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**CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY
AND SHIFTING BOUNDARIES**

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
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
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ABSTRACT

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In the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s Europe and the world witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s the member states of the European Union decided to enlarge the Union towards the Eastern Europe. Thus European integration entered into an unprecedented phase. Integration of the Eastern Europeans with the Western Europe contributed to the debates on the notions of European identity and the idea of Europe. Adherence of the East Europeans to the ideals of the Western European civilization brought up some questions about the changing identities and shifting boundaries of Europe. Various theories deal with the problems of identity in general and European identity in particular. However to a great extent they are limited within a rigid description of self-other relationship. They do not intend to investigate the real motives or purposes behind these transformations of the prevailing identities and shifting of the boundaries of Europe. So, it will be argued that, in order to understand construction/reconstruction process of the new European identity, one should also take into consideration the more dynamic effects on changing European identity and shifting borders of Europe.

Keywords: European Integration, European Identity, Idea of Europe, the other, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, identity theories, constructivism, boundaries

ÖZ

AVRUPA KİMLİĞİNİN DEĞİŞKENLİĞİ VE SINIRLARIN KAYGANLIĞI

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1980'lerin sonunda ve 1990'ların başında Avrupa ve dünya Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışına tanık oldu. 1990'ların ortalarında Avrupa Birliği üyesi devletler Birlik'i Doğu Avrupa'ya doğru genişletmeye karar verdiler. Böylece Avrupa entegrasyonu eşi benzeri görülmemiş bir aşamaya girdi. Doğu Avrupalıların Batı Avrupa ile entegrasyonu Avrupa Kimliği ve Avrupa düşüncesi kavramları üzerine tartışmalara katkıda bulundu. Doğu Avrupalıların Batı Avrupa medeniyetinin ideallerine bağlılıkları Avrupa'nın değişen kimlikleri ve sınırları ile ilgili bazı soruları beraberinde getirdi. Farklı teoriler genel olarak kimlik, özel olarak da Avrupa kimliği sorunlarıyla uğraşı halinde. Buna rağmen bu teoriler çok büyük oranda kendi-diğeri ilişkisinin değişmez bir tanımı içerisinde sınırlandırılmış durumda. Öncül kimliklerdeki bu dönüşümlerin ve Avrupa'nın sınırlarının yer değiştirmesinin ardındaki gerçek güdüleri ve niyetleri araştırma kaygısını duymuyorlar. Bu sebepten, bu çalışmada yeni Avrupa kimliğinin kurulması/yeniden kurulması sürecini anlayabilmek için daha dinamik etkenlerin değişen Avrupa kimliği ve yer değiştiren Avrupa sınırları üzerine etkilerinin dikkate alınmasının gerekliliği savunulacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupa entegrasyonu, Avrupa kimliği, Avrupa düşüncesi, diğeri, Doğu Avrupa, Orta Avrupa, kimlik teorileri, yapıcılık, sınırlar

To

My Beloved Wife

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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Signature: 

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On the 1st of May 2004, the European Union (EU) became an international organization consisted of twenty five members. Entrance of ten new member states into the EU became the largest enlargement that has ever happened in the history of European integration. Today the EU covers most of European territory, thus in a sense it had become Europe itself. Sixteen years ago, if someone would have ever suggested that such an instance will take place, no one would believe it but it did happen.

Until the Iron Curtain fell down, Europe was split into two. These two parts of Europe represented different ideologies. The western part had developed somewhat a prosperous community and provided its people with a high standard of living. On the other side of the divisionary line, people were ruled under repressive hegemony of Russia and were in constant economic crisis, which in the end became one of the important factors that caused disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Iron Curtain was considered as the main obstacle preventing western and eastern halves of Europe from developing in the same direction. Or more precisely, it was seen as an obstacle for East European countries to catch up with their western

brothers. Although it really separated 'the East' from 'the West', their separation was concealed in the minds of west Europeans long before the Iron Curtain. Mental map of Europe that was drawn by West Europeans did not include East Europe on cultural and civilizational terms.

This cultural and civilizational mapping of Europe came into existence with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. East Europeans were not considered as Europeans but as 'the other' of 'Europeans'. There was a clear cut distinction between the Eastern and Western halves of Europe. Within the context of this distinction Western half represented the civilized face of Europe whereas the Eastern half was deemed as less civilized or not civilized at all.

However division of Europe into two parts was not a novelty of the Enlightenment. Rather it was a redefinition of the aspects that separated them. Before Europe was identified with civilization, it was identified with Christianity and was considered to constitute Christendom. Of course East was also the land of Christianity but still it did not belong to Christendom. Its Orthodoxy distinguished it from the Catholic lands. Through history, East-West dichotomy did not cease to exist. Just the criteria on which it was based has been changed.

However, the above statement is valid for the times after when cultural, political and economic centres of Europe shifted from south of Europe towards north-west of Europe. Until Italian city states ceased to be the cultural and intellectual centres of Europe from where cultural achievements spread, the north-south divisionary line, which was a heritage of Roman Empire, divided Europe into two. Northerners were seen as barbarians and were not fully converted into Christianity yet. Of course East

was also barbarous but it was northerners who threatened the southern Europeans most.

So to speak, there has always been a divisionary line dividing Europe into two although its direction and aspects have changed through time. Europe has always been defined through construction/reconstruction of 'the other' and with its relations with this 'other'. 'The other' changes and so does 'the European'. The so-called 'other' can become European and in so doing it creates its own 'others'. 'The other' never ceases to exist. Only thing that changes is the location of the boundaries that are drawn between Europe and 'the other'.

The problematic of this thesis is transformation of 'the European' and 'the other' and outcome of this transformation. This study aims to investigate a couple of questions. First of all "how did concepts of European identity and the idea of Europe evolved through time by using 'the other' as a constitutive element?" Then "how did the EU monopolize these concepts and used them in its rhetoric in the enlargement process?" In connection with this "did a shift in position of 'the other' take place and how did the Eastern Europe lose its 'otherness', or its 'demi-otherness', and was 'Europeanized'?" In so doing "how were the boundaries of Europe defined and redefined?" In sum "what become of the old divisions of Europe and what is the role of the EU in reconstruction of the new Europe?"

Answers to these questions will provide us with the necessary data for investigation of the real argument of this thesis. In this study it will be argued that the construction of 'the other' and 'the self' cannot be understood only through psychological and sociological explanations. 'The other' is not a static entity and thus construction/reconstruction of an identity in relation with 'the other' is a constant

process. This process is not only a psycho-sociological process. On the contrary it involves ideological, political, economic, historical, societal considerations and most of all it does come out according to the expectations and interests of the constructor. The general theories which try to explain 'identity' and 'the other' fall short of incorporating these variables into their explanations of 'the self' and 'the other'. Thus in this thesis, the attempt will be to incorporate the constructivist explanations into the general theories on 'identity' and 'the other' and investigate changing 'European identity' and shifting borders of Europe with variables provided by the constructivist theory.

"The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations" (Castells, 1997: 7). 'European identity' is not an exception to this argument. It is constructed by certain actors for certain purposes. It is a project that is far from being concluded as "...identity is always a project, not settled accomplishment; though various external ascriptions or recognitions may be fixed and timeless" (Calhoun, 1994: 27). The arguments for the 'idea of Europe' and 'European identity' in this thesis show us *how* the 'European identity' is constructed but do not provide us *why* it has been so. This thesis aims at touching upon the *whys* of the construction of a 'European identity'.

In the first part of this thesis, theoretical construction of the concepts of 'identity', 'the other', and 'the idea of Europe' is made. Later the attempt has been delineating how the EU incorporated 'the idea of Europe' into the European integration process

and became the dominant actor in the creation/recreation of 'the idea' in order to construct its 'European citizenship'.

The concept of identity is tried to be explained by three distinct theories, namely identity theory, social identity theory and the constitutive other. The former two approach the concept of identity from psycho-sociological perspectives, focusing on individual and relations of individual and group, thus providing explanations for grounds of identification process, commitment to an identity and some other aspects of identity. The third theory emphasizes on the decisive role of 'the other' in construction of identities at macro level and provides us with the real basis that this thesis depends on as 'the other' plays a crucial role in construction of the idea of Europe.

'The idea of Europe' is not a concept to be easily depicted. There are various approaches to it. Its existence is advocated by pro-Europeans who treat European unity as the ultimate achievement whereas Eurosceptics claim it to be a disillusionment to take European idea as the sole factor in unifying Europe and creating a European identity. Nevertheless its importance comes from its tight interconnectedness with the European identity and its usage as a definitive concept to vindicate existence of a shared 'Europeanness'.

Under the last heading of the first part, the EU's increasing dominance over the ideals that European integration is based upon is investigated. In the end of the 1980s and especially in the 1990s the EU has become the leading actor in shaping the contemporary Europe. The ideals of a unified Europe is strongly supported and incorporated into the general scheme of integration where deemed necessary.

Creation of the European citizenship became the basic motive in creation of an 'ever closer union'. So, the emphasis is made on European citizenship at this part.

The EU considers itself as representing the Europe and its ideals. After all, thanks to it that Europe has prospered and has become a haven of security and stability. At no other time in the history of Europe such a thing had happened. Also it was consisted of most of the European states. Moreover it was created to promote unity of European peoples and prevent any hostility. For that it had the right to take necessary precautions and give appropriate decisions to fulfil its job. And Europe needed a cement to hold its parts connected tightly to each other.

European identity, and European citizenship, would be perfect materials as the cement of European integration. The discourse of 'unity in diversity' became an important dynamic of the European integration. Thus European citizenship did not necessarily have to be contradictory to national citizenship. It was a higher level of belongingness that embraced all other identities of European peoples. Policies are developed by various institutions of the EU in order to promote this new European citizenship.

The second part deals with the boundaries of Europe. As Europe is defined by its distinctive features from the others, it is inevitable not to draw divisionary lines. So, emphasis is given on creation and definition of borders of Europe.

Firstly, historical changes in borders of Europe are examined. Then the EU's role in definition of new borders of Europe within the context of enlargement is investigated. Enlargement paved the way for the EU to identify itself with the European continent as a whole. So, in a way, borders of the EU became borders of Europe also. Thus being a member of the EU implied belonging to Europe. Once

East Europeans were considered as outside of a general European scheme, now they were to become an integral part of it.

At the end of the second part it is tried to be shown how the boundaries of Europe are eligible for shifts as the place of the other changed. So it is examined how the grounds for incorporating East Europe into the West did exist in the history of Europe.

The last part is examination of the effects of the recent European enlargement on reconstruction of the new Europe. In this part it is argued that the traditional rhetoric of the other versus the self is adopted and revived by the new Europeans in their accession to the EU and thus Europe.

At the time of disintegration, the European Economic Community (EEC) had just entered a new phase of integration, the deepening. Without solving its own problems, it had been put in a position to help and guide ex-communist states of Europe. In order to do so, first of all it had to overcome traditional boundaries that it had established through centuries. East of Europe played a significant role among the others of Europe. It was so close but still so far away from Europe. By looking at it, as if looking at a mirror, Europe could see what it was not and thus become aware of itself. Through defining the other, Europe recreated itself and in recreating itself it created the other. Iron Curtain of the post-war period was not a novelty but an embodiment of what was accepted as a fact of Europe. Now it was not there where it had to be. With its fall, so did the traditional otherness of Eastern Europe. So, the main task in recreating the new Europe was to redraw the boundaries of Europe, and thus Europeanness.

What happened then was not the redefinition of the other of Europe. Instead, the other was thought to be turned into the self. The divisionary line would stay but this time at a different place. The EU found itself in the position of deciding the rules of the game and the rules were clear: they had to become European as how the EU meant it. Copenhagen criteria for membership were set for East Europeans to accomplish. These criteria reflected the very ideals of Europe and thus Europeanness as advocated by the EU. In order to accomplish this, the EU drew guidelines for East Europeans to become Europeans. They could be within Europe geographically but they were not real Europeans yet. And to be eligible to become a member of the EU, which was seen as the only salvation by East Europeans to reach a better living, you had to be a European. So, if they wanted to be a member of the EU, they had to turn themselves into Europeans. Most of the applicants proved to be successful in adopting the EU's accession policies. Even some of them were too successful that they also internalized European rhetoric on the other and used it within themselves to create their own others to prove their belongingness to Europe.

This assumption necessitated investigation of arguments on concept of Central Europe. Central Europe is not a geographical definition of a region of Europe but more than that it is a geopolitical and cultural creation of a place. Central Europe is incorporated into the idea of Europe and Europeanized at the expense of some other parts of Europe. It is defined through its similarities with West Europe which the others lacked. Thus the other's non-Europeanness is first depicted and then used to show how European the Central Europe is compared to that other.

So, first the other of Central Europe is defined in order to be able to define a Central Europe. Then via definition of this other, it is placed inbetween the two worlds and

thus demi-Europeanized, which in turn opens the way for Central Europeans to achieve full Europeanness.

A new Europe is about to be born out of all these developments. Borders are to be drawn/redrawn and traditional definitions have to be replaced with the new ones. Will the outcome of all these developments be a new Europe? Or will the Europe reconstruct itself by using the old recipe although with different ingredients this time? This thesis is written in search for an answer to these questions by examining the creation/recreation of Europe's boundaries.



CHAPTER II

CONCEPT OF IDENTITY¹ AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

All human beings who are born into and raised in a social environment have identities. This is because we are born as very fragile beings that need to be looked after by others, as well as for our being social entities who have to live side by side with others. We are born into a world that we share with other human beings like us. At the very first place, we struggle to achieve our needs vital to our survival, e.g. food, shelter, reproduction. Later on depending on the environment we live within, we pass our lives by trying to satisfy our secondary needs, be they tangible or intangible, a large house full of luxuries or a respectable social status within the society we live in. In other words our physical and psychological needs make it a necessity for us to bear identities via which we find it easier to attain satisfaction of our needs. With this respect, identities that we have until we die play a very crucial role in determining what we are and how we act.

As we grow up and get older, the channels we interact with societies we live within increases also. We join or leave different social groups and as we do so, we acquire

¹ For the semantic history of the word 'identity' look in Gleason, 1983.

and lose identities related with those groups². Numbers of members of these groups vary to a great extent, ranging from including a few persons to a nation and even to more. In other words identities range broadly from local to universal. So, identities are multi-levelled. They overlap and may become conflictual occasionally although their conflictual character will not be discussed here.

Concept of 'European identity' is not a novelty of our times. It has its roots mainly at the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century Europe. Nevertheless it has gained predominance over other cultural issues recently within the context of European enlargement and the EU. The issue of defining a 'European identity' is so complex and controversial that any attempt made to clarify it necessitates a great effort. Looking only at psychological grounds of identity formation of any individual and extending this towards including a general collective identity in relation with Europe can not be sufficient enough by itself to understand what 'European identity' is. Still they provide a basis for further investigation of the matter.

Below, firstly I will emphasize two different theories on identity, namely the *identity theory* and the *social identity theory*.³ This is because each of them takes a different approach towards identity and when taken together they depict a larger picture. The first approaches identity on an individual level where personal aspects of identity are focused on whereas the latter deals primarily with group identities and intergroup relations. Thus both theories contribute to this thesis when they are taken into

² In this thesis, the word 'group' is a direct reference to a collective identity formed by members of the group.

³ Of course there are other more fundamental theories on identity and identity construction. However they are pure psychological theories and it is nearly impossible to incorporate them into the general structure of this thesis. So, they are omitted. On the other hand even these two theories mentioned here do share the same problematic to some extent. Nevertheless they are needed to depict a general picture of the subject of our concern and thus provide us with a brief knowledge on identity. For further reading on recent developments in studies on identity see Cerulo, 1997.

consideration together. On the other hand they still lack the necessary means to define conceptualization of a general 'European identity'. So, a third theory will be incorporated. The third theory, which can be named as the *constitutive other in identity formation*, develops its arguments on constitution of identity at macro level from relation of 'the self' with 'the other'. A fourth theory, namely the constructivist theory, will not be dealt with directly. Still, it will be used at the critical level of this thesis in order to fill in the gaps of these theories and to provide us with a more dynamic understanding of European integration and the 'European identity'. This critical level will be in the conclusion of this chapter.

2.1 Identity Theory

We interact with lots of people beginning from the day we are born until we die. These social interactions affect who we are to a large extent. Looking from another point of view, they also depend on as whom we perceive ourselves. So, we can "...consider the self to be product of social interaction[s], in that people come to know who they are through their interactions with others" (Hogg et al, 1995: 256). As we interact with not only different people but also with and within different groups, we tend to bear different identities. This character of identity makes it a multifaceted construct. Identity theory merges these two characters of identity, that they are product of social interaction and multifaceted constructs, and as the result "... the self [is seen] not as an autonomous psychological entity but as a multifaceted social construct that emerges from people's roles in society" (Hogg et al, 1995: 256). This definition of self brings the notion of role identities:

Role identities are self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions, or self-definitions that people apply to themselves as a consequence of the structural role positions they

occupy, and through a process of labelling or self-definition as a member of a particular social category (Burke, 1980; Thoits, 1991). They should be shared, socially recognized, and defined by action (Callero, 1985: 204).

These role identities affect how we respond to others and vice versa. We aspire to fulfil necessities of having these role identities in order to satisfy our self-esteems or to prevent dissatisfaction. On the other hand different role identities we have could become conflictive under certain circumstances. One's satisfaction could mean the dissatisfaction of another. This possible conflictive manner of role identities brings out a hierarchical order among them depending on the self-relevance that they have. They "... are organized hierarchically in the self-concept with regard to the probability that they will form the basis for action" (Hogg et al, 1995: 257). Identities that are more important to us, or in other words that enhance our self-esteem relatively more than others do when they are satisfied, take their place at the top of the hierarchy. From the point of relative gains, with satisfaction of the identity on a higher level of the hierarchy, we gain more than we lose even when a dissatisfaction of a lower identity takes place.

According to Stryker and Serpe, identity salience defines the hierarchy of role identities. Identity salience can be "... defined as a readiness to act out an identity as a consequence of the identity's properties as a cognitive structure or schema" (1994: 17). Still, they think that it is not necessarily that people be "in directly aware of the salience of their identities". Negative or positive images of identities depending on a person's belief could be as effective as cognitive schemas (Stryker and Serpe, 1994).

Here comes the question of what defines a person's identity salience that on similar conditions different persons could invoke different role identities depending on their

own identity salience. For example a police officer could stick to his police identity and put one of his relatives under arrest even for a negligible crime whereas another person could pretend not to see it and choose to satisfy his family identity. Identity theory incorporates the concept of commitment as an independent variable and puts the identity salience in the place of dependent variable.

Commitment indicates the degree of adherence to a role identity, which is either thought as crucial or seen inconsequential for self with respect to rewards and gains a person expects from obliging to the codes of behaviour⁴ of that role identity in relation with his relations with other people within a social network. Burke and Reitzes identify “two processes that maintain an identity and serve as bases for commitment: 1) rewards and positive evaluations of the identity, which form the cognitive base of commitment, and 2) ties to others as sources of “we-ness” and warmth, which form the socioemotional base of commitment” (1991: 245). For Marks, commitment to a role identity is related with the time and energy, which are scarce and should be distributed accordingly between multiple-identities, invested in enactment of a particular identity (cited in Thoits, 1983: 177). Thoits emphasize on a sociological aspect of commitment that as social positions are ranked culturally, commitment to the identities tied to them varies according to their positions’ value or worth (1983: 177-178). Nevertheless, either its base is cognitive or socioemotional, or in the end we acquire material or emotional satisfaction, “[c]ommitment to a particular role identity is high if people perceive that many of their important social

⁴ Thoits uses the terms ‘reciprocal role relationships’ and to a lesser extent ‘role requirements’ in defining perception of rights and duties, which are prescribed by the group, by the individual. “*If one knows who one is (in social sense), then one knows how to behave*” (Thoits, 1983: 175). It is very similar to my conception of ‘codes of behaviour’ that both suggest a role given to the individual who identifies himself with a group. However Thoits’ emphasis is more on behavioural roles whereas mine is on general expectations from each and every member of a group. For example as a member of a sports team, a player of the team knows what is expected from someone playing in his position. Thus he plays accordingly. However by ‘codes of behaviour’ I mean what is expected from *any* player.

relationships are predicated on occupancy of that role” (Hogg et al, 1995: 258). Thus we commit ourselves to the role identities that we find more beneficial to us with respect to our other role identities and act in line with that particular role identity even if it conflicts with our relatively less important role identities to do so. In Burke’s and Reitzes’ words “commitment is increased when one benefits materially by rewards such as money, labour, goods, favours, or prestige” (1991: 241). This commitment to particular role identities increases their identity salience and they take their places at top of the hierarchy. So, commitment has a direct effect on identity salience. Stryker and Serpe support this proposition while opting out the possibility that “over time, salience affects commitment” (1994: 20). Nevertheless, they still accept commitment as a dominant factor over salience.

We have thus seen the basic premises of identity theory, which depend on explaining individuals’ role-related behaviours. This theory is best for explaining individual’s actions in relation with his perception of his own role identities and his commitment to these roles in turn defining their salience. Still it totally lacks to define collective actions of different members of an identity and intergroup relations. For this, we have to look at the social identity theory.

2.2 Social Identity Theory

Perception of the other and the self is very crucial in determining our relations with the others. The other here could be either an anti-self or a mirror-self. Here anti-self indicates whom we think we believe to have too little or nothing common at all that we can not identify ourselves with. On the other hand at our mirror-selves we think we find too much common characteristics or roles as if they are one of our own reflections. We believe we share the same identities. The role identities we have

dictate us how we have to behave towards the others. When one identifies himself with a group of people he also acquires a role identity which all members of this group supposedly have. Most of the time those role identities bring with them a predefined base of actions. These do not necessarily have to be written. They are expected to be fulfilled by each and every member of that group. These could be called codes of behaviour. When unwritten, a person could act in a way which he thinks to be suitable with his role identity, in a way depending on his own judgment on what his role identity necessitates. Nevertheless a single role identity implies a generally agreed code of behaviour.

A collective identity also defines written or unwritten codes of behaviour, as can be seen in religions⁵ and traditions of a particular society respectively, towards the other in particular situations that all members are thought to act accordingly. So, identities do not only affect our interaction with the others as single identities but also affect interaction of large units that coincide with a collective identity. Although each and every member of a single identity never reacts exactly in the same way towards the other but still we can witness a common attitude of behaviour with respect to relations with the others. Members of an identity group generally share the same perception of the other as either a negative one or a positive one.

As to social identity theory, it "... is a social psychological theory that sets out to explain group processes and intergroup relations" (Hogg et al, 1995). In the core of it lays the idea that "... a social category... into which one falls, and to which one falls one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining characteristics of the category – a self- definition that is a part of the self-concept"

⁵ See Seul for examination of religions' role in intergroup conflicts from the social identity theory perspective.

(Hogg et al, 1995: 259). In other words when one is thought to bear the identity of a social group, he is also thought to bear the same characteristics that are perceived as the common characteristics of that particular group, with other group members. This perception has its reflection on the self in a way that not only describes how his attributes as a member of that group should be but also prescribes it in the way that "... what one should think and feel, and how one should behave" (Hogg et al: 260). This argument is very much in line with the above mentioned concept of codes of behaviour.

As Hogg et al. indicate, two sociocognitive processes, which are articulated with subjective belief structures that refer to people's beliefs about the nature of relations between their own group and relevant out-groups, lie at the core of social identity theory:

1. *Categorization* sharpens intergroup boundaries by producing group-distinctive stereotypical and normative perceptions and actions, and assigns people, including self, to the relevant category; and
2. *Self-enhancement* guides the social categorization process such that in-group norms and stereotypes largely favour the in-group. (1995)

Social identity theory emphasizes the fact that social groups are prone to create their prototypes (Mael and Ashforth, 1989) which usually bear the characteristics of the most favoured members of the group. Fiske and Taylor defines a prototype as "... a subjective representation of the defining attributes... of a social category, which is actively constructed from relevant social information in the immediate or more enduring interactive context." This definition brings out the questions of by which channels does the group acquire social information and to what extent each and every member of the group is affected by these information, or put differently, how

they react to such information. This is crucial for the reason that although a member of a particular social group, or a collective identity, is supposed to carry the characteristics of that group, also it is very much likely to expect that each member would perceive different images from the same source of information. The problem here is that it is nearly impossible to draw an accurate graph of possible varieties of perception of a source of information by different members of a group. Nevertheless some generalization can still be made.

It is acceptable to assume that percentage of common perception of the other increases especially when members of the group have access to the same limited communication channels and information sources flowing to them. Just imagine of a small European community living in a village which can know the outside world either by the tales of a passers-by or by the very personal experiences of a few community members who had the luxury to travel to a place outside the village. Without any alternative source of information, almost all of them would share the same perception of the outside world. Weird tales of outside world and outsiders would lead the residents to an understanding of the characteristics that differentiate them from the others and see the similarities among themselves. Thus consciousness of an identity by being a member of a community that is different from the outside world is created. Increased number of information and various channels available to the members of a particular social group to acquire information would increase the chance of a differentiation in perception of the other. So, it can be argued that the degree of a person's sharing the same perceptions with other group members would depend on quantity of information and information channels, and on the number of different ways of access that a person has to them.

A second factor is the number of members of a social group. As the number of members of a group increases, so does the possibility of an increase in the variety of perceptions. As the group gets bigger, it gets harder to expect an identical action from its members concerning a particular case, and the degree of an accurate and similar interpretation of codes of behaviour by each and every member would decrease.

The third factor is the combination of the clearness of codes of behaviour that the group depends on and the solidarity of the group. We can expect an identical common action by the members of a group where a member relies less on self-interpretation, or discretion, than at situations where he does the contrary. So, collective identities which rely for their codes of behaviour on written rules would expect higher obedience from their members, just because less discretion is left to members in deciding what were expected from them in certain circumstances. Similarly, if the prototype created by a social group, which as a result affects solidarity of its members and their adherence to their role identities, is strong, it is likely that members of that group, let alone falling inconsistent with it, would try their best to be identified with them. This in turn would make it easier for the prominent figures of the group to impose their perceptions and characteristics to other members, which would already be eager to follow their lead. Their perceptions of the other and their reflected views of this other can become a general view of the group itself.

The last factor is the codes of behaviour itself. A group can expect total obedience from its members, as in a fanatical religious sect, or, from the other end of spectrum, none at all.

Hence, not only our singular identities but also our collective identities define our behaviours and our relations with the others. Identity theory and social identity theory try to explain foundations of our individual and collective actions with regards to our identities respectively. Identity theory uses concepts of role identities, hierarchy of identities, identity salience and commitment in order to explain grounds of individual behaviours, whereas social identity theory uses prototypes and sociocognitive processes, categorization and self-enhancement to show intra group identification for explaining intergroup actions depending on collective identity.

2.3 The Constitutive Other

The third theory approaches 'identity' concept from a macro level. In micro level the individual 'personal identity' emerges within a society depending on psycho-social constraints. At the macro level these micro identities turn into a kind of 'collective identity' that owes its existence to its distinguishing traits rather than its reference to similarities among its members. "Any identification ... requires a distinction. For any unit of identity and identification process, there is a need for *the other*"* (Yurdusev, 2002: 109). Within identification process of the self the other is placed as the perfect opposite of it. The other is perceived as and becomes what the collective self is not and vice versa. Still the anti-self does not necessarily have to be perceived on negative terms as a whole. Perception of the other and formulation of reciprocal identities out of it can be placed within a range from a total negation of the other to a positive inclination for it. In this sense perception of the other can develop depending on three interconnected levels:

* Italic is mine.

- *Axiological level*: Based on value judgements like ‘the other’ is perceived as good or bad, worthy of our love or to be hated, or considered as superior or inferior.
- *Praxeological level*: Based on the decision of either identifying the self with the other or distancing it from the other. We can identify ourselves with the other or want to see an image of ourselves at it. Three choices are there, “submission to the other, the other’s submission, and neutrality or indifference”.
- *Epistemic level*: Based on the knowledge of the other. We “know or [are] ignorant of the other’s identity” (Todorov, 1984: 185).

The epistemic level affects the other two levels to a great extent. As our knowledge of the other increases so does the accuracy of our perceiving its true nature. With this, from a normative point, our attitudes towards the other become more consistent and just (as in the saying ‘Caesar’s share to Caesar’). Nevertheless the level of knowledge we have of the other determines only the level of accuracy of our perceptions. Perceptions still do exist in the absence of any information or in the presence of misinformation. Misperceptions are still perceptions in the end. Ultimately, lack of information could just create a hesitation in giving a premature decision on the nature of the other at best.

However the other two levels directly affect our decision on how to treat the other. In different combinations we can, for example, consider the other as bad or inferior and could decide to impose our own identity over it or would stay indifferent; or we can perceive the other as superior to us and could submit ourselves to its identity. To sum up, everything first of all depends on our knowledge on the other, be it precise or not, then on how we perceive the other and judge it in relation with ourselves.

The other does not necessarily have to be an outsider. Just to be perceived as incompatible with the dominant identity is enough to be put in the place of the other even if you think you are no different than other members of that dominant identity. You can see yourself as sharing the same identity with the other members of community. But in order to be identified with the group, members of the group also have to identify themselves with you. This is a crucial aspect of identification process and it has two levels. The first is pure subjective and reflects the self's willingness to be connected. The other level is external to the self that it consists of the decision the society made on how to label the peoples with total negligence of how they label themselves (Friedman, 1999: 124). Any identification does come into being the mutual recognition of each other by the sides involved in identification process. Thus, community could exclude some of its members and put them in the place of the other. Living in the same community does not provide necessary conditions also to share the same identity. For example Jews have always been considered as non-members of a Christian Europe although the degree of their alienation changed from time to time.

Throughout history, Europe has always been the place of diversity. The only power that held most of European land under control for a significant time was the Roman Empire. Europe did consist of innumerable independent political sovereignties after the Roman Empire ceased to exist. Although efforts were made to conquer Europe or at least to have the absolute power over Europe, these efforts had always been suppressed or balanced by resistances of other European powers⁶. Cultural diversity

⁶ For example France vs. Habsburg domination of Europe, 1815 Vienna Congress and the Holy Alliance against Napoleonic France. Also Hitler Germany faced with considerable resistance against its European domination although this time the united European power block against it was not

accompanied political diversity of Europe, also. They fed each other on some occasions like creation of a distinct French identity versus a British image. However, cultural and political diversities divided mostly the masses. European nobility, intellectuals and later also the bourgeois class as an important actor more or less had a common denominator. "In fact nobles were cosmopolite. Class rules, officers' principles of honour, duty and virtue, marriage with the same class members were valid thorough everywhere" (Im Hof, 1995: 98). Nationality was not the dominant identity yet and monarchical system of European states was very much complicated compared to the modern state's.

Rulers were an international community distant relatives with each other. In reality, only dynasties of Brandenburg at Prussia, Este at Parma, Savoia at Torino were "purebred". Mostly, ministers of these kings were not children of these countries. *(Im Hof, 1995: 98)

Intellectuals were also very mobile. Most of them carried their work under the best patronage offered to them and their patronage changed occasionally. This provided a fertile ground for the intellectual though to diffuse throughout Europe. It is this interconnectedness of members of European higher strata that people refer to when they talk about the existence of a historically shared culture as a constituent part of today's European identity.

Still, Europe depicts characteristics of a divided land rather than a unified one. However under certain circumstances, Europeans had been able to put aside both their political and cultural differences and perceived themselves as a single entity. Their political and cultural divisive lines become their uniting characteristics when they are faced with a common external enemy, an alien to all of them. Their

capable of preventing the most feared nightmare, total domination of Europe. Only with the help of two outside powers it had been possible to crush the German threat.

* Translation from Turkish to English belongs to me.

differences became obsolete whereas distinction between the European and the other supersedes internal diversities of Europe. Conceptualized other is used and abused to the full extent. Internal hostilities are mitigated and are channelled towards the other, at least tried to be channelled in theory and/or on a mental level.

Constitutive others of Europe can be generalized under three headings which concomitantly exist and more or less carry each other's characteristics. The first of them are barbaric tribes which invaded Europe. They first caused the Roman Empire to crumble and later nearly destroyed institutions left of it. Their impact on Europe had been mostly on physical terms. The second constitutive other of Europe came out as a political and cultural rival. It was seen as a benchmark by which European were able to judge their level of progress. Europeans had shaped their identities based on their experiences of both defeats by and victories over these rival civilizations. The third is the conquered other. Beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, Europe became to know the whole world via geographical explorations. They easily submerged native peoples of newly explored lands with the help of their superior weapons technology. First driven by commercial incentives, they developed a whole new understanding of how to subjugate these peoples and to extract material gains from lands once they inhabited. As a result Europeans have been inclined to redefine themselves more and more from a point which they had conceived themselves both product and producer of a supreme civilization.

2.4 The Idea of Europe and the Other

To define what Europe is very much problematic in itself let alone to depict a general idea of Europe from a European theme. Still there is a huge accumulated literature on the matter. Views on the issue differ to a great extent. One can consider the idea of

Europe as an ongoing process beginning without a general sense of Europe however ending with a one where as another can view it as a creation and an invention rather than as a self-evident entity, both sides basing their arguments on the same historical evidences and converge on some points. Either one takes it as an outcome of a historical process or as a construction reflecting self-images of its time and place, idea of Europe lays at the core of reconstruction of today's Europe both geographically and geopolitically.

Idea of Europe bears in itself also acceptance of a shared European identity, an idea of Europeanness in a sense. Thus with regards to reconstruction of Europe nowadays, it is hard to distinguished idea of Europe from the concept of Europeanness. Still each of them has different implications that deserve to be investigated separately. For these reasons they will be dealt with separately but not without reference to each other where necessary.

European idea and Europeanness owes their existences to the literature on Europe versus the other to a great extent. When there was no clearly defined Europe and Europeans there was the other. As Europe became a reference of identification for Europeans, geographical places falling outside Europe were identified with their differences from European soil. The other still existed in the minds of Europeans. Europe created its own idea and identity all by itself. Although the other played a crucial role in this creation, it was not he who defined Europe but rather through whom Europe was defined.

2.4.1 The Others of Europe

Vikings, Normans, Germanic tribes, the Huns and Mongols, all are invaders of Europe. They came in endless numbers and passed over the European soil. Some of

them mingled with native population and became ancestors of today's Europeans; some returned to their homelands where they were spawned and left behind a devastated Europe. More than that, they left behind a people who were to live their lives in constant fear of their returning back. Their invasion was unexpected and very harsh as their disappearance was. Their origin was unknown (but from their appearance and characteristics it has to be related with the hell itself) and it was impossible to know whether there would be another strike of them. Thus Europeans of the Dark Ages⁷ had nothing to do but wait in fear for reappearance of *the other*.

As stated above *the other* came from north and east. It came and swept the institutions left from the Roman Empire. They were intolerant, cruel, merciless and most of all were pagans. It was impossible for Europeans to find any trace of humaneness at those nomadic barbarians. They only knew to devastate, sack and pillage. Descendants of the Roman Empire depicted them as monstrous creatures most probably coming from hell. They represented Satan whereas Europeans belonged to the realm of God. They were evil and Europeans were righteous. They were what Europe was not.

Nordic tribes settled down in Europe and mixed with or became the native European peoples whereas Asiatic tribes plundered Europe and fell back to their homelands. Thus Europeans did not have a constant interaction with these peoples. Nevertheless they contributed to the self-definition of Europeans via their victories and atrocities against them.

⁷ The epoch of Dark Age is a construction of European thought and does not reflect total condition that world was in at that time. It represents a period during when Europe is considered to be in its decline. Even this argument is a contested one let alone its negligence of other cultures' achievements.

Orthodox East Roman Empire had been a rival of Western civilization both on political, cultural and religious matters. Byzantine⁸ Empire saw itself as the legitimate successor of the Roman Empire and claimed its western territories. Europeans rejected this argument and a new Holy Roman Empire was established. This created a political schism between the western and eastern territories of the old Roman Empire. This schism was also accompanied with a religious one. Western Christianity claimed its universality and considered itself as the sole legitimate religion (in fact as *the only* religion) thus took the name of Catholic. Eastern church differed from its western counterpart on some basics of Christianity. Unsuccessful tries for unification resulted in total exclusion of the Eastern Church and deepened the schism between western and eastern parts of Europe. Orthodox Christians were seen as heretics by their western counterparts. They did not belong to the Catholic Christendom and were put in position of the other.

However Orthodox Christians were fellow brothers compared to Muslims. Muslim Arabs became a real threat to the Christianity after the eighth century. They conquered south Mediterranean and the Holy lands. In the west they invaded Iberian Peninsula and pushed back the East Roman Empire in the east. In the mid-fifteenth century, under the banner of Turks, Islam conquered the Byzantine Empire and put an end to the last remnants of the Roman Empire. The threat that Muslims posed to Christianity did not cease to exist until the end of the seventeenth century although it had a setback in the fifteenth century.

⁸ The name 'Byzantium Empire' was not what Byzantines called themselves. They considered themselves, and writer of this document agrees with them, as East Roman Empire and after the fall of the western part of the Empire as Roman Empire. 'Byzantium' comes from the name of city that Constantinople was built upon and was given by Europeans.

Islamic civilization shared the characteristics of both early barbaric invaders and the Orthodox Christians. It posed a threat to the existence of Christianity and thus Latin Christendom like the former; and was also a considerable political and cultural rival as the latter was.

Doubtless Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to Christianity, geographically and culturally. It drew on the Judeo-Hellenic traditions, it borrowed creatively from Christianity, it could boast of unrivalled military and political success. Nor was this all. The Islamic lands sit adjacent to and even on top of the Biblical lands; moreover, the heart of the Islamic domain has always been the region closest to Europe, what has been called the Near Orient or Near East... From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, Islam ... dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. That Islam outstripped and outshone Rome cannot have been absent from the mind of any European past or present. (Said, 1991: 74)

Islam was a natural enemy of Christianity, resembling Christianity in many ways and claiming both its worldly and other worldly throne. Only way to stop and repel Islam was to wage war against it. But first of all the legitimacy had to be provided for such an action and it could be done by showing how pervert, how barbarous, how anti-Christian it was. Thus the Western Christianity found its perfect other in the image of Islam.

In order to by-pass traditional trade routes passing through lands of Islam, Europeans initiated sea expeditions to find new routes to trade centres of Far East. These expeditions led to discoveries of unknown lands and totally changed hitherto scheme of the world. Newly discovered lands were inhabited by peoples. Peoples who were never thought to exist. Technologically they were very primitive. They and their homelands were easily subjugated by Europeans for material ends. Their incapability for resistance strengthened the thought of superiority of European civilization. Accompanied by developments in late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sciences,

especially anthropology, Europeans were able to define a supreme identity for themselves by placing natives of those lands in the place of the other.

Europeans have always been successful in finding or creating its other both from insiders and outsiders. Thus an additional other can be added to the three headings mentioned above. It could be 'the other' within Europe. Scattered peoples, like Jews, living on European soil also contributed to the European identification as a means of otherness. They lived in Europe under the same circumstances with Europeans. And if there were to be anything like a commonly shared European identity, they deserved to be a part of it. Nevertheless they were always perceived as aliens to civilizations they lived within for generations and were never incorporated into them by their fellow Europeans. On the contrary they were always conceived as external to Christian characteristics of Europe and were left outside. However they are not among the subjects of this thesis and duly will be no further examined.

Europeans have looked at the other as if they were looking at a mirror. As a mirror reverses the image of the self, the other becomes the transverse of European. The left becomes right and the right turns into wrong. When European looked in the mirror, he saw his exact opposite, the anti-European. The other was barbarian and nomad whereas European was civilized and settles. The other was inclined towards destroying whereas European was apt in building. The other was anti-Christian or non-Christian whereas European was Christian. The other was despotic, authoritative and slavish whereas Europeans were free peoples.

The lens through which Europeans looked at the other changed its shape, as their relationship with the other evolved through time. It evolved from a feeling of inferiority first into a feeling of equality and shortly after towards superiority.

Europeans' perceiving the world and thus themselves also evolved inline with this relationship.

Religion played a crucial role in defining European's relations with the other. In a sense the otherness depended on being a Christian or not. Even as it was in the case of Orthodox Christianity, being a Christian was not enough in itself to be considered as a part of the Latin Christendom that was dominated by Catholic Christendom which was organized and Christianized continuously with institutions tied to Papacy. Christianization process, be it either through new conversions or protection of consistency of old conversions, was an ongoing process under control of the Papacy (Braudel, 2001). Once the barbaric tribes and kingdoms of north and east converted into Catholic Christianity and thus became a natural part of Latin Christendom they lost their otherness. On the other hand even for its being a successor of Roman heritage and for its Christian identity, Byzantine Empire was placed among the others of western Christianity. Still eastern Christians were considered as deceived and their sins were redeemable if they were to offer their allegiance to the Papacy and give up their perverted interpretations of Christianity. With this respect they were seen as demi-Christians compared to anti-Christian Muslims.

As Nordic tribes of Europe converted into Christianity and cultural and political centres of Europe shifted towards the west, the south-north divisionary line coming from Roman heritage ceased to exist. It was replaced with another line drawn vertically along north-south direction this time separating west from east. Muslims took precedence over other peoples in becoming the arch-enemy and thus the supreme other of Europeans.

In the eleventh century Europe was in economic despair. Remnants of the mighty Roman Empire were just a shadow of what they used to be. Europe was disintegrated into tiny independent parts and feudalism became the dominant regime. The feudal regime was reflection of a defensive stance. A castle situated preferably over a hill provided security to its surrounding territory. Each was cut off from each other. Yet there was a visible civilizational and cultural similarity between separated political units of Europe. Religious, cultural and ethical values are same through each and every fief. The Crusades between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries depict this unity (Braudel, 2001: 357). Crusades were organized first of all in order to repulse the expanding Islam. Islam was not seen as a religion but as a heretical sect of Christianity and its prophet Mohammed was a liar. So, to leave the holy lands to the hands of Muslims was out of question. Also Europe was not yet to recover from destruction of barbaric invasions and was in poverty. Tales about richness of the Orient were tempting Europeans struggling for survival. Here the other and the European have their places on the opposite sides of the spectrum. In a sense burden of Europe's poverty was put on shoulders of Muslims and Crusades were retribution of their evil deeds.

Crusades had short-lived success and after 1270 no other crusade was organized, at least in the character of a counter-offensive movement. Later, crusade type initiatives were organized by the leading states of Europe against the infidel Turk. However, they were just in defensive manner that they were made in order to protect a Christian land or to prevent Turks from further advancing into European heartland rather than being offensive ones made for reclaiming lands from the infidel. This reflects the weaker position of Europe compared to the other, the Turks this time.

Although Christianity had secured its grounds in European continent, it had lost its homelands, which were Jerusalem centred Middle East and North Africa, to the infidel and was in constant retreat. Whatever the nature of the Turk was, it was a fact that he was invincible on battlefield. This was an irony for Christians. They were supposed to be favoured children of the God and should be granted victory over the infidel. But what happened was the contrary. By some, Turks were considered as a castigation of God for the sins Europeans had committed. And the sin could be redeemed by ceasing fighting with each other and uniting against the anti-Christian. Dividedness of Christians were enabling the despotic and heretic other to gain victory over them.

There was a dilemma for the Europeans in identifying themselves and the other. European political system was seen as superior to the Orient's for it provided Europeans with much more freedom. On the other hand they also envied discipline the other had. Turks did not inherit their titles from their fathers. Instead titles were given to those who were worthy of them. In Europe it was just the opposite. Nevertheless between the late sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire had entered into a period of stagnation and the Europe was on the way of increasing its pace of development on every aspect. As the Turk's power diminished and begun losing its all wars with the European, the latter gained more confidence in himself.

In the eighteenth century Europeans' interpretation of the other began to change drastically. Cause of this was not only diminishing power of the Orient but also Europe's increased dominance over all other parts of the world. Europeans had discovered new cultures and civilizations, although they did not see them either as

culture or civilization, via exploration of overseas. These primitive peoples were not considered as anti-Christian, as Levantines were, but as non-Christians who could be converted into Christianity.

In the “Age of Exploration” as over against the preceding “Age of Crusades,” the Other is not anti-Christian, as the ever threatening Moors had been, but *non-Christian*. This non-Christian is also a *potential* Christian... In the papal bull of 1537 Paul III declares that the Indians are “true man,” capable of receiving the Christian faith and that, essentially, they are “equal” to European Christians (McGrane, 1989: 14).

With the enlightenment, Europeans began to interpret themselves and the other from a different perspective. Knowledge of the Europeans on nature was increasing with each passing year. Scientific inquiry made it possible to grasp or understand better how the world was. This was an awakening, an increase in the self-awareness. The European held the key to the universe in his hands which anyone other than him lacked.

The self-identity of the Enlightenment is aligned with knowledge *as opposed to* the identity of the unenlightened, alien Other that is aligned with ignorance: Enlightenment knowledge consists in awareness of ignorance and ignorance consists of nonawareness of ignorance. *Not knowing about ignorance* is the very being of ignorance. The Ignorance of the Other consists of his ignorance of Ignorance. The alien Others are seen as ignorant because they don't know that they don't know. What they don't know is the nature of ignorance. The Other manifests the incarnation not of sin and Satan but of Ignorance (McGrane, 1989: 71-72).

This statement was not only valid for primitive peoples of the new world but also for more advanced civilizations of the Orient. Once it was the land of glorious civilizations, the Near East was in decay. Levantines resided at a land which bore civilizational treasures but were unaware of them and themselves. They had nothing that Europeans could learn from them. On the contrary if they were to learn something, only Europeans could teach them because they did not know how to

acquire knowledge. With these regards any valuable knowledge should be sought, found and appropriated. Europeans had the monopoly over each and every piece of knowledge. After all, the others were in no position to make use of them.

In the nineteenth century the war against the Orient was already won and Christianization of the New World was already finished. Though it was not acquired exactly through conversion of native inhabitants but rather with purposeful or accidental (via Old World originated viruses) extinction of natives, especially in the North America, and their replacement with European immigrants. Nevertheless European powers secured their dominance throughout the world. This dominance paved the way for Europeans to treat the other as an object. The other became the object of developing sciences and thus of inquiry. They were classified and put in order according to their level of civilizational development compared to European states.

So, with the eighteenth century Enlightenment, Europe began to have a different meaning other than being the name of a continent. It became the land of civilization with which Europeans identified themselves. A sense and awareness of existence of a common European identity and a distinct European culture was born. In other words, the idea of Europe was born.

2.4.2 The Idea of Europe

Although Western Europeans were able to define themselves in unison against the others, they were still diversified among themselves. Rise of the modern state did not help the Europeans in mitigating their diversities. They kept on competing with each other even they shared a common attitude towards the other. Nevertheless the late twentieth century witnessed a unity of western European states that were once

considered as arch-enemies. Explanations for such a unity are thought to rest in the history of Europe and in its shared heritage. So, the idea of Europe became a crucial subject of investigation.

To talk of a notion of European idea necessitates looking into validity of some positive assumptions that come along with it. Integration process of Europe that we face with today treats these assumptions in an a priori manner. In so doing it also treats itself as a natural outcome of an ongoing process coming from the history of Europe. This way the EU becomes embodiment of the idea of Europe and of Europe that idea represents. Three concepts bring out the idea of Europe that:

- There *is* something called ‘Europe’ (some kind of European ‘specification’).
- Europeans *hold* a perception of themselves as being European (they have something of a European ‘self-identity’).
- History *reveals* schemes for European unity (politics *for* and *in the name of* ‘Europe’). (Wilson, 1996, p. 9)

So we have before us Europeans aware of their place in this world and of themselves, united by an unprecedented organization, the EU.

Does history of Europe really provides the idea of Europe with necessary arsenal for its existence and defence as these positive assumptions put forward? The answer can be positive or negative. In either case still there *will be* an idea of Europe. Here the crucial question “whether the idea of Europe is an end in itself or is used as a means for some other ends?” would be more appropriate to ask. And the answer of the first can also be the answer of the second as well.

Pim den Boer indicates three main elements in the history of the idea of Europe, which are the identification of Europe: i- with liberty; ii- with Christendom; and iii-

with civilization (1996: 13). Notion of political freedom that was associated with Europe was first born in Greece of fifth century BC, whereas in the fifteenth century and during the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Europe was identified with Christendom and civilization respectively.

Europe was only a geographical expression until the Enlightenment. Beginning with the Enlightenment and deepening after the 1789 French Revolution, the Europe began to develop as an idea and an ideal (Wilson, 1996). European white man was ruling all over the world and had not met with a match for his power in it. Its uncontested power and supremacy were facts and rapidly developing natural and social sciences were eager to deduct from these facts the laws of nature. As no other people in the world were capable of achieving such a development, Europe and *Europeans* had to be distinguished from the others. Within this context "... it was in the nineteenth century that these various identifications of Europe were not only rediscovered, but also reassessed and given unprecedented prominence"(den Boer, 1996: 13), which in turn led to a rise of self-awareness of European intelligentsia. Europe of the nineteenth century, which has proven its dominance over the whole world on economic, political and cultural domains in combination with and with the help of its supreme military power, distinguished itself from everything which was not considered as European, based on a more systematic ideological construction of Europe.

In order to examine place of the idea of Europe within the history of Europe, I will use den Boer's three elements, namely liberty, Christendom, and civilization, that are attributable to the idea of Europe and European identity.

i- Political freedom of the West vs. the despotic East

As Greeks distinguished themselves from both northerners (Europeans) and easterners (Asiatic peoples), they considered themselves to bear the best traits of both worlds. Depending on climatic judgments, Europeans were considered as apt in warfare but lacking in skills and brain, for their cold habitat, whereas Asians lacked necessary conditions to be good soldiers but were skilled and had brains. Both Hippocrates and Aristotle drew this conclusion but Aristotle adds the superiority of Greeks over the others which comes from the combination of “the positive characteristics of the peoples of both continents” thanks to their “intermediate geographical position between the Europeans and the Asians” (den Boer, 1996: 16-17).

Even though Greeks did not consider themselves as Europeans (on the contrary they clearly distinguished themselves from Europe), they have become the core element of the idea of Europe. Or more precisely, they have been integrated into the European idea and were in a sense Europeanized with the process beginning with Renaissance and gaining its peak at Enlightenment. Important thing here for this study is the distinction the Greeks made among themselves and the others. As they became more and more European, the dual distinction they made with themselves and both Europeans and Asians was already reduced to a distinction between the western Christendom and the East. For Greeks, Persians represented the despotic nature of Asiatic peoples. Their rulers were despots ruling over submissive and passive natured peoples of Asia. On the other hand Greeks themselves were free and democratic peoples who had attained a political excellence. They lived and died for themselves whereas Persians lived and died for their rulers. As the relative

intellectual dominance of Greek thought shifted towards the centre of Europe, especially Rome, this dual distinction that was used by them was adopted in the way that Europe was replaced by its northern neighbours, still distinguished with their being inhabitants of a cold climate, and Greeks vs. Persians with Romans vs. Carthagians and later on with Christians vs. Muslims.

ii- The Latin Christendom vs. Islamic world and the idea of Europe

The Empire and the Papacy had always ruled over separate domains in the western part of Europe. Although Papacy was entitled to crown the elected emperor of Holy Roman Empire and other Christian kings of Europe; had the right to excommunicate a king and his kingdom as a whole; and hold enormous economic power via its politically untouchable lands and holdings that were scattered all over Europe, it has never had necessary means to dictate its will over other rulers unless their interests coincided. Nevertheless, as Europe became more and more of a Christian land, especially "... in the course of the fifteenth century the word Europe came to be used frequently by a large number of authors" with reference to Christendom (den Boer, 1996: 34). As internal clashes and struggles among Christian rulers were abundant, identification of Europe with Christendom owes its existence to the direct threat it faced from Islam to a great extent.

After establishment of the first Islamic state under Muhammad's rule, it began to expand so rapidly. After the death of Muhammad, Muslim Arabs became neighbours to Persia and Byzantine. In the 8th century, borders of the Islamic Empire had been expanded from Indus in the East to the Iberian Peninsula in the West. A short time from after its foundation, Islam became a fearsome enemy both for the Latin and Greek Christianities.

The genealogy of image creation about Islam in Europe had three elements. The first one was the military one: namely the conquests undertaken by the Arabs, first in the Middle East, North Africa, Spain and Sicily between the seventh and the ninth centuries... The second element was the theological problems arising with the arrival of Islam, the last religion of the Judeo-Christian line, which claimed to revise and replace Christianity as a universal religion. The third one was the general lack of political unity in Christendom -which was now Europe- that coincided with the apex of Muslim Arab expansion as well as that of the Ottoman one. (Soykut, 2001: 2)

In this context Catholic Europe found a perfect other in Islam. Pontiffs could be able to unite and mobilize the masses against the Muslims as early as 11th century. The myth of rich, fertile and prosperous lands of the East, political opportunities that the Rome found at its hands and Europeans holding onto their religion strictly started the waves of crusades which would last for centuries physically and would last forever mentally. In military terms, Crusades were planned to extinguish the fire, conquests of Muslims, spreading throughout Asia, Africa and lastly Europe and to regain the lands lost to the other. Jerusalem was still a part of Christendom, thus of Europe. There was no difference between Rome and Jerusalem in that sense. Even after it was accepted that it was lost for good, it would not lose its ideological importance.

Theologically it was impossible for Catholics to accept Islam as a rightful religion. Universalism of Catholicism was a constraint for that kind of an acceptance. Islam is a religion claiming universalism like Christianity. Moreover, it is claiming to be the successor and a complement to the religions sent before it by Allah. It was accepting Christianity as a rightful religion but claiming that words of Allah were changed. The most crucial theme of Islam was that it was accepting Jesus as one of the most prominent prophets, made of flesh and blood, but not as a godly figure. This was a direct threat to the Trinity of Catholicism, which was consolidated after a hard work of the Church, lying at the core of its teachings. Church tried to learn and understand

Islam, especially at the 11th and 12th centuries, and theologians gathered data and submitted them to the pontificate⁹ with their comments. Even if these materials were impartial and objective, they were used maliciously in order to prove the heresy of Islam (Hentch, 1995: 60-63). Thus Islam took its place near paganism and Orthodoxy as a heresy of Christianity. Muhammad was seen as a converted heretic, a cheater and a liar. Legends were created about him: "... Muhammad [was claimed] to be the disciple of a certain Maurus who came to Arabia after the death of his own master Nicolaus, one of the seven deacons of Rome, and had the aspiration to become the Pope" (Soykut, 2001: 17). Once a Christian, Muhammad thus becomes a pervert and establishes his own heretical religion.

The rapid expansion of Muslims was halted in western Europe as early as the 8th century. Victory of the coalition army led by Charles Martell, the 'mayor of the palace' of Austrasia, over Moors near Poitiers played a significant role at the creation of a sense of Europeanness much later (den Boer, 1996: 26). Charles Martell has been placed among the common heroes of Europe for preventing the Islamic conquest of Europe, a significant victory for the Europeans but a nuisance for the Arabs (Lewis, 1997: 17-18). Although Muslims would stay at Spain and create a very advanced civilization for seven hundred years, they did not pose a real threat to the Europe as they did to the Byzantine. Maybe because of this or because south Iberia was never regarded as a part of a Christian Europe¹⁰, which then meant nothing more than a geographical expression, even before its invasion by Muslims, crusades against Islam were directed towards eastern Mediterranean and Muslim civilization continued to flourish until the *reconquista*.

⁹ The office of Papacy.

¹⁰ For a brief investigation of 'Spain and its Europeanness' see Işık, 1991.

This decline in the power of Arabs was replaced by another Islamic power, namely the Turks. Just a year before the reconquest of Palermo, the last bastion of Islam at Sicily, the Turks won an important battle against Byzantines at Manzikert. After depleting its power at the Manzikert, Byzantine Empire was unable to stop the invasion of Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turks. During the crusades, Seljuk Turks of Asia Minor played an important role against Europeans. After them, Ottomans would take the banners of Islam to their hands. Only within a hundred years after its establishment, Ottoman state defeated the joint armies of Christendom at the battle of Nicopolis. Still, they were not considered as a power to be reckoned with by the west Europeans, though they rapidly ascended to the merits of otherness. Only after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, nearly fifty years before the completion of *reconquista* in Spain, Turks got involved in politics of Europe as an outsider.

European states could not unite against the Ottomans because of the factional power politics of European dynasties. Still the traditionality of the other imposed on Europeans to exclude the Turks and placed them at the counter sides of the mirror. Alliances made with the Porte were kept as a secret. Any monarch allying with the *Gran Turco* would be considered as a traitor to the Christianity and his acts would be considered as illegitimate (İnalçık, 2001). Moreover, kings were usually including claims to drive the Turks back to Asia in their rhetoric in order to legitimize their actions and get support of the Europeans. Charles V of Habsburg dynasty was one of them. When fighting against the French for the control of Italian states, he claimed that he was going to attack the Turk right after providing security in Italy, thus preventing an unexpected attack behind his back. The Turk was used by the Europeans in two ways: the first as an eternal enemy of Christianity, against which

each and every waged war would be done on behalf of whole Christianity; and second as a powerful ally against other rival states of Europe, which had to be kept as a secret from other Europeans.

After the fall of the Constantinople, Catholic Church became more and more ardent in its calls for a united attack against the infidel Turks. Pope Pius II (1458-64) was the most prominent pope with regards to his continuous efforts to unite Christian Europe against Muslim Turks. As the leader of a universal church he was in a suitable position to see, or more precisely inclined to see, a Europe of united Christians. In his works he “used the terms ‘Respublica christiana’ and Europe as interchangeable synonyms, also speaking of ‘our Europe, our Christian Europe’” (den Boer, 1996: 35). Later on, it became a holy mission for each and every Pope to try his chance to unite the Europeans against the infidel Turks. This orientation did gain impetus during the Reformation and religious wars of Europe. The Pontificate saw it as an opportunity to divert the attention from the wars taking place between the Catholics and Protestants towards the so-called common enemy of Christianity, namely the Turks. Also by this way it would be able to regain the grounds it had lost to the Protestants. These attempts, too, had been fruitless in so far as the Ottomans offered their helping hands to the Protestants of east Europe against Catholics. It could have been possible to form a Holy Alliance against the Turk if the Council of Trent had achieved success. Without any conformation between Catholics and Protestants, it became impossible to organize a united action against the Turks. Moreover, Luther was preaching that the Turk was a castigation of God to Christians because of their sins and should not be resisted, an argument placing the Turk where he belongs to: among vulgar, noxious barbarian pagans as the others of Christians. In

reality, Catholic Habsburg was confronting the threat of Turk when he made this argument. Later on he changed his stance with respect to the Turks after seeing that they became a threat also for the Protestants. Once again the basic instinct within the European to use the Turk: against his European rivals on occasions when it is possible, or to increase the consciousness of Christian (European) identity among Christians (Europeans).

The otherness of the Turk was based on fear until the end of 16th century. With the naval victory of Lepanto in 1571, the image of invincible Turk was largely shaken. It "... was a Christian naval victory on an unprecedented scale and it sparked off an astonishing outpouring of celebration in the form of church services, commemorative paintings and medals, and popular literature" (Housley, 1992: 142). Though the Turk was still a fearsome enemy, his psychological effect on Christians was undergoing a contextual change. Approximately a hundred years after the battle of Lepanto, the Turks were defeated by the united forces of Christianity, which came together by the austerity of Pope Innocent XI, at the second siege of Vienna in 1683. This was a decisive defeat for the Turks that they were no more of concern of the Europeans as a threat to the existence of Christianity.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catholic world faced with separatist movements especially at German cities. Central Europe became a war field and balance of power politics added fuel to the flames burning there. The two archrivals, namely France and Habsburg Empire, intensified the destructiveness of the ongoing war between Catholics and Protestants, which would be named as Thirty Years War. Although this schism among Christians would have been expected to undermine importance of Christendom and the unity it provided for Europeans against outsiders,

the picture was somewhat different. European powers succeeded in reaching a compromise on religious tolerance and accepted to respect the right to choose between Catholicism and Protestantism at Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648. In addition to this, Protestantism did lack the necessary traits to become so opposite to Catholic world with its roots coming from the European soil itself. On the contrary, Protestants and Catholics did share just the same thoughts on others living outside Europe. Europe was a Christian land, either inhabited by Catholics or Protestants, and outside world was either Islamic, pagan, or Orthodox. Nevertheless, Europe was in brink of acquiring a new definition for itself. Religious dissents and problems they caused, and Europe's expansion all over the world via colonialism gave a different role for Christianity. The fall of Ottoman Empire in terms of the potential threat it posed towards Europe after their defeats in 1680s and scientific developments that were about to come out especially with general acceptance of Newton's physics led to a great transformation in the self-image of Europe (Bernal, 1998: 291).

iii- The rise of civilization of Europe

Enlightenment of the eighteenth century provided Europe with different means to identify itself. As Boer states:

Christianity continued to play a role in the self-image of European during the eighteenth century but it was no longer the dominant force that it had been in previous centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century Europe and Christendom were no longer synonyms. European feelings of superiority were based on a conglomeration of ideas proceeding from the Enlightenment which, in turn, came to be associated with the notion of civilization (den Boer, 1996).

Approximately from eighth to seventeenth century Europe was under direct threat of Islamic incursions. Between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries Europe tried to extinguish the Islamic threat via Crusades. However in the following centuries it

changed its aggressive stance towards a defensive one. With the increase in its maritime power and with the colonization process, and ultimately after the diminished power of Ottomans, it turned the tide against its adversaries. Economic and scientific progress went hand in hand with each other and provided Europe with a total supremacy over American, African and Asian peoples. As Europeans found themselves in a superior position compared to these peoples, they also found themselves in a position to define and classify those inferior peoples, reducing them to mere objects of investigation. Europe became the sole bearer and representative of a higher civilization. On the other hand, diminished importance of Christianity and the idea of Christendom at European politics because of the rise of Protestantism in the seventeenth century and later the impetus that secular thought gained at the eighteenth century, did not impede colonialist Europeans to undertake the mission of spreading Christianity to the primitive peoples of colonized lands. Europeans were not only bringing salvation to the souls of other peoples via Christianity but also spreading benefits that their civilization provided with the cultivation of lands that were previously left out of use by the natives. But what they brought with them had been enslavement of the natives, who did not have the right over the lands which they did not cultivate (Bernal, 1998: 297), instead of the freedom to which the European civilization adhered itself.

In the eighteenth century, secular thought began to gain grounds at European thought. Prudent criticism of Christianity at the Renaissance period began to be replaced by direct criticism of it with the Enlightenment. Europe and Europeans were no more defined solely with reference to their Christianity but more and more based on their cultural and civilizational advancement compared to the others. Of course

Christianity was still one of the dominant traits of Europeans but could not be enough alone to define European civilization (den Boer, 1996: 64). In relation with Europe, “concept civilization had a clear and positive connotation, coinciding with a growing feeling of European superiority” and it was conceived “as a process directed towards an ideal state” (den Boer, 1996: 64). With the achievements it made and with its unstoppable pace of progress which let it to assert its domination over other parts of the world, “Europe should be [and was] seen as the embodiment of the highest level of civilization” (den Boer, 1996: 65). In the nineteenth century, Europe and concept civilization could no more be separated and both became identical with each other.

Advent of various branches of science, especially the natural sciences, and their indispensable role at developments that took place in Europe, made the science the most reliable source for understanding and in giving a meaning what things really are. Its definitions of the world are taken as absolute truth. Its superiority was not just coming from its Greek roots but more than that from the unprecedented way Europeans were able to process it. Thus the Europeans hold the power to know what things really were and knowing could be done through scientific exploration. Science was (and still is) considered as the supreme means which enabled human beings to rule over nature. And the Europeans were considered as the only ones who were apt scientists. Thus they held the power to rule over nature, and the world, in their very hands. This power gave Europeans the opportunity to treat the others as if they were mere objects to be classified and defined with the help of scientific inquiry.

A constituent part of relationship of Europe with its others is its interaction with the East. As mentioned above once the land of formidable arch-enemy of Europe until

end of the seventeenth century, with the increase in power of Europe, the East took its share from the change in the way Europeans defined the world in compliance with European science. Orient became one of the fields of research to which any travel that was made was considered to be made to another dimension that was out of time and space when compared to Europe. Orientalism, very roughly could be explained as the knowledge about the East, not only did try to explain what the East was but also tried to consolidate the thought of what Europe was by emphasizing on what the East was not. One of the meanings Said used to define Orientalism is:

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Said, p. 3),

which could be extended for other parts of world where Europeans got involved with. In this context, repeating once more, the other is reduced to an object which becomes an anti-European image. Europe is everything that the others are not. Europe could only be subject who would understand what things really are because he alone stands at the height where he can be able to see everything whereas the other could only be object who is unaware of her own characteristics just because it is beyond her capability to do so. So she should be treated as if she is a child who needs to be taught, or as a woman to be conquered and ruled over. In most occasions Europe takes the form of a man, Orient is embodied in a woman's image, and other primitive peoples are considered as infants at best and even as inhuman at worst. Europe is progressive, in control of nature; the others are stagnant and are the nature itself. European civilization is identical with the time itself, where the others are considered stuck at some point in the past and/or even out of history. Europe is the master and the teacher in a world where the others could be either students or

servants, both of which are signs of former's generosity. In short, Europeans stand at the top of everything whereas the others have their places in the descending steps of the ladder.

2.5 European Integration and European Identity

Europe of the twentieth century faced with two terrible great wars that had devastated the Continent, especially the latter one. After the World War II, mentally divided Europe became physically divided also. Western part of the continent fell under the influence of the USA whereas the Eastern part was left to the control of Soviet Russia. In order to create a stable Europe free from any kind of aggression, the USA directly involved in the European affairs and utilized its resources to form a united Europe which would stand with the help of it against a possible Soviet threat. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) became the embodiment of these efforts of the USA. It was thought first to reduce the tension between arch-rivals, namely France and Germany, by creating a kind of cooperation among European powers on management of crucial natural resources. From the functionalist point of view, this cooperation on economic matters would in turn pave the way for cooperation on political matters also. Integration process went on and in the 1980s the European Economic Community (EEC) reached the number of twelve members. But still it was thought to lack the necessary fuel that Europe needed to act as a single body on more important matters. Until 1987, it was considered as a regional organization merely involved in unimportant economic regulations and seemed to go on like this. With the signing of Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, everybody was surprised that members of the Community decided to deepen the integration. The end of 1980s brought even more surprises and at the beginning of the 1990s world faced

with the unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union. This development enabled Europe to fit itself in a much broader picture that would increase its role and power in the world.

European integration is not only an economic and political process but it is also a cultural project (Shore, 2000). “European integration has been a top-down, elite-led process that has taken place largely over the heads of the public who, according to the opinion polls, remain largely indifferent or hostile to the EC” (Shore, 1996: 475). This characteristic of European integration makes it a project, a construction. However, cultural policies for increasing Euro-awareness have been initiated much later after the establishment the ECSC. The EU, then the EC, initiated policies that would result in an increase of feelings of solidarity, unity, and belongingness to a common European identity among the Europeans. In June 1985, the twelve circular yellow starred, azure coloured flag was adopted as flag representing the Community. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony – the ‘Ode to Joy’- was accepted as the ‘anthem of European unification’. Harmonized European passport, driving license and car number-plates were other symbolic vehicles that were considered to contribute to the awareness of a European identity (Shore, 2000). But the main attention was given first of all to media and communication channels and then to education. Information channels and media were considered as perfect means to spread ‘European consciousness’ to the masses¹¹. European education programmes, like Socrates, Erasmus, and provided scholarships, would create the future elites (or missionaries) of Europe who would adhere themselves to the ‘European project’.

¹¹ For the impact of communication media on definitions of ‘self’ and ‘the other’ see Morley and Robins, 1995.

All these symbols and consciousness-building measures raised the question of nation states and national identities versus a European state and European identity (Shore, 1996; Shore, 2000; Smith, A. D., 1992; Smith, A. D., 1993; Schlesinger, 1992) and the myths those nations and identities depend on (Hansen and Williams, 1999). Debates on future of the EU revolve around the transformation of the nation state and on the question whether the EU will supersede national states and become a super-state. Looking through the mirror of the nation state, 'European identity' and its constitution is compared to the national identities. All the symbols mentioned above are *sine qua non* of a nation state. They create the differences between national identities by defining allegiances. So, the main problem here is whether the new 'European identity' will shift allegiances of Europeans from nation states to the EU and thus whether the EU will replace European states.

A. D. Smith talks of two important components of collective cultural identity that provides us with a third. These are: a sense of shared *continuity* on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population; shared *memories* of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit; and the collective belief in a common *destiny* of that unit and its culture (Smith, A. D., 1992: 58). Myths play an important role in providing the continuity coming from history and stretching towards the future for collective identities. Hansen and Williams claim that functionalism, which is the most appropriate theory in explaining European integration, has created its own covert myth which is modernity as rationalization (Hansen and Williams, 1999). This myth can provide Europeans with a common future and thus create continuity that any collective identity is in need of. "The future becomes open because the rationality of modernity is able to *remake* it, and to do so

in terms that rely not on any particular geographic or historical point of origin, but on a timeless reason which opens the way to an infinite future of global expanse” (Hansen and Williams, 1999: 244). Historical developments in European history are taken as reference points that step by step evolved Europe to this end.

Returning to A. D. Smith, he approaches the problem with the traditional myths that constitute a society. He argues that the dilemma of choosing “between unacceptable historical myths and memories on the one hand, and on the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific ‘culture’ held together solely by the political will and economic interest” lies before the new Europe. Instead he suggests Europeans to forge their collective identity on ‘family of cultures’ (Smith, A. D., 1992: 74). For him:

[T]here *are* shared traditions, legal and political, and shared heritages, religious and cultural. Not all Europeans share in all of them; some share in particular traditions and heritages only minimally. But one time or another all Europe’s communities have participated in at least *some* of these traditions and heritages, in some degree (Smith, A. D., 1992: 70).

These shared traditions and heritages include “traditions like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, and Judeo-Christian ethics, and cultural heritages like Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, and romanticism and classicism” (Smith, A. D., 1992: 70). These traditions and heritages constitute what A. D. Smith calls as ‘family of cultures’.

Nevertheless all these arguments bear in themselves the understanding of a progress that dominates European history. European integration and unification is not a break up with the past. On the contrary, it is a continuation and outcome of history. The EU is the recent stage that Europe is in. This conclusion results in further investigation of the ‘European identity’ in relation to the EU.

Even before the new phase that the integration got into at the end of the 1980s, the idea of Europe had been one of the elements that Western Europeans adhered themselves to. It was this very common European heritage coming from ancient Greece, Roman Empire, Christianity (although it was not stated overtly by the majority), Renaissance and Reformation to some extent, Enlightenment, and development of modern state which Europeans 'shared in common' at least some of them (Smith, A. D., 1992). Depending on this idea of Europe, European unity was within the grasp of Europeans via integration of European states. The European Community and later the European Union emphasized more and more on a shared European identity that would be a fundamental element as the cement of reconstructed Europe. Euro-barometers are prepared to see the degree of Europeans' commitment to this European identity. Increased numbers of Europeans identifying themselves with a general European identity is considered as the reflection of their commitment to the ideals put forward by the institutions of the Union.

Thus European identity became one of the leading themes since the 1990s for anyone who is dealing with the EU enlargement. It plays a crucial role at restructuring of the new Europe. Some people refer to it as a unifying element of peoples of Europe when they want to stress their optimistic views for a united Europe whereas Eurosceptics emphasize on its absence or on its artificiality. For this thesis it is not crucial to draw a conclusion out of facts or opinions and find an answer to the question whether there is a European identity or not. The focus is, rather, on the implicit and explicit implications of a generally accepted European identity and of its ways of definition on the enlargement of the EU towards the East Europe.

The notion of European identity is today conceived to a great extent with relation to the EU. This is because it is mostly used interchangeably with the notion of European citizenship which is adopted by the institutions of the EU in the process of construction of an identity based on the legal and to a certain extent on cultural aspects of Europeans that are citizens of the member states of the EU. Although the two are distinct concepts, it is a fact that they are very much intertwined because they both are constructed within a social context and in their construction they can share the same elements. Even substituting one with the other can be acceptable depending on the context they are used. Nevertheless we should distinguish each from the other. Identities can be forged depending on various factors, namely genetic, economic, cultural, political, etc. Whereas citizenship is a legal construction although it could be defined with reference to the same factors used in the formation of identities. Still citizenship is very much bound to a place and requires a formal recognition of an authority even in times it is automatically acquired. As Somers states "... the term *citizenship* addresses the generic problem of the freedoms, rights, and duties between 'the people' of a territorially bounded polity, and of that polity's institutions of rule" (Somers, 1995: 242). On the other hand identities can transcend the borders, like religious and ethnic identities, and do not necessitate approval from an official institution, like one does not have to register his/her sexual choice. Moreover even the way we use the terms suggests a distinction to be made between them that we use citizenship in its plural form none at all whereas it is impossible for a human being not to have multiple identities.

To distinguish between the concepts of 'identity' and 'citizenship' is important that they are very much used interchangeably within the context of Europeanness that is

under construction and at monopoly of the EU. The cultural implications of a *European identity* are used as foundations of a *European citizenship* that is considered to be one of the most important aspects of belonging to Europe, or in other words one of the elements of sharing *Europeanness*. This policy, led foremost by the Commission, to find a common ground for a shared European identity, which in turn could constitute grounds for legitimizing construction of the European citizenship in legal sense, is in accordance with, or more accurately in parallel with, the emerging European constitution. As constitutions do provide the basis of rights and duties of the citizens at the national level, so it could be expected to be alike with the European constitution. In other words, via the mostly debated European constitution the EU would further materialize European citizenship which would be based on legal terms.

So, on legal terms European citizenship implies existence and application of same rights and obligations for all peoples from different nationalities on European level (Lehning, 2001). Taken this definition as a basis, it could be said that the EU has already granted Europeans with European citizenship by the supremacy of community law over national laws. However citizenship does not have only legal implications. It is also about political participation. As modern state spread its control over its citizens, through obligations required for acquisition of that state's citizenship, it provided them with some rights. Right to vote and right to be elected were among the basic political rights provided to citizens. In addition, accountability of the elected body to the society in general for its actions is another aspect of the relationship between the state and the citizens. Also this elected body holds in its hands the power delegated to it from the citizens. The EU's institutional structure

lacks this very basic requirement. It does provide representation of Europeans at the European Parliament (EP) via European wide elections but the EP lacks the necessary means and power to have a saying in the EU politics. Thus making the EU fall short of representing the general will of the citizens of Europe.

In order to overcome this problem the EP is thought to have more powers and should be more alike with its national counterparts. But even if this would be the case “[t]he argument in favour of bringing the EU closer to ‘its’ citizens by strengthening the power of the European Parliament, for example, presupposes either that a European citizenry already exists or that it should be created, and that the primary difficulties lie in structural and procedural barriers to its representation within the institutions of the Union” (Hansen and Williams, 1999: 237). In this context, European citizenship is more of a cultural construction which in turn is expected to have legal and political implications. It could be considered as an integral part of a ‘project for Europe’ (Bugge, 1996) which is embraced by the EU as an initiative.

From the neofunctionalist perspective, creation of European citizenship can be considered as an outcome of spill over effect. As mentioned above, integration on economic areas has also led to proximity of political and cultural issues. In other words cooperation on less problematic issues, economics in this case, helped the European states to learn how to mitigate their discrepancies on more serious issues, like politics. Thus benefits of economic integration created grounds for a spill over affect and raised the consciousness of achieving the same benefits also from political integration. This in turn necessitates and brings out a stronger organization. As the EU’s role in European politics did increase, the integration reached a higher level

and paved the way for the creation of European citizenship which would create an 'ever closer' union.



CHAPTER III

SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF EUROPE

The fall of iron curtain, alleged political and ideological divisionary line, from Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea coasts in the south, separating two halves of Europe, namely the Western and the Eastern parts, since partition of Europe between the Soviet Russia and the USA at 1944, undoubtedly opened a new phase in history. Rather than providing a sound ground for appropriateness Fukuyama's term 'end of history', implying the achievement of ultimate level of governance that could be acquired through the course of history with the establishment of liberal democracies, this unexpected development unleashed a new dynamism for both construction and reconstruction of new formations and already existing formations respectively. Everything that has been taken for granted and seen as constant changed within a few years.

Abolishment of the Soviet Union that was lying from the western coast of Pacific Ocean as far as to the inlands of Europe had its resonance all over the world. Disintegration of the Soviet Union had its impact world wide not only because of the geography it occupied. Failure of the communist ideology that the Soviet Union proposed created far more important consequences for both other communist and

capitalist states. Dismantlement of the Soviet Union was considered as a triumph of liberal democracies, or capitalist economies more accurately, over the authoritarian communist governance. This would really mark the end of history as Fukuyama suggested if change has not been at a very large scale and unexpected. Indeed newly independent states of Eastern Europe could mark the end of history with their adherence to the liberal democratic ideals of the west. Nevertheless new challenges facing both parts of Europe necessitates a much more cautious approach in interpreting possible outcomes of the reconstruction of Europe. If these changes should impose much more burden than liberal policies could cope with, then it is possible for some adaptations to take place, which may 'rehistoricize' Europe.

Iron Curtain had been the divisionary line between *the West* and *the East* during the cold-war period until 1989. Literally it was the border between Europe and *the East* although it passed through the centre of Europe. Separation of East European countries from *the East* created new challenges for both parts of Europe. Easterners no more wanted to be seen as part of a civilization which was regarded as backward compared to the western civilization. Failure of a whole system in providing a better living for its citizens on all accounts, like politics, culture and most importantly economics, was very much addressed to the Oriental traits of it. Under these circumstances, newly independent states of Eastern Europe rejected any kind of responsibility for or an active participation in the politics of former Soviet Union and thus disclaimed their organic connections, of which being voluntary or involuntary does not matter, that endured for half a century. They cut their ties not with just the former Soviet Union but especially with the Russian hegemony which they hold it responsible for their staying backward compared to western societies. As a result of

this they turned their faces from the incapable, stagnant societies of the east to the well developed, dynamic societies of the west. They adhered themselves to the ideals of western thought and enthusiastically emphasized on their claims of their historical rights to be part of the west. In so doing, they not only based their claims to be a part of western civilization on congruence between them and the west but also their distinct traits from their eastern neighbours. Although discourse of belongingness is much more emphasized than distinctiveness from the east, still the latter indicates an exclusive approach emphasizing creation of an east which is considered to lack the necessary conditions for belonging to the west, and thus also differentiates from newly claimants of European heritage, in order to fall within the borders of the west.

Boundaries are important that they define who we are or what we are through defining where we are. They separate us from the others so that we distinguish ourselves. Because of that it is easier to know nature of a thing residing within clear cut boundaries. As boundaries become blurred, so do places. They become ambiguous when their tangible determinants and mental perceptions do not coincide with each other. Or from a different approach, they become blurred when there is more than one boundary that does not have overlapping divisionary lines. So, there can be more than one boundary that separate distinct entities based on different criteria.

Border means distinction. It is drawn to separate what cannot be united, what cannot live together. European is accustomed to borders. Everything should have its boundaries; everything should know its limits. European knew the limits so did he draw the borders all over the world. The most crucial of them was his own which he himself could not agree upon. To draw the *borders* of Europe meant to decide who

were to be within Europe and thus considered as European. The end of the twelfth century made it necessary to draw the new borders: borders that were to decide how the new Europe was to be.

In this chapter the role that boundaries of Europe played in creation/recreation of Europe will be examined within various spaces and times. How they are perceived, shifted and which one of them gained precedence over others in relation with the other at different times.

3.1 Historical and Geographical References

The question “What is Europe?” is a very tricky and hard question to answer. No other continent of the world is as hard to define as Europe is. When we say America, be it South or North, or Africa, or Asia we think of concrete political or geographical boundaries for each of them which is not the case for Europe. Europe does not have stable boundaries but has shifting political, cultural and geographical boundaries over the course of history and from person to person. Even for some, Europe, in its very essence, is just a tiny peninsula of the huge landmass of Asia. But because of the contradictory characteristics of its inhabitants compared to their Asian counterparts, and its distinctive historical development from any part of the world, Europe resembles an entity that should be treated almost as if it is an island separated from the rest of the world, especially from Asia with which it is directly connected geographically. Significance of the borders, or its boundaries in another sense, stems just from this distinctiveness of Europe from the rest with its each and every characteristic.

The borders of Europe have always been ambiguous, especially when its eastern frontiers are considered. It could be said that only after two decisive events, western

and southern borders of Europe have been fixed to what we understand of it today: the conquest of Palermo by Normans in 1061, and the successful completion of Spanish *reconquista* after the take-over of Granada from last remnants of independent Moriscos in 1492. Even incursions of Ottomans into Friuli and invasion of Otranto in the late 15th century could not be enough to change the tide that had turned against Muslims in the Western Europe and Southern Europe. Still, they were important in showing that today's assured borders of Europe were under constant threat of forces, namely Ottomans, considered as outsiders by inhabitants of Europe. Striking point at those events is that they had not been undertaken to secure a geography which was thought to be a natural part of a continent. Rather they were actions taken by Catholic Christians against peoples considered as infidels. Especially at Iberian Peninsula, *reconquista* was considered as a process of expansion and consolidation of a Catholic Kingdom by conquest, expulsion and/or eradication of infidels, especially Muslims and Jews. Motivation was not to secure European lands in west. Nevertheless they stayed unchanged since then and became fixed borders of Europe in the west.

When we look at the Europe of late medieval times and of Renaissance and Reformation, we can see that not only its external borders but also Europe's internal borders were far from being consistent with today's borders. Spain consolidated its sovereignty over Iberian Peninsula, except Portugal, in the late 15th century. Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabelle of Castille not only united four kingdoms of Spain, namely Castille, Aragon, Navarre, and Granada, but also established a strong centralized monarchy by breaking the authority of the Cortes¹² and eradicating the very existence of Jews and Moors from the peninsula (Ferguson, 1962: 354-56).

¹² An assembly representing the upper and middle classes, something like the French Estates General.

Later on Spain became one of the scattered lands of Habsburg Empire. France could only secure its monarchic kingdom after the Hundred Years' War, thanks to the consciousness of belonging to a French nationhood that was acquired against the English. France then became the foremost threat to the political configuration of Europe under Louis the XIVth. Northern provinces of Netherlands fought against the Habsburg Spain for their independencies during the second half of 16th century and were able to create the state of Netherlands only after the Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648. There was neither a united Germany nor Italy. Germanic city-states were part of the Habsburg Empire during the fifteenth century. Italian city-states were constantly under the threat of invasion of other European states and to some extent of the Ottoman Empire. Germany and Italy would form their unity as late as the 19th century and become consolidated states, as we understand today. War between monarchs for authority over disputed lands was very common. Intertwined character of dynasties was leading to claims from different monarchs over same land pieces. Monarchs were trying to extend territories of their states either by inheritance, by marriage or by direct conquest. States in modern sense with relatively defined territories would not spread over Europe until the period beginning with the French Revolution of 1789.

This unstable character of Europe's internal borders always paved the way for the rise of various hegemonic powers within Europe that were prone to achieve the holy mission of uniting the divided geographies of European continent under the same banner, which was theirs. Habsburg Empire to some extent and Napoleonic France got very close to achieve domination over Europe with devastating wars over European soil. Lots of more peaceful propositions made for preventing a large scale

war among European powers, but mostly to prevent a single power to dominate the rest, and keeping integrity of the continent via institutions formed by major European powers based on balance of power.

These two intertwined aspects of internal politics of Europe, namely instability of borders within Europe as the main cause of wars made over European soil and dreams of achieving harmony among major powers of Europe and channelling energy of these powers towards outside, has endured since the mid-twentieth century. Fundamental motive that lied within formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was to achieve the dream of centuries, to develop a network of communication via coordination of vital economic activities and eliminating any possibility of hostility that would arise from claims over lands replete with important natural resources. Europe of the twentieth century witnessed a development of peaceful coexistence of its states, covering its western half, none of which ever thought of relying on use of force against another only after 1945 because of the US hegemony over them. Instead hostilities were mitigated through steady communications and interchange of ideas within institutions of ECSC, and later of European Economic Community (EEC), and at the end, of the EU.

Today's EU not only has a character of reducing tensions but also is an organization that its members' joined resources and forces provide each and every member of it with the chance of an economic development, at least, that would be otherwise unattainable when left all alone. Internal stability that has been achieved beginning with 1950s and its main promulgator, namely the ECSC which has become the EU, is now seen as a beacon of hope by East European countries of former Soviet Union.

These states claim to be left out of Europe artificially by a hegemonic power, namely Russia, and seek to take their places within Europe.

Speaking for the twentieth century and onwards, the problem in defining boundaries lies not in the question of “where it begins”, but in the question of “where it ends”. For the answer of the first question, it is indisputable that Europe begins in the West from the shores of Atlantic Ocean, as a result of historical events mentioned above. It is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea, which cuts the homelands of Ancient Greek civilization into two with the shallow Aegean Sea, from the south and southeast until reaching Black Sea. In the north waves of the Baltic Sea washes shores of Europe. In short, Europe is a huge peninsula which is surrounded by water at west, north and south; thus marking its respective borders.

On the other hand the borders of Europe become more and more blurred as one goes towards the East. This is basically because in his/her head, each person has a different line that separates Europe from Asia (Braudel, 2001; Fontana, 2003). This differentiation occurs because of the discrepancy between cultural and geographical portrait of Eastern Europe, or some would prefer east of Europe instead, in the minds of people. Geographical boundaries of Europe could be stretched till Ural Mountains at Ukraine, and this is generally agreed upon. Nevertheless, some people would never consider Ukraine or Ukrainians as a part of European cultural topographic scheme. Some others would pull the cultural border of Europe even further towards the west, excluding Eastern Europe from the general European scheme that is represented solely by the Western thought. The discrepancy between the cultural and the geographical borders of Europe takes us to the conclusion that there are people

living in Europe but not belonging to Europe because of distinctiveness of their very cultures, traditions, and their societies' institutions in total.

These different views on the Eastern border of Europe are important in determining the shape Europe is going to have under the umbrella of European Union, which claims to be not only the sole promoter of Europe as an institution on all aspects of economic, political and social constructions of the continent but also considers itself as *the Europe*. All European nations, excluding the ones that have voluntarily chosen not to join the EU and including post-communist states of Eastern Europe, seem to agree on this perceived role of the Union and consent to the standards of Europeanness defined by it. Europeanness is considered to be somewhat equal to modernization and implying in itself a belonging to the winners' club of the West. Each miles of extension of borders of the EU towards east would mean breaking their ties with the stagnancy of the Eastern way of life and becoming part of a world developing constantly for the people living there. This very inclusive/exclusive character of Europeanness and benefits or loses for being granted or left out of it respectively increase the importance of which view will gain dominance in defining eastern boundaries of Europe. Competing and contesting ideas will have their impact on construction and reconstruction of Europe's geographies (Dingsdale, 2001: xix). In turn, they will also define, literally speaking, fate of many people. Thus states of Eastern Europe and their citizens, which are granted acceptance to the EU, even though still considered as half Europeans in the sense that they have much to accomplish on the road to full Europeanness, have also been granted with a shining future of which they could benefit from the fruits of fulfilling their destiny by becoming real Europeans.

Though it is certain that borders of Europe will be defined, or more accurately already has been defined by the process of enlargement of the EU towards the East, on a more inclusive basis depending on thorough examination and conciliation between competing arguments compared to the exclusive definition of Europe and Europeanness dependent on the distinction between the democratic West and the authoritarian East. Still any drawn border will bear an arbitrariness that it would be inevitable to distinguish among the peoples living on immediately opposite sides of the border. People left at the east side by looking at their western counterparts and inevitably seeing no real difference would find it hypocritical not to be considered as worthy of belonging to the construction/reconstruction of Europe. On the other hand, to counter this negative effect of exclusion, the Commission sought to activate the proximity policy, by which mutual and regional agreements are supposed to be developed with left out neighbours of the Union, based on mutual benefits and obligations (Prodi, 2002a). In one of his speeches Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, emphasizes on that:

Enlargement also means laying the foundations for relations between the new enlarged EU and its immediate neighbours. Enlargement and proximity policies are inextricably linked. This is how we can show that enlargement does not mean exclusion of those countries not part of the enlargement strategy. That enlargement does not mean building new walls and barriers. This is why we must start to define greater detail what we mean by special relations with the band of countries neighbouring on the Union, from Russia to the Mediterranean (Prodi, 2003).

Thus historical tendency concerning identification of Europe with its negative 'other' is supposed to be replaced by a novel type of identification of Europe which is much more cooperative and inclusive in relation to its 'other'. The other is let to unilaterally adopt basic principles (political, economic, and cultural) laid down by the Union if it wills to do so. On the other hand it cannot play a role in

construction/reconstruction of these principles. You can share them but cannot be a part of them. In the words of Prodi, they can “shar[e] everything but institutions” (Prodi, 2002b).

Under these circumstances, defining the eastern borders of Europe basically depends on firstly, and essentially, until where western Europeans want to see Europe’s borders stretched; and secondly, and depending on the first, how willing and diligent new comers of Europe are in pursuing the ideals put forward to them for achieving the degree of real Europeanness.

We see that defining Europe even on geographical and geopolitical terms is difficult let alone to define it on cultural and social terms. The enlargement of the EU does not only depend on geographic coordinates of applicant states but also and more importantly on political and economic, and to some extent “implicit” cultural achievements of them. This increases importance of definition of Europe and Europeanness that is put forward and carried solely by recent members of the EU. In order to grasp a better understanding of the place of new entrants to the EU within reconstruction of Europe firstly we have to search for the foundations of ideals of Europe that are claimed to form the common historical heritage shared by all Europeans. The main concern here is not to put forward a new definition of Europe or defend an already shared view on what it is. Rather what of this study intended is to emphasize how Europe is perceived by west Europeans and how it is presented to, or more harshly ‘imposed on’, others residing on the other half of it.

3.2 Changing Boundaries of EU

Order of Europe is changing. Once it was an economic organization just with six constituent members, the EU became an organization with twenty five members.

With its recent enlargement the EU covers almost the whole European continent. Former communist states of Eastern Europe have either been a member or on the way to become a member of the EU. With a few exceptions, future's Europe will be the total of the EU, a possibility that gives the credit to the EU of becoming the Europe itself. So, the EU and its policies will define to a great extent how the new European order is going to be.

In this sense boundaries of the EU will affect the general European scheme. From a 'critical neoliberal-institutionalist' approach, Smith argues "that four types of boundary exist or can be constructed between the Union and its environment" (Smith, 1996: 13). These boundaries in turn will define the characteristics of relation between the EU and the new Europe. Will the EU insist on its 'politics of exclusion' or rather will it prefer a 'politics of inclusion'?

The geopolitical boundary. European integration started with six members. ECSC's main concern was to manage the resources that were crucial both for civil and military industries of any country. Thus creating a system for preventing excess usage of these resources by its member states, especially France and Germany, and eliminating any unpredictability. It was initiated directly under the hegemony of the US and included what was considered as the core of Europe. Also it was an initiative of deterrence against the Soviet threat accompanied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Post-war Europe was divided into two blocks and a geopolitical boundary had been drawn between them. Within this context the EC acted as a promoter of stability, security and peace.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the divisionary line between the West and the East ceased to be a geopolitical division. Nevertheless the EC and later the EU did

not cease to be seen as a haven of order and stability. General acceptance was that the future stability of Europe rested on the shoulders of the EU. Thus:

To talk about the geopolitical boundary between the EU and its environment is to imply that there are distinct geopolitical... differences between insiders and outsiders, and that these have become more distinct as a result of two processes: the post-Cold War disorder, and the post-Maastricht redrawing of the boundary itself. Both outsiders and insiders have been heard to worry about the ways in which broader European order can be promoted or jeopardized by the manipulation of the boundary (Smith, 1996: 14).

The institutional/legal boundary. The EU owes its success to its relative effectiveness as an international organization. Its effectiveness comes from two factors: its well functioning institutions and the legal structure that has gained supremacy with each passing day over national legislations of member states. These two factors give the EU a civic character which does not reflect only national interests of member states but rather plays the role of a mediator between the society and the state.

The EU not only preserved this institutional/legal boundary it drew but also strengthened it through the integration process. This boundary, first of all, “constitutes a powerful set of institutional and legal incentives for the establishment and maintenance of civic statehood” (Smith, 1996: 15). Also, “the EU has made it an aim to promote the intensification of institutional contacts and the promotion of civic statehood across Europe as a whole in the post-Cold War era” (Smith, 1996: 15).

The transactional boundary. With transactional boundary, Smith points at “creation of a customs union and a common external tariff” (Smith, 1996: 16). This boundary creates an intra-economic zone within Europe. It encourages increased intra-trade between members and diverts international trade. Thus creates a clear distinction between the insiders and the outsiders.

The cultural boundary. It is the most problematic boundary that the EU has. It can be said that cultural boundary of the EU exists both as an independent factor and within the cement of other boundaries. In a way the EU considers itself as an outcome of a shared European values.

Whilst the member countries of the Union make much of their continued cultural differences, there is arguably much more of an assumption of difference between those inside and those outside, and this has a political and economic resonance (Smith, 1996: 17).

When ex-communist states applied the EU for membership, their main argument was that historically they belonged to the cultural sphere of Europe. If their developments were not interrupted, or artificially separated from west Europe's development, they would have already made a progress in embracing European ideals and values. Although this argument was not given too much credit, still these countries were regarded as suitable for European ideals to be adapted by them.

Within the logic of European enlargement we find not elimination or loosening of these four boundaries but rather their relocation in farther east. As from the inclusion/exclusion nexus it can be said that where boundaries exist there is always exclusion. The EU is not going to enlarge forever towards the east, which is very natural for it not to do so. What is yet unknown is that where it will, or the Europe will, stop. Nevertheless there will still be a Europe and the other and a 'politics of exclusion' as long as the boundaries that are drawn by the EU keep on existing. As we have seen above, the 'politics of inclusion' of the EU consists of a proximity policy which was supposed to be a mutually constructed relation but mainly meant the unilateral acceptance of the European style without being incorporated into the EU's institutions. Thus what changes at Europe is the location of these boundaries, not the logic behind their creation.

3.3 Changing Lines of Demarcation between East and West

It was mentioned that it is hard to depict an accurate border concerning eastern parts of Europe. So, speaking in geopolitical and cultural terms, it is also hard to give an answer to what 'Europe is'. For the very same reason, a sub-question, but no less important than the other, of 'what is East Europe' is a tricky one. Depending on the context it is considered within and depending on by whom it is defined, borders of East Europe shift accordingly even within itself. The main reason for this ambiguity is the profound East-West dichotomy that took its shape throughout centuries. This dichotomy reaches its peak when West European peoples see the others not as subjects in themselves but instead as mere objects unaware of themselves. Within this dichotomy, the word 'west' connotes all the positive attributes given to Europeans whereas 'east' is considered as inferior and backward. This understanding finds its repercussions in today's arguments of East Europeans' place within Europe. The connotation of 'West' is as blessed, 'East' as cursed seems to be accepted also by East Europeans to a great extent. Even before the fall of Iron Curtain one can find arguments placing East Europe as possible as close to West Europe not only geographically but also culturally. Later on, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, these arguments contributed to East Europeans' adherence to the Western civilization and criteria put forward by it.

Even though belonging to an East European civilization and to an Eastern civilization imply different meanings, still one can find traces of the same attitude taken by Europeans towards them. East is always the East for Europeans even it is geographically belonged to the European continent. As stated above, we can find the roots of this negative connotation that the East has within history itself.

3.3.1 Shifting Centres of Europe: From East to West; South to North

Lands of Egypt, Mesopotamia and both coasts of Aegean Sea were the centres of developing civilizations and increased cultural activities at Mediterranean until the end of the ancient times. Later on East Roman Empire and its political and cultural capitol, namely the city of Constantinople, became one of the successors to those civilizations' achievements along with Muslim Arabs and Persians. In the west, Muslims of Iberian Peninsula were also carrying their civilization to higher levels. East Roman Empire stayed as an important cultural centre until its total conquest by the Turks with the fall of Constantinople. Fleeing Byzantines carried valuable Greek manuscripts and documents with them. Even before this happened, Europeans were working on ancient Greek documents. Still these manuscripts and their bearers who were able to easily read them, contributed to the work done hitherto. This increased the pace of intellectual development that was taking place in Italy. Italian city states became centres of cultural awakening and played significant role at Renaissance. Thus the cultural centre of Europe shifted towards the west from Constantinople to Italian city states¹³. This way the divisionary line within Europe took the form of a north-south axis. Southern part represented a well developed society whereas north Europeans were considered as peoples lacking any kind of finesse. Sacking of Rome by the army of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1527 made a significant contribution to the validity of this view in the eyes of Italians. Development of Italian city states was hindered both by internal rivalries and by external invaders, namely the French and Habsburg Spain.

¹³ Many people would oppose this statement by claiming that Constantinople has never been a cultural center within the borders of European cultural geography. Nevertheless it was the most important and the most developed city of its time compared to other European cities.

Beginning with the sixteenth century, as overseas trade diverted traditional trade lines crossing Mediterranean, Paris, Amsterdam and London increased their weight on European economics along with Lisbon. Intellectual and economic developments found their repercussions within the West. Once they were centres of culture and wealth, Rome, Florence and Venice were replaced with Paris, London and Amsterdam (Wolf, 1994: 5). Thus the core of Europe shifted once, and for all, again towards west and north of Europe.

Once barbarous lands of Europe then turned into the lands of development and intellectual activity. Old divisions had to be replaced with the new ones.

Just as the new centers of the Enlightenment superseded the old centers of the Renaissance, the old lands of barbarism and backwardness in the north were correspondingly displaced to the east. The Enlightenment had to invent Western Europe and Eastern Europe together, as complementary concepts, defining each other by opposition and adjacency (Wolf, 1994: 5).

Still the West Europeans were the ones who needed to redefine themselves since now they held the power of defining and naming the other at their hands. The East has already been invented thanks to its Orthodox and Islamic identities. Western Europe just had to fit itself within already constructed division between the Christian and anti-Christian. What they could not fit in was the religious grounds of division. Instead of underlining the adherence to Christianity vs. Heretics division, they preferred to use cultural and especially civilizational criteria in distinguishing themselves from the other.

Until the Enlightenment there was not such a thing as East-West dichotomy within Europe in the sense of civilizational comparison. There was only a religious schism between the Western Latin Christianity and the Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Related with the context of the schism between the Western and the Eastern

Churches, Catholics saw their Orthodox brothers as members of a heretical sect. They had lost their path leading towards God and if the truth could be returned to them, they would easily be converted into the real Christianity once again. Compared to the infidel Muslims, they still had a chance. In this sense they were regarded as superior to the Easterners. Nevertheless they were inferior compared to Latin Christendom. They still needed a shepherd to tend them and to bring them salvation. The sacking of Constantinople by Latin crusaders at the fourth crusade in 1204 was the utmost atrocity that Orthodoxy was exposed to by Catholics.

Latin Christendom saw its Eastern counterpart not only as misguided in its religious beliefs but also as inferior with regards to its political organization. Orthodox kings held both worldly and divine power at their hands whereas the religious and state affairs were separated in the West. This made Orthodox kingdoms resemble despotic regimes of Asiatic peoples. But because the case was not hopeless for them, they were regarded as semi-Christian. As concept of European identity developed through the course of time and as ideals of being a European¹⁴ changed with it, this attribute of being semi-Europeans that was given to East Europeans stayed intact. Just the premises it was based on changed.

As philosophers of the Enlightenment began to use the term civilization increasingly in defining Europe, more emphasis is made on anti-civilizational barbaric traits of the other. Western Europe, mainly consisted of France, Britain, Italy, Netherlands and Prussia, was considered to be the foremost civilized place. When one travelled to east of Prussia, he was believed to enter uncivilized lands of Europe. Inhabitants of those lands were just masses of peasants. They did not know any manners. Their women

¹⁴ Here the word 'European' means any people living in the Western half of Europe, even s/he did not yet call herself/himself a European.

and men were alike and both lacked any kind of beauty. They resembled to the earlier forms of human beings who had not yet taken his share from civilization.

East of Prussia also belonged to a different age, an age that Europe had left behind centuries ago. It was as if time has stopped or stuck at a constant second. And it seemed that nobody living on those lands could be able to start it ticking once again. Everything was stagnant there. Those people were even unaware of what they were. Their backward civilization, if it could be called a civilization, was no match for its Western counterpart. There were no big cities for intellectual development to flourish. Tiny cities of East Europe were places of sadness and darkness like the forests and plains that surrounded them (Wolf, 1994).

3.3.2 Politics of Exclusion and East Europe as a Sacrifice to Power Politics

East Europe's cultural otherness found its resonance also at politics of Europe. East Europe was never perceived as an independent entity that could have an impact on European politics. Indeed, as it was in the case of cultural inquiry, it was treated as a mere object. East Europeans lacked the necessary traits to rule themselves. If they did so, they would be deemed to stay backward forever. Instead, they should be ruled by the ones who know how to rule. The problem was that who was to rule them.

On political grounds, East Europe had always been a playground of imperialist states. Russia, Austria-Hungary, Prussia had either overt or covert claims over those lands. Russia unceasingly tried to infiltrate the region via its pan-Slavic arguments and Orthodox Church. Germany developed its *Ostpolitik* to justify claims over those peoples and their lands. Even before its unification it was a rival of Austria-Hungary for the dominance over the region. On the other hand Western powers directly involved in local politics against Ottomans and supported nationalist sentiments that

began to gain grounds in the nineteenth century. With independence of Greece and after the Balkan Wars, Ottoman Empire withdrew from most of the lands it was able to hold in its hands in Europe. New independent states joined the Balkan states after the First World War with disintegration of Austria-Hungarian Empire and with the temporary withdrawal of Soviet Russia from East Europe.

Even after gaining their independence, those states did not cease to be a concern for greater powers and their destinies were drawn by Western powers. On two occasions they were left alone: The first was just before the Second World War began when Germany claimed its right over those lands and invaded them. Hitler and Stalin shared East Europe between Germany and Russia. Western powers stayed indifferent and considered the situation as an Eastern affair. For them if it would be enough to let Germany conquer some Eastern states in order to appease it then why not let it be so. What happened later was that Europe had its share from the most devastating war ever seen. Second was to let the Soviet Russia to hold its grasp over the lands it liberated from Nazi invaders. At Yalta Conference of 1945, fate of East European peoples was once more drawn on tables without their consent. Whatever the reason may be, like Roosevelt's naïve belief that Russia could be a partner in peace in post-war period (Kissinger, 2000), they were easily left under influence of imperialist Soviet Russia as a war trophy¹⁵. But a second mistake was not done. East Europe could be dispensable. It did not belong to Western civilization anyway and it was a troublesome place where the two great wars were triggered. This time a line was

¹⁵ We should distinguish Greece from other countries of the region. While Greece geographically and also culturally according to the writer of these lines, belonged to East Europe, it was deemed to share separate cultural heritage from other countries of the region. It was the cradle of Hellenistic intellect that Europe owed its civilization. Greece was considered to be an indispensable part of European civilization and was not left to Soviet Russia. Still when someone talks of Eastern Europe, nobody thinks of Greece even geographically it lays at the farthest southeast of Europe.

drawn to prevent Soviet Russia from penetrating further into West. The USA gave its full support to Europe's reconstruction: both economically and politically. The Europeans and their very civilization and ideals were under threat of an 'other', an Eastern authoritarian power, and should stand united against *the other*. So did the story of today's European Union begin with establishment of ECSC.

The Iron Curtain had been the first physical line separating the East from the West. As we have seen, even before its establishment there was a divisionary line in mental mapping of Europe. Iron Curtain became just an embodiment of this mental mapping. Its roots lie even before its occurrence and it owes its very existence to the East-West dichotomy based on Europe's self-perception in relation with *the other*. East Europe was never considered to be a part of Western civilization. On the contrary it contributed to the literature on others vs. European civilization. East Europe's domination by an Eastern power was negligible as long as it was prevented from penetrating further into the heartland of Europe. Western Europe neither wanted to involve nor interested in uprisings against Soviet Russian domination that took place in East Europe. Without a support from the West, those revolts were deemed to be crushed by Russia.

Nevertheless, discontentment did not cease to exist. On the contrary, as communist ideology failed to fulfil even its basic premises it increased further. Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* were efforts just aimed to oil rusted and malfunctioning machinery of Soviet Union. They were supposed to appease discontent peoples of the Union and enable a better functioning of the system. What they created was the unstoppable breakdown of the system itself. One by one East European countries declared their independence from the Union and they were

followed by other members. At last, in the year of 1989, Warsaw Pact dismantled itself and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. This historical development paved the way for the possibility of construction of a new Europe, this time united and standing as a whole.



CHAPTER IV

A NEW EUROPE?

The fall of Iron Curtain and dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact was a totally unexpected development. As always it has been the case, the West did not take any part within this development. They were just among the audience who were following the developments with curiosity. Members of the EEC were busy with their own business. Only two years had passed since the enactment of the Single European Act (SEA). Even though they did not take any part in these developments, they were to be the real beneficiaries from them. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and East Europeans' entering into the political arena of Europe as independent actors, recent developments that were taking place within the EEC gained more importance and new meanings. Once deemed as an initiative that was kept in coma knowingly by its constituent members, the pace European integration had gained with the SEA increased with these new developments. European Community opened its arms for its once neglected brothers and sisters. This was a historical opportunity for *the Europeans* to unite the whole continent at last with the consent and will of everybody. The notion of a united Europe, at least against the

other, has always been at the core of the idea of Europe and it was about to become a reality.

The old Europeans were waiting to *rejoin* with the new Europeans with open arms. But every gain has its toll and there was still much for the newcomers to accomplish. First of all they should always keep in mind that they had fallen way back of West European achievements. This was because their organic ties with Europe had been cut off by outsiders. Those outsiders, namely firstly the Ottomans and later the Soviet Russia, were not walking in the same path with Europeans towards achievement of higher levels of civilization. By cutting off their connection with the West, these outsiders hindered would-be developments that should have took place in East Europe. Secondly they should understand that the definition of Europeanness could be found only in one place, which is the Europe defined and constructed by Westerners. Lastly and as a result of the two, East Europeans should bear in mind that in order to deserve to be recalled as Europeans they have to adhere to the principles and any criteria put before them. As these are covert ideas coming out of the context of Europeanness that is generated by West Europeans, the tangible requirements for acceptance to the house of Europe are stated in the Copenhagen criteria. Three main principles are deemed necessary to be fulfilled by applicant states in order to become a member of the EU and thus of the Europe. In the Copenhagen criteria it is stated that membership requires:

- that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (Copenhagen, 1993)

Later the European Council added a fourth semi-principle, but not less important, to the former three principles at its meeting in Madrid in 1995. According to this principle the candidate States have to adjust their administrative structures to ensure harmonious operation of Community policies after accession (Madrid, 1995). At Luxembourg, in 1997, the need for incorporation of the *acquis* into legislation is stressed on and more importantly it was added that its actual application has to be ensured (Luxembourg, 1997). These principles were *sine quo non* of becoming a member of the EU and they defined how a European has to be in themselves, thus introducing a new dimension to the idea of Europe.

4.1 The EU and the Idea of Europe

In the second chapter we have seen that the idea of Europe included three main elements, namely freedom, Christendom, and civilization. The twentieth century witnessed introduction of a fourth one among these. It was, and still it is, the European integration. At last Europeans were able to come together peacefully and mitigate hostilities between them via established institutions. Today the EU is considered as the most successful international organization in the world. Its supranational characteristics provide it with a freedom to act on its behalf and to go beyond national interests. It becomes embodiment of the idea of Europe and a platform where Europeans can finally feel themselves belonging to a European identity. It sets the rules and the criteria of Europeanness, as stated above, and considers itself to be the sole legitimate body to do so. In so doing, while referring to diversity of peoples of Europe, it reduces the idea of Europe to a single ideology,

liberal capitalism. Europe is the land of freedom within which peoples (workers), commodities and services should move without any interference. Europe is also the land of continuous development which has been achieved by successful functioning of market economy and will continue to do so. Even though the communist and socialist ideologies were born within boundaries of Europe, they did not fit in European character. They hinder freedom of peoples and cannot provide necessary structures for development, as it was witnessed in the case of the Soviet Union. Thus Europe can only be liberal and its economic and social structures can be constructed/reconstructed within a functioning market economy. And anyone who adhered to the ideals of Europe and Europeanness has to accept this fact.

Today various institutions of the EU are working on to transform the arguable European identity into European citizenship and give it a legal basis. In this context the EU considers itself as the sole representative of Europe as a whole. Today's Europe is considered to be based on the idea of Europe which has its roots in the history of Europe. The idea of Europe involves and strengthens a sense of Europeanness and the European identity. European identity is about to be turned into European citizenship. The new European citizenship will be secured by supranational institutions of the EU. Thus the EU will become the place in where Europeans will be united and represented. This in turn will validate the EU's argument of being the representative of whole Europe. Of course even with its supranational character, the EU could be still tied up with the decisions of its member states. In another way it is a means at the hands of its constituent parts and their ideas and policies are reflected via it. It cannot exceed the limits put on it in application of its policies. Nevertheless this does not reduce importance of the policies generated by the EU. On the contrary

it shows that West Europeans are content with its policies on European identity and give their full support. The foremost necessity to become a member of the EU is to be European and Europeanness is defined by the very EU itself. So, East Europeans are obliged to fulfil the criteria imposed on them and prove their worthiness to be considered as real Europeans in order get access to the EU.

4.2 Where Does East Europe Belong?

The above question has just one clear answer: East Europe belongs to Europe. The hardest question to answer is that “who belongs to East Europe?” Is it still valid to use the term ‘East Europe’ for all ex-communist states of that part of Europe? Where is ‘Central Europe’ then?

In relation with belongingness and the concept of identity arising from a sense of belongingness to a group or community, we can refer to two aspects of identification. One is intra-identification that we are initiator of the identification process. In other words, *we identify ourselves* with a group of people. The other can be named as extra-identification which is initiated by others, depending on how they perceive us. These aspects of identification could be easily applied to the East European case.

4.2.1 West in East

In the first part we stressed on the characteristics of one way relationship between the West Europeans and the East Europeans¹⁶. This does not mean that these countries are forced to enter the EU. On the contrary they want to be a member of the EU more than anything. Reasons for their adherence to the EU membership can be listed as:

¹⁶ The EU advocates that the integration process is a two way relationship. At the Accession treaties, both sides could stand for its own point of view and agreement would be reached with compromise. This can be the truth at theoretical level but in practice it has not been the case. The Copenhagen criteria are *sine quo non* for accession and out of any questioning. In addition to this none of the East European applicant states is in a position to oppose what is wanted from them.

stabilizing democratic institutions and providing precedence of rule of law, benefiting from the economic prospects that the EU offers, belonging to a zone of prosperity and security, and redefinition of cultural placement in the world (Cuddy, 1999: 154-155).

Becoming a member of the EU became the top priority of any East European country “[b]ecause EU membership in particular has become equated with ‘being European’, and because in Central and Eastern Europe, being ‘European’ has come to mean much the same as being ‘civilized’ and ‘modern’” (Batt, 2003: 20). Under these circumstances, East Europeans seem to be more devoted to the cause of Europeanness than the real constructors of the cause are. They appropriate the concept of Europeanness that is shaped by their western counterparts. In so doing, they create their own others accordingly. This *other* resides in the East as it does in the general idea of Europe. So, within the geography of East Europe the Eastern neighbour(s) of a country of the region become the other of that country. Put in another way, certain East European countries appropriate the idea of Europe to their cases and claim that they have connection with the same historical processes that has shaped today’s Europe. They add to these claims that their Eastern neighbours lack the necessary conditions to be considered as Europeans. They define their neighbours just like the way Europeans had done in the nineteenth century: The other consists of stagnant institutions, inapt in adopting democracy, and ever did have its share from a European civilization. As much as negative elements are attributed to the characteristics of the other, the more these certain countries are esteemed and move themselves closer to the West.

4.2.2 Creation of the East within the East

Debates on Western identity, or Westernization, of East Europeans trace back to eighteenth century. When the West was identifying itself with the notion of civilization beginning with the Enlightenment, the East was debating on how to treat western thought. There were two sides arguing on the subject. One side was advocating the total adaptation of Western notions and thus catching up with the West in developments it had achieved. The other side was also accepting that ideas coming from the West should be adapted but by protecting the native social institutions from their negative effects on the society. However in the second half of the twentieth century, East Europe was left to the control of Soviet Russia and its organic ties with the West was cut. This is regarded as an impediment that prevented East European countries to benefit from developments of West Europe. Now free from their binding ties, East Europeans are in search for their place within a united Europe.

As we have seen, Europe was divided into two according to the East-West dichotomy created by the Western civilization. With the Iron Curtain, this dichotomy had taken its concrete form. After its fall, the divisionary line between two halves of Europe was thought to disappear also with the EU's enlargement. However this was not the case. Some of the East European intellectuals and their Western collaborators put their emphasis on the additional divisionary within East Europe. Thus eastern half of Europe was divided into separate parts. This division owes itself to the concept of a distinguishable Central Europe from the rest of East Europe.

Central Europe as a Concept

Creation of the concept of a distinct Central European identity from its eastern counterparts resembles very much to the creation of European identity from the relation with its other. Central Europe is rather defined through its comparison with other East, and South East, European states than its unifying internal dynamics. Central Europe locates itself within the Western European context by dislocating itself from its Eastern neighbours.

First the term 'Eastern Europe' is considered as "a political misnomer produced by the Cold War when Europe was split into two parts" (Ágh, 1998: 2). Then East Europe is deconstructed and the region is freed from its 'political misnomer'. Lastly the region is reconstructed appropriately through proper division and naming of separate parts. So, these new regions are not sub-regions of a bigger part but they constitute separate individual parts. In the brink of unification, Europe becomes more divided than ever. Out of an improper 'Eastern Europe' three regions are constructed: Central Europe, the Balkans (South-Eastern Europe), and Eastern Europe proper (the former Soviet Union without the Baltic Republics) (Ágh, 1998: 3).

Still the geographical definitions of these regions are very problematic. This is because they are not geographical constructions. Instead they are political and cultural constructs to which geographical boundaries are approximated. The aim here is to create a distinct Central European identity which fits itself into the European identity by using the very East-West dichotomy created by the eighteenth century philosophers of Western Europe. More you distinct yourself from the East the more you become European.

Ágh uses the other, the Balkans at this instance, in order to prove existence of a distinct Central Europe. He is in need of a comparison because Central Europe is hard to be defined as a region in itself. He lays down six features by which Central Europe is compared to the Balkans. They perfectly show the rhetoric on the other in creation of self-identity. So I will take the risk of making an excessive quotation:

1. The geographical proximity of [the] North-South belt, from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea, to Western Europe. This is a zone of the 'lands in between', that is, between East and West, with everyday contacts to both...
2. Central Europe has always had a historical advantage compared to the Balkans because of its closeness to the West. It has always belonged, so to speak, to the first wave of Europeanization, directly following the West European models. These Western contacts in Central Europe were formed first as cultural links and penetration by Western Christianity, which has been a common cultural tradition versus the rival tradition of Eastern Christianity. Central Europe has had a semi-peripheral status in the West European world system since the sixteenth century.
3. Historically, these waves of Europeanization-Westernization have been interrupted by the periods of 'Easternization'... Central European countries have also the common historical tradition of the Habsburg empire with its positive and negative imprints on their societies. Central Europe has developed a modern economy, society and polity earlier and better than the Balkan countries...
4. Altogether the Central European countries can be defined in the concrete terms of economy, society and polity as a different region from both East and West. We can describe their belated industrialization, heterogeneous modern societies and mixed political traditions from the late nineteenth century on in precise modern social sciences terms. This description shows their historical backwardness compared to the Balkans and/or Eastern Europe proper...
5. ...The Central European identity in its diverse forms has existed since the sixteenth century, first partially connected to the Habsburg empire, then as a

residual consciousness after the collapse of the empire... The ECE countries, unlike the Balkan nations, had reform cycles of 10-12 years, ending up with revolutions against the Soviet rule...

6. The idea of Central Europe played a great role in ensuring the peaceful and negotiated transition in all the countries concerned. At present, this common identity is the most important form of cultural contact among these nations, first of all for the intellectuals but also for a large part of the populations... The regional differences appear in the fact that these Central European countries have a *re-democratization* process, that is they have revived their democratic traditions and institutions, versus the *democratization* process in the Balkan countries, which has actually been the first serious attempt at building democratic institutions. (Ágh, 2003: 4-5)

Here Ágh, by laying down the features of it, not only defines a Central Europe but also its negation, namely the Balkans. Central Europe is approximated to the West, and thus to Europe whereas the Balkan region is distanced from the West. The Balkan states do not belong to the Western civilization yet because they lack the features that Central European states have. On the other hand Central Europe should be considered as semi-Western at least because it shares something in common with the West which the Balkans do not share. Although Debeljak does not distinguish his country from the other 'East European' countries (he is Slovenian), he describes the uneasiness that he feels, which 'Central Europeans' should not feel at all, in a hotel of western Europe as:

While it may not be immediately obvious that I am an 'Easterner', 'a Slav', or someone from 'the Balkans', and my physiognomy may not say much about my ethnic origin, the insecure movement across the parquet floor nonetheless exposes me. The political economy of insecurity manifests itself in the most minuscule gestures and facial expressions. In my cautious approach, it is not only the experience of socialist poverty that accompanied my student hitchhiking trips to western Europe, but, above all, a bitter experience of the hidden, nonrecognizable identity—which is not the same as being unnoticed. No this is due to lack of context and a network of symbolic cultural and

mental signs that could allow the identification of the region I come from (Debeljak, 2001: 211).

These 'network of symbolic cultural and mental signs' are supposed to exist for Central Europe and they are considered to be the close relatives of their western counterparts. Which East Europeans lack, the Central Europeans do not. Debeljak continues as:

I have a feeling that I owe something to somebody and that my place is not at the parlor table where I could be idly flipping the pages of today's issue of L'Esspresso and the International Herald Tribune. Instead, my place, for which I was supposed to be grateful, is at best somewhere outside, at the limits of the acceptable public space, on the terrace, not exactly on the street yet certainly not in the comfort of an air-conditioned luxury. This has been reserved for the chosen ones. And I sense that this is not only my personal experience that whispers in my ear, but also the historical, and surely problematic, collective narrative of the region and nation to which I belong (Debeljak, 2001: 212).

Debeljak does not feel this way for the reasons that solely depend on his identity. Rather he feels this way because he knows how the others see him and give a meaning to his identity depending on their own perceptions. What 'Central Europeans' seek is an alteration of these perceptions in their cases. They distinct themselves from the general perception of 'the other' by distinguishing themselves from 'East Europeans' and 'the Balkans'. Thus they see at themselves the right to be among 'the chosen ones'.

Usage of the very term 'Central Europe' implies that the region in consideration is not in the 'East'. The negative connotation given to the 'East' is revived once again. For the justification of the inclusion of Central Europe into the new Europe, or should we say for its return to Europe, legitimate grounds for exclusion of the other have been put forward. Thus the 'East' is recreated as the other within the East. As Milan Kundera defines East Europe and Central Europe:

As a concept of cultural history, Eastern Europe is Russia, with its quite specific history anchored in the Byzantine world. Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, just like Austria, have never been part of Eastern Europe. From the very beginning they have taken part in the great adventure of Western civilization, with its Gothic, its Renaissance, its Reformation—a movement which has its cradle precisely in this region (quoted in Neumann, 1998: 402).

So, Europe is geopolitically and culturally divided into more parts than its traditional division into two. Western Europe still constitutes the core of Europe and stays as the centre of attraction. Eastern Europe is seen as periphery and yet lacks the necessary conditions to be considered as a part of the idea of Europe. Central Europe lays inbetween these two regions and bears the characteristics of both them. However it is located closer to the West than the East both in geographical and cultural terms. It has more in common with the West than it has with the East. The fourth region, the Balkans, is the most excluded one from the picture. They are even seen as inferior by East Europeans of the periphery. They still have much to accomplish in order to convince the Europeans that they directed themselves towards the right path to be considered as eligible to become members of house of Europe.

Some countries may shift their position between different regions according to which criteria are set to define those regions. If the pure geographical positions have been the criterion to define borders of these regions it would have been easier to put all of these countries to appropriate places. But the shadow of tradition of defining self with comparison to the other blurs everything. Still if the tradition has not been based on the assumption that self gets superior as the other gets inferior, then the negative connotation burdened on the East would have had no detrimental effect on feeling yourself belonging to the East. In other words your place on the map would not define *a priori* whether you are backward or developed, or inferior or superior compared to others.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The ideas of Europe and the reflections on European identity are much older than the process of European integration, the EC or the EU. They include such references as a Roman heritage, a Judaeo-Christian heritage, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, industrialization, civilization, democracy and liberty (Wintle, 1996: 15) and the created images of the self and other. Europe has created and defined itself through its characteristics that distinguished it from the other. This perceived distinctiveness came along with its boundaries and divisionary lines that separated European from the other. European integration is a process which tries to synthesize all these references and to create a Europe of its own out of this synthesis.

In the 1980s, European integration entered into a new phase, namely deepening. Enlargement of the EEC was seen enough for the time being. What it needed was a restructuring of its institutions and their roles. Otherwise it was deemed to stay as merely an economic organization. Europeans wanted it to be an organization which reflected and strengthened their adhered unity. So its limits bounded to economic areas should be extended also to include cultural and political areas.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union came at a time when Europe was in the process of deepening. Newly independent ex-communist East European states both created an opportunity for European integration and brought new problems. Opportunity it created was that for the first time in the history, there were no obstacles before Europe to be a united continent, along with the economic opportunities. This increased the importance of the arguments that supported a united Europe which had a common European idea and a common European identity.

Problem was, excluding economic considerations, the redefinition of a whole region which was considered as outside of the core of Europe. The East had never been a part, or had never been seen as a part, of the Western civilization. But this was about to change. Easterners should be turned into real Europeans and then incorporated into the new Europe under the auspices of the EU. And the boundaries of Europe had to be redrawn by the very same organization. However this patronage of the EU over the creation of the new Europe also made it possible for it to assert its claims over the European ideals and European identity more vigorously.

In the first part we saw how the idea of Europe was born and the European identity was defined in comparison with the other. In this comparison ideals of Europe were used as reference points and the other was treated as an object accordingly. European ideals were even more idealized as the other's inferior traits brought into foreground. So, 'the European' epitomized the perfect human and civilization. European identity is defined through exclusion and domination of the other. Borders are drawn. Borders which the other could not pass through unless Europeans let them do. And it were Europeans who decided to change the historical traditional divisionary line separating West from the East. West Europeans permitted East Europeans to cross

the boundaries of Europe and thus become Europeans. In this process, it was not the nature of the boundaries that has changed but rather it's placement.

However not all of the East Europeans were seen as sharing the same level of Europeanness. This was valid not only from the western perspective but also from within the region itself. Central Europe was conceptualized as a product of this thought. It was conceptualized as a demi-European land stretching from north towards south inbetween the West and the East. A clear cut was made between Central Europe, although it was not clear who belonged to Central Europe, and the rest, especially the Balkans, who fell short of having the same traits with Central Europeans that would make them more European. So, European enlargement did not abolish the boundaries of Europe. Even it created new ones within Europe. European integration generated a multileveled European identity. Some are considered as pure European, some other as demi-European, the rest are non-European or anti-European. This is valid for boundaries of Europe also. First kind of boundaries separates Europeans from demi-Europeans, the second kind separates both Europeans and demi-Europeans from non-Europeans (who are not yet European), and the last kind is the traditional divisionary line separating the Europeans from the other.

These were what this thesis was about: the idea of Europe, the European identity, the other, and the European integration embracing all these concepts and reproducing the boundaries of Europe. Their synthesis provides us with the argument that all of them are political, social and cultural creations of Europeans. They are created through 'subjective' interpretation of systemized knowledge on the other in order to serve either for protection of integrity of a European identity that provides Europeans with

self-awareness and self-consistency or to strengthen feeling of superiority of Europeans. Thus the new Europe is not born out of ashes of the old Europe but rather it is a continuation of the old Europe. It cannot be really said that East Europeans returned to Europe. Instead they were integrated into the Europe with a shift of the boundaries that were separating them from the West, as it had happened when the north-south divisionary line of Renaissance Europe was replaced with the east-west divisionary line. Though this time the shift did not take place because of an irresistible pressure coming from the East as it was the northern Europeans who shifted the boundaries of Europe in the age of exploration. Rather it was the Western Europeans who redefined 'the other' and made it a part of its own.

This transformation of 'the other' cannot be explained with the traditional identity theories. Social and psychological explanations of identity formation do not reveal the real motive behind such a shift in definitions. Even incorporation of a cultural dimension is not enough in itself. Political and economic interests of the parties that are involved in the process should be taken into consideration as well as the cultural and historical considerations. 'European identity' is used both as a means and as an end within this transformation by the EU. First of all history and culture have been appropriated in order to suit the 'European identity' and prove the logic behind its existence and its rightful construction. Then this 'European identity' is turned into something which is deemed as perfect state of the Europeanness. It becomes a higher phase in the evolution of Europe and the Europeanness. It is considered as an end to be reached that would pave the way for Europeans for further development and in turn would become a means.

Identities are constructions but in order to understand the real purpose behind their construction we have to ask not only how but also why they are needed. We can observe, and theories do explain, how one would feel in fulfilment of an identity or in its failure and why one prefers to comply with a certain identity instead of another. But in cases like the transformation of the East Europeans from 'the other' of 'European' into the 'European' along with the question of 'how' the question of 'why' should be investigated also.

In this study an attempt has been made to show that the EU plays a significant role in this transformation. The EU is a project of Europe initiated and carried out by the Western European countries. It is a project aimed at not only preventing any war among European powers but also it is a project carried out to create a world power from out of Europe. Within this context it initiates policies which are deemed crucial for achieving its reason for existence, even sometimes at the expense of its constituent parts. Construction of a 'European identity', which is based on cultural and historical determinants, and creation of a 'European citizenship', which becomes the complement of 'European identity' on political and legal terms, can be considered as a part of a general European project. Integration of the East European countries with the EU would increase the legitimacy of the EU in its claims to be the sole representative of Europe. Thus the EU should enlarge towards East Europe while preserving the 'European identity' it advocated. So, the traditional 'other', or at best the 'demi-other', of Europe has been turned into European first and then was granted access to the EU. This transformation shifted the boundaries of 'Europe' further east.

Nevertheless the problem of constructing the boundaries of Europe, a problem for us not for Europe really, is an open-ended one. Enlargement of the EU will continue. In the long run its borders can shift even further east. However there seems to be always a border separating Europe from the rest. The important thing here is what will become of the internal borders of Europe? Enlargement of the EU seems to have accomplished a great deal with the accession of ten new member states but their integration is not finished yet. There are still internal boundaries dividing Europeans among themselves. In the future, this distinction can be overcome if the EU succeeds in implementation and recognition of European citizenship that would treat all Europeans on equal terms. Otherwise Europe will continue to be consisted of a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery.

As for conclusion, the other of European changed through time, so did the Europe and its boundaries. And all of them continue to do so. As it is impossible to stop the progress and reach the end of history, it is also inappropriate to talk of a finished European project and fixed boundaries of Europe. The history shows us that nothing stays constant and especially if it is the case with the boundaries of Europe. It should be expected that as interests of European peoples, or more precisely of the ruling elite, change so would the definition of 'European identity' and of Europe.

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