

**T.C.**

**MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**NATIONALIST TENDENCIES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EU:  
THE CASE OF FRANCE AND GERMANY**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Oğuzcan Üstün**

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**Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır**

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## ABSTRACT

It has become a frequently-repeated suggestion that the European Union, in the contemporary international relations, is an actor whose economic weight is undeniable. As much as the welfare produced within the territory of the Union, historical background of its members, too, contributes to this perception. However, before evaluating the weight of the Union on the world scale, one must first turn to the questions of how united it is in itself or under what motivations or factors it emerged and progressed. Is the Union the current state of a conscious and systematically-developed initiative that intended to eventually unite, in peace and welfare, the residents of a war-torn continent in economic, political and social dimensions; or is it a platform that some members shaped or helped progress in order to secure their interests more effectively than they could do on their own: a platform they sometimes utilized, sometimes praised?

This thesis suggests that there are more reasons to believe the validity of the second suggestion above and that the Union is, in fact, the eventual state of an endeavor initiated to transform the historical rivalry between France and Germany into a more peaceful form. European integration, for France, has been a useful mean to restrict its eternal rival, Germany, and -where possible- to assume the leading role in Western Europe; while, for Germany, it has been an avenue where the country would be redeemed from the mistakes in its recent past, and regain the status of a respected, equal state. In the following sections of the study, Franco-German influence on both the institutional design and the policy areas of the Union were examined and it was found that French influence, experienced heavily in the early phases of the integration, eroded in time; while Germany, being gradually released from the restricting factors, took over the leading role.

## ÖZET

Bugünün uluslararası ilişkiler düzleminde, Avrupa Birliği'nin ekonomik ağırlığı yadsınamaz bir aktör olduğu söylemi çokça tekrarlanan bir iddia haline gelmiştir. Bu algının oluşmasında Birlik sınırları içerisinde üretilen refah kadar, üyelerin tarihi bakiyesi de etkili olmaktadır. Fakat Avrupa Birliği'nin dünya ölçüğündeki ağırlığını değerlendirmeden önce kendi içinde ne ölçüde birlik olduğu, hangi amaç ve faktörlerin etkisi altında doğup geliştiği mutlaka sorgulanması gereken noktalardır. Avrupa Birliği, savaşlarla yıpranmış bir kıtanın sakinlerini sonunda barış ve refah içinde ekonomik, siyasi ve sosyal anlamda bir araya getirmek için bilinçli ve sistematize bir şekilde geliştirilmiş bir girişimin modern hali midir yoksa bazı ülkelerin tek başlarına elde edemeyecekleri çıkarlarını daha etkin bir şekilde gerçekleştirebileceklerine inanarak şekillendirdikleri ya da gelişimine destek oldukları, zaman zaman araçsallaştırip belli durumlarda yücelttikleri bir platform mudur?

Bu tez ikinci önermenin doğruluğuna inanmak için daha fazla sebebin var olduğunu ileri sürmekte ve Avrupa Birliği'nin, aslında Fransa ve Almanya arasındaki tarihi rekabeti daha barışçıl bir forma dönüştürmek amacıyla başlatılan bir girişimin nihai hali olduğunu anlatmaktadır. Avrupa entegrasyonu Fransa için, tarihi rakibi Almanya'yı zapt etmek ve mümkün olduğu ölçüde Batı Avrupa'nın lideri rolünü üstlenmek amacıyla yönelik kullanışlı bir araç; Almanya için de yakın geçmişteki kusurlarının bağışlanacağı ve yeniden saygın ve eşit bir devlet haline gelebileceği bir mecrâ olarak belirmiştir. Çalışmanın ilerleyen bölümlerinde Birlik'in hem kurumsal yapısı hem de politika alanlarındaki Fransız-Alman etkisi incelenmiş ve entegrasyonun ilk dönemlerinde baskın olarak görülen Fransız etkisinin, zamanla Almanya'nın kendisini kısıtlayan çeşitli faktörlerin etkisinden kurtulmasıyla aşındığı ve liderlik rolünün Almanya tarafından devralıldığı görülmüştür.

## PREFACE

The European Union is such an entity that most of the time it is, within the contemporary debates, either the target of despise or the object of praise. Its limited actorness, ineffective stance in international context and trade-centered outlook are some of the defects its critics like to voice. On the other side of the argument, there is the other group with the tendency of depicting the Union as a civilization project that flies the flag of normative values, and aims to institute a multi-dimensional unity in the continent. This paper will try to form an understanding as to what could be expected of the Union when it comes to establishing such a unity. The argument in this paper was intended to provide an alternative view to the mainstream approach explaining European integration. In order to better understand the EU and determine what it is or what it is not, one is bound to dig into its roots and explore the motivations of those who invented it. This is why the paper starts with a chapter dedicated solely to the long-standing, troubled relationship of France and Germany. At the end of the paper, it is hoped that the reader will be able to view the current debates within the Union, regarding for instance how to rescue debt-ridden members, under a different light.

I must state my thankfulness for the help and consideration that I have been shown during the preparation of this thesis. I, therefore, would like to express my endless gratitude to my family for their support and encouragement during my efforts for academic study. I would also like to thank my supervisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır who, with his valuable guidance and careful review, kept me from falling into error and elevated the quality of this thesis. Likewise, I owe thanks to Ms. Pınar Deniz as well for her assistance enabling me to comprehend and better explain the monetary aspect of the integration.

Oğuzcan Üstün

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD:	Administrative Personnel (in the European Commission)
AG:	Advocate General
AST:	Assistant Personnel (in the European Commission)
CAP:	Common Agricultural Policy
CDU:	Christian Democratic Union (of Germany)
CEECs:	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFLN:	French Committee of National Liberation
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE:	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSU:	Bavarian Branch of the CDU
DG:	Directorate General
ECB:	European Central Bank
ESCB:	European System of Central Banks
ECSC:	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU:	European Currency Unit
EDC:	European Defense Community
EEC:	European Economic Community
EMF:	European Monetary Fund
EMI:	European Monetary Institute
EMS:	European Monetary System

EMU:	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC:	European Political Co-operation
EPU:	European Payments Union
EU:	European Union
EURATOM:	The European Atomic Energy Community
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDP:	Free Democratic Party (of Germany)
FRG:	Federal Republic of Germany
GATT:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR:	German Democratic Republic
GNP:	Gross National Product
ICA:	International Co-operative Administration (of the United States)
IGC:	Intergovernmental Conference
ILO:	International Labor Organization
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
MLF:	Multilateral Nuclear Force
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEGP:	North Europe Gas Pipeline
OEEC:	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
PHARE:	Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Their Economies
SEA:	Single European Act
SFR:	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPD:	Social Democratic Party (of Germany)
TACIS:	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
US:	The United States of America
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHO:	World Health Organization

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the roles and the weight of France and Germany in the European Communities/Union throughout the historical course of the European integration in 20<sup>th</sup> century. The term European integration in this paper denotes the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community for these institutions -unlike the Atomic Community- provide an avenue of political and economic interaction among their members in which nationalist demeanors are more likely to surface. The origin of this study derived from the curiosity of whether or not it is plausible to expect the European Union to evolve into a formation of further unity, when its members are already having hard time displaying coherence in the current phase of the integration due to pursuit of their national interests. These attitudes of the member states, however, had to be inspected in a narrowed field in order for them to be the research subject that would have to be studied within a certain time period and domain scope. These two countries, France and Germany, are selected as the subjects of the study and the main actors of the integration due not only to the fact that the integration was, at its root, built on these countries; but due also to the reality that France and Germany had differed from other European states on the continent in terms of some inherent characteristics such as historical depth or material capabilities which would eventually affect their approach to integration in favor of self-interests.

As another, perhaps more important, reason to put the focus of this study on these countries, the centuries-old rivalry between France and Germany also needs to be stressed here for the suggestion of a European integration on the foundations of normative values put forward by the classical approach will be the first issue whose plausibility will be questioned in this study. The purpose of this historical discussion is to urge the reader to re-think the true necessities and motivations behind the integration as well as shedding light on the patterns in the current events taking place in the Union with the help of past examples. Allowing a separate part for the historical background lying behind the European integration is also expected to enrich the qualitative nature of this study since

drawing conclusions in a research subject with a deep-running past would lack reliability without a certain degree of historical depth.

The first part of the study, therefore, is a necessary component in order to understand not only how deep the rivalry between these two countries runs; but also how probable it is for France and Germany to put aside the burdens of their past and engage in an endeavor with idealistic motivations in mind. In this regard, the first part will function as a ground that the overall argument of the thesis will rest on. In the following sections of the first part, the focus will be put exclusively on France in order to clarify what circumstances or motivations facilitated the efforts that gave birth to the European integration, as well as questioning to what extent, in the process, the idealistic aims in the minds of the forefathers were adhered to. The discussion was also intended to be enriched with the quotations from the persons of high historical importance to the integration. When considered within its entire context, it is, indeed, the first part that will link the subject directly to the root of nationalist attitudes on the part of France. The alternative view presented as to the inception of the European integration in this part portrays, in a sense, the overall mindset of Paris regarding its motivations behind the idea of integration.

In line with the main objective of defining such nationalist reflexes exercised by France and Germany during the course of integration, the following parts of the study are aimed to become more specific and to explain such behaviors on the basis of fields whereby the French and German efforts for their bilateral gains are concentrated most. The fact that the signs of French influence were grouped in a way that relates to the institutional structure of the Union, while the impact of Germany was expressed on the basis of policy areas does not mean that Paris had no effect on the formation of the Community policies. In fact, France played a vital role in the making of some of the Community level policies regarding, for instance, agriculture and European neighborhood. However, since German influence is felt heavily on the policy areas that constitute the core activities of the Community, the classification of the parts was inevitably shaped in conformity with this reasoning. Considering the fact that the integration itself was, at its roots, a French initiative, the second part is dedicated to investigate the examples of French presence in the European integration, which would be found in several different dimensions. Although the country managed to secure a community-level agricultural policy favoring its interests, the

long-term influence of Paris has been, in fact, on the institutional design of the Communities, rather than on the policy areas. Findings presented in this part regarding both the culture and the structure of the Community institutions reveal a reflection of a historical accumulation deriving from French governance traditions. The second part, therefore, tries to make these patterns at the Community level more visible while, in the meantime, explaining how they developed.

After reviewing the French marks concentrating in the institutional structure of the Communities, another -and more extensive- part will be dedicated to assess German influence. As will be stated also in the text, Germany had always been a country with outstanding potential throughout its history, especially in the economic realm. It should, therefore, not be surprising that its drifts into nationalist attitudes in the policy areas of the European Economic Community and the Union constitute a more extensive volume in this study. Dominating the economic sphere of the integration both in terms of trade and monetary issues, Germany in the third part will be examined in the historical continuity of the post-war era within each section, all of which were intended to express the theme that Germany, due primarily to its economic performance, utilized the Community/Union endeavors to gradually gain a legitimate, recognized competence in those policy fields and to eventually reunite with the other half of its nation kept apart by the Soviet hold. Especially in the economic dimension of the third part, the argument is supported not only with the figures indicating the successful performance of the German state; but also with the contemporary news expressing the tension stemming out of that success. The third and the fourth sections of the third part aim to review the conduct of German foreign policy, and the handling of a domestic problem, immigration, at the European level. Findings emerging in these sections of the third part also confirm the presence of actions and policies that were carried out primarily for self-interest on the part of Germany. In the foreign policy section, the argument will be explained within the political atmosphere of the era for the conditions enabling unilateralism in the foreign policy conduct of Bonn/Berlin to stand out. Likewise, the fourth section too benefited from the reference to this political atmosphere since the growing confidence of the German state would inevitably manifest itself as a more nationalist attitude in German identity.

Before proceeding to the text, however, a point regarding the origin of this study has to be made clear once again, especially to the readers of international relations discipline who may find nothing beneficial or interesting in writing on the nationalist tendencies of two countries since pursuing self-interests has never been an unaccustomed behavior for states. However, if these two countries are the most important actors of an initiative that has the claim of reshaping the political and economic order of Europe in an ever closer union where the ethnic tensions and rivalries seen recurrently in the history of the continent would be left in the past, then the roles of France and Germany -the two end of the centuries-old enmity- become a notable research subject, which could lead the reader to revise the classical approach as to the European integration without, however, disregarding the power dynamics in the continent. A brief assessment in this regard will, therefore, make up the conclusion where all the review regarding the roles of France and Germany will be outlined in a way that clarifies the main argument of the thesis. The conclusion also aims to present a final evaluation whereby the prospects of further integration will be questioned in line with the discourse diffused into the entire study.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

With the aim of exploring the nationalist tendencies of two countries in the governance of the Union, the argument in this study -in theoretical context- rests on the basic tenets of the realist view with its state-centric assumption, and on its intergovernmentalist interpretation for regional integration in particular. As known, the literature on the issue of integration in the international organizations refers to two distinct poles of argument that stress the conditions or factors that are believed to either catalyze or hinder the prospect of integration.

The logic of integration put forward by the neo-functionalism understanding has its roots in a mentality deriving from the notion of interdependence in European scale, and the pressure agents associated with the supranational initiatives<sup>1</sup>, both of which would eventually render nationalistic attitudes on the part of states not only unnecessary; but also undesired due to a common sense of unity that would arise out of the supranational endeavor<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, neo-functionalism as a regional integration theory is considered to be a revised version of a global approach to the notion of functional co-operation in which the successful outcome in one specific sector of integration is expected to spread out into other areas<sup>3</sup>. Since the agents benefiting from the supranational endeavors are expected to reach out their like-minded counterparts, the purpose of overcoming the borders of the nation state lies primarily with those agents at both industrial and governmental dimensions whose constant feedbacks could constitute a viable ground to achieve an eventual political union<sup>4</sup>. The emphasis put on this sort of non-state integrative actors by neo-functionalists, especially by Ernst Haas, is also visible in the example of inner executive body of the integration<sup>5</sup> which is believed to have a transformative influence. The efforts of the

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<sup>1</sup> Hoffmann, Stanley "Obstinate or Obsolete?: France, European Integration and the Fate of the Nation State" in **Euro-skepticism: A Reader**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2001, p.49.

<sup>2</sup> Rosamond, Ben, **Theories of European Integration**, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2000, p.77.

<sup>3</sup> Jo, Sam-Sang, **European Myths: Resolving the Crisis in the European Community/ European Union**, University Press of America, Maryland, 2007, p.8.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Galbreath, David and Gebhard, Carmen, **Cooperation or Conflict: Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe**, Ashgate, Farnham, p.5.

European Commission to convert industrial actors into the idea of liberalizing the energy market in member states and gain their support for the Single European Act (SEA) can be seen as this sort of influence<sup>6</sup>. In the process, however, the neo-functionalism understanding also acknowledges a subtle consensus for interest on the part of stakeholders to start the first motion towards further integration.

On the other hand, the logic of divergence put forward by intergovernmentalist reasoning inevitably limits the integrationist movement and its probable spillover<sup>7</sup> on the part of a state when the national imperatives and the outcomes of international co-operation in the case at hand cease to overlap. This is why the intergovernmentalists have defined the concepts of low and high politics as the venues where the likelihood of the integration in a policy area is inversely-correlated to the importance of the policy to the given state<sup>8</sup>. To this reasoning, even when a state should lose a possible gain on a crucial policy area, it prefers loosing by its own mistake, rather than that of a collective setting<sup>9</sup>. It would, therefore, be naïve to expect that the states with individual parameters such as national identity, domestic pressure or historical background in defining their interests would let them be governed by a third party, however collective it may be. Intergovernmentalist approach to regional integration also rules out the impact of the non-governmental agents on activities and preferences of the governments regarding the integration process<sup>10</sup>. However, it must be stated that the intergovernmentalists differ from the proponents of realist view since the former take also domestic policy preferences into account in determining the national position of a state towards the idea of integration<sup>11</sup>. Still, the integration seems possible only when sovereign states agree on the fruitful outcomes of the process. The same example above, therefore, can also be interpreted according to the intergovernmentalists as a consensus among the Federal Republic, France and Britain regarding the adaptation to the neo-liberal political economy<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Lelieveldt, Herman and Princen, Sebastiaan, **The Politics of the European Union**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p.36.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffman, op.cit., p.49.

<sup>8</sup> Rosamond, op.cit., p.77.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Lelieveldt and Princen, op.cit., p.37.

<sup>11</sup> Lequesne, Christian, "The European Union: How to Deal With a Strange Animal" in **The New International Relations: Theory and Practice**, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p.57.

<sup>12</sup> Rosamond, op.cit., p136.

With nationalism already disfavored, it was a suitable atmosphere in Europe after the Second World War when the hope for an ever closer union on the foundations of functional co-operation of supranational nature began to develop. However, as argued also in the study, nationalism would never be out of the picture, though its heavy demonstrations were temporarily out of sight. The institutions of the integration would be dedicated to European cause only in proportion as the member states want them to be. Even if the birth of the post-war European integration and the efforts of Jean Monnet were assumed, with extensive optimism, a natural process -which this study argues contrarily- soon enough, France would present the indisputable instance in the mid 60s with its attitude against the European Commission. While it is true that the development of the theoretical approach of intergovernmentalism coincided with perhaps the most visible nationalistic impulses of the de Gaulle era, it should also be taken into consideration that the Community initiatives in the following decades of the integration would not emerge without subtle yet heavy struggle among member states, especially between France and Germany.

As also stated in the main theme of the study, France and Germany are the sole countries that have been influential and effective in shaping the course and nature of the integration since its very beginning. As this study argues, there is a reason why the institutions of the Community heavily received the traditions or customs of French origin during its inception phase. There is a reason why the Union still lacks a common, firm attitude in international political scene forty years after the inception of the European Political Cooperation. Likewise, there is a reason why Euro, regarded once as the crowning element of the horizon that the integration has reached is now seen as a vain attempt benefiting no member except for Germany. These are just the initial examples among many that could be presented when it comes to motivations and necessities behind the idea of integration which intergovernmental perspective seems more likely to make sense of. It would, therefore, be an inaccurate evaluation to regard what are usually deemed as the historical steps in the European integration just as the elements of a spontaneous march towards a functional unity, without considering the arduous processes of intergovernmental bargaining behind them and the roles of France and Germany in it.

## PART ONE

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN RIVALRY AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE COMMUNITIES

#### 1.1. Roots of the Franco-German Antagonism

The history of Europe has oftentimes been a history of wars. Happening first between the tribes at the early Middle Ages upon the decline of the Roman Empire and later between ruling dynasties during the high and late Middle Ages, wars, stemming from several reasons, have never been uncommon events, unlike the periods of peace. With Roman Empire fading in power, families from different Germanic tribes competed with each other for reign in Europe. One of the longest-lasting rivalries, however, has been engaged between French and German powerhouses that stood out from the other dynasties and became imperial: The House of Valois that would be succeeded by the Bourbons and The House of Habsburgs.

##### 1.1.1. Franco-German Rivalry in Early Modern Europe

From the 15<sup>th</sup> century onward, Habsburgs looked to exercise their influence over territories other than heartland Germany. These imperial achievements have often been acquired not through costly warfare but through well-designed marriages between the Habsburgs and other dynasties in Europe. At the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Holy Roman Empire under Maximilian I had already turned into a multinational empire annexing modern Belgium, Netherlands and also inheriting the Spanish throne, through the marriage of his son Philip<sup>13</sup>. Other than territorial gains, the reign of Maximilian I in this era also saw the Holy Roman Empire undertaking institutional reforms to administer the empire, coming to be known as the Holy Roman Empire of The German Nation, or as the Germans like to call it, *The Reich*<sup>14</sup>. When Maximilian I passed the crown to his grandson Charles V, the power of the Empire was at its peak, almost reaching the control of the entire continent. Standing in his way, however, was an obstacle: The French Kingdom.

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<sup>13</sup> Ingrao, Charles, **The Habsburg Monarchy: 1618-1815**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p.4.

<sup>14</sup> Coy, Jason Philip, **A Brief History of Germany**, Infobase Publishing, New York, 2010, p.45.

While being transformed into an institutional empire around German identity, Habsburgs would eventually begin to pose a challenge to the French who at that time were trying to consolidate their power after the Hundred Years' War with British Empire and recover both socially and economically<sup>15</sup>. The French, whether it was in the time of the Kingdom, the Empire or the Republic, have always felt surrounded and threatened by every territorial gain of the Habsburgs. It was this fear that led the French to seek alliances with other powers both within and outside of the Holy Roman Empire. In order to create a counterweight against the dreaded Habsburgs, the French would never miss an opportunity, for a hegemonic Germany would bring nothing but disastrous consequences for the vital interests of France<sup>16</sup>.

The reformation movement that challenged Catholic Church, and hence, the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor was such an opportunity for the French, when a young monk, named Martin Luther, shook the tenets of the Catholic belief with his discourses over the issues such as the sale of indulgences and the authority of the Papacy. Soon enough his writings would spread across the Empire and attract the masses, as well as attracting furious imperial and Papal response. However, the more Catholic Church resorted to silence reformists with executions, the more spark flared up among supporters of Luther, bringing a period of chaos for the Empire. Moreover, the conciliation reached in Augsburg in 1555, after several battles between the imperial forces and Reformists could not be enough to settle the religious dispute since the new Emperor Ferdinand tried to consolidate Catholic Church with a counter-reformation against the Reformists<sup>17</sup>.

The scene seemed to be set for the French. At the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the princes making up the Holy Roman Empire had parted into two camps and began to wage war against each other, bringing about Thirty Years' War. Although imperial forces seemed to lose ground when the Dutch and the Swedish forces joined the Reformists against imperial forces, the Emperor Ferdinand quickly got the upper hand in the battlefield, and German Protestants began to seek peace with the Empire, leading to Peace of Prague. The French, however, had no intention as to encouraging peace within the

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<sup>15</sup> State, Paul, **A Brief History of France**, Infobase Publishing, New York, 2010, p.84.

<sup>16</sup> Ulbert, Jörg, "France and German Dualism, 1756-1871" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.40.

<sup>17</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.75.

Empire and, thereby, allowing the Emperor to strengthen his position<sup>18</sup>. Despite his Catholic faith, the French statesman, Cardinal Richelieu, built a broad alliance with the Protestant Dutch and Swedes to prolong the war in the Empire and also declared war against Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs<sup>19</sup>. When imperial forces successfully responded to the French advances and even threatened Paris, war proved to be too costly, not just for France but for all parties involved since Swedish forces, supported generously by the French, had ravaged the Empire. Still, it was the French who would benefit the most from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The peace ending the Thirty Years' War loosened the grip of the Habsburgs on Europe by leaving Austria and Spain quite weakened, and it won for France territorial gains, most of Alsace and Lorraine<sup>20</sup>. More importantly, with the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy Roman Emperor had to grant concessions to German princes, making them sovereign to a degree and able to conduct their own foreign policy, all of which would eventually leave the Holy Roman Emperor with an eroded throne and diminished imperial authority. Not surprisingly, after the long years of warfare and social unrest across the Empire, the Habsburgs lost their weight and momentum in international politics, as another rival arose from within.

Raised, in 1701, to the rank of kingdom, Prussia became a remarkable power in just a few decades and quickly began to defy Austria<sup>21</sup>. That is strictly connected to the term *German dualism* which is often explained as the lack of a single German state but presence of two hegemonic German powers struggling for supremacy<sup>22</sup>. War of Austrian Succession in 1740 was the prominent example of this when Prussia, along with a few German princes, waged war against Austria, under the pretext that a female could not assume the imperial throne<sup>23</sup>. The French supported the Prussian forces, invading a rich Austrian province Silesia. Interfering the conflict with the hope of exploiting the dynastic instability of the Habsburgs, the French tried to create a counterweight against Austria. However, power of Prussia from 1755 was deemed too large and even menacing for French interests<sup>24</sup>. When Austria attempted to re-take Silesia, French army, this time, was on the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.85.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> State, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>21</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.39.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.89.

<sup>24</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.40.

side of Austria, bringing about the term *diplomatic revolution*<sup>25</sup> to explain such a sudden reversal of alliance on the part of French Kingdom. This marriage of convenience, however, would not bring the desired outcome to the French or to Austria, since Prussia managed to keep its hold over Silesia and put the French through a catastrophic defeat in little more than an hour on the ground, causing a great humiliation<sup>26</sup>. This would be the first of forthcoming disastrous defeats that the French would suffer when confronting with Prussia in the future. Witnessing the might of Prussia first hand in the Seven Year's War, the French felt the need to keep their alliance with the Habsburgs until the French Revolution. This alliance with the Habsburgs, however short-lived, can still be considered beneficial for the French. Although Prussian forces won a great victory against the French in Seven Years' War, German dualism reached its peak in 18<sup>th</sup> century, presenting an opportunity for the French to manipulate a power balance within the Empire. But as the revolutionary movement gained ground in the French Kingdom, changing tone of French foreign policy would not allow maintaining this balance.

Even if, at first, the Revolution did not change anything in the diplomatic orientation of the German policy of France, things began to change from 1792<sup>27</sup>. Revolutionary wars springing from all the previous resentful experiences that the French public had gone through were now in sight. New republican principles would bear no moderate approach towards the Habsburgs<sup>28</sup>:

The Holy Empire, that monstrous assembly of small and large despots who damn one another in society with their excessive politeness, very well! The Holy Empire must also disappear by the effects of our incredible revolution. The Kingdom of France supported it; the French Republic shall work for its destruction.

Not surprisingly, the Revolutionary Assembly declared war on Austria, invading Austrian Netherlands. Soon after taking the field, however, the French revolutionists began to pay the price of having purged the aristocratic officer corps of the kingdom<sup>29</sup>. Allied Prussian forces were also advancing through France, and furthermore, Spain and Portugal had joined the campaign, upon the execution of the royal family. Although mass conscriptions

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Frey, Linda, and Frey, Marsha, **The French Revolution**, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2004, p.58.

<sup>27</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.41.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.108.

on the French part did not bring success, French forces, in time, began to obtain supremacy on the battlefield, forcing Prussia and Spain to withdraw from the coalition. When the French army, under the command of a young officer named Napoleon Bonaparte, launched a daring attack in 1796<sup>30</sup> on Austrian soil to conquest Vienna, the capital of Habsburg Emperor, revolutionary France proved invincible, forcing the Habsburgs into a humiliating peace, and hence, a forthcoming war for revenge. After this point, the Empire entered into a cycle of destructive wars with French Republic, none of which would see the Habsburgs as victor. The Empire became even weaker after the each coalition established against the French Republic. The institution that had ruled Germany for a millennium was coming to its end. The first punch came on July 1806, when Napoleon signed a treaty with 16 of his German allies, including the prominent states of Baden, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, withdrawing them from the Holy Roman Empire and forming a coalition known as the Confederation of the Rhine<sup>31</sup>. When the last Habsburg Emperor proclaimed the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, only Austria and Prussia, along with two Danish and Swedish possessions<sup>32</sup>, had remained outside of this confederation.

However, rise of the French Republic would not keep its momentum. Suffering crushing defeats at the hands of the French, a growing sense of nationalism began to spring among German nation, resembling a future scene that would happen in the inter-war era in 21<sup>st</sup> century. In fact, anti-French sentiments and outbreak of German nationalism were so intense that they found their reflection also in the cultural products of this period: publication of patriotic newspapers, including the *Deutsche Zeitung*, in great numbers, and spreading out songs such as “Die Wacht am Rhine” and the “Deutschlandlied,” which opens with the line “Deutschland über alles” (Germany above all), that would one day be sung as the national anthem of a united Germany<sup>33</sup>. On the other hand, other European nations were also determined to sort out the French expansion and the ambiguous general Bonaparte once and for all. The Sixth Coalition against the French Republic was established under these circumstances. Soon, Napoleon Bonaparte faced a mighty alliance (Grand Alliance) including Prussia, Austria, Britain, Spain, Portugal, Russia and Sweden<sup>34</sup>. Europe was hosting the largest battle ever seen before the World War I, with more than

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.109.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.111.

<sup>32</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.42.

<sup>33</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.118.

<sup>34</sup> State, op.cit., p.186.

half a million troops on the field, causing the term Battle of the Nations<sup>35</sup>. The defeat of the French signalled the collapse of Confederation of the Rhine. Instead, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna established a German Confederation with the participation of more than 30 German states, taking place of the old empire<sup>36</sup>. However, the Confederation would only be an instrument at the hands of the German rulers to suppress liberal movements and maintain aristocratic order. The unification of the German nation would progress via economic stage, which would alarm the French, just like the case a century thereafter. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the French would probably have never known that their descendants would have to deal with the same situation in the future, within a structure they themselves would design. It is very interesting today to see, in this sense, how the history of Franco-German relations recurs almost in the same way it did in the past.

Thus, the main concern of the French now was the Prussian attempts at achieving a customs union in Germany, since an economic union under the leadership of a strong German state was likely to bring the political unity of Germany<sup>37</sup>. Germans, on the other hand, had understood that they could only achieve economic development if they formed a customs union<sup>38</sup>. The tough process of forming a German Customs Union began in 1818 when all customs barriers between the different Prussian provinces were abolished<sup>39</sup>. Although on several occasions France tried to slow down the process, thirteen German states joined Prussia and Hesse to form a larger customs union (Zollverein) which was soon to be joined by almost all the remaining states, except for Austria<sup>40</sup>. After the bloody revolts in Germany in mid 1800's where masses demanded democratic rights and abolition of monarchies, Prussia kept its policy of isolating Austria also in politic unification. Both German states were now competing with each other to unify German states under their rival confederations, which eventually would lead a war between Austria and Prussia, relieving the French temporarily. Although Prussia -upon Austrian and Russian pressure-declared that it recognized Austrian supremacy, with Otto von Bismarck at the chancellor seat, it was determined to expand its power. Austro-Prussian war in 1866, though triggered

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<sup>35</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.114.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.116.

<sup>37</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.43.

<sup>38</sup> Kitchen, Martin, **A History of Modern Germany: 1800-2000**, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004, p.61.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.43.

by a territorial dispute<sup>41</sup>, was a war of dominance between these two German powerhouses. With a conclusive defeat of Austria at the end of the war, it was now clear that Habsburgs would have no leading role in the unification process of Germany. The French, realizing their mistake of considering Austria as the biggest danger for themselves, would now begin to side with the Habsburgs<sup>42</sup>. However, the French Republic would soon find itself in a war with Prussia: a war that the French both tried to prevent and recklessly provoked at the same time.

The background of the widely-known Franco-Prussian war in 1870 was a dynastic competition between the Bourbons and the Hohenzollerns for the vacant Spanish throne<sup>43</sup>. Fearing that Prussian-Spanish formation was encircling them, the French pressured Prussia to withdraw the Hohenzollerns candidacy. In fact, the pressure from the French side and the advice of the Prussian King were enough for Prince Leopold to turn down the throne. It was when the French insisted that no Hohenzollern shall ever be candidate for Spanish throne again, that the conflict began. Feeling insulted upon this demand from the French envoy, King Wilhelm I refused to renounce the claims of his house permanently<sup>44</sup>. Afterwards, when Bismarck exposed the correspondence between the Prussian and French governments regarding the Spanish throne, it quickly caused bitter sentiments and outraged French public, which, in turn fueled anti-French sentiments on German side. The Ems Dispatch<sup>45</sup> was, in fact, a telegram from the Prussian King to his chancellor, reporting the plain exchange between himself and the French envoy. Before being public, however, the telegram was a bit edited by the Chancellor, in a way that would insult the French. Clearly, Bismarck wanted to seem attacked, rather than seeming as attacker, since he had calculated the nationalistic sentiments that would arise in case of a French aggression.

The Chancellor was right. Numerical inferiority, poor preparation and command mistakes brought France on the verge of defeat within a few weeks<sup>46</sup>. The Franco-Prussian war was now a Franco-German war in which south German states, including Bavarian patriots, gave their full and enthusiastic support to Prussia<sup>47</sup>. Soon, the French army was

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<sup>41</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.132.

<sup>42</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.45.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Kitchen, op.cit., p.118.

<sup>46</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.45.

<sup>47</sup> Kitchen, op.cit., p.118.

trapped in a fortified city it retreated to. Encircled by the German forces, the French army had no other option but to capitulate. Newly-founded Second Republic announced that it would agree to a peace provided that its territorial integrity was respected<sup>48</sup>. On the other hand, Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth Graf von Moltke was declaring to the Prussian Crown Prince<sup>49</sup>: ‘we must fight this nation of liars to the very end! Then we can dictate whatever peace we like.’ Not surprisingly, this would be the mentality in minds of the French in the next Franco-German war. After the defeat, a quarter of the French army had become the war prisoner of Prussia, including the Emperor Napoleon III himself<sup>50</sup>. In the process, as soon as Napoleon III was defeated, his empire had also ended. ‘Down with the empire, long live republic’ was the slogan of the French masses surrounding the French Legislative Assembly, upon hearing the defeat<sup>51</sup>. German side, on the other hand, was celebrating this historical moment, unification of German states, turning the Kingdom of Prussia into the German Empire, the second *Reich*.

### 1.1.2. The World Wars as the Last Cycle of Franco-German Aggression

France, at this point, was not only suffering from a harsh defeat, and hence, wounded pride; but also facing the collapse its eternal German policy: using German dualism to its advantage. A unified Germany, or with a more precise definition, greater Prussia was now heading to its imperial goals and, more dangerously, the character of this new German state had militarist tendencies. With the seizure of Alsace and parts of Loraine, industrial production in Germany grew instantly. In the age of steam, economic power of a nation was measured in terms of its steel and coal production<sup>52</sup> which Germany had plenty of. Not surprisingly, such aggressive growth would cast its reflections on political scene too. The German Chancellor, however, was smart enough to take calculated steps and guarantee the well-being of his country via a web of reassurance treaties with other major powers, trying to prevent a two-front war with France and Russia. The French, on the other hand, began to experience economic recovery before the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century,

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Foley, Robert Thomas, “From Volkskrieg to Vernichtungskrieg: German Concepts of Warfare, 1871-1935” in **War, Peace and World Orders in European History**, Routledge, London, 2001, p.217.

<sup>50</sup> Ulbert, op.cit., p.45

<sup>51</sup> Chaurasia, Radhey Shyam, **History Of Europe: 1649-1789**, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 2002, p.278.

<sup>52</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.142.

due to newly-found iron deposits in Loraine<sup>53</sup>. While obtaining imperial expansion overseas, France began to rid itself from diplomatic isolation policy that Bismarck had been executing since 1870. Upon the resignation of the Chancellor in 1890, however, alliance-building on the French side became more noticeable: the political accord signed with Russia in 1891, which would be followed by a military pact in 1894<sup>54</sup>, was declaring that Russia would come to defence of France, if attacked. This was, in other words, an agreement Bismarck had tried to prevent all along. With the absence of the Chancellor, new, ill-advised Kaiser of Germany Wilhelm II was reversing the fortune of Germany, causing his enemies to gather against him. Constant race of armament and tense political atmosphere on the continent would soon cause a massive war among almost all nations in Europe, giving the French the opportunity of avenge for the disaster of 1870/71<sup>55</sup>.

When the heir of Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in 1914, the event quickly started a chain of alliances that would lead to the First World War. Within a few months, major powers of Europe would find themselves in opposing camps with Austro-German forces at one side as central forces, and Franco-Russo forces at the other. As the conflict progressed, however, more countries would tumble into the war on both sides. When the fighting began in 1914, war plan of Germany, Schlieffen Plan<sup>56</sup>, entailing the rapid invasion of France was put in motion. The French plan, on the other hand, called for a speedy advance into Alsace and Loraine<sup>57</sup> which would be stopped by the Germans. Similarly, Schlieffen Plan had also failed since General Joseph Joffre of France managed to transfer his soldiers to the front in 600 Parisian taxicabs and busses<sup>58</sup>. After the initial phase of the collision, however, the aggression would begin to progress in a very inhumane way for both sides: the trench war, since conventional engagements in assaults had proved fruitless. With Britain siding with France and the United States joining them, it would only begin to get worse for Germany both on the ground and at the sea. When the last German offensive in 1918 was successfully responded by Allied forces under single command<sup>59</sup> there was no longer hope on German

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<sup>53</sup> State, op.cit., p.229.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p.250.

<sup>55</sup> Simkins, Peter, Jukes, Geoffrey and Hickey, Michael, **The First World War: The War to End All Wars**, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2003, p.19.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.26.

<sup>57</sup> State, op.cit., p.256.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.263.

side as to reversal of the situation. This time it would be the French that would live the joy of victory but given the circumstances of war-ravaged continent, no party had gained anything.

Europe had gone through a real carnage, claiming almost 10 million lives<sup>60</sup>. Besides, social and economic picture of the continent, in both victors and losers, was no better. Most productive agricultural regions in the northern part of France had been ravaged during the war<sup>61</sup>. Although it regained Alsace and Loraine territory from Germany, France had become financially dependent on US loans. Similarly, in Germany, war had already forced women left behind to work long hours in massive munitions factories for minimal wage<sup>62</sup>. Its economy in disarray, Germany, aftermath of the war, would face food shortages, hyperinflation and, more dangerously, social unrest. Since German people had been fed with misleading propaganda by the authorities, they were having hard time believing that they had actually lost the war<sup>63</sup>. When furious masses took to streets, leaving the Emperor Wilhelm II no choice but to step down, new chancellor of Germany Prince Max was handing over power to Social Democrats under Friedrich Ebert<sup>64</sup> who would manage to arrange elections for a German National Assembly that would negotiate an armistice with the Allies.

After the war, France had found itself in a place that it could not dictate the fate of defeated Germany alone, since each ally had its own post-war objectives. However, the French were still after a conclusive solution that would sort out their long-time enemy once and for all. The peace terms for Germany, therefore, would be no moderate than those imposed on France in 1870 by Germans. With the Treaty of Versailles, ratified in July 1919, Germany suffered a range of costly sanctions, including handing over Alsace-Lorraine to France, a pair of Prussian provinces to Poland, and a trio of cities to Belgium<sup>65</sup>. Also, German Army was cut down in both personnel and equipment, being prohibited from obtaining some specific war weapons<sup>66</sup>. And even more devastatingly, Germany was subjected to heavy reparations of which even the French doubted their receipt, considering

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<sup>60</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.170.

<sup>61</sup> State, op.cit., p.264.

<sup>62</sup> Weitz, Eric, **Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007, p.10.

<sup>63</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.172.

<sup>64</sup> Balfour, Michael, **Germany: The Tides of Power**, Routledge, London, 1992, p.35.

<sup>65</sup> Coy, op.cit., p.171.

<sup>66</sup> Balfour, op.cit., p.41.

the current inflation rate in the country. Still, the peace treaty, giving France many territorial gains and temporary invasion of Ruhr region, would not be ratified by the French before going through lengthy debates in the Chamber of Deputies<sup>67</sup>.

What strikes one most, here, is the unchanging form of Franco-German relations built on the foundation of antagonism. As stated in the beginning of this section, wars have always been natural tools for states whose survival is inherently dependent on power-seeking behaviour. However, when two states which are almost in the same scale of power, material resources and historical depth happen to be found in such a close proximity to each other; a constant cycle of collision, whether politic or military, becomes inevitable. That is what the history has recorded as the Franco-German antagonism, sometimes in the shape of alliances and sometimes in pure aggression. This is also why the rivalry between these two nations has been fuelled more, instead of ending, after each seemingly-conclusive war where one party has clearly prevailed over the other.

What Europe witnessed at the end of the First World War, however, was a lot more different than past post-war conditions, due to human and material loss and social devastation. Ironically, a peace settlement seemingly-designed to end the conflict has catalysed another war where the destruction would escalate to an unprecedented level. The French have never happened to be short of allies while the Germans have been too powerful to defeat. After the Second World War, neither the French nor the Germans could afford to continue such a destructive confrontation towards each other, at least not through the same means. The Second World War, in this sense, would be a milestone since it would be the last German aggression and French victory.

## **1.2. The Post-war Atmosphere and the Recovery of the Continent**

As hard as it is to believe, Europe, in the spring of 1945, was witnessing the same situation as it had after the fall of 1919. The Second World War has been the clearest indication that meaningless revenge wars between these two nations have brought no good to the French or to the Germans. What has been brought, instead, was a complete destruction of countries involved and loss of lives at catastrophic levels, since changing war concept left no line between civilians and soldiers. It has been a war that exhausted all

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<sup>67</sup> State, op.cit., p.266.

the nations involved, whether victor or loser. Relegated to an ordinary state status, France was no longer a super power- or even a power at all<sup>68</sup>. In fact, it was a *liberated country*, by means of American forces. Likewise, France would get its seat at the Allied council only upon the insistence of the British<sup>69</sup>. Germany, on the other hand, was going through a terrible combination of war sufferings. Two out of every three German man could not survive the war, causing thousands of German children to grow up without fathers, including the future chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder<sup>70</sup>. In the meantime, the country was also experiencing a severe case of food shortages that would soon be followed by starvation, since most of the best agricultural land of pre-war Germany was now under Soviet rule or else handed to Poland<sup>71</sup>. It is very reasonable, at this point, to conclude that such a tragedy has been a mean for long-needed wisdom and paved the way for the unity of the continent in peace. The European integration, however, would not stem from such noble motives.

The fall of the Third Reich, unlike that of the Second, had introduced a complex control system of victors for both the continent and for defeated Germany. While the Allies were sharing Europe by percentages, Germany was being divided into control areas as well, just like the city of Berlin in itself. Partition was not only in the political geography of Europe, but also in the mindsets of the Allies that would soon split in two ideological camps. When the initial phase of war trauma faded and victors gathered in the conferences to redraw the political map of Europe, each party had its own agenda as to the future of the continent. While pursuing the retreating Germans, The Red Army had reached and anchored at the heart of Europe. In the eyes of Americans, Soviet influence, rather than a possible German revival, was the real threat facing Europe. It would, however, still be hard to convince the French of this fact. As one of the pre-eminent backbench deputies, Le Bail, would ask<sup>72</sup>:

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<sup>68</sup> Judt, Tony, **Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945**, Penguin, New York, 2005, p.113.

<sup>69</sup> Willis, Roy, **France, Germany and the New Europe: 1945-1963**, Stanford University Press, California, 1965, p.12.

<sup>70</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.19.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.105.

<sup>72</sup> Hörber, Thomas, **The Foundations of Europe: European Integration Ideas in France, Germany and Britain in the 1950s**, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2006, p.42.

Are the German people capable of change? Are they able to condemn their faults of yesterday? These Germans, to whom we offer our hand, have they, at the bottom of their souls, abandoned Hitler and the horrors of national socialism?

Similarly French public opinion in post-war years was no different in their attitudes towards Germans. The answer of French people to an international enquiry at the end of 1946 clears any doubt in this respect. When asked 'do you still have a feeling of sympathy for the German people?', only 3% of the French participating answered yes, while 56% answered the same question contrarily<sup>73</sup>. The initial stance of the French public against Germans after three wars in past 70 years was the same, which is understandable. However, if the initial policy of Quai d'Orsay against Germany after three wars in past 70 years was still to be the same, it would mean no bright future prospects for both Franco-German couple and for Europe. Obviously, a strong wave of Germanophobia had resurfaced again on the minds of French policy-makers. A secure France, to them, would only be achieved if Germany was separated from its coal-rich Ruhr and Saar regions, banned from arms and arms related industrial production<sup>74</sup> and reduced economically. Nevertheless, this aggressive attitude towards Germany did not last long. The inception of the cold war would bring with it a change of enemy: The Soviet Union, an ally during the war, had become the new foe to cope with, whereby, making the recovery of Germany a necessity<sup>75</sup>.

### 1.2.1. US Initiative for the Reorganization of Western Europe

When US Secretary of State George C. Marshall came back on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1947, from a Moscow meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers, having witnessed the Soviet unwillingness to work together for a solution for the war-wrecked Germany and shaken by economic and psychological effects war left in western Europe, he realized the necessity of a radical and immediate measure for the recovery of the continent<sup>76</sup>. Europe had already

<sup>73</sup> Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste., (1952, October) "The German-Franco Relations since 1945" *Review of Politics* 14:4, Cambridge University Press, p.505.

<sup>74</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.114.

<sup>75</sup> Munte, Victor Gavin, "A New Framework for Franco-German Relations through European Institutions, 1950 to 1954" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.166.

<sup>76</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.90.

become dependent on US loans, and it was time for an American initiative that would both organize and recover Europe in political, social, economic aspects and, at the same time, serve the United States as a chance to eliminate protectionist international trade practices with which it was hit in 30s<sup>77</sup>. Besides, any form of solidarity and cooperation in Western Europe would be of critical importance for the United States against Soviet expansion. The Marshall Plan was entailing well-planned investments fostering national economic growth and also an intra-European collaboration setting that would play a very important role in integrating Germany -at least, west of it- into Europe. Revitalization of the industrial power of Europe, however, was impossible without its engine: Germany would have to be re-established as an industrial state<sup>78</sup>. Economic revival, for Germany, would be a sure-fire way to heal itself in the process. The German people as a nation were industrious and methodical by tradition, and their level of education has long been high, making an envied labour force for an industrial country<sup>79</sup>. Besides, once Germany became prosperous, that would, without a doubt, boost the confidence of the country on the way to come together with its neighbours as a respected -if not yet equal- partner: something that both the government and the opposition wanted in Bonn.

Not surprisingly, Marshall Plan was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Bundestag<sup>80</sup>. The French part, however, was not that enthusiastic. Wondering what secret motives lay beneath the Plan, Paris even thought that it was being baited into a program for German recovery under the pretext of international co-operation<sup>81</sup>. The French were still reluctant to give up their hard-line policy against Germans. At the same time, however, the country was in dire need of American assistance and the French knew that reparations from Germany would never be enough to revitalize their domestic industry<sup>82</sup>. It was at this point that a smart French planner Jean Monnet came to the aid of his foreign minister, Bidault, with an idea. By going along with a coordinated recovery plan, French influence, in the reasoning of Monnet, would be a lot greater than if France decided to establish its own by

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p.94.

<sup>78</sup> Bartlett, Roland, (1967, January) "France and West Germany in the European Common Market" *Illinois Agricultural Economics*, Oxford Univresity Press, p.3.

<sup>79</sup> Balfour, op.cit., p.107.

<sup>80</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.206

<sup>81</sup> Hitchcock, William, **France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954**, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998, p.74.

<sup>82</sup> Geremek, Bronislaw, "The Marshall Plan and European Integration" in **The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2008, p.45.

itself<sup>83</sup>. Marshall Plan would be utilized for the national interests of France. After all, what good could have come from dismantling Germany, when it was possible to use its potential for the recovery of France? Convinced, not by his Western partners but by one of his bureaucrats, Bidault could now go along with the US proposal. Economic cooperation scheme brought by Marshall Plan would be, in this respect, the prototype for the French as to the solution of their German problem: anchoring Germany at a European setting where it could do no military harm but much economic good<sup>84</sup>. This reasoning would also be the method the French would make use of two more times, when conditions necessitated an integrated Germany.

When the United States Congress established the International Co-operative Administration (ICA) on April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1948, and appropriated funds to provide the Marshall Plan aid, seventeen European countries were in queue, including France which would get 40% or \$3.2 billion of the total aid allocated to be distributed over the term of nine years<sup>85</sup>. With the help of American aid, French industry, by the mid-50s, entered into a period of growth with production indicators being restored to inter-war figures, output increasing and urban economies expanding<sup>86</sup>. In the process, Marshall Plan also served the goals of planners, as Pierre Uri, one of the associates of Monnet, would later acknowledge or, in a sense, admit: “we used the Americans to impose on French government what we deemed necessary, disregarding the American call for liberalization but responding enthusiastically to the US advice to invest and modernize”<sup>87</sup>. However, in order to fully realize its economic potential and national welfare, France needed more sources, not something in the form of direct aid, but rather, something structural: access to German coal.

### 1.2.2. The Origin of the European Coal and Steel Community

It is a known fact that during the first half of the twentieth century coal was the primary energy source in Europe, like coke which was a rare kind of coal required for steel

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<sup>83</sup> Hitchcock, op.cit., p.76.

<sup>84</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.117.

<sup>85</sup> Bartlett, op.cit., p.3.

<sup>86</sup> State, op.cit., p.297-8.

<sup>87</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.96.

production<sup>88</sup>. By a twist of fate for the French, coal-rich territory in the region, notably the Ruhr basin, has been on the German side of the border. The area, due to its war-feeding potential, had allowed Germany to build large armies<sup>89</sup> which, in turn, had led the French to covet the Ruhr basin and even to occupy it in the beginning of the 20s. After the Second World War, however, the region fell on the British and American zones. Internationalization of the region, therefore, seemed to be a viable choice for the French. The Ruhr Authority, established under the London Agreement in 1948, was bringing an allied control over the region and keeping Germany from exercising national sovereignty over the region<sup>90</sup>. Occupational Law No.27 was the functional tool in this respect and also the rationale behind the idea of Ruhr Authority. Steel trusts, according to that rule, had to be decentralized in order to defuse strong German industrial structures: something which would relieve competitor French industrialists. But severing the Ruhr, to the British and the Americans, would deprive the German state of any chance to recover economically and politically, which would ultimately increase the political weight of the Soviet Union in Europe<sup>91</sup>. This was going to be the reason of the gradual transfer of the Ruhr to the Germans. France somehow could not manage to keep its grip on the future of the coal-rich region. At this point, just as in the aftermath of the Marshall Plan, an innovative choice appeared for the French. If the objective were not to be accomplished through force, annexation or internationalization, then why not *Europeanize*<sup>92</sup> it in a way to secure the access to the material and energy resources located there?

Acceptance on the German part did not seem to be much of a problem. In fact, considering the circumstances facing the newly-founded German state, this could even be an opportunity for the West Germany, at least, in the eyes of Conrad Adenauer, the leader of the coalition government, it was. The Chancellor, at that time, was not only working for the recovery of his country but also trying to bury the Nazi legacy and to gain the trust of the Allies, which his country lacked. Therefore, in the leading circles of the Christian-Democratic Union, (CDU) a set of values consisting of anti-Nazism, Christianity and a

<sup>88</sup> Fasanaro, Laura, "Franco-German Relations and the Coal Problem in the Aftermath of the First and Second World Wars" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.89.

<sup>89</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.46.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Fasanaro, op.cit., p.96.

<sup>92</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.117.

genuine adherence to European unity had a vital ideological role for the redemption from the recent past of the German state<sup>93</sup>. The recovery of sovereignty, equality among western partners, security partnership with the United States were also in the agenda of the first chancellor<sup>94</sup>. In fact, economic integration in Western Europe was something which would find supporters not only in CDU but also in the opposition, Social Democrats. However, CDU and SPD would part ways in how to go about that endeavour. Kurt Schumacher, leader of the opposition, had adopted a nationalistic and uncompromising tone against the idea of a French-designed economic unity. Instead, re-unification, restoration of national sovereignty and equality were the immediate priorities to him. Pooling energy sources under a supranational authority was a well-designed French national project<sup>95</sup> to establish French political and economic hegemony in Europe and keep the German industrialization under control. Considering the French manoeuvres for the annexation of Saar, another coal-rich area, pooling energy sources under the supervision of a supranational body could even institutionalize the French hegemony over the region. Obviously, Schumacher was not ready to retreat from his position of advocating national unity. In the eyes of Schumacher, Adenauer was too generous to the French whose understanding of meaningful co-operation seemed to be nothing more than accessing cheap coal and coke. It would, however, be a mistake to consider the Social Democrat opposition as single voice in their criticism for Adenauer. In fact, what was thought by a board member of SPD, Carlo Schmid, in 1949 as a solution for the Franco-German enmity was very close to the approach of Monnet<sup>96</sup>:

There is no conflict about the Saar, unlike that over Alsace-Lorraine. There is one reality, namely coal from the Saar and ore from Lorraine, kept apart by a frontier. The problem is how to get them both together despite the frontier. (...) The best solution would be, if we could Europeanise the European mineral resources (...) if we could unite the potential of the Ruhr, the Saar and Lorraine, i.e. coal, ore, iron, steel, into an economic partnership. Even today there could be a treaty between Germany and France which could result in

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<sup>93</sup> Haas, Ernst Bernard, **The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957**, Stanford University Press, California, 1958, p.127.

<sup>94</sup> Lappenküpper, Ulrich, "On the Path to a Hereditary Friendship? Franco-German Relations since the End of the Second World War" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.152.

<sup>95</sup> Banchoff, Thomas, "National Identity and EU Legitimacy in France and Germany" in **Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Policy**, Routledge, London, 1999, p.189.

<sup>96</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.209.

unreserved access of the ore to the coal and vice versa. I am thinking about something like the old German Customs Union [of 1844] (...)

The remarks of Schmid on this matter seem to refute the presumption of Schumacher, that such a unity could bring French hegemony over the region and chain German industrialization. The sole party that would benefit from such a Franco-German rapprochement did not have to be France. On the contrary, Adenauer was ready to set forth many reasons to explain why such an endeavour was in the best interest of the Germans. To Adenauer, a united Europe was not only the materially best way for the Germans but also a mean through which Germany could regain its dignity, its reputable place among its European neighbors and eventually its equality<sup>97</sup>:

Whoever rejects the Europe is the grave-digger of the German people, because he takes away the only possibility for each German to lead the life he values and treasures, on the basis of Christian principals.

These aims of the Chancellor were, in fact, nothing less than the priorities of Kurt Schumacher. The difference of stance between these two men, however, was in the timing of those goals. Adenauer knew that it was not yet time for such bold demands; but for calculated progress on their part. Indeed, if the French proposal also served German interests, having the potential to be a vehicle for the goals of Federal Republic, then why decline? Instead of an obstructionist policy, such a proposal entailing political and economic co-operation was without a doubt a better path for the promotion to equal status, demanded wholeheartedly by all German people at the time. Similarly, the plan would not only terminate the current Ruhr Authority but also override the Occupational Rule No.27: a term even Adenauer had never accepted<sup>98</sup>. Under the auspices of a supranational body where it was impossible to outvote Germany, Allied control over the German coal and steel industry would eventually be lifted. Likewise, the integration plan could also sort out the Saar problem for the Germans, as it would render the separatist French efforts in the region meaningless. Besides, from the perspective of Christian Democrats, the French

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., p.147-8.

<sup>98</sup> Haas, op.cit., p.128.

proposal aiming to unite the Western Europe by means of a strong co-operation scheme could even bring the re-unification of German states.

In essence, French-designed integration plan, from this perspective, turns into something that was wholeheartedly supported by Christian Democrats. Still, as usual, it would take the French serious reservations to settle for their own project. Towards the foundation of *Communities*, it may, therefore, be helpful to examine the motives on the French part in a bit more detail.

### 1.3. The Architect of the European Project: France

Being the head of the French Planning Commissariat, Jean Monnet, after the war, had faced with a formidable task of rebuilding France from the devastation it experienced<sup>99</sup>. What Monnet was trying to achieve was not only to bring back the pre-war economic indicators but also to establish sufficiently strong ground to secure the economic future and welfare of France as a first-rank power<sup>100</sup>. The French planner had built his plan of investments on six specific sectors which would be of critical importance: agricultural machinery, cement, railroads, electricity, *coal and steel*<sup>101</sup>. This was the prescription of Monnet for the recovery of his country in post-war years. Not surprisingly, the French planner did not design his plan in a way to cover only the French soil, but in relation to the neighbouring region, specifically to Germany<sup>102</sup>. Seeing that post-war conditions were not favouring his country, Monnet had come to realize that France had to adjust the sails, instead of directing the wind. France, to him, could not afford to repeat the mistakes made after the First World War. However uncomfortable, recovery of France had to be materialized through the recovery of Germany. As the Foreign Minister of the time, Georges Bidault would make it clear to the Schuman cabinet in 1948<sup>103</sup>:

There is not the slightest possibility of combining the benefits of the Marshall aid with the rejection of Germany that will be configured according to our views, halfway at least.

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<sup>99</sup> Geremek, op.cit., p.47.

<sup>100</sup> Munte, op.cit., p.166.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p.167.

There are moments when it is necessary to be able to conclude matters. If we wish to advance alone, we will lose everything.

In the meantime, Europe, at the end of the 40s, began to become more fragmented as Red Army blockaded Berlin in 1948, North Atlantic Treaty was signed and two German states were founded in 1949<sup>104</sup>. Stuck between two super-powers, Europe had turned into a geographical entity whose fate was doomed to the will of its liberators. It was such an atmosphere when the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman received a letter from American Secretary of State Dean Acheson, asking the Frenchman to lead the integration of West Germany into a Europe that would be re-organized in accordance with the Marshall Plan. In his request, Acheson was asking for something concrete being prepared until the next meeting of three Western allies, which was scheduled for May, 1950<sup>105</sup>. The Russian aggression in central Europe seemed to have accelerated American efforts to form a united Europe, since the current in Washington at the time entailed the containment of the Soviets. Soon, Monet would once again present a plan for his foreign minister to both accommodate American demands and sort out the dependency of his country on coal. It was such a solution that it would accommodate the desires of many axes in France: the ones demanding emergence of Europe as a *third power* between two blocks, the ones demanding the age of Franco-German antagonism be closed and the ones demanding a grip on German coal and coke which, at the moment, were slipping through their grasp. Indeed, seeing France as a single voice regarding its intention as to the fate of Germans in particular and of Europe in general is nothing but a miscalculation. As will be expressed below, thoughts of Monnet were not going to serve only one purpose; but instead, would be utilized for different motivations.

When Schuman made his famous speech on May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1950, and declared the French plan entailing to place Franco-German coal and steel production under a supranational High Authority which would be powered as some kind of regulatory body, it was a success to some since France took the control of the Ruhr and other crucial German energy resources out of solely German hands<sup>106</sup>. This would, as stated officially, also render a Franco-German war materially impossible. There was, along with these, one more point

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<sup>104</sup> Fransen, Frederic, **The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of European Community**, Greenwood Press, Westport, 2001, p.94.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p.95.

<sup>106</sup> Judt, op.cit., p.156.

outlined in the declaration, something Monnet was known to have voiced: Federalism. The ECSC was mentioned in the plan as the first step in the federation of Europe. However, not everyone was intended to take following steps.

### 1.3.1. Idealism or Pragmatism?

At this point, in order to express the following events better, one needs to pause for a moment and go back a few years to review the thoughts of Monnet as to the recovery of Europe. Before the confrontation with such a task, Monnet had, in fact, been known for his idealistic thoughts for the future of the continent. As a deputy of the Secretary General of the League of Nations in interwar years, he seemed to have comprehended the destructive cycle threatening Europe. To him, the transformation of the continent into a peaceful, prosperous land could be possible only with demise of national sovereignty and development democratic institutions. The seeds of his thoughts had flourished when he was in Algeria in the early 40s, in the service of the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN). Monnet knew that the fate of his country was dependent on that of Europe. He thought that in order for such a project to be put into practice, France had to assume the leading role since no other country in the continent, at the time, had the required resilience and vision. After the foundation of OEEC, for instance, Monnet had not considered this endeavour daring enough to remedy the problems of the continent. To him, what Europe needed was something bolder<sup>107</sup>:

Efforts by the several countries in the present national frameworks will not in my view be enough. Furthermore, the idea that 16 sovereign nations will co-operate effectively is an illusion. I believe that only the establishment of a *federation* of the West, including Britain, will enable us to solve our problems quickly enough and finally prevent war.

At the same time, France, with such an undertaking, could well raise to the rank of leading continental power in Europe. Although the primary concern in the thoughts of Monnet does not seem to be solely the purpose of establishing French hegemony over the continent, it would be naive to expect that he would turn down such a prospect in the

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<sup>107</sup> Geremek, op.cit., p.48.

process. As he noted in a memorandum written six days before the declaration of the plan<sup>108</sup>:

The continuation of the recovery of France will be halted if the question of German industrial production and competitiveness is solved rapidly (...) The base of the superiority that the French industrialists recognize traditionally in Germany is its production of steel at a price against which France cannot compete. From this, they conclude that French production as a whole suffers a handicap.

Yet, it can be said that Monnet, with his visionary thoughts regarding the future of Europe and Franco-German relations, sounded more idealist than many of his colleagues. His enthusiasm for the European project can be seen in the preliminary sketches of Schuman declaration. From first draft to the seventh one, Monnet had, in fact, introduced the Coal and Steel Community as the first step towards a Franco-German Union that could eventually lead to the organization of Europe on federal basis with the participation of other countries in the continent<sup>109</sup>. However, his bold ideas could not find a place in the final version of the text. What Monnet enthusiastically envisioned was only cited in the declaration with very weak expression, as the first step of a European federation, which brings one to the conclusion that vision of Monnet was, in the end, cut down to give birth to an entity unified enough to rescue France from the isolation among its Western allies; but loose enough to protect French national sovereignty, identity and customs which French politicians were not ready to give away.

Indeed, it was not very easy, at those times, to find French statesmen who shared the same vision as Monnet did. On the contrary, many of them would find his thoughts risky for the well-being of their country. Particularly De Gaullists were very resentful by the transfer of sovereignty. Article 15 of the French Constitution provided for the transfer of sovereign rights to common organisations for the purposes of peace and defence, on the condition of reciprocity on the parts of other states<sup>110</sup>. Rather than transferring sovereignty, in the eyes of the Gaullists, Germany was gaining it through the Schuman Plan, for it was not a sovereign state under the occupational rule<sup>111</sup>. Besides, in the eyes of far right

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<sup>108</sup> Munte, op.cit., p.168.

<sup>109</sup> Fransen, op.cit., p.96.

<sup>110</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

politicians, there was also the risk of Germany turning into a major exporter if the tariffs, quotas and other restrictions were gone. As stated in the previous pages, there was such a functional architecture behind the plan that it could be put into service of national priorities of France, without having to undertake its idealistic aspects. This seems to be the exact reason why the declaration, in the end, made it through the French parliament. A note written by François Seydoux, chairman of the European Desk in French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicates that thoughts of Monnet would be inspirational to materialize a hard-line German policy in disguise<sup>112</sup>:

Germany will not recover its complete independence; the current system of tutelage will pass directly to another system under which other restrictions will limit its freedom, but these limitations will have to be assumed by all members. (...) No time will exist during which Germany can be the master of its destiny; it will exit the present framework to enter into another one, easier to bear, firstly because it will be less rigid, secondly because it will not be confined to the borders of Germany. Germany will enjoy equality of rights, but this equality will only be applied to limited rights.

With Schuman declaration, France successfully pre-empted the American and British requests regarding the integration of Germany into Europe on disadvantageous terms to itself. Recognizing the opportunity brought by Monnet, French officials realized that active engagement to the process with a solution of their own making, rather than simply blocking Germany and risking isolation due to such a stance, would be more fruitful. In fact, considering the usual French approach to the issue, the protection of even that amount of idealism in the declaration is surprising. However, the French, as stated, knew that only with active and constructive policies could they defuse any more extreme Anglo-American arrangements for the complete liberation of Germany from the political and economic control measures brought by the occupation<sup>113</sup>. Thus, one has reasons to believe that the real motivation behind the plan was not to build a federal Europe or to abolish the borders of nation-state for their own sake, but instead; to sort out a fundamental problem of French industry and to keep Germany under control after the occupation ended<sup>114</sup>. At this point, one may counter this view by putting forward another French initiative of the time,

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<sup>112</sup> Munte, op.cit., p.167.

<sup>113</sup> Hitchcock, op.cit., p.100.

<sup>114</sup> Munte, op.cit., p.168.

European Defense Community (EDC) and ask: if the French were not intended to federalize Europe, then why would they have initiated such an undertaking? The answer lies in another question: why did the Pleven Plan fail, while the Schuman declaration succeeded?

### 1.3.2. French Discourse Put to the Test: The EDC

After successfully countering the Anglo-American demands regarding political and economic integration of FRG into Europe, the French faced another, yet similar, task: re-armament of FRG as a contribution to the defense of the continent against the Soviet Union. This would be another time that the French Deputies would be overwhelmed by ‘what if’s. Giving the Germans economic equality was one thing, reviving the German *Wehrmacht*, however, would be whole another. France, now, once again saw itself in a position where it had to choose between two unfavorable options. In case of a Soviet aggression, France would ultimately have to fall back on the US insurance. However, this option would have to come at a heavy price of German re-armament, since the US was already burdened with the war in Korea.

It was at the council meeting of the Atlantic Alliance in New York in September 1950, when Acheson informed his French counterpart Schuman that West Germany would soon be invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which had been created only a year earlier<sup>115</sup> as a broad security network for Western Europe. This was initially rejected by Schuman. The French, however, knew that too much foot-dragging on their part could lead them into isolation among Atlantic Alliance and cause the US to unilaterally arm the Germans on national basis. Alarmed by the prospect of armed German divisions, Schuman hastily began to search for a viable alternative, since the French knew very well what the Germans were capable of in the battlefield once militarized. To the US, however, the issue of benefiting from West German manpower in the defense of Western Europe was non-negotiable<sup>116</sup>. This was where Monnet would come into play again. His thoughts had successfully countered American demands and sorted out a structural problem of French industry. With the same method, Monnet proposed the creation of a

<sup>115</sup> Gillingham, John, “Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal” in **Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity**, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, p.146.

<sup>116</sup> Dedman, Martin, **Origins and Development of the European Union**, Routledge, London, 1996, p.72.

European Defense Community to prevent not only the establishment of an independent German army but also the possible derailment of ECSC, for US demand of larger German role in the West would jeopardize the commitment of the Germans to the Schuman Plan<sup>117</sup>. If the Germans saw the prospect of American support for international normality and restoration of sovereignty, they could well become less enthusiastic for integration with France. Obviously Monnet could not let Germany have such a bargaining power. The same team engineering the Schuman Plan, therefore, had to devise another one to give birth to a European army<sup>118</sup>, dominated by the French both numerically and administratively. This time it would be called Pleven Plan, as a reference to the current French Prime Minister Rene Pleven. The EDC, inheriting the institutional form of the ECSC, would be under the supervision of a European Political Community (EPC) and forces from member countries would be merged into a European army, wearing single uniform and under a single minister of defense. However, this did not mean the abolition of national armies. According to Pleven Plan, each member state, except for West Germany, would be able to retain its national army and be subject to supranational aspects only in proportion with the troops it allocated for the EPC. This was, without a doubt, a safety precaution for France, enabling it to both deny Germans independent military action and keep the French national army intact. Likewise, in order to keep Germans committed to European path, EDC would be set only after ECSC treaty was signed.

The French, as seen clearly, were not intended to take any risk that might have led them to be caught off-guard when Germany was in question. The Plan in its current form did not only solve the problem of German re-armament, but also put France in a very favorable position where it could dominate Europe militarily under French command with a French Minister of Defense<sup>119</sup>. Wrapped in European idealism in rhetoric, the plan was portrayed as if it were a deliberate, subsequent step to materialize the aims in the Schuman declaration. The Pleven Plan, however, had been an evident attempt to delay German rearmament until some solid European political and economic institutions, dedicated to limit the freedom of action of Germany in the continent, were established<sup>120</sup>. It was, therefore, no wonder that French National Assembly approved the plan with a vote of 348

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<sup>117</sup> Fransen, op.cit., p.115-9.

<sup>118</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.73

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p.74.

<sup>120</sup> Hitchcock, op.cit., p.144.

to 224<sup>121</sup>. However, as the negotiations over the plan progressed among the Atlantic partners, the original Pleven Plan and the final EDC Treaty began to differ dramatically.

Integrating West Germany forces under NATO command was still an option, appealing to every party but France. On the other hand, Adenauer, in exchange for military contribution in NATO framework, was demanding political independence and equality of treatment among Western Allies. Even further, Adenauer considered these conditions as prerequisites for any solution in French framework and demanded additional concessions such as divisional formations and establishment of a Ministry of Defense<sup>122</sup>. Obviously Bonn had realized its key role both in American demands of establishing a solid barrier against the Soviets and in French efforts for assuming the leading role in the continent. Rather than see a separate German army be raised, France, at this point, was bound to give concessions to make West Germany go along with the French proposal, which would ultimately be the reasons of the defeat of EDC in the French National Assembly.

After fifteen months of exhausting negotiations with the Germans, the Americans and the other European Atlantic Partners, France did finally secure the signing of the EDC Treaty [Treaty of Paris, May 27<sup>th</sup> 1952] only to see that they ended up with remarkably different text than what they had had in mind at the beginning. Firstly, with the Allied-German Contractual Agreement, signed on May 26<sup>th</sup>, West Germany was to retrieve the right of full sovereignty over its foreign and domestic affairs once the EDC Treaty came into effect<sup>123</sup>. In other words, ratification of the EDC Treaty would end the occupation regime in West Germany, for equality among Western powers was the price for FRG to take part in such a scheme. To the surprise of the French, Adenauer, with such a precondition, very effortlessly managed to defuse delicately calculated French motivations regarding his country. Likewise, while the Pleven Plan had envisaged a half-French European Army, the EDC Treaty was establishing a one-third German force in the integrated army<sup>124</sup>. More crucially, during the course of negotiations France had to agree with the abolition of the national armies, due to the insistence of West Germany on the principle of equality in European Army. Thus, there was no way out for the French if the

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<sup>121</sup> Willis, op.cit., p.132.

<sup>122</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.74

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p.80-1.

integration failed to tame the Germans<sup>125</sup>. Besides, their army had always been something that the French took great pride in. Disbandment of the French Army, therefore, was not something they could tolerate. As De Gaulle would express<sup>126</sup>:

The European Army plan would be either the end of the French Army or just a smoke screen which would permit the resurrection of the German Army without the least guarantee of its use. It would be a fatal blow to the French Army. We alone would be surrendering our army. To whom? To Europe? But it does not exist. We would be giving it to General Eisenhower. For centuries our value and prestige have been merged with those of the French Army. We therefore must not and cannot give up an army of our own.

Similar to above concerns, there was also another nationality issue with regard to the command of the forces. Instead of a French General in overall command of a European Army in the Pleven Plan, there was going to be a Board of Commissioners, made up of nine commissioners including German members and voting on majority basis<sup>127</sup>.

The Pleven Cabinet, which rejected outright a German re-armament two years ago, was now about to pave the way for the armament of West Germany itself. Almost entirely overridden after the negotiations, the plan had lost its key features and began to seem quite unfavourable not only to the French parliament but probably to its supporters as well. This could be why the Pleven Cabinet was not enthusiastic as to the ratification of the EDC Treaty. Indeed, France repeatedly used all instruments at its disposal to delay the practical application of the Treaty, demanding endless guarantees to grant itself a superior position compared to those of the other participating countries and to limit the area of West Germany to maneuver<sup>128</sup>. When Mendès-France took the office in 1954 with his Gaullist-Radical cabinet<sup>129</sup>, it became obvious that the end for the EDC Treaty was near. His final attempt of re-negotiating the entire EDC Treaty in order to cut off its supranational aspects could not be enough to mend eroded French influence in the text. This proposal was rejected instantly by other EDC states and the Treaty was finally rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30<sup>th</sup> 1954. After the end of the EDC project, France agreed

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<sup>125</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.102.

<sup>126</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.80.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p.81.

<sup>128</sup> Munte, op.cit., p.170.

<sup>129</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.86.

to the settlement entailing the entrance of West Germany into NATO: a solution France had rejected four years ago.

Failure of the EDC exposed the real motivations on the French part and showed that it was not European idealism that led the French to build communities. Instead, the late 40s and early 50s had been the years in which France came to realize that it had to find its out of date obstructionist German policies a new cover, compatible with the conditions of current international system. Similarly, bothered with its auxiliary role cast by the Americans, France also aspired to assume the role of leading continental power, although, in reality, it had found its seat in victorious bloc by the courtesy of the winners. When Jean Monnet came up with his innovative solutions, France, thus, realized there was no other viable option to keep its eastern neighbor under control and earn itself a role, other than being an American satellite. All the half-hearted efforts and foot-dragging on the French part can now be better understood, considering the state of mind of the post-war French decision-makers when glorious memories of the French history were still in their minds. The use of the word, federalism, in the Schuman declaration, therefore, seems to have been nothing but mere rhetoric. As exemplified in the refusal of the EDC Treaty by the National Assembly, the French were neither ready nor willing for any bold integration project that might have taken away their national sovereignty in such a vital area: the very reason why the Pleven Plan failed while the Schuman Plan had got nod from the French Assembly. Yet, the late 50s would see the integration unfold via an economic platform that would be the main base for further progress.

Unlike the previous endeavors initiated by the French, The European Economic Community (EEC) and The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were not the projects invented by Monnet. In fact, he had fallen out of favor due to his supranational ideas which did not have many supporters in Quai d'Orsay. At the designing phase of the EDC, for instance, he had voiced his concerns as to the diminishing supranationalist aspects and increasing intergovernmental traits in the EPC<sup>130</sup>. His complaints soon made him a *persona non grata* within French executive circles, especially after a dispute with Mendès-France in late 1954 over the issues in question<sup>131</sup>. When Monnet wanted to resume his post in ECSC, the President of the High Authority, for a second term, France was the

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<sup>130</sup> Fransen, op.cit., p.122.

<sup>131</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.99.

only country that did not want Monnet there<sup>132</sup>. The person who had invented accommodating solutions in tough times and put them in the service of the Quai d'Orsay was now ironically dismissed due to his ambitious ideas.

On its path to these new endeavors in the mid 50s, The Six was this time being driven by Dutch Foreign Minister Jan-Willem Beyen, with the purpose of ceasing the unfavorable trade practices among the members and establishing a freer, larger, more productive, economic area by means of a common market<sup>133</sup>. In other words, a wider ECSC was underway. In the absence of Monnet, his associate Pierre Uri was in the small team studying the schemes, after the formal proposal of common market idea at Messina Conference of the six foreign ministers in 1955<sup>134</sup>. Despite its initial, distant stance, France was shifting towards the beneficial prospects of a common market. It would therefore be no surprise that the Rome Treaty would not share the destiny of the Treaty of EDC.

Although France and Germany, by coming together around common endeavors, seemed to have put their long-standing antagonism behind themselves, following decades would prove that neither party was willing to let its guard down against the other and give up its national agenda. In fact, built on the purpose of economic gain, European Communities, and later the European Union (EU), would be nothing but a mean which France and Germany would utilize in order to multiply their capabilities. Foundation of the communities, in this respect, does not signalize the end of the Franco-German rivalry; but a transformation of it into a more civil fashion. The frequently praised term, *one of a kind*, used to describe the unique structure of the European Union does ironically seem to expose its un-evolved state, stuck between national interests and great expectations. However, as will be expressed in the following sections, France and Germany, just like the others, will be more preoccupied with the security of the former, rather than the realization of the latter.

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Hörber, op.cit., p.124.

<sup>134</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.99.

## PART TWO

### FRENCH INFLUENCE IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

When the institutional structure of the ECSC is examined, it is easy to notice that it included bolder supranational features than its successor institution, the EEC. The Treaty of Paris had built, along with the High Authority, a council for political control by the member states, an assembly highlighting the democratic dimension and a court for arbitration of the disputes among the members. As stated previously, the High Authority would function as the executive body as to the management of the coal and steel resources of the member countries. The High Authority included nine members in office for six years; eight of whom assigned by the governments of the member states jointly while the ninth was elected by these eight members<sup>135</sup>. Further, members of the High Authority were to be appointed collectively by the governments of the members, instead of being nominated by the states individually. Besides, in terms of operational capabilities, the High Authority was equipped with distinguishing powers, at least on paper. It was able to charge fines for failure of compliance and refrain from releasing transfer payments to such firms<sup>136</sup>. In other words, the High Authority could become too dangerous for the national interests of member states.

The Dutch, therefore, demanded a body to supervise the High Authority: A Council of Ministers. Although the original plans of Monnet had not included such a body<sup>137</sup>, in the course of negotiations he realized that such an institution was necessary to satisfy member states which were asked to surrender a part of their sovereign rights. The Council of Ministers, composed of ministers from member states, therefore became the body of approval for policy measures initiated by the High Authority, but the decisions would come from the High Authority, based on a majority vote of its members<sup>138</sup>. However, one should not be confused with the fact that it was the Dutch, instead of the French, who

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p.67.

<sup>136</sup> Alter, Karen and Steinberg, David, "The Theory and Reality of the European Coal and Steel Community" in **Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p.95.

<sup>137</sup> Drake, Helen, **Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader**, Routledge, London, 2000, p.75

<sup>138</sup> Alter and Steinberg, op.cit., p.91.

demanded an intergovernmental body in the service of member states. Monnet, however idealist, would not fail to ensure that the voice of France was dominant in the governing mechanism of the ECSC<sup>139</sup>:

Look, I don't care if we take population or Gross National Product or steel capacity or coal capacity, or whatever as a measure of voting power. All I want is an outcome, so that Italy and Germany, voting together, will not constitute a majority.

Similarly, the original plans of Monnet also excluded the existence of a parliamentary assembly<sup>140</sup>, making the character of the European project highly technocratic. Resisting to the existence of a council is somewhat understandable since such a ministerial body would render the ECSC prone to the influence of national governments. Motives behind the idea of excluding a parliamentary assembly, however, are a bit hard to understand. Obviously, Monnet did not want any factor to get in the way when a handful of experts were running the Community. Still, in the course of the negotiations of the ECSC, Monnet had to propose the creation of a parliamentary assembly<sup>141</sup> just as the fact that he greenlighted the presence of a council of ministers. From this angle, Monnet, while trying to protect the Community from the intentions of member states, was at the same time putting his supranational ideas into practice in a very bureaucratic and elitist manner.

Towards the late 50s, interest in the ECSC -theoretically and practically- decreased, for integration of European economies, instead of a limited project on coal and steel, was deemed a more viable path to take the European project to success. However, the technocratic nature, in particular, and the French influence, in general, would be preserved in the EEC. In fact, it is hard to expect otherwise, for Germany and Italy -let alone taking the lead- were still under the shame of their recent pasts while, on the other hand, little Benelux countries were, in power, no match for France. The French intentions at the early stages of the EEC, thus, went unchallenged. Similarly, there was also no community spirit to challenge France since the supranational aspects of the organization were cut down significantly. Indeed, unlike the High Authority of the ECSC, the new Commission would

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<sup>139</sup> Fransen, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>140</sup> Featherstone, Kevin, (1994, June) "Jean Monnet and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union" *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol:32 No:2, p.160

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

entirely depend on financial contributions coming from the member states until 1970<sup>142</sup>. Likewise, powers which the High Authority was entitled to exercise were now replaced with a lot less effective measures. For instance where the High Authority was authorized to issue fines and implement sanctions on states, the Commission was allowed, by the Treaty of Rome, to file infringement suits which could at most lead to an ineffective European Court of Justice declaration that ‘a member state had failed to fulfill its obligation<sup>143</sup>. Apart from these facts, the late 50s would also see De Gaulle factor that enabled France to materialize its goals with the help of intergovernmentalist discourses. This period of French hegemony over the process of European integration during its formative stages would have fundamental consequences for the future shape of European institutions<sup>144</sup>. These factors at the early stage of the EEC, therefore, led to what the French called *Golden Age* where France imposed its own customs, traditions and methods on the several layers of the functioning mechanism of the EEC.

## 2.1. Linguistic Dimension: Use of French Language

It was in the 17<sup>th</sup> century that French language, with its widespread use, acquired the position of *lingua franca* in Europe<sup>145</sup>. Replacing Latin in many domains except religion and learning, French was now the new connecting language used towards practical aims, spoken by diplomats, European legists, and being learned all over the continent<sup>146</sup>. Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, use of the French language in the routines of diplomacy had been a common practice or even a custom. Trade with its European neighbors, products of art flourishing in its capital and scientific developments it had hosted had been some other reasons enabling France to impose its language on the continent. For one reason or another, those who interacted with the French had to learn their language to trade with them or access the information and cultural products originating in France. In short, several factors from different domains had catalyzed the prevalent use of French language in Europe.

<sup>142</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.95.

<sup>143</sup> Featherstone, op.cit., p.95.

<sup>144</sup> Ruttley, Philip, “Long Road to Unity: The Contribution of Law to the Process of European Integration since 1945” in **The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, p.230.

<sup>145</sup> Wright, Sue, (2006) “French as Lingua Franca” *Annual Review of Applied Linguistic*, Vol:26, p.36.

<sup>146</sup> De Swaan, Abram, (1993, July) “The Evolving European Language System: A Theory of Communication Potential and Language Competition” *International Political Science Review*, Vol:14 No:3, p.241.

What attracts the attention here is the fact that this picture coincides with the era where France was at the height of its power. Similarly, decline of the use of French in international settings also follows a parallel line to the imperial retreat of France beginning after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and being embodied most visibly after the Second World War. This is the foundation of the claims of many linguists maintaining that use of French in the European Union is on decline. It is true that many findings confirm the growing use of English in the Community. However, that does not necessarily erode the substantial presence of French language in the EEC. The more French was rooted as the central language in administrative registrar, the more marks it left on the culture of the entity in which it was used. The EEC, therefore, would be another lieu where the use of French language would be prominent.

Originally, article 217 of the Treaty of Rome had left the language issue in the hands of the Council acting in unanimity. Based on that provision, the Council consequently adopted the Regulation No. 1 – April 15<sup>th</sup> 1958, setting national languages of the member states -Dutch, French, German and Italian- as the official and working languages of the EEC. The obvious rationale behind this was to ensure the credibility of the Community as a pluralist institution each member of whom had to be equal in the proceedings of its bodies. What is meant by the linguistic supremacy here, therefore, is not an explicit, deliberately-institutionalized usage of the French language -though it is not something France did not attempt- but rather, an implicit influence that French language has cumulated throughout centuries and eventually reflected on European institutions as some sort of heritage with the help of the leading role exercised by France.

Holding a privileged position from the outset, French had been the sole official language of the forerunner of the Community, the ECSC<sup>147</sup> and natural working language of the High Authority<sup>148</sup>. Of course, the tradition would not be abandoned in the EEC: French was regarded as the connecting language. Official documents were first drafted in French and then translated into the other official languages<sup>149</sup> for bureaucrats of the EEC, for a long period of time, have widely considered the French language as the most

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p.245.

<sup>148</sup> Ban, Carolyn, "Sorry, I don't speak French: The Impact of Enlargement on Language Use within the European Commission" in **Walk the Talk: Integrating Languages and Cultures in the Professions**, The Edward Mellon Press, New York, 2009, p.3.

<sup>149</sup> Ruttley, op.cit., p.231.

important common language of the administration<sup>150</sup>. In fact, no different way could have been expected since institutions, or the heartland of the Community, have always happened to be in francophone territory -Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg<sup>151</sup>. Findings presented in a survey directed by the Commission in 1974 at A-grade civil servants below the division rank confirm the natural consequence of this situation. When asked ‘what percentage of the time do you use your mother tongue, second language, third language and fourth language in your division, specialized department, or office of a member of the Commission?’, French officials reported to have used their mother tongue 77% of the time<sup>152</sup>. Likewise, in the survey, the lowest ratio of having to switch to a second language was also reported by the French with 15.4%.

Indeed, first wave of enlargement did not cause much influence as to diminishing the use of French, though, at the first glance, the entry of the two English-speaking countries seems to have a reducing effect on the use of French language considering the remarkable native-English population flooding into the Community. Still, the francophone characteristic of the Community in language terms has been preserved for the officials from these newly-joined countries did not have a tendency of pushing the use of their language. Furthermore, accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 80s had solidified the francophone nature of the Community since southern European politicians and bureaucrats in the 80s were of a generation that was likely to have had French as their second language<sup>153</sup>. By the time the third wave of enlargement was undertaken, out of 12.000 EC officials some 5.000 were still French-speaking<sup>154</sup>. It was, however, the fourth wave of enlargement that took its toll on French language since the most widespread second language in northern Europe was English<sup>155</sup>. Comments from an observer in this respect indicate the significance of the effect brought by the fourth wave of enlargement compared to that of the first<sup>156</sup>:

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<sup>150</sup> Nedergaard, Peter, **European Union Administration: Legitimacy and Efficiency**, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007, p.25.

<sup>151</sup> Drake, Helen, (2006, March) “France: An EU Founder Member Cut Down to Size?” *Journal of European Integration*, Vol:28 No:1, p.93.

<sup>152</sup> Michelmann, Hans, (1978, Spring) “Multinational Staffing and Organizational Functioning in the Commission of the European Communities” *International Organizations*, Vol:32 Issue:2, p.491.

<sup>153</sup> Wright, op.cit., p.40.

<sup>154</sup> De Swaan, op.cit., p.245.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p.250.

<sup>156</sup> Wright, op.cit., p.40.

When Brits and the Irish came in, they could not insist upon [...] the use of English, partly for historical reasons connected to the community and partly for cultural reasons. They do not like to be seen imperialistic in language terms, whereas the Scandinavians had no such complexes. They liked English, they preferred it enormously to French and it was a little tilt in the overall balance that made English acceptable as a working language.

Similarly, the fifth wave of enlargement had a significant impact since German was the first foreign language in the Central and Eastern European countries<sup>157</sup>. It was, therefore, not very likely for the politicians and bureaucrats of these countries to have French as lingua franca<sup>158</sup>. Instead, they would opt for English since it was now able to provide the communication needs of a remarkably large population within the EEC. Currently, even in the European Parliament, the institution with the most visible commitment to ensuring plurilingualism, the use of English as a lingua franca is growing<sup>159</sup>.

However, although the growing use of English and its high number of native and second-language speakers seem to dethrone French at the first glance; there are still reasons to believe that French, though contested, will keep its significance in the Union. When the prominence of a language is measured by the amount of people who speak it in order to interact with each other, it can well be said that English has overtaken French in many aspects and many domains of the Union. However, when a language had been an important hallmark in the tissue of an entity, whose institutional culture was drenched in the essence of that language, then one would be right to think that the substantial weight of French will not fade away easily in the Union, regardless of the usage of other languages. Indeed, anyone with even a remote familiarity with the European Union or its proceedings would not be surprised by the existence of remarkable amount of French-originated terms in the Community jargon. Some of these terms have remained French (*acquis communautaire*), some have been partially melted into English (*rapporteur*) and some - perhaps the most puzzling ones- have obtained an unnatural Englishness in translation, with only a few people being entirely sure of their meaning (*comitology, subsidiarity*)<sup>160</sup>.

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<sup>157</sup> De Swaan, op.cit., p.250.

<sup>158</sup> Wright, op.cit., p.40.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>160</sup> Bainbridge, Timothy, **The Penguin Companion to European Union**, Penguin, London, 1998, p.11.

These terms exemplify only a small amount of the 30.000 or so items in the glossary in which other languages barely show their influence<sup>161</sup>.

Likewise, it is also this sort of substantial effect that gave the prominent DGs in the Commission a francophone color. For instance, the Secretariat General, DG Agriculture, DG Personnel and Administration and DG Relex (foreign relations) were among the traditionally Francophone DGs in their preference of language use<sup>162</sup>. Frequent use of French in the Commission is more evident especially in the routine encounters of the officials from new members who did not expect to still find such a common use of French. As a senior official commented on the subject in a very sincere manner<sup>163</sup>:

I was not very aware that French language was of as much importance as it turned out to be. [...] Although my parents wanted me to learn (French), I said “the French language... that is on the way out. English is winning and German is more important because Hungary has a rather German-speaking neighborhood, so why the (\*\*\*)<sup>164</sup> should I waste my time?” I think the culture is still very strongly French here, that was another challenge. [...] Of course I tried to learn and I tried also earlier to pick up some French, but of course I must say that although formally English is the main working language, especially colleagues that started earlier, they tend to switch very often to French.

By 1996, French was the language used in 75% of the cases in internal written communications<sup>165</sup> indicating that it was, until quite recently, unchallenged as the language in use in the internal operations of the EU<sup>166</sup>. However, as stated previously, it would be unrealistic to deny the current balance developing in favor of English. Concerned by the growing use of English as the future lingua franca, French government sought preemptive attempts in order to prevent any further decline in the use of French. For instance, it was the French presidency in 1995 demanding that working languages of the EU be reduced to five: English, German, French, Spanish and Italian<sup>167</sup>. Although the motive behind this attempt seems to be the purpose of ensuring simplicity in the routines of large EU

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<sup>161</sup> Anderson, Wendy, **The Phraseology of Administrative French: A Corpus-Based Study**, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2006, p.22.

<sup>162</sup> Ban, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>164</sup> (Inappropriate expression)

<sup>165</sup> Anderson, Wendy, op.cit., p.11.

<sup>166</sup> Philipson, Robert, **English-Only Europe: Challenging Language Policy**, Routledge, London, 2003, p.120.

<sup>167</sup> Wright, op.cit., p.47.

bureaucracy, it was in fact a step taken towards the predominance of French language in a relatively smaller group of languages. Likewise, three senior French officials in 2004 petitioned Brussels asking that French be made the official language of the EU justice system and that the French version of all documents relating to the legal domain be the definitive version<sup>168</sup>. Again, the petitioners put forward a legitimate pretext, this time however, protection of plurilingualism and prevention of uniformity, in relation to the growing use of English. The real rationale behind this maneuver was no different. As one of the French member of the European Parliament, Jean Michel, would stress in 2005<sup>169</sup>:

[...] What initiatives does the government intend to take at Community level to solve a serious language problem, which could bring about a uniformity harmful for Europe? French has been until recently the language of diplomacy, and we cannot allow its disappearance nor its demotion in relation to the language of the Anglo-Saxons.

Combined with their famous fondness to their cultural identity, the French seem to perceive their language as one of the integral parts that gave the Community its French character. This privileged position of French language had marked the initial stage of the European integration. Any decline in the use of French in the Community, therefore, is beyond their tolerance, since French language is one of the prominent reminders of those years when the destiny of the European project was being shaped by the French will. Just as the language subject, organizational structure or administrative body of the Community would also bear such marks from that character.

## 2.2. Institutional Dimension: Structure of the Commission

What is initially striking in the institutional body of the Community is the bureaucratic base it was built on. Considering the fact that the Parliament and the Council of Ministers were added to the scheme only upon the extrinsic criticism, it can well be said that at the heart of the European design was the High Authority that would be replaced with the Commission. The two men, Jean Monnet and Pierre Uri, seem to be of special importance in this respect for they were the ones establishing the role and the modus

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p.47.

operandi of the executive organs of the ECSC and the EEC respectively. As a natural consequence, it would be impossible that such a vital body designated to keep the Community running would not bear hereditary traits from its designer. Indeed, there are several characteristics in the nature of the Commission bearing close resemblance with the French administrative patterns. Entrusting the functions of the administration to a small group of technocrats was very familiar to these Frenchmen since it was the concept that had strong roots in French tradition<sup>170</sup>:

The concept of technocracy, always stronger in France (than in Britain), implies the control of policy by a disinterested elite of experts, with technical knowledge or at least technical outlook, differing both from traditional businessman and from party politician or bureaucrat. Their strength in France derives not only from the large role of the state in industry, but also from the high reputation of their main breeding-ground, the great engineering colleges known as the *Grandes Ecoles*.


Since the architectures of the system had had a strong attachment to functional administrative machinery, particularly to a small and powerful committee designated to make pervasive decisions<sup>171</sup>, many traits of the Commission such as divisional structure, terminology, hierarchical order and grading of the officials would all seem familiar to those acquainted with the French administrative tradition. Indeed, no guideline was set in the founding treaty of the EEC regarding the internal organization of the Commission<sup>172</sup>, making it easier for the French civil service to be the model of the body. In this sense, the resemblance could be examined in a two-fold structure, allowing a better view on both the political and administrative sphere of the office of a Commissioner.

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<sup>170</sup> Featherstone, op.cit., p.154.

<sup>171</sup> Milward, Alan, **The European Rescue of Nation State**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p.336.

<sup>172</sup> Nedergaard, op.cit., p.110.



\*The concept in the graph was illustrated by the author.

\*\*The boxes are of illustrative purpose, and their amount does not necessarily reflect the current division amount in actual organization in question.

Each Commissioner of the European Commission is assigned to specific policy area or areas based on his field of expertise. The Commissioner, in order to run the related law-making process, assembles a team, *the Cabinet*, which would help him regarding the technical aspects of the work in question. This is the political sphere of the office of a Commissioner. Up to this point, this scheme in the office of a Commissioner brings to mind the inner circle of a minister in his administration, which is quite normal. However, headed by *chef de cabinet*, this team is modeled on the French ministerial staffs of the same name<sup>173</sup>, including also the posts *conseiller* or *aides to the Commissioner* as the body of advisers<sup>174</sup>, resembling an individual tradition of government in France that a minister appoints his own ministerial cabinet to advise him<sup>175</sup>. Besides, the only French connection of these officers is not only the resemblance of their posts to their French equivalents but also the previous positions they occasionally held in the French administration itself. A majority of cabinet members of a French commissioner, especially *chef de cabinets*, were likely to be senior officials from the French administration<sup>176</sup>. Pascal Lamy, for instance,

<sup>173</sup> Michelmann, op.cit., p.482.

<sup>174</sup> Sideri, Katerina, (2005, June) "The European Commission and the Law-Making Process: Compromise as a Category Praxis" *International Journal of Law in Context*, Vol: 1 Issue: 2, p.159.

<sup>175</sup> Thiebault, Jean-Louis, "The Political Autonomy of Cabinet Ministers in the French Fifth Republic", in **Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p.140.

<sup>176</sup> Menon, Anand, "The French Administration in Brussels" in **The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.84.

*chef de cabinet* of Jacques Delors from January 1995, was the *directeur adjoint* of his cabinet in Paris between May 1981 and April 1983, prior to holding the same position for Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy<sup>177</sup>. It would, therefore, be arguable how these cabinet members of the Commissioner, with strong ties with their former employer -the French government- would operate in a community-minded manner and dedicate themselves selflessly and solely to the European cause.

In the meantime, the real administrative machinery in the service of the Commissioner, that takes pride in being the *custodian of the Treaties* is also a system derived from French conception of civil administration<sup>178</sup>. Although it is arguable in reality if these Directorate Generals (DG) are at the behest of their Commissioners or the other way around, real technocratic aspect of the work of a Commissioner is performed by the DG in question. Being the administrative sphere in the office of a Commissioner, DG or DGs perhaps bear closer resemblance to their French equivalents than do the cabinets, for DG structure of the Commission is almost identical with that of a French ministry of the Fifth Republic. In fact, ministry itself is a French-originated concept, closely associated to the executive function<sup>179</sup>. The concept can be dated back to the Napoleonic period establishing the hierarchic pyramidal structure in the state administration with a political senior management: a member of the national executive body<sup>180</sup>. Therefore the emphasis put on hierarchy, codification, centralization, principle of permanence<sup>181</sup> in the European Commission is certainly not coincidental. Taking a close look at the structure of a DG is quite revealing in this respect.

A DG is divided into directorates and directorates into units<sup>182</sup>, just as a French ministry in itself is divided respectively into *directions générales*, *directions*, occasionally *sous directions*<sup>183</sup> and finally *bureaux*. Secondly, grading of the officials in the DG also

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid., p.84.

<sup>178</sup> Ruttley, op.cit., p.230.

<sup>179</sup> Casini, Lorenzo, "Models of Public Administration: Comparative Analyses of Administrative Organization" United Nations Public Administration Network, [www document] p.16. URL:

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAIMED/UNPAN028187.pdf> Accessed on April 28<sup>th</sup> 2011.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>181</sup> Sideri, op.cit., p.159.

<sup>182</sup> Suvarierol, Semin, **Beyond the Myth of Nationality: A Study on the Networks of European Commission Officials**, Eburon Academic Publishers, Delft, 2007, p.16.

<sup>183</sup> Sideri, op.cit., p.159.

follows the French civil service pattern with four discrete streams, from A to D<sup>184</sup>. In French civil service, A grade denotes highly-skilled officers with higher education, working in managerial positions<sup>185</sup> while B grade corresponds to officers charged with mid-level management tasks with accordingly-set authority. Finally, C grade officials, at the bottom of the pyramid, are responsible to carry on day-to-day administrative tasks<sup>186</sup> of their organizations. In a DG, very similarly, A-grade officials are the administrative elite assigned to, what is called in French as *conception*, a concept that entails innovative thinking<sup>187</sup>. Indeed, far from being mere public servants, personnel of this grade are inclined to see themselves as an elite body of policy-makers, intellectuals or diplomats instead of being just public servants<sup>188</sup>. A new recruit without experience joins this category of a DG at A8 level while the head of a unit, a director and a director general hold oftentimes respectively A3, A2, and A1 ranks<sup>189</sup>. Position of B grade officials of a DG, on the other hand, is -just as their French equivalents- more modest due to lack of competence in policy formulation. They are mainly responsible for executive tasks<sup>190</sup> Diminishing in importance towards the bottom, responsibilities of the staff in the C grade include secretarial and clerical duties<sup>191</sup>, under which D grade officials engage daily routine tasks, manual or service duties<sup>192</sup>. Although the system was modified by Prodi administration with the new Staff Regulations which have been in effect since May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004<sup>193</sup>, the new grading system does not make much difference as it categorizes the personnel into administrative (AD) and assistant (AST) staff which, at their core, imply the former division of labor.

Just as in the language subject, one may argue that such structural traits in the European Commission cannot benefit France since they have no effect on policy formulation which is what counts when it comes to legislative output binding every party.

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<sup>184</sup> Cini, Michelle, **The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation, and Culture in the EU Administration**, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996, p.116.

<sup>185</sup> United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Division for Public Administration and Development Management, "Republic of France: Public Administration Country Profile" [www document] p.17. URL: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023308.pdf> Accessed on: April 28<sup>th</sup> 2011.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Cini, op.cit., p.116.

<sup>188</sup> Shore, Cris, **European Union and the Politics of Culture**, Burges Group (Monograph No:21), London, 2001.

<sup>189</sup> Sideri, op.cit., p.164.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Cini, op.cit., p.116.

<sup>192</sup> Sideri, op.cit., p.164.

<sup>193</sup> Suvarierol, op.cit., p.18.

True. However, this sort of effect, though devoid of practical benefit, is unlikely to fade away regardless of the members joining in. Rooted in the genes of the Community, it is this sort of traits that give the European blend a French color, in other words, a reflection of the notion *grandeur*: what the French decision-makers of the time embedded into the Community as their signature whose sole bearer would not be the Commission. The Court of Justice of the Communities, too, would be a French-inspired institution with several distinct traits in its body.

### 2.3. Judicial Dimension: Legal Culture in the Court of Justice

In the formation of the ECSC, a court, as stated previously, was deemed necessary for the arbitration of the conflicts among both the members and the organs of the Community. Its main mission would be to ensure that *the law is observed* in Community operations falling within its jurisdiction. The Court would achieve that mission by acting within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaty (or, in the near future, Treaties) and by applying them rigorously within the conditions and according to the procedures set forth in the text<sup>194</sup>. Beginning to operate on December 1952, the Court was transformed into the judicial organ of all three communities<sup>195</sup> when the EEC and EURATOM came into being in 1958. This merger did not cause any substantial change in the institution for the new Court took from its forerunner the majority of the judges, most of its personnel, its premises and its docket of almost 40 cases<sup>196</sup>. Some judges, however, could not find themselves a seat in the new Court due to the related clause set forth in the new Treaties, obligating that the judges should be chosen from persons whose independence is unquestionable and who meet the conditions required for the practice of the highest judicial functions in their respective countries or who are legal experts with universally recognized reputation and outstanding ability<sup>197</sup>.

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<sup>194</sup> Lagrange, Maurice, (1967, Fall) "The Court of Justice as a Factor in European Integration" *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol: 15 No: 4, p.710.

<sup>195</sup> Feld, Werner Joachim., (1978, November) "The Court of Justice—Invisible Arm" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol: 440 No: 1, p.43.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Valentine, Donald Graham, **The Court of Justice of the European Communities**, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1965, p.8.

The Court, due to the nature of its jurisdiction, has dealt with the administrative conflicts. This is where the connection to French legal ethos emerges. Just as the Commission, the Court too would get its share of French tradition both in its legal mentality and its functioning. However, in order to comprehend the legal nature of its domain, a brief look at the root of French legal tradition and administrative law might be helpful.

French legal culture has its roots in *jus civile*, Roman Civil Law system that had prevailed in the European continent and was adopted by the nations that are now the home of the civil law tradition<sup>198</sup>. Codification of *Code civil des français* can be traced back to the Napoleonic era, just after the unsuccessful drafts attempted to abolish the legal order of the *Ancien Régime*<sup>199</sup>. Afterwards, conquests by Napoleon across the continent brought the consequence of spreading, in European countries, not only a model of centralized and hierarchically organized state; but also a *Code Civil* directly inspired by its French original<sup>200</sup>. The prominent distinction in this legal thought is the clear line drawn between what is public and what is private<sup>201</sup>, which is explained by the reason that relationships between state and the private persons cannot be governed by the same legal principals<sup>202</sup>. This is the notion creating the two orders of courts in France: the judicial courts, dealing with all the legal conflicts between private persons under the control of the *Court de Cassation* and the administrative courts, dealing with almost all the legal conflicts between public authorities and the private persons under the control of the *Conseil d'État* (the Council of State)<sup>203</sup> that could be considered as the highest administrative court in France. In fact, it would not be wrong to claim that this institution has its own place in French legal tradition. Administrative courts -due to the separation of powers principle emerging with the Revolution- have been a French-patented institution. A body that was formerly set to advise the King gradually became an institution for the review of the government

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<sup>198</sup> Merryman, John Henry and Perez-Perdomo, Rogelio, **The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007, p.10.

<sup>199</sup> Vranken, Martin, **Fundamentals of European Civil Law**, The Federation Press, Sydney, 1997, p.26.

<sup>200</sup> Galabert, Jean-Michel, (2000, July) "The Influence of Conseil d'Etat Outside France" *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol:49 No:3*, p.704

<sup>201</sup> Apple, James, and Deyling, Robert, "A Primer on the Civil Law System" Federal Judicial Center [www document] p.23. URL: [http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/\\$file/CivilLaw.pdf](http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf) Accessed on May 30<sup>th</sup> 2011.

<sup>202</sup> Galabert, op.cit., p.702.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

conduct<sup>204</sup>. It is important to note that this brief description above does not intend to establish a similarity between the European Court of Justice and *Conseil d'État*, in terms their procedural styles. However, behind the reason of existence of both institutions lies the same legal mentality. Whatever reason it was that had given way to the establishment of *Conseil d'État* after the French Revolution, it was -at its root- the same reason establishing a court for European Communities: a check on the unrestricted power of the executive<sup>205</sup>.

Thus, The ECSC Treaty, inevitably inheriting the French administrative patterns, brought with it an immense supply of administrative legal measures such as annulment procedures in its Article 33, the plea of illegality in its Article 36, the action for failure to act in its Article 35 and the non-contractual responsibility of the Community in its Article 40<sup>206</sup>. These powers of the Court, codified in the ECSC Treaty, are associated more with those of national -instead of international- jurisdictions: review of the legality of the acts of the High Authority that puts both substance and form aspects under examination, is more similar to the action for excess of power in French administrative law than to the functions conventionally designated to judicial mechanisms on the international stage.<sup>207</sup>. Of course, Treaty of Rome would not cause any change in this respect. For instance, Article 137 of the EEC Treaty, setting out provisions on actions for annulment of Community decisions<sup>208</sup>: This article, among others, allows a natural or legal person to launch proceedings against a decision addressed to him, which, ultimately authorize the Court with the jurisdiction to review the legality of the acts of the Council and the Commission<sup>209</sup>. Similarly, article 173(1) allows parties to invoke legal measures against a Community act on any one of these four grounds: lack of competence, breach of an essential procedural requirement, breach of the Treaty or of any other rule of law regarding its application; or misuse of powers<sup>210</sup>. All of these have their roots in French administrative law. The grounds of annulment bear close resemblance to those developed

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<sup>204</sup> Apple and Deyling, op.cit., p.25.

<sup>205</sup> De Cruz, Peter, **Comparative Law in a Changing World**, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1999, p.159.

<sup>206</sup> Dehousse, Renaud, **The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration**, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, p.17.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> De Cruz, op.cit., p.159.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

by the *Conseil d'État* as certain types of ‘*excès de pouvoir*’ that result in annulment in French administrative law<sup>211</sup>.

Apart from legal mentality the Court inherited from the French tradition, there is also a very distinct aspect of proceeding in its body. Indeed, French legal practitioners - among which were members of the *Conseil d'État* - had participated in the preparation phase of the Treaties and played a significant role in the European institutions<sup>212</sup>. One of these persons, for instance, had posed remarkable importance for the Court when it was establishing the basic elements for the entire system of the Community law, under the impact of his powerful opinions<sup>213</sup>: Maurice Lagrange was among the draftsmen of the Treaty of Paris<sup>214</sup> and, at the same time, member of *Conseil d'État*<sup>215</sup>, allowing him to inspire the Court with Romano-Gallic notions in its preliminary stage. In these initial years, the Court even followed the case law of *Conseil d'État* very closely<sup>216</sup>. It was through this sort of French practitioners that French legal concepts or ways of reasoning exerted an influence on European law or on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice<sup>217</sup>.

The post of advocate general (AG) that Legrance had held, in this respect, symbolizes a visible impact on the Court. This post is unknown to countries of common law system, making it a genuine reflection of French legal tradition. Indeed, post of the AG is an extensively used practice in French administrative law procedures as the position of *commissaire du gouvernement*<sup>218</sup>. The AG, in France, studies the case and then presents - considering law and similar cases- his opinion regarding why and how the case should be decided<sup>219</sup>. In lower administrative courts, members hold the post of *commissaire du gouvernement* on ad hoc basis, while, at the *Conseil d'État* level, a certain number of judges occupy their seats for a term of years.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Galabert, op.cit., p.708.

<sup>213</sup> Hunnings, Neville March, **The European Courts**, Caternill Publishing, London, 1996, p.58.

<sup>214</sup> De Cruz, op.cit., p.159.

<sup>215</sup> Galabert, op.cit., p.708.

<sup>216</sup> Wessel, Ramses, “A Legal Approach to EU Studies” in **Handbook of European Union Politics**, Sage, London, 2007, p.107.

<sup>217</sup> Galabert, op.cit., p.708.

<sup>218</sup> Ruttley, op.cit., p.231.

<sup>219</sup> Bermann, George, and Picard, Etienne, “Administrative Law” in **Introduction to French Law**, Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008, p.100.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

In a parallel manner, the AG in Luxembourg assists the judges in their task and prepares, for the Court, an opinion with regard to the legal dimensions of any question submitted to it<sup>221</sup>. Representing neither the Communities nor the public, he functions only for the sake of justice<sup>222</sup>. In fact, it can even be said that it is the AG who, for the legal concerns, digs into the specific details of the case. He expresses the facts of the case and widens the law with greater perspective, usually with more precision than the collegiate decisions of the Court allow<sup>223</sup>. The fact that his opinions are not legally binding should not overshadow the significance of the post or the prominent role he has in terms of the development of the European law, for the Court often happens to have a tendency towards following these opinions<sup>224</sup>. Indeed, opinions of the AG strongly influence the Court, and their conclusions are published together with the judgment in the collection of jurisprudence<sup>225</sup>. Even when the opinions of the AG are dismissed, they acquire the character of dissenting opinion and oftentimes provide alternative solutions that may contribute to the development of future case law<sup>226</sup>.

However, just as the previous issues marking the French influence in the Union, legal domain, as well, is not immune to fading, especially by the effects of new-comers. Since French legal tradition has very strong roots at the foundation of European legal order, such a heavy dose from it inevitably led to tension with new member states whose legal and administrative traditions are quite different, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark<sup>227</sup>. In the same sense, legal understanding of the Court also imported notions such as proportionality (*Verhältnismassigkeit*)<sup>228</sup> and loyalty (*Bundestreue*) from German administrative culture<sup>229</sup>. However, the fact remains that it is a very strong influence that the French had laid on the legal culture of the Court. In addition to legal reasoning aspect described above, use of French language in the Court is also another constituent of this influence.

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<sup>221</sup> Feld, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Vranken, op.cit., p.72.

<sup>224</sup> Hartley, Trevor, **European Union Law in a Global Context: Text, Cases and Materials**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.78.

<sup>225</sup> Feld, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ruttle, op.cit., p.231.

<sup>228</sup> De Cruz, op.cit., p.160.

<sup>229</sup> Wessel, op.cit., p.107.

In legal terms, The Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice states, in article 29, that all the twenty-three languages of the Union can be used before the Court, as well as setting forth some exceptions where the plaintiff has the right to choose the language of the case<sup>230</sup>. However, French was preserved as the working language of the Court. There have been some arguments in this regard that French is a better fit, on the grounds that it allows a clear and precise reasoning in legal domain. From this perspective, multilingualism is not something achievable in the Court, but ironically, something to avoid for the sake of precision. Language and legal reasoning, to this thought, are strongly connected. Since each legal system is based on its own language<sup>231</sup>, essences of the judicial output will ultimately be altered where the judges have to review the case in a language foreign to their legal reasoning. As one of the judges of the Court had explained<sup>232</sup>:

This Court operates in the French language so, automatically, French is there in the structure of the notions and in the style of argumentation.

This is why, whatever the language of the case, the pleadings will be translated into French<sup>233</sup> just as the judgment of the Court is first drafted in French and then translated into the languages of the case<sup>234</sup>. In fact, uncertainties of meaning in other-language versions can at times be solved by comparing them with the French-language version, even though only the version written initially in the language of the case in question is authentic<sup>235</sup>.

It is ironic that French influence in the design of the Union carries no *de jure* effect but has some visible -occasionally fundamental- *de facto* marks, just as explained in this section. It is perhaps the reason of the bad boy attitude France has adopted today: a desire to bring back those years of golden age and a bitter realization of conditions making it impossible. Residents of *Élysée* know that it is now much harder to assert influence and have their way in the Union with twenty seven members on board. More importantly, with

<sup>230</sup> Derlen, Mattias, **Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law**, Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2009, p.5.

<sup>231</sup> Terris, Daniel, Romano, Cesare and Swigart, Leigh, **The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases**, Brandeis University Press, New Hampshire, 2007, p.78.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> Arnall, Anthony, **The European Union and Its Court of Justice**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p.12.

<sup>234</sup> Derlen, op.cit., p.5.

<sup>235</sup> Arnall, op.cit., p.12.

German economic miracle, France, again, found its Eastern neighbor bringing back its old days of aggressive growth. Indeed, while the United States sweated the burden of security for years; prosperity and growth were left to Europeans. Germans, of course, had no intention to be number two in this respect. Even in 1960, West Germany was developed enough to correspond to one fifth of the world trade in manufactured goods, outpacing Britain economically and acting as the engine of the Six<sup>236</sup>. The French who had invented the community method, influenced the treaties and imported their design to the European project were about to witness what they have embodied being hi-jacked by the Germans. Several policy areas, in this regard, can shed light on the attitudes of Franco-German couple in the development of the Communities into a full-fledged economic union.

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<sup>236</sup> Reynolds, David, "Europe Divided and Reunited, 1945-1995" in **The Oxford History of Modern Europe**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.289.

**PART THREE**  
**GERMAN INFLUENCE**  
**IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

The first decade of the integration can be said to have passed with concerns in French minds as to containing Germany and preserving the continuity of the French leadership, if not hegemony, in the Community. Those concerns, as stated in the previous section, did inevitably bring European institutions designed according to French preferences, norms or customs largely inheriting French tradition and, more crucially, political will orienting the EEC on the basis of intergovernmentalist discourses. Strong importance attached to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), resistance to the use of unanimity in the Council meetings and insistence on the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the EEC were such examples marking that concern. However, with the absence of the pro-European Chancellor Adenauer, West Germany was gradually adopting a more assertive stance when it comes to both its economic and political goals. Of course this attitude would not mean that West Germany would cease to play along or go back to its old days of aggressive advance with a new Bismarckian stance; but that it would, for France, no longer be as easy as it was in the initial postwar era to occupy its leading position in the Franco-German axis. Regardless of the time passing since the initial bitterness and resentment brought by the German aggression in the World War II, keeping an eye on the German state had hardly decreased in importance for Élysée.

However, it is also an undeniable fact that the EEC, during the following decades, undertook significant economic and political developments. It responded to the economic turbulence of the 70s with a daring project that would give birth to the future currency of Europe. Similarly, the EEC also questioned the uncontested place of the United States in the bi-polar world of the cold war by political initiatives reaching out even to the Middle East. While Europe, in these initiatives, failed as much as -perhaps more than- it succeeded, a forward course was still maintained by those at the helm of the Union: France and Germany. Right at this point, one could -and should- ask: if there was such a harsh and constant effort on the French part to keep the upper hand in the EEC both economically and politically, as suggested at the end of the first part, then how did the Community happen to take forward steps almost in every ten years of its integration? True, almost in

every decade after the 60s the European history was marked with bold initiatives to deepen the integration. However, as the reason suggests, no party would turn down a prospect that -when put into motion- can be materialized to multiply its interests. For instance, it was this concern on the French part that led to cease resisting the British accession, the British whose accession -when it meant a threatening element to the French interests- was rejected twice by de Gaulle. Likewise, the only suitable card France could play in this regard was not enlargement. Deepening, too, with the new policy areas could provide solution for Élysée at this point. Indeed, alongside materializing national economic and political objectives, if these endeavors could also serve to pull Germany back into the Community orbit when it was gaining more power than could be handled, what reason was there for France to turn down? While those initiatives of the 70s, 80s and beyond were not steps designed solely to revive fading French supremacy in relation to its partners, notably Germany; in the same sense, they were definitely not taken just for the sake of European cause. It is, therefore, no coincidence that behind all of those initiatives, -be it economic and monetary union or enlargement- was the Franco-German couple. However, as stated, those days of French political will shaping the early stage of the integration were now about to be a thing of the past- not the future. Instead, Germany was now taking the lead, due particularly to its incredible economic potential and political confidence gained after the reunification.

### **3.1. Trade Dimension: Export-Oriented Stance of Germany in the Common/Single Market**

The idea behind the common market is the purpose of increasing the trade, among the partners, through dedicated mechanisms or abolishment of the hindering procedures and, thereby, boosting the wealth in the area in a balanced -if not completely even- manner. However, if one member of the system, due to its extraordinary capability of methodical labor tradition and excessive material capacity, comes to a position enabling it to sell a lot more than it buys, then the idea behind the common market begin to lose its function. Germany has been such a member, a trade giant with its export-dependent economy in the EEC.

### 3.1.1. German Familiarity with the Idea of Common Market

In fact, as stated in the first part, German state is, historically, quite familiar with the notion of common market since Prussia in the first half of the 1800s had successfully managed the formation of the German customs union, *Zollverein*. This system not only functioned as a ground for political unity on the way leading to formation of the German Empire, but also established a solid ground on which the spread of manufacture and commerce would clinch the prominent place of Germany as the leading industrial state of the continent<sup>237</sup>. This successful experience of Germans in customs union proved that not all members of the system had to be at the same economic development stage, for *Zollverein* had included states disproportionate to one another not only in industrial development level; but also in territorial size<sup>238</sup>. In this system, a 19<sup>th</sup> century-economist, Friedrich List had a remarkable influence<sup>239</sup>.

List is known for his writings on free trade and his advocacy of some degree of protectionism in that setting. According to him, economic power -or, more precisely- productive power is the number-one determinant factoring in the source of the power of a nation<sup>240</sup>. When a developing country is at the very early stage of building its manufacturing force, it is crucial for it to protect its infant industry from free trade utilized by big industrial powers to penetrate less developed markets: a thought also voiced by Alexander Hamilton earlier<sup>241</sup>. Thus, if the objective is to cultivate wealth, it is vital for a nation -just as it is for an individual- to improve production capacity -without the interference of foreign players - and consume less than the amount produced. Upon the Great Depression, these thoughts were revived and led many economists to abandon arguments in favor of free trade, inspiring a sort of development based on policies of import substitution<sup>242</sup>. Despite the initial claims that his writings addressed specifically the

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<sup>237</sup> Henderson, W.O., **The Genesis of the Common Market**, Anchor Press Ltd., Essex, 1962, p.110.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p.112.

<sup>239</sup> Altmann, Matthias, **Contextual Development Economics: A Holistic Approach to the Understanding of Economic Activity in Low-Income Countries**, Springer, Heidelberg, 2011, p.113.

<sup>240</sup> Levi-Faur, David, (1997, July) "Economic Nationalism: From Friedrich List to Robert Reich" *Review of International Studies*, Vol:23 Issue:3, p.361.

<sup>241</sup> Snowdon, Brian, **Conversations on Growth, Stability and Trade: A Historical Perspective**, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2002, p.174.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid., p.175.

needs of the imperial Germany in 19<sup>th</sup> century, it would be a mistake to disregard the influence of his thoughts when considering the stance of the Federal Republic.

Contemporarily, the modern customs union in Europe, entailing a common market with harmonizing policies almost a hundred years later would also consist of members that are at different level of industrial growth or with different industrial production patterns. This is why the path of customs union entailing a common market -instead of a free trade area- was chosen. According to List who had a remarkable influence on the nature of the EEC, a free trade area could work only among members that are at the same industrial development level<sup>243</sup>. Besides, no good could have been achieved by abolishing customs when the governments of the members were not bound to implement the same economic policies -in other words- the same set of rules. Although this logic was voiced by a German economist, this scheme would also benefit France, at least theoretically. France, 28% of whose labor force worked, in 1955, in agricultural sector, could not afford to take part in a free trade area which would cover only industrial goods that Germans could produce for lower prices due to the cheaper input costs<sup>244</sup>: the reason why economics minister of Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, insisted on a free trade area, instead of a common market where the German state would be bound with implementing the same harmonizing regulations as the others. The reason Adenauer had gone along with common market scheme and disregarded the opinion of his minister is generally associated with his desire of rapprochement with his European allies<sup>245</sup>. However, as will be expressed below, it would turn out in the near future that the Chancellor, in his decision, was neither wrong nor sacrificing anything. The stance West Germany would adopt in a common market would, by no means, be as cautious as its attitude in political sphere had been.

### **3.1.2. Course of the Increase in the Exports of the FRG**

There are reasons to believe that the thoughts of List are still a source of inspiration for Germany. The advices of List are evident especially in the emphasis that Federal Republic would put on *supply* end of the economy, rather than import limitations. Although, at the first glance, this stance is expected to encourage exports, while leading to

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<sup>243</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.97.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p.103.

the consequence of limiting imports; the high volumes of foreign products did not cease to accompany the export figures of the Federal Republic, for goods coming both from the other EEC partners and from the outer world have never been regarded as a negative factor. On the contrary, West Germany -to some degree- considered imports beneficial since they would increase competition, efficiency and innovation<sup>246</sup>. Besides, structural traits of German economy would never let imports to reach a level threatening the export-driven growth of the economy. Germans are known for their disciplined and methodical work tradition. It is also in their nature, as List advised, to save and live within their means. With this understanding in mind, the economic objectives of Germany concerned stability at least as much as they concerned economic liberalism<sup>247</sup>. This export-led growth of Germany, however, has been at the expense of wealth on the part of other EEC member states.

After the war, West Germany found itself in a well-rounded industrial installation<sup>248</sup> that gave way to specialization on machinery, vehicles and chemicals production. In fact, West Germany would be global leader in the export of such merchandises. Other than technical expertise, structural dynamics for German economy were also favorable. Between 1950 and 1960, while labor costs in manufacturing decreased about 6%, German exports increased at the annual average rate of 13.5%<sup>249</sup>. Thus, the surplus in the foreign trade balance, that -before the 1960s- grew modestly at one-digit values, saw -despite occasional decreases- a steady upward trend and then tripled at the end of the decade with 15.6 billion Deutschemark in 1970<sup>250</sup>. The EEC -since the 60s- was becoming the primary market of the Federal Republic<sup>251</sup>. In the period from 1979 to 1990, Germany, due to trade with the other members of the EEC, has acquired a cumulative

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<sup>246</sup> Grotewold, Andreas (1973, September) "West Germany's Economic Growth" *Annals of the Association of the American Geographers*, Vol:63 Issue:3, p.361

<sup>247</sup> Feldman, Lily Gardner, (January, 1994) "Germany and the EC: Realism and Responsibility" *Annals of American Political Science*, Vol:531 No:1, p.27.

<sup>248</sup> Krelie, Michael (1977, Autumn) "West Germany: Dynamics of Expansion" *International Organizations* Vol:31 No:4, p.776.

<sup>249</sup> Brenner, Robert, **The Economies of Global Turbulence**, Verso, London, 2006, p.72.

<sup>250</sup> The Bundesbank, German Foreign Trade Balance - Time Series XJ4206, URL:

[http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik\\_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206](http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206) Accessed on July 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>251</sup> Feldman, op.cit., p.28.

surplus of \$275 bn<sup>252</sup> while both southern and core European countries, in the same period, found figures starting with ‘-’ in their foreign trade accounts.

First, the market share of West Germany in intra-EEC exports steadily increased in the 70s<sup>253</sup>. Following decades were no exception. Germany continued to allocate remarkable portions of its exports to European market with 50.8% in 1986 and 57% in 1995<sup>254</sup>. As a consequence, 30% of West German foreign trade surplus in the 70s -and 63% in 1988- came from intra-EEC trade<sup>255</sup>. Still, as successful as it is in exporting, these figures did not hold West Germany back from utilizing some sort of non-tariff barriers, such as standards<sup>256</sup> and introducing domestic subsidies<sup>257</sup> to limit or neutralize imports occasionally. There are, however, not enough indicators suggesting that Federal Republic had made use of extensive models of such protectionist measures. In fact, it can even be suggested that the Federal Republic, due to the trade diverting effect of customs union, must have been partly damaged by imports coming from other members of the EEC. Indeed, going back to previous decades, between the years 1952 and 1968, imports to West Germany from non-EEC countries increased 309.9%, bouncing from \$2,447 million to \$10.152 million<sup>258</sup>. Also, in the same period, imports from the EEC partners of the Federal Republic increased, from \$858 million to \$8,333 million, largely attributed to trade liberalization among EEC members<sup>259</sup>. However, during the course of this period, West Germany saw no deficit in its trade balance -not even for a single year- and surpluses continued to increase<sup>260</sup>. Thus, for the members of the EEC, trade deficits were not an uncommon experience when trading with the Germans. In 1988, for instance, 44% of the entire trade deficit of Great Britain was with West Germany<sup>261</sup>. As stated, enlargement had

<sup>252</sup> Cameron, David, “Creating Supranational Authority in Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: The Sources and Effects of EMU” in **European Integration and Supranational Governance**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.203.

<sup>253</sup> Markovits, Andrei, “Germany: Power and the Left” in **When the Wall Came Down**, Routledge, New York, 1992, p.210.

<sup>254</sup> Cameron, op.cit., p.194.

<sup>255</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, **The German Surplus: An Economic Problem in the New Europe**, London, 1989, p.10.

<sup>256</sup> Feldman, op.cit., p.28.

<sup>257</sup> Smith, Eric Owen, **The German Economy**, Routledge, London, 1994, p.506.

<sup>258</sup> Grotewold, op.cit., p.362.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> The Bundesbank, German Foreign Trade Balance - Time Series XJ4206, URL:

[http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik\\_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206](http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206)  
Accessed on July 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>261</sup> Institute for Public Policy Research, op.cit., p.10.

served the best interests of the Federal Republic with, in late 80's, more than the half of its total exports routed to the expanding European market. At the same time, prospective members of the Community, too, were among the customers of the Federal Republic. Even before the unification, West Germany, considering the exports to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), was the number-one trading partner with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria with the figures doubling its closest Western competitor<sup>262</sup>.

Upon the unification, Federal Republic also faced with a task of integrating East Germany into the Community. If GDR was put under the coverage of Common External Tariff -without any kind of transitional agreement- that would seriously endanger any chance of continuity of its trade with its former sphere. Federal Republic, at this point, had to secure a deal with its European partners in order for Eastern Bloc goods to enter into the Common Market and circulate freely, for Russia was insisting on the tariff-free status of the goods entering the GDR<sup>263</sup>. When the Federal Republic managed to have its proposal accepted, this flared up strong criticism and opposition in some members such as the UK, France and Italy on the grounds that the Federal Republic was on its way to create its own Hong-Kong in the territory of the former GDR with low costs factoring in production<sup>264</sup>. However, Eastern Bloc goods, in competition with their western competitors, could barely stand a chance. Besides, when these Eastern bloc exports were contained in the territory of the former GDR, as the Federal Republic guaranteed, there was no risk left to the economic well-being of EEC members: except for the consequence of continuing trade deficit that would be generated by the need for intensified export-led growth the Germans would utilize to offset the costs of unification.

Indeed, in the wake of the unification, exports had declined 76% in 1991 compared to the previous year<sup>265</sup>. This trend is also evident in the current account of Germany running a deficit in 1991 and 1992<sup>266</sup>. In such a period, positive trade balance -considering the fact that German trade balance, though declining greatly, never run deficits even after

<sup>262</sup> Markovits, op.cit., p.210.

<sup>263</sup> Anderson, Jeffrey, **German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.57.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> The Bundesbank, German Foreign Trade Balance - Time Series XJ4206, URL:

[http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik\\_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206](http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&open=konjunktur&func=row&tr=XJ4206)

<sup>266</sup> Accessed on July 6<sup>th</sup>, 2011

<sup>266</sup> Collignon, Stefan, **Europe's Monetary Future**, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, New Jersey, 1994, p.176.

the unification- has been a positive constituent contributing to growth. This brought the natural consequence of commitment, on German part, to international trade liberalization, as exemplified in the will of a successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since, as the SPD spokesperson Norbert Wieczorek stated: “the more liberalization was achieved in Geneva, the more favorable implications would arise for the new *Länder*”<sup>267</sup>, lifting the burden of the unification off the shoulders of German economy. With the second half of the 90’s, exports began to increase its share in the Gross National Product (GNP). In 2002, share of the exports in German GNP with 35.5% became even higher than the figure of pre-unification era in 1990, which was 32.1%<sup>268</sup>. This upswing, of course, meant higher volumes of exports into the European market, especially into the Euro area to which, in the same year, 42% of all German exports was routed<sup>269</sup>. With the adoption of the single currency -that would be the subject of the following section-, German competitiveness increased even more, since *Euro* would be a relatively weaker currency for such a strong economy.

### 3.1.3. Tension over the Conservative Stance of Germany

The upper hand that Germany had been holding in economic sphere would inevitably brought with it reactions from its partners. France, for one, has been voicing its opinion in this regard, urging Germany particularly not to constrain wages in order to decrease labor costs and to revive internal demand so as to curb exports and reach a healthy trade balance- for all trade partners of Germany. This is why Christine Lagarde, then French Finance Minister, thought that the situation Greece found itself in relates in part to this European-wide problem. In her interview with the Financial Times -although Lagarde refers to the responsibility of Germany in a broad sense- the underlying points she implies as to boosting domestic demand or loosening its grip on labor costs are evident<sup>270</sup>:

<sup>267</sup> Anderson, Jeffrey, op.cit., p.59.

<sup>268</sup> Siebert, Horst, **The German Economy: Beyond the Social Market**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005, p.5.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Hall, Ben, *Lagarde Criticises Berlin Policy* [www document] Financial Times, URL: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/225bbcc4-2f82-11df-9153-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Vwp1qddW> Accessed on July 11<sup>th</sup>, 2011

Clearly Germany has done an awfully good job in the last 10 years or so, improving competitiveness, putting very high pressure on its labour costs. When you look at unit labour costs to Germany, they have done a tremendous job in that respect. I'm not sure it is a sustainable model for the long term and for the whole of the group. Clearly we need better convergence.

Since external trade, as intra-community as it is, is seen as a zero-sum game, there is a tendency to hold Germany partly responsible for what happened to Greece and to other countries such as Portugal and Spain whose economies are in a bad shape. However, far from giving in to the complaints and reconsidering the position of her country with a moderate approach, Chancellor Angela Merkel stands her ground and defends the stance of her country, as exemplified in her speech at Bundestag<sup>271</sup>:

Where we are strong, we will not give up our strengths just because our exports are perhaps preferred to those of other countries. [...] The problem has to be solved from the Greek side, and everything has to be oriented in that direction rather than thinking of hasty help that does not achieve anything in the long run and merely weakens the euro even more.

In part, what Germany has been accused of does not seem to be entirely intentional for features such as high productivity, excellence in manufacturing, methodical and efficient labor force have long been associated with German economy as structural traits. Beyond the economic nature of the issue, anyone who reviews the history of the Germans from the formation of the *second Reich* to the establishment of Federal Republic cannot help but reach a conclusion that it is quite a pattern for the German nation: when the growth of Germany exceeded its physical sphere, some outlet is necessary to release this accumulation. The First and the Second World Wars had been the tragic events of this sort. As suggested in the first part, European project invented to put an end to destructive expansion of Germany was seen as the answer in this regard. This time, however, such accumulation changed circumstantially in nature and began to present itself in a different form. Rapid and steady economic expansion on the part of Germany, therefore, should not be surprising. This is why it would be unrealistic to expect such an economic power to step

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<sup>271</sup> Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose, *Angela Merkel Defies IMF and France as Anger Rises over German Export Surplus* [www document] The Telegraph, URL: [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans\\_pritchard/7467198/Angela-Merkel-defies-IMF-and-France-as-anger-rises-over-export-surplus.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/7467198/Angela-Merkel-defies-IMF-and-France-as-anger-rises-over-export-surplus.html) Accessed on July 11<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

back just to satisfy the cohesion demands of its fellow partners. The fact that such complaints fallen upon deaf ears on German part, therefore, would give way to similar criticism that Germany drifts away from the Union, considering another important issue: economic and monetary union (EMU).

### **3.2. Finance Dimension: Role of Germany in European Monetary Initiatives**

Trade was one of the most important elements that revived the Western Europe in the post-war years. International trade, however, could be beneficial only among the countries whose currencies are freely convertible to one another at a stable exchange rate<sup>272</sup>. Since American dollar was the primary reserve currency in the initial post-war years, the Europeans had to acquire adequate reserves of gold or dollar in order to ensure the convertibility of their currencies and take part in multilateral trade<sup>273</sup>. Necessity of some sort of mechanism for currency exchange, therefore, was evident even before the establishment of the EEC. At this point, the United States organized, among the beneficiaries of Marshall Aid, a clearing system, that will be known as European Payments Union (EPU), in order to allow Europeans to trade bilaterally -and later- multilaterally, without using dollar<sup>274</sup>. By the time European countries reached healthy reserves of gold and US dollars to ensure the convertibility of their national currencies, EPU had fulfilled its mission and, hence, was dissolved a year after the establishment of the EEC<sup>275</sup>.

#### **3.2.1. Beginning of the European Monetary Initiatives**

However, the need for lower transaction costs, higher efficiency and stability continued in order to ensure the well-functioning of the European common market. Even in the initial stage of the EEC, therefore, the Commission was beginning to present the blueprints of the future monetary union. Entrusted with the monetary and economic issues, Commissioner Robert Marjolin envisaged, in his memorandum in 1962, a monetary union

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<sup>272</sup> Grotewold, op.cit., p.354.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid.

<sup>274</sup> Dornbusch, Rüdiger, "Exchange Rate Policies in Economies in Transition" in **Approaches to Exchange Rate Policy: Choices for Developing and Transition Economies**, International Monetary Fund Publication Services, Washington D.C., 1994, p.249.

<sup>275</sup> Grotewold, op.cit., p.355.

to ensure the permanent fixing of the member currencies<sup>276</sup>. When this initiative did not appeal to the executive circles of the central banks of the member states, the Commission, this time, tried to include central bank governors into the process. However, the Committee of Governors, known for its standoffish attitude towards the idea of a monetary union, has been nothing other than a platform where fundamental divergences of opinion between the Commission and the central bankers would come to light<sup>277</sup>. Ideas of Marjolin regarding monetary union, according to the Governors, were too ambitious for an entity that had not formed a political union beforehand. Still, the momentum on the way to monetary unification continued, due to both internal and external drives.

With a significant breakthrough in the international monetary system -the collapse of the Bretton Woods order- in sight, the governments of the EEC countries in 1969 entrusted Pierre Werner, Luxembourg Prime Minister, with the task of assembling a group experts that would work on the establishment of an economic and monetary union<sup>278</sup>. Werner, in his report, introduced a three-stage modality on the way to the monetary unification that would include irreversibly fixed exchange rates and a European Central Bank system<sup>279</sup>. This was, in fact, what had been brought up at The Hague Summit in 1969 by the Chancellor Willy Brandt: a proposal entailing the gradual development towards a European economic and monetary union, being completed by 1980<sup>280</sup>. This attempt was not only marking the Germans as the initiators in the historical course of the European monetary unification, but also signalizing the very beginning of a repeating cycle when it comes to monetary policy formation in the Federal Republic. As will be shown in the following pages, each attempt at the establishment of a monetary union would derive from the same intents on the German part, championed and opposed by the same coalitions within the German state and left the other members of the EEC with almost in the same consequences, although they had hoped for the opposite effects.

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<sup>276</sup> Singleton, John, **Central Banking in the Twentieth Century**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, p.261.

<sup>277</sup> Toniolo, Gianni and Clement, Piet, **Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p.443.

<sup>278</sup> Prodi, Romano, "The Euro and Enlargement" in **The Past, Present and the Future of the European Union**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2004, p.8.

<sup>279</sup> Prodi, op.cit., p.8.

<sup>280</sup> Rücker, Katrin, "What Role for Europe in the International Arena of the Early 1970s?: How France and Germany Were Able to Matter, in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.217.

### 3.2.2 First Attempt at EMU with Willy Brandt

In the late 60s, Brandt had intensified his diplomatic maneuvers towards the Eastern Bloc in line with his *Ostpolitik* which would eventually cause discomfort in Paris. The Chancellor was aware that he needed to display a very strong sign of commitment to the European integration to defuse such concerns. Besides, instability in the exchange rates could lead to serious negative effects on the CAP which was known for its remarkable benefits to French farmers<sup>281</sup>. Being a former foreign minister<sup>282</sup>, the Chancellor Brandt must probably have seen that he had to go along with this trade-off, if he wanted no additional strains on Franco-German relationship. However, just like in future attempts on the monetary unification, major objections to this initiative would be raised from within, by those who had placed the domestic monetary concerns -notably, price stability- above all else.

After the prescription that Werner had outlined was endorsed and some of its recommendations began to be implemented, governments of the Six developed a system to bring some degree of monetary stability in the absence of the Bretton Woods order. This system, European Common Margins Agreement<sup>283</sup> -or with a more familiar expression- *the snake in the tunnel*, entailed that exchange rates would fluctuate within a limited, narrower margin and that member currencies would have a fixed parity against the dollar<sup>284</sup>. However, the snake would suffer from both external and internal hardships. Large scale capital flows resulting from the disintegration process of the Bretton Woods and the oil shock in 1973 took their toll on the stability that the EEC members hoped to create<sup>285</sup>. In the meantime, different priorities the European governments had in order to remedy their domestic instabilities which were presenting themselves as trade shock on real economies and as inflationary trend<sup>286</sup> undermined the cohesion needed on the way to monetary unification. With some of the members currencies beginning to abandon the system upon

<sup>281</sup> Kaltenthaler, Karl, **Policymaking in the European Central Bank: The Masters of Europe's Money**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2006, p.15.

<sup>282</sup> Rücker, op.cit., p.213.

<sup>283</sup> McNamara, Kathleen, **The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union**, Cornell University Press, New York, 1999, p.107.

<sup>284</sup> Linter, Valerio, "European Monetary Union" in **European Union: Power and Policy-Making**, Routledge, Oxon, 1996, p.326.

<sup>285</sup> Houben, Aerdt Carl Frans Joseph, **Evolution of Monetary Policy Strategies in Europe**, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2000, p.135.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

the oil crisis and the inflationary shock; the fixed, intra-community exchange regime had been the sole visible component implemented in accordance with Werner plan<sup>287</sup>.

### 3.2.3. Second Attempt at EMU with Helmut Schmidt

After this unsuccessful attempt and pessimistic visions regarding the future of the European integration following afterwards, the president of the Commission Roy Jenkins introduced a bold idea to revive the process: a new set of monetary institutions geared towards a European Monetary System (EMS) which would eventually lead to monetary unification<sup>288</sup>. The system would bring, along with a European reserve, fixed yet adjustable exchange rates with a notable aspect: an artificial common currency: the European Currency Unit (ECU)<sup>289</sup>. Member currencies, in the EMS, would be fixed in relation to the Deutschemark that would float against the dollar and other non-member currencies<sup>290</sup>. Although, at first, the leaders of France and Germany, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, had adopted a cold stance against the initiative, the two soon began to reorient their positions in line with the proposal.

However, one also needs to pay attention to the international stage in order to better evaluate the developments leading the Germans, as well as the French, to the development of a second joint endeavor in monetary realm. After the Jamaica Accords in 1976, legalized free-floating of the currencies did cause remarkable fluctuations of the dollar and hence great instability for European currencies<sup>291</sup>. Just like the fact that the Snake was put in use as a stabilizing measure, the Europeans could once again make use of the same modality, in terms of managed fluctuation, for a stable exchange rate system. In the community, on the other hand, considering the fact that the economic turbulence, following the Snake experience, left some EEC members -including France- battling high price increases that manifested itself during 1973-78 as two-digit annual inflation rates -

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<sup>287</sup> McNamara, op.cit., p.106.

<sup>288</sup> Kaltenthaler, Karl, **Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money**, Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1998, p.46.

<sup>289</sup> Weinachter, Michele, "Franco-German Relations in the Giscard-Schmidt Era: 1974-1981" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.229.

<sup>290</sup> Prodi, op.cit., p.9.

<sup>291</sup> Weinachter, op.cit., p.229.

compared to 4.7% in Germany<sup>292</sup>-, the EMS could be utilized as a disinflationary measure by tying the currencies of such members to the currency of a stable, low-inflation economy: the Deutschemark<sup>293</sup>. Indeed, by the time the EMS was being considered, the Deutschemark, due to the massive economy behind it, had already proved its strong currency characteristic and began to attract those seeking a reliable anchor. High volumes of trade, less instability and hence more credit had been the hallmarks of German economy. This seems to be the reason why the European economies found themselves getting drawn to strength of the Deutschemark while, ironically, complaining about the policies of the Bundesbank which, in the first place, helped forge it. However, the Federal Republic, as conflicted as it was in itself, would try to get the best possible outcome out of the process.

In the beginning, Schmidt must probably have championed the EMS with, at least to some degree, political intents in his mind. Of course, it is an undeniable fact that Germany always had its interests served the best in integrated European financial markets and under a controlled exchange rate system that offered less variability in which Deutschemark would gain less real appreciation compared to a system entailing free floating<sup>294</sup>. However, it is also reasonable to believe that the Chancellor wanted to make use of the international environment, available to a European initiative since the United States became monetarily unreliable due to the politically and economically turbulent years it was going through. In doing so, Schmidt even abandoned the traditional German theory of the ‘economists’ propounding that monetary unification should come only after the establishment of economic convergence between the countries in question<sup>295</sup> and sided with the French monetarists suggesting the opposite. Ultimately, Schmidt found a powerful coalition<sup>296</sup> gathering against himself including his own Ministry of Finance, the Federation of German Banks, the German Savings Banks Federation and finally the Bundesbank which was known for its dedication to price stability and also for its stand-offish attitude against expansionary policies: the same institution standing against Brandt earlier.

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<sup>292</sup> Houben, op.cit., p.137.

<sup>293</sup> Frattiani, Michele, (1988, Fall) “The European Monetary System: How Well Has It Worked?” *CATO Journal* Vol:8 No:2, p.485.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p.487.

<sup>295</sup> Rücker, op.cit., p.217.

<sup>296</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe’s Money, p.51.

Keeping its focus on price stability was a historical inheritance the high-inflation era after the Second World War had left for the Bundesbank. The EMS, according to the Bundesbank, could cause Federal Republic to import inflation from high-inflation countries in it<sup>297</sup>. Besides, a symmetric regime would eventually bring the consequence of expansionary policies since market interventions would have to be shouldered not just by weak-currency countries -as was the case in the asymmetric systems- but also by countries whose currencies are strong<sup>298</sup>. Although Schmidt, together with Giscard, worked in secrecy to save the EMS plan from being the target of strong opposition, the Chancellor soon realized that there was no way to outmaneuver the Bundesbank, especially after a warning its president had voiced in a cabinet meeting<sup>299</sup>. In fact, the warning was nothing short of an ultimatum declaring that any advance through the EMS plan would be achieved either without the Bundesbank or with it at the center of the project. This was when the Bundesbank marked its influence on the monetary unification policies of the EEC, for this system would indeed come into being, not be abandoned as the Werner Plan had been. In the course of the negotiations for the EMS, the Bundesbank-led coalition successfully managed to fend off proposals from the weak-currency countries such as France and Italy.

Also known as *the maximalists*, this side of the argument demanded ECU play the central role in determining the exchange value of a currency, bypassing bilateral cross rates<sup>300</sup>. This way, when a currency becomes too volatile or reached the limits of the previously-set margin for the ECU basket, that currency would be singled out and the responsibility to intervene to the foreign exchange market for the purpose of neutralizing the disequilibrium would solely rest on that individual central bank<sup>301</sup>. Feared that it could be forced to intervene in favor of the weak-currency countries, The Bundesbank, instead, demanded the parity grid system in which the intervention of a central bank was identified according to the bilateral exchange rates<sup>302</sup> and the cost of the intervention was put on all

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<sup>297</sup> Fratianni, op.cit., p.487.

<sup>298</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, p.47.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., p.52.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid., p.53.

<sup>301</sup> Gandolfo, Giancarlo, **International Finance and Open Economy Macroeconomics**, Springer, Heidelberg, 2001, p.352.

<sup>302</sup> Henning, Randall, **Currencies and the Politics in the United States, Germany and Japan**, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1994, p.188.

central banks, including those that had nothing to do with the formation of the disequilibrium<sup>303</sup>.

Another aspect of the EMS on which the Germans managed to prevail over the other members is the existence -or in fact, the non-existence- of a European Monetary Fund (EMF). This institution had its roots in the demand of the weak-currency countries that monetary conditions should be loosened occasionally in favor of them<sup>304</sup> with the help of pooling the European reserves. In this scheme, weak-currency countries would be able to finance their interventions with those reserves. The Bundesbank, again, stepped up to oppose the setting on the grounds that it could compromise monetary discipline by bringing expansionary policies, causing inflation<sup>305</sup>. What the Bundesbank really meant was that it did, under no circumstances, wanted to pull the weight of -what it considered- profligate governments in the system.

At the end of the negotiations between the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Monetary Committee of the European Commission, the Bundesbank had its priorities mostly secured by the German negotiators<sup>306</sup>. The EMS, willed by Schmidt as a symmetric system, had ended up as an asymmetric arrangement, differing greatly from its initial designing. Before putting the scheme in front of Giscard, the Chancellor was once again reoriented by the Bundesbank in case his political intentions could get the better of him. Through the end of 1978, the Chancellor assured the Bundesbank that it would never be forced to abandon its price-stability oriented policies and adopt, just for the sake of the EMS, an over-expansionary domestic monetary policy<sup>307</sup>. To rule out any possibility of this kind, the president of the Bundesbank, Otmar Emminger, even received a letter of reassurance from the government, granting the Bundesbank with a right to opt-out of the system if the domestic price stability was compromised<sup>308</sup>.

At the first glance, it was Giscard conceding to a German-designed EMS while, in reality, it was in fact Schmidt who had conceded to the Bundesbank. A question might arise at this point as to the reason why the Chancellor bowed to the coalition or,

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<sup>303</sup> Gandolfo, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>304</sup> Eichengreen, Barry, **The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007, p.285.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, p.54.

<sup>307</sup> Henning, op.cit., p.188.

<sup>308</sup> Eichengreen, op.cit., p.286.

alternatively, why he had proposed a plan disregarding the importance of the traditional German monetary priority, although he himself had been a finance minister in the Brandt cabinet. A possible assumption could be that the Chancellor did not want German success to stand out without shielded by or embedded in a European skin. Just like Adenauer, Schmidt felt the need for a broader European scheme in which any advance of the German nation would not be associated by skeptic minds with the aggressive growth of the Third Reich. European institutions, in this way, would be a lightning rod when the eyes were turned to the Germans in the aftermath of an extraordinary success in any realm. The luxury of severe opposition of the Bundesbank, in this respect, can now be better evaluated since no seat in the council of the Bank could bring responsibility as high as that of the Chancellor when it comes to shaping the vision and the future path of the nation.

### **3.2.4. The Final Attempt at EMU with Helmut Kohl**

In the Community, on the other hand, the EMS was running on German terms with the traditional orientation of the Bundesbank on price stability. As a consequence, inflation -in the average of the EMS members- fell from more than 10% in 1980 to 2% in 1986, though at the expense of unemployment<sup>309</sup>. Although, in this sense, EMS seemed to have served the interests of those who utilized it as a disinflationary measure, members that occasionally implemented different choices in domestic monetary policies, for instance socialist expansionary ones as in France, had to orient their positions in line with that of Germany and remain in discipline<sup>310</sup> since economic policy for the Bundesbank, especially after the second oil shock, simply meant restrictive money supply and cuts on government expenditures<sup>311</sup>. Two other weak-currency countries, Italy and Belgium, were also annoyed by the same issue that the EMS mechanism was forcing them to disregard significant domestic policy aims<sup>312</sup>. Still, for France, being tied to German monetary policy through the EMS -despite the secondary importance given to employment and growth- could be

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Smets, Jan, and Michielsen, Jan, "EMU from a Historical Perspective" in **Economic Thought and the Making of the European Union**, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2002, p.146.

<sup>311</sup> Huffschild, Jörg, "Hoist with Its Own Petard: Consequences of the Single Currency for Germany" in **The Single European Currency in National Perspective: A Community in Crisis?**, MacMillan Press, Houndsills, 1998, p.92.

<sup>312</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, p.56.

considered beneficial due to the low inflation and stable exchange rates<sup>313</sup>. The flaws of the system, perhaps, were its asymmetrical aspects and unilateral leading position of the Bundesbank. If the system, therefore, could somehow be stripped of these traits, then it could even, in the eyes of other members, turn into a better-functioning scheme. Demands, in the late 80s on the French part, for reforming the EMS and establishment of an Economic and Financial Council between Bonn and Paris were the initiatives proposed for this aim.

Under the pretext of improving monetary cooperation, the French, through the Economic and Financial Council, hoped to influence the policies of the Bundesbank over which they had no say. This initiative, as could be expected, became the target of heavy criticism of the Bundesbank and, as a consequence, led the Chancellor Kohl -who previously had welcomed the idea- abandon his initial stance. In the end, the legislation entailing the formation of the Council was passed at the Bundestag, however, not before being robbed of its key features attacking the autonomy of the Bundesbank<sup>314</sup>. Realizing that its overtures to amend the existing frame yielded no results, France in 1988 proposed the establishment of a European Monetary Union (EMU) in which Germany would be tied with joint decision-making mechanisms under the governance of a European Central Bank and with the use of a single currency.

Resembling the past scene a decade earlier, the prominent circles in the Bundesbank and other institutions such as Ministries of Finance and Economics<sup>315</sup>, known for their distant attitudes towards the EMS, pressured the Chancellor into a conception that the EMU would bring less advantages than estimated<sup>316</sup>. However, Kohl, just like Schmidt before himself, knew that the French, to some extent, had to be bribed with less strict monetary policies in exchange for smooth maneuvers in foreign policy realm, especially concerning the German unification. To this aim, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, Hans-Dietrich Genscher even proposed, in 1988, a rapid transition to EMU and later -with his Chancellor- the convention of an intergovernmental conference whose sole purpose

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<sup>313</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew, **The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht**, Cornell University Press, New York, 1998, p.411.

<sup>314</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, p.68.

<sup>315</sup> Siegel, Nico, "EMU and German Welfare Capitalism" in **Euros and Europeans: European Integration and the European Model of Society**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.113.

<sup>316</sup> Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, p.70.

would be a treaty amendment to accomplish EMU<sup>317</sup>. However, it should be noted that while encouraging a monetary union, Genscher -in his memo in 1988- also had to adhere to the necessity of a price stability commitment in EMU and the export of the Bundesbank model to its central bank<sup>318</sup>. The commitment to this path was finally declared at the Hanover Summit in June 1988, where both Kohl and Mitterrand agreed to entrust the task of designing a process towards EMU to the president of the European Commission Jacques Delors<sup>319</sup>. The irony of the matter is that Kohl, who had -for the EMS experience- criticized Schmidt for aligning Germany with high-inflation countries, did now find himself destined to engage in a bolder project which was to take away what the Germans were perhaps most proud of: the Deutschemark. Still, as was the case in the EMS experience, acceptance on the part of the Bundesbank was possible only if the new system accommodated, or at least, addressed the traditional German monetary concerns.

Comprised of the governors of the European central banks -in personal capacity- and the experts on the subject, the Delors Committee was responsible for the design of EMU- not that of the European Central Bank (ECB), for the statue of the latter would be the mandate of the Committee of Central Bank Governors<sup>320</sup>. Yet, considering the presence of the Bundesbank president Karl-Otto Pöhl, thus, the remarkable weight of his position, the Delors Committee would be an avenue where Pöhl would present his own proposal also concerning the ECB. No demise of sovereignty at the early stage of the transition, budgetary convergence criteria<sup>321</sup> and an independent, price-stability oriented central bank -modeled, of course, on the Bundesbank<sup>322</sup>- were some of the issues whose acceptance he managed to secure, even at the early phase of the Committee and with great concessions on the French part<sup>323</sup>. For instance, while the president of the Banque de France had insisted on the creation of source such as a European Reserve Fund, to lift the burden of intervention in the foreign exchange markets off the shoulders of weak-currency countries; Pöhl, with his fundamentalist approach, stood his ground as to prevailing importance of the

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<sup>317</sup> Moravcsik, op.cit., p.398.

<sup>318</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.21.

<sup>319</sup> Saunier, Georges, "A Special Relationship: Franco-German Relations at the Time of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl" in **A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From Hereditary Enemies to Partners**, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, p.240.

<sup>320</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.21.

<sup>321</sup> Moravcsik, op.cit., p.435.

<sup>322</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.22.

<sup>323</sup> Moravcsik, op.cit., p.435.

stability of the value of money<sup>324</sup>. Further, the gradualist, three stages approach approved by the Committee for the transition to EMU also reflected the economist view of the Germans, rather than the monetarist thought of the French<sup>325</sup>. Countries could join the monetary union only upon the successful accomplishment of a high level of economic and policy convergence with each other<sup>326</sup>. In return, however, Pöhl too had to make some sacrifices by accepting the single currency<sup>327</sup>, fixed dates for monetary unification and possibility of convergence criteria being by-passed by a political decision<sup>328</sup>. To his surprise, however, the last two of these would be caused by his own Chancellor, rather than by any foreign opponent, when Kohl agreed to these terms at the Maastricht summit.

Officialized at the Madrid summit in June 1989, Delors Report, whose essence was shaped with the influence of the work of Pöhl, had been the basic constituent determining the way the EEC members -or, from Maastricht on, the EU members would carry out the establishment of EMU. Abolishment of the capital controls, establishment of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to monitor the progress and the introduction of the common currency -simultaneously with the start of monetary policy management by the ESCB- were decided to be the stages towards the monetary union, first of which was scheduled to start in July 1990<sup>329</sup>. By the time the Maastricht Treaty was concluded, the German government -or with a more precise expression- the Bundesbank had managed to secure the majority of its priorities such as, budgetary controls, stringent convergence criteria and ineffectual second-stage institutions<sup>330</sup>. Given the fact that its forerunner, European Monetary Institute (EMI), inherited German influence not only in terms of operation mode but also through the choice of its location -Frankfurt-; it was obvious that the ECB would naturally assume the structure, responsibility and the price stability oriented functioning of the Bundesbank. Besides, the EMI was designed with restricted competence in order to leave the authority of the national central banks –notably, that of the Bundesbank- less eroded, if not intact; while the French had demanded a strong institution in terms of authority<sup>331</sup>.

<sup>324</sup> Smets and Michielsen, op.cit., p.152.

<sup>325</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.22.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p.23.

<sup>327</sup> Moravcsik, op.cit., p.435.

<sup>328</sup> Henning, op.cit., p.234.

<sup>329</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.23.

<sup>330</sup> Moravcsik, op.cit., p.440.

<sup>331</sup> Kaltenthaler, Policymaking in the European Central Bank, p.28.

After reviewing German influence in the attempts during the chronological progress of the monetary initiatives in the Community, one can rightly expect the continuity of the German influence in the functioning of the monetary union. This is where the contemporary conflicts over EMU arise. The German model had managed to inject itself into the European system due to its impressive track record. However, given that the monetary policies produced by the Bundesbank were specifically tailored for Germany which has traditionally been associated with impressive qualities such as low inflation and large current account surpluses; then what had suited the German economy might not necessarily amount to a prescription structurally divergent European economies could make use of. Clearly, not every European economy is as familiar with the stability notion as the Germans have been. Southern Europeans -though, at first, appealed by the stable exchange rates in trade with their European partners- faced a necessity to accommodate to the low inflation and low interest rate policies in the Euro-zone<sup>332</sup>, with which relatively weaker economies with huge public debts cannot keep up, perhaps even when they comply with the severe austerity measures prescribed by the leader of the system. As stated in the previous section, the rhetoric of European solidarity is not likely to apply considering the fact that Germany is quiet adamant in its stance, recommending further austerity measures, instead of, what it called, hasty solutions that would fall on the shoulders of the German tax-payers.

At the time of writing this section, the Union was going through a stressful set of discussions regarding how to keep Greece from going bankrupt. In fact, Greece was not the only member overwhelmed by the debt crisis. So far, Silvio Berlusconi has been, after George Papandreou of Greece, the second prime minister leaving his office due to deteriorating national economic indicators. Indeed, the conditions that put Greece under current circumstances are commonly seen in many Southern European countries. These are, as also stated previously, some inherent characteristics or structural flaws in the economies of these countries such as low productivity, non-competitiveness or lack of innovation. The current monetary order of the Union fits loose to some members while some others find it too tight. Looking at the current conditions surrounding the Eurozone members, one cannot help but entertain the possibility that the insistence of the

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<sup>332</sup> Magone, José María, **The Politics of Southern Europe: Integration into the European Union**, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2003, p.16.

Bundesbank on strict convergence criteria as a precondition for participating in EMU could, in fact, be right. Indeed, it took a Europe-wide economic crisis to finally acknowledge the fact that Euro is a political endeavor instead of being a sound economic decision. Grouping such diverse economies with different spending behaviors and structural traits under common monetary governance without a comprehensive alignment was bound to cause problems.

Not surprisingly, all the prescriptions that are currently under discussion revolve around the initiatives that would put Franco-German initiatives in their center. The summit held in Brussels on December 8 and 9, 2011 as an effort to fiscally stabilize the Eurozone is a current example of this suggestion. Since a strong German dedication to monetary discipline is an accustomed fact that was also proven right throughout the post-war European integration, maneuvers of Berlin to put a strict scheme of fiscal discipline in the treaty framework is an understandable move for it would constrain the countries crossing the deficit lines and suffering high public spending. With the automatic penalties that will be applied in case of the breach of the regime, Berlin -even in the absence of a full-fledged treaty change- hopes to minimize the risk of shouldering any financial burden deriving from the conduct of the profligate governments in the Eurozone. On the other hand, France too is among the primary beneficiaries of the compact emerging out of the summit as long as preserving a high credit rating and the status of being a highly investable country remain priorities to Paris. Besides, without an active engagement to the process alongside the Germans, chances of Paris to get Berlin to consider options such as the ECB intervention seem less probable. In the meantime, the ten non-Euro countries, as well, endorsed the compact and sided with the Eurozone members for a stable European fiscal regime and, for some of them, a cure for their structural problems in their fiscal practices. More importantly, however, no non-Euro member state longs to be a part of a demoted group that would suffer isolation within the Union- as could be the case for the United Kingdom. The idea of a two-speed Europe, therefore, seems to be irrelevant as all the non-Euro countries -except for Britain- line up one after another to greenlight the fiscal compact born out of the Franco-German initiative. However, one should not overestimate the role of Paris in the remedies for a new, healthy European economic order and think of France as an equal partner to Germany in this regard since budgetary discipline, for almost four decades, has been something that no French government has achieved. During the recent

crisis, it was seen once again that the role of ‘master’ in monetary realm belongs solely to Germany owing both to its firm practice of fiscal discipline and to an unspoken recognition and acknowledgement of its dominant position by the other member states. Whatever initiative is decided eventually -be it, for instance, a stricter Eurozone or a new economic government including also other common economic policies such as taxation- it is highly probable that the voice of Germany will suppress that of France.

### **3.3. Foreign Policy Dimension: Foreign Policy Agendas of Bonn and Berlin**

At the first glance, foreign policy conduct might give the impression of reflecting the overall national stance of a country towards the dynamics of the global system. French maneuvers in the first years of the post-war era, for instance, had signalized the will on the French part to shape -what may be called- *its turf*, Western Europe in a more unilateral manner. However, even for a winner of the war, raising its voice and adopting an outright nationalist demeanor was both unfeasible and practically impossible, which is why expecting, in the case of Germany, an influence as visible as in the economic sphere would not be factual- at least, not before the wall came down. The Federal Republic, especially until the mid 60s, had to face and live with a *German responsibility* for the recent past of the continent. This seems to have been a major constituent in the German foreign policy perception of putting responsibility before interests, of which any morally-detached country would do the opposite. Political partnership with France, adherence to American expectations, firm admittance regarding the western ideological norms had been some of the initial hallmarks of this perception. However, while it is unrealistic to expect an aggressive German rise in foreign policy realm; it is, at least as much, unrealistic to assume a selfless German dedication to European cause. Several moves and policies on the German part indicate a subtle of deviation from the Community path, an implicit drive for complementing what was being achieved in the economic realm. Therefore, instead of a conventional examination of German foreign policy along the lines of *before* and *after* the reunification; it would be more productive to study it with a separation between periods marked by a tendency towards multilateralism and unilateralism, in both of which reconciliation with Russia and with the historically-connected nations in its immediate proximity, while at time same time carefully accommodating the concerns of the Atlantic

Alliance had been the overriding priority, though the balance between these two poles was not always maintained properly. However, with its basic core not changing, a gradual increase of unilateralism wrapped in a more self-interested foreign policy conduct by Berlin would become easier to recognize after the reunification, which may justify examining the issue under a subsection.

### 3.3.1. The Pre-Brandt Era

As stated above, it is hard to point out a unilaterally-designed German foreign policy agenda in the early post-war era, since the FRG -due to the immediate need for solidarity in cold war conditions- faced less restraining policies, making the co-operation an obvious choice. In such an international environment, the institutions of the European project were, by themselves, the major developments in the postwar German foreign policy for the commitment on the German part to these institutions and to the idea behind them were the essence of what the Federal Republic valued perhaps most in order to promote from the status of a defeated country to a respected, equal partner. Along with its European component, the *Westpolitik* also had its clear reflections in the membership of the Federal Republic to the prominent post-war institutions such as GATT, the Council of Europe, the World Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and most notably North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)<sup>333</sup>.

Although unification was the obvious aim ahead of any German Chancellor, Adenauer did never seem to be in a rush to accomplish that task. The Chancellor even declined a Soviet offer<sup>334</sup> that entailed the merger of the German territories in exchange for German neutrality. While the pro-western stance of the Chancellor Adenauer was largely ideological; it is important to note the fact that the economic boom of the FRG also necessitated a firm adherence to the western integration and its institutions<sup>335</sup>. In this path, Adenauer, upon the return from a visit to Moscow in 1955 -in which he himself intended to

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<sup>333</sup> Erb, Scott, **German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era**, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado, 2003, pp.27-29.

<sup>334</sup> Garnieri, Ronald, **The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, The CDU/CSU and the West 1949-1966**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2004, p.53.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., p.41.

contact diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union<sup>336</sup>, launched the policy of isolating East Germany and thereby rendering the Federal Republic the sole legitimate representative of the German people. Named after the Foreign Minister Walter Hallstein, this doctrine also classified the recognition of the GDR by any country as an unfriendly act, as was the case with Yugoslavia in 1957 when Belgrade opened an embassy in East Berlin<sup>337</sup>. Anti-communist attitude -in other words, Atlanticist stance- of the FRG was, especially in those years, a must for Bonn, if it was to survive in case the Cold War turned hot. Still, it can be said that Adenauer tried his best in striking a very delicate balance between his commitments regarding Western Europe and the other side of the Atlantic, despite the delusions of *grandeur* on the French part. Indeed, the early 60s -in spite of the nearing détente- were highly turbulent for Western Europe due to the desire of de Gaulle of challenging the American tutelage over the continent and guiding Western Europe under his lead. In fact, Adenauer too was somewhat bothered by the Kennedy-Khrushchev rapprochement since he, together with de Gaulle, saw that the fate of Europe could be at the mercy of superpowers which probably made French and German leaders think that their interests could be sacrificed in the process, for a broader reconciliation in East-West axis<sup>338</sup>. 1963 Élysée Treaty between the FRG and France was a consequence of such reasoning. However, Adenauer was rational enough to refer to his commitment to the NATO as well<sup>339</sup>. Especially towards the end of his term in office, therefore, Adenauer can be considered to have had to conduct a balanced foreign policy not only concerning global East-West relations; but also within the Western bloc itself. However, since the EEC partners of the FRG, notably France, were unable to address the security needs of the continent, successors of Adenauer thought that German interests would be served better if the Federal Republic put a bit more emphasis on its relations with the US. Likewise, Chancellor Kiesinger, unlike Adenauer, would put more effort also on his relations with the Eastern Bloc which would function as a base for a more ambitious Ostpolitik under the chancellorship of Brandt.

When Ludwig Erhard became Chancellor in late 1963, prospects for pro-European attitude on the German part were by no means hopeful. This not only derived from

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<sup>336</sup> Kitchen, op.cit., p.333.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.

<sup>338</sup> Martin, Garret, p.200.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p.202.

deteriorating Franco-German relations due to the French desire to contain Germany with the help of Soviets; but also from the lack of what may be called the European stance in the Community scale when it comes to its external relations. Besides, pro-American attitude of Erhard was also returned with a gesture by the President Kennedy when he paid a visit to the FRG in 1963 and delivered the support of his country to the citizens of West Germany with the historical expression “ich bin ein Berliner!”<sup>340</sup> Since French maneuvers with Soviets for establishing a counterweight against strong American-German ties evoked discomfort in Bonn and consequently led the Chancellor to question the sincerity of the French, prospects of a Franco-German partnership under a Western European roof, as de Gaulle had hoped, were now seriously handicapped. The distance between Franco-German couple became even more visible when the Federal Republic expressed its interest in the US proposal of Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) under NATO framework<sup>341</sup>. Within an integrated nuclear force in which each member of the system would hold veto power over the use of nuclear materials, the FRG would look like the main beneficiary since the system -if had been realized- could put the FRG in a very influential position regarding the nuclear defense of the Western Europe, which was the main reason of the constant support of Erhard cabinet to the plan<sup>342</sup>. Even the slight possibility of the FRG securing access to nuclear technology was enough reason for the French to form a closer relationship with the Soviets. However, with the new Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and the Foreign Minister Brandt, German policy both towards France and Eastern Bloc, after 1966, would begin to experience a substantial reorientation in which single-dimensional Western policy and the Hallstein doctrine would all be revised.

### 3.3.2. Willy Brandt and the Surfacing Unilateralism: 1970-1990

It can be said that the chancellorship of Kiesinger served as a transitional period for a more advanced *Ostpolitik* that would be put into motion a few years later. Kiesinger was quite influential on his party, Christian Democrats, as to altering their attitude towards the East Germany, which, in Adenauer era, had been severely harsh. The aim of the Chancellor was to find grounds that would defuse the tension in bilateral relations and facilitate an

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<sup>340</sup> “I am a Berliner”. Kitchen, op.cit., p.342.

<sup>341</sup> Martin, op.cit., p.202.

<sup>342</sup> Erb, op.cit., p.40.

east-west co-operation in economic, cultural and humanitarian areas<sup>343</sup>, while avoiding the official recognition of the GDR. Kiesinger and Brandt even asked de Gaulle to be their special envoy in their bilateral relations regarding the conduct of their *Ostpolitik* with Eastern Bloc leaders<sup>344</sup>. In the meantime, Brandt was lobbying within NATO circles for the gradual mitigation of the tension between two blocs and for a decrease in the sum of their armed forces<sup>345</sup>. However, the Federal Republic, before the late 60s, could not maneuver politically towards the Kremlin, due especially to the way of suppressing the Prague Spring by the Red Army and to the fact that *Ostpolitik*, under Kiesinger, did not yet include recognition of the status quo in Europe<sup>346</sup>, which would be the price Brandt would pay in his chancellorship in exchange for a comprehensive rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Under Brandt, relations both with the Soviets and with the GDR improved on the basis of German admittance of the post-war realities. According to Bonn, recognition of the GDR would not necessarily mean accepting the division of the German nation and giving up on reunification; but -through contacts and initiatives on several areas- an opportunity to portray German people as a one nation kept meaninglessly apart by a wall<sup>347</sup>. In this path, the FRG, before the end of 1972, signed a series of treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and the East Germany in which the Federal Republic declared that it recognized the loss of its pre-war territories and the existence of the sovereign state of East Germany<sup>348</sup>. Though seeming disadvantageous, these treaties ruled out the possibility of aggression in Bonn-Moscow relations and ensured the inviolability of the German borders. Besides, return of such a political investment to the East would also bear economic gains. Alongside their political importance, one should also entertain the economic opportunities that the Eastern policy of the FRG gave way. While it is arguable how consistent it is to claim that *Ostpolitik* derived substantially from the German economic interests, it is also unwise to disregard profitable economic prospects *Ostpolitik* offered to the German

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<sup>343</sup> Kitchen, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>344</sup> Martin, op.cit., p.205.

<sup>345</sup> Kitchen, op.cit., p.353.

<sup>346</sup> Stent, Angela, **From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations 1955-1980**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p.128.

<sup>347</sup> Clemens, Clay, **The Reluctant Realists: The CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik**, Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1989, p.56.

<sup>348</sup> Link, Werner, "Ostpolitik: Détente German-Style and Adapting to America" in **The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1968-1990, Volume 2**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp.33-36.

industrialists. Though working in favor of the West German benefits, pro-Western policies, in economic sense, were impeding Germany from making the most of a large market: the Soviet Union, with which the Federal Republic had had a negative trade balance between 1963 and 1966, which was the reason why it was the Federal Republic, in 1966, that lobbied among NATO members for the lifting of the pipe embargo in order for German companies to export their products<sup>349</sup>. While the Soviet Union needed Western technology for its petroleum transportation infrastructure, the German steel industrialists, notably, Mannesmann-Thyssen, needed to regain their competitiveness which was damaged by the embargo and growing activity of their Japanese competitors. Not surprisingly, \$18.9 million negative trade balance of the FRG in 1968 with the Soviet Union turned, also with the help of other machinery and sheet metal exports, into \$71.5 million surplus in 1969<sup>350</sup>. Yet, the political dimension of *Ostpolitik* tends to stand out more since it was beginning to alter the current balance in the relations of Bonn with Washington and especially Paris.

The United States, at first, seemed to have viewed *Ostpolitik* with suspicion, for the national security adviser of the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger, was under the impression that *Ostpolitik*, in the long run, could deviate from the US perception of détente – even though seeming momentarily in line with it<sup>351</sup>. This concern derived largely from the fear of *selective détente*: the idea of another NATO member, after France, maneuvering politically towards the Soviet Union for its bilateral gains, which would eventually undermine the cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance and damage the US position. Yet, Brand knew very well that he could rely neither on his Eastern policy nor on any Allied agreement to guarantee the security of the Federal Republic<sup>352</sup>; the US protection was the ultimate guarantee for the freedom in the western side of the wall. Reception of *Ostpolitik* in some of the European partners of the FRG, however, evoked old concerns.

European Community, at the time, was divided in itself not only regarding the conscious conduct of its external relations but also regarding how to respond *Ostpolitik*. While smaller states and Scandinavians welcomed the initiatives of the FRG cordially, France and the United Kingdom -soon to be a member of the EEC- were in fact more

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<sup>349</sup> Stent, op.cit., p.165.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>351</sup> Schwabe, Klaus, "Détente and Multipolarity: The Cold War and German American Relations, 1968-1990" in **The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1968-1990, Volume 2**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.2.

<sup>352</sup> Link, op.cit., p.37.

skeptical<sup>353</sup>. A more unilateral conduct in *Ostpolitik* -despite the initial calls for French assistance on the German part- was somewhat evident even before the chancellorship of Brandt. Egon Bahr who had remarkable influence on the Eastern policy of Brandt, had, in 1967, already concluded that not so much could be expected of France<sup>354</sup> as to helping improve German relations with the Eastern Bloc, since the conception of Franco-German partnership was, within French political circles, always based on German subordination. While the British were concerned largely with the Soviet aspect of the German policy; successor of de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, though seeming undisturbed publicly, was more preoccupied with the consequences of a potential unification of Germanies. Indeed, the reason behind the initial political support to *Ostpolitik* treaties on the part of Pompidou was probably the fact that they were solidifying the divided state of Germany<sup>355</sup>. At this point one cannot help but remember an old French method of using *German dualism* that France had utilized almost two and a half centuries ago. Actual side of the matter is also important since it can clarify what can be expected of the EEC in political terms when the interests of its members clash. In a community which, in rhetoric, was built to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among its people and to eliminate the existing obstacles, one of the members -in a sense, its founder- was putting an effort on keeping another member divided. In order to counterweigh *Ostpolitik*, it was now time for France to greenlight British accession and devise another European framework to contain any further German maneuvers.

European Political Co-operation (EPC), born out of The Hague Summit convening upon the initiative of Pompidou in December 1969<sup>356</sup>, was an attempt to put an end to the uncoordinated state of the EEC members on political matters and to generate some degree of coherence in their stances in relation to the external events, while in the meantime making the foreign policy conduct of Bonn more predictable. However, by resisting to the supranational mechanisms and insisting on the intergovernmentalism in the application of

<sup>353</sup> Lunestedt, Geir, **The United States and Western Europe since 1945**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p.173.

<sup>354</sup> Germond, Carine, "A Cordial Potentiality? De Gaulle and the Franco-German Partnership, 1963-1969" in **Globalizing De Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969**, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2010, p.55.

<sup>355</sup> Soutou, Georges-Henri, "President Pompidou, Ostpolitik and the Strategy of Détente" in **The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p.236.

<sup>356</sup> Hendricks, Gisela and Morgan Annette, **The Franco-German Axis in European Integration**, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2001, p.156.

the scheme, the French -in terms of controlling the foreign policy of the Federal Republic- could not achieve the expected outcomes out of the initiative. On the contrary, EPC became a useful mean for Bonn in order to camouflage its confident conduct of foreign policy with the help of a European setting. Indeed, the Federal Republic, through the EPC, gained the chance of establishing more rewarding ties in its relations with the Middle East which, on bilateral basis, it probably could not have afforded due to its historical liability towards the state of Israel. Considering the dependence on Arab oil, the FRG needed to balance its pro-Israeli attitude with a more Arab-friendly stance. Especially after facing a selective embargo by oil-exporting Arab states, the FRG -by supporting the Community declarations of 1973- gained the statue of friendly state in 1974 and secured the reception of oil imports from the region without remarkable disruption<sup>357</sup>.

Besides, EPC did not seem to have impeded the unilateral German efforts to integrate its *Ostpolitik* into the Cold War circumstances either- even when the both blocs, with the end of détente, progressed towards the new phase of tension in the late 70s. In fact, the Federal Republic, until the second phase of the Cold War, had been a keen supporter of arms reduction by both blocs and of gradual lessening of the tension, over which Bonn could easily materialize the reunification. It was Willy Brandt that had tried, during his term in office as the foreign minister, to persuade Atlantic Alliance into adopting a more flexible attitude towards the Soviet Union. This was, more or less, what the Harmel Report would adopt at NATO Council in 1967: pursuing further improvements in defense capabilities of the nations under the Alliance, while, at the same time trying -through common or individual policies- to overcome the barriers dividing Europe<sup>358</sup>. In the reasoning of Brandt and Bahr, if -through a European Security System- the Cold War atmosphere could somehow be eliminated and both alliances could be rendered pointless, then reunification would well become attainable. The FRG soon obtained, upon the Soviet request- its chance of a European Security Conference. Recognition of the status quo in Europe was by no means meaningless for the FRG, for Brandt and Bahr seemed to have made all their plans assuming that it would not last much. The Federal Republic, in the

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<sup>357</sup> Müller, Patrick, (2011, March) "Germany and EU-Foreign Policymaking toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Assessing National Europeanization Experiences" *European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Twelfth Biennial Conference* [www document] p.10. URL: [http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/61\\_mueller.pdf](http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/61_mueller.pdf) Accessed on: September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>358</sup> Best, Anthony, Hanimaki, Jussi, Maiolo Joseph, and Schulze, Kristen, **International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond**, Routledge, Oxon, 2004, p.278.

course of the Conference for Security and Cooperation for Europe (CSCE) would try, as hard as it could, to get the Soviet Union to accept the principle that status quo - more precisely, the borders of Germany- could change via peaceful means.

Desired achievements that could come out of the CSCE were grouped under four baskets: the first concerning security in Europe; the second concerning co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology, and of environment; the third one concerning co-operation in human rights and other fields; and lastly, the fourth one introducing follow-up conferences<sup>359</sup>. In Basket II and Basket III, the Federal Republic supported the stance adopted by the EEC and NATO<sup>360</sup>. In Basket I, however, otherwise occurred: Bonn, despite the pressure from its NATO and EEC partners, worked in a very stubborn manner to secure German priority that could one day initiate the reunification. Recognizing the unalterable state of the borders meant, according to Bonn, formalizing the current, divided state of Germany, which was, under no circumstances, possible to accept- if the unification was to be achieved. The aim of the FRG, therefore, was to get the Soviet Union to accept the presence of the clause of 'peaceful change of the borders' in the Declaration of the Principles of Basket I: something the Federal Republic could not manage to insert into Moscow Treaty<sup>361</sup>. Over the course of negotiations on the subject, the FRG was oftentimes urged by its partners to adopt a more reasonable stance regarding the issue. Not surprisingly, France was among these participants, recommending more flexibility on German part when the Soviet Union offered to register the clauses of peaceful change and inviolability of borders separately<sup>362</sup>. When, after one and a half years of negotiation, the FRG went along with the new proposal accommodating German interests, it was due mainly to the American assistance -rather than European- that achieved the outcome.

During the Cold War period, the Federal Republic catalyzed its own détente, and tried actively to incorporate its interests into those of Euro-Atlantic community without having to sacrifice its aim of reunification. In fact, let alone compromising, the Federal Republic got its partners to foster its *Ostpolitik* and realize, through détente, the very aim

<sup>359</sup> Bloed, Arie, **From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process**, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, pp.5-8.

<sup>360</sup> Niedhart, Gottfried, "Peaceful Change of Frontiers as a Crucial Element in the West German Strategy of Transformation" in **Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2008, p.44.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., p.47.

of the FRG. An *Ostpolitik*, integrated into the institutions and policies of the broader East-West rapprochement, initiated the normalization of the relations between Germanies, increased the economic ties of the FRG with the Soviet Bloc and, at the same time, prevented a continental NATO-Soviet armed confrontation whose immediate victims, no matter in which side of the wall they were, would be Germans. From this perspective, it was quite an example of revisionism on the German part in the Cold War, although those moves were embedded in collective settings.

### 3.3.3. Post-Wall Conduct of German Foreign Policy

When two Germanies became peacefully united on October 3<sup>rd</sup> 1990, and the full sovereignty was granted, a year later, to the new German state under the chancellery of Kohl, London and Paris felt an obvious discomfort, which manifested itself as closer Franco-British co-operation<sup>363</sup> for the reunification would ultimately change the current power-balance within the EEC<sup>364</sup>. Though such reservations, on the part of France, were never new, the Chancellor indeed caused some concern when he, after the wall came down, unilaterally announced a ten point plan for the reunification. Both the way of announcement and the content of the plan constituted the ground for such concern. Kohl had presented the plan without a prior consultation with its EEC partners and, in its content, there was -according to Quai d'Orsay- a weak adherence to European dimension<sup>365</sup>. What resented Mitterrand seemed to have been the attitude of Kohl, considering the reunification *a sole German business*, as a French diplomat Jacques Blot would express<sup>366</sup>: "Not a word about the Allies, not a word about neighbors, not a word about borders. (...) Unity is an affair for the Germans and them alone." The new, more assertive stance of Germany would be the first of a few more forthcoming examples of self-centered acts. Indeed, in some issues of foreign policy throughout 90s, European partners of Germany had hard time recognizing the accustomed multilateralism in the conduct of German foreign policy.

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<sup>363</sup> Dedman, op.cit., p.120.

<sup>364</sup> Erb, op.cit., p.97.

<sup>365</sup> Bozo, Frederic, **Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2009, p.125.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., p.126.

### 3.3.3.1. Early Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia

There was not much unpredictability in the events leading to disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts taking place simultaneously. The Socialist Federal Republic would barely outlive its founder, Josip Broz Tito. Towards the end of the Cold War, the republics constituting the SFRY began to declare, through their assemblies, their will of departing from Serbian-dominated structure of the SFRY. Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics in doing so. Both republics declared their independence on June 25<sup>th</sup> 1991, upon which they faced Yugoslav military offensive<sup>367</sup>. Disregarding the fact that the SFRY was breaking up, the EC at the time was defending the unity of the Yugoslav state, by supporting the economic reforms of the SFRY and even offering it an association agreement in April 1991<sup>368</sup>. The latter occurred during a visit in May 1991 by the then European Commission President Jacques Delors to Belgrade, in which he also declared that there would be no recognition for breakaway republics unless a peaceful solution was found<sup>369</sup>. Neither EC members nor the US was willing to welcome the formation of the new states in Balkans with minority issues, which was the reason behind the decision of the EC members, on June 1991, of not recognizing the independence declaration of breakaway republics of the SFRY, even after the beginning of the war<sup>370</sup>. It would -according to the mainstream EC view- be better if Croatia and Slovenia put aside their independence declarations until the negotiations for the transformation of the SFRY into a mild federation and for the probable amendments to the 1974 constitution bore fruit<sup>371</sup>.

Although Germany -for the time being- was publicly in this bloc that voiced its preference of territorial integrity of Yugoslav federation, from July 1991 on, it began to reorient its position in favor of the recognition demand of the Slovenian and Croatian republics. While Germany was not alone in supporting a unilateral recognition, none of the

<sup>367</sup> Dettke, Dieter, **Germany Says “No”: the Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009, p.76.

<sup>368</sup> Lucarelli, Sonia, **Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation**, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, p.124.

<sup>369</sup> Hoffmann, Stanley, “Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European Institutions” in **The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars**, Council on Foreign Relations Books, New York, 1996, p.98.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., p.124.

<sup>371</sup> Crawford, Beverly (1993, May) “United Germany, Divided Yugoslavia, Weak Europe? The Post Cold War Debate over Croatia’s Recognition and Lessons for Constructing a Common European Security and Foreign Policy” *European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference* [www document] p.7. URL: [http://aei.pitt.edu/7162/1/002396\\_1A.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/7162/1/002396_1A.pdf) Accessed on: September 12<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

other EC members has been as vocal in its stance as Germany had been. Though Italy and then candidate Austria took up the German position; France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom were against a prompt recognition on the grounds that such a move would have to be backed up with actions<sup>372</sup>. The German stance could have derived from a few reasons. Firstly, Germans probably believed that the bilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia could initiate the defusion of the armed-confrontation phase of the conflict, and deter the Serbs from utilizing further violence<sup>373</sup>, which was what happened upon the decision of recognition<sup>374</sup>. Secondly, for Germans -as a nation achieving their reunification partly over the principle of self-determination- it was now a moral responsibility to support the demands of Slovenia and Croatia<sup>375</sup>. More importantly, however, there was a very strong domestic pressure on the German cabinet and the parliament regarding the acceptance of the recognition demands of the two republics.

At the time, out of 500.000 migrant Croatian workers in Germany, 200.000 had the status of electorate, and they were actively lobbying within the CSU -Bavarian branch of the Christian Democrats- to obtain support for Croatia<sup>376</sup>. It was such a public pressure that both the CDU and the SPD representatives, at the Foreign Policy Committee meeting of the Bundestag on July 1<sup>st</sup>, urged the Foreign Minister Genscher to convert EC members into adopting the German view: recognition of the two republics<sup>377</sup>. It would soon be understood that the public opinion were neither groundless nor exaggerated. Especially towards the end of 1991 -when Germany would announce its recognition- Bavarian police would report the seizure of a remarkable amount of gun, ammunition, ground-to-air missiles and automatic weapons being smuggled for use in the clashes in Croatia, as well as reporting thousands of Croatian men abandoning their homes in Germany to fight in their homeland<sup>378</sup>. Upon a Bundestag resolution of July 1991, aiming the recognition of the Slovenian and Croatian republics, German efforts for convincing the EC members of a collective recognition increased, perhaps not in order to wrap a unilateral recognition in EC context; but to ensure the highest number of states recognizing the republics, for -after

<sup>372</sup> Hoffmann, *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars*, p.102.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid., p.105.

<sup>374</sup> Conversi, Daniele, "Germany and the Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia" in **War and Change in Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.71.

<sup>375</sup> Lucarelli, op.cit., p.125.

<sup>376</sup> Crawford, op.cit., p.6.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>378</sup> Crawford, op.cit., p.17.

July- it was not unpredictable that Germany would take unilateral action even if no other EC member sided with it.

Although the EC member states, by October, had gradually shifted towards the German position, they were still reluctant to recognize both republics before giving the issue two months of extra time with the hope of reaching a broader settlement, which Germany responded with the declaration of its intent of unilateral recognition with Denmark and Italy unless an agreement was reached before December 10<sup>th</sup><sup>379</sup>. The EC, despite the firm German stance, was still maintaining its insistence on, what it called, comprehensive solution, and trying to avoid the embarrassment of not being able to form a common attitude in the very summit that was intended to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in December 1991. That common attitude, however, was blind to the fact that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was now inevitable. After the European Council of December 1991, therefore, EC members, on December 17<sup>th</sup>, agreed on the timing of the recognition of the breakaway republics as January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1992<sup>380</sup>, on the condition of fulfilling some specific criteria regarding the respect for human rights and democracy<sup>381</sup>. Two days later, however, Genscher announced the unilateral recognition of both republics by the German federal government which occurred on December 23<sup>rd</sup> 1991<sup>382</sup>, before the Christmas, as Kohl promised in November at the CDU convention in Dresden<sup>383</sup>.

What was said to be “*the hour of Europe*<sup>384</sup>,” had ended up as the hour of newly-reunified Germany, through which its European partners faced a more assertive German attitude. Although labeling the new, confident policy conduct of Berlin as a forthcoming Fourth Reich would be groundless -for Germany seems to have chosen to make use of European settings- it is also a fact that, with the lifting of the Cold War constraints, Germany became more able to define its interests with less consideration to the Paris-Washington axis. As stated in the previous sections, it would be naïve to assume that Germany, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, would compromise its national goals just for

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<sup>379</sup> Lucarelli, op.cit., p.126.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., p.128.

<sup>381</sup> Hill, Christopher, and Smith, Karen, **The European Foreign Policy: Key Documents**, Routledge, London, 2000, p.280.

<sup>382</sup> Dettke, op.cit., p.78.

<sup>383</sup> Lucarelli, op.cit., p.126.

<sup>384</sup> Hoffmann, **The World and Yugoslavia's Wars**, p.98.

the sake of conformity with the other EU members. After its display of confidence in the preliminary stage of the Yugoslav crisis, its emphasis on the Eastern enlargement of the Union may also be a remarkable indicator in this regard.

### **3.3.3.2. Role of Germany in the Eastern Enlargement of the Union**

After the decades of controversial issues marking the history of the European integration, accession of the former members of the Eastern Bloc finally emerged as a historical event which EU-15 welcomed with rare consensus. This stance must have probably derived from the moral perception that it was now an ethical duty for the members of the Union to unite with the other residents of Europe who were kept apart by the Communist hold. While it was such a noble end that no member of the Union could reasonably object to -at least not publicly-, Germany had more reasons to be the advocate of the Central and Eastern Europeans in their journey back to Europe for several reasons. German interest towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) after the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc was by no means extra ordinary, since Germany in itself had been the subject of the same ideological division which took it forty years to overcome. Just as the two halves of Germany reunited after the end of the Cold War, it was now just as much natural for the two halves of Europe to come together. Besides, considering the historically-inherent connection between CEECs and Germany -more precisely, the fact that CEECs throughout the European history had always happened to be parts of German Empires- some sort of responsibility on the German part becomes more understandable. However, for Germany, there was more to the subject than just a sense of responsibility.

The prominent aspect of benefit seems to be, as can be expected, economic. Trade and investment of German origin had never been unfamiliar for CEECs, not just due to the economic dimension of *Ostpolitik*; but due also to the deep-rooted connection dating back to even Middle Ages in which economic centers of the Central Europe -especially Poland and Hungary- were dominated by German population and run by law adopted from German cities<sup>385</sup>. Considering such a long-standing German economic presence in the

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<sup>385</sup> Zaborowski, Marcin, "More than Simply Expanding Markets: Germany and EU Enlargement" in **Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity**, Routledge, Oxon, 2006, p.108.

region, it would hardly be surprising that Germany alone -by the end of the Cold War- was realizing half of the trade being transacted between the Union and CEECs<sup>386</sup>. In the last decade of the Cold War, for instance, the FRG was surpassed only by the Soviet Union regarding the volume of trade with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia<sup>387</sup>. Upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, Germany began to actively support the transformation of CEECs into stable EU candidates both economically and politically. Significant amount of the provisional aid and assistance to CEECs -ECU 7.3 billion between 1989 and 1993- was shouldered by Germany<sup>388</sup> which assumed a major role in not only creating the assistance programs such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) and TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States); but also in concluding association agreements (Europe Agreements) negotiated with ten CEECs: Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, Baltic States, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria<sup>389</sup>.

It is not hard to understand why Germany put a remarkable emphasis on the eastern enlargement of the Union. In fact, Germany had not taken a cold stance towards the previous enlargement waves either, for each new country would mean more export opportunities to the German industrialists. What CEECs meant to Germany, however, was not just 100.000 more customers<sup>390</sup>, but rather, a solid boost of competitiveness in production. With a possible accession of CEECs into the Union, advantages for the German industry could easily soar, concerning the low tax regimes and even lower labor costs, which was exactly what happened after 2004. In fact, even before the accession, 40% of all the German firms with certain manufacturing capacity had already spread out into Central and Eastern Europe, such as Volkswagen, Siemens and Audi whose production facility in Györ-Hungary alone contributed almost 12% of the entire turnover of the company and 74% of Audi profits, thanks to the generous tax reduction by the Hungarian government<sup>391</sup>.

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<sup>386</sup> Hendricks and Morgan, op.cit., p.148.

<sup>387</sup> Zaborowski, op.cit., p.109.

<sup>388</sup> Endow, Aparajita, **France and Germany and the European Union: Maastricht and After**, Aakar Books, Delhi, 2003, p.76.

<sup>389</sup> Anderson, Jeffrey, op.cit., p.53.

<sup>390</sup> Hendricks and Morgan, op.cit., p.148.

<sup>391</sup> O'Brennan, John, **The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union**, Routlegde, Oxon, 2006, p.138.

Other than the economic dimension, Germany -through eastern enlargement- could well sort out the stabilization of its eastern borders, which, especially after the Yugoslav crisis, proved to be a problem. Besides, after the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia went into the process of disintegration; majority of the residents of these socially and politically-troubled region had chosen Germany to resettle<sup>392</sup>. Between the years of 1989 and 1992, 1.35 million refugees who sought asylum in Germany had come from Central and Eastern Europe<sup>393</sup>. If there was no European Union membership prospect in sight, it may have well taken a lot more time and effort on the part of CEECs to recover in social, political and economic aspects after the Communist era, while in the meantime, Germany could have been highlighted further as the favorite destination for the immigration waves. Stabilizing the region, therefore, could serve the best interests of Germany since that would also mean ending the exposed status of its borders via friendly buffer states on its east, and fostering -through the EU membership- the prospects of socioeconomic and political development in CEECs, which could eradicate the root cause of the possible movements of immigration.

As visible as the socioeconomic dimension, there was also a political implication that the eastern enlargement would bring with it: putting the unified Germany in the center of Europe, and thereby, eliminating the French perception of a European Union whose center of gravity had to be France. Indeed, German thought of *Mitteleuropa* was not a new conception. Its main idea was based on establishing a German sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe where -due to historical reasons- its political, military and economic advances could easily form a *Pax Germanica* without significant resistance<sup>394</sup>. Although the choice Germany made after the World War II entailed engagement in Western political and economic institutions and presupposed multilateralism as the method, the possibility that Germany -with the end of the Cold War- could utilize its relations with CEECs in order to carry out a more moderate *Mitteleuropa* project in disguise was quite a concern on the part of the French. Recognizing the remarkable leeway that could emerge for Germany out of such an endeavor, and the fact that Franco-German power symmetry was changing contrary to the preferences of Paris<sup>395</sup>, France -before the conclusion of Europe Agreements- showed signs of will to delay the membership prospects

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<sup>392</sup> Zaborowski, op.cit., p.112.

<sup>393</sup> Endow, op.cit., p.75.

<sup>394</sup> Lucarelli, op.cit., p.131.

<sup>395</sup> Hendricks; Morgan, op.cit., p.151.

of CEECs<sup>396</sup>. Negotiations for the association agreements of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had been a prominent example of this, due to the French unwillingness to grant concessions to CEECs<sup>397</sup>. While unable to prevent the accession of the CEECs publicly, France, instead, tried to counter German interest in eastern enlargement with solidifying the relationship of the Union with the Mediterranean countries with which France, due to its colonial past<sup>398</sup>, had historical connection.

Although, in the end, Germany seemed to have put remarkable effort on eastern enlargement, there are fewer reasons to entertain that these efforts on the German part stemmed solely from a desire of achieving European solidarity or from a sense of responsibility. As stated in the beginning of this section, Germany -after the reunification- felt less pressure to refrain from conducting more assertive, self-centered policies, compared to those days of the Cold War when it had sought conformity with the major powers at the both sides of the Atlantic. Much to their disappointment, Central and Eastern Europeans would soon learn that their interests could easily be sacrificed by Germany for its bilateral gains.

### 3.3.3.3. Germany and the Nord Stream Pipeline

Co-operation in the field of energy with Russia was not an unaccustomed endeavor for Germany. As stated previously, the late 60s -with the conduct of *Ostpolitik*- had witnessed an increase in the economic activity between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic. In transactions where the FRG received petroleum or natural gas, the Soviet Union, in return, was supplied high-capacity pipes to solve the transportation problem of its energy industry. From 1958 to 1965, Soviet petroleum exports to the Federal Republic witnessed a six-fold increase, carried out on a price level well below the world standards<sup>399</sup>. With a more comprehensive deal for Soviet natural gas, concluded in 1970, - though northern part of the country was well-supplied with Dutch and Norwegian gas<sup>400</sup>-

<sup>396</sup> Bulmer, Simon, Jefferey, Charlie and Paterson, William, **Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu**, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000, p.115.

<sup>397</sup> Hendricks; Morgan, op.cit., p.151.

<sup>398</sup> Endow, op.cit., p.81.

<sup>399</sup> Stent, op.cit., p.165.

<sup>400</sup> Lippert, Werner, **The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO's Energy Dilemma**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2011, p.33.

the Federal Republic increased the portion of the products of Soviet-origin in its energy portfolio<sup>401</sup>. From the 70s on, the amount of the Russian energy imports to Germany continued to increase at a steady pace. In 1980, petroleum and gas imports of Soviet-origin comprised respectively 2.9% and 17% of the total imports of the Federal Republic<sup>402</sup>. Even during the severing period of the Cold War in the 80s, the FRG and France, despite the US warnings, continued to purchase higher volumes of Soviet petroleum and gas until the agreement with the US brought the limit that gas imports from the Soviet Union could not exceed 30% of the total amount of the commodity imported<sup>403</sup>. However, need for Russian oil and gas further mounted up with the reunification, increasing the demand on the German part by half between the early 90s and 2003<sup>404</sup>.

Considering the historical context, high volumes of these import figures -or, in other words- close Russo-German relations in energy were necessary since energy imports not only used as barter in return for German technology, necessary for the transportation of the commodity from the distant regions of the Soviet Union; but also functioned as a major hard currency-earner for the Soviet economy in the long run. Motives on the German part, however, were a bit more complex. An advanced industrial aspect had always been an inseparable, structural trait of German economies. In order to ensure the continuity of the businesses of industrial companies that the German economy has relied on, high volumes of undisrupted energy flow was of vital importance. In political dimension, amicable relations with the Soviet Union was also beneficial since it could, and did, enable the FRG to foster its goals on the East-West axis with eliminating the possibility of Soviet aggression. In present, history -in a sense- repeats itself and witnesses the same German pattern of using Europe as a shield while, at the same time, dealing with Russia for the bilateral gain, even though such opportunities come at the expense of security and welfare loss on the part of other EU members in the Central and Eastern Europe. The project of Nord Stream pipeline provides an excellent example in this respect. However, in order to better evaluate the current condition as to the supply of fossil-based energy in the EU, one should take a brief look at the basic facts regarding the subject.

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<sup>401</sup> Westphal, Kristen, "Germany and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue" in **The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Europe's Future Energy Security**, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2008, p.95.

<sup>402</sup> Ibid., p.96.

<sup>403</sup> Closson, Stacy, "Russia's Key Customer: Europe" in **Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation**, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, p.92.

<sup>404</sup> Westphal, op.cit., p.96.

Due to the structure and the scale of their economies, three major industrial countries -Germany, France and Italy- have always been in need of more energy than their neighbors. The dominant industrial companies in these countries which needed high volumes of energy on a constant basis would inevitably force their governments to the long-term contractual engagements in the field of energy with the Soviet Union in order to ensure the sustainment of their activities<sup>405</sup>. Towards the late 60s, West European states began to seek diversification in their energy mix, preferring natural gas and other sources to petroleum, which, from the 70s on, made the Federal Republic and France the major clients of the Soviet gas via multi-decade contracts<sup>406</sup>. This is where the current situation of Russian gas supply to the Union had their roots in: the fragmentation of the European gas market according to the preferences of the major clients of the Russian gas. While the CEECs had been supplied with Soviet gas even before the Western Europeans, political attachment to Soviet Union during the Cold War left them more dependent on Russia since the prospect of diversification of their energy portfolio both in the choice of supplier and of material was limited when in the Soviet Bloc. Further, since these countries did not have industrial economies as developed as their western counterparts, gas consumption by CEECs constitutes only a small portion of the Russian gas deliveries to Europe, which, in turn, puts CEECs in a more vulnerable position in which their interests can easily be disregarded by Russia when dealing with the bigger clients in the West. Indeed, while the old members of the Union (EU15), by 2006, account for 86% of the total EU gas consumption only 20% of which coming from Russia, the twelve new members correspond to a mere %14 in EU-wide total gas consumption with at least %50 dependency on Russian gas<sup>407</sup>. When exports to Germany and Italy alone make up almost 40% of the entire profit of Gazprom, it is hard to label these states as just the regular clients of Russian gas, instead of strategic partners enjoying privileged energy partnership with Moscow<sup>408</sup>.

With this understanding in mind, Nord Stream is not only an example of such a partnership; but also a very prominent display of a self-centered German foreign policy conduct. Nord Stream -or North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP)- is a 1200 km long

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<sup>405</sup> Noel, Pierre, (2008, November) "Beyond Dependence: How to Deal With Russian Gas" [www document] *European Council On Foreign Relations*, p.8. URL: <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/Russia-gas-policy-brief.pdf> Accessed on: September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>406</sup> Closson, op.cit., p.91.

<sup>407</sup> Noel, op.cit., p.9.

<sup>408</sup> Ibid.

offshore pipeline project with dual lines to transport natural gas from Vyborg, Russia to directly Greifswald, Germany<sup>409</sup>. Originating in 1997, it was first the idea of Gazprom to build a pipeline connecting the gas-rich region, Shtokman of Northern Russia to first Sweden and Finland and then -through the Baltic Sea bed- to Denmark and Germany, which is why it was initially recognized as a Trans-European Network Project by the Union<sup>410</sup>. In 2004, however, upon a declaration from Gazprom that Shtokman field would now be dedicated to liquefied natural gas exports, Finland withdrew from the consortium and the project turned into a bilateral Russian-Germany partnership<sup>411</sup> in which Germany, with its two major industrial companies E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall -along with a Dutch company, Gasunie with little share- formed the new shape of the consortium with Gazprom holding 51% share of the venture in total<sup>412</sup>. Based in Zug, Switzerland and run -since 2006- by the former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder<sup>413</sup>, Nord Stream AG now seemed to have the sole objective of carrying more gas into Germany without disruption of the countries in between, which is where the serious concerns for these countries in both economic and political aspects began to surface.

Since there will be no pipeline passing through their soil, CEECs on the route will first be deprived of transit fees. Based on the figures -for instance- Ukraine agreed, in 2006, to charge for gas flows through its land -as \$1.60 per million cubic meters (mcm) per 100 km- the total length of Nord Stream and 55 bcm of natural gas that will flow in it roughly account for the amount of \$1 billion for a year<sup>414</sup>. By taking such an amount out of the picture, Nord Stream will, instead, serve Germany by diminishing the price Berlin would pay for Russian gas deliveries, as well as making Germany the key actor in redistributing the Russian energy across the Union<sup>415</sup>. Perhaps a heavier deprivation than that of direct financial loss, the cost of vulnerability in energy supply constitutes another dimension of concern for relevant CEECs, for the project enables Russia to manipulate the volume of gas flowing into Europe according to its own preferences and to the current

<sup>409</sup> Whist, Bendik Solum, (2008, November) "Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline: An Analysis of the Political Debates in the Baltic Sea Region regarding the Planned Gas Pipeline from Russia to Germany" [www document] *Fridtjof Nansen Institute*, p.5. URL: <http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1508.pdf> Accessed on: September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>410</sup> Westphal, op.cit., p.108.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid.

<sup>412</sup> Whist, op.cit., p.6.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid.

<sup>414</sup> Ibid., p.21.

<sup>415</sup> Mankoff, Jeffrey, **Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2009, p.179.

political atmosphere, while being still able to transport great volumes of gas to its bigger clients without disruption: in other words, lifting the Russian dependency on transit countries while increasing theirs on Russia.

Although Nord Stream is portrayed by its proponents as a financially-wise initiative, CEECs claim that its costs indicate otherwise, making it nothing but a politically-motivated venture for a Russo-German strategic partnership that divides Europe. Indeed, such concerns do not seem ungrounded after a quick check of the estimated figures. The construction cost calculated by the consortium in 2005 as €4 billion was revised in 2008 as €7.4 billion and is still carry the possibility of increasing to €12 billion due to the price changes in certain commodities and services<sup>416</sup>. Despite the increase in expenses, the commitment of Nord Stream AG on the continuity of the project causes CEECs, particularly Poland, to question the real motivations on the part of Germany, for bearing such a cost -especially when cheaper onshore alternatives are claimed to be possible<sup>417</sup> - would be irrational unless a greater return is expected. Indeed, the fact that Chancellor Merkel did not change the approach of her country to the project<sup>418</sup> and gave her support to the pipeline by labeling it 'a strategically important for the whole of Europe'<sup>419</sup> is a significant indicator raising the assumption that a broader plan, or perhaps, a preparation for a substantial change in the future course of the German national agenda is underway in Berlin. Either way, Nord Stream is an obvious proof as to the fact that the national interests still take precedence over the commitments on unity.

Even after a brief review of modern German history, one cannot help but entertain the possibility that this endeavor could be an application of a modern *Ostpolitik*. Political legacy of Willy Brandt continued to be implemented even after the end of the Cold War, and being on good terms with Russia have retained its importance for Berlin as much as it had for Bonn. Indeed, why had Germany not showed the same enthusiasm for NATO accession of CEECs, although lobbying actively for their EU accession? Or alternatively, why did Germany, in the early 90s, tried to prioritize CSCE -instead of NATO- as an avenue where the security issues of the continent should have been addressed? The need of Germany for a friendly Russia seems to be an expression of its historical vulnerability: the

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<sup>416</sup> Whist, op.cit., p.18.

<sup>417</sup> Böhme, Dimo, **EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solution: A Focus on the Natural Gas Sector**, Postdam University Press, Postdam, 2011, p.115.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Whist, op.cit., p.13.

only dimension of its sphere where it feels insecure and, therefore, needs pacification instead of confrontation. On the other hand, as seen in the second invasion of Iraq in 2003, Germany is now a lot less motivated to seek complete conformity even with its primary post-war ally, whose protection it had relied on for four decades. Though the stance of Schroeder at the time of Iraq war is said to have derived largely from electoral concerns<sup>420</sup> -instead of principles- it was now a fact that Berlin was ready for further divergences on the issues of high politics, as also seen in the reluctance of Germany when it comes to sanctions to be imposed on Iran, with which it had a significant volume of trade. Although Germany had been able, also in previous decades, to shape European endeavors into its preferences, today it is more unlikely for any European initiative to bear fruit if Berlin stands against it. Again, while it is ungrounded and quiet unlikely even to entertain the possibility of a militarily-aggressive Germany, it is now safe to conclude that the responsibility Berlin felt for the recent past of the continent is long gone, though it is arguable whether or not it was really felt after Adenauer.

### **3.4. Social Dimension: Germany and the Immigrants**

As shown in the previous sections, Germany -before and after the reunification- enjoyed a dominating position in Europe in economic terms, and thereby, gained the ability to influence or shape the norms ruling the European economic order. In the meantime, its historical background and geographical position also located the country in the center of Europe in both senses which helped flourish not only its political leverage but also its cultural depth. On the West, Germany was neighbor to an area of welfare that -despite French maneuvers- could offer more benefit than harm; while on the East it was surrounded by the historically-familiar nations that would later turn into the prospective members of the Union. This combination, however, put Germany in an intersection point in terms of migration, and generated a side effect for the country: permanent non-German residents.

Although the post-war Germans had been indoctrinated with, what can be called, de-militarization or non-aggression, some sort of aversion to outsiders would begin to develop after the initial decades of the integration. While foreign worker recruitment from

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<sup>420</sup> Dettke, op.cit., p.163.

Mediterranean countries, and refugees coming from Yugoslavia and other troubled-Eastern European countries seem to be the basic causes of the problem at the first glance, one should also note the historical fact that German states, especially since the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, had been entities founded on the notion of German ethnic origin, instead of multinational formations with a colonial past. Indeed, when compared to France and the United Kingdom, Germany -as stated above- has a historical difference altering its view regarding immigration and the foreigners residing in its land. While these two countries -due to their colonial history- gained a familiarity with foreign elements and somewhat embraced such populations as a part of their nations, the same understanding remained alien to Germany<sup>421</sup>. One may suggest that several nations from different origins encompassed by Germanic empires throughout the history gained some degree of Germanness, despite the fact that these nations may not be referred as German in anthropological context. While such a suggestion holds remarkable amount of truth, it should also be noted that the perception of nationhood in Germany would later be wrapped in a more homogenous concept revolving around ethnic German origin, especially with the national unity accomplished under Prussia.

A firm adherence to ethnic origins in the concept of German nationality was also visible in 20<sup>th</sup> century. German citizenship law of 1913, based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, defined the German nation on the basis of descent, stressing the ethnic singularity of the nation and, thereby, excluding the immigrants<sup>422</sup>. Likewise, the *divided nation* rhetoric used as a base for achieving reunification during the Cold War also contributed to the idea of the unity of the German nation and solidified the nationalist sentiments along with the German identity<sup>423</sup>. Therefore, the post-war indoctrination aiming to hinder a future resurgence of a sharp-edged nationalism was bound to remain skin-deep since the very notion the FRG put in use necessitated a certain degree of nationalism. Though it is arguable whether or not it is at the level of *phobia*, an unfriendly attitude towards foreigners is still harbored in the country. Although Germany is not the only EU member with a distant stance against the immigrants, it seems to be the only one that invented and made use of European mechanisms to pre-empt migration movements towards its soil. However, since any attempt to examine such a problem would be

<sup>421</sup> Triandafyllidou, Anna, **Immigrants and National Identity in Europe**, Routledge, London, 2001, p.69.

<sup>422</sup> Ibid., p.70.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

incomplete without focusing first on the internal, existent components of the issue, an outward look must be put in use in order to better evaluate the attitude of Germany in this regard.

### 3.4.1. Beginning of the Immigrant Inflow to the FRG

The first contact of the German nation with outsiders in modern context was with the mass recruitment of foreign workers, starting in the early 60s. In fact, the first contract for recruiting foreign workers was signed with Italy in 1955 in order to provide manpower for agricultural and construction jobs<sup>424</sup>. However, with Berlin Wall erected in 1961, insufficiency in the worker supply from Eastern Bloc led to further contracts with Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia<sup>425</sup>. Though the stay of the foreign workers was thought temporary in the beginning, there would soon originate a pattern of settling down in the host country and a natural consequence: a second generation of migrants born into foreign parents in Germany, which would flare serious concerns in German society<sup>426</sup>. Germany, therefore, tried to restrict the foreign worker inflow into the country between 1976 and 1980, before which the population of foreigners reached the 6.8% of the entire German population and 9.4 % of the total workforce<sup>427</sup>. With these percentages remaining more or less similar in the beginning of 90s<sup>428</sup>, perception of foreign workers began to deteriorate substantially for there was now a remarkable gap between the needs of the developed German industry and the capabilities of unskilled foreign workers that inevitably lacked the required educational background and failed to meet those professional standards<sup>429</sup>.

Incompatible with not only ethnocentric assumption of German citizenship; but also with the welfare and prosperity-oriented German state identity, foreign workers - now with following generations- turned into immigrants that would find no chance of social

<sup>424</sup> Taras, Ray, **Old Europe and New: Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Maryland, 2009, p.130.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid.

<sup>426</sup> Triandafyllidou, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>427</sup> Gunlicks, Arthur, "Between Elections in West Germany: 1976-1980 and 1980-1983" in **Germany at Polls: The Bundestag Elections of the 1980s**, Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1990, p.12.

<sup>428</sup> Taras, op.cit., p.130.

<sup>429</sup> Ulrich, Ralf, "The Impact of Foreigners on the Public Purse" in **Immigration as an Economic Asset: The German Experience**, Trentham Books Limited, Oakhill, 1994, p.79.

absorption within German society. Perhaps more unfortunately, concerns as to the normalization of the legal status of the immigrants upon their applications for permanent residency<sup>430</sup> coincided with the debates, especially after the mid 80s, regarding the future characteristics of the German identity, whereby calls for a more nationalist emphasis would begin to be voiced against the feeling of inferiority stemming from the Nazi tragedy<sup>431</sup>. Rate of naturalization of the immigrants in Germany, therefore, remained very low. Especially under the chancellorship of Kohl, who viewed naturalization as an exceptional process that was to occur under a very strict set of criteria, Germany became a country holding both the largest population of foreigner and, at the same time, the lowest rate of naturalization: 3% per year<sup>432</sup>.

It is argued that Germany, in the late 90s, recognized the immigration reality and departed from the strict application of *jus sanguinis* principle and shifted to that of *jus soli* (citizenship by birth on the soil)<sup>433</sup>. While it is true that the 1999 Citizenship Law made it possible to acquire German citizenship for children born in Germany to foreign parents who were residing legally in the country for at least eight years and in possession of resident permit for at least three years; such citizens have to renounce their citizenship of origin before their 23<sup>rd</sup> birthday if they are to hold German one<sup>434</sup>. Besides, a community comprising of such *unnatural Germans* could hardly, in the eyes of the society, be a real part of the nation, which is why, in the case of Turkish-Germans, a parallel community within Germany with high intermarriage rates was formed<sup>435</sup>. Indeed, the distant stance towards the immigrants, especially after the late 70s, was certainly not something unaccustomed, which would, in the near future, subject the Muslim community in Germany to a heavy discrimination, in terms of, for instance, employment opportunities<sup>436</sup>. Immigrants from Eastern Europe would also get their share of unfriendly attitudes towards themselves in the following decades<sup>437</sup>. According to public opinion surveys, 62% of the respondents in 1982 had the view that there were too many foreigners in Germany, and

<sup>430</sup> Taras, op.cit., p.131.

<sup>431</sup> Triandafyllidou, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>432</sup> Taras, op.cit., p.132.

<sup>433</sup> Castles, Stephen, "The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies" in **Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2007, p.30.

<sup>434</sup> Taras, op.cit., p.134.

<sup>435</sup> Ibid.

<sup>436</sup> Silver, Hilary, "The Social Integration of Germany since Unification" in **From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2010, p.195.

<sup>437</sup> Taras, op.cit., p.137.

half of the respondents expressed that they should be sent back to their country of origin<sup>438</sup>. This trend among German society led the German government to seek ways to filter the inflow of outsiders into the country. This aim, however, had to be carried out in such a delicate way that the method chosen could not be associated with the racist, inhumane practices in the recent history of Germany. Needless to say, it had to come in a European clothing. Schengen regime can be considered as a product of such a quest on the part of Germany.

### 3.4.2. Schengen Regime as a Remedy for the Immigration Problem

Recruitment of foreign workers, though most of them chose to remain in the country, was in the end a temporary project that would -and did- eventually halt. With 80s, however, Germany faced the same problem under a different cover: refugees and asylum seekers. The amount of people fleeing mostly from Eastern Europe to the FRG for the fear of persecution reached almost 100.000 in the mid 80s<sup>439</sup>. That figure, throughout the decade, continued to increase due, for instance, to the state of emergency in Poland and coup d'état in Iran<sup>440</sup> while the refugees from the Eastern Europe continued to constitute a significant portion, especially upon the weakening of the Soviet Bloc. The constant inflow of such foreigners began to turn into a burden on social services and, hence, on the government budget<sup>441</sup>. The lack of an effective immigration policy made Germany the popular destination of asylum seekers, for the Basic Law had provided not only constitutional guarantee of asylum for *anyone* subjected to political persecution<sup>442</sup>; but also provided state benefits during their stay in Germany while their application was being reviewed<sup>443</sup>.

At this moment, a Franco-German initiative regarding the issue was being gradually prepared. In fact, there was already an ongoing Community initiative under the

<sup>438</sup> Triandafyllidou, op.cit., p.72.

<sup>439</sup> Flam, Helena, "Germany and Migration: A European Case" in **Rule Systems Theory: Applications and Explorations**, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2008, p.269.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.

<sup>441</sup> Turnbull, Penelope, and Sandhotz, Wayne, "Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces" in **The Institutionalization of Europe**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.207.

<sup>442</sup> Hellmann, Gunther, Baumann, Rainer, Bösche, Monika, Herborth, Benjamin, and Wagner, Wolfgang, (2005, March) "De-Europeanization by Default?: Germany's EU Policy in Defence and Asylum" *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol:1 No:1, p.150.

<sup>443</sup> Turnbull; Sandhotz, op.cit., p.205.

Adonnino Committee that was charged by Fontainebleau Council of June 1984 with the task of investigating the methods for abolishing internal borders and, along with them, all the police and custom procedures<sup>444</sup>. Coinciding with the Community endeavor, France and Germany signed, a month later, an agreement with the aim of easing border controls between them<sup>445</sup>. However, since border controls could cause serious implications in terms of public security, such a step could not be taken without harmonizing the related policies such as immigration, asylum or visa. With the participation of the Benelux countries, this initiative between France and Germany was institutionalized and put in a formal order with the Schengen Agreement signed on June 1985,<sup>446</sup> which would be followed in 1990 by a convention regarding the technical aspect of the issue. Though seeming paradoxical at the first glance, abolishing internal borders and permitting intra-community human circulation would serve German interests since it would, at the same time, strengthen outer borders of the Community and tighten the procedures as to the entry over them. For instance, the border police which was authorized to check identity papers of a person only on the border before the system was set, was now entitled to exercise the same control for a person from a non-Schengen country in everywhere in the national territory<sup>447</sup>. True, at the moment Schengen was to secure only the western borders of Germany which were with the prosperous, developed states, unlike its eastern borders facing the unstable countries of Eastern Europe. However, owing to German efforts, the new regime would not remain limited to its current sphere; but instead, would expand parallel to the enlargement of the Community as -what would come to be known- the third pillar.

In Germany, on the other hand, dislike towards the foreigners was, just as the numbers of refugees pouring into the country, continuing to increase. A public opinion poll conducted in 1991 by *Der Spiegel* indicated that 69% of the respondents demanded a change in the generous asylum provisions of the constitution<sup>448</sup>. In fact, demand for legislative modifications to the related provisions had already been voiced by the CDU in

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<sup>444</sup> Boccardi, Ingrid, **Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy**, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, p.28.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

<sup>446</sup> Kapteyn, Paul, **The Stateless Market: The European Dilemma of Integration and Civilization**, Routledge, London, 1993, p.74.

<sup>447</sup> Weil, Patrick, "France, Germany and Immigration Policy: A Paradoxical Convergence" in **The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union**, Routledge, London, 1999, p.171.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., p.208.

1984<sup>449</sup>. However, it was by no means an easy task to make such a change at constitutional level, especially if that provision had the status of a basic human right in German law<sup>450</sup>. Aside from the fact that it would be hard to obtain a two thirds majority needed to make such an amendment considering the currently divided state of the ruling CDU-FDP coalition, there was also a moral dimension in the issue on which the entire post-war German identity was built. Indeed, as stated above, there was probably no person within the German governing circles who wanted to give the world an impression that the old *Reich* aiming for the purity of the nation was back again. Recognizing the impasse he faced in domestic politics, Chancellor Kohl realized that dealing with the problem at the European level would both save him the heated debates in the country and, at the same time, contribute to a co-operative, European Germany image.

In the course of the IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) for the European Political Union, therefore, the German delegation forced the discussions regarding the immigration policy and police co-operation into a shape that would accommodate the domestic needs of Germany<sup>451</sup> and managed to secure intergovernmental co-operation in the related issues within the treaty structure, under the heading of justice and home affairs<sup>452</sup>. It was now a lot more possible for the German government to make the constitutional amendment restricting the liberal asylum law since the Community-wide development in the issue would inevitably necessitate domestic alignment. While Germany -with Schengen initiative- managed to cut down its liberal asylum law in 1993 with a lot less resistance<sup>453</sup>; it also further secured its eastern borders through the bilateral agreements in the early 90s with some of the CEECs such as Czech Republic, Poland and Romania, in which they were all agreed to the repatriation of their citizens who had tried to enter Germany illegally<sup>454</sup>. Though these agreements provided some degree of precaution, they were in the end still stop-gap solutions in some of which Germany had to offer financial assistance in return. A comprehensive handling of the refugee problem of Germany could only be secured through the incorporation of the Schengen regime into the community framework:

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<sup>449</sup> Flam, op.cit., p.269.

<sup>450</sup> Turnbull and Sandhotz, op.cit., p.208.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid., p.209.

<sup>452</sup> Hellmann, et.al., p.152.

<sup>453</sup> Flam, op.cit., p.269.

<sup>454</sup> Klusmeyer, Douglas, and Papademetriou, Demerios, **Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking Nation**, Berghahn Books, New York, 2009, p.209.

making it a part of the *acquis* by which any prospective member of the Union would inevitably be bound. The last bend for Germany on this path, therefore, was the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Germany continued its efforts for further integration on the related policy fields in order for them to gain community competence, for they would be stricter once communitarized<sup>455</sup>. The consensus among other members of the Union in this regard also helped conceal German motivations, since weeding out the undesired bulk of the migrants while filtering the skilled labor was a viable solution that no prosperous country could disregard. Aware of the possible financial side effects such an initiative could cause, federated states of Germany, in the process of creating a common asylum policy, heavily resisted the possibility of further integration -through the method of QMV in the proceedings regarding the issue- and insisted on the necessity of veto power, which in the end won Germany a transitional period of five years before the implementation of QMV method in the asylum policy<sup>456</sup>. Incorporating the Schengen regime into the community framework through the Treaty of Amsterdam not only distributed the financial burden of Schengen implementation on the east of Germany onto all members of the Union; but also necessitated that any country that would accede to the Union after May, 2004 would have to execute the stricter provisions brought by the system regarding, for instance, illegal immigration and repatriation of illegal migrants<sup>457</sup>. Already preempted -in terms of immigration- with the promise of membership, CEECs could now function as a buffer region that would defuse the unwanted immigration waves before reaching German borders. In the course of the application of both the system and the complementary bilateral agreements, number of asylum applications for Germany saw a remarkable decrease from 468.200 in 1992 to 104.400 in 1997<sup>458</sup>.

Looking back at the history of European integration, it is seen that Germany did often welcome political integration with the expectation that it could give the country some degree of legitimacy or recognized competence in that field, which was a valuable benefit for a defeated nation. The ECSC and the EEC themselves were the prominent examples of this understanding. Support to the idea of the EDC, participation in the Common Market,

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<sup>455</sup> Hellmann, et.al., p.152.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid., p.153.

<sup>457</sup> Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, op.cit., p.217.

<sup>458</sup> Hellmann, et.al., p.153.

projects of EPC and CFSP; all gave Germany a chance to pursue its interests that it could not manage to secure on its own. It is, however, a bit unaccustomed to witness Germany to pioneer co-operation in a policy field in order for it to gain community competence, since promoting a European level initiative as a remedy for a national problem was in fact a French pattern. Indeed, the role of policy entrepreneur had always been assumed by France as a contra movement to balance out Germany, since those initiatives could provide a method to tie Bonn deeper to the Community and put it under some sort of surveillance. However, due to the power-boost coming with the reunification and to the demise of Cold War constraints, Germany is now not only willing but also capable to play the role of a fully sovereign country, rather than the one assigned to it by others. While how much of a burden the immigrants could be to a welfare state is subject to another debate, Germany - with its attitude towards foreigners- revealed that Berlin was not willing to bear any unnecessary cost that could hinder its outstanding economic performance to which it owes its entire success.

## CONCLUSION

After going through a comprehensive literature on post-war European history with the aim of exploring the nationalist tendencies in the governance of the Union in the cases of its two prominent members, it is safe to say that the classical approach explaining the European integration on the basis of functional and normative understanding, and the idealist rhetoric used extensively by the elite policy entrepreneurs during the Community initiatives are not completely sufficient for understanding the inception or the development of the Communities. Basic tenets of the realist view of international relations hold that the notion of self-interest on the part of a given state has been, and will continue to be, the primary element governing its relations with the other states, and that it would not be a wise expectation to assume that these relations could be governed anything but unilateral gains. In the case of Europe, history, too, confirms the presence of recurring wars waged for the political, economic or ideological ends. This is why the efforts of Monnet to put an end to wars in the continent by building a unity both among the states and the people of Europe is generally deemed a noble and revolutionary attempt in the mainstream approach to the European integration mentioned above. In this study, however, it is argued that even after the tragedy of Second World War, there was neither such a plan nor a will on the part of individual European states to dedicate themselves, especially in the case of France and Germany that had different post-war objectives. Indeed, as set forth also in the second and the third parts of the study, both the institutions of the integration and the initiatives of historical importance could develop not because of their intrinsic value; but of national motivations that most of the time mattered to France and Germany.

As shown in the second part, for instance, France, in the initial post-war era, faced a dual task of containing Germany and promoting from the ordinary-state status it had been relegated to. While feeling a bitter resentment and animosity towards its eastern neighbor, Paris had to go along with a regional co-operation scheme in order to restore its supreme position in Western Europe and ensure its national reconstruction at the same time. During the first decades of the integration, therefore, France not only determined the

characteristic features of the Community institutions; but also kept the level of the integration on a position accommodating French concerns of sovereignty. As found in the second part of the study, it was in this era that Community institutions were planted in francophone territories, that the officers of these institutions adopted French as the default language in the proceedings, and that the French legal culture began to root in both functioning and the form of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Likewise, it is shown in the third part of the study that the Federal Republic, especially after the 70s, making use of the joint initiatives of the Community, gradually gained an edge that gave the Germans both international acceptance and economic benefits. Strong German monetary influence that the Bundesbank managed to assert on Community level from the 70s on, and the adamant march towards the reunification with remarkable unilateralism in German foreign policy conduct were the prominent examples of how the national agendas mattered also in the German case. In the meantime, the third part also indicates that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the appearance of the independent states in the Central and Eastern Europe did not lead to continent-wide European solidarity; but two different perceptions of Europe. As also stated in the third part, the Eastern Europeans that had been regarded as the hostages of the Soviet Union during the Cold War seem to have been deemed, after their accessions into the Union, second-degree Europeans, rather than the genuine ones. Indeed, it was not long ago when the Eastern Europeans were labeled as Polish plumber in case they could lower the value of labor in Western Europe, or when they were -upon declaring their support to the US position on Iraq war of 2003- deemed, by President Chirac, ineligible to express their opinions. Likewise, Southern Europeans too got their share of cynical comments when they were accused of laziness, and advised by Chancellor Merkel to work harder in the face of financial hardships. Now it takes quiet an optimism -perhaps an extensive one- to believe that the motto of the integration, *united in diversity*, still keeps its substance.

Just as in the past development of the European integration, today, France and Germany are at the center of the discussions regarding the prospective shape and course of the Union. It was -and still is- the concurrence and disagreements of these two countries that draws the route for other member states. Still, as ironic as it is, it has to be admitted that the continuity of the integration and its arrival at its current phase would have been greatly handicapped had the integration not included Franco-German couple. There is still

some degree of comfort for those perceiving the European Union as a civilization project for it, indeed, made another major war in Europe unthinkable, if not materially impossible, and created a land of prosperity and peace however problematic it may be. On the other hand, it still does not seem plausible to believe that the historical rivalry between France and Germany has been overcome for the sake of idealistic purposes. On the contrary, there are -as this study suggests- more reasons to believe that what are perceived by a foreign eye as the steps of European integration were, in fact, the outcomes of the well-orchestrated efforts on the part of France and Germany to pursue national motivations. As emphasized also in the first part, the European Union is bound to be haunted by the foundation it was built on for the integration was not born as a genuine, popular endeavor possessed or shouldered by the people of Europe; but a solution designed, at its inception, as an alternative to another Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, this is the point disregarded oftentimes in the efforts trying to make sense of the contemporary European Union. As stated also at the end of the first part, what is expected of the Union and what it delivers are most of the time far different things due to the flawed perception in the minds of the observers that the steps in the integration followed each other naturally and spontaneously for the sake of forging an ever closer union. The brief review of the post-war history of Europe and the examples highlighting the roles of France and Germany in it were gathered under the parts of this study to question this mainstream suggestion.

Efforts of France to assume the European integration were the initial example of this understanding. France seemed to enjoy a leadership position within the several layers of the integration, especially during the first decades. As also expressed in the second part of the study, Paris did not experience any major impediment during this era when, for instance, resisting the QMV extension in increasing policy areas and the budgetary powers of the Commission in the mid 60s or, as stated previously, giving the institutions of the integration a francophone character. However, fortune of France began to change in the following decades of the integration as the *golden age* gradually wore off. Indeed, since the supremacy Paris had established in the first decades of the integration had to do more with form than substance, it has not been long-lasting, and consequently began to erode in proportion with the rise of the Federal Republic in economic and political spheres. The suggestion presented in this study as to the French presence in the post-war European integration can also be confirmed by the historical continuity of the Franco-German

relationship. As shown in the first part of the study, chance of France to keep the upper hand in the settings involving Germany had never been high. Especially after the Napoleonic Wars and towards the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, France entered into a repeating cycle of retreat in the face of German advances. However peaceful, European integration in this respect can be considered as the last loop in the cycle. That being said, it does not seem plausible to explain the declining presence of France in the European Union with reference to German factor alone. Being the birthplace of the nation state conception, France has always had a strong attachment to the traits peculiar to itself, and -as seen in the course of the integration- resisted the bold initiatives that could bring harm to its national sovereignty. This mindset, however, put Paris in a highly awkward and contradictive position in which it would have to distance itself, at the core level, from the supranational initiatives of the integration while, at the same time, having to champion them with the hope of containing Germany. Indeed, it was this mindset at work in EMU, EPC, EDC and in the entire idea of integration. Therefore, it was, to some extent, France that tied its own hands.

Germany, on the other hand, embraced the notion of integration for it was not only the sole viable path to redemption from the mistakes of the Third Reich; but also an avenue offering advantageous economic prospects for German nation. There was also the Cold War factor that came to the aid of the Germans and saved them from otherwise obstructionist policies in minds at the both sides of the Atlantic. Within a very short time after the inception of the Economic Community, German industry began to function in a way that catalyzed economic growth on which the monetary strength of the Deutschemark would rely. Boosted by the extraordinary economic performance and the self-confidence coming with it, the Federal Republic, as shown in the third part, gradually changed the balance within the integration to its favor. Characteristics or the features enabling Germany to achieve such a success were expressed several times in the study. The broad picture that emerges in the historical perspective, however, indicates a pattern of German conquest of the continent that has occurred either militarily, as seen until the World War II, or economically just as in the contemporary European Union. On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that Germany is not to be blamed here for its economic advances in the post-war European integration since the relationship among the members of the

Community/Union is not that of equals; but of those with varying level of potentials and capabilities.

It is, therefore, the basic perception as to the European Union that should be revised in order to reach a healthier understanding regarding what to expect of the Union in terms of the forthcoming initiatives, especially in political sphere. Perhaps, at this point, it is wiser for the observers to rethink their perceptions regarding the Union in a way that enables them to view the integration for what it is: an artificial political and economic expansion beyond the idea of single market. With the lack of genuine desire for unity at the public level, major initiatives that are of historical importance are taken on with a pragmatist mindset by the member states that are capable and influential enough to lead on the rest. As shown in the overall theme of this paper, those member states have, most of the time, been France and Germany. Considering the motivations and the attitudes of these countries over the course of the post-war European integration, and the fact that these two countries -both economically and politically- constitute the center of gravity of the Union, one is bound to conclude that any attempt for further integration in Europe is possible only in proportion as it conforms to the needs and the preferences of Paris and Berlin.

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