# “VOICING THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC?”

# CONTESTATION, NEGOTIATION, AND THE EMERGENCE OF OTTOMAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1862-1875.

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**Abstract**

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the financial crises of the Ottoman Empire increasingly made visible the contestation within the public. Multiple political and economic actors, such as intellectuals, bureaucrats, merchants, and bankers, challenged and profited from the bankruptcy of the Empire. The contestation among these actors became visible through a newly emerging tool: the newspaper. The newspapers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire not only defined the parameters of the daily politics but also challenged and reproduced the financial and economic politics of the Porte, claiming to reflect demands and concerns of the public. Hence, the newspapers appeared as tools to establish a new political and social order.

In this dissertation, I focus on a subject previously unexamined in Ottoman historiography: the ways in which the first private newspapers gave a voice to, shaped, and reflected the public opinion during the nineteenth century financial crises, one that resulted in the bankruptcy of 1875. In order to show how the Ottoman press attempted to shape and reflect public opinion, I analyze four Ottoman newspapers of the Empire, namely *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* between 1862 and 1875. I also define the Ottoman reading public and argue that the public was composed of fragmented and multiple actors. Therefore, I expose the heterogeneity and plurality of the Ottoman public. During these crises, however, this dissertation shows that the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* advocated for a "public" that would unify fragmented and multiple actors in order to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman society.

Furthermore, I conceptualize newspaper representations of the financial crises as outcomes of conflicting interests. In so doing, I resituate the financial crises as sources of tension and competition among varied interests. By scrutinizing how interpretations of the financial crises competed, coexisted and were utilized to promote certain interests, I explore how newspapers provided an arena of contestation for diverse groups and individuals. In so doing, I show how these publications connected the survival of the Empire and criticisms of the government and foreign financial intervention with the interests of diverse groups.

*To my parents Çiğdem and Yaşar Karagöz*

*And to the memory of my beloved mentor Professor Donald Quataert*

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Like any Ph.D student, I experienced difficult days conducting research, locating sources, and finding my own voice when writing the dissertation as well as the joy finding new resources and producing what I believe to be a challenging dissertation. Additionally, life in a somewhat deserted town, Binghamton, failed to raise my spirits during particularly difficult days of writing. However, in days of difficulties, I was always lucky enough to have colleagues and friends around me who motivated me, cheered me up, and listened to the details of my research findings and writing process that, sometimes, might have been uninteresting and dull. I would like to express my special thanks to my fellow graduate student Todd M. Goehle, who contributed to my dissertation project in many different ways and

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## Introduction

This dissertation confronts a question previously unexamined in the nineteenth century Ottoman historiography: the role of the Ottoman press in the nineteenth century financial crises, one that resulted in bankruptcy and the loss of the ability to manage its finances and resources with the establishment of the Public Debt Administration (Duyun-u Umumiye) in 1881. The study focuses on four specific newspapers published in the imperial capital and printed in Ottoman, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (Depiction of Ideas)*, İbret* (Admonition) *Hadika* (Garden) and *İstikbâl* (Future). The goal of this study is to show how, just prior to the bankruptcy of 1875, the discourse of these private publications connected the survival of the Empire and criticisms of the government and foreign financial intervention with the interests of diverse groups and classes.

Ottoman historiography, in particular Şerif Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, describes two of these four newspapers, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* as the instruments used by Young Ottomans to garner support and prevent the collapse of the empire.[1] It is undeniable that these newspapers were published by this loosely organized, oppositional group. In the standard Ottoman historiography, it is also argued that since the Young Ottoman movement appears to have resulted from the stresses created by the political hegemony of the *Tanzimat* elite within the

[1] See Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962; reprint, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

bureaucracy, the Young Ottomans defended the elite's interests in their newspapers. Furthermore, Ottoman historians generally approach the press as a record of events rather than as a reflection of contested interests, events and occurrences in society.[2] As a result, the history of the newspaper press, and its implications for the society as a whole, has remained virtually unaddressed in Ottoman historical research, as historians of the field have not viewed the press as a significant contributor to nineteenth century Ottoman social, cultural, economic and political life.

In this dissertation, I approach these newspapers differently. By making the news and articles on the economy and finance of the Empire the core of this study, I aim to analyze these newspapers not as a mere tool of one particular group, but as reflective images of the economic, political and social tensions that existed within the Ottoman public. This study suggests that the Ottoman press emerged as a tool for multiple actors between the years 1862-1875, a period when the financial crises of the empire ended in bankruptcy.

The historical context within which this new print culture emerged as well as the actual content of the newspapers lead one to hypothesize that newspapers played a unique role in this era and created an environment for the inclusion of the middle and lower classes, or at the very least their inclusion at the discourse level, into daily politics. Between 1862 and 1875, the Ottoman press helped bring about

[2] Among the historians who approached newspapers as a record of events see for example, İlhan Yerlikaya, *XIX Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi Hayatında Basiret Gazetesi* (Van: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1994). Hamza Çakır, *Osmanlıda Basın İktidar İlişkileri* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2002). Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın Ve Yayın* (İstanbul: Literartür Yayınları, 2000). Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992).

To some extent, this is also the case for the historiography of the Western press. For such discussion see, for example, Jeremy D. Popkin, *News and Politics in the Age of Revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).

the formation of an Ottoman press culture that would gradually incorporate the wider segments of society into the daily discourse of politics, even if this incorporation was not the main or sole motive of the editors' newspaper publishing activities.

As I will show in this dissertation in the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret*, *Hadika* and *İstikbâl,* an evolving discourse was constructed that helped to integrate not only elites but also the lower classes into daily politics. By examining criticisms of the financial crises, criticisms that were articulated, challenged and reproduced by varied actors in Ottoman society through the filter of these "oppositional" voices, this dissertation aims to show how the struggle for power by various actors became one for shaping public opinion. These voices not only challenged governments and their policies but also from time to time sought to negotiate with them. More specifically, this dissertation seeks to show how some of the first private newspapers, namely *Tasvir-i Efkâr, Hadika, İbret*, and *İstikbâl,* on the one hand sought legitimizing arguments to assert that they defended the public's interests, as opposed to the interests of the state and sometimes that of Imperial powers, in the middle of the economic crises. On the other hand, these publications did not directly and actually protect the general public's interests, but rather those of emerging middle classes and diverse groups, whose interests were at times conflicting as well as occasionally intersecting with that of the general public. Therefore, this dissertation also analyzes the Ottoman public and public opinion that, in order to alter the direction of nineteenth century Ottoman politics, diverse interests attempted to control and shape. The assertion that the Ottoman print

culture played a crucial role in the development of the notion of a "public," which consisted of contested political and economic interests, challenges the conventional Ottoman historiography's claim of the press as an elite source, a claim that still persists today. In the following pages, this study suggests that the close analysis of each newspaper's subject matter and more specifically the ways in which publications framed their news on contemporary events, allows us to construct the meaning of a public around "the idea of contested economic and political interests" in the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman society.

It was during this period when a multitude of dramatic events such as the difficulty in financing growing state expenditures, unsuccessful attempts in issuing paper money in 1840 and again in 1842 and 1848, as well as the continued failures in raising taxes from internal sources, led the Ottoman government to its first foreign loans. These loans began during the Crimean War of 1854, when the Ottoman government, under unfavorable terms, sold long-term bonds in European markets. In the subsequent two decades, from 1854 to 1875, the Ottoman Empire borrowed over "one billion dollars" from Europe.[3] The increased reliance on internal and external loans indicated a dangerous financial crisis for the Empire. As the government declared the suspension of charges on Ottoman bonds that were in excess of two hundred million pounds sterling, the financial crisis reached critical mass with the bankruptcy of 1875.[4] This financial crisis coincided with the

[3] Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, And Significance of The Administration Of The Ottoman Public Debt (*New York: AMS Press, 1966), 23.

[4] This insolvency was followed by the state's loss of financial control over some of its own economic resources to an international organization. Facing pressure from its bondholders, the Empire in 1881 negotiated with the representatives of its domestic and foreign creditors to establish

Tanzimat period (1839-1876) and had been foreshadowed by the economic crises of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[5] During this period, the Ottoman Empire struggled with a prolonged series of wars with Russia as well as rebellions in Egypt and the Balkan regions. As the Empire lost control of its diverse geographical parts, it lost the revenues extracted from those regions. Equally important for the economy of the Tanzimat was the destruction of the janissaries in 1826, creating a void that the central state would soon use to crush guild privileges.[6] This paved the way for the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Convention and its removal of monopolies against the benefits of Ottoman traders and guilds. When the *Imperial Rescript of Gülhane,* known as Tanzimat was promulgated in 1839, the conditions that set the stage for *laissez-faire* policies and subsequently deep economic and fiscal crises were already underway.

As the economy weakened from a combination of external and internal problems, including revolts, wars, fiscal policies and internal and external

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the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye). British and Dutch, German, Italian, French, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman delegates and a representative of the Imperial Ottoman Bank formed the executive committee of the Administration. This organization controlled certain Ottoman revenues such as stamp, fishing, and alcoholic beverage taxes to ensure orderly payments on the outstanding debt. For more information on the Public Debt Administration see, Donald C Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire,* and Faruk Yılmaz, *Devlet Borclanmasi Ve Osmanli'dan Cumhuriyete Dış Borçlar, Düyun-u Umumiye* (Istanbul: Birlesik Yayincilik, 1996). Concerning the issue of the Ottoman budget deficits see Engin Deniz Akarlı, "Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876-1909" *Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 3 (July 1992): 443-476. From 1854 to 1875, the Ottoman Empire borrowed over a billion dollars from Europe. In 1876, the public debt of the Empire was 210 millions of British pounds. Blaisdell, ibid., 23.

[5] Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000). See in particular pages 186-205 and 211-225.

[6] See Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 175-184. For an unconventional analysis of the destruction of janissaries and its consequences see also Mehmet Mert Sunar, "*Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps, 1807-1826"* (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006).

borrowings, the organization and control of economic resources either by private economic actors or the government became more important for Ottoman society. Thus, a hidden conflict came to the surface both within the state apparatus and other economic actors concerning how to maintain the production of resources and wealth, how to distribute produced wealth and which individuals and groups should benefit from these resources and wealth.

This conflict was partly mobilized with the promises of the *Imperial Rescript of Gülhane*, since the Rescript recognized the principle of equality before the law along with a new notion of "citizenship", according to which the state declared that it recognized its subjects as "citizens". Ex-subjects who were now new citizens of the empire asserted greater and extended rights on the production and distribution of wealth, as the agrarian rebellions in the Bulgarian provinces exemplify.[7] Yet, the state initiated a centralization program that sought to increase its ability to intervene in the daily lives of Ottoman citizens.[8] The centralization policies challenged the autonomy of important economic actors who were expected to relinquish more of their local surpluses to the central administration in a period when private interests became more significant due to the development of market relations.[9] The hopes embedded in the promised rights of the Rescript and the

[7] Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", in *Belleten* (Ankara: 1964), v.27, 624-690. For an unconventional explanation of the rebellions see Erden Atilla Aytekin, "Land, Rural Classes and Law: Agrarian Conflict and State Regulation in the Ottoman Empire, 1830s and 1860s" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006).

[8] In this vein, the provincial administration of the Empire was restructured by the central bureaucracy. For an example of provincial restructuring see Eugen Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[9] Quataert, "Main problems of the economy," 213.

concerns emanating from the economic and political chaos, together with the concerns created by the centralization policies that resulted in greater involvement in society's everyday life, led to overt challenges against Tanzimat governments and their policies. These challenges were brought about by diverse actors in various geographic parts of the Empire.[10] Among these actors were Ottoman oppositional intellectuals, the Young Ottomans, lower and middle rank bureaucrats, merchants, as well as local bankers, guilds, and notables who expressed their heightened concerns in contemporary political, economic and social events.

International actors such as bankers, investors, merchants, travelers and scholars also played an active role in challenging Ottoman economic policies. This challenge was mainly the expected outcome of new Western/European economic developments, ones that promoted the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy as a supplier of raw materials and consumer of Western manufactured goods. Consequently, the expansion of free trade and the empire's agrarian sector were the principal fields of interest for European investors.[11] Expectedly, the agendas of the Ottoman and European citizens as well as different classes, groups and individuals were in conflict not only with each other but also with the Tanzimat governments. Yet, the conflict with the Ottoman state was far

[10] See, for example, Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

[11] Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters On Turkey* (New York: Arno Press, 1973). Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-944, 828-29 and 848-852.

from being uni-linear, since it changed with the agendas of the governments and its international political requirements.[12]

Ottoman historians have long recognized the history of opposition to, and the search for negotiations with, the Tanzimat and its governments as important aspects of the history of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Stanford Shaw, Bernard Lewis and Carter Findley are a few of the scholars who address the challenges brought about by newly emerging and traditional groups such as merchants, moneylenders, the religious class (ulema), the various religious communities (millets) and Young Ottomans to the Tanzimat governments. Challenges levied at the Ottoman governments and their search for negotiations with some governments as in the case of Young Ottomans and Galata bankers, are the subjects of detailed studies.[13] Such studies, however, rarely conceptualized the conflict around the idea of competing and contested economic, social and political interests. Rather primary attention was placed on political competition, as exemplified in studies on the Young Ottomans.[14] Problematically, conventional

[12] For example, the Ottoman sultans and governments meddled in trade competitions between the Ottoman subjects/citizens and European powers based on the state's own concerns in daily politics and international relations. On the one hand, Mahmud II, for example, attempted to protect Ottoman merchants in the face of foreign competition by creating "Avrupa" and "Hayriye tüccarı" groups. On the other hand, by destroying the Janissary Corps and signing the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 and the reform decrees of 1839 and 1856, he and his successors left Ottoman merchants for the most part unprotected to the rigors of free trade. For Hayriye tüccarı see, Bruce Masters, "The Sultan's Entrepreneurs: The Avrupa Tüccarıs and The Hayriye Tüccarıs in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 24, No.4 (Nov., 1992), 579-597.

[13] Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri* (Ankara: Orion Yayınevi, 2006) and Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.*

[14] See, for example, Mardin, Ibid. Enver Koray, "Yeni Osmanlılar" in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 547-565. E. Engelhardt, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kaknüs, 1999). İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar" in *Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile* (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 777-857.

studies often construct their frameworks based from a duality between rulers and ruled. According to this outdated model, two parties could engage solely in one-dimensional confrontations and processes of compromise, and not in a challenge of and negotiation to the system based on their political and economic interests. By applying this basic duality to Ottoman political and social life, these scholars disregard fragmentation and fluidity among the roles and economic interests of multiple actors in a society. Based on their concerns, these actors took part in opposition and negotiation activities including involvement in upheavals, the formation of political parties or groups as in the cases of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks and the publication of newspapers, books and pamphlets that helped shape and control public opinions surrounding their economic and political interests. Scholarly attention, therefore, has tended to neglect the new vehicles of opposition/negotiation activities such as printing culture and the press. And despite the ever-increasing interest in the nineteenth century Ottoman press, the Ottoman historiography has produced only a few systematic analyses of the newspapers and journals that are presently obtainable.[15]

An equally under-analyzed topic of nineteenth century Ottoman culture, mentioned only in passing in many studies, is "the public" created by Ottoman

[15] See Elizabeth B. Frierson, "Unimagined Communities: Educational reform and civic identity among late-Ottoman women," *Critical Matrix* 9:2 (Fall 1995): 57-92. Elizabeth B. Frierson, "Women in the late Ottoman intellectual history", in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, (ed.), Elisabeth Özdalga, (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), 142. On the Ottoman press see Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). Sarah Abrevaya Stein, *Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian and Ottoman Empires* (Indiana University Press, 2006). Johann Strauss, "Kutup ve Resail-i Mevkute: Printing and Publishing in a Multi-ethnic Society," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (New York: Routledge Press, 2005). Without providing systematic analysis, some studies focus on the Ottoman press. See for example, Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi* (İstanbul: Müteferrika Yayınları, 1998). Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*.

newspapers. As exemplified in recent works published by, among others, Elizabeth Frierson, Palmira Brummett, Johann Strauss and Sarah Abrevaya Stein[16], investigations of the Ottoman press are limited to those years when the Ottoman press was relatively prosperous and acquired larger reading publics.[17] In the context of Ottoman social history, greater scholarly attention is needed regarding the first decades of the privately owned newspapers, specifically the 1860s and 1870s, and the public opinion that was attempted to create and shape by these newspapers.

Yet, most Ottoman historians are convinced that focusing on the press generally produces narrow studies on Ottoman culture and social life. To some extent, such an approach might result from the assumption that the Ottoman press was an elite source by nature, as it was produced and consumed by elites. According to this assumption, the products of the Ottoman press were only enjoyed by a limited number of people, since illiteracy prevented newspapers from emerging a mass medium in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.[18] The publications were produced by a limited number of intellectuals who were perceived as the elites of the society. The neglect of the Ottoman press by scholars as a source for the study of social history, and the acceptance of printed materials as

[17] For the Hamidian period, Elizabeth B. Frierson convincingly argues that the Ottoman press was utilized not only by elites but also by middle class women. See Frierson, "Unimagined Communities,". On the increased activity of non-elite authors see Frierson, "Women in the late Ottoman intellectual history", 142. See also Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*. Stein, *Making Jews Modern*.

[17] See Brummett, ibid.

[18] Roderic H. Davison asserts that in 1860s literacy rates among Muslims was 2%. See *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 69. However, Donald Quataert argues that Muslim literacy rates were 2-3% in the early nineteenth century and possibly 15% at the end of the century. See, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922,* 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169.

the reflection of elites' intellectual concerns and as an elite tool for acquiring power within the state might be justified on the grounds of the low literacy rate. Such arguments, however, neglect both the growth of the Ottoman press in quantity and quality in the middle of the financial crises as well as the increase in readership. In 1860, there were 12 newspapers and journals in the Ottoman Empire. By 1876, the number had increased to 101.[19] During the *Tanzimat* era of 1839-1876, the reading public of the Empire widened due to an increased level of literacy, in some ways a by-product of the Ottoman central state's modernization policy, when Western style schools were first established to train bureaucrats. Intellectuals and the literate classes of this period received their education in these schools.[20] In this period, in addition to the state schools private schools were established as well, a development that also increased the numbers of potential readers. Significantly enough, by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the empire annually added 44,810 potential newspaper readers.[21] In 1895, this number increased to 868,879 in

[19] By 1872, three dailies, two papers appearing three times a week, a satirical semi-weekly, a satirical weekly, as well as a commercial, a police and a military weekly were published in the Ottoman language. In the same year, a weekly and six daily newspapers in French such as *The Levant Herald, Levant Times,* and *Phare du Bosphore*, three dailies, two semi-weeklies, and six weeklies in Armenian, a daily, two appearing three times a week, three semi-weeklies, one bi weekly in Greek, three weeklies and a monthly in Bulgarian, one weekly in Hebrew were published. In 1876 there were 101 newspapers and journals published in the Ottoman Empire. See Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Colombia University, 1914), 40-41. Hami Kartay, *Basım ve Yayıncılığımızın 250. Yılı*, Bilimsel Toplantı, Tebliğ (Ankara: Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği). To date, however, no Ottoman scholar has problematized in detail the readership profile of these journals and newspapers.

[20] For the Tanzimat period education system see, for example, Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2001) and Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom : Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[21] I calculated this number based on the numbers of students in the Ottoman Empire in 1873. For the numbers of the students see Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Eğitim ve Eğitim İstatistatikleri, 1839-1924," in *Osmanlı Devletinde Bilgi ve İstatistik*, ed. Halil İnalcık and Şevket Pamuk, 131 (Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000).

Istanbul alone.[22] Based on the circulation rates that remained small in number, particularly outside urban centers where people had limited access to newspapers, many Ottoman historians view the newspapers of the period as an elite source.[23] Yet, newspapers were hardly the sole source for disseminating news in the Ottoman Empire. The expansion of newspapers did not result in the disappearance of "oral communication forms".[24] In this period, though newspapers had a "circulation of a few thousand," in the coffeehouses and at evening gatherings of neighbors, newspapers were consumed by literate and illiterate alike, revealing the limited nature of circulation statistics.[25] Likewise, readers collected newspaper copies, and shared these editions with social and family associations.[26] After the Crimean War, the number of coffeehouses, like many newspapers' circulation rates, peaked.[27] According to Johann Strauss' study, Serafim's *Kıraathane-i Osmani* on the Divan

[22] For the numbers of students see Alkan, ibid., 49.

[23] Reference, for example, Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

[24] By utilizing spy reports, from the first half of nineteenth century, Kırlı shows how the literate people read aloud the newspapers in the coffeehouses. He asserts that news disseminated through "oral information networks" which were established mainly in the coffeehouses. Cengiz Kırlı, "The struggle over space: coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2000), 237.

[25] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Colombia University, 1914), 47.

[26] Ibid., 46-47.

[27] Although there is a lack of information about circulation rates, through the memoirs of many journalists, we know that the total newspaper sales were closely connected to the political events of the Ottoman Empire, as was the case in revolutionary France and Britain. Wars such as Crimean War created broad demands for news. In the Crimean War of 1854, newspapers sales boomed. See Basiretci Ali Efendi, *Istanbul'da Elli Yillik Onemli Olaylar* (Istanbul, 1976). Although they should be taken into consideration carefully, traveler accounts might be another source of information about the circulation rates. According to Paul Fesch'in, *Tercüman-i Hakikat's* circulation rate was 20.000 in the era of Abdülhamid. See Paul Fesch'in, *Abdülhamit'in Son Günlerinde Istanbul* (İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret, 1999), 62.

Yolu, which was founded in 1857, and many coffeehouses of learned societies such as *Cemiyet-i İlmiye*, the *Greek Literary Society in Constantinople* (1862-1922) and the *Bulgarian Chitalishte* (1866-1877) made great contributions to the formation of not only Ottoman intellectual groups but also a reading public.[28]

The view of the press as solely an elite source disregards some evidence of change in Ottoman society, which found its reflection in the law system as well. The increase in the number of press regulations, and regulations with the threat of punishment, showed the state's ever growing interest in controlling the press due to its increased influence in the society.[29] Thus the press was one of the tools that reached an audience extending from the upper classes to the literate and illiterate, as well as urban and rural middle and lower classes such as middle ranking bureaucrats and peasants.

This study seeks to explore four of the first privately owned Ottoman newspapers that revealed dissenting arguments and criticisms that were representative of diverse groups in the Ottoman society. I particularly chose to focus on *Tasvir-i Efkâr, Hadika, İbret*, and *İstikbâl* as they privately owned and rejected any kind of governmental subsidies at a time when their contemporaries received governmental subsidies. Except for *İstikbâl,* on the one hand, the editors of these newspapers served as state bureaucrats. On the other hand, as members of Ottoman society and being familiar with the problems of that very society, these editors published news reports and articles asserting that the Ottoman public needed

[28] Johann Strauss, "Kütup ve Resail-i Mevkute", 231.

[29] For such regulations see, for example, Hasan Refik Ertuğ, *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi Gazetecilik Enstitüsü Yayını, 1970).

their voice to be heard. The voice of the Ottoman public was the voice of their perceived public as well as the reflection of many voices in the society since those editors' interests and problems intersected with many parts of the Ottoman society. Therefore, they took risks in criticizing governmental policies and subsequently their newspapers were closed several times Furthermore, for the majority of their lives, these editors lived as exiles.

More specifically, by analyzing how these newspapers attempted to shape and were shaped by the financial crises, the dissertation seeks to show the possible relationships between newspapers and society. In this period, newspapers appeared as the defenders of middle and lower ranking bureaucrats, merchants, civil servants, workers, peasants, day laborers, the Ottoman state, and the general public good. Rather than confirming the prevailing Ottoman historiography on the press as a source used and produced exclusively by elites, this dissertation suggests that the Ottoman press was a tool of multiple actors from the period of 1862 to 1875, when the Ottoman financial crises led to the empire's bankruptcy.

These financial crises increasingly made visible the contestation among multiple political and economic actors, each of whom sought to challenge and profit from the financial difficulties. During this period, various economic, political and social actors of the Ottoman state, middle classes, and foreign powers expressed a new interest in contemporary political and social events. As a part of this interest, the Ottoman print culture, in which practices such as printing, reading, publishing and writing were charged with both oppositions and negotiations to change the form of expressions, to reproduce the prevailing state ideology and to

promote diverse interests, began to flourish. The press was maybe the most influential genre of the print culture in the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire since newspapers had more accessible language for readers who recently became acquainted with the written culture. For diverse groups such as foreign investors, local and foreign bankers, merchants, manufacturers, land owners, intellectuals and the educated groups including officials in the public bureaucracy and military, the newly burgeoning newspapers were one of the most significant mechanisms through which they could criticize, define and benefit from the economic and financial crises. Newspapers became a tool through which these groups could actively shape the policy making process.

For the state, the potential involvement of these groups into the policy making process created a caveat that urged the governments to issue repressive measures. But not even restrictive forms of legislation such as the 1864 Press Law, which increased the state's ability to suspend and punish publications, or an 1867 regulation on official news, which banned the publication of news not approved by the State Office of the Press, could prevent newspaper editors from enthusiastically criticizing the government's economic policies on tax collecting, external debts and industrialization.[30] By accentuating the deteriorating living conditions of the Ottoman public, the editors of these newspapers established a discourse criticizing the Porte (Ottoman central government) and imperialist financial interventions that were favorably represented by foreign newspapers such as the British-owned *Levant Herald.* Advocating protectionist economy policies against European states,

[30] For the restrictive regulations on the press, see, for example, Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Rejimleri* (İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, Mutbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, 1939).

some editors utilized the print media to criticize foreign powers and mobilize anti-imperialist sentiments within the general public against European intervention and its tactics, such as speculation in the Ottoman stock market.[31] The rapid expansion of newspapers intensified those groups' criticisms and helped voice their opinions about daily politics to a wider public. Ottoman newspapers constituted a print culture within which different interests were contested and manipulated by fragmented groups and individuals in such ways that their very own interests could be promoted not only in the capital city but also in some of the Ottoman provincial cities, such as İzmir, Beirut, Diyarbakır, and Kayseri.[32]

Although the first detailed study on the Ottoman press, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press,* appeared in 1914 as a PhD dissertation of the famous journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman, it is striking that Ottoman historiography overall has neglected the issue of the press in the period of Tanzimat and financial crises.[33] In some studies, scholars make reference to the printing press in the Ottoman Empire. These references, however, either have been bounded by the discourse of specific newspapers on a certain subject or seek to show the press as a by-product of the state and Ottoman intellectuals' reform attempts.[34] In fact,

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[31] See, for example, *İstikbâl*, 11 Rebiüllevvel 1292(17 April 1875).

[32] For example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* published news reports that its correspondants sent from İzmir, Beirut, Diyarbakır, and Ankara. For a news report sent from Izmir see, for example, 12 Zilkade 1283 (19 March 18670, No:467. For a news report sent from Beirut, see, for example, 14 Safer 1279 (10 August 1862), No:13. For a news report sent from Kayseri, see, for example,14 Rebiülahir 1279 (8 October 1862), No:30.

[33] Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey*.

[34] See, for example, Nesimi Yazıcı, *Takvim-i Vekayi: Belgeler* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi, 1983). Çakır, *Osmanlıda Basın*. Yerlikaya, *XIX Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi Hayatında*. Alpay Kabacalı, Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın Ve Yayın (İstanbul: Literartür Yayınları, 2000). Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*.

explaining the emergence and development of the Ottoman press as an expected result of the Tanzimat reforms stems directly from the long-lived Orientalist and nationalist paradigms that dominated conventional Ottoman historiography. Expectedly, the perception of the Ottoman press has been shaped by the contemporary politics and ideologies of the time.

For nineteenth century Orientalists, the Ottoman press emerged when westernization was brought to a backward empire. In this paradigm, the emphasis was ideologically placed to establish differences between Western and Eastern societies. Consequently, this focus sought to show the superiority of the West and thus legitimize the colonization of the non-Western world. The main difference between the East and West was the patrimonial structure of the non-European states, whose political systems were dominated by arbitrary despots. Accordingly, Orientalist paradigms characterize non-European states and societies as entities based on strong state/weak society dichotomies. In this patrimonial structure, the sultan and state officials and not the public would be the main actors of change for state and societal structures. This perspective views non-Western societies as weak, backward and unsuccessful entities that lacked many of the key institutions of the West such as civil society, free press, and civil constitutions, institutions perceived to be instrumental in the West's efforts to achieve modernity and democracy.

By defining the previous two centuries of the Ottoman Empire as a period of decline caused by a combination of individual incompetence and the corrupt characters of state officials and sultans, Orientalist scholars emphasize the necessity

for remedying the political and economic ills of the Empire through nineteenth century state reforms.

According to this body of literature, the newspaper was a Western institution adopted first by the Ottoman government and later by intellectuals to guide the society and emancipate it from the "backwardness" of its stagnant social structure. For historians who subscribe to this paradigm, the Ottoman press is merely an instrument for Ottoman elites who were adapting to modernization models. Not only the first generation of Ottoman historians, but also many modern historians, sought and still seek to explain the emergence and development of the press within this Orientalist decline paradigm. Likewise, many Turkish scholars studying the Ottoman press have found the roots of such views in the texts of Ottoman chroniclers.[35] They have also adopted such views from their Western colleagues, who have found their evidence predominantly in nineteenth century European travel accounts and other forms of Orientalist scholarship.[36]

The official historian of the Ottoman palace, Ahmet Lütfi Efendi, for example, continues to serve as the main reference point in the conventional Ottoman historiography, even though Lütfi Efendi's accounts offer a one sided reflection on the emergence of the press in the Ottoman Empire. According to chronicler Lütfi Efendi, the reformist sultan Mahmud II., as he was concerned with other aspects of the state structure and society, sought to broaden his reform

[35] Yazıcı, *Takvim-i Vekayi*. Çakır, *Osmanlıda Basın*. Yerlikaya, *XIX Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi*.

[36] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge University Press, 1977). Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East, A History* (Oxford University Press, 1995).

concerns to the communication structures. The Sultan's interests in communication structures were extended beyond improving the transportation and postal systems of the Empire, as he created and published an official newspaper.[37] Thus, in 1831 the first Ottoman newspaper of the Empire, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events) was issued by order of sultan Mahmud II. In Lütfi Efendi's narrative, therefore, the introduction of the press, and particularly newspapers, appears as a well-intended endeavor of a sultan concerned with enlightening his public. In this light, the narratives of Ottoman official historians regarding the press intersected with the interpretations of nineteenth century European travel accounts and scholarly productions.

In accordance with the nineteenth century "Oriental spirit," which predominantly reflected the ideology of unevenly extending European hegemony, economic and political influence over the non-Western world, Western scholars and travelers generated certain images and perspectives of the Orient. As one of the most referenced states in the Western imagination, the Ottoman Empire continuously received the attention of European travelers for centuries.[38] By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had lost its long feared power and influence while European states expanded their control over Muslim territories once ruled by this powerful non-European state. The Ottoman ruling elite initiated a

[37] Regarding many historians who followed the argument of Lütfi Efendi see, Nesimi Yazıcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Haberleşme Kurumu", in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, 139-209 (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992). Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa*, Basın ve Yayın (İstanbul: Literartür Yayınları, 2000). Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*.

[38] Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42-48.

reform program targeting the modernization of its administrative structure but more specifically its military institutions to prevent the complete disintegration of the empire. This program met with limited success. With its perceived decline, the existence of the Ottoman Empire thus turned into the "Eastern Question" for European statesmen as well as European scholars and travelers. European travel accounts predominantly emphasized the superiority of the West over the Ottoman Empire. Their narratives coincided with the European scholarly focus on the Ottoman's classical period, a period in which the skilled Ottoman rulers supposedly brought the Empire to its geographical, political, military and economical zenith. Under the governance of unskilled sultans and pashas, this distinctive state and its culture entered into a period of decline and degeneration that became apparent with the loss of territories. The reform attempts of the nineteenth century required a strong central administration that often overlapped with the expansionist intentions of European states. The nineteenth century reform attempts of the Ottoman ruling elite, therefore, were depicted as vital for the survival of the empire. This perspective of Orientalist scholars and travelers bolstered the politics of European states, which sought new ways to insure the dominance of European capital in areas such as transportation, railroads, and coalmining as well as with the implementation of Westernization in Ottoman society.[39] In accordance with the basic premises of European Orientalism, European travel accounts primarily explained changes in Ottoman society as an outcome of modernization processes that succeeded with

[39] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Westernized rulers.[40] The emergence and development of the Ottoman press, therefore, was interpreted as part of a Western style enlightenment project of the Ottoman ruling elites. Without analyzing the processes of change occurring in society, European travel accounts and academic scholarship apparently derived their Orientalist commitment from an institutional history, which is no more than a description of specific institutions. As a result, European travel accounts and scholarship depicted the Ottoman newspapers and printing press as tools imposed upon society by enlightened Ottoman elites, not as the products of complex processes of change occurring in a society.

Following the one-sided, state centered approach offered by chroniclers and nineteenth century Orientalist scholarship and travel accounts, many Ottoman and Turkish scholars analyzed the Ottoman press within the same conventional paradigm.[41] Not surprisingly, Ahmed Emin Yalman, as a journalist who experienced the disappearance of the empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, considered the press as one of the main agents utilized by the Ottoman reformist sultans, and later by the *Young Ottomans,* to form public opinion.[42] For

[40] See, for example, H. Elliot, "The Death of Abdulaziz and of Turkish Reform", *The Nineteenth Century* (1888), vol.23; Henry J. Van Lennep *Travels in Little Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870). George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, (Boston, 1909). Bernard Camille Collas, *La Turquie en 1864* (Paris: E.Dentu, 1864).

[41] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Colombia University, 1914). Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*. Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*. Koloğlu, "Transportation and Communications" in *Ottoman Civilization*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Günsel Renda (Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 2002), 442-455. Necdet Kurdakul, *Tanzimat Dönemi Basınında Sosyo-Ekonomik Fikir Hareketleri* (Ankara: T.C Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992).

[42] Ahmed Emin Yalman was the first scholar to devote a monograph to the Ottoman press in 1914.

Yalman, the publication of the first official newspaper was an inevitable and desirable outcome of the reformist Sultan's attempts to create an enlightened public.

With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and in particular during the 1930s and 1940s, many Turkish scholars were inspired by a new, nation state-centered historical approach that praised the national reform movements in general, the Westernization attempts of the Ottoman sultans, and the reformers of the young Turkish Republic in particular. Overlapping with the modernization project of the newly founded nation state and the rising nationalist climate in the world, Turkish scholars adopted the modernization/Westernization paradigm to analyze their Ottoman heritage. On the one hand, they condemned Islamic, monarchic and arbitrary facets of the Ottoman past, disparaging its irrational governance style prior to the reform period. On the other hand, Turkish scholars embraced the discourses of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms, even though they deemed them as imitative and incomplete. Accordingly, these historians interpreted the Ottoman reforming bureaucracy as the major impetus of change. In their view, the bureaucracy attempted to make structural changes in a declining society by reestablishing the main institutions that were necessary for the survival of state apparatus, including military, judicial, fiscal and administrative systems, as well as communication structures. Since the Ottoman state's reform attempts concluded in failure with the disintegration of the Empire, Turkish scholars supplemented their interpretation with a strong conviction of how the newly founded Turkish nation state would succeed in the unfinished modernization project of the fallen Empire. According to

this perspective, the Ottoman press and newspapers were perceived as the products of Tanzimat reforms that created the beginnings of a reading public, generally lacking in non-modern societies like the Ottoman Empire. These reforms, however, attained only negligible success since they were the imitation of real Western reforms. In contrast, the Turkish Republic was able to broaden the reading public through a modern state education system, one that helped increase the literacy rate and establish a free, uncensored press whose rights were protected by state. In this nationalist framework, the Ottoman press appeared as an example of flawed and incomplete attempts at Westernization. In contrast, the Turkish press was a press system that could be viewed as an example of successful Westernization of the society.

One of the first studies on the Ottoman and Turkish presses, Server R. İskit's 1939 work *Türkiye'de Neşriyat Hareketleri Tarihine Bir Bakış*, applied this perspective when analyzing the development of the press in Turkey. Using state regulation documents on the Ottoman press such as imperial orders (ferman), yearbooks (salname) and official archival documents as well as newspapers, journals, plays, and press bulletins, İskit compared the structure of the Ottoman and Turkish press systems.[43] Covering two hundred years of the history of the Ottoman and Turkish printing press between 1729 and 1928, and showing quantitatively the proliferation of the press during the Turkish Republic, İskit linked the partial success of the Ottoman reform movement not only to the disintegration of the Empire but also to the superficial and imitative nature of the targeted cultural

[43] Server R. İskit, *Türkiye'de Neşriyat Hareketleri Tarihine Bir Bakış* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1939).

reforms in the Tanzimat period. Similar to other scholars of his time, İskit found the impact and accessibility of the nineteenth century press existed only among a limited number of people. The limited expansion of the press and thus the reading public were the expected outcomes of the public's difficulty in learning the Arabic script. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic was able to change from an Arabic to a Latin based alphabet. Because of this accomplishment, the press developed and reached broader audiences.[44] As the general director of the press and information office, İskit developed this line of reasoning in greater detail with his following two books.[45] He emphasized the importance of press freedom, which was highly restricted under the Ottoman rule. Lacking in these books and their analysis was neither an accurate determination of the rising literacy rate and thus broadening reading public in the newly founded nation state, nor the relative expansion of press freedom. Rather these books simply did not discuss the possibility of relationships between the press as a representative of diverse interests and public. One problem with İskit's analysis was that he traced the development of the press from an institutional perspective. In this perspective, the absence of press freedom, a reading public, and the Ottoman governments' failed reform endeavors affected the development of the press as a tool of society's cultural progress. Such an institutional perspective considered, as we have seen, a rigid division between rulers and ruled, of which the former bestowed constitutional rights as press freedom and supplied the conditions for cultural development by providing free

[44] Ibid., 328-331.

[45] Server R. İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları* (Başvekalet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınlarından, 1943).

education, while the latter passively received what was given by an "omnipotent state." In this perspective, neither the economic, political and social concerns and interests of diverse readers, nor the non-homogenous journalists' similar interests, were addressed. Both the public and journalists' interests were represented as indistinguishable from the "sublime interests" of the state.[46]

Mithat Cemal Kuntay took the nationalist tendencies of the period one-step further when he wrote a 1949 biography on Namık Kemal as a popular book and not as an academic study. Although the book provided many details concerning Namık Kemal and some of the newspapers in which he contributed articles, its interpretations of Namık Kemal and newspapers were biased, nationalist and lacking in historicization. In Kuntay's narrative, Namık Kemal first and foremost was a patriot rather than a journalist.[47] All of Namık Kemal's journalistic and intellectual endeavors, therefore, were directed to prevent the possible demise of the Ottoman Empire. In such a framework, journalistic activities and the emergence of the Ottoman press appeared not as part of social and economic processes, but rather as by-products of the patriotic activities of some reformers.

In the 1950s new investigations on the question of Westernization and its roots in the inherited Ottoman past by scholars and politicians of the newly founded Turkish Republic, as well as Western oriented Ottoman historians, took shape. These developments would affect the interpretation of Ottoman and Turkish press

[46] Enver Ziya Karal's section was devoted *to the publishing of the first official Ottoman newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi*, and shared a similar view with İskit regarding Ottoman reforms, which reflected the tendency of the 1940s historical approach. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.V, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1970).

[47] Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal: Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında*, vol.I (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), 64. See also Karal, ibid., 161-162.

as well. With the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States emerged as a leading power with deepening interests in the Middle East. This emerging global capitalist superpower, however, was accompanied with and challenged by another superpower, communist Soviet Russia, each aiming to be the leading economic, military, political and technological power. This competition for global hegemony led to the creation of a bipolar world between "East" and "West." The Cold War opened a new page for Middle Eastern and Orientalist studies and in turn directly and profoundly affected Ottoman historiography. For Cold War Western scholars, the central premises of nineteenth century Orientalism, such as the superiority of Western culture, acquired new currency, albeit with an even stronger emphasis on modernization and progress. Consequently, scholars who applied modernization approaches provided the theoretical framework for the integration of the "Third World" into the "modern" capitalist system. By utilizing Weberian based modernization theories, the majority of Middle Eastern studies scholars, including Bernard Lewis and Roderic Davison, situated the Islamic/Middle Eastern world as traditional and thus a civilization which fosters subservience in contrast to the modern Western world. For the adherents of this paradigm, homogeneous and stagnant traditional societies such as the Ottoman Empire needed to undergo an universal modernization processes to achieve modernization. In *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* for example, Bernard Lewis asserted that the essentially static nature of the Ottoman Empire remained intact until the beginning of the reform movements in the late eighteenth and following centuries, a view which was commonly accepted and passed on by several generations as a major model to

analyze the Empire.[48] In his framework, the newspaper was a Western institution adopted first by the Ottoman government and later by intellectuals such as the Young Ottomans to guide the society and to emancipate it from the "backwardness" of the stagnant social structure. Lewis considered the Young Ottoman movement, for example, which was formed by the dissident Ottoman intellectuals in 1865, as an agent for achieving Westernist modernization goals.[49] For Lewis, this group's liberal and constitutional ideas, which reached the public through journalistic activities, were subject to the government's repressive policies, since the Young Ottomans brought a strong challenge to the traditional Ottoman order. Without analyzing dynamics such as class structures, social tensions and societal resistance, Lewis explained the ongoing struggles between the high officials of the Ottoman Empire and the Young Ottomans as part of an elite conflict that were not interwoven with the society. Subjects such as the economic policy of the government, the distribution of wealth, and economic production were addressed rarely. In Lewis's narrative, neither the economic interests of different groups in the Ottoman society nor the social and economic origins of the journalists were analyzed to understand the Young Ottomans' place, and thus the significance of their journalistic activities in the society and economy was ignored. Hence Lewis, similar to other scholars who subscribe to the modernization paradigm, depicted the Ottoman press as a mere instrument of the state and Ottoman elites. These elites, in Lewis interpretation, were either directly or indirectly part of the state apparatus

[48] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, 3rd ed., 2002).

[49] Ibid., 138.

and utilized the press for altering the traditional structure of the state and society into Western style organized structures.

Such essentialist and Orientalist rigidity between state and society neglects the possible fluidity among the roles and interests of real actors in a specific state. Moreover, this rigidity disregards the fact that the actors of state apparatuses, such as bureaucrats and officials, operate both within and outside the administrative structure as actors possessing their own political and economic interests. The actors of the central state apparatus, for example, might need to negotiate with local land owners, merchants and tradesmen not only for the purposes of control and tax collection for the benefit of the central administration, but also for their own interests as, for example, investors. For the historians who utilize a modernization approach, however, the rigid conceptualization of, and division between, state and society, prevents diverse actors of the non-Western entities from forming public opinions around their contested interest. As a result, conventional Ottoman historiography interprets the central state as the only major actor of historical change, and economic, social, and political contestation. With the belief in the state as the first and foremost actor, its authority would be rescued by remedying each state institution when external factors like upheavals and financial difficulties caused problems for the state's structure. By defining the previous two centuries of the Ottoman Empire as a period of decline induced by personal incompetence and the corrupted characters of state officials and sultans, Orientalist scholars emphasize the need for nineteenth century state reforms to remedy the political and economic ills of the Empire.

Although Şerif Mardin differed from conventional scholars such as Lewis on the roles and interests of Young Ottomans as journalists, he nonetheless followed a Weberian approach to analyze the Ottoman state system. Thus, Mardin acknowledged many dichotomies of the modernization theory in analyzing the societal relationships as well. Mardin asserts that by introducing modern journalism into the Empire, the Young Ottomans facilitated and furthered the new idea of criticizing governments in a state that lacked a civil society. In this context, Mardin introduced journalists as the supporters of the subject classes who gained an opportunity to articulate anti-elite ideas, such as constitutionalism, in a period of Westernization, a movement that was equated with the revival of the Empire.[50] Yet, in Mardin's conceptual framework, Young Ottomans appeared as part of the Ottoman state's elite and not part of the Ottoman public.[51] Furthermore, Mardin claimed that newspapers intended to meet the needs not of the general public but of the educated classes -or in other terms, elites in an intra-elite struggle within the state structure. In his framework, Mardin explained the absence of civil society based on the "center-periphery model", which was acclaimed as the major analytical tool in most of the Ottoman studies.[52] According to the center-periphery model, the development of a civil society required multiple confrontations between center, in this case a state, and the periphery through mediating institutions such as

[50] Şerif Mardin "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol.11, no.3. (1969), 276.

[51] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 121-32; and Mardin "Power, Civil Society and Culture," 277.

[52] Metin Heper uses this model to explain the reasons for the absence of a civil society in

the parliament and *stat*, which were absent in the Ottoman Empire.[53] In this Weberian institutionalist perspective, which was also inspired by Hegel's state theory model, the state and civil society are defined as separate entities in which the state model is external to societal forces. In so doing, Mardin shared the dichotomizing vision of Orientalism and modernization theory.

Niyazi Berkes offered one of the influential and long-lived conceptualizations of the political and cultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, also a part of the Weberian modernization framework. This author, due to his socialist leanings, lived in exile in the West for most of his life. Although diverging from Şerif Mardin with his Marxist-influenced world view, Berkes also utilized the very terms of modernization theory such as, "traditional" and "modern," to examine the founding principles of state and societal organizations.[54] Yet Berkes' interpretation of social change did not contradict his Marxist leanings, since he focused on the political structure of the Ottoman Empire and the state. In his framework, the state generated Ottoman social change. Berkes conceptualized the development of the press as Westernization processes that emerged as a product of the secular minded, reformist sultans and intellectuals' endeavors to challenge the traditional structure of the state and society, a structure which imposed a dominancy of religion on both state and society.[55] In accordance with

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Turkey. See Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate: The Ethen Press, 1985).

[53] See Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Deadalus* no.102 (1973), 169-190.

[54] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).

[55] Ibid., 107 and 126-127.

modernization theory, Berkes acknowledged the absence of the civil society in the Ottoman Empire. Yet unlike Mardin, Berkes emphasized the strength of "tradition" in explaining the "inadequate" Westernization of the Ottoman Empire that allowed him to theorize the secular structure of the Turkish Republic, which he thought was indispensable for a modern state and society.[56] Thus, the development of a print culture within a civil society could only be accomplished through a secular, modern state. Yet, the economic facets and implications of this development, such as producers, distributors and consumers of the press, were not addressed adequately in Berkes' analyses. In this vein, for example, Berkes focused not on possible economic interests and concerns of journalists, but rather their political identities as traditional or modern minded journalists of their time.

Even though many critiques and alternatives of modernization theory such as dependency and world system theories introduced unconventional and primarily economistic explanations about the unequal political and economic development of the globe, the dominance of the modernization theory in Ottoman studies continued in the 1970s. In the works of the prominent Ottoman historian Stanford J. Shaw, for example, there was no mention regarding the terms of the 1970s revisionist scholarship such as economic and politic dependence, poverty of lower classes, autocracy of the central powers, and foreign intervention. Instead, like Bernard Lewis, by defining Western minded bureaucrats and sultans as reformist, Shaw sided with the central authority of the Ottoman state and explained the emergence of the Ottoman press as the personal enlightenment attempts of Mahmud II, who

[56] For the strength of tradition and thus the unchanging nature of the Ottoman Empire see, for example, ibid., 7-20.

"worked to broaden horizons by developing an Ottoman press."[57] As Lutfi Efendi and Yalman argued, this duty of enlightenment emanated not only from the idea of preventing misinformation about the reform movement, but also the wish to motivate the Ottoman public into participating in "contemporary European civilization."[58] Not surprisingly, Shaw only mentioned the reading public and circulation rates to argue that the official newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, led the "development of a substantial Ottoman press" and thus an increase in readership.[59]

In the 1980s and 1990s, particularly with the increasing popularity and the critique of Edward Said's book *Orientalism*, Marxist and non-Marxist scholars raised extensive critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory, which made further inroads in Middle East and Ottoman studies.[60] Even though revisionist approaches influenced some of the Ottoman historians, traditional Orientalist and modernization theories proved to be remarkably resilient in the Ottoman historiography. In the midst of these debates, there were some monographs and other studies that attempted to elaborate on the historical context within which the Ottoman press emerged. Yet, once again, these studies explained the proliferation of the Ottoman press from the perspectives of either the Ottoman ruling elite or the Westernization paradigm.[61] Accordingly, the press functioned as a device of the modern state to form public opinion in the *Tanzimat* period. These conventional

[57] Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 4th edition., 1992), 35.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

[61] See, for example, Koloğlu, "Transportation and Communications."

scholars argued that pre-nineteenth century Ottoman rulers considered prevailing channels of communication as sufficient for the "pre-modern" society's needs.[62] Only in the nineteenth century did the state, based on the changing conditions of the Empire in the world order, import Western style communication technology to reform the Ottoman public. Hence, in this approach, historians depicted social change as being imposed from above.[63]

İlber Ortaylı, for example, explained the emergence of the Ottoman press as one of the most significant developments of the Tanzimat period.[64] He asserted that the Ottoman public gained an interest in reading not through books but rather through journals and newspapers. By comparing the Ottoman Empire with Russia, Ortaylı acknowledges the state's leadership in the inauguration of newspaper publishing for both Empires. He argued that publishing an official newspaper was a shared point of intersection for some empires pursuing reform in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the Ottoman case, the state published the first newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, for many reasons. Through the official newspaper, the state kept officials throughout the Empire informed. For example, it published both the promotions of bureaucrats and proclamation of imperial orders (fermans). Secondly, the press was among one of the first instruments to educate the Ottoman

[62] For this argument, see particularly Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 138-140. The Ottoman Empire developed communication channels that were inherited from the Achaemenid Empire, the Sassanid Empire, the Roman Empire, the Abbasids, the Byzantine Empire, and the Seljuk Empire. The late coming of the newspaper to the Ottoman Empire, however, cannot only be explained due to sufficient communication channels.

[63] Also see, for example, Yazıcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Haberleşme Kurumu" in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 139-209.

[64] İlber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Devri Basını Üzerine Notlar" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadi ve Sosyal Değişim : Makaleler 1* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi Yayını, 2000).

public. In Ortaylı's interpretation, once again, the state appeared as the major agent that generated social change. On the other hand, Ortaylı argued that not only the state newspaper but also the newspapers of diverse ethnic groups of the Empire functioned like teachers who educated the public about subjects such as science, geography, literature and economics. He also emphasized how these newspapers, by applying a simpler language, attempted to broaden their reading publics.[65] Ortaylı, however, did not fully contextualize the meaning of this development since he placed it within a modernization approach. He stressed the simplified language structures of newspapers to support his claims that journalists singularly intended to educate the public. Problematically, such scholars rarely consider the possibility that a newspaper's simplistic language was an editorial device employed to manipulate readers and increase newspaper circulation rates for their own political and economic interests. Such views imply that newspapers are autonomous institutions that lack social, economic and political ties with the Ottoman society. At the same time, by employing state documents, Ortaylı provided significant details about the state's efforts, in cooperation with several foreign states, to control the Ottoman press through devices such as subsidizing newspapers and applying censorships on newspapers that rejected the subsidies from either Ottoman or foreign governments. Ortaylı examined these controlling practices only from the perspective of the government; therefore, issues such as the resistance and negotiation by journalists were not fully explored.

[65] Ortaylı, ibid., 490-492.

Privileging the role of the state and interaction with the West in explaining the Ottoman social change has continued to dominate the field even among scholars who gave priority to internal rather than external dynamics. These studies inadequately but ambitiously asserted that their analyses focused not only on the external dynamics such as Westernization but also internal dynamics to explain the parameters of the Ottoman social change and thus the establishment of the Ottoman print culture. By elaborating on the Weberian and Marxian analyses of social change and the role of states in non-Western countries, Fatma Müge Göçek, for example, attempted to problematize the roles of the Ottoman state in producing social change. She argued that with the interactions of internal and external dynamics, a newly emerging class, the Ottoman bourgeoisie, shaped the parameters of Ottoman social change with the support of newspaper technology. This new class diffused into Ottoman society through the adaptation of Western behaviors such as print culture, music and literature, all of which were produced by Western-educated Ottoman intellectuals. Furthermore, she asserted that the seeds of Ottoman civil society were formed through print culture. Göçek interpreted Ottoman social change and its parameters such as the emergence of print culture and civil society as shaped and defined by not the state but the Ottoman middle class. Yet, this new class brought and imposed Westernization, namely the "Enlightenment concept of civilization", on Ottoman society through newspapers. The establishment of newspapers and creation of civil society, therefore, once again succeeded due to Western minded people. Thus, in Göçek's analysis, "the complex impact of

Western ideas" shaped Ottoman social change and the print culture which accompanied it.[66]

Both some early modernist and later the revisionist studies that accentuated the significance of press and civil society, however, offered more nuanced views. These views allowed scholars construct a more complex picture of Ottoman Empire. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, for example, published an article that focused on the emergence and development of civil society in Ottoman Empire.[67] It appeared in a book published by the Ministry of Education honoring the centenary anniversary of Tanzimat and praised the Westernization and incomplete reforms of the Ottoman Empire. Expectedly, Ülken argued that the combination of external influences and the state brought Westernization and the Tanzimat movements to the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Ülken's argument was distinct about how and through which channels Tanzimat reforms were recognized by the Ottoman public. Ülken asserted that through the introduction of newspapers, the Ottoman public embraced the Tanzimat reforms. He continued that with the emergence of newspapers, the Tanzimat lost its official character and found its roots in the society. Moreover, Ülken acknowledged Ottoman newspapers as the voice of public, one composed of Muslim tradesmen and newly flourishing investment groups. When this new vehicle defended the Tanzimat reforms, the public became aware of those reforms and thus acknowledged the benefits of the Tanzimat.[68] For his time Ülken's

[66] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 127.

[67] Hilmi Ziya Ülken, "Tanzimat'tan Sonra Fikir Hareketleri" in *Tanzimat I: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile* (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 757-775.

[68] Ibid., 757.

acknowledgement of the significance of newspapers and their roles in persuading and mobilizing the Ottoman public was unique and significant for the scholars who attempted to reveal the relationships between press and public. Yet, Ülken conceptualized this new vehicle as the carrier of primarily Western ideas. There was no mention of the press as a tool of economic, political and social contestation.

In the 1990s, Selim Deringil approached the emergence of the Ottoman press from a different angle than that of Westernization. Deringil's focus was not on the development of print culture but rather the ways in which the Ottoman sultans attempted to support their political systems and particularly their public images. He argued that, in an era of revolutions, "ancient dynastic regimes such as the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, and the Romanovs" tried to support and legitimize their political systems with diverse methods.[69] Seeking approval from their subjects by publishing newspapers was one such method. Therefore, for the state, the publication of the first Ottoman newspaper could be considered as an instrument to legitimize Ottoman policymaking.[70] In Deringil's explanation, the state's purpose for utilizing newspapers thus shifted from Westernization attempts to legitimization concerns. The targeted public's reception of newspapers and thus the success of attempts to legitimize the sultans through newspaper utilization, however, were not addressed.

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[69] Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire 1808 to 1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol.35, no.1. (1993), 3.

[70] In this vein, Benedict Anderson understands the newspaper as a technical means for representing the idea of the nation through which an imagined community such as a class or a nation is built. What makes possible the national imagination is a constellation of economic (*system of production and productive relations*) and technological forces (print). See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso. 2nd edition, 1991), 43.

Recent studies on the Ottoman Empire such as Brummett's *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* and Frierson's studies on Ottoman women, however, emphasize the significance of the public and the press by focusing on the political repercussions of the 1908 revolution, which ended the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid. From this moment of transition, revisionist Ottoman historians have increasingly viewed the newspaper as a potent political and economic force. Distinct from the scholars operating within the modernist paradigm, these studies considered Ottoman newspapers as one of the main sources for analyzing Ottoman society. Based on extensive research, Brummett, for example, argues that although the press is interpreted as an elite source, particularly in a society in which "the majority of the population was illiterate it could still provide a valuable starting position to understand the dynamics of state and social relationships".[71]

Indeed, the recent interest in studying the Ottoman press and public to understand the dynamics of society and changes in the Ottoman political structure stemmed from the revisionist approaches, one of the pioneering examples of which was produced by Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj. In *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire 16th to 18th centuries,* Abou-El-Haj strongly criticizes traditional Ottoman historiographical approaches that view the state and elites as the major social actors who supposedly instigated social, economic and political changes. Instead, Abou-El-Haj's emphasizes significance of social forces and the multiplicity of actors in Ottoman society who also actively participated in the

[71] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 26.

changes that occurred in the political and economic structures of the empire.[72]

Similar to Abou-El-Haj's approach, revisionist studies on the Ottoman print culture focus on diverse social actors. Both traditional and revisionist strands of the Ottoman historiography, however, have overlooked the steady spread of newspapers produced in the midst of the financial problems, preferring to concentrate their efforts on the increased number of newspapers after the 1908 revolution.

### Methodology and Key Terms

This study aims to open avenues for the detailed analysis of Ottoman print culture, leaving ample room for further discussions of its social, cultural and economic components. That is, offering a full account of competing interests surrounding the financial crises of the Empire far exceeds this dissertation limits. At first glance, the presentation of the financial crises found in Ottoman newspapers might seem peripheral to other questions of state and social transformation in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. This dissertation, however, contends that an investigation of how the Ottoman press presented the financial crises will lead scholars to sites of negotiation, resistance and contestation,

[72] See *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire 16th to 18th centuries*, (New York: SUNY, 1991). Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj criticizes the conventional Ottoman historiography that identify the changes in the empire with Westernazing reforms of the Ottoman bureaucracy rather than dynamic public. See, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "Historiography in West Asian and North African Studies since Sa'id's Orientalism," in *History after the Three Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies*, ed. Arif Dirlik, et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000),67-84.

which are essential characteristics of social transformation. With the expansion of Ottoman newspapers in the middle of the nineteenth century, the press increasingly became a realm where state policies were discussed, reproduced and resisted. Although the Ottoman press was still in the early stages of development, it began to define a new political and social order. In the 1860s, the Ottoman press promoted an anti-imperialist, anti-European, anti-government discourse to garner public support for their agendas against the Ottoman government and foreign powers which respectively had their own political and economic interest in the Empire. In the period covered by this dissertation, a small number of Ottoman intellectuals published unofficial newspapers. Therefore, in the conventional Ottoman historiography, besides the state, these intellectuals were treated as agents of change who altered the backward conditions of the Ottoman public. Expectedly, in such a framework, journalists were the actors who sought to improve the new idea of citizenship. In this context, journalists were interpreted as the supporters of the subject classes that gained an opportunity to articulate anti-elite ideas such as constitutionalism.[73] Yet, this dissertation challenges those arguments that newspapers were vehicles solely used to enlighten the public. Rather, this study contends that multiple groups used newspapers to promote their own political and economic visions over diverse cross-sections of the society.

In this context, the present dissertation questions the conventional definition of Ottoman public opinion and its broader implications in the Ottoman society. Although the newspaper was a medium that attempted to shape public opinions in

[73] Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," 276.

order to impose its conception of state and society, the Ottoman press historiography rarely discusses both the definition of "public" and the creators of the daily, weekly and/or monthly agenda for it. Ottoman historians have hardly conceptualized the meaning of the newspaper for both the editors and the public. In contrast to the previously outlined Eurocentric and modernist approaches, this study attempts to reveal the competing financial and economic interests that were represented by the private Ottoman newspapers. In such a framework, the Ottoman public is contextualized not as a homogenous, stagnant entity but rather an entity composed of diverse groups and individuals who were involved in practices of negotiation and resistance. The Ottoman public, therefore, was formed by fragmented and multiple agencies in nineteenth century Ottoman society.[74]

In the following pages, as stated above, this dissertation focuses on four newspapers published between 1862 and 1875 to show how these newspapers reflected and challenged to the political, financial, and economic interests of a variety of groups such as bureaucrats, merchants, bankers, land owners, foreign investors, peasants and workers. Such an approach leads the study in three directions. First, it aims to historicize the economic and social conditions that are responsible for the emergence of an Ottoman press and reading public. Second, by identifying the different political and economic layers of the society, this study exposes the diverse publics targeted by newspaper editors. Finally, it aims to understand the reasons for conflict between the ruling elites and diverse social

[74] Goeff Eley criticizes Habermas' homogenous conceptualization of the public sphere. He characterizes it as "the structured setting where cultural ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place." See Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), 305.

groups and the way in which they represented in the newspapers.

In this framework, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions. (i) What did the editors hope to accomplish? What audience or public did they reach? How do the opinions expressed in newspapers fit in or challenge to the broader context of economic practices? More specifically, (ii) What did newspapers mean to publishers, the central government and the Ottoman public? Was it conceived as an oppositional tool to the ruling elites? As Jürgen Habermas argues in the context of Western democratization, did the press, in the Ottoman context, became a/the primary medium for the articulation and distribution of popular protest against the government? (iii) Why did newspaper publications boom even in the midst of intensifying financial crises? (iv) Since newspapers mediated messages to socially, politically and geographically diverse populations, did the government utilize the newspapers to impose a more homogenous culture? In response to these questions, an explanation and contextualization of many concepts in the nineteenth century Ottoman society, such as the meaning of state, the public, and the classes that formed the Ottoman public, is required.

Therefore, this dissertation combines sociological and historical methodologies to analyze the relationship of the Ottoman press with the public. The concepts of public sphere and public opinion are essential for such a study. It is remarkable that although it was addressed by some scholars in earlier periods, until recently, the concepts of public sphere and public opinion have failed to penetrate Ottoman historiography.[75] Consequently, lacking are quantitatively and

[75] As previously mentioned, although Ülken touched upon the importance of the public and its relationships with the early Ottoman newspapers, the attempts to conceptualize the Ottoman

qualitatively adequate debates on the concept's usefulness and applicability to Ottoman History. As Elizabeth Thompson argues in the context of Middle Eastern women's history this lacuna reflects the possible avoidance of European categories "that might distort local experiences."[76] The present study, however, emphasizes the significance of public opinion in the Ottoman Empire. This leads the dissertation to examine the Ottoman public in a historical context when the press flourishes, specifically between the years of 1862 and 1875. In this dissertation, I will analyze the Ottoman public in two different yet related levels. First, based on the literacy rates, number of the potential readers and Ottoman reading practices, I will explore the meaning of the reading public. Second, I will analyze the meaning of the public as it was conceived and represented by Ottoman journalists. In so doing, I seek to situate the significance of the public and its power in nineteenth century Ottoman politics and to determine whether or not classic definition of the public sphere is applicable in a pre-twentieth century Ottoman context.

In his *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Habermas views the public sphere as a location where "the press mediates between state and society."[77] The concept is a democratic ideal that, along with political participation and ideas of citizenship, emerged in Western bourgeois society as a site of public opinion during the late

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public, until recently, were mostly influenced by top-down approaches. Recently, a number of scholars such as Cengiz Kırlı, Nadir Özbek, and Elizabeth Frierson have each addressed the significance of the public sphere and public opinion in the Ottoman Empire.

[76] Elizabeth Thompson, "Public and Private in Middle Eastern Women's History" *Journal of Women's History* Vol.15 No.1 (Spring 2003), 52.

[77] Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), 15.

half of the eighteenth century. Accordingly, a Western public sphere emerged alongside long-term processes of societal and economic transformation, a trade-driven transition from feudalism to capitalism. In this new economic structure, "the flow of international news attendant on the growth of trading networks generated a new category of public knowledge,"[78] one that led to the invention of the press. To some extent, Habermas' perspective is valuable for the present dissertation since he argues that the press and the reading public simplified the exchange of information in a social setting in which the public participated in political action and mobilization.

Despite its merits, many scholars have criticized Habermas' approach. Geoff Eley has persuasively argued that Habermas limits the public to the bourgeoisie and its public sphere.[79] Furthermore, for Habermas, public opinion is exclusively associated with the literate public, particularly in its eighteenth century European context. Additionally, Habermas' definition ignores the "possibility of the existence of public opinion" in non-European societies such as the Ottoman Empire.[80] Since Habermas' concept excludes a variety of social groups, classes, and gendered subjects, scholars from diverse disciplines have revised the term. Therefore, without repudiating the validity of the public sphere as an analytical tool to understand the society, the new literature on the concept has been released from the constraints of Habermas' limited definition.

[78] Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," 291.

[79] Ibid., 303. For Habermas, public sphere was only composed of public of private bourgeois people. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 51.

[80] Cengiz Kırlı,"The struggle over space: coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2000), 258.

Similarly, the approach of this dissertation substantially diverges from Habermas' contextualization of the public. Contrary to Habermas' conceptualization, this study stresses the presence of the public opinion in a non-Western nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. This dissertation characterizes a public sphere as a stage on which actors from above and below appears as active players.[81] By building from Eley's formulation, the present dissertation defines the Ottoman public sphere as a composite of multiple and competing publics, an idea that is reflected in my repeated use of the terms "public" and "public opinion" in their plural forms. Since I claim the heterogeneity of the Ottoman public, I analyze the formation and expression of public opinion regarding the interests of diverse groups and classes. In this vein, the terms that I use in this dissertation to analyze different layers of society such as middle and lower classes need to be explained as well.

In the Ottoman historiography, there are few studies that use the term "middle class." This lack of usage emanates from the general belief among Ottoman historians who assert that a middle class did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. The conventional Ottoman historians asserted that, unlike its Western counterparts, an all-encompassing Ottoman state owned the lands and controlled Ottoman internal and external trade, factors that proved to be detrimental for the development of bourgeois or middle class. However, many recent studies have engaged in attempts to prove the contrary. For example, in his book on Ottoman

[81] In her book, Barbara Mittler argues that actors from below and above were important in the formation of a Chinese public sphere. See Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity, and Change in Shangai's News Media, 1872-1912* (Harvard University Press, 2004),2.

Palestine, Beshara Doumani uses the terms "rural middle class" and "middle peasants" to refer to people "whose land and capital resources set them apart from both the majority of fellow peasants and from the ruling rural families."[82] Without asserting that these peasants formed a homogenous group, he argues that, like the peasants of Europe and Asia, the peasants of Jabal Nablus had their own complex dynamics that generated their own change. With the changing political economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and with the spread of commercial relations, the level of economic well-being of these peasants increased. As a result, those peasants concentrated their resources in areas such as land holdings and purchasing the labor of other peasants.[83] Similarly, in his book on the cultural history of Cairo's middle class from sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Nelly Hanna argued the existence of a middle class. He argued that the middle class of Cairo emerged with the development of commercial capitalism.[84] In this dissertation, similar to the arguments made by Doumani and Hanna, I argue that with the development of commercial relations in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, the middle classes of the Empire started to flourish.[85] Inspired by Hanna's definition, in this dissertation, I use the term "middle class" to refer to people

[82] Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Berkeley& Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 133.

[83] Ibid, 133.

[84] Nelly Hanna, *In Praise of Books: a Cultural History of Cairo's Middle Class, Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003).

[85] For the development of commercial relations in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire see, for example, Zafer Toprak, "Modernization and Commercialization in the Tanzimat Period: 1838-1875," *New Perspectives on Turkey* no.7 (Spring 1992), 57-70. Ayhan Aktar, "The Analysis of yellow pages in Annuaire Oriental, commercial guides to Istanbul: Changes in occupational structure and economic activities between 1868 and 1938," *Toplum ve Bilim* 76 (1998), 105-143.

"whose living went beyond subsistence."[86] These people could afford leisure activities as well as spending money on non-essential products and services such as luxury soaps, perfume, silver utensils, and theater tickets, which indicated a level of economic well-being. In this vein, I use the term lower classes to refer to people whose economic well-being would not support leisure activities or purchases.

Furthermore, my dissertation problematizes Habermas' claim that the press constitutes a realm between state and society, since I challenge the dichotomical distinction between state and society that has been popularized by Lewis and others in the Orientalist and modernization camps in the Ottoman historiography. In this dissertation, I argue that the Ottoman journalists' occupational identities and political and economic interests were often fluid and contested based upon context and conditions. Similarly, the supposed "borders" between society and state were in constant flux. These journalists, on the one hand, as members of the Ottoman public, published private newspapers that criticized and challenged the Porte's (central state) social, economic, and financial policies. On the other hand, those very journalists also served as middle ranking state bureaucrats. In other words, the journalists of the first private Ottoman newspapers kept two jobs, moving between bureaucratic and journalistic professions. At the same time, the journalists also defended the integrity of the Ottoman state, asserting that the state was responsible for providing for the well-being of the Ottoman public. In this sense, the political and economic concerns and societal roles of these journalists were fragmented. For example, based on their concerns, these actors took part in activities of opposition and negotiation, including involvement in upheavals and the formation of political

[86] Hanna, *In Praise of Books: a Cultural History of Cairo's Middle Class,* 26-27.

groups as in the case of the Young Ottomans. Therefore, in this dissertation, rather than replicating or reproducing western-based approaches and models, such as Habermasian models or modernist dichotomies, I show how Ottoman journalists had multiple roles. These roles included being advocates for the interests of workers, peasants, and tax farmers, as well as being dissidents against the government, yet at the same time serving in the state bureaucracy, a condition which was distinctly Ottoman in context and practice.[87]

Within the scope of these research goals, methodologically, this dissertation focuses on newspapers that were published in the capital city of the Empire. Although there were papers published in the provinces, this study is limited to the press of Istanbul. Aside from the fact that few copies of most of the provincial newspapers seem to have survived, the field would have been too large to cover. Even though data on the capital city or provincial newspaper subscription lists are not available, as I will attempt to show in the following chapters, there is little doubt that Istanbul based newspapers reached audiences in the provinces as well. The newspaper articles and the news reports analyzed in this study show that these papers responded to an imperial public, rather than targeting readers only in Istanbul. In addition, the conditions under which the provincial press operated were

[87] In order to challenge the dichotomy between state and society, to show the fluidity of the roles played by actors between the state and the society, and to refer to state, I chose to use the term government and, for the Ottoman case, -the Porte-. However, in many instances, I will use the terms of "state" and "government" interchangeably. This usage never insinuates the acknowledgement of a state-society dichotomy, however. Rather, it emanates from the fact that the term "government" generally refers to "the body of people that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit" while the "state" refers to an abstract concept. In other words, a government functions as the representative of a state. Therefore, while referring to an abstract entity, I prefer to use the term state. For the definition of government reference, for example, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: a User's Guide to its terms,* 1999 eds. Frank Bealey, Allan G. Johnson., s.v. "Government," 147-148. *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, Oxford University Press, 2002 ed., Craig J. Calhoun s.v. "Government," 196.

different from those privately published in Istanbul. Provincial publications, for example, were mainly produced in the state publishing houses.[88] In other words, the non-official newspapers of the crises period were published in the imperial capital and thus this dissertation focuses on Istanbul newspapers.

The newspapers of note in this study -*Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret*, *Hadika*, and *İstikbâl*- were owned and published by dissident Ottoman intellectuals, some of whom organized the Young Ottoman movement. Therefore, methodologically, it is possible to argue that these newspapers can only partially reflect the contestation within the Ottoman public. Nevertheless, this dissertation claims that, as Mardin persuasively argues, the Young Ottoman movement consisted of people with diverse social and economic backgrounds who held similar political views to oppose the prevalent government. At the same time, as I will show in this dissertation, the editors of these newspapers articulated divergent arguments and defended the interests of different groups and individuals. Moreover, these newspapers envisaged themselves as the center of political, social and economic discussions and promoters of economic and financial solutions that were necessary for the survival of the Empire. Even if these editors' advocacy of diverse interests, quite possibly, emanated from their own concerns and interests, they reflected and provided clues on existing contestations.

In this context, to analyze how newspaper editors shaped public opinion to further their own interests, this dissertation investigates the contents and rhetoric of

[88] For the provincial press see for example, Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, "Tuna Vilayet Gazetesi", in *Yoktur Zulme Rızamız* (Ankara: Phoenix, 2004), 45-54. Zeki Arıkan, "Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Dönemlerinde İzmir Basını" in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul:İletişim, 1985), c.1, 103-111. M.Bülent Varlık, "Yerel Basının Öncüsü: Vilayet Gazteleri," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul:İletişim, 1985), c.1,99-102.

these newspapers. By looking closely for the explicit and implicit signs of the targeted public in a newspaper's texts, such as letters from readers and articles by editors, this study evaluates the parameters of the contested interests. It argues that in the new news scene, these newspapers played a representational role in defining new ways of promoting contestation and negotiation in the Empire. The nineteenth century Ottoman press used many rhetorical arguments in an effort to both legitimize their perceptions about the financial crises before the public and mobilize that very public into action against the government. While representations of financial crises are this dissertation's primary examples for showing divergent interests, this study considers editorial articles as the reflective accounts of contesting interests which find their roots within the society. The editors of these newspapers articulated the demands and problems of the society in order to influence governmental policies on issues such as "public interests" that would directly affect the society's well being. The articulation of societal subjects, however, stems not merely from editorial concerns advocating for public interests, but rather from the engagement in voicing particular groups and individuals' political and economic interests through a new medium, newspapers, in an era of rapid changes. By analyzing discourses within and between the newspapers, it is possible to expose the multilayered, competing interests of different classes.

However, the present study claims that the activities of diverse groups cannot be analyzed merely by reading the texts. Unlike the Ottoman historian Brummet and media theorist Marshall McLuhan,[89] this study does not accept the

[89] When Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan wrote their books on the development of printing technology, they asserted that circulation of the written materials was one of the most

notion that the press, serving as an agent itself, can translate images and their content into a new medium. In this sense, this study does not examine the text in a postmodernist sense of a discourse that is independent of its own social context. Instead, I read newspapers as an expression of certain historical conditions. Therefore, this dissertation claims that newspapers are socially and politically constructed products rather than transparent texts. Only in this context, could the press "alter the consciousness of the Ottoman government, people and outsiders" [90] in order to dictate the direction of the political and cultural transformations of the Empire. This study, therefore, examines the newspaper's contents as both the expression of the editors and a reflection of evolving historical processes. This study argues that the press can be a tool to understand society if it is understood in relationship to a broader historical context. Therefore, one of the major questions of the dissertation is where to fit journalists in the socio-economic and political structures of Ottoman society. This study argues that looking at both the social backgrounds of newspaper editors, financiers and the ideas that shaped the public could be useful to situate both the newspapers and the reading public in a larger society. In this vein, this study suggests that the journalists can never be considered autonomous entities. The journalists influenced and were also being shaped by

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significant stages thanks to which history has been changed. They argued that this very form of the medium of communication might affect the nature of social organizations. Innis proposed that societies in which the dominant medium is geared towards "temporal durability" will tend to be small and decentralized, whereas societies with media, which are geared towards spatial mobility will tend to be large and imperial. See Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), c1951 and Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1964). Once press is acknowledged as a driving force for historical change, not only media researches but also various studies from different areas of the social sciences utilized McLuhan's and Innis' arguments either to represent new concepts or improve their analyses about nature and dynamics of societies.

[90] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 25.

prevailing political, economic, social developments. In order to prove this argument, the study intends to look at the rhetorical practices of journalists, their social, economic and political origins, political associations and their contested intellectual ideas. To analyze these conflicting interests, this dissertation emphasizes the economic and/or the social links of these newspapers and journalists.

This dissertation thus considers the role of these newspapers as not only one of the first modern vehicles of the Empire which proposed to grant voices to diverse groups publicly, but also as a means of advancing varied interests exemplified in news reports, editorial articles and advertisements. In this context, this dissertation argues that the Ottoman press's presentation of the financial crises deserves close study, since it played an increasingly important role in the establishment of a politically and economically engaged public, which gave voice to multiple competing interests. Accordingly, this dissertation suggests that the study of print culture exposes the methodological pitfalls of the modernization paradigm, and reveals the contested nature of Ottoman society.

Therefore, this dissertation seeks to make four important contributions to the Ottoman historiography. First, by conceptualizing the media representations of the economic and financial crises as an outcome of conflicting interests, this dissertation attempts to help historians place economic strife in a context that takes place not among state's elites but varying groups of the society. Second, this dissertation identifies the ways in which competing discourses on the contemporary financial situation were disseminated and processed by the Ottoman print media.

Third, it explains the reasons for a growing interest in print media in Ottoman public. Finally, by scrutinizing how interpretations of the financial crises competed, coexisted and were utilized by particular social groups to promote their interests, the present study exposes how print media provided an arena for diverse economic agents.

**Structure and Sources**

This dissertation is composed of four chapters and the appendixes. Chapter 1 analyzes the circumstances that paved the way for the publication of the first official Ottoman newspaper and later the private press. It concretely shows the extent to which the social and economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the emergence of an Ottoman press. Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of news and its implications for Ottoman journalists. The chapter also shows the ways in which the worldview of the journalists influenced the journalists' approach to news. In so doing, the chapter shows whether the news reporting style of the reporters and editors reflected the contemporary concerns of the society. In this vein, it also reveals the effects of social, political and economic environments on the news making process. These details are significant in order to understand to what extent the newspapers were reflective images of the societyf, a society that Tasvir-*i Efkâr, İbret*, *Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* claimed to represent in their pages. Chapter 3 focuses on Tasvir-*i Efkâr'*s and *İbret'*s idea of the public, which was perceived and represented by the editors of the newspapers under study. It also

analyzes the idea of the government's fiscal and economic responsibilities towards that public, ideas presented and voiced by these two private Ottoman newspapers on behalf of the Ottoman public. In so doing, the chapter attempts to show the changing nature of the public, a public which is problematically represented as stagnant by the aforementioned modernist top-down approaches. Furthermore, it shows how Tasvir-*i Efkâr* and *İbret* constructed a discourse that imposed and reminded the government/ruling elites' responsibilities to Ottoman public. Those newspapers claimed that providing and securing the well-being of the Ottoman public was one of the primary reasons for the existence of the Ottoman state. In order to provide a possible picture of Tasvir-*i Efkâr* and *İbret*'s targeted readers, this chapter also investigates the contents and advertisements of these two newspapers. Chapter 4 focuses on *Hadika'*s and *İstikbâl'*s representations of the Ottoman public(s) during the days of increasing financial pressures. It investigates the ways in which *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* both challenged and sought to construct consensus with the central government regarding the Porte's fiscal policies and decisions. Similar to chapter 3, this chapter also analyzes the advertisements and the contents of *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* the newspapers. In so doing, this chapter attempts to illuminate the targeted newspaper readers' classes, occupations, and interests. Additionaly, this chapter also attempts to show what parts and groups of the society were indeed represented in the newspapers as the representatives of general public.

Other than the newspapers that are housed in the Turkish National Library in Ankara and the Library of Binghamton University at the State University of New

York, this dissertation uses the official archival documents in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) in Istanbul. Specifically, it utilizes the *Hariciye* (Ministry of the Foreign Affairs), the *Dahiliye Nezareti* (Ministry of the Interior Affairs), *Meclis-i Vala* and *Şura-yı Devlet* (the Council of State) *Cevdet Maarif, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Evrakı* classifications. Within these classifications, there are many documents concerning censorship and newspaper subsidies that Ottoman and foreign newspapers received from the Ottoman government. These state documents reveal the central government's attempts to control newspapers and thus its intention to shape the Ottoman public opinion.

This study also uses the published memoirs and personal letters of journalists.[91] By utilizing those memoirs and letter', I argue that it might be possible to define some of the diverse relationships that existed between private newspapers and the central government. It is also possible to follow the newspaper editors' economic relationships with European states that had economic, political and military interests in the empire.[92]

[91] For example, Fevziye Tansel, *Namık Kemal'in Hususi Mektupları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1967).

[92] For example, in his memoirs journalist Basiretci Ali Efendi writes about how his newspaper received subsidies from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to bolster its politics on the Ottoman Empire. Basiretçi Ali Efendi, *İstanbul'da Elli Yıllık Önemli Olaylar* (İstanbul, 1976).

## Chapter One

## Developing an Ottoman Print Culture in a Period of Substantial Change: From Official Newspaper to Private Press

### 1. Introduction

"As a public lives in a society and is bound by many laws, certainly that public deems expressing its own ideas, both verbal and written, about the benefit of its motherland as part of its natural rights."[93] So wrote the journalist İbrahim Şinasi, one of the founders of Ottoman journalism as well as a well-respected and famous intellectual of the nineteenth century, in the introductory article of the first private Ottoman newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* in 1860. He, however, only partially lived long enough to witness the emergence of the Ottoman newspaper press as a political force, impossible to ignore by the state, through which the "public" expressed its own ideas. And maybe surprisingly for his generation, newspapers became an arena for many people, such as peasants, workers, women, and small traders, who were given spaces for expressing their problems on the pages of newspapers, even if the stories of these ordinary people occupied only small

[93] Şinasi, "Mukaddime", *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*, 2 Rebiülahir 1277, (8 October 1860).

portions of the papers. This was a long but steady process that intersected with many events.

The publication of relatively widely-known and read newspapers was a new phenomenon for the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, a phenomenon which more fully emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century with the publication of private newspapers. However, the first private Ottoman newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl,* was preceded by an official and afterward a semi-official newspaper.[94] Specifically, a state newspaper appeared when, in an order of 1831, Sultan Mahmud II decided, "As the time is now ripe, and as the matter does not harm our laws and religion" and thus stated "…we desire to proceed to the establishment of a newspaper".[95] After issuing this proclamation, the state launched a newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events), which is acknowledged as the first Ottoman newspaper in the Ottoman and Turkish historiographies.[96] Yet, neither *Takvim-i Vekayi* nor the semi-official *Ceride-i Havadis* emerged as arenas for the Ottoman public to freely express its own ideas.

[94] Here, I use the term semi-official to refer to the newspaper, *Ceride-i Havadis,* which was published in 1840. This newspaper was printed by William Churchill, a British private entrepreneur. Even though Churchill did not have an official position in the Ottoman Empire, he received funding from the government to support the policies of the government. For further information on *Ceride-i Havadis* and William Churchill, see Orhan Koloğlu, *Miyop Çörçil Olayı: Ceride Havadis'in Öyküsü* (Ankara: Yorum Yayınları, 1986).

[95] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman State Archive), HAT, 48157, undated.

[96] Yet another newspaper, *Vekayi-i Mısriye,* was published in Egypt in 1828. The newspaper was published in Ottoman on one page and followed by in Arabic on the other page, which also could be considered the first Ottoman newspaper, even if it was not entirely in Ottoman. This newspaper was the official newspaper of Egypt and it engaged in debates with *Takvim-i Vekayi*. For more information on *Vekayi-i Mısriye,* see Orhan Koloğlu, *İlk Gazete İlk Polemik: Vekayi-i Mısriye'nin Öyküsü ve Takvim-i Vekayi ile Tartışması* (Ankara :Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği Yayınları, 1989).

The official newspaper of the state, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, was not the first paper published in the Ottoman Empire. Many groups such as foreign embassies and consulates published non-Ottoman language newspapers as early as the eighteenth century. Perhaps this was one of the reasons for why the state declared that this time was the proper time for the publication of a newspaper since the growing number of newspaper readers consisted of a group that needed to be informed about the real nature of daily, local, and international events by the official paper.[97]

In this chapter, I will first look at the emergence as well as steady progress of an Ottoman newspaper culture, which stood at the intersection of foreign press activities that often carried imperialistic purposes; the state's centralization policies and afterwards the Tanzimat reforms; and finally the state's recognition of a public as a tool of legitimization and the publics' possible interests in newspapers. Thus, I analyze the emergence of a reading public in the era of financial and economic crises. In so doing, I will provide the foundation for the following three chapters to analyze the possible reasons for why and how newspapers evolved into a realm of competing political, social, and economic interests. I argue that even though the nineteenth century Ottoman newspapers were far from being a mass medium, they nonetheless reached a reading public extending from wealthy bankers, bureaucrats, and landholders to the urban lower classes and even the peasantry, due to their

[97] The state emphasized the significance of informing the Ottoman public about "world events" since, according to the state, if the public had not been "immediately" informed about "the causes of the events" and what was occurring in the world, some of the people would have ignorantly and mistakenly interpreted the events based on their own imaginations, imaginations that "ministers and the high echelon" of the state could never fathom. Yet, if "the Ottoman public is informed about the external and internal news" of the empire with its real causes, everybody learns the truth about what has been going on in the world and empire. The order stated that [thus], some people cannot interpret the "events based on their own imaginations". See the introduction of *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 25 Cemaziyülevvel 1247 (1 November 1831).

ability to express the economic and political concerns about a financially devastated empire.

## 2. Foreign Newspapers and a Growing Newspaper Culture

In analyzing the emergence and development of the press and its culture in the Ottoman Empire, the connections of the press with a bourgeoning or existing "Ottoman public" and public opinion has mostly remained unrecognized in the Ottoman press historiographies.[98] Likewise, the interconnectedness between the press and the public has been barely referenced in the Ottoman press historiographies, which predominantly focus on the foreign press. Rather, the scholarly consensus on the emerging foreign press of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire has formed around recognizing the growing foreign press activities as part of the imperialistic expansion of those foreign states that published bulletins, newspapers, and journals in the Ottoman Empire.[99]

Accordingly, motivated by imperialist purposes and cooperating with their local partners, the foreign powers utilized the press to implement a substructure

[98] Applying a top down model when analyzing the Ottoman press, the Ottoman historiography, up until recently, has rarely problematized the Ottoman public and its possible interest in the news, except when claiming the Ottoman reading public to be a homogenous whole, which consisted of passive receivers for whom newspapers were published to educate rather than to satisfy their interests in news. Indeed, most of the studies on the development of the Ottoman press are either too general or monographs that focus on the main political themes and debates of those given newspapers. Each approach lacks an analysis or explanation of the social, economic, and political environments that caused the emergence of the press. Therefore, in these studies, the readers of the newspapers appear neither as the main focus of study nor as active actors who can engage in communication with the newspapers' editors. For classic examples of these approaches, see Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*. Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri*. Koloğlu, *Takvim-i Vekayi*. Yazıcı, *Takvim-i Vekayi*.

[99] See, for example, Çakır, *Osmanlıda Basın İktidar İlişkileri*.

that, for their own economic and political interests was politically, economically, and socially supportive and stable. Indeed, as many studies suggest, many of the first papers, appearing predominantly in French, were published to fulfill the ideological and economic purposes of French imperialist expansion. These non-Ottoman newspapers were published both by the French embassy and French investors to promote the French Revolution in the Ottoman Empire.[100] This agenda, for example, led to the publishing of a bulletin in June 1793, called *Bulletin de Nouvelles*, which was considered the first French newspaper to be produced in the Ottoman Empire.[101]

When the Marquis de Sainte-Croix was appointed as the French ambassador to Istanbul, he contacted the Ottoman government to receive their approval for the publication of this paper. By issuing this bulletin, the French embassy sought to avert anti-French propaganda in the capital city of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the French embassy issued the *Bulletin de Nouvelles* every two months, it is possible to assume that the embassy ascribed special importance to the bulletin, as we know that the bulletin was delivered throughout the coffeehouses of İstanbul.[102]

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[100] Alemdar, 1. I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Korkmaz Alemdar, who provided me with the revised version of his soon to be published book, *İstanbul (1875-1964): Türkiye'de Yayınlanan Fransızca Bir gazetenin Tarihi* (Ankara: Ankara İktisadi ve ticari İlimler Yayınları, 1980).

[101] Based on the article of Gerard Groc and İ. Çağlar, the Ottoman and Turkish press historiographies, up until recently, give the date of the first paper published in the Ottoman Empire as 1795. For example, see Gerard Groc and İ. Çağlar, "La Presse Française de Turquie de 1795 a nos jours", *Histoire et Catalogue* (İstanbul:Isis, 1985). Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*, 11. Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 10. Based on archive research in Vienna, Gérard Groc, however, revised his article and showed that the *Bulletin de Nouvelles* was published in June 1793 not 1795. See "Le Mercure Oriental: Une Tentative de Presse Commerciale ou Le Premier Journal Privé de l'Empire Otoman," in *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: 1994), 33.

[102] Groc, ibid., 32.

The delivery of the bulletin into the coffeehouses, even if it was in its embryonic form, indicated the existence of a possible reading public or at least a certain interest in acquiring news in the capital city of empire, a subject that has been barely addressed in the Turkish or Ottoman press historiographies.[103]

The increasing regularity and frequency of publishing newsletters and newspapers by the embassy yet again might be an indicator of a widening reading circle, even if these readers had to be familiar with French in order to read the papers. For example, the embassy's desire to spread a positive image of the French Revolution through the written word continued when Raymond Verninac (de Saint-Maur) inherited the ambassadorship from the Marquis de Sainte-Croix. Under Verinac, a new bulletin, *Le Bulletin de la Légation de la République Française près la Porte Ottomane*, was published twice a month, a more frequent period than *Bulletin de Nouvelles*.[104] In 1796, the French embassy published another revolutionary paper, *La Gazette Française de Constantinople*, which according to Ahmed Emin Yalman and L. Lagerde, was regularly printed until the French occupation of Egypt in 1798.[105] These newspapers were mostly read by the foreign dwellers of the Ottoman Empire for commercial, investment, and diplomatic

[103] In a recent study, Hülya Eraslan only briefly mentions the need and interest of different millets in receiving news. See "Osmanlı'da Yabancı Dilde Basın" in *Türkiye'de Kitle İletişimi Dün-Bugün-Yarın*, Korkmaz Alemdar (Ankara: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 2009).

[104] G. Groc, "Propagande Révolutionnaire et Presse Française à Constantinople à la fin du 18e siècle", *Histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman et de la Turquie (1326-1960),* Collection Turcica, v.VIII (Paris, 1995), 799-800. Cited in Alemdar, *Istanbul*., 6.

[105] See Yalman *The Development of Modern Turkey*. L. Lagarde, "Note sur les journaux français de Constantinople à l'époque révolutionnaire, *Journal Asiatique,"*, vol. 236, (1948), 275. Kologlu gives this date as 1795. See "Transportation and Communication", 454.

reasons, as well as Ottoman subjects who were engaged in trade activities. However, there was no reason for intellectual Ottomans, who desired to follow current events in Europe and showed interest in the Revolution, to not read the newspapers. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that these French official newspapers and bulletins provided information for Ottomans who spoke and read French as well.

Interest in publishing newspapers was never limited to diplomatic circles such as the French embassy or its activities that promoted the revolution. The contents of the papers, therefore, varied depending on the ownership pattern or interests. For example, within the same decade, the first private newspaper of the empire, *Le Mercure Orie*ntal, was published in May 1796 by a French merchant, Philibert Marion.[106] *Le Mercure Oriental* not only was a private paper but also was the first commercial newspaper of the empire. According to the historian Greg Groc, the paper intended to provide Europeans with the information that they needed to sell their industrial products and to find raw materials in the Ottoman markets.[107] This paper in turn benefited from growing commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire. European merchants as well as their local partners in the Ottoman capital read the paper for the benefit of their own commercial activities.

[106] In the Ottoman and Turkish press historiographies, *Spectateur de l'Orient* has been acknowledged as the first privately published newspaper of the Ottoman Empire. For example, Roderic H. Davison represents the *Spectateur de l'Orient* as the first private newspaper of the empire with a publication date of 1825. See "How the Ottoman Government Adjusted to a New Institution: The Newspaper Press," in *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999), 362. Also see, Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey*, 28. However, based on archival research Groc showed that *Le Mercure Oriental* was the first private newspaper of the empire. See "Le Mercure Oriental".

[107] G. Groc, ibid., 28.

This commercial newspaper, however, did not last long, as *Le Mercure Oriental* criticized the Prussian King and aggravated Prussian governing elites, which led the French embassy to eventually close the newspaper.[108] With the French occupation of Egypt, the French newspapers that were published by either the embassy or private persons were closed by the Ottoman government.[109] Obviously, the contesting economic interests of French tradesmen and of the Prussians were communicated to the Ottoman audience through this paper. Yet, the Ottoman government interfered with the publication of French originated papers on its lands at times of possible diplomatic crises and French occupation. Prior to such crises, however, foreign papers that were published in the empire reached Ottoman audiences without any interference by the Ottoman government.

Beginning from 1821, French language newspapers gradually yet steadily flourished in the port cities of the empire, such as İzmir and İstanbul. A few French language newspapers of note at this time were *Le Smyrneen, Le Spectateur de l'Orient,* and *Courrier de Smyrne*. Among these newspapers, *Spectateur de l'Orient,* established in 1821,[110] had a special importance for the Ottomans. Published in French, this paper at its outset was owned by Charles Tricon and defended the Greek revolts against the Empire, an editorial policy which caused aggravation among Ottomans. The French minister to Istanbul, therefore, closed the

[108] Ibid., 37-38.

[109] Furthermore, the printing machines of the embassy were confiscated by the Ottoman government. Alemdar, *Istanbul*, 7.

[110] Unlike Davison and Yalman, Koloğlu gives this date as 1821. Indeed, based on archival research, Koloğlu revealed that 1825 was the republication date of this paper under the editorial leadership of Alexandre Blacque. See Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi* (İstanbul: Müteferrika, 1998) and also see "Transportation and Communication", 454.

newspaper in March 24, 1824. According to the Ottoman press historian Orhan Koloğlu, the editors of the newspaper, like European intellectuals of their time, supported the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Yet, at the moment when they were convinced that this support would negatively affect European trade in the Aegean Sea, *Le Spectateur de l'Orient'*s editors withdrew their support from the Greeks.[111] Change in the attitudes of the editors toward the uprisings and the Ottoman politics did not occur abruptly, however. Charles Tricon published another newspaper, *Le Smyrne,* to give his editorial support to the Greek independence movement, which once again led the French consul to close the newspaper.

After a six-month suspension, *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* was republished with the support of new subscribers, which were provided by Austrian and Prussian consulates.[112] Now under the editorial leadership of the Turcophil Frenchman Alexandre Blacque, a tradesman from Izmir, *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* defended Ottoman interests against the Greek independence movement.[113] The re-publication of the newspaper and its new editorial policy disturbed British interests, as Britain failed to shape Greek-Ottoman peace negotiations according to its own interests. The British ambassador accused *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* of its failed attempts in influencing Ottoman negotiation policies and requested that the French government close the newspaper, citing the paper's inappropriate language.[114] As one might

[111] Koloğlu, "Transportation and Communication", 454. Also see Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi*, 12.

[112] Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi*, 13.

[113] Ahmet Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmet Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, v.3, ed.M. Münir Aktepe (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi), 98.

[114] Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi*, 15.

argue, these continuous international pressures proved that the nineteenth century French newspapers became a site of international rivalry.

Alexandre Blacque, for example, perpetuated the anti-Greek politics of *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* with the recommencement of the publication in October 1827. On behalf of "Levantine" tradesmen, he complained about the "Greek pirates" who posed a threat to commercial activities in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, when France aligned with Britain and Russia and defeated the Ottoman army at Navarin, Alexandre Blacque severely criticized the Great Powers of Europe, including the French government, for supporting the Greek independence movement. He argued that by supporting the Greeks, not only was the French government helping British and Russian interests to succeed in the region, but it also was impeding the interests of Frenchmen who lived in the "Levant." [115] Thus, *Le Spectateur de l'Orient*'s pages turned into an arena in which French politics were not propagandized but rather strongly criticized along with the policies of Russia and Britain. The editorial policy of *Le Spectateur de l'Orient,* which appeared as a strong criticism of French politics in the Levant, aggravated the French consul. The exasperation of the French government led the consul to warn the newspaper to revise its editorial policies. Without heeding the warning of the consulate, *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* continued to criticize the French policy in the Aegean Sea, which resulted in a one-month suspension of the paper. In December 1827, the printing machines of the newspaper were confiscated and the

[115] Ibid., 17-18.

newspaper was closed by the French embassy.[116]

The incessant efforts of the consulate to prevent publishing activities that criticized the French polices on the "Levant", however, could not avert Alexandre Blacque from maintaining and publishing exactly the same editorial policy with a new newspaper, titled *Courrier de Smyrne.* For this new newspaper, Blacque received the support of French tradesmen in Marseilles who had trade ties in the Levant. Published in January 1828, this paper drew the ire of not only the French Consulate but also international interests, particularly Russian officials, who protested the editors' criticisms Russian policies. *Courrier de Smyrne* tried to attract the readers' attentions on the increasing effects of the Russians in the Balkans and the Black Sea as well as how the Greek government served the Russians in acquiring more power in these two regions. The criticisms of the paper, therefore, caused a diplomatic crisis between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as the Russian ambassador sent an official note to the Sublime Porte demanding that it ban the publication of a "French journalist's" paper that attacks "friendly powers" like Russia.[117] The Ottoman government evaded the demands of Russia; however, the growing pressure placed on the newspaper by Russia led Alexandre Blacque to leave the *Courrier de Smyrne*.[118] This departure represented a new phase in the life of Alexandre Blacque and for the traditionally acknowledged analysis of the Ottoman press historiography, as he published the French version of the first

[116] Ibid., 20-23.

[117] Ahmet Lutfi, v.3, Vak'a-nüvis Ahmet Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 98. Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey*, 29.

[118] Alemdar, *Istanbul*, 3.

official newspaper of the empire, called *Monitor Ottoman*. This newspaper was published only a short time after *Takvim-i Vekayi* and on the instructions from the Sultan Mahmud II.

In the Ottoman and Turkish press historiographies, these lively newspaper publishing activities in İzmir and Istanbul were mostly analyzed in two different yet, to some extent, related contexts. Accordingly, the ensuing conflicts among the actors and subjects of these publishing activities were interpreted as the incidents that emanated from Ottoman Empire's increasing economic and political significance in the international capitalist rivalry. Therefore, scholars interpreted the publishing activities as reflexive of foreign political and economic interests and their local partners' activities in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, even to some extent, the Ottoman Empire's potential and actual reading publics were not explored in the Ottoman historiography particularly when it analyzed the reasons for these spreading publishing activities, since it considered a reading public as non-existent. Rather, publishing activities were conceived as the activities that led the Ottoman Sultan to acknowledge the necessity of informing the public through state controlled or sponsored newspapers. In this vein, the first foreign papers published in the empire were viewed as providing the impetus for the Ottoman sultan and his decision to publish an official newspaper. Revealing the challenging power of the press against international rivals of the empire, these European newspapers inspired the Ottoman sultan to publish an official newspaper. Ironically, the Ottoman historiography never acknowledged its own contradictory arguments about the pre-supposed non-existence of a reading public(s) as well as the state and foreign

newspapers' editors supposed desire to shape that very non-existent public(s).

Many press historians, like Orhan Koloğlu for example, argued that the start of the Greek independence movement became the foremost determining element to understand the spread of newspapers and their role in shaping public opinion(s) in Ottoman society. According to these scholars, the Sultan, who was influenced by *Le Spectateur de l'Orient* and *Courrier de Smyrne's* depiction and criticisms of the Greek revolts, understood the power of the press and decided to publish an official newspaper. Accordingly, Alexandre Blacque's interpretation of Sultan Mahmud II's reign as a period of "development and peace" and his articles praising Sultan Mahmud II's reform attempts[119] had an effect on Mahmud II.'s decision on whether to publish a newspaper. When Alexandre Blacque had to leave the *Courrier de Smyrne* due to the pressures originating from the Russian and French embassies, Mahmud II benefited from Alexandre Blacque's disassociation from the newspaper. According to Ahmed Lütfi Efendi and Ahmed Emin Yalman, he invited Blacque to Istanbul for guidance in publishing an official Ottoman newspaper. According to these interpretations, the practices of the Porte were the reflection of the reformist Ottoman sultan. Therefore, the sultan appeared as the principle instigator for the inauguration of an Ottoman press culture. Yet, his decision was put into practice only with the assistance of a Francophone journalist, who was a Westerner.[120] Furthermore, in this interpretation, publishing activities with French origins were

[119] See, for example, Koloğlu, *Osmanlı Basınının Doğuşu ve Blak Bey Ailesi*.

[120] Ahmet Lütfi, Vak'a-nüvis Ahmet Lütfi Efendi Tarihi,. Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey.* Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Shaw & Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*. Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*. Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze*.

primarily analyzed not in an Ottoman societal context but rather in a context where Ottoman actors would appear almost only as "observers" of developing publishing activities within their own land. Their relationships with these activities were used to explain how conflicts on the newspapers' editorial policies convinced the Ottoman sultan of the need to publish an official newspaper.

Dissatisfied with this framework, a few scholars analyzed the motives and impacts of the steady increase in French language newspapers in a process that did not place the Ottoman sultan and government at the center of the analysis.[121] Rather, these scholars placed French publishing activities in a framework that focused on the processes which incorporated the Ottoman system into the world economy. Korkmaz Alemdar, for example, argued that the growth of the capitalist world economy required the integration of new geographical areas into the widening capitalist economy. The Ottoman Empire was one of those areas whose incorporation would be achieved through trading activities. Beginning from the late eighteenth century, port cities like Izmir, due to the intensified relations between the capitalist world economy and the Ottoman Empire, acquired significance for both local traders and foreign merchants. These groups required recent news to maintain their commercial activities and to improve their trade networks. Hence, publishing activities emerged and developed with the expanding world capitalist

[121] Alemdar, *Istanbul*. Ertuğ, *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi*. There are scholars who give descriptive accounts of the events. These scholars on the one hand touched upon the trade activities of the Frenchmen and their interests in the Aegean Sea. On the other hand, they emphasized the Westernization attempts of the Sultan Mahmud II and how he adopted this modern vehicle, the newspaper, to inform the Ottoman public. For this argument, see, for example, Necdet Ekinci, "*Türk Basın Tarihinden Kesitler"* in Türkler, vol.14 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 675-680.

economy.[122] In such a framework, Alemdar argued that concomitant with the French government's propaganda attempts in promoting the French revolution, the contesting economic interests of capitalist international actors in the Ottoman Empire were the major reasons of French-led publishing activities. He suggested that these newspapers favored French economic interests against prevailing international competitors, such as Britain and Russia, who wanted to take a share of the expanding Ottoman market. Therefore, the penetration of European capitalism into the empire was the major motive for French publishing activities.[123] The liberal economic policies[124] of the Ottoman governments accelerated these activities in the Ottoman Empire.

Indeed, foreign press activities influenced the emergence of Ottoman newspapers in many ways. The recognition of the press' significance in shaping and controlling a reading public(s) through newspapers could be acknowledged as one of the possible effects, among many, of the foreign press. When one considers the steady spread of Ottoman newspapers in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, it would be wrong to argue that the decision of the Ottoman government to publish a state newspaper was solely and very directly affected by these foreign press activities. Even if the government was more convinced by the power of the press as in the case of *Le Spectateur de l'Orient,* the emergence of

[122] Alemdar, *Istanbul*, 7-8.

[123] In his study, Alemdar suggested that, particularly after 1838 British-Ottoman Trade Convention, the increase in the number of French language newspapers indicated the growing impact of foreign activities and interests in the Ottoman Empire, since the empire became an open market for imperialist activities. See, ibid., 6-7.

[124] By using the term liberal economic policies, I am referring to the *laissez-faire* policies of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire such as the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838, a decision that removed the monopolies that benefited Ottoman traders and guilds.

foreign newspapers in the Ottoman Empire was not the motive of the sultan and Ottoman officials for acknowledging the significance of providing the Ottoman public with the "real nature of events".[125] Rather, the Ottoman state's decision on the publication of a newspaper was part of newly invented attempts that sought to support the state structure in a changing world.[126] Therefore, for the state, the publication of the first Ottoman newspaper could be considered as a tool to legitimize Ottoman policymaking.[127] In this vein, the foreign press in the Ottoman lands might have accelerated the Ottoman government's decision in taking a role in the development of a print culture. Yet, more than this effect, the necessity for constructing a consensus within the Ottoman public on the political system was a driving force for the Ottoman state. By acknowledging the significance and possible impact of foreign publishing activities in the Ottoman governments' effort to support an emerging press culture, I aim to analyze the spread of newspapers from a different angle. Furthermore, without excluding the importance of it, my viewpoint exceeds the analysis on the *hunger of European capitalism for new markets*[128] and its ensuing impact on press activities in the Ottoman Empire.

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[125] For more on this point, please reference footnote 5 in this chapter, which details the importance placed on a state-operated newspaper by the Sultan for informing and shaping the Ottoman public.

[126] Selim Deringil, for example, argues that, in an era of revolutions, ancient dynastic regimes such as the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, and the Romanovs tried to support their political systems through diverse methods. Seeking the approval of their subjects through the publication of newspapers was one such method. See, 'The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire 1808 to 1908", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol.35, no.1. (1993),3.

[127] Benedict Anderson understands the newspaper as a technical means for representing the idea of the nation, through which an imagined community such as a class or a nation can be built. See *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso. 2nd edition, 1991), 25. In this dissertation, I contend that for the Ottoman state, a newspaper was a tool for legitimizing its perceived public(s).

[128] Emphasis belongs to me.

I analyze the emergence of this new medium in relation to developing and expanding public opinion(s) and contested interests in the nineteenth century Ottoman society. Therefore, I conceive of the editors, foreign newspapers and the state as among many actors in the contestation of shaping public opinions in line with those actors' interests. In such a framework, the Ottoman print culture is not necessarily analyzed by constructing a binary model that places a state vis-à-vis a public or a civil society. Rather, the role of many groups in constructing public opinion(s) through the press and therefore the role of these groups in developing a print culture are two of the main focuses of this dissertation.

Even though the traditional Ottoman historiography has argued to the contrary[129], recent revisionist studies have argued about the existence of the Ottoman public(s), which would articulate its opinions on public matters even before the publication of newspapers.[130] Coffeehouses, public baths, mosques and open bazaars of the Empire, for example, were spaces where the Ottoman public would exchange news and have conversations on intricate societal, political and economic issues such as international relations, wars with Russia or European

[129] Contrary to what I argue in this dissertation, as I discussed in the introduction, by applying a Weberian framework, the conventional Turkish and Ottoman historiographies draw clear boundaries between the state and civil society. In this framework, many characteristics that were lacking in the Ottoman society but existed in Western contexts such as feudal contracts, autonomous cities, and expanding trade activities brought capitalist developments and hence the formation of civil societies in the West. Yet in the Ottoman case, according to Weberian approaches, the absence of such developments resulted in a state and society formation in which a strong civil society could not have flourished. Therefore, the Ottoman public did not have the necessary voice or institutions to affect any decisions taken by the absolute state. See, for example, Şerif Mardin, *Bütün Eserleri 6, Makaleler 1, Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*. eds. Mümtazer Türköne and Tuncay Önder (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002) and Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1985). However, in this dissertation I challenge these approaches by problematizing the dichotomy between the state and society.

[130] See, for example, Cengiz Kırlı, "The struggle over space: coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2000).

powers, upheavals in the distant provinces of the empire, trade, public matters, and local gossip about the very neighborhoods in which these public conversations took place.[131] Yet I contend that this public did not form a public sphere in the Habermasian sense, a formulation that neglects conflicting social groups and their interests.[132] Rather, I follow Geoff Eley's definition of a public sphere, "where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place"[133] since this amendment allows us to include conflicting political, social, and economic groups that form multiple publics and hence public opinions. Similar to Belinda Davis, I apply the term, public sphere, as a "space for debate and a place for political influence."[134] Moreover, I employ the term, *public sphere* (my

[131] For those public spaces that served as sources of information, see, for example, Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey*. In addition to coffeehouses, markets, and masques where people would congregate for five times a day, he also mentions the convent of dervishes as another location of news exchange. Yalman, ibid., 17. For specific examples like coffeehouses as spaces of news exchange, see Cengiz Kırlı, "Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire" in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, eds. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 75-97.

[132] Although the concept "public sphere" is well received by scholars, its formulation by Habermas has been strongly criticized. According to Habermas' conceptualization, the public sphere signifies a society composed of rational individuals who set aside their varying interests for the sake of that very public. In this formulation of the public, it is not social groups but rather rational subjects that form an impartial and consensus based public sphere, one that reflects the "common concern." Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989), 36. Historians like Geoff Eley and Mary Ryan, however, challenged and revised the concept, conceiving of the public sphere as a space for free expression that is accessible not merely to one social group but rather to a variety of social groups. According to their formulation, a public sphere is described as a "contested terrain," or in other terms "competing public spheres," which refers to a constant conflict of interests and struggle for power. See Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in the Nineteenth Century America" in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Calhoun, (Boston: The MIT Press, 1992), 259-288 and Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," in *Habermas and the Public, Sphere* ed. Calhoun, (Boston: The MIT Press, 1992).

[133] Eley, 306.

[134] Belinda Davis, "Reconsidering Habermas, Gender and the Public Sphere: The Case of Wilhelmine Germany," in *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930*, ed., Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: Michigan, 1998).

emphasis), as a place where diverse *public opinions* would be formed, without discussing the existence or absence of a public sphere in the nineteenth century Ottoman context.[135] Rather, in my framework, the focus is on conflicting and competing public opinions and the ways in which Ottoman newspapers represented these voices. In such a framework, Ottoman newspapers are analyzed as realms where continuous conflict of interests reveal themselves through the representation of news and current events while, according to their own discourse, those same newspapers were claiming to voice a general and unified public's interests in a Habermasian sense.[136] Furthermore, I prefer to use the terms *public* and *public opinion(s)* as historical referents that were significant discursive tools for the state and Ottoman journalists in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. I contend that, for the Ottoman government, the terms, public and public opinion appeared for utilizing these terms as discursive tools to legitimize the power and actions of

[135] In his recent article on the public in the Ottoman Empire, Cengiz Kırlı formulates the public sphere without necessarily analyzing the existence or absence of a public sphere in the nineteenth century Ottoman context. He argues that an analysis which focuses on such antagonistic conceptualizations leads the current historiographies in directions that validate "the obsolete premises of modernizing approaches, by emphasizing the different temporalities that the so-called East and West". Furthermore, as a form of "cultural nationalism," such conceptualizations form "defensive historiographies" that argue the existence of a public sphere in the Middle Eastern context long before the emergence of the European public sphere, a public sphere which is labeled as a fantasy by many scholars. He argues that the "public" and "public opinion" had been constituted in a series of governmental practices that redefined politics in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. For the detailed discussion of these arguments, see Cengiz Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire" in *Public, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Steney Shami, 177-204. (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009). Here, I follow Kırlı's argument, which rejects discussions about the existence of an Ottoman public sphere that are formulated according to antagonistic terms. My concern is not the emergence of a public sphere as a realm that developed apart from state, but rather, how Ottoman public opinion was reflected in and attempted to be shaped by private newspapers. In this sense, I analyze the ways in which this new tool, the newspaper, was used by journalists and/or interest groups with the assertion of manifesting Ottoman public opinion.

[136] For example, İbrahim Şinasi asserted that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* defended unified, homogenous public interests, while as we see in the following chapters, the editors of the newspaper mainly voiced the interests of different groups, in particular, upper and middle class tradesmen, bureaucrats, and military officers. See İbrahim Şinasi, "Mukaddime",*Tasvir-i Efkâr*, (28 June 1862), No:1.

government. But, at the same time, these terms were borrowed by such groups as journalists and political dissidents for asserting a certain share of the political and economic resources of the empire. Due to the competing political and economic interests that existed during this process of change in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, I will often refer to public and public opinion in plural forms.[137] Such a framework allows us to consider the foreign newspapers, which were published on the Ottoman lands as one of among the many tools used by many actors who attempted to promote their economic, financial, and political interests. Public opinion(s), in this context, were formed by fragmented and multiple agents in nineteenth century Ottoman society. Therefore, this dissertation argues that these actors tried to create public opinion(s) around their very own specific interests.

Additionally, this amendment allows us to revise the Habermasian conceptualization that draws a rigid, antagonistic distinction between state and society. Up until recently, by accepting such a distinction, many scholars argued for the absence of a public sphere in the Ottoman and Middle Eastern contexts.[138] The recognition of the civil society's absence in the nineteenth century Ottoman context leads historians to explain the development of the Ottoman press solely in relation to the state's involvement and intervention in press activities, which limits the possible analysis of the societal changes for engendering the necessary conditions of a print culture. Rather, I consider civil society as a constitutive element of the

[137] In this vein, my formulation departs from Kırlı's conceptualization in that I do not emphasize the governmental practices in the construction of public opinion(s) but rather competing and conflicting interests.

[138] For more on this point, please reference footnote 98 in this chapter, which details the influence of the Weberian distinction between state and society on the Ottoman historiography.

state not apart from state. Furthermore, this dissertation reveals that the Ottoman state was not fully coercive, allowing no room for resistance.[139] Moreover, this dissertation conceptualizes the state as a composition of ruling groups that came together not with a homogeneous set of interests and alignments, but rather as a convergence of different groups and interests, which continuously redefined and reshaped themselves in relation to current events and developments. In this vein, there was neither clear political boundaries between the state and society nor a static hegemony production that would create a top down print culture. Neither was the state nor the society monolithic. Rather, actors of the nineteenth century Ottoman society, like actors of any given culture, had diverse and sometimes conflicting roles, as journalist and bureaucrats. In this vein, I argue that due to the changing and redefining ruling groups and economic interests, the Ottoman print culture was developed by fractured groups that competed with each other in the hopes of seizing or utilizing state power. Moreover, these groups competed for the ability to impose their hegemony over the realms of not an antagonistically designed but rather a fractured public sphere. Again, in a Gramscian sense, I argue that newspapers were used when creating consensus in Ottoman society.

### 3.Preconditions for an Ottoman Newspaper Culture

[139] Here, I am inspired by Gramsci's conceptualization of state and civil society. For Gramsci, in a capitalist society, the state is not merely "the Government", but rather it is a dualistic polity: the political society, which consisted of social institutions, and the civil society that includes the private realm and the economy. He argues that the division between the political society and the civil society is *intellectual*, not literal, as both societies constitute the State. For the Ottoman case, even if we cannot talk about a capitalist state, this formulation allows me to consider the Ottoman civil society or the public sphere not as a realm that was constituted in opposition to the state. And hence the civil society was not inimical to the state. For Gramsci and civil society, see, for example, Joseph A. Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society" *Boundry 2* Vol. 22, No.3 (Autumn 1995), 1-32.

The Ottoman Empire experienced a substantial transformation in its economic, social, and political structures in the nineteenth century, which provided a necessary foundation for a newspaper culture. The structural transformation of the empire during this time had two, compatible, internal and external dynamics: In this century, the market relationships between the capitalist European economy and the Ottoman Empire increased and expanded. The increase in market relations between the European economy and the empire emanated from not only Europeans' concerns in finding new markets for exporting their manufactured products and importing raw materials but also the Porte's intended support of its modernization attempts. The Industrial Revolution of the West in the eighteenth century had dramatic effects on the Ottoman Empire as it motivated the industrialized states to seek ever expanding markets to accumulate their wealth and capital. European states thus targeted promising markets with rich natural resources that were located in the Middle East, including the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, with the end of the Napoleonic Wars, British export manufacturing flowed to the Ottoman markets. Initially, the existence of tariffs and monopolies limited the ability of European states to access vast Ottoman markets. Yet, in seeking help with the centralization policies of the Ottoman governments to control the wealth and power within the empire, the governments received support from the European states, and ironically, through European asistance, the Ottoman Empire turned into an outlet for the exportation of European manufactured goods in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, with the intention of strengthening the central state, the ruling elites of

the empire initiated a reform program called the *Tanzimat* or *modernization* period of the empire. As I will show below, both of these dynamics facilitated the emergence of the essential conditions necessary for a newspaper culture such as technological developments, communication and transportation infrastructures, and the discontent felt by the diverse parts of Ottoman society.

While in the eyes of Europeans, the onetime "horror of Europe" known as the Ottoman Empire became known as the "Sick Man of Europe" due to its diminishing international stature, the Ottoman state structure nonetheless flourished in many ways in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the restructuring of the empire was both a result of and reaction to the endangered territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as the Ottoman governments dealt with upheavals and territorial loses. On the other hand, rather than seeking a consensus with local elements within the empire, the governments preferred to strength the central government to control resource production and distribution.[140] The compatible political and economic interests of European and Ottoman states combined with the Ottoman officials' concerns in forming a centralized state structure prepared the necessary conditions

[140] Ariel Salzmann asserts that the decentralization and indirect rule of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire was a viable strategy for the survival of the Ottoman state into the twentieth century. She argues that the ancien regime had partially privatized the administrative structure. One of the characteristics of this order was the system of revenue contracts held for the life of the contractor. This system, called *malikane*, created a diffuse but interrelated state power. It was this fiscal network that knitted the center and peripheries of the Empire together over the eighteenth century. See "An Ancien Regime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire", *Politics and Society*, Vol.21, no.4 (December 1993), 393-423, 394-395. However, this fiscal network was altered by the Porte's centralization attempts in the nineteenth century. As an alternative argument, it is worth considering that the inability to utilize internal sources emanated from the administrative centralization practices of the central government throughout the nineteenth century. However, Selim Deringil completely opposes Salzmann's argument, asserting that after implementing the nineteenth century reforms, the Ottoman Empire was governed more effectively than it was in the eighteenth century. *See The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 9.

for the bourgeoning state structure. The Western states supported and encouraged the re-centralization policies of the Ottoman Empire as long as the Ottoman state kept its mostly untouched markets open through privileges and concession.[141]

With the aim of centralization, the Istanbul governments improved the administrative structure, educational system, and transportation and communication structures. The military and bureaucratic apparatus of the state also expanded greatly in size and function.[142] The provincial administration was restructured as well by the establishment of provincial councils.[143] Many ministries such as health, education, trade and commerce were established during this period along with the symbols and many more institutions of a modern state such as lifeguard ships, clock towers, and museums.[144] This centralization program aimed at imposing the

[141] For example, the *British-Ottoman Trade Convention* that was signed August 16, 1838 enabled the British government to extract serious economic concessions. With this treaty, all monopolies within the Ottoman Empire were abolished: "The subject of Her Britannic Majesty, or their agents, shall be permitted to purchase at all places in the Ottoman Dominions (whether for the purposes of internal trade or exportation) all articles, ….; and the Sublime Porte formally engages to abolish all monopolies of agricultural produce, or any of other articles whatsoever, as well as all *Permits* from the local Governors, either for the purchase of any article, or for its removal from one place to another when purchased…."(article-II). I borrowed the translation from Akram Fouad Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 49.

[142] The number of civil servants rose from 2000 at the end of the eighteenth century to somewhere between 35,000 to 50,000 in 1908. See Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, 62.

[143] For an example of this restructuring, see Eugen Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1991; Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, 2nd edition (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997).

[144] Like many other historians, Selim Deringil asserts that the signs of a modern state appeared with the Tanzimat reforms. See, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999),9. However, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj shows that the Rebellion of 1703 changed the political structure of the state by creating a split between the independent power of the Ottoman dynasty and the vizier and pashas households. With this rebellion, the political power shifted from the sultans to the vizier and pashas households. This fissure prepared one of the conditions for a modern state, a break between the state "entity" and the power of dynasty. Therefore, although it would not be wrong to argue that the symbols and institutions of a modern state increased and became more visible during the Tanzimat

will of the Istanbul governments on the empire, which entailed more involvement in the everyday relationships of the society.

From the perspective of the Ottoman bureaucracy, reshaping the state structure through more centralized policies would bring an end to the sharing of its political and economic power with multiple actors such as janissaries, who were the protectors of, for example urban guilds, or provincial dynasties which were mostly tax-farmers and therefore were considered to be obstacles for directly accessing the taxed wealth throughout the empire. For the Ottoman governments, the centralization of the state was also required to adjust to the global changes, which ironically for the Ottoman state brought increasing European dominance over the Ottoman Empire. From the European perspective, a centralized state structure would unite provincial powers such as notables and tribes, whose fragmented structures made trade activities more difficult for European states.[145]

In the process of mutual agreement between the Istanbul centered bureaucracy and European powers in creating and supporting a central government, and in a period of increasing economic relationships with the European economies, the central government and ruling elites of the empire attempted to regulate the economic arena in order to secure and to exercise their political power and to

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period, one should remember that one of the most important conditions in the formation of a modern state appeared with the Rebellion of 1703. See, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report", *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol.94, No.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), 438-447. Also see, Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984).

[145] Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds., Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 762.

control economic resources. Accordingly, new economic policies were implemented to accelerate the commercialization of Ottoman agriculture for international export, which coincided with the economic requirements of Europe. During the nineteenth century, many significant urban centers such as Izmir, Salonika, and Aleppo began to produce raw materials for export to Europe. Yet, the exportation of manufactured materials to Europe diminished, which in turn redirected and subsequently accelerated the orientation of Ottoman economic activities towards providing European demands for the exportation of raw materials. [146] Commercialization as well as increasing economic activities in the Ottoman Empire prepared one of the most significant conditions for the rise of the printing press. Traditionally, information and news followed trade flows, as merchants were significant news carriers in a world where institutional and commercial news sources were absent in the daily life of publics. With the appearance of daily, weekly, or monthly newspapers, the connection between news and trade routes remained unchanged. Printing itself spread in Europe via important trade centers such as Mainz to Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Basel, and the newssheets and papers followed trade routes, such as the sugar route from the Caribbean to London or the silver route from Mexico or Peru of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.[147] Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, news began to flow from trade centers with the publication of newspapers, particularly private newspapers.[148]

[146] Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 77. Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914," 1830-32.

[147] Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, *A Social History of the Media, From Gutenberg to the Internet*, 3rd Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 23.

[148] Private newspapers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire published news on and

As a part of economic reorganization, the Porte attempted to regulate finance and financial instruments. In order to finance the centralization process and furthermore to control the overall wealth in the Ottoman dominions, the ruling elite attempted to establish an institutional mechanism to centrally extract taxes and to create new revenue sources. Considering the methods used for administrative reorganization, and the new fiscal and economic policies of the empire, it can be argued that the main motive of these measures was to control the collection and distribution of revenues. Accordingly, the tax collection system was directed towards disqualifying intermediaries and the *muhassıls* (salaried agents of the government) were assigned for direct tax collection.[149] Prohibited from collecting surtaxes, fees, and dues, local judges and administrators now lost a substantial part of their income, which increased the strength of the central government. These measures, expectedly, challenged the autonomy of local judges and tax farmers, a development that formed another condition for a newspaper culture: dissatisfaction with the changing political and economic systems.

In this process and in accordance with the monetization of the Ottoman economy, the governments took measures toward collecting taxes in cash. In 1829

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from cities like Izmir, Aleppo, Trabzon, Damascus, and many others that were commercially important for the empire. See, for example, news published on measures that were taken by a special commission to increase cotton production in İzmir, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no:30, 14 Rebiülahir 1239 (9 September 1862) or news that complained about the warm weather in Trabzon, though the weather did not harm the crops of the year. See, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no:645, 2 Camaziyelevvel 1285 (21 August 1868).

[149] In practice, however, mostly due to their corrupt policies that were based on heavy taxation and bribery, centrally appointed *muhassıls* were challenged in many places like Diyarbakır, Erzurum, and Ankara, which showed the resistance of the provincial public(s) to the central government. Thus, the old system prevailed in many places. See, for example, Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler, 1840-1856" in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, eds. Halil İnalcık & Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu 2nd edition (Ankara: Phoenix, 2006), 151-158.

and 1833, new coins were minted. In 1839, paper money, similar to hand written bonds with interest rates, was issued. In 1847 the exchange rate of the Ottoman *kuruş* was fixed. To maintain the exchange rate, the Ottoman government sponsored the establishment of a bank in Istanbul.[150] This monetization and cash targeted economy would have brought a natural interest in acquiring news by merchants, land holders, bankers, and even peasants about many basic subjects. Among these subjects might be the annual product rates of the certain regions to calculate the possible "expected" tax revenue or cut and weather conditions that would provide information to predict the expected amount of crops both of which would reveal, for example, the peasants' tax burden. Therefore, they would also reveal the expected income of bankers since the bankers accumulated part of their wealth by lending money both to *mültezims* and financially strained tax payers.[151]

Changes in the economic policies and life of the Empire also involved the restructuring of the Ottoman industry and specifically the pushing of hand manufacturers into labor-intensive, Western-style workshops. The import of European goods increased greatly.[152] Yet, the Ottoman market was neither

[150] To stabilize the exchange rate, the government made an agreement with two Galata bankers, namely Jacques Alleon and Theodore Baltazzi, in 1845. According to this agreement, these bankers received 2 millions kuruş from the Ottoman government and, in return, they were responsible for fixing the exchange rate of the Ottoman kuruş, according to which 1 pound sterling was supposed to be 110 kuruş. In 1847, these partners established the *Banque de Constantinople* (Dersaadet Bankası), which was liquidated in 1852. See, Andre Autheman, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Osmanlı Bankası: Bank-ı Osmanî-i Şahane* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2002), 17-18.

[151] For example, even low ranking state officials (memurlar) borrowed money from bankers. See, Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri*, vol.1 (Ankara: Orion, 2005), 26. For a specific and well analyzed example of how a banker operated in the empire see Murat Hulkiender, *Bir Galata Bankerinin Portresi Goerge Zarifi*, 1806-1884 (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2003).

[152] Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey*, 76.

completely open for European subordination nor removed from competition. On the contrary, as recent Ottoman scholarship shows, the Ottoman economy of the nineteenth century continued to exhibit impressive signs of vitality in a period of incorporation into the capitalist world economy.[153] In order to survive in a difficult period of competition, Ottoman manufacturers and merchants showed varied and unconventional ways of resistance as well.[154] Indeed, during the Tanzimat period, as Donald Quataert shows, even though the state attempted to control every aspect of the political, economic, and social lives of the Ottoman society, the economic power of the central government decreased, since private interests became more important than ever before in Ottoman history. The growth of private interests indicated increased market relations in both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors.[155] For the Porte, controlling the economy was of vital significance, since the state required increased revenues for its centralization.

Due to competing claims for the control of wealth, the process of reorganizing the state and economic structures affected diverse social groups and classes in many different ways.[156] The effects were experienced in two different yet

[153] See, for example, Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1970). Donald Quataert "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908" (PhD dis., UCLA, 1973). Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya Kapitalizmi, 1820-1913* (Ankara: Yurt Yayıncılık, 1984).

[154] For example, based on the commercial reports from the consular offices in Turkey, the British government warned British merchants about Ottoman manufacturers and merchants, who, according to the reports, produced and sold imitated, low quality products such as wine, beer, medicine, ink, matches, and textiles. See, Parliamentary Papers, *Account and Papers*, Istanbul, 1873, 1556.

[155] Quataert, "Main Problems of the Economy", 213.

[156] For example, even if his article is written from the perspective of the state, İnalcık shows that one of the regulations of the Tanzimat period, the abolition of the tax farming system, disturbed large numbers of tax farmers, credit agents, and officials. See Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of

related levels. First of all, the reorganizing process created conflicting demands among domestic groups.[157] In the agricultural sector, there were tribes, landlords, tax farmers, and peasants. In manufacturing, there were guilds, artisans, and free labor. In addition to these groups, many groups such as local judges, merchants, and cultivators were affected by the Tanzimat policies. The varying interests and demands of these groups were in conflict with one another, within each respective group, and, expectedly, with the Istanbul governments. Yet, these conflicts were not limited to the domestic level. Combined with the demands of domestic groups were the expectations, interventions, and interests of international groups and markets.

For example, the economic requirements of some groups such as guilds were in sharp conflict with some other groups like merchants. Unlike merchants' economic requirements, which might be for free trade, artisans sought protective tariffs. Yet, urban guilds and artisans, who received protection from janissaries, lost their privileges and hence their economic powers during this process of reorganization as the janissaries were abolished by the state.[158] More importantly,

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Traditional Society" in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* eds. Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 59.

[157] For the conflicts that were experienced in the mount of Lebanon see, for example, Usamma Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). For the Balkan regions see, Erden Attila Aytekin, "Land, Rural Classes and Law: Agrarian Conflict and State Regulation in the Ottoman Empire, 1830s-1860s" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006). Also see, Donald Quataert, "Rural Unrest in the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1914" in *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, eds. Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 38-49.

[158] Donald Quataert divides the nineteenth century's Ottoman economic re-structuring policies into four periods. Accordingly, restrictive economic policies such as monopolies and the retention of raw materials for domestic use dominated the first period. With the abolition of the janissaries in 1826, the first period and thus the protectionist and monopolist policies ended. The second period that started in 1826 and ended in 1860 was the period of free trade liberalism. In this period, the Ottoman bureaucracy granted Europeans access to Ottoman markets without serious challenges from any groups or individuals in the Ottoman society. The destruction of the janissary

the urban artisans and guilds mostly lost their ability to compete with the international actors. The infamous British-Ottoman Trade Convention of 1838, for example, removed many barriers in Ottoman markets for the benefits of European merchants. With the destruction of the janissaries and the Trade Convention, the Ottoman economy was further integrated into the European economic system. Therefore, the sultan's decision to eliminate the janissaries removed possible threats to the Ottoman economic liberalism and *laissez-faire* policies, which paradoxically emerged in a period of state involvement in everyday life and accelerated the commercialization of the Ottoman agriculture, industry, and markets for the benefits of European powers. Furthermore, not only guilds and artisans but also the Ottoman merchants were badly affected by the *laissez-faire* policies, as the internal tariffs worked against them. On the other hand, in many instances, the Porte attempted to protect the Ottoman guilds and merchants against European competition.[159]

Yet, economic liberalism and the *laissez-faire* policies of the Porte were challenged by groups whose autonomy was infringed upon by the centralization policies. Many groups such as urban guilds, artisans, and workers challenged these

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corps, which had a vital impact on Ottoman society, marked the events and policies of this period. The janissaries were the best organized group, who acted as mediators between the governing authorities, both in the provinces and the center, and the public. They imposed public demands on the sultan and moreover advocated protectionist policies for the benefits of urban guilds and artisans. Therefore, the janissaries' disappearance seriously endangered the guilds and artisans monopolistic privileges. See Quataert, "The Age of Reforms". For the effects of the janissaries' destruction on the Ottoman economy see, Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent* and Quataert, ibid. The third period that started in 1860 and prevailed until 1908 offered some protection to local manufacturers as the governments raised import duties and partially restored the privileges of some Ottoman guilds. Quataert, "The Age of Reforms", 762-763. Ottoman newspapers prospered during this period and, on behalf of the Ottoman public, editors of papers defended some protectionist policies.

[159] For example, Selim III and Mahmud II created the *Avrupa* and *Hayriye Tüccarı* groups. See, Masters, "The Sultan's Entrepreneurs".

policies and advocated protectionist economy policies against Europeans. Yet the challenges of these groups were formed without using the term "Europeans." Neither did these occupational groups use the term *protectionist* nor accentuate the dangers of the *liberal economy policies* since, expectedly, they were unaware of liberal economic theories. Rather, these groups first needed to experience the effects of liberal economic policies.[160]

Challenges against the *laissez-faire* economic policies found support among Ottoman intellectuals as well as some government members.[161] In general, however, between 1830 and 1860, a period when the first Ottoman language newspaper was launched as well as the first semi-official newspaper and private newspapers, Ottoman economic theory was composed of rather small pieces of protectionist and liberal economic policies.[162] This fragmentation found its root in Ottoman society, since for some of the groups and individuals, the state emerged as either insufficiently protective or too meddling. As there were Ottoman intellectuals who criticized the *laissez-faire* economic policies of the state and therefore voiced

[160] The italics belong to the author. For examples of these policies and the discontent felt by urban guilds see, for example, Nalan Turna, "The Everyday Life of Istanbul and its Artisans, 1808-1839" (PhD dis., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006). Another example provided by Donald Quataert shows how the petition of the Greek patriarch and the Christian merchants in the city of Aleppo wished to reduce taxes on their textile products and therefore the local industry to more effectively compete with foreign goods. In this petition, petitioners defined themselves as the representatives of the people (*ahali*) of Aleppo. Quataert, "Ottoman Workers and the State 1826-1914", in *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), 145.

[161] For example, Sadık Rifat Pasha and Cevdet Pasha argued against free trade policies and defended cameralist policies. Many Ottoman journalists such as Namık Kemal and Ahmed Mithad Efendi criticized *laissez-faire* policies as well. See, Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi, 1838-1918* (Ankara: SBF, 1962). Ahmed Güner Sayar, *Osmanlı İktisat Düşüncesinin Çağdaşlaşması* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1986), particularly chapter 3.

[162] Ahmed Güner Sayar argues that neither Ottoman intellectuals nor bureaucrats were aware of the complexity of economics as a social science. Rather, they tried to produce practical answers to the current fiscal and economic problems. See, ibid, 275-276 and 292.

the concerns of inadequately protected groups, there were also intellectuals who voiced the sentiments of free traders. The flourishing discussion between the free traders and protectionists could be considered as one of the preconditions for a newspaper culture, as these groups and intellectuals needed to spread their arguments through the printed word, arguments that were echoed in the pages of Ottoman newspapers.

In this period of restructuring, a new and Westernized military force replaced the janissaries to serve the central government in international and domestic policies. Although unsuccessful in preventing the loss of significant territories such as Greece in 1830, and Moldavia and Walachia in 1856, the new military forces proved to be successful in the domestic front. They helped the central government to reduce the independence of local notables, tribes, and guilds, as in the case of the abolishment of the janissaries in 1826. For example, in this centralization process, vast lands which were previously uncultivated or held by nomads were integrated into the Ottoman economic system by expanding Istanbul's control over tribal dominions.[163] In so doing, the central state's bureaucracy acquired a greater share of the economic surpluses from the urban and rural economies, which created a conflict among those groups that sought to expand or regain their former shares.

In this process, on the one hand, agricultural production increased. On the other hand, tribes like the Kurds of eastern Anatolia lost their political autonomy as the policies of nomadic sedentarization broke tribal power. It also caused lingering conflicts between the provincial elites and the Istanbul bureaucracy. The provincial

[163] Quataert, "The Age of Reforms", 769.

elites, most of whom were tax-farmers, lost some of their previous and privileged access to local resources to the central state. The Istanbul bureaucracy in particular attempted to collect taxes with its centrally appointed and trained officials (*muhassıls*). Expectedly, the provincial elites engaged in a struggle to maintain and to regain their previous non-conflicted "rights" as tax farmers and landowners, which in the end resulted in the failure of the central state in abolishing the tax farming system for the benefit of the Istanbul government. In this process, the local notables retained their control over the tax collecting process and over the agrarian cultivators. Yet, to some extent, they had to accept the political supremacy of the central state. On the other hand, local notables did not lose their power in the countryside, which had negative effects on the Ottoman peasants. In theory, with the 1839 Gülhane Decree, compulsory services were abolished. Yet, feudal dues and services continued to exist at the expense of the peasants. Furthermore, the unsuccessful attempts of abolishing the tax farming system did not bring an end to the local notables' control over the agrarian surplus. On the contrary, the tax burden of peasants increased.[164] Therefore, the surplus gained from mounting agricultural products fell far short of bringing wealth to the Ottoman peasants. The challenge and frustration expressed by all of these groups helped to bring about one of the necessary conditions of an Ottoman print culture, which was the continued dissatisfaction with government policies. As we will see in the following chapters, emerging mutually with the press, the challenges and voices of these elements were reflected on the pages of newspapers through the pen of dissident Ottoman

[164] Quataert, "Main Problems", 215.

journalists.[165]

In this conflict between the Istanbul government and the provincial notables over the economic surpluses, receiving news from the provinces expectedly became more important for some individuals and groups who were involved in, for example, trade, tax farming, or money lending activities in the provinces since, these actors required news, for example, to carry their trade or money landing activities. Additionally, local notables sought a new and effective channel to voice their discontent with the Istanbul bureaucracy, which over the years found its reflection in the pages of many newspapers. In this battle, most probably, some of the local notables provided some journalists with direct financial support, as was the case between exiled Young Ottomans and Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, who was one of the successors of the Egyptian khedive.[166] Therefore, one can argue that expanding central control over rural economies formed another condition for the emergence of a newspaper culture.

The centralization of the state structure, as well as the reshaping of the economic policies through the lines of global economic competition, required the

[165] Among the dissident journalists, there were İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Tevfik, and Nuri, all of whom were part of the Young Ottoman movement. For further information on the Young Ottomans, see, Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

[166] Unfortunately, unlike historians of the British and French presses, very basic historical resources such as newspaper subscription lists or the private collections of publishing houses that reveals information such as the number of printing press workers, the income of the journalists, and their "financial providers," are not accessible for Ottoman press historians. Therefore, we can only critically use the available memoirs of some journalists to reveal the financial connections between local notables and journalists. And in most cases, our information for such connections is very limited. However, in the published letters of Namık Kemal, for example, which were sent to his family and friends when he was an exile, we gain some information on many journalists. For example, Namık Kemal mentioned that even though Ziya Pasha never accepted bribes, he received money from the khedive of Egypt when Ziya Pasha penned articles in *Hürriyet* that harshly criticized the policies of Ali Pasha. See, Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *Namık Kemal'in Hususi Mektupları,* vol.2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973), 314.

construction of Ottoman infrastructure, which was another pre-condition for a newspaper culture. The use of the steam engine for land and water transportation in the Ottoman Empire generated at least three necessary and specific conditions for the press. Firstly, steam ships carried European newspapers to Ottoman lands, allowing the Ottoman public(s) to encounter diverse news stories, opinions, and information. Secondly, even though ithe mprovement and development of roads and railroads were inadequate, with the construction of roads and railroads, inland regions were linked to the coast, their harbors, and certainly to the center of the empire. These linkages accelerated the integration of the Ottoman economy to the European economy.[167] With the development of modern transportation systems on Ottoman lands, Ottoman inlands and hence the cultivators became more open to international competitions, which, with some exceptions, generally worked against the interests of Ottoman merchants and cultivators. Local manufacturers and the Ottoman industry struggled to retain domestic markets. In this process, the commercialization of the Ottoman economy increased and therefore, I argue that the importance of acquiring news for the Ottoman merchants, peasants, as well as manufacturers became more vital. Thirdly, developing the infrastructure meant increased speed in acquiring and disseminating news, which was another necessary requirement for publishing newspapers.

The construction and improvement of a postal system was a *sine qua non*

[167] The first railroad line of the empire was constructed between Constanta and Cernavoda (within the borders of current Romania today) and opened in 1860. This line was followed by the İzmir-Aydın line in 1865. Yet, more than the railroads, the telegraph lines reached many towns and villages in distant parts of the empire. See, Yakup Bektaş, "The Sultan's Messenger: Cultural Construction of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880, *Technology and Culture*, vol.41, No.4 (Oct., 2000),671.

prerequisite for a newspaper culture in the nineteenth century Ottoman world, as newspapers reached their readers through post offices in the provinces and in the center. The first post offices of the empire were built and run by the government. As part of the centralization efforts, Sultan Mahmud II took the first step to establish a postal institution (*Posta Nezareti*) in 1832, even if this attempt resulted in failure. In 1840, however, the central state was able to establish *Posta Nezareti*. However, before that date, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha embarked on a postal project in 1832 to serve not only the state but also the Ottoman public, which was a new development for the Ottoman history.[168] Even though in practice, the Ottoman public utilized the existing postal system of the state such as the *menzilhane* systems in theory, these systems were only intended to serve the central state.[169] As Musa Çadırcı argues, up until the end of Mahmud II's reign, the central state was unable to fully control the existing postal system.[170] For example, *mültezims* and merchants of the empire continued to use the *menzil* system for carrying their post,

[168] Before the construction of the regular postal system, the Ottoman Empire had an information network based on the requirements of the state. In the pre-nineteenth century, the Ottomans had a variety of communication channels. For informing the Ottoman public, the state used official announcers and mosque preachers who disseminated news and conveyed messages to public congregation in bazaars, mosques and coffeehouses. The Ottoman Empire also had the *menzil* system in order to carry news for the state. For more information on the menzil system see, for example, Yücel Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Menzilhane Sorunu", *Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, V.28 (Ankara: 1977), 339-368.; C. H. Heywood, "Some Turkish Archival Sources for the History of the Menzilhane Network in Rumeli during the Eighteenth Century", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, No.4-5, (İstanbul: 1976-77), 39-55.

[169] The *menzilhane* system was established by the order of Grand Vizier Lütfi Pasha in the sixteenth century. In this system, riding on horseback, messengers would carry official mail, documents, and annoucement to the intented locations. The messengers would stop at certain locations called menzil to rest, have food, and fulfil other needs in order to be able to arrive the targeted destinations. The people of the regions would be responsible for the construction and the maintanence costs of the roads and stations. Previously, the *menzilhane* system aimed at only serving the needs of the state. See, for example, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme, Menziller* (Ankara: PTT Genel Müdürlüğü), 2002, 44. However, in practice, the merchants benefited from the system as well.

[170] Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin*, 73-78.

even though the state attempted to prevent such activities. [171] With the introduction of centralization policies, the state established a system that validated the current Illegal practices of the Ottoman public(s).

After constructing a road between Üsküdar and İzmit in 1832, the state started to carry mail, money, and many goods.[172] What was significant about this road was that the "public" and merchants of the empire officially began to utilize the postal service for their own trade activities, which led the Porte to construct more roads for the postal service.[173] Indeed, the main motivation for establishing the *Posta Nezareti* was not only to centrally control all postal activities of the state but also to improve trade activities in the empire.[174] In this vein, the opening of *Postahane-i Amire* in Eminönü in 1840, which was the central post office building of the new Ottoman postal system, was not a coincidence, as the building was centrally located and close to the trade centers and the shore. The demands of the merchants for postal services, and the Porte's choice for the location of the main postal building, invalidates the assumptions of the conventional Ottoman historiography, which asserts that due to a lack of sufficient economic activities, a bourgeoisie class and therefore a press culture did not develop in the Ottoman

[171] Halaçoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme*, 43-44.

[172] Nesimi Yazıcı, argues that this service was used only by merchants and not by the whole public. See, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Haberleşme Kurumu", 144.

[173] Beginning from 1841, Ottoman post offices began to carry *emanet* and sürre akçası in order to facilitate trade activities. See, ibid., 164. *Emanet akçası* was a type of money that was carried by the postal system. It is for this reason that it is called as an *emanet* (trust). Similarly, *sürre akçası* was a term used by the Ottoman public to to name a type of gold money issued by Mahmud II in 1822 and 1823. See Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, cilt.3 (Ankara: 1983), 283.

[174] Nesimi Yazıcı, "Posta Nezaretinin Kuruluşu" in *Çağını Yakalayan Osmanlı: Osmanlı Devletinde Modern Haberleşme ve Ulaştırma Teknikleri*, eds. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Mustafa Kaçar (İstanbul: Ircica, 1995), 43.

Empire up until the state imposed the Westernization program of the nineteenth century.[175]

Beginning in 1840, the routes and stations of the post offices were fixed and many new post offices were established outside of Istanbul to ensure regular postal service for the provinces.[176] By 1868, the number of post offices in the Anatolian region of the empire alone rose to 142.[177] This was a very significant development for transmitting and acquiring news with speed and reliability across a vast geography. Therefore, the construction of a regular postal service was fundamental for the emergence of a periodical press.[178] Courier networks and the postal service ensured regular transmission of news even if it was not as fast as expected due to the conditions of the roads. On the other hand, the impediments posed by the road condition were overcome partly by the construction of railroads, even if they were inadequate for the vast lands of the empire. The first railway line of the empire began operating in 1856 just before the spread of private newspapers, which accelerated the development of the press culture as well.

The infrastructure of the empire and therefore the development of a newspaper culture would be incomplete without telegraph lines, which in this period was the fastest method for acquiring and spreading information.

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[175] For this argument, for example, see Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*.

[176] For example, the post offices of İstanbul were followed by ones established in Edirne, Bursa, Maçin, Varna, Filibe, Salonika, Serez, Niş, Yanya, Ankara, Kayseri, Konya, Adana, Aleppo, Damascus, İzmir, Aydın, Trabzon, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Bagdad, Mosul and many others between 1840 and 1849. See Yazıcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Haberleşme Kurumu", 153-161. The fast and continued increase in the post office openings across a diverse geography provided one of the necessary infrastructures that would facilitate the distribution of newspapers.

[177] Yazıcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı", 159.

[178] The Department of Ottoman Postal Services submitted advertisements to newspapers announcing that it would carry newspapers. Nesimi Yazıcı, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı," 164.

Construction of the first telegraph line in the Ottoman Empire began during the Crimean War of 1854. The telegraph was intended to secure the communication lines of the British and the French with their governments, who joined the war as the allies of the Ottoman Empire. This line linked Istanbul to Europe when the world's first telegraph line opened to commerce between Paddington and Drayton in 1839.[179] Like its counterparts in the Europe, this line obviously was not commercial.[180] On the contrary, the first attempts to construct telegraph lines were initiated during the reign of Mahmud II, as he looked to develop rapid communication for military purposes. The telegraph lines of the empire provided speed in acquiring and spreading news for the government, a development that assisted the centralization of the government's power. Ironically, even if the government intended to be the main beneficiary of the telegraph system, telegrams assisted the spread of dissatisfaction of government policies.[181] With the help of news acquired from telegraphs, newspapers expectedly provided the principal medium to reflect discontent of the public.

On another level, the coming of the telegraph system to the Ottoman Empire

[179] Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire" in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1990), 133.

[180] Indeed, in almost all of Europe with the exception of Britain, the use of telegraph lines was under the control of government bureaucracies. In the United States, however, the improvement of telegraph lines followed a different path and these lines mostly were operated independently from the governments. The first experimental commercial line began in 1845 between Baltimore and Washington. It was founded by Morse, who was the inventor of the telegraph, with the help of post offices. This commercial attempt ultimately resulted in failure. In 1855, however, Western Union Company was formed by numerous small telegraph companies, which served nation wide. See, John R. McNamara, *The economics of Innovation in the Telecommmunications Industry* (New York: Quorum, 1991), 10.

[181] For example, a group of merchants in Bursa petitioned the government and demanded a new telegraph line that would operate between Bursa and Istanbul. See, Asaf Tanrıkut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf ve Telefon Tarihi ve Teşkilat ve Mevzuat* (Ankara: 1984), 579.

provided a significant requirement for publishing newspapers. Groups and individuals who were involved in trade activities and stock markets benefited from the news that was acquired through telegrams.[182] Speed and day to day news on international affairs, wars, and weather conditions that could affect crop conditions, exchange rates, stock prices, and secure loans reached merchants and stock brokers through newspapers. These mediums acquired up to date news via telegraph systems. Acquiring news from worldwide news agencies was a product of telegraph lines as well. The first news agencies were founded as early as the sixteenth century in Europe. With the publication of newspapers in the nineteenth century, global news agencies such as Havas and Reuters started to serve in the Ottoman Empire.[183] Two of the first private newspapers of the empire, namely *İstikbâl* and *Vakit*, served news that was acquired from Havas and Reuters. Ultimately, the advent of the telegraph in the empire assisted the development of a press culture.

In many respects, the development of printing and publishing activities, which included more advanced printing techniques, and an increase in the number of books produced and publishing houses, assisted the emergence of a press culture in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the printing press in the Ottoman Empire in 1727 did not immediately lead to the publishing of newspapers or journals.[184] Yet, with the changing social, political, and economic

[182] Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph", 154.

[183] For how global news agencies as early as the nineteenth century divided the world, including the Middle East, among themselves and controlled the flow of international news, see Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, "The Globalization of News" in *The Globalization of News*, eds. Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (London: Sage, 1998), 1-14.

[184] Indeed, the first printing press of the empire was established by the rabbi Gerson in 1483 in Istanbul, a time when the printing press started to spread in Europe as well. Therefore, it

relationships and surfacing discontent in Ottoman society, the once forgotten printing press was remembered by many Ottomans and was brought into the social arena, producing more published materials for the nineteenth century Ottoman public.[185] İlber Ortaylı argues that the most significant development of the Tanzimat era, which deserves special interest, was the emergence and subsequent development of book and newspaper publications.[186] Similarly, Johann Strauss argues that the changes that occurred in the printing and publishing domains were more apparent than the economic and political spheres of the Tanzimat era as all communities alike benefited from the developments experienced in the publishing and printing fields. He asserts that the development of the printing and publishing fields must be regarded as the collective effort of all of the communities.[187] By producing the discourse of the state or criticizing the current politics, these

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was not something imported from Europe but rather it was a technology established by the Jews in the Ottoman Empire. See, Alpay Kabacalı, *Cumhuriyet Öncesi ve Sonrası Matbaa ve Basın Sanayii* (İstanbul: Cem, 1998), 9. According to the conventional Ottoman historiography, the late coming of the newspaper, like the printing press to Ottoman culture, emanated from the fact that the Ottomans lacked the internal dynamics that would create demands for published materials. Only after acknowledging its "backwardness" when compared to the West, the empire adopted the printing press. Similarly, the publishing of newspapers had to wait until the modernization period when the empire initiated its Westernization program. For this sort of an argument, see, for example, Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie,* 119. This type of an argument can also be found in popular history books that targets general readers. See for example, Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Prennial, 2003). Particularly for publishing and printing activities, see Lewis, 50-51 and 142-145.

[185] Until the second half of the nineteenth century, book production remained low like the number of printing houses. Between 1729 and 1875, 151 printing houses were founded. See, Jale Baysal, *Müteferrika'dan Birinci Meşrutiyet'e Kadar Osmanlı Türklerinin Bastıkları Kitaplar*, (İstanbul, 1968). Newly established schools of the empire created a demand for more books and printed materials even before the second half of the nineteenth century. As the demand increased for published materials, one of the most important preconditions for a newspaper culture emerged: potential readers.

[186] İlber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Devri Basını", 489. Ortaylı asserts that the Ottoman public became readers not by reading books but rather by reading newspapers and journals. See, ibid, 490.

[187] For example, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks, like Turks, published newspapers. See, Johann Strauss, "'Kütüp ve Resail-i Mevkute", 225.

communities published journals and newspapers that contributed to the development of a press culture.

The bureaucratic policies of the Porte, in forming a more centralized state structure, helped prepare the necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of a newspaper culture, a culture that conveyed open approval or criticisms of state policies by redefining the state's roles and interests in adjusting to changing conditions. The centralization policies of the state affected the newspaper culture on many significant yet related levels. First of all, the centralization policies of the Istanbul bureaucracy engendered discontent among many groups such as workers, local notables, merchants, artisans, who utilized newspapers to express their opposition to the government policies.[188] Secondly and ironically, the support received by the Ottoman governments from Europeans to develop a more centralized state structure generated opposition against Europeans, oppositions which found their reflections in the pages of newspapers.[189] Thirdly, the infrastructure that was developed for centralization brought necessary technological innovations and developments for newspaper publishing.

Furthermore, after the publication of newspapers, the subsidies that were offered to dissidents and also foreign journalists were used to control and silence oppositional voices, which could be considered as part of a newspaper culture since

[188] For example, a dissident group of people called the Young Ottomans published many newspapers such as *Muhbir* (1867) and *Hürriyet* (1868) abroad and in Ottoman lands to challenge the governments' policies. In these newspapers, dissident journalists reflected such groups' voices.

[189] See, for example, Namık Kemal, "Avrupa Şarkı Bilmez", *İbret*, , 16 Rebiülahir 1289 (22 June 1872), No:7; Namık Kemal, "Konsoloslar", *İbret*, 15 Şevval 1289 (16 December 1872), No: 72; particularly in the case of the Ottoman finance see, for example, "Devlet-i Âliye Mukrizleri", *İstikbal*, 11 Ramazan 1292 (11 October 1875), No:45; "Müsade Mazarratı", *İstikbal*, 26 Ramazan 1292 (26 October 1875), No:58.

this method of control generated the reproduction of government discourses through newspapers.[190] Thus, as I contend in this dissertation, the appearance of newspaper publishing activities did not emanate from the Westernization policies of the state. Very ironically for the Porte, the newspaper culture of the empire emerged, on the one hand, due to the materially more advanced environment with its roads, telegraph lines, and postal system created by the state. On the other hand, I argue, the press culture of the empire emerged due to the new conditions that emanated from the centralization policies and displeasure, dissatisfaction, and therefore opposition against the Porte that were the products of those very centralization policies in different parts of the Ottoman public.

### 4. Between Past and Present: Evoking Tradition through a New Medium

With its centralization policies, the Ottoman state played a much more central role in the development of a press culture than what was observed in Europe, as the Ottoman state both directly and indirectly engaged in activities that would affect the press and its social surroundings.[191] The state not only published

[190] The Ottoman state subsidized many European newspapers and bribed many journalists to promote Ottoman policies. Among many documents on subsidies see, for example, BOA, İ.HR, 241/14325, 7 Şevval 1286 (9 September 1870); İ.HR, 245/14557, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1287 (7 August 1870); 236/14026; 236/14017, 17 Muharrem 1286 (29 April 1869), 236/14018, 17 Muharrem 1286 (29 April 1869); 232/13681 2 Rebiyülevvel 1285(23 June 1868); 232/13651, 19 Safer 1285 (11 June 1868); 230/13510, 7 Zilkade 1284 (2 March 1868); 163/8757 3 Cemaziyelahir 1275(9 January 1859); HR.MKT, 295/24, 1 Zilhicce 1275(2 July 1859); A.AMD, 59/100 (1271). To control the Ottoman press, the governments subsidized Ottoman newspapers as well. See, for example, BOA, C.MF, 162/8095, 6 Receb 1261(12 July 1845); HR.MKT, 58/78/1; I.HR, 26/1239, 19 Receb 1260 (4 August 1844).

the first Ottoman newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, provided press machines for newspapers such as *Ceride-i Havadis*, and subsidized many of the Ottoman and foreign newspapers, but also, even if it was not intentional, accelerated the emergence of the social, political, and economic conditions essential for a newspaper culture. Yet, by no means does this dissertation suggest that publishing an official newspaper or providing the technical means for newspaper publishing created a press culture. The Ottoman state only, to some extent, assisted the development of a press culture.

As I discussed above, this role only partially emanated from the modernization policies of the state, policies that resulted in, for example, the construction of additional educational institutions and therefore the expansion of literacy in the Ottoman public.[192] Contrary to the arguments of the traditional historiography, this dissertation argues that newspaper publishing was a matter of controlling and shaping the public compatible with the centralizing state policies rather than creating a modern and Westernized public. In this framework, even though it was before the proclamation of the Tanzimat, the state-initiated publication of the first Ottoman newspaper in 1831 was part of the first reflections of the centralizing and bourgeoning state structure and changing economic, social and political relationships in the empire.

For the state, news publishing was significant for many reasons. First, the

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[191] The role played by the Chinese state in newspaper publishing was very similar to the Ottoman state. See, for example, Stephen R. MacKinnon, "Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period," *Modern China*, Vol.23, No.1 (Jan 1997), 3-32.

[192] By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the literacy rate among Muslims rose to 15 percent. See Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169.

state utilized the newspapers as a supplement to the existing system of official communication. Through the official newspaper, the state kept officials all over the Empire informed. For example, it published both the promotions of bureaucrats and the proclamation of imperial orders (fermans) in *Takvim-i Vekayi*. Secondly, the press was among one of the first political and social instruments to justify the sultan's power and public image of the state.[193] Thirdly, threatened by ethnic and political unrest, the Ottoman state regarded the press as a vehicle that supported the empire's political unity.

Published weekly, *Takvim-i Vekayi* from its inception was closely tied to and reflected the state's policies.[194] It compiled news on state regulations, state affairs, announcements, fetvas, official appointments, promotions, and lists of officials who received state medals. Furthermore, it published news on current, local, and international events and developments such as wars, upheavals and diplomacy, and trade affairs. For example, the first issue of *Takvim-i Vekayi* included such news as Sultan Mahmud II's earlier trip to Dardanelles (Çanakkale), a fire in Tatavla, upheavals both inside and outside of the Ottoman lands like Albania and Poland, and a ceremony that was organized to celebrate the beginning of Prince Abdülmecit's formal school studies.[195] According to the lead article, the

[193] For other ways of legitimization of sultanic power, see Donald Quataert, "Clothing Laws, State and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829," *IJMES*, 29 (1997), 403-425 and Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Welfare: Philanthropy, Voluntarism and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1914" (PhD dis., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2001).

[194] However, the publication of *Takvim-i Vekayi* was not regular.

[195] *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no: 1, November 1, 1831.

newspaper was "going to consist of two parts:"[196] the first would include official news concerning the internal affairs of the high bureaucrats, while the second would contain articles on science, education, industry, and commerce. Since the newspaper consisted not only of news on internal events but also articles and news on science, history, geography and literature, many historians presented and analyzed *Takvim-i Vekayi* as a vehicle for educating the Ottoman public.[197] Yet, the information that *Takvim-i Vekayi* provided for the Ottoman public and the discourses of the news, expectedly, reproduced the ideology of the state. For example, when *Takvim-i Vekayi* mentioned the annihilation of janissaries, it presented janissaries as members of a turbulent class that damaged the order of the Porte.[198] Even seven years after the event, in order to prevent the revival of positive images on janissaries, *Takvim-i Vekayi* published news stating that two janissaries were revived as vampires in Tırnova.[199] Therefore, if the newspaper was the vehicle for educating the Ottoman public, it was a in way that sought to control and to shape its subjects/citizens.

Expectedly, the editors of the newspaper were state bureaucrats who would produce and apply state policies to bring public opinion in line with the state.[200] For example, when the state's publishing house Takvimhane-i Amire was established

[196] Ibid.

[197] Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Devri Basını", 490. İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri*, 4.

[198] "….itlaf beytülmalından gayrı bir işleri olmayarak devlet-i aliyyeye zararları tebeyyün edip nizamları bozulup azmış olan eski sınıfı ilga…"Quoted in Koloğlu, *Takvimi vekayi : Türk basınında 150 yıl 1831-1981* (Ankara : Çağdaş Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1981), 69 and also see *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no:4.

[199] See, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, No:68, 19 Rebiülevvel 1249 (6 August 1833).

[200] For the list of these editors see, Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, *Tarih-i Lütfi*, v.3, 156-160.

for publishing *Takvim-i Vekayi*, Esad Efendi was appointed the head of the publishing house. Esad Efendi was the official historian (*vaka'nüvis*) of the state who, using the state's discourse, wrote the conventional version of the annihilation of janissaries, *Üss'ü Zafer*, and published many articles in *Takvim-i Vekayi*, including the introductory article of the paper.[201] Expectedly, these state bureaucrats tried to establish an effective discourse to legitimize prevailing state policies. Such an editorial policy overlapped with the state's purpose in publishing an official newspaper, which would reflect the voice of the state. Indeed, in one of the issues of the newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi* asserted that the pages of the newspaper could be considered as the "mirror" of the Sultan.[202] Not surprisingly, the main news source of the newspaper was the state authority, a source that could only be one necessary source among the others in news publishing practice. This reliance on state sources for the information and dissemination of information through the official newspaper, on the one hand provided self-censorship for the editors of *Takvim-i Vekayi*. On the other hand, it prevented the development of the concept of "news", which was the reformulation of information as a source for the reading public(s) about what was really going on within the Ottoman society. Yet, to some extent, the development of news as a commodity, which helped the continuation and development of financial affairs and was distributed for the purpose of trade, was established by the official newspapers.

[201] Most probably, Esad Efendi was the writer of "the news" on revived janissaries in Tırnova. Without publishing his name under the article, he penned the introduction of the paper (*Mukaddime)* as well. Based on the discourse of the article, Selim Nüzhet Gerçek and Nesimi Yazıcı assert that Mukaddime was written by Esad Efendi. See Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, *Türk Gazeteciliği, Yüzüncü Yıl Dönümü Vesilesiyle* (İstanbul: 1931). Yazıcı, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 3.

[202] Koloğlu, *Takvim-i Vekayi* ..., 9, *Takvim-i Vekayi* No:12

The Ottoman state published *Takvim-i Vekayi* both to foster a sense of belonging among its subjects/citizens and to subdue public resistance in an era of ethnic revolts as well. In this sense, the news publishing activities of the state attempted to construct the idea of Ottoman citizenship, an idea that was controlled and regulated by the state. Thus the reaffirmation of the power of the state was expected to be achieved through the application of new discourses, yet with the intention of evoking the past memories of traditional state power. When *Takvim-i Vekayi* published news on insurrections, revolutions, and upheavals or any movements against the states in Europe, for example, it described events with such words like *fesad* (intrigue), *fitne* (disorder), *fetret* (interregnum).[203] In this vein, during the Polish upheaval of 1830, *Takvimi Vekayi* supported and reflected the official Russian view. It described the Polish public, which demanded its independence from the Russian state, as a public composed of people who were "deceived and fooled" and therefore lost their directions.[204] Similarly, the Porte used *Takvim-i Vekayi* to relieve the possible concerns of the Ottoman public that might have stemmed from the European newspapers' articles on the possible disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to the claims made by European newspapers about the future demise of the Ottoman Empire, *Takvim-i Vekayi* argued that the empire was powerful enough to survive.[205] Furthermore, *Takvim-i Vekayi* consistently emphasized the continuity of the Ottoman state.[206] The Porte

[203] *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no: 1, 9, 38, 47 also cited by Koloğlu, ibid., 137.

[204] *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no: 4 also cited by Koloğlu, ibid., 137.

[205] *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no: 8 also cited by Koloğlu, ibid., 81.

[206] For example, *Takvim-i Vekayi* used expressions like *Devlet aliyye-i ebed beka* (eternal

nonetheless looked to do more than merely consolidate the Empire's integrity; it sought to provide an impulse for the creation of public opinions that supported the state's political and economic decisions and policies. By including news on trade and commerce in *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the state reassured the Ottoman public, for example, about the adequacy of provisions or the government's "all-encompassing ability" to control crop prices and to avert the smuggling of some crops such as opium and tobacco.[207]

With the intention of acquiring the support of Ottoman publics, the newspaper was published in the languages of different ethnic groups in Ottoman society, such as Armenian, Arabic, and Greek. Moreover, it was also published in foreign languages like Persian and French.[208] For example, the French version of *Takvim-i Vekayi* called *Moniteur Ottoman* was published to promote the Porte's propaganda against Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt, who revolted against the Istanbul government to declare the independence of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.[209] By publishing a French language version of *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the state sought to inform and influence European public opinion, or at least the European states. With this act, the Porte intended to prove to the Europeans that the Ottoman Empire was

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endurance) (no: 44, 74, 99), *Devlet aliyye-i ebed müddet* (no: 68 and 141), *Saltanat seniye-i ebed kıyam* (eternal rising) (no:107)" quoted in Koloğlu, ibid., 91.

[207] Koloğlu provides some news on provisions in many issues of *Takvim-i Vekayi*, including issues 5, 30 and 35. See, ibid., 148-149.

[208] Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, "Takvim-i Vekayi", *Aylık Ansiklopedi*, (İstanbul: 1945), v.1, 189-91. Based on archival documents, Cengiz Orhonlu showed that *Takvim-i Vekayi* was published in Persian. See, "Türkçe Yayınlanan İlk Gazete Takvim-i Vekayi," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, v.1, no:6 (İstanbul: 1968), 35-9.

[209] According to Koloğlu, *Moniteur Ottoman* succeeded in effectively promoting the Ottomans' interests. This development led Mehmet Ali Pasha to publish *Moniteur Egyptien*. See, Koloğlu, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 36.

capable of utilizing one of the supposed engines of modernization: the newspaper.[210]

The publication of an official newspaper by the state indicated the acceptance or existence of, at least, an emerging, politically oriented public. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, public opinion became a more implicit concern for the Ottoman state as it was in Europe.[211] While observing the European press and seeking ways to influence European public opinion through their own newspapers were long recognized and utilized practices for the Ottoman state, the idea of influencing the Ottoman public was a new phenomenon.[212] Even though *Takvim-i Vekayi,* with a circulation rate of 5,000 in Ottoman language, reached only a limited number of readers who were primarily composed of state bureaucrats, prayer leaders (imam) and teachers, the newspaper had officially recognized the significance of the Ottoman public and sought ways to communicate with it.[213]

In the first issue of *Takvim-i Vekayi,* for example, state officials emphasized the significance of informing the Ottoman public. The lead article stated that the

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[210] As we have seen above, the Ottoman Empire used many methods, such as subsidizing European newspapers, to create positive images of the Ottomans in the imagination of the Europeans.

[211] The concept of public opinion appeared in late eighteenth century in Europe and concerns with the masses and their opinions became visible in the early nineteenth century. See, Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, *A Social History of the Media* Burke, 1. Similarly, governmental policies that looked to influence public opinions began to take shape in the nineteenth century.

[212] Cengiz Kırlı argues that even though the term "public opinion" was not part of the political discourse before the 1860s, the Ottoman governments, beginning from 1830s, invoked the term as a source of legitimacy. See, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008), 17. From this point, I contend that the idea of "informing", influencing, and manipulating the public through the assistance of press was a new phenomenon.

[213] For the circulation rate of *Takvim-i Vekayi* and its subscribers see, BOA, HAT, 48157, undated: "…..reâya vesâireye dahî münâsibi vechile îtâ kılınmak üzere icrâsı ber-vech-i tahmin 5000'e karîb *Takvim-i Vekayi* neşri melhûz olup ancak masârifât-ı vâkıa-i mâlûmesinin idâresi zımnında bir senede neşr olunacak nüshanın evvel emirde mahallerinden bahâlarının tahsîli lüzûmuna mebnî bu defâ tab' oluncak mukaddimenin 5000 mikdârı…"

Ottoman public was composed of people whose support should be secured by making them "acquainted with the real nature of events."[214] Similarly, from the outset, the reports on trade and provisions were ways of constructing communication with the public. Over the years, in the pages of *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the state sought to develop communication with its public not only by trying to increase the subscription rate of the paper by attempting to resolve the concrete and visible problems of *Takvim-i Vekayi* such as poor quality of the print, misspelled words, irregular publication and distribution of the paper in the provinces, but also by publishing more and more news that could prove useful for many groups such as merchants. [215] Furthermore, the Porte sent newspapers the announcement of the governmental decision on increasing the wages of day laborers.[216] This action also showed the government's awareness of this reading public(s). The Ottoman government explicitly sought ways in which it could form, manipulate, and negotiate with the public. However, with its dull content and overly sophisticated language, a language which was very close to the one used in official state documents, *Takvim-i Vekayi* neither appealed to nor reflected the primary concerns of the Ottoman reading public and contributed minimally to the maturation of an Ottoman print culture.

[214] *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no: 1, November 1, 1831.

[215] In 1863, for example, the state ordered the publication of weather forecasts in *Takvim-i Vekayi*. See, BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 281/35, 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1280 (6 November 1863). Through such reports, state officials hoped to obtain the support of groups who acquired their wealth in commercial activities and in investing in public funds such as traders, bankers, and stockbrokers. Thus, the government used newspapers to broaden their influence among increasingly powerful segments of the population. For the attempts of resolving material problems of the paper see, for example, BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, Dosya 76, 21 Şevval 1254 (7 January 1839).

[216] See, BOA, ID.H, 1290/101474, 18 Receb 1275.

Indeed, it could be argued that by publishing a newspaper, the state extended the Ottoman tradition of employing official historiographers for representing the state's view to contemporary and future generations in a new medium. Through such a new medium, the state tried to re-construct its "news providing"[217] role, a role that was shattered by the foreign newspapers when foreign newspapers were published and circulated throughout the empire. For the state, the issue was, therefore, not the question of how far it could provide news for the public and whether its news was identical or compatible with the new medium, but rather, how the state could create a tradition evoking newspaper as a political resource for legitimizing its new centralization and modernization policies. In this process, recognizing an Ottoman public was the most significant pre-condition for publishing a newspaper that would create ways to communicate with the Ottoman public(s). Yet, describing a public in detail and claiming to speak on behalf of supposed or imagined public(s) and their opinions on public affairs which were spurred by "economic concerns" was another story that was written by privately owned newspapers, which will be the story of the next chapters.[218]

[217] Prior to newspaper publishing in the Ottoman Empire, the state maintained an alleged monopoly in informing the public and shaping public opinion through proclamations issued by local and imperial magistrates, and public announcements at bazaars, coffeehouses, mosques. Yet, the empire never had full control and was not the sole actor for proving and disseminating news to the public, since the Ottoman public and particularly merchants illegally used official postal systems such as the *ulak* and *menzilhane* systems. For more information regarding the linkages between communication systems and possible dissent, please reference footnotes 169 and 172 in this chapter.

[218] According to Habermas, a bourgeois public sphere emerged to articulate its own opinions on public affairs in the eighteenth century in Europe. This Western and bourgeois public sphere, which used newspapers for discursive interaction, emerged during an ideal process that was spurred by principally economic factors. See, Habermas, ibid. Yet, this concept of the public sphere received many criticisms for being an ideal one and therefore the possibility of its existence was refuted. For one of the most powerful critics of Habermas and the application in history of his conceptualization see, for example, Harold Mah, "Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians", *The Journal of Modern History*, vol.72 (March 2000), 153-182. Even

though we cannot claim the existence or emergence in the Habermasian sense of a bourgeois public sphere in Ottoman society or maybe in any given society, in this dissertation, I argue that newspapers emerged as an arena that spurred by economic and political concerns to articulate maybe not the exact concerns of the Ottoman public(s) but the possible concerns of that very public(s). Thus, I argue that the private Ottoman newspapers constituted an intermediary between public(s) and the members of ruling circles.

## Chapter Two

## News Publishing as a Means for Reflecting Public Opinion?: The First Private Newspapers of the Ottoman Empire and the Idea of News

### 1. Introduction

While the newspaper of state, *Takvim-i Vekâyi* (1831), published mainly but not exclusively imperial edicts and news reports on the promotions and travels of high-ranking members of the bureaucracy, the first private and non-subsidized papers of the empire provided news reports on daily current events. These dispatches included such subjects as public health, for example the spread of plague in Anatolia or Syrian region, city related news such as police reports on burglaries and stabbings, accidents, fires in Istanbul, the problem of the increasing numbers of beggars, and, expectedly, war reports and reports on social and political upheavals.[219] During the periods when the private newspapers had to publish

[219] For more information concerning these references, as well as additional examples of similar news reports, see the following citations. Concerning the plague in Alexandria, see *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 21 safer 1282 (14 July 1865), No:315; in Istanbul, see *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 24 Safer 1282 (17 July 1865), No:316. For the drought in Edirne, see *Hadika*, 8 Ramazan 1289 (9 November 1872), No:1.Regarding how rainfall in Beirut increased the hopes for a robust, expected harvest, see *İbret*, 12 Şevval 1289 (13 December 1872), No:73. For a story about a boat fire, see *İbret,* 21 Zilkade 1289 (21 January 1873), No:97. Regarding the issue of burglary, see *İbret*, 22 Zilkade 1289 (22 January 1873), No:98. Concerning the outbreak of war in the Balkans in Montenegro, see, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 15 Muharrem 1279 (25 March 1872), No:2. For a story on how a 12 year-old child accidently died when he fell down a well, see *İstikbâl*, 19 Ramazan 1292 (19 October 1875), No:52.

official announcements (*ilân-ı resmiye*), newspaper editors frequently either wrote their own comments just below the announcements or published their comments on the following day.[220] When the editors penned these comments, however, they did not hesitate to criticize the government.

Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, one of the most captivating ways of criticizing the Porte and its policies was publishing not only newspaper articles but also news reports. Therefore, the history of opposition to the Tanzimat governments was partly molded and defined by the private newspapers. News reports and articles defined the parameters of the Ottoman journalists' political and financial opposition to the Porte. The mild to bitter critiques of these journalists shaped this opposition in a society that newly formed an acquaintance with newspaper press. In the critiques of the first private Ottoman newspapers, the form and structure of periodical news reports and articles undermined the information production of the state and sometimes of the foreign newspapers, even if these two information producers were not the sole and absolute producers of news in the empire.[221] The private newspapers eroded the knowledge production of the state as the readers received unofficial news reports written with more accessible language. This erosion was partly shaped by the periodicity of the

[220] For such comments see, for example, *İbret*, 24 Şaban 1289 (27 October 1872), No:39; *Hadika*, 23 Zilkade 1289 (23 January 1873), No:57; *İstikbâl*, 14 Rebiülevvel 1293 (9 April 1876), No:108; *İstikbâl*, No:162.

[221] In the newspaper series published in installments in Yeni *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1909 and in which Ebüzziya Tevfik provided an account on the history of Young Ottomans, it was mentioned that accessibility to news was limited to some people from the Beyoğlu district of İstanbul who had contacts with Europeans. Therefore, Ebüzziya Tevfik argued, even though the news was exaggerated by these people or provided limited information, the Ottoman public benefited from this news, since it was a source of information. See, Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, v.1, (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1973), 21.

newspapers or, in other terms, through periodical news, readers received constant news reports on their surroundings from the perspective of private interests rather than the state.[222] Maybe the most important aspect of these news reports, however, was the journalists' approach to news writing and publishing and how they drew a line between information and commentary.

In the initial part of this chapter, I will first analyze the meaning of news and newspapers for Ottoman journalists in a time span starting from 1862 and ending with the bankruptcy of empire in 1875. By focusing on the news and articles regarding the Ottoman finance and economy and the news making style of the journalists, I will analyze whether or not the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl* utilized an impartial and objective news reporting style to provide up to the date news for their readers. Furthermore, I will analyze the possible reasons for impartiality or a biased news-making style when the editors decided to cover *newsworthy* financial and economic events. In this vein, I will also reveal the news selection criteria of these newspapers. In so doing, it is possible to conclude that these newspapers provided news reports for diverse parts of the society and hence

[222] C. John Sommerville argues that publishing periodical news means, among other things, creating expectations to read tomorrow's events, pushing for change in the society and expectations from government, creating excitement for further news in the reader, presenting reports in terms of facts, and relating everything possible to politics. See, *The News Revolution in England*, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9. As I will discuss in this chapter, such motives or agendas were, to some extent, also apparent in the Ottoman press of the period. Still, caution is needed when using Sommerville and his ideas on the rise of the British press as inspiration for analyzing the private newspapers of the Ottoman Empire. First, one must critically negotiate Sommerville's arguments according to Ottoman conditions and contexts. The rise of the British press, according to Sommerville, was a rise overwhelmingly driven by profit motive. In contrast, as I reveal throughout the dissertation, the rise of the Ottoman press was one largely linked to the emergence of a political culture that looked both to criticize and to negotiate with the state through a new tool, newspapers. In the Ottoman context, publishing periodical news was mainly about creating constant doubts or approval about the government's politics and policies.

sought to be consumed by a variety of readers rather than solely fulfilling the news expectations of the elites of the Ottoman society, as argued by both the conventional and revisionist Ottoman historiographies. Furthermore, it is possible to situate the meaning of the news in the Ottoman context.

In the second part of this chapter, first, I will analyze how the discontent that stemmed from the Tanzimat policies affected the news-making and reporting styles of the journalists. Second, I will discuss the ways in which the worldview of the journalists influenced the journalists' approach to news.

## 2. The Meaning of News

Rather than state sponsored publications, non-subsidized (private) newspapers were instrumental actors in the development of a distinct, Ottoman print culture. Through these non-official newspapers, the journalists vocalized both their own and the conceived Ottoman public(s) demands and concerns about how to distribute the sources and produced wealth of the empire in the middle of the financial crises between 1862 and 1875. In the process of articulating the problems and demands of a "conceived public(s)", the conceptualization of news and the public changed over time as the content and layouts of the papers varied and improved. The reporting style and the interpretation of financial and economic news in nineteenth century Ottoman newspapers reveal the tensions in the society as well as with the central government.

### 2.1 News as a concept

The first private newspapers of the empire offered a skeletal narrative of major public events including wars, foreign affairs such as diplomatic controversies, and negotiations, economic and financial developments and problems related to commerce, security bonds, and taxation, droughts in Anatolia, and political occurrences within the state such as the promotion of bureaucrats and soldiers, edicts and the official visits of sultans and bureaucrats. Twice a week, the owner and the main editor of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* İbrahim Şinasi, for example, like his contemporaries in Istanbul, selected news reports on subjects such as the activities of members of high echelons like the travels of Sultan Abdülaziz and the promotions of bureaucrats and soldiers. İbrahim Şinasi conversely devoted only minor space for such news reports, and subjects that were mainly the concern of supposed public(s) took more space in the newspaper. These subjects varied and included news reports on fires, public upheavals, taxation, crop production, commerce, the establishment of new schools, roads, railways; news on health related concerns, such as cholera outbreaks and doctors' and pharmacists' malpractices; news on diverse countries, some of which were Russia, Italy, Spain, France, England, America, Mexico, China, Japan, Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark; and wrote articles to make up the next issue of his newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkâr*.[223] As İbrahim Şinasi sorted through the news from

[223] For more information concerning these references, as well as additional examples of similar news reports, see the following citations. For the travel of Abdülaziz to Egypt, see 16 Şevval 1279 (5 April 1863), No:81; 20 Şevval 1279 (9 April 1863), No:82; 4 Zilkade 1279 (22 April 1863), No:86. For his travel to Europe and arrangements for the trip, see, for example, 23 Muharrem 1284

correspondents and the foreign newspapers that he collected in Istanbul and that were published mostly in French, he attempted to compose a picture of the political reality of the empire for the readers of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the first issue of which was published in 1862. On the one hand, this picture had to be comprehensive enough to acquire and maintain readers. On the other hand, the picture also had to be acceptable to governments that, maybe not completely but typically, controlled the flow of news and the distribution of newspapers throughout the empire.[224] The

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(27 May 1867), No:486; 3 Safer 1284 (6 July 1867), No:489; 21 Safer 1284 (24 July 1867), No:494; 28 Safer 1284 (1 August 1867), No:496. For promotions of the officials see, for example, 15 Muharrem 1279 (12 July 1862), No:5; 25 Safer 1279 (21 August 1862), No:16; 2 Rebiülevvel 1279 (27 August 1862), No:18; 12 Recep 1279 (2 January 1863), No:54; 28 Şaban 1279 (17 February 1863), No: 67; 24 Rebiülahir 1280 (8 October 1863), No:134. Regarding fires, see, for example, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1279 (30 October 1862) No:45; 27 Safer 1280 (12 August 1863), No:118; 16 Rebiülevvel 1280 (1 September 1863), No:123; 16 Rebiülahir 1282 (6 September 1865), No:328. For reports on agricultural production, see, for example, 13 Şevval 1279 (2 April 1863), No:80, 24 Recep 1280 (4 January 1864), No:159, 23 Zilkade 1280 (30 April 1864), No:198, 14 Muharrem 1282 (6 July 1865), No:305. For reports on damages on harvests caused by a grasshopper invasion, floods and drought see, for example, 11 Rebiülahir 1279 (5 October 1862), No:29, 26 Recep 1282 (14 December 1865), No:353, 6 Rebiülevvel 1283 (19 July 1866), No:406, 11 Şaban 1283 (18 December 1283), No:444, 6 Rebiülevvel 1286 (16 June 1869), No:727, 18 Cemaziyelevvel 1286 (26 August 1869), No:738. For news on taxes, export, and import, see, for example, 13 Rebiülevvel 1279 (7 September 1862), No:21, 23 Rebiülevvel 1280 (8 September 1863), No:125, 15 Şaban 1280 (24 January 1864), No:165, 30 Cemaziyelevvel 1281 (31 October 1864), No:243, 29 Şaban 1283 (5 January 1867), No:449.

[224] Since the state was unable to control the foreign postal system that functioned throughout the empire, its ability to control the flow and distribution of news was not absolute. When the Porte attempted to place strict control over the press to prevent any kind of opposition, (as was the case when many Young Ottomans had to flee to Europe and publish their newspapers like *Hürriyet*, *İttihad* and *İnkılâb* as exiles in London, Paris and Geneva,) these journalists found ways to circulate their newspapers through many different underground methods, such as the foreign postal system that functioned in the Ottoman Empire, and the bookstores and tobacco shops that clandestinely sold banned pamphlets, newspapers, and books. For example, in his memoirs, Ebüzziya Tevfik references a bookstore in the Beyoğlu district of İstanbul. The bookstore, called Roth, served the Young Ottomans, circulating their newspapers and pamphlets, bringing books from Europe, and selling these books with very inexpensive prices. Tevfik remarked that the number of young people who went to that bookstore on Fridays, "without exaggeration", were more than the number of people who went to the pubs of Beyoğlu on the date that his memoirs were written –in 1909. These essays from the newspaper were translated into Turkish and published in 1973. See Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, v.1, 208-209. He also mentions the pressure of some people from the Ottoman public(s), who tried to prevent the selling of the first private Ottoman newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*. Ebüzziya Tevfik described these people as "abysmally ignorant" -*kara cahiller*-. Yet, Tömbekici Acem Hüseyin, who was a tobacco seller, secretly sold *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* to the people whom he knew and trusted. See Ebüzziya Tevfik, ibid, 274.

Circulating news underground was a common phenomenon in systems that were controlled

picture that İbrahim Şinasi painted in the pages of his newspaper, however, was rather fragmented in nature; even though the content and style of the newspaper improved over the course of the next five years. As in *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the presentation of news in the first private newspapers was fragmented in a sense that the newspapers often times inserted the event and occurrences in the editorial articles or news items, which clearly included the opinions of the reporters. The fragmented nature of news, as I will show in the following pages, to some extent, was apparent in *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl*, yet only with a small amount of diminishing frequency.

The fragmented nature of news and hence the style of newspapers emanated partly from the first Ottoman journalists' concepts about news and how they structured the newspapers. Indeed, from the publication of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1862 to the publication of in *İstikbâl* 1875, the concept of news and the news reporting style of the reporters shifted from a rather opinion-loaded form to a more modern journalistic discursive style. The modern style was based on the idea of providing information in a predominantly "objective" rather than "impartial" tone in the sense that journalists only juxtaposed the "facts". Indeed, as revisionist media scholars argue, even if news reports narrate real events, one must take into consideration the distinction between the initial physical event and the stories about the event.[225] In

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by the states. For very elaborately written examples of the eighteenth century French underground publishing activities that were written by analyzing the stories of ordinary people from a "history from below" approach, see Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime*, (Cambridge & London: Harvard, 1982). See, particularly chapters 4, 5, and 6.

[225] Revisionist media studies question the notions of journalistic objectivity, impartiality, and clear distinctions between opinion and fact in the process of writing the news and journalists' attempts to represent reality. See, for example, J.D.Halloran, *Mass Media and Society* (Leicester, 1974), 14-15. Many unconventional media scholars argue that news reports are either culturally and

this sense, although Ottoman journalists provided information for their readers about contemporary events, the reports that compiled information on events were rather selected stories. In other words, the meaning of news for the Ottoman journalists, I argue, was more than reporting news events. Remembering then Robert Darnton's contention that news is not what happened –yesterday, or last week- but rather stories about what happened, I contend that Ottoman journalists penned their *selected* news stories on contemporary events and occurrences with their very own opinions and suggestions, offering their perceived solutions for the problems reported in news reports.[226] For example, when *Hadikâ* reported about the navy shipyard workers' protests of the Porte after their unpaid salaries reached an eleventh month in 1873, the editors of *İbret* chose to skip that very news.[227] Apparently, for the editors of *İbret,* workers' protests and their stories were not news-worthy enough to be published in the paper even though, many times, the editors of *İbret* contended that they valued labor and published news reports on the unpaid wages of workers.[228] In this vein, for Ottoman journalists, news appeared as

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socially constructed narratives or commodities selected and published with economic motives. For the culturalist approaches that consider news "as a particular kind of symbolic system," see, for example, S. Elizabeth Bird and Robert W. Dardanne, "Myth, Chronicle and Story: Exploring the Narrative Qualities of News" in J.W.Carey (Ed), *Media, Myths and Narratives: Television and the Press* (London: Sage, 1988), 67-86; W.R. Fisher, "The Narrative Paradigm: In the Beginning," *Journal of Communication*, No:35, (International Communication Association;1985), 74-89. For the political economy perspective, see, for example, Dan Schiller, *Objectivity: The Public and the Rise of Commercial Journalism* (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); J. Herbert Altschull, "Boundaries of Journalistic Autonomy", in Daniel Allen Berkowitz, *Social Meaning of News: A Text Reader* (Sage: California & London & New Delhi: 1997), 259-268.; Vincent Mosco, *The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal* (London: Sage, 1996).

[226] Robert Darnton, "An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris," *The American Historical Review* vol. 105, no.1 (February 2000), 1.

[227] See, *Hadikâ*, *Tersane Amelesi Ayaklanması*, 23 Zilkade 1289 (23 January 1873), No:57; 27 Zilkade 1289 (27 January 1873), No:54.

[228] For example, *İbret* published an article on the Paris Commune that defended the

a concept that would be the source of information for readers on selected stories of contemporary events. Therefore, the news reports did not always represent and reflect the problems of all of the classes and segments of the society. Rather, the news reports of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ,* and *İstikbâl,* like the other contemporary newspapers of the empire, published news reports based on the arbitrary selection made by the editors.

Furthermore, for the first Ottoman newspapers, before the full adaptation of modern journalistic and editorial techniques, the difference between news and opinion was rather blurred. At the inception of the emergence of the Ottoman newspapers, the distinction between news reports and articles existed only at the level of layout. As I will show on the following pages, columns and sometimes headlines were used by the editors to differentiate news and editorial articles.[229] However, at the level of the newspapers' contents, this distinction was not always clear. Rather, the latest news of the day or week that was considered as significant for the society was inserted into editorial articles. For example, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, a paper that was chronologically published before *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl*, inserted news on the upheavals in Balkan and Mediterranean regions such as Crete, Montenegro, and Walachia into the editorial articles.[230] Expectedly, as I will discuss in this chapter, the style of news on finance and economy was in line with their presentation of political news.

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legitimacy of the movement. See, "Devair-i Belediye Tarafdaranı", 11 Rebiülahir 1289 (17 June 1872), No:3.

[229] For the layout of the newspapers, see the appendix A, B, C, and D.

[230] See, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Muharrem 1279 (2 July 1862); *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 7 Şaban 1279, (27 January 1863).

## 3. News and News Reporting

As many revisionist media theorists and scholars convincingly argue, news as a source of pure information and news reporting as a plain narration purged of opinion never really existed in any newspapers, as it was an ideal situation for the profession of journalism rather than a practical reality.[231] Expectedly, news that was compiled by Ottoman newspapers did not provide pure information on recent events. For example, when a correspondent of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* reported the news, he generally included his very own and direct comments and projections on contemporary Ottoman economic and financial policy. In one instance, news that was reported from Basra not only provided information on cereal imports, but also discussed both the importance of the government for developing infrastructures and the benefits of utilizing the natural resources of the Mosul region. This utilization of natural resources included constructing and running coal and iron mines, developments that would help cultivate the interests of the very public of that region.[232]

### 3.1 News Reporting Style of the Financial and Economic Events

[231] As media scholars and historians like Robert Darnton and Oliver Boyd-Barrett argue, news is more than simply information; news is selected "stories" about what has happened. See Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, "The Globalization of News" and footnote 8. For a similar argument, also see Gaye Tuchman, "Telling Stories," *Journal of Communication Studies* vol.26, no. 4 (December 1976), 93.

[232] See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 7 Zilhicce 1281 (2 May 1865), No:294.

The news reporting style of these private newspapers, with comments and judgments of the news reporters and editors, included almost every aspect of financial and economic news. For example, when *Tasvir-i Efkâr* informed its readers about plans to arrange a "monthly balance of payment sheet that explained Istanbul's customs tariffs on exports and imports", the reporter applied a discourse that also included the judgments and thoughts of the news reporter, saying that "it has been conferred that in the future, similar sheets should be prepared for the provinces as well. If this is accomplished, balance of trade will be established between the Ottoman Empire and Europe." [233]

Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret* published news, for example, on the Ottoman financial budgets. In *İbret*'s report on the Ottoman budget of 1872, the news was interwoven with commentary. Similar to the narrative that the reporter of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* used, the news of *İbret* was loaded with the advisory comments of the news reporter. Accordingly, the reporter informed the Ottoman public(s) about a "reported rumor" on the deficit of the budget. He suggested that the government announce the real balance of the payment table to the Ottoman public (s), without "fooling ourselves" on the budget, as was the case in the previous year. The reporter advised the government that the real conditions of the Ottoman finance

[233] For the original text of the quotation see, "İstanbul gümrüklerinde ithalat ve ihracat şehriyesini mübeyyen bir muvazene defteri tanzim olunmakda olduğu ve ileride taşra gümrüklerinde dahi böyle birer defter yapılması mansur bulunduğu iştima' kılınmış ve bu usul husul bulur ise memaliki Osmaniye'de Avrupa ile olan ahz ü itası muvazenesi yakınılabileceği (yakalanabileceği, mistyping belongs to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*) derkâr bulunmuştur." See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 23 Rebiülahir 1280 (7 October 1863), No:125.

should be revealed in order to seek remedies for curing the deteriorating finances of the empire.[234] Clearly, in this news report, giving advice to the government on behalf of the readers/public(s) was of a higher priority than informing the readers about the budget.

In another news report, however, the news reporter applied a different news reporting style. In this news dispatch, the reporter of *İbret* informed the readers about the debts (*düyun*) of the "diverse empires and states" (*düvel-i mütehâbbe*) that were mutual friends of the Ottoman Empire. Written with a rather impartial tone, the news report provided information on the growing public debts of many foreign states such as Turkistan, America, Germany (*Almanya*), Russia, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, and Brazil. These states obtained their loans from British bankers between the years of 1862 and 1872, and the report emphasized a 126 % percent increase public debt over the course of those ten years.[235] In this news report, even though the reporter did not include his comments, the emphasis on the growing debt and how these above mentioned states had to waste borrowed money to recover their budget deficits that were created by upheavals and wars pointed to a similar financial end in the Ottoman case.

Indeed, news making on topics of finance and economy devoid of commentary only rarely appeared in the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret*, *Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl*. Although from the year that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was first published in 1862, to the year of the financial bankruptcy, 1875, the news reports on daily events that

[234] *İbret*, 25 Rebiülahir 1289 (1 July 1872), No: 12.

[235] Untitled, *İbret*, 16 Şevval 1289 (17 December 1872), No:83.

were purged from open and direct comments visibly increased, for news on finance and the economy, the commentary style remained unchanged. Informative news stories on finance and economy were inserted in the editorial articles of *İbret, Hadikâ*, and *İstikbâl*. For example, the editors of *İbret* and in particular the editor in chief, Namık Kemal, published many editorial articles on finance and economy that provided specific information –news- on recent and contemporary developments. For example, in an anonymous article on the expenditures and incomes of the empire signed with the initials *C.E* indicating editor in chief (*B.M, Baş Muharrir*), the author incorporated the news reports on the balance sheet (*muvazene defteri*) of the year 1288 (1871) into the article.[236]

Harsher in tone, yet similarly providing information on the balance sheet of the same year, was an editorial by *Hadika*. In this article, the readers of *Hadikâ* learned about the "cruelty" (*insafsızlık*) of tax-farmers (*mültezim*) when the state issued a tax amnesty on the land holdings in the regions that were affected by "Heavenly calamities" (*âfât-ı semâviye*).[237] Dissatisfied with the regulation, the land-holders, however, deferred their debt (*ta'vik-i deyn*) to the state. According to the article, although the tax-farmers had four or five million *kuruş* that they could farm out in their regions, by asserting that they had only a few thousand *kuruş* or nothing left as their capital, the "cruel" tax farmers unfairly requested mercy (*istidâ-yı merhamet*) from the state and continued to postpone the repayment of

[236] Indeed, the article was written by Namık Kemal, as the rhetoric of the article clearly belonged to him. Namık Kemal published most of his articles with the initials of E.C. For the article that provided information on the balance sheet of 1871, see "Masraf ve İrâdımız", *İbret*, 10 Zilkade 1289 (10 January 1873), No:90.

[237] Ibid.

their debts to the state.[238] Interestingly, both articles were penned by Namık Kemal and appeared on almost the same day. Yet, the rhetoric that was used in *Hadikâ* was far more bitter than the tone found in *İbret*. Indeed, similar to inserting news into editorial articles, using a harsher tone in its articles was a more common practice for *Hadikâ*, as the newspaper openly acknowledged itself as an "oppositional" newspaper by its main editor and publisher Ebüzziya Tevfik. Arguably, for that reason, Namık Kemal penned an article full of vehement criticism for not only the government but also specific groups such as the tax-farmers. Therefore, Ebüzziya Tevfik claimed that *Hadikâ* was embraced with great interest by the Ottoman public(s) and devoted most of its pages to editorial articles.[239]

Only to some extent did *İstikbâl* differ from *İbret* and *Hadikâ* with its news making style, as it was slightly closer to what can be considered modern journalistic practices. For example, although Teodor Kasap, the main editor of *İstikbâl*, published editorial articles in every issue of the newspaper, he devoted more pages and spaces of the newspaper to news reports than *İbret* and *Hadikâ*. While these two newspapers relied heavily on editorial articles in their first two pages of a total six pages, *İstikbâl* generally published news reports in its initial pages. Yet, like the appearance and style of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl*, the typical first private newspapers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire would most probably discourage modern newspapers readers with their columns of crowded type that lacked headlines, subheads, and illustrations, each of

[238] N.K (Namık Kemal), "Mümteni'ât", *Hadîka*, 13 Şevval 1289 (14 December 1872), No:23.

[239] Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlilar Tarihi*, vol.2, 166.

which were modern journalist inventions.[240] Even though *İstikbâl* published more news reports than the other newspapers, for the readers, it was difficult to find the specific news at first sight, since there were no subheads or headlines. Headlines, however, were not completely absent in *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ,* and *İstikbâl,* as the main articles of the papers were almost always accompanied with headlines, just not the news reports. Even though the news was not divided by subheadings, which made it difficult for readers to find the news, local and international news articles were divided by two main subheads.[241] News reports on finance and economy in *İstikbâl,* like *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret,* and *Hadikâ,* were not arranged in relation to journalistic concerns or rules that allowed the readers to easily find specific news reports. As editorial articles on finance and economy were of greater concern than the publishing of news reports, *İstikbâl* published many news articles on the contemporary conditions and problems of finance rather than publishing the news reports.[242]

This style of news reporting on finance and economy, partly, stemmed from the fact that the financial problems of the empire had debilitated to a point that the empire came close to its financial collapse. Therefore, it was possible that the editors of *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl* analyzed the financial problems of the empire

[240] Publishing newspaper with crowded style of columns was the case for the eighteenth century European newspapers as well. See, Jeremy D. Popkin, *News and Politics in the Age of Revolution, Jean Luzac's Gazette de Leyde* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 4.

[241] See the appendixes.

[242] For the editorial articles on the Ottoman finance, see for example, Untitled, *İbret,* 15 Şaban 1289 (18 October 1872), No:33; N.K [Namık Kemal] "İflas", Hadika, 8 Şevval 1289 (9 December 1872), No:19; "Devlet-i Âliye Mukrizleri", *İstikbâl*, 11 Ramazan 1292 (11 October 1875), No:45.

in detail in the voluminous editorial articles of these papers rather than only juxtaposing the reports. Indeed, as the first issue of *İstikbâl* was published amid the approaching financial bankruptcy of the empire in 1875, the readers encountered informative pieces, in other words news items, on finance in these commentary editorial articles.[243] For example, in a news report that was similar to an editorial article entitled "Conditions of Yesterday's Stock Exchange" (*Dünkü Borsa Ahvâli*), the reporter first provided detailed information on the fluctuating market value of Ottoman bonds that fell to 34 *kuruş* 30 *para* from 37 *kuruş* and afterwards rose to 35 *kuruş* 37 *para*. [244] Afterwards, in the same report, the reporter discussed the reason for this fluctuation not by providing possible financial explanations but rather providing his own commentary as the only logical reason. Accordingly, the sudden decrease in the stock exchange emanated from the publication of "various false rumors" (*eracifin neşri*).[245] In the author's mind, there was no reason politically for the decrease in the market. He continued that "although they [*İstikbâl*] warned the stockholders about not trusting publications"[246] that based their information from "stock tricks", by believing those publications, shareholders started to sell their bonds. [247]

[243] The first issue of the paper was published in 20 Recep 1292 (22 August 1875).

[244] *İstikbâl*, "Dünkü Borsa Ahvâli", 5 Ramazan 1292 (5 October 1875), No: 40.

[245] Ibid.

[246] Ibid.

[247] "we had previously warned and advised stockholders not to believe in and to be cautious of news which was based on stock market tricks, in such a time like this [at the time of sudden decreases in the stock exchange],. Even though, of the news that was published yesterday, the most reliable one was only an example, still, everybody took this news seriously and started selling their bonds." For the original text see for the translation, "….Böyle bir zamanda borsa entrikalarına mebni neşr olunan her nevi havadise konsolid sahiplerinin itimad etmeyip ihtiyatlı davranmalarını

As exemplified in the article, like the news reports of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ,* and *İstikbâl* on the Ottoman finance and economy, the newspapers' commentary news reporting style allowed the editors not only to criticize the government's economic policies but also to reflect the public(s) interests and concerns. The news reporting style about foreign financial developments, to some extent, differed from the reporting style about local events, as the financial developments in the foreign states and empires were considered to be envied or competed with developments. For example, as it was reflected in the news reports and articles on Russia, for *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl,* particularly the economic developments in Russia were considered to be developments the Ottoman Empire needed with which to compete.

### 3.2 News Reporting Style of the Foreign Financial and Economic Developments

Unlike the news reporting style used in reports about the financial developments in Ottoman Empire, when *İbret* published the balance payment of Russia (*Rusya'nın muvazene cedveli*), the reporter applied an impartial tone. In the report, only statistical figures were given to readers, and therefore, the news informed the readers without any comments or judgments by the journalist.[248] Yet, the selection of Russia as a subject of news reporting, I argue, reflected the

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bundan mukaddem ihtar ve tavsiye etmiştik. Dün neşr olunan havadisin en ziyade itimade şayan olanı bir misal hükmünde olduğu halde yine herkes inanıp eshamlarını satmağa başlamış." Ibid.

[248] *İbret*, 25 Rebülahir 1289 (1 July 1872), No: 12.

concerns of the Ottomans about Russia and its role in contemporary international politics.

The Ottoman Empire, an agrarian society similar to its neighbor Russia, competed with this neighbor in war fields, diplomatic domains, and economic and religious areas for centuries. The competition between centuries old rivals, Russia and Ottoman Empire, continued well into the nineteenth century due to incessant wars, the beginning of similar reform movements in both of the empires, and most importantly, the Russian involvement in Ottoman politics by using the protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire as a pretext for intervention.[249] For example, military reforms that aimed at state centralization were initiated under the rules of two *modernization carrier* monarchs: Tsar Peter I in Russia and the sultan Selim III, where the latter's attempts failed yet were remedied by his successor Mahmud II.[250] Similarly, state aided industrialization attempts in both empires began in the same period. For example, the Russian Industrial Society founded in 1867 and the Russian Technical Society founded in 1866 were both established to foster the development of Russian industry and trade as well as to disseminate scientific innovations in industry. Similarly, the Ottomans' Industrial Reform Commission

[249] For this continued rivalry see, for example, Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol.87, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1967), 498-512.; Joseph Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol.12, no.1 (Jan., 1976), 3-44.; David Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1994); Brain Glyn Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire: A Critical Analysis of the Great Crimean Tatar Emigration of 1860-1861," *Chaiers du Monde russe*, vol.41, no.1 (Jan.-Mar., 2000), 79-108. For the similarities between the reforms of the two empires, see, for example, Virginia Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830," *The International History Review* vol.24, no.2 (Jun., 2002), 253-277.

[250] For the centralization/reform efforts of Peter I, see for example, Derek A. Wilson, *Peter the Great* (New York: St.Martin's Press, 2010).

sought to revive industrial production by restoring, for example, the monopolistic position of some Ottoman guilds.[251] Similarly, the education reforms of both empires were inaugurated in the same period.[252] Furthermore, the Ottoman journalists felt the competition more feverishly during the insurrections on the Island of Crete, as Russia was involved by expressing its doubts about the Porte's ability to contain the revolts. Additionally, the Russians advised the annexation of Crete to Greece, which immensely disturbed Young Ottoman journalists and found its reflections on the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*.[253] Furthermore, the newspaper attentively observed and made news reports on income resources of Russia and its trade agreements with other states.[254]

The escalating competition and rivalry, undoubtedly and increasingly, found its reflection on the pages of other Ottoman newspapers that were published after the closing of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1869. Over the years, overwhelmed by the Pan-

[251] Thomas C. Owen, "The Russian Industrial Society and Tsarist Economic Policy, 1867-1905," *The Journal of Economic History* Vol.45, No.3 (Sep., 1985), 587-606. For the Ottoman case, see, for example, Donald Quateart, "The Age of Reforms," 762 and 897.

[252] For example, Jeffrey Brooks shows how common literacy arose in Russia even before the revolution with urbanization and industrial growth. See, *When Russia Learn to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1985). For the change in the Ottoman education system, see, Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*; Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Eğitim ve Eğitim İstatistatikleri," in *Tanzimat Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri*, ed. Adnan Şişman (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004); Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline* (Brill, 2001); İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Eğitim ve Bilgi Üretim Sisteminin Dönüşümü* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999).

[253] An anonymous article that has been attributed to Ziya Paşa and was published in *Muhbir* in 1867 claimed that Russia was behind the uprisings in the empire. See, Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottomans*, 24-26. For articles and reports that reveal the irritation felt by the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and accuse the Russians for the insurrections in Crete, see, for example, 23 Rebiülahir 1283 (3 September 1866), No: 418; 18 Zilkade 1283 (25 March 1867), No:469. *Tasvir-i Efkâr* also published reports from foreign newspapers such as *Courrier d'Orient* and *La Turquie*, adducing that the publication of anti-Ottoman articles increased in Russian newspapers. See, for example, 3 Zilhice 1283 (8 April 1867), No:473; 29 Rebiyülevvel 1284 (31 July 1867), No:505.

[254] See for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (25 October 1865), No:341; 16 Muharrem 1283 (31 May 1866), No:392.

Slavist policies of Russia,[255] which surfaced on several occasions during the Crimean War of 1854 and the Crete insurrections, and concerned with the cultural penetration of Russia into the Balkans, the editors of the Ottoman newspapers proclaimed their grievances against the Russians when opportunities presented themselves to criticize, accuse, and condemn the Russian Empire for its internal and international politics. For example, when "it was heard" by the Ottoman journalists that "Russia was establishing a new naval force," Namık Kemal wrote an article on Russian naval power by exposing its financial problems. Reminding readers with a rather condescending tone that "Russia's Black Sea Navy was destroyed" by the Ottomans as a result of the Crimean War, Namık Kemal argued that this "forlorn" condition of the Russian navy remained unchanged for more than fifteen years. On the contrary, in the estimation of Namık Kemal, the Ottoman Empire spent quite a lot of money to renew its navy in these last fifteen years. He stated that building a navy required time, and in the process of renewing the Russian's navy, the Ottoman Empire would definitely not only wait but also watch this process of revival.[256] What was gripping in this article is that although the Ottoman Empire won the Crimean War thanks to the alliance of England and France, Namık Kemal applied a tone and constructed a narrative that showed the superiority of the Ottoman Empire

[255] For the critique of Pan-Slavist policies of Russia, see, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 9 Muharrem 1284 (13 May 1867), No:482; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 12 Muharrem 1284 (16 May 1867), No:483; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 26 Safer 1284 (29 June 1867), No:487.

[256] "It is already known that with the Crimean War, Russia's Black Sea Navy was destroyed and [therefore] the deserted condition [of the Black Sea] continued for more than fifteen years. Meanwhile, we have advanced our navy to a great extent." For the original text, see : "Malumdur ki Kırım muharebesi netâyicinden olarak Rusya'nın Karadeniz donanması mahvedilmiş ve bu metrukiyet hali on beş seneden ziyade devam etmiş idi. Bizim tarafdan ise o müddet zarfında donanmaya hayli ikdâmlar edildi….." "Namık Kemal, "Bir Mülahaza", *İbret*, 9 Rebülahir 1289 (15 June 1872), No:2.

over the Russian Empire. Furthermore, at a time when Ottoman financial problems intensified, he emphasized the "emptiness" of the Russian's state treasury, asking sarcastically if "Russia's treasury was teeming with gold".[257] deserted

Although at the local level, the Ottoman journalists vehemently criticized the fiscal policies of the Porte, when they turned to the international arena, the Russian Empire and its fiscal condition was an important target. For example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* informed its readers about Russia's public debts and finance with its news reports.[258] More interestingly, when Russia attempted to interfere in the Ottoman politics of the Bulgarian region, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* published a news report explaining that the revenues of Russia lacked 1.708.441 ruble in 1868 since Russia spent that amount of money supporting the Bulgarians in their revolt against Ottoman Empire. The report predicted that due to this deficiency in their revenues, the Russian public would suffer from a lack of bread and, moreover, the exportation of gold and silver would increase by 27% percent.[259]

Within three years, from 1869 (when *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was closed) to 1872 (when *İbret* was published), the competition and irritation that was expressed by the Ottoman journalists was elevated and more concretely revealed in the pages of first *İbret* in 1872 and later *İstikbâl* in 1875. The journalists applied a rather condescending and harsh discourse to describe the escalation of Russian debt

[257] "…..Bir de Petersburg'un hazinesinden altın mı taşıyor?", ibid.

[258] See for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 25 Recep 1284 (21 November 1867), No:537.

[259] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 17 Recep 1285 (3 November 1868), No:670. In another translated article, which was originally published in the *Gazette de Vienne*, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* presented to the Ottoman reader the idea that, although the Russians seemed as though they had ceased their involvement, the Russians were indeed actively involved in the Ottoman politics of the Bulgarian region. See, 1 Rebiülahir 1285 (22 July 1868), No:623.

internationally.[260] For the editors of *İbret* Russia was "still a state that had to become civilized"(*daha Rusya gibi daire-i medeniyete girmemiş bir devletin*).[261] Therefore, the editor Reşad stated that Russia could not pay its debt by "selling the ice of Siberia," implying that Russia did not have anything but the ice of Siberia to sell, especially given Russia's "shortness in education and wealth".[262] What was striking in Reşad's article was that originally, the article aimed to criticize the Porte's fiscal policies on borrowing foreign debt, yet, the author could not resist the temptation of expressing condescension towards Russian financial sources.

In this vein, even though the readers of *İbret* received updates about Russian finances through news reports, as was the case of Russians' balance payment, the readers frequently were informed by editorial articles or news reports that were loaded with the comments of the reporters. On the other hand, the editors of *İbret* continued to publish informative news reports on Russia. For example, quoting from a Russian newspaper, the editors published the number of banks in Russia and the amount of capital housed in those banks in cities like Moscow, Warsaw, and Petersburg.[263]

Indeed, *İbret's* approach to the international debts of Russia under the editorship of Namık Kemal differed from İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. İbrahim

[260] The editors of *İbret* applied this condescending tone in almost every news piece and editorial article that they published on Russia. For example, Namık Kemal reminded *İbret*'s readers that "Russia, up until two centuries ago, was paying a tribute to the Tatar Khans who were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire." See, "Rusya ki bundan iki asır evvelinceye kadar Devlet-i Aliyye'nin tâbiyetinde bulunan Tatar Hanlarına harac-güzâr idi." See, B.M, "Durup Duruken Zuhur Etmiş Bir Merak",11 Şevval 1289 (12 December 1872), No:70.

[261] Namık Kemal, "Reddiye", *İbret*, 18 Rebülahir 1289 (25 June 1872), No:8.

[262] Reşad, "İstikrâz", *İbret*, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1289 (9 July 1872), No:19.

[263] *İbret*, 20 Şevval 1289 (21 December 1872), No:76.

Şinasi was not very critical of Ottoman Empire's interest in borrowing loans from external sources. Therefore, to prove that borrowing loans from external sources was a common practice even for states considered as powerful such as England, France, and Prussia, he published news on the debts of those states.[264] Yet, for the editors of *İbret*, international loans could cause great fiscal risk, as was the case for the economies and finances of England and Russia. In an article on the Ottoman debts, for example, the readers were informed about the debts of England, "which was famous for its opulence".[265] Accordingly, the debts of England amounted to a point that was "impossible to defray" (*tediyesi imkân dairesinden çıkmıştır*).[266]

With these kinds of news reports and editorial articles on the financial and economic situation of the foreign states, the editors of *İbret* served two main purposes: shaping public opinion on the danger of relying on the external sources and criticizing the Porte's economic policies. For example, to criticize the Porte, Namık Kemal compared the level of manufacturing in the empire with Europe. He concluded that the internal custom tariffs of the Ottoman Empire presented the main impediment to the development of trade and manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the author of the article argued that the annulment of internal

[264] For a news report on the debt agreement signed between Russia and British company, see *Tasvir- Efkâr*, 8 Recep 1279 (29 December 1862), No:53. Regarding a news report on the submission of the 1864 budget of England to the parliament by the minister of finance Gladstone, see *Tasvir- Efkâr*, 11 Zilkade 1279 (29 April 1863), No:88. Finally, for a news report on the loans that Prussia was about to borrow, see *Tasvir- Efkâr*, 24 Recep 1280 (4 January 1864), No:159.

[265] Reşad, "İstikrâz", *İbret*, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1289 (9 July 1872), No:19. For an article describing the wealth of England, also see B.M, "Terakki", *İbret*, 3 Ramazan 1289 (4 November 1872), No:45.

[266] Ibid.

tariffs would not cause a decrease in the incomes for the Ottoman budget.[267] With this comparison, on the one hand, the editor of the newspaper informed the readers about the contemporary European manufacturing industry as a newspaper would be expected to do: informing readers on the world. On the other hand, by publishing this article, *İbret* voiced the Ottoman merchants and artisans' discontents with local tariffs.

The criticism and comparison of Russia by *İstikbâl*, however, followed the path paved by both *İbret* and *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, yet with a more intensified tone. The Russian Empire's level of indebtedness was one case that the financial situation of both empires would be compared to in order to show the economically and financially stronger position of the Ottomans in the international arena, even after the financial collapse of the empire in 1875.[268] Indeed, nearly within the same timeframe, both the Russian and Ottoman Empires had financial difficulties and needed to borrow loans in international markets.[269] During the difficult days of the Ottoman financial crises, the editors of *İstikbâl* directed their readers' attention to Russia's financial devastation. In an editorial article, for example, the editor informed his readers about how Russian stocks, which were sent to the market of the London stock exchange by the Russian government, were not bought by British investors. The editor continued that "even Russians claim that they lack reliability

[267] B.M (Baş Muharrir), "Sanat ve Ticaretimiz", *İbret*, 19 Ramazan 1289 (20 November 1872), No:57.

[268] See, for example, anonymous "Rusya'nın Maliyesi", *İstikbâl*, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1293 (5 July 1876), No:134.

[269] "Except for Russia," the Ottoman Empire was the largest borrower of funds from Western money markets. See the report by Vice-Consul Wrench on the Trade and Commerce of Constantinople for the Years 1874 and 1875, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 74, 1878.

in London markets".[270] The editor also provided information that the Russians were unable to find loans in Paris as well.[271] As exemplified in this editorial article, in order to protect the interests of the Ottoman Empire in the international arena, *İstikbâl* utilized the news on the financial situation of the foreign states to deflect attention from the financial crises of the empire. In so doing, *İstikbâl* attempted to show foreign stock buyers the stability of Ottoman market for making investments in Ottoman finance.

### 4. News Publishing and Providing Information

This kind of commentary news reporting, I argue, was partly the expected outcome of how the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, such as İbrahim Şinasi, Recaizade Ekrem, Kayazade Reşad, and Ebuzziya Tevfik, approached their news publishing activities. When the main editor İbrahim Şinasi petitioned the government to publish *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, he stated that the paper would focus on education and news (*maârif ve havadise dair*) and would be published as many times as possible in a week (*haftada mümkün olduğu miktar*).[272] Intentionally, in the petition, İbrahim Şinasi enumerated education before news reporting, as he wished to receive a newspaper-publishing license without any possible intervention from the members of the ministry of justice. The narrative that İbrahim Şinasi used in the petition was

[270] Anonymous "Rusya'nın Maliyesi", *İstikbâl*, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1293 (5 July 1876), No:134.

[271] Ibid.

[272] BOA, Meclis-i Vâlâ, 19973.

also compatible with the discourse of the official newspaper, as in the official discourse, one of the main motives of publishing *Takvim-i Vekayi* was to help the Ottoman public(s) increase their knowledge on not only events in the society but also on subjects such as science, arts, commerce.[273] It was true that after acquiring the right to publish *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the owner of the paper, İbrahim Şinasi, published feuilletons, news, and articles on contemporary scientific developments, as would be the case for *İbret, Hadikâ,* and *İstikbâl* in the following years.[274] Yet, contrary to the modernist and Orientalists historiographies' claims, *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* like the other private newspapers that I analyze in this dissertation, was concerned more with informing and politically shaping public opinions rather than educating its readers.[275] Furthermore, when İbrahim Şinasi referred to education, he actually referred to the necessity of increasing the *political knowledge* of the readers, to make readers defend their own rights, and, most importantly, to resist undesirable government policies. Newspaper publishing was a contribution for the understanding of contemporary politics and for developing ways of resistance, rather than purely comprehending the world in a modernist sense. In this vein, the educational purposes of Ottoman journalists and their contribution to developing

[273] See, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, "Mukaddime", 1 November 1831, No:1: " ….fünûn-ı bedîa ve sanâyi-i hasene ve es'âr-ı erzak ve emtia ve emr-i, ticarete dair mevâdd dahi neşr ve beyân olunduğu vakitde…".

[274] For example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, [lectures of] Salih Efendi, "Tarih-i Tabiî" 1 Şevval 1279-17 Zilhicce 1279 (21 March 1863 – 4 June 1863), No:77-98; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, "Devlet-i Aliyye'nin Devri istilasına Dair Bir Makaledir", 6 Şaban 1283-7 Ramazan 1283 (13 December 1866 – 13 January 1867), No:443-451; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Boufon, "Tarih-i Tıbbî", 28 Safer 1281- 4 Rebülahir 1282 (1 August 1864 – 25 August 1865), No: 217-315.

[275] For the conventional historiography on the first private newspapers, see the first chapter.

the readers' understanding of the world emanated from the political, financial, and economic concerns of the journalists.

Indeed, İbrahim Şinasi previously explained his ideas about the interconnectedness between education and politics in the introduction of the first private newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*, in 1860. Accordingly, İbrahim Şinasi stated that "Since people living in a given social community are circumscribed in their actions by multifarious legal obligations, definitely they *consider* the expression of ideas aimed at the protection of the interests of the fatherland as part of the totality of their vested rights. If tangible proof of this assertion is sought, it is sufficient to point to the political newspapers of civilized nations whose understanding has been broadened by the power of knowledge [education]."[276]

Chronologically, as it is stated above, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was the second private Ottoman newspaper published in the empire after *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*. At the time of its publication, which was 1862, dissident voices were rather quiet, even if their voices would increase in the following years. By referring to education both in the petition that was submitted to the government and in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, İbrahim Şinasi on the one hand convinced the government that his intention for publishing a paper was similar to the objectives of the state. On the other hand,

[276] "Madem ki bir heyeti içtimaiyede yaşayan halk bunca vezaifi kanuniye ile mükelleftir. Elbette kalen ve kalemen kendi vatanının menafiine dair beyanı efkâr etmeyi cümle-i hukuku müktesibesinden addeyler. Eğer şu müddeaya bir senedi müsbit aranılacak olsa maarif kuvveti ile zihni açılmış olan mileli mütemeddinenin yalnız politika gazetelerini göstermek kifayet edebilir". See, "Mukaddime", *Tercüman-ı Ahvâ*l, 2 Rebülahir 1277 (October 8, 1860). The English translation is partly borrowed from Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 263. For the comparison, see Şerif Mardin's translation below. For example, he translates *mileli mütemeddine* (civilized nation) as people. His translation is as follows:

"Since people living in a given social community are circumscribed in their actions by multifarious legal obligations, it is quite natural that they should consider the expression of ideas aimed at the protection of the interests of the fatherland part of the totality of their vested rights. If tangible proof of this assertion is sought, it is sufficient to point at the political gazettes of those people whose understanding have been enlarged by the power of knowledge. "

particularly in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, İbrahim Şinasi revealed a clue regarding his real aim for publishing a newspaper to potential readers who had received a Western style education and hence were familiar with such modern ideas as the public, vested rights, and the obligation of the state to its citizens. İbrahim Şinasi sought the cooperation of these educated readers in order to criticize the policies of the government, creating the impression that they would not be alone in their actions against the governments, as *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was ready to broaden the political knowledge of the Ottoman public. Therefore, it was understandable that the paper announced that it would focus on education and news (*maârif ve havadise dair*).[277]

The petition of İbrahim Şinasi sought to acquire a license from the contemporary government that would grant publishing rights for a newspaper. Therefore, concerns regarding the approval of the license forced İbrahim Şinasi to use a rather formal discourse in this petition. Definitely, more than this petition that did not completely reflect İbrahim Şinasi's intentions for news publishing, the content and the style of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* more clearly exposed the editor's perceptions about news publishing. Although just under the title of the newspaper it was stated that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was an 'Ottoman newspaper' on news and education (*Havadis ve Maârife Dair Osmanlı Gazetesi*), the main motive of publishing *Tasvir-i Efkâr* revealed some clues regarding the news making style of the newspapers' editors. İbrahim Şinasi outlined the motives of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in the lead article of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s first issue. Titled "Introduction," the article explained the main reasons for

[277] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, "Mukaddime", Selh-i Zilhice 1278 (28 June 1862), No:1.

publishing *Tasvir-i Efkâr*: to reflect the public's thoughts on the protection of its own interests by the state and to promote a public "which has reached a certain level of maturity to explain its thoughts."[278] In this discourse, what is striking is the emphasis on the public and its need for a tool to explain its thoughts, which was the newspaper. In his memoir, one of the editors of the paper, Ebüzziya Tevfik, noted in the days when official and semi-official newspapers were published but a private press sphere was lacking, the Ottoman press was in no condition to "warn" the Ottoman public.[279] Therefore, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* aimed at publishing a private newspaper that would place the public in the main focus of events and would show real interests in that very public not at a discursive level similar to the official newspapers, but rather in practice by reflecting the thoughts and interests of public. Clearly, both in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the memoirs of Ebüzziya Tevfik, a newspaper was conceived of as a medium that would convey messages to, and vocalize the messages of, the public. Both in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the narrative of Ebüzziya Tevfik, then, the activity of newspaper publishing appeared to have priority over news publishing. Providing news proved secondary to giving voice and warning to that very public.

Although *İbret* was published in 1872, ten years later than the first publication of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1862, it in many ways inherited the news-making style of its predecessor. Dissimilar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret* did not include a note under the name of the newspaper indicating the content of the paper. It might be possible that the editors of *İbret*, among whom there was Namık Kemal who had

[278] Ibid.

[279] Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, v.1, 153.

previously worked at *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, did not feel the need to convince the government of the "educational" content of the paper. Instead, the paper only provided the name of the main editor, the price for publishing advertisements, the frequency of publication, and the price of the paper. In this sense, *İbret* was closer to the modern day style of a newspaper than its predecessor. Yet, in comparison to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the commentary articles of the newspaper occupied more space than the daily or weekly news about contemporary events. Therefore, *İbret* was still far from exhibiting a modern style of newspaper.

In the pages of *İbret,* as it is clearly stated in the introduction of the newspaper, the definition of the news by the editors Ebüzziya Tevfik, Nuri, Mahir, Reşad, Namık Kemal, had many similarities to the description offered by İbrahim Şinasi. As in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the editors of *İbret* acknowledged the significance of providing information about certain subjects rather than events in the Ottoman society.

The articles of the first private newspapers not only informed the readers about current political and economic events, but also shaped public opinions according to the editors' perceived expectations and concerns. In this sense, İbrahim Şinasi and Namık Kemal, like the other editors of their time, strove to inform the Ottoman public about their concerns on Ottoman policy rather than to provide news. According to these editors, providing information on the "principals of politics" (*kavâid-i siyâsiye*) and "progress of civilization" (*terakkiyât-ı medeniye*) had the foremost priority over publishing news on daily events and

life.[280] Indeed, when Ebüzzziya Tevfik wrote the history of the Young Ottoman movement, he clearly stated that *İbret* was published to discuss political and societal subjects, and the editors were not truly interested in daily news. Furthermore, he claimed that the news reports were written with harsh tones to criticize the government.[281] Therefore, when the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* reported news on the Ottoman finance and economy, they referenced the events and financial decisions of the Porte with a rather commentary tone, one intertwined with information and loaded with varied criticisms ranging from moderate to aggressive.

For news on finance and economy, the approaches devised by *Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl* paralleled the news reporting style of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*. However, unlike *İbret*, *Hadikâ* devoted more space to news reports than political articles.[282] *Hadikâ* was published in 1872, the same year of the publication of *İbret*.[283]

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[280] "According to us, the most important duty of the newspapers here [in the Ottoman Empire] is to provide the public with information about the principals of politics and progress of civilization. Therefore, we will use this modest power [of the newspapers] essentially for this duty. Nevertheless, we will not refrain from providing news [for the public]". "İtikadımızca burada gazetelerin en büyük vazifesi halkımıza kavâid-i siyâsiyeye ve terakkiyât-ı medeniyeye müteallik malumat vermektir. Binâenaleyh elimizde olan iktidar-ı âcizâneyi esasen bu hizmete sarf edeceğiz. Mamafih havâdis i'tâsında dahi kusur etmeyeceğiz." *İbret*, 7 Rebiülahir 1289 (13 June 1872),no:1.

[281] Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, vol.2, 127.

[282] For example, while the first two pages of *İbret* were generally for the commentary editorial articles, *Hadika* published news reports on its first or first two pages.

[283] Indeed, *Hadika* was published as a weekly journal in 1870 under the editorship of Aşir Efendi. The newspaper focused on the sciences (*fünûn*), education (*maârif*), and the arts (*sanâyii*'), aiming to make the readers familiar with the developments of those areas. See, *Hadika*, 18 Zilkade 1286 (19 February 1870). However, most probably, by renting the usage of the name *Hadika* from Aşir Efendi, Ebüzziya Tevfik started to publish this journal as a daily political newspaper on 9 November 1872 (8 Ramazan 1289). Renting a journal or a newspaper name was a common practice, as many people had difficulties in acquiring a license from the state to publish a newspaper. For example, Namık Kemal, Reşad, Nuri, Tevfik and Mahir rented *İbret* from Alexander Sarafyan, as their request for a publishing license was rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Nezareti*). See Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, vol.2, 121-123.

However, with its more accessible discourse, *Hadikâ* targeted wider readers. Yet, in terms of providing news reports that were stripped of commentary, *Hadikâ* did not differ from *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*. Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, just under the name of the paper, *Hadikâ* heralded itself as a daily political newspaper (*yevmi politika gazetesi*). In the introductory article of the first issue, Ebüzzziya Tevfik stated that without contradicting the contemporary law and regulations on the press and "obeying morals" (edeb ve ahlaka riayet ederek), *Hadikâ* would "mention everything" (herşeyden bahs [edecek]).[284] This "everything" mainly included critiques of the Porte's internal and external policies as well as daily contemporary events such as drought in Anatolia or the other parts of the empire, travels of state officials, the visits of foreign consuls to the Porte, burglaries, and homicides. Resembling the news making style of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret, Hadikâ* aimed at providing news reports on certain events without comments. For example, the regular travels of the state officials and the visits of the consuls were presented with a rather objective journalistic tone, providing details of the event. However, similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, the editors and the reporters of *Hadikâ* inserted their comments into the news on finance and economy.

Similar to *Hadikâ*, Teodor Kasap's *İstikbâl* devoted more space to news reports than to editorial articles. In this vein, for the editors of *Hadikâ* and *İstikbâl,* providing news for the readers, which is one of the important aspects of the journalistic profession, seemed as equally significant as criticizing the government and the foreign interests through editorial articles. The interpretation of news, along with the responsibility of news providing by news reports that were stripped of

[284] See, [Ebüzziya Tevfik], "İhtar", *Hadika*, 8 Ramazan 1289 (9 November 1872), No:1.

comments, however, was only in its early stages.[285] As announced in the first editorial article of the paper, *İstikbâl* expressed concern with the "future" of the next generations of the empire.[286] In this vein, for the editors of the newspaper, publishing news reports and articles was a way of constructing and securing the future of the empire. For this reason, commentary and news were blended in the news reports to create awareness about the problems and the solutions for contemporary issues.

Not uncommon in *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* was the reporting of news on the economic events of states, for example, trade agreements between two states, publishing news reports on the economic and financial problems of the Ottoman public(s), such as the economic difficulties of bakery artisans, and mentioning about the low level of workers' daily or monthly wages and unpaid salaries of workers in news articles.[287] Expectedly, news on finance and economy generally would be loaded with the comments of the reporters. Furthermore, in comparison to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, the less complicated discourses of these two newspapers targeted wider readers.[288] Other than these common points, however, *Hadikâ* and

[285] Here, with the notion of "news providing", unlike conventional media studies, I basically do not imply "pure" and "impartial" news that would be reported for the sake of fulfilling the readers' demands for information and news "hunger". Rather, I emphasize providing news reports without the comments of the reporter.

[286] "İstikbâl", 20 Recep 1292 (22 August 1875), *İstikbâl*, No:1.

[287] In a news report on the Rumelia railways, the reporter referenced the low wages of workers. See, *Hadika*, 8 Ramazan 1289 (9 November 1872), No:1. For a report on the trade agreement between France and England, see for example, the same issue. For the letter explaining the difficulty that was experienced by the bakery artisans due to the increase in the prices of grain, see *İstikbâl*, "Varaka", 27 Şaban 1292 (28 September 1875), No:33. For the news report on unpaid salaries of Anatolia railway workers, see, *İstikbâl,* 16 Şevval 1292 (15 November 1875), No:72.

[288] Nonetheless, the circulation rate of *Hadika* reached only 3.000 while *İbret*'s reached 12.000 beginning with its ninth publication day. For *İbret's* circulation rates, see Ebüzziya Tevfik,

*İstikbâl* diverged in their news reporting discourse. While in *Hadikâ*, the discourse and the content of news regarding finance and economy was inclined to have a more critical tone towards the Porte's policies, as it focused on criticizing contemporary problems, *İstikbâl*'s discourse was rather cautious and even protective towards the state as in the publication days of the paper when the empire came close to bankruptcy.

### 5. News and Journalists

As Daniel Allen Berkowitz argues, understanding the nature of news is "like viewing a hologram". In his view, there are many perspectives that can reveal different aspects of the same holographic picture. There is no single "vantage point where the entire hologram" can entirely be viewed.[289] Therefore, he suggests that, to understand news, one should view "news as human construction that gains its characteristics through the social world from which it emerges".[290] In this vein, when the Ottoman journalists attempted to present a picture of Ottoman society in their news reports and their articles, journalists reflected their political background, social origins, education, interests, and the environments. Therefore, to analyze the meaning of news for the Ottoman journalists and to gain better insight into the

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*Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, v.2, 126-127; *Hadika*'s circulation rate, ibid, v.2, 222. As Ebüzziya Tevfik was the owner of *Hadika* and also, for a while, published *İbret* with his friends, I consider these circulation rates reliable.

[289] Daniel Allen Berkowitz, *Social Meaning of News*, 11.

[290] Ibid., 12.

motivations of the newspapers' editors, I will explore the social, economic, and political environments in which the newspaper culture flourished.

### 5.1 Ottoman Journalists and Discontent with the Tanzimat Reforms

The first private newspapers of the empire were published in economic and political environments whose boundaries were shaped by fiscal difficulties, continuing wars, and insurrections in diverse parts of the empire. The Ottoman state, following the Crimean War of 1853, reluctantly but increasingly became more dependent upon the foreign loans.[291] Under unfavorable terms, those external loans of the empire were borrowed in the international stock markets by selling long-term bonds.[292] Between the year of the first loan in 1854 and the bankruptcy of the empire in 1875, the Porte borrowed over a billion dollars from the European markets.[293] As argued in the previous chapters, the Porte's inability to extract taxes and to issue paper money to finance growing expenditures that were caused by and

[291] The first attempts to borrow external loans were made by Reşid Paşa during 1839-41. In this period, detailed arrangements were made with English bankers for a loan on the security of customs in Istanbul, Izmir, and Salonika. Yet those bankers demanded from the British government a guarantee to act as a surety, a guarantee that the British government was reluctant to give to the Porte. On the other hand, contrary to the eagerness of Reşid Paşa, for the Porte, there existed an equal unwillingness to seek foreign loans. In 1851, Reşid Paşa made the second attempt for a loan of 55 million francs, a contract of which was signed in Paris. Yet, this time, the Sultan refused Reşid Paşa's ratification and hence, as an indemnity, the empire had to pay 2,200,000 francs to its lenders. Therefore, for many, the first external loan of the Ottoman Empire in 1854 was surprisingly late. For this argument, see, Olive Anderson, "Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854-1855," *The Historical Journal* Vol.7, No.1 (1964), 47-48.

[292] Donald C Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*; Osman Okyar "Economic Growth and the Ottoman Empire, 1800-1914," *Asian and African Studies* (January 1987).

[293] Blaisdell, ibid, 23.

aggravated with the centralization policies of the Porte resulted in an increasing tension among the diverse groups of the society.

This tension mounted with international developments, the reflections of which were felt in the Ottoman society as well. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a period that coincided with the emergence and development of the Ottoman press, Europe generated favorable conditions for the circulation of goods, people, and capital thanks to the removal of mercantilist barriers, the development of communication and transportation infrastructures, the discoveries of gold, and the absence of general war in its immediate domestic sphere.[294] Therefore, the financiers, investors, and their intermediaries were able to direct their energies and capitals to the geographical parts that were abundant with natural resources, but lacked stable governance and advanced infrastructure and technology. With the destruction of the janissaries in 1826 and the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Trade Convention (*Balta Limanı*) with the British in 1838, the Ottoman Empire assured the European investors of promised lands for their high profit expectations. Yet, internally for the Ottoman Empire, the annihilation of the janissaries and the treaty caused mostly unvoiced annoyance among the Ottoman public(s), as these two actions of the Porte destroyed the social and economic protections of the masses and hence the peace of the public(s). The treaty forbade monopolies in Ottoman territories and brought low import tariffs for foreign goods, and therefore enabled the foreign merchants to carry out free trade in the Ottoman Empire. This treaty shook the already shattered positions of Ottoman merchants, guilds, and

[294] Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, the Nineteenth Century* (New York: SUNY Press, 1988), 44.

manufacturers, as they were prevented from the social and economic protection of janissaries.[295] Expectedly, the application of liberal economic policies by the Porte that worked to the detriment to Ottoman citizens deepened the existing tensions in diverse parts of the society. Consequently, varied groups targeted the Great Powers and their policies in the Ottoman territories by blaming Europeans as being one of the stimulators of the application of the liberal economic policies in the empire, despite the fact that those liberal economic policies did not affect the Ottoman public(s) simultaneously and with the same intensity.[296]

Political developments in the years between 1854 and 1875 did not help to ease the exasperation that was felt toward the Great Powers among the Ottoman citizens. To the contrary, events such as the Crimean War of 1853-56, the civil war of Lebanon in 1860, the Cretan insurrections of 1866-69, and the French note of 1867 that was supported by England and Austrian Empire urging the Porte to apply a more active policy in advancing and hastening the reforms, resulted in greater displeasure in the Ottoman public(s) towards Europeans, as the Ottoman public(s) was aggravated by the actions pursued by Europeans in these events. Indeed, the involvement of European powers in Ottoman politics partly stemmed from the application of the Imperial Rescript (*Hatt-ı Hümayun* of Gülhane). When this semi-constitutional charter was proclaimed by the Porte in 1839, it promised equality between Christian and Muslim citizens. Yet, the complexity of the process and

[295] According to Ebüzziya Tevfik, since the Ottoman public lost its rights with the abolition of the janissaries, "the public opinion was in a deep sleep" since the event. See, Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, v.1, 152.

[296] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of the Middle East Studies* vol.3, no.3 (Jul., 1972), 247.

hesitations of the Porte in establishing promised equality created unforeseen problems. These problems included the growing interest proceeded by the European Great Powers in the protection of Christians, and hence the involvement in Ottoman internal politics claiming that the "sick man of Europe" did not have the ability or the intention to provide for the well-being of its Christian citizens.[297] Such involvement created displeasure, particularly among those actors who were not necessarily but mainly Muslims and were exempt from European protection and therefore, who did not have access to European concessions. As these concessions also extended into economic and fiscal domains, by engaging in global trade, banking institutions, and tax farming, diverse groups increasingly sought to obtain and maintain personal wealth by acquiring the protection and concession rights of the Great Powers. Particularly in the port cities of İstanbul, İzmir, Beirut, and Salonika, to promote their economic interests, Ottoman non-Muslims sought European protection to escape paying Ottoman taxes.[298]

[297] The attempts of the nineteenth century Great Powers to interfere in the internal issues of Ottoman Empire by claiming themselves as the protector of particular Christians groups found its roots in the so-called Eastern Question. Indeed, the term first was used at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 by the Russian delegates to refer to the escalating tensions between the Ottoman sultan and his Greek subjects. During the nineteenth century, the term became popular among European diplomats when they debated the fate of the empire and whether to help the Ottomans sustain its existence or allow the Ottoman Empire to vanish. Unconventional historians generally avoid using the term, claiming that the "Eastern Question" stemmed from a Eurocentric reduction of the Ottoman Empire and its citizens as the passive recipients of the power politics of the Great Powers. For further information on the Eastern Question, see, Kahraman Şakul, "Eastern Question", in Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 191-192. For an unconventional explanation of the Eastern Question, see, for example, Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[298] Regarding the issue of trade in Ottoman port cities, see, for example, Çağlar Keyder, Y. Eyüp Özveren, Donald Quataert, "Port Cities in the Ottoman Empire: Some Theoretical and Historical Perspectives", *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), v.16, no:4, *Port Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean 1800-1914*, (Fall 1993), 519-558.

Furthermore, in the 1860s, the discontent among the public(s) gained an even greater impetus when, as part of the Tanzimat reform process, the Rescript of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) was proclaimed by the Porte. The Rescript of 1856 was issued to reaffirm the provisions of the Rescript of 1839, the main purpose being to grant equality to non-Mulims as promised in 1839. Yet, contrary to the Sublime Porte's anticipations and hopes, instead of relieving the tensions, the Islahat Fermanı of 1856 intensified the debates and tensions over the reforms since equality had limited grounds for implementation due to the lack of institutions. In the long run, however, the notion of equality increased the economic power of non-Muslims in the empire.[299] Furthermore, the Rescripts' economic promises, such as providing security for property and protecting the value of Ottoman currency through the establishment of banks, generated discontent as well. For example, the Ottoman Bank was owned by and represented foreign interests, a condition that caused displeasure among Ottoman citizens.[300] Hence, discontent emerged in the following years of these proclamations. Subsequently, the reform process increased dissatisfaction with the Porte, as the public(s) was rightly expecting the delayed implementation of social and economic policies.[301] As the case of the sectarian clashes of 1840 and 1860 in Mount Lebanon proved, the non-elites or, in other words, the vast majority of the Ottoman public(s) demanded the implementation of

[299] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," 259.

[300] For the Ottoman Bank, see, Andre Autheman, *The Imperial Ottoman Bank* (İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research Center, 2002); Edhem Eldem, *A history of the Ottoman Bank*(İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Historical Research Center, 1999);Christopher Clay, *Gold for the Sultan: Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856-1881: a Contribution to Ottoman and to International Financial History* (London:I.B Tauris, 2000).

[301] For the English translation of the decree, see Khater, *Sources in the History*, 14-18.

promised reforms, while the elites of the empire wished to maintain their granted privileges.[302] As the Sublime Porte was not fast enough or adequately influential in commanding the implementation of reforms, the Ottoman commoners (*ahali*) were

[302] For the conventional explanation of the Islahat Fermanı, its effects, and the reactions to it in the Ottoman society, see, Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Muslim-Christian Equality in the Nineteenth Century", *The American Historical Review* vol.59, no.4 (Jul., 1954), 844-864. According to Davison, since nationalism and nationalist movements were not fully comprehensible to the Tanzimat statesmen, those bureaucrats regarded the nationalist movements in the Balkans as dissatisfaction with local conditions or upheavals stimulated by foreign agitators. Davison argued that the Porte's intention in the implementation of equality between the non-Muslims and Muslims failed not because of the reluctance of the Tanzimat statesmen, but rather due to the Christians, as they did not seek equality but rather autonomy and independence. On the other hand, when Davison approached the issue of equality from the Muslims' position, he mainly emphasized the religion and feeling of superiority among Muslims as the creators and bearers of emerging and amounting social tensions. See, ibid., 853-58.

Yet, the recent revisionist Ottoman historiography on the implications of the Tanzimat reforms among non-Muslims in particular and in Ottoman society in general shows the problems of the "top down and outside-in" model when analyzing the upheavals in diverse geographical parts of the empire and the discontent felt by Ottoman public(s). For example, in his book on the sectarian clashes of 1840 and 1860 in the rural region of Mount Lebanon, Ussama Makdisi asserts that whereas many historians and scholars studied sectarianism and sectarian identities by focusing on its cultural, religious, and political aspects, they did not quite realize that sectarianism and sectarian clashes between Christian Maronites and Muslim Druzes were a new and *produced* phenomenon associated with modernity and modernist theory. Challenging the historiography on the sectarian clashes in the Mount Lebanon region, Makdisi continues that sectarianism was neither a foreign conspiracy, nor simply a native malignancy that prevented modernization. In this context, Makdisi asserts that since studies on the sectarian clashes and/or identities and Lebanese problem try to conceptualize the violence with an Orientalist paradigm, concluding that the Lebanese problem is fundamentally tribal and it is as an example of failed nationalism in the non-Western world, these studies fail to see the profound reasons for the sectarian clashes. Makdisi elaborately argues that sectarianism and sectarian violence occurred when the old Ottoman regime had collapsed but an independent nationalist society had not yet formed. By focusing on the conflicts between commoners (*ahali)* and elite families, he persuasively suggests that sectarianism was a culture of elites who fought to keep their privileges and to maintain a hierarchical social order. On the other hand, commoners were the ones who demanded the implementation of the rights that were promised in the Hattı Hümayun of Gülhane and Islahat Fermanı. See, Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*. In this vein, it can be argued that the Tanzimat reforms created tensions between lower and wealthy classes as well. Furthermore, the revisionist Ottoman historiography also shows that although "ordinary" non-Muslims of the empire complained about the tardiness of the reforms, they did not regard the imperial framework illegitimate. For example, in a recent study, Milen V. Petrov shows that there is no evidence in the Danube region in the 1860s to suggest that popular attitudes to the new criminal justice system were split along religious or ethnic lines. To the contrary, Bulgarian inhabitants of the Danube province quickly adjusted to the new system. See, Milen V. Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864-1868," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol.46, no.4 (Oct., 2004), 730-758, 757-758. The conventional Ottoman historiography, however, claims that the Tanzimat reforms did not make a tangible impact on the non-elite Ottoman citizens, particularly in regards to non-Muslims. For such a claim see, for example, Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Rule in Europe from the Perspective of 1994," in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Economic History: Selected Articles and Essays*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

frustrated with the reform process. Similarly, the elites of the empire increasingly felt dissatisfied with the Tanzimat reforms, as those of the reforms heralded equality among its ex-subjects but new citizens. Furthermore, the Tanzimat reforms promised to abolish the tax-farming system but at the end transferred this significant wealth resource of the local elites to the new bureaucratic elites. Indeed, with the proclamations, the sultan and Tanzimat bureaucrats channeled their new reform program and hence the promises towards the Ottoman masses to seek their support in their struggle with the *ayans*.[303] As the Tanzimat reforms looked to transfer local power and wealth to the central bureaucracy –bureaucratic elites-, expectedly, the Tanzimat reforms created discontent among the "waning" elites. In this vein, the vested interests of the elites and non-elites stood in conflict due to their differing expectations of the Tanzimat reforms. Yet, their discontent with the reforms was a common reason for opposing the Porte's policies.

Well aware of the disturbances that were created by the centralization policies of the Porte and the irritation that stemmed from the activities of European investors and their intermediaries in the empire, Ottoman journalists embraced an ambitious journalistic project. On the one hand, these journalists assertively attempted to give a voice to unvoiced parts of the society, including peasants, farmers, small merchants, petty bureaucrats, workers, beggars, and landlords.[304] On

[303] Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", 258.

[304] For peasant related problems, see, for example, anonymous, "Aşar", *İstikbâl,* 21 Ramazan 1292 (21 October 1875), No:54; "Bir köylü imzasıyla Zaman gazetesinde görülen varakadır", *İstikbâl*, 23 Şevval 1292 (22 November 1875), No:78. For news on the workers, see anonymous (Ebüzziya Tevfik), "Tersane Amelesi", *Hadika*, 27 Zilkade 1289 (27 January 1873), No: 54; untitled news report, İstikbâl, 16 Şevval 1292 (15 November 1875), No:72; for the letter written by an unknown reader that complained about the cruelty of local landlords towards the public in the Sivas region, see *İstikbâl*, 21 Zilkade 1292 (20 December 1875), No:102. For news on beggars, see,

the other hand, by claiming to fill the protective position previously occupied by the janissaries, those Ottoman journalists of the private newspapers reflected their concerns on contemporary politics.[305] For example, these Ottoman journalists wrote on the Eastern Question, the concessions of the Great Powers, and Ottoman citizens who sought European protection and worked against the benefits of the Ottoman populace.[306] Balancing the criticisms and demands of conflicting parties in the pages of newspapers was a complicated as well as a difficult task, especially considering the contested interests regarding the distribution of wealth.

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for example, anonymous, "Mesele", *İstikbâl*, 30 Recep 1292 (31 August 1875), No: 10; anonymous, "Teesüf", *İstikbâl,* 19 Ramazan 1292 (19 October 1875), No:52. For reports on civil servants and a news report on the salaries of civil servants, *İstikbâl*, 8 Şaban 1292 (8 September 1875), No:17; anonymous, "Memurlar", *İstikbâl*, 28 Şaban 1292 (28 September 1875), No:34; for an article that emphasized the necessity of reforms on the state structure that also briefly mentioned the inadequacy of the low and middle-ranking civil servants' salaries, B.M, "İdarece Muhtaç Olduğumuz Tadilat", *İbret*, 15 Şaban 1289 (18 October 1872), No:33.

[305] Namık Kemal argued that when the janissaries were annihilated, there were no longer any social actors who remained in the political arena to counterbalance the power of the Porte's bureaucrats. See, *Hürriyet*, June 29 1868, quoted in Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of* Young Ottomans, 133.

[306] For the Eastern Question, see for example, "Şark Meselesi", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 4 Zilkade 1283 (11 March 1867), No: 465; untitled news report, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 9 Muharrem 1284 (13 May 1867), No:482. For an untitled news report that announced a conference on the Easter Question that was supposed to be held, see *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 26 Safer 1284 (29 June 1867), No: 487; untitled news report, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 27 Şaban 1284 (23 December 1867), No:546; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 28 Ramazan 1284 (23 January 1868), No:555; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 2 Zilhice 1284 (26 March 1868); No: 572; Reşad, "Bir Mülahaza"[on the unification of Slavs], *İbret*, 11 Rebiyülahir 1289 (17 June 1872), No:3; B.M, "Şark Meselesi-I", *İbret* 2 Şaban 1289 (23 September 1288), No: 24; B.M, "Şark Meselesi-II", *İbret,* 8 Şaban 1289 (11 October 1872), No: 28*;* B.M "Şark Meselesi-III", *İbret*, 13 Şaban 1289 (16 October 1872), No: 31; N.K (Namık Kemal), "Şimale Nîm Nigâh", *Hadika*, 17 Şevval 1289 (18 December 1872), No:26; N.K, "Ünvan İstemez!", *Hadika*, 25 Şevval 1289 (26 December 1872), No:32. Regarding the discomfort felt by the Ottomans due to the concessions of Europeans and the Ottoman citizens who sought European protection, see, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 30 Muharrem 1280 (17 July 1863), No: 110; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 7 Rebiyülahir 1281 (8 September 1864), No:228; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 16 Rebiyülahir 1283 (27 August 1866), No: 416; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 8 Zilkade 1283 (15 March 1867), No:466; *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 10 Muharrem 1286 (22 April 1869), No: 714; Kemal, "Bir Hatıra", *İbret*, 25 Rebiyülahir 1289 (1 July 1872), No:13; B.M, "Muahedât ve Hukuk", *İbret,* 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:55; B.M, "Beyan-ı Hal", *İbret*, 4 Şevval 1289 (5 December 1872), No:65;B.M, "Cevap", *İbret*, 13 Şevval 1289 (14 December 1872), No:71; B.M, "Konsoloslar", *İbret*, 15 Şevval 1289 (16 December 1872), No:72; anonymous, " Müsaade Mazarratı", *İstikbâl,* 26 Ramazan 1292 (26 October 1875), No:58; anonymous, "İngilizler", *İstikbâl,* 8 Zilkade 1292 (7 December 1875), No: 91.

As perhaps one of the most important problems stemmed from and revolved around the sharing and distribution of societal affluence, the Ottoman journalists inevitably, however avidly, focused on the fiscal issues and problems of the empire. To reflect the perceived concerns of the many groups on contemporary events and the future of the empire, these journalists criticized the Ottoman government's economic and fiscal policies on issues such as tax collecting, external debts, industrialization, and political, economic, and judicial concessions that were endowed to Europeans. For example, the journalists focused on the tax problems of the social actors who possessed lower incomes even though they worked under difficult conditions to maintain their minimum living expenses. In this vein, Ottoman journalists explored the dilemmas of the "real producers" of the empire, who indeed were the "real tax payers".[307] The "real taxpayers" of the Ottoman society stood in contrast to those local individuals and actors who enjoyed the protection of Great Powers such as bankers and middlemen. The interests of "real taxpayers and producers" conflicted with those actors who in the editor's view did

[307] For example, an article by Namık Kemal argued that the Ottoman Regie forced (*mecbur bıraktı*) tens of thousands or maybe hundreds of thousands of "free people" (*ahrâr-ı beşer*), including peasants, workers, and artisans who produced tobacco and cigarettes, into "real slaves" (*esâreti sahiha*). Although these people worked in every step of tobacco production, for example,"Petro sowed, Marice picked, Yanko desiccated, Manol packed, Zahari brought the tobacco to Istanbul, and Kostaki, Mihali ve Panayoki prepared it for sale,…. none of them were able to maintain their subsistence expenses with their labor" (*bunların cümlesi mahsuli sa`ylarıyla karınlarını doyurmağa muktedir olamasın*). Yet, "companies that were established by three or five individuals" like the ones that were found by Zarifi and Hırstaki would "unfairly earn millions". See, B.M, "Reji", *İbret*, 12 Şaban 1289 (15 October 1872), No:30. Indeed, in addition to claiming that these workers were the real producers and taxpayers of the Empire, this article also reveals that for the editors of *İbret,* or at least for Namık Kemal, the workers constituted a group that was not categorized regarding their religious or ethnic identities, but rather their occupations. Such a claim is significant as it challenges nationalist and top down approaches that contend that, even though the Young Ottomans criticized the ruling elites of their time, the interests of the Young Ottomans essentially intersected with the state. The underlying premise of these approaches is that the Young Ottomans were only concerned with the demise of the Empire and the decreasing importance of Muslims and hence they did not voice the problems of either non-Muslims or non-Turks.

not produce anything, yet unfairly consumed the resources of the society.[308] Similarly, these Ottoman intellectuals penned many articles to show their fervent resentment against the Great Powers' interference in the Empire, since with the protection of the Great Powers, many Ottoman residents did not pay taxes. For example, the editors of *İbret* promoted Ottoman merchant interests against the interests of Europeans and non-Muslim traders. In an article published in *İbret* in 1872, Namık Kemal questioned the favored trade conditions of non-Ottoman merchants over domestic entrepreneurs. In the same article, he also criticized internal tariffs as being the main impediment to the development of the Ottoman entrepreneurial class.[309] By revealing the tension between the producers and non-producers of the society who unrightfully consumed the economic and financial sources, the private Ottoman newspapers, indeed, reflected the escalating discontent that stemmed from the insufficient application of the Tanzimat reforms, which promised equality among the Ottoman citizens.

### 5.2 News Making as a Reflection of Journalists' Worldviews

When the editors of *Hadikâ, İstikbâl*, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* printed articles on subjects such as tax collecting, external debts, political, economic, and judicial concessions to Europeans in Ottoman territories, and industrialization, they not only considered, referenced, and were affected by the political, international,

[308] B.M, "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?", *İbret*, 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1872), No:60.

[309] *İbret*, 19 Ramazan 1289 (27 May 1872), No:57.

and social environments of the empire, but the editors and their articles also reflected the values of their worldview, their concerns regarding the place of the empire in its surroundings and in the European world, and the voices of the different parts of the society. For the editors of the first Ottoman private newspapers, the foremost political and international problems of the empire, which set the tone and the content of the papers, were resisting the disintegration process of the empire. Indeed, the political anxieties of these journalists shaped their attempts to give voice to the public(s) and reflect the concerns of many groups regarding the problems of the empire.

The journalists' concerns and tone over the disintegration of the empire partly emanated from the fact that most of the newspaper editors were members of the loosely organized group, the Young Ottomans. The group was formed by dissident Ottoman intellectuals in Istanbul in 1865 and sought to prevent the collapse of the empire.[310] Initially, the members of the group called themselves

[310] According to the modernization paradigm, the emergence of the Young Ottoman movement appears to have resulted from the introduction of Western ideas and from stresses created within the bureaucracy by the political hegemony of the *Tanzimat* elite. Accordingly, those Young Ottomans were educated in Western style schools, sent to Europe either as students or as commissioned officials, and therefore shared a common knowledge of European civilization. See, Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 121-132; Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture", 277. As Bernard Lewis argued, the Young Ottomans were the agents for achieving Westernist modernization goals. In this vein, those scholars argued that the Young Ottomans attempted to alter the backward conditions of the Ottoman public. In this process of shifting the backward position of the empire to a modern one, as many scholars argue, the Young Ottomans utilized newspapers to create a new political consciousness for preventing the collapse of the empire. However, without referencing such dynamics as class structures, social tensions, and resistance in the society towards the Tanzimat reforms, Lewis explained the ongoing struggle between the high officials and the Young Ottomans about the economic policy of the government as a problem of liberalization. In his narrative, neither the economic structure of the society nor the social and economic origins of the journalists are analyzed to understand the Young Ottomans' place in the society and economy. See, Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 38; Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey*, 37. On the other hand, even though he utilized a modernist approach and claimed the Young Ottomans as liberals, Şerif Mardin focused on the social origins of the group members and, to some extent, connected the liberalization problem to the existing social tensions within the society.

*Türkistanın Erbâbı Şebabı* (Youth of Turkistan) and *İttifak-ı Hamiyet* (Society of Zeolots). As their choice of names reveal, the members of the Young Ottomans emphasized their youth and therefore the energy of the centuries old empire, ruling members of which were proud to be part of the long established state machinery. Furthermore, for the ruling elites of the Ottoman society, being intellectual and respectful was considered the natural outcomes of age, experience, and knowledge of traditions.[311]

As with the name of this dissident group, the group's method for challenging the traditional modes of policymaking was new as well. Even though the members of the Young Ottomans did not invent the idea of criticizing governments through newspapers, they were the first Ottoman dissenters who utilized the press to channel their youthful and fresh criticisms about the Porte. Among the Young Ottomans, there were İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Nuri, Reşad, Ebüzziya Tevfik all worked as the editors of *Hadikâ, İstikbâl*, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*. İbrahim Şinasi launched *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. Namık Kemal, Nuri, Reşad, and Ebüzziya Tevfik published *İbret* and Ebüzziya Tevfik published *Hadikâ*. Among them, Namık Kemal was the most productive journalist, as he published in all of these newspapers many articles on foreign and domestic politics, economics, finance, and the military. However, Teodor Kasap, the publisher and the main editor of *İstikbâl*, was not a member of the movement.[312] Therefore, except for

[311] Mardin, "Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi" in Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* v.1 (İstanbul: İletişim, fourth edition 2002), 43.

[312] Teodor Kasap's dissident identity made him a close friend with many Young Ottomans, including Namık Kemal. After publishing several satirical newspapers such as *Hayal* and *Diyojen*, which drew the ire of state censors and were consequently closed, Kasap founded and published

*İstikbâl*, the Ottoman historiography describes three of these four newspapers as instruments used by the Young Ottomans to garner support from the Ottoman public in asserting their political stands towards the Porte and searching for ways to prevent the collapse of the empire.[313]

According to the Young Ottomans, the future of the Ottoman Empire could only be secured with a change in the ruling structure, one that would shift from an absolute to a constitutional rule.[314] Both in theory and practice, however, the members of the movement lacked consensus in how this change would be achieved as, among the Young Ottomans, there was no ideological unity. Where the Young Ottomans could find common ground was targeting the ruling practices of Âli and Fuad Paşa who, for the Young Ottomans, lacked the talent to deal with the European Powers and their policies concerning the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, as Mardin argues in his detailed study on the Young Ottomans, even though in a broad

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*İstikbâl* in August 21 1875. *İstikbâl* was originally the planned title for Namık Kemal's publication after his return from European exile in 1872. Since his licensing application for *İstikbâl* was rejected by the government, Kemal was unable to establish his own publication. As a result, friends of Namık Kemal rented *İbret* and allowed the Young Ottoman to become its main editor. Two years after the closing of *İbret* and Namık Kemal's exile, Kasap published *İstikbâl.* In the absence of Kemal, *İstikbâl* continued to promote the oppositional discourse first seen in *İbret*. Tanpınar, 351 and 358.

[313] See Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

[314] For example, Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr* drew the readers' attention to the concept and necessity of justice. In this vein, the state's application of justice through the law was emphasized not by directly advising or criticizing the sultan but rather by publishing the well-known studies of many authors in feuilleton form. See for example, Katip Çelebi,"Düstûrü'l- Amel", 12-29 Rebiülevvel 1280 (28 August – 14 September 1863), No:122-127. Indeed what Şinasi wished for the empire was a constitutional monarchy. See for example, 10 Zilkade 1280, No:187. Regarding similar demands and arguments in *İbret*, see, for example, Kemal, "Hukuk-ı Umumiye", 2 Rebiülevvel 1289 (10 May 1872), No:18; B.M, Untitled, *İbret,* 9 Şevval 1289 (10 December 1872), No:68; B.M, Untitled, *İbret,* 10 Şevval 1289 (11 December 1872), No:69. With the publication of *İstikbâl* in 1875 when the financial crises of the empire was deepened, the demands for constitutional rule were voiced more loudly. See for example, "Tanzimat-ı Cedide", *İstikbâl*, 2 Recep 1293 (23 July 1876), No:150; "Meclisi Umumi", *İstikbâl*, 25 Şaban 1293 (14 September 1876), No: 183; Nazım, "Usulü İstibdadın Mazarratı", *İstikbâl,* 8 Ramazan 1293 (27 September 1876), No: 194.

sense, these intellectuals could be considered as liberals, the ideology of these men of print differed from each other. For example, Ali Suavi, who was a member of the Young Ottoman movement and published *Muhbir* (Reporter) in Istanbul in 1866 and then in London during the exile of the group members, defended the rule of *ulema*. Ali Suavi also placed the *ulema* class over the military ruling class, while Namık Kemal was closer to liberal democratic ideas, as he put considerable effort into introducing the concept of popular sovereignty into Ottoman political thinking. However, while Ali Suavi defended civil disobedience, Namık Kemal opposed any kind of act that would go beyond the verbal protests of the state.[315] Ziya Paşa's[316] political view settled between Ali Suavi's and Namık Kemal's political views, since he was deeply uninterested in the concept of freedom but rather believed in the importance of monarchic principles and directed his energy to the elimination of bureaucrats.[317] In practice, the ideological differences among the Young Ottomans resulted in, first, a division within the movement and afterwards the disintegration of the group when Ali Suavi and Rıfat detached from the group and when Namık Kemal severed relationships with Mustafa Fazıl Paşa.[318] Yet, the once existing financial and political relationships of the Young Ottomans with Mustafa Fazıl Paşa were among the reasons that the movement was conceptualized as a part of the elite struggles.

[315] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought,* 365-367.

[316] Ziya Pasha published *Hürriyet* (Freedom) with Namık Kemal in London.

[317] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 340-349.

[318] For Ali Suavi see, Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, v.1, 233-92; for Namık Kemal, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, v.2, 5-32.

Mustafa Fazıl Paşa financially supported the stay of the Young Ottomans in Europe as well as the publications that they used to criticize the oppressive and incompetent policies of the Porte in general and Ali and Fuad Pashas in particular.[319] In return, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa benefited from the opposition of the Young Ottomans, since the Young Ottomans made criticisms of the Porte visible to the Ottoman public(s). Furthermore, showing the opposition to Âli and Fuad Paşa's governing practices but not to the Sultan's methods led historians to conceptualize the Young Ottoman movement as a product of elite struggle. Additionally, the Young Ottomans' consent and willingness to negotiate with the Porte, as with the case of Ziya Paşa's petition that he submitted to the Sultan Abdulaziz during his visit to London explaining Ziya Paşa's loyalty to the monarchy, caused historians to analyze the movement as intra-elite struggle. The type of education that the Young Ottomans acquired in either Western style schools or in Europe with state scholarships, the Young Ottomans' familiarity with the West and Western languages in a mostly illiterate society, and the Young Ottomans' connections with the state bureaucracy due to their posts at the Translation Bureau were among the other reasons that the Young Ottoman movement was conceptualized as an intra-elite struggle.

### 5.3 News Making as a Reflection of the Journalists' Social Origins

While analyzing the Young Ottoman movement, Ottoman historians, including those scholars that consider themselves to be revisionists, do not consider

[319] For the financial support that the Young Ottomans received from Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, see Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar*, v.1, 159; also see, Ali Suavi, *Ulûm*, no:14.

the Young Ottomans as real dissidents but rather a group of Ottoman intellectuals who looked to receive a share of the available resources in the Ottoman bureaucracy. For example, the Ottoman historian Cemil Koçak argued for the existence of structural and methodological differences between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire in their style of oppositions. Accordingly, opposition in the Ottoman Empire differed from opposition in the Western Europe since the opposition in the West did not limit its responsibility to the salvation of its empire or state. Rather, as in the case of Paris Commune of 1871, opposition movements in Western Europe were mainly class based and, from time to time, were the aggressive reflections of power struggles. On the contrary, Koçak argued, the opposition movements of the Ottoman Empire lacked the ideological and political thoughts that would lead the rebellions to paralyze, destroy, or change all kinds of existing power structures and state apparatuses.[320] Therefore, Koçak concluded that the opposition presented by the Young Ottomans differed from its Western counterparts, as the scope of political struggle was only limited to the diverse fractions of the bureaucratic elites. According to Koçak, the Young Ottomans' political struggle excluded the diverse social groups of Ottoman society, since the opposition of the Young Ottomans looked to prevent the disintegration of the empire. Therefore, their struggle aimed at the protection of the state's integrity but not the public's liberation. The only novel aspect of the Young Ottoman opposition movement, which was similar to its Western counterparts' methods, was its use of

[320] Cemil Koçak, "Osmanlı Türk Siyasi Geleneğinde Modern Bir Toplum Yaratma Projesi Olarak Anayasanın Keşfi: Yeni Osmanlılar ve Birinci Meşruiyet" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* v.1, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan (İstanbul: İletişim, fourth edition 2002), 76.

the press. Here the Young Ottomans attempted to influence Ottoman public opinion, even if it was only limited to a small number of literate people.[321] In addition to approaching the Ottoman opposition movements with a self-orientalizing perspective, a perspective that did not acknowledge many of the public rebellions that targeted the state's apparatus, Koçak failed to acknowledge the Young Ottomans' concerns over the well-being of the public(s). Therefore, Koçak failed to acknowledge the possible influences on the Ottoman public(s) that the Young Ottomans obtained through newspapers.[322]

Considering the anxiety of the Porte in their attempts to appoint group members with new duties in diverse parts of the empire, to send them away from Istanbul, and hence to prevent these Young Ottomans from spreading their dissident voices via newspapers, it might be possible to argue that the influence of the Young Ottomans' opposition reached beyond elite circles. When a member of the Young Ottoman movement chose exile in Europe and not relocation within the borders of the empire as state appointees, they continued to publish newspapers such as *Hürriyet* and *Muhbir*, since they were aware that they could still reach and influence the Ottoman public(s).[323] For example, when Ebüzziya Tevfik published

[321] Ibid., 76-79.

[322] For example, the *Celali* Revolts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries targeted the state apparatus. For the *Celali* Revolts, see, for example, Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâli İsyanları: 1550-1603* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1963). Even though the Young Ottomans did not rebel against the state, they articulated their arguments on the financial and economic crises of the empire during a time of power struggles within the political structure. Therefore, the criticisms of the Young Ottomans paved the way that led the Ottoman public(s) to rebel in 1908.

[323] The foreign country based, émigré press was not peculiar to the empire nor was its impact in the development of a print culture. As the exile journalism of the empire was not strictly controlled by government censorship, to some extent, exile journalism showed success in expediting

his memoirs on the Young Ottomans, he mentioned how the readers feverishly waited for the newspapers' newest issues, issues that they would only be able to access through clandestine methods.[324]

In the Ottoman historiography, these readers, like the journalists and newspapers' editors, were supposed to be the elites of the empire, as they were literate and hence educated. Even if one could claim that these papers reached the readers who were the "elites" of the empire by education and not by wealth, they definitely were not part of the ruling elites. Similarly, the journalists who published the papers could be considered to be elites due to their education. Therefore, the non-ruling elites' worldview and its reflection in their rhetoric, which became visible via newspapers, included the issues of concern felt by diverse groups in Ottoman society. The negative effects that tax policies had on the peasants, artisans, and merchants, for example, found voice in the pages of newspapers that were published by these non-ruling "elites". Therefore, the newspapers that were published by the ex-Young Ottomans[325] could not be considered merely as the

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the development and dynamism of the dissident voices in the public(s). Yet, the exile journalism of Young Ottomans has received inadequate attention in the Ottoman historiography. For one example that partly analyzes the exile journalism and journalists in London, see, Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Yeni Osmanlılardan Bu Yana İngiltere'de Türk Gazeteciliği, 1867-1967* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1985). Similarly, before and after the French revolution, the London-based exile journalism of France proved to be successful in creating and reflecting the criticism of the political regime. See, for example, Simon Burrows, *French Exile Journalism and European Politics, 1792-1814* (New York and Suffolk: Royal Historical Society, The Boydell Press, 2000); Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground*.

[324] For more on this point, please reference footnote 6 in this chapter, which details how the readers accessed *Hürriyet* and *Muhbir*.

[325] I use the term ex-Young Ottomans since, when returning from the exile in Europe, the movement of and the loose unity between the members of Young Ottomans were dissolved. For the details of this dissolution, see Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought.*

elites' organs, even if the members of the movement were still part of elite circles due to their levels of education.

### 5.4 News Publishing and Advocating the Public (s)' Interests

As Edward Harman and Noam Chomsky argue in their propaganda model, if one would claim that newspapers serve to communicate messages to general public, one should also claim that newspapers could function to inculcate individuals with the values and beliefs of the dominant ruling elite, considering that the ruling elites generally control press. For the bureaucracy, this control would be through censorship in general and law and regulations in particular. For private interests, the techniques of controlling the press are varied and re-adjusted depending upon changing material and historical conditions. Where state bureaucracy has limited control over the press and formal censorship is absent, private interests compete with each other and "aggressively portray themselves" as the advocates of general interests. Expectedly, the critiques of the newspapers' editors on subjects that would directly affect the well being of the general public(s) are limited in nature and leaves untouched many critical subjects, such as the command and distribution of the public(s)' resources. In this vein, newspapers could allow the governmental and private interests to shape the general populace in accordance with their very own interests. The control of the press by private interests against the benefit of general populace, more often than not, exists in

societies where the ownership of press is monopolized and where the primary income of the press comes from advertising.[326]

Even though this model does not exactly fit into the Ottoman case, since state censorship was not completely absent and press ownership was not monopolized by "market forces", this model would be useful for analyzing how the private interests of the empire represented themselves as the advocates of the general populace. In this vein, although formal censorship existed starting from 1864 with the *Matbuat Nizamnâmesi* (Publication Act) and becoming more severe in 1867 with *Âli Kararname* (Sublime Decree), a decree which brought strict and oppressive censorship, the newspapers that were published by the non-ruling elites of the empire did, indeed, reflect private interests that differed from those of the elite. As the members of the Young Ottoman movement were not part of the ruling elite circles, they did not represent the ruling elites' views. The news and articles published in the newspapers of the ex-Young Ottomans reflected the worldview of counter-elites who, in a sense, defended private interests by aggressively and feverishly portraying themselves as the advocates of general interests.[327] As the worldview of these counter-elites or in another term, the ex-Young Ottomans, concerned with the prevention of the empire's disintegration by obtaining the strong support of the Ottoman society, the way in which the counter-elites/Ottoman journalists represented private interests had to rely on the idea of the public and its

[326] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky developed the propaganda model to analyze the function of mass media in societies where free market conditions prevail. See, A Propaganda Model in Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 1-2.

[327] I borrowed the term, counter-elites, from Benjamin Fortna, "Education and the Autobiography at the End of the Ottoman Empire", *Die welt des Islams*, New Series, vol.41, issue 1 (Mar., 2001), 2.

rights in front of the state. Therefore, in their opposition to the Porte's policies, Ottoman journalists defended the rights and emphasized the problems of the Ottoman public(s), problems that stemmed from financial and economic difficulties. In this vein, despite the reports written by the *elites* of the empire, the articles and news reporting style of these journalists on the financial issues in general and financial crises in particular reveal the compliance and resistance points of non-elites as well. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, the distribution of the empire's resources for the benefit of the public(s) and particularly for the lower classes remained not exceptionally but mostly untouched in private newspapers.

## Chapter Three

## Between Being the Voice of the "Voiceless" and the Protector of the Middle and Upper Classes' Interests: *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*'s Idea and Representation of the Public(s) between 1862 and 1872

### 1. Introduction

The first private newspapers of the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire never emerged as a genuine mass medium. Educational and social constraints, like low literacy rates, and technological inadequacies, like the inadequate distribution of newspapers to diverse geographical parts of the empire due to the recently developing road and rail infrastructures, made the possibility of newspapers becoming a genuine mass medium difficult but not impossible. Still, as I discussed in the first chapter, thanks to the practice of public reading, the newspaper was the one genre of printed material that reached a variety of readers, extending from wealthy bureaucrats to the urban lower classes and even some of the peasantry. In the second half of the nineteenth century, private newspapers became the main printed form in which the political and economic criticisms that questioned the government's legitimacy and, furthermore, that imposed new responsibilities on the government were articulated. Limited in content and with its rather complicated

style of language, however, general historians of the Ottoman world have yet to view the newspapers published before 1908 as possible forerunners for the 'voiceless Ottoman people' and hence a part of dissident Ottoman political culture.[328]

Indeed, the development of printed information and its dissemination through newspapers were two of the vital stages in the construction of an Ottoman political culture that facilitated the circulation of the idea of the public and its rights. During the days of the financial and economic crises, the private Ottoman newspapers constituted a significant medium through which the economic and fiscal responsibilities of the state for its public(s) were discussed and legitimated. Additionally, private Ottoman newspapers reinforced ideas regarding the negative effects of foreign financial interventions.

In this chapter, by analyzing the structure of the news and the many articles on the Ottoman finance and economy, I will show how two of the first private newspapers of the empire before the 1908 revolution were in fact significant in reflecting the contemporary concerns of their own day. With their vivid depictions of the society and vehement criticisms of the Ottoman policy on behalf of the Ottoman public(s), *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* were also significant in bringing the idea of the public and the public's interests to the daily discourse of Ottoman life. In so doing, these two Ottoman newspapers, perhaps gradually however steadily, made visible the problems of many people, even if the journalists of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*

[328] For example, Orhan Koloğlu, who produced many books on Ottoman newspapers, considers the 1908 revolution as the starting point of a flourishing Ottoman press and public. See,Orhan Koloğlu, *1908 Basın Patlaması* (İstanbul: Bas-Haş, 2005).

and *İbret* were often times inclined to reflect middle or upper middle class concerns and interests. Yet to some extent, these newspapers also helped raise the lower classes' visibility by mentioning the difficulties that lower class actors faced in their daily lives. Furthermore, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* argued for fiscal responsibility, a quality that the government was obliged to have for its public(s).

In this chapter, first, I analyze the meaning of the public(s) and public opinion in the Ottoman context. The editors interpretation of the idea of the public(s) and the public's interests and how these editors, at the discursive level, constructed such ideas in relation to the economic and financial difficulties of these very public(s) will be addressed. Afterwards, regarding the construction and promotion of the public, I analyze how *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, on behalf of the Ottoman public(s), claimed and imposed the idea of the public(s)'s rights on the Ottoman state. In this context, I show how these specific newspapers applied a discourse that explained the main reason for the establishment and existence of a state was to serve and protect its public(s). In connection with the economic and financial crises, I also show how these newspapers claimed that the fiscal responsibility of the Porte to its public(s) was one of indispensable duties that a state was obliged to fulfill for that very public(s). At the discursive level, I analyze as well which parts of the society were included in the editors' ideas and representations of the public(s).

Through an exploration of the advertisements found in *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* I also discuss the targeted public(s) not only at the discursive level but also as the reflective images of economic interests as those advertisements targeted

particular groups for their business interests. In this chapter, my aim is to understand how these two newspapers, namely *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* attempted to shape and express public opinions. By focusing on dispatches and editorial articles, I intend to show how these two private newspapers of the empire, at the discursive level, assisted in establishing the idea of the state' responsibilities to its public(s), a characteristic of a modern state or, in other words, a necessary element for the formation of a modern state. Additionally, analysis of the advertisements will provide us with a possible readership profile of the individuals whose opinions were shaped and reflected by *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret.*

## 2. The Meaning of the Public and Public Opinion

As I have discussed in the previous chapters, historians of the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire have long recognized the delay in the emergence and development of a public sphere and of public opinion in Ottoman society. Accordingly, the emergence of Ottoman public opinion was an outcome of the Western impact that resulted from the modernization attempts of the state.[329] Here, I will not discuss when and in which contexts the Ottoman public opinion emerged.[330] However, it should be remembered that before the publication of newspapers and journals, there were many public and semi-private spaces, such as sufi lodges, mosques, coffeehouses, public reading rooms (*kıraathane*), public

[329] See, for example, Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 69-79.

[330] For such a study, see for example, Bedri Gencer, "The Rise of Public Opinion in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1909", *New Perspectives on Turkey,* 30, (Spring/July, 2004), 115-154.

baths, hairdressing-parlors, bazaars, and theaters, and public acts, such as holding funerals and memorials, petitioning state authorities, and listening to the announcement of imperial edicts, where and in which ways the formation and articulation of public opinion would be manifested.[331] For example, the *defter-i şikâyat*, which compiled written grievances, including for instance the complaints of the Ottoman public(s) against tax collectors, reflected the public opinion of Ottoman society.[332] Additionally, on behalf of the Ottoman public(s), the opinion leaders of the Ottoman society, such as lower and middle ranking members of the *ulema* class for Muslims, and heads of non-Muslim religious groups, janissaries, and guild organizations, served as mediators between various sultans and the public(s). Even if it was limited due to spatial restrains, the Friday sermons (*Cuma Selamlığı*) of the sultans also allowed the male public(s) of Istanbul to express its opinion. Popular public rebellions, such as the *Celali* revolts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the *Patrona Halil* revolt of 1730, and the *Kabakçı* revolt of

[331] Concerning public reading rooms, see, for example, Kemallettin Kuzucu, "Osmanlı Entellektüel Mekanlarından Kıraathaneler", *Düşünen Siyaset,* Osmanlı ve İdeolojisi-II, No:8, 2008, 83-109. For coffeehouses that served as spaces for expressing and forming public opinions, see, for example, Cengiz Kırlı, "Kahvehaneler: 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kamuouyu" in Ahmet Yaşar (ed.), *Osmanlı Kahvehaneleri: Mekân, Sosyalleşme, İktidar* (İstanbul: Kitap, 2009), 95-128. Selma Akyazıcı Özkoçak, "Kamusal Alanın Üretim Sürecinde Erken Modern İstanbul Kahvehaneleri," in Ahmet Yaşar (ed.), *Osmanlı Kahvehaneleri: Mekân, Sosyalleşme, İktidar*, (İstanbul: Kitap, 2009), 17-36. François Georgeon, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Son Döneminde İstanbul Kahvehaneleri" in Helene Desmet-Gregoire and François Georgeon (eds.), *Doğu'da Kahve ve Kahvehaneler* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 43-85.

[332] For how *defter-i şikâyat* were used by the Ottoman public(s), see for example, Michael Ursinus, *Grievance Administration (Şikayet) in an Ottoman Province: The Kaymakam of Rumelia's' Record Book of Complaints' of 1781-1783* (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005). Also see Milen V. Petrov, "Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864-1868", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol.46, no.4, (Oct., 2004), 730-758.

1807 were also rebellions in which public opinion manifested itself and questioned the legitimacy of the sultans.[333]

For the nineteenth century Ottoman society, therefore, I argue that the significant and new development was not the manifestation of public opinion but rather the ways in which public opinion was manifested, as well as the implication and usage of the concept of public opinion by the government and newspapers in relation to the political and economic changes in the empire. Therefore, instead of discussing when and in which context the Ottoman public opinion emerged, I will focus on how Ottoman journalists perceived and afterwards attempted to form public opinion.

### 2.1 The Meaning of the Public for the Ottoman Journalists

When a retired divisional general (*ferik*) embezzled more than 300.000 *kuruş* from the treasury, leading to the cutting of his retirement salary and his forced exile in Kütahya, a gardener was killed, or a mother of a one and half years old toddler lost her baby daughter under a collapsing wall, these varied individuals were possibly unaware that they would make the news coverage of *Tasvir-i Efkâr's*.[334] Neither did these people know that they were *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s targeted

[333] Concerning these rebellions, see, for example, Robert W. Olson, "The Esnaf and Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol.17 (1974), 329-344. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Road to State Centralizations*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994). Akdağ, *Celâli İsyanları.* Sunar, "*Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps".*

[334] Concerning Moralı Mehmed Paşa's embezzlement case, see *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 25 Şaban 1280 (3 February 1864), No:168. For the dispatch on the gardener, see 19 Cemaziyelevvel 1282 (9

public(s), individuals who were to be addressed and whose voice needed to be conveyed to the government and the general public.

Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, based on the "rights of the public", the first private newspapers of the empire constructed an exciting and new discourse for its readers, a straightforward discourse that possibly surprised the Ottoman public(s) yet attempted to fulfill the public(s)'s expectations as a tool that claimed to voice readers' wishes and problems. For these newspapers, the definition of the public(s) evolved from a general and abstract concept to a more substantial one that included not only many occupational groups and classes such as workers, peasants, bureaucrats, and tax farmers but also individuals who were mentioned as women, children, men and thieves, and killers. Furthermore, as private newspapers of the nineteenth century published articles and reports on the contemporary financial crisis of the empire, they also provided a real physical space on the newspaper pages for the Ottoman public(s)' voices, even though these voices were filtered through the newspapers' editors. Therefore, from 1862, when *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was launched, to the closure of *İbret* in 1873, many members of various occupational groups or individuals became familiar with the fact that their voices could be raised in private newspapers.

During this process of constructing a new discourse that claimed to reflect the voices of the Ottoman public(s), the editors defined the meaning of Ottoman public opinion according to rights that ranged from the basic to the economic. In

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October 1865), No:337. For the baby that was killed by the collapsing wall, see 23 Şaban 1284 (19 December 1867), No:584.

this attempt to reach a definition, as I will show below, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* generally reminded and referred to the rights that stemmed from the promises of the Western style Tanzimat reforms.[335] For example, when considering the promises of the Tanzimat edicts, for the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* the public referred to the people whose voice was to be revealed by newspapers, whose level of progress could be measured by looking at whether or not these individuals had newspaper reading habits, and whose life, property, and wealth should be protected by state.[336] Furthermore, the concept of the public referred to an abstract group to whom the government needed to explain and legitimize its actions.[337] In this sense, the notion of the public(s) was fluid, allowing the authors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* to criticize the Ottoman government, sometimes on behalf of general Ottoman public(s) and other times on behalf of specific occupational groups.

Additionally, even though it appears to be contradictory, the editors, while reminding the state of the responsibilities for its public(s), also referred to and sought out the roots of Ottoman society in Ottoman traditions. For example, in an article published in *İbret* and titled *Tanzimat,* the anonymous author referred to Şeria law and argued that if the Şeria law was truly respected by the Ottomans, the recognition of the Tanzimat would not have been necessary. Similarly, the author

[335] For an article that argued and presented the Ottoman public(s) as the internal guarantor of the application of Tanzimat's promises, see, for example, anonymous, "Tanzimat", *İbret*, 4 Ramazan 1289 (5 November 1872), No:46.

[336] Concerning newspaper reading habits, see, B.M, "Terakki", *İbret*, 3 Ramazan 1289 (4 November 1872), No:45.

[337] See, Kemal, "Bârika-i hakikat müsâdeme-i efkârdan çıkar", *İbret*, 22 Zilkade 1289 (22 January 1873), No:98.

argued that if the *ulema* class (religious class) had protected and applied Şeria law, the *ulema* class would not have created the need for the Ottomans to protect their own lives, lives which were in theory created by Allah, with a worthless document (*varak-pâre*) that was shaped under European protection.[338]

For the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* then, the rights of the public(s) stemmed from not only the newly invented Tanzimat reforms but also the Ottoman traditions that were based on tacit contracts between rulers and ruled. The intersection of traditions and newly formed reforms, therefore, established the rights of the public(s) that included the economic rights and/or protection of the public(s), even though the newspaper editors never used the term *economic rights*. Rather, regarding the financial and economic problems of the Ottoman public(s), the emphasis was placed on tax regulations which could not be analyzed without considering provincial restructuring, and hence the changing dynamics of the power structures in the ruling strata of the empire. However, from the perspectives of the newspapers' editors, the taxes levied by the central government presented a problem of unfair tax policies on different occupational groups and classes.

### 2.2 Provincial Reorganization, Private Newspapers, and Public Opinion

Not surprisingly, diverse parts of the Ottoman society were affected by the financial and economic crises of the empire that began in the eighteenth century

[338] See, anonymous, "Tanzimat", *İbret*, 4 Ramazan 1289 (5 November 1872), No:46.

and reached their peak with the crises of the nineteenth century.[339] The nineteenth century financial and economic crises, combined with the social and political changes of the Tanzimat period, however, truly disturbed many members of the middling and upper ranks of the society. Among the provincial actors, whose interests were directly threatened by the reorganization of relationships between the center and the provinces, there were provincial governors, qadis (*kadı*), tax farmers, and the leaders of non-Muslim communities. Until the Tanzimat period, these local actors possessed the right to charge duties and fees in consultation with local merchants. For the members of these upper ranks, such as the provincial elites, the most disturbing elements of the crises lay in the central government and elites' attempts to control the produced wealth. This control included the collection of taxes by the central government, a process that interfered with the political and economic power of the local elites.

The results of this process shared many similarities with the results of France's absolutist regime's taxation policies that were applied just before the revolution of 1789. For example, the historian Michael Kwass argued that in pre-revolutionary France, although the crown maintained the privileged tax system throughout the eighteenth century, it disturbed formerly tax-exempted groups by imposing new direct taxes on those very groups. Accordingly, from 1695 to 1789, on the one hand, elites maintained their privileges regarding the older direct taxes; on the other hand, those very elites had felt and dealt with the pressures that were created by the new direct taxes. In this process, privileged taxpayers arose yet stood

[339] Regarding the eighteenth century financial crises, see, for example, Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*.

in conflict with the crown. This "oxymoronic" situation created displeasure among the privileged elites. In response, they politicized the issue of taxation and "motivated the spread of critical parliamentary rhetoric".[340] The magistrates of the old regime were important actors in producing an oppositional rhetoric that revealed and publicized the danger of despotic regimes. While producing a dissident discourse, magistrates stressed that the crown needed to adhere to the fundamental laws of the kingdom. In this discourse, the magistrates appealed to the transcendent authority of public opinion.[341] Lawyers, philosophers, journalists, ministers of the state, and royal officials increasingly used a discourse that criticized political practices as well.[342] According to Kwass, the new taxation policy of the crown emanated from the monarchy's cash requirements, forcing the crown to borrow from creditors in exchange for fiscal privileges.[343]

The new taxation policy of the nineteenth century Ottoman central government was partly shaped by the need to narrow the budget deficit of the central state as well. However, contrary to the French case, the central government of the Ottoman Empire proved unsuccessful in imposing new direct taxes on the elites of the empire. Yet since the main objective of the Tanzimat policies was to extend the control of the central government in the provinces, the central

[340] Michael Kwass, "A Kingdom of Taxpayers: State Formation, Privilege, and Political Culture in Eighteenth Century France," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol.70, No.2 (Jun., 1998), 299-300, 295-339.

[341] Ibid, 298.

[342] Ibid, 296.

[343] Ibid, 299.

government aimed to collect the taxes centrally in the provinces, which until the Tanzimat period, were collected by provincial elites. For example, in 1840, Mustafa Reşid Paşa[344] attempted to displace provincially appointed tax-farmers (*mültezims*) who collected land taxes and tithes with salaried and centrally appointed tax collectors (*muhassıl-ı emval*). While tax farmers benefited from the system by keeping a substantial portion of the taxes as personal profit, the centrally appointed salaried tax collectors were supposed to return all collected taxes to the central treasury. Additionally, the central government tried to replace the traditional tax (*örfi tekalif*), which was collected from tax payers in equal amounts and therefore criticized particularly by the editors of *İbret* as being against the notion of justice (*adalet*), with taxes that would be collected based on the ability of taxpayers to pay.[345]

As the Crimean War of 1854-1856 increased government expenditures, the Porte more actively attempted to control the provinces in order to extract even greater taxes for the central treasury. For example, the reorganization of the administrative structure of the provinces was already initiated in 1840 by establishing administrative councils, by reducing the authority of local governors, and by making smaller the administrative units in the provinces. However, as experienced in eighteenth century France, attempts to reorganize systems of tax imposition and tax extraction caused many conflicts. At the same time, however,

[344] For Mustafa Reşid Paşa, see, for example, Bayram Kodaman and Ahmet Turan Alkan, "Tanzimatın Öncüsü Mustafa Reşid Paşa", in Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (ed.), *150. Yılında Tanzimat* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992), 1-11.

[345] See for example, B.M, "Tekalif-1", *İbret*, 7 Zilkade 1289 (7 January 1873), No:87. B.M, "Tekalif-2", *İbret*, 8 Zilkade 1289 (8 January 1873), No:88.

restructuring the central government resulted in the requirement of negotiations with local actors. When the governing of the districts (*sancak*) began to be maintained by the centrally appointed *muhassıl*, *kaza* (sub-division of *sancak*) by *müdür*, and village or town by *muhtar*, on the one hand the power and authority of the provincial governors were restrained. With the strong support of military, the central government collected the taxes. On the other hand, however, the central government had to continue discussing its policies with provincial actors, such as local notables and guilds who were members of newly created representative councils.[346] The requirement for the central government to cooperate with local notables stemmed from the fact that the centrally appointed officials were not received without opposition by the local actors. Therefore, for example, in 1842 and 1858, new regulations were issued by the Sublime Porte to secure the collection of taxes more efficiently, once again increasing the power of the local governors.[347] Furthermore, the central government restored the tax farming system, as it was unsuccessful in collecting taxes.

In eighteenth century France, the new direct taxes on elites resulted in the production of oppositional discourses which were circulated through printed

[346] For a well analyzed example of oppositional efforts of local actors as well as the negotiotions between the provincial councils and the central government, see, for example, Elizabeth Thompson, "Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-45", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.25, no.3 (August 1993), 457-475. For the structure of local councils, namely *büyük meclis* (large councils) and *küçük meclis* (smaller councils), see, for example, Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*. İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği*, (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1985).

[347] In practice, mostly due to their corrupt policies that were based on heavy taxation and bribery, centrally appointed *muhassıls* were challenged in many places like Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Ankara. Thus, the old system prevailed in many places. See, for example, Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler, 1840-1856" in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Halil İnalcık & Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu (ed.), (Ankara: Phoenix, second edition, 2006), 151-158.

materials. Similarly, the structural reorganization of the provincial system and particularly the attempts to change the methods of tax collection created conflicts in Ottoman society in general and between the central and provincial elites in particular. Similar to the French example, these conflicts were important in producing an oppositional rhetoric that also emphasized the state's responsibilities to its public(s). Like the French example, many of the political and educated elites of the empire stressed the significance of the central government to adhere to the traditional roots of the empire [i.e Seria law] while appealing to public opinion. In this process of conflict and negotiation with the central government, oppositional discourses were conveyed to the general public through private Ottoman newspapers.

### 3. Bringing the Public into the Arena of Politics: Public Opinion, Newspapers, and the Search For Consensus: 1862-1875

As stated in the previous chapters, in 1860, the first privately owned newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* (Interpreter of Conditions), was published by an opponent of the government, Agah Efendi. Targeting a *reading public* that was dissatisfied with the current official and semi-official newspapers, *Tercüman-ı Ahval* provided an appealing format through which the Ottoman public(s) could be informed about daily economic and political events. From the moment the first non-official newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahval* appeared, the press increasingly became an arena where state policies were discussed, reproduced, and resisted. With their

more accessible style and language, the successor newspapers *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* as well as *Hadika* and *İstikbâl*, however, more assertively claimed to reflect the voices of public(s). More importantly, these newspapers claimed to defend public interests. For *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika* and *İstikbâl*, the financial and economic interests of the Ottoman public(s) referred to the providing for its well-being. The well-being of the Ottoman public(s) was connected to issues such as the formation of fiscal responsibilities, the imposition of lawful and fair taxes that according to the editors should be levied based on individuals' income levels, the prevention of external debt, and the provision of internal resources for public debt. In this chapter, I argue that the Ottoman journalists' emphasis on fiscal responsibility and their problematization of taxes stemmed from the *unfair* fiscal and administrative practices of the central government as well as the editors' strong assertions about not only defending public(s) interests but also reflecting the existing strands of public opinion.

Indeed, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika* and *İstikbâl* had many problems with the financial regulations of the Tanzimat edicts. What they strongly criticized was the centralization of tax collection in the provinces and hence the distribution of wealth. The editors of these newspapers demanded that the promises of the edict concerning tax collection be applied according to one's fortune and means. In this sense, as I will show in this and the next chapter, while the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika* and *İstikbâl* demanded the application of what the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 announced on taxation based on one's own means, they criticized the methods of tax collection used by the centrally appointed *muhassıls*.

However, at first sight, this seemed contradictory, as the main argument of the edict for that kind of taxation was based on the abolishment of the *iltizam* system. The edict stated that

"....our Empire has already been relieved of the affliction of monopolies, the harmful practices of tax-farming [iltizam], which never yielded any fruitful results, still prevails. This amounts to handing over the financial and political affairs of a country to the whims of an ordinary man and perhaps to the grasp of force and oppression, for if the tax farmer is not of good character, he will be interested only in his own profit and will behave oppressively. It is therefore necessary that from now on, every subject of the Empire should be taxed according to his fortune and his means, and that he should be saved from [any] further extraction." [348]

For the central government, then, in order to collect taxes based on one's own means, the tax-farmer system should have been abolished. Yet, for the editors, the tax farming system should have been in effect while tax levying should have been based on ones means and fortune. Therefore, for example, *İbret* strongly argued the necessary application of Tanzimat for the benefit of the public(s). Indeed, as I will show in this chapter, *İbret*, under the editorial leadership of Namık Kemal, more often and more strongly than the other newspapers, stressed the central government's tax policies on behalf of peasantry and workers.

[348] "....memalik-i mahrusamız ahalisi bundan evvelce kurtulmuş ise de alat-ı tahrribiyyeden olup hiçbir vakitde semer-i nafiası görülmeyen iltizamat usul-i muzırrası el-yevm cari olarak bu ise bir memleketin mesalih-i siyassiye ve umur-ı maliyesini bir ademim yedd-i ihtiyarına ve belki, pençe-i cebr ü kahrına teslim demek olarak o dahi eğer zaten bir iyice adem değilse hemen kendi çıkaırna bakıp e-mi harekat ve sekanatı gadir ve zulumden ibaret olmasıyla badezin ahali-i memalikten her ferdin emlak ve kudretine göre bir vergi-i münasip tayin olunarak kimseden ziyade şey alınmaması...". See, Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, I. Cild, Nizamı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri, 1789-1856*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), 263-264. English translation of the edict borrowed from Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, 13.

## 3.1 *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* the State's Responsibilities to the Public, and the Emerging Voice of "the Public"

### 3.1.1 *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the Public under the Editorial Leadership of İbrahim Şinasi

During the financial and economic crises of the empire, the story of the Ottoman press was one of continuous growths. Although the conventional Ottoman historiography argues that there was a lack of public opinion in the early phase of newspaper publishing, throughout this period, the titles, subjects, and contents of the newspapers and journals varied and increased. So too did the interests of the readers in newspapers together with criticisms of the state.[349] Beginning with the publication of the first private newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*, the Ottoman language press promoted a discourse that emphasized the "state's obligations to the public," a concept that was new for Ottoman society.[350] As Şinasi stated, publishing a newspaper was a means for "reflecting the thoughts of the public" (*tercüman-ı efkâr-ı ahali*), to remind the government of its responsibilities to its public(s).[351]

[349] In 1872, Namık Kemal published an article in *İbret* claiming that with each passing day, the interest of the Ottoman public in the press increased. See B. M., "Türkçe Matbuat," *İbret*, 16 Zilkade 1289 (16 January 1873), No:94. This article suggested that the reading public(s) of the empire was widening and hence the people's interest in daily political, economic and social affairs was increasing as well. By proposing that the reading public(s) was widening, Namık Kemal also attempted to convince the government about the growing power of the Ottoman press. Since the editors of the private newspapers claimed themselves to be the advocates of the Ottoman public(s), the emphasis on widening reading circles was significant in order to gain certain types of power to shape the government's decisions.

[350] See, "Mukaddime,", *Tercüman-ı Ahvâ*l, 2 Rebiülahir 1277 (18 October, 1860).

[351] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 25 Ramazan 1279 (15 March 1863), No:75.

One of the first private newspapers to be published in the Empire, one that sought to generate opposition against the government's policies yet approval for the concept of the state, as it defined the Ottoman state as the protector of Ottoman public(s), was *Tasvir-i Efkâr.* Despite several intervals when state censorship suppressed its criticisms of the government, this Istanbul based paper ran from 1862 to 1869. Originally a biweekly publication that after its 592nd issue expanded to five times a week, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, like most of its contemporaries of the period, claimed to present the voices of different groups in the Ottoman public who were dissatisfied with the state's policies.

The motives of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, as I discussed in chapter two, were outlined by İbrahim Şinasi in the lead article of its first issue. The article explained the main reasons for publishing *Tasvir-i Efkâr*: to reflect the public's thoughts (*tercüman-ı efkâr-ı ahali*) on the protection of its own interests as stated by the state, to promote a public "which has reached a certain level of maturity to explain its own thoughts,"[352] and to remind the government of its responsibilities to its public(s). For the Sultan and his granting of a license, on the appearance of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, İbrahim Şinasi expressed his "gratefulness"[353] to the Ottoman leader, under whose rule the state and the public would obtain "security."[354] İbrahim Şinasi did not hesitate, however, to emphasize that "every state" is only a "representative of its

[352] İbrahim Şinasi, "Mukaddime", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Selh-i Zilhice 1278 (28 June 1862), No: 1.

[353] Ibid.

[354] Ibid.

public."[355] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s main editor detailed how the state could empower its own authority by taking "essential precautions" for the "protection of public's interests" and well-being.[356]

Indeed, before the publication of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the first private newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* promoted a discourse that emphasized the "state's obligations to the public," a concept that was new for Ottoman society.[357] Ideas of "the people" and their "rights" first appeared in the introduction (*mukaddime*) of *Tercüman-i Ahval*, also written by İbrahim Şinasi. In his first journalistic article, İbrahim Şinasi connected the concept of the "public" to the protection of the "public's vested interests".[358] What was new in İbrahim Şinasi's own paper, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, was not the idea of the public, but rather its narrative, and how it was conveyed to the state and the supposed public(s). The "Introduction" of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* clearly expressed the concept of the people's right to be informed on what was happening in their society. Based on "the people's right," the newspaper's concern with reporting current events in the empire and its surroundings was developed with more consistency. In *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s narrative, based on the idea of the protection of the

[355] Ibid.

[356] Ibid.

[357] Before the proclamations of the Imperial Rescript (*Hatt-ı Hümayun* of Gülhane) of 1839 and the Rescript of Reform (*Islahat Fermanı*) of 1856, the Ottoman people were claimed to be the subjects of the Sultans. With these proclamations, the Sultans' subjects were transformed into citizens who were equal under the law. Therefore, in the new order, the state and not the sultan was obliged to provide for its citizens security and wealth. For the English translation of these decrees see, Khater, *Sources in the History*, 11-18.

[358] Şinasi stated that "Since people living in a given social community are circumscribed in their actions by multifarious legal obligations, definitely they *consider* the expression of ideas aimed at the protection of the interests of the fatherland part of the totality of their vested rights."See, "Mukaddime", *Tercüman-ı Ahvâ*l, 2 Rebiülahir 1277 (18 October, 1860).

well-being of citizens, referring to Ottoman public(s) and criticizing the government's policies were consistent patterns of argument.

In the pages of İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* one topic connected to the protection of the citizens' welfare and interests was finance. Awarded a state scholarship to study finance and economy in Paris and receiving his training at the French Ministry of Finance, İbrahim Şinasi unsurprisingly penned editorial articles and published many dispatches on the financial policies of the Porte.[359] Beginning with the first issue, for example, İbrahim Şinasi revealed his interest in finance by announcing that the most important contemporary issue of the empire was finance (*ıslahatı maliye a'zam-ı mühimm-i hâliye*).[360] Yet, the first news reports and articles on finance and economy did not truly criticize the Porte's fiscal policies. Rather, the editorial policy of the paper was, to some extent, at least on the surface, in support of the Porte's policies. For example, by claiming the nascent prolific impacts of fiscal reform initiated by the state, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* supported fiscal reform measures such as withdrawing paper money from market circulation.[361] In the second issue, in a small dispatch, he mentioned some "hearsay" on a few planned "reforms" (*ıslahat*) on finance that included the provision for "the extraction of needed liquid assets from external sources and the reduction of redundant

[359] In an article responding to the editor of *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis*, İbrahim Şinasi mentioned that he worked at the French Ministry of Finance on the orders of the Porte. "Tasvir muharririnin asr-ı sâbıkta Paris'te tahsil ile meşgul iken aldığı emir-i mahsus üzerine Fransa Maliye Nezaretine biraz müddet vuku bulan devamından…." See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 27 Recep 1281 (26 December 1864), No:259. Yet, he did not complete his education in the fields of finance and economy. For more information about his education, see Ziyad Ebüzziya, *Şinasi*, (ed). Hüseyin Çelik, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997).

[360] *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* Selhi Zilhice, 1278, (28 June 1862), No:1.

[361] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Selh Z 1278(28 June 1862), No:1.

expenditures".[362] For İbrahim Şinasi, as long as the state sought to reform its fiscal policies, which in the long run would work for the benefit of the Ottoman public(s), borrowing money from external sources was not an issue to be criticized. Rather, being able to borrow external debt would prove the financial and political credibility of the empire in the international markets.[363] Similarly, İbrahim Şinasi supported the government in their financial reform acts, such as their attempts to prevent the corrupt practices of state officials and clerks. For example, in a news report, without giving any details, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* informed its readers on the dismissal of finance department treasurers due to their unlawful practices in the treasury.[364] Indeed, İbrahim Şinasi deemed the beginning of financial reform as one of the successes of Sultan Abdulaziz's period.[365]

Yet in 1863, when he realized that the Porte's desired fiscal reform to withdraw paper money from circulation proved unsuccessful, İbrahim Şinasi cited news from foreign newspapers and thus indirectly criticized the Porte's policies with a cautious tone. For example, quoting from *Imperial*'s 1195th issue, a news report informed the readers on the prices of basic staples in İzmir. According to the news report, even though the paper currency (*evrak-ı nakdiye*) was withdrawn from circulation, the prices of some necessary goods such as meat, coal, and firewood did not decrease. On the contrary, due to "the abuse" (*suistimal*) of some

[362] "Devlet-i Aliyye'nin umûr-i maliyesince bazı ıslahat der-desti tesviye olunduğu işitilmiştir. Bu da hariçten nukud-i lazimenin tedariki ve mesarif-i zâide ve gayri âdiyenin taklîli…." 13 Rebiülahir 1277 (29 October 1860), No:2.

[363] See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 27 Rebiülahir 1277 (12 November 1860), No:4.

[364] *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* 21 Şaban 1279 (1 February 1863), No:65.

[365] *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* 5 Cemaziyelahir 1279 (27 November 1862), No:44.

"profiteers" (*muhtekir*), the prices of some items doubled.[366] Just one day after the publication of this news report, a copy of an imperial edict (*Suret-i Hattı Hümayun*) was published in the paper, stating the difficulties and reform attempts in the finance of empire. This edict seemed as though it responded to the criticisms levied against the Porte's fiscal policies.[367] İbrahim Şinasi's vigilant yet critical discourse of the Porte's policies, however, continued to warn the readers. For example, to increase the strength of the state's finance and increase the wealth of individuals,[368] İbrahim Şinasi sought to convince the readers and particularly the state officials (*me'murin*) on the need and necessity of learning the basic "principles of political economy" (*ilm-i emvâl-i maliye*). With the appointment of Mustafa Fazıl Paşa as the new Minister of Finance, İbrahim Şinasi found the opportunity that he was looking for to expose the problems of the state's finances that emanated from "the abuses" (*suistimal*) of officials' in the state's finance. When Mustafa Fazıl Paşa launched an investigation into one such abuse, and when his investigation revealed instances of embezzlement by Nazif Efendi, a clerk of *Masarifat Muhasebesi* at a military squadron in Herzegovinia,[369] İbrahim Şinasi praised the newly appointed Minister of Finance. He also expressed his expectations for continued success in

[366] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 2 Ramazan 1279 (20 February 1863), No:68.

[367] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Ramazan 1279 (23 February 1863), No:69.

[368] This article was published under the section of *Pâyitaht* (seat of the government) yet without a title. See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 14 Safer 1280 (31 July 1863), No:114.

[369] In 1840, the account office of the state, which worked under the Ministry of Finance, was divided into two parts: *Varidat Muhasebesi* and *Masarifat Muhasebesi*. *Varidat Muhasebesi* was responsible for recording the state's revenues while *Masarifat Muhasebesi* kept the records of state's expenditures.

exposing the hidden abuses of the state's finance department.[370] Indeed, I argue that, by praising Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, İbrahim Şinasi showed the possibility of creating consent for government policies within the public(s), yet only if the bureaucrats would work for the benefit and interests of the public(s), which was the reason for the creation and existence of the state as an entity. Furthermore, İbrahim Şinasi also supported Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, who later cooperated with the Young Ottomans in their opposition to the Porte and financially supported them while the Young Ottomans were exiles in Europe.[371] However, the support for Mustafa Fazıl Paşa and his fiscal policies began earlier and emanated from the fact that Mustafa Fazıl Paşa applied the reform program of Fuad Paşa, who targeted a fiscal reform and issued *layiha* (proposed law) announcing the aims of the reform program. Accordingly, paper money would be withdrawn from circulation, the irregular debt of the Ottoman state treasury would be paid, the budget would be announced annually, and the ways of creating "balanced budget" (*denk bütçe*) would be investigated. The propositions of Fuad Paşa's *layiha,* at the level of discourse, fulfilled the expectations of İbrahim Şinasi. When Mustafa Fazıl Paşa attempted to withdraw paper money (*kaime*) from circulation, İbrahim Şinasi supported him. For the benefit and well-being of the public(s)', İbrahim Şinasi supported Mustafa Fazıl Paşa's fiscal decision on announcing the state's budget, as İbrahim Şinasi

[370] This article was published under the section of *Pâyitaht* yet without a title. See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 2 Rebiülevvel 1280 (18 August 1863), No:128.

[371] Mustafa Fazıl Paşa was one of the successors of the Egyptian khedive Mehmed Ali Paşa, the rebellious governor of Egypt. Mustafa Fazıl Paşa received his education at the various bureaus of the Porte. In 1862, he was appointed as the Minister of Education, in 1864 as the Minister of Finance, and in 1865 as the chair of the Treasury Council (*Meclis-i Hazain*). See, Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Tanzimat Maliye Nazırları*, (Ankara: Kanaat Basımevi, 1939).

believed that the state needed to announce the annual budget to the public(s), showing the expected yearly incomes and expenditures of the empire.[372] Therefore, when İbrahim Şinasi published a serial (*tefrika*) on France's finances (*Fransa'nın Maliyesine Dair Malumat*),[373] the similarities between French financial practices and Fuad Paşa's *layiha* did not appear as a coincidence but rather as İbrahim Şinasi's conscious support for the proposed law and contemporary minister of the finance. Furthermore, the publication of this serial was also important as it argued the need to levy more taxes on the wealthy members of the Empire than on the poor individuals of the society. Yet, İbrahim Şinasi's consideration of lower income classes did not go to the extent that they would be included as the members to the local councils since only people who paid higher taxes would be the members of local councils.[374]

For İbrahim Şinasi then, while discussing the financial subjects of the empire, the public(s) appeared as a general concept whose well-being needed to be provided and protected by the central government. In this vein, when the government failed to provide for the public(s)'s well-being due to the bureaucrats' corrupt policies and abuses, the newspaper criticized the government and its

[372] Mustafa Fazıl Paşa was the first Finance Minister of the empire to announce the state's budget to public.

[373] *"Fransa'nın Umuru Maliyesi Hakkında Bir Zatın 1259 Tarihinde Tertip Eylediği Risalenin Hulasasıdır", Tasvir-i Efkâr,*18 Muharrem 1280 (5 July 1863), No:107. 26 Muharrem 1280 (13 July 1863), No:109. 21 Safer 1280 (7 August 1863), No:117. 1 Rebiülevvel 1280 (17 August 1863), No:119. 5 Rebiülevvel 1280(21 August 1863), No:120.

[374] " ...members of the council would be elected among [the people] who would give the highest taxes". For the original quote see"...ve erbabı meclis en ziyade vergi verenlerden intihap kılınır". See, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 17 Safer 1280 (3 August 1863), No:115. Indeed, just after the publication of this article, an imperial order was issued for İbrahim Şinasi's expulsion from his state service at the state bureaucracy. See, Kenan Akyüz, "Şinasi'nin Fransa'daki Öğrenimi İle İlgili Bazı Belgeler", *Türk Dili*, no.31, (Ankara, 1984), 405.

bureaucrats on behalf of the Ottoman public(s). However, when the members of the government acted for the benefit of that very public(s), by expressing an approval on behalf of Ottoman public(s) and furthermore, producing consent for the state, İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr* appeared as the voice of a perceived public(s).

İbrahim Şinasi's perception of the public(s), however, did not include lower income individuals or criminals or women of the Ottoman society as active actors who would be able to change let alone participate in political and economic decisions. For example, a mother, a child, beggars, and thieves made the news or were subject to editorial articles. When İbrahim Şinasi wrote an article on the rising number of beggars (*seele*) in Istanbul, for example, they did not appear as the active actors of the society but rather as a group that should be provided with, as a part of benevolent activities, alms.[375] If they intentionally chose to be beggars due to their "nature" (*cibilliyet*) or "ill-bred education" (*terbiyet-i rediesi*), those beggars should be banned from begging and should be compelled to make their living and should be compelled to work. [376] In this narrative, even though İbrahim Şinasi mentioned the members from the lower class, he approached the issue of begging from the perspective of the Ottoman tradition that was shaped around the idea of charity. Therefore, İbrahim Şinasi never addressed the financial crises as contributing to begging or the increase in poverty.

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[375] For the importance of charity in the Ottoman Empire, see, for example, Eyal Ginio "Living on the margins of charity : coping with poverty in an Ottoman provincial city", 165-184; Mine Ener, "The charity of the Khedive", 185-201; Nadir Özbek,"Imperial gifts and sultanic legitimation during the late Ottoman empire, 1876-1909",203-220 in *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Context*, Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy Singer (eds.),(Albany: SUNY Press, 2003).

[376] "…..cibilliyet veyahud terbiyet-i rediesi iktizasınca istihsali teayyuşte tabiî olan meşak-u mihenden kaçınarak bu yola sulûk edenler dahi men' ile kâr-ü kisbe icbar kılınur ki şu suret hem umumun şanını nakiseden himaye ve hem de…" İbrahim Şinasi, "Bend-i Mahsus Seele Hakkındadır", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1280 (23 November 1863), No:147.

### 3.1.2 *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the Public under the Editorial Leadership of Namık Kemal

Despite its cautious discourse, beginning with the 268th issue,[377] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s criticisms of the state's policies on finance, foreign intervention, and international relations shifted and progressively became more transparent and intense under the editorial leadership of Namık Kemal,[378] who became the main editor following İbrahim Şinasi's departure from the empire in 1864.[379] While İbrahim Şinasi emphasized the state's financial obligations and responsibilities to its public(s), Namık Kemal took such discourses a step further by addressing the financial problems of the public(s) and penning articles that directly addressed the debilitating financial conditions of the Ottoman Empire. The disappointing climate stemmed from the unsuccessful economic and fiscal policies of Tanzimat bureaucrats. For example, in 1865, the Treasury Council (*Meclis-i Hazain*) was

[377] Before leaving for Europe, İbrahim Şinasi's name appeared for the last time in the 268th issue of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* that was published on 28 Şaban 1281 (26 January 1865).

[378] The first article by Namık Kemal appeared in the 35th issue of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1279 (26 October 1862). Beginning in 28 Şaban 1281, (27 January 1865), he became the lead editor of this newspaper.

[379] İbrahim Şinasi left the editorial leadership of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the empire after the issuance of the first Ottoman Press Law of 2 Şaban 1281 (1 January 1865). Therefore, Hüseyin Çelik, who published a book on İbrahim Şinasi thinks that İbrahim Şinasi left the empire due to his timid personality. Çelik argues that İbrahim Şinasi's personality made him believe that, as the main editor and owner of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the articles of the new press law could be used to detain him. See Çelik, *Şinasi*, 227-238. However, İbrahim Şinasi's fleeing to Paris also followed his expulsion from the state service. Regarding the reason why İbrahim Şinasi left the empire, it was also argued that he had participated in a plot aganist against Ali Pasa. See Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman* Thought, 255.

established by the Porte to prevent the financial collapse of the empire.[380] Indeed, in 1865, the Ottoman government had already defaulted the interest payments on its consolidated debts. In the same year, the government also attempted to create new financial resources to acquire more taxes. With this aim, attempts to secularize religious endowments *(evkaf*) were made, since these properties were tax exempted and constituted as untouched sources of revenues.

During this period of mounting financial difficulties and institutional reorganizations, increasing debt and the corrupt practices of state bureaucrats were primary concerns for Namık Kemal's *Tasvir-i Efkâr.* Regarding these issues, Namık Kemal's articles specifically emphasized the public(s)'s wealth, the public(s)'s well-being, and the public(s)'s interests that were supposed to be secured by the state.[381] In comparison to İbrahim Şinasi's editorial approach, Namık Kemal applied a more confrontational and direct news making style. His dissenting personality appeared more openly in the printed word than İbrahim Şinasi.[382] However, Namık Kemal's more confrontational style was not only a product of his dissident personality. Due to his disagreements with Fuad Paşa, the

[380] Ibid, 29.

[381] For example, up until 1864, the Ottoman public debt and rate of issue increased consistently. While the amount of debt borrowed was 3,000,000 pounds in 1854, it increased to 5,000,000 pounds in 1855 and another 5,000,000 pound loan was borrowed in 1858. Even if the borrowed amount dropped to 2,037,220 pound in 1860 it increased to 8,000,000 pounds in 1862, which was followed by another 8,000,000 pounds in 1863 as well. For these numbers as well as the rate of issues and acquired numbers,see, Murat Birdal, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*, (London&New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 28.

[382] An ideological split occurred between the other members of the Young Ottomans and İbrahim Şinasi after İbrahim Şinasi fled to Europe. While in Paris, İbrahim Şinasi distanced himself from his former friends and devoted himself to literature and linguistics. When Namık Kemal fled for Europe and met with Ibrahim Sinasi approximately four years after his leave, Namık Kemal and his other Young Ottoman friends were received cold welcome of İbrahim Şinasi. Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought*, 255.

resignation of Mustafa Fazıl Paşa from his post after serving finance minister only for three months in 1866 also shaped Namık Kemal's discourse and style.[383]

In an article concerning issues of internal and external borrowing published in 1866, Namık Kemal "voiced" the thoughts of the "people" within Ottoman society. When "Considering the past 20-30 years of the state's policies,"[384] [i.e. the Tanzimat reforms] Namık Kemal argued that the Porte made decisions that opposed the public's interests. Contrary to İbrahim Şinasi's thoughts on how taking foreign loans increased the credibility of Ottomans in the external markets, Namık Kemal approached this supposed credibility from the perspectives of what he perceived to be the public(s). While the Ottoman government made payments to its debtors in order to maintain its credibility in European markets, Namık Kemal continued, "the attempts of the Ottoman government to reform the state and its fiscal problems proved to be unsuccessful" in the eyes of the public.[385] In this narrative, "the public" appeared as a non-specific term. Within four months, however, the meaning of "some people" or the "public" became clearer in another article written by Namık Kemal. By comparing the interest rates and the payments of internal and external loans used to balance the budget deficit, the author looked to prove that, "in the long run,"[386] foreign loans would bring disaster to the state.[387] Instead of foreign loans, Namık Kemal suggested that the Porte should prefer taking loans in

[383] Following his resignation, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa was sent abroad as an exile by Fuad Paşa.

[384] Namık Kemal, "Ahval-i Maliyeye Dair bir Layihadir," *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 27 Rebiülevvel 1283, (9 August 1866), No: 414.

[385] Ibid.

[386] Namık Kemal, untitled, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 1 Şaban 1283, (8 December 1866), No:.445.

[387] Ibid.

internal markets using the *esham* system, a long term domestic borrowing method which was a modified form of the Ottoman tax farming system.[388] Even though this system of borrowing was "detrimental" like the other borrowing systems, it was still in general "better" (*ehven*) than all other borrowing methods. The article went forth to state, "since it would serve the needs of the general public (*ihtiyacı umumiye*)," to some extent, acquiring loans in the form of *esham* should be considered as "one of the good works" (*hasenat)* for the public. As long as the Porte's treasury existed, the *sehm* (share) would be the most secure investment for "people" not engaged in trade or commerce.[389] Thus, throughout *Tasvir-i Efkâr's* pages, the "people" transformed from an abstract concept to a term that signified a public composed of people that would be able to provide loans for the Ottoman government. As one of the purposes for the *esham* system was to create small-scale lenders,[390] in this article, the author suggested that the "people" included many individuals from different occupational groups and individuals who had savings to make investments. Therefore, in this narrative, not only groups such as high and middle ranking soldiers, bureaucrats, bankers (*sarraf*), and tax-farmers who had better opportunity to auction for *sehm*, but also lower-middle income groups

[388] Beginning in 1775, due to the rising military expenditures and increasing fiscal problems of the Empire, the central government implemented a new domestic borrowing system, called the *esham* system. In this system, the pre-specified annual net revenues of a tax source would be divided into a large number of shares. These shares would then be bid upon by lifetime buyers at a public auction. The tax-farmers continued to collect the annual revenues of the tax sources. See, Mehmet Genç, "Esham", İslam Ansiklopedisi, XI (1995), 376-380. Veli Aydın, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bir İç Borçlanma Örneği Olarak Esham Uygulaması", Hasan Celâl Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca (eds.), *Türkler*, vol.14, (Osmanlı), (Adana, 2002), 345.

[389] Namık Kemal, untitled, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 1 Şaban 1283, (8 December 1866), No:.445.

[390] Şevket Pamuk, "Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol.35, no.2 (Autumn 2004), 242.

appeared as investors and money-lenders, not the foreign sources who would lend money to the government with high interest rates.[391]

In this article, economic and social actors who were involved in arts and trade were specifically addressed. In this vein, the Ottoman public, whose "well-being"[392] needed to be provided for by state, included many occupational groups. Probably more significant than the fact that the author referred to occupational groups was the defense of the revival of the *esham* system. The author supported the revival of the system, since he believed that Ottoman society would benefit from a renewed *esham* system in two ways. Firstly, individuals who would buy *sehm* would receive good interest and therefore would be making a profitable investment. Secondly, by buying *sehm*, investors would be supporting the state's finances. From the point of view of *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* finding internal financial resources was important, as in this way, domestic individuals would be supporting and contributing to their own state and at the same time would be benefiting the system by making investments by lending their money to the state.

Indeed, this article was published only thirteenth days after a dispatch that mentioned expectations that the government would not borrow new [i.e. foreign] loans in the coming year. The news informed readers on how the government's decision to not borrow loans for the current year yielded possible budgetary

[391] *Sehm* auctions were open to Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire without gender prejudice. In 1792, non-Muslims were bestowed the right to bid at these auctions. Among the *sehm* owners, there were children and women as well. In general, however, the *sehm* owners were high-ranking ruling elites who resided in Istanbul. See, Veli Aydın, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bir İç Borçlanma Örneği Olarak Esham", 347.

[392] Namık Kemal, untitled, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 1 Şaban 1283, (8 December 1866), No:.445.

success.[393] Therefore, for the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, it was consistent to argue for the taking of internal loans if the loans were the only possible solution for recovering the budget deficit.

The Porte's growing anxiety over the critiques of Namık Kemal and his insistence on reflecting the voice of the Ottoman public(s) led to the closure of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1867. Particularly inflammatory was an article authored by Namık Kemal criticizing how European powers intervened in the Cretan affair,[394] leading Ali Paşa to temporarily close *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and appoint its confrontational editor assistant governor of the Erzurum province.[395] After many attempts to refuse his new assignment and delay his leave from Istanbul, Namık Kemal fled to Paris alongside a number of his Young Ottoman counterparts.[396] Following Namık Kemal's escape from the empire, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* continued to be published by Recaizade Ekrem, Kayazade Reşad, and Ebuzziya Tevfik, a colleague of Namık Kemal in the Young Ottoman movement and secretary of the Council of State.[397]

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[393] Untitled, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, No:432.

[394] After the Greek War of Independence (1821-30), the Greeks of Crete remained subjects of the Ottoman Empire, yet revolted several times, demanding unification with Greece. Between 1866 and 1869, when Ottoman private newspapers of the empire were being published, serious insurrections arose in Crete. In 1866, the diplomats of the Great Powers expressed their doubts about the Ottoman army's ability to contain the upheavals. In 1867, France and Russia submitted a specific reform proposal to the Porte to put an end to the uprisings. The Russian plan, however, aimed at partitioning the Ottoman Empire into autonomous regions. Regarding Crete, the Russians advocated for the annexation of the island to Greece, which created more displeasure in the Ottoman public(s) towards Europeans, since the Ottoman public(s) was aggravated by European interventions into the Ottoman internal affairs. See Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thoughts*, 25-27.

[395] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 18 Zilkade 1283, (25 March 1867). Similar to the majority of those Ottoman intellectuals and opponents who published newspapers at the time, Namık Kemal had spent most of his life as a state official, a position he continued to occupy in 1867.

[396] Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thoughts*, 42.

[397] Ebuzziya was dismissed from his post in the government shortly after he began publishing *Tasvir-i Efkâr.* Mardin, ibid., 57.

The newspaper's criticisms of the Porte, however, faded with the public's interest in *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* as government pressures forced the editors of the newspaper to lose their dissenting tone. After two more years, the newspaper eventually was closed. *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s politically charged discourse, however, left a legacy that carried with it the potential to create a public that might exceed beyond the groups and classes which could be considered as elite. While topics of interest to lower class audiences such as railway workers, peasants, and porters were relatively absent from the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the tradition of the critique of the Porte's financial policies allowed the next newspaper, entitled *İbret,* to include the lower classes into its pages, making the paper appear as an inevitable outcome of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s legacy.

### 3.2 *İbret,* Real Tax Payers, Public Debt, and the "Public's" Quest for Fiscal Responsibility

After spending years as a political exile in Paris due to his dissident acts against the government, Namık Kemal returned to Istanbul and continued to use the press as a mechanism to challenge the state's financial policies. By May 1872, Namık Kemal and his colleagues Nuri, Reşad, and Ebüzziya Tevfik began to publish *İbret.* [398] Appearing five times a week, *İbret* communicated a strong and

[398] Nuri, Reşad, and Ebüzziya Tevfik were among the six founders of the Young Ottoman movement. At some point in their lives, these Ottoman intellectuals worked in the Translation Bureau of the Porte. In 1867, due to the pressure of the Porte regarding their involvement in the clandestine Young Ottoman movement, Nuri and Reşad had to flee to Paris. Nuri and Reşad rejected accepting money from khedive Mustafa Fazıl Paşa ,who claimed himself as the leader of the movement and provided financial support for the Young Ottomans during their exile in Europe. After returning to the Ottoman Empire in 1872, Nuri and Reşad published *İbret* with Namık Kemal

overt criticism of the state and was received by Ottoman readers with greater interest than previous publications. While the intellectuals of the Empire provided *İbret* with a significant core readership, the newspaper's popularity increased in the Ottoman public(s), as it quickly reached a circulation rate of 24,000 copies.[399] Concerning the rhetoric used by *İbret*'s editors, throughout 1872, the notion of the public acquired a more concrete and significant base, since in their articles and narratives, the editors of *İbret* addressed diverse and specific occupational groups. In these articles, the problems of these occupational groups were presented as originating from the state's fiscal and economic policies. *İbret* also acknowledged the existence of "public opinion"[400] in the Ottoman Empire and its significance on controversial government policies. Such policies, according to the editors of *İbret*, only intensified the financial difficulties of the Empire and negatively affected the "public's well-being."[401]

In one of the first issues of *İbret*, the deterioration of the "public's well-being" was connected to the state's indebtedness which, according to the editor Reşad, resulted in increased public taxation. In this article, Reşad acknowledged

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and Ebüzziya Tevfik. See, Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal, Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında,* v.1 (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944), 381-393. Tevfik was another Young Ottoman intellectual concerned with the future of Empire. In 1871, Ebüzziya Tevfik also launched *Hadika*, which was an oppositional paper that grew in prominence when it published the petition of the navy yard workers. These workers revolted against the Porte since their salaries were unpaid for several months. In *Hadika*, Ebüzziya Tevfik supported the workers justified revolt against the government. He also published newspaper articles in *Yeni Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1909 on the Young Ottoman movements, which provided most of the current information that we have on the Young Ottomans. These articles were complied and published. See, Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*.

[399] Namık Kemal, "Terakki," *İbret*, 3 Ramazan 1289 (4 November 1872), No: 45.

[400] Namık Kemal, "*Efkâr*i Umumiye," *İbret*, 26 Şaban 1289 (29 October 1872), No: 40. Also see, anonymous, "Tanzimat", *İbret*, 4 Ramazan 1289, No:46.

[401] Reşad, "İstikraz", *İbret*, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1289 (9 July 1872), No:19.

that the state in principle possessed the right to secure loans, yet emphasized the necessity of this condition being an "exception not a rule"[402] in periods of possibly unexpected budget deficits, such as unpreventable wars. In the Ottoman case, Reşad argued that the phrase of Fuad Paşa, "This Empire cannot survive without debt,"[403] was recognized as one of the main imperatives of the state machinery, which created "chronic illness"[404] for Ottoman finances. Essential to this article was Reşad's emphasis on the negative effects that the "Public debt" presented for the Ottoman public. Accordingly, by increasing public taxation, the "public debt" would "damage the future of later generations" and the "public order".[405] These fiscal policies would hurt "the public order," since the public would be paying the interest of the debt instead of making sound investments, which was necessary for the "public's development."[406]

Regarding the fiscal responsibilities of the state, for the editors of *İbret,* one significant subject that needed to be addressed and resolved by the state was the tax problems of varied groups and individuals. Furthermore, related to the tax problem, there were the public debt policies of the state and foreign interventions in the Ottoman economy and finance. In this vein, the editors of *İbret* applied their defense of the public to matters of trade and commerce.

[402] Ibid.

[403] Ibid.

[404] Ibid.

[405] Ibid.

[406] Ibid.

Throughout the nineteenth century, diverse Ottoman groups increasingly sought to acquire and protect personal wealth by engaging in global trade, tax farming, and banking. Such financial endeavors further aggravated pre-existing tensions between international entrepreneurs, particularly British investors, and Ottoman interests.[407] Although geographically dispersed and forming a network that reached from the port cities and to the interior, particularly in the port cities of Istanbul, Izmir, Beirut and Salonika, Ottoman non-Muslims sought European protection to escape Ottoman taxation and to promote their economic interests. Such European protection created resentment among Muslims, who did not have similar access to European concessions and privileges that were permitted through capitulations.[408] Opposing the tactics pursued by European and non-Muslim traders, *İbret's* editors tried to promote Ottoman merchant interests. In an article published in November 1872, for example, Namık Kemal questioned the favored trade conditions of non-Ottoman merchants over domestic entrepreneurs.[409] In this vein, Namık Kemal criticized the state's policies on internal tariffs by presenting those tariffs as the main impediments for the development of an Ottoman entrepreneurial class.[410] Such rhetoric reflected not only the editors of *İbret*'s resentment towards European interference in domestic commerce but also anger with the Porte's

[407] Using a comparative perspective, Reşat Kasaba shows the British interests in the Ottoman Empire. See, "Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century", *Journal of World History*, vol.4, no:2 (Fall 1993), 215-241.

[408] For capitulations, see for example Bruce Masters, "Capitulations", in Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 118-119.

[409] Namık Kemal, "Sanat ve Ticaretimiz", *İbret*, 19 Ramazan 1289 (20 November 1872), No: 57.

[410] Ibid.

policies. As the implementation and development of European's interests required a central government -since it was easier for Europeans to deal with one centralized authority rather than vast networks of merchants, bankers, and provincial elites-[411], indeed, the critiques regarding the Porte's policies and European interference that were voiced in the article, which was published in November,[412] were not contradictory in nature. Even if Namık Kemal did not address or analyze the connection between the imperialistic policies of the Great Powers and centralization policies of the Sublime Porte, he criticized and challenged both Europeans and central actors on behalf of the local merchants. Before the centralization policies and progress of European merchants in the Ottoman Empire, peasant households were linked to each other and to regional markets via the mediation of local traders. Those local merchants had immediate contacts with cultivators, officials, and foreign merchants. Therefore, for foreign merchants, those local traders/intermediaries were possible *collaborators* who could enter Ottoman trade networks. Reşat Kasaba argued that even though the interests of local merchants and foreign traders were not inherently incompatible, Great Britain's foreign trade policy irritated Ottoman traders due to its privileged status. Accordingly, by establishing British banks, insurance companies and similar infrastructures, British traders attempted to takeover local networks, which created a different style of resistance among Ottoman merchants.[413] Therefore, the critiques of *İbret*'s authors

[411] Kasaba, "Treaties and Friendships", 227.

[412] Namık Kemal, "Sanat ve Ticaretimiz", *İbret*, 19 Ramazan 1289 (20 November 1872), No: 57.

[413] Ibid, 230-231.

towards Europeans' favored trade conditions reflected the contemporary concerns and aggravations of local Ottoman merchants. Furthermore, in criticizing internal tariffs, the editors of *İbret* also attempted to defend the interests of an emerging Ottoman middle class.

Indeed, in Namık Kemal's mind, the foreign loan policy of the central government, tax exemptions for specific groups such as bankers and high ranking officials in Istanbul, and European interference in Ottoman policy were somewhat related. For example, to defend middle class interests, *İbret* mentioned the insufficient (*kâfi değildir*) and low level salaries of the urban classes, in this case middle and lower ranking officials such as gendarmes (*zaptiye*), while emphasizing how most of the wealth was transferred to Galata bankers, who were tax exempted, due to the continuous transactions between the Porte and bankers.[414] Emphasizing these continuous transactions, indeed, Namık Kemal also questioned Istanbul's foreign loan policy since the Imperial government, via bankers, was transferring money to Europe to pay the interest of the loans extracted from the provinces. Yet, instead of mentioning a general displeasure in the provinces due to the foreign loans, heavy taxes, and tax collection methods, he focused on the tax problems of the middle and lower classes.

In this sense, the public that was promoted by *İbret* included middle and lower class interests as well. In one article, for example, Namık Kemal emphasized the depressed living conditions of the rural peasantry as a means to aggressively

[414] See, B.M, "İdarece Muhtaç Olduğumuz Ta'dilât", *İbret*, 15 Şaban 1289 ( October 1872), No:33.

criticize government tax policies.[415] As Namık Kemal outlined the unfair and difficult working conditions of tax-paying peasants and farmers (*rençber*)[416], he also harshly criticized wealthy Galata bankers, who held profitable connections with European bankers, lived comfortably in Istanbul, and were exempt from paying taxes to the central government. The issue of the Galata bankers' tax exemption was specifically addressed, since these local bankers made their wealth not through "real production" like the peasantry, but rather by lending money to a financially troubled Ottoman government. Therefore, for the benefit of the "real producer", Namık Kemal argued against the tax policies of the central government, which favored bankers but not the peasants. The tax policies of the central government also favored the inhabitants of Istanbul, since they did not pay taxes like the residents of other locations of the empire.

In this article, *İbret* emerged as a tool for vocalizing peasantry's interests. In reality, however, Namık Kemal looked to do more than voice the interests of the peasantry. He also questioned the centralization and taxation policies of the central government. These policies resulted in the extraction of wealth from the provinces and therefore disturbed provincial elites. As I stated before, during the centralization and modernization period of the empire, the tax farming system was abolished. Although the state introduced this decision for the benefit of the

[415] B.M, "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?", *İbret*, 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1872), No:60.

[416] See, ibid. Indeed, the examples of the heavily taxed and hardworking farmers, in contrast to the tax exempted bankers "who were soaked by gold up to their neck" (*boğazlarına kadar altına müstağrak olmuş*) or merchants who would make more money than farmers but pay fewer taxes, were used in many instances. See, for example, "Müvâredât-ı Belediye", *İbret*, 25 Muharrem 1290 (23 March 1873), No: 122. "Masraf ve İrâdımız", *İbret*, 13 Zilkade 1289 (13 January 1873), No: 91.

peasantry, the pronouncement disturbed diverse groups within the society, as the central government intended to directly extract the wealth produced in the provinces. Large numbers of tax farmers who generally were appointed as a governor of a province (*vali*) and credit agents, who generally had organic connections with Galata bankers,[417] and state officials, who profited from the system, objected to the destruction of their privileges. In the article, Namık Kemal, as a journalist who claimed to defend the general public(s)'s good and interests,[418] did not mention the financial and economic interests of tax farmers. He neither questioned nor showed the connection between Galata bankers and tax farmers. Instead, he criticized the central state's tax policy not on behalf of a general public or provincial elites specifically, but on behalf of the tax paying peasants. The same article stated that if the inhabitants of the capital city and officials (*memurlar*) would continue to not pay any taxes, providing and maintaining the order in provinces would not be possible. Indeed, in this article, Namık Kemal questioned the authority of the central state and its policies, as many high-ranking official and pashas acquired state posts and, through these posts, collected taxes in the provinces for their own benefits. Expectedly, the peasantry was most affected by the heavy taxes collected by centrally appointed officials for the vested interests of pashas or *valis.*

Perhaps the most straightforward and bitter in rhetoric, as well as detailed in analysis, article on taxation was entitled *Tekalif* (*taxes*). Indeed, this article was

[417] Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri,* 2nd ed. (Ankara: Orion, 2005), 19-23.

[418] For example, in one article, Namık Kemal claimed that practicing the profession of journalism was a means of serving one's country (*vatan*). See, Kemal, "Gazete Muharrirliği ve *İbret*", İbret, 21 Zilkade 1289 (21 January 1873), No: 97.

significant in many ways. For the readers, it provided information on the different types of state taxes. However, before explaining the variety of taxes, the article stated that since borrowing debt cost five, and in most cases, fifteen times higher in expenses than its yield to the public(s), debt was a type of sacrifice (*bir nev´ fedakarlık*) one that should only be taken during periods of certain necessity. After proposing such an argument, the article stated that the financial needs of a state would be acquired through taxation. In this vein, the author proposed that the government should assess the taxes rather than taking loans. However, for the author, there were appropriate ways of levying taxes. The article argued that the public(s) should only be levied taxes to a necessary extent (*lüzum-ı zaruri dairesinde*) to provide the essential needs of a state. Accordingly, a state would need resources and hence taxes to provide security, safety, and order for its public(s), which should be considered under the purview of the state's administrative functions. Furthermore, it can assess taxes to provide and develop infrastructures for transportation systems, to improve education system and health services, and to induce investments for industry, and to support municipalities. The article continued, stating that the public(s) were obliged to pay taxes, since it needed the services that the state would provide. However, when taxing people it was the state's duty to use upmost moderation (*mümkün olduğu kadar mutedil*).The most intriguing part of the article was a paragraph explaining how one of the most important reasons for upheavals across the world was the lack of moderation used when taxing people. Moreover, the same paragraph stated that if one would read the history of any state, the reader would realize that, due to heavy taxation, half of the

history of that state was full of the stories of people whose blood was spilled for no reason.[419] Making such a claim, indeed, the author of the article not only threatened the government on behalf of Ottoman public(s) but also encouraged that the very public(s) resist heavy and unfair taxations. The same article also clearly expressed displeasure regarding the notion of equitable taxation, a notion that was announced in *Islâhat Fermanı* of 1856. For example, when the author criticized taxing one's consumption instead of one's income, he specifically compared bankers (*sarraf*) with street porters. He argued that powerful bankers who commissioned whopping amounts of gold by lending money to the government should not be taxed equally with the street porters who carried the gold of these bankers, since such an arrangement would be an injustice against the street porters.[420] Therefore, I contend that the article voiced as well as attempted to shape public opinion. Throughout this article, however, the interpretation of the public(s) did not appear to be such a general concept, although mainly it was addressed as the public(s). Rather, in this context, the public(s) of the article included people from wealthy and lower-income groups.

In another article written in November 1872, the tax problems of the peasants and farmers were specifically addressed.[421] In this article, the author praised the importance of farmers for their production and emphasized that their indispensable qualities stemmed from the fact that farmers of the empire worked for

[419] B.M, "Tekalif-1", (Taxes), *İbret*, 7 Zilkade 1289 (7 January 1873), No: 87.

[420] B.M, "Tekalif-2", İbret, 8 Zilkade 1289 (8 January 1873), No:88.

[421] B.M, "Ziraatimiz" (Our farming), *İbret*, 25 Ramazan 1289 (26 November 1872), No: 61.

the benefits of city dwellers. Although these very farmers were the real producers of the empire, they had to deal with countless difficulties in order to provide for their daily lives. By providing detailed information on how farmers (*rençber*) had to live under heavy debts, including how they needed to borrow money from usurers with very high interests rates[422] to cultivate, harvest and sell their production, the author stated that a farmer still could not make enough money to support his children (*çoluğunu çocuğunu idare etmeye*) and maintain his farms until the next harvest time. Therefore, the author continued that if the central state would give extra time to peasants to pay their taxes, they would not be stranded between the money lenders and low-paying traders and therefore their current debt problems. For this reason, the author asked the government to assess and collect the taxes in installments according to specific qualities of not even the province (*vilayet*) or the subdivision of provinces (*liva*) but of the villages (*köy*). So, in this article, centralized tax collection was not challenged. Rather, the way in which taxes were collected was criticized.

Similarly, the editors of *İbret* focused on the tax problems of urban social actors, such as workers who possessed lower incomes, even though they worked under difficult physical conditions to maintain their minimum living expenses. For example, an article by Namık Kemal argued that the Ottoman Tobacco Regie turned tens of thousands or maybe hundreds of thousands of "free people", including peasants, workers, and artisans who worked to produce tobacco, into

[422] "In this way, a farmer is giving back one hundred seventy five kurus for one hundred kurus [that he borrowed] for four months." For the original quote see, "……rençber bu suretle dört ay icin yüz kuruşa yüz yetmiş beş kuruş faiz i'ta ediyor", ibid.

slaves. He noted that although these people participated in every step of tobacco production,[423] they barely were able to maintain their subsistence expenses with their labor. Yet, "companies that were established by three or five individuals," like the ones that were found by Zarifi and Hırstaki, unfairly earned millions. In this vein, Ottoman journalists explored the dilemmas of the "real producers" of the empire, who indeed were the "real tax payers".[424] Similarly, in another article that criticized the Beyoğlu municipality, Namık Kemal stated that the poor people of Beyoğlu were burdened by heavy taxes while the municipality worked to enlighten the recreational spots of foreign (*ecnebi*) bankers, who poured into Istanbul from Europe.[425] Clearly, the "real taxpayers" of the Ottoman society stood in contrast to those individuals who enjoyed the protection of the Great Powers such as bankers and middlemen. The interests of "real taxpayers and producers" conflicted with those actors who did not produce anything substantively yet unfairly consumed the resources of the society.[426] By criticizing the groups who did not pay taxes due to the protection that they received from the Great Powers, the editors also showed their fervent resentment about the Great Powers' interference in the Empire. In this context, Namık Kemal's comments exemplify the general discourse promoted by

[423] Kemal stated that "Petro sowed, Marice picked, Yanko desiccated, Manol packed, Zahari brought the tobacco to Istanbul, and Kostaki, Mihali ve Panayoki prepared it for sale". See, B.M, "Reji", *İbret*, 12 Şaban 1289 (15 October 1872), No: 30.

[424] Ibid.

[425] Kemal, Untitled, *İbret*, 3 Safer 1290 (1 April 1873),No:132.

[426] B.M, "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?", *İbret*, 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1872), No:60.

*İbret's* editors who, by claiming to speak on behalf of the public's interests, overtly challenged the government's economic and fiscal policies.

Through the printed word, the editors of *İbret* sought to awaken a public that they considered to be exploited financially, and warn the public about the dangers of the government's economic and fiscal policies together with foreign intervention into the Ottoman economy. Furthermore, these editors attempted to convince the public(s) about the dangers of foreign intervention and to mobilize the public(s) for the unity of Empire, a mobilization built upon the backs of lower, middle, and upper class interests. For Ottoman officials, such arguments were increasingly viewed as a challenge to the Sultan's authority. The breaking point for the state resulted first from the enthusiasm Namık Kemal received for the initial performance of his play *Vatan yahut Silistre* in 1 April 1873, which patriotically called for Ottomans to defend their "Fatherland" in the face of foreign enemies, and second, the positive praise that the play received throughout the issues of *İbret*, which led to the publication's closure on 5 April 1873 and the deportation of Namık Kemal from Istanbul.[427] For its strong criticisms of the government, the newspaper was eventually closed. Furthermore, the editors of İbret, Tevfik and Mithat, were to be confined in a fortress in Rhodes (*kalebend*). In order to avert a possible escape, the government strictly ordered the guards of the fortress to prevent Tevfik and Mithat from seeing anyone at all.[428]

[427] Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı,* 7th. Edition (İstanbul:Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988), 351-358.

[428] BOA, A.MKT.MHM. 452/47, 19 Safer 1290 (17 April 1873).

## 4. Tracing the Ottoman Public(s) through the Prices, Advertisements and Contents of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*

The rhetoric of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* revealed that these two newspapers never eschewed any independent role, independent from the voice of the Sublime Porte, to claim themselves to be the active conveyers of the public(s)'s opinion. Furthermore, these two newspapers' discourses never deployed a neutral tone to the government's policies, as "the voice of public(s)" could be critical about those very same policies. Yet, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* were not merely reflections of public opinion, since they devoted themselves to defending the rights of the Ottoman public(s). Consequently, they appeared as the advocates of the Ottoman public(s). However, as it was stated by Namık Kemal, publishing a newspaper was also a way of providing income for the journalists.[429] Therefore, most probably, receiving advertisements was an important source of revenue for the publishers of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret.* Leaving the attempt to analyze the meaning of the public at the discursive level aside, in this last part of the chapter, I will attempt to further define the targeted Ottoman public(s) by tracing the readership profiles of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* through their prices, advertisements and layouts.

### 4.1 *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and its Readership

#### 4.1.1 *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s Layout Design, Content, and its Readers

[429] Kemal, "İbret hakkında", *İbret,* 26 Zilkade 1289 (26 January 1873), No:101.

Although subscription registers have not survived, through a content analysis, it is possible to identify the targeted readers' profiles particularly their educational backgrounds, occupations and geographical locations, as well as who purchased and maybe did not purchase but still read *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. Geographically, it is clear that *Tasvir-i Efkâr's* audience included not only residents of Istanbul, but readers from the provinces as well. Evidenced in the letters sent by amateur correspondents who volunteered notable news items from their respective districts, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was read in diverse regions and published news from different parts of the Empire such as Izmir, Beirut, Basra, Belgrade, Diyarbakır, and Ankara.[430] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, nevertheless, relied heavily on letters volunteered by amateur correspondents, particularly from the Anatolian portion of the empire. It can be assumed that amateur correspondents sent news dispatches from their districts to make their problems heard in the imperial center, through a tool, the newspaper, that was available for public eyes, instead of the petitions that would only be read by bureaucrats.

Considering the limited distribution opportunities of the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman newspapers, however, it would be wrong to argue that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was widely read in the provinces of the empire. Newspapers of the time were distributed to the provinces of the empire by the state's postal system.[431] The postal

[430] For Bagdad, see, 11 R 1279 (5 October 1862), No:29, 7 Z 1281, No:294. For Izmir, see 2 Ramazan 1278 (4 March 1862), No:68, No:228. For Belgrade, No: 228. For Basra, No: 294. For Beirut, see, 11 Sefer 1279 (7 August 1862), No: 12, 14 Sefer 1279 (10 August 1862), No:13.

[431] In order to be carried to the provinces by the Ottoman postal system, the newspapers paid the shipping cost according to the distance. However, books were exempted from this distance based application. See, BOA, A.AMD, 81/12, 25 Muharrem 1274 (14 September 1857).

systems of the consulates were another option, particularly for the dissident newspapers' distribution, which was prevented by state censorship and hence by the state postal system. Most probably, it took weeks and sometimes months for the readers to receive a copy of the newspaper in the distant provinces of the empire, even if the distribution of the newspapers were not prevented by state censorship. Considering that we do not have the subscription lists of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, even if we cannot be sure about the geographical distribution of the paper, we can still argue that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was read in the provinces and that the correspondents sent dispatches to the paper as, I showed in chapter 2, correspondents sent news reports from diverse regions.

The layout design of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* provides some clues regarding the educational background and classes of the readership core of the newspaper. Material considerations related to layout and formatting might have both encouraged as well as restricted *Tasvir-i Efkâr's* accessibility. Though similar to its Ottoman counterparts, and as I discussed in chapter two, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* lacked headlines for every dispatch, illustrations, and other visual markers that could be used to steer less literate readers through and around texts, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* did include headings that separated domestic and international news. Readers familiar with the paper's layout could quickly locate topics of interest. Concerning the issue of format, in many ways like French newspapers of the revolution,[432] *Tasvir-i Efkâr*

[432] Jeremy D. Popkin mentions that most of French newspapers published in 1789 used an octavo format previously employed in pamphlets. See Popkin, "Journals: The New Face of News," in Robert Darnton and Daniel Roche (eds.), *Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989), 151.

modeled its size and shape in between books and modern day newspapers.[433] Limited pages equally encouraged readers to preserve and collect each issue's news and encyclopedic contents in bounded volumes.[434] Such features were enjoyed most by those individuals with a necessary amount of capital, a condition that might indicate *Tasvir-i Efkâr's* catering to more upper middle and wealthy classes. However, it should be noted that the paper was read and bounded by coffeehouses as well.

The targeted reading audience, as suggested by the layout of the paper, was not limited to groups that possessed a certain amount of wealth. In comparison to the language used in the official state newspaper *Takvim-i Vekâyi* and its semi-official counterpart *Cerideyi Havadis,* the privately owned *Tasvir-i Efkâr* deployed a rather less sophisticated style of prose which was more accessible to a wide range of social groups, such as lower and middle ranking state officials, students, merchants, and artisans. These individuals, though literate, could not be considered members of the upper classes. Nevertheless, a number of factors impeded the promise of this early private publication in constructing and reaching the lower classes. Although an improvement on the offerings of state-sponsored publishers, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* still employed a sophisticated discourse, which required the reader to be educated in order to understand the content of the articles. *Tasvir-i Efkâr* also sought to educate its readers on topics related to science and literature. Articles

[433] The size of the newspaper was 40 X 55cm.

[434] *Tasvir-i Efkâr* consisted of four pages.

informing readers of how snow[435] and rain[436] formed in the atmosphere or why people would sweat[437] were frequent and written with a simpler language. To this extent, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, at least with its discursive style, had the potential to reach audiences other than wealthy groups of the Empire.

Based on its content, one could assert that the readers of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* took a strong interest in the current political situation of the Empire. *Tasvir-i Efkâr* began with domestic news items such as official documents, accounts of speeches, appointments, and travel news of high-ranking bureaucrats, almost all of which were extracts from the official government newspaper and published under the title "official news." The type of events that *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s editors found newsworthy were wars, diplomatic negotiations between the Porte and European powers, and crises and upheavals in Balkan and Mediterranean regions such as Crete, Montenegro, and Walachia.[438] Foreign news items commonly followed domestic topics and were arranged according to the town and dateline from which they were sourced. Separate rubrics reported issues under the headlines of America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. While such detailed information on foreign and domestic events proved to be invaluable to state officials, diplomats, bureaucrats, and soldiers, the other news items of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* targeted a wider reading public.

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[435] "Kar nasıl oluşur?", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1282, (2 October 1865), No: 335.

[436] "Yağmur nasıl oluşur?", *Tasvir-iEfkâr*, 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1282, (13 October 1865), No: 338.

[437] "İnsanlar neden terler?", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1282, (25 September 1865), No: 341.

[438] For Montenegro, see, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Muharrem 1279, (2 July 1862); *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 7 Saban 1279, (27 January 1863).

*Tasvir-i Efkâr* provided news, for example, for rentiers and bankers who had invested in state bonds. The newspaper provided these actors with up-to-date stock market information, such as changes in commodity and stock prices in major global financial markets. Similar to the investors of our time, the Ottoman stockholders needed updates of the current political and economic situation of the Empire. *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was also required reading for traders and merchants, whose occupation necessitated knowledge that could influence their professional decisions. Information on weather and travel conditions such as floods, earthquakes, sites of road constructions and cities affected by fatal diseases such as plagues, and the amount of the current year's harvest were published in the pages of the newspaper. With its critical commentary on finance, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was probably read by investors and trading groups who either directly or indirectly held vested interests in the financial situation of the Empire.

### 4.1.2 *Tasvir-i Efkâr*'s Advertisements

The layout design of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and the language that the newspaper employed reveals a reading audience which was composed of educated but not necessarily wealthy groups. Yet, the advertising profile of the newspaper seemed like they targeted wealthy individuals. At the outset, there was seldom advertising, as *Tasvir-i Efkâr* devoted less than one quarter of its final page to advertisers. Over time, the number of advertisements increased alongside the profile of *Tasvir-i Efkâr's* audience. Indeed, since *Tasvir-i* in its first issue *Efkâr* announced that it

would publish advertisements and announcements on education and on issues that would be for the benefit of public for free, advertisements on books appeared often. However, in the first issues of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, there were more advertisements that sought to sell and waterside residences and mansions. These items, including recently published books, could only be purchased by wealthy groups of the society such as tax farmers, merchants, bankers, high ranking officials, and high ranking military and religious class (*ulema)* members.[439] Sometimes under the private postings on the page were official state announcements, which announced lands that were available for tax-farming purposes as well as recent or contemporary regulations, for example, on merchants.[440] There were also announcements given by the Ottoman army to purchase provisions for its soldiers. Advertisements for luxury estates, tax-farm properties, and expensive leisure objects would seemingly draw the attention of wealthy readers as well. Nevertheless, state demands for supplies and foodstuffs would attract groups who engaged in trade, in particular, guild members, tradesmen, merchants, and artisans who sought and were able to sell their products to the government. Upper and middle class interests were thus the targets of the products and services publicized.

Interestingly, however, in *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, gender based advertisements were not published. Probably, this lack of gender recognition in the advertisements

[439] For mansions and residences for sale and rent, see, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 8 Muharrem 1279 (7 July 1862), No:3. *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 12 Muharrem 1279 (9 July 1862), No: 4, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 15 Muharrem 1279 (12 July 1862), No:5, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 7 Sefer 1279 (3 August 1862), No:11. For books see, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 6 Şaban 1279 (26 January 1863), No:61, 29 Zilkade 1279 (17 May 1863), No:93, 21 Cemazüyelahir 1280 (3 December 1863), No:150.

[440] See, for example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 2 Ramazan 1279 (20 February 1863), No: 68, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 5 Ramazan 1279 (23 February 1863), No:69, *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, 20 Receb 1280 (31 December 1863), No:158.

emanated from a lack of professionally made advertisements in the newspaper. After all, publishing advertisements in newspapers were new phenomenon, just as newspaper publishing was a recent development for the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the first advertisements were similar in style to announcements and were published under the title of announcements (*ilânat*), not advertisements (*reklamlar*). These advertisements of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* were more similar to the announcements that were written with a dull style and only provided necessary information for the possible customers about the product or the property that was on the market for sale or rent. More likely, since print advertising remained in early development, the announcement-like advertisements were published in *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. Therefore, based on the advertisement found in this newspaper, it is difficult for us to gather an idea about readers' gender.

## 4.2 *İbret* and Its Readership

### 4.2.1 *İbret*'s Layout Design, Content, and its Readers

Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* the subscription lists of *İbret* did not survive. However, from the personal account of Ebüzziya Tevfik and an article written by Namik Kemal, we know that the circulation rate of the newspaper was between 12.000 and 24.000 copies.[441] If we consider the public reading possibilities and habits in coffee houses and other public places, we can assume that *İbret* was more

[441] See chapter 2.

widely read or heard during these public readings by the Ottoman public(s). Attempting to determine the public(s)'s tastes, as well as educational and class background is nevertheless much more difficult, even if it is not impossible. From the content and layout design of *İbret,* we can learn about what the Ottoman public(s) might have read about the political, economic, cultural, and social life of the empire and world politics, and therefore we can make assumptions about their educational and class background.

As I stated before, compared to *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret* used a more direct and harsher tone towards governmental policies. Maybe for this reason, it reached wider reading circles. Unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret* did not use news that came from volunteer correspondents. Therefore, based on the dispatches written by volunteer correspondents, it is difficult to assume if the paper was read in geographically diverse parts of the empire. However, considering *İbret'*s circulation rates, it is possible to argue that the paper was read not only in the capital but in other cities of the empire as well. Furthermore, even if they were limited, improving transportation opportunities and mail systems should be taken into consideration, as the development of the infrastructure might have helped with the distribution of the paper and therefore increased the circulation rates of *İbret,* since there were five years between the publication dates of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret.*[442]

[442] For example, the improvements at the port of Izmir occurred between 1867 and 1875. In Jidda alone, the number of steamships increased from 250 to 600 between 1814 and 1861. The Oriental Railway, which begun in the early 1870s and was completed in 1888, connected Istanbul to Edirne and Sofia. The İzmit-Ankara line was built in 1873. Due to the tribal pacification program of the central government, as it was the case in 1865 in the Adana region, the plundering of caravans dropped sharply. See, Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 798-818. Most probably, these developments resulted in the better distribution of mail and therefore newspapers.

Most probably, *İbret* reached a wider readership not only because of the improvements in the empire's infrastructure but also due to its accessible style as the layout style of the paper reveals. Most of all, *İbret* used a less complicated style than not only the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekâyi* and its semi-official counterpart *Cerideyi Havadis* but also its predecessor *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. Although, like *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret* lacked headlines for every dispatch and lacked illustration, *İbret* included more headings and simple visual markers, such as lines that separated each dispatch in addition to domestic and international news.[443] *İbret* also included a new section under the headline of *Istanbul Havadisi* that devoted news on Istanbul. Considering the layout design of *İbret* then, it was easier for the readers to locate news items. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that *İbret* was directed towards a larger number of readers. This argument could also be made regarding its language. *İbret* deployed an even less sophisticated style of prose compared with *Tasvir-i Efkâr.* This style was more accessible for wider audiences, as it could be understood not only by literate and educated social groups such as lower and middle ranking state officials, students, merchants, and artisans but also for individuals who did not receive a certain level of education but were interested in contemporary events. Nevertheless, one should be careful when making an argument on how *İbret* constructed and reached the lower classes, since most of the editorial articles required the readers to be educated in order to understand the content of the articles. At the same time, as exemplified in the articles on the tax problems of the working classes, many articles attempted to deploy a clear prose style to reach lower class audiences as well. Therefore, *İbret*, with its discursive

[443] See the appendix B.

style, at least had the potential to reach audiences other than educated groups of the Empire.

Based on its content, like the readers of *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* and perhaps more so than those readers, it is possible to assert that the readers of *İbret* took a strong interest in the current political and international developments of the empire. *İbret,* more often than not, devoted its entire first and most of the time second pages on the editorial articles written by Namik Kemal, Ebüzziya Tevfik, Nuri, and Reşad. Even if not exclusively, but generally, these articles were on current political or international developments. Editorial articles were followed by diverse news items. Unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* however, *İbret* did not always carry headlines for official and international news. Indeed, in contrast to *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* some news on the Ottoman bureaucracy, such as the travel news of high-ranking bureaucrats and their acceptance of foreign ambassadorship in the capital, was published under the category of *Istanbul Havadisi.* In terms of subjects, this section included mixed dispatches on Istanbul and governmental decisions such as annual budgets of the state and fire, stabbings, accidents, and burglaries that took place in Istanbul. On some occasions, domestic news items from different provinces and dispatches on Istanbul were not published separately. Instead of headlines, a visual marker, of a star was used to separate those domestic items from diverse regions and dispatches from Istanbul. Foreign news items commonly followed domestic topics and were arranged according to the province and town from which they were sourced. However, unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* there were no separate rubrics devoted to America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. While information on foreign and domestic events

possibly proved to be captivating for bureaucrats, soldiers, diplomats, intellectuals, and merchants, the news items published under the title of *Istanbul Havadisi* most probably were read by a wider reading public.

With its dispatches and editorial articles *İbret* also targeted particular groups in Ottoman public(s). For example, the exchange rates of foreign and Ottoman currencies were diligently published under the rubric of prices (*fiyat*). Furthermore, as stated above, *İbret* published news on the budget and how the announcement of the budget was received by the public(s), as well as news and editorial articles on Ottoman commerce and finance. These editorial articles and dispatches both supported and reflected the development of an Ottoman bourgeois class. This Ottoman bourgeoisie class was not particularly divided by religious lines. However, one can argue that *İbret* encouraged the embourgeoisement of the Ottoman Muslim readers since many articles criticized Ottoman citizens who, so as not to pay taxes, preferred the protection of Europeans.

### 4.2.2 *İbret*'s Advertisements

Like its articles, the advertisements found in *İbret* mirrored the growth of the Ottoman middle class in the early 1870s. Services for middle class and wealthy interests were promoted in *İbret,* as evidenced by an advertisement for dentists whose Parisian identities and Paris based educations were emphasized. The advertisement declared, "If people do not have healthy and complete teeth, they

would look ugly and their breath would smell bad."[444] Advertisers who marketed objects of middle class beauty and lifestyle were found in the newspaper's pages as well. A reopened store announced the sale of fine imported goods, including perfumes, silver utensils, Chinese porcelain plates, elegant candleholders, tobacco boxes, travel items such as trunks and suitcases, drawing paper, fine shirts, ties, and English bedsteads. A second store publicized the sale of soap in "elegant boxes."[445] Still another ran a series of French language book advertisements. In contrast to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, whose advertisements on the sale of lavish properties or on services required by the state could only be pursued by the very wealthy, the advertisements of *İbret* catered to broader economic interests as they targeted flourishing new tastes and middle classes as well.

The advertisements found in *İbret* appeared in an informative letter form or in a long announcement that tried to sell diverse items within a single announcement. For example, in an advertisement similar in style to a letter, the owner of a store offered to sell bath soap, kitchen utensils, tobacco boxes, shirts and ties for men, perfumes, and furniture.[446] The products and services that were advertised in *İbret*, however, displayed an awareness that the newspaper was read or possibly intended to be read by female readers as well. These women readers or, in other terms, the targeted costumers of advertisements, predominantly, if not

[444] For such advertisements, see, for example, *İbret*, 12 Rebiülahir 1289 (18 June 1872), No: 4; *İbret,* 13 Rebiülahir 1289, (19 June 1872), No: 5.

[445] Ibid.

[446] *İbret*, 11 Rebiülahir 1289 (17 June 1872), No: 3; 13 Rebiülahir 1289 (19 June 1872), No: 5; 14 Rebiülahir 1289 (20 June 1872), No: 4. Beginning from the 7th issue, the owner of the store accentuated Parisian origin of the items and announced that if consumers would not satisfied with the the item that he/she bought the item coul be returned to the store. See, 16 Rebiülahir 1289 (22 June 1872), No: 7.

exclusively, consisted of affluent Ottoman women. Even if the advertisements directly did not address women, they employed simple strategies to attract those affluent women. For example, as I stated above, the advertisement for a dentist suggested a correlation between healthy teeth and beauty. For "health and beauty reasons," "consumers" were invited to visit the dentist.[447] In such advertisements, a certain new life style was promoted for affluent women. In this new life style, women were invited to consume and furnish their home with imported products such as silver utensils, Chinese porcelain plates, elegant candleholders, and English bedsteads.[448] The publication of such advertisements, I contend, indicated a possibly flourishing middle class that would be interested in what was happening in their surroundings and therefore interested in reading newspapers.

### 5. The Prices of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* and their Readers

*Tasvir-i Efkâr* announced its price on the first page, and from the first edition until its closing, the price of the newspaper remained unchanged. Accordingly, each issue of the newspaper was priced at 1 guruş (piaster) while the shipping cost -24 piasters for a year, 12 piasters for six months, or 6 piasters for three months- was demanded separately. The price and the shipping cost of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* can only be meaningful if we have data to evaluate the purchasing powers of diverse occupational groups. However, our knowledge of the prices and wages is

[447] For such advertisements, see, for example, *İbret*, 12 Rebiülahir 1289 (18 June 1872), No: 4; *İbret,* 13 Rebiülahir 1289, (19 June 1872), No: 5.

[448] Ibid.

limited. Even though, for example, Şevket Pamuk has studied price trends in the long period in the Ottoman Empire, he did not provide specific details about retail prices.[449] However, state documents on the wages of workers, an engineer, a French doctor, a conductor, and chief and regular trackwalkers might be helpful in determining who could afford the possible purchase of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. In 1860, the daily wage for a road construction worker in Trabzon was approximately 5 piasters, while the monthly stipend of an engineer was 1000 piasters in 1863.[450] Quite possibly, a daily wage of a construction worker was higher in Istanbul where *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was published. Yet, even then, the newspaper would be an expensive item for a worker to purchase. For an engineer or a doctor[451] who could be considered from the middle class, however, the price of the newspaper was very accessible. In this sense, it was possible that *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was most probably bought and read by people who possessed a certain level of income. The price for *İbret* was the same as *Tasvir-i Efkâr.* For 1873, we have data showing the monthly stipend of a conductor, which was 10 lira (1000 piasters) in 1873.[452] Furthermore,

[449] Şevket Pamuk, "Prices in the Ottoman Empire, 1469-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol.36 No.3 (Aug., 2004), 451-468.

[450] For these documents see BOA, I.MMS, 19/845, 24 Muharrem 1277 (12 August 1860); I.MVL 545/24493, 12 Şaban 1282 (31 December 1865); I.ŞD 17/723, 18 Recep 1286 (24 October 1869); I.DH 665/46304, 18 Safer 1290 (17 April 1873) and Fulya Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" (Tentative Title), (Dissertation in Progress, SUNY:Binghamton).

Here I would like to express my special thanks to Fulya Özkan who, without hesitation, graciously shared her documents with me on the wages of workers, an engineer, and a doctor. Without her help, it would have been impossible for me to provide an analysis of the prices of these newspapers.

[451] The stipend given to a French doctor was 30 lira (3000 piasters). See, BOA, I.MVL 545/24493, 12 Şaban 1282 (31 December 1865) and Fulya Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries".

[452] See BOA, I.ŞD 17/723, 18 Recep 1286 (24 October 1869) and Fulya Özkan, "A Road in

in the same year, the monthly stipend of a chief trackwalker (bekçi başı) was four liras (400 piasters) and that of a regular trackwalker (bekçi) was two liras (200 piasters) in Trabzon. The stipends were 306 and 175 piasters in Erzurum respectively.[453] Quite possibly, these wages were higher in the capital city. Therefore, we can speculatively claim that for the individuals from middle as well as lower classes, it was possible to purchase a newspaper. Considering the public reading practices of the Ottoman society and, particularly for *İbret*, the content as well as language of *İbret* and *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, it can be argued that, these newspapers targeted and possibly were read by a wider public(s).

## 6. Conclusion

The editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* were quite aware of the possibilities that newspapers could provide for the circulation of the idea of the public and its rights. The debilitating economic and financial conditions of the empire provided the journalists with the concrete ground needed to propose and to reinforce the state's fiscal responsibility for its public(s). In so doing, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* not only constructed a new public discourse that would criticize the government's policies but also, to a certain extent, allowed different groups to promote their vested financial interests.

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Rebellion, A History on the Move: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries".

[453] See BOA, I.DH 665/46304, 18 Safer 1290 (17 April 1873) and Fulya Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries".

For the Ottoman public, İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr* appeared as a significant newspaper for two main reasons. Firstly, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* was the first Ottoman language newspaper that mentioned the public's interests and the necessity of its protection by the state. This assumption of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* not only put pressure on the government for the acknowledgement of the *public(s)'s rights* but also provided an opportunity to that very public(s) to ask for financial regulations for its own good. Therefore, for groups who were concerned about making their voices heard, İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkâr* provided a significant arena.

*İbret* followed the path that was opened by *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, yet more feverishly advocated for the public(s)'s interests. The bitter and critical rhetoric used by the editors of *İbret*, in many ways similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, emanated from the conflicting interests among the central government, provincial elites, and the Ottoman intellectuals. Unfortunately, due to lacking archival documents, I do not have specific information on whether or not the editors of *İbret* received any financial support from the provincial elites. Still, based on the rhetoric of *İbret,* one can contend that the editors of the paper, intentionally or unintentionally, worked for the benefits of provincial elites. The provincial elites who looked to establish tax autonomy from the central state acquired the support of *İbret.* Throughout *İbret*, the provincial elites also possessed the possibility of reaching and shaping wider public circles regarding their political and economic concerns. Yet, in a process in which consensus was sought to reconcile diverse parties' interests, at least at the discursive level, newspapers like *İbret* were used not merely to benefit Ottoman

elites, but also to advocate for middle and lower class interests, including merchants, workers, artisans, and peasants.

## Chapter Four

## Criticisms and Consensus: *Hadika*'s Attempts to Provide an Active Voice for the Ottoman Public(s) and *İstikbâl*'s Attempts to Seek Consensus for the Empire's Integrity between 1872 and 1875

### 1. Introduction

The first private newspapers of the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire constituted alternative ways or of communication for the Ottoman journalists, who themselves claimed to be the advocates and voices of the Ottoman public(s). In this sense, the Ottoman press also provided a new method of communication for the Ottoman public(s), since political, economic and social demands, expectations and criticisms occurred in a public domain or, in other terms, before the public(s)'s eyes. Since newspapers questioned the legitimacy and the consequences of the government's policies, this new medium constituted an alternative way of seeking consensus as well. The potential power of the newspaper for criticizing the government or bureaucratic elites and for seeking consensus with them on behalf of the public(s) made this alternative way of communication significant. It was

significant since the private newspaper press of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire sowed the seeds of a newspaper culture that would define the parameters of both opposition to and negotiation with the Porte. Since the private newspapers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire were not parts of monopolistic and capitalist press corporations, the subject of their opposition and negotiation was mainly the central government (the Porte) and the social and economic actors who held connections with the Porte. As I discussed previously, among these actors, there were local and foreign groups and individuals. From its outset, when this new medium of communication appeared, the Ottoman journalists proclaimed their continual attempts to develop an independent tool that seemingly reflected the public voice, a tool that was intended to be independent from the interests of the government and other competing actors. Therefore, these Ottoman journalists articulated criticisms and negotiation points in their newspapers, claiming that these criticisms were proposed on behalf of the general public's interests.

In this chapter, I will investigate the ways in which *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* both challenged and sought to construct consensus with the central government, which in their rhetoric represented the state. Similar to the previous chapters, I will focus on news reports and editorial articles that discuss finance and economy in order to show the criticisms and negotiation points used by *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* with regards to the central government. Although *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* criticized and attempted to construct consensus with the Porte, *Hadika* and *İstikbâl*, as a result of their editorial policies, differed from these two newspapers. Furthermore, in the case of *İstikbâl,* the economic, social, and political contexts in which this

newspaper was published were quite different from the conditions faced by *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret,* and *Hadika*. Therefore, I will also analyze why and how *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* rose as significant mediums for their perceived public(s) to criticize and to construct consensus with the central government.

Following the path of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* imposed the rights of the Ottoman public(s) on the Ottoman state as well. In connection with the economic and financial crises, similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, *Hadika* and *İstikbâ l* also claimed that the fiscal responsibility of the Porte to its public(s) was one of indispensable duties that a state was obliged to fulfill for that very public(s). However, as I will show in this chapter, *Hadika* reminded the government of this responsibility by giving an "active voice" to a particular group. At the discursive level, I analyze as well the sections of society that were included in the editors' ideas and representations of the public(s). Additionally, by analyzing the discourses of *İstikbâl*'s editors, I will also show the ways in which *İstikbâl* differed from *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret*, and *Hadika* when it criticized the fiscal and economic policies of the Porte on behalf of the public(s). Since this dissertation not only focuses on text but also context, I will investigate the possible conditions that shaped the editorial policies and hence *Hadika*'s and *İstikbâl*'s representations of the Ottoman public(s). In so doing, I will attempt to show how the agendas of these newspapers intended not only to influence the policies of the Porte but also to shape Ottoman public opinion.

Similar to the method that I applied in chapter three to explore the advertisement structures and possible readership profiles of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and

*İbret*, in this chapter, I will also analyze the advertisements found in *Hadika* and *İstikbâ l* and discuss the possible readers of these two newspapers. As I stated in the previous chapter, such analysis will allow me to constitute the targeted public(s) as the reflective images of economic interests as well. In this chapter, I will reveal that the advertisements found in *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* targeted particular groups according to developing classes in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. My aim here is to understand the possible reasons for *Hadika*'s and *İstikbâl*'s focus on specific groups and utilization of particular discourses to shape and express public opinions. By focusing on news reports and editorial articles, I intend to show how these two private newspapers of the empire, at least at the discursive level, assisted in establishing a newspaper culture that would give the societal actors an "active voice". Furthermore, by tracing the shifting discourse of *İstikbâl*, I intend to show how a newspaper was used by its editors to construct consensus between the Porte and its perceived public. In this framework, I intend to show how the editors of *İstikbâl* reproduced the state's discourse under particular conditions.

## 2. The Voice of the Workers and the Problems of the Peasants: *Hadika* and the Presentation of Workers and Peasantry

Published at nearly the same time as *İbret*, *Hadika* appeared as another newspaper that expressed concern with the public(s)'s financial conditions. Originally owned and published by Ebüzziya Tevfik, the newspaper was published daily (*yevmi*) and devoted most of its pages to editorial articles on contemporary

politics. Even though it deployed a less complicated and sophisticated style of language, *Hadika* did not reach the level of popularity achieved by *İbret.*[454] Throughout the publication period of the newspaper, it appears that Ebüzziya Tevfik was the only editor who reported news as well as wrote editorial articles. However, as Ebüzziya Tevfik stated, the articles of Namık Kemal were occasionally published in *Hadika* with his initials N.M.[455] As I will show, even the same article of Namık Kemal that was previously published in *Hadika,* concerning the tax exemption of Istanbul's residents and Galata bankers was once again published in *İbret*.[456] Yet what made *Hadika* distinctive and significant, among the other three newspapers in question was not its popularity or editors but rather Ebüzziya Tevfik's editorial approach to particular groups, mainly urban workers and how he placed emphasis on these occupational groups to criticize the Porte and foreign financial interests in the empire. In this chapter, as I will show below, the depiction of the voice of urban workers evolved from a passive one to an "active one".

### 2.1. Giving an "Active" Voice to the Workers while Criticizing Foreign Interests and the Central Government

[454] *İbret* initially published 5,000 copies daily. Beginning with its nineteenth issue, *İbret*'s circulation rate was nearly 12,000 copies daily. See, Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlilar Tarihi*, vol.2,,126. In contrast, the circulation rate for *Hadika* was around 3000 copies. See Ibid., 222.

[455] Ibid.

[456] B.M [Namık Kemal], "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?", *İbret*, 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1872), No:60. N. K., "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?",*Hadika*, 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:7.

From the outset of *Hadika*, railway workers, for example, were mentioned although the main subject of the dispatch was not the workers. The news report complained about the Rumeli railways and stated that since the railways were constructed with very poorly paid workers the railways should have been the least expensive railways in the world. To the contrary, Ebüzziya Tevfik emphasized that the railways' construction was probably the most costly project in Europe.[457] Furthermore, Ebüzziya Tevfik stated that even though "the cost of the railways defrayed by Ottomans [workers] who dug the ground with their nails" (*o yolun masrafını tırnaklarıyla yer kazan Osmanılar tediye etti*)[458], and even though the "domain" (*mülk*)[459] belonged to the Ottomans, the Ottoman public(s) was not able to truly benefit from the railways, since nothing related to the trains, such as train schedules and time tables, were printed in the "Turkish" language. Neither did the railway attendants (*hizmetkâr*)[460] speak in "Turkish" to assist the Ottomans.[461] In the dispatch's narrative, the readers of *Hadika* were informed about many issues. Furthermore, the editor attempted to shape the opinions of the readers on a number of different levels.

First, the readers learned from the dispatch that the railway company exploited the Ottoman public(s) in their very own land. This exploitation was

[457] *Hadika*, untitled dispatch on Rumeli railways, 8 Ramazan 1289 (9 November 1872), No: 1.

[458] *Hadika*, ibid.

[459] *Hadika*, ibid.

[460] *Hadika*,ibid.

[461] *Hadika*,ibid.

succeeded not only by preventing the Ottoman public(s) from utilizing infrastructures developed by the Ottoman public(s)'s very own finances and labor but also paying very low wages to the Ottoman workers who were deemed by the newspaper to be part of the Ottoman public(s). In so doing, it can be argued that Ebüzziya Tevfik attempted to form Ottoman public opinion in the direction of resistance or at least in the direction of protests towards the government's policies that functioned not for the benefit of Ottoman public(s) but rather for the benefit of the foreign railway company. Moreover, the editor took steps to form public opinion against the foreign companies that constructed railways in the Ottoman land yet worked for their very own interests and not for the benefits of the Ottoman public(s). The editor attempted to show how the Ottoman public(s) did not have a chance to obtain the resources of the empire; in this case, it was the recently constructed and developed transportation resources, even though the railways were constructed with financial resources that came out of the Ottoman public(s)'s pocket.[462] Second, Ebüzziya Tevfik in the narrative of the dispatch expressed his concerns about the exploitation of a certain occupational group and drew the attention of the Ottoman public(s) to this group's low wages. Although, the main subject matter of the dispatch was not the workers and their wages, Ebüzziya Tevfik's mentioning about this occupational group was significant since the government's policies and foreign interests in the empire were criticized through the an emphasis on the railway workers. Third, the way in which the workers were recognized was also significant, as the identity of the workers was defined

[462] *Hadika*, ibid.

according to being Ottoman rather than the emphasis on their religious or ethnic identities. In this sense, in the mind of Ebüzziya Tevfik, the workers presented an occupational group that was part of the Ottoman public(s). Fourth, the criticism of European imperialism and its economic interests in the empire appeared to be the main concern of the dispatch, even though foreign or imperial interests were never directly addressed or analyzed. The main focus of the dispatch was significant, since it tried to cater to the opposition against foreign economic and financial interests on the lands of the Ottoman public(s). Lastly, the dispatch also criticized other Ottoman newspapers for not publishing any news reports on this subject that could work for the benefits of Ottoman public(s). In so doing, Ebüzziya Tevfik also challenged to his contemporary colleagues such as the editors and owners of newspapers of his time and therefore, most probably, the political and economic interests of those journalists.[463] Therefore, *Hadika* advocated for the interests of the

[463] Presently, Ottoman historians lack any evidence about whether these contemporary newspapers received financial support from the railway company. However, based on Ebüzziya Tevfik's criticism, it is possible that there were vested interests between the newspapers that did not criticize the railway company in particular, and financially and economically imperialistic activities in general. Indeed, in another instance, without giving the specific names of the newspapers and journalists, Ebüzziya Tevfik made a strong statement about the Ottoman press. He argued that "the majority of the newspapers that were published by greedy [*tamahkâr*] journalists in the empire were only considering their own interests". "Memleketimizde basılan gazetelerin hemen ekserisi menfaati şahsiyeden başka şey düşünmez.Tamahkâr adamlar elinde kaldıkça...". See, Ebüzziya Tevfik, untitled, *Hadika*, 25 Ramazan 1289 (26 November 1872), No:13. In the same issue, he also indirectly criticized the government and the newspapers that intentionally accepted being used by the government to manipulate public opinion. In an editorial article that used a story-telling style of narrative, Ebüzziya Tevfik mentioned that a man visited *Hadika* and offered money to the editor for him to publish an article that would eulogize the local governor (*vali*) of a region. Without mentioning that it was he who was approached and speaking on behalf of *Hadika*, Ebüzziya Tevfik stated that he rejected the man's offer. Ebüzziya Tevfik mentioned how they [editors of the newspaper] laughed at the ill-mannered (*terbiyesizlik*) behavior of the man. In the editorial, he stressed that *Hadika* would never make news or write editorial articles based upon financial relationships. See, "Bir Valinin Adaleti", *Hadika*, 25 Ramazan 1289(26 November 1872), No:13. In this story, the name of the governor, region, and the man were never mentioned. Most probably, the story was fictional. However, with this news report/editorial article, Ebüzziya Tevfik not only successfully criticized the government and the way in which it functioned, but he also sought to warn the Ottoman public(s) about possible collaboration between the government and the journalists

Ottoman public(s) against imperialistic and governmental policies by drawing attention to poorly paid workers. Yet, in this news report, the railway workers appeared as passive and voiceless actors who worked for very low wages and did not resist the exploitive policies of the railway company. The appearance of the workers in the newspaper's pages, therefore, closely resembled the earlier representations of the workers in *İbret.* As in *İbret*, *Hadika* emphasized the problem of the workers to challenge the Porte and its policies that appeared to serve the imperialistic interests of foreign companies.

Regarding the subject of workers, *Hadika*'s disfavor with the government's policies was more overtly pronounced than the other newspapers of its time. For example, in January 1873, *Hadika* published a letter of navy shipyard workers, which eventually caused the suspension of the paper for two months.[464] In this year, 500-600 of the navy shipyard workers such as carpenters, hewers, and cutlers went on strike and gathered in front of the government building to submit a petition (*arzuhal*) to the grand vizier (*sadrazam*) of the empire. In the petition, the workers

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that worked in the empire. Most probably, such collaborative newspapers included *Hakayık-ül Vekâyi*, *Basiret*, and *Levant Herald*. In his memoirs, the chief editor and owner of *Basiret*, Ali Efendi, mentioned that the paper was subsidized by the Porte and voiced German political and economic interests in the empire. See, Basiretci Ali Efendi, *Istanbul'da Elli Yillik Onemli Olaylar* (Istanbul, 1976).

For an article that criticizes *Hakayık-ülV ekâyi* on how the paper defended the very own interests of its owner, see B.M, "Meğer Hakayık Hâlâ Çıkıyor İmiş !!!", *İbret*, 14 Şaban 1289 (17 October 1872), No:32. In this article, Namık Kemal asserted that the publisher of *Hakayık-ül Vekâyi* would manipulate the news to receive a few hundred pieces of gold (*birkaç yüz altın*) or a jeweled watch (*mücevherli saat*) or both a watch and gold. He also mentioned that the paper was published under the names of *Muhbir* (Informer), *Ayine-yi Vatan* (Mirror of motherland), and *Terakki* (Progress). See, ibid. When one considers that *Hadika* was published at nearly the same time as *İbret* and the chief editor Ebüzziya Tevfik followed a similar editorial policy with his friend Namık Kemal, it is possible that when Ebüzziya Tevfik depicted the general tendencies of representing vested interests in Ottoman press, he was referring to *Hakayık-ül Vekâyi* among other papers. However, this point yet need to be analyzed in the future researches.

[464] See Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, vol.3, 496.

demanded their salariesthat were left unpaid for eleven months. The next day, detailed news and information about the workers' demonstration against the government was published as the first news report of *Hadika*.[465] In this rather impartially toned article, Ebüzziya Tevfik criticized neither the Porte nor the workers for their demands. However, the dispatch provided details on how the workers were kept waiting by the *sadrazam* in front of the government buildings for hours. Interestingly, however, at the end of the report, Ebüzziya Tevfik added a sarcastic note indicating the indigenousness of the event. Accordingly, Ebüzziya Tevfik stated that he was curious whether the news agency Reuters would wire this report to Europe, as if the strike decision was put into action with the encouragement of the International (*enternasyonel*).[466]

Most likely, Ebüzziya Tevfik's note on Reuters was in reference to the comments and debates about an article that was published in *İbret* only two months before the strike of the navy shipyard workers. As I explained in chapter two, besides editing *Hadika*, Ebüzziya Tevfik was among the editors of *İbret.* In one of the very first issues of *İbret*, Ebüzziya Tevfik's colleague Reşad published an article on the Paris Commune of 1871.[467] Although Reşad expressed his discontent with communism and the communist system, he argued that the Paris Commune

[465] *Hadika*, 23 Zilkade 1289 (23 January 1873), No:52.

[466] Ibid. Among the newspapers that I analyzed, I did not encounter a news report by Reuters that mentioned the connection between the Communist International and the worker strikes in the Ottoman Empire. Analyzing other contemporary newspapers could shed additional light on this subject.

[467] See, Reşad, "Devair-i Belediye Tarafdaranı", *İbret*, 11 Rebiülahir 1289(17 June 1872), No:3.

did not have any ideological connection with the communist system and that the Paris Commune was formed against a regime that governed France in an unruly manner. The reason for these distinctions was that Reşad conceived of communist ideology as the partitioning of one's possession and women (*iştirâk-ı emvâl ve a'yâl*).[468] Reşad argued that, some people, without having sufficient knowledge of French to understand the distinction between the words communism and communalism caused the labeling the supporters of the Paris Commune as communists. According to Reşad, the comments on the conditions (*ahvâl*)[469] in France indicated a "ridiculous courage"[470], which stemmed from ignorance (*cehalet)*.[471] Reşad continued that the Commune ruled Paris for two months and member of the Commune did not practice the "vicious principle of collectivism/socialism" (*iştirâk-ı emvâl kaide-i fâsidesi*).[472] Indeed, the discussion on the Commune revealed the inaccuracy of Reşad's analysis. For Reşad, the reason for the establishment of the Paris Commune emanated from the illegitimate and unfair rule of the Versailles government. In this article on Paris Commune, Reşad very clearly expressed his sympathy and support with the Commune since the members of commune revolted against illegitimate rulers. Yet, clearly, neither Reşad nor the editorial policy of *İbret* supported the principles of socialism.

[468] Ibid.

[469] Ibid.

[470] Ibid.

[471] Ibid.

[472] Ibid.

Therefore, it would be wrong to argue that the editors of *İbret* truly understood the principles of socialism.

Despite these distinctions, a French language newspaper published in Istanbul, *Phare du Bosphore*, accused *İbret*'s editors of completely sharing the ideas of communism and the Commune. Furthermore, by condemning the violent activities that the commune members committed in Paris in 1871, the newspaper criticized the editors of *İbret* of ignoring violent acts such as the setting of Paris on fire.[473] In response to these allegations, two of the editors of *İbret*, Namık Kemal and Reşad, co-wrote a rebuttal against *Phare du Bosphore.* Titled "Reddiye" (rejection)[474], the editors harshly criticized the Ottoman language skills of *Phare du Bosphore'* editors, claiming that they did not understand what Reşad argued about the Commune. Furthermore, Namık Kemal and Reşad stated that Reşad himself was present at the Commune and had the opportunity to observe the Commune members and their rebellion against the violent and illegitimate Thiers' government. The editors stated that the Commune members neither burned any locations in Paris nor exhibited any form of violent behavior. Rather, Namık Kemal and Reşad argued that, due to the violent and oppressive rule of the government, the public of Paris rebelled against and resisted the government. Although *İbret* was not closed by the government after the article's publication, it still drew the ire of the Porte. The Ottoman Grand Vizier (S*adrazam)* of the time, Ali Pasha, expressed

[473] See, Kemal ve Reşad, "Reddiye", *İbret*, 18 Rebiülahir 1288 (18 November 1872), No:8.

[474] Ibid.

the official view about the Paris Commune in an imperial edict.[475] In this order, Ali Pasha stated that, although the possibility of spreading the ideas of the "mischievous committee" (*muzır hey'et*)[476] [i.e Commune] in the Ottoman lands was weak, the necessary precautions should be taken to protect the Ottoman public from such ideas. Among the precautions, the edict mentioned the prevention of propaganda activities to promote the ideas on Paris Commune. Therefore, when Ebüzziya Tevfik published the news report on the worker's strike by adding a note on Reuters, he looked to prevent possible government attacks. Yet, Ebüzziya Tevfik's emphasis on the disconnect between the communist ideas and the worker's strike was significant due to its practical and theoretical implications.

Practically, being aware of the threat that he posed to the Porte with the publication of a news report on the striking Ottoman workers, Ebüzziya Tevfik attempted to protect himself and his newspaper from the Porte's pressure. Furthermore, he attempted to prevent possible comments of foreign owned newspapers as, in his mind, those newspapers could have influenced the government thoughts about *Hadika's* publication. At the practical level, Ebüzziya Tevfik's emphasis on the indigenousness of the event also allowed him to attempt to convince the Ottoman public(s) on the legitimacy of the strike. In so doing, Ebüzziya Tevfik attempted to shape public opinion to question the activities of the Porte by showing the government's unfairness towards the workers. Most probably, for this reason, he wrote the dispatch with a very simple style, which refrained from

[475] For the copy of edict see, *Muharrerât-ı Nâdire* (Istanbul: Izzet Efendi Matbaası, 1289/1873–74).

[476] Ibid.

using complex Arabic and Persian words. Indeed, the words that were used in the news report were very close to the modern Turkish language style. Most probably, such a style was used so that not just highly educated readers but rather people who did not have an advanced education could read the dispatch. Considering public reading practices, with such a dispatch, Ebüzziya Tevfik probably targeted a wider public who would be interested in the workers' protests of the government. Indeed, in the dispatch, he mentioned the Istanbul public(s)'s curiosity in the protest. In this vein, by spreading the word about the worker's protest, Ebüzziya Tevfik also attempted to seek support of the Istanbul public(s) for the workers in their action against the government.

Theoretically, by emphasizing the differences between communist ideas and the domestic worker's strike, Ebüzziya Tevfik rejected the possible formation of class-consciousness among the workers. For him, similar to the thoughts of his colleagues at *İbret*, the protests and demands of the workers stemmed from the workers' difficult living conditions. Therefore, for the editors of *İbret* and *Hadika*, the journalists' obligation to the workers was to reveal the difficult conditions that the workers were exposed through the unfair policies of the Porte and the Porte's collaborators. Consequently, more often than not, the workers appeared in the pages of *Hadika* as passive actors of the society. However, this situation changed when the workers received only one month's compensation after their strike and repeated protests in front of the government building.

Expectedly, one-month's worth of compensation fell far short of covering the workers' accumulated debt to small-scale guilds and merchants such as

butchers, grocers, and bakers. Dissatisfied with the payment, three days later, the workers and their families looted the food courts of the army officers and demonstrated against the minister of the navy. In response, the soldiers were sent to suppress the worker's demonstrations. Afterwards, workers attempted to submit a petition to the government demanding the complete payment of their salaries. Yet, the response of the government to the workers' attempt to submit the petition was to close the doors of the state building and avoid the workers.[477] In response, the workers penned a letter (*varaka*) and submitted it to the printing house of *Hadika,* with the hopes that the document would be published by the newspaper.[478] The following day, *Hadika* only partly fulfilled the expectations of the shipyard workers, as Ebüzziya Tevfik did not completely publish the letter.[479] Rather, by preferring to interpret the letter, Ebüzziya Tevfik penned an article. In this article, he mentioned how the workers demanded him to be their mediator and announce to the Ottoman public the workers' misery. He stated that in the letter, the workers described the near starvation conditions of workers and their families, and their lack of sin qua non-materials for survival such as candles to light at nights. He added, "the distressing content of the letter could easily trigger the emotional responses"[480] of the newspaper's readers.

[477] EbüzziyaTevfik, *YeniOsmanlılarTarihi*, v.3, 497.

[478] EbüzziyaTevfik, "TersaneAmelesi", *Hadika*, 27 Zilkade 1289 (27 January 1873), No:54.

[479] Ibid.

[480] Ibid.

As the event occurred in the middle of deepening economic and financial crises, it was not unknown that the treasury of the empire lacked the necessary budget for the payment. Without referencing the financial crises, yet, by mentioning the difficulty that the government was experiencing in managing its budget, in the article, Ebüzziya Tevfik advised the government that it should pay the workers in installments. However, Ebüzziya Tevfik did not hesitate to state that while the navy completely received its allowance (*tahsisat*)[481] from the central treasury, it was not clear for him the wisdom (*hikmet*)[482] of the navy's decision on not paying the worker's wages. This article was followed by many news reports such a dispatch on how the workers looted bread from naval soldiers, implying the serious hunger of workers, who lacked even a loaf of bread to suppress their hunger.[483] In these dispatches, while narrating the events, Ebüzziya Tevfik used a sentimental tone and even described the workers as wretched (*biçare*).[484] Furthermore, at the end of the dispatches Ebüzziya Tevfik advised the state (*devlet*)[485] to find a solution for the payments of the workers. In these articles and news reports on the workers, Ebüzziya Tevfik's *Hadika* very overtly sided with the workers. By describing the workers' situation with emotional words, he also attempted to shape the public opinions of *Hadika*'s readers concerning the justness of the workers' actions. This editorial stance led the government to suspend the publishing of *Hadika* for two

[481] Ibid.

[482] Ibid.

[483] Ibid.

[484] Ibid.

[485] Ibid.

months. *Hadika*'s note for Routers on how the workers' protests did not resemble the Paris Commune or the ideas of International, and hence newspaper's statement on not supporting communist ideas, was not deemed convincing enough for the Porte while making the decision on the closing the paper.

In general, *Hadika* rarely referenced workers. However, by publishing the articles on the shipyard workers' strike and recent news on workers' protests, the newspaper not only overtly challenged the government policies but also brought workers into the public's eyes as real and active actors of Ottoman society. This development gave a voice to a commonly neglected group in the Ottoman Empire.

### 2.2 Representation of the Tax Problem, the Provinces, and the Ottoman Peasantry

For Ebüzziya Tevfik, the workers of the empire and their material problems were not the sole interests or subjects mentioned in *Hadika* in order to criticize governmental policies and foreign financial, economic, and political interests in Ottoman lands. Similar to the topics discussed in *İbret*, the tax problems of the provinces and the peasants who were directly affected by the unfair tax policies of the central government were addressed as well. As I stated above, in the seventh issue of *Hadika*[486] Namık Kemal published a short article criticizing the tax exemptions of the Istanbul region and the Galata bankers, a more developed and

[486] N. K., "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?",*Hadika*, 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:7.

detailed version of what was republished a week later in *İbret'*s 60th issue.[487] In this shorter version, the author questioned the contemporary situation of the residents of capital city, asking why these residents would be exempt from their citizenship duties (*vatandaşlık vezaifi*)[488] simply because those residents lived in the capital (*payitaht*)[489] of the empire. He also referenced the Tanzimat edict, asking that, with the edict, "while the state declared general equality among its citizens" (*devlet müsavat-ı umumiyeyi ilân etmiş iken*)[490] how could it be legitimate for the general Ottoman public(s) to be obliged to be tax-payers while the people (*ahali*)[491] of one city [Istanbul] could be exempted from that very obligation.

Perhaps the most significant part of this article was Namık Kemal's comparison between the people of the center [*payitaht*] and the provinces (*taşra*) regarding their tax obligation. As I explained in chapter three, Namık Kemal made a very clear and direct statement about the unfairness of the taxes levied in the provinces. Accordingly, Namık Kemal asked, "to what extent would it [i.e. the practice of tax paying] be in agreement with the principles of justice and the law"[492] while the farm laborers in the provinces who were able to produce only a few

[487] B.M [Namık Kemal], "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?",*İbret,* 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1872), No:60.

[488] N. K., "Acabaİstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?",*Hadika*, 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:7.

[489] Ibid.

[490] Ibid.

[491] Ibid.

[492] Ibid.

*kile*[493] of wheat in a year, working pertinaciously and dealing with great difficulties to the point of expensing their lives (*bedel-i can edercesine*),[494] paid the taxes to the state, taxes that were categorized under many names, bankers of Istanbul who made thousands of gold living comfortably did not help with the empire's treasury.[495]

In this article, by exposing the difficulties experienced by the Ottoman peasantry, *Hadika* attempted to convince the Ottoman public(s) that the paper voiced the problems and defended the rights of the Ottoman public(s). However, more importantly, the author revealed the tension between the center and provinces on the issue of taxation. The article also stated that the Ottoman public(s) highly respected the Porte and expected the government to apply an equal tax imposition both in the capital city and in provinces. Most probably, with the anxiety of the possibility of government closure, the newspaper and the article in particular used a cautious discourse to explain the expectations of the supposed public(s). However, in reality, the tone of the demand clearly and directly threatened the Porte to revise its taxation policy both in the center and in provinces. Accordingly, the article stated that as long as this kind [i.e. unequal tax policy] of impertinence (*münasebetsizlik*)[496] existed in the center, the orderliness (*intizam*)[497] in the

[493] *Kile* was an Ottoman unit of measurement that was used to calculate the volume of grain. One *Kile* was equal to 40 liters.

[494] N. K., "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?",*Hadika*, 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:7.

[495] The original text for this translation is: "Kavâid-i adl ü hakka ne suretle tevâfuk edebilirki taşrada bedel-i can edercesine bir ikdâm ü meşakkatle senede birkaç kile buğday hâsıl edebilen bir rencber birkaç nam ile devlete vergiler versin de İstanbul'dak ûşe-i rahata kurularak günde binlerle altınlar devreden bankerlerin hazineye bir para iânesi olmasın?".Ibid.

[496] Ibid.

provinces would not be possibly succeeded.[498]Furthermore, the author mentioned the necessity of state officials to pay taxes (*memurlar*).[499] He stated that if officials would pay taxes, they would properly (*lâyıkıyla*) understand the situation of tax-payers (*mükellef*).[500]

By emphasizing the lack of fairness with regards to the unequal imposition of taxation, in this article, Namık Kemal not only questioned the legitimacy of the central government's taxation practices but also specifically defended the interests of the peasantry as opposed to the interests of the Galata bankers and state officials who benefited from the system. Although the article criticized the tax exemptions of the residents of the capital, the editorial policy of *Hadika* clearly indicated that it did not have problems with certain residents of the city, such as guild members, merchants, and workers who produced and contributed to the economy of the empire. Rather, the grievances of *Hadika* were with those groups who participated in the economic system, not by *producing* resources, but rather *controlling and benefiting*[501] from those very resources.

Such an argument was consistent with the editorial policy of *Hadika* and was found in other articles as well. Indeed, only one day before the aforementioned

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[497] Ibid.

[498] Ibid.

[499] Ibid.

[500] Ibid.

[501] Emphasis belongs to me.

editorial, another article was published by N.K., the initials of Namık Kemal.[502] This article prepared the ground for Namık Kemal's criticisms of taxation in the provinces. As an Istanbul resident, Namık Kemal asserted that as long as Istanbul residents (*Istanbullular*) depended on (*muhtaç oldukça*)[503] the money (*para*)[504] and soldiers provided by the government (*hükümet*), one day, it was doubtful for the people of Istanbul not suffering from the starvation [i.e as they did not know how to survive based on their own resources]. [505] He also stated that *Istanbullular* needed to feel shame since the people of Istanbul received thousands of benefactions (*nimet*)[506] due to the efforts of hard-working peasants.As these examples revealed, for the editors of *Hadika,* the defense of the Ottoman peasantry's rights against the central government's tax policies provided a material base to challenge the Porte's attempts in centrally controlling the economic and financial resources of the provinces. Furthermore, since this challenge was presented before the public(s), *Hadika* also attempted to influence the public opinion of Istanbul in accordance with the expectations of the provinces.

Meanwhile, claiming themselves to be the representatives of the public(s), in this case representatives of the public(s) in the provinces, the editors of *Hadika* sought opportunities to convince the central government and hence negotiate with it

[502] N.K, "Biz istemesek zelil olmazdık", *Hadika,* 15 Ramazan 1289, No:6.

[503] Ibid.

[504] Ibid.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Ibid.

on the proper application of Tanzimat edicts. For example, on 20 October 1873, under the title of *vilayat* (provinces), a letter was published in *Hadika.* Above the letter, *Hadika* noted that a person (*zat*) from a province sent the letter to the newspaper.[507] However, neither the name of the province nor the name of the reader who sent the letter was revealed in *Hadika.* The anonymous writer began the letter by mentioning the Porte's reform orders that were created in the last three or four months. He stated that if the recent reform orders would be applied, that within a year, there would be "twenty or thirty years worth of progress (*terakki*)"[508] in the provinces. According to the reform order, some of the regulations from the *Vilayet Nizamnamesi* of 1864 were annulled.[509] By stating the accuracy of the central government's decision, the writer of the letter explained his pleasure with the recent policy, a policy that, if applied, would possibly take into consideration the expectations of the people in the provinces. Furthermore, the letter clearly stated that the recent decision of the government was compatible with the spirit of *Imperial Rescript of Gülhane*. Since the archive of *Hadika* did not survive, historians lack evidence about the authenticity of this letter. However, even if the letter was written by an editor of *Hadika* and not by a reader, it is possible for us to argue that by publishing this letter, *Hadika* showed the Porte that the Ottoman public(s) would not always challenge the central government's decisions. For *Hadika*, as long as the Porte applied the principle of equality for the Ottoman

[507] "Taşrada bulunan bir zattan aldığımız mektubdur", *Hadika*, 20 Ramazan 1289 (20 October 1873), No:10.

[508] Ibid.

[509] Ibid.

citizens, there existed ways to negotiate between the provinces and the center and hence Ottoman public(s).

### 2.3 *Hadika* and Its Readership

#### 2.3.1 *Hadika*'s Layout Design, Content, and its Readers

In the serial that Ebüzziya Tevfik published on the history of the Young Ottomans in Yeni *Tasvir-i Efkâr*in 1909, Ebüzziya Tevfik stated that *Hadika* was the most politically dissident (*muhalif)* newspaper of its time.[510] Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* and indeed like all of the nineteenth century newspapers published in the empire, the subscription registers of *Hadika* have not survived. For this reason, the definite profiles of the readers are unavailable for researchers. Expectedly, we do not have specific information about who possibly bought *Hadika* for its dissident content. However, based on Ebüzziya Tevfik's newspaper articles, as it is stated earlier in this chapter, we know that *Hadika*'s circulation rate did not exceed 3,000[511] while its contemporary *İbret*,'s reached 12,000.[512] Interestingly, however, the narrative and style of the content that Ebüzziya Tevfik used in his newspaper was less sophisticated than *İbret*. I hypothesize that the differences between the two newspapers' circulation rates stemmed from the content of *İbret* and *Hadika.* Through a content analysis of the newspapers, it is

[510] Ebüzziya Tevfik, 496.

[511] Ibid, 222.

[512] Ibid, 126.

possible to identify the readers' profiles, particularly their educational backgrounds and occupations as well as who might have purchased and perhaps did not purchase but still read *Hadika.*

Stated below the name of the newspaper, *Hadika* declared itself to be a daily political newspaper (*yevmi politika gazetesi*). Based on its content, one could assert that the readers of *Hadika* took a strong interest in the contemporary political situation of not only the empire but also the world. The first pages of the newspaper were devoted to either editorial articles on domestic and international political subjects, such as education,[513] liberal-based political rights such as equality,[514] the tax problem,[515] and the contemporary situation of the press, or news items.[516] News reports generally appeared in the second or the third pages of the paper. Even though initially the news items did not occupy a great deal space, beginning with the tenth issue, dispatches began to appear on the first page of *Hadika*. However, as the main purpose of *Hadika* was to serve as a political newspaper, news items did not outweigh the editorial articles. In the main editor Ebüzziya Tevfik's mind, publishing a political newspaper meant publishing a paper that predominantly consisted of politically-driven, editorial articles. And unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, when *Hadika* published dispatches, it did not provide a great deal of space for news items on official documents, the accounts of speeches, appointments, and the travel news

[513] "Maarife Dair Bir Makale", *Hadika*, 10 Ramazan 1289 (11 November 1872), No: 2.

[514] "Müsavat", *Hadika*,13 Ramazan 1289(14 November 1872), No:5.

[515] N. K., "Acaba İstanbul'dan Niçin Vergi ve Asker Alınmaz?", *Hadika*, 17 Ramazan 1289 (18 November 1872), No:7.

[516] N.K., "Matbuat-i Osmaniye", *Hadika*, 18 Ramazan 1289 (19 November 1872), No:8.

of high-ranking bureaucrats. Moreover, unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, *Hadika* lacked news on stock market information, such as changes in stock prices and international currency rates in major global financial markets. Therefore, one can assert that editorial articles on foreign and domestic events could prove invaluable for the educated groups of society, such as state officials, diplomats, bureaucrats, soldiers, clerks, teachers, and students. However, the lack of up-to-date information on stock markets, most probably, did not fully capture the interest of readers such as bankers and investors in the newspaper.

The layout design and style of *Hadika* also provide some clues regarding the readership core of the newspaper. Material considerations related to layout and formatting might have both encouraged as well as restricted *Hadika's* accessibility for the readers. Similar to its Ottoman counterparts, *Hadika* lacked headlines and even titles for dispatches. Furthermore, the newspaper, similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret,* lacked illustrations and other visual markers that could be used to steer less literate readers through and around texts. *Hadika* used three stars that were placed in the shape of a triangle to divide news items.[517] Those stars were the only visual markers for locating news items. In this sense, compared to *İbret, Hadika* paid less attention to its layout design. Therefore, it was more difficult for the reader to locate news items. Most probably, the layout design of the newspaper was one of the reasons that *Hadika* reached a smaller number of readers than *İbret.*

[517] See appendix C.

*Hadika* divided domestic and international news with two general titles *dahili* (local) and *harici* (foreign). Foreign news items commonly followed domestic topics and were arranged according to the town and dateline from which they were sourced. However, there was also one other general title for international news, called *telgraf* (telegraph). Those headings for either international or domestic news did not provide a clue about the subject of the dispatches. Rather, headings were categorized only for international news according to the name of the countries that were to be addressed, such as America, Italy and Russia.[518] The domestic news, however, lacked such headings. Indeed, *Hadika* mostly published editorial articles,which could possibly explain the reason for its low circulation rate, if one could accept that the readers were more interested in news than editorial articles. At the same time, one should remember that since İbret housed more editors, it offered a more diversified content than *Hadika*. Perhaps this was the reason why *İbret*'s circulation rate reached a higher level than *Hadika*. However, this argument could not be made with regards to its language. *Hadika* deployed an even less sophisticated style of prose compared with *İbret*. *Hadika'*s style was more accessible for wider audiences, as it used less complex sentences and was written as if it was spoken language. Furthermore, *Hadika* deployed more Turkish words than *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*. The words found in *Hadika* probably made it more accessible to not only literate and educated social groups such as state officials, students, merchants, and artisans but also for individuals who did not receive a certain level of education but were interested in contemporary events. As exemplified in the articles and the dispatches on the workers' protests, many

[518] *Hadika*, 14 Safer 1290 (12 April 1873), No: 59.

articles deployed a clear prose style that reached less educated audiences as well. Considering the Ottoman public's reading practices, one can argue that the deployment of a clear prose style allowed *Hadika* to reach a wider audience, including less educated groups of the Empire. The reason for a lower circulation rate for *Hadika* then, most probably was not its discursive style but its content and layout design.

### 2.3.2 *Hadika*'s Advertisements

The advertisements found in *Hadika* provide an interesting study about the readers and furthermore the editorial policy of the newspaper. Like the advertisements found in *İbret*, *Hadika* heralded the growth of the Ottoman middle class in the early 1870s.

Unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret, Hadika* devoted its entire last page to advertisements. The advertisement page of *Hadika* was constructed in a more professional manner than *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, and was promoted as a special "issue on advertisement" (*ilân nüshası*).[519] Moreover, on the top of the page, detailed information was provided for any possible costumers (*müşteri*)[520] who would like to submit their advertisements for publication. In addition, it was clearly

[519] See, for example, Hadika, 25 Ramazan 1289 (26 November 1872), No:13. *Hadika*, 26 Ramazan 1289 (27 November 1872), No:14.

[520] Ibid.

stated that "*Hadika* in no way and under any name can publish advertisements on pages that are reserved for the news".[521] With this statement, *Hadika* acknowledged the difference between news and profit. In so doing, the newspaper also tried to assure its readers that *Hadika* presented the interests of the Ottoman public(s) and not private interests. Such a statement, actually, overlapped with Hadika's main assertion on how the newspaper represented the general good and interests of Ottoman public. Even though *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret* made such claims, *Hadika* was the first private newspaper that overtly communicated this message on its advertising page.

Within the advertisement declaration, *Hadika* also provided the readers with the rates for publishing an advertisement. Customers who wished to publish book advertisements were asked to pay lower rates than other kinds of advertisements.[522] One can argue that, in so doing, *Hadika* intentionally attempted to contribute to the development of Ottoman intellectual life. Expectedly, many book advertisements appeared on the pages of the newspaper.[523]

The advertisement page of Hadika, similar to the advertisements of İbret, reflected the growth of the Ottoman middle class at this time. Items compatible with middle and upper class tastes were notable, as evidenced by two different advertisements for stores whose American and English identities were particularly

[521] "Hadika havadise mahsus olan sahifelerine her ne nam ile olursa olsun ilân derç edemez." See, ibid.

[522] Ibid.

[523] See for example, *Hadika*, 24 Ramazan 1289 (25 November 1289), No: 12. *Hadika*, 27 Şevval 1289 (28 December 1872), No: 33.

emphasized. The store tabbed as American, for example, marketed fine imported goods, including sewing machines, hair colors, fabrics to tailor winter and summer clothes, chairs for patios, yards, and homes; clocks, iron and porcelain stoves, pianos, oil lamps (*petrol lambası*)[524] and "the pure and scentless gas of America" (*Amerika'nın hâlis ve kokusuz gazı*)[525], cotton handkerchiefs, shoes, ink in any color, and bedsteads. Another store publicized the sale of English bedsteads, candies, and ornaments.[526]

Even though the publishing of advertisements in newspapers was a new phenomenon, *Hadika*, unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, published advertisements catering directly to women. For example, a Parisian store announced a variety of services for middle and upper classes women. Published with a drawing of an attractive and longhaired woman, the advertisement announced a parlor of an Armenian hairstylist who could cut hair in any European style (*alafranga*).[527] In the same advertisement, it was also stated that the store sold "nice scented water [i.e fragnance] that could be put on one's head, face and dress" (*Başa ve yüze ve elbiseye sürülecek güzel kokulu sular*).[528] Similarly, the earlier-mentioned advertisement that promoted sewing machines and hair colors published a drawing of a longhaired woman as well. The advertisement provided information on the

[524] Ibid.

[525] Ibid.

[526] See for example, *Hadika*, 13 Ramazan 1289 (14 November 1872), No: 5. *Hadika*, 16 Şevval 1289 (17 December 1872), No: 25.

[527] See for example, *Hadika*, 29 Zilkade 1289 (29 January 1873), No: 56.

[528] Ibid.

merits of hair coloring, explaining that coloring one's hair would revitalize the roots, expand the length of the hair, and "return white hair back to its natural color".[529] In these two advertisements, *Hadika* used both visual markers and gender division to attract the interest of its readers. Considering that *Hadika* was not the creator but only the mediator in publishing such advertisements, one can argue that it was not the owner of *Hadika* but rather the merchants who demanded the publishing of such advertisements who were aware of the gender divisions. Still, the existence of these kinds of advertisements might suggest that women read *Hadika* as well. Considering the literacy rate of the time, however, the number of women who read *Hadika* was most likely limited.

As advertisements can inform us about the identity of Ottoman consumers, the hair products and perfumes that were advertised in *Hadika* suggest that affluent women most likely read the paper. It is also clear that the advertisements promoted a new life style for Ottoman women who might have been interested in or familiar with European imported products. Indeed, without emphasizing the gender division, a similar kind of argument can be made for those advertisements that publicized many types of European imported products. I argue that such advertisements suggest that *Hadika* was most probably read by educated male and female readers. By publishing the news reports and editorial articles on lower-income people, for example workers, Ebüzziya Tevfik and his newspaper attempted to make those affluent classes who were targeted in such upper scale advertisements familiar with the problems of lower classes. In this sense, *Hadika*

[529] Ibid.

acted as a mediator between the wealthy and less wealthy people of the empire. Furthermore, the newspaper served as the mediator between Ebüzziya Tevfik's perceived public(s) and the Porte.

### 3. Unifying the Interests of the Empire and Negotiating with the Porte: *İstikbâl*, Criticisms of Foreign Interests, and the Changing Fiscal Responsibilities of the State during the Ottoman Bankruptcy of 1875

Unlike *Tasvir-i Efkâr,* which was published in a period of relative political tranquility enjoyed by the empire between the years following the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and the insurrection in Crete in 1866, *İstikbâl,* like *İbret* and *Hadikâ*, came on the scene in a rather economically, politically, and socially chaotic period. In 1874, the Empire dealt with many natural disasters, such as unsatisfactory harvests in several provinces, famine, floods and diseases, which significantly affected the Ottoman economy and prevented the government from calculating its estimated revenues for the year.[530]Moreover, the burden of paying the charges on external and internal debts worsened a desperate economic situation that reached its critical mass with the partial financial bankruptcy of 1875, declared officially by the Ottoman government to the internal and external creditors in October 6th of 1875.[531] In this

[530] On the issue of famine, see for example, Donald Quataert, "Famine in Turkey, 1873-1875," *Regional Studies* 201 (7 March 1968): 1-54. Mehmet Yavuz Erler, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kuraklık ve Kıtlık Olayları,1800-1880* (İstanbul:Libra, 2010).

[531] See Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire,* 80-81.

period of economic and political instability, the editorial policy of *İstikbâl* shifted from criticizing the government's economic policy in general to defending its decision of deferring payments. Expectedly, in such a process, the policies and actors who were deemed responsible for producing the financial crises changed as well.

In 1875, the politically dissident newspaper *İstikbâl* was first published in Istanbul by Teodor Kasap.[532] Deploying a similar editorial policy to *İbret* and *Hadika, İstikbâl* was published a short time before the financial bankruptcy of the empire. For the editors of *İstikbâl*, like the editors of *İbret* and *Hadika*, the Ottoman Empire was a state riddled with dysfunctional political and economic systems. At the same time, *İstikbâl*, like its predecessors, perceived the Ottoman Empire as a political entity that could be cured by the integration of the public(s) into politics and by providing more rights with the application of the promised reforms outlined in the *Tanzimat* decree of 1839 and the Rescript of 1856.[533] Continuing from the precedents established by *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, *İstikbâl* placed an even greater emphasis on the rights of the citizens, the dangers of foreign intervention, and

[532] Teodor Kasap's politically dissident identity made him a close friend of many Young Ottomans, including Namık Kemal. After publishing several satirical newspapers such as *Hayal* and *Diyojen*, which drew the ire of state censors and were consequently closed, Teodor Kasap founded and published *İstikbâl* in August 21 1875. *İstikbâl* was originally the planned title for Namık Kemal's publication after his return from European exile in 1872. Since his licensing application for *İstikbâl* was rejected by the government, Namık Kemal was unable to establish his own publication. As a result, friends of Namık Kemal bought *İbret* and allowed him to become its main editor. Two years after the closing of *İbret* and Namık Kemal's exile, Teodor Kasap published *İstikbâl.* In the absence of Namık Kemal, *İstikbâl* continued to promote the oppositional discourse first seen in *İbret*. See, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı,*351- 358.

[533] The editors of *İstikbâl,* similar to the editors of *İbret*, believed that the application of the Rescripts' promised rights, such as providing the security of citizens, abolishing many taxes, and bringing equality before the law would alleviate the problems of the empire. For such arguments in *İstikbâl* see for example, "Devlet millet", No: 116, "Tanzimadi Cedide", 2 Receb 1293 (23 July 1876), No: 150. "Umur-ı İnsan Umur-ı Devlet", No: 159.

critiques of foreign and domestic financial policies. Therefore, despite state censorship and the press law of 1864,[534] *İstikbâl* consistently, if very often indirectly, reminded the state of its responsibilities to its citizens when it declared:

"Since a state cannot exist without its citizens and citizens cannot exist without a state, when one mentions a state it naturally recalls citizens….wealth and power of a state would depend on the wealth and power of its subjects, ….and the power and wealth of its subjects. …..A state with wealthy subjects would have greater and better income. [Therefore,] states should have certain obligations to its subjects. The first of these obligations is to provide security on its lands by granting its existing subjects with every form of law and justice."[535]

This article depicted the state as the servant of the public(s), and ultimately responsible for the wealth and security of its citizens. Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*, in the discourse of *İstikbal*, the economic and political interests of the supposed Ottoman public(s) emerged as the reason for the state's existence. *İstikbâl* thus established itself as a newspaper that harshly criticized government policies on behalf of the Ottoman public(s). At the same time, *İstikbâl,* acted as a mediator

[534] In 1864, a new Press Law intensified the Ottoman state's censorship of newspapers. Modeled after the 1852 Press Law of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the 1864 Press Law required prospective publishers to acquire a license of operation from both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This law increased the state's ability to suspend, punish, and dissolve publications that questioned the policies and legitimacy of the Ottoman government. İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, "Chasing the Printed Word: Press Censorship in the Ottoman Empire: 1876-1913," *The Turkish Studies Association Journal* 27:2 (2003), 17-18.

[535]Anonymous, "Tebaiyeti Osmaniye",*İstikbâl*, 7 Şaban 1292, (7 September 1875), No: 16.
"Devlet tabiyesiz tabiye devletsiz olamadığı için hangisi söylenirse öteki hatıra gelir.…..Bir devletin kuvvet ve serveti tabiyesinin maddi kuvvet ve serveti nispetindedir….. Tabiyesi zengin olan devletin varidatı çok ve devlet dahi zengin olur…. Artması için devletçe bir takım esbaye tespit olunur.Bunların en birincisi mevcut olan tabiyesini her türlü hukuk ve adaletten hissedarı menfaat ederek mülkinde emniyeti kamile hâsıl etmesidir."

between the central government and the Ottoman public(s) and carried the voices of the "supposed" public(s)' wishes and concerns to the Porte.

*İstikbâl* aimed at an audience who asked for, and benefited from, criticisms of the government, such as high and middle ranking Ottoman bureaucrats, provincial elites, guilds, as well as the lower classes such as workers and peasants. For example, the issue of tax farming was addressed in a letter supposedly penned by a peasant in the seventy-eighthedition of *İstikbal*.[536]In this letter, by referring tothe significant role peasants played in the Ottoman land system, a defense of the peasants was promoted, one that criticized the state decision for abolishing tax farming.

"For some time now, we peasants have been hearing that instead of giving the duty of tax collecting to the tax farmers, the government will be subtracting taxes from the land under the name of tithe. We as peasants would not comprehend how the state operates. However, we know that as we and our lands belong to the state, the state belongs to us. ……Therefore, we are aware that the state would protect our profits and the peace we have in our towns.."[537]

After this introduction, the letter continued with an argument that a state clerk who would be appointed by the central state would not know which parts of their farms the peasants would be able to cultivate and which parts the peasants

[536] Anonymous, "Bir Köylü İmzasıyla Zaman Gazetesinde Görülen Varakadır," *İstikbâl*, 23 Şevval 1292, (22 November 1875), No: 78. "Biraz vakitten beri işitiyoruz ki bademe devlet aşarı mültezimlere ihale etmeyip arazi üzerinden öşrnamıyla bir vergi alacakmış. Bizim aklımız devletin işine karışmağa ermez ve biz de devletin malımız da devletin olduğuna…"

[537] Ibid.

would use as pasturage. According to the letter, the central government's clerk would demand a tax amount that only a pasha would be able to pay. After such explanaition, the letter went on to state that "Therefore, after a while, our state could not collect the taxes that would be necessary for the state budget since we would eventually turn into beggars under the burden of the heavy taxes." Since the peasants did not want to become beggars, the letter writer claimed that the peasants needed *mültezims* (tax farmers) to collect taxes, since they would know the productivity level of the peasants' farms and the limits of their taxpaying abilities.

By criticizing the abolishment of the tax farming system, similar to *İbret, İstikbâl* supported some provincial elites in their resistance against the centralization attempts of the Ottoman governments. At the same time, by defining the Ottoman lands as the lands of the peasantry, the publication of such letters and articles helped *İstikbâl* to purportedly defend the interests of real taxpayers, as opposed to tax exempted groups during times of financial crises. In reality, however, through criticisms of the state, previously privileged and wealthy local economic actors, rather than Ottoman peasants, reaped financial and economic benefits, since in reality the tax-farming system worked against the benefits of the peasants. Nonetheless, it was still significant for the peasants that their problems found some space in the newspaper.

Not until the Ottoman Empire came very close to facing economic devastation did *İstikbâl* directly support the government's financial decisions. As the economic crisis increasingly brought into question the political future of the empire, *İstikbâl* acknowledged the need to construct a series of negotiating points

between the government and the "Ottoman public." However, this support only appeared at the peak of the crises. Throughout this period, *İstikbâl* appeared as a newspaper that would try to alleviate the taxpayers' concerns regarding the economic devastation of the empire. Despite *İstikbâl*'s consistent disfavor for how the Empire borrowed foreign loans, the newspaper nonetheless provided the government with a certain amount of support when it first delayed and then defaulted on the payment of the bonds.[538] When the dangers and severity of economic and financial crises could no longer be concealed from the Ottoman public by the default of the internal and external coupon payments, for *İstikbâl*, the Ottoman stock market became a potent symbol for the problems of the Ottoman economy. More specifically, the stockholders, who were composed of not only Ottomans but also foreign shareholders, became the major group to blame for the crises.

Only one day before the declaration of the deferment of the Ottoman bonds' charges in the international markets, *İstikbâl* published a short article discussing the Ottoman stock market. It mentioned the surprising fluctuations of Ottoman bonds, which occurred in just a few hours. Without addressing specific economic and financial problems, *İstikbâl* stated that there was no political reason for this fluctuation of the bonds and that the only possible explanation might have been those publications guilty of producing "false rumors".[539] In such a narrative, the

[538] The Ottoman Government defaulted on its loans on 6 October 1875. See Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire,* 80-81.

[539] "Dünkü Borsa Ahvâli", *İstikbâl*, 5 Ramazan 1292 (5 October 1875), No:40.

actors of the false rumors were unidentified. Yet in the following days of the declaration, *İstikbâl* exposed the culprits of the false rumors to the public(s).

The outbreak of the bankruptcy in 1875 gave rise to a new form of crisis coverage, as long articles on the financial situation of the empire appeared more frequently. In an article published four days after the official default payment declaration, an anonymous editor of *İstikbâl* expressed his bewilderment with people who were stockholders and anxious about the Ottoman government's decision. In the article, the editor stated that such individuals could not be real stockholders, but rather people who were not cognizant about the conditions of the Ottoman economy. In this article, *İstikbâl* protested the "ill-fated"[540] and "harmful"[541] reactions of the shareholders. It also attacked shareholders for being "cruel" and "unfair" to the Ottoman Empire and its public, since the Ottoman state would be able to pay its debt in the future. In particular, *İstikbâl* declared "if you really consider the decision of reducing the charges on the Ottoman bonds it would not damage the respectability of the Ottoman state. The presumption that the decision will be detrimental for the bondholders stems only from the cruelty of the creditors".[542]

In the first week of the apparent financial crises, as evidenced in the previous two articles, the editorial policy of *İstikbâl* looked to connect the culprits

[540] Anonymous, "Devlet-i Âliye Mukrizleri", *İstikbâl*, 11 Ramazan 1292, (11 October 1875) No: 45.

[541] Ibid.

[542] Ibid.

of the default payment with fortune hunting stockholders. However, in just a few days, *İstikbal* directed the increasing social unease of the Ottoman public(s) against European bondholders and their allies in the Ottoman Empire, who were described as "cruel" and "greedy". Hence, the possible bankruptcy of the Empire faced scrutiny from *İstikbâl*, which sought to shape public opinion around the idea of the "cruelty" created by European stockholders and their allies among the Ottoman citizens, behavior that eventually would bring economic and financial disaster to the Ottomans.

Claiming to speak on behalf of the entire Ottoman society, *İstikbâl* sought to aid the government in a moment of rising economic instability and escalating speculation, and it placed the blame for the financial crises on the stockholders. The possible bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire was denounced as meaningless and driven by the exaggerated lies of greedy stockholders. According to *İstikbâl*, the term "bankruptcy"[543] could stimulate for "honorable"[544] ordinary people resentment and distrust for their country and government. *İstikbâl* quickly called for a "battle against greedy stockholders to rescue respectful Ottoman borrowers" and hence the society from their "cruel attacks"[545] which might lead to the financial disaster of the empire. Therefore, in *İstikbâl*'s representation of the crises, stockholders became the underlying cause of the Ottoman financial disaster.

[543]Ibid.

[544]Ibid.

[545] Ibid.

According to *İstikbâl*, the reason for the creditors' cruelty was the preference of the Ottoman government to delay the payment of bonds instead of taking out new loans, the outcome of which was destructive for those individuals who had the possibility of making higher profits from the Ottoman bonds. Just three days after this article, *İstikbal* accused the European creditors of being "deceitful"[546] and "greedy"[547],since those who bought Ottoman bonds during this period "unfairly looked for 15 and 18 percent for their shares, while shares in Europe were yielding only four or five percent."[548] For *İstikbal*, the Ottoman government needed time to recover its budget deficit "which, in the long run would work for the benefit of the shareholders."[549] Instead of considering these facts, the editor stated, it was regrettable that some people expressed "unreasonable anxiety"[550] about the government's decision. The creditors, in this vein, "without considering the effects of their disruptive criticism, continued to exert immense pressure on the Ottoman economy that would place the Ottoman public in deep sorrow about their future."[551]

Many in the Ottoman public(s) knew that it was primarily Europeans and particularly the British public(s) that bought Ottoman stocks in Ottoman stock markets. Yet interestingly, until publishing an article criticizing its rival newspaper

[546] *İstikbâl*, 14 Ramazan 1292, (14 October 1875), No: 48.

[547] Ibid.

[548] Ibid.

[549] Ibid.

[550] Ibid.

[551] *İstikbâl*, 14 Ramazan 1292, (14 October 1875), No: 48.

*Basiret*'s editorial policy on the government's deferment decision, *İstikbâl* never used the term "Europeans" or foreigners in their criticisms on stockholders.[552] In the article, the editor of *İstikbâl* accused *Basiret* of not loving its homeland and the Ottoman public(s). The source of *İstikbâl*'s concerns was an article published by *Basiret* questioning the government's decision to defer payment of external and internal coupon payments. *Basiret*'s article argued that the Ottoman government deferred the payment, since it wished to utilize foreign stockholders' principal in order to resolve the severe budget deficit. Rather than accepting the deferment decision, *Basiret* argued that the Ottoman government should have levied a new tax on the Ottoman public(s).[553] The editor of *İstikbâl*, however, viewed such a suggestion as unfeasible, since the Ottoman public(s) was already experiencing difficulty with the repayment of their taxes. *İstikbâl* argued that by buying Ottoman stocks, the foreign stockholders were obliged to agree that their investments be used to align the Ottoman budget. Hence, according to *İstikbâl*'s narrative, the previously ambiguous group of stockholders gained a more concrete form with the term *foreigners*.[554]

At this particular moment, British stockholders, who possessed Ottoman bonds and were aggravated by the Ottoman government's payment decision, demanded the British government interfere and pressure the Ottoman Empire to

[552] *İstikbâl*, 19 Ramazan 1292, (19 October 1875), No: 52.

[553] This argument was made by Basiretçi Ali Efendi who in his memoirs accepted that he received financial support from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to bolster its politics on the Ottoman Empire. Basiretçi Ali Efendi, *İstanbul'da Elli Yıllık Önemli Olaylar*(İstanbul, 1976).

[554] Emphasis belongs to me.

withdraw its decision. While the British stockholders requested assistance from their government, *İstikbâl* published another article criticizing the negative effects of the concessions.[555] These concessions were bestowed by the Ottoman Empire to the citizens of foreign states, yet these foreign citizens either lived in Ottoman Empire or had trade connections with the Empire. In this article, foreign citizens were interpreted as individuals or groups that would bring problems upon the Ottoman public.

Under these circumstances, by citing comments and news from newspapers published in the countries of the bondholders, *İstikbâl* tried to assure the Ottoman public(s) that there was no reason to panicabout the future of the Empire, stating how "The Times says that the British government is not compelled to object to the decision of the Ottoman government on behalf of the English shareholders and to interfere with Ottoman decision."[556] To convince the public(s) about the unity of the empire, the same report also referred to the *Daily Telegraph*'s protest of a French man who "insanely proposes an adjustment of the Ottoman map under the pretext of solving the Eastern Question."[557]

In general, however, the shift in *İstikbâl*'s discourse, from unleashing a storm of vehement criticism directed at the Ottoman government's economic policies to its open support of the government, was not a sign of inconsistency in

[555] Anonymous, "Müsaade Mazarratı", *İstikbâl*, 26 Ramazan 1292 (26 October 1875), No:58.

[556] Ibid.

[557] *İstikbâl*, 9 Şevval 1292, (8 November 1875), No: 66.

editorial policy and was rather peculiar to one specific moment. As exemplified in the above-mentioned peasant's letter, which was published after the bankruptcy, *İstikbal*'s support for government policies disappeared shortly after the deferment of payments. Moreover, *İstikbal* continued to publish articles that very overtly criticized the government's policies, which led the Porte to close the newspaper. However, only one day after its re-publication, *İstikbal* published an article on the public debt titled "There cannot be a rush in borrowing loans" (*İstikrazda telaş olunmaz*). Here once again, *İstikbal* supported the government's policies on the deferment of the payments and advised the stockholders to be patient about receiving the return of their.[558] The advice, however, was not direct. Rather, *İstikbal* tried to assure the Ottoman public(s) and the stockholders that the Ottoman state was financially strong enough to pay its debt. The article stated that more or less every country had foreign debt. Therefore, having debt would not cause any problem by itself. Rather, the ways in which the debt was used might be problematic. After making this statement, the editor on the one hand attempted to convince the Ottoman public(s) that the state's debt was not very excessive considering the resources that the Empire possessed. Therefore, according to the author, the only avenue that the public(s) needed to follow was to work and to try to increase its very own wealth. On the other hand, *İstikbal* explained the condition needed for producing wealth by the public(s). Accordingly, that was the state, which was responsible for providing the necessary conditions for producing wealth, namely security (*emniyet*) and justice (*adalet*) for the Ottoman public(s). In this

[558] Anonymous, "İstikrazda telaş olunmaz", *İstikbâl,* 14 Rebiülevvel 1292 (20 April 1875), No: 108.

sense, *İstikbâl*'s support for the state during the crises was both functional and practical in nature. Considering the ideology of the Ottoman intellectuals such as the Young Ottomans, which centered on preventing the collapse of the Empire, *İstikbal*'s shifting discourse overlapped with the idea of preserving the Empire's integrity.

*İstikbâl* perceived the Empire as a political entity that could be revived through the integration of the public(s) into daily politics. This public(s) included actors from the lower classes like peasants, workers, and beggars. Yet, the integration of peasants and workers versus beggars into the Ottoman society substantially differed from one another. For example, in one article, published shortly before the financial bankruptcy, *İstikbâl* directed attention towards the rising mendicancy in the streets of Istanbul.[559] After categorizing beggars under three groups, such as people who would beg due to poverty, people who even if they were sufficiently strong and capable of working chose to beg, and children who were too young to be aware of the outside world but were forced to beg either by their parents or other people, the article emphasized the state's role in successfully preventing mendicancy in developed and civilized countries. Yet, the issue of begging was not connected with the economic and financial difficulties of the Empire. Instead, the problem forcefully appeared as a moral issue that emanated from a lack of good parenting and the state's insufficient punishment of such parents. The editor of the article also expected the state to force beggars who were healthy and strong enough to work. The article did not analyze the issue of poverty

[559] Anonymous, "Mesele", *İstikbâl,* 30 Recep 1292 (31 August 1875), No:10.

and its possible connection to begging, as it rather emphasized the Ottoman Empire's rich culture of benevolence. Accordingly, charities could provide alms for people who were having financial difficulties and, therefore, the people who struggled with poverty did not need to beg on the streets of Istanbul. By addressing the issue of begging, *İstikbâl* maybe unintentionally contributed to the consideration of beggars in Ottoman society. Yet, unlike peasants and workers, beggars were presented as passive actors who would be controlled by the necessary government policies. Therefore, the issue of poverty, mendicancy, and economic and financial difficulties were not linked in the pages of *İstikbâl*.

## 3.3 *İstikbâl* and Its Readership

### 3.1 *İstikbâl*'s Content, Layout Design, and its Readers

Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret* and *Hadika*, the subscription registers of *İstikbâl* have not survived. However, unlike the circulation rates of *İbret* and *Hadika*, which are found in the memoirs of a contemporary journalist, historians do not have any information on *İstikbâl*'s circulation rates. Ebüzziya Tevfik, for example, did not mention *İstikbâl* in his newspaper serials on the history of the Young Ottomans.[560] Over the course of its publication, *İstikbâl* was closed by the

[560] Most probably, the reason for not including *İstikbâl* in the serials was that the owner of the newspaper, Teodor Kasap, was not a member of the Young Ottoman movement.He was a close friend of Namık Kemal however, and, indeed, he borrowed the name of the newspaper from Namık Kemal.

government on several occasions, indicating that the newspaper held a certain degree of power or influence on the Ottoman public(s).[561] Therefore, even if we do not have any information on *İstikbâl*'s circulation rates, we can still argue for the significance of the newspaper and its readership profile.

Unlike *Hadika, İstikbâl* did not declare itself to be a political newspaper. However, the content of the newspaper reveals that *İstikbâl* mainly published news reports and editorial articles on politically driven subjects. Perhaps for that reason, the first page of the newspaper was mainly devoted to either editorial articles on domestic political subjects or news items. Even social subjects, such as the problem of begging and beggars, were written with a political tone, demanding the intervention of state.[562] Similarly, when a poor woman committed suicide on the domestic ferry (*vapur*) of Istanbul, *İstikbâl* blamed the ferry company (*Şirket-i Hayriye*) on the death of the woman and criticized its policy of maintaining high ticket prices, stating that woman did not have enough money to buy a ticket for the ferry.[563] At the same time, many news items on the daily life of Istanbul's residences appeared in the newspaper and they were stripped of overtly political comments. Yet, these news reports were significant, as they revealed *İstikbâl'*s editorial policy on how the daily problems of not an abstract public(s) but the real people were important for the newspaper. For example, *İstikbâl* presented news

[561] For an article that explains the readers the reasons for *İstikbâl's* closing see, Anonymous, "Tatilimiz", *İstikbâl,* 13 Rebiülevvel 1292 (19 April 1875), No: 107.

[562] Anonymous, "Mesele", *İstikbâl,* 30 Recep 1292 (31 August 1875), No:10. On this subject, also see, Anonymous, "Teessüf", *İstikbâl,* 19 Ramazan 1292 (19 October 1875), No:52.

[563] *İstikbâl,* 21 Şaban 1292 (21 September 1875), No:28.

reports on thirty railway workers who demanded their unpaid salaries.[564]*İstikbâl* also published the letters of its readers, including a letter by boatmen (*kayıkçılar*) from Istanbul who complained that the opening and closing of the bridge in Haliç negatively affected their business.[565]Similarly, *İstikbâl* published a news report on how road construction in Galatasaray harmed the business of the neighborhood's artisans (*esnaf).*[566] As evidenced by these examples, then, although *İstikbâl* was published as a politically driven newspaper, the content of the paper did not solely target readers who interested in contemporary political events. *İstikbâl*, appeared as a newspaper that published contemporary social, economic, and international events with a political tone. This tone was predominantly shaped by the criticisms of the Porte and of its policies. In this sense, most probably, the individuals who bought *İstikbâl* were interested not only in contemporary politics but also in critiques of daily events that were politically loaded in tone.

Similar to *Hadika,* in *İstikbâl,* the news items did not occupy a great deal space. It should be remembered,however, that these first private newspapers of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire blended news and editorial articles as well. In this sense, by reading editorial articles, the readers of *İstikbâl* were informed about contemporary events. For that reason, the news items did not outweigh the editorial articles. Similar to *Hadika,* when *İstikbâl* published dispatches, it did not provide a great deal of space for news items on official documents, the accounts of speeches, appointments, and the travel news of high-ranking bureaucrats. Nonetheless,

[564] Untitled news report, *İstikbâl,* 16 Şevval 1292 (15 November 1875), No:72.

[565] "Şikâyet", *İstikbâl,* 25 Ramazan 1292 (25 October 1875), No:57.

[566] *İstikbâl*, 8 Şevval 1292 (7 November 1875), No:65.

*İstikbâl* did include a section titled "appointments" (*tevcihât*). Under this section, expectedly, the appointments of the bureaucrats were addressed. Interestingly, however, the other news items on contemporary political developments, including the printing of *İstikbâl'* comments below the dispatch, were published in this section as well. Most probably, these news items captured the interests of the educated groups of society, such as state diplomats, officials, bureaucrats, soldiers, clerks, teachers, and religious groups whose lives were directly influenced by the decisions of the government, as they served the state. However, individuals who did not serve the state, yet needed to be informed with the decisions and practices of the government due to, for example, their economic investments, such as traders and artisans, also might have read the newspaper. Furthermore, people who were potentially aware of their environments such as students, most probably, were interested in the publication of *İstikbâl*, as the newspaper included articles that were critical of contemporary events.

In contrast to *Hadika, İstikbâl* published daily news stories on stock markets, such as changes in stock prices and international currency rates in major global financial markets. It additionally provided detailed news and editorial articles on the Ottoman stock market which was called the *Galata Borsası*, since it was located in Galata neighborhood of Istanbul. The existence of up-to-date information on stock markets, most probably, did capture the interest of readers such as bankers as well as possibly even small investors that bought stocks in the Galata stock exchange.

The layout design and style of *İstikbâl* also might have determined the readership core of the newspaper. Even though *İstikbâl* was published twelve years after *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, it still lacked headlines and titles for the dispatches. *İstikbâl* even lacked separate sections or headings for international and domestic news items. *İstikbâl* did use lines to divide news items, however, and they were the only visual markers for locating news items. In this sense, *İstikbâl*, like *Hadika*, paid less attention to its layout design. Therefore, it was more difficult for the readers to locate news items.[567]

Compared to *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret* and *Hadika, İstikbâl* created a simple narrative and style, which made newspaper more accessible for the readers. Specifically, *İstikbâl* deployed simple and short sentences that were constructed with more punctuation marks, making the reading experience less difficult in a society where most of its individuals were illiterate. Like *Hadika, İstikbâl* also deployed more Turkish words than its predecessors. With the Ottoman public(s)'s reading practices, the sentence structures and words found in *İstikbâl* probably made the newspaper more accessible to maybe also undereducated and illiterate social groups. Therefore, one can argue that with its very clearly written articles and dispatches, at least in theory, *İstikbâl* possessed the power to form and to influence Ottoman public opinion on the effects of foreign stockholders in creating disastrous financial crises in the Ottoman Empire. Connectedly, *İstikbâl* was also potentially capable of creating consensus between the central government that

[567] See the appendix D.

represented the state and some parts of the Ottoman public(s) whose interests overlapped with the survival of the empire.

### 3.2 *İstikbâl*'s Advertisements

With regards to volume, *İstikbâl* did not publish as many as advertisements as *Hadika* and *İbret*. Similar to *Tasvir-i Efkâr,İbret*, and *Hadika*, the advertisements and announcements (*ilânat*) of *İstikbâl* appeared only on the last page of the newspaper. However, two or, more commonly, one column out of four total was devoted to the advertisements. One can speculate that this scarcity of advertising could have been a product of *İstikbâl*'s relatively high price compared with its contemporaries. The approaching financial collapse might have been another reason for the relative limited amount of advertisements.

Lacking a great number of advertisements, however, *İstikbâl* published the announcements that were given by the Porte. However, most probably due to the newspaper's critical tone for the Porte, it did not receive these announcements as often as the chief editor wished. Therefore, Teodor Kasap published an article complaining that even though the official announcements were supposed to be submitted to all of the newspapers equally, *İstikbâl* received the official announcements one day later than the other newspapers.[568]

[568] See, for example, *İstikbâl*, 24 Receb 1292 (25 August 1875), no:5

Even though limited in number, *İstikbâl*'s advertisements and their messages might still provide us with some clues about newspaper's readership. The overwhelming majority of the advertisements published in *İstikbâl* marketed books, including dictionaries (*lü*gât) and translated works, which indicated that the newspaper was possibly read by a more educated readership. Additionally, *İstikbâl* included advertisements of a store that sold diverse assortments of goods (*envai*) that were imported from Paris.[569] However, the advertisement did not provide detailed information about the products. The same store also published advertisements that promoted stock shares of the Rumelian railways that were sold in the French currency of the Franc.[570] These two advertisements suggested that the newspaper's targeted readers were composed of people who possessed a level of income that allowed them to purchase imported products as well as stock shares.

Maybe more interesting than its advertisements was *İstikbâl's* announcement that the newspaper invited its readers to be part of *İstikbâl*'s *team* of journalists. In the announcement, *İstikbâl* declared to its readers that it was looking for people who would, "in a timely manner" (*vaktiyle*), report the events (*vukuat*) that would occur in "İstanbul, and in particular the Eyüp, Galata and Beyoğlu districts of Istanbul". Furthermore, *İstikbâl* announced that these people would be paid for their work (*memnun edilir*). Additionally, the newspaper announced that newspaper articles (*bendler*) and letters (*varakalar)* would be published with the author's name (*sahibi namına*) if the submitted articles and letters would be deemed

[569] See for example, *İstikbâl,* 20 Şaban 1292 (20 September 1875), No:36.

[570] See for example, ibid.

as beneficial for the public(s). Similar to the volunteer news reporters who *İstikbâl* attempted to recruit for the paper, the management of *İstikbâl* offered payment to these writers "if those writers would like".[571] In so doing, in its advertisement and announcement page, *İstikbâl* attempted to construct lines of communication with its readers who would actively participate in the news publishing process, even if the articles, dispatches, and letters would go through an alteration process by the newspapers' editors. Still, the attempts to encourage and to pay their readers for possible news stories and commentaries leads one to speculate that the newspaper might have taken seriously its rhetoric of both representing and incorporating the interests of the public(s), or at least those individuals who were literate and possessed the ability to write.

### 4. The Prices of *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* and their Readers

As was the case with its content and language, the price for each issue of *Hadika* provides an indication of the newspaper's readers. The price of the newspaper was 20 *para*(0,5 piaster) which was half of the prices of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* and *İbret*. Additionally, *Hadika* provided two different prices for the readers, one for the capital city (*pâyitaht*) and the other for the provinces (*vilâyat*). In its first page, *Hadika* announced that for the provinces, the price of the newspaper was 52 piasters for three months, 105 piasters for six months, and 200 piasters for a year. For the capital city, it was 40 piasters for three months, 80 piasters for six months,

[571] See, for example, İstikbâl, 24 Receb 1292 (25 August 1875), no:5

and 100 piasters for a year. *İbret,* which was published in the same year, demanded 150 piasters for six months, and 300 piasters for a year. While *İbret* announced that the shipping cost would be charged separately, there was no mention about the shipping cost in *Hadika*.

As I stated in chapter three, in 1873, the monthly stipend of a chief trackwalker (*bekçibaşı*) and that of a regular trackwalker (*bekçi*) could hypothetically allow one of these workers to buy a newspaper.[572] By selling the newspaper for half of the price of other contemporary newspapers and publishing news reports on workers, for example, *Hadika* attempted to reach wider public(s). As the striking workers' submission of their letter to *Hadika* and afterwards newspaper's forced closing by the Porte reveals, the newspaper indeed accessed diverse parts of the society. The newspaper's ability to reach different groups and classes was significant since, most probably, it reminded the Porte of the newspapers' ability to persuade the Ottoman public(s) to act against the government.

Published in 1875, the price of *İstikbâl*, however, was again one piaster, which was expensive for its time. Indeed, in the first issue of the newspaper, the editor Teodor Kasap published an article to explain the reason for *İstikbâl'*s high price. He stated that the price of the newspaper seemed high among many other newspapers that were published in Istanbul, which sold their copies for 20-30 *para* (0.5 piaster). He argued that to be able to reimburse the expenses that emanated from publishing a paper and to be able make a living through the publishing of a

[572] For these documents see BOA, I.DH 665/46304, 18 Safer 1290 (17 April 1873) and Fulya Özkan, "A Road in Rebellion, A History on the Move: Trabzon-Erzurum-Bayezid Road in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries".

newspaper, the price of *İstikbâl* needed to be one piaster.[573] Based on the price of the newspaper, a similar argument that I made for *İbret* can be suggested for *İstikbâl* as well. For middle class audiences, the price of the newspaper was accessible. Even if *İstikbâl*'s price was not as low as *Hadika,* most probably, some individuals from the lower classes were able to buy the newspaper as well. However, since we do not have the circulation rates of the newspaper, it is difficult to assess with precision how the paper was received in the Ottoman society.

## 5. Conclusion

For the editors of *Hadika* and *İstikbâl*, newspapers were significant tools that could potentially form, convince, and transform Ottoman public(s) in resistance against the government. The debilitating economic and financial conditions of the empire, combined with the centralist policies of the Porte, provided the editors of *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* with the critical topics needed to mobilize the Ottoman public(s) against the government and foreign financial interests. By promoting in practice the idea that, newspapers were independent mouthpieces of the public voice, the editors of *Hadika* and *İstikbâl*, attempted to define the parameters of legitimate governing policies. In this sense, *Hadika* and *İstikbâl* provided a supposed forum where people could advance their respective political agendas.

[573] "İhtârat", *İstikbâl,*20 Receb 1292 (21 August 1292), No:1

These newspapers made possible for diverse parts of the society to challenge imperial authority and its fiscal policies. In this framework, for example, the navy shipyard workers gained access to *Hadika*'s pages in order to express their grievances and encourage debate about the government's policies. In so doing, *Hadika*, perhaps unintentionally, shifted the locus of power downward, as the people who were expected to be voiceless by the upper classes of society appeared as social actors who openly questioned the legitimacy of the political power holders.

Initially siding with the Ottoman public(s) against centralist state policies, with the bankruptcy of the empire, *İstikbâl*, however, shifted its editorial policy and supported the state. After a short while, however, its editorial policy on criticizing the government and its centralization policies shifted back again and remained unchanged. Only at the moment of the bankruptcy, aware of the danger that the foreign financial interventions posed against the Ottoman Empire, *İstikbâl* directed its harsh criticisms towards foreign investors and particularly Englishmen. By externalizing the responsibility of the Ottoman financial disaster, *İstikbâl* tried to restore the confidence of the Ottoman public(s) in their very own empire. In so doing, *İstikbâl* not only attempted to construct consensus between the rulers and citizens but also attempted to elevate the confidence of Ottoman public(s) in the struggle for international financial survival.

## Conclusion

The present study has focused on four Ottoman private newspapers of the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, in particular *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* between the years of 1862 and 1875. The decision to study the Ottoman press, particularly in these specific years, was not an arbitrary decision, yet it was a difficult one. It was a difficult decision for two main reasons. First, difficulty emanates from the unstated bias against using newspapers as primary sources in the Ottoman historiography. Second, difficulty emerges when writing a social history of the period under study.

The majority of Ottoman historians refrain from using Ottoman newspapers as primary sources in general and the newspapers of the third quarter of the nineteenth century in particular. The reason for this neglect is the expected result of both the revisionist and conventional Ottoman historians' conceptualization of the Ottoman press as an elite source. Due to the low literacy rates of the nineteenth century Ottoman society, Ottoman historians have approached the Ottoman press as a fruitless source for the writing of social history. Many recent revisionist studies, however, have focused on the nineteenth century Ottoman press, approaching the press and especially its print productions as texts that themselves are agents which possess the ability to influence historical processes. These culture-based approaches by themselves are problematic, as they analyze the text for its own value

exclusively. In these approaches, neither the economic, social, and political specificities of the given historical moment in which the newspapers were published, nor the producers of this medium, such as publishers, editors, and journalists, are thoroughly analyzed. By avoiding these methodological shortcomings, the dissertation attempts to fill a void in the Ottoman historiography. In this vein, I attempted to show that the first Ottoman private newspapers could indeed provide valuable sources in an attempt to write Ottoman social history. The argument does not insinuate that newspapers are the only sources for writing social history. Similar to other archival sources, newspapers should be used in combination with other sources. Among these sources, one might turn to memoirs and letters of editors and readers, as well as documents that discuss or mention income and literacy levels, the subscription lists of the newspapers, and governmental policies regarding the press.

Related to the sources that I used in tandem with the newspapers, a second issue presented itself. The specific period that this study focused on proved to be significant yet lacking in source material. For example, the number of memoirs and letters of interest were limited. Furthermore, as is the case for the Ottoman press in general, the private archives of the newspapers under investigation did not survive. Hence, in my analysis, I remained relatively restrained when outlining the readership profiles of each newspaper as well as the authenticity of the readers' letters. Yet, by combining available memoirs, the personal letters of the editor Namık Kemal, and state archival sources with a thorough analysis of the newspapers' contents, I attempted to show the possibilities for using Ottoman newspapers as primary sources to write social history. In this dissertation, I contend that the decision to study nineteenth century private newspapers in many ways

can prove fruitful. Moreover, the specific years under examination were part of a period when political, economic, and social changes produced the necessary environment for the publication of private newspapers, which made this period an indispensable one for this study. The years under study were significant, since diverse yet contested economic, political, and social interests "seemingly" utilized a new tool, the newspaper, to voice their demands and criticisms about contemporary policies. On the one hand, the private press of the Ottoman Empire began to flourish in these years, as evidenced by the growing number of newspaper publications as well as the newspaper's ability to reach wider publics. On the other hand, the financial situation of the Empire deteriorated to a point that the Porte announced the bankruptcy of the Empire in 1875.

Contrary to the claims of the Ottoman historiography on the press, in this dissertation, I argued that the steady but continued development of the Ottoman press, in a period of serious financial crises, was not a direct byproduct of the modernization project of the Porte. Rather, the present study has argued that not exclusively, but mainly, the discontent created by the centralization policies of the Porte combined with the irritation caused by European imperialism assisted the emergence of the Ottoman press. Many other social and political developments influenced the emergence of the Ottoman press as well, including the increasing commercial relationships with Europe, the central government's application of *laissez faire* economic policies while stripping the social and economic protection of many occupational groups against European trade competition, and improvements in communication structures. In this sense, the present study suggested that although the new medium, the newspaper, was not invented in the Empire and therefore was "adopted", the reasons for using newspapers and the environment that

created the conditions for the utilization of newspapers were indigenous. Furthermore, this study has argued that due to the specific conditions of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, not only the press emerged but also a press culture developed. In this study, I defined the press culture as one that was charged with both the ability to oppose and to negotiate with the state and diverse groups in order to change forms of political expression and resistance, to reproduce and to resist the prevailing state ideology, and to promote diverse political and economic interests.

The private newspapers of this period made visible the contestation among diverse groups, such as tax farmers, central government, bankers, peasants, workers, journalists, and bureaucrats. Therefore, the contents of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* and particularly the ways in which these newspapers' editors framed news reports and wrote news articles provided this study with important primary source material, allowing me to paint a rich picture of the political and economic contestation that existed in the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman society. In order to present the complexity and vividness of contestation among diverse actors as well as negotiation with the government, the parameters of which the newspapers attempted to define, the preceding chapters have analyzed the reasons for the emergence of a press culture in a "non-Western" society. The society under investigation, according to Orientalist historiographies, lacked the necessary internal dynamics to produce and benefit from newspapers. In contrast, this study sought to reveal the internal dynamics that produced a press culture by also analyzing the interconnectedness of newspapers and the public(s). Therefore, the present study effectively provides a counterpoint to the premises made in the modernist and Orientalist historiographies, which depict the Ottoman society as

backward and lacking the necessary public(s) to form public opinion(s) about contemporary political, economic, and financial developments. To show the interconnectedness between the emergence of the press and the existence of the public(s), I focused on the meaning of the public(s) and public opinion. The present study thus analyzed the Ottoman public(s) on two levels.

First, this study argued for the multiplicity of societal roles and the diversity of interests, which provided a framework to expose the heterogeneity and therefore plurality of the public. This public(s) and its opinion(s) existed throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, revealing its presence by resisting state policies in the form of submitting petitions to state authorities, emigrating to challenge the central government's taxation, and revolting against the government. What was new about the public(s)'s form of resistance in the nineteenth century then was its acquaintance with press. In this sense, the Ottoman public(s) emerged as a reading public that benefited from the opportunities that the newspapers presented to that very public(s), as *Hadika*'s news reports on the workers' strike of 1873 revealed, for example. To expose the existence of an Ottoman reading public, this study used many methods, including the incorporation of circulation rates of *İbret* and *Hadika*, which were provided by a journalist in his memoirs. Furthermore, based on the number of students in the Ottoman Empire, the dissertation attempted to calculate the amount of potential readers that could have read Ottoman newspapers. The present study also suggested that this reading public(s) was not only composed of literate people, since public reading practices provided the Ottoman public(s) and the illiterate with the opportunity to access news. It also utilized state documents that discussed state subsidies and censorship efforts. These documents are

important since they reveal the public control practices of the Porte and hence, for the state, acknowledgement of a reading public(s). Indeed, publication of *Takvim-i Vekâyi* in 1831 also revealed the state's awareness of a reading public(s). Furthermore, the Porte's action about sending newspapers the announcement of the governmental decision on increasing the wages of day laborers also showed the government's awareness of this reading public(s). Based on the wages of a trackwalker and the prices of the newspapers, the present study additionally suggests the possibility that individuals who possessed lower income levels might have bought a newspaper. In particular, the price of *Hadika* showed its possible accessibility for lower income wage earners, whose interests were defended explicitly in the pages of this newspaper. However, this assessment should be made cautiously, as we need additional sources and studies on wages and retail prices, for example, to show the real purchasing power of members of the lower class and their access to newspapers. Even though I have only tentative findings about the wages of varied classes and occupational groups, still, based on the content of newspapers, I challenge one of the dominant premises of the Ottoman press history scholarship, which claims that the press, as an elite based source, lacked the potential to reflect the concerns, demands, and problems of the Ottoman public(s).

Second, in this dissertation, I also conceptualized the Ottoman public on another level, which was the journalists' perception of the public(s). To analyze the meaning of the Ottoman public(s) for the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl*, first, I examined the reasons for newspaper publishing activities. Through an analysis of news reporting styles, the editors' news selection criteria for dispatches, as well as the worldview of the newspapers' editors, I showed that, for the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr,*

*İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl,* news publishing was a form of political expression. Furthermore, as İbrahim Şinasi stated in the introduction of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, the newspaper was a way of protecting vested rights. Therefore, for the editors of these newspapers, news publishing was a political activity that was loaded with criticisms and sought to negotiate with the state any number of political, social, and economic points on behalf of and with the Ottoman public(s). More specifically, the present study asserted that the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* published news on finance and economy to increase the political awareness of the readers, to push readers to defend their political and economic rights, and to resist undesirable government policies. However, publishing news was also a way of warning the Porte about its "unfair" political and economic policies, which occurred in front of the eyes of the public(s) and on behalf of the public(s). Therefore, when the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* criticized the Porte's financial policies on the dangers of relying on external financial resources as well as the threat of foreign intervention in the Empire, they also attempted to show the central government a political solution that could resolve its financial problems. This solution was the application of the Tanzimat decrees that promised equal rights and responsibilities for all Ottoman citizens. In this vein, the present study also attempted to demonstrate the newspaper editors' consciousness about the deepening financial and political problems and their accuracy in assessing the immediate problems of the Ottoman society, as exemplified by the bankruptcy of the Empire in 1875.

After outlining the journalists' primary reasons for publishing a newspaper as well as the connectedness of these reasons to the journalists' perceptions of the public(s), I focused on the content of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* as well as the

discourse of these newspapers. In so doing, I attempted to define the targeted readers of Ottoman newspapers as well as the accessibility of the newspapers in a society whose members were predominantly illiterate. Additionally, this approach helped analyze the contemporary affairs, problems, and concerns of the Ottoman public(s) as they were perceived by the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl*.

A close examination of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* revealed how the editors of these newspapers constructed an evolving and changing language structure at this time. Indeed, from the first edition of *Tasvir-i Efkâr* in 1862 to the publication of *İstikbâl* in 1875, the language structures deployed in these newspapers became simpler and less complex. Refraining from Arabic and Persian expressions also added greater clarity to the language used in the newspapers. Over time, the words and the terms deployed in the newspapers became closer to the language used in the daily lives of the people. Additionally, the sentences used by editors evolved and became shorter in length. Quite possibly, less complicated sentence structures and word usages attracted larger numbers of readers. Therefore, this study has suggested that the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* used an accessible language that they believed could resonate with their readers.

An examination of the layout designs used by *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* also revealed that the first private Ottoman newspapers of the nineteenth century lacked appealing compositions. However, I assert the possibility that the dull layout style of these nineteenth century newspapers did not discourage contemporary readers, due to the newspapers' rich contents and accessible language. Moreover, the reports and articles

of the newspapers mattered to their readers, since they often times provided the best source of information about contemporary events.

As the dissertation aimed to analyze how newspapers presented the contestation and negotiation surrounding financial and economic practices, it primarily but not exclusively focused on dispatches and editorial articles regarding the financial problems of not only the state but also the diverse actors in the Ottoman society. Therefore, the present study analyzed the content of the newspapers regarding subjects that included the Ottoman public debt, the collection of taxes, the problems of local merchants, and the financial difficulties that ordinary people such as workers and peasants encountered in their daily lives. The volume of such news reports and editorial articles showed that the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* held consistent concerns about the escalation of Ottoman public debt and its negative effects on Ottoman society. Therefore, as exemplified in all four newspapers and with increased emphasis, *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* problematized the tax levying methods and collection practices of the central government by discussing the financial difficulties of the Ottoman public(s). Particularly in *İbret* and *Hadika*, the emphasis placed on the financial problems of the peasants, problems that were represented as emanating from heavy and unfair taxation, was especially interesting for me. The analysis of the news reports and editorial articles revealed that the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* were not only aware of their international and internal surroundings but also the everyday difficulties of the Ottoman public(s). Therefore, these editors clearly defined the state's responsibilities for its public(s). By showing the editors' awareness of their environments and the problems of the Ottoman public(s), the present study also challenges the existing

scholarship on the roles played by nineteenth century newspapers and their editors. According to modernist scholarship, the editors of the nineteenth century newspapers were modernist intellectuals who were only concerned with the problems of the state and its governing apparatus. Furthermore, this scholarship argued that the editors of the newspapers attempted to educate the Ottoman public(s) in order to orient them with Western ideas that, in the editors' minds, would lead to the successful revitalization of the state. By demonstrating that the Ottoman journalists indeed reflected and articulated the concerns, problems, and demands of different parts of Ottoman society, the present study attempted to define these journalists as actors who did not conceptualize the Ottoman public(s) as passive receivers of modernist and Western ideas. In this vein, this study also challenged the arguments of modernist scholars that singularly conceptualize Ottoman newspapers as vehicles for modernization that deserve analysis only with regard to their objectives as well as the newspapers' ability to modernize and Westernize the Ottoman public(s). By bringing into focus the unacknowledged human element in newspapers that was the diverse actors of the Ottoman society, I have attempted to complicate the historian's depiction of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The present study attempted to show that, as it was reflected by the journalists, the Ottoman public(s) was composed of real individuals and groups who held diverse economic, political, and social interests. Furthermore, as exemplified by the letters of peasants and workers, many elements in society appeared as vocal and active actors on the pages of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl*. Even though we can never be sure about the authenticity of the letters sent by the readers, the letter writers were active actors in the sense that the newspapers' editors gave voice to particular parts of the Ottoman public(s). In other

words, those individuals who were not visible in the public arena unless they revolted against or protested the government at the very least appeared as actors who anticipated the application of their promised rights, sought justice on the streets of Istanbul, and voiced their complaints and demands. Subsequently, the present study also suggests that the Ottoman public(s)' appearance as "active actors" in the newspapers as well as the Porte's censorship and newspaper closing practices can reveal how Ottoman newspapers did indeed offer sites of contestation and negotiation and hence sites of producing societal consensus. On the one hand, these newspapers showed the central government the ways that it could construct consensus with the diverse parts of society. On the other hand, *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* exposed the diversity and multiplicity of the vested interests as well as the necessity for finding consensus points both among diverse interests and with the central government. For such a consensus, the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl* defined the responsibility of the state as the protection of the well-being of the Ottoman public(s). In moments of societal instability and challenge, however, these newspapers demonstrated not to the state but to the Ottoman public(s) the ways in which to construct consensus with the Porte. The financial crisis of the empire was one such moment when, for example, *İstikbâl* published news reports and editorials so that the Ottoman state could receive the support of the Ottoman public(s).

Through a thorough exploration of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika*, and *İstikbâl,* my dissertation has discovered the kind of historical evidence that challenges the orientalist and modernist perspectives that still influence the Ottoman press historiography. Indeed, the analysis of these newspapers shows that the Ottoman print culture played a crucial

role in the development of the notion of a "public," which consisted of contested political and economic interests. As this public(s) included middle and lower income classes, this dissertation challenges the conventional Ottoman historiography's claim of the press as an elite source. Furthermore, this dissertation attempted to show that between the years of 1862 and 1875, the Ottoman press helped bring about the formation of an Ottoman print culture that would gradually incorporate the wider segments of society into the daily discourse of politics, even if this incorporation was not always the primary motive of the editors' newspaper publishing activities.

The findings that have been reached from a close reading of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl* are significant, as they suggest that the editors of these newspapers, lacking confidence in what they viewed to be an ineffective and problematic central state, realized that cooperation with the different segments of the Ottoman public(s) was crucial for the defense of the Empire's political and financial integrity. For the editors of *Tasvir-i Efkâr, İbret, Hadika,* and *İstikbâl,* the immediate financial collapse of the Empire and hence the Ottoman public could be prevented through a political price that the Porte needed to pay. This price was a shift in power structures that required the central government to share its political and economic power with the Ottoman public(s). This is not to say that the nineteenth century Ottoman newspapers proposed a democratic model in which every citizen would enjoy equal rights. Rather, they suggested a system in which the people who would pay more taxes would acquire a say in governmental policies. While suggesting such a power shift, the newspapers reflected the contested interests of the Ottoman public and attempted to cooperate with the wider parts of the society in order to make their claim be recognized by the government. I believe that

assessing the legacies of these newspapers is crucial for understanding the continuities and changes in both the press and political cultures of the Empire as well as its inheritor state, the Turkish Republic.

## Appendix A

## Example of *Tasvir-i Efkâr*

Source: "Tasvir-i Efkâr," Periodicals of Hakki Tarik US Collection, accessed 13 August 2011, http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/list1.html.

## Appendix B

## Example of *İbret*

Source: "İbret," Periodicals of Hakki Tarik US Collection, accessed 13 August 2011, http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/list1.html.

## Appendix C

## Example of *Hadika*



١ نسخه‌سی ٢٠ پاره‌در

ولایات ایچون بدلی
اوچ آیلغی ٥٢ آلتی آیلغی ١٠٥
سنه‌لکی ٢٠٠ غروشدر .

ادارہ یہ متعلق ایشلر
ایچون حافظ شریف افندی یہ مراجعت ایدلیدر .

# حدیقہ

حوادث ومعارفه دائر
بر عمی غزتہ

پای تخت ایچون بدلی
اوچ آیلغی ٤٠ التی آیلغی ٨٠
سنه‌لکی ١٥٠ غروشدر .

مرکز تحریر واوارہ
باب عالی انصا لندہ ٹعلغی مسجد جاده‌سنده‌در .

نومرو ٢ ] استانبول پازار ایرتسی فی ١١ تشرین ثانی ١٢٨٩ سنه [ ١٠ رمضان

معارفه دائر بر مقاله

الناس اما ناعالم اومتعلم والباقی همج

دنیاده شرف انسانیت فیض معرفتدن عبارتدر . بوقیمه نصاب عمله مالك وبالتحصیلله سالك اولمیان عوامك هوامدن هیچ فرقی اولهمز . برکره مزیات انسانیه یی دوشونهلم ! .

هرکسی ناقیصله وظیفهٔ خلقتدن خبردار ایدن معارف دکلیدر .

فطرتزدهٔ استعداد کامل بالفعل اظهارایدن معارف دکلیدر؟ .

موجودات زمینی اکثر خواصیله برابرینی نوعزه خدمتکار ایدن معارف دکلیدر ؟ .

دنیانك برکوشه سنده‌کی نم فوائدی دیکر کوشه سنده بولنانلرك یانه ایشار ایدن معارف دکلیدر ؟ .

طوفازده فنالولان بوئیجه اقوام سالفه‌نك ماثر عرفانی جهان مدنیتده دائمی الاستقرار ایدن معارف دکلیدر؟ .

حقیقت دنیاده معرفتدن بیوك نعمتزیت تصور اولنسون ؟ .

معرفت حقك اجل لطف سحانیسیدر
عزتکمك حامیسی معبودریکك بانیسیدر
دائم ایلر ظاهر وباطنده تنقیب امور
صانکه احکام شوکك صانع ثانیسیدر

معارف سایه سنده‌در که اوروپا دهرکس معوتان اهالیسك تعیین ایتدیکی مثافعی وفایه به کافل اولور . حال بوکه آسیاده هیچ کیمسه معوتان الهیه‌نك تعیین ایتدیکی شرایعی حمایت ایدهمز .

معارف سایه سنده‌در که انکلیز روکوچك اردوایله اوچ یوز ملیون‌دن زیاده نفوسه مالك اولان چین حکومتنك پای تختنه داخل اولور . حال بوکه اوقوجه چین حکومتی برکوچك فرقهٔ عاصیه‌نك بیله اوزرینه وارمغه جسارت ایدهمز ! .

معارف سایه سنده‌در که برقاچ کوندهاوروپالی برقاچ بحر محیطی بکه‌رك دنیانك او برکوشه سنه واصل اولور .

حال بوکه برقاچ ملیون تاتار برقاچ یوزسنه‌ده بردیواری آشمغه کسب قدرت ایدهمز ! .

معارف سایه سنده‌در که دائرهٔ مدنیت ایچنده حقیقتی چشم ادراکه نهان اولان بوئیجه علل مهلکه‌نك تداویسی قابل اولور . حالبوکه بدونت محرالزده هیچ کیسه وجودی میدانده اولان صاعقه قارشو دفع مضرت ایدهمز ! .

معارف سایه سنده‌در که بارسده برادیب کامل اوچ بش آی چالیشمغه رق برکتابه ترتیب اینسه مدت عمرنده ضرورت کورمیه‌جك قدر ثروته نائل اولور . حالبوکه استانبولده برعلامهٔ یگانه‌نك مأثر مدت عمرنده تألیف ایدیجکی کتابلرك محصولیه اوچ بش آی اسنیضای حاجت ایدهمز .

برکره نظر امعان ایله باقلسون که معارف یلدیکمز اقوام ایچنده انتشار ایدیلی نه قدر آثار بدیعه میدانه کتیرمشدر !

طبیعتك برقاچ شعبه‌سی تدوین اولندی . کتندی قوتله یوجك برکتابی تحریرکدن عاجز اولان برشیی ، اکرخارجدن برنقطهٔ استناد بولسیدم زمینی یرندن اویناتیردم . فرض امکان بسیله منظور ایدلی .

فن سیاستك بعض قواعدی تعیین اولندی . ملکی ایکی اوچ ایالته منحصر اولان رساکی آزمدتده فتح ایچون جهان ایچنده چهان تحرا ایله مقتدر ایدلدی .

ظهور اسلام مکارم اخلاقی اتمام ایدلدی . برایکی عصر ایچنده قطعات ثلثه‌نك اکثر جهانداری قانون عدل وحقی اولان شریعته منقاد ایدلدی .

علمای کرام قواعد عقل ونقلك تدقیقنه اقدام ایلدی . دنیانی فردوس معموریت ایدن مدنیتك اسباب کلیه‌سی اعداد ایدلدی .

ایچلرنده حاکم ظهور ایتدی که سیف عدالتاری مشرقدن مغربه زمان اولوردی .

حکیم وجوده کلدی که تألیفات عدیده وکشفیات جدیده‌ایله هربری قدرت صانعك کامانه برهان اولوردی .

بعض اهل صنعت یاخمه‌یی ایجاد ایتدی . اوزمانه قدر خواصه منحصر اولان کمالات عقلیه‌نك تعمیمله فوائد مدنیتك کوردیکمز درجه‌یه وصولنه مدار اولدی .

یوطاغ ارباب معرفت سباحت بحریه‌یی اعتیاد ایتدی . اووقته قدر عمان خفاده فالش اولان برقطعهٔ عظمادائرهٔ تدننه النه‌رق حائز اولدیغی عطایای قدرتدن عوم انسانیت حصه‌دار اولدی .

برقاچ حکیم استدلالات نظریه‌نك تطبیقات خارجیه‌یه احتیاجی تأیید ایلدی . بو احتیاجك ثبوتی فیوضات طبیعتدن استفاده‌یی بلکه‌یك درجه تزید ایلدی .

اصول هیئت و قوهٔ جاذبه قانونلری وخواص عناصر کبی برطاقم حقایق قدرتك ادراکیله افکار بشر احاطه‌سی قابل اولهمیه‌جق قدر وسعت بولدیغی مسلمدر . بوکشفیاتدن سعادت حالزده حاصل اولان منافع نافعه‌یه ایسه پیش نظر مزده‌کی مصنوعات بدیعه‌نك هربری بردلیل منتظمدر .

مأثر سائردن قطع نظر عقله کوره بخار قوتیله سیاله رقیبه خاصه‌سنك کشفندن بیوك نه خدمت اوله بیلور ؟ بونلر ترقی مدنیت ایچون ایکی واسطهٔ عظیمه‌در که بری روح قدر بدیع لازم

Hakkı Tarık Us Koleksiyonu Süreli Yayınları

Source: "Hadika," Periodicals of Hakki Tarik US Collection, accessed 13 August 2011, http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/list1.html.

## Appendix D

## Example of İstikbâl




Source: "Istikbal," Periodicals of Hakki Tarik US Collection, accessed 13 August 2011, http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/list1.html.

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*İbret*

*Hadika*

*İstikbâl*

**b) The National Library of Turkey**

*Takvim-ı Vekayi*

**II) Prime Ministry Archives (BOA-Basbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi)**

**a) Classifications (Tasnifler) with individual documents**

A.MKT (Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Evrakı)

A.AMD (Sadaret Amedi Kalemi Evrakı)

A.MKT.MHM (Sadaret Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı)

C.MF (Cevdet Maarif)

HAT (Hatt-ı Hümayun)

HR.MKT (Hariciye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi)

İ.DH (İrade Dahiliye)

İ.MVL (İrade Meclis-i Vala)

İ.ŞD (İrade Şura-yı Devlet)

İ.HR (İrade hariciye)

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