



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA

MASTER'S THESIS

ABDINASIR MUHUDIN WASUGE AHMED

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

ANKARA, 2021

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Thesis Defense Date: 28.09.2021

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PLAGIARISM

I declare here that all information in this thesis is my own original work. I have clearly referenced in accordance to Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University guidelines as well as with the academic rules and ethical conduct. Lastly, I accept all legal responsibility related to my thesis's academic procedure.

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DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this thesis to my honorable mother Sakino MOHAMUD and my father Muhudin WASUGE.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research thesis is my academic contribution in order to achieve a master's degree in Political Science and Public Administration, at Yıldırım Beyazıt University. This has been realized with the support and encouragement of many people. Firstly, I would to express my special thanks of gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Selcen Özkan for her valuable guidance, recommendations, suggestions and comments that she gave me during the course of this work. Secondly, a huge appreciation also goes to all my family and friends who helped me in shaping this thesis. I am grateful for the support and encouragement they offered me during my studies at the University.

Finally, I would like to thank the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities for offering me this scholarship in order to achieve my life goal. And awards like yours make it possible for students like me to earn our degrees and take the responsibility to make our countries and the world a better place.

ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA

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September 2021, 111 pages

This study aims to investigate the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia. Since the collapse of central government at the beginning of 1991, the country entered a civil war that made the state failed. After tremendous efforts made by the international community, the country regained its system of government. Although there is no effective government, the country is fighting with the powerful terrorist group named Al-Shabab, which is considered the most deadly terror group in Africa. Somalia is considered the world's most corrupted country in the world, according to Transparency International (TI) 2019. In this research, a secondary data sources of a complete decade which covers 2009-2019, were analyzed to the both of the variables (Corruption and good governance), and the two data sources were taken from Transparency International Corruption perception index (CPI) and World bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The main objective of this study is to know the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia. Also, this study seeks answers to the question of the relationship between corruption and good governance. And to examine this, multiple simple regressions were employed as the study concludes that there is a significant relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia. Finally, this study recommends that comprehensive monitoring and assessment are required to identify the major issues of poor governance practices in Somalia at the federal and regional levels. This monitoring and assessment method might aid administrative authorities, civil society organizations, and policymakers in identifying obstacles to project execution.

Keywords: Corruption, Good governance, Fight against corruption, Governance, Somalia.

ÖZET

SOMALI'DE YOLSUZLUĞUN İYİ YÖNETİM ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

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M. A., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Eyül 2021, 111 sayfa

Bu çalışma, yolsuzluğun Somali'de iyi yönetim üzerindeki etkisini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. 1991'in başında merkezi hükümetin çöküşünden bu yana, ülke devleti başarısız kılan bir iç savaşa girmiştir. Uluslararası toplum tarafından yapılan muazzam çabalardan sonra, ülke hükümet sistemine yeniden kavuşmuştur. Etkili bir hükümet olmamasına rağmen, ülke Afrika'daki en ölümcül terör grubu olarak kabul edilen El Şabab adlı güçlü terör grubuyla savaştırmaktadır. Uluslararası Şeffaflık Örgütü (TI) 2019'a göre Somali, dünyanın en yozlaşmış ülkesi olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu araştırmada, 2009-2019 kapsayan tam on yıl ikincil veri kaynakları (Yolsuzluk ve iyi yönetim) değişkenleri de analiz edilmiştir ve iki veri kaynakları, Uluslararası Şeffaflık örgütünün Yolsuzluk algılama Endeksi (WGI) (CPI) ve Dünya Bankası Dünya Yönetişim Göstergeleri alınmıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Somali'de yolsuzluk ve iyi yönetim arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymaktır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma yolsuzluk ve iyi yönetim arasındaki ilişki sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Ve bunu incelemek için, Somali'de yolsuzluk ve iyi yönetim arasında anlamlı bir ilişki olduğu sonucuna varıldığı için çok sayıda basit gerileme kullanılmıştır. Son olarak, bu çalışma, Somali'deki kötü yönetim uygulamalarının federal ve bölgesel düzeylerdeki temel sorunlarını belirlemek için kapsamlı izleme ve değerlendirmenin gerekli olduğunu önermektedir. Bu izleme ve değerlendirme yöntemi idari makamlara, sivil toplum kuruluşlarına ve politika yapıcılara proje yürütmesinin önündeki engelleri belirlemede yardımcı olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: yolsuzluk, iyi yönetim, yolsuzlukla mücadele, yönetim, Somali.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BTI:	BertelsmannStiftung Transformation Index
CGG:	Commission on Global Governance
CPI:	Corruption Perception Index
FGS:	Federal Government of Somalia
IDAs:	International Development Agencies
IDPs:	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IND:	Immigration and Naturalization Directorate
LCDs:	Late Developing Countries
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISA:	National Intelligence and Security Agency
NPG:	New Public Governance
NPM:	New Public Management
OECD:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPPs:	Public Private Partnerships
R&D	Research and Development
SAPs:	Structural Adjustment Programs
SPF:	Somali Police Force
TI:	Transparency International
WB:	World Bank
WGI:	Worldwide Governance Indicators

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

In general, corruption is all kinds of abuse of power to acquire private benefits. The capability of corruption is a situation that lets crook acts of corruption arise. The stuff for corruption can occur because of five things, particularly the superiority of excessive corruption, the low responsibility of public funding, the extreme motivation of corruption, the massive quarter suffering from corruption, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption applications within the region (Atobatele & Bello, 2018, p. 108). Corruption is as old-fashioned as the arena itself. It has become worldwide distress that has left the management of the arena and not using a choice apart from to search for a worthwhile method to fight it to the barest minimum. Corruption isn't always the handiest rife; however additionally adverse to the boom and improvement of any nation (Atobatele & Bello, 2018, p. 110). Corruption produces destructive consequences that cause rallying grievances. For several Africans, corruption isn't without a doubt summary authorities dysfunction; it's miles an invasive and recurrently coercive incidence of their lives (Lewis, 2021, p. 229). Indeed, corruption is at the center of the disaster in problems consisting of governance and legitimacy, the status quo of a sustainable democratic order, the rule of law, countrywide improvement and the welfare of the citizens (Mercy, 2015, p. 293).

Corruption exists anywhere inside the globe. It will become the norm if the probabilities of being stuck and significantly punished are low and if it's far a commonly generic or tolerated mode of behavior. Corruption in Africa is an improvement and social trouble which will become an obstacle to alternate and a severe constraint on the monetary boom and poverty reduction. Corruption in African international locations has to turn out to be endemic; as such, it's far observed nearly in all factors of life. Endemic corruption implies a breakdown of the guideline of thumb of regulation and, in maximum times, a lack of country legitimacy (Lawal, 2007, p. 1).

Corruption is a word that has been perceived in numerous approaches via way of means of diverse scholars. Its conceptualization has attracted in latest beyond competing and several perspectives and approaches. It is consequently visible as a global phenomenon

which has long been with each society in the world. It has been diagnosed because of the bane of maximum political and financial issues in societies. Corruption is once more taken into consideration as an enemy of financial improvement due to its numerous vices. A state that condones corruption is regularly besieged with a variety of financial, political and social vices (Lawal, 2007, p. 2).

In a single shape or another, corruption has been determined in all human societies for the duration of history. Because of corruption's enduring strength throughout history, some scholars and politicians have come to regard it as an inevitable element of human interaction. Nonetheless, many societies (for example, northern European nations) have effectively created institutional arrangements and implemented public-sector coverage measures to reduce corruption and its negative effects on their financial, social, and systems of government. Unfortunately, corruption remains a crucial impediment to political and economic development in numerous areas worldwide, particularly in Africa (Mbaku, 2008, p. 427).

In Somalia, corruption is each one the main reasons and outcomes of the country's endemic political instability, which has been ranked backside of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index each yr. starting from 2006. Corruption takes place in any respect tiers in each private and governmental sector and is a seen and anticipated shape of behavior. It sincerely impacts each issue of the Somali society: public officials' misuse of public items for non-public advantage and the solicitation of bribes in change for fundamental offerings to the clan-primary based patronage networks used to gain political employment arrangements (Ronan, 2017, p. 1).

The idea of "governance" doesn't always new. However, it's way various things to distinctive people; consequently, we must get our attention right. The scope of government determines the true value of a concept we're talking about, the objectives to be achieved, and the technique used to achieve them. For a long time, the concept has circulated in political and educational discourse, referring to the endeavour of walking authorities or any other suitable unit for that recall. In this context, the broad explanation provided by "Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986:982)" is of little use, suggesting only that governance is a synonym for authority, or "the act or method of governing, particularly authoritative conduct and control." The efficiency of government departments or authorities

is the focus of this interpretation. The British Council's running definition, on the other hand, highlights that "governance" is a larger view than authority (and to that end, recall also linked notions like as the state, senior leaders, and regime), and goes straight to state: Governance includes collaboration between official institutions and members of civil society. Governance is a procedure in which societal forces exert power, authority and influence the public attitudes and social living standards through enacting rules and decisions (Srivasta, 2009, p. 14).

The questioning in the back of the pass, in the overdue 1980s, from Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to the best governance schedule become knowledgeable through the great reputation that the African disaster become political in preference to financial; or, to place it some other way, that the absence of improvement often become because of political, in preference to financial, factors. In itself becomes a massive shift because it had usually been assumed in improvement circles that what becomes lacking has been the monetary and technical manner to allow Africa to attain the critical 'lift-off' degree of financial growth. Indeed, for decades, the focal point was at shipping resources to guide the funding that could inspire improvement. In this respect, it's miles instructive to revisit the grounds for and the assumptions about Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). At its sentiment, the resolution, from the mid-1970s, to introduce SAPs derived from a twofold observation. The first becomes that there were no enormous improvements in post-colonial Africa, notwithstanding the guarantees of the early years of independence. The second becomes that the speedy flow to single-party states throughout that duration had caused the immoderate dominance of a country that had emerged as bloated and ineffective (Chabal, 2009, p. 2).

The words "governance" and "good governance" have been progressively prominent in reform literature in recent years. Bad governance is frequently cited as one of the root causes of all bad in our society. Major funders and international institutions are increasingly stipulating that "appropriate governance" reforms be implemented before they provide aid or lend money. The term "government" is not a modern one. It may be traced back to the start of human society. Simply defined, "governance" refers to the process of making choices and the execution of those decisions (or now no longer implemented). Governance, global, national, and local governance are examples of circumstances where governance is used. An evaluation of governance focuses on the official and informal players engaged in making

and enforcing choices and the formal and informal processes in place in the region to reach and execute those decisions (Srivasta, 2009, p. 6).

In the 1980s, new institutionalists and community academicians reintroduced governance as "bringing the nation returned in". However, the idea became not mainly related to government, that is, political control through governments. Instead, governance cited a system of decision-making in which sovereignty is distributed among governmental and nongovernmental players that jointly participate in a political choice process that cannot be governed from a central point of control (van Doeveren, 2011b). Confusion approximately the means of governance intensified because of its "travels" throughout disciplinary and sub-disciplinary borders. Scholars adjusted the idea to their discipline of studies. They studied many actors concerned with decision-making approaches in countries, corporations, markets, societies, supranational corporations, and the European Union (van Doeveren, 2011b, p. 302).

Good governance is defined as the existence of bureaucratic transparency, political accountability, the exercise of legitimate power, freedom of association and participation, the autonomy of statistics and expression, sound financial control and public economic responsibility, respect for the rule of thumb of law, and a predictable legal framework encompassing an interdependent and dependable system of government (Hope, 2009, p. 81).

In addition to viewing governance in phrases of each shape and process, different governance preparations have existed traditionally in addition to at present. Each of those preparations addresses the hassle of offering guidelines to society and the financial system in its very own way. Each appears to be decisive in fixing a few components of the governance hassle. However, every additionally has its weaknesses (Katsamunska, 2016, p. 141).

In Somalia, governance dates again to the age of nearby sultanates earlier than centuries to the primary contemporary-day republican country of the Sixties together with the dictatorial length and the anarchy generation later in the early 1990s as much as the closing decade. Everyone in Somalia has skilled its personal separate version of governance in those specific epochs with its excellent performance degrees. However, one high-quality and regular similarity becomes the twin nature of Somali politics wherein conventional

social settlement (Xeer) and contemporary-day charter performed parallel roles with inside the home issues. During the age of nearby sultanates, the Somali society essentially becomes disintegrated pastoral blocs every having their unbiased arrangement, however, related via way of means of General Somali customary law (referred to as Xeer-Soomaali) become the handiest reputable social settlement together with sharia without critical authority. Even though a sturdy critical governance gadget becomes no longer intact, those aforementioned legal guidelines performed an essential function in handling inter-communal clashes and public order (Sofe & Miruts, 2017, p. 69).

1.2. Problem Statement

According to the 2019 “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)” published by Transparency International, Somalia is at the bottom out of 180 countries globally. It leads as the most corrupted country in the world since 2006. On the other hand, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) challenge constructs combination signs of five huge dimensions of governance: *"Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, and Rule of Law"*, whereas the percentile rank among all the countries (ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank), thus the last report of Somalia's governance indicators from WGI in 2019 indicates that Voice and Accountability rank 2.96 out of 100, Political Stability and Absence of Violence ranks 2.86 out of 100, Government Effectiveness ranks 0.96 out of 100, Rule of Law ranks 0.00 out of 100, and Control of Corruption ranks 0.96 out of 100. Therefore, Somalia's corruption is the highest in the world, and its good governance is abysmal. This research has tried to examine the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia to help policymakers solve corruption and governance issues.

1.3. Study Objectives

The General objective of this study is to examine the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia.

1.3.1. Specific Objectives

This study also intended to achieve the following specific objectives:

- To examine the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia
- To Identify factors that cause corruption in Somalia
- To understand the barriers to good governance in Somalia

1.4. Research Questions

This study will try to get answers to the following questions based on understanding the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia.

- What is the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia?
- What are the factors that cause corruption in Somalia?
- What are the obstacles to good governance in Somalia?

1.5. Purpose of the Study

This study aims to investigate the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia

1.6. Significance of the Study

Generally, the findings of this research will rebound to the advantages of society that governance plays a principal function and matters with inside the sphere of social and political development. Specifically, since this study will be targeted towards formerly no longer researched vicinity of corruption and good governance in Somalia, it'll assist apprehend the sincerity of the issue be counted of ways corruption pertains to poor governance in Somalia. Many approaches might be useful for government policymakers, stakeholders, and researchers to find the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia, which previous research has no longer explored. This study will also contribute to the existing literature on corruption and good governance, making the upcoming researchers interested in investigating this field. Therefore, it'll assist replenish the knowledge gap. Additionally, this research will provide higher recommendations basing on the findings of the study.

1.7. Scope of the Study

This study is limited to the sociopolitical and administrative aspects of corruption on good governance, which is considered one of the greatest challenging in Africa's governments' institutions and Somalia. In this study, the researcher will examine the impact of corruption on governance in Somalia by focusing on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks in specific years from 2009 to 2019 as a measurement of corruption and parts good governance indicators from World bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which are; “Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption” which will be used to measure good governance in Somalia. The researcher's justification for using the above secondary data sources is that collecting primary data from relevant government institutions in Somalia is complicated and risky. Second, doing this kind of research by collecting primary data will cost a lot of money. And the third is the limited time to complete the study.

This study was conducted between October 2020 to September 2021. Specifically, this study will focus on Somalia as a geographic area by using the sources mentioned above of secondary data to measure the study's variables.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. The Concept of Corruption

According to Transparency International (TI), Corruption is described as the misuse of entrusted power for personal gain. Corruption undermines confidence and democracy, stifles economic growth, and exacerbates inequality, poverty, social discord, and environmental disaster (TI, 2017, p. 3). Though there are various interpretations of the word "corruption," it can be broadly described as the misuse of entrusted authority for personal gain. The abuse of public or corporate offices for the intent of obtaining illegal benefits is a classic example of this criminal activity (Heidenheimer & Lohnston, 2017, p. 284). Bribery, nepotism, clientelism, embezzlement, fraud, and graft are all examples of corruption in one form or another. Despite ongoing discussions in the social sciences, there is yet to be consensus on the concept of corruption. This is also due to the difficulty of distinguishing corrupt activities from commonplace ones like gift-giving or lobbying. Early thinkers saw corruption as a violation of the public interest or a departure from the formal responsibilities of a public position. This needs at least a rudimentary specialization among the subsystems of organizations and administrations (structural differentiation). It also assumes that the "public interest" is distinct from the "private interests" of members of organizations or society. Corruption has been promoted in political science as a violation of the impartiality norm (Graeff, 2020, p. 1).

Corruption is a notoriously complex word to describe. Bribery, campaign financing, clientelism, deception, embezzlement, coercion, kickbacks, misuse, abuse, nepotism, patronage, graft, rent-seeking, controversy, side transactions, special interest politics, stealing, and venality are only a few of the words that come to mind. Indeed, corruption is often used as a blanket term to describe any lack in politics or politicians. Whether corruption refers to various things to distinct people or in different countries, we're dealing with a stubborn topic that defies the kind of systemic cross-national analysis that has arisen in recent times and that we are trying to do here (Gerring & Thacker, 2016, p. 300).

The challenge of coming up with a conceptually sound idea of corruption has proved to be incredibly difficult. Despite thousands of years of concern over corruption and low

ethical expectations, there is still no consensus about what constitutes corruption. As the number of meanings of corruption has grown, so has philosophical consistency. Indeed, it is becoming more difficult to understand what academics and politicians are talking about as they debate corruption. The idea that corruption is an assessment of an incident rather than a summary of an event contributes to the intellectual complexity. Though it is accurate that corruption is always thought to necessitate any constructive action, the term "corruption" is never solely descriptive. Indeed, allegations of corruption are almost always linked to morality claims, a reality built into early discussions of corruption and ethics and often contributes to uncertainty in definition implementation. Since key conceptions of morality are largely arbitrary and likely culturally bound, there will almost invariably be a wide range of different meanings of corruption that all tug in different directions (Rose, 2018, p. 221).

Academic meanings have continued to get more precise over time. However, the most common definition of corruption is Transparency International's preferred definition of "*the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.*" This term, like earlier definitions of corruption, has a strong moral dimension. The concept suggests some ideal use of entrusted authority, which is subverted in the case of corruption for the abuser to accomplish some private advantage. The concept offers no clarification on what constitutes an "abuse" or a "use" of authority, how to treat circumstances in which power has been taken rather than delegated, or how "private" any advantage must be to "count." Thus, it is possible to debate whether North Korea is corrupt by this description, arguing that Kim Jong-un is not "entrusted" with authority as he is "using" it by state brutality against the North Korean people. Transparency International's internal interpretation of this concept is largely normative, given that North Korea is considered one of the world's most corrupt nations (TI, 2017, p. 5). Although, some have criticized this definition because they believe that corruption can have positive social implications. But their accusation is irrelevant. Corruption is characterized as the violation of public office standards rather than the social good. Breaking most social expectations has negative social implications in all cases; for example, theft negatively impacts the country's growth. This traditional definition has no issues with corruption serving political and social transformation, as a tool to redistribute resources, or as a means of increasing productivity in over bureaucratized states (Heywood & Kurer, 2015, p. 23).

The English word "corruption" is derived from the Latin word *corrumpere*, which has the meanings "mar," "bribe," and "kill." *Corrumpere* is derived from *co[r]-*, which means "all at once," and *rumpere*, which means "to smash." Although such a description may be seen as primarily descriptive, unlike earlier ethical literature that was expressly moralizing, corruption had strong moral and normative overtones even during the Roman period (Rose, 2018, p. 222). The concept of corruption as misuse of public service has been criticized as (a) too legalistic and (b) dependent on a Western ideal of public-private separation that does not match the cultural background of many developing states. In response to the first criticism, the term "abuse of office" clearly means a breach of any norms. However, the norm does not follow from the concept that it is legitimate. The criterion may also be legal, with the proper position of office holders drawn from basic ethical values. As a result, the term does not depend on legal laws that could be incomplete or incidental. While a Western conception of public office has influenced the way donors often apply the term, the criticism of a foundation of Western principles is a matter of application. The meaning, on the other hand, does not apply to a single concept of public office. To reap the advantages of organization and specialization, every well-functioning community must have an efficient job distribution (Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008, p. 5).

One approach to solving the problems mentioned above is to define corruption as the unlawful utilization of public office seeking private gain. The major benefit of such an explanation is that it allows us to get past the seeming difficulties of determining when the adjustability in the interpretations of all bureaucratic positions became corrupt. Using the word 'public office' to indicate both, such a definition might also include the actions of administrators and politicians. We've seen how politicians generally enjoy freedom when performing their official functions makes it nearly hard to describe such corrupt acts in anything other than legalistic terms. Political corruption is the unauthorized use of a governmental office or even the procedure of preference to public office for private gain,' says the definition, which significantly changes to account for the fact that lawful prescribing regarding the practices of elected officials tend to put more emphasis on behavior at elections. It is necessary to make some comments just on elements of this definition (Theobald, 1990, p. 15).

There has been an increasing policy approval among donor countries or international donor agencies that promoting self-sustaining growth, as well as resolving broader concerns

such as human rights, would require more than relying on market forces, which provided the policy imperatives that drove the 1980s excitement for economic liberalization and structural reform. Corruption has emerged as a topic of investigation in and of itself, and it is tied to other aspects of lawlessness and mismanagement, such as bribery and organized crime. There has long been a history of investigative journalism in the United States, as well as more considered scholarly studies. It's not shocking, then, that the first wide-ranging systematic conceptualizations of corruption came from US scholars, three of whom were influential at the time (Doig, 1999, p. 658).

Many see corruption as the epitome of today's ambitious communities, leading to the perpetuation of social ills and hardships, thus jeopardizing their long-term survival in a dynamic environment. Regulatory mechanisms that lead to the preservation of social order are common in highly established socials. Regulations create structures usually manifested as formal laws represented as rules of law in a society with a statutory framework. Community standards and ethical standards can only be manifested and maintained if certain laws are followed. Nevertheless, it is not just the establishment of regulations needed for socials to act in a non-corruption manner. One of the goals of this report is to describe the reasons that may be involved in this phase. Corruption is most prevalent when political resources are not taken advantage of, such as when laws and institutions are lacking. Weak organizations cannot enact enabling or constraining mechanisms regarding policy provisions and ensure that policies meet the genuine interests of the society. Countries in transformation, such as those in Asia or Central and Eastern Europe, are more likely to experience higher levels of corruption. However, this assumption assumes that the concept of corruption is the same in each society. Formulation corruption could be intensified during times of rapid development, especially if such growth is lubricated by the supply of wealth-inducing resources (Yolles & Sawagvudcharee, 2010, p. 4).

Corruption is a multifaceted social, political, and economical and political issue that affects all countries to varying degrees. In the early twenty-first century, there's been a tremendous upsurge of interest in the word. It has a wide range of meanings as a word. It is most commonly defined as the abuse of power for personal gain. It is one of the world's greatest challenges, according to Transparency International.

Fraud, extortion, exploitation, deception, and misappropriation are all examples of corrupt behaviour. Corruption comes in a variety of forms. Political or grand corruption occurs at the top levels, involving a significant subterfuge of political, legal, and economic systems. While bureaucratic or petty corruption also occurs on a smaller scale and within developed social structures and governing norms, political or grand corruption arises at the top levels, encompassing substantial usurpation of political, legal, and economic structures. Political corruption is a fresh issue for academic fields, despite being a problem in politics and society for millennia. International academics from various social science disciplines, including political science, economics, international affairs, philosophy, law, sociology, and history, are drawn to the issue. Western researchers often examine the concept of corrupt and or immoral behaviour from political economics, behavioural ethics, organizational performance, and management studies. However, some of the most significant “classic” social science views, such as historiography, sociology, ethnography, and psychology, give valuable insights on corruption, especially in non-Western contexts. An increasing number of studies take a multidisciplinary or even holistic perspective to corruption, which helps us better comprehend the concept's intricacy. In this regard, a dizzying array of alternate definitions, typologies, and cures for corruption have emerged in various nations due to varied empirical and theoretical investigations. Empirical research on the origins and effects of corruption have exploded in popularity, especially with the availability of larger data sets. However, this has sparked a lively methodological discussion over how to quantify and judge corruption. The signing and acceptance of international anticorruption agreements resulted in a huge anticorruption boom worldwide, thanks to the creation of larger data sets that included many countries from across the world. Anti-corruption legislation has been advocated at the national level as a result of international initiatives. Government reactions to economic crises drive the majority of these anti-corruption reform efforts. Literature concentrating on global anticorruption strategies has arisen in response to this trend (Soyaltin, 2016, p. 1).

The history of contemporary empire-building has been marred by scandal, corruption, exploitation, and abuse of authority. Colonial areas were frequently transformed into claimed lands wherein individuals tried to earn quick money, sometimes in conjunction with the local community but often at their cost. These dubious deals occasionally culminated in metropolis-wide scandals, casting doubt on civilizing debates in parliaments and the media and promoting reforms in colonial governments. Despite some useful case studies and broader dissertations on corruption and colonialism, historians have typically given these issues only sporadic

consideration. This isn't to imply that colonial corruption isn't an issue that gets a lot of attention. Corruption is mentioned in the colonial literature as a feature of colonial governance and the colonial economy. Such research reveals the recurring and sometimes systematic presence of corruption in an imperial setting and the diversity of how corruption is characterized and perceived among studies. A series of articles devoted to case studies of corruption in a colonial environment is also included. For the British instance, studies of the Warren Hastings affair or corruption in colonial Burma (modern-day Myanmar) and colonial Nigeria, as well as the influence of corruption in French Algeria, the Spanish Philippines, and the Dutch East India Company's collapse, are examples (Kroeze et al., 2021, p. 2).

Additionally, significant studies conducted on the history of empires frequently cite corruption as one of the factors that led to the fall or reforming of various imperial governments. These narratives are insightful in that they highlight the role of misuse of authority and resources as part of imperial rule's "politics of difference." Still, they don't go into great detail on the ties among colonialism and corruption. In other words, corruption is treated as a symptom rather than a specific subject of investigation, whether in imperial governance, the economic system, or the features of an empire. In recent years, a slew of new books on the culture of corruption in Europe has appeared. These studies have demonstrated that corruption, both as a concept and a discourse and a practice, has played a significant part in the history of contemporary politics and state-building. These works have emphasized the complexities of corruption in the contemporary period, such that corrupt practices persisted long after "modern" elites said their governments were free of them (Kroeze et al., 2021, p. 5).

Political corruption is a hotly debated topic. Both words in the idea are the subject of political theory debates, with the debates centred on what corruption and greed are and whether it is a politically important phenomenon. "Political corruption" has been debated throughout history, across countries, and intellectual systems. Typically, political corruption includes a meeting between a private corruptor and a public official who uses her position to further their own interests. Whereas this explanation may be correct in some cases, such as bribery, there are some strong doubts about its validity. Patronage and state capture may escape this account because they do not include a corruptor or because the corrupted officer pursues the interests of his/her party or faction rather than her interests. Despite, or maybe because of, this lexical ambiguity, political corruption is often seen as a sickness of the public function, which any rational political philosophy of the good state should seek to prevent. Why is there such

widespread skepticism regarding the presence of political corruption? The precise nature of the immorality of political corruption is currently the subject of a rising dispute in political theory (Ceva, 2021, p. 145).

Modern governments develop and enforce norms that ensure social cohesiveness, individual liberty, and communal well-being. On the other hand, corruption is defined as anything that detracts from that aim by distorting the goal for which all socio-political systems are designed, surrendering the communal good for the advantage of the few. According to the United Nations Convention against corrupt practices, corruption is no longer recognized as a national problem but as a worldwide phenomenon that affects societies in a variety of ways. On the political front, corruption is a barrier to the development of democratic countries and the rule of law, affecting political leadership and institutional credibility; on the economic front, corruption harms economic growth. To summarize, corruption poses a complex, pervasive, and multi-faceted danger to all societies' common interests, allowing for huge systemic hazards in various sectors, from regional to global levels. It is widely acknowledged that traditional corruption studies' theoretical and technical structures are insufficient to address the high pervasiveness of this occurrence. Recent empirical, cross, and knowledge and reasoning are required to address corruption's sophistication effectively. At this point, legal concerns intersect with scientific ones because the goal of the research, technology, and creativity is to investigate our natural, social, and technical environments to get a better comprehension of them and to use what we learn to enhance our living standards (Luna-Pla & Nicolás-Carlock, 2020, p. 2).

Examine the election of a governorship as an obvious illustration of political corruption. A governor has authority over the government budget and can utilize transfers to undermine the opposition to a important program to his or her constituents. Assume that voters are informed that the party they are contemplating voting for in the upcoming elections has been implicated in corruption charges at a higher political level. Whether this party is in control at the state level indicates that it is prepared to pay bribes to advance its agenda. If voters are primarily concerned with the agenda at the state level, this would be regarded as a positive indication. Suppose this party is in opposition, on the other hand. In that case, an upward increase of corruption indicates an upward update of the perception that the delegate will “accept” bribery in return for weakening the party's position in determining state-level policy. Voters will take this as a negative signal. They will be inclined to vote for a more radical representative in the hopes that she will be less subject to corruption and more committed to striving for the state policy goals

important to her constituents. As a result, if widespread corruption is seen, voters' reactions may be uneven, with those on the receiving end more inclined to vote for extremist politicians than those on the providing end (Gáspár et al., 2021, p. 2).

When a public official or other government employee behaves in an authorized position for personal benefit, this is known as political corruption.

Corruption and violence are chronic social phenomena that exist on a worldwide scale in various degrees and proportions in nearly all countries. Each country allocates domestic resources to combating and regulating crime and corruption. Anti strategies are frequently grouped under the umbrella phrase. Political corruption is most harmful when officials and the elite, who have the authority to establish and enforce the laws in the people's interest, legislate to produce laws that benefit their own selfish interests. This might lead to institutional deterioration, a loss of legitimacy, and social instability, since individuals may no longer be happy with imposed power, as J.J. Rousseau's social contract stipulates. The personalizing of public assets by individuals encapsulates the influence of corruption on our economy. All democratic governments seek the well-being of their citizens, but owing to corruption, self-interests frequently take precedence over the greater good. Collaboration between companies, such as extractive sector players, and administrative authorities, is quite frequent here, intending to facilitate tax evasion and have other social amenities enshrined in their agreements to the disadvantage of the public (Ismoil o'g'li et al., 2021, pp. 5–6).

Corruption is a global problem, particularly in developing nations. Corruption is a prime example of utilizing one's position to exert restrictive control over others while neglecting and violating the public's interests as well as the equal rights and claims of other people. Moral decay has a physical manifestation. We can reformulate Baron Acton's famous saying, "Superior authority appears to stimulate people in using their power for their just for their own gain stringently, i.e., against the desires of the other, and therefore it corrupts those moral concerns which acknowledge the autonomy of others," to distinguish the level of power as just potential from the use of such prospects in a constructive or restrictive way. Absolute, unmanageable authority tends to be utilized restrictively, and it corrupts completely. In a nutshell, massive power distribution leads to greater corruption (Scholl & Schermuly, 2020, p. 173).

Corruption is often argued to be a cultural phenomenon with varying interpretations in various cultures. Some argue that perhaps the world community is describing as unethical acts that are simply a reflection of common African cultural traditions of "gift-giving." While looking at public perceptions of the level of corruption, it's important to understand how Africans perceive corruption (Logan et al., 2006, p. 32). While the scientific literature scorned the public opinion method, those involved in calculating corruption embraced it without delay. The majority of foreign comparisons are focused on personal experiences. In the very least, the developers and recipients of the comparisons must conclude that there is enough agreement on what constitutes wrongdoing throughout the public sector to justify the use of this technique. The Afrobarometer report, which covers eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries, provides the most detailed evidence for developing a shared perception of unethical practices. It not only demonstrates that bureaucratic graft, or petty extortion via public officials, is strongly opposed, but it also demonstrates that nepotism is strongly opposed by majorities in each nation, often big ones. The strong rejection of clientelistic activities by most people is perhaps the most unexpected finding, see in Table 1 (Heywood & Kurer, 2015, p. 37).

Table 1. Defining corruption

For each of the following, please indicate whether you think the act is not wrong at all, wrong but understandable, or wrong and punishable.	Not wrong at all	Wrong but understandable	Wrong and punishable	Don't know
A public official decides to locate a development project in an area where his friends and supporters lived	13%	24%	61%	2%
A government official gives a job to someone from his family who does not have adequate qualifications	5%	18%	75%	2%
A government official demands a favour or an additional payment for some service that is part of his job	5%	16%	77%	2%

Source: Afrobarometer Network, 2006. 'Citizens and the State in Africa'. New Results from Afrobarometer Round 3, Table 5.1. As cited in Heywood & Kurer, 2015. 'Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption' Definitions of corruption, Table 2.1.

According to Thompson, 2013, making strides in creating a modern-day record of political corruption when we differentiate two areas wherein corporate interests can

circumvent or quick the democratic process. The methods of distorting the mechanism suggest two related definitions of corruption.

Individual corruption is the first and most well-known notion: a public official's gain or advantage in return for pursuing private interests. The second type of administrative or institutional corruption is fairly common, but it is often combined with the first and thus overlooked. It entails a public official gaining political advantage or profit in circumstances that favor private interests in general. In all examples, wrongdoing happens not because corporate interests are encouraged, but they're also promoted without respect for the laws of a legal procedure. Commercial interests inappropriately affect public purposes in both ways; however, what renders the influence unethical varies (Thompson, 2013, p. 3).

After all, corruption is a long-standing problem that dates back to Mesopotamia. Public figures exploited their positions for the selfish benefit even back then. Citizens, groups, and commercial actors have long sought benefit by corrupting people in authority positions or controlling access to permissions, perks, rulers, and the like. Any act of discretion, particularly those that provide or prevent access to opportunity, creates a magnetic chance to misuse or exploit that authority. Being such a gatekeeper under favorable circumstances may pay out handsomely, especially if the prospects are potentially nil in their influence on individuals or groups of people. It is an unbreakable law of human achievement that those seeking benefit will reach officials for recognition or gain, and those in positions of authority who do this in their office or feature to endorse one complaint about another will admire the strength of their roles and gladly accept forms of persuasive communication to carry out their duties (Johnston, 2017, p. 16).

2.2. Types of Corruption

According to Suleiman & Othman 2017, corruption classifications in this typology include distinguishing what the literature considers the two main types of corruption. As a result, these are described as high-level or grand corruption and survival or petty corruption, respectively. The term "high level" or "grand corruption" refers to corruption at all government or political leadership levels. On the other hand, survival or petty corruption refers to corruption at the level of the individual elected authorities. However, this distinction between petty and grand corruption has been widely criticized in the literature(Suleiman &

Othman, 2017, p. 104). Bribery, blackmail, graft, embezzlement, and various types of theft are examples of illegal acts committed as part of corruption. Most people in positions of power engage in practices like bribery and influence peddling. These actions are unethical because they fall short of their official responsibilities (Vinod, 2012, p. 25).

When we look at Harrison, 2017, Corruption can manifest itself in various ways, in different organizations, and at various levels within those organizations. The forms of corruption described here often overlap due to these variations over many dimensions:

1. *Petty Corruption*, which is payment of relatively minor sums of money to "facilitate" regular official operations, such as clearing customs or the issuance of construction permits.
2. *Systemic Corruption*; is corruption that exists at any level of society.
3. *Administrative Corruption*, occurs when such people or companies benefit from bribes and favouritism to reduce their taxes, avoid rules, or secure low-level procurement contracts.
4. *Grand Corruption*, which involves presidents, ministers, or even other government members, represents the needs of a small number of businesspeople and political leaders or crime syndicates, is described.
5. *Corporate Corruption*, takes place mostly in interactions among private companies and their vendors or customers. That may also happen within companies, where executives exploit the company's capital for personal benefit at customers' expense.
6. *Political Corruption* entails politicians, such as royals, dictatorial regimes, and senators, working in their capacity as designers of a polity's laws and norms. Those officials commit corruption whenever they accept bribery or other forms of remuneration for their own political or personal gain in exchange for political favours for their followers at the expense of the public good (Harrison, 2017, p. 1).

Bribery, coercion, cronyism, theft of intelligence and abuse of discretion are just some of the behaviors that fall under the category of corruption. Such behaviors can be manifested in various ways, like hiring people, procuring services, monitoring and overseeing practices, including granting permits and licenses and building items. Most of

these occur simultaneously in various sectors, such as health, energy delivery, tax administration, justice, and in various locations, such as regions, localities, or specific workplaces. These frameworks, known as TASP (types, practices, industries, and places) elsewhere, offer a basis for analyzing corruption inside the public sector. The structure is depicted in Table 2 (Graycar, 2015, p. 4).

Table 2. Examples of type, activities, sectors and places (TASP) of corruption.

Type	Activities	Sectors	Places
• Bribery • Extortion • Misappropriation • Self-dealing • Patronage • Abuse of discretion • Misuse of information • Creating or exploiting conflict of interest • Nepotism, Clientelism and Favouritism, etc.	• Appointing personnel • Buying things (Procurement) • Delivering programmes or services • Making things (construction/manufacturing) • Rebuilding things (after a disaster) • Controlling activities (licensing/regulation/issuing of permits) • Administering (justice for example), etc.	• Construction • Health • Tax administration • Energy • Environment and water • Forestry • Customs and Immigration • Legal system • Disaster relief • Education - etc.	• Countries • Regions • Localities • Work places, etc.

Source: Graycar, 2015. 'Corruption'. Classification and analysis, Table 1.

Uslaner argues in his view of corruption, the contrast between petty and grand corruption is crucial. Though petty corruption is not seen as moral, people respond to it because there is no other choice. Petty corruption does not evoke envy or distrust because it requires comparatively minor amounts of money. Petty theft is not associated with inequity, according to people. They do draw a direct link between inequity and grand corruption, as shown by survey results analyzed by the scholar (Uslaner, 2008, p. 17).

2.3. Corruption in Public Sector

Corruption in the public sector has always been a thorn in the side of every administration across the world, and it will continue to be. Corruption is a concern in many ways, regardless of what controls are put in place. It affects the government's and workers' authority and confidence, has an impact on the country's economic balance, and contributes

significantly to the expansion of economic crime in general (Heath, 2000, p. 373). The most serious and common kind of corruption is said to occur in public procurement. Public procurement is the term used to describe the purchasing of products and services from the public and private sectors by any person or organization. It's also known as contracting since it encompasses a wide range of operations that funnel government funds. Public procurement, often known as public contracting, is a complicated process that can vary from acquiring an entire service to acquiring simple assets like office equipment at various levels of government. All of these things encourage corruption (Ateljevic & Budak, 2010, p. 381).

Public procurement corruption has far-reaching negative implications that impact governments all over the world. It wastes public dollars on initiatives that are unneeded, inappropriate, unprofitable, or even harmful. The great level of discretion granted to public officials in implementing such programs and the engagement of several private sector companies in the process all contribute to the procedure's corruption vulnerability. According to the literature, public procurement regimes in Africa have made significant progress in building protections against corruption in public sector procurement. Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Gabon, Tanzania, and other nations have lately implemented legislative frameworks to combat corruption (Appolloni & Mushagalusa Nshombo, 2014, p. 190).

Corruption costs governments and companies trillions of dollars each year raises the cost of products and services significantly, and, most importantly, undermines policy objectives and undermines confidence. Corruption has a vast list of negative consequences. Corruption, among other things, impedes economic growth and performance, hinders investment, alters natural resource development, harms the environment, helps to reduce tax revenue, lowers quality of life, slows human development, warps services, undermines judicial integrity and the rule of law, and, most importantly for this book, contributes to wasteful public administration (Graycar, 2019, p. 1).

However, proof of public corruption may not be completely documented in official documents because a corrupt government may not prosecute corruption with the same enthusiasm and expertise as other crimes. Due to disparities in legal norms, prosecution resources, record-keeping norms, and public access to documents, the issues are exacerbated when comparing corruption across nations. As a result, investigations into corruption in

different nations tend to depend on subjective expert surveys or public opinion to quantify corruption (Cordis & Milyo, 2016, p. 129).

Since a corruption investigation may permanently damage a politician's image, we may well see prosecutors prosecuting political opponents rather than political allies. This is because most of the countries, for example, the federal prosecutors in the United States, are chosen by the president and approved by the Senate. They have substantial discretion about which cases they bring to court. The fact that federal prosecutors handle most corruption cases raises the likelihood of political interference in corruption investigations. Furthermore, political variations across governments may lead to variances in corrupt conduct (Pavlik, 2017, p. 349).

Several papers and books have been produced on the definition and measuring of corruption in the public sector. The main challenge is typically related to how this phenomenon is understood, with each technique to data gathering having its own set of strengths and shortcomings. Conviction rates and court workload rates have been widely used to quantify public sector corruption. Still, they have been challenged for the impact that anti-corruption efforts may have as an endogenous component. Furthermore, while this method may be suitable for countries with reasonably developed governance institutions, it may pose a challenge in extremely corrupt environments where institutions are weak and legal system is likely to be bought and sold. There is substantial evidence that public sector corruption reduces service supply's effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability, as the large publications on public corruption show (Moldogaziev & Liu, 2021, p. 477).

2.4. Causes of Corruption

According to Šumah , (2018) the political and economic environment, professional ethics and morals, and, of course, habits, conventions, tradition, and demography are all typical sources of corruption (Šumah, 2018, p. 63). While Aidt, (2011) argues that economic and demographic variables, political institutions, judicial and bureaucratic issues, and geographical and cultural elements are the four groupings of probable causes (Aidt, 2011, p. 17). Historical effects are significant since they form the cultural standards that govern corrupt behavior. Bribe-giving and bribe-taking may be socially acceptable in one nation due to historical precedence, whereas comparable activities may be frowned upon in another.

Additionally, bribe-givers or bribe-takers might acquire "efficient" methods to participate in corrupt behaviors over time (Goel & Nelson, 2010, p. 434).

Three (3) levels may be distinguished as the fundamental framework for examining the causes of corruption: international, national, and individual levels.

a. International Level-According to Khan, the competition of international markets encourages multinational corporations to provide bribes in order to obtain an edge over other rivals in the system. Some of the corruption instances involving overseas corporations in Nigeria include the Siemens affair, the National Identity Card crisis, and the Halliburton case.

b. At the national level, the government's development agenda may create corruption possibilities and incentives. At this level, there are three types of relationships: the relationship between the government (elected and appointed officials) and the civil service, the relationship between the government and the judiciary, and the relationship between the government and civil society/private organizations or individuals. Connivance and advantages come to mind when I think about this. This might happen while awarding contracts, offering concessions, or providing privileges for economic reasons (such as privatisation of government-owned businesses).

c. Individual Level - This includes regulations on business, international aid maintenance, outright distraction tactic of public funds, gathering of insurrection fees without project execution or total abandonment after the amount due has been paid or poor project execution, a culture of affluence and get rich syndrome, and unbridled competition between and among different social classes. That helps explain why politicians spend so much money throughout electoral campaigns (Moyosore, 2015, pp. 28–29).

In recent decades, the theoretical literature on the determinants of corruption has exploded. The political character of corruption and the effects of different institutional designs on corruption have occupied a substantial portion of this research. We evaluate this literature selectively in order to provide a theoretical baseline to guide our experimental inquiry. Corruption will be influenced primarily through two pathways by the architecture of political institutions. The first is connected to political accountability: any measure that

promotes political accountability, whether by increasing the punishment of corrupt people or by lowering the informational issue around government actions, tends to diminish corruption. The other is connected to the form of public goods provision: institutions that create a competitive environment for the provision with the same public service tend to diminish rent extraction, lowering corruption through a simple economic competition mechanism. The next section delves more into these two aspects (Lederman et al., 2005, pp. 3–4).

According to the findings of a cross-country empirical investigation, political institutions have a significant role in determining the incidence of corruption: parliamentary systems, democracy, press freedom, and political stability are linked to lower corruption levels. Lederman, Loayza, and Soares analyze the drivers of corruption using a cross-country panel, focusing on political institutions that improve political accountability. Previous empirical research has not looked into political institutions' function in determining corruption, despite the fact that both the political science and theoretical economics literature have highlighted their relevance. Political institutions influence corruption through two channels, political accountability and the form of public goods provision, according to the authors' fundamental theoretical hypothesis. The findings imply that political institutions have a significant role in determining corruption levels: democracy, parliamentary systems, political stability, and press freedom are all linked to lower levels of corruption. Furthermore, the authors show that once political variables are considered, general conclusions from prior empirical work on the drivers of corruption related to openness and legal tradition do not hold (Lederman et al., 2001, p. 4).

2.5. Fight Against Corruption

The international affairs community's interest in corruption has risen dramatically during the last decade. The Anti-Bribery Convention of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) has been ratified by 38 nations since 1998. The United Nations Convention against corruption, the far more comprehensive anti-corruption treaty to date, went into effect at the end of 2005. The World Bank Group's Enhancing World Bank Group Involvement on Governance and Anticorruption plan was introduced in 2007. The US Justice Department and the Security and Exchange Commission have stepped up their enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in recent years. Nevertheless,

numerous international assistance organizations, like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, have placed aid payments to low-income nations depends on the country's corruption records (Olken & Pande, 2012, p. 480). Throughout the last fifteen years, most countries afflicted by pervasive corruption, mostly in developing parts of the world, have implemented anticorruption reforms with the international community's backing. However, investing in the nation's most seriously afflicted by corruption has yielded few achievements as yet. As a result, most of these countries are still as corrupt as before the anti-corruption laws were implemented. In fact, in several nations where extensive corruption exists, the problem appears to have gotten worse in tandem with efforts to combat it (Persson et al., 2013, p. 450).

According to principal-agent theory, the problem of corruption might be handled by 'fixing the incentives.' When confronted with the job of combating systemic corruption and achieving "good governance," a community must ask itself two key questions. To begin, what kinds of institutional adjustments are required to minimize corruption? Several people propose creating new or changing current legal institutions to improve the incentive structures for receiving or providing bribes. Second, which mechanisms are most likely to succeed in adopting such reforms? The majority of corruption research has been concentrated on the first, structural question, while the second, including changes in processes, tactics, and agents' cognition, has been mostly overlooked. For example, Rod Alence's, (2004) paper "*Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa*", investigates how different political institutions affect corruption levels in thirtyeight African nations. The conclusion is that electoral competition combined with institutional checks and balances on executive authority reduces the prevalence of corruption. To put it another way, this method implies that the theory and practice of democratic government work against corruption (Rothstein, 2011, p. 234). The factors that influence country-level corruption have been studied extensively. A growing number of nations are committing to anti-corruption programs such as e-government plans, open government programs (such as the US Open Government Initiative and the Open Government Partnership), and data, information, and policy procedure openness. Traditional factors such as political and economic variables, on the other hand, have a deciding impact on degrees of corruption. The question of whether national efforts (projects, programs, or initiatives) to combat corruption can outperform the conventional antecedents of corruption has been a focus of research (Nam, 2018, p. 273).

Furthermore, auditing has the potential to play two roles in the battle against corruption: it could either prevent or identify corruption. These positions are intertwined in several ways. If auditors uncover corruption, it may act as a deterrent, preventing additional corruption; there would be less to uncover if auditors prevent wrongdoing. While existing data implies that a mix of preventative and investigative tactics is the most effective strategy to eliminate corruption, past research has focused nearly entirely on the preventative side (Jeppesen, 2019, p. 3). Corruption stifles decent government, hinders public policy, causes resource misallocation, hinders the private sector, and disproportionately affects the poor. Audit is among the instruments for combating corruption, and society expects auditors to be effective in decreasing, if not completely eradicating, corruption. As a result, the government sector auditor cannot remain oblivious to the challenges of fighting corruption by successfully conducting financial audits of public institutions accounting practices and financial statements to make sure consistency and reliability, as well as quality checks of reviewing the lawfulness of payments made by the audited body in response to the scrutiny of the operations. While it is widely assumed that auditors neither quantify corruption nor report on actual instances of corruption, they can at least assist in preventing corruption by pointing out locations where corruption is possible. The auditors succeed only if there is an enabling climate for combatting corruption (Otalor & Eiya, 2013, pp. 130–131).

The World Bank, Transparency International (TI), United Nations Organizations, and other intercontinental and regional institutions have undertaken significant action to tackle corruption among their member nations throughout the world. These initiatives encourage member nations to develop a reform agenda and methods for combatting corruption or rethink their current ones, with the primary goal of combatting corrupt practices or decreasing it to the basic minimum (Mikail et al., 2017, p. 18).

At the very least, good domestic legislation is a start. The greatest ones explain corrupt acts and corrupt conduct explicitly, laying out what is and is not allowed in great detail. Specific restrictions on what a public servant can donate and receive, as well as the conditions under which they can do so, are outlined in some circumstances. Many legal systems, on the other hand, are too broad, unclear, or poorly constructed. Despite the aim of the applicable law, potential criminals may see loopholes or paths to wealth. Alternatively, prospective criminals may alter weak or ambiguous rules to suit their nefarious aims. Circumstantial proof of corrupt deals is permitted in several countries. Others will

investigate and prosecute someone simply because they look to be living above their means. Such broad statutes make it simpler to apprehend accused criminals and, following forensic or other investigative work, to convict them. The simpler it is for prosecutors to restrict a defendant's civil freedoms, the more legal measures there are. Indeed, in some countries where corruption has been effectively eliminated, prosecutors have wide search and seizure powers, are allowed to enter hearsay evidence, and are authorized by law and court practice to infer guilt based on suspicious behaviors or appearances. Concrete evidence or direct evidence is not necessary for several crucial nation-states. Realize that poorly conceived regulations may fail to regulate avarice as well as other related to human weaknesses among civil officials, some few exceptional nation-states have continued to struggle, usually through trial and error, to write strict, tough laws that make it easier to pursue and prosecute acts or behaviors that are appropriately repugnant to civil libertarians. Furthermore, only a few nation-states have recognized that laws with a broad scope and reach can aid in the prevention of corruption (Johnston, 2017, p. 79).

Governments usually control public sector organizations, which provide various services to the general public or its inhabitants. There are growing concerns over the environmental and social consequences of government sector organizations' institutional operations. Authorities and government entities are expected to provide responsible public service by recognizing the rights of public sector relevant parties, developing policies and strategies to ensure sustainable resource use, and being liable and transparent at all about their social and environmental consequences. In this view, sustainable assessment by government institutions such as federal, regional, or municipal governments and public businesses can indicate that they provide successful and sustainable public services by taking environmental and social factors into account. Furthermore, public sector sustainable reporting might enhance greater transparency and accountability for government sector sustainability initiatives and provide nationwide, provincial. Local documentation on sustainability performance, therefore ensuring long-term growth in a given place (Uyar et al., 2021, p. 13).

The policy of the World Bank defines the activity as a "corrupt practice." According to the guidelines, typical ones of fraudulent activities include kickbacks and bribery, which are considered illicit or deceitful practices, as well as a "enrichment payment", which is described as an improper monetary transfer in addition to a "corrupt practice", a

“monopolistic practice”, a “coercive practice”, and a “obstructive practice”. The World Bank's anti-corruption standards for the guarantee and carbon financing transactions explain each of the five banned corruption activities. There are at least two interpretive concerns to be considered among the Bank's five versions. To begin, Corrupt Practices are defined as "kickbacks and bribes" according to the Bank's criteria. The behavior in question must include the payer obtaining an unfair benefit or avoiding an obligation by using inappropriate measures (such as bribes) to breach or detract a duty owed by the receiver (Lemdjo, 2021, pp. 390,393-394).

Many nations' anti-corruption efforts are based on the assumption that low salaries in the "public sector" induce corruption. The implications of public worker pay on corruption are the subject of a significant amount of research. The "shirking model" of Becker and Stigler (1974) forecasts that if the expected profits from such activities are larger than their projected salary earnings, public officials will participate in corruption. The implications of public sector worker pay on corruption are the subject of a significant amount of research. According to Akerlof and Yellen's (1990) "fair wage" hypothesis, public officials would participate in corruption unless their pay increases to what they consider a fair salary. Fair pay for public officials may enable communities to denounce corruption rather than accepting it as a cultural norm. The empirical data on the impact of public sector pay on corruption is still ambiguous (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2021, pp. 2–3).

The higher successful democracy is in keeping its representatives accountable, the less we may assume to see abuse of public authority for private benefit. We suggest that this manifests itself in replacing one stimulant, the commitment value of secure democratic political systems, with another, project partnerships, corrupt transactions. Infrastructure improvement partners are attracted to good democracies. This is because robust political systems boost the trustworthiness of pledges made in public transactions (Bertelli et al., 2021, p. 331).

In developing nations, reform agendas have generally included digitization and concurrent restructurings to enhance capabilities such as advantages handling, custom checks, finance, and payroll services, assuming that poorly functioning administration appears to contribute to unfair practices and "petty corruption". However, whether and how digitization aids in controlling corruption in developing country public

administrations is still up for dispute. On the one hand, digitization has been portrayed as a tool for combating corruption and reforming corrupt organizations (Addo, 2021, pp. 99–100).

Due to the economic and social repercussions, corruption has allured unexpected attention all over the globe. This focus has grown in the last few years, owing to the fact that the phenomenon has grown in the past few decades, its extent has enlarged, its negative effects have also continued to increase of late, citizens are more aware of its outcomes, and they have progressively been seeing a need to decrease it to the leaner levels. Several governments throughout the world have undertaken robust anti-corruption campaigns and increased their efforts to combat the problem at various times. It's impossible to say when corruption first appeared in the life of human existence; nonetheless, literature shows that corruption has been since the beginning of time. The phenomena affect all nations, large and small, established and emerging, market-driven, transitional, mixed, and central planning economics. This phenomenon has an impact on people's social, economic, and spiritual lives. Furthermore, it influences a country's long-term economic prosperity and progress (Zumba et al., 2021, p. 607).

Government by its very essence necessitates public accountability. Financial reports and internal supervision are the foundations of accountability. Independent auditors' job is to help institutions demonstrate responsibility without becoming a portion of the intrinsic control system. Like the private sector, governments require an impartial outside party to provide legitimacy to their reporting process by conducting an unbiased review of the financial statements and underlying accounting data. The role of audits is critical in ensuring the reliability of financial assertions. In the public sector, the importance of auditing is amplified since auditors attempt to give an unbiased public assessment of state finances. It is crucial to note that the institution in charge of the audit function is not the only factor to consider. The reliability of the audit performed is crucial, yet audit integrity is a complicated problem (Caruana & Kowalczyk, 2021, p. 1).

2.6. The Concept of Governance

The word "governance" stems from the ancient Greek verb *kybernein* (infinitive) or *kybernao* (first person), which means directing, leading, or navigating a ship or a land-based

transport, and was used figuratively for the first time by Plato to portray the controlling of men or people (Campbell & Carayannis, 2012, p. 3). In academic circles and decision-makers, there is a well-known lack of conceptual coherence in the usage of the term governance. Governance is defined by the World Bank Institute (WBI) as "the traditions and structures through which authority in a nation is exercised for the common benefit." This includes (1) the process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing those in positions of authority, (2) the government's ability to manage its resources and implement sound policies effectively, and (3) citizens and the state's respect for the entities that govern social and economic interactions among them (Hufty, 2009, pp. 1–2). In 1996, Rhodes presented six distinct governance applications in society in a study titled "The New Governance." Rhodes' paper reinforced the political science application of governance and offered six possible new methods to governing society (Rhodes, 1996, p. 652).

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), governance is the practice of economic, political, and institutional authorities at all stages to govern a country's affairs. It consists of the tools, procedures, and institutions that people and groups use to express themselves, utilizes their constitutional rights, fulfil their duties, and arbitrate disagreements. While, the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) defines governance as the collection of all the many ways that individuals and institutions, both public and private, handle their shared affairs. It's a never-ending process of balancing opposing or divergent interests and working together to achieve a common goal. It encompasses official organizations and regimes with authority to induce compliance and informal agreements that individuals and institutions voluntarily agreed to or believed are in their best interests. The International Institute of Administrative Sciences defines governance as the process through which members of society wield power and authority to influence and execute policies and choices affecting public life, economic growth, and human progress. The term "governance" refers to a larger concept than "government." The interplay between such official institutions and that of civil society is fundamental to governance. The World Bank defines governance as the method in which authority is exerted to administrate a country's social and economic resources. And the World Bank has described three different key elements of governance; (i) the type of political regime; (ii) the method by which power is exercised in the management of a country's social and economic resources for development; and (iii) governments' ability to design, establish, and adopt policies as well as discharge functions (Weiss, 2012, p. 170).

Over the last several decades, the notion of governance has grown extremely popular, and it is now one of the most often used words in political science. This word has been referred to as a "fetish" by one French researcher. Furthermore, the phrase is becoming extensively used during international organisations' debates and publications, particularly those tasked with improving the lives of those living under poverty and persecution across the world. The word "governance" has been applied to the administration of private-sector companies, with interest in corporate governance growing in response to significant business failures such as Enron and Lehmann Brothers. Another reason for its appeal is that the idea of governance is ambiguous; it may be molded to fit the intellectual tastes of the particular author. It misrepresents meaning while possibly enhancing understanding. According to Sartori (1971), this notion is typically weak on intension but strong on extension. That is, even though the idea may be applied in a variety of contexts, it may have little meaning that separates it from other concepts (Peters, 2012, p. 17).

After that, the term governance began to expand from the business world to the larger political arena in the 1980s. These dissemination and appropriation processes are challenging to map and resist straightforward summarization. However, one may go into further detail about one specific conceptualization of governance that has proven to be important, not notably because it has international consequences. It focuses on how the World Bank conceptualised the idea, a historically sensitive institution to domestic political disputes in Washington DC. The concept of governance emerged to the Banks in response to criticism, similar to how the word was refined in corporate law and management theory. The concept's origins may be traced back to early resistance in Southern nations to the introduction of policy associated with neoliberalism (Eagleton-Pierce, 2014, p. 13).

Governance is a system of social facts or a topic of research. It describes "the activities among the players engaged in a collective issue which leads to choices and the formation of social norms." It's a notion that may be applied to a wide range of situations. A governance process may be witnessed in every society, whether local, national, or worldwide, at any point in its history; it is not a phenomenon unique to our time; this role is essential in any civilization. Even in a community without a state, decisions must be made, and decision-making mechanisms, social norms (legal or common law), and institutions are necessary to allow community members to live together and collaborate. It is not the same as the term "political system," which is considerably broader and describes a certain type of

society known as the Nation-State. It's also not the same as public policies, which are activities taken by a legal authority, usually the central government (Hufty, 2009, p. 7).

There is substantial uncertainty and dispute concerning the meaning of governance, as Trofing and Sorendsen (current issue) point out. The word is used to describe both specific types of rule and the entire rule-making process. There have been a variety of Gegenbegriffe, as well as a propensity to lump them all together into an unified Oberbegriff. Torfing and Sorendsen, define governance as “the mode of government coordination of interested parties exerted by state actors.” In contrast, Howlett and Ramesh (this issue) defines it as “the style of government coordination of societal actors practiced by state actors.” Bell and Hindmoor, (2009) argue that “governments usually use four distinct modalities of governance,” including markets, contracts, joint ventures, and indoctrinating “self-discipline” in both cases, “governance” is what Outside of academics, governance is frequently used in ways that have nothing to do with stakeholder negotiation. For example, in the Australian Public Service, ‘governance’ refers to management supervision, but in business, “corporate governance” is akin to a firm's charter (Colebatch, 2014, p. 309).

The discourse on governance has a slightly muddled definition of governance, which the concept's double connotation may explain. "On the one side, it relates to scientific incarnations of government adjustment to its surrounding environment as it arises in the late 20th century," writes J. Pierre (2000, p.3), "while on the other hand, governance signifies a theoretical or conceptual depiction of co-ordination of social structures as well as, for the most portion, the proper role of government within this process." According to J. Pierre and B. Guy Peters (2000, p.29), the role of government in governance is dynamic rather than fixed since there are governmental and socially governance models. The government is strongly associated with governance for a lot of scholars. Although, governance seems to be the institutional ability of public institutions to deliver public and other goods required by a country's inhabitants or representatives in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable way, according to resource limitations, as defined by scholars (Katsamunsk, 2016, pp. 133–134).

According to Zürn, "global governance" entails the exercise of power over national boundaries as well as disputed principles and standards beyond the sovereign nation, both of which are excused in terms of shared goods or transnational issues. To be acknowledged,

authority, on the other hand, requires legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined as the objective pursuit of a social goal. Legitimacy is not an optional characteristic of good global government; it is a must. This is a strong step, and Zürn is hardly the first to emphasize the importance of legitimacy. However, few academics have requested it to carry the conceptual and deterministic heft for a global governance theory, focusing on materialism and functionalist considerations (Barnett, 2021, p. 132).

Neoliberals depict governance as a collection of measures, such as marketization and new public management, that are ostensibly unavoidable consequences of global economic forces. Institutionalists believe that all these neoliberal measures do not have consistent impacts across states but instead impacts that vary depending on the substance and intensity of existing practices. Furthermore, a decentered approach shows that the constraints are produced as somewhat distinct issues from inside diverse traditions, rather than being provided as hard truths. As a result, it implies that a state's policies aren't always required answers to specific forces but rather a collection of imagined solutions to a certain understanding of them. Instead of stating some type of ongoing result that deems such a worry nugatory, a decentered perspective would've had us question ourselves with the conflicts through which forms of governance are produced. In the context of capital mobility and state rivalry, our focus should no longer be on an abstraction of natural selection. On the opposite, we would emphasize the political battles that accompany policy selection and execution, replete with the intimidation that comes with them (Bevir, 2002, pp. 13–15).

In reality, the scientific definition of governance is hazy at best. Governance is defined in political science as the coordination and management of independent but interdependent actors by an external authority or an internal self-regulation or self-control mechanism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 16). Examples of command and collaboration are preemptive regulating in hierarchy, mutual recognition inside the market, consent in negotiations, or confidence and consensus within networks and social groups. In addition to this wide definition of governance as the control and coordination of interdependent activities of social actors, a tighter definition has evolved, with researchers distinguishing between government and governance. In this sense, “governance” refers to network-like, “horizontal arrangements of collaboration among public and private actors,” whereas “government” refers to the standardized capacity to make and implement decisions in a state. It is significant in political science as both a conceptual and empirical term. In terms of its

normative application, it is important to note that governance must not be confused with previous literature on "Good Governance," but instead it emphasizes the need for criteria to determine policy effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the political mandate of political issues and institutions (Benz, 2007, pp. 3–4).

Public governance has risen to the forefront of the international development agenda in recent decades. Despite substantial attempts to achieve public governance under the legal system, there appears to be a disconnect between policy proposals and actual results. In this regard, according to the World Bank's 2017 World Development Report: Governance and the Law, legal enhancements to the rule of law have seldom resulted in significant decreases in corruption. Baez-Camargo and Passas (2017) propose a plausible explanation: the lack of effective rule-of-law changes may result from discrepancies among governance and the cultural standards that lead people and bureaucrats or from a failure to consider systemic consequences (Guerrero & Castañeda, 2021, p. 140).

In the field of public administration, the term "governance" has become trendy. It is a "tool" for managers to execute public policies more effectively, whether in academics or reality. The purpose of this paper is to provide a suggestion for analyzing governance in the context of changing public administration perspectives in the presence of a more citizen-centred democracy. Public governance is considered to be influenced by democratic ideas that emphasize more engagement in public areas as well as the government's requirement for effectiveness and democratic mandate. In this approach, "public governance, or New Public Governance (NPG)", as a model rather than a management instrument used to bureaucratic system and "New Public Management (NPM)", can help to the formation of a more accessible democratic, which seeks to expand the public sphere. According to Kissler and Heidemann (2006) and Paula (2005), public governance is linked to a shift in socio-political, economic-financial, and organizational administrative aspects because it highlights the centralization of co-produced procedures and the co-management of real social problems of public administrators, asserting full involvement, collective action, and citizens' involvement in the political system. Governance reflects an ideological desire to enact a democratic project that allows for more articulation between the state and civil society, and therefore a political desire to build public spaces that effectively implement participation - and the expansion of politics to the point where it deems the primacy of civilized society in its choices - the result of expatriation (PEREIRA & CKAGNAZAROFF, 2021, p. 112).

Many countries face a variety of obstacles in their public sector that necessitate immediate, transformational solutions; maybe this describes "why "new public management (NPM)" has pushed the world's most developed countries", including, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States. This has led to bureaucratic failed policies because public employees' interior ethos frustrates and contradicts service delivery concepts and aspirations, calling into doubt the efficacy and usefulness of the New Public Service framework. Internal ethos constraint is one of the so-called terrible issues in public policy. The focus in the "New Public Governance (NPG)" period is on shifting some responsibilities for public service delivery to people who are now regarded as involved partners, a bilateral partnership needed by globalization, in conjunction with the bureaucrats (Ukeje et al., 2020, pp. 4–5).

Great governance, according to Graham, J., Amos, B., and Plumptre, T. (2003), "means a participatory way of administering those capabilities in a competent, fully accountable, and concise manner in light of the norms of performance, truthfulness, and common understanding with the end aim of accelerating the liberty of citizens and the population in general intrigue, thus showing the activity of excellent governance. Plumptre provided a more succinct definition of good governance, stating that it "implies creating a politically powerful framework useful for personal financial activities: steady administrations, the legal system, constructive state institution altered to the sections that governments can accomplish, and a strong wellbeing and social consideration independent of the state." The notion and idea of governance are not new; many individuals have created various perspectives on governance, but they all share the fact that it includes the interaction of institutions and society. Several scholars have also formed differing perspectives on the concept of governance. According to Mark Robinson and John Healey (1994). t denotes a high level of organizational effectiveness in policy formulation and implementation, particularly in the conduct of monetary strategy and contributes to growth, stability, and public welfare. The World Bank defines governance as "applying the rule of law, involvement in public affairs, openness, and accountability." Another academic, K. Wohlmuth (2014), defined governance as an inclusive term describing a comparative ideological approach. According to him, the game's rules should be changed to guarantee that everyone participates in the activities that govern their country to create a more productive future for society. Governance, thus according to G. Akpan and E. Effiiong (2012), is the allocation of legitimate power to influence and execute actions and laws. The

three democratic governance economic measures that make up a nation's hierarchy of power are: who has authority, who is in control of that power, and who is accountable for putting that power into action (Al-Naser & Hamdan, 2021, pp. 88–89).

2.7. Why Does Governance Matter?

According to Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), disparities in the efficacy of public spending may be accounted in a significant part by the quality of governance. In nations with excellent governance, public health expenditure reduces child mortality rates even more. Similarly, in nations with excellent governance, public expenditure on primary education becomes much more successful in improving primary school attainment. In general, public expenditure has little influence on education and health results in nations with inadequate governance. These findings have significant implications for improving the efficacy of government expenditure on development. The lessons are especially important for underdeveloped nations, where public investment in healthcare and education is low, and governance is frequently lacking.

In recent years, the importance of strong governance as a cornerstone to sustainable development has been stressed. According to World Bank, 2003, just providing public resources for the proper products and services may not result in acceptable outcomes if budget institutions, including budget design, execution, and monitoring, are ineffective. Does governance have an impact on development outcomes? The connection between a range of governance indices and development results has spawned substantial empirical studies. The vast majority of this research demonstrate that stronger governance results in better development achievements. These studies looked at the impact of corruption and institutions on economic development, government investment, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and basic facilities, among other things (Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008, p. 96.98).

As Quibria (2006), explored the link between Asian emerging nations' economic development and governance performance. This investigation provides some intriguing results. First, despite its enormous economic successes, Asia's governance is far from ideal by world standards. The bulk of such countries appear to have a governance problem. Second, statistics do not support our predictions that there is a significant positive

relationship between governance and growth: surprisingly, nations with governance surpluses grew significantly slower than countries with deficits (Quibria, 2006, p. 114).

The evidence that governance has an impact on economic growth is increasing. For example, Seldadyo et al. (2007) find a strong link between governance and economic development. In contrast, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) find that disparities in the efficacy of public expenditure are primarily explained by governance quality. Aid and loans from funders and international institutions are becoming more and more conditional on changes that assure "better governance." While governance concepts vary, there appears to be general agreement that governance means the government in question is responsible, open, accessible, efficient, and effective. It adheres to the rule of law, reducing corruption. Several researchers have examined governance disparities between countries. In several of these research, geography is taken into account. As models representing geography, variables such as latitude, climate, temperature, nation size, climate-related illnesses, indicating whether nations are either landlocked, islands, or belonging to a certain area, are often employed. Moreover, these analyses overlook the fact that cross-country data is typically spatially dependent. Spatial, reliance as according to Anselin (2006), is a subset of cross-sectional dependence in that the framework of the connection or co - variance among observational data at multiple places is derived from a particular placing an order, which is ascertained either by position in relation of such observational data in geographical area (Seldadyo et al., 2010, pp. 625–626).

Criminality stifles African development by destroying social and human capital, jeopardizing social and political stability, and raising the cost of conducting business, among other things. Governments have been required to promote their population's life quality and well-being by safeguarding their lives and property from criminality and violence since the dawn of time. As a result, poor government quality, particularly corruption, may significantly impede a sustainable socio-economic development strategy to achieve the goals mentioned earlier. As a result, a new wave of research has focused on the underlying link between government competence and well-being. The worry about crimes and disputes and the quest for ways to address their corrosive consequences has resurfaced as a topic of public discourse and a measure through which civil society evaluates leadership in recent decades. This rising interest stems from a growing understanding among international development specialists that growth necessitates, above all, socioeconomic stability and governance

quality. As a result, reasonable policy suggestions, well-intentioned incentives, and assistance initiatives may fail to accomplish their goals unless they are delivered in a way that enhances self-sustaining development and growth. More importantly, there is a growing understanding that unaffordable strategies aren't necessarily the result of a lack of information about the optimal policies to pursue. Instead, these policies may result from decision-makers distorting economic policies (bad governance) in an environment where impunity, crime, and violence are the norm (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016, pp. 466–467).

The theoretical and empirical research on economic growth and development drivers continue to emphasize the importance of financial development and strong governance quality. We rely on financial institutions as one of the components of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) financial development index, whereas governance quality, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), involves the cultures and institutions through which the country's control is exercised. In developed financial markets, financial institutions redirect funds from inefficient to meaningful work among economic agents, resulting in scale economies and economic growth. The conceptual logic that underpins the link between financial structure and economic growth is primarily based on an investor's perception of the risk involved with a specific investment. Whenever private investors (individuals or businesses) are attracted to join in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), they are often worried about the impact and uncertainty posed by weak governance quality, mainly in developing countries (Ahad & Imran, 2021, pp. 1–2).

Development capabilities relate to governance qualities that help emerging countries to deal with property rights insecurity at an initial phase of development. This also aids in the preservation of political stability and the management of technical advancement. The ability to acquire capacities linked to institutional governance is one of the main goals of growth-enhancing governance. Capabilities manage and facilitate the transfer of funds and lands to the productive sector in the setting of inadequate land and asset markets through institutional governance. Investments and training in human capital can be used to alleviate labour market problems. Adopting new technology and investing in learning can help overcome capital market failures caused by insufficient savings and investment. Maintaining governmental stability and redistributive justice can help to bring about social reform.

On the contrary, a distinct process has been proposed in which improved economic success leads to an improvement in governance quality. Substantial governance changes are seen to be costly, and poor nations lack both the financial and administrative means to carry them out. The concept of "good enough governance", which supports growth more often and may be ignited by small improvements, complements the concept of 'excellent governance. Furthermore, it stimulates investment which leads to growth and aids developing nations in the latter stages of economic development in establishing stronger governance mechanisms with both the help of resources and time (Singh, 2019, p. 8).

To begin with, good governance efficiency adds significantly to the efficacy of public investment in the development and execution of financial subsidy or tax relief programs. Governments may balance market distortions, share Research and Development (R&D) risks, and foster industry-university-research collaboration by providing cash subsidies or tax breaks for fundamental research innovation. Governments must correctly specify the rationale, timing, kinds, and optimal boundaries of subsidies, as well as tax preference, to maximize the value of public expenditure. Government innovation initiatives or policies are inextricably linked to governance efficiency. Some academics have successfully claimed that the rise of Japan's innovative economy is solely due to innovation strategies or policies. The success of Japan's innovation policies in the 1970s & 1980s inspired other nations to create similar networks. For example, several European countries have developed various types of programs to stimulate innovation. Many studies on policy learning and dissemination have found that, while a country may be able to copy other countries' innovative policies, the effectiveness in meeting projected goals depends on the government's governance effectiveness (Zang et al., 2019, pp. 241–242).

2.8. Good Governance

According to the World Bank, good governance is defined as "the method in which authority is exercised in the administration of a country's social and economic resources for development" (Simms, 2008, p. 6). The phrase "good governance" is a relatively new trend. As previously stated, it rose from near obscurity in the latter quarter of the 21st century to become a key figure in the development plan, promoting the idea that progress is driven by "good governance." In general, establishing institutions and procedures that are more attentive to ordinary individuals, particularly the impoverished, is referred to as "good

governance." At all levels, it entails encouraging involvement, responsibility, and effectiveness. The idea has been adopted by practitioners, development professionals, and international development organizations as a fresh way of thinking about developing nations' public sector, political, and administrative systems. The word of good governance has long been a topic of debate among governmental officials, civil society, and the development and assistance groups. In its conventional definition, the term "good governance" is generally associated with the political government. It is associated with ideals such as democracy, participation, civil rights, the rule of law, and openness under this garb. Because all human rights are universal, interconnected, linked, and indivisible, as stated in the Vienna Declaration, good governance guarantees that political authorities and institutions are held accountable for ensuring the protection of all human rights. With the emergence of globalization as well as the expansion of global economies, the notion of good governance has been expanded to include resource management that promotes growth in the economy and development (Ashiku & Krypa, 2016, p. 156).

The term "good governance," coined by the World Bank in the 1990s, has become a mantra for donor organizations and donor nations to condition aid on the recipient government's performance. A borrower government must show a successful approach to development and carry out further reforms to get development aid. The reasoning is that aid would be more efficiently used if good governance was in places, such as battling corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy, mismanagement, transparency, accountability, and correct processes. Under their conventional missions, the IMF And world bank remain politically neutral and not involved in assessing governance concerns. Therefore the Bank has traditionally not examined political considerations in choosing whether to conduct assistance programs in the receiving state. As a result, good governance became a priority for the World Bank, with "Good Governance" becoming one of the Bank's 1991 Annual Development Economic Conference themes. In terms of the link between development and governance, the World Bank defines governance as "the way responsibility and influence are exercised for development in the administration of a country's social and economic resources" (Nanda, 2006, p. 269,272).

Good governance is seen to be among the strategies for reducing corruption (Hofheimer, 2006) and will have a beneficial influence on public welfare in the long run. Because of their policies and decision in the interest of the public, a local government with

stronger governance should perform better. According to the OECD (2011), public governance refers to the formal and informal structures that regulate how public choices are taken and how public operations are performed to preserve a country's constitutional ideals in the face of changing challenges and circumstances (Saksono & Manoby, 2021, p. 4501).

Looking at the development thinking patterns of International Development Agencies (IDAs), which dictated development initiatives sponsored by multilateral donors during the previous 50 years, helps to understand the notion of good governance better. Within politics, state administration, and bureaucracy, governance is defined as a broad process impacting how choices are made and responsibility is distributed among social and economic players. Good governance depends on the execution of good policies regarding the ability of late developing countries (LDCs) to manage their transition to development successfully. These policies are aimed at promoting democracy, reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and increasing human capacities. And, more recently, there has been evidence that the establishment of the information age, particularly the adoption of e-government, will lead to stronger (or better) governance. E-government connects government agencies and institutions using various ICTs (with a specific focus upon on Internet) and encourages the reorganization of the government's internal and external information flows, tasks, and operations to transfer the delivery of public services through the Internet (Ciborra & Navarra, 2005, pp. 142–143). As the word "good" suggests, good governance is a normative notion whose meaning is susceptible to political decision-making and reflects many organizational philosophies. Donors are divided on what public ideals developing nations should preserve in order to be classed as well-governed. Consider how the World Bank promotes market liberalization policies. Still, the United Nations may label the same policies as terrible governance since individuals are not included in the decision-making procedure (van Doeveren, 2011a, p. 304).

The World Bank's "good governance" strategy focuses on the state, the markets, and civil society in loan recipients. The 'effective state' ideal has superseded the 'minimalist state' ideal. According to the Bank, the government must play a vital role in controlling and regulating the market and civil society. This briefing paper analyzes the Bank's definition of "good governance," how it's been adopted in reality, and some of the underlying conflicts in the governance agenda. Implementing the good governance approach has consequently required the Bank to redefine its perspective on the value of the state and institutions. It

currently stresses that states and markets are complementary rather than competing and that both are necessary for economic growth and development. Instead of impeding growth, the government may play an important role in controlling, regulating, and supervising the private sector. In turn, by taking over the delivery of public services when practicable, the private sector relieves the state of its load and delivers more efficient services. According to World Bank policies and activities, strategies and actions in the major areas of macroeconomic policy reforms, financial sector improvement, and privatization. The World Bank's good governance strategy revolves around the state and the market relationship, and the Bank has implemented several changes in this area. Despite the shift to institutions, the Bank's worldview is dominated by neoliberal policies, making the good governance agenda market-centric instead of state-centric. The Bank's confidence in market forces, according to the study, undervalues the enormous problems of institution-building with the need to safeguard the weak (Simms, 2008, p. 2,8).

The concept of "good governance" has become widely used in public administration, political science, and, most specifically, in development management. It's found next to concepts like democracy, civil society, participation, human rights, and long-term development. It has been strongly connected with public sector reform in the recent decade. After, the notion of good governance has progressively gained traction in political and development debates. It has permeated all industries and has been ingrained in many countries' shared values and virtues throughout the world. It has achieved worldwide recognition as a symbol of democracy and the rule of law. However, there is a risk that good governance will become a buzzword, with few people considering its consequences. Good governance is defined as a broad concept that includes a wide range of concerns in a country's sociopolitical and economic structure. The creation of the Rule of Law, which replaces the power structure's whims and caprices, is a prerequisite for successful administration. Good governance necessitates a government that is representative and responsive to the demands of the people it governs. The effective delivery of services to the public would be ensured by a deep sense of responsiveness and dedication to serving the governed (the government's customer and client). As a result, good governance reflects or strives for the ethos of a responsible and integrated democratic society. Other than constitutionality, good governance gives moral trust to the aims and instruments of government. Good governance encompasses all aspects of government and all groups and areas of society (Srivasta, 2009, p. 4,16).


The execution of good governance is a must for any administration to fulfil the country's and or state's dreams and objectives. Furthermore, effective governance contributes to enhancing people's welfare, fostering a healthy commercial environment, improving productivity, and minimizing irregularities as well as bribery and corruption. Suhardjanto et al. (2018) discovered that two components of corporate governance, clarity and independence, had a beneficial impact on a company's financial success in the private sector. Together with the effective execution of "Good Corporate Governance" in the corporate sector, the state has come to recognize that "Good Governance" is not only required in the corporate sector but it is also required in the public sector (Nurhanifah & Setyaningrum, 2021, pp. 153–154).

There are eight major characteristics of good governance. It is transparent, accountable, responsive, participatory, effective and efficient, consensus-oriented, as well as equitable and inclusive, and it adheres to the rule of law. It ensures that corruption is reduced, minorities' perspectives are considered, and society's most vulnerable voices are represented in decision-making. It is also sensitive to society's current and future demands. Here are the explanations of eight characteristics of good governance:

1. **Transparency** refers to how choices are made and how they are implemented in accordance with laws and regulations. It also implies that information is openly available and accessible to individuals who such decisions and their implementation may impact. It also implies that sufficient information is supplied in easily understandable formats and mediums.
2. **Responsiveness**: Good governance demands that the institutions and procedures make every effort to satisfy all stakeholders quickly.
3. **Participation**, Good government necessitates the participation of both men and women. Direct participation or participation through lawful intermediary entities or representatives are both viable options. It's vital to note that representative democracy does not always imply that societies' most disadvantaged interests are taken into account when making decisions. Participants must be well-informed and well-organized. On the one hand, this entails freedom of association and speech, while on the other, it entails a well-organized civil society.

4. **Rule of law**, Good government need just and unbiased legal systems. Human rights, particularly those of minorities, must also be fully protected. An independent judiciary and an unbiased and trustworthy police force are required for equitable law enforcement.
5. **Consensus-oriented**, in every given society, there exists a variety of players and viewpoints. Good governance necessitates the mediation of many societal interests in order to establish a wide consensus on what is in the best interests of the entire community and how this may be accomplished. It also necessitates a wide and long-term view of what is required for long-term human development and how to attain those goals. This can only come through a thorough grasp of a society's or communities' historical, cultural, and social circumstances.
6. **Effectiveness and efficiency**, good governance implies that procedures and institutions generate results that satisfy society's requirements while ensuring the most efficient use of available resources. In the context of good governance, efficiency also refers to the efficient use of resources and environmental preservation.
7. **Equity and inclusion**, the well-being of a society depend on ensuring that all of its members believe they have a stake in it and are not removed from society's mainstream. This necessitates providing chances for all groups, especially the most vulnerable, to enhance or preserve their quality of life.
8. **Accountability**, One of the most important aspects of good governance is accountability. Public institutions, as well as the corporate sector and civil society groups, must be responsible to the public and its constituents. It should be obvious from the preceding discussion which good governance is an aspiration that is difficult to fulfill in its entirety. Only a few nations and cultures have come close to attaining complete excellent governance. However, to assure long-term human growth, steps must be done to achieve this ideal and make it a reality (UN & ESCAP, 2000, pp. 69–70).

Figure 1. Characteristics of good governance



Source: UNESCAP, 2000. "What is good governance". Characteristics of good governance, Figure 2.

Due to the lack of it among its proponents, evaluating good governance is a difficult task, but it is not impossible. Simply put, governance was described as nation-states supplying specific political benefits to their inhabitants, as previously stated. Good governance is constantly focused on results. Since these political commodities refer towards the nation-state delivering tangible lists of goods such as democracy, health care, and the rule of law, it should be feasible to assess how well or poorly the nation-states are ruling. Delivering these political benefits, for example. Once governance can be measured, the influence of many other variables on governance can be examined. Different techniques and tools for measuring good governance have now been developed, based on the objective of measurement, such as evaluating the previous scenario or overall trends inside a country, determining the extent to which a particular state is abiding by its responsibilities in principle, or determining the pragmatic conditions on the ground. Researchers outlined five categories of good governance measures, such as: (1) as a proxies measurement for the rule of law, civil and political rights or political freedoms are used, (2) as an indirect measure of good governance, increasing frequency of political unrest, (3) expert opinions and evaluations of good governance in investments, (4) quantitative measures such as that of the

'economic rate of interest of government initiatives or 'collective bargaining agreement intensive funds' as a gauge of individual trust in local financial institutions, and (5) economic development through a mix of techniques. Meanwhile, each of the aforementioned initiatives seems to have its own merits and demerits (Ashiku & Krypa, 2016, pp. 157–158).

2.9. The Challenges of Corruption and Bad Governance in Somalia

Somalia is one of the world's longest persistent examples of statelessness, with the full breakdown of public institutions in 1991. The ongoing civil conflict, rivalries between traditional tribes, and periodic droughts all contribute to the country's lack of political stability. Although the country is now recovering from the political chaos caused by civil war, still the government is fighting with Al-shabab terrorist group with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). But the country suffers severe corruption challenges both in public and private sectors like most other African countries. Corruption is among the primary causes and effects of Somalia's pervasive political unrest, which is now being rated at the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index since 2006. Corruption is a clear and anticipated behavior that happens at all stages in the public and private sectors. It impacts almost every element of Somali culture, from public officials abusing public resources for personal gain and soliciting bribes in return for essential services to clan-based cronyism that help people get jobs and political positions. Businesses have adapted to the anarchic environment by evading taxes and selling outdated food and pharmaceuticals.

Institutional corruption and large-scale theft of public funds by government personnel are the norms in Somalia, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung, (2016). For example, the Central Bank was heavily chastised in 2013 and 2014 for the fact that people made 80% of withdrawals from state accounts, which were not utilized to support government operations or provide public services. Instead, monies were diverted for personal benefit, funneled into slush funds, and bolster political support via patronage networks. The then-president and several of his cronies also were accused of smuggling assets out of the country through the central bank. The director of the Central Bank resigned in mid-2013 as a result of the public scandal (Ronan, 2017, p. 1,8).

Somalia has a complicated political, security, and development environment, with most of its recent history defined by poverty, hunger, and periodic warfare. However, in 2012, Somalia began a new era, marked by the development of permanent governmental institutions and significant military offensives, a period in which a longer-term peace seemed feasible. A federal government was formed after decades of violence and instability, and it was constructed via national debate and consent. Somalia was split when this Federal Government was created. With no obvious route to reconciliation and union, Somalia faced the huge challenge of simultaneously establishing frameworks and institutions while also delivering real benefits to the Somali people. As a result, Somalia's issues are complicated and varied, depending on the political, social, and geographical settings. This fact is acknowledged in the National Plan, and the approach outlined in this chapter aims to solve these issues and successfully lead Somalia on a road of recovery, growth, and long-term peace (Huriye, 2020, pp. 249–250).

According to an authentic statement from the Federal Republic of Somalia's Office of the Auditor General, the government expenditures from March, April, and May 2015 were \$31,473,638.85. Public servants of the public sector and the security personnel were not paid during that time. As a result, there are still concerns about what, where, or how these monies were used. In most developing nations, corruption is pervasive and part of daily life, and communities have learnt to live with it (and even contemplate it sociologically) as an important aspect of their culture. Somalia's corruption, on the other hand, has gone too far. Not only are public or official choices, like government projects or the percentage of tax due, purchased and sold, but accessibility to a government service or the performance of a right, such as acquiring civil records, is frequently required to be paid for. Economic and political power are inextricably connected in Somalia since political dominance secures economic benefits.

Similarly, under the current patronage-based system, access to economic benefits assures political influence, such as a privileged position. The profits that may be gained from them affect the process of distributing political and administrative offices, particularly those with decision-making authority over import and export permits, logistics, and banking. As these transfers of advantages are repaid by political support or loyalty, the political underpinnings are reinforced. Corruption thrives in these and similar environments. Once a crisis has ended, a country's security system must change. People's feelings of safety and

security and their trust in their system of the country are even more important for long-term peace and progress. Corruption abounds in every area of Somalia's security system, including all the police, the SNA, and the courts, hindering the security sector's progress (LCPT, 2016, pp. 8–9).

To develop anti-corruption measures, good governance initiatives rely on concepts such as accountability, openness, and involvement. Establishing organizations like the anti-corruption commission, building information-sharing systems, and auditing governments' use of public money and policy execution are all possible initiatives (Srivasta, 2009, p. 14). Despite advances on numerous fronts, Somalia's central government cannot properly administer taxes or deliver vital basic services. Even though certain tariffs and taxes are collected, there is little or no effective fiscal policy in place. Most government spending is funded by aid, with relatively limited internal revenue coming mostly from Mogadishu's sea and airports. Institutional flaws, such as a lack of the rule of law, impede any substantial and long-term economic development. A functional formal labor market is practically non-existent, and the informal sector employs most of the workforce. The unorganized agricultural, banking and telecommunication industries have thrived without subsidized or competent supervision, despite practically non-existent government governance (LCPT, 2016, p. 10).

Thus, this indicates the country's poor governance for managing state revenues and service delivery to its society. In contrast, governance indicators such as the “rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability & absence of violence, control of corruption, voice and accountability” do not exist or are very poor in Somalia. At this time, Somalia is not like how it was five years ago. The Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s led government made great improvements in the fight against corruption and improved governance to achieve good governance. Although what the outdated government did and what the public was waiting for is not the same, if we compare it to its predecessors, we can see a big difference in promoting the fight against corruption and how they tried to reshape the country's governance system. The next chapter will give the full detailed information about Somalia’s corruption and good governance for the last two decades and if there were efforts made to prevent or resolve those issues.

CHAPTER THREE

OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA

Somalia is one of the world's most homogeneous countries; its people share a common culture, speak the same language, and practice the same religion. On the Horn of Africa, Somalia is Africa's easternmost country. It stretches northward from the Equator to the Gulf of Aden, occupying a strategic geopolitical location among Sub-Saharan Africa and Arabian and southwestern Parts of Asia. Mogadishu, the nation's capital, sits on the Indian Ocean, just north of the Equator.

The Republic of Somalia was founded on June 1960, after Somalia gained independence from the colonizers of the Italian protectorate and the British protectorate of Somaliland. In 1960, North Somalia (British Protectorate of Somaliland) and South Somalia (Italian Protectorate of Somaliland) merged to establish the Somali Republic. Mr. Adan Abdullah Osman was appointed as Somalia's first elected president from 1960 to 1967. Somalia adopted its first national constitution in a countrywide public vote in June 1961, resulting in the democratic republic of Somalia with such a parliamentary form of government based on the Westminster model of democracy. Mr. Aaden Abdulla's administration chose the democratic system of government as the country's chosen form of government. Aden Abdullah Osman strengthened the country's governance structure and built national institutions as well as a democratic culture during his presidency. In 1967, Abdulle adopted Somalia's second presidential election, in which Abdi Rashid Sharmake was chosen as the country's second president. From 1967 till his assassination on 15th October 1969. The days after the assassination of president Sharmake, a military coup led by General Mohamed Siyad Barre occurred. The military quickly switched to a Leninist-Marxist system of administration. The revolutionary dictatorship ruled Somalia for two decades, turning a blind eye to the country's human rights and constitutional democracy (HARED, 2018, pp. 39–40).

Siyad Barre's regime ensured some tangible developments, including writing the Somali language script in 1972 and replacing colonial languages used in government offices and social lives. After that Somali language became the official language of the country, i.e.

the government offices, education, the media, and many more, almost soon, just after the new Script was adopted, following that, the mass literacy campaign was launched in both urban and rural regions. The first widespread literacy program was limited to cities, towns, and a few villages. Somali public workers were trained to read and write the Somali script in six months or fewer, regardless of where they worked. The second phase was to teach Somalis in metropolitan areas within a year, depending primarily on volunteers who were rewarded with honor certificates if their students passed the state literacy exam. At the end of this stepped-up effort, 500,000 individuals had learned to read and write. The new script removed a barrier to written communication, as only a small proportion of the population previously communicated in several languages.

Since the late 1980s, Somalia has been engulfed in armed conflict and bloodshed, resulting in a protracted, drawn-out, and complete state breakdown. However, international reconciliation efforts are underway, including attempts to construct a new federal government framework under the 2012 temporary constitution; Somalia's peace process is complicated by thirty years of civil conflict and entrenched social divisions. Since the early 1990s, Somalia has been defined by three interconnected layers of conflict, mostly local, national, and international and regional. Thus every level has its own set of conflicts triggers and drivers. Locally, Somalia's hostilities are reaffirmed as low-level community violence and are inextricably tied to wealth and clan allegiance. Deadly riots have often boiled across to the national level, and it was a contributing factor in the civil war's breakout in the 1990s. Following a surge in fatalities during the civil war in the early 1990s, communal violence between various clans persisted. Access and control of natural resources, particularly land, cattle, fisheries, and water, were and continue to be central to these wars. In disputes amongst dominant clan-based nomad herder communities and frequently marginalized established populations, resource ownership is related to livelihood styles, that typically implies clan membership. On a local level, access to natural resources frequently determines power dynamics within and across groups. As clan affiliations become progressively politicized, the consequences of community disputes often spill over to the national scale.

Somalia's disputes are connected to territory claims, tribes, and political contestations, particularly since the civil war began in 1991. Somaliland's northern region claims independence and acts as a de facto autonomous state, but it is not officially recognized as such. Puntland is dedicated to unification with the Federal Government of

Somalia (FGS), yet it functions independently. Jubaland, Southwestern State, Hirshabelle, and Galmadug (see figure 3.1) are also Federal Member States that function under the 2012 interim constitution. As a result, the national struggle is a mash-up of political clan identities and a relic of Somalia's colonial past. On the one hand, community conflicts and related communal identities, tied to clan-based complaint stories, exacerbate national conflicts. On the other hand, elite rivalry for national power has intensified local political divisions (EKLÖW & KRAMPE, 2019, pp. 4–5).

Figure 2. Map of Somalia and contested territories




Figure 3: Map of Somalia



Source: UN Cartographic Section.

3.1. The State of Corruption in Somalia


According to BTI's report (2020), corruption and plunder of domestic income and foreign aid are rampant within federal institutions and beyond, and they persist on a massive scale. Vote-buying, bribery, and other types of fraud and corruption were particularly prevalent during the 2016-2017 election cycle when corruption and theft of government funds were rampant. President Farmaajo came into office in February 2017 promising to combat corruption and implement financial reforms. Despite this, reports of corruption, nepotism, and theft of public monies persist, notably in handling public contracts, citizen registrations, and visa and passport issuance. The security establishment continues to be rife with corruption. Another sector is prone to corruption in land and property transfer, particularly in larger towns where land and housing values are soaring. Forced evictions are common as a result of land transactions, and they are frequently carried out in a violent manner. Aid diversion remains common in Somalia, and a variety of "gatekeepers" have developed, providing vulnerable individuals, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps, access in exchange for money. NGOs are frequently accused of collaborating with local dealers and brokers and of accepting bribes in exchange for contracts to supply help. Corruption and nepotism remain significant problems in Somaliland and are frequently practised on a clan system based. Institutional reforms were achieved under Silanyo's former administration, including the formation of an anti-corruption commission. However, the commission is currently ineffective. There were no additional institutional protections put in place. Concerns have been raised about the Somaliland government's contracts with the UAE, including a thirty-year lease to operate and rebuild the seaport in Berbera in 2016 and a deal to build a military facility at the port in 2017 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, pp. 17–18).

According to Transparency International, corruption is among the primary causes and effects of recurrent political unrest in Somalia, which has rated Somalia at the bottom of the institution's Corruption Perceptions Index every year since 2006. Somalia again ranked last out of 180 countries in 2019. Furthermore, Somalia was ranked lowest out of 200 nations in Trace International's Bribery Risk Index in 2019, with a risk score of 94 out of 100.2. Because these indices are often based on data from at least a year ago, if not more, and are frequently dependent on perceptions, it will likely take a few years before meaningful changes are revealed using these methods. Meanwhile, progress has been achieved in the

public finance sectors and procurement processes, particularly in corruption and overall integrity evaluation. The National Parliament enacted the long-awaited Anti-Corruption Committee Act on June 20, 2019, and President Farmajo signed the bill into law on September 21, 2019 (UN, 2019, p. 27).

Transparency International' (CPI) 2020 report, according to this year's CPI, corruption is more widespread in nations that are least prepared to deal with the COVID-19 epidemic and other global issues. The index utilizes a scale of zero to 100, with zero being very corrupt and 100 being very clean, to evaluate 180 nations and territories related to observed levels of the public sector corruption, according to experts and entrepreneurs. More than two-thirds of nations, like in past years, scored under 50 on this year's CPI, with such an aggregate rating of just 43. The research reveals that, notwithstanding some improvements, most nations are still failing to successfully combat corruption (See figure 3.2 below) (Transparency International, 2020, p. 6).


Figure 4. Global average corruption (Top and bottom countries)



Source: Global Average, Transparency International CPI 2020 Report

Sub-Saharan Africa is the worst-performing area on the CPI, with an overall average of 32, indicating little progress from prior years and emphasizing the need for immediate action. Seychelles regularly receives the highest grades in the area, with a score of 66, accompanied by Botswana (60) and Cabo Verde (58). Sudan (16), Somalia (12), and South Sudan are still at the bottom of the ranking (12) (Transparency International, 2020, p. 20).

Figure 5. Sub-Saharan Africa Average regional Score.



Source: Average Regional Score, Sub-sahara Africa, Transparency International CPI 2020 Report


According to TI' CPI, Since 2006, Somalia has ranked at the bottom out of 180 countries, which baves the country to be considered one of the world's most corrupted countries. Although the country's parliament passed the anti-corruption commission act in June 2019, the newly established anti-corruption commission's expected performance didn't achieve because they have not independent from the executive branch, which is where corruption occurs mainly.

In weak nations, corruption erodes governmental authority, capability, and legitimacy (Johnsn 2016: 59). For example, in Somalia, significant levels of corruption have resulted in dysfunctional institutions, with security sector corruption regarded as "chronic and coordinated" (Marqaati 2017: 9). Military and internal security personnel have been accused of robbing, harassing, threatening, and abusing civilians (Marqaarti 2017: 10-11).

Breakdown and pervasive corruption in the security sector and governmental institutions contribute to the country's chaos and anarchy. In a set of African nations, political hopefuls are still attempting to consider buying votes. Claims of massive corruption marred the 2016/2017 Somali legislative and presidential elections. Senior Somali government official Abdirazak Fartaag said that the election system, which needed just 14,000 voters to elect parliament members, who would pick a president, led to "corruption inflation," with such as candidates buying voters gain a seat in parliament. At least US \$20 million was allegedly misappropriated during the legislative elections. Following that, presidential hopefuls blamed each other for bribing votes from legislators. Domestic anti-corruption activists dubbed it "the most costly election, each vote," in the country's history. According to Burke, unrevealed political fundraising brings political groups and actors at threat of takeover since hidden donors will demand "payback" once their financed politicians gain power. The UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia were all accused of funding selected candidate campaigns in Somalia. Therefore it must be considered a fuelling corruption in the country (Duri, 2019, pp. 11–13).

In terms of institutional development, the federal administration has done little to create the constitutionally required government entities critical to establishing the Somali state. Such as the Constitutional Court, which might have litigated between the federal and regional administrations; the anti-corruption commission, which could have recovered stolen property; and the Judiciary Service Committees, which must work to reorganize the judiciary, are just a few examples. Marqaati has received corruption complaints from the FGS ministries at a nearly similar rate as during the time covered in our last study, implying no shift in culture with the change in administration. Among the most agencies in corruption charges include the Somali Police Force (SPF), the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate (IND), and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), which all fall under this ministry. This is primarily because of the frequent interactions that the community has with them at Mogadishu's security checks. Marqaati received 365 allegations of corruption at this ministry's different offices.

Figure 6. The level of corruption in Ministry of internal security



Source: Marqaati, (2018), Somalia state of accountability 2017/18, Corruption in the ministries,

Furthermore, in terms of work attendance, the ministry was the most inept. During six months in 2017, the minister was absent from the office for nearly three months. Security checkpoints are set up all over the city by SPF and NISA to collect money from drivers driving social service vehicles and freight trucks. Extortion is extended to private motorists whenever there is a security lockout. A pregnant lady with two children refused to drive until she had paid \$50 to the NISA officials stationed at Marinayo Junction in Abdiaziz district, according to Marqaati. Extortion at security checks is not restricted to the general people; some of the complaints we received reveal how police 'demand' low-level government ID-holders about \$1; those who reject would be denied future access to the route, with the message that "only high-level officials are allowed to use it". Extortion of the public has also been linked to the SPF-run Criminal Investigations Department (CID). Passport applicants would have to wait longer than normal unless they paid a \$10 bribe to the personnel in charge of the verification procedure. Others utilize brokers to speed up the procedure and avoid having their fingerprints taken at the CID. They obtain their certification of good behavior, and their fingerprints are taken by someone else. The CID's corruption is a public show without any effort to disguise transactions. It not only undermines public trust in the system but also poses a significant security risk. The IND accepts payments for new passports for which receipts are produced but not delivered to the payer, implying that the transactions are not accountable and that the amount transferred with the central bank is below what citizens pay. The earnings from this plan are distributed among the directorate's senior executives. Applicants are also given the option of getting their passports in 24-72 hours once they provide a \$50 bribery. Because passports are published through several offices and systems,

the expedited processing is known at all stages of the IND structure, and the funds are distributed accordingly (Marqaati, 2018, pp. 3,8-9).

According to experts, developing nations lose \$1.26 trillion a year due to corruption, fraud, and tax dodging enough to bring 1.4 billion people out of poverty for six years. According to development experts, attaining the other SDGs would be very difficult until corruption is addressed. Despite this, corruption scandals make the news practically every day, both in Africa and abroad. South Africa is still dealing with the consequences of state capture under Jacob Zuma's presidency. Namibians are preparing for one of the most high-profile court trials in the country's history, featuring two ministers accused of corruption and jailed in the Fishrot bribery scandal. Corruption allegations concerning COVID-19 pandemic aid have been made in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, and elsewhere. And ordinary Africans claim that conditions are worse rather than improving. According to Afrobarometer polls in 18 African nations, most residents believe their country's corruption worsened in the previous year. Police are the biggest violators from the public's perspective, but many healthcare practitioners also seek bribes. The majority of residents believe their government is not doing enough to combat corruption. Most Africans fear punishment if they disclose incidents of corruption to authorities, which is a negative indication for campaigners seeking to engage citizens on this problem (Afrobarometer, 2020, p. 1).

There are no procedures in place to monitor the behavior of public officials or politicians. Corrupt officials work with impunity, and while isolated incidents of corruption-related dismissal have been documented, there are no legal consequences, no matter how serious the wrongdoing. The failure of federal institutions and funders to confront chronic corruption stymies the continuing state-building process renders institution-building inefficient, and undermines citizens' faith in government. The significant danger of corruption is especially obvious in security organizations, where misuse of resources and refusal to pay salaries have resulted in serious security threats. Suspicion of mutinies in the Puntland security personnel over unpaid salaries allegedly led to the State Bank of Puntland issuing money illegally. The lack of legal repercussions and general assumption that incumbents of public office should profit financially from their positions enable the abuse of authorities and misconduct (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 18).

3.2. Anti-Corruption Efforts in Somalia

On September 21, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" signed the anti-corruption commission bill into law, a major milestone in the FGS's progressive politics program. (United Nations Security Council, 2019, p. 2). Emphasis on motivations and institutional capacities, increasing procurement system transparency and efficiency, addressing resistance to change, and leveraging forces in the corporate sector and society organizations that have a strong stake in strengthening procurement results are critical. These three case studies from Somalia, Bangladesh, and Chile show how anti-corruption measures in public procurement have progressed along a governance spectrum in each nation. The Somalia case examines an efforts to minimize corruption in a few key high-value public procurement contracts by using a specially designed process developed in collaboration with development stakeholders and the Somali government. The ability to limit corruption in an amount of transactions was demonstrated, demonstrating the ability to accomplish outcomes even in the most difficult circumstances (World Bank, 2020, p. xvii). In September 2017, Somalia's chief justice dismissed eighteen judges in Mogadishu in response to public concerns as part of President Farmaajo's commitment to overhaul the judicial system. Following this, the Supreme Court chairman was replaced in May 2018, again responding to public claims of significant corruption. Both actions have been denounced as unconstitutional, despite the fact that they may be seen as part of a more extensive reform process (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 16).

Throughout 2018, the Prime Minister launched a series of anti-corruption actions, including the arrest of many persons, the majority of whom worked for the police and at the Foreign ministry and Mogadishu's seaport manager. The seaport is among the government's primary sources of revenue, and it is from there that a significant amount of money is diverted to various "stakeholders." According to Africa Confidential, corruption is a persistent problem for the administration since it requires money to garner support from members of parliament (MPs) and troops and protect its position in FMS, where elections are going to occur. An inquiry by the Somali parliament in November 2018 revealed that USD 42 million had vanished. The amount was then reported to be USD 20 million in subsequent publications. The African Exponent reports that parliament has backed down from its previous allegations. Within the year 2018 was also marked by a significant number of guard changes. The resignation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives has

previously been considered. The governor of Mogadishu was fired in January 2018. Many ministries and the Chief Justice were also removed, with the latter being replaced by a known regime loyalist. According to a secret source, the constitutionality of these interventions has been called into question, and they may reflect authoritarian inclinations in the federal administration. Africa Confidential, a journalistic organization, has described the behavior as "undemocratic." Furthermore, according to a secret source, Salafist networks rapidly influence the administration (Netherlands, 2019, pp. 8–9).

The government of Somalia has taken a few other notable recent steps to combat corruption in the armed forces, including the replacement of many high ranking officers, the unveiling of a scheme to biometrically enrol troops in order to overcome "ghost soldiers" from the salaries, and plans to distribute salaries directly into soldiers' accounts to ensure coherent payment and alleviate theft. Salary delays are still being reported: in March 2019, many units outside the capital reportedly departed their positions in protest, and Al Shabaab temporarily seized the regions before being repulsed. In early April, US-trained, equipped, and coached elite infantry forces started a major operation south of Mogadishu to recapture territory from Al Shabaab. The ability of regular army troops to retain territories will be a major test. Spoilers and Corruption networks are complicating efforts to reconstruct Somalia, which act towards consolidating governmental power. Somalia is the world's most corrupt country, according to Transparency International. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has praised Somalia for enacting crucial reforms and taking measures to widen its revenue base, but theft charges remain. Somalia will not be eligible for major financial assistance until it pays off \$5 billion in debt. As Somalia nears the decision point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) project, it wants donor promises to help with debt reduction (Congressional, 2019, p. 11).

3.3. The State of Governance in Somalia

Like nearly all African countries, Somalia is a colonial creation, with Somali populations extending into Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It is simpler to include such cross-border zones occupied by Somalis when discussing governance in Somali territory, particularly the way communities are controlled at the local level. Putting the state aside helps to concentrate on the diverse types of governance in Somalia's regions while highlighting how well the state became a source of conflict and bloodshed. Despite the

Somali community's geographical dispersion, the Somali lands remain ethnically homogenous, especially when contrasted to the majority of Africa or the adjacent Middle East. Although there are few notable outliers, the majority of the population is Somali and Muslim. Given that many of the usual fractures of conflict, such as ethnic and religious divisions, are not important to the Somali war, many people are perplexed as to why violent conflict persists. Clans, as well as families, have played a larger part in the conflict. Yet, they haven't been the defining characteristic, as commerce, politics, assistance, and the endless battle for resources have played a role in the continuous bloodshed. The Somali regions are an outstanding illustration of what is considered state failure in many ways. On the other hand, looking at the extremes can frequently reveal the most, bringing particular qualities into sharp perspective. Many assumptions are made in the country's conception as a "failed state," which disregard alternative ideas of statehood or state-building trajectories. The notion that there is an endpoint nation must attain to avoid such characterizations is founded in the paradigm of Western Liberal Democracy and is grounded in the notion of "failed states," "failing states," or "weak states." As a result, states are evaluated and ranked about this particular paradigm in the failed states debate. This method has been widely criticized, not least by researchers from the Horn of Africa, who have emphasized how this approach ignores the diversity of social order, or public authority, that may exist at any particular time or location. This method also ignores the range of legal frameworks that may impact state performance and are often neglected in more normative analyses (Muktiyanto et al., 2019, pp. 73–74).

On the other hand, Somalia isn't just a collection of lessons gained about how not to create a state. In some ways, it is in the vanguard of a poorly defined trend: the emergence of informal mechanisms of adaptations, security, as well as governance in reaction to the lack of a central authority for an extended period of time. The growing involvement of coalitions of corporate organizations, conventional authority, and civic groups in supporting more "organic" forms of public harmony and the rule of law is driving this trend. It's unclear if Somalia's informal patchwork of local administrations and coping methods represents embryonic state formation. However, the recurrent failures of top-down attempts to resurrect Somalia's political system should not overshadow the substantial achievements of governance-building initiatives inside some indigenous Somali societies. The shifting ambitions and adjustments of Somali groups have altered Somalia's "governance without government". Compared to the periods when a wartime economy and warlordism controlled

Somalia, greater Somali constituents today possess political and economic interests in a particular amount of certainty and stability and a better capability to pursue these interests. This scenario may be creating a more favorable political atmosphere for state rebirth than in the past. Community adaptability to state breakdown, on the other hand, may obstruct state-building by lowering communal impulses to support a resurrected state. The failure of the whole emerging range of priorities to eventually result in a revitalized central government has been attributed partly to the absolute everlasting power of internally and externally spoilers, as well as risk avoidance among politicians and bureaucrats who've already earned their money in the sense of government breakdown and for which the resumption of a centralized government postures dangers they are reluctant to accept. Studies that emphasize the role of evolving interests and risk management strategies in Somalia were likely to offer more accurate explanations both for shifts and trilogies in the political environment (Menkhaus, 2006, p. 74,77).

Clans have had a role in both administration and violence in Somalia since its establishment in 1960 (Lewis, 1972; Samatar and Samatar, 1987; Samatar, 1992; Luling, 1997; Besteman, 1996). Clans performed a significant social role even before independence. They served as both a source of safety as well as an identity for the populace, acting as a governing organization that enforced regulations. However, those in authority used clans as a weapon to acquire access to resources and influence during colonial and post-colonial eras. During Siad Barre's twenty-year dictatorship, which started in 1969 and ended in 1991, leaders' use of clans became entrenched. Barre's exploitation of clans to continue in power and stealing state and clan resources to pay his loyalists resulted in the formation of armed militias. As a result, long-lasting societal divides emerged, politicized once again during Somalia's protracted civil war. Following the civil war, militias split the Somali people along clan lines, resulting in the populace being stuck in the middle of inter-clan conflicts, distrust, and intense hatred for over 30 years. Clan chiefs played a key part in the peace discussions in Arta, Djibouti, in 2000 as a result of this. The influence of colonial authority on Somalis varied according to their region. Those who lived in the south and farming regions were mainly affected by colonial effects, as opposed to those who lived in the northern portions of the nation, which clan leaders still controlled. According to Besteman (1995), colonialism contributed to inequity in Somalia's social structure. During colonial control, the Somali Bantu were most oppressed, notably inside the Italian colonial farm. The British referred to Northern Somalis as "natives" of Somalia, who enhanced their position. To emphasize the

group's claimed slave ancestry and separate them from the "natives," the Italians coined "liberti" for Somali Bantus. In the framework of slavery under Italian colonial authority, the name "Liberti" meant "freedmen," and it was used to describe Somali Bantus as a means to distinguish them from other Somalis. The difference made it easier to compel Somali Bantu workers to work on Italian farms. Somalis resisted colonialism when Sayyid Mohammed Abdulle Hassan began the battle for independence and repatriated Somalia in 1899. The "Dervish Movement," as it was known, began in the north part of the nation and continued till the 1920s. Hassan utilized poetry to bring Somali tribes together to resist their colonial overlords, and he was so efficient in combat that the British and Ethiopians teamed together to destroy him. In the south, the opposition took several forms. Sheikh Uways, a renowned religious leader in the Barawa region, disseminated his teachings from Somalia's southern coast to Mozambique. He called for resistance to colonial forces through his preaching and the Uwaysiya, his disciples. Fighting against slave labor and slavery was another kind of resistance. This campaign, known as the "Gosha Revolt" and led by Nassib Buunto, occurred from 1890 to 1907 and was directed at settlers as well as Somali overseers who worked with them. The Bantu slave labor in southern Somalia resulted in a significant number of deaths due to forced labor and illness (Ahmed, 2019, pp. 49–50).

Somalia is in the process of establishing a state. Despite increased donor funding since 2012, putting in place a statewide governance structure remains difficult. After two decades of inadequate state infrastructure and continuous violent conflicts, the government's structural restrictions remain very severe. The government must completely restore the physical and social infrastructure that was damaged during the conflict. The ongoing al-Shabaab insurgency, regular assaults, violent confrontations, repeated droughts, and humanitarian crises all pose serious challenges to any kind of governmental control and administration. The conflict has formed the governing elites, and their government skills are limited. The authority must confront a severe shortage of human resources while also controlling the few resources available to it. Although there was some improvement throughout the reporting period, it was little, and political interests come to lead politics. In Somalia, where there are minimal divisions between both the formal and informal spheres, the Western notion of civil society is deceptive. Throughout Somalia, there are extensive legacies of social organization outside of the state, centered mostly on societal cohesion within familial groupings. Social system structures have restructured and reinforced themselves since the start of civil war to secure the survival of its members. Since the mid-

1990s, a slew of NGOs and community-based activist groups (CBOs) have sprouted up, first in reaction to (actual or anticipated) external financing from both Islamic and Western donors, but many have matured over time. Many of these NGOs were compelled to shut down their operations in al-Shabaab-controlled regions because they were accused of espionage for Western forces. Many NGOs have root growth following departure of Al Shabaab from most metropolitan areas. Professional groups, unions, and clubs, such as the national union of Somali journalist, trade organizations, and women trade organizations, all promote the interests of their respective professions. In general, however, civil society's authority and supervision of the state remain limited (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 33).

Most Somalis are descended into one of six "great tent" clans, according to Somali lineage. Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Isaaq clans, together known as the "Samaale" clans, have the strongest linguistic and cultural links. Together, these traditionally nomadic tribes account for about 75% of any and all ethnic Somalis. Remaining two clans, the Digil and Mirifle of southern Somalia, account for around 20% of the all the ethnic Somalis. They speak "af-maymay", as opposed to Samaale clans' af-"maxaa" tiri, and have traditionally lived a much more immobile lifestyles of agriculture and/or pastoralism. In addition, unlike many Samaale tribes, the Digil and Mirifle clans have a tradition of integrating clansmen, ranging from non-ethnic Somalis to previous slaves and their offspring. Indeed, the Rahanweyn's clan name means 'large multitude' in their tongue. When Samaale group members use the pejorative term sab (translated version: "ignoble") to referring to certain of their Rahanweyn and Digil Somali kin, a separation between them and the Rahanweyn and Digil clans is clearly visible.

Somalis divide themselves into subclans and ultimately sub-sub subclans. There aren't less than three (some historians estimate as many as eight) subclans of the Isaaq clan, which comes under the umbrella 'Samaale' clan configuration: "the Habar Awal, Habar Jaalo, and the Harhajis". The Habar Awal is then subdivided into the following two sub-clans: Sa'ad Muse, isse Muse, and so on. If a man has more than one wife, for instance, certain family members may place greater emphasis on the clans, subclans, or sub-subclans connected with one maternal line than another. Furthermore, not everyone in Somalia agrees on whose genealogical lineages other Somalis belong. Individuals of Somali ancestry have an almost endless variety of ways to associate with, or separate from, other Somalis, which could be the purpose. Whether they live a nomadic life in the semi-desert, a day-to-day

lifestyle in a failed state's metropolitan region, or a day-to-day existence as recently arrived emigrants in a foreign nation, Somalis require permanent but adaptable means to manage limited economic opportunities. This is accomplished through the Somali lineage system. Most Somalis see a realistically complicated, moving network of ancestry, but outsiders see an unfeasibly complex, changeable system. Have a watering well or grazing area grown insufficient for the amount of clansmen that frequent it? A sub-subclan might split away from the main clan and take the rule of it. Is another clan attempting to monopolize a market to the disadvantage of all others? A group of sub-clans could pool their money to form their own competing company. Are there relatives of a specific family who have settled in Paris or Philadelphia? A newcomer from the same ancestry might seek guidance and assistance from these close cousins (Hesse, 2010, p. 249).

There seem to be a lot of topics on the Somali agendas, regardless of how one defines politics or even Somali dynamics, which is really clanship politics. There is a need to reassess governance in contemporary Somalia, from current attempts to reform the security sector to the constitutional evaluation process and, most importantly, the reconciling effort. Somalia is still dealing with state-building and peace-building efforts thirty years later, with certain technical assistance from the world community. Nevertheless, there is a discussion over whether the national agenda is sufficiently Somali. It is also past time for Somalia's government to be rethought. This indicates that instead of working under political pressure from foreign actors, it is preferable to operate independently and following Somali national interests and values. It also implies that the goals of governance, i.e. fundamental public administration and management, must be prioritized over effective governance, good governance, or perhaps even 'democratic' governance, when such a concept exists. In the same way, the future administration will be required to establish a complete PCR framework for the country, form an elders' committee to counsel on governance, and, very importantly, prioritize and focus on significant national objectives rather than the political squabbling of the past. Also, it implies that Somalia is now at a fork in the road, and that the Somalis could make it to this moment with competent leadership and reinvented governance (Farah, 2021, p. 1).

The lack of industrialization, inequality in income distribution, intricate religious and ethnic disputes and weak governance mechanisms are among the issues supporting the expansion or escalation of terrorists and armed conflicts in Somalia and across Africa.

Extensive reforms are also required to enhance Somalia's growth in the economy, inclusivity, better social justice, and governance competence. Military attacks alone will not be enough to address the security issues that face Somalia and the region if crucial aspects of structural instability remain elusive. Absence of democratic maturity and economic progress in the past has aided the spread of terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Because the potential risks identified in this study are extremely obvious to Africa and beyond, the AU's attempts to manage the scenario in Somalia ought to have continuous support and establish a highly successful and powerful government in Somalia (Chigudu, 2021, p. 415).

3.4. Good Governance Issue in Somalia

IFAD, in 1999, describes good governance as the method in which authority is used to administrate a country's economic and social resources for development. "Accessibility", accountability, predictability, and transparency" are all characteristics of good governance. "Openness, participation, accountability, and transparency" are also important aspects of good governance. Mercy Corps (2000) defines responsiveness as when effective governance demands institutions and procedures to satisfy all stakeholders within such a reasonable period and to have means for seeking ideas and informing constituents. Responsiveness is a process and an organization that aims to serve all interested parties (Huriye & Ahmed, 2020, pp. 249–250).

The ongoing legacy of Italian, French, and British colonial authority is one of the main aspects to analyse the fundamental issues of the successive Somali administration's failure to develop good governance. This problem of colonialism's continued influence is not limited to Somalia, and it has become the subject of a large level of research in the discipline of African studies. Somalia was not the only country where colonial meddling in indigenous government institutions was used to dominate rural and distant areas. According to Herbst (1997: 18), one of several fundamental reasons for state instability in Africa is African nations' failure to expand state power into these places. The colonialist rulers' choice to depend primarily on indirect control via chosen and reimbursed chiefs generated a governance divide that still persists today between the bulk of rural communities and the few metropolitan areas along the coastal. Whereas the current governance crisis in Somalia is a severe illustration of the repercussions of state breakdown and the disintegration of state-society relations, several other African countries are

experiencing identical governance and legitimacy issues. These issues are firmly based on bad governance, corruption, incompetence, and tribalism in Somalia (Odowa, 2021, p. 281,284).

Good governance is critical for every country in the globe, particularly emerging countries, which must act quickly to provide basic services to their inhabitants and raise their living standards. Given that Somalia's government implemented certain economic and financial reforms, it could entice wealthy countries to sign millions of dollars in development aid to the country. For example, the United States and the government of Somalia recently inked a \$300 million deal for economic initiatives, while Qatar just signed a \$200 million arrangement. Turkey has been assisting Somalia in constructing infrastructure such as roads, schools and re-establishing governmental institutions that were destroyed due to the civil conflict. This is the first time since the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991 and the first time since the dictatorship in 1991 that Somalia has demonstrated efficiency and effectiveness in the administration of public businesses, a fact international organizations have recognized. Furthermore, because one of the most important principles of good governance is compliance to the rule of law, the safeguarding of each and every individual's rights, respect for human rights, governmental transparency and accountability, political openness, and tolerance, Somalia has received much attention in developing a culture of good governance in their federal and regional institutions (HARED, 2018, p. 39).

Somalia has a complicated political, security, and development environment, with most of its recent history defined by poverty, hunger, and periodic warfare. However, in 2012, Somalia began a new era, marked by the development of permanent governmental institutions and significant military offensives, a period in which a longer-term peace seemed feasible. A federal government was formed after decades of violence and instability, and it was constructed via national debate and consent. Somalia was split when this Federal Government was created. With no obvious route to reconciliation and union, Somalia faced the huge challenge of simultaneously establishing frameworks and institutions while also delivering real benefits to the Somali people. As a result, Somalia's issues are complicated and varied, depending on the political, social, and geographical settings. This fact is acknowledged in the National Plan, and the approach outlined in this chapter aims to solve these issues and successfully lead Somalia on a road of recovery, growth, and long-term peace (Huriye & Ahmed, 2020, p. 249).

Even though Somalia is comparatively stable compared to a few other African countries, the historical status of good governance in Somalia is not an exception to what other African countries have experienced. However, when it comes to good governance, Somalia has not taken advantage of this chance to build democratic institutions and promote good governance. However, Somalia has endured 21 years of dictatorship and military rule, which has resulted in the country's lack of effective governance and freedom rights. The dictatorship was primarily concerned with strengthening the Somali arm and imposing stringent rules and regulations on the country; freedom of expression and human rights were not prioritized. Then, Somalia had a lack of the rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Once the system fell apart, Somalia's most difficult issue was restoring law and order and making the nation stable and democratic. Compared to other African countries that have lately pushed democracy and built a good governance-friendly climate and growth, Somalia has failed to reconstruct government structure in 25 years due to instability and clan domination. As a result, one of the primary reasons for inequality and poverty in Somalia is a lack of effective governance practices. One of the most fundamental elements of effective administration is the rule of law and accountability. This principle demands that citizens be governed according to the country's laws and constitutions.

Yet, Somalia has been ruled under a clan-based system for more than three centuries (what so-called 4.5 formula). Somalia's authorities have also been witnessed and alleged to be disobedient to the rule of law and the constitution. In Somalia, for example, it has been said that the public administration system lacks accountability and openness. Currently, Somalia has a federal system of governance, but Somalis had no say in its implementation; no one solicited the society's opinion. There was no vote on the new form of administration when Somalia was going to change. All Somalis are debating if federalism is the best route forward for Somalia. When will Somalis be allowed to vote for their leader and the sort of government they want to see implemented in Somalia? (HARED, 2018, p. 35).

When experts analyze the Somali conflict, they identify foreign and internal elements as the primary causes of state failure, social disintegration, civil war, and the ongoing war on terror. However, post-state collapse studies emphasise internal factors, portraying what occurred when the military administration collapsed as a battle between clans¹. This provided a narrow window for external players to intervene in the struggle. The external intervention has just lately become such a subject of interest that it warrants additional

investigation. Nonetheless, the existing studies on the topic begins with the huge military action led by the US in Somalia in 1992, which many view as an attempt by the US to represent the growing influence of the Islamist militia 'Al-Itixaad; which first emerged in southern and central Somalia and later spread to northeast Somalia (modern-day Puntland state) and especially the Bari region, where the SSDF defeated them. Following the fall of the SSDF, Al-Itixaad relocated to Gedo and constructed military bases, training grounds, and a governance structure that was effective in providing peace and stability to individuals fleeing the Mogadishu civil war. However, this did not sit well with regional powers, particularly Ethiopia. Somalia became a point of interest and a flashpoint for international conflict following the 9/11 attacks. Somalia's risk and threat to US national interests and stability have been likened to those of Afghanistan since Somalia is seen as a safe place for transitional extremists, notably al-Qaeda and related groups such as al-Itixaad, ICU, and now AlShabaab. The US response to the event was to penalize a number of private companies linked with al-Qaeda, including Al-Barakat, the world's largest telecommunications and money transfer firm, and to halt all donations and charitable activities from the Gulf countries and Somali diaspora. Two interconnected factors shifted the Somali conflict from a domestic to a regional and global confrontation: the introduction of political Islamists and the emergence of armed Islamists seeking to fill the vacuum left by military rule. Several studies on the issue have glossed over the crucial role of armed Islamist groups such as al-Itixaad and al-Shabaab in elevating the Somali war to a regional and global concern. Al-Shabaab became closer to al Qaeda underneath the command of Ayro and Godane, especially when Godane hailed Bin Laden for his handout and sacrifice for Muslims worldwide. The United States replied by designating Al-Shabaab a terrorist and jihadist group. Al-Shabaab professed their loyalty to al - qaida and its supreme commander Bin Laden in 2009 with the release of a video titled "at your service, oh Osama." Al Qaeda's answer to al-allegiance Shabaab's was to recognize them as an integral component of their global goal and regional representation in the Region (Horn of Africa) (Ahmed, 2020, pp. 48-49,65).

Fight against terrorism is another key factor that affects the country's wishes of reaching good governance. According to Hansen (2013) and Pitts, Al Shabaab has garnered considerable attention for two primary reasons (2015). To begin, it was the group's 2013 declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has been severely weakened over the last decade, most notably with the assassination of the elusive Osama bin Laden. Ties with al-Shabaab, on the other hand, demonstrated that the train of thinking remains fundamentally

strong, with sympathizers adding to global terrorist fears. Al-backing Qaeda's may provide al-Shabaab an advantage in obtaining financial and military help. Additionally, Somalia may quickly develop into a staging area for worldwide assaults or a potential hideout site for those in authority. However, there does not appear to be adequate evidence to demonstrate the strength of the perceived or genuine partnership at the moment. Second, it is when al-Shabab began to spread outside Somalia, posing problems for US-backed governments such as Ethiopia and Kenya and the rest of the western community (Chigudu, 2021, p. 412).

According to the world bank, Governance refers to the customs and structures that govern how a country's authority is exercised. This comprises the method by which governments are chosen, monitored, and changed the government's competence to design and implement sound policies efficiently, and the citizens and state's respect for the institutions that regulate economic and social relations. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) assess six major governance characteristics across more than 215 nations and territories from 2009 to 2018. In WGI, Since 1996, the country scored at the lowest; here are a decade series data from WGI. There you can fully understand the country's situation of good governance, that we can easily say the country is in a critical situation of governance. Normally WIG indicators are six, but in this study, we have selected four of them. See below table 3.

Table 3. Worldwide governance indicators (WGI) Somalia 2009-2019.

Indicator	Country	Year	Number of Sources	Governance (-2.5 to +2.5)	Percentile Rank	Standard Error
Voice and Accountability	Somalia	2009	10	-2.04	2.37	0.14
		2010	11	-2.01	2.37	0.13
		2011	11	-2.02	1.88	0.14
		2012	12	-2.20	1.41	0.13
		2013	12	-2.17	1.41	0.12
		2014	9	-2.11	0.99	0.13
		2015	10	-2.00	1.48	0.13
		2016	11	-1.91	2.46	0.12
		2017	11	-1.78	3.94	0.13
		2018	11	-1.84	3.45	0.13
		2019	10	-1.84	2.96	0.12
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Somalia	2009	4	-3.31	0.00	0.28
		2010	5	-3.13	0.00	0.27
		2011	5	-3.08	0.00	0.26
		2012	6	-2.86	0.00	0.23
		2013	6	-2.76	0.00	0.24
		2014	6	-2.52	1.90	0.21
		2015	6	-2.38	1.90	0.21
		2016	6	-2.36	2.38	0.22
		2017	6	-2.26	3.81	0.22
		2018	6	-2.25	3.33	0.22
		2019	6	-2.38	2.86	0.24
Government Effectiveness	Somalia	2009	6	-2.23	0.00	0.23
		2010	6	-2.21	0.00	0.23
		2011	6	-2.14	0.00	0.23
		2012	7	-2.20	0.00	0.22
		2013	8	-2.22	0.00	0.19
		2014	7	-2.45	0.00	0.22
		2015	8	-2.20	0.00	0.20
		2016	9	-2.19	0.48	0.19
		2017	9	-2.22	0.48	0.20
		2018	9	-2.19	0.96	0.19
		2019	8	-2.24	0.96	0.20
Rule of Law	Somalia	2009	8	-2.45	0.00	0.19
		2010	8	-2.41	0.00	0.19
		2011	8	-2.33	0.00	0.18
		2012	9	-2.42	0.00	0.18
		2013	9	-2.40	0.00	0.17
		2014	8	-2.35	0.00	0.19
		2015	9	-2.30	0.00	0.19

		2016 10	-2.35	0.00	0.17
		2017 10	-2.31	0.00	0.16
		2018 10	-2.33	0.00	0.15
		2019 9	-2.35	0.00	0.15
Control of Corruption	Somalia	2009 8	-1.72	0.00	0.21
		2010 8	-1.74	0.00	0.20
		2011 8	-1.71	0.00	0.20
		2012 9	-1.59	0.00	0.17
		2013 9	-1.58	0.47	0.17
		2014 8	-1.66	0.48	0.17
		2015 9	-1.62	1.44	0.16
		2016 10	-1.70	0.96	0.16
		2017 10	-1.72	0.48	0.14
		2018 10	-1.80	0.00	0.16
		2019 9	-1.71	0.96	0.17

Source: World Bank database, worldwide governance indicators (WGI)

3.5. The Possible Ways that Somalia Can Overcome Corruption and Achieve Good Governance

Since corruption is a huge obstacle to a country's struggle for reaching good governance, thus, before the countries approach good governance strategies, firstly, it must be developed a possible anti-corruption policies. Likewise, study of country data from global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demonstrates that corruption exacerbates income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 1998; Bhargava and Bolongaita, 2004; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998), disproportionately affecting the poor. While one might argue that bribery is a kind of payment for speed and efficiency for the wealthy, in nations with high levels of corruption, the poor are forced to bribe for even basic services. Due to the fact that they spend a greater percentage of income on bribes, economic disparity is worsened. Thus, as Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004) argue, combating corruption entails nothing less than encouraging economic development, increasing a country's competitiveness, enhancing social circumstances, and alleviating poverty. However, eradicating corruption is a difficult process. The majority of initiatives to combat corruption over the last decade have generally begun with an examination of the root factors or facilitators of corruption. According to the literature on e-government initiatives to combat corruption (Hopper et al., 2009), computerized delivery of services (e.g., electronically required to submit internet-based applications and tax documents for computer processing) can help reduce corruption practices by decreasing encounters with officials, speeding up decision-making, and reducing human error. Similarly, while evaluating the research to

determine the possible role of e-government in decreasing corruption, Singh et al. (2010) stress that e-government removes discretion by eliminating intermediate services and allowing individuals to perform transactions directly. Additionally, Andersen and Rand (2006) explore the relationship between corruption and e-government, examining a cross-section of nations between 1997 and 2002. They believe that well-designed information and communication technology policies are likely to be helpful in combating corruption. Through the use of national-level data, Shin and Eom (2008) examine the effects of bureaucratic professionalism, bureaucratic quality, and law enforcement and discover how both e-government and classical anti-corruption elements have a beneficial effect on decreasing corruption. Shim and Eom (2009) investigate the influence of ICT and social capital on corruption in a follow-up paper, arguing that ICT has the ability to decrease needless human involvement in governmental work processes, therefore alleviating the need to monitor corrupt conduct. They employed panels of datasets from a variety of sources to find that ICT is an effective instrument for decreasing corruption and that social capital also has a beneficial influence on corruption reduction, however, the association among human capital and ICT is equivocal (Mistry & Jalal, 2012, p. 149,153).

To summarize, one critical method for combating corruption is to ensure that all individuals have simple access to the information through the use of e-government projects. These could result in more openness, reducing the public official's capacity to ask for bribes. Thus, e-government has the potential to give more information to the populace and eliminate the discretion of public officials by allowing individuals to perform transactions directly, perhaps resulting in a decrease in corruption.

E-government as a tool for good governance, e-government initiatives seek to simplify the public sector by basically automating its operations to enhance service delivery to consumers and companies. Digital workflows are one part of this streamlining since they enable workflow management via computers. This enables fine-grained control over work processes, resulting in consistency and mistake prevention, while also providing measurement and reporting. Governments have the potential to expedite service delivery, decrease costs, and enhance the quality of their services at all levels through the use of digital processes. However, the reality of digital process implementation frequently falls short of this promise (Negumbo, 2018, p. ii).

Some developing nations tested e-government as a method to prevent corruption and make easy public service delivery to their citizens. Although a country like Somalia needs more than e-government, the country's institutions are weak, just like countries recovering from failure. If the government establishes a mass conflict resolution to retain the trust among the society, it is possible to reach good governance. After that, accountability and transparency come next. Those involved in corrupt acts must be on trial, and the government transactions must be clear to the public to regain the public's lost trust in their government.

3.6. Research Design

To investigate the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia, a distinctive simple regression model was engaged on account that influencing element of good governance measured by Worldwide governance indicators (Control of corruption, Government effectiveness, Political stability, Rule of law, and Voice and accountability) as sub independent variables. In contrast, corruption which is the dependent variable is measured by Corruption perception index (CPI) to test the study questions. These questions consist of one causative relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. In this study, secondary data gathered from the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators (WGI) and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) will be analyzed to answer the study question of, what is the relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia?. For both sources, time-series data is used, which covers from 2009 to 2019.

Simple regression is a statistical approach for determining the amount and direction of a criterion and predictor variable's connection. The models will be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) results imply that the analysis is minimizing the sum of square errors by adopting a relationship model between one or even more explanatory variables and an ongoing or at least interval outcome variable that minimizes the difference between the actual and predicted value of the outcome variable. Linear regression with a single or many predictor variables is the most popular analytical approach that uses OLS models. Ordinary least squares regression is extensively utilized in a variety of scientific disciplines, including physics, economics, and psychology, and a slew of textbooks have been produced to teach the approach and its applications in many fields of study. OLS regression, in its most basic form, shows a linear

relationship between the x predictor and the y outcome variable, and provides a solution to the $Y_{1...n} = a + bX + e$ model, where a is an intercept (value of y at x 0), b is a regression coefficient expressing the amount of change in y associated with a one-unit change in x, and e is a residual error; a difference between the predicted and actual score. Because it defines the breadth, direction, and intensity of the connection between y and x, the regression coefficient b is of particular relevance. When adjusting for some factors known to interact with the outcome variable, multiple OLS regression is used to determine which of several predictors are more or less relevant in predicting the result variable or how one or more predictors connect to the outcome (Michaels, 2014).

The OLS regression models used variables as given in the following;

$$Y_{1...n} = a + bX + e$$

Where;

X = Voice and accountability, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness Political Stability.


$Y_{1...n}$ = Corruption Perception Index (CPI),

e = Error term,

a = Arbitrary constant.

3.7. Findings and Discussion of the Results


Figure 7. Corruption perception index (CPI) and Voice and Accountability.



R-square = 0.553, Adjusted R-square = 0.515, P-value = 0.003

Voice and Accountability measure individuals' opinions of their capacity to engage in the election of their government, as well as their freedom of speech, association, and access to a free press. The African Development Bank advocates alongside African governments to improve their abilities to stand publicly and be held accountable. It is preparing a financial support mission for African governments, which will aid in the creation of mechanisms for public participation and greater information access, among some other things. In Somalia some barriers undermining the country's voice and accountability progress, these barriers include, the 4.5 power-sharing system which is already mentioned in our third chapter, also traditional clan chiefs' role in society is also an obstacle that eliminates citizen's rights or politicians' accountability. Therefore, the result of the regression analyses indicates, there is a positive correlation between corruption perception index (CPI) and Voice and accountability (VA), whenever Voice and accountability increases also there is a small increase in CPI.


Figure 8. Corruption perception index CPI) and Rule of Law (RL).



R-square = 0.475, Adjusted R-square = 0.391, P-value = 0.152

Generally, the rule of law indicates that the making of laws, their implementation, and the links between legal norms are all governed by the law and that no one is above the law, including all the highest-ranking officials. The judicial factor on rulers indicates that perhaps the government, like its population, is bound by existing laws. As a result, a closely connected concept is that of equality under the law, which states that no “legal” person should be granted benefits that are not provided to everyone and that no one should be exempt from legal consequences. The rule of law is a system that keeps government and private sector organizations respond to the law and safeguards individuals' rights from arbitrary governance and power abuse. As a result, since the failure of the central government, rule of law has been one of the most essential elements in restoring Somalia's governmental structure. Solid changes to improve the rule of law in Somalia have been undertaken by the federal government of Somalia (FGS) and United Nations (UN) agencies representing the international community. As a result of the regression study, there is a positive relationship between rule of law and the corruption perception index (CPI), with a modest improvement in corruption whenever rule of law improves. However, this does not imply that the rule of law has a direct influence on Somalia's corruption and that a rise in the rule of law would inevitably result in a decrease in Somalia's corruption.


Figure 9. Corruption perception index (CPI) and Control of corruption (CC).



R-square = 0.605, Adjusted R-square = 0.561, P-value = 0.004

Even though corruption is both a cause and a consequence of Somalia's persistent political instability, the country has been rated at the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index since 1991. It is a visible and anticipated kind of conduct that occurs at all levels in both the public and private sectors. This has had an impact on almost every area of Somali life. Despite dramatic political developments in early 2017 that witnessed the peaceful transfer of power to an elected government that now has already finished its time in office, there are few signs of meaningful anti-corruption measures. However, the study found a negative relationship between the two variables, with increased corruption control leading to a fall in the corruption perception index (CPI). On the other hand, the research revealed that there is a strong relationship between the two variables, implying that improving corruption control will result in a reduction in corruption.


Figure 10. Corruption perception index (CPI) and Government effectiveness (GE).



R-square = 0.129, Adjusted R-square = 0.032, P-value = 0.277

The ability of the government to ensure the safety of its citizens from violence, and to maintain the integrity of the bureaucracies and the service delivery, as well as the supply of essential infrastructure, is why government effectiveness is the ability to secure the citizens from violent acts. A government that is effective is the one that can provide the services that its people require to increase their social wellbeing. Since the start of the development process in Somalia, establishing a functional government has been a critical goal to achieve. The FGS and its development partners have been working extremely hard to achieve this political milestone. However, the data analysis results showed there is a negative relationship between the two variables, and when the government effectiveness amount increases there is also a slight decrease in corruption perception index (CPI). Since the relationship between variables is not significant, the possibility that government effectiveness could impact corruption is very low.

Figure 11. Corruption perception index (CPI) and Political stability (PS).



R-square = 0.193, Adjusted R-square = 0.104, P-value = 0.175

The extensive political instability that Somalia has experienced since 1977 has had a negative impact on economic performance, finally leading to the state's entire collapse in 1991. Since then, the international community has been working extremely hard to restore political stability in Somalia. To do so, they organized a series of national debates and finally succeeded in forming a governance structure with the goal of gaining authority over the country's territory. For the previous three decades, this has been a major political turning point for the world community. In the recent decade, important political developments, as well as other forces such as the Somali national army's and AMISOM's repulsing of Al-Shabaab, have played a crucial part in achieving peace and stability. Thus, the analysis shows that there is no relationship between the two variables. Whenever the corruption perception index (CPI) increases the political stability remains unchanged.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the foundation of the Somalia state in 1960, there have been many problems that have hampered the building of a decent institutional framework in Somalia. Clan identification and clannism, for example, have served as the foundation for the country's political power. The federalism process has been slowed by technical issues and an absence of adequate entities on the ground, as well as weak institutions, corruption, and political instability. Somalia's political and economic problems also obstruct the establishment of effective governance. The prevalent image of Somalia is that it is a chaotic country with no order. Somalis continue to rely on a traditional governance structure, which creates informal regulations that allow Somalis to go about their everyday lives. Traditional governance structure can only provide informal governance; nevertheless, formal governance is required if economic growth is to be achieved. As a result, traditional governance's institutional structure should be complemented or replaced by formal governance in the long run. Conclusion and possibly these formal governing systems should be built on Somali society's well-known norms to obtain a wide understanding and approval of the Somali people and allow for institutional syncretism.

Citizens have fought for an autonomous state for decades. Following independence, Somalia put democracy to the test in 1960, when the country chose democracy as its preferred system of government. That dream, however, did not last long, and democracy was shattered when a military dictatorship took over Somalia and ruled for nearly two decades. Since then, Somalia has been the world's poorest performer in terms of good governance and democracy, with substantial difficulties impeding the creation of a good governance environment in the country, including political challenges, weak institutions, and terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab Al Qaeda affiliated group. As a result, the study discovered that effective governance would be critical in establishing trust between the people and the government in Somalia. But, within the country and across the Horn of Africa, fostering good governance will be critical to establishing a long-term democracy.

As demonstrated in the above findings through secondary data analysis by using OLS regression, Somalia has a low level of accomplishment in several criteria of good government. For example, rampant corruption in the public sector and a lack of accountability and transparency have hampered the development of good governance and

the provision of public services. When there is a lack of accountability and transparency, it leads to the creation of fake economies and corrupt institutions and poverty, inequality, and droughts. As a result, if Somalia is to overcome the majority of the difficulties it has today, the nation's existing state of good governance requires substantial reforms and immediate attention. Lack of essential concepts in practice, such as the rule of law, legal administrative competence, and an effective anti-corruption strategy, are blamed for the lack of good governance practices. According to the findings, Somalia pays little attention to fostering good governance and tackling corruption issues. In certain places, a lack of suitable and relevant laws and policies also poses a significant challenge to developing good governance. Somalia is a federal state with a constitution, parliament, and ministries for each member state. As a result, Somalia has failed to produce national norms and regulations that affect the lives of all Somalis in the country and abroad. For example, the government does not govern some parts of Somalia, and the country's rule of law has not yet reached these places. Furthermore, there is a lack of ability to maintain law and order and a lack of skills among civil servants and policymakers in public institutions, all of which have led citizens to accept weak governance and corruption.

This study examined the impact of corruption on good governance in Somalia. The main objective of this study was to know the relationship between the two variables and how they affect each other. The study findings showed that corruption is a constraint to promoting good governance in Somalia, and although some good governance indicators are critical for preventing corruption. Finally, this study concludes that there is a relationship between corruption and good governance in Somalia. Since the governance in Somalia is based on a traditional clan system that undermines good governance initiatives of the country and facilitates corrupt acts. This traditional governance also removes the accountability of those in government offices and paves the way of committing corruption. So that, Somalia should take a formal governance system to take the way to good governance and come with a good anti-corruption strategy based on the rule of law to eradicate the long-lasting corruption in the country.

1. This study recommends Somalia should concentrate on developing a set of governance competencies known as good governance principles. Human rights legislation, the rule of law, an effective anti-corruption measure, and the use of e-governance techniques to improve government transparency and

accountability should all be included. As a result, the government's public service will improve, and public institutions will be more responsive to the general public. Meanwhile, the federal government should stress an analytical approach that can be used to the country's diverse institutions, including state and federal level institutions, to help examine their existing circumstances, identify possible areas for development, and assess their relative feasibility and measures needed to enhance governance. Any reform initiative that lacks this analytical framework is likely to fail due to a lack of shared ability to understand the actual problems and possible remedies. Civil society groups should play a key role in attaining this goal, and government bodies should be held accountable for stressing and implementing these processes.

2. In Somalia, governmental institutions should evaluate the importance of public satisfaction, formally implement their demands, and provide prompt answers. This implies that major departments should be obliged to create strategic plans that clearly define their organizations' immediate and long-term aims and how they expect to offer public services.
3. A good anti-corruption strategy may lead the country to prevent corruption. It can develop that kind of strategy by carrying out extensive research about countries that once had an endemic corruption issue but now have less corruption and how they fought with it. After that, Somalia can easily benchmark those strategies, and surely it will benefit.
4. The federal government of Somalia and its member states must reflect openness, accountability, and legitimacy of state affairs to influence the political development process. Documents about tax revenue generation and expenditures should be freely accessible to citizens.
5. At both the federal and regional state levels, comprehensive monitoring and assessment are required to identify the major issues of poor governance practices in Somalia. This monitoring and assessment method might aid administrative authorities, civil society organizations, and policymakers in identifying obstacles to project execution.

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APPENDIX


Appendix A: Map of Somalia



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
December 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Appendix B: Map of Somalia and Contested Territories



Appendix C: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Somalia 2009-2019

Indicator	Country	Year	Number of Sources	Governance (-2.5 to +2.5)	Percentile Rank	Standard Error
Voice and Accountability	Somalia	2009	10	-2.04	2.37	0.14
		2010	11	-2.01	2.37	0.13
		2011	11	-2.02	1.88	0.14
		2012	12	-2.20	1.41	0.13
		2013	12	-2.17	1.41	0.12
		2014	9	-2.11	0.99	0.13
		2015	10	-2.00	1.48	0.13
		2016	11	-1.91	2.46	0.12
		2017	11	-1.78	3.94	0.13
		2018	11	-1.84	3.45	0.13
		2019	10	-1.84	2.96	0.12
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Somalia	2009	4	-3.31	0.00	0.28
		2010	5	-3.13	0.00	0.27
		2011	5	-3.08	0.00	0.26
		2012	6	-2.86	0.00	0.23
		2013	6	-2.76	0.00	0.24
		2014	6	-2.52	1.90	0.21
		2015	6	-2.38	1.90	0.21
		2016	6	-2.36	2.38	0.22
		2017	6	-2.26	3.81	0.22
		2018	6	-2.25	3.33	0.22
		2019	6	-2.38	2.86	0.24
Government Effectiveness	Somalia	2009	6	-2.23	0.00	0.23
		2010	6	-2.21	0.00	0.23
		2011	6	-2.14	0.00	0.23
		2012	7	-2.20	0.00	0.22
		2013	8	-2.22	0.00	0.19
		2014	7	-2.45	0.00	0.22
		2015	8	-2.20	0.00	0.20
		2016	9	-2.19	0.48	0.19
		2017	9	-2.22	0.48	0.20
		2018	9	-2.19	0.96	0.19

		2019	8	-2.24	0.96	0.20
Rule of Law	Somalia	2009	8	-2.45	0.00	0.19
		2010	8	-2.41	0.00	0.19
		2011	8	-2.33	0.00	0.18
		2012	9	-2.42	0.00	0.18
		2013	9	-2.40	0.00	0.17
		2014	8	-2.35	0.00	0.19
		2015	9	-2.30	0.00	0.19
		2016	10	-2.35	0.00	0.17
		2017	10	-2.31	0.00	0.16
		2018	10	-2.33	0.00	0.15
		2019	9	-2.35	0.00	0.15
Control of Corruption	Somalia	2009	8	-1.72	0.00	0.21
		2010	8	-1.74	0.00	0.20
		2011	8	-1.71	0.00	0.20
		2012	9	-1.59	0.00	0.17
		2013	9	-1.58	0.47	0.17
		2014	8	-1.66	0.48	0.17
		2015	9	-1.62	1.44	0.16
		2016	10	-1.70	0.96	0.16
		2017	10	-1.72	0.48	0.14
		2018	10	-1.80	0.00	0.16
		2019	9	-1.71	0.96	0.17

Source: World Bank database, worldwide governance indicators (WGI)