

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CROSS-CUTTING EXPOSURE AND  
POLITICAL TOLERANCE: THE CASE OF TURKEY

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CROSS-CUTTING EXPOSURE AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE: THE CASE OF TURKEY**

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Political tolerance is a crucial issue in Turkey due to potential political polarization, prolonged inter-ethnic conflicts, and negative views toward minorities. This study examines the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance based on the beneficial consequences of cross-cutting exposure for deliberation (i.e., unbiased information seeking, ambivalence, a realistic perspective towards one's own view). The present study replicates the hypothesis that cross-cutting discussion (i.e., being exposed to oppositional political perspectives) can predict greater awareness of opposing viewpoints, which in turn predicts greater political tolerance (Mutz, 2002). In addition, I expect that need for cognitive closure moderates the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views. In measuring the awareness of opposing arguments, three conflictual political issues and poles for each issue in Turkey were determined with a pilot study with 74 participants. Accordingly, issue labels were "Presidency System", "Kurdish Problem" and "Freedom and Human Rights". In the main study, 299 participants (F=134, M=164) reported their need for cognitive closure, opinions regarding the three contradictory issues, awareness of opposing views, and their political tolerance. Using Hayes's (2013) PROCESS macro,

results supported mediation hypothesis, but not the moderation hypothesis. Findings of the study, potential implications and future suggestions are discussed.

**Keywords:** political tolerance, cross-cutting exposure, need for cognitive closure, awareness of opposing views.



## ÖZ

### KARŞIT SİYASİ GÖRÜŞLERE MARUZ KALMA İLE SİYASİ TOLERANS ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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Türkiye’deki potansiyel siyasi kutuplaşma, uzun süredir devam eden etnik gruplar arası çatışmalar ve azınlıklara karşı olumsuz tutumların yaygınlığı, siyasi toleransın çalışılmasını bu ülkede önemli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, karşıt siyasi görüşlere maruz kalmanın siyasi anlamdaki olumlu sonuçlarından (ör., tarafsız bilgi arama davranışı, siyasi çelişkililik, kendi görüşlerine karşı gerçekçi bakış açısı kazanma) yola çıkarak, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile politik tolerans arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Temel olarak, Mutz’ın (2002a) çalışmasının bir replikasyonunun yapılması amaçlanarak, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın, karşıt görüşler hakkındaki farkındalık aracılığı ile siyasi toleransı yordayacağı hipotez edilmiştir. Ayrıca, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının bu modeldeki düzenleyici etkisi test edilmiştir. Karşıt görüşler farkındalığını ölçmek için 74 katılımcıyla yapılan pilot çalışmayla Türkiye’de insanların üzerinde en çok fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı siyasi konular ve bu konulardaki farklı iki görüş (kutuplar) belirlenmiştir. Buna göre, konular “Başkanlık Sistemi”, “Özgürlük ve İnsan Hakları”, ve “Kürt Sorunu” olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ana çalışmada, 299 katılımcıya (K=134, E=164) bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı, siyasi tolerans, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma sıklığı, Türkiye’de tartışmalı bulunan siyasi konular hakkındaki görüşleri ve karşıt görüşler farkındalığı hakkında

sorular yöneltilmiştir. Hayes'in (2013) PROCESS makrosu kullanılarak yapılan analizler sonucunda, bulgular aracı değişken modelini desteklerken, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının modelde düzenleyici bir etkisi bulgulanmamıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçları alanyazındaki bulgular çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** siyasi tolerans, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma, karşıt görüş farkındalığı, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı.





*To my sister*

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Turkey is a country which has experienced prolonged interethnic conflicts for nearly three decades and is under the threat of ideological polarization (e.g., Sarigil, & Karakoc, 2016; Keyman, 2014; Tekin, & Güney, 2015). Furthermore, there is a severe discrimination toward members of minority groups like women, LGBTI individuals, and immigrants (e.g., Göregenli & Karakuş, 2011; Kaya, 2015; Önder, 2013). Considering the interethnic, ideological, and minority intolerance, political tolerance is a key issue in Turkey.

Since democratic regimes require citizens to tolerate the political participation of others with different views, political tolerance is a key concept for these regimes (e.g., Gibson, 1992a; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). As an important part of stable, enduring democracies, political tolerance is characterized by people's willingness to respect the rights and liberties of those with different opinions and practices (e.g., Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Robinson, 2010; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1979). Although many people living in advanced democracies support democratic rights abstractly, they are found to be politically intolerant in more specific terms (e.g., Barnum & Sullivan 1990; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus 1993). Therefore, political tolerance is a critical issue in reaching stable democracies which provides all citizens with many rights and freedoms on an equal basis.

Moreover, political tolerance can play a role in helping the negative political consequences of intergroup conflicts to diminish (e.g., Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014). Furthermore, political tolerance provides new perceptions toward conflicts and contradicts with dominant societal beliefs which fosters intolerance (e.g., belief that one's own group is superior than that of others), thereby offers a peaceful solution for intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). Gaining

new perceptions toward conflicts and healthier solutions for reducing tensions means greater political tolerance, which can contribute to enhancement of democratic regimes. In brief, considering the situation in Turkey, political tolerance has a key role in having a stable and enduring democracy because it helps to prevent potential conflicts, and promote peaceful intergroup relations.

This study examines the relationship between exposure to opposing political views (i.e., cross-cutting exposure) and political tolerance in Turkey. By doing this, three beneficial consequences of cross-cutting exposure are mentioned the rationale for conducting this study. First, cross-cutting exposure leads to unbiased information seeking behavior in that it increases motivation to seek information about many sides of one political issue (Nemeth & Rogers, 1996). Second, cross-cutting exposure helps people to have a realistic perspective towards their own political opinions; therefore, they can accept legitimacy of opposing viewpoints (Munson & Resnick, 2010). Third, cross-cutting exposure leads to political ambivalence which helps people to incorporate both positive and negative sides of the same political issue (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004). As a result, exposure to different political views can provide an awareness of opposing political viewpoints, thereby, increasing tolerance (e.g., Mutz, 2002a; Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). As a result, exposure to different views can be related with political tolerance through increasing awareness of opposing political views. This hypothesis was already tested in an American sample. The present study takes *the need for cognitive closure* (NFC) into account as a moderating variable in the relationship between *exposure* to different views and *awareness of opposing views*. The need for cognitive closure refers to a desire for reaching a definite answer to a question and avoidance from ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). It is related to engaging in stereotypical judgements, commitment to stereotypic information, use of heuristics and stereotypes at the time of negotiation, and lower level of perspective taking (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). As a result, people with low level of exposure to dissonant views and high level of NFC probably

have less awareness of the reasons of opposing viewpoints than people who experience high level of cross-cutting exposure and have low level of NFC.

In brief, this thesis partly replicates Mutz's (2002a) work regarding the relationship between exposure to different political views and political tolerance through the mediation of awareness of opposing views in the Turkish context. The need for cognitive closure is also considered as a moderator between exposure to different political views and awareness of opposing views. More specifically, I expect that the positive relationship between exposure and awareness will be stronger for people with lower NFC levels.

### **1.1 Cross-Cutting Exposure as a Predictor of Political Tolerance**

Exposure to rationales of conflicting political views can be named "cross-cutting exposure" (Mutz, 2002a; Robinson, 2010). It is related to more informed political attitudes and can result in opinion change (e.g., Barabas, 2004; Mutz, 2006). Moreover, it can play a role in preventing ideological polarization since interaction with like-minded others can lead to polarization (Sunstein, 2002). For example, selective exposure to views which reinforce one's opinion can lead to a shift toward more extreme position; thereby, polarization might lead to difficulties in finding a common ground among people with opposing opinions (Munson, & Resnick, 2010). On the other hand, cross-cutting exposure leads to more divergent thinking; thereby, it improves individual and group problem solving (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth, & Rogers, 1996).

In this study, cross-cutting exposure is examined as a predictor of political tolerance because of three reasons. First, cross-cutting exposure encourages unbiased information seeking behavior. To illustrate, research shows that, participants who are exposed to an article in which contents classified into different viewpoints, become motivated to search more articles than that of participants who are exposed to only

one-side of the issue (Park, Kang, Chung, & Song, 2009). This implies that being exposed to different point of views increases information seeking behavior. Even, this information seeking is experienced as an unbiased behavior by which people search for information about all sides of the issue (e.g., Nemeth & Rogers, 1996).

Second, cross-cutting exposure provides people with a more realistic perspective toward their political views. Generally, people tend to consider that their own opinions are more broadly shared than they really are (Sanders & Mullen, 1983); however, exposure to dissonant views provides them with a more realistic assessment of these views' popularity. Therefore, people can realize the legitimacy of opposing views in political spheres; therefore, they can develop a more realistic perspective in politics (Munson & Resnick, 2010). In other words, exposure to dissonant political views are beneficial for people to have a realistic political perspective through which they can accept other viewpoints' legitimacy as well.

Third, cross-cutting exposure is related with political ambivalence. Political ambivalence is not having weak political attitudes toward a candidate or objects. Instead, individuals who hold politically ambivalent attitudes tend to have multiple and strong attitudes toward the same object in opposite directions (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004). For example, a person who is ambivalent about U.S. president Trump can support his strong position but oppose to his immigrant policy. Political ambivalence is considered as having two main components: intensity and polarization (e.g., Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). First, intensity of political attitudes increases when both positive and negative attitude components grow larger. Second, if positive and negative attitude components grow similar regarding to magnitude, polarization gets smaller. That is, decreasing polarization means incorporating positive and negative attitudes toward the same political object. Therefore, higher intensity and lower polarization reflects higher ambivalence.

Since cross-cutting exposure contributes to ambivalence in political attitudes (e.g., McClurg, 2006; Mutz, 2002b), it can also lead people to have a broader perception toward political objects. Namely, people can understand both positive and negative

sides of their political opinions due to the attitudinal ambivalence resulting from cross-cutting exposure (e.g., Huckfeldt, Mendez & Osborn, 2004). Also, they are more likely to search for political information in a more random manner than individuals who do not experience cross-cutting exposure (McClurg, Sokhey & Seib, 2011). Hence, ambivalence which results from cross-cutting exposure can foster individuals to search political information considering many sides of the issue. As a result, politically ambivalent attitude is beneficial for people to have a broad understanding of their attitudes.

In brief, since cross-cutting exposure might lead to, greater unbiased information seeking behavior, understanding of other viewpoints, and ambivalent political attitudes; cross-cutting exposure can contribute to greater understanding of others' point of view. This greater understanding, in turn, can contribute to greater political tolerance. For instance, research demonstrates that cross-cutting exposure is related with greater deliberation and political tolerance, both of which are regarded as essential components of deliberative democracies (e.g., Mutz, 2002a; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). Therefore, cross-cutting exposure can contribute to political tolerance via better understanding of others' views.

### **1.1.1 Mediating Role of Awareness of Opposing Views**

Exposure to different political opinions through interpersonal discussion imparts new information, and prompts people to think about the reasons why others hold such an opinion that is different from their own (Mutz, 1998; Mutz, 2002a). Specifically, cross-cutting exposure is related with a greater understanding of the reasons for opposing views. To illustrate, Mutz (2002a) tested this assumption with a representative national telephone survey in the USA in 1996. In this study, participants' frequency of political discussion with people whom they disagreed with, reasons for opposing viewpoints and the level of political tolerance were assessed. Through this data, the author examined the contribution of cross-cutting exposure on the awareness of the reasons

for opposing views, the awareness of the reasons for their own views and the political tolerance. Mainly, higher frequency of exposure to opposing viewpoints was correlated with greater awareness of the reasons for the opposite opinion, as well as for their own views. This, in turn, would be associated with the level of political tolerance. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants who reported higher level of cross-cutting exposure generated more reasons both for dissonant and consonant views; which, in turn predicted greater political tolerance. Namely, being exposed to different political views provide people a better understanding of others' views. Hence, they could be more politically tolerant.

Similarly, Price, Cappella, and Nir (2002), studied whether disagreement on political talk expands one's understanding of others' perspectives. In other words, they examined the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and generating reasons for others' points of view. Utilizing data from a survey of the U.S. public (N = 1,684), they found that disagreement in political discussion leads to higher opinion quality. That is, exposure to dissonant political views is positively related with people's ability to generate reasons for conflicting views. On a similar vein, in the present study, it is expected that exposure to dissonant political opinions could lead to greater political tolerance by increasing awareness of the reasons for opposing views.

However, cross-cutting exposure might not always be resulted in beneficial political consequences. For example, it could hinder the motivation for deliberation. For instance, upon realizing dissonant opinions through cross-cutting exposure, people may avoid future interaction with those having discordant views (Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015). Similarly, research demonstrates that experience of disagreement may discourage people from expressing their point of views (Wojcieszak & Price, 2012). Another negative result of cross-cutting exposure for deliberation is related to ambivalence. Although, ambivalence in political attitudes caused by cross-cutting exposure have positive consequences, it can cause political withdrawal (McClurg, Sokhey & Seib, 2011; Mutz, 2002b). On the other hand, Huckfeldt, Mendez & Osborn (2004) showed that cross-cutting exposure did not lead to an important withdrawal

from politics. It might cause reduction in political interest, but had no effect on voter turnout. Nevertheless, decrease in political interest can demotivate people to discuss politics, thereby, understanding others' view in politics.

Briefly, although cross-cutting exposure fosters unbiased information seeking, having a broad and realistic perspective toward one's own and opposing views; it can lead to avoidance of further interaction or confusion which could hinder the understanding of the others' point of view. Thus, one might conclude that cross-cutting exposure can both have beneficial and detrimental effects for deliberation. Hence, researchers should focus on the mechanisms and moderating factors in examining the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and deliberation.

In a national mail survey data conducted during the U.S. presidential campaign in 2008, additional mechanisms influencing the effect of cross-cutting exposure on political participation were also considered (Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015). More specifically, "dialogue openness" (i.e., motivation to discuss political issues with lesser known others) and "strong tie-homogeneity" (i.e., having a homogenous primary discussion network) are measured. The results show that those with strong tie homogeneity in their political discussion network and dialogic openness tend to continue people's motivation to deliberate. In other words, when cross-cutting exposure is combined with homogenous discussion networks and dialogue openness, it leads to greater political participation. Although the authors bring some explanation for the dilemma, it is obvious that their results cannot be generalized as they found that this model can be accounted for only highly politically efficacious individuals, and not for others. Hence, cross-cutting exposure had an adverse relationship with political participation among less efficacious individuals whose close social context is comprised of like-minded others. This finding seems to be contradictory with their hypothesis that cross-cutting discussion in combination with strong-tie homogeneity contributes to a greater political participation. In addition, their "dialogic openness" scale only consisted of one item; and thus, insufficient to measure openness to participation in political discussion with unfamiliar others. As a result, strong tie-

homogeneity and dialogic openness remains insufficient to explain what plays role in change in the influence of cross-cutting exposure on deliberation and participation. It can be concluded that previous research remained weak to make generalizable explanations for the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and deliberation; therefore, future research needs to bring new perspectives to understand this relationship by taking into account for different motivational variables.

In sum, cross-cutting exposure can be related to greater awareness of opposing views. However, considering that cross-cutting experience might not always foster people to deliberate on political issues, this experience cannot always lead to greater awareness for opposing views. This is because cross-cutting exposure might lessen people's motivation to deliberate and can prevent gaining awareness of others' point of view because this awareness requires a motivation to deliberate, and being open to discussion to political issues. As this experience can be cause both beneficial and detrimental effects for deliberation, research needs to clarify the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and deliberation.

As cross-cutting exposure does not allways be beneficial for deliberation, an individual difference variable, need for cognitive closure, may help to explain this relationship. More specifically, as people with high need for cognitive closure have strong desire for consensus within dyadic partners, tend to be easily influenced by stereotypical information, and might be low in perspective taking ability, cross-cutting exposure may not be related to awareness of opposing views for these people (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). On the other hand, people who are low in need for cognitive closure might benefited form cross-cutting exposure, therefore, can have higher level of awareness for opposing views after the experience of cross-cutting exposure. As a result, this study attempts to fill the gap in literature considering the individual difference variable of need for cognitive closure as a possible moderator in the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of the reasons for opposing views.

### 1.1.2 Need for Cognitive Closure

The need for cognitive closure refers to a desire for reaching a definite answer to a question as well as avoidance from ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). It lies upon a continuum from need for cognitive closure and need to avoid closure. Mainly, strong need for cognitive closure refers to strong desire to have closure urgently and also maintain it permanently. In other words, need for cognitive closure is characterized by “seize upon early information” and “freeze on judgement it implies” (e.g., De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). In other words, individuals with high level of need for cognitive closure (NFC) have tendency to “seize” the information and reach closure urgently; and “freeze” this judgement permanently. It implies a tendency to reach closure without any further delay and a desire for the continuity of closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). These tendencies are suggested to cause closeness to new information, therefore, lower the information processing.

Considering the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views, in this study, the need for cognitive closure was suggested as an important motivational variable because of three reasons.

The first reason is based on *social accountability*. Accordingly, people might perceive cross-cutting exposure as a threat to the harmony in social relationships (Mutz, 2002b). As a result, people might feel discomfort when talking with others who have dissonant political views; and thus, cannot be aware about reasons why others hold dissonant views. In other words, since it was characterized by the need for firm answers to reduce uncertainty (e.g., Manchi Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010), NFC can be a motivational characteristic that hinders the understanding of opposing views following cross-cutting exposure. Individuals with high NFC have high desire for consensus within groups, and have preference for agreement with their dyadic partners (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Likewise, individuals whose NFC levels were experimentally manipulated to increase in a group setting were more likely to

reject a confederate who held a dissonant point of view (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). That is, people with high NFC can benefit from cross-cutting exposure less than people with low NFC, especially with respect to message deliberation.

The second reason why NFC is important in the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views is based on the relationship between NFC and stereotypical processing. Specifically, it is shown that stereotypical information is more influential on people with high NFC. For example, ethnic stereotypic judgements are more pronounced under high NFC condition than that of low NFC condition (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). That is, increasing NFC triggers stereotypical judgements. Likewise, high NFC increases participants' commitment to gender stereotypes, and leads to greater recall on characteristics regarding to stereotypes than that of low NFC (Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989). Also, people with high NFC tends to perceive outgroup more homogenous than that of low NFC, thereby, make more stereotypical judgements.

Considering political discussion contexts, people with high NFC might have a tendency to hold information about other side based on stereotypical information and to close themselves off to new information coming from people who have opposing viewpoints. Specifically, when individuals who have high NFC realize that the person they discuss hold dissonant political views, they may use stereotypical information about this person's group and close themselves to think of their opinions. On the other hand, individuals who have low NFC might consider new information coming from people with opposing views. For instance, in a study examining the relationship between NFC and use of heuristics in negotiation, it was found that people with high NFC tends to use stereotypical information for out-group discussants and they are influenced more from stereotypes about other groups compared to people with low NFC (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999). Therefore, low NFC individuals can generate more reasons about opposing viewpoints than high NFC individuals because

low NFC individuals are probably influenced from stereotypes less at the time of political discussion compared to high NFC individuals.

The third and last reason lies on the assumption that there is an inverse relationship between NFC and *perspective taking*. Perspective taking is important for the positive influence of cross-cutting exposure on tolerance (Mutz, 2002a). In other words, people low in perspective taking skills also have lower tolerance when exposed to dissonant political views. Mutz's (2002a) explanation for this is that exposing people who cannot perceive things from the eyes of others may lead them to believe that those who disagree with them are unworthy people. As a result, those with low in perspective taking ability could not understand the reasons for opposing views.

Perspective taking can be lower among those with high NFC because perspective taking ability requires cognitive effort (Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). That is, because low NFC people want to reach a judgement urgently and tends to hold it permanently, they may use little cognitive effort; thereby, have low level of perspective taking ability. The authors emphasize that high level of NFC might be related to low level of perspective taking ability especially at the time of being exposure to different viewpoints. Therefore, one can conclude that, at the time of experiencing cross-cutting exposure, having high level of NFC can be associated with low level of perspective taking ability. In other words, when individuals with high NFC is exposed to dissonant political views, they consider information from dissonant opinions less, thereby they might not have much awareness of opposing views.

To summarize, one can conclude that for low NFC people cross-cutting exposure can lead greater awareness of opposing views because they process unbiased information on opposing views, are relatively more open to new information, and not perceive dissonance as threat to consensus. However, cross-cutting exposure of high NFC individuals probably do not lead to greater level of awareness of dissonant opinions. Hence, NFC is expected to moderate the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views.

In this study, the relationship between political tolerance and cross-cutting exposure through awareness of opposing viewpoints in Turkey is examined. Also, the moderating role of the need for cognitive closure in the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views is investigated.

## **1.2 Current Situation in Turkey**

As a country with politically intolerant climate, studying political tolerance and its correlates are especially important in Turkey. Specifically, in Turkey, potential polarization, prolonged inter-ethnic conflicts, and negative attitudes toward minority groups brings the political tolerance issue to a priority.

First, Turkey is under the threat of ideological polarization. For example, in 2006, Corporate Social Responsibility of Turkey conducted a study about the extent of polarization in Turkey which is sponsored by The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. Based on a representative data of 1024 individuals from 16 cities, seven main results obtained. First, evaluation of economic situation for Turkey varied substantially among the supporters of four most popular political parties in that JDP (AKP) supporters believe that the future of economic situation in Turkey is good; however, other party supporters are very pessimistic about this issue. Hence, people seem to be polarized on their opinions about the future of the country. Second, people based their identities (e.g., Religiousness, conservatism, modernism, Turkishness, Kurdishness etc.) on party membership. Third, differences in political ideologies turned into social distance toward out-groups. That is, people indicated strong feelings of social distance toward supporters of other political parties. Fourth, 69% of participants reported that dissonance of views regarding to political issues among people is greater compared to the situation at the time of participants' youth. Fifth, it was also found that people evaluate political issues based on their party identification instead of common sense. Sixth, media sources to getting information are also differed

among people based on their party identification. Also, most of them find the sources that are different from what they follow biased. Finally, most of the participants indicated that their political views are consistent with their Facebook friends and people whom they follow on Twitter. That is, partisanship become an important determinant for what people follow and get political information.

Moreover, there is an Islamic-Secular polarization in Turkey which might be due to the authoritarian policies and Islamist agenda of the government (e.g., Keyman, 2014; Rabasa & Larabee, 2008). For example, Freedom House changed the label of Turkish net freedom from “partly free” in 2016 to “not free” in 2017. Also, considering the highest rate of jailed journalists and self-censorship, Turkey is ranking 154th among 180 countries regarding to freedom press. Many secularists reacted to those restrictions negatively. In brief, Turkey seems to be increasingly polarized in terms of the political views in that political tolerance became a very important issue in order to get rid of potential negative consequences of intolerance. Even the polarization along political viewpoints is greater than polarization along other lines in Turkey. To illustrate, there is a study which investigates polarization in Turkey along ethnic, religious and political party membership using a representative sample of 3612 individuals (Bilgiç, Koydemir, & Akyürek, 2014). This study showed that social distance based on political party voters is higher than that of ethnicity and religion. That is, political polarization in Turkey is more salient than other polarization lines. Briefly, these results demonstrate that, people in Turkey seem to be polarized mainly based on their political viewpoints.

Second, prolonged interethnic conflict could be another indicator for the intolerant climate in Turkey. In fact, transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic led to change in policies of government from Islamisation to Turkism in that various assimilation efforts were taken, leading to conflict between the state and ethnic/religious minorities in Turkey (Saatçi, 2002). For instance, as the largest ethnic minority group in Turkey, Kurdish population is important to consider at this point because there has been prolonged conflict between Kurdish-Turkish parts since 1980s

in Turkey. Specifically, Turkish governments' nationalizing policies like exclusion of ethnic policies and rights, prohibition of teaching Kurdish language in schools, as well as the economic and regional inequality in the country are suggested to be important contributors to this conflict (Ergil, 2000; Mousseau, 2012).

Besides, the conflict on the Kurdish issue spread through public. For example, high levels of anti-Kurdish attitudes are found among the Turkish majority (Dixon & Ergin, 2010). As a tolerance indicator, out-group trust levels are also low for both sides (e.g., Çelebi, Verkuyten, Köse, & Maliepaard, 2014). In brief, intolerance of both parties (Turkish people, Kurdish people) toward each other, as well as intolerant policies of government for Kurdish population raised the political tolerance issue as an important obstacle to the peaceful climate in Turkey.

The third issue which brings political tolerance priority in Turkey is the intolerant treatments of the many minority group members like refugees, LGBTI individuals, and women. For instance, Turkey became the largest country worldwide in refugee-hosting (1.6 million refugees) in 2015 (International Migration Report, 2015). However, Turkish people seem to hold strong negative attitudes toward Syrian refugees (e.g., Topkaya & Akdağ, 2016; Yazıcı, 2016). In turn, Syrian refugees also indicated that they feel discriminated and experience conflict in Turkey (Kaya, 2015). Additionally, as other minority groups in Turkey, LGBTI individuals and women are also exposed to severe discrimination (e.g., Göregenli & Karakuş, 2011; Önder, 2013). For instance, Turkish gay pride rally was banned in İstanbul, and police attacked on the march in June 2017.<sup>1</sup> These examples illustrate the intolerance towards diversity in Turkey.

In conclusion, political tolerance level in Turkish society is critically low because of many reasons including (but perhaps not limited to) ideological polarization, prolonged interethnic conflicts, negative attitudes of majority members toward

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40395472>

minority groups. Therefore, political tolerance in Turkey is important to investigate to understand these problems and promote adequate living conditions in a peaceful context in which diversity is supported (e.g., Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2010; Tunç, 2002).

### **1.3 The Present Study**

Present study aims to replicate Mutz's (2002a) pioneering study on the relationship between political tolerance and cross-cutting experience. In doing that, it adds to it in two important ways. First, the current study hypothesizes that not merely exposure to conflicting viewpoints, but also an open mind about these political differences, i.e., the need for cognitive closure can be important in predicting political tolerance in the original model. This aims to fill the gap in literature bringing the explanation for changing influence of cross-cutting exposure on deliberation. Second, this model is tested in Turkey which is increasingly suffering from inter group polarization along the Secular-Islamist, and Kurdish-Turkish dimensions. As a result, studying political tolerance is important in this country since it provides opportunity to generate comprehensive and realistic solutions for this problem through a better understanding of the dynamics of political intolerance. Mainly, this study can contribute the Turkish literature in understanding of importance of exposure to conflicting views in preventing political intolerance, thereby polarization in the society.

The present study examines the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance in Turkey. In addition, awareness of opposing viewpoints is expected to play a mediating role in this relationship. That is, higher frequency of cross-cutting exposure and greater political tolerance are related through greater awareness of opposing views. In addition, the need for cognitive closure is expected to moderate the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing viewpoints. In other words, higher frequency of cross-cutting exposure coupled with low level of individual NFC is expected to be related with greater

awareness of opposing viewpoints. More specifically, the hypotheses of the current study are:

Hypothesis 1: Cross-cutting exposure predicts political tolerance positively.

Hypothesis 2: Awareness of opposing views mediates the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance.

Hypothesis 3: Need for cognitive closure moderates the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing viewpoints. More specifically, the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness is expected to be stronger and positive for low levels of NFC but weaker with higher NFC.

## CHAPTER 2

### STUDY 1 (PILOT STUDY)

In order to grasp people's opinions of the most contradictory political issues, a pilot study was conducted. In this study, participants were asked to indicate the name of political issues on which they perceive that people experience deep divisions in Turkey. After that, they were asked to specify the two opposing opinions (i.e., poles) for these contradictory issues. Also, they rated importance level of each issue for them.

#### 2.1 Method

##### 2.1.1 Participants

The data was collected through online survey and convenience sampling was used to recruit participants. 130 participants started the survey, however not all of them finished it. The data from 74 (Male = 25, Female = 49) individuals who completed at least 50% of the survey were included.<sup>2</sup> Participant ages ranged from 18 to 63 ( $M = 30.52$ ,  $SD = 9.91$ ). Participants also rated their political orientations at 10 point Likert type scale from 1(left) to 10 (right). In general, political orientations of the participants can be classified as moderate to left orientation ( $M = 3.44$ ,  $SD = 2.11$ ).

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<sup>2</sup> The data of people who completed at least 50% of the survey was considered because they indicated some of the issues, rated level of importance of them or indicated pole names of the issues. We aimed to reach most opinions as far as possible. Specifically, the data of participants who completed at 50 % (n = 16), 92 (n=4), and 100 % (n=54) of survey were considered for the analysis.

### **2.1.2 Procedure and Materials**

To be able to conduct study, an approval from Middle East Technical University (METU) Human Subjects Ethics Committee (HSEC) was obtained. Upon approval, an online survey was prepared on Qualtrics. The link to the online survey was shared on Facebook and Twitter accounts and Facebook group pages, and also in some mailing lists of various social clubs and societies. The study was introduced participants without debriefing. That is, they were given full and correct information about the aims of the study, i.e., to understand conflictual political issues in Turkey.

Upon consenting to participate, the participants filled demographic questions asking about age, gender, and political orientation. After that, they were asked to reflect names of the five most contradictory political issues in Turkey. In other words, they indicated the political issues that they think divide Turkey. Next, they were asked to write two poles of each issue. The purpose is determining two opposite opinions regarding to each issue. Open-ended response format was used for this scale. Then they rated level of the importance of each issue. For each issue that participants indicate in the previous part, participants asked to rank order them from 1 (most important) to 5 (least important).

### **2.2. Results**

Two criteria were used to determine the conflictual issues: popularity and level of importance. At first, all responses for contradictory issues in Turkey were categorized into meaningful groups based on their contents. That is, issues which have similar content with each other were categorized under the same heading. According to this categorization, 18 groups were obtained. Numbers of mention for each heading were counted for assessing popularities for each issue. In addition, mean of the importance levels for each issue was calculated to obtain level of importance. Accordingly, the “Presidency System” was the most popular and important issue ( $n = 34$ ,  $M = 2.31$ ) and

“Freedom and Human Rights” followed it ( $n = 27, M = 2.24$ ). Although “Secularism” was the third popular issue that was rated also third in importance ( $n = 23, M = 2.90$ ), we did not include it as it was mostly preferred by secularists. Hence, this issue does not seem to be generalizable to Turkish society. That is, only 2 of 9 right-wing oriented participants (i.e., people who rated themselves between 5 and 10 in political orientation) mentioned about secularism as a contradictory problem in Turkey, in contrast with 21 left-wing oriented participants. As a result, this heading was not included in analysis as it cannot be generalizable. Therefore, “Kurdish problem” was taken as third issue ( $n = 22, M = 2.00$ ).

Poles of each issue were determined by considering the frequency of answers and by talking to some of the participants. Accordingly, for “Presidency System” the two poles are determined as “I support presidency system” and “I oppose to presidency system”. The two poles for the “Freedom and Human Rights” issue were determined using “Dimensions of the Polarization in Turkey” survey carried out by the Corporate Social Responsibility Association (2016) through the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation<sup>3</sup>. Poles were determined as “There used to be more freedom in Turkey” and “People in Turkey are freer than the past”. Finally, for “Kurdish issue”, the two of the narratives found in Uluğ and Cohrs’s (2017) study were modified to fit the purposes of the current study. Accordingly, authors examined endorsement of the different narratives explaining the conflict regarding to the Kurdish issue. The most appropriate narratives that converge with the data of the current study are “Democracy and Rights Narrative” for one pole, and “Terrorism Narrative” for the other pole.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, the two poles are determined as “Kurdish problem is a terror problem and should be solved via counter-terrorism policies” and “Kurdish problem is an identity problem and should be solved by democratization”.

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<sup>3</sup> A project of The German Marshall Fund of the United States Corporate Social Responsibility.

<sup>4</sup> These narratives were chosen because they were the most consistent with the participants’ answers for the poles in this study.

## CHAPTER 3

### STUDY 2 (MAIN STUDY)

Study 1 is conducted to understand the most controversial issues in Turkey as well as the poles of each issue. Findings of this study formed a basis for the method of the main study in that cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance relationship via awareness of opposing views was examined based on these three issues. Specifically, in measuring awareness of the reasons for opposing views, participants were asked about their own opinions for these three issues and report the reasons for opposing views. By doing these, controversial issues and the pole names for each obtained in study 1. In study 2, firstly, cross-cutting exposure and tolerance relationship, and mediating role of awareness of opposing views in this relationship were examined. Secondly, the moderating role of the need for cognitive closure in this model was tested.

### 3.1 Method

#### 3.1.1 Participants

The data of the current study was collected through an online survey and participants were recruited through convenience sampling. A total of 909 participants started the survey; however not all of them reached the end of the survey questions. There were 413 participants who finished the survey. However, only 299 cases including no missing value were included in the analyses. There were 298 participants who gave information about their sex consisted of 134 women (44.8 %) and 164 men (54.8 %). 1 person did not answer this question. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 64 ( $M = 30.95$ ,  $SD = 11.17$ ).

Participants indicated the highest educational degree they had completed (Table 1). Most of participants reported that they were university graduates ( $n = 154, 51.5\%$ ). Also, 71 individuals ( $23.7\%$ ) reported to have graduated from high school. While, 60 of the participants ( $20.1\%$ ) reported to have Master's degree, 8 of them reported to have a doctoral degree ( $2.7\%$ ). Of the remaining people, 2 participants ( $0.7\%$ ) were secondary school graduate. 4 participants who were answered as "other" reported various responses (e.g., continuing to high school, two-year degree, preparing to university)

**Table 1**

*Education Levels of the Participants*

Education level	N	%
Secondary school	2	.7
High School	71	23.7
University	154	51.5
Master's degree	60	20.1
Doctoral degree	8	2.7
Other	4	1.3
Total	299	100

Most of the participants spent their lives big cities ( $n = 186, 62.2\%$ ), followed by cities ( $n = 65, 21.7\%$ ), districts ( $n = 40, 13.4\%$ ), towns ( $n = 5, 1.7\%$ ) and villages ( $n = 3, 1.0\%$ ). Participants' indicated the amount of their household monthly income. In general, socioeconomic status of the 293 participants based on their income levels can be classified as middle class ( $M = 5729.96, SD = 5753.73$ ).

**Table 2***Cities That Participants Spent Large Part of Their Lives*

<i>City</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Big city	186	62,2
City	65	21,7
District	40	13,4
Town	5	1,7
Village	3	1,0
Total	299	100,0

Most of the participants indicated their identity as Turkish ( $n = 132$ , 44.15 %). There were 16 participants who defined their identity as Kurdish (5.35 %) and 8 participants defined themselves as Alevi (% 2.68). Also, 5 of them reported Arabian as their identity (1.67 %). Some of the participants reported their identity as Turkish Citizen ( $n = 14$ , 4.68 %). Also, there were 7 participants identified their identity as Caucasian (2.34 %). Also, some of them preferred a combination of Turkish identity and ethnic or religious identity such as Uzbek Turk, Crimean Turk, Caucasian Turk, Arabian Turk, Kurdish Turk ( $n = 27$ , 9.03 %). While 4 of the participants indicated Anatolian (1.34 %), 13 of them reported Human as their identity (4.35 %) There were 18 participants indicated that they do not believe ethnic identity, do not prefer to think about it, or it does not important for them to having an ethnic identity (6.02 %). One participant indicated having no identity. Others composed of various ethnic, and religious statement (e.g., Tartarian, Laz, Conservatist etc.).

**Table 3***Ethnic Identities of The Participants*

Identity	n	%
Turkish	132	44.15
Turkish Citizen	14	4.68
Turkish & Other Identity	27	9.03
Kurdish	16	5.35
Caucasian	7	2.34
Alevi	8	2.68
Arabian	5	1.67
Alevi	8	2.68
Arabian	5	1.67
Anatolian	4	1.34
Human	13	4.35
No identity	18	6.02
Other	55	18.39
Total	299	100

In general, political party preference was mostly CHP ( $n = 137$ , 45.81 %), HDP ( $n = 51$ , 17.06 %), AKP ( $n = 18$ , 6.0 %), and MHP ( $n = 9$ , 3.01 %), 4 of the participants indicated that they do not know or undecided (1.34 %). While 30 individuals reported that they do not prefer any of the political parties or do not vote (10.03 %), 3 participants indicated that they would not vote (1 %). Of the remaining, 28 participants indicated various parties with not more than 3 participants supported each. Also, they indicated their level of commitment to the political party which they support at 7-point Likert scale from 1 (low) to 7 (strong). Higher scores reflect higher commitment to the particular political party they supported. Participants showed moderate level of commitment ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = 2.01$ ). There were 133 (44.5 %) of the participants reported that they believe in a religion, whereas 166 (55.5 %) participants indicated that they do not believe in a religion.

**Table 4***Political Party Preferences of the Participants*

Party	n	%
CHP	137	45.81
HDP	51	17.06
AKP	18	6.0
MHP	9	3.01
TKP	8	2.68
LDP	7	2.34
HEPAR	3	1.00
Independents	1	.33
Don't know / Undecided	4	1.34
Don't vote / Neither	30	10.03
Empty	3	1.00
Other	28	9.36
Total	299	100

Participants who indicated that they believe in a religion were asked to specify which religion they believe. Most of the participants who considered themselves as religious chose “Islam” as their faith ( $n = 67, 50.38\%$ ). There were 44 participant who indicated their religion as “Sunni” (33.08 %) and 2 participants who reported “Alevi” (1.5 %). The remaining indicated Christianity, Agnostizm, and Deizm as their religion. Participants who indicated other, reported various answers (i.e., no religion, belief in God, no specific religion, no commitment to any religion). Participants also rated how much their religious belief influence their life at 11-point scale from 0 (none) to (too much). Higher scores reflect higher level of influence ( $M = 5.74, SD = 3.23$ ).

**Table 5***Religious Identities of the Participants*

Religion	N	%
Sunni	44	33.08
Alevi	2	1.5
Christian	2	1.5
Agnostic	1	.75
Deist	1	.75
Islam	67	50.38
Other	4	3.01
Total	100	133

Regarding to their level of conservatism, participants rated their conservatism level on 11 point Likert type scale from 1 (none) to 11 (too much). Higher scores reflect higher level of conservatism. Participants of this study regarded themselves as low to moderate conservative ( $M = 3.14$ ,  $SD = 2.63$ ). On the 11-point political orientation scale, participants placed themselves on a left-right continuum, from 0 (extreme left) to 11 (extreme right). Participants' political orientation were close to left-wing ( $M = 3.36$ ,  $SD = 2.67$ ). One participant left this question blank. Participants also rated the level of commitment to political views on 11 point Likert type scale from 1 (none) to 11 (too much). Higher scores indicate higher level of commitment. They generally scored moderate to high level of commitment to their views ( $M = 7.48$ ,  $SD = 2.76$ ) Participants also rated how much their political orientation influence their life at an 11-point scale from 1 (none) to 11 (very much). Higher scores reflect higher level of influence ( $M = 6.34$ ,  $SD = 2.97$ ).

### **3.1.2 Procedure**

The procedure of this study is the same with the pilot study in terms of ethics approval and data collection. Participants were fully informed at the beginning that this study is about exposure to different political views and political tolerance, hence no debriefing at the end was provided.

At first participants read the informed consent and indicated their approval or disapproval for continuing the survey. Participants who approved to participate filled demographic questions first. After that, they answered questions on need for cognitive closure. Later, they filled questions about cross-cutting exposure. After that, their opinions about the controversial issues, and awareness of the opposing viewpoints were assessed. Survey was ended with questions on political tolerance. The whole survey took approximately 15 minutes.

### **3.1.3 Instruments**

The survey set of the current study consisted of various measures as well as demographic questions. Questions on discussant choice, frequency of political discussion, and frequency of exposure to different political views were adapted from Mutz (2002a). Measurement also consisted of Awareness of Opposing Views Scale, Political Tolerance Scale, and Need for Cognitive Closure Scale.

#### **3.1.3.1 Demographic Questions**

Participants were asked about their gender, age, political orientation, city they born in, city that they spent most of their life, household income (monthly), and education level. They were also asked to indicate their ethnic identity, and the party they would vote if elections were held today. After that, they were asked to rate their level of

commitment to this party on a 7 point Likert Type scale. Also, they indicated which politician they support most, and whether they believe in a religion or not. Participants who confirmed that they believe in a religion were asked to indicate the name of that religion. Moreover, they rated the level of their religions', as well as political views' effect on their life, their level of conservatism, and their level of commitment to their own political views on a 11 point Likert type scale from 1 (none) to 11 (very much). Participants also specified their political orientation at 11 point Likert type scale from 1 (left) to 11 (right) (see, Table 1 and Appendix A).

### **3.1.3.2 Discussant Choice**

This scale intended to determine discussants who the participants discuss political issues most. Accordingly, participants were asked to indicate the three people's name or nickname that they discuss political issues most. First, they were asked the person that they discuss political issues most ("Who is the person you talk most about politics?"). Then, they were asked to write a person's name they talk with political issues most after the first person ("Aside from this person, who is the person you've talked with most about politics?"). Finally, they were asked to indicate a person's name they discuss political issues frequently regardless of the two they indicated before ("Aside from the people you've already mentioned, who is the person you've talked with most about politics?") (Appendix C).

### **3.1.3.3 Discussion Frequency**

Measuring cross-cutting exposure, participants' frequency of political discussion is considered. Discussion frequency is measured by asking participants about frequency of their talk about political issues with whom they mentioned at the discussant choice part. Names or nicknames of discussants appeared at this part to be rated on frequencies of political talk. Participants rated frequency of political discussion with discussants, at 7 point Likert-type scale from 1 (very rarely) to 7 (very often). Mean

scores were calculated taking into account of three frequency scores given for discussants (Appendix D).

#### **3.1.3.4 Cross-cutting Exposure**

This scale touched upon how participants see discussants' political views. Also, they are required to make comparison between their own and their discussant partners' political views. They compared their own and their discussion partners' political view on 7 a point Likert type scale. These items are as follows. "Your views and views of [discussant] are..." was responded from 1 (totally same) to 7 (totally different), "Compared with [discussant] how much your political views are similar to him/her?" (reverse coded) and "When you discuss politics with [discussant], how often do you disagree with him/her?" were evaluated on 7 point Likert type scale from 1 (never) to 7 (too much/always, respectively) (see Appendix E). Reliability analyses which were conducted for combined three items for each discussant showed appropriate Cronbach's alpha level for first, second, and third discussants, .86, .81, .82; respectively. In order to obtain an indicator of the overall exposure of participants to dissonant views, these three measures were weighted by the frequency of discussion with that particular discussant, and then combined across each of three discussants for a measure of summary.<sup>5</sup> Reliability coefficient for combined index of cross-cutting exposure for three discussant was as expected, .75.

#### **3.1.3.5 Issue Opinions**

Upon determining three most controversial issues via pilot study, issue opinions scale was prepared. Assessing issue opinions of participants, they were asked to indicate their opinions for each issue. Specifically, participants chose one of the two poles for

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<sup>5</sup> Dissonance scores for each participant was calculated based on following method. At first, scores of each three dissonance questions were summed for each discussant. Second, frequency of each discussant was divided by seven (number of choices in scales). Then, resulting score was multiplied by sum of dissonance scores for each discussant which were obtained at first part. This process was repeated for all three discussants. Obtained scores were summed up.

each issue. For example, regarding to “presidency system” they were asked to indicate their opinions by choosing “I support presidency system” or “I oppose to presidency system”. (see, Appendix F)

### **3.1.3.6 Awareness of Opposing Viewpoints (AOV)**

The original scale (Cappela, Price, & Nir, 2002) was adapted to Turkish, as well as modified in a manner of political issues in this study (see also, Price, Cappela, & Nir, 2002). In order to assess whether participants’ awareness of the reasons for opposing views, they were asked to offer reasons why other people might hold the opposite opinion. For example, someone who supported the presidency system, was later asked to indicate possible reasons why others might be opposed to the presidency system. Similarly, someone who opposed the presidency system, was then asked to provide reasons why others might support the presidency system (Appendix G). Responses were coded based on detailed coding manual obtained from the authors of the original study in which the scale was developed. Basically, if the answer is irrelevant, does not make sense, merely restates the opinion, indicated that the person did not know why he or she held that opinion, unclear, it was coded as zero. For example, statements such as “poor nutrition”, “ignorance”, “Because they are idiots” were coded as zero. On the other hand, each meaningful answer which meets the requirements of the manual, one point was given for every reason. For example, the following response received a score of three.

Question: We are interested in hearing about the reasons people have for supporting presidency system. Regardless of your own views, what reasons can you think of for supporting presidency system?

Answer: Younger candidates would participate the parliament because age limit for selecting deputies will be reduced (1), president could be put on trial (2), martial courts will be removed (3).

Higher scores on why others might disagree indicates greater awareness of opposing viewpoints. Intercoder reliability was assessed between two coders on all responses. Cohen's kappa values for the coders' agreement was found to be above .70 for three issues.<sup>6</sup>

### **3.1.3.7 Political Tolerance**

In measuring political tolerance, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus's (1993) content-controlled method was adopted. Accordingly, participants were asked to select their "least-liked" group among various ethnic, cultural, and religious groups living in Turkey<sup>7</sup>. If there is some other group they like even less than the groups in the list, participants were also allowed to write another group's name. Then, they were asked a series of nine questions about extending civil liberties to this group. For example, they were asked whether this group should be banned or outlawed, be allowed to get education at public schools (reverse item), be subject to government phone tapping. They rated their level of agreement to these items at 7 point Likert scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Higher points of this scale refer to higher level of political tolerance (see Appendix H). Reliability coefficient level was found to be appropriate ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

### **3.1.3.8 Need for Cognitive Closure Scale**

In order to measure the need for cognitive closure, Şeker and Akman's (2015) Turkish adaptation of Webster and Kruglanski's (1994) Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS) was used. Although original scale is composed of 42 items, Şeker and

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<sup>6</sup> Inter-rater reliability coefficients are found to be above chance for presidency ( $\alpha = .71$ ), Kurdish issue ( $\alpha = .71$ ), and freedom (.70).

<sup>7</sup> Syrians, Kurdish people, atheists, Islamists, feminists, rightists, leftists, religionists, communists, chauvinists, nationalists, Alevist, Circassians, Arabians, Armenians.

Akman's adapted form consists of 36 items<sup>8</sup>. NFCS is used to assess the need to have some knowledge on a given topic. This scale consists of five subscales. These are *preference for order* measuring desire for structure and order (10 items; "I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament"), *preference for predictability* measuring preference for predictable situations (9 items; "I don't like going into a situation without knowing what to expect from it"), *decisiveness* measuring fast and correct decisions (7 items; "When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly"), *discomfort with ambiguity* measuring displeasure and discomfort caused by ambiguity (8 items; "When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset"), and *closed-mindedness* measuring the degree to preparing oneself for exposing to inconsistent evidences or alternative ideas (8 items; "I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes"). 16 items were reverse-coded. Items were rated on 7 point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Higher scores reflect higher level of need for cognitive closure.

Because Şeker and Akman's (2015) Turkish adaptation of NFC Scale is the first study examining this construct in Turkey, and authors collected the data from a student sample; factor analysis of the scale was repeated in this study<sup>9</sup>.

Factor analysis showed that, in the Rotation Component Matrix, items loaded on four factors instead of five. Specifically, items from *discomfort for ambiguity* and *predictability* loaded on the same factor. Based on the factorability and reliability

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<sup>8</sup> The first Confirmatory Factor Analysis has demonstrated that some of the factor loadings are insignificant and three items were which have no correlation with factor structures were deleted from the scale. At the second Confirmatory Factor Analysis, it was demonstrated that correlation coefficients of the three items and related subscales were under the acceptable level (.15). As a result, six items were deleted (see, Şeker and Akman, 2015).

<sup>9</sup> Initially, the factorability of the 36 NFC items was examined. Accordingly, it was observed that communalities were all above .3 indicating reasonable factorability confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .83 which has indicated that correlation matrix was suitable for factor analysis, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ( $\chi^2(630) = 4099.40, p < .001$ ).

analyses, four of the items which cross-loaded and were not distinguishable in terms of factorability were removed. Also one item from “Order” were removed to get higher level of reliability. Therefore, 31 items remained.<sup>10</sup> One factor consists of “Order” (n = 7), a second 15-item factor consists of a combination of “Discomfort for Ambiguity” (n = 7), and “Predictability” (n =8), and the third factor consisted of items from “Closed-mindedness” (n = 5), and the last factor consists of “Decisiveness” items (n = 5) items.

Reliabilities for Preference for order ( $\alpha = .84$ ), Preference for predictability - Discomfort for ambiguity ( $\alpha = .86$ ), Closed-mindedness ( $\alpha = .73$ ), Decisiveness ( $\alpha = .76$ ) are as expected. Total NFC score is calculated based on the scores on these subscales. Reliability coefficient of total NFCS is also as expected ( $\alpha = .85$ ). (Appendix B).

### **3.2. Results**

The data were analyzed in accordance with three main hypotheses and a model to define questions in the theoretical framework. The model was tested using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS model in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 23.0.

At first, descriptive statistics of the study variables are presented. Second, bivariate correlations among the variables in question are explained. Third, the model to test hypotheses is presented.

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<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, one item from “Order” (“I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success”), two items from “Discomfort for ambiguity” (“When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset” and “In most social conflicts I can easily see which side is right and which side is wrong”), one item from “Predictability” (“I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen”), and one from “Decisiveness” (“When faced with a problem, I usually see the one best solution very quickly”) were removed.

### **3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Study**

#### **Variables**

Means, standard deviations, sample sizes, minimum and maximum scores of the major study variables are demonstrated in Table 6. Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficients were computed and tested at .05, two-tailed. The pattern and the strength of the associations between the study variables were thus examined. The results are given in Table 7. The correlations were in expected directions.



**Table 6**

Means and Standard Deviations of The Study Variables and Demographics

<i>Variables</i>	N	Min	Max	M	SD	$\alpha$
CCE	299	.41	6.22	2.19	.87	.75
NFC	299	2.35	6.35	4.39	.70	.85
AOV	299	.00	4.50	1.13	.91	.71, .71, .70 <sup>11</sup>
PT	299	1	7	4.61	1.70	.90
DF	299	1	7	4.79	1.25	-
Education	299	2	7	4.04	.83	-
Conservatism	299	1	11	3.14	2.63	-
PO <sup>12</sup>	299	1	11	3.36	2.67	-
CPV	299	1	11	7.48	2.76	-
IPD	299	1	11	6.34	2.97	-
Religiosity	133	1	11	5.74	3.23	-

Note: CCE = Cross-cutting Exposure; FC = Need for Cognitive Closure; AOV = Awareness of Opposing Viewpoints; PT = Political Tolerance; DF = Discussion Frequency; PO = Political Orientation; CPV = Commitment to Political Views; IPD = Influence of the Political views on Daily life; Higher scores of PO indicate higher level of right-wing orientation.

<sup>11</sup> Inter-rater reliability coefficients for presidency, Kurdish, and freedom issues, respectively.

<sup>12</sup> On the 11-point political orientation scale, participants placed themselves on a left-right continuum, from 0 (extreme left) to 11 (extreme right)

**Table 7**

## Bivariate Correlation Coefficients of the Study Variables

<i>Variables</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. PT	1	.19**	.23**	-.21**	.05	.14*	-.10	-.12*	-.03	.09	-.06
2. CCE		1	.11*	-.08	.59**	-.06	-.10	-.04	-.01	.06	.03
3. AOV			1	-.29**	.09	.06	-.10	-.12*	-.02	.08	-.09
4. NFC				1	-.04	.03	.29**	.19**	.10	-.12*	.18*
5. DF					1	.10	-.21**	-.19**	.28**	.33**	-.08
6. Education						1	.05	.01	-.08	-.07	.05
7. Conservatism							1	.59**	-.08	-.22**	.72**
8. PO								1	-.16**	-.33**	.46**
9. CPV									1	.62**	.03
10. IPD										1	-.03
11. Religiosity											1


Note. PT = Political Tolerance; CCE = Cross-cutting Exposure; AOV = Awareness of Opposing Viewpoints; NFC = Need for Cognitive Closure; DF = Discussion Frequency; PO = Political Orientation; CPV = Commitment to Political Views; IPD = Influence of the Political views on Daily life. Higher scores on PO indicate higher level of right-wing orientation. \*p < .05; \*\* p < .01.

### 3.2.2 Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analyses

The hypotheses of this study are tested using a conditional process modeling program, PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). PROCESS macro is preferred for analyzing the current data because it allows us to explore mediator and moderator effects simultaneously in the same model. Specifically, the current analysis employed PROCESS Model 4 for mediation, and 7 for moderated mediation hypotheses. All indirect effects were subjected to follow-up bootstrap analyses with 1000 bootstrap samples and 95% bias corrected confidence intervals.


The current study tests whether the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance is mediated by awareness of opposing views. Also, we tested whether need for cognitive closure moderates the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views in the same model.

First, PROCESS Model 4 was conducted to test the mediation effect. Regression coefficients indicated that cross-cutting exposure predicts awareness of opposing views,  $b = .12$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95 % CI [.00, .24]. Awareness of opposing views predicted political tolerance,  $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .10$ , 95 % CI [.18, .60]. The indirect effect of cross-cutting exposure on political tolerance through awareness was also significant,  $b = .37$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95 % CI [.15, .59]. After controlling for the mediator, cross-cutting exposure still predicted political tolerance,  $b = .32$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95 % CI [.10, .54]. Mediation analysis based on 1000 bootstrapped samples was used in order to test indirect effects of cross-cutting exposure on political tolerance via awareness of opposing views. The bootstrapped indirect effect was statistically significant,  $b = .05$ ,  $SE = .03$ , 95% CI [.00, .12]. The model explained 8 % of variance in political tolerance,  $R^2 = .08$ ,  $F(2, 296) = 12.57$ ,  $p < .001$ . As a result, awareness of opposing views mediated the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance, as hypothesized (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1.** The relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance as mediated by awareness of opposing viewpoints. \*\*  $p < .001$ , \*  $p < .05$

Second, to test moderated mediation, Model 7 in the PROCESS macro is used. In this model cross-cutting exposure did not directly predict awareness of opposing views,  $b = .55$ ,  $SE = .39$ , 95% CI [-.23, 1.32]. Also, when predicting awareness of opposing viewpoints, cross-cutting exposure X need for cognitive closure interaction is not significant,  $b = -.10$ ,  $SE = .09$ , 95% CI [-.27, .08]. However, cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views were predicted political tolerance,  $b = .32$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95% CI [.10, .54];  $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .10$ , 95% CI [.18, .60], respectively. The model explained .08 % of variance,  $R^2 = .08$ ,  $F(2, 296) = 12.57$ ,  $p < .001$ . Overall, results showed that there is no moderation effect of need for cognition in this mediation model. Also, in the moderated mediation model, awareness of opposing views does not mediate the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance because cross-cutting exposure did not predict awareness of opposing views in this model,  $b = .55$ ,  $SE = .39$ , 95 % CI [-.22, 1.31].



**Figure 2.** Statistical diagram of the Moderated Mediation Model \*\*  $p < .001$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

### 3.3 Discussion

Current study aims to conduct a Turkish adaptation of the Mutz's (2002a) in that the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance via awareness of opposing views is examined. As a contribution to the original study, need for cognitive closure is also examined as a moderator between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of opposing views.

Results partially supported the hypotheses. First, cross-cutting exposure was found to be related positively with political tolerance. In other words, people who were frequently exposed to dissonant views in their political discussion networks, tended to have greater political tolerance. Second, awareness of opposing views mediated the relationship between political tolerance and cross-cutting exposure, indicating that exposure to dissonant views is related with political tolerance via having greater awareness of the reasons for opposing views. That is, people who were exposed to dissonant views frequently tend to have greater awareness for the reasons of opposing views, this in turn contributes to higher level of political tolerance. This finding supports the second hypothesis. As a result, findings of this study replicated Mutz (2002a).

However, there is no moderated mediation effect found in this study. Specifically, need for cognitive closure did not moderate the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and awareness of the reasons for opposing views. Two plausible explanations can be generated upon the evaluation of this result. First explanation is based on probability of misinterpretation of dissonance. Specifically, some of the researchers emphasized individual control over socially transmitted political information (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). Accordingly, at the time of interactions involving dissonance, people can reinterpret dissonance inducing information (Laumann, 1973, as cited in Huckfeldt, & Sprague, 1987) and deliberately represent their true opinions differently. Namely, disagreeable communications can be misinterpreted as agreeable in order to reduce dissonance. As people with high NFC have strong desire to reach consensus

(Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), they might have higher tendency to misinterpret dissonance. Hence, high NFC people might report their dissonance level in a biased way in this study. In order to understand whether this could be a case or not, a study should be designed in which level of the dissonance is manipulated by experimenters.

Second, since participants answered questions about their cross-cutting exposure according to their discussions with whom they discuss about politics most, they probably reported their family members or close friends. However, instead of experiencing disagreement with family and close friends, disagreement with acquaintances (i.e., disagreement in the “public” sphere) was found to be important in forming and understanding reasons for opposing views (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). That is, NFC could moderate the relationship between cross-cutting exposure with acquaintances and awareness of opposing views. This might be because discussion with acquaintances might involve more heterogeneity in political discussion than that of family and close friends, this in turn contributes to greater understanding for opposing views about various controversial issues. Future studies should take into account participants’ relationship strength with discussion partners.

Nevertheless, awareness of opposing views and political tolerance negatively correlated with NFC which means lower NFC is related with greater reason awareness for opposing views and political tolerance. Specifically, people who have high NFC tend to have lower level of awareness of the reasons for opposing views, and lower level of political tolerance. Although, we could not find any effect of NFC in this study, these results demonstrated that NFC is an important characteristic of people to be studied in political tolerance research.

As any piece of research, this study includes a number of limitations and open questions. First, present study does not test a mere exposure of dissonant political views. Instead, it is focused on experiencing cross-cutting exposure through personal choice of discussing politics with people who might disagree. However, in real life,

people could be exposed to dissonant views from social media, and mainstream media which can also play role in political tolerance in that online political messaging and use of Social Networking Sites contributes to experience of cross-cutting exposure (e.g., Kim, 2011; Kim & Chen, 2016). Also, we did not take into consideration involuntary exposure in that various experiences could lead to cross-cutting exposure like meeting new people, attending lectures involving political talks which can be important factors in understanding frequency of people's cross-cutting exposure. Furthermore, dialogical openness which is willingness to discuss political issues with those outside of one's strong ties, should be considered since it is an important individual characteristic related with cross-cutting exposure (Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2013) dialogic openness level of participants which could be an important not considered. Also, political ambivalence is suggested as a beneficial consequence of cross-cutting exposure on awareness of opposing views, thereby political tolerance. However, political sophistication in one's discussion networks (i.e., being surrounded by politically knowledgeable discussants) can hinder the effect of cross-cutting exposure on ambivalence (McClurg, 2006). That is, cross-cutting exposure in the context of politically sophisticated networks can be resulted in reduced ambivalence. Therefore, political expertise in one's discussion networks can prevent a person to have greater awareness of opposing views after cross-cutting exposure. Reaching a more comprehensive perspective toward cross-cutting exposure, future studies should consider exposure to dissonant political views through social media, mainstream media, involuntary exposure, dialogic openness and political sophistication level in one's discussion network.

Second, this study involves limitations regarding to participants due to the fact that convenience sampling technique is used to recruit participants. Convenience sampling is a nonprobability sampling technique characterized by selecting the most available participants to the researcher (Özdemir, Louis, & Topbaş, 2011). This nonrandom selection of the participants prevents researchers to make inferences about the population (e.g., Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). As a result, the sampling technique of this study hinders to generalize results to the Turkish population. Even, there are

differences between this study sample and Turkish society. For example, 277 (92 %) participants compared to 22 (7.4 %) indicated that they are opposed to presidency system; however, results of the referendum for presidency issue which happened just one week after we collected data for issues, demonstrated that the yes vote for presidency had about 51.3% compared with 48.7% for the no vote. In addition, only %6 of the participants in this study indicated their support to Justice and Development Party (AKP), although the last election results showed that it is the most popular party in Turkey.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, most of the participants of this study graduated from university indicating that these results cannot have implications for people who are coming from lower educational levels. Future studies should conduct this study using a probability sampling technique in order to increase generalizability of the results.

The last limitation is about measuring the political tolerance. In this study, political tolerance was measured by adapting Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus's "least-liked" approach. However, this method is criticized because participants may select a trivial group or they may indicate a group as most disliked although there are other groups they disliked as much (Gibson, 1992b). Thus, it indices with random measurement error. Moreover, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus' scale focused on the level of support for civil liberties; therefore, this scale may not properly measure "political tolerance". Mainly, political tolerance and support for civil liberties are different constructs in that support for civil liberties is a policy preference whereas political intolerance involves exceptionalism towards particular political groups or ideologies (Gibson, 2013). As these two constructs are not interchangeable, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus's scale does not measure political tolerance. Future studies should use more valid measurements to assess political tolerance.

Yet, this study is important for two main reasons. First, political tolerance is a critical issue to study in Turkey because of prolonged conflicts, potential polarization, and general intolerant views of majority people toward minority group members (e.g.,

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<sup>13</sup> <http://secim.ntv.com.tr/>

Syrian immigrants, women). As a result, researchers should examine this issue in order to reveal well-established solutions for promoting political tolerance in Turkey considering the importance of heterogeneous discussion networks and need for cognitive closure. This study is a first attempt in Turkey through which demonstrating the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and political tolerance. Therefore, it was shown that promoting political tolerance requires people to be exposed of divergent political opinions. In other words, heterogeneous political discussion networks are important to promote political tolerance; this in turn will play an important role in preventing potential polarization, prolonged interethnic conflicts and quieting negative attitudes toward minorities.

Social policies can be developed to promote more heterogeneous discussion network settings in schools and workplaces. Specifically, ministry of national education can support school administration to balance population of classes in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, and culture. In other words, classes can be arranged including children from different ethnic, religious, or cultural background in order to allow children to experience diversity. Besides, some of new lectures can be added to the school curriculums in which children are supported to discuss politics with their peers in order to enhance their understanding of the reasons for opposing views. On the other hand, government can encourage owners of the businesses to support people from various ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds work together in occupational settings; thereby, promote heterogeneous working contexts.

Second, this study contributes the political tolerance and communication literature showing that need for cognitive closure is an important characteristic which play role in preventing politically tolerant climate and greater awareness for opposing opinions. Thus, examining the role of need for cognitive closure deeply could open new windows on how to prevent political polarization and politically intolerant climates. Future studies should consider cross-cutting exposure from a broader perspective including involuntary exposure and social media networks.

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## APPENDICES

### A: Demographic Questions

1. Cinsiyetiniz:  Kadın  Erkek  Diğer: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Yaşınız: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Doğum yeriniz: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Yaşamınızın büyük bölümünü geçirdiğiniz yer:  Büyükşehir  İl  İlçe  Belde  Köy
5. Eğitim düzeyiniz (En son tamamladığınız okul):  
 İlkokul  Ortaokul  Lise  Üniversite  
 Yüksek Lisans  Doktora  Diğer \_\_\_\_\_
6. Ortalama olarak hanenize giren aylık gelir ne kadardır? \_\_\_\_\_
7. Hepimiz aynı ülkenin vatandaşı olsak da değişik kökenlerden, yörelerden olabiliriz; siz kendi etnik kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Bugün Türkiye'de genel seçim yapılsaydı, oyunuzu hangi partiye verirdiniz?  
\_\_\_\_\_
9. Kendinizi bu partiye ne ölçüde bağlı hissediyorsunuz?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Çok zayıf Çok güçlü
10. Hangi politikacıyı ya da parti başkanını desteklersiniz? \_\_\_\_\_
11. Herhangi bir dine mensup musunuz?  Evet  Hayır
12. Kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz din ve mezhep nedir? \_\_\_\_\_
13. Size göre dini inancınız gündelik yaşantınızı ne kadar etkiliyor?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
Hiç Oldukça fazla
14. Kendinizi ne kadar muhafazakâr bulursunuz?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
Hiç Oldukça fazla
15. Lütfen siyasi olarak yakın durduğunuz yeri aşağıda belirtilen ölçekte işaretleyiniz.  
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5  
Sol Sağ
16. Siyasi görüşlerinize ne kadar bağlısınız?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
Hiç Tamamen
17. Siyasi görüşleriniz gündelik yaşamınızı ne kadar etkiliyor?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
Hiç Tamamen

## B: Need For Cognitive Closure Scale

1. **İş yerinde düzen ve kuralların açık olmasının başarı için esas olduğunu düşünüyorum. \*** O
2. Saatleri belli, düzenli bir hayatı mizacıma uygun buluyorum.\* O
3. Benim kişisel yerim (oda, ev, dükkan vs.) genellikle karışık ve düzensizdir. O
4. Bana göre tertip ve düzen, iyi bir öğrencinin en temel özellikleridir.\* O
5. Bana göre, istikrarlı bir hayat tarzına sahip olma, hayatımı çok daha keyifli hale getiriyor.\* O
6. Açık ve düzenli bir hayat tarzından keyif alırım. \* O
7. Her şey için bir planın ve yerin olmasından hoşlanırım. \* O
8. Belirsiz durumlardan hoşlanmam. \* IA
9. Birden fazla cevabı olan sorulardan hoşlanmam. \* IA
10. Başıma gelen bir olayın sebebini anlamadığım zaman rahatsız olurum. \* IA
11. **Önemli bir konu hakkında aklım karıştığında kendimi çok kötü hissedirim. \*** IA
12. **Çoğu sosyal çatışmada, hangi tarafın haklı veya haksız olduğunu kolaylıkla anlarım. \*** IA
13. İnsanların her zaman ne düşündüklerini bilmekten hoşlanırım.\* IA
14. Bir kişinin sözünün çok farklı anlamlara gelebilecek olmasından hoşlanmam.\* IA
15. Kararsız görünen birini dinlemeyi sıkıcı bulurum.\* IA
16. Bir kimsenin niyetinin ve kastının açık olmaması beni rahatsız eder.\* IA
17. Ne yapacağı belli olmayan arkadaşlarımın olmasından hoşlanırım. P
18. **Beni neyin beklediğini bilmediğim bir duruma girmenin belirsizliği hoşuma gider.** P
19. Dışarı yemeğe çıktığım zaman daha önceden gittiğim yerleri tercih ederim çünkü beni neyin beklediğini bilirim.\* P
20. Planlarımı son anda değiştirmekten nefret ederim.\* P
21. Planlarımı son anda değiştirmeyi eğlenceli bulurum. P
22. Ne yapacağı belirsiz insanlarla birlikte olmaktan hoşlanmam.\* P
23. Tanıdık arkadaşlarla birlikte olmayı tercih ederim; çünkü onlardan ne bekleyeceğimi bilirim.\* P
24. Ne olup biteceğini bilmediğim yeni bir durumda bulunmaktan hoşlanmam.\* P
25. Sonrasını tahmin edemediğim durumlardan hoşlanmam. \* P
26. Bir şey hakkında fikir geliştirdikten sonra bile başka bir görüşü dikkate almaya her zaman istekliyimdir. C

27. Pek çok çatışmaya baktığımda genellikle iki tarafın da haklı olduğu yanları görürüm. C
28. Bir problem hakkında düşünürken çözüm konusunda olası farklı görüşleri dikkate alırım. C
29. Benden farklı görüşlere sahip insanlarla ilişki kurmayı tercih ederim. C
30. Karşılaştığım sorunların olası pek çok çözümünü daima görürüm. C
31. Ben, kendimi kararsız biri olarak tanımlayabilirim. D
32. Alışverişe gittiğimde, tam olarak ne istediğime karar vermekte zorlanırım. D
33. **Problemlerle karşılaştığımda en iyi çözümün ne olduğunu genellikle çabuk bulurum.** D
34. Önemli kararları son ana kadar bekletme eğilimindeyim. D
35. Önemli kararları genellikle hızlı ve kendimden emin bir şekilde veririm. D
36. Bir problemi çözmeye çalıştığımda sıklıkla, o kadar çok seçenek görürüm ki, bundan kafam karışır. D

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\* Items reverse coded prior to the analyses. Based on the factor analysis, items written in bold font were deleted. O = Order, IA = Intolerance to Ambiguity, P = Predictability, C = Closed-mindedness, D = Decisiveness.

### C: Discussant Choice

İnsanlar zaman zaman başka insanlarla devlet, siyaset veya seçimler hakkında konuşur, tartışır. Şimdi size bu konular hakkında EN ÇOK konuştuğunuz kişilerle ve onların görüşleri ile ilgili birtakım sorular yönelteceğiz. Bu insanlar ailenizden, işyerinizden, mahallenizden, üyesi olduğunuz bir topluluktan ya da başka herhangi bir yerden tanıdığınız kişiler olabilir.

1. Siyasi konularda en çok kiminle konuşursunuz? (Lütfen bu kişinin adını, adının baş harfini ya da kişiyi sizin için belirleyici kılacak vereceğiniz bir takma adı yazınız) \_\_\_\_\_
2. İlk soruda belirttiğiniz kişi dışında, siyasi konularda en çok kiminle konuşursunuz? (Lütfen bu kişinin adını, adının baş harfini ya da kişiyi sizin için belirleyici kılacak vereceğiniz bir takma adı yazınız) \_\_\_\_\_
3. Şimdiye kadar belirttiğiniz kişiler haricinde siyasi konularda en çok kiminle konuşursunuz? (Lütfen bu kişinin adını, adının baş harfini ya da kişiyi sizin için belirleyici kılacak vereceğiniz bir takma adı yazınız) \_\_\_\_\_

## D: Discussion Frequency

“1. tartışmacı için için verilen isim/takma ad<sup>14</sup>” ile ne sıklıkta siyasi konulardan konuşursunuz?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Oldukça  
nadir

Oldukça  
sık

“2. tartışmacı için için verilen isim/takma ad” ile ne sıklıkta siyasi konulardan konuşursunuz?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Oldukça  
nadir

Oldukça  
sık

“3. tartışmacı için için verilen isim/takma ad” ile ne sıklıkta siyasi konulardan konuşursunuz?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Oldukça  
nadir

Oldukça  
sık

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<sup>14</sup> Name or nickname of discussants appeared in the each related question at the Discussion Frequency Scale. For example, a participant who indicated “C” as first discussant name at the Discussant Generator Scale, then was asked to rate discussion frequency with “C”.

## E: Cross-Cutting Exposure

1. “1. /2. /3. Tartışmacı” ile benim siyasi görüşlerim:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Tamamen aynı Tamamen farklı

4. Genel anlamda “1. /2. / 3. tartışmacı için için verilen isim/takma ad” kişinin siyasi konularda sizinle ne kadar hemfikir olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?\*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Hiç hemfikir değil Tamamen hemfikir

5. “1./ 2. /3. tartışmacı için için verilen isim/takma ad” kişisi ile siyasi konularda konuşurken ne sıklıkta fikirlerinizin uyuşmadığını düşünüyorsunuz?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Her zaman uyuşuyor Hiçbir zaman uyuşmuyor

## F: Issue Opinions

Şimdi sizden Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde fazlasıyla fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı konular hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi ifade etmenizi istiyoruz. Bu konulardan 3 tanesi hakkında, sizin yakın durduğunuz tarafı (tamamen aynı görüşte olmasanız da) işaretlemenizi rica edeceğiz. Bu konular hakkında belirteceğiniz görüşünüze göre diğer sorular ayarlanacaktır, bu nedenle bu kısımda bir yanıtı seçmeniz önem taşımaktadır.

### 1. Presidency:

Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde tartışma yaşadığı konulardan biri başkanlık sistemidir. Buna göre bazıları başkanlık sistemini destekleyip bu sistemin Türkiye için iyi olacağını ifade ederken; bazıları ise başkanlık sistemine karşı olup, bu sistemin Türkiye için iyi olmayacağını düşünmektedir. Siz kendinizi bu iki düşünceden hangisine daha yakın görüyorsunuz?

- Başkanlık sistemini destekliyorum  Başkanlık sistemine karşıyım

### 2. Kurdish Issue:

Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde tartışma yaşadığı bir konu da Kürt sorunudur. Buna göre, bazıları Kürt sorununu bir TERÖR sorunu olarak ele almaktadır. Bu kişiler sorunun ÇÖZÜMÜ için PKK'nın silahlanmayı bırakması, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin de terör karşıtı politikalar çerçevesinde terörle aktif bir şekilde savaşmasını uygun bulmaktadır. Bazıları ise Kürt sorununu bir KİMLİK sorunu olarak ele almaktadır. Bu kişiler ise sorunun ÇÖZÜMÜ için köklü demokratikleşmeye gidilmesi, insan haklarının gözetilmesi ve yerel yönetimlerin güçlendirilmesini uygun bulmaktadır. Siz kendinizi bu iki düşünceden hangisine daha yakın görüyorsunuz?

- Kürt sorunu bir terör sorunudur ve terör karşıtı politikalarla çözümlenmelidir.  
 Kürt sorunu bir kimlik sorunudur ve demokratikleşme ile çözümlenmelidir.

### 3. Freedom:

Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde tartışma yaşadığı konulardan biri de temel hak ve özgürlükler ile ilgilidir. Buna göre, Türkiye'nin yirmi yıl önceki durumu ile şimdiki durumu kıyaslandığında, bazı insanlar Türkiye'de şimdi eskisine göre daha AZ özgür bir ortam olduğunu savunurken ("Eskiden daha fazla özgürlük vardı"), bazıları ise

Türkiye'de eskisine göre daha FAZLA özgürlük olduğunu düşünmektedir. Siz kendinizi bu iki düşünceden hangisine daha yakın görüyorsunuz?

- Türkiye'de insanlar eskiye göre daha özgürdür.
- Eskiden Türkiye'de daha fazla özgürlük vardı.



## G: Awareness of Opposing Views

### 1. Presidency: <sup>15</sup>

**Option 1.** Bu kısımda, Türkiye'de tartışmalı bulunan konularla ilgili benimsedikleri görüşlerin nedenleri ile ilgili sorular yer almaktadır. Bunlardan biri de başkanlık sistemidir. Bu noktada, insanların başkanlık sistemine destekleyip, bu sistemin Türkiye için iyi olacağını düşünmelerinin sebeplerini merak ediyoruz. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce başkanlık sistemini desteklemenin ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

**Option 2.** Bu kısımda, Türkiye'de tartışmalı bulunan konularla ilgili benimsedikleri görüşlerin nedenleri ile ilgili sorular yer almaktadır. Bunlardan biri de başkanlık sistemidir. Bu noktada, insanların başkanlık sistemine karşı olup, bu sistemin Türkiye için iyi olmayacağını düşünmelerinin sebeplerini merak ediyoruz. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce başkanlık sistemine karşı olmanın ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

### 2. Kurdish Issue:<sup>16</sup>

**Option 1.** Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde en çok fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı konulardan birisi de Kürt meselesidir. Bu noktada insanların, Kürt sorununu bir kimlik sorunu olarak ele alıp, sorunun ÇÖZÜMÜ İÇİN köklü demokratikleşme, insan haklarının gözetilmesi ve yerel yönetimlerin güçlendirilmesini uygun bulmaktadır. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce Kürt sorununu bir kimlik sorunu olarak görüp, bu sorunun demokratikleşmeyle çözüleceğini düşünmenin ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

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<sup>15</sup> For the presidency system, participants who indicated their opposition to the presidency system at the Issue Opinion Scale were then asked to indicate the reasons people have for supporting this system (Option 1), and vice versa.

<sup>16</sup> Participants who indicated that “Kurdish problem is a terror problem and should be solved via counter-terrorism policies” at the Issue Opinion Scale” was then asked to specify reasons for some people think for “Kurdish problem is an identity problem and should be solved by democratization” (Option 1), and vice versa.

**Option 2.** Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde en çok fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı konulardan birisi de Kürt sorunudur. Bu noktada, insanların, Kürt sorununu bir terör sorunu olarak görüp sorunun ÇÖZÜMÜ İÇİN de PKK'nın silahsızlandırılması, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin terör karşıtı politikalar ile terörle aktif bir şekilde savaşmasını uygun bulmaktadır. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce Kürt sorununu bir terör sorunu olarak görüp, bu sorunun terör karşıtı politikalarla çözüleceğini düşünmenin ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

### **3. Freedom:<sup>17</sup>**

**Option 1.** Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı konulardan bir diğeri de insanların temel hak ve özgürlükleri ile ilgilidir. Bu noktada, Türkiye'nin yirmi yıl önceki durumu ile şimdiki durumu kıyaslandığında, Türkiye'de eskisine göre özgürlüklerin daha kısıtlı olduğunu düşünmenin sebeplerini merak ediyoruz. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce Türkiye'de temel hak ve özgürlüklerin eskisine göre AZALDIĞINI düşünmenin ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

**Option 2.** Türkiye'de insanların üzerinde fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı konulardan bir diğeri de insanların temel hak ve özgürlükleri ile ilgilidir. Bu noktada, Türkiye'nin yirmi yıl önceki durumu ile şimdiki durumu kıyaslandığında, Türkiye'de eskisine göre özgürlüklerin daha fazla olduğunu düşünmenin nedenlerini merak ediyoruz. Kendi fikirlerinizi dikkate almaksızın, sizce Türkiye'de temel hak ve özgürlüklerin eskisine göre İYİLEŞTİĞİNİ (ARTTIĞINI) düşünmenin ne gibi sebepleri olabilir?

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<sup>17</sup> Participants who indicated that “People in Turkey are more free than the past” at the Issue Opinion Scale were asked to indicate reasons for why some people think that “There used to be more freedom in Turkey” (Option 1), and vice versa.

## H: Political Tolerance Scale

1. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin Türkiye’de meclise girmesi yasaklanmalıdır.
2. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin Türkiye’de başbakan olması yasaklanmalıdır.
3. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin Türkiye’de cumhurbaşkanı olması yasaklanmalıdır.
4. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin yasal hakları ellerinden alınmalıdır.
5. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin yaşadığım şehirde kendi haklarını savunan konuşmalar yapmasına izin verilmelidir.\*
6. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin yaşadığım şehirde protesto ile hak talep etmesine izin verilmelidir.\*
7. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin bulunduğum şehirde ya da mahallede umumi toplantılar yapmasına izin verilmelidir. \*
8. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin devlet okullarında eğitim almasına izin verilmelidir.\*
9. “Katılımcının en az sevdiğini belirttiği grubun adı” grubu üyelerinin telefonları dinlenmelidir.

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\*Items were reverse coded prior to the analyses.

## I: Informed Consent Form

Bu çalışma, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyelerinden Yrd. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu danışmanlığında, Sosyal Psikoloji alanı yüksek lisans öğrencisi Cansu Paksoy tarafından tez çalışmasına yönelik olarak yürütülmektedir. Bu form sizi araştırma koşulları hakkında bilgilendirmek için hazırlanmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı Türkiye'de siyasi anlamda farklı görüşlere maruz kalma sıklığı ve politik tolerans düzeylerini incelemektir. Bu sebeple sizden istediğimiz, az sonra yönlendirileceğiniz soruları doldurarak bu konulardaki görüşlerinizi bize iletmenizdir.

Çalışmaya katılım tamamıyla gönüllülük esasına dayanır. Çalışma süresince, sizden kimlik belirleyici hiçbir bilgi istemiyoruz. Cevaplarınız gizli tutulacak ve sadece araştırmacılar tarafından diğer katılımcılarinkiyle birleştirilerek toplu bir şekilde istatistiksel analizlerle değerlendirilecektir; elde edilecek bulgular bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacaktır. Bu çalışmada sizden öncelikle yaşınız, cinsiyetiniz, eğitim durumunuz, politik ve dini görüşleriniz ile ilgili birtakım sorular içeren bir anket formunu doldurmanız istenecektir. Daha sonra, kişilerarası ve medya bağlamlarında politik tartışma ve bilgi alışverişinde bulunmanız ile ilgili soruları içeren anket formunu doldurmanız istenecektir. Bu formu, Türkiye'de bulunan birtakım kültürel, dini ve etnik grupları değerlendireceğiniz bir anket takip edecektir. Daha sonra, sizden belirsizliğe karşı tutumlarınız ile tahmin ve düzen ihtiyaçlarınızı ve hızlı karar verme yöneliminiz ile ilgili soruları içeren bir anketi yanıtlamanız istenecektir. Çalışma toplamda 4 bölümden oluşmaktadır ve yaklaşık 15 dakikanızı alacaktır. Anket sırasında size sorulacak olan sorular, genel olarak kişisel rahatsızlık verecek herhangi bir ayrıntı içermemektedir. Ancak katılım sırasında herhangi bir sebepten dolayı kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz anketi yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Anketi yarıda bırakmanız durumunda herhangi bir olumsuz durumla karşılaşmayacaksınız. Ankete ilginiz ve katılımınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için sosyal psikoloji bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Cansu Paksoy (Tel: 05055544374, e-posta: e173057@metu.edu.tr) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim

zaman yarıda kesip ıkabileceđimi biliyorum. Verdiđim bilgilerin bilimsel amalı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

- Evet
- Hayır



## J: Ethical Approval of The Current Study

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ  
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
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05 NİSAN 2017

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Yrd. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz ULU;

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız yüksek lisans öğrencisi Cansu PAKSOY'un "*Farklı Politik Görüşlere Maruz Kalmanın Politik Tolerans ile ilişkisi*" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay **2017-SOS-044** protokol numarası ile **05.04.2017 – 30.09.2017** tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN

Başkan V

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL  
Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR  
Üye

Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI  
Üye

Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK  
Üye

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN  
Üye

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK  
Üye

## K: Turkish Summary/ Türkçe Özet

### KARŞIT SİYASİ GÖRÜŞLERE MARUZ KALMANIN SİYASİ TOLERANS İLE İLİŞKİSİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

İstikrarlı demokrasilerin bir parçası olan siyasi tolerans, insanların farklı görüşleri ve pratikleri olan insanların hak ve özgürlüklerine karşı saygı duyması olarak tanımlanır. (ör., Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Robinson, 2010; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979). Siyasi tolerans, gruplararası çatışmaların olumsuz sonuçlarını hafifletmede rol oynar (ör., Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014). Ayrıca, çatışmalara karşı yeni perspektifler kazandırarak zorlu çatışmalar için barışçıl çözümler üretilmesine yardımcı olur (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). Bu kazanımlar da demokratik rejimlerin gelişmesine katkıda bulunur, barışçıl çözümleri ortaya çıkararak potansiyel çatışmaları önlemeye yardımcı olur.

Bu çalışma, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın siyasi anlamda yararlı sonuçlarından yola çıkarak, Türkiye’de karşıt siyasi görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Buna göre, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmak; bilgi arama davranışı, kendi ve başkalarının siyasi görüşlerine karşı daha gerçekçi bir bakış açısı ve çelişik siyasi tutumlar ile ilişkilidir (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; Munson & Resnick, 2010; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996). Bu nedenle, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmak, karşıt görüşlere karşı farkındalık sağlayarak siyasi toleransı artırabilir (ör., Mutz, 2002a; Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). Yani, karşıt görüş farkındalığı, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkide bir aracı değişken rolü üstlenebilir. Ayrıca, bir soru için kesin bir cevaba ulaşma ve belirsizlikten kaçınma eğilimini ifade eden bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı (BKİ), karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile karşıt görüşlere karşı farkındalık arasında düzenleyici bir faktör olabilir (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Örneğin, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı fazla olan kişiler, belirsizliği azaltma, grup içinde fikir birliğini destekleme ve diyardik partnerlerini onaylama eğiliminde olduklarından; karşıt fikirlere maruz kalmayı bir tehdit olarak algılayıp, karşıt görüş farkındalığı kazanamayabilirler (ör., Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem,

1993; Manchi Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010). Ayrıca, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma durumunda kalıpyargısal bilgilere bağlılığı tetikleyerek farklı görüş farkındalığını engelleyeceği düşünülebilir (Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Ayrıca, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ve siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkide önemli bir rolü olan “bakış açısını alma” (perspective taking), bilişsel bir çaba gerektirdiğinden, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı fazla olan kişilerde düşük düzeyde olabilir (Mutz, 2002a; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997).

Bu çalışma Mutz’un (2002a) siyasi tolerans ve farklı görüşlere maruz kalma arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyen öncü çalışmasının bir replikasyonudur. Bunu yaparken, bu çalışma, iki önemli katkı sağlamaktadır. Öncelikle, literatürdeki karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ve karşıt görüş farkındalığı arasındaki çelişkili ilişkiye bir açıklık getirmek amaçlanmış ve bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı düzenleyici bir değişken olarak modele eklenmiştir. İkinci olarak, daha önceden Amerika örneğinde test edilmiş olan model, ilk kez Türkiye örneğinde test edilmiştir. İdeolojik kutuplaşma tehlikesi altında olan (Bilgiç, Koydemir, & Akyürek, 2014; Keyman, 2014), yaklaşık otuz yıldır etnik kimlikler arası çatışmalara sahne olan (ör., Dixon & Ergin, 2010) ve azınlık grubu üyelerinin şiddetli ayrımcılığa maruz kaldığı (ör., LGTI bireyler, Göregenli & Karakuş, 2011) Türkiye’de siyasi toleransın oldukça düşük olduğu söylenebilir. Bu nedenle, böyle bir çalışma, ülkedeki potansiyel ideolojik kutuplaşmayı, gruplar arası çatışmayı ve ayrımcı tutumları önleyip barışçıl çözümler üretme yolunda öneriler getirebilir.

Buna göre, çalışmanın hipotezleri aşağıda listelenmiştir:

Hipotez 1: Karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma siyasi toleransı pozitif yönde yordayacaktır.

Hipotez 2: Karşıt görüş farkındalığı, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkiye aracılık edecektir.

Hipotez 3: Bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı, farklı görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkide düzenleyici değişken olacaktır.

## 1. ÇALIŞMA (PİLOT ÇALIŞMA)

İnsanların Türkiye’deki en tartışmalı konular hakkındaki fikirlerini almak için bir pilot çalışma yapılmıştır. Veriler, online anket yoluyla ve uygun örnekleme (convenience sampling) yöntemiyle katılımcılara ulaşılarak toplanmıştır. Ankete 130 kişi başlamış, ancak hepsi anketi bitirmemiştir. Dolayısı ile analizlere anketin %50’sini tamamlayan 74 kişinin (Erkek = 25, Kadın = 49) verileri eklenmiştir. Katılımcıların yaşları 18 ile 63 arasında değişmiştir ( $M = 30.52$ ,  $SD = 9.91$ ). Ayrıca, katılımcılar siyasi yönelimlerini 10’lu Likert tipi ölçekte 1’den (sol) 10’a (sağ) kadar değerlendirmiştir ( $M = 3.44$ ,  $SD = 2.11$ ).

### İşlem ve Veri Toplama Araçları

Bu çalışmayı yapabilmek için Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTÜ) İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu’nun (İAEK) izni alınmıştır. İzin alındıktan sonra, Qualtrics’te hazırlanan online anket çeşitli sosyal medya hesapları aracılığı ile paylaşılmıştır.

Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul eden katılımcılar önce yaş, cinsiyet ve siyasi yönelimlerinin sorulduğu demografik bilgi formunu doldurmuştur. Daha sonra, katılımcılardan Türkiye’de insanların üzerinde en çok fikir ayrılığı yaşadığı beş konuyu belirtmeleri istenmiştir. Ardından, katılımcılar belirttikleri bu beş tartışmalı konunun birbirine zıt iki görüşünü (kutuplar) adlandırmıştır. Son olarak, katılımcılar belirttikleri her bir tartışmalı konuyu önem derecesine göre, 1’den (en çok önemli) 5’e (en az önemli) sıralamışlardır.

### Sonuçlar

Tartışmalı konuları belirlemek için, konunun tercih edilme sıklığı ve önem derecesi göz önüne alınmıştır. Buna göre, en çok tercih edilen ve en önemli konu “Başkanlık Sistemi” ( $n = 34$ ,  $M = 2.31$ ) olmuş, “Özgürlük ve İnsan Hakları” konusu da onu takip

etmiştir ( $n = 27$ ,  $M = 2.24$ ). “Laiklik” ise en önemli ve en çok tercih edilen üçüncü konu olmasına rağmen ( $n = 23$ ,  $M = 2.90$ ), çoğunlukla laik kesim tarafından tercih edildiği için dahil edilmemiştir. Yani “Laiklik” konusu genellenebilir bir konu olarak görülmediğinden çıkarılmıştır.<sup>18</sup> Bu yüzden, “Kurt sorunu” üçüncü konu olarak alınmıştır ( $n = 22$ ,  $M = 2.00$ ).

Her konu için kutupları belirlerken, katılımcıların cevaplarından ve ilgili çalışmalardan yararlanılmıştır. Buna göre, “Başkanlık Sistemi” için iki kutup, “Başkanlık sistemini destekliyorum” ve “Başkanlık sistemine karşıyım” şeklinde belirlenmiştir. “Özgürlük ve İnsan Hakları” konusunun kutuplarını belirlemek için TKSSD’nin kutuplaşma araştırmasından yararlanılmıştır. Buna göre iki kutup, “Türkiye’de insanlar eskiye göre daha özgürdür” ve “Türkiye’de eskiden daha fazla özgürlük vardı” olarak belirlenmiştir. Son olarak, “Kürt Sorunu” konusunun kutupları için, Uluğ ve Cohrs’un (2017) çalışmasındaki Kürt sorununu açıklamak için yaygın olarak kullanılan anlatılardan yararlanılmıştır. Buna göre, iki kutup, “Kürt sorunu bir terör sorunudur ve terör karşıtı politikalarla çözümlenmelidir.” ve “Kürt sorunu bir kimlik sorunudur ve demokratikleşme ile çözümlenmelidir” olarak belirlenmiştir.

## 2. ÇALIŞMA (ANA ÇALIŞMA)

1. çalışmada belirlenen tartışmalı konular ve kutupları, ana çalışmada karşıt görüş farkındalığının ölçümünde kullanılmıştır. 2. çalışma, karşıt görüş farkındalığı aracılığı ile karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile politik tolerans arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Ayrıca, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının düzenleyici rolü test edilmiştir.

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<sup>18</sup> 9 sağ siyasi yönelimli katılımcıdan yalnızca 2’si laikliği tartışmalı konu olarak belirtirken, bu sayı sol siyasi yönelimli katılımcılar arasında 21 olmuştur.

## YÖNTEM

### Katılımcılar

Bu çalışmanın verileri online anket sistemi ile toplanmış, katılımcılara uygun örnekleme yöntemi ile ulaşılmıştır. Ankete başlayan 909 katılımcı arasında 413 kişi anketi tamamlamış, ancak analizlere yalnızca hiç kayıp değeri (missing value) olmayan 299 kişinin verileri dahil edilmiştir. Cinsiyet bilgisi veren 298 katılımcıdan 134'ü (44.8 %) kadın, 164'ü (54.8 %) erkektir. Katılımcıların yaşları 18 ile 64 arasında değişmiştir ( $M = 30.95$ ,  $SD = 11.17$ ). Katılımcıların çoğu üniversite mezunudur ( $n = 154$ , 51.5 %). Kalan katılımcılar ise, sırasıyla, lise ( $n = 71$ , 23.7 %), yüksek lisans ( $n = 60$ , 20.1 %), doktora ( $n = 8$ , 2.7 %), ve ortaokul ( $n = 2$ , 0.7 %) mezunlarından oluşmuştur.

Katılımcıların siyasi parti tercihleri genel olarak CHP ( $n = 137$ , 45.81 %), HDP ( $n = 51$ , 17.06 %), AKP ( $n = 18$ , 6.0 %), ve MHP ( $n = 9$ , 3.01 %) olmuştur. Ayrıca, katılımcılar destekledikleri siyasi partiye olan bağlılıklarını 7'li Likert tipi ölçekte 1'den (çok zayıf bir şekilde bağlı) 7'ye (çok güçlü bir şekilde bağlı) kadar derecelendirmiştir ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = 2.01$ ). Herhangi bir dine inandığını belirten 133 (44.5 %) katılımcıya kıyasla, 166 (55.5 %) katılımcı hiçbir dine inanmadığını belirtmiştir. Dini inancı olan katılımcılar dini inançlarının gündelik yaşamlarını ne kadar etkilediğini 11'li Likert tipi ölçekte 1'den (hiç) 11'e (tamamen) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir ( $M = 5.74$ ,  $SD = 3.23$ ).

Katılımcılar muhafazakarlık düzeylerini 11'li Likert tipi ölçekte 1'den (hiç) 11'e (oldukça fazla) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir ( $M = 3.14$ ,  $SD = 2.63$ ). Ayrıca, yine 11'li ölçekte katılımcılar siyasi yönelimlerini 1'den (sol) 11'e (sağ) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir ( $M = 3.36$ ,  $SD = 2.67$ ). Ayrıca, katılımcılar siyasi görüşlerine olan bağlılıklarını 11'li Likert tipi ölçekte 1'den (hiç) 11'e (tamamen) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir ( $M = 7.48$ ,  $SD = 2.76$ ). Daha sonra, katılımcılar siyasi

görüşlerinin gündelik yaşamlarını ne kadar etkilediğini 11’li Likert tipi ölçekte 1’den (hiç) 11’e (tamamen) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir ( $M = 6.34$ ,  $SD = 2.97$ ).

## **Veri Toplama Araçları**

### **Demografik Sorular**

Katılımcılara cinsiyet, yaş, politik yönelim, doğdukları şehir, yaşamlarının en çok bölümünü geçirdikleri yer, aylık gelir ve eğitim düzeyleri ile ilgili sorular sorulmuştur. Ayrıca katılımcılara kendi etnik kimliklerini nasıl tanımladıkları ve bugün seçim olsa hangi siyasi partiye oy verecekleri sorulmuştur. Daha sonra, destekledikleri siyasi partiye olan bağlılıklarını derecelendirmişlerdir. Sonra, en çok hangi politikacıyı destekledikleri ve herhangi bir dini inançları olup olmadığı sorulmuştur. Herhangi bir dini inancı olan katılımcılardan inandıkları dinin adını belirtmeleri istenmiştir. Ayrıca, katılımcılar inandıkları dinin ve kendi siyasi görüşlerinin gündelik hayatlarını ne kadar etkilediğini derecelendirmişlerdir. Daha sonra, siyasi yönelimlerini (sol-sağ) belirtmişlerdir.

### **Tartışmacı Seçimi<sup>19</sup>**

Bu ölçekle amaçlanan katılımcıların siyasi konularda en çok tartıştıkları kişileri belirlemektir. Buna göre katılımcılardan siyasi konularda en çok konuştukları üç kişinin isimlerini (ya da takma isimlerini) yazmaları istenmiştir.

### **Tartışma Sıklığı**

Katılımcılar bu ölçekte daha önceden belirttikleri kişilerle siyasi tartışma sıklıklarını 7’li Likert Tipi ölçekte 1’den (oldukça nadir) 7’ye (oldukça sık) kadar derecelendirmiştir. Yüksek puanlar daha sık tartışmaya işaret etmiştir. Her bir

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<sup>19</sup> Tartışmacı seçimi, siyasi tartışma sıklığı, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile ilgili sorular Mutz’un (2002) çalışmasından uyarlanmıştır.

tartışmacı için belirlenen tartışma sıklıkları alınarak ortalama tartışma sıklığı hesaplanmıştır.

### **Karşıt Görüşlere Maruz Kalma**

Katılımcılara, önceden belirttikleri tartışmacıların görüşleri ile kendi görüşlerini karşılaştırdıkları üç soru yöneltilmiştir. Örneğin, “[tartışmacı] ile benim siyasi görüşlerim...” ifadesi 1’den (tamamen aynı) 7’ye (tamamen farklı) kadar değerlendirilmiştir. Birinci, ikinci ve üçüncü tartışmacılar için hesaplanan Cronbach alfa katsayıları uygun düzeydedir, sırasıyla, .86, .81, .82.<sup>20</sup>

**Görüşler:** Pilot çalışmada belirlenen üç konu ve her bir konunun kutupları kullanılarak, katılımcılara bu üç konu hakkındaki görüşleri sorulmuştur. Örneğin, katılımcılardan “Başkanlık Sistemi” hakkındaki düşüncelerini “Başkanlık Sistemini Destekliyorum” ya da “Başkanlık Sistemine Karşıyım” ifadelerinden birini seçerek belirtmeleri istenmiştir.

### **Karşıt Görüş Farkındalığı (KGF)**

Orjinal ölçek (Cappela, Price, & Nir, 2002) bu çalışmanın siyasi konularına uygun olarak uyarlanmıştır (ayrıca bkz., Price, Cappela, & Nir, 2002). Katılımcıların karşıt görüş farkındalığını ölçmek için karşıt görüşteki insanların neden böyle düşündükleri hakkında sebepler yazmaları istenmiştir. Örneğin, “Görüşler” ölçeğinde başkanlık sistemini desteklediğini belirten bir katılımcıya başkanlık sistemine karşı olmanın sebepleri sorulmuştur. Yanıtlar, iki kodlayıcı tarafından, ölçeğin alındığı orjinal çalışmanın yazarlarından edinilen kodlama kılavuzuna göre değerlendirilmiştir.<sup>21</sup> Yüksek skorlar daha yüksek düzeyde karşıt görüş farkındalığını ifade etmiştir.

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<sup>20</sup> Karşıt fikirlere maruz kalmanın toplam skorunu hesaplamak için, önce her bir tartışmacı için karşıt fikirlere maruz kalma skoru o tartışmacıyla olan tartışma sıklığına ağırlıklandırılmış, daha sonra üç tartışmacı için elde edilen puanların ortalaması hesaplanmıştır.

<sup>21</sup> Alakasız, ya da katılımcının karşıt görüşün sebebinin benimsenmesi hakkında herhangi bir fikri olmadığını gösteren yanıtlar sıfır (0) puan alırken, anlamlı her bir sebep bir puan olarak kodlanmıştır.

Kodlayıcılar arası güvenilirlik analizi sonucunda Cohen'in kappa değeri üç konu için de .70'in üzerindedir.

### **Siyasi Tolerans**

Siyasi tolerans ölçümünde Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus'un (1993) yöntemi uyarlanmıştır. Buna göre, katılımcılardan, Türkiye'de bulunan pek çok etnik, kültürel ve dini grup arasından en az sevdiklerini düşündükleri grubu işaretlemeleri istenmiştir. Daha sonra ise seçtikleri bu grup için temel hakların arttırılmasını ya da kısıtlanmasını ne kadar desteklediklerini 1'den (kesinlikle katılıyorum) 7'ye (kesinlikle katılmıyorum) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir. Örneğin, katılımcılar seçtikleri gruba üye olan bireylerin meclise girmesinin yasaklanmasını ne kadar desteklediklerini değerlendirmişlerdir. Yüksek skorlar daha yüksek düzeyde siyasi toleransa işaret etmiştir ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

### **Bilişsel Kapalılık İhtiyacı Ölçeği**

Bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacını ölçmek amacıyla Webster ve Kruglanski'nin (1994) orjinal ölçeğinin Şeker ve Akman (2015) tarafından uyarlaması kullanılmıştır. Ölçek "Düzen Tercihi", "Belirsizlikten Rahatsızlık" "Tahmin ihtiyacı", "Dar Görüşlülük" ve "Kararlılık" alt ölçeklerinden oluşmuştur. Katılımcılar soruları 7'li Likert tipi ölçekte 1'den (kesinlikle katılıyorum) 7'ye (kesinlikle katılmıyorum) kadar değerlendirmişlerdir.<sup>22</sup> Yüksek skorlar yüksek düzeyde bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacını ifade etmiştir.

## **SONUÇLAR**

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<sup>22</sup> Faktör analizi sonucunda 5 madde çıkarılmış, 31 madde kalmıştır. Ayrıca, belirsizlikten rahatsızlık ve tahmin ihtiyacı alt ölçeklerinin maddeleri tek bir faktörde toplandığından, 5 yerine 4 alt ölçek belirlenmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkide, karşıt görüş farkındalığının aracı değişken rolü test edilmiştir. Daha sonra ise, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı modele dahil edilerek, bu değişkenin karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile karşıt görüş farkındalığı arasındaki düzenleyici etkisi sınanmıştır.

Veriler, üç hipotezi ve çalışma modellerini test etmek amacıyla Hayes'in (2013) PROCESS modelleri kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Spesifik olarak, 4. model aracı değişkenli modeli test etmek amacıyla kullanılırken, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının modeldeki düzenleyici etkisinin testi için 7. Model kullanılmıştır. Bütün dolaylı etkiler 1000 bootstrap örneklemlili bootstrap analizine tabii tutulmuştur.

İlk olarak, aracı değişken modeli test edilmiştir. Regresyon katsayıları, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın karşıt görüş farkındalığını yordadığını göstermiştir,  $b = .12$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95 % CI [.00, .24]. Karşıt görüş farkındalığı da siyasi toleransı yordamıştır,  $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .10$ , 95 % CI [.18, .60]. Karşıt görüş farkındalığı aracılığı ile, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın siyasi toleransa dolaylı etkisi de anlamlı bulunmuştur,  $b = .37$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95 % CI [.15, .59]. Ayrıca, aracı değişken control edildiğinde de, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma siyasi toleransı yordamıştır,  $b = .32$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95 % CI [.10, .54]. Bootstrapping işlemi yapılan dolaylı etki de anlamlıdır,  $b = .05$ ,  $SE = .03$ , 95% CI [.00, .12]. Model toplamda % 0.8 varyans açıklamıştır,  $R^2 = .08$ ,  $F(2, 296) = 12.57$ ,  $p < .001$ . Bu nedenle, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma, siyasi toleransı, karşıt görüş farkındalığı aracılığı ile yordamıştır.

İkinci olarak, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın, siyasi toleransı, karşıt görüş farkındalığı aracılığı ile yordamasında bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının düzenleyici etkisi test edilmiştir. Bu modeled, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma, karşıt görüş farkındalığını doğrudan tahmin etmemiştir,  $b = .55$ ,  $SE = .39$ , 95% CI [-.23, 1.32]. Ayrıca, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının, karşıt görüş farkındalığı üzerindeki etkileşim etkisi istatistiksel olarak anlamsızdır,  $b = -.10$ ,  $SE = .09$ , 95% CI [-.27, .08]. Ancak, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmak ve karşıt görüş farkındalığı siyasi toleransı yordamıştır, sırasıyla,  $b = .32$ ,  $SE = .11$ , 95% CI [.10, .54];  $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .10$ ,

95% CI [.18, .60]. Model toplamda % 0.08 % varyans açıklamıştır,  $R^2 = .08$ ,  $F(2, 296) = 12.57$ ,  $p < .001$ . Özetle sonuçlar, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının modelde düzenleyici bir etkisi olmadığını göstermiştir. Yani, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı, aracı değişkenli modelde, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile karşıt görüş farkındalığı arasındaki ilişkide düzenleyici bir etki göstermemektedir. Ayrıca, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının modele dahil edilmesi, aracı değişken etkisinin kaybolmasına yol açmıştır. Spesifik olarak, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma bu modelde karşıt görüş farkındalığını yordamamıştır,  $b = .55$ ,  $SE = .39$ , 95 % CI [-.22, 1.31].

## TARTIŞMA

Bu tez çalışması Mutz'ın (2002a) karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ile siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkiyi incelediği çalışmasının Türkiye'deki adaptasyonunu yapmayı amaçlamıştır. Buna ek olarak, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının düzenleyici etkisi test edilmiştir.

Sonuçlar hipotezlere kısmi olarak desteklemiştir. Öncelikle, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmak siyasi tolerans ile pozitif yönlü ilişkili bulunmuştur. Yani, karşıt görüşlere daha sık maruz kalan insanlar siyasi anlamda daha toleranslı olmuştur. Bu bulgu, çalışmanın ilk hipotezini desteklemiştir. Ayrıca, karşıt görüş farkındalığı, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ve siyasi tolerans arasındaki ilişkide aracı değişken olmuştur. Yani karşıt görüşlere sık maruz kalan insanlar, karşıt görüşler hakkında daha fazla farkındalığa sahip olmuşlar, bu da onların daha yüksek düzeyde siyasi toleransları olmasına katkı sağlamıştır. Bu bulgu da, çalışmanın ikinci hipotezini desteklemiştir. Böylelikle, bu çalışma ile Mutz'ın (2002a) çalışmasının Türkiye'deki bir replikasyonu yapılmıştır.

Ancak, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının modelde düzenleyici bir etkisi bulunmamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ve karşıt görüş farkındalığı arasındaki ilişkide düzenleyici bir rol almamıştır. Bunun nedeni, siyasi tartışmalardaki uyumsuzluk düzeyinin yanlış yorumlanabileceği ile ilgili olarak yorumlanabilir. Örneğin, bazı araştırmacılar, insanların kendi içlerindeki çatışmayı

azaltmak için, fikir uyuşmazlığı içeren siyasi tartışmaları farklı yorumladığını iddia etmiştir (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). Yani, tartışmalardaki fikir uyuşmazlığı daha çok hemfikirlik olarak yorumlanabilmektedir. Bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı yüksek olan insanlar tartışma sırasında fikir birliğine ulaşmak için güçlü bir istek duyduklarından (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), fikir uyuşmazlığını yanlış yorumlama eğilimi bu insanlarda daha fazla olabilir. Yani, karşıt görüşlere maruz kalma ölçeğini yanıtlarken, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı yüksek olan katılımcılar gerçekte olduğundan daha fazla fikir birliği rapor etme eğiliminde olmuş olabilirler. Bu açıklamanın geçerli olup olmadığını test etmek için, gelecekteki çalışmalar bu çalışma modelini deneysel olarak test ederek, gerçek fikir uyuşmazlığı düzeyini kontrol edebilirler.

Yine de, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının hem siyasi tolerans, hem de karşıt görüş farkındalığı ile ters yönlü ilişkili olması, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının siyasi tolerans çalışmalarında önemli bir değişken olabileceğini göstermektedir. Yani, beklentilerle tutarlı olarak, yüksek düzeyde bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacı düşük düzeyde siyasi toleransı ve düşük düzeyde karşıt görüş farkındalığını yordamıştır.

Her çalışmada olduğu gibi, bu çalışmanın da birtakım sınırlılıkları vardır. İlki, bu çalışmanın karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmayı yalnızca kişilerarası etkileşim temelinde ele almasıdır. Halbuki, gündelik hayatta insanlar pek çok yolla karşıt düşüncelere maruz kalabilirler. Örneğin, online siyasi mesajlar ve sosyal medya sitelerinin kullanımı da karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmayı arttırarak siyasi toleransı yordayabilir (e.g., Kim, 2011; Kim & Chen, 2016). Ayrıca, istemsiz olarak da karşıt görüşlere maruz kalınabilir. Daha kapsayıcı açıklamalar getirebilmek adına, gelecek çalışmalar karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmayı daha geniş bir perspektiften ele alarak sosyal medya, ana akım medya ve istemsiz maruz kalma deneyimlerini de göz önünde bulundurabilir. İkinci olarak, katılımcılara ulaşmada uygun örnekleme yöntemi kullanılması, bu çalışmanın diğer bir sınırlılığı olabilir. Bu örnekleme yöntemi araştırmacının en kolay ulaşabildiği katılımcıları seçmesini ifade eder (Özdemir, Louis, & Topbaş, 2011). Dolayısı ile, araştırmacının katılımcıları rastgele bir biçimde seçmemiş olması da, çalışmanın

bulgularının genellenabilirliğini azaltarak evren hakkında çıkarım yapmayı engeller (e.g., Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2015). Bu nedenle gelecek çalışmalar, örnekleme yöntemi olarak rastgele örnekleme yöntemlerinden birini kullanmalıdır.

Son olarak, Piereson, and Marcus'un siyasi tolerans ölçeğinde kullandığı "en az sevilen grup" yaklaşımı, son çalışmalar tarafından eleştirilmektedir (Gibson, 1992b). Çünkü, katılımcılar kendileri için önemsiz olan bir grubu ya da daha az sevdikleri gruptan başka bir grubu da işaretleyebilirler. Bu da rastgele ölçüm hatasına yol açar. Ayrıca, katılımcıların en az sevdikleri grup üyelerine devlet tarafından tanınacak birtakım haklara ve kısıtlamalara ne kadar destek verdiklerinin sorulduğu bu ölçek, aslında siyasi toleransı ölçmüyor olabilir. Çünkü, bu ölçekte asıl odaklanılan birtakım kültürel ve etnik gruplara karşı takınılan dışlayıcı bir tavır olan siyasi toleranssızlık değil, politikalara verilen desteğin derecesidir (Gibson, 2013).

Yine de, bu çalışma iki ana sebepten dolayı önemlidir. Öncelikle, Türkiye'de siyasi toleransın çalışılması potansiyel ideolojik kutuplaşmaları, etnik gruplar arası çatışmaları önlemek ve azınlık grubu üyelerine karşı olumlu tutumları desteklemek adına kritik bir önem arz etmektedir. Bu nedenle, araştırmacılar Türkiye'de siyasi toleransı teşvik edecek yeni öneriler öne sürmek adına, siyasi tolerans ve ilişkili olduğu değişkenleri detaylı bir şekilde çalışmalıdır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de karşıt görüşlere maruz kalmanın siyasi tolerans ile ilişkisini gösteren ilk çalışmadır. Buradan hareketle, siyasi toleransı arttırmanın bir yolu olarak karşıt siyasi görüşlerin paylaşılabilirdiği ortamların teşvik edilmesi düşünülebilir.

Sosyal politikalar, okullarda ve kamusal alanlarda daha heterojen siyasi tartışma ağlarının kurulmasını ve desteklenmesi yönünde yeniden düzenlenebilir. Örneğin, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (MEB), ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde okul müfredatına farkı görüşlerin tartışıldığı, karşıt görüşler arasında beyin fırtınalarının gerçekleştirildiği dersler ekleyerek öğrencilerin karşıt görüşlere karşı farkındalık kazanmasını sağlayarak daha toleranslı bireylerin iş hayatına katılmasını sağlayabilir.

İkinci olarak, bu çalışma, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının siyasi tolerans ve karşıt görüş farkındalığı için önemli bir değişken olduğunu bulgulayarak, siyasi tolerans alanyazınına katkı sağlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, bilişsel kapalılık ihtiyacının siyasi tolerans ile ilişkisinin daha detaylı bir şekilde incelenmesi, ideolojik kutuplaşmanın önlenmesi konusunda yeni pencereler açacaktır.



## L: Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu

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