GHANBATT
Mediterranean Sea
Harat al Hart
Shwayya
Hasbayya
Shaba
Majdal Shams
Mughir Shaba
Kafr Shuba
Al Ghajar
Marjayoun
Ibil as Saqi
Al Qulaylah
Al Khiyam
KHIAM
Kafr Kila
Metulla
Misgav Am
Kefar Gil'adi
HaGosherim
Margaliyyot
Dnyat Shemona
Manara
Addaisseh
Markaba
MAR
Hula
Mays al Jabal
Bilda
Yiftah
Ramot Naftali
Dishon
Yesud Hamaala
Avivim
Alma
Sede Eliezer
Rihaniya
Yiron
Baram
Dovev
Fassut
Eilon
Menahem
Even Shetula
Adamit
Yara
Hanita
Sheiomi
Nahariyya
Rosh HaNiqra
Naqoura
Alma ash Shab
Yarin
Marwahin
Shomera
Zarit
Ramyah
Ayta ash Shab
RAS
Ramaich
Yarun
Aytaron
Aynata
Bayt Yahun
Haddathah
Brashit
Khirbat Silm
Maidal Silm
Qabrikha
Tulin
Al Tayyabah
Kafr Kila
Addaisseh
Frun
Zawtar ash Sharqiyat
Tibnin
Shaqra
Kafra
Haris
Yatar
Rshaf
Al Tiri
Bint Jubayl
Dibal
Bay Lif
Shihin
HIN
Majdal Zun
Al Bayyadah
Al Mansuri
Al Hinniyah
Ayn Baba
Dayr Qanun
Ar Rashidiyah
Jwayya
Diana
Kafr Dunin
Tayr Zibna
Barish
Shhur
Tayr Falsayh
Tura
Maarakah
Yahun
Shabriha
Sur (Tyre)
Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC)
Tayr Harfa
Yarin
Adamit
Hanita
Yara
Sheiomi
Eilon
Menahem
Even Shetula
Fassut
Dovev
Baram
Rihaniya
Alma
Sede Eliezer
Yesud Hamaala
Dishon
Avivim
Yiftah
Ramot Naftali
Bilda
Mays al Jabal
Aytaron
Aynata
Bayt Yahun
Haddathah
Brashit
Khirbat Silm
Maidal Silm
Qabrikha
Tulin
Al Tayyabah
Kafr Kila
Addaisseh
Misgav Am
Kefar Gil'adi
HaGosherim
Margaliyyot
Dnyat Shemona
Manara


Map 26 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2004)




Map 27 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2005)



Map 28 (UNIFIL Deployment as of July 2006)


UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL
Mediterranean Sea
LEBANON
ISRAEL
SYRIA Arab Republic
INDBATT
GHANBATT
CHINBATT
GHANA
FRANCE
POLAND
ITALY
INDIA
COMPOSITE
UNIFIL
Naqoura
Tyre
Sidon
Beirut
Haifa
Nahariyya
Metula
Kfar Kila
Bint Jbayl
Marjayoun
Hasbaya
Harat al Hart Shwayya
Hebbariye
Kafr Hammam
Shaba
Kafr Shuba
Al Khiyam
Al Qulayah
Ibil as Saqy
Al Ghajar
Majdal Shams
Mughr Sheba
Zawtar ash Sharqiyat
Tayr Falsayh
Shhur
Maarakah
Barish
Tayr Zibna
Kafra
Yaater
Rashaf
At Tiri
Dibil
Ramyah
Ayta ash Shab
Rmaich
Yarun
Aytarun
Ramot Naftali
Yiftah
Bilda
Mays al Jabal
Bayt Yahun
Aymata
Avivim
Dishon
Yesud Hamaala
Alma
Rihaniya
Sede Eliezer
Dovev
Baram
Yiron
Fassuut
Even Menahem
Shelula
Marwahin
Zarit
Shomera
Adamit
Yara
Elon
Shelomi
Rosh HaNiqra
Hanita
Alma ash Shab
Yarino
Ayn Bal
Dayr Qanun
Qana
Jwayya
Ar Rashidiyah
Shabriha
Tura
Al Qulaylah
Al Hinniyah
Al Mansuri
Al Bayyadah
Shama
Majdal Zun
Haris
Haddatah
Brashit
Tibnin
Shaqra
Khirbat Silm
Majdal Silm
Kafr Dunin
Qabrikha
Addaisseh
Markaba
Hula
Kfar Gilad
Misgav Am
HaGosherim
Margaliyyot
Qiryat Shemona
Manara
At Tayyabah
Fqun
Tulin
Ayn Ebel
Ayn Ata
Ayn Qana
Ayn Ata

Map 29 (UNIFIL Deployment as of June 2008)



Military component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon as at 25 February 2008[a]

	Military component deployed in UNIFIL		
Country	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*
Belgium	5	359	364
China	8	335	343
Croatia	1	0	1
Cyprus	2	0	2
France	22	1 434	1 456
Germany	7	534	541
Ghana	19	849	868
Greece	3	280	283
Guatemala	1	0	1
Hungary	4	0	4
India	13	869	882
Indonesia	7	850	857
Italy	33	2 561	2 594
Ireland	7	0	7
Korea	3	359	362
Luxembourg	0	2	2
Malaysia	7	360	367
Nepal	9	850	859
Netherlands	1	145	146
Poland	8	481	489
Portugal	5	141	146
Slovenia	0	14	14
Spain	15	1 119	1 134
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1	0	1
Turkey	3	904	907
United Republic of Tanzania	2	75	77
Total	**186**	**12 521**	**12 707**

Appendix C: Resolutions of The Security Council on the UNIFIL



Resolution 425 (1978)

of 19 March 1978

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon[19] and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,[20]

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,[21]

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

3. *Decides*, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[22]

[19] *Ibid.*, documents S/12600 and S/12606.
[20] *Ibid.*, document S/12607.
[21] *Ibid., Thirty-third Year*, 2071st meeting.
[22] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 426 (1978)

of 19 March 1978

The Security Council

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;[23]

2. *Decides* that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

Adopted at the 2075th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[24]

Decision

At its 2076th meeting, on 3 May 1978, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/12675)".[25]

Resolution 427 (1978)

of 3 May 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,[26]

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

1. *Approves* the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;

2. *Takes note* of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay;

4. *Deplores* the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.

Adopted at the 2076th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[27]

[23] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978.*
[24] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.
[25] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978.*
[26] *Ibid.*, document S/12675.
[27] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 434 (1978)

of 18 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March and 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978,

Recalling in particular that, in its resolution 425 (1978), the Council called for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

Gravely concerned at the serious conditions in Lebanon, which continue to endanger the achievement of a just and lasting solution of the Middle East question,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 September 1978[32] on the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions,

Commending the outstanding performance of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in seeking to carry out its mandate as established in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978),

Deeply grieved at the loss of life suffered by the Force,

Conscious of the progress already achieved by the Force towards the establishment of peace and security in Southern Lebanon,

Noting with concern that the Force has encountered obstacles in deploying freely throughout its area of operation and that it has not been possible as yet for the Lebanese Government fully to restore its authority over all its territory in accordance with resolution 425 (1978),

Supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and taking into account the observations in his report describing the problems encountered by the Force in carrying out its mandate,

Resolution 444 (1979)

of 19 January 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March, 427 (1978) of 3 May and 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978,

Recalling also the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 8 December 1978 (S/12958),[7]

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 12 January 1979, contained in document S/13026 and Corr.1,[6]

Expressing concern at the grave situation in Southern Lebanon resulting from obstacles placed in the way of the full implementation of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978),

Reiterating its conviction that the continuation of the situation constitutes a challenge to its authority and a defiance of its resolutions,

Noting with regret that the Force has reached the end of its second mandate without being enabled to complete all the tasks assigned to it,

Stressing that free and unhampered movement for the Force is essential for the fulfilment of its mandate within its entire area of operation,

Reaffirming the necessity for the strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

Re-emphasizing the temporary nature of the Force as set out in its terms of reference,

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon taking into account the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Deplores* the lack of co-operation, particularly on the part of Israel, with the efforts of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon fully to implement its mandate, including assistance lent by Israel to irregular armed groups in Southern Lebanon;

2. *Notes with great appreciation* the efforts being made by the Secretary-General, the commanders and soldiers of the Force and the staff of the United Nations, as well as by Governments which have lent their assistance and co-operation;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* with the declared policy of the Government of Lebanon and the steps already taken for the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and encourages it to increase its efforts, in co-ordination with the Force, to re-establish its authority in that area;

4. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for a period of five months, that is, until 19 June 1979;

5. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General and the Force to continue to take all effective measures deemed necessary in accordance with the approved guidelines and terms of reference of the Force as adopted by the Security Council[8] and invites the Government of Lebanon to draw up, in consultation with the Secretary-General, a phased programme of activities to be carried out over the next three months to promote the restoration of its authority;

6. *Urges* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;

7. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and to meet again within three months to assess the situation.

Adopted at the 2113th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[9]

At its 2148th meeting, on 14 June 1979, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Egypt, Iran, Ireland, Jordan and the Netherlands to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 450 (1979)

of 14 June 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March, 427 (1978) of 3 May and 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978, and the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 8 December 1978 (S/12958),[7]

Recalling also, and particularly, its resolution 444 (1979) of 19 January 1979 and the statements made by the President of the Security Council on 26 April (S/13272)[20] and on 15 May 1979,[21]

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[22]

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon and noting with concern the questions raised in its letters addressed to the Security Council on 7 May,[23] 30 May[24] and 11 June 1979,[25]

Reaffirming its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

Expressing its anxiety about the continued existence of obstacles to the full deployment of the Force and the threats to its very security, its freedom of movement and the safety of its headquarters, which prevented the completion of the phased programme of activities,

Convinced that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and impedes the achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the area,

1. *Strongly deplores* acts of violence against Lebanon that have led to the displacement of civilians, including Palestinians, and brought about destruction and loss of innocent lives;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to cease forthwith its acts against the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, in particular its incursions into Lebanon and the assistance it continues to lend to irresponsible armed groups;

3. *Calls also upon* all parties concerned to refrain from activities inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and to cooperate for the fulfilment of these objectives;

4. *Reiterates* that the objectives of the Force as set out in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 444 (1979) must be attained;

5. *Highly commends* the performance of the Force and reiterates its terms of reference as set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[8] and approved by resolution 426 (1978), in particular that the Force must be enabled to function as an effective military unit, that it must enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks and that it must continue to be able to discharge its duties according to the above-mentioned terms of reference, including the right of self-defence;

6. *Reaffirms* the validity of the General Armistice Agreement[26] between Israel and Lebanon in accordance with its relevant decisions and resolutions and calls upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission and to ensure full respect for the safety and freedom of action of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

7. *Urges* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;

8. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, that is, until 19 December 1979;

9. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

Adopted at the 2149th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[27]

Decisions

At its 2155th meeting, on 29 June 1979, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights: letters dated 13 March 1979 and 27 June 1979 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the President of the Security Council (S/13164[6] and S/13418)".[15]

[20] *Ibid., Thirty-fourth Year,* 2141st meeting, para. 2.

[21] *Ibid.,* 2144th meeting, para. 2.

[22] *Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1979,* document S/13384.

[23] *Ibid.,* document S/13301.

[24] *Ibid.,* document S/13361.

[25] *Ibid.,* document S/13387.

[26] *Ibid., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.*

[27] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 459 (1979)

of 19 December 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March, 427 (1978) of 3 May and 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978, 444 (1979) of 19 January and 450 (1979) of 14 June 1979, as well as the statements made by the President of the Security Council on 8 December 1978 (S/12958),[7] on 26 April (S/13272)[20] and on 15 May 1979,[21]

Recalling its debate on 29 and 30 August 1979[44] and the statements of the Secretary-General concerning the cease-fire,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[45]

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon and noting with concern the continued violations of the cease-fire, the attacks on the Force and the difficulties in implementing Security Council resolutions,

Expressing its anxiety about the continued existence of obstacles to the full deployment of the Force and the threats to its very security, its freedom of movement and the safety of its headquarters,

Convinced that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and impedes the achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the area,

Reaffirming its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, and welcoming the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to reassert its sovereignty and restore its civilian and military authority in Southern Lebanon,

1. *Reaffirms* the objectives of resolutions 425 (1978) and 450 (1979);

2. *Expresses its support* for the efforts of the Secretary-General to consolidate the cease-fire and calls upon all parties concerned to refrain from activities inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and to co-operate for the fulfilment of these objectives;

3. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General and the Force to continue to take all effective measures deemed necessary in accordance with the approved guidelines and terms of reference of the Force as adopted in resolution 426 (1978);

4. *Takes note* of the determination of the Government of Lebanon to draw up a programme of action, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to promote the restoration of its authority in pursuance of resolution 425 (1978);

5. *Takes note also* of the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to obtain international recognition for the protection of the archaeological and cultural sites and monuments in the city of Tyre in accordance with international law and the Convention of The Hague of 1954,[46] under which such cities, sites and monuments are considered to be a heritage of interest to all mankind;

6. *Reaffirms* the validity of the General Armistice Agreement[26] between Israel and Lebanon in accordance with its relevant decisions and resolutions and calls upon the parties, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission and to ensure full respect for the safety and freedom of action of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

7. *Highly commends* the performance of the Force and its Commander, and reiterates its terms of reference as set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[8] and approved by resolution 426 (1978), in particular that the Force must be enabled to function as an efficient military unit, that it must enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks and that it must continue to be able to discharge its duties according to the above-mentioned terms of reference, including the right of self-defence;

8. *Urges* all Member States which are in a position to do so to continue to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;

9. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, that is, until 19 June 1980;

10. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

Adopted at the 2180th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[47]

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[44] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year,* 2164th and 2165th meetings.

[45] *Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1979,* document S/13691.

[46] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (United Nations, *Treaty Series,* vol. 249, p. 240).

[47] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 467 (1980)

of 24 April 1980

The Security Council,

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon,[29]

Having studied the special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 11 April 1980[30] and the subsequent statements, reports and addenda,

Having expressed itself through the statement of the President of the Security Council of 18 April 1980,[27]

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979) and 459 (1979),

Recalling the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[31] confirmed by resolution 426 (1978), and particularly:

(*a*) That the Force "must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit",

(*b*) That the Force "must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks",

(*c*) That the Force "will not use force except in self-defence",

(*d*) That "self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council",

1. *Reaffirms* its determination to implement the above-mentioned resolutions, particularly resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 459 (1979), in the totality of the area of operation assigned to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, up to the internationally recognized boundaries;

2. *Condemns* all actions contrary to the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions and, in particular, strongly deplores:

(*a*) Any violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity;

(*b*) The military intervention of Israel in Lebanon;

(*c*) All acts of violence in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon;[32]

(*d*) Provision of military assistance to the so-called *de facto* forces;

(*e*) All acts of interference with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

(*f*) All acts of hostility against the Force and in or through its area of operation as inconsistent with Security Council resolutions;

(*g*) All obstructions of the ability of the Force to confirm the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, to supervise the cessation of hostilities, to ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, to control movement and to take measures deemed necessary to ensure the effective restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon;

(*h*) Acts that have led to loss of life and physical injuries among the personnel of the Force and of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, their harassment and abuse, the disruption of communication, as well as the destruction of property and material;

3. *Condemns* the deliberate shelling of the headquarters of the Force and more particularly the field hospital, which enjoys special protection under international law;

4. *Commends* the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and by the interested Governments to bring about the cessation of hostilities and to enable the Force to carry out its mandate effectively without interference;

5. *Commends* the Force for its great restraint in carrying out its duties in very adverse circumstances;

6. *Calls attention* to the provisions in the mandate that would allow the Force to use its right to self-defence;

7. *Calls attention* to the terms of reference of the Force which provide that it will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation will not be utilized for hostile activities of any kind;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convene a meeting, at an appropriate level, of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission to agree on precise recommendations and further to reactivate the General Armistice Agreement conducive to the restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon over all its territory up to the internationally recognized boundaries;

9. *Calls upon* all parties concerned and all those capable of lending any assistance to co-operate with the Secretary-General in enabling the Force to fulfil its mandate;

10. *Recognizes* the urgent need to explore all ways and means of securing the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978), including enhancing the capacity of the Force to fulfil its mandate in all its parts.

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on the progress of these initiatives and the cessation of hostilities.

Adopted at the 2218th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America).

Decisions

In a letter dated 28 April 1980,[33] the Secretary-General informed the Council that it was his intention to replace the Norwegian medical unit, withdrawn from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, by a medical unit from Sweden, subject to the usual consultations, if and when the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Force. In a letter dated 29 April,[34] the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"I have brought your letter dated 28 April 1980 to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in consultations on 29 April and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter.

"The representative of China has informed me that China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), dissociates itself from this matter."

At its 2219th meeting, on 29 April 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Bulgaria, Guyana, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the United Arab Emirates to participate, without vote, in the further discussion of the item entitled:

"The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights:

"Letter dated 6 March 1980 from the Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13832);[16]

"Letter dated 24 March 1980 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13855)".[16]

Resolution 474 (1980)

of 17 June 1980

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979) and 467 (1980), as well as the statement by the President of the Security Council of 18 April 1980,[27]

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 12 June 1980,[42]

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon and noting with concern the questions raised in its letters addressed to the Security Council on 8 May,[43] 17 May[44] and 27 May 1980,[45]

Convinced that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East,

Reaffirming its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

Commending the performance of the Force, yet expressing its concern about the continued existence of obstacles to the full deployment of the Force and its freedom of movement, the threats to its security and the safety of its headquarters,

1. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a period of six months, that is, until 19 December 1980, and reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the mandate of the Force throughout its entire area of operation up to the internationally recognized boundaries, according to the terms of reference and guidelines as stated and confirmed in the appropriate Security Council resolutions;

2. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and fully endorses the conclusions and recommendations expressed therein;

3. *Strongly condemns* all actions contrary to the provisions of the mandate and, in particular, continued acts of violence that prevent the fulfilment of this mandate by the Force;

4. *Takes note* of the steps already taken by the Secretary-General to convene a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission and urges the parties concerned to extend to him their full co-operation in accordance with the relevant Security Council decisions and resolutions, including resolution 467 (1980);

5. *Takes note* of the efforts deployed by Member States, and more particularly the troop-contributing countries, in support of the Force and urges all those which are in a position to do so to continue to use their influence with those concerned so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;

6. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

Adopted at the 2232nd meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[46]

Decisions

At its 2233rd meeting, on 24 June 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 28 May 1980 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13966)".[25]

At the same meeting, the Council also decided, by a vote, that an invitation should be accorded to the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate and that that invitation would confer upon it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Adopted by 10 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 4 abstentions (France, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

At the same meeting, the Council further decided, at the request of the representative of Tunisia,[47] to extend an invitation to Mr. Clovis Maksoud under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At its 2234th meeting, on 24 June 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Lebanon, Mauritania and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2235th meeting, on 26 June 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cuba, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Senegal to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2236th meeting, on 26 June 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Malaysia, Turkey, Yemen and Yugoslavia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At the same meeting, the Council also decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to the Rapporteur of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

At its 2238th meeting, on 27 June 1980, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Bahrain, Somalia, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates to

[46] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

[47] Document S/14012, incorporated in the record of the 2233rd meeting.

Resolution 483 (1980)

of 17 December 1980

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980) and 474 (1980),

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 12 December 1980,[54]

Noting the letter dated 15 December 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General,[55]

Convinced that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East,

Reaffirming its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon;

2. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, that is, until 19 June 1981, and reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the mandate of the Force throughout its entire area of operation up to the internationally recognized boundaries, according to the terms of reference and guidelines as stated and confirmed in the appropriate Security Council resolutions;

3. *Commends* the performance of the Force and reiterates its terms of reference as set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[31] and approved by resolution 426 (1978), in particular that the Force must be enabled to function as an efficient military unit, that it must enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks and that it must continue to be able to discharge its duties according to the above-mentioned terms of reference, including the right of self-defence;

4. *Expresses its support* for the Lebanese Government in its efforts to strengthen its authority, both at the civilian and at the military level, in the zone of operation of the Force;

5. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts to reactivate the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, takes note of the preparatory meeting that was held on Monday, 1 December 1980, and calls on all parties to continue such efforts as are necessary for the total and unconditional implementation of the General Armistice Agreement;[32]

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to intensify discussions among all the parties concerned, so that the Force may complete its mandate, and to report periodically on the results of his efforts to the Security Council;

7. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

Adopted at the 2258th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[56]

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[52] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

[53] Document S/14271, incorporated in the record of the 2256th meeting.

[54] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980*, document S/14295.

[55] *Ibid.*, document S/14296.

[56] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 490 (1981)

of 21 July 1981

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the urgent appeal made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 17 July 1981,[27] which reads as follows:

> "The President of the Security Council and the members of the Council, after hearing the report of the Secretary-General,[26] express their deep concern at the extent of the loss of life and the scale of the destruction caused by the deplorable events that have been taking place for several days in Lebanon.
>
> "They launch an urgent appeal for an immediate end to all armed attacks and for the greatest restraint so that peace and quiet may be established in Lebanon and a just and lasting peace in the Middle East as a whole.",

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General in this respect,

1. *Calls* for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks;

2. *Reaffirms* its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than forty-eight hours from its adoption.

Adopted unanimously at the 2293rd meeting.

Resolution 498 (1981)

of 18 December 1981

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 474 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981) and 490 (1981),

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 11 December 1981,[35] and taking note of the conclusions and recommendations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General dated 14 December 1981,[36]

Convinced that the deterioration of the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 425 (1978), in which it

(*a*) *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

(*b*) *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

(*c*) *Decides*, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern

Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

2. *Reaffirms* its past resolutions and particularly its repeated calls upon all concerned for the strict respect of the political independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon;

3. *Reiterates* its determination to implement resolution 425 (1978) in the totality of the area of operation assigned to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon up to the internationally recognized boundaries so that the Force may fulfil its deployment and so that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization may resume its normal functions, unhindered, under the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949;[37]

4. *Calls upon* all concerned to work towards the consolidation of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in resolution 490 (1981) and reiterates its condemnation of all actions contrary to the provisions of the relevant resolutions;

5. *Calls attention* to the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[20] confirmed by resolution 426 (1978), and particularly:

(*a*) That the Force "must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit";

(*b*) That the Force "must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks";

(*c*) That the Force "will not use force except in self-defence";

(*d*) That "self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council";

6. *Supports* the efforts of the Government of Lebanon in the civilian and military fields of rehabilitation and reconstruction in southern Lebanon, and supports, in particular, the restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon in that region and deployment of substantial contingents of the Lebanese army in the area of operation of the Force;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his discussions with the Government of Lebanon, with a view to establishing a joint phased programme of activities to be carried out during the present mandate of the Force, aimed at the total implementation of resolution 425 (1978), and to report periodically to the Security Council;

8. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for six months, that is, until 19 June 1982;

9. *Commends* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the performance of the Force, as well as the support of the troop-contributing Governments, and of all Member States who have assisted the Secretary-General, his staff and the Force in discharging their responsibilities under the mandate;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and to review, within two months, the situation as a whole in the light of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General dated 14 December 1981.

Resolution 501 (1982)

of 25 February 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 474 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981), 490 (1981) and 498 (1981),

Acting in accordance with its resolution 498 (1981), and in particular with paragraph 10 of that resolution in which it decided to review the situation as a whole,

Having studied the special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[6]

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council,[7]

Having reviewed the situation as a whole in the light of the report of the Secretary-General and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General that it is the strong recommendation of the Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, and also the wish of the Government of Lebanon, that the ceiling for troops of the Force should be increased, and that the Secretary-General fully supports the recommendation for an increase by one thousand of the troop strength of the Force,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 425 (1978) which reads:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Taking note* of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon[8] and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,[9]

"*Having heard* the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,[10]

"*Gravely concerned* at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

"*Convinced* that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

"1. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

"2. *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

"3. *Decides,* in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of

Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution."

2. *Decides* to approve the immediate increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon recommended by the Secretary-General in paragraph 6 of his report,[6] from six thousand to approximately seven thousand troops, to reinforce present operations as well as to make further deployment possible on the lines of resolution 425 (1978);

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978[11] confirmed by resolution 426 (1978), and particularly:

(*a*) That the Force "must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit";

(*b*) That the Force "must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary to the performance of its tasks";

(*c*) That the Force "will not use force except in self-defence";

(*d*) That "self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council";

4. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to renew his efforts to reactivate the General Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel of 23 March 1949[12] and, in particular, to convene an early meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his discussions with the Government of Lebanon and the parties concerned with a view to submitting a report by 10 June 1982 on the necessary requirements for achieving further progress in a phased programme of activities with the Government of Lebanon;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and invites the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the situation as a whole within two months.

Resolution 508 (1982)

of 5 June 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and its ensuing resolutions and, more particularly, resolution 501 (1982),

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Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982,[26]

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region,

Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon,

Reaffirming and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 4 June 1982,[24] as well as the urgent appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1982,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,[27]

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and not later than 0600 hours, local time, on Sunday, 6 June 1982;

2. *Requests* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the present resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of the present resolution.

Resolution 509 (1982)

of 6 June 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 508 (1982),

Gravely concerned at the situation as described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council,[28]

Reaffirming the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

1. *Demands* that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

2. *Demands* that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

3. *Calls* on all parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their acceptance of the present resolution within twenty-four hours;

[26] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1982*, documents S/15161 and S/15162.
[27] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year*, 2374th meeting.
[28] *Ibid.*, 2375th meeting.

Resolution 511 (1982)

of 18 June 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981), 490 (1981), 498 (1981) and 501 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[31] and taking note of the conclusions and recommendations expressed therein,

Bearing in mind the need to avoid any developments which could further aggravate the situation and the need, pending an examination of the situation by the Security Council in all its aspects, to preserve in place the capacity of the United Nations to assist in the restoration of the peace,

1. *Decides*, as an interim measure, to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a period of two months, that is, until 19 August 1982;

[29] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1982*.
[30] Document S/15239, incorporated in the record of the 2379th meeting.
[31] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1982*, documents S/15194 and Add.1 and 2.

Resolution 512 (1982)

of 19 June 1982

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949[33] and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to The Hague Convention of 1907,[34]

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian populations, to refrain from all acts of violence against those populations and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by the conflict, in particular, by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross;

2. *Appeals* to Member States to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible;

3. *Stresses* the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations and its agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, towards civilian populations and calls upon all the parties to the conflict not to hamper the exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts;

4. *Takes note* of the measures taken by the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the activities of the international agencies in this field and requests him to make every effort to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the present resolution and to report on these efforts to the Security Council as soon as possible.

Resolution 513 (1982)

of 4 July 1982

The Security Council,

Alarmed by the continued sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations in southern Lebanon and in west Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949[33] and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to The Hague Convention of 1907,[34]

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 512 (1982),

1. *Calls* for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

2. *Calls further* for the restoration of the normal supply of vital facilities such as water, electricity, food and medical provisions, particularly in Beirut;

3. *Commends* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the action of international agencies to alleviate the sufferings of the civilian population and requests them to continue their efforts to ensure their success.

Resolution 515 (1982)

of 29 July 1982

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the situation of the civilian population of Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949[33] and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to The Hague Convention of 1907,[34]

Recalling its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

1. *Demands* that the Government of Israel lift immediately the blockade of the city of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the present resolution to the Government of Israel and to keep the Security Council informed of its implementation.



Resolution 516 (1982)

of 1 August 1982

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

Recalling its resolution 515 (1982),

Alarmed by the continuation and intensification of military activities in and around Beirut,

Taking note of the latest massive violations of the cease-fire in and around Beirut,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions and demands an immediate cease-fire, and a cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to deploy immediately, on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on compliance with the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than four hours from now.

Adopted unanimously at the 2386th meeting.

Decisions

At the 2387th meeting, on 3 August 1982, the President read out the following statement:[37]

"Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on their behalf in connection with the present grave situation in Lebanon:

" '1. The members of the Security Council are seriously concerned at the prevailing high state of tension and at reports of military movements and continued outbreaks of firing and shelling in and around Beirut, contrary to the demand in resolution 516 (1982), which was adopted at 1325 hours, New York time, on 1 August 1982, for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border. They consider it vital that these provisions be fully implemented.

" '2. The members of the Security Council have taken note of the Secretary-General's reports submitted pursuant to resolution 516 (1982).[38] They express full support for his efforts and for the steps he has taken, following the request of the Government of Lebanon, to secure the immediate deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut. They note with satisfaction from the Secretary-General's report that some of the parties have already assured General Erskine of their full co-operation for the deployment of United Nations observers and they call urgently on all of the parties to co-operate fully in the effort to secure effective deployment of the observers and to ensure their safety.

" '3. They insist that all parties must observe strictly the terms of resolution 516 (1982). They call further for the immediate lifting of all obstacles to the dispatch of supplies and the distribution of aid to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in accordance with previous resolutions of the Council. The members of the Security Council will keep the situation under close review.' "

At its 2389th meeting, on 4 August 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cuba and India to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 517 (1982)

of 4 August 1982

The Security Council,

Deeply shocked and alarmed by the deplorable consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982,

1. *Reconfirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982) and 516 (1982);

2. *Confirms once again* its demand for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon;

3. *Censures* Israel for its failure to comply with the above resolutions;

4. *Calls* for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward subsequent to 1325 hours, eastern daylight time, on 1 August 1982;

5. *Takes note* of the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization to move the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut;

6. *Expresses its appreciation* for the efforts and steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the provisions of resolution 516 (1982) and authorizes him, as an imme

diate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than 1000 hours, eastern daylight time, on 5 August 1982;

8. *Decides* to meet at that time, if necessary, in order to consider the report of the Secretary-General and, in case of failure to comply by any of the parties to the conflict, to consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Adopted at the 2389th meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).

Resolution 518 (1982)

of 12 August 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982), 516 (1982) and 517 (1982),

Expressing its most serious concern about continued military activities in Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut,

1. *Demands* that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut;

2. *Demands* the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in Beirut;

3. *Requests* the United Nations observers in, and in the vicinity of, Beirut to report on the situation;

4. *Demands* that Israel co-operate fully in the effort to secure the effective deployment of the United Nations observers, as requested by the Government of Lebanon, and in such a manner as to ensure their safety;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to meet, if necessary, in order to consider the situation upon receipt of the report of the Secretary-General.

Adopted unanimously at the 2392nd meeting.

Decision

At its 2393rd meeting, on 17 August 1982, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15357)".[35]

Resolution 519 (1982)

of 17 August 1982

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981), 490 (1981), 498 (1981), 501 (1982) and 511 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), as well as subsequent resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied with grave concern the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[39] and noting its conclusions and recommendations and the wishes of the Government of Lebanon as set out therein,

Bearing in mind the need, pending an examination by the Security Council of the situation in all its aspects, to preserve in place the capacity of the United Nations to assist in the restoration of the peace and of the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of two months, that is, until 19 October 1982;

2. *Authorizes* the Force during that period to continue to carry out, in addition, the interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields assigned to it in paragraph 2 of resolution 511 (1982);

3. *Calls on* all concerned, taking into account paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of the report of the Secretary-General on the Force, to extend full co-operation to it in the discharge of its tasks;

4. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General, with a view to optimum use of observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as envisaged by relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Decides* to consider the situation fully and in all its aspects before 19 October 1982.

Adopted at the 2393rd meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decision

At its 2394th meeting, on 16 September 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Kuwait and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"(*a*) Letter dated 4 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15162);[16]

"(*b*) Letter dated 28 July 1982 from the Permanent Representatives of Egypt and France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15316);[35]

[39] *Ibid.*, document S/15357.

Resolution 520 (1982)

of 17 September 1982

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1982,[40]

Condemning the murder of Bashir Gemayel, the constitutionally elected President-elect of Lebanon, and every effort to disrupt by violence the restoration of a strong, stable government in Lebanon,

Having listened to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon,[41]

Taking note of the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 516 (1982) in all their components;

2. *Condemns* the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions;

3. *Demands* an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982, as a first step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolutions;

4. *Calls again* for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon;

5. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982), which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

6. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement resolution 516 (1982), concerning the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut, and requests all the parties concerned to cooperate fully in the application of that resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and asks the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of developments as soon as possible and not later than within twenty-four hours.

Adopted unanimously at the 2395th meeting.

Decision

At its 2396th meeting, on 18 September 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Algeria, Democratic Yemen and Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 521 (1982)

of 19 September 1982

The Security Council,

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General[42] at its 2396th meeting,

Noting that the Government of Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations observers to the sites of greatest human suffering and losses in and around that city,

1. *Condemns* the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut;

2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982), which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from ten to fifty, and insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of those observers in order that they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate to the effort to ensure full protection for the civilian populations;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as a matter of urgency, to initiate appropriate consultations and, in particular, consultations with the Government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Security Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian populations in and around Beirut and requests him to report to the Council within forty-eight hours;

6. *Insists* that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge their mandates and, in this connection, solemnly calls attention to the obligation of all Member States, under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on an urgent and continuing basis.

Adopted unanimously at the resumed 2396th meeting.

Decisions

At its 2400th meeting, on 18 October 1982, the Council decided to invite the representative of Lebanon to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15455 and Corr.1)".[43]

At the same meeting, the Council also decided, by a vote, that an invitation should be accorded to the representative

Resolution 523 (1982)

of 18 October 1982

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the President of the Republic of Lebanon,[44]

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 519 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), as well as all subsequent resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General[45] and taking note of its conclusions and recommendations,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of three months, that is, until 19 January 1983;

2. *Insists* that there shall be no interference under any pretext with the operations of the Force and that it shall have full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate;

3. *Authorizes* the Force during that period to carry out, with the consent of the Government of Lebanon, interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields, as indicated in resolutions 511 (1982) and 519 (1982), and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all the inhabitants of the area without any discrimination;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within the three-month period, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Security Council on ways and means of ensuring the full implementation of the mandate of the Force as defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and the relevant decisions of the Council;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of his consultations.

Adopted at the 2400th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decisions

In a letter dated 27 October 1982,[46] the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in accordance with the decision of the Government of Nepal, the Nepalese contingent would be repatriated from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Subject to the usual consultations, he intended to accept the offer of Finland to provide a replacement contingent of equivalent strength for service with the Force. In a letter dated 28 October,[47] the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

> "I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter dated 27 October 1982[46] concerning the organization of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations on 28 October and agreed with the proposals contained in your letter."

At its 2401st meeting, on 12 November 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Morocco, Niger and Senegal to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

> "The situation in the occupied Arab territories:
>
> "Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);[43]
>
> "Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Niger to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15483)".[43]

At the same meeting, the Council also decided, by a vote, that an invitation should be accorded to the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate and that that invitation would confer upon it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Adopted by 12 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 2 abstentions (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

At the same meeting, the Council further decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

At its 2403rd meeting, on 29 November 1982, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/15493)".[43]

Resolution 529 (1983)

of 18 January 1983

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and all subsequent resolutions on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,

Recalling further its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Having taken note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of 13 January 1983,[3] and of the statement he made at the 2411th meeting of the Council,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General[4] and taking note of his observations,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 July 1983;

2. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to co-operate with the Force for the full implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress made in this respect.

Adopted at the 2411th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

[1] Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted by the Council in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.

[2] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1983.*

[3] *Ibid.*, document S/15557, annex I.

[4] *Ibid.*, document S/15557.

Decisions

At its 2412th meeting, on 11 February 1983, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Egypt, India, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"The situation in the occupied Arab territories:

"Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);[5]

"Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United

[5] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1982.*

Resolution 549 (1984)

of 19 April 1984

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 9 April 1984[18] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 9 April 1984,[19]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 October 1984;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[20] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Adopted at the 2530th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 April 1985;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[20] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Adopted at the 2559th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Resolution 555 (1984)

of 12 October 1984

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 9 October 1984,[27] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 8 October 1984,[28]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

[25] *Ibid.*, document S/16722.
[26] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1984.*
[27] *Ibid.*, document S/16776.
[28] *Ibid.*, document S/16772.

Decisions

In a letter dated 15 November 1984,[29] the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in accordance with the decision of the Government of Senegal, the Senegalese battalion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon had been withdrawn. Subject to the usual consultations, the Secretary-General intended to accept the offer of the Government of Nepal to provide a replacement battalion of about 650 men for service with the Force. In a letter dated 19 November,[30] the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

> "I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter dated 15 November 1984[29] concerning the organization of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations on 19 November and agreed with the proposals contained in your letter."

At its 2563rd meeting, on 28 November 1984, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/16829)".[26]

[29] S/16831.
[30] S/16832.

Resolution 561 (1985)

of 17 April 1985

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 11 April 1985,[6] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 27 March 1985,[7]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 October 1985;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[8] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Adopted at the 2575th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

[5] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1985.*
[6] *Ibid.*, document S/17093.
[7] *Ibid., Fortieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1985*, document S/17062.
[8] *Ibid., Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978*, document S/12611.

Decision

In a letter dated 29 April 1985,[9] the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Major-General Carl-Gustav Ståhl of Sweden, was resigning and that it was his intention, subject to the usual consultations, to appoint Major-General Gustav Hägglund of Finland to the post of Commander of the Force, effective 1 June. In a letter dated 3 May,[10] the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

> "I wish to inform you that your letter dated 29 April 1985[9] concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Gustav Hägglund of Finland to the post of Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations on 1 May and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter."

At its 2581st meeting, on 21 May 1985, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/17177)".[11]

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Adopted at the 2623rd meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decision

At the 2630th meeting, on 21 November 1985, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/17628)".[20]

Resolution 575 (1985)

of 17 October 1985

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 10 October 1985[21] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 3 October 1985,[22]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 April 1986;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[8] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

[19] Document S/17560, incorporated in the record of the 2621st meeting.
[20] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985.*
[21] *Ibid.*, document S/17557.
[22] *Ibid.*, document S/17526.

Resolution 576 (1985)

of 21 November 1985

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,[23]

Decides:

(*a*) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(*b*) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1986;

(*c*) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

Adopted unanimously at the 2630th meeting.

Decision

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 576 (1985), the President made the following statement:[24]

"In connection with the resolution just adopted on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the following complementary statement on behalf of the Secretary-General:

[23] *Ibid.*, document S/17628.
[24] S/17653.

Resolution 583 (1986)

of 18 April 1986

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 9 April 1986,[6] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 1 April 1986,[7]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of three months, that is, until 19 July 1986;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[8] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council thereon by 19 June 1986.

Resolution 586 (1986)

of 18 July 1986

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 17 June and 10 July 1986[15] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General of 7 July 1986,[16]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 January 1987;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[8] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2699th meeting.

Decisions

At its 2705th meeting, on 5 September 1986, the Council decided to invite the representative of Lebanon to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 4 September 1986 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/18318)".[17]

At the same meeting, following consultations with members of the Council, the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:[18]

"The members of the Security Council express their deep sorrow at the grave and distressing attacks which killed several members of the Irish and French contingents of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. These attacks come after various serious incidents in the recent past, in particular those of 11 and 12 August 1986, in the course of which a number of members of the Force were injured. The members of the Council express their indignation at such resort to deliberate violence, which places in jeopardy the safety of the members of the Force.

"They convey their sympathy to the afflicted families and pay tribute to the qualities of composure, courage and self-sacrifice manifested collectively by all the members of the Force, in service of the ideals of peace of the Organization.

"Given the worsening of the situation in the zone in which the Force operates, the members of the Council consider it essential to adopt with all urgency measures aimed at the effective reinforcement of the security of the members of the Force and request the Secretary-General to undertake all necessary steps to that effect.

"The members of the Council express their appreciation to the Secretary-General for his immediate dispatch of a mission led by the Under-Secretary-General which is to carry out, in consultation with the Lebanese Government, an in-depth examination of the measures to be taken to enable the Force to carry out its mandate, as laid down in Council resolution 425 (1978), effectively in the necessary conditions of security.

"They invite the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, as soon as possible, a report which he will prepare following the mission.

"The members of the Council unanimously express their confidence in the Secretary-General and the Commander of the Force in the current difficult circumstances."

Resolution 594 (1987)

of 15 January 1987

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 12 January 1987,[1] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 6 January 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[2]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months and twelve days, that is, until 31 July 1987;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[3] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2731st meeting.

Decision

On 13 February 1987, after consultations, the President made the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council:[4]

"The members of the Security Council, mindful of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, express their profound concern at the continued escalation of violence in certain parts of Lebanon, affecting the civilian population, particularly in and around Palestinian refugee camps.

"Deeply alarmed by the tragic suffering undergone by the civilian population, particularly inside the Palestinian refugee camps, they call on the parties concerned to observe an immediate cease-fire and to permit access to these camps for humanitarian purposes.

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[1] Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted by the Council in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986.

[2] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1987*.

[3] *Ibid.*, document S/18581 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

[4] *Ibid.*, document S/18580.

[5] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978*, document S/12611.

[6] S/18691.

Resolution 599 (1987)

of 31 July 1987

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 24 July 1987,[12] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 16 July 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[13]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1988;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[1] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Resolution 609 (1988)
of 29 January 1988

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 22 January 1988,[11] and taking note of observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 20 January 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[12]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1988;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[13] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Resolution 617 (1988)
of 29 July 1988

Taking note of the letter dated 13 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[24]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1989;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[13] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2822nd meeting.

Resolution 618 (1988)
of 29 July 1988

The Security Council,

Taking note of paragraph 23 of the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[23] concerning the abduction of Lieutenant-Colonel William Richard Higgins, a military observer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Force,

Recalling the Secretary-General's special report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[25]

Recalling also its resolution 579 (1985) of 18 December 1985, which, *inter alia*, condemned unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction and called for the immediate release of all hostages and abducted persons wherever and by whomever they are being held,

1. *Condemns* the abduction of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins;

2. *Demands* his immediate release;

3. *Calls upon* Member States to use their influence in any way possible to promote the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted unanimously at the 2822nd meeting.

[24] *Ibid.*, document S/20014.
[25] *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1988*, document S/19617.

Decision

At its 2831st meeting, on 30 November 1988, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/20276)".[26]

Resolution 624 (1988)
of 30 November 1988

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,[27]

Decides:

(*a*) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(*b*) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1989;

(*c*) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

Adopted unanimously at the 2831st meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 624 (1988), the President made the following statement:[28]

> "In connection with the resolution just adopted on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, I have been authorized to make the following complementary statement on behalf of the Security Council:
>
> " 'As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force[27] states, in paragraph 24: "Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached." That statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.' "

[26] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1988.*
[27] *Ibid.*, document S/20276.
[28] S/20306.

Resolution 630 (1989)

of 30 January 1989

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 24 and 27 January 1989,[36] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 19 January 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[37]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1989;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[38] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2843rd meeting.

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[34] Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted by the Council in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.

[35] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1989.*

[36] *Ibid.*, documents S/20416 and Add.1 and 2.

[37] *Ibid.*, document S/20410.

[38] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978*, document S/12611.

Decisions

At its 2851st meeting, on 31 March 1989, the Council discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

At the same meeting, the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council:[39]

"The members of the Security Council express their grave concern at the recent deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, which has left many victims among the civilian population and caused considerable material damage.

"In view of the threat that this situation poses to peace, security and stability in the region, they express encouragement and support for all ongoing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Lebanese crisis, notably those made by the Ministerial Committee of the League of Arab States led by Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait.

"They urge all the parties to put an immediate end to the confrontations, to respond favourably to the appeals launched for an effective cease-fire and to avoid any action that might further heighten the tension.

"They reaffirm their support for the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon.

"The members of the Security Council also stress the importance of the role of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and reaffirm their resolve to continue to keep the evolution of the situation in Lebanon under close review."

At the 2858th meeting, on 24 April 1989, following consultations with the members of the Council, the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:[40]

"The members of the Security Council, gravely concerned by the sufferings caused to the civilian population by the worsening situation in Lebanon, reaffirm their statement of 31 March 1989[39] in which, in particular, they urged all parties to respond favourably to the appeals for an effective cease-fire.

"They reiterate their full support for the action of the Ministerial Committee of the League of Arab States led by Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, in order to put an end to the loss of human lives, to alleviate the sufferings of the Lebanese people and to achieve an effective cease-fire indispensable for a settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

[39] S/20554.

[40] S/20602.

Resolution 639 (1989)

of 31 July 1989

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 July 1989,[45] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 13 July 1989 from the representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[46]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1990;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[38] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2873rd meeting.

Resolution 648 (1990)

of 31 January 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 25 January 1990,[14] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 11 January 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[15]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1990;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[16] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2906th meeting.

Resolution 659 (1990)

of 31 July 1990

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 24 and 26 July 1990,[21] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 16 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[22]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1991;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[16] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to

co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2931st meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following consultations with the members of the Council, the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:[23]

"The members of the Security Council have noted with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[21] submitted in conformity with resolution 648 (1990) of 31 January 1990.

"They reaffirm their commitment to the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. In this context, they assert that any State shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

"As the Security Council extends the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period on the basis of resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, the members of the Council again stress the need for the implementation of that resolution in all its aspects. They express their appreciation for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in this regard. They reiterate their full support for the Taif Agreement and for the efforts of the Lebanese Government to extend its authority over all Lebanese territory.

"The members of the Security Council take this opportunity to commend the troops of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries for their sacrifices and commitment to the cause of international peace and security under difficult circumstances."

In a letter dated 24 September 1990,[24] the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"The members of the Security Council agreed, during their consideration in consultations on 31 July 1990 of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[21] on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of the Force to request that a review of the scale and deployment of the Force be carried out by the Secretariat in the light of the performance of its functions since its establishment in 1978 and with a view to fully implementing resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978. The Council is mindful of the great benefit that the presence of the Force continues to contribute to Lebanon. The members of the Council also agreed that the review should be carried out during the interim period of six months for which the mandate of the Force was extended on 31 July 1990, that is, prior to the expiration on 31 January 1991 of the current mandate.

"The members of the Council were of the view that such a review would accord with the spirit of the statement made by the President on behalf of the Council at the 2924th meeting, held on 30 May 1990,[25] in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'United Nations peace-keeping operations', and would provide the Council with a basis on which to assess whether existing arrangements for the Force should be maintained or changed."

At its 2964th meeting, on 30 November 1990, the Council discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/21950 and Corr.1)".[26]

Resolution 684 (1991)
of 30 January 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General of 23 and 28 January 1991 on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[13] and taking note of the observations expressed therein, and without prejudice to the views of the Member States thereon,

Taking note of the letter dated 14 January 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[14]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1991;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[15] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2975th meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 684 (1991), the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:[16]

"The members of the Security Council have noted with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[13] submitted in conformity with Security Council resolution 659 (1990) of 31 July 1990.

"They reaffirm their commitment to the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. In this context, they assert that any State shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

"As the Council extends the mandate of the Force for a further interim period on the basis of resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, the members of the Council again stress the need for the implementation of that resolution in all its aspects. They express their appreciation for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in this regard. They reiterate their full support for the Taif Agreement and for the recent efforts of the Lebanese Government to extend its authority over all Lebanese territory.

"The members of the Council take this opportunity to commend the troops of the Force and the troop-contributing countries for their sacrifices and commitment to the cause of international peace and security under difficult circumstances."

In a letter dated 22 March 1991 addressed to the President of the Security Council,[17] the Secretary-General referred to his statement on 21 March 1991 in informal Council consultations in which he had announced his decision to appoint a successor to Mr. Gunnar Jarring, who had announced his retirement as Special Representative to the Middle East in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 11 January 1991. The Secretary-General confirmed his decision, effective 22 March 1991, to appoint Mr. Edouard Brunner (Switzerland) as Special Representative to the Middle East in accordance with paragraph 3 of Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

In a letter dated 26 April 1991 addressed to the President of the Security Council,[18] the Secretary-General referred to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, whose mandate the Council had to plan to renew by 31 May 1991 at the latest, and informed the Council that Major-General Adolf Radauer (Austria), who had been Commander of the Force since 10 September 1988, would end his tour of duty on 30 September 1991 and that it was the Secretary-General's

Resolution 701 (1991)
of 31 July 1991

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 July 1991,[23] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Recalling the report of the Secretariat team of 28 January 1991,[24] and without prejudice to the views of Member States thereon,

Taking note of the letter dated 15 July 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,[25]

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1992;

2. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[15] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 2997th meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 701 (1991), the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:[26]

"The members of the Security Council have noted with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[23] submitted in conformity with resolution 684 (1991) of 30 January 1991.

"They reaffirm their commitment to the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. In this context, they assert that any State shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

"As the Council extends the mandate of the Force for a further interim period on the basis of resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, the members of the Council again stress the need for the implementation of that resolution in all its aspects. They express their appreciation for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in this regard. They reiterate their full support for the Taif Agreement and commend the Lebanese Government for the recent successful deployment of its army in the Sidon and Tyre regions in the process of extending its authority over all Lebanese territory.

"The members of the Council take this opportunity to commend the troops of the Force and the troop-contributing countries for their sacrifices and commitment to the cause of international peace and security under difficult circumstances."

Resolution 734 (1992)
of 29 January 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 January 1992,[143] and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Recalling the addendum of 28 January 1991[144] to the Secretary-General's report of 22 January 1991,[145]

Taking note of the letter dated 17 January 1992[146] from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1992;

2. *Approves* the overall objective of the Secretary-General, as set out in paragraph 33 of his report of 21 January 1992 on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,[143] aimed at promoting the greater effectiveness of the Force;

3. *Approves in particular* the recommendations summarized in paragraphs 59 (c) (i) and (ii) of the addendum of 28 January 1991[144] to the report of the Secretary-General of 22 January 1991;[145]

4. *Invites* the Secretary-General to consider further, in consultation with the troop-contributing countries, how to achieve the overall objective referred to in paragraph 2 above, and to take action on the objectives in paragraphs 2 and 3 above;

5. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

6. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978,[147] approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

7. *Reiterates* that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Adopted unanimously at the 3040th meeting.

Decisions

At the same meeting, following the adoption of resolution 734 (1992), the President made the following statement:[148]

"The members of the Security Council have noted with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 January 1992[143] submitted in conformity with Council resolution 701 (1991) of 31 July 1991.

"The members of the Council reaffirm their commitment to the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. In this context, they assert that any State shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

"As the Council extends the mandate of the Force for a further interim period on the basis of resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, the members of the Council again stress the need for the implementation of that resolution in all its aspects. They reiterate their full support for the Taif Agreement and commend the Lebanese Government for its successful efforts to deploy units of its army in the south of the country in full coordination with the Force. The members of the Council urge all the parties concerned to support the Force fully.

"The members of the Council express their concern over the continuing violence in southern Lebanon and urge all parties to exercise restraint.

"The members of the Council take this opportunity to express their appreciation for the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in this regard and commend the Force's troops and troop-contributing countries for their sacrifices and commitment to the cause of international peace and security under difficult circumstances."

At its 3053rd meeting, on 19 February 1992, the Council discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 17 February 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23604)".[3]

RESOLUTION 768 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3102nd meeting, on 30 July 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 July 1992 (S/24341) and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 15 July 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/24293),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 January 1993;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 803 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3167th meeting, on 28 January 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 22 January 1993 (S/25150 and Add.1) and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 18 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25125),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 July 1993;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 852 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3258th meeting,
on 28 July 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 July 1993, 1/ and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 14 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2/

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 January 1994;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, 3/

approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 895 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3331st meeting,
on 28 January 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 January 1994, 1/ and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 13 January 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2/

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1994;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, 3/ approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 938 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3409th meeting, on 28 July 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 July 1994 (S/1994/856), and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 13 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/826),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 January 1995;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 974 (1995)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3495th meeting,
on 30 January 1995

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 23 January 1995 (S/1995/66), and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 16 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/45),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is until 31 July 1995;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Endorses the Secretary-General's intention to pursue the possibilities for streamlining and achieving economies in the areas of maintenance and logistic support;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1006 (1995)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3558th meeting,
on 28 July 1995

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 19 July 1995 (S/1995/595) and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 10 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/554),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1996;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Condemns the increase in acts of violence committed in particular against the Force and urges the parties to put an end to them;

6. Concurs with the streamlining of the Force, described in paragraph 11 of the report of the Secretary-General and stresses that its implementation will not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1039 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3622nd meeting,
on 29 January 1996

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 22 January 1996 (S/1996/45) and taking note of the observations expressed therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 17 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1996/34),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1996;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force and urges the parties to put an end to them;

6. Welcomes the streamlining of the Force described in paragraph 16 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 January 1996, to be completed by May 1996, and stresses the need to continue efforts to achieve further savings by rationalizing the administrative and support services of the Force, provided they do not affect its operational capacity;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1052 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3654th meeting,
on 18 April 1996

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions regarding the situation in Lebanon, including resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 which established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council of 13 April 1996 (S/1996/280 and S/1996/281),

Bearing in mind the debate which took place at its 3653rd meeting on 15 April 1996 on the situation in the Middle East,

Gravely concerned at the consequences which the ongoing fighting could have for the peace and security of the region and for the furthering of the peace process in the Middle East, and affirming its full support for that process,

Gravely concerned also at all attacks on civilian targets, including residential areas, and at the loss of life and suffering among civilians,

Stressing the need for all concerned to respect fully the rules of international humanitarian law with regard to the protection of civilians,

Gravely concerned further at actions which seriously threaten the safety of UNIFIL and impede the implementation of its mandate, and deploring in particular the incident on 18 April 1996 in which shelling resulted in heavy loss of life among civilians at a UNIFIL site,

1. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties;

2. Supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts to this end;

3. Reaffirms its commitment to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and to the security of all States in the region, and calls upon all concerned fully to respect those principles;

4. Calls upon all concerned to respect the safety and security of civilians;

5. Calls upon all concerned to respect the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNIFIL and to allow it to fulfil its mandate without any obstacle or interference;

6. Calls upon Member States to offer humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the population and to assist the Government of Lebanon in the reconstruction of the country and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations and its agencies play their part in meeting the humanitarian needs of the civilian population;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of developments on a continuing basis;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 1068 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3685th meeting, on 30 July 1996

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 July 1996 (S/1996/575) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 18 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1996/566),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1997;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

5. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

6. Welcomes the completion of the streamlining of the Force described in paragraph 33 of the report, and encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1095 (1997)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3733rd meeting, on 28 January 1997

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 January 1997 (S/1997/42) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 17 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1997/41),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1997;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1122 (1997)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3804th meeting,
on 29 July 1997

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 16 July 1997 (S/1997/550 and Corr.1) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 10 July 1997 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1997/534),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1998;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1151 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3852nd meeting,
on 30 January 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 20 January 1998 (S/1998/53) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 6 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1998/7),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1998;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1188 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3913th meeting,
on 30 July 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 16 July 1998 (S/1998/652) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 26 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1998/584),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1999;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1223 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3970th meeting,
on 28 January 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 19 January 1999 (S/1999/61) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 8 January 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1999/22),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1999;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1254 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4028th meeting,
on 30 July 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 21 July 1999 (S/1999/807) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 25 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1999/720),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 2000;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

RESOLUTION 1288 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4095th meeting on 31 January 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 17 January 2000 (S/2000/28) and taking note of the observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Taking note of the letter dated 28 December 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1999/1284),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 2000;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate;

4. Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

5. Reiterates that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), and all other relevant resolutions;

6. Encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned with the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon.

Resolution 1310 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4177th meeting, on 27 July 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon and also its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

R*ecalling also* the statements of its President of 20 April 2000 (S/PRST/2000/13), 23 May 2000 (S/PRST/2000/18) and 18 June (S/PRST/2000/21) on the situation in Lebanon, in particular its endorsement of the work done by the United Nations as mandated by the Security Council including the Secretary-General's conclusion that as of 16 June 2000 Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of 20 July 2000 (S/2000/718) and its observations and recommendations mentioned therein,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 11 July 2000 to the Secretary-General (S/2000/674),

1. *Endorses* the understanding, mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General of 20 July 2000, that the Force will deploy and function fully throughout its area of operations and that the Government of Lebanon will strengthen its presence in this area, by deploying additional troops and internal security forces;

2. *Decides*, in this context, to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of 6 months, until 31 January 2001;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Welcomes* the statement in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 24 July 2000 (S/2000/731) that, as of that date, the Government of Israel had removed all violations of the withdrawal line;

5. *Calls on* the parties to respect that line, to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with UNIFIL;

6. *Calls on* the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority and presence in the south, and in particular to proceed with a significant deployment of the Lebanese armed forces as soon as possible;

7. *Welcomes* the establishment of checkpoints by the Government of Lebanon in the vacated area, and *encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including through the control of all checkpoints;

8. *Welcomes* the measures taken by the Secretary-General and the troop contributing countries regarding UNIFIL military personnel and deployment, as agreed to in the above-mentioned statements of its President, and *reaffirms* that the expected redeployment of UNIFIL should be conducted in coordination with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese armed forces;

9. *Re-emphasizes* the terms of reference and general guidelines of UNIFIL as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 (S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978);

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon;

11. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

12. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General to submit to the Council by 31 October 2000 a report on progress towards achieving the objectives of resolution 425 (1978) and towards completion by UNIFIL of the tasks originally assigned to it, and *requests* the Secretary-General to include in this report recommendations on the tasks that could be carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

13. *Decides* to review the situation, by early November 2000, and to consider any steps it deems appropriate regarding UNIFIL, on the basis of this report, the extent of the deployment of UNIFIL and the actions taken by the Government of Lebanon to restore its effective authority and presence in the area, in particular through a significant deployment of the Lebanese armed forces;

14. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1337 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4267th meeting, on 30 January 2001

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982 and 1310 (2000) of 27 July 2000, as well as its resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Recalling further its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460),

Emphasizing the interim nature of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 5 January 2001 to the Secretary-General (S/2001/14),

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 22 January 2001 (S/2001/66), and *endorses* his observations and recommendations;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months, until 31 July 2001;

3. *Decides* to return the military personnel of UNIFIL to the operational level referred to in paragraph 24 of the Secretary-General's report of 22 January 2001 by 31 July, and *requests* that the Secretary-General take the necessary measures to implement this decision, including taking into account the upcoming rotations of the battalions, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

5. *Calls* on the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority and presence in the south, and in particular to increase the rate of the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces;

6. *Welcomes* the establishment of checkpoints by the Government of Lebanon in the vacated area, and *encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including through the control of all checkpoints;

7. *Calls* on the parties to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with UNIFIL;

8. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses* concern about the serious breaches and violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to them and to respect the safety of UNIFIL personnel;

9. *Commends* UNIFIL for having fulfilled its mandate regarding verification of Israeli withdrawal, and *supports* its continued efforts to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through patrols and observation from fixed positions and close contacts with the parties, with a view to correcting violations and preventing the escalation of incidents;

10. *Welcomes* the contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, and *calls* on donor countries to support these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon;

12. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

13. *Endorses* the general approach for reconfiguration of UNIFIL, as outlined in paragraph 23 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 January 2001, and *requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a detailed report by 30 April 2001 on UNIFIL reconfiguration plans and on the tasks that could be carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

14. *Decides* to review the situation by early May 2001 and to consider any steps it deems appropriate regarding UNIFIL and UNTSO, on the basis of this report;

15. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1365 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4354th meeting, on 31 July 2001

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1310 (2000) of 27 July 2000 and 1337 (2001) of 30 January 2001, as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 9 July 2001 to the Secretary-General (S/2001/677),

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 20 July 2001 (S/2001/714), and *endorses* his observations and recommendations;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL, as recommended by the Secretary-General, for a further period of 6 months, until 31 January 2002;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to implement the reconfiguration and redeployment of UNIFIL as outlined in his report and in accordance with the letter of the President of the Security Council of 18 May 2001 in the light of developments on the ground and in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

5. *Calls on* the Government of Lebanon to take more steps to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces;

6. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation;

7. *Encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south;

8. *Reiterates its call* on the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

9. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the air, sea and land violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to them and to respect the safety of the UNIFIL personnel;

10. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent the escalation of incidents;

11. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions, and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution;

13. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General, following appropriate consultations, including with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries, to submit to the Council before the end of the present mandate a comprehensive report on the activities of UNIFIL, taking into account its possible reconfiguration to an observer mission in the light of developments on the ground and on the tasks carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

15. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1391 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4458th meeting, on 28 January 2002

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1310 (2000) of 27 July 2000, 1337 (2001) of 30 January 2001 and 1365 (2001) of 31 July 2001, as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 9 January 2002 to the Secretary-General (S/2002/40),

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 16 January 2002 (S/2002/55), and *endorses* his observations and recommendations;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL, as recommended by the Secretary-General, for a further period of six months, until 31 July 2002;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to implement the reconfiguration of UNIFIL as outlined in his recent report and in accordance with the letter of the President of the Security Council of 18 May 2001, in the light of developments on the ground and in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

5. *Calls on* the Government of Lebanon to continue to take steps to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces;

6. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation;

7. *Encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south;

8. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

9. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches in the air, sea and land violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations and to respect the safety of the UNIFIL personnel;

10. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent the escalation of incidents;

11. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and welcomes in this regard the establishment of the International Support Group, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution;

13. *Requests also* the Secretary-General, following appropriate consultations, including with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries, to submit to the Council before the end of the present mandate a comprehensive report on the activities of UNIFIL, its technical reconfiguration and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

14. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

15. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1428 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4593rd meeting, on 30 July 2002

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1310 (2000) of 27 July 2000, 1337 (2001) of 30 January 2001, 1365 (2001) of 31 July 2001 and 1391 (2002) of 28 January 2002, as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 9 July 2002 to the Secretary-General (S/2002/739),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 12 July 2002 (S/2002/746), and in particular its recommendation to renew the mandate of UNFIL for a further period of six months;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL, as recommended by the Secretary-General, for a further period of six months, until 31 January 2003;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to implement the reconfiguration of UNIFIL as outlined in his recent reports in accordance with the letter of the President of Security Council of 18 May 2001, in the light of developments on the ground and in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

5. *Commends* the Government of Lebanon for taking steps to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and *calls on* it to continue these measures;

6. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report;

7. *Encourages* the Government of Lebanon to ensure a calm environment throughout the south;

8. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

9. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the air, sea and land violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

10. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation;

11. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and welcomes in this regard the establishment of the International Support Group, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution;

13. *Requests also* the Secretary-General, following appropriate consultations, including with the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries, to submit to the Council before the end of the present mandate a comprehensive report on the activities of UNIFIL, its technical reconfiguration and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

14. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

15. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1461 (2003)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4696th meeting, on 30 January 2003

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1428 (2002) of 30 July 2002 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 9 January 2003 to the Secretary-General (S/2003/36),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 14 January 2003 (S/2003/38), and in particular its recommendation to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 July 2003;

3. *Takes note* of the completion of the reconfiguration of UNIFIL as outlined in paragraph 26 of the Secretary-General's report (S/2003/38) and in accordance with the letter of the President of the Security Council of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500);

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

5. *Commends* the Government of Lebanon for taking steps to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and *calls on* it to continue to extend these measures and to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south;

6. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report;

7. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

8. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the air, sea and land violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

9. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation;

10. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and encourages further international contributions, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

12. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

13. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1496 (2003)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4802nd meeting, on 31 July 2003

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1461 of 30 January 2003 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 2 July 2003 to the Secretary-General (S/2003/685),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 23 July 2003 (S/2003/728), and in particular its recommendation to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 January 2004;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Welcomes* the steps already taken by the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, and *calls on* it to continue to extend these measures and to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south;

5. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

7. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the air, sea and land violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

8. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation;

9. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *applauds* the progress in demining efforts noted by the Secretary-General in his report, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and encourages further international contributions, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

11. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1525 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4907th meeting, on 30 January 2004

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1496 (2003) of 31 July 2003 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, as stated in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 14 January 2004 to the Secretary-General (S/2004/35),

Expressing its concern over the tensions and potential for escalation as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 20 January 2004 (S/2004/50),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 20 January 2004 (S/2004/50), and in particular its recommendation to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 July 2004;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Encourages* the Government of Lebanon to continue efforts to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, *stresses the importance* of the Government of Lebanon continuing to extend these measures and *calls* on the Government of Lebanon to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including along the Blue Line;

5. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

7. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the sea, land and continuing air violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act or provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

8. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation;

9. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *applauds* the progress in demining efforts noted by the Secretary-General in his report, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and encourages further international contributions, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

11. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1553 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5012th meeting, on 29 July 2004

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1525 (2004) of 30 January 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of six months presented in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 9 July 2004 to the Secretary-General (S/2004/560),

Expressing its concern over the tensions and potential for escalation as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 21 July 2004 (S/2004/572),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 21 July 2004 (S/2004/572), and in particular its recommendation to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months;

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 January 2005;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Encourages* the Government of Lebanon to continue efforts to ensure the return of its effective authority throughout the south, including the deployment of Lebanese armed forces, *stresses the importance* of the Government of Lebanon continuing to extend these measures and *calls* on the Government of Lebanon to do its utmost to ensure a calm environment throughout the south, including along the Blue Line;

5. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

7. *Condemns* all acts of violence, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the sea, land and continuing air violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act or provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide scrupulously by the obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

8. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation;

9. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, *applauds* the successful completion of Operation Emirates Solidarity noted by the Secretary-General in his report, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining activities in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in kind contributions and encourages further international contributions, *takes note* of the communication to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL of maps and information on the location of mines and *stresses* the necessity to provide the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL with any additional maps and records on the location of mines;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

11. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to, achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1559 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on 2 September 2004

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, and resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory,

Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,

Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and *underlining* the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence,

1. *Reaffirms* its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon;

2. *Calls upon* all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;

3. *Calls for* the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;

4. *Supports* the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;

5. *Declares* its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence;

6. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon;

7. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and *decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 1583 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5117th meeting, on 28 January 2005

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, including resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the persistence of tension and violence along the Blue Line,

Emphasizing once again the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of six months presented in the letter from its Permanent Representative to the United Nations of 11 January 2005 to the Secretary-General (S/2005/13), while reaffirming that the Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for the purpose of confirming Israel's withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 and that the Blue Line must be respected in its entirety,

Expressing its concern over the tensions and potential for escalation as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 20 January (S/2005/36),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 20 January (S/2005/36);

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 July 2005;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the south, including through the deployment of sufficient numbers of Lebanese armed and security forces, to ensure a calm environment throughout the area, including along the Blue Line, and to exert control over the use of force on its territory and from it;

5. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, and requests UNIFIL to report any obstruction it may face in the discharge of its mandate;

6. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the entire withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), to exercise utmost restraint and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

7. *Condemns* all acts of violence, including the recent incidents across the Blue Line that have resulted in the killing and wounding of United Nations military observers, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the sea, land and continuing air violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act or provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel;

8. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation, while stressing the primary responsibility of the parties in this regard;

9. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational mine clearance, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and clearance of the remaining mine/UXO threat in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in-kind contributions and *encourages* further international contributions, and *stresses* the necessity for provision to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL any additional existing maps and minefield records;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

11. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate and structures of UNIFIL at the end of the present mandate and requests the Secretary-General, following appropriate consultations, including with the Lebanese Government, to include in his report recommendations in this regard, taking into account the prevailing situation on the ground, the activities actually performed by the Force in its area of operation and its contribution towards the remaining task of restoring international peace and security;

12. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

13. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1595 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5160th meeting, on 7 April 2005

The Security Council,

Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon,

Endorsing the Secretary-General's opinion, as expressed in his letter of 24 March 2005 to the President of the Security Council, that Lebanon is passing through a difficult and sensitive period, that all concerned should imperatively behave with the utmost restraint and that the future of Lebanon should be decided strictly through peaceful means,

Reaffirming its unequivocal condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others, and caused injury to dozens of people, and *condemning* the subsequent attacks in Lebanon,

Having examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon inquiring into the circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act (S/2005/203), transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General following the declaration of the President of the Security Council of 15 February 2005 (S/PRST/2005/4),

Noting with concern the fact-finding mission's conclusion that the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion,

Noting also in this context its opinion that an international independent investigation with executive authority and self-sufficient resources in all relevant fields of expertise would be necessary to elucidate all aspects of this heinous crime,

Mindful of the unanimous demand of the Lebanese people that those responsible be identified and held accountable, and *willing* to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth,

Welcoming the Lebanese Government's approval of the decision to be taken by the Security Council concerning the establishment of an international independent investigation Commission, and *welcoming also* its readiness to cooperate fully with such a Commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and of its legal system, as expressed in the letter of 29 March 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Lebanon to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S/2005/208),

1. *Decides*, consistent with the above-mentioned letter from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Lebanon, to establish an international independent investigation Commission ("the Commission") based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices;

2. *Reiterates* its call on the Lebanese government to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing, and *calls upon* the Lebanese government to ensure that the findings and conclusions of the Commission's investigation are taken into account fully;

3. *Decides* that, to ensure the Commission's effectiveness in the discharge of its duties, the Commission shall:

- Enjoy the full cooperation of the Lebanese authorities, including full access to all documentary, testimonial and physical information and evidence in their possession that the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry;
- Have the authority to collect any additional information and evidence, both documentary and physical, pertaining to this terrorist act, as well as to interview all officials and other persons in Lebanon, that the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry;
- Enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Lebanese territory, including access to all sites and facilities that the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry;
- Be provided with the facilities necessary to perform its functions, and be granted, as well as its premises, staff and equipment, the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult urgently with the Lebanese Government with a view to facilitate the establishment and operation of the Commission pursuant to its mandate and terms of reference as mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and *requests also* that he report to the Council accordingly and notify it of the date the Commission begins its full operations;

5. *Requests further* the Secretary-General, notwithstanding paragraph 4 above, to undertake without delay the steps, measures and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the Commission, including recruiting impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise;

6. *Directs* the Commission to determine procedures for carrying out its investigation, taking into account the Lebanese law and judicial procedures;

7. *Calls on* all States and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission, and in particular to provide it with any relevant information they may possess pertaining to the above-mentioned terrorist act;

8. *Requests* the Commission to complete its work within three months of the date on which it commenced its full operations, as notified by the Secretary-

General, and *authorizes* the Secretary-General to extend the Commission's operation for a further period not exceeding three months, if he deems it necessary to enable the Commission to complete its investigation, and requests that he inform the Security Council accordingly;

9. *Requests* the Commission to report to the Council on the conclusions of its investigation and *requests* the Secretary-General to update orally the Security Council on the progress of the Commission every two months during the operations of the Commission or more frequently as needed.

Resolution 1614 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5241st meeting, on 29 July 2005

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, including resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1583 (2005) of 28 January 2005 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling further the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling also the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for the purpose of confirming Israel's withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978) and that the Blue Line must be respected in its entirety,

Gravely concerned at the persistence of tension and violence along the Blue Line, in particular the hostilities that took place in May and the grave incident on 29 June, which demonstrated once more that the situation remains volatile and fragile, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 21 July 2005 (S/2005/460),

Emphasizing once again the interim nature of UNIFIL,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of six months presented in the letter from its

Chargé d'affaires to the United Nations of 11 July 2005 to the Secretary-General (S/2005/444),

Taking note of the Secretary-General's opinion that the situation does not support a change in UNIFIL's mandate or another reconfiguration of the Force at this stage, and his recommendation that its mandate be extended with no changes to the strength and composition of the Force,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 21 July 2005 (S/2005/460);

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 January 2006;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Condemns* all acts of violence, including the recent incidents across the Blue Line that have resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides, *expresses great concern* about the serious breaches and the sea, land and continuing air violations of the withdrawal line, and *urges* the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act or provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel;

5. *Reiterates its call on* the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the entire withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), and to exercise utmost restraint;

6. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the south, including through the deployment of sufficient numbers of Lebanese armed and security forces, to ensure a calm environment throughout the area, including along the Blue Line, and to exert control and monopoly over the use of force on its entire territory and to prevent attacks from Lebanon across the Blue Line;

7. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to discuss with the Lebanese Government the next steps in preparing for an expansion of its authority in the south;

8. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line through mobile land and air patrols and observation from fixed positions and through close contacts with the parties to correct violations, resolve incidents and prevent their escalation, while stressing the primary responsibility of the parties in this regard;

9. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational mine clearance, *encourages* further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and clearance of the remaining mine/UXO threat in the south, *commends* donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in kind contributions and *encourages* further international contributions, and *stresses* the necessity for provision to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL any additional existing maps and minefield records;

10. *Calls on* the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, requests UNIFIL to report any obstruction it may face in the discharge of its mandate, and *reiterates* its call on the parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

11. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and *urges* troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO);

13. *Expresses* its intention to keep the mandate and structures of UNIFIL under regular review, taking into account the prevailing situation on the ground, the activities actually performed by the Force in its area of operation, its contribution towards the remaining task of restoring international peace and security, the views of the Lebanese Government and the implications for the Force of an increased presence of the Lebanese army in the south;

14. *Looks forward* to the early fulfilment of the mandate of UNIFIL;

15. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1636 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5297th meeting, on 31 October 2005

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004,

Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Having examined carefully the report of the international independent investigation Commission (S/2005/662) ("the Commission") concerning its investigation into the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury to dozens of people,

Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it has accomplished under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, and taking note of the Commission's conclusion that the investigation is not yet complete,

Commending States which have provided assistance to the Commission in the discharge of its duties,

Commending also the Lebanese authorities for the full cooperation they have provided to the Commission in the discharge of its duties, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1595 (2005),

Recalling that pursuant to its relevant resolutions, all States are required to afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to terrorist acts, and recalling in particular that it had requested in its resolution 1595 (2005) all States and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission,

Taking note of the Commission's findings that although the inquiry has already made considerable progress and achieved significant results, it is of the utmost importance to continue the trail both within and outside Lebanon in order to elucidate fully all aspects of this terrorist act, and in particular to identify and hold accountable all those who bear responsibility in its planning, sponsoring, organization and perpetration,

Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others be identified and held accountable,

Acknowledging in this connection the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 October 2005 (S/2005/651) requesting that the mandate of the Commission be extended to enable the Commission to continue to assist the competent Lebanese authorities in any further investigation of the various dimensions of the terrorist crime,

Acknowledging also the concurrent recommendation of the Commission that continued international assistance is needed to help the Lebanese authorities get right to the bottom of this terrorist act, and that a sustained effort on the part of the international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding those responsible for this terrorist act accountable for their crime,

Calling upon all States to extend to the Lebanese authorities and to the Commission the assistance they may need and request in connection with the inquiry, and in particular to provide them with all relevant information they may possess pertaining to this terrorist attack,

Reaffirming its profound commitment to the national unity and stability of Lebanon, emphasizing that the future of Lebanon should be decided through peaceful means by the Lebanese themselves, free of intimidation and foreign interference, and warning in this regard that attempts to undermine the stability of Lebanon will not be tolerated,

Taking note of the Commission's conclusions that, given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge, and that there is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials,

Mindful of the Commission's conclusion that while the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the Commission, several Syrian officials have tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements,

Convinced that it is unacceptable in principle that anyone anywhere should escape accountability for an act of terrorism for any reason, including because of his own obstruction of the investigation or failure to cooperate in good faith,

Determining that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the region, and the need for peaceful solutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

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1. *Welcomes* the report of the Commission;

2. *Takes note with extreme concern* of the Commission's conclusion that, there is converging evidence pointing at the involvement of both Lebanese and Syrian officials in this terrorist act, and that it is difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such complex assassination could have been carried out without their knowledge;

3. *Decides* as a step to assist in the investigation of this crime and without prejudice to the ultimate judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of any individual;

(a) that all individuals designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organizing or perpetrating of this terrorist act, upon notification of such designation to and agreement of the Committee established in subparagraph (b) below, shall be subject to the following measures:

– All States shall take the measures necessary to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of such individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall obligate a state to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals, or, if such individuals are found within their territory, shall ensure in accordance with applicable law that they are available for interview by the Commission if it so requests;

– All States shall: freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such individuals, or that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such individuals or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction; ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories to or for the benefit of such individuals or entities; and cooperate fully in accordance with applicable law with any international investigations related to the assets or financial transactions of such individuals, entities or persons acting on their behalf, including through sharing of financial information;

(b) to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the tasks described in the annex to this resolution;

(c) that the Committee and any measures still in force under subparagraph (a) will terminate when the Committee reports to the Security Council that all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to this terrorist attack have been completed, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council;

Resolution 1644 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5329th meeting, on 15 December 2005

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous relevant resolutions, including resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, and reaffirming in particular resolution 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005,

Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing, as well as of all other terrorist attacks in Lebanon since October 2004, and reaffirming also that all those involved in these attacks must be held accountable for their crimes,

Having examined carefully the report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2005/775) ("the Commission") concerning its investigation into the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury to dozens of people,

Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it has accomplished under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of this terrorist act, and commending in particular Detlev Mehlis for his leadership in the discharge of his duties as the Head of the Commission and for his dedication to the cause of justice,

Reiterating its call upon all States to extend to the Lebanese authorities and to the Commission the assistance they may need and request in connection with the inquiry, and in particular to provide them with all relevant information they may possess pertaining to this terrorist attack,

Acknowledging the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 5 December 2005 (S/2005/762) requesting that the mandate of the Commission be extended for a further period of six months, with a possibility of an additional extension as necessary, to enable the Commission to continue to assist the competent Lebanese authorities in the ongoing investigations of the crime, and to explore possible follow-up measures in order to bring the perpetrators of the said crime to justice, and acknowledging also the concurrent recommendation of the Commission in that regard,

Acknowledging also the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found responsible for this terrorist crime and requesting also that the mandate of the Commission be expanded or that another international investigation Commission be created, to investigate the terrorist attacks that took place in Lebanon since 1 October 2004,

Noting that Syrian authorities made available Syrian officials for questioning, but deeply concerned at the Commission's assessment of Syrian performance to date, and noting that the Commission is still awaiting the provision of other requested materials from Syrian authorities,

Reaffirming its determination that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Commission;

2. *Decides*, as recommended by the Commission and requested by the Lebanese Government, to extend the mandate of the Commission, as set forth in resolutions 1595 (2005) and 1636 (2005), initially until 15 June 2006;

3. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the progress of the inquiry achieved since the Commission's last report to the Council, and notes with extreme concern that, while the inquiry is not yet complete, it confirms its previous conclusions and that the Syrian Government has yet to provide the Commission with the full and unconditional cooperation demanded in resolution 1636 (2005);

4. *Underscores* Syria's obligation and commitment to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Commission, and specifically demands that Syria responds unambiguously and immediately in those areas adduced by the Commissioner and also that it implements without delay any future request of the Commission;

5. *Requests* the Commission to report to the Council on the progress of the inquiry every three months from the adoption of this resolution, including on the cooperation received from the Syrian authorities, or anytime before that date if the Commission deems that such cooperation does not meet the requirements of this resolution and of resolutions 1595 and 1636;

6. *Acknowledges* the Lebanese Government's request that those eventually charged with involvement in this terrorist attack be tried by a tribunal of an international character, requests the Secretary-General to help the Lebanese Government identify the nature and scope of the international assistance needed in this regard, and requests also the Secretary-General to report to the Council in a timely manner;

7. *Authorizes* the Commission, following the request of the Lebanese Government, to extend its technical assistance as appropriate to the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations on the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, and requests the Secretary-General in consultations with the Commission and the Lebanese Government to present recommendations to expand the mandate of the Commission to include investigations of those other attacks;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Commission with the support and resources necessary for the discharge of its duties;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1655 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5362nd meeting, on 31 January 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, including resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1614 (2005) of 29 July 2005 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Recalling also the letter from its President to the Secretary-General of 18 May 2001 (S/2001/500),

Recalling further the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel has withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May 2000 (S/2000/460), as well as the Secretary-General's conclusion that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, focusing now on the remaining task of restoring international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for the purpose of confirming Israel's withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978) and that the Blue Line must be respected in its entirety,

Gravely concerned at the persistence of tension and violence along the Blue Line, including the hostilities initiated by Hizbullah on 21 November 2005 and those triggered by the firing of rockets from Lebanon into Israel on 27 December 2005, which demonstrated once more that the situation remains volatile and fragile and underlined yet again the urgent need for the Lebanese Government to fully extend its authority and exert control and monopoly over the use of force throughout its territory, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 18 January 2006 (S/2006/26), and concerned also by the continuing Israeli violations of Lebanese air space,

Recalling its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Recalling also its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,

Recalling further the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of six months presented in the letter from its Chargé d'affaires to the United Nations of 9 January 2006 to the Secretary-General (S/2006/15),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL of 18 January 2006 (S/2006/26);

2. *Decides* to extend the present mandate until 31 July 2006, while emphasizing the interim nature of UNIFIL and looking forward to the early fulfilment of its mandate;

3. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Condemns* all acts of violence, including the latest serious incidents across the Blue Line initiated from the Lebanese side that have resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides, expresses great concern about the serious breaches and the sea, land and the continuing aforementioned air violations of the withdrawal line, and urges the parties to put an end to these violations, to refrain from any act of provocation that could further escalate the tension and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel;

5. *Reiterates* its call on the parties to continue to fulfil the commitments they have given to respect fully the entire withdrawal line identified by the United Nations, as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590) and to exercise utmost restraint;

6. *Reiterates* its call upon the Government of Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the South;

7. *Welcomes* the steps undertaken recently by the Lebanese Government to strengthen the liaison between its armed forces and UNIFIL, including the establishment of a Lebanese Armed Forces liaison office at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, the appointment of liaison officers to UNIFIL field battalions, and the appointment of a new government coordinator with UNIFIL, and acknowledges the firm intention of the Lebanese Government to preserve the security and, to that end, to reinforce the presence of its armed forces in the southern region and to coordinate their activities with UNIFIL;

8. *Urges* nevertheless the Lebanese Government to do more to assert its authority in the South, to exert control and monopoly over the use of force and to maintain law and order on its entire territory and to prevent attacks from Lebanon across the Blue Line, including through deploying additional numbers of Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces and taking up UNIFIL's proposals to enhance coordination between those forces and UNIFIL on the ground and establishing a Joint Planning Cell, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to work with the Lebanese Government to reinforce its authority in the South, and in particular to facilitate the early implementation of the measures contained in paragraph 8 above;

10. *Supports* the continued efforts of UNIFIL to maintain the ceasefire along the withdrawal line consistent with its remaining task, while stressing the primary responsibility of the parties in this regard and encourages the Force to focus also on assisting the Lebanese Government to assert its authority in the South;

11. *Welcomes* the continued contribution of UNIFIL to operational mine clearance, encourages further assistance in mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the continued development of its national mine action capacity and clearance of the remaining mine/unexploded ordnances threat in the South, commends donor countries for supporting these efforts through financial and in kind contributions and encourages further international contributions, and stresses the necessity for provision to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL any additional existing maps and minefield records;

12. *Calls* on the parties to ensure UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement throughout its area of operation as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, requests UNIFIL to report any obstruction it may face in the discharge of its mandate, and reiterates its call on the parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

13. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of pre-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council before the end of the present mandate as well as on the activities of UNIFIL and the tasks presently carried out by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and to include in the report an assessment of the progress made by the Government of Lebanon towards extending its sole and effective authority throughout the South;

15. *Expresses* its intention to keep the mandate and structures of UNIFIL under regular review, taking into account the prevailing situation on the ground, the activities actually performed by the force in its area of operation, its contribution towards the remaining task of restoring international peace and security, the views of the Lebanese Government and the measures it has taken to fully extend its authority in the South as well as the implications these measures may have, in order to adjust the force to its mission;

16. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

Resolution 1664 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5401st meeting, on 29 March 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005 and 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005,

Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon,

Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others be identified and brought to justice,

Recalling the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting inter alia the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found responsible for this terrorist crime and recalling its request to the Secretary-General in its resolution 1644 (2005) to help the Government of Lebanon identify the nature and scope of the international assistance needed in this regard,

Having examined the report of 21 March 2006 submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644 (2005) (S/2006/176), and welcoming the common understanding reached between the Secretariat and the Lebanese authorities on the key issues regarding the establishment and the main features of a possible tribunal,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in this terrorist attack accountable,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General, and requests him to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the highest international standards of criminal justice, taking into account the recommendations of his report and the views that have been expressed by Council members;

2. *Acknowledges* that the adoption of the legal basis of, and framework for, the tribunal, would not prejudice the gradual phasing-in of its various components and would not predetermine the timing of the commencement of its operations, which will depend on the progress of the investigation;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to update the Council on the progress of the negotiation as he deems appropriate and to submit in a timely manner for the consideration of the Council a report on the implementation of this resolution, in particular on the draft agreement negotiated with the Lebanese Government, including options for a funding mechanism appropriate to ensure the continued and effective functioning of the tribunal;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1680 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5440th meeting, on 17 May 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 1559 (2004), 425 and 426 (1978), resolution 520 (1982) and resolution 1655 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) and of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3),

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting positively that further significant progress has been made towards implementing in full all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), in particular through the Lebanese national dialogue, but noting also with regret that other provisions of resolution 1559 have not yet been fully implemented, namely the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all its territory, the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon, and free and fair presidential elections conducted according to the Lebanese constitutional rules, without foreign interference and influence,

Noting with concern the conclusion of the Secretary-General's report (S/2006/248) that there had been movements of arms into Lebanese territory for militias over the last six months,

Expressing full support for the Lebanese National Dialogue and commending all Lebanese parties for its conduct and for the consensus reached in this context on important matters,

Having heard the Prime Minister of Lebanon's address to the Security Council on 21 April 2006 (S/PV.5417),

1. *Welcomes* the third semi-annual report of the Secretary General to the Security Council of 18 April 2006 on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2006/248);

2. *Reiterates* its call for the full implementation of all requirements of resolution 1559 (2004);

3. *Reiterates also* its call on all concerned States and parties as mentioned in the report, to cooperate fully with the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council and the Secretary-General to achieve this goal;

4. *Strongly encourages* the Government of Syria to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to the stability in the region, and urges both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to this end, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent;

5. *Commends* the Government of Lebanon for undertaking measures against movements of arms into Lebanese territory and calls on the Government of Syria to take similar measures;

6. *Welcomes* the decision of the Lebanese national dialogue to disarm Palestinian militias outside refugee camps within six months, supports its implementation and calls for further efforts to disband and disarm all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and to restore fully the Lebanese Government's control over all Lebanese territory;

7. *Reiterates* its support to the Secretary-General and his Special envoy in their efforts and dedication to facilitate and assist in the implementation of all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004);

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1686 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5461st meeting, on 15 June 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005, 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004,

Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing, as well as of all other attacks in Lebanon since October 2004, and reaffirming also that those involved in these attacks must be held accountable for their crimes,

Having examined the report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2006/375) ("the Commission"), submitted pursuant to resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005),

Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it continues to accomplish under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, and taking note of the Commission's conclusion that, while significant progress has been made, the investigation is not yet complete,

Taking note of the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon of 4 May 2006 to the Secretary-General (S/2006/278) requesting that the mandate of the Commission be extended for a further period of up to one year from 15 June 2006, and noting the concurrent recommendation of the Commission in this regard,

Recalling its request to the Secretary-General in resolution 1644 (2005) to submit recommendations with regard to the request of the Government of Lebanon to expand the mandate of the Commission to the other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in this terrorist attack accountable,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Commission;

2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Commission until 15 June 2007;

3. *Supports* the Commission's intention, as it deems appropriate and consistent with its mandate, to extend further its technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations into the other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, and requests the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the support and resources needed in this regard;

4. *Requests* the Commission to continue to report to the Council on the progress of the investigation on a quarterly basis, or at any other time as it deems appropriate;

5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1701 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

– full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

– security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

– full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

– no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;

– no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;

– provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;

(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations

Resolution 1748 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5648th meeting on 27 March 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1664 (2006), 1686 (2006), 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004),

Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing, as well as of all other attacks in Lebanon since October 2004, and reaffirming also that those involved in these attacks must be held accountable for their crimes,

Having examined the report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2007/150) ("The Commission"), submitted pursuant to resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), and 1686 (2006),

Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it continues to accomplish under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation into all aspects of this terrorist act,

Taking note of the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon of 21 February 2007 to the Secretary-General (S/2007/159, Enclosure) requesting that the mandate of the Commission be extended for a further period of up to one year from 15 June 2007 in order to ensure stability and continuity in the investigative process, and noting the concurrent recommendation of the Secretary-General in this regard,

Noting the Commission's conclusion that, in light of its current and planned investigative activities and while significant progress has been made, it is unlikely that the Commission will complete its work before its current mandate expires and that the Commission therefore welcomes the Lebanese request for an extension of its mandate beyond this date,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in this terrorist attack accountable,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Commission;

2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Commission until 15 June 2008 and declares its readiness to terminate the mandate earlier if the Commission reports that it has completed the implementation of its mandate;

3. *Requests* the Commission to continue to report to the Council on the progress of the investigation every four months, or at any other time as it deems appropriate;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1757 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, on 30 May 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005, 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006 and 1748 (2007) of 27 March 2007,

Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombings as well as other attacks in Lebanon since October 2004,

Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon,

Recalling the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting inter alia the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found responsible for this terrorist crime, and the request by this Council for the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing such a Tribunal based on the highest international standards of criminal justice,

Recalling further the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon on 15 November 2006 (S/2006/893) reporting on the conclusion of negotiations and consultations that took place between January 2006 and September 2006 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Hague, and Beirut between the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and authorized representatives of the Government of Lebanon, and the letter of its President to the Secretary-General of 21 November 2006 (S/2006/911) reporting that the Members of the Security Council welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations and that they were satisfied with the Agreement annexed to the Report,

Recalling that, as set out in its letter of 21 November 2006, should voluntary contributions be insufficient for the Tribunal to implement its mandate, the Secretary-General and the Security Council shall explore alternate means of financing the Tribunal,

Recalling also that the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon was signed by the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations respectively on 23 January and 6 February 2007,

Referring to the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/2007/281), which recalled that the parliamentary majority has expressed its support for the Tribunal, and asked that his request that the Special Tribunal be put into effect be presented to the Council as a matter of urgency,

Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others be identified and brought to justice,

Commending the Secretary-General for his continuing efforts to proceed, together with the Government of Lebanon, with the final steps for the conclusion of the Agreement as requested in the letter of its President dated 21 November 2006 and referring in this regard to the briefing by the Legal Counsel on 2 May 2007, in which he noted that the establishment of the Tribunal through the Constitutional process is facing serious obstacles, but noting also that all parties concerned reaffirmed their agreement in principle to the establishment of the Tribunal,

Commending also the recent efforts of parties in the region to overcome these obstacles,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in the terrorist attack accountable and reaffirming its determination to support Lebanon in its efforts to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this and other assassinations,

Reaffirming its determination that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides*, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that:

(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including its attachment, on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force on 10 June 2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided notification under Article 19 (1) of the annexed document before that date;

(b) If the Secretary-General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has not been concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the annexed document, the location of the seat of the Tribunal shall be determined in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and be subject to the conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the State that hosts the Tribunal;

(c) If the Secretary-General reports that contributions from the Government of Lebanon are not sufficient to bear the expenses described in Article 5 (b) of the annexed document, he may accept or use voluntary contributions from States to cover any shortfall;

2. *Notes* that, pursuant to Article 19 (2) of the annexed document, the Special Tribunal shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, taking into account the progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation Commission;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in coordination, when appropriate, with the Government of Lebanon, to undertake the steps and measures necessary to establish the Special Tribunal in a timely manner and to report to the Council within 90 days and thereafter periodically on the implementation of this resolution;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 1773 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5733rd meeting, on 24 August 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 3 August 2007 (S/PRST/2007/29),

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 28 June 2007 (S/2007/392) and the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 2 August 2007 (S/2007/470),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders and under the sole and exclusive authority of its Government,

Reiterating its strong support for full respect for the cessation of hostilities and the Blue Line in its entirety,

Reaffirming its attachment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and *aware* of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Emphasizing the need to address the causes of the conflict, including that the abducted Israeli soldiers have not been released, nor has proof of life been provided, and calling once again for their immediate and unconditional return,

Encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the steps taken by the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, and *encouraging* it to continue its efforts in this regard,

Welcoming also the tripartite arrangements referred to in the aforementioned report, and *encouraging* the parties to coordinate further with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), notably to visibly mark the Blue Line and reach an agreement on the northern part of Ghajar,

Condemning in the strongest terms all terrorist attacks against UNIFIL and *emphasizing* the need for further coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL, and for UNIFIL to enhance its investigative capacities in response to these attacks,

Underlining the importance of continued efforts to clear unexploded ordnance from Southern Lebanon and calling on all parties to support these efforts,

Reaffirming UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, as well as of the Special Coordinator of the United Nations for Lebanon,

Expressing its strong appreciation to Member states that contribute to UNIFIL and underlining the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in the letter from the Lebanese Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of 25 June 2007 (S/2007/396),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2008;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, and *looks forward* to its increased cooperation with the LAF in the discharge of its mandate;

3. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities and the Blue Line in its entirety;

4. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of the UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel and by ensuring UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement within its area of operation;

5. *Calls* upon all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to achieve a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* the need for greater progress in this regard;

6. *Reiterates* its intention to consider further steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

7. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

9. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 1815 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5901st meeting on 2 June 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1664 (2006), 1686 (2006), 1748 (2007), 1757 (2007), 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004),

Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing, as well as of all other attacks in Lebanon since October 2004, and reaffirming also that those involved in these attacks must be held accountable for their crimes,

Having examined the report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2008/210) ("The Commission"), submitted pursuant to resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007),

Commending the Commission for its outstanding professional work and the progress it continues to achieve under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation into all aspects of this terrorist act,

Taking note of the request to extend the mandate of the Commission expressed by the Commissioner in his briefing to the Security Council on 8 April 2008, in order to ensure stability and continuity in the investigative process,

Taking note of the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon of 8 May 2008 (S/2008/334, Enclosure) to the Secretary-General expressing the hope that the Security Council will respond favourably to the Commissioner's request by extending the mandate of the Commission until 31 December 2008, and noting the concurrent recommendation of the Secretary-General in this regard,

Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in this terrorist attack accountable,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Commission;

2. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Commission until 31 December 2008 and declares its readiness to terminate the mandate earlier if the Commission reports that it has completed the implementation of its mandate;

3. *Requests* the Commission to report to the Council on the progress of the investigation at the latest in six months, and at any other earlier time if it deems appropriate;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Resolution 1832 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5967th meeting, on 27 August 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006) and 1773 (2007), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of 18 August 2008 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 21 August 2008 (S/2008/568) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and expressing its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and underlining the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2009;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, and welcomes the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces and encourages further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities and the Blue Line in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel and by ensuring UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement within its area of operation;

4. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to achieve a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and emphasizes the need for greater progress in this regard;

5. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

7. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

Resolution 1884 (2009)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6183rd meeting, on 27 August 2009

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007) and 1832 (2008), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 4 July 2009 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 6 August 2009 (S/2009/407) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006),

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest serious violations highlighted in the Secretary-General's letter of 6 August 2009 and *emphasizing* the importance of the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL, and, to that end, encouraging further coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces,

Calling upon all parties concerned to respect the Blue Line in its entirety, including through Ghajar, and encouraging the parties to coordinate further with UNIFIL, to visibly mark the Blue Line,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Calling upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties, in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2010;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, and welcomes the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces and encourages further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. Strongly *calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities and the Blue Line in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel and by ensuring UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement within its area of operation;

4. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to achieve a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and emphasizes the need for greater progress in this regard;

5. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

7. *Welcomes* in this regard receiving as soon as possible the conclusions of the review of the operational capacity of UNIFIL, including the force structure, assets and requirements that will be conducted, as referred to in the Secretary-General's letter of 6 August 2009, during the coming months, in an effort to ensure, along with peacekeeping good practice, that the Mission's assets and resources are configured most appropriately to fulfil its mandated tasks;

8. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

9. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 1937 (2010)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6375th meeting, on 30 August 2010

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008) and 1884 (2009) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 20 July 2010 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 11 August 2010 (S/2010/430) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006),

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest grave violation of 3 August 2010 highlighted in the Secretary-General's letter of 11 August 2010 and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigation with a view to preventing such incidents in the future,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety and encouraging the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2011;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, welcomes the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces and calls on further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* the deployment of an additional brigade of the Lebanese armed forces on 1 August 2010 and *calls* on the Government of Lebanon to further increase the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in Southern Lebanon, consistent with resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. *Deplores* strongly the recent incidents involving UNIFIL peacekeepers, *emphasizes* the importance of not impairing the ability of UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and *calls on* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement;

6. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and emphasizes that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. *Reaffirms* its call for the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. *Welcomes* the conclusions of the Joint DPKO-UNIFIL Technical Review presented in the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 12 February 2010 (S/2010/86) and *calls* for their rapid implementation;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

Resolution 2004 (2011)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6605th meeting, on 30 August 2011

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009) and 1937 (2010) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 22 July 2011 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 3 August 2011 (S/2011/488) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest grave violations of 15 May and 1 August 2011, *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigation with a view to preventing such incidents in the future,

Commending the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL on steps taken to prevent an escalation of violence during protests on 5 June 2011,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety,

Condemning in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers on 27 May and 26 July, as well as all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon, *reaffirming* its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation will prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 and *welcoming* the investigation launched by Lebanon and its commitment to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks, and to protect UNIFIL movements as stated by the Lebanese Higher Defence Council on 12 August 2011,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2012;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic dialogue which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006), *calls* for an acceleration of its pace, and *requests* in this regard the Secretary-General to conduct, before the end of the year, a Strategic review of UNIFIL in an effort to ensure, along with peacekeeping good practice, that the Mission is configured most appropriately to fulfil its mandated tasks;

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. *Condemns* in the strongest terms all terrorist attacks against UNIFIL and *urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, and for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May and 26 July attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

6. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. *Reaffirms* its call on all states to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 2064 (2012)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6825th meeting, on 30 August 2012

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 21 July 2012 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 14 August 2012 (S/2012/632) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigations with a view to preventing such violations in the future,

Welcoming the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in de escalating tensions and *expressing its support* for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701 (2006),

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the progress in the marking of the Blue line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms the terrorist attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers on 9 December 2011, as well as all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon, *reaffirming* its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation will prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006),

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and expressing its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing its full support for the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *requesting* the Secretary-General to continue updating the Council on the implementation of the Strategic Review,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2013;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic dialogue which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006), *calls* for an acceleration of its pace, consistent with the relevant recommendations of the Strategic Review, including through enhancing the coordination among donors to provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to enable it to fulfil its mandated tasks under resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. *Condemns* in the strongest terms all terrorist attacks against UNIFIL and urges all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks and to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

6. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. *Reaffirms* its call on all states to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 2115 (2013)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7025th meeting, on 29 August 2013

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011), 2064 (2012) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 12 July 2013 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 31 July 2013 (S/2013/457) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigations with a view to preventing such violations in the future,

Welcoming the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in de escalating tensions and *expressing its support* for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the continued progress in the marking of the Blue line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon, *reaffirming* its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation will prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and recalling the necessity for all parties to ensure that UNIFIL personnel are secure and their freedom of movement is fully respected and unimpeded,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing its full support for the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *requesting* the Secretary-General to continue updating the Council on the implementation of the Strategic Review,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2014;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006), and, in this regard, is encouraged by the progress made in the formalisation of a regular Strategic Dialogue mechanism between the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL;

4. *Commends*, in this context, the Lebanese Armed Forces for its efforts regarding its wider capabilities development plan, of which the Strategic Dialogue plan forms a separate but integral component, consistent with the relevant recommendations of the Strategic Review, and consequently *calls for* an enhancement of the coordination amongst donors to provide assistance to build up Lebanese Armed Forces capabilities including through training, as these forces are a central pillar of the country's stability;

5. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

6. *Urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

7. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

8. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

9. *Reaffirms* its call on all states to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

10. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

12. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 2172 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7248th meeting, on 26 August 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011), 2064 (2012) and 2115 (2013) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 25 July 2014

and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 31st July 2014 (S/2014/554) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigations with a view to preventing such violations in the future,

Welcoming the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in de-escalating tensions and *expressing its support* for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the continued progress in the marking of the Blue line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon, *reaffirming* its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation will prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and recalling the necessity for all parties to ensure that UNIFIL personnel are secure and their freedom of movement is fully respected and unimpeded,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing its full support for the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *requesting* the Secretary-General to continue updating the Council on the implementation of the Strategic Review,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2015;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006), and, in this regard, is encouraged by the progress made in the formalisation of a regular Strategic Dialogue mechanism between the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL;

4. *Commends*, in this context, the Lebanese Armed Forces for its efforts regarding its wider capabilities development plan, of which the Strategic Dialogue plan forms a separate but integral component, consistent with the relevant recommendations of the Strategic Review, and encourages Member States to support LAF in particular through the established coordination tools of international assistance to build up Lebanese Armed Forces capabilities including through training, as these forces are a central pillar of the country's stability; and recognizes in this regard the importance of the International Support Group for Lebanon and the related meetings held in Paris and Rome, as well as substantial contributions already made by some donors;

5. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

6. *Welcomes* in this regard the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions and expresses *support for* the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements;

7. *Urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

8. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

9. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

10. *Reaffirms* its call on all states to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

11. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

13. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

Resolution 2236 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7509th meeting, on 21 August 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011), 2064 (2012), 2115 (2013) and 2172 (2014), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of its President dated 19 March 2015, and its Press Statement of 4 February 2015,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 14 July 2015 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 5 August 2015 (S/2015/598) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006) in particular the serious disruption of the cessation of hostilities that took place on 28 January 2015, and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigations with a view to preventing such violations in the future,

Underlining the risk that such events could lead to a new conflict that none of the parties or the region can afford,

Urging all parties to make every effort to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is sustained, exercise maximum calm and restraint and refrain from any action or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the region,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701 (2006),

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue line in its entirety, *welcoming* the continued progress in the marking of the Blue line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL, including through the tripartite mechanism, to continue working in the ongoing process to delineate and visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and *recalling* the necessity for all parties to ensure that UNIFIL personnel are secure and their freedom of movement is fully respected and unimpeded,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL has at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the crucial role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in extending and sustaining the authority of the Government of Lebanon, in particular in southern Lebanon, and responding to other security challenges, including the threat of terrorism, and the strong international commitment to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, which has helped strengthen the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide security for Lebanon,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review, and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing its full support for the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *requesting* the Secretary-General to continue updating the Council on the implementation of the Strategic Review,

Calling upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2016;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the continued engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue, which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Urges* in this regard further international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as in the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including counter-terrorism and border protection;

5. *Strongly calls upon* all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

6. *Welcomes* the constructive role played by the Tripartite Mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, which has helped to further stabilize the situation along the Blue Line and build trust between the parties, and *expresses* in this regard strong support for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to facilitate liaison, coordination, and practical arrangements on the ground and to continue to ensure that the tripartite mechanism enables the parties to discuss a wider range of issues;

7. *Urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

8. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006) and on all outstanding issues in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004), and other relevant Security Council resolutions;

9. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

10. *Reaffirms* its call on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

11. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

13. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 2305 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7763rd meeting, on 30 August 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011), 2064 (2012), 2115 (2013), 2172 (2014) and 2236 (2015) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of its President dated 22 July 2016,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 25 July 2016 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 3 August 2016 (S/2016/681) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Expressing concern at the limited progress made towards the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and other key provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) ten years after its adoption,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts, including by exploring concrete solutions with the Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General and the UNIFIL Force Commander, to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006) in particular the incidents which occurred on 20 December 2015 and 4 January 2016,

Underlining the risk that violations of the cessation of hostilities could lead to a new conflict that none of the parties or the region can afford,

Urging all parties to make every effort to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is sustained, exercise maximum calm and restraint and refrain from any action or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the region,

Emphasizing to all parties the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701 (2006),

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the continued progress in the marking of the Blue Line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL, including through the tripartite mechanism, to continue working in the ongoing process to delineate and visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and *recalling* the necessity for all parties to ensure that UNIFIL personnel are secure and their freedom of movement is fully respected and unimpeded,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and expressing its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL has at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the crucial role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in extending and sustaining the authority of the Government of Lebanon, in particular in southern Lebanon, and responding to other security challenges, including the threat of terrorism, and the strong international commitment to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, which has helped strengthen the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide security for Lebanon,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review, and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Bearing in mind the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *expressing* the need for a follow-up and update,

Calling upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2017;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the continued engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue, which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with global peacekeeping best practice, to conduct by February 2017 a strategic review of UNIFIL, examining the structure of its uniformed and civilian components and related resources, further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of this review, in an effort to ensure that the Mission is configured most appropriately to fulfil its mandated tasks, and *affirms* in this regard its strong continuing commitment to the existing UNIFIL mandate;

5. *Urges* further international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as in the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including counter-terrorism and border protection;

6. *Strongly calls upon* all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

7. *Welcomes* the constructive role played by the Tripartite Mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, which has helped to further stabilize the situation along the Blue Line and build trust between the parties, and *expresses* in this regard strong support for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to facilitate liaison, coordination, and practical arrangements on the ground and to continue to ensure that the Tripartite Mechanism enables the parties to discuss a wider range of issues;

8. *Urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, calls for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

9. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006) and on all outstanding issues in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004), and other relevant Security Council resolutions;

10. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

11. *Reaffirms* its call on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

12. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

14. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix D: The UN Civilian Structure for Conflict Resolution (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009)

Three main organs of the United States: the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General play the most important roles in the Conflict Resolution. Each has a number of procedures and structure for dealing with dispute. With regard to the conflict prevention, the main goals of the UN were to prevent a dispute a dispute from escalating into conflict, to avoid the recurrence of conflict. Preventive diplomacy refers to action to prevent disputes from arising, to resolve them before they escalate into conflicts, or to limit the spread of conflict when they occur. The UN involvement may take the form of mediation, conciliation or negotiation through authorized representatives of UN including the S-G and his good offices[595], special representatives, special advisors, special coordinators, special envoys, special rapporteurs. Their term of office may vary depending on the nature of dispute, parties and underlying causes of a conflict.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Under the Charter, member states are obliged to accept and carry out its decisions. When a dispute is brought to its attention, the Council usually urges the parties to settle it by peaceful means. The UNSC may make recommendations to the parties for a peaceful settlement, appoint special representatives, ask the S-G to use his good offices and undertake investigation and mediation. Except military actions or enforcement measures, the UNSC may recommend the terms of settlement when it is

[595] The term "good offices" has its roots the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. Article 2 and 3 of both instruments stipulate that "before an appeal to arms" states shall have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers. Moreover, friendly Powers are further authorized to take the initiative to offer good offices or mediation even during the course of hostilities. Currently, the term refers to independent political role of the S-G in preventing or mediating conflicts among states. Yet, there is no specific authority for this in the Chapter; it is a role which has developed in practice. Prospects for the good offices function of the S-G are closely connected with prospects for the UN organization itself.

satisfied that the parties themselves have exhausted all peaceful ways and the dispute is likely to escalate and endanger international peace and security. The council generally recommends or calls on the parties to observe a ceasefire, withdraw armed forces from disputed territory, accept an offer of mediation, or initiate bilateral negotiations. If the causes of dispute are unclear or controversial, the UNSC may authorize and dispatch a fact-finding mission. In addition to fact-finding committees, a special group to assist the negotiations may be needed to establish. The UNSC may formally appoint a mediator, such as the S-G or one of his officials, a prominent personality, or a high- ranking government representative to act as an intermediary on behalf of the UNSC.

The General Assembly's role in the conflict resolution based on the Article-10 of the UN Charter. It provides the General Assembly with the right to consider any matter within the framework of the UN Charter. The Assembly can initiate inquires and studies on a situation which may have a potential to pose a threat to the international peace and security that may need to united action[596]. Unlike the UNSC, it has no power to enforce its decision but it can recommend terms for settlement of the dispute which also express the opinion of the international community. The General Assembly often calls on the parties to initiate a ceasefire, begin talks, or implement a peace plan. It can also employ mediation, conciliation, and good offices. Furthermore, the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, which is likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations.

[596] In 1950, The General Assembly passed the resolution 377 named "the United for Peace Resolution" which enable the Assembly to deal with the disputes posing a threat to the peace, or an act of aggression, at a time when the UNSC was paralyzed by inconvenient use of veto.

The Secretary-General's position is one of the most visible and important of the entire UN system. The charter describes the S-G as "chief administrative officer" of the organization, who shall act in that capacity and perform "such other function as are trusted" to him by the Security Council, General Assembly and other UN organs. He is the focal point for the collection and distribution of information and helps prepare the ground for the decision-making organs, and performs other functions as are entrusted to him by the General Assembly and the UNSC. In other words, the UNSC or Assembly may delegate certain talks to the S-G, such as providing good offices, dispatching a fact-finding team, or overseeing a PKO spreading (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000). The S-G may designate one of his high-level staff or request a diplomat from member states as his special adviser or personal representative on a crisis to act on his behalf[597]. One of the most vital roles played by the S-G is the use of his "good offices" which drawing upon his independence, impartiality, and integrity to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000). His role as mediator is very important, and may involve simply providing good offices or conciliation. In practice, much of his work occurs in quiet diplomacy, making the most of his central position, his discretion and impartiality, and the moral and political status of his office. By hosting proximity talk between the leaders, his good offices try to reach a comprehensive settlement which aiming at bridging the gaps between them. He and his representatives provide an important point of contact between governments that may not be able to meet directly, and sometimes even between governments and non-governmental actors such as resistance groups or

[597] His representatives or special envoys engage in dialogue with all relevant parties and help stop to hostilities on the ground and provide a more enabling environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

liberation movements. For example, he has provided important contacts between the PLO, Hezbollah and Israeli government at various times.

The civil instruments of the S-G are used most for the conflict resolution. The UN Secretariat consists of departments and offices which include OSG: Office of the Secretary-General, OIOS: Office of International Oversight Services, OLA: Office of Legal Affairs, DPA: Department of Political Affairs, DDA: Department of Disarmament Operations, DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, DESA: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, DGACM: Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, DPI: Department of Public Information, DM: Department of Management and other relevant departments.

Here are the some of the important offices:

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for assisting member states and the S-G in their efforts to maintain, achieve and sustain international peace and security. It does this by planning, preparing and conducting UN PKO, in accordance with mandates provided by the member states. Department undertakes contingency planning for possible PKOs; develops plan, methodologies and budgets for these operations once they are mandated. The DPKO provides political and executive guidance and support to PKOs; maintains contacts with parties to conflicts and the members of the Security Council on the implementation of the resolutions; analyses emerging policy questions and best practices related to peacekeeping, and formulates policies and procedures on them. The head of the department directs PKOs on behalf of the S-G, formulates policies and guidelines for

operations, and advices the S-G on all matters relating to peacekeeping and mine action.

Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provides advice and support on all political matters to the S-G in the exercise of his global responsibilities under the Charter related to maintenance and restoration of peace and security. The head of department undertakes consultations and negotiations relating to peaceful settlement of disputes, and is the focal point for UN peace building, preventive and electoral assistance activities.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), strengthens coordination among the bodies that provide assistance in response to emergencies. Within the OCHA, the core functions of the emergency relief coordinator are to address the advocacy of humanitarian issues and to establish the appropriate response mechanism with the political organs in the field.