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**INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE
NOSTALGIA ON CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT THE
RIVAL POLITICAL PARTY**

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ABSTRACT

INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA ON CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT THE RIVAL POLITICAL PARTY

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Conspiracy beliefs may be a form of intergroup bias, as they are motivated by the need to protect the ingroup by portraying outgroups as conspirators. Similarly, political party supporters might believe in conspiratorial narratives about rival parties as outgroups. Moreover, specific psychological needs (i.e., security, control, and information) trigger these beliefs. By being both a group-level emotion increasing negative attitudes to outgroups and triggering psychological motives of conspiracy beliefs, collective nostalgia might increase people's conspiracy beliefs about outgroups. In the present thesis, two experimental studies investigated the role of collective nostalgia in the conspiracy beliefs of two major political party supporters about each other in Türkiye. Study 1 tested whether Kemalist nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about the rival conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) among the Republican People's Party (CHP) supporters. Study 2 tested whether Ottoman nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about CHP among AKP supporters. Results showed that manipulations did not work for both studies. However, when ideology's moderating role was tested for the manipulation check, participants closer to left-wing ideology experienced more collective nostalgia compared to the control condition only in Study 1. Religiosity did not moderate the effect of condition on collective nostalgia experience in both studies. There was no difference in conspiracy beliefs between conditions in both studies, even after controlling for demographic variables. In Study 1, ideology moderated the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs in a way that Kemalist nostalgia manipulation decreased conspiracy beliefs about AKP only among more right-wingers. Neither ideology nor religiosity had a moderating effect in Study 2. Correlation results between

conspiracy beliefs, collective nostalgia, and other group-level emotions (i.e., guilt, anger, pride, fear of future, and hope) showed that conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia were positively correlated in both studies. It was discussed that further research is still needed in this regard with different approaches to manipulating collective nostalgia and categorisation of participants, especially considering the effect of ideology.

Keywords: conspiracy beliefs, collective nostalgia, Kemalist nostalgia, Ottoman nostalgia, social identity, polarisation, intergroup relations, group processes, seculars, conservatives, group-level emotions



ÖZ

KOLEKTİF NOSTALJİNİN RAKİP SİYASİ PARTİ HAKKINDAKİ KOMPLO İNANÇLARINA ETKİSİNİN ARAŞTIRILMASI

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Komplo inançları, dış grupları komplocu olarak göstererek iç grubu koruma ihtiyacından kaynaklanabileceği için bir tür gruplar arası önyargı olarak ele alınabilir. Benzer şekilde, siyasi parti destekçileri de rakip partiler yani dış gruplar hakkındaki komplocu anlatılara inanabilir. Bunun yanında, belirli psikolojik güdüler (güvenlik, kontrol ve bilgi) bu inançları tetikler. Kolektif nostalji, hem dış gruplara yönelik olumsuz tutumları artıran grup düzeyinde bir duygu olarak hem de komplo inançlarının psikolojik güdülerini tetikleyerek, insanların dış gruplar hakkındaki komplo inançlarını artırabilir. Bu tezde, iki deneysel çalışma ile Türkiye'deki iki büyük siyasi parti destekçilerinin birbirleri hakkındaki komplo inançlarında kolektif nostaljinin rolü araştırılmıştır. Çalışma 1 Kemalist nostaljinin Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) destekçilerinin rakip muhafazakâr Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) hakkındaki komplo inançlarını artırıp artırmayacağını araştırmıştır. Çalışma 2 Osmanlı nostaljisinin AKP destekçilerinin CHP'ye yönelik komplo inançlarını artırıp artırmayacağını araştırmıştır. Sonuçlar manipülasyonların her iki çalışmada da işe yaramadığını göstermiştir. Ancak manipülasyon üzerinde ideolojinin düzenleyici rolü incelendiğinde, sol ideolojiye daha yakın katılımcılar sadece Çalışma 1'de kontrol koşuluna kıyasla daha fazla kolektif nostalji deneyimlemiştir. Dindarlığın her iki çalışmada da koşulun kolektif nostalji üzerinde düzenleyici etkisi olmamıştır. Demografik değişkenler kontrol edildikten sonra da her iki çalışmada da koşullar arasında komplo inançları açısından bir fark bulunmamıştır. Çalışma 1'de ideolojinin Kemalist nostalji manipülasyonununun AKP hakkındaki komplo inançlarını daha sağ görüşlüler arasında azaltacak şekilde deneysel koşul ve komplo inançları arasındaki ilişkiyi düzenleyici etkisi bulunmuştur. Çalışma 2'de ne ideolojinin ne de dindarlığın düzenleyici bir etkisi olmuştur. Komplo inançları, kolektif nostalji ve diğer grup

düzeyindeki duygular (suçluluk, öfke, gurur, gelecek korkusu ve umut) arasındaki korelasyon sonuçları, komplo inançları ve kolektif nostaljinin her iki çalışmada da pozitif yönde ilişkili olduğunu göstermiştir. Özellikle ideolojinin etkisi göz önünde bulundurularak, kolektif nostaljiyi manipüle etmeye ve katılımcıları kategorize etmeye yönelik farklı yaklaşımlarla daha fazla araştırma yapılması gerektiği tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: komplo inançları, kolektif nostalji, Kemalist nostalji, Osmanlı nostaljisi, sosyal kimlik, kutuplaşma, gruplar arası ilişkiler, grup süreçleri, laikler, muhafazakârlar, grup düzeyinde duygular



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Eylül Deran Atalay

İzmir, 2024

TEXT OF OATH

I declare and honestly confirm that my study, titled “INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA ON CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT THE RIVAL POLITICAL PARTY” and presented as a Master’s Thesis, has been written without applying to any assistance inconsistent with scientific ethics and traditions. I declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that all content and ideas drawn directly or indirectly from external sources are indicated in the text and listed in the list of references.

Eylül Deran Atalay

March 2024



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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

SYMBOLS:

M	Mean
SD	Standard Deviation
N	Sample Size
CI	Confidence Interval
LL	Lower Limit
UL	Upper Limit
SE	Standard Error
η_p^2	Partial Eta Squared
λ	Lambda

ABBREVIATIONS:

AKP	Justice and Development Party
CHP	Republican People's Party

1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

As a group-level emotion that an individual feels on behalf of the social group he/she belongs to by experiencing a longing for the social identity's past (Wildschut et al., 2014), collective nostalgia's relationship with conspiracy beliefs has not been investigated much yet. In the present thesis, the impact of collective nostalgia on political outgroup conspiracy beliefs was investigated with two studies in Türkiye. More precisely, in Study 1, Kemalist nostalgia's effect on conspiracy beliefs about the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was investigated among the Republican People's Party (CHP) supporters. In Study 2, Ottoman nostalgia's effect on conspiracy beliefs about CHP was investigated among AKP supporters.

Collective nostalgia reflects people's social motivations concerning their identified group. An individual's identification with a group generates the need to protect the ingroup's self-esteem and positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In order to meet this need, group members tend to favour the ingroup while displaying prejudice and negative attitudes to outgroups. Collective nostalgia can represent this tendency concerning the group's relatively better past while at the same time increasing negative attitudes towards outgroups (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Smeekes et al., 2018; Wohl et al., 2020a). Recalling the ingroup's past can draw attention to intergroup differences and conflicts (Behler et al., 2021; Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Reyna et al., 2022). Conspiracy beliefs can represent a negative attitude towards outgroups triggered by collective nostalgia. People might endorse conspiracy beliefs to point out an outgroup as a result of experiencing the present of the ingroup as relatively worse than the past. Different aspects and ideologies emphasized in collective nostalgia content can influence how outgroups are perceived (Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Stefaniak et al., 2021). Also, political parties and leaders use collective nostalgia to get support from the citizens (Bar-Tal, 2007; Dresler-Hawke, 2005; Stefaniak et al., 2021; Wohl et al., 2020b) and this might create negative attitudes to certain political groups. Therefore, collective nostalgia may influence conspiracy beliefs about political outgroups. Here, in Türkiye's political context, it was investigated whether different collective nostalgia types as Ottoman

and Kemalist nostalgia (Elçi, 2022) influence two major political party supporters' conspiracy beliefs about each other.

In this first part, a general summary of the studies in this thesis was introduced. In the next section, brief definitions and explanations about conspiracy beliefs, as well as the motives behind these beliefs, will be provided as a starting point before delving into the role of social identity and intergroup relations in conspiracy beliefs, which will be essential to explain the political conspiracy beliefs being investigated in this paper.



2. CHAPTER LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introducing The Motives Behind Conspiracy Beliefs

Conspiracy beliefs are the beliefs that a powerful and small group of people covertly carry out malicious plans against public (Douglas et al., 2017). Even though conspiracy beliefs may be adaptive because they alert people to potential threats and malicious coalitions (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017; van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018), they might also have broad negative consequences, ranging from unprotective health behaviour to social discrimination (van Mulukom et al., 2022). A deeper understanding of the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs is crucial to counter potential negative consequences. Therefore, researchers working on this subject pointed out three important motives – originally from system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) – of conspiracy beliefs. These are epistemic, existential, and social motives that encompass various psychological needs usually prompted during social crises (Douglas et al., 2017, 2020; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Epistemic motives correspond to the desire for knowledge, existential motives include the desire for security and control, and social motives represent the need for sustaining a positive representation and self-esteem of a person's social group. People tend to justify the existing status quo triggered by these motives and needs, even if the status quo is to their disadvantage (Jost et al., 2004, 2008, 2010; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). This justification process may also lead to biased and motivated information processing to reach the desired conclusion to satisfy those needs (Haines & Jost, 2000; Hennes et al., 2016). When these needs are triggered, as in the case of significant societal events, conspiracy beliefs may provide a sense of certainty, control, and self-esteem by providing explanations regardless of whether they are true or false.

The present study will focus more on the social aspect of conspiracy beliefs in the context of politics, as other studies investigated these beliefs in political contexts (Uscinski, 2017; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Thus, in the next section, describing social identity and how it affects intergroup relations and biases from the perspective of

social identity theory is crucial to explain the role of political identities in conspiracy beliefs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Then, their link to conspiracy beliefs will be briefly explained before proceeding to political conspiracy beliefs.

2.2. Social Identity and Conspiracy Beliefs

Apart from personal identity, people also derive their social identities from belonging to social groups. According to social identity theory, people's identification with a social group is accompanied by a need to protect and promote the ingroup's positive image, uniqueness, and self-esteem, depending on the strength of identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Although belongingness to a group can provide a sense of security (Cruwys et al., 2014; Greenaway et al., 2015), people may express some biases as a result of the need to protect and promote the ingroup's positive distinctiveness. In previous social identity experiments, researchers divided participants into groups based on an arbitrary criterion (minimal group paradigm). Then, participants had to allocate points to ingroup and outgroup members as part of the experiment. It has been found that even if the participants were divided into groups based on a meaningless criterion, they tended to allocate fewer points to the outgroup, and this was more important than the ingroup receiving more points (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971). This biased intergroup behaviour was explained mainly by the motivation to achieve a positive distinctiveness and self-esteem for one's social identity compared to other groups rather than focusing on limited resources. In other words, group members try to achieve positive self-esteem and distinctiveness by comparing themselves with outgroups and trying to reach the conclusion that they are superior than outgroups, which may result in unfairly favouring the ingroup and showing prejudice to outgroups.

Intergroup bias may manifest in different attitudes and behaviours in intergroup contexts. Conspiracy beliefs can be an example of a biased way to achieve this positive distinctiveness and self-esteem needed for the ingroup. The result of identification's need to protect the ingroup corresponds to the social motive of conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs may represent intergroup biases that aim to defend and support the ingroup by showing outgroups as immoral and conspiring against the ingroup (Biddlestone et al., 2021; Enders & Uscinski, 2021; Miller et al., 2016). Furthermore, when the ingroup experience problems, they might blame an outgroup's conspiring

actions for these problems. By doing this, the ingroup members protect their group's self-esteem by attributing blame to others (e.g., groups that they have already been in conflict with). Hence, it can be stated that conspiracy beliefs can intensify the existing intergroup conflicts and be reinforced by them (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; van Prooijen & Song, 2021). In other words, people may try to confirm their ingroup's positive image and conclude that they are superior through conspiracy beliefs that assign responsibility to outgroups for important social occasions.

Collective narcissism can be a noteworthy example to explain how strong forms of social identity and the need for protecting the ingroup's self-esteem can play a part in intergroup bias and conspiracy beliefs about outgroups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Collective narcissism refers to the perception that the ingroup is exceptionally superior and deserves more, but others do not recognise this (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) which is reflected in outgroup derogation, biases and perception of the outgroups as threat (Douglas et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Accordingly, this form of social identity beliefs and perception is associated with higher conspiracy beliefs about the outgroups (Cichocka et al., 2015, 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). For instance, if there is an important social situation which prompts feelings of anxiety and uncertainty, higher collective narcissism has been found to be associated with higher possibility of interpreting of such events as threat to their social group, and blame external powers (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018), which can be provided by a conspiratorial explanation about outgroups.

In summary, people's social identity motivations impact conspiracy beliefs. In addition, people have different political ideologies and social identities in terms of various social dimensions. So, similar effects can be observed with respect to these different social identities and conspiracy beliefs. Since this paper investigates conspiracy beliefs towards the rival political party as an outgroup, the link among political ideology, political identity, and conspiracy beliefs, in particular, will be briefly discussed in the next section.

2.3. Political Identity and Conspiracy Beliefs

One of the domains where the relationship between group processes and conspiracy beliefs becomes clearer is politics. As politics involves competitions among social groups for power and recognition, as well as events that are important for society, this

area may contain many occurrences and cues to trigger motives of conspiracy beliefs. For example, conspiracy beliefs are likely to increase when groups perceive each other as a threat to their ingroup and its values (Bilewicz et al., 2013; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; van Prooijen, 2020) and also when intergroup conflict is high (Hebel-Sela et al., 2022). Politics, where political groups represent social identity, often involves intense intergroup conflicts between political groups with incompatible values. Distinct ideologies and values of political groups may be perceived as a threat to each other by group members. As mentioned in the part about social identity, people may tend to protect their ingroup (i.e., political group) by believing in information showing the opposite political group immoral and blaming them for negative political events.

In addition, motivated reasoning accounts have argued that people tend to process the information they encounter in line with their previous views and attitudes (Kunda, 1990). This argument indicates that people may endorse conspiracy beliefs that confirm their previous attitudes. In a political context, a political party or group member might not believe in conspiracy explanations that accuse their political group but might be more likely to believe in others that accuse a rival political group (Claassen & Ensley, 2016; Enders et al., 2022; Miller et al., 2016). For instance, Democrats and Republicans or liberals and conservatives are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that accuse the opposing political group rather than those that accuse their own group (Edelson et al., 2017; Oliver & Wood, 2014; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Thus, specific social identity processes and existing intergroup conflicts also impact conspiracy beliefs in the political sphere.

Some related factors, such as political ideology, political control, or the alleged conspirators in specific conspiracy beliefs, also influence politics' relationship with conspiracy beliefs. Firstly, various studies have investigated the relationship between political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Some found that right-wing conservative ideology is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Enders et al., 2020; Pasek et al., 2015), whereas others found that both left- and right-wing ideologies are associated with conspiracy beliefs even if right-wing (Alper et al., 2021; Imhoff et al., 2022) and extreme ideologies are more likely (Hardin, 2002; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; van Prooijen et al., 2015) because of their structured thinking style (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Also, as already mentioned, since groups are competing for power and resources in politics, conspiracy beliefs' motives include control and security needs

along with protecting social identity; whether one's supported party or group has power or not is influential in conspiracy beliefs. For example, there is a positive association between conspiracy beliefs and being powerless or lacking control as a group (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bruder et al., 2013; Crocker et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff et al., 2022; Kofta et al., 2020; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). When a person's political group is not in power, it poses a threat to both the positive image of one's social identity and existential needs such as control. As a result, the person can both compensate for the lack of control with alternative explanations (e.g., political conspiracy beliefs) and protect the image of the ingroup by blaming external groups and endorsing those explanations, as social identity theory's argument about intergroup bias. Moreover, ideology also affects which conspiracy explanation a person believes in in terms of the alleged conspirator group. For example, political extremists and people with power-challenging ideas are more likely to endorse upward conspiracy beliefs, which include more powerful groups as the conspirators. In contrast, conservatives are more likely to endorse downward conspiracy beliefs, which include powerless groups as conspirators (Nera et al., 2021). To sum up, from ideology to power relations, many political factors might influence people's conspiracy beliefs and the content of their conspiracy beliefs.

Up to this point, information about the description of social identity, its influence on conspiracy beliefs, and how political identities as social groups and ideologies can influence conspiracy beliefs has been provided. As mentioned in the introduction, the present research examines the influence of collective nostalgia on conspiracy beliefs. Therefore, before moving on to collective nostalgia, explaining how the collective past takes part in social identity and intergroup relations is now relevant.

2.4. Collective History and Social Identity

A shared history with other ingroup members can define intergroup distinctions by describing the ingroup values and norms with a narrative about the group's past and strengthen attachment among group members (Hirst & Manier, 2008; Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Collective history is not only an objective story of the group's past, but also a historical representation of the group including a biased narrative of positive and negative events along with emotions that are influenced by social and political factors (Burnell et al., 2022; Hirst & Manier,

2008; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Collective history can reinforce people's social identity and emotions on the group's behalf. Accordingly, collective history can trigger social identity motivations and needs, such as protecting the ingroup's positive distinctiveness and self-esteem. For example, collective history can be used to establish the group's positive distinctiveness by emphasising the positive characteristics of the group from its glorious past, or by justifying the ingroup's power over outgroups based on this glorious past (Dahl et al., 2004; Honneth, 2004). As a result, collective history can take part in group processes by reinforcing social identities and making intergroup distinctions salient which can increase intergroup tension.

This section summarised shortly the collective past's importance on social identity and its role in intergroup processes. The next part will explain how collective history's influence on social identity processes can manifest in conspiracy beliefs by pointing out important past social events in the group's history, along with the explanation of how threatening past experiences of the group can trigger conspiratorial explanations.

2.5. Collective History, Intergroup Conflicts, and Conspiracy Beliefs

Given how social psychological motives give rise to conspiracy beliefs during important events (Douglas et al., 2020), those events may be a part of collective history that group members bring explanations in their social identity narrative. In other words, important events that prompt people's epistemic, existential, and social needs of conspiracy beliefs are not necessarily contemporary. Events that happened in a group's past or a perceived disruption in the group's historical continuity can also prompt those needs. Conspiratorial explanations that have been offered to give meaning to those events may be embedded in group members' perception of their history and social identity today (Bilewicz et al., 2013; Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Hence, the collective past can be expected to be influential in conspiracy beliefs because it contains events that prompt the psychological needs of conspiracy beliefs.

Recalling the collective past can also make social identities and conflicts apparent, which may affect intergroup conspiracy beliefs. For example, for a negative event in the group's past, group members may protect the ingroup's positive image by believing and internalising conspiratorial explanations that blame an outgroup for that

event in addition to bringing explanations for big events triggering epistemic, existential and social needs. Similarly, group members may blame outgroups for the present events by referring to outgroups that they had conflicts in the past with. Some studies supported that varying experiences of collective history can influence conspiracy beliefs. For instance, traumatic past events, collective victimhood in the past, and historical hardship of one's nation as a kind of social identity have been found to foster conspiracy beliefs and susceptibility to conspiratorial thinking (Bilewicz, 2022; Pantazi et al., 2022; Vincze et al., 2021). Group members may try to reduce their sense of existential insecurity to their social identity arising from past events – which may point to specific outgroups in those events – via conspiracy beliefs. Consequently, a group's history can influence social identity processes, manifesting in conspiracy beliefs as a reflection of the need to protect the ingroup.

The following section will argue that most of the research mentioned up to this point has focused on negative representations of the social group's past as triggers for conspiracy beliefs and conflict. It will be argued that representing the collective past as relatively positive compared to the present can trigger conspiracy beliefs. By doing this, the paper's hypothesis that collective nostalgia will increase beliefs in conspiracy theories about outgroups will be implied. So, the next section will be a transition and support for the hypothesis before explaining collective nostalgia and its proposed effect on conspiracy beliefs.

2.6. Positive Collective Past and Conspiracy Beliefs

Although previous research which examined the effect of the collective past on conspiracy beliefs has usually focused on a negative representation of the past, a positive recollection of the ingroup's past may also trigger the psychological motives of conspiracy beliefs, when the past is perceived as more positive than the present, or the continuity of this positive history is perceived as disrupted (Cheung et al., 2017; Ramonaitė, 2022; Smith et al., 2012). This experience is similar to the conditions that trigger conspiracy beliefs because a social change from the past to the present poses a threat to the ingroup by creating feelings of uncertainty and existential anxiety (Zárate et al., 2019). For example, when people perceive their country's economic downfall creating existential insecurity, they are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Hornsey et al., 2022). In addition to bringing explanations to decrease individual

existential insecurities and threat to the needs for security, knowledge and control, conspiracy beliefs might also help protecting the ingroup's positive distinctiveness and image by blaming other powerful groups for any perceived negative change in their social group (e.g., society or country in this example) from past to present. Therefore, a relatively positive past of the ingroup can also trigger conspiracy beliefs.

So far, it has been explained that a negative collective past of a social identity may elicit conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, it has been argued that there is some supporting evidence indicating that when the past is perceived as more favourable compared to the present, people's conspiracy beliefs tend to increase. As such, collective nostalgia serves as a tangible example of this effect. This experience portrays the ingroup's past in a positive light and potentially contributes to the rise of conspiracy beliefs about outgroups. In the following part, the potential relationship between collective nostalgia and outgroup conspiracy beliefs will be discussed after introducing group-level emotions in general, and it will be argued that collective nostalgia as a group-level emotion can prompt conspiracy beliefs.

2.7. Group-Level Emotions, Collective Nostalgia and Conspiracy Beliefs

Another factor that may play an important role in social identity motivations, processes and intergroup relations can be group-level emotions. As discussed so far, identifying with a social group can influence the evaluation and interpretation of events and objects from a group-based perspective in terms of a wide range of factors, from the way people treat each other to the way they perceive their collective history. Emotions are such an aspect that are influenced by social identity in this way, especially group-level emotions. Group-level emotions are emotions that people feel on behalf of the group they identify with, and they are different than individual emotions or emotions about being a member of the ingroup (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Smith et al., 2007). Basic human emotions, like anger, fear, guilt, pride, or hope can also be experienced on behalf of one's social identity. For example, group-level anger can be felt in face of a threat when the group has source to handle (Mackie et al., 2000), fear can be felt in face of a threat in times of uncertainty but the group has low control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Group-level guilt can be felt when it was perceived that the ingroup behaves wrongly and take an advantage against outgroups unfairly (Harth et al., 2008) or a person can feel pride at the group-level about

situations in which positive outcomes for one's social identity can be attributed to the ingroup qualities and capability (Mackie & Smith, 2018). Similarly, group-level hope can appear from a feeling that it is possible to achieve a positive consequence for one's group, even if it is highly unmanageable and unpredictable (Cohen-Chen et al., 2017). Therefore, group-level emotions may also inform social identity processes and intergroup relations.

People's thoughts and emotions about and on behalf of their social identity may not be specific to what is happening at the present moment, because people's relationship with their social group has also a temporal aspect and historical narrative (Smith & Mackie, 2021). Collective nostalgia is an example of this kind of group-level emotion which will be focused in the present thesis. *Collective nostalgia* refers to an emotional yearning for a shared past, a feeling experienced when people long for their group's past by reflecting on identity-related situations or objects (Wildschut et al., 2014). This experience points out intergroup differences and makes social identity more salient by reinforcing it (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Martinovic et al., 2018). It focuses on positive aspects of the ingroup from the past and how it changed in the present compared to the past. Since this experience is characterised by seeing the ingroup's past as more positive and longing for it, it may result in treating outgroups – who are not recognised as parts of the ingroup's past – negatively (Cheung et al., 2017; Smeekes, 2015). More specifically, these groups might be seen as responsible for these negative disruptions in the group's social identity from the past or they might be seen as further reinforcing factors of these negative changes in the group because they are outgroups who are not involved in that shared positive past.

These negative attitudes towards outgroups as a result of collective nostalgia experience may be manifested in intergroup conspiracy beliefs. Firstly, collective nostalgia can be thought of as a kind of critique of the present circumstances accompanied by perceptions like a threat to one's own social identity, temporal relative deprivation, and powerlessness, which have been found as positive predictors of conspiracy beliefs (Abts & Baute, 2022; Ramonaitė, 2022; Rogenhofer et al., 2023; Vincze et al., 2021). Furthermore, as a result of collective nostalgia, people may need to make sense of and explain these changes in their group and at the same time protecting the ingroup's positive image. At this point, they may complementarily accuse those outgroups in order to bring explanations for such significant changes

(Petrović et al., 2019; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). In this way, they protect the positive image of their group by endorsing conspiracy beliefs to explain the deteriorating changes they feel in the group and attribute responsibility to outgroups. Moreover, intergroup conflicts from the past might also influence to which group people attribute blame in also current events.

To the best of my knowledge, only one study by Ramonaitė (2022) directly explicitly investigated the link between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs. In that study, a strong relationship has been found between conspiracy beliefs and communist nostalgia as a result marginalisation and social status decline in Lithuania. This finding may support that people's conspiracy beliefs, which inherently blame an outgroup, can increase when negative social changes are perceived concerning the ingroup. It can be stated that perceiving these negative changes to social identity from the past to the present can trigger people's experiences of powerlessness, existential anxiety and feeling left behind. People might turn to conspiratorial explanations to decrease these feelings and find meaning. These meanings and explanations in conspiracy beliefs can help them also to protect the ingroup's self-esteem and positive image by attributing blame to outgroups. Hence, it can be argued that collective nostalgia may increase conspiracy beliefs because collective nostalgia may create feelings that prompt conspiracy beliefs' motives. In other words, collective nostalgia which is accompanied by experiences like powerlessness or threat to the ingroup can result in a need to explain the decline in the ingroup's status by, at the same time, protecting the ingroup. Conspiracy beliefs may meet this need to explain when there is a competing outgroup.

The previous sections have explained how the group's past, including collective nostalgia, can influence group identity. In addition, it has been argued that collective nostalgia, in which the group's past is perceived better than the present, may trigger psychological needs (e.g., security, control, knowledge) and perception of threats towards social identity. These may increase conspiracy beliefs about outgroups. Since the present study examines how collective nostalgia affects conspiracy beliefs about political outgroups in Turkish political context, general information about the polarisation of the two rival political parties and ideologies in Türkiye will be presented to provide a general background to the political context of the study in the next part. In addition, the section will describe a historical event on this polarisation

before going into the rationale for the contents of collective nostalgia used in this research.

2.8. Political Polarisation in Türkiye and History of Polarisation

As a highly polarised country, Türkiye's political history and context provide an appropriate setting to investigate the relationship between collective nostalgia and outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Firstly, Türkiye is polarised between seculars and conservatives. While this political polarisation is currently highly salient among different political groups, for the main representatives as political groups of these camps that are highest in number, some historical events can be considered as influential on this polarisation. This history may indicate that different collective nostalgia contents might suit for these different groups because these groups' values have been in power in different periods in history. Considering how collective nostalgia represents a positive perception of the ingroup's past, the content and specific time periods that nostalgia refers to might differ for different political groups.

Examining Türkiye's polarisation from a point of view akin to Şerif Mardin's (1973) helps in interpreting political history's significance in this polarisation between the most prominent political representatives of nationalist seculars and Muslim conservatives and distinct nostalgia types for these groups. Mardin (1973) states that the conflict between the secular elite and the Muslim public originated during the end of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic was established, the public suddenly encountered a new societal system in which secularism and Western values became dominant. However, these people still identified with religious and conservative lifestyles as in the Ottoman times. Thus, they felt that the elites in the new system were imposing nationalist secular values, which created a further division between nationalist secular and conservative identity and fuelled nostalgic feelings for the Ottoman, where their values were dominant (Aytaç & Elçi, 2018; Elçi, 2022; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994; Sunar, 1990). Specifically, this event and the experience of collective nostalgia about Ottoman past in conservative public are associated with insecurity and threat to their social and political identities. According to Mardin's perspective, these experiences still have an influence on the current conflicts in Türkiye.

In the next part, it will be briefly discussed how historical events and group differences, which have played a significant role in the polarisation between nationalist secular and conservative Muslim social identities in Türkiye, led to the development of feelings of collective nostalgia for different periods within these two distinct political groups. Two major political parties as the primary representatives of these polarised groups in contemporary Türkiye will be introduced, and how these parties use references to different collective pasts will be mentioned. These discussions will imply that the expected impact of collective nostalgia may depend on the specific content within different political groups.

2.9. Different Collective Nostalgia Contents for Two Polarised Groups

While these chronic social identity conflicts have led religious conservatives to emphasise Ottoman times and religious identity that they feel the secular nationalist Republic rejected, secular nationalists have felt nostalgic for the early years of the Republic (Kemalist nostalgia) because religious conservative values gained power (Ciftci & Yavuz, 2021; Elçi, 2022; Karaveli, 2010; Özyürek, 2006). Thus, the periods to feel collective nostalgia for differ in these groups: conservatives would more likely to feel nostalgic for Ottoman times, whereas secular nationalists would more likely to feel nostalgic for the Republican times (Kemalist nostalgia) where the secular nationalist values were more dominant.

The current representative parties of this conflict between two political camps are the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is the government, and the Republican People's Party (CHP), which is the main opposition party. These parties are not only representatives of these camps but they are the most prominent parties corresponding to these group's ideologies and respective collective nostalgia in the parliament. AKP represents conservatives, and CHP, the founding party of the Republic, represents seculars. Indeed, different collective nostalgia contents are emphasised in these two political groups, as expected. For instance, AKP uses nostalgic rhetoric by referring to Muslim values from the Ottoman times as a basis of their social identity, and they picture their governance as a breaking away from the secular nationalist identity of the Republic (Christofis, 2018). However, for CHP supporters, they are emphasising the times dominated by more secular nationalist values of the Republic, like the early years of the Republic, with an emotional yearning. Therefore, it seems more suitable for

CHP supporters to feel Kemalist collective nostalgia and AKP supporters to feel Ottoman nostalgia in order for collective nostalgia to reinforce biases and feelings about social identity, group processes and outgroup conspiracy beliefs, as described above.

The effect of polarisation on conspiracy beliefs about outgroups will be discussed next. Drawing on the argument that the conflicts in Türkiye's history continue today through similar social/political identities, it will be argued that those enduring conflicts can influence political conspiracy beliefs. It will be explained how outgroup conspiracy beliefs of the supporters of these two political parties representing two major polarised groups can be influenced by collective past experiences.

2.10. Historical Intergroup Conflict and Political Conspiracy Beliefs in Türkiye

As the findings on the positive correlation between conspiracy beliefs and intergroup conflict (Hebel-Sela et al., 2022) suggest, the political polarisation in Türkiye and history's nurturing effect on this polarisation may also have a similar relationship with conspiracy beliefs. Secular nationalist and socially conservative Muslim political groups may believe in conspiracy beliefs that blame the other. As mentioned, the fact that they have already been in conflict may also make them more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs about each other. Taking into consideration that people evaluate information in a way that confirms their pre-existing views and social identities (Bolsen et al., 2014; Kunda, 1990) implies that their previous views can also be influenced by the enduring historical conflict and incompatibility of these groups. Moreover, if people feel an threat and existential insecurity to themselves and their groups, they become more prone to conspiracy beliefs (Adam-Troian et al., 2021). Political groups can pose such a threat to each other. More specifically, a threat against a group or a person's lifestyle, values, and norms can also be considered an existential threat increasing conspiracy beliefs (van Prooijen, 2020). The conflict between secular nationalists and social conservatives can be an example of this argument because these groups' different lifestyles, values, and norms are incompatible.

In Türkiye, incompatible values of rival groups as existential threats have been nurtured with historically differentiated identities of different political groups. Moreover, conspiracy beliefs are endorsed because they align with the group's identity

and provide a narrative that aligns with the group's perspective (Krekó, 2019). It is possible to observe this effect on conspiratorial discourses of these two groups towards each other. For example, sometimes the conservative government party AKP sometimes projects secular opposition groups as existential threats and conspirators who are collaborating with the West, while secular nationalist groups see religiosity as an existential threat and perceive them as conspirators against their secular, Western social identity (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). As a result, it can be expected that the two main political groups in Türkiye, distinguished in a polarisation between conservatives and seculars influenced by different historical events, they might believe in conspiracy explanations against each other.

In this section and the previous one, the conflict between two groups in Türkiye's political context was explained along with how political events in history affected their polarisation, how these conflicting political identities influence conspiracy beliefs, and which parties in the current context represent these two camps. In the final part of the introduction, the present two studies will be explained.

2.11. The Present Research

Collective nostalgia may emphasise the ingroup's past as more positive. Also, similar to an important social event, it may increase the need to explain this change in the group along with negative attitudes towards outgroups as a threat to social identity. People may try to mitigate anxiety and social identity threat feelings by blaming outgroups with a conspiracy explanation. Although previous studies have not focused much on the possibility of such an effect of collective nostalgia (for exception, see Ramonaitė, 2022), some findings provide indirect support for this potential role of collective nostalgia by indicating how nostalgia for the supported party's previous president times predicts negative attitudes towards the other political group (Fetterman et al., 2021).

Two experimental studies in the present paper investigated whether collective nostalgia increases conspiracy beliefs in Türkiye, which provides a suitable framework for examining this because of the intense polarisation between two political groups and historical traces of this conflict. Specifically, the present research investigated whether Ottoman and Kemalist nostalgia will increase AKP and CHP supporters' conspiracy beliefs about each other. Ottoman nostalgia refers to the good Ottoman

times when conservative and religious Muslim social identity was stronger. It can be suggested that Ottoman nostalgia will reveal the proposed effect on conspiracy beliefs in AKP supporters about CHP as their rival political group with secular nationalist values. Kemalist nostalgia refers to the early years of the Turkish Republic when secular and nationalist social identity values were becoming stronger. Thus, it can be expected that in CHP supporters, Kemalist nostalgia will reveal the proposed effect on conspiracy beliefs about AKP as their rival political group. In other words, it was hypothesised that in AKP supporters, Ottoman nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about CHP compared to Kemalist nostalgia and control condition, whereas in CHP supporters, Kemalist nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about AKP supporters compared to Ottoman nostalgia and control condition. Therefore, in Study 1, CHP supporters were recruited as participants, and collective nostalgia was manipulated with a Kemalist nostalgia text. In this study, conspiracy beliefs items were about AKP. In Study 2, AKP supporters were recruited as participants, and collective nostalgia was manipulated with an Ottoman nostalgia text. Conspiracy beliefs items were about CHP this time.

In addition to collective nostalgia as a group-based emotion that is yearning for the ingroup's past, I also measured five additional basic group-based emotions (guilt, anger, pride, fear for the future, and hope) being felt on behalf of the identified group (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Smith et al., 2007) to explore how these emotions might be associated with conspiracy beliefs, and if these emotions would be affected as a result of collective nostalgia manipulation, which might potentially invoke social identity. Regardless of the feeling of collective nostalgia, the manipulation texts may invoke group membership (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Seger et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007), which can be enough to trigger the need to protect the ingroup, as in social identity experiments (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Identification with a group is positively associated with positive group-based emotions (e.g., pride or hope) and can facilitate intergroup bias (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Smith et al., 2007), such as derogating the outgroups and protecting the image of the ingroup through conspiracy beliefs. At the same time, these positive emotions might lead ingroup members to help outgroup members (van Leeuwen et al., 2013). In contrast, negative group-based emotions, like anger or fear, are related to the perception of threat to the ingroup (Mackie et al., 2000) and a sense of lack of control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

This threat perception and lack of control can also motivate conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, as Douglas et al. (2020) indicated, the link between conspiracy beliefs and emotions still needs further exploration. Existing research suggests that negative emotions increase the need for meaning (Park, 2010) as a predictor of conspiracy beliefs. Indeed, these negative emotions are related to conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2020; Franks et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2019; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), along with group-based negative emotions (Moscovici, 1987). Since conspiracy beliefs might be motivated by the need to protect the ingroup and imply the outgroup as conspirators in the political context, and since some group emotions are associated with factors related to conspiracy beliefs' motives, I decided to include basic group-based emotions to explore without having any hypothesis about the relationship.



3. CHAPTER STUDY 1

3.1. Methods

3.1.1. Participants

In Study 1, people who support the main opposition party, CHP, were targeted as the most prominent representatives of the secular group. Participants were recruited through social media posts and Facebook advertisements. Although G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was used to determine the minimum required sample size, which was 620 with .80 power and .20 small effect size for independent samples t-test, because of time limitations for the thesis and difficulty to reach participants who are willing to indicate the party they support, I was able to reach 267 people who supported CHP. I only recruited participants who indicated that they support CHP in Study 1 because CHP is the primary representative party of secular values and ideologies, which are expected to be more compatible with Kemalist nostalgia. I conducted a sensitivity analysis for a one-tailed independent samples t-test with a statistical power of .80 and an alpha of .05. The sample size 267 was sensitive to detect a small effect size as Cohen's $d = .305$. Yaşar University Ethics Committee provided ethics approval for the study.

3.1.2. Materials

Collective nostalgia manipulation was taken from Elçi's (2022) study. In Study 1, text for the manipulation of Kemalist nostalgia was used, and the control condition did not read anything. Originally, Kemalist nostalgia text included references to İsmet İnönü, but mentioning the names of the controversial figures was deleted in this study. Participants in the Kemalist nostalgia condition read the Turkish version of the text below (see Appendices for the Turkish version):

This heavenly homeland is the trust of the founders of the Republic. Since the early years of the Republic, this people have always stood firmly against several external outbreaks, and their collaborators within us, that have played games with our country.

*Remember the glorious War of Independence! Remember Mustafa Kemal Atatürk!
When I miss those times, I wish I had lived in these good old days.*

Collective nostalgia was measured with one question along with definition, asking participants *“Collective nostalgia is the experience of sentimental longing for one’s social group’s past and sad affection about events and objects related to that identity, depending on whether one considers oneself as a member of a particular social identity. Considering the above definition, to what extent do you currently feel nostalgic on behalf of the political group you feel close to?”* The options were on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at all” (1) to “Very much” (5).

Political conspiracy belief items about the rival political party were taken from Enders et al.’s (2022) study. In the original measurement, five items measured electoral fraud, political extremism, health policy, economy, and crime-related conspiracy beliefs about Democratic and Republican elites. In this study, these items were adapted by changing the alleged party into AKP and the sentence and question structure in a way compatible with Turkish language. Some of the questions in the original scale referred to USA-specific political information; therefore, those items were also changed in an appropriate way in Türkiye’s context. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agree with the following statements: *“Political elites of AKP engaged in election fraud”, “Political elites of AKP are secretly working with terror supporters to undermine Türkiye for their own gain”, “Political elites of AKP are secretly plotting with private hospitals to lie about the effectiveness of the health system and gain support for their health policy proposals”, “Political elites of AKP are secretly plotting with large banks to lie about the health of the economy to gain support for their economic policy proposals”, “Political elites of AKP are secretly plotting to lie about crime rates to gain support for their immigration policy proposals”*. Participants answered each question on a 5-point Likert scale. The options were “Strongly disagree” (1), “Disagree” (2), “Neither agree nor disagree” (3), “Agree” (4), “Strongly agree” (5).

For exploratory analyses as mentioned in the previous chapter, participants were also asked about their emotions on behalf of their group. Participants answered five different group emotion questions. The questions were: *“To what extent do you feel [guilty/angry/proud/fearful for the future/hopeful] on behalf of your political group?”*

Participants indicated their answers on 5-point Likert scales ranging from “Not at all” (1) to “Very much” (5).

3.1.3. Procedure

Participants were recruited through social media advertisement. Qualtrics online survey platform was used to collect responses for both studies. Participants were first shown an information sheet for the study and a consent form to confirm that they were over 18 years of age, agreed to participate, and their language was Turkish. Participants who agreed to participate were informed that the study is specifically for people who are either AKP or CHP supporters. They were asked whether they supported any of these parties with two options: Yes or No. For the participants who indicated that they did not support any of these, the survey page was directed to the end by taking them. Participants who indicated that they supported one of these parties were asked to indicate which one they supported. Study 1 includes only CHP supporters, and participants were randomly assigned to either Kemalist nostalgia or control condition. Participants in the Kemalist nostalgia condition were informed that they would read a text about Turkish history and should read it carefully because they may be asked questions about it before reading the text. Participants in the control condition did not receive any text. Then, both groups of participants received a definition of collective nostalgia and were asked to answer the manipulation check question. They indicated to what extent they felt nostalgic on behalf of their political group at that moment. Next, participants answered conspiracy beliefs questions about AKP as their rival party. The order of the conspiracy belief items was randomised. Then, they answered questions about emotions on behalf of their political group, and emotion questions were randomly presented again, as conspiracy items. Then, participants were asked to answer demographic questions about their age, gender, education, socio-economic status, political ideology, and religiosity. For socio-economic status, options ranged from 1 to 10, and a higher value indicated a higher socio-economic status. For political ideology, options ranged from “Left-wing” (1) to “Right-wing” (7). Finally, for the religiosity, the options ranged from “Not at all religious” (1) to “Very religious” (7). In the final part, they were informed that the study was finished and thanked for their participation.

3.2. Results

3.2.1. Descriptives

Table 3.1. shows descriptive statistics of the demographic variables (age, gender, and education) of the participants in each condition and in total. This information includes only participants who answered all questions of demographics. There were 123 participants in the control condition, and 117 participants in the nostalgia condition who completed the questions about demographics. Among these participants, in total, participants' age ranged from 18 to 75 years ($M = 47.20$, $SD = 15.04$). The sample's 62.5% consisted of female participants ($n = 150$) and 37.5% male participants ($n = 90$). There was no participant selecting the option "other" for gender. In terms of education, more than half of the sample was highly educated by having at least a Bachelor's degree. 0.8% of the participants completed primary school ($n = 2$), 13.8% completed high school ($n = 33$), 12.5% completed a pre-bachelor's degree ($n = 30$), 58.8% completed a bachelor's degree ($n = 141$), 11.3% completed a master's degree ($n = 27$), and 2.9% completed a PhD degree ($n = 7$), for their highest completed education level.

Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Study 1

	Control Condition (<i>n</i> = 123)	Nostalgia Condition (<i>n</i> = 117)	Total (<i>n</i> = 240)
Demographic Variables			
Age			
Range	19-75 years	18-73 years	18-75 years
Mean (SD)	47.74 (14.84)	46.64 (15.30)	47.20 (15.04)
Gender/sex			
Male	39% (48)	35.9% (42)	37.5% (90)
Female	61% (75)	64.1% (75)	62.5% (150)
Other	0	0	0
Education			
Primary School	0	1.7% (2)	0.8% (2)
Middle School	0	0	0
High School	15.4% (19)	12% (14)	13.8% (33)
Pre-bachelor's degree	11.4% (14)	13.7% (16)	12.5% (30)
Bachelor's degree	60.2% (74)	57.3% (67)	58.8% (141)
Master's degree	11.4% (14)	11.1% (13)	11.3% (27)
PhD	1.6% (2)	4.3% (5)	2.9% (7)
Other	0	0	0

Note. The table includes participants who answered all demographic questions in Study 1. 27 participants were missing in demographic information because they only responded to the questions of the core variables. They were not excluded from the main analysis.

3.2.2. Manipulation Check

Although the Shapiro-Wilk test for testing normality indicated that the data was not normally distributed neither for the control condition ($W = .845, p < .001$) nor for the collective nostalgia condition ($W = .752, p < .001$), parametric tests were used in all the analyses based on suggestions from the literature indicating that similar sample size and variances across groups are more important than normality when comparing two groups with each other (Poncet et al., 2016).

An independent samples t-test was conducted comparing the collective nostalgia group and the control group on how much they feel nostalgic to their group's collective past. There was no significant difference in collective nostalgia feeling between the

collective nostalgia manipulation group ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.38$, $n = 132$) and the control group ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 1.33$, $n = 135$), $t(265) = -1.555$, $p = .061$, Cohen's $d = -.190$, 95% CI [-0.584, 0.069]. Hence, the results suggested that manipulation was not successful to increase feelings of collective nostalgia in participants in the manipulation group compared to the participants in the control group.

Then, I checked whether the effect of manipulation might change depending on participants' ideology or religiosity with two moderation analyses. This is because there might be differences in ideology and religiosity within the characteristics that distinguish the two political camps. Also, the values emphasised in collective nostalgia texts and its effect can depend on ideology and religiosity. Moreover, and importantly, since the data collection process included the election period, and since parties formed alliances with different views, participants might have indicated they supported this party because of their alliance but maybe their ideology could be quite different from this party's.

In the first moderation analysis, ideology was included as a moderator in the relationship between condition and manipulation check question. There was a marginally significant interaction between condition and ideology, $b = -0.288$, 95% CI [-0.563, -0.013], $t = -2.064$, $p = .040$. This provides some support that the relationship between condition and the experience of collective nostalgia depends on participants' ideology. Table 3.2. shows the linear model of the predictors of this moderation analysis where ideology was included as a moderator in the relationship between condition and collective nostalgia experience.

Table 3.2. Moderated Regression Results Using Collective Nostalgia Experience as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	3.673	0.122	3.433	3.913	30.109	<.001
Condition	0.226	0.175	-0.119	0.570	1.292	.198
Ideology	-0.013	0.099	-0.209	0.183	-0.131	.896
Condition * Ideology	-0.288	0.140	-0.563	-0.013	-2.064	.040

Note. $R = .207$, $R^2 = .043$

On an ideology question scale ranging from 1 – “Left-wing” to 7 – “Right-wing”, at lower values of this question (1 SD below the mean), which is closer to left-wing, there was a significant positive relationship between condition and the experience of collective nostalgia, $b = 0.587$, 95% CI [0.099, 1.075], $t = 2.372$, $p = .019$. However, neither at mean ($b = 0.226$, 95% CI [-0.119, 0.570], $t = 1.292$, $p = .198$) nor high (1 SD above the mean) values of ideology ($b = -0.136$, 95% CI [-0.623, 0.351], $t = -0.549$, $p = .584$), there was no significant relationship between condition and the experience of collective nostalgia. The results provide support that collective nostalgia manipulation worked only for more left-wing participants (1 SD below the mean value of the ideology question), see Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1. Simple Slopes Plot Illustrating the Relationship between Condition and Collective Nostalgia by Ideology in Study 1

In the second moderation analysis, religiosity’s effect as a moderator was tested in the relationship between condition as predictor and the experience of collective nostalgia as outcome. However, there was no significant interaction between condition and religiosity, $b = -0.123$, 95% CI [-0.345, 0.100], $t = -1.086$, $p = .279$. Thus, the relationship between condition and the experience of collective nostalgia did not depend on participants’ religiosity. Table 3.3. shows the linear model of the predictors of this moderated regression analysis with religiosity as the moderator.

Table 3.3. Moderated Regression Results Using Collective Nostalgia Experience as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
Constant	3.673	0.123	3.431	3.915	29.878	<.001
Condition	0.196	0.176	-0.025	0.542	1.110	.268
Religiosity	-0.025	0.078	-0.179	0.130	-0.315	.753
Condition * Religiosity	-0.123	0.113	-0.345	0.100	-1.086	.279

Note. $R = .136$, $R^2 = .018$

3.2.3. Main Analyses

Despite the results indicating that the manipulation did not induce collective nostalgia in participants, I still tested whether there was a significant difference between conditions in terms of conspiracy beliefs about AKP. There were 5 different conspiracy items referring to different topics as mentioned in the materials part. I calculated the average of these items to get a single conspiracy beliefs score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .884$).

An independent samples t-test comparing average conspiracy beliefs about the rival party AKP between the participants in the control condition and the participants in the collective nostalgia condition was implemented. The results indicated that there was not a statistically significant difference in conspiracy beliefs about AKP between the participants in the collective nostalgia condition ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.03$) and the control condition ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 0.86$), $t(265) = 0.984$, $p = .163$, Cohen's $d = .120$, 95% CI [-0.114, 0.343]. Therefore, among CHP supporters, the hypothesis that there would be higher conspiracy beliefs about AKP among participants in the Kemalist collective nostalgia condition compared to the participants in the control condition was not supported. Figure 3.2. shows the comparison of conspiracy beliefs about AKP data between conditions.




Figure 3.2. Comparison of the Conditions on Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP in Study 1

Next, I checked whether there was any difference in conspiracy beliefs between the conditions after controlling for demographic factors. Thus, a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was utilised to investigate the effect of condition on conspiracy beliefs, while controlling for age, gender, education level, and socio-economic status. Results showed that there was a significant effect of age on conspiracy beliefs, $F(1,234) = 4.875, p = .028, \eta_p^2 = .020$. There was also a significant effect of gender on conspiracy beliefs, $F(1,234) = 5.560, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .023$. However, there was not a significant effect of neither education level ($F(1,234) = 0.486, p = .486, \eta_p^2 = .002$) nor socio-economic status, $F(1,234) = 1.236, p = .267, \eta_p^2 = .005$. After controlling for demographic factors of age, gender, education level, and socio-economic status, the condition still had no significant effect on conspiracy beliefs, $F(1,234) = 2.056, p = .153, \eta_p^2 = .009$.

Then, similar to analyses for the manipulation check and for the same reasons about party preference, it was tested whether ideology or religiosity moderates the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs. Firstly, a moderation analysis conducted to test whether the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs was moderated by ideology. Moderation effect was shown by a significant interaction

between condition and ideology, $b = -0.203$, 95% CI [-0.388, -0.017], $t = -2.156$, $p = .032$, indicating that the relationship between the condition that a participant was assigned and conspiracy beliefs change at different levels of ideology. Table 3.4. shows the linear model of the predictors of moderated regression with ideology as the moderator between condition and conspiracy beliefs relationship.

Table 3.4. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	4.397	0.082	4.236	4.559	53.544	< .001
Condition	-0.132	0.118	-0.364	0.099	-1.126	.261
Ideology	-0.031	0.067	-0.163	0.101	-0.464	.644
Condition * Ideology	-0.203	0.094	-0.388	-0.017	-2.156	.032

Note. $R = .243$, $R^2 = .059$

There was no significant relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs for the participants closer to left-wing ideology (1 SD below the mean on ideology), $b = 0.122$, 95% CI [-0.207, 0.450], $t = 0.730$, $p = .466$. For mean levels of ideology, there was again no significant relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs, $b = -0.132$, 95% CI [-0.364, 0.099], $t = -1.126$, $p = .261$. However, only for the ones 1 SD closer to right-wing ideology (1 SD above the mean), there was a significant negative relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs, $b = -0.387$, 95% CI [-0.714, -0.059], $t = -2.323$, $p = .021$. Thus, when ideology is 1 SD closer to right-wing, participants had lower conspiracy beliefs about AKP in the Kemalist collective nostalgia condition compared to the control condition, see Figure 3.3 for the simple slopes plot of this moderated regression analysis.




Figure 3.3. Simple Slopes Plot Illustrating the Relationship between Condition and Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP by Ideology in Study 1

Next, another moderation analysis was used with religiosity as the moderator in the same relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs. However, there was not a significant interaction between condition and religiosity level, $b = -0.010$, 95% CI [-0.160, 0.140], $t = -0.134$, $p = .893$, indicating that the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs did not depend on participants' level of religiosity. Table 3.5. shows the linear model of the predictors of the moderated regression with religiosity was taken as the moderator in the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs.

Table 3.5. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	4.394	0.083	4.231	4.558	53.011	<.001
Condition	-0.155	0.119	-0.389	0.079	-1.302	.194
Religiosity	-0.086	0.053	-0.190	0.018	-1.634	.104
Condition * Religiosity	-0.010	0.076	-0.160	0.140	-0.134	.893

Note. $R = .179$, $R^2 = .032$

Since the manipulation did not work as intended, I conducted the same moderation analyses by using manipulation check question, which indicates how much participants experienced collective nostalgia, as a predictor instead of using condition. Firstly, when ideology's moderating role was investigated in relationship between the experience of collective nostalgia (answer to manipulation check question) and conspiracy beliefs, there was a significant interaction between collective nostalgia and ideology, $b = 0.095$, 95% CI [0.027, 0.162], $t = 2.756$, $p = .006$. This indicates that the relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs significantly changed across different levels of ideology. Table 3.6. shows the linear model of the predictors of this moderated regression where ideology was taken as moderator in the relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs.

Table 3.6. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP as the Criterion, Collective Nostalgia as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	4.340	0.057	4.227	4.453	75.652	<.001
Collective Nostalgia	0.123	0.043	0.038	0.208	2.862	.005
Ideology	-0.137	0.046	-0.229	-0.046	-2.962	.003
Collective Nostalgia * Ideology	0.095	0.034	0.027	0.162	2.756	.006

Note. $R = .331$, $R^2 = .110$

Figure 3.4. shows simple slopes plot for the moderating effect of different levels of ideology on the relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs about AKP. There was no significant relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs for the participants closer to the left-wing ideology (1 SD below the mean), $b = -0.005$, 95% CI [-0.127, 0.136], $t = 0.067$, $p = .946$. At the mean level of ideology, there was a significant positive relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs, $b = 0.123$, 95% CI [0.038, 0.208], $t = 2.862$, $p = .005$. Also, for the participants 1 SD closer to the right-wing ideology (1 SD above the mean), there was a significantly positive relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs, $b = 0.241$, 95% CI [0.134, 0.349], $t = 4.434$, $p < .001$.




Figure 3.4. Simple Slopes Plot Illustrating the Relationship between Collective Nostalgia and Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP by Ideology in Study 1

Then, when religiosity's moderating role in the same relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs was tested, there was no significant interaction between collective nostalgia and religiosity, $b = 0.008$, 95% CI [-0.043, 0.060], $t = 0.320$, $p = .750$. Thus, the relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs did not significantly change at different levels of participants' religiosity. Table 3.7. shows the linear model of the predictors of this moderated regression analysis.

Table 3.7. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about AKP as the Criterion, Collective Nostalgia as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 1

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	4.320	0.058	4.205	4.435	73.311	<.001
Collective Nostalgia	0.152	0.043	0.067	0.236	3.540	<.001
Religiosity	-0.081	0.037	-0.155	-0.007	-2.167	.031
Collective Nostalgia * Religiosity	0.008	0.026	-0.043	0.060	0.320	.750

Note. $R = .275$, $R^2 = .076$

3.2.4. Exploratory Analyses

For exploratory reasons, I first checked the correlation among conspiracy beliefs, collective nostalgia, and other group-level emotions regardless of the condition. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively correlated with collective nostalgia, $r = .218, p < .001$ and hope, $r = .207, p < .001$. Collective nostalgia was significantly positively correlated with pride, $r = .336, p < .001$ and hope, $r = .277, p < .001$. Table 3.8. shows correlation results.

Table 3.8. Correlations among Conspiracy Beliefs, Collective Nostalgia and Group-Level Emotions in Study 1

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Conspiracy Beliefs	—						
2. Collective Nostalgia	.218**	—					
3. Guilt	-.041	.040	—				
4. Anger	.038	.110	.083	—			
5. Pride	.099	.336**	-.116	.019	—		
6. Fear of Future	-.051	.056	.243**	.255**	-.203**	—	
7. Hope	.207**	.277**	-.098	-.126*	.567**	-.220**	—

Note. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Next, I checked whether the collective nostalgia manipulation made a difference in participants' other group-level emotions rather than collective nostalgia. I utilised a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to investigate whether there was a significant difference in five different group-level emotions between the participants in the control condition ($n = 128$) and the participants in the collective nostalgia condition ($n = 124$). Result indicated that the differences between the control condition and the collective nostalgia condition on the combined group-level emotions was not statistically significant, $F(5,246) = 1.619, p = .155$, Wilks' $\lambda = .968, \eta_p^2 = .032$.

When I checked the emotions separately, there was a statistically significant difference only in pride between the participants in the control condition and the participants in the collective nostalgia condition, $F(1,250) = 6.514, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .025$. Surprisingly, participants in the control condition had significantly higher pride feeling ($M = 3.58, SD = 1.23$) than the participants in the collective nostalgia condition ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.36$).

3.3. Discussion

Study 1 aimed to test whether collective nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about the rival political party AKP of the participants who indicated that they were supporting CHP, the main opposition party. According to the values that the participants' supported party, a collective nostalgia manipulation text referring to the times when Republican and Kemalist values were dominant was used. The analysis of the manipulation test indicated that the text did not work to induce feelings of collective nostalgia. However, when ideology was included as the moderator in the relationship where condition is the predictor and collective nostalgia experience is the outcome, for participants who are 1 SD closer to the left-wing ideology, nostalgia condition was significantly associated with higher collective nostalgia experience. Religiosity did not have an effect.

Even if the manipulation was unsuccessful overall when CHP-supporting participants were recruited, I still conducted the main analysis to see if there was a significant difference in conspiracy beliefs about AKP between conditions. However, the expectation that Kemalist collective nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about AKP in CHP supporters was not supported, even after controlling for demographic variables. Interestingly, among participants who are closer to right-wing ideology, collective nostalgia manipulation was associated with decreased conspiracy beliefs about AKP. Given the decreased homogeneity of political groups and parties following the recent elections, the manipulation text might activate different aspects of right-wing participants' social identity which are different than their indicated affiliation and it might be influential. However, when collective nostalgia experience was taken as the predictor, at mean and 1 SD closer to right-wing ideology levels, there was a positive relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs. These again imply a problem with the way of manipulation.

In the next study, I investigated the same relationships among conservative right-wing AKP supporters as participants to see if the results would be different for conservatives. I conducted the same study to test if Ottoman collective nostalgia manipulation among AKP voters would increase their conspiracy beliefs about CHP as their rival party.

4. CHAPTER STUDY 2

In Study 2, I conducted the same study as Study 1 but with AKP supporters to see if collective nostalgia, which is Ottoman nostalgia this time, would work in the expected way for conservative party. Firstly, if there is an effect, it might be more observable in conservative AKP-supporting participants because previous research suggested that conservatives are more prone to collective nostalgia feeling compared to liberals (Baldwin & Lammers, 2016; Lammers & Baldwin, 2018) and because their ideological values are focused on protecting the traditions (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost, 2017), as in the past in collective nostalgia experience. In Study 2, I recruited AKP-supporting participants, but I used the collective nostalgia content as Ottoman because research also highlighted that the content of collective nostalgia could be different for different political groups (Stefaniak et al., 2021; Wohl et al., 2020b). I expected that the Ottoman past to appeal more to conservative AKP-supporting participants, and their conservative ideology would be more appropriate for the study.

4.1. Methods

4.1.2. Participants

As the G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) indicated for Study 1, 620 AKP-supporting participants should have been reached in Study 2 as well. Again, for similar reasons, I was able to reach 103 participants. I have done a sensitivity analysis for a one-tailed independent samples t-test with an alpha of .05 and a power of .80. The sample size 103 was sensitive to detect medium effect size as Cohen's $d = .493$. Similar procedures were used to recruit participants.

4.1.3. Materials

The materials were similar to Study 1, except that the conspiracy items referred to political elites of CHP instead of AKP, and the collective nostalgia manipulation text mentioned Ottoman times this time, as below:

This heavenly homeland is the trust of our ancestors. Since the Ottoman Empire, this people have always stood firmly against several external outbreaks, and their collaborators within us, that have played games with our country. Remember the glorious Ottoman! Remember Fatih Sultan Mehmet! When I miss those times, I wish I had lived in these good old days.

4.1.4. Procedure

The procedure was the same as described in Study 1.

4.2. Results

4.2.1. Descriptives

Table 4.1. shows descriptive characteristics of the sample in terms of demographic variables (age, gender, and education) in each condition and in total. Again, this information shows only participants who fully answered demographics-related questions. There were 49 participants in the control condition, and 47 participants in the nostalgia condition who answered the demographics questions. Participants' age ranged from 18 to 72 ($M = 39.96$, $SD = 12.87$). 58.3% of the sample was male ($n = 56$) and 41.7% was female ($n = 40$). Similar to Study 1, none of the participants selected the option "other" for gender. 11.5% of the participants had primary school education as highest ($n = 11$), 7.3% had middle school education ($n = 7$), 20.8% had high school education ($n = 20$), 10.4% had a pre-bachelor's degree ($n = 10$), 33.3% had a bachelor's degree ($n = 32$), 15.6% had a master's degree ($n = 15$), and 1% had a PhD degree ($n = 1$).

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Study 2

	Control Condition (<i>n</i> = 49)	Nostalgia Condition (<i>n</i> = 47)	Total (<i>n</i> = 96)
Demographic Variables			
Age			
Age range	18-72 years	19-69 years	18-72 years
Mean (SD)	40.82 (12.94)	39.06 (12.87)	39.96 (12.87)
Gender/sex			
Male	59.2% (29)	57.4% (27)	58.3% (56)
Female	40.8% (20)	42.6% (20)	41.7% (40)
Other	0	0	0
Education			
Primary School	12.2% (6)	10.6% (5)	11.5% (11)
Middle School	4.1% (2)	10.6% (5)	7.3% (7)
High School	28.6% (14)	12.8% (6)	20.8% (20)
Pre-bachelor's degree	12.2% (6)	8.5% (4)	10.4% (10)
Bachelor's degree	24.5% (12)	42.6% (20)	33.3% (32)
Master's degree	18.4% (9)	12.8% (6)	15.6% (15)
PhD	0	2.1% (1)	1% (1)
Other	0	0	0

Note. The table includes participants who answered all demographic questions in Study 2. 7 participants were missing in demographic information because they only responded to the questions of the core variables. They were not excluded from the main analysis.

4.2.2. Manipulation Check

Similar to Study 1, to check if Ottoman collective nostalgia manipulation worked in participants in the manipulation condition, an independent samples t-test was conducted comparing the collective nostalgia group ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.362$, $n = 52$) and the control group ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.595$, $n = 51$) in terms of to what extent they feel collective nostalgia. Again, there was not a significant difference in collective nostalgia between the conditions, $t(101) = -0.182$, $p = .428$, Cohen's $d = -.036$, 95% CI [-0.633, 0.526]. The manipulation did not induce nostalgic feelings in participants in the collective nostalgia condition compared to the participants in the control condition in Study 2 as well.

As with Study 1, due to similar reasons, ideology's and religiosity's moderating roles on the effect of condition on the experience of collective nostalgia were investigated with two different moderation analyses. Unlike Study 1, there was no significant interaction between condition and participants' ideology on the experience of collective nostalgia, $b = -0.178$, 95% CI [-0.677, 0.321], $t = -0.707$, $p = .481$. Thus, the effect of condition on the experience of collective nostalgia did not change across different levels of ideology. Table 4.2. shows the linear model of the predictors of collective nostalgia where ideology was the moderator.

Table 4.2. Moderated Regression Results Using Collective Nostalgia Experience as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	3.200	0.215	2.772	3.627	14.870	<.001
Condition	0.080	0.308	-0.531	0.691	0.261	.795
Ideology	0.148	0.176	-0.201	0.496	0.842	.402
Condition * Ideology	-0.178	0.251	-0.677	0.321	-0.707	.481

Note. $R = .095$, $R^2 = .009$

Similarly, when religiosity's moderating role was investigated, there was no significant interaction between condition and religiosity on the experience of collective nostalgia, $b = 0.235$, 95% CI [-0.285, 0.754], $t = 0.896$, $p = .373$. Thus, the effect of condition on the experience of collective nostalgia did not depend on the level of participants' religiosity. Table 4.3. shows the linear model of the predictors of collective nostalgia where religiosity was the moderator.

Table 4.3. Moderated Regression Results Using Collective Nostalgia Experience as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	b	SE	95% CI		t	p
			LL	UL		
Constant	3.175	0.213	2.753	3.598	14.933	<.001
Condition	0.136	0.304	-0.468	0.740	0.448	.655
Religiosity	0.077	0.187	-0.293	0.448	0.414	.680
Condition * Religiosity	0.235	0.262	-0.285	0.754	0.896	.373

Note. $R = .182$, $R^2 = .033$

4.2.3. Main Analyses

I tested whether there is still a significant difference in conspiracy beliefs about CHP between the collective nostalgia condition and the control condition, despite the result showing that the manipulation did not work. I calculated the average score of conspiracy beliefs items to get an overall score of conspiracy beliefs (Cronbach's $\alpha = .892$).

Similar to Study 1, there was not a significant difference in conspiracy beliefs about CHP between the participants in the control condition ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.22$) and the participants in the collective nostalgia condition ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.32$), $t(101) = 0.849$, $p = .199$, Cohen's $d = .167$, 95% CI [-0.285, 0.710]. Therefore, among AKP voters, the hypothesis that there would be more conspiracy beliefs about CHP for participants in the Ottoman collective nostalgia condition compared to the control condition was not supported. Figure 4.1. shows the comparison of the data of conspiracy beliefs about CHP between conditions.




Figure 4.1. Comparison of the Conditions on Conspiracy Beliefs about CHP in Study 2

Next, a one-way ANCOVA was used to test whether there is a difference in conspiracy beliefs between collective nostalgia and control condition while controlling for

demographic factors of age, gender, education, and socio-economic status. This time, none of the demographic variables had a significant effect on conspiracy beliefs. There was not a significant effect of age ($F(1,90) = 0.028, p = .866, \eta_p^2 < .01$), gender ($F(1,90) = 0.895, p = .347, \eta_p^2 = .010$), education level ($F(1,90) = 0.307, p = .581, \eta_p^2 = .003$), and socio-economic status ($F(1,90) = 2.245, p = .138, \eta_p^2 = .024$). Accordingly, after controlling for demographic variables, condition had no significant effect on conspiracy beliefs, $F(1,90) = 0.492, p = .485, \eta_p^2 = .005$.

Then, as in Study 1 and with similar reasons, ideology's and religiosity's roles as moderators in the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs were investigated by conducting two moderation analyses. I conducted the first moderation analysis by adding ideology as the moderator into the model. Contrary to Study 1, there was no significant interaction between condition and ideology, $b = -0.033, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.444, 0.379], t = -0.159, p = .874$. This result indicates that the relationship between the condition that the participant is assigned to and conspiracy beliefs about CHP did not change at different levels of ideology. Table 4.4. shows the linear model of the predictors of conspiracy beliefs when ideology is the moderator.

Table 4.4. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about CHP as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
Constant	3.254	0.177	2.902	3.607	18.343	<.001
Condition	-0.205	0.254	-0.709	0.298	-0.810	.420
Ideology	0.312	0.145	0.024	0.599	2.152	.034
Condition * Ideology	-0.033	0.207	-0.444	0.379	-0.159	.874

Note. $R = .290, R^2 = .084$

Secondly, the level of religiosity was also tested as a moderator in the same association. As in Study 1, there was no significant interaction between condition and religiosity level of the participants, $b = -0.016, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.465, 0.434], t = -0.069, p = .945$, showing that the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs about CHP did not change according to the level of religiosity. Table 4.5. shows the linear model of the predictors of conspiracy beliefs when religiosity is the moderator.

Table 4.5. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about CHP as the Criterion, Condition as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
Constant	3.206	0.184	2.841	3.571	17.426	<.001
Condition	-0.112	0.263	-0.634	0.410	-0.426	.671
Religiosity	0.134	0.161	-0.187	0.455	0.830	.409
Condition * Religiosity	-0.016	0.226	-0.465	0.434	-0.069	.945

Note. $R = .128$, $R^2 = .016$

Again, as in Study 1, since manipulation did not work, to further explore the relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs and the associated factors, I checked ideology and religiosity's moderating roles also in the relationship between how much participants experienced collective nostalgia, as indicated by manipulation check question, and conspiracy beliefs. There was no significant interaction between ideology and collective nostalgia experience, $b = -0.026$, 95% CI [-0.157, 0.106], $t = -0.388$, $p = .699$. Therefore, the relationship between collective nostalgia experience and conspiracy beliefs did not significantly change at different levels of ideology. Table 4.6. shows the linear model of the predictors of conspiracy beliefs when ideology is the moderator.

Table 4.6. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about CHP as the Criterion, Collective Nostalgia as the Predictor, and Ideology as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
Constant	3.155	0.121	2.914	3.395	26.054	<.001
Collective Nostalgia	0.243	0.082	0.080	0.406	2.956	.004
Ideology	0.271	0.099	0.075	0.467	2.739	.007
Collective Nostalgia * Ideology	-0.026	0.066	-0.157	0.106	-0.388	.699

Note. $R = .400$, $R^2 = .160$

Results were similar when religiosity was taken as a moderator. There was no significant interaction between collective nostalgia experience and religiosity on conspiracy beliefs, $b = -0.074$, 95% CI [-0.212, 0.064], $t = -1.064$, $p = .290$. Therefore,

the relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs did not significantly change across different levels of religiosity. Table 4.7. shows the linear model of the predictors of conspiracy beliefs when religiosity is the moderator.

Table 4.7. Moderated Regression Results Using Conspiracy Beliefs about CHP as the Criterion, Collective Nostalgia as the Predictor, and Religiosity as the Moderator in Study 2

Effect	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
			<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
Constant	3.171	0.126	2.921	3.421	25.166	<.001
Collective Nostalgia	0.244	0.086	0.074	0.414	2.855	.005
Religiosity	0.080	0.109	-0.136	0.296	0.736	.464
Collective Nostalgia * Religiosity	-0.074	0.070	-0.212	0.064	-1.064	.290

Note. $R = .326$, $R^2 = .106$

4.2.4. Exploratory Analyses

Next, I checked the correlations among conspiracy beliefs, collective nostalgia, and the group-level emotions regardless of the condition. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively correlated with collective nostalgia, $r = .299$, $p = .002$, pride, $r = .381$, $p < .001$, and hope, $r = .455$, $p < .001$ but significantly negatively with guilt, $r = -.280$, $p = .005$, anger, $r = -.248$, $p = .013$, and fear of future, $r = -.334$, $p < .001$. Collective nostalgia was significantly positively correlated with pride, $r = .219$, $p = .029$, and marginally significantly positively with hope, $r = .206$, $p = .041$. Table 4.8. shows correlation results.

Table 4.8. Correlations among Conspiracy Beliefs, Collective Nostalgia and Group-Level Emotions in Study 2

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Conspiracy Beliefs	—						
2. Collective Nostalgia	.299**	—					
3. Guilt	-.280**	-.082	—				
4. Anger	-.248*	-.172	.515**	—			
5. Pride	.381**	.219*	-.175	-.245*	—		
6. Fear of Future	-.334**	-.040	.563**	.721**	-.237*	—	
7. Hope	.455**	.206*	-.468**	-.427**	.574**	-.510**	—

Note. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Next, similar to Study 1, I tested whether the participants' group-level emotions significantly differed between the control condition and the collective nostalgia condition by using a one-way MANOVA. The differences between the control condition and the collective nostalgia condition on the combined group-level emotions was not statistically significant, $F(5,93) = 0.372, p = .867$, Wilks' $\lambda = .980, \eta_p^2 = .020$.

4.3. Discussion

Similar to Study 1, Study 2 results also indicated that collective nostalgia manipulation text did not work as intended to induce the feeling of nostalgia about the ingroup. Regardless of the manipulation test, AKP-supporting participants' conspiracy beliefs about the rival party CHP were not higher in the collective nostalgia condition compared to the control condition, even after controlling for the participants' demographic characteristics. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported. Although I expected to observe a potential effect more in conservative participants, Study 2 also had an additional problem compared to Study 1. I could not recruit as many participants as in Study 1, and the power was small. In addition, it seems that giving a short text to manipulate participants' collective nostalgia feelings might not be very influential in the present studies, regardless of the content of the text. Also, unlike Study 1, there was no moderation effect of ideology on the relationship between condition and conspiracy beliefs.

5. CHAPTER DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Interpretation and Summary of the Findings

This research aimed to investigate whether collective nostalgia increases conspiracy beliefs about a rival political party as an outgroup in two studies within Türkiye's political context. To investigate this, I recruited participants who supported the CHP and the AKP, the two largest parliamentary representatives of secular nationalist and socially conservative Muslim identities, respectively, in Türkiye.

I employed different collective nostalgia content for each party's supporters, based on the historical event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the secular Republic of Türkiye. This period plays a vital role in the conflicts of secular nationalists and conservatives (Mardin, 1973). According to Mardin's perspective, during the Ottoman Empire, the dominant social identity was conservative Muslim identity. When the secular Republic of Türkiye was established, some public groups felt that the new ruling elites were dictating new secular values on them. These identity conflicts between conservatives and nationalist seculars continued to influence contemporary conflicts between these two groups and presumably the content of collective nostalgia they would experience in relation to the country. Specifically, conservative people might perceive the periods when secular nationalist values are dominant as a threat to and disruption in their social identity, and long for Ottoman periods. In contrast, secular nationalists might long for certain aspects of the early years of the Republic and perceive the times when conservative and religious values are dominant as threatening similarly. Thus, I used two collective nostalgia types for seculars and conservatives separately. To manipulate seculars' collective nostalgia, Kemalist nostalgia was used in Study 1. To manipulate conservatives' collective nostalgia, Ottoman nostalgia was used in Study 2.

It was expected that Kemalist nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about AKP in Study 1, and Ottoman nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about CHP in Study 2. However, the comparison of the manipulation check question across conditions in both studies revealed that nostalgia texts failed to induce collective

nostalgia in participants, also after controlling for the participants' age, gender, education, and socio-economic status. Only in Study 1, ideology had a moderating effect on collective nostalgia. For participants whose ideology is closer to left-wing, they felt higher collective nostalgia in the nostalgia condition compared to the control condition. Thus, rather than categorising participants according to the specific party preference, other political factors might be more influential on what kind of collective nostalgia political groups are more likely to be prone to experience (Stefaniak et al., 2021; Wohl et al., 2020b). Although it has been argued that conservatives are more predisposed to feel collective nostalgia (Baldwin & Lammers, 2016; Lammers & Baldwin, 2018), as the protection of tradition and opposition to change are the key features of conservative ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost, 2017), collective nostalgia manipulation did not work in conservative participants in Study 2, even after ideology's moderating role was checked. Although these different results with ideology's moderating effect might imply that conservatives are not more sensitive to feel collective nostalgia, it is important to note that the sample size in Study 2 was half smaller than in Study 1. Beyond these, the results show that manipulation method was still weak to elicit the effect.

Elçi's (2022) experimental study included approximately 900 observations, a significantly higher number than the present research, which could not reach such numbers of participants. Therefore, even if there is an effect of the text on the feeling of collective nostalgia, it might be small in this way. Moreover, there was no information about manipulation check in Elçi's study, so it is not obvious if that manipulation is strong enough. Additionally, in Elçi's study, collective nostalgia texts included the names of the other political figures. For example, İsmet İnönü was mentioned in the original Kemalist nostalgia text, and Sultan Abdülhamit was mentioned in the original Ottoman nostalgia text. Since these figures can be more controversial compared to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Kemalist nostalgia and Fatih Sultan Mehmet in Ottoman nostalgia, their names were excluded in the present research. This difference between the two papers may be a possible factor contributing to the fact that the manipulation did not work.

I conducted the main analyses anyway to see whether manipulation texts made a difference in conspiracy beliefs because manipulation texts may have invoked group membership and social identity motives by mentioning and reminding social identity

of the participants (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Seger et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007). This potential invoking of social identity and group membership could still influence conspiracy beliefs about the political outgroup, maybe by triggering intergroup bias. There was no difference in conspiracy beliefs across conditions in both studies, even after controlling for demographic variables.

However, since manipulations did not seem to work and since these two polarised groups seem to have different ideologies and attitudes to religion, their moderating effects on conspiracy beliefs were investigated both by taking the condition as the predictor of conspiracy beliefs and by taking manipulation check question measuring collective nostalgia as the predictor. In Study 1, there was a moderating effect of ideology, indicating that higher right-wing ideology was associated with lower conspiracy beliefs in collective nostalgia condition. Again, in Study 1, when collective nostalgia experience was taken as the predictor, at mean and higher right-wing ideology levels, there was a positive association between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs. There was no such effect in Study 2. When religiosity is taken as a moderator, none of the results was significant.

These results might indicate a problem with the method. Using simply short texts to manipulate collective nostalgia may not be a very valid method. In future studies, different methods could be explored with higher number of participants. For example, participants could be asked to write down their ideas about the period of collective nostalgia, or more potentially powerful methods, such as showing videos, pictures or music, could be employed. It may have been better to include an attention check to be sure that participants read the collective nostalgia text. There was no way to check whether participants really paid attention to the provided text in the present studies. Furthermore, in the current studies, participants in the control condition did not receive any neutral text to read, future studies may elaborate on collective nostalgia manipulation texts and provide an irrelevant reading to the participants in the control condition along with an attention check measure.

Overall, these results might also be related to a problem with categorising participants as AKP or CHP supporters. There was also an election during the data collection period, and instead of one party, people were supporting alliances. These alliances, especially on the opposition side where CHP stands, included other parties and ideologies. Therefore, some participants might have said that they were supporting a

specific party because they were supporting their party's alliance or different ideologies. This might have influenced the results.

In both studies, in addition to measuring collective nostalgia as a group-based emotion, I also measured other basic group-based emotions (guilt, anger, pride, fear of future, and hope) of the participants for exploratory analyses. The rationale behind this was to investigate how group-based emotions might be connected to conspiracy beliefs, considering the close relationship between conspiracy beliefs and intergroup conflict, especially within the context of this research, namely politics. In addition, it was aimed to discern whether there is a difference with other group-based emotions, even if not observed with collective nostalgia.

Among the five basic group-based emotions, pride and hope had a significantly positive correlation with collective nostalgia in both studies. Additionally, hope consistently demonstrated a significant positive correlation with conspiracy beliefs across both studies. These findings support the argument that positive feelings about the group are associated with intergroup bias (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Smith et al., 2007). In this context, as intergroup biases are associated with positive group-based emotions, collective nostalgia can be seen as ingroup favouritism protecting the ingroup's positive self-esteem, while conspiracy beliefs about outgroups function as outgroup derogation blaming an outgroup.

The significant correlation between pride and collective nostalgia, but not conspiracy beliefs and pride, in Study 1 may be related to the emphasis of collective nostalgia on aspects that are associated with pride within the ingroup. The primary agent in conspiracy beliefs is outgroup, so there might be less emphasis leading to feel proud about the ingroup in conspiracy beliefs. In contrast to this explanation, in Study 2 with religious conservative participants, pride also showed a significant positive correlation with conspiracy beliefs. Collective pride might be a feeling connected with collective narcissism. Collective narcissism refers to beliefs that one's ingroup does not get the special treatment by others but should be (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). These kinds of beliefs about the ingroup can be associated with collective pride. So, the role of collective narcissism in collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs should be further investigated.

Previous research provided support that collective narcissism predicts negative attitudes to outgroups (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Marchlewska et al., 2020) and conspiracy beliefs (Ük & Bahçekapılı, 2022). However, collective narcissism is more associated with conservative beliefs (Cichocka et al., 2017; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Therefore, collective narcissism as being associated more with conservative ideology may be a potential explanation of the link between pride and conspiracy beliefs in Study 2. However, It is also important to note the sample size in Study 2 compared to Study 1. In Study 2, guilt, anger, and fear of future were significantly negatively correlated with conspiracy beliefs, which is surprising. The literature suggests that negative group-based emotions are associated with perceived threat to the ingroup (Mackie et al., 2000), lack of control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and a need for meaning (Park, 2010), all of which are predictors of conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2020; Franks et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2019; Moscovici, 1987; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). This should be investigated more by further research. There might be factors that are related to conservative ideology or factors associated with the party being in power influencing this association.

Conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia significantly positively correlated in both studies. This correlation supports Ramonaitė's (2022) finding showing the relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs. In that study, Ramonaitė connects collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs in terms of populism and feeling marginalised and powerless. Considering the positive relationship between collective nostalgia and populism in Elçi's (2022) study, it may be better for future studies to examine the relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs in terms of populism more than ideological division (Eberl et al., 2021; Stecula & Pickup, 2021; van Prooijen et al., 2022; Wojczewski, 2022). Unfortunately, since the manipulation did not work, no further interpretation can be made about this relationship.

Furthermore, I included group-based emotions because the collective nostalgia manipulation might induce changes in other group-based emotions which might influence conspiracy beliefs, although this was not the case. Along with the absence of differences in conspiracy beliefs, the collective nostalgia manipulation did not lead to an emotional change different from the control group. However, in Study 1, although the MANOVA results were not significant, a separate analysis of emotions

revealed a significant difference in pride between the experimental and control group. This is in contrast to what might be expected. Since nostalgia emphasises the positive aspects of the ingroup from the past, one might expect higher pride in the collective nostalgia condition. Future studies are needed to explain this.

5.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies

Although this research aimed to establish a relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs for the first time, important limitations need to be acknowledged. First and foremost, the manipulation did not produce the desired effect, preventing any conclusions from the findings. Future studies should explore the connection between conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia using more robust methods to better establish their relationship.

Due to the extended time required for participant recruitment, data collection was during both pre- and post-election periods. Data collection was started in 2022 and ended in 2023 after the elections. This timing may pose a challenge given the influence of election results on conspiracy beliefs in previous studies (Edelson et al., 2017; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Additionally, while participants were categorised as AKP and CHP supporters to align with their respective collective nostalgia content, the changing dynamics of voter identities, especially with alliances formed in the last elections, may be considered a limitation. Future studies could benefit from more precise grouping criteria and a research design that facilitates more meaningful group comparisons.

Furthermore, it might be necessary to measure participants' identification with their political group using various indicators, such as collective narcissism, to understand how these factors may influence the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia. Future studies should also measure and control for conspiracy mentality (Bruder et al., 2013) and nostalgia proneness (Abakoumkin et al., 2020), which are trait-level characteristics and relatively stable to explore the impact of collective nostalgia on specific conspiracy beliefs. As conspiracy beliefs are related to relative deprivation (Bilewicz et al., 2013) and collective nostalgia would underline a sense of decline and loss compared to the past (Elçi, 2022), it was predicted that collective nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about political outgroups.

However, it might be important to measure the extent to which participants perceive temporal group deprivation.

Two different types of collective nostalgia were utilised by drawing on Mardin's (1973) perspective, but these may not be appropriate for Kemalist nostalgia, in particular. For instance, contrary to this perspective, religious conservatives can also embrace Kemalist nostalgia and the Republic because that period and Atatürk can still be considered as the core values of the country by some conservatives. Considering the relationship between populism and Ottoman nostalgia identified in Elçi's (2022) paper, future studies in the context of Türkiye may yield interesting results if they examine the relationship between collective nostalgia and conspiracy beliefs from an alternative perspective.

Finally, participants indicating that they support a specific party may not directly represent their ideology both in general and especially in the election context of this research because of alliances between parties with different ideologies. Future studies can investigate the role of collective nostalgia on conspiracy beliefs by taking ideology more into account rather than relying on a party classification or maybe also without categorising collective nostalgia content.

5.3. Conclusion

Although this thesis investigated whether collective nostalgia would increase conspiracy beliefs about the rival political party, the manipulations failed in both studies. Future studies should try manipulating collective nostalgia in different methods. It might also be useful to better establish the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia in general. However, since the literature lacks studies examining the relationship between these two variables, this thesis brings a novel perspective about conspiracy beliefs and collective nostalgia.

Populist and right-wing radical leaders around the world aim to mobilise the masses by using collective nostalgia along with conspiratorial narratives. Accordingly, the relationship between the experience of collective nostalgia in some Western countries and anti-immigration conspiracy beliefs, such as The Great Replacement, is particularly worth investigating for future research. Therefore, I believe that this thesis can provide beneficial ideas for future studies that will explore the relationship between these two constructs in different contexts.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. CONSENT FORM

Bu araştırma Yaşar Üniversitesi Psikoloji Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Eylül Deran Atalay tarafından Doç. Dr. Sinan Alper danışmanlığında yürütülen yüksek lisans tezi çalışmasıdır.

Bu çalışmada tarih anlatımının ve siyasi parti yöneliminin bazı inançlarla ve duygularla olan ilişkisi araştırılmaktadır. Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde, size verilecek olan metinleri okumanız ve soruları yanıtlamanız yaklaşık 5-10 dakikanızı alacaktır. Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayalıdır. Çalışmada rahatsızlık veya zarar verici herhangi bir içerik bulunmamaktadır fakat yine de araştırma sırasında rahatsızlık duyduğunuz bir durum olursa sayfayı kapatarak çalışmadan ayrılabilirsiniz. Bu durumda verileriniz analize katılmayacaktır. Araştırmada siyasi parti yöneliminiz, yaşıınız, cinsiyetiniz vb. gibi bazı demografik bilgiler harici kişisel verilerinizle ilgili herhangi bir soru sorulmayacaktır, bu nedenle verilerinizden kim olduğunuzun tespit edilmesi mümkün değildir. Çalışmanın sonucunda elde edilen veriler yine anonim bir şekilde toplu olarak tez yazımında analiz edilecektir.

Araştırma hakkında herhangi bir sorunuz olması durumunda Eylül Deran Atalay ile [redacted] e-posta adresi üzerinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz.

“Onaylıyorum” yazısına tıkladığınızda aşağıda bulunan açıklamaları doğrulamış ve çalışmamıza başlamış olacaksınız. Onaylamıyorsanız “Onaylamıyorum” yazısına tıklayabilir ya da doğrudan sayfayı kapatabilirsiniz.

- Yukarıdaki bilgileri okudum ve çalışmaya katılmayı gönüllü olarak kabul ediyorum.
- Ana dilim Türkçe
- 18 yaşında veya 18 yaşından büyüğüm.
 - Onaylıyorum. (1)
 - Onaylamıyorum. (2)

APPENDIX 2. QUESTIONS FOR CONDITIONAL PARTICIPATION INFORMATION AND PARTY PREFERENCE

Lütfen aşağıdaki bilgilendirmeyi dikkatlice okuyunuz.

Çalışmamızın amacı ve hedef kitlesi gereği, bu araştırmaya katılmasını istediğimiz katılımcıların kendini **Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti)** ya da **Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)** seçeneklerinden birine yakın hissediyor olması gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle kendinizi bu iki partiden birine yakın hissetmiyorsanız çalışmaya devam etmemenizi rica ediyoruz.

- Evet, kendimi bu partilerden birine yakın hissediyorum. (1)
- Hayır, kendimi bu partilerin ikisine de yakın hissetmiyorum. (2)

Kendinizi Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) seçeneklerinden hangisine daha yakın konumlandırırsınız?

- AK Parti (1)
- CHP (2)

APPENDIX 3. COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA MANIPULATIONS AND MANIPULATION CHECK

Şimdi sizden Türkiye tarihi ile ilgili bir metin okumanızı isteyeceğiz. Lütfen bu metni **yavaşça** ve **dikkatlice** okuyun. Çalışmanın devamında okuduğunuz metinle ilgili sizden soru yanıtlamanız istenecektir.

Osmanlı Nostaljisi: Bu cennet vatan ecdadımızın emanetidir. Osmanlı'dan bu yana bu halk, ülkemizle oyun oynayan içimizdeki işbirlikçilerine ve birçok dış mihraklara karşı hep dimdik durmuştur. Şanlı Osmanlı'yı hatırla! Fatih Sultan Mehmet'i hatırla! O zamanları özledikçe keşke bu güzel günleri yaşasaydım diyorum.

Kemalist Nostalji: Bu cennet vatan, Cumhuriyet'in kurucularının emanetidir. Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarından itibaren bu halk, ülkemizle oyun oynayan içimizdeki işbirlikçilerine ve birçok dış mihraklara karşı hep dimdik durmuştur. Şanlı Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı hatırla! Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ü hatırla! O zamanları özledikçe keşke bu güzel günleri yaşasaydım diyorum.

Kolektif nostalji, kişinin kendisini belirli bir sosyal kimliğin üyesi olarak düşünmesine bağlı olarak o kimlikle ilgili olaylara ve nesnelere ilişkin geçmişe yönelik duygusal bir özlem veya hüznü bir sevgi ile hayal kurma deneyimidir.

Yukarıdaki tanımlı düşündüğünüzde yakın hissettiğiniz grubun adına (AK Parti veya CHP), **şu anda** ne ölçüde **nostaljik duygular** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = Hiç Hissetmiyorum; 5 = Çok Hissediyorum)

- 1 Hiç Hissetmiyorum
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 Çok Hissediyorum

APPENDIX 4. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ITEMS

Bazı önemli konularda bütün gerçeklerin halka anlatılıp anlatılmadığı hakkında sık sık tartışmalar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Aşağıda bu konuların bazılarına ilişkin çeşitli görüşler yer almaktadır. Lütfen aşağıdaki her bir görüşe ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz. (1 = Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum; 5 = Kesinlikle Katılıyorum)

1. AKP/CHP'li siyasi elitler, Türkiye'deki seçimlerde hileye karışmışlardır.
2. AKP/CHP'li siyasi elitler, kendi çıkarları ve Türkiye'yi baltalamak için terör örgütü yanlılarıyla gizlice çalışmaktadır.
3. AKP/CHP'li siyasi elitler, sağlık politikalarıyla ilgili düşüncelerine destek kazanmak ve yalan söylemek için özel hastanelerle birlikte gizlice çalışmaktadır.
4. AKP/CHP'li siyasi elitler, ekonomi politikalarıyla ilgili düşüncelerine destek kazanmak ve ekonominin sağlığı hakkında yalan söylemek için büyük bankalarla gizlice çalışmaktadır.
5. AKP/CHP'li siyasi elitler, göçmenlik politikası önerilerine destek kazanmak ve suç oranları hakkında yalan söylemek için gizlice plan yapmaktadır.

APPENDIX 5. QUESTIONS FOR GROUP-LEVEL EMOTIONS

1. Şu anda siyasi grubunuz adına ne ölçüde **suçluluk** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = **Hiç Hissetmiyorum**; 5 = **Çok Hissediyorum**)
2. Şu anda siyasi grubunuz adına mevcut adaletsizlikler hakkında ne ölçüde **öfke** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = **Hiç Hissetmiyorum**; 5 = **Çok Hissediyorum**)
3. Şu anda siyasi grubunuz adına mevcut başarınız hakkında ne ölçüde **gurur** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = **Hiç Hissetmiyorum**; 5 = **Çok Hissediyorum**)
4. Şu anda siyasi grubunuz adına ne ölçüde **daha kötü bir gelecek korkusu** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = **Hiç Hissetmiyorum**; 5 = **Çok Hissediyorum**)
5. Şu anda siyasi grubunuz adına daha iyi bir gelecek için ne kadar **umutlu** hissediyorsunuz? (1 = **Hiç Hissetmiyorum**; 5 = **Çok Hissediyorum**)

APPENDIX 6. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

1. Yaşınız?

2. Cinsiyetiniz?

- Erkek (1)
- Kadın (2)
- Diğer (3)

3. En son tamamladığınız eğitim seviyesi nedir?

- İlkokul (1)
- Ortaokul (2)
- Lise (3)
- Önlisans (4)
- Lisans (5)
- Yüksek Lisans (6)
- Doktora (7)
- Diğer (8)

4. Aşağıdaki merdivenin Türkiye'deki insanların sosyoekonomik açıdan bulunduğu seviyeyi temsil ettiğini düşünün.



Merdivenin tepesindekiler (10) her şeyin en iyisine (en çok paraya, en iyi eğitime ve en saygın mesleklere) sahip insanlardır. Merdivenin en altındakiler (1) ise en kötü koşullara (en az paraya, en az eğitime ve en az saygın mesleklere) sahip insanlardır. Merdivende daha yüksek konuma sahip olmanız en tepedeki insanlara daha yakın olduğunuz, daha aşağıda olmanız ise en alttaki insanlara daha yakın olduğunuz anlamına gelmektedir. Türkiye'yi düşünürseniz, bu merdivende kendinizi hangi basamağa yerleştirirdiniz?

5. Siyasi konularda “sol” ve “sağ” ayrımından bahsedilmektedir. “1”in en solu, “7”nin en sağ gösterdiği sol sağ cetvelinde kendi görüşlerinizi nereye yerleştirirsiniz?

- 1 (Sol)
- 2
- 3
- 4 (Orta)
- 5
- 6
- 7 (Sağ)

6. Kendinizi ne kadar dindar tanımlıyorsunuz? (1 = Hiç Dindar Değil, 7 = Çok Dindar)

- 1 Hiç Dindar Değil
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 Çok Dindar