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NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA:
A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE MAKING?

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
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
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ABSTRACT

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA: A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE MAKING?

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This thesis attempts to portray the recent course of NATO-Russia relations in the post-Soviet era, especially in terms of the issue of NATO enlargement. In this thesis NATO has been considered not as military alliance but a security community in the sense that probably no NATO member would seriously consider the use of military force as a means of problem solving among themselves. Besides this thesis examines the current state of NATO and traces its transformation from the end of the Cold War to the post September 11 era. The thesis also examines the Russian foreign policy orientation in terms of NATO enlargement after the Cold War and it will also concentrate on the new security relationship after 11 September 2001 between NATO and Russia. The thesis argues that Russia's inability to improve its relations with NATO stands from the fact that post-Soviet Russian leadership has been unable to reform its military structure and security culture in accordance with NATO's attempts at redefining its identity and strategy in the post-Cold War.

Keywords: Security Community, NATO, Russia, Enlargement.

ÖZ

SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ SONRASI DÖNEMDE NATO-RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİ: YENİ BİR İLİŞKİ Mİ DOĞUYOR?

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
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Bu tez NATO-Rusya ilişkilerini Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde özellikle NATO genişleme süreci çerçevesinde değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezde NATO bir askeri birliktelik örgütü olmaktan çok üyelerinin birbirleri ile yaşadıkları sorunların çözümünde güç kullanmayı düşünmeyecekleri bir güvenlik toplumu olarak analiz edilmektedir. Ayrıca bu tezde NATO'nun Soğuk Savaş sonrası başlayan ve 11 Eylül 2001 sonrasında da devam eden değişim süreci incelenmekte olup, Rusya'nın Soğuk Savaş sonrasında NATO genişlemesine yaklaşımı ile 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası NATO-Rusya arasındaki güvenlik ilişkileri değerlendirilmektedir. Bu tez, Rusya'nın NATO ile olan ilişkilerini geliştirememesinin sebebini; Sovyetler Birliği sonrası dönemde Rus siyasi ve askeri elitlerinin Rusya'nın askeri yapısı ve güvenlik kültürünü NATO'nun kendini yeniden tanımlama çabası ve stratejisi ile uyumlu olarak değiştirememesinden kaynaklandığını iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik Toplumu, NATO, Rusya, Genişleme.



To my sister for her support and encouragement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NACC	- North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NRC	- NATO-Russia Council
EAPC	- Euro Atlantic Partnership Council
PfP	- Partnership for Peace
OSCE	- Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCE	- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CFE	- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
PJC	- Permanent Joint Council
WEU	- West European Union
EU	- European Union
CJTF	- Combined Joint Task Forces
CIS	- Commonwealth of Independent States
SFOR	- Stabilisation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina
IFOR	- Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
KFOR	- Kosovo Force
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
START I/II	- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN	- United Nations
MAP	- Membership Action Plan
IPP	- Individual Partnership Program
CIS	- Commonwealth of Independent States
FSB	- Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Scope: This thesis attempts to chart the course of NATO-Russia relations in the post-Cold War period. In this context the thesis explores the process of NATO's redefinition of itself since the end of the Cold War with a view to placing the enlargement question as an attempted reinvention of the Alliance itself. Then it attempts to portray the process of readjustment in Russian foreign policy after the Cold War. Besides this thesis explores whether important aspects of Russian foreign policy changed after the Cold War or it remains the same. Also the issue of acceleration of relationship between the NATO and Russia after 11 September 2001 is in the scope of this thesis. In this respect this chapter structured as follows firstly; I will try to clarify my argument by reviewing the existing literature and explore the main attributes of the security community approach, then I will point out my argument and lastly the organisation of this thesis will be put forward.

Literature review: The demise of the Cold War bipolarity has accelerated a process of rethinking security. Growing numbers of academicians and practitioners found traditional security thinking as state-centric and military focused. So with the end of the Cold War the concept of security has been stretched to encompass a much broader range of concerns and issues.

H. Gartner and A. Hyde-Price states that traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Increasing military capacity was the primary strategy to be in secure. And the result was steadily growing security dilemmas. However with the end of the Cold War, there is much greater awareness that "states should seek to balance threats and capabilities rather than try to exceed the military strength of potential adversaries."¹

¹ H. Gartner and A. Hyde-Price. "Introduction," in *Europe's New Security Challenges* (eds.) H. Gartner and A. Hyde-Price, E. Reiter, (Newyork: Lynne Reiner Publishers Inc., 2001), 2.

After the Cold War, it is understood that future European security should go beyond the traditional concepts of military power and territorial defence. The dominant concern has been to develop new structures and relations for avoiding the security dilemma. So debates about the new security architecture tended to stress the need for any new system to promote cooperation among the members; facilitate communication and provide information; develop common principles, norms, and rules; “constrain aggressive behaviour; and provide basis for collective action, conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”²

As a result security debates moved from the realist approaches to other approaches developed after the Cold War. One of these approaches and fundamental challenge to realist approach was formed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues namely the concept of “security communities”. Their work on the concept of security communities has become very influential which has been developed and interpreted by several scholars.

The concept of security communities is largely alien to the standard logic of strategic analysis. It has several differences from traditional security thinking, these are:

1) By addressing both normative and material factors, the security community framework is able to overcome the “rigidities of monocausal theories of international relations, and artificial realist-idealist divide.” This approach also tends to distance itself from both extremes of structuralism- either the material or the normative. Instead, “it explores the possibility of process changing the structural conditions, which in turn re-shape security politics.”³

² H. Gartner and A. Hyde-Price, 3,

2) The concept of a security community has not been considered or promoted as a general analytical framework for regional studies. "It is issue-specific and is used to evaluate all existing and nascent forms of regionalism with respect to security." It has proved its relevance in the study of regional security by maintaining a "median position between neorealism and constructivism."⁴

3) The other difference of the security community approach is the "relevance of ideational factors for security matters", especially the development of mutual expectations of peace.⁵

In this thesis security community approach will be used to evaluate the NATO-Russia relations. Below the main attributes of the approach are summarised.

The Main Attributes of Security Community Approach

In his work on political communities Deutsch assumed that an increased flow of transactions and communication among the states leads to assurances that they will settle their disputes peacefully. He defined this emerging entity as a security community, stressing the importance of communicative interaction in building a shared identity.

According to Deutsch;

A security community is a group of people which has become 'integrated'. By integration we mean "the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population." By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social problems must and can be resolved by process of

³ Boyka Stefanova, "The Baltic States Accession to NATO and the European Union: An Extension of the European Security Community?", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 2 (June 2002): 162.

⁴ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organisation*, 1992, 46(2), 1992: 400.

⁵ Stefanova, 160.

peaceful change that is the assurance that members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.⁶

According to B. Stefanova this integration process resembles the consolidation of the nation state because of the increased density of international communication and transactions, which results in the establishment of:

...mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we feeling', trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour...In short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.⁷

B. Stefanova argues that "Deutsch's assumption of the feasibility of a community on a regional scale offers an alternative perspective on international politics." While a realist model relies on the conditions of power and material force as determinants of interstate behaviour, security community approach as mentioned before points to the role of communication, discourse and shared knowledge as factors for regional peace.⁸

In addition Deutsch states that if the entire world were integrated, as a security community wars would be automatically eliminated. It is also mentioned in this approach that a security community involves not only the absence of war but, more importantly, the absence of the military option in the interactions of states in the security community.⁹

According to Deutsch and his colleagues there are two kind of security communities:

⁶ Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957): 5.

⁷ Deutsch, 36.

⁸ Stefanova, 160.

1. Amalgamated Security Communities: This type of community is formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single unit with a common government. This common government may be unitary or federal. United States is proposed as amalgamated type.
2. Pluralistic Security Communities: In this type of security communities separate governments retain their legal independence. That is two separate governmental units form a security-community without being merged.

North Atlantic Security Community defined by Deutsch as “pluralistic security community.” And for the formation of “pluralistic security communities” three conditions are required: (1) compatible values among decision-makers, (2) mutual predicability of behaviour among the decision-makers of the units to be integrated, (3) and mutual responsiveness that is governments must respond quickly without resort to violence, to the actions and communications of other governments.¹⁰

So according to Deutsch these conditions should provide “enough assurances for states not to fight each other.” Institutional structures should be added, when there is a possibility of political differences among the member states.¹¹

Asberg and Wallensteen complement Karl Deutsch’s definition, characterising a security community as an agreement by the states, which share values, including democracy. They also observe that changes in attitude, which bring about such cooperation among the states, tend to take place over a period of time, around two to three generations. Furthermore, Asberg and Wallensteen note that the “survival of the state and sovereignty constitutes the core value of a security community and the state regarded as the provider of security.” It is nevertheless pertinent to observe

⁹ Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall, 1978): 198-199.

¹⁰ Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 198-199.

¹¹ Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War”, *International Organisation*, 54 (4) (Autumn 2000): 712.

that the relationship among the states in a security community is seen as “reasonably equal and symmetrical.”¹²

The security community approach is therefore a socially based phenomenon, which is premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment. The approach, according to Adler and Barnett,¹³ “interrogates the role of identity, norms and the social basis of global politics” and they like Asberg and Wallensteen identify the “existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation.” According to them, this deepens shared values and transnational linkages. These linkages, such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational, and physical communication facilities, are in fact indicators of the growth of human communities. While Adler and Barnett regard communication as the “cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular” that enables a group “to think together, to see together and to act together.” The common cultural and social affinities, historical experiences, problems and aspirations, are a means of maintaining a community of states.¹⁴

Adler and Barnett¹⁵ states that the emergence of security communities occurs in three tiers. The first tier relates to casual factors, such as technology, demography, economics and the environment. These are considered to be among the motivating factors that lead to the formations of security communities. The second tier comprises factors that facilitate the development of mutual trust and collective identity as a result of “shared meanings and understanding”. Adler and Barnett identify core states that are expected to act as the centre around which the rest of the states in the region coalesce. Aside from this structural dimension there is also a process, which includes communication between the states in the region, and “the

¹² Naison Ngoma, “SADC: Towards a Security Community?”, *African Security Review*, 12 (3), (2003): 19.

¹³ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, in (eds.) E. Adler and M. Barnett, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 4-7.

¹⁴ Ngoma, 19.

identification of organisations and institutions through which trust and collective identity may develop.” The third tier reflects the actual development of trust and collective identity with two end states; loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled security communities. The former relates to “partial identification as one people, ability by people to restrain states while also empowering states to act on the global level and joint issues.” The latter has a membership that conforms strictly to the community’s identity and norms. In this community there is a complete corporate identity in which states’ behaviour is synonymous with that of the region.¹⁶

In what respect security community approach reflects the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation?

According to G. Aybet,¹⁷ A “Western Security Community,” in Karl Deutsch’s terms, is essentially an Atlantic community, which evolved from an accumulation of defence and security cooperation between its party states before and during the Cold War. However, this defence and security cooperation was not entirely limited to the technical/military level there was also deep cultural aspects. G. Aybet also states that Western security community evolved from a set of conditions, which necessitated its existence. These were: the issues of German integration into Europe; the division of Europe; the rehabilitation of Western Europe; and the Soviet threat. So these conditions eventually bound culturally a group of states with the common threat of “preserving a certain way of life.”¹⁸ This certain way of life determined by several factors like the value of democracy and free market economies. Within this sense G. Aybet argues that one of the important components of western security community is NATO and as the security community approach proposes, it is bound together by economic, social and

¹⁵ Adler and Barnett, 4-7.

¹⁶ Ngoma, 19-20.

¹⁷ Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War : Questions of Legitimacy*, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000): 53.

¹⁸ Aybet, 53.

cultural links as well as military ones. So in this sense NATO's role went beyond western security community it also embodies the "preservation of certain way of life."¹⁹

Similarly B. Stefanova argues that the we-feeling within the North Atlantic security community has been the result of a "profound formative event- the devastation caused by World War II which provoked a commonality of security goals and the preservation of peace." As an effect of World War II transaction flows increased the density of social networks and developed community feeling. The security of an individual country was no longer a primary concern as the security question is transferred to the region as a whole.²⁰

Besides one of the most significant terms of the security community approach is the concept of "core" areas. K. Deutsch refers in his study that, historically security communities have tended to form around "core areas": at the national level, around Prussia during nineteenth century German unification, and around Piedmont during Italian unification; internationally, Sweden was the core of pluralistic Scandinavian security community that began to take hold in the early years of this century. United States has been the core area around which a transatlantic security community was constructed since 1950s. Because, there was no other alternative except U.S., in terms of its economic, political and military capabilities, about pulling together a Western alliance.²¹ It is stated by J.G. Ruggie that these core areas "take initiatives, act as stabilisers, and provide the potential for mutual economic rewards as well as the high levels and diverse flows of social communications that facilitate the growth of 'we-feeling' and trust."²²

¹⁹ Aybet, 53.

²⁰ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 36.

²¹ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 36.

J. G. Ruggie states that security commitments typically follow and complement economic and cultural ties in the formation of security communities. Indeed, military alliances have turned out to be “a relatively poor pathway unless they have been embedded in a broader project of political, economic and social integration.” In this sense it should be stated that the creation of NATO itself followed the Marshall Plan by two years. U.S. policymakers saw the Marshall Plan as the primary vehicle for European postwar reconstruction and only gradually moved toward NATO as a reinforcing security mechanism—the sufficient condition. Similarly, “Spain’s admission into NATO in 1982 was meant to complement its entry into the European Union.”²³ In this sense, Western Europe has become in Karl Deutsch’s terms a ‘pluralistic security community’, where there exist long-term expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its members. In other words, one principle at least is intact: that war between these states has become unthinkable. For Deutsch, this community is not an exclusively ‘European’ one, but a transatlantic community evolving from two components: the European pillar and the US and Canada.²⁴ And according to G. Aybet “European pillar emerged from the common experience of being sandwiched between superpowers”, which drove the western European states to cooperate on security matters and, through an accumulation of this shared experience, led to a “common understanding of their respective security interests.”²⁵

In sum, in Deutsch’s work on security communities NATO is considered not as military alliance but a security community in the sense that probably no NATO member would seriously consider the use of military force as a means of problem solving in intermember relations.

²² John Gerard Ruggie, “Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO’s Future,” *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 1997): 111.

²³ Ruggie, 111.

²⁴ Charles L. Glasser, “Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,” *International Security*, 18, (Summer 1993): 10.

Russia and NATO through the Prism of Security Communities

As we know throughout the 1990s countries of Eastern and Central Europe pursued a comprehensive strategy of integration with NATO as the one of the dominant institution of Western security community. This search for integration was not just because “they perceived direct security threat from the Russia and in order to eliminate strong power asymmetry in their geographical situation”, but also since the 1980s these countries identified themselves with the Western values.²⁶ These states integration to the Western security community culture is provided through a system of interlocking institutions which will be analysed in the following chapter.

As mentioned before NATO is assessed as a pluralistic security community by K. Deutsch because of that, the idea of expansion of the NATO is indeed the idea of expanding the western security community. The clear indicator of NATO's being security community can be found in the reasons of enlargement in the first years of the alliance. Looking back to NATO's early years, it is clear that the representatives of the member states had ambitions of establishing not only a military alliance, but also an Atlantic Community. This dimension to NATO was strongly emphasised in 1956 ‘Report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO’. Presenting an ambitious line of action for the North Atlantic Alliance, the report proposed that, alongside its overall objective of guaranteeing security, NATO should aim at creating an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. It argued that politics and security were interdependent and also that the challenge to NATO was not exclusively military. Consequently, it concluded that the success of the military alliance depended on the political cohesion of an Atlantic community.²⁷

²⁵ Aybet, 56.

²⁶ Stefanova, 158-159

With all these purposes for 40 years NATO is one of the most important and basic elements of the all-European security. However starting from the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, which was the symbol of the division of Europe many things began to change rapidly. One of the most precious developments has been the return of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to the western security community “as equal partner and friends.” Then since the early 1990s, many of the former Warsaw Pact member states, emerging from more than four decades as satellites of a totalitarian USSR, viewed membership in NATO as well as the European Union as essential for reintegration to the West. For most of these nations joining the West means bringing to an end the recurring uncertainties, integrating to community of values and gaining assurances against a possible re-emergence of Russian imperialism.

In that sense NATO has attributed particular importance to developing cooperation with Russia, whose relations with NATO had always been adversarial during the first four decades of NATO's existence, whose power was the immediate motivation for creating NATO in 1949 and whose involvement is critical for any comprehensive post-Cold War system of European security. In this context, “the NATO’s enlargement process to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has become a dominant concern in the evolution of Russian foreign policy.”²⁸

In the Russian viewpoint, if the aim of enlargement were the protection of stability, the enlargement of the EU, instead of NATO, would yield better results. On the other hand Russians also argue that in the current European security environment “there is no danger of a threat, which could require an Article 5²⁹ response in NATO, that Russia poses no threat to security and stability and that instability in

²⁷ Helene Sjursen, “On the Identity of NATO”, *International Affairs*, 80 (4) (2004): 691.

²⁸ Luis Jose Rodrigues Leitaó Tomé, *Russia and NATO Enlargement*, NATO Research Fellowship Programme 1998-2000 Final Report, (June 2000): 27.

²⁹ Article 5 is one of the most important articles of the Washington Treaty and contains one of the essential provisions of the Treaty: “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...” This undertaking is exceptionally important

21st century originates from non-traditional risks such as fundamentalism, terrorism and organised-crime.”³⁰

In order to understand better contemporary Russian perceptions on the issue of NATO enlargement it might be useful to turn the tables around, re-imaging a different end to the cold war. Imagine for a moment that:

United States and the ‘West’ had lost the cold war. Not only did the United States lose the cold war but also it emerged in the post-war period in a state of economic, social and political crisis as it was forced to re-conceptualise its identity and role in the world politics. NATO was disbanded, but the Warsaw Pact survived to include Western Germany as part of a unified German Democratic Republic. In order to gain agreement for the unification of Germany and its membership of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev gave assurance to the United States that the Soviet Union would not seek to expand the alliance. However, later, in response to request to join the alliance from sovereign independent states both close to the United States (say Cuba and Mexico) and in Europe (say in Italy and France and the United Kingdom), Gorbachev announces during a Communist party Congress that the Warsaw Pact will indeed be enlarged. Gorbachev states that this is in the best interests of international security, and in particular to security in the Western Hemisphere, and especially for the new member countries given their previous difficult relations with the United States. The United States voices its opposition to Warsaw Pact enlargement, and in order to appease this opposition Gorbachev agrees to sign a Founding Act which give the United States a ‘voice’ but not a veto, in the security arrangements in Europe and the Americas. It is surely obvious, the Soviet keep on arguing, that enlargement of the Warsaw Pact is actually in the national interests of the United States, and any Americans who might not see this are suffering from misperceptions, but will eventually be persuaded of the logic of the argument.³¹

because the resulting solidarity creates a coalition, which will discourage aggression. Having stated this principle, the article goes on to define the obligations of countries in the event of armed attack. These obligations consists of taking at once, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action, including the use of armed force, as is deemed necessary by each Party. Each country is thus free to take whatever action it may deem necessary. All armed attacks need not, in fact, be considered as general offensives calling for declaration of war.

³⁰ Peter Shearman, “Russia and NATO enlargement: the case against” in *Russia After the Cold War*, (ed.) Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross, (Great Britain: Pearson Education, 2000): 304.

³¹ Shearman, 313.

It is an interesting scenario, and from that point of view Russian reaction against NATO's existence and its decision of enlargement seemed to be understandable. To be more precise the Russian reaction to NATO's eastward expansion must be put into perspective to be properly understood and assessed. This reaction is conditioned by a number of factors, including Russia's recent history and the development of its relations with the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, for Moscow it is of "particular importance to be reassured that the security environment in Eastern Europe would not be changed to its detriment as a result of new members joining NATO."³²

However in spite of all these concerns NATO – Russia relations have moved to new sphere in the 1990s. The conflict in Bosnia provided an opportunity of cooperation between NATO and Russia in the field of peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Russia was a founding member of the NACC in 1991. NACC's membership included thirty-six countries "stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok including all the members of NATO and the former Soviet republics." The idea was to extend a 'shadow of security' over the region without offering concrete defence guarantees. Then Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, launched by NATO on 10 January 1994, which was simultaneously a way of managing NATO enlargement and delaying it. Russia signed the Partnership Framework Document³³ on 22 June 1994, when Kozyrev conceded that Russia 'had no fundamental objections' to NATO enlargement. However, the true basis for the development of a strong and durable partnership between NATO and Russia was provided by the 1997 Founding Act, signed in Paris in 1997, which expressed a joint commitment to "build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area." And finally following the September 11 events, which became an unexpected catalyst regarding the Russia-NATO relations, in the Rome Summit in May 2002, NATO and Russia created the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) replacing the PJC as a major

³² Tomé, 6.

instrument of an emerging, new strategic relationship. All these developments were actually the ways of NATO's redefinition of itself institutionally in the new century and Russia's efforts to be part of the Western security community.

Argument: This thesis argues that Russia's inability to improve its relations with NATO stands from the fact that, post-Soviet Russian leadership has been unable to reform its military structure and security culture in accordance with NATO's attempts at redefining its identity and strategy in the post-Cold War era. And incompatibility of their security culture makes their relationship difficult.

Structure of the Chapters of the Thesis

Following the introduction, chapter II will focus on the NATO's transformation in the aftermath of the Cold War, with a view to preserving its core functions, pursuing its aims through mostly political means and continuing to project stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this respect first formation of the "New Strategic Concept of the Alliance", and London Declaration and Rome summit which are crucial in NATO history will be summarised. Then in line with the "New Strategic Concept" military transformation of the alliance will be analysed. Also the "cooperation programmes" of the Alliance namely, NACC, PfP and EAPC will be discussed in this chapter. Besides in the chapter II the reasons behind the NATO's decision of enlargement and three contending approaches about the ways of enlargement; the maximalist approach, the WEU-first approach and self limitation approach will be analysed. At the end of this chapter 1999 Washington Summit, in which strategic concept of the alliance was revised, and 4th wave of enlargement in the history of NATO will be discussed.

After Chapter II, Chapter III examines Russia's relations with the new NATO after its redefinition of itself and enlargement decision. In this respect in the chapter III,

³³ But delayed later in signing the associated Individual Partnership Programme.

first Russia's readjustment to her new circumstances following the loss of her superpower status and within this respect Russian new foreign policy direction will be analysed. In this chapter Russian approach towards Partnership for Peace (PfP) Cooperation Programme of NATO and the reasons behind Moscow's initial refusal to Sign-on to the Individual Partnership Agreement will be presented. This chapter also focuses on the current state of NATO-Russia relations, initiated in the framework of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, then institutionalised by the NATO-Russia founding Act and put into practice by the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council.

In the chapter IV internal sources of Russian reaction to the new NATO will be analysed. Within this context first the most striking turn in NATO-Russia relations that is "Kosovo Crisis" will be presented, then elites' and mass' reactions towards the foreign policy issues of the Russia will be analysed and lastly the new foreign policy direction after Putin Presidency will briefly presented.

Chapter V sheds light on the current state of NATO-Russia relations, in this respect the period starting from 11 September 2001 until the Istanbul Summit will be analysed in detail. With this aim first the changes in NATO itself after the 11 September 2001 and the impact of the event on NATO expansion will be discussed. Then Russia's attitude towards NATO enlargement after 11 September 2001 will be presented. After that the latest summit of the alliance that is Istanbul Summit and the sixth enlargement of the NATO will be put forward.

Finally, in the conclusion, the discussions and the findings of this thesis will be summarised chapter by chapter and the findings that strengthen my arguments will be pointed out.

While analysing all these aforementioned issues, open sources material provided by NATO, academic journals, books and essays have been consulted. It should be concluded that this study will be based on the descriptive level without the slightest

intention of formulating laws or judgements. It will attempt to integrate and put facts together in the context of relating and explaining them.



CHAPTER II

NATO'S REDEFINITION OF ITS IDENTITY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR UNTIL 1999

This chapter will aim to explore the NATO's transformation in the aftermath of the Cold War as an important actor of 'western security community', with a view to preserving its core functions, pursuing its aims through mostly political means and continuing to project stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this respect first formation of the "New Strategic Concept of the Alliance", and London Declaration and Rome summit which are crucial in NATO history will be summarised. Then in line with the "New Strategic Concept" military transformation of the alliance will be discussed. Also the "cooperation programmes" of the Alliance namely, NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), PfP (Partnership for Peace) and EAPC (Euro Atlantic Partnership Council) Cooperation Programmes will be analysed. Besides in this chapter the reasons behind the NATO's decision of enlargement and three contending approaches about the ways of enlargement; the maximalist approach, the WEU-first approach and self limitation approach will be presented. At the end of this chapter 1999 Washington Summit, in which strategic concept of the alliance has been revised, and the 4th wave of enlargement in the history of NATO will be discussed.

2.1. NATO in the Post-Cold War Era

In the aftermath of the Cold War there seemed to be two main scenarios concerning the future of NATO, and both looked as basically acceptable to many scholars. One proceeded from the inevitable disappearance of the alliance that looked "having lost its *raison d'être*, represented a kind of memorial inherited from the previous epoch and could at best continue for some time only due to political and bureaucratic inertia." Another one described NATO as the core of the future

pan-European security system, with the Alliance to be radically transformed and to “include Russia as *sine qua non*.”³⁴

In reality none of these two scenarios was implemented. The developments in and around the NATO followed a 'third way' and contained several components that were (and still are) perceived by Russia with considerable concern. First, this on-going scenario envisages the consolidation and growing role of the NATO rather than its gradual erosion. Secondly, new military and political tasks are being ascribed to the Alliance “in addition to the 'old' ones rather than instead of them.” Thirdly, the Alliance, far from getting a lower profile, is carrying out a kind of a triple expansion – extending its functions, its membership and its zone of responsibility.³⁵

It can be concluded that Alliance started;

- Identifying the changing European security landscape, and stressing dialogue and partnership with the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact;
- Addressing, for the first time, security threats beyond the NATO area, and establishes the basis for peacekeeping and coalition crisis management operations as important NATO missions;
- Establishing the Cooperation Programmes through which creating a new institutional framework for political security consultation and cooperation between NATO and the former communist states of the East.³⁶ And pursuing its aims through predominantly political means.

³⁴ <<http://www.eusec.org/baranovsky.htm> Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 9 July 2001> (23 November 2004)

³⁵ <<http://www.eusec.org/baranovsky.htm> Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 9 July 2001> (23 November 2004)

³⁶ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement-NATO's First Fifty Years*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers,1999):95.

2.1.1. New Strategic Concept³⁷ of the Alliance

“The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area” which was developed between October 1949 and April 1950 as the initial formulation of NATO strategy “encompassed a strategy of large-scale operations for territorial defence.” It emphasised deterrence based on the threat that NATO would respond to any aggression against its members by every means, specifically including nuclear weapons.³⁸ In 1967 after the adoption of the Harmel Plan based on the parallel policies of maintaining adequate defence while seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations “massive retaliation was replaced by the strategy of ‘flexible response’ which emphasised giving NATO the advantages of flexibility and of creating uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about NATO’s response in the case of a threat of aggression.”³⁹ It also took into account the USSR’s nuclear capability. Those strategies reflected the perceptions of the Cold War, the political division of Europe and the confrontational ideological and military situation, which characterised East-West relations for decades.⁴⁰

C. Wallander argues that, NATO began to change to a limited degree in the late 1980s as a result of the easing of the Cold War. The number and scale of alliance exercises declined as Gorbachev’s Soviet Union reduced its military presence in Europe; “arms control negotiations increased in number and scope, and the opposing alliances initiated a process of confidence-building measures.” NATO also shifted its nuclear strategy indirectly, as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-

³⁷ There had been three “strategic concept” documents produced at various times in NATO’s history prior to the one produced in 1991. Unlike the new one, these were all classified. The first, known as DC-6, was in place in December 1949. At that time, American nuclear weapons were still scarce, but by adding what few there were to the conventional resources of the nuclear “strategy” was created. This concept was in effect replaced in 1957 by Document MC 14/2 which enshrined massive retaliation as the strategy, as nuclear weapons had become plentiful. It stayed in place until 1967, when MC 14/3 the strategy of flexible response, was adopted, to remain in force until 1991.

³⁸ <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/natousis.htm>> (23 November 2003)

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Kaplan, 65.

range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, which eliminated a “class of nuclear weapons that had been integral to the alliance’s strategy for credibly threatening nuclear escalation.”⁴¹

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the unification of Germany on October 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 April 1990 and of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991, some of the main elements that contributed to the formation of NATO, namely the division of Germany and the threat of potential massive Soviet military aggression disappeared and gave way to the re-orientation of NATO’s approach to the issues of military doctrine”⁴²

Within this direction after 1991 we recognise a deep transformation in the Alliance:

2.1.2. London Declaration and Rome Summit

C. Wallander thinks that, NATO’s real transformation began with the London Declaration of 1990. The London declaration ‘On a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance’ stated that NATO, although remaining an alliance for collective defence, must adjust to the changing circumstances.⁴³ “The transformation of NATO was linked to the implementation of the CFE treaty and a package of measures to inspire confidence and promote security, which were being negotiated in the CSCE.” In addition the political role of NATO needed a visible change. A willingness to do so was expressed by inviting President Gorbachev and other representatives of the Warsaw pact countries to address the North Atlantic Security Council in Brussels. Furthermore the governments of Warsaw Pact countries were invited to establish diplomatic relations with the NATO.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Wallander, 717.

⁴² Kaplan, 65

⁴³ Wallander, 722.

In line with this change in purpose, the alliance declared that “it would reduce its reliance on flexible response, though it did not rule out the nuclear option.” In November 1990 NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and a joint declaration on commitment to nonaggression. Besides all the members of the OSCE signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. These commitments were seen as formally ending the Cold War and establishing a new security system in the world.

The London declaration initiated a review process of NATO’s political roles, functions and military strategy, which commenced after July 1990. This review process took place at three levels:⁴⁵

- (i) *The North Atlantic Council*: This was the forum where the fundamental political questions of NATO’s role and character were discussed between Permanent Representatives of the member states.
- (ii) *The Strategy Review Group (SRG) based in the Defence Planning and Policy Division of International Staff*: This was a special group created specifically for the task of drafting the new strategy paper and the Rome Declaration which were announced at the Rome Summit in November 1991. The areas covered by this group in preparing the documents of the Rome Summit were arms control, crisis management and force structures.
- (iii) *Military Committee*: The task of the Military Committee was to apply the results of the reviews of SRG and the Council to force structures and organisations- in other words, the implementation of the new strategy.

Following all these developments the alliance began a review of its military strategy which resulted in NATO’s “New Strategic Concept,” announced at the Rome Summit in November 1991, reflected the change of perceptions, differed from the earlier concepts that it emphasised cooperation with the former adversaries as

⁴⁴ Rob De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, (U.K: Brassey’s Publ. 1997): 17.

⁴⁵ Aybet, 53.

opposed to confrontation. This was the first time that NATO strategy document was made public.⁴⁶ According to the new strategic concept, by the collapse of the communist bloc the security of Europe substantially improved. "The threat of massive military confrontation no longer existed. Nevertheless new potential risks to security emerged out of regional instability and tensions." Against this background, according to NATO sources, NATO's Strategic Concept reaffirmed the core functions of the Alliance including the maintenance of the transatlantic link and of an overall strategic balance in Europe. While maintaining the security of its member nations as NATO's fundamental aim (article 5), "it also reconciled this with the task of working towards improved and expanded security for the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole, though geographic definition remained still unclear."⁴⁷

This 'New Strategic Concept' also recognised that security is based on political, economic, social and environmental considerations as well as defence. 1991 Rome Declaration acknowledged that the challenges facing the new Europe can not be extensively addressed by one institution alone; hence a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions was required. To achieve this, "NATO expressed its willingness to work towards a new European security architecture in which the roles of NATO, the OSCE, the European Union, the now defunct Western European Union and the Council of Europe are complementary." The importance of other regional frameworks of cooperation such as those in the Baltics, the Black Sea area and the Mediterranean was also emphasised.⁴⁸

Moreover the Strategic Concept underlined the need for NATO to take account security of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital

⁴⁶ Tomé, 25.

⁴⁷ Mc. Calla, Roberts, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War" *International Organisation*, 50 (3), (Summer 1996): 450.

⁴⁸ *The Readers' Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999*, (Brussels:NATO Office of Info. and Press, 1999): 64

resources and acts of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests.”⁴⁹

The strategy document also opened the way for another new development in alliance military planning, which is the envisaged expansion of NATO’s role from collective defence to collective security. According to G. Aybet the ‘New Strategic Concept’ made it possible for the allied forces to “contribute to UN missions for global stability, and created the potential for it to reinforce political decisions by contributing to the management of crises and their peaceful resolution.”⁵⁰

Thus NATO had already laid the foundations of its post-Cold War reconstruction by the end of 1991.

2.2. Transformation of NATO’s Military Structure

After the presentation of new strategic concept the “old NATO” and its heavy military structure, which was designed against the threat of Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, was changed.⁵¹ That is; “NATO's standing military forces have been reduced radically because the alliance is no longer postured against an extended military threat or enemy to the East.”⁵²

Several factors contributed to the process of transformation of NATO’s military structure. The need to sustain the Alliance’s military effectiveness, the maintenance of the transatlantic link was foremost among the fundamental objectives pursued. Moreover the accomplishment of the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force, the reductions and restructuring of Allied military forces and the “assumption of the

⁴⁹ De Wijk, “Towards a new political strategy for NATO”, 15.

⁵⁰ Aybet, 60-61.

⁵¹ Klaus Neumann, “NATO’s New Command Structure”, *Perceptions*, Vol. 1 (March-May 1999): 53-54.

⁵² <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/natousis.htm>> (23 November 2003)

new tasks and responsibilities such as peace support operations and crisis management were also relevant factors.”⁵³

The Alliance also re-examined its military command structure in line with the new geo-strategic conditions in the aftermath of the Cold War with “non-traditional sources of conflict such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, illegal arms and drugs trafficking, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia”, and the new missions assumed by NATO in accordance with the new Strategic Concept such as peace support operations and crisis management. In this regard “military headquarters of the Alliance reduced from 65 to 20.”⁵⁴

“The new command structure consists of a wide distribution of integrated command capabilities with a single, effective, multi-capable and flexible structure” to perform the Alliance core function, the collective defence, as well as the new missions such as peace support operations, expansion of stability tasks and counter proliferation.⁵⁵

Briefly the following changes have occurred since 1991:

- Defence budgets have decreased by 30 percent;
- Armed forces have been decreased in size by 28 to 40 percent for most countries;
- Land forces are down 25 percent; major warships by 20 percent; and combat aircraft by 30 percent;⁵⁶

It should also be mentioned that NATO has shifted its emphasis from high-readiness, forward-deployed heavy units to lower-readiness forces and a “rapid reaction corps oriented toward the new missions”; the changed security

⁵³ NATO Handbook 1998-1999, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press): 263.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/natousis.htm>> (23 November 2003)

environment required not only a simple reduction in command but also a shift in their capacity and makeup. With out-of-area missions, NATO's command structure needs to be as mobile as its forces so NATO's solution to this problem was to put into practice the combined joint task forces concept (CJTF), which was introduced at the 1994 Brussels Summit and allowed for the first time the possibility for NATO to engage in military action with other international entities and for the participation of non-NATO Partners in joint operations, establishing a mission-specific mobile command structure.⁵⁷

As a result, NATO shifted its military strategy in the early 1990s to adopt changing security conditions in the world.

2.3. NACC, PfP and EAPC Cooperation Programmes After 1991

After the cold war enlargement of the alliance became the major goal for NATO, to promote security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole, without dividing lines and exclusion. The purpose of integration of Eastern and Southern Europe into the political, military and economic structures of the West, was to make them share common values that is re-integrating the Western security community to make their policy more predictable and transparent.⁵⁸

Within this direction the developments of dialogue and partnership with its new Cooperation Partners formed an integral part of NATO's Strategic Concept. Since then, NATO has sought to institutionalise its cooperative relations with CEE states, first through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and then the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

⁵⁷ Wallander, 719.

⁵⁸ Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and Stephen Larabee, "Building a New NATO" *Foreign Affairs*, 42 (4), (September/October,): 32.

2.3.1. Establishment of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

As mentioned before the NATO London Declaration of July 1990 cited the need for the establishment of a closer relationship with the CEE nations. In terms of concrete proposals, it suggested “military contacts” between NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders, “regular diplomatic liaison” between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, and a joint declaration by the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact affirming that they were “no longer adversaries.”⁵⁹

At the June 1991 Copenhagen NATO meeting, the Alliance proposed the “further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships” with the former Warsaw Pact nations, including the Soviet Union. During the debates for adopting the final communique of the meeting, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher “in particular believed that deepening the contacts between NATO and Central and Eastern Europe was implicit recognition of NATO’s role as a stabilising factor in Europe.”⁶⁰

In October 1991 Genscher and his American counterpart James Baker presented an initiative to increase the relations with CEE countries by “strengthening and deepening co-operation”⁶¹ in a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO extended this invitation to Eastern European countries for several reasons. First, with the collapse of the USSR, NATO was concerned about nuclear weapons falling outside the control of the Russian government. Several of the Newly Independent States (NIS) such as the Ukraine had Russian nuclear weapons stationed in their countries. A second reason for concern was that the existence of the Warsaw Pact had provided for balance and stability in Europe. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO feared that new conflicts could break out in Eastern Europe. “They

⁵⁹ North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1990): par. 6-8.

⁶⁰ <<http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/ADIssues/amdipl12/lungucoop5html>> (23 December 2003).

would be proven right several times during the 1990s.”⁶² Thus, the November 1991 Rome Declaration proposed the creation of a cooperation body.⁶³ Consequently, on December 20, 1991, the NATO ministers of foreign affairs met with their counterparts from the former Warsaw Pact in Brussels for the first session of the NACC.

During this first session, both Genscher and Baker described the NACC as a new pillar of the emerging European security order. It was intended to play specific and unique functions.⁶⁴ Among them:

It would serve as a forum for consultation with the “liaison states” on issues such as civilian control over the military and the conversion of defence industries to civilian purposes; it might also serve as a forum for negotiating further conventional arms control and confidence and security building measures; and it was suggested that the NACC could play a peace-making role in Nagorno-Karabakh and other contested areas in the former Soviet Union and CEE.⁶⁵

While much of the first year of NACC's existence was taken up with efforts to agree on a viable workplan for cooperation on practical matters, it was evident from the first meeting of NACC ministers in December 1991 that one topic that would dominate discussion among members would be how to keep the peace among the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe. Two main themes emerged from these discussions: the desire of many of the NACC partners for closer integration to western security community “as a hedge against instability and external threats; and the specific need for cooperation in developing a common

⁶¹ De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, 31.

⁶² <<http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/natopartnerships.htm>>, (23 December 2003).

⁶³ After the summit the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, including the Baltic States, were invited to a meeting with the NATO ministers of foreign affairs to formally commence the new initiative.

⁶⁴ The initiative provided for annual meetings at the ministerial level in the NACC, periodic meetings with the ambassadors, extra meetings “as circumstances warrant,” and regular meetings with the Military Committee and other NATO committees. The meetings would concentrate on matters of NATO expertise, such as defense planning and civil-military relations.

⁶⁵ <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair35/m035ch09.html>> (23 December 2003)

approach to peacekeeping.”⁶⁶

From the American perspective the creation of the NACC was part of a larger strategy involving “diplomacy and economics, in order to maintain a political-military equilibrium in Eurasia.” It was in the U.S. strategic interest to promote a balanced “configuration of power in this part of the world, presumably following from at least three specific interests:”⁶⁷

1. “To prevent the total disintegration of the Soviet Union and, that failing, to promote the emergence of stable, democratic, and prosperous successor states”;
2. To prevent the reimposition of Soviet or Russian military or political control in Eastern Europe, which presumably can best be achieved by “NATO guaranteeing the national independence, territorial integrity, political democracy and diplomatic neutrality of the former Soviet-bloc states”; that is NATO guarantees the values of western security community still against Russian factor, and,
3. To encourage stability in Central and Eastern Europe by strengthening the new democracies.⁶⁸

The 8 June 1992 (Oslo) and the 18 December 1992 (Brussels) NACC meetings of foreign ministers proved to be turning points for the NACC because they “cleared the way for active co-operation between NATO and the partners in the field of peace-keeping.”⁶⁹ The NACC work plan for 1993 included the following activities:

Consultations on peacekeeping and related matters, starting in a brainstorming format at ambassadorial level, followed by ad-hoc meetings of political-military

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “America’s Changing Strategic Interests,” *Survival*, 33(January/February 1991): 13.

⁶⁹ De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, 67.

experts, as agreed by ambassadors, leading to cooperation among interested NACC members in preparation for peace-keeping activities, including: joint-sessions on planning of peace-keeping training, and consideration of possible point peace-keeping exercises.⁷⁰

De Wijk, states that “the first brainstorming session of the ambassadors took place on 26 January 1993 on the basis of a German-American non-paper.” As a result of these activities, in February 1993 the NACC Ad Hoc Group⁷¹ on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was founded.⁷²

The U.S. in particular believed that, starting from this group, the NACC could form the nucleus of a new security system. A structure needed to be developed which would enable the partners to take part in an operational “framework,” with NATO acting as a catalyst behind this development. “The Americans directed their endeavours mainly towards involving the Russians in all questions concerning European security in order to avoid a new division of Europe.” The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, argued for a more operational role for the NACC.⁷³ “There was consensus within NATO that intensification of co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries could promote stability and security in the whole of Europe.”⁷⁴

NACC was consisting of Foreign Ministers of the 19 NATO countries as well as the Central and Eastern European and Baltic States with which NATO established diplomatic liaison during 1990 and 1991. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union which took place on the same day, and the subsequent establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), participation in the NACC was

⁷⁰ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1993*, Brussels, (18 December 1992): 2.

⁷¹ The Ad Hoc Group was able to succeed, where NATO had stalled, in producing a document covering terminology, general criteria and operational principles for peace support operations. Their initial report was presented to the NACC Ministers in Athens in June 1993.

⁷² The work of this group progressed rapidly and as a result it prepared a series of reports in the next years.

⁷³ De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, 69.

⁷⁴ De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, 70.

expanded to include all the member states of the CIS. Georgia and Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 respectively. At the meeting of the NACC held in Oslo in June 1992, Finland also attended as an observer.⁷⁵

As mentioned before, consultations and cooperation in the framework of the NACC focus on political and security-related issues where Alliance member countries can offer experience and expertise. In addition to consultations on political and security-related matters, it focuses defence planning questions and military matters such as principles and key aspects of strategy; force and command structures; military exercises; democratic concepts of civilian-military relations; civil/military coordination of air traffic management; and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Participation in NATO's scientific and environmental programs has also been enhanced as well as dissemination of information about NATO in the countries concerned.

2.3.2. Cooperation at Practical Level: Partnership for Peace (PfP)

While forming the NACC the idea was creating a mechanism that would function on an operational and practical level drew upon NATO's professional capabilities and traditions of working together.

Partnership for Peace looked like something new, but NATO laid the groundwork for it. The idea was to generate military activities for nonmembers similar to those generated by NATO members in order to "garner the same effects on cooperation as NATO." Since peacekeeping was an obvious post-Cold War mission, the original idea was to focus on limited peacekeeping operations. C. Wallander states that the program was to be called "Partnership for Peacekeeping," but when eighteen U.S.

⁷⁵ <<http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/natopartnerships.htm>>, (23 November 2003).

soldiers died in a peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the idea was changed to “Partnership for Peace.”⁷⁶

The Partnership for Peace as mentioned before was first presented to the NATO allies in October 1993. It grew out of the London Summit of 1990; The PfP was intended to bring the NACC “out of the realm of discussion and into the realm of practicality.” In June 1994, the NATO foreign minister decided that the PfP’s Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) and the NACC Ad Hoc Group (AHG) should closely coordinate their activities, along with those OSCE states that sustained an interest in peacekeeping and cooperation with the NACC. NATO also recognised that, due to the declining size of forces its members were willing to provide, all future “out of area” operations would by necessity, be “multinational” in character. “The PfP was thus designated to guarantee a modicum of interoperability, to meet the needs of enlarged NATO and partner states.”⁷⁷ In September 1996, an enhanced PfP or “PfP Plus” was initiated that could potentially permit greater regional defence preparations among PfP participants. It was estimated that between fifteen to twenty out of twenty-seven PfP participants would join an enhanced PfP.⁷⁸

So the PfP which was, created two years after the NACC, is designed to go ‘beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership’, which it does by building on six aspects of the NACC process:⁷⁹

1. Ensuring transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes
2. Ensuring democratic control of defence forces

⁷⁶ Wallander, 717.

⁷⁷ Klaus Naumann, “From Cooperation to Interoperability,” *NATO Review*, 17 (4) (1996) in SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford, (1995): 279-280.

⁷⁸ <<http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/natopartnerships.htm>> (23 November 2003).

⁷⁹ North Atlantic Council, *Partnership for Peace Invitation Document*, 28.

3. Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN or CSCE
4. Developing cooperative military relations with NATO in order to undertake joint missions in peace-keeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operation;
5. Developing forces better able to operate with NATO members; and
6. Consulting with NATO in the event of partner perceiving a threat to its security.

On the other hand according to its authors, the purpose of PfP was threefold:

(1) to address the security and identity concerns of many of the Central and Eastern European states seeking closer relations and eventual membership in NATO; (2) not to destabilise the delicate political environment in the former Soviet Union; and (3) not to jeopardise the alliance itself.⁸⁰

Within the context of PfP any Partner also had the right to consult with the Alliance, if it perceived a threat to its political independence, security, or territorial integrity. At first, the Partnership focused on the development of forces that would be interoperable with those of NATO, and on issues such as civil emergency planning. The Partnership also provided the mechanisms enabling Partners to take part in NATO-led operations if they wished to do so.⁸¹

“The popularity of Partnership for Peace and the burst of activity surrounding it took most officials by surprise.” Originally, partners were invited to observe exercises. As the military contacts resulting from these exercises proved successful, partner countries requested to participate and eventually to assist in planning the exercises. “Civilian governments eagerly sought the influence of NATO’s practices and procedures on their own militaries, and the militaries were eager for the professionalization and association of coping with NATO militaries.”⁸²

⁸⁰ Tomé, 33.

⁸¹ <<http://www.jcc.nato.int/PfP%20Programme/PfP%20contd.htm>> (30 December 2003)

⁸² Wallander, 721.

During the first NATO operations in Bosnia, several Partners helped the Alliance to enforce an arms embargo against the whole of former Yugoslavia, economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and a flight ban over Bosnia. Albania, for example, allowed NATO ships to use its territorial waters to enforce the arms embargo and economic sanctions and Hungary, then a Partner, allowed "NATO Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to use Hungarian airspace to monitor the Bosnian no-fly zone."⁸³

Troops from 14 Partner countries served alongside NATO forces in the Implementation Force (IFOR), the first NATO-led peacekeeping operation, "bringing to the force extra capabilities and adding international legitimacy to the mission." This was an impressive combined effort, but Partners naturally sought greater opportunities to take part in the political-military decision making process. These Partners able to exchange views with Allies and associate themselves with the first stage of planning for an operation. "They will also be consulted on the plan for the operation and be involved in the force-generation process, as the commander draws up the composition of the mission force."⁸⁴

However in late 1996, NACC and the PfP proposed to be merged to form the Atlantic Partnership Council. This proposal was intended to permit all NACC members to participate in the planning, preparation, and implementation of PfP peacekeeping missions and exercises.⁸⁵

⁸³ Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", *Survival*, 41(3) (Autumn 1999): 112

⁸⁴ Philipp Borinski, "NATO Towards Double enlargement: The Case of the Balkans", *European Integration*, 24(2), (2002): 116.

2.3.3. A New Platform for the Cooperation: Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

Because the centre of gravity was shifting to topics such as peacekeeping, arms control verification, scientific and environmental cooperation, and the conversion of defence industries, a new institution designed to be more inclusive than the NACC was required.⁸⁶

The NACC was replaced in May 1997 by an organisation including all PFP and NACC participants—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, a new forum that would “combine the activities of NATO’s aging Cooperation Council and the Pfp Programme.”⁸⁷

Warren Christopher, then U.S. Secretary of State, first proposed the EAPC⁸⁸ on 6 September 1996.

We should involve our Partners in the planning as well in the execution of NATO missions. We should give them a stronger voice by forming an Atlantic Partnership Council. In all these ways, NATO gives us a foundation to build our New Atlantic Community—one in which all of Europe and North America work together to build lasting security, one that succeeds where all past efforts have failed.⁸⁹

Upon its establishment on 30 May 1997, in Sintra, Portugal, the EAPC adopted the NACC work plan as its own, with a view to replacing it with an even more extensive agenda of topics for consultations. The EAPC’s founders, the NACC members and

⁸⁵ John Borawski, “Partnership for Peace and Beyond”, *International Affairs*, 71(2) (April, 1995) : 242.

⁸⁶ Robert Waever, “NACC’s Five Years of Strengthening Cooperation”, *NATO Review*, 45 (3) (May/June 1997): 24-26.

⁸⁷ Waever, 24-26.

⁸⁸ The NACC met yearly at the Foreign Ministers level until 30 May 1997, when the NACC was replaced with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). By 1997, there were forty members of the NACC, including all sixteen members of the Alliance. By 2000 membership in the EAPC was up to forty-six.

the PFP partners, declared that its establishment would be a “qualitative step forward in raising to a new level the dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation” already achieved in NACC and PFP, and that it would “make a strong contribution to cooperative approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European Security architecture.”⁹⁰

The EAPC as to be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation. It was planned to offer options for cooperation to Partners that aspire to NATO membership but that were not selected for the “first round” of enlargement and, in a formal sense, it was dependent on the NAC. So the EAPC “is guided by the desire to soothe the disappointment of the unsuccessful applicants for membership by creating a whole range of different offers.”⁹¹

EAPC have pursued four main areas of cooperation:⁹²

Political Consultation: The EAPC provides a forum for consultations on political and security-related matters including regional security concerns.

Economic Issues: The Economic Committee of the EAPC works to monitor the defence expenditures of Member States in relation to their overall economy as well as security aspects of economic development.

Information Matters: The EAPC has been working to promote a wider flow of information among its Members, including political contacts as well as issues dealing

⁸⁹ <<http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/natopartnerships.htm>> (19 October 2003)

⁹⁰ Summary of the meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, par.3.

⁹¹ Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 30 May 1997, par.4.

⁹² <<http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/natopartnerships.htm>> (19 October 2003)

with media and the Internet. This area also includes promoting the work being done by the EAPC.

Scientific and Environmental Issues: The EAPC has been working to address environmental issues and technical questions relating primarily to the “dismantling and disposal of armaments, both conventional and nuclear.” Other topics discussed have included computer networking and environmental security.

27 Partners used the EAPC to consult regularly with 19 NATO Allies on all aspects of security in all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. Allied and Partner militaries exercise and interact together on a regular basis, and, some 9,000 soldiers from Partner countries, including about 4,000 from Russia, serve alongside Alliance forces in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.⁹³

2.4. Why NATO Decided to Enlarge after Cold War?

The decision of enlargement of the alliance was taken for various reasons. Previous NATO enlargements have derived from different circumstances and reasons. After the initial decision to include the United States and Canada with the UK, France, and Benelux, the United States insisted that NATO also include Norway, Portugal, Denmark, and Italy because they shared common values and Iceland for geographic reasons. The Korean War provided the catalyst for the entrance of Greece and Turkey (Lisbon Conference 1952). When the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955, Germany agreed to the following restrictions: to force levels of 495,000 troops and no weapons of mass destruction. When post-Franco Spain entered the Alliance in 1982 it refused to participate in the integrated military command, but sought membership to strengthen democracy and provide Spain with the opportunity to enter the European Economic Community (now European Union). In sum, previous enlargements have been driven by common values, geographic and

⁹³ <<http://www.jcc.nato.int/PfFP%20Programme/PfFP%20contd.htm>> (19 October 2003)

defence requirements, and “included restrictions on new members and special membership arrangements.”⁹⁴

However enlargement policy after the Cold War was different from the earliest enlargements in that prospective candidates for NATO enlargement are likely to be from among the 25 states participating in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) established in January 1994. Necessary conditions for enlargement are: active participation in North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership program, the successful performance of democratic political institutions, a free market economy, respect for human rights, and effective democratic control of the military as well as some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability, shortly compatibility with Western norms. At this point it can be concluded that the enlargement decision after the Cold War was taken as considering the reintegration of western security community.

Study on NATO Enlargement, which was conducted in 1995, lays down key postulates to govern process. In this study purpose of the enlargement after the Cold War are defined as:⁹⁵

1. to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim of improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines. It is understood from the study that, as claimed by Deutsch’s security community approach, NATO views security as a broad concept “embracing political and economic, as well as defence, components.” Such a broad concept of security should be the basis for the new security architecture which must be built through “a gradual process of integration and cooperation brought about by an interplay of existing multilateral institutions in Europe, such as the EU, WEU and OSCE”, each of which would have a role to play in accordance with its

⁹⁴ <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_31/forum31.html> (09/02/2004)

⁹⁵ Ibid.

respective responsibilities and purposes in implementing this broad security concept.

2. When NATO invites other European countries to become Allies this will be a further step towards the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of broad European security architecture. NATO enlargement will extend to new members the benefits of common defence and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The benefits of common defence and such integration are important to protecting the further democratic development of new members. By integrating more countries into the existing western community of values and institutions.
3. Therefore, enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by :
 - Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
 - Fostering in new members of the Alliance "the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterise relations among current Allies";
 - Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
 - Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby "curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines";
 - Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
 - Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.

However, this study refrains from saying who will be admitted and when. Indeed, it spells out no specific criteria for admission to NATO. But it does make clear the

general principles. The broad goal is to “enlarge in ways that strengthen the alliance, promote democracy, and contribute to a stable Europe.” As a result, the study proclaims, NATO will consider countries that can contribute to these objectives while also carrying out the duties and obligations that come with membership.⁹⁶

On the other hand, many central and eastern Europe’s political leaders, confirmed the main attributes of the security community approach by mentioning that their primary motivation for joining NATO has to do with its identity as a Western institution – “an institution to which they believe they rightfully belong by virtue of their cultural and historical ties to the West.” Central and Eastern Europeans tend to view their post-World War II history as marked by an artificial separation from the West and “subjugation by an alien power and culture.” Hence, the region’s leaders have repeatedly characterised joining NATO as ‘return to Europe’. Upon Poland’s accession to NATO, Foreign Minister of Poland put it:⁹⁷

We...have spared no effort to return to the roots of our culture and statehood, to join the Euro-Atlantic family of democratic nations. We will not rest until Poland is safely anchored in Western, economic, political and military structures. This is the essence of our aspirations to join NATO.⁹⁸

Hungary’s and Czech Republic’s motives as well were largely “political and tied to their self-identification project as a Western state.”

To summarise, enlargement reflects the premise that Western Europe and Eastern Europe are no longer separable, and that if the former is to be stable, the latter must be stable too. It offers to make the West’s eastern flank more secure while protecting its growing interests to the east and fostering greater stability there. NATO sources claim that, as proposed by Deutsch and his colleagues, enlargement also offers the prospect of an enormously positive change for the better: that of bringing new but endangered democracies into the Western family of nations, where

⁹⁶ Tomé, 29.

⁹⁷ Rebecca R. Moore, “NATO’s Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-Based Approach to Building Security”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 23.(1) (April 2002): 11.

⁹⁸ Moore, 11.

they will be able to nurture common values. "Enlargement thus seems necessary because it is required by the precarious situation in East Central Europe; it seems desirable because it is the proper vehicle for capitalising on the opportunity to spread democratic values." For both reasons, it is likely to be central feature of the West's strategy for dealing with Europe's new security affairs.⁹⁹

2.4.1. How to Enlarge NATO: Three Different Enlargement Proposals

In essence, three very different proposals for a new system of security for the Central and Eastern European countries have been outlined since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It should be mentioned that these proposals regarding to process of enlargement mostly based on the US point of view. H. Gardner¹⁰⁰ summarise these approaches as; first of all, the "NATO *Maximalist*" *approach* argue for a rapid expansion of membership to as many states as is feasible but generally "regard the defence of the Central European theatre (Poland and the Czech Republic, plus Hungary entered into the alliance earlier because of the geostrategic reasons) as the most crucial." "Full" membership is regarded as the best force for regional stabilisation as well as for the "export" of stability to non-NATO members. The adoption of new Alliance members is additionally regarded as a means to preserve newly emerging democracies, protect international investment, and continue progress toward market liberalism in the newly liberated Soviet-bloc states, and toward the "democratisation" of civil-military relations for prospective NATO members. Membership is also regarded as the best way to protect Central European states from Russian pressures.¹⁰¹ According to this approach "NATO enlargement into Cental Europe would not only help to create a "buffer" between Germany and the potential for eastern instability but would work to preserve U.S. hegemony over an expanding EU/WEU." This approach accordingly argues that Washington must

⁹⁹ L. Richard Kugler, *Enlarging NATO The Russian Factor.*, (U.S: Rand Publ, 1996): 15

¹⁰⁰ Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the future of NATO*, (Westport: Praeger Publ., 1997): 176.

¹⁰¹ Gardner, 176.

sustain its leadership within Alliance.¹⁰² The maximalist approach also argues that the West should cooperate with Russia, but it should do so on the basis of toughness and western interests. NATO maximalists believe that “a decisive enlargement into Central Europe will ultimately attract both Ukraine and Russia toward a stronger NATO.”¹⁰³ In effect, this view holds that Moscow will ultimately see that it is in its own interest to accept enlargement—even into areas of former Soviet and czarist spheres of influence and security.

Secondly the *WEU-First school* proposes an “evolutionary” approach to European security. It argues that states in Central and Eastern Europe should first become members of the EU and then the WEU before becoming members of NATO. They argued that “once these countries join the WEU, NATO could extend then security guarantees to them.” These states would thus obtain conjoint NATO-WEU guarantees but not “full” NATO membership. The Baltic-Adriatic belt of states, for example, which do not qualify for WEU membership, could be made subjects of “security assurances similar to the conjoint U.S. and Russian assurances granted a non-nuclear Ukraine in the trilateral agreement of January 1994.” Alternatively Baltic States could obtain full WEU membership.¹⁰⁴ The WEU-first approach also addresses the democratic political consequences of NATO enlargement; NATO’s very legitimacy would be in question if it refused to accept new Central European states as “full” members.¹⁰⁵

Thirdly the NATO self-limitation approach argues that the Alliance can expand into Central Europe without provoking Russia, creating a new Iron Curtain, or isolating those states not included, but only if it simultaneously extends “bridges” to those

¹⁰² Gardner, 177.

¹⁰³ Gardner, 177.

¹⁰⁴ Jonathan Dean, “Losing Russia or Keeping NATO: Must We Choose?” *Arms Control Today*, (June 1995): 4-5.

¹⁰⁵ Gardner, 178.

states not immediately drawn into NATO.¹⁰⁶ The “self-limitation” approach accordingly seeks to grant Russia special rights (but within limits) and argues that a separate treaty forming a “standing consultative committee” with Russia and Ukraine as members can be established to give Russia greater rights of participation in European security issues. It argues that expanding NATO membership should be accompanied by continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on conventional arms, such as the CFE treaty, as well as by the strengthening of UN, OSCE, and EU/WEU mechanisms for guaranteeing peace.¹⁰⁷ The NATO self-limitation approach argues that once applicants fulfill the conditions for membership, they should join the political structure of NATO as a participant in North Atlantic Council but not its military structures. In addition, NATO membership can help to head off “re-nationalisation” tendencies, in which Central and Eastern European states re-militarise or else attempts to forge new, potentially destabilising alliances. Likewise, “democratisation” and resolution of minority and ethnic tensions are best done within, and not outside, the Alliance. NATO enlargement would furthermore permit certain Central European countries to help “export stability” to non-NATO members. Finally, the NATO self-limitation approach argues that it is better for the alliance to expand gradually, but decisively, and in a non-crisis environment: “Precipitous enlargement of the Alliance in a crisis situation could have a potential disastrous escalatory effect on that crisis.”¹⁰⁸

2.5. Washington Summit and the 4th Wave of Enlargement in the History of NATO

It is obvious that NATO Summits generally see the announcement of grand initiatives. In London in 1990 a ‘Declaration’ was issued, offering a ‘hand of friendship’ to the East. At the 1991 summit in Rome, both the New Strategic

¹⁰⁶ Karsten Voigt and Tamas Wachsler, *The Enlargement of the Alliance*, Draft Special Report on the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, (Brussels: International Secretariat, May, 1995).

¹⁰⁷ Gardner, 178.

Concept and North Atlantic Cooperation Council were inaugurated. In 1994, in Brussels the heads launched the Partnership for Peace Programme. The Madrid Summit in 1997 saw the formal invitation issued to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the alliance. And finally in Washington in 1999 the fiftieth birthday summit although overshadowed by the War in Kosovo, nevertheless “saw a number of initiatives, including a new strategic concept. In short “summits mean commitments and agreements.”¹⁰⁹

At the 1997 Madrid Summit, not only were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland invited to join NATO but also the alliance committed itself to revisit the issue of further enlargement at its next summit.¹¹⁰ In the declaration issued at that next summit in Washington¹¹¹ NATO welcomes as its newest members the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. As a security community based on ‘liberal-democratic’ principles the prospect of joining NATO provides countries in Central and Eastern Europe with a powerful incentive to undertake the political, economic, and military reforms that will build the “democratic politics, prosperous economies, and transparent militaries on which peace and security in Europe must rest.” In preparation for their accession to NATO, Poland created a new civilian-controlled military. Hungary signed a border treaty with Romania. The Czechs proceeded with economic reform. Although these steps were taken for many reasons, one crucial consideration common to all was that they were steps that Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague had to take to become NATO members.¹¹² In other words to become a member of Western security community.

¹⁰⁸ Karsten Voigt and Tamas Wachsler.

¹⁰⁹ Stuart Croft, “Guarantecing Europe’s security? Enlarging NATO again”, *International Affairs*, 78 (1), (2002): 97

¹¹⁰ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation issued by the heads of state and government, at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997> (4 April 2004)

¹¹¹ The meeting, taking place at the historical Mellon auditorium (in which the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949).

¹¹² Ivo H. Daalder, “NATO at 50: Summit & Beyond”, *Policy Brief*, 48(April 1999), Brookings Institution: web edition.

In the communique of the Washington summit NATO heads of state and government stated that "Our alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose wider inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe." Further in the summit the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was presented to assist to prepare for admission, which provides for yearly progress reports on aspiring members success (or lack thereof) in meeting stringent political and military criteria.¹¹³ So a major theme for the alliance in 1999 was thus that enlargement was a process: one that began formally in 1994, and one that would continue. In this respect, the text of the Washington summit communique is of particular importance. "Applicants were commanded in an order that could have been interpreted as a reference to the level of support for their candidature within the alliance." At the top, the alliance "recognise and welcome the continuing efforts and progress in both Romania and Slovenia." Next it "also recognise and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania." At the third level came reference to the "positive developments' in both Bulgaria and Slovakia." Finally came the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to whom NATO was "grateful for the co-operation" and Albania, whose cooperation was "welcome."¹¹⁴ It is also noted by the alliance that it would consider further enlargement at its summit meeting in Prague in 2002.

It should be mentioned that NATO summit in Washington had been followed by "a major escalation of the war by the United States and the European NATO powers on Yugoslavia", with intensified bombing of economic as well as military targets throughout Serbia and the deployment of more warplanes, troops and ships to the Balkan region. So the war against Serbia was the focus of media coverage of the NATO summit.

¹¹³ Mark Kramer, "NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: a Framework for Sustainable Enlargement", *International Affairs*, 78(4) (2002): 737.

¹¹⁴ Croft, 98.

Although the crisis in Kosovo heavily influenced the agenda, the NATO leaders also spent considerable time discussing the future of the organisation. NATO leaders signed and issued the “Washington Declaration”. This declaration marked the 50th anniversary of the Alliance and declared its goals for the 21st century. The Declaration stated that collective defence remains the core purpose of NATO and affirmed its commitment to promote peace, stability, and freedom. The NATO leaders also reaffirmed the significance of the trans-Atlantic link, declaring that the Alliance must be as effective in the future as it was in the past in dealing with the new challenges. The Declaration envisioned the new NATO as

an Alliance committed to collective defence, capable of addressing current and future security risks, strengthened by and open to new members, and working together with other institutions, Partners, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries in a mutually reinforcing way to enhance Euro-Atlantic security and stability.¹¹⁵

On the other hand the enhanced version of the Strategic Concept launched during NATO’s fiftieth anniversary in Washington in April 1999, seems to have removed completely the definition of intervention areas, and regards an immense geography as its operation fields of possible interventions in order to ensure the continued relevance of the Concept in the face of changing conditions and the emergence of new challenges. To be more exact, “the new Strategic Concept will not dictate any restriction on geography of operation.” While the concept outlined the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance as security, consultation, deterrence, and defence (main purpose of collective defence of its members) it also referred to the new missions and roles, assumed since the end of the Cold War in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, namely crisis management, peacekeeping and partnership. The concept also addressed and recognised the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO through which the European Allies will assume greater responsibilities in the field of security and defence and more autonomy in political and security matters. At the same time, the

new concept considers radical changes in NATO forces, in order to become capable of intervention into the conflicts very far away from the NATO.

To sum up, in this chapter I tried to explore the impact of the break-up of Soviet Union into the process of NATO's redefinition of itself. In order that in this chapter, I mainly focused on the construction of interlocking institutions, as an initial step for enlargement, between the years 1991-1999. Besides in this chapter I also presented the reasons behind NATO's enlargement decision with regard to the three different enlargement proposals as Maximalist approach, WEU-First approach and Self-Limitation approach.

I think it can be concluded in this chapter that through its transformation, NATO has adapted to the new security environment in Europe and remain as the most important western security community actor by expanding its area of influence. When we think of main criteria for accession, actually NATO is asking aspiring members to meet almost entirely non-military criteria just to be considered for admission. Remember that, in late 1950's K. Deutsch predicted, NATO will develop as the chief international organisation in the North Atlantic Area. And it will be more political in character by the creation of new organs for consultation and decision making. He also suggests that NATO should expand its area of influence and it should seek the opportunities for closer integration in the region. This will contribute to the eventual abolition of the war in the region. So in accordance with Deutsch's proposal, starting from the early 90s NATO redefined itself as more political institution striving for integration of Western security community.

CHAPTER III

DIRECTIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE NEW NATO

*Like it or not, NATO is a reality in today's international arena, primarily in Europe but also in the world in general.*¹¹⁶

This chapter mainly focuses on the Russia's foreign policy direction after the Cold War and Russia's relations with the new NATO after its redefinition of itself. In this context this chapter first examines Russian foreign policy orientation in terms of the relations with the NATO. It also explores that Russian foreign policy was from 1990 to 1995 dominated by the ideology of anti-communism and anti-Soviet thinking. However from 1996 to 1999 it was dominated by the Primakov's alternative policy, that is ideology of 'Great Russia' started to capture the political establishment. Besides in this chapter NATO's efforts for upgrading institutional links with Russia between 1995-1997 will also be presented.

3.1. Russia's New Foreign Policy

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union left policymakers in Moscow facing profound challenges. Russia's leaders had the task of establishing new political and economic institutions, while at the same time determining Russia's national security interests and identifying threats to those interests. According to Sergei Kortunov, national interest problem and consequently national identity never discussed in the Soviet Union, because the Soviet interests and the national interests were absolutely different and even opposite ideas. The interests of the U.S.S.R. were global, rather than national: "they were intimately connected with the efforts to

¹¹⁶ Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, "Russia, NATO and the EU in an Era of Enlargement: Vulnerability or Opportunity?", *The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe* (web edition): 79.

realise a global historical project as an alternative to the Western (also global in terms of time and space) project.” It was towards the end of the Soviet Union that a

national interest conception became needed: by that time the Communist Party bosses had already abandoned the global project. National identity was urgently needed. During Gorbachev period it was admitted that the country was no longer able to carry out its own historical project and was willing to join the “Western liberal project alien to it.”¹¹⁷

On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War there was a shared sense of loss among the Russians and there was no collective definition of what Russia has become – so in the aftermath of the Cold War Russians have been undergoing an “identity crisis,” of sorts, characterised by differing definitions of “Russian-ness.” Vera Tolz identifies five competing conceptions of the Russian identity: Russians as Russian speakers; Russians as Eastern Slavs; Russians as imperialists; Russians as race, Russians as a civic nation. And each of these conceptions of the national identity has implications for foreign policy, as each contributes to a unique sense of the national interest. For example, if Russians are defined as Russian speakers then “this could have implications for the extent to which Russia actively promotes the interests of its diasporas littered throughout the former Soviet Union, especially in Latvia and Estonia where Russians comprise nearly thirty percent of the overall population”, and where citizenship laws which actively promote the national language, are thought to be discriminatory against the Russian-speaking population.¹¹⁸

Should “Russian-ness” be understood to reflect a traceable racial lineage, or the assertion of Russia as part of a greater pan-Slavic connection, then perhaps a logical

¹¹⁷ Sergei Kortunov, “Russia’s National Identity: Foreign Policy Dimension”, *International Affairs*, (web edition): 98.

¹¹⁸ Kari Roberts, “Empire Envy: Russia-U.S. Relations Post-9/11”, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 6(4), (2004): 7.

path for Russian foreign policy might be to pursue closer relations, or perhaps even unification, with Ukraine and Belarus. Should Russians view themselves as imperialist, this could provoke an interest in some form of reunification of the former Soviet Union. And finally, though unlikely, should Russian identity come to be defined in terms of patriotic citizenship – to be Russian is to live in Russia and love Russia – “then this may resemble the notion of identity and citizenship often shared in western liberal democracies and may reflect Russia’s adoption of western-style governance, which may influence a more western-oriented foreign policy agenda.” There are so many competing definitions of the national identity, and consequently, of the national interest, that “consensus on this subject has been elusive.” And in the absence of a united answer to the question “what is Russia,” it has become easier to identify what Russia is not – it was not the victor in the Cold War.¹¹⁹

So Russia’s national identity, the unresolved problem, is firmly connected with the painful and contradictory process of formulating Russia’s policy and consolidating its national security. What sort of a state is the Russian Federation? What is its real position in the world? Where are its true borders? How can they be determined? How should its historical experience (both negative and positive) be correlated with its present state? What is its long-term strategy for the 21st century?¹²⁰

According to J. Berryman this uncertainty as to the identity and place of Russia in the new world order has found its expression in the different foreign policy opinion groups. These groups are by no means fixed. Moreover figures shift from one group to another, and certain people can be placed in more than one grouping. Yeltsin for example, has shifted from being a liberal Westerniser to a centrist, while Yavlinsky,

¹¹⁹ Roberts, 13.

¹²⁰ Allen C. Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(1), (2001): 7-31.

the democratic critic of Gaidar's economic reform, can be located as both an international institutionalist and a state realist.¹²¹

It is generally mentioned that today there are three different contending schools of political thought in Russia that comment on Russia's place in world affairs and its relation to Europe and the West. These are; reformers, centrists, and nationalists.

Reformers: Kozyrev, Gaidar

- *Liberal Westernisers*: Pro-Western group, which favoured close relations with the West. This group dominated foreign policy formulation from August 1991 to the middle of 1992.

- *International Institutionalists*: A group which put particular emphasis on "the benefits for Russia of belonging to international institutions", not only from the perspective of national interests, but also to encourage democracy in Russia, international cooperation and peace. Proponents of this view do not differ greatly from those of the liberal Westernisers, but many centrist (such as Primakov) favour membership of regional and international institutions, they are simply more sceptical that Russia will be allowed to join some of the more important ones-such as, the EU- as a full member.¹²²

Centrist: Primakov, Ivanov, Chernomyrdin

- *State realist*: This group favours actively pursuing Russian national interests, even if this means sometimes upsetting the West. Hard bargaining rather than antagonism to the West is the slogan of this group.

- *Eurasianists*: This group wants Russia to act as some kind of bridge between Europe and Asia. More specifically, members priorities relations with the CIS (and

¹²¹ Berryman, 337.

¹²² Nicolai Petro and Alvin Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State*, (London:Longman,1997): 99.

some Asian countries) in preference to the West. This group was founded by Yeltsin's former adviser, Stankevich.¹²³

Nationalists: Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky

- *National patriotic expansionists*: There are a wide variety of nationalist groupings in Russia today. Some seek an alliance of Slavic States (Solzhenitsy) others wish to see revival of the old Soviet Union (Zyuganov); while yet others envisage Russia becoming the centre once more of a great empire (Zhirinovsky).¹²⁴

Similarly Brzezinski outlines three schools of thought, "that emerged in Russia after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union"; according to Brzezinski one group advocated priority for a "mature strategic partnership" with America, second group put emphasis on the "near abroad" and the third argued for forming counter-alliance, involving some sort of Eurasian anti-US coalition in order to reduce the American supremacy in Eurasia.¹²⁵ It is generally stated by Brzezinski that, to an extent Yeltsin's and Kozirev's policy was based on the first group, while Putin's emphasis has probably been on a combination of the second and third options.

However it is generally mentioned by the analysts that there was considerable overlap in the views of the schools of thought about domestic and foreign policy. All of these thoughts stressed the importance of the relations with the west, although they differed in the priority and exclusivity they accorded to these relations. All three groups insisted that Russia was and would continue to be a great power. They differed however, "on what the implications of great-power status were for Russian foreign policy."¹²⁶

¹²³ Petro and Rubinstein, 99.

¹²⁴ Petro and Rubinstein, 100.

¹²⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997): 107.

¹²⁶ Petro and Rubinstein, 99.

3.2. The Search for Objectives in Russian Foreign Policy in terms of NATO Enlargement

One of the first major foreign policy statements issued by the emerging Russian state, under President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, made even before the final dissolution of the USSR had been confirmed in December 1991, "raised the prospect of Russia eventually joining NATO itself." This was not generally viewed either in Russia or amongst Western countries as representing a firm declaration of intent. Yeltsin's statement spoke of membership as being a "long-term political aim and concentrated instead on pledging constructive Russian participation in the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council", which grouped NATO members with their erstwhile Warsaw Pact adversaries.¹²⁷

In early 1992, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that Russian foreign policy would differ from foreign policy under Gorbachev's New Thinking because democratic principles would drive it. These principles would provide a solid basis for peaceful policies. Kozyrev also stressed that the basis for the new foreign policy would be Russia's national interests rather than the so-called international class interests that theoretically underlay Soviet foreign policy. For two years (1991-93), "Russian foreign policy was generally low key and conciliatory toward the West with endorsement of many Western foreign policy positions on world conflicts." Pressing domestic problems were a major determinant of this direction. Kozyrev argued that good relations with the West were possible because he stated that: "no developed, democratic, civil society . . . can threaten us."¹²⁸ As it was, during the years 1991-93, the Russian government pursued a foreign policy based fundamentally on maximising cooperation with the United States and the European

¹²⁷ "History 'Turns Inside Out' as Russia Asks to Join NATO", *Daily Telegraph*, 21 December 1991.

¹²⁸ <<http://countrystudies.us/russia>> 2 February 2004.

NATO and EU allies in order to try to “ensure inclusion in the important decisions.”¹²⁹

During this period, the Russians tried to show by all means the difference between the newly born democratic Russia and the old Soviet empire which was concentrated on the idea of maintaining its own integrity and that of the “Socialist camp: Russia contributed more than other countries to the removal of the Soviet threat”-the USSR would have never collapsed so quickly without Russia’s effort. “In relation to the USSR Russia was secessionist; in relation to Europe Russia was integrationist. And if the USSR occupied the Baltic Republics, it was Russia who liberated them!”¹³⁰

Moscow was, of course, interested in the further development of co-operation with the Western countries, waiting from them stable financial, technical and organisational support for the economic reforms in Russia. At this time, as in the future, Russian government “uses the nationalist card as a leverage in negotiating with the West, trying to show that Russian pro-Western orientations needed to be encouraged.”¹³¹ The choice, Russian leaders tell to their Western partners, was between the democrats and the reactionaries, between the government representing the forces of peace and the Red-Brown nationalist opposition, the party of war, as Kozyrev said in the first article by a Russian Foreign Minister published in the NATO Review in February 1993:

If we began to be seen in Western capitals as something “unnecessary” or “dangerous”, this would only encourage our “national patriots” to increase their attacks on current Russian policy and would sustain their chauvinist desires to close off Russia in pseudo-superpower isolation.¹³²

¹²⁹ ‘Doubts About a NATO Jr.’, *Time*, 3 October 1994, 40-41.

¹³⁰ Tomé, 9-12.

¹³¹ Tomé, 9-12.

¹³² Andrei Kozyrev, “The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance”, *NATO Review*, 41(1), (February 1993): 3,

The apogee of this benign period came in August 1993 when President Yeltsin, on visits to Warsaw and Prague, appeared to give the green light to the enlargement of NATO's membership to embrace at least Poland and the Czech Republic. In Warsaw, Yeltsin and then Polish President Lech Walesa issued a joint declaration, which stated that such enlargement, "in the interests of overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia"¹³³

The picture on the Russian side was complicated from the autumn of 1993 by the entry of the defence ministry and senior military officers into the debates. The military's main concerns, not surprisingly, revolved around perceived threats to Russian security in the sense of defence of the national territory. "The defence ministry and the generals were thus concerned about the geopolitics of vulnerability in the physical, territorial sense vis-a-vis the West." Domestic politics placed increasing pressure on this pro-Western and generally benign attitude. "Bureaucratic infighting broke out in the government over foreign policy goals" and the means of implementing them and the same questions stimulated a major conflict between the legislative and executive branches of power.¹³⁴

The lack of clarity in many aspects of foreign policy also reflected opposing Russian viewpoints over Russia's place in the world. Public debates raged over whether Russia should orient itself toward the West or the East, whether Russia was still a superpower, and what the intentions of the West were toward Russia —"all indicating Russia's general search for a new identity to replace the accepted truths of Marxism-Leninism and the Cold War." In the debate, ultranationalists and communists strongly criticised what they viewed as pro-Western policies and argued that close relations with the West constituted a danger to Russia's national security because the West remained Russia's chief enemy.

¹³³ Smith and Timmins, 80.

¹³⁴ Smith and Timmins, 82.

In April 1993, the newly created Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission of the Security Council finalised a foreign policy concept that the parliament approved. According to the 1993 foreign policy concept, Russia is a great power with several foreign policy priorities: ensuring national security through diplomacy; protecting the sovereignty and unity of the state, with special emphasis on border stability; protecting the rights of Russians abroad; providing favourable external conditions for internal democratic reforms; mobilising international assistance for the establishment of a Russian market economy and assisting Russian exporters; furthering integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States and pursuing beneficial relations with other nearby foreign states, including those in Central Europe; continuing to build relations with countries that have resolved problems similar to those that Russia faces; and ensuring Russia an active role as a great power. The concept also called for enhanced ties with Asian Pacific countries to balance relations with the West. Beginning in 1993, public statements about foreign policy placed greater emphasis on the protection of Russia's vital interests and less emphasis on openly pro-Western policies.¹³⁵

When analysed in detail, the doctrine largely drafted by the defence ministry and the military themselves and, as such, constituted an “authoritative statement of their views.” Published passages from the document revealed that amongst the “basic existing and potential sources of military danger from outside” which it identified, was “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security.” From the start, therefore, the position of the Russian defence ministry has been one of opposition in principle to NATO enlargement, a view that has endured. The dominant view amongst the military has differed from that of the foreign ministry and the presidency (under both Yeltsin and later, Vladimir Putin) in seeing only vulnerability resulting from NATO

¹³⁵ Gardner, 77.

enlargement, and not the “potential opportunity to remake the European security architecture which the foreign ministry pursued, at least during 1993-94.”¹³⁶

Accordingly in year 1996 pro-Western Kozyrev has been taken from his post by Yeltsin, and the Foreign Ministry of Russian Federation handed over to Yevgeny Primakov. Following Kozyrev’s dismissal, the new Russian foreign minister took a slightly different tack. In January 1996, Yevgeny Primakov took a position that appears tougher but thus far kept the door open to compromise. In December 1995, as chief of foreign intelligence, Primakov had stated that NATO expansion would create a “security threat” for Russia and that his organisation would try to find the true motives for NATO enlargement and to block that expansion.

Primakov also warned that Russia no longer had an obvious “main opponent” however it would seek to prevent the emergence of a “global hegemony, a rather clear reference to the United States.”¹³⁷

At the 4 June 1996 NATO summit Primakov, for his part, noted that Western leaders seemed to recognise “for the first time” that NATO could not expand “without an intensive dialogue with Russia about the terms of that expansion.”¹³⁸

One significant indication of a possible compromise according to Primakov was that NATO ministers met him prior to meeting with Central and Eastern European foreign ministers, thus suggesting a decision to consider Russian interests before those of Central and Eastern Europe.

Yet in reconfirming his previous statements, after the 4 June 1996 meeting of NATO/NACC foreign ministers, Primakov asserted that Moscow would oppose any expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure. He stated that Moscow would not only oppose the “deployment of NATO troops in Central Europe but would oppose joint military command structures, air defence systems, intelligence sharing,

¹³⁶ Smith and Timmins, 83.

¹³⁷ OMRI Daily Digest, 248, I, 22 December 1995.

and similar measures.” At the same time, Primakov noted that Moscow would accept the “political enlargement” of NATO, which led Western commentators to believe that Moscow’s policy had changed. Primakov’s statements, however, really reiterated Kozyrev’s proposals for a NATO-Russian “system of overlapping security guarantees.” In April 1996, Primakov likewise proposed the establishment of conjoint NATO-Russian security guarantees for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. These proposals had been rejected by each of these states, as well as by Washington. “Concurrently, Primakov also opposed “full” NATO membership for Finland, the Baltic States, Sweden, or Austria.”¹³⁹

The key difference between Foreign Minister Primakov and his predecessor, however, was that Primakov appeared less insistent that NATO reform itself into a “political organisation” and that the OSCE and NACC should form an “all-European security regime.” Primakov-while adamantly opposing the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders- “thus appeared more willing to deal with NATO as a military organisation.” Moreover, he appeared to “de-emphasise the role of the OSCE as “security” organisation, although supporting it as a necessary “political” organisation.”¹⁴⁰

So during Primakov term it is proposed that the problems between NATO and Russia should be tackled sequentially: first of all NATO re-organisation, then working out NATO-Russian relations and then following from that, deciding on whether NATO should be enlarged, in what order and to what extent.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Scott Parish, “NATO and Russia Talk Compromise on Expansion Issue,” *OMRI Analytical Brief*, 145(1) 4 June 1996.

¹³⁹ Stephen J. Cimbala, “NATO Enlargement and Russia”, *Strategic Review*, 24(2) (1996): 51-57.

¹⁴⁰ Gardner, 25.

¹⁴¹ Almar Latour, “Lebed Warns NATO to Stall Plans to Expand Eastward: Security Chief Tones Down Rhetoric, Calls for Talks on West's Growth Agenda”, *Wall Street Journal*, 14(175) (1996 October 8): 2

3.3. Trends in Russian National Security Policy and Military Reform

National security policy of Russia developed in accordance with the foreign policy direction of the same period. Initially Moscow identified its national security interests very closely with those of the West, especially the United States. During the first years of independence there was a widespread enthusiasm among Russia's ruling elite, as well as among many of the country's people, for all manner of western forms and institutions, and an intense desire to see Russia take its place besides the United States and the countries of Western Europe as an accepted member of the democratic nations of the world.¹⁴²

As in the case of foreign policy, during 1992 and the beginning of 1993, Boris Yeltsin's Russian government continued, and even went beyond, Gorbachev's policy of pursuing good relations with the Western countries. The main theme in Russian national security policy during this early period was distancing the new Russia from the old Soviet Union in every way possible, especially by reducing the threat, which other countries perceived from Russia. To accomplish this goal, "Yeltsin's government embarked on a series of measures designed to reassure the leaders of Western countries and demonstrate that Russia was worthy of their trust."¹⁴³

Russia's control over the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union and its commitment to strategic arms control were the areas about which the western powers required the most reassurance, and Russia's government lost no time in providing it. As early as December 1991 all four Soviet republics with nuclear weapons stationed on their territory (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) "pledged to abide by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by President Bush and Gorbachev in July 1991." Similarly, Russia joined the other former Soviet states in January 1992 in agreeing to the OSCE (formerly CSCE)

¹⁴² C. Bluth, "American-Russian Strategic Relations: From Confrontation to Cooperation?" *The World Today*, 49(3) (1993): p.48.

framework. In June 1992 Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed the terms of an 'American-Russian Charter', which asserted that the two countries no longer regarded each other as adversaries. The meeting between the American and Russian presidents produced a plan for further step, reductions in both countries' strategic nuclear weapons arsenals, which was the basis for the second START agreement, signed by Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993. While START I marked a significant new step in strategic nuclear arms control by providing for cuts in the number of "warheads deployed by each side", START II represented another qualitative change in US-Russian arms control by "providing for the elimination of all land-based missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs." The fact that START II banned land-based MIRVed (the largest component of Moscow's strategic triad) but not "multiple warheads on sea-based missiles" (the traditional strength of the American side), indicates that the Russians were still pursuing Gorbachev's strategy of placing good relations with the West and the achievement of arms control agreements at, or close to, the top of the Kremlin's list of national security policy priorities.¹⁴⁴

Russia continued to demonstrate through its actions that the old days of Moscow's "obstruction of western policies and unilateral use of the military as a tool of its national security policy were at an end." The troops of the former Soviet army were steadily withdrawn from Eastern Germany, Central Europe and the newly independent Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In fact in December 1992 Yeltsin agreed to speed up the withdrawal of Russian forces from Germany by four months to meet a new deadline of 31 August 1994. At the same time, Russia pursued the strategy begun by Gorbachev of reducing Moscow's commitments to former client states in the Third world such as Libya, Iraq and Angola, and embracing former enemies in the international arena. By the middle of 1993, Russian national security policy was undergoing a noticeable shift, as Moscow began moving away from enthusiasm for western concepts and institutions and attempted

¹⁴³ Mathers, 42.

¹⁴⁴ M. M. El Doufani, "Yeltsin's Foreign Policy-A Third World Critique" *The World Today*, 49,(6)(1993): 107.

instead to “assert a more independent line on national security policy issues.”¹⁴⁵

This shift in Russia’s national security policy orientation can be attributed to two main factors. The first one is the influence of domestic politics and, more importantly, the increase in the power and influence of more conservative factions and institutions in Russia since late 1992. Rapid inflation, a fall in production and general dislocation and uncertainty, which have been the results of Russia’s transition to a market economy, created a “conservative backlash on many fronts, including that of foreign and national security policy.” With increasing popular support for political parties and groupings advocating more overtly pro-Russian, nationalist and assertive policies it is not surprising that the “Yeltsin government has adopted some of its critics’ positions on national security issues in order to deflect criticisms at home.”¹⁴⁶

The second main reason for the shift in Russia’s national security policy stance is the failure of a “cooperative, pro-Western position to bring tangible benefits in terms of aid, trade and investment.” The major economic powers in North America and Western Europe were unlikely to provide large-scale economic aid to Russia in the early 1990s. In fairness to the Russians, however, it is important to remember the “enthusiasm with which Western leaders greeted the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and their tendency to make rash promises about the material assistance they would provide to a democratic Russia.”¹⁴⁷ Western leaders promised \$2.5 billion, and then \$24 billion in aid, but much of the foreign aid was linked to Russia’s implementation of specific policies or was earmarked for purchasing goods from Western countries.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Mathers, 44

¹⁴⁶ F Griffiths, “From Situations of Weakness: Foreign Policy of the New Russia” *International Journal*, 49(4)(1994): 713.

¹⁴⁷ Mathers, 46.

¹⁴⁸ Mathers, 46.

As a result, in order to quieten critics at home and to ensure that the world's leaders once again heard Russia's voice, Moscow began to take steps to establish a more independent and a distinctly Russian stance on a number of issues. One of Russia's new policies in the area of national security which the leaders of the United States and western Europe found most disturbing was the change in Moscow's position regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Whereas during 1992 Russia had supported the Western position of condemning and isolating the Serbs, in the following year Russia's policy became distinctly pro-Serbian. In February 1993 Kozyrev presented an eight-point peace plan which stressed "sanctions against Croatia in response to Zagreb's attacks on Serb-controlled enclaves in that republic, and by April Russia had reversed its previous support for economic sanctions against Serbia."¹⁴⁹ Moscow also strongly opposed the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and in February 1994 announced an agreement with Serb leaders to send Russian peacekeepers to Sarajevo, "making the use of military measures against Serb positions in Bosnia even more problematic." From the point of view of Russian policymakers, the benefits of this shift were twofold. *First* it is demonstrated that Russia was willing to distance itself from a policy already well established by the western powers; and *second*, it played to the sympathy which many Russians were feeling for their fellow Slavs and Serbs.¹⁵⁰

Western leaders viewed the "more independent Russian national security stance as an alarming feature" and as a result Russia's continued adherence to arms reduction treaties has come under question. Western concerns have been raised, "first by the Russian Parliament's delay in ratifying the START II agreement", but more importantly by the reservations, which have been expressed by Russia's political leaders about the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. From the early 1995 Russian leaders began to argue that Russia's involvement in the war in Chechnya prevented Moscow from reducing its troops and weapons in that area

¹⁴⁹ H. Adomeit, "Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and reality", *International Affairs*, 71(1)(1995): 46.

to the levels required by the CFE treaty.¹⁵¹

Consequently after 1994 extreme nationalistic ideas gain speed in the area of foreign and national security policies and supported by political and military elites. Most of these elites called for an isolationist policy. They considered West as the eternal enemy of Russia. So the Western-oriented part of the elite become a fairly small minority. Although Russian leadership continued to cooperation with the West like seeking loans from IMF or signing partnership agreements with NATO, according to opinion polls “only 13 per cent of the population had an open attitude towards values of Western democracy, and more than 50 per cent openly declared themselves anti-Western.”¹⁵² The results of these opinion polls proves that although Russian leaders claimed that they share main Western values and security interests, majority of the population and political and military elite do not think in the same way.

3.4. Russian Approach towards Partnership for Peace Cooperation Programme of NATO

As mentioned before, Boris Yeltsin first proposed Russia's interest in belonging to NATO in December 1991 and United States subsequently asked Russia to participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Individual Partnership Program (IPP); Washington also agreed to “let Moscow opt for an special status in relationship to NATO”¹⁵³ and appeared to promise eventual “full” membership in the Alliance. But the main reasons why official Russian attitudes towards NATO grew more suspicious during 1994 and 1995 was a belief that Russia had been

¹⁵⁰ P. Marantz, “Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the West Search for a New relationship” *International Journal*, 49(4)(1994): 739.

¹⁵¹ Mathers, 49.

¹⁵² Ludmilla Selezneva, “Post Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism”, in *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, (ed.) Rick Fawn, (Portland: Frank Cass Publ, 2003): 15.

¹⁵³ Gardner, 13.

duped about the true nature and aims of Partnership for Peace scheme which NATO members had unveiled at January 1994 summit.

Critics in Russia have accordingly dubbed the PfP as the “Partnership for Postponement” of NATO enlargement. More moderate observers, however, have argued that the PfP represents a necessary “holding pen” until NATO members themselves “forge a consensus as to how to permit new states to meet the qualifications and responsibilities of membership.”¹⁵⁴

Russian critics have joked that the PfP will implement “such an army of peacekeepers and rescuers in Europe that there may not be enough armed conflicts and catastrophes.”¹⁵⁵ Russian observers argue that the primary motivation for the PfP stems from a deep-rooted anti-Russian bias, and that “NATO is still geared toward containment.” It is believed that the PfP will ultimately result in a new arms race between those who belong to the PfP (and then to NATO), and those who do not make the grade. Moreover, they worry that Russian arms will not be included in NATO’s integrated forces, which would exclude Russia from its Soviet arms markets and a significant source of hard currency. More subtly, Russian critics argue that the PfP is designed to implement the Partnership on a strictly individual basis with particular countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In such a way, “the PfP could play off the interests of one CIS state against another (particularly Ukraine versus Russia) and thus ultimately undermine political, military, and economic cooperation among the CIS states.” Likewise, PfP activities might expand in a way that collides with Russian interests. Russia might have to accept the demand to deploy peacekeeping forces, for example, in regions where Russia does not want such forces. The PfP might likewise attempt to draw Russia into a defence of U.S. interests alone; “it might, for example, seek to draft Russia as a gendarme against China and pan-Islamic movements in a way that serves American, and not

¹⁵⁴ Gardner, 13.

¹⁵⁵ Vladislav Chernov, “Moscow Should Think carefully,” *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 46(8)(1994): 11.

Russian interests.” According to Russian critics another ulterior purpose of the PfP was an attempt “to forge a “Baltic-Black Sea” alliance and a new *cordon sanitaire* against Russia.”¹⁵⁶ Russian critics see the formation of a Polish-Ukrainian “strategic partnership,” combined with Polish, Baltic State, and other Central and Eastern European efforts to join NATO, as a potential new “encirclement” or “double buffer zone.”

Moscow’s initial opposition to the PfP may have also represented a protest against President Clinton’s threat to end U.S. support for the arms embargo of Bosnian Moslems and against U.S. threats to “augment NATO airstrikes against on Bosnian Serb positions, Yeltsin had threatened not to sign-on to the PfP.” Moscow likewise stated its intent to block NATO’s use of Central Europe, such as Hungarian airspace and facilities, to stage activities that might ultimately oppose Russian interests or allies.¹⁵⁷ An additional reason for not entering the PfP stemmed from the projected military operation in Chechnya. Russia did not want to engage itself in defence commitments with the West at the same time that it was planning a significant military intervention in Chechnya.

Despite similar criticism, and after some bargaining and threats, Moscow did sign the PfP framework document in June 1994. The PfP document seemed acceptable to Moscow in that it appeared to promise a far-reaching NATO-Russian relationship both inside and outside the Alliance, including the sharing of information on issues of European political security, plus cooperation in peacekeeping.

Critics on both sides attacked the agreement. In 1994 Kozyrev proposed the formulation of conjoint NATO-Russian security guarantees to Central and Eastern European States raised the fears of those countries that “NATO and Russia

¹⁵⁶ Chernov, 11.

¹⁵⁷ Gardner, 19-20.

intended to establish a condominium.” NATO spokespersons accordingly emphasised that PfP did not represent a “NATO-Russian condominium” or a “Yalta II.” Moreover, Western critics of PfP feared that Moscow could still use its special relationship within the PfP to pressure other members.¹⁵⁸

By December 1994, because of the intense criticism of Russian political and military elite towards the PfP, Moscow appeared to reverse its support. “At the meeting of NATO foreign ministers, former Foreign Minister Kozyrev balked at formally signing the PfP Individual Partnership Agreement or an agreement on special NATO-Russian ties.”¹⁵⁹ The latter represented a symbolic bilateral protocol (not legally binding) which underscored that Russia could cooperate with the United States on an equal basis with the other major European states. The protocol also permitted active consultation and participation with NATO; Moscow, however, believed that even this accord did not fully meet its demands for rough geopolitical parity with the United States and EU, as a politically “equal” decision-making power.

By February 1995, the Russian deputy foreign minister, Georgi Mamedov, was sent to Washington to start negotiations over the conditions for NATO enlargement. In March, at his Geneva meeting with U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, Kozyrev did set some preconditions for NATO’s expansion. First, Moscow could accept NATO’s eastward expansion if the United States, the EU, and Russia updated the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. “As the CFE was based on the obsolete principle of “parity” between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the total count would now refer to national forces, not rival blocs.” Second, the United States needed to formulate a firm treaty recognising Russia’s legitimate security interests in a number of areas. These would include the nondeployment of foreign military bases and nuclear weapons in eastern countries;

¹⁵⁸ Gardner, 18.

¹⁵⁹ Gardner, 18

the nonextension of NATO's military organisation to the Baltic states and other former Soviet republics; and Russia's equal participation in programs relating to logistical and technical support for the armed forces of former Warsaw Pact states that became NATO members. Third, Russia would demand that "all peacekeeping operations in Europe be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the OSCE." The Russian Federation's territorial integrity, including Kaliningrad, would be guaranteed. Fourth, "the new security architecture of Europe required a formal codification of NATO-CIS relations by which Russia could preserve its subregional security system with CIS states and resolve disputes with Ukraine." In addition, a reformulation of principles governing the partnership with the United States was also required so that the sides would deal with each other as equal partners (not sixteen plus one, but one plus one).¹⁶⁰

Before the May 1995 summit, President Clinton drafted a letter to President Yeltsin stating that Washington had no objection "in principle" to Russia ultimately joining NATO as a "full" member of the alliance. President Clinton promised to slow down steps toward NATO enlargement (despite congressional pressure to expand Alliance membership as soon as possible), and he proposed "a broad, enhanced NATO-Russia dialogue and cooperation going beyond PfP," to begin on 31 May 1995.¹⁶¹

Moscow finally signed the Individual Partnership Program and bilateral accord on 31 May 1995, but not without significant reservations. Kozyrev warned the NATO allies of the need (from the Russian perspective) to transform NATO "from a

¹⁶⁰ Critics linked Russian membership in the G-7 with PfP-hence the formation of the "Political Eight." Russia renewed its demand for "full" membership in the "G-7" in early 1997 in the context of a NATO-Russian Charter; Gardner, 19-20.

¹⁶¹ Gardner, 21.

military alliance to a political organisation with corresponding changes in NATO institutions and basic documents.”¹⁶² Kozyrev furthermore stated that:

“preserving NATO as a purely military bloc would run counter to the trends of moulding a single Europe. In this case we would need to clarify whom NATO is going to defend itself against...If one has in mind Russia, it is obvious that this would mean creating new dividing lines in Europe. If, however, one has in mind a third party threat, Russia and NATO could tackle the issues jointly together with other European institutions...Russia’s position regarding NATO expansion has remained unchanged. We continue to believe that it does not meet either the interest of European security as a whole. Furthermore, the hasty resolution of the issue may threaten the establishment of truly mutually advantageous and constructive relations between Russia and NATO and the usefulness of Russia’s partnership in the PfP. It will not create greater stability or security either.”¹⁶³

By this statement, Kozyrev outlined the continued Russian opposition to a NATO expansion that did not take into account specific Russian interests. However, he did not rule out the possibility of Russia working with a reformed NATO, thus raising the question of whether NATO itself could accept Russian proposals for reform. Yet, Kozyrev warned if the two sides could not soon work out a compromise Moscow might call off its participation in the Pfp, and a further deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations could result in new “dividing lines” in Europe.

3.5. NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Establishment of Permanent Joint Council

When it became clear that the expansion of NATO membership is inevitable, Russian government was actually faced with a very realistic danger of becoming the hostage of its own anti-NATO rhetoric and wide anti-enlargement campaign. Indeed, the enthusiasts of the latter were arguing in favour of reacting in the most

¹⁶² Statement by Russian foreign minister Kozyrev, “Acceptance of the Pfp Individual Partnership and Broad Enhanced NATO-Russian Dialogue and Cooperation going beyond Pfp” (Brussels: NATO Press, 31 May 1995).

¹⁶³ Ibid.

energetic way, even at the expenses of rational considerations on Russia's own security and political interests. For instance, among the proposed 'counter-measures' were the following: "building a CIS-based military alliance; re-deploying armed forces in the western areas of Russia; targeting East Central Europe with nuclear weapons; developing strategic partnership with anti-Western regimes and so on."¹⁶⁴

Moscow opted for another logic: disagreement over NATO enlargement should not be aggravated by other confrontational words and deeds; on the contrary, "the enlargement might make a breakthrough towards constructive interaction even more imperative and urgent."¹⁶⁵ So in March 1997 President Yeltsin summarised Russia's position as follows.¹⁶⁶

- Russia remains negative to plans for NATO enlargement and "especially to the possible eastward advance of the Alliance", and a decision to advance "could lead towards a slide into a new confrontation";
- The NATO-Russia relationship was not "payment" for enlargement but separate issue;
- The NATO-Russia document must be a legally binding treaty containing "clearly worded guarantees" of Russia's security regarding non-expansion of NATO military infrastructure eastward and the non-deployment of foreign forces outside the territories where they are presently deployed. In addition, "NATO's unilateral statement on non-deployment of nuclear weapons should be written into the NATO-Russia document as a permanent pledge";
- Reassurance should also be provided by CFE Treaty adaptation, "joint discussions should be initiated on issues concerning NATO's transformation" especially since this process is developing slowly, and the aims of NATO's adaptation to the new conditions, "declared in Berlin"¹⁶⁷ last year, are far from being implemented". Such

¹⁶⁴ <<http://www.eusec.org/baranovsky.htm> Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 9 July 2001> (23 November 2003).

¹⁶⁵ "The Mademov Visit to Washington," Strategic Forum 34 (1995): 3

¹⁶⁶ Gerald B. Solomon, *NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997*, (Westport: Praeger Publ., 1998): 112-113.

discussions should also be initiated for “developing coordinated approaches to all issues of European security as well for taking decisions on issues involving Russian interests on a basis of consensus.”¹⁶⁸

It is obvious that, while maintaining its fundamental opposition to an expanded NATO, Russia recognised that enlargement was inevitable and sought a compromise position. As a result Moscow proposed the conclusion of a formal accord that would articulate the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, an “act” throughout Moscow sought to preserve some influence on NATO decisions related to Russian interests, Russian leadership sought to make the relationship contractual, with the force (and limitations on NATO’s independence) of a treaty. NATO however, was supportive of creating a “charter”- the Allies wanted commitments to be political, not legally binding.

At the Russia-US summit held on March 20-21, 1997, in Helsinki, both President Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to A NATO-Russia document would;

- be signed by heads of state and constitute an “enduring commitment”, as NATO did not favour a formal treaty; Yeltsin stated that the document would nevertheless be sent to the Duma for ratification;
- provide for “consultation, coordination, and to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decisionmaking and action on security issues of common concern”;
- reflect and contribute to “the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension”; and
- refer to NATO’s unilateral statement regarding nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ In Berlin NATO actually reaffirmed its core function of collective defence, and although progress was made on CJTFs for both collective defence and collective security missions, NATO had never adopted Russia’s proposal that the Alliance become a purely and peacekeeping organisation.

¹⁶⁸ *BBC SWB Former USSR*, March 17, 1997.

¹⁶⁹ *Tomé*, 25-26.

Russia reversed its position on the issue “treaty/charter”, with Yeltsin agree on a non-binding document outlining the Russian-NATO relationship to be signed by each NATO member state. Consequently, the Russian administration adopted a policy of consolidating the political system while demanding “economic benefits” as compensation for its approval of NATO’s eastward expansion. This position reflected the perception that “economic chaos and social unrest within the country is a greater danger than foreign military threats”, as was stated in the “National Security Concept” approved by the Security Council in early May 1997.¹⁷⁰

Resigned to the inevitability of NATO enlargement, the Russian government could not allow the opposition to claim a monopoly on defending Russia against a new type of “iron curtain.” Primakov told in the press conference in Bonn after meeting with his counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, that the RF still thought NATO expansion was “the biggest mistake since the end of the Cold War.”¹⁷¹ “We will make the best of a very bad policy”, was the Russian stance. Primakov then carried this message to France, where he spent a three-day official visit, 8-10 April. In that country he told reporters that “NATO expansion must not bring the alliance’s military machine closer to our territory” and that “no troops should be stationed beyond the borders of the 16 member states.”¹⁷²

There followed a rush of press reports treating the Helsinki talks as “surrender” to American pressure and Anti-NATO group of deputies resolved to make Victory Day (9 May) one of demonstrations explicitly against NATO enlargement. As the clock wound down for the 27 May Russia-NATO charter signing ceremony, the argument intensified in Russia. “The May Day annual socialist celebration in

¹⁷⁰ Tomé, 26.

¹⁷¹ ITAR-TASS, 29 March.

¹⁷² J. L.Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?* (Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers. Inc. 2000): 39.

Moscow was muted in part by public indifference and in part by the NATO conundrum.”¹⁷³

Both sides admitted that negotiations were difficult. The result, according to President Clinton this date, was that “Russia will work closely with NATO but not work within NATO, giving Russia a voice in, but a veto over NATO’s business”.¹⁷⁴ On May 19 Yeltsin informed Russian parliamentarians- to whom the act would be submitted for approval-that should the former Soviet Republics be invited to join NATO, Russia would have to “reconsider” its relationship with the Alliance.¹⁷⁵

The Russian press carried a few details of the proposed Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. This was because of no draft copy was made available, forcing Russian journalist to turn to the Western press where the Act’s content was widely publicised. One Russian commentator claimed that he had not even seen the Act’s actual name other than in English.¹⁷⁶

The intensity of Russian media anger increased and “ridiculing Yeltsin and Clinton assumptions that the Act would ensure security.” Russia will be able to veto nothing, and expansion itself is a “stab in Russia’s back,” were the rhetorical refrains. “NATO will be vastly stronger now, with the tanks, plans, artillery coming it from the former Warsaw Pact States, having catastrophic military-strategic consequences” for Russia, was an especially serious charge. It was also stated usually that NATO troops were likely to appear in the area of the former USSR and that this would be abetted by expediency-driven Caucasus (Georgia and Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan) leadership. However within a few days government

¹⁷³ Black, 45.

¹⁷⁴ *Atlantic News*, May 23, 1997.

¹⁷⁵ *BBC SWB Former USSR*, May 19, 1997.

¹⁷⁶ Black, 49.

officials were issued positive messages like an optimistic observation of Ministry of defence claiming that the Founding Act “suspended” the possibility of NATO military infrastructure moving closer to Russia’s borders they also issued that the “Act gave NATO the right to bring conventional forces on to the new territories only temporarily (for exercises) or in the case of a direct threat of aggression”¹⁷⁷

When Primakov finally brought the Founding Act on to the Duma for discussion, the press was not admitted to the session and deputies did not get to see the actual document. The Duma now was promised only that the Act would be the subject of debate after its signing on the 27th. Primakov described the document thoroughly, promising the deputies that “Moscow would have a veto over any NATO decision that affected the interests of Russia.” He credited the government, and therefore himself, with “compelling NATO to make it explicit that the Act be binding and include a provision that NATO will have no plans, intentions, or reasons to deploy nuclear arms in the new territories.” However the Anti-NATO Commission, which is a commission established by mainly nationalist deputies within the Duma, was of course not persuaded and they drafted a statement that the Act contradicted the Russian government’s long standing position that it would not agree to the expansion of NATO.¹⁷⁸

Finally after all intensive discussions, on 27 May 1997, the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO” was signed by the Secretary General of NATO and Heads of State and Government of NATO and the Russian President at the Elysée Palace in Paris. The Founding Act aims at strengthening relations between NATO and Russia, and the Russian-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which would serve as regular forum for a close exchange of opinions.

¹⁷⁷ Black, 51

¹⁷⁸ *Interfax*, 23 May 1997.

To summarise four key sections in the Founding Act.¹⁷⁹

1. Section I details the principles on which the NATO-Russia partnership will be based. These include commitment to norms of international behaviour as reflected in the UN Charter and OSCE documents, as well as more explicit commitments such as respecting states' sovereignty, independence and right to choose the means to ensure their security, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
2. Section II creates a new forum: the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). This will be the venue for consultations, co-operation and- wherever possible- consensus building between the Alliance and Russia. The PJC will:
 - Hold regular consultations on a broad range of political or security related matters.;
 - Based on these consultations, develop joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
 - Once consensus has been reached, make joint decisions, if appropriate and take joint action on a case-by case basis.
3. Section III details a broad range of topics on which NATO and Russia can consult and perhaps co-operate, including preventing and settling conflicts, peacekeeping, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and exchanging information on security and defence policies and forces.
4. Section IV covers military issues. In this section, the members of NATO reiterate their statement of 10 December 1996 that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy-and do not foresee any future need to do so.

¹⁷⁹ <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndacts-a.htm>> (23 April 2004)

Moscow hoped to achieve four objectives through the act:

- To minimise the military consequences of NATO enlargement. Russia needed some reassurance that it could limit the impact of NATO's military advance towards Russia's borders in three areas: "stationing nuclear forces; incorporating Soviet-built infrastructure into NATO's capabilities; and stationing foreign troops on the territory on new members."
- To obtain some guarantees against future enlargement, particularly in relation to the Baltic States.
- To enhance Russia's influence on NATO's future transformation, particularly on the development of its "New Strategic Concept."
- To obtain written confirmation of NATO's support for the development of a new European security system with a strengthened OSCE and a commitment not to use force without a UN or OSCE mandate.¹⁸⁰

According to L.J. Tomé the Founding Act was written more from the NATO than the Russian perspective. The fact it was reached was a major concession.¹⁸¹ But the Allies also made several concessions in response to Russia's concerns. For Moscow it was of particular importance to be reassured that the "security environment in Central and Eastern Europe would not be changed to its detriment as a result of new members joining NATO."¹⁸² None of the new NATO members was located beyond Moscow "red line", although NATO did make a favourable mention of the Baltic States. NATO allies did concede two major points regarding its military forces: "they formally agreed and signed a memorandum to hold talks on revising the CFE Treaty which had become an issue with the conflicts in Chechnya and elsewhere"; and they emphasised that they have no intention, no plan and no reason

¹⁸⁰ Tomé, 27.

¹⁸¹ Tomé, 27-28.

¹⁸² Tomé, 27.

to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of "NATO's nuclear posture policy."¹⁸³

For its part, Russia did gain some access to NATO deliberations through the PJC without any role in deciding NATO Policy outside of the specific subjects to be agreed by the Council: "consultation, co-operation, and even potential common action in areas to be agreed." NATO also offered several economic and political incentives in order to secure Russian support for expansion.¹⁸⁴

This signing of the accord between NATO and Russia opened the way for the first expansion of NATO. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, the Atlantic Alliance leaders ceremoniously invited Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to start accession talks with the Alliance, step across the old Yalta division and become the NATO's first independent new recruits from that was once Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, in 1999. Yet, Russian concerns were not entirely alleviated by the accord. President Yeltsin has repeatedly stated that Moscow remains opposed to NATO expansion and kept away from Madrid summit.¹⁸⁵

However with the Founding Act and the Madrid summit in 1997 the Alliance believed it had effectively balanced two contending poles of policy: satisfying Central European demands for inclusion while respecting Russian desires to be accorded a role as a serious European power. "The Alliance saw a workable and effective balance in terms of its engagement with Russia-retaining its freedom of action while opening a structured dialogue with Moscow's representatives."¹⁸⁶ However, all of the language used in founding Act was the product of international

¹⁸³ Ulrich Bradenburg, "NATO and Russia: a natural partnership", *NATO Review*, 45(4) (July-August 1997): 3.

¹⁸⁴ Expanding the Group of Seven industrial leaders to include Russia as a formal member was one example of this. Increased economic assistance from the IMF and World Bank was another. Russia had been asking to be admitted to the Paris Club of major creditor nations, and its request for admission will now be supported.

¹⁸⁵ Paula J. Dobriansky, "Russian Foreign Policy: Promise or Peril?", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 2000): 138-142.

-and fateful- ambiguity. Since both sides were under pressure to reach an agreement before formal invitations went out to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to begin membership negotiations, some major differences were left unresolved. Even the status of the document was not resolved.¹⁸⁷

The different interpretations soon become apparent. After the signing of the Act not many minds were changed but some started to claim that Russia found true protection in this agreement, also some observers think that Russia will take part in important European decision-making, the military threat is tempered and Russia has a chance to be a full member of a G-8, the Paris Club and the World Trade Organisation, also some experts saw the act as a breakthrough for Russia's involvement in Europe. "It is a good document," one of the paper's commentators said, adding that "some prominent Europeans, such as Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel, complained that Russia was given too much to say about NATO's admission policies."¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, some observers claimed that Russia's interests will be considered, at least "to a minimum extent," force will not be used when Russia and NATO have differences and the "non-deployment of nuclear weapons" in Eastern Europe seems to be guaranteed. Moreover, the consultative Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) will give Russia a voice in European security issues. But the problems are not solved, they claim, "the document may amount to very little if Russia cannot afford active participation, if the rest of Europe objects to Russian participation, and/or rivalries with the myriad other integrative organisations in Europe emerge."¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Tomé, 29.

¹⁸⁷ Tomé, 29.

¹⁸⁸ Black, 46.

¹⁸⁹ Black, 53.

Russians soon started criticising the PJC as a “talking shop” with no real decision-making power. NATO has proved reluctant to discuss issues such as the drafting of a New Strategic Concept or upgrading of NATO candidate states’ armed forces, until they were agreed among all Alliance members. At the first Ministerial meeting of the PJC in September 1997, then Foreign Minister Primakov reportedly warned NATO members against “contemplating the use of force in peacekeeping and related missions without the specific authorisation of the United Nations Security Council.”¹⁹⁰ This was to become a recurring issue raised by Russian representatives in PJC and other NATO meetings.¹⁹¹ By January 1999, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, was warning that “NATO’s strategic Concept which was worked out without taking into account Russia’s position and interests, without any consultations with us may inevitably become a source of mutual mistrust”¹⁹² On 10 March 1999, the PJC finally took up a discussion of the New Strategic Concept. However, the meeting was dominated by the Kosovo crisis.

The precise meaning of the NATO refrain –that the Founding Act would give a voice but not a veto over NATO’s policies’– was even more illustrated when NATO decided to bomb Serbia despite “Russia’s explicit and vehement opposition and without any attempt to accommodate Russia’s legitimate concerns.” However two weeks later, NATO launched its air-strikes against Yugoslavia, thereby transforming Russia-NATO relationship. Russian critics thought “NATO had deliberately chosen to exclude them from decision-making about the wisdom and practicality of its air operations.” Even before this became a live issue, comments by Russian leaders had indicated disenchantment with the PJC which, they alleged, was developing into a mere talking shop. In December 1998, for example, Defence Minister Igor Sergeev was quoted asking what use to Russia the institutional relationship was if NATO

¹⁹⁰ “NATO and Russia Discuss Peacekeeping in Bosnia”. *RFE/RL Newsline*, <<http://rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/290997.html>> (18/10/2003)

¹⁹¹ “NATO Invites Russia to Party”, *RFE/RL Newsline* <<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/12/101298.html>> (18/10/2003)

¹⁹² *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 23 January 1999.

members simply ignored Russian views. All things considered, therefore, the prospects for NATO-Russia relations did not seem bright as a new millennium dawned and Yeltsin handed over the reins of presidential power to Vladimir Putin.¹⁹³

To sum up, this chapter traced the phases of Russian foreign policy and national security policy after the demise of the Cold War. "While their counterparts in Washington, Bonn and London had the task of rethinking NATO, the Russians had lost the military and political alliance which they had led during most of the postwar period."¹⁹⁴ So as a new and much reduced actor Russia is struggling to develop a coherent definition of its national identity, statehood and national interests.¹⁹⁵ While searching for national interests the first few years of an independence, post-Soviet Russia have seen its leaders engaged in a search for friends and allies in the international arena. During this time the emphasis in Russian national security policy has shifted from the "initial almost exclusive concentration on cooperation with Western countries and the whole-hearted embrace of international and supranational organisations."¹⁹⁶ However it is clear that periods of good relations have simultaneously borne tensions and strains. So it is explored in this chapter that relations between Russia and NATO have endured the periods of hostility, argument, warming and cooperation which confirms that in spite of all the efforts to have a better relationship between NATO and Russia incompatibility of values and security interests once again appeared as a dark shadow over the NATO-Russia relations.

¹⁹³ "Kremlin Condemns Not Only US, But Also NATO", <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/12/181298.html> (18/10/2003)

¹⁹⁴ Mathers, G. J., "Russian National Security Policy after the Cold War" in *"Security Issues in the post-Cold War World"*, ed. M. J. Davis, (London: Edward Elgar publ. 1996): 40

¹⁹⁵ John Berryman, "Russian foreign policy: an overview" in *Russia After the Cold War*, (ed.) Mike Bowker & Cameron Ross (London: Pearson Education, 2000): 336.

¹⁹⁶ Berryman, 336.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN REACTION TO THE NEW NATO: FROM THE 'KOSOVO CRISIS' UNTIL 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

In this chapter first the serious testing ground for NATO-Russia relations that is; Kosovo crisis will be analysed. This chapter will also focus on the elites and mass' attitudes towards Russian foreign policy issues. Lastly Russian foreign policy orientation after the rise of Putin to presidency until 11 September 2001 will be presented.

4.1. The Most Dangerous Turn in Russia-NATO Relations "The Kosovo Crisis"

NATO strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of March 1999 came as shock to many in Russia. "The use of force without the express sanction of a United Nation's Security Council resolution dramatically devalued not only the Russian veto right but also the former superpower's actual international weight."¹⁹⁷ Moscow was shown to be impotent to prevent a major international military operation in an area that it traditionally regard as crucial to its entire position in Europe.

"Yet Moscow could not properly claim to have been a simple bystander at the development of the Kosovo crises." It was a member of the so-called Contact Group that had a major share of responsibility for diplomacy between the Albanian Kosovars and the Belgrade government, and it was represented at both the Rambouillet and Paris negotiations in the Spring of 1999. However, in Russia's interpretation the "hopes hinging on more than five years of partnership approach" did not prevent the Alliance from risking everything for the sake of a military adventure in the Balkans. NATO's actions came just a few weeks after the first wave of enlargement, and this reinforced the view of those in Russia who from the

beginning expected enlargement to be a stage in the creation of a more aggressive Alliance.¹⁹⁸

Immediately after the air-strikes began, Russia suspended its participation in the Founding Act and PfP, withdrew its military mission from Brussels, terminated talks on the establishment of NATO's military mission in Moscow, and ordered the NATO information representative in Moscow to leave the country. In an official statement, the Ministry of Defence declared that they saw:¹⁹⁹

“no opportunity today to continue cooperation with NATO-the organisation which committed an aggression, the organisation which has destroyed the agreements reached in a persistent joint search, as well as ruined those constructive foundations on which this cooperation was beginning to form”.

Many in Russia saw the Kosovo war as NATO's attempt to establish-by means of superior military force- a “new world order” which no longer recognises a UN mandate as a necessary precondition for the use of force, which violates the Helsinki Final Act by interfering in a sovereign state's internal affairs and which undermines the international arms-control regime. All this was seen as part of strategy to establish NATO as the central European collective security institution.²⁰⁰

The adoption of NATO's New Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit a month later, and the Alliance's stated “willingness to intervene anywhere in Europe to uphold stability and human rights”²⁰¹ raised dark suspicion about where NATO might strike next, perhaps even closer to Russia's borders. Such suspicion were only strengthened when, while Russia declined the invitation to attend the Washington Summit, the leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova

¹⁹⁷ Viktor Gabarev, “Russia and Kosovo-Feeling Threatened”, *The World Today*, (June 1999): 17

¹⁹⁸ Gabarev, 17.

¹⁹⁹ Tomé, 30-32.

²⁰⁰ Tomé, 30-32.

²⁰¹ The Washington Declaration, (Washington: 23 April 1999): web edition.

(GUUAM) chose to attend and decided to use the US capital as the venue for a meeting among themselves.

NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia can be evaluated as the most dangerous turn in Russia-Western relations since the early 1980s, and some Russia analysts, convinced that NATO and Russia came close to a direct military confrontation. NATO now carries not only the baggage of Russia's Cold War perceptions, but also the new conviction that "NATO is not an instrument of security but one of war, murder and aggression."²⁰²

In this context, Kosovo was a worrying watershed, the first time since the end of the Cold War that Russia and NATO found themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict. The majority of Russian analysts and politicians have concluded that NATO's action has transformed a local Balkans conflict into a new source of East-West tensions.

The strong Russian objections and its reaction to NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia is conditioned by a number of factors, including Russia's political weakness, the Caucasus complex, its perception of NATO's recent transformation and expansion, and the bitter Russian sense of loss of superpower status -the feeling of being humiliated and marginalised. Russia genuinely feared that Kosovo was precedent: "Who can guarantee that if not Russia, then somebody else close to Russia will not be punished in the same way?" Many people thought that the most likely candidates for the next NATO attacks, they felt, were former Soviet Union Republics where separatist movements were on the rise.²⁰³ "The fears were fanned by renewed appeals from Georgia and Azerbaijan for NATO to intervene in their own internal conflicts."²⁰⁴

²⁰² BBC SWB SU/3497 B/8, 31 March 1999.

²⁰³ Tomé, 32.

As a result of these crisis institutions for confidence building and cooperation between NATO and Russia –including the Founding Act and the PJC –failed when tested by their first real crisis.

All these developments made Russians to revise their military doctrine at the end of the 90's. NATO expansion eastward, the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and the Kosovo campaign triggered a revision of Russia's military doctrine and further adjustment to its defence policies. The Ministry of Defence finally published its new revised military doctrine, on October 1999. The document reflects significant changes in the assessment of threats to Russian security, shifting the balance from internal to external concerns. The new draft doctrine, by contrast with previous, emphasises the "threat of direct military aggression against Russia and its allies, a threat that can only be deterred by conducting active foreign policy and maintaining high readiness of conventional and nuclear forces. Cited threats include:"²⁰⁵

- Intervention into internal affairs of Russian federation;
- Attempts to ignore and infringe upon Russia's interests in addressing international security problems, and to prevent Russia from becoming of the influential power centre in a multipolar world;
- The intentional weakening of the UN and the OSCE;
- Conducting military campaigns without a UN mandate and in violation of international law;
- Undermining international arms-control agreements;
- Outside support for extremist nationalist-ethnic and religious separatist movements;
- Increased concentration of armed forces near the borders of Russia and her allies, thus undermining the balance of forces;

²⁰⁴ Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze suggested that events in Kosovo could set a good example for a speedy and fair settlement of the conflict in the Abkhazia and sought military intervention from the West to guarantee the return of Georgian refugees. Azerbaijan sought to exploit the Kosovo crisis to establish closer military cooperation with NATO.

²⁰⁵ Tomé, 32.

- Establishment and provision of “logistical and training support of various paramilitary groups on the territory of foreign states”, for the purpose of activity on the territory of Russia and its allies;
- Enlargement of military alliances at the expense of the security of Russia and its allies;
- Disinformation and propaganda campaigns, through press, mass media and new information technologies, against the interests of Russia and its allies;
- International terrorism.²⁰⁶

Although the doctrine refrains from explicitly stating that such threats come from the West –and does not mention NATO- the language makes abundantly clear to whom and to what it refers. It can be concluded that Moscow reaffirms the general reorientation of Russia’s threat perceptions over the past few years from the West to the South, and recognises that conventional or nuclear war with NATO is unthinkable. However, this might be changed by NATO enlargement and/or NATO’s use of force outside its area of responsibility.

However, in spite of all mistrust, Moscow recognised that it cannot avoid dealing with the Alliance on individual issues where interests coincide, and accepted participation in the peacekeeping operation. Thus, for Russian politicians and military commanders, the costly participation in KFOR was justified on three grounds: to prevent NATO from unilaterally setting up a permanent military presence in the region; to reaffirm Russia’s own interests in the region; and to protect the minority Serb population against Albanian “terrorists” while “monitoring implementation of the UN Resolution on KLA disarmament and the preservation of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.”²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ Oksana Antoneko, “Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo”, *Survival*, 41(4) (1999): 134

²⁰⁷ Antonenko, 137.

Although tensions have eased somewhat with the end of the Kosovo war, the anger and suspicions engendered on the Russian side did not easily dissipate. For their part, NATO leaders began to talk up the post-Kosovo rapprochement as 2000 progressed. Shortly before a ministerial meeting of the PJC in May of that year, Secretary-General Robertson was significantly more upbeat than he had appeared on his visit to Moscow three months previously. He declared that:

We recognise, and President Putin made this clear when he met me, that we have too many common interests not to work together. We share a common responsibility to tackle common threats. That's why I know the NATO-Russia relationship will develop. And there's no more important time to do this than a new Russian president and government are taking over and looking afresh to the future.²⁰⁸

As a result it was clear that "NATO-Russia relations had survived the Kosovo crisis intact", if far from rude health and existence of a substantial element of mistrust.²⁰⁹

4.2. Attitudes of Russian Elites' and Public Opinion' towards the NATO Expansion.

According to I. McAllister and S. White "beyond all the foreign policy issues appeared after the Cold War were a wider questions of perception and identity."²¹⁰ Western security community after all was a community of shared values however did the Russian citizens think of themselves as part of this system of values and natural allies of 'other democracies'? Who were their 'friends' and who were their 'enemies' in these new circumstances?

²⁰⁸ 'Statement to the press by the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson'.
<<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000524e.htm>> (25/05/2004)

²⁰⁹ Martin A. Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO-Russia Relations, 1991-2002", in *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, (ed.) Rick Fawn, (Portland: Frank Cass Publ.,2003):70.

²¹⁰ Ian McAllister and Stephen White, "NATO Enlargement and Eastern Opinion", in *Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy*, (ed.) Rick Fawn, (Portland: Frank Cass Publ.,2003): 47.

The table below presents the mean response to a battery of questions asked of foreign policy elites and a national sample of ordinary Russians in late 1995 and in the fall of 1999 concerning perceived security threats to Russia.

Table 1. Public Assessment of Threats to Russian Security, 1995 and 1999

(1=absence of danger; 5=greatest danger)²¹¹

	Mass Public: Mean	
	1995	1999
"Uncontrolled growth in global population"	2.28	— ²¹²
"Increase in the gap btw. rich and poor countries"	3.14	3.49
"Spread of NATO to Eastern Europe"	3.48	—
"Growth of U. S. military power"	3.74	4.01
"NATO intervention" in internal affairs of European countries	—	4.03
"Border conflicts within the CIS states	3.91	3.90
"Involvement in conflicts" which don't concern Russia	3.96	4.15
Non-CIS conflicts	3.99	4.11
Having "key economic sectors in foreign hands"	4.02	—
"Inability.....to resolve domestic conflicts"	4.13	4.20

Zimmerman argues that among sizeable portions of the mass public, for a considerable period of time, it was inappropriate even to speak of there being a reaction. "As we have long known to be true about American mass public, Russians in the mid-1990s showed an impressive ability to tune out international events. NATO expansion? "Never heard of it" was the response of many in the years 1995 to 1997." Those who answered yes when asked whether they had heard of NATO

²¹¹ Tables are taken from the, William Zimmerman, *The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): 190.

²¹² Dashes in the table, indicates question not asked.

expansion were more likely to think that the Baltic republics would be the first to join than the three states-Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic-that did. The 1999 NATO incursion in Kosovo seemed briefly to catch the attention of Russian mass public, but by 2000 issues involving NATO were probably raised once again not even at the same level as other foreign policy issues.²¹³ And yet when respondents among mass public were asked abstract policy questions about how Russia should respond to NATO expansion, those who answered did so in ways that were both rational and proportionate.

Zimmerman states that as can be seen in the table below elite reactions were more immediate and initially more intense in the issue of perceived security threats to Russia. Their hostility to NATO expansion also intensified. In 1995, differences in elite dispositions toward NATO expansion were clearly a “function, aside from perception of the U.S. threat to Russia, of whether persons were civilian or military elites.” While there were differences in the proportions among civilian elites varying with “orientations to the political economy, these were not significant in most multivariate models that included the threat of the United States to Russian security.” In 1999, civilians in general and those who were not market democrats particularly had apparently “caught up” with military elites in their level of concern.

Table 2. Elite’s Assessment of Threats to Russian Security, 1995 and 1999
(1=absence of danger; 5=greatest danger)

	<u>Elites: Mean</u>	
	1995	1999
“Uncontrolled growth in global population”	2.46	2.50
“Increase in the gap btw. rich and poor countries”	2.79	3.13
“Spread of NATO to Eastern Europe”	3.73	3.63
“Growth of U. S. military power”	3.38	3.65

²¹³ Zimmerman, 213.

Table 2. (Continued)

"NATO intervention" in internal affairs of European countries	—	3.67
"Border conflicts within the CIS states	3.43	3.52
"Involvement in conflicts" which don't concern Russia	3.15	2.99
Non-CIS conflicts	2.99	3.03
Having "key economic sectors in foreign hands"	3.20	3.41
"Inability.....to resolve domestic conflicts"	4.31	4.31

As the table reveals, NATO expansion was both far more salient and a greater source of concern for Russian elites than it was for mass public in 1995. In 1995, all foreign policy issues were of less concern to both elites and mass public than their misgivings about "the inability of Russia to resolve its internal problems." The gap between domestic and foreign policy concerns and the handling of domestic problems was greater for elites than for those in the mass public who expressed views. Of the foreign policy concerns mentioned, for elites in the late fall of 1995, NATO enlargement was easily the most pressing. The evidence that NATO expansion as an issue had not penetrated the mass public very deeply is striking.

Needless to say, some Russians, elites most notably, were more alarmed by NATO expansion than others. They were, as a consequence, more prone to assert that everything should be done to prevent NATO expansion, to characterise it as a great or the greatest threat to Russian security, and to express alarm at the possibility of NATO interference in inter-nationality conflicts within European countries.²¹⁴

²¹⁴ Zimmerman, 198.

It should also be mentioned that similarly in a 2001 poll of Russian elites, when asked what they most feared, for 52% of respondents' "NATO eastward expansion to include the former Soviet Republics" was their response.²¹⁵

4.3. Russian Foreign Policy Orientation since Putin's Rise to Presidency

The previous year's decision of NATO enlargement and NATO bombing of former Yugoslavia, increased support for the militant nationalist inside the Russian political establishment. To them these steps proved that west was selfish and militant, and a 'natural enemy' of Russia. Particularly in the case of Kosovo, the West did not take Russia, or the UN, or the international law into consideration. Hence, as mentioned before relations between Russia and the West became much more antagonistic than they were immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So the situation in "1999-2000 was just like the return to the Cold War." The nationalistic ideology of 'Great Russia' rapidly strengthened and won over the great majority of the Russian political elite.²¹⁶ Nostalgia about a Russia's superpower past fashioned by the ideology of strong statehood, became the most widespread feeling among the political elites.

Consequently the concept of an 'alternative' foreign policy appeared and it used the theory of 'Eurasia' as its philosophical background. In accordance with the ideas of "past Russian thinkers like Leonid Karsavin and Petr Savitskiy, they thought that Russia cannot be included in a European civilisation."²¹⁷ From a social and cultural point of view, this view claims that strong state unity is the core of Russian nation. Thus the whole of Russian history has been characterised by the dominance of the state. For this reason Russia appears different from Europe with its tradition of civil society and human rights.

²¹⁵ Poll originally reported in *Izvestia*, May 25, 2001 and reprinted in the CDPSP. "Poll Charts Russian Elite's Foreign Policy Views," *Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press* 53:21 (2001):6.

²¹⁶ Selezneva, 16.

In accordance with this ideas in early 2000 Vladimir Putin ran his presidential campaign under the slogan of 'Great Russia' and 'Strong Russian Statehood', but without any detailed program referring to foreign policy. Later at the beginning of 2001, Putin put forward his criteria: a clear definition of national priorities, pragmatism and economic effectiveness. Nevertheless it still did not shed the light on the concept of his foreign policy. Russian foreign policy in 2000 has been predominantly European oriented. Europe has been recognised as a natural partner. Putin and his government have started to develop bilateral relations with all the West European countries.²¹⁸

During this period we witness the Russia's endeavour to become a part of western security community that is at the beginning of 2000, Putin had shocked public opinion at home by accepting the idea of Russian cooperation and even membership to NATO. It was obvious that Russian leadership has tried to overcome the Cold War legacy. Accordingly in Germany Vladimir Putin emphasised that the West should get rid of the Cold War fears and look at the new democratic Russia.²¹⁹ While some authors described this as a crisis of national identity others claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to have a stable foreign policy environment and Western support for both his reform and modernisation policies.²²⁰ However the tides in Russian foreign policy in terms of NATO is once again proved at the beginning of 2001. For example, agreement on opening a NATO information office in Moscow was reached against a backdrop of press speculation that Russia had begun to deploy theatre nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, on the borders of Poland and Lithuania. Besides in July, Putin told an international press conference that "while we do not consider NATO hostile...we do not see any reason for its existence."²²¹

²¹⁷ Selezneva, 16.

²¹⁸ Selezneva, 17.

²¹⁹ Dimitrij Polikanov, "U-Turns in Russia-NATO Relations", *Perspectives*, 17, (2001): 68-69.

²²⁰ <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/242-17.cfm>> (18 June 2004)

So what were the main assertions of Putin's foreign policy in the beginning of new century? This was an issue of concern for many scholars as well as many western power centres.

The most important turn in Russian Foreign Policy thinking has been experienced by year 2000 when a foreign policy doctrine, which was thought to be lacking until then, has been introduced. Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept approved by the Putin on 28 June 2000. According to Igor Ivanov "an important characteristic of the New Foreign Policy Concept is that it does not spell out rhetorical goals; instead, its aims are realistic and attainable." Ivanov also mentions that this concept is based on the past experience and poised to go forward into the future.²²²

Conflict in the Balkans influenced the writing of Putin's 2000 Foreign Policy Concept. Russian concerns about the American Empire, or its global position of dominance, are visible in President Putin's Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation so that Moscow promoted the vision of "multipolarity", enshrined in the Concept.²²³ Published in 2000, "this document asserts Russia's rejection of any unilateral, bilateral or multilateral military operations not sanctioned by the UNSC, as such actions would be in breach of international law and therefore would pose a threat to Russia's national security." Also contained within the document was a list of what Russia considered to be threats to its national security. Among them was "the danger of weakening Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world."²²⁴ It is clear that this statement may have a number of meanings and seems open to interpretation.

²²¹ Smith, *A Bumpy Road to an unknown destination? NATO-Russia Relations, 1991-2002*, 72.

²²² Igor Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy*, (Washington D.C.: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2002): 9.

²²³ Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002):12

²²⁴ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, October 2000.

Implicit within the Foreign Policy Concept is "Putin's desire to reduce the influence of the United States as an autonomous actor in the international system." For this purpose Russia emphasises "multilateral action within those organisations in which it possesses influence and power, such as the UNSC," and de-emphasises organisations like NATO in which according to Russians important decisions are made by an elite club of wealthy and powerful states (and in which decisions are perceived to be made under US leadership).²²⁵

When analysed in detail after the rise of Putin presidency we can observe the dynamic development of relations with the western countries. In year 2001 Putin himself declared the non-isolationist character of his foreign policy. It is a significant indicator that "in 2000 alone, Russia participated in 260 international meetings at the highest official level."²²⁶

According to T. Bukkvoll Russia's new strategic partnership with the West have both international and domestic causes. T. Bukkvoll states that domestic interest groups are likely to have a particular impact on foreign policy in semi-democratic states such as Russia. In the case of Putin's partnership with the West preferences of domestic interest groups namely; military, military-industrial complex, the civilian bureaucracy, the security services and the oil and gas lobby, are important parts of the explanation for the new foreign policy.²²⁷ Below these interest groups' attitudes towards new foreign policy direction and sources of their disappointment is analysed.

Putin and the Military: Although Putin came from the security services, traditionally a competitor with the military for political influence, the military were initially an

²²⁵ Kari Roberts, 11.

²²⁶ Selezneva, 17.

²²⁷ Tor Bukkvoll, "Putin's Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy", *Comparative Strategy*, 22(3) (2003): 225.

important part of his “winning coalition.”²²⁸ Although military hoped for an high expectations, no military figures were included in the first tier of political decision-making conversely Putin sought a smaller, better trained and equipped military that could fight terrorism, separatism, and other asymmetrical threats, whereas the military top brass sought to retain something reminiscent of the Red Army. Military become disappointed in terms of material payoff for their support.²²⁹ So the Russian Military had strong reasons to oppose Putin and his ‘pro-Western’ foreign policy.

Putin and the Military Industrial Complex: The Military industry also rallied behind Putin before the March 2000 elections, because Putin on his side, promised to increase domestic arms purchases. However the VPK (Military Industrial Complex-Voenno-Promyshlennii Komplex) has been negative to the new foreign policy for at least two reasons. First, if the West is no longer defined as the enemy, that can mean a decrease in domestic defence orders, and the military may come to demand other types of weapons than those produced and supplied by VPK. Second, the export-earning-part of the VPK fears that relations with the West might make the Russian government yield to Western pressure to stop arms sales to such traditional Russian markets as Iran and Syria.²³⁰ Because of these facts Putin’s strategic partnership thinking did not satisfy them.

Putin and the Civilian State Bureaucracy: The civilian state apparatus made a significant contribution to securing Putin’s election in March 2000. In contrast to military and military-industrial complex, as long as the new foreign policy focuses mainly on strategic partnership and economic cooperation, the state bureaucracy has little to fear. However, Russian bureaucrats are likely to worry that, through the partnership, the West might gradually be able to convince the Russian leadership of the necessity

²²⁸ Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Marching to a different Drum? Political Orientations and Nationalism in Russia’s Armed Forces,” *Communist Studies & Transition Politics*, 17(1) (March 2001): 48.

²²⁹ Bukkvoll, 225-226.

²³⁰ Bukkvoll, 226-228.

of implementing Western norms also in bureaucracy.²³¹ A particular case within the civilian state bureaucracy is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here as in the case of many other state bodies whose activities are related to foreign policy, mood towards the shift in policy has been one of great scepticism. "According to one source, only three of thirteen deputy foreign minister within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs willingly promote the new policy whereas the remaining ten are trying to remain Primakovian."²³² However in many ways, the civilian state apparatus' support for Putin has paid off. His policy of strengthening state control over society has necessarily meant more power, at least to the central state bureaucracy. On the other hand, the civilian state bureaucracy has not been able to escape externally generated ideas of reform either.

Putin and the Security Services: The Russian security services have traditionally been seen as a "mainstay of anti-Western thought." In late November 2001, a former spokesman for Russian foreign intelligence, Iurii Kobaladze, told the Washington Post: "The whole intelligence community is raised on hate for the United States and the West."²³³ However an unusual support for Putin's strategic partnership with west, came from the security services. According to T. Bukkvoll there are at least three explanations for this change of perception of security services: the particular awareness among the security services to asymmetrical threats; "the possibility of gaining hitherto non-accessible intelligence from Western security services and "ever-closer relations between the security services and pro-Western groups of Russian big business since the mid-1990."²³⁴ But it should also be mentioned that security service support for the new foreign policy is probably heavily conditioned by an understanding of the new policy as a strategic partnership. The security services have no wish for Russia to Westernise on the domestic level, as can be seen

²³¹ Bukkvoll, 228-229.

²³² Bukkvoll, 229.

²³³ Bukkvoll, 230.

²³⁴ Bukkvoll, 229-232.

by successful FSB²³⁵ efforts in 2002 to halt the activity of international organisations such as the OSCE in Russia.

Putin and the Oil and Gas Lobby: The oil lobby has special interests in Russia's close relations with the West. It wants to increase oil exports to the West substantially, and realises this is more likely if the West trusts Moscow politically. Similarly, several other branches of the Russian economy also favour the pro-Western policy because they believe it will serve their private interests.²³⁶

According to T. Bukkvoll, Putin's new strategic partnership with the West "rests on shaky domestic foundations, despite support from the oil and gas lobby, other business groupings, and parts of the security services." Furthermore, societal groups most sceptical of the West, such as the military and the VPK, have also been disappointed with Putin in terms of their "domestic material and influence payoff." These shaky foundations still limit Putin's ability to manoeuvre in foreign policy. For instance, domestic reasons made it riskier for Putin to support the United States on the Iraq issue.

To sum up, in this chapter first the 'Kosovo Crisis' between NATO and Russia is analysed and it is stated that NATO intervention in Kosovo, in March 1999, triggered the worst period of NATO-Russia relations in the history of the new Russian State. Although there were differences in emphasis and nuance of Russian reactions across politicians and parties, the general sentiment was overwhelmingly critical. NATO intervention in Kosovo fuelled Russian suspicions of the Alliance and it was a catalyst for renewed concern about Russia's security interests. However NATO-Russia relations had survived the Kosovo Crisis with the substantial element of mistrust. After making the analysis of Kosovo Crisis, I tried to explore the internal sources of Russian foreign policy direction. In order that, public and elites'

²³⁵ Security Service of Russia.

²³⁶ Bukkvoll, 232-234.

attitudes towards foreign policy issues in year 1995 and 1999 presented comparatively. Survey evidence reveals that both Russian mass and elites were hostile to West and NATO in particular in year 1999. Lastly, in this chapter whether there is a change in foreign policy direction after Putin's presidency has discussed. In this analysis it is presented that interest groups are influential in Russian foreign policy and in spite of support from business groups and some state institutions there are still many societal groups most sceptical of the West like military and the VPK. Because of that it is concluded in this chapter that Putin's partnership with the West based on a "shaky ground."



CHAPTER V

CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 2001

"Welcome to the world of 20,"²³⁷

International relations have completely changed since the 11 September 2001. Revised domestic and foreign policy priorities have become necessary in all countries. Regarding the NATO-Russia relations, 11 September 2001 appeared to act as an unexpected catalyst, bringing Russia and its former Cold War adversaries in the West closer together. In this context in this chapter first the changes in NATO itself in terms of new security environment will be analysed. Then NATO-Russia council, which was established in 2002 as a new platform of dialogue between NATO and Russia, will be presented. Lastly June 2004 Istanbul Summit of the Alliance and the decision taken in this summit will be summarised.

5.1. Impact of September 11 2001 to the NATO and to the Issue of Enlargement

Throughout its history, NATO has shown an impressive ability to adapt to changes in its geopolitical environment. As mentioned in the previous chapters in the 1990s in particular, the alliance reached out to former enemies via enlargement and the Partnership for Peace, took on new and important missions in the Balkans, and adapted its internal organisation –through command structure reform.

Before 11 September 2001, there were serious doubts about the health and future of the Atlantic alliance. With the Cold War over, the most difficult parts of the NATO military mission in the Balkans largely completed. On the other hand the European

²³⁷ Lord George Robertson told Russian President Vladimir Putin at the NRC signing ceremony from <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/05/28/nato.russia/> (25 May 2004)

Union finally coming together. In these conditions analysts had begun to wonder whether the Atlantic alliance, and NATO specifically could endure.²³⁸

While the debate was going on about the existence of the Alliance, on the evening of 12 September 2001, just over 24 hours after the attacks on the United States, the members of the "North Atlantic Treaty Organisation invoked the treaty's mutual defence guarantee for the first time in the alliance's 52 years."²³⁹

For its first 52 years, NATO never really had to define its central commitment, the Article 5 defence guarantee. Article 5 clearly states that an attack on one ally "shall be considered an attack against them all." But the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty never had to contemplate that such an attack might come from halfway around the world, that the victim would be the United States, or that it would be carried out by a terrorist group rather than a state.²⁴⁰

The meaning of Article 5 was debated briefly during the 1990 Gulf War, when some Europeans questioned whether the commitment would apply to an Iraqi attack on NATO member Turkey in response to coalition air-strikes from Turkish territory. But the question was never formally answered because the attack on Turkey never took place.²⁴¹

NATO's response to the 11 September attacks has resolved some of these uncertainties. At the suggestion of Secretary General George Robertson, allies

²³⁸ Ivo. H. Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?," *International Affairs*, 77(3) (Summer 2001): 554

²³⁹ Polikanov, 68-69.

²⁴⁰ Antony J. Bilken and Philip H. Gordon, "NATO is ready to Play a Central Role," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 September 2001.

²⁴¹ Philip Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival*, 43(4) (Winter 2002): 4

agreed as early as 12 September that the collective defence clause did indeed apply to terrorist attack on the United States: "If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States", the allies declared, "it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."²⁴² With very little public or official debate, NATO had now interpreted Article 5 to include a terrorist attack on a member state.

Americans did want to make of Article 5 something more than a symbolic commitment, and in early October the United States presented the allies with a request that they take eight specific measures, individually and collectively, to support the American campaign. On October 4, after having been presented with credible proof from US officials that the attacks were indeed sponsored from abroad, NATO allies agreed to the US request. The measures included:

- Enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;
- "Blanket overflight clearances for US and other NATO aircraft"²⁴³;
- Assistance to allies and other states that might be subject to terrorist threats as a result of their cooperation with the United States;
- Measures to provide increased security for US facilities in Europe;
- "Backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism"²⁴⁴;
- Access for the United States and other allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;
- The deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and
- "The deployment of NATO airborne early warning-and-control systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS could be used abroad."²⁴⁵

²⁴² "Statement by the North Atlantic Council," *NATO Press Release*, 12 September 2001.

²⁴³ Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", 5.

²⁴⁴ Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", 5.

And just as previous developments have obliged the alliance to adapt, 11 September and the conflict that has followed it will require NATO leaders to think boldly and creatively about how to keep alliance relevant to the most critical missions of the day. The eleventh of September, in fact, does not require a radical transformation of the alliance's mission or purpose, but it does imply the need for some significant new emphasis and rapid acceleration of an adaptation process that in some ways was already underway.

First, NATO needs to reemphasise that new threats such as international terrorism are a central concern to member states and their populations –with implications for defence planning, political solidarity and allied action. NATO leaders had already recognised in the 1991 Strategic Concept that “alliance security must also take account of the global context” and that “alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”²⁴⁶ NATO made essentially the same point in the 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving ‘acts of terrorism’ to the top of the list of ‘other risks’. Second, “NATO members must accelerate the process of adapting their military capabilities for new missions.” Third, NATO needs to develop its capacity to deal with the specific issue of terrorism; a process long resisted by European allies who worried about giving the alliance too great a ‘global’ or ‘political’ role.²⁴⁷

The decision on whether and how to expand NATO membership has also been placed in a dramatically new context by the 11 September attacks. Prior to those attacks, there were strong indications that the Bush administration was planning to support a wide enlargement, notwithstanding strong opposition from Russia and from longstanding domestic opponents of the process. In a major speech in

²⁴⁵ Gordon, “NATO After 11 September”, 5.

²⁴⁶ “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991”, para. 12.

²⁴⁷ Gordon, “NATO After 11 September”, 6.

Warsaw, Poland on 15 June 2001, Bush asserted that “all of Europe’s new democracies from the Baltic’s to the Black Sea should have an equal chance to join Western institutions.” He suggested that the failure to allow them to do so would amount to the moral equivalent of ‘Yalta’ or ‘Munich’, and “appealed to NATO leaders to take a forward-leaning approach to enlargement at their November 2002 summit in Prague.”²⁴⁸ At American urging, alliance leaders agreed to allow NATO Secretary General George Robertson to take the ‘zero option’ off the table, saying that NATO ‘expected’ to launch the next round of enlargement at the Prague Summit in 2002.²⁴⁹

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, opponents of NATO enlargement will now argue even more forcefully that it should be put off or stopped altogether, particularly since Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism is so important. In fact, the case for enlargement is probably now stronger than before. The NATO allies’ solidarity in the campaign against terrorism underlines the importance of having strong, stable partners who can contribute to common goals. And while cooperation with Russia on terrorism is also critically important, the 11 September attacks have served to remind Russians of the common interests they have with the United States and Europe. This changes Moscow’s own calculations about its interests, and already there were signs from Russian leaders that even NATO membership for the Baltic States would not lead to the crisis long predicted by opponents.²⁵⁰

Russia’s reaction to the new momentum behind NATO Enlargement has not, in fact, been as hostile as many expected and Putin went even further in October 2001, as Russian-American cooperation on terrorism was moving forward, saying that if NATO “were to continue becoming more political than military Russia might

²⁴⁸ Frank Bruni, “President Urging Expansion of NATO to Russia’s Border,” *New York Times*, 16 June 2001.

²⁴⁹ “Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson”, *NATO Press Release*, 13 June 2001.

²⁵⁰ Gordon, “NATO After 11 September”, 6.

reconsider its opposition to enlargement.”²⁵¹ This was hardly an expression of Russian support for enlargement (still opposed by the vast majority of Russians), but

it was the strongest signal yet that Moscow wants to find a way to accommodate a development that it knows it cannot stop.²⁵²

5.2. Direction of the Relations between NATO and Russia after September 11 2001 and the Establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

In the aftermath of the attacks in the United States many analysts “predicted a new era in international relations that the global community would eventually realise the significance of new security challenges and form a single front in combating international terrorism and other threats.” How will this affect the Russian rapprochement with Europe and Russia’s attitude to NATO?²⁵³ There are a wide variety of opinions about the state of this relationship in the wake of the 2001 attacks in the United States and the subsequent global war on terrorism these attacks provoked. After September 11, relations between Moscow and Washington appeared to improve considerably. Many scholars and politicians heralded a new era of friendship between the two former enemies and there was optimism about the direction this new relationship would take; President Putin was the first world leader to telephone President George W. Bush with words of support after the September 11 events in New York and Washington. In the following days after the September 11:

Russia has curbed its policy of belligerent multipolarity, supported the antiterrorist coalition practically without any pre-conditions, reacted quite modestly to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, closed some military bases (in Cuba, Vietnam and neighbouring states) and even abrogated the

²⁵¹ Gareth Jones, ‘ Putin Softens Opposition to NATO Expansion,’ *Reuters*, 3 October 2001.

²⁵² Kara Bosworth, “The Effect of 11 September on Russia-NATO Relations”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3(3)(2002): 363.

²⁵³ Polikanov, 69.

fundamental principles of their foreign policy- no foreign military presence in the post-Soviet space.²⁵⁴

And shortly afterward, Putin quickly mobilised a five-point plan to support the American war on terrorism. This plan promised: intelligence sharing with their American counterparts; an opening of Russian airspace for flights providing humanitarian assistance; cooperation with Russia's Central Asian allies to provide similar kinds of airspace access to American flights; participation in international search and rescue efforts; and, an increase in direct humanitarian and military assistance to the Northern Alliance and the Rabbani government in Afghanistan. Naturally, "Russia's willingness to allow American access to airspace in Central Asia was a major reversal of Russian foreign policy" and was viewed as such; it was said to be a "symbol of just how significantly the Russian position on America had changed." The Russian promise to support the Americans in their hunt for terrorists, wherever they may be found, underscored this confidence in the new relationship.²⁵⁵

By reminding Russia of its common interests with the West, moreover, the terrorist attack may help to transform long-hostile NATO-Russia relations and promote peace across the continent. This would in turn make it easier for NATO "to fulfil its pledge to expand its membership in the coming years, allowing more new democracies of Central Europe to join the Western security community while building strong relations with Russia at the same time."²⁵⁶ In another sharp break with the recent past, Moscow has also agreed to get NATO's help in "restructuring its armed forces, long resisted by Russia's conservative defence establishment, but an area where NATO has much to offer."²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Terry Terriff, et al., "One in all in' NATO's Next Enlargement", *International Affairs*, 78(4)(2002):717.

²⁵⁵ Kari Roberts, 2.

²⁵⁶ Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", 1.

The potential for integrating Russia into a new post-Cold War order in the wake of 11 September had not been missed by the West either. On 17 November 2001 it was disclosed by senior British officials that, on the previous day, Prime Minister Tony Blair had sent a four-page letter to President Putin, President Bush, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and the leaders of the seventeen other NATO member countries. It contained a proposal for a new framework in which Russia would be able to take part in discussions with the Alliance, as an equal, on variety of security issues, including eg. counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and arm proliferation.²⁵⁸ The proposal also contained the “far-reaching suggestion that the NAC should be merged with a Russian politico-security team (provisionally named the R-NAC).”²⁵⁹ It was also proposed that this new institution should be up and running by the NATO Prague summit, scheduled for November 2002.²⁶⁰

In this case the Kremlin reaction was positive; the Presidential Press Service noted the following day that “Moscow appreciates the sensible reaction of the British leadership to Russian President’s repeated calls for bringing the relations between Russia and North Atlantic Alliance in line with new challenges and security threats on the European continent and in the world as a whole”.²⁶¹

There was, of course, a counter-argument to the creation of new NATO-Russia forum; this was that the PJC already existed for the same purpose. Critics believe that for Russia to have decision-making role in NATO is ‘premature’, commented at the same time of the proposals that there was “nothing wrong with the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council” that a dose of goodwill and hardwork could not fix”. However, although it is clear that the PJC did not function that well, and

²⁵⁷ Judy Dempsey, “Moscow Asks NATO for Help in Restructuring,” *Financial Times*, 26 October 2001.

²⁵⁸ Bosworth, 372.

²⁵⁹ The name R-NAC (Russia-North Atlantic Council) was used a few times in November 2001, primarily by the press, but also by NATO Secretary General Robertson, to describe the new forum.

²⁶⁰ *The Times*, 17 November 2001.

²⁶¹ *RFE/RL Newsline*, 19 November 2001.

perhaps, even with some minor adjustments and a new name, there would be the possibility of reinvigorating it.²⁶²

The period between the Blair proposal and the NATO meetings of 6-7 December was characterised by a lot of publicly expressed goodwill and productive suggestions by the Russian security and defence elite. A look at the wording of the Final Communiqué of the NAC ministerial meeting of 6 December 2001, which discussed the possible new arrangements, is instructive. The feeling prior to the meeting seemed to have been that the new NATO-Russia collaborative mechanism was of the utmost importance post 11 September and should therefore be established as soon as possible. In the communiqué it is mentioned that new, effective mechanisms for consultation, co-operation, joint decision and co-ordinated/joint action must be created between NATO and Russia. The most noteworthy point here is the admission that the PJC was not an effective mechanism. Overall, according to K. Bosworth the “tone of the Communiqué was warm, but the content was more vague”, not really stating how the institution might function, and especially reinforcing that NATO clearly did not intend Russia to have veto or similar powers, stressing that the “Alliance would still be able to take action alone when deemed necessary” and, interestingly, it only contained one direct reference to NATO working ‘at 20’.²⁶³

Overall, after much ‘intense’ work between Russia and NATO, the blueprint for the operation of the new forum was prepared to be discussed and signed at the ministerial meeting at Reykjavik on 14-15 May 2002. The mechanism decided upon was duly named the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome on 28 May 2002, it replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which was mentioned before, a forum for consultation and cooperation created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act

²⁶² *Washington Times*, 5 December 2001.

²⁶³ Bosworth, 374.

on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, and remains the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations.²⁶⁴ This founding declaration is entitled 'NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality'.²⁶⁵

The purpose of NRC is to serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. Operating on the principle of consensus, it works on the basis of continuous political dialogue on security issues with a view to the early identification of emerging problems, the determination of common approaches and the conduct of joint operations, as appropriate. According to the Rome declaration, NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners in areas of common interest in the framework of the NRC, which provides a mechanism for consultation consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.²⁶⁶

The 26 NATO member states and Russia participate in the NRC.²⁶⁷ Meetings of the NRC are chaired by NATO's Secretary General and are held at least monthly at the level of ambassadors and military representatives; twice yearly at the level of foreign and defence ministers.²⁶⁸

The NRC will aim to focus on specific, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share a common goal.²⁶⁹ NATO and Russia have agreed on an initial, specific workplan, which includes projects in the following areas:

²⁶⁴ Bosworth, 380.

²⁶⁵ Text of 'NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality'

²⁶⁶ Kari Roberts, 14.

²⁶⁷ <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030723be.htm>> (3 June 2004)

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020528-3.html>> (23 May 2004)

- **Struggle Against Terrorism:** strengthen cooperation through a “multi-faceted approach”, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to “civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure; an initial step will be a joint assessment of the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.”²⁷⁰

- **Crisis Management:** strengthen cooperation, including through: regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including continuing cooperation and consultations on the situation in the Balkans; “promoting interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, including through joint or coordinated training initiatives; and further development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.”²⁷¹

- **Non-Proliferation:** broaden and strengthen cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements through: a structured exchange of views, “leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents”²⁷²; and exchange of experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and chemical agents.

- **Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures:** “recalling the contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)” to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security, work cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and entry

²⁷⁰ <<http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/US-Russia/28may02.htm>> (26 May 2004)

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

into force of the “Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue the NATO-Russia nuclear experts consultations.”²⁷³

- **Theatre Missile Defence:** enhance consultations on “theatre missile defence (TMD)”, in particular on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and system capabilities, to analyse and evaluate possible levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises.

- **Search and Rescue at Sea:** monitor the implementation of the “NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue”, and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the area of search and rescue at sea.

- **Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform:** pursue enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhance cooperation on defence reform and its economic aspects, including conversion.

- **Civil Emergencies:** pursue enhanced mechanisms for future NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies. “Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management information.”²⁷⁴

- **New Threats and Challenges:** In addition to the areas enumerated above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic

²⁷³ Ibid.

area in the framework of the activities of the NATO Committee on "Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military airspace controls; and pursue enhanced scientific cooperation."

Although the NRC does not provide Russia a veto over NATO decisions or action, the new council of 20 will give Russia a stronger voice in NATO affairs than it had in the "19 plus-one" Permanent Joint Council established in 1997 as an effort to console Russia for the NATO expansion that later brought Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the NATO alliance.²⁷⁵

The Russian side made it clear that in the future Moscow is going to actively participate in the 'NATO Council of Twenty'. Intelligence representatives welcomed this level of cooperation between their organisations as something the likes of which has never been seen before.²⁷⁶

On the other hand according to K. Bosworth these provisions do not vary greatly from those of the Founding Act; all of the above (with the exception of 'new threats and challenges') can be found "either explicitly or implicitly in the earlier document." It also transpired that the earlier reports were correct about "retreicability and Article 5; both sides will also still be able to pull back issues upon which they do not agree 'at 20' and the new framework also does not deal with the implications of Russia ever requiring the Allies to come to its assistance militarily." According to K. Bosworth we can conclude two things from here. One is that the issue of veto and Article 5 are not being dealt with in a profound way, rather they are being swept under the carpet and ignored. The other is that the new mechanism would seem not to constitute a qualitative rethink, but rather a rehash of existing structures.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ <<http://www.rcpbml.org.uk/wdic-02/d02-106.htm>> (23 May 2004)

²⁷⁶ <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/201-2.cfm>> (12 March 2004).

On the other hand, K. Bosworth also mentions that the new mechanism does show some movement in the thinking. It contains at least one notable useful addition in the provision for dealing with 'new threats and challenges', allowing the two sides to co-operate on unforeseen terrorist actions and other –unpredictable– threats to their mutual security. Positively, on the whole, the NRC seems to have been “well received, and may indeed put an end to the ‘pre-cooked’ decision process of the PJC and open up a fruitful dialogue between NATO and Russia.”

5.3. NATO's 5th Wave of Enlargement and Istanbul Summit

According to A. Ward, the expectations for a successful meeting were set low before the Istanbul summit of 28-29 June 2004. The basic issues of concern of the meeting were: avoiding a heavy discussions over Iraq; “agreeing to meet the modest and probably inadequate goals the Alliance had already set for itself in trying to stabilise Afghanistan; and endorsing the U.S. initiative to promote modernisation and democracy in the Arab Middle East.”²⁷⁸ And finally welcoming of the seven new members, which were determined in Prague Summit in 2002 for NATO membership- Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania- into the alliance.

A. Ward states that NATO leaders may have given up arguing publicly over Iraq, but they hardly furnished the US with the kind of support it once hoped for. It is also notable, that the whole ‘out of area’ debate of the 1990s -that is whether NATO had a role beyond the physical territory of its member states –has been still the abiding question. It is also widely concerned issue of the meeting that whether NATO as an institution will be important and effective in the critical strategic threats of the 21st century.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ Bosworth, 380.

²⁷⁸ Adam Ward (ed.), “NATO's Istanbul Summit, Alliance Under Cloud”, *IISS Strategic Comments*, 10(5) (June 2004):1

²⁷⁹ Ward, 2.

Similarly according to M. Tezkan²⁸⁰ the most important result of the Istanbul summit is that the United States has been successful in persuading NATO to assume a more active role in Iraq. With this decision, NATO's domain of mission has been enlarged. The reasons for NATO presence in Iraq have been justified within the framework of combating terrorism. M. Tezkan states that;

NATO is from now on to organise intelligence activities to fight terrorist groups. The new targets of the alliance will be the countries helping terrorist groups. NATO is becoming a gendarmerie to combat the countries supporting terrorists... The alliance is being transformed into an organisation, which will fight terrorism in all aspects...²⁸¹

According to the Communique of the Istanbul Summit of NATO, Alliance²⁸²

-Decided to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

-Agreed to conclude the Alliance's successful SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and welcomed the readiness of the European Union to deploy a new and distinct UN-mandated Chapter VII mission in the country, based on the Berlin plus arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU.

-Confirmed that a robust KFOR presence remains essential to further enhancement of security and promote the political process in Kosovo.

-Decided to enhance the contribution of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime operation in the Mediterranean, to the fight against terrorism.

-Decided to offer assistance to the Government of Iraq with the training of its security forces.

-Agreed on an enhanced set of measures to strengthen NATO's individual and collective contribution to the international community's fight against terrorism.

²⁸⁰ Mehment Tezkan, "NATO Is in Iraq", *Sabah Gazetesi*, 29 June 2004.

²⁸¹ Tezkan.

²⁸² <www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home.htm> (18 July 2004)

-Decided to further the transformation of NATO's military capabilities to make them more modern, more useable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.

-Reaffirmed that NATO's door remains open to new members, and encouraged Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to reform necessary to progress towards NATO membership

-Taken a number of steps to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular through a special focus on engaging with NATO's Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

-Decided to enhance NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the 'Istanbul Cooperation Initiative'

In the communique of the summit, terrorism has been strongly condemned whatever its motivations or manifestations. It is also stated that Alliance will fight it together as long as necessary. And it is strongly stated that the Alliance provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism, which requires the closest possible cooperation of North America and Europe.

When analysed in terms of NATO-Russia relations, the summit was not productive. However, it was stated in the communique that since its creation two years ago, the NATO-Russia Council has raised the quality of the relationship between the Alliance and Russia to a new level, to the benefit of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. It is reaffirmed to broaden political dialogue and deepening consultations on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.

However the rejection by the Russian President Vladimir Putin to assist the summit has created some trouble within the NATO-Russian Council. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the summit as a representative. One possible factor for Putin's absence at the meeting can be explained as; former Soviet Baltic Republics'

membership has irked Russia. In addition Putin's conditions for coming to Istanbul included continuing tolerance of Russia's failure to comply with commitments under the 1999-adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). "Russia is anxious for the adapted treaty to be ratified so that the Baltic States can sign up some Russian officials fear they could become NATO outposts for nuclear arms or army bases."²⁸³

But Western nations insist the adapted treaty cannot be ratified until Russia meets its part of the bargain, agreed five years ago, to "pull back forces and weapons from Moldova and Georgia." NATO diplomats had hoped that even without a deal on the CFE, Putin could be enticed to a summit meeting by promises of more meaningful cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council.²⁸⁴

As a result it can be concluded that Istanbul Summit is significant in terms of the decision of new mission areas and rejection of Putin to attend the meeting as a sign of disappointment with NATO's last expansion into East and Central Europe.

To sum up, in this chapter first the impact of 11 September 2001 to the Alliance and its enlargement plan has been summarised. Then it is explained that 11 September 2001 brought acceleration to the relationship between NATO and Russia and it provided an opportunity for collaboration on the several new areas. The new mechanism, NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established for joint action, consultation and cooperation is also discussed in this chapter. Lastly the decisions taken by NATO Allies in the Istanbul Summit and evaluation of the Summit regarding the NATO-Russia relations presented. It can be concluded from this chapter that regardless of the ultimate success of NRC, Putin's rejection to attend the Istanbul Summit in which new members are welcomed is indeed the sign of the specific impact of 11 September 2001 on the NATO-Russia relationship has been limited.

²⁸³ Paul Taylor, "Putin to stay away from NATO summit-diplomat" *Reuters*, 2/6/2004

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have focused on the issue of NATO-Russia relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. My argument was that, Russia is unable to improve its relations with NATO because post-Soviet Russian elites could not reform the military structures and security culture of the country. But on the other side since 1991 NATO started to transform itself and redefined its identity and strategy. Because of this fact, in spite of all the positive developments occurred since 11 September 2001 NATO-Russia relation remains limited.

To support my argument, in the first chapter, I have presented the security community approach in explaining or understanding the persistence of NATO after the Cold War. In this chapter I found out that, the conditions that had created Western security community during the Cold War were no longer relevant, yet intense transactions and communication had yielded a certain culture among its participants. So through the security community approach it is claimed in this chapter that, sense of common history and sharing common identity was the main factor that keep the Alliance intact.

In chapter II, I have summarised NATO's internal and external transformation in the aftermath of the Cold War. In this context I have presented main developments of the periods between 1991-1999. During this period while the alliance retaining the core function of providing for the collective security of its members, it has paid growing emphasis on conflict-prevention and peacekeeping, "made deep cuts in the level of armed forces and transformed its structures." In this period NATO also reformed its military command structure, which allowed NATO forces to assume new tasks in addition to their primary function of guaranteeing the security of its members, thus "accompanying NATO's growing role in crisis management and

peacekeeping.”²⁸⁵ In the chapter II, I also discussed the reasons of enlargement and various enlargement proposals. While studying these issues I have inferred that in the post-Cold War era, the main objective for NATO has been the preservation of Western security community and its promotion beyond its Cold War boundaries, through the absorption of the post-communist states in its institutions and practices. The mission of these interlocking institutions was the promotion of the values of democracy, free markets, and human rights so the moral imperative of ‘us against them’ was gradually translated to the moral pretext of promoting the values of the security community.²⁸⁶ The issues discussed in this chapter proves that as argued before, NATO transformed itself successfully in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In Chapter III, I have studied the direction of Russian foreign policy in terms of its relations with NATO after the Cold War. In this context I explored that during the initial years of the post-Soviet era, NATO-Russia relations improved substantially, this period defined by some experts as “initial honeymoon.” During the period of 1991-1995 Russian foreign policy direction can be defined as pro-western. However after Primakov’s appointment as foreign minister of Russia he started to apply “policy of alternatives” in that he laid out the conditions under which NATO enlargement into central Europe could be accepted by Russia. In spite of the increasing tension between the two sides, in 1996-1997 NATO upgraded its institutional links with Russia through Permanent Joint Council. But here once again the perceptions played an important part in Russia’s relations with the West and majority of Russian political and military elites continued to be suspicious about the intentions of the Alliance. Through this chapter I tried to show that after the Cold-War identification of Russia with the Western security community and its values is not recognised by an important part of the Russian political and military elite.

²⁸⁵ Karl Kaiser, “The New NATO”, *Asia-Pacific Review*, 10(1) (2003): 63

²⁸⁶ Aybet, 229.

In chapter IV, I have focused on the period between Kosovo Crisis and 11 September 2001. In this chapter, it is discussed that NATO intervention in Kosovo cast a heavy shadow over the improvements like PJC and Founding Act. In this chapter, it is presented through the results of the public opinion polls that, Kosovo Crisis increased the support for the militant nationalist inside the Russian political establishment. To them, these steps proved that the west was selfish militant and a 'natural enemy' of Russia. Initial years of Putin's presidency have also been analysed in this chapter, under Putin presidency Russian foreign policy has been defined as predominantly European-oriented. But it is concluded that there is still many domestic interest groups protesting against the partnership with the west. These groups proposed anti-Western alliances as an alternative to the west. It can be argued that the causes like the reactions of Russians to the Kosovo Crisis and attitudes of domestic interest groups and military and political elites towards pro-western partnerships, strengthen the claim that Russia proved to be unable to reform itself. That is the morality of 'us against them' still constitutes the basis of Russian foreign policy.

In chapter 5 the recent course of NATO-Russia relations have been portrayed. In this chapter I have mainly focused on the impact of 11 September 2001 into the NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations. First finding of this chapter is that, despite harsh criticisms against the decision of enlargement, after 11 September 2001 NATO did not change its enlargement plans. On the contrary it claimed that the new security environment requires the continuity of the enlargement. And interestingly after 11 September 2001, official Russian foreign policy has come to regard the West and NATO more closely than ever. A significant indicator of this improvement was the establishment of NATO-Russia Council in May 2002, which replace the Permanent Joint Council of 1997. Moreover, in the last part of this chapter NATO's last summit in Istanbul has been analysed. The summit was significant because; in this summit NATO's mission area is expanded and the new targets of the alliance have been defined as terrorist groups. Concerning the NATO-Russia relations, Putin's symbolic rejection to assist

the meeting was important indicator of Russia's disappointment with the NATO's decision to continue to expand its borders to east and central Europe. Issues discussed in this chapter can be concluded as, despite all the cooperation and dialogue after 11 September 2001 NATO-Russia relations have its own limits. It seemed for a time that, given the consensus among the Russian political elite that NATO expansion constituted a security challenge for Russia and that it should be actively resisted, and given NATO's expression of its intention to proceed with enlargement, this issue would serve as the prime catalyst in an inevitable cooling of the relations between NATO and Russia bringing about the era of "cold peace" that Yeltsin had once warned about.²⁸⁷

To conclude the findings of this thesis, since 1991 the development of NATO-Russia relations has been uneven and it has its ups and downs as the discussion in this thesis made clear. It is obvious that, Russia is still concerned about NATO's agenda in Eastern Europe. For years, Russian leaders balked at the notion of the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO, a reality they were forced to accept in 1999. To make matters worse, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria belong to the second round of new members. Even newly elected Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has expressed an interest in NATO membership and made a trip to the White House to meet President Bush "just weeks after his inauguration in January 2004. NATO's borders continue to creep slowly into the FSU and closer to Russia."²⁸⁸ For these reasons, for the bulk of Russians, NATO was and remains the enemy and its "encroachment is a haunting reminder of what many perceive as Russia's crushing defeat in the Cold War."²⁸⁹ NATO's presence in Central Europe and its presence in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltics, became members in 2004, will only serve to remind Russians of this defeat and for the loss of great power status, previously a source of great national pride. Here it can be

²⁸⁷ Yeltsin warned of this new era of "cold peace" in a November 1994 speech in Budapest.

²⁸⁸ Kari Roberts, 14.

concluded that while common ground, like fight against terrorism, may be found on a number of issues, “there is little reason to expect a long-term partnership between the two sides. Cooperation can only be expected when interests coincide.”²⁹⁰ Therefore the road ahead for NATO-Russia relations is not clear and the destination is unknown.

On the other hand I think, the findings of this thesis strengthen my argument that Russia’s inability for integration with the western security community makes its relations with NATO difficult. In my opinion if Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others, became members of the expanding Western security community represented by NATO and EU; it was because they have successfully assimilated the essential elements of the integration model. Seen from this perspective, Russia represents a troublesome fit in the post-Cold War integration of Europe. It is a significant actor in European politics, but it seems unable to relate to the western part of Europe either in terms of the nature of its domestic politics or in the area of its foreign and security policy concepts and practices. There has been no visible effort on the part of the Russian elites, however, to understand that integration cannot be achieved by an act of governmental will or by a diplomatic fiat but must come from a complex social process of becoming alike, of fitting in with the object of integration.

This lack of fit between the Western and Russian approaches may originate from the very different historical models of the state formation. The Western model had its origins in well-ordered, multi-level social hierarchy with the ruler (the sovereign) at the top. The second, eastern and Russian, functioned without a hierarchically differentiated social base. Apart from the person of the ruler, there existed equality in subservience. As a consequence of the challenges to the position of the sovereign from the upper and later lower social strata, the Western State model could and did evolve into democracy. The second model, composed of autocratic ruler and undifferentiated subservient masses, remained in its authoritarian mould and, when

²⁸⁹ Kari Roberts, 16.

placed under stress, periodically underwent revolutionary spasms. Russia has been unable to overcome the legacy of the second model. But it should also be mentioned that, under the Putin presidency Russia started to change and seek cooperation with the West, Putin attached greater emphasis to the relationship with the West based on an equal partnership with NATO. Moreover following the election of Vladimir Putin as President, Russia's relations with NATO have been placed on pragmatic level. It seems if Russia can reform itself politically and militarily and if Russia can harmonise itself with the political and military standards of NATO, which have been applied to other Eastern and Central European Countries earlier, then NATO-Russia relations can start to change in positive way. However if Russia does not realise the necessary reforms then, I think the integrative fit between the current Russian system and the NATO does not likely to be observed in the foreseeable future.

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