LOSING BY WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS ABROAD: ESSAYS ON IMPACTS OF FOREIGN POLICIES ON FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION

BY

IHSAN EFE TOKDEMIR

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MA, Binghamton University, 2015

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Dr. Benjamin O. Fordham, Chair, and Faculty Advisor
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Dr. David H. Clark, Member
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Dr. Seden Akcinaroglu, Member
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Dr. Ekrem Karakoc, Member
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Dr. Thomas M. Wilson, Outside Examiner
Department of Anthropology, Binghamton University

Abstract

Foreign public opinion is important for states' interactions with their counterparts. Insomuch that, a wide range of countries invest in soft power strategies via providing foreign aid, opening up the borders, promoting inter-societal interactions, and using public diplomacy effectively to win hearts and minds abroad. However, even these policies specifically aiming to increase foreign public support do not often succeed.

In the dissertation I will examine micro-level impacts of foreign policies on public opinion abroad, and thus address the causes of such failures, by probing the attitude formation processes of individuals. How do foreign publics perceive and assess the sender states in response to their foreign policy choices? What could explain the variance in foreign public attitudes towards different sender states? Can states influence foreign public opinion by offering appropriate policies at all? By addressing these questions, I argue that we cannot understand whether states could influence the public opinion in target states without a comprehensive examination of individuals' political and social predispositions within the domestic politics.

Hence, my dissertation will investigate how domestic political configuration within the target state (e.g. cleavage structure, ethnic/religious tensions, regime characteristics, etc.) conditions the effect of policies offered by the sender state at the individual level. I aim to offer a theory of attitude formation by showing that foreign public opinion is not free from domestic political dynamics in its evaluation of foreign states and their policies, unlike the previous studies that focused on either what foreign states are/represent or what they do.

To my grandma who believed in me from the beginning

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Introduction

When Barack Obama was elected as the first black President of the United States along with some rumors about his religion in 2008, the prime expectation of most Middle East experts was a decline in anti-Americanism in the region, where Islam is the predominant religion.[1] Following the neo-conservative Bush administration that drove the U.S. into two controversial battles in Afghanistan and Iraq, public opinion abroad largely took Obama administration as a step back from previous aggressive U.S. policies. Indeed, Obama administration largely met the expectations by proposing plans of military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, and not intervening in Syria during the Arab Spring. Despite his favorable rhetoric about the region and Muslims, and non-aggressive U.S. policies in the Middle East, the figures still show a high and ever-increasing anti-Americanism among Middle Easterners and continuing threat to U.S. national security from the region.

Similar expectations appeared when Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in 2009. As a scholar, who studies foreign policy and international politics, Dr. Davutoglu promised friendly relations with Turkey's neighbors to advance the countries' interests in the region. Following the doctrine disclosed in his piece "Strategic Depth," Davutoglu initiated the "zero problems with-neighbors" policy by embracing a constructivist approach, and

[1]Please see Kohut, A., Wike, R., Carriere-Kretschmer, E., Holzwart, K., & Poushter, J. (2009). Most Muslim publics not so easily moved: Confidence in Obama lifts U.S. image around the world. 25-nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Washington, DC: The Pew Global Attitudes Project for a more comprehensive survey

suggested that people of the Middle East would welcome Turkey's reappearance in the regional politics (Davutoglu, 2000; 2010). Despite the increasing soft power investments and public diplomacy activities of Turkey in the region, and the promotion of "Turkey as a role model for the rest" rhetoric, the time has revealed that nothing much changed either in people's attitudes or other countries' policies towards Turkey. Dr. Davutoglu eventually resigned, and his "zero problems with neighbors" policy is now labeled as "zero friends in the neighborhood" (Zalewski, 2013).

We know that states care about their reputation when advancing their national interests (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 2005; Nye, 2004; Schelling, 2008; Tomz, 2011); and, they do not build their strategies exclusively around intergovernmental relations. Since, they care about their image among publics abroad, many global and regional powers such as the U.S., Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil heavily also invest in soft power strategies to attract positive attention of the foreign public. By providing foreign aid, opening up the borders, promoting inter-societal interactions, and using public diplomacy successfully, these states aim to win hearts and minds abroad (Gallarotti & Al-Filali, 2012; Kirisci, 2005; Lee et al., 2010; Li, 2009; Nye, 2005; Popescu, 2006; Thompson, 2005; Tsygankov, 2006).

Why does the U.S. care about what people think about it globally? Why does China, a country that does not embrace the norms and values of the existing world order, invest in public diplomacy in Africa and Asia? Why does Turkey, a moderate regional power, claim to be a role model of democratic values in the Middle East while this claim is an obvious threat to the authoritarian structure of Middle Eastern countries? Winning hearts and minds of foreign publics becomes notably important for states, as public opinion plays an increasing role in the relations with international society. However, as two examples clearly demonstrated above, aiming to win hearts and minds through some policy changes or rhetoric may not achieve the desired objectives. Moreover, some policies may even further harm the interests of the sender states, as in the case of Davutoglu – Turkey example. To examine this puzzle, I will take a step back, and tackle a more general question to understand the possible effects of foreign policies on the public opinion abroad. Hence, the main

research question that I will address in this dissertation concerns how foreign publics perceive and assess the foreign countries and their foreign policy choices and what could explain the variance in foreign public attitudes towards these states regarding their foreign policies.

Motivation of the Project

Foreign public opinion matters in foreign policy decision-making. Despite the limitations on public awareness, interest, and information problems, foreign policy still matters to people, and people are receptive to international developments (Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2012; Hayes & Guardino, 2011). In democratic counterparts, elected leaders should take public opinion into account in foreign policy decision-making to pursue their self-interested goal of re-election. Thus, states must not only consider the inter-state interactions but also acknowledge the role of public opinion of the democratic target state in their decision-making. Lack of support to the U.S. from their allies in Iraq War, 2003 is one of the examples that show the importance of foreign public opinion. Mass protests with the participation of millions of people in France and Germany against the U.S. decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein by military intervention played a role in the negative stance of these countries in the U.N. Security Council. In the U.K., a strategic ally of the U.S., mass protests against the war led to the decrease of Prime Minister Tony Blair's approval and his eventual resignation in 2007.

Leaders of non-democratic regimes are no different than those of the democratic ones when it comes to the necessity of establishing a support base (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Although authoritarian leaders do not rely on popular support to govern, they need to get the support of a coalition to maintain their office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2009; Weeks, 2008). Even if authoritarian leaders could neglect public opinion in their decisions, still a negative public opinion would give them leverage against others to demand more costly policies (Weiss, 2013). Additionally, neglecting public opinion in authoritarian regimes may endanger the security of the regime; accumulating dissatisfaction among people might trigger a revolutionary cascade, and weaken the control of the regime over its subjects. The Arab Spring in the Middle East is a recent example of

the disastrous consequences of neglecting public opinion for authoritarian leaders. Hence, public opinion still matters for non-democratic states, as well.

Aside from intergovernmental relations, the emergence of non-state actors and their increasing global impact may force states to account for foreign public opinion in designing their policies (Hayes & Guardino, 2011; Moravcsik, 1992). Policies that aggrieve foreign public would indirectly benefit terror groups, as they enhance the pool of latent resources and recruits, and help such groups' cause (Cederman et al., 2013). This makes public opinion more and more important, as it has an impact on the strength of these groups by affecting resolve and recruitment directly (Cederman, Gledistch & Buhaug, 2013; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). For instance, ISIS in Iraq lately is an example proving that resentment of the Sunni population that resulted from U.S. policies favoring Shiites led to the emergence of a threat to the U.S. national security.

Accordingly, many states invest in soft power and public diplomacy strategies including the United States through The National Security Strategy (2010) setting the goal of renewing U.S. leadership, image, and reputation to advance U.S. interests in the new global era. Notwithstanding the importance of this phenomenon, only a few studies in the literature probe how states' foreign policy choices influence and shape public opinion in the target state. [2] Whether states deliberately invest in building a positive image through soft power strategies and public diplomacy efforts or not, the effect would not be uniform in the target state. This is because individual interests are typically heterogeneous in a given country context. For instance, carefully designed U.S. policies to win hearts and minds of the Shias in Iraq generated grievances and resentment among Sunnis in Iraq, which strengthened ISIS and other ethnic-religious groups. Thus, regardless of the very purpose of the policy, every foreign policy offering comes with its positive and negative externalities that need to be analyzed very carefully.

In this dissertation, I argue that people develop attitudes towards foreign actors not independent from the context in which they live. Instead, the domestic political configuration of the target

[2] See Bush & Jamal, 2014; Corstange & Marinov, 2012; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2012

state influences their citizens' perception and reaction towards other states' and their foreign policy choices. Hence, this research will probe how domestic politics and individuals' predisposition within the domestic politics condition the impact of foreign policy choices of the sender state over public opinion in the target states. The dissertation is intended to tackle the role of domestic politics in shaping individuals' attitudes towards foreign actors by embracing a holistic approach to analyzing the impacts of foreign policies and by examining the externalities of foreign policy choices at the micro-level.

My contribution in this dissertation will be three-fold. First, this research is one of the rare inquiries in the literature probing the effect of foreign states' policies on the attitudes of individuals in a quantitative cross-sectional design. In so doing, I aim to (a) provide policy makers with a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of policies by examining externalities of these policies at the micro-level, (b) contribute to the existing literature on soft power and public diplomacy by showing that the impact of policies are not deterministic, but conditioned by domestic politics. Second, by relaxing the unitary actor assumption, this research aims to establish that domestic politics, i.e., domestic coalitions, preferences, etc. is a crucial moderating factor for the impact of foreign policies. And third, by investigating potential soft power tools, I intend to contribute to the conflict literature by showing whether such policies could prevent individuals from developing grievances and hostile attitudes, which generates a recruit pool for terrorist organizations.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will first briefly frame the state of the academic debate and the main objective of the dissertation. The aim of this introductory part is not to present the overall theoretical framework in detail but to locate this project in the literature as well as stating its relevance and motivation. This dissertation is structured as a three empirical paper compilation; therefore, I will discuss the detailed explanation of the theoretical framework and methods used to test my claims in each paper separately. In this regards, this introduction serves the aim of stressing the common underlying intention of these individual papers, which I will briefly introduce at the end of this chapter.

Relevance of the Project

The literature on foreign policy attitude formation has identified multiple factors, which make people more or less likely to prefer some policies to others. Accordingly, ideology and partisanship (Fordham, 1998; Fordham & Kleinberg, 2012; Herrmann et al., 1999; Holsti, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Martini, 2015), elite and media cues (Gelpi, 2010; Gaines et al. 2007), personality traits and values (Kam & Kinder, 2007; Schoen, 2007; Barker et al., 2008; Kertzer et al., 2014), social network (Radziszewski, 2013), image of the countries (Boulding, 1959; Herrmann, 1985, Jervis, 1970) and strategic factors (Mueller, 1973; Jentleson, 1992; Gelpi et al., 2006) are significant predictors of an individual's attitudes on their state's foreign policies. Along with these factors, some studies also reveal the role of nationalism, national proud and attachment to national identity in identifying individuals' foreign policy attitudes (Prizel, 1998; Telhami & Barnett, 2002; Feshbach, 1987). Feshbach (1987, 1990) and his colleagues (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) show that nationalist and patriotic people who feel national superiority and/or strong emotional attachment indicate high support for nuclear armament policies, and volunteer to fight abroad as well as support aggressive foreign policies in international arena (Van Evera, 1994; Becker 2009).

These studies, however, do not necessarily explain what causes how individuals develop their attitudes towards foreign states regarding their foreign policies. Moreover, there are not many studies, other than the literature on anti-Americanism, that offer an explanation to the question of how individuals form their attitudes towards foreign countries' policies from a comparative perspective. Previous studies on anti-Americanism offer multiple explanations for the negative opinions and attitudes of foreign publics toward the U.S., though their findings might not apply to other countries because of the peculiarities of the U.S. in world politics. Still, we can utilize these explanations to understand how people develop their attitudes towards foreign countries, and what factors are influential in attitude formation process, with some reservations that I will discuss below.

Previous studies show that negative attitudes of foreign publics toward the U.S. are not single-sourced, i.e., they do not result solely from American values and ideas but consist of many layers including and non-U.S. based sources. Beginning with the first mechanism, qualitative case studies build on historical and cultural accounts at the regional level to identify the causes of anti-Americanism, i.e. American values such as support for democracy and liberalism, and religion (Abdallah 2003; Baxter & Akbarzadeh 2008; Krastev 2004; Makdisi 2002; Ross & Ross 2004, Ciftci & Tezcur 2014). However, the findings are not always consistent to support value-based explanations of anti-Americanism. For instance, Chiozza (2010) shows that majority of the people in the East- ern Europe, South Asia, East Asia, and industrial democracies have positive attitudes towards U.S. democracy, popular culture, science, and business. Even in the Middle East, where we observe high anti-American attitudes, almost majority of people express positive feelings towards many U.S. values, such as the way of doing business and popular culture (Chiozza 2010). Support for democracy is also very high in the region as shown by the multiple surveys. [3]

Moreover, such idiosyncratic reasons explaining the sources of anti-Americanism prevent us from providing a generalizable theoretical framework. Even if the findings of these studies may correctly explain where anti-Americanism stems from, we cannot extend the contribution to other countries. For example, what would be the implication of Japanese, Russian, or Turkish values on the attitudes about foreign countries? Without a generalizable theoretical framework, we cannot answer this question thoroughly, and all our findings would be limited to single country in a given year.

The second mechanism that explains attitude formation abroad is what the U.S. does; hence, we should account for the impact of U.S. foreign policies on the public of the target countries. Alleged U.S. hypocrisy, which stems from the perception of inconsistencies in terms of what the U.S. is, how the U.S. represents itself and what the U.S. does, is an important source of anti-Americanism (Katzenstein & Keohane 2007; Lynch 2007; Makdisi 2002; Sengupta & Masood

[3]Please see Pew Global Attitudes Project and Arab Barometer

2005). For example, U.S. support of authoritarian regimes reinforces anti-Americanism by linking the U.S. policy stance with the rulers of repressive regimes (Abdallah 2003; Lynch 2007). On this point, Rubin (2002) claims that the U.S. is blamed and used as an excuse for political and social oppression. On the one hand, these policies impede people's trust in U.S.-led actions in the region. On the other hand, these same policies trigger the "friend of my enemy is my enemy" rationale—especially among citizens of Arab countries—thus intensifying the animosity toward the U.S. Hence, people may "transfer their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in their countries onto the U.S." (Chiozza 2010: 121).

Since what the U.S. does also shapes what the U.S. is in the long term (i.e., U.S. policies of allying with authoritarian countries in the Middle East and widespread belief about U.S. hypocrisy), the emerging literature on soft power argues for investment in policies that could win hearts and minds of foreign publics (Nye, 2008). Accordingly, earlier policies suffer from neglecting the importance of public opinion abroad, if not from being designed poorly in the first place to pursue national interests. The very idea of improving these policies and adopting a soft power strategy that accounts for the power of individuals in politics constitutes the heart of public diplomacy efforts.

Soft power arguments attract a broad attention in policy circles recently, and many countries from the U.S. to China and Turkey have adopted such strategies building appropriate policies. How- ever, quantitative research, albeit limited in number, could not provide substantial findings confirming the effectiveness of public diplomacy tools. On the one hand, Atkinson (2010) finds that U.S.-hosted educational exchange programs can serve U.S. democratization interests by ensuring citizens of nondemocratic states to have a firsthand experience of democracy. On the other hand, however, pro-active policies of the U.S. to increase its soft power and win hearts and minds abroad through public diplomacy does not seem to be working as intended. In their work, Corstange and Marinov (2012) reveal that active U.S. endorsement for democratization through intervening in electoral process polarizes the domestic politics of the target country in terms of the attitudes towards the U.S. Bush and Jamal (2014) show that American endorsement for women in politics is

not welcome in Jordan, a U.S. ally in the region. Even worse, such endorsements depress support for the female candidates among Jordanians. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012) find that high-level visits as a tool of public diplomacy do not necessarily create large and positive effects on the public of the target country; they even exhibited a backlash effect eventually. Again Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi (2005) argue that the influence model of foreign policy that aims for transnational influence on foreign public opinion presents insignificant or weak effects in shaping public attitudes abroad.

Why, then, are these soft power strategies, which are specifically designed to win hearts and minds abroad, not working properly, and even generating a backlash effect under some circumstances? I suggest that focusing merely on states' policies to influence public opinion abroad would neglect the context in which people live. Whereas, the context people live in could directly affect their attitude formation, as perception is subjective, and it could shape these subjective evaluations. Moreover, lack of any evidence regarding the success of what other countries do also prevent us from coming to a conclusion whether it is U.S. or any soft power strategy that fails.

A third mechanism to explain anti-Americanism is to probe non-U.S. factors. Previous works show that anti-Americanism is an elite-driven phenomenon resulting from conflicting policy goals between the U.S. and other countries' elites. This conflict and domestic interests of the elites lead them to manipulate U.S. image and identity to strengthen their position (Blaydes & Linzer 2012; Rubinstein & Smith 1988). For instance, being anti-American could be reasonable for a nationalist, because of the American hegemony and supremacy globally. For a religious Muslim, anti-American rhetoric could also be effective, first, due to religious purposes (e.g., Dar al-Harb), and secondly, due to recent American policies in the Middle East. For a leftist, the anti-American rhetoric could still be valid for the values the U.S. represents, and historical rationales may even go back to Cold War legacies. Anti-Americanism, thus, is a reaction to the political actions on salient domestic issues, and anti-American rhetoric can be instrumental to the success of elite in the context of domestic politics (Blaydes & Linzer 2012). The roots of anti-Americanism are political rather

than cultural or social (Furia & Lucas 2008). The hegemonic role of the U.S. reinforces elite-driven, instrumental anti-Americanism, as the U.S. frequently interacts with the domestic politics of other countries (Bacevich 2009; Ferguson 2003; Free 1976; Lynch 2007).

While this explanation of attitude formation, in general, takes domestic politics into account, it does only in a hierarchical way ignoring the active involvement of individuals in the process. Accordingly, it is solely the elites who decide to manipulate the public or not. However, the same domestic politics and very similar dynamics (e.g. competition, rivalry, etc.) could also lead people to develop attitudes, as well, in the absence of elite-manipulation. In other words, while elite-driven anti-Americanism would help me develop the theoretical mechanism, I should still take a step forward to investigate the domestic sources that might trigger the development of both positive and negative attitudes toward abroad at the individual level. And again, as a common problem with other works mentioned above, the theoretical mechanism could not provide a generalizable framework, because non-U.S. factors still rely on the global power and role of the U.S., i.e., elites manipulating public opinion based on the visibility and strength of U.S. and the values she represents.

Anti-Americanism could be a sub-section of an extensive literature that investigates the consequences of states' foreign policies regarding the formation of attitudes and structure of opinions and beliefs; however, probing anti-Americanism solely puts some reservations on the theoretical and practical contributions. First of all, the U.S. is a world hegemon, a great power that almost everyone recognizes its global status as a friend or an enemy. This implies that no matter what the U.S. is or does, people acquire biased opinions about it. As anti-Americanism literature suggest, manipulating opinions about the U.S. is a valid strategy for almost all ideologies in political spectrum to strengthen their position in domestic politics. Therefore, we cannot truly assess the intertwined attitude formation process merely looking at the opinions about the U.S. Hence, to come to a conclusion about the effects of domestic politics on attitude formation of individuals, we must find similar patterns applicable to other countries along with the U.S.

Second, as a common problem, looking at only one country, and investigating how that country's policies influence foreign public opinion would impede the external validity of the study. I do not contend that such a study would be unsatisfactory; instead, I argue that contribution and implications of a study that only focuses on the policies of a single country would be very limited. Given the U.S. hegemonic role discussed above, solely exploring the effect of U.S. policies would be even problematic in generalizing the argument to other most-similar cases. Therefore, in this dissertation, I benefit from the anti-Americanism literature; nevertheless, surveying other literatures explaining individual level dynamics of attitude formation (e.g. social psychology, political psychology) helps me develop a theory about individual's perception and interpretation of foreign policies of other countries.

The very goal of this dissertation is to investigate how domestic politics moderates individuals' perceptions and reactions towards foreign states. This is because the perception and interpretation of a policy is subjective, and open to manipulation and distortion in politics. This holds true when it comes to foreign policies as well due to serious information problems (e.g., hidden information, private information) and cognitive elements (e.g., the requirement of expertise and knowledge about the issues at stake for proper information processing). Thus, failure to account for the domestic dynamics in the target state does not only result in misinterpreting the impact of foreign policies but also leads us to poor evaluations about the performances of specific foreign policy choices.

To this end, I will first relax the unitary actor assumption about the states, hence differentiate between elites – those who actively engage in the decision-making process– and others –those who are exposed to the all possible consequences of the specific policies offered by the sender state. Second, I will also relax the homogeneity assumption of the ordinary citizens arguing for the heterogeneous interests and preferences of various groups within the borders of the target country. Given these assumptions, there will be multiple actors across different levels in my model of "influencing public opinion." Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the different attitudinal

effects of these policies on people, instead of concluding that an entire population shares same attitudes. In return, some foreign policies choices may intervene in the domestic politics of the target state. Therefore, I will discover how individuals/groups with different objectives perceive foreign states' policies that 1) target their states 2) target third parties 3) target specific groups within their state. In so doing, I aim to reveal the intended and unintended ramifications of foreign policy choices in three individual articles, which respectively focus on the domestic politics' conditioning effect through examining 1) government – citizen relations 2) transnational identity ties, and 3) inter-group relations within the state. Overall, this approach aims to offer a complete analysis of the impacts of foreign policy choices at different levels and contexts, as depicted in Figure 1.1.

The Three Essays

As mentioned above, this dissertation is structured in three-article format, each paper revolving around a common underlying theme, which investigates the impact of foreign policy choices on public opinion abroad. In this section, I present these papers by summarizing their main objectives and contributions.

The first article of the dissertation, entitled as "Winning hearts & minds (!): The dilemma of foreign aid in anti-Americanism" investigates the impacts of U.S. foreign aid on public opinion abroad in a large-N setting. Foreign aid is a policy tool implemented with the purpose of fostering both hard and soft power abroad. Despite the strategic importance of foreign aid, previous research has not fully probed the effects of U.S. foreign aid on public attitudes toward the U.S. in the recipient countries. In this article, I argue that U.S. foreign aid may, in fact, feed anti-Americanism. That is, foreign aid indirectly creates winners and losers in the recipient countries, such that politically discontented people may blame the U.S. for the survival of the ruling regime. Drawing on Pew Research for Global Attitudes and on USAID Greenbook datasets, I focus on determining both the conditions under which foreign aid exacerbates anti-Americanism and the type of aid most likely to do this. The findings reveal that political losers of the recipient countries are more likely to express

Figure 1.1: Attitude Formation Towards Foreign States



negative attitudes toward the U.S. as the amount of U.S. aid increases, whereas political winners enjoy the results of U.S. aid and view the U.S. positively accordingly. Moreover, the effect of U.S. aid on attitudes toward the U.S. is also conditional on the regime type. While U.S. aid increases the likelihood of anti- American attitudes among the losers in non-democratic countries, it decreases the likelihood of anti-Americanism among the losers in democratic ones. This article has important implications for policy in terms of determining how and to whom to provide aid in the context of the possible ramifications of providing aid at the individual level.

The second article of the dissertation, entitled as "Effects of Transnational Identity Ties and Domestic Conflict on Attitudes towards Foreign Actors: An Experimental Evidence from Turkey" probes the role of domestic cleavages and transnational identity ties in individuals' attitude formation towards foreign states. In many countries, international politics is a natural extension of domestic politics regarding the cross-border ethnic and religious ties. In this paper, I investigate how individuals perceive the policies of foreign states toward other countries, and what specifically conditions their interpretation. I argue that individuals rely on their political identity in perceiving these policies, and cognitively balance their attitudes towards sender state based on the policies they offer to their in or out-group members across the border. Therefore, I contend that ethnic/sectarian group rivalries would also influence non-target state citizens' interpretation of the sender state's policies towards the target state. Conducting a survey experiment in Turkey, I test my claims in the context of Syrian Civil War, where ethnic Turkmens and Kurds, who are either brethren or enemy of Turks and Kurds in Turkey, are parties to the conflict. The findings show that Kurds in Turkey express more pro-American attitudes when informed about U.S. policies favoring YPG (Kurdish rebels) in Syria; whereas Turks express negative attitudes when informed about the very same policy. I also replicate the findings in a complementary experiment, this time focusing on the effect of Russian policies in regard to Turkmens in Syria. By providing a comparative perspective, these findings offer crucial policy implications with regards to soft power building strategies by suggesting that winning hearts and minds abroad may come at the expense of losing others.

The third article of the dissertation, entitled as "The Role of Inter-Group Conflict in Attitude Formation towards Public Diplomacy Efforts" examines the impact of public diplomacy initiatives of foreign states, which are supposed to win hearts and minds of public abroad. States engage in public diplomacy activities to pursue their national interests at the micro-level. Along with others, human rights and democracy promotion efforts constitute one of the foremost tools to reach the hearts and minds, as these initiatives by definition promote individuals' rights and liberties. Nevertheless, non-homogenous group interests may complicate the effect of these efforts and may spoil the desired impact by providing individuals with distinct cues. In this paper, I suggest that inter-group conflict, which generates in-group vs. out-group dichotomy activate reactive devaluation bias, and hence conditions how individuals' perceive and react to the foreign actors and their policies based on the source of the policy and its connections with other domestic actors. By employing observational and experimental data from the original public opinion surveys conducted in Lebanon and Turkey, I find that 1) identities affect individuals' attitudes towards foreign actors and their policies 2) some foreign actors are seen as adversary when they are positively linked to the out-group, and 3) the source of the policy offering determines individuals' attitudes due to reactive devaluation bias, and thus some foreign actors' efforts are devaluated, regardless of the content of the policy offering.

Overall, all three articles aim to investigate individuals' attitude formation processes in regard to foreign states and their policies. In the first paper, I identify the transformation of U.S. foreign aid by institutional structure and individuals' attitude formation as a reaction to this process. In the second paper, I analyze the role of in-group vs. out-group dichotomy and cross-border identity ties in predicting individuals' attitudes towards foreign states. And in the last paper, I explore the effects of reactive devaluation bias, which is triggered by the presence of an inter-group conflict in shaping attitude formation of individuals in regard to the foreign actors' human rights and democracy promotion efforts.

Winning Hearts & Minds (!): The Dilemma of Foreign Aid in Anti-Americanism

"Obama can take his foreign aid, and go to hell" (Mahmoud Badr, an Egyptian protester whose petition campaign helped to bring down Egypt's President)

Introduction

The United States' image among the public abroad declined sharply in the last decade. Increasing anti-Americanism and negative views on U.S. values impair the global image of the US, which could lead, in turn, significant problems for the national security (Holsti, 2009; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). On the one hand, intense and widespread anti-Americanism endangers U.S. national interests by forcing democratic governments to reconsider their relations with the U.S. and/or by encouraging terrorist activities against the U.S. and U.S. -friendly nations (Berger, 2014; Datta, 2014; Lord, 2006). Further, anti-Americanism also erodes the US's image and U.S. -led values in global terms, which could impede the nation's long-term goals. Put simply, increasing global anti-Americanism has an adverse impact on U.S. hard and soft power.

One of the strategies designed to foster pro-American attitudes abroad is that of providing foreign aid as a tool to endorse and complement public diplomacy (Lancaster, 2000, 2008; Radelet, 2003; White House, 2010). Starting with the Marshall Plan after World War II, foreign aid pro-

grams have been used as an effective tool of U.S. diplomacy, fostering both hard and soft power, to further the goal of sustaining U.S. interests by supporting public diplomacy and shaping public opinion (Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998). In fact, the substantial increase in total aid after 9/11 provides evidence that the U.S. is using exactly this strategy in an effort to renew its image and win the hearts and minds of people in the aid-recipient countries (Fleck & Kilby, 2010).

Figure 2.1: U.S. Foreign Aid



Recent developments in the US–Egypt relationship, however, have shown that foreign aid does not necessarily produce the desired results as a winning hearts and minds policy. Egypt, as a pivotal partner of the U.S. in the Middle East, has always benefited from a large amount of U.S. aid mostly for strategic reasons. Yet, Gallup polls in 2011 show that only 21% of the Egyptians are in favor of U.S. aid, which reveals concerning results about other possible uses of aid (Younis & Younis, 2012). With the outbreak of the mass protests, the slogan "Obama can take his foreign aid and go to hell" was only one of many called out by protesters on the streets of Cairo. Why,

then, on the basis of a large foreign aid package was the U.S. not only unable to win the hearts and minds of Egyptians along with achieving its strategic goals but instead contributed to anti-American attitudes? I answer this question by providing a generalizable theoretical mechanism, and contribute to a newly emerging literature, which probes the effect of foreign aid on public opinion abroad (Milner & Tingley, 2013).

In this chapter, I argue that far from functioning to salvage the image of the US, foreign aid may actually feed anti-Americanism. Relaxing the unitary actor assumption and focusing on predispositions of individuals in domestic politics, I examine how institutional settings and people's political status moderate the effect of aid on their attitudes towards the US. Building on the selectorate theory, I argue that winners of the political system can be economically and politically better off from incoming aid, whereas losers see very little if any positive impact on their lives. Losers who are deprived from the benefits of aid will also develop feelings of anger and frustration as relative deprivation theory suggests (Grofman & Muller, 1973; Horowitz 1985).

However, I contend that this anger will also be directed towards the aid-donor that is blamed to strengthen the position of the winner. As a result, people balance their attitudes; and eventually, hatred and frustration toward the non-democratic regime and its supporters are transferred to the US, with the reasoning of 'the friend of my enemy is my enemy.' Based on an analysis of individual attitudes toward the U.S. in 50 countries drawing on Pew Research Global Attitudes and USAID Greenbook datasets, I find that in non-democratic recipients losers, those who are politically discontented, express a higher level of anti-Americanism, as the aid supports the current regime even enabling it to become more powerful, and that the winners, those who are politically content, enjoy the aid that consolidate their positions.

My contribution in this chapter is four-fold. First, this chapter is one of the few studies in the literature to probe the effect of U.S. policies on the attitudes of individuals in terms of the extent to which they are pro- or anti-American in a quantitative cross-sectional design. I consider a) how domestic political configuration in the recipient countries condition the effect of aid, b)

the conditions under which foreign aid may exacerbate anti-Americanism, and c) the type of aid most likely to do this. Second, I demonstrate that more aid does not necessarily create more pro-American attitudes in the recipient country. On the contrary, this chapter shows that foreign aid may even feed anti-Americanism conditional to domestic politics of the recipient country (e.g. domestic coalitions and preferences). Third, by investigating a possible use of foreign aid as a soft power tool, I also provide an empirical test for one of the soft-power arguments about foreign aid. In so doing, I aim to offer a more comprehensive understanding for the possible impacts on soft power policies abroad. Finally, my contribution extends to the conflict literature, as well, by showing whether such policies could prevent individuals from developing grievances and hostile attitudes, which otherwise generates a recruit pool for terrorist organizations.

In the remainder of the chapter, first, I briefly review the causes of anti-Americanism and the impact of aid programs as a potential antidote to growing anti-Americanism. Second, I explore the mechanism whereby aid distribution feeds anti-Americanism sentiments. To this end, I examine people's attitudes toward their own governments, and I consider the connections people make between the survival of the regime and U.S. aid looking at the case of Egypt. Third, I present the research design, followed by my empirical findings in the result section. Lastly, I offer remarks about the findings, including a discussion of their implications for government policy, and I suggest a roadmap for future research.

Causes of anti-Americanism: The effect of U.S. foreign policy

According to Rubinstein and Smith (1998: 36), "Anti-Americanism can be likened to an onion; it has many layers and these need to be peeled and examined separately." However, there are not many studies offering an explanation to the question of how individuals form their attitudes towards foreign countries' policies from a comparative perspective. Qualitative case studies largely build on historical and cultural causes (i.e. support for democracy and liberalism as well as religious

considerations) to identify causes of anti-Americanism (Abdallah, 2003; Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008; Krastev, 2004; Ross & Ross, 2004). Yet, the findings are not always in support of value-based explanations of anti-Americanism. For instance, Chiozza (2010) shows that majority of the people in the Eastern Europe, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East have positive attitudes towards U.S. democracy, popular culture, science, and business.

Some other studies investigate non-US factors, and show that anti-Americanism is an elite-driven phenomenon resulting from conflicting policy goals between the U.S. and other countries' elites. The domestic interests of the elites are the driving cause to manipulate U.S. image (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012; Rubinstein & Smith, 1988). The roots of anti-Americanism, hence, are political rather than cultural or social (Furia & Lucas, 2008). The hegemonic role of the U.S. also reinforces elite-driven, instrumental anti-Americanism, as the U.S. frequently interacts with the domestic politics of other countries (Bacevich, 2004; Ferguson, 2003). While this explanation of attitude formation in general takes domestic politics into account, it does only in a hierarchical way ignoring the micro-level processes, such as domestic coalitions and preferences.

Lastly, U.S. policies abroad is an important source of hostile attitudes (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Lynch, 2007; Makdisi, 2002; Sengupta & Masood, 2005). For example, U.S. support for authoritarian regimes reinforces anti-Americanism by linking the U.S. policy stance with the rulers of repressive regimes (Abdallah, 2003; Lynch, 2007; Rubin, 2002). On the one hand, alleged U.S. hypocrisy impede people's trust in U.S. -led actions in the region; on the other hand, they trigger the 'friend of my enemy is my enemy' rationale—especially among citizens of Arab countries—blaming the U.S. for political and social oppression. Hence, people "transfer their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in their countries onto the US" (Chiozza, 2010: 121), which intensifies the animosity toward the U.S.

Since what the U.S. does also shapes what the U.S. is in the long term, an emerging literature on soft power argues for investment in policies that could win hearts and minds of foreign publics (Nye, 2008). Soft power arguments attract a broad attention in policy circles recently; however,

quantitative research, albeit limited in number, could not provide solid findings confirming effectiveness of public diplomacy tools. U.S. hosted educational exchange programs can serve U.S. democratization interests (Atkinson, 2010); whereas, pro-active policies of the U.S. to increase its soft power and win hearts and minds abroad though public diplomacy does not seem working as intended. Intervening the electoral process to endorse democratization (Corstange & Marinov, 2012), promoting women's participation into politics (Bush & Jamal, 2014), high-level diplomatic visits (Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2012), economic aid and exposure to U.S. media (Goldsmith et al., 2005) do not necessarily create positive effects among the public of the target country for U.S. interests. Why, then, are these strategies not working properly, and even generating a backlash effect under some circumstances? In the following section, I explore the possible effects of foreign aid on public abroad as a 'hearts and mind' strategy, then probe micro-level attitude formation in return.

Foreign aid: A treatment for anti-Americanism?

Foreign aid programs can ideally serve as a soft-power tool as well by influencing public opinion in the positive direction (Böhnke & Zürcher, 2013; Baker & Cupery, 2013). The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (2010) clearly expresses the need for a new American foreign policy in regard to promoting strategic communication with foreign publics and rendering more economic foreign aid in a variety of forms. Foreign aid is a powerful tool in supporting an effective public diplomacy—a tool that penetrates and shapes public opinion (Meernik et al., 1998; Nye, 2004). Indeed, the increase in total U.S. foreign aid after 9/11 suggests that the U.S. is, indeed, using aid as a way to renew the nation's image (Fleck & Kilby, 2010).

The broad literature on aid shows that this tool is used in ways that are multi-faceted. Lebovic (1988) and Grover (2009) conclude that strategic calculations play an important role in the selection of aid recipients. For example, foreign aid is used as a bribe in an effort to gain the allegiance of non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014). In addition, foreign aid can be used as a 'carrot' especially when given to non-

democratic countries to influence their stance in international issues (Lai & Morey, 2006; Wang, 1999). Thus, foreign aid pushes recipient states to comply with U.S. interests and policies.

No matter for what reason the aid is given, its ability to also serve as an effective U.S. soft power tool is doubtful. Aid may lead to positive institutional changes (Dietrich & Wright, 2015), can reduce poverty and remove constraints on economic growth (Sachs, 2005; Sachs & Ayittey, 2010). However, Easterly & Pfutze (2008) and Chong, Gradstein & Calderon (2009) show that aid provided to authoritarian, corrupt structures is not very effective in reducing poverty and income inequality. Moreover, foreign aid fails to improve indicators of human development (Boone, 1999), has a negative influence on governance (Busse & Gröning, 2009) and that it does little to nothing to promote the democratization of the recipient country (Knack, 2004). Foreign aid may even exacerbate political repression in recipient countries (Ahmed, 2016; Fielding & Shortland, 2012; Wood 2003). Thus, aid does not necessarily serve the people's interest in the recipient countries, as it may fail to generate improvements in social, political, and economic conditions. It can be expected, therefore, that aid may fail to function as a soft power tool in generating negative attitudes toward the U.S. in such contexts.

Shooting yourself in the foot: The boomerang effect of foreign aid

Aid may strengthen suppressive regimes by equipping them with repressive capabilities and private goods, thus facilitating efforts to consolidate their rule (Ahmed, 2016; Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2009; 2011; Dube & Naidu, 2015). This automatically implies the existence of other people who are not the beneficiaries of the aid. Hence, those subjects of these regimes do not uniformly enjoy or suffer from the ramifications of aid. While some people benefit from the policies of the existing government, others suffer under its policies, and aid itself may intervene in domestic politics by creating political and social winners and losers or simply by reinforcing a current situation of this nature in recipient countries.

Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the effects of aid among people instead of

concluding that one attitude is shared by an entire population. Furthermore, it is also necessary to consider the relationship between the provision of aid and the type of regime prevailing in the recipient country. If foreign aid does not have a positive influence across all people, then it may be that such aid offered with the goal of reducing anti-American sentiment may actually be back-firing. That is, U.S. aid may be used by the recipient country's regime to fuel existing domestic dynamics with one result being that the image of the U.S. becomes even more tarnished in that country—among the social and political losers, at least.

Perceiving aid: Winners vs. losers

Providing or even increasing the amount of aid to nations where anti-American sentiment is strong ought to foster pro-Americanism. However, there is no direct connection between U.S. aid and gains accrued to individuals in the recipient countries because aid does not flow directly to individuals. Instead, the government of the recipient country becomes the intermediary agent that decides who receives it. [1] Therefore, in providing aid, the U.S. becomes party to a principal–agent relationship, where the possibility of agency loss is high due to lack of effective monitoring. This problem is exacerbated for the US, as it ranks second in providing aid to corrupt countries. [2] The U.S. could, of course, send aid with conditions attached to it, i.e. cut off aid in case of corruption. However, whatever conditions are set, there is no way to ensure effective monitoring of the distribution of aid. In fact, while USAID's Inspector General admitted that the agency is unable to produce an inventory of organizations to which USAID provides funds (Regnery, 2012), Ambassador Albright (US Senate, 1997: 205) during the fiscal year hearings also confirmed how hard it is to influence how aid is distributed within recipient countries: *[Aid] is designed to help the poorest people . . . and delivers services at the township level. What is very hard, I think, . . . is to make*

[1] Please see Appendix A for a discussion of direct vs. bypass channeling of U.S. aid, and its impact on my argument.

[2] The U.S. ranks 39th out of 40 countries in aid going to corrupt countries by 2004. Table III in Easterly & Pfutze (2008).

sure that programs actually get to the grassroots.

Who does benefit from the aid, then, if allocation of aid is not equal and fair in many circumstances? In non-democratic regimes, aid may become a resource to strengthen and consolidate their repressive capabilities. Put differently, the non-democratic structure of a recipient country can transform foreign aid from a potential public good into a private good, and thus strengthen the hand of authoritarian governments (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 1999; Licht, 2010). The avowed goal of U.S. aid may be to support the economic and humanitarian development of the people in the recipient country. However, strict control over the distribution of aid on the part of non-democratic, repressive regimes is likely to hinder this purpose (Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2015). The potential result: aid siphoned off through corrupt and unequal distribution among the populace (Culbertson, 2016; Decanay, 2005; Koelbl, 2010). It is not surprising, therefore, that Muluzi, Malawi's former president, and Chiluba, Zambia's former president, were each charged with embezzling foreign aid (Moyo, 2009). Aid dollars are used to sustain an authoritarian leader's rule, whether directly or indirectly.

Since repressive and non-democratic governments, neither constrained by public approval nor by any need to appease a large coalition of individuals, it is not implausible to say that aid, as a private good, would only benefit a small proportion of the population, namely the winning coalition. Why, then, those who may not receive private goods still distinguish from each other attitudinally in their response to U.S. aid? In fact, some groups in the society may side along with the existing regimes for their economic, political and social interests regardless of their inability to access the private goods. Based on the premise that political winners are more likely to be content, and losers to be discontent with the status quo (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001), winners enjoy the aid considering it as a tool to reinforce the existing conditions, which makes winners content with in the first place, whereas losers do not. In this sense, I conceptualize the winners of the regimes differently from the literature, which defines them as part of the winning coalition that have direct access to private goods. Political winners in this article denote those who support the status quo;

losers are those who are opposed to it, hence politically discontented.

From the perspective of winners, they can be economically and politically better off from incoming aid. Since the existing status quo already favors them, foreign aid as an extra resource to maintain the status quo providing the regime with additional capabilities would contribute to the social, political and economic position of the winners. Moreover, in presence of ethnic, sectarian and religious lines within the society, winners, as part of the politically advantaged group, would enjoy the aid, as it help reinforcing the political and social status, as well. Governments with enhanced capacities could sustain the status quo more easily by distributing more private goods as well as taking measures against the aggrieved population.

Whereas political losers see very little if any positive impact on their lives (Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Easterly, 2005). This can generate a feeling of unfairness among the losers. Regardless of the absolute benefits that losers may receive, the perception that aid is being unfairly distributed mitigates against aid having a broad positive impact. Perceptions of a widening gap between the winners and the losers may, therefore, cause the losers to develop negative attitudes toward the donor. Indeed, according to relative deprivation theory, groups are frustrated when they are denied benefits granted to others (Grofman & Muller, 1973), which leads to feelings of anger and frustration (Horowitz, 1985; Miller, Bolce & Halligan, 1977). Lastly, the losers also directly suffer from the ramifications of aid. As aid provides winners with increasing power and control over existing institutions and policy area, their well-being and security is likewise supported (Ahmed, 2016; Regan, 1995). The future for losers becomes more and more uncertain.

Here the important question is what lead people to translate their political status to their attitudes related foreign aid, thus the donor of the aid. Social dominance theory suggests that individuals desire group-based dominance and inequality, which makes dominants better off than subordinates, due to individual predisposition in the group hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). As a response to this, counter – social dominance orientation creates awareness about differing interests and motivate subordinated groups such as ethnic, racial, or religious groups, or political and social

minorities to reject the hegemony and to challenge the status quo (Pratto et al., 2014). Hence, while political winners would like to reinforce their position, political losers would challenge it. This domestic conditioning also translates into attitudes towards international actors, as the balance theory suggests. Accordingly, '(an) attitude change can occur in the absence of careful scrutiny of a persuasive message' to maintain the cognitive balance (Visser & Cooper, 2013: 218; Heider, 1958). When subordinated group has prior negative attitudes towards the subordinator, and the donor is perceived having good relations with the subordinator due to the aid provision, then subordinated group restores the balance by adopting negative attitudes towards the donor, too. In fact, Teimourian (2002) implies this effect saying "governments as [the] most corrupt and authoritarian, and because [the] U.S. gives billions of cash every year to some Arab regimes, the public opinion assumes those regimes are [lackies] of the United States." Hence, hatred toward the repressive regime is transferred to the U.S. as a result of the reasoning whereby 'the friend of my enemy is my enemy.'

The case of Egypt: Failure of aid to win hearts and minds

The U.S. –Egypt relations have recently shown the ways in which U.S. policies aimed at winning the hearts and minds of people in the Middle East may be failing to achieve the desired results—and may even be backfiring. As a pivotal partner of the U.S. in the region, Egypt has benefited from a large amount of aid during the Mubarak era. In terms of receiving U.S. aid, Egypt is second only to Israel. To date, Egypt has received 73 billion dollars in U.S. aid. Almost half of this aid has been provided in the last 15 years (1998–2012), a remarkable fact given that other countries saw a marked reduction in U.S. aid after the Cold War (Sharp, 2009). While military aid included contracts for the delivery of all kinds of weaponry systems (i.e. tanks, attack helicopters), economic aid mostly targeted policy reforms and economic development of Egypt. How this aid was spent, though, was unclear (Regnery, 2012). Moreover, the aid given to Egypt carried no conditions—not in reference to human rights and not in reference to political reforms either (Meyer, 2013).

With the outbreak of mass protests against the Mubarak regime, it has become clear that

aid provided to Egypt has endorsed the status of winners and losers. While foreign aid to Egypt supported the old regime in both military and economic terms, those who did not benefit (the losers), Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were subject to increasingly repressive measures due to the increasing power of the regime supported by aid. Among the many examples of anti-American rhetoric called out by activists during the mass protests was this one: "Obama can take his foreign aid, and go to hell" (Saleh, 2013). Many other Egyptians shared this opinion. According to a Gallup poll of Egyptians in December 2011, only 26% of respondents favored U.S. aid to Egypt, whereas the support for aid from international institutions was 50%, and from Arab governments 68%. Hence, aid intended to serve as a tool of public diplomacy designed to boost the standing of the U.S. among Egyptians instead fed anti-American sentiment.

Although the U.S. expects to win the hearts and minds of the people by rendering foreign aid, as well as pursuing other strategic goals, the implications of providing foreign aid are clearly multifaceted. As the ways in which aid is distributed do not necessarily target the needy by any means, understanding the distribution mechanism is crucial to establishing a meaningful understanding of the impact of aid on the attitudes of people in a recipient country. In the case of Egypt, where the interests of the regime differ in fundamental and far-reaching ways from those of the rest of the society, U.S. aid has been transformed into a private good by empowering police force and intelligence, and advancing interests of elites around Mubarak, such that it is threatening the interests and rights of citizens not aligned with the regime. Moreover, such support to the regime and its supporters also generated feelings of unfairness, relative deprivation, and a lack of hope for the future among the losers, as the winners further consolidated their power. These, in return nullifies the positive effect of U.S. foreign aid on the U.S. 's image in the recipient country as shown in Figure 2.2.

Iraq provides another recent example. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. allied itself with the Shias, due to the fear of a Sunni revival. Shiite control over the state mechanism helped them to establish an ethnic-oriented nepotistic regime that ostracized ex-Baathists

Figure 2.2: Theory of the effect of aid as a public diplomacy tool



and Sunni Arabs (Beauchamp, 2014). Although the Shias enjoyed private benefits through aid allocation (e.g. social programs that mostly targeted southern Iraq and strengthened Shia groups), the exclusion of Sunnis from aid led them to develop an anti-American attitude, and pushed them toward anti-government and anti-American strategies such as lending support to the Islamic State. The following hypotheses are derived from the discussion provided thus far, and describe how aid interacts with the regime type in the recipient country and transforms attitudes at the individual level depending on individuals' perception.

Hypothesis 1: The higher the amount of aid the U.S. provides to a non-democratic regime, the more likely it is that losers in the recipient country will express anti-American attitudes.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the amount of aid the U.S. provides to a non-democratic regime, the less likely it is that winners in the recipient country will express anti-American attitudes.

Thus far, I have mostly focused on the conditional effect of political predispositions at the

individual level arguing that the losers develop a negative attitude toward the aid-giving country. However, a key question should be considered next: What distinguishes the losers in non-democratic countries from the losers in democratic countries? In other words, how does regime type as a country level indicator moderates the attitude formation of individuals? The main difference here is the use of aid. While democratic regimes with large winning coalitions use aid to increase quantity and quality of the public goods, non-democratic regimes take it as a private good to content elites (Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2009). Thus, from an institutional perspective, the latter transforms the very purpose of aid in order to reinforce existing political and social status. Nevertheless, today's losers can become tomorrow's winners in democratic regimes (Przeworski, 1991); whereas political losers often lack hope in non-democratic regimes. Although the literature on winners and losers establishes that losers report less satisfaction with democracy compared to winners (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001), they still have the means to change the game in the next election. Thus, in democratic regimes, losers would be less aggrieved even if they benefit disproportionately from aid.

Accordingly, I expect the attitudes of winners and losers in democratic regimes towards the aid-giving country to differ from the attitudes of those in non-democratic regimes. Since democratic regimes are the ones with larger winning coalitions, it becomes inefficient for them to distribute the benefits of aid as a private good. Instead, they use foreign aid for public good purposes; hence the benefits of aid are non-rival and non-excludable by definition. This implies that both losers and winners of the regime can benefit from the goods of foreign aid; and therefore, the losers neither develop anger or frustration, nor perceive a disadvantaged position for themselves based on the use of aid. In return, political losers will have no reason to blame the aid-giving country for the survival of the regime. So, the third hypothesis reiterates this flow of argumentation as the following:

Hypothesis 3: The more democratic the aid recipient country is, the less likely neither losers nor winners express more anti-American attitudes with the increasing amount of aid

Research design

In order to test my hypotheses, I employ two datasets. First, data from the Pew Research for Global Attitudes (2007-2012) provided individual-level indicators of anti-Americanism. I restricted the analysis to the six waves of surveys, which were conducted between 2007 and 2012. This restriction in the data scope is a result arising from the lack of survey data across time and space. The unit of analysis is survey respondents of 50 countries situated in regions worldwide including Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South and East Asia, and Europe. The detailed list of survey countries, including the number of survey respondents and the years of surveys, were gathered in Appendix A. Second, I draw on USAID datasets (2014) for data pertaining to U.S. foreign aid. USAID provides military assistance and economic-humanitarian assistance separately.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is anti-American attitude at the individual level. Survey respondents from all the countries are questioned about their attitudes toward the U.S. The responses are given on a four-point Likert scale ranging from very unfavorable to very favorable. For further robustness checks, I also transformed the variable into a binary one: 1 indicated an unfavorable opinion of the US, whereas 0 to indicate otherwise. In so doing, I used alternative model specifications and avoided possible biases that might stem from different weights assigned to favorability or unfavorability in different years and countries. Given the cross-sectional longitudinal nature of the data, the difference between 'very unfavorable' and 'unfavorable' or 'very favorable' and 'favorable' might not be equal across units.

Independent variables

Theoretically, foreign aid may feed anti-American rhetoric because it helps regimes consolidate their support and augment their repressive capabilities. However, aid is not a unified phe-

nomenon, and different types of aid may serve different purposes (Fielding & Shortland, 2012; Wood, 2003). Military aid is a direct way to support a regime by enriching the security apparatus through training and equipment, whereas economic aid is aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the citizens of the recipient country by improving their economic state of affairs (Regan, 1995). For instance, by providing high-tech military equipment to the Iraqi Police Force, the Royal Saudi Land Force, and the Royal Bahraini Army, U.S. military aid directly improved the capacity of the state security apparatus. However, the impact of economic aid is less direct, as recipient countries may not have full control over its distribution. For instance, USAID delivers U.S. agricultural products to the recipient country as part of its food program, bypassing the government in the distribution of aid. Similarly, NGOs or IGOs can also play an intermediary role in providing economic aid, which limits the involvement of the recipient government in the distribution process. Therefore, I look at the effect of military and economic aid separately.

For both variables, I calculated per capita military and economic-humanitarian aid, and lagged the variables by one year to alleviate possible endogeneity problems. As the interactive terms are key explanatory variables, I designed a three-way interaction of both military and economic-humanitarian aid per capita with the dummy variables of dissatisfaction (which measures loser–winner status) and non-democracy (regime type), respectively. [3]

To identify the first moderator in the model, i.e., winners vs. losers, I utilize people's expressed satisfaction and dissatisfaction with 'how things are going in the country' question. Survey respondents who express dissatisfaction with the conditions in the country, and thus with the government responsible for addressing matters with which people are dissatisfied, are more likely to be losers than winners; therefore, I coded dissatisfaction as 1, otherwise 0. Another constitutive term in the three-way interaction is regime type. Countries with a polity IV score of lower than 5 were coded as 1, indicating the status of a non-democracy, whereas the rest were coded as 0 to indicate

[3] In order to show how it might be misleading for researchers and policy makers to look at the effect of aid directly disregarding the context into which aid is distributed, I also run unconditional models in Appendix A showing that the more aid given, the less anti-American attitudes people express.

the status of democracy.

Control variables

In the models, I included commonly used variables that may influence the level of anti-American attitudes, both at the country and the individual level. At the individual level, I controlled for gender (Male = 1), age (continuous), religiosity (Religious = 1), employment (Employed = 1), education (High School Graduate = 1), and economic conditions (Content = 1) (see Appendix A for cross-level standardization of variables).

At the country level, I controlled for gross domestic product per capita in a given year, physical integrity score (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010), Polity IV score (2014), and for Middle Eastern countries. I discarded Israel from the analysis because with more that $300 per person yearly aid amount, Israel is an outlier, which could directly bias the results. Nevertheless, I also added Israel into the analysis in the models provided in Appendix A. Lastly, I controlled for the Bush era on the basis that according to some studies Obama's election to the presidency was welcomed worldwide (Chiozza, 2009; Datta, 2014; Dragojlovic, 2011). The dummy variable for the Bush era is coded 1 for the years 2007 and 2008, and 0 otherwise. Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A.

Model Specifications

I used ordered logistic estimator in order to test my hypotheses. However, this method has the potential to bias the results given that I combined two datasets at different levels. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of observations at the country level with no variation across survey respondents within each country-year. One way to overcome this problem is to offer an alternative model specification, e.g. multi-level logistic regression, in order to determine how macro-level indicators (variations across countries) affect micro-level attitudes (anti-Americanism among survey respondents). Although I proceeded with the ordered logistic regression as the main estimator with robust standard errors and year-fixed effects to account for the macro-level dynamics, I also run a

random effects model as a robustness check (see Appendix A).

Results

The findings show that both military and economic aid is statistically significant. Although some constitutive terms are not statistically significant, a careful examination of the t-scores of the interactive terms (Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006), which are key explanatory variables, reveals significant results as reported in Table 2.1. While the ordered logistic regression results provide support for the hypotheses, further robustness checks show that the parallel regression line assumption is violated by some of the variables in the models. Additionally, given the cross-sectional longitudinal nature of the data, using a Likert-scale dependent variable may have given rise to biases, as the meaning and weight of respective levels of favorability toward the U.S. may differ across units and years. Therefore, I transformed the four-scale anti-Americanism variable into a binary choice and then replicated all the models. Therefore, the substantive results presented in Figures 2.3 - 2.6 are based on logistic estimations.

In Figure 2.3, I plot the predicted probabilities of anti-Americanism conditional on political status (winner or loser) and regime type across different amounts of military aid. Setting all other variables to their mean and mode, political losers, i.e., those who are dissatisfied with the regime, in non-democratic countries express anti-American attitudes more with the increase of military aid. Comparing two 'losers', one is in a non-democratic regime receiving no military aid at all, and the other receiving high amount of aid (+2SDs), probability of expressing anti-American attitudes increases from 21% to 35%. This finding confirms the first hypothesis. Figure 2.4 also reports the statistically significant effect of military aid conditional to dissatisfaction in a non-democracy on anti-American attitudes. Looking at the attitudes of the winners, though, I cannot find support for the second hypothesis, as the satisfied people in non-democratic setting do not reveal any statistically significant attitudinal change. One possible explanation for this finding might be the very characteristics of the military aid. Accordingly, military aid is given for a specific type of use,

Table 2.1: Effect of Foreign Aid On Anti-American Attitudes

DV: Anti-Americanism=1	(1) Ologit	(2) Ologit	(3) Ologit	(4) Ologit	(5) Logit	(6) Logit	(7) Logit	(8) Logit
Military Aid pc	0.070**	-0.091**			0.060**	-0.075**		
	(0.009)	(0.008)			(0.007)	(0.007)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	-0.042**	0.083**			-0.026**	0.077**		
	(0.009)	(0.008)			(0.007)	(0.007)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.031**	0.018*			0.016*	0.007		
	(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.008)	(0.008)		
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.614**	-0.471**	-0.556**	-0.556**	-0.631**	-0.445**	-0.576**	-0.554**
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.015	-0.005			0.002	0.005		
	(0.010)	(0.009)			(0.008)	(0.008)		
Economic Aid pc			0.008**	-0.039**			0.010**	-0.028**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.			0.005**	0.033**			0.005**	0.026**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXDissatis			0.002**	-0.011**			0.001	-0.014**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.			0.003**	0.018**			0.004**	0.020**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Non-Democratic	0.456**	0.150**	0.559**	-0.005	0.606**	0.362**	0.760**	0.310**
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Dissatisfied	0.400**	0.184**	0.447**	0.274**	0.446**	0.244**	0.490**	0.334**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Physical Integrity		-0.060**		-0.008*		-0.061**		-0.008*
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Middle East		2.151**		2.450**		1.845**		2.112**
		(0.022)		(0.020)		(0.022)		(0.021)
GDP pc		0.021**		0.003**		0.018**		-0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Male		0.069**		0.025*		0.117**		0.080**
		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Age		0.008**		0.007**		0.007**		0.007**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		0.064**		0.090**		0.053**		0.075**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Employed		-0.034*		0.048**		-0.056**		0.007
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)
High School Grad.		-0.226**		-0.167**		-0.263**		-0.196**
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.018)		(0.016)
Economic Condition		0.141**		0.163**		0.153**		0.173**
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)
Bush Admin.		0.337**		0.263**		0.372**		0.287**
		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.025)		(0.025)
Constant					-0.396**	-1.601**	-0.610**	-1.738**
					(0.018)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.038)
Observations	121938	101787	140446	113476	121938	101787	140446	113476
Pseudo R^2	0.026	0.086	0.018	0.094	0.047	0.127	0.037	0.133
Log likelihood	-158300	-124900	-182700	-137100	-80432	-61489	-93491	-67756
χ^2	7443	19543	6974	22271	5520	14581	6138	16224

Robust standard errors in parentheses, cut points not reported + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

and only serves the interest of a very small winning coalition, namely military officers. By either promoting the social status of military personnel, or providing them with corruptible resources, military aid could benefit officers; however, the rest of the winning coalition or the people who perceive themselves as winners could hardly benefit from the aid directly or indirectly. Lastly, we see that people in democratic regimes, regardless of political status, show less anti-American attitudes with the increasing amount of aid, as aid in these regimes provides them with a public good, increasing security.

Looking at the effect of economic aid in Figure 2.5, the results confirm the first hypothesis again. Political losers are more likely to express anti-American attitudes in non-democratic regimes as the amount of economic aid increases. Probability of showing anti-American attitudes increases from 20% to 26% comparing two dissatisfied people, the former in a non-democratic regimes receiving no economic aid, and the other with high economic aid (+2SDs). Figure 2.6 also shows the significant impact of economic aid conditional to dissatisfaction in a non-democracy. So, I can confidently confirm the first hypothesis. Looking at the political winners, this time, I also confirm the second hypothesis. Accordingly, the higher the amount of economic aid, the lower the probability of expressing anti-American attitudes. This findings show that political winners in non-democracies actually enjoy the material (as argued by the selectorate theory) and/or psychological benefits (as argued by social dominance theory) of economic aid. Compared to military aid, economic aid could appeal more people in a winning coalition, or among those who perceives themselves as winners, because it is not as technical as the military aid is, and it is easier to transform the economic aid to a private good for more people. Lastly, confirming my expectations, people in democracies enjoy the aid and express positive attitudes towards the donor, as aid in these institutional setting contribute to the public goods in different forms.

Lastly, the findings also confirm Hypothesis 3. Regardless of their political status, people in democratic regimes enjoy U.S. aid, and express less negative attitudes toward the U.S. with the increasing amount of aid. In both types of aid, while dissatisfied citizens express more anti-

Figure 2.3: Effect of military aid on Anti-Americanism



*Based on Model 6 in Table 1, 95% CI

Figure 2.4: Marginal effect of military aid



*Based on Model 6 in Table 1, 95% CI

Figure 2.5: Effect of economic aid on Anti-Americanism



*Based on Model 8 in Table 1, 95% CI

Figure 2.6: Marginal effect of economic aid



*Based on Model 8 in Table 1, 95% CI

American attitudes compared to satisfied citizens, the substantive effects in Figures 2.3 and 2.5 show that the aid helps U.S. alleviate anti-Americanism in democratic contexts. In democratic regimes, probability of showing anti-American attitudes decreases from 51% to 4% comparing two dissatisfied people, the former in a country receiving no economic aid, and the other with high economic aid (+2SDs). It decreases from 18% to 2% when we compare two satisfied. When we look at the military aid, the results hold significantly, probability of showing anti-American attitudes decreases from 25% to 3% comparing two dissatisfied people, from 18% to 2% when we compare two satisfied, the former in a country receiving no military aid, and the latter with high military aid (+2SDs). So, the results hold across different types of aid, as well. This is because democratic regimes rely on large winning coalition, aid is used as a public good to satisfy large group of supporters. The larger aid in this context means the larger amount of resources which public could benefit.

Robustness checks and discussion

In addition to using alternative estimators, I also used different variables and samples to determine whether the findings are sensitive to variable and sample selection as some countries are less likely to receive foreign aid (e.g., advanced democracies) and because citizens of some countries are less likely to have anti-American attitudes (e.g. U.S. allies). I first limited the sample to Middle Eastern countries because these are the countries receiving the most aid and expressing the most anti-Americanism. The effect largely holds for Hypothesis 1 and 3, but they do not hold for Hypothesis 2. Then, I ran the analyses excluding the U.S. allies, and OECD countries, respectively. The results were robust in regard to sample changes (see Appendix A).

I tested the sensitivity of my results depending on variable selections, as well. I employed question asking about 'Americans' instead of the 'US', to avoid any bias resulting from the survey respondents identifying the U.S. and Americans interchangeably. Then, I also rerun the models

replacing the regime type variable with W/S scores [4] to test my expectations using a more direct measure. The results are similar, but the direction of coefficients are reversed, as the higher scores indicating a more democratic system in W/S, whereas it is coded 1 for non-democratic regimes in the main analysis (see Table II in Appendix A). I also switched my moderating variable 'non-democracy' considering that some democracies can be repressive as well. Therefore, I created a binary variable 'repressive regime' using CIRI data, coded 1 if we see frequent violations of physical integrity rights (0 & 1); otherwise 0 (see Appendix A). The results still largely hold, but show some sensitivity to Hypothesis 2 when we use CIRI data.

Along with looking at yearly aid data, I also looked at the effect of cumulative amount of aid, and yearly change in it. The former is important because people may maintain their already acquired attitudes. I calculated the cumulative aid a country received over the 15-year period, and rescaled the aid by 100 million USD. The effect is still statistically significant; the results are also robust in regard to long-term aid patterns. In terms of the latter, the change may signal citizens' about changing donor policies, which influence their attitudes. I used the percentage change in aid between time t-2 and t-1 to predict the effect of aid on anti-Americanism at time t. There was no significant effect of military aid; yet, the effect is significant with regard to economic aid (see Appendix A).

Endogeneity might be an important theoretical problem more than it is for empirics. Perhaps it is not the high amount of foreign aid that feeds anti-Americanism, but high anti-Americanism that leads the U.S. to give more foreign aid to win hearts and minds in the recipient countries. Along with using lagged variables in the main models, I also predicted the effect of anti-Americanism level in a country on U.S. foreign aid. I found no statistically significant relationship between the level of anti-Americanism and the U.S. decision to provide aid (see Appendix A). Nevertheless, this leaves us with a puzzling finding, which deserves further attention for future research about the

[4] W/S scores were not available for many countries from 2007 to 2012. Therefore, I have extended the data for 50 countries in missing years. Please see supplementary files for the replication.

strategic use of aid.

Lastly, U.S. aid could help repressive regimes consolidate their power, but are citizens of the recipient countries aware of the existence and type of aid or the connections between the survival of their country's regime and U.S. policy? First, visibility is a function of the amount and type of aid provided. Second, increasing globalization and the widespread broadcast of transnational TV channels may heighten people's awareness of international politics in the Middle East (Nisbet & Myers, 2011). This potentially implies people's awareness of international politics, and the tie between their governments and others. Hence, citizens of these countries are likely to be informed about U.S. aid and to associate it with the survival of the repressive regime in their country.

Conclusion

In this article, I aim to investigate the individual-level effects of U.S. foreign aid in the recipient countries. Policy-makers may see foreign aid as a foreign policy tool to renew U.S. image abroad as a response to increasing anti-Americanism. However, I contend that individual attitudes toward U.S. aid are conditional on the political predisposition of citizens and on the regime type of the recipient country. I argue that those who are oppressed under the existing aid-recipient regime may blame the U.S. for the survival of the regime. Under such circumstances, losers may discern U.S. aid as a life belt for the regime that suppresses them, whereas political winners enjoy the aid for reinforcing their dominant social and political status. In democratic regimes, however, people enjoy the aid regardless of their political status as it is largely used as a public good.

The empirical findings support these theoretical expectations. In non-democratic countries, losers are more likely to express a negative attitude toward the U.S, whereas winners enjoy the benefits of U.S. aid and show a more positive attitude toward the U.S accordingly. An increase in U.S. aid increases the likelihood of an anti-American attitude among the losers of non-democratic countries, but such an increase decreases anti-Americanism among the losers of democratic countries. This leads us to important policy implications pertaining to how and to whom aid should be

given.

By testing the influence of U.S. aid on anti-American attitudes in aid-recipient countries, this article contributes to the empirical evaluation of U.S. policies on global public attitudes. No doubt various factors affect the image of the U.S. abroad, which should be considered in further research. Nevertheless, as one of the few efforts to empirically test the influence of U.S. policies on foreign public attitudes, this article has the potential to open the door to future quantitative research on public diplomacy and soft-power theories.

Effects of Transnational Identity Ties and Domestic Conflict on Attitudes towards Foreign Actors: An Experimental Evidence from Turkey

Introduction

Lack of reliable support to the United States from their allies for Iraq War in 2003 is only one of the examples that reveal the importance of foreign public opinion. Mass protests with the participation of millions of people in France and Germany against the U.S. decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein via military operation played a key role in these countries' [1] negative stance in the U.N. Security Council. Favorable attitudes towards the U.S. have not only dropped drastically in both countries, but people all over the world have embraced a relatively negative stance towards the U.S. within only one year. In so much that, in the United Kingdom, a strategic ally of the U.S., mass protests against the war eventually led to the resignation of British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2007 because of his troop contribution to the war.

This general decline in the popularity was not only limited to European countries, where people display high support to the international organizations and have stood against the Iraq War.

[1] Pew Global Attitudes Project shows that pro-American attitudes in France dropped to 42% in 2003 from 62% in 2002. It dropped to 45% in 2003 from 60% in 2002 in Germany.

In longtime allies of the U.S. and recipients of large amounts of U.S. aid, the positive attitudes of public towards the U.S. have dropped significantly. Existing research on public opinion in the Middle East shows that the U.S. popularity was even in sharper decline in Turkey and Jordan, but surprisingly, Iranians and some Arabs were neutral towards the U.S. invasion, if not pleased. [2] Moreover, in most of these countries, it has become common to see people burning American flags on the one side; and enjoying American culture, business, and policies on the other. For example, some see the U.S. as the liberator and the pioneer of the Arab spring; others blame the U.S. for her support to the authoritarian regimes at first. Hence, along with diverging attitudes across countries in the region, previous studies on anti-Americanism also find within country variation in people's attitudes towards the U.S (see Bush & Jamal, 2014; Corstange & Marinov, 2012, Tokdemir, nd.).

To explain this controversial phenomenon, on the one hand, some studies concentrate on the role of values and ideology, i.e., religion, democracy, human rights, capitalism, to explain why public opinion abroad develop negative attitudes towards some states (Abdallah, 2003; Krastev, 2004; Ross & Ross, 2004). On the other hand, scholars also probe foreign policy choices to blame them for negative attitudes; and many suggest designing "appropriate" policies as a remedy for deteriorated public opinion abroad (Nye, 2004). Nevertheless, these efforts fall short because they fail to answer why public opinion towards the U.S diverges across and within the Middle Eastern countries whose citizens share similar values, or they neglect the externalities of specific policy choices within or outside the national borders of the target country for which policy is tailored. In this sense, my research question in this paper concerns how individuals in non-target countries respond to foreign policy choices for target countries, especially given that they may share common ethnic, religious and sectarian ties with their neighbors?

The perception about and interpretation of policy choices at the individual level is subjective; it is even more so when it comes to foreign policy due to serious information problems (e.g., hidden information, private information) and cognitive issues (e.g., a requirement of expertise and

[2]Ibid. and please see: `https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0211_ir1.htm`

knowledge about the issues at stake). Therefore, an evaluation of individuals' social identities, as well as their predispositions in domestic politics, is necessary to predict their attitudes towards the foreign states. By building on the premises of social identity theory and inter-group conflict, I suggest that political identities of individuals are determinant on how they perceive and interpret policies of sender state to target state. Social identities that gain political relevance create ethnic cleavages and lead to the formation of in-group vs. out-group dichotomy. Since political identities are not constrained by national borders, I argue that such dichotomy can also extend across borders, where individuals share common identities. As a result, by building on the social balance theory and Heider's (1958) P-O-X model, I contend that individuals are motivated to correct their attitudes towards the sender state accordingly.

To test this indirect process of attitude formation towards foreign states, I explore the attitudes of Turkish and Kurdish citizens of Turkey towards U.S. and Russian policy choices in regards to the ethnic groups fighting Syrian Civil War (SCW). Conducting a survey experiment with 1,136 Turks and Kurds in three major cities in Turkey, I investigate how transnational ethnic ties condition people's attitudes in their assessment of the U.S. and Russia as a result of its policies in SCW. Looking at SCW allows me to observe the effects of transnational ties, as millions of Kurds lives in, and Kurdish rebels actively fight in both countries. Moreover, the social and political conflict in Turkey based on ethnic (Turks vs. Kurds) identity provide an appropriate setting to manipulate the target and the goal of these policies to analyze differing attitudinal responses of individuals. In so doing, I demonstrate how inter-group conflict conditions individual attitudes towards foreign states by triggering "friend of my friend is my friend" and "friend of my enemy is my enemy" rationales.

The contribution of this article is threefold. First, by probing the impact of transnational ties, and domestic predispositions among identity-based groups, this research embraces a holistic approach to assessing individuals' attitude formation towards the foreign states. Accordingly, contrary to the conventional approach, which limits the examination of specific policy choices solely within the target country, I investigate the externalities of foreign policy choices on the publics of

non-target countries. Second, it offers a comprehensive understanding of the socio-psychological sources and outcomes of potential international conflicts. Given that international politics and foreign policy are intertwined with domestic politics in many countries, this research also contributes to the conflict literature through showing what kind of foreign policies could prevent individuals from developing grievances and hostile attitudes at home, which generates a recruitment pool for non-state actors resorting to violence. Third, this research provides scholars and policy makers with valuable insights into the possible impacts of foreign policy choices. It contributes to the existing literature on soft power and public diplomacy by demonstrating that domestic politics in other countries moderates possible effects of policy choices, some may ideally serve for soft power building strategy, on the citizens of third party countries. And fourth, by embracing a comparative approach and looking at the impacts of both U.S. and Russian foreign policies on people, the findings are generalizable to other countries. Hence, this research does not only contribute to the anti-Americanism literature but also promises to extend its impact to the literature on comparative foreign policy, so does its implications.

In the remainder of the article, I will first review the literature on people's attitudinal and behavioral responses to the foreign actors and their policies, and the role of identity in shaping these attitudes. Second, I will develop a theoretical framework, which builds upon social identity theory to explain the creation of "us vs. them" process in individuals' attitude formation. Then, I will demonstrate how "others' matter" becomes a part of the domestic issue through transnational identity ties, and then, I will theorize how people react to return. Third, I will explain the experimental design built in the survey conducted in Turkey. Lastly, I will present the results and conclude with a short discussion of what the findings imply.

Foreign Policy Attitudes

Hostile attitudes among foreign publics may impede the achievement of strategic objectives of a state as well as threaten its national security (Datta, 2014; Nye, 2004). Considering the necessity of

establishing a support base in their decisions, foreign leaders must take public opinion into account in pursuing their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita (hereafter BDM) et al., 1999; Weeks, 2008). Additionally, given the increasing impact of non-state actors on politics, policies that aggrieve foreign public would constitute a potential opportunity for non-state actors to enhance the pool of resources and recruits (Cederman et al., 2013). As a recent example, ISIS in Iraq demonstrates that resentment of Sunni population resulting from U.S. policies favoring Shiites and Kurds has eventually posed a threat to the U.S. national security. That said, it is crucial to explore the very sources of these hostile attitudes.

The literature on foreign policy attitude formation has long identified multiple factors that make people more or less likely to prefer some policies to others. Accordingly, ideology (Martini, 2015; Herrmann et al., 1999; Holsti, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), elite and media cues (Gelpi, 2010; Gaines et al. 2007), personality traits and values (Kam and Kinder, 2007; Schoen, 2007; Barker et al., 2008; Kertzer et al., 2014; Bayram, 2016), social networks (Radziszewski, 2013), image of a country (Boulding, 1959; Herrmann, 1985, Jervis, 1970) and strategic factors (Mueller, 1973; Jentleson, 1992; Gelpi et al., 2006) are significant predictors of an individual's attitudes on their state's foreign policies. Along with these factors, some studies also reveal the role of nationalism, national pride and attachment to national identity in identifying individuals' foreign policy attitudes (Prizel, 1998; Telhami & Barnett, 2002; Feshbach, 1987). Feshbach (1987, 1990) and his colleagues (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) show that nationalist and patriotic people who feel national superiority and/or strong emotional attachment indicate high support for nuclear armament policies, and volunteer to fight abroad as well as support aggressive foreign policies in international arena (Van Evera, 1994; Becker 2009).

These studies, however, do not necessarily explain what causes individuals how to develop their attitudes towards foreign states regarding their foreign policies. Studies on anti-Americanism, in fact, points out the U.S. foreign policy as the primary determinant of hostile attitudes of foreign public toward the U.S. Its support for authoritarian regimes, strategic alliance with Israel, rivalry

with Soviets during cold war, and military actions and political interventions in the Middle East and Latin America are other sources of global anti-Americanism (Abdallah, 2003; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007; Lynch, 2007; Sengupta & Masood, 2005). Accordingly, these policies impede people's trust in U.S.-led actions, and also trigger the "friend of my enemy is my enemy" rationale—especially among citizens of Arab countries—thus, intensify the animosity toward the U.S (Teimourian, 2002).

With acknowledging the role of all these factors, these studies build on the assumption that imposes an abstraction of the international system, namely national borders. More specifically, previous studies examining the impact of U.S. foreign policy choices on individuals' attitudes towards the U.S. limit themselves with analyzing the public opinion in the target country. However, there is no theoretical reason not to contend that these foreign policy choices create externalities, and their effect spills over to other countries, as well. Indeed, individuals sharing common transnational identities may not be only concerned about their countries, where they are bound with the citizenship, but also about others. One example is the Cyprus issue, which has dominated both Turkish and Greek foreign policies for the last 60 years, as a result of public demand to secure their brethren, Turkish and Greek Cypriots, respectively. Despite the fact that Ottoman Empire ceased to control the island in 1878, and then Cypriots lived under British Administration for more than 80 years, both Turkish and Greek public opinion responded immediately to the political turmoil in the island in the late 1950s. With the British having decided to leave the island, both governments prioritized the issue in their foreign policies, and even came to the edge of the war, and eventually, Turkey invaded the Northern Cyprus.

Another recent example is the support of Muslim people to Palestinians in their struggle with Israel. At the cost of their welfare and security, most people of Arab countries as well as of Turkey and Iran held demonstrations during both Intifadas asking their governments to take action against Israel, and protested, occasionally violently, Western governments to withdraw their support from and presence in Israel. Among many others, these two examples alone suffice to

show that individuals do no limit their concerns with the interests of their countries, but also may extend their consideration abroad, where their brethren live, in developing their attitudes towards other countries. Hence, we should also account for domestic politics of non-target states to fully comprehend the impacts of foreign policy choices of sender states.

The Role of Social Identity in Interpreting the Politics

People are cognitive misers, and they rely on mental shortcuts, i.e., heuristics, and biased information processing in decision-making (Popkin, 1991; Lou & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia, 1994). Given the difficulty of access to diverse and private information about what is going on abroad for ordinary citizens, this statement becomes even more accurate in developing attitudes towards foreign actors and their policies. In fact, this is the reason why referring to policy preferences of foreign states to understand their image among public abroad is problematic. It is not the actual policy choices, but perceptions about these policies, which are often biased and distorted, that contribute to people's attitudes towards the source of these policies. Hence, what lenses people use through which to see the world is an indicator of how they will assess foreign states and their policy choices.

Social identity is one of the foremost tools in providing people with a perspective to perceive and interpret the politics (Tajfel, 1982). It can be defined as a "common form of a group identity that involves the incorporation of group membership into concept of self" (Huddy, 2013:739). Thus, social identity bridges the concept of self to a group where an individual belongs to (Tajfel, 1981). When social identity is based on racial, religious or ethnic ties, it may also generate saliency and further cohesion among the members of the group by binding them together (Turner et al., 1984; Oakes, 2002). This is partly because social identities based on ethnoreligious factors make it easier to distinguish group members within the larger society. Hence, no matter to what extent group membership is a result of an intentional and voluntary process, social identities based on ethnoreligious factors persist. Awareness of this membership is the first step that triggers the crucial role of identity in perceiving and interpreting the world.

Social identities constructed around a political issue gain political relevance, and become salient (Huddy, 2013). In today's world, it is not implausible to say that any social identity based on race, religion or ethnicity is by default features a political relevance in itself, and hence, turn into a political identity for the group members. In other words, once a common feature of some individuals within a larger society, identity can become an indicator of the political predisposition of these individuals, and regulate their relations with other groups and the state. Given this, social identities that gain a political relevance and become salient by affecting people's lives make the heuristics more accessible and motivate the biased reasoning of individuals in interpreting the effects of these policies (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Spears, 2011). Further, the motivated reasoning of group members around the political identity that is always fed by the hostile political context become more and more definitive in perception and interpretation of political events.

Mapping Political Identity on Political Attitudes

Here the important question revolves around what leads people to translate their political identity to their political attitudes. In many contexts, political identities of individuals determine to what extent they satisfy their needs and have access to the limited resources. Many individuals are deprived of some social, political, rights solely for being part of a minority group based on race, ethnicity, religion, or language. Black people in South Africa until the end of Apartheid regime were banned from fundamental rights such as going to the university or voting in elections. Or Kurds in Turkey were banned from speaking in the Kurdish language during the military coup in the 1980s. Assad regime in Syria also denied giving identity cards to Kurds, which has prevented them from accessing social services.

Such discriminatory activities against minorities are not limited to government decisions, but some people in the majority also support this to maintain their privileged status. Accordingly, social dominance theory suggests that individuals look for group-based dominance and inequality, which makes dominant groups better off than subordinated ones, and hence make the individuals

that belong to the dominant group better off compared to the individuals of subordinated groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Thus, those who are advantaged regarding access to needs and resources act to maintain the status quo. As a response to this, counter – social dominance orientation among individuals of subordinated groups creates awareness about differing interests and motivates them to reject the hegemony and to challenge this status quo (Pratto et al., 2014).

Relatedly, relative deprivation theory also contends that members of groups that are deprived of the primary needs and resources are more likely to develop anger and frustration (Horowitz 1985; Miller et al., 1977), as they are denied benefits granted to others (Grofman & Muller, 1973). Along with a common political identity, their denial of resources can be blamed for the identity they are bound with and can be framed as a fraternal deprivation (Brown, 2010). This blaming, in return, will not only further increase the saliency of, and emotional attachment to the identity as a result of a shared grievance, but also reinforce the role of political identity, which provides the lenses through which one sees and interprets the world when processing the information.

Inter-group conflict arises when the divergence of interest and competition for resources and needs between identity groups emerge. A realist approach to group conflict suggests that the very competition for resources results in in-group favoritism bias, which makes group members favor each other (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). Whereas in-group favoritism does not automatically cause hostility towards out-group, the political context of diverging political interests and competition for resources may cause out-group negativity along with in-group favoritism (Hewstone et al., 2002). One immediate consequence of formation of out-group negativity accompanied with in-group favoritism is the perception of threat by both groups, which will eventually increase the saliency of the identity, tightening the group borders, and ethnocentrism (Coser, 1956; LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

Transferring Attitudes towards the Third Party

While the pillars of international politics dictate us to take national borders as our unit of analysis to probe the impact of some policy choices on public opinion, there is no reason to believe that in-group favoritism as well as out-group negativity operates solely within the national borders. After all, the very definition of identity incorporates a group membership, which can cross the border through ethnicity and religion, into the concept of self. Hence, the group borders may well cross the national borders, for example, the case of jihadists coming from all over the world as to join the ranks of their "Muslim brothers" in their holy war against "the infidels." Moreover, when political identity is built upon ethnic factors, which can be easily distinguishable for group members of both sides, this would facilitate an activation of a stereotyping mechanism as a result of out-group homogeneity bias in individuals' cognition (Rubin et al., 2007; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). As a result of activation of the bias, people tend to see all out-group members alike, not differentiating among out-group members based on their country of origin.

Given this, for example, analyzing the micro-level impacts of the U.S. policies in Syria should not be solely limited to examining the attitudes of Syrians, but also Turks and Kurds in Turkey, who can be part of the in-group with or out-group of Kurds in Syria. In other words, impacts of any policies targeting one country may easily spill over through transnational identity ties and domestic inter-group tensions. What is the mechanism, then, through which individuals of non-target countries, who share a common identity with those in the target country, develop their attitudes towards foreign actors? Or, how do individuals evaluate third parties in the context, where an in- group vs. out-group dichotomy exists?

Heider's (1958) social balance theory, a cognitive consistency theory, proposes that individuals tend to reach consistency in their relationship with related objects (Heider, 1958; Greenwald et al., 2002). In other words, people seek consistency among cognitive elements that they use to make sense of the world. Hence, social balance theory can predict an individual's attitudinal adaptation

and response to a third party in a network of relations. Accordingly, "(an) attitude change can occur in the absence of scrutiny of a persuasive message" to maintain the cognitive balance (Visser & Cooper, 2013:218). This need indicates that should a member of an identity group feel an imbalance in its sentiment or affinity toward another group; she should feel the pressure to correct such imbalance by shifting her opinion until there is cognitive consistency (Hummon & Doreian, 2003). The process can be extended to a triangular relation, as well, as social balance theory suggests. Heider's P-O-X model explains this situation as when a person (P) has negative attitudes towards other (O), but positive attitudes towards an object (X), and O has positive attitudes towards X, then P will perceive the imbalance, and be cognitively motivated to correct the imbalance. In this case, P has three ways to balance its attitudes socially) O is not bad at all, b) O and X are not in a positive relation, c) X is not good after all.

Figure 3.1: Heider's P-O-X Model



People are motivated to be consistent in their attitudes; however, how to ensure the consistency so that they balance their attitudes towards others is another issue. Having applied social balance theory into the politics, where social identities are reinforced with political relevance, and threat perceptions tighten the group boundaries by reinforcing in-group favoritism and out-group negativity, it is not plausible to predict the first two balancing mechanisms to take place. Instead, it

is more likely for group members (P, here) to reassess and balance their attitudes towards X, which are the sender states' foreign policy choices to out-group members (O). This theoretical proposition implies that in the presence of two identity groups competing for political, economic and social resources (e.g., Turks vs. Kurds in Turkey), and when one group is in relation to a third party (e.g., the U.S.), a group member of the other group reconsiders her attitudes towards the U.S. based on the nature of relation between Kurds and the U.S. The same process holds for Kurds in their relation with other Kurds or Turks with a third party, as well. It constitutes the base for the application of popular propositions "the friend of my enemy is my enemy" and "friend of my friend is my friend" into the micro-level attitudes about international actors. Hence, an inter-group conflict between the identity groups in the domestic politics also translates and conditions the attitudes towards foreign states. In other words, public opinion abroad about an international actor results from an equation domestically constructed, as well. Figure 3.2 depicts the mechanism mentioned above graphically.

Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses



Case Selection and the Hypotheses

I conducted a survey experiment in three cities of Turkey manipulating the policy choices of the about the actors fighting in SCW. In so doing, I aim to probe the differentiating effect among Turks and Kurds in response to the policies of foreign states favoring their out-group. The reason why I chose Turkey to conduct this research is three-fold: 1) the presence of an identity-based cleavage structure and perception of threat from the other group, 2) presence of transnational ties crossing the border, and 3) presence of visible and salient policies by foreign actors affecting these identity groups.

Turkey is a country, where Turks and Kurds have a long history of conflict from the very beginning of the foundation of the state, which has triggered in-group favoritism as well as out-group negativity. Modern Turkey was founded as a centralized system, and as a result of nation-state policies, Kurds could not fully and freely exercise many political and socio-cultural rights. During the 1920s and 1930s, diverse Kurdish groups rebelled against the state in regions Kurdish population constitutes the majority but were defeated militarily. In the 1970s, Kurds reorganized demanding additional rights and freedoms, and these efforts culminated to the foundation of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 1980s; a rebel group resorted to terrorism and demanded autonomy for Kurds. By attracting the support of Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian Kurds as well, PKK caused more than 40,000 casualties in its attacks on civilians and military targets. Despite the reform process initiated by the Turkish government in 2000s, the conflict between PKK and Turkey reinitiated in June, 2015 and only in one and half year, the casualty toll has reached to more than 400 civilians along with around 800 security officers deaths as a result of bombing in major cities and guerilla tactics in southeastern Turkey.

Along with the long history of conflict, a deep political cleavage based on the ethnic identity of Turkish and Kurdish communities also exists. Beginning from the 1990s, much Kurdish political par- ties and their successors were banned with the accusation of having ties with PKK. Despite all

restrictions against the Kurdish politicians' integration to the political sphere such issuing electoral bans on parties, employing a 10% electoral threshold, arresting the main political figures, Kurdish politicians and Kurdish party, People's Democratic Party (HDP), won the majority of the votes with large margins in Kurdish-majority cities in recent elections. Turks, on the other hand, have mostly shown their attachment to the national identity with increasing votes of the nationalist party, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), during the ongoing conflict. Some argue that the abandonment of the reform process by the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP), is, in fact, an outcome of decreasing vote share resulted from the resentment by Turks. With the increasing political tension, ultra-nationalists attacked many HDP offices, Kurdish PMs are arrested, and massive military campaigns are held in southeastern Turkey recently. In light of this chronologic course of the conflict, the existence of an identity-based cleavage, and its saliency makes Turkey a perfect case.

Many Kurds and Turkmens, who are the ethnic brethren of Turks in Turkey, living in Syria provide us with an appropriate setting to see the role of transnational identity crossing the border. With the demise of Ottoman Empire and the emergence of new colonial states in the Middle East, many ethnic and sectarian groups sharing a common identity and language were constrained to live in different countries. For example, Turkmens living in Syria and Turks living in Turkey are ethnic brethren, and they share a common language and historical – cultural background. Indeed, Turkmens are Anatolian Turks who were encouraged to migrate to today's Syria and Iraq following Ottoman invasion of the region in late 16^{th}, early 17^{th} century (Heras, 2013). Although there is no clear ethnic distinction or discrimination between these two groups, the fall of Ottoman Empire forced these two ethnic brethren groups to live in two different countries. As a result of the nation-state building process in Turkey, such groups are not called as Turks but as 'Azeri Turks' for Turks living in Iran and the Soviet Union, then Azerbaijan; the word Turkmen, Turkman or Turcomen are used to identify Turkic-speakers in Arab areas (Peyrouse, 2015). In this regard, as in the case of ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties between Kurds in Turkey and Syria, Turks have very similar connections with Turkmens.

Moreover, despite the existence of national borders, these groups mostly continued their social and political interaction with each other as geography permits. In the case of Kurds and Turkmens living in Syria, they are located along Turkey's borders, engaged in formal and informal economic activities with their brethren living on the Turkish side of the border. [3] Also, PKK also located its headquarter in Syria for long years, and recruited many Syrian Kurds into its cause. Some reports estimate that around 15-20% of PKK members are Syrian Kurds, [4], indeed and that they have a significant influence of the military wing of the group.[5]

Existing political and social connections with Kurds and Turkmens in Turkey and Syria have deepened further with the start of the war in Syria. Not only many refugees, who are brethren of Turks and Kurds, passed the border, as a catalyst to the increasing awareness of the collective identity, but also the establishment of the Kurdish cantons, and fight against ISIS and Assad regime by Kurdish and Turkmen fighters have reinforced these transnational ties. As local sources reported, many Kurds, in fact, left Turkey to join the ranks of YPG, Kurdish rebels fighting against ISIS, in defense of a Kurdish city, Kobane, located along the border. Prominent Kurdish figures have supported the resistance against ISIS in Kobane, called Turkish government to militarily intervene in support of YPG, and have celebrated the eventual success. [6] However, Turks strongly diverge from Kurds in their attitudes about YPG. Turkish government many times announced that YPG is one of the offspring of PKK. [7] One reason for this is the "threat" of an independent and unified Kurdish state, which may also include Turkey's territories. It is a proof of Turks seeing not only

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[3] http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/blog/bin-kisi-de-olse-kacakcilik-bitmez and http://aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/suriye_kurtleri_rapor1_11072014.pdf

[4] http://aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/pkknin-baglantili-orgutleri-yok-farkli-isimleri-var/716411 and http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-tbmm39de-gorusulen-pkk39nin-nufus-raporu,197038

[5] http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/764143-pkkda-komuta-suriyelilerde

[6] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/turkey-pro-kurdish-party-leader-demirtas-pkk-tamil-tigers.html

[7] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-says-pyd-no-different-than-pkk-for-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73172&NewsCatID=338

Kurds in Turkey, but also Syrian Kurds as the out-group regarding assumed and existing identity ties among Kurds in the region, and the acute threat perception.

Third, SCW provides us with an environment to test how Turks and Kurds living in Turkey perceive and interpret foreign states' policies that impact the lives of their brethren and enemy. It is an ongoing war and a salient issue at both the national and international level. International actors also heavily involved in the conflict, and the U.S. is one of the actors fighting against ISIS through financial and military support to Kurds and some moderate Sunni groups. There are many visual elements and official announcements evidencing U.S. and Russia support for these groups, and people of Turkey is no doubt aware of their policies in the region. The content of these actions, though, is always open to speculation and manipulation as a result of lack of access to information as well as cognitive problems. In fact, the Turkish government has also made contradictory statements, some- times condemning the U.S. for its support to YPG, and other times appreciating for its cooperation with Turkey.

Overall, applying the theoretical mechanism I outlined in the previous section into the complex equation of Turks/Turkmens vs. Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and the U.S. and Russian involvement into the SCW, I expect individuals to cognitively balance their attitudes for, or oppose to, the U.S and Russia. As described in Figure 3.1, a triadic relationship between the Turks, the Kurds, and the U.S. or Russia hence should be in perfect logical harmony. Accordingly, while Kurds balance their attitudes by developing positive attitudes towards the U.S. as a result of U.S. policies supporting Kurds in Syria, Turks will develop negative attitudes towards the U.S., as the same policy is for their out-group, whom they perceive a threat. And this will also be true regarding people's attitudes toward Russia, considering Russian policies defending Assad regime against Turkmens, in-group of Turks in Turkey. I below hypothesize these attitude formation processes as:

Hypothesis 1a: Turks who are exposed to the treatment of U.S. support for YPG express more negative attitudes towards the U.S. than Turks getting no treatment.

Hypothesis 1b: Kurds who are exposed to the treatment of U.S. support for YPG express more positive attitudes towards the U.S. than Kurds getting no treatment.

Hypothesis 2a: Turks who are exposed to the treatment of Russian bombing of Turkmens express more negative attitudes towards Russia than Turks getting no treatment.

Hypothesis 2b: Kurds who are exposed to the treatment of Russian bombing of Turkmens express more positive attitudes towards Russia than Kurds getting no treatment.

Research Design

Method of the Experimental Approach

To test my claims, I created short vignettes informing respondents about the U.S. and Russian foreign policy choices regarding violent non-state actors fighting in Syria and embedded an experiment into a face-to-face public opinion survey manipulating the target of these policies. In these experiments,, I ask Turks and Kurds in Turkey about their attitudes towards the U.S. and Russia after reading the vignettes. By informing about the policy choices targeting their brethren or rival, I aim to trigger in-group favoritism or out-group negativity among Turks and Kurds. Hence, the experimental design allows us to see the variation of attitudes within and across the ethnic groups conditional on the presence or lack of the treatment.

It is important to have effective but short and straightforward vignettes in the experiment to trigger the desired activation of the inter-group dichotomy between Turks and Kurds, and expose the engagement of the U.S. and Russia with Kurds and Turkmens that are either part of in or out-group of Turks and Kurds in Turkey. To avoid possible problems of conducting research on a sensitive topic in a conflict zone, I design the vignettes without embedding any deceiving information about foreign policy preferences of the U.S or Russia. Instead, the information provided in the vignettes is directly derived from the news about SCW in national newspapers from Turkey. One drawback

of such an approach may be a weak effect generated by the endorsements provided in the vignettes. However, this is a safe approach for the security of enumerators as well as the comfort of survey respondents.

The first experiment aims to see the diverging attitudes of Kurds and Turks about the U.S. regarding U.S. engagement with Kurdish insurgent, which are in-group of Kurds and out-group of Turks. In the control group, I measure individuals' attitudes towards the U.S. by using a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where the higher scores indicating more positive attitudes. In the treatment groups, the survey respondents receive a brief about the U.S. policies in Syria before reporting their the attitudes. In the ethnic treatment, people are informed about U.S. policies regarding Kurdish insurgent group YPG. In this brief, survey respondents are told that 1) YPG is a Kurdish insurgent organization, 2) the U.S. supports the group militarily and economically, and 3) both international and national sources show proofs of this support clearly. Moreover, considering the potential bias of a crosscutting cleavage, e.g., sectarian identity, I also give a sectarian treatment to a third group. In the sectarian treatment, people are informed about U.S. policies regarding Sunni insurgent group Free Syrian Army as in the case of the ethnic treatment. To make the effect of manipulation stronger, I also give details of the proofs of support, such as the use of American weaponry and Kurdish insurgents wearing American uniforms with the American flag on them as shown in Figure 3.3.

The second experiment focuses on the attitudes of Turks and Kurds about Russia regarding Russian engagement with Turkmens, which are in-group of Turks. The reason why I also look at Russian policies targeting Turkmens is two-fold: First, I do not use any deception in the vignettes, and the U.S. does not have a clear policy choice targeting Turkmens. Instead, Turkish media consistently reported violent Russian engagement with Turkmens, who fight against the Assad regime. Second, by testing the role of group identity on attitudes about Russia, I also have a chance to control the robustness of my theoretical claims. In so doing, I do not limit the findings of this study solely with the U.S. In the control group, I measure individuals' attitudes towards Russia,

Figure 3.3: First Experiment

Control Group - I'd like to get your feelings about the Unites States using a rating. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. The United States of America		

Ethnic Treatment Group - A civil war is ongoing within Syria with the participation of many armed groups. One of these groups is PYD/YPG, which is founded by Kurds. The United States provides Kurdish insurgent group PYD/YPG with military and economic support. International and national news agencies display the extent of the support, by reporting pictures of Kurdish insurgents using American weaponry, and wearing uniforms carrying the American flag on it. Now, I'd like to get your feelings toward the United States. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. The United States of America		

Sectarian Treatment Group - A civil war is ongoing within Syria with the participation of many armed groups. One of these groups is Free Syrian Army, which is founded by moderate Sunni Muslims. The United States provides moderate Sunni insurgent group Free Syrian Army with military and economic support. International and national news agencies display the extent of the support, by reporting pictures of moderate Sunni insurgents using American weaponry and wearing uniforms carrying American flag on it. Now, I'd like to get your feelings toward the United States. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. The United States of America		

again by using a scale ranging from 0 to 10. In the ethnic treatment group, before measuring the attitudes of individuals, the survey respondents receive a brief about the Russian policies in Syria regarding Turkmens. In this brief, survey respondents are told that 1) Turkmens are fighting in SCW, 2) Russia supports the Assad regime militarily and economically, and 3) both international and national sources show proofs of Russian bombing of Turkmens. In the sectarian treatment, respondents are briefed about Russian policies towards Sunni Muslims living in Syria as shown in Figure 3.4

The experiments I designed were fielded as a part of a broader project of face-to-face surveys on a randomly drawn sample of Turkish citizens living in three major cities, namely Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir. We chose these cities to have a representative sample with the participation of enough Turks and Kurds into the study. The sample is representative of these cities' actual ethnic/religious and socioeconomic distribution. Based on the population distribution of these three cities, a local survey company, Infakto, interviewed 1,136 (Istanbul (N=518), Gaziantep (N=315), Diyarbakir (N=303) people over the age of 18. The interviews were conducted between December 24, 2016, and January 22, 2017, within a time frame in which the conflict was still ongoing with the participation of all actors in Syria. Moreover, terror attacks by ISIS and PKK in Turkey prior to the conduct of survey ensured the saliency of the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy. In total, 141 districts were randomly chosen from all three cities to ensure the representative sample within the cities. From the official records of street lists of each chosen district, four streets were randomly chosen; and then from each randomly chosen street, two houses were also selected randomly for an interview. In the case of a no-response from the household, enumerators skipped three houses and interviewed with the fourth one. The interviews were only held with the household members. In total, 31 enumerators conducted the interviews, and they were carefully selected by Infakto to represent the ethnic and religious characteristic of the cities and districts. The average interview time with a survey respondent completing the survey was 19 minutes. Given that 4,819 houses were tried to interview with someone from the household, refusal rate (52%) is a bit higher than usual,

Figure 3.4: Second Experiment

Control group - I'd like to get your feelings toward Russia using a rating. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. Russia		

Ethnic Treatment group - A civil war is ongoing within Syria with the participation of many armed groups. One of these groups is Assad regime. Russia provides Assad regime with military and economic support. International and national news agencies display the extent of the support, by reporting pictures of Russian fighters bombing and destroying Turkmen towns. I'd like to get your feelings toward Russia using a rating. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. Russia		

Sectarian Treatment group - A civil war is ongoing within Syria with the participation of many armed groups. One of these groups is Assad regime. Russia provides Assad regime with military and economic support. International and national news agencies display the extent of the support, by reporting pictures of Russian fighters bombing and destroying Sunni towns. I'd like to get your feelings toward Russia using a rating. Ratings between 5 and 10 mean that you feel positive and warm toward the country. Ratings between 0 and 5 degrees mean that you don't feel positive toward the country. You would rate the country at the 5 if you don't feel particularly positive or negative toward the country. How would you rate?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. Russia		

though response (25%) and cooperation rates (32%) are within the normal range.

Independent Variables – Ethnicity and Demographics

Along with responding to the questions measuring attitudes towards the U.S. and Russia, survey respondents also answer a set of demographic questions. These questions are crucial to see the heterogeneous effects of the treatments on distinct identity groups, as hypothesized. To this end, we ask survey respondents how they would identify themselves ethnically. While self-reporting may be problematic in a conflict setting, our sampling decision enables us to overcome underrepresentation problem and ensure a representative sample of the cities. As explained earlier, the main reason we conduct the survey in three cities, one of them with a Kurdish-majority who is heavily voting for the Kurdish party, is to minimize the problem of underrepresentation and possible bias in our sample.

In addition to these, I also control for demographics such as survey respondents' age (continuous), gender (binary), education status (ordinal), income level (ordinal), urbanity (binary), and religiosity score (continuous), which is an index variable consisting of the individual's support for sharia, frequency of religious practices, and self-reported importance of religion in their life. Although randomization in the experimental setting already strips away the effect of confounding factors by taking all others constant, controlling for these demographic variables is informative for seeing the heterogeneous effects, and thus, helps us conclude which people express more anti or pro- American or Russian attitudes. I reported the summary statistics in Appendix B.

Results

In this section, I will first look at the results of the average treatment effects, and then present the results heterogeneous treatment effects. My hypotheses claim that ethnic orientations of individuals, which determine their in-group and out-group, conditions how they perceive the policies of the U.S. and Russia, and also develop attitudes towards them. Therefore, the latter demonstrates the

results of a more accurate empirical test for my hypotheses, as the average treatment effects cancel out the conditional effect in the former.

In Table 3.1, I report the average treatment effects of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In each experiment, I have three groups: one control, one ethnic treatment, and one sectarian treatment group. The table demonstrates potential outcome means (PO means) for the control group, the average treatment effect of the given treatment compared to the control group, and confidence intervals calculated by bootstrapped standard error estimation. Lastly, by using delta-method, I also obtained percentage change of attitudes. While the ethnic treatments in both experiments reveal statistically significant effect, sectarian treatment is not distinguishable from the control group in the attitudes towards the US. This result mainly tells us that sectarian identity, as a crosscutting cleavage, does not play a significant role in shaping attitudes of individuals towards the US. Ethnic treatments, on the contrary, influence individuals' attitudes towards the United States and Russia. Both ethnic treatments have a significant negative effect; however, the direction does not tell much, as these findings do not demonstrate the conditional effect of individuals' ethnic background.

Table 3.1: Average Treatment Effects

	PO means Control Group	ATEs	95% CIs	% Change
Experiment 1 - Attitudes towards the US				
Ethnic Treatment	2.171	-.256*	(-.564, .053)	%12 (-)
Sectarian Treatment	2.096	-.022	(-.368, .324)	%1 (-)
Experiment 2 - Attitudes towards Russia				
Ethnic Treatment	3.358	-.380**	(-.719, -.040)	%11 (-)
Sectarian Treatment	3.429	-.543**	(-.965, -.121)	%16 (-)

Regression adjusted Average Treatment Effects, 100 reps bootstrapped 95% CIs
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 3.2 and 3.3, I report the findings of heterogeneous treatment effects to distinguish

Turks and Kurds' reaction to the U.S. – YPG and Russia – Turkmen treatments, consecutively. The tables report the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors, and the interpretation of the key interaction terms as the key explanatory variables revealing the heterogeneous impact of the treatments is straightforward. The findings of the first experiment are reported in Table 1 to provide support for Hypothesis 1a, as the interaction term is significant, and is in the expected direction. Accordingly, respondents that self-report as ethnic Turks express significantly negative attitudes towards the U.S. when they are informed about U.S. policies favoring and supporting Kurdish rebels YPG in Syria. Compared to Turks getting no YPG treatment, Turks getting YPG treatment express more than half point decrease in their evaluation of the U.S. in average. While an average Turk in my sample with no exposure to the ethnic treatment gives a score of 1.94 to the U.S, an average Turk who is exposed to the treatment scores 1.42 according to Model 2.

Figure 3.5: Substantive Results of Experiment 1



Table 3.2: First Experiment

DV: Attitudes towards the U.S.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
YPG Treatment	0.198	0.296	-0.407***	-0.489***
	(0.299)	(0.344)	(0.145)	(0.169)
Turk	-0.883***	-0.727***		
	(0.180)	(0.205)		
Turk (YPG Treatment=1)	-0.612*	-0.811**		
	(0.333)	(0.385)		
Kurd			0.963***	0.787***
			(0.187)	(0.211)
Kurd (YPG Treatment=1)			0.604*	0.783*
			(0.347)	(0.400)
Age		-0.013**		-0.013**
		(0.006)		(0.006)
Male		0.272*		0.280*
		(0.160)		(0.160)
Education		0.100		0.098
		(0.062)		(0.062)
Income		-0.105***		-0.102***
		(0.039)		(0.039)
Urban		0.078		0.107
		(0.285)		(0.287)
Religiosity		-0.192**		-0.191**
		(0.091)		(0.091)
Constant	2.708***	2.917***	1.831***	2.162***
	(0.154)	(0.488)	(0.090)	(0.485)
N	1056	805	1056	805
R^2	0.058	0.091	0.063	0.093

Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

On the contrary, the findings reveal that Kurds enjoy U.S. policies in Syria providing military and economic support to their brethren fighting across the border. Hence, respondents that self-report as ethnic Kurds express significantly less negative attitudes towards the U.S. when they are informed about U.S. policies targeting Kurdish rebels YPG in Syria. While an average Kurd in my sample with no exposure to the ethnic treatment give a score of 2.74 to the U.S, an average Kurd who is exposed to the treatment scores 3.03 in Model 4 as depicted in Figure 3.5. Although the effect is in the expected direction, 95% confidence intervals in the predicted scores of attitudes towards the U.S. overlap, which make me put reservation before concluding that I find statistical support for Hypothesis 1b.

In the second experiment, I ask survey respondents about their attitudes towards Russia briefing randomly assigned respondents about Russian policies in Syria. As explained in the previous section, to avoid any deception for the security of survey respondents and the enumerators, I could not solely only change the country name holding all policy details constant. Instead, I provided a brief about the Russian bombing of Turkmen towns and cities in Syria. Table 3.3 reports the findings of the second experiment.

Table 3.3: Second Experiment

DV: Attitudes towards Russia	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Turkmen Treatment	-0.740***	-0.574**	-0.186	0.099
	(0.216)	(0.238)	(0.296)	(0.332)
Kurd	-0.358*	-0.106		
	(0.208)	(0.249)		
Kurd (Turkmen Treatment=1)	0.558^{+}	0.634^{+}		
	(0.366)	(0.414)		
Turk			0.172	-0.001
			(0.206)	(0.242)
Turk (Turkmen Treatment=1)			-0.588^{+}	-0.719*
			(0.365)	(0.410)
Age		0.007		0.008
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Male		0.525***		0.520***
		(0.187)		(0.187)
Education		0.124*		0.126*
		(0.073)		(0.073)
Income		0.079*		0.089**
		(0.045)		(0.045)
Urban		0.789***		0.799***
		(0.288)		(0.286)
Religiosity		-0.139		-0.136
		(0.099)		(0.099)
Constant	3.531***	1.201**	3.304***	1.093**
	(0.122)	(0.535)	(0.163)	(0.525)
N	1023	785	1023	785
R^2	0.013	0.048	0.012	0.050

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ p<0.10 at one-tailed, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 at two-tailed

Beginning with Turks' reaction to the treatment, Model 8 shows that the Turks who are informed about the Russian bombing of Turkmen cities express significantly more negative attitudes towards Russia compared to Turks getting no such information. In that sense, while an average Turk in my sample with no exposure to the ethnic treatment give a score of 3.66 to Russia, an average Turk who is exposed to the ethnic treatment scores 3.03. Thus, I confirm Hypothesis 2a.

Figure 3.6: Substantive Results of Experiment 2



While Turks express more negative attitudes towards Russia when they are informed about Russian policies, Kurds, on the contrary, express more positive attitudes to these policies targeting their out-group's brethren in Syria. Accordingly, looking at Model 6, the results reveal that the Kurds who are informed about the Russian bombing of Turkmen cities express significantly less negative attitudes towards Russia compared to Kurds getting no such information. While an average Kurd in my sample with no exposure to the ethnic treatment give a score of 3.56 to Russia, an average Kurd who is exposed to the treatment scores 3.62. As shown in Figure 3.6, the empirical findings are in the expected direction; however, they are not statistically significant, as the confidence intervals around the predicted scores for control and treatment group overlap.

Aside from the main analysis, the results reveal some other interesting findings. First of all, we see that people of Turkey, regardless of their ethnic identity, are more sympathetic to Russia than the U.S. This is not a surprising fact considering the ongoing high level of anti-Americanism in Turkey after Iraq War in 2003. Regarding the control variables, I find that the older the people, the more anti-American attitudes they reveal. Men are more sympathetic to both the U.S. and Russia than women. Having higher education levels do not have any significant impact on anti-Americanism, but indicate pro-Russian attitudes. An interesting finding is that with the increasing income level, anti-Americanism rise, but anti-Russian attitudes decline. So, the richer people are, the friendlier they are towards Russia, which can be a result of increasing trade volume between Turkey and Russia. Lastly, the results show that increasing religiosity among people of Turkey results in more anti-American attitudes; however, it does not have any significant effect on attitudes towards Russia, despite the fact that majority of Russian are Christian Orthodox.

Robustness Checks

Although this paper concerns the ethnic identities' role on attitudes towards foreign states, the presence of crosscutting cleavages in Turkey might have biased the findings. Therefore, to overcome this problem, a second treatment is introduced on the sectarian identities (Sunni vs. Alevi

in Turkey) as explained above. Accordingly, some survey respondents have received the sectarian treatment, which manipulated U.S. and Russian policies in Syria based on negatively targeting or supporting Sunni or Nusayri, a group with common religious ties with Alevis in Turkey. To test the sensitivity of these results more conservatively, I rerun the analysis, but this time dropping the survey respondents who get sectarian treatment from the data. In other words, I shrink the sample size by filtering out those who took the sectarian treatment, so that I can see the effect of ethnic treatments with control groups. This decision does not generate any selection bias because all the respondents are randomly assigned one to of the treatment or the control groups. I reported these results in Appendix B.

Regarding the first experiment, the results still hold for the Turks, and the effect size is similar to the effect in the main analysis. Thus, compared to the Turks in the control group, Turks getting YPG treatment express significantly more negative attitudes towards the U.S. However, the effect is not significant anymore when it comes to heterogeneous treatment effects for Kurds. In the second experiment, the Turks, again, reveal very similar results; the Turks who are informed about the Russian bombing of Turkmen towns and cities in Syria express more negative attitudes towards Russia compared to the Turks in the control group. Nevertheless, the effect is not significant for Kurds.

Given the weak statistical significance and small substantive change in the effect of Kurds' attitudes in the main analysis, and loss of significance in the robustness checks, I believe that the findings deserve further elaboration. A possible reason why the effect size is small, and the level of significance is weak regarding Hypothesis 2b might be the social desirability bias. Although I took necessary measures for confidentiality and security of the survey respondents, the very fact that Kurds are the minority in Turkey may have affected their answer significantly, especially in an issue, where brethren of Turks are at stake. Moreover, compared to the first experiment, policy details in the treatment are negative, which is the Russian bombing of Turkmens. In that sense, it is an even more conservative test because for manipulation to work; I expect individuals to express

their content about Turkmen casualties, in a way. Given this, with finding limited support for Hypothesis 2b, I urge the reader to be cautious before coming to a conclusion.

Lastly, I also control for the location effect. As explained above, we conducted the survey in three cities: Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and Gaziantep. While Istanbul is a city located far away from the conflict, highly developed, and predominantly Turkish city; Diyarbakir, on the contrary, has been the epicenter of Kurdish secessionist movement with its Kurdish-majority population. Additionally, Gaziantep is an industrial city where both Turkish and Kurdish populations widely present. That said, I test the robustness of my findings to city selection to see to what extent this influences individuals' attitudes towards the foreign actors. As reported in the Appendix, the results hold in general; while citizens living in Istanbul express significantly more anti-American attitudes, those live in Diyarbakir do less. When it comes to the attitudes towards Russia, both Diyarbakir and Istanbul residents show significantly more pro-Russian attitudes.

Conclusion

Foreign public opinion matters for states in contemporary world politics, as citizens' of foreign states indirectly influence international politics through democratic or violent means. So far, the literature has focused on the 'action-reaction' chain in analyzing the effect of policy choices on public opinion. In this approach, previous studies probe how citizens' of a target country react to the policies of a sender state. However, citizens' affiliations and attachments are not limited to the national borders of their countries. Instead, they share many commonalities with other people living abroad. Therefore, this chapter embraces a holistic approach to analyzing the impacts of foreign policy preferences' impact on public opinion abroad.

In this chapter, I investigate the role of social identities in influencing attitudes of individuals towards foreign actors. By building on the premises of social identity theory and inter-group conflict, I suggest that political identities of individuals are determinant on how they perceive and interpret policies of sender state to target state. Social identities gaining a political relevance also

lead to a formation of in-group vs. out-group dichotomy. Then, by building on the social balance theory, I contend that individuals are motivated to balance their attitudes towards the foreign states, accordingly.

Conducting a survey experiment with 1,136 Turks and Kurds in three major cities in Turkey, I investigate how transnational ethnic ties condition people's attitudes in their assessment of the U.S. and Russia as a result of her policies in SCW. I explore the attitudes of Turks and Kurds in Turkey towards U.S. and Russia conditional on their policies in regards to the SCW. The results confirm my theoretical expectations, with Turks who are exposed to the information about U.S. support to Kurdish insurgent group YPG are significantly more likely to express negative attitudes towards the U.S. compared to the Turks who are not exposed. Similarly, Turks show the same reaction when it comes to Russian policies against Turkmens in Syria. In return, Kurds show more positive attitudes towards the U.S and Russia when they are exposed to the same information about their policies regarding YPG and Turkmens, respectively. However, one should be careful before concluding about the robustness of the results, as the mechanism needs further analysis to see the extent of heterogeneous effects given other confounding factors, i.e., religious tendencies and sectarian preferences.

The findings of this research demonstrate the impact of domestic cleavages and transnational identity ties on individuals' attitude formation about foreign actors. In this sense, this research differentiates from previous ones in accounting the domestic politics of the target country in predicting public opinion abroad, and hence, in analyzing externalities of foreign policy choices. Although the empirical analysis focuses on Turks and Kurds' attitudes towards the U.S. and Russia, the theoretical foundation makes a bigger contribution and extends the implications and application of my findings into other countries, as well. I suggest that the literature on comparative foreign policy as well as conflict process can build on this research, and make micro-level analysis in predicting individuals' reaction towards both state and violent non-state actors. Last but not least, the find- ings of this research provide policymakers with crucial lessons in aiming to win hearts and minds abroad.

Accordingly, it is not only what a state is, does or stands for, but also what the target state is, does and means that conditions people's attitude towards foreign actors. This result, hence, challenges the very ideas of soft power and public diplomacy as a way to advance national interests among public abroad. Yet, this is still a small step to investigate the impact of foreign policy choices on public opinion abroad, as further research is still needed to fill the gap in this area of study.

The Role of Inter-Group Conflict in Attitude Formation towards Public Diplomacy Efforts

Introduction

"(T)he ultimate victory will depend on the hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there" said President Lyndon B. Johnson when outlining the United States' strategy to win Vietnam War.[1] Almost thirty years later, this time President George W. Bush addressed foreign publics saying "America will defend liberty and justice... [and] will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of the human dignity" when justifying U.S. invasion of Iraq with the goal of "bring democracy to Iraqi people".[2] Not only the U.S. but also a relatively smaller regional power, Turkey, has also adopted a "new foreign policy" investing on public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East (Davutoglu, 2000; Kalin, 2010; Cevik & Seib, 2015). Along with Turkey, other regional powers in the Middle East also set their agenda to promote a favorable environment for their national interests. For instance, King Abdullah of Jordan and many experts argued that the primary goal of Iran to form a Shia crescent in the region by developing close relations with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon based on a common sectarian identity (Berzegar, 2008; Gonzalez, 2009), or Saudi Arabia to lead Sunni

[1] "Remarks at a Dinner Meeting of the Texas Electric Cooperatives, Inc." on 4 May 1965

[2] President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002," Please, see Dietrich, J (2006). U.S. Human Rights Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. Political Science Quarterly. 121(2): 269-294

Muslims under its religious leadership (Patrick, 2016).

Nevertheless, these public diplomacy efforts, which are "government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries" [3], may not produce desired outcomes. In fact, a limited number of quantitative studies cannot reach a conclusion in confirming the effectiveness of these policies. Corstange and Marinov (2012) reveal that active U.S. promotion for democratization through intervening in electoral process polarizes the domestic politics of the target country. Bush and Jamal (2014) show that American endorsement for women in politics does not have any impact in Jordan. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012) find that high-level visits do not necessarily create positive effects among the public abroad. Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi (2005) argue that the influence model of foreign policy that aims for transnational influence on foreign public opinion presents insignificant or weak effects in shaping public attitudes abroad. These controversial findings constitute the central puzzle of this chapter: why do some individuals positively react to the public diplomacy efforts, while others do not, despite the fact that most of these initiatives are framed by the sender state to serve their interest, e.g., human rights and democracy promotion efforts?

States' foreign policy choices play a role in shaping attitudes of publics abroad. However, individuals get influenced by their group identities in forming attitudes, and group interests are neither homogenous nor free of conflict within any country. This is mainly because group-based dominance and subordination determine group members' access to resources. Thus, any foreign policy choice of a foreign state, whether specifically targeting particular groups or not, affects the domestic status quo in the target state. Even though public diplomacy efforts aim to win hearts and minds of individuals, social identity of individuals and domestic context, then, may transform the perceptions about and reaction towards the policies that aimed to serve the good of the publics abroad.

Building on social identity theory and the inter-group conflict, I suggest that people are mo-

[3] U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms, 1987, p. 85

tivated to see any gains and loss from a zero-sum perspective; hence, a gain for the out-group is automatically a loss for the in-group. However, the group boundaries are not limited within a country but operate across national borders. Thus, as theorized in the previous chapter, people may count on domestic and transnational identities as a cue in their evaluations. Further, they may extend their attitudes towards domestic out-group to foreign states engaging in friendly relations with the out-group. Once activated by in-group vs. out-group dichotomy and extended national beyond the borders, individuals may deprecate foreign states' policies, as reactive devaluation bias suggests, because they are coming from an "adversary."

In this chapter, I specifically investigate the impact of human rights and democracy promotion efforts as a public diplomacy tool. To test the proposed mechanism of attitude formation, I use two original data sources that provide me observational and experimental evidence from Lebanon and Turkey, where ethnic/sectarian cleavage is salient within both countries. By employing an original public opinion research from Lebanon, and a survey experiment from Turkey, I find that foreign states' relations with different groups in the target state predict people's attitudes towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts. The findings reveal that ethnic/sectarian identity of Lebanese moderate their attitudes towards these efforts when it comes from an adversary who has a positive link with an out-group, as reactive devaluation theory suggests. A more comprehensive analysis for causal inference using experimental data also confirms these findings over Turkish citizens.

My contribution in this article is three-fold. First, this chapter differs from previous works examining the impacts of public diplomacy efforts by accounting the role of social identities in shaping individuals' attitudes, and inter-group relations. In this sense, I do not only relax the unitary actor assumption in foreign policy analysis but also bridge the gap between micro, meso, and macro level factors as a conditioning force in individuals' attitude formation towards foreign states' public diplomacy initiatives. Second, by focusing on human rights and democracy promotion efforts, I also empirically test the effectiveness of soft power and public diplomacy arguments. In

this regard, this research offers important policy implications by demonstrating that even "benign" foreign interventions may not positively influence attitudes of individuals, as such policies impact the existing payoff structure and group interests within the domestic politics. Third, unlike previous studies, this research embraces a comparative approach by analyzing people' attitudes towards multiple countries including global and regional powers such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Hence, it does contribute to the comparative foreign policy and public opinion literature.

In the remainder of the paper, first I will briefly summarize the goals and tools of public diplomacy efforts. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate why states are engaging in which strategies expect- ing what, and summarize the previous studies' findings of how these efforts influence attitudes of foreign public opinion. Second, I will explain the role of inter-group relations in shaping individuals' attitudes, and I utilize reactive devaluation theory to argue for the crucial role of the policy source in people's reactions to the public diplomacy initiatives. Third, I will elaborate on the case selection and hypotheses, focusing on reactions of Sunnis, Shiites and Maronites in Lebanon towards the policies of U.S., Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia; and reactions of Turks and Kurds towards European Union's human rights and democracy promotion efforts. Fourth, I will report the results of the two studies and then conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of my findings.

Public Diplomacy and Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy

States care about their reputation to advance their national interests (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 2005; Nye, 2004; Schelling, 2008; Tomz, 2011). However, they do not build their strategies exclusively around intergovernmental relations (Henrikson, 2006; Melissen, 2005; Nye, 2004a, 2008; Rugh, 2004). Instead, many global and regional powers such as the U.S., Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil heavily engage in public diplomacy efforts and invest in soft power strategies to attract positive attention of the global public. By providing foreign aid, building schools and

hospitals for public good, facilitating the visa regimes, offering educational programs, promoting inter-societal interactions, and hence using various public diplomacy tools effectively states aim to win hearts and minds abroad (Gallarotti & Al-Filali, 2012; Kirisci, 2005; Lee et al., 2010; Li, 2009; Nye, 2005; Popescu, 2006; Thompson, 2005; Tsygankov, 2006).

The very idea of getting what you want through influencing people's mindset is not novel, though. Previous studies also discuss and analyze the importance of controlling the hearts of common people for gaining control over their decision-making process (Gramsci, 1992; Morgenthau, 2005). Lately, Nye (2004a: 256) also redefines the concept of power by arguing for the importance of soft power, which "is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." Bu using their soft power, states can reach the hearts and minds of individuals, and shape their attitudes by their goals and interests.

States often engage in public diplomacy efforts to reach the hearts and minds of individuals. Although public diplomacy has many dimensions and is not limited to states' efforts, it typically stands for the organization and conduct of governmental efforts including various activities to influence public abroad, such as developmental and humanitarian aid programs, cultural exchange and language training, educational exchange programs, radio and television broadcastings, leadership visits (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2017; Zaharna, 2009). Needless to say, these efforts are not limited to such activities. Any effort using a declaratory or actual goal to improve the conditions of individuals living abroad can help the sender country's image and reputation in the target country.

From the time of Jimmy Carter until today, the spread of human rights and democracy has al- ways been a part of the U.S. Presidents' rhetoric and utilized to project soft power in Latin America and the Middle East. Carter declared U.S. guarantee for human rights as "We stand for human rights because we believe that government has as a purpose to promote the well-being of its citizens. This is true in our domestic policy; it's also true in our foreign policy. The world

must know that in support of human rights, the United States will stand firm." [4] Similarly, Obama administration publicly underlined the U.S. role in promoting human rights abroad many times during the Arab Spring. [5] Along with these examples, Presidents Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush also asserted that the U.S. would act in the global defense of human rights and commit to improving human rights throughout the world on many occasions. [6] The U.S. also called out regimes for their human rights abuses and tailoring foreign policy in ways that punished human rights violations (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985). [7] Likewise, National Security Strategy of the Unites States (2006; 2010; 2014) highlighted the role of human rights promotion efforts to win hearts and minds abroad.

Like the U.S., some other countries such as Turkey have recently favored the spread of democracy and human rights in the Middle East arguing for the fall of authoritarian regimes in the region and highlighted the importance of public preferences. [8] In one of his declarations about the vision of "new" Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East, then Prime Minister Davutoglu stated that "[Turkey] will not keep silent on oppression by autocratic leaders... will not take steps that will alienate us from the hearts and minds of our region's people,... [and] will work towards the establishment of a more peaceful and prosperous regional order and support people's quest

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[4]Jimmy Carter (1978) State of the Union Address

[5]Please see President Barack Obama's "A Moment of Opportunity" speech 05.19.2011 accessed from `https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-barack-obama-prepared-delivery-moment-opportunity`

[6]Please, see Dietrich, John W. (2006) "Human Rights Policy in the Post-Cold War Era" Political Science Quarterly 121:2, and President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 for quotes evidencing the rhetoric of Presidents related to human rights.

[7]US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which, under Section 116, specifies that foreign aid cannot be distributed to countries that engage "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the aid is intended to help "needy people" (Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations 2006: 73) from Fariss, Christopher J. 2010. "The Strategic Substitution of United States Foreign Aid" Foreign Policy Analysis (6) 107-131

[8]Turan Kayaoglu Brookings – Opinion 05.19.2012 accessed from `http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/19-turkey-democracy-kayaoglu`

for basic human rights and democracy." [9] Chief Adviser to Turkish President and Press Secretary Kalin (2011) also highlights the role of legitimacy in "new" foreign policy, and argues, "the most important among those elements... To achieve a soft power status [is to] prioritize freedoms and liberties, guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms."

Despite these efforts, both countries have not succeeded to project a soft power in the region. Anti-Americanism is at its peak in the region. Putting Israel aside, there is no single country in the Middle East whose citizens express favorable attitudes towards the United States; though, the very same individuals express high support for the spread of democracy and human rights in the region. Similarly, the model of Turkey as a democratic country with a Muslim majority seems failed. Insomuch that "zero-problem with the neighbors" doctrine is replaced by "precious loneliness in the neighborhood" (Israyelyan, 2015). [10] Hence, despite the fact that people are for democracy and human rights, they do not always welcome such efforts by foreign states. In the following section, I will explain how identity and inter-group conflict in domestic politics condition individuals' attitudes towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts despite the fact that such efforts do not necessarily favor some groups over others.

The Role of Identity in Evaluating Public Diplomacy Efforts

People may develop their attitudes based on their ideology (Martini, 2015; Herrmann et al., 1999; Holsti, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), personality traits (Kam and Kinder, 2007; Schoen, 2007; Barker et al., 2008; Kertzer et al., 2014), networks (Radziszewski, 2013), elite and media cues (Gelpi, 2010; Gaines et al. 2007), image of the target country (Boulding, 1959; Herrmann, 1985, Jervis, 1970), and strategic factors (Mueller, 1973; Jentleson, 1992; Gelpi et al., 2006). Along

[9] Ibid.

[10] Please see for details including Kalin's statement about the term http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-not-lonely-but-dares-to-do-so-for-its-values-and-principles-says-pm-adviser-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53244&NewsCatID=338

with these factors, some studies also reveal the role of national identity (Prizel, 1998; Telhami & Barnett, 2002; Feshbach, 1987), as a significant predictor of an individual's attitudes in identifying individuals' foreign policy attitudes.

Most of these factors point out that individuals actually seek for information and short cuts to rely on in developing their attitudes, as they are cognitive misers, and rely on heuristics (Popkin, 1991; Lou & Redlawsk, 2001). Group identity can provide individuals with lenses through which they can perceive and interpret the politics. This interpretation, though, will build upon group interests and values, as social identity transforms the concept of self, and redefines it as a part of the group (Huddy, 2013; Tajfel, 1982). In this regard, individuals may redefine self-interest, and those with salient group identity may prioritize group interests over self-interests. Hence, group members are primarily motivated to defend group interests and integrity as well as to enhance the group gains (Brewer, 2011).

The research shows that group identities, which are based on race, ethnicity, and religion, are more likely to generate saliency and cohesion among the group members (Turner et al., 1984; Oakes, 2002). Moreover, when identities gain political relevance, they become even more salient (Huddy, 2013). Therefore, ethnoreligious identities largely determine the political predisposition of individuals. In fact, to be part of an inter-group conflict, group members even do not need to be in conflict personally with other group members (McDermott, 2004). Instead, inter-group conflict emerges when the group interests diverge. A realist approach to inter-group conflict suggests that the very competition for resources results in in-group favoritism bias, which makes group members favor each other, as access to the resources requires a collective effort (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). In-group favoritism may not always trigger hostility towards out-group. However, the political context built upon ethnoreligious conflict may lead to out-group negativity because of the increased threat perception, saliency of the identity, rigidity of the group borders, and ethnocentrism (Coser, 1956; Hewstone et al., 2002; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). That said, salient group identities that acquire political relevance increase their reliance on identity and bias reasoning of individuals

in interpreting the effects of these policies (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2000; Spears, 2011).

Inter-Group Conflict and Zero-Sum Nature of the Gains: Reactive Devaluation

In the existence of a salient inter-group conflict, identities have a key role in assessing the antecedents and consequences of policy choices because individuals rely more on their biased reasoning informed by identity cues. Inter-group conflict and perception of threat may cloud any rational cost-benefit analysis in evaluating the pros and cons of each policy offerings, and it transforms the political considerations into a zero-sum game. In this realist approach, which is motivated by the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy, group members are inclined to take any gains by the out-group as a potential loss for their group, and any loss as a potential gain.

As outlined in the previous chapter, social dominance theory suggests that people who are belonged to an identity group seek for group-based dominance, as individual interests are mostly aligned with group interests (Pratto et al., 1994; Tajfel, 1981). Accordingly, it is more important to be a member of an identity group that dominates over other groups than individual-level competition. This is because, regardless of individual-level comparisons, group membership makes the dominant group's members better off than subordinated ones (Pratto et al., 1994). This implies that those who are advantaged can easily access to resources, than those who are disadvantaged. This inter-group competition also motivates the subordinated group members to challenge the status quo, and to acquire an advantaged position, if possible (Pratto et al., 2014). This cycle fuels the inter-group conflict and leads group members to embrace a zero-sum perspective in politics.

In Chapter 3, I have shown that transnational identities require us to redefine the group boundaries, as identity does not merely operate within country boundaries. Instead, in-group vs. out-group conflict is extended beyond the national borders if there are people who share common ethnic, historical, cultural, linguistic ties with their "brethren" or "enemy." That said, sharing a common identity across the borders may not be the only instance group members extends the limits of inter-group conflict. Looking from a broader perspective, any other person, group, or country

that is in relation with the in-group or out-group becomes a party of in-group vs. out-group dichotomy as a result of zero-sum nature of the conflict. Hence, individuals are mostly motivated for developing proper attitudes towards the third party informed by the network of relations.

As a psychological consistency theory, reactive devaluation bias, in fact, suggests that people heavily weight the source of ideas and policies. Should an offer is coming from an out-group, adversary, or an antagonist, then the value of the proposal decreases in the eyes of the recipients (Ross & Stillinger, 1991; Ross, 1993; Ross & Ward, 1995; Stillinger, Epelbaum, Keltner, & Ross, 1990). As a matter of fact, the very pillars of the reactive devaluation theory lay under the prospect theory, which contends that every individual interprets gains and losses using heuristics differently. Hence, regardless of what a proposal actually offers to all parties, each will rely on their biased divergent construal in assessing the pros and cons of the proposal depending on how they perceive the "source" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ross & Ward, 1995).

Stilinger et al. (1990) provided the initial evidence for reactive devaluation theory by surveying Americans' opinions about a possible arm reduction deal between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Their findings show that 90% of the respondents found the proposal more favorable when they were told that U.S. President made the proposal. If the proposal is coming from a third party, then 80% of the respondents found that the deal favored the U.S or at least evenhanded. And only 44% of the respondents actually thought that the very same proposal favored the U.S. So, the source of the proposal mattered for individuals' consideration of the deal. Another application of the bias is in the context of another identity-based inter-group conflict situation, namely Palestine-Israel conflict. Maoz et al. (2002) asked both Palestinians and Israelis' opinions about a specific peace plan. The findings showed that Israelis who were told the plan was coming from Palestinians mostly rejected the deal, which was, in fact, an Israeli peace proposal. Likewise, Palestinians who were told that the plan was offered by Israel were against the deal, which was this time, a Palestinian proposal.

These two studies showed that individuals base their opinion about a policy offering on the

source of it. One of the underlying reasons for this cognitive bias is skepticism. Human beings are more inclined to look for ambiguities and inconsistencies when an out-group that is untrusted and antagonistic makes a proposal (Ross & Constance, 1988; 1991; Ross, 1995; Ross & Ward, 1996). In fact, it is quite easy to point out some inconsistencies, when it comes to public diplomacy efforts of foreign states. For instance, while the U.S. promotes the spread of universal values of democracy and human rights, it is also establishing alliances with the regimes that are authoritarian, and that suppress their citizens. This, in return, may lead individuals to question the sincerity of U.S. human rights and democracy promotion efforts in their country. Similarly, favoring Sunni identity in the domestic politics, and establishing alliances with Sunni groups in Syrian Civil War also underrate Turkey's multicultural rhetoric and inclusive "new foreign policy" in the Middle East.

Another underlying mechanism to explain reactive devaluation bias is even simpler. Accordingly, as psychological consistency theories (e.g., balance theory by Heider (1958)) suggest, policy or proposal could be evaluated based on its linkages with the source. More specifically, the linkages between foreign state and an in-group or out-group within a country influence the attitudes of individuals towards the policy and its sender. As explained in Chapter 3, individuals seek for consistency in their attitudes in a network of relations and feel the pressure to correct any imbalance of sentiments and affinity by shifting their opinion until a cognitive consistency is ensured (Hummon & Doreian, 2003). Hence, regardless of its identity, any third party engaged in a relation with an adversary will be evaluated based on the cues provided by nature their relation. More specifically, a group member will also account for the links and connections between a foreign state and the out-group, when she evaluates former's policies.

Hypotheses

Human rights promotion strategies seem costless in winning hearts of people in the target states, as they do not come at the expense of other groups' rights and freedoms. As exemplified by both the U.S. and Turkey's efforts to promote human rights and establishment and consolidation of

democracy, they do not solely aim for the improvement of the rights of particular groups while giving up others. Accordingly, human rights gains for some groups do not necessarily imply human rights deficits for other groups. However, as discussed above, individuals' perceptions about such policy offerings mostly rely on their biased reasoning, i.e., reactive devaluation makes the source of policy critical in their assessment. Regardless of the mechanism, in-group – out-group dichotomy conditions the attitudes of group members towards policies of foreign states depending on their linkages with an in-group or out-group. Hence, I contend that individuals that are motivated and biased by inter-group conflict within the domestic politics evaluate human rights and democracy promotion efforts through a zero-sum perspective.

Figure 4.1: Inter-Group Conflict and Activation of Reactive Devaluation Bias



Figure 4.1 also describe the theoretical framework discussed above. When a foreign state engages in public diplomacy efforts, the attitudes towards this policy and the foreign state is conditioned by the domestic inter-group conflict. Once an in-group member considers friendly relations between the foreign state and the out-group, she will also see the foreign state as an adversary, and try to maintain a cognitive consistency/balance. Otherwise, if an in-group member thinks there are friendly relations between the in-group and the foreign state, then she will welcome its policies and develop positive attitudes towards the foreign state. Whereas, this time, an out-group member will balance her attitudes, and develop a negative stance towards it. In light of this theoretical framework, I derive the following hypotheses listed below.

Hypothesis 1a: A group member expresses favorable opinions towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts if there are friendly relations between the sender state and the in-group.

Hypothesis 1b: A group member expresses unfavorable opinions towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts if there are friendly relations between sender state and the out-group.

Hypothesis 2a: A group member expresses unfavorable opinions towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts if there are hostile relations between the sender state and the in-group.

Hypothesis 2b: A group member expresses favorable opinions towards human rights and democracy promotion efforts if there are hostile relations between the sender state and the out-group.

Research Design & Results

To test my hypotheses, I conduct two studies, which are original public opinion surveys con- ducted in Lebanon and Turkey. The first study aims to demonstrate how inter-group conflict conditions the

attitudes of individuals towards foreign states promoting human rights and democracy in Lebanon in a comparative setting. Whereas, the second study intends to test the theoretical mechanism on how inter-group conflict activates reactive devaluation bias by manipulating the source of the human rights and democracy promotion efforts in a survey experiment conducted in Turkey. I believe that both cases provide an appropriate setting to test my hypotheses for the following reasons: 1) presence of a salient inter-group conflict within domestic politics, which can trigger reactive devaluation bias in individuals' attitude formation, 2) intense and visible public diplomacy efforts of foreign actors, and 3) comparability of the cases, as both countries suffer from ethnoreligious cleavages and experience conflict with non-state actors. So, I test my claims in two countries to see the generalizability of my results. Moreover, by using experimental data in Turkey, I aim to shed light on the causal mechanism more rigorously. Below, I will thoroughly explain how Lebanon and Turkey cases serve me to test my theoretical claims, introduce the data, and present the research designs for both studies and results respectively.

Study 1 – Inter-Group Conflict in Lebanon and Attitudes towards Foreign State

Case Selection

Lebanon has gone through decades of civil war which pitted the Muslim Sunnis, Shiites and Christian/Maronites against each other, and enhanced the local cleavages embodied in the clear-cut memberships and boundaries around these three identities. Although Taif Accords ended this last Lebanese civil war that started in 1975, it created an uncertain duopoly of power divided between Sunni and Shia leadership, and lead to a fierce Muslims contention against Christians. Hence the accord provided only a fragile coexistence among the communities by failing to mend the ever-existing ethnoreligious division (Bahout, 2014). In fact, consociational democracy established in the post-war Lebanon, where all ethnoreligious groups sharing political power in proportion to their population, has created a rigid and salient cleavage by fueling the fragmentation (Salamey, 2009).

Three historical events reinforced the ethnoreligious cleavage in Lebanese politics: 1) ambush

of Phalange, a Christian Lebanese militia, to Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, which caused hundreds and thousands of Palestinian Muslim to die, 2) the assassination of Sunni Saad Hairi, and the overthrow of the government by Shia Hezbollah vigilantes in 2005, and 3) the subsequent partial takeover of Beirut by Hezbollah, a group aided by Syria and Iran, in 2008. Recently, with the presidential elections in crisis, the parliament in paralysis, and the Lebanese Armed Forces slowly fragmenting under the influence of Hezbollah, it has fueled the ethnoreligious division, and further endangered the fragile peace in the Lebanon.

Along with its long history of inter-group conflict, Lebanon has always attracted the attention of foreign actors due to its strategic location. While France has special relations with Lebanon based on the colonial past, the United States showed interest in Lebanese politics during the Cold War era as a step to prevent Soviets from spreading their influence in the region. Starting from the Operation Blue Bat in 1958, which aims to support pro-western government of Lebanon, the U.S. has heavily engaged in contentious politics of Lebanon. In this regard, U.S foreign aid has poured into the Lebanese economy, and human rights and democracy promotion efforts through either public diplomacy or hard power took place for years.

Not only Western powers but recently regional powers, too, have involved in Lebanese politics through transnational identity ties. For instance, Turkey has developed its political, economic and social relation with Lebanon in the "new foreign diplomacy" perspective. Turkey initiated a free trade zone under the name of "Levant Business Forum" with the participation of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has built schools, hospitals and housing in mostly underdeveloped neighborhoods of Lebanon; and Turkish Armed Forces sent troops for UN peacekeeping efforts under the UNIFIL task force (ORSAM, 2010). Iran has also displayed a considerable interest, and deeply engaged into to Lebanese politics through Hezbollah. As part of a Shia-Crescent strategy and leverage against Israel, Iran aided the foundation and development of Hezbollah, a Shia political party with a heavily armed militia. In 2006, Hezbollah succeeded to challenge Israel's invasion of South Lebanon militarily, and became popular among Lebanese

Muslims, especially Shiites. Increasing its political power, Hezbollah became a prominent actor in Lebanese politics with its rigid ethnoreligious political agenda. Lastly, as a new emerging regional power, Saudi Arabia also engaged in contentious politics of Lebanon to counterbalance Iran's spread of influence. To this end, Saudi policies are mostly to bolster Lebanese Sunnis' political and economic impact in Lebanese politics (Gillis, 2016). In this respect, Saudis promised over $3 billion USD economic and military aid to Lebanon to have a seat in this race to get control of Lebanese politics.

Data

As explained above, Lebanon has divided ethnoreligious lines among Maronites, and Sunnis and Shiites. Moreover, foreign actors are deeply engaged in Lebanese politics through transnational ethnic/religious identity ties as well. This constitutes an appropriate setting to see how inter-group conflict activates reactive devaluation bias in attitude formation process, and how individuals react to the policies of different foreign actors, accordingly. Hence, I employed an original survey data from Lebanon conducting face-to-face interviews in October 2015 with a sample of 1,200 adults. The sample was composed of surveys conducted in 1361 districts covering all regions in Lebanon. Using Probability Proportional to Size Sampling technique we selected 150 clusters among 27,550 from all districts, and each single cluster includes 100 to 150 households. We, then, chose 8 to 10 households from each cluster. Using the Kish table, we chose a random respondent. The respondents were visited three times at maximum. If they were not accessible because they were unwilling to answer or the interviewers were not able to reach them after three trials, we randomly chose the next household to visit. Hence, our sample is representative of Lebanese socioeconomic and confessional distribution. Taking into account the design effect due to cluster sampling rather than simple random sampling, the margin of error for this survey is +/- 3%.

Dependent Variable

I have five dependent variables, each focusing on a global or regional power, which has involved in the international politics of the Middle East, and Lebanon more specifically. As shown in Figure 4.2, each survey respondent respectively answers how they evaluate public diplomacy efforts of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, the US, and Russia, in promoting rights of political, ethnic and sectarian groups living in Lebanon. Respondents give their answer on a five-point Likert scale, 1 for strongly negative attitudes towards these policies by given foreign state, and 5 for strongly positive attitudes. Given the structure of the dependent variables, I estimate an ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors.

Figure 4.2: Questionnaire for the Dependent Variable

How would you evaluate _____ foreign policy promoting the rights of political, ethnic and sectarian groups in Lebanon? Please respond in a scale where 1 corresponds to "strongly negative" and 5 corresponds to "strongly positive."

	1.Strongly negative	2. Negative	3.Neither negative nor positive	4. Positive	5.Strongly positive	9.Don't know
1. Saudi	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. Turkish	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Iranian	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. American	1	2	3	4	5	9
5. Russian	1	2	3	4	5	9

Independent Variable

My independent variable is each respondent's self-reported ethnic/sectarian identity, as I argue that ethnoreligious identity condition people's attitudes by creating adversaries and activating reactive devaluation bias for foreign actors' policy choices. In the survey, respondents are asked to report their ethnoreligious identity, and I dummy out each identity, namely Shiite, Sunni and

Maronite, and employ them as separate binary variables in the analysis.

Using self-reported identity as an independent variable may be problematic because individuals may not be sincere in self-identification. Accordingly, they may hide or intentionally give wrong information regarding their ethnoreligious backgrounds, especially when inter-group conflict is salient. However, Lebanon has a consociational governing system. Hence the political system encourages ethnic/sectarian groups to become more visible and acquire high organizational capacity through proportional representation. More importantly, a power-sharing system, where President is elected among Maronites, Prime Minister among Sunnis, and Speaker of the Parliament among Shiites, empowers all ethnic groups. Lastly, three main identity groups in Lebanon that are subject to our research happen to be in similar sizes and organizational capacities, indicating similar political mobilization power. Therefore, under or over-representation is not a serious problem in our study. Comparing estimated percentage of different identity groups and their composition in our survey also alleviates our concerns about the accuracy of the data on self-reported identities. [11]. Along with my main independent variables, I also control for a set of demographic, political, social, and economic factors, which may influence individuals' attitudes in their evaluation towards the public. There is no official census conducted in Lebanon after 1932. Therefore, I compare the distribution of ethnoreligious identities in the data with CIA The World Factbook data (2012 estimates). The latter predicts that Sunni and Shiites each is consist of 27% of the population, Maronites are around 28%. This is in line with our distribution in the survey data; only Maronites are overrepresented a bit diplomacy efforts of foreign states. Accordingly, I account for respondents' age (continuous), gen- der (binary, male=1), education level (ordinal), income (ordinal), egocentric evaluations about their economic situation (binary, positive=1) and religiosity (ordinal). Moreover, I also control whether the respondent is employed in public sector (binary) to account

[11]There is no official census conducted in Lebanon after 1932, therefore, I compare the distribution of ethnoreligious identities in the data with CIA The World Factbook data (2012 estimates). The latter predicts that Sunni and Shiites each is consist of 27% of the population, Maronites are around 28%. This is in line with our distribution in the survey data; only Maronites are overrepresented a bit

Figure 4.3: Representative Power of the Survey



for a possible social desirability bias, as employees in the public sector may intentionally falsify their preferences regarding their job security. To control for political activism, I include a variable indicating whether the respondent voted in the most recent Parliamentary elections in Lebanon in 2009. Lastly, I also control for the frequency with which the individual is exposed to media sources such as TV, radio or newspapers as individuals who are frequent recipients of political news should have a greater awareness of the political events in and abroad. I reported the summary statistics in Appendix C.

Results of Study 1

Table 4.1 displays the results of Study 1 employing ordered logistic regression analysis. Beginning with the different ethnic groups' attitudes towards regional powers' human rights promotion efforts, the results confirm hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b. Accordingly, Shiites, whose political

party Hezbollah is a long-term ally of Iran, and who share a common ethnoreligious identity with Iranians, express positive attitudes towards Iranian public diplomacy effort in Lebanon. However, Sunnis, who are in conflict with Shiites in Lebanese politics, poorly evaluates the very same policies of Iran as shown in Models 1 and 2. On the contrary, when such efforts are originated from Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, countries with majority Sunni populations and are in close relations with Sunnis in the region, Lebanese Shiites are against both countries' policies, whereas Lebanese Sunnis welcome them as reported in Models 3-6. Maronites, on the other hand, does not show negative attitudes towards either Iran nor Saudi Arabia or Turkey's public diplomacy efforts. This also supports my theoretical claims, as all three countries have links to the out-groups of Maronites.

In Figure 4.4, I also report the substantive effect of different ethnoreligious identities on public diplomacy efforts of foreign actors. Lebanese Shiites are 22% more likely to show high support for Iran's public diplomacy efforts, while 11% less likely to Saudi Arabia's and 3% less likely to Turkey's efforts compared to all other ethnoreligious groups. Lebanese Sunnis, on the other hand, are 9% more likely to support Saudi Arabia's policies and 4% more likely to support Turkey's policies, whereas 9% less likely to support Iran's efforts compared to other groups.

In their support of global powers, neither being Sunni nor Maronite has any statistically significant effect towards U.S. and Russian policies. However, Shiites express significantly lower support for the U.S. and higher support for Russian efforts in Lebanon. This may be a result of the fact that the United States recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. In addition to this, Lebanese Sunnis are largely against Russia's public diplomacy efforts (8% less likely compared to others), whereas Shiites are in favor of these efforts (19% more likely compared to other groups). I think that this finding clearly demonstrates how inter-group conflict triggers reactive devaluation bias to- wards a foreign actor that is linked to an out-group. Accordingly, Lebanese Shiites show support for Russian policies because of the contemporary alliance between Russia and Iran against the U.S. in the region. In this regard, Lebanese Shiites may see Russia's effort critical to their survival in the region. This could also explain Sunnis' negative attitudes towards Russia's pub-

Table 4.1: Results of Study 1

DV: Attitudes towards Public Diplomacy efforts of	(1) Iran	(2) Iran	(3) Turkey	(4) Turkey	(5) Saudi Arabia	(6) Saudi Arabia	(7) USA	(8) USA	(9) Russia	(10) Russia
Maronites	-0.157	-0.239	-0.167	-0.159	-0.035	-0.169	-0.004	-0.074	-0.098	-0.244
	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.158)	(0.174)	(0.155)	(0.169)
Sunnis	-0.851***	-0.922***	1.748***	1.696***	1.731***	1.625***	0.120	0.105	-0.986***	-1.059***
	(0.161)	(0.172)	(0.166)	(0.181)	(0.166)	(0.181)	(0.157)	(0.178)	(0.156)	(0.164)
Shiites	2.137***	2.036***	-0.638***	-0.828***	-1.423***	-1.611***	-1.303***	-1.477***	1.337***	1.401***
	(0.167)	(0.173)	(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.188)	(0.200)	(0.172)	(0.183)	(0.161)	(0.173)
Male		0.194*		-0.259**		-0.282**		-0.088		0.223*
		(0.112)		(0.123)		(0.128)		(0.119)		(0.114)
Religious		-0.033		-0.263***		-0.042		-0.218**		0.111
		(0.095)		(0.092)		(0.097)		(0.097)		(0.094)
Ego-centric		0.083		0.328***		0.326***		0.312***		0.153
		(0.098)		(0.099)		(0.108)		(0.099)		(0.094)
Voted in 2009		0.132		-0.214*		-0.033		0.123		0.231*
		(0.119)		(0.126)		(0.130)		(0.126)		(0.120)
News		-0.017		-0.008		-0.096		0.065		-0.121**
		(0.055)		(0.060)		(0.062)		(0.057)		(0.056)
Income		-0.123**		-0.059		-0.104**		-0.073		-0.045
		(0.049)		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.046)		(0.046)
Education		0.060**		-0.005		-0.002		0.047*		0.042
		(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.030)		(0.027)		(0.027)
Age		0.004		0.000		0.009*		0.011***		0.003
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Public Employment		0.084		0.088		-0.040		-0.123		-0.640**
		(0.241)		(0.296)		(0.349)		(0.283)		(0.306)
N	1185	1136	1173	1125	1182	1134	1183	1134	1170	1121
Pseudo R^2	0.112	0.118	0.084	0.096	0.116	0.126	0.034	0.046	0.065	0.078
Log likelihood	-1601.615	-1527.614	-1467.204	-1388.980	-1411.489	-1334.913	-1480.996	-1393.656	-1739.661	-1643.892
χ^2	404.686	411.460	269.768	288.939	371.635	337.870	105.610	131.850	243.243	280.461

Cut points are not reported, robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.4: Effect of Group Identity on Attitudes



lic diplomacy efforts, as they are supposed to make their out-group, Lebanese Shiites, better off eventually.

Lastly, the findings do not reveal any strong pattern for control variables across countries. To elaborate more on the covariates, the richer an individual is, the less likely they support Iran's and Saudi Arabia's public diplomacy efforts. Those who think they are doing well in last 12 months are more likely to support U.S., Saudi Arabia and Turkey's policies targeting Lebanon. Men are more likely to support Russia and Iran's efforts, and less likely to support Turkey's and Saudi Arabia's policies. The more religious an individual is, the less likely they are for Turkey's and U.S.' involvement in Lebanese politics. More educated people are more likely to support Iran's and U.S.' policies. Lastly, age is not a significant predictor of individuals' attitudes.

Overall, the empirical results confirm my hypotheses. However, two issues might potentially bias these findings: First, despite the existence of a salient inter-group conflict in Lebanon, the presence of three groups that are in conflict against and shifting alliance with each other makes it harder to come to a conclusion. For example, we can explain the lack of statistical significance in Maronites' attitudes towards Iran and Saudi Arabia through the shifting alliances of Maronites with Shiites and Sunnis. Second, possible confounding factors make it more difficult to test the role of inter-group conflict in evaluating foreign actors' policies. For instance, while conventional wisdom may expect Maronites to be for, and Sunnis and Shiites against the U.S., widespread anti-Americanism and their causes may deeply affect the attitude formation process. Likewise, the second study aims to extend both external and internal validity of these findings, by testing the theoretical mechanism more rigorously by manipulating the possible target of public diplomacy initiatives in Turkey.

Study 2 – Inter-Group Conflict in Turkey and Attitudes towards the European Union

Case Selection

Differing from the first study, in Study 2, I investigate the attitudes of individuals with different identity backgrounds towards the European Union by manipulating the possible target groups of given policies. In so doing, my goal is to see whether individuals' attitudes change when they are told human rights, and democracy promotion efforts are to improve political rights and liberties of out-groups. Hence, I aim to rigorously test the theoretical mechanism, i.e., inter-group conflict, which activates reactive devaluation bias. In other words, while the first study demonstrates the role of reactive devaluation bias in attitudes of individuals towards foreign states' policy choices, the second study shows how inter-group conflict moderates the direction of reactive devaluation bias.

As explained in the previous chapter, Turkey constitutes a great example to observe the impact of inter-group conflict on foreign policy attitudes of individuals for the following reasons. First of all, there is a clear identity-based cleavage structure and perception of threat coming from the other group. Turks and Kurds have a long history of conflict from the early stages of state foundation, which triggers in-group favoritism as well as out-group negativity. PKK, a violent non-state organization, which have resorted to terrorism, and claiming to defend rights of Kurds, caused more than 40,000 casualties in its attacks on civilians, and military targets. The conflict is highly salient, as the casualty toll has reached to more than 1200 deaths only in the last one and a half year. Along with the Kurdish issue, the inter-group conflict between Sunni Muslims and Alevis constitutes another historical cleavage in Turkish politics. Starting from the 16th century in Ottoman era, the sectarian cleavage still dominated the Turkish politics. As a result of this division, hundreds of people lost their lives during Maras, Corum and Sivas Massacres in 1978, 1980, and in 1993, respectively. Currently, Alevis are deprived of their religious rights, as the state does not officially recognize their belief as a religion.

Not only the presence of a salient ethnoreligious cleavage but also visible efforts of the European Union to promote human rights and democracy in Turkey make the country an appropriate setting for examining individuals' attitudes. Turkey has long attempted to integrate with the European Union (EU), insomuch that the initial association agreement signed in 1963. From then on, EU membership has stood as one of the ultimate goals of Turkish Foreign Policy. During the 1980s and 1990s, the EU's critics on the progress of Turkey mostly focused on systematic violations of human rights and threats to democracy in Turkey. Despite the improvements in the 2000s and high popular support for EU membership, recent years have witnessed a sharp turn in EU-Turkey relations. EU countries' critical approach to political and judicial processes and practices, widespread discontent with Turk- ish leadership, and the rise of the radical right in Europe has dramatically deteriorated the relations. In this regard, public support has also gone down, and the EU is more and more seen as a Christian club with an ultimate goal to challenge Turkey's grandiosity by threatening its unity and integrity.

Data

Given a salient ethnoreligious division, and the visible, contentious policies of the EU regarding human rights and democracy promotion, I designed an experiment, which I embedded into face-to-face surveys conducted in three major cities, namely Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakir. As explained in the previous chapter in detail, focusing on these cities provide me with the participation of enough Turks and Kurds into the study. The sample is representative of these cities' actual ethnic/religious and socioeconomic distribution, and 1,136 people over the age of 18 are interviewed between December 24, 2016, and January 22, 2017. I previously explained details about the data collection, sampling, and randomization in the research design section of Chapter 3.

Dependent Variable

To test my hypotheses, I embedded an experiment in the form of short vignettes into the

survey informing respondents about the EU's public diplomacy activities to promote the better exercise of rights and freedoms, and demand of rules and regulations in this regard. Then, I asked survey respondents about their attitudes towards the EU in a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 10, the higher scores indicating more favorable opinion. By informing respondents about the EU policies aiming to improve rights and freedoms their brethren or rival, I aimed to trigger in-group favoritism or out-group negativity among different identity groups in Turkey. Thus, the experimental design allows seeing the variation of attitudes within and across the ethnic groups in the presence or lack of the treatment.

As shown in Figure 4.5, there are one control and four treatment groups. In the control group, I inform the survey respondent about how the EU provides funds to improve the rights and freedoms of the citizens, as well as requires Turkey to enact laws to facilitate the exercise of these rights and liberties to pursue its membership goal. In the treatment groups, I manipulate the target group for these policies. The control group vignette does not provide any specifics about the target and suggests these efforts are to improve the rights and freedoms of all citizens of Turkey regardless of their ethnoreligious identity. In the treatment groups, I additionally highlight the potential target groups. One point deserves further attention, though. I do not provide biased information about EU initiatives to avoid deception. Hence, instead of saying these policies are aimed at specific identity groups, I imply that these policies are for all the citizens, including specific identity groups (e.g., Alevis). In that sense, I embrace a very conservative approach regarding manipulation and do not give deceptive information not to endanger survey respondents' or enumerators' security.

Independent Variables – Ethno-Religious Identity and Demographics

Along with responding to the questions measuring attitudes towards the European Union, survey respondents also answer a set of demographic questions as well as questions inquiring their political, social and economic background. As explained in the previous chapter, these questions are important to see the heterogeneous effects of the treatments on different identity groups. To

Figure 4.5: The Vignettes

Control Group – Now, I would like to ask you about your opinions of European Union. As part of their strategic goal, EU provides funds and grants to better exercise of democratic rights and freedoms, and Turkey must enact laws and regulations to pursue its membership goal. How do you feel about the EU?

Sectarian Treatment 1 – Now, I would like to ask you about your opinions of European Union. As part of their strategic goal, EU provides funds and grants for local communities including Alevis in Turkey to better exercise their democratic rights and freedoms, and Turkey must enact laws and regulations to pursue its membership goal. How do you feel about the EU?

Ethnic Treatment 1 – Now**,** I would like to ask you about your opinions of European Union. As part of their strategic goal, EU provides funds and grants for local communities including Kurds in Turkey to better exercise their democratic rights and freedoms, and Turkey must enact laws and regulations to pursue its membership goal. How do you feel about the EU?

Sectarian Treatment 2 – Now, I would like to ask you about your opinions of European Union. As part of their strategic goal, EU provides funds and grants for communities including Sunni Muslims in Turkey to better exercise their democratic rights and freedoms, and Turkey must enact laws and regulations to pursue its membership goal. How do you feel about the EU?

Ethnic Treatment 2 – Now, I would like to ask you about your opinions of European Union. As part of their strategic goal, EU provides funds and grants for communities including Turks in Turkey to better exercise their democratic rights and freedoms, and Turkey must enact laws and regulations to pursue its membership goal. How do you feel about the EU?

	Rating (0-10)	No Response
1. European Union		

this end, I ask survey respondents how they identify themselves ethnically and religiously. The reason why I also question respondents' religious identity is to account for crosscutting cleavages. Accordingly, while Turk vs. Kurd constitute a main cleavage in the society; religious identity may lead individuals from both identity groups to express similar attitudes if the primary identity is being Muslim. For this reason, I include sectarian treatments, as well.

In addition to asking ethnoreligious identity, I also control for survey respondents' age (continuous), gender (binary), education status (ordinal), income level (ordinal), urbanity (binary), and lastly religiosity score (continuous), which is an index variable consisting of the individual's support for sharia, frequency of religious practices, and self-reported importance of religion in their life. Randomization in experimental settings already strips away the effect of confounding factors by taking all others constant. Yet, controlling for these demographic variables is informative for seeing the heterogeneous effects, and thus, helps us conclude which people express more anti or pro – EU attitudes regarding the target of policy efforts. I reported the summary statistics in Appendix C.

Results of Study 2

I report the results of Study 2 in two parts: First, I briefly look at the average treatment effect of both ethnic and sectarian treatments, and then focus on heterogeneous treatment effects, as my theory actually predicts a conditional effect on the treatments. Beginning with the former, Table 4.2 reports the average treatment effects of four treatments with potential outcome means for the control group of the each treatment group. I report 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors around the average treatment effect while I present the effect size by percentage change. No treatment, except Sunni Treatment, is statistically significant. In fact, this is an expected result because all treatments are randomly assigned to all identity groups, so the effects are canceled out as distinct identity groups express divergent attitudes regarding each treatment. One reason Sunni Treatment is significant in the positive direction is that the sample

consists of the Sunni majority. Although Sunni vs. Alevi cleavage is a salient one; none of the cities where I conducted the experiment has a significant Alevi minority. As a result, only 6% of our respondents (70 out of 1136) identify themselves as Alevi. That said, it is reasonable to find out the majority of the sample to positively react to the Sunni treatment. Regarding heterogeneous

Table 4.2: Average Treatment Effects in Study 2

	PO means Control Group	ATEs	95% CIs	% Change
Attitudes towards the European Union				
Kurd Treatment vs. Others	3.990	-.014	(-.542, .514)	%0.3 (-)
Turk Treatment vs. Others	3.977	.062	(-.392, .517)	%2 (+)
Alevi Treatment vs. Others	4.015	-.119	(-.660, .423)	%3 (-)
Sunni Treatment vs. Others	3.908	.364*	(-.063, .791)	%9 (+)

Regression adjusted Average Treatment Effects, 100 reps bootstrapped 95% CIs
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

treatment effects, Figure 4.6 and 4.7 graphically display the predicted score of attitudes towards the EU along with 90% confidence intervals. [12] All the other control variables are set to their means or medians depending on their levels of measurement. The graphs show whether identity groups are significantly changing their attitudes if the target of the policy is the in-group or out-group. The effects of sectarian treatments are mostly statistically insignificant, though the predictions reveal that the effects are in the expected direction. Accordingly, while a Sunni citizen is informed that EU policies are also to promote rights and freedoms of Alevis, she expresses more negative attitudes towards the EU compared to one who does not get this treatment. On the contrary, if she gets the Sunni treatment, then she is significantly more likely to express more positive attitudes towards the EU. Not only Sunni citizens but also Alevis show similar attitudes when they receive the treatment

[12]Tables are reported in Appendix C

about Sunnis and Alevis. They express more positive attitudes when they are informed EU policies are also to promote Alevi rights, but more negative attitudes when it comes to Sunni rights. Still, the results are suffering from large confidence intervals due to underrepresentation of Alevi minority in the sample. Lastly, when we look at the effect across treatment groups, Sunnis getting the Sunni treatment are significantly more likely to express positive attitudes towards Sunnis receiving the Alevi treatment.

Regarding the heterogeneous effects of the ethnic treatments, we see very similar findings to the sectarian treatments. All the predictions are in the expected direction, although they suffer from the lack of statistical significance. Hence, Turks that were informed that EU policies aim to promote rights and freedoms of Kurds as well express more negative attitudes towards the EU compared to Turks who did not get the Kurd treatment. On the contrary, they express more positive attitudes towards the EU, when they get the Turk treatment. Similarly, while Kurds favor the EU when EU policies are also targeting the Kurds, they reveal their discontent when the policies are supposed to be improving the rights and freedoms of Turks. Nevertheless, considering the lack of statistical significance, I urge the reader to be careful before coming to a conclusion.

Given that the findings are in the expected direction but suffer from a lack of significance, I believe that it deserves an elaboration on the possible causes of not having statistically significant results. One reason why some of the results are statistically indistinguishable may be the conservative approach I embraced in the vignettes. As explained above, to avoid deception in the questionnaire I did not embed a strong manipulation about the target and the goals of EU policies. Instead, I only included an endorsement highlighting that these policies are also to promote rights and freedoms of different identity groups living in Turkey. This wording, however, automatically implies that all identity groups would benefit from EU policies, which wipes out the activation of reactive devaluation by suppressing the "zero-sum perspective."

Another reason may be about the sensitivity of questions, especially given that we conducted the survey experiment in a conflict zone during a low-intensity conflict time in Turkey. Notwith-

Figure 4.6: The Effect of Sectarian Treatment on Attitudes towards the EU



Figure 4.7: The Effect of Ethnic Treatment on Attitudes towards the EU



standing the possible problems of this, I do not think this poses a significant problem because the empirical findings in the previous chapter revealed that mainly Turks were not profoundly affected by social desirability bias. Moreover, expressing attitudes towards the EU is not risky for survey respondents regarding the general anti-EU atmosphere in Turkey lately. Lastly, for the sectarian cleavage, it is a huge problem not to have enough observations in the data to account for the cleavage between Alevis and Sunnis. The survey was mostly designed to account for ethnic cleavages. Therefore, sampling choice is primarily prioritized including enough Kurds and Turks into the research. However, neither Istanbul nor Gaziantep nor Diyarbakir consists of many Alevis. Thus, while I believe that the findings in Study 2 support my findings from Study 1, I also think that the results of Study 2 need further attention before making any final claims.

Conclusion

Foreign actors act strategically in making their foreign policy preferences. One of the pillars of their strategy is to win hearts and minds abroad. To this end, many states engage in public diplomacy efforts. In this paper, I investigate individual-level impacts of public diplomacy efforts by examining the conditioning effect of inter-group conflict in the target states. In focusing on human rights and democracy promotion efforts, a strategy that is supposed to attract individuals' attention positively, I aim to demonstrate that heterogeneous group interests may negatively influence individuals' evaluations of these policies. To test my theoretical claims, I conduct two studies in Lebanon and Turkey, where ethnoreligious divisions are rooted in the society.

The findings of the Study 1 show that individuals express divergent attitudes towards the very same policies based on the source of policy and its links with other groups in the target country. While Lebanese Shiites welcome Iran's public diplomacy effort in promoting human rights and democracy, Lebanese Sunnis reveal their discontent about these strategies because it is coming from an adversary, an ally of Lebanese Shiites. The same goes for Lebanese Shiites, this time against Turkey and Saudi Arabia because both states are in alliance with Sunnis. Hence, a salient inter-

group conflict that generates in-group vs. out-group dichotomy also activates reactive devaluation bias in people's mind towards foreign actors that are linked to their out-group.

To test this mechanism more directly, I conducted a survey experiment in Turkey by asking individuals how they feel about the European Union. Before seeing the questions, respondents were randomly assigned to a control group or one of the four treatment groups that provide a brief on EU policies and its likely target group in Turkey. Despite the lack of statistical significance in some models, the findings reveal that people actually consider the likely targets of the policies, and reactive devaluation bias is activated as a result of the consideration of the nature of the relation between foreign state and the out-group. Hence, in the lights of these two studies, I find that identities affect individuals' attitudes towards foreign actors and their policies, 2) some foreign actors are seen as adversary when they are positively linked to the out-group, and 3) the source of the policy offering determines individuals' attitudes due to reactive devaluation bias, and thus some foreign actors' efforts are biased, regardless of the content of the policy offering.

This study offers important policy implications for scholars and policy makers. Complementing the findings of the previous chapters, I suggest that foreign actors' efforts to make positive influence at the micro-level are running in vain. It is because of that the domestic dynamics in the target state condition citizens' evaluations of these policies and their sources. That successfully explains why Turkey's efforts to gain power in the Middle East through soft power and public diplomacy investments turned out well against the expectation, or why U.S. policies to promote democracy and individual liberties in post-war Iraq mostly failed, or why Saudi Arabia's economic investments in Lebanon gained her more enemies.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I examine the attitude formation process of individuals towards foreign states and their policies. Thus, the main goal of the dissertation is to analyze the micro-level impacts of foreign policies of sender states by accounting for the domestic dynamics in the target state. In this regard, I have developed a theory, which sought to explain how domestic politics moderate the effects of policies of foreign countries. To this end, I bridge the gap between micro, meso, and macro levels of explanations, and argue that political, social and economic identities of individuals provide them with cues about the pros and cons of the policies; and people form their attitudes accordingly, regardless of the very goals of the actual policy. Since the dissertation is structured in the three-article format, I focus on different aspects of this attitude formation process in each main chapter. A common underlying theme in all three chapters is to suggest that the interaction among different levels of analysis determines individuals' perceptions about and reaction towards policies and their sources.

In the first main chapter of the dissertation, I investigate the impact of U.S. foreign aid abroad at the micro-level by analyzing how people form their attitudes in response to changing levels of aid. I demonstrate that the governing structure of the target country, as well as individuals' political predispositions, condition their attitudes towards the aid donor, the United States. In the second main chapter, I examine how people assess foreign policy choices of foreign states as employed in a manner that targets third parties. By focusing on the role of transnational identity ties, I argue

that any policy, which makes an impact on the in-group or out-group living abroad also influences individuals' attitudes towards the sender country, as group identities operate across borders. In the third main chapter, I probe the externalities of public diplomacy initiatives of foreign states, which are actually designed to win hearts and minds abroad and to serve the national interests of the sender countries at the micro-level. I contend that the presence of ethno-religious cleavages, which fuel inter-group conflict, motivates individuals to embrace a zero-sum perspective in assessing the effects of such policies and activate a reactive devaluation bias towards the sender country. Hence, regardless of the intended benefits of public diplomacy efforts for the target groups, individuals may devaluate such efforts, which wipes out the very goal of engaging in these initiatives.

In the rest of the conclusion chapter, I will begin with briefly summarizing the empirical findings of the main chapters. Then I will discuss the implications of this project. The findings offer important lessons for both scholars and policy makers by suggesting an arduous path for reaching out to the hearts and minds of the publics abroad. Lastly, I will conclude by presenting the theoretical and empirical limitations of this research and discuss future direction.

Summary of the Findings

In Chapter 2, I find that U.S. foreign aid has a non-homogenous impact on public opinion abroad. By utilizing Pew Global Attitudes Project dataset, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis in fifty countries from 2007 to 2012. As theoretically predicted, individuals' attitudes towards the aid donor is moderated by two factors: the regime type of the target state and individuals' political predisposition. Since non-democratic regimes corrupt such aid by transforming it from a public good to private one, and that benefiting from this corrupted aid is conditional on the political predisposition of an individual, each individual reacts to the aid differently. Accordingly, losers living in non-democratic regimes express negative attitudes towards the aid donor as the amount of foreign aid increases; whereas, winners in non-democratic regimes enjoy economic aid. Nevertheless, winners do not express significantly positive attitudes with the increasing amounts of military aid, partly

because it is difficult to transform the usage of military aid and to access its benefits. In democratic regimes, however, U.S. aid has a positive impact on the public opinion. Since democratic regimes use foreign aid as a public good, neither losers nor winners suffer from the potential corruption of the aid. Hence, with the increasing levels of aid, they express more pro-American attitudes, as the aid contributes to the public good.

In Chapter 3, I find that transnational identity ties cause individuals to positively or negatively assess foreign policy choices of foreign states, even if the given policy does not target their country or themselves. By conducting an original survey experiment in three major cities in Turkey, I demonstrate that political identities of individuals, which operate across the borders, are indicators of how people perceive and interpret policies of the sender state to the target state. I test my hypotheses embracing a comparative approach, and evaluate individuals' reactions to U.S. and Russian policy offerings in Syria. I specifically explore the attitudes of Turks and Kurds in Turkey towards the U.S. and Russia in regard to their policies for their brethren or enemies fighting in Syrian Civil War. The results of the empirical analysis show that Turks who are informed about U.S. support to Kurdish insurgents express more negative attitudes towards the U.S. compared to the Turks who are not. Similarly, attitudes of Turks are not in favor when it comes to Russian policies, which are against Turkmens in Syria. On the contrary, Kurds display more positive attitudes towards the U.S. and Russia when they are informed about the same policies regarding Kurdish insurgents and Turkmens, respectively.

In Chapter 4, I find that presence of an ethno-religious identity, which generates in-group vs. out-group dichotomy conditions individuals' evaluations of public diplomacy initiatives of foreign states through activating reactive devaluation bias against foreign states. By utilizing an original public opinion survey conducted in Lebanon, and a survey experiment conducted in Turkey, I show that the source of policy offerings is crucial in predicting people's attitudes about the policies. In the first study, I show that Lebanese express divergent attitudes towards the very same human rights and democracy promotion efforts, and they base their attitudes on the connections of the

sender state with their in-groups and out-groups in Lebanon. More specifically, I discover that while Lebanese Shiites welcome Iran's public diplomacy efforts in promoting human rights and democracy, Lebanese Sunnis express discontent with them, as it is coming from an adversary, an ally of Lebanese Shiites. The same is also true for Shiites when the source of the policy is Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Maronites, however, do not show any positive attitudes towards none of these regional powers, as they are all linked to their out-groups, either Shiites or Sunnis. To test the theoretical mechanism rigorously, I also employ the experimental data from Turkey in which individuals are asked how they feel about the European Union. With some reservations related to the statistical significance of the findings, I find that reactive devaluation bias is activated when people are hinted about the possible beneficiaries of the public diplomacy efforts.

Overall, I find that it is not only the features of the policy sender country, or what the policy aims, but also the features of the target country that affect individuals' attitudes towards the sender. Institutional structure, political cleavages, saliency and strength of identity politics as well as inter-group conflict in domestic politics are some of the factors that condition individuals' perception about and reaction towards foreign states and their policy choices. Along with these factors, connections of a foreign state with other states and identity groups, and transnational identity ties among individuals also moderate the attitude formation process of individuals.

Implications of the Project

In this section, I summarize below some of the immediate and broader implications of this research in bullet-points:

- First of all, scholars and policy makers must avoid taking impacts of foreign policy choices on public opinion abroad as homogenous. It is not the content of the policy, or who the policy sender is, but the domestic dynamics of the target states and connections of the policy sender that determine how the public perceives and reacts towards the policy and its source. Hence,

we should relax unitary actor assumption at both country- and individual-level. Foreign policies will not make a uniform effect across countries, across groups within countries, and across individuals within groups. Instead, the attitude formation is conditioned to a) macro- level factors, e.g., institutional structure, b) meso-level factors, e.g., cleavage structure and salience of identity politics, c) micro-level factors, e.g., the political predisposition of individuals.

- Second, an important lesson from this project is that soft power strategies and public diplomacy initiatives are often likely to suffer from inefficiency and ineffectiveness, which should not mean that such efforts are completely useless. Instead, I contend that designing policies operating at macro-level with broad goals such as "winning hearts and minds abroad" may also lead to "losing some hearts and minds." In this regard, scholars should examine the effects of specific policies at the micro-level, and policymakers must account for domestic dynamics of the target state when choosing the most appropriate policy depending on its purposes.

- On a related note, the findings of this project reveal how hard it is to get the support of public opinion abroad. States could take advantage of certain factors such as identity politics, in order to win hearts and minds of particular groups, but then would encounter serious difficulties in communicating with other sub-national groups. In that sense, states can still aim for ensuring a friendly environment at micro-level; nevertheless, this strategy would come with its costs either in the target country or third parties.

- Third, a broader implication of this research is to demonstrate how important is to bridge the gap between micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. As shown in this project, policies that are designed to pursue macro-level goals may actually generate undesired ramifications at the micro-level. For instance, giving economic aid, which is supposed to help the target state and its citizens, may result in increased negative attitudes towards the donor due to heterogeneous

group interests within the target state. Alternatively, a policy, which could win hearts and minds of an identity group, may well harm the attitudes of other groups because of an inter-group conflict between the target groups and others. Or, some policies, which are solely designed to improve the image of a country among public abroad, may not be welcome as a result of existing ties and connections of the sender country with "other" publics. Therefore, though it requires complex modeling decisions, future work on these topics should focus on disentangling the factors that mediate and moderate attitude formation of individuals.

- Hence, future research on understanding how people react to the policies of foreign states must benefit from an inter-disciplinary approach. Previous works on this topic mostly rely on the comparative foreign policy, public opinion and anti-Americanism literatures. However, given that multiple social and psychological factors influence decision-making and attitude formation of individuals, future work could easily benefit from political psychology, social psychology, cognitive science, communication theories, as well.

- Lastly, I believe that contribution of this project goes beyond the foreign policy and public opinion literatures. Specifically, the last 15 years of world politics revealed that states cannot simply neglect public opinion abroad, as it may pave the ground for violent non-state actors. Recent works on conflict processes demonstrate that accumulation of grievances is one of the foremost indicators for individuals to be recruited to the cause of insurgent, rebel, or terror groups. Or, in the context of inter-state relations, this research may shed light on some inquiries, as well, such as whether foreign policies like providing aid, engaging in public diplomacy with the rival state de-escalate a rivalry. So examining micro-level impacts of any policy choice, whether it aims to win hearts and minds, or not, is central for pursuing global peace and security.

Limitations and Future Directions

Notwithstanding its contributions, this dissertation project suffers from some practical and methodological limitations. In this section, I will first begin with the chapter specific limitations and then continue with possible weaknesses overall. In so doing, I will suggest improvements for the project, and also show possible venues of research for scholars of foreign policy and public opinion.

In the first main chapter of the dissertation, a finer-grained data could help probe the impact of foreign aid on distinct groups in the target country. For example, one can look at the agricultural aid or development assistance more specifically to see how people from different economic sectors react to the aid donor. In doing so, we can also relax the assumption about the level of information about foreign aid. This is because individuals may be more aware of the amount and impacts of specific aid programs that are targeting their primary expertise. Second, further research can focus deeper on the role of institutional factors. Currently, I am distinguishing the democracies from non-democracies and treating all non-democracies uniformly. However, as many studies suggest, there are also institutional differences among types of non-democracies, which can affect the transformation of aid, hence the reactions of individuals. Lastly, the theoretical mechanism can be tested more rigorously with an experimental approach. In the empirical analyses, the finding that increasing amount of aid influences anti-Americanism is derived from a cross-sectional model specification. With the help of an experimental design manipulating the information on aid, its amount, how it is used, and potential beneficiaries, we can also test whether the increasing amount of aid has a gradual effect on pro- or anti-American attitudes. Moreover, such experimental approach can also help us relax the information assumption I explained above via short vignettes.

In the second main chapter, I believe that the findings about Kurds' attitudes are likely to suffer from social-desirability bias and the manipulation itself. Beginning with the former issue, Kurds are an ethnic minority struggling for their rights in Turkey. Thus, the presence of an ongoing low-intensity conflict between Turkish Armed Forces and PKK may be concealing the true attitudes

of Kurds. This is because expressing negative attitudes towards the brethren of Turks, which are Turkmens in Syria, may be dangerous in a context where military operations keep taking place. Regarding the manipulation issue, I intentionally avoid deception in the vignettes not to endanger the security of enumerators and survey respondents. Therefore, while the manipulation in the first experiment is U.S. financial and military support to Kurds in Syria, it is Russians bombing of Turkmen towns in the second experiment. When two manipulations are compared, the latter is more conservative because its success relies on Kurds expressing gratification for an aggressive behavior, which has killed many people. Having said that, the results in the first experiment actually confirm my hypotheses, but one can make further tests to be more confident about their generalizability.

In the third main chapter, rapidly shifting alliances may bias the results against the theoretical claims I made in the first study. Considering that existing results largely support my hypotheses, I believe that focusing on a country, where there is a strong, salient and more consolidated ethno-religious cleavage, would also confirm my findings. In the second study, I urge the reader to be careful before coming to a conclusion. Although all the coefficients are in expected directions, and hence, manipulations influence the attitudes of individuals from various identity groups as expected, the lack of statistical significance in some models deserves further attention. This problem, I contend, is related to lack of deception in the manipulations. Accordingly, I could only highlight that the given ethno-religious groups would also benefit from such efforts along with all others. Moreover, compared to the experiment in the previous chapter, power of analysis is lower because there are one control and four treatment groups. Plus, given that I am interested in heterogeneous treatment effects, each of the five groups should have enough participation from different ethno-religious groups, which would also decrease the power.

Aside from chapter specific limitations and suggestion to overcome these problems in future research, I also believe that conducting a longitudinal analysis would contribute to the literature by showing how long the impacts of policy preferences endure at the micro-level. With acknowledging the difficulty of panel data collection, this type of research could also disclose the long-term effects

of specific policy choices at the micro-level as well as shed light on individuals' potential attitude changes. In addition to this, focusing on non-Middle Eastern cases may also strengthen the external validity of the empirical results. Lastly, further research can also focus on other individual-level moderators in order to see whether the effects are amplified conditional on risk and threat perceptions, attachment to identity, issue saliency and group loyalty. This way, we can better distinguish how and which individuals' hearts and minds are more likely to be won under what circumstances.

Appendix A

Appendix A contains summary statistics, robustness checks, and additional explanations about the theoretical framework, empirical strategy, and results of Chapter 2.

Table 6.1: W/S Score replacing 'Democracy' variable in the models of Main Table

DV: Anti-Americanism=1	(9) Ologit	(10) Ologit	(11) Ologit	(12) Ologit	(13) Logit	(14) Logit	(15) Logit	(16) Logit
Military Aid pc	0.013**	-0.009**			0.016**	-0.000		
	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.002)		
Military Aid pc X W/S	0.058**	-0.110**			0.046**	-0.086**		
	(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.011**	0.011**			0.016**	0.012**		
	(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)		
Mil.AidX W/S XDissatis.	0.055**	0.029**			0.029**	0.007		
	(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.009)	(0.009)		
Economic Aid pc			0.005**	-0.002**			0.005**	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)
Economic Aid pc X W/S			0.001	-0.049**			0.002	-0.039**
			(0.001)	(0.003)			(0.001)	(0.003)
Econ.AidXDissatis			0.003**	0.003**			0.005**	0.004**
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)
Econ.AidX W/S XDissatis.			0.001	-0.017**			-0.003*	-0.020**
			(0.001)	(0.003)			(0.002)	(0.003)
WoverS	-1.277**	-0.308**	-1.505**	0.564**	-1.567**	-0.730**	-1.903**	-0.012
	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.059)
Dissatisfied	-0.167**	-0.216**	0.030	0.003	-0.277**	-0.240**	-0.139**	-0.090^{+}
	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.037)	(0.052)
W/S X Dissatis.	0.571**	0.391**	0.412**	0.206**	0.755**	0.507**	0.665**	0.396**
	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.052)	(0.066)
Physical Integrity		-0.052**		-0.010**		-0.064**		-0.020**
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Middle East		2.175**		2.528**		1.791**		2.126**
		(0.024)		(0.021)		(0.023)		(0.022)
GDP pc		0.021**		-0.001		0.021**		-0.002^{+}
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Male		0.069**		0.024*		0.108**		0.067**
		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Age		0.008**		0.007**		0.008**		0.007**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		0.069**		0.091**		0.068**		0.089**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Employed		-0.044**		0.043**		-0.050**		0.023
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.016)
High School Grad.		-0.221**		-0.169**		-0.264**		-0.206**
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.018)		(0.016)
Economic Condition		0.137**		0.159**		0.150**		0.171**
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)
Bush Admin.		0.331**		0.260**		0.398**		0.307**
		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.025)		(0.025)
Constant					0.872**	-1.027**	0.914**	-1.599**
					(0.033)	(0.062)	(0.028)	(0.054)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	121938	101787	140446	113476	121938	101787	140446	113476
Pseudo R^2	0.030	0.085	0.025	0.093	0.053	0.125	0.048	0.131
Log likelihood	-157800	-125000	-181600	-137300	-80000	-61622	-92405	-67936
χ^2	9009	19298	9573	22672	7122	14297	8163	16514

Robust standard errors in parentheses, cut points not reported + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.2: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) Mean	(3) SD	(4) Min	(5) Max
Anti-American	154,783	0.469	0.499	0	1
Total Aid pc	139,629	19.26	59.00	0.0004	397
Economic Aid pc	163,405	9.223	24.57	0.0001	185
Military Aid pc	143,883	10.83	51.12	0.0001	375
Dissatisfied	160,972	0.619	0.486	0	1
Non-Democratic	169,413	0.298	0.458	0	1
Middle Eastern	169,413	0.238	0.426	0	1
Physical Integrity	166,576	3.162	2.596	0	8
GDPpc	169,413	12,516	14,680	241	50,558
Male	169,413	0.488	0.500	0	1
Age	168,835	40.36	15.79	18	97
Religiosity	140,436	0.787	0.409	0	1
Employed	165,210	0.666	0.472	0	1
High School Grad.	169,413	0.217	0.412	0	1
Economic Content	162,733	0.426	0.495	0	1
Bush Era	169,559	0.394	0.488	0	1

Table 6.3: Survey Respondents by Country-Year

Countries	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Argentina	800	801	800	803	-	-
Australia	-	700	-	-	-	-
Bangladesh	1,000	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	834	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	-	-	813	1,000	802	800
Bulgaria	500	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	1,004	-	750	-	-	-
Chile	800	-	-	-	-	-
China	3,142	3,212	3,169	3,262	3,308	3,177
Czech Rep.	900	-	-	-	-	1,000
Egypt	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Ethiopia	710	-	-	-	-	-
France	1,004	754	753	752	1,004	1,004
Germany	1,000	750	751	750	1,001	1,000
Ghana	707	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
India	2,043	2,056	2,038	2,254	4,029	4,018
Indonesia	1,008	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	-
Israel	900	-	1,201	-	907	-
Italy	501	-	-	-	-	1,074
Ivory Cost	700	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	762	708	700	700	700	700
Jordan	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Kenya	1,000	-	1,002	1,002	1,002	-
Kuwait	500	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	750	-
Malaysia	700	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	700	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	828	805	1,000	1,300	800	1,200
Morocco	1,000	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	1,128	1,000	1,000	1,000	-	-
Pakistan	2,008	1,254	1,254	2,000	1,970	1,206
Pakistan*	-	-	-	-	1,251	-
Palestine	808	-	1,204	-	825	-
Peru	800	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	504	750	750	750	750	1,001
Russia	1,002	1,000	1,001	1,001	1,000	1,000
S.Africa	1,000	1,001	-	-	-	-
S.Korea	718	714	702	706	-	-
Senegal	700	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	900	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	500	752	750	755	1,000	1,000
Sweden	1,000	-	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	704	704	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
Turkey	971	1,003	1,005	1,003	1,000	1,001
Uganda	1,122	-	-	-	-	-
UK	2,002	1,753	754	750	1,000	1,018
Ukraine	500	-	-	-	1,000	-
Venezuela	803	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**43213**	**23717**	**25397**	**23788**	**28100**	**25199**

* Pakistan revisited in 2011.

Table 6.4: Questions - Pew Research Global Attitudes Datasets

Satisfaction

Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?

Satisfied – Dissatisfied // Don't know - Refused

Anti-Americanism

Please tell me your opinion of …

a. The United States

b. Americans

Very good - Somewhat good - Somewhat bad - Very bad // Don't know - Refused

Economic Condition

Now thinking about your economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation?

Very good - Somewhat good - Somewhat bad - Very bad // Don't know - Refused

Age

How old were you at your last birthday?

Gender

Female - Male

Religiosity

How important is religion in your life?

Very important - Somewhat important - Not too important - Not at all important // Don't know - Refused

Education

Question wording and response categories vary by country

Employment

What is your current employment situation?

Full-time employed

Part-time employed

Pensioner and employed

Self-employed

Pensioner, not employed

Unemployed, no state benefit

Unemployed, receiving state benefit

No job, other government assistance for such things as maternity or disability

Not employed (e.g. housewife, houseman, student)

Don't know - Refused

Standardization of Control Variables

As the Pew Research for Global Attitudes surveys were not designed for longitudinal cross-sectional analysis, I encountered a problem in regard to determining how to standardize the demographics of the survey respondents across countries and years. Specifically, the categories of education and income varied across countries and years. Therefore, I sought to overcome this problem by creating dummy variables, which partly controlled for the different standardizations of these categories across countries. For the education variable, I selected high school graduation as an important threshold, considering a university education to be rare in underdeveloped countries. It was much more difficult, however, to come up with standardized income levels. This is because there is no clear and reliable way to set a threshold, as the categories that make up income vary drastically, even within the same country, and across years. For this reason, I decided to control for ego-tropic evaluation of income, a more standardized measure of income. The survey questions can be found in Appendix C.

Aid Through Different Channels

The reason why I contend that the people in non-democratic regimes would develop different attitudes than the people in democratic regimes, as the former transforms the aid to a private good to be utilized for the consolidation of the status quo. This argument builds on the premise that aid provision forces donor country to engage in a principal-agent relation with the recipient country. However, not all types of aid are channeled via government mechanism. For example, the U.S. donates around 50% of its Official Development Assistance via bypass channels . Therefore, one can argue that aid provided via bypass channels would not cause the same effect I expected to see compared to governmental channels. Due to data limitations, I put some reservations on the findings related to economic aid. Nevertheless, I do not think that bypass channels would seriously undermine the theory. My argument builds on perception of individuals instead of direct benefits they derive. In non-democratic regimes, winning coalitions who can receive the direct benefits

of aid by distribution of private goods is very limited, in so much that it is very implausible to measure their attitudes through survey questions. The rest, I categorize as winners and losers mostly define their status based on their perceptions, thus cognitive processes. So, as long as people perceive some level of donor-recipient relations between their government and the U.S., they can still develop their attitudes accordingly. When it comes to military aid, though, merely direct channels, namely Department of Defense, provide it. Hence, interpretation of the results does not necessitate any reservations in relation of aid distribution channels.

Table 6.5: Robustness - Sub-Sampling: Middle East & Non-Middle East

DV: Anti-Americanism=1	(1) Middle East	(2) Non-Middle East	(3) Middle East	(4) Non-Middle East
Military Aid pc	-0.035**	-0.290**		
	(0.008)	(0.039)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	0.058**	0.334**		
	(0.008)	(0.073)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.011	0.366**		
	(0.008)	(0.041)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.009	0.930**		
	(0.009)	(0.094)		
Economic Aid pc			-0.024**	-0.041**
			(0.002)	(0.004)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.			0.029**	-0.013^{+}
			(0.003)	(0.007)
Econ.AidXDissatis			-0.008**	-0.032**
			(0.003)	(0.004)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.			0.007**	0.168**
			(0.003)	(0.010)
Non-Democratic	-0.271**	0.308**	-0.538**	0.501**
	(0.073)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.041)
Dissatisfied	0.158**	0.134**	0.259**	0.295**
	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.017)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.088	-0.929**	-0.079	-1.355**
	(0.084)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Physical Integrity	-0.449**	0.039**	-0.130**	0.053**
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.004)
GDP pc	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.194**	0.030*	0.158**	-0.002
	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.014)
Age	0.005**	0.008**	0.005**	0.008**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Religious	-0.317**	0.138**	-0.253**	0.119**
	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.007)
Employed	-0.069*	-0.026	-0.023	0.030*
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.016)
High School Grad.	-0.275**	-0.110**	-0.256**	-0.096**
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.015)
Economic Condition	0.201**	0.114**	0.200**	0.128**
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Bush Admin.	1.023**	0.306**	0.542**	0.199**
	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.026)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	31648	70139	32070	81406
Pseudo R^2	0.050	0.029	0.051	0.030
Log likelihood	-35138.402	-86948.827	-35696.594	-99299.887
χ^2	3436.273	5086.360	3445.009	5794.785

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.6: Robustness - Sub-Sampling: Non-OECD & OECD

DV: Anti-Americanism	(1) Non-OECD	(2) Non-OECD	(3) Non-Ally	(4) Non-Ally
Military Aid pc	-0.071**		-0.087**	
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	0.072**		0.080**	
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.016*		0.017*	
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.004		-0.003	
	(0.008)		(0.009)	
Economic Aid pc		-0.034**		-0.036**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.		0.030**		0.031**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Econ.AidXDissatis		-0.013**		-0.013**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.		0.019**		0.019**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Non-Democratic	0.074**	-0.030	0.148**	-0.004
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Dissatisfied	0.170**	0.288**	0.185**	0.295**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.420**	-0.517**	-0.470**	-0.562**
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Physical Integrity	-0.115**	-0.013**	-0.064**	-0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Middle East	1.858**	2.187**	2.094**	2.351**
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)
GDP pc	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.101**	0.035*	0.074**	0.028*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age	0.009**	0.009**	0.009**	0.009**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious	-0.003	0.108**	0.053**	0.115**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	-0.060**	0.041**	-0.035*	0.047**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)
High School Grad.	-0.297**	-0.230**	-0.255**	-0.203**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Economic Condition	0.131**	0.157**	0.140**	0.169**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Bush Admin.	0.589**	0.362**	0.367**	0.289**
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	74019	77366	94654	99464
Pseudo R^2	0.082	0.090	0.088	0.098
Log likelihood	-92643.433	-96014.717	-1.164e+05	-1.210e+05
χ^2	14350.907	15777.313	19114.115	21126.469

Robust standard errors in parentheses, cut points not reported, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.7: Robustness - Israel included into the models of Main Table

DV: Anti-Americanism=1	(1) Ologit	(2) Ologit	(3) Ologit	(4) Ologit	(5) Logit	(6) Logit	(7) Logit	(8) Logit
Military Aid pc	-0.001**	-0.002**			-0.001**	-0.001**		
	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	0.029**	-0.001			0.035**	0.009**		
	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	-0.000	0.000			-0.000	0.000		
	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)		
MilAidXNonDemXDis.	0.016**	0.014**			0.018**	0.013**		
	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.002)	(0.002)		
Economic Aid pc			0.006**	-0.035**			0.008**	-0.027**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.			0.007**	0.031**			0.007**	0.026**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXDissatis			0.003**	-0.010**			0.001*	-0.012**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
EconAidXNonDemXDis.			0.002*	0.016**			0.004**	0.018**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.001)	(0.002)
Non-Democratic	0.421**	0.223**	0.567**	0.002	0.573**	0.424**	0.766**	0.312**
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Dissatisfied	0.480**	0.180**	0.442**	0.279**	0.511**	0.234**	0.485**	0.335**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.680**	-0.479**	-0.545**	-0.556**	-0.681**	-0.453**	-0.566**	-0.557**
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Physical Integrity		-0.074**		-0.029**		-0.075**		-0.025**
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Middle East		1.908**		2.388**		1.596**		2.059**
		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.020)
GDP pc		0.000**		0.000**		0.000**		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Male		0.080**		0.026*		0.130**		0.083**
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Age		0.008**		0.007**		0.007**		0.006**
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		0.041**		0.077**		0.028**		0.058**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Employed		-0.054**		0.045**		-0.077**		0.005
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.016)		(0.015)
High School Grad.		-0.243**		-0.163**		-0.283**		-0.194**
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.017)		(0.016)
Economic Condition		0.133**		0.161**		0.145**		0.172**
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.008)
Bush Admin.		0.373**		0.309**		0.407**		0.315**
		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.025)		(0.024)
Constant					-0.405**	-1.569**	-0.643**	-1.694**
					(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.017)	(0.037)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	124747	104475	143255	116164	124747	104475	143255	116164
Pseudo R^2	0.022	0.083	0.018	0.093	0.043	0.122	0.035	0.131
Log likelihood	-162600	-128600	-186500	-140600	-82657	-63462	-95424	-69475
χ^2	6971	19438	6900	22628	5096	14706	6111	16433

Robust standard errors in parentheses, cut points not reported $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.8: Robustness - Variable Selection: Attitudes towards Americans

DV: Anti-Americanism	(1) Miltary	(2) Military	(3) Economic	(4) Economic
Military Aid pc	0.032**	-0.104**		
	(0.009)	(0.008)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	-0.022*	0.090**		
	(0.009)	(0.008)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.024*	0.015^{+}		
	(0.010)	(0.009)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.005	0.001		
	(0.010)	(0.009)		
Economic Aid pc			0.006**	-0.042**
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.			-0.003**	0.033**
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXDissatis			0.001	-0.013**
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.			0.007**	0.021**
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Non-Democratic	0.460**	-0.031	0.572**	-0.238**
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Dissatisfied	0.298**	0.101**	0.327**	0.205**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.598**	-0.372**	-0.565**	-0.445**
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.034)
Physical Integrity		-0.086**		-0.034**
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Middle East		1.771**		2.036**
		(0.022)		(0.019)
GDP pc		0.000**		-0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Male		0.050**		0.000
		(0.013)		(0.012)
Age		0.006**		0.005**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		0.061**		0.096**
		(0.007)		(0.006)
Employed		-0.065**		0.029*
		(0.014)		(0.013)
High School Grad.		-0.297**		-0.246**
		(0.014)		(0.013)
Economic Condition		0.130**		0.150**
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Bush Admin.		0.194**		0.140**
		(0.021)		(0.021)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	120526	100703	138916	112325
Pseudo R^2	0.012	0.058	0.010	0.070
Log likelihood	-154886	-124602	-177566	-135492
χ^2	3436.7	13383.3	3593.2	16780.8

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Cut points and year fixed effects are not reported

Table 6.9: Robustness - Variable Selection: Repressive States

DV: Anti-Americanism	(1) Military	(2) Military	(3) Economic	(4) Economic
Military Aid pc	0.033**	0.002*		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Mil.AidXRepress	0.101**	0.025**		
	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.007**	0.003**		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.XRepress.	0.422**	0.141**		
	(0.016)	(0.013)		
Economic Aid pc			0.016**	-0.003**
			(0.000)	(0.001)
Econ.AidXRepress			0.024**	0.013*
			(0.005)	(0.006)
Econ.AidXDissatis			-0.003**	-0.007**
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Econ.AidXDissatis.XRepress.			0.171**	0.062**
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Repressive	-0.067**	-0.304**	0.042**	-0.157**
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Dissatisfied	0.099**	-0.003	0.102**	0.101**
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Dissatis.XRepress.	-0.261**	0.126**	-0.262**	-0.031
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.032)
Physical Integrity		-0.079**		-0.034**
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Middle East		1.755**		2.092**
		(0.024)		(0.020)
GDP pc		0.000**		0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Male		0.074**		0.059**
		(0.013)		(0.012)
Age		0.008**		0.008**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		0.075**		0.075**
		(0.007)		(0.006)
Employed		-0.059**		-0.051**
		(0.014)		(0.013)
High School Grad.		-0.222**		-0.179**
		(0.014)		(0.013)
Economic Condition		0.112**		0.116**
		(0.008)		(0.008)
Bush Admin.		0.391**		0.102**
		(0.021)		(0.021)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	121938	101787	137708	113476
Pseudo R^2	0.042	0.085	0.021	0.084
Log likelihood	-155677	-124991	-178331	-138747
χ^2	7859.9	18418.4	6056.7	20031.0

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.10: Robustness: Cumulative Aid & Change in Aid

DV: Anti-Americanism	(1) Cumulative	(2) Cumulative	(3) Change	(4) Change
Cumm. Mil.Aid	-0.000			
	(0.000)			
Cumm.Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	0.003**			
	(0.000)			
Cumm. Econ.Aid		0.000		
		(0.000)		
Cumm.Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis		0.011**		
		(0.001)		
Ch. in Mil.Aid			-0.034**	
			(0.004)	
Ch.in Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.			0.173*	
			(0.071)	
Ch. in Econ.Aid				0.000*
				(0.000)
Ch.in Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis				0.242**
				(0.041)
Non-Democratic	0.316**	0.291**	0.179**	0.209**
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Dissatisfied	0.181**	0.177**	0.199**	0.177**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.499**	-0.960**	-0.353**	-0.339**
	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Middle East	2.057**	2.003**	2.013**	1.990**
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Physical Integrity	-0.063**	-0.055**	-0.037**	-0.054**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP pc	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.062**	0.072**	0.083**	0.063**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Age	0.008**	0.007**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious	0.044**	0.041**	0.049**	0.055**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Employed	-0.042**	-0.053**	-0.047**	-0.047**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
High School Grad.	-0.207**	-0.219**	-0.257**	-0.214**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Economic Condition	0.125**	0.133**	0.145**	0.132**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Bush Admin.	0.359**	0.386**	0.371**	0.286**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	114089	114482	96060	109942
Pseudo R^2	0.080	0.080	0.086	0.079
Log likelihood	-1.401e+05	-1.405e+05	-1.182e+05	-1.353e+05
χ^2	19395.424	19269.197	18283.258	18862.257

All Constitutive terms including 2-way interactions are included but not reported.

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.11: Robustness: Random Effects Model

	(1) Military	(2) Military	(3) Economic	(4) Economic
Military Aid pc	-0.0003	-0.002		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.	0.008*	0.008*		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Mil.AidXDissatis.	0.008*	0.006^{+}		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Mil.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.007*	-0.006*		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Economic Aid pc			0.0002	0.003^{+}
			(0.0004)	(0.001)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.			0.002*	-0.002
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Econ.AidXDissatis			-0.0002	-0.005**
			(0.0004)	(0.001)
Econ.AidXNon-Dem.XDissatis.			0.001^{+}	0.005**
			(0.0005)	(0.001)
Non-Democratic	-0.206**	-0.195**	-0.218**	-0.211**
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Dissatisfied	0.171**	0.109**	0.171**	0.125**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Non-Dem.XDissatis.	-0.041**	-0.015	-0.049**	-0.031*
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Physical Integrity		0.014*		0.015**
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Middle East		1.012**		0.931**
		(0.151)		(0.123)
GDP pc		0.019**		0.008**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Male		0.050**		0.050**
		(0.006)		(0.006)
Age		0.003**		0.002**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Religious		-0.008*		-0.006^{+}
		(0.004)		(0.003)
Employed		-0.009		-0.013*
		(0.007)		(0.006)
High School Grad.		-0.058**		-0.047**
		(0.007)		(0.007)
Economic Condition		0.077**		0.076**
		(0.004)		(0.003)
Bush Admin.		0.196**		0.189**
		(0.013)		(0.013)
Constant	2.546**	1.606**	2.539**	1.714**
	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	121938	101787	140446	113476
Pseudo R^2	43	40	49	45
χ^2	2189	2655	2185	2745

Robust standard errors in parentheses $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.12: Robustness: Predicting the Distribution of Foreign Aid

DV: Foreign Aid	(1) Total Aid	(2) Military Aid	(3) Economic Aid
Anti-Americanism (lag 2 years)	0.028	-0.025	0.027
	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Total Aid pc (lag 1 year)	1.029**		
	(0.027)		
Military Aid pc (lag 1 year)		1.017**	
		(0.023)	
Economic Aid pc (lag 1 year)			1.046**
			(0.126)
Physical Integrity	-0.237	-0.054	-0.275
	(0.422)	(0.197)	(0.323)
Polity	0.197	0.041	0.106
	(0.227)	(0.073)	(0.149)
Middle East	-0.756	1.281	-1.492
	(2.680)	(2.682)	(2.668)
GDP pc	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.705	0.576	-1.213
	(2.008)	(0.651)	(1.626)
Observations	86	87	109
R^2	0.989	0.995	0.909

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

The unconditional effect of aid on anti-American attitudes

The reason why I report this unconditional model, which tests the conventional wisdom that the aid could recover anti-Americanism, is to reveal the importance of accounting for political status of people and regime type, as well as different aid types in predicting anti-Americanism. The unconditional model covers all countries in the analysis with all survey respondents regardless of the extent to which they are or are not satisfied with the regime under which they are living. The effect is statistically significant, indicating that the higher total aid per capita received, the less likely the public is to express anti-American opinions. However, the substantial effect is actually very low. This also confirms the necessity of looking at other factors about which I have hypothesized in this study.

Table 6.13: Robustness: Unconditional Effect of Aid on Anti-American Attitudes

	(1) Ologit	(2) Ologit	(3) Ologit	(4) Logit	(5) Logit	(6) Logit
Total Aid pc	-0.006**			-0.004**		
	(0.000)			(0.000)		
Military Aid pc		-0.005**			0.003**	
		(0.001)			(0.001)	
Economic Aid pc			-0.010**			-0.007**
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Physical Integrity	-0.022**	-0.048**	-0.019**	-0.024**	-0.052**	-0.025**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Polity	-0.026**	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.050**	-0.036**	-0.039**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Middle East	2.130**	2.035**	2.225**	1.788**	1.660**	1.851**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
GDP pc	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.090**	0.087**	0.058**	0.141**	0.134**	0.109**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Age	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.007**	0.008**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious	0.040**	0.052**	0.064**	0.022**	0.039**	0.046**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	-0.087**	-0.081**	-0.053**	-0.118**	-0.105**	-0.088**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
High School Grad.	-0.218**	-0.228**	-0.182**	-0.253**	-0.254**	-0.215**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Economic Condition	0.155**	0.152**	0.160**	0.178**	0.172**	0.180**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Bush Admin.	0.244**	0.300**	0.100**	0.311**	0.396**	0.177**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.086	0.084	0.083	0.125	0.121	0.118
Log likelihood	-126595	-129514	-142914	-62481	-64086	-71044
χ^2	19138.4	19234.1	19892.2	15094.9	14956.6	15581.4

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Appendix B

Appendix B contains summary statistics, robustness checks about the empirical strategy and results of Chapter 3.

Table 7.1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Dependent Variables:					
Attitudes towards the US	1,065	2.090	2.249	0	10
Attitudes towards Russia	1,032	3.269	2.640	0	10
Independent Variables:					
YPG Treatment	1,136	0.301	0.459	0	1
Turkmen Treatment	1,136	0.301	0.459	0	1
Turk	1,125	0.619	0.486	0	1
Kurd	1,125	0.346	0.476	0	1
Turk (YPG Treatment=1)	1,125	0.188	0.391	0	1
Kurd (YPG Treatment=1)	1,125	0.104	0.305	0	1
Turk (Turkmen Treatment=1)	1,125	0.182	0.386	0	1
Kurd (Turkmen Treatment=1)	1,125	0.114	0.318	0	1
Male	1,136	0.510	0.500	0	1
Age	1,136	37.62	13.37	18	77
Education	1,134	4.175	1.515	1	8
Income	1,015	4.597	2.466	1	10
Urban	1,136	0.878	0.328	0	1
Religiosity	917	3.34e-09	1.000	-2.160	2.036
Istanbul	1,136	0.456	0.498	0	1
Diyarbakir	1,136	0.267	0.442	0	1
Gaziantep	1,136	0.277	0.448	0	1

Table 7.2: Summary Statistics for Treatments

	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi	Total
First Experiment					
Control Group	272	162	296	32	447
US - Ethnic Treatment	211	117	233	18	337
US - Sectarian Treatment	213	110	233	20	335
Total	696	389	762	70	1136
Second Experiment					
Control Group	273	147	305	19	436
Russia - Ethnic Treatment	205	128	232	23	340
Russia - Sectarian Treatment	218	114	225	28	343
Total	696	389	762	70	1136

Totals do not hold as individuals have both ethnic and sectarian identities
Other ethnic and sectarian identities are not reported

Table 7.3: Robustness: Controlling for the Effect of Location

DV: Attitudes towards	(1) The U.S.	(2) The U.S.	(3) Russia	(4) Russia
Turk (YPG Treatment=1)	-0.745*			
	(0.379)			
Kurd (YPG Treatment=1)		0.709*		
		(0.394)		
Turk (Turkmen Treatment=1)				-0.739*
				(0.405)
Kurd (Turkmen Treatment=1)			0.674*	
			(0.408)	
YPG Treatment	0.274	-0.441***		
	(0.338)	(0.168)		
Turkmen Treatment			-0.561**	0.136
			(0.233)	(0.329)
Turk	-0.259			0.085
	(0.260)			(0.293)
Kurd		0.325	-0.233	
		(0.264)	(0.301)	
Age	-0.012*	-0.012*	0.006	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Male	0.286*	0.288*	0.513***	0.510***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.183)	(0.184)
Education	0.074	0.074	0.109^{+}	0.113^{+}
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Income	-0.015	-0.015	-0.034	-0.032
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Urban	0.294	0.306	0.577**	0.571**
	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.282)	(0.283)
Religiosity	-0.209**	-0.206**	-0.151^{+}	-0.145^{+}
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Istanbul	-0.500**	-0.486**	1.328***	1.334***
	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.253)	(0.252)
Diyarbakir	0.773***	0.752***	0.721**	0.609**
	(0.291)	(0.286)	(0.305)	(0.308)
Constant	2.088***	1.806***	1.312**	1.178**
	(0.542)	(0.489)	(0.527)	(0.569)
N	805	805	785	785
R^2	0.113	0.114	0.081	0.083

Robust Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ p<0.10 at one-tailed, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 at two-tailed

Table 7.4: Robustness: Dropping Sectarian Treatment from the Data

DV: Attitudes towards	(1) The U.S.	(2) The U.S.	(3) The U.S.	(4) The U.S.	(5) Russia	(6) Russia	(7) Russia	(8) Russia
Turk (YPG Treatment=1)	-0.442	-0.626^{+}						
	(0.369)	(0.428)						
Kurd (YPG Treatment=1)			0.357	0.494				
			(0.384)	(0.441)				
Turk (Turkmen Treatment=1)							-0.763*	-0.820*
							(0.408)	(0.463)
Kurd (Turkmen Treatment=1)					0.877**	0.872*		
					(0.408)	(0.465)		
YPG Treatment	0.021	0.126	-0.393**	-0.441**				
	(0.326)	(0.377)	(0.169)	(0.195)				
Turkmen Treatment					-1.231***	-1.044***	-0.461^{+}	-0.229
					(0.245)	(0.266)	(0.327)	(0.374)
Turk	-1.053***	-0.984***					0.347	0.100
	(0.240)	(0.274)					(0.275)	(0.319)
Kurd			1.210***	1.160***	-0.676**	-0.345		
			(0.249)	(0.283)	(0.276)	(0.327)		
Age		-0.013*		-0.013*		0.006		0.007
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.009)
Male		0.273^{+}		0.284^{+}		0.588***		0.595***
		(0.191)		(0.191)		(0.221)		(0.221)
Education		0.085		0.079		0.169*		0.168*
		(0.073)		(0.073)		(0.086)		(0.087)
Income		-0.079^{+}		-0.069^{+}		0.086^{+}		0.103**
		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.054)		(0.052)
Urban		0.084		0.142		0.752**		0.764**
		(0.329)		(0.328)		(0.339)		(0.334)
Religiosity		-0.278**		-0.274**		-0.269**		-0.270**
		(0.117)		(0.116)		(0.121)		(0.121)
Constant	2.885***	3.082***	1.817***	1.998***	4.022***	1.493**	3.579***	1.196*
	(0.201)	(0.598)	(0.125)	(0.587)	(0.168)	(0.641)	(0.214)	(0.624)
N	746	567	746	567	716	550	716	550
R^2	0.073	0.116	0.084	0.123	0.039	0.085	0.035	0.087

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ p<0.10 at one-tailed, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 at two-tailed

Figure 7.1: Robustness: Dropping Sectarian Treatment from the Data





Appendix C

Appendix C contains summary statistics for the control groups and treatments as well as variables used in empirical analysis, main tables of the results of Study 2, and robustness checks for the sensitivity of empirical strategy and results in Chapter 4.

Table 8.1: Summary Statistics - Study 1

VARIABLES	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Dependent Variables:					
Support for Public Diplomacy Efforts of					
Iran	1,185	2.622	1.510	1	5
Turkey	1,173	2.098	1.212	1	5
Saudi Arabia	1,182	2.136	1.354	1	5
The United States	1,183	1.939	1.138	1	5
Russia	1,170	2.822	1.351	1	5
Independent Variables:					
Sunni	1,200	0.267	0.442	0	1
Shiite	1,200	0.258	0.438	0	1
Maronite	1,200	0.274	0.446	0	1
Media	1,155	2.950	1.089	1	5
Egocentric Evaluation	1,198	1.504	0.602	1	3
Voted in 2009	1,198	0.584	0.493	0	1
Religiosity	1,197	3.063	0.653	1	4
Male	1,200	0.500	0.500	0	1
Age	1,200	44.18	15.69	18	81
Education	1,200	6.656	2.441	1	11
Income	1,200	4.272	1.414	1	8
Employed in Public Sector	1,200	0.0550	0.228	0	1

Table 8.2: Summary Statistics - Study 2

VARIABLES	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Dependent Variable:					
Attitudes towards the EU	984	3.909	2.818	0	10
Independent Variables:					
Turk Treatment	1,136	0.202	0.401	0	1
Kurd Treatment	1,136	0.201	0.401	0	1
Sunni Treatment	1,136	0.203	0.403	0	1
Alevi Treatment	1,136	0.195	0.397	0	1
Turk	1,125	0.619	0.486	0	1
Kurd	1,125	0.346	0.476	0	1
Sunni	1,119	0.681	0.466	0	1
Alevi	1,119	0.0626	0.242	0	1
Turk (Turk Treatment=1)	1,125	0.128	0.334	0	1
Kurd (Turk Treatment=1)	1,125	0.120	0.325	0	1
Turk (Kurd Treatment=1)	1,125	0.0693	0.254	0	1
Kurd (Kurd Treatment=1)	1,125	0.0747	0.263	0	1
Sunni (Sunni Treatment=1)	1,119	0.143	0.350	0	1
Sunni (Alevi Treatment=1)	1,119	0.135	0.342	0	1
Alevi (Sunni Treatment=1)	1,119	0.0125	0.111	0	1
Alevi (Alevi Treatment=1)	1,119	0.0125	0.111	0	1
Male	1,136	0.510	0.500	0	1
Age	1,136	37.62	13.37	18	77
Education	1,134	4.175	1.515	1	8
Income	1,015	4.597	2.466	1	10
Urban	1,136	0.878	0.328	0	1
Religiosity	917	3.34e-09	1.000	-2.160	2.036
Istanbul	1,136	0.456	0.498	0	1
Diyarbakir	1,136	0.267	0.442	0	1
Gaziantep	1,136	0.277	0.448	0	1

Table 8.3: Summary Statistics for Treatments - Study 2

	Turk	Kurd	Sunni	Alevi	Total
Control Group	134	74	149	8	219
Turk Treatment	144	78	156	15	227
Kurd Treatment	135	84	146	19	224
Sunni Treatment	142	84	160	14	231
Alevi Treatment	141	69	151	14	218
Total	696	389	762	70	1136

Totals do not hold as individuals have both ethnic and sectarian identities
Other ethnic and sectarian identities are not reported

Table 8.4: Heterogenous Effect of Ethnic Treatments

DV: Attitudes towards EU	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Turk (Kurd Treatment=1)	-0.646^{+}	-0.803^{+}						
	(0.481)	(0.556)						
Kurd (Kurd Treatment=1)			0.551	0.708				
			(0.492)	(0.573)				
Turk (Turk Treatment=1)					0.307	0.535		
					(0.482)	(0.539)		
Kurd (Turk Treatment=1)							-0.154	-0.454
							(0.493)	(0.552)
Turk	-0.573***	-0.802***			-0.768***	-1.061***		
	(0.207)	(0.238)			(0.208)	(0.242)		
Turk Treatment					-0.034	-0.263	0.204	0.220
					(0.392)	(0.436)	(0.275)	(0.309)
Kurd			0.533**	0.781***			0.677***	1.006***
			(0.212)	(0.247)			(0.212)	(0.249)
Kurd Treatment	0.434	0.465	-0.153	-0.264				
	(0.379)	(0.451)	(0.290)	(0.321)				
Age		-0.003		-0.003		-0.003		-0.003
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Male		0.012		0.034		0.020		0.039
		(0.205)		(0.206)		(0.206)		(0.206)
Education		-0.014		-0.019		-0.013		-0.018
		(0.077)		(0.077)		(0.077)		(0.077)
Income		0.131***		0.130***		0.129***		0.129***
		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)
Urban		-0.001		0.013		-0.013		-0.004
		(0.369)		(0.368)		(0.368)		(0.367)
Religiosity		-0.631***		-0.636***		-0.631***		-0.637***
		(0.108)		(0.108)		(0.107)		(0.107)
Constant	4.269***	3.992***	3.726***	3.238***	4.367***	4.155***	3.657***	3.166***
	(0.167)	(0.619)	(0.120)	(0.657)	(0.166)	(0.634)	(0.122)	(0.666)
Observations	977	757	977	757	977	757	977	757
R^2	0.016	0.079	0.013	0.076	0.015	0.078	0.012	0.074
χ^2								

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10 (one-tailed), * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8.5: Heterogenous Effect of Sectarian Treatments

DV: Attitudes towards EU	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Sunni (Alevi Treatment=1)	-0.112	-0.488						
	(0.511)	(0.557)						
Alevi (Alevi Treatment=1)			-0.532	0.283				
			(1.057)	(1.103)				
Sunni (Sunni Treatment=1)					1.013**	0.953*		
					(0.506)	(0.548)		
Alevi (Sunni Treatment=1)							-0.187	-0.825
							(0.976)	(0.954)
Sunni Treatment					-0.518	-0.279	0.207	0.417*
					(0.444)	(0.476)	(0.220)	(0.248)
Alevi Treatment	-0.094	0.200	-0.159	-0.133				
	(0.444)	(0.475)	(0.230)	(0.258)				
Sunni	-1.244***	-1.132***			-1.480***	-1.434***		
	(0.223)	(0.257)			(0.223)	(0.259)		
Alevi			1.632***	0.920*			1.562***	1.155**
			(0.413)	(0.490)			(0.430)	(0.509)
Age		-0.003		-0.005		-0.003		-0.005
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)
Male		0.122		0.109		0.115		0.105
		(0.202)		(0.207)		(0.202)		(0.207)
Education		-0.024		-0.020		-0.022		-0.017
		(0.076)		(0.078)		(0.076)		(0.078)
Income		0.103**		0.058		0.107**		0.059
		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.044)
Urban		0.062		-0.160		0.047		-0.176
		(0.357)		(0.373)		(0.361)		(0.375)
Religiosity		-0.577***		-0.591***		-0.578***		-0.594***
		(0.106)		(0.109)		(0.106)		(0.109)
Constant	4.803***	4.359***	3.828***	4.005***	4.891***	4.459***	3.752***	3.891***
	(0.190)	(0.625)	(0.103)	(0.624)	(0.189)	(0.617)	(0.105)	(0.623)
Observations	972	758	972	758	972	758	972	758
R^2	0.043	0.093	0.019	0.060	0.048	0.099	0.019	0.064
χ^2								

Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8.6: Robustness: Merging Maronites and all other Christians

DV: Attitudes towards Public Diplomacy efforts of	(1) Iran	(2) Iran	(3) Turkey	(4) Turkey	(5) Saudi Arabia	(6) Saudi Arabia	(7) USA	(8) USA	(9) Russia	(10) Russia
Christians/Maronites	0.090	0.066	-0.412**	-0.320*	-0.170	-0.284	-0.087	-0.111	0.504***	0.397**
	(0.181)	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.200)	(0.180)	(0.186)	(0.176)	(0.174)
Sunnis	-0.692***	-0.733***	1.537***	1.549***	1.621***	1.508***	0.057	0.065	-0.561***	-0.628***
	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.204)	(0.198)	(0.212)	(0.186)	(0.195)	(0.182)	(0.175)
Shiites	2.293***	2.221***	-0.853***	-0.974***	-1.533***	-1.728***	-1.366***	-1.517***	1.774***	1.834***
	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.218)	(0.232)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.189)	(0.186)
Male		0.190*		-0.260**		-0.286**		-0.089		0.210*
		(0.112)		(0.123)		(0.128)		(0.119)		(0.114)
Religious		-0.055		-0.249***		-0.033		-0.215**		0.064
		(0.096)		(0.092)		(0.097)		(0.096)		(0.094)
Ego-centric		0.080		0.328***		0.325***		0.312***		0.149
		(0.099)		(0.099)		(0.108)		(0.099)		(0.093)
Voted in 2009		0.119		-0.205		-0.027		0.124		0.202*
		(0.119)		(0.127)		(0.130)		(0.127)		(0.120)
News		-0.016		-0.009		-0.097		0.065		-0.122**
		(0.055)		(0.060)		(0.062)		(0.057)		(0.056)
Income		-0.117**		-0.061		-0.105**		-0.073		-0.035
		(0.048)		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.046)		(0.046)
Education		0.056**		-0.003		-0.001		0.047*		0.033
		(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.030)		(0.027)		(0.027)
Age		0.004		0.000		0.009*		0.011***		0.003
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Public Employment		0.101		0.060		-0.064		-0.132		-0.581*
		(0.243)		(0.298)		(0.352)		(0.285)		(0.304)
N	1185	1136	1173	1125	1182	1134	1183	1134	1170	1121
Pseudo R^2	0.112	0.117	0.085	0.096	0.117	0.127	0.035	0.046	0.067	0.079
Log likelihood	-1601.994	-1528.621	-1465.243	-1388.076	-1411.109	-1334.395	-1480.881	-1393.585	-1735.743	-1642.737
χ^2	403.927	414.346	273.691	289.471	372.395	337.549	105.839	132.522	251.079	284.412

Cut points are not reported, robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8.7: Robustness: Dropping Sectarian Treatment Groups

DV: Attitudes towards EU	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Turk (Kurd Treatment=1)	-0.708	-0.797						
	(0.587)	(0.678)						
Kurd (Kurd Treatment=1)			0.640	0.664				
			(0.599)	(0.704)				
Turk (Turk Treatment=1)					0.051	0.326		
					(0.588)	(0.659)		
Kurd (Turk Treatment=1)							0.080	-0.273
							(0.600)	(0.676)
Turk	-0.511	-0.949**			-0.511	-0.803*		
	(0.394)	(0.463)			(0.394)	(0.453)		
Turk Treatment					0.264	0.096	0.256	0.386
					(0.470)	(0.536)	(0.345)	(0.380)
Kurd			0.443	0.944*			0.443	0.766
			(0.401)	(0.486)			(0.401)	(0.476)
Kurd Treatment	0.633	0.673	-0.031	-0.042				
	(0.458)	(0.551)	(0.357)	(0.393)				
Age		-0.007		-0.008		0.007		0.007
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Male		-0.156		-0.089		-0.203		-0.191
		(0.335)		(0.337)		(0.320)		(0.319)
Education		-0.056		-0.068		-0.010		-0.021
		(0.119)		(0.120)		(0.128)		(0.127)
Income		0.231***		0.229***		0.102		0.106
		(0.074)		(0.074)		(0.076)		(0.078)
Urban		-0.371		-0.328		0.258		0.273
		(0.573)		(0.576)		(0.507)		(0.509)
Religiosity		-0.578***		-0.595***		-0.812***		-0.808***
		(0.184)		(0.186)		(0.177)		(0.177)
Constant	4.069***	4.181***	3.605***	3.276***	4.069***	3.365***	3.605***	2.630***
	(0.307)	(1.044)	(0.240)	(1.051)	(0.307)	(0.990)	(0.240)	(0.990)
Observations	388	298	388	298	381	293	381	293
R^2	0.027	0.099	0.020	0.090	0.010	0.090	0.009	0.089
χ^2								

Robust standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ p<0.10 (one-tailed), * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8.8: Robustness: Dropping Ethnic Treatment Groups

DV: Attitudes towards EU	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Sunni (Alevi Treatment=1)	0.035	-0.249						
	(0.623)	(0.702)						
Alevi (Alevi Treatment=1)			-1.350	0.243				
			(1.229)	(1.139)				
Sunni (Sunni Treatment=1)					0.924	1.001		
					(0.618)	(0.687)		
Alevi (Sunni Treatment=1)							-1.077	-0.694
							(1.153)	(1.003)
Sunni Treatment					-0.382	-0.224	0.285	0.514*
					(0.535)	(0.599)	(0.277)	(0.311)
Alevi Treatment	-0.045	0.214	-0.005	0.062				
	(0.535)	(0.599)	(0.285)	(0.318)				
Sunni	-1.391***	-1.513***			-1.391***	-1.500***		
	(0.418)	(0.471)			(0.418)	(0.468)		
Alevi			2.451***	0.873			2.451***	0.832
			(0.747)	(0.583)			(0.747)	(0.579)
Age		-0.002		-0.005		0.004		0.004
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Male		0.224		0.155		0.099		0.064
		(0.306)		(0.319)		(0.303)		(0.312)
Education		0.049		0.057		0.082		0.087
		(0.124)		(0.130)		(0.118)		(0.120)
Income		0.144**		0.087		0.149**		0.112
		(0.069)		(0.071)		(0.070)		(0.070)
Urban		0.894*		0.451		0.552		0.403
		(0.498)		(0.555)		(0.577)		(0.602)
Religiosity		-0.532***		-0.527***		-0.640***		-0.635***
		(0.157)		(0.162)		(0.163)		(0.169)
Constant	4.754***	3.102***	3.674***	2.792***	4.754***	3.080***	3.674***	2.275**
	(0.352)	(0.974)	(0.197)	(0.955)	(0.352)	(1.042)	(0.197)	(1.002)
Observations	383	301	383	301	399	310	399	310
R^2	0.052	0.136	0.021	0.072	0.032	0.120	0.025	0.090
χ^2								

Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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