



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN TURKEY AND
GERMANY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL,
MILITARY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

CELAL TÜTER

YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

MAY 2018

KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN TURKEY AND
GERMANY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL,
MILITARY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

BY
CELAL TÜTER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MAY 2018

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

Doç. Dr. Seyfullah Yıldırım
Director of Institute

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor.

Prof. Dr. Birol Akgün
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor.

Prof. Dr. M. Sıtkı Bilgin
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. M. Sıtkı Bilgin

(AYBU, IR)

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Eravcı

(AYBU, HISTORY)

Doç. Dr. Giray Sadık

(AYBU, IR)

Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtaş

(GAZI U., IR)

Prof. Dr. Osman Köse

(POLİS A., I. SECURITY)

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Name, Last name: Celal Tüter

Signature:

ABSTRACT

KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN TURKEY AND GERMANY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS.

Tüter, Celal

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin

Co-Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aravcı & Doç. Dr. Giray Sadık

May 2018, 240 pages

Turkey and Germany have established strong relationships in the political, economic, military, educational, cultural and scientific fields in the recent historical period. These relations from the past to the present have contributed to both Turkey and Germany. These relations between Turkey and Germany are so advanced that they can not be compared with any other country. However, when comparing the two countries, the transfer of knowledge and technology from Germany to Turkey in social and scientific fields has been advanced. Scientific experiences transferred from Germany to Turkey in this framework are mainly about the transfer of information and technology and especially the study of the influence of Germany over Turkey.

After looking at the historical dimensions of the relations and the modernisation process of the Republic of Turkey, and the first years of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the arrival of German scientists, the problems they encountered before and after they arrived, in addition the contributions and effects on Turkish institutions and organisations, and how they affected the relations between the two countries has been researched.

Keywords: Turkish-German Relations, German Scientists, Social Sciences and Science, Institutions and Organisations, Knowledge and Technology Transfer

ÖZET

İKİ SAVAŞ ARASI DÖNEMDE TÜRKİYE ALMANYA ARASINDAKİ BİLGİ VE TEKNOLOJİ TRANSFERİ; SİYASİ, ASKERİ VE KÜLTÜREL İLİŞKİLERE ETKİSİ.

Tüter, Celal

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin

Ortak Tez Yöneticileri: Prof. Dr. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aravcı & Doç. Dr. Giray Sadık

Mayıs 2018, 240 sayfa

Türkiye ve Almanya yakın tarihi süreçte siyasal, ekonomik, askeri, eğitim, kültürel ve bilimsel alanlarda ileri boyutlarda ilişki kurmuştur. Bu ilişkiler geçmişten günümüze Türkiye ve Almanya'ya katkı sağlamıştır. Türkiye ile Almanya arasındaki bu ilişkiler başka bir ülkeyle mukayese edilemeyecek kadar ileri boyuttadır. Ancak iki ülke karşılaştırıldığında, sosyal ve fen bilimleri alanlarında Almanya'dan Türkiye'ye olan bilgi ve teknoloji transferleri ileri boyutlarda gerçekleşmiştir. Bu çerçevede Almanya'dan Türkiye'ye aktarılan bilimsel tecrübeler, genelde bilgi ve teknoloji transferi ve özelde ise Almanya'nın Türkiye üzerindeki nüfusu inceleme konusu yapılmıştır.

İlişkilerin tarihsel boyutu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin modernleşme süreci ele alındıktan sonra, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kuruluşunun ilk yıllarında Alman bilim adamlarının ülkeye gelişleri, gelmeden önce ve geldikten sonra karşılaştıkları sorunlar, Türk kurum ve kuruluşlara olan katkı ve etkilerine ilaveten iki ülke arasındaki ilişkileri nasıl etkilediği araştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Alman İlişkileri, Alman Bilim Adamları, Sosyal ve Fen Bilimler, Kurum ve Kuruluşlar, Bilgi ve Teknoloji Transferi



To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin and co-supervisors Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aravcı and Doç. Dr. Giray Sadık for their thoughtful guidance, excellent advice and careful criticism. Their motivation and insight helped me complete this thesis.

I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Theres Debul and Adnan Eren Can on material research, his suggestions and comments were very helpful.

The feedback and support given by Dr. Emre Kazım was remarkable he's careful and patient evaluation was one of the strongest support that I received in completing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vi
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I	
GERMAN-TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	11
1 Political Relations	11
1.1 German Foreign Policy in the Middle East	11
1.2 The Ottoman Empire and the Great European Powers.....	15
1.3 Military Relations of the Ottoman Empire	17
2 Economic Relations	20
2.1 Financial Relations between the Ottoman Empire and Foreign Countries	20
2.2 German Economic Policy in the Orient.....	24
2.3 The Baghdad-Railway	28
3 Cultural Relations	33
3.1 Literature.....	33
3.2 Education	35
3.3 Archaeology	39
CHAPTER II	
TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE REPUBLIC PERIOD.....	41
1 Political Relations.....	41
1.1 Germany and Turkey's Foreign Policy	41
1.2 Ambassadors.....	43
1.3 Issue of Mosul and Germany's Perspective	43

1.4 The League of Nations, Turkey and Germany	46
1.5 Cooperation in the Balkans and The Balkan Pact	48
1.6 Treaty of Versailles and the National Socialists.....	49
1.7 Turkey's Domination on Bosphorus and Germany.....	52
1.8 Montreux Convention of Straits and Germany's Attitude	54
1.9 The Annexation of Austria	61
1.10 The Treaty of Munich and Annexation of Czechoslovakia.....	61
1.11 The Influence of the Occupation of Albania on Turkish-German Relations.....	63
1.12 Germany's Attitude against Turkey's Approach to the United Kingdom and France.....	64
2 Economic Relations	69
2.1 Germany's Economic Impact on Turkey.....	69
2.2 German Capital in Turkish Corporations established between 1920-1930.....	75
2.3 Imports and Exports.....	76
2.4 The Capital of the German Railway Investments in Turkey	77
2.5 Credit Problems	78
2.6 Establishment of Kayseri Aircraft Factory Installation and Air Transport Initiative with Lufthansa	78
2.7 Business Affairs and Foreign Trade	80
3 Cultural Relations	83
3.1 German Experts in Turkey.....	84
3.2 Ankara School of Agriculture.....	86
3.3 Turkish Personnel in Germany	86
3.4 The First Turkish-German Dictionary in Latin Alphabet.....	86
3.5 Relations in Fine Arts	87
3.6 German Daily Newspaper "Turkische Post"	88
3.7 Bilateral Consulate Agreement.....	88
3.8 Germany's Efforts to Manipulate Turkish Media and Propaganda Activities	88

3.9 Turkish Press Members' Visit to Germany	90
3.10 The Investments of Germany to Turkey in Art, Culture and Education	90
3.11 German Schools.....	91
3.12 Turkish Students and Turkish Student Associations in Germany	94
4 Military Relations	95
4.1 Military Partnerships	97
4.2 German officers in the Turkish Military Academy	98
4.3 Training of Turkish Officers in Germany.....	99
4.4 Arms Trade	101
4.5 German Impact on Turkish Army.....	104
CHAPTER III	
TURKEY'S MODERNISATION	107
1 The Path to Reform.....	107
2 Political Structure and New Identity	110
3 Reforms	111
3.1 Declaration of the Republic	113
3.2 Abolition of the Caliphate and Deportation of the Ottoman Dynasty	114
3.3 Acceptance of the New Turkish Alphabet	115
3.4 Establishing Universities	117
3.5 The Surname Law.....	119
3.6 Giving Women the right to vote and to be elected	120
3.7 Other Revolutions	121
CHAPTER IV	
GERMAN INFLUENCE ON MODERN TURKEY	122
1 Life of German Emigrants in Turkey	122
1.1 Political Situation in Germany	122
1.2 The Implementation of the Plans	122
1.2.1 The Displaced	126
1.2.2 The West as a Role Model	127
1.2.3 The "Uselessness" of the New System	129

1.2.4 The Crossroads	130
1.3 The Rights and Obligations of the Professors in Turkey	132
1.3.1 Obligations	132
1.3.2 Rights	132
1.4 Internal Tension in Turkey	133
1.4.1 Suspicions of Former Darülfünun Professors	133
1.4.2 Objectors of the University Reform	134
1.5 Forced Cooperation	136
1.5.1 Fears and Worries	136
1.5.2 Feared Threat to Turkey's National Interest	137
1.5.3 Problems of Cooperation	138
1.5.4 Which Requirements must be met for Good Cooperation?	138
1.6 The Fulfilment of the Requirements	140
1.6.1 Learning the Turkish Language	140
1.6.2 Publications	142
1.6.3 Research	142
1.6.4 Public Relations and Educational Work	144
1.7 Migrant's Everyday Life in Turkey	145
1.7.1 A Problem Shared is a Problem Halved	146
1.7.2 Emigrant Destiny	148
1.7.3 The End of Turkey's Neutral Policy	150
1.7.4 Departure of the Emigrant Professors	154
1.7.5 Turkey – New Home for the Emigrants	157
2 Scientific Works	159
2.1 University	160
2.2 Science	162
3 Medicine	165
3.1 Pathology	166
3.2 Dermatology, Internal Medicine and Gynecology	167
3.3 Ophthalmology	168
3.4 Dentistry	169
3.5 Ear, Nose and Throat	169
3.6 Radiology	170
3.7 Pharmacology	170

4 Political	172
4.1 Law and Economy	172
5 Urban Planning	183
6 Culture	186
6.1 Library	186
6.2 Literature	187
6.3 Archeology	188
6.4 Architecture	190
6.5 Arts and Music	192
CONCLUSION	196
REFERENCES	202
APPENDICES	
A. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	216
B. CURRICULUM VITAE	217
C. TURKISH SUMMARY	218

INTRODUCTION

The principle foreign influence in the formation and early years of the Turkish Republic is typically thought of as French. However, upon inspection it becomes clear that there were varied and important influences from other European nations. This thesis argues that the German influence is central and formative. The thesis is forwarded by outlining the impact of German intellectual exiles to Turkey in various fields (such as economics, medicine and engineering), and crucially details in what way the influences are likely to have effected Turkish nation building. Contrary to previous research, this thesis explores both German and Turkish literature and attempts to go beyond anecdotal evidence. As such, it will be shown that the German influence, in the form of knowledge transfer from German to Turkey, is to be thought of as of central importance, thereby revaluation of theses concerning the formation of Republican Turkey can be undertaken. In particular, this work is the first systematic academic treatment of the influence of German exiles in particular.

This thesis explores knowledge transfer from German to Turkey primarily between the years spanning the first and the second world wars. As I will show, knowledge transfer took place in numerous fields, such as economics, politics, science, engineering and culture. A central theme in this study will be in highlighting the impact and varied influence of German exiles in the Nazi period.

The Methodological Approaches

In this thesis, along with German Foreign Policy archives 1918 – 1945 -Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945, aus dem Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts- (*Files for German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*), Turkish, German and English second hand sources on the subject, were accessed as much as possible during the research. Although, there have been many works on Turkish – German relations, this thesis differs by looking at the advantages of the knowledge and technology transfer from Germany to Turkey, on Turkish modernisation.

Ilber Ortaylı, researched in depth the Turkish – German relations in a historical perspective of *the German influence in the Ottoman Empire* (Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman

Nüfuzu). Cemil Koçak, in his book on *the Turkish – German Relations* (Türk - Alman İlişkileri), researched this relationship particularly looking at the Republics first years, apart from looking at the knowledge and technology transfer. Sezen Kılıç, due to focusing more on schools, in the book *the Turkish-German Relations and German Schools from 1852 to 1945* (Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Türkiye’deki Alman Okulları 1852’den 1945’e kadar), did not look at the political and cultural relations. Sabine Mangold, in the German book, *Deutschland und die Türkei 1918-1933 (Germany and Turkey 1918-1933)*, looks at the political relations in great detail. Horst Widmann’s, *Exil und Bildungshilfe: Die Deutschsprachige Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933 (Exile and educational aid: The German-speaking emigration to Turkey after 1933)*, is a great source which looks at the effects of Atatürk’s university reforms in depth. Also, there are many other works focusing on the Turkish – German relations, which have not been mentioned here.

A similar study has been conducted by Reisman Arnold, however, there are significant flaws in his work. I detail these below:

1. Arnold is not a social scientist. He is from an Engineering background. This is problematic as he is not versed in the methodology of social science.
2. He is concerned with primarily scientific and technology transfer. This is problematic because there are many more areas, in particular cultural, economic and political, that require significant attention.
3. He does not discuss, with any analysis, the extent and scope of the influence of these intellectuals. For example, his commentary is predominantly notes regarding what a particular person brought with them from Germany and in what field. Analysis and exploration of the scope and extent of influence requires a more sustained treatment.
4. He openly speaks about his mission as one to explore the question of German Jews in Turkey as a task concerning wider discussions of Jewish exile. In other word his concern is not primarily Turkish (despite the title of his book). The purpose of my study is primarily concerned with Early Republican Turkey and is situated within these academic discussions.
5. There is plenty of evidence in his writing of his romantic and nostalgic relationship with the subject matter. This makes him bias and likely to be exaggerating the influence. This can be seen in this introduction and spills over into this wider

analysis. The central question and concern of my study is historical and as such concerns discerning and enlightening the historical epoch.

6. It is highly likely that Reisman does not know the Turkish and German languages or that his access to the Turkish resources is limited and second hand.

Indeed, Arnold's work, although flawed, is nonetheless an important resource in this study.

Important methodological approaches that I take, which address some of the problems in the work of Arnold, are as follows:

1. I approach the subject where the focus is on Turkey, rather than the personal stories of some of these exiles.
2. I engage in archival research: for example, I will draw upon documents from the German Foreign ministry.
3. I draw upon interviews given by subjects of importance. Additionally, I highlight memoirs of important figures.
4. I have also sought of newspapers and articles from the period in question.

These methodological approaches are supplemented by my ability to explore and include resources in the German, Turkish and English language. As a result, this study presents an important and new resource on this subject.

Historical Background

Historically, Turkish-German relations started when Sultan Mustafa III (1757-1774) tried to reform the army of the Ottoman Empire. He was astonished that Prussia rather a small state of the era, could win over Russia in the seven years' war (1756-1763). Following this Sultan Mahmut II had asked for military advisors from Germany. As a result of this Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was sent to Anatolia in 1838.

Until the rise to the power of Otto von Bismarck during the last quarter of the 19th century, Prussia's attitude was sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time it refrained from acting in a manner that would distort what it considered to be more important interests, namely its relations with the other members of the Concert of Europe. Prussia did, however, act as a friendly mediator when possible, favouring the Ottomans in the negotiations

regarding the Near Eastern crisis, which led to the Treaty of Edirne, signed in 1829, and also in the peace negotiations that followed the Crimean War between the years 1853-1856. Turkish-German relations reached its peak during the reign of Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) prior to the foundation of Germany's National Unity. The relations during the reign of Bismarck came closer; but Bismarck was a pacifist and did not want to get involved in the Eastern Question thereby limiting his involvement in the region.

Turkish-German relation have not only concerned with the military. Cultural relations have also played a role. Abdulhamit II's sympathy towards Germany resulted initially in the establishing of cultural relations and thus some officers were sent to Germany for education. Germany sent a Military Advisors group under the command of Wettendorf. A few years later this was substituted by a larger group (1883-1895) under Von der Goltz. German Deutsche Bank opened a branch in Istanbul and the import of German military equipment and goods began.¹ In 1889, Emperor Giyom II or namely Kaiser Wilhelm II, visited Istanbul and became friends with Abdulhamit II. To honor his visit he gifted *the German Fountain* to the city of Istanbul, a monument now in the Sultanahmet Square. Kaiser Wilhelm II continued his trip to Damascus, Jerusalem and Haifa where he was warmly received by Arabs and Jews; he showed that he was a friend of 300 million Muslims.²

Furthermore, industrial relations existed. In 1888 Germans were given the right to operate the Istanbul Izmit railway and extend it to Ankara. The portion Eskisehir-to-Konya was completed in 1896. The plan was to complete the railway line all the way to Baghdad and Basra. Britain was competing with Germany to get the concession of this railway, but the project was given to the Germans.³ The company formed to build the new railway line was financed 40% by Deutsche (German) Bank and 40% by the French Ottoman Bank. The remaining 20% were financed by various shareholders. The railroads that were built and

¹ Beşirli Mehmet, *Die europäische Finanzkontrolle im Osmanischen Reich in der Zeit von 1908 bis 1914: Die Rivalitäten der britischen, französischen und deutschen Hochfinanz und der Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der türkischen Staatsanleihen und der Bagdad-Bahn*, Mensch & Buch, Berlin 1999, p. 122.

² Neulen Hans Werner, *Adler und Halbmond. Das deutsch-türkische Bündnis 1914-1918 (Eagle and crescent. The German-Turkish Alliance 1914-1918)*, Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main 1994, pp. 18-20.

³ Bilgin M. Sitki, *The Construction of the Baghdad Railway and Its Impact on Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1902-1913*, OTAM, 16, 109-130, 2004, p. 115.

opened, immediately contributed to the progress of farming and trading in the adjacent towns and villages. The investment was reimbursing the share holders.⁴

Another important step in Turkish-German relation was the First World War. Ottomans had asked Kaiser Wilhelm II to send an “*Army Reformation Envoy*” in May 1913. The emperor sent General Liman von Sanders, who was reputed for his discipline, plus a delegation of 42 officers in October 1913. Liman von Sanders was put on duty for 5 years with a wide scope of authorities that even equalled or surpassed the Minister of War. Germans needed the Ottoman Empire’s man power and strategic location, whereas the Ottomans needed an ally for the First World War in sight, because their approach to Britain was rejected earlier and those to France and Russia, were likewise refused in the spring of 1914.⁵ Turks needed not only new army discipline and training but also, arms, ammunition and money to pay the salaries of the army officers, which had been delayed for several months. Alliance with Germany was inevitable and the young Minister of War, educated in Germany and liked by the Kaiser, used the situation to drag the Ottoman Empire into the War, which had started in Europe on July 28, 1914. According to the agreement between the two countries, when the commander in chief was German, his general staff was Turkish (Liman von Sanders and İzzet Pasha). When the Army Commander was Turkish, his general staff was German (Enver Pasha and General Bronssart von Schelledorf, 4th Army Commander Djemal Pasha and his general staff Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, 6th Army Commander General von der Goltz, his general staff General Ali İhsan Sabis, etc.). During the First World War German-Turkish military collaboration, discipline, and chivalry is full of many interesting episodes, such as the foresight of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli as Lieutenant Colonel and his fast appraisal by Liman von Sanders.⁶

World War I engendered a big inconsistent force. It was a unity and a determination in each country to make every effort and sacrifice necessary to win the war. Thus, nationalism and patriotism were intensified. But at the same time, the hatred of all wars and the resolution to

⁴ Atun, A. & Server Aya, *Different opinions on the Ottoman and German political military and economic relations*, International Journal of Academic Research 2013, pp. 227-28.

⁵ Bilgin Mustafa Sıtkı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin I. Dünya Savaşı'na Girişi*, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın 100. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu, ESAM, Ankara 2015, pp. 180-81.

⁶ Ortaylı İlber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu (German Penetration of the Ottoman Empire)*, Timaş Publications, Istanbul 2014, pp. 38-42.

prevent them also were increased. These racialist ideas will then lead to Hitler coming to power.

The war in Europe had hardly begun when groups were organized in several European countries and in the United States for the specific purpose of planning how to maintain peace in the postwar period and prevent future wars. In the United States the most important private group in postwar planning was League to Enforce Peace, founded in Philadelphia in June 1915. The commission held a lot of meetings in five years for founding of the League of Nations. Since the League Covenant was a part of the Treaty of Versailles, the official birthday of the organization was delayed for eight additional months until the treaty was ratified and took effect on January 10, 1920. Germany was admitted to League in 1926, Turkey was admitted in 1932, and the Soviet Union was admitted in 1934.⁷

Moreover, the scientific activities of Germany towards Ottoman Empire had occurred first in the area of literature. This had started with the translations by Germans of their literature into Turkish. Germany, along with pursuing this policy, aimed to weaken the existing French influence in Ottoman literature.

Therefore, it can be said that meeting German culture with Ottoman society and settlement of German language amongst elite class has been targeted. Hence opening of German Schools in Istanbul and Anatolia emerges as complementary elements of this policy. With the influence of the German Associations opening of German Hospital in 1870 in Istanbul and the opening of German Schools at different times indicate some of the important developments of Turkish-German scientific relations.

In the beginning of the 20th century it is observed that relations bear fruit in quite different areas. Turkish-German scientific relations have contributed positively in the relations of the two countries on commercial and military areas. In fact, during this period there is a connection between scientific and cultural relations. The most important scientific development in this period is Prof. Dr. Franz Schmidt's who was ex-chief of German schools abroad, who started working as a consultant at the Ministry of Education. Schmidt's mission was on the one hand to contribute to the Ottoman education system, while on the other hand

⁷ Bennet A. LeRoy, *International Organizations Principles & Issues*, Prentice Hall 5th edition, Tokyo 1977, pp. 21-27.

provide a vehicle by which Germans could establish their influence in the education area. The main purpose of the Germans was to weaken the French influence on Turkish education system. Moreover, Schmidt proposed the foundation of a German University in Istanbul to the Turkish authorities.

At the beginning of the new Turkish Republic, Turkish-German relations were mainly about economic and political issues. In 1934, a German trade mission representing various Krupp's interests visited Turkey and had discussions with the Turkish government. The outcome was a long-term credit of 20 million TL and also an agreement by the Turks to purchase a large quantity of railway materials and parts from Germany. The lively interest that the German government professed in the Turkish five-year plan and their willingness to assist in its realisation led to the sending, in February 1935, of a German adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Economics. This official's job was specifically to assist with the getting under way of the five-year plan. In the same year the Turks ordered 11 million TL of material from Krupp for the electrification of their railways. Thus, within the short span of a few years Germany gained a dominant grip over Turkish economy and was well on the road to making continued economic assistance to have effect on the political areas.

However, although Turkish-German relations went well in the case of economic issues, ideological discrepancies came up. This was due to anti-semitic ideas, which spread over Germany in the 1930s. Atatürk offered a home to the Jews of Germany in the early 1930s. Of course, there was an advantage to Turkey of giving asylum to some of Germany's gifted Jews who might help develop new Turkey. Many German Jews and other refugees from Hitler's persecution migrated to Turkey in the 1930s, including scholars and artists.

As we will see later, these scholars influenced Modern Turkey to a large extent. During 1936 Germany maintained its preponderating position in the economic life of Turkey - a position in which it took 49,5 percent of Turkey's exports and supplied 46 percent of Turkey's needs. The Turkish government was actively concerned over the country's dependence upon the German economy, particularly the cooling of Turkish-German relations that took place during and after the conclusion of the Montreux Straits Convention of 20 July 1936.

However, Germany's efforts to ensure Turkey's position within the Nazi orbit had not been limited to commerce, though this had been the most important contact between the two

countries. A certain amount of initiative had also been expended on cultural propaganda. Financial backing was given to books that stressed Turkish-German amity and a German newspaper called the, *Türkische Post*, received backing for propagating the German viewpoint. In addition, special facilities were made to attract Turkish students to complete their studies in German universities and technical colleges.

Particularly by instructing young Turkish technicians Germany hoped to form a German - trained personnel who on their return to Turkey would gain key governmental positions and whose corporate pro-German influence would have a decisive effect upon Turkish-German relations.

However, these German overtures, though regarded with high suspicion by the Turkish government, were not all rejected. According to Güçlü: Thus on 21 April 1939 a German industrial consortium (consisting of Gutehoffnung Shütte, Philippe Holzmann, Julius Berger and Siemens Bav-Union) was called in to build the naval base and arsenal at Gölcük in the Gulf of Izmit. The contract was not a small one. It was valued at 2,3 million Pounds Sterling in Europe and 150 million TL in Turkey, for over four years. It was also accorded substantial political weight. In diverse ways the Germans showed their ever increasing interest in Turkey as the springboard to the Middle East. An air service between Turkey and Germany was inaugurated; Berlin radio began transmissions in Turkish. All and everything was done by the Germans to bring Turkey within the German sphere of influence.⁸

Exiles from Germany

The knowledge transfers in the field of political and cultural relations during the foundation and the early years of the Republic of Turkey was caused by two different phenomenas in Germany and Turkey, which occurred in parallel. In Germany, on the one hand, Hitler came to power and aimed for a *pureblood* Germany, while in Turkey, at the other hand, Atatürk aimed to Westernise and modernise the young republic.

As soon as Hitler came to power, as one of his implementations he issued the *Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service* on April 7, 1933 to prohibit non-Aryans from

⁸ Güçlü Yücel, *Turkish-German relations from Montreux to the second world war*, in: The Turkish Yearbook 1999, Vol. XXIX, pp. 68-69.

working as civil servants any more. Thus, for Jewish German scholars and members of various professions, all of whom were civil servants, there was no longer any future in Nazi Germany, and they had to find a new country to earn their bread and practice their profession and even to save their lives.⁹

In that same year, 1933, the young Turkish Republic was in search of civil servants capable of modernizing its old-fashioned and seemingly anti-reformist educational system. The Turkish government thought that a new spirit and dynamism in higher education could be attained only by replacing the non-productive and old-fashioned academicians with those modern, contemporary scientists who could be brought from Europe. Thus, the dismissal of German-speaking scholars of high academic ranks and Turkey's search for academicians to reform the educational system turned out to be a perfect match. Indeed, more than one hundred German-speaking scholars were recruited through a contract with the Turkish Educational Ministry and found refuge in Turkey. Besides the scholars of Jewish origin, there was also a smaller group of scholars who were obliged to leave Nazi Germany for their political views.

But why did these German academics not leave to other countries? Why did so many decide to go to Turkey? The answer is quite simple. In general, these scholars did not really favour Turkey but most did not have the option of going to the United States or Great Britain, given the restrictive immigration laws in place in those countries at the time.

Thus, because Turkey was looking for European academics in general and because the country decided to build three universities fashioned on the prevailing German university model, Turkey had the best opportunity to receive these academicians could get.

For the employment of the German emigres also another factor played an important role: *Die Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland (Emergency Association of German Scientists Abroad)*. This organisation, which was founded in 1933 by Philipp Schwartz, helped Jewish or other persecuted German scholars secure employment in countries prepared to receive such refugees. It was this organisation, which submitted a list to the Turkish government, consisting of German scholars with the most needed skills for

⁹ Schwartz Philipp, *Notgemeinschaft: Zur Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933 in die Türkei*, Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg 1995, pp. 42-43.

Istanbul University. Many academics followed and thus the German emigres were able to influence Modern Turkey to a great extent.¹⁰

German emigres in Turkey were living in an odd condition: they were living in a Muslim majority with which they had limited contact. They never mixed socially with the Muslim society nor even with the Turkish Predominantly Sephardic Jewish community. They pursued a somewhat *German life*, they always remained a distinctive and segregated community with their different language, customs, and social life.

When talking about the life of German emigres in Turkey, especially the relation of the Turkish government and the emigres are to be considered. Some talk about the *harmony of the common interests* to explain this relationship. This is, because the German academics were hired due to their promise as intellectual mediators for the promotion of Europeanness in the host country.¹¹

Outline of Chapters

To understand in which sense the German emigres influenced the young republic and which role the Turkish-German relations played, I will start to analyse Turkish-German relations during the Ottoman Empire and during the early years of the Republic. Then I am going to explain reforms to Turkey's modernization. After that, I will move on to how the life of the emigres looked like in Turkey. In the main part I will show in which disciplines German academics worked and how this work influenced Turkey. Finally, I am going to summarize the findings and I will give a short conclusion.

¹⁰ Widmann, Horst, *Exil und Bildungshilfe. Die Deutschsprachige Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933 (Exile and educational aid. The German-speaking emigration to Turkey after 1933)*, Bern/Frankfurt a. M., Frankfurt 1973, pp. 45-47.

¹¹ Bahar, I. (2010) *German or Jewish, Humanity or Raison d'Etat. The German Scholars in Turkey, 1933-1952*, Shofar - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 29(1) 2010, pp. 59-62.

CHAPTER I

GERMAN-TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1 Political Relations

1.1 German Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Under Bismarck foreign policy was equivalent to European-Politics.¹² In his opinion German colonies made only sense in terms of diplomatic compensation objects with France and England. Above all, the chancellor saw German colonial policy as a way for national integration, by means of which people could be distracted from internal tensions. He also aimed to use the emerging colonial movement in the German Empire for his domestic policy.¹³ Accordingly, the interest of the German Reich towards the Ottoman Empire was relatively low.¹⁴ At the Berlin Congress in 1878 Bismarck did not mediate in favour of the Ottoman Empire, but he could at least ensure its further existence. Bismarck tried to avoid the direct engagement of the German Reich in the Orient and to keep the “*Eastern question*” open. An agreement between the major powers in the Orient should be avoided. Rather, their conflicting interests should prevent them from forming a coalition against the German Reich. However, Bismarck saw the Ottoman Empire as an ally against Russia and therefore advocated the cautious German support to strengthen the Ottoman military. He nonetheless

¹² Bismarck told the Africa researcher Eugen Wold about his point of view: Your maps of Africa are very nice, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and we are in the centre. This is my map of Africa. Baumgart Winfried, *Deutschland im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1890-1914: Grundkräfte, Thesen und Strukturen*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz 1982, p.46.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁴ Beşirli Mehmet, *Die europäische Finanzkontrolle im Osmanischen Reich in der Zeit von 1908 bis 1914: Die Rivalitäten der britischen, französischen und deutschen Hochfinanz und der Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der türkischen Staatsanleihen und der Bagdad-Bahn*, Mensch & Buch, Berlin 1999, p. 21.

refused the offer for an alliance of the Sultan.¹⁵ On the other hand, by using the reinsurance contract from 1871 Bismarck tried to take the feeling of isolation away from Russia. Furthermore, he tried to control Russia's Orient policy and its relation with Austria.¹⁶ However, although in the secret additional protocol to the contract Russia was granted free hand for the takeover of the Danubian, the margin between the two states increased. In the same year Germany increased the agrarian tariffs, which affected especially Russian grain exports, and later prohibited Russian bonds from the German capital market. As a result, the relations between Russia and France became closer.¹⁷

Given the political risks, the German policy abstained deliberately from taking influence in the Ottoman Empire until the end of the 19th century. This was the case in spite of the growing involvement of the German economy in the region.¹⁸

However, there have not only been voices in the German Reich who wanted to be limited to the economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire, but also those, like the "*Alldeutscher Verband*" (Pan-German League) who favoured a dominant role of Germany in Turkey's administration and military.¹⁹ The climate in Germany, which was marked by national-romantic dreams and missionary sense of consciousness, encouraged the advocates of a new policy.²⁰ This was reflected in the rapidly increasing number of publications that aimed to articulate the existing mood in large parts of the population and to influence them, by using romantic pathos. Worth to mention here is the book about Babylonia from 1886 by Aloys Sprenger, in which he described the German colonisation of Syria and Mesopotamia. This reached great attention in public. In the eyes of the supporters of the colonisation efforts in the Middle East the Baghdad Railway, in particular, should be used to promote German political, economical and cultural interests.²¹ However, the official policy of the German Reich was more cautious. Although Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, had plans for German

¹⁵ Van Kampen Wilhelm, *Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik in der Zeit Wilhelms II*, Dissertation, University of Kiel 1968, p. 15.

¹⁶ Baumgart 1982, p. 86.

¹⁷ Geiss Imanuel, *German Foreign Policy 1871-1914*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/Boston 1976, p. 56.

¹⁸ Baumgart 1982, p. 75.

¹⁹ Neulen Hans Werner, *Adler und Halbmond. Das deutsch-türkische Bündnis 1914-1918*, Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main 1994, p. 20.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²¹ van Kampen 1968, p. 81.

settlements along the Baghdad Railway, these were not pursued.²² In any case, further territorial claims were unrealistic, since both the remaining strength of the Ottoman Empire and the rivalry between the major European powers, made it seem to be impossible. Rather, in its Orient policy the German Empire made itself dependent on Austria-Hungary and targeted its policy in the Balkans accordingly, for example.²³

After the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, the German Reich sought to win Turkey as an ally. Thus the influential advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs - Friedrich von Holstein, who thought that a two-front war, especially a war with Russia, would be inevitable - pushed for the alignment of the Ottoman Empire, as well as England, Spain and the Balkans, to the "*Dreibund*" (Triple Alliance).²⁴ From a political-military viewpoint, the Ottoman Empire was seen as a natural enemy of Russia, which was able to bind Russia's power on the Black Sea and the Caucasus, as well as, to relieve Germany on its eastern border. In addition, commitment in the Orient was seen as necessary, as Germany was on its way to develop to an equal world power, just as England and France.²⁵

This new policy of German imperialism that began to prevail in the German Empire after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 and that was carried out energetically from 1897, can be summarised under the term "*world politics*". The driving forces behind these expansionary policies were very complex. On the one hand, the economic interest groups, which gained considerably influence due to the rapidly increasing industrialisation of the country, played an eminent role. The not mastered structural problems within German society have also been reason for predominantly conservative political circles to derive foreign policy successes and German missionary thoughts from domestic policy. Not least, since 1896 significantly enhancing "*personal rule*" of the emperor and his goal to give Germany worldwide recognition, were the driving forces behind the change of direction of the German Reich.²⁶

Especially after the journeys of the German emperor to the Ottoman Empire, the Orient moved more in the foreground in German public. After the emperor already had visited

²² Neulen 1994, p. 21.

²³ Baumgart 1982, p. 74.

²⁴ Ibid., p.88.

²⁵ Neulen 1994, p. 18.

²⁶ Geiss 1976, p. 75.

Constantinople in 1889, he travelled a second time to the Ottoman Empire in 1898. In his famous speech in Damascus he assured the Sultan the friendship of the German Empire and offered himself as the protector of all Mohammedans.²⁷ Both in Russia and France, as well as, in England in particular, this speech was understood as a call to the peoples in India, Indochina, Turkestan and Crimea to rise up, under the leadership of the Sultan and with German support, against the colonial powers.²⁸ The emperor had considerable influence on following closer relations with Turkey. While there have been his romantic notions of the Orient, at the same time, many, who made him aware of Germany's political and economical possibilities in the Middle East, influenced him. But he also admired the position of the Sultan as a sovereign autocrat, who the population owed not only absolute obedience, but who was in his position as the caliph the representative of god, at the same time.²⁹

The Ottoman Empire saw the German Reich as the most suitable ally. Unlike France and Russia, Germany never pursued serious territorial ambitions in the Orient. Only in the case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; which became apparent after the First Balkan War, when Turkey had to give up nearly its entire European possessions, as well as, with regard to the national movements of the Armenians and Arabs; Germany wanted to protect its own interests.³⁰ The goal of the German policy was rather the preservation of the status quo.³¹

During the Balkan conflict, German politics tried both to prevent a major war, as well as, to preserve the sympathies of the allies. Due to the war between Italy and Turkey, in 1911/12, after the annexation of Tripoli, there was also a burden on the "*Dreibund*" (Triple Alliance), since again, as was the case with Austrian annexation of Bosnia, an ally of Germany acted against its political interests.

The economical and military possibilities of an engagement in a kingdom, that reached as far as the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, became more important for the German leadership in 1912 than the concerns arising from the predictable conflicts with England and

²⁷ Neulen 1994, p. 18.

²⁸ Baumgart 1982, p. 77.

²⁹ van Kampen 1968, p. 21.

³⁰ Neulen 1994, p. 23.

³¹ van Kampen 1968, p. 33.

Russia about a for them strategical important region.³² Overall, the German expansionism in the Middle East must be regarded as very critical for German politics and its relations with other major powers. *Germany's drive into the Middle East became an expensive adventure, a 'fata morgana', contributing to the failure of "world politics"*.³³

1.2 The Ottoman Empire and the Great European Powers

The major European powers tried in the 19th century to secure a crucial influence in the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman government, the "*Sublime Porte*", lost power it could retain its independence. The central bureaucracy played a significant role in internal and external affairs.³⁴ Although the Ottoman Empire could not be considered as equal to the great powers anymore, it was able to maintain itself within its own means. The aim of Abdülhamid II's policy was to create a balance in the relations with the major European powers by means of a neutral policy.³⁵

Russia was very aggressive towards Turkey. One of the main goals of Russian foreign policy in the South was to bring the access from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea under its control or at least to keep it open at all costs. Therefore, Russia tried; in particular by supporting nationalist independence movements and Pan-Slav groups in the Balkans, which were directed against the rival superpower Austria-Hungary; anything to destroy the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ Just as in China, with this policy Russia got in a conflict with England, which felt threatened in its spheres of influence. Not least because of the conflicts between England and Russia in the Middle East and Asia, the German Reich saw itself in a strong position in alliance talks with both countries.³⁷ But it was just the increase of German influence in the Ottoman Empire that encouraged the Russian Federation to have negotiations with England.

³² Geiss 1976, p. 139: While the Kaiser wanted to support the Ottoman Empire, the Reichskanzler and the Foreign Ministry, who tried to hold Italy in the "Dreibund", succeeded.

³³ Ibid., p. 90.

³⁴ Beşirli 1999, p. 22.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 107.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 105.

³⁷ Baumgart 1982, p. 95.

The construction of the Baghdad Railway and the fear of an Anglo-German agreement contributed to the completion of the agreement between England and Russia in 1907.³⁸

The main objective of British policy was to secure the connection to India. Against this background, it was the desire of England to consolidate and expand its political, as well as, economic influence in Egypt, Iran and Iraq, but also in Greece and Turkey.³⁹ Although the effort of England focussed on its direct interest in Turkey, it looked with discomfort at the constitutional aspirations in the Ottoman Empire before the revolution of 1908, as one looked at them as models for similar developments in own colonies. Rather, it was expected to be able to control these more easily, if the Ottoman Empire would continue to suppress the Arab fight for independence. In this respect it was considered to re-evaluate the rather hostile policy towards Turkey and, to be on the safe side, to support Sultan Abdulhamid II as well as the "*Unity and Progress Party*".⁴⁰ In the same manner as England sought to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's tensions with the German Reich rose. Even more so with the apparent betrayal due to Germany's support of Austria after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴¹ It was not until 1910 when for the reorganisation of the country there required financial support from France and England failed to appear, and Germany procured a loan.⁴² Germany succeeded in being the most influential power in Turkey⁴³, although the British and French influence remained significant until 1914. France found itself particularly obliged to secure its already established influence, which was predominantly based on French capital exports, in the Ottoman Empire and to expand this by concessions, if possible.⁴⁴ One was quite concerned about Germany, as well as about England, that it could use its economic power to its full potential and thus weaken France.⁴⁵

³⁸ Baumgart 1982, p. 103: The Bosnia Crisis in 1908, when Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina with diplomatic support and without Russia taking any compensations, increased the prevailing conceptions against Germany.

³⁹ Beşirli 1999, p. 105.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 110.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 112.

⁴² Ibid., p. 129 & p. 176.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 235.

The importance of France in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War was also reflected in the use of the French language. The knowledge of the French language was a prerequisite for admission to the Ottoman government service. In particular, within the Turkish elite and very influential minority of Greeks and Armenians was the use of French an expression of modernity and high cultural level, which was supported by France by a very active cultural policy. Around the turn of the century about 60,000 students were taught in French, some with financial support from France. In 1914, the vast majority of the 90,000 students was taught in foreign schools in French or English, but only 3,000 in German.⁴⁶

Until the beginning of the First World War, the major European powers had tried to stake their zones of influence in the Ottoman Empire. While Russia occupied the territory from Kars to Erzincan, the English influence was to be found in Iraq, and the French was dominant in Syria and Palestine. Germany managed, not least on the basis of the construction of railway lines and thereby the investment of capital, to establish a large impact zone in the Anatolian heartland from Istanbul and Konya to Baghdad.⁴⁷

1.3 Military Relations of the Ottoman Empire

After the coup attempt of the Janissaries in 1808 and the dissolution of the Janissary corps in 1826, the Ottoman Empire tried to reorganise its army by looking at the Western model. For this purpose, German military advisers were also brought into the country. For example, the Prussian Captain Helmuth Graf von Moltke served from 1835 for four years under Sultan Mahmud II in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸

After the founding of the German Empire it was the already mentioned policy of the Chancellor, which advocated a military cooperation between Germany and Turkey, but only as long as the relations with the major powers would not be disturbed. Bismarck was quite keen to strengthen the Ottoman Empire militarily and it was agreed by the Congress of Berlin, both to send German experts for financial reforms, as well as, military advisors for

⁴⁶ Farah Irmgard, *Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit im Osmanischen Reich 1908- 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des „Osmanischen Lloyd“*, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft: Beirut Texte und Studien 50, Beirut 1993, p. 251.

⁴⁷ Beşirli 1999, p. 245.

⁴⁸ Neulen 1994, p.15 & Kreiser Klaus, *Der osmanische Staat 1300-1922*, Oldenburg Verlag, München 2001, p. 63.

the purpose of reorganisation of the Ottoman army. When France and England criticized this German commitment, the sending was postponed immediately by Bismarck.⁴⁹

Under the leadership of Colonel Kaehler four German officers were deployed initially in 1882, which was to contribute to a reform of the Turkish military.⁵⁰ In 1887 the army was divided into regular troops (*Nizamiye*), defensive force as a reserve (*redif*) and militia (*mustahfiz*).⁵¹ In 1897 the military had manpower of around 500.000 soldiers.⁵² The fear of Sultan Abdulhamid II of a coup by its military did not allow for further reforms of the outdated and ineffective military structures.⁵³

It was only after the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 that the reforms of the military have been seriously pursued,⁵⁴ but they did not show the desired results because of the wars in the Balkans and Africa.⁵⁵ In 1911, the first military flight school was established in the Ottoman Empire. In the beginning the flight instructors had been French, but after the beginning of the First World War, they were displaced by Germans.⁵⁶ Due to the threat of war another German military mission was sent to the Ottoman Empire in May 1913. General Liman von Sanders, who was entrusted with the leadership of the comprehensive 42, later 70, officer mission, took over as head of the First Armeekorps, and was the direct superior of all military schools and training regiments, a member of the military council and got the inspection right of all troops and forts.⁵⁷ The signed contract with Liman von Sanders put almost the whole organisation of the army in the hands of the Germans and allowed the head of the mission to engage in almost all military affairs.⁵⁸ So far-reaching may have been Sanders' powers, it must not be overlooked that in the Ottoman Empire military advisers of other nations were engaged, as well. In 1914, the British Military Mission under Rear-

⁴⁹ van Kampen 1968, p. 18.

⁵⁰ Neulen 1994, p. 16.

⁵¹ Kreiser 2001, p. 63.

⁵² Neulen 1994, p. 63.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁵ Kreiser 2001, p. 63.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 63.

⁵⁷ Neulen 1994, p. 24.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

Admiral Sir Arthur Limpus introduced nearly as much as the German staff and was responsible for organising the defense of the straits. This corresponded to the sustained policy of the Ottoman Empire until the First World War: if possible, maintaining a balance between the major powers in the empire and the target was to push back the influence someday.⁵⁹

The recent German commitment provoked counter-reactions of the other great powers. Especially Russia felt disturbed by the German military support for Turkey and thus tried to provoke the outbreak of a European war, by occupying some Turkish ports, just like Trebizond. However, this crisis could be resolved diplomatically.⁶⁰

In March 1914, the status of the Ottoman armed forces was judged extremely negative by the German military. The German General Staff von Moltke saw the Turkish army in a condition that defied description. If one previously spoke of Turkey as a sick man, one must now speak of the dying.⁶¹ However, shortly before the outbreak of World War I this evaluation was changed and it was thought that the Turkish army would be prepared for the battle against the major European powers.⁶² The reasons for this were the rumours, spread by the Turkish side, that the Ottoman Empire would join the Entente.⁶³ Now substantial benefits have been expected, even if Turkey would not take action. This was due to the binding of Russian forces in the Caucasus and the possible attack on the allies in Egypt.⁶⁴

During the World War, supplies and all kinds of weapons, heavy artillery, vehicles, even submarines and aircraft from Germany and Austria were delivered to the Ottoman Empire. In early March 1915, the first German airplane together with a pilot and mechanics was transported by train to Turkey⁶⁵, about 460 more aircraft and 600 pilots and technicians

⁵⁹ Trumpener Ulrich, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1968, p. 12.

⁶⁰ Neulen 1994, p.24.

⁶¹ Beşirli 1999, p. 255.

⁶² Neulen 1994, p. 25.

⁶³ Bilgin Mustafa Sıtkı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin I. Dünya Savaşı'na Girişi*, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın 100. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu, ESAM, Ankara 2015, p. 181.

⁶⁴ van Kampen 1968, p. 76.

⁶⁵ Neulen 1994, p. 153.

would follow in the course of the war.⁶⁶ Whereas at the beginning of the war in 1914 about 2.000 German soldiers were in action in the Ottoman Empire, in mid 1916, about 10.000 fought between the Dardanelles and the Caucasus, from the Black Sea to Palestine and Sinai. Until 1918 the number had increased to about 25.000 Germans. Four of the nine Turkish armies were at least temporarily commanded by Germans. Not least, the high number of German and Austrian soldiers greatly contributed to the fact that the Ottoman Empire capitulated not until 1918.⁶⁷ The military successes of the Allies in Arabia, Mesopotamia and Palestine, where in 1917 Baghdad and Jerusalem was occupied, this contributed to the fact that the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, despite the German military aid and the resignation of Russia from the war after the revolution, was only a matter of time.⁶⁸

2 Economic Relations

2.1 Financial Relations between the Ottoman Empire and Foreign Countries

Already during the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire had to take its first foreign loans. From England, its ally in the war against Russia, it received a loan of three million Pounds in 1854. One year later English and French investors granted another five million Pounds.⁶⁹ However, the political control of France and Great Britain was already installed when the private investments started.⁷⁰

As of 1880, the financial situation of the Ottoman Empire changed to the extent that the German influence increased, while English capital began to withdraw gradually. Since capital investments also mean a political influence - how much this may be - this increasing financial commitment of the German Reich strengthened its position in the Ottoman Empire.⁷¹ Whereas until the end of the 19th century French financial institutions dominated Turkish finance, Germany succeeded in exercising influence together with negotiating

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 163.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶⁸ Kreiser 2001, p. 51.

⁶⁹ Kreiser 2001, p. 40.

⁷⁰ Schölch Alexander, *Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung und politische Kontrolle durch die europäischen Mächte im Osmanischen Reich (Konstantinopel, Kairo, Tunis)*, in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 1, 1975, pp. 404-446.

⁷¹ Beşirli 1999, p. 125.

spheres of influence. A cooperation agreement between Deutsche Bank and Banque Imperiale Ottoman in 1894, followed one between German, French and English arms industry.⁷²

The Turkish government was aware of the need for foreign capital. Due to absence of funding from England and for the sake of containment of French influence, the “*porte*” was left nothing else but to turn to Germany.⁷³ In awarding the concession for the construction of the Baghdad Railway to Germany, a major role played that the German Reich had granted a loan to the Ottoman Empire in the amount of 30 million Mark at an interest rate of 5%. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was able to reduce French influence in its financial sector.⁷⁴

The high capital requirements of the Ottoman Empire after 1908 were necessary for the implementation of the reform models of the Young Turks, which necessitated a corresponding cash flow from abroad.⁷⁵ The new government did not only want to reorganise the country and to create modern institutions, but also planned the construction of new roads, railways, port facilities, infrastructure for electricity and water, and more. The opposition accused the government of trying to copy the economic policies of unequal further developed European industrial countries. On the other hand, due to the interest created outflow of capital, which in contrast to the capitalist states would not remain in the country, would not be considered sufficiently, just like the increasing dependence of the country.⁷⁶ However, the government did not see an alternative to foreign capital. The accumulation of capital in the country was far from sufficient to meet the financial needs of the state, so one had to rely on money from Europe.⁷⁷

In 1908 and 1909 the new Turkish government drew two bonds totaling approximately 11.7 million Turkish Pounds from French and British investors. But they were not sufficient to

⁷² Ibid., p. 122.

⁷³ Schölch 1975, p.440.

⁷⁴ Beşirli 1999, p.47.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 122-136.

⁷⁶ Beşirli 1999, p. 93.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 98.

cover the financial needs arising from the reform efforts. One reason for this was that the government was not able to reduce the high military spending.⁷⁸

With the support of high ranked English and French officials, the Turkish government began to reform customs, financial and tax system. German experts were not involved in the project, since in the eyes of the Young Turks the German policy was too tied to the old Ottoman system.⁷⁹ In particular, one also saw in the contracts for the construction of the Baghdad Railway a significant expansion of German influence and a threat to the independence of the country.⁸⁰ However, Germany was able to achieve prestige against France and England, as it granted a German bond over 11 million Turkish Pounds with favorable conditions to Turkey, in 1910.⁸¹ Lengthy negotiations between the Turkish government and France failed, as credit conditions were so stringent that the Turkish Finance was one step further on the road to being in total French control.⁸² The loan also meant a gradual shift of Turkey towards the “*Dreibund*” (Triple Alliance).⁸³ While in 1881 England and France contributed almost two-third of the entire Ottoman loans, in 1914 more than 20% of the 142 million Pound increased financial needs came from the German Reich. While France was able to extend its dominant position, so that before the First World War over 50% of the debt of the Ottoman Empire was operated from French sources, England had to accept a significant loss of influence. Only 14% of Turkish government liabilities were met by local sources.

When the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the “*Dreibund*” (Triple Alliance), its finances were exhausted. The leadership of the German Empire, however, was aware that financial support was essential, if Turkey should make serious war effort. Already in October 1914, an immediate bond of 20 million Mark was granted.⁸⁴ In the spring of 1915 a further loan of 150 million was granted. In addition, 150 million Mark was paid by the German

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 137.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 97.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 146.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 199.


⁸² Ibid., p. 180.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 201.

⁸⁴ Trumpener 1968, p. 271.

Reich for arms deliveries of German companies.⁸⁵ Under the impact of hard battles in Gallipoli, the Ottoman Empire was able to assert an additional payment of over 160 million Mark in the fall of 1915. After Germany was able to convince the “*Porte*” to put paper money in circulation, the Ottoman Empire insisted on full coverage of the currency for which the German Reich came up. Only this obligation cost the German Empire nearly 4 billion Dollars until the end of the war. In addition, the expenditure of the German Empire for Turkey during the war amounted to about one billion Marks, which was used for defense equipment, machinery, coal, but in particular for the construction of the Baghdad Railway.⁸⁶

The distribution of the Ottoman public debt by creditor countries at the beginning of 1914 (in percent)



(Beşirli, 1999, p.307)

⁸⁵ Trumpener 1968, p. 279.

⁸⁶ Trumpener 1968, p. 282

2.2 German Economic Policy in the Orient

Just as the foreign policy in general, German economic policy, under Bismarck, in the Ottoman Empire was guided by consideration of other major powers. When in 1888 the concession contract, about the contraction of the Anatolian railway, between a financial group led by Deutsche Bank⁸⁷ and the Ottoman Empire was completed, the German Foreign Ministry declined to expressly protect the rail project from potential complications.⁸⁸ In the period that followed, the main target of the German economy, especially with Deutsche Bank as a protagonist, was the highest profitability of the projects, while the German Reich tried to advance its validity as a world power in the region.⁸⁹

In 1880 the German exports, 6.7 million Mark, to the Ottoman Empire have been relatively insignificant. Despite feeble efforts to open up the Ottoman Empire for Germany economically; just as in the case of the “*German trade association*”, which was founded in 1880 but after unsuccessful activities closed down in 1889; the economic commitment remained marginal.⁹⁰

It was only under Kaiser Wilhelm II, there was a change in German foreign policy in the Middle East. After his second trip to the Orient, Wilhelm II also supported the desire of the Sultan for a continued construction of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, for which the pre-concession was issued on 26.11.1899 for the Anatolian Railway Company. The German influence increased considerably in the subsequent time.⁹¹ The more the German economy was engaged in Turkey, the more interest there was in political stability in the Ottoman Empire. How then ambassador of the German Empire in Constantinople, Marshal of Bieberstein, wrote in 1899 to the chancellor: the interest in the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire would increase the more capital flow to the Ottoman economy. While under Bismarck the principle of strict separation of economic and political interest in Turkey was

⁸⁷ Beşirli 1999, p. 57.

⁸⁸ Neulen 1994, p. 17.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 50.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹¹ Neulen 1994, p. 18.

applied, Germany was now willing and able to defend its commitment in Turkey against other powers.⁹²

The reasons for the increasing German involvement in the Middle East are diverse. The German industry; which reported considerable growth after it, compared to Great Britain, quite late onset of industrialisation; saw in the Orient a large sales market, as well as, the possibility of exploitation of large deposits of raw materials such as iron, ore, copper, oil and many more. The Ottoman Empire also had the advantage that it was geographically close to the German Empire and thus the trade routes could not directly be disturbed by other great powers.⁹³


In contrast to the other great powers Germany had developed interest in different economic sectors in the Ottoman Empire. These included in particular agriculture and railway construction.⁹⁴

⁹² van Kampen 1968, p. 29.

⁹³ Neulen 1994, p. 18.

⁹⁴ Beşirli 1999, p. 245.

Trade volume of the Ottoman Empire with Germany 1880-1912 (absolute)



(van Kampen 1968, p. 24)

The total German exports rose from 6.7 million Mark in 1880 to 77.8 million Mark 1912. Compared to total German exports, the share of the Ottoman Empire, however, was very low and was before the First World War, only about 1%.⁹⁵ Particularly after 1906 Germany succeeded in expanding the trade volume with Turkey. Was the German share of the total Ottoman imports 9,2% in 1910/11, so this grew up to 11,5% in 1913/14. During this time 6% of Turkish exports went to Germany.⁹⁶ However, for German trade the Ottoman Empire played only a subordinated role. The trade volume with Turkey was, before the war, only about 1.5% of the total exchange of goods.⁹⁷ As shown by the example of Germany, it can be said that the entire amount of investment of the European great powers, relatively to their economic power, was rather low and thus the Ottoman Empire played a rather subordinated role for the economies of these countries. A major reason for the low involvement of business

⁹⁵ Farah, 1988, p. 14.

⁹⁶ Beşirli 1999, p. 22.

⁹⁷ Trumpener 1968, p. 336.

in Turkey was, beside political instability, certainly the above mentioned low domestic demand in terms of value, due to the low standard of living of the population. Accordingly, the risk of investment did not appear profitable. Only in railway construction, which was state-sponsored and financially secure due to kilometer guarantees, greater activity was recorded. This had its reason in military consideration, especially as the Ottoman provinces in the East and Arabia had hardly proved to have infrastructure and thus troop- and supply transports became a problem for the military.

During the war, Turkey received from its allies in the West about 1.25 to 1.5 million. Tons of replenishment to weapons, food and operating supplies,⁹⁸ including about 750.000 tones of coal.⁹⁹ In return, Turkish commodities such as cotton, wool, ore, oil and leather; with a value of 300 million Mark; were transported to Germany.¹⁰⁰ All this was transported by the Balkan Train that ran through Constantinople, Nish, Sofia and Edirne.¹⁰¹ Further transport was carried out on smaller ferries to Haidar Pasha, where the Anatolian railway began. The large expansion of the Ottoman Empire and the limited capacity of the Turkish railway network, however, prevented an efficient distribution of supplies to the external borders of the empire. Added to this were frequent accidents of the railways.¹⁰² The interest of the German Reich to exploit the natural resources of Turkey and to strengthen the German economic influence in the country, did not only come up against its limits due to the problems of infrastructure, but also due to the fact that capital and personnel were highly bound by the war in Europe. In contrast, it happened that (...) *in some areas the positions and influence secured by German financial, industrial, and commercial interest groups prior to 1914 (were) actually eroded in the course of the war.*¹⁰³ The Turkish leadership was rather anxious to repel foreign influence in the Ottoman Empire and in particular to prevent an impending dominance of Germany after the war.¹⁰⁴ Especially in respect to the exploitation of Turkish natural resources; such as ore mines in which German companies, here mainly

⁹⁸ Neulen 1994, p. 127.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁰⁰ Trumpener 1968, p. 321.

¹⁰¹ Neulen 1994, pp. 125-126.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁰³ Trumpener 1968, p. 317.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 318.

the defense producer Krupp¹⁰⁵, were interested in¹⁰⁶; the Ottoman leadership insisted that this was solely a matter of the Turkish state and a clarification of the question of the participation of foreign firms should be clarified after the war.¹⁰⁷ While Germany insisted, in particular due to the extensive material supplies and loans to the Ottoman Empire, to have committed the gate and to be able to put this into economic influence, expressed the Sublime Porte the view that German claims on contractual repayment obligations were paid by the successful defense of the Dardanelles and in Galicia. Turkey denied the fact that Germany could derive a special place in Turkey, trying to keep their full freedom of action.¹⁰⁸ By showing a responsive attitude; especially in respect to Turkish debt, whose repayment seemed to be very unlikely due to the high sum, and for whose exempt or extension Finance Minister Cavid campaigned vehemently; and giving economic concessions, the German Reich tried to achieve a long-term dependence and economical penetration of Turkey. The worsening military situation of the German Empire and the following defeat in the First World War ended these efforts.¹⁰⁹

Overall, Germany was quite capable of significantly expanding its economic position in the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. However, the importance of trade with Turkey was rather marginal for Germany. The same may be presumed for the Ottoman Empire as a location for German investment. From this it can be concluded that the interest of the German economy in the Orient was low in this respect and was essentially limited to the construction of the Baghdad Railway and future possibilities of development and imports of mineral deposits.

2.3 The Baghdad-Railway

The investments of the major European powers in the Ottoman Empire had its clear focus on railway construction, capital flows in the industrial and agricultural sectors were made only at a low level.¹¹⁰ The first concession for the construction of a railway line was awarded

¹⁰⁵ Trumpener 1968, p. 321.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 344.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 338.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 339.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 345.

¹¹⁰ Beşirli 1999, p. 16.

to England in 1856. The railway line Izmir-Aydın was started in 1856. Later the line was extended by 340 kilometer and went from Aydın through Dinar to Esirdir.¹¹¹ It was completed in 1912. In particular due to the lack of competitors at the beginning, England was able to increase its economic influence in western Anatolia.¹¹²

Starting approximately from 1870 France began to become more involved in railway construction in the Ottoman Empire. Over the next 20 years, about 1,900 kilometer of railway lines were built mainly in the west of the country.¹¹³ Thus, between 1868 and 1869 the lines Salonika -Mitrovice and Edirne-Dedeaç emerged with about 360 and 150 kilometer, respectively, track length. In 1885, work began on the Asian side for the lines Kasaba-Alaşehir-Afyon, whose length was 250 kilometer, and for the about 90 kilometer railway line between Manisa and Soma.¹¹⁴ 1892 France began the construction of railways in Syria and with the route from Jaffa to Jerusalem also in Palestina. By 1911, about 780 kilometer train paths were installed for the narrow gauge lines. Of particular importance was the line Beirut-Rajak-Damascus-Muzerib with 258 kilometer in length and from Riyad to Aleppo with 332 kilometer.¹¹⁵

In order not to get to dependent on England and France,¹¹⁶ in 1888 the Ottoman Empire issued a concession to a financial group led by Deutsche Bank to extend the existing railway line Haidar Paschamid to Angora, today Ankara.¹¹⁷ The construction was financed by the concession holder to whom a state-guaranteed income minimum for each in-service kilometer of the railway line was granted in return, the so-called kilometer warranty. Any losses incurred in the operation of the line were thus borne by the Ottoman State.¹¹⁸

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.312.

¹¹² Bilgin M. Sıtkı, *The Construction of the Baghdad Railway and Its Impact on Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1902-1913*, OTAM, 16, 109-130, 2004, p.116.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.312.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.312.

¹¹⁵ Neulen 1994, p.130.

¹¹⁶ Sultan Abdulhamid II wrote in his memoirs: Of the Great Powers we can trust the German the most during the construction of the railway. For them the financial and economic aspects are important. Sultan Abdülhamid II: *Siyasi Hatıralarım*, İstanbul 1984, p.139, in: Beşirli 1999, p. 25.

¹¹⁷ Neulen 1994, p.127.

¹¹⁸ The difficulties that arose in terms of the funding provided by the Turkish state, as well as, debt, the conflicts with the major powers on customs tariffs, and the profitability of routes, will not be discussed here.

In this way, a total of about 80% of all railway lines were financed in the Asian provinces.¹¹⁹

For the new trail the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie (Anatolian Railway Society) was founded, which was finishing the line in 1893. Just three years later, the line between Eskisehir to Konya was built. Now one planned to extend the line through Adana and Aleppo to Baghdad. First, the German economy shrank from carrying out the construction in a national solo attempt. The enormous costs, 550 million French Francs, of implementing such a project were the main obstacle to the construction of the railway line.¹²⁰

In particular, due to the insistence of Deutsche Bank France was ready to be involved in the project with approximately 40%. However, in the subsequent negotiations absolute equality with the German financial group was denied to the French, so that France withdrew from the project.¹²¹ France promised itself benefits from a connection to its existing and planned rail lines and tried to link these to the rail network in Europe.¹²² In England too, one saw for itself advantages of an investment. An improvement of the connection to the Persian Gulf, where they had recently established a protectorate over Kuwait, and on to India, was certainly in British interest.¹²³ Just as with the French, the general director of Deutsche Bank, von Siemens, tried to persuade English business circles to have a stake in the project.¹²⁴ However, the British public and the opposition were to a large extent against the project. One feared too great influence of Germany in the Middle East and a threat to the trade route to India.¹²⁵ Russia, however, sought to prevent any strengthening of Turkey and refused railway construction categorically. When in March 1903 the concession contract was finally

¹¹⁹ Quataert Donald, *The Age of Reforms: 1812-1914*, in: Inalcık Halil, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, pp.759-944. One of the major routes funded by donations, special taxes and charges by the Ottoman state was the Hejaz Railway, which was constructed under the leadership of the German engineer Heinrich August Meissner in 1900. It should lead from Damascus through Medina to Mecca and not only to connect the holy places closer to Konstantin, but also facilitate the deployment of troops against rebellious Bedouin tribes in the more remote provinces. Although not involved in funding Germany could derive economic benefit from the project by delivering locomotives and wagons. 1908, the route to Medina was ready and extended over 1,564 km. See: Beşirli 1999, p. 314 & Neulen 1994, p. 130.

¹²⁰ Beşirli 1999, p. 53.

¹²¹ Neulen 1994, p. 127.

¹²² Beşirli 1999, p. 51.

¹²³ Neulen 1994, p. 19.

¹²⁴ Beşirli 1999, p. 51.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p.142. For example, in the treaty of the Baghdad Railway to the Germans was also granted the right to operate shipping on Tigris and Euphrates, to which previously England had the monopoly. Further, a concession for ports in Baghdad and Basra was granted what hit England quite hard.

signed in Constantinople, the funding was almost exclusively done by German capital.¹²⁶ That the project came into being in spite of the economic risks was due to the significant influence of the German government, which through its active participation was in charge of the project in quite different dimension than it was the case once under Bismarck.¹²⁷ The now-to-build railway from Konya through Karaman, Adana, Mosul, Baghdad to Bassorah was 2,467 kilometer long including some branch lines.¹²⁸ In the Ottoman Empire one was completely aware of the growing influence of the German Empire. The fact that the concession was granted to a single country and the huge capital outlay, caused protests by the opposition in the following years.¹²⁹

The talks with Britain, however, persisted and seemed to be crowned with success. Following long negotiations, an agreement was signed on 15 June 1914 in which England accepted the construction of the railway after extensive German concessions. Germany committed itself to set Basra as the end point of the line and not to build a branch line to the Persian Gulf. In short, the countries agreed that England recognises Anatolia, Syria¹³⁰ and northern Mesopotamia as German economic sphere of influence, while Germany acknowledged the British supremacy in southern Mesopotamia, including the country's oil fields, as well as, the transport monopoly on the Euphrates and Tigris. The Ottoman Empire was thus divided into zones of influence.¹³¹ But the outbreak of the First World War prevented the ratification of the treaty.¹³² Even so the railway caused intense debates with England, and also with Russia, so it may be said that the construction of the Baghdad Railway has not threatened the peace of Europe in the last years before the war. The negotiations with Russia in 1910/11 and with England in 1914 even show the will of the

¹²⁶ Neulen 1994, p. 19.

¹²⁷ van Kampen 1968, p. 25.

¹²⁸ Beşirli 1999, p. 55.

¹²⁹ Beşirli 1999, p. 141.

¹³⁰ at least the northern regions through which the Baghdad Railway went; compare the opinion of the new chairman of Deutsche Bank, Helfferich, in April 1913 in which he emphasized the Turkish interest of a German counter-weight to the French position in Syria. Politisches Archiv/Auswärtiges Amt, Türkei 110, R.12495, Bd.66, Abschrift A.7238, in: Beşirli 1999, p. 292.

¹³¹ Beşirli 1999, p. 226.

¹³² Neulen 1994, p. 19 & Beşirli 1999, p. 226.

powers to come to an agreement over a question which caused so much trouble over the years.¹³³

In its hegemonic aspiration in Europe it has always been the concern of German foreign policy to keep England neutral. The German concessions in relation to the Baghdad Railway, as well as other agreements, for example with respect to the colonies or diplomatic cooperation in the Balkans 1912/1913 support this. Further agreements, most notably an objective from the chancellors Bülow and Bethmann-Hollweg naval agreement failed. The English policy of maintaining the balance of power in Europe could not be retained due to the agreement with Germany in the Middle East.¹³⁴ Instead, the German Eastern policy has contributed to the emergence of the Anglo-Russian alliance of 1907 and to strengthen the contradiction with Russia.

In October 1904, the route through Eregli to Bulgurlu was opened. After a six-year suspension of the work, the route had expanded rapidly. By 1914, approximately 900 kilometer of the route was completed, approximately 700 kilometer of the route to Baghdad was still missing, including some important tunnel connections in Taurus and Amanus Mountains.¹³⁵ The German Empire, including Emperor Wilhelm II and Chief of Staff General von Falkenhayn, saw the construction of the Baghdad Railway not as an urgent project, as long as the war lasted in the West.¹³⁶ Money and personnel should be better used there. However, in 1915 one came to the belief that a rail link in Turkey would be indispensable for an advance into Egypt or India. After negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, Germany granted a loan of 40 million Mark for the completion of the lines in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains.¹³⁷ However, these were only built in October 1918. Three weeks before the Turkish surrender the route from Istanbul to Aleppo was fully passable for the first time.¹³⁸ The railway line was already built from Baghdad to the north-west to

¹³³ Baumgart 1982, p. 78.

¹³⁴ Geiss 1976, p. 130.

¹³⁵ Neulen 1994, p. 128.

¹³⁶ Pazarkaya Yüksel & Hottinger Arnold, *Die osmanische Geschichte*, in: Kündig-Steiner Werner, *Die Türkei. Raum und Mensch, Kultur und Wirtschaft in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit*, 2, Tübingen/Basel 1977, p. 288.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 288-295.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

Samara, but after the war still 280 kilometers were missing to complete the line.¹³⁹ Since the Baghdad Railway was mainly used for military transports at reduced payment or unpaid, so that the revenue did not even cover the cost of fuel, the operating company; the Baghdad Railway Company, a subsidiary of the Anatolian Railway Company; was de facto insolvent and maintained only by the financial support of the German Reich. In 1917, again after long negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, the German Empire granted an amortisation loan of approximately 94.5 million Mark to compensate for the debts of the Baghdad Railway Company.¹⁴⁰ Overall, at the end of the war the German Treasury had out-standings of about 207 million Mark for the Taurus Amanus project and about 103 million Mark for the construction in Mesopotamia. In sum, the expenses of the German Empire for the construction of the Baghdad Railway were estimated to be about 360 million Mark.¹⁴¹

3 Cultural Relations

3.1 Literature

The cultural relations of Germany and the Ottoman Empire had occurred first in the area of literature. It started with the translations of German literature into Turkish.¹⁴² Germany, along with pursuing this policy aimed to reduce the existing French influence in Ottoman literature.¹⁴³ Furthermore, also the negative picture of Turks, which remained in German literature at the end of the 17th up to the 18th century, changed. This was especially because of the good political and economical relations between the countries. Thus, while Turks were portrayed as violent and lascivious, as well as, irrational despots, and embodied by their ethical and political action the opposite type to the ideal ruler, this discourse changed by the mid of the 18th century. In operas, plays and novels, the Turks and other oriental characters were no longer exclusively negative associated, but developed - often during each stage of the text - to exemplary and rational figures. Now, Turkish and Arab characters were designed to propagate the positions of the Enlightenment. As a result, the German audience saw variations of now enlightened oriental rulers. The negative traits with which Turkish

¹³⁹ Neulen 1994, p. 130.

¹⁴⁰ Pazarkaya & Hottinger 1977, p. 311

¹⁴¹ Pazarkaya & Hottinger 1977, p. 315

¹⁴² Grimme Otto - Hachtmann-Hubert, *Europäische Kultureinflüsse in der Türkei: Ein literär-geschichtlicher Versuch*, Der neue Orient Verlag, Berlin 1918, p. 5.

¹⁴³ Becker Carl Heinrich, *Das türkische Bildungsproblem*, Islamstudien 2, 1932, p. 371.

characters were connected in the 17th century were banned in a minor character who was usually called “*Osmin*” and often appeared as a comic figure, whereby the negative features were softened again.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, conversion of Turks to Christianity and the acceptance of European/German values conveyed a sense of superiority and increased self-confidence, given the weakened Ottoman Empire. It was now conceivable that Turks and Muslims lived according to European ideas, but this gesture of appropriation meant neither tolerance nor acceptance of cultural or religious difference. Accordingly, the weakening of the Ottoman Empire in the context of Enlightenment and other socio-political developments enabled the new attitudes in the literature. These attitudes resulted in a wide range, from representations of the Ottomans and Muslims as equal fellow men to texts which were highlighting the development potential of the Ottomans and Muslims, while ultimately not accepting cultural and religious differences.¹⁴⁵

The best know author who was dedicated to the Ottoman Empire might be Karl May. He wrote no less than five novels situated in the Ottoman Empire. These included: *Durch das wilde Kurdistan*, *Von Bagdad nach Stambul*, *In den Schluchten des Balkans*, *Durch das Land der Skiperaten* and *Orientzyklus* (which he originally published, significantly, in serial form in “*Deutscher Hausschatz in Wort und Bild*,” between 1881 and 1888).¹⁴⁶ Among the ideas addressed by May was the role of German arms and military instruction in the Ottoman Empire; specifically, he wrote of the superiority of German weapons (meaning the Krupp weapons) and the sloppiness of Ottoman soldiers, whose lines were not straight.¹⁴⁷ His novels also addressed the reality of the Turks as the “*Sick man of Europe*,” and sometimes proposed that Germany would provide the Ottoman Empire with its salvation.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Berman Nina, *Was dokumentiert die Literatur? Praxistheoretische Überlegungen zum deutsch-türkischen Kulturkontakt im 18. und 20 Jahrhundert*, in: Ozil Şeyda; Hofmann, Michael & Dayıoğlu-Yücel Yasemin, *Türkisch-deutscher Kulturkontakt und Kulturtransfer - Kontroversen und Lernprozess*, V&R unipress, Göttingen 2011, pp. 157-168.

¹⁴⁵ Berman 2011, p. 163

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 55 & Kuran Burçoğlu Nedret, *The Image of the Turk in Karl May's Novel Von Bagdad nach Stambul*, *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 5(II), 1995, pp. 239-247.

¹⁴⁷ Berman 2011, p. 62.

¹⁴⁸ Kuran Burçoğlu Nedret 1995, p. 243.

3.2 Education

German-Ottoman relations in the education sector played an important role for the military, as already mentioned before. But the Ottoman Empire was also quite interested in the German school system and thus the first German schools already opened in the 19th century in Istanbul and Anatolia. But why was the Empire so interested in this? The reason was the general modernisation process of the empire, which started in the 19th century and for which West-European role models have been used. From the late 19th to the beginning of the 20th century Germany was used as a model for the Ottoman society reforms. The Empire admired especially the German military, industry and state leadership, German virtues; just like discipline, order, regularity, public peace, security, commercial assiduity; developed agriculture and science. Accordingly, the Ottoman elite (teachers, publicists, military staff, and technicians) undertook many travels to Germany. This influence from the foreign education system created a new rank of civil servants, officers, teachers and intellectuals.¹⁴⁹

An important role for the modernisation of the Ottoman education system was played by the Young Turks. From 1908 onwards they did successful opposition work against the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The Young Turks tried to maintain the Ottoman Empire by using school and education reforms. Thus, between 1908 and 1918 many laws and enactments have been issued to reform the education system. Here the aim was to introduce new education concepts. Instead of only reading, memorizing and using corporal punishment to teach the pupils absolute obedience, the teacher should now act as a role model. Not only intellectually, but also morally, and in aesthetics and athletics. Accordingly, handwork, sport, music and games were added to the syllabus, so that students could develop to be independent.¹⁵⁰ They tried to change the education system with its traditional Islamic orientation to a system of basic, middle and higher education schools.

From 1913 onwards the German Empire was allocated to the reform of the military and the education system. While the Ottoman Empire could benefit a lot from this, Germany also saw benefits. Baron Hans von Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Constantinople,

¹⁴⁹ Bilgin 2004, p. 118.

¹⁵⁰ Gencer Mustafa, *Der Transfer deutschen Bildungswissens in das Osmanische Reich*, in: Möller, Esther & Wischmeyer, Johannes: *Transnationale Bildungsräume - Wissenstransfer im Schnittfeld von Kultur, Politik und Religion*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2013, p.117-136.

stated that not foreseeable opportunities might arise, if it would be possible to infiltrate Turkish peoples with the German spirit.¹⁵¹ In 1917, also the Ottoman Education Minister, Şükrü Bey, made a study trip to Germany, where he visited German facilities of public education. But, as already mentioned, also civil servants and publicists undertook trips to study the German education system and to publish books about it. It was suggested that at first the universities should be reformed to educate professional experts. Reforms in this sense have not only targeted the teaching itself, but also the autonomy of the university, freedom of speech and freedom of research and investigation. Interestingly, also plans for schools for handicapped students have been mentioned. For example, pupils have been sent to German schools for deaf and disabled, as well as, blind people. In addition, contemporary education for girls was suggested, so that they could better support their future husbands. But also literature and music have been important topics. While the language should be simplified to create a national literature, students were sent to German music schools.

But not only Turkish scholars and students went to Germany, also Germans came to Turkey to help reform the system. One example is Prof. Dr. Franz Schmidt, ex-chief of German schools abroad, who started working as a consultant at the Ministry of Education. Schmidt's mission was, on the one hand, to contribute to the Ottoman education system while, on the other hand Germans got a tool that could increase their influence in the area of education. The main purpose was to weaken the French influence on the Turkish education system. Accordingly, Schmidt also proposed the foundation of a German University to the Turkish authorities.

The idea of establishing a German University in Turkey was the dream of Hugo Grothe, who was the president of the German Front-Asia Committee.¹⁵² Furthermore, Schmidt and other German teachers also prepared a draft for the establishment of an Imperial University, called "*Entwurf einer Satzung für die Kaiserlich Osmanische Universität in Istanbul*" (Regulation

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.122.

¹⁵² Grothe Hugo, *Gedanken zur deutschen Errichtung einer Hochschule in der Türkei. Eine Sammlung von Gutachten*, 1913, in: *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients*, 10, pp. 103-172.

draft for Istanbul Ottoman Empire University).¹⁵³ However, this offer was politely rejected by the Minister of Education, but was useful in the statutes for the university.

Anyway, with the support of Schmidt, the Minister of Education had decided to appoint a certain number of German professors at Istanbul University. Later the Union and Progress

Party demanded for Austrian, Swiss, and Hungarian professors besides German ones to prevent the country's domination at the university.¹⁵⁴ According to the agreement made between Turkey and Germany a group of scientists consisting of Dr. Gustav Fester (Technical Chemistry), Dr. Kurt Hoesch (Organic Chemistry), Dr. Walther Penck (Geology and Mineral Sciences), Dr. Erich Leick (Botany), Dr. Erich Obst (Geography), Dr. Gunther Friedrich Jacoby (Philosophy), Dr. Georg Anschütz (Pedagogy and Experimental Psychology), Dr. Gotthelf Bergstrasser (Comparative Semitic Languages), Dr. Carl Friedrich Wilhelm Giese (Ural-Altai Languages), Dr. Ferdinand Friedrich Carl Lehmann-Haupt (Ancient Tribes History, Greek and Roman History) and Dr. Walther Schönborn (Public Law) came to Istanbul. Other than these Dr. Fritz Arndt (Inorganic Chemistry), Dr. Boris Zarnik (Zoology), Dr. Anton Fleck (Finance) and Dr. Friedrich Hoffman (Economics) came to Turkey later. Because of the continuing need for professors another agreement was signed for the appointment of two German diplomats at the university; Dr. Johannes Heinrich Mordtmann (Germany's former Consul General in Istanbul, History Methodology) and Dr. Erich Nord (new Consulate General in Istanbul, European Civil Law). There were also eight German scientists working with private agreement at the university. Due to World War I and an insufficient number of students, these professors have been provided with only limited contribution for the institutionalisation of the university.

Anyway, during this period, Istanbul University faculty members have attempted to enhance existing departments, library, laboratories and other technical equipment to adapt to the requirements of the age system. Beside these, the professors working in the University they have also published articles in various scientific journals. Among the above mentioned

¹⁵³ Dölen Emre, *II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Darülfünun*, Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, 2008, pp. 34-37.

¹⁵⁴ Ergün Mustafa, *Die deutsch-türkischen Erziehungsbeziehungen während des ersten Weltkrieges*, OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi), Sayı 3, Ankara 1990, online available: <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/835/10568.pdf>, 20.01.2014, pp. 200-203.

teachers only few have written books. Among those faculty members who did, like Dr. Obst, Dr. Penck, Dr. Arndt and Dr. Fester, their books could be supposed iconic.¹⁵⁵

Although the Turkish government asked them to deliver their lessons in Turkish in two years later only six of them could fulfil this requirement. As a result, assistants were assigned to the others because they could not learn Turkish.¹⁵⁶ Due to the negativeness of the war and short period in Turkey (1915-1918), the contribution of the German scientists to the Ottoman education system has remained limited.

However, beside this scientific perspective, the Ottoman youth was also asked to learn something from German culture. They should give their culture national character, whereby Germany was used as an example for what education could do for the intellectual and economical development of a country. For that reason, the education of the youth was emphasized. It was the aim to bring up a generation which loves law and order, as well as having respect for authority. Here, especially important was the love for the motherland, what was an important part of German culture, and what the Ottoman Empire wanted for its own youth.¹⁵⁷ For this purpose monographs about the German way of living, culture, history and mentality have been published. Of course, also the translation of German literature into Turkish played an important role, as already mentioned in 3.1. These efforts have even strengthened during the war, whereby the topic shifted to the social, political, cultural and economical relations of the Ottoman Empire and its bilateral relations. The activities were supported by the German-Turkish Organisation in Berlin and its counter part in Constantinople, the Turkish-German Organisation.

All in all, the German education system and education ideals were used as a pattern for contemporary social development in the Ottoman Empire. The official sending and private stays abroad of pupils, students, journalists and scientists, as well as, their reports, translations and papers contributed to the Westernisation of the education system in the Ottoman Empire. The reports about German cultural life and education system have been

¹⁵⁵ Dölen 2008, pp. 34-35.

¹⁵⁶ Ergün 1990, pp. 200-203.

¹⁵⁷ Gencer 2013, pp. 128-129

the basis for education reforms and built the way for western education in the empire, as well as, the young Turkish Republic.¹⁵⁸

3.3 Archeology

Although the influence of German professors on science in the Ottoman Empire was quite low, as mentioned before, relations between Germany and the empire emerged in terms of archaeology. This was, because the Ottoman Empire contributed a lot in the completion of the Pergamon Museum in Berlin in 1899. The German government during this time wanted to establish a museum similar to those in France and England, where these places became some of the most popular destinations due to their famous artefacts from the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁹ But to do so, the Germans would need a magnificent artefact that would justify the museum's development. This requirement was satisfied by the Pergamon Altar. The complicated and often antagonistic relationship between the German government (especially under Wilhelm II) and art meant that any public display of art between 1871 and 1914 constituted a political statement.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the importance accorded to the Pergamon Altar by the German government required that the political ramifications of this monument was considered. The decision to construct a museum around the Pergamon Altar represented a public statement of German interest in the Ottoman Empire, as well as, German artistic achievement (through the altar's acquisition and display).

The replacement of Ottoman artefacts was further supported by the German government and universities and thus Germans discovered and appropriated thousands of pieces of Ottoman, Byzantine, and other ancient history while asserting their influence in the Ottoman territories.¹⁶¹

The Germans began receiving artefacts from the Pergamon digs with Carl Humann's discoveries (Humann was in the Ottoman Empire to plan and construct railways) in 1872,

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 131-133.

¹⁵⁹ Marchand Suzanne, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750-1970*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996, p. 86.

¹⁶⁰ Gaehtgens Thomas W., *The Museum Island in Berlin*, in: Wright Gwendoline, *The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology, Studies in the History of Art*, no. 47, National Gallery of Art, Washington DC 1996, p. 68.

¹⁶¹ Shaw Wendy M. K., *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualisation of History in the Late Ottoman Empire*, University of California Press, Berkeley 2003, p. 133.

but after their activity got too intense the German participation in Pergamum became regularized.¹⁶² Although regularized, the Germans intentionally concealed their discovery from the Ottoman officials, and, thus, secured for themselves a greater proportion of the artefacts.¹⁶³ However, in the case of the Pergamon Altar the Germans received official permission to excavate the site where they discovered the altar and they generally complied with the Ottoman laws on antiquities.¹⁶⁴ German influence in the empire permitted the Germans to “accept not only sculpture and (...) jewellery”¹⁶⁵ but to appropriate the entire altar without considering Ottoman objections.

¹⁶² Gaehtgens 1996, p. 68.

¹⁶³ Marchand 1996, p. 94. Ottoman law divided such findings in the following way: one-third of the artifacts went to each of the following, the state, the group or individual who discovered them, and the land owner. The Germans (including the German government) purchased the land to acquire two-thirds of the artifacts, without telling the Ottomans what the land contained. However, it may not have been necessary for the Germans to do this as they acquired almost all the artifacts they wished with only limited interference from the Ottoman government.

¹⁶⁴ Although the Germans received permission, they did not (as previously noted) disclose the significance of their discovery to the Ottoman government, nor did they adhere to Ottoman law regarding the appropriation of antiquities. Further, German influence in the Empire (including the visit of the Kaiser) permitted them to appropriate the treasures without significant interference from the government.

¹⁶⁵ Gaehtgens 1996, pp. 71-72. According to the established Ottoman law on the recovery of antiquities, some of the artifacts would have to remain in the Ottoman Empire, especially if the artifacts were of particular importance. The Germans successfully sought to appropriate the whole of the altar.

CHAPTER II

TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE REPUBLIC PERIOD

1 Political Relations

1.1 Germany and Turkey's Foreign Policy

When the First World War finished, victorious countries moved to establish their new world order the defeated empires were either divided or new states were formed in their place and to a large extent the plan was to eliminate their future political, economic and military power.¹⁶⁶ There are proximity, parallelism and similarities observed here between Turkey and Germany in foreign policy.

With the forced abdication of Wilhelm II, Weimar Republic was founded in jarring internal turmoil and economic hardships in 1918. With its lost territory and lost economic power, Germany was imposed to pay war reparations¹⁶⁷, with the Treaty of Versailles. One of the reasons for Turkey being close to Germany was that both were defeated in the war. Both states were unwilling to accept the agreements put in front of them and appealed to the pressure. One of the commitments of Germany in the Treaty of Versailles was not to establish again diplomatic and political relations with Turkey. Turkey, according to Article 23 of Mudros Armistice signed on 30 October 1918, would cut all relations with Germany and with its other allies so the two countries were totally cut off¹⁶⁸. However, after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 23 July 1923, Turkey had at least got rid of this disaster and won the right at any time to re-establish diplomatic relations with Germany.

¹⁶⁶ Haffner Sebastian, *Von Bismarck zu Hitler*, Kinder Verlag GmbH, München 1989, p. 177-199.

¹⁶⁷ Lothar Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, Frankfurt am Main 1964, pp. 70-143.

¹⁶⁸ Kılıç Sezen, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Türkiye'deki Alman Okulları (1852'den 1945'e kadar)*, (Turkish-German Relations and German Schools from 1852 to 1945), Atatürk Research Center, Ankara 2005, p. 121.

German government had some reservations in establishing relations with Turkey. Moreover, other western states were pursuing a harsh policy towards Turkey. The German Government was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey not to disrupt relations with these states. However, this hesitation did not last long time and a Turkish-German Friendship Treaty was signed in March 1924 between Germany and Turkey.

Two states have formalised their mutual political and diplomatic relations, and then ambassadors were appointed mutually. Here, Turkey has been successful with the opposition in Lausanne and won some rights. Germany was restricted in many respects by the Treaty of Versailles and believing that to get rid of these provisions, was not showing power, instead, and followed peacefully by a pass through negotiations and agreements.¹⁶⁹ Since, her conditions did not offer more possibilities. With peaceful and tolerant methods applied, they had achieved a bit of gains in foreign policy.

The main issues with the peace treaties, which both countries were not satisfied with, was with respect to the foreign policy demands that existed related to geographic boundaries. The most important issue held in Lausanne, which Turkey was not satisfied with, was the Hatay, Mosul, and the Bosphorus problem. Due to much more comprehensive situation, Germany was pursuing a revisionist foreign policy. Therefore, both countries had to be tolerant and understanding of foreign policy objectives against each other.

During the Nazi period, Turkish-German relations had remained fragile and had begun to show differences. Objectives and methods were presenting differences. Germany, to achieve the objectives in foreign policy, was taking unilateral decisions and refusing to recognize treaties. Germany was bringing them into basic principles and showing its power from time to time, and was using military force from time to time.¹⁷⁰ In the foreign policy of Turkey, existing agreements were certainly recognised and implemented. It was trying to get desired results within the framework of international law on the issues that bothered Turkey in Lausanne. Turkey strictly refused unilateral actions and was strongly against it. As a result, there are contradictions of preferred methods between the two countries.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 1-143.

¹⁷⁰ Schulz Gerhard, *Deutschland seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg 1918-1945*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1976, pp. 144-157.

1.2 Ambassadors

After the end of diplomatic relations between Germany and Turkey, immediately ambassadors were mutually appointed. Germany appointed Rudolf Nadolny as the Ambassador of Ankara on May 8, 1924. Nadolny, first came to Istanbul and then after a month, he went to Ankara and met with Ismet Pasha, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ismet Pasha asked in the meeting if they would open an embassy in Ankara or not and Nadolny had responded positively to this question. Similar questions in the meeting with Mustafa Kemal Pasha were on the agenda. At the first meeting proposing the question to move German Embassy to Ankara for the agenda means, Ankara gave importance to the diplomatic and political problem. The German Government's response looked favorably to this offer, Turkish government responded by showing the location of the Embassy in Ankara.

Nadolny wanted 16 thousand German marks from Germany for the land of the German Embassy, and bought 30 thousand square meters with this money. Turkish Government kept its word, and gave just over 21 thousand square meters of land where purchased. Thus, Germany was the first country to begin their construction of the Embassy building in Ankara.¹⁷¹

The Turkish government in response to Nadolny, appointed Kemaleddin Sami Pasha as Ambassador to Berlin and Kemaleddin Sami Pasha presented credentials in Berlin on October 8, 1924.¹⁷²

1.3 Issue of Mosul and Germany's Perspective

Before the First World War the Mosul region, due to oil, had been subject of competition between UK, France, Germany and even the US, was ceded to France on Sykes- Picot agreement in 1916. France, in 1920 San Remo Conference, in return for support in the Middle East, had left Mosul to the UK.

¹⁷¹ Koçak Cemil, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1939 (Turkish-German Relations 1923-1939)*, Publications of Turkish History Institution, Ankara 2013, pp. 10-15.

¹⁷² JK 1, (8.10.1924), p. 87.

One of the problems that remained unsolved in the Lausanne Conference was, to whom Mosul should be ceded, this was the most important problem of Turkish foreign policy. When the issue of drawing the Turkish-Iraqi border was the topic of discussion at the conference, Turkey, due to the fact that the majority of people from Mosul and Suleymaniye region was Turkish, argued that this region should be a part of Turkey, UK opposed to this thesis as a mandatory government. The solution to this issue was left to the bilateral talks between Britain and Turkey in nine months, where upon the Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne.¹⁷³

During negotiations, started in Istanbul on 19 May 1924, there were no result; the parties had not changed their attitude. Britain had raised the thesis that Hakkari and the region around it was the continuation of Iraq geographically, In addition, United Kingdom raised the issue that the religious majority in Hakkari province was Assyrians and thus the Assyrians migrated to Iraq, Hakkari also needed to join to Iraq.

After failing to get results from the Istanbul Conference and Turkey not softening its stance, UK provoked incidents in the Turkish-Iraqi border.¹⁷⁴

This situation increased the tension of Turkish-British relations. If the problem could not be solved by this way, these issues would be assigned to the League of Nations. The League of Nations began to discuss the issue by putting it on the agenda in September 1924. Although Turkey proposed plebiscite in Mosul and the region around it, Britain did not accept the proposal. Decisions taken by the League of Nations were supporting the British thesis and Turkey having its own internal problems, could not go further due to the economic and political effects.

German Foreign Ministry official, Röpke, a few days before the decision of the League of Nations in the report he wrote to the London Embassy of Germany, on Mosul problem and the attitude Germany should take on the Turkish-British conflict.¹⁷⁵ In the report the

¹⁷³ Seha Meray, *Conference of Lausanne; Minutes - Documents, Volume 7*, Yapi Kredi Publications, Istanbul 2001, pp. 274-275.

¹⁷⁴ Dincer Said, *Atatürk's Principles and History of Turkish Revolution*, Nobel Publications, Istanbul 2004, p. 212.

¹⁷⁵ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945), from Röpke to German London Embassy, Nr. I, 02.12.1925.

following was recorded, Turkey's attitude to the League of Nations, which gradually hardened and explained that it even became threatening. Nadolny had the opinion that although Turkey's entering a war was not expected, a possible crisis might cause trouble for Germany. Nadolny also explained that harsh attitudes; dominant in the Geneva talks, would prevent Turkey's entry to the League of Nations and this situation would be met with disfavour by Germany.¹⁷⁶ Nadolny emphasises that due to Turkey's vital struggle for the Mosul problem, Germany definitely needed to avoid giving the impression that it was against Turkey and that it was by England's side. Since, England wanted to have a successful result in Mosul, Turkey was put in a position of self-defense. Therefore, Turkey attempted to forge an alliance with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey was pushed to make attempts to establish the Balkan Pact. Germany believed that because of this behavior, Turkey would break off its ties with the West. In contrast Nadolny, if Turkey would accept, had proposed a small change to the border.¹⁷⁷

The League of Nations report, published in September 1925, mentioned that Mosul belongs to Iraq and Hakkari should remain in Turkey. The report was adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. England dominated Council of the League of Nations, decision-making body.

The decision of the League of Nations created uproar in Turkey and rallied opposition to the British. Moreover, Turkish press also mentioned a Turkish-British war but rulers of Republic of Turkey did not go further and accepted the decision of the League of Nations with the Treaty of Ankara signed on 5 June 1926.¹⁷⁸ This treaty defined the current border with Iraq and Mosul and tensions came to an end at that time. 10% of Mosul oil revenues would be given to Turkey with the Treaty for a period of 25 years and this was accepted.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik, Dezember 1925 – December 1926), from the Archive of the German Foreign Office (aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswaertigen Amts), Serie B: 1925-1933, Band III.

¹⁷⁷ From the Archive of the German Foreign Office (aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswaertigen Amts), K 503 668-70, Nadolny's Report, Nr. 212, 29.12.1925.

¹⁷⁸ Ismail Soysal, *Turkey's Political Treaties 1920 - 1945*, Volume I, Ankara 1989.

¹⁷⁹ Armaoğlu Fahir, *20th Century Political History (1914 - 1980)*, Alkim Publishing, Istanbul 2010, pp. 322 – 323.

Solving the problem of Mosul, Turkish foreign policy was influenced in two ways; firstly, Turkey was closer to the Soviet Union, with the balance of policy, Turkey had strengthened its cooperation with the Soviet Union, Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Paris on December 17, 1925. Secondly, it led Turkey to soften its relations with France and Italy. Since 1929 the UK had begun to change the approach to Turkey and started to contribute to the Turkish economy.¹⁸⁰

Relations with UK were further developing with Turkey joining the League of Nations in 1932 and the building of the Balkan Entente with Greece against aggressive policies of Italy in Balkans and eastern Mediterranean in 1934. In German Foreign Ministry on April 22, Undersecretary Schubert met with the British and told to Kemaleddin Sami Pasha that England would not support Italy. Turkey, according to its foreign policy, had declared that rather than Soviet Union, improving bilateral relations with England meant that it would be in a league with free world and democratic regimes in the future a state policy.¹⁸¹

Germany refrained to be on Turkey's side with Mosul problem and also refrained to be on the UK side. These relations have kept the countries in balance and because of the importance of the problem; Germany did not want to disturb the Turkish- German relations but also did not want the Turkish-Soviet relations to be disturbed.

1.4 The League of Nations, Turkey and Germany

On January 18, 1919, at a Peace Conference held in Paris, the establishment of League of Nations was put on the main agenda. Association Agreement was accepted as part of the Versailles Treaty, and entered into force with the approval at 10 January 1920.

League of Nations, in order to ensure broad participation after World War 1, was established to ensure international peace and security by improving international cooperation.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Shaw Stanford & Shaw Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Second Volume, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. 447.

¹⁸¹ Armaoğlu 2010, p. 344.

¹⁸² Kiran Abdullah, *League of Nations and the war cannot be avoided*, GAU J. Soc. & Appl. Sci., 2008, pp. 19-36.

Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey, as a result of their exclusion in international politics, they were not part of the League of Nations. Germany was accepted directly after the membership application to the League of Nations on February 9, 1926.¹⁸³ Turkey and the Soviet Union were approaching warily to the League of Nations which was under the control of France and Britain. Because this organisation was under UK's control continuously since its foundation and decisions were taken against Turkey in its relations with Britain. Moreover, UK and some European states did not lean towards Turkey's entry into the organisation because of Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey, since 1930, entering into peaceful appropriate improvements for collective security understanding in the regional and world politics and solving the problems remaining from Lausanne with considerable peace and diplomatic channels increased Europe's interest in Turkey especially by Britain.

Entrance of Germany to the League of Nations distressed both countries, as concerns raised about one of the three countries in good standing now being separated from the trio and starting cooperation with other two countries.¹⁸⁴ Especially, the concern of the Soviet Union was that Germany would make significant changes with shaping its foreign policy with Western big states even to act in their favour hereafter. At the same time, they thought that this would be effective on Turkey and have negative impact on Turkish-Soviet relations.

On the session at April 13, 1932 of the Disarmament conference in 1932, Turkey was reported officially to become a member of the League of Nations. Turkey had been a member¹⁸⁵ of the League of Nations by unanimous votes of 43 members at July 18, 1932 dated session of Council and after joining this league; Turkey had stayed sincerely until the end and had supported the league always for the preservation of peace.

Moreover, Turkey joining to the League of Nations increased cooperation and rapprochement activities in the Balkans. The Soviet Union, despite supporting Turkey's

¹⁸³ From the Archive of the German Foreign Office (aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswaertigen Amts), JK 1, (9.2.1926), p. 101.

¹⁸⁴ Files For German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945), from the Archive of the German Foreign Office (aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswaertigen Amts), Serie B: 1925-1933, Band II.

¹⁸⁵ Oran Baskin, *Turkish Foreign Policy Volume I: 1919-1980*, Communication Publications, 17th Edition, Istanbul 2012, p. 311.

membership in this association firstly, after the increase of Germany and Japan's militarist policies, in 1934, officially became a member of the League of Nations.¹⁸⁶

1.5 Cooperation in the Balkans and The Balkan Pact

Italy, despite being with the Allies during the First World War was following a moderate policy against the Turkish state during its national struggle because it was not given decisions according to its own interests and did not show any serious resistance from the military point of view. Mussolini's government which came to power in Italy in 1922 and acquiring expansionist foreign policy application, this purpose begun to disrupt the relationship and the presence of the rhetoric to place Turkey's territorial water and land area in a Roman Empire Area led Turkish Italian relations to remain negative until the end of the World War II. The rapprochement of Italy with Germany irritated Turkey and led to establishing the Balkan Pact with Greece for collective security in the Balkans due to Italian expansionism and this move irritated Italy. When Turkey started using the Balkan Pact as a protective armour against Italy, this met with a completely negative attitude of the Germans. Balkan Entente was against the Italians, but Germany wouldn't allow this attitude against his ally. However, Turkey's policy was precautionary in early stages. Turkey didn't object Germany on re-enacting compulsory military service despite Versailles. German re-militarised the Rhine region. English and French governments could only protest this, but Turkey did not show a large and active effort, was just content to join to the resolution of the League of Nations condemning Germany.

Turkey, as a result of its foreign policy, tried to serve both the preservation of world peace and spent considerable efforts towards the establishment of permanent regional peace. The most intense area of the regional activities has been the Balkans particularly parallel to the developments in Europe. Turkey has proven that it was in favour of peace in this region with the friendship treaties with Albania on 15 December 1925, Bulgaria on 18 October 1925 and Yugoslavia on 25 October 1925 and has enforced this policy with solving the problem of population exchange with Greece after 1930 and increasing cooperation with this country.

¹⁸⁶ Armaoğlu 2010, p. 337.

On September 14th, 1933 when the Treaty of Friendship and Border Protection¹⁸⁷ was signed with Greece the positive atmosphere in the Balkans had further matured the idea of establishing the Balkan Entente. Balkans stability and security was in danger with the developments after 1930, Italy and Germany's rhetoric further came along, diplomatic activities started with Turkey's leadership, with Greek support and approval of Yugoslavia and Romania, bilateral negotiations started in Athens and mutual agreements were signed for the Association of Balkan. Albania and Bulgaria, to continue their ethnic and territorial claims and therefore were not willing to support Russia's policy in this cooperation.

The Balkan Entente was signed in Athens among Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on February 9, 1934.¹⁸⁸ This entente between the parties provides mutual guarantees in the point of political and military views and guarantees the borders against each other.¹⁸⁹ Also guarantees to consult with each other in case of war and not to conclude political treaties against each other.

This entente, could not establish a strict and confident collective security, especially such fundamental political and military reservations like the Italian and German treaty on the Yugoslavia, the tendency of Bulgaria to cooperate with Germany and Italy and making Romania the target of Germany and Italy had prevented the strong cooperation. The Entente, in 1939, lost its function but at least has constituted an important stage of recent history in terms of showing for the first time the importance of regional cooperation in the Balkan countries and specifying Turkey's policy of the state.

In addition, these developments have been important in terms of showing that Turkey's place in the future would be in the Western World, the relations between Turkey and Western mainly Britain and French quickly entered in to a recovery and in a development process.

1.6 Treaty of Versailles and the National Socialists

Turkey was recognising the effort of National Socialist German foreign policy which wanted to escape from the Treaty of Versailles, and even likened it with its struggle to get rid of the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 339.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 351.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 339-340

Treaty of Sevres. The duration of this tolerant approach, of course, would be closely related to the degree of demand of Germany.

Until the Nazis came to power, relations with Germany were good, while political relations of Turkey with France and England were almost cut. After Hitler came to power, a radical change showed in German foreign policy. He began to take steps that Germany would be effective and powerful state in Europe and in world politics. The struggle of first economic and then, on this fundamental a political dominance, establish with Southeast European countries and the Balkan states were a part of this step.¹⁹⁰ Here, the main problem that could not be overlooked was the breakdown of the stability of the European-based international policy established by France and Britain after World War I. Therefore, with these two states the question was rather not how much they let it be, until the end, political and economic struggle which would occur across the world, they would not refrain from entering into a war with Germany in this struggle. Firstly, Germany not hesitating to put on every agenda the demand to change its borders and using military force to do so, established closer ties with Italy, trying to get first economic and after political influence in the Balkan countries, militarisation of the Bosphorus, which was the most important issue in Turkey's foreign policy full sovereignty on Bosphorus, and distant and cold attitude towards the issue of Hatay joining the country's territory was showing that Turkish-German relations would not be as smooth as before.

One of the most important problems in the Treaty of Versailles for Germany was undoubtedly the prohibition of the compulsory military service system. In order to solve this in a short period of time, Germany pulled from the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1933 and from the League of Nations. Turkey declared that Germany's position was wrong and should return¹⁹¹ to the Geneva Disarmament Conference via Tevfik Rüşti.

Germany proclaimed that the German army would be build on the basis of compulsory military service, here in after “Germany has decided to establish a new and powerful navy,” March 16, 1935. As for Turkey, although it declared that it was sad to see Germany’s withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament Conference, it didn’t look unfavourable towards

¹⁹⁰ Schulz 1976, pp. 117-153.

¹⁹¹ Files For German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), German Foreign Minister Nuerath Report, Nr. 371, 12.3.1934.

the reestablishment of the German army. On the contrary, Turkey was pleased by this development.

Because, as it was before the World War I, the Turkish army, wanted to appropriately benefit from the German war industry and experience. However, the Turkish image looked like it was not against rearmament of Germany, but the compulsory military service in contrast had irritated Turkey.

It seemed that meanwhile Germany decided for rearmament, Turkey, taking it as an opportunity; put forward one of the decisions taken in the Treaty of Lausanne, to put disarmament of Bosphorus to the international agenda and defended the view of impossibility of unilateral disarmament. Turkey shared the decision of the League of Nations of condemning Germany as well as to respect her decision and calling Germany to return to the League of Nations.¹⁹²

Another incident which Germany declared not to recognise in the Treaty of Versailles was not recognising demilitarized status of the Rhine from the date of March 7, 1936 and declared that the German troops would enter the region. The Government of Turkey held a meeting with Ambassador of Germany Keller via Foreign Ministry Secretary General Numan Menemencioglu on the course of events. Turkey declared that recent developments were not a direct concern of Turkey, however, Turkey's main concern was endangering of world peace.¹⁹³ In Keller's report on March 13th, it is explained that Turkey remained neutral in the Rhine problem; and its actual concern is, certainly to jeopardize the peace.¹⁹⁴ As a result, Turkey joined the decision of the League of Nations condemning Germany in this regard.

For Turkey, the most important step taken towards establishing sovereignty over the Mediterranean was the attack on Abyssinia on 3 October 1935 by Italy and a few months later the annexation of this country. This event had a direct impact on the Turkish-German relations, as it was supported by Germany.¹⁹⁵ Germany was clearly taking place alongside

¹⁹² Soysal 1989, pp. 154-156

¹⁹³ Files For German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1933-1937), from Keller to the German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 20, 03.20.1936.

¹⁹⁴ From Keller, Ibid Nr. 20.

¹⁹⁵ Koçak 2013, p. 110.

with Italy, Turkey's cautious approach towards Italy and cautious approach against Germany, resulted in relationships being negatively affected.

1.7 Turkey's Domination on Bosphorus and Germany

The Bosphorus was not only politically, militarily and geopolitically important for Turkey. It was a matter of importance in the same way for the other states. Therefore, the New Turkish State adopted the principle of establishing absolute dominance on Turkish Straits at National Pact according to past experiences also consistently argued it at the Lausanne Peace Conference, but could not gain full control.¹⁹⁶ This situation and the security of the Straits was a situation that Turkey is constantly irritated by. Turkey was given many commercial and military guarantees on Straits in Lausanne. After 1930, the validity of this guarantee was far from satisfying Turkey.

The effects of Italy's expansionist policies had begun to increase well over to Turkey. League of Nations was unable to prevent these militarist developments and the Japanese attack to Manchuria, despite the commitment to keep listening, it brought Turkey to make necessary measures for the defence of Bosphorus. Disarmament efforts went bust and Turkey started to take action. Since 1935 Turkey has started an attack on the diplomatic area and demanded the removal of the disarmament provisions on the Straits. However, this request was not accepted at that time. Turkey did not slow down the adoption of a peaceful and diplomatic offensive. On the contrary, peacefully going on with a policy agenda it won the sympathy of Europe. Because the world went to war and the problems getting solved with force and threat, the way of peace followed by Turkey in the period in which and are trying to solve with diplomacy drew particular attention of the United Kingdom and Switzerland, in June 22, 1936 Montreux¹⁹⁷ parties gathered in the city and having a positive attitude towards Turkey had a positive influence on politics.

Turkey, through Secretary General of the Ministry of External affairs, Numan Menemencioglu, to the signatory countries of the Lausanne Treaty, presented a note

¹⁹⁶ Meray Seha, *Lausanne Peace Conference, Minutes- Documents*, Volume 8, Yapi Kredi Publications, Istanbul 2001, pp. 50-59

¹⁹⁷ Sander Oral, *Political History (1918-1994)*, Imge Printing, London 2013, p. 106.

containing a request to change the provisions relating to the treaty's notes on the Straits on April 10, 1936.¹⁹⁸

The crisis in Europe, in 1923 Straits Convention, due to the collective guarantee given to the safety of the Straits, no longer works, stating their security, in terms of the protection of defence and sovereignty changing this status, wanted militarisation of the Straits.

Via Berlin Ambassador Hamdi Arpag, despite not a signatory country at Lausanne Treaty, a note was passed to Germany on the same day. Menemencioglu described to Neurath broadly the causes and consequences of its visits to the Balkan States and the Soviet Union on the 15th of May 1936. Turkey's aim was to illuminate these countries on the problem of Straits, Menemencioglu indicated that countries other than Romania had been able to be influenced on the opinions of Turkey, even declared that to be finally convinced talks with Romania. Menemencioglu in his visit to Moscow, the German-Soviet relations were on the agenda. Moscow had a belief that Germany would attack them in the apparent future. Therefore, according to the Soviets, in order to prevent the possibility of French support and assistance Germany occupied the Rhine. The aim of Berlin was to get the Soviet Union into a circle and to make this happen, Germany wanted to have Italy on its side. Neurath stated to Menemencioglu, that Germany would never establish a pact with the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁹ Menemencioglu thought that after the end of the talks, League of Nations had lost its prestige and he noted that it was impossible to regain its prestige in the short period of time.²⁰⁰

In the report that German Foreign Ministry officials Dieckhoff sent on 21 June to Keller stated that; Turkey's demand about Bosphorus was appreciated by Germany, Turkey remained neutral in the event of a war it did not pose the problem in terms of Germany, this created an impression that Germany was remaining indifferent to the problem of the Straits. But then, pointed out that the Montreux Conference made not a satisfactory impact to German public, this main crucial problem, Germany did not request to join the treaty that would occur at the end of the conference but especially emphasised that it reserved the right to rule that

¹⁹⁸ Armaoğlu 2010, pp. 343-345.

¹⁹⁹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Serie C (1933 – 1937), Band V.

²⁰⁰ Koçak 2013, p. 113.

participate out in the formation. Also it was asked from Keller to reflect this attitude in a very careful manner to the Turkish Government.²⁰¹

1.8 Montreux Convention of Straits and Germany's Attitude

Germany clearly showed the cold attitude during the conference and during pre-conference in Montreux, immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Montreux, it crystallised the negative attitude towards the treaty. Two days after the signing of the Treaty of Montreux, on 22 July, Neurath evaluated Germany's attitude against treaty; argued that Germany's formal protest against the treaty or to place reservations were not appropriate behaviors; but also treaty was not seen friendly or not evaluated friendly by Germany and wanted this to be explained to Turkey. Neurath stressing that the Treaty is not a friendly attitude towards Germany, after a while Germany would have the opportunity to put forward their claims for the treaty, was reported.²⁰²

Keller made a case evaluation in his report that he sent to the German Foreign Ministry two days after the start of the Montreux Conference on 24 June 1936. Keller reported that common view in Ankara, judging by the optimistic view of the almost unlimited dimensions of Turkey's demands and requests, at the Montreux, signing of a treaty in a short time can be obtained by the impression that was given. However, according to Keller, the situation was different; there were serious difficulties and problems. First of all, Italy was not attending the conference it was totally and absolutely opposed to Turkey's demands. On the other hand, there was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and according to Keller, in terms of security in the Straits; Turkey's interest was not to boggle to any state, to situate in the middle of the two. Conflict between Britain and the Soviet Union was considered to be sad for Turkey. Ankara wanted a compromise between the two countries. The ideal solution for Turkey was that the realisation of the full meaning of neither the United Kingdom's nor the Soviet Union's recommendations, was a mid-point of the proposed agreement. Keller pointed out that the UK might force Turkey to choose between

²⁰¹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Dieckhoff, the staff of German Foreign Ministry to Keller, Nr. 464, 21.6.1936.

²⁰² Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to the German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 439, 7.7.1936.

the Soviet proposals or the British proposals, he also draws attention to Turkey and the Soviet Union's suggestions seemed to not be close to each other.²⁰³

Keller, meanwhile in another one of his reports; made an assessment of recent developments that Turkey should also be considered as a factor in international politics, the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union lost heat lately, Montreux Treaty also accelerated this cooling process, it could be considered to be that increase in cooling. However, Keller pointed that cooling did not mean separation; Atatürk and İnönü did not ever want a separation from the Soviet alliance. Besides, Turkey also began rapprochement with the United Kingdom to provide a counterweight to the Soviet Union. One reason for this was Turkey was not asking for a Soviet military support against Italy, and for the Turkish-Italian relations to be extremely negative. Another reason was that the UK demanded strongly Turkey's support against Italy's expansionist tendencies in the Mediterranean. But yet UK was undecided about the degree of relationship to be established with Turkey. On the other hand, UK was reluctant to give unilateral security to Turkey against the Italy. Keller, at his report, made it clear that Turkey's success at the Montreux Treaty, was entirely indebted to England, in the Turkish press, until a while ago there existed anti-British writings but these opinions were completely eliminated; the place left to highlight the Turkish-British friendship. Meanwhile, Keller pointed to new developments in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey voted yes to actions taken by League of Nations against Italy's Abyssinia invasion and the annexation and supported these measures, however, indicated that Turkey did not have an initiative of signing of a Turkish-French alliance against Germany. Keller said, Atatürk and İnönü after making a course change in Turkish foreign policy, they would make an effort to reveal Turkey as a European power.²⁰⁴

Keller in his report dated April 15, 1937, in Germany, said if Italy would participate to the Treaty of Montreux, Germany should not appeal it; because Germany could sign a similar agreement with Turkey later.²⁰⁵ It is pointed out in a report sent by German Foreign Ministry to Keller on July 16 that after treaty signed on maritime power on July 17 between UK and

²⁰³ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to the German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 400, 7.7.1936.

²⁰⁴ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to the German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 483, 28.7.1936.

²⁰⁵ Koçak 2013, p. 116.

Germany, as regards to the Treaty of Montreux, it was time to start negotiations with the Turkish Government. Germany, which would do negotiations with the Turkish government, wants to maintain parallel with the Turkish-Italian negotiations which continued on the same subject, for that matter they wanted Germany and Italy to follow a similar policy together, they were desiring to cooperate and avoided contradicting the Italian policy of its own policies.

In this regard, Ambassadors of Italy and Germany was asking to be in co-operation with each other about this issue. The view of the Turkish Government was announced to the German Foreign Ministry on March 9. According to Ankara, Germany could not even join to Montreux Convention because it was a not signatory of the Lausanne Treaty.

However, the German Foreign Ministry was thinking that Germany's situation to get rid of bonds created by the Treaty of Versailles and the outcome of his fight for re-recognition of the rights movement, completely changed. Berlin was ready to recognize Turkey's rights; to obtain the right to re-militarisation of Straits was to meet with sincere emotion. However, Germany emphasised the reservations against the Montreux Convention. Germany as a great European power drew attention that he could not remain indifferent to the Straits problem; because the Straits problem, not only in terms of commercial maintenance of Germany, but also in terms of the German navy, was important in military respects. The German Government was ready to recognise all rights in this matter on the condition that Germany would be provided with equal rights at the Treaty of Montreux by Turkish Government on the Straits problem. Keller was expected to transfer these issues to Aras at Montreux Conference meeting on July 13. Germany was ready to start negotiations with Turkey. Keller, taking Turkey's sensitivity on this issue in consideration, orally had to explain that Germany wanted to be a signature power and like a signatory force; the Turkish Government expected to make Germany aware of the Treaty of Montreux, of the Article 24 in accordance with paragraph 4 and 5. Berlin was of this opinion, Turkey would have negative attitude of recognition of the German interests in this area and wanted to carry out its politics together with Italy and Japan.²⁰⁶ German Defence Ministry had the argument that the Treaty of Montreux with this status might be harmful to the German Navy. However, German Ministry of Defence still did not see it as possible a favour to Germany with an amendment in current

²⁰⁶ Koçak 2013, p. 117.

agreements. In conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, according to paragraph 6 of the Annex II, auxiliary ships with certain features (war) were entering to the category of a warship was a focal point of the German Ministry of Defence in particular. Germany's interests were required to provide as much as possible a broadly interpretation of the term of auxiliary ship(war). Specially to put Soviet auxiliary (war) ships, which could pass troops or war materials through the Straits, into this definition and thus to prevent to pass out of the limits of the right of way of the warships. A development in this direction would be very valuable to the Germany. However, Berlin did not presume that this demand would unlikely be accepted by Ankara. The German Government, in terms of Straits, to reach a solution, wanted from the Turkish government to see Germany as in the same status with the other signatory powers to and was intended to reach an agreement through negotiations in this regard with the two countries.²⁰⁷ The aim of Germany was, like Italy and Japan, its reservations to be formally adopted by the Turkish Government. However, making an agreement on this issue between the two countries has also been known that it depended on the decisions of the other signatory powers. To ensure this, Berlin demanded assurances from Turkey.²⁰⁸

Keller passed the German Government's views on the subject to Aras on August 27. Aras stated that, Turkey's notes dated to March 9 on the implementation of the Treaty of Montreux covered all kinds of guarantee on relations with Germany. Aras stated that the suggestion of Germany related to treaty between the two countries without the consent of the other signatories in order to accept the current treaty was not confirmed. Keller stated that such a treaty was concerned by just two signatory countries. Aras reiterated that the issue should be examined more extensively. Aras stated, Turkey will announce a unilateral declaration to other states with the implementation of the treaty, Turkey assured that it would not be entitled to less than the United States and Poland to Germany. German Government, not a member of the League of Nations, had the opinion that Germany had to put reservations to the treaty. Besides it is said that the United States, not a member of the League of Nations, would put reservations to the treaty. Germany, pointing to the reservations placed by Japan to the agreement, considered Germany's equal rights and current international policy, argued that

²⁰⁷ Koçak 2013, p. 118.

²⁰⁸ Files For German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from German Foreign Ministry to Keller, Nr. 535, 16.7.1937.

Germany had the right of recognition on putting reservation like Japan as needed. Aras, after revealing all issues in the clarity by Keller, wanted to examine all the issues put forward in a comprehensive manner.

Also Aras still had a very full program due to several visits, this was stated that it could have come to the force in early November. Aras requested information from these interviews to be given to the public.²⁰⁹

Keller, stood strongly on the recommendation of a common policy to follow Germany in collaboration with Italy against the Treaty of Montreux. Turkey's idea was if Italy's presence in Ethiopia and demands were recognised Italy would be on its way to attend the Treaty of Montreux. Keller was discussing Italian Foreign Minister Ciano's visit to Ankara in this context. Keller, again referring to the policy of Germany against the Treaty of Montreux and criticised this policy in a moderate manner., Keller, pointed to the futility to highlight the suggestion and demands of Germany to join the Treaty of Montreux, quoted by Turkey as a signatory power, and even the view that put some reservations; but was reminding that Turkey didn't approach to such talks on the grounds that Germany was not the signatory power of the Treaty of Lausanne but Aras gave the guarantee that it would be taken to German interests. Furthermore, according to Keller, the German request was impossible to be adopted.²¹⁰

In the report penned Weizsaecker, Ambassador of Rome demanded to learn from the Italian Government, if it had intended to participate in the Treaty of Montreux and so far in this regard whether or not the attempt to restart talks were frozen. Because ultimately the decisions taken in this regard Neurath-Ciano meeting May 4, 1937 was still valid. Thus the Ambassador of Rome to Germany once again had to explain the attitude of the Italian government. Germany requested a bilateral treaty with Turkey. It was reminded in that report once again that in the Neurath-Ciano the Treaty of Montreux negotiations two

²⁰⁹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nr. 535, 27.8.1937.

²¹⁰ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nr. 540, 23.2.1938.

countries agreed on the principle that before adopting the Treaty of Montreux they would make an agreement.²¹¹

In the interview with Numan Menemencioglu on 7th July German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, brought the Treaty of Montreux that continued to adversely effect on Turkish-German relations on the agenda, he stated that, he was of the opinion that it was time to solve this problem. According to Ribbentrop, Germany was ready to make a bilateral treaty with Turkey. According to the agreement between Turkey and Germany the Treaty of Montreux provisions and rules would be applied. Also Ribbentrop demanded from the Turkish Government assurances for Germany in a possible amendment to the Treaty of Montreux. Menemencioglu, reported that the views of Germany on the subject was examined with a legal aspect, but it was understood with great sadness that the participation of Germany to the Treaty of Montreux in accordance with their recommendations would create difficulties. These difficulties stemmed from the lack of practice in Turkey of the Treaty of Montreux judge. Germany's participation in the treaty meant that any amendments to the treaty was required by the approval of the signatory states. Without such approval, Turkey could not sign an agreement relating to the issue of the Straits with another foreign power. Even Menemencioglu told his opinion in the same direction to Gaus, official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Department and Weizsaecker. During this interview Menemencioglu, gave assurance that the Article 19 of the Treaty of Montreux provided for warning to the countries, which would not allow the passage of warships through the Straits. Turkey had the opinion that according to the treaty provisions, the war ships of a state, committed to help an assaulted state due to an earlier treaty, would not pass through the Straits. Menemencioglu stated that a step in accordance with the request of Germany causing, protests from the other signatory powers to Turkey and such a development also would result in jeopardizing the Treaty of Montreux itself. Menemencioglu was thinking that Germany should recognise the Treaty of Montreux unilaterally. For this, he thought of a formula that could be found. For example, the disclosure of Germany in this respect could be such a formula.²¹² However, Ribbentrop rejected such a formula suggestion. Ribbentrop stated that he could not understand why and how the other signatory States oppose Turkey

²¹¹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Weizsaecker to German's Roman Ambassador, Nr. 541, 23.2.1938.

²¹² Koçak 2013, p. 122.

to make a similar agreement with Germany as well as with any other signatory power. Ribbentrop, said that he couldn't understand that why Memenecioğlu stated that making an explanation on this issue without Germany making any new treaty was not possible for Turkey and why it is so hard that Turkey cannot give an assurance in this regard to Germany. Ribbentrop said that pointing, Germany's reservations against the Treaty of Montreux would create meager results on the Straits problem and the problems stemmed from the Treaty of Montreux, at this stage, this adversely affected relations between the two countries and damaged the relationship. Ribbentrop emphasised, that if given a solution to the problems arising with the Treaty of Montreux, Turkish-German relations could be developed.²¹³

Menemencioglu Ribbentrop met again on 20th January for the issue of the Straits. Ribbentrop was thinking that he could not understand Ankara's legal reasons put forward against the demand of Germany and in the case of Turkish government's policy as to solve the existing problems with Germany and to be really committed to making a political statement on this issue to give up than the difficulties against Germany.²¹⁴ In essence Germany had concerns about whether the Treaty of Montreux would succeed for the benefit of Germany. Therefore, there was no rush to signing a treaty which did not mean anything for Germany.

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Department Manager Gaus's stated in the report he wrote on January 20, 1939 between Menemencioglu with Ribbentrop meeting held on the same day Ribbentrop complained that Turkey still refused to come to an agreement about the Treaty of Montreux. Ribbentrop, argued that Turkey had no intention to take a step forward in solving the problem.²¹⁵

As a result, although Germany wanted to engage in cooperation, Germany's Montreux policy and partnership, behind this followed the attitude of the underlying principles of the idea that is Italy's act of loneliness and hesitation of being left alone. Germany's, main pressure on Ankara was the advantage of the power of Italy, was trying to take initiatives in his favour.

²¹³ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's Report, Nr. 535, 27.8.1937.

²¹⁴ Koçak 2013, p. 124.

²¹⁵ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Department Manager Gaus's Report, Nr. 558, 20.1.1939.

But if Italy, allying with a compromise with Ankara joined the Treaty of Montreux, Germany would be left alone against Turkey and Turkish government had a negative attitude already against Germany and would be unable to convince to start negotiations and to establish relations with him. Italy's participation to the Treaty of Montreux on May 2, 1938 showed that the reason of Germany's unrest on these issues. Besides, Germany's loneliness against the Turkish government, did not lead to a change in the views of Berlin.

1.9 The Annexation of Austria

Germany annexed Austria on 12 March 1938.²¹⁶ Turkey did not directly react to this incident and saw this annexation as part of Germany's disposal from the problems caused by Versailles. The view of Turkey takes place in Rosenberg's report in his conversation with Aras on 8 June 1935. In this report, it is stated that more than half of Austrians would accept Nazi government, and the people in Austria cannot stand the pressure and maltreatment of current government and that this would cause political explosion. For this reason, according to Aras it would be better to wait for the natural advances in Germany with patience and take steps according to them.²¹⁷

Turkey was not concerned much about the political expansion strategy of Germany. The aim of German National Socialism was to gather all Germans, who are out of the borders of Germany, under the roof of one single government. As Turkey was not a country within these borders, it was not disturbed from this aim. Turkey was following a neutral foreign policy that did not stand against Germany.

1.10 The Treaty of Munich and Annexation of Czechoslovakia

After Germany annexed (Anschluss) Austria, it was expected that the Sudet region of Czechoslovakia, which was governed by the Nazi politician Konrad Henlein and had a high population of German-origin people, would be the next target of Hitler.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Shirer William L., *Nazi Empire: The Birth, The Rise and Fall*, Ağaoğlu Publications, Istanbul 1970, p.470.

²¹⁷ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Rosenberg to German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nr. 144, 8.6.1935, Göttingen.

²¹⁸ Haffner Sebastian, *von Bismarck zu Hitler (from Bismarck to Hitler)*, Kindler Verlags, München 1987, p.282.

Both France and Soviet Union had military alliance with Czechoslovakia; however neither of these countries was ready for war. In fact, Soviet Russia and Stalin were disturbed by the capitalist agreements and France had a leader, Edouard Daladier, who was sided with soothing foreign policy. The results of the elections done in France in 1938 also showed that it was not possible for France to send a military force. None of the countries in Western Europe desired a war. They exaggerated the movement ability of Nazi Germany. On the other hand, Hitler's insistent calls for peace had a very positive affect in European public and were very persuasive.

On the other hand, Hitler was making use of the weaknesses of the West and was following a foreign policy that could help reach his goals in the Middle Europe.²¹⁹ He was convinced by Benito Mussolini to hold a conference because Italy was not ready for a clash in the whole Europe. The military leaders of Germany were also aware of the situation of their army and were in great effort in order to prevent the war.

Nevertheless, while getting closer to the times of conference, the super powers of Europe mobilised their armies for the first time after The First World War. Most people thought that the war was inevitable and peace was impossible. For this reason, Hitler gave priority to the problem of Austria so he gained both time and power. He became aware of the fact that he cannot annex Czechoslovakia by force, and delayed it.²²⁰

Sudet region of Czechoslovakia was given to Germany due to the Treaty of Munich signed between the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany. Sudet was a region of Czechoslovakia that had a strategic importance. Skoda, which had a huge armour factory, was in this region. This region, which had a population of 2.5 million German speakers, should be under the control of Germany according to the "nations right to determine their own future" of the Treaty of Versailles. The aim of the conference was to prevent the war in Europe because of Sudet crisis, which resulted in Germany's having almost the whole

²¹⁹ Haffner 1987, p.282.

²²⁰ Kılıç Sezer, *Türk Basını'nda Hitler Almanyası (1933-1945)*, (*Hitler's Germany in Turkish Press 1933-1945*), Atatürk Research Center, Ankara, 2010, p. 114.

region. As Hitler's aim was to start a war against Czechoslovakia, he perceived this treaty as a defeat.²²¹

1.11 The Influence of the Occupation of Albania on Turkish-German Relations

Italy occupied Albania on 7 April 1939. With this occupation Turkey was confronted with an important problem. Italy, who was regarded as the mortal enemy of Turkey, had an opportunity in Balkans and it seemed that they would not stop after occupying Albania. More importantly, Italy and Germany took steps in the Balkans, Balkans were regarded as the secure region by Turkey and however Italy and Germany were going forward in their imperialist policies in this region. As Albania was occupied immediately after Czechoslovakia, it was thought by Turkey that these two countries had a common and systematic actions. Accordingly, it was inevitable that these incidents would negatively affect the relation between Turkey and Germany.²²² Ankara was in the opinion that Germany supported Italy's occupation to Albania in return for Italy's support for the occupation of Austria by Germany.²²³ Moreover, the approval of German media in Italy's occupation strengthened this opinion.²²⁴

The doubts of Turkey increased as not only political but also economic relations between Italy and Germany strengthened and the issues such as the *iron agreement*²²⁵ were at the same time with these incidents. Additionally, since the German Embassy in Ankara was empty for five months, the relations between two countries were getting weaker. Franz von Papen was officially assigned as the Ambassador on 18th of April.²²⁶

Kroll believed that Turkey could rapidly be a part of the English policy since Germany occupied Czechoslovakia and Italy occupied Albania and they had good relations with Turkey for a long time. Ankara thought that Italy's attack was not an end but a beginning.

²²¹ Haffner 1987, p. 284.

²²² Koçak Cemil, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945 (Turkey's National Chief Period 1938-1945)*, Yurt Publications, Ankara 1986, pp. 84-85.

²²³ Kroll Hans, *Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters*, Kiepenheuer und Witsch Verlag, Köln 1967, p. 107.

²²⁴ Ibid., p.108.

²²⁵ Schulz 1976, p. 192.

²²⁶ Koçak 2013, p. 139.

Their attack was really a beginning of new aggression attempts in to the Aegean Sea and Balkans. Italy even supported the alliance between Turkey, England and France.²²⁷

1.12 Germany's Attitude against Turkey's Approach to the United Kingdom and France

Main trends of the foreign policy of Turkey in the period between two worlds wars was towards to continue the status quo formed by the Lausanne Treaty and so Turkey had contributed to the efforts of the governments trying to maintain the balance consisting of post-war Europe. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey tried to establish close relations with neighboring states as well as the Balkans and Middle Eastern states and were aimed at maintaining the status quo.²²⁸ In this context, after Lausanne, the main objective of Turkish foreign policy was to create a shared security system around Turkey against a possible military intervention that can be directed, on the other hand, to resolve the current problems in international relations by peaceful means.²²⁹ For this purpose, friendship treaty signed with Italy on May 30, 1928 provided friendship to the two countries relations, which continued for a while, but Italies ambitions in 1934 in the Middle and Near East led to a sudden deterioration in relations.²³⁰

Relations with Germany, which began in 1933, also changed with the Nazi rule, especially Hitler's Germany began to talk about border changes, to increase its cooperation with Italy and a negative attitude towards the Straits had a negative effect in Turkey.²³¹

The world order established after First World War was disrupted by Germany's withdrawal from the Treaty of Versailles, rapidly arming and withdrawing from the League of Nations and Germans in Europe being binded to Germany. Italies, expansion efforts with the “*Great Roman idea*” and participation of an alliance in Japan's and Germany had formed in the future.²³² All these developments, since the second half of the 1930s as a balancing factor

²²⁷ Kroll 1967, p.111.

²²⁸ Armaoğlu 2010, p. 145.

²²⁹ Oran 2012, p. 305.

²³⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol- Cem Sar, *Turkish Foreign Policy with Events*, Volume I, A.Ü.SBF Publications, Ankara 1982, p. 189.

²³¹ Ibid., p.190.

²³² Armaoğlu 2010, p.148.

in the Mediterranean, all this led to Turkey to the search of the proximity of the UK. 1936 Montreux Straits Convention had been a turning point in Turkish-British relations after the worsening during Mosul issue.²³³

Relations with Britain which supported Turkey in the Straits rapidly improved, and began to deteriorate its relations with the Soviet Union. Importance of straits for Turkey's past and present political, military and geopolitical means was crucial. New Turkish State had adopted also the principle of establishing absolute dominance in the Turkish Straits in line with the experience from the past the National Pact also consistently argued during the Lausanne Peace Conference, but could not provide a full dominance.²³⁴ This situation and the security of the Straits was a situation that Turkey was constantly irritated about. Turkey was given many commercial and military guarantees on the Straits in Lausanne. The validity of this guarantee was far from satisfying Turkey after 1930. The effects of Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy's expansionist policies had begun to increase well over to Turkey.²³⁵

Despite Turkey's efforts to find an amicable way to continue the relationship with the Soviet Union, when it came to 1939, the Soviet Union's policy towards Turkey had changed completely.²³⁶ Staff who helded the power in this period had reshaped the foreign policy of Turkey's generation they lived the most important stage through the recent history. 'İttihat and Terakki' of the First World War, the War of Independence and the founding period of Republic constituted the historical background of these elite.²³⁷

Turkey, as seen by the German and Italian expansionist policies and the war had not started at the beginning of 1939 had accelerated its relations with England and the Turkish-British Joint Declaration was declared at 12 May 1939. Germany's negative stance on Turkey was immediately reflected in the German press and radio. German Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication "*Diplomatischer Correspondenz*" newspaper threatened Turkey for the opening of the Straits to the allies ships in the event of a war, Zekeriya Sertel from Tan Newspaper, "*German newspaper should know that the Republic of Turkey is not the Turkey of the*

²³³ Oran 2012, p.306.

²³⁴ Gönlübol-Sar 1982, p.195.

²³⁵ Koçak 2013, p.154.

²³⁶ Oran 2012, p.306.

²³⁷ Oran 2012, p. 307.

Ottoman Empire era. Today's Turkey knows the interests of this country, and as a government that knows to protect the benefits of this country. For this reason there is no need to take directives from outside"²³⁸ and criticised the attitude of the paper with these words.

Another German newspaper Berliner Börsen Zeitung said the following about this agreement, "*Since Turkish pride, made the Turkish nation in a neighbourhood with Paris has managed to forgive those who want to insult with a peace treaty; it is hoped that it can quickly realise the meaningless of reaching an agreement with the English system.*" the article Ahmed Şükrü, "*Reasons that led to cooperate with Turkey in the UK, was not as written in Börsen newspaper, not the rumours, you should seek the facts ... English-Turkish agreement were made to prevent aggression...*" we came to the word that Kazim Özalp said: "*If there are those who doubt that this agreement, about its intention of peace alone, we can doubt their good faith*"²³⁹ have responded with words and has defended the legitimacy of the agreement.

Turkish-French Declaration with France was signed after the dissolution of the Hatay issue at 23 June 1939.²⁴⁰ Germany itself in the process of getting rid of the Treaty of Versailles, set an example to Turkey in Hatay and argued to provide support in this area. The importance of Hatay issue for Germany, but the alliance of Turkey with the UK and France, bore value in terms of affecting positively or negatively. Indeed, the German Government knew that France did not want to leave Hatay to Turkey, with a view of playing a role in the Turkish-French fruitless negotiations, and had supported before the release of Hatay, Turkey.²⁴¹ During this time, Turkey's natural development, the expansion would be in the Balkans, neither north eastern nor in Aegean regions, but the only way of expansion was towards the south, Iraq and Mosul, according to the German Government. Even, States that constitute an obstacle in this regard; the UK and France are shown. However, the recent withdrawal of French troops from Hatay in July 24, 1939 and at 19 October 1939 the tripartite alliance with

²³⁸ Kılıç 2010, p. 150.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 151.

²⁴⁰ Soysal 1989, p. 155.

²⁴¹ Koçak 2013, p. 172.

Turkey-France-England was signed, guaranteeing a bit more, stability.²⁴² Policy of Berlin had changed. This time Berlin, had condemned Turkey's expansionist policies against the Arabic states by emphasizing that Western countries, France and the UK supported these policies too. In Arabic states there have been found in the propaganda work for Germany in a supporting way of Arab nationalism, which stimulates the Arab countries against any kind of expansionist policies, on the other hand Germany had tried to increase its efficiency by Arab nationalists against England and France in the region working to ensure the support of Germany. The German press has interpreted the abandonment of Hatay to Turkey as a gift, received from the Arab world to Ankara from France and England to gain Turkey.²⁴³

Because Turkish government executives were afraid of the result of the convergence of the German-Soviet alliance, they signed an agreement with the United Kingdom and France in Ankara on 19 October 1939, but the fundamental principles of the Turkish foreign policy were established on staying out of the war during the Second World War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia from Germany on 15 March 1939 and a month later on April 7, 1939, Italy's invasion of Albania were directed to Ismet İnönü against the aggression of the Axis Powers and Turkey's political facade was determined by preparing for defence against the aggression and led to the ground for the signing of the declaration.²⁴⁴

Turkish-British Joint Declaration signed on May 12, 1939, was seen as the fault of the German Ambassador Papen.²⁴⁵ Because he spent an intensive diplomatic efforts, to try to prevent Turkey from making cooperation with the United Kingdom and France. Germany translated this declaration as the inclusion of Turkey to the UK's surrounding policy of Germany.²⁴⁶ Turkish public opinion and the press had a negative attitude towards Germany and news were limited in response to media reports of Germany. Italy had been appeared more accused country. Papen wrote in his report that Turkey's policy of neutrality was gone because of the Italian threat. Germany had been extremely uncomfortable due to Turkey's attitude, Germany's efforts had maintained to destroy the previously established under the

²⁴² Türkođan Berna, *Ataturk Period Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ataturk Research Center, Ankara, 2010, p. 362.

²⁴³ Glasneck Johannes, *German - Fascist Propaganda Methods of Activity in Turkey before and during World War II*, Scientific Contributions of Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle 1966, pp. 8-9.

²⁴⁴ Soysal 1989, p.156.

²⁴⁵ Koçak 2013, p 153.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p 155.

leadership of Turkey's Balkan Pact, as well as the Turkish-British Declaration.²⁴⁷ In addition, it was decided to thoroughly review the situation with Italy and take joint measures. On May 22, 1939 Italy-Germany Alliance Agreement (Pact of Steel) at the ceremony, German authorities made the suggestion that Italy should approach Turkey and they warned the Italian government.²⁴⁸

The diplomatic relations between Germany and the Turkish government authorities increased through the Ambassador Papen. He transmitted the discomfort of Germany due to approach and development of close ties between Turkey and Western Countries. Nevertheless, these diplomatic efforts yielded no result so the German reaction to Turkey became more repressive. In that sense, German authorities started not to give diplomatic appointments to Turkey and Germany did not have not have diplomatic contact with Turkey. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop met Hamdi Arpag on 8 June 1939 and Ribbentrop openly expressed that Turkish foreign policy was on the wrong track²⁴⁹. Turkish government authority articulated that this situation stemmed from the aggressive policies of Italy and Germany.²⁵⁰ In order to prevent approach among Turkey, England and France; Germany used Romania. Romania based on the request of Germany had diplomatic contact with Turkey in order to exclude Turkish- English and Turkish- French alliance within the Balkan Pact. The basic concern of Germany was the increase of influence of Western countries in the Balkan states because of the Turkish foreign policy. In this frame, German ambassador had engaged in extensive efforts in order to ameliorate the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Germany.²⁵¹

German- Soviet Non-aggression Pact signed on the 23rd of August created a new opportunity for the disengagement of Turkey from Western Alliance. German Ambassador Papen had stated in Ankara in talks with Şükrü Saracoglu that Turkey was on the wrong track and in this case the current situation would have negative consequences for Turkey. Also he asked if Turkey would return to its former policy of neutrality. Papen stated in his

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p.154.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 156-157.

²⁴⁹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Talks between Hamdi Arpag and Ribbentrop on 8, June 1939, Nr. 496, 8.6.1939.

²⁵⁰ Koçak 2013, p.162

²⁵¹ Koçak 2013, p. 168.

report that Turkey was likely to take steps in accordance with its own security and it was possible that Turkey may remain to be neutral and the attitude of the Soviet Union would be certain in Ankara's policy.²⁵²

Consequently, the decisive break in the Turkish-German relations was seen in all fields and the good relationship that continued for many years was reversed. Germany's strong position in Turkey,²⁵³ disappeared and the gap, which arose would be filled with England and France. Also the relations between Germany and Turkey's hinterland countries of Iran, Iraq and the rest of Arab lands suffered considerably from the break. Papen emphasised Turkey's importance not only in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, but also in terms of the relations of Germany in the Middle East.²⁵⁴

2 Economic Relations

2.1 Germany's Economic Impact on Turkey

After establishing the political unity of the German Bismarck in 1871 also put an end to France's military superiority in Europe. To regain its military superiority in Europe back from Germany, both to regain the ascendancy and to regain the lost territory, France began to look for allies secretly. This German-French rivalry lasted until the First World War.²⁵⁵ After ensuring the political unity, Germany, was getting economically stronger, began to take over the world market in a short time. Germany's development had led to a confrontation with Britain. So last until the First World War, the German-British economic and military competition began.²⁵⁶

German-Ottoman relations are based on a long history and background. Relations with Prussia until the establishment of the German national unity in 1871 have continued since that date with Germany. The Ottoman Empire signed a peace and friendship treaty with the Kingdom of Prussia in 1790, and had developed its military relations with Germany

²⁵² Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Papen to German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 247, 24.8.1939.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Koçak 2013, p. 156.

²⁵⁵ Sander 2013, p. 346.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 346-347.

especially during Abdulhamid II. Germany diversified the relations with the Ottomans and made it multi-dimensional since the second half of the 19th century. During World War I, taking part on the same side, relations had gone up to an ally stage. Besides, Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire was established in Anatolia and Germany had advanced relations in political, economic, military, education and scientific fields with each other for many years and these relations continue today.

After the First World War, former allies, Ottoman Empire and Germany, after the end of the war had different developments. In many respects, the new Republic of Turkey in the event of continuing on the path with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was deprived of the chance to set up a special friendship with Germany due to the changing conditions of international balances in the first years. Due to the Treaty of Versailles, a ban had brought on any kind of cooperation, including military relations between the two states in particular. However, it did not last long for Germany which did not want to lose its ties with Anatolia and the Middle East to re-establish economic and diplomatic relations with the new government of Turkey. The first official relation was the Germany-Turkey Friendship Treaty signed in March 1924. Mainly due to economic relations as historical relationship bonds gained momentum. Indeed, Germany's export to Turkey was 42.4 million Mark in 1924, 5-6 years later, this figure would increase to 50 percent. Turkey's export to Germany was 51.6 million in 1924 and when it came to 1932, it would decline to 27 million.²⁵⁷

In addition, being allies during the First World War, at that time, significant investments were made such as the construction of the Baghdad Railway, Germany was in collaboration with the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottoman Empire, the new Republic of Turkey was founded and a new western-oriented foreign policy and an understanding of the status quo were followed. Germany had accepted the Versailles but followed a revisionist approach to getting rid of the economic restrictions caused by it. During this period, Turkey, established in Anatolia, continued its relations with Germany. The signing of the Friendship (1924), Embassy (1929) and Trade Agreements (1930) took place between the Republic of Turkey and Germany during this period.

²⁵⁷ Kuruç Bilsay, *Economy of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Period*, Bilgi University Press, Istanbul 2012, p. 121.

In the period after the WW1, economic relations constituted as an important aspect of the Turkish-German relations as well as political relations.²⁵⁸ Turkey needed new resources to carry out the first five-year industry plan; Germany was looking for new markets for finished goods in the Middle East and the Balkan countries. Meanwhile, Turkey needed for external financing sources and had never seen a barrier to entry into a tight economic cooperation with Germany. Through loans, big German firms opened to Turkey, Turkey's trade volume with Germany expanded rapidly since 1934. Besides, after 1933 after leaving Hitler's Germany, Jews, leftist, liberal German academics and engineers were invited to Turkey and these intellectuals made a valuable contribution to the reorganisation of the universities, establishment of industrial plants and the companies.

In 1923 Germany was carrying an average 10 percent of Turkey's imports and exports. Germany raised its share in a short period of time and the Nazis came to power in 1933 and brought the level close to 25 percent; i.e. the share of imports and exports in Germany was largely left to the UK and France behind.²⁵⁹ Due to the obligations of Versailles, Germany had entered a difficult situation from the economic point of view.²⁶⁰ High reparations paid by Germany Particularly to Britain and France were very forcible. The economic situation did not change much until the 1930s. The desire to get rid of Versailles obligations and political and economic as a result of steps taken in this direction, opened the way to a more active and aggressive position at foreign policy.

Political relations between Turkey and Germany led to the convergence of economic relations.²⁶¹ Germany, under the influence of the American Young plan in 1929, found the opportunity to spread economically especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This opening was including Turkey. In general, these economic relations involved more in agricultural production and natural resources.²⁶² Foreign trade policy set by Hitler's Economics Minister Schacter, the necessary raw materials for the German industry would be taken from the more eastern and south-eastern European countries and they were intended

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁵⁹ Koçak 2013, p. 201.

²⁶⁰ Oran 2012, p. 297.

²⁶¹ Koçak 2013, p. 56.

²⁶² Oran 2012, p. 304.

to sell finished products with the compensation agreements. Turkey had become a raw material supplier for Germany and Turkey as a result of this policy has been a good market for Germany.

Turkey choosing the way of economic development method with a free market economy in 1920s, had made the transition to the statist economic model in 1930s.²⁶³ This shift to the statist policies, the economic crisis faced in 1929 and its great impact had an effect. Statist economic development moves by the state would require large industrial moves. As a result of this policy capital and technology was needed, Germany granted to meet this requirement to a large extent. Germany while providing both investment and credit to Turkey, was ensuring the expansion and development of bilateral economic relations. In 1934, a German trade delegation came to Turkey and conducted a study and released 20 million Lira loan for a long-term. Besides these investments, German technology and capital were used for the Seka paper factory in Izmit, Kayseri aircraft factory and the construction of Istanbul and Iskenderun ports.²⁶⁴

Likewise, trade relations between the two countries had gained momentum. Germany was buying more agricultural products and raw materials from Turkey, while selling industrial products to Turkey that was realised²⁶⁵ by a swap system called “*clearing*”²⁶⁶. Kroll said that Germany's success on swap-based foreign trade policy to South East Europe, the Balkans, the Near East, described that this trade is advantageous for both sides.²⁶⁷ On one hand, while guaranteeing to not suffer providing raw material to Germany, on the other hand, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey's agricultural population for the first time could secure certain and adequate income for future years. Now, they did not have to worry about a price reduction or a stay of the goods in their hands. This situation created a growing satisfaction in the peasant population.²⁶⁸ Germany was buying these products to higher prices, but selling industrial products to much higher prices, result was

²⁶³ Kuruç 2012, p. 133.

²⁶⁴ Güçlü Yücel, *In the First Ten Years of the Republic and the Balkan Pact (1923-1934)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara 1974, s.73-121.

²⁶⁵ Oran 2012, p. 304.

²⁶⁶ Clearing: A kind of pay made with goods on bilateral trade agreements among countries.

²⁶⁷ Kroll 1967, pp. 80-88.

²⁶⁸ Koçak 2013, p. 200.

putting Germany in an advantageous position. In addition, facing with foreign currency shortage and such as seen advantageous in the area of buying industrial products instead of raw materials, the system began to detriment to Turkey. Turkey by becoming dependent on foreign trade in Germany had created a negative situation. For example, Germany in the 1930s, rail, air and sea transport was the only country that Turkey was dependent. Turkey became the only recipient and issue to set prices which began to create completely negative situation for Turkey to be in the hands of Germany. Almost all German steel, electrical and chemical companies were doing business with Turkey.²⁶⁹

As a result of these issues, increasing Germany's weight in Turkey's foreign trade had begun to worry Ankara. Since, the political results of economic hegemony over Turkey by Germany, had won a certain importance since 1935.²⁷⁰ Germany, with its economic influence on Turkey, wanted to disrupt Turkish-English and Turkish-Soviet relations and was trying to proselytize Turkey. Therefore, Turkey followed a multidimensional policy in economic relations in 1936, for the construction of Karabük Iron and Steel Factory, although Germany's offer was better, Britain was chosen.

In addition, the British and French were dismayed that Germany's growing economic pressure on Turkey and wanted to relieve this pressure by mutual clearing agreements with Turkey.²⁷¹ Besides, the behaviour of Germany against the Montreux Convention on Straits and that it wanted to have signed this agreement in accordance with its interest had also created discomfort in Turkey. Turkey, with the expansion of Germany's economic influence and demand to develop this influence on political and military fields, along with the discomfort, decided to make loan agreements with England and France.²⁷² Germany to increase the economic pressure on Turkey had sent the German Trade Minister to Turkey in 1938 and understood between the two state representatives in principle in the talks for 10 year term 150 million Marks of credit loan in Istanbul. Granting of the loan agreement to Turkey was signed in Berlin on 16 January, 1939. On the other hand, a trade agreement with Turkey signed in Berlin in July 25, 1938 contained provisions to increase trade relations

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 304.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 200.

²⁷¹ Güçlü 1974, pp. 73-121.

²⁷² Oran 2012, p. 306.

between Germany.²⁷³ However, Germany's attempts to draw Turkey near political and military was continuing. This issue underlined one of Germany's most senior diplomats Von Papen's envoys to Ankara in 1939.²⁷⁴ Before World War II, attempts to capture Turkey to join the war, were fruitless and Turkey did not fall into the same error in 1914 and be a side of the war.²⁷⁵ Relations with Germany came to the point where almost complete standstill, Italian military landing to Albania. Thus, with the occupation of Albania, political relations between Germany and Turkey came to completely break point in 1939 and it could be said that when the war started in 1939, Turkey would not hesitate to sign an alliance treaty with Britain and France. But economic relations, was ongoing unlike political relations. For example, German experts were still coming and people from Turkey continued to go for training to Germany. Turkey which was established on the basis of statist policy even if the Russians were constructing industrial facilities, outside Russia, largely German engineers and technicians were working there and infrastructure of these places, the machine structure was provided largely by Germany.²⁷⁶ The number of Turkish students studying in Germany approached close to 3500 in 1938 and in the same way teachers of German officers, Turkish officers studying in the German army was continuing. Also the German equipment being used in the Turkish army caused distress during World War II for Germany²⁷⁷. On September 1, 1939, when the war began, Turkey's imports and exports share was more than 50 percent of German materials. This showed the great deal of trade relations with Germany in international trade of Turkey.

As a result, the German - Turkish relations, after the First World War until the 1930s, had a limited development due to both state's domestic and foreign affairs. After 1930, after the coming to power of the Nazi Party and with the practice of "*Turkey's First Five Year Development Plan*" Turkey started developing and Germany became active in the political arena with the Turkish needing industrial materials to accelerate the Turkish and German

²⁷³ Koçak 2013, p. 233.

²⁷⁴ Akandere Osman & Polat Hasan Ali, *During World War II Years Germany's Pressure to Turkey and Capture Efforts Inside the War*, First Turkish-German Relations Symposium of International History and Cultural Aspects of 8 to 10 October 2009 Selected Works in April 2010.

²⁷⁵ Oran 2012, p. 310.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 310

²⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 310-311

relations.²⁷⁸ One of the German foreign policy instruments, commercial and industrial goods, entered Turkey and Turkey became a region influenced by Germany. 1936, was a year in which it was turning point in the Turkish-German relations.²⁷⁹ The German diplomacy could not consider the Turkish sensitivity against Italian threats and they continued to follow an Italy based policy, trying to apply pressure to disconnect Turkey from the Western World and connect Turkey to the Berlin-Rome line. By this Germany planned to control Anatolia and the Bosphorus against the Soviets and could be able to use it as a spring board for future actions. But since Germany continued to implement expansionist policies with Italy, this increased the intimacy with Turkey and pushed Turkey to develop relations with the free world and the Western States. Despite the chilling of foreign relations, the industrial relations continued and both countries separated the diplomacy and trade relations by thinking pragmatically.

2.2 German Capital in Turkish Corporations established between 1920-1930

German capital had acquired an important place in Turkish corporations founded between years 1920-1930. To give examples;

- Arslan and Eskişehir Müttehit Cement and Lime Water Works Corporation
- A.E.G Turkish Anonymous Electric Company
- Ankara Electrical Corporation
- Adana Electrical Corporation
- Ankara Gas Corporation
- Ergani Copper Corporation
- Bulgardag Mines Corporation
- Cenubi Anatolia Mines Corporation
- Adapazarı Mining Property Corporation
- Manganese Corporation
- Maadin Mines, Industry and Trade Corporation
- Keşfiyet and Construction T.A.Ş

²⁷⁸ Armaoğlu 2010, p. 237.

²⁷⁹ Gönübol Mehmet & Cem Sar, *Turkish Foreign Policy with Events*, Volume I, A.Ü.SBF, Publications, Ankara 1982, p. 224.

- Turkish-German Economic Teşebbüsat-i İktisadiye Corporation
- Astro-Turkish Tobacco Commission Company Limited
- Numan Machinery Sales Turkish Company
- Bitumuls Asphalt Company
- Industrial Turkish Company²⁸⁰

In addition, railway investment was an important part of the economic investment of the German Capital in Turkey. Establishment of Kayseri aircraft factory with the help of Junkers Company, Lufthansa and establishment of Turkey's air transportation initiatives, participation of German experts to the Turkish Republic Central Bank organisation process, the Turkish-German trade agreements and conducting, the development of mutual trade had created a significant part of bilateral economic relations in this period.²⁸¹

2.3 Imports and Exports

Turkey's Export to Germany by Turkish Statistics:

1924	20.551 Million TL (Turkish Lira)
1925	27.701 Million TL
1926	23.575 Million TL
1927	14.708 Million TL
1928	22.151 Million TL
1929	20.582 Million TL
1930	19.938 Million TL
1931	13.649 Million TL
1932	13.722 Million TL

²⁸⁰ Koçak 2013, p. 58.

²⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 56-61.

Turkey's Import to Germany by Turkish Statistics

1924	19.114 Million TL
1925	27 Million TL
1926	32.222 Million TL
1927	30.112 Million TL
1928	31.224 Million TL
1929	39.235 Million TL
1930	27.056 Million TL
1931	27.122 Million TL
1932	19.245 Million TL ²⁸²

Tables show that Germany's total exports and imports to Turkey remain at very low levels.

2.4 The capital of the German Railway Investments in Turkey

Another more important economic item between Germany and Turkey was the railway investments. Germany's railway investments which started in the Ottoman Empire, accounted for a significant portion of the economic relations during the Republic Turkey period.

During the reign of Wilhelm II, one of the largest investments of Germany was the Baghdad railway project, which continued spreading in different ways in this period. An important financial agreement for railway lines would be built in Anatolia this was signed with Dresdner Bank in 1927. According to the agreement, Krupp monopoly, with many years of selling weapons to the Ottoman, was determined to buy the railroad tracks.

Railway, built during the Ottoman period between Istanbul and Baghdad, was opened on November 1, 1913 and construction started in the beginning of the 20th century, connecting Baghdad railway through Konya, Aleppo and Mosul. German emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, during his second Istanbul visit in 1898, had promised Istanbul-Baghdad Railway's to be given to the German company. A fountain, celebrating it, was built in Germany in 1899, and

²⁸² Koçak 2013, pp. 239-245.

was brought and erected in Istanbul, Sultan Ahmet Square. Laws related to purchasing and repairing the Baghdad railway line was adopted by the Parliament on April 22, 1924.²⁸³

2.5 Credit Problems

German Foreign Ministry report prepared in 1926 stated that, it was doubtful to find ready and willing German capital to come to Turkey and the difficulties of opening a new loan in Berlin existed. Among the reasons for these reservations was the economic conditions of Turkey when was considered. Because Turkey was unable to pay the old debt to Germany, while there were no means that the charge again was mentioned. As a result of negotiations, in these circumstances, swap-clearing system in the economic relations were re-addressed and evaluated. Also these two countries were affected by the damage caused the economic crisis to the world economy in 1929, as a result of this Turkish Lira lost more value compared to the German Mark. Turkey was thus encouraged to take various measures.²⁸⁴

In another report which the German Foreign Ministry had prepared, in the same way stated Turkey's weak financial situation and therefore the negative position of the opening of credits. Nevertheless, the German businessmen and banks were given the news that they would deal with the Ankara-Eregli railway line and Eregli port construction project and they might participate in these projects.²⁸⁵ Both did not want to give credit to the projects but also did not want to miss it to other countries.

All of these reports in mind, the German Government considered that it was not possible to lend and give credit to Turkey.

2.6 Establishment of Kayseri Aircraft Factory Installation and Air Transport Initiative with Lufthansa

While Turkey was preparing plans to make investments in the aircraft factory in Kayseri, a consensus with the German Junkers company was reached in 1925 to establish an aircraft

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁸⁴ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), The Report of German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 241, 3.12.1926, 4578/E 174 801-02, Göttingen, 1968.

²⁸⁵ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Band B3, Nr. 191, 8.9.1926, Göttingen, 1968.

and aircraft engine factory in Turkey. 7 million Marks which would be capital of the new company would be shared equally by the parties. An agreement signed on 15 August 1925. But later Junkers demanded its share of 3.5 million Marks as a royalty rights from Turkish Government. Prime Minister Ismet Pasha proposed the amount be paid of 5 percent over the turnover of the factory at a rate constant to be completed in five years. But Junkers needed money immediately and applied for a loan to German Foreign Ministry. The German Foreign Ministry took into account that it was not only an investment in the aircraft sector, but also Turkey's trust until the end in Germany for establishment of its heavy industry, which is an important market in the processing of raw materials, had a positive view of a credit. In addition, German Foreign Ministry was thinking unless credit was given, to the Turkish Government aircraft factory project primarily may be admitted to a French group of companies.

French companies showed their desire at every platform about this issue.²⁸⁶ However, because of the financial issues and hardships, Junkers was in, there had been some breakdowns in project. The bankruptcy of the Junkers which was blocked by government support, Aircraft and Engine Corporation Turkey (Tomtasch) completed projects under the leadership of the Turkish-German joint venture and Kayseri Aircraft Factory and was opened on October 6, 1926.²⁸⁷

However, because of Junker's financial problems the project had a slowdown and did not go as planned. This situation's affect in Turkish-German economic relations was inevitable. Indeed Ministry of National Defence would not import military equipment from Germany in budget year 1926-1927 anymore.²⁸⁸ Insecurity and unrest against German industry was present. It is therefore Junkers bankruptcy which denied the government support.²⁸⁹

Lufthansa's establishment of an air transport in Turkey was also another important project. Lufthansa's proposal was the formation of Sofia, Istanbul, Ankara, Kayseri, Sivas,

²⁸⁶ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Report of German Foreign Ministry, Abteilung III, Türkei Bd. 1, 13.7.1925.

²⁸⁷ Koçak Cemil, p. 71.

²⁸⁸ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Report of German Foreign Ministry, Abteilung III, Türkei Bd. 1, 13.7.1925.

²⁸⁹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), Serie B: 1925-1933, Türkei Bd. V, 17.3.1927.

Diyarbakır, Van, Tabriz, Tehran and Kabul flight lines. Junkers Company was also competing with Lufthansa with a similar proposal. Turkey stayed neutral to both companies' competition and waited for Germany to solve the problem. German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supporting Lufthansa for the flight line agreement considering Junkers' financial problems.²⁹⁰ A detailed consultation process took place with the Turkish government and was signed on 30 January 1930's. It corresponded to 1850 km long railway line, Berlin-Ankara flight time was 10 hours. According to the agreement, Lufthansa was recognised for 20 years of a permit. The regular mail and cargo flights would begin in the spring months of 1930.²⁹¹

2.7 Business Affairs and Foreign Trade

After World War I. attempts to establish trade relations between the two states were sometimes faced with actual and legal problems. Such as the removal of agreements signed between Ottoman-German governments. Turkey's firm stance in financial policy at Lausanne caused some problems. But at the end Turkish-German Trade Agreement was signed on 12 January 1927 in Ankara. The Treaty shall remain in force for two years, unless one of the parties terminate, the treaty would prevail. Later it was extended until February 3 1930.²⁹²

Mainly Turkish-German trade relations can be summarised as Turkey selling agricultural products and industrial raw materials to Germany, whereas buying industrial goods from Germany. In this respect, in addition to the agreement of 1927 another Turkish-German Trade Agreement was signed on August 10 1933 in Berlin. From this date until 1936 Turkish-German Trade Agreements continued to be made on the basis of old agreements.²⁹³ The new treaty was signed in Berlin on July 26, 1938. According to the treaty, all Turkish exports would enter Germany without a quota. This agreement was valid until August 31,

²⁹⁰ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Nadolny to German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 194, 18.9.1926.

²⁹¹ Koçak Cemil, *ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

1939. This sought to create a balance with such treaties against the growing influence of the Western powers,²⁹⁴ 90 percent of Turkey's total imports was being based on barter.

Turkish-German General Trade between the years 1924-1932

	According to German	According to Turkish
1924	108,4 Million	94,2 Million
1925	134.9 Million	125 Million
1926	130.1 Million	123 Million
1927	130.5 Million	97.4 Million
1928	137.7 Million	114.3 Million
1929	148.1 Million	118 Million
1930	117 Million	93.6 Million
1931	100 Million	81 Million
1932	71 Million	67.4 Million ²⁹⁵

Turkey's exports to Germany between the years 1924-1937 by the German Statistics²⁹⁶

1924	59.6 Million
1925	69.1 Million
1926	54.7 Million
1927	63 Million
1928	72 Million
1929	75.6 Million
1930	52.6 Million
1931	69.0 Million
1932	40.1 Million
1933	74.2 Million
1934	118.4 Million
1935	160.7 Million

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

²⁹⁵ Torgay Osman Zeki, *Last 10 Years In Turkey-Germany Trade, 10th Year in Germany*, Turkey Chamber of Commerce, Berlin, 1938, pp. 66-70.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 79.

1936	197.7 Million
1937	208.9 Million

Turkey's imports from Germany between the years 1924-1939 by the German Statistics²⁹⁷

1924	49.2 Million
1925	65.2 Million
1926	75.4 Million
1927	67.5 Million
1928	65.9 Million
1929	72.5 Million
1930	48.3 Million
1931	47.4 Million
1932	31 Million
1933	36.3 Million
1934	50.9 Million
1935	67.3 Million
1936	79.4 Million
1937	111 Million
1938	151.4 Million
1939	151.4 Million

Turkish-German Foreign Trade between the years 1933-1937²⁹⁸

1933	74.2 Million
1934	118.4
1935	160.7
1936	197.8
1937	208.9

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 100.

Germany's share in Turkey's total exports²⁹⁹

1933	19 Percent
1934	37.3
1935	40.9
1936	51
1937	36.8

Germany's share in Turkey's total import³⁰⁰

1933	25.5 Percent
1934	33.8
1935	40
1936	45.1
1937	42.2

Turkey's share in Germany's total export³⁰¹

1933	0.7 Percent
1934	1.2
1935	1.6
1936	1.7
1937	1.8
1938	2.9

Turkey's share in Germany's total import³⁰²

1933	0.9 Percent
1934	1.5
1935	2.2

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 76.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 76.

1936	2.8
1937	1.8
1938	2.8
1939	2.6

Turkish-German foreign trade has been characterised by figures that cannot be underestimated. Germany is the country which makes the most economic cooperation with Turkey among the European countries.

3 Cultural Relations

Experts and academicians, who came to Turkey in the first years of the Republic regime, had important roles in the re-establishment of many state institutions such as colleges, factories, and ministries. The first diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany started with the “*Treaty of Amity*” signed on March 3, 1924 in Ankara and it led to a cultural convergence. The third article of this treaty of amity states that the relations between two countries are aimed to be developed not only in diplomatic fields, but also in the economy, military and culture.³⁰³ This article also includes opening consulates mutually and starting the commercial relations. At first, the German school in Istanbul, which was closed in 1918 due to the Armistice of Mudros was re-opened in 1924.³⁰⁴

3.1 German Experts in Turkey

Turkey, as a newly established state, invited German experts in various fields in order to make use of their knowledge. Johannes Glasneck suggests the reason of preferring German experts as: “*Turkish Government brought German scientists to Turkey as Germany was seen as the least jeopardous of all imperialist states to its independence due to the defeat in the First World War.*”³⁰⁵ For this reason, firstly, Turkish Ministry of Interior demanded for experts from Germany to establish Department of Staff Affairs. Accepting this demand,

³⁰³ Özgüldür Yavuz, *German-Turkish Relations 1923-1945*, Office of Commander in Chief Publications, London 1993, p. 36.

³⁰⁴ Koçak 2013, p. 38.

³⁰⁵ Johannes Glasneck, *German Fascist Propaganda in Turkey*, (Trans: Arif Gelen), Onur Publications, Ankara 1976, p. 27.

Germany sent two experts called Schmid and Max Mühl to Turkey.³⁰⁶ Additionally, on demand of Turkish Ministry of Agriculture, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Karl Julius Horn came to Turkey and was assigned as a general inspector on stockbreeding for 4 years. In 1926, another German expert called Fritz Neumann came to Turkey to be appointed to state factories. Moreover, many German experts and academicians such as Bernhard, the expert of Forestry, engineer Spetzler at Kırıkkale armour factory, director Weseman at Turkish Military Manufacturing Factories worked at various levels of state from Directorate of Planning to Ministry of Health.³⁰⁷

At the time of Hitler, many German experts worked in Turkey. Wein Meyer was assigned as the expert of fire department in Istanbul.³⁰⁸ On demand of Turkish Ministry of Finance, 9 German experts were called to Turkey. The authorities of the Turkish government negotiated with 36 professors and scientists. Invited experts were planned to be in charge of solving problems in the 5-year development plan. The experts, except one aide for economy, were aimed to be used in the fields of electrification, foundry, chemistry and insurance.³⁰⁹

According to the archive studies of Cemil Koçak; Rosenberg, the German Ambassador in Ankara reported on 2 May 1935 that Turkish government requested to extend the musician Prof. Paul Hindemith's duration of permit until the middle of May to complete his reform programme.³¹⁰ Moreover, Hindemith's successful works in Turkey are emphasised in detail. Additionally, the report indicates that Hindemith's works declined because of the rise in Soviet guest artists.³¹¹

As stated in Cemil Koçak's works, the Rector of Saechsische Bergakademie (Academy of Mining) tells in his letter on 2 April 1936 that as a result of the Director of Geology Institute, Prof. Dr. Schumacher's and the General Director of Academy Müller's efforts;

³⁰⁶ Koçak 2013, p. 39.

³⁰⁷ Koçak 2013, p. 40.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 174.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 174.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 175.

Turkish government sent 15 Turkish students to study at Mining Academy with scholarship and 8 German mining engineers and 1 chemist would work in his service.³¹²

3.2 Ankara School of Agriculture

In terms of scientific relations during the Republic period, the most important event without doubt is the establishment of Ankara School of Agriculture in 1930 when 14 German experts of agriculture came to Turkey in 1928 under the presidency of Oldenburg. All academic staff of this school was German. This school, which adopted the same education system with German agriculture faculties, was turned into Higher Institute of Agriculture after three years when the reform of the university was done. The academic staff of this school was in charge according to the bilateral agreement signed with German government. The first rector of this school was Prof. Dr. Friedrich Falke from Leipzig University in Germany. Addition to the staff who came to Higher Institute of Agriculture with the bilateral agreement, there were four other academicians called Salomon-Calvi, Otto Gerngross, Max Pfannenstiel and Hans Bremer who worked under the refugee status.³¹³

3.3 Turkish Personnel in Germany

While hosting German experts, Turkey sent Turkish staff to Germany to study at several fields of expertise. The main field of these staff was security. The servants who work at security organisations were aimed to gain experience by studying and working at German security organisations.³¹⁴

Moreover, 137 Turkish students were sent to Germany in 1932 to study at various schools. Berlin Association of Turkish Students was founded here and a framework was established for the following incoming Turkish students.

3.4 The First Turkish-German Dictionary in Latin Alphabet

The first Turkish-German dictionary written in new letters after Turkey started to use Latin alphabet was published in 1931. Heuser, who was a teacher at German School in Istanbul,

³¹² Ibid., p. 175.

³¹³ Kılıç 2010, p.159.

³¹⁴ Koçak 2013, p.42.

prepared this dictionary and it was presented to the readers as a post of daily German newspaper “*Türkische Post*” that was published in İstanbul.³¹⁵

3.5 Relations in Fine Arts

In 1927, Prof Arthur Kampf was requested to draw a portrait of Atatürk by favour of German Embassy. It was planned that Kampf would draw a portrait of President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and would be paid 12,000 Turkish Liras. This portrait was drawn in January of 1928.³¹⁶ Moreover, Prof. Josef Thorak was invited to Turkey to make a sculpture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1934. Josef Thorak, who is popular by his work of Güven Monument in Ankara due to its impact, made many portraits of Atatürk exhibited in public places. One of Thorak’s special portraits that fit with the real expression was occurred at Güven Monument in Ankara in 1934/35. This first portrait sculpture of Atatürk made by Thorak himself was the original version of many other variations. Thorak drew the Turkish President with his dynamic and almost furious facial expression by emphasizing his eyebrows.³¹⁷

It is known that Prof. Herman Jansen and Prof. M. Brix came to Ankara and drew the city plan that is currently in use. Prof. Clemens Holzmeister and his assistant were invited to Turkey for observation and they negotiated with Prof. Hoffman on demand of Ankara Municipality to prepare a construction plan. Prof. Jansen worked as a counsellor in the Directorate of Construction Affairs in Ankara. Jansen also prepared the plans of cities such as İzmit, Mersin, Gaziantep, Adana, Ceyhan and Tarsus. It is also known that Prof. Egli prepared the plan of Niğde in 1937. In this period, many German architects drew the plans of some state buildings in Ankara.³¹⁸

Like Ankara, German experts contributed to İstanbul in various fields. For this reason German expert Wild was negotiated for the preparation of a new sewerage system in Beyoğlu and Galata.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ Koçak 2013, p. 43

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 43

³¹⁷ Oliver Rathkolb, *Ganz groß und Monumental. Die Bildhauer des Führers*. Arno Breker und Josef Thorak, Kunst und Diktatur Volume II, Baden 1994, pp. 586–591.

³¹⁸ Koçak 2013, p. 44.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

The exhibition of Modern German Art and German Ornament Arts was opened in Ankara on 2 May 1936. The works such as paintings, watercolour pictures, graphic arts modern and ancient printings were demonstrated in this exhibition. The same exhibition was opened in İstanbul on 29 May 1936. Both of the exhibitions attracted much interest by senior statesmen and İnönü had a visit to the exhibition in Ankara on 14 May. Additionally, between 1-10 of March in 1939 the exhibition of German Books and Newspapers was opened in Ankara.³²⁰

3.6 German Daily Newspaper “Turkische Post”

After the re-establishment of political relations, a daily newspaper in German language was published in Istanbul in 1926. It is known that German Ambassador Nadolny showed interest to this newspaper in person. It continued to be published as a half-official newspaper that reflects the views of German government until the Nazi government. After the Nazi government, it became totally a means of propaganda for the government.³²¹

3.7 Bilateral Consulate Agreement

The Consulate agreement signed in 1929 between Turkey and Germany has been in effect since 1930 when it was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.³²² With this agreement both countries has had the right to open a consulate in the other party. This agreement is very important as it contributed to the solutions of problems for the citizens of both countries in cultural and economical fields.

3.8 Germany’s Efforts to Manipulate Turkish Media and Propaganda Activities

When Nazis came to power in the leadership of Hitler, they started to make a different impression of Germany. Aiming to be a world empire, Germany intensely used propaganda activities. They established a foreign affairs unit in the Nazi party. The aim of this unit was to do Nazi propaganda in foreign countries especially in the Balkans and the Near East. Foreign Countries Organisation of the Nazi Party (Auslandsorganisation=AO) had some activities in this area and they worked very close to German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 183.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 45.

³²² Özgüldür 1993, p. 40.

The members of this unit were trying to form Nazi organisations and do Nazi propagandas in German civil society organisations located in other countries. The members were using these civil society organisations to be organised and carry out propaganda and espionage affairs.³²³ In 1932, 11 of organisations established by Nazi Party in foreign countries were located in Turkey.³²⁴ The representative of Nazi Party's Foreign Countries Organisation (AO) in Istanbul was R. Gross by 1 May 1935.³²⁵

Accordingly, German government, who had intention of influencing Turkey via media channels, began propaganda activities in Turkey.³²⁶ One of the reasons why Germany preferred this way on Turkey was the pressure of England and France on Turkish media at that time.³²⁷

In 1937, one of the most significant propaganda newspapers of Nazi Party in foreign countries was "*Türkische Post*".³²⁸ The first step of Germany in the control of Nazi Party was to use "*Türkische Post*", which was published since 1924, as a means of their official propaganda.³²⁹ They took steps to increase the number of readers of this newspaper and the German booksellers "*Völkischer Beobachter*" and "*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*" in Istanbul sold more and more daily newspapers.³³⁰ The agencies called "*DNB*" and "*Transcontinent-Press*" supported the propaganda of Hitler's Germany by publishing four posts a day and sending them to Ankara and Istanbul. The same posts were sent to rural parts of Turkey by telegraph to influence the people living there and make them have positive attitudes to Germany. Addition to all these attempts, German Ministry of Propaganda tried

³²³ Johannes Glasneck, *Methoden der Deutsch-Faschistischen Propagandataetigkeit in der Türkei Vor und Waehrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Wissenschaftliche Beitrage der Martin-Luther Universitaet Halle-Wittenberg, Halle 1966, p. 5.

³²⁴ Jacobsen Hans Adolf, *National Sozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933-1938*, Alfred Metzner Verlag, Berlin 1968, p. 650.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 668.

³²⁶ Özgüldür 1993, p. 74.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³²⁸ Jacobsen 1968, p. 656.

³²⁹ Özgüldür 1993, p. 74.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

to impress Turkish people by sending them scientific journals such as “*Journal of Science and Progress*” telling about German industry and its progress.³³¹

The members of Nazi Party’s Foreign Countries Organisation (AO) in Turkey were 22 persons before Nazi Party came to power and Turkey was in the 44th rank in this subject. After the Nazi Party, the number of new members highly increased and became 216 in this period. According to the data received in 20 June 1937, the number of members was 238 and Turkey was the 29th country.³³² As it may be understood from these numbers, Germany attributed much importance to Turkey with the leadership of Hitler.

3.9 Turkish Press Members’ Visit to Germany

In his notes of memories, Asım Us wrote that they visited Germany with press members between 23 April and 8 May 1935. Ahmet Şükrü Esmir from Milliyet newspaper, Abidin Daver from Cumhuriyet newspaper, Asım Us from Vakit newspaper and Burhan Belge from General Press Directorate were in the committee. The committee visited Breslau, Dresden, Munich, Cologne, Koblenz, Berlin and Hamburg. They also visited Hitler’s labour camps and youth schools. They attended the meeting of youth organisations who support Hitler and listened Göbbels’ speech. The committee was received by Hitler and Göbbels on 2 May. Then they watched the movie “*The Victory of Willpower*” that reflects the last congress of Nazi Party. Before leaving Germany on 8 May, the committee participated in the invitation of Berlin Ambassador of Soviet Union.³³³

It is here that the Germans’ interests were to publish the writings in the Turkish press in favour of Germany, and Soviets’ request raised a question that Germany were disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles.

3.10 The Investments of Germany to Turkey in Art, Culture and Education

German government used not only diplomacy but also all other ways of propaganda activities in order to influence and manipulate Turkey. By means of press and radio they

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Jacobsen 1968, pp. 661-664.

³³³ Us Asım, *Asım Us Reason Memoirs (1930-1950), Atatürk, İnönü, the Second World War and Democracy Regime Input Memoir.*, Istanbul 1966, pp. 99-106.

aimed to impose Turkish people a positive attitude towards Germany and gave importance to their actions in the fields of education and fine arts.

Turkey, within the scope of Near East German propaganda, was regarded as one of the most significant countries in Germany's target of propaganda, in other words "*German Culture Area*" by German government.³³⁴ In this regard, Turkey was presented as a bridge between the Balkans and Middle East and was attributed much importance due to its geographical and strategic features.³³⁵ The definition "*German Area*" was used as "*German Life Area*" after a while and the occupation of Poland and Czechoslovakia was realised because of the reason given. However, Turkey was aimed to be included in Germany's "*life area*" with means of propaganda instead of being directly occupied.³³⁶ For that purpose, all means of propaganda were used.

3.11 German Schools

German school, which has been in Istanbul since 1868 and changed to a high school in 1911, is the first one in this field.³³⁷ This school was closed after the First World War and began its functions again in its old building with the diplomatic relations started in 1924.³³⁸ With the Nazi government after 1933 this school was turned to a powerful centre of propaganda and besides educational activities, conferences and movies about Germany were frequently organized.³³⁹

In the early 1930s, there were two schools that were formally supported by German government. In the educational year of 1931-1932, there were 1127 students and in 1932-1933 the number of students decreased to 1007. After May of 1934, another German school was opened in Ankara for the children of German staff working at German Embassy.³⁴⁰ In 1937-1938 educational year, 642 students were studying at German School in Istanbul and

³³⁴ Glasneck 1976, p. 28.

³³⁵ Kılıç 2010, p. 162.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 162.

³³⁷ Özgüldür 1993, p.78.

³³⁸ Kılıç 2010, p. 167.

³³⁹ Ibid., p.167.

³⁴⁰ Koçak 2013, p. 180.

only 150 of them were German, the others were Turkish.³⁴¹ According to Turkish education system, even in foreign schools it was compulsory to take some courses in Turkish language by Turkish teachers, this posed a problem for German school. The Minister of Education updated this regulation in October of 1932. Until the autumn of 1937 the German school ignored this regulation, but in the end, upon a complaint it was warned to obey the regulations. Though the German Ambassador of the time, Keller, sent a diplomatic protest note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aras and Celal Bayar, there were no fundamental changes in the content of this regulation.³⁴²

These schools were used for various purposes. German government tried to benefit from the staff of German school in intelligence, organisation and propaganda areas. Glasneck states that 18 of 20 German teachers working at German school worked for Nazi organisations.³⁴³ Moreover, missionary and German propaganda activities of these German schools continued together. Turkey, which took place in Near East Propaganda plans of Germany, had great importance for Germans.³⁴⁴ Germany carried out certain plans according to the profiles of the countries it desired to control with imperialistic aims; and tried to influence Turkey politically, economically and culturally. At this point, German schools were used as an instrument. The ultimate aim of Germany, as it was in the periods before, was to dominate geographically and to be in touch with these dominated countries.³⁴⁵ Germany also tried to dominate Turkey due to bilateral commercial agreements and economic relations, and cultural relations had an important role in these attempts. The current term “*Public Diplomacy*” still used in literature was first used thanks to German schools and incoming German experts.

³⁴¹ Kılıç 2010, p. 170.

³⁴² Koçak 2013, p. 180.

³⁴³ Glasneck 1976, p. 29.

³⁴⁴ Kılıç 2010, p. 162.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p.164.

The Number of Students and Teachers at German Schools During the Republic Period³⁴⁶

Years	Number of Teachers	Number of Students
1927-1928	28	414
1928-1929	29	545
1929-1930	32	482
1930-1931	39	727
1932-1933	44	1007
1937-1938	48	642

As much as educational areas, Germany maintained its propaganda activities in the other areas such as fine arts. After 1934, the influence of Germany was seen in modern arts.³⁴⁷ The task of founding Presidential Symphony Orchestra was given to the German artist Ernst Praetorius and it was founded in 1935. Ankara Public Conservatoire was founded by the German artist Carl Ebert in 1936, and another German artist Paul Hindemintmade significant contributions to its development.³⁴⁸

Cart Ebert, who contributed much to the foundation of Ankara Public Conservatoire, was also effective in the foundation of theatre, German dance and opera after becoming the Theatre Adviser of Ministry of National Education. Also in this period, German Art Exhibition was opened, thus a large scaled German propaganda was carried out by German Embassy.³⁴⁹ A Turkish-German Tourism Committee was established on 3 March 1934 under the presidency of Muhiddin Üstündağ, Governor and Mayor of Istanbul of that time, in order to improve tourism between Turkey and Germany.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p.173.

³⁴⁷ Özgüldür 1993, p. 79.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p.79.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p.79.

3.12 Turkish Students and Turkish Student Associations in Germany

Another dimension of cultural relations between Turkey and Germany was the outgoing Turkish students to Germany. In 1937-1938 educational year, the number of higher education students, who went abroad with Government scholarships, was 273 (230 males and 43 female) and more than 100 of these students were in Germany. In the spring of 1937, 80% of Turkish students studying abroad were in Germany.³⁵¹ With the rising tension in relations between two countries in 1939, Turkish students studying in Germany were in the agenda and it was discussed that they could study at other countries such as England and France.³⁵²

Turkish government authorities even stated that German lecturers, counsellors and technicians working in Turkey could be deported if Turkish students studying in Germany were mistreated.³⁵³

The number of Turkish people living in Berlin from 1920 to 1938 is shown below:

Year	The Number of Turkish People in Germany
1920	1.269
1921	1.393
1922	1.904
1923	1.451
1924	909
1925	1.164
1926	1.200
1927	1.162
1928	1.172
1929	1.047
1930	856
1931	737

³⁵¹ Koçak 2013, p.181.

³⁵² Ibid., p.181.

³⁵³ Ibid., p.181.

1932	608
1933	585
1934	929
1935	1.234
1936	2.644
1937	2.848
1938	3.310 ³⁵⁴

Turkish Students Association in Berlin (Türkischer Studenten-Verein Berlin) was founded on 18 November 1925 and took the name of Berlin Turkish Students Organisation in 1931; in the beginning of 1932, its name was changed to Berlin Union of Turkish Students.³⁵⁵

Again in this period, 38 Turkish (34 males, 4 female) students and 1 Afghan student studying at Faculty of Law at Ankara University visited Germany in the mentorship of Prof. Cahit Otuzođlu. In the February of 1939, 40 students studying at Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara went to Berlin upon an invitation.³⁵⁶

4 Military Relations

Beside the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire entered the World War I. German-Turkish military alliance played an important role in this.³⁵⁷ The basis of military relationship, formed by Russia's aggressive politics in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire and its aim to descend to the Balkans had worrying effects in the Ottoman Empire. In this case, all the balances in the region were meant to change in favour of Russia. Prussian state which was also suffering from these developments sought to improve relations with the Ottoman Empire.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁴ Gültekin 1986, p. 48.

³⁵⁵ Gültekin Emre, *Turkish Associations in Berlin*, Mülkiyeliler Association Journal, Issue 81, April 1986, p. 46.

³⁵⁶ Koçak 2013, p. 182.

³⁵⁷ Ortaylı İlber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluđunda Alman Nüfuzu (German Penetration of the Ottoman Empire)*, Timaş Publications, Istanbul 2014, p. 36.

³⁵⁸ Beydilli Kemal, *1790 Prussian - Ottoman Alliance*, Istanbul University Faculty of Literature Publications, Istanbul 1984, p. 21

Prussia, first in German geographical area and later in Europe, increased its military and political influence; it had a strong diplomatic balance as a new force. In this new process, Prussia desperately needed the Ottoman Empire in the medium and long term.³⁵⁹ Realising this fact very well, Prussia followed a peaceful policy with the Ottomans and put efforts to improve the relations in all fields. In this sense, in Turkish-German relations, the military alliance treaty of 1790 Prussia-Ottoman has an important place. Alliance in 1790, between the Turks and the Germans meant the centuries-long classical struggle and war, was gone and the development of Turkish-German relations begun and was an important stage that made its way to the diplomatic relations today. Also Ottoman administrators gave up and no longer put forward classic jihad and fight against Germany; they began to accept Germany as an ally against a common enemy in order to maintain the existence of the state. This perspective lasted until the First World War. In the year 1835 as Helmut von Moltke's contracted military personnel began to educate the Ottoman Army in the Ottoman service, an important symbol in the history of both states. Because this development had increased German influence in the Ottoman Empire and its successor the Republic of Turkey. Also after Moltke, in later years Colmar von der Goltz³⁶⁰ and Liman von Sanders two important Prussian/German names gave many years of service to modernise the Ottoman Army and for the training of officers.³⁶¹ Likewise, in the Ottoman side Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), while in the German side, Emperor Wilhelm II (1888-1918) had a serious contribution to the expansion and improvement of relations.

Abdulhamid II, since 1882 increased the rapprochement effort with the German Empire, he employed the first military German delegation during his period.³⁶² These positive developments in the Turkish-German relations also had positive effects on the economic and commercial areas.³⁶³ In particular, in the field of the purchasing of military equipment and infrastructure investments there were very important steps that have been taken. ³⁶⁴As a result of all this historical background in the WW1 Turkish-German cooperation had reached

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁶⁰ For extensive information about Goltz Pasha. Ramadan Çalık, *Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (Pasha) and Some Opinions*, Atatürk Research Center Journal, Cilt 12, November 1996.

³⁶¹ Ortaylı 2014, p.40.

³⁶² Kılıç 2010, p.12.

³⁶³ Armaoğlu 2010, pp. 142-143.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 145-148.

the alliance position and the new governments that were founded in the post-war political diplomatic conditions, continued this historical heritage.³⁶⁵

4.1 Military Partnerships

Turkish-German “*military partnership*” started before the First World War, this partnership made major contributions to the development of both political and economic relations.³⁶⁶ According to the articles of Treaty of Versailles, unemployed soldiers as a result of the disarmament of Germany dispersed to many countries and Turkey had been one of these countries. German officers gave lectures in Yıldız Military Academy, they shared their experiences in the course according to their area of military techniques but mainly on war and strategy. Chief of General Staff Kazim Pasha has said that during this training he emphasised the need for Turkey's political opinion to be taking into account.³⁶⁷

Before the First World War Activities of German military delegation in the Ottoman Empire was the most important part of the Turkish-German relations. German military delegation had been very effective in the reorganisation operation of the Ottoman army they had been also effective before the war. Mudros Treaty resulted in the removal of German troops on Turkish soil; the Turkish-German military relations had been severed completely. Turkish-German diplomatic relations started again in 1924 but resumed diplomatic relations were not reflected in the military field. Because Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, German army was scattered. In addition, the negative attitude of the Turkish public opinion against Germany in the First World War, it was believed that German dragged the Ottomans into the war, led to the relations not starting again in particular in the military field.

However, the Turkish-German brotherhood in arms in the First World War contributed to the re-establishment of political relations between the two countries and has also contributed positively to the rapid rapprochement in military affairs in the aftermath.

³⁶⁵ Ortaylı 2014, p. 89.

³⁶⁶ Kılıç 2010, p.12.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p.139.

4.2 German officers in the Turkish Military Academy

Due to the Treaty of Versailles numerous dispersed German officers, remained unemployed in the German army and because the Turkish army was based on the German system many of the German officers unemployed could serve in the Turkish Military Academy. Here another important point was that other western countries; especially England and France did not want the convergence between, Turkey and Germany. As a result of this, Turkish government had begun diplomatic relations in hesitation of the future response of these countries. Since 1926, German officers, signed civil contracts, so that they could work in the Military Academy. These officers have served as teachers in courses such as attack, artillery, supplies, aviation and war history.

Although there is no official duties given by the German government, German officers involved in the Military Academy, had been naturally very influential also on the Turkish officers and the Turkish army. In particular, the number of German soldiers in the Turkish army increased after 1933 and these officers had important task of the formation of the Turkish army.³⁶⁸

Freiherr von Richthofen from German Foreign Ministry was providing information on the foreign officers written in a report on March 19, 1927. In a meeting at General Staff with Nadolny, Kazım Paşa said that no foreign military delegation would be invited to Turkey but only some experts, educators and consultants may be invited. The expectations from these, would certainly be that they don't express a political point of view but completely offer knowledge and experience in military matters. In addition, he gave information that they would obtain lessons on, historical battles, war of aggression, war techniques and strategies trainings from the German officers, while the French officers would provide the information about defense technology and the superior mobility training.³⁶⁹

As a result of the Nazis rise to power, Germany started to have more impact on these teacher officers in Turkish army. Policy pursued by the Nazis was multifaceted. They endeavoured

³⁶⁸ Kılıç 2010, p. 142.

³⁶⁹ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945), from the Archive of the German Foreign Office (aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswaertigen Amtes), Serie B, Band, 19.3.1927, Göttingen, 1972.

to affect senior military echelon politically for to take a pro-German attitude in decision making process of foreign policy. On the other hand, by meeting Turkish army military supply demand making Turkish army dependent to German military industry had been their target. Sympathy and admiration towards the German army which developed in the Turkish army was started by these teacher officers.³⁷⁰ Purpose of German government who sent Hans Rohde which taught here in the past as a military attaché in 1935 was to increase the German influence inside the Turkish army.³⁷¹ German officers among them were infantry General Mittelberg, R.Colonel Karl Kercher, R. Captain Veisbarch, R.Col. Otto Layke were successful in influencing the Turkish officers.³⁷²

Despite all this, some demands from Turkey did not look favourable for the German government. Germany did not accept sending German officers to the Turkish army. However they had accepted 12 Turkish Staff Officers who were sent for observing the modern German army and studying in 1938.³⁷³ Because, such training would be in the interests of Germany, and used as one of its propaganda. Additionally, civilian experts arrived as well as military experts came to Turkey. Many German experts began to arrive to work in the state administration of Turkey. Many invitations were present at this field. In particular, to open new technical schools and to have German experts who would teach in them. German experts were brought to work in Turkey in agriculture, even regulating Turkish police department and also at the same time there was a student influx from Turkey into Germany.³⁷⁴

4.3 Training of Turkish Officers in Germany

Turkish Government, made attempts for Turkish military students and young officers to get their education in Germany. Turkish military officers, students and trainees in Germany had been an important part of the military relationship. After the signing of the Turkish-German

³⁷⁰ Koçak 2013, p. 184.

³⁷¹ Özgüldür1993, p.93.

³⁷² Ibid., p.93.

³⁷³ Ibid., p.94.

³⁷⁴ Koçak 2013, p. 49.

Friendship Treaty, Turkish military students and young officers were sent to be educated in Germany.³⁷⁵

Ministry of Defence sent seven art and engineering students to Germany for a few years, for technical training in the summer of 1924. Later five more students were added to this group. Their costs would be paid by the Turkish Government though students would work for eight years in military factories of Turkey when they returned. The aim of the Turkish Government was to meet the technical personnel needs in the future as well as make them train new students.³⁷⁶

In Keller's report dated May 17, 1938, he informed that the number of Turkish students studying in the German army is 12 and the number of Turkish Officers Turkish Government is in attempt to send is 12 and this demand was being investigated by the German Ministry of Defence. Although German Military Attache in Ankara General Rohde supported this demand it was contested in higher command echelons of the German Armed Forces. At the end of the report, Keller requested that the issue and desire of Turkish Government should not be evaluated just in terms of military and technical aspects but also political aspects should be taken into consideration by Berlin. Keller was pointing out that meeting demands of the Turkish Government in the military field, would play an active role in the prevention of Turkey joining a group of anti-German alliance in the future, In the event of a conflict, it would contribute to a cautious attitude. Keller wrote that if Turkey's request was not granted, officers could be sent to other countries with the aim of training, particularly to Soviet Union.

Keller was requesting from German Foreign Ministry for the answer to the Turkish government to be positive. As a result these initiatives it had positive repercussions and the German military authorities informed that number of Turkish officers could be increased to 24.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

³⁷⁶ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Nadolny to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, Nr. 102, 07.10.1924.

³⁷⁷ Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Keller to Weizsaecker, Nr. 544, 17.5.1938.

4.4 Arms Trade

Arms trade was an important part of the Turkish – German military relations and the German investment to the Turkish defence industry. Turkey prepared a plan to establish an independent arms industry since 1925. Just as the Aircraft factory by the Junkers firm agreement the intention was to make this happen in the arms industry. Mutual diplomatic negotiations and assessments did not result in a solid partnership. The reason for this could be shown that Germany was hesitant to meet the requirements of the Turkish defence industry. The German government wanted to help Turkey in this field, but in spite of the Western powers - Britain and France- it was afraid to give military support clearly.³⁷⁸ Because it thought that such a support would leave Germany in a difficult situation in Europe. But Germany did not completely tear off the ropes with Turkey in this direction and economically saw Turkey as a springboard thanks to the influence German influence.

Chrome abundance in Turkey was very important for the German armaments industry.³⁷⁹ Germany's other sources of chromium was Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia but Turkey was more favourable.³⁸⁰ Germans were using this chrome in making aircraft, making steel pipes and tanks signs used and in the gun mount plate. Turkey received in exchange of this chrome from Germany, railway equipment, textile machinery and plants, light industry gave weapons and ammunition.³⁸¹ In a little while Turkey had become a weapon market like it was before the World War I. On the one hand the Germans received weapons orders, on the other hand, they won military tenders such as the construction of munitions factories and the expansion of the Golcuk War Port.

Nadolny wrote in the report dated January 8, 1926 to the German Foreign Ministry that for the formation of the Turkish defence industry German firms should apply without losing time to the Ministry of Defence or contact as soon as possible directly to Kemalettin Sami Pasha. Because he saw this composition as an important opportunity to spread the German influence in the economic field in Turkey.

³⁷⁸ Koçak 2013, pp. 51- 55.

³⁷⁹ Oran 2012, p. 300.

³⁸⁰ Kılıç 2010, p. 140.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 140.

This also meant that at the same time the development of political relations.³⁸² After a while, the Turkish Government Ministry of Defence began to give orders to certain German companies for military requirements. For example, the Ministry of National Defence in 1930 has signed an agreement relating to purchasing of 29 motor vehicles with Büssing Company.

383

In the Turkish - German relations the year 1933 could be considered as one of the milestones. It was also an important year for both countries in the context of being a year in which both countries suffered internal and external political change. Republic of Turkey for 10 years as a state in terms of rapid industrialisation policies had been applied, but for reasons such as the lack of technology and lack of sufficient knowledge, and 1929 world economic crisis it did not reach the desired results. Diplomatic relations began in 1924 between Turkey and German with the growing economic ties this did not achieve the desired results in 1933 for Turkey. Here, despite the weight of raw material exports of Turkey, imported goods, especially in the military field hurt the Turkish economy. Also for reasons such as the lack of the necessary industrial infrastructure and lack of planned industrialisation and development model of the state the Turkish government put in place a 5-year development plan in 1933.³⁸⁴

In Germany “*German National Socialist Party*” or Nazis, came to power in 1933 and they seemed as a rescue plan for the Germans, which started to crush under the 1929 economic crisis and the heavy load of the Treaty of Versailles. In the leadership of Hitler’s Nazi party, them came significant changes in Germany's domestic and foreign policy and in the history of Europe and the world.

Gradually developing economic relations with Turkey since 1926 was not considered, enough for Hitler’s Germany.³⁸⁵ Hitler’s government, wanted to connect Turkey economically and politically to Germany and to get Turkey's rich raw resources for cheaper they searched for ways to improve further Turkish-German relations. For this purpose,

³⁸² Files for German Foreign Policy (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik), from Nadolny to German Foreign Ministry, Nr. 25, 8.1.1926, Göttingen, 1968.

³⁸³ Koçak 2013, p. 55.

³⁸⁴ Oran 2012, pp. 306-307.

³⁸⁵ Özgüldür 1993, p. 70.

references to the historical Turkish-German relationship were made and examples highlighted, Moltke, von der Goltz, Lemon studies von Sanders were praised and emphasis was put on weapons of friendship in the First World War further development for friendship were asked by the German administration.³⁸⁶

The role of the German soldiers, which is another factor for the further development of Turkish-German relationship, had been increased. Military delegation, which arrived in Ankara often, sought to expand the volume of relations in economic and military fields. The delegation consisted of in particular Turkish-speaking German soldiers, who had stayed in Turkey before and obtained personal friendships. The German government also insisted on hosting the Turkish military and civilian delegations carefully in Germany.³⁸⁷ Likewise, Hitler, who made the German press write news full of praises for Mustafa Kemal, did a heavy propaganda on the delegation of the press from Turkey and asked German press, by making news praising the German regime, industry so the Turkish media delegation could reflect this situation in Turkey.

Military relations between Turkey and Germany maintained in the period of Nazi rule.³⁸⁸ Policy pursued by Nazi Germany against Turkey's military area was multifaceted. German officers in the Turkish army were committed to take Turkey on their side in order to increase German influence. Thus they wanted to influence the high level commanders, who were thought by them to affect Turkish foreign policy making process or at least they wanted to prevent them from taking a negative attitude against Germany. On the other hand, they wanted to make Turkey dependent on Germany by meeting Turkey's military needs. The purpose of both policies was to influence Turkish foreign policy.³⁸⁹ The most important step taken in this direction before was the German officers in the Turkish army. Especially in this period it is observed that the Turkish Navy was educated by the German experts and with the German training methods. German officers sent to Turkey temporarily also continued their activities towards the objectives of the Nazi government. Likewise, officers from

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁸⁸ Oran 2012, pp. 300-301.

³⁸⁹ Koçak 2013, p. 54.

Turkey by studying in Germany were given training on that not only military means but also in political terms considered to be friendly to Germany.

Studies on the arms trade and military equipment between Germany and Turkey were the very important aspect of military relations. So much so that Turkey's weapons orders to Germany in 1938 reached 45 million pounds.³⁹⁰ German managers knew that the Turkish army, consisting of German arms industry, would make Turkey depend on Germany. It was calculated that steps to be taken in this direction will directly affect Turkish foreign policy and political decision, which could be in Germany's favour. Various military supplies as a result of mutual negotiations began to be delivered to Turkey. But tensions emerged in Europe and especially, the UK did not want to see Turkey on the side of Germany, and this had led to problems with the delivery of this military equipment. Delivered guns by German started to come missing in terms of materials and structures, and Turkish government forwarded the complaints towards the timely receipt of the shipment of weapons and they did not get the answer they wanted.³⁹¹ As a result of recent political developments in Germany, taking into account Turkey's anti-German groups and concerns about the possibility that Turkey could use weapons against Germany, they had slowed down the shipments of the arms substantially. In particular, the Turkish-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1939 just before the publication; it was observed that the German government started taking a tough stance on Turkey.

4.5 German Impact on Turkish Army

The diplomatic relations established between the two countries in 1924 did not reflect on the military field. As a result of the disintegration of the German army, there was a limited military relationship with the German officers who came individually. With Hitler, who came to power in 1933 starting the recovery of the German army and the need for a strong army to carry out the theory "*life space*" the need for rich raw materials in Turkey had increased.

Germany since 1934 had taken steps to get closer the two countries' armies to each other and establish the military relations with Turkey. First, the military delegations began to

³⁹⁰ Kılıç 2010, p. 141.

³⁹¹ Ibid., p. 141.

arrive in Turkey and then started to propaganda through German officers in the Military Academy in Turkey.³⁹²

Germany sent to Turkey the first military delegation in November 1934. Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel Hans Alfred Jold Rohde's military delegation was formed under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff hosted by Fevzi Cakmak. These names were not ordinary names, and both spoke Turkish very properly. These two soldiers, served in Turkey previously, they were welcomed because of their personal friendship during missions and played an important role in strengthening the positive sense on the good image of German army for Turkey.³⁹³ Germany has been effective in Turkey through propaganda activities in the press and by the German officers, particularly German army, emerging after Hitler was carefully monitored by the Turkish military authorities.

The Ankara government, which wanted to begin the development of military relations between the two countries and making investigations on the Turkish army, requested again a new military mission in 1937 from Germany and German military delegation under the chairmanship of staff to Turkey Colonel von Fretter and Major Richard Leppez troops have made investigations in Istanbul and Ankara. In addition, in 1937 the German Youth Agency came to Ankara and Istanbul with press and propaganda committee and had various contacts.³⁹⁴ Germany has been found not only in the military sense but also in the context of civilian areas to affect Turkey as we have seen in some activities.

As a result, the German-Turkish political relations from the 18th century to the mid-20th century, continued to develop in economic and military dimensions. During the Empire period, Germany, started to develop its relations with the Ottoman Empire, to provide the necessary raw materials for the evolving industry and the use of market opportunities considering the Ottoman wide geographical area, as well as strategic value sought to increase the very high political influence on the Ottoman territory. The Ottomans, which wanted to follow a multi-dimensional foreign policy, to get rid of political loneliness and to take

³⁹² Özgüldür 1993, p. 75.

³⁹³ Ibid., pp. 75-92.

³⁹⁴ Özgüldür 1993, p. 93.

advantage of Germany's advanced military and economic infrastructure wanted to achieve this by improving relations with Germany.

In this respect, developing relations rapidly growing Ottoman-German relations from 1800 to 1914, the First World War after wiping the arena where the two empires in history have undergone a period of interruption to the establishment of the new state. The relations went up to an Alliance in the First World War, despite the new governments established after a certain period after the war there continued multidimensional relationships. Between the years of 1923-1945, contrary to popular opinion the Turkish-German relations, political, economic, and most importantly in the military field have progressed in a very intense way.

The economic and military relations have been an important part of the relations. Specifically, with Hitler's National-Socialist Party coming to power in Germany in January 1933 Germany experienced a sharp change in domestic and foreign policy. This change has been reflected in the form of Turkish-German relations, there were variations in terms of political and foreign policy. However, despite disagreements on foreign policy, economic and military relations maintained its intensity and became even more advanced. Up to the war Turkey approached to Britain and France politically but economically the trade with Germany continued. However, the political polarisation based on the war affected the economic and military fields and the relationships entered into trouble. May 12, 1939 in the Turkish-British talks to each other, in the case of a war zone in the Mediterranean, they took the decision that they would do all kinds of support towards one another. In addition, Turkey requested from the UK military and economic assistance and decided to have negotiations on these issues.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁵ Soysal İsmail, *Modern Turkish Diplomacy: Period of two Centuries*, Press of Turkish History Institution, Ankara 1999, p. 299.

CHAPTER III

TURKEY'S MODERNISATION

1 The Path to Reform

The Turks gained their liberty after the Turkish War of Independence, however, 10 years after the war, the population decreased on a large scale, fertile lands of Rumelia (Balkan Peninsula) were invaded and the lands which formed the new Turkey were economically broken. Society was seriously confused. Most of non-Muslims left the country, Greek population decreased from 1.8 million to 120 thousand, Armenian population decreased from 1.3 million to 100 thousand. Foreign trade dropped tremendously, from 1911 to 1923 exports dropped from 25 billion piasters to 800 billion piaster, imports dropped from 4.5 billion piasters to 1.4 billion piasters.³⁹⁶

As with any civilisation that cannot keep up with time, the Ottoman State also suffered from not renewing itself, not keeping up with science and technology and therefore became part of history by giving birth to a new state.

Many of the steps this new state had to take to become part of the new age had actually started being taken earlier. Hence, before the Republic of Turkey was created Ottoman State, rebuild the state structure on the basis of Western science and technique. Change and reform attempts in the Ottoman history were seen as the parameter of the Europeanisation process. Education system changed completely, a western system of military structure became the norm. For the Ottoman State, West proved itself with its economy and military and its political state system became a good symbol to aim for.³⁹⁷ Knowing this, the roots of western political regime and foreign policy in Turkey can be found in the modernisation process of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman intelligentsia used modernisation in the same sense as westernisation. Even though there were many reasons and inspirations for the Ottoman

³⁹⁶ Shaw Stanford J.&Shaw Ezel Kural, *Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey II*, E Publishers, Istanbul 2006, p. 441.

³⁹⁷ Tüter Celal, *Building the identity of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Daily Turkey, Issue 119, Ankara 2014, p.137.

Empire to carry out such reforms, the political elite of that time thought that the only way to save the Empire was to carry out European style reforms.³⁹⁸ Thus, the Republic of Turkey was established in the course of these developments. This newly established nation state, believed that it could only become a modern state by having Western style reforms.

In 29 October 1923, Ataturk told French writer Maurice Pernot, “*Turks have always gone towards West, European Turkey, rather a Turkey which favours West is what we want. We want to modernise our homeland. Our efforts in Turkey is to modernise, therefore bring a Western style government. Which nation attempted to enter civilisation and has not favoured West?*”³⁹⁹ The interview confirms this view.

Administrators of the new Turkish Republic, inherited a state which Europe tried to keep out of the continent for centuries. Knowing this, they thought that new Turkey had to have a western structure almost as a matter of security.⁴⁰⁰ Although Europe, did not want a state which thought differently and was hostile towards it, by its side, it was necessary to take its place there in order to be contemporary and strong in the world stage.⁴⁰¹ Therefore modernisation, seemed to be the fundamental and in fact the only policy objective of Ataturk’s Turkey. If modernisation was everything that was western, then everything that happened in the West would also happen in Turkey, this was the view.

Big European adventures and conflicts of opinions such as, the struggle between the Church and the State, Renaissance, scientific awakening, humanism, liberalism, rationalism and enlightenment had no effect and was foreign in a unfamiliar and irrelevant society.⁴⁰² These are what happened in the West, and the stage to which the West had come to in terms of both economy and social welfare had advanced. Turkey however, was pulled out of the Balkans and had to withdraw to Anatolia to establish a new system. Furthermore, while Rumelia was the centre of the cosmopolitan dominant class, Anatolia, was in the second plan. Anatolia compared to Rumelia was considered to be more Turkish but represented the lower working

³⁹⁸ Erol Mehmet Seyfettin & Ozan Emre, *Political Regime as an Element of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Gazi University Akademik Perspective, Volume 4 Issue 8, Ankara 2011, p. 25.

³⁹⁹ Türkdoğan 2010, p. 25.

⁴⁰⁰ Bilgin Pinar, *Culture of Security in the EU-Turkey relations*, Ayraç Publishers, Istanbul 2003, pp. 208-210.

⁴⁰¹ Türkdoğan 2010, p. 26.

⁴⁰² Lewis Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 482.

class. This made reforms a little more difficult. Nevertheless, with a handful of Anatolian people who didn't even know what the terms such as, *Modernisation, Westernisation and Freedom* meant, radical revolutions had to be made.⁴⁰³ The way the architects of the new system were brought up, the books they read and researched and the type of things they had done, shows that they have been inspired by the models which have been developed by the Western countries.⁴⁰⁴ Also these staff who were forming the new political regime, were brought up in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, they were soldiers /intellectuals /bureaucrats who did their best to stop the fall of the Empire. Therefore, the most effective element in the staff's political conscience was for them to sustain the state against its enemies both internally and externally.⁴⁰⁵

2 Political Structure and New Identity

The Turkish political regime adopted the goal of creating a modern nation-state by rejecting the imperial heritage.

This nation state was not to be differentiated from a western model, during the formation of the state the religious characteristics of the empire, namely backward people were to be purged. The state was to control religion and when this new regime was forming on a secular base, the reduction of Islam in social life was going to be inevitable. This type of nation, had to create the modern industry and strong economy. For this, the nation state had to adopt modern education, value secularism and rationality.⁴⁰⁶ Republic regime, with this new identity was to face the West as a whole, and work to become like a Western State. As republicanism is known to be the base of this political regime, the Turkish political regime is a Republic regime⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ Modernisation; The problem of secularism is a new problem in Europe. What is more important about these problems is not that there is more outsiders involved in Church establishment or religious affairs but the rise in the freedom of demands by non-religious part of the society in the fields of economy, politics, education, family and sexual life. This is what we call "*modernisation*". Niyazi Berkes, *Modernisation in Turkey*, Yapı Kredi Publishers, İstanbul 2003, p. 22.

⁴⁰⁴ Bozdağlıoğlu Yücel, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, Routledge, New York & London 2003, p. 51.

⁴⁰⁵ Erol M.S & Ozan E. 2011, p. 20.

⁴⁰⁶ Ahmad Feroz, *Formation of Modern Turkey*, Kaynak Publishers, Istanbul 2015, p.69.

⁴⁰⁷ Sander Oral, *Reasons for Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ankara University SBF Journal. Volume 37. Issue 3-4, Ankara 1982, p. 108.

Mustafa Kemal, did not want to inherit the problems that the Ottoman Empire had, in the process of building this new structure he created an artificial asset which did not exist before, he gave life to it by only having one sole element, the Turkish nation.⁴⁰⁸ Therefore before Mustafa Kemal executed his project the national identity of the Turkish Republic, namely the Turkish nation did not exist. However, Kemal Ataturk and the Kemalist elites wanted to eradicate the Ottoman history and did this by bringing about cultural and political institutions to become modern like the Western countries and shaped the formation of Turkey's nation state.⁴⁰⁹

A new step was taken as Turks turned away from China a 1000 years ago and turned towards West and Islam, this new step was not Islam but it was Westernisation. This change was not to be defined as an economic, political or military change but a civilizational change. This new civilisation, was located in China's far west, Turkey's west, and it was called the *Western Civilisation*. This civilisation, was based around terms such as democracy, human rights, equality, justice and freedom and it was on the agenda of Turkey for the last two hundred years.

The most prominent feature of the republican regime is that it emphasises social outcomes rather than personal gains and organises the state into a unitary structure.⁴¹⁰ For example, non-homogenous, nation system that grants different type of religious groups to have their own laws, was strained when the idea of a nation state was developed and failed to sustain different groups in one society and subsequently disappeared. Despite this, the West, which was on the rise, was the most important enemy of the Ottoman Empire. The transition of the empire to the nation-state with its numerous ethnic and religious elements was made possible by the republican regime. With a republic based on the principle of one state, one nation, it could be said that it was more authoritarian than democratic. On the other hand, effectiveness of the military establishment strengthened the authoritarian character of the Republic of Turkey since most of the staff that formed the Republic were part of the military in the

⁴⁰⁸ İnaç Hüsamettin, *Identity Problem of Turkey during the European Union Integration Process*, East West: Identities, 6, 23, İstanbul 2003, pp. 99-103.

⁴⁰⁹ Keyman E. Fuat, *Thoughts on the Problem of Secularism in Turkey: Modernity, Secularisation, Democratisation*, East West: Identities, 6, 23, İstanbul 2003, p. 121.

⁴¹⁰ Okutan C. & Ereker F., *Regime Element in Decising Turkish Foreign Policy*, İstanbul University Social Sciences Journal. Year 4. Issue 8, İstanbul 2005, p. 191.

national struggle for independence. Moreover, the role of the military establishment helps us understand the role of security in the Turkish foreign policy.⁴¹¹

Since most of the elites which have created the Turkish political regime were of military origin, we can find the origins of the role of Turkish Armed Forces in politics during the Ottoman times. The Ottoman tradition rested on tight ties between the military and the state, the military bureaucracy formed one of the most influential classes in state administration. This situation was also inherited to the republican period. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire's defensive real-politic meant that reforms were always first implemented in the military. "*Strengthening and reforming the military*" was the most important issue for the Ottoman administration. As a result of the reforms starting from the military, members of the military have become well-educated, progressive and political elites bearing the reforms. In other words, the military was also the carrier of modernisation. During the War of Independence and in the declaration and consolidation of the Republic, the role played by the military was very influential. Therefore, the Turkish Armed Forces saw themselves responsible for the protection of territorial integrity and political unity, as well as the republic and the secular regime.

3 Reforms

For the West the 'other' was East, to be free from being the 'other' Turkey tried to become like the West. Thus, the West would not want to divide and destroy a nation with the same qualities as its own, but would do anything to strengthen the Turks as Westerners. In this context, Turkey has tried to be involved in any political and military alliance led by the West in foreign policy, aiming to be part of the Western system and therefore protect its territorial integrity. Turkey has always aimed to establish a Western system not only in foreign policy but also in secular domestic politics.⁴¹²

In this direction, it is seen that in order to make the reforms, with Mustafa Kemal himself, Ankara, decisively turned its face from the East to the West. Because for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends, Westernisation was the only solution for the Turkish state and

⁴¹¹ Erol, M.S. & Ozan, E. 2011, p. 21.

⁴¹² Zürcher Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, London & New York, I. B. Tauris 1993, p. 179.

nation.⁴¹³ But for there to be a Western state that is recognised by the international community, created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and having national qualities, the modern social structure of the empire was not going to be enough. It was necessary to remove the hostility that has developed due to the events that happened in the past with Europe. For this, the new nation state had to stay away from the passion for the Ummah, from adventurous politics and empty dreams. In order for all this to happen, a series of reforms were needed.

Before the reforms began, the first Parliament adopted a resolution to abolish the Sultanate. Because the abolishment of the Sultanate was an important move before the Lausanne Treaty and before starting the reforms. To divide the Turkish side, the allied states invited both the Ankara (Parliament) and the Istanbul (Ottoman Empire) governments together, therefore the Sultanate had to be overthrown and it was. On the other hand, the existence of the Sultanate was also a major obstacle on the way to the republic. On the 1st of November 1922, the law providing for the abolition of the sultanate was accepted without much reaction in the parliament. If it were not for such an invitation by the allied states, it would have been a little difficult to pass this decision from the Parliament. Because even the closest friends of Mustafa Kemal were against the abolition of *Sultanate*. For example, Rauf (Orbay), then the prime minister and later an oppositionist, when consulted, made it clear to Kemal about his own views about the Sultanate. He said:

*I am connected to the Sultanate with my conscience and emotions. My father grew up under the influence of the Sultan and became one of the leaders of the Ottoman Empire. The gratitude I have for these good deeds are in my vain. I am not ungrateful and I cannot be ungrateful. I am faithful to his highness. My commitment to the Caliph is a requirement of the way I grew up. Besides this, I observe that it is difficult to keep the general situation under control. This can only be solved by an authority so high that it cannot be reached by everyone. This authority can only be the Caliphate or the Sultanate. To remove this authority and replace it with different qualities will lead to failure and misfortune. This can never be acceptable.*⁴¹⁴

⁴¹³ Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, p. 91.

⁴¹⁴ Feroz Ahmad 2015, p.73.

When the Sultanate was removed, the Caliphate was untouched. Because the public was not ready for this yet. On the other hand, the last Ottoman Sultan VI. Mehmet Vahidettin abandoned the country by taking refuge in England's patronage. Abdulmecid Efendi of the Ottoman dynasty was appointed as the Caliph on the possibility that Britain could use Vahidettin against the Republic of Turkey. So the British were cut off. Therefore, with the abolition of the Sultanate, a very important step was taken towards national sovereignty. The Caliph was nothing beyond being a symbol. In another sense, the first and only reform of the first parliament was to abolish the Sultanate. Other reforms are the six principles that determine the basic philosophy of Ataturk; Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Revolutionism. These are the reforms of the new state, the Republic of Turkey.⁴¹⁵

3.1 Declaration of the Republic

On October 2, 1923, the Allied Forces left Istanbul, and on October 13, the law that made Ankara the capital of the Republic of Turkey was accepted. Even in September 24, Ataturk made it clear his intention to establish the Republic to; *Neue Treie Presse* a newspaper from Vienna; he said that the newly created system in April 23, 1923 would be a Republic but the name of the Republic was not certain, and that only choosing the name of the Republic was left to do.⁴¹⁶ On October 27, the Fethi Okyar Government resigned. It was difficult to create a new government. Because, according to the rules, each minister had to be elected by the parliament. This led to compliance problems within the ministerial council. In the Republic, however, the Prime Minister would determine his ministers, so the possibility of non-compliance would be reduced. It is as if the Republic was developed as a practical remedy to solve such technical difficulties. On October 29, 1923, the necessary amendment was adopted in the 1921 Constitution and the Republic was established. Mustafa Kemal, president of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was unanimously elected president.

Ataturk, after declaring the republic had laid the foundations for all of the rules of democracy. The use of the political rights of the society as they wished, the functioning of pluralistic democracy in the country, was his main purpose.

⁴¹⁵ Yayla Ali, *Ataturks Reforms and Principles Lecture Notes*, ITU publishers, Istanbul 2005, p.76-78.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., p. 77.

3.2 Abolition of the Caliphate and Deportation of the Ottoman Dynasty

After the victory in Egypt by Yavuz Sultan Selim, the caliphate passed from the Mamluk dynasty to the Ottoman dynasty, Caliphate which was the spiritual supreme authority of the Islamic world and represented the mandate of the Prophet Muhammad. From the outside the Caliphate seems purely religious, however there have been attempts to make it a collective and unifying office in the Islamic World, but this did not succeed. The Caliphate politics of the Caliph Sultan Abdülhamid carried out with his own methods had been completely unsuccessful with the “Cihad-i Ekber” fetwa published in World War I. When the Sultanate was removed and the national sovereignty was gathered in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the nation, the Caliphate was left as an independent entity, and Abdulmecid Efendi, the youngest son of Sultan Aziz, was brought to this position by absolute majority. The Caliphate’s budget was added to the overall national budget, while the income of members of the Ottoman dynasty was left alone and renamed to ‘Hazine-i Hassa’. Caliph Abdulmecid Efendi, on the other hand, was making fanciful ceremonies and demanding that the government should increase his salary.⁴¹⁷ At the beginning of 1924 there were developments that accelerated the removal of the Caliphate. The caliph expressed regret that the members of the government who came to Istanbul had not visited him and asked the government to provide more budget for the expenditures that exceeded the power of the Caliphate. The prime minister conveyed the situation to Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal stated that the state could not have a separate treasure in the name of the Treasury of the Caliph, he wanted the Caliph to know what the Caliphate was, and to be content with what it had, additionally he demanded from the government to take steps to make sure this was achieved.⁴¹⁸

The strongest motive that forced Mustafa Kemal to lift the Caliphate was that as long as the Caliphate remained it would not be possible for the social and secular revolutions to be made. The caliphate problem was actually a regime problem. Mustafa Kemal made a series of attempts to remove the caliphate problem altogether.⁴¹⁹ First, he had to convince his friends

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

⁴¹⁸ Atatürk Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk*, C.II, Istanbul 1975, pp. 478-480.

⁴¹⁹ AYTEPE OĞUZ, *Removal of the Caliphate in the Light of New Documents and Abolition of Members of the Dynasty*, Ankara University History of Turkish Revolution Institute March-November Issue, Ankara 2002, p. 22.

because among them there were different views. After convincing his friends he also succeeded in convincing those that could oppose. Now was the time to pass this resolution in the parliament. On March, 3 1924 talks in the parliament with the acceptance of the law number 431, offered by a member from Siirt Sheikh Saffet Efendi, the Caliphate was abolished and the Ottoman Dynasty was deported from Turkey.⁴²⁰ Thus, the Caliphate which became the last remains of the Ottoman State and became a danger to the Republican administration was removed. Removed ministries were replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Chief of General Staff were established under the Prime Ministry. The law number 431 contained that all men, women, grooms and all children born to Abdulmecit and Osmanogulları family should be removed from Turkish citizenship and not to live in Turkey. The sultan and his family immediately had to go abroad, while the other members of the dynasty would be sent abroad after ten days.⁴²¹

One day before this resolution, on March 2, 1924 the authority for religious matters and institutions was removed along with the law that combined the education in the country. According to this new law; all of the schools were put under the control of the Ministry of Education. With this decision the institutions of the Caliphate were already abolished. After the removal of the Caliphate, Madrasa's and neighbourhood schools were also closed. There was from then on one type of education in the country, and this was a secular education. There were a limited number of Imam Hatip Schools (Islamic Schools) and the Faculty of Divinity in Istanbul to educate religious men. Another law that was passed at the same time (March 3, 1924) removed the religious and military authorities, instead of the ministry of Religion the Republic established the Presidency of Religious affairs, and the Chief of General Staff would become part of the Ministry of Defence. This law prevented the clergy and the soldiers from having a say in the government. Therefore, the first step towards a secular republic was taken.

3.3 Acceptance of the New Turkish Alphabet

After the great victory, and the acceptance of the Republic by the Turkish Society, the cultural problems of the new state were to be handled one by one. Certainly, one of these

⁴²⁰ Uluğ Naşit Hakkı, *End of the Caliphate*, Istanbul 1975, pp. 158-161.

⁴²¹ Aytepe 2002, p. 23.

problems was changing or reforming the alphabet.⁴²² Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, these discussions have continued increasingly. Due to the difficulty of reading and writing in Arabic letters and therefore the low rate of literacy in the country, the debate about the replacement of this alphabet has led to the argument of “*should we or should we not accept and change to the Latin alphabet*”. Even the newspapers have tried to create public opinion by doing questionnaires on this issue. In 1924, it was Sukru Saracoglu, member of the parliament from Izmir, who brought the inadequacy of the Arabic alphabet to the agenda for the first time in the parliament. But according to Atatürk, these ideas need more time to mature.⁴²³ This proposal by Saracoglu was supported by the public however it caused great criticism in the parliament. Tanin newspaper writer Huseyin Cahit Yalcin published an article titled “*Path to Salvation*” in the newspaper on February 27, 1924. In this article, it was argued that the way to increase reading and writing in education could be achieved by the Latin alphabet. When these debates continued in Turkey, Turkish youth who were studying in Berlin formed an association called “*New Turkish Letters Association*” and published a magazine called the “*New Writing*”.⁴²⁴

Meanwhile, developments in the field of culture continued to follow. To establish a language union for the unity of education the Tevhid-i Tedrisat (Unity of Education) law was accepted on March 3, 1924 this started to point out the importance of the Latin alphabet. The 1925 calendar and international time-related regulations further increased the opinion that the alphabet could be changed. In 1926, a decision was made by the Council of Ministers and a working group consisting of language experts in the name of “*Language Council*” or “*Language Committee*” was established on the topic of language. This delegation would work on the preparation of the new Turkish alphabet. They would examine many alphabets in order to investigate, in particular, whether the Latin alphabet was appropriate for the Turkish language structure. Because the Latin alphabet is the most commonly used alphabet in the world.⁴²⁵

⁴²² Çelik Adem, *The Path Towards the Alphabet Revolution (1923-1928)*, Master Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul 2009, p. 33.

⁴²³ Aydoğan Erdal, *History of Ataturks Reforms and Principles*, Erzurum 2011, p. 369

⁴²⁴ Ural Ömer& Müjdecı Mustafa, A.İ.İ.T., Ankara 2010, p. 440

⁴²⁵ Aydoğan 2011, p. 369.

The first important step of the cultural revolution was the introduction of Turkish letters instead of Arabic letters. It was seen as a very brave and a remarkable development. Acceptance of the Latin-based Turkish alphabet, which was accepted under the leadership of Atatürk, was a turning point for the Republic of Turkey. Prior to the adoption of the Latin alphabet, only the intellectual class had a high literacy rate but, with the alphabet revolution, every part of the society became literate. The Turkish nation accelerated the process of modernisation through this revolutionary movement. With this revolution which aimed for a contemporary and modern target, Turkish people could easily learn to read and write, and could easily write their daily conversations. People's Schools, People's Houses and People's Rooms were established and literacy opportunities were offered to those who could not read or write.

The Latin alphabet reform, which was officially accepted on November 1, 1928, solved the issue of the alphabet and ended these arguments which have been on going since the constitutional monarchy during the end of the Ottoman Empire and the start of the Republic. With the adoption of the Latin alphabet, the printing process became easier and the effect of religion on the alphabet was removed and the state became a secular country.

3.4 Establishing Universities

After the announcement of the Republic and the revolutions in the field of education, fundamental changes were happening in all stages of education. Firstly, the alphabet was changed from Arabic to Latin, and an educational campaign covering every segment of the society began. As a natural consequence of these developments, the developments that have emerged in the field of education also had an impact on higher education

The first institution founded in 1846 for higher education was Darulfunun. In this institution, education continued from 1863 to 1933 through various stages. To prepare a report for the reform of this institution due to its failure, Prof. Albert Malche was brought from Switzerland. As a result of the report, Darulfunun was shut down on July 31, 1933⁴²⁶ and Istanbul University was opened on 1 August 1933. Istanbul University had tried to establish a modern higher education structure. Atatürk's university reforms were usually done

⁴²⁶ Namal Yücel & Karakök Tunay, *Atatürk and University Reform (1933)*, Bulent Ecevit University Higher Education and Science Journal Volume I Issue 1, Zonguldak 2011, p. 27.

according to the model of the German University. In these years, many valued scientists who escaped from the persecution of the fascist German dictator Hitler had begun to take refuge in Turkey, which they regard as the freest country. In order not to lose these great scholars to other countries and to keep increasing the scholars coming in, the environment was prepared so that they can stay and work for the Turkish universities. Jewish scientists that arrived in Turkey have made great contributions to the establishment of universities based on scientific and contemporary democratic principles.⁴²⁷ Minister of National Education, Resit Galip, during the agreement signed with the immigrant scientists on July 6, 1933 clearly set out the contributions of 1933 University reform to modernisation and scholarship in the universities.⁴²⁸

When we took Istanbul 500 years ago, leading Byzantine scientists and artists left the country. Many of them went to Italy and started the Renaissance there. Now it is time for Europe to give back what it took. We hope that you will bring your innovations to our country, that you will keep us up to date with contemporary principles and show the way to progress and modern science to the new generations, we thank you as a nation and offer our respects.

Instead of the title 'muderris' professors and stages were accepted. Instead of Madrasa, Faculty was used. For every academic stage there were particular rules for the dress code; girls and boys were no longer separated, centre of the state Ankara would have its own University with its own faculties and courses. Faculty of Language and History-Geography was established. To that date only foreign and schools for minorities would have taught primary education. With the law that passed on March 23, 1931 Turkish children could get primary education in Turkish schools. Turkish lessons were then placed in schools for minorities and unity in culture was established in the country.

The 1933 University Reform has a distinct place in the history of universities. The University Reform, which is the first and most radical work in the university field, has been much more important in that it pioneered the changes in the Republic in the following years, and perhaps influenced the formation of other laws. On the other hand, unlike the other new changes, this

⁴²⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p. 33.

was the first act which contained the term reform. Another important point is that the changes were made with the observations made by a foreign academic. Lastly, with all this knowledge, the foundation of the higher education structure was established and institutions and universities such as the Istanbul University (1933), Higher Agricultural Institute (1933), Istanbul Technical University (1944) and Ankara University (1946), were opened in the first years of the Republic.

3.5 The Surname Law

In accordance with the founding principles of the newly established country, the legal arrangements required to solve the problems of the old practices and to build the modern society were required to be dealt with as soon as possible, therefore this legal arrangement was required.

Mustafa Kemal and his friends, who embraced the ideal of establishing a new, contemporary state after the National Struggle, entered into the struggle for the construction of the new society they desire. One of the efforts to lift the barriers in front of the goal of establishing a classless, non-privileged but contemporary society has made it obligatory to use surnames. The use of nicknames, titles etc. and similarly old forms of surnames created inequalities and caused problems for the state which embraced western modernisation. For this reason, the government immediately took action and made a decision. As many researchers have stated today, Turkish modernisation is far from being a process that has roots in the public. Moreover, it has been experienced in the form of the acceptance and enforcement of the decisions taken by the government. Making the use of the surname mandatory is also a decision that should be read like this. This “*political communication*” process, which started before the Surname Law, accelerated after this law was accepted in the parliament, this was shaped by the orders of the government and the society was changed dramatically.⁴²⁹ It is not possible to ignore the role of the media in this communication process. Media of course with directives from the government, had great interest in this subject, it kept the subject in the headlines and managed to increase awareness of the issue.⁴³⁰ On June 21, 1934, after the

⁴²⁹ Avşar Zakir&Emre Kaya Ayşe Elif, *Populism Practices in Republican Turkey: Surname Law as an Example*, Turkish Studies International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/5 Spring 2013, p. 87.

⁴³⁰ Sezer Ayten, *The First Reforms In the Society, Atatürk and History of Republican Turkey*, Political Bookstore, Ankara 2003, p. 33.

law was passed in the parliament, the eyes were turned to the public. The newspapers of that time, gave great importance to the surname law and kept the topic alive so that the people could get their surname as soon as possible.⁴³¹ In this we witness that the media takes one step further from the functions of notifying or informing, and does the functions of publicity creation, socialisation and education. Nowadays, when it is considered that the use of surname is well established and therefore the official processes are operating very smoothly, it is acceptable that this political communication campaign has achieved its goal.

3.6 Giving Women the right to vote and to be elected

Since the early years of the Republic, the Turkish Women's Union have taken the agenda of women's political rights from time to time, but there has not been a large scale struggle given by women for equal voting rights as in Western Europe in Turkey.⁴³² These rights were granted to women in order to fulfil Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's goals of modernisation and democratisation.⁴³³ Atatürk brought all the rights of Turkish women to the levels of women of civilized nations and even left some behind. 22 Turkish women obtained the same rights as Men before any women in a Muslim country, or from those in France or Italy.⁴³⁴ The recognition of the right to elect and be elected as a deputy to the Turkish woman on 5 December 1934 was welcomed with joy and satisfaction among women. It was indicated that the great support by the Turkish women in the War of Independence, in the front lines and behind the front lines meant that they already deserved these rights and that they will represent themselves as best as they can. Atatürk's recognition of these rights to Turkish women before many European countries has been a source of pride. Because many years after Turkey, France 1944, Italy 1945, Belgium 1948, Greece 1952⁴³⁵ gave the same rights to women.

⁴³¹ Avşar & Emre Kaya 2013, p. 80.

⁴³² Özdemir Nuray, *The Celebrations After The Turkish Women Were Given The Right To Vote And Be Elected*, History Studies Volume 6 – Issue, 5 September 2014, p. 179.

⁴³³ Kartal Cemile Burcu, *The Legacy of the Second Constitution To The Republic: Acceptable Women*, I.U Faculty of Political Science Journal, No:38, Marh 2008, p.227.

⁴³⁴ Caporal Bernard, *Turkish Women After Kemalism*, Turkey IS Bank Publications, Ankara 1982, p.706.

⁴³⁵ Özdemir 2014, p. 191.

3.7 Other Revolutions

Atatürk's greatest aim was to bring the Turkish society, which has remained behind in every sense, to the level of contemporary civilisations. He was aware of the necessity of achieving social and cultural transformation and to have a sustainable economic development. Literacy rates were extremely low, libraries did not exist, schools were insufficient, no intellectual accumulation existed, art culture was absent or was only a regional thing, hunger and misery was everywhere, transportation and communication methods were not available, no connection occurred with the outside world, most of the population was living in rural areas, to bring this society to the levels of a modern society and to establish a nation-state which is the key requirement for achieving this goal, was the biggest aim of Mustafa Kemal. In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to carry out a series of reforms. These are listed below in titles.

- Removal of the Sharia Courts, Uniting the Courts (April 8, 1924)
- Hat Revolution (August 23, 1925)
- Acceptance of the International Calendar and Time (December 26, 1926)
- Making Turkish Compulsory in Economic Institutions (April 10, 1926)
- Acceptance of the Cabbotage Law (July 1, 1926)
- Promoting the Industry Law (May 28, 1927)
- Women's Participation in Municipal Elections (December 23, 1930)
- Acceptance of the International Measurements (metre and kilogram method) (March 26, 1931)
- Establishment of the Society to Study Turkish History (Institution of Turkish History) and a Society to Study Turkish Language (Institution of Turkish Language)
- Changing Weekend Day from Friday to Sunday (June 1, 1935)
- Inserting the Principle of Secularism in the Constitution (February 5, 1937)

CHAPTER IV

GERMAN INFLUENCE ON MODERN TURKEY

1 Life of German Emigrants in Turkey

1.1 Political Situation in Germany

With the rise of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party), and its party leader Adolf Hitler, the Weimar Republic transformed from a democracy to a dictatorship in 1933. Extreme anti-Semitism, as well as rejection of democracy and Marxism characterized the ideology of the party.

On January 30, 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor.⁴³⁶ In 1934, after the death of former president Paul von Hindenburg⁴³⁷, Hitler merged the position of the president and the chancellor in his person. With this new official position, he had unrestricted power, which he exerted immediately. In Germany began, a hard nationalist autocracy of a man, who described himself as the leader of the German people.

1.2 The Implementation of the Plans

With the proclamation of the sovereign Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made the first step to modernise the country. Prior to the proclamation of the autonomy, he abolished the sultanate on November 1, 1922 and the caliphate on March 3, 1924, because he sought a secular form of government like the French pattern. But the head of state did not only leave it to that, he intended to redevelop the existing system. All old had to be replaced by the new. Atatürk proceeded systematically and introduced the new laws one by one. In 1924, Turkey abolished the Ottoman Ministry for the Implementation of Islamic Law⁴³⁸ and the religious

⁴³⁶ Antweiler Anton, *Hitler*, published by Heroldsberg, Glock und Lutz Verlag, Nürnberg 1978, p. 198; In 1935, the Nuremberg Laws were enacted: 1. Blood Protection Law, 2. Reich Citizenship Law; in both laws prohibitions were given that destroyed primarily the lives of Jews in Germany.

⁴³⁷ Born on October 2, 1847 in Posen (now Poznan, Poland), died on August 2, 1934 in Neudeck / Marienwerder / Poland; was active in military and politics.

⁴³⁸ in Turkish: "Şeriye ve Evkaf Bakanlıkları".

courts⁴³⁹. In 1925, the switch was made from the Islamic calendar to the Gregorian calendar. The same year, the so called “*Hat Law*” was enacted, which prohibited everyone, except of clergy, the wearing of turbans or fez. In 1926, the Swiss Civil Code superseded the Islamic legal norms⁴⁴⁰. In 1928⁴⁴¹, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic one, which was used until then⁴⁴². In addition, a language reform began, in which words, coming from Arabic or Persian, were turkized⁴⁴³. With these measures Atatürk prepared the Turkish people for a modern future.

In Germany, laws were passed in favour of the NSDAP, but which have been fatal for many people. As I already mentioned, Hitler did not want democracy, but the sole reign over Germany. Therefore, its pillars, as freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of letter, had to be banished from Hitler’s Empire. Coming from the same idea, Hitler announced the “*Regulation of the President for the Protection of People and State*”. This decree of February 28, 1933 repealed the civil rights of parliamentarism and formed the basis for arbitrary arrests and killings of many contemporaries. Immediately after this proclamation, on April 7, 1933 the “*Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service*” followed. With this provision, the Nazis caused the expulsion of all officers from the civil service, who stood with their political beliefs against the dictatorship. But especially Jewish scientist, teachers and professors have been affected.

This course of action was determined as follows:

§ 2 a:⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁹ in Turkish: “*Şeriye Mahkemeleri*”.

⁴⁴⁰ Keskin Hakkı, *Die Türkei. Vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat-Werdegang einer Unterentwicklung*, Verlag Olle & Wolter, Berlin 1981, p. 80.

⁴⁴¹ “There was a “*Language Commission*” (*Dil heyeti*) that should deal with the Turkish language, related scientific issues and develop a dictionary in 1926. This commission was however disbanded after a short time.”; Steuerwald 1963, p. 81.

⁴⁴² On May 20, 1928 in Ankara the “*Language Committee*” was established on the order of Mustafa Kemal. Before all, it aimed to develop a Turkish Latin script. On just two months the committee designed the so-called “*Türk alfabesi*” Latin script. The law on the adoption and implementation of the Turkish alphabet was enacted on November 3, 1928.; Laut 2000, p. 25.

⁴⁴³ Lewis 1999, p. 33.

⁴⁴⁴ Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. April 7, 1933, Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, Part I, no. 34, p. 17; Şen F.&Halm D., *Exil unter Halbmond und Stern. Herbert Scurlas Bericht über die Tätigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer in der Türkei während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (Exile under crescent and*

- (1) Civil servants belonging to the Communist Party or Communist auxiliary or substitute organisations or have otherwise operated in communist sense, have to be dismissed from the service. The dismissal of those officials may be dispensed for those, who accompanied with a party or association, which backed the government of the national uprising and who has proven himself in the national movement in an outstanding way.
- (2) Civil servants, who are active in a Marxist (communist and social democratic) way, need to be dismissed, as well.

§ 3:⁴⁴⁵

- (1) Officers who are not of Aryan descent (§§ 8) are to retire; involved honorary officials need to be dismissed.

§ 4:⁴⁴⁶

Officials, who after their previous activities do not ensure that they stand for the national government at any time, can be dismissed from the service.

With the “*Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service*” Hitler was able to identify his opponents and to get them out of his way. The effected scientists, lecturers, teachers and professors were now out of work.

On the Turkish side, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had redeveloped the social system by introducing new laws. To implement his ideas, he acted quickly and radically. One of his reforms, which had a decisive role in the reorganisation of the society, was the education reform. At the time there was the Darülfünun⁴⁴⁷, which was a college built during the Ottoman period. With the law on April 21, 1924 the “*House of Science*” was granted academic independence. In addition, it was declared a legal person. The self-administration

star. Herbert Scurla's report on the activities of German university teachers in Turkey during the period of National Socialism), Klartext, Essen 2007, p. 211.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Founded in 1900 during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, consisted of four faculties: mathematics, theology, philosophy and science.

of the Darülfünun was thus reiterated by law what prevented the interference of the state in the principles of the university. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not want that the university remained the same during his reorganisation efforts of the society, but that it would be also renewed and that it would develop to a modern educational institution following Western-patterns. Under this considerations Atatürk could not retain the autonomy of the Darülfünun. All educational institutions should be under governmental control to realise the reforms and modernisation measures without any delay.

Since Kemalist Turkey wished to have a rapid Westernisation of the existing university, it was sure that the facility of the Ottoman period, the Darülfünun, needed to be reorganised immediately. With the approval of the Turkish parliament, this need led to the invitation of Geneva professor of Education, Albert Malche⁴⁴⁸. He came to Istanbul in 1932. The pedagogue should check the Darülfünun, reveal the existing shortcomings and prepare an evaluation for the government. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wanted a quick solution for the Darülfünun problem. It should be under his control, as an autonomous university did not fit into the concept of Kemalist aspirations. In professor Malche's criticism the independence of the Darülfünun was precisely mentioned. He held the opinion that such independence would only lead to the isolation of the Darülfünun from society and government. Hence, Atatürk's idea to bind the university to a ministry was an inevitable step. Albert Malche also referred to the professors, who had to do a side job because of their low wages. The teaching staff should focus solely on their work at the university, so that the level of lectures would not get lower. This secondary activity of the professors might have been a reason for the necessary but non-existent scientific publications in Turkish. Most likely, they lacked the necessary time for these. The Swiss pedagogue referred not only to the teaching staff, but also to the students, whose language skills were not sufficient in his opinion. But in this point he excluded the former pupils of the Galata-Saray-Lyzeum⁴⁴⁹, as well as the German⁴⁵⁰ and

⁴⁴⁸ Malche was born on February 22, 1876 in Geneva and died on December 29, 1956 in Geneva. He was 1912-1930 rector of the Geneva primary schools and 1912-1951 Associate Professor of Education at the University of Geneva.; Barrelet 2009.

⁴⁴⁹ Is an elite school in Istanbul, which was opened after French model on September 1, 1868, the first names of the school were: "Mekteb-i Sultani", "Galata Sarayi Mekteb-i Sultanisi", "Umumi-i Idadi"; in 1924 the school was renamed "Galatasaray Lisesi".

⁴⁵⁰ e.g.: "Özel Alman Lisesi" was found in May 1868 for the children of the German tradesmen, artists, engineers and diplomats living in Istanbul; it is a private High School in Istanbul's district Beyoğlu.

English⁴⁵¹ schools, which he called the elite of the university. In order to solve this problem, he proposed the establishment of a mandatory foreign language examination. This should be a prerequisite for further studies. He even argued that students should learn the respective foreign language from a native speaker. Another critique was the teaching procedure. He considered the teaching method as dusty, out-dated and not adequate. Students would be guided to memorise only. The mission of the university is to encourage people to have free scientific thinking and not to educate them to under-age adults. Albert Malche also criticised the training of university teachers. The Turkish university itself was not able to train their future teachers and therefore sent them abroad. Furthermore, he questioned the inconvenient location of the medical faculty in Haydarpaşa⁴⁵², on the Asian side of Istanbul. He proposed to relocate it to the centre of Istanbul. Lastly, Malche criticised the time overlaps of lectures at the faculty of law⁴⁵³, the Mülkiye⁴⁵⁴ and the higher trade schools⁴⁵⁵. Instead of these lectures, training courses, conferences or archaeological excursions should be carried out. In his view, the university should also provide national and adult education.

After this report the Turkish government agreed that the Darülfünun should be closed and a new university would be opened. The simultaneous changes in Turkey and Germany led their paths cross. While there was no place for Jewish scientists in the German Empire, Kemalist Turkey needed qualified Western university teachers, which should bring the higher education institutions in the country up to date.

⁴⁵¹ e.g.: “English High School for Boys”, is one of the oldest schools in Turkey; was founded in 1905 by the British citizens living in Turkey; they wanted to offer their children a good school education; today it is called “Nişantaşı Anadolu Lisesi”.

⁴⁵² “Tıphane” was found on March 14, 1827; in 1839 Tıphane was renamed “Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şâhâne”; 1867 a second medical school called “Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye” was developed; 1909 both schools merged in Haydarpaşa to “Haydarpaşa Tıp Fakültesi”.

⁴⁵³ Was found in June 17, 1880 under the name “Mekteb-i Hukuk”; in 1900 it became a faculty of the Darülfünun; after the closure of the Darülfünun it received the name “İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi”.

⁴⁵⁴ Was found in 1859 in Istanbul as a vocational school and was called “Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şahane”; 1918 the school was renamed “Mekteb-i Mülkiye” and was bonded to the Ministry of Education; in 1936/37 the school was relocated to Ankara and renamed “Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu”; today it is a faculty of the Ankara University.

⁴⁵⁵ The school was found on January 16, 1883 under the name “Hamidiye Ticaret Mekteb-i Alisi”; in 1893 it was closed down for unknown reasons and 1894 reopened in Istanbul’s district Beyazıt; 1924 it received the name “Yüksek İktisat ve Ticaret Mektebi”; since 1982 it is part of the Marmara Üniversitesi and is called “İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi”.

1.2.1 The Displaced

The professors, lecturers and scientists, who were no longer tolerated in the anti-Semitic German Empire, had lost their jobs and homes – their very existence. They found themselves constrained to leave their homeland. But where should they go? This uncertainty concerned the affected people in addition. While the displaced people of the Nazi regime had to face these problems, in Zurich an academic group came together to prepare a new life. To be able to live normally again these academics needed a foundation for existence, like any other human being: employment and housing. They planned to purchase this by mutual support of fellow sufferers. Not only employment and housing should be acquired again, also their dignity, pride and reputation should be continued. Big distress had promoted them to form this community. It was not about trying to find places that would help them to secure their incomes, but more about preventing the degradation of the spirit, which helped them to develop their skills⁴⁵⁶. At the end of March 1933 also the physician Philipp Schwartz joined this community. Initially, a counselling centre for German scientists developed under his leadership. Generous Swiss friends supported this counselling office, both spatially and financially. With their assistance Schwartz's counselling centre was able to grow. The expansion was followed by a name change and from now on the group of displaced academics called itself "*Emergency Association of German Scientists Abroad*" (Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland). Those, who were victims of anti-Semitism and who looked for help, quickly and knew this organisation⁴⁵⁷.

1.2.2 The West as a Role Model

The Turkish Republic had taken professor Albert Malche's⁴⁵⁸ critical review to heart. Without wasting much time, in August 1933 the law for the closing of the Darülfünun was adopted. The second important aspect of the law was the establishment of a university in Istanbul, which should be called *İstanbul Üniversitesi*. Just like all the other reforms of

⁴⁵⁶ Schwartz Philipp, *Notgemeinschaft. Zur Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933 in die Türkei*, Metropolis, Marburg 1995, p. 67.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁵⁸ Levi Avner, *Jews in the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler)*, İletişim Publications, İstanbul 1996, p. 98.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this reorganisation was carried out immediately and radically. Atatürk himself argued:

As in all our projects, also in education and the establishment of the university we are absolutely determined to go ahead with radical measures (radikal tedbirler).⁴⁵⁹

The former Ottoman dominated Darülfünun, including a large part of its workforce, was closed. The University of Istanbul should be a complete new foundation and should have nothing in common with the old college. The closure followed immediately the ceremonial opening of the new educational institution, which should be organized along Western lines, on Beyazıt Square on August 1, 1933.

At the opening of the new university the former Minister of Education Dr. Reşit Galip⁴⁶⁰ gave a speech. In this he criticised the Darülfünun for its quite watching while immense changes have taken place in the Turkish Republic.

In the country great political and social changes had taken place. The university (Dar-ül-fünun) remained in the role of the neutral observer. In the economic sphere, fundamental events have occurred. The Dar-ül-fünun seemed to know nothing of it. In the legal system, radical changes have taken place. The Dar-ül-fünun was content to simply add the new laws in the teaching program. The script reform had taken place, the movement of the language purification had begun; the Dar-ül-fünun did not care about it at all. In the sense of a national movement a new conception of history connected the whole country. In order to arouse interest in the Dar-ül-fünun, it was necessary to wait three years and to strive. The Istanbul Darülfünun did finally come to a standstill, has cut itself off

⁴⁵⁹ Widmann, Horst, *Exil und Bildungshilfe. Die Deutschsprachige Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933*, Bern/Frankfurt a. M., Frankfurt 1973, p. 43.

⁴⁶⁰ Is one of the three most important Ministers for Education during the foundation of the republic. He was born in 1892 in Rhodes and deputy of Aydın in 1925. From September 19, 1932 to July 12, 1933 he was Minister of Education. The reorganisation of Istanbul University was his most important and also last work. He died on March 5, 1934.

*and has completely withdrawn into a medieval isolation from the outside world.*⁴⁶¹

This speech showed that the Darülfünun was not in line with the Kemalist government and that it could not persist under these circumstances.

1.2.3 The “Uselessness” of the New System

As already mentioned, the Turkish state did not only close the Darülfünun, but also terminated a large number of professors⁴⁶². The Darülfünun-professors, who did not promote the radical measures and reforms of Atatürk, were terminated without any alternative. This happened, although they had proven their services for many years. It is hard to say, if the integration of the suspended professors into the new college would have been completely ruled out. There are different opinions about the suspended teachers of the Darülfünun. On the one hand, one might have thought, for instance that the suspended professors have been valuable and hard working sons of the country. They were deprived of the possibility of greater productivity, as well as their work opportunity⁴⁶³. On the other hand, Fritz Neumark, himself a migrant in Turkey, suggest that the dismissal of the professors was wisely.

*To the old university belonged alongside a range well qualified Turkish scholars also many professors and other teachers who could hardly or no longer fulfil their academic obligations due to poor, coming from the Ottoman period customs, but appeared only once a month to pick up their very modest salary. In order not to give these and other innovation opponents time for long and open resistance, one decided to reform the University of Istanbul according to the ideas of the government (...).*⁴⁶⁴

From these views it can be assumed that Atatürk wanted to eliminate those, who did not support the Kemalist endeavour and therefore constituted a potential danger to the government. From the perspective of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this selection of professors

⁴⁶¹ Widmann 1973, p. 42.

⁴⁶² Of 240 university teachers, 157 have been dismissed; *ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴⁶⁴ Neumark 1969, p. 16.

was part of a logical sequence of actions. In a short time, the Darülfünun-professors became useless for Kemalist Turkey.

1.2.4 The Crossroads

With the help of their organisation, the German scientists hoped to find a new field of activity. All of them have been highly qualified scientists, professors and university teachers without a perspective.

The university of Istanbul was founded full of hopes. Although the desire to match the Turkish higher education system with European university standards existed in theory, in practice there was a lack of teaching staff that would help to achieve this goal. The Geneva professor noted in his report the importance of the teaching staff. For him, it made little sense to introduce Western teaching methods and departments, but to continue with the old staff. New energetic professors, who presented different nations, needed to be employed. This diversity of nations at the University of Istanbul would break the political and cultural barriers and allow students a cosmopolitan outlook. The Turkish government wanted to fulfil the requirements of the given proposal and thus had to create a target oriented constellation of professors. The new staff of the university was composed of teachers from the former Darülfünun, of Turkish graduates from European universities and foreign professors. With this new staff, the state hoped for rapid adaptation to the European universities. The first two groups of staff have been available for the state. But the final composition caused concerns. Where should they find professors who would be dedicated to this reform experiment and play an active role?

The head of the *“Emergency Association of German Scientists Abroad”* - Philip Schwartz - had heard of the educational reforms in Turkey and invited Geneva pedagogue Albert Malche. He contacted Malche immediately and got information about the circumstances in Istanbul. With the *“Notgemeinschaft”* Philipp Schwartz could transfer professors to the University in Istanbul. Turkey needed new qualified university teachers, while the organisation was looking for new fields of activity for the people asking for help. This brought the ways of the victims of the Nazi-regime and the reforms of the education system in Turkey together.

On July 5, 1933 the physician Philipp Schwartz arrived in Istanbul. Since the meeting with the Turkish government was held in Ankara, he was picked up from the train station by a Turkish officer, informed about the situation of the university and forwarded to Ankara. The following day, the meeting in Ankara was opened under the leadership of former Minister of Education Dr. Reşid Galib. Professor Malche also attended the meeting, which was held in French⁴⁶⁵. There was a constant giving and taking on both sides, just like a supply and demand game. “*Can you suggest us a professor of (...)?*” – this questions was asked 30 times during the afternoon and answered under increasing stress⁴⁶⁶. After the wages and the general principles of the employment contracts of the mediated professors were also discussed and negotiated, the signature of the Minister and Professor Schwartz followed.

This meeting allowed Schwartz to make plans for the future. His organisation had fulfilled its task. New life, new hopes and new homes for the undesirables of fascist Germany were thus realised.

*At this time, I knew that the ignominious expulsion from Germany received a inventive sense. I discovered a wonderful country, untouched by Western Pest! Formation and development of the “Notgemeinschaft” was now justified: yes, it has proved to be historical necessity.*⁴⁶⁷

Both sides were satisfied now, both benefitted from each other. After the meeting, Schwartz travelled back to Switzerland the same day. The candidates proposed to Turkey got informed. The historical coincidence of events in two different countries has caused this crossroads. The Turkish government found its foreign professors for its university reform. In turn, the in Germany undesirable university teachers could pursue their career as teachers of their fields and could live a normal life again. At Schwartz’s second stay, from July 27 to the end of August 1933, the agreement led to the fixation of the treaties and the discussion about important procedures for the reform project Istanbul Üniversitesi. The final signing of contracts took place on October 4, 1933 with the Turkish ambassador Hüseyin Bey Cemal in Geneva.

⁴⁶⁵ Schwartz 1995, pp. 45.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

1.3 The Rights and Obligations of the Professors in Turkey

1.3.1 Obligations

After both sides had agreed to cooperate both the professional demands of the emigrant professors, as well as their rights have been inserted in the employment contracts. Turkey made only temporary contracts that were either concluded for two, three, or five years⁴⁶⁸. For a contract extension one needed a certificate from the respective dean⁴⁶⁹. This confirmation should express that the work of the professor in question constituted a proven asset to Turkey⁴⁷⁰. By signing the contracts, the emigrant professors committed primarily to learn the national language within three or five years. Since the process of learning a language is unique and cannot be generalised, the Turkish government was indulging in this point. Another claim was the prohibition of an ancillary activity for the university teachers. Their performance potential should not be weakened by other work, but utilised only for the University of Istanbul. The emigrant professors agreed also to develop scripts and manuals for their students. However, these should be written in Turkish and thus the cooperation with a translator was prescribed. From the university professors also the commitment in training seminars and public education was requested. The other requirement of Kemalist Turkey was the preparation of a report by the professors. If commissioned by the government, each individual teacher should hand in a review of his own compartment.

1.3.2 Rights

In the negotiations with the Turkish state, the physician Philipp Schwartz did not forget about the rights or claims of the professors conveyed through his organisation. Just like any other work, also the activity of the emigrant professor at the University of Istanbul had its price. Their pretty high income differed strongly from the salaries of their Turkish colleagues. They should earn between 500 and 700 Turkish Lira (in 1933 1 Lira was equivalent to 2 Reichsmark), while the Turkish professors would get a maximum amount of 150 Turkish

⁴⁶⁸ Dietrich, Anne, *Deutschsein in Istanbul. Nationalisierung und Orientierung in der deutschsprachigen Community von 1843 bis 1956*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen 1998, p. 265.

⁴⁶⁹ Widmann 1973, p. 74.

⁴⁷⁰ To draw up the certificates, for example, in the early years medical index cards had to be set up, which contained, among other things, a specified overview of the activities of foreign professors (number of lectures, publications, lectures, etc.); *ibid*, p. 74.

Lira⁴⁷¹. The wages of exile professors showed also enormous difference compared to the remuneration of officials in the upper civil service. The officials received minimum 80 Turkish Lira and maximum 300 Turkish Lira for their work⁴⁷². This huge difference in salary was ascribed to the contractual point, which prohibited subsidiary employment of the emigrant professors⁴⁷³. Another reason has been the different standards of living of emigrant and Turkish university teachers. The emigrated professors sought to maintain their usual standards and lived thus more expensively than their Turkish counterparts⁴⁷⁴.

The conveyed professors had a contractual right to travel expenses⁴⁷⁵. The Turkish government has promised to bear the costs for the relocation to Istanbul. The university teachers also benefited from protection in case of illness.

Furthermore, the emigrant professors received the permission to employ foreign staff. These immigrated as assistants or lecturers with their superiors to Istanbul and were called *Araştırma Asistanı*⁴⁷⁶ (research assistant).

1.4 Internal Tension in Turkey

1.4.1 Suspicions of Former Darülfünun Professors

After all points of the work contracts have been negotiated and agreed on, the Turkish government expected their compliance and fulfilment. To meet these requirements, without delay the exile professors travelled with their families to Turkey. Their start in the new life marked the end of the educational activity of the former Darülfünun professors. They had to make room for the emigrant professors. From the given facts, the Darülfünun teachers could not have been sympathisers of the exiled professors. For the dismissed professors the exiled scientists were those who had taken away their work. Therefore, they felt envy and resentment for their foreign counterparts. They tried by all means to make their life in Turkey

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., p. 217.

⁴⁷² Ibid, p. 230.

⁴⁷³ Stauth, Georg & Birtek, Faruk, *Istanbul. Geistige Wanderung - aus der Welt in Scherben*, Transcript, Bielefeld 2007, p. 166.

⁴⁷⁴ Widmann 1973, p. 230.

⁴⁷⁵ Stauth & Birtek 2007, p. 165.

⁴⁷⁶ Widmann 1973, p. 75.

more difficult. Their suspicion and hate let them to initiate press campaigns against the exiled professors. The foreign university teachers felt threatened and misunderstood, because they had become the target of the dismissed Darülfünun professors, who did not agree with the innovation activities of the state. In their eyes, the dismissal was not justified.

1.4.2 Objectors of the University Reform

The Turkish government refused to be deterred by the unrest in some parts of the population and started in early November the first semester⁴⁷⁷. The new university was set up after the University Organisation Act⁴⁷⁸ of May 29, 1934⁴⁷⁹. The building of the new university was located between the Beyazıt Square and Suleymaniye Mosque. The former Ministry of War served from now on as the new educational institution. The above mentioned University Organisation Act specified, on the one hand the payment of the teaching staff, and on the other hand the division of the University of Istanbul into four faculties⁴⁸⁰. The faculties were: the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Law. The teaching staff was composed as follows:

	Turks	Foreigners
Ordinaries	27	38
Professors	18	4
Lecturer	93	-
	138	42 ⁴⁸¹

The former Minister of Education Hikmet Bayur⁴⁸² held a speech on the opening day in the main building of the Istanbul University. After his speech he introduced all new professors, both Turkish and emigrant scientists. However, the work on which the exile professors had agreed on constituted a great challenge. In makeshift classrooms, often on tables, on a box,

⁴⁷⁷ Winter term 1933/34.

⁴⁷⁸ in Turkish: “Üniversite teşkilat kanunu”.

⁴⁷⁹ Widmann 1973, p. 64.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., p. 68.

⁴⁸² Born in 1891, died in 1980 in Istanbul; actually Professor of History of the Turkish War of Independence; was Minister of Education from 1933- 1934; in 1942 retired.

standing or sitting, we began to teach. A Turkish employee translated sentence by sentence⁴⁸³. But the equipment of the individual faculties was not the only difficulty they had to overcome and where they had to show their tireless commitment.

The exile professors entered a country, which faced enormous changes. Turkey wanted to modernise and renew itself as quickly as possible in order to meet the Western patterns. Of course, this daring venture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not accepted with great enthusiasm in all parts of the population. As in every country there were people who were for or against the policy of the government. Especially in the field of education the emigrant university teachers faced these two groups. On the one side were the supporters of Atatürk, for which these measures had a high priority. On the other side, were the Darülfünun professors who were the enemies of these changes. The rejection or acceptance of the Westernisation of the education system pointed to two different political orientations. The reform-minded professors encouraged Atatürk in his projects and campaigned for a secular Turkish Republic. The reorganisation of the whole system was a must for them. The opponents of the new feature have been so deeply rooted in the old Ottoman-Islamic university system, that they did not want to or were not able to see the need for such reforms. A Westernisation of Turkey did not fit into their own concept of state. Exactly with these teachers, who also organized the above-mentioned press-campaigns, the exile professors ran into problems and great opposition. But in addition to these professors full of resentment, there have been some who appreciated the work of the emigrant professors. Among others, there was the mathematician Kerim Erim, the director of the psychiatry Bakırköy⁴⁸⁴ Mazhar Osman or the director of the therapeutic hospital and the pharmacological institute Akil Muktar⁴⁸⁵. They welcomed the foreign colleagues and supported Atatürk's efforts regarding the university reform. The exile professors also received support from students who saw a high value in their teaching. In addition, the university teachers found very hospitable people who welcomed their stay in Turkey. Primarily the hospital directors encouraged this positive attitude. Among many doctors, three have been praised particularly due to their medical and operational activities: Professor Rudolf Nissen (Surgery), Wilhelm Liepmann

⁴⁸³ Schwartz 1995, p. 70.

⁴⁸⁴ Founded in 1924; is the successor of the in 1873 established hospital "Toptaşı Bimārhanesi", which was closed down in 1927; today the hospital is called "Bakırköy Prof. Dr. Mazhar Osman Ruh Sağlığı ve Sinir Hastalıkları E. A. Hastanesi".

⁴⁸⁵ Schwartz 1995, pp. 80.

(Gynaecology) and Joseph Igersheim (Ophthalmology). “*These three clinicians have decided the fate of the University reform*”⁴⁸⁶. Although the clinics were equipped very poorly and they had to work under very difficult conditions, they tirelessly pursued their medical practice. The Turkish population recognized these efforts and showed them great affection. But the emigrant professors received the greatest support from the Turkish government itself. Due to the tense situation the project could have failed, if the government would not have demonstrated its trust into the emigrant professors. In a conversation with professor Schwartz the former Economy Minister Celal Bayar⁴⁸⁷ explicitly emphasised:

*Do not be misled by the newspapers and the talk of jealous professional colleagues. Our youth, the public opinion and the government are with you. We - and I also declare this on behalf of the President - appreciate your services and wish to deepen them.*⁴⁸⁸

The Turkish state was firmly determined to carry out this project and neither the prevailing internal unrest, nor the reform opponents could change its idea. Thanks to this determination the Istanbul Üniversitesi reform project was saved and enjoyed full support.

1.5 Forced Cooperation

With the performance of their duties, the exile professors have shown the country, which assured them shelter and field of activity, their gratitude. This was certainly not an easy task, but the only way they could be credible. They had to prove to the opponents of the reforms that they would not take a stand in questions about Turkish domestic policy, but only wanted to carry out their work as teachers.

1.5.1 Fears and Worries

With the forced cooperation between the Turkish and emigrated scientists and academics questions, problems and difficulties emerged. Both sides had different fears and worries. At the Turkish side, one had to face a very suspicious workforce. This had not much trust in the

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

⁴⁸⁷ Born on May 15, in Gemlik/Bursa, died on August 22, 1986 in Istanbul; was elected federal president on May 22, 1950; he was Turkey’s third federal president.

⁴⁸⁸ Schwartz 1995, p. 91.

foreign professors, who had more rights in their work. The exile scientists, in whose hands Turkey's future was – namely the education of the Turkish youth – could consider their work in the country only as the saving of their lives and professional existence. The fact that these foreigners were responsible for the education of the next generation, posed a threat to national consciousness in the eyes of the Turkish professors⁴⁸⁹. Did they really play the role of education assistants without any ulterior motives or to enrich themselves at the expense of the individual exile country? Logically, this unanswered questions and uncertainties led to problems and misunderstandings.

If one now considers the ambiguous position, was it also that complicated for the emigrant professors? Expelled from their homes, they came into a completely foreign country; took the role of saviours in times of need. The exile professors participated through their teaching and research activities in the university reform in Turkey. As a result, they became the target of angry Darülfünun professors. The initiated press campaigns and the envy of the former university teachers made their life in Turkey more complicated. This difficult starting situation caused worries. How could they offer their help, if they encountered indigenous resistance? Thus, the emigrant professors had to live and learn how to work with the suspicious attitude of their Turkish colleagues. Giving these sensations on both sides the cooperation was very difficult.

1.5.2 Feared Threat to Turkey's National Interest

Above, I already expressed the feared threat to Turkey's national consciousness on the part of the Turkish professors. The emigrant professors had to deal with another fear. They faced a number of people who had doped the hatred of foreigners of the old times, but with the founding of the republic internalised national consciousness.⁴⁹⁰ For this reason, both the Turkish modernists, as well as the Islamic traditionalists feared the violation of Turkey's national interests. However, if one makes himself fully aware of the political situation of the German emigrants, this fear can be considered unfounded. The appointed emigrant professors came to Istanbul as they were said to be politically undesirable in Germany. They had no home to which they could go back. With regard to their connection to their

⁴⁸⁹ Widmann 1973, p. 203.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

homeland, they have been in a conflicting situation what made it easier for the exile professors to facilitate scientific internationalism.

1.5.3 Problems of Cooperation

After the foreign professors exemplified the above-mentioned scientific internationalism in their fields, their Turkish colleagues began to trust them. The scientific internationalism is the precondition for good cooperation as it functions connecting⁴⁹¹. Therefore, the internationalist thinking and actions of emigrant professors was an important aspect regarding the successful cooperation. The exile scientists had no negative feelings for the country, which has called honourable to Istanbul and granted them a new field of activity, as well as asylum. The contrary was the case. For many scientists it was naturally to show their gratitude. But the circumstances made this task difficult. With the closure of the Darülfünun many Turkish professors, scholars and scientists got unemployed. They were dismissed from the public service, because of Atatürk's desire to modernise the country. What significance had this initial situation for the appointed professors? The exile professors, who were not allowed to work in their old homes, depended on the chairs, which the Darülfünun professors had to leave. Of course, the occupation of the chairs by emigrants led to great tensions between both sides. This was not the optimum condition for good cooperation. Despite everything one had to find ways and means to facilitate cooperation. Without a doubt, the tireless supports of the Turkish government contributed allot to ease these tensions. The help in such a critical situation emerged clearly as the foundation of successful cooperation. As I mentioned before, besides the help of the government, also Turkish students and the Turkish population are to mention. They met the university teachers with great sympathy and appreciate their work.

1.5.4 Which Requirements must be met for Good Cooperation?

With the Kemalist state the emigrant professors had a strong backing, but this was not enough. They had to earn the trust of their Turkish colleagues, so that the work for the reform experiment Istanbul Üniversitesi could proceed smoothly. Above I have already referred to the understandable fears of the Turkish workforce. In the first place they have closed a

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p. 204.

familiar era and have gone to an entirely new. Whether willingly or unwillingly, all new had to be absorbed and internalized. While they were trying to deal with these changes, scientists from a completely different society arrived. From now on, the newcomers should have a great say in many areas of their education system and they should work together with them.

Without government support, the failure of reform trial would have been inevitable. Ways and means needed to be found to facilitate the interaction. All the more the exile university teachers sought all to meet the asked demands. For many, learning the local language was the first of these expectations. It is an indispensable condition of successful working together. Many emigrated professors tried to learn the Turkish language as quickly as possible. This willingness was highly appreciated by the Turks⁴⁹². *“And as some professors started to teach in Turkish before the contractually required date, the students were well pleased with the zeal and effort in learning their language”*.⁴⁹³

At this point the learned language also had great impact on the university lecture. The Kemalist government had set a time frame of five years to learn Turkish. However, as the appointed professors began their university activities immediately, the government provided interpreters. These were unnecessary, after the professors themselves learned the language. For many of the emigrants was the translated lesson one of the reasons to learn the Turkish language. Many were not satisfied with the translation methods in academic instruction. The professors were forced to express themselves clearly and in short sentences. Thereby *“not every sentence, but every coherent thought”*⁴⁹⁴ was translated. Moreover, the knowledge of the translators was not enough for scientific lectures. To ensure proper and understandable lectures, the translators had to demonstrate specialist knowledge. Without the necessary expertise of the interpreters much information would be lost and the forwarding of knowledge was difficult. Thus, the students preferred lectured held in poor Turkish instead of translations. This was in fact free from false or defective interpretations⁴⁹⁵.

⁴⁹² Ibid., p. 207.

⁴⁹³ Nissen Rudolf, *Helle Blätter - dunkle Blätter. Erinnerungen eines Chirurgen*, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1969, pp. 200.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Neumark 1980, pp. 138.

The learning of the national language by the exile professors was a very important criterion of good cooperation. Without communication in a common language the both sides would never tie together. Both the Turkish workforce, as well as the exile scientists tried to understand each other. This new situation meant for everyone involved a big change. Therefore, the time had come to join forces.

The emigrant professors did not only learn the Turkish language, but tried to feel at home in Turkish mentality, culture and tradition. The more they dealt with the new environment, the closer they moved to the Turkish people. The population should not tolerate, but accept them. To purchase this acceptance, the scientists showed the country that gave them a new home that they knew and respected its customs⁴⁹⁶. This open-minded behaviour made not only their teaching at university, but also their daily lives easier. They were no longer disapproved strangers, but valued colleagues and even friends.

If one disregards the initial strains, it can be said that with united effort and mutual respect a successful cooperation between the two groups of professors came to the force.

1.6 The Fulfilment of the Requirements

The basic objectives of the Turkish government, specifically of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, included the modernisation of the university system in Turkey. With the above-mentioned cooperation, goal should be achieved in particular at the University of Istanbul. The University of Istanbul should be able to connect to the scientific level in Europe. This project was not just a dream of Kemalist Turkey, but could be implemented with the active support of the emigrated professors. Although they saw that the work would not be very easy, they unswervingly stood for their new jobs in their exile country. In the negotiated labour contract the host country had imposed duties, which were needed for the university reform.

1.6.1 Learning the Turkish Language

According to the contract, the language should be learned within the specified time, namely, three or five years. For the exile professors this obligation distinguished as the top priority. Without knowledge of the local language teaching was a daily torture for many. As I

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 228.

mentioned above, teaching with an interpreter was not an easy task. Both for the presenters, as well as for the students misunderstanding arose in the translated lectures.

You get a picture of it when I tell you that next to us at the lectern, an interpreter has translated sentence by sentence. I do not need to stress that with this transformation of energy a significant loss of power occurs.⁴⁹⁷

For a short time, this temporary solution was certainly an advantage. Instead of cancelling the lectures, they were held with the translator. But in the long run the lack of language skills would be an insuperable barrier between the students and the professors and thus blocked the learning outcomes. Therefore, such a method could not prevail. For many university teachers, this was the reason to learn the language quite quickly.

Some of the exile professors spoke the language fluently in a short time, just like Fritz Arndt, Ernst Eduard Hirsch, Fritz Neumark, Felix Haurowitz, Alfred Isaac, Andreas Bertalan Schwartz, Wolfgang Gleissberg, Clemens Bosch⁴⁹⁸, while others were unable to fulfil this contract point. The reasons for that might be that not all scientists have been linguistically talented⁴⁹⁹ and the characteristics of the Turkish language posed problems for some. Because it belongs to the family of the Altaic languages, Turkish was not easy to learn.

Turkish is in its basic elements one of the so-called agglutinative languages; instead of declension, conjugation, etc. a serial connection of the various suffixes to the stem occurs. For Europeans or Americans, at the beginning it is a difficult task to get used to so different forms of formulation of ideas and relationships. If this is done, Turkish is not a difficult language, since there are no irregularities and everything is perfectly logical. How different the ways are to formulate thoughts in our Indo-European and the Turkish language, is for example shown by the fact that sentences from both languages can never be translated word-by-word, but in the Turkish sentence everything is in reverse order. Over the years

⁴⁹⁷ Röpke Wilhelm, *Briefe 1934- 1966. Der innere Kompaß*, Eugen Rentsch Prese, Zürich 1976, p. 22; this sentence contains pictures from electronic engineering. It can be compared to the Ottoman literature, which was rich of metaphors.

⁴⁹⁸ Widmann 1973, p. 208.

⁴⁹⁹ Neumark, Fritz, *Zuflucht am Bosphorus. Deutsche Gelehrte, Politiker und Künstler in der Emigration 1933-1945*, Knecht Presse, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, p. 140.

and with much practice I have acquired the ability to translate European sentences immediately and fluently into Turkish, but I have never learned the reverse (...) For instance: when Europeans say “he said he would not be able to come”, so these 8 to 10 words can be expressed in Turkish by only two words: “Gelemediğini söyledi” – “Söyledi” means “he said”; however the first word expresses what he said as an accusative, which is composed of the stem “gel”=“come” and the suffixes for not-able and future.⁵⁰⁰

1.6.2 Publications

The university teachers had at the Turkish university neither their familiar equipment of lecture halls, nor the necessary specialized curriculum books. At the beginning the emigrant professors had to provide or create these essential equipment, just like textbooks, journals, etc. by themselves. This was, because with the signature of the contracts they agreed on the composition of subject-specific textbooks. According to professor Malche’s recommendation, they should respond in this laborious work to teaching methods. In his reform proposals, he called for a change in academic teaching methods. Instead of an encyclopaedic teaching, university teachers should try to encourage the Turkish students to scientific work. They should get an understanding of free expression of opinion and exercising criticism. This basic scientific attitude also entered the textbooks of the emigrated professors. A majority of the appointed professors fulfilled this obligation according to the contract. With the development and publication of these books the professors made a significant contribution to the development of Turkish higher education. The importance of these publications was that they constituted the basis of academic instruction, and resulted in the lecture independence of the Turkish students. Thus, the professors had reached the point that I had mentioned earlier, namely, the students should be able to take and give criticism. If one is able to work independently, he also tends to exercise criticism.

But the publication of textbooks was not enough. Also the lacking literature had to be produced. The Turkish government had taken the western universities as a model and a European university without scientific journals could not be imagined. They were a matter of course and could be found in all departments of higher education institutions. In Turkey

⁵⁰⁰ Widmann 1973, p. 234.

they had to be newly founded. This in turn meant a new role for the exile professors. The first publication of scientific journals took place in 1935. Turkey owns the appointed professors the following important journals: “*İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen Fakültesi Mecmuası*”⁵⁰¹ thanks to the mathematician Willy Prager. The emigrants were also responsible for the publication of the *İstanbul Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi Mecmuası*⁵⁰². *Felsefe Arşivi*,⁵⁰³ a philosophical magazine of the *Edebiyat Fakültesi*, was founded by Ernst von Aster in 1945⁵⁰⁴. *İstanbul Yazıları*, which was a scientific series, was published by Robert Anhegger, und Andreas Tietze⁵⁰⁵. *Psikoloji ve Pedagoji Mecmuası* was founded by Wilhelm Peters in 1940. In addition, *Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, founded in 1935, *Romanoloji Mecmuası*, founded in 1937, and *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, founded in 1939, emerged with the active support of emigrant professors. From these publications benefited, on the one hand the Turkish students and, on the other hand the young emigrant professors, who hoped for reputation in the world of science by publishing these journals.⁵⁰⁶

1.6.3 Research

Besides the publication of textbooks and journals, also the country-specific research of the academics was of great importance for Turkish higher education. Indeed, the emigrants did not have the means they were used to from their home country, but a country where many things were still unexplored. For this reasons, the possibility arose to launch new research projects. First and foremost, the emigrated physicians are to mention. They gained much insight into the diseases about one had only poor information. In particular, one can mention the so-called Oriental Boil.⁵⁰⁷ With the help of the new-won investigations healing methods have been developed for skin leishmaniosis. Also worth mentioning is the discovery of the

⁵⁰¹ Founded in 1935.

⁵⁰² Founded in 1938.

⁵⁰³ Appears two times a year since 1945.

⁵⁰⁴ Widmann 1973, p. 193.

⁵⁰⁵ Dietrich 1998, p. 317.

⁵⁰⁶ Some of the journals still appear, e.g.: At İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen Fakültesi the academic journal appears, which is separated into two parts; the journal for biology and the journal for math, physics and astronomy; İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası appears two times a year; Psikoloji ve Pedagoji Mecmuası appears under the name “Psikoloji alışmaları Dergisi”.

⁵⁰⁷ Also called skin leishmaniosis; is caused by the unicellular organisms *Leishmania tropica*, which is transmitted by sand flies to humans; Hahn 1999, pp. 756.

poison honey (Zehir Bali)⁵⁰⁸ by professor Paul Pulewka,⁵⁰⁹ who was specialized in pharmacology and toxicology. Not only doctors, but also the archaeologists and geologists discovered unexplored areas of their field. The history of the capital Ankara was examined by archaeologists Clemens Bosch and the history of the University of Istanbul by jurist Richard Honig.

In summary, one can say that the forced displacement of the German professors had contributed to a great extent to Turkish science. The numerous researches and studies constituted a very important source of information for the young generation.

1.6.4 Public Relations and Educational Work

The duties of the exile scientists also included the holding of the *üniversite konferansları* (university lectures). Professor Malche had the opinion that the university should present itself and its work to the society. With the help of the above mentioned university lectures, it should be made available to the public⁵¹⁰. Accordingly, the lectures were held in cities with universities⁵¹¹. The reprehensive university teachers chose the subjects of the lectures. In the academic year 1942/43, among others, Ernst von Aster held a lecture with the title *Free Will* (İrade Hürriyeti) and Gerhard Kessler talked about *Politics and Morality* (Siyaset ve Ahlak).

With the help of these public events of the higher education institution, adult education and public enlightenment gained importance. Kemalist Turkey aimed to modernize the whole country in all areas. Therefore, it had to inform, enlighten and educate the people. For this reason, during the summer holidays the emigrant professors were commissioned to travel to different cities of Turkey and to give lectures. The speeches should be held and documented in writing. These trips were called “*üniversite haftası*” (university weeks)⁵¹². The first

⁵⁰⁸ Is a honey which is produced from the poisonous pollen and nectar of the heather family; occurs at the Turkish Black Sea coast; Zander 1984, p.102.

⁵⁰⁹ He was born on February 11, 1896 in Elbing/ Poland and died on October 22, 1989 in Tübingen/ Baden-Württemberg; he was at the University of Ankara.

⁵¹⁰ Neumark 1980, p. 250.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Ibid.

university week was held in Erzurum from July 13 to 19, 1940⁵¹³. Further contributions to public enlightenment were provided in Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Samsun, Van, Konya, Çanakkale, Antalya, Trabzon, Rize, Hatay und Edirne. These üniversite haftaları continued until 1958⁵¹⁴.

1.7 Migrant's Everyday Life in Turkey

In this section I am going to explain the daily life of the emigrants in their new home. However, first of all, it should be mentioned why they had to live this emigrant life. In this case, both the motives of the refugees from the Nazis and the composition of the group of emigrants in Turkey were heterogeneous⁵¹⁵. Nevertheless, the majority of the scientists consisted of Germans, and later also Austrians, who had to leave the National Socialist Germany due to “*racial reasons*”⁵¹⁶. Many of the concerned university teachers, researchers and professors could not get used to the decision to leave Germany. It was not only the country that they left behind, but also their whole belongings, familiar environment, family, and ultimately their workplace. They did not know what they have done wrong and did not want to give up their homes. But over time the situation was becoming unbearable, so they had no other way out. In the memoirs of Professor Schwartz one can read about the means by which they were forced to emigrate:

On March 23, 1933 Monday morning, in the garden of the hospital in Frankfurt/Main I coincidentally met my colleague A.W. Fischer, a benevolent man who played a leading role in our teachers' association. He asked me honestly worried, why I have not “gone away” yet. I should “disappear” on the same day otherwise I could be arrested. Hopefully it is not too late! Apparently, led by him, who exactly knew the currents and intrigues in the Faculty of Medicine, one hour later colleague Rheindorff, the chairman of our “group”, called me and asked me even more urgent to leave. I was ready. A few days earlier, the police – reluctantly and regretfully, but with expertise - searched my house to find

⁵¹³ Widmann 1973, p. 195.

⁵¹⁴ 1940: Erzurum, 1941: Diyarbakır, 1942: Elazığ, 1943: Samsun, 1944: Van, 1945: Konya, 1952: Çanakkale, 1954: Antalya, 1955: Trabzon- Rize, 1956: Hatay, 1958: Edirne; Widmann 1973, p. 195.

⁵¹⁵ Dietrich 1998, p. 258.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

machine guns. The local head of the police department then assured a friend that one knew my innocence and reliability, but one forced the investigation against me and some other professors. No doubt it was intended to force us to leave the country; and just so he would do in our place; reliance on fair treatment would be completely inappropriate. It seemed that the already for 2-3 years persisting and gradually unbearable situation, has found its natural solution.⁵¹⁷

In addition to the people whose *Jewish race* was the cause of the expulsion from Germany, there were also those who lived in Christian-Jewish intermarriage⁵¹⁸. They had to make a decision, divorce or emigrate. Many have chosen to emigrate.⁵¹⁹ Among the exiled scientists who left Germany neither for “*racial reason*”, nor because of intermarriages, were economically liberal people.⁵²⁰ They included, among others, the social scientists Röpke, Kessler, and Rüstow.⁵²¹

The motives of emigration were indeed heterogeneous, but the desire of all emigrants was the same, they wanted to live a decent life. This was no longer possible in Germany and thus many scientists followed the call to Turkey.

1.7.1 A Problem Shared is a Problem Halved

Now the appointed professors have been in a country of which they knew nearly nothing. Therefore, the circumstances in the new home were extremely difficult for them. On the one hand, there have been the local colleagues, with which they had to keep a balanced relationship. At the beginning this was not so easy, because immediately after their arrival in Istanbul they were confronted with the suspicion of the former Darülfünun teachers. On the other hand, there have been the fellow sufferers, with which they shared the same fate, but not always the same views. Nevertheless, they tried to look beyond these differences and lived together in solidarity. They shared both their joys and their sorrows, were there for

⁵¹⁷ Schwartz 1995, p. 39.

⁵¹⁸ Bozay Kemal, *Exil Türkei. Ein Forschungsbeitrag zur deutschsprachigen Emigration in die Türkei (1933–1945)*, LIT, Münster 200, p. 70.

⁵¹⁹ Widmann 1973, p. 177.

⁵²⁰ Neumark 1980, p. 25.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

each other and always listened to the problem of other emigrants. This solidarity was characterized by their mutual support, for example for finding a job or accommodation.⁵²²

*We live in a modern apartment magnificently on the Marmara Sea, away from the dirty and dilapidated Istanbul, which we enjoy as a picturesque panorama across the sea.*⁵²³

Although the Turkish state paid the travel and moving expenses, a relief fund was established from which the emigrants could borrow money in financial distress.⁵²⁴ But by and large their salaries have been enough for a financially secure life in Turkey. With their wages they have been even able to establish their private library: “...our income allows us to buy books and magazines to a considerable extend for our own library...”⁵²⁵

Financially the scientists could always afford the books, but their procurement was very difficult in Turkey. The absence of the journals or textbooks from around the world to which they were accustomed from their old home or renouncing international contacts, dissolved in them a sense of isolation from the rest of the world. This scientific solitude in which they slid deeper and deeper meant a huge ordeal for those appointed scientists. They could no longer tolerate the enclosure from the scientific community. Now personal initiative was needed. After the professors had settled down they often invited each other. These invitations led to a sociable circle of professors⁵²⁶. The group met alternately in the private homes of the professors⁵²⁷. With the help of these meetings, the scientists tried to avoid the threat of intellectual isolation and accordingly held presentations from the various departments⁵²⁸. The chemist of the Institute of Hygiene, Friedrich Breusch, wrote:

⁵²² Dietrich 1998, p. 302.

⁵²³ Röpke 1976, pp. 22; “is a negative image of the Orient that emanated from the inferiority of the Arab-Islamic world”, Mangold 2004, p. 15; Professor Röpke's statement expresses this “looking down” of the Occident to the Orient; Edward W. Said summarizes in his book *Orientalism* this topic: “...for dealing with Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient., p.3.

⁵²⁴ Widmann 1973, p. 75.

⁵²⁵ Röpke 1976, pp. 22.

⁵²⁶ Neumark 1980, p. 190.

⁵²⁷ Widmann 1973, p. 181.

⁵²⁸ Neumark 1980, p. 190.

*To escape from intellectual isolation, we had established a kind of private academy, which listened to 12-15 from all disciplines. Leader have been the cultural historian Alexander Rüstow or the lawyer Andereas Schwartz; it included the economists Neumark, Kessler, Isaac, the botanists Heilbronn and Brauner,...*⁵²⁹

Although the emigrants were completely different personalities, with different characteristics - depending on temperament and inclinations the circle of people, the individual emigrants met with outside the university and the above mentioned meeting, were naturally different – with regard to common objectives they still tried to show consideration towards each other. If they would not be tolerant to other members of the circle of professor, they would have no opportunity to share their knowledge and broaden their horizons.

1.7.2 Emigrant Destiny

Thanks to these meetings, life was a little easier for the appointed professors. But was one problem solved with great effort, another one emerged. The emigrants had to deal with personal tragedies in exile. First, the fear for their family members left in Germany arose. Many had to learn that the relatives were executed.⁵³⁰ This oppressive news caused depressions in the cases of some emigrant professors. Some did not see any other way than taking their own life and committed suicide⁵³¹

The appointed professors also took their families to Istanbul. These created the next worries for the professors. Especially, the emigrated children had often problems at school. Some children visited the Turkish school, where they felt the xenophobia of their classmates.⁵³² In contrast, some went to German schools,⁵³³ where ideological difficulties arose.⁵³⁴ Despite these initial adjustment difficulties, the children were most likely to find their way in the

⁵²⁹ Bozay 2001, p. 86.

⁵³⁰ Professor Haurowitzs' mother was killed in Theresienstadt; Misses Isaac lost nearly her whole family; Professor Gross suffered from the murder of family members; Widmann 1973, p. 183.

⁵³¹ Professor Herzog committed suicide during a conference trip in 1936 in Zürich; Widmann 1973, p. 183.

⁵³² Bozay 2001, p. 87.

⁵³³ "Özel Alman Lisesi", founded in 1868.

⁵³⁴ Dietrich 1998, p. 366.

new environment⁵³⁵. Some of the children of appointed professors studied at the university, including the son of Heilbronn, who studied medicine, or the son of Peter's, who studied chemistry.⁵³⁶

In addition to personal tragedies the feeling of being without a home was a further aspect, which made the emigrant life hard for the scientists. For many this feeling was too difficult to handle.

*Some of the immigrants drew the conclusions and did not have any hope to return to Germany and made themselves unreservedly available to the receiving country.*⁵³⁷

In Turkey, they had virtually no contact with the official representatives of Germany.⁵³⁸ There were institutions that stood between the two fronts, such as the German hospital⁵³⁹ and the German Protestant community.⁵⁴⁰ However, since Germany, partly with the help of local journalists, tried to work against the emigrants, the contact with the institutions mentioned above became more dangerous.⁵⁴¹ In the early years of the emigration the relationship between the two sides was not that tense, but the situation worsened.⁵⁴² The exile scholars tried to refrain from meetings. But visiting the German embassy was inevitable. The emigrant professors had to go there, if they wanted to renew their passport.⁵⁴³ Even this contact broke off, because without giving any reason the passes of the migrants were not renewed, and gradually lost their validity. Therefore, many of the appointed

⁵³⁵ Dietrich 1998, p. 368.

⁵³⁶ The most important case here is Dankwart, the son of Alexander Rüstow, because his respective language and cultural knowledge advanced his career; he has become the most important USA- expert for Turkish questions; Widmann 1973, p. 125; Dankwart was born on December 21, 1924 in Berlin and died on August 3, 1996 in New York; he was professor at the City University of New York.

⁵³⁷ Widmann 1973, p. 181.

⁵³⁸ Dietrich 1998, p. 349.

⁵³⁹ Alman Hastanesi was found in 1852 for German artisans, who received medical care there.

⁵⁴⁰ The German Protestant community in Istanbul was found in 1843 by German merchants; they campaigned for social work; they founded the organisation "Evangelical Asylum" which later became the German Hospital (Alman Hastanesi).

⁵⁴¹ Dietrich 1998, p. 349.

⁵⁴² Neumark 1980, p. 182.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

professors were *stateless*. Thus, the exile scientists had no other choice than to learn how to feel and to judge in supranational relations.

The strained relationship between the two sides reached its peak after the arrival of a questionnaire on May 30, 1938 which was drawn up at the request of the Foreign Office.⁵⁴⁴ The emigrants should indicate whether they themselves and / or their wife were Aryan, Jew or *non-Aryan interrelated*.

Back then started the pressure, which enhanced up to the stage, where on the advice of the Chief of the Federal Immigration Police, Dr. Heinrich Rotmund, the German passports whose holders by Nazi standards were Jewish, got stamped with a big red "J". However, this was only the prelude to further stringent measures, and so I learned one day - not officially, but by a German friend living in Switzerland,⁵⁴⁵ who had read the message in the "Reichsanzeiger" no. 161, of July 12, 1940 - that my wife, my children and me have been expatriated without any justification: by an announcement of the Interior Minister under the seizure of my assets (in reality the little property of my wife, as I myself had no assets). The global expatriation of all "non-Aryan" German citizens took place some time later; I do not know why I individually had that honour.⁵⁴⁶

The questionnaire was a proof that the emigrant professors could not escape from advocates of German National Socialism. The power that had robbed the scientists of their life in Germany, wanted to hinder them from their everyday life in the new home by all possible ways and means.

1.7.3 The End of Turkey's Neutral Policy

If we take a closer look at the situation of the emigrant professors, one can say that it worsened beginning from 1944. This is because on August 2, 1944 Turkey gave up its neutral policy and cancelled all relations with Nazi Germany. After the rupture of diplomatic

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 183.

⁵⁴⁵ Conducted a restrictive refugee policy; refused many people at the border before the Second World War; Lienert 2006.

⁵⁴⁶ Neumark 1980, p. 183.

relations, the declaration of war from Turkey to Germany followed on February 23, 1945.⁵⁴⁷ But what effect had this on the emigrant professors in Turkey?

After such a delicate situation all Germans had to be interned or expelled from Turkey⁵⁴⁸. They had the choice, either they led themselves to “*deport*” to Germany or they should be interned in three different places in Anatolia⁵⁴⁹. Excluded from this measure were the emigrants with the Turkish citizenship⁵⁵⁰ and those considered as irreplaceable. As internment cities Çorum, Yozgat and Kırşehir were possible. The ultimatum was fixed; they had to commit to one of the possible ways out. “...*there have been surprisingly many that favoured to return to the bomb-damaged homeland, instead of staying in Turkey, even if it would be under primitive conditions...*”⁵⁵¹ According to Neumark’s statement, it can be affirmed that it was not perceived as a matter of course that the Germans in Turkey did not want to return to the country, which expelled them groundless. There were some emigrants, for example Heinz Anstock,⁵⁵² who had taken the path back to Germany⁵⁵³. He did not want to let his home country down, although it has forced him to leave⁵⁵⁴. The migrants, who have chosen Turkey, lost their German citizenship and were considered as “*stateless*”. Turkey issued new identity papers for those emigrants, in which they were identified as *haymatloz*.

After the decision in favour of Turkey was made, the internment took place. On all three places of internment it was strictly forbidden to pursue a job and to leave the place.

*We had to rent a room somewhere and promise not to leave the city. And the second promise was that no one would work there.*⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁴⁷ Dietrich 1998, p. 385.

⁵⁴⁸ Stauth & Birtek 2007, p. 168.

⁵⁴⁹ Dietrich 1998, p. 385.

⁵⁵⁰ e.g. professor Hirsch had the Turkish citizenship.

⁵⁵¹ Neumark 1980, p. 211.

⁵⁵² Born on March 13, 1909 in Wuppertal-Elberfeld and died on August 21, 1980 in Sinzig/ Rhineland-Palatinate; came to Istanbul in 1934 as staff member of Leo Spitzer.

⁵⁵³ Dietrich 1998, p. 385.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 386.

⁵⁵⁵ Cornelius Bischoff reported about the internment; in: Bozay 2001, p. 94; Cornelius Bischoff was born in 1928 in Hamburg; studied law in Istanbul and in Hamburg; spent his teens in Turkey; was a lawyer and since 1978 also scriptwriter and literary translator.

The Turkish government granted them financial assistance in the amount of 10 or 20 Turkish Lira, what was monthly handed out to the emigrants by the Red Crescent.⁵⁵⁶

At the place of internment in Çorum, among other interned emigrants, was family Kantorowicz and family Neumark.⁵⁵⁷ At the beginning the emigrants lived in boarding houses and later they receive rental housing. In Çorum it was not always easy for the interned emigrants. The local population did not welcome them. As usual they faced restrain, distrust and a negative attitude.⁵⁵⁸

In Yozgat 260 emigrants were interned.⁵⁵⁹ The exile scientists who have opted for internment initially found accommodation in a community centre⁵⁶⁰. Later, they were resettled in apartments. It was not long until a German infrastructure emerged in Yozgat.⁵⁶¹ As in Istanbul, the emigrants had to cope with the place of internment. For this reason, a soup kitchen, in which financially weak internees were fed a hot meal, was set up with the help of nuns.⁵⁶² In addition, schools have been improvised for the children of the internees.⁵⁶³ In Yozgat the church services that were held Sunday served as meetings of the internees.

Since the internees should not engage in any work, they had a lot of free time. Therefore, they organised among themselves classical concerts, established a children theatre group and ballet dances have been presented by youth groups.⁵⁶⁴ Also for this closed society, such as in Çorum, it was not easy to make friends with the locals. They faced again xenophobia.

⁵⁵⁶ In Turkish: Kızılay; was found in 1868; is a aid organisation that was then called Osmanlı Yaralı ve Hasta Askerlere Yardım Cemiyeti (Ottoman charity for wounded and sick soldiers); in 1947 it received today's name Türkiye Kızılay Derneği.

⁵⁵⁷ Dietrich 1998, p. 390.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 391.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 389.

⁵⁶⁰ Bozay 2011, p. 91; in Turkish: Halkevi; was found in 1932 to lead the Turkish people to the level of contemporary civilisation; the establishment of Atatürk's reforms should be ensured by halkevi; its activities covered many areas: Sport, Language and Literature, public courses, social assistance, history, museums, theatres, art.

⁵⁶¹ Dietrich 1998, p. 389.

⁵⁶² Ibid., p. 389.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p. 389.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 390.

*Most residents held suspicious and sometimes hostile distance. Especially the adolescent, young males hurled often well-targeted stones at us.*⁵⁶⁵

Only the merchants appreciated them very much because they knew how they could take advantage of the situation. They set the prices of as high and made a huge profit.

*Above all, the merchants benefited of the internees. In our group lived allot wealthy Germans, who caused the rapid increase of the prices in a few weeks as they overpaid from time to time, what affected the poor strangers allot. Now there was a double standard: one for locals and one for us.*⁵⁶⁶

It was the same in the third place of internment – Kırşehir - where 200 emigrants came together as internees⁵⁶⁷. Life in this small town in Anatolia changed abruptly after the arrival of the interned emigrants. There were housing, as well as food shortages and prices increased⁵⁶⁸. In contrast to the people in Çorum und Yozgat, the local population of Kırşehir had a much nicer attitude towards the internees. Among the many immigrants who came to Kırşehir, was also the economist Fritz Baade⁵⁶⁹. He has to be highlighted for the discovery of an old spa treatment place⁵⁷⁰. Fritz Baade's discovery led, on the one hand to the razing of onyx stones, which meant a new work field for the locals and on the other hand to his popularity among the Turkish population⁵⁷¹.

Living in a place of internment was not easy for the most. Separated from the rest of the world and living in an unfamiliar place was a difficult circumstance. But they had no other

⁵⁶⁵ Nun Engelburga Strobel reported about it; Dietrich 1998, p. 390; Engelburga Strobel was born in 1911 in Raabs at the Thaya/ Lower Austria, and died on April 2, 1999 in Graz; taught from 1939 at the girls school of the Austiran St. Georgs- College Istanbul; was interned in Yozgat from August 24, 1944 to January 1, 1946.

⁵⁶⁶ Dietrich 1998, p. 390.

⁵⁶⁷ Bozay 2011, p. 92.

⁵⁶⁸ Dietrich 1998, p. 392.

⁵⁶⁹ Was born on January 23, 1893 in Neuruppin/ Brandenburg; studied classical philosophy, art history, theology, economics and medicine in Göttingen; he was a member of the Reichstag between 1930-1933; economic advisor in Turkey 1935-1946; he died on May 15, 1974 in Kiel.

⁵⁷⁰ Bozay 2011, p. 92.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

option. The internees remained in the three places in Anatolia until the end of the Second World War.

1.7.4 Departure of the Emigrant Professors

The end of World War II in 1945 also marked the end of the emigration movement from Nazi Germany⁵⁷². Many of the appointed professors left Turkey. Before the Second World War the USA had been the main destination country for many, but after the war a lot of the emigrants started their homeward journey.⁵⁷³ Ernst Reuter was the first among the professors, who returned to Germany at the end of the war.⁵⁷⁴ For the scientists displaced for political reasons, the desire to return was very strong⁵⁷⁵. In 1971, Friedrich Breusch left Turkey as the last of the emigrants.⁵⁷⁶

The following tables illustrate the above mentioned two stages of departure of the emigrant professors from Turkey (also the professors, who worked in Turkey were taken into account):

USA

	Professors	Assistant
1934 – 1939	12	9
1940 – 1945	2	-
1945 – 1950	8	2
1950 – 1956	1	5
after 1956	-	-
	23	16 ⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷² Stauth & Birtek 2007, p. 168.

⁵⁷³ Erichsen Regine, Türkei, in: Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933- 1945, WBG, Darmstadt 1998, p.429.

⁵⁷⁴ Dietrich 1998, p. 261.

⁵⁷⁵ Lehmann, Hans Georg, *Rückkehr nach Deutschland? Motive, Hindernisse und Wege von Emigranten*, in: *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 194, Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands*, Polis, Marburg 1997, p. 42.

⁵⁷⁶ Widmann 1997, p. 171.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 173.

Germany and Austria

	Professors	Assistant
1934 – 1939	-	1
1940 – 1945	-	-
1945 – 1950	2	3
1950 – 1956	20	2
after 1956	2	-
	24	6 ⁵⁷⁸

Only a few appointed professors remained in Turkey after 1956. But what have been the reasons for this heavy backflow? Why the scientists did not stay in their “new home”?

On the one side, they were migrants who had to leave their homes against their own will. This fact was difficult to bear for many and caused great longing for their home country.

... the fact that we re-migrants – despite all the terrible things from which we, our friends and families suffered in the Third Reich – were troubled with homesickness never disappeared. We missed the landscape and especially our language. I could not say what was harder – probably the language. In his essay “The Brothers Grimm” (1948), Carl Zuckmayer wrote about “language homesickness” and rightly pointed out that this would be the most painful form of homesickness for a writer; and almost all of us have been writers. If one does not grow up in a country with a foreign language, and thus inevitable learns different thinking and living habits, it is only possible to adapt the new environment to a certain extent and even this assumes the will to win a second home.⁵⁷⁹

On the other side, the Turkish government did not want to keep the emigrants in the country. It considered their work as fulfilled. Now they wanted to employ their own people, the young

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 173 (table).

⁵⁷⁹ Neumark 1980, p. 228.

Turkish scientists⁵⁸⁰. Another motive was that Germany did not want to provide the pensions for the university teachers abroad⁵⁸¹.

*It turned out to be impossible to get new German colleagues for long time contracts to replace the retired ones, as the German government did not accept to pay pensions for German university teachers abroad.*⁵⁸²

In their concern for the future, which had to be financially secured, the emigrant professors made the decision to leave the country, which had provided them asylum.

Some emigrants could not leave Turkey. Many died in Istanbul. Sometimes after long illness, the gynaecologist Liepmann⁵⁸³, the historian Bosch, the architect Taut, the physician Frank, the orientalist Süssheim and the assistants Mendelsohn und Rosenbaum died⁵⁸⁴. The astronomer Rosenberg suffered a heart attack in Istanbul⁵⁸⁵. During traveling abroad, the philosopher Ernst von Aster died in Stockholm and the lawyer Andreas Schwartz in Freiburg⁵⁸⁶. The chemist Herzog already committed suicide in Zurich in 1936⁵⁸⁷.

Scientists that died in Turkey:⁵⁸⁸

in Istanbul: 10

in Ankara: 5

during travels abroad: 3

⁵⁸⁰ Bozay 2001, p. 101.

⁵⁸¹ Neumark 1980, p. 229.

⁵⁸² Breusch Freidrich, *Über die deutschen Chemiker an der Universität Istanbul*”, in: *Nachrichten aus Chemie und Technik*, no. 22. 1965, p. 455.

⁵⁸³ Dietrich 1998, p. 261.

⁵⁸⁴ Widmann 1973, p. 172.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Dietrich 1998, p. 261.

⁵⁸⁸ Widmann 1973, p. 173.

1.7.5 Turkey – New Home for the Emigrants

Besides all the mentioned problems, hardships and worries there were also positive reasons that the emigrant professors might have considered in their decision to stay or to go away. Many of the exile scientists had a very friendly relationship with the Turkish assistants and students. Contacts with these were for most university teachers “*a constant source of joy and satisfaction*”⁵⁸⁹. They got along very well with the Turkish colleagues, as well. The emigrant professors had made new contacts, met new people. Of course, there were professors who would rather be associated together with the *own people*.

*To a certain extent it may have been understandable or even inevitable, that many of them associated mainly or solely with German colleagues or other emigrants for a long time.*⁵⁹⁰

But for many it was important to make friends with the local colleagues, as well as with the local population and not to belong to a discriminated minority.

*In contrast, I myself always attached importance to not have a “ghetto life”, as I was always aware of its disadvantages.*⁵⁹¹

In addition to the human aspects, the professors were very amazed by the scenic beauty of Istanbul. Professor Schwartz reported in his notes from the first time in Istanbul:

*We still had time to visit the city, the museums, the mosques and to fall in love for a lifetime with the beauty of the Bosphorus, the Marmara, the islands. What a past, what a wealth!*⁵⁹²

Nevertheless, the financial concerns about the future have been so great that the above-mentioned reasons were merely marginal. For this motive only one of the group in 1933 emigrated university teachers has remained in Turkey, Traugott Fuchs⁵⁹³. The zoologist Curt

⁵⁸⁹ Nissen 1969, p. 201.

⁵⁹⁰ Neumark 1980, p. 190.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Schwartz 1995, p. 61.

⁵⁹³ Dietrich 1998, p. 261.

Kosswig, who had immigrated to Turkey in 1938, came back in 1969 and took a teaching position at the University of Erzurum⁵⁹⁴. The physician Reimann, who immigrated to Istanbul last, still worked as a 70-year-old at a medical research institute⁵⁹⁵.

Ultimately, one can say that only two emigrants, who had contributed to the reorientation of the University of Istanbul, found their new home in Turkey: professor Reimann and Traugott Fuchs.

Scientists that remained in Turkey:⁵⁹⁶

As university teacher in Istanbul: 1 professor, 1 assistant

In other positions in Istanbul: 3 assistants

2 Scientific Works

The level of development of an individual country is closely related to the scientific and technical development that the country has and can develop. Scientific developments are the source of technical developments. Technical inventions are certainly not accidental. Atatürk, who thought that economic growth and development may emerge after scientific developments which give birth to technical developments, he thought that it was necessary to take some steps in this context. Since scientific progress, scientific knowledge development, could not as a whole be developed at random, it was necessary for some institutions to be renovated and to have modern technology. Atatürk thought that the step needed to be taken urgently on this road was to have higher schools.

At the session of the Grand National Assembly on May 23, 1926, Minister of Education Mustafa Necati explained the view of Atatürk about Darülfünun.⁵⁹⁷

Darülfünun is an independent institution. It represents the nations spiritual power. We must admit that the institution called Darülfünun is not an institution directly under

⁵⁹⁴ Widmann 1973, p. 172.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 174.

⁵⁹⁷ Namal Yücel-Karakök Tunay, *Atatürk and University Reform (1933)*, Journal of Science and Higher Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2011, p. 30.

the administration of the Ministry of Education. If anyone arbitrarily orders Darülfünun institution to act in a particular way, then there is no Darülfünun.

But 15 days later, Mustafa Necati, who spoke in Darülfünun, thought that he had to give the following message to the teaching staff:⁵⁹⁸

There will be strong evidence to show by the teachers by publications and works about the hope that the nation has connected to the university. Darülfünun is the scientific focus of all the intellectuals of Turkey. Researches and works from here will raise Turkish intellectuals. Your work will open up new horizons for the Turkish intellectuals and will give Turkey an international honor in the field of culture. I would like to especially point out that Darülfünunuzun is in the necessity of reaching the level of the universities of other civilised nations in every arena because it is Darülfünun, the institution representing this nations civilisation ability and the highest living power.

From here it is understood what the next steps would be, and in what direction the government would proceed. It was also a clear warning that the Government would like to focus on research and publication, and to give them an international level of content.

The newly established state, the Republic of Turkey, had not yet reformed the University sector. The reforms that were to be put in place before this were the steps that would improve this sector. But after a decade of studying, then came the university reform. Many reforms were made by Atatürk in the fields of social life, culture, education and science. Within these reforms, the university reform in 1933 has a separate position. Atatürk thought that there would be no modernisation and development without education. On the one hand, while recommending the establishment of new universities, on the other hand, the current university (Darülfünun) had to have a big reform and change in order to achieve modernisation.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

2.1 University

The three universities (the University of Istanbul, Istanbul Technical University which was created from one of the military academies, and Ankara University was founded from the ground up) were to be fashioned on the prevailing German university model. However, since qualified personnel were not readily available to do all this, they had to be imported.⁵⁹⁹

Atatürk aimed to create universities that would defend the principles of the Turkish revolution and support political power through university reform.⁶⁰⁰ In Article 2 of the university establishment law published on May 31, 1933, the Ministry of National Education was supposed to prepare a draft law about the establishment of Istanbul University by April 1, 1934 and present it to the Grand National Assembly. On 29.05.1934 the University Organisation Law was formed which envisages the division of the University into 4 faculties (Medicine, Science, Literature and Law) and regulated the fees of the university staff.

There were a total of 180 Turkish and foreign staff members at Istanbul University. Later, when 142 assistants and scientific assistants were added to these, the number went up to 322. 85 of them were foreign.⁶⁰¹ Istanbul University, which opened its doors to these foreign scientists and was hosting them, made calculations about how it could provide modern education. Undoubtedly, these emigres who were German science and culture men offered valuable services to Istanbul University.

There were no university in Ankara yet. It was established after 1933, and in 1946 it started education. During this time, Ankara High Institute of Agriculture continued its activities. Since there was already a treaty with Germany before the Nazi's, they continued to work with teachers from Germany. After the migration, although the numbers were not as high as Istanbul University, German teachers were also used.

Wilhelm Salomon Calvi, who founded the Institute of Geology in Turkey, worked for about 2 years here and then worked at the Mineral Research Institute for 5 years until his death, he

⁵⁹⁹ Kazancıgil Ali- Ortaylı İlber-Tanyeli Uğur, *Türkiyenin Yabancıları (Foreigners of Turkey)*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, Üç aylık düşünce dergisi, Sayı:23, Yaz, İstanbul 2000, pp. 119-132.

⁶⁰⁰ Schwartz Philipp & Peukert Helge, *Notgemeinschaft: Zur Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933 in die Türkei*, Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg 1995, s. 14.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., s. 107.

made great contributions to this institution. Calvi has published 37 scientific studies during his stay in Turkey. Hans Bremer who came from Aschersleben in 1934, who first worked for the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry Biology then at the same time started working for the Ministry of Agriculture and the Institute of Higher Agriculture.⁶⁰² Before the migration, Otto Gerngross, a professor of organic chemistry and protein technology at the University of Berlin Charlottenburg, came to Turkey in 1933. He extended his stay until 1938, when he did not return because of the developments in Germany. He stayed in Turkey until 1943, when he decided not to return. During his stay, he did some important research on bread wheat, especially for the development of grapes, especially contributed by helping grape squeezing machines enter the country.⁶⁰³

Among the incoming scientists the most popular ones were Ernst Reuter, Fritz Neumark, Ernst Eduard Hirsch, Hans Reichenbach, Leo Spitzer, Erich Auerbach, Ernst von Aster, Marchand, Wilhelm Röpke, Gerhard Kessler, Philipp Schwartz, Rudolf Nissen, Alexander Rüstow, Friedrich Dessauer, Richard von Mises, Rudolf Belling, Bruno Taut and Paul Hindemith.⁶⁰⁴ They had great contributions to Turkish academic realm in terms of re-shaping the higher education system and improving scientific framework in Turkey. These scientists worked at sub-commissions of many ministries as well as contributing to the academic development of science in Turkey.⁶⁰⁵

Some of these scientists worked at Istanbul University while others had positions at various institutions and organisations such as German Hospital in Istanbul and Ankara, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts, Ankara Faculty of Language, History and Geography, Institute of Hygiene, Institute of Mining Research, Gazi Teacher Education Institute and Conservatoire.⁶⁰⁶ Moreover, these scientists had an important role in the increasing number of books and development of libraries because of the books they

⁶⁰² Ibid., s. 147.

⁶⁰³ Will Mangold Sabine, *Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei 1918-1933*, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen 2013, p. 406.

⁶⁰⁴ Neumark Fritz, *Boğaziçi'ne Sığınanlar, Türkiye'ye İltica Eden Alman İlim Siyaset ve Sanat Adamları 1933-1953 (Seeking Refuge in the Bosphorus, German Politicians and Artists who took Refuge in Turkey 1933-1953)*, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü Yayını, İstanbul 1982, p. 12.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

wrote and translated. Many scientific works that have worldwide importance were translated to Turkish.

The assistants and students of these scientists continued to contribute to the development of scientific research in Turkey. Some of these students continued their education at German universities and after adopting German academic discipline they applied their research in Turkey.⁶⁰⁷

After the end of the Second World War some of the German scientist returned to Germany and United States of America and had important works, few of these academicians and experts stayed in Turkey. For instance, Ernst Reuter gave lectures on local governments and city planning at Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences and had a role in establishment of “*Institute of City Planning*”. After leaving Turkey, he worked as the Mayor of Berlin between 1948 and 1953.⁶⁰⁸

Ataturk planned the university reform to cover all of Turkey: for this, he was considering the country as three big cultural regions; Istanbul University for the western region, Ankara University for the central region, and Van Lake for the eastern region, establishing a university in one of the most beautiful places around the lake, he hoped to bring to an agenda of forming a cultural city in this area.

2.2 Science

German professors have been influential in all aspects of science in Turkey. They influenced Astronomy, Chemistry and Biology. Accordingly, Germans built the first observatory in Turkey and westernised the countries astronomy. Astronomy was taught in Turkey’s three military academies in the first years of 19th century. But still, the Republic of Turkey did not receive an astronomic observatory of any kind. To provide this fact, leading astronomy professors were invited to set up an academic department an observatory.⁶⁰⁹ Here is what Istanbul University gives today about its Astronomy and Space Sciences:

⁶⁰⁷ Yücel 2012, p. 14.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶⁰⁹ Reisman Arnold, *Turkey’s Modernisation: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk’s Vision*, New Academic Publishing, Washington DC 2006, p. 191.

The department currently located on the University Campus at Beyazıt...was set up in 1933 by Prof. E. F. Freundlich under the name of Institute of Astronomy, As a branch of the Faculty of Science of Istanbul University. During the years of 1933-34 and 1934-35, the Institute occupied two rooms in the Faculty of Science Building called Zeynep Hanım Konağı. With the building of a small observatory on the Istanbul University Campus at Beyazıt in 1936, technological research on the subject started. An astrograph ordered from Zeiss, Germany, on December 11 1934, arrived in İstanbul via Trieste on September 25 1936, and was placed in the dome of the new building in the fall of 1936. For the year of 1936-37, the Institute of Astronomy started the enrollment of students in its new building.

In this subject, especially, Erwin Finlay Gleisberg, who was launching Turkey's first astronomical laboratory in Istanbul from 1933 and who worked at Istanbul University; Hans Rosenberg, who worked at the University of Istanbul as a director of the institutes for astronomy and observatory; as well as, Wolfgang Gleissberg, who was working at Istanbul and later also at Ankara University; have been important.

Gleissberg writes about the establishment of the Institute of Astronomy in Istanbul as follows:⁶¹⁰

In Istanbul University for astronomy education and research, all materials and requirements were initially lacking: besides observation instruments, neither astronomy institute nor any astronomy literature existed. But all these shortcomings were quickly overcome by the generous incentives the university had seen from the Turkish government. In January 1935, a star observatory building was laid on the garden of the university in Beyazıt (one of the highest points of the city) and construction proceeded so quickly that we could arrange the study rooms in the spring of the same year. Over the following year, a Zeiss-Dome of 6.5 meters in diameter was added to the building, under which a Zeiss-astrograph was installed. The university prepared enough facilities for the literature project and many colleagues from outside countries helped by sending us various magazines and publications free of charge; So

⁶¹⁰ Gleissberg Wolfgang, *Astronomi in der Türkei*, Sterne und Weltraum, Jg. 6., Nr. 12, Dezember 1967, s. 277.

much so that after a short period of time, an Institute library was provided to meet our needs. Clocks and ancillary equipment were also provided.

After the construction was finished, Professor Erwin Findlay Freundlich left Istanbul in 1937, he was replaced by a Professor at Kiel University, Professor Rosenberg. Rosenberg was sick after a short while and a short time later died in Istanbul. Instead, in 1942 a British Astronomer Professor Royds was called; Royds stayed in Istanbul for 5 years. In 1948 Gleissberg took over as the chair and the administration of the institute. Many former students of Gleissberg still work at the institute today.⁶¹¹ One of the greatest contributions of Gleissberg and Freundlich was to write the first astronomy textbook and to put the Turkish equivalents of the terms.⁶¹² These German Jewish emigres gave Turkey not just an update and an upgrade on the science being taught. They created for Turkey what this science has always needed most a capability to observe the heavenly bodies and collect data.⁶¹³

Furthermore, reforms and new programs in Chemistry, Biochemistry and Biology got established. For example, Fritz Arndt was a German academic who became the head of the Chemistry Institute in Istanbul, taught both inorganic and organic chemistry and was skilful in communicating and integrating information,⁶¹⁴ continued his research in organic chemistry, was invited to serve at the government's official commission on terminology and also published many textbooks in Turkish.⁶¹⁵

In addition to these, Arndt published two major works during his second period in Turkey. These were comprehensive texts, both experimental in approach, in the areas of inorganic and organic chemistry. His inorganic textbook was first published in 1938 under the title Genel Kimya Dersleri I – Gayriuzvî Kimya (General Chemistry Lessons I – Inorganic Chemistry). Updated editions were printed in 1944, 1949, and 1953. Arndt's organic textbook, also published in 1938 as lecture notes under the title Profesör F. Arndt'in Genel Kimya Dersleri II – Uzvî Kısım (Professor F. Arndt's General Chemistry Lessons II –

⁶¹¹ Widmann 1999, p. 151.

⁶¹² Esin Fatma, *Astroid Ankara'nın İsim Babası (Astroid the Father of Ankara)*, Cumhuriyet Bilim Teknik, No. 85, Ekim 1988, s. 8.

⁶¹³ Reismann 2009, p. 197

⁶¹⁴ Burk Lale Aka, *Fritz Arndt and His Chemistry Books in the Turkish Language*, *Bulletin for the History of Chemistry*, 2003, Volume 28 Nr.1, p. 48.

⁶¹⁵ Reisman 2009, p. 198.

Organic Section), appeared with updated editions in 1947 and 1950.⁶¹⁶ Significantly, he was a pioneer in the field of the newly developing field of physical organic chemistry and contributed to the development of the concept of resonance.⁶¹⁷ According to a former student (İsmet Gürgey), Arndt brought the foundations and the principles of contemporary chemistry to Turkey. At the end of most of his books, Arndt provided a comparative dictionary of chemical terms and concepts in Turkish, German and English.⁶¹⁸

3 Medicine

Between 1915 and 1918, German scientists lectured at the Istanbul Darülfünun. During this period, it was a common practice for the Ottoman State to send students abroad to Germany for internships or higher education.⁶¹⁹

After the building of the new republic, the big influence of German doctors went on and on. In this context, the most important name to mention might be Albert Eckstein, who was crucial in modernizing Turkey's health care system and who has a big influence on famous Turkish pediatricians. In 1935 Eckstein had to flee from Germany. With the help of the Emergency Organisation for German Scientists Abroad (*Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler*) he received an offer from the Numune Hospital in Ankara, which was the biggest in the city in this time. One of his first assignments was the investigation of rural child mortality.

Thus, in 1937/38 he undertook several trips to rural areas and provided villagers with some basic medications. Due to his work, leadership and guidance, child mortality decreased. Furthermore, the eradication of Noma is due to him.⁶²⁰ Albert Eckstein also published a textbook in Turkish in 1941, which was used as part of medical school curriculum for many years.

⁶¹⁶ Burk 2003, p. 46.

⁶¹⁷ Burk Lale Aka, *An Open Door: German Refugee Professors in Turkey*, in Peter Rose, ed., *The Dispossessed-An Anatomy of Exile*, University of Massachusetts Press 2005, pp. 235-57.

⁶¹⁸ Burk 2003, p. 49.

⁶¹⁹ Reisman 2009, p. 213.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-218.

Moreover, he published many more books and organized the first Turkish Pediatrics Congress in Ankara. Eckstein established institutes and clinics for Turkish children, especially in rural areas. To sum up, the most significant outcomes of his work have been the introduction of ways and means of collecting public health data and of using the resulting statistics in planning and implementing public health services throughout the country; he cured Noma and reduced Noma caused deaths to zero; and he greatly reduced infant mortality rates. Furthermore, Eckstein's knowledge and skills have been an inspiration to his colleagues and students.⁶²¹ However, doctors like Eckstein have not only been influential in the areas of paediatrics and public health, but they influenced all areas of medicine in Turkey.

A survey of all academic Personnel Department files identified no fewer than 76 unduplicated exile names who worked in the Istanbul University of Medicine between the years of 1933 and 1950.⁶²² Philipp Schwartz played the most significant role in organizing emigration of a group of intellectuals who made possible important steps of Turkey's social reform in all sectors.

3.1 Pathology

Philipp Schwartz was the youngest Professor in all of Germany at the time.⁶²³ Schwartz was a major figure in the reorganisation of Istanbul University along modern lines starting in 1933. The Turkish government sought his advice on hiring of more university teachers and government experts. He himself worked in Istanbul in the field of pathology for many years.

Although Philipp Schwartz was not known a social reformer, but he played a most significant role in organizing emigration of a group of intellectuals who made possible important facets of Turkey's social reforms in all sectors.⁶²⁴

⁶²¹ Ibid., pp. 219-20.

⁶²² Reisman 2009, p.136.

⁶²³ Shaw Stanford J., *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1993, p. 359.

⁶²⁴ Reisman 2009, p. 137.

3.2 Dermatology, Internal Medicine and Gynecology

Alfred Marchionini, who was a Professor of Dermatology in Freiburg and Richard Richter have been especially important for dermatology. Dermatologist Richard Richter, who was later invited to Ankara, tells of Marchionini's work in Turkey in his "*A Letter from Ankara*"⁶²⁵ as follows:

*The department he took over was small and did not fit at all the description of a modern centre of research in dermatology. However, the energy of Marchionni and his amiable cooperation with his colleagues in other departments made it possible to expand his clinic and establish an institute which could shoulder a large clinical workload. How Marchionni's influence was felt by a large section of the population is best evidenced by an increase of 24 000 in patients applying to the clinic during one year; this, in a very conservative population which was cautious against innovation and even rejected everything new. To succeed thus in the most primitive clinical conditions deserves admiration. As if this would not suffice, advanced scientific research was being conducted, although they did not have their own laboratories and Marchionni opened new horizons in dermatological research with innumerable articles. His work on the climatophysiology and pathology of the skin, his initial descriptions of a disease's progression, new methods tried in the cure of sub-tropical diseases, will always provide a foundation and new dermatological research will continue to be conducted on this basis. His heritage continues to survive in the hard work of many of his students in Turkey today.*⁶²⁶

Economist Neumark remembered Marchionini as a typical Eastern Prussian, one famous as a dermatologist and as a specialist in venereal diseases. He organised a German-French Week of interesting conferences and discussions in Munich, the aim of which was scientific sharing as well as rapprochement between German and French scientists.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁵ Richter, R., *Ankara'dan Bir Mektup (A letter from Ankara)*, Cilt Doktoru, Yıl 5, Sayı 11, Kasım 1954, p. 518.

⁶²⁶ Widmann 1999, p. 20.

⁶²⁷ Neumark 1980, p. 73.

In the field of internal medicine, Alfred Erich Frank discovered anti-diabetic drugs that could be taken orally. He also made important discoveries in the area of thrombocytes. Dr. Frank's personal story is summarised by retired Professor A. Kazancıgil, a noted Turkish scientist, educator, and writer who owes his own education to the émigré professors.⁶²⁸

Frank came and settled here; he made his name here, grew old, and did not want to leave. These [German] people were very useful for Turkey in the long run. It is not that internal medicine was not existent in Turkey until then; it did exist. We had first-rate men but [Frank] started a whirlwind of change. Of course, there is also the matter of their deaths for those who stayed on. Many chose Turkish cemeteries.

Furthermore, a new branch of gynecology got established by Wilhelm Liepmann,⁶²⁹ who taught at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Istanbul. Fritz Neumark recalled that⁶³⁰

...besides Rudolf Nissen and ophthalmologist Joseph Igersheimer, gynecologist Wilhelm Liepmann especially became to be loved for his work as professor and clinic director in Istanbul. Liepmann, with his familiar but gentle manner not frequently seen among physicians, was known worldwide among his peers for his efforts while in Berlin to establish and develop the new branch of frauenkunde [gynecology]. He died in Istanbul after only four years of work. I met him there for the first time. With his quiet and friendly manner, he not only made numerous friends among his colleagues but also made good impressions on his patients.

3.3 Ophthalmology

Numerous ophthalmologists fled Germany after 1933 as the Nazis began to persecute those of Jewish descent. A representative leader was Joseph Igersheimer (1879–1965), best known for his discoveries with arsphenamine for the treatment of syphilis. He fled to Turkey in 1933. Joseph Igersheimer was in the first party of scientists to arrive in Turkey. Joseph Igersheimer was in the first party of scientists to arrive in Turkey. On October 15th, 1933, he took charge of Istanbul University's Institute of Ophthalmology a part of its Faculty of

⁶²⁸ Kazancıgil-Ortaylı-Tanyeli 2000, pp. 119–132.

⁶²⁹ https://www.jewiki.net/wiki/Wilhelm_Liepmann, 12.07.2017

⁶³⁰ Neumark 1980, p. 70.

Medicine. During the second week on the job Igersheimer gave his first Istanbul lecture on *Blindness and its Causes*.⁶³¹ It was in German. Igersheimer's first contract with the Turkish government covered the period November 15th, 1933 to November 15th of 1938. He was allowed to lecture in German until the end of the third year. However, starting the fourth year he was obligated to give the lectures in Turkish.⁶³² He built a modern eye clinic and trained students.⁶³³

3.4 Dentistry

Alfred Kantorowicz worked in Turkey from 1933 until his retirement in 1948. During this period, he was instrumental in modernizing Turkey's dental curricula. As director of dentistry from 1936 to 1948 he tried to create a department similar to its American counterparts. He was among the outstanding professors and held many patents for his research.⁶³⁴ Kantorowicz was a dedicated social reformer for most of his adult life.

When he arrived in Turkey, dental education was a three-year [post-high school] program and the clinical areas were divided into prosthodontics and conservative dentistry and were based primarily on the French educational system.⁶³⁵ He separated surgery from general dentistry, obtained the transfer of aesthetic surgery of the face (including cleft lip and palate) into the dental curriculum from the medical department, and introduced orthodontics into the curriculum. The curriculum was also lengthened to four years.⁶³⁶ He published several textbooks for dentists and auxiliary personnel.

3.5 Ear, Nose and Throat

In 1936 Karl Hellmann was invited to Turkey, where he became Professor Ear, Nose and Throat at Istanbul University,⁶³⁷ also replacing another Austrian Professor Erich Ruttin as

⁶³¹ <https://ssrn.com/abstract=764426> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.764426>

⁶³² Sloane Albert E., *Biographical Sketch of Josef Igersheimer. Survey of Ophthalmology*, 1969, pp. 174-175.

⁶³³ <http://wikivisually.com/wiki/Ophthalmologic>.

⁶³⁴ Bali Rifat N., *Sarayın ve Cumhuriyetin Dişçibaşısı- Sami Günzberg (Sami Günzberg the Dentist of the Palace and the Republic)*, Kitapevi Yayınları, İstanbul 2007, p. 40.

⁶³⁵ http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Alfred_Kantorowicz

⁶³⁶ Loevy, Hannelore T.- Kowitz Aletha A., *Alfred Kantorowicz, Pediatric Dentistry Innovator*, Journal of Dentistry for Children 60, 1993, pp. 263-69.

⁶³⁷ Bahar İzzet, *Turkey and the Rescue of European Jews*, Routhledge New York 2015, pp. 61-63.

Director of Ear, Nose and Throat Section of Gürabe Hospital of Istanbul University. Ruttin could not get the support he requested for modernizing the clinic, so when he left Turkey for Austria, Hellmann managed to have the clinic moved to a building in much better condition, increased the number of patients examined, and devised a technique that enabled laryngectomies to be performed in a much shorter period of time.⁶³⁸

3.6 Radiology

German and Austrian specialists (medical practitioners cum scholars, several multi faced intellectuals with expertise in biochemistry, pharmacology, X-Ray physics, engineering and radiology nursing, as well as the life science) introduced many reforms, including radiology. Thus, they introduced radiotherapy, electro diagnostics, electro therapy, diathermy, measurement of radium preparations, control of radioactive materials, control of dosimeters, testing of protective substances, filters and measurement equipment, and so on, as well as, the commensurate knowledge of facilities design, including relative locations of facilities, shielding, and ancillary units.

The first German-Turkish collaboration in the field of radiology was carried out by the so called Frankfurt-Team, but especially one scientist was important: Friedrich Dessauer. He accepted the invitation from Turkey after he had to flee from Germany because of his activities in the Centre Party. He was Director of the Radiology and Biophysics Institute of Istanbul University.⁶³⁹ Dessauer taught medical physics and especially radiology courses in Istanbul at the Radiology Institute.

3.7 Pharmacology

When talking about pharmacology in Turkey, we need to mention Paul Pulewka, because he is the founder of Turkish pharmacology. Even before he got expelled from his post at university, because his wife was Jewish, Pulewka came to Turkey in 1935. He worked at first for the Central Hygiene (Public Health) Institute of the Ministry of Health. When the

⁶³⁸ Shaw Stanford J., *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1993, p. 361.

⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

Ankara Medicine Faculty was founded, Pulewka was named Director of its Pharmacology Institute as well as his director at Refik Saydam Institute.⁶⁴⁰

Although his 5-years contract was not renewed, when Refik Saydam got Prime Minister in 1941 Pulewka was rehired. He even benefited from a big financial amount to equip his laboratory. During his stay in Turkey, Pulewka produced hormone preparations, particularly Insulin; founded the Pharmacology Departments at the Refik Saydam Health Institution and at the Medical Faculty of Ankara University; administered the Materia Medica institute; and served as a member of the Turkish Codification Commission. However, the most significant characteristic of his studies was that they were all directed at local and national problems in Turkey.⁶⁴¹

Moreover, Pulewka established an official pharmacological drug control system in Turkey. Since 1927 Turkey had a drug control system. However, the system only controlled the chemical composition of drugs.⁶⁴² The usage and hazards of drugs were not being controlled. Real drug controls in Turkey only began with the Pulewka initiatives. He made toxicological examinations, developed a filter to be used in cases of water poisoning, examined narcotics, developed many effective drugs for the examination of insects and rats, examined climate and air conditions, studied unexpected deaths that happened during surgical operations, he was a member of the Turkish Drug Commission, a member at intercollegiate associate professorship examinations, publication council member in medical journals, and one of the editors of *Türk İjiyen ve Tecrübi Bijoloji Dergisi* (Turkish Bulletin of Hygiene and Experimental Biology).⁶⁴³ Although Pulewka was so successful in his work he had to experience difficulties at university due to a lack of understanding and interest in original scientific studies during the 1930s/40s in Turkey. He was also the director of Material Medical Institute. He was teaching his students in this Institute to prepare simple drugs and pharmaceuticals as well as synthetic or chemical drug types. Lectures in this institute were being given by pharmacy professors.⁶⁴⁴ Furthermore, he experienced hostilities because he

⁶⁴⁰ Kruppa Wienfried, *Deutsch - Türkischer Wissenschaftsaustausch in der Pharmazie*, Würzburger Medizin historische Forschungen Band 44, Patentsen - Hannover 1988, p. 313.

⁶⁴¹ <http://www.ishim.net/ishimj/910/JISHIM%20NO.10%20PDF/04.pdf>

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Reisman 2009, pp. 200-203.

⁶⁴⁴ <http://www.ishim.net/ishimj/910/JISHIM%20NO.10%20PDF/04.pdf>

refused to become a Turkish citizen. In 1953 Paul Pulewka was dismissed from his position at university.⁶⁴⁵

4 Political

There is also an impact of German intellectuals in the field of Politics. We can divide this impact into two categories, the impact on the new laws and the impact on the development of the economy. The emigre intellectuals were teaching at Universities however they also contributed in the areas of public service. For instance, Ernst E. Hirsh, a legal scholar, contributed to the key laws of the new Republic, Ernst Reuter, an MP and later the mayor of Berlin, worked for the Turkish Ministry of Economics and served as a government advisor on city planning.⁶⁴⁶ Andreas Bertholan Schwartz, also a legal scholar, was advising the parliamentary commissions on many issues. Fritz Neumark, professor of economist, was an advisor to many of the government ministers. Compared to other areas however there was a small number of German intellectuals in the fields of law and economy.⁶⁴⁷ This however does not mean their influence was weak, these emigre intellectuals were very influential in the areas they served. They helped raise the intellectuals of the young Republic, and were respected by almost everyone and mostly by their students who later served the country in many areas. We have listed some of the emigre intellectuals above and will go into more detail later on.

4.1 Law and Economy

With the transition from an Empire to a Republic, naturally many laws were changed or reformed to fit the new Republic. Reforms during the Ottoman Empire began much earlier. However, the Republic needed to be Western in order to be a modern country. Therefore, its laws and economy too, had to be Western. Ataturk was open to the idea of using some of the emigre intellectuals in these fields.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 207-2008.

⁶⁴⁶ Guttstadt Corry, *Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2008, p. 86.

⁶⁴⁷ Kazancıgil Aykut, Ortaylı İlber, Tanyeli Uğur 2000, pp. 119-132.

⁶⁴⁸ Reisman 2009, p. 237.

In the case of the German academics the question was just: Could some of the invited scholars from Germany act as advisors in various ministries as well as teach? Atatürk's response to this question was very positive: Why not? Due to problems in using the new codes and laws, the government began negotiations with those German professors and judicial scholars with the relevant skills who had agreed to immigrate to Turkey.

Several of the emigres who participated in the plots and subterfuge were responsible for Turkish legal reforms. Turkish legal reforms were going to be western, same as the other reforms that took place earlier. This was, because the new republic was oriented at several European countries to reform its legal system.

Ataturk in 1923 gave the following speech in Bursa,

“The new Turkey cannot be tied down to Mecelle (Sharia law), which does not correspond to our needs today. To govern with the laws that were promulgated a hundred, five hundred or a thousand years ago is heedlessness, is ignorance.”

This speech also confirms Ataturk's willingness to change the old laws completely. There were however some issues that had to be tackled before the reforms. Not everyone agreed to the change from a theocratic to a modern secular system. A commission was established to look at the laws of western countries. Particularly the laws of France, Austria, Italy and Switzerland.

“The young republic's penal code was taken from Italy, penal proceedings from Germany, Debts and Obligations law from Switzerland, Commerce law from Germany, France and Italy, and Administrative law from France”⁶⁴⁹ with the writing of these new laws, the Republic did not hesitate to use the emigre professors, who had a good knowledge of the structure of the laws.

The emigre professors were very influential in the writing of the new laws. In particular, there have been four emigres who were very influential in the legal and administrative

⁶⁴⁹ Reisman 2009, p. 236.

reforms that occurred after 1933. Not only were they outstanding teachers, but also advisors whose opinions and ideas were sought by the government.

One of these was Andreas Bertholan Schwarz. Schwarz became a law professor at the Istanbul University after dismissal from the University of Freiburg. Fritz Neumark's remarks about Schwarz explain his character:

...was one of the most impressive and scientifically invaluable persons among us. He had a particular self respect that was commensurate with his abilities. He influenced his colleagues in a permanent fashion, if not his students at first. Even his deep assimilation of the notion of law did not prevent his scotting in a manner based on the hypothesis that a university professor could naturally have a social privilege sometimes, a true hypothesis according to the traditions in Turkey. This cannot be described better by this example. As did many other German refugees, Schwarz lived in Bebek, one of the most beautiful areas of Istanbul. During the war, on a day when certain streets were closed for several hours due to military manoeuvres, thinking that such an interdiction would not be valid for him, he went out of his home in his bathing suit to cross the 20-30 meters which separated his house from the Bosphorus for his daily morning swim. He got arrested by the police immediately and taken to the nearest police station to be interrogated. After it was understood that he is not a "normal" citizen or a spy but a respectable professor in Istanbul University, he survived the interrogation in spite of his interesting costume.⁶⁵⁰

He advised parliamentary commissions and submitted several memoranda for the required changes in law. Thus, he played a significant role in modernising Turkey's Civil laws during the 1930s. Due to his work, the religious marriage law was abolished and civil marriage became obligatory, polygamy was outlawed, equality of husband and wife in the eyes of the law got implemented, as well.

Schwarz also worked at the Law Faculty of Istanbul University and wrote a book on Family law. He influenced Turkish jurists and contributed to the modern conceptualisation of family jurisprudence. Furthermore, Schwarz trained and influenced an entire generation of Turkish

⁶⁵⁰ Neumark 1980, *Seeking Refugees in Bosphorus*.

legal scholars.⁶⁵¹ He made an important contribution to the adoption of western law in Turkey.⁶⁵²

The second influential scholar in the subject of law was Ernst Eduard Hirsch. After he was dismissed from the University of Frankfurt am Main he declined an offer from Amsterdam University, which turned out to be a very wise move. Hirsch then accepted an offer from Turkey. Hirsch came to Turkey in 1933.

He was the youngest emigre professor at the University of Istanbul and wrote numerous books, as well as, articles and submitted a series of reports and memoranda, in the context of commercial law, to the government. Hirsch played an important role in modernising (westernising) Turkey's Commercial Code. Hirsch quickly learned Turkish and even wrote books in this language. He stayed in Istanbul from 1933 to 1943.

Hirsch was a teacher of commercial law and later he also taught philosophy and legal sociology in addition to commercial and maritime law in Ankara. But not only was his work at university important, he also worked as an advisor at the Ministry of Justice and thus influenced public policy and legal structure of Turkey. Hirsch himself designed and wrote many of the laws of Turkey, for example the Commercial law and the Laws on Art and Thought.⁶⁵³ Hirsch also attended many of the meetings of the commission in the Parliament where he was representing the Ministry of Law.⁶⁵⁴ Thus Hirsch was very influential among the Turkish lawyers and Turkish politics. Hirsch liked Turkey so much that he considered it his fatherland.⁶⁵⁵ This was also the same on the Turkish side as he was well respected by almost everyone around him. Hirsch was given Turkish citizenship in 1943, he stayed in the country until in 1952, he returned to West Berlin. Back in Germany he was twice elected the Chancellor of that University but his main intention was to continue teaching.

⁶⁵¹ Reisman 2009, pp. 237-238.

⁶⁵² Shaw 1993, p. 355.

⁶⁵³ Hirsch 1997, p. 371.

⁶⁵⁴ Hirsch 1997, p. 371.

⁶⁵⁵ Reisman 2009, p. 239.

We can see the impact of Hirsh's influence on Turkey in his memoirs.⁶⁵⁶ In the third chapter of this book, Hirsh explains his life in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and Ankara. His works in the faculty of Law and his social life in Istanbul. Additionally, he explains his life in Ankara, his application for and the acceptance of citizenship and the Law faculty post he accepted after he became a citizen. Hirsh was very well aware of his influence on Turkey. He influenced the legal structure and the public policy of Turkey. Additionally Hirsh saw that there was no Law school library at the University, he went onto achieve this aim by asking the rector for the help of his colleagues, he aimed to achieve all this in the summer holidays.⁶⁵⁷ Therefore Hirsh like his other emigre friends not only provided teaching to the University, but also brought the western norms and the University system to the Republic of Turkey, which was what the new Republic was asking for. Many Turkish lawyers and law Professors proudly refer to him as their mentor. One example of this Professor Ünal Tekinalp. The respect Turkish intellectuals had for Hirsh could be seen in the book they wrote for him.⁶⁵⁸ The following quote explains a lot about their view:

As much as the fruitful intellectual works he had, with his outstanding education technique he played an important role in the upbringing of the Lawyers of our country.

Another important scholar was Ernst Reuter. Reuter was more known than the other emigre's in the field of social and legal reform. Reuter had difficult time before coming to Turkey as he was put in concentration camps for being anti Nazi. There he suffered many injuries, One summer when, dressed only in his bathing suit with no shirt on at the swimming pool at Ormançiftlik outside Ankara, he was asked whether the deep wounds on his back were caused while fighting during the First World War, he answered: "*Concentration camp.*"⁶⁵⁹ After escaping from the camp with his friends and he went on a long journey to England then to Turkey and arrived in Istanbul in 1935. An old friend of Reuters, Cevat Dursunoglu who was a diplomat in Berlin for Turkey and later a high official for the government, helped him come to Turkey. In Istanbul he met his friends Martin Wagner and Fritz Baaede which

⁶⁵⁶ Hirsh Ernst Eduard, *Memoirs: Age of Kaiser, Weimar Republic, Country of Ataturk*, Tubitak, Ankara 1997, C. 3

⁶⁵⁷ Hirsch 1997, p. 241.

⁶⁵⁸ Topçuoğlu. Karayalçın. Akipek. Özmen, *Gratitude to Professor Ernst Hirsch*, Ankara University Law Faculty Publishers, Ankara 1964, P. 197.

⁶⁵⁹ Erkönen Kudret, *Reuters Family in Ankara*, Ankara 1978, pp. 25 – 26.

helped him in his first days. He moved to Ankara to start his work.⁶⁶⁰ Reuters learned Turkish very quickly and had good relations with locals

He did not only work as a tax socialist in the Ministry of Economy and subsequently in the Ministry of Transportation in Ankara where he wrote many reports and made a lot of contribution, but also as a professor of community sciences with a focus on urban planning, urban architecture, municipal finance administration and environmental management at the School of Public Administration. Reuter was a technical advisor to the Turkish government and thus prepared the statute, which founded the institute for urban settlement and city building at the faculty of political science in Ankara. His suggestions to the government were included in Article 116 of the Turkish Constitution from 1961 and in Article 127, from 1982, which state that the central government distributes public funds proportionally among the local governments.

Reuters publications can be listed as follows:

- Entry to Urbanisation
- Municipal Finance
- Solutions to the problems of rural areas
- Financial situation of Istanbul Municipality
- Report on the Economy of Istanbul Municipality
- Close Transportation
- Reports on Banks
- Conferences for Governors

From all of his works the '*Social Science: Introduction to City Planning*' was the most well known and used. Also Reuter's students; who became professors, city majors, governors, government officials and general directors; made their impact on the administrative structure and political development of Turkey, especially from 1950 to 1975⁶⁶¹ Reuters returned to Germany in 1946 and became the first mayor of post-World War II Berlin. Reuters was a hero at the time when he showed determination against the Russian blockade to the city in

⁶⁶⁰ Reisman 2009, p. 241.

⁶⁶¹ Reisman 2009, pp. 240-242

1948-49. Which again shows his outstanding character. His aim of creating an institute for urbanisation was unfortunately not achieved until just after his death in 1953, which was 7 years after his request.

Richard Honig was also an important figure in the area of law. Honig was brought from Gottingen in 1933, for the areas of criminal law, Law Philosophy and Church Laws. He gave lessons on Law Philosophy and history of Law. Considering his short stay, he wrote many law textbooks, and wrote many Turkish articles and even made research into the field of History of Law in Turkey. Honig was very talented, having characteristics such as playing chess and painting in his spare time according to his friend Nissen. For his relatively short stay Honig made an important impact at the University level.

Another important figure in the field of law is Karl Strupp. Strupp, a law professor only lived in Istanbul for two years. He came from Frankfurt am Main University and started teaching State Law at Istanbul University. Some argue that the reason for him being invited to Istanbul was his interest in the Turk-Greek relations. As there were turbulences between these countries especially at that time. However due to the different weather conditions of this country he only lived in Turkey for two years and had to return back home in 1935.⁶⁶² After teaching for some time in Denmark, Switzerland and Netherlands he died in Paris in 1940. Although he only lived for two years in Turkey, his book: *Eléments du Droit International Public Universel, Européen et Americain* was translated to Turkish much before he came to the Turkey, which shows his influence on the subject of law.

Fritz Neumark contributed a lot to the modernisation of the Turkish legal system and had a great impact on the countries economy. Neumark had to leave Germany after he was dismissed from the University of Frankfurt in 1933. He signed five-year contract which was renewable with Cemal Hüsnü, the Turkish Ambassador to Switzerland. Neumark was one of the remarkable characters among all of the emigre intellectuals. He learned Turkish extremely quickly and wrote and lectured in Turkish within two years. Because of his proficiency in Turkish and his success as a professor his contact was renewed and he stayed for a long time in Turkey.⁶⁶³ Neumark became a professor of economics and public finance

⁶⁶² Widmann Horst, *Ataturk and University Reform*, Kabalcı Publishers, Istanbul 1999.

⁶⁶³ Reisman 2009, p. 243.

at the Faculty Of Law, later when the discipline of economics was separated from the law faculty, Neumark became the Chair of Public Finance.

One might call him the most important contributor to the modernisation of the Turkish public sector due to his influence within the group of policy makers in Turkey. Neumark was firstly a professor for social hygiene and statistics, as well as, an advisor to many government ministries. Furthermore, Neumark gave a series of lectures, which had a threefold objective in the provinces, this was, because he wanted to educate and increase the knowledge of the general population, to educate the government staff and to familiarise himself with the economic structure of the country. Due to this, he gained knowledge, which he used in analysis in frequently requested reports he submitted to various ministries and policy makers. Neumark advised in agricultural and industrial problems, planning and etatism, public administration, monetary policy and taxation. For instance, he suggested that land holdings needed to be redistributed and to improve productive technology. Moreover, Neumark suggested expanding the mining industry. At all, he was in favour of encouraging industrialisation and against excessive etatism which was quite high at that time. The administration accepted Neumark's opinion and thus the Lira was devalued, for example. He also published several books, but his most important report was the "Report on the Principles of Rational Processes in Public Offices and Institutions". In this report Neumark identified the imbalance in the employment in public offices and enterprises, as well as, lacking networking between them; inefficient management; a lack of inspections and transparency; and he called for tax reforms. Especially, to work on tax reforms a commission was founded. However, the proposals in Neumark's report have been the basis of today's tax system which again shows his influence in the field of economics. Thus, Fritz Neumark can be seen as the architect of the new tax system. Neumark had an impact on the establishment of state factories and overall he had a "know-how" transfer impact to the young Republic. He worked with very important people in their own field for example Nurullah Esad Sümer the head of Sümerbank and later the finance minister. Therefore, he had close contacts within the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Turkey.

Neumark became a Turkish citizen after his third contract. Neumark also had other important aims in the country, Neumark wanted to educate and increase the knowledge of the general population; he wanted to educate the government staff; and he wanted to familiarise himself

with the economic structure of the country in which he had taken refuge.⁶⁶⁴ Neumark was also very much respected and admired by his students.⁶⁶⁵ There were very successful students of Neumark, Sabri Ülgener, Orhan Dikmen and Memduh Yaşa for instance. Nissen also in his book talks about Neumark and his achievements,

*From all of those that newly arrived, he adapted very easily with his Turkish colleagues and students. This was not just because of his perfect French (the most used foreign language in Turkey), but also because he managed to learn Turkish in a very short time. He was the first to teach in the country's own language. As an expert he would be asked and sought after for any of the economic problems that the country faced.*⁶⁶⁶

Neumark returned back to Germany to teach in Frankfurt University in 1952 and twice became a rector at this university.

Another economist was Gerhard Kessler, Kessler came to Istanbul after he was arrested by the Nazi's in Leipzig. Kessler was very close to his students in Istanbul, he even invited them to his home sometimes. Like the other emigre professors, he not only worked in his own field economics, but also contributed and taught Literature and Law.

Kessler contributed a lot to his university, he re-organised the Economics Faculty library. Kessler contributed to the development of the Social Policy of Turkey. He pointed out the problems he thought that should be tackled, in his books, his articles, conferences, and in his talks with others. Kessler wrote 4 textbooks in his field which highly contributed in the economics area. Kessler returned back to Germany in 1951, and gave conferences at the Gottingen University till 1958.

Alexander Rüstow was a manager in the German machine building industry. According to Nissen he was a neoliberalist and was completely against the Nazi ideology. Which explains why he migrated to Turkey. On the other hand, in Turkey he became a University lecturer in 1933, Istanbul. Rüstow gave lectures on economics and economic geography. Additionally, he gave lectures on the history of Philosophy at the Literature faculty.

⁶⁶⁴ Volker Wolf, *Fritz Neumark Emigrationsziel Türkei: Deutsche Wissenschaftler*, Berlin 2006, p.73.

⁶⁶⁵ Andic Fuat. Andic Suphan, *Fritz Neumark, Teacher and Reformer: A Turkish View*, Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Tübingen 1981.

⁶⁶⁶ Nissen, p. 213.

Furthermore, Rustow published his papers and books in Turkish. His contributions were in many fields and he was known for being very serious about his work.⁶⁶⁷

Rüstow was known for his traditional seriousness in his academic work. He worked as a multidisciplinary professor and contributed in many fields. Rüstow worked with Reuter and Breush to help establish an organisation to help the emigres. Rüstow returned back to Germany to continue his work at the Heidelberg University and retired at a very old age in 1963.

Another emigre, who contributed to the further development of the Turkish economy, was Fritz Baade. According to Reismann Baade:

...introduced standardisation of raisins and the drying of apricots and other fruit as required by importers in western countries. Baade organized Turkish food processors and thought them how to make their final products uniform, be properly packaged in order to have the greatest shelf life, remain at highest quality and therefor be sought after by the more sophisticated purchasers, and fetch the highest price.⁶⁶⁸

Thus he was one of the main contributors to Turkey's agrarian economy. Furthermore, Baade founded a spa in Kirsehir and a crafts industry out of the remains left by chalky sea waters.

Also Alfred Isaak played a major role in Turkey's economy. He taught Business Management as a professor at the Faculty of Economics at Istanbul University and advised the Ankara government on the mission for and organisation of its Ministry of Labor. Thus Isaak had a major role in formulating Turkey's laws on social insurance and therefore social welfare. Moreover, he introduced the educational discipline of Managerial Economics and trained Turkish economists, as well as, financial experts.⁶⁶⁹

Wilhelm Röpke was brought with Rüstow in 1933 to form an economics institute in Istanbul. He formed the Economics faculty in 1936, which was separated from the Law faculty. Röpke

⁶⁶⁷ Widmann 1999, P. 199.

⁶⁶⁸ Reisman 2009, p. 118.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 121.

was an important economist and he worked as a professor of economics for 4 years. Röpke for his short stay in Istanbul, wrote Turkish books however he was not as effective as others as he stayed for a very short time. Röpke was a Neoliberal and he and the other emigre intellectuals had an important influence of neoliberalism in Turkey. In 1937 he was invited to the “*Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales*” in Geneva, where he stayed and taught for the rest of his life.

Josef Dobrestberger also stayed for a very short time. He thought at the Istanbul University for 4 years. He wrote some textbooks for students, his most known work is on Political Economy.⁶⁷⁰ After Istanbul, Dobrestberger went to Cairo University in 1941, as a professor. There he made English broadcasts to Germany from the radio.⁶⁷¹ In 1964 he returned back to Germany to become the rector of the University of Graz. He taught here for a very long time.

Alfred Isaac, was responsible for teaching business at the Economics faculty. He came to Istanbul in 1933. Before that he was teaching at the Nurnberg Business School. Isaac was very important for Turkey. He was an outstanding professor in his field. During his stay in Turkey for 13 years he was very successful in his publishing career, he wanted to improve and make his subject more known in Turkey. He wrote books, textbooks, leaflets, magazines, articles etc. About his subject. He and Kessler spent a lot of time together. As they were colleagues and were both emigre in Turkey. Kessler said the following about Isaac:

*When he came to Istanbul, there were small number of books in his field, therefore Isaac astonishingly started writing many books. Because of this, Isaac was known by the economists of his time and was respected by everyone. Labour Ministry, asked for his advice for Social Security and payments when there were issues in this field. But his biggest contribution was his teachings at the University. He improved his conference subjects and asked his 3 assistants to continue to work in this field. His students and assistants liked him and were very respectful to him. He was an outstanding lecturer, a very helpful person towards his colleagues, to the institute and the faculty. He and his wife were rightfully loved and respected by his German and Turkish colleagues.*⁶⁷²

⁶⁷⁰ Dobrestberger Josef, *Political Economy, Istanbul 1940*.

⁶⁷¹ Widmann 1999, p. 202.

⁶⁷² From a letter wrote by Kessler to an Economist W. Hasenack which was published, 11.7. 1950.

Isaac was very modest among his friends, he was also teaching in Turkish like his other friends such as Neumar and Hirsh.⁶⁷³ He returned back to Germany in 1950. There he continued his teaching career at the Gottingen University and later in 1952 at the Nurnberg University. He retired from teaching in 1955 and died in Nurnberg in 1956.

*It can be rightfully said that the emigre professors were the first to introduce management, public administration, business economics, accounting, and western law as university level curricula in Turkey. They also wrote the needed textbooks.*⁶⁷⁴

Thus, all of the emigre intellectuals had a big influence on Turkey's economy. The influence of these emigre professors to the Laws and the Economy of Turkey continue today. Turkey's Commercial Code which was originally developed and modified by the emigre professors, is used to this day in harmony with its western counterparts. When we look at Turkey's economy for many years the economic policy was in line with Neumar's teachings and views. Thus the impact of the German emigres on the Laws and the Economy was tremendously important and influential in the formation and in the following years of the Republic of Turkey.

5 Urban Planning

With the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 after the war of independence there had been a fresh start for Turkey. The newly established state had required assistance, mostly in fields of architecture and planning in order to achieve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his fellow statesmen's objectives, as the Kemalist ideology envisaged Turkish cities to form an anti-thesis in their clarity to the classical Ottoman towns⁶⁷⁵, which were shaped spontaneously according to Islamic principles and monarchic rules, characterized with organic, narrow streets and compact chaotic layouts.⁶⁷⁶ Consequently the Turkish Government had begun to invite foreign experts to give advice and assistance on development issues, and in the

⁶⁷³ Widmann 1999, p. 203.

⁶⁷⁴ Reisman 2009, p. 128.

⁶⁷⁵ Doğramacı B, *Architecture Politics and Culture Transfer: German Speaking Architects, Planners and Sculptors during the Establishment of Turkish Capital Ankara*, LIT Verlag, Berlin 2007, pp. 95-

126.

⁶⁷⁶ Aktüre S, *The Islamic Anatolian City*, Environmental Design: Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre, 1989, pp. 68-79.

following decades approximately forty German, Austrian and Swiss architects came to practice in Turkey.⁶⁷⁷

The German urban planner Hermann Jansen was responsible for the creation of a unique urban plan for Ankara in 1934. Jansen was an urban planner but he also worked as an architect. He was educated at the Technical University of Aachen. *“New kinds of structures and spaces were instruments for cultivating a new kind of public thinking and practice. At the same time, these structures and spaces also served visual expressions of revolutionary ideas and material confirmations of revolutionary success. The new architecture was a vehicle for implementing an legitimizing nation-building”*⁶⁷⁸ In changing the appearance of the city, Ankara was supposed to show a clear cut from the Ottoman period. The condition in which Jansen was chosen to design Ankara was that:

- A 300,000 population for the next fifty years.
- Construction of a new city other than the existing historical city.
- Main road arteries

The Ankara Urban Plan was going to be very modern. Jansen's plan included trees being planted along the roads, the buildings would be designed so that they would not exceed four stories. The development would continue on two directions and would intersect at Kizilay Square. The plan envisioned a garden city idea with huge green areas inside and outside of the city.⁶⁷⁹ Some modifications were needed to make the plan work. The Gazi Forest Farm was extended to the city, which meant that there was a continuity of greenery in the city. The plan was drawn in 1928 and was intended for a population of three hundred thousand at most. The city would have large faultless streets, proud buildings, a stadium, airport, schools, and institutes, and later all of these were created with people's effort, without the help of foreign capital.⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁷ Tümer G, *The Issue of Foreign Architects during the Republican Period*, Mimarlar Odası Branch, Izmir 1998.

⁶⁷⁸ Reismann 2009, p. 138.

⁶⁷⁹ Günay B, *The formation of the minor area of Ankara and Evaluation of the Nazım Plan*, pp. 71-73.

⁶⁸⁰ Caner Dilek İnci, *Ankara as the Capital of Turkey: Its Planning and Development in Early Republican Period*

For the Ankara Urban Plan, Leon Jausseley, Hermann Jansen and M. Brix were invited to offer proposals.⁶⁸¹ Atatürk himself studied the plans and was approved by Law on July 23, 1932 and implemented on June 9, 1934. The new capital was to be a symbol of Turkey's modern future and a strong contrast to the country's ancient past, epitomized by Istanbul. The city would expand on the axis of Cankaya-Telsizler and an Industrial quarter would be built behind the Central Railways Terminal.⁶⁸² Jansen also worked in other cities especially in Adana where he was appointed to develop a plan to shape the future physical structure of the city in 1932. Also other German architect influenced urban planning in Turkey.

Architect, Martin Wagner, who worked as a consultant for Istanbul and at the same time he taught at the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy. Wagner studied architecture in Dresden and Berlin. He worked as a city official in northern Germany. He became the head planner of Berlin, after world war I in 1926. He built modernist buildings such as the "Hufeisensiedlung". Wagner ran into trouble soon after the Nazis took power in 1933. He was expelled from the Werkbund and lost his position with the city administration of Berlin. As a result, Wagner left Germany for Turkey in 1935. He became a lecturer and adviser to the state government where he influenced the city planning activities of the government, working in Istanbul and Ankara. However, he left Turkey to go to work in the United States in 1938.

The impact of emigre intellectuals was also very important in the field of urban planning as we have seen. They designed the capital of Turkey and were given very big funds and resources to complete these important works, which also included other cities of the country. The modernisation of Turkey had to be in all levels and urban planning and city life was an important part of this work. As unlike the western countries, Turkish Republic did not start the urbanisation process as thoroughly as the countries in the west had done.

⁶⁸¹ Tankut G, *The Problems of Implementing the Jansen Plan and The View of The Democratic Republic Towards Urban Planning (Jansen Planı: Uygulama Sorunları ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisinin Kent Planına Yaklaşımı)*, Tarih İçinde Ankara, p.307.

⁶⁸² Reisman 2009, p. 127.

6 Culture

6.1 Library

The important work of German librarians played an important role. Professor Ernst E. Hirsch made a great contribution to the establishment of the Faculty of Law in Ankara University. He worked and studied in Istanbul University Faculty of Law between the years 1933 and 1942, and at Ankara University Faculty of Law between 1943 and 1952. During his academic life in Turkey, Hirsch wrote a book on improving the country's university system. The book,⁶⁸³ titled *World Universities and Development of Universities in Turkey*, was completed in 1946 and published in 1950.

His book also comprised discussions and proceedings about *university libraries*, emphasized the significant need to establish a National Library and demanded the provision of a special law for the education and training of Turkish librarians. Hirsch criticized an issue in Malche's report regarding the Law Library.

Malche pointed out the poor situations of the Medical Library and praised the conditions of Law Library in Istanbul University. However, according to Hirsch, the books in the Law Library were old fashioned records from the Ottoman period and written in the Ottoman alphabet. In other words, they were outdated resources for Hirsch.⁶⁸⁴ For similar reasons, in 1934 Istanbul University's Academic Board of Professors appointed Hirsch to work towards the establishment of a new Law Library in conjunction with the needs of the Faculty of Law. The Board supplied an adequate budget, but there were no librarians. So Hirsch himself, along with his young Turkish law assistants, started book acquisitions and then catalogued all the new books.⁶⁸⁵ They designed their own classification system and subject headings. This library was run successfully by Hirsch and his assistants. Hirsch's contributions were

⁶⁸³ Katipoğlu Serdar, *Academic Librarianship in Turkey: The Historical Context*, International Journal of Legal Information: Vol. 38: Issue 2 Summer 2010, pp. 151-53.

⁶⁸⁴ Hirsch Ernst E., *Anılarım: Kayzer Dönemi, Weimar Cumhuriyeti, Atatürk Ülkesi*, Tübitak Yayınları, Ankara 1997, p. 239.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

not limited to these efforts. He also prepared the Turkish Law Bibliography for the period between 1934 and 1940, which is the first serious study in the realm of law bibliography.⁶⁸⁶

Another German professor influential in the development of Turkish libraries was Gerhard Kessler. He was a professor at Istanbul University. He founded the library for the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences in 1937. The collection had more than 50,000 books. Professor Kessler classified and catalogued the books in this library as a volunteer. Walter Gottschalk was specially invited, as a librarian, to work in Istanbul University Libraries. He was there between 1941 and 1954.⁶⁸⁷ He previously worked at the Prussia State Library. Gottschalk was responsible for the coordination of the libraries at Istanbul University. He also consulted for the public libraries in İzmir and Bursa.⁶⁸⁸

The German librarians contributed greatly to the organisation of a modern European university system in Turkey.⁶⁸⁹ But not only librarians, also bookbinders and restorer came to Turkey.

6.2 Literature

In the case of literature Germans had a big influence on Turkey, as well. One of the greatest contributions to the national translation project was the work of an emigre professor Geord Rohde, professor of Philology⁶⁹⁰ and Ancient Languages at Ankara University, who organized a program for the translation together with the Ministry of Education. In the year 1933, Hans Reichenbach came to Turkey and began teaching in the Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University. He was invited by the Turkish government to establish a modern Philosophy department and was appointed as its first chairperson. This was part of a much bigger movement of reforming Istanbul University as a whole scientists and technical

⁶⁸⁶ Hirsch Ernst E., *Türk Hukuk Bibliyografyası: 1934-1940*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 6, 1940, pp. 860-992.

⁶⁸⁷ Katipoğlu 2010, p. 153.

⁶⁸⁸ Üstün 2004, pp. 11-35.

⁶⁸⁹ Reisman 2009, p. 66

⁶⁹⁰ Shaw Stanford J., *The Jews of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1991, p. 252.

personell.⁶⁹¹ At the University of Ankara, Rohde not only founded the Institute for Classical Philology but also built its library.

He also played an advisory role in the selection of works for the Translations from World Literature series and translated along with his assistants.⁶⁹² The translation Bureau employed several very talented translators. Most were ethnic Turks.⁶⁹³ This played an important role for Turkey's modernisation. The publication of this literature was also supported by the IS Bank, which established its own Cultural Publications Department. Furthermore, a state-sponsored translation bureau was founded in 1940.⁶⁹⁴

6.3 Archaeology

Consequently, the Ottoman Darülfünun had the lectures of archaeology and over the years, its faculty taught archaeology courses. In spite of all incompleteness, archaeology was practiced in Istanbul Museum of Archaeology. Surely Turkey's aristocracies did not want to live in the past. They found much of their more recent cultural legacy ideologically repugnant. Nevertheless, they were convinced that all history needs to be discovered, preserved, and studied. With the result that, among the invited German professors had capabilities to do all this.

Also the importance of German scientists in the field of Archaeology is not to underestimate. For instance, Helmut Ritter was invited to work as a lecturer at the department of Arabic-Persian Philology of Istanbul University in 1933. He founded the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul and served as its director.⁶⁹⁵ Moreover, he founded also the International Oriental Society and published its journal *Oriens*. In 1935 Ritter became professor of

⁶⁹¹ Irzik Gürol – Güzeldere Güven, *Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*, Springer, Dordrecht the Netherlands 2005, p. 2.

⁶⁹² Gürçaglar Şehnaz Tahir- Paker Saliha- Milton John, *Tradition, Tension and Translation in Turkey*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam 2015, p. 116.

⁶⁹³ Reisman 2009, p. 81.

⁶⁹⁴ Reisman 2009, pp. 76-78.

⁶⁹⁵ Müller Hildegard, *German Librarians in Exile in Turkey 1933-1945*, *Libraries & Culture* Vol. 33, No. 3, *Orientalist Libraries and Orientalism* 1998, pp. 294-305.

Arabic, Turkish and Persian Philosophy at the University of Istanbul.⁶⁹⁶ He knew Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Hebrew and Syriac. Afterwards in 1938 he was appointed as a professor.

Prof. Dr. Ritter is known for his contributions regarding the acknowledgement of philological investigations and methods. He played a major role in establishing The Oriental Research Center. Prof. Dr. Ritter, who is one of the most respected researchers in Orientalism.⁶⁹⁷

One of them was Hans Gustav Güterbock, who served on the staff of the Berlin Museum from 1933 to 1935 and participated in archaeological expeditions to Boghazköy, Turkey. He received his Ph.D. from Leipzig University in 1934 but soon left Germany because, under Nazi racial laws, he could not find employment in his field. Güterbock was a faculty member at Ankara University in Turkey from 1936 until 1948, where he trained the first generation of Turkish Hittitologists and archaeologists.⁶⁹⁸ One of the few non-Turkish Hittitologists who spoke the Turkish language like a native, he was inducted into a select group of the Turkish Historical Society and granted an honorary doctorate by the University of Ankara.

Güterbock was archaeologist, philologist, and historian, perhaps the last of such polyhistorians. His students and colleagues find his greatest influence in the philological area, but he considered himself, and was proud to be, an archaeologist.⁶⁹⁹

Clemens Bosch was a German scholar who began his academic career in the field of ancient history in Germany and left his country for Istanbul because of his wife's Jewish heritage at a period which he might have been very productive as an academician. When he was in Istanbul he apparently converted to Islam and took the Turkish name Emin. Clemens Emin Bosch, who lived approximately twenty years in Istanbul and died there, is widely known for his studies in the field of ancient numismatics.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁶ Reisman 2009, p. 65.

⁶⁹⁷ Müller 1998, pp. 294-305.

⁶⁹⁸ <http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/000413/obit.shtml>

⁶⁹⁹ Reiner Erica, *Hans Gustav Güterbock Biographical Memoirs*, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 146, No. 3, September 2002, p. 294.

⁷⁰⁰ Tekin Oğuz – Tekin Nil Türker, *Clemens Emin Bosch (1899-1955) Biography of a Refugee Academician*, Akmed Yayınları, 2007, İstanbul, p. 257.

6.4 Architecture

Architecture was another form of expressing the change and development in the newly formed republic. In order to build a new and modern city, architects with new and modern ideas were needed. Atatürk was already acquainted with the urban planners, many of whom were German. New ideas had been developing in Germany since the war and architectural changes were being promoted in conceptual terms that were appealing. This was a way to make a clean departure from the nineteenth century and be viewed by the world as modern and forward thinking.⁷⁰¹

Holzmeister was perhaps one of the most well known architect who worked in Turkey. He designed many institutions and was known for his creativity and culture in Austria. Holzmeister designed many of the most important buildings of the Republic of Turkey. He was perhaps respected so much because he was strongly against fascism. Holzmeister was expelled from his work at Vienna and Düsseldorf due to his views. Before he came to Turkey, in Vienna he was also involved in the projects that were happening in Turkey. One of his biggest projects was the new General Staff Building in Ankara which was designed in 1927. Due to his works in Turkey he would regularly travel to here. But his most important work in Turkey was the design of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Due to the problems in Vienna, he arrived in Turkey in February 1938, he had won the international competition for the design of the Turkish Grand National Assembly back in Vienna and was then the Administrator of Vienna's Fine Arts Academy's Architectural Section so Turkey did not hesitate to accept him.

Holzmeister was also teaching at the Istanbul Technical University from 1940 to 1954. In 1950, Holzmeister was reinstated to his former position in Vienna. He returned back to Vienna later in 1954. He retired from Istanbul Technical University and served at the Viennese academy till 1957. His work was not just based in Turkey, Holzmeister planned 700 projects in Austria, Italy, Germany and Turkey. He never lost contact with Turkey and he visited regularly.

⁷⁰¹ Reisman 2009, p. 142.

Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky another emigre architect was famous for her kitchen design. She was an extraordinary woman. Schütte-Lihotzky demonstrated this by winning a housing competition while she was a student at the Vienna School for Applied Arts. She studied under Josef Hoffman and Heinrich Tessenow. Schütte-Lihotzky accepted an invitation to work in Turkey in 1938. She was invited to Turkey because she epitomized several of the goals and objectives of the Republic's fathers. Furthermore, that she was a female was of significant importance and an important signal sent by the young Turkish Republic's leaders.⁷⁰² Lihotzky also represented the *Neuen Bauens*, which meant New Constructions.

Schütte-Lihotzky can be credited as being the first to introduce the women's perspective into architectural design. Although she may not have spent a great deal of time in Turkey, the role she provided can be credited for the fact that currently more than a third of practicing architects in Turkey are women!⁷⁰³

Bruno Taut was another important architect in the modernisation period of Turkey. He was a Lecturer at the Istanbul Technical University and the Istanbul Academy of Fine Arts. "*All nationalist architecture is bad, but all good architecture is national,*" his motto was famous among his students in Istanbul.⁷⁰⁴ In Ankara, he designed several public buildings. Taut was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and thus in 1932 left Germany to go and live there. However, he returned a year later in 1933, where he witnessed a very different, more dangerous political environment. He was forced to flee to Switzerland after he was named a Bolshevik by the Nazi's. After Switzerland he went to Japan, here he wrote three important books on Japanese culture and architecture, and worked in the area of furniture and interior design. In October 1936, he accepted an offer to work as a Professor of Architecture at Istanbul Technical University. In Turkey he wrote one more book and designed buildings in Ankara. Additionally, he worked as the chief architect of the Ministry of Education and Public Works. While in Istanbul, Taut repeatedly made use of the similar sun-shading devices not only in his own house in Ortaköy, but also in order to bring natural light deeper into the classrooms of a number of school buildings that he designed in Ankara, Izmir, and

⁷⁰² Reisman 2009, p. 148.

⁷⁰³ The Chamber of Architects of Turkey

⁷⁰⁴ Taut Bruno, *Lectures on Architecture*, Fine Arts Academy, Istanbul 1938, p. 333.

Trabzon, Turkey.⁷⁰⁵ The following are part of his works, the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography building, the Ankara Atatürk Lycee, the Trabzon Lycee, and the Cebeci Secondary School.

Taut was a very controversial character, he published very debatable works. He was born in Königsberg and later studied there and went to work in Berlin. Taut wrote a lot but many of these were never translated into English. He had a special place of all the architects that visited Turkey. He was given the honourable job of designing Atatürk's catafalque. He died the following month after this work. Just months before his death, produced a sketch design for the Grand National Assembly without officially entering the competition.⁷⁰⁶ It was just a "conceptual exercise" that to a certain extent also catered to the prevailing nationalist sentiments. It was on the top of the hill overlooking Ankara's government complex, Taut's project carried reminiscences of his expressionistic Stadtkrone projects of 1919. The project description accompanying the sketches combined the quasi-religious and spiritual overtones of expressionism with the democratic ideals of the nation-state and resorted to classical analogies.⁷⁰⁷ After his death he was buried in Istanbul's Martyr's cemetery, which also shows his importance.

Some say that the Turkish architecture reforms, sadly, were similar in some ways to the contemporaneous Nazi reforms. Though certainly nowhere near as brutal, both governments eliminated a high level of culture that was politically expedient in an effort to transform society, thought and attitudes. Like German science, Turkish architecture has never recovered its respective qualitative, distinctive stylistic edge.⁷⁰⁸

6.5 Arts and Music

Atatürk did not only aim to modernise the universities, science, medicine, law, economy and urban planning, he also aimed to create a modern twentieth century society. One of the most important areas of the reform that required to be reviewed were the visual arts and music,

⁷⁰⁵ Erdim Burak, *from Germany to Japan and Turkey: Modernity, Locality, and Bruno Taut's Transnational Details from 1933 to 1938*, Lunch 2, Journal of the University of Virginia School of Architecture, Virginia 2007, p. 103-115.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ Bozdogan 2001, P. 282.

⁷⁰⁸ Reisman 2009, p. 161.

which played a crucial role in shaping the society. While Atatürk was contemporizing Turkey, firstly the national culture came out and Turkish enlightenment was fed with neo-nationalist culture.⁷⁰⁹

Turkey's founders recognized the fact that some architects are good artists and that some sculptors could play a role in educating architects. Hence, there were a number of cross-disciplinary academic appointments between the visual arts and architecture.⁷¹⁰ The staff of the Fine Arts Academy was reinforced with new members parallel to contemporary understandings identifying with the cultural life of the Republican Period. German sculptors Rudolf Belling and Josef Thorak were invited to Turkey to be a teacher of the sculpture department in 1937 with this point of view.⁷¹¹ In 1937, Belling became Head of the Sculpture Studio at the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul. Belling greatly influenced many Turkish sculptors. Turkish students have been sent abroad. In this context it is important to know that sculptors have not been allowed under Ottoman law, but from 1923.⁷¹²

German emigres played an important role for music, as well. Several German musicians have been responsible to bring Western music and opera to Turkey. Some of them have been Paul Hindemith, Carl Ebert, Ernst Praetorius and Eduard Zuckmayer.

Thus, the Ministry of Education asked Cevat Dursunoglu, who was a school inspector in Berlin in 1934, to find an expert for the organisation of the conservatory. As a result of the investigations, Dursunoglu invited German Paul Hindemith to Turkey, and after signing the contract on 27 March 1935, Hindemith started his studies. Hindemith was asked to consider our music works nationwide and to prepare his reports in this direction.⁷¹³

Paul Hindemith, was commissioned by the Turkish government to reorganize the country's musical education, in 1935, and was given the task of preparing material for the *Universal and Turkish Polyphonic Music Education Program* for all music related institutions in

⁷⁰⁹ Gülşen G. Erdal, *Academics coming to Turkey between 1933-1945 opened and their effects on today's music life*, *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 55, 2012, p. 1222.

⁷¹⁰ Reisman 2009, p. 94.

⁷¹¹ Bozdoğan Sibel, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early*, University of Washington Press, Singapore 2001, p. 284.

⁷¹² Reisman 2009, p. 258.

⁷¹³ Gülşen 2012, p. 1222.

Turkey. It can be seen that a western oriented conservatory was established with Hindemith and institutional regulations were designed in a national structure under the control of state.⁷¹⁴

Furthermore, he was requested by the government to investigate the musical culture in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul and to make recommendations for musical education in the new republic. Hindemith's proposals became the the road map for the Ministry of Education. Thus, Paul Hindemith not only created the plan for Turkey's music education system during the early years of the republic, but was also in charge of that plans implementation. He tried to restructure both the musical administration and the curricula in the schools of the three biggest cities. Moreover, Hindemith had the idea of creating an opera in Turkey and the Ankara State Conservatory owed much of his efforts.⁷¹⁵

Carl Ebert has been very influential, too. He was invited to Turkey to develop the opera and an infrastructure that would allow for performances, as well as, education. Thus, state conservatory classes were first held at the Musiki Muallim Mektebi in the 1935-36 academic term and all aspects of musical education, included opera and theatre instruction, got implemented.⁷¹⁶ Ebert directed the Ankara Conservators Theatre School, as well as, Theatre Studio and founded a *practice theatre* where opera and drama students could appear in public performances. In addition, he founded and directed the Turkish State School of Opera and Drama and he directed the Turkish State Theatre. Carl Ebert also served as an official advisor on theatrical affairs to the Turkish ministry of Education.⁷¹⁷

Unfortunately, about the work of Ernst Praetorius is not that much known, but he was appointed as a conductor of the Turkish Presidency's Symphonic Orchestra. In contrast, Eduard Zuckmayer taught at the Conservatory and State Music School in Ankara.⁷¹⁸ One might call him the leading figure in the world of music education in Turkey. First,

⁷¹⁴ Saritaş Eyup, *Interdisciplinary Studies in Turkey: New Ideas New Strategies*, Trafford Publishing, New York 2016, p. 96.

⁷¹⁵ Reisman 2009, pp. 271-78.

⁷¹⁶ Yüksel Ayşegül, *The Role of Theatre in Transforming The Small Ottoman Town of Ankara into The Westernized Capital of Modern Turkey*, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 35- Sayı:1, Ankara 1991, p. 310.

⁷¹⁷ Reisman 2009, pp. 278-283.

⁷¹⁸ Gülşen 2012, p. 1223.

Zuckmayer taught at the *Müzik Konservatuvari* in Ankara, and then for many years in the school teacher-training program at the Gazi Enstitüsü Ankara. Furthermore, he was teacher of music theory and choir director at Ankara's Conservatory.⁷¹⁹

All in all, German emigres created conservatories, symphony orchestras, arts academies and introduced opera in Turkey.

⁷¹⁹ Reisman 2009, 285.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis which is about the knowledge transfer from Germany to Turkey, it stands out that there is a long history of Turkish-German relations. Already during the time of the Ottoman empire these countries worked together especially in military affairs, therefore cultural and industrial relations already existed. With the founding of the Republic of Turkey the relations continued, although they have been more restricted to economic connections.

The bilateral relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany can be broadly distinguished into four phases. For Germany, under Bismarck, the Ottoman Empire played only a role, if the relations to the other major powers were affected. This can be clearly seen on the process and outcome of the Berlin Congress. Furthermore, the Orient was important for Bismarck with respect to his domestic policy. Turkey became a mean to utilize the existing desires of the expansion of the empire and to involve relevant interest groups, such as colonial associations.

With the succession to the throne of William II and after Bismarck's dismissal, the trend continued. The Ottoman Empire was of great importance for Germany. In particular, the political efforts were increased to penetrate Turkey economically and thus increase the influence. But clearly there was the attempt of the German leadership to put an emphasis on political interests before the economical ones.

The objective of the Turkish policy was always to achieve a balance between the great powers regarding their country. The Ottoman Empire, which had to overcome the contradiction between an anachronistic system of government and Westernisation inside the country, it had to always fight against the dissolution of the empire which was mainly driven by Russia. In addition, one of the major powers achieving dominant economic and thus political influence in the empire was always aimed to be prevented. Under these circumstances the German Empire, as well as, France and England suited the Turkish leadership.

Another change occurred after 1897, which can be linked to the second trip of the emperor to the Orient. The German appearance in the Middle East lost more and more of consideration of the great powers, especially Russia and England. With the construction of

the Baghdad Railway, although seeming very risky economically but at the same time of great prestige for Germany, the German Empire succeeded in expanding its position in the region against England and France but did not manage to obtain dominant influence. It is important to examine, whether the aim of the policy was to increase the importance of the Ottoman Empire itself, or whether it was driven by economic interest groups and advocates of a colonial policy based on the economic dynamics in the kingdom.

After the Turkish revolution of 1908, the German influence strengthened. The German friendly government around Enver Pasha finally succeeded to overthrow the critics, who spoke out for a rapprochement with the Entente. Following this, Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, this however ended with a complete defeat.

After the First World War, Turkey having lost a lot of land and population found itself in a political and an economic crisis. This dilemma could only have been solved by relying on somewhere else, where the executives believed that this would only be possible by establishing a new system without continuing with the old. Here, this new system they wanted to establish was the Western model itself, so they were open to anything that was Western. This went so far that they had to imitate the culture and art which they did not know anything about. The public always looked sceptical to the ruling elite because of the unappreciated reforms. Since Mustafa Kemal was aware of this, he spread these reforms over time.

After the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, significant changes took place. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was able to maintain his position as head of government and carried out a purge against all the Ottoman elements in Turkey. He wanted to create a Western-oriented country. For this project, he used all his strength and also radical measures to get closer to his goal. Atatürk knew that the first foundation of Westernisation had to be at the universities. This is, because only an outstanding education given to the the new Turkish generation would contribute to the country's development. With this endeavour in mind, he closed the Ottoman University Darülfünun in 1933. This was in fact influenced by Islamic approaches, which did not fit to the secular Kemalist approach. Following the closure of the Darülfünun the opening of the new, University of Istanbul took place the same year. Thus, the basic preparations were carried out. Now the newly established university had to have a new professional teaching staff. Based on the reform proposals of Geneva Professor Albert

Malche foreign professors had to be employed. At the same time, the head of the “*Emergency Association of German Scientists Abroad*”, professor Schwartz, offered to convey a number of highly qualified German academics. This proposed solution was adopted immediately. Thus, both sides profited, while Turkey offered protection from persecution by the Nazis, the emigrant professors were safe and had a new place to continue their work.

If we concentrate on the subject of knowledge transfer, Germany was very important for the young Turkish Republic. This was because, while in Germany many scholars and academics got expelled from their positions because of their religion or political viewpoint, Turkey was looking for European scholars to modernise its fragile university system and to modernise/westernise the country. Due to the fact that immigration to Great Britain or the United States was very difficult during this time and thanks to the work of the *Notgemeinschaft Deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland* many German scholars decided to work in Turkey. It is important to notice that the Turkish government did not aim to save these German refugees, but rather needed them for westernisation and modernisation. This argument is proven by several facts. For example, already at the very beginning of the building of the new republic the Turkish government asked Germany for assistance. However, no, so called, “pure-blood” German scholar was willing to go to Turkey. Thus, immigration of German scholars to Turkey just started when these scholars lost their jobs and would have to leave Germany sooner or later, in any case. Another evidence is that the German emigres got only 5-years contracts. Thus, the Turkish government had aimed for these academics to built up a modern and functioning university system and assist the government in other crucial fields. After their work was done, they were not needed anymore. Due to this, many German emigres had to leave Turkey after their contracts expired. Most of them went to Great Britain or the United States as they were unable to return home at that time.

The domestic political conditions in the “new home” made it difficult for the exile scientists to adapt to the unfamiliar environment. Not all groups of society welcomed them with open arms. The new, mostly German staff of the University of Istanbul faced suspicions of the former Darülfünun professors. But with the support of the Turkish government, they won both the trust of the Turkish students, as well as the Turkish population. The emigrant academics did not want to disappoint the country that placed so much trust in them. Their

remarkable contributions brought the university to a standard that is comparable to the ones in European.

Although the German scholars worked in Turkey for a relatively short period of time and although they did not decide to go to Turkey by choice, their influence on Modern Turkey was remarkable. The German scholars were expected by the Turkish government to create foundations for the future generations to build upon. Thus German emigres were working in all conceivable disciplines. Of course, they contributed to the literature of their respective disciplines and professions. Thus, they influenced not only Turkish professional and academic language, but moreover the culture of research that was introduced to the Turkish universities.

Already Atatürk's idea to modernise the country was a very important step, because the replacement of the old, Islamic conceptions of identity, authority and loyalty by new conceptions of European origin was of fundamental importance. However, the decision to hire European academics to implement these new ideas in all possible areas was of remarkable importance, as well. Emigres who went to Turkey to infuse western culture into a young Republic that had dreams and plans of modernisation in all aspects of its society, made contributions that were significant and impacted the country in a way beyond anyone could have imagined at the time. The impact of these emigre professors was immeasurable. They totally transformed Turkey's higher education in the sciences, professions, humanities, and the arts. They also re-engineered its public health, library, legal, engineering, and administrative practices.

In the 19th century while there were more than 10 universities in Germany, while there were only two universities in Britain. Urban universities such as Heidelberg, Marburg, Halle, Berlin Humboldt were very powerful centres of sciences with free working environments. Academicians had a lot of experience in the field of education as well as in the establishment of faculties because of the abundance of university numbers in Germany and the fact that they are very deeply-rooted. It was a good opportunity for Turkey as these experienced intellectuals were escaping from their homeland at the same time as Turkey was requiring their experience.

If the German emigrants were not invited to Turkey, or they decided not to come, then the process of modernisation and Westernisation in the early times of the Republic of Turkey would have continued differently. We should also remember here that the modernisation process did not start with the German emigrant professors or the Republic. However, the modernisation process started much earlier during the late period of the Ottoman Empire.

Whether Turkey would have achieved the desired objective of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in terms of university reform, without the active support of emigrant scientists, can not be determined. But one may well see that the intersection of two historical events has shortened the time of the realisation of the Kemalist reform efforts. Therefore, I believe that the way that the Turkish government would have exercised the reforms, without the participation of the German academic professors would have required great effort and exertion.

The emigre intellectuals had a profound difference to the modernisation process. Many learned the Turkish language to a high level whereby they could give their lectures and talk to students in Turkish, therefore translators were not needed so they could express their ideas without the need of anyone. To that extent University Public Conferences were started as early as 1934, in these conferences which took place across the country, emigre intellects in all fields talked about different kinds of issues. This also shows the importance of university and modernisation for the general population as well, which Malche also wanted to achieve when he presented his report on the reform of the universities.

The research carried out by the emigre's in the university further contributed to the knowledge transfer from the German side to the Turkish students, which greatly benefited from this experience and went onto teach to their own students in the future, which overall supported the modernisation process. As well as opening a number of University departments, the emigre intellectuals were also effective in the opening of a number of institutes such as, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Geology institutes. The emigre intellectuals also served the universities with the textbooks and journals that they had written in Turkish, this was an important step in the modernisation process as it meant that a radical change took place in what people were reading to be educated. The aim was to raise the new Turkish intellectuals who were educated with the basic principles of the West, such as scientific thinking, freedom of expressing opinion and to exercise criticism. This would done then be reflected in the whole population.

The Western Style University established with the support of emigre intellectuals had established the foundations of the Turkish University system. After the closure of Darulfunun and the opening of the Istanbul University the first Western Style University had been opened, this would then be the example University whereby all of the Universities that were opened afterwards were designed according to the Istanbul University. The partnership between the German and the Turkish intellectuals continued for a long period of time even when the German intellects had left Turkey. So all in all the German emigres had established one of the most important institutions of the Republic of Turkey, the University. They had a big impact on how the University would operate. The partnership formed between the German and Turkish intellects had a great impact on the modernisation and westernisation of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish – German relations.

Although it is not well known, after Turkey had moved to a multi-party system, German intellectuals played an important role in the preparation of a number of laws which the Menderes government brought to the parliament. Because of the continuous interventions in the newly founded Republic, political, cultural and economic fields were in a change. Turkey, on its way to become a Western state, had to make its laws taking into account the Western States laws in international commercial, economic and social matters and domestic laws. It was thought that if the country lagged behind the Western states then it would not be possible to build a contemporary system. German scientists did not only shape higher education, they also affected new laws, and some of them consulted the government, especially in the field of law and economics. Their political influences continued in the formation and shaping of the institutions of this new state. However, the reason for the émigré intellectuals not being effective in the technology field in Turkey is that only a few of these scientists had an engineering background.

As a result, these scientists, who returned to Germany, exhibited fidelity and observed the interests of Turkey as well as kept the Turkish culture alive both written and verbally in their homeland. They also brought mutual relations to a better level in the field of science and technology. The continuity of these relations has been instrumental in promoting both political and economic co-operation between Turkey and Germany.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad Feroz, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu (Formation of Modern Turkey)*, Kaynak Publishers, Istanbul 2015.
- Akandere Osman & Polat Hasan Ali, *During World War II Years Germany's Pressure to Turkey and Capture Efforts Inside the War*, First Turkish-German Relations Symposium of International History and Cultural Aspects of 8 to 10 October 2009 Selected Works in April 2010.
- Aktüre S, *The Islamic Anatolian City*, Environmental Design: Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre, 1989.
- Akyüz Yahya, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi (History of Turkish Education)*, Culture College Publishing, Istanbul 1994.
- Andic Fuat. Andic Suphan, *Fritz Neumark, Teacher and Reformer: A Turkish View*, Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, Tubingen 1981.
- Antweiler Anton, *Hitler*, Glock und Lutz, Nürnberg 1978.
- Antweiler Anton, *Hitler*, published by Heroldsberg, Glock und Lutz Verlag, Nürnberg 1978.
- Armaoğlu Fahir, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980 (20th Century Political History 1914 - 1980)*, Alkım Publishing, Istanbul 2010.
- Armaoğlu Fahir, *Siyasi Tarih (1789 - 1960)*, SBF Yayınları, Istanbul 2010.
- Ataturk Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk*, C.II, Istanbul 1975.
- Avşar Zakir & Kaya Ayşe Elif, *Populism Practices in Republican Turkey: Surname Law as an Example*, Turkish Studies International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/5 Spring 2013.
- Aydoğan Erdal, *Atatürk Reformları ve İnkıapları (History of Atatürks Reforms and Principles)*, Erzurum 2011.
- Aytepe Oğuz, *Yeni Belgeler Işığında Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Hanedan Üyelerinin Yurtdışına Çıkarılması (Removal of the Caliphate in the Light of New Documents and Abolition of Members of the Dynasty)*, Ankara University History of Turkish Revolution Institute March-November Issue, Ankara 2002.
- Bahar İzzet, *Turkey and the Rescue of European Jews*, Routhledge New York 2015.

Bali Rifat N., *Sarayın ve Cumhuriyetin Dişçibaşısı- Sami Günzberg (Sami Günzberg the Dentist of the Palace and the Republic)*, Kitapevi Yayınları, İstanbul 2007.

Bauer Yehuda, *Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1994.

Baumgart Winfried, *Deutschland im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1890-1914: Grundkräfte, Thesen und Strukturen*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz 1982.

Becker Carl Heinrich, *Das türkische Bildungsproblem (The Turkish education problem)*, Islamstudien 2, Frankfurt 1932.

Berkes Niyazi, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme (Modernisation in Turkey)*, Yapı Kredi Publishers, İstanbul 2003.

Berman Nina, *Was dokumentiert die Literatur? Praxistheoretische Überlegungen zum deutsch-türkischen Kulturkontakt im 18. und 20 Jahrhundert*, in: Ozil Şeyda; Hofmann, Michael & Dayıoğlu-Yücel Yasemin, *Türkisch-deutscher Kulturkontakt und Kulturtransfer - Kontroversen und Lernprozess*, V&R unipress, Göttingen 2011.

Beşirli Mehmet, *Die europäische Finanzkontrolle im Osmanischen Reich in der Zeit von 1908 bis 1914: Die Rivalitäten der britischen, französischen und deutschen Hochfinanz und der Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg am Beispiel der türkischen Staatsanleihen und der Bagdad-Bahn*, Mensch & Buch, Berlin 1999.

Beydilli Kemal, *1790 Osmanlı - Prusya İttifakı (1790 Prussian - Ottoman Alliance)*, Istanbul University Faculty of Literature Publications, Istanbul 1984.

Bihl Wolfdieter, *Orientalistik an der Universität Wien, Forschungen zwischen Maghreb und Ost- und Südasien: Die Professoren und Dozenten*, Böhlau Verlag, Wien, Köln, Weimar 2009.

Bilgin Pınar, *Culture of Security in the EU-Turkey Relations*, Ayraç Publishers, Istanbul 2003.

Bilgin M. Sıtkı, *The Construction of the Baghdad Railway and Its Impact on Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1902-1913*, OTAM, 16, 109-130, 2004.

Bilgin Mustafa Sıtkı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin I. Dünya Savaşı'na Girişi*, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın 100. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu, ESAM, Ankara 2015.

Bilgin M. Sıtkı, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*, IB Tauris, London and New York 2004.

Bilgin Mustafa Sıtkı, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Uzak Şark Türkleri'nin Sovyet Esareti Altına Düşmesi ve Ayaz İshaki'nin Siyasi Mücadelesi*, Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi 216, 2004.

Bozay Kemal, *Exil Türkiye. Ein Forschungsbeitrag zur deutschsprachigen Emigration in die Türkei (1933–1945)*, LIT, Münster 200.

Bozdoğan Sibel, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early*, University of Washington Press, Singapore 2001.

Breusch Friedrich, *Über die deutschen Chemiker an der Universität Istanbul*”, in: *Nachrichten aus Chemie und Technik*, no. 22. 1965.

Burazerovic Manfred, *Die Türken in der jüngeren Geschichte des Ruhrgebietes, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Essener Raumes*, Essen 1995.

Burk Lale Aka, *An Open Door: German Refugee Professors in Turkey*, in Peter Rose, ed., *The Dispossessed—An Anatomy of Exile*, University of Massachusetts Press 2005.

Burk Lale Aka, *Fritz Arndt and His Chemistry Books in the Turkish Language*, *Bulletin for the History of Chemistry*, Volume 28 Nr.1. 2003.

Büyükkarcı Süleyman, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde Yabancı Okullar*, Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, Konya 1996.

Caporal Bernard, *Turkish Women After Kemalism*, Turkey IS Bank Publications, Ankara 1982.

Çelik Adem, *Harf İnkılabına Giden Süreç 1923-1928 (The Path Towards the Alphabet Revolution 1923-1928)*, Master Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul 2009.

Dietrich Anne, *Deutschsein in Istanbul. Nationalisierung und Orientierung in der deutschsprachigen Community von 1843 bis 1956*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen 1998.

Dincer Said, *Atatürk’s Principles and History of Turkish Revolution*, Nobel Publications, Istanbul 2004.

Dobretsberger Josef, *Political Economy*, Istanbul 1940.

Doğramacı B, *Architecture Politics and Culture Transfer: German Speaking Architects, Planners and Sculptors during the Establishment of Turkish Capital Ankara*, LIT Verlag, Berlin 2007.

Dölen Emre, *II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Darülfünun (Darülfünun in the second constitutionalist period)*, Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, 2008.

Erdim Burak, *from Germany to Japan and Turkey: Modernity, Locality, and Bruno Taut’s Transnational Details from 1933 to 1938*, Lunch 2, Journal of the University of Virginia School of Architecture, Virginia 2007.

Ergün Mustafa, *Die deutsch-türkischen Erziehungsbeziehungen während des ersten Weltkrieges*, OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi), Sayı 3, Ankara 1990.

Ergün Mustafa, *Atatürk Devri Türk Eğitimi*, A.Ü. Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara 1982.

Erichsen Regine, *Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Naturwissenschaftler von 1933 bis 1945 in die Türkei in ihrem sozial- und wissenschaftshistorischen Wirkungszusammenhang*, in: *Die Emigration der Wissenschaften nach 1933*, K.G. Saur: München, London, New York, Paris 1991.

Erichsen Regine, *Türkei*, in: *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933- 1945*, WBG, Darmstadt 1998.

Erkönen Kudret, *Reuters Family in Ankara*, Ankara 1978.

Erol Mehmet Seyfettin & Ozan Emre, *Türk Dış Politikasında Süreklilik Unsuru Olarak Siyasal Rejim (Political Regime as an Element of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy)*, Gazi University Akademik Perspective, Volume 4 Issue 8, Ankara 2011.

Esin Fatma, *Astroid Ankara'nın İsim Babası (Astroid the Father of Ankara)*, Cumhuriyet Bilim Teknik, No. 85, Ekim 1988.

Farah Irmgard, *Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit im Osmanischen Reich 1908- 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Osmanischen Lloyd*, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft: Beirut Texte und Studien 50, Beirut 1993.

Frankel Joseph, *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making* London, Oxford University Pres, New York 1967.

Friedlaender Saul, *Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume I: The years of Persecution, 1933- 1939*, Harper Collins Publishers, London 1998.

Gaehtgens Thomas W., *The Museum Island in Berlin*, in: Wright Gwendoline, *The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology, Studies in the History of Art*, no. 47, National Gallery of Art, Washington DC 1996.

Geiss Imanuel, *German Foreign Policy 1871-1914*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/Boston 1976.

Gencer Mustafa, *Der Transfer deutschen Bildungswissens in das Osmanische Reich*, in: Möller, Esther & Wischmeyer, Johannes: *Transnationale Bildungsräume - Wissentransfer im Schnittpunkt von Kultur, Politik und Religion*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2013.

Gilbert Felix, *The Renaissance of the Art of War*, Edward M. Earle (Der.), *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1943.

Glasneck Johannes, *Methoden der Deutsch-Faschistischen Propagandaetigkeit in der Türkei Vor und Waehrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (German - Fascist Propaganda Methods of Activity in Turkey before and during World War II)*, Wissenschaftliche Beitræge der Martin-Luther Universitaet Halle-Wittenberg, Halle 1966.

Glasneck Johannes, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası (German Fascist Propaganda in Turkey)*, (Trans: Arif Gelen), Onur Publications, Ankara 1976.

Gleissberg Wolfgang, *Astronomi in der Türkei*, Sterne und Weltraum, Jg. 6., Nr. 12, Dezember 1967.

Goldberg Andreas, Dirk Halm and Faruk Sen, *Die deutschen Türken (The German Turks)*, Lit-Verlag, Münster 2005.

Gökay Fahrettin Kerim, *Türk - Alman Kültür Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış*, Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, İstanbul 1955.

Gönlübol Mehmet - Sar Cem, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası 1919 – 1938 (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events)*, Volume I, A.Ü.SBF Publications, Ankara 1982.

Grimme Otto - Hachtmann-Hubert, *Europäische Kultureinflüsse in der Türkei: Ein literärgeschichtlicher Versuch*, Der neue Orient Verlag, Berlin 1918.

Grothe Hugo, *Gedanken zur deutschen Errichtung einer Hochschule in der Türkei. Eine Sammlung von Gutachten*, 1913.

Grothusen Klaus Detlev, *Der Scuria Bericht. Die Tätigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer in der Türkei 1933- 1939*, Dağyeli, Frankfurt a. M. 1987.

Guttstadt Corry, *Turkey, the Jews and the Holocaust*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2008.

Güçlü Yücel, *In the First Ten Years of the Republic and the Balkan Pact (1923-1934)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara 1974.

Güçlü Yücel, *Turkish-German relations from Montreux to the second world war*, in: The Turkish Yearbook 1999, Vol. XXIX.

Güleryüz Naim A., *Toplumsal Yaşamda Türk Yahudileri (Turkish Jews in Social Life)*, Gözlem Yayınevi, İstanbul 2012.

Gülşen G. Erdal, *Academicians coming to Turkey between 1933-1945 opened and their effects on today's music life*, *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 55, 2012.

Gültekin Emre, *Turkish Associations in Berlin*, *Mülkiyeliler Association Journal*, Issue 81, April 1986.

Gürçaglar Şehnaz Tahir - Paker Saliha- Milton John, *Tradition, Tension and Translation in Turkey*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam 2015.

Haffner Sebastian, *von Bismarck zu Hitler (from Bismarck to Hitler)*, Kindler Verlags, München 1987.

Hahn Hellmut, *Medizinische Mikrobiologie und Infektiologie*, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Barcelona, Hongkong, London, Mailand, Paris, Singapur, Tokio 1999.

Hale William, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, Portland, OR, Frank Cass, London 2000.

Hanig Ludmila, *Die Nachfolger der Exegeten*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2003.

Hanisch Ludmila, *Die Nachfolger der Exegeten. Deutschsprachige Erforschung des Vorderen Orients in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2003.

Hartmann Hans, *Die Auswaertige Politik der Türkei 1923-1940 (The Foreign Policy of Turkey 1923-1940)*, Verlag A. G, Zürich 1941.

H. H. Nolte, *Die eine Welt. Abriß der Geschichte des internationalen Systems*, Fackelträger Press, Hanover 1993.

H.-P. Waldhoff, *Fremde und Zivilisierung: über das Verarbeiten von Gefühlen der Fremdheit. Probleme der modernen Peripherie-Zentrum-Migration am türkisch-deutschen Beispiel*, Suhrkamp Press, Frankfurt/Main 1995.

Hirsch Ernst E., *Anılarım: Kayzer Dönemi, Weimar Cumhuriyeti - Atatürk Ülkesi (Memoirs: Age of Kaiser, Weimar Republic - Country of Ataturk)*, Tübitak Yayınları, Ankara 1997.

Hirsch Ernst E., *Türk Hukuk Bibliyografyası: 1934-1940*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 6, 1940.

Hirsch, Ernst E., *Die Verfassung der türkischen Republik*, Metzner, Frankfurt am Main 1966.

Irzik Gürol – Güzeldere Güven, *Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*, Springer, Dordrecht the Netherlands 2005.

İnaç Hüsametdin, *Identity Problem of Turkey during the European Union Integration Process*, *East West: Identities*, 6, 23, İstanbul 2003.

Jacobsen Hans Adolf, *National Sozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933-1938 (National Socialist Foreign Policy 1933-1938)*, Alfred Metzner Verlag, Berlin 1968.

Jaeschke Gotthard, *Türkei (Turkey)*, Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, Berlin 1941.

Jaeschke Gotthard, *Die Türkei in den Jahren 1935-1941 (Turkey in the years 1935-1941)*, Geschichtskalender, Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig 1943.

Jivkova Ludmila, *İngiliz-Türk İlişkileri, 1933-1939 (British-Türkish Relations, 1933-1939)*, Habora Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul 1978.

Karabekir Kazım, *Tarihte Almanlar ve Alman Ordusu*, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001.

Karabekir Kazım, *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001.

Kartal Cemile Burcu, *The Legacy of the Second Constitution to The Republic: Acceptable Women*, I.U Faculty of Political Science Journal, No:38, March 2008.

Katipoğlu Serdar, *Academic Librarianship in Turkey: The Historical Context*, International Journal of Legal Information: Vol. 38: Issue 2 Summer 2010.

Kazancıgil, A. - I. Ortaylı - U. Tanyeli, *Türkiyenin Yabancıları (Foreigners of Turkey)*, Yapı KrediYayınları, Üç Aylık Düşünce Dergisi, Sayı:23, İstanbul 2000.

Keskin Hakkı, *Die Türkei. Vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat-Werdegang einer Unterentwicklung*, Verlag Olle & Wolter, Berlin 1981.

Keskin Hakkı, *Die Türkei. Vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat - Werdegang einer Unterentwicklung*, Verlag Olle & Wolter, Berlin 1981.

Keyman E. Fuat, *Thoughts on the Problem of Secularism in Turkey: Modernity, Secularisation, Democratisation*, East West: Identities, 6, 23, İstanbul 2003.

Kılıç Sezen, *Hitler'in Gizli Dosyalarında Türkiye (Turkey in Hitler's Hidden Files)*, Atatürk Research Center, Ankara 2005.

Kılıç Sezen, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Türkiye'deki Alman Okulları 1852'den 1945'e kadar (Turkish-German Relations and German Schools from 1852 to 1945)*, Atatürk Research Center, Ankara 2005.

Kılıç Sezen, *Türk Basını'nda Hitler Almanyası 1933-1945 (Hitler's Germany in Turkish Press 1933-1945)*, Atatürk Research Center, Ankara, 2010.

Kiran Abdullah, *League of Nations and the war cannot be avoided*, GAU J. Soc. & Appl. Sci., 2008.

Koçak Cemil, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945 (Turkey’s National Chief Period 1938-1945)*, Yurt Publications, Ankara 1986.

Koçak Cemil, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1939 (Turkish-German Relations 1923-1939)*, Publications of Turkish History Institution, Ankara 2013.

Köhbach Markus, *In Memoriam Andreas Tietze (1914- 2003)*, in: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, no. 94, Wien 2004.

Konyar Levent, *Alman Dışişleri Dairesi Belgeleri, Türkiye’deki Alman Politikası (1941-1945)*, Havas Yayınevi, İstanbul 1979.

Kreiser Klaus, *Der osmanische Staat 1300-1922*, Oldenburg Verlag, München 2001.

Kroll Hans, *Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters*, Kiepenheuer und Witsch Verlag, Köln 1967.

Kruppa Wienfried, *Deutsch-türkischer Wissenschaftsaustausch in der Pharmazie. Würzburger Medizinhistorische Forschungen Band 44. Patentsen-Hannover 1988.*

Kuran Burçoğlu Nedret, *The Image of the Turk in Karl May’s Novel von Bagdad nach Stambul*, *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 5(II), 1995.

Kuruç Bilsay, *Economy of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Period*, Bilgi University Press, Istanbul 2012.

Kürkçüoğlu Ömer, *Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri (1919-1926) (Turkish-British Relations (1919-1926))*, SBF Yayınları, Ankara 1978.

Laqueur Kurt, *Kırşehir 1944- 1945: Das Leben der deutschen Konfinierten in einer anatolischen Kleinstadt*, in: *Deutsche Wissenschaftler im türkischen Exil: Die Wissenschaftsmigration in die Türkei 1933- 1945*, Egon, Würzburg 2008.

Laut Jens Peter, *Das Türkische als Ursprache? Sprachwissenschaftliche Theorien in der Zeit des erwachenden türkischen Nationalismus*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2000.

Lehmann, Hans Georg, *Rückkehr nach Deutschland? Motive, Hindernisse und Wege von Emigranten*, in: *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 194, Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands*, Polis, Marburg 1997.

Levi Avner, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler (Jews in the Republic of Turkey)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1996.

Leviy Avigdor, *Jews, Turks, Ottoman; A Shared History, Fifteenth Through The Twentieth Century*, Syracuse University Press, New York 2002.

Lewis Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002.

Lewis Geoffrey, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*, Oxford University Press, London 1999.

Lienert Salome, *Flüchtlingskinder in der Schweiz. Das Schweizer Hilfswerk für Emigrantenkinder 1933 bis 1947*, in: *Exilforschung*, no. 24, München 2006.

Loevy, Hannelore T.- Kowitz Aletha A., *Alfred Kantorowicz, Pediatric Dentistry Innovator*, *Journal of Dentistry for Children* 60, 1993.

Lothar Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, Frankfurt am Main 1964.

Mangold Sabine, *Eine weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft - Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert*, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2004.

Marchand Suzanne, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750-1970*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.

Meray Seha, *Lausanne Peace Conference, Minutes- Documents*, Volume 8, Yapi Kredi Publications, Istanbul 2001.

Müller Hildegard, *German Librarians in Exile in Turkey 1933-1945*, *Libraries & Culture* Vol. 33, No. 3, *Orientalist Libraries and Orientalism* 1998.

Nadolny Rudolf, *Mein Beitrag (My Contribution)*, Limes Verlag, Wiesbaden 1955.

Nadolny Rudolf, *Zehn Jahre Türkischer Aussenpolitik (Ten years of Turkish foreign policy)*, XII. Jahrgang, Heft 6 b, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Berlin 1936.

Nadolny Rudolf, *Die Türkische Innenpolitik, Die Neue Türkei (Turkish internal policy, The New Turkey)*, *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, 33. Jahrgang, Frankfurt 1936.

Namal Yücel & Karakök Tunay, *Atatürk ve Üniversite Devrimi 1933 (Ataturk and University Reform 1933)*, *Bulent Ecevit University Higher Education and Science Journal* Volume I Issue 1, Zonguldak 2011.

Neulen Hans Werner, *Adler und Halbmond. Das deutsch-türkische Bündnis 1914-1918 (Eagle and crescent. The German-Turkish Alliance 1914-1918)*, Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main 1994.

Neumark Franz, *Der Türkische Aussenhandel im Jahre 1938 (The Turkish Foreign Trade in 1938)*, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Cilt:1, İstanbul 1939.

Neumark Franz, *Der Türkische Aussenhandel im Jahre 1939-1940 (The Turkish Foreign Trade in 1939-1940)*, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Cilt:2, İstanbul 1939.

Neumark Fritz, *Boğaziçi'ne Sığınanlar, Türkiye'ye İltica Eden Alman İlim Siyaset ve Sanat Adamları 1933-1953 (Seeking Refuge in the Bosphorus, German Politicians and Artists who took Refuge in Turkey 1933-1953)*, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü Yayını, İstanbul 1982.

Neumark Fritz, *Zuflucht am Bosphorus. Deutsche Gelehrte, Politiker und Künstler in der Emigration 1933- 1945*, Knecht Presse, Frankfurt a. M. 1980.

Nissen Rudolf, *Helle Blätter - dunkle Blätter. Erinnerungen eines Chirurgen*, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1969.

Oğuz Burhan, *Yüzyıllar Boyunca Alman Gerçeği ve Türkler*, Can Matbaa, İstanbul 1983.

Okutan C. & Ereker F., *Regime Element in Decising Turkish Foreign Policy*, Istanbul University Social Sciences Journal. Year 4. Issue 8, Istanbul 2005.

Oliver Rathkolb, *Ganz groß und Monumental. Die Bildhauer des Führers*. Arno Breker und Josef Thorak, Kunst und Diktatur Volume II, Baden 1994.

Oran Baskin, *Turkish Foreign Policy Volume I: 1919-1980*, Communication Publications, 17th Edition, Istanbul 2012.

Ortaylı İlber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu (German Penetration of the Ottoman Empire)*, Timaş Publications, Istanbul 2014.

Özdemir Nuray, *The Celebrations After the Turkish Women Were Given The Right To Vote And Be Elected*, History Studies Volume 6 – Issue, 5 September 2014.

Özgüldür Yavuz, *German-Turkish Relations 1923-1945*, Office of Commander in Chief Publications, London 1993.

Pamuk Sevket, *Foreign Trade, Foreign Capital and the Peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1913*, Univ. of California, Berkeley 1978.

Pazarkaya Yüksel & Hottinger Arnold, *Die osmanische Geschichte*, in: Kündig-Steiner Werner, *Die Türkei. Raum und Mensch, Kultur und Wirtschaft in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit*, 2, Tübingen/Basel 1977.

Pomiankowski Joseph, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, Akademische Druckbund Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1969.

Pulewka Paul, *Wissenschaft und Bildung in der modernen Türkei*, in: *Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1960.

Quataert Donald, *The Age of Reforms: 1812-1914*, in: Inalcık Halil, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994.

Reiner Erica, *Hans Gustav Güterbock Biographical Memoirs*, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 146, No. 3, September 2002.

Reisman Arnold, *Turkey's Modernisation: Refuges from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision*, New Academic Publishing, Washington DC 2006.

Reuter Ernst, *Türkei im Brennpunkt (Turkey in Focus)*, Atatürk in deutscher Sicht, Köln 1982.

Richter R., *Ankara'dan Bir Mektup (A letter from Ankara)*, Cilt Doktoru, Yıl 5, Sayı 11, Kasım 1954.

Röpke Wilhelm, *Briefe 1934- 1966. Der innere Kompaß*, Eugen Rentsch Prese, Zürich 1976.

Said Edward W., *Orientalism*, Vintage Books, New York 1979.

Sander Oral, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 4. Issue, Ankara 2013.

Sander Oral, *Political History (1918-1994)*, Imge Printing, London 2013.

Sander Oral, *Reasons for Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ankara University SBF Journaş. Volume 37. Issue 3-4, Ankara 1982.

Sarıtaş Eyup, *Interdisciplinary Studies in Turkey: New Ideas New Strategies*, Trafford Publishing, New York 2016.

Schölch Alexander, *Wirtschaftliche Durchdringung und politische Kontrolle durch die europäischen Mächte im Osmanischen Reich (Konstantinopel, Kairo, Tunis)*, in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 1, 1975.

Schulz Gerhard, *Deutschland seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg 1918-1945*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1976.

Schwartz Philipp, *Notgemeinschaft: Zur Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933 in die Türkei*, Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg 1995.

Seha Meray, *Conference of Lausanne; Minutes - Documents, Volume 7*, Yapi Kredi Publications, Istanbul 2001.

Sezer Ayten, *The First Reforms in the Society, Atatürk and History of Republican Turkey*, Political Bookstore, Ankara 2003.

Shaw Stanford & Shaw Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Second Volume, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997.

Shaw Stanford J., *The Jews of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1991.

Shaw Stanford J., *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1993.

Shaw Wendy M. K., *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualisation of History in the Late Ottoman Empire*, University of California Press, Berkeley 2003.

Shirer William L., *Nazi Empire: The Birth, The Rise and Fall*, Ađaođlu Publications, Istanbul 1970.

Soysal Ismail, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları 1920- 1945 (Turkey's Political Treaties 1920 – 1945)*, Volume I, SBF Yayınları, Ankara 1989.

Soysal İsmail, *Çađdaş Türk Diplomasisi: İki Yüzyıllık Süreç (Modern Turkish Diplomacy: Period of two Centuries)*, Press of Turkish History Institution, Ankara 1999.

Stauth, Georg & Birtek, Faruk, *Istanbul. Geistige Wanderung - aus der Welt in Scherben*, Transcript, Bielefeld 2007.

Steuerwald Karl, *Untersuchungen zur türkischen Sprache der Gegenwart, Part I, Die türkische Sprachpolitik seit 1928*, Langenscheidt, Berlin 1963.

Suraiya Faroqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert and Sevket Pamuk, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Volume two (1600-1914), Cambridge University Press, London 1994.

Şen Faruk & Halm Dirk, *Exil unter Halbmond und Stern. Herbert Scurlas Bericht über die Tätigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer in der Türkei während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*, Klartext, Essen 2007.

Tankut G., *Bir Başkentin İmarı (Reconstruction of a Capital)*, Anahtar Kitaplar, İstanbul 1993.

Taut Bruno, *Lectures on Architecture*, Fine Arts Academy, Istanbul 1938.

Tekin Ođuz & Tekin Nil Türker, *Clemens Emin Bosch (1899-1955); Biography of a Refugee Academician*, Akmed Yayınları, İstanbul 2007.

Thomas Geisen und Christine Riegel, *Jugend, Partizipation und Migration*, GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2007.

Topçuođlu Hamide, Karayalçın Yaşar, Özmen Aydođan, *Gratitude to Professor Ernst Hirsch*, Ankara University Law Faculty Publishers, Ankara 1964.

Torgay Osman Zeki, *Last 10 Years in Turkey-Germany Trade, 10th Year in Germany*, Turkey Chamber of Commerce, Berlin 1938.

Trumpener Ulrich, *German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation*, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 32, June, 1960.

Trumpener Ulrich, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1968.

Trumpener Ulrich, *Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities*, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 34, No. 4, December, 1962.

Tukin Cemal, *Boğazlar Meselesi (The Straits Issue)*, Pan Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1999.

Turan Şerafettin, *Türk Devrim Tarihi; Yeni Türkiye'nin Oluşumu 1923-1938 (History of Turkish Revolution; Formation of the new Turkey from 1923 to 1938)*, 3. Kitap, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara 1998.

Turfan M. Naim, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, The Military and Ottoman Collapse*, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London 2000.

Tümer G, *The Issue of Foreign Architects during the Republican Period*, Mimarlar Odası Branch, İzmir 1998.

Türkdoğan Berna, *Ataturk Period Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ataturk Research Center, Ankara, 2010.

Tüter Celal, *Building the identity of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Daily Turkey, Issue 119, Ankara 2014.

Uluğ Naşit Hakkı, *End of the Caliphate*, İstanbul 1975.

Us Asim, *Asim Us Reason Memoirs (1930-1950), Atatürk, İnönü, the Second World War and Democracy Regime Input Memoir.*, İstanbul 1966.

Üstün Ayşe, *Üniversite Reformu 1933*, İstanbul 2004.

Van Kampen Wilhelm, *Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik in der Zeit Wilhelms II*, Dissertation, University of Kiel 1968.

Volker Wolf, *Fritz Neumark Emigrationsziel Türkei: Deutsche Wissenschaftler*, Berlin 2006.

Weber Frank G., *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance 1914-1918*, Cornell University Press, New York 1970.

Widmann Horst, *Atatürk Üniversite Reformu (Ataturk and University Reform)*, Kabalcı Publishers, İstanbul 1999.

Widmann, Horst, *Exil und Bildungshilfe. Die Deutschsprachige Emigration in die Türkei*

nach 1933 (*Exile and educational aid. The German-speaking emigration to Turkey after 1933*), Bern/Frankfurt a. M., Frankfurt 1973.

Will Mangold Sabine, *Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei 1918-1933 (Limited Friendship: Germany and Turkey 1918-1933)*, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen 2013.

Yayla Ali, *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları (Ataturks Reforms and Principles Lecture Notes)*, ITU Publishers, Istanbul 2005.

Yüksel Ayşegül, *The Role of Theatre in Transforming, The Small Ottoman Town of Ankara into The Westernized Capital of Modern Turkey*, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya

Zander Enoch, *Der Honig: Herkunft, Gewinnung, Eigenschaften und Untersuchung des Honigs (The honey: origin, extraction, properties and investigation of the honey)*, Ulmer Verlag, Stuttgart 1984.

Zürcher Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, London & New York, I. B. Tauris 1993.

Online documents:

Ergün Mustafa, *Die deutsch-türkischen Erziehungsbeziehungen während des ersten Weltkrieges (The German-Turkish relations of education during the First World War)*, (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Ankara University Ottoman History Research and Application Center Magazine), OTAM Sayı; (Number) 3, Ankara 1990. Retrieved September 16, 2014, from <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/835/10568.pdf>.

Malcher Albert, *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*. Retrieved April 20, 2015, from <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F6492.php>.

<http://www.tarihikesfet.com/2013/05/turkiyenin-ilk-ucak-fabrikas-tomtas.html>

<http://derintarihimiz.blogcu.com/iki-dunya-savasi-arasinda-turk-silahlikuvvetleri/10923592>

<http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-78/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-devletinin-ucak-fabrikasi-kurma-mucadelesinde-ilk-girisim-tayyare-ve-motor-turk-anonim-sirketi-tomtas-ve-kayseri-ucak-fabrikasi>

<http://www.euractiv.com.tr/yazici-sayfasi/article/yildiz-teknik-universitesi-unlu-alman-mimar-bruno-tautun-eserlerini-agirliyor-009145>

<http://www.goethe.de/ins/tr/ank/prj/urs/arc/tho/trindex.htm>

Archive:

Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945, Aus dem Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes (*Files for German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*)

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Tüter

Adı : Celal

Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Knowledge and Technology Transfer between Turkey and Germany in the Interwar Period and its Impact on the Political, Military and Cultural Relations

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Tüter, Celal

Nationality: Turkish

Date of Birth: 12 February 1973

Place of Birth: Gaziantep

Phone: +90 534 673 47 04

email: ctuter@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	BHTB IR	2007
MS	BHTB ITTM	2005
MS	BTU Aero - Engineering	2002
BS	BTU Aircraft - Engineering	1999

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014- Present	Ministry for EU Affairs	Advisor to the Minister
2004-20013	VfKuSA Berlin	General Coordinator
2001-2003	BTU-Dep. of BTU Aero-Engineering	Research Assistant
1998-2001	BMW-Berlin	Engineer

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced German and English

PUBLICATIONS

Tüter Celal, *Building the identity of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Daily Turkey, Issue 119, Ankara 2014.

Tüter Celal, *Die Republik Türkei: Identitätsbildung eines Nationalstaates*, Der Wisch, Issue 11, Vienna 2014.

Tüter Celal, *Kahire'ye Dair (About Cairo)*, Perspektif Dergisi, Köln 2011.

TÜRKÇE ÖZET

GİRİŞ

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşunun ilk yıllarında yabancı etkisi, ilkesel olarak genellikle Fransız olduğu düşünülür. Bununla birlikte, araştırmalarda diğer Avrupa ülkelerinin çeşitli ve önemli etkilerinin bulunduğu da açıkça görülmektedir. Bu tez, yeni kurulan Cumhuriyet üzerinde Alman nüfuzunun merkezi ve biçimlendirici olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Bu tezde Alman dış politika arşiv belgelerinin (Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945, Aus dem Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts) yanısıra Türkçe, Almanca ve İngilizce ikincil el kaynaklara mümkün olduğunca erişmeye çalışarak konu araştırılmıştır. Türk-Alman ilişkileri konusunda pek çok çalışma yapılmış olsada mevcut tez Almanya'dan Türkiye'ye bilgi ve teknoloji transferi ile Türkiye'nin Modernleşmesine katkısı bakımından onlardan ayrılmaktadır.

İlber Ortaylı Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu ile tarihi açıdan derinlemesine Türk - Alman ilişkilerini incelemiştir. Cemil Koçak Türk - Alman İlişkileri kitabında, bilgi ve teknoloji transferi hariç Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarındaki ilişkileri kapsamlı bir şekilde incelemiştir. Sezen Kılıç Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Türkiye'deki Alman Okulları kitabında Okulları öncelediği için siyasi ve kültürel ilişkiler eksik kalmıştır. Sabine Mangold'un Deutschland und die Türkei 1918-1933 (*Germany and Turkey 1918-1933*) adlı Almanca eseri ilişkilerin siyasi boyutunu etraflıca incelemektedir. Horst Widmann Exil und Bildungshilfe: Die Deutschsprachige Emigration in die Türkei nach 1933 (*Exile and educational aid: The German-speaking emigration to Turkey after 1933*) adlı kitabı ise Atatürk'ün Üniversite Reformlarına etkisi üzerine derinlemesine çalışılmış bir kaynaktır. Ayrıca burada sayılmayan Türk-Alman İlişkilerini inceleyen bir çok çalışma mevcuttur.

Tez, ana hatlarıyla sürgün edilen Alman bilim adamlarının Türkiye'ye çeşitli alanlarda (ekonomi, tıp ve mühendislik gibi) etkileri ve önemli ayrıntılar esas alınarak Türk ulusunun inşasındaki nüfuzlarıyla devam ettiriliyor. Bu tez, daha önceki araştırmaların aksine, hem Alman hem de Türk eserlerini inceliyor ve kişisel anlatım ve yorumların ötesine geçmeye

çalıyor. Almanya'dan Türkiye'ye bilgi transferiyle beraber Alman nüfuzunun merkezi öneme sahip olduğu düşünülünce, Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinin oluşumuyla ilgili öne sürülen tezler yeniden değerlendirilmelidir.

Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında, Türk-Alman ilişkileri esas olarak ekonomik konulardaydı. 1934 yılında, Krupp firmasını temsil eden bir Alman ticaret heyeti Türkiye'yi ziyaret etti. Sonuç olarak; 20 milyon TL'lik uzun vadeli bir kredinin yanı sıra Türklerin Almanya'dan çok miktarda demiryolu malzemesi ve parçaları satın alması konusunda bir antlaşma yapıldı. Dolayısıyla Almanya, birkaç yıl kısa bir süre içinde Türkiye ekonomisi üzerinde egemen bir konuma geldi ve siyasi alanlarda etkili olması için ekonomik desteğin devam ettirilmesi yolunda ilerledi. Bununla birlikte, ekonomik konularda Türk-Alman ilişkileri iyi geçse de, zaman içerisinde ideolojik bazı sıkıntılar ortaya çıktı. Bu, 1930'lu yıllarda Almanya'ya yayılmış anti-semitik düşüncelerden kaynaklanıyordu. Atatürk, 1930'ların başında Almanya Yahudilerini Türkiye'ye gelmeleri için davet etti. Türkiye'de yeni kurulan Cumhuriyet'in gelişmesine yardımcı olabilecek bazı yetenekli Yahudilere sığınma hakkı verilmesini kapsayan bu teklif, bu bilim adamları içinde ciddi bir fırsat ve avantajdı. 1930'larda Hitler'in zulmünden birçok Alman Yahudi bilim insanını, sanatçıları ve diğerlerini kapsayan mülteciler Türkiye'ye göç etti.

OSMANLI DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK - ALMAN İLİŞKİLERİ

Gerçek anlamda Türk-Alman ilişkileri, Sultan III. Mustafa'nın Osmanlı Ordusu'nu yenilemeye çalışmasıyla başladı. 19. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde iktidara gelen Bismarck öncesi de Prusya genel olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna sempati duyuyordu. Almanya'nın Ulusal Birliğinin kurulmasından önce II. Abdülhamit döneminde Türk-Alman ilişkileri zirveye ulaştı. Türk-Alman ilişkileri sadece orduyla sınırlı kalmamış, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilerde de kendini göstermiştir. Abdülhamit'in Almanya'ya olan sempatisi kültürel ilişkileri hızlandırdı ve bu nedenle bazı görevliler eğitim için Almanya'ya gönderildi. Eğitim sektöründeki Alman-Osmanlı ilişkileri, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi ordu için önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Ayrıca Osmanlı Devleti, Alman okul sistemi ile de oldukça ilgiliydi ve 19. yüzyılda İstanbul ve Anadolu'da açılmış ilk Alman okulları mevcuttur.

Almanya da, Wettendorf'un komutasında askeri danışmanlar grubu gönderdi. Birkaç yıl sonra bu, Von der Goltz yönetimindeki daha büyük bir grupta (1883-1895) değiştirildi.

Alman Deutsche Bank İstanbul'da bir şube açtı ve Alman askeri teçhizatı ile malların ithalatı başladı. 1889'da İmparator II. Wilhelm İstanbul'u ziyaret etti ve II. Abdülhamit ile arkadaş oldu. Ziyaretini onurlandırmak için "Alman Çeşmesi" ni İstanbul kentine armağan etti, şimdi Sultanahmet Meydanı'ndaki anıt. 1888'de Almanlara İstanbul İzmit demiryolunun işletilmesi ve Ankara'ya uzatılması yetkisi verildi. Esas düşünce demiryolu hattını Bağdat ve Basra'ya kadar tamamlamaktı. Britanya bu demiryolunun imtiyazını almak için Almanya ile yarıştıyordu, ancak proje Almanlara verildi. Yeni demiryolu hattını kurmak için kurulan şirketin % 40'ı Deutsche (Alman) Bankası, % 40'ı Fransız Osmanlı Bankası tarafından finanse edildi. Kalan% 20'lik kısmı çeşitli ortaklar tarafından finanse edildi.

Türk-Alman ilişkisinde bir diğer önemli adım Birinci Dünya Savaşı'dır. Osmanlılar, II. Wilhelm'den Mayıs 1913'te "*Ordu Reform Elçisi*" göndermesini istedi. İmparator, Ekim 1913'te 42 subayı temsilden yetkili olan Liman von Sanders'i gönderdi. Liman von Sanders, Savaş Bakanı'na eşit denecek bir şekilde çok geniş yetkililerle geldi.

Almanların, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun insan gücü ve stratejik konumuna ihtiyacı vardı. Bu Savaş'da Osmanlılar içinde görünürde bir müttefik lazımdı. Çünkü İngiltere, Fransa ve Rusya'ya olan yaklaşımları daha önce reddedildi. Almanya ile ittifak kaçınılmazdı, Almanya'da eğitim görmüş ve II. Wilhelm tarafından sevilen, savaşın genç Harbiye Nazırı olan Enver Paşa, 28 Temmuz 1914'te Avrupa'da başlayan Savaşa Osmanlı'yı sürükledi.

CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK - ALMAN İLİŞKİLERİ

SIYASİ İLİŞKİLER

Birinci Dünya Savaşı bittiğinde galip ülkeler kendi yeni-dünya düzenlerini kurmak üzere harekete geçtiler ve yenilmiş olan imparatorluklar üzerinde gerek topraklarını parçalayarak, gerekse de yeni devletler kurarak ve onların gelecekteki siyasi, ekonomik, askeri güçlerini büyük ölçüde bertaraf etmeye çalışarak planlarını gerçekleştirmeye çalıştılar. Burada Almanya ile Türkiye arasında dış politikada benzerlikler, yakınlıklar ve paralellikler görülmektedir.

1918'de Kaiser II. Wilhelm'in tahttan çekilmek zorunda kalmasıyla kurulan Weimer Cumhuriyeti, sarsıcı iç karışıklıklar ve ekonomik sıkıntılar içinde kurulmuştu. Toprak kaybetmiş ve eski ekonomik gücünü kaybetmiş olan Almanya birde Versailles Antlaşması ile savaş tazminatlarını ödemesi kabul ettirilmişti.

Alman Hükümeti'nin Türkiye ile ilişki kurmada bazı çekinceleri vardı. Zira diğer batılı devletler Türkiye'ye karşı sert bir politika izlemekte idi. Alman Hükümeti'de bu devletlerle ilişkileri bozmama adına Türkiye ile diplomatik ilişki kurmakta çekiniyordu. Ancak bu tereddüt çok sürmedi ve Mart 1924'te Türkiye ile Almanya arasında bir Türk- Alman Dostluk Antlaşması imzalandı.

Nazi döneminde ise, Türk-Alman ilişkileri hassasiyetini korumakla beraber farklılıklar göstermeye de başlamıştı. Amaçları ve yöntemleri farklılık arz ediyordu. Almanya, dış politikada hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için, tek yanlı kararlar alıyor ve antlaşmaları tanımaya yanaşmıyordu. Bunları temel ilke haline getirip güç gösterilerinde bulunuyor, zaman zaman da askeri güç kullanıyordu. Türkiye ise, dış politikasında, mevcut anlaşmaları kesinlikle tanımakta ve uygulamaktaydı. Lozan'da rahatsız olduğu hususları devletler hukuku çerçevesinde gündeme getirerek arzu ettiği şekilde neticeler elde etmeye çalışıyordu. Türkiye tek yanlı uygulamalara kesinlikle karşı olduğu gibi ilke olarak ta reddediyordu. Sonuç olarak, iki ülkenin tercih ettiği yöntem arasında çelişkiler vardı.

Musul Sorunu ve Almanya'nın Bakışı

I. Dünya Savaşından önce Musul bölgesi, petrolü dolayısıyla, İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya ve hatta A.B.D. arasında rekabet konusu olmuş, 1916'da ki Sykes- Picot anlaşması ile bu bölge Fransa'ya bırakılmıştı. 1920 San Remo Konferansında Fransa, kendini Orta Doğuda desteklemesine karşılık, burasını İngiltere'ye bırakmıştı.

Lozan Konferansında çözülemeyen sorunlardan biri olan Musul'un kime kalacağı sorunu Türk dış politikasının en önemli sorunlarındanı. Konferansta Türk- Irak sınırının çizilmesi meselesi görüşme konusu olduğu zaman, Türkiye, Musul ve Süleymaniye bölgeleri halkının büyük çoğunluğunun Türk olması sebebiyle, buraların Türkiye'ye ait olması gerektiğini ileri sürmüştü, İngiltere'de Mandater devlet olarak bu teze karşı çıkmıştı. Bunun üzerine Lozan Antlaşmasının 3. Maddesiyle, bu meselenin çözümü, dokuz ay içinde Türkiye ile İngiltere arasında ikili görüşmelere bırakılmıştı.

Musul sorunun çözülmesi, Türk dış politikası iki yönden etkiledi; birincisi Türkiye'yi Sovyetler Birliği'ne daha da yaklaştırdı, denge politikasında Türkiye, Sovyetlerle işbirliğini geliştirdi, 17 Aralık 1925 de Paris'te Türk-Sovyet Dostluk ve Saldırmazlık Paktı imza edildi. İkincisi de Türkiye'nin, Fransa ve İtalya ile olan ilişkilerin yumuşamasını sağlamıştı.

1929'dan itibaren İngiltere'nin Türkiye'ye olan yaklaşımı değişmeye başlamış ve Türk ekonomisine katkıda bulunmaya başlamıştır.

Almanya, Musul sorununda Türkiye'nin yanında yer almaktan çekindiği gibi İngiltere yanında da yer almaktan çekinmiştir. Bu sorunun öneminden dolayı ilişkileri dengede tutmuş, sadece Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin değil aynı zamanda Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinin de bozulmasını istememiştir.

Milletler Cemiyeti, Türkiye ve Almanya

18 Ocak 1919'da Paris'te toplanan Barış Konferansı'nda milletler cemiyetinin kurulması ana gündem maddesi olarak ele alındı. Cemiyet Sözleşmesi Versailles Antlaşmasının bir parçası olarak kabul edildiğinden, 10 Ocak 1920'de onaylanarak yürürlüğe girdi. Milletler Cemiyeti, I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında geniş katılımı sağlamak amacıyla, uluslararası işbirliğini geliştirerek uluslararası barış ve güvenliği sağlamak amacıyla kurulmuştur.

Almanya'nın Milletler Cemiyetine girmesi her iki ülkeyi de tedirgin etti, zira iyi ilişkiler içerisinde olan üç ülkeden biri şimdi diğer iki ülke ile işbirliğine girerek üçlü gruptan ayrılacak kaygısını gündeme getirdi. Özellikle Sovyetler Birliği'nin endişesi; Almanya dış politikasını bundan sonra Batılı büyük devletlerle yapacağı hatta onların lehine hareket ederek önemli değişiklikler yapacağı idi. Aynı zamanda Türkiye üzerinde etkili olabileceği ve bununda Türk- Sovyet ilişkilerini olumsuz yönde etkileyeceğini de düşünüyordu.

1932 tarihli Silahsızlanma konferansında ki 13 Nisan 1932 oturumunda Türkiye, Milletler cemiyetine üye olabileceğini resmen bildirdi. Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyinin 18 Temmuz 1932 tarihli oturumu ve 43 üyenin oybirliği ile Türkiye Milletler cemiyetine üye oldu ve bu teşkilata, katıldıktan sonra sonuna kadar ve samimiyetle bağlı kalmış barışın korunması için cemiyeti daima desteklemiştir. Ayrıca Türkiye'nin Milletler Cemiyetine katılması Balkanlarda da işbirliğini ve yakınlaşma faaliyetlerini arttırmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği de ilk önce Türkiye'nin bu cemiyete üyeliğini desteklememesine rağmen, Almanya ve Japonya'nın militarist politikaları artınca kendisinde 1934'de resmen Milletler Cemiyetine üye olmuştur.

Versay Antlaşması ve Nasyonal Sosyalistler

Türkiye, Nasyonal Sosyalist Alman dış politikasında hayati önemi taşıyan Versay Antlaşması'ndan kurtulma çabalarını haklı buluyor, hatta kendi mücadelesi olan Sevr Antlaşması'ndan kurtulma gayretine benzetiyordu. Bu hoşgörülü yaklaşımın süresi ise, elbette Almanya'nın taleplerinin derecesine yakından bağlı olacaktır.

Türkiye, Fransa ve İngiltere ile neredeyse siyasi ilişkileri kesikti denebilecek durumdayken, Almanya ile ilişkileri Naziler iktidara gelinceye kadar iyiydi. Hitlerin iktidara gelmesinden sonra Alman dış politikası radikal bir değişim gösterdi. Almanya'nın Avrupa, hatta dünya politikasında etkili ve güçlü bir devlet olması için adımlar atmaya başladı. Güneydoğu Avrupa ülkeleriyle Balkan devletleri üzerinde öncelikle ekonomik ve daha sonra da bu ekonomik temel üzerinde siyasal egemenlik kurma mücadelesi bu adımın bir parçasıydı. Burada asıl gözden kaçmayacak sorun, Fransa ve İngiltere'nin I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası kurduğu Avrupa merkezli uluslararası politika dengesinin temelden bozulması idi. Almanya'nın Versay Antlaşması'nda en önemli sorunlarından biri şüphesiz zorunlu askerlik hizmeti sistemini yasaklayan hükümdü. Almanya bunu kısa zamanda çözüme kavuşturmak için 1933 Cenevre Silahsızlanma Konferansı'ndan ve Milletler Cemiyeti'nden ayrıldı. Türkiye, Almanya'nın tutumunun yanlış olduğu kanâtini taşıdığını ve Cenevre Silahsızlanma Konferansı'na geri dönmesi gerektiğini, Tefvik Rüştü aracılığı ile iletmiştir.

Almanya, 16 Mart 1935'te Alman ordusunun bundan böyle mecburi askerlik esası üzerine yapılacağını ilan ederek "Almanya, yeni ve kuvvetli bir donanma kurmaya karar vermiştir" açıklamasını yaptı. Türkiye ise, Almanya'nın Cenevre Silahsızlanma Konferansı'ndan çekilmesine üzüldüğünü bildirmesine rağmen Alman ordusunun yeniden kurulmasına olumsuz bakmadığını tam aksine bu gelişmeden memnunluk duyuyordu. Çünkü Türk ordusu, I. Dünya savaşından önce olduğu gibi, Alman savaş sanayiinden ve deneyiminden uygun biçimde yararlanmak istiyordu.

Almanya'nın Versay Antlaşması'nı tanımadığını ilan ettiği başka bir hadise de, Ren bölgesinin askerden arındırılmış statüsünü 7 Mart 1936 tarihinden itibaren tanımadığı ve Alman askerlerinin bölgeye gireceğini ilan etmesidir. Türkiye Hükümeti, Hariciye Vekaleti Genel Sekreteri Numan Menemencioğlu aracılığı ile Almanya'nın Büyükelçisi Keller ile olayların gidişatına dair bir görüşme gerçekleştirdi. Son gelişmelerin Türkiye'yi doğrudan ilgilendirmedeğini, ancak Türkiye'nin esas endişesinin dünya barışının tehlikeye düşmesi endişesi olduğunu açıklamıştır. Keller'in 13 Mart tarihli raporunda, Türkiye'nin Ren sorununda tarafsız kaldığını, asıl taşıdığı kaygının kesinlikle barışın tehlikeye düşmesinden dolayı olduğunu açıklar. Netice itibariyle, Türkiye Milletler Cemiyeti'nin bu konuda Almanya'yı kınayan kararına katıldı.

Türkiye'nin Boğazlarda Hakimiyet Kurması ve Almanya

Boğazların önemi sadece Türkiye için siyasi, askeri ve jeopolitik açıdan öneme haiz değildi. Diğer devletlerin de aynı şekilde önem verdiği bir mesele idi. Bundan dolayı, Yeni Türk Devletli geçmişten kalan tecrübeleri doğrultusunda Türk boğazlarında mutlak hâkimiyet kurma ilkesini Misak-ı Milli de kabul etmiş, Lozan Barış Konferansında bunu sürekli savunmuş, fakat tam olarak denetimi sağlayamamıştı.

Türkiye, Hariciye Vekâleti Genel Sekreteri Numan Menemencioğlu aracılığı ile Lozan antlaşmasının imzacı ülkelerine, antlaşmanın Boğazlar ile ilgili hükümlerinin değiştirilmesi talebini içeren bir notayı 10 Nisan 1936 tarihinde sundu.

“Avrupa'daki buhranların 1923 Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ile Boğazların güvenliği için verilmiş kolektif garantiyi artık işlemez hale getirdiğini belirterek, kendi güvenliği, savunması ve egemenlik haklarının korunması bakımından bu statünün değiştirilerek, Boğazların askerileştirilmesini istiyor.”

Alman Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda görevli Dieckhoff 21 Haziran'da Keller'e yolladığı raporda, Almanya'nın Türkiye'nin Boğazlar konusundaki taleplerini takdir ettiğini, Türkiye'nin tarafsız kaldığı bir savaş durumunda Almanya açısından sorunun teşkil etmediğini bildirmektedir. Alman kamuoyunda Montrö Konferansı'nın hiç de hoşnut edici bir etki yaratmadığına işaret ederek, asıl can alıcı soruna gelmekte ve Almanya'nın konferans sonunda oluşacak antlaşmaya katılmayı talep etmediğini, fakat oluşumuna katılmadığı kurallar için haklarını saklı tuttuğunu özellikle vurgulamaktadır. Keller'den de, Türk Hükümeti'ne bu tutumu gayet dikkatli bir üslupla yansıtması isteniyordu.

Avusturya'nın İlhakı

Almanya 12 Mart 1938'de Avusturya'yı ilhak etti. Türkiye'nin doğrudan bir tepkisi olmadığı gibi Almanya'nın Versay sıkıntısından kurtulmasının bir parçası olarak gördü. Türkiye'nin bakışını Rosenberg'in 8 Haziran 1935 tarihli raporunda Aras ile yaptığı görüşmede yer almaktadır. Raporda, Avusturya halkının yarından fazla çoğunluğunun Nazi yönetimini kabul edeceğini, Avusturya halkının mevcut yönetimin baskısı ve eziyetine dayanamayıp bir sosyal ve siyasal patlama olacaktır. Bundan dolayı Aras'a göre doğru olanı, Almanya doğal gelişmeleri sabırla bekleyip ona göre davranmasıdır.

Almanya'nın genişleme politikasını devam ettiriyor olması Türkiye'yi fazla kaygılandırmıyordu. Alman Nasyonal Sosyalizminin amacı, Almanya'nın sınırları dışında

kalmış tüm Almanları tek bir devletin çatısı altında birleştirmekti. Türkiye bu sınırlar içerisinde bir ülke olmadığından, bu durum Türkiye'yi pek rahatsız etmiyordu. Türkiye Almanya'yı karşısına almayacak bir şekilde dış politika sürdürüyordu.

Münih Antlaşması ve Çekoslovakya'nın İlhakı

Almanya Avusturya'yı ilhak ettikten (Anschluss) sonra, Nazi politikacı Konrad Henlein tarafından yönetilen ve nüfusunun çoğunluğu Alman kökenli olan Çekoslovakya'nın Südetlerinin, Hitler'in bir sonraki isteği olacağı beklenmeye başlanmıştı.

Hem Fransa'nın hem de Sovyetler Birliği'nin Çekoslovakya ile askeri ittifakı vardı ama ne Fransa ne de Sovyetler bir savaşa hazır değildi. Gerçekte, Sovyet Rusya ve Stalin kapitalist anlaşmalardan oldukça rahatsızdı ve Fransa'nın başında ise yatıştırıcı bir dış politika izlemekten yana olan Edouard Daladier vardı. 1938'de Fransa'da yapılan genel seçimler de Fransa'nın askeri güç göndermesinin mümkün olmadığını göstermişti. Batı Avrupa'daki hiçbir devlet savaş istemiyordu. Nazi Almanyasının askeri hareket kabiliyetini fazla abartmışlardı. Öte yandan Hitler'in çeşitli kamuoyu açıklamalarında ısrarla vurguladığı barış çağrıları, Avrupa kamuoyunda son derece olumlu karşılanmaktaydı ve ikna ediciydi.

Diğer taraftan Hitler ise Batı'nın bu zaafalarını iyi değerlendiriyordu ve bir an Orta Avrupa'da hedeflerine ulaşacak bir dış siyaset izliyordu. Konferans yapılması için Benito Mussolini tarafından ikna edildi. Zira İtalya da henüz Avrupa çapında bir çatışmaya hazır değildi. Alman askeri liderliği de ordunun durumunun farkındaydı ve savaşı engelleyebilmek için ellerinden geleni yapıyorlardı.

Arnavutluk'un İşgalinin Türk-Alman İlişkilerine Etkisi

İtalya 7 Nisan 1939'da Arnavutluk'u işgal etti. Bu işgal ile Türkiye önemli bir sorunla karşı karşıya kaldı. Çünkü Türkiye'nin can düşmanı sayılan İtalya bu kez Balkanlar'da bir fırsat yakalamış ve davranışlarıyla sadece Arnavutluk ile yetinmeyeceğini gösteriyordu. Daha önemlisi, Türkiye'nin güvenlik bölgesi olarak kabul ettiği Balkanlar'a İtalya ve Almanya birlikte adım atmışlardı ve yayılmacı politikalarını devam ettiriyorlardı.

Arnavutluk'un işgali Çekoslovakya'nın işgalinden hemen sonra olması, Türkiye'nin aklına iki ülkenin ortak ve programlı bir eylem içinde olduklarını getiriyordu. Dolayısıyla bu gelişmelerin, Türk-Alman ilişkilerini olumsuz biçimde etkilemesi kaçınılmazdı. Ankara, İtalya'nın Almanların Avusturya'yı ilhakı sırasında Almanya'ya verdiği desteğe karşılık, Almanya'nın da İtalya'nın Arnavutluk'u işgalini desteklediği görüşündeydi. Ayrıca Alman

basınının İtalya'nın işgalini onaylaması da bu düşüncenin doğruluğunu kanıtlayan bir gösterge olarak kabul ediliyordu.

EKONOMİK İLİŞKİLER

Türk - Alman ilişkileri, I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası 1930'lara kadar her iki devletin de kendi iç ve dış meseleleriyle uğraşması yüzünden fazla gelişmemiş, sınırlı olmuştur. 1930'dan sonra Türkiye'nin iç gelişmeleri ve Almanya'nın siyasi alanda aktifleşmesi ve Nazi Partisinin iktidara gelmesi sonrasında, Türkiye'nin, Birinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma planının kabul edip uygulamaya koymasıyla beraber sanayi teçhizatı ihtiyacı Türk Alman yakınlaşmasını hızlandırmıştır. Almanya'nın dış politik araçlarından biri olan sanayi ve ticari nüfuz bölgelerine Türkiye de girmiş, Türkiye'nin Almanya ile ticari faaliyetleri artmıştır. Türk Alman ilişkilerinde 1936 yılı dönüm noktalarından birini oluşturmuştur. İtalya eksenli bir politika izleyen ve Türkiye'nin İtalya tehdidi konusundaki hassasiyetini kavrayamayan Alman Diplomasisi, Türkiye'ye baskı uygulayarak Türkiye'yi Batılılardan ayırıp, Berlin Roma Hattına çekmek istemiş, bu gerçekleştirdiği takdirde Almanya, Sovyetlere karşı Boğazlarda ve Anadolu'da üstün bir duruma geçtiği gibi, Türkiye'ye bir sıçrama tahtası olarak kullanmak istemiştir. Fakat Almanya'nın İtalya ile yürüttüğü yayılcı politika Türkiye'nin bu dönemde Almanya olan ilişkilerinin gelişmesine engel olmuş ve Türkiye'yi genellikle özgür dünya ve Batılı Devletlerle işbirliğine itmıştır. Siyasi olarak gerginleşen ilişkilere rağmen, ticari ilişkiler devam etmiş iki ülke bu noktada pragmatik davranarak ekonomiyi ve siyaseti ayırmışlardır.

Türkiye Kayseri'de uçak fabrikası yatırımı yapmak üzere planlar hazırlarken, 1925 yılında Alman Junkers şirketi ile, Türkiye'de bir uçak ve uçak motoru fabrikası kurulması için gerekli görüş birliğine vardı. 15 Ağustos 1925 tarihinde bu anlaşma imzalandı. Daha sonra, Junkers kendi payına düşen 3,5 milyon Markı patent hakkı olarak Türk Hükümeti'nden talep etti. Başvekil İsmet Paşa'nın bu miktarı fabrikanın cirosu üzerinden yüzde 5'lik bir oranda sürekli ödeyerek beş yılda tamamlanmasını önermişti. Türkiye'nin kredi talebine, Alman Dışişleri Bakanlığı sadece uçak sektörüne bir yatırım olmadığını aynı zamanda hammadde işlemede çok önemli bir Pazar olan Türkiye'nin ağır sanayiinin kurulmasında da Almanya'ya sonuna kadar güveniyor olmasını hesaba katarak, krediye olumlu bakmıştı. Ayrıca kredi verilmediği takdirde, Alman Dışişleri Bakanlığı Türk Hükümeti'nin uçak fabrikası projesi için öncelikle bir Fransız şirketler grubuna başvurabileceğini düşünüyordu. Çünkü Fransız şirketleri bu konuda istekli olduklarını her platformda belli ediyorlardı. Fakat

Junkers'in içinde bulunduğu mali sorunların ve güçlüklerin ortaya çıkmasıyla projede aksamalar olmuş, Junkers'in iflas etmesi devlet desteğiyle engellenmiş, Tayyare ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi (Tomtasch) Türk-Alman ortak kuruluşu öncülüğünde proje tamamlanmış ve Kayseri Uçak Fabrikası 6 Ekim 1926'da açılmış oldu.

Lufthansa'nın Türkiye'de hava ulaşımı kurma projesi de bir diğer önemli projeydi. Lufthansa'nın önerisi, Sofya, İstanbul, Ankara, Kayseri, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Van, Tebriz, Tahran ve Kabil uçuş hattının kurulmasıydı.

Ticari İlişkiler ve Dış Ticaret

I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası iki devlet arasında kurulmasına çalışılan ticari ilişkiler bazen fiili bazen de hukuki sorunlarla karşılaşmıştır. Osmanlı-Almanya arasında imzalanan anlaşmaların yürürlükten kalkması, Lozan'daki Türkiye'nin ekonomik politikasındaki sağlam duruşu bazı güçlüklerle karşılaşılmasına yol açmıştır. Fakat neticesinde Türk-Alman Ticaret Antlaşması 12 Ocak 1927'de Ankara'da imzalanmıştır. Türk-Alman ticari ilişkileri esas olarak, Türkiye'nin Almanya'ya tarım ürünleri ve sanayi hammaddesi satması, buna karşılık Almanya'dan sanayi malları alması biçimde kısaca özetlenebilir. Bu doğrultuda 1927 yılındaki anlaşmalara ek olarak 10 Ağustos 1933 yılında Türk-Alman Ticaret Antlaşması Berlin'de imzalandı. Bu tarihten 1936 yılına dek Türk-Alman Ticaret Antlaşmaları eski anlaşmalar temel alınarak yapılmaya devam etti. Yeni antlaşma 26 Temmuz 1938'de Berlin'de imzalandı. Antlaşmaya göre, tüm Türk ihraç malları Almanya'ya kontenjan sınırlaması olmaksızın girecekti. Bu antlaşma 31 Ağustos 1939 tarihine kadar geçerliydi. Batılı devletlerin artan etkinliğine karşı bu tür antlaşmalarla bir denge oluşturulmaya çalışılıyordu. Türkiye'nin toplam ithalatının yüzde 90'ı takasa dayanmakta idi.

TÜRKİYE-ALMANYA KÜLTÜREL İLİŞKİLERİ

Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında Türkiye'ye gelen uzmanlar ve akademisyenler; yüksekokullar, fabrikalar ve bakanlıklar gibi birçok devlet kurumunun yeniden yapılandırılmasında önemli roller oynamışlardır. Türkiye ve Almanya arasındaki diplomatik ilişkileri başlatan "*Dostluk Antlaşması*", 3 Mart 1924 yılında Ankara'da imzalandıktan sonra kültürel ilişkilerde de yaklaşma başlamıştır. Dostluk Antlaşmasının 3. maddesi, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin sadece diplomatik alanda kalmamasını, ekonomik, askeri ve kültürel anlamda da ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi amaçlanmakta olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Bu maddede ayrıca karşılıklı konsoloslukların açılması ve ticari ilişkilerin başlaması da hedeflenenler arasındaydı. İlk

olarak Mondros Antlaşması gereğince 1918 yılında kapatılmış olan İstanbul'daki Alman okulu 1924 yılında tekrar açıldı.

Almanya'daki Türk Görevliler

Türkiye Almanya'dan gelen uzmanları ağırlarken bir yandan da Almanya'ya çeşitli alanlarda uzmanlık eğitimleri almak amacıyla Türk görevliler göndermiştir. Bu gönderilen görevliler, genelde güvenlik alanlarından olmuştur. Güvenlik örgütlerinde görevli personelin Almanya'da eğitim görerek ve Alman güvenlik teşkilatlarında çalışarak deneyim kazanması hedeflenmiştir.

Ayrıca Almanya'ya 1932 yılında 137 Türk öğrenci gönderilmiş ve çeşitli yüksekokullarda öğrenim görmesi sağlanmıştır. Burada Berlin Türk Talebe Cemiyeti oluşturulmuş ve daha sonraları Türkiye'den gelebilecek öğrenciler için bir çatı oluşturulmuştur.

Latin Alfabetiyle İlk Türkçe-Almanca Sözlük

Türkiye'nin Latin alfabesini kullanmaya başlamasından sonra yeni harflerle yazılmış olan ilk Türkçe-Almanca sözlük 1931 yılında yayınlanmıştır. İstanbul Alman Lisesinde öğretmen olan Heuser tarafından hazırlanan bu sözlük İstanbul'da yayınlanmakta olan Almanca günlük gazete "*Türkische Post*" un yayını olarak okurlarına sunulmuştur.

Güzel Sanatlar Alanındaki İlişkiler

1927 yılında Alman Büyükelçiliği aracılığıyla Prof. Arrhur Kampf'tan Atatürk'ün bir portresinin yapılması istenmiştir. Kampf'a, Cumhurbaşkanı Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün bir portresini yapması için 12.000 Türk Lirası ücret ödenerek portre yapılması planlanmıştır. 1928 yılının Ocak ayında bu portre yapılmıştır. Ayrıca 1934 yılında yine Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün heykeli yapılması amacıyla heykeltıraş Prof. Josef Thorak Türkiye'ye davet edilmiştir. Bıraktığı etki itibariyle genellikle eserleriyle Ankara'daki Güven Anıtı ile sınırlı tutulan heykeltıraş Josef Thorak, kamuya ait pek çok yerde sergilenen muhtelif Atatürk portreleri yapmıştır. Thorak'ın mizaca uygun olarak modellemiş olduğu ilk özel portrelerden birisi, 1934/35 yıllarında Ankara için yapılan Güven Anıtı ile ortaya çıkmıştır. Atatürk'ün bu ilk portre büstü, çeşitli sipariş sahiplerinin ısmarlamış olduğu büstleri teslim etmek için bizzat Thorak'ın kendisi tarafından yapılan çok sayıda kopyanın ve varyasyonun orijini teşkil etmekteydi. Thorak, Türk Cumhurbaşkanı'nı dinamik, neredeyse kızgın bir yüz ifadesiyle birlikte, hemen hemen sadece gümrüklerini vurgulayarak resmetmiştir.

Günümüzde halen geçerliliğini koruyan Ankara şehir planı için Türkiye tarafından davet edilen Prof. Clemens Holzmeister'in asistanı ile birlikte Ankara'ya gelip incelemelerde bulunduğunu ve bu doğrultuda Ankara Belediyesi'nin talebi üzerine Prof. Hoffman'ın imar planı hazırlaması için görüşmelerde bulunduğu ve Hoffman'ın tavsiyesi ile Prof. Herman Jansen ve Prof. M. Brix'in Ankara'ya gelerek Ankara'nın şehir planı çizdiği bilinmektedir. Prof. Jansen 1938 yılına kadar Ankara İmar Müdürlüğünde danışmanlık görevini sürdürmüştür. Jansen ayrıca İzmit, Mersin, Gaziantep, Adana, Ceyhan ve Tarsus gibi kentlerin planını hazırlamıştır. Keza Prof. Egli'nin 1937 yılında Niğde şehir planını yaptığı da bilinmektedir. Bu dönemde ayrıca Ankara'daki çeşitli devlet kurumlarının binalarının Alman mimarlar tarafından çizildiği görülmektedir.

Ankara gibi İstanbul'da çeşitli alanlarda Alman uzmanlardan yararlanma yoluna gitmiştir. Bu amaçla Alman uzman Wild ile Beyoğlu ve Galata için yeni bir kanalizasyon projesi hazırlaması için anlaşma sağlanmıştır.

Almanya'nın Türk Basınına Etkileme Çabaları ve Propaganda Faaliyetleri

Hitler liderliğinde Naziler iktidara geldiğinde farklı bir Almanya profili çizmeye başlamıştı. Bir dünya imparatorluğu kurma hedefi belirleyen Almanya çeşitli propaganda faaliyetlerini yoğun olarak kullanmıştır. Nazi Partisi içinde bir dış ilişkiler birimi oluşturmuştu. Bu birimin amacı, yabancı ülkelerde, özellikle de Balkanlar'da ve Yakın Doğu'da Nazi propagandası yapmaktı. Nazi Partisi'nin Yabancı Ülkeler Organizasyonunun (Auslandsorganisation=AO) da bu alanda etkinliği vardı ve bu birim örgütlenme ve propaganda konularında Alman Dışişleri Bakanlığı ile yakın ilişkiler içindeydi. Bu birimin üyeleri, yabancı ülkelerdeki Alman sivil toplum kuruluşlarında Nazi örgütleri oluşturmaya çalışarak Nazi propagandası yapıyorlardı. Üyeler, bu tür sivil toplum kuruluşlarını, örgütlenmek, propaganda ve casusluk amacıyla kullanıyorlardı. 1932 yılında Nazi Partisi'nin yabancı ülkelerde oluşturduğu örgütlerden 11 tanesi de Türkiye'de bulunuyordu. 1 Mayıs 1935 tarihi itibarıyla Nazi Partisi'nin Yabancı Ülkeler Organizasyonunun (AO) İstanbul'daki sorumlusu R. Gross idi.

Nazi Partisi'nin 1937 yılında yabancı ülkelerdeki en önemli propaganda gazetelerinden biri de, Türkische Post'tu. Nazi partisi iktidarındaki Almanya ilk adımını 1924 yılından beri yayınlanan "*Türkische Post*" isimli Alman gazetesini resmi propaganda aracı olarak yoğun bir şekilde kullanmaya başlayarak atmıştı. Bu gazetenin okuyucu kitlesinin artırılması için çalışmalar yapılmış ve ayrıca İstanbul'daki Alman kitapçıları "*Völkischer Beobachter*" ve "*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*" gazetelerini günlük ve çok sayıda satmaya başlamışlardı.

Nazi Partisi'nin Yabancı Ülkeler Organizasyonunun (AO) Türkiye'deki üye sayısı Nazi Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesinden önce 22 kişi idi ve Türkiye bu konuya ilişkin sıralamada 44. ülke iken; Nazi Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesinden sonra üye sayısı artmış ve bu dönemde yeni üye sayısı 216 olmuştur. 30 Haziran 1937 tarihli verilerde ise, üye sayısı 238 iken sıralamada Türkiye 29. Ülke olmuştur. Bu rakamlardan da anlaşıldığı gibi Hitler liderliğindeki Almanya Türkiye'ye büyük önem vermiştir.

Almanya'nın Türkiye'ye Sanat, Kültür ve Eğitim Üzerindeki Yatırımları

Alman hükümeti Türkiye'yi etkilemek ve kendi yanına çekebilmek adına yalnızca diplomasiyi kullanmamış, bütün propaganda faaliyetlerini kullanma yollarını denemiştir. Basın ve radyo yoluyla Türk kamuoyu üzerinde olumlu bir Alman imajı bırakmak istemiş ve yalnızca bu alanda da kalmamış özellikle eğitim ve güzel sanatlar alanında da faaliyetlerini hızlandırmıştır.

Yakındoğu Alman propagandasının kapsamında olan Türkiye, Alman hükümeti tarafından Almanya propaganda alanının ya da "*Alman Kültür Sahasının*" en önemli ülkelerinden biri olarak görülmüştür. Bu bağlamda Türkiye, Balkanlar ile Ortadoğu'yu bağlayan bir geçit olarak sunulmuş ve coğrafi stratejik özelliklerinden dolayı bu ülkeye önem verilmiştir. "Alman Sahası" tabiri daha sonra "Alman Hayat Sahası" olarak kullanılmaya başlanmış ve Polonya ve Çekoslovakya işgalleri bu tanım doğrultusunda gerçekleştirilmiştir. Türkiye ise doğrudan askeri işgalle değil, propaganda araçları ile Almanya'nın "*hayat sahasına*" dahil edilmek istenmiştir. Bu amaçla da propaganda alanlarının her biri kullanılmıştır.

Alman Okulları

1868'den beri İstanbul'da var olan ve 1911 yılında liseye dönüştürülen Alman Okulu bu alanda bir ilktir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası kapatılan bu okul 1924 yılında başlayan diplomatik ilişkilerle birlikte tekrar eski binasında faaliyete geçmiştir. 1933 sonrası Nazi iktidarıyla beraber bu okul etkili bir propaganda merkezine dönüşmüş, eğitim faaliyetleri yanı sıra sık sık Almanya hakkında konferanslar ve filmler verilmiştir.

1930'lu yılların başında Alman Hükümeti'nce resmen desteklenen okul sayısı iki idi. Bu okullarda 1931-1932 öğretim yılında 1.127 öğrenci öğrenim görürken, bu sayı 1932-1933 öğretim yılında 1.007'ye düşmüştür. 1934 yılının Mayıs ayından sonra Ankara'daki Alman Büyükelçiliği'nde görevli personel ve diğer Alman görevlilerin çocuklarının eğitimi için Ankara'da bir Alman Okulu daha açıldı. İstanbul'daki Alman Okulu'nda 1937-1938 öğretim

yılında öğrenim gören toplam 642 öğrenciden sadece 150 tanesi Alman, diğerleri Türk öğrenciydi. Türkiye'deki eğitim sistemi, yabancı okullarda öğrenim gören öğrencilerin dahi bazı derslerinin Türk öğretmenler tarafından ve Türkçe olarak verilmesini zorunlu kıldığından, bu durum, Alman Okulu için bir sorun oluşturmuştu. Milli Eğitim Bakanı 1932 yılının Ekim ayında bu düzenlemeyi yenilemişti. 1937 yılının sonbaharına dek İstanbul'daki Alman Okulu bu düzenlemeye uymaktan kaçındı; ancak nihayet, şikâyet üzerine, kurallara uyması için uyarıldı. Alman Büyükelçisi Keller Hariciye Vekâleti'ne, Aras'a ve Celal Bayar'a bu konuda birer protesto notası yolladıysa da, düzenlemenin içeriğinde temel bir değişiklik olmamıştır.

Bu okullar çeşitli amaçlarla kullanılmıştır. Alman Hükümeti Alman Okulu'nda faaliyet gösteren Alman görevlilerden istihbarat, örgütlenme ve propaganda alanlarında yararlanmaya çalışmıştır. Glasneck İstanbul'daki Alman Okulu'nda görevli 20 Alman öğretmenden 18'inin Nazi örgütlerinde faaliyet gösterdiğini belirtmektedir. Ayrıca bu Alman okullarının misyonerlik faaliyetleri ve Alman propagandası yapma çalışmaları da iç içe sürmüştür.

TÜRKİYE'NİN MODERNLEŞMESİ

Reformlara Giden Süreç

Kurtuluş savaşı ile Türkler bağımsızlıklarını kazanmışlardı ama 10 yıl süren savaş sonrası nüfus büyük ölçüde azalmış, verimli Rumeli toprakları işgal edilmiş, yeni Türkiye'yi oluşturan toprakların ekonomisi paramparça edilmişti. Toplum ciddi karışıklığın içindeydi. Müslüman olmayanların çoğu ülkeyi terk etmiş, Rum topluluğu 1.8 milyondan 120 bine, Ermeniler 1.3 milyondan 100 bine düşmüştü. Dış ticarete de korkunç düşüşler olmuş, ihracat 1911 ile 1923 arasında 25 milyar kuruştan 800 milyon kuruşa, ithalât da 4.5 milyar kuruştan 1.4 milyar kuruşa inmişti.

Zamana ayak uyduramayan hiç bir medeniyet kalıcı olamadığı gibi Osmanlı Devleti'de kendini yenileyememenin, bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmelere ayak uyduramamanın acısını çekti ve tarih sahnesinden yerine yeni bir devlet doğarak çekildi.

Aslında yeni doğan bu devletin çağa ayak uydurma adına atması gereken birçok adım daha öncesinden atılmaya başlanmıştı. Zira Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulmadan evvel Osmanlı Devleti, Batı bilimini ve tekniğini esas alarak devlet yapısını yeniden düzenledi. Tanzimat

ve reform girişimleri Osmanlı tarihinde Avrupalılaşıma sürecinin temel parametreleri olarak kabul edildi. Eğitim yapısı tünden deęiştirildi, askeri yapılandırılmalarda batı merkezizyetçi bir mekanizmanın işletilmesi esas alındı. Osmanlı Devleti nazarında artık Batı, kendini ekonomik ve askeri bakımdan ispat ettięi gibi kurmuş olduęu siyasi devlet sistemi ile de örnek alınabilecek bir yapı haline gelmişti. Bu açıdan Türkiye'nin siyasi rejiminin ve dıř politikasının batıcı karakterinin kökenlerini Osmanlı modernleşmesinde bulmak mümkündür. Osmanlı aydınları modernleşmeyi batılılaşma ile aynı anlamda kullanmışlardır. Osmanlı'nın gerçekleştirdięi reformların birçok nedeni ve esin kaynaęı olsa da dönemin siyasi seçkinleri İmparatorluğu kurtarmanın tek yolu olarak Avrupa tarzı reformların hayata geçirilmesini görmüşlerdi. İşte Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bu gelişmelerin devamında kuruldu. Yeni kurulan bu ulus devlet, Batı'nın Reformları ile ancak muasır bir devlet olacaęı kanatını taşıyordu.

Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yöneticileri, Avrupa'nın yüzyıllar boyu kıtanın dıřında tutmaya çalıştıęı bir devleti miras almışlardı. Bunu bildikleri halde, yeni Türkiye'ye batılı bir yapı kazandırmanın âdeta bir güvenlik gerekçesi olacaęını düşünüyorlardı. Her ne kadar Avrupa, kendi gibi düşünmeyen ve kendine düşman olan bir devleti yanında görmek istemesede, çağdaş ve güçlü olmak için orada yer almak gerekiyordu. Bundan dolayı modernleşme, Atatürk Türkiye'sinin temel bir politika hedefini oluşturduęu gibi hatta tek çıkar yol gözüküyordu. Modernleşme, batılı olan her şey idi ise, o halde Batı'da yaşananlar Türkiye'de yaşanacaktı.

Avrupa'da, Kilise ile Devlet mücadelesi, Rönesans, bilimsel uyanış, hümanizm, liberalizm, akılcılık ve aydınlanma gibi büyük Avrupalı serüvenler ve fikir çatışmaları, pek yabancı ve ilişiksiz oldukları bir toplumda farkına varılmaksızın ve yansımasız olarak geçti. Buna rağmen, *Çağdaşlaşma*, *Batılılaşma* ve *Özgürlük* gibi kavramların ne anlama geldiğini bile bilmeyen bir avuç Anadolu insanı ile köklü devrimlerin yapılması gerekiyordu. İşin mimarlarının yetişme biçimi, okudukları ve inceledikleri kitaplar ve yaptıkları uygulamalarla, Batı ülkelerinden ve bu ülkeler için geliştirilmiş modellerden etkilendiğini göstermektedir.

Reformlar

Batının '*öteki*'si doğuydu ve Türkiye batının '*öteki*'si olmaktan kurtulmak için batı gibi olmaya çalışıyordu. Böylece batı kendisiyle aynı özelliklere sahip bir ulusu bölmek ve yok etmek istemeyecek aksine Türklerin bir batılı olarak güçlenmesi için her türlü yardımı

yapacaktı. Bu bağlamda da Türkiye dış politikada Batının öncülük ettiği her türlü siyasi ve askeri ittifaka dahil olmaya çalışarak batı sisteminin içinde yer almayı ve bu sayede toprak bütünlüğünü korumayı kendine amaç edindi. Türkiye, sadece dış politikada değil aynı zamanda iç politikada da Batılı seküler sistemi kurmayı kendine amaç edinmişti.

İşte bu doğrultuda Reformlar için bizzat Mustafa Kemal'in kendi döneminde Ankara'nın, kararlı bir biçimde yüzünü Doğu'dan Batı'ya çevirdiği görülmektedir. Çünkü Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve arkadaşları için Batılılaşmak Türk devletinin ve ulusunun yegane çıkış yoluydu. Ancak Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tarafından, ulusal niteliklere sahip, Batı'lı bir devletin kurulması ve uluslararası toplumun saygın bir üyesi olunabilmesi için, imparatorluk dönemindeki toplumsal yapının modern temeller üzerine oturtulmasının yetmeyeceği düşünülüyordu. Aynileşmek istenilen Avrupa'yla geçmişte yaşanan olaylara bağlı olarak gelişen düşmanlıkların da ortadan kaldırılması gerekirdi. Bunun için de öncelikli olarak yeni kurulan ulus devletin ümmetçi tutkularından, maceracı politikalarından ve boş hayallerden uzak tutulmalıydı. Bütün bunların olabilmesi içinde bir dizi reformlar gerekiyordu.

Reformalara geçilmeden önce, I. Meclis'in aldığı bir karar ile *Saltanat* kaldırıldı. Zira *Saltanat*'ın kaldırılması hem Lozan Antlaşması öncesi olması bakımından hemde Reformları başlatabilmek için çok önemli bir hamle idi. İtilâf Devletleri Lozan'da yapılacak görüşmelere, Türk gücünü parçalamak maksadıyla, hem Ankara (TBMM), hem de İstanbul (Osmanlı) Hükümeti'ni birlikte davet edince bu plânın bozulması için Saltanat kaldırılmalıydı ve kaldırıldı. Öte yandan saltanatın varlığı cumhuriyete giden yolda da büyük bir engel teşkil ediyordu. Saltanatın kaldırılmasını sağlayan kanun 1 Kasım 1922'de T.B.M.M.'de fazla tepki görmeden kabul edilmiştir. Şayet İtilâf Devletleri'nin böyle bir daveti olmasaydı bu kararın Meclis'ten geçmesi biraz güç olacaktı. Zira Mustafa Kemal'in en yakın arkadaşları bile *Saltanat*'ın kaldırılmasına karşıydılar. Mesela o sırada başbakan olan ve daha sonra muhalefete geçen Rauf (Orbay), Kemal'in sultanlık konusunda kendisine danışması üzerine görüşlerini açıkça ortaya koydu. Şöyle dedi:

“Sultanlığa vicdanımla ve duygulanımla bağlıyım. Babam padişahın himayesinde büyüdü ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin önde gidenlerinden biri oldu. Bu iyiliklere duyduğum minnet kanıma işlemiş. Nankör değilim ve nankörlük edemem. Zatı şahanelerine sadakatle yükümlüyüm. Halife'ye olan bağlılığım yetişme tarzımın bir gereğidir. Bunun yanı sıra, gözlemim şudur ki, genel durumu denetim altında tutmamız zordur. Bunu ancak, herkesin ulaşamayacak kadar yükseklerde görmeye alıştığı bir otorite

sağlayabilir. Bu da ancak sultanlık ya da halifelik makamı olabilir. Bu makamı ortadan kaldırmak ve farklı nitelikte bir varlığı onun yerine geçirmek, başarısızlığa ve felakete yol açacaktır. Böyle bir şey asla kabul edilemez.”

Saltanat kaldırılırken, halifelige dokunulmamıştır. Çünkü kamuoyu buna henüz hazır değildi. Öte yandan 16-17 Kasım 1922’de son Osmanlı Padişahı VI. Mehmet Vahidettin İngiltere’nin himayesine sığınarak ülkeyi terk etti. İngiltere’nin Vahidettin’i Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne karşı kullanabileceği ihtimali üzerine, Osmanlı Hanedanı’ndan Abdülmecid Efendi halife olarak görevlendirildi. Böylece İngilizler’in önü kesilmiş oldu. Saltanatın kaldırılmasıyla, millî egemenlik yolunda çok önemli bir adım atılmıştır. Halife bir sembol olmaktan öteye gidememiştir. Bir diğer anlamda, 1.T.B.M.M.’nin yaptığı ilk ve tek inkılâp saltanatın kaldırılmasıdır. Diğer inkılâplar ise Atatürk’ün temel felsefesini belirleyen altı ilkedir; Cumhuriyetçilik, Milliyetçilik, Halkçılık, Devletçilik, Laiklik ve İnkılapçılık. Bunlar yeni devletin yani Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin yaptığı inkılâplardır.

MODERN TÜRKİYE’YE ALMAN NÜFUZU

Hitler Döneminde Almanya’dan Kaçarak Türkiye’ye Gelen Bilim İnsanları

Almanya’da 1933 yılında iktidara gelen NSDAP’nin Yahudilere karşı başlatmış olduğu takibatın sonucu olarak Almanya’yı terk etmek zorunda kalan işsiz bilim adamları tarafından Zürih’te Philipp Schwartz’ın yönlendirmesiyle yeni iş imkanları sağlamak amacıyla bir dernek kurulmuştu. Tam da bu dönemde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Cenevre Üniversitesi profesörlerinden Malche’ye Türk yükseköretim sisteminin reform gereksinimlerini saptamak ve buna uygun öneriler getirmek görevini vermişti. Tam da bu dönemde Malche Schwartz ile ilişki kurarak Alman bilim adamlarını Türkiye’ye yönlendirmiştir. Türk ve Alman yetkililerin yaptığı görüşmeler neticesinde Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ile Malche, Schwartz ve Rudolf Nissen arasında Ankara’da bir çalışma anlaşması imzalanmıştır. Gelen ünlü bilim adamları arasında; Ernst Reuter, Fritz Neumark, Ernst Eduard Hirsch, Hans Reichenbach, Leo Spitzer, Erich Auerbach, Ernst von Aster, Marchand, Wilhelm Röpke, Gerhard Kessler, Philipp Schwartz, Rudolf Nissen, Alexander Rüstow, Friedrich Dessauer, Richard von Mises, Rudolf Belling, Bruno Taut ve Paul Hindemith gibi isimler bulunmaktaydı. Bu bilim adamları, Türk akademik hayatının gelişmesinde ve bilimsel bir çerçeveye kazanmasında önemli katkıları olmuştur. Ayrıca bu

insanlar, çeşitli bakanlıkların alt komisyonlarında görev aldıkları gibi, yetiştirdikleri öğrenciler sayesinde de Türk bilim hayatının gelişmesine büyük katkılar sunmuşlardır.

Bu bilim adamlarının bir kısmı İstanbul Üniversitesinde görev alırken, diğer kısmı da İstanbul ve Ankara’da bulunan Alman Hastanesi, İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi ve Ankara Dil, Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi, Hijyen Enstitüsü, Maden Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Gazi Öğretmen Yetiştirme Enstitüsü ve Konservatuar gibi kurum ve kuruluşlarda görev üstlenmişlerdir. Ayrıca bu Alman bilim adamları, yazdıkları kitaplar ve yaptıkları çevirilerle, kütüphanelerin gelişmesi ve kitap sayısının artmasında önemli rol oynamıştır. Bunun yanında dünya çapında önemli bilimsel eserler Türkçeye kazandırılmıştır.

Bu Alman akademisyenlerin yetiştirdikleri öğrenciler ve asistanlar daha sonra Türkiye’de bilimsel araştırmaların gelişmesine önemli katkılar sağlamışlardır. Bu öğrencilerden bir kısmı Alman üniversitelerinde eğitimlerine devam etmiş, tam manasıyla Almanya’nın bilimsel anlayışını kazanmış ve daha sonra Türkiye’de uygulamış olan kişilerdir.

II. Dünya savaşının bitimiyle bazı Alman bilim adamları Almanya’ya ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri gibi ülkelere dönmüşler ve önemli görevler almışlardır, az sayıda Alman akademisyen ve uzman Türkiye’de kalmıştır. Örneğin Ernst Reuter, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesinde yerel yönetimler ve şehir planlaması konusunda dersler vererek “Şehir Planlaması Enstitüsünün” kurulmasında görev almıştır. Türkiye’den ayrıldıktan sonra 1948-1953 yılları arasında Berlin Belediye Başkanlığı yapmıştır.

Bilimsel Çalışmalar

Bir ülkenin kalkınma düzeyi ülkenin sahip olduğu ve kullanabildiği bilimsel teknik gelişme ile yakından ilgilidir. Teknik gelişmelerin kaynağı bilimsel gelişmelerdir. Teknik buluşlar kesinlikle rastlantıya bağlı değildir. Bilimsel gelişmenin teknik gelişmeyi doğurduktan sonra iktisadî gelişme ve kalkınmanın ortaya çıkabileceği görüşünde olan Atatürk, bu bağlamda bazı adımlar atmanın elzem olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bilimsel ilerleme, bilimsel bilgi gelişimi, genel çizgileriyle gelişigüzel bir şekilde gerçekleşemeyeceğine göre, bunun için bazı kurumların yenilenmesi ve modern teknolojiye kavuşması gerekirdi. Atatürk bu yolda acilen atılması gereken adımın yüksekokullar olduğu fikrini taşıyordu.

TBMM'nin 23 Mayıs 1926 tarihli oturumunda Maarif Bakanı Mustafa Necati, Atatürk'ün Darülfünun'a bakışını şöyle açıklamıştır:

Darülfünun doğrudan doğruya bağımsız bir kurumdur. Ulusun manevi gücünün temsilcilerinden biridir. Kabul etmek gerekir ki Darülfünun denen kurum, doğrudan doğruya Maarif Bakanlığının buyruğu altında bir kurum değildir. Eğer gelişigüzel herhangi bir kişi Darülfünun kurumuna şu biçimde, bu biçimde davranın diye emir verecek olursa orada Darülfünun yok demektir.

Ancak bundan 15 gün sonra Darülfünun'da konuşan Mustafa Necati, öğretim kadrosuna şu mesajı vermek gereğini de duymuştu:

Ulusun üniversiteye bağladığı umudu akli gösterecek güçlü kanıt da sayın müderrislerimizin, öğretmenlerimizin yayınları ve yapıtları olacaktır. Darülfünun, Türkiye'nin bütün aydın takımının bilimsel odağıdır. Buradan çıkacak araştırmalar ve yapıtlar, Türk aydınlarını yükseltecektir. Sizin yapacağınız eserlerdir ki yurt aydınlarına yeni ufuklar açacak ve Türkiye'ye kültür alanında uluslararası bir onur kazandıracaktır. Bir ulusun uygarlık yeteneğine ve yaşam gücünü en yüksek kerte de temsil eden kurum Darülfünun olduğu için Darülfünunumuzun her alanda öteki uygar ulusların üniversiteleri düzeyine çıkma zorunluluğunda olduğunu özellikle belirtmek isterim.

Buradan hareketle sonraki adımların neler olacağı ve hükümetin talebinin hangi doğrultuda ilerleyeceği de anlaşılmış olmaktadır. Bu ayrıca, Hükümetin araştırma ve yayınlara ağırlık verilmesini ve bunlara uluslararası düzeyde bir içerik kazandırılmasını istediği yolunda açık bir uyarı demektir.

Yeni kurulmuş bir devlet olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti henüz yükseköğretim sektöründe bir reform yapmış değildi. Zira daha önce yürürlüğe koyması gereken reform ve devrimler bu sektörün önünü açacak adımlardı. Ancak on yıl aradan sonra sıra üniversite reformuna geldi. Atatürk tarafından sosyal hayat, kültür, eğitim ve bilim alanlarında birçok reformlar yapılmıştır. Bu reformlar içerisinde 1933 yılında yapılan üniversite reformu ayrı bir öneme sahiptir. Atatürk eğitimsiz ve kadrosuz çağdaşlaşma ve kalkınmanın olamayacağı düşüncesindeydi. Bir yandan yeni üniversitelerin kurulmasını önerirken, diğer yandan

mevcut üniversiteyi (Darülfünun) geniş çaplı bir reform ile düzeltme, modernleştirme gereğini duymuştur.

Atatürk üniversite reformuyla Türk devriminin ilkelerini savunacak ve siyasal iktidarın desteği olacak üniversiteler oluşturmayı hedeflemiştir. 31 Mayıs 1933'te yayımlanan üniversite kuruluş kanununun 2. maddesinde Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın en geç 1 Nisan 1934'e kadar İstanbul Üniversitesi'nin kuruluşu hakkında bir kanun tasarısı hazırlaması ve bunu Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne sunması öngörülüyordu. 29.05.1934'te *Üniversite Teşkilat Kanunu* oluşmuş oldu ve Üniversite'nin 4 Fakülte'ye (Tıp, Fen, Edebiyat ve Hukuk) bölünmesini öngörüyor ve öğretim görevlilerinin ücretlerini düzenliyordu.

İstanbul Üniversitesi'nde toplam olarak 180 Türk ve yabancı öğretim üyesi vardı. Daha sonra bunlara 142 asistan ve bilimsel yardımcı elemanlar eklenince 322'yi buldu. Bunların 85'i yabancı idi. İşte bu yabancı bilim adamlarına kapılarını açan ve ev sahipliği yapan İstanbul Üniversitesi, çağdaş bir eğitim verdirmenin hesabını yapmaktaydı. Şüphesiz Alman bilim ve kültür adamlarından oluşan bu sığınmacılar İstanbul Üniversitesi'ne değerli hizmetler sundular.

Ankara'da henüz kurulu bir üniversite yoktu. 1933'ten sonra kurulmaya başlamış, 1946'da da eğitime başlamıştır. Bu ara Ankara Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü faaliyetlerini sürdürüyordu. Almanya ile Nazi öncesi zaten bir antlaşması olduğundan Almanya'dan gelen hocalar ile çalışmalar sürdürülüyordu. Göç sonrası sayıları İstanbul Üniversitesi kadar olmasada göç eden Alman hocalardan istifade edildi.

Burada Jeoloji Enstitüsünü kuran Wilhelm Salomon Calvi yaklaşık 2 yıl çalıştıktan sonra Maden Tetkik Enstitüsü'nde 5 yıl yani ölünceye kadar çalışmış ve bu kuruma ciddi katkıları olmuştur. Calvi Türkiye'de bulunduğu süre zarfında toplam 37 bilimsel çalışma yayınlamıştır. 1934'te Aschersleben'den Ziraat ve Ormancılık Biyolojisi Enstitüsü'nden gelen Hans Bremer bir taraftan Ziraat Bakanlığı'nda çalışırken diğer taraftan Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsü'nde dersler vermiştir. Göçten önce organik kimya ve proteinlerin teknolojisi profesörü olarak Berlin Charlottenburg Üniversitesi'nde çalışan Otto Gerngross 1933'te Türkiye'ye izin alarak gelmiştir. Almanya'daki gelişmeler nedeniyle geri dönmemiş 1938'e kadar da iznini uzatmıştır. Daha sonra geri dönmemiş 1943 yılına kadar Türkiye'de kalmıştır. Burada kaldığı süre zarfında özellikle ekmeklik buğday üzerinde önemli araştırmalar yaptı

ve bağıcılıđın geliřtirilmesine bilhassa üzüm sıkma makinelerinin ölkemize girmesine ön ayak oldu.

Atatürk üniversite reformunu tüm Türkiye'yi kapsayacak řekilde planlamıřtır. Bunun için memleketi řimdilik üç büyük kültür bölgesi halinde mütalâa ederek; batı bölgesi için İstanbul Üniversitesi, merkez bölgesi için Ankara Üniversitesi ve Dođu Bölgesi için Van Gölü sahillerinin en güzel bir yerinde bir üniversite kurarak modern bir kültür řehri kurmak gerektiđini gündeme getirmekteydi.



SONUÇ

Türk-Alman ilişkileri gerek Weimer Cumhuriyeti gerekse sonrasında çatışmasız, karşılıklı çıkarların gözetildiği, dünya ve bölge barışını olumlu etkileyen bir hava içerisindeydi. Sadece siyasi ve ekonomik olarak değil, askeri ve kültürel olarakta ilişkiler olumluydu. Türk ordusunda görevli Alman subaylar ve Almanya'ya eğitim için gönderilen Türk subaylarının yanı sıra Almanya'dan alınan askeri malzemeler, askeri ilişkilerin iyi gittiğinin göstergesidir.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, Türk-Alman ilişkileri 1938'e kadar sorunlardan uzak yakınlık içerisinde gitmiştir. Hatta Türkiye Hitler'in yayımcı politikalarına karşı bile pek olumsuz tutum içerisinde girmemiştir. Ancak Münih antlaşması sonrası meydana gelen Balkanlar'daki gelişmeler, Almanya'nın Prag'ı işgal etmesi ve Romanya'ya zorla ticaret antlaşmasını yaptırması, İtalya'nın Arnavutluk'u işgaline Almanya'nın ses çıkarmaması ve Almanya 1936-1938 döneminde ekonomik ilişkileri kendi lehine geliştirerek Türkiye'yi kendine tam bağımlı yapmaya çalışması Türk-Alman ilişkilerini olumsuz etkilemiş, bir çatışmanın içerisinde sokmuştur. Bu tarihten itibaren Türkiye tavrını net bir şekilde ortaya koydu ve 1939'da Almanya'dan koparak, İngiltere ve Fransa ile ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkileri geliştirmeye yöneldi.

Birinci Dünya savaşı sonrası bir çok toprak ve nüfus kaybına uğrayan Türkiye artık kendini hem siyasi hemde ekonomik çıkmazın içinde bulmuştu. Bu çıkmazdan ancak bir yerlere dayanarak kurtulabilirdi, yönetici kadrolar bunun eskisini devam ettirmeden yeni bir sistem kurmakla mümkün olacağı inancındaydı. İşte kurmak istedikleri bu sistem batılı modelin ta kendisi olduğundan, batılı olan her şeye açıldılar. Hatta ne olduğunu bilmedikleri kültür ve sanatı taklit etmek zorunda kaldılar. Halk, tasvip edilmeyen reformlar yüzünden yönetici kitleye hep şüpheyle baktı. Mustafa Kemal bunun bilincinde olduğundan, reformları zamana yayarak uygulamaya soktu.

19. yüzyılda Almanya'da 10 üniversiteden fazla üniversite varken İngiltere'de sadece iki üniversite vardı. Heidelberg, Marburg, Halle, Berlin Humboldt gibi kent üniversiteleri özgür çalışma ortamlarıyla çok güçlü birer bilim merkeziydiler. Akademisyenler Almanya'da üniversite sayılarının fazlalığı ve eskiye dayanmasından dolayı hem eğitim alanında hemde fakültelerin kurulmasında birçok tecrübeye sahiptiler. Bu tecrübeye sahip olan bilim adamlarının yurttan kaçışları, Türkiye'nde ihtiyacı olduğu bir zamana denk gelmesiyle, Türkiye içinde bir fırsat oldu.

Türk devleti ve halkı Hitler rejiminden kaçan bu Alman bilim adamları ve sanatçılara hiçbir devletin sahip çıkmadığı dönemde kapılarını açarak sahip çıktı. Bu Almanlara da hoşgörüyle davrandı ve önemli mevki ve görevler verdi. Hatta kültürümüze yabancı bir ülkeden gelen bu insanlara eğitim ve kültür hayatımız teslim edildi. Onlar da kendi ülkelerinde yaşıyor gibi, Türkiye'nin bilim, eğitim ve kültür hayatına izlerini bıraktı. Henüz demokrasiye geçme aşamasında olan Türkiye'nin bu davranışı, uygar olarak tanınan ABD ve İngiltere gibi diğer uluslar için bir örnek teşkil etmiştir.

Türkiye, Nazi hükümetinin maddi teklif ve tehditlerine rağmen onları geri göndermedi. Ne tuhaftır ki; Türklerin bu erdemli davranışı bile, günümüzde Alman ve Avrupa kamuoyunda Türk imgesine en ufak bir katkıda bulunmamaktadır.

Pek gündeme gelmeyen ama Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin çok partili döneme geçtikten sonraki dönemde Menderes'in Mecliste gündeme getirdiği bir çok kanun maddelerinin hazırlanmasında Alman bilim adamları önemli rol oynamıştır. Zira yeni kurulan Cumhuriyet'te sürekli müdahalelerden dolayı siyasi, kültürel ve iktisadi alanlar bir değişim içindeydi. Batılı bir devlet olma yolunda ilerleyen Türkiye, Batılı devletlerin uluslararası ticari, ekonomik, ve sosyal konularda antlaşmalarını ve iç hukuklarını gözönünde bulundurarak kanunlarını yapmak durumundaydı. Onlardan geri kalma durumunda çağdaş bir sistem kurmasının mümkün olamayacağı inancındaydı. Alman bilim adamları sadece yüksek öğrenimi şekillendirmekle kalmadı, yeni kanunları da etkiledi ve içlerinden bazıları hükümetlere özellikle hukuk ve ekonomi alanında danışmanlık yaptı.

Netice itibariyle tekrar Almanya'ya dönen bu bilim insanları bir vefa örneği sergileyerek Türkiye'nin menfaatlerini hem gözetmişler hem de Türk kültürünü oralarda hem yazılı hem de sözlü sürekli canlı tutmuşlardır. Ayrıca bilim ve teknoloji alanında da karşılıklı ilişkileri ileri seviyeye taşımışlardır. Bu ilişkilerin sürekliliği Türkiye ve Almanya arasında hem siyasi hem de ekonomik işbirliğinin artmasına vesile olmuştur.