DESIGNING POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION: THE ROLE OF ARCHITECTS IN THE RECOVERY OF ANTAKYA IN THE WAKE OF 2023 EARTHQUAKES

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By
Su Sezer
December 2024

Honouring the memory of
and standing in solidarity
with the disaster victims.

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We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

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ABSTRACT

DESIGNING POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION:
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M.S. in Architecture

Advisor: Bülent Batuman

December 2024

This thesis analyses the recovery process of post-disaster Antakya, the actors, distribution of responsibilities, and ambiguities in decision-making mechanisms within the housing production models, and examines the role of architects through the concept of accountability. A mixed qualitative method was employed, with data collected through in-depth interviews and field observations. The design process in Antakya, claimed to be participatory but involving only architects, was observed to proceed through non-transparent verbal agreements with public authorities. This process prioritised construction speed over recovery efforts. Architects operated within a framework where the legal infrastructure was established through emergency decrees, disregarding zoning plans and urban planners. Despite being labelled as research-based, the process was far from participatory, advancing in a top-down manner. In this context, doxa refers to the common, unquestioned beliefs that architects used to legitimize the lack of accountability in their design processes. These doxas, frequently encountered in the propositions about Turkey's construction sector, bureaucracy, and society, facilitated the rapid production of standardised housing. However, this approach neglected long-term societal and urban resilience, local community participation and accountability. Consequently, this study highlights the necessity of scientific and participatory planning approaches, institutionalised practices, and strengthened legal frameworks to position architects as accountable actors in post-disaster reconstruction. Antakya illustrates the critical need for a more holistic approach to resilient cities.

Keywords: Post-Disaster Reconstruction, Role of Architects, February 2023 Earthquakes, Antakya, Accountability, Doxa

ÖZET

AFET SONRASI YENİDEN İNŞA:
2023 DEPREMLERİNİN ARDINDAN ANTAKYA'NIN İYİLEŞMESİNDE
MİMARLARIN ROLÜ

Su Sezer

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Bu tez afet sonrası Antakya'nın iyileşmesi sürecinde konut üretiminde uygulanan modellerin aktörleri, sorumluluk dağılımları ve karar alma mekanizmalarındaki belirsizlikleri ele almış ve mimarların rolünü, hesap verebilirlik kavramı üzerinden incelemiştir. Karışık niteliksel yöntem kullanılmış; derinlemesine görüşmeler ve saha gözlemleri ile veri toplanmıştır. Antakya'da katılımcı olduğu iddia edilen ancak yalnızca mimarların dahil olduğu, kamu yetkilileriyle şeffaf olmayan şifahi anlaşmalarla ilerleyen bir tasarım süreci gözlemlenmiştir. Süreç iyileşme çabalarından ziyade inşaat hızının önceliklendirildiği bir yaklaşımla şekillenmiştir. Mimarlar, hukuki altyapının acele yasalarla kurgulandığı, imar planlarının ve kent plancılarının göz ardı edildiği ortamda, araştırma tabanlı olduğu iddia edilen ancak katılımcılıktan uzak ve üstten aşağıya ilerleyen bir süreçte tasarımcı rolü üstlenmiştir. Doxa bu bağlamda, mimarların tasarım sürecindeki hesap verebilirlik eksikliklerini meşrulaştırmak için kullandıkları yaygın ve sorgulanmamış inançları ifade eder. Türkiye'de inşaat sektörü, bürokrasi ve topluma dair önermelerde sıkça rastlanan bu doxalar, hızlı ve standartlaşmış konutların üretilmesini kolaylaştırmış; ancak uzun vadeli toplumsal ve kentsel dirençliliğin, yerel halkın katılımının ve hesap verebilirliğin göz ardı edilmesine yol açmıştır. Sonuç olarak, afet sonrası yeniden inşa süreçlerinde mimarların hesap verebilir aktörler olarak konumlanması için bilimsel ve katılımcı bir planlama anlayışının, kurumsallaşmış pratiklerin, yasal altyapıların güçlendirilmesinin gerekliliği vurgulanmaktadır. Antakya dirençli kentler için daha bütüncül bir yaklaşımın önemini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afet Sonrası Yeniden Yapılandırma, Mimarların Rolü, Şubat 2023 Depremleri, Antakya, Hesap Verilebilirlik, Doxa

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To my maternal lineage, I owe the freedom and strength that have allowed me to navigate this journey fearlessly.

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"Ben yanmasam
sen yanmasan
biz yanmasak,
nasıl
çıkar
karan-
-lıklar
aydın-
-lığa.."
(Nazım Hikmet Ran, 1930)

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA – Anadolu Agency (Anadolu Ajansı)

AFAD - Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı)

AKP - Justice and Development Party - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

AURA İstanbul - Istanbul Architecture and Urbanism Research Academy (İstanbul Mimarlık ve Şehircilik Araştırmaları Akademisi)

BBB - Building Back Better

DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction

GEDAŞ - Gayrimenkul Değerleme A.Ş.

GFDRR - The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GNDR - The Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction

GYODER - Turkey's Real Estate Platform

HIM - Architecture for All (Herkes İçin Mimarlık)

ICOMOS - International Council on Monuments and Sites

IFRC - The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

KADOP - Ancient Antakya Friends Platform (Kadim Antakya Dostları Platformu)

KEYM - Urban Renewal Center - Kentsel Yenileme Merkezi

MO - Chamber of Architects (Mimarlar Odası)

Mw - Moment Magnitude

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

OAA – Collective Mindset Antakya (Ortak Akıl Antakya)

TC - Republic of Turkey - Türkiye Cumhuriyeti

TMMOB - Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği)

TOKİ - Mass Housing Development Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı)

TTV - Turkey Design Association (Türkiye Tasarım Vakfı)

UN - United Nations

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNDRR - United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context

Figure 1.1: Antakya in the wake of 2023 February Earthquakes
(Source: Author during Site Visit in September 14, 2024)

On February 6th, 2023, at 4.17am local time, a Mw 7.8 earthquake hit south-eastern Turkey and northern Syria. At 1.24 pm the same day a Mw 7.5 earthquake hit the area again. On 20th of February 2023 a Mw 6.4 earthquake at Defne and Samandağ hit the region again. The earthquakes affected a territory of 110.000 square km, 11 provinces in Turkey:

Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Malatya, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Osmaniye, Diyarbakır and Elazığ (AFAD, 2023). More than 60.000 people had lost their lives across Turkey and Syria. More than 300.000 buildings had collapsed leaving more than 3.3 million people displaced, 2 million people sheltering in tent camps and containers (AFAD, 2023a). After 18 months 600.000 people still live in emergency shelters, without adequate living conditions (TTB, 2024).

Hatay was the most severely affected province by the earthquake. Due to long-standing issues with infrastructure and urban planning, combined with inadequate emergency response following the disaster, a significant number of lives were lost, and 85% of the buildings in the city centre were destroyed. Antakya, historically the name of the ancient city and the central district of Hatay, was one of the hardest-hit areas. Antakya has faced significant damage and has been the zone of interest of architectural and urban discussions. The almost tabula rasa state of Antakya brought the question: how to rebuild the city?

Figure 1.2: Destroyed buildings are seen from above in Antakya, southeastern Turkey, February 9, 2023. (Source: Hussein Malla/AP)

Recovery refers to the emergency and long-term efforts to restore the physical, social, economic and psychological conditions of a community after the disaster (Schwab, 2010). It encompasses short-term relief for basic needs such as: shelter, food, and medical care, and long-term efforts to restore the built environment and social networks within. Hence reconstruction is a subset of recovery that specifically focuses on rebuilding physical infrastructure and housing. It should involve not just restoring structures to their pre-disaster condition but also improving the buildings, infrastructure, landscape and urban planning to be more resilient to future disasters. Large-scale post-disaster urban recovery is realised through mainly 4 stages including emergency response, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (Kates & Pijawka, 1977). The emergency response phase involves immediate actions to save lives and provide basic needs. Restoration follows, focusing on bringing essential services like electricity and water back online. The rehabilitation phase is about restoring livelihoods and supporting the psychological recovery of affected communities. Finally, the reconstruction phase aims to rebuild and improve infrastructure, housing, and public services, often with an emphasis on enhancing resilience (Alexander, 2002; Phillips, 2009). The built environment/housing equivalents of these stages are respectively: emergency shelters, temporary shelters, temporary housing and reconstruction of the permanent housing. Several recovery examples from the last decade demonstrate that the overall reconstruction and recovery process may extend over 10 years (Edgington, 2011).

The final stage of the recovery process, the reconstruction of Antakya, is observed to be conducted through several design and construction practices. The urban centre and historical part of Antakya, the historical and urban centre of Hatay, had been guided by a foundation, the Turkish Design Council (TTV), architect Bünyamin Derman (DB Architects) and urban renewal agency Urban Renewal Center (KEYM) as highlighted by coordinators of each establishment Turkish Design Council Board Chairman at that moment, Mehmet Kalyoncu, KEYM Founding Partner Cem Yılmaz and DB Architecture Founding Partner Bünyamin Derman in an interview with *Milliyet Mimarlık/Yapı Dergisi* (Şener, 2023)[1]. A master plan was developed in collaboration with architects and the ministries for the reconstruction of the city centre. The plans produced within the scope of TTV, even though it has no formal obligatory agreement for the whole of Hatay, are the closest research made by official

[1] The authorisation of these groups and question marks around the possibility of gentrification, displacement, exploitation and lack of scientific reconstruction methods, local communities' involvement and transparency made me observant to the topic.

collaboration to a holistic plan for a resilient urban plan in Antakya. However, under pressure to expedite development, this project has remained limited to a Pilot Area of around 7,000 units and conservation of the historical part of Antakya. Contrasting to the proposed master plan's planning principles, a parallel government-commissioned project introduced standardised housing units based on the TOKI type-block typology within the city centre aiming to address housing needs through state-managed construction on 08.05.2024 (Hatay Governorship, 2024). In many areas across Hatay, a complex system emerged: some regions pursued rapid housing production without addressing infrastructure or urban planning needs, thereby perpetuating pre-disaster vulnerabilities. The city began to be reconstructed without conducting a holistic research and urban plan while the underlying reasons for the problems that have been going on for years in the development of the city. Since Antakya is a geography prone to disasters, reconstructing the city without reviewing the ever-existing vulnerabilities and risks within, a resilient reconstruction can not be achieved. While certain projects adopted holistic, area-specific solutions, they were confined to localised interventions. Urban planning necessities were disregarded by several policies. Local people, who face problems such as displacement, dispossession of the virgin agricultural lands for development, experience uncertainty about how their housing will be produced and how they will purchase it. In addition, TOKİ blocks continue to be produced on the periphery of the city as disaster housing. The peripheries of the city; olive groves which are ecologically and economically the backbone of the city and unzoned lands converted into suburban residential neighbourhoods to meet the urgent numerical demand for housing. These TOKİ residences are being produced rapidly in order to reach the required number of residences without the necessary infrastructure studies and analyses. These different reconstruction methods, despite some commonalities, present distinct approaches to post-disaster reconstruction in terms of production, communication, participation, and transparency.

Hatay was on the focus of national and international professional groups because of the multiculturality and the lack of immediate action after the emergency period of the earthquake, and the extensive damage. After the earthquake other architectural firms, NGOs, and government ministries collaborated, aiming to develop solutions beyond individual efforts. Within this framework, architects advocating for a holistic plan often limited their efforts to design-centric solutions. However, this ad-hoc collaboration lacked formal institutional support, resulting in a project that risked remaining on paper with uncertain implementation outcomes. In this intricate system, the pilot project in central Antakya and the

broader master plan for Hatay were largely shaped by the initiatives of a few architectural offices and NGOs, without a master plan developed by central or municipal government authorities. Furthermore, various organisations, including universities, recently established NGOs, and professional teams, have proposed solutions for Hatay. Yet, the implementation and outcomes of the ministry-approved project remain uncertain. The gap and tension between the architects, governmental bodies and local groups within this context brought this research into life. This thesis will focus on the role of the architects during the design process of the Pilot Area of Antakya's Master Plan and go into the government endorsed project proposals on the periphery of the Pilot Area within the Master Plan Area (See Figure 1.3.).

Figure 1.3: Map of Master Plan Area, Pilot Area, and Historical Antakya
(Source: Author)

Different housing models were implemented post-earthquake in Antakya. Projects frequently spotlighted in media raised numerous questions and criticisms from various segments of society, including Antakya's residents, professional organizations, academia, and civil groups. Key concerns included whether star architects design the cities, should construction occur in the same zones without

seismic resilience or should reconstruction begin without consensus on the recovery needs of disaster victims?

This reconstruction process appears to place responsibility primarily on architects for decision-making and spatial solutions, as if the outcomes depend solely on their recommendations. However, post-disaster reconstruction is a complex, multi-faceted process encompassing financial planning, temporary housing, economic recovery, psychological support, the revitalisation of small industries, protection of cultural heritage, and urban memory restoration. Architects lack authority over these aspects, and by positioning the problem as primarily a design challenge, they risk narrowing the broader scope of post-disaster recovery. Consequently, this thesis raises the question of the architect's role in post-disaster design within Antakya, Turkey, and broader contexts of disaster recovery.

1.2 Research Aim and Objectives

This thesis aims to research the social, political and ethical role of architects in post-disaster reconstruction during the reconstruction stage in the permanent housing phase in Antakya following the earthquakes on the 6th and 20th of February 2023. The reconstruction is a complex multi-agent process with various layers of development. In 4 provinces, Malatya, Adıyaman, Kahramanmaraş and Hatay master plans had been generated by governments commision of several architects (Usul, 2023). Architects have been targeted as the decision makers for a large-scale urban planning after the earthquake in the region. However, the reconstruction process has become a microcosm of the broader challenges of Turkish architecture. Hence in order to understand and uncover the role of architects in post-disaster urban reconstruction in Antakya, it is important to understand how architects faced the conjuncture of politics and economics of Turkish urbanism. This thesis examines the duality of accountability and lack thereof among architects in this context by analysing how systematic constraints and authoritarian regimes of urbanisation shape their roles and responsibilities and their tools of overcoming them.

The goal of this research is to contribute to the academic discourse and practical application in post-disaster reconstruction by addressing the ethical, social, and political roles of architects. This investigation aims to highlight the bureaucratic, legal, economic, and

construction-related mechanisms in Turkey that hinder architects from actively participating in accountable practice. The audience of this research is policymakers, architects, urban planners that are going to focus on post disaster reconstruction. Architects' role in post disaster recovery in literature is mostly focused on technical and aesthetic assistance. Architects' role regarding the challenges of social, ethical and political aspects of post disaster reconstruction should be investigated thoroughly. To this end, the thesis tackles the following research questions:

- What has been the role of architects in post-disaster reconstruction in Antakya?
- How do architects interact with other stakeholders?
- What are the main challenges and opportunities faced by architects in post disaster recovery within the Turkish context?
- What are the factors setting ground for architects' accountability in the urban reconstruction process in Turkish urbanism?

Objectives: Identify the role, responsibilities, and challenges faced by architects; map the reconstruction process; assess community engagement and transparency

1.3. Scope of the Study

Architects may take part in all stages of post-disaster recovery. This thesis focuses on the permanent housing design and reconstruction stage of recovery. The stage of post-disaster reconstruction can be analysed through different lenses and focuses. The evaluation of the post-disaster architectural designs is not the main aim of this thesis. Rather it is to suggest some critical investigation to how architects position themselves during the reconstruction and recovery processes. Hence the scope of the thesis is to contribute to understanding the architect’s role in post-disaster reconstruction.

The centre of Hatay, Antakya is mainly divided into two zones, Old Antakya and New Antakya. Old Antakya is also being reconstructed by collaboration of governmental and architectural firms' efforts, producing a conservation development plan for the historic city centre. The master plans for both the historic and modern sections of the city centre have been designed by the same groups of designers (T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, n.d.). However, this thesis does not delve into the restoration

efforts within the historic area or the archaeological activities conducted there. Instead, I will concentrate on the master plan and housing production within the western part of the Asi River, an area that saw significant urban growth after the 1920s and experienced severe damage during the earthquake. Additionally, I will explore the mass housing projects launched to construct the pilot area of this master plan, as well as the process behind the TOKI housing projects that were developed in parallel to these efforts.

1.4. Methodology

This research employs a mixed method in order to understand the complex relations and roles of architects and design within the reconstruction of Antakya in the wake of 2023 earthquakes in the construction system, political state, and economic relations of Turkey. 1) literature review on Antakya's and Turkey's urban planning and disaster history, 2) mapping the stakeholders of Antakya's reconstruction and the timeline of reconstruction, 3) in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, 4) site visit to examine the status of the city and recovery and reconstruction efforts (visited in September 2024).



Figure 1.4: Research Methodology Framework (Source: Author)

The methodology is designed to capture the complexities of the reconstruction process, the involvement of architects, and the broader implications for urban recovery. 1) literature review on the role of architects in disaster recovery and Antakya's pre-earthquake urban planning and vulnerabilities. This lays the foundation for understanding the context of reconstruction efforts. In order to better comprehend Turkey's post-disaster reconstruction framework, the research examined the historical development of the country's reconstruction efforts, its legal infrastructure, and the gaps in these systems. The aim was to understand how these gaps can be addressed and improved upon. 2) News articles and reports from government bodies & NGOs were analysed to track the disaster's effects and the progress of recovery and reconstruction. These sources help build the timeline & map key stakeholders and capture the public discourse surrounding the reconstruction process. Stakeholders, including government bodies, architectural firms, NGOs, and international organisations, were mapped using media reports, official documents, and interviews. This analysis captures the complexity of actors involved in the recovery process. 3) in-depth interviews were conducted with architects, urban planners, and NGO representatives involved in the reconstruction. These interviews focused on the challenges faced during the recovery, such as design constraints, time pressures, and community engagement. The interviews provide critical insights into how architects navigate their roles within a complex political and social context. Thematic analysis was used to identify patterns and themes from the interviews, focusing on architects' roles, design constraints, and stakeholder influence. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and confidentiality was maintained by anonymizing responses. Data was securely stored in compliance with institutional ethical standards. The interviewees were chosen based on their direct involvement and expertise in the reconstruction of Antakya. The eight interviews were conducted with four architects involved in the TTV Hatay reconstruction project, one architect and one urban planner from architectural offices responsible for developing TOKI-type housing projects in areas outside the pilot project led by Emlak Konut. One individual representing professional non-governmental organisations and foundations that contributed to community engagement and oversight during the reconstruction process were also selected due to their positions within the post-disaster process[2]. 4) In September 2024, I conducted a one-week site visit to Antakya

[2]Interviewee #2 (Interviw conducted on 29th of July 2024), #4 (Interview conducted on 8th of August), and #5 (Interview conducted on 10th of August) are head architects from architectural firms within the pilot area primarily organised around TTV. Interviewee #3 (Interview conducted on 7th of August) represents the Architects from the City, an architectural firm established during the reconstruction process by architects from

to examine the ongoing recovery and reconstruction efforts following the disaster. During my visit, I documented the status of the city through photographs of construction sites, particularly housing units in the city centre. I engaged in discussions with local residents to understand their experiences with displacement and the rebuilding process, gathering insights into the social and economic challenges faced by affected populations. Additionally, I met with architects, lawyers, and members of the Chamber of Architects working on the reconstruction, allowing me to gain a deeper understanding of the technical, legal, and regulatory aspects of the recovery process. This visit provided essential primary data on the current state of the city's rebuilding efforts, informing my analysis of the effectiveness and sustainability of urban recovery strategies. I realised how crucial it is to experience first-hand the scale of deconstruction in a disaster-affected area. This also provided valuable insight into the social and psychological state of the local population during the recovery process.

However, I was unable to engage with architects working in the other government projects in the master plan around the pilot area. As a result, the findings are based on a limited number of interviews, making it challenging to generalise the conclusions to broader contexts. Additional quantitative and qualitative research is needed to fully understand the complexities of architectural decision-making in post-disaster reconstruction across different settings in Turkey.

The interview questions were designed to address key themes identified in the literature review and to explore specific aspects of the reconstruction process. The questions focused on the role and involvement, design processes and constraints; insights into the scale of designs, decision-making flexibility, and constraints such as time and budget, community and stakeholder engagement. Collected data is thematically analysed to identify and analyse patterns and themes within the qualitative data to understand the roles and contributions of architects and identify challenges and constraints. Ethical considerations were integral to the

Antakya. Interviewee #1 (Interview conducted on 26th of July) is a representative from OAA (Ortak Akıl Antakya), a group of professionals and academics who developed a plan for the reconstruction of Antakya following the disaster.
Additionally, I interviewed a TTV representative (Interview conducted on 13th of August), a high-ranking architect (Interview conducted on 11th of August) and a city planner from architectural offices responsible for developing TOKI-type housing projects in areas outside the pilot project led by Emlak Konut (Interview conducted on 6th of August). Due to the sensitivity of the process, concerns about future reactions, and the non-disclosure agreements they signed, these interviewees requested that their conversations not be recorded. The data obtained from these interviews have been generalised and used in the text in a manner that does not reveal their identities.

research process. All interviewees provided informed consent before participating in the study. Confidentiality was maintained by anonymizing responses and securely storing data.

1.5. Structure of the Thesis

Following the Introduction providing an overview of the research topic, outlining the background and context that has shaped the research, the second chapter sets the stage for the thesis by reviewing the literature by defining the context of post-disaster recovery and urbanisation in Turkey. The first part of Chapter 2 focuses on the history and contextual evolution of the term resilience, stages in post-disaster reconstruction processes. Psychological and social recovery and urban heritage has been touched upon as key themes. Importance of temporary housing solutions and active participation to reduce future vulnerabilities in disaster prone areas and building and recovering the community is emphasised. Political and economic aspects of post disaster reconstruction by focusing on the displacement, exploitation, exclusion and gentrification of the vulnerable groups and urban fabric is conducted through literature review. After that social and political roles of politically conscious architects are discussed through historical examples from modernism and the topic is discussed between urban planning and architectural design. At the end architects' role in post disaster recovery and reconstruction is explained and their political and social roles are elaborated.

The second part of Chapter 2 tackles urbanisation in Turkey after the 1950s with a focus on the last 20 years, during the AKP government. Accountability within the construction system or the legal and bureaucratic infrastructure facilitating unaccountability in Turkey is discussed by referencing the literature and focusing on the disaster management strategies, legal framework and agents of disaster management.

In Chapter 3 the contextual framework of the research is examined through the case study of Antakya, both before and after the disaster. First part of Chapter 3 includes a historical overview of the city and an assessment of the damage caused by the February 2023 earthquakes and post disaster efforts. The process is overviewed through a chronological timeline of the reconstruction by referencing the official resources, news reports and interviews and also interviews and reports of architects and other stakeholders of the design

process. The stakeholders and key actors are mapped for clear explanation. Second part of Chapter 3 delves into the central theme of the thesis, the critical assessment of the accountability of architects in post-disaster reconstruction of Antakya by referencing the in-depth interviews.

Finally, the conclusion chapter discusses the architectural and urban design process of Antakya's post-disaster reconstruction. The process is summarised and criticised by referencing the main topics of lack of accountability. The lack of accountability is related with the systemic validations of legal and governmental bodies and prejudice/bias around the societal and cultural doxas around people of Turkey and the fate of the geography.

CHAPTER 2

POST DISASTER RECOVERY AND TURKEY

2.1. Post-Disaster Recovery: Theoretical Framework

The term “natural disaster” has been considered as the synonym for earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tsunamis. There is a misconception that since disasters are natural phenomena there is nothing to mitigate them and their effects. Historically, disasters are considered the results of bad luck or even the punishment of supernatural, divine forces. The etymological description of disaster is from Italian disastro, literally "ill-starred," from dis-, + astro "star, planet," from Greek astron "star". The astrological sense is that the calamity was blamed on an unfavourable position of a star (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Sørensen & Albris, 2016). This may contribute to the explanation of why some take on a religious perspective, believe that these occurrences cannot be changed and suggest getting accustomed to them. These kinds of occurrences are sometimes referred to as "acts of God" to rationalise that the losses and damages were inevitable (Sayers, 2001; Köse & Küçükcan, 2006). In the 1990s, analysts started purposefully connecting catastrophe studies to development and giving significance to social studies, which made disasters less of a divine act (Buren, 2001; Gaillard, et.al., 2017). Incidentally, February 2023 Earthquakes were called “The Disaster of the Century” (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2023) by political authorities to overemphasise the severity of the natural phenomena rather than the vulnerabilities and lack of mitigation pre-disaster (See Fig 2.1.).

Figure 2.1: “Disaster of The Century” book (Source: T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, 2023)

Disasters, whether natural or human-made, are not just physical events but are deeply intertwined with the political and economic systems in which they occur. Disasters are more frequent and have more severe results in the case of developing countries (Wisner et.al., 2004). This is caused by the settlements' vulnerability and lack of mitigation rather than a rise in the number of disasters (El-Masri & Tipple, 2002). After disasters, governments clamour for rapid restoration, reconstruction and recovery. The pressure to rapidly address complex, difficult decisions often result in reactive policies that may increase long-term vulnerability of affected populations and resilience of the settlement (Ingram et.al., 2006).

Vulnerability to environmental risk refers to the potential for loss. Losses differ across locations, time periods, and social groups. As a result, vulnerability also fluctuates across both space and time. In the context of hazard research, the term "vulnerability" carries various meanings, shaped by the specific research focus and viewpoint (Dow, 1992; Cutter, 1996). Vulnerability research typically centres on three key elements (Cutter, et.al., 2003) first, identifying the factors that make individuals or locations susceptible to extreme natural events, which is known as an exposure model; second, recognizing that vulnerability is inherently a social issue, reflecting the ability of societies to withstand or recover from hazards; and third, combining assessments of exposure and societal resilience with a particular emphasis on specific regions or places. A significant portion of research has

concentrated on the biophysical aspects of vulnerability and the vulnerability of the built environment (Mileti, 1999).

For a sustainable reconstruction, vulnerabilities that are a compromise to the system should be examined thoroughly, and short-term and long-term stages of reconstruction should separately and continuously be organised and aimed around these vulnerabilities (Birkmann, 2006). The political economic aspects of disasters refer to how these events are managed, who benefits from them, and how they are used to shape societal structures and policies (Tierney, 2014). Ingram, Franco, del Rio and Khazai (2006), analyse the aftermath of the 2004 Sri Lanka tsunami and describes the lack of attention to reducing exposure to future disasters. The recovery process did not address the critical social, economic and institutional factors that influence vulnerability to the disaster. Governmental bodies endowed with extensive authority, often make decisions behind closed doors, with minimal transparency or public scrutiny. States operate systems of power toward legibility in a top-down model. The goal of legibility by the state described by Scott (1998) is transparency from the top down. This lack of openness allows for actions and policies that may prioritise expediency and political interests over the needs and rights of affected communities.

Post-disaster urban recovery is multifaceted and reconstruction is the physical manifestation of the recovery. Reconstruction must first of all facilitate and support other kinds of recovery, such as; psychological, emotional, social and economic recovery. Recovery is successful through enhancing the future resilience of the disaster victims and all users of the system (Mileti, 1999). Decision-makers should comprehend and manage layers of complexity, the interactions between systems of social, economic, technical and governmental relations and the integrating processes of people in order to manage urban reconstruction (Arefian, 2018). Architectural design, in this context, can be manipulated to serve as a superficial display of progress, masking deeper issues such as substandard construction, exclusion of community input and holistic planning. The new housing projects may be products of rushed processes that fail to meet the actual needs of displaced residents. These projects are often presented as symbols of governmental efficiency and compassion, yet they may obscure the reality of a decision-making process that is more concerned with profit and political gain than with the long-term welfare of the communities they are meant to serve.

Cities are complex entities shaped by the interplay of physical, social, and psychological factors. The establishment of a deep connection between people and their urban environment is facilitated by the continuity and memory inherent in settled life. This bond with the place is integral to the residents' identity and cultural continuity. Any alteration to the city's physical structure can disrupt this connection, particularly when a city's location, layout, or skyline is drastically changed. Such changes can sever the ties that people have with their past and culture, leading to a loss of identity and a break in the continuity of urban life. The most radical socio-political shifts in history occurred during and after the two world wars, societies throughout the world demonstrated their ability to recover from the consequences of disasters. Some of the most valuable architectural and urban heritage was restored during that period. The reconstruction model following the First World War was "where it was, as it was" ("dov'era, com'era")[3]. The most famous example of this model is the reconstruction of Warsaw and Dresden after the Second World War. However, Dresden and Warsaw turned into open-air museums as a result of this strategy and this model triggered gentrification (Voisin, 2007).

City centres are often built on disaster and risk prone areas such as water bodies and on hills. Thus, a question that arises in the aftermath of a disaster is "can the city centre be built in the same place or is the relocation of the city possible?" In the context of post-earthquake reconstruction, cities face the choice between relocating to a safer area or rebuilding in their original location. Historically, cities have typically been rebuilt on their existing sites due to several practical reasons, these include the centrality and economic importance of the original location, the high costs associated with relocating and establishing new transportation networks, and the relative preservation of infrastructure compared to buildings. Additionally, the emotional and cultural attachment that residents have to their cities often outweighs the potential benefits of relocation. Therefore, on-site reconstruction, which emphasises creating more resilient and sustainable cities, is crucial not only for preserving the physical and economic aspects of urban life but also for addressing the psychological and social impacts of such disasters (Alexander, 2013). However, the reconstruction of the settlement in the same disaster-prone area necessitates the risk mitigation measure to be taken to a disaster resilient future for the city.

[3] An important note here is that the comparison between post-war and post-disaster reconstruction methodologies is insufficient. Risk mitigation and disaster management is essential in post-disaster cases.

Resilience in the face of disasters is “the ability of the settlement and people exposed to disaster to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects in a timely and efficient manner, through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management” (UNISDR, 2009). The mechanical notion of resilience was adopted by ecologists in the 1970s and later expanded by psychologists (Holling, 1973; Rutter, 1987). However, the word "resilience" has a much older and richer etymology. It derives from the Latin "resilire" or "resilio," meaning "to bounce" or "to leap back”. “Resilie” denotes the act of retracting or returning to a previous state. The term not only has a physical connotation but also has a broader metaphorical sense of recovery and adaptability (Alexander, 2013). By the 2000s, resilience became a key concept in disaster risk reduction (DRR). It describes a society's built environment's ability to resist and absorb the impact of disasters. In this context, resilience is related to all stages of disaster, with a cyclic relation: before, during and after the disaster, hence each reconstruction is a process of getting ready for the next disaster. In the post disaster stages the main aim is to build back better (BBB), more preventative and adaptive. Bosher (2008) defines the framework for resilience to recover from and mitigate the impacts and vulnerabilities against extreme natural- and human-made disasters. He suggests, “the built environment should be analysed, located, designed, built, operated and maintained to enhance the ability of the physical and governmental systems and the society to withstand the future disasters” (Bosher, 2008: p.13).



Figure 2.2: Model for Community Resilience (Source: Norris et.al., 2007)

Figure 6. (Norris et.al., 2007) illustrates a model of stress resistance and resilience over time. Resistance occurs when resources are strong, redundant, or responsive enough to prevent any dysfunction in response to a stressor. However, total resistance is considered rare, especially for severe or prolonged stressors, with temporary dysfunction being more common in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Resilience is the ability to recover and adapt after a stressor, with resources again being robust enough to counteract the stressor's effects and restore functioning, leading to wellness in individuals or communities. Vulnerability arises when resources are insufficient to either resist or recover from the stressor, resulting in ongoing dysfunction. The severity of the stressor dictates the strength of resources needed to ensure resistance or resilience.

Overall, vulnerability forms the opposite of resilience, highlighting the importance of preparation and risk mitigation in reducing disaster risks (Birkmann, 2006). According to Cardona (2004) the primary causes of vulnerabilities are 1) physical fragility referring to the lack of physical resistance, 2) socio-economic fragility, defines the degrees of marginalisation and social segregation; and 3) lack of resilience, i.e. the limitations and inability to bounce back from the impact. Three steps of collective risk management include: 1) identification of the personal, social and external risks; 2) risk mitigation; and disaster management: response and recovery (Cardona, 2004). As discussed, disasters are not solely natural phenomena hence they should be examined as unresolved development issues. They are the products of underdevelopment or vulnerabilities caused by the rupture between nature and society. There is a famous line in Turkish "It is not the earthquake but the buildings that are not resistant to earthquakes that kill people." The concepts of prevention and mitigation should be duly considered in the planning of developing countries. However urban, regional and economic policies generally increase the pre-existing vulnerabilities (Cardona, 2004).

In the aftermath of a disaster, it is crucial to recognize that every step -before, during, and after- plays a significant role in shaping the recovery process. Immediate actions must prioritise prevention, and it is essential for national and international actors to collaborate effectively throughout this phase. The cycle of recovery should be approached as an integrated system, where each operation influences the subsequent phases. Therefore, it is vital to explore various recovery methods within the literature and emphasise the concept of recovery over mere reconstruction. This distinction allows for a more nuanced understanding of how decisions made in one phase can impact others. As we focus on the reconstruction of

the city, we must first examine recovery in its entirety, laying the groundwork for a comprehensive and cohesive rebuilding strategy.

2.1.1. Recovery vs Reconstruction

Recovery after an earthquake is typically a command-and-control operation (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019), which often results in a division of labour and a lack of communication between disciplines and organisations (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010). The post disaster reconstruction model by Kates and Pijawka was constructed in 1977 to offer a model for recovery after disaster (Kates & Pijawka, 1977). This 4-stage model has been the foundation for much academic research on recovery.



Figure 2.3: Post-Disaster Reconstruction Model (Source: Kates & Pijawka, 1977)

This conceptual framework is designed to understand and analyse the process of recovery after a disaster, focusing on the temporal aspects of recovery. The 4 key stages in the disaster recovery process are: 1) Emergency Response Phase is the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The emergency relief efforts, rescue operations, and the provision of basic needs like food, shelter, and medical care has to be taken care of within 2 days. In this phase it is important to offer emergency shelters, such as tents. 2) Restoration Phase following the initial response,

focuses on the basic necessities such as water, health, transportation and electricity. This phase includes the supply of temporary shelters, such as containers. 3) Reconstruction Phase involves rebuilding permanent structures, including homes, public buildings, and infrastructure. The goal is to restore the community to its pre-disaster condition or better, to reduce future vulnerability. This phase may take up to 10 years, hence it is important for the recovery of the community to offer temporary housing solutions and necessary infrastructure while rebuilding the city. 4) Rehabilitation Phase focuses on long-term recovery, addressing social, economic, and psychological impacts. This phase may involve rebuilding the local economy, restoring livelihoods, and addressing the mental health needs of the affected population.

Since its introduction, Kates and Pijawka's 4 phase model has been expanded and modified by subsequent researchers to address its limitations and to include more detailed analysis of the social and psychological aspects of recovery. Sobhanina and Buckman (2022) adapt this four-phase model with the help of interdisciplinary studies and suggest some upgrades (See Fig. 2.4.). They modify it such as: 1) resistance of the community before the disaster should be addressed. 2) The psychological and sociological recovery of the community should be emphasised. 3) By examining the community's circumstances both before and after the disaster, everyone in the community should benefit from the recovery in equity. 4) The influence of resilience on the preparedness of pre-disaster communities for future disasters should be emphasised.



Fig. 9. The reconfigured model of disaster recovery.

Figure 2.4: Reconfigured model for disaster recovery (Source: Sobhanina & Buckman, 2022)

The description of temporary housing changes through the reconstruction process: 1) A space that meets the minimum needs of disaster survivors after a disaster. 2) A part of post-disaster resettlement. 3) A place that will function as housing while permanent solutions are being completed (Johnson, 2007). In the aftermath of a disaster, there is often a significant need for both temporary and permanent housing solutions. The adequacy and speed of these solutions can have profound impacts on affected communities. Often the urgency and desperation for rapid reconstruction creates a dichotomy of good design and technical and scientific methods as being "too idealistic". When temporary housing is insufficient or inadequate, affected populations experience increased urgency and desperation for stable living conditions. This situation creates pressure on governmental bodies to provide immediate and lasting solutions. The post disaster recovery models described in this chapter suggests that permanent housing design starts right after the disaster, however construction may take a long time hence it is important for the locals to have their temporary housing solutions. By not moving away from their land the owners and users have a chance to be a part of the decision-making processes regarding reconstruction.

The envisioned recovery process is not linear but rather follows a complex timeline. The different phases overlap, for example, during the reconstruction phase, new challenges may arise to offer solutions for temporary housing and infrastructure of the society. The model focused that recovery should not only aim to return to the existing situation but should also include mitigation measures to reduce the impact of future disasters. This may involve changes in land use, building codes, and infrastructure design to enhance resilience. Urban planners and policy developers should use the model to design post-disaster recovery strategies that are phased and prioritise both immediate needs and long-term resilience. The model informs policy-makers on how to allocate resources efficiently over the course of recovery and where to intervene to support the most vulnerable populations. The emphasis should be on the effectiveness (including the cost-effectiveness) of reconstruction, hence each stage should be managed carefully and all decisions should be taken by accountable bodies. In the times of crises resources are more critical hence the energy and resources should be effectively spent, the right ownerships, temporary housing requirements (both numerically and physically), investments should be organised through accountable organisations. It is common that especially international funds are being exploited by unnecessary expenses.

Disasters often exacerbate existing inequalities. Wealthier communities tend to recover faster because they have more resources, better infrastructure, and greater political influence. In contrast, marginalised groups often suffer more during disasters and receive less support during recovery (Bullard & Wright, 2012). The New Urban Agenda that was adopted in 2016 at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development - Habitat III in Ecuador (UN, 2017) combined the qualitative components of cities and urban development with a growing number of contributions coming from social sciences (García-Hernández et.al., 2017; Arefian et.al., 2021). Social and psychological recovery necessitates the measures being taken before the final reconstruction process. While the physical reconstruction takes place the community needs immediate recovery. Since the main goal of the recovery is building back the life of the victims of the disaster, as in their human rights, recovery should be a continuous process. Each stage has importance in their social, emotional, psychological and economic recovery.

The shared built cultural heritage has a healing capacity in post disaster cases. Rebuilding their cities is a psychological necessity for the people. This process is not only about the rebuilding of the built environment, rather rebuilding the life, time and relations. Therefore, the people and the society should be a part of rebuilding. Urban heritage is not only about the built environment but about the cultural heritage as well. Rebuilding the monuments and listed buildings will not only rebuild the cultural diversity. Reconstructing the community's identity is fundamental for rebuilding the local communities and minimising displacement, exclusion and gentrification.

2.1.2. Participation and Design

According to Erzen (2015, p.117), the city is a place where the values and heritage inherited from the previous generation are physically manifested and passed on to the next generation. The spiritual and emotional surroundings of a location play a major role in determining the resilient environment. By paying attention to them, architects may participate in a dialogical process that would lead to more innovative practices for resilience related to incorporating resilience into neighbourhood place-making initiatives. In places where customs (especially intangible heritage) could not be naturally passed down from generation to generation and

there was no historical continuity, common signals embedded in the environment became carriers of cultural heritage, bridging the generational gap (Jelenzski, 2018).

The 1970s shift towards heritage conservation emphasised authenticity, diversity, and urban identity, leading to more conservative reconstruction practices. In the historical context of the city, preservation and conservation of the evolving identity requires continuity in spatial, relational, emotional, and functional aspects. These sites are crucial to urban culture and collective memory, especially in a globalised and standardised world. However, even if the reconstruction zone in the city is a mundane built fabric the local community holds the bond with their urban memories of those places. Urban built environment cannot be imagined without the experience and the movement of the local community. Therefore, it is critical that reconstruction's designers comprehend the significance and impact of the environment as well as how much it contributes to the locals' sense of self, memory, and image. This is almost impossible to achieve without the inclusion of the local community and NGOs representing them and designing with their contributions. Active citizen participation has been a custom practice in the restoration of social and physical assets (Arefian et.al., 2021). In particular, urban heritage shifted from being seen as a static museum-like preservation of historic buildings and neighbourhoods to being recognized as one of the many complex layers of urban life (Darlington, 2020). This perception of urban heritage shifted from being seen as a deadweight from the past to a dynamic asset for the future.

Several examples of post-disaster reconstruction highlight the diverse approaches and tools used in post-disaster reconstruction, demonstrating the importance of integrating architectural, urban planning, and community engagement strategies to create resilient and sustainable urban environments (Edgington, 2011; Vallance, 2014). Citizen participation has proven crucial in various contexts. For instance, in Talca, Chile, and Benghazi, Libya, (Arefian et.al, 2021) local communities actively engaged in reconstruction despite opposition from authorities favouring top-down approaches. This highlights the importance of involving citizens to preserve emotional connections to their urban environment and enhance resilience.

The concept of the "ladder of participation," as introduced by Arnstein, illustrates the varying levels of public involvement in decision-making processes (Arnstein, 1969). Eight levels on the "ladder" represent varying levels of nonparticipation, tokenism, and citizen power. Arnstein proclaimed citizen control to be the authentic mode of involvement (See Figure

2.5.). In post-disaster scenarios, true participation often remains an elusive goal, with architects and planners sometimes relegating it to a mere formality. Participation is frequently reduced to consultation rather than a collaborative process where affected communities have a genuine voice. This approach further alienates those who are already marginalised, reinforcing the power imbalances that contribute to social ineffectiveness in reconstruction efforts.



Figure 2.5: Ladder of Citizen Participation (Source: Arnstein, 1969)

Participatory design is an essential link between designed and lived spaces. It turns disaster victims into aware agents by enabling their presence known inside the created environment. This methodology not only promotes the reintegration of architecture and urban areas on a more comprehensive level, but it also underscores the crucial function that users play in moulding their tangible environment. Overall, designers (architects) are only responsible for 2% of structures worldwide. Participatory design, by collaboration of a wider spectrum of users, could address this global architectural crisis (Sgoutas, 2005).

The gap between the community and the urban design professionals during the post-disaster reconstruction should be minimised by an involvement of the community to the reconstruction process. The agents and stakeholders of this participatory process can be

defined as the urban planners, architects, governmental and non-governmental institutions, professional organisations, researchers/academics from both technical and social fields and the affected community. Unfortunately, with active participation the recovery process may slow down. Instead of including communities in problem-solving and decision-making processes, public authorities often choose to tire them out with fake forms of engagement (Davidson et al. 2007, p. 100).



Figure 2.6: Ladder of participation for developing countries (Source: Choguill, 1996)

Davidson et al. (2007) utilise Anrstein's (1969) Ladder of Participation modified by Choguill in 1996 to describe the levels and methods of participation in several post-disaster housing reconstruction case studies (See Fig. 2.7.). Choguill's depiction of participation in developing countries consists of 'neglect', 'rejection', 'manipulation' and 'support'. Davidson et.al. (2007) argue that even though for both Arnstein (1969) and Choguill (1996) information and consultation cannot be truly categorised as participation because users do not have the authority to make a decision, case studies demonstrate that information and consultation have been accepted as legitimate forms of participation. Hence their simplified version of participation ladder starts from manipulation, informing and 'consulting', 'collaborating' and to 'empowering'. They define 'empowering' as active participation in the design process.



Figure 2.7: Ladder of Community Participation adapted from Arnstein (1969) and Choguill (1996) (Source: Davidson et.al., 2007)

2.1.3. Political Economy of Post Disaster Reconstruction

Post-disaster reconstruction involves a several set of actors, including governments, international and national organisations, local municipalities, and community groups. When disasters become a global concern, it necessitates assistance from international foundations and organisations to support recovery efforts such as UNDP, UNDRR, World Bank, IFRC, GFDRR, GNDR... Addressing disasters solely as national issues may create economic and logistical challenges. Each government tailors its disaster recovery strategy according to the specific context of the disaster, the scale of the damage, and the socio-political landscape. Risk mitigation, reconstruction, and recovery methods are often devised in a top-down manner, but the effectiveness of these approaches can vary significantly based on local engagement and resource availability. In Italy the recovery process following the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake emphasised local solutions. The Italian government implemented a decentralised approach, enabling municipalities to engage in reconstruction efforts while receiving support from national agencies (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020). In Tokyo, particularly after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, the recovery was characterised by a more centralised strategy. The national government played a significant role in coordinating recovery efforts and rebuilding infrastructure (Cho, 2014). New Zealand’s approach, especially following the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, was notably participatory. The recovery process involved extensive community engagement, allowing residents to have a voice in decision-making and ensuring that reconstruction aligned with local needs (Kenney & Phibbs, 2015; Bakema, 2013). Chile's recovery after the 2010 earthquake and tsunami

highlighted a combination of national and local efforts. The Chilean government implemented a robust reconstruction plan, which included a mix of centralised policies and local involvement, demonstrating an effective balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches (Platt, 2019). Haiti's recovery following the 2010 earthquake serves as a cautionary tale. The response was heavily reliant on international aid, but challenges such as poor infrastructure and governance hindered effective reconstruction. Many initiatives failed to incorporate local input, leading to prolonged displacement and inadequate recovery (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010; Höfer, 2023).

The sense of urgency is frequently given as a justification for disregarding established standards of accountability and public participation (Agamben, 2005; Klein, 2008). Issue with participation is the lack of transparency and asymmetry of information. By preventing the integration of local knowledge and resources by the authorities, post-disaster reconstruction may undermine effective recovery by alienating communities. Herman and Chomsky (1988) describe how authorities manipulate public opinion to align with their interests with the concept of "manufacturing consent". Governments may control the narrative around post-disaster reconstruction to justify rapid, yet potentially flawed, permanent housing solutions. This manipulation often involves closed decision-making processes, such as a top-down method of design by restraining community involvement and lack of transparency such as selective information release, information asymmetry.

Without properly engaging with the reconstruction process the public may be positioned with limited solutions, and have to choose from one of them. Community may be offered several solutions to choose from, hence participation with the lack of information may turn into a legitimation act. Displacement and gentrification of the built fabric, rebuilding the vulnerabilities and falling short to create resilient settlements are the most dangerous risks in this scenario. Temporary housing solutions are important for the community to engage with the reconstruction efforts and recovery of the economy and intangible heritage of the city. Recovery emphasises; transparency, inclusivity, and community engagement, ensuring that rebuilding efforts are resilient, sustainable, and aligned with the community's needs. However, when these principles are compromised, systemic failures and persistent vulnerabilities arise, leaving communities more vulnerable and disconnected from the recovery process.

This process may lead to housing developments that prioritise political or economic interests over community needs. In her book Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein (2008) highlights the risks of exploiting crises to push through controversial policies, sidelining community participation and exacerbating social inequalities. “Disaster Capitalism” refers to the practice of exploiting large-scale crises; natural disasters, economic collapses, or wars, to implement controversial and often neoliberal economic policies. These policies may otherwise face strong public opposition, however in the times of crises the community may fail to oppose (Klein, 2008). These policies typically include privatisation, deregulation, and deep cuts to social spending, which disproportionately benefit corporations and the wealthy. This may result in inequality and social fragmentation (Harvey, 2005).

Klein (2008) argues that certain governments and corporations deliberately take advantage of the shocks to push through radical economic and legal changes (Klein, 2008). These changes are often introduced during the period of disorientation and confusion following a disaster, when populations are too overwhelmed to resist. After a disaster, public services like healthcare, education, and infrastructure are often privatised under the guise of efficiency and rebuilding. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, public schools in New Orleans were largely replaced by charter schools, and public housing was demolished to make way for private developments (Adams, 2013). Disasters are used as opportunities to remove regulations that protect property owners, public space, and the environment. The legitimation is that deregulation will speed up reconstruction, but in reality, it often leads to exploitation and increased vulnerability for the affected populations (Harvey, 2007).

Large corporations (especially construction, energy and transportation companies) are frequently the primary beneficiaries of disaster capitalism. They are awarded contracts for reconstruction and services, often without competitive bidding, leading to inflated costs and reduced quality (Klein, 2008). This practice was evident in wars, where companies profited enormously from reconstruction contracts. This can sometimes result in the suppression of dissent and the imposition of authoritarian measures under the guise of maintaining stability (Scahill, 2007). In order to prevent these, it is crucial to promote a transparent, inclusive, and participatory decision-making model that prioritises the needs and voices of affected communities. This is generally accepted to be the only method of reconstruction that contributes to long-term recovery and resilience.

2.2. Roles of Architects in Post-Disaster Recovery

In the wake of a disaster the role of architects is crucial. The community needs immediate relief and first be relocated into temporary housing. Structural reinforcement and strengthening are mainly an engineering problem; however, architects may also offer professional practice in the modifications of existing buildings. The houses that have been already existing pre-disaster should be evaluated due to their location, physical and structural integrity and overall position in the post-disaster resilient urban plan. Before focusing on the building scale of urban planning, vulnerabilities against the future hazards should be examined and the risk should be minimised. Subsequently permanent housing should be provided. In that scenario, design and construction activities are far more crucial than the procedures used in regular times. While it is necessary to plan and build new spaces rapidly, it is also expected that these spaces and units be tailored to the needs of the victims in order to mitigate trauma and the social, economic and psychological effects of the disaster.

Minnery (2014) defines the significant role of the architect in disaster management (Figure 9.) to provide a healthy recovery process throughout all phases. After the disaster strikes trained architects next to other professionals evaluate the safety and habitability of buildings. This process of risk assessment is necessary to offer the background for future reconstruction statistics, temporary housing necessities and the scale of the destruction. Architects may assess the risks regarding the buildings that can cause injury, harm, or insufficient conditions (Minnery, 2014). AIA's (American Assistance Program) DAT (Design Assistance Team) programs approach post disaster recovery through 1) interdisciplinary teams since systems are too complex to understand by one profession, 2) design process through the initial formative stages to the implementation and 3) public participation through the expert citizens in the community (AIA Disaster Assistance Handbook, 2021).



Figure 2.8: Disaster Resilience Cycle and the Role of the Architect (Source: Minnery, 2014)

Building an urban fabric on a tabula rasa, in a disaster-prone region may offer a new ground for architects to suggest innovative architectural design solutions. However, compared with tabula rasa, disaster areas are extremely tainted. The destruction of the disaster creates a highly traumatised place. Politics, memory, and economic gain compete for their roles in the recovery. The unknown future is taken away by the disaster, leaving the city with injustice. The architect's primary responsibility is to memorialise by focusing on the past rather than the future (Cuff, 2009). Rethinking and imagining the city is an inspiring process. However, do architects have the right to rethink, imagine and build the city in their mind? What are the elements controlling this godlike power of design to rebuild an urban fabric?

There is a necessity to incorporate holistic planning especially in post-disaster cases. Focal architectural solutions may fail as they may not incorporate larger urban decisions. Hence it is important to be prepared for the disaster impacts and have the relevant analysis of land use, geographic and seismic vulnerabilities, urban growth patterns, infrastructure etc. before the disaster strikes. Architectural scale of reconstruction is possible only after building the common ground for the urban planning scale. As Pieterse (2001, p:xvii) suggests "development is too complex to allow partial approaches to have their way".

First and foremost, a disaster is perceived as a communication crisis within the community, making it harder for individuals to learn and share information with others (Quarantelli, 1998). Reconstruction plans are typically created in institutions with authorities without actually considering the requirements of the impacted areas and the victims themselves. De Carlo (2013) suggested participatory design, which meant that the architect would design with users rather than for them, and process planning, which meant that participation would be initiated as an open-ended procedure in such a way that users would continue shaping their environments even after the work of the architect ended. In making a distinction between the client and the user, de Carlo was suggesting that architecture ought to work for the common good rather than the particular interests of the wealthy or powerful authorities.

Architects must navigate the complexities of diverse memories and wills, recognizing that their work impacts varied social groups and must be inclusive, rather than assuming a single, unified vision for rebuilding. This aligns with the idea that architects in post-disaster scenarios should actively engage with and prioritise the diverse needs and voices of affected communities, rather than imposing a singular architectural vision. Hence in the context of post disaster reconstruction, architects have close complex relations with governmental organisations, contractors and capital. However, locals, victims of disaster, professional chambers sometimes sit on the other hand and criticise the architectural decisions.

Glass (2008) states that the role of architects during reconstruction as a coalitator because of their ability to influence the design process through their interpretation of a brief to design materials. She views the role as comprising two concurrent but fundamentally different roles, that of an ‘information manager’ and that of a ‘creative individual’. However, the need for integration extends beyond the need to join up the activities of built environment professionals (Healey, 2006).

Glass (2008) also argues that there is a disconnect between emergency managers and the construction industry. This view is congruent with that of Lorch (2005), who believes that some of the non-technological problems of emergency planning are the result of disciplinary boundaries within the scientific community and between the scientific community and the policy community. Policy makers, practitioners and academics must develop a collective approach for embedding hazard risk reduction and emergency management into the mainstream risk-management process.

2.2.1. Between the Scales: Urban Planning and Architecture

In the wake of a disaster, the role of urban planning is the critical step before moving into the architectural intervention stage such as reconstruction of singular buildings, local restorations or proposal of new buildings. Urban areas affected by disasters should not only be rebuilt as they were but also need to be reimagined as places of recovery and as environments designed to be more resilient for future crises, especially with the risk of slow burn disasters such as climate change (Satterthwaite et.al., 2007; Dodman et.al., 2013). This includes securing safe zones for displaced populations after the disaster, redesigning temporary public spaces to promote social recovery and ensuring that infrastructure is both resilient and sustainable. This stage is crucial for long-term recovery, ensuring that cities and habitants can adapt to future crises while enhancing quality of life for their residents.

Urban planners must assess the scale of damage and determine priorities for intervention. A resilient urban design seeks to improve not just the structural elements of a city but also the social, economic, and environmental factors that contribute to long-term recovery. Resilience in this context goes beyond risk management; it involves proactive planning to reduce vulnerability and improve the capacity of urban systems to withstand and recover from future disasters. The role of urban planners, therefore, is to create adaptable, flexible urban environments that can respond to changing conditions and future risks.

Urban planners need to evaluate land use, the location of critical infrastructure, and existing zoning laws to ensure that future urbanisation does not exacerbate the risks of future disasters[4]. The planning process should focus on fostering safer communities through careful design that addresses both environmental and human risks. One of the most important steps in post-disaster urban planning is the reassessment of zoning and land use policies. Zoning regulations play a crucial role in ensuring that urban areas are rebuilt in a way that mitigates future risks. This may involve relocating vulnerable populations away from floodplains, improving building standards in high-risk areas, and introducing land use practices that

[4] "Land use planning that considers natural hazard risk is the single most important mitigation measure in minimising the increase in future disaster losses in areas of new development" (Australian Institute Disaster Resilience, 2020).

incorporate green spaces and natural flood control measures. Urban planners must work with local governments to implement zoning changes that increase resilience without hindering economic development. Thoughtful land-use planning can minimise future disaster impacts by considering factors such as climate change, seismic activity, and social vulnerability (Pede, 2020). The reconstruction of urban infrastructure following a disaster is not just a matter of rebuilding roads and bridges; it requires a systems-based approach that ensures the long-term functionality and resilience of urban systems. This includes the rethinking of transportation networks, water supply systems, and energy infrastructure. Urban planners, alongside engineers, must design systems that can withstand future disasters while providing efficient service during normal conditions. Infrastructure must be integrated into the broader urban fabric to ensure that services are equitable and accessible to all residents, especially vulnerable populations. Larger-scale urban planning decisions, such as infrastructure investments and zoning laws, shape the overall growth and resilience of cities. These decisions affect long-term sustainability, liveability, and resilience (Hall, 2002).

After a disaster greenfields are at the risk of being used as new development zones and especially in the intersection of urban and rural areas the agricultural production zones are at a risk. With the necessity of new housing development, the temporary and permanent housing construction zones should be decided cautiously, since the characteristic and economic sustainability of the disaster struck zone may depend on agricultural production. Recovery should promote both human resilience and environmental sustainability. Urban planning should shift away from an anthropocentric focus and also prioritise nature, other species that have been affected from the disaster, and ecosystems. This approach acknowledges that cities are not just for humans but are shared spaces for all living beings.

Urban planning is essential in post-disaster recovery particularly in situations of rapid urbanisation and disaster-driven urbanism. Urban planners, in partnership with architects, engineers, and sociologists, provide the strategic oversight required to rebuild cities in ways that are sustainable, equitable, and resilient. Planning at both the architectural and urban scales must be interconnected and informed by scientific methodologies, creating a framework for recovery that is adaptable to future challenges. By recognizing the value of urban planning and ensuring that it is harmonised with architectural and engineering efforts, cities can emerge from disaster stronger, more resilient, and better equipped to face the challenges of the future. Urban plans are key long-term documents that outline a city's future

development vision, goals, and strategies. They guide decision-making to ensure urban growth aligns with overarching objectives, helping prevent disjointed development, provide the framework for detailed zoning regulations, ensuring consistency and coherence across the city (Hall, 2002). They balance competing interests, such as economic development, environmental protection, and social equity, addressing these priorities in a holistic way (Talen, 2012).

Effective post-disaster urban planning must include multiple projections across various timeframes in post-disaster recovery (Schwab, 2014). These timeframes allow urban planners to evaluate progress, reassess vulnerabilities, and adjust policies based on lessons learned during the recovery process. Short-term plans often focus on emergency housing, infrastructure repair, and basic services, while longer-term plans should focus on structural improvements, economic recovery, and resilience to future disasters. The integration of these different timeframes ensures a balanced approach that addresses immediate needs without sacrificing long-term resilience. Comprehensive planning that spans decades ensures that recovery is not just about reconstruction but also about building a future-ready city.

Modernists saw the reconstruction of bombed city centres as an opportunity to modernise and redevelop the city, raise living standards, and create new urban settlements.[5] Modern architecture, opposing ornamentation with rational structural and formal simplification offered a solution of the limited time and money. Construction evolved with standardised industrial production, especially in the housing production (Arefian, et.al., 2021). The modernisation of housing unit however produced its own problems. The tension between architecture's technical capabilities and its social responsibilities remains a critical issue. While modernist architects attempted to address the role of architecture in serving the public good, their efforts were often limited by the complexities of social needs and political realities. The profession's ongoing challenge is to better integrate social equity and political advocacy into architectural practice, ensuring that the built environment serves all members of society, not just a privileged few (Cuff, 1991). The rigid and often top-down nature of

[5] In the case of historical post-disaster reconstruction examples however modernist redevelopments were outside the historical city centres. The modernist ideals were better suited for the tabula rasa peripheries of the city. Housing development for the working-class was utilising the ideals of rational language and methods. This functionalist model divided the city into zones, aiming to reduce the density in the city centres, building green belts and expanding the stress (Hall & Tewdwr-Jones, 2019).

modernist planning sometimes led to the very social disconnection they sought to overcome. Nevertheless, the modernist movement laid the foundation for ongoing discussions about the role of architecture in addressing social and political challenges (Frampton, 2007; Fishman, 1982, 1992). Critique of architects' focus on design over broader social and ethical responsibilities should focus on the examination of how the modernist legacy influences the role of architects in post-disaster contexts. Modernism had a strong statement on society. Its manifestos were meant to improve architecture's social role. The driving force of the movement was using architectural design as a tool for economic and political betterment. However, a city as a complex system is a strong antithesis to modernist urban design examples. These architects, driven by the ideals of modernism, often prioritise aesthetic and functional concerns over the lived experiences and socio-cultural realities of the affected communities.

Post-disaster urban planning requires interdisciplinary collaboration, integrating fields such as urban planning, engineering, architecture, sociology, economics, and environmental science. Collaboration among urban planners, engineers, sociologists, architects, and local governments is essential for successful post-disaster recovery. Each discipline contributes unique expertise, from technical standards and community dynamics to building design. Sociologists offer insights into how communities cope with displacement, engineers ensure recovery projects meet technical needs, architects design physical spaces, and urban planners integrate all elements into a cohesive strategy. Effective disaster recovery relies on interdisciplinary teamwork to create resilient, adaptable, and inclusive urban spaces.

In disaster recovery, urban planning plays an indispensable role, especially in rapidly urbanising areas and disaster-driven development. Post-disaster planning must be approached as a complex, interdisciplinary system, requiring collaboration between urban planners, architects, engineers, and sociologists. The planning process -from zoning to infrastructure redesign- should never be overlooked, especially when considering the potential for a "blank slate" approach. Urban planning and architecture must work in tandem to ensure cities recover, adapt, and thrive in the face of future challenges. Urban planners and architects must collaborate closely to ensure disaster recovery efforts are cohesive. While architects focus on individual buildings, urban planners address the larger urban system. The integration of both perspectives is necessary to ensure the built environment is functional and resilient. Discrepancies between architectural designs and urban strategies can lead to inefficiencies.

Therefore, both professions must align their work, ensuring that architectural projects support broader urban planning goals. The regulatory framework -building codes, zoning laws, and policies- must support this integration and prioritise scientific planning methods. Planners must ensure that development is strategic and coordinated to address the challenges of urbanisation, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Architects, in turn, implement urban planning decisions to mitigate future disaster risks.

2.2.2. Accountability of Architects

A common definition of accountability is "the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). This definition highlights several key elements: it is external (involving accountability to an external authority), it entails social interaction and exchange (answerability and acceptance of sanctions), and it includes the rights of authority (to demand answers and impose penalties). This perspective is valuable as it underscores the role of external authority in demanding accountability and enforcing consequences. However, in contemporary examples and studies, with globalisation, the increasing number of actors, the intertwining of powers, the dispersion of responsibility, and the overshadowing of these dynamics, several authors have documented a shift from traditional bureaucracies to collaborative arrangements involving both public and private sectors, hence, different definitions of accountability have started to emerge (Willems & Van Dooren, 2011).

Bovens (2010) states that “accountability” is used as a synonym for many loosely defined political desiderata, such as good governance, transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity (Bovens, 2010). The legitimacy of the system to be equal to all, rich or poor, powerful or not, asks for accountability (Williams, 2006). Accountability is the obligation of political, economic and other power-holders to take responsibility for their actions. Power-holders include government officials, private corporations, and non-governmental organisations. Accountability is especially significant in democratic systems, where citizens have the right to demand accountability, and public actors must comply. As Mulgan (2000) explains, this involves superior authority asserting rights over those accountable. Accountability differs from related concepts such as responsibility, responsiveness, and regulation (Mulgan, 2000). While responsibility involves individual

choice, responsiveness refers to meeting others' wishes, and regulation focuses on controlling future behaviour. Accountability is retrospective, requiring mechanisms for individuals to explain past actions, often through formal processes like complaints or legal procedures.

Accountability is mostly seen as a relational process, in which an account-giver provides information about its conduct and performance to an account holder, who makes an assessment of this account and may respond with sanctions or rewards. This entails the existence of three consecutive phases in accountability processes: an information phase, a debating phase and a consequences phase (Bovens, 2007). Several scholars have studied accountability through a prism of four leading questions: who is accountable to whom, for what and how? (Scott, 2000; Goodin, 2003).

Accountability is a key issue in contemporary public administration, as governments have delegated many tasks to lower-level bodies (Bovens, 2007; Willems & Van Dooren, 2011). Accountability as a core value in democratic governance that has so far failed to reach an unequivocal meaning. Meanwhile, contemporary society demands more accountability in all aspects of individual, social, organisational, and institutional arrangements.

Leadership accountability critiquing political corruption, public challenge the leaders and authorities for their misconduct. Falk (1988), examines the tension between political pragmatism and accountability in granting asylum to deposed dictators, highlighting the historical struggle for human rights and the limitations of international law in prosecuting state leaders for crimes. International conventions and domestic laws are needed to hold former leaders accountable while navigating the political risks of asylum. accountability for abuses of power. Williams (2006) explores the challenges and responsibilities of leadership in the context of globalisation, using personal accountability. He examines how leaders in public, private, and non-profit sectors are held accountable for their decisions, especially as their actions increasingly affect global networks and diverse stakeholders. He argues that traditional models of accountability, often focused on local or national boundaries, must evolve to address the interconnectedness of today's globalised systems and complex ethical, social, and political landscapes within those systems. He highlights the role of transparency, governance structures, and ethical frameworks in ensuring that leaders remain responsible for their actions, and it calls for more inclusive and participatory approaches to leadership accountability in an increasingly interdependent world.

Governance complexes often comprise a multitude of different actors that “self-organise” into collaborative or competing structures, or that are loosely coordinated or orchestrated (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2024). As such, they often lack formal links or clear chains of delegation. In turn, this means that some actors or entities may claim a right to hold others accountable to certain standards, whereas those held accountable do not recognize a corresponding obligation to abide. Even when delegation takes place, overlapping obligations can make accountability harder to achieve. It is well known, for example, that “multiple principals” set-ups -situations in which a single agent has more than one contract with organizationally distinct principals)- can weaken accountability (Hirschmann, 2019). Similarly, complex patterns of collaboration and competition can make it harder for principals to trace specific actions to individual implementing agents. When many hands are involved, it can be difficult to determine who has contributed in what way and hence who is the responsible actor. Bovens (1999) describes the "problem of many hands” to highlight how responsibility becomes diffused in complex systems, making it difficult to hold any single individual or group accountable for outcomes, especially when wrongdoing or failures occur. Thompson (1980), who first used the concept, defines the problem of many hands as the situation in which more than one person in a group or organization bears responsibility, when there is uncertainty about the consequences of the actions of individuals, making it difficult to share responsibility. This problem makes it difficult to clarify how each individual's work affects the whole and which individual is responsible for which results. This situation becomes especially evident in large organizations or complex social structures. Bovens' analysis suggests that without a supportive structure that enforces moral behaviour and clear lines of responsibility, even well-intentioned professionals are likely to fall short in their ethical obligations, leading to long-term consequences for both the affected communities and the integrity of the architectural profession.

Mulgan (2000) discusses how public services are increasingly being provided by private companies instead of the government, with the government still funding the services. This shift is part of a global trend to reduce the size of the public sector and rely more on private companies. The paper focuses on whether outsourcing these services reduces accountability to the public. Outsourcing can make certain information about private contractors less transparent and harder for the public to investigate. When the government outsources a service, the companies involved often become "commercially confidential," meaning their

business practices, including salaries or fees paid to their employees, are not open to public scrutiny. Essentially, outsourcing can make it difficult for the public, even though taxpayer money is involved, to hold private contractors fully accountable for how they use public funds.

Who sets the standards, who holds others accountable, and how is this accountability enforced? In representative democracies, elected leaders or appointed officials must publicly explain their actions and be open to feedback from citizens. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann (2024) propose three accountability mechanisms for complex governance systems: deliberation, interactive learning, and inter-organizational competition. Accountability through deliberation emphasises peer interactions across overlapping organisations. Actors can act as "deliberation instigators" to facilitate communication and promote accountability (Moravcsik, 2004; Bexell et al., 2010). Accountability through interactive learning focuses on how organisations learn from past experiences. It encourages openness, reflection, and feedback for improvement. Finally, accountability through inter-organizational competition suggests that competition between organisations can stimulate monitoring and responsiveness, especially when jurisdictional boundaries are unclear. This fosters accountability through competing standards. The diagram below (See Fig. 2.9.) offers an overview of key accountability relationships typically found in democratic societies. Although not all societies have the same set of institutions, this framework can help explore accountability options in less ideal contexts. The arrows represent those who can hold others accountable for a particular action or outcome, pointing to those who are responsible for that action or result.



Figure 2.9: Accountability Relationships (Source: Wignaraja & Balassanian, 2006)

Social accountability is an approach to building accountability through civic engagement, where citizens or NGOs actively participate in holding power-holders accountable. These mechanisms are often demand-driven and operate bottom-up, complementing traditional "horizontal" (state-internal) mechanisms by providing "external" or "vertical" accountability (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). While elections serve as a primary vertical accountability mechanism in democracies, their limitations necessitate broader citizen-led actions to hold public officials accountable beyond voting. Traditional social accountability practices include protests, advocacy, investigative journalism, and public interest lawsuits. Recent practices emphasise evidence-based approaches, such as participatory policymaking, budgeting, public expenditure tracking, and citizen monitoring of public services (Paul, 2002). Social accountability mechanisms aim to complement and enhance conventional state mechanisms by fostering mutual reinforcement, which can lead to "hybrid" or "diagonal" accountability. Institutionalising social accountability practices -making state mechanisms transparent and open to citizen engagement- has proven effective and sustainable (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). These mechanisms use formal and informal rewards or sanctions, such as public pressure via media, petitions, or interface meetings. Where formal enforcement (e.g., legal claims, appeals to anti-corruption agencies) is inadequate, social accountability actions may seek reform or develop new hybrid mechanisms like citizen oversight committees. Social accountability

tools vary by the stage of the policy/budget cycle they target, their initiators (citizens or state), their degree of institutionalisation, and their collaborative or conflictive nature. They also differ in whether they employ formal or informal sanctions and the level of governance they address (local, regional, or national).

Social accountability is vital for three main reasons: improved governance, increased development effectiveness, and empowerment. Accountability is foundational for good governance and effective democracy. A global "governance crisis" highlights citizens' growing disillusionment with governments, citing issues like corruption, favouritism, and lack of responsiveness (Gaventa, 2002; Paul, 2002). Social accountability mechanisms provide citizens with tools to access information, voice needs, and demand accountability beyond elections. Social accountability improves public service delivery and policy design by addressing issues such as resource misallocation, corruption, and lack of communication among policymakers, service providers, and citizens. By enhancing information flow, strengthening citizen voices, and encouraging dialogue, these mechanisms promote transparency, participation.

Shenkin and Coulson (2007), argue that Bourdieu's social theories offer an alternative to traditional, rule-based approaches to accountability, which often reinforce existing power structures. Drawing on Bourdieu's work and Marxist critiques, the paper calls for a community-centred approach to accountability, emphasising flexible, participatory practices that empower marginalised voices and foster genuine political engagement outside institutional frameworks. The authors argue that traditional approaches to accountability, dominated by liberal politics, tend to prioritise formalised, rule-based systems that may serve corporate interests more than societal needs. They critique liberal accountability mechanisms, such as corporate reporting, for failing to create real social change and advocate for a post-liberal model that prioritises informal, community-driven actions and direct dialogue. Bourdieu's insights are used to challenge this by suggesting that true accountability requires informal, community-based practices that resist the limitations of institutional control. They criticise the traditional, procedural approaches that focus on transparency and reporting but often fail to address deeper ethical issues. These methods are seen as legitimising corporate actions without real societal accountability. Bourdieu's ideas on social dynamics, field (structured social spaces) and habitus (internalised dispositions) are leveraged to propose a post-liberal form of accountability. Here, accountability should reflect social and political

activism outside formal corporate and market controls, highlighting the power struggles within society. The authors advocate for a "post-liberal" approach, where accountability stems from social activism, informal dialogues, and symbolic capital (non-material social resources). This approach emphasises the need for academics and communities to act collectively, influencing policy and challenging corporate power from the periphery of the political space (Shenkin & Coulson 2007).

Drawing on Bourdieu's work, Shenkin and Coulson (2007) critiques the notion that academic research, critique, and policy reform can be neatly linked. Bourdieu warns against institutional capture and advocates for a theory of reflexivity, where academics engage with peripheral political spaces to coordinate more effective forms of activism. This approach would also enable scholars to recognize the connection between marginalised politics and emergent social communities. Ultimately, the paper suggests a community-centred approach to accountability, informed by critical theory, that empowers agents such as activists, corporations, and individual consumers. This approach, rooted in Bourdieu's critical ethnography, would focus on understanding the needs of communities and using this understanding to inform political action, fostering a participatory and radical form of democracy. The work underlines how Bourdieu's view of accountability as a social "combat sport" aligns with activism, making accountability not just about transparency but about transforming societal power relations, ultimately empowering marginalised communities through an informal, ethnographic approach.

But what are the factors holding architects accountable, especially in post-disaster reconstruction? Architects are responsible for navigating the intersection of politics, sociology, design, and economics, where their social position and reputation influence their accountability. Architects in post-disaster recovery are accountable for designing safe, sustainable, and inclusive structures that address both immediate needs and long-term resilience. Their role involves balancing the priorities of local communities, government agencies, and international organisations, ensuring that recovery efforts are transparent and resources are used effectively. Architects must also prioritise ethical considerations, ensuring that vulnerable populations are not overlooked and that recovery projects foster long-term community resilience to future disasters. Accountability in this context requires transparency, engagement with local stakeholders, and a focus on both the physical and social dimensions of rebuilding. Accountability of architects in post-disaster recovery is crucial because their

decisions directly affect the rebuilding of communities and the safety, well-being, and resilience of affected populations. In the aftermath of a disaster, architects play a pivotal role in designing and rebuilding structures that must not only address immediate needs but also ensure long-term sustainability. The accountability of architects in this context extends beyond their technical expertise to include their ethical and social responsibilities, as their work often involves navigating complex political, social, and economic pressures. Architects' and architecture's role and responsibility in the intersection of politics, sociology design and economy. social and institutional processes by which accountability concepts are organised and stratified within the field.

Jane Jacobs' seminal work from 1962 asserts that urban design should not be limited to the physical form even though aesthetic concerns in urban design are not inherently bad (Jacobs, 1962). She suggests, true aesthetic value of design must take social and cultural diversity into account. Places have their unique patterns of evolution and that pattern is the foundation of the cultural heritage (Yogalingam et.al., 2016). Architecture as a practice often falls short to address social and political needs of the society. Most of the political literature regarding urban issues focus on the appropriation of the public, or laws and legislations of the authorities. Hence architects as political and social actors sometimes fail to organise themselves around equity, and social responsibility. While architecture has the potential to shape communities and influence social outcomes, it often falls short of realising these possibilities due to various structural, professional, and ideological constraints).

Architecture mostly "sustains the unsustainable" (Kalantidou & Fry, 2014). However 90% of the world's population does not live by professional designers (Smith, 2007). One can accuse spatial design disciplines with being both primarily irrelevant and generally unaccountable. Teddy Cruz, states that this is the point at which architecture may offer new operational paradigms and rethink unsustainable practices by bringing an ethical and "urgent imagination" (quoted in Catling, 2014). Being at the intersection of social and technological domains, is architecture, with its own skill set, better suited to serve as the moral conscience of the built environment professions?

Rowe (1996, p. 242) defined the importance of social accountability of architects as stating "sense of fiduciary duty, of something held or given in trust that places the client's interests before those of the professional, and the interest of society above both," which "lies at the

heart of all professional activity" (Rowe, 1996). Architects involved in this process have found themselves at the intersection of professional ethics, government pressure, and societal expectations. Faoro and Merrill's (1990) study on architects' contracts revealed how architects' role is overbeared by contractors and other professionals and they are limited as overseers then observers and then having no role in the construction process (Faoro & Merrill, 1990). Architecture (as practice and on an ideological level) continues to undergo a reduced professional position because its authority weakened over clients and contractors (Faoro & Merrill, 1990; Pinnington & Morris, 2002). Architects are excluded from the construction process, they rarely build and 'make' their own buildings and their autonomy on their design is overbearing by construction systems, contractors and clients (Musiitwa, 2019). "The architectural profession is increasingly confronted with ethical dilemmas that stem from its relationship with capital. Architects often find themselves torn between serving the interests of their clients and upholding broader social responsibilities, raising questions about their accountability" (Wasserman et.al., 2000, p. 32). The pressures placed on architects to conform to pre-established plans and construction typologies also play a significant role in their accountability. The erosion of the professional autonomy of architects is closely linked to the broader regulatory and institutional failures within the construction system (Tanyeli, 2017). This pressure to conform not only limits the creative and ethical potential of architects but also undermines their ability to act as agents of change in the reconstruction process. The consequence is a built environment that reflects the interests of political and economic elites rather than the needs and aspirations of the broader population (Tafuri, 1976).

In the context of post-disaster reconstruction, the role of architects extends beyond mere technical considerations to encompass ethical and social responsibilities. In order to understand accountability within the context of architecture, housing production and post-disaster reconstruction cases, it is first important to establish whether the architects are accountable for their professional actions. The professional expertise of architects often results with economic, social and political results. And in the cases of disasters architectural decisions may create life threatening examples. However, architecture as a labour often leaves the architect as an individual to alienise from the end result. In order to hold architects accountable for their urban decisions, there should be systematic mechanisms, such as creating a control mechanism during the construction and livelihood of the buildings, questioning the resilience of the master plan, and there should be accountable urban plans, in which, within architects may design according to. The accountability of architects should not

be discussed as a personal and individualistic virtue, rather it should be organised in a systemic control mechanism. Architects often find themselves constrained by bureaucratic structures and overwhelmed by the scale of the reconstruction efforts, leading to a situation where ethical and social responsibilities are either overlooked or inadequately addressed. Architects in large-scale projects often face ethical dilemmas when their professional duties clash with organisational or governmental objectives (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

The accountability of architects in such scenarios raises significant concerns, particularly in relation to the psychological and social recovery of affected communities. Architectural decisions that prioritise speed and efficiency often neglect the complex needs of individuals and communities struggling to rebuild their lives. This oversight can exacerbate trauma and hinder the long-term social recovery of disaster victims. In many instances, architects and architectural institutions have been slow to engage in political advocacy for more equitable urban policies. In the aftermath of natural disasters, the social capital may not sufficiently advocate for inclusive rebuilding processes that would address the needs of marginalised communities (Aldrich, 2012). Architects are often seen as apolitical or neutral actors, focusing on design and aesthetics rather than engaging in the political processes that shape urban environments. This reluctance or failure to engage can lead to missed opportunities for advocating for social justice, equitable development, and community participation in urban planning. The profession's focus on design over advocacy reflects a broader issue where the potential for architecture to address social and political needs is not utilised enough (Ellin, 2006).

Ethical dilemmas emerge when architects, pressured by time constraints and a lack of transparency, are forced to compromise on participatory practices. The exclusion of local communities from the decision-making process leads to designs that fail to address the lived experiences and cultural values of those most impacted. This exclusion not only undermines the potential for meaningful recovery but also raises questions about the ethical obligations of architects to engage with the communities they serve. Architecture, in this context, should not only be seen as a means to rebuild structures but as a tool for social recovery. However, when architects neglect these dimensions, the result is a built environment that fails to foster community cohesion or address the long-term needs of residents.

The ethical and social concerns arising from the unaccountability of architects underscore the importance of integrating participatory practices into the architectural process, particularly in post-disaster contexts. Ensuring transparency, valuing local knowledge, and prioritising the well-being of communities are essential steps toward addressing the ethical challenges inherent in post-disaster reconstruction. By reimagining their role, architects can contribute not only to the physical rebuilding of communities but also to their psychological and social recovery, ultimately leading to more resilient and inclusive environments.

In the context of hybrid systems, where mechanisms of accountability may be lacking, there is a clear need for both systemic and social accountability. Architects, in their professional roles, are currently held accountable primarily through their compliance with zoning and urban plans, as well as through their relationships with professional chambers, government institutions, and the public. However, the evolving nature of urban spaces and the complexity of post-disaster reconstruction or cases of corruption demand a more comprehensive system of accountability that goes beyond these traditional structures. In situations where there is a breakdown of professional ethics, or where established authorities may be wrong, architects must also be held accountable through their personal professional ethics. This personal accountability is embedded in architectural education and should serve as a foundation for making ethical decisions, especially when dealing with vulnerable and changing zoning plans. Yet, when architects are solely accountable to decisions made by authorities or other institutions, this personal accountability can dissolve, leading to a lack of responsibility in critical moments. To address these gaps, there is a pressing need for stronger control mechanisms. This is why urban planning and architecture must work across different scales, ensuring that accountability is maintained at every level. Furthermore, as urban environments evolve, the rules and regulations governing architectural practice should be updated to reflect these changes, allowing architects to navigate complex situations with greater responsibility and transparency. In the end, a robust and multi-layered system of accountability is essential for the future of architecture, ensuring that it serves both the profession and society as a whole.

Bosher and Dainty (2011) emphasises the need for the construction industry to adopt a disaster risk management perspective (Bosher & Dainty, 2011). Professional institutions and trade associations should enhance their members' awareness of the need to assess the risk of disasters in order to take the necessary precautions at all stages of the planning, design and

construction processes. They offer a point of departure for embedding resilience considerations at both project and institutional levels, since real change would demand challenging some of the conventions that currently underpin construction development.

2.2.3. Doxa

"Doxa[6]" is a term derived from the Greek word (from the Greek δόξα) for "opinion" or "belief". In phenomenology, doxa is a term that refers to opinion, belief, or common knowledge. It derives from the verb dokein, meaning "to seem" or "to appear." In its earliest usages, doxa referred to the subjective perception or judgement of an individual—what seems to be true or what one believes to be true, even if it may not be objectively or universally verifiable. Over time, the term evolved in both philosophical and sociological contexts.

In the classical philosophical tradition, doxa came to be understood as a form of knowledge that is not rooted in certainty or reason, but rather in common opinion, hearsay, or conventional wisdom. In contrast to episteme (knowledge, science), which was seen as grounded in rational inquiry and objective truth, doxa was associated with the realm of subjective belief and social consensus. In ancient Greek philosophy, particularly in the work of Plato, doxa was typically framed in opposition to episteme. For Plato, the doxa was the realm of mere opinion—an unreliable and distorted form of knowledge that arises from appearances rather than from reasoned understanding. In his Republic, he explored the distinction between true knowledge (philosophical wisdom) and opinion (the general beliefs or misconceptions held by ordinary people). For Plato, doxa was seen as the "shadow" of true knowledge—something that could be influenced by the senses, emotions, or social convention. In contrast, episteme referred to knowledge gained through philosophical inquiry, which was objective, unchanging, and rooted in rational understanding. Aristotle, too, was concerned with doxa in his works, particularly in terms of how it shaped rhetoric and persuasion. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle classified different kinds of knowledge, with doxa being

[6]In this research, doxa was initially introduced by an interviewer to describe certain social characteristics of Turkey. The interviewee noted that many doxic relationships exist in which people justify their actions based on deeply ingrained perceptions of Turkey, its people, and its history as "it is what it is." These assumptions, along with a sense of fatalism or resignation to one's fate, were suggested as reasons for Turkey's difficulty in bridging academic research with practical application, particularly in urban studies.

a category of opinions that could be used by rhetoricians to persuade audiences, often without offering substantive or rational arguments.

In sociology, doxa refers to the set of assumptions, beliefs, and practices that are taken for granted within a particular society or culture. While episteme refers to knowledge that is grounded in rigorous, reflective, and systematic investigation, doxa represents everyday, unexamined, and often taken-for-granted beliefs. These beliefs are so ingrained that they are often perceived as natural or self-evident truths by the members of that society. These preconceived ideas -what I call doxa- can obscure or distort genuine, reflective knowledge and experience.

The concept of doxa was extensively used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to describe the unconscious beliefs and practices that shape the social world and maintain social order (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu expands the concept of doxa in his work on power, culture, and society (Bourdieu, 1990). He uses doxa to describe the unspoken, unquestioned assumptions that define and shape social reality. For Bourdieu, doxa refers to the deeply ingrained, taken-for-granted beliefs and practices that are often invisible because they are so thoroughly accepted within a given society (Bourdieu, 1990). These beliefs are not simply individual opinions, but rather collective social representations that sustain social structures and power relations (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu's doxa plays a crucial role in the reproduction of social hierarchies, as it helps to legitimise existing power dynamics (Bourdieu, 1984). According to Bourdieu, these doxas are the frameworks within which people understand the world, and they function to perpetuate the status quo. They are not open to question because they are seen as "natural" or "self-evident," even though they may serve the interests of dominant social groups (Bourdieu, 1990). In Bourdieu’s work, doxa contributes to its reproduction in social institutions, structures, and links, as well as in minds and bodies, expectations and behaviours. Doxa are mostly not questioned, while opinions are open to discussion (Bourdieu, 1990).

Doxa refers to shared beliefs and perceptions that are taken for granted and rarely questioned. These beliefs are communicated within specific social areas, or "fields," which shape what is considered "natural" in terms of behaviour and attitudes. People internalise these beliefs through their habitus, or the dispositions formed by their social context. Doxa consists of fundamental assumptions that do not need to be explicitly stated or consciously accepted as

dogmas. Instead, they are just seen as natural, even though they are deeply rooted in the social conditions of a given time. These assumptions are beyond formal ideologies but can still lead to conscious conflict. In academic fields (skholè), doxa has an epistemological dimension, requiring intellectuals and academics to be more reflexive about their beliefs. In this way, doxa helps preserve power relations—such as values and categories—that are socially constructed, while making them appear natural. This misrecognition reinforces doxa, perpetuating it in a self-reinforcing cycle (Deer, 2014).

In politics, doxa can be used to legitimise authority and power. Through media, education, and socialisation, certain ideas that are considered "common sense" can be promoted in political discourse. These ideas, even if arbitrary or serving a specific group's interests, can become so deeply ingrained that they are seen as "just the way things are." Political ideologies often manipulate doxa to influence public opinion, build consensus, and suppress opposition. For Bourdieu, this process is central to social control, as people internalise doxa and accept societal norms without questioning them. This acceptance allows power structures to persist without the need for overt force, as the norms of society seem invisible and self-evident. In politics, doxa serves as a tool for political leaders to secure and maintain power by framing certain ideas as inevitable or necessary, while marginalising others. By shaping the dominant discourse, elites can influence public opinion, minimise dissent, and justify their power. Doxa thus helps to secure social consensus, reduce accountability, and maintain inequality.

Doxa also plays an important role in shaping national identities and group membership. Through socialisation, certain traits and behaviours become associated with national or cultural identity and are accepted without question. These shared beliefs about what defines a nation or group help to reinforce social cohesion while excluding alternative perspectives. Social groups develop their own doxa—shared ideas that define their identity and establish norms. These beliefs can justify inequalities by framing the conditions of one group as "natural" or deserved, while presenting the challenges faced by another group as a result of individual failings. In this way, doxa helps solidify group unity while also reinforcing social hierarchies.

Furthermore, actors within a given field tend to share the doxa of that field determining what is considered possible or thinkable. As Bourdieu explains, “The most profitable strategies are

usually those produced, on the hither side of all calculation and in the illusion of the most ‘authentic’ sincerity, by a habitus objectively fitted to the objective structures” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 214). Actors often accept their social position without realising how arbitrary it may be, misrecognising it as essential. The habitus transforms what seems like necessity into virtue by shaping "choices" that align with the conditions from which it arose (Bourdieu, 1984). By uncovering the hidden dynamics of the habitus, Bourdieu suggests that this process functions like a "socio-analysis" a form of political therapy that helps individuals better understand their position within the social order.

Wacquant's essay "Critical Thought as Solvent of Doxa" (2004) explores the role and current state of critical thought in society, drawing on both Kantian and Marxian traditions of critique. Wacquant argues that critical thought functions best when it integrates epistemological inquiry with a social critique of the structures of power and domination. This dual critique challenges both established knowledge systems and the social realities they support, aiming to expose and dismantle prevailing ideologies and practices, which he refers to as doxa (common sense). He outlines that critical thought is both strong and weak at the same time. It is strong in terms of the intellectual and empirical tools available today to understand the social world, citing the work of influential thinkers like Foucault, Bourdieu, and feminist scholars. These thinkers have contributed to a fertile environment for critical inquiry across various fields such as anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. However, critical thought is weak because it is often confined to academia, detached from real-world change, and overshadowed by dominant neoliberal ideologies. Furthermore, many intellectuals and researchers today are pressured by market forces and political agendas that limit the scope and impact of critical thought. Wacquant identifies several forms of "false" or diluted critical thought that hinder progress. In the United States, he critiques "policy research" as a form of technocratic thinking that sanitises critical inquiry to fit political agendas. In Europe, he points to "sociological journalism," where academics with limited expertise contribute to public debates without addressing the structural issues that give rise to social problems. The most significant threat, however, comes from neoliberal think tanks and institutions that produce pseudo-science to legitimise market-driven policies and global capitalism, often under the guise of progressivism. Despite these challenges, Wacquant argues that the mission of critical thought is as urgent as ever. Its primary role is to resist the forces of global capitalism, which threaten to commodify all aspects of life, including culture and knowledge. Critical thought must continue to expose the contradictions of neoliberal

discourse, unmask the ideological underpinnings of social and economic policies, and advocate for alternatives. He echoes Marx's call for a "ruthless critique of everything existing,[7]" emphasising that critical thought must actively question the assumptions that govern social and political life, in order to reimagine and transform the world. In conclusion, Wacquant calls for a revitalization of critical thought, not just within academia but as a broader cultural and political project aimed at dismantling the dominant ideologies that perpetuate inequality and exploitation in the neoliberal era.

At the core of Pierre Bourdieu's early sociology is the idea of the habitus, which refers to the deep-set patterns of thought, behaviour, and taste that are shaped by the culture and social environment we grow up in. This habitus is a kind of "cultural common sense"—it influences how we act and see the world, but we don't usually think about it consciously. It helps guide our actions and interactions with others, even though it doesn't completely control us. Nationalist movements can be seen as a reaction to the pressures and insecurities caused by globalisation. Some argue that these movements reflect a longing for community, a desire for resistance, or an effort to reclaim national identity in a world that feels increasingly fragmented. Some people feel a need to return to close-knit, community-based groups in response to the global changes brought on by postmodern globalisation (Bauman, 1992). This is a way of seeking security and belonging in a time when the world is increasingly interconnected. Others see these movements as a response to exclusion in the modern digital world. People who feel left out of the fast-moving, tech-driven "information age" may look to their cultural or national identity as a way of resisting this exclusion (Castells, 1997). Some argue that the rise of nationalism is a response to the disorienting effects of globalisation (Beck, 2000). This includes feelings of insecurity brought about by the changes in society, which may be called "denationalisation shock". In a world where borders and identities seem to be constantly shifting, people sometimes seek to reaffirm their national or cultural identity to maintain stability and clarity. The "risk society" (Beck, 1992) refers to how modern global risks (like economic uncertainty, environmental threats, and political instability) make people feel vulnerable. In response, many turn to strong national or ethnic identities as a way of coping with these risks. This has led to a reassertion of national and ethnic identities, which

[7] "But, if constructing the future and settling everything for all times are not our affair, it is all the more clear what we have to accomplish at present: I am referring to *ruthless criticism* of all that exists, ruthless both in the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict with the powers that be." Karl Marx to Arnold Ruge, Kreuznach, September 1843, Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher 1844.

challenges earlier theories that suggested we were moving toward a more unified, global future. Karner (2005), utilises the term doxa to analyse the construction and contestation of Austrian national identities. It argues, in Bourdieu-ian fashion, that successive crises since the mid-1980s have transformed a previously non-reflexive habitus/doxa—the taken-for-granted (though not ideologically homogeneous) "cultural universe of the undiscussed"—into a contested "universe of discourse" previously "banal" and now consciously negotiated national identities.

Billig (1995), introduced the idea of "banal nationalism" (Bilig, 1995) to explain how national identity is not just something people express in big, obvious ways, like in political rallies (which he calls "hot" nationalism), but also in everyday, subtle actions that we don't really think about. For example, things like saying "we" or "us" when talking about a country, or seeing flags displayed in public places, are forms of "cold" nationalism. Billig argues that this everyday, routine nationalism is really important because it keeps national identities alive and helps people feel a sense of belonging to their country without actively thinking about it. In a field's doxa, "what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying: the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167). Edensor (2002), builds on Billig's idea by looking at how national identity shows up in everyday life through rituals, national symbols, and even things like the products we use (like cars) (Edensor, 2002). He studies how these "cold" forms of national identity connect with the more obvious, "hot" nationalism, especially in places like Austria. He uses ideas from Pierre Bourdieu to explain this relationship. McCrone describes how ethnicity can be understood as the "politicisation of culture." This means that ethnic identity becomes something that people actively define and defend, often in political terms. He argues that since the end of the Cold War, many people have begun to change how they view their cultural and ethnic identities, which is evident in the rise of ethnic conflicts and debates about multiculturalism (McCrone, 1998). This "process of ideologization" turns everyday cultural practices into a tool for political action and group identity (Karner, 2005). In a negative light these cultural codings can be utilised as legitimation of lack of accountability within the governing and control systems.

Bourdieu's relational sociology and field-mapping methodology, informed by the concepts of field (social space), habitus, capital, doxa, and strategy (Bourdieu, 1988). This framework helps to examine architecture discipline as a field (a spatial social space) and how it is

organised by the mediating role of capital, strategy, and doxa. Architectural practice in Turkey is highly influenced with the doxa (ingrained ideas) around Turkish society and construction system and within the field of architecture. This thesis uses the concept of doxa to explain accepted prejudices or assumptions within society. The widely accepted characteristics of a society can contribute to the construction and politicisation of national and cultural identities. However, they can also serve as a method for legitimising and normalising actions that may not actually exist or could be politically exploited. Therefore, it is crucial to question what is accepted as "truth" and avoid producing academic research based solely on these unchallenged assumptions. In processes like post-disaster reconstruction, where decisions impact society and the economy, decisions should be grounded in scientific reasoning rather than being shaped by the doxas surrounding a society's supposed characteristics.

2.3. Urbanisation and Disaster Management in Turkey

The relationship between the state and the construction industry in Turkey is shaped by the historical and cultural context of Turkish urbanism. Bozdoğan and Akcan (2012) have explored how modern architectural practices in Turkey have often been closely aligned with the state's broader goals of modernisation and control. This alignment has resulted in the architecture profession being frequently complicit in the state's efforts to reshape urban spaces according to its political and economic objectives. They offer a nuanced view of how architecture has been shaped by and, in turn, has shaped Turkey's social, political, and cultural landscapes from the early 20th century to the present day (Batuman, 2014). They focus on how architectural practices in Turkey reflect broader issues of governance, modernization, and power. They argue that architecture in Turkey is not merely a reflection of aesthetic values but is deeply intertwined with the country's political ideologies and social transformations. For instance, the authors discuss how the architecture of the early Republican period was used as a tool for nation-building, often reflecting the state's desire to modernise and secularise the country. This period saw the construction of numerous public buildings designed to embody the values of the new Turkish Republic. Their work underscores the idea that accountability in architecture goes beyond technical and aesthetic considerations; it involves a critical understanding of how buildings and urban spaces influence and are influenced by the political and social context in which they exist.

Right after World War II, Turkey transitioned to a multi-party system, and from 1950 onwards, development became one of the key themes in the political discourse of the ruling elite. The first significant wave of migration from rural to urban areas occurred due to mechanisation in agriculture during the 1950s, which led to the beginning of slum settlements and apartment buildings in Turkey between 1950 and 1960. The period from 1960 to 1980 was marked by planned development, with urbanisation issues being addressed in the development plans, primarily focusing on housing, regional development, rural settlements, and environmental problems. During this period, the need for cheap labour was met by tolerating informal housing markets, where the housing demand was addressed through slum settlements. The residents of these slum areas not only served as a voting base for central and local governments but also helped integrate migrants into urban life, contributing to continuous consumption and the reproduction of labour, ultimately boosting economic activity.

The 1960s witnessed a rapid increase in the urban population living in slums. Urbanisation was utilised as a driving force for the economy and as a tool for development (Bölükbaşı, 2024). As seen, the urbanisation during this period, primarily in the form of slums and apartment buildings, occurred without proper control, aligning with the development vision and strategy of the time (Adam, 1979; Tekeli et.al., 2020). In other words, unplanned and illegal settlement and housing acquisition practices continued to be tolerated. As a solution to the social divide between slums and middle-class housing close to city centres, it was aimed to build "people's housing" or "social housing" and offer them to the public at low rents. On the other hand, those who wanted to build their homes were provided with land, loans, and materials. It was also decided to improve the conditions of existing slums, fulfilling the statement in the 1961 Constitution that "the state takes measures to meet the housing needs of poor or low-income families under suitable health conditions". In 1966, the Slum Law No. 775, introducing three distinct provisions for addressing slums. These provisions categorised slum areas for improvement, liquidation, and renovation (Resmi Gazete, 1966). Following this legislative action, efforts were concentrated on identifying slum areas and establishing slum prevention zones (Tekeli, 1998; Şenyapılı, 1998, as cited in Bektaş, 2021). It can be seen as Turkey's first law on urban transformation. The law assigns responsibilities to the Housing Development Administration, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and municipalities. The law covers a range of activities, including research and projects aimed at

improving, liquidating, and renovating slum areas, as well as housing and land development. It also extends to state-owned land and areas under government jurisdiction, including those designated by the President, even if they lie outside municipal boundaries. However, the law, introduced during a time of rapid urban migration and concerns over squatting, has become outdated due to changes in Turkey's social landscape. Originally based on the principles of improvement, liquidation, and renovation, the law's focus has shifted over time, with prevention now becoming the dominant approach in practice. Due to the rapid pace of urbanisation, the construction of new housing and the demolition of existing ones as planned during this period did not take place.

The Condominium Law No. 634 (Resmi Gazete, 1965), introduced during this period, made it easier for middle-class civil servants and workers to become homeowners, leading to the emergence of contractors who made a living by building and selling apartments. Alongside this, cooperative-based housing, especially apartment construction activities accelerated. These houses, produced with low-quality workmanship and materials, lacking architectural concerns, and aimed at quickly meeting the housing needs of these groups, laid the groundwork for an unhealthy building stock. The unspoken acceptance was the toleration of irregular and distorted development to benefit from the economic driving force of urbanisation.

Alongside the recurring oil crises in 1973-74-79 and 1980 the expansion of petrodollar capital due to rising oil prices, coupled with low-interest credit opportunities, increased construction investments and accelerated the shift from slum settlements to apartment buildings. The political instability caused by the successive resignations of coalition governments in the 1970s served populist election policies. In 1977, as another election policy, it was decreed that demolition orders would not be enforced for structures identified as built before March 1976 under the Slum Law No. 775. This regulation was the first of its kind that could be considered a zoning/slum amnesty. The growth of an uncontrolled informal housing sector resulted in the accumulation of an extremely low-quality building stock, which later led to significant losses in subsequent earthquakes.

From 1980 onwards, Turkey transitioned to a neoliberal political and economic style. National goals and policies began to be shaped according to the requirements of international capital in the context of globalisation (Bektaş, 2021). Neoliberalism, which applies the logic

of the free market to every aspect of economic, political, and social life, also manifested itself in urbanisation policies, abandoning the national developmentalist vision. From the 1980s onwards, urbanisation policies began to be calculated based on profitability and efficiency and evaluated for their compliance with technical and economic requirements. From this turning point onwards, intervening in and criticising urbanisation policies was no longer seen as a political choice but rather as an attitude contrary to the nature of the matter. The notion that architects would only be implementers of urbanisation projects, and this becoming a professional style, was internalised starting from this period.

TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey) established in 1984, TOKİ (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı) was initially focused on providing affordable housing. New laws granted TOKİ the powers to provide mass housing loans, build mass housing in disaster areas, carry out mass housing projects in slum transformation areas, undertake luxury housing projects, establish companies operating in the housing sector, or partner with financial institutions. Through these legal regulations, TOKİ was endowed with broad privileged planning powers, enabling it to operate like an economic entity in areas such as construction and real estate sector financing. TOKİ is responsible for constructing permanent housing for disaster victims and has been a central figure in rebuilding efforts following major earthquakes. The constructed houses have been distributed by lot; hence the beneficiaries were relocated into new zones, mainly on the peripheries of the city (Özdoğan et.al., 2024).

In Turkey, the wave of migration from rural to urban areas increased exponentially starting from 1980. As an indicator of this, the rural and urban populations became equal in the mid-1980s. During this process, large capital groups focused on major cities, particularly in Istanbul. Additionally, predominantly foreign capital groups invested in urban transformation projects, particularly in tourism regions, leading urban transformation activities. In this process, the demands of capital became more decisive in urban spatial planning than the power of local and central institutions (Şengül, 2009).

The zoning amnesty regulations, which became routine in the 1980s, were applied as one of the routine symptoms of the neoliberal political style. Started with the Zoning Amnesty Law No. 2981, enacted in 1984 (Resmi Gazete, 1984) zoning amnesty laws enacted successively from 1983 onwards, slums were legalised and encouraged over time. The classification, identification, and evaluation authority regarding whether slums would be demolished or not

was transferred to municipalities and governorships. 20 building amnesties, with the most recent one in 2018 often legalised structures that did not comply with building codes (Erensu, 2024). This caused not inspected buildings to threaten the safety and resilience of the built environment. Although there is no official data on the number of buildings destroyed in the recent earthquakes, the connection between these amnesties and the scale of the destruction is a critical issue that requires further investigation. As stated in the 2018 TMMOB Building Amnesty Report, “An illegal structure is, simply put, a building that lacks safety, has not undergone planning, architectural, or engineering processes, and whose technical health and safety conditions are uncertain” (TMMOB İmar Affı Raporu, 2018).

During the 1990s municipalities were expected to designate certain areas as housing plots and provide infrastructure there. Thus, the "Help Program for Those Building Their Own Homes" was developed to prevent slum settlements, and municipalities were tasked with preparing housing projects (Bölükbaşı, 2024). It was also decided to use the Mass Housing Fund for these purposes and to increase the share of fund credits. These efforts aimed to prevent the growth of land mafias and informal markets in major cities. The Customs Union Agreement, signed with the European Union in December 1995 and entered into force in January 1996, highlighted policy proposals related to city centres, especially in major cities such as Istanbul, from the perspective of EU harmonisation (Bölükbaşı, 2024). It was aimed to create satellite cities around city centres by making these cities multi-centered.

In the 2000s, topics such as EU harmonisation, disaster management, urban transformation, and the renewal of the housing stock came to the forefront in Turkey. Since the 2000s, the urban transformation process in Turkey has taken on a different dimension. The neoliberal institutionalisation that began in the 1980s paved the way for the state to redefine its existence and functions in the 2000s without being accountable. As a result, the growth and transformation process in Turkish cities was not managed with a planned development approach and predictions aimed at meeting the needs of society but rather focused on capital accumulation, i.e., the reproduction of capital.

After 1980, the focus in Turkey shifted toward sectors like trade, tourism, and services, driven by urbanisation and consumption. While industrial production continued, it slowed down, and more investments went into consumption-based sectors. This shift did not lead to full deindustrialization, as seen in Western countries, but it changed Turkey’s economy to

one focused on urban growth and consumption. The change in capital accumulation in the 2000s is evident in the construction sector. After rapid growth in 1980s, the sector peaked in its contribution to the national economy and number of buildings built during 2002-2007. Although the global financial crisis in 2008 caused a temporary slowdown, the sector resumed growth in 2009, with more buildings being constructed.

2.2.1. Urbanisation under the AKP Regime

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 and adopted a neoliberal political style ever since. The urbanisation process under the AKP regime has created a new urban characteristic with economic policy focused on privatisation, construction and land (Adaman et al., 2017; Batuman, 2017). This new urban structure has led to the emergence of a new urban elite, which can be observed not only in large cities but also in rapidly growing smaller cities. These elites influence both the economic framework and urbanisation processes, simultaneously transforming the social and spatial fabric of cities. Disaster risk, -especially after 1999 Marmara earthquake, 2011 Van earthquake and 2023 Kahramanmaraş and Hatay earthquakes- post-disaster reconstruction and 'pre-disaster urbanisation' were used as tools to quickly validate government agendas on urban decisions.

Bora (2017) argues that the AKP's approach differs from traditional corporatist-statist Islamic parties. It focuses on a civil society-oriented perspective that aligns with neoliberal ideology, aiming to reduce the state's role and empower civil society. Between 2002 and 2010, the government pursued liberalisation policies that reflected this ideology. The success of marketization and privatisations during this period was also supported by financial reforms under IMF guidance after the 2001 economic crisis. This period saw the rise of a new elite in areas like media and academia, challenging the old establishment. However, this shift was not entirely organic. It was supported by direct state interventions, which helped build a new capital class. Media organisations, influenced by state control over the media landscape, became fully aligned with the government's policies. This strategy also aimed to create a new class of major capital. While the government's approach expanded its support base and

claimed to be liberal, it faced criticism from liberal commentators for its manipulative and interventionist tactics, particularly in how it reshaped the tender system.

In capitalist urbanisation, space is a key factor in sustaining capitalism, as it relies on the reproduction of space in cities (Lefebvre, 2019). Capitalism must urbanise to reproduce itself (Harvey, 1976), with the state playing an active role in investments that support both capital and labour through profit-driven urban projects, including residential areas, shopping malls, and infrastructure. In 2003 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism granted the authority to prepare plans in regions declared as tourism centres. The 2004 amendments to the Industrial Zones Law granted the Ministry of Industry and Trade (known as the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology after 2018) the authority to develop the built environment and prepare plans in industrial zones. During this process, while significant portions of urban planning authority were transferred to central government institutions, at the same time, privileged powers were granted to metropolitan municipalities regarding urban transformation. With the amendment to the Municipal Law No. 5393, metropolitan municipalities were given the authority to declare any area within their municipal boundaries as an urban transformation area (Resmi Gazete, 2005). All these regulations explain the state's strong involvement in the capital accumulation process, i.e., the production of the built environment, in Turkey in the 2000s. In practice, it was observed that TOKİ, which was continuously supported by state-backed housing loans marketed with public support, was actively involved in the production of shopping malls and luxury housing, while there was intense interest from investors in urban transformation projects, and public lands were allocated and sold to the private sector for the construction of luxury hotels and consumption complexes.

Housing has become the dominant sector, and real estate has transformed into a key investment tool (Çelik, 2021). Despite homelessness, an economic crisis, rising rents, and an ongoing housing shortage, new housing developments have continued extensively. Currently, there is both a significant housing shortage and a surplus of properties. The state continues to produce housing through TOKİ for purchase as part of social housing initiatives. Rental housing, however, remains limited, with few options available for affordable leases. The emphasis on homeownership through state-backed projects, rather than on rental solutions, has contributed to a market imbalance where housing is often unattainable for lower-income

groups. Consequently, the gap between available housing and actual accessibility continues to widen, exacerbating the housing crisis despite ongoing construction efforts.

In Turkey's last 20-year process of capitalist urbanisation, while the state has positioned itself in a role that determines and supports the production of the built environment, it has also attempted to establish new forms of intervention in urban space. Through large-scale urban projects, the freedom to consume and the liberation through consumption, as well as a safe life within secure gated communities, have been promoted as a way of life, i.e., an individualised lifestyle has been sought to dominate society. This process increases the living costs of low-income groups and causes their displacement from the places where they live (Swyngedouw et.al., 2002).

Since the 2000s, the government has prioritized economic growth through a construction-driven agenda, centralizing authority within the state while frequently disregarding environmental sustainability and social equity. Under the AKP regime, sectors like construction and energy have been pivotal in shaping this growth strategy, often benefiting elite interests at the expense of broader societal and environmental concerns. Mega-projects and expansive energy developments have not only consolidated political power but also reinforced inequitable resource allocation and urban transformation (Adaman et al., 2017; Muhcu, 2020). As a result, the increase in built environment production and the growth in the construction sector in Turkey during the AKP government have become a part of the capital accumulation regime. Gourain (2024) discusses the urban transformation as the main resource of the Turkish economy, such as merging parcels, addition of several floors and real estate speculation. These suspicions of real estate speculation after the disaster made groups hesitate to engage with reconstruction activities. Within the complex urbanisation conjuncture in Turkey in the last 20 years architecture is almost viewed as the agent of this profit oriented financial structure.

The construction sector in Turkey has long been enmeshed with issues of accountability, which are deeply rooted in the country's legal and bureaucratic frameworks. These frameworks have historically favoured rapid urbanisation and economic growth, often at the expense of regulatory oversight and public safety. The shift towards neoliberal policies in the late 20th century, particularly under the AKP government, has further exacerbated these issues. According to Buğra and Savaşkan (2021), the confluence of politics, religion, and

business interests has led to the construction sector becoming a central pillar of Turkey's economic strategy. This entanglement has fostered an environment where accountability is frequently overshadowed by the pursuit of profit and political gain. Tansel (2018) describes this as a form of authoritarian neoliberalism, where the consolidation of state power undermines regulatory frameworks, leading to a construction system that is structurally predisposed to unaccountability.

One of the key factors contributing to this lack of accountability is the weakening of regulatory bodies and professional organisations that are tasked with enforcing standards within the construction sector. Law No. 4708 (Resmi Gazete, 2001) known as the Construction Inspection Law, enforcing inspection throughout the construction process creates vulnerabilities in disaster prone areas and establishes authority to private inspection firms to oversee construction processes. Scholars suggest this law promotes financial gains of private companies by prioritising their interests, rather than considering the public's welfare under state regulation (Tercan, 2018; TMMOB, 2018). Professional bodies, such as the Chamber of Architects, Urban Planners and Engineers, have seen their influence significantly diminished due to political interference and the broader neoliberal agenda. This weakening is part of a larger trend where market-driven growth is prioritised over public safety and welfare, leaving these organisations with limited power to hold the industry accountable. The regulatory frameworks in Turkey are often subject to capture by private interests, which exert considerable influence over public policy (Adaman et.al., 2017). This regulatory capture results in a construction sector where oversight is superficial at best, and accountability is severely compromised.

Urban transformation

The implications of this unaccountability are particularly evident in urban transformation projects across Turkey. State-led property transformations and urban renewal initiatives have often prioritised the interests of private developers over those of local communities (Karaman, 2013; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010). These projects, driven by the state's desire to stimulate economic growth through construction, typically lack transparency and meaningful public consultation. The result is the displacement of vulnerable populations and the destruction of established communities, all while enriching a select group of developers and political elites. These projects frequently lead to environmental degradation and social fragmentation, with little regard for the long-term sustainability of urban environments

(Ercan & Dinçer, 2015). The state's role in promoting these projects, often under the guise of economic development, has further entrenched the culture of unaccountability within the construction sector.

In conclusion, unaccountability within the Turkish construction system is a product of a complex interplay between political, economic, and cultural factors. The weakening of regulatory bodies, the erosion of professional autonomy, and the prioritisation of market-driven growth over public welfare have all contributed to a construction sector that is rife with unaccountable practices. The works of scholars provide a critical lens through which to understand these dynamics, highlighting the need for a profound rethinking of the legal and bureaucratic frameworks that govern urbanisation and construction in Turkey. Addressing these issues will require not only stronger regulations and oversight but also a shift towards a more inclusive and participatory approach to urban planning and development, where the voices of architects and local communities are given greater weight and consideration.

2.3.2. Disaster Management in Turkey

The way governments respond to disasters can reveal much about their priorities. For instance, a government might prioritise the protection of business interests and the economy over the needs of vulnerable populations (Peck, 2010). Understanding the damage caused by the 2023 February 2023 earthquakes requires a comprehensive review of urbanisation decisions and the history of disaster management in Turkey. The three most devastating earthquakes were the 2023 Kahramanmaraş Earthquake, the 1939 Erzincan Earthquake, and the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, which was centred in Gölcük (Turkish Presidency Strategy and Budget Presidency, 2023).



Figure 2.10: Earthquake Danger Map of Turkey (Source: AFAD, 2018)

The Erzincan earthquake that occurred on December 27, 1939 had a devastating effect on 11 provinces of Anatolia and the biggest loss was experienced by Erzincan, which was the epicentre. As a result of the earthquake that caused great loss of life and property, 32,968 people lost their lives and 116,720 buildings were destroyed. The legal infrastructure was developed after the Erzincan earthquake. Due to the scale of the destruction, quantitative data and definite data on migration within the country could be obtained. The settlement of a large number of earthquake victims in various places accelerated the construction and construction process of the new city to be established in Erzincan. The transfer of a large number of earthquake victims to other provinces allowed for easier construction work in the city. After the completion of the construction process, some of the people who migrated to other provinces returned to their hometowns and some continued their lives in the places they migrated to.

Four segments of the North Anatolian fault broke off at 3:02 a.m. on August 17, 1999, close to the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmara in Turkey, close to the centre of Istanbul. Over 20,000 people died because of the 7.4-magnitude earthquake, including at least 1,000 in Istanbul; hundreds of thousands were injured and lost their homes; and billions of dollars were damaged in Turkey's industrial centre. Recovery solutions and legal framework after the 1999 Marmara earthquake were not successful in solving the more deep-rooted problems of post disaster management such as; permanent housing and bringing corrupt constructors and

government officials to justice (Jalali, 2002). After the 1999 Marmara earthquake Şentek (1999) highlighted a critical issue regarding the role of architects in disaster management. He notes that architects have increasingly distanced themselves from comprehensive responsibilities in the construction process, often limiting their role to design and certification (Şentek, 1999). This shift raises concerns about whether the architects' role in disaster reconstruction has evolved sufficiently to address the complexities of modern disaster scenarios, or if it remains constrained by outdated practices and regulations. In response to the Marmara earthquake, the Turkish government initiated several reforms aimed at disaster preparedness and response.

According to a study by Limoncu and Bayülgen that categorised post-disaster shelter problems in Turkey and analysed earthquakes from the 1966 Muş Earthquake to the 1999 Marmara Earthquake there has not been much progress made in addressing administrative issues and infrastructure problems, like inadequate preparation and organisational deficiencies (Limoncu & Bayülgen, 2005). In addition, when choosing temporary housing units, the long-term effects have not been taken into consideration, which has made it extremely difficult to provide appropriate sheltering facilities based on climatic circumstances following each earthquake (Torus & Şener, 2015).

The political conjuncture after the 1999 Marmara earthquake and the everlasting social binary in Turkey's social structure led to a change in government. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002. The AKP government changed the role of the state in Turkey as previously discussed (Adaman et al., 2017). Disaster management in Turkey has been highly centralised through ministries and AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency established in 2009) which is the only authority responsible for preventing disasters, minimising their damages, coordinating the response and reconstruction. The disasters surpassing the capacity of district level is organised through his top-down system. Central and local governments do not have shared responsibilities during disaster management. Regulations do not give administrative roles to municipalities, NGOs, professional chambers or citizens. This centralisation is legitimised by the insufficient control of contractors and the built environment. AFAD's central role in coordinating disaster management in Turkey illustrates ongoing challenges and shortcomings in Turkey's disaster management system, particularly regarding the implementation of zoning regulations and the need for stricter enforcement to mitigate disaster risks. AFAD is responsible for coordinating

all aspects of disaster response, including search and rescue, emergency relief, and post-disaster recovery. During the 2023 Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, AFAD played a crucial role in organising rescue operations, distributing aid, and collaborating with other governmental bodies like TOKİ to begin the reconstruction process. Emlak Konut (Emlak Konut GYO A.Ş.), established in 1953, is a major real estate investment trust in Turkey, collaborates with other governmental bodies to plan and develop new housing areas, often taking part in the reconstruction of urban infrastructure and residential buildings.

Law No. 6306 (2012), enacted after the 2011 Van earthquake, empowered the state to intervene in urban transformation areas, enabling the designation of such zones and expediting construction without master plans, which sparked worries about transparency and accountability (Resmi Gazete, 2012a). A presidential decree on February 24, 2023, called Presidential Decree No. 126 on Settlement and Construction within the Scope of State of Emergency, granted the Ministry of Environment, Urbanism, and Climate Change extensive authority to lead the process, bypassing existing laws and regulations (Resmi Gazete, 2023a). This included using forest and agricultural lands for reconstruction and beginning construction without detailed plans. However, this approach overlooked stakeholder participation and thorough needs assessment faced criticism for potentially exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities from environmental, social, and economic perspectives (TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2023; TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası, 2023b). Most recently, Law No. 7452 was introduced in response to the February 2023 earthquakes, further centralising state control over settlement and construction in disaster-stricken regions (Resmi Gazete, 2023b).

Madden (2021), introduces the concept of "disaster urbanisation", describing how disasters reveal the social and political vulnerabilities embedded in urban society. Drawing on Butler's notion of precarity, Madden explains that these vulnerabilities become especially visible before, during, and after a disaster, with marginalised groups disproportionately affected by displacement and disposability. Disasters often leave behind vacant urban land, abandoned by former residents due to ongoing risks. This land becomes prime for reconstruction, perpetuating a cycle where disaster risks are used as justification for urban redevelopment. In this cycle, the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups are further exacerbated by the opportunities for profit-driven redevelopment, which prioritise urban renewal over addressing the root causes of vulnerability. This creates a cycle where disaster risks are utilised as justification for urban redevelopment, which in turn leads to the potential for both disaster

and renewal. Batuman (2024) examines disaster urbanisation in Turkey following the 2023 earthquakes, focusing on how the country's urbanisation policies have intensified vulnerabilities. He argues that resilient cities cannot be built without first addressing the factors that make Turkish cities particularly vulnerable to disasters. From a vulnerability-centred perspective, he critiques the urbanisation practices of the 20th century, which prioritised rapid growth over safety and resilience. He highlights how poor regulatory oversight, speculative development, and a focus on development at all costs have left cities ill-prepared for natural disasters like earthquakes. Specific policies, such as zoning amnesties, urban transformation projects, plan revisions, and weak environmental impact assessments, have contributed to weakened urban infrastructure, increasing the risks associated with disasters. He critiques the prioritisation of rapid growth over resilience, highlighting how poor regulatory oversight and speculative development have left cities ill-prepared for natural disasters. He highlights the need to reframe urbanisation policies to address these systemic vulnerabilities and build truly resilient cities.

CHAPTER 3

ARCHITECTS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ANTAKYA'S AFTER 2023 FEBRUARY EARTHQUAKES

3.1. Antakya Pre- and Post-Disaster: Contextual Framework

Antakya's reconstruction post-disaster is not merely a matter of rebuilding structures but an intricate process involving multiple stakeholders and complex systems. The city's history, marked by previous disasters and rich urban memory, sets the stage for understanding the current reconstruction efforts. This section delves into the timeline of recovery, from immediate relief measures to the establishment of permanent housing.

Ancient Antiokheia (Antakya) was founded around 300 B.C. on the Habib Neccar Mountain under Seleucus I Nicator, a successor to Alexander the Great[8]. It became the capital of the Seleucid Empire, which stretched from Macedonia to nearly India. The city thrived as a key stop on the Silk Road, bringing wealth and luxury, visible today in Daphne (Harbiye). Under Roman rule, Antioch-ad-Orontes became the capital of Syria, with a population of around 500,000 (Kloeg, 2013). It was one of the empire's greatest cities, only surpassed by Rome and Alexandria. The city had a significant Jewish community. Saint Peter preached here, and Saints Paul and Barnabas used it as a base for their missionary work. It was in Antioch that the term "Christians" was first used. The city flourished under the Byzantines until a massive earthquake in the 500s killed 200,000 people (Kubin et.al, 2024). It was later conquered by Persians, Arabs, and Seljuk Turks. The Crusaders regained it in 1098, making it the capital of the Principality of Antioch (Downey, 1961). However, the Mamelukes destroyed the city in 1268. By the time the Ottomans took control in 1516, it had declined to a village. After World War I, it became part of Ottoman Syria under French Mandate. In 1938, a plebiscite

[8] The main source regarding the ancient history of Antakya depends on the writings of John Malalas, who described events eight years after them happening. For further readings on Antakya's ancient history Müller, 1938; Downey, 1961.

returned the area, including Antakya, to Turkey, now part of Hatay province (Aslan & Selçuk, 2014). Hatay is known for its natural beauty, rich cuisine, and diverse cultural influences. Today, Antakya is called the "Melting Pot of Civilisations."

Figure 3.1: Map of Hatay and Antakya (Souce: by the Author)

Hatay is a fairly modern name of the province, since the region became a part of Turkish Republic in 1939. Hatay became a Metropolitan Municipality in 2012 (Resmi Gazete, 2012b). Antakya is the city centre of Hatay. Hence Antakya is both the ancient name of the city and also locals mostly call the city by the same name. Antakya's urban development has been significantly influenced by two key geographical features: the Habib-i Neccar Mountain to the east and the Asi River, which runs through the city (Figure 3.2 and 3.3). These natural landmarks have shaped the historical growth and urban layout of the region.



Figure 3.2: Geomorphology Map of Hatay (Source: Korkmaz & Karataş, 2013)

Figure 3.3: Thresholds defining Antakya (Reproduced by the author with reference to Tezer, 2019)

The centre of Antakya is divided into two distinct urban areas by the Asi River. The main connection of the two areas is through Ata Bridge (previously the historic Roman bridge): Old Antakya: Located between the Asi River and Habib-i Neccar Mountain, this area is characterised by its historical fabric (Demir, 2016). New Antakya: Situated west of the Asi River, this section of the city was developed under French colonial rule (1918-1938) with a radial plan. During the French Mandate, under the administration of Danger in 1932, a development plan was created, outlining the existing settlement areas, garden spaces, the Asi River, and Habib-i Neccar Mountain (Tezer, 2019). This plan laid the foundation for New Antakya's urban structure, which included the creation of radial road networks and public buildings along the western bank of the Asi River. It has since evolved into a densely built commercial and residential hub. Over time, as the city expanded, this area became the central public gathering space in Antakya.

3.1.1. Historical Overview of Antakya’s Urban Planning and Disasters

Antakya is famously rebuilt 7 times in its history (Soysal et al., 1980; Pınar Erdem & Lahn, 2001). The oldest recorded earthquake in Antakya was in 148 B.C. (Aslan, 2000) following which the destroyed city was reconstructed by Antiokhos IV. Emperor Traia. The earthquake that occurred in 115 destroyed a significant part of Antakya and caused a great disaster. September 458 Antakya Earthquake: It is stated that approximately 80,000 people died. Recorded by the chronic Ihoannes Malalas as follows: “On 528 the earthquake disaster caused approximately 250,000 people to die”. After this earthquake, the city’s name was changed to “Theoupolis” meaning “the God’s city”, in other words people seeked refuge in God’s protection. The 581 event totally destroyed the nearby settlement of Daphne and six years later, another disaster struck Antiokheia and approximately 60.000 inhabitants were killed in the 587 earthquake. After the 6th century, for up to the mid 18th century however, earthquakes resulted in fewer casualties and lesser metarial damage (Tekin, 2002). The earthquake occurred in 1822 caused damage not just in Antiokheia, but in the whole region, resulting in tsunami and 20.000 casualties. The most destructive of these earthquakes definitely was the 1872 Amik Lake earthquake, destruction of half of the Antiokheia city. While there were 3000 houses in total in the city, 1960 houses were destroyed in the earthquake. The last earthquake in Antiokheia prior to the 20th Century was in 1894.

The geomorphological structure of a region significantly influences the choice of settlement areas for cities. Unplanned urbanisation often occurs when cities are developed without considering this structure. However, major cities were often built on soft soil near rivers or plains due to their agricultural value and ease of settlement. Antakya is a prime example of this. The city is located on a water-saturated alluvial layer, which is weak and has limited load-bearing capacity (Ovalı, 2010). This weak soil contributes to the high level of damage to buildings during earthquakes. In the centre of the city the eastern side of the Asi River, (New Antakya), has the weakest soil conditions, where seismic effects are most severe. Conversely, the bedrock horst areas west of the Asi River and the eastern slopes of Habib-i Neccar Mountain consist of more stable, solid soils, where the earthquake impact was notably less intense. One of the key reasons for the catastrophic impact of the earthquake in Antakya is the conversion of the reclaimed agricultural lands of the Amik Plain into urban areas and soil liquefaction. Tracing the city's development reveals that the area underwent a transformation: the Faust Line fault created a graben that filled with water, eventually forming a lake. This lake was later drained, with the reclaimed land used for agriculture before being opened for urban construction. In such a seismically active area, where the soil is prone to liquefaction and intersects with fault lines, the lack of appropriate construction methods and designs has turned earthquakes into devastating disasters.

The urban problems in Antakya are deeply connected to the city's historical development and legislative changes. The first modern urban plan for Antakya was created in 1948. In 1957, a second plan at a 1/1000 scale was developed. This plan focused on the expansion of Antakya beyond the Asi River and included development toward the Reyhanlı and Harbiye regions. However, the main emphasis was on the new developments on the western side of the river, which quickly became insufficient due to the city’s growth and various amendments over time. In response to this, a new urban plan was prepared in 1978. In 1987, Gazi University completed the “Antakya Conservation Plan,” which was officially approved. The plan, alongside a regulation titled "Antakya Historical Site Conservation Implementation Plan," aimed to manage urban growth while preserving Antakya’s historical fabric (Demir, 2016).



Figure 3.4: Hatay Map of Urban Zones versus General Land Area and District Municipalities (Source: Dinç, 2022)

By the 1990s, Antakya faced increasing governance challenges, with over 20 small district municipalities encircling the city, causing administrative fragmentation. These municipalities lacked sufficient resources, resulting in poor urban management. The push for a metropolitan municipality emerged as the solution to better manage Antakya's urban problems, yet, even after its establishment, no significant improvements were made to previous urban plans. One of the major issues is the lack of a comprehensive urban plan, with zoning decisions historically influenced by local district municipalities. This piecemeal approach prevented the formation of an integrated urban vision, particularly for disaster preparedness, thereby increasing the city's vulnerability to risks like earthquakes. The 2012 Law No: 6360 Metropolitan Law (Resmi Gazete, 2012b) and its implementation following the 2014 local elections played a significant role in exacerbating these urban problems. This law merged the municipal structures, transferring planning responsibilities from district municipality to the metropolitan municipality. However, the method of combining the zoning plans created additional urban fragilities, particularly due to the lack of coordination between these local plans (Bulut & Dönmez, 2019; Dönmez & Tamer, 2021). Furthermore, the introduction of

zoning amnesties over the years worsened the situation by legitimising irregular constructions, increasing both the housing density and the seismic risk of the city. These amnesties contributed to the continued urban sprawl without proper oversight, weakening the structural integrity of the housing stock, particularly in earthquake-prone areas.

The Metropolitan Municipality Law brought another complication. By reclassifying a significant portion of Hatay's rural population as urban, it failed to acknowledge the socio-economic differences between rural and urban dwellers. Historically, rural areas have had different development needs and a distinct urbanisation process. The shrinking social, cultural, and economic differences between rural and urban areas have led to a spatial merging, making it increasingly difficult to define clear boundaries between the two. As cities expanded rapidly, administrative changes did not always align with settlement patterns, creating a mismatch between legal and physical borders. This issue, already prevalent before the law, became even more pronounced after 2012, as district municipalities that had long been integrated with Antakya were officially merged under the metropolitan umbrella, leading to further urbanisation pressures (Adıgüzel, 2014).

The large-scale urban development brought about by this legislation has also had political implications. Electoral behaviour and political strategies were influenced by these demographic shifts, as seen in districts like Defne. Politically, this district has been associated with opposition views, and the political landscape, including the drawing of district boundaries, has affected how aid and reconstruction efforts were distributed following the earthquake. For example, Defne, home to a significant portion of the opposition electorate, received less and slower post-earthquake assistance, and its reconstruction has been characterised by standardised housing solutions or, in some cases, left unresolved. The strategic delineation of district boundaries also impacted electoral outcomes, influencing both local and national political parties' engagement with voters in these areas (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2014; Adıgüzel & Karakaya, 2017). Antakya had experienced significant disruptions in its urban and social fabric due to the large influx of Syrian refugees, which began in 2011 with the open-door policy. The population became uncertain and difficult to manage, as around 3 million Syrians, both registered and unregistered, settled across Turkey, with Hatay being one of the most affected areas due to its proximity to Syria and strong social and economic ties (Güngördü & Kurtarır, 2016). This influx strained the city's infrastructure, leading to irregular urban development and heightened social tensions, particularly between the local

population and the refugee communities. The administrative restructuring under the Metropolitan Municipality Law further complicated the situation, as new districts were created, leading to perceived ethnic and political divisions.

Two years prior to the 2023 earthquakes, in 2021 AFAD and the Hatay Provincial Governor's Office worked together to develop the Provincial Risk Mitigation Plan Guide (IRAP) for the region (AFAD & T.C. Hatay Valiliği İl Afet ve Acil Durum Müdürlüğü, 2021). In the report, the risk of the seismicity of the error was emphasised and the importance of resistant urban design was discursively underlined. The Metropolitan Municipality Law, Hatay being a metropolitan municipality and having 1/5000 scale plans were offered as positive qualities contradicting to the discussed problematics.

IRAP report also laid out the vulnerabilities against disasters and preparation for mitigating risks. The report outlined potential scenarios for a severe earthquake of a magnitude between 5.5 and 7.5. The report identified vulnerabilities, including construction on liquefaction-prone alluvial soil, urban renewal efforts being carried out on a parcel-by-parcel basis, insufficient data on building stock, low uptake of mandatory earthquake insurance (DASK), presence of unlicensed buildings, lack of regulatory oversight in construction, and limited training for workers in the construction sector (AFAD & T.C. Hatay Valiliği İl Afet ve Acil Durum Müdürlüğü, 2021). Hence it projected extensive structural damage, especially to older buildings, and potential infrastructure collapse. The predictions and results of the report show that the results of the earthquake in 2023 were not an unexpected disaster, the forecasts were correct and the awareness of not being taken as the said measures should be taken. Therefore, we see how important accountability is in the case of disaster management in Turkey.

In summary, the lack of a unified urban planning approach, compounded by zoning amnesties and the hasty merging of zoning plans under the metropolitan law, has significantly contributed to Antakya's urban problems. The vulnerabilities created by irregular urbanisation were further exacerbated by political and administrative decisions, which not only increased the city's fragility but also shaped the uneven distribution of post-disaster recovery efforts. These factors collectively contributed to Antakya’s heightened risk in the face of earthquakes, as seen in the aftermath of the 2023 disaster. The effect of the earthquake was a consequence of these vulnerabilities and already established risks.

3.1.2. Overview of the Post-Disaster Process of Antakya after 6th and 20th of February Earthquakes

The February 2023 earthquakes had a devastating impact across Turkey. According to official records, the disaster resulted in 62,013 deaths; 53,537 in Turkey and 8,476 in Syria and more than 120,000 injuries across the region (Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team, 2024)[9]. The Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change conducted a damage assessment, revealing that a total of 518,009 residential units were classified as needing urgent demolition, having collapsed, or being severely damaged (SBB, 2023, p. 37). Consequently, 2,273,551 people faced immediate housing challenges in the aftermath of the earthquake (SBB, 2023, p 37). Despite advancements in building codes and regulations, significant destruction was observed even among the most recently constructed buildings after the 2000s (TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası, 2023b). This situation illustrates that seismic resilience in Turkey transcends technical considerations and necessitates a multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary dialogue. This dialogue must critically examine the regulatory framework, bureaucratic hierarchy, and the legal and political backdrop within which the construction sector operates in Turkey.

Figure 3.5: Antakya maps for 3 stages, before the earthquake, after the earthquake, after the debris removal (Source: Google (12/2022, 06/2023, 04/2024))

In Antakya, the destruction was catastrophic. The region witnessed significant casualties and extensive structural damage. 215.255 buildings classified as destroyed, urgently needing

[9] The quantitative data regarding the effects of earthquakes differs between the resources (SBB, 2023; International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation, 2023; International Medical Corps, 2023; Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team, 2024). The official numbers versus reality remain questionable to this day with numbers of missing people.

demolition, or heavily damaged, and 25.957 buildings moderately damaged[10]. The earthquakes exposed significant vulnerabilities in Antakya's infrastructure, particularly in areas that had been developed without regard for seismic risks. Historical lessons from previous earthquakes were ignored, leading to preventable damage and loss of life. The importance of temporary, safe, and high-quality housing became evident, as the slow response and poor planning left many survivors in inadequate living conditions. Poor planning and construction in seismic prone areas had a major result in both the destruction of Antakya and the results of the destruction. Amik Plain expanded after the draining of Amik Lake in 1975 (Bingöl & Meoli, 2022). Despite being at the intersection of three fault lines, the airport and a hospital were built on this plain, located at Antakya's northern entrance.

Damage assessment and removal of debris

The initial evaluation of damaged buildings was mainly organised through GEDAŞ (General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre's Disaster and Damage Assessment Unit) operating under the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre. GEDAŞ was authorised to damage assessment to provide initial data to guide reconstruction efforts through the MAKS (Spatial Address Registration System) system that integrates geographic information systems (GIS) with the national address database. Damage assessments were utilised as initial data on property rights for the reconstruction master plan. However, the lawsuits regarding the damage assessment of buildings have been still ongoing 21 months after the earthquake. Buildings which are damaged and not used at that moment have spray painted notices left by the owners, stating "Lawsuit ongoing", "Do not demolish", "Moderately damaged[11]". Removal of debris started in April and was stated 95% finished 12 months after the earthquake (AA, 2024). At the end of the 21 months, there are still places in the city where the debris removal has not been completed.

[10] Throughout the post-disaster period, the number of severely damaged, moderately damaged, and slightly damaged buildings kept changing. This was due to several reasons, including inadequacies in damage assessment, instances of bribery to alter the recorded damage status of buildings, changes in official policies regarding reconstruction, and methods for determining whether buildings should be demolished or not. Additionally, irregular practices such as citizens filing appeals to prevent or hasten the demolition of their buildings and attempting to obtain signatures from authorities through unofficial means contributed to this fluctuation.

[11] Moderately damaged means the building may be used after strengthening operation, hence this is a warning that the building cannot be demolished without permission.

Figure 3.6: Buildings with red spray paint stating they cannot be demolished (Photographed by the Author in September 2024)

After 1 year, as of February 2024, Hatay had 199 container cities with 64,317 containers (Hatay Planning Centre, 2024). Around 100.000 habitants of Antakya left the city and most without any plans of turning back in the future. City lost its economic and social grounds. Tension around reconstruction issues brought its own problems by not building the temporary housing solutions and hence damaging the city and society. 169,851 people living in emergency shelters; predominantly containers and prefabricated temporary housing units. 254,195 permanent housing units were planned and 39,446 units were contracted (Hatay Planning Centre, 2024). Documentary filmmaker İmre Azem captured the evolving situation with his documentaries: "Hatay: 17-24 Nisan 2023" and "Hatay: 1-11 Eylül 2023," and "Hatay: 5-15 Şubat 2024" which highlight the challenges faced by the region after the February earthquakes (Azem, 2023a; 2023b; 2024). Despite initial hope and resilience, the situation in Hatay has grown increasingly complex and dire (Tezer, 2023a).

Figure 3.7: Temporary Shelter Locations (Produced by the author using Google maps and Hatay Planning Centre, 2024 data.)

In the aftermath, emergency shelters like tents, which were meant to be used for the first weeks, are still in use after a year. Antakya and Hatay are home to numerous container cities, however the numbers are still not sufficient to accommodate the dislocated population. As a result of insufficient temporary housing solutions, many survivors migrated to cities like Adana, Mersin, Izmir, Ankara, and Antalya. This internal migration may have an irreversible damage on Antakya's population, since people may not return to the city after the reconstruction. Daily life in Antakya after 21 months is still lacking basic necessities. Schools, hospitals, social, and recreational spaces are lacking. Local businesses, which are mostly relocated in containers and prefabricated structures, struggle with poor working conditions and inadequate support. Only a few schools and hospitals remained operational, with most educational and healthcare services being provided in temporary structures. The entire community is in dire need of psychological rehabilitation, highlighting the depth of the ongoing crisis (Tezer 2024a). Several architectural groups offered temporary housing solutions throughout the earthquake region. One of these groups, Architecture for All Association (HIM) shared their concerns on the 15th month anniversary of the earthquake regarding the lack of innovative solutions and implementations for temporary shelters and other post-disaster needs, which they believe fall within their professional responsibility. They expressed frustration regarding the reconstruction process as, despite possessing

relevant knowledge, architects remain passive and are limited to roles defined by external authorities, which leads to a sense of hopelessness regarding future disasters. They argue that meaningful participation and future planning cannot occur if even basic social, economic, and cultural infrastructures are not adequately addressed in the present (HIM, 2024). After 21 months, there is still a need for temporary settlements. People are waiting in line for the temporary housing distribution. The infrastructure needed to support the population has not been established. The container cities are suffering from a lack of infrastructure; education and health management (TTB, 2024).

Figure 3.8: Washing machine container from a temporary housing settlement from Serinyol (Source: Author, photographed in September 2024)

Figure 3.9: Cranes on the skyline of Antakya's centre above containers
(Source: Photographed by the author in September 2024)

Figure 3.10: Prefabricated Temporary Commercial & Social Area in the City Centre
(Source: Photographed by the author in September 2024)

People are trying to continue their lives by carrying out commercial, social, gastronomic activities in temporary prefabricated market areas established mainly by different city municipalities. The city centre has shifted to the relatively less destroyed Serinyol on the northern and Defne on the southern sides of the fishbone development in Hatay. Local community of Antakya has an overwhelming need to process the loss by rebuilding the city, and sustaining daily life. It highlights the complex layers of trauma and the community's unyielding spirit. Antakya's recovery during the initial stages emphasises the essential role of the local people in this process (Tezer, 2023b). Just as Rossi's open architecture concept (Rossi, 2006) emphasises the importance of community memory and collective will in shaping the future, Antakya's identity is shaped and sustained by the will and memories of its residents, who are the true architects of the city's past, present, and future. Tezer (2024b) suggests, after 18 months since the February 2023 earthquakes, Antakya stands at a crossroads with both hopeful and bleak scenarios possible. She describes the lack of infrastructure, especially in temporary settlement areas and its effect on the local communities (Tezer, 2024c). Antakya's recovery remains incomplete and fraught with challenges. The reconstruction of Antakya as a disaster-resistant city should be through public support and community participation. Holistic planning and the construction of permanent housing should not be rushed. However, there is no time to delay improving living conditions and creating quality temporary housing for those who remain. This after 1 and a half years deepens the duality of post-disaster reconstruction efforts in Antakya. The pressure for rapid reconstruction and the need for scientific and participatory reconstruction being a long-term effort is on the core of this duality. In front of the construction activities in the city centre, there are billboards and posters with rendered images of projects and images of the governor and Erdoğan, cranes rise behind them, concrete cement manufacturing centres have been established in the city centre, 66 quarries have been opened, in other words, the city centre has been transformed into a huge construction industry.

From the first day the lack of disaster management had been the focal point of criticism by the strong civil society that embraces pluralism within and outside Antakya. Institutional and professional organisations such as professional chambers, local and external NGOs, professional architectural and urban initiatives, criticisms from intellectuals/academics. Connecting this to the motto "What makes Antakya Antakya is its people", the essence of Antakya lies not in static structures but in the enduring collective memory and the active

participation of its people. The local population, deeply connected to their land, showed a remarkable sense of belonging and determination to rebuild. In his documentary Azem (2023) captures this resilience, reflecting on the city's history of recovering from past earthquakes (Azem, 2023a).

3.1.3. Chronological Timeline and Mapping of Actors and Stakeholders of Post Disaster Reconstruction of Antakya

This section provides a snapshot of the reconstruction and construction activities in Antakya as of November 2024, based on interviews, on-site field observations, public presentations, official statements, and data from news sources. Four primary reconstruction methods are observed in Antakya[12]:

1. TTV Hatay project in the pilot area: Carrying out architectural projects advanced with the protocol made with the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in the pilot region within the reserve area with the participation of architectural teams in cooperation with TTV (Turkish Design Council), DB Architecture (Architect Bünyamin Derman) and KEYM by Emlak Konut and its affiliates.

[12] On May 15, 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change signed a protocol regarding the works to be carried out in "Risk Zones" and "Risky Structures" in Hatay Province, following the earthquake on February 6, 2023. This includes a cooperation agreement with the Turkey Design Foundation, signed on July 24, 2023, for the revision of the zoning plan for the Historical City Center of Antakya. 1/5000-scale Protection-Oriented Master Plan and a 1/1000-scale Protection-Oriented Implementation Plan for the Antakya Historical City Center were approved. These plans were initially announced on June 11, 2024, for public display. Additionally, a proposal for the revision of the master and implementation plans for the Historical City Center of Antakya, covering an area of approximately 307 hectares, has been approved in line with the provisions of the 6306 Law on Risky Areas, following the publication of a presidential decree on April 5, 2023 (Hazırlar, 2023).

The ICOMOS Turkey National Committee has issued a statement regarding the revision of the zoning plans for the Historical City Center of Antakya, which was severely affected by the February 2023 earthquakes (ICOMOS Turkey National Committee, 2024). The statement emphasises the need for a comprehensive and legally grounded approach to the protection and revitalization of this culturally significant area. It critiques the current planning process, highlighting issues such as the lack of coordination between authorities, insufficient integration with broader regional plans, and the failure to engage local communities effectively. ICOMOS stresses that the restoration and future development of Antakya’s historical fabric must consider both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, involve scientific, multidisciplinary methods, and prioritise participatory planning. The Committee calls for the immediate designation of Antakya as a "management zone" and the development of a detailed, transparent, and inclusive management and planning process that incorporates local input and ensures the preservation of the city's cultural identity.

2. TOKİ type housing in the reserved area
3. Relocation-Based Construction: Production of new TOKİ type-block housing as satellite towns and sale to owners whose houses were destroyed or severely damaged in the disaster.
4. On-Site Transformation: This method focuses on reinforcing and retrofitting existing buildings in the original locations.

In order to be able to examine the roles of architects in these processes, the factors affecting the design, the level of accountability and responsibility that architects take in the decisions taken during the process and how they legitimise their actions, I will explain and summarise how these processes started to develop, how they continued with agreements, their economic and legal infrastructure, and their actors, including architects.



Figure 3.11: Map of Antakya Representing Reconstruction Method Zones *(*Source: Author)



Figure 3.12: Timeline of Reconstruction (Source: Author)

After the February 2023 Earthquakes public statements and speeches of government officials such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey and Murat Kurum, Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, often stated the necessity of rapid permanent housing and made a proposal to rebuild each city within 1 year (Usul, 2023). However, this scale of urban reconstruction may take several years (Edgington, 2011; Johnson et.al, 2006; Maly, 2020), hence temporary housing solutions are a necessity (Johnson et.al, 2010). The public statements stressed the significance of being able to finish urban reconstruction rapidly. The push for rapid implementation of permanent housing projects, framing it as a necessary and urgent response to the crisis causes micro solutions instead of a holistic planning. These types of urban reconstruction strategies may cause the deepening of risks and vulnerabilities in the disaster prone areas (Ingram et.al., 2006).

A presidential decree on February 24, 2023, called Presidential Decree No. 126 on Settlement and Construction within the Scope of State of Emergency, granted the Ministry of Environment, Urbanism, and Climate Change extensive authority to lead the process, bypassing existing laws and regulations (Resmi Gazete, 2023a). This included using forest and agricultural lands for reconstruction and beginning construction without detailed plans. However, this approach overlooked stakeholder participation and thorough needs assessment faced criticism for potentially exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities from environmental, social, and economic perspectives (TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası, 2023b; TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2023). On 23 of March 2023 the project boundaries were established. The scope and boundaries of reconstruction projects in Hatay were determined.

Post-disaster reconstruction efforts aimed to complete housing construction within one year, as promised by the Turkish government. 4 cities that had been affected harshly had been opened to discussion by several architectural groups with the delegation of MoEUCC. The idea to reconstruction of the most damaged cities by local (Turkish) architects was presented by the minister at the time (Usul, 2023). Murat Kurum stated: “Each of the projects will be undertaken by an architect and the city centre of each province will bear the signature of an architect. Our team consists of very valuable Turkish architects and urban planners trained by our country.” (Usul, 2023). Reconstruction efforts and preparation of project proposals and analyses started after 1 week from the disaster. MoEUCC had a nuncupative contract with 4 architectural firms to lead the reconstruction effort in Adıyaman, Kahramanmaraş, Malatya and Hatay (Usul, 2023) the cities that had been affected the most from the earthquake. Bünyamin Derman from DB Architects and Cem Yilmaz from KEYM were in that meeting and started working on a proposal for Antakya (Şener, 2023). The architects were asked to plan and prepare necessary documents and data for urban reconstruction of these cities, in order-to-order fast solutions and rapid construction. They were asked to offer rapid proposals for 1:100.000 scale to building scale.

The term “architect with a reference” is a common concept in Turkish urbanism, where it refers to architects that have been working with the government on several occasions and are used to the rapidness and other limitations of bureaucratic collaboration. 4 of the architectural firms proposed their solutions in closed circle presentations to the ministry. The process being conducted with lack of transparency is suggested to be a result of leading the public opinion safely. The initial proposals were not mature enough; hence ministry and

architectural firms suggest this should be taken care of separately from the public view. They were asked to study the zoning development plans from scratch, offer strategic 1/1000 plans for focal points that had been mostly affected or central part of the city and housing/building scale solutions. With the help of this population and property right projectory and legal documents regarding the waterbeds, transportation, microzoning and geographical studies made it possible to offer rapid solutions, such as uncovering the streams, greenery and thresholds. This process, with the initiatives of the architectural firms, is conducted through collaborative efforts with academics, interdisciplinary scholars, professionals and NGOs. Taking into consideration the destruction of the disaster, the discussed 4 architectural firms suggest presenting relevant and important data, regardless of the ministry's demand and request. The authorities in this time period of initial months provided flexibility. However, in the subsequent times, with the approaching election and lack of temporary housing solutions, ministry and governmental authorities started to pressure these proposals. The lack of coordination between governmental bodies, such as the Ministry of Industry offering a solution for the industrial zone in a city clashing with the suggestions of MoEUCC made it necessary to have disaster coordination meetings. Detailed meetings are taken care of and cities and responsibilities in reconstruction efforts are distributed within the ministries.

On 4th of June the Minister of MoEUCC Murat Kurum left his position to Mehmet Özhaseki, hence the organisational structure of the ministry changed in a very critical moment. This caused a change in strategy and the large-scale analyses and zoning plans were asked to become more direct and offer focal solutions with smaller scales. The presentations of 4 architectural firms in the ministry were asked to only offer focal solutions, however architects asked to continue with the holistic planning efforts. The destruction level of Antakya was not suitable for a rapid reconstruction of existing urban morphology. The already established roots for the master plan designed by Bünyamin Derman was facing disposal of the constructed master plan solutions replaced with rapid tunnel formwork housing construction. Bünyamin Derman took the lead in coalescing the groups and invited several architectural firms to join the reconstruction projects. DB Architects, KEYM and Foster + Partners with the facilitation of Turkish Design Council (TTV) produced a master plan for Antakya (TTV Hatay, 2024). This partnership first started with the conservation plan for Old Antakya region, and later on they produced a master plan for Antakya and also collaborated with several architectural and urban design groups to produce architectural projects for the pilot area as well.



Figure 3.13: Reconstruction parcelisation of boundaries of reconstruction projects in Hatay, Antakya's Centre (Source: (Hatay Valiliği, 2024a)

The centre of Antakya is designed as a pilot area with efforts from a project conducted by Bünyamin Derman (DB Architects) leading other architectural and urban firms. The collaborative effort of foundations, architects, and academics was mainly facilitated by an independent foundation, TTV which played a critical role in the reconstruction process by facilitating integration between ministries and designers[13]. They worked under protocols with the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Şener, 2023) to oversee the planning and design efforts necessary for the

[13] Turkish Design Council (TTV), was founded in 2016, as a research foundation with close governmental relations. Foundation focuses on art, design and especially architecture and since 2016 has been offering presentations, open resources and workshops to designers in Turkey. One of the founders of the foundation organising this rejuvenation of Hatay campaign is Mehmet Kalyoncu, who is the heir to Kalyoncu Holding which is one of the famously 5 real estate forces of the AKP regime of Turkey. The personal relations, previous collaborations and ability to mobilise the national fundings from construction firms and international fundings gave the authority to TTV to be a relevant actor in Antakya's reconstruction project. The issues regarding the accountability and legitimacy of Turkish Design Council, transparency, responsibility and legitimation to be a part of the post disaster reconstruction echoed through professionals. The foundation organised international collaborations to enhance the perception of accountability (TTV, 2024). The funding of the projects and architectural firms were through donations from construction firms and international agencies. Conspiracies regarding the goals of the foundation are not within the scope of this thesis. However the heavy focus on design being powerful enough to solve major problems without being political while having close ties with contractors and governmental bodies and using star architects as front men without addressing the founding and financial aspects of the design and reconstruction process transparently raises questions. The protocols of the design and reconstruction state were criticised for not being transparent. TTV builds a narrative around design being powerful enough to solve post-disaster recovery problems, eliminating political speech around the reconstruction projects. This sterilised narrative around post-disaster reconstruction disregards the important factors of lack of transparency. Describing the rejuvenation project, Kalyoncu stated in an interview that the project for revitalising Hatay focuses on collaborating with global organisations to design cities, particularly for areas affected by wars and natural disasters. The model in Hatay is planned to be applied in countries with crises like Ukraine, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Morocco, Palestine. They are also building the academic foundation for this model, aiming to help revive cities worldwide. At the moment the foundation with its international collaboration is working on the global reconstruction projects of Ukraine and Gazza, which depicts the goal of the foundation as being a featured actor in post-disaster reconstruction design globally.

revival of Hatay's urban centre. Kalyoncu states he reached out to Cem Yılmaz (KEYM) for the reconstruction and Bünyamın Derman had already made a verbal protocol with the ministry (as described above). Hence the collaboration between TTV, KEYM and DB Architects organised a master plan[14]. This collaboration led to the fairly holistic master plan for Antakya, which discussed the riverbeds, earthquake zones, transportation models etc. However these analyses were presented as the ideas of the architectural firms rather than offering a know-how or exemplary solution by the formal institutions. This created a narrative that the responsibility of the reconstruction depended on the architect, especially Bünyamin Derman, as a frontier. Which caused the public and professional critics to focus on the architect as the decision-maker, while the recovery process was almost unrelated with the reconstruction projects. There are several studies focusing on the accountability of the private sector, and private bodies as well as the public sector (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). However no one type of institutional structure can be guaranteed to deliver effective accountability for all types of public activity (Mulgan, 2000). Designing public institutions in order to maximise the accountability of their officials requires a careful matching of appropriate institutional structures to the differing types of issues and skills involved (Deleon, 1998).

Figure 3.14: TTV Hatay’s Master Plan for Pilot Area in the Centre of Antakya
(Source: TTV Hatay, 2024)

[14] This master plan is offered as the closest thing there is to holistic planning for Antakya. Bünyamin Derman in a recent interview in Chamber of Architects Hatay stated since nobody worked on a holistic master plan (here master plan is closer in meaning to an urban plan for Antakya, Hatay’s city centre) when professional officials fail to answer the needs of the built environment with their own building and urban planning vocabulary, they will have to turn back to this master plan. He suggests that he never stopped working on the master plan and he did it without expecting something in return, which created a one time and one person event, where the entire destiny of Antakya depends on the work ethic and accountability of one architect. However the protocols made between the ministries and the stated architect is not clearly defined. Mustafa Özçelik, the President of the Chamber of Architects Hatay states the governmental officials found the holistic planning features of the master plan, time consuming and pressured for type blocks to offer an urban solution.

15 months (~60 weeks) after the disasters, on 20th of April 2024, proposals were shared with the public by a meeting that had been organised in Hatay. Professional groups were summoned to Hatay for this meeting and housing and commercial projects were presented (TTV, 2024). The pilot area scale is 7.000 housing and commercial units and have been designed by 16 architects with a master plan designed by DB Architects KEYM and Foster and Partners partnership. Each architectural firm presented their design proposals for the designated blocks, and also the urban plan was presented as well. After 16 months of preparation on the master plan with several stakeholders, 1 week after the presentations, on 8th of May 2024, 140.000 unit of tunnel formwork typology of standart TOKI mass housing blocks[15], disregarding the master plan proposals, were presented on the official website of the Hatay Province Governorship. These projects which are within the reserved area in the centre of Antakya, are conducted through TOKI type blocks, which were criticised to fail to answer the commercial and social needs of residents. These projects have been discussed to be designed by several architecture firms, however there is almost no formal information to be found regarding the projects (Usul, 2023). Interviewee #3 (2024) who was one of the architects from the TTV Hatay project stated while comparing the TOKİ projects with pilot area projects:

> "In September (2023), we received news about the design for the pilot area. While in other cities like Maras, Adıyaman, and Malatya, the city centres were being designed by the architects assigned there working on their own, Bünyamin Derman established a model that brought different teams into the system. He invited architectural teams to join the process through a selective invitation approach. The master plan decisions were presented, and based on these higher-level decisions, offices were assigned to produce block-based projects." (Interviewee #3)

[15] Tunnel formwork is a steel formwork system used in multi-story buildings that allows for the simultaneous pouring of slab and shear wall concrete, creating a monolithic structure. This system has been widely used in the construction of earthquake-resistant buildings, especially after the 1992 Erzincan and 1999 Marmara earthquakes in Turkey, where buildings constructed with tunnel formwork demonstrated superior performance during subsequent earthquakes, remaining within elastic limits and avoiding damage to structural elements. The modular nature of tunnel formwork makes it highly efficient, reducing labour and construction time, and it is particularly suitable for projects with repetitive floor plans and heights. However, the system also has limitations, including high initial investment costs, lack of architectural flexibility, and additional costs in foundation design due to the increased building weight. The rigid modularity also makes it less adaptable to complex architectural designs and urban aesthetic demands, potentially limiting its long-term sustainability in urban environments.

Figure 3.15: Screenshot from the rendered video of Proposed TOKİ blocks, Unknown architects (Source: Hatay Valiliği, 2024b)



Figure 3.16: Actor Network of Post Disaster Reconstruction Process in the Pilot Area of Antakya (Source: Author)

One of the key figures in the reconstruction efforts was “Architects of the City”. As a collaborative effort, the discussion between Bünyamin Derman, KADOP (Ancient Antakya Friends Platform) and Chamber of Architects Hatay, all architects from Antakya, had been invited to be a part of the design process.

> “The idea of involving a local Antakya-based office in the process emerged. Mustafa Özçelik, the president of the Chamber of Architects, was contacted first to suggest a local office from Antakya. However, Mustafa emphasised the importance of ensuring the process is fair and participatory, stating that directly recommending an office wouldn’t be fair. As a result, an email was sent to all architects registered with the Chamber of Architects in Antakya to inform them about the opportunity.They were offered a block within the pilot area within the TTV project. Several architects founded a company, namely Architects of the City.” (Interviewee #3, 2024)

In the interview Interviewee #3 (2024) described the proposal to be a several step processes of the pilot area being designed by the group and architects transforming the know-how to the local offices and architects. This was one of the main goals of Architects of the City. They envisaged a different construction methodology. The initial emphasis was in the project stated in the 9th of September meeting in Istanbul named Hatay Revival Workshop, suggesting that the construction should be managed in a structure that not only requires approval but also includes production and small investors (TTV, 2023). However, there was uncertainty as to who will do the tendering and contracting of the projects. Interviewee #4 stated the architects suggested building an independent “application centre” to solve the application process faster. He stated separate high-class firms drawing the application projects would be slow and expensive. Different details in each project may be costly. Hence producing application drawings in a local centre to gain the know-how for the future implementation of the projects would be beneficial. They envisaged a local construction system, which takes the know-how of housing design and production from this project and apply it to the rest of the master plan area.

> “Architectural teams in the most densely populated and problematic area tried to take on a pilot role to demonstrate how the rest of the city could be developed. It was decided that the areas outside the pilot region would not be designed by the architectural teams working within the pilot area. Instead, a system was established for the rest of the master plan, focusing on local architectural teams using the models that had been produced. This approach aimed to prevent monopolisation and uplift the city’s architects, which was very valuable. As Architects of the City, our reason for being part of this project was to help local Antakya architects learn from other architectural teams and to share the process in Antakya with other architects. This mutual learning process was successfully carried out.” (Interviewee #3, 2024)

This model of construction may have been a good way to create economical resilience during the reconstruction process, achieve employment of locals in a participatory and transparent method and pursue a sustainable architectural and urban know-how in the system. This positionality gives hope as a crack in the system to integrate local professionals to the top-down government organised process and offer psychological and social recovery through architectural practice. Which reminds a possibility to oppose “There is no right life in the wrong one” (Adorno, 2012).

> “The implementation phase for the value assessment has not yet begun, as it’s related to the administration. TTV's responsibility ends with the design; they are not directly authorised over the implementation. They deliver the projects at the final design stage. The implementation projects are managed by Emlak Konut under the coordination of contractor companies. The architect's control over this process was lost at this point. Everyone wanted architectural supervision during the implementation phase, but with the revisions and changes, we don’t know what the final outcome will be. These matters are currently in the hands of Emlak Konut.” (Interviewee #3, 2024)

3. TOKI blocks as disaster housing examples are mostly built in the peripheries of the city as satellite towns. We see dense TOKİ settlements in Hancağız, Toygarlı, Gülderen and Dikmece, which are produced in new settlement areas offered by lottery to people whose buildings have been demolished. These selected areas are focused on the mountain beds of Amanos mountains in greenfields with TOKİ type-block projects. This strategy positions the reconstruction as a matter of building new housing units rather than engaging in a holistic rebuilding of the urban fabric, cultural heritage, or community-centred spaces. The proposed disaster housing was distributed by lot randomly (AFAD, 2024) without proper assessment of the needs. Rest is waiting to be rented while there are still 200,000 people living in containers.



Figure 3.17: Map of new developments of TOKİ projects
(Source: Author using Google Earth Pro data)

Figure 3.18: Examples of TOKİ disaster housing, Gülderen/Hatay (Özgüven & Bayrak, 2023)

Currently, Antakya's streets and neighbourhoods are populated more by government officials and construction workers who have arrived from outside the region than by local residents. The presence of locals in the city is minimal, as they have largely been relocated, with many staying in nearby temporary housing or other cities. This has led to an unusual urban dynamic where the city's fabric is being reshaped largely in the absence of its traditional population and without the engagement of local voices in the rebuilding process.

The emphasis on rapid urban reconstruction, while essential for addressing immediate housing needs, has raised concerns about the long-term social and cultural impacts on Antakya's community structure. Rebuilding efforts, largely organised around parcel-based urban renewal, also run the risk of undermining local heritage preservation and disregarding the unique historical and cultural identity of Antakya. Additionally, the lack of cohesive urban planning that incorporates community feedback may affect the social cohesion and resilience of neighbourhoods, as displaced residents may find it challenging to reconnect with altered urban environments upon their return, even if they return. This approach to post-disaster reconstruction has also highlighted underlying vulnerabilities in Antakya's pre-disaster urban planning and housing infrastructure. The reconstruction of housing units alone, without consideration for community needs, public spaces, and resilient urban infrastructure,

might address the immediate need for shelter but risks missing the opportunity to build back a stronger, more integrated city.

In conclusion the reconstruction strategy in Antakya has been observed to be focused on depopulating the city from the residents to facilitate rapid construction activities. This removal is to the temporary (container) settlements or to other cities. This approach emphasises completing housing projects rapidly within selected areas. This “build-first, return-later” strategy primarily organises reconstruction as new building developments with fast construction methods and exemplary legal frameworks that provide government and ministries to reconstruct large urban lands which were previously densely urbanised without dealing with property rights and honour issues. The following solutions have been offered regarding property in this area, which has been almost completely demolished in the reserve housing area. 1) People whose buildings have been demolished throughout Hatay enter a lottery to gain the right to buy apartments from the new settlement TOKİ areas. The method solved here is to provide an alternative residence where the person whose building has been demolished can live and sell it. The health of the produced TOKİ settlement areas and how they are produced with architectural practices are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to discuss. 2) People with collapsed, heavily damaged buildings within the reserve housing area and people with slightly damaged or moderately damaged houses that have been seized for the purpose of ensuring project integrity will be allocated flats in the settlement areas produced within the reserve area. However, it has been stated that no matter how many flat titles a person has, after the construction processes in the reserve area are completed and the honouring begins, this person will be given 1 flat, and for this reason, many lawsuits have been filed and legal processes are ongoing. Due to decisions such as dense construction, high number of floors, excess surface area of the housing units, increase in green areas, social facilities, widening of roads, opening of stream beds, the surface areas of the houses will be lower than the houses previously owned and destroyed in the earthquake. There is a general barrier to accessing information regarding the fate of the properties of the people living in the reserve housing area, namely the property owners. It is impossible to photograph the construction sites in any way. While the projects that are carried out within the semicircular area limited by Fatih Street and on the path developed by TTV started construction in August, TOKİ projects are being carried out in the reserve area remaining in the remaining part of this semicircle.

Figure 3.19: White Lights in Antakya, Construction zones in the centre of Antakya during day-time and night-time from the same location on Habib-i Neccar Mountain (Source: Author)

During the site visit of Antakya in October 2024, it was observed that the city centre had transformed into an urban-scale construction zone. Several concrete factories have been established in the city centre, and more than 60 quarries are being operated to supply materials for these factories and the rapidly rising residential projects by TOKİ (Turkey's Housing Development Administration) and Emlak Konut. TOKİ projects built by the construction method of tunnel-formwork in the centre of Antakya are almost finished. TTV Hatay's projects are conducted through Emlak Konut's subcontractors. The new "vegetation" of the city consists of cranes (Tezer, 2024d). From a nighttime view from Habib-i Neccar Mountain, the historic city of Antakya appears empty and dark, while the construction area glows with the white lights of cranes, creating a stark contrast with the surrounding yellow street lights. In the mornings, Antakya is being rapidly rebuilt, filled with dust from concrete and fast construction, and the air is likely contaminated with asbestos from demolished debris. The city is being pushed to recover, but it is quickly becoming an uninhabitable place in its temporary state of reconstruction and recovery.

Figure 3.20: Concrete Production Centre facilitated in the centre of Antakya
(Source: Author, Photographed in September 2024)

3.2. Designing Post-Disaster Reconstruction of Antakya

It is difficult to discuss the role of the architect in an architectural production process because there is no single, fixed role for an architect[16]. Architects take on different roles in various forms of production and across different fields (Tanyeli, 2017). Especially in the aftermath of the earthquake in Antakya, where architects and urban planners should play a key role in shaping the urban environment, there were many different modes of building production and urban construction, as discussed in the previous chapter. Large-scale reconstruction projects also involve substantial economic and labour costs. Moreover, decisions made during such projects will determine the future of the city and its inhabitants. Therefore, it becomes essential to question the accountability of the architects who design these projects. Architects are not only responsible for the technical aspects of design but also carry significant ethical

[16] In addition to practices related to construction, many architects worked on academic research, organising the process, and preparing inventories of historic structures for preservation, mostly voluntarily. Also, it is important to note the role differences between junior and senior architects in the discussed architectural offices and the office's lead architect, however this issue is beyond the scope of our discussion, since the focus is on the architects who are the designers of the housing reconstruction projects.

and socio-political responsibilities in shaping the built environment and contributing to recovery. The role of the architect extends far beyond merely designing buildings.

In the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes that struck Antakya, architects found themselves at the centre of a complex and pressured reconstruction process. The accountability of architects in this context is multifaceted, encompassing ethical responsibilities, professional standards, and the practical challenges of working within a bureaucratic system. This section explores how various factors, including legal frameworks, organisational structures, and professional practices contribute to the pervasive lack of accountability among architects involved in these projects. The argument is built around this lack of accountability causing a detachment from social and ethical responsibilities of architects caused by the complex actor network. The reconstruction projects following the February 2023 earthquakes often demonstrate hesitation when it comes to taking accountability for their designs and their implementation. This section critically examines how architects' roles were shaped, restricted, and their accountability compromised during the reconstruction process.

To frame the discussion, it is essential to recall the research questions that guided this thesis, especially those concerning the role architects should play in disaster recovery. The general goal of this chapter is to ask what is the role of an architect? I questioned how the architects reacted to their accountability of whether the same urban vulnerabilities will be reproduced in the next disaster cycle after the reconstruction. Accountability in architectural practice is rooted in transparent and open design processes, with clear regulations and a defined division of responsibilities, ensuring that designs serve the broader public interest. I directed questions regarding participation, the reproduction of local culture, whether the produced projects would be implemented, and their supervision, to the architects involved in the projects[17]. Additionally, I examined interviews shared on the internet and written sources from publications. As a result of this research, I studied the process where architects, especially after a disaster, disregard their socio-political roles and consider themselves as designers in

[17] The questions evolved around: How were the individuals involved in the project selected, and to what extent did each person participate? In this process, where urban planners were not included, which architects were part of the project, and to what scale? Is it correct to approach the redesign process of a city in a tabula rasa state after a disaster with a designer's workflow and express it in terms of project definition? What positive action responsibilities do architects have, and to what extent have architects fulfilled these? These questions have been raised in different sources, and suggestions, warnings, and voices have been issued by academics, civil society organisations, associations, and locals. After all the information produced,

any urban transformation project (which, in such projects, should also involve the responsibility of adopting a socio-political mission to advocate for the rights of both the local and the general). In this process, I primarily questioned the identification of problems, the issues for which architects considered themselves responsible, the lack of actions, and who was held responsible for uncontrolled mechanisms. I investigated how they explained and justified the process of avoiding these responsibilities. However, in Turkey architects often lack agency within layers of actors. This shift is rooted in societal structures and professional practices that limit their broader responsibilities. In every response given by each architect, I observed reflections of internalised cultural prejudices related to the society of Turkey in this project as well. I would like to explain how urbanisation and architectural practices in Turkey are based on several doxa (preconceptions) with examples from my in-depth interviews.

At the core of post-disaster reconstruction in Antakya lies the tension between architects' traditional roles and the broader responsibilities demanded by recovery efforts. This section will explore the key challenges that architects face, starting with the influence of cultural doxa on how architects rationalise their limited involvement in community participation and accountability. I will discuss how these ingrained beliefs justify the exclusion of local communities from recovery processes, particularly through top-down projects like TOKI blocks, how legal frameworks and policies that drive rapid urbanisation and dispossession, sidelining local needs in favour of political and economic interests. Furthermore, I will investigate how architects' roles are confined to design-centric tasks, distancing them from broader social responsibilities such as community rebuilding and psychological recovery. The section will critique how architects, positioned as "architects of the city," often exclude the voices of those most affected by disaster, shifting the focus solely to technical solutions. Finally, I will address the erosion of accountability in post-disaster reconstruction, examining how architects have become passive bystanders in the recovery process. This section will

propose a path forward, urging architects to reclaim their agency by balancing design with active participation in recovery efforts.

3.2.1 Legitimising Through Doxa

Urban professionals frequently legitimise their lack of accountability by aligning their practices with the deeply ingrained doxas [18] of Turkish society. Doxa here is used almost synonymous to belief systems around the cultural characteristics of Turkish citizens. In the context of Turkish society and culture, several doxas influence the way individuals think, behave, and interact with one another. These doxas are deeply embedded in the collective consciousness and are often linked to historical, religious, and socio-political factors and they provide a cultural framework that allows professionals to navigate and justify their actions or inactions within the reconstruction process.

In Turkey, election campaigns were often shaped by arguments such as "less talk, more action" and "everyone talks, but we act". These slogans, while appealing, reflect a broader political culture where to talk is devalued and practical results are prioritised. In particular, in the fields of urban planning and conservation there is a significant amount of academic research, including in Antakya before and after the earthquake. However, there is a pervasive distrust in applying this research, and its lack of implementation has led to a systematic sense of disappointment. The constant production of new discourse, without tangible or observable outcomes, created a context where those who talk less and act more gained power. In an environment where there is a systematic preference for rapid execution over research, there are two key questions to consider:
1) Who is responsible for the application of solutions, research, and scientific foundations produced on glossy paper, and what is the reason for their lack of implementation?
2) Is the failure of produced knowledge to translate into action, or its inability to be converted into practice, a deliberate method of producing speculative political discourse?
In a context where it is clear that things cannot be done as planned or researched despite knowing what is right and where we see the fruits of action rather than words, the real

[18]The term *doxa* is utilised here, drawing on the work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977), to describe the underlying assumptions within the field of architecture that serve to legitimise the practice of architects. A more detailed explanation of *doxa* in relation to society is provided in Chapter 2.2.3.

question may not be "Why is the right thing not being done?" despite our knowledge, but rather: "Why is the right thing not being done even though we know how?"

When this question was posed to the architects working on the projects, they all gave similar responses. When asked whether they could truly believe that their projects were correct, whether they would have liked to develop them on a stronger research foundation, why things were not done differently, and whether they thought these projects would actually be implemented, the architects pointed out that “this is Turkey, and in Turkey, things never go as planned”. They emphasised that we should be thankful that so much research was even done, while comparing the master plan in Hatay with other earthquake-stricken provinces, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman and Malatya, where city centres are rebuilt within the first year with limited research. "Was it my responsibility? I'm not sure. Was I the one to decide that? I'm not sure. It wasn't exactly my job," they said, passing the responsibility to one another and blaming others. These responses create an atmosphere of ambiguity and uncertainty. It becomes unclear who is truly responsible for the projects, who will implement them, and even who the "client" is - despite the fact that the residents (displaced survivors) who will live in these buildings are clearly known.

These doxas materialise within the argument of "Burası Türkiye" which translates to "This is Turkey," a cultural legitimation for systemic violations in Turkey. The phrase is often used in Turkish society to express resignation or acceptance of systemic inefficiencies, corruption, or irregularities that are seen as inherent to the way things function in the country. In the context of post-disaster reconstruction, this saying encapsulates a cultural attitude that tolerates a lack of accountability, transparency, and participation in the decision-making process. It serves as a convenient justification for the flaws in the reconstruction efforts, where governmental authorities often fail to engage with the public or experts and instead opt for quick fixes that lack sustainable and accountable frameworks.

The deeply ingrained doxas of Turkish society provide a cultural framework that urban designing professionals can and do use to legitimise their lack of accountability in post-disaster reconstruction efforts. By aligning their practices with these societal values, they can justify decisions that might otherwise be questioned and avoid taking full responsibility for the long-term outcomes of their work. This approach, while seemingly progressive, reminds the description of "costless modernization" Bilgin (1999) critiques where the design becomes

an abstract exercise detached from the pressing needs of the vulnerable population. The architect, in this scenario, risks becoming an agent of top-down modernization, imposing solutions that may not align with the local context, thereby exacerbating the very vulnerabilities they seek to mitigate. The emphasis on design for its own sake, without a deep engagement with the social and economic fabric of the region, underscores a broader issue of accountability in the profession, where the success of a project is measured more by its visual and technical merits than by its ability to truly serve the community it is intended for.

Architects faced ethical dilemmas when their professional responsibilities clash with the demands of the reconstruction process. There is a saying in the Turkish construction system that emphasises the unaccountability of architects as “If I don’t do it, someone else will”. This phrase is deeply embedded in the socio-cultural and economic fabric of Turkey, particularly within the construction sector. It reflects a mindset that is often driven by pragmatism and competition, but also highlights significant ethical and accountability challenges in the industry. Turkey’s construction sector is one of the most competitive and lucrative industries in the country, often seen as a primary driver of economic growth. The saying "If I don’t do it, someone else will" captures the intense competition within the industry, where the system is motivated by the fear of losing opportunities to rivals. This mindset encourages quick decision-making and prioritisation of short-term gains, often at the expense of long-term sustainability and ethical considerations.

When discussing about the preparedness of the governmental bodies to the disaster interviewee #2 stated: “We are not a society that lives primarily by logic and reason. I think it's part of our nomadic heritage—we tend to act first and think later.”

The cultural acceptance of short-term fixes that lack a foundation in solid, accountable regulations in post-disaster reconstruction manifests in the rapid implementation of rebuilding efforts that prioritise speed over safety and quality. These efforts are often conducted without clear, enforceable regulations, leading to inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in the built environment. The absence of robust regulatory frameworks means that once the immediate crisis is addressed, there is little follow-up to ensure that the reconstruction meets long-term needs. This approach not only jeopardises the safety and sustainability of the rebuilt areas but also perpetuates a culture where accountability is an afterthought rather than a guiding principle.

The phrase "This is Turkey" encapsulates a cultural acceptance of systemic inefficiencies and the lack of accountability in Turkey's post-disaster reconstruction efforts. These sayings reflect and reinforce a mindset that tolerates the exclusion of public participation, the dismissal of expert advice, and the implementation of short-term, unregulated fixes.

To break this cycle, there is a need for a cultural shift towards greater transparency, participation, and accountability in the reconstruction process. By challenging the fatalistic acceptance embedded in "This is Turkey," stakeholders can advocate for a more responsible and sustainable approach to rebuilding, one that prioritises the long-term well-being of communities and holds all actors accountable for their roles in the process.

3.2.2. Disaster Urbanisation / Centralised Power

Disaster urbanisation describes the relation of economy-politics between urbanisation and disasters. Madden (2021) asks what critical urban theory can contribute to the sociology of disaster. If the fundamental insight of disaster studies is that there is no such thing as a natural disaster, the starting point of critical urban studies is that capitalist urbanisation is a disaster waiting to happen. Disasters are instigated and influenced by the particular forms of crisis and vulnerability created by neoliberal urbanisation. Disasters are also the ways in which urban space is produced and remade in a process that can be called disaster urbanisation. A critical account of the relationship between contemporary urbanisation and disaster can help us better understand disaster-prone, unequal urbanised futures (Madden, 2021).

Architects defined the disaster as an opportunity to start over and turn the crisis into a resilient master plan for Antakya. Interviewee #2 stated the interdisciplinary work on the master plans and constant coordination meetings made them feel accountable for the final products: “We really felt like we were able to make a change by focusing on the ecological and natural aspects of the city as well.”



Figure 3.21: TTV Hatay Master Plan Area (Source: TTV, 2024)

Interviewee #2 (2024) supported the master plan solutions:

> "The expectation of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation was to assign four architects for four cities, but their expectation for Hatay was not something like this. They didn't anticipate such a detailed project at this scale. Initially, the government, the state, and the ministry seemed to aim for a quick selection of certain areas in the damaged zones to rapidly develop and construct projects to boost people's morale and motivation. However, as the process went on, the scope of this master plan grew. Master planning is not something commonly done in Turkey. We thought, if we're going to rebuild, let's do it right. Before the earthquake, Antakya was lacking in urban amenities, green spaces, and proper scaling—there was no concept of ground floor level. The earthquake opened up an opportunity to correct some of these issues, and addressing them became an ethical responsibility. That was how the goals were set, but the process didn't unfold exactly that way."

Architects expressed a system of violation within this reconstruction process. Lack of temporary housing solutions caused the rush for focal solutions and time limitations for design. In this environment, architecture risks becoming a tool for the state to manage public perception rather than a genuine means of addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. The emphasis on rapid construction hence a detract from the critical need for transparency, accountability, and meaningful public participation in the reconstruction process.

The Turkish government announced that 207 hectares in Antakya and Defne would be designated as reserve building areas, this was the first time in Turkish history that a built fabric was designated as a reserved building area. This was a crisis management solution which complicated the process. Reserve housing area declaration was chosen as the legal infrastructure used in the change of property rights. It attracted serious reactions from the public, claiming that this was a dispossession project. The implementation of Reserved Area in the whole extent of the master plan, insufficient data on the inheritance of the population and designing without the value assessment indicate the shortsightedness of architectural design. We can observe this situation in the transformation of cities today, especially in the disaster-induced urbanisation. There is a situation where the fast is put against the right with a system such as urgent expropriations, omnibus laws, one-time quick solutions, and construction systems preferred because of their speed.

In the critical statement published by the Chamber of Architects on May 9 in response to the project presentations on April 30, 2024: In the Master Plan Study presented by the local team, "closing the stream beds to construction, creating green corridors, protecting the main artery traces, moving administrative buildings from the city centre to the periphery, social and cultural facilities" Although principled decisions such as "increasing the areas of urban areas" are thought to be in line with the principles of scientific urbanism, it is understood that the dense construction before the earthquake is being tried to be maintained at similar scales. It is seen that this situation is reflected in multi-storey and dense construction in projects specific to the pilot region.

However, the architects state their unaccountability for this decision as stating their main concern was to focus on being able to achieve the limitations to the number of floors with the related properties. This creates a dichotomy for the architect. The sensibility to displacement and property rights conflicts with the need to geological constraints.

> “In December, after the first announcement of the reserved housing area, there was a significant uproar. Declaring a reserved area was actually necessary for this implementation. However, there was a lack of proper process management for the reserved area. Simply announcing it wasn’t enough. The announcement didn’t clarify how the powers within it would be used, leading to serious issues regarding property rights. We criticise reserved area law as well. I can’t support, trust, or stand behind the reserved area.” (Interviewee #3, 2024)

In Antakya, locals are constantly protesting. There is no agent that gives an answer to their questions of where they are going to live and with whom. There are several solidarity groups of disaster victims such as: Right to Housing Platform, Earthquake Solidarity Association, Hatay Earthquake Victim Association (In Turkish: Barınma Hakkı Platformu, Deprem Dayanışması Derneği, Hatay Depremzede Derneği) and several women solidarity groups and cooperatives (TTB, 2024). These groups protest for their housing rights by stating “We are earthquake victims, not customers!” (Bayraktar, 2024). The information on which stages the reconstruction is, with which budget and with which management or governance mechanism the implementations will be carried out is completely left in the air (TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2024).

The phrase also speaks to the opportunistic nature of the "rant economy" in Turkey, where the primary focus is on maximising profit from real estate and construction projects. The idea that if one does not take advantage of an opportunity, someone else will, fosters a culture of seizing any available chance to profit, sometimes regardless of the ethical implications. This has contributed to a construction boom in Turkey, with rapid urbanisation and large-scale projects often driven by speculative interests rather than careful planning. While the phrase reflects a realistic understanding of the competitive environment, it also underscores a problematic aspect of the construction industry in Turkey namely, the erosion of accountability. The attitude of "If I don't do it, someone else will" can lead to a neglect of ethical standards, safety regulations, and quality control. It can result in a race to the bottom, where the pressure to outdo competitors leads to cutting corners and compromising on spatial quality. By focusing on the rapid construction techniques public space is the first to be disregarded. The prevalence of this saying in the construction sector also points to weaknesses in the legal and regulatory frameworks governing the industry. When regulations are not strictly enforced, or when loopholes exist, this attitude can flourish. It becomes easier

for individuals and companies to justify non-compliance with regulations, believing that if they do not take advantage of a situation, someone else will, leading to a cycle of systemic negligence and corruption. This highlights the tension between economic pragmatism and ethical responsibility, shedding light on how this mindset contributes to systemic issues such as lack of accountability, regulatory non-compliance, and compromised safety standards. Addressing these challenges requires not only strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks but also fostering a culture of accountability and ethical responsibility within the construction sector. And it is observable that the tension between implementation and design becomes reality when tunnel formwork system TOKİ typology disaster housing units are used as the unit for built environment in the rest of the master plan. And it is also observable from the examples of Adıyaman, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya, where the reconstruction is relatively fast but lacks public space and recovery of every-day life. Interviewee #3: "Tunnel formwork applications in our country are not of high quality. Their limitations make them unsuitable for city centres. If you directly use a typology meant for earthquake housing in the outskirts within the city, you won't solve any problems. In the long run, it will create much more serious issues."

Figure 3.22: Draft Plans of TOKİ Type Blocks within the reserved area, Initial Proposals as ordered by Emlak Konut, 2024[19] (Source: Personal Communication of the Author)

[19] These plans have not been officially shared with the public. They were shared on social media networks where there are city activists working on Antakya. I wanted to add it because I think the lack of official data on the fate of these plans is an important indicator of the post-disaster reconstruction process.

In the context of urban reconstruction, particularly following disasters like the February 2023 earthquakes in Antakya, tunnel formwork presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, its proven earthquake resilience makes it an attractive option for rebuilding efforts in seismic zones. The system's ability to produce durable, monolithic structures that can withstand seismic forces could significantly enhance the safety and longevity of reconstructed urban areas. Moreover, the efficiency of tunnel formwork, with its reduced construction times and labour requirements, is crucial in post-disaster scenarios where rapid reconstruction is often necessary to rehouse displaced populations and restore normalcy. However, the use of tunnel formwork in urban reconstruction must be carefully considered within the broader context of urban planning and architectural needs. While the system excels in producing repetitive, standardised housing units, its lack of flexibility can be a significant drawback in urban environments where architectural diversity and aesthetic integration are important. Urban centres often require a blend of residential, commercial, and public spaces that cater to diverse needs and contribute to the city's character and identity. The rigidity of tunnel formwork, with its constraints on wall configurations, floor spans, and façade designs, can limit its applicability in such contexts, leading to uniform and potentially monotonous urban landscapes. Furthermore, the initial high investment and the need for similar repetitive structures to justify the cost may not align with the urban reconstruction goals that prioritise variety and adaptability. In the long term, the architectural and urban planning constraints associated with tunnel formwork could hinder the creation of vibrant, sustainable urban spaces that meet the aesthetic and functional demands of contemporary cities. Thus, while tunnel formwork is a valuable tool in post-disaster reconstruction for its structural benefits, its use should be balanced with other construction methods that offer greater flexibility and adaptability to the unique needs of urban environments.

On 8th of May 2024, 1 week after of the master plans presentation with public, Hatay Governorship and MoEUCC presented the peripheries of the pilot area within the city centre with type blocks of disaster housing units (Hatay Valiliği, 2024) which have been the model for urbanisation in AKP Turkey with TOKİ in the last 20 years. This brought questions of loss in urban fabric. The pressure for rapid construction and tunnel formwork to be chosen as a construction method is heavily criticised. Interviewee #4 stated "Creating urban fabric is not in their vocabulary.", they described urbanisation under AKP regime mostly focused on statistics rather than building an urban fabric. The implementation of this construction system within the urban centre may cause lack of flexibility, public space, commercial ground floor

(which are the main socialisation and economic spaces in city centres). “Another problem with tunnel formwork is that you cannot build car parks in the basement, hence you have to offer a large open space area designated for car parking, hence the urban interface becomes a car-oriented space lacking pedestrian movement. Large areas are being lost that have been possible to use as recreational green areas.” stated interviewee #5 (2024). They stated their concerns regarding the reconstruction pressure by the government to reuse the already purchased 6 types of tunnel formwork for the disaster housing in the peripheries to be used in the city centres reconstruction as well.

> “In the area where 140,000 housing units are being built using tunnel formwork, there are only 6 architectural designers involved. The area is being developed based on 6-7 project types. Despite changes in ground conditions and social structure, the same project is being used everywhere.” (Interviewee #3, 2024)

“If what we understand from reconstruction is only rebuilding buildings that people can sleep in, without focusing on the everyday life and the social and economic recovery of the community, tunnel formworks may be rapid and economic methods. However there are important factors in urban planning. A city does not only consist of buildings, but also movement.” (Interviewee #5, 2024). Similar to this, interviewee #4 (2024) described the reason for this duality between the pilot area and tunnel formwork type block areas. They defined the opposition and Kafkaesque depiction of the ministry officials about TTV projects as referencing one of the authorities opposing the designs of the housing blocks for being “good design”: “I had a meeting with the Deputy Minister in Antakya. The main issue, as the Minister also said, is not the cost, but rather the question people will ask: If these things can be done, why didn't we do them for the whole city? From the beginning, I said I wouldn't do another project here. But I will provide free consultancy. Let the local architects do the rest of the projects."

This clearly illustrates the models and envisagement’s staying on the paper without being implemented in reality without contracts and full contribution of each stakeholder. The Ministry disregarded those decisions to propose another project. Interview #4 stated their frustration regarding the consent manufacturing around TOKI blocks as: "Evil has become invisible now, and I ask, what fault does my project have? A certain kind of consent is being built here: they present the unstarted project as a reason for the delay, to claim there's no progress, while the TOKI projects are moving along smoothly." With tunnel formwork, you

can't ensure the same property ownership within the same block, nor can you provide the same valuation, because you're producing standardised housing types. There is no alternative.

> "The main reasons for reverting to the tunnel formwork system were the shortage of temporary housing and the familiarity with this system in terms of urbanisation. The TTV project was a first in the country regarding the construction process. Typically, in mass housing projects, systems consisting of quickly built housing types are preferred. We've seen this in other cities as well. The public administration is choosing this approach." (Interviewee #3, 2024)

When explaining the lack of transparency in the process regarding the right to choose—whether between TOKI or TTV projects—the officials stated that the process was developed without listening to the demands of the Antakya community. Interviewee #3 (2024) stated:

> "Property owners who listened to TTV presentations generally liked the projects. However, because they don't have enough information, and they don't know how the payment plans and costs will work, they are unsure of what to trust. If a comprehensive guide on how the process would be managed had been produced, Antakyans could have made an informed choice. If people were choosing based on design, they might opt for TTV projects, which offer well-designed common areas, are tailored to the demographic structure, add value, and raise standards. But if they are choosing based on cost, they might go for TOKI housing instead."
>
> "After our presentations one local said "I feel like we are going to support and defend these projects against the authorities if they decide to not build them. They were strongly opposing the designs however after they saw how hard we worked and how good the design was they decided to support us." (Interviewee #2, 2024)

These statements illustrate the importance of transparency and informing the public about the design solutions and offering active feedback. Without properly engaging the public within the reconstruction process, the discussions around the accountability of designers can only be on the speculative level. Interviewee #3: "Unfortunately, the process isn't going as ideally as it should. There's significant pressure from those in power to speed things up. Both TTV and the architectural teams are facing serious pressure from the government regarding the process. There are aspects of the process that need to be made more inclusive, and it can't be done quickly". This example illustrates the gap between the needs of the future users and the

decisions of the architect. Even though the architect has good intentions this may cause problems. The only possible way out is through clear discussion and open debates about the needs. However as discussed, the pressure to build rapidly and without participation and community feedback left architects distanced from the users.

3.2.3. Design-Centric Roles

"Design has the potential to change the world" is almost the slogan of the Rejuvenation of Hatay project. However only actors of TTV utilise this mindset. Interviews with architects reveal they are aware of social and political responsibilities of architectural and urban design, hence main themes around the interviews were always on the limitations of architecture caused by the governmental bodies and authorities and how architects produced their design within this context. Hence without proper implementation design does not have the power to change the world.

The idea that design has the power to solve urban and societal problems has to be analysed by looking through both sides of the coin. On the one hand urban design and architecture in Turkey in recent years as discussed in the 2nd Chapter fails to offer quality design solutions, and lack public space, rehabilitation infrastructures and builds the city and housing into bedroom neighbourhoods. Standardisation of housing blocks into disaster houses all over the country. The caricaturised "architect with a reference" designing those projects, as to recall, offers architectural projects that both transform urban and also rural fabric. TOKİ blocks, even though resistant to the physical effects of the disaster, lack urban, public and social recovery and regeneration of the urban life. On the other hand, it limits architects' scope to design-centric problem solvers, overlooking the main problems of urbanisation & post-disaster recovery in the construction system. The implementation, legal backbone / framework of the reconstruction projects, lack of public participation, moreover lack of informing the public has to be addressed as a part of the post-disaster design agenda.

Another important doxa is that, "people of Turkey are not ready to participate in reconstruction efforts". In Antakya, there are numerous NGOs, foundations, and solidarity groups formed before and especially after the earthquake. Architects stated the impossibility of participation in Turkey's context, geographical and social doxa's of Turkey Interviewee #1

stated “This is not Germany or Sweden or Japan, you cannot tell people you are not going to give them a house next to the river because of the flood risk, they would not accept that.”

> “When people ask what will happen to the land next to the stream, and you respond with, "Well, what do you think should happen?" their answer is very clear. Of course, they will say, "Let it stay there," and they are right to think that way. The flow of correct information was not provided to people who have houses in the streambed. If the situation had been explained clearly—"Yes, your house is in the streambed, but here are the possible consequences, and you'll be given property elsewhere"—then things might have been different. The responsibility lies with the government. As an architect, I don't fully feel responsible for this; there's nothing I can do. I can't go and communicate with each person individually. This is not just the government's responsibility; it's their duty. They acted a bit amateurishly and weakly in this communication. TTV could have taken a different approach, but even their capabilities are limited since the foundation is not a substitute for the government.” (Interviewee #2, 2024)

The gap between the architects as designers and the victims is increased by this view. Regarding the comparison between the previous apartment blocks and the new housing design scales interviewee #4 stated an observation from the temporary housing settlements that the people of Antakya grew stronger bonds after the earthquake which may help them to organise. This meant the earthquake gave them a chance to live together, hence they will be able to live in larger blocks.

Architects justified the limited community involvement using these cultural beliefs and ingrained professional norms. This mindset contributes to a systemic lack of participation in the reconstruction process. There is a noticeable absence of meaningful public consultation or involvement of local communities in the planning and rebuilding phases. However, TTV Project for Pilot Area suggested that the process to be a participatory project, a unique example for future studies. However, revoking the description of Ladder of Participation by Arnstein (1969), the reconstruction efforts fail to be a participatory process. TTV defined a type of participation by informing selected delegates of professionals on several occasions (TTV, 2024). The number of those “public” meetings is being presented as a new and improved model of participation and collaboration in reconstruction (TTV, 2024). The definition of participation in their design process was to make presentations, collaboration of

architects and other professionals to the design process (invited ones). TTV, which claims to bring together Turkey's best designers, researchers and greatest minds, described this process as an unprecedented participatory process in the world.

> "Many large presentations were held, open to the public, where anyone who wanted to come could attend. It wasn't possible to reach everyone individually, but communication was established with NGOs. People also participated through Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups, asking questions. Some of the TTV meetings were open to all participants, while others were thematic meetings, open to academics from universities or civil society groups. I'm not sure if this qualifies as a participatory model, but generally, it followed the format of presentations." (Interviewee#2, 2024)

The model of reconstruction efforts, since informing the public with open sources, collaborative efforts of architects who made their name within the practice is a unique example, this efforts lack of participation, moreover lack of informing the public is overlooked.

Architectural preferences such as open corridors, scales of the open-air spaces, were used as a mode of eliminating participatory design. It is important to note that even though they were using this dichotomy of 'what people are hypothetically going to want' versus 'what should have been done' they suggested that this was a scientific and technical solution for the resilience of the city. However deeper questioning illustrated a need to design without being challenged by the questions of the society. This cultural alignment not only allows architects to navigate the complexities of the reconstruction process but also shields them from accountability, reinforcing a system where the true impacts of their work—positive or negative—are less likely to be scrutinised in depth. To address these issues, it is crucial to critically examine how these cultural doxas are leveraged in professional practices and to advocate for a more accountable and transparent approach to urban design and reconstruction in Turkey.

Architects of the City

The mode of participation and community involvement was mostly defined as architects from Antakya being a part of the design project within the TTV Hatay proposal. This group established an architectural firm called Architect of the City. However professional collaboration does not replace participation or informing the public.

Interviewee #3:

> “The offices from Antakya (Architects of the City) lacked the know-how to produce large-scale housing projects, while the architects coming from outside didn’t have much knowledge about Antakya's local context. Therefore, it became a mutually beneficial process where both sides supported each other.”

> “We provided presentations to all teams about the living conditions and demographic structure in Antakya, sharing relevant information. We created mental maps and maps for local identities and shared the interviews we conducted with locals. Similarly, we made sure to source everything properly when presenting the produced projects to the local community. We organized several large meetings with local representatives, such as neighborhood headmen, local professional chamber representatives, and prominent figures of the city. People who would be directly affected by the projects participated in the meetings during the early stages, and while their input wasn't directly reflected in the designs, it still had an influence. We tried to contribute to the process by ensuring it developed through relationships. We requested that meetings be held directly in Antakya, and both our team and TTV were open to this. We took on a dual responsibility in this way.”

Interviewee #2 (2024) emphasised the importance of Architect’s from the City being a part of the design process as:

> “The briefs we received from the city's architects were thoroughly worked on, with careful examination of details related to both physical usage and housing. For example, we learned that the southwest wind is very well-known in Antakya, and this became a valuable piece of information. As similar data were brought to the table, the designs became richer. Each designer incorporated these insights into their work from their own perspective.”

3.2.4. Accountability in Limbo

Architects often find themselves constrained by bureaucratic structures and overwhelmed by the scale of the reconstruction efforts, leading to a situation where ethical and social responsibilities are either overlooked or inadequately addressed. Architects in large-scale projects often face ethical dilemmas when their professional duties clash with organisational

or governmental objectives (Flyvbjerg, 1998). This misalignment can lead to prioritising short-term technical solutions over socially responsible, long-term outcomes. The absence of a clear accountability framework allows architects to focus solely on design, avoiding the political and ethical implications of their work. This detachment fosters a cycle of unaccountability, where architects are neither fully responsible for the outcomes of their designs nor empowered to address systemic issues.

This situation is exacerbated by the complexity of the reconstruction process and the sheer number of stakeholders involved, which further diffuses responsibility and hinders effective accountability. Bovens' analysis suggests that without a supportive structure that enforces moral behaviour and clear lines of responsibility, even well-intentioned professionals are likely to fall short in their ethical obligations, leading to long-term consequences for both the affected communities and the integrity of the architectural profession (Miceli, 1999).

In the context of post-disaster reconstruction in Antakya, the issue of unaccountability among architects can be understood through the lens of what Bovens (1999) describes as the "problem of many hands." This concept highlights how responsibility becomes diffused in complex systems, making it difficult to hold any single individual or group accountable for outcomes, especially when wrongdoing or failures occur.

> “Architects are often viewed as the decision makers since they materialise the previous decisions which are the main accountable factors of the end product. However, all of those legal, legislative bricks of design are made visible by architects, hence we face criticism as if we are the sole responsibilities of the end product.” (Interviewee #5, 2024)
>
> “The role of the architect here is very conflicted. In some meetings, it feels like you're the one making all the decisions, while in others, it feels like you have no role at all. This constant swing between the two extremes can be mentally exhausting for the architect. And, understandably, being held responsible for the entire process while caught in this back-and-forth is quite frustrating.” (Interviewee #2, 2024)

As a result of the complexity of authorities and accountable bodies the discussion of the tension between design intentions and the realities of implementation had always been relevant. Even though the designs were being presented with the public frequently the implementation of the designs into reality remained unknown. The main concern that the

architects involved in the project in the pilot area and TTV employees expressed both in the interviews and in their presentations is whether the projects produced will turn into reality. Interviewee #5 (2024) stated their concern as “There was always a possibility of the projects being off the table. Normally in Turkey people reject these types of idealist projects with presumptions. They think this will not work and be cynical about it or position themselves in a distance. However, we kept working on the projects.” Interviewee #5 stated, at the initial design phases of the projects the architectural firms were informed that implementation and supervision during the post-application process would be substantive to the architects. Hence, they agreed to be a part of the project during the concept and project design phases. However, architects not being able to oversee the construction process and in fact not being informed of the situation of their proposals created a conflict. Interviewee #2 when describing the volatile nature of their projects and the constant proposal of elimination of the projects as:
“The Turkish Design Council (TTV) is an organisation that came forward on its own initiative. These designs were never initially handed over to the foundation; it started more like a research project. During the first meetings, before any public gatherings, the president of the design foundation mentioned, "We're doing this, but none of it might be implemented." It began entirely as a civil initiative, and the government might not have taken it seriously. A protocol was signed, and project work was planned. The design foundation, with contributions from Bünyamin Derman, even made a personal contract. I'm not sure what process the state followed or what they thought, but somehow, it was decided to move forward with the implementation.”

Within this system of violations, it is observed that architects mostly positioned themselves as design professionals. The lack of control and decision making besides the design solutions and the disregard of their social, political and ethical concerns creates an actor unaccountable from the effects of their proposals. Governmental authorities often proceed with top-down approaches, disregarding the input of those directly affected by the disaster as well as professionals who might offer alternative solutions. This lack of participation is rationalised through the belief that this is simply "how things are done" in Turkey, reinforcing a cycle where the voices of citizens and experts are systematically marginalised. This cultural resignation is further reflected in the way governmental authorities handle reconstruction efforts. Government's tendency to ignore feedback, criticisms, or suggestions from both the public and professionals allows authorities to maintain control over the reconstruction process without being held accountable for their decisions. The failure to listen to

stakeholders perpetuates a sense of futility among those who might otherwise advocate for more inclusive, participatory approaches. This top-down governance style, where decisions are made behind closed doors, not only diminishes transparency but also erodes trust in the institutions responsible for rebuilding communities.

Architects expressed exasperation from the authorities, suggesting the Kafkaesque fabric of Turkish bureaucracy, making the last decision on the reconstruction efforts are the main ones which are accountable from the decisions.

> Interviewee #2: “The state system in Turkey is like a semi-cage organisation, very heterogeneous and disorganised. In this chaotic environment, getting things done takes a long time. It’s almost Kafkaesque. Sometimes, you even forget what you’re trying to achieve.”
>
> Interviewee #7: “Whatever we design, we are not sure if they are going to be implemented. The minister changes, and the whole proposal is disregarded. The entire organisation of the ministry changes, and they rush to point solutions because of the change in ministries’ approach.”

Architects also expressed that they were not able to be the decision makers in this process. However in the ideal situation the participation should take place. Unaccountability in the case of suggesting “This was not a decision we could have made, if the ministry or foundation asked us to support a participatory process, we would have”. This emphasises their unaccountable position in the design process.

Lack of transparency in the reconstruction process is a recurring pattern of offering one-time, short-term solutions to complex problems, often without establishing the necessary regulations or accountability mechanisms to ensure long-term success. Disregarding the master plans, which are brought to life by collaborative efforts of architects and scholars is a direct example of this. Governmental bodies, on the first hand, should have been the ones which are leading this holistic planning method. This approach of offering one-time solutions is summed up in the phrase "kervanı yolda düzmek," which translates to "fixing the caravan on the road." It suggests a tendency to address problems as they arise, rather than planning and preparing in advance. In the context of reconstruction, this means that buildings might be rapidly erected without proper oversight or adherence to safety standards, only to require

further repairs or adjustments later. This reinforces a cycle of inefficiency and unaccountability.

This unaccountability of architects is exacerbated by the architects' admission that once their designs were submitted, they had no control over how these designs were used or whether they aligned with the needs and desires of the local community. The lack of sanctions or enforcement mechanisms to ensure that architects are held responsible for the social outcomes of their designs underscores a significant gap in the profession's ethical framework.

The centralization of power in the reconstruction process, where decisions are made by a few authoritative figures, allows urban designers to defer responsibility, claiming that they are merely executing orders rather than actively shaping outcomes. This deference to authority aligns with societal expectations and helps professionals evade accountability by placing the onus on the political hierarchy that controls the reconstruction agenda.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

> "The architect's role is ultimately reduced to that of a technician serving the needs of capital, rather than a visionary political actor." (Tafuri, 1976, p. 22).

This thesis has revealed the intricate challenges faced by architects during post-disaster reconstruction in Turkey, particularly in Antakya. Through a series of interviews with key stakeholders, primarily architects involved in the reconstruction of Antakya, this study explores the legal, bureaucratic, and cultural factors that constrain architects' accountability within post-disaster reconstruction practices. The dual nature of accountability in architecture becomes evident. On one hand, architects are criticised for their unaccountability, particularly their failure to engage with the ethical and social dimensions of their work. On the other hand, they are constrained by a system that limits their ability to act according to these values. This tension reflects broader systemic issues in Turkey, where authoritarian governance and rapid urbanisation pressures diminish professional accountability. The case of Antakya illustrates the dangers of a fragmented and top-down approach to urban reconstruction, where the focus on rapid implementation and compliance with pre-existing zoning plans often overlooks the broader social and ethical responsibilities of architecture. Architects have attempted to extend their influence beyond design, engaging in political and social actions. However, these efforts are often thwarted by a lack of collaboration, transparency, and institutional support. Furthermore, the systemic transition from traditional bureaucracies to collaborative arrangements involving public and private sectors has dispersed responsibilities, complicating accountability.

The legal framework for Antakya's redesign was established through expedited laws and irregularities. On February 24, 2023, Presidential Decree No. 126 granted exceptional powers

to the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, TOKİ, and AFAD to accelerate bureaucratic processes. It was stipulated that city centres could be designed, regulated, and constructed with master plans without adjusting zoning plans. These institutions were given significant powers, including altering zoning plans, exercising expropriation rights, expediting tender processes, and relaxing certain legal limitations. Clearly, weakening oversight mechanisms in this manner carries the risk of resource mismanagement and neglecting long-term needs. Public officials frequently declared that the earthquake-affected regions would be rebuilt within a year. Law No. 6306 on the Transformation of Areas Under Disaster Risk was amended on November 7, 2023, and for the first time on November 9, 2023, it was implemented in inhabited urban areas in earthquake-hit city centres. Areas with existing buildings could now also be declared as reserve housing zones.

Different architectural firms were delegated to design post-disaster cities by government agencies. The architects involved in the Antakya project and other cities were working under pressure from the government and ministry to expedite the reconstruction process and finish the whole process of designing and construction within one year. The urgency imposed by these authorities left little room for critical reflection or ethical questioning, forcing architects to focus on rapid delivery rather than thoughtful, community-centred design. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the urgency to rebuild quickly led to a reconstruction process that prioritised rapid implementation over thoughtful, resilient, long-term planning. In the reserve area of Antakya, two distinct project types produced by TOKİ and Emlak Konut were observed. Additionally, disaster housing built with TOKİ's tunnel-form block system was constructed at the foothills, where beneficiaries were determined through a lottery. In the remaining parts of the city, a "half from you, half from us" model was proposed without altering the pre-earthquake zoning plans and regulations.

Initially, architects in the reserve area were requested to produce 1:100,000, 1:25,000, and 1:1,000 scale plans. However, under pressure for rapid housing production, higher-scale planning was bypassed, and they were forced to submit quickly implementable projects focused on specific areas. While architects were initially given the initiative to produce resilient cities, subsequent efforts to realize these plans were curtailed. Architects were compelled to propose quick solutions instead of research-based projects. In Antakya, the process became concentrated within a pilot region involving multiple stakeholders, including

international actors, aiming to lend legitimacy to the project. Consequently, it evolved into an architectural production project.

Due to the complexity of the situation and the multitude of stakeholders, determining who is responsible or the decision-maker remains ambiguous. Should architects as project authors or decision-making institutions be held accountable? Most architects interviewed agreed on one response: "I am not the one responsible for these decisions. We were asked to do this, and we did it. We didn't have time; we were under severe pressure to complete the projects and move into production as soon as possible. We faced bureaucratic constraints and time pressures." I questioned the accountability of architects in this cycle and whether they should be held responsible while preparing for the next disaster or in the allocation of public resources. Within the current system, providing a straightforward answer to this question is difficult. Ideally, however, architects in post-disaster recovery should be accountable for designing safe, sustainable, and inclusive structures that meet long-term resilience. Architects' accountability in this context should not only be limited to their technical expertise but also encompass their ethical and social responsibilities, as their work often involves navigating complex political, social, and economic pressures. They must work within a structure that ensures marginalized populations are not ignored and supports long-term societal resilience against future disasters. Accountability in this context requires transparency, interaction with local stakeholders, and a focus on both the physical and social dimensions of the reconstruction process. Most importantly, a legal system providing the necessary regulatory and institutional framework must be structured.

Despite these challenges, architects have sought to extend their influence beyond mere design, attempting to engage in political and social actions to effect change. However, their efforts are frequently stymied by the lack of collaboration and transparency in the decision-making process, as well as by the absence of institutional support for a more integrated and participatory approach. Unaccountability of architects must be understood within the broader conjunctural situation in Turkey. With globalization, the increase in actors, intertwining of powers, and dispersion of responsibilities have led to a transition from traditional bureaucracies to collaborative arrangements involving the public and private sectors. Unlike the earlier phases of capitalism, the neoliberal order does not have distinct operational codes. As a more complex system, it governs our lives through the rights it delineates and the opportunities it offers. Accountability in democratic systems involves citizens' rights to

demand transparency and responsibility from public actors, a standard that remains unmet in Turkey's fragmented governance.

Government-backed projects often used architectural designs as propaganda tools, showcasing recovery superficially while neglecting the lived realities of affected communities. After 21 months, Antakya remains largely untouched, with architectural designs used to project an image of recovery that belies the ongoing struggles of the local population. Despite attempts to foster a more collaborative and transparent approach, the realities of the situation often fell short. Architects involved in the process were frequently faced with the risk of being constrained by top-down directives. Their master plan decisions for risk mitigation and resilient planning for urban strategy faced disruption. This led to a disjointed reconstruction effort, where the immediate need to restore property rights and rebuild housing overshadowed considerations of urban resilience and community well-being. Rather than acting as agents of holistic recovery, architects have increasingly limited their roles to narrow design functions, where the complexity of recovery has been reduced to mere architectural designs. This shift has resulted in a situation where accountability is in limbo neither fully acknowledged nor entirely absent, but in a grey area where responsibilities are obscured by systemic and cultural doxas. As a result, the broader needs of post-disaster recovery -temporary housing, psychological and emotional recovery, community involvement, and transparency- are neglected in favour of rapid, top-down reconstruction processes. Architects dissatisfied with the lack of participatory, transparent, and holistic development in the process normalized these challenges through efforts rooted in Turkey's societal norms, construction system, and bureaucracy.

This thesis contributes to the ongoing discourse on the role of architecture in post-disaster reconstruction, offering insights into the systemic issues that limit architects' effectiveness and proposing pathways for overcoming these challenges. Decisions brought by hasty legislative regulations such as the Presidential Decree No. 126 have produced master plans that were accepted through verbal agreements and were not binding. As a result of this situation, the designs of the architects remained only on paper. The fact that the architects were not informed about the implementation of the projects produced has also complicated the accountability discussions. By examining the case of Antakya, the research sheds light on the broader implications of Turkey's urbanisation policies and their impact on the built environment, offering a critical perspective on how architects can navigate and transform

these constraints to achieve more meaningful and impactful outcomes in the face of disaster. The collapse of a model in which a single architect, Bünyamin Derman in Antakya in particular, based on his superior efforts and attempted to contribute to urban production by assuming multiple responsibilities is inevitable. The exclusion of urban planners from the system and a structure managed by fragmented, verbal decisions have created a lack of holistic planning.

Ultimately, this thesis calls for a paradigm shift in the role of architects in post-disaster recovery. Moving beyond design-centric approaches, architects must embrace accountability as a core professional value, advocating for transparent, participatory processes that prioritise the needs and voices of affected communities. Due to these procedural and legal gaps and limited areas of authority and influence, architects cannot be an accountable actor. By addressing the systemic constraints that limit their agency and rethinking their position as both technical experts and social actors, architects can transform post-disaster reconstruction into an opportunity for holistic and sustainable recovery. The case of Antakya highlights both the urgency and potential for such change, offering a critical lens through which the architectural profession can reimagine its responsibilities in the face of disaster. In order for architects to develop an accountable profession and production practice, there is a need for defined codes, institutionalised practices, participatory processes, scientific and holistic planning, and the public display period of zoning plans.

What makes Antakya resilient is not the buildings but the people of Antakya. A resilient city design can be achieved with the needs, rights and participation of the people living in the city. The minimum standards of Antakya should be met urgently and the resources should be transferred to the health, education, social, economic and psychological investments required for recovery and to create a resilient society. A city produced with the approach of "Let's produce first, you can come back later" will neither be sustainable nor resilient. Instead, there is an urgent need for an institutionalized, accountable and participatory planning process. The same urgency applies to the need for architects to be more effectively organized in order to create pressure on the legislators.

Future Studies

The outcomes of the different methods of housing construction, urban life they produce, the residency of these housing surplus should be analysed. Practices in both architectural design and construction in post disaster scenarios should be held accountable for the transfer of funds. The possibility of gentrification, dispossession and exploration of the disaster victims in the reserved area is an alarming topic to be examine in the future. The limitations of censorship around the decision-making process of the housing construction made it hard to achieve accurate data and information about other cities and TOKİ projects which were built with the tunnel formwork system. They were preferred for rapid production, and the method and planning were not questioned during this process. In a system focused on statistics, a detailed and holistic planning process that will shape the future of the city has been disabled. Future studies should conduct comprehensive research comparing the experiences and roles of architects during the reconstruction of the 4 different cities with large destruction: Adıyaman, Kahramanmaraş, Malatya, and Hatay.

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APPENDIX

6.1. In-Depth Interview Questions

1. How were you involved in the post-earthquake reconstruction project in Antakya?
2. Can you describe your role in this process?
3. What is the scale of your design? Can you share quantitative data about your design?
4. At which stage of the master plan were you involved in the project?
5. Were you given flexibility in making urban design decisions? Did you contribute to the urban design framework?
6. How was participatory design defined and ensured in the reconstruction process?
7. How did you collaborate with other stakeholders in the reconstruction process, including government agencies, NGOs, local governments, professional associations, and civil society groups?
8. Did you seek assistance from other professionals during the design process?
9. Did the fact that these housing units were for post-disaster recovery create any differences in the production process compared to other housing projects?
10. What were the main design objectives and goals of your project, and how were they prioritised?
11. What feedback did you receive from the local people of Antakya? How was this feedback collected, how often, and how was it incorporated into the design solutions? How did this affect the final outcomes?
12. What were the time constraints for your design? How long were you given to complete the project?
13. What were the cost constraints, and how did they affect your design?
14. Did you consider the local context, urban memory, cultural heritage, and historical significance of Antakya in your design process?
15. Were ethical and social issues addressed in the design process?
16. The housing units produced in Antakya post-disaster are significant not only as design objects but also for their process. Will the design process of these projects be shared with the public?
17. What do you think is the role of architects in post-disaster reconstruction?
18. What are the main lessons learned from your experience with the Antakya reconstruction project? Do you have any recommendations for future post-disaster reconstruction efforts?