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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Hüseyin ŞEKERLİ



THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**UNPACKING MORAL HYPOCRISY: DIFFERENTIATING
THE EFFECTS OF MORAL SELF- LICENSING, COGNITIVE,
EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES OF MORAL
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Prof. Dr. Cemşafak ÇUKUR

Ankara, 2024

APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis, prepared by Hüseyin ŞEKERLİ and titled “Unpacking Moral Hypocrisy: Differentiating the Effects of Moral Self- Licensing, Cognitive, Emotional and Behavioral Outcomes of Moral Hypocrisy” is accepted by a unanimous vote as a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work, that I have not had any unethical behavior infringing patent rights and copyright at any stages from the planning to writing of the thesis, that I have obtained all the information in this thesis within academic and ethical rules, and that I have cited all the information and comments used in this thesis. 25-12-2024

Signature

Hüseyin ŞEKERLİ

X

DEDICATION

To my beloved grandfather, whose presence I always feel by my side,

&

To my dear mother and father,

&

To my spouse, my daughter, and my son,

&

To my siblings,

&

To my friends,

&

To all the good ones

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ABSTRACT

Unpacking Moral Hypocrisy: Differentiating the Effects of Moral Self-Licensing, Cognitive, Emotional and Behavioral Outcomes of Moral Hypocrisy

The lack of experimental methods to detect moral hypocrisy does individually presents a significant gap in the literature. To address this issue, the first part of this study (N=101) developed a novel experimental method, the envelope method, aimed at directly assessing individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy. The effectiveness of this method was evaluated using the Chi-square test. In the second part of the study (N=381), the newly developed method was employed to investigate the causes of moral hypocrisy behavior, focusing on moral self-licensing materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation. Participants completed the Material Values Scale, Self-Monitoring Scale, and Religious Orientation Scale. The data were analyzed using the Chi-square test, independent samples t-test, and binary logistic regression analysis. The third part of the study (N=196) examined the cognitive (micro-macro justice perception and state self-esteem), emotional (self-conscious emotions), and behavioral (donation as a helping behavior) outcomes of moral hypocrisy. Participants completed the Micro-Macro Justice Perception Scale, State Self-Esteem Scale, Emotional Labor Scale, and Helping Behavior Scale. The findings from the second part indicated that the moral self-licensing manipulation was effective, and participants engaging in moral hypocrisy exhibited higher levels of self-monitoring compared to those who did not. Analyses in the third part revealed that participants displaying moral hypocrisy had higher tendencies toward micro justice, significantly lower state social self-esteem, a greater likelihood of donating, and higher levels of shame compared to their counterparts. The primary contribution of this study lies in the development of a novel method that enables the identification of individuals engaging in moral hypocrisy individually. Future research applying this method with different variables and samples, using culturally sensitive measurement tools, is crucial for evaluating its validity.

Keywords: Moral hypocrisy, moral self-justification, causes and outcomes of moral hypocrisy behavior

ÖZ

Ahlaki İkiyüzlülüğün Çözümlemesi: Ahlaki Öz-Gerekçeleştirme Etkilerinin ve Ahlaki İkiyüzlülüğün Bilişsel, Duygusal ve Davranışsal Sonuçlarının Ayırıştırılması

Ahlaki ikiyüzlülük davranışını bireysel düzeyde tespit edebilecek deneysel yöntemlerin eksikliği, literatürde önemli bir boşluk oluşturmaktadır. Bu eksikliği gidermek amacıyla, çalışmanın birinci bölümünde (N=101), ahlaki ikiyüzlülük sergileyen bireyleri doğrudan değerlendirmeyi amaçlayan yeni bir deneysel yöntem (zarf yöntemi) geliştirilmiştir. Bu yöntemin etkililiği, Ki-kare testi kullanılarak değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde (N=381), yeni yöntem kullanılarak ahlaki ikiyüzlülük davranışının nedenleri (ahlaki öz-gerekçeleştirme, maddecilik, kendini ayarlama, dini yönelim) incelenmiştir. Katılımcılar, Maddeci Değerler Ölçeği, Kendini Ayarlama Ölçeği ve Dini Yönelim Ölçeğini doldurmuştur. Veriler, Ki-kare testi, bağımsız örneklem için t-testi ve ikili lojistik regresyon analizi ile değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde (N=196), ahlaki ikiyüzlülüğün bilişsel (mikro-makro adalet algısı ve durumsal benlik saygısı), duygusal (öz-bilinçli duygular) ve davranışsal (bağış yapma) sonuçları incelenmiştir. Katılımcılar, Mikro-Makro Adalet Algısı Ölçeği, Durumsal Benlik Saygısı Ölçeği, Duygusal Emek Ölçeği ve Yardım Davranışı Ölçeğini doldurmuştur. İkinci bölümden elde edilen bulgular, ahlaki öz-gerekçeleştirme manipülasyonunun etkili olduğunu ve ahlaki ikiyüzlülük sergileyen bireylerin, bu davranışı sergilemeyenlere kıyasla daha yüksek düzeyde kendini ayarlama eğilimi gösterdiğini ortaya koymuştur. Üçüncü bölümde yapılan analizler ise, ahlaki ikiyüzlülük sergileyen bireylerin mikro adalet eğilimlerinin daha yüksek düzeyde olduğunu, durumsal sosyal benlik saygılarının daha düşük düzeyde olduğunu, bağış yapma olasılıklarının daha fazla olduğunu ve utanç duygularının daha yüksek düzeyde olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu çalışmanın temel katkısı, ahlaki ikiyüzlülük sergileyen bireyleri bireysel düzeyde tespit etmeye olanak tanıyan yeni bir yöntemin geliştirilmesidir. Gelecekte, bu yöntemin farklı değişkenler ve örneklemelerle, kültüre duyarlı ölçme araçları kullanılarak uygulanması, yöntemin geçerliliğini değerlendirmek açısından kritik öneme sahiptir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahlaki ikiyüzlülük, ahlaki öz-gerekçeleştirme, ahlaki ikiyüzlülük davranışının nedenleri ve sonuçları

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	: Ankara University
AYBU	: Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University
BIRGing	: Basking in the Glow of Reflected Glory
CDT	: Cognitive Dissonance Theory
CSR	: Corporate Social Responsibility
DPT	: Dual Process Theory
EFA	: Exploratory Factor Analysis
IDGCC	: Identification with Global Consumer Culture
KMO	: Kaiser- Meyer Olkin
MFT	: Moral Foundations Theory
MOYS	: Ministry of Youth and Sports
MSI	: Moral Self Image
MSL	: Moral Self Licensing
MVS	: Materialistic Values Scale
PEB	: Pro-Enviromental Behavior
ROS	: Religious Orientation Scale
RWA	: Right Wing Authoritarianism
SDO	: Social Dominance Orientation
SMS	: Self Monitoring Scale
TPB	: Theory of Planned Behavior
TRC	: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UPB	: Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior

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1. INTRODUCTION

Moral behavior plays a critical role in regulating social relationships and adhering to moral norms. Moral hypocrisy, in contrast, undermines these norms and relationships at both individual and societal levels. At individual level, moral hypocrisy negatively impacts self-esteem, moral identity, and self-evaluative emotions. At societal level, its effects are complex and far-reaching. For instance, act of moral hypocrisy by leaders or prominent figures can erode trust in them and weaken social bonds (Canner, 2008; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Murphy, 1993). Moreover, such phenomenon diminishes trust in social norms and adversely affects moral frameworks, posing a significant barrier to their establishment and sustainability.

Studies indicate that moral hypocrisy is prevalent in society and commonly observed in individuals' daily lives (Ayal & Gino, 2012; Aquino & Reed, 2002). For example, Batson et al. (1997) demonstrated in an experimental study that, despite expressing intentions to act morally, 80% of participants chose actions favoring their self-interest. Similarly, a study by Mazar and Zhong (2010) revealed that more than 60% of individuals found it easier to rationalize unethical choices after engaging in environmentally friendly behavior. Greenwald and Banaji (1995) reported that while over 70% of individuals claimed to uphold moral consistency, they often violated it in practice. Academic cheating provides another example of widespread moral hypocrisy, with around 90% of students justifying dishonest behavior under the guise of fairness or necessity (Rabi et al., 2006). Furthermore, Gino et al. (2009) revealed that individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior within in-groups, highlighting the contextual nature of moral hypocrisy. Although Aquino and Reed (2002) reported that nearly 84% of participants viewed themselves as moral, experimental studies by Batson et al. (1997, 2000, 2002) revealed that 80–90% of individuals demonstrated immoral behavior in controlled settings. These findings underscore the widespread nature of moral hypocrisy and the pressing need for a deeper examination of this phenomenon.

Given its prevalence, investigating moral hypocrisy doers individually would provide significant contributions to the literature. Although literature on moral hypocrisy is abundant, an indepth literature review has shown that the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions of moral hypocrisy have not been simultaneously examined

individually. The limitation to detect directly moral hypocrisy doesers has constrained research into its various facets. The focus of the previous studies has been primarily on the causes or consequences of moral hypocrisy without emphasizing the identification of individuals who exhibit this behavior (Batson et al., 1997, 1999, 2002; Bian et al., 2020; Chvaja et al., 2020; Greene, 2014; Krettenauer et al., 2019; Lammers et al., 2010; Monin & Merritt, 2012; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Sie, 2015; Tamming, 2017; Yousaf & Gobet, 2013). Batson (2002) sought to address this gap by developing a method that covertly observed participants' moral weaknesses. However, ethical concerns regarding covert observation limited its application in subsequent studies.

This gap in the literature highlights the urgent need for methodologies capable of identifying moral hypocrisy individually, enabling a nuanced understanding of its antecedents and broader implications. Addressing this need, the present study introduces a novel approach to directly assess individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy. The introduction of this new approach represents a significant step forward in advancing knowledge of moral hypocrisy and its effects on individuals.

The importance of investigating moral hypocrisy individually extends beyond merely identifying its causes and consequences. It plays vital role in facilitating the development of interventions aimed at reducing unethical behavior by uncovering the underlying causes and psychological processes of this phenomenon. Given the widespread nature of moral hypocrisy and its individual and societal impacts across various domains of life, studying this behavior holds significant potential for strengthening social cohesion and trust. Addressing the causes and consequences of moral hypocrisy individually will not only deepen our understanding of personal behaviors but also foster social solidarity, ensure the sustainability of moral values, and offer a methodological framework for future research in this area. To explore the matter indepth, three consecutive studies were conducted.

Study 1 examined the validity of the method designed by Batson et al. (1997) to detect moral hypocrisy in the Turkish sample. Following this, the newly developed method (the envelope method) was tested to enable the examination of moral hypocrisy individually. The newly designed method was expected to allow the examination of both the causes and outcomes of moral hypocrisy in participants who engaged in this behavior. This method aimed to address the limitations of Batson's original coin method, which focused on indirect analysis of moral hypocrisy. The primary goal of study 1 was, therefore, to facilitate the direct identification of moral hypocrisy individually, allowing for its exploration across a wide range of variables. To do so, a quantitative research method with a quasi-experimental

design was employed. Using a Chi-square test, Batson's original method (coin method) was compared to the newly developed experimental method (envelope method). Subsequently, a statistical comparison was conducted to evaluate whether the envelope method could more effectively identify moral hypocrisy individually.

Following this, in study 2, the new method tested in study 1 was used to investigate the causes of moral hypocrisy in participants within the context of materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation. Moreover, moral hypocrisy was treated as a dependent variable to evaluate the effectiveness of moral self-licensing in the context of moral hypocrisy. To examine this effect, we hypothesized that moral self-licensing could increase moral hypocrisy behavior. This is because the good deeds people have done previously can serve as a reason or justification for engaging in bad behavior later on. To test this hypothesis, the group subjected to moral self-licensing manipulation was compared to non-manipulated group, focusing on various variables such as materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation.

Study 3 primarily focused on identifying the cognitive (micro-macro justice, state self-esteem), emotional (self-conscious emotions), and behavioral (donation as a helping behavior) outcomes of moral hypocrisy. In this section, moral hypocrisy was considered as an independent variable, and its potential influence on situational changes, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioral variables was explored.

The following section aims to provide comprehensive conceptual framework by discussing moral hypocrisy, moral self-licensing, materialism, self-monitoring, religious orientation, as well as cognitive variables (macro-micro justice, state self-esteem), emotional variables (self-conscious emotions) and behavioral variable (donation as a helping behavior).

1.1. Moral Hypocrisy

People have motivation on having good impression on others and desire to have positive views of themselves (Greenwald, 1980; Schlenker, 1980). As extensive literature in social psychology revealed people want to protect their positive self-image, because they want to see themselves as good and moral (Rosenberg, 1979; Schlenker, 1982). However, studies also indicated that if they have an opportunity to avoid being moral, they prefer to avoid it and behave immorally (Ayal & Gino, 2012).

Appearing moral and finding a way to escape possible costs represent two phases of the process of being hypocritical. First, a choice or decision is perceived as moral by

individuals when they have the opportunity to either uphold their moral principles or violate them. Second, individuals are motivated to maximize benefits by presenting themselves as moral; however, they may seek to avoid the costs of being too moral if given the chance (Batson et al., 1997, 2008).

When these two stages (appearing moral and find a way to escape from possible costs when it is possible) are assembled, we come across a blindspot term called moral hypocrisy which has been intensively investigated and clarified by Batson et al. (1997, 1999, 2002). Moral hypocrisy has been described as inconsistency between act and discourse. For example, people who advise moral principles do not behave according to those principles (Stone & Fernandez, 2008), or they preach moral principles or values in public, however, they ignore those in private (Lammers et al., 2010). Batson et al. (1997) described moral hypocrisy as “pretending to have moral principles, when he/she get a chance, turn the tables on other person by avoiding possible cost of being moral”.

In the moral psychology literature, the question of “How do those people who have moral principles behave when their self-interests conflict with their moral principles, especially if it is possible to be seen moral to other people and get away from possible costs of violating moral principles while favoring themselves?” is an interesting question which has been wondered by some researchers (Batson et al., 1997; Lönnqvist et al., 2014). Researchers explained that self interest motive is a fundamental factor to behave hypocritically (Batson et al., 1997, 1999; Monin & Merrit, 2010). Because humans, due to their inherently selfish nature, may manipulate moral norms to align with their own self interests when faced with a dilemma in order to maintain their personal benefits (Rosati, 2006). Therefore, it is important to mention the relationship between moral hypocrisy and self-interest.

1.1.1. Moral Hypocrisy and Self-Interest Motive

It is well known fact that human-being come into the world with ambition, desire, selfishness which are not to be filed. They are inclined to meet their needs and reduce tension stemming from their needs, impulses or deprivation, and to have pleasure. Conversely, in the process of moral development, social environment such as parents, teachers, friends put pressure on individuals to behave in line with moral standards and they have been inbued with moral principles from early ages to inhibit their self interests. In here, the aim is to turn its members' self-interests to their benefit by behaving moral, yet this suppression by society

can result in false moral behaviour which is just for show (Freud, 1961), because giving priority to their own self interests are indispensable and common traits for people. So, people learn how to meet their own needs without violating moral standards in public over time. They show themselves as if they firmly attach to moral principles, since they target self benefits by gaining the trust of others (Frank, 1988). In another word, not only they know how to meet their selfish needs, but also they learn how to present their behaviour proper to their own self and others (Burnstein, 1966; Krebs, 2005; Lapsley & Stey, 2011).

This contradictory situation is seen by Haidt (2007) as two-poled fact, one side is selfishness, other side is morally motivated. That is, it is like double-edge sword. Because most of people is inclined to favor their own self interest, while they also want to appear moral (Batson, 1997; Bersoff, 2008; Krebs, 2005). In another word, people may use moral principles or standards as a means to to cover their selfish side and represent themselves moral, however, still give priority to their own benefits (Krebs, 2005).

Batson et al. (1997, 1999) showed us how strong self-interest motivation of most people is. In their research, they created a simple dilemma which consists of positive and neutral tasks to choose. They give an opportunity to some participants to flip coin to assign tasks or choose to assign themselves to tasks they preferred without flipping coin. They found that most of people chose positive tasks, either flipping coin or not flipping coin. Both almost 90 percentage of participants who flipped coin assign themselves to possitive tasks and participants who were more willing to accept experimenter's assignment to the tasks when they knew this assignment would favour them support evidence of moral hypocrisy. Interestingly, those who privilege see themselves as having moral standards. Actually, the thing happened is just appearance of morality (take a chance on other participant by flipping coin) by using advantage of ambiguity of favoring themselves, while focusing on their own self-interest. (Batson et al., 1999; Frank, 1988).

Bananji et al. (2003) use the term of boundend ethicality to explain unethical behaviour. According to this, people give their decisions unconsciously. The unconscious decision is incompatible with their beliefs and choices, however asists their self interest motivation. As seen, self interest motive is very dominant motive over unethical behaviours, which one of them is hypocritical behaviour.

When thought in the context of moral hypocrisy experiments, there is an another point which prove the effect of self-interest. Latane and Darley (1970) pointed out that people can suspend and rebuild their thought or decision in an emergence situation. We can infer from this point of view that participants who flip coin in the moral hypocrisy

experiments may not have decided which side of coin is winning side. Participants may have decided after flipping coin, so participant will be always in winner side (Batson et al., 1997, 1999). This behaviour which result is warranted exposes the drive of self-interest. As a proof, Batson et al., (1997) found that some of participants might not be sure of what heads and tails refer to. That is, they did not make a decision that either heads or tails will win the lottery. Due to this ambiguity, they may serve their self interest easily. Moreover, people who rate themselves high moral responsibility than people who rate low themselves has been seen to act greater hypocrisy (Batson et al., 2002). Yet most of participants who flip coin said that flip coin is the fairest way to assign tasks, but almost all of them assigned themselves to positive tasks. This result highlights the rarity of true moral integrity and the prevalence of self-interest as a dominant motivation. At this point, a critical question arises: How do individuals manage this double-edged process of balancing moral ideals with self-interested actions? The most widely accepted explanation lies in the mechanism of rationalization. Moral hypocrisy emerges as a key concept in understanding how individuals confront ethical dilemmas while maintaining a positive self-image. Studying this phenomenon inevitably highlights the need to explore the rationalization mechanisms that make such behavior possible, because these cognitive processes are crucial in justifying actions that deviate from moral norms.

1.1.2. Moral Hypocrisy and Rationalization Mechanism

It is not surprising to expect people who support moral principles get involved in immoral actions. Rationalization mechanism has an effective role on those actions. People use rationalization mechanism to elude their immoral actions. For instance, people who massacre (in Bosnia, in Syria, in Yemeni, in Rwandan) can be perceived as heroes by themselves and their own nationalities due to rationalism mechanism, while they can be perceived as murder by victim nationalities (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Staub, 1989; Todorov, 2010). In society, there are some groups which believe that they are privileged in many aspect. Those groups of people can see themselves having rights to deviate from moral principles which they want other powerless group to follow. According to approach/inhibition theory, it is because the powerful group are more inclined to get potential rewards of their any action, so they are more self interest oriented as compared to powerless groups. Tendency to show favoritism toward their own group in terms of applying of moral principles resembles tendency to favour individuals' own interests when their self-

interests conflict with moral principles. In the study of Polman and Ruttan (2012), they found that people see their own transgression as more acceptable than others' transgressions. They judge themselves more leniently, but others' transgressions are inexcusable (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Moreover, they can ignore moral principles which has been asserted to be meritorious and precious (Darley, 1992; Todorov, 2010). One possible explanation for those self-interested behaviours may be that reactive use of moral principles is more prevalent than proactive use to justify and rationalize by people for their own actions (Batson et al., 1997, 1999). In addition to this, even though moral principles can function as a means to harmonize among human-being, those principles which are open to rationalize, especially abstract ones, may function as a rationalization means to facilitate morally selfish and unacceptable behaviours. Accordingly, people can behave as self-interest oriented if they persuade their own and deceive others that their behaviours are compatible with moral principles thanks to rationalization mechanism (Batson et al., 1999). Tension stemming from immoral or unacceptable behaviours and fear to appearing immoral have been overcome by virtue of rationalization mechanism. This fact is supported by Batson's studies (Batson et al., 1997a, 1999b, 2007c).

Moral principles may be used to rationalize moral or immoral actions more than to motivate them. Furthermore, people can satisfy their need to see themselves as moral through the rationalization mechanism (Bersoff, 2008; Tsang, 2002). So far, it has been explained how the rationalization mechanism bends moral principles to align with self-interest. Building on this, the discussion naturally leads to the concept of self-deception, which sheds light on how individuals not only justify their actions but also unconsciously deceive themselves to sustain a moral self-image, even when their behavior violates moral standards.

1.1.3. Moral Hypocrisy and Self-Deception

Self-deception is the most predictable and easy way to understand how possible moral hypocrisy is (Batson et al., 2008; Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). People can use self-deception strategies to escape from tension which stems from discrepancy between their selfish behaviours and moral standards they claim to have. In here, intuitive scientist metaphor may be a useful means which can be used to understand how self-deception makes moral hypocrisy possible. Intuitive scientist metaphor means that people strive to give meaning to their environment by processing information. However, using particular inference rules to make sense of evidence and inductive inferences can cause faulty results (Kuhn,

1989; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Most of the people, that is, intuitive scientists are intended to make inference using insufficient information (Kuhn, 1989).

Baumeister and Newman (1994) stated that people process information to make sense of their environment and world, and they make some inferences from these processes. However, they claimed that people made these inferences to reach their preferred outcome. Similarly, it has been stated that the self-regulation mechanism in humans can function to end self-deception, but it can be successful provided that self-deception is top secret (Baumeister, 1996; Bersoff, 1999).

As a personality trait and independent mental state, self-deception consists of composition of conscious belief which is motivationally false and inconsistent unconscious belief which is real (Jian et al., 2019; Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Self-deception provides nonexistent phenomena to meet people's wish or request. When people confront with a dilemma, they feel tension and have cognitive load. To avoid these tension and cognitive load, they persuade themselves their eye washing is true. Accordingly, the desired outcome of moral hypocrisy can be achieved by ordinary self deception. The important thing here is to manoeuvre the data in order to escape from discrepancy stemming from tension between self-serving behaviours and moral principles (Baumeister, 1996; Bersoff, 1999).

There is a similar manoeuvre in the case of moral hypocrisy. More specifically, self-deception serves moral hypocrisy in two ways. First one is that the behaviour is perceived as compatible with moral principles, even though it is not compatible with. But, the person still believes to have these moral standards. Second one is to avoid comparing immoral behaviour with moral principles. Hereby, the person can escape from tension stemming from violation (Batson, et al., 1999, 2008). It may be that the first strategy is more effective than the later strategy, leading to increased sensitivity to any phenomena caused by a discrepancy between behavioural norms. It is because, if a person who use first strategy can persuade that he/she behaves morally and focuses on positive aspects of his/her behaviour by removing the ambiguity of not being able to make a choice, he/she will have lived neutral or positive emotions, even such as pride, and saved from tension stemming from behaviour-standard discrepancy. The first strategy provides easiness to perceive immoral behaviour as compatible with moral principles. This strategy is certainly more convenient because participants don't have to specify their decides of which side of coin is winning before they toss up. Accordingly, the result of flipping a coin can be perceived as the participant's own choice, as if she had decided what she would prefer before flipping the coin, even if it wasn't.

Thus, the first strategy makes people easy to perceive themselves as moral and compatible with moral principles (Batson et al., 1999).

Eventhough self-deception strategy is useful mechanism to do moral hypocrisy, it may not exactly explain moral hypocrisy. Batson et al. (1999), in their first study, found that participants who flipped a coin and found the choice of "tasks that yield positive results to other (Pos to Other)" assigned themselves to the positive outcomes task instead of the others. Thus, it is difficult to explain this result with just self deception mechanism. However, it does not mean it is useless, it may not be necessary (Batson et al., 1999). In their second study, they highlighted that participant might have used second deception strategy which includes to avoid comparing immoral behaviour with participant's moral standards. In other words, participant can think that he/she flipped the coin, that is fair. Afterwards, participant terminates his/her evaluation of his/her immoral behaviour and unfair result is ignored by the participant. These results and strategies show us both self-deception mechanisms are useful to explain complex moral hypocrisy process.

People can also avoid facing to moral behaviour- moral standards discrepancies through suspending cognition by using precursor affective alarms. These affective cues provide people not to think about thoughts related to moral hypocritical behaviour. In this way, people abstain to confront with undesirable results and its implications. Additionally, people can have high tolerance about discrepancy between standards and behaviours, and they see this situation as acceptable and usual (Batson et al., 1999; Baumeister & Newman, 1994).

The mechanisms of self-deception not only enable individuals to ignore discrepancies between their actions and moral standards but also serve as a foundation for understanding the interaction between moral hypocrisy and moral integrity. This relationship is significant as it underscores the tension between appearing moral and genuinely adhering to moral principles, highlighting the complexities of human moral behavior.

1.1.4. Moral Hypocrisy and Moral Integrity

Moral principles have imposed on children by their social environments via reward or punishment. Some of these children internalize these moral principles and see these principles as ultimate aim. Others may seem to be moral, however, it is just for to produce moral outcome. If individuals internalized moral principles genuinely, this phenomena is called as moral integrity (McKinnon, 1999; Williams, 1981). Some scientists define moral

integrity as an outcome of desire to uphold moral principles in the absence of charming rewards or punishment refrained from (Batson, 2007). Moral integrity is an important topic which is used to understand moral motivation of people.

Batson et al. (1997) stated that it is important to know if motivation of moral behaviour derives from genuine moral integrity or not. To answer this question, Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b) conducted experiments and pointed out that if a person has the opportunity to appear moral in the eyes of himself and others and avoid the cost of being moral, he will choose his own interests. After a series of experiments, they claimed there could be two bases of moral motivation which can be called as moral hypocrisy, moral integrity or both of them. Moreover, they have carried out two staged study to understand the true idiosyncrasy of moral motivation. First stage was to elicit moral action which infer motivation from moral behaviour instead of unwise hypothetical situation which can be misleading. Second stage, since moral behaviour can not show main cause (moral hypocrisy or moral integrity) of moral motivation, an opportunity that a person will be able to gain advantage from outcome of his/her own moral behaviour and as if one can appear that he/she has no effect on given to people. Such an uncertainty can give true idiosyncratic of moral motivation; moral hypocrisy or moral integrity. What is more, the right of choice makes moral hypocrisy easy in private and people can behave in accordance with their own interest. In doing so, it will be provided people have behaved like they really are.

When ambiguity is present, that is, a person has an opportunity to conceal his/her immoral behaviour and when it is difficult to be determined by the others, if moral behaviour does not affect the outcome of moral behaviour, this situation proves that the person has powerful moral integrity. Thus, the ultimate aim of that person is to behave based on moral principles. However, if that person use this opportunity to appear moral and his/her behaviour affect outcome of moral behaviour, we can call that person as “participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy”. Overall, ambiguity provided here make easier to differentiate moral behaviour (stemmed from moral integrity) from immoral one (stemmed from moral hypocrisy). As it is seen, ambiguity between appearance and reality make great contribution to understand the nature of moral motivation (moral hypocrisy or moral integrity) (Batson et al., 1997a, 1999b, 2002c).

In addition to this, not to confuse moral integrity with altruistic motivation, it may be also useful to differentiate these two concept from each other. In the moral integrity, the ultimate aim is to behave according to moral principles, whereas in the altruistic motivation, the ultimate aim is to enhance others’ well-being (Batson et al., 1994).

At that point, it may be useful to mention difference between moral hypocrisy and moral weakness, since one of terms coming to mind is moral weakness. Paradigm of moral weakness can be explained as violating somebody's own moral principles deliberately (Rapaport, 1975). Difference between moral hypocrisy and moral weakness should be explained based on study of Batson et al. (2002). In that study, people who flip coin, and assign themselves to positive tasks eventhough they lost raffle perceive their own behaviour more moral than people who do not flip coin but assign themselves to positive task. In addition to this, percentage of first group of people was quite high than second group of people. This result refers us to evidence of moral hypocrisy rather than moral weakness. If this difference between two group was close each other, then claimed that this is because of moral weakness. In moral weakness situation, people are supposed to accept that their actions are not fair, then are supposed to rate their moral score lower than others. However, in the situation of moral hypocrisy, people wants to appear moral, and do not want to pay the price. Furthermore, they wanted to show themselves and their morality high (Batson et al., 2002). Interestingly, people who flip coin and assign themselves to positive task scored higher from social responsibility scale and emphathic concern scale than others which include people who did not flip coin and assign themselves to positive tasks and assign others to positive tasks. These results clearly shows that motivation related to higher scores on scales associated with morality provide us clearer evidence about moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 2002). After explaining the differences with hypocrisy and other similar concepts, knowing the various forms of hypocrisy will provide a deeper understanding of the concept in question.

1.1.5. Forms of Moral Hypocrisy

Generally, moral hypocrisy is accepted to include inconsistency. Although it is useful to accept moral hypocrisy includes inconsistency in this manner to get valuable research findings, should be noted that sometimes moral hypocrisy may not include inconsistency (Monin & Merit, 2010). Because, even if hypocrisy is used to refer deception in non-moral domain, it is a problematic issue which covers dishonesty.

Eventhough behavioral inconsistency is a common accepted feature of moral hypocrisy, hypocrisy may not require failing to practice what a person preach. What preach at that moment may not have believed by this person. Hence, it is expected by people to fail in practicing of moral norm aferomentioned (Monin & Merit, 2010). In literature, general

tendency is to study moral hypocrisy with inconsistency. Inconsistent behaviour is preferred while studying hypocrisy because it provides tangible evidence for hypocritical behaviour. However, hypocrisy behaviour is not limited to explicit inconsistency. Thus, focusing on moral hypocrisy which include inconsistency and does not include inconsistency can help us to get better understanding this immoral behaviour; moral hypocrisy (Hale, 2012). Accordingly, we will now explain moral hypocrisy including behavioral inconsistency, and then moral hypocrisy which does not include behavioral inconsistency.

1.5.1.1. Moral Hypocrisy as Behavioral Inconsistency

Monin and Merrit (2010) pointed out that there are lots of appearance of moral hypocrisy, such as appearance of conflict between attitude and behaviour or psychological disguise of illegitimate intentions. However, most accepted form of moral hypocrisy includes moral stance without paying any cost. Moral hypocrisy defined by Batson et al. (1997) shares common feature as stated before and useful to make research. Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b, 2002c) found that most of the people choose moral posturing without paying price. That is, they choose not to pay cost and want to get price to themselves by passing over moral norms, especially when they are sure their hypocrisy is not to be recognized by others. This form of moral hypocrisy addresses persons who experience moral hypocrisy and evaluate their own selves. The question of how others perceive persons who experience moral hypocrisy is another wondering question. Think about two persons, which first one emphasizes how important morality is and then seemed he/she does not do what claimed before. Second person does not have big claims about morality. Since moral hypocrisy wipes out positive effects of prior deeds, observers accept immoral behaviour of second person as more innocent compared to first person (Effron & Monin, 2010).

1.5.1.2. Moral Hypocrisy without Behavioral Inconsistency

In the some definition of moral hypocrisy, instead of not practicing moral norm, disingenuousness is main point to consider. Therefore, it may be reasonable to take hypocrisy with hidden intent (non-moral) or self-serving motives (Monin & Merrit, 2010). In the study of Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b, 2002c), moral hypocrisy has been studied within subjects. That is, it has been investigated whether one person does not practice what he/she preach in the content of behavioral inconsistency. However, Monin and Merrit (2010) claimed that

moral hypocrisy can be investigated in the content of situational manipulations without behavioral inconsistency even if moral hypocrisy with behavioral inconsistency takes much more attention. Accordingly, moral decisions given by subjects (between subjects) can be studied in the content of opportunistic use of morality. For example, it is more likely to expect people to apply moral norms in a different manner to himself/herself and other people. Individuals can apply moral norms differently. That is, a person may use a moral norm in a different way (mostly in a more flexible and more positive way), while same person may use same moral norm in a different way for another person (mostly in a more strict and negative way) (Monin & Merrit, 2010; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007).

One way of doing moral hypocrisy is that flexibility of a moral norm has shown difference between his/herself and another. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) and Batson et al. (1999) have revealed that when people did same unfair behaviour, they perceived others less fair than they did. Applying double standard is valid in the relationship between ingroup and out group. People has also inclination to apply moral norms differently for their in the ingroup and out-group (Lammers et al., 2010). The point here is individuals are not objective or have no goodwill in the carrying moral norms out, while, they interpret their own immoral decision or behaviour more moral or fair in themselves in the situation of violation of moral norm he/she preached before (Monin & Merrit, 2010).

Another way of doing moral hypocrisy is strategic moralization. In that situation, when a person see another one who behaves selfishly, he/she can feel a sting or anger to selfish person. This emotional state, which serves to make one feel better, is due to one's own inadequacy rather than being truly integrated into moral norms. In other words, a person has no courage to act for his/her own interest or can not behave for his/her own interest by breaking moral norm, he/she can feel jealousy and anger to another person acting his/her own interests. When this person compares his/her behavior with another person's behavior, he/she evaluates his/her behavior, which he/she thinks is compatible with moral norms, from the perspective of being moral in order to protect his/her own worth. He even prefers to condemn another person's selfish behavior to another person for gains that he could not achieve himself. In this situation, hypocrisy stems from fear of confrontation with unconfident, unsavoury, and spineless part of his/her self, not natural lack of virtue coming from inborn. Strategic moralization functions as supporting mechanism for self-worth. This kind of strategic moralization is a manifestation of moral hypocrisy without inconsistency, which is not a situation of not performing what one redees (Monin & Merrit, 2010).

Another form of moral hypocrisy that does not involve incongruity involves the denial of virtue. This form of moral hypocrisy includes insincerity towards moral principles. Individuals whose self-image are threatened through comparison may show less respect for the same behavior (such as self-interested behavior) than individuals who are not involved in any comparison. This fact can be exemplified from the racist study literature. For example, participants were given some statements that included the plot. In this plot, only black suspects are introduced as criminals. Participants criticized this situation as being unethical, but observers evaluated this reaction as a moral behavior. However, a different situation arose when these observers had previously completed the same task. They scolded the black suspect and did not see this reaction as a moral act (Monin et al., 2008).

This situation may stem from suspicion about moral motives, so moral or immoral behaviour may be seen as a result of situational factors instead of moral temperament. To be accused of moral hypocrisy by others is a course of human beings' nature. Hence, if they feel to be less moral compared to moral person, they may see moral person's behaviour as immoral or look with suspicion to moral person's behaviour (Monin & Mennin, 2010). In a similar vein with moralization, this example proves that demoralization has self-protective nature. Moreover, people tend not to believe other individuals' moral behaviour, or they believe involuntarily. They prefer to attribute moral behaviours from others to moral hypocrisy or ulterior motives. This tendency can derive from the self-protective nature of human-being (Fein et al., 1990; Monin & Merrit, 2010).

Similarly, Crisp and Cowton (1994) classified four different forms of moral hypocrisy which include inconsistency and does not include inconsistency in addition to other common features. This classification as follows provides clear evidence to understand the perception of self and others' hypocrisy;

- a) Inconsistency: Inconsistency is accepted as underlying feature for all forms of hypocrisy. In the process of not practicing what you preach, focusing exclusively to "not practicing" show us first form of moral hypocrisy. According to them, inconsistency can be explained as follows; fail to be committed to moral requirements that other people accepted; any instance which a person says something in public, however he/she does the opposite when she/he is on her /his own, or any example in which a person's expressed beliefs don't disagree with their purposeful behaviour.
- b) Pretense: Main character of pretense is that a person does not believe in standards which is endorsed by public, however, he feign he has these moral standards. In

the pretense, specially spuriousness of a person's implicit and explicit statements or preachings are focused on. A person proclaims to have a quality or characteristic implicitly or explicitly, but he/she does not practice that quality or characteristic intentionally. While behaving in this way, he/she hopes to hide his/her real character or motivations to gain rewards and escape from punishments. To make it clear, consider the following two individuals:

"Mike is a cigarette smoker who admits he cannot quit smoking and warns others to stop smoking while they can because it is unhealthy and will ultimately destroy their lives. Bob is also a smoker who hides cigarettes all over his house, secretly smokes, and then tells others to quit smoking because it is unhealthy and destroys lives, saying, "Look it's easy, I did it! If you had a little more will power, you could do it too."

In that example, Bob is entirely know that he smokes but he is pretending not to smoke. Thus, he can be accused of doing pretense.

- a) Blame: The main feature of blame is that a person criticizes another person for similar or smaller faults which the critic himself has same wrong behaviours. In the absence of open behavioral inconsistency, it is more likely to see and perceive blame. The person concerned has characteristics which criticized, however the person criticizes lesser or similar wrongs. Blame can consist of disingenuous preaching. People who blame others do not seem their moral indignation because of concerns based on moral principles, rather, they show their moral indignation to score over others morally. People who choose blame are talented in making arbitrary distinctions between others immoral behaviours and their own. Blame can function as applying double standards, especially if participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy uses standards to their advantage, which this standard is expected to apply to himself/herself and others equally. Participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy may deprive or promote one of two equally guilty parties, which shows that same standard is used differently to both parties. In here, it may be helpful to understand relationship between blame and pretense. Both of the, people want to obtain high ground morally or raise the appearance of virtue between themselves and others. To do this, people choose either raising oneself up or demolish someone else (Hale, 2012).
- b) Complacency: Those people care about morality and take it seriously, however, if moral behaviour appears costly, then, they choose to avoid from those costs resulting from moral behaviour (Crisp & Cowton, 1994). Complacency includes

disingenuous preaching. The participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy wants to make good impression on others and besides this, the participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy has faith he/she support implicitly or explicitly. The important point here, the participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy choose the easiest way to be seem moral and only wants to do as much as as is needed to make that good impression. Generally speaking, the individual exhibiting moral hypocrisy claims implicitly or explicitly to have moral beliefs to make good impression, however, he/she choose the easiest things to do but not hard things that are necessary by those beliefs to avoid costs resulting from their moral beliefs (Hale, 2012). Herein, it may be helpful to understand complacency by stressing out the difference between complacency and pretense. In cases of complacency, the individual exhibiting moral hypocrisy has the supported belief for real, while in cases of pretense the individual exhibiting moral hypocrisy just pretends to possess claimed belief. Secondly, in pretense, the participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy wants to get rewards linked to a desired impression (not every time). In complacency, the participant exhibiting moral hypocrisy wants to avoid costs pertaining to desired impression (Hale, 2012).

Generally speaking, disingenuous and inconsistency are fundamental factors of various forms of hypocrisy (Crisp & Cowton, 1994). In addition to this, based on level of disingenuous, from low to high or as disingenuous increases, it can be thought that the order can be as inconsistency < complacency < blame < pretense. Moreover, this order may help to understand how and why some behaviours are seen as more hypocritical than other immoral behaviours. In here, one of important question is that how people mitigate or cope with the effects of hypocrisy.

Moral hypocrisy can be understood as a form of ethical or cognitive dissonance. However, it is more accurate to analyze moral hypocrisy through the lens of ethical dissonance. To clarify this distinction, it is important to understand the difference between ethical dissonance and cognitive dissonance. In cognitive dissonance, behavior that contradicts a belief or attitude cannot be denied because it is publicly observable. As a result, the individual often adjusts their beliefs or attitudes to align with their behavior to avoid inconsistency. In ethical dissonance, however, unethical behavior is known only to the individual and not to others. Therefore, there is no need for the individual to change their internal beliefs or attitudes to address the dissonance (Ayal & Gino, 2012). The similarities between ethical dissonance and moral hypocrisy—such as unethical behavior being known

only to the individual and the lack of a need to change internal beliefs or attitudes—indicate that similar basic adjustment strategies may be used to reduce moral hypocrisy.

1.1.6. Strategies to Mitigate Effects of Moral Hypocrisy

Moral hypocrisy can cause identity predicaments and cognitive dissonance. Some of these predicaments is minor, but some of them is remarkable. To cope with these predicaments, people can activate five strategies (Brown, 1998). First strategy is to claim innocence or endeavor to reject responsibility. When people did hypocrisy, they benefit from doubt for their own sake. They can see this situation possible exception in cases of direct inconsistency, however, they do not give this credit to others. When discussed their own moral hypocrisy and others' moral hypocrisy, they immediately reject to be person exhibiting moral hypocrisy, while they easily indicate how and when another person did hypocrisy. Furthermore, they do not have insight into why others behaved hypocritically.

Hence, those people can infer the other individuals' (that is individual exhibiting moral hypocrisy) beliefs or standards from their own moral hypocrisy behaviour. In short, it can be inferred that when it comes to their own behavior, people tend not to perceive dissonance as hypocrisy between beliefs or standards and behaviors, but perceive others' behavior as hypocrisy based on their own inconsistency between beliefs or standards and behaviors. Due to effects of dissonance on people, they sometimes can give trivial examples of their own hypocritical behaviour. People who behave hypocritically confess more general things about their own hypocritical behaviour, but they give more detail for others' hypocritical behaviour. By doing so, they endeavor to cope with their identity predicaments, because the confessing of general hypocritical behaviour can trigger the apprehension of everyone can make small mistake and it is less threatening for individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy. Rest of three strategies is reinterpretation which includes altering the meaning of the event, justification which include rationalizes the behaviour, and excusing which includes minimizing responsibility for the hypocritical behaviour by claiming not to be willful. These three strategies can especially function as mitigating information to cope with negative effects of identity predicaments, that is, protecting moral self-image (Brown, 1998; Hale, 2012).

Protecting moral self-image, while benefit from dishonest behaviour remind us moral hypocrisy because of similarities of those two term. Due to these similarities, it can be inferred that methods to reduce ethical dissonance using in the situation of dishonest

behaviour may be also valuable asset to reduce dissonance in the situation of moral hypocrisy. Those methods enabling people to rationalize and close eyes' to the person own faults are moral cleansing, local social utility, and social comparisons of one's own behaviour to behaviours of others (Ayal & Gino, 2012). Moral cleansing is the first mechanism which means that an attempt to get away from negative feelings result from committing an immoral behaviour through mental appeasement (Tetlock et al., 2000). This conscious process help people walk away from their immoral acts or their transgressions. Accordingly, they can have a white page in future life (Ayal & Gino, 2012). Secondly, one person who committed immoral behaviour can perform an altruistic behaviour. This altruistic behaviour may also serve as a means of justification for immoral behaviour in the future. Immoral behaviour such as cheating or hypocrisy can benefit other people in addition to the person herself/himself. Hereby, the person who commit immoral behaviour has had avoid from decreasing the level of moral self- image, because the person has shared the benefits getting from immoral behaviour with other people in community. In other words, person exhibiting moral hypocrisy has had preserved his/her own moral self image by sharing his/her benefits obtained from immoral behavior with other people in the society (Ayal & Gino, 2012; Baumeister, 1998). This mechanism is called as "Local social utility". Last one is social comparisons. According to that, people observe others' behaviour and find out social norms which is related to dishonest behaviour by interacting with other people in society (Campbell, 1964). They observe frequency of these unethical behaviour and where and when those people who committed unethical behaviour stopped. Then, people asses costs and benefits of others' transgressive behaviour and make a decision in a similar situation (Ayal & Gino, 2012; Becker, 1968).

Learning social norms by observing society makes unethical behaviour easier for people in the society, since it may lower the negative effects of immoral behaviour (Ayal & Gino, 2012). This explaining can be also true for moral hypocrisy, since people believe that most of the people behave like they do as based on their observing the society (Gino et al., 2009; Rabi et al., 2006). Moral hypocrisy is a complex phenomenon that refers to individuals engaging in self-serving behaviors while striving to appear moral. Understanding this complexity requires addressing specific theories and approaches, as they help uncover the cognitive, emotional, and social processes underlying moral hypocrisy.

1.1.7. Interpreting Moral Hypocrisy Behavior Through Theoretical Perspectives

The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provides a robust theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between planned behavior and moral hypocrisy. The Theory of Planned Behavior posits that an individual's intention to perform a specific behavior plays a critical role in determining the likelihood of that behavior being carried out (Ajzen, 1991). In the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), individuals' behaviors are explained by three main factors. Attitudes refer to an individual's positive or negative evaluations of a behavior. Subjective norms indicate the need to meet the expectations of significant reference groups, such as family, friends, or society. Perceived behavioral control refers to an individual's belief in their ability to perform a specific behavior. These three key factors influence behavioral intentions, thereby shaping the final behavior. However, inconsistencies can arise between individuals' intentions and actual behaviors. This is where moral hypocrisy comes into play. Moral hypocrisy involves the rationalization of one's actions to align with social acceptance. TPB serves as a valuable framework for analyzing this rationalization process. In the context of these three main factors, the rationalization process leading to moral hypocrisy can be explained as follows:

Attitudes: Individuals form intentions before engaging in morally questionable behaviors. If an individual perceives immoral behavior, such as moral hypocrisy, to be beneficial due to personal interests or rationalized justifications, the likelihood of engaging in such behavior increases. During this process, individuals may cognitively restructure their attitudes toward the behavior, thereby reducing the cognitive dissonance between their beliefs or statements and their actions. This restructuring facilitates the enactment of moral hypocrisy behavior.

Subjective Norms: If individuals perceive that immoral behaviors are prevalent and socially acceptable within their group or environment, the probability of engaging in behaviors like moral hypocrisy may increase. In such scenarios, individuals might outwardly conform to social norms to maintain their social status and prestige while simultaneously acting in a self-serving manner.

Perceived Behavioral Control: When individuals believe they can manage the consequences of their immoral actions and avoid negative outcomes, their propensity to engage in such behaviors increases.

To summarize, individuals' intentions to engage in morally questionable behaviors, such as moral hypocrisy, are influenced by their attitudes, social norms, and perceptions of control. Through rationalization, they justify these behaviors, convincing themselves that their social prestige will remain intact or that the consequences will be insignificant. This rationalization strengthens their intention to engage in behaviors like moral hypocrisy. In conclusion, the relationship between the mechanisms proposed by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and moral hypocrisy provides a highly valuable theoretical connection for explaining individuals' conflicts between social conformity and moral consistency.

Another theory that can contribute to explaining moral hypocrisy is Moral Foundations Theory. Examining this relationship can provide a deeper understanding of the individual dynamics of moral hypocrisy while also offering a more comprehensive explanation of how moral hypocrisy interacts with moral norms in society. Haidt and Joseph (2004) proposed a multifaceted understanding of morality guided by intuitions that align with cultural, moral, and evolutionary codes across different regions of the world. Their Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) defines morality based on five core foundations, each representing adaptive mechanisms developed to resolve distinct social dilemmas through a combination of genetic predispositions and environmental interactions. These foundations, conceptualized as opposing pairs, include: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. While these moral foundations are universal, their relative significance can vary across cultures, influencing how individuals make moral judgments. The theory is grounded in three key principles: (1) Implicit or intuitive moral judgments precede rational decision-making. (2) Morality is multidimensional, encompassing various foundations. (3) The emphasis placed on different moral foundations is contextually relative, varying across individuals, social groups, and cultures (Graham et al., 2013).

To explain moral hypocrisy within the framework of Moral Foundations Theory, it is essential to understand how individuals utilize these moral foundations during the moral decision-making process. For instance, individuals may emphasize certain moral foundations that align with their personal interests or group identities while neglecting others. A practical example involves someone who claims a strong commitment to the principle of fairness but disregards it when prioritizing loyalty to an in-group member, thereby aligning with the moral foundation of loyalty instead of fairness. Moral Foundations Theory posits that individuals make decisions intuitively and later justify their actions through moral reasoning. This justification often involves selectively applying moral

foundations to rationalize behavior. For example, someone who tells a lie may justify it by referencing a higher moral principle, such as authority (e.g., claiming that a respected figure would have done the same). In doing so, the individual violates other moral foundations but masks their immoral behavior by tying it to an acceptable moral framework.

Additionally, individuals may use prior moral behavior to justify future immoral actions. For instance, after behaving in line with one moral foundation, they might rationalize subsequent immoral behavior by appealing to another foundation, creating a perceived balance. This dynamic allows individuals to navigate between moral foundations, reducing the cognitive dissonance between their stated moral values and actual behaviors, thereby sustaining moral hypocrisy. In summary, individuals employ moral foundations flexibly, navigating between them to reduce inconsistencies between their declared moral values and actual behavior. This process enables them to prioritize personal or group interests, maintain their self-image, and conceal moral inconsistencies, thereby facilitating moral hypocrisy.

Bandura's (1999) Moral Disengagement Theory provides a robust framework for understanding moral hypocrisy by explaining how individuals rationalize their moral inconsistencies and alleviate the discomfort arising from such contradictions. Examining these two concepts together is crucial for understanding moral inconsistencies and their implications for interpersonal relationships and social justice. Bandura's theory elucidates the mechanisms individuals employ during moral hypocrisy to justify their actions. For instance, an individual may rationalize their behavior with statements such as "I had no other choice" or "It had to be done." Common mechanisms include blaming the victim and rationalizing actions through moral justifications. Through these strategies, individuals avoid the costs associated with moral behavior while prioritizing their own interests.

The theory also highlights how individuals strategically use disengagement mechanisms to preserve their social image during acts of moral hypocrisy. For example, while criticizing others, they may engage in similar behavior but frame it more favorably for themselves through advantageous comparisons. Such strategies enable individuals to maintain a moral facade while protecting their self-interest.

It is equally important to explore how cognitive dissonance theory explains the psychological tension underlying moral hypocrisy and the mechanisms individuals use to resolve this tension. According to Festinger's (1954) Cognitive Dissonance Theory, individuals experience psychological discomfort when their actions conflict with their beliefs or values. To reduce this discomfort, they may adopt various strategies, such as

altering their attitudes or behaviors, aligning their actions with their beliefs, or engaging in rationalization or self-deception.

In the context of moral hypocrisy, individuals strive to appear aligned with societal norms and expectations while simultaneously pursuing personal interests that contradict the moral standards they impose on others. This discrepancy between their moral self-concept and immoral behavior creates cognitive dissonance. To resolve this tension, individuals often resort to mechanisms such as moral hypocrisy, which allows them to safeguard both their self-concept and public image. Moral hypocrisy enables individuals to maintain the appearance of moral integrity in line with societal expectations, even when their private actions deviate from these standards. In this regard, moral hypocrisy can be considered an effective strategy for preserving the self-concept while alleviating cognitive dissonance.

Having explored the connection between moral hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance theory, it is equally critical to examine its relationship with dual process theory, as this perspective provides valuable insights into the cognitive mechanisms underpinning moral hypocrisy, particularly the interplay between intuitive and deliberative processes in moral decision-making. The Dual-Process Model, proposed by Greene et al. (2001) posits that moral and immoral decision-making involves the interaction of two distinct cognitive systems: automatic, intuitive emotional responses (System 1) and deliberate, rational reasoning (System 2). System 1 is characterized by fast, unconscious, effortless, and emotionally driven processes. It adopts a rule-based perspective on moral or immoral behavior, such as “Dishonesty is wrong” or “Harming another person is not acceptable.”. System 2, on the other hand, operates slowly, consciously, and logically. It is effortful and flexible, focusing on maximizing benefits and minimizing harm when making moral decisions. In the context of moral hypocrisy, this process unfolds as follows:

1. Intuitive responses (System 1) establish moral standards, which shape an individual's moral identity.
2. When self-interest comes into play, rational reasoning (System 2) overrides these moral standards, rendering them ineffective.

In other words, moral hypocrisy emerges as a result of the conflict between these two systems. Furthermore, according to the theory, when individuals engage in behaviors inconsistent with their automatic moral intuitions, they use rational reasoning to exhibit moral hypocrisy, thereby protecting both their self-interest and their self-image.

Other theories and approaches can also be added to those mentioned above. However, most of these perspectives highlight the individual's efforts to protect their positive self-

image while simultaneously safeguarding their self-interest through strategies such as self-deception or moral justification. Collectively, these theories provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying moral hypocrisy.

To gain a deeper understanding of the concept of moral hypocrisy, it is necessary to examine related concepts that shed light on the mechanisms enabling individuals to justify selfish behavior while maintaining a moral self-image. One such concept is moral self-licensing, which is particularly important in the context of moral hypocrisy as it explains how prior good deeds can provide a sense of moral credit, allowing individuals to engage in morally questionable actions without threatening their sense of moral worth.

1.2. Moral Self-Licensing

The concept of moral self-licensing is referred to by various names in the literature, including "moral licensing," "self-licensing," and "licensing effect." These terms are used to describe a subconscious phenomenon whereby individuals are more likely to engage in immoral or problematic behaviors when they have previously engaged in good deeds. Typically, individuals may refrain from engaging in these immoral behaviors due to a fear of being perceived as immoral. However, prior good deeds provide a form of credit that makes it easier to justify these immoral acts. In other words, individuals may be more inclined to engage in morally problematic behaviors when they rely on their previous moral conduct (Hartmann et al., 2023; Jordan et al., 2011; Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Mullen & Monin, 2016).

When individuals engage in unethical behavior, they strive to restore a sense of balance as a means of compensating for their wrongdoing. This process is known as moral self-licensing, and it is a phenomenon that has been extensively studied by Wallington (1973). In fact, moral self-licensing can be conceptualised as a form of cleansing. Those who engage in unethical conduct may engage in ethical conduct in order to reduce emotional distress and other negative feelings (Ayal & Gino, 2012). Moreover, they tend to prioritize virtuous conduct. To illustrate, individuals who derive income through illicit means tend to allocate their resources towards virtuous pursuits rather than leisure (Levav & McGraw, 2009). Those who perceive themselves to have engaged in harmful actions towards others are more likely to engage in altruistic behaviours towards others. This evidence demonstrates that individuals seek equilibrium by reducing their ethical dissonance (Ayal & Gino, 2012; Darlington & Mackey, 1966). If an individual believes themselves to be morally upright,

their inclination to act in accordance with their moral principles may be diminished, given that they have already accumulated a reserve of moral capital through their previous actions. Therefore, they may opt for a more costly approach. Indeed, the sense of moral superiority has been demonstrated to restrict future moral behaviour (Sachdeva et al., 2009).

Moral self-licensing can give rise to a broad and diverse range of immoral behaviours. It is possible that individuals may be more inclined to display prejudiced and negative attitudes and behaviours (e.g. lying more or choosing more pleasurable products instead of choosing useful products) following the recollection of their previous positive behaviours (Effron et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2011; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). The moral licensing theory postulates that individuals establish a kind of equilibrium to operate a consistent moral value mechanism for themselves and other individuals they hold in high regard (Effron & Monin, 2010). One of the mechanisms that operates during this process is the moral compensation mechanism. Moral compensation indicates that when an individual experiences a decline in their moral self-perception, they are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviours such as helpfulness (Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). In a separate study, Tang et al. (2021) and Wang et al. (2022) observed that unethical pro-organizational behaviour (UPB) was associated with increased helping behaviour, both towards external stakeholders and the organization. The results provide a clear understanding of the moral self-licensing cycle.

On the other hand, individuals who perceive themselves to be morally upright in a specific domain tend to exhibit diminished motivation to adhere to moral standards in other domains (Merritt et al., 2010a, 2012b; Sachdeva et al., 2009). The moral self-licensing effect has been the subject of differing interpretations, based on findings from a range of research fields. For instance, if there is a perceived correlation between the conduct displayed by the individual and the values or identity of that individual, it is more probable that consistency will be maintained between behaviour and identity. In such a case, the probability of the moral licensing effect is reduced (Dütsche et al., 2018; Mullen & Monin, 2016). Moreover, when individuals do not perceive morality as an integral aspect of their self-concept, their feelings of moral superiority facilitate the exhibition of self-serving behaviours (Mullen & Monin, 2016).

The moral credits model posits that individuals act as if they are accumulating credits in a bank, with the intention of either purchasing positive behaviours or offsetting negative ones. In accordance with the moral credentials model, an individual's behaviour serves to mediate the interpretation of subsequent behaviour (Bem, 1972). For example, Vecina and

Marzana (2016) investigated the potential discrepancies that may emerge in the relationship between moral self-concept and moral behaviour within the context of actual social interactions. This study seeks to elucidate the processes through which male perpetrators of domestic violence develop a positive moral self-concept while committing offences. The answer can be summarised as follows: These males employ a covert regulatory mechanism to rectify existing inconsistencies. In certain instances, they will engage in actions that are consistent with their robust moral self-concept and will have amassed sufficient credit to be able to activate the moral self-licensing effect. One of the mechanisms employed to reconcile this inconsistency is moral crediting. That is to say, when individuals engage in morally good, socially approved behaviour, when they imagine themselves as such, or when they observe other people engaging in such good behaviour, they gain some kind of credit for engaging in immoral behaviour (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Jordan et al., 2011; Kouchaki, 2011). For instance, an individual who publicly espouses the evils of substance abuse may act as if they have been rewarded for sexual harassment or another immoral act (Dinh et al., 2016; Effron & Monin, 2010; Jordan et al., 2011). Even the belief that one has engaged in a morally appropriate action can serve as a rationale for subsequent immoral conduct.

As observed in the study by Sachdeva et al. (2009), In this study, participants were asked to consider and record terms related to the moral self. It was found that participants who wrote positive terms were less likely to donate and engage in charitable behaviours later on. This finding is consistent with the moral credentials model proposed by Bem (1972). This finding can be explained as a kind of moral self-regulating mechanism, which includes both moral licensing and moral cleansing processes (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there are also studies that fail to corroborate these findings (Blanken et al., 2023).

As posited by Mullen and Monin (2016), if the exhibited behaviour is an outward reflection of some fundamental values, subsequent behaviour is more likely to be consistent and moral. However, if the initial behaviour is associated with more concrete, specific actions and the consequences of these actions, the moral licensing effect is more likely to occur. Vecina and Marzana (2016) posit that contemplating concrete moral actions may give rise to compensatory behaviours. For instance, contemplating past moral actions may result in a reduction in donations to a charity, in comparison to contemplating immoral actions. Conversely, consistent behaviour is more likely to occur when the individual considers more abstract aspects of their moral identity. For instance, contemplating the immoral aspects of one's identity may result in a reduction in charitable donations, in comparison to considering the prosocial and benevolent facets of one's identity (Vecina & Marzana, 2016).

On the other hand, as abstract perceptual constructions are more reminiscent of central personality traits, lacking in detail, decontextualised and schematic, the optimal method for triggering abstract perceptual constructions is to ensure that the individual focuses on the central features of their identity (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Conversely, concrete perceptual constructions encompass perceptual constructions with a discernible context, encompassing coincidental features and being rich in detail. Consequently, the method for inducing concrete perceptual constructions is to prompt individuals to reflect on their recent behaviours (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010). In this instance, individuals will utilise the moral self-licensing mechanism (or compensatory mechanism) and will be less inclined to engage in prosocial behaviours on the basis that they are morally sufficient due to the activation of their self-concept (Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009).

In their study, Vecina and Marzana (2016) prompted the moral identity group to reflect on their past prosocial behaviours and observed a subsequent decline in their future prosocial conduct relative to the control group. The study also demonstrated that although individuals arrested for domestic violence may initially engage in behaviours that align with their positive identities, they may subsequently opt to engage in immoral behaviour due to the moral licensing effect. This finding is also consistent with the finding that concrete perceptual constructs will produce a moral self-licensing effect, while abstract perceptual constructs will produce a consistency effect (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Vecina & Marzana, 2016).

An alternative perspective suggests that if an individual's initial behaviour is perceived as an indication of commitment to a specific goal, it is more likely to be exhibited consistently in subsequent actions. However, if the initial action is part of a process or facilitates the completion of a goal, moral licensing is more likely. This can be exemplified by the following illustration: If the consumption of a salad is equated with leading a healthy lifestyle, the consumption of desserts will be avoided (moral consistency). However, if the consumption of salad is perceived as an integral component of a healthy diet, the consumption of desserts may be viewed as an acceptable alternative (moral self-licensing). In other words, if the behaviour in question is more conscious and related to higher-level personality traits (traits that express continuity such as values and the moral dimension of personality), the probability of moral licensing is reduced, while the probability of moral licensing may be higher when focusing on short-term gains (perhaps more likely in situations that do not require much mental effort). Another potential explanation is that individuals

who are externally motivated may be more likely to exhibit a moral licensing effect when they choose to engage in virtuous behaviour on their own volition. In contrast, individuals who are internally motivated may be more likely to exhibit a moral licensing effect after engaging in virtuous behaviour because it is expected of them. This is in line with the findings of Dötschke et al. (2018).

A meta-analysis of 91 studies investigating moral licensing (which included various areas such as racism, dieting and purchases of environmental goods) found a small to moderate moral licensing effect (Blanken et al., 2015). The majority of these studies employed small laboratory samples. However, Hoffman et al. (2014) observed in a study of 1,200 participants that performing a moral action beforehand decreased the likelihood of performing another moral action afterwards and increased the likelihood of performing an immoral action. This discrepancy can be regarded as an indication that the impact of moral licensing can be more precisely delineated when studied in larger samples. This finding is supported by a number of studies. For instance, Meijers et al. (2015) demonstrated that charitable giving can lead to environmentally unfriendly behaviours. In a further study, individuals who prefer to shop at an environmentally friendly store were found to be significantly more likely to engage in subsequent unethical behaviour (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). In a further study, Tiefenbeck et al. (2013) conducted an experiment to investigate the spillover effect. In the experiment, the experimental group was informed about water saving, whereas the control group was not. As a consequence of this information, there was a reduction in the amount of water saved by people living in this region of approximately 6%. Nevertheless, there was an equivalent increase in electricity consumption (5.6%). It is estimated that the observed increase in electricity consumption is a consequence of moral licensing, rather than a direct consequence of the increase in water saving.

In a recent publication, Liao et al. (2023) highlighted the existence of studies examining the subsequent conduct of employees who have engaged in morally charged behaviours. Nevertheless, there is a paucity of research examining the subsequent work behaviours of employees who exhibit unethical pro-organizational conduct. In their study, they have proposed that showing unethical pro-organizational behaviour (UPB) should be defined as "tendency to act in violation of social values, customs, and appropriate standards of behaviour for the benefit of the institution in which they work". This can be exemplified by selling a product to a customer without informing them that it is missing. Umphress and Bingham (2011) has been demonstrated to elicit feelings of moral deficiency (moral cleansing) and psychological empowerment (moral licensing). Liao and Johnson (2023)

demonstrated that unethical pro-organizational behaviour has a positive effect on psychological entitlement. Consequently, the hypothesis that engaging in UPB is positively related to psychological entitlement has been confirmed. Additionally, the study revealed a significant interactive effect between UPB and perceived CSR on psychological entitlement. Furthermore, the results indicated that UPB had a significant positive effect on psychological entitlement in the control condition. In other words, UPB interacts with perceived CSR initiatives to influence psychological entitlement. Consequently, employees are likely to feel more entitled as a result of their UPB when perceived CSR initiatives are lower (in comparison to higher levels). The findings demonstrate that UPB has a significant impact on the psychological entitlement perceptions of participants in both the experimental and control groups. Furthermore, the study revealed a positive correlation between psychological entitlement and deviance. In the second study conducted by the researchers, it was demonstrated that unethical pro-organisational behaviour had a positive effect on moral deficit and psychological entitlement. The findings indicated that UPB was associated with moral deficit to a greater extent than the control group participants. The results demonstrate that IPB is an effective intervention for reducing moral deficit and psychological entitlement. Furthermore, the findings indicated that prior engagement in UPB behaviour is a significant factor in the development of psychological entitlement. Furthermore, the results demonstrated that individuals who had previously engaged in UPB behaviour exhibited a situational licensing effect for displaying deviant behaviours. The greater the individual's perception that they are contributing to the organisation by assuming greater responsibility, the more pronounced the indirect impact of UPB on service-oriented helping behaviour through moral deficiency. This is because the employee psychologically attributes credit for the performance of an immoral behaviour. This result also indicates that unethical behaviour is effective in influencing subsequent helping behaviour (Liao & Johnson, 2023).

In their study, Dinh et al. (2022) examined how individuals perceived as responsible and powerful can engage in sexual harassment and how this behavior is tolerated by others in the context of moral licensing. The power approach theories posit that the activation of power activates cognitive, emotional and behavioural systems that elicit goal-oriented and self-beneficial behaviours and thoughts (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Boksem et al., 2012). This is because the sense of power increases behaviours such as gambling and risk-taking (Galinsky et al., 2003). It is estimated that the intention to engage in sexual harassment increases in both males and females when they feel a sense of power, but it is thought that this probability is higher in males due to the influence of social roles.

In a separate study, Stochdale et al. (2020) discovered that power derived from serving others (i.e., responsibility-focused) increases the probability of sexual harassment among participants due to the generation of positive social sentiments towards those they serve. Similarly, Hershcovics et al. (2017) found that leaders with a responsibility-focused leadership style may take a variety of positive actions to protect an employee, which may be welcomed by society. However, this socially positive behaviour may also lead to immoral behaviours such as sexual harassment by triggering the moral self-licensing effect. The results of the study conducted by Dinh et al. (2022) are also in alignment with the aforementioned data. The researchers discovered that individuals who perceive themselves to possess responsibility-focused power are more likely to engage in sexual harassment when they feel a sense of communal belonging and believe they are acting morally.

Engaging in morally praiseworthy behaviours for the benefit of the organisation by making extra efforts beyond organisational duties strengthens the moral self-concept (Merritt et al., 2010; Yam et al., 2017). Similarly, even thinking about doing good things can have a morally empowering effect (Clot et al., 2013), which may subsequently lead to the individual engaging in unethical behaviours (Merritt et al., 2010; Yam et al., 2017). Furthermore, previous research on discretionary behaviour has demonstrated that when unethical behaviour is encouraged by external motives, individuals are more likely to exhibit entitlement or experience moral deficiency (Liao & Johnson, 2023).

Based on the above research findings and literature, it is estimated that the participants in the study will have a high probability of engaging in moral hypocrisy behavior since it is predicted that engaging in a moral action before may lead the individual to a less moral behaviour in the following behaviour through both moral compensation mechanism and moral credential mechanism. Having explored the connection between moral hypocrisy and the moral self-licensing mechanism, it is equally important to examine its relationship with materialism, as materialism can significantly influence how individuals prioritize self-interest over moral considerations.

1.3. Materialism

In contemporary societies, individuals have an unlimited array of needs and a constant desire for more. They pursue what Fromm (1967) refers to as a "good life," where their needs are constantly met. One of the most fundamental concepts that encapsulates this phenomenon is materialism. In the academic literature, it is commonly observed that

materialism is most often defined as placing a high value on material possessions (Bilgin, 2009). When the term materialism is mentioned, the context that is most commonly associated with it is the tendency to be relatively more attached to material needs and desires and to prioritize material interests (Richins & Dawson, 1992). While Belk (1984, p. 291) defines materialism as "the importance the consumer attaches to worldly goods", according to Rassuli and Hollander (1986, p. 10), materialism is the mental structure consisting of interests in acquiring and spending. Due to the differences in the mental structure in question, some individuals are content with a minimalist lifestyle, while others may resort to criminal activities to obtain more material possessions (Richins & Dawson, 1992). The question thus arises as to the origin of this discrepancy. The fundamental assumption is that postmaterialists place greater emphasis on aesthetic and intellectual values than materialists, while materialists prioritize economic security (Bean & Papadakis, 1994). A review of the literature reveals significant differences between those with high levels of materialism and those with low levels of materialism in terms of psychological health, psychological well-being and self-esteem variables. For instance, research has demonstrated that individuals with high levels of postmaterialism exhibit superior psychological health, psychological well-being, and self-esteem compared to those with high levels of materialism (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Richins & Dawson, 1992; Sirgy, 1998). In order to elucidate these discrepancies, it is essential to determine whether materialism should be conceptualised as a personality trait or a value. If materialism is considered a personality trait, it can be evaluated in the context of other personality traits, such as the desire for possessions, stinginess and emulation-envy (Belk, 1985). Conversely, if it is defined as a value, it is emphasised that it can be evaluated according to the headings of centralism, happiness and success (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Richins and Dawson (1992) developed a materialism scale that reflects both personality and values in order to reveal these individual differences with greater clarity. The results of the scale development studies indicated that those who scored highly on the scale in question desired a higher level of income than those who scored low. Additionally, they attached greater importance to financial security, placed less emphasis on interpersonal relationships, and tended to spend more on their own needs, while spending less on others. It was found that they were less satisfied with their lives.

In order to comprehend the distinction in question, it is imperative not to neglect the experiences and transformations that societies undergo. For example, consider II. The economic and physical recovery achieved in Western societies following the Second World War has led to a shift in values. Whereas materialistic values, which emphasise physical and

security, were previously dominant, postmaterialistic values, which emphasise belonging, self-expression and quality of life, have emerged (Inglehart, 1977a, 1990b). These differences at the social level also manifested at the individual level. Richins and Dawson (1992) posit that materialism can be a useful argument in understanding cultural or structural differences between societies, as well as being a highly functional means of determining individual differences. Furthermore, knowledge of the causes of materialistic tendencies at the individual level can inform interpretations at the social level.

In his analysis of the socialisation and scarcity hypotheses, Inglehart employs them to explain the observed differences at the social level, specifically in his estimates of the extent of postmaterialist values in any given country (Richins & Dawson, 1992). The concepts of scarcity and socialisation are employed to elucidate the distinctions between materialism and postmaterialism. The scarcity hypothesis is founded upon Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943). The fundamental needs of humans, such as sustenance, shelter and safety, are situated at the lowest rung of this hierarchy. Once these fundamental needs are satisfied, individuals begin to prioritize intellectual, aesthetic, and social needs, which are situated at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of needs (Bean & Papadakis, 1994). From this perspective, it can be stated that while economic and physical security are indicative of materialism, the values of belonging and aesthetics are representative of postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1990).

The socialisation hypothesis posits that an individual's fundamental value orientation (materialistic or postmaterialistic) is formed during the early stages of life. The experience of economic and physical deficiencies during the formative years of an individual's life is posited to engender materialistic tendencies, whereas the presence of positive economic and physical security conditions is hypothesised to foster postmaterialistic tendencies. In contrast to the scarcity hypothesis, Inglehart posits that this tendency is relatively stable and resistant to sudden changes in economic conditions. The scarcity hypothesis posits that materialism may increase and postmaterialism may decrease during periods of economic difficulty. Nevertheless, this does not demonstrate a long-term effect (Bean & Papadakis, 1994; Inglehart, 1990). In other words, an individual who is materialistic and whose basic needs are met may subsequently demonstrate postmaterialist tendencies. It can be argued that basic needs, such as material security, precede the emergence of postmaterialistic values (Bean & Papadakis, 1994; Inglehart, 1990). Moreover, the majority of individuals exhibit a combination of materialist and postmaterialist tendencies, rather than exhibiting one or the other exclusively. This may also indicate that the relationship between materialism and

postmaterialism is not a unidimensional phenomenon, but rather a two-dimensional structure. In order to gain an understanding of materialism, it is essential to be familiar with the following concepts:

Acquisition centrality: Those with high materialistic tendencies are driven by the acquisition and possession of material goods, which occupy a central position in their lives (Richin & Dawson, 1992). Individuals with high-level materialistic tendencies perceive these tendencies as a goal that becomes a lifestyle and provides meaning to their lives (Daun, 1983). Such individuals may even worship their possessions, with their material goods becoming a substitute for religion in their lives (Vedder, 1964).

The tendency to pursue happiness: One of the key reasons why acquiring goods and property is so central to the lives of materialists is related to ensuring satisfaction and well-being in their lives (Richins & Dawson, 1992). In individuals exhibiting high levels of materialistic characteristics, the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is directly proportional to the extent of their material possessions (Belk, 1984, p. 291). The objective of elevated consumption is to attain personal satisfaction, personal happiness, or some social benefits. This can be achieved through the acquisition or ownership of certain items. The term "materialism" is used to describe the tendency for individuals to seek happiness or benefit through material possessions, rather than through personal relationships, social relationships, or achievements (Belk, 1984, p. 291; Richins & Dawson, 1992).

Possession-defined success: Those with a materialistic worldview tend to evaluate their own and others' success based on the number and quality of material possessions they have accumulated (Richin & Dawson, 1992). Those with this inclination tend to value possessions based on their cost rather than the satisfaction they provide (Heilbroner, 1956, p. 23). As Campbell (2013) posits, the value of possessions is derived from the status they provide, reflecting the desired personal image and making them a participant in the idealised perfect life. Additionally, the criterion of success for materialists is the degree to which they have products that reflect the image they desire (Richins & Dawson, 1992).

In addition to this classification, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1978) propose a further classification, namely Instrumental and Terminal Materialism. Instrumental materialism refers to the means that are necessary to pursue and discover life goals and personal values. This type of materialism is innocuous and has a beneficial impact on the individual's life. The other type of materialism that can have a negative impact on the individual is referred to as terminal materialism. In terminal materialism, there is a tendency to make others jealous of the goods or properties owned, to arouse admiration and to achieve

a certain status. In other words, rather than acquiring property, envy, admiration and status are among the aims of terminal materialism.

In other words, the goals of terminal materialism are to arouse envy, to be envied and to have status rather than to acquire property. A person may be said to be motivated by instrumental materialism if they have an intrinsic motivation, a mental orientation or a guiding feeling that the desired goals will be achieved through the objects acquired. In instrumental materialism, the means are regarded as indispensable for the advancement and realisation of goals. It offers a more comprehensive understanding of human life and situates it within a broader context. In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between the objects to be possessed and the ends. In contrast, terminal materialism posits that there is no sense of reciprocal interaction between objects and ends (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981, p. 231). Nevertheless, the distinction between the two may not always be as evident as it seems (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Upon examination of the literature, it became evident that materialism and postmaterialism concepts were investigated with a range of variables. A summary of some of these studies is provided below.

Liu et al. (2022) investigated the relationship between materialistic tendencies and moral flexibility triggered by self-interest and the tendency to change moral judgments based on self-interest. The study aimed to demonstrate that materialism is associated with an increased propensity for moral flexibility derived from self-interest. The researchers postulated that individuals with high levels of materialism were more likely to engage in immoral behaviour and to act in their own self-interest when presented with the opportunity to conceal their true selves or flexibility. The results of the study, which were designed to test these hypotheses, are presented below. The initial study sought to ascertain whether materialism is a predictor of the discrepancy that can arise between an individual's moral judgments regarding their own immoral conduct and that of others. In the study, participants were requested to envisage themselves either as an individual who would engage in immoral behaviour for their own benefit or as a person who had been victimised by the immoral behaviour of others, and they evaluated the acceptability of each behaviour. The results of the analysis indicated that individuals with high levels of materialism reported a greater discrepancy in their moral judgments regarding their own and others' behavior. In the second study, the researchers examined whether there were differences between individuals with high and low levels of materialism in their responses to the principle of fairness, depending on whether it served their own interests. Participants were invited to engage in the immunity game in a laboratory setting. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two roles:

either the allocator of points to themselves or their partner, or the arbiter of whether their own points would be accepted or rejected. The findings indicated that, in instances where a lack of fairness resulted in an unequal distribution of points, individuals with high levels of materialism exhibited a more negative attitude towards justice. Conversely, when a result aligned with their personal interests, these same individuals demonstrated a more positive attitude towards justice. Another aim of this study was to determine whether one moral rule is preferred over another. The findings indicated that when individuals face a moral dilemma, those with materialistic tendencies are more likely to perceive self-serving moral values as morally superior.

In a study published in 2023, Cleveland, Iyer, and Babin investigated the relationship between immigrants' in-group and out-group tendencies and their use of social media, materialistic tendencies, and subjective well-being. A further research question is whether the use of social media promotes materialism among immigrants. The research involved members of prolific consumer panels in Canada (ethnic Chinese) and the United States (ethnic Indians). Those who provided implicit consent and answered three separate ethnic screening questions correctly were included in the online study, while others were excluded. The researchers drew on psychological theories related to self-concept to examine how the subjective well-being and materialism of minorities (sampled from two immigrant communities) were indirectly (through social media use) and directly related to ethnic identity, acculturation to mainstream society, and identification with global consumer culture (IDGCC). The findings indicated that materialism promoted by IDGCC identification was negatively associated with subjective well-being. The findings indicated that social media use did not lead to an increase in materialism. However, it was observed to be a factor that was not influenced by subjective well-being.

The objective of the study conducted by Ryoo et al. (2023) was to ascertain whether neutralisation prompts participants who initially decline to donate to a given campaign to rectify their moral missteps by making donations to a subsequent campaign. When consumers become aware of their inconsistent moral conduct, they experience moral dissonance and employ rationalisation techniques that they have previously used to neutralise their past misdeeds. The present study examines the subsequent behaviour that occurs following the neutralisation process. Previous research has demonstrated that materialism and moral identity interact within individuals. The findings of all three studies indicated that, in the absence of neutralisation, individuals with high levels of materialism exhibited a greater propensity to donate, irrespective of their level of moral identity.

Conversely, those with low levels of materialism demonstrated a greater inclination to donate when they exhibited high moral identity. Neutralisation was observed to impede compensatory behaviour and result in a reduction in the donation amounts of those with high levels of materialism. However, individuals with high levels of materialism exhibited a greater propensity to donate when they also exhibited high moral identity.

The study conducted by Liu and Koivula (2023) sought to determine whether environmentally friendly behaviours have the potential to protect adolescents from developing materialistic tendencies. The sample comprised adolescents from secondary schools in central China. The sample consisted of 379 female (48%) and 405 male (52%). The participants were distributed as follows: 59% were in the seventh grade, 16% were in the eighth grade, and 25% were in the ninth grade. The participants' age range from 12 to 17 years old. The mediation analysis revealed a negative correlation between adolescents' pro-environmental behaviours and materialism, with psychological empowerment identified as a significant mediator in the relationship between the two. In other words, young people who engage in pro-environmental behaviour and activities exhibit lower levels of materialism. In accordance with the social cognitive theory proposed by Bandura (2018), the repetition of pro-environmental behaviours enables young people to actualise their potential and mitigate their materialistic tendencies. In the moderated mediation model, the negative relationship between pro-environmental behaviour and psychological entitlement was only significant for adolescents with high family socioeconomic status. The results may be attributed to the attenuation of the impact of pro-environmental behaviour on psychological empowerment, potentially due to the influence of stronger factors such as social class on the psychological empowerment levels of lower-class adolescents.

The study by Issock (2023) offers a novel perspective on the relationships between materialism, e-waste disposal and consumer welfare, which are often presented as opposing concepts. The present study draws on the perspective of value-attitude-behavior theory to investigate the potential impact of materialism on environmentally friendly disposal practices and, ultimately, on consumer welfare. A quantitative methodology and cross-sectional research design were employed, and data were collected from 420 South African users of electronic and electrical equipment. Furthermore, the study has examined the mediating role of e-waste disposal in the relationship between materialism and welfare. The results obtained from the structural equation modelling using Amos indicate that the model explains 25% of the variance of subjective well-being accounted for by the significant and positive impact of the three dimensions of materialism and the disposal of e-waste.

Additionally, the findings indicate that materialism should be conceptualised as a multidimensional construct, given that each of the three dimensions of materialism exerts a distinct influence on subjective well-being. To elaborate, all three dimensions of materialism (materialism-success, materialism-acquisition, materialism-happiness) demonstrate a significant and positive correlation with environmentally friendly e-waste disposal and subjective well-being.

Pro-environmental activities exert a profound influence on society and the environment, which also contributes to well-being. To substantiate this finding, e-waste disposal was subjected to a more detailed analysis as a mediator in the relationship between materialism and well-being. The results indicated that environmentally friendly disposal of e-waste behaviour plays an important role in consumers' well-being. Indeed, even the materialistic tendencies of consumers in South Africa facilitate the environmentally friendly disposal of e-waste. Although there is a lack of consensus on this issue, the available evidence suggests that materialism is positively associated with sustainable behaviour. This study also indicates a positive correlation between the centrality of the attainment dimension of materialism and moral norms. In light of the considerable impact moral norms exert on the uptake of sustainable practices, this outcome indicates that the intrinsic obligation to act in an environmentally conscious manner can be attributed to the extent to which consumers perceive the acquisition of goods as a central aspect of their lives. Furthermore, the current research demonstrates that when consumers perceive their possessions as a marker of success and a reflection of their overall life success, they exhibit more favourable attitudes towards e-waste disposal. This is an intriguing finding when considering the influence of attitudes on e-waste disposal.

A review of studies conducted in the context of materialism and values indicates a positive relationship between materialism and individual values, and a negative relationship between materialism and social values such as universality and helpfulness (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). In a further multicultural study (Canada, USA, Germany) conducted by Kilbourne et al. (2005), a negative relationship was identified between materialistic attitude and self-transcendence, while a positive relationship was observed between self-enhancement. Furthermore, the variable of self-enhancement was identified as a robust predictor of materialism.

The study conducted by Richins and Dawson (1992) tested the hypothesis that individuals with higher materialist tendencies are self-centred and do not care much about others. The participants were requested to assume that they had been granted a sum of

\$20,000. In addition to six alternatives for the expenditure of the funds, there was also a further option. The survey was conducted using the split-ballot method. The findings indicate that individuals with a high level of materialism are more likely to spend their money on material goods than those with a post-materialist outlook. Another outcome of the study was that individuals with a high level of materialism were found to donate less to charitable organisations than those with a lower tendency towards materialism. The correlation analysis revealed a significant and positive relationship between materialism and non-generosity at the .25 level. A significant and negative relationship was identified between materialism and voluntary simplicity at the level of -0.28. A significant negative correlation was identified between materialism and life satisfaction, with a coefficient of -.31.

In their study of 700 participants between the ages of 12 and 20, Cohen and Cohen (1996) found that individuals with materialistic tendencies were more likely to experience attention disorders, social isolation, relationship difficulties and emotional expression problems. A review of similar studies has revealed that as the level of materialistic tendencies increases, individuals exhibit lower levels of psychological well-being and are less satisfied with their lives (Christopher & Schlenker, 2004; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Richins & Dawson, 1992).

Studies have demonstrated that individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy are more self-centred and prioritize their own interests (Batson et al., 1992a, 1997b, 2003c). Similarly, an excessive attachment to materialistic values is also indicative of egocentricity. Furthermore, a person's concern for attaining and acquiring may influence their motivation to share with another individual due to selfishness (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Furthermore, an examination of the literature reveals a negative correlation between these variables and well-being and happiness, as well as a positive correlation with anxiety (Chang & Arkin, 2002; Turan, 2007). In light of the aforementioned information, it can be posited that individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy may exhibit heightened materialistic tendencies relative to other individuals.

As a consequence of the moral self-licensing mechanism, individuals who perform a good deed beforehand perceive it as their moral entitlement to subsequently engage in negative behaviour. In other words, those with a materialistic outlook who have previously had the opportunity to perform a good deed may exploit this to their advantage and be more likely to engage in morally hypocritical behaviour subsequently. The study conducted by Batson et al., (1999) lends support to this conclusion. The study indicates that the discomfort

experienced when choosing oneself and gaining financial gain despite the other participant (even though the prize questions were not answered) may negatively affect individuals' positive self-perceptions. It may therefore be posited that individuals are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour at a later point in order to compensate for this situation and protect their self-integrity.

After examining the relationship between moral hypocrisy and moral self-licensing, it is also important to explore the interaction between moral hypocrisy and self-monitoring. Self-monitoring, which refers to individuals' awareness of their behavior and their ability to adjust it in social contexts, can influence the extent to which they engage in moral hypocrisy. For instance, individuals with high self-monitoring tendencies may prioritize social approval and modify their actions to appear moral, even if their underlying motivations are self-serving. This highlights the importance of self-monitoring in understanding moral hypocrisy.

1.4. Self-Monitoring

People want to be liked, rewarded and approved. In order to leave positive impressions on people, they care about how they are perceived by others and use various methods to influence the thoughts of others on this issue (Baumeister & Finkel, 2010; Leary, 1995), observe the reactions of others and their own reactions to create the desired effect (Goffman, 1959), and exhibit behaviours as required by the social environment (Snyder, 1974).

For the first time, Snyder (1974) defined this process as self-monitoring. According to him, people exhibit behaviours by adjusting how they express themselves to others and how they interact with them in accordance with social environments by comparing their own behaviours with the behaviours of others and obtaining environmental clues. The main focus of the self-monitoring theory is the social images that individuals attribute value to, develop and put in front of others with the motive of obtaining the appreciation of the environment or environment (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). This process can also be defined as the ability of individuals to influence thoughts about themselves by carefully guiding the impressions of others about themselves (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). This process involves consciously shaping a person's behaviour by monitoring his/her own behaviour for a certain period of time (Carpenter, 2023; König et al., 2022; Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray, 1999). For example, they can behave as if they are experiencing an emotion by consciously observing it even though they do not experience it, or as if they think it even though they do not think it

(Gangestad & Snyder, 1985a, 1991b). Because such a style gives individuals with high self-adjustment level, who are social pragmatists, the opportunity to get what they want (Day & Schleicher, 2006; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). In addition, people with high levels of self-monitoring have the ability to manage this distinction by differentiating between the personalities they show to others and their real personalities and tend to use more active coping methods than others (Flynn et al., 2006; Scott et al., 2012). People with low levels of self-monitoring react to situations or social cues in the context of their inner tendencies, they have the motivation to show their true tendencies in every situation (privately or publicly) because honesty requires consistency (Flynn et al., 2006; Larkin & Pines, 1994), because according to them, honesty requires this. While individuals with low levels of self-monitoring are influenced by their own internal emotional states, individuals with high levels of self-monitoring are more influenced by the verbal or non-verbal expressions of other people in the environment (Leone, 2006).

1.4.1. Self-Monitoring Styles

Snyder (1974) categorised people who use self-monitoring strategies and people who do not use them, or use them less, as 'high self-monitoring' and 'low self-monitoring'. These two groups of people differ in many ways. For example, it has been found that people with a high level of self-monitoring are better at understanding others' emotions than people with a low level of self-monitoring, they are more likely to use the principle of reciprocity in interpersonal relationships (e.g. they give as much information to others as others give about themselves), they focus more on information about other people (Leone & Hall, 2003; Shaffer et al., 1982), and they are more extraverted and friendly (Wysocki et al., 2010). In addition, it has been found that those with high levels of self-monitoring are more likely to cheat on their partners in romantic relationships (Öner, 2002) and have a higher tendency to have social status (Parks-Leduc et al., 2014).

Snyder (1974) suggested that self-monitoring behaviour could be examined in two sub-dimensions, 'protective self-monitoring' and 'acquisitive self-monitoring', and developed the Self-monitoring Scale in this context. Protective self-monitoring involves avoiding being rejected by others, whereas acquisitive self-monitoring involves seeking social approval or reward from others. If we look at the literature, we can see how these two factors differ from each other. For example, Fuglestad and Snyder (2010) found that those with a protective self-monitoring style are more sensitive to social contexts and try not to look bad to others,

whereas those with an acquisitive self-monitoring style try to look good to others and use appropriate strategies (saying nice things to others, buying gifts, presenting oneself as an intelligent, honest, moral person) (Jones, 1990; Schütz, 1998; Tedeschi & Lindskold, 1976). Other studies have found that they interact as little as possible with others in order to minimise the risk of criticism or negative evaluation, display shyness and show emotional inconsistency (Arkin, 1981; Bachner-Melman, et al., 2009; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). People with a gainful self-monitoring style have been found to be more extroverted and open to new experiences. However, the classification of this scale has been criticised for measuring different traits such as extraversion, other-orientation and role-playing rather than self-adaptation styles (Briggs et al., 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984).

Lennox and Wolfe (1984) proposed a new classification of self-monitoring styles that they felt would make this distinction clearer: "ability to regulate self-presentation" and "sensitivity to the self-presentational behaviour of others". Whereas the ability to regulate one's self-presentation involves the ability to regulate one's self-presentation according to the demands of the environment or situational conditions, sensitivity to the expressive behaviour of others involves sensitivity to messages and cues in the behaviour of others. In terms of Lennox and Wolfe's (1984) classification, those with high levels of gainful self-monitoring correspond to the group with high levels of 'ability to regulate self-presentation'. Those with a protective style correspond to those with a high level of 'sensitivity to the self-presentational behaviour of others'. Therefore, it can be concluded that those with a high ability to regulate self-presentation have higher levels of self-monitoring, more reward motivation, and are more likely to be self-serving social pragmatists than those with a high sensitivity to others' self-expressive behaviour.

According to Bacanlı (1990), self-monitoring skill is a prerequisite for effective social relationships. In order to maintain and regulate the interactions they enter into, people should be able to control the impressions on others and correctly perceive the self-presentation strategies of others. Academically, it is necessary to know the basic classifications in order to understand these strategies correctly. At this point, there is another classification proposed by Bacanlı (1990): principled orientation, utilitarian orientation. This categorisation emerged from the debate about when self-monitoring is a personality trait and when it is a situation-specific trait. While principle-orientated self-monitoring is valid for low level self-monitors, utilitarian-orientated self-monitoring is a classification valid for high level self-monitors.

The self-monitoring variable has been studied with a wide variety of variables. Faulhaber et al. (2023) conducted to study the effect of self-monitoring limited social media usage on psychological well-being. After pretesting, 230 college students from a large midwestern university were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups (the group in which social media use was limited to 30 minutes per day and the group that continued to use social media in the same way). Significant improvements were seen in the psychological resilience of the self-monitoring group after 2 weeks while negative emotions such as anxiety, depression, and loneliness decreased, positive emotions increased.

In their 2023 study, Dirtu and Prundeanu sought to elucidate the associations between narcissistic types and pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) by considering environmental attitudes and self-monitoring. They found that both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism were negatively related to environmental control and positively related to self-monitoring. Furthermore, they observed that both types of narcissism exerted similar and indirect effects on PEB. The mediating role of self-monitoring and environmental attitudes in the relationship between narcissism types and PEB was not observed. Both types of narcissism exhibited high levels of self-monitoring, yet this did not result in pro-environmental behaviours. This may be attributed to the fact that narcissistic individuals utilise self-monitoring features solely in situations pertaining to self-presentation.

In a separate study, the impact of self-monitoring and self-efficacy on the performance of athletes was investigated, with a particular focus on the moderating effect of the self-monitoring variable. The findings indicate a positive correlation between self-monitoring and athletes' performance. In other words, the greater the awareness that athletes have of their performances, tendencies and behaviours, the more effectively they can manage their emotions and behaviours. This is a factor that affects success. Furthermore, the relationship between self-monitoring and athlete performance is mediated by athlete motivation. An athlete with self-monitoring skills is able to regulate their emotions, thoughts and behaviours in accordance with their obligations. Furthermore, athlete motivation plays a role in strengthening the relationship between self-monitoring and performance, as it enables athletes to gain insight into their physiological development and physical performance. As a consequence of self-monitoring, this awareness enhances motivation and improves the performance of athletes (Hartoto et al., 2023).

A study was conducted to examine the relationship between self-monitoring level and job variability. The study involved 139 participants, who were followed for a period of five years. The findings indicated that individuals with high levels of self-monitoring

exhibited a greater propensity for seeking alternative employment, changing employers, and pursuing career advancement, in comparison to those with low levels of self-monitoring (Kilduff & Day, 1994). In a similar study, it was found that individuals with low self-monitoring levels accept certain rules for their work environment and behaviours, yet they experience difficulty in making behavioural changes according to the work environment and expectations. Consequently, their self-esteem decreases after creating a negative impression on the employer (Jones et al., 1990).

In a study conducted by Wilmot et al. (2016), the relationship between self-monitoring styles and dopamine and serotonin levels was examined. The findings indicated that individuals with elevated dopamine levels and a high level of gainful self-adjustment also exhibit a high motivation to seek rewards and information. Additionally, their motivation to enhance their own image in the eyes of others is greater than that of individuals with low dopamine levels and low reward-seeking motivation (i.e., those with a low level of self-adjustment and a protective style). Furthermore, they are more prone to engage in self-serving biased behaviors (Kraus et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2011).

The study conducted by Snyder and Kendziersky (1982) revealed that people with high-level self-monitoring exhibited gender roles that aligned with the expectations of their environment, rather than their own gender roles, in contrast to people with low-level self-monitoring. In a subsequent study, Day et al. (2002) observed that male exhibited higher levels of self-monitoring than female. Nevertheless, in another study, no significant difference was found between the two sexes (Lafçı, 1999). Furthermore, the results of another study did not provide a clear answer to the question of whether there is a difference in self-monitoring levels between male and female. For instance, Day et al. (2002) observed that female exhibited a lower level of self-monitoring than male, yet other research yielded results indicating that female exhibited a higher level of self-monitoring than male (Yazar, 1996). It can be seen that there is a lack of consistency in the results obtained on this issue (Lafçı, 1999).

Snyder and Simpson (1984) examined the relationship between self-monitoring behaviour and daily relationships. The findings indicated that those with high levels of self-monitoring were more likely to sever existing relationships and establish new ones, whereas those with low levels of self-monitoring were more likely to maintain existing relationships. Conversely, Bacanlı (1990) examined the relationship between self-monitoring behaviour and variables such as gender, economic level and the place where the individual grew up. The findings indicated that no significant relationship was found with other variables, with

the exception of the economic level of the participants' families. However, as the economic welfare level of the families increases, the level of self-monitoring also increases.

A study examining the psychophysiological effects of self-monitoring behaviour revealed significant differences between those with high levels of self-monitoring and those with low levels of self-monitoring. The findings indicated that participants who were asked to give an impromptu speech with a high level of self-monitoring experienced less stress, and their skin conductance levels and parietal and frontal lobe activations were found to be lower (Hofmann, 2006).

Most people are motivated to gain the approval of others. Therefore, they endeavour to make themselves look good, honest and moral. One of the basic components of the concept of self-monitoring is this motivation. The concept of moral hypocrisy, which is the main variable of this study, also emphasises this situation. In other words, while people try to make themselves look good on the one hand, on the other hand, when they find the opportunity and when they can hide their immoral behaviours, they behave in a way that will be to their advantage. In this way, they will both make themselves look good and get what they see as a reward. In this study, it is thought that the level of self-monitoring may be higher in individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy because individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy are more likely to be motivated to receive rewards, more likely to exhibit behaviour patterns that will be to their own advantage, and more sensitive to ambient and situational cues. In addition, Snyder (1974) stated that people regulate their behaviours in accordance with expectations in order to be seen as good/pleasant by others, and this situation is similar in individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy. In other words, since individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy and individuals with high levels of self-monitoring have high levels of adjusting their social behaviours according to the environment and controlling their verbal or non-verbal expressive behaviours, they are more capable of both doing the behaviour expected of them and behaving according to their own interests. The consistency between their attitudes and behaviours, i.e. between what they say and what they do, may be quite low (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Miller & Thayer, 1988; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982).

In other studies, it has been demonstrated that there is a significant consistency between the attitudes and behaviours of individuals with a low level of self-monitoring. In contrast, this consistency is significantly lower in people with high self-monitoring (Bacanlı, 1990; Snyder & Cantor, 1980). Another indication of this phenomenon is the research

findings that individuals with high levels of self-monitoring are more likely to engage in unethical behaviors. For instance, Tsang (2002) demonstrated that unethical behaviours are significantly correlated with situational factors. Furthermore, the higher the level of self-monitoring, the lower the level of honesty (Norris & Zweingehaft, 1999). Kapıkıran (2007) supports the idea that individuals with high levels of self-monitoring tend to show lower loyalty to their spouses and make less effort in their marriage decisions. This suggests that self-monitoring might influence personal relationships negatively by reducing commitment. On the other hand, Snyder (1974) identifies the main goals of self-monitoring behavior as the ability to disguise emotional states that do not match expectations or circumstances and to generate appropriate emotional responses in various situations.

Those with a high level of self-monitoring are more concerned with the impression they give to their environment. Consequently, they may be more likely to behave in accordance with the wishes of the environment or people. In contrast, those with a low self-monitoring level behave according to their real feelings and thoughts (Aktaş, 1997; Bacanlı, 1990; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). The tendency to gain reward due to dopamine and serotonin hormones in individuals with high levels of self-monitoring (Kraus et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2011) suggests that individuals with high levels of self-monitoring may also exhibit high levels of moral hypocrisy. In conclusion, the above literature indicates that there are notable parallels between moral hypocrisy and the behaviours of individuals with high levels of self-monitoring.

After examining the relationship between moral hypocrisy and self-monitoring, it is important to explore the interaction between moral hypocrisy and religious orientation. Religious orientation, which reflects how individuals interpret and integrate their religious beliefs into their lives, plays a significant role in shaping moral behavior and self-perception. Understanding this relationship can provide valuable insights into how different types of religious orientation, such as intrinsic or extrinsic, influence the tendency toward moral hypocrisy, particularly in situations where religious norms and personal interests conflict.

1.5. Religion

Religion is a system of values that has existed throughout the history of mankind. It affects human behaviour and attitudes at the micro level, social relations at the macro level, and the lives of believers in every political, cultural and economic field. Furthermore, religion provides meaning to the whole of life (Akyüz & Çapcıoğlu, 2012; Donahue, 1985;

Kurt, 2012). The term 'religion' is derived from the Latin 'religare', which means 'to bind back again'. It is therefore a system of beliefs and practices that bind people back to a higher power, and which prescribe a way of life based on the principles of obedience, custom, respect, honesty, responsibility and the worship of the sacred (Hökelekli, 2010; Öztürk, 2015). Religion can be defined as a set of systems that contribute to people's conscious attachment to a transcendent being, which is accepted to be a supreme being, in order to make sense of life by directing them to a purpose and to shape people's behaviour with its teachings. In accordance with an alternative definition, religion may be conceptualised as a system of beliefs, attitudes and practices that are directed towards a being that is perceived as sacred (Durkheim, 1969).

From a psychological perspective, the phenomenon of religion is sought to be elucidated on the basis of how the individual perceives religion and its effect on the individual (Köse & Ayten, 2014). Freud presents a particularly negative perspective on religion. Freud posits that religion serves as a means of temporarily alleviating the distress associated with life's challenges, yet simultaneously impedes the attainment of genuine satisfaction. This is because the pursuit of pleasure is seen as a fundamental human need, and the inhibition of this desire is believed to result in a loss of self-confidence and an increased susceptibility to various psychological disorders, including neurosis and obsession (Tarhan, 2013). In contrast, Jung presents an alternative perspective. In contrast to Freud's perspective, Jung posits that religion represents a comprehensive psychotherapeutic system (Köylü, 2012). Despite the existence of various definitions, there is no consensus on the definition of religion (Hökelekli, 2017; Kızılgeçit, 2017) due to the fact that religion is a multi-dimensional phenomenon open to subjective interpretation (Hökelekli, 2010). Indeed, religion has emerged in almost all societies with the aim of guiding people in regulating social relations. It encompasses behaviours and rituals that exhibit similarities across cultures (Fromm, 2015). Furthermore, it can be observed that definitions of religion encompass common elements, such as a sincere attachment to a sacred being and the assimilation of that being (Kurnaz, 2018). It is important to note that the concepts of religion and religiosity are distinct. The concepts of religion and religiosity can be used interchangeably, although there are fundamental differences between them.

1.5.1. Religiosity and Religious Orientation

While religion is defined as the theoretical and abstract reality, religiosity represents the practical and concrete side of this theoretical and abstract reality (Baynal, 2015). Religiosity can be defined as the reflection of the teachings of the religion that an individual believes in to the extent that they care about them. This includes perceiving a supernatural transcendent being and its power, having an individual who believes in the transcendent being, and fulfilling the orders and prohibitions brought by the transcendent being whose power the individual believes in (Bilgin, 2014; Kızılgöç, 2017). In other words, religiosity is the extent to which an individual's religious beliefs influence their life (Kurt, 2009). Furthermore, there are those who define religiosity in a very broad manner. Paloutzian and Park (2013) define religiosity as "everything done to cope with the problems encountered with the awareness of the reality of death.". Malinowski (2014) defines religiosity as a reflection of the desire for immortality and the hope of reaching eternity.

There is a diversity of perspectives regarding the factors that motivate individuals to espouse religious beliefs. Freud, for instance, posits that the glorification of the father image and the transmission of culturally-derived teachings in holy books are the primary causes of religiosity. David Hume posited that the sole rationale for religiosity is the fear and anxiety associated with the future.

While religiosity measures the extent and commitment to religious behavior, religious orientation focuses on the underlying reason driving an individual's engagement in religious practices (Ryan et al., 1993). Religious orientation encompasses the fundamental motivations and attitudes that guide an individual's religious beliefs, behaviors, and practices. It represents a psychological construct used to understand why people engage in religious activities and how they interpret their relationship with religion (Allport & Ross, 1967).

In order to obtain more precise information about the measurement of religious orientation, researchers have developed a framework for understanding this behaviour. For example, the most pioneering classification in this field was made by Allport and Ross (1967). They devised a classification of internally and externally motivated religious orientation to facilitate the measurement of religious orientation. In internally motivated religious orientation, individuals adhere to religious teachings with sincerity, internalising them and practising them in a manner that is submissive and without any self-interest. In externally motivated religious orientation, the pursuit of religiosity represents a primary

objective for individuals. Such individuals reflect this aim in all areas of their lives. Those who are internally motivated in their religiosity display a number of positive characteristics, including tolerance, maturity, and a lack of prejudice. These characteristics are also positively correlated with mental health. In contrast, in externally motivated religious orientation, individuals perceive religion and its teachings as a means of self-benefit and as a form of unassimilated religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967). Such individuals may join a religious group for the purpose of socialising. Furthermore, they may utilise religion instrumentally for a multitude of reasons, including security, status, forgiveness, social status, and self-protection (Genia & Shaw, 1991; Kahoe & Meadow, 1981). Those with an externally motivated religious orientation tend to direct their attention towards a transcendent entity, yet they do not disengage from their ego. They perceive practices such as prayer and worship as a means of addressing their problems when they arise. Such a religious orientation may be associated with an increased vulnerability to mental health issues (Allport, 1963).

Although religious orientation was not perceived as a multifaceted phenomenon, participation in a religious ritual and fulfilment of worship were gauged through items expressing frequency. Subsequently, multidimensional measurements were developed. The most prominent of these measurement tools is the "Religiousness Orientation Scale (ROS)" developed by Allport and Ross (1967), which consists of two sub-dimensions: "internally motivated" and "externally motivated."

Over time, various classifications have been developed regarding the measurement of behaviour related to religious orientation. For instance, Batson and Ventis (1982) introduced the concept of enquiry, in addition to intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. The questioning dimension encompasses the willingness to investigate what is curious about existence and an openness to new information (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). Such individuals are able to direct their attention simultaneously to questions pertaining to the nature of existence and the complexities they experience. Such individuals perceive doubt and self-criticism as a positive situation. Finally, they are open to change and new experiences in their religious beliefs (Maltby & Day, 1998). In other words, the questioning dimension of religious orientation encompasses a sincere and sincere confrontation with existential issues and a continuous questioning of life, one's own life, and social life. This contrasts with internal and external religious orientation (Batson, 1976; Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). Those with an enquiry orientation are more tolerant of differing views (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). In later years, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) added

the fundamentalism dimension to these dimensions. The fundamentalism dimension encompasses the conviction that there exists a unique and enduring bond between a transcendent being and the individual, that this bond has existed since the beginning of time, and that acting in accordance with this bond can help resist evil forces. In addition to the aforementioned dimensions, Glock and Stark (1965) posit that although different dimensions of religiosity are proposed, there are some universal features that are common to all forms of religiosity. The first is the "belief dimension". The belief dimension involves the affirmation of the belief principles of the religion believed in. The second is the "worship dimension". The worship dimension includes the verbal or actual practices that are within the scope of the religion believed in and must be fulfilled. The third is the "experience dimension". The experience dimension includes the experiences that result from the interaction that occurs during these practices, the intensity and emotional level of which vary according to the individual. The fourth is the 'knowledge dimension'. The knowledge dimension includes information about the verbal or non-verbal rules, principles, practices, etc. of the religion in which the person believes. The fifth and final dimension is the 'influence dimension'. The influence dimension describes the effect of the other four dimensions on the person who believes in the religion in question (Glock & Star, 1965).

Looking at the literature, it is noticeable that religious orientation behaviour is studied in a wide range of different disciplines. For example, theology, philosophy and religious studies, medicine, psychology, psychiatry, sports science (Acat, 2019; Akyüz, 2017; Çalışır, 2014; Erim, 2022). For example, in a study investigating the relationship between social media use and religious orientation among 406 university students using the religious orientation scale-short form and the social media addiction scale, a negative relationship was found between religious orientation and social media. In other words, it was found that religious orientation decreased as social media addiction increased (Aydın, 2023).

In another study conducted with the variables of religious orientation, moral integrity and social media addiction, the following results were obtained. There is a negative relationship between individual religious orientation and social media addiction. As social media use increases, religiosity decreases. There is a positive relationship between religiousness and moral integrity. That is, as the level of religiosity increases, moral integrity also increases (Akyürek, 2022).

A study conducted by Batmaz (2022) on 671 participants examined the relationship between religiosity and body image perception. The results showed that the level of religiosity was positively correlated with positive body image perception. However, as the

level of religiosity increases, there is a proportional decrease in the behaviour of comparing one's physical appearance with others.

McCoullough and Bono (2004) investigated the relationship between forgiveness, religious orientation and age in adults. They found that religiosity increases with age. Older people are more forgiving and less likely to seek revenge than younger people. As religious orientation increases, people can be more forgiving. Although age was found to be an important factor in this study, Bahadır (2010) found no significant relationship between age and religious orientation.

Maltby et al. (1999) examined the relationships between internally motivated religious orientation, externally motivated religious orientation, enquiry oriented religious orientation, attendance at a place of worship and personal worship variables and psychological well-being. The results showed that internally orientated religious orientation and personal worship significantly predicted psychological well-being. Similarly, Koenig et al. (2001) found that religious belief had a significant positive relationship with life satisfaction and positive mood in their analysis of studies conducted in this area over the last 50 years.

Piazza and Sousa (2013) examined the relationship between religiosity, political orientation and moral behaviour. According to their findings, when violating social rules such as lying, stealing, etc. leads to less pain and more happiness, and when people are confronted with statements questioning moral rightness, their reactions to these questions are largely determined by their level of religiosity. That is, the more religious people are, the less comfortable they are with violating abstract moral rules and basing their decisions on profit and loss calculations.

Batson and Gray (1981) investigated whether religious orientation is related to altruistic appearance (i.e. giving a good impression to other people). In this study, participants were given the opportunity to volunteer to help a child in need in an open setting where other people were present. Two situations were set up in this study. In the first situation, there is a high probability that the subject will be chosen to fulfil the offer (the condition that the needy child's request will be fulfilled). In the second situation, this probability was unlikely, which means that when a person performs an altruistic act, he or she may enjoy the benefits of appearing altruistic even though he or she knows that he or she is unlikely to pay the cost of this altruism. According to the results, although there was no significant relationship between intrinsically motivated religious orientation and offering help in the first case, there was a strong relationship between intrinsically motivated religious

orientation and offering help in the second case. This means that the higher the level of religious orientation of the participants, the more likely they are to volunteer to help, even when they do not really need to do so.

Elçi et al. (2011) collected data from 715 workers in Istanbul, Ankara, and Kocaeli to examine the effect of morality and religiosity on workers' diligence behaviour in the context of work ethics. The results show that both morality and religiosity have a positive and significant effect on diligence. Diligence, religiosity and morality differ according to gender, marital status and educational level. Male's level of religiosity and diligence at work was found to be higher than that of female. In addition, the level of morality and industriousness of married employees is higher than that of single employees. However, no significant relationship was found between marital status and religiosity. According to the regression results, morality and religiosity are important components of diligence.

Ward and King (2018) sought to answer the question of whether religiosity contributes to moral behaviour in the context of moral self-regulation. In Study 1, participants were reminded of a recent moral transgression. The results showed that the moral self-image (MSI) of these participants decreased, even when their religiosity was high. Study 2 showed that variables related to religiosity were able to predict increased negative affect and moral self-consciousness following a threat to MSI. Looking at the other studies (Studies 3 to 5), participants with higher levels of intrinsic religiosity and acceptance of items related to belief in God showed a significant increase in the rate of completion of pro-social tasks following MSI threats. Similarly, a decrease in cheating was observed in a word solving task (Study 4). In addition, Study 5 showed that moral identity explained the role of religious orientation variable in promoting moral self-regulation following MSI threat.

Baumsteiger and Chenneville (2012) investigated whether religiosity and spirituality are effective in moral reasoning. According to the results, religiosity and spirituality affect moral judgement (moral reasoning). The results showed that religious people tend to be more idealistic, but when it comes to the concept of relativism, the situation is not the same as idealism. It was found that people with high levels of religiosity were more likely than less religious people to believe that the best outcome can be achieved, and they may be more likely to make decisions according to universal moral norms (rather than personal norms) when making moral decisions. These relationships suggest that highly religious people may hold more extreme views on contemporary moral issues and make more negative judgments about others' or their own immoral behaviour. Religiosity and spirituality are the most important factors in moral reasoning (moral justification). In addition, those with higher

levels of religiosity are more likely to adhere to moral absolutes than those with lower levels of religiosity.

Kirchmaier et al. (2018) examined the relationship between religion and moral behaviour and attitudes: Religious people are less tolerant of unethical economic behaviour (e.g. tax evasion, bribery, etc.) and show more voluntarism. In the study, an experimental game titled "betraying trust" was designed, where participants from both groups were aware that their social behavior could not be observed and that their actions were not directed towards a specific group of recipients. This setup allowed researchers to analyze participants' behavior in a context where their actions were free from social scrutiny and external expectations. The results showed that religious and non-religious people were equally likely to betray trust. Religious people reported more moral judgement (less acceptance of ethical errors) and more voluntarism. Furthermore, in an abstract experimental game with an anonymous partner, religious people were just as likely as non-religious people to betray another person's trust. Religious people also showed a lower preference for redistribution in their wages. Comparing different Christian denominations, Catholics were found to be less likely to betray than the non-religious, while Protestants were more likely to betray than Catholics. In this respect, protestants do not differ from non-religious people on this characteristic.

1.5.2. The Relationship Between Moral Hypocrisy and Religious Orientation

According to Fromm (1997), individuals may say they are religious, but in their inner worlds they may feel the opposite and behave accordingly. Similarly, it can be said that individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy tend to have more extrinsic religious orientation. This is because individuals with a tendency towards extrinsic religious orientation may use religious behaviour primarily as a means of achieving a particular goal. The goal is not to approach or be close to the transcendent being, but to benefit other people. This situation is also known as functional religiosity. This functional religiosity can manifest itself in many areas such as politics, economics, faith, etc. Individuals with an extrinsic religious orientation may exhibit behaviours in order to gain prestige, social status and materialism (Okumuş, 2002). At this point, the typology of religiosity defined by al-Ghazali is an important classification (unbelief, ostentatious-deceptive religiosity, imitative religiosity, scientific religiosity and pleasurable religiosity). Because ostentatious-deceptive religiosity in this classification includes using religion for worldly interests, behaving as a believer in

the presence of believers and as a non-believer in the presence of non-believers (Okumuş, 2006). In this respect, it is quite similar to the concepts of ostentatious-deceptive religiosity and extrinsic religious orientation (functional religiosity). Both religious tendencies bear a notable resemblance to the concept of moral hypocrisy. In other words, whether it is ostentatious-deceptive religiosity or extrinsic religious orientation, it can be argued that individuals with such religious inclinations may be associated with moral hypocrisy.

After examining the relationship between moral hypocrisy and religious orientation, it is also important to explore the interaction between moral hypocrisy and emotions, particularly self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, and pride. These emotions, often considered as outcomes of moral hypocrisy, play a critical role in regulating moral behavior and shaping individuals' responses to their own moral transgressions. This makes emotions a significant variable in understanding the mechanisms underlying moral hypocrisy.

1.6. Emotions

The question of what constitutes emotion has been posed by numerous researchers. The term "emotion" has its etymological roots in the Latin word "movere," which signifies "to move" or "to stir up." In his work, Aristotle (383–323 BC) asserted that emotions constitute the primary principles of human behaviour. He further proposed that the emotional states we experience are in a constant state of flux, as they are shaped by our perceptions of external stimuli. Furthermore, emotions are socially constructed, and there is a coexistence of emotional rationalities and justifications within the mind. In his work, Plato regarded emotion as an impediment to the functioning of the human mind. He proposed that emotions are constituted by three fundamental elements: reason, spirit, and appetite (Lewis et al., 2008; Strongman, 2003). Aristotle advanced the argument that emotions influence people's judgments in a manner similar to that proposed by Plato. However, he introduced an additional perspective, namely that emotions operate in conjunction with pleasure and pain. This implies that every emotion possesses both positive and negative aspects. Consequently, pain and pleasure can be regarded as integral components of the emotional process (Plamber, 2015). This perspective, which is widely accepted in the present day, posits that our appraisals of circumstances pertaining to our objectives, interests, and desires constitute emotions (Oatley, 2004).

The ideas of Descartes, regarded as the most influential pioneer of modern psychology, bear resemblance to those of Aristotle. He posits that emotions are primarily

cognitive structures. Emotions encompass not only physiological alterations but also cognitive processes, including beliefs and perceptions (Strongman, 2003). He posits that emotions are experienced exclusively by humans and not by animals. This is due to the fact that animals' bodies are capable of reacting to any emotional situation, whereas human beings experience those emotions and give reactions consciously (Strongman, 2003). Similar to Strongman's ideas, Spencer (1870) stated that emotion and cognition are two separate parts of one entire construct, because they function together. This relationship can fluctuate in response to changes in emotional state. In some cases, the intensity of an emotion may be high or low, and the speed at which emotions are processed may also vary.

The concept of emotion has been elucidated by numerous contemporary researchers, including Plutchik, Frijda, and Tenhouten. Plutchik (2003) defined emotions using an epistemological orientation, whereas Frijda (1987) employed a functionalist approach to define emotions. For example, Plutchik (2003) proposed that emotional processes unfold in a series of intricate chains of events, cognitions and actions that evolve to provide behavioural equilibrium, stabilisation or, in other words, homeostasis. Frijda (1987) posited that every individual exhibits a proclivity to construct, sustain or dismantle a relationship with the environment. In light of the above, it can be posited that emotions can be defined as a reactive preparation for situations that suddenly arise in order to protect, maintain or prevent the relationship.

Emotions can be conceptualised as a means of coping with social situations or events (Tenhouten, 2007). Such individuals are often depicted as being prone to emotional outbursts and a lack of rationality. While emotions are typically adaptive responses, they can also manifest as maladaptive, inappropriate, and destructive behaviours when the potential consequences are not taken into account (Tenhouten, 2007). Emotions are methods of coping and adapting to social situations. Consequently, some scholars concur that emotions are merely a social construct. However, it is also a biological construct (Harre, 1986). The term "emotion" is understood to encompass a comprehensive array of feelings, including slower processes that unfold in a sequential manner. Emotion exerts a more potent and pervasive influence on an individual, comprising a specific combination of emotional elements (Wundt, 1998).

In the words of Myers and Derakshan (2004), emotion can be defined as a multifaceted conceptualisation process. This multifaceted process encompasses the general arousal state of the individual, the external reflection of this arousal, and the conscious experience of these processes. In other words, emotions are the result of behaviours that are

elicited in response to external stimuli following the physiological arousal and cognitive appraisal processes. These behaviours represent physical and cognitive changes (Myers & Derakshan, 2004). Moreover, bodily changes, such as a heartbeat, changes in the skin, perspiration, and movements on the face, posture, specific behaviours, and social relationships, are the result of physiological arousal and cognitive appraisals (Damasio, 2003; Oatley, 2004). Similarly, James (1948) posited that the perception of any bodily change constitutes an emotion. The contemporary psychological perspective also posits that the mind and body are two integral components of emotional experience. Additionally, emotions are constituted by thoughts pertaining to past and future occurrences (Oatley, 2004; Strongman, 2003).

1.6.1. Functions of Emotions

There are numerous theories regarding the function of emotions in human life. The duration of emotional experiences may vary (short-lived or long-lived), but both serve as informative signals to ourselves and others. Emotions serve as signals for individuals, alerting them to potential threats or obstacles that could impede the achievement of their goals and ideals. Furthermore, emotions serve as signals to others, given that individuals lack direct access to the inner feelings of others. The recognition of projections of emotions is facilitated by reactive emotions, which are sudden impressions of a situation, goal, or concern that occur in the real world (Oatley, 2004). Emotions play a pivotal role in the organization and pursuit of behaviors. Furthermore, they are instrumental in comprehending an individual's internal processes, providing insights into the self, and elucidating the internal processes of others (Izard, 2007).

Emotions are a significant factor in decision-making processes, both internal and external (Schmid et al., 2011; Vatan, 2014). Some internal physiological processes, such as standardised emotional or behavioural patterns, and external processes that include some social factors/forces, play an important role in the formation of moral judgments. Hume (1796) posited that emotions not only influence our actions but also serve as the foundation for social and moral conduct. They operate in conjunction with reason, influencing our actions. Similarly, reason and rationality have been situated by people within an appropriate part of their moral life. This also lends support to the robust assumption of contemporary theories examining the relationships between emotions and moral judgments that emotions

are the genuine and authentic source of moral judgments, which are the outcomes of moral reasoning (Zagzebski, 2003).

Emotion theories provide significant insights into the psychological mechanisms driving the emotional outcomes of moral hypocrisy. These theories not only clarify the relationship between emotions and moral hypocrisy but also help us explain how emotions shape individuals' future moral reasoning and behavior. In this way, a more comprehensive understanding of the interaction between emotions and moral hypocrisy is developed.

1.6.2. The Role of Emotion Theories in Understanding Moral Hypocrisy

Theories of emotion are typically classified into two categories: physiological and cognitive (Baran, 2011; Vatan, 2014). McDougall's Theory of Emotion is one of these relevant frameworks, and these theories can offer significant contributions to understanding moral hypocrisy behavior. McDougall's Theory of Emotion provides a significant perspective for understanding moral hypocrisy by emphasizing the connection between instincts and emotions (McDougall, 1923). According to this theory, primary emotions such as fear or anger stem from instinctual responses, while more complex emotions like guilt or pride emerge through social and cognitive processes.

According to McDougall (1923), instincts guide an individual's fundamental mechanisms for survival and success. In this context, moral hypocrisy can be interpreted as an adaptive strategy in situations where instincts conflict with social pressures. McDougall's theory suggests that emotions not only drive behavior but also strengthen social bonds. Moral hypocrisy may function as a strategy to fulfill an individual's need for social acceptance. In such cases, emotions like guilt or shame may not compel adherence to moral standards but instead serve as mechanisms to maintain social status or public image. In McDougall's framework, primary emotions (e.g., fear or anger) interact with complex social situations to shape secondary emotions (e.g., guilt or pride). Moral hypocrisy can arise from the interaction between primary and secondary emotions. For example, an individual may engage in morally acceptable behavior to compensate for a fear of social exclusion, all while safeguarding personal interests. This allows the individual to preserve both personal benefits and social prestige simultaneously.

The Cannon-Bard (1927) proposes that emotional and physiological responses occur simultaneously following the perception of a stimulus, mediated by the thalamus. This theory offers a valuable perspective on how individuals process the tension between moral

standards and personal interests in the context of moral hypocrisy. In cases of moral hypocrisy, engaging in morally inconsistent behavior can trigger both self-conscious emotions, such as guilt or shame, and physiological responses, such as increased heart rate or sweating, simultaneously. The thalamus directs these responses to the cerebral cortex, enabling individuals to rationalize their actions and mitigate internal discomfort. This process facilitates a rapid justification of moral inconsistencies, allowing the individual to manage psychological tension effectively. The theory also suggests that similar physiological responses can accompany different emotions. This may lead individuals engaged in moral hypocrisy to misinterpret their emotional signals. Such misinterpretation can help sustain an outward appearance of moral consistency despite internal conflicts.

The Cannon–Bard (1927) emphasizes that moral behavior results from the interplay between emotional and cognitive processes. In this framework, the thalamus facilitates the simultaneous emergence of emotions and physical states, while the cerebral cortex contributes to constructing a socially acceptable image. The integration of these processes provides insights into the neurophysiological complexity underlying moral hypocrisy.

Arnold's Model of Emotions offers a valuable framework for understanding moral hypocrisy by emphasizing the role of cognitive appraisal and the objects toward which emotions are directed. According to Arnold (1960), emotions arise from the cognitive evaluation of a stimulus and are shaped by tendencies to approach objects perceived as suitable or to avoid those deemed unsuitable. In the context of moral hypocrisy, these objects may include an individual's reputation, societal norms, or the judgment of others. This process, combined with specific physiological changes, helps explain how individuals manage moral conflicts. In situations of moral hypocrisy, individuals may exhibit an approach tendency by outwardly conforming to moral norms to preserve their social image, while simultaneously showing an avoidance tendency by refraining from examining their own moral inconsistencies. Arnold's model facilitates an understanding of the justification strategies individuals use to alleviate discomfort associated with moral hypocrisy. For instance, emotions such as guilt or shame may prompt individuals to rationalize their behavior in ways that align with moral expectations.

Arnold's Model of Emotions conceptualizes moral hypocrisy as a dynamic interaction between cognitive appraisal and approach-avoidance tendencies, aimed at preserving both self-concept and social standing. This approach provides valuable insights into how emotional appraisals influence behavior and how individuals navigate the internal and external conflicts arising from moral hypocrisy.

The classification of emotions can facilitate understanding the emotional processes individuals experience during moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy often leads to distressing emotions such as guilt and shame, arising from morally conflicting behaviors. Classifying these emotions allows for the exploration of the individual and social dimensions of such morally inconsistent actions and helps identify the emotions that play a significant role in these processes.

1.6.3. Classification of Emotions

From the past to the present, there have been various efforts to classify emotions. During these studies, emotions have been subjected to different classifications. For example, love and hope, which are now accepted as emotions, were not recognised as emotions in the Middle Ages. Similarly, desires were seen as related to emotions, especially self-interest. In other words, while emotions have been categorised, even what is and is not considered an emotion has changed over time.

On the other hand, some researchers have classified emotions based on the relationship between emotion and cognition. Wundt (1998), for example, believed that the relationship between emotion and cognition began in infancy. This relationship begins from infancy and to support this, it is associated with the ability to distinguish sweet (pleasant emotions) from sour (unpleasant emotions) (Plamper, 2015). As explained above, there is a general classification of emotions from birth. Another view is that emotions have a similar structure to reason (Lewis et al., 2008). This structural similarity has also contributed to the classification of emotions.

Emotions are divided into good (such as pride) and bad (such as humility). Given that passions and emotions can be used interchangeably, it can be inferred that he classified emotions as direct and indirect. Direct emotions include desire, hope, etc., while indirect emotions include pride, humility, etc. Both direct and indirect emotions arise out of pain or pleasure, or good and bad at the same time (Hume, 1896). This classification has been made for passions, but it seems that passions and emotions are not very sharply separated. It can therefore be useful for classifying emotions.

Wundt distinguishes between short emotions and long emotions, which include complex emotions (Plamper, 2015). Furthermore, he claims that there are three principles for categorising emotions: The quality of feelings that lead to emotions, the density of these feelings, and the form of occurrence, which is determined by the type and speed of emotional

changes (Wundt, 1998). According to him, excitatory and inhibitory emotions can be used to classify emotions. Excitatory emotions, such as joy and anger, accelerate cognitive activity and cardiac activity, whereas inhibitory emotions, such as terror and fear, paralyse or stabilise muscles and the heartbeat. Depending on this, the physiological effects can be said to enhance the intensity of the emotion or reduce the intensity of the emotion and its effects (Wundt, 1907).

People tend to be happy and have well-being, while they tend to avoid negative emotions. Assuming that people tend to approach positivity and avoid negativity. Based on this, it is accepted that the emotions they experience can be divided into negative and positive emotions, which are adaptive responses to our bodies, to life events (Tenhouten, 2007). Although it is one of the most accepted distinctions to divide the emotions that people experience into positive and negative, different theorists have made different classifications. For example, pleasant-unpleasant emotions or positive-negative emotions are among these classifications (Barret & Russell, 1999). Lazarus (1991) classified emotions as feelings associated with losses and gains.

Emotions have also been classified as basic and complex (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1971; Oatley & Johnson, 1987; Plutchik, 1980). There is a diversity of perspectives on the classification of basic emotions. For example, cognitively oriented psychologists argue that the evaluation of the most basic emotions should be based on their positivity or negativity (Tenhouten, 2007). Oatley and Johnson (1987) propose that there are four basic emotions that are widely accepted by theorists: sadness, joy, disgust, anger and anxiety. Similarly, Scherer and Ekman (2014) proposed that there are eight basic emotions. The positive basic emotions are interest, surprise, and joy, whereas the negative basic emotions are anguish, fear, shame, disgust, and rage. Plutchik (1980) posited that there are eight basic emotions: fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, hope, joy, and acceptance. In contrast, Ekman (2013) proposed a different classification, identifying seven basic emotions: anger. Additionally, Izard (1971) proposed that there are ten basic emotions, including guilt, concern, shame, anger, sadness, surprise, disgust, joy, anxiety, and contempt. Theorists also diverge in their perspectives on complex emotions. Plutchik (1980) posited that distinct emotions give rise to complex emotions through interactions of various kinds. Ekman et al. (2013) put forth the idea that complex emotions are the consequence of basic emotions being subjected to analysis and interpretation at the cognitive level.

Some researchers have proposed that emotions can be examined through two dimensions: valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal (low/high). This approach posits that

the valence dimension is associated with the loss or gains experienced, whereas the arousal dimension refers to the level of activity or energy revealed by the loss or gain (Barrett & Russell, 1999; Russell, 2003; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).

As proposed by McDougal (2015), there are two fundamental principles that must be considered in order to ascertain which emotion is primary and which is not. Firstly, if an emotion is discernible in the instinctual activities of animals that are analogous to humans, it can be designated as a primary emotion. Secondly, it is necessary to consider whether the emotion in question sometimes manifests in a markedly exaggerated form in humans, in contrast to the condition of mania (McDougal, 2015). In light of the aforementioned information provided by McDougal (2015), it can be posited that the terms 'mixed', 'secondary', and 'complex' emotions have been employed to illustrate a multitude of emotional states.

1.6.4. Moral Hypocrisy and Emotions

Emotions are a fundamental aspect of human existence (Heidegger, 1962), and the expression of emotion is crucial for human well-being (Darwin, 1872). The recognition and expression of emotions are both inherited and instinctive. The inherited and instinctive process is further influenced by a range of emotions, including anger, happiness, disgust, guilt, pride, and joy. These emotions play a crucial role in maintaining human existence, as they allow individuals to express and experience a diverse range of feelings (Darwin, 1872; Sirswal, 2014).

On the other hand, numerous domains that are pivotal to human existence, including education, values, human rights, and art, reflect the interplay between individual morality (moral conduct) and social morality (Sirswal, 2014). To elucidate the relationships between moral behaviours and emotions exhibited by individuals across a range of fields, researchers employ a multi-variate approach, examining the complex interplay between moral behaviours and emotions in diverse contexts (Goldie, 2000; Gray et al., 2017; Greene, 2013; White, 1994). One particularly intriguing area of investigation for researchers is the relationship between emotions and unethical behaviors, such as cheating and fraud (Engelmann & Fehr, 2016; Hong et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2019; Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Schmalz & Orth, 2012). This is because emotions serve as sanctions in the context of moral transgression or the breaking of moral principles, or contribute to the motivation to comply with moral norms (Bagnoli, 2011). In addition to cheating and fraud, moral hypocrisy

represents one of the most noteworthy forms of unethical behaviour. A review of the literature reveals a paucity of research examining the relationship between emotions and moral hypocrisy. Where such studies do exist, they tend to investigate moral hypocrisy as a consequence, with emotions as the presumed cause. However, in the present study, we have investigated the role of self-conscious emotions as outcomes of moral hypocrisy. This approach differs from that of many other studies in this field.

1.6.5. Self-Conscious Emotions

Some fundamental emotions, such as fear and happiness, elicit an automatic response when an individual encounters a positive or negative situation. Nevertheless, certain emotions, such as those pertaining to self-consciousness, are more prone to manifest as a consequence of a moral transgression or morally praiseworthy conduct, entailing an introspective assessment of one's own actions and social expectations, as opposed to those that elicit an immediate fight-or-flight response. In order to gain a deeper comprehension, it is necessary to pose a question: In the event that the individual is the perpetrator of an unjust or immoral situation, it would be pertinent to enquire as to whether they experience feelings of anger, disgust or contempt towards themselves. This appears to be a relatively minor possibility (Haidt, 2003). As these emotions involve the condemnation of others and serve as a defence or protection for various areas of the moral order (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999), it seems unlikely that they would be experienced in the context of an unjust or immoral situation. Furthermore, anger, disgust, and contempt may also be somewhat related to moral hypocrisy. However, our hypothesis posits that self-conscious emotions are more likely to manifest as an outcome of moral hypocrisy, as they do not entail the condemnation of others, as seen in emotions such as anger, disgust, or contempt. This allows individuals to navigate challenges more effectively and to respond to difficulties with greater agility. Furthermore, self-conscious emotions facilitate inner peace and social acceptance by aligning internal standards with social norms. Therefore, individuals are able to proceed without contravening the standards of society (Haidt, 2003; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robbins, 2006). Furthermore, self-conscious emotions are the primary moral emotions that have been the subject of the most research (Haidt, 2003). Accordingly, the emotions under discussion in this study are those that are believed to be most closely associated with immoral situations, such as moral hypocrisy.

Self-conscious emotions serve as a conduit between an individual's internal standards and social expectations that facilitate social acceptance and fulfilment of the individual's social needs (Tracy & Robins, 2004). The process of adapting to a new community or group is inherently challenging and complex. Self-conscious emotions are those that facilitate the individual's ability to navigate social situations without evoking negative emotions such as contempt, anger, and disgust, which can impede adaptation in the context of challenges and complexities (Haidt, 2003).

In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of self-conscious emotions, it is helpful to draw a comparison with the concept of basic emotions. While self-conscious emotions (such as shame, guilt, pride and embarrassment) are characterised by their social dimension, basic emotions (such as anger, sadness, fear and disgust) are more instinctive and automatic processes that are driven by survival instincts. While the socio-cultural dimension is particularly salient in self-conscious emotions, the biological foundations of basic emotions are more pronounced (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Self-conscious emotions are directly perceived and experienced by the individual, and exhibit cultural variation in their manifestations. In this regard, it differs from basic emotions, which are more instinctive and universal (Kitayama et al., 1995). It is also important to note that basic emotions can serve as a foundation for the formation of self-conscious emotions, given that any emotional state is comprised of a complex array of feelings and reactions (Freud, 1915).

Some researchers posit that self-conscious emotions emerge later in the developmental process of individuals than basic emotions (Izard, 1971). Others suggest that this is due to the neurobiological development required to reach the level of understanding social norms and rules taking more time (Tracy & Robins, 2004). The capacity to experience self-conscious emotions necessitates a higher level of mental development than that required for the experience of basic emotions. As the individual develops mentally, they gain the capacity to reconcile social norms and rules with their own personal norms and values, which in turn affects their self-evaluation. This process contributes to the development of self-conscious emotions subsequent to the emergence of basic emotions (Lewis & Sullivan, 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

The development of one's capacity for self-evaluation is a crucial factor in the emergence of self-conscious emotions. The advent of self-conscious emotions is contingent upon the formation of stable self-representations. Once this skill has been acquired, the individual is able to perceive the behaviours of others and their own behaviour from their own subjective perspective, and to evaluate the reactions of others to the behaviour in

question (Leary, 2004; Tracy & Robin, 2004). As a result of this evaluative capacity, the individual is able to experience self-conscious emotions (such as guilt, shame, or pride) in response to any given event (Tracy & Robin, 2004). In other words, if an individual is confronted with a negative situation and attributes responsibility for it to themselves, they will experience emotions such as guilt, shame, or anger. However, in the event of encountering a positive situation, the individual may experience emotions such as pride, happiness, or satisfaction. The cognitive process of self-evaluation can yield positive or negative outcomes, contingent on the extent of alignment between an individual's identity and their self-image (Tangney & Tracy, 2012).

Similarly, a considerable number of individuals engage in hypocrisy and subsequently ascribe their favourable outcomes to a just outcome of chance. Such individuals may then engage in charitable behaviour, such as donating money, in an attempt to rectify their mistake. This entire process is indicative of the fact that, as a consequence of hypocrisy, the individual is confronted with an internal contradiction when their internal norms and social expectations and norms do not align. In order to compensate for this contradiction or the resulting negative outcome, the individual engages in a number of positive behaviours, as a result of the necessity to harmonise internal and external norms and achieve psychological balance during the process of self-evaluation.

Self-conscious emotions mostly involve feelings about oneself as a result of social comparison, which involves a cognitive process in a social settings (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Similarly, self-conscious emotions (such as guilt, shame, embarrassment and pride) are also considered in a social and relational context (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). In order to do so, people tend to use certain internal moral standards, which they then apply to the situation at hand. This is done by considering their social positions based on these internal standards. As a result of these cognitive evaluations, feelings of guilt, shame or pride may be experienced. It may be the case that emotions that arise as a result of a particular behaviour affect how the person will behave and think later on (Campos et al., 1994). With this in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that after moral hypocrisy, people who feel guilt or shame may behave in a more helpful way towards other people. In order to gain a deeper understanding of self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, embarrassment and pride), we will explain them shortly below.

Guilt is related to reparative behaviors and more compensatory behaviors such as apology or compensate for harm done to others (Lewis, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt is associated with internal, unstable, and controllable attributions in the context of failure,

whereas shame is linked to internal, stable, and uncontrollable attributions in the same situation (Tracy & Robins, 2006). A sense of guilt arises in response to internal attacks on the self. However, negative evaluations associated with guilt are attributed to the specific behaviour of the individual in question (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Additionally, guilt is more likely to be triggered in instances of private moral violation or transgression when an individual evaluates their own behaviour negatively at the time (Wolf et al., 2010). In the event of an individual failing to align with their internal and social standards, they may experience guilt, as this is incongruent with their ego ideal state. Conversely, if the individual has behaved in accordance with their internal and social standards, this demonstrates compatibility with their ego ideal state, leading to feelings of pride. In contrast, if the individual adheres to both internal and external standards, it indicates a state of alignment with one's ideal ego and a sense of pride, which will be elaborated upon subsequently (Freud, 1914/1957). Scherer and Ekman (2014) posited that guilt and shame are essentially similar emotions, differing primarily in their respective causes and consequences. While both emotions are associated with feelings of unease and distress, guilt is often associated with moral violations, whereas shame is more commonly linked to feelings of inferiority. Similarly, Ferguson et al. (2000) and Harder and Zalma (1990) have asserted that these two emotions are strongly correlated, despite their distinct structural characteristics. For example, negative evaluations associated with shame are attributed to the entire self (Tracy & Robin, 2004). In contrast to guilt, shame encompasses intense negative emotions such as feelings of inferiority and inadequacy (Lewis, 1995).

Shame is an aversive emotion that people attempt to cope with by withdrawing or attributing blame to others (Tangney et al., 1992; Tracy & Robbins, 2006). This can result in maladaptive behaviours such as hiding or withdrawing oneself (Tracy & Robbins, 2006). As a consequence of this circumstance, non-verbal manifestations of shame, such as hunching the body, averting one's gaze, remaining motionless, or remaining still, may manifest (Darwin, 1872/2007; Gilbert, 2000). The experience of shame plays an essential role in the survival of individuals in social contexts characterised by strict rules and challenging circumstances. Shame serves to confirm negative evaluations of the individual's general self-state, including attributions that the individual considers to have developed outside of themselves (Weiner, 2006). It is also postulated that the submissive posture and pessimistic gaze associated with shame may elicit forgiveness and sympathy from others, given that these emotions have evolved to assuage anger and other negative sentiments and

behaviours following a moral transgression (Gilbert, 1998; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Keltner & Buswell, 1997).

Another self-conscious emotion is embarrassment, which may be considered a form of shame. Although embarrassment is similar to shame in many respects, there are some differences in the relational details. This is because emotions such as embarrassment, shyness and humiliation all involve an inability to reach the ego ideal. Embarrassment is a relatively mild emotion, used in a causal manner, in comparison to other forms of shame, such as humiliation or mortification, which are considerably stronger reactions (Lazarus, 1991; Lewis, 1995). Embarrassment is a relatively mild emotional state that includes a certain degree of self-consciousness and a tendency to smile. In contrast, shame is often a more painful emotion, as it highlights a perceived flaw in the individual's true self (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The facial expressions associated with embarrassment include a downward gaze, pressed lips, turning the head sideways, touching the face, and non-Duchenne smiles, which are fake or inauthentic smiles that appear to be polite or socially obligatory. In contrast, shame is often accompanied by a relatively continuous gaze downwards (Keltner, 1995). However, although shame and embarrassment can be conceptualised as distinct emotions in different cultural contexts, these two emotions are essentially analogous in the same cultural setting (Haidt, 2003). For example, similar to shame and guilt, the evaluation of identity-goal relevance, identity-goal incongruence, and internal attributions are essential for the experience of embarrassment. Nevertheless, embarrassment may arise from either unstable or stable causes. In the absence of further attributions, it requires that one's attention be directed towards the self as perceived by others, that is, the public self (Robins & Schriber, 2009).

Pride can be defined as the emotion experienced when an individual achieves their internalised aims and standards and is accepted by society. Emotion-based pride enables individuals to perceive themselves as worthy (Muris & Meesters, 2014). Pride is the consequence of an individual's favourable assessment of their conduct, interpersonal relationships and personal identity in the context of a specific situation, as a result of cognitive evaluation processes. (Sullivan, 2014; Tracy & Robins, 2004). For an individual to experience pride, it is crucial to align their internal standards with the prevailing social and cultural norms (Muris & Meesters, 2014). A more accurate analysis of pride may be achieved by dividing it into two categories, thus facilitating a more precise interpretation of the research results and a clearer revelation of the relations between the variables. As a result, authentic pride is associated with more specific achievements and situations, whereas

hubristic pride is associated with a general self-state. In contrast, authentic pride is formed based on internal, unstable and controllable reasons, whereas hubristic pride is formed based on internal, stable and uncontrollable reasons. It can be reasonably assumed that authentic pride is a sentiment that is likely to be experienced by all individuals in the context of a successful outcome, and that such feelings are generally regarded as acceptable within the broader social context. In contrast, hubristic pride is characterised by feelings of arrogance and extremism, which are generally perceived unfavourably by society. It is more probable that shame will be experienced in the context of hubristic pride. (Lewis, 2000; Tangney et al., 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). It can therefore be concluded that authentic pride is the more adaptive of the two. The experience of shame associated with hubristic pride leads to the individual's withdrawal from social interactions, preventing the engagement in restorative or compensatory behaviours (Carver et al., 2010; Lewis, 1995). The following section will examine the relationship between emotional outcomes and moral hypocrisy, with a particular focus on the role of self-conscious emotions.

1.6.6. Emotional Outcomes and Moral Hypocrisy

A review of the literature on moral hypocrisy and related behaviours and emotions reveals a striking tendency to consider emotions as the primary cause. There is a paucity of studies examining the emotional consequences of moral hypocrisy (Lammers et al., 2010; Lönnqvist et al., 2014; Tong & Yang, 2011).

In this study, given the limitations of existing research on moral hypocrisy, literature on related topics such as cheating and unethical behaviour was also consulted to inform the current research. The commonality among these phenomena is the tendency to portray others as trustworthy (Haidt, 2003). In this section, the focus is on the emotional consequences of moral hypocrisy, with a particular emphasis on self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, and pride.

Emotions such as anger, disgust and contempt are characterised by a tendency to condemn others, in contrast to self-conscious emotions. In contrast, self-conscious emotions lack the components of disgust, anger, and condemnation towards others. Instead, they serve as a guiding force in challenging circumstances, such as when individuals engage in hypocritical behavior, helping them to navigate these situations and evaluate their own actions. In light of the aforementioned considerations, this study sought to ascertain whether

self-conscious emotions are primarily precipitated by moral hypocrisy or not (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 1992; Tracy & Robbins, 2006).

The experience of shame and embarrassment may be triggered when an individual violates certain cultural norms in the presence of others, perceives a high risk of being held accountable for the violation, or makes assessments that they may have committed such a violation. These feelings may be triggered by the violation being carried out in front of others, even when the individual believes the act to be secretive, as illustrated by studies on moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 1999; Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Wolf et al., 2010). Following a moral transgression, individuals who experience intense feelings of shame may employ various coping mechanisms, including compensation, humor, or denial, to alleviate the situation. This situation demonstrates that individuals may engage in compensatory behaviours following a negative self-conscious emotion, such as shame, in response to moral hypocrisy (Harper, 2011; Lewis, 1995). However, the extent to which this occurs is less pronounced than in the case of guilt (Lewis, 1995). In the context of moral hypocrisy, it can be expected that a person exhibiting moral hypocrisy will experience shame following the commission of a morally hypocritical act. This is because a person who feels shame believes that there is something wrong with their true self (Babcock & Sabini, 1990; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney et al., 1996). However, it can be argued that guilt is a more likely emotion to be experienced by individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy in situations where they are attempting to compensate for their actions. This is because individuals who experience guilt are more likely to attempt to rectify the situation in which they have caused harm. In the present study, it is postulated that the compensation method in question may be to make a greater financial contribution to the other person or persons.

Embarrassment is primarily associated with violations of social norms, including customs, traditions, and perceived transgressions of moral standards (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Moreover, shame is characterised by an intensified urge to withdraw, which can be perceived as distressing and ominous (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Although there are slight differences between the two, these feelings, which are seen as similar or embarrassment is a form of shame, are presented as an illustration of their reflection in the individual as a result of violating a social rule or norm (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Based on this information, it can be concluded that the individual may experience emotions of shame and embarrassment after moral hypocrisy.

An individual who pursues their own interests through the use of hypocritical and harmful tactics may also experience a sense of guilt as a result. Guilt is an emotion that can

be experienced when an individual violates moral principles or obligations and causes harm to another or others (Hoffman, 1982; Lazarus, 1991). Given that moral hypocrisy denotes the immoral and implicit prioritisation of one's self-interest over that of another or others, it is probable that the experience of guilt will ensue in the context of these social relationships. This is due to the fact that the other party will suffer a loss or be harmed as a result of the behavior of individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy (Fiske, 1991; Haidt, 2003). Guilt may also prompt individuals to empathise with others and repair damaged relationships as a result of their immoral actions (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Moreover, it is anticipated that individuals who have experienced guilt will exhibit a higher level of prosocial behaviour, defined as helping behaviour, than those who have not experienced guilt. This is because guilt is an emotion that is action-oriented and oriented towards compensation (Lewis, 1995). Furthermore, since guilt is accompanied by reformatory behaviours aimed at rectifying and compensating for misguided actions, these behaviours can serve to mitigate the effects of guilt (Lewis, 1995). It can therefore be inferred that guilt is one of the most likely emotions to be encountered after a moral hypocrisy occurs, based on the aforementioned information. The aforementioned literature is also in alignment with the findings of Batson's experiments, as guilt was identified as a prevalent emotion among individuals engaging in moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 1999a, 2003b).

Pride is the most probable emotional state to be experienced by individuals who do not engage in moral hypocrisy and behave in an honest manner. The sense of pride enables the individual to evaluate themselves, their relationships and their behaviours in a positive light as a result of cognitive evaluation processes in the face of various situations. In certain situations, the individual may perceive themselves as a holistic positive (Lewis, 1995; Sullivan, 2014; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Pride can be considered the antithesis of shame. From this perspective, it can be inferred that an individual who does not engage in hypocrisy can experience pride following the honest expression of their own volition. Moreover, the individual may perceive that they have aligned their actions with their ideal self. Consequently, the degree of altruistic behaviour exhibited by such an individual is likely to be comparatively limited, given the absence of intrinsic motivation to assist others (Babcock & Sabini, 1990; Lewis, 1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).

Given the paucity of studies examining the emotional consequences of moral hypocrisy, this study will provide insight into this issue by drawing on existing research on the emotional outcomes of other similar behaviours, including unethical, immoral and dishonest conduct. Especially self-conscious emotions, could have a role as an emotional

outcome, which is thought to be related to moral hypocrisy, some research results on the possibility of the relationship that is claimed to exist through some researches on the subject (i.e., emotional outcomes that are likely to occur after moral hypocrisy) will be illuminating to present.

This study explores the emotional consequences associated with engaging in morally unjust practices, such as moral hypocrisy. One of the few studies on the emotional consequences of moral hypocrisy is that of Batson and his colleagues. The objective of the study was to ascertain the emotional consequences of not behaving unfairly in a secretive manner. The findings indicated that individuals who assigned positive tasks to the other participant as a result of the lottery exhibited greater feelings of pride and lower levels of guilt. Conversely, those who assigned positive tasks to themselves and negative tasks to other participants demonstrated elevated levels of guilt and diminished feelings of pride (Batson et al., 1997).

The objective of the study conducted by Yousaf and Gobet (2014) was to investigate the emotional and attitudinal consequences of religious hypocrisy. The researchers asserted that individuals who are aware of their religious hypocrisy are significantly more prone to experiencing feelings of guilt and shame. To investigate this hypothesis, three experimental studies were conducted. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that the experience of hypocrisy was associated with the emergence of guilt and shame, while no evidence was found for the experience of upset, distress, or irritability. In Experiment 2, it was found that participants in the dissonance conditions exhibited greater levels of guilt and shame than those in the control conditions. It was hypothesised that a religious self-affirmation task would result in a reduction in cognitive dissonance, given that the opportunity to write about significant religious values would negate any feelings of guilt and shame caused by hypocrisy. The results indicated that the level of guilt and shame experienced by participants in the dissonance conditions was higher than that experienced by participants in the control conditions. With regard to other general discomfort emotions (irritability, distress, and upset), a slight difference was observed between the two groups.

The tenets of moral foundation theory may prove beneficial in elucidating the emotional ramifications of hypocritical conduct. Moral foundation theory posits that each moral foundation is associated with a distinct emotional response. One of these moral foundations is fairness, which is also a focus of this study. The theory posits that violations of fairness can elicit feelings of anger. Additionally, violations of autonomy have been linked to anger, violations of community to contempt, and violations of divinity to disgust (Rozin

et al., 1999). Furthermore, while transgressions related to care may elicit compassion, and violations pertaining to purity may evoke disgust (Haidt & Joseph, 2008), Although there is no definitive or straightforward relationship between moral violations and specific emotions, and these relationships are inherently complex, it can be inferred from related studies that certain violations may elicit or intensify particular emotions more than others, such as those related to purity (Haidt & Joseph, 2008; Landmann & Hess, 2017).

The study conducted by Landmann and Hess (2017) aimed to investigate whether moral transgression elicits specific emotions. To test this hypothesis, a sample of 195 participants were asked to rate their emotional responses to situations involving moral violations. A five-by-seven repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the emotion ratings. The researchers observed that the emotional responses exhibited by participants varied in accordance with the specific type of moral transgression involved. Moreover, compassion and disgust demonstrated a robust correlation with care and purity, while exhibiting a comparatively weaker association with fairness and authority. Anger and rage were found to be caused by transgressions of care, fairness, and authority, though not to the same extent as those of loyalty and purity. Resentment was found to be caused by transgressions of care and fairness, though not to the same extent as transgressions of authority, loyalty, and purity. The results demonstrate the existence of a complex relationship between moral emotions and moral violations, characterised by varying degrees of strength.

The aversive emotions, including guilt, shame and embarrassment (which are classified as self-conscious emotions), that arise as a result of immoral behaviours such as moral hypocrisy can be evaluated as the outcomes of this process. Nevertheless, these emotions can also be regarded as outputs that function to inhibit immoral conduct. In other words, the aversive emotions experienced as a result of an immoral act may act as a deterrent to future immoral acts (Ruedy et al., 2010). Therefore, individuals who engage in hypocritical behaviour may subsequently act morally in order to avoid or alleviate the aversive self-conscious emotions posited in the current study.

Emotions constitute an essential component of any decision-making process (Schwartz, 2000). From this perspective, it can be inferred that unethical behaviours can act as a catalyst for both negative and positive emotions that arise from any decision (Ruedy et al., 2010). The decision to act immorally is associated with negative emotional responses, including feelings of guilt, shame, and anxiety. It is hypothesised that such emotions act as a deterrent to further immoral behaviour (Bandura, 2001). In other words, emotions such as

regret and guilt can result in positive outcomes, such as the avoidance of repeating the same wrong behaviour. For example, guilt may lead to compensatory behaviours, as well as reducing the likelihood of repeating the immoral behaviour in question at a later stage (Baumeister et al., 1995).

People evaluate themselves after engaging in unethical behaviour. For example, most liars are aware of their obligation to tell the truth, so they try to find justifications for not telling the truth, and they know that they have violated their own standards of moral integrity and the risks and potential costs this may incur. This violation may trigger some negative emotions such as shame, guilt and anxiety (Lewicki, 1983; Ruedy et al., 2010).

In his study (1999), Bandura examined the phenomenon of moral disengagement, which he defined as "the avoidance of actions or means that could potentially violate moral norms" (p. 17). Otherwise, they may experience negative emotions directed towards themselves, such as feelings of self-condemnation comprising guilt and shame. The avoidance of negative emotions following the implementation of ethical decisions can be influenced by emotional responses subsequent to the commission of unethical behaviour, which may occur directly or indirectly. For instance, the experience of guilt by an individual following the perpetration of an unethical act may prompt the restoration of damaged relationships or the reduction of the likelihood of repeating such behaviour (Baumeister et al., 1995).

It is crucial to recognise that certain emotions have a common set of antecedents, which can be activated by disparate circumstances. For example, guilt, shame, and embarrassment are emotions that are elicited in different situations and which people seek to alleviate or diminish since they are aversive and should be avoided (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tracy & Robbins, 2006). In order to alleviate or reduce these feelings, individuals may engage in prosocial behaviours. For example, research indicates that there is a positive correlation between prosocial behaviour and guilt during adolescence, while a negative correlation exists between prosocial behaviour and shame (Tangney et al., 1996). This result may provide insight into the relationship between moral hypocrisy and emotions. It appears that individuals who engage in morally hypocritical behavior are more likely to experience guilt than shame, as they may seek to rectify the harm caused to others.

Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, unethical conduct may also engender positive sentiments, such as a semblance of pleasure or enjoyment (Ruedy et al., 2010). In the study conducted by Nunner-Winkler (2007), the researchers investigated the relationship between moral motivation and moral identity among individuals aged 17 to 22. The study revealed a

correlation between low moral motivation and a proclivity for rule transgressions. If the findings are elaborated upon, it was observed that the subjects expressed a positive mood when their own will and moral norms were in conflict, and subsequently when they acted in accordance with their own will and committed moral violations. The findings indicate that individuals may experience positive emotions following the transgression of a moral norm. The present study also sought to ascertain whether individuals experience positive emotions following the act of moral hypocrisy.

Similarly, Mulder and Dijk (2020) have asserted that post hoc moral rationalisations can contribute to the pursuit or increase of immoral behaviour. To test this hypothesis, three experimental studies were conducted. The findings revealed that individuals with low moral identity were more likely to believe that immoral behaviour is morally acceptable. Consequently, post hoc moral rationalisation was more successful in reducing emotional guilt when compared to individuals with a high level of moral identity. This result indicates that, despite both groups experiencing emotion guilt as a result of immoral behaviour, those who employ the rationalisation mechanism, which is a key driver of hypocritical behaviour, exhibit a reduced sense of guilt. This contrasts with the findings of previous studies (Baumeister et al., 1995; Landmann & Hess, 2017; Ruedy et al., 2010).

After discussing the relationship between moral hypocrisy and emotions, it is essential to consider helping behavior, particularly charitable giving, as a potential outcome of moral hypocrisy. This perspective is significant because helping behavior may serve as a way for individuals to compensate for or mask their self-serving actions, providing valuable insights into how moral hypocrisy influences helping behavior.

1.7. Helping Behavior

In general, helping behaviour can be defined as a voluntary action directed towards an individual in need, with a consideration of the potential benefit to others and an underlying sense of social responsibility (Batson & Powell, 2003; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Oswald, 1996). This behaviour, which is based on the consideration of the benefit to others, manifests in a multitude of forms, including the holding of a door, the provision of directions to someone seeking guidance, and the notification of a need for assistance in a given situation. (Batson, 1998; Dovidio et al., 2006). Among this wide range of helping behaviours, donation is particularly noteworthy. The existing literature indicates that resources such as money, blood, organs, shopping cards, and so forth can be used to address

these needs by donating to those in need (Bremner, 2017). In this study, we concentrated on the role of donation within the broader context of helping behaviours.

In terms of the benefits of helping behaviour to the person who helps, it can be argued that this behaviour is exhibited on a voluntary basis and that the person benefits by feeling good after the help (Batson, 1994; 1995). Since helping behaviour has a very diverse range, the classification of this behaviour provides convenience in studies.

The term "helping behaviour" is typically classified as either altruistic or egoistic (Franzoi, 2006). Altruistic helping behaviour is typified by a high degree of altruism towards others, with minimal consideration of the individual's own needs (Karadağ & Mutaçlılar, 2009). In other words, the individual prioritises the well-being of those in need of assistance over their own well-being, acting without any self-interest (Franzoi, 2006). This situation indicates that the individual's tendency to help is driven by their own internal emotional state. There may be instances where there is no individual in a truly dire situation requiring assistance (Xiao et al., 2021). In contrast, egoistic helping behaviour is characterised by an individual's primary focus on their own well-being, with the act of offering help serving as a means of self-gratification (Knez, 2016). It is crucial that the individual receiving assistance experiences a positive emotional state in return for the help provided. The primary motivation for such behaviour is the extent to which the act of helping has an effect on the individual in question (Batson et al., 1981). Examining the relationship between moral hypocrisy and helping behavior theories is crucial for understanding how individuals navigate the balance between prioritizing their self-interest and engaging in prosocial behaviors.

1.7.1. The Role of Helping Behavior Theories in Understanding Moral Hypocrisy

Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977) posits that individuals learn behaviors, including helping behavior, through observation, imitation, and reinforcement. In this context, individuals may learn to appear altruistic while acting in ways that serve their self-interest. Within the framework of moral hypocrisy, individuals can observe or internalize from role models that helping behavior is often used as a tool to gain social approval (Berkowitz, 1987; Gillies, 2003). When individuals receive social or personal benefits from appearing moral through helping behaviors, this can reinforce and perpetuate morally hypocritical behavior.

Given the close connection between Social Learning Theory and the concept of moral disengagement, this framework also suggests that individuals may employ rationalization techniques such as advantageous comparison or euphemistic labeling during helping behavior. These mechanisms allow individuals to reconcile their self-serving actions with the appearance of moral integrity, further facilitating moral hypocrisy in the context of helping behavior.

Social Exchange Theory (Cook & Emerson, 1987; Thibaut, 2017) posits that individuals shape their social relationships and helping behaviors based on a cost-benefit analysis. According to the theory, helping behaviors are often driven by personal interests, with potential rewards and costs playing a significant role in decision-making. In the context of moral hypocrisy, visible acts of helping may be performed primarily to gain social approval. Helping behaviors are often directed toward individuals or groups from whom future benefits are anticipated. Individuals may choose to engage in helping behaviors that are low-cost but highly visible, maximizing social recognition while minimizing personal sacrifice. The theory also emphasizes the central role of reciprocity in social relationships, suggesting that behaviors are shaped by the expectation of mutual obligations (Blau, 2017). In the context of moral hypocrisy, helping behaviors can serve to establish reciprocal obligations while simultaneously projecting a moral image. This allows individuals to maintain an appearance of moral integrity while safeguarding their own self-interest.

Batson's (1991) Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis provides a valuable framework for understanding moral hypocrisy behavior. According to this hypothesis, true altruism stems from empathy, which motivates individuals to help others without considering personal gain. However, in the context of moral hypocrisy, individuals may imitate empathy-driven helping behaviors. Through this imitation, they can maintain a moral image while prioritizing their self-interest. In other words, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy may engage in helping behaviors by pretending to feel empathy. This allows them to construct a moral image while simultaneously seeking social approval or rewards that align with their self-interest. Such individuals often demonstrate helping behaviors that require minimal effort or cost, thereby appearing altruistic without significant personal sacrifice. Batson (1991) distinguishes between empathy-based altruism and altruism driven by self-serving motivations. Empathy-based altruism is genuine, heartfelt, and involves helping others purely out of concern for their needs, with no expectation of personal benefit. In contrast, those displaying moral hypocrisy are more likely to engage in helping behaviors to alleviate their own feelings of guilt or to protect their social status and reputation. These individuals are more likely to

assist when their helping behaviors are visible or enhance their social image. However, in less visible situations, where helping does not provide tangible social benefits, they may refrain from acting altruistically. Understanding moral hypocrisy behavior requires examining not only individuals' moral intentions but also the contextual factors shaping these intentions. Factors influencing helping behavior constitute a significant part of this context and provide critical insights into why individuals exhibit moral hypocrisy in specific situations. Considering these factors enables a deeper understanding of the dynamics of moral hypocrisy.

1.7.2. Factors Affecting Helping Behaviour

The factors affecting helping behaviour can be categorised under two general headings: personal and situational. While personal factors can be exemplified by a sense of proximity or empathy towards the individual in need of assistance, as well as a perception of responsibility, situational factors can be illustrated by the emotional state of the individual providing assistance and the extent to which the norms that govern helping behaviour are adopted. Situational factors can also be exemplified by the costs associated with providing assistance, the expectation of reciprocity and the urgency of the situation. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that individuals are less inclined to offer assistance when they anticipate a lower level of reciprocity, whereas the opposite is true (Dovidio et al., 2010; Litvack-Miller et al., 1997; Myers, 1999). In addition to the aforementioned factors, the race, gender, and family background of the helper and the recipient also influence helping behaviour (Barnett et al., 2000; Staub, 2015).

A further significant factor influencing the propensity to engage in helping behaviour is the mood (emotional state) of the helper. In this study, the mood of the helper is also a significant factor, given that the mood of the participants was manipulated. Individuals exhibiting a positive mood are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors such as donating money, assisting others, or donating blood (Carlson & Miller, 1987; North et al., 2004). The act of helping others has been shown to have two distinct benefits. Firstly, it provides a direct benefit to the individual being helped. Secondly, it contributes to the maintenance of the positive mood of the person helping. This is because it allows the person helping to focus more on their own feelings and values, rather than the environment (Berkowitz, 1987; Salovey & Rodin, 1986). It is evident that a positive mood has a beneficial impact on the

likelihood of engaging in helping behaviour. The following paragraph will elucidate the effect of a negative mood on helping behaviour.

Conversely, the propensity to engage in helping behaviours may be heightened when an individual is experiencing a negative emotional state. At this juncture, a compensatory or balancing mechanism is initiated. This is because individuals believe that their previous good deeds can compensate for bad deeds. In instances where individuals experience negative emotional states such as sadness, sorrow, or unhappiness, they may engage in helping behaviors with the intention of reversing or alleviating these negative emotions. Conversely, individuals may attempt to offset feelings of guilt by engaging in helping behaviors such as altruism (e.g., donating, etc.) (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981; Wegener & Petty, 1994). Consequently, when individuals engage in a morally hypocritical act, the subsequent emotional state, characterised by feelings of discontent or irritation, may prompt the manifestation of helping behaviour.

As a result of research on temporary changes in mood or the relationship between mood and moral behavior, significant relationships have been found between situationally triggered emotions (such as anger, guilt, sadness, disgust, etc.) and perceived injustice or immoral behavior variables (Mikula et al., 1998; Scherer, 1997). People generally rely on their moods and momentary emotional states as a guide in their decision-making and evaluation processes, which is called the affect as information hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, people make judgments about events and situations in their environment by using their emotions as information (Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).

A negative mood can serve as an efficacious source of information, just as a positive mood can (Forgas et al., 2005). It is also important to note that in such studies, participants are not placed in situations that could compromise their moral integrity or confront them with potentially serious consequences (i.e., high-cost situations) in which they must face social disapproval. In conclusion, individuals are capable of making decisions in accordance with the fluctuating moods and emotional states that arise in response to the information they encounter (Clore et al., 1994). In light of the aforementioned studies, it appears that transient mood states exert a considerable influence on the functioning of moral judgments.

The role of helping behaviour in influencing numerous aspects of life, including those encountered in daily life, is a significant area of interest within the field of study. Consequently, the phenomenon of helping behaviour, which exerts a profound influence on human life, has been subjected to extensive investigation incorporating a multitude of variables (Cunningham & Platow, 2007; Kossowska, 2020; Olthof, 2012). In order to gain

insight into the relationship between helping behaviour and moral hypocrisy and the extent to which moral hypocrisy affects helping behaviour (i.e. whether it increases or decreases helping behaviour), it is necessary to consider the findings obtained from some research results, which are as follows:

Olthof (2012) aimed to explain the relationship between guilt and shame with antisocial or prosocial behaviours. For this purpose, 363 children (187 male and 176 female) between the ages of 10-13 were studied. The participants were asked to imagine a bullying behaviour and to think that it happened to a classmate. Parental and peer reports were requested to determine the antisocial and prosocial behaviours of the participants. According to the findings, guilt was positively associated with prosocial behaviour and shame was negatively associated with antisocial behaviour.

Aronson et al. (2012) examined the relationship between culture and helping behaviour. Accordingly, in collectivist cultures, dependent individuals feel more inclined to help others. In addition, individuals tend to help people from their own group that they identify with more than those in the out-group. Cultural factors also affect in-group or out-group helping behaviour. For example, individualistic cultures tend to help out-group members less than collectivistic cultures.

The results demonstrate noteworthy differences between genders. To illustrate, the study conducted by Clark and Teasdale (1985) demonstrated that positive and negative mood states influence females's ability to recall words that evoke corresponding emotions. No such effect was observed in the male participants. This may be attributed to the observation that females utilize positive and negative vocabulary more frequently and associate these terms with specific emotional categories to a greater extent than males. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that females are more adept at recalling words that are congruent with their emotional state than males (Clark, 1986). In other words, given that females demonstrate a greater capacity to remember and act in accordance with positive or negative emotional states and words compatible with these states than males, it is anticipated that a similar difference may be observed in this study.

An alternative perspective can be elucidated through the lens of the concept of private self-consciousness. It has been observed that individuals with high levels of private self-consciousness tend to direct a greater degree of attention towards their own thoughts, attitudes and emotions. The ability to access thoughts and emotions that are compatible with one's own feelings more easily can facilitate the triggering of emotions and the subsequent effects that result. In the context of this study, individuals who are able to access concepts

such as inner feelings and values with greater ease may exhibit a stronger reaction to stimuli pertaining to immediate emotional states or mood. Consequently, individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy may be inclined to provide assistance more frequently as a result of the guilt they experience in response to the stimuli directed towards them (Scheier & Carver, 1977). It may be posited that private self-consciousness facilitates superior recall and heightened engagement with mood-congruent material. This is a significant individual difference. Moreover, individuals with high personal self-consciousness may be more inclined to utilise stored, controlled strategies for two key reasons. Firstly, it may be the case that such individuals are more aware of the existence of these strategies than others. Secondly, they may be more aware of their own values and beliefs regarding the circumstances under which emotions should or should not be expressed (Clark, 1986).

Furthermore, an individual's awareness of their own arousal states can influence their emotional states. The awareness of changes in emotional states affects the encoding of such changes into memory and subsequent recall. Therefore, alterations in emotional states or moods can be stored in memory and subsequently retrieved. In the context of this feature, individual differences can be posited as an explanatory factor in the emergence of change (Underwood et al., 1977). The momentary mood of an individual can influence their propensity to engage in helping behaviour. The act of helping others is a rewarding experience for individuals experiencing negative moods (Salovey et al., 1991). Conversely, helping others can also be a rewarding behaviour for those in a positive mood. A negative mood, particularly when accompanied by feelings of guilt, has been observed to enhance helping behaviour (Niesta, 2010). For example, Cialdini et al. (1973) posited that adults are more likely to offer assistance to another individual when they are in a negative emotional state, thereby reinforcing positive affect.

Guilt is one of the self-conscious emotions that can prompt an individual to engage in behaviors for which they will subsequently assume responsibility. As one of the self-conscious emotions, guilt is an emotion that is experienced as a result of the individual increasing their awareness through self-evaluation. The individual experiencing this emotion may engage in punitive or reinforcing behaviors as a consequence of heightened self-awareness (Lewis, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Similarly, an individual who engages in moral hypocrisy experiences guilt and seeks opportunities to compensate for their negative actions. As self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame play a pivotal role in moral decision-making (Batson, 2002; Franzoi, 2006). Nevertheless, a salutary sense of guilt

encourages the individual to adopt a new behavioural pattern as a consequence of their previous misdemeanour (Tak, 2014).

A negative mood, such as guilt, has been observed to increase helping behaviour. It is possible that individuals may engage in deliberate strategies, such as performing acts of altruism, in order to cope with the negative mood they are experiencing. Indeed, this situation can be interpreted as an automatic strategy for enhancing positive well-being and circumventing negative states (Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Means, 1983). It can therefore be posited that those who engage in moral hypocrisy may exhibit a greater tendency to help (in the form of donating behaviour) than other participants (Cialdini et al., 1973; Harris, 1977; Manucia et al., 1984).

As previously stated, a negative emotional state (such as guilt) can enhance helping behaviour. A consequence of a previous negative action may be feelings of guilt, sadness or unhappiness. In such a situation, people may attempt to cope with this situation by employing a balance/compensation mechanism (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981; Wegener & Petty, 1994). In other words, the negative emotional state may act as a trigger for helping behaviour due to the need for compensation or balance. Conversely, individuals may make decisions based on their current emotional state. The Affect as Information hypothesis posits that individuals can utilize their emotional states as a form of information, influencing their judgments about events and situations (Clore et al., 1994; Forgas et al., 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).

The act of giving and the behaviour of helping are typically regarded as positive and moral actions. Nevertheless, the relationship between these behaviours and moral hypocrisy and immoral behaviour is intricate and worthy of further investigation. Moral hypocrisy can be defined as the act of presenting oneself as morally superior while failing to adhere to the moral standards that one espouses. In this context, some individuals may attempt to disguise their own moral shortcomings or assuage their consciences while providing assistance or donations to others.

Batson et al. (1997) investigated the role of moral hypocrisy in people's helping behaviour. Their study found that individuals tend to pursue their own interests when helping others, but attempt to justify their actions with a moral rationale. Similar findings have been reported in other studies. For example, the study conducted by Gino and Bazerman (2009) also supports this finding. It is proposed that individuals may engage in charitable behaviour, such as donating to atone for past immoral actions (including moral hypocrisy). This behaviour may be interpreted as an attempt to discharge one's moral debt or to assuage one's

conscience, as well as an attempt to restore one's own moral integrity (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). This behaviour can be interpreted as an attempt to protect one's moral integrity, whilst simultaneously seeking to enhance or reinforce one's social status or image (Grace & Griffin, 2009). On occasion, individuals may justify their negative or immoral actions by referencing their past positive or moral conduct. To illustrate, an individual may act as though they have the prerogative to engage in future immoral behaviour following the completion of a morally praiseworthy act, such as the provision of assistance or the making of a donation. In other words, an individual who has demonstrated moral rectitude is, in and of themselves, imbued with a certain degree of legitimacy to engage in immoral behaviour. Indeed, this process can be described as cyclical. In other words, when individuals utilize these forms of justification and engage in immoral behavior, they may subsequently resort to good or moral behavior as a result of the emotional state or irritable situation that such actions create (Merritt et al., 2010).

After examining the relationship between moral hypocrisy and helping behavior, it is also crucial to explore its connection with perceptions of micro and macro justice. Understanding how moral hypocrisy shapes individuals' justice perceptions—particularly their tendency to prioritize personal interests (micro justice) over societal considerations (macro justice)—provides valuable insights into the effects of moral inconsistencies on fairness and equity at both individual and societal levels.

1.8. Micro-Macro Justice

The question of how to allocate the various resources possessed by a society to the groups or individuals that comprise it, and how to ensure social justice, is a complex issue for the authorities or individuals responsible for resource distribution. In the relevant literature, it is accepted that there are three fundamental standards regarding the distribution of rewards, resources, or other assets to members of a society: equity, need, and equality (Homans, 1982; Leventhal, 1976; Tornblom & Foa, 1983). Equity refers to the distribution of rewards to members of society in proportion to their contributions (inputs). Need refers to the distribution of rewards according to the personal circumstances of the members of society. Equality refers to the equal distribution of rewards among members of society. To address this complexity, two significant concepts based on these fundamental standards have emerged: “Equity-based (Micro justice) and equality-based (Macro justice) justice principles”. The concepts of equity-based (Micro justice) and equality-based (Macro justice)

justice principles are two sets of principles frequently used to address the question of how resources (e.g., wages, rewards) should be distributed in society (Anderson et al., 2015; Brickman et al., 1981; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011).

The fundamental concerns of micro and macro justice approaches revolve around the question of whether resources within a society should be distributed based on individual merit or in consideration of disadvantaged groups within the society, adhering to the principle of equality (Anderson et al., 2015). People base their decisions regarding distribution on two different principles of justice: macro and micro justice principles (Brickman et al., 1981). Macro justice principles advocate that individual characteristics should not be considered, and that there should be a guaranteed and equal reward/salary for everyone. They are concerned with the overall fairness of the total distribution of resources within society. Micro justice principles, on the other hand, emphasize individual effort and performance.

When distinguishing between macro and micro justice orientations, it is crucial to note that the equality standard provides an unusual connection between the two. This is because the equality standard is related to both orientations. Equality is a macro justice principle as it imposes restrictions on the distribution of resources/rewards to all members of society. By doing so, it essentially determines the exact amount each member will receive from these resources/rewards, making it different from other macro justice principles. Thus, in this respect, it also resembles a micro justice principle. In fact, individuals who advocate for the equality standard in terms of individual reward allocation may prefer the equality principle as a complementary principle in the final income distribution. This supports the previously mentioned notion that the equality principle functions as a bridge between macro and micro justice orientations.

Macro justice is defined as the holistic justice in the distribution of rewards within a society. Furthermore, macro justice focuses on whether the total distribution of resources within society is fair, rather than considering individual characteristics. For example, a guaranteed minimum outcome for everyone, or in other words, "equality" (Anderson et al., 2015). Macro justice principles represent the macro justice view of distributive justice and are based on the principle of restoring equality. They argue that planning should be done to maximize the needs of the most disadvantaged social group in society. The primary goal here is to increase the overall welfare of society (Brickman et al., 1981; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011).

The micro justice orientation advocates that behavior should be based on the equity-based principle, meaning that rewards or resources should be distributed fairly among individuals. According to this orientation, in a just society, goods and assets should be distributed in proportion to the contributions and services individuals provide to the system. This approach asserts that individuals should be rewarded based on their contributions to society, their efforts, and their individual skills. In other words, the alignment or proportionality between the rewards individuals receive from the system and their contributions or services to it is crucial for fair distribution. Therefore, according to micro justice principles, individuals should be evaluated based on how well they perform their jobs and how much effort they put in, considering their individual characteristics (Anderson et al., 2015; Brickman et al., 1981; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011).

Individuals in a society care about the proportionality between the rewards or earnings they receive and the costs or investments they have made. In other words, the greater the cost or investment, the greater the reward or gain should be. Otherwise, individuals' expectations of justice would not be met. This discrepancy can lead to feelings of anger (when costs or investments exceed the rewards) or guilt (when costs or investments are less than the rewards) (Cropanzano, 1993; Homans, 1961). The question of what happens to individuals after the perception of injustice arises needs to be addressed. According to this, with the perception of injustice, individuals may reduce the contributions/costs or investments they provide as inputs to the system to restore the disturbed balance. In other words, they may lower their work performance to match the level of rewards they perceive as insufficient (Colquitt et al., 2005).

1.8.1. Moral Hypocrisy and Micro-Macro Justice Relationship

Individuals with a strong independent self-construal tend to prefer micro justice principles over macro justice principles. They place greater importance on personal effort, achievement, performance, and merit. For these individuals, personal preferences take precedence over societal goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Consequently, they do not favor macro justice principles that ignore individual differences in resource distribution (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). Additionally, these individuals distinguish themselves from others based on their talents and characteristics, prioritizing personal goals over group goals. Personal preferences, rights, and desires also take precedence in their moral decision-making

processes (Miller, 1994). When faced with moral dilemmas, they tend to use conflict resolution methods that prioritize their own interests over the needs of others.

Even though they act according to their own interests, they are concerned about how they are perceived and evaluated by their community. Their sensitivity to fair behavior largely stems from their relationships within their group. Acting contrary to group norms may result in negative emotions, and to avoid these, consistency, impartiality, and morality are important norms (Leventhal, 1980; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Therefore, when given the opportunity, individuals may operate micro justice principles when prioritizing their own interests, but conform to macro justice principles when societal norms are unavoidable, acting as if societal welfare is more important to them. The emergence of these processes can be quite complex.

When the characteristics of the social whole are understood, parameters related to distribution and decisions can be established, making these complex processes relatively predictable (Jasso, 1983). However, the process of individuals using such information at any decision-making moment is not very clear. Brickman et al. (1981) stated that it is almost impossible for individuals to coordinate their preferences regarding micro or macro justice principles with predetermined parameters or standards. Thus, there may not be a meaningful relationship between responding to inequalities in resource distribution according to macro justice principles and supporting fairness or need at the micro level (Anderson et al., 2015).

The variable of micro and macro justice has been the subject of research on how resources/assets should be distributed within a society. For example, Murphy-Berman et al. (2002) examined how participants resolved dilemmas involving macro-micro justice judgments. They investigated whether sensitivity to macro justice issues changed when resources were allocated at the group level versus the individual level. This effect was found only when there was no information about the recipient's in-group/out-group status concerning monetary allocation. This could be due to additional information about in-group/out-group relationships reducing the salience of the framing manipulation. Therefore, the framing effect was not strongly supported. The allocation task was also influenced by contextual features, weakening the framing effect.

Significant effects were found regarding group affiliation. Participants were more inclined to follow macro justice principles for in-group members and less likely for out-group members. When allocating money, participants leaned more towards macro justice principles. If the underrepresented group was an out-group, Turkish participants allocated less scholarship money compared to Americans. This pattern was similar for distributing

other conditions. Macro justice principles were more prevalent in collectivist cultures (like Türkiye), whereas micro justice principles were preferred in individualistic cultures (like the USA). Turkish participants showed significant differences among the three group affiliation conditions, whereas participants from the United States did not. Turkish participants allocated more scholarship money to underrepresented in-group members compared to their American counterparts.

Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) investigated the relationship between independent self-construal and affirmative action using micro and macro justice terms. They explored whether participants preferred the Tie policy (supporting macro justice to ensure representation) or the PT policy (also supporting macro justice but potentially favoring less qualified underrepresented individuals over more qualified ones). Findings indicated that PT policies were less accepted. The stronger the independent self-construal, the more opposed individuals were to PT policies. Independent self-construal did not predict opposition to Tie policies.

When PT policies violated micro justice principles to ensure macro justice, individuals with a strong independent self-construal were more opposed compared to those with a weak independent self-construal. However, if the policy included both micro and macro principles, opposition decreased. In North American culture, micro justice principles were more preferred, and individuals with an independent self-construal were more opposed to affirmative action practices. Being micro justice-oriented did not mediate the effect of independent self-construal on opposition to PT policies, but micro justice concerns were still important for understanding attitudes towards affirmative action.

Anderson et al. (2015) examined the role of macro and micro justice principles in predicting attitudes towards refugees, beyond the established roles of social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). The findings indicated that SDO and RWA are significant predictors of negative attitudes towards refugees, with SDO being a stronger predictor than RWA. A key result was that macro justice principles strongly predicted positive attitudes towards refugees and significantly contributed to the variance in attitudes beyond what was predicted by SDO and RWA. Another finding was that micro justice orientation did not predict attitudes towards refugees. This contrasts with Zdaniuk and Bobocel's (2011) research, which found that micro justice principles were associated with greater meritocratic beliefs and a lower likelihood of accepting affirmative action, indicating inconsistency between the two studies.

Simpson and Kaminski (2005) investigated income inequality and micro-macro justice among 453 participants, including 119 private sector managers and 334 union representatives. They addressed questions about the strength of commitment to the equity standard in rewarding individuals, the association of increasing wage and income inequality with perceived injustice, whether union members endorse the equity standard more than non-union members, and whether a higher commitment to the equity standard mediates the relationship between union membership and perceived injustice of increasing income inequality. The findings showed that among the three micro justice standards, only equity was associated with perceived injustice of increasing income inequality. No relationship was found between equity and need standards, while a high positive relationship was detected between the equity standard and perceived injustice. The results also indicated that the equity standard serves as a logical bridge to the macro justice domain that other micro justice standards do not. The equity standard did not mediate the relationship between union membership and perceived injustice of increasing income inequality. However, perceived injustice was higher among union members, likely due to demographic and positional differences distinguishing them from managers. The likelihood of union members supporting the equity standard over managers was not proven, but union members were less likely to prefer the equity standard compared to managers.

Lillie and Janoff-Bulman (2007) examined the impact of micro justice (individual focus) and macro justice (societal focus) on perceptions of justice in the context of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Participants were provided with a detailed explanation of the TRC and asked to evaluate its overall fairness and specific components. The findings revealed that groups with a micro justice orientation perceived the TRC as less fair compared to those with a macro justice orientation. Significant differences were found in the perceived fairness of the amnesty policy and the monetary compensation policy. Post hoc analyses showed that the group with a higher macro justice orientation perceived the TRC as more fair and beneficial to society in terms of Overall Fairness, Positive Contributions, and perceived fairness of the amnesty policy, compared to the micro justice-oriented group. Overall, macro justice-oriented groups rated the TRC as more fair than micro justice-oriented groups. Additionally, differences were noted between micro and macro justice-oriented groups in terms of Overall Fairness and Evaluative Adjectives, with the micro justice-oriented group perceiving the TRC as less fair than both the macro justice-oriented group and the control group. Specifically, participants questioned about the fairness

to "victims' families" rated the TRC less favorably. No significant differences were found between the macro justice-oriented group and the control group.

Ceylan (2010) investigated the effects of contribution type and in-group/out-group membership on perceptions of fairness in reward and penalty distribution. Participants were asked how they would allocate rewards in the case of success and penalties in the case of failure. They were then asked to rate the fairness of distributing rewards or penalties based on effort or ability and to indicate their levels of satisfaction and anger. The findings showed that when "effort" was the criterion, rewards and penalties were distributed based on contribution without regard to group membership. However, when "ability" was the criterion, penalties were distributed equally between both groups. Participants tended to allocate rewards based on contribution if the in-group member was more talented and to distribute rewards equally if the out-group member was more talented. Participants perceived equal distribution as more fair when penalties were involved compared to rewards. Additionally, equal distribution based on ability was seen as more fair than distribution based on effort. Equal distribution was also perceived as more fair when the out-group member contributed more than the in-group member.

Reis and Jackson (1981) investigated the impact of task type on principles of reward distribution. Their findings indicated a gender difference in the allocation of rewards when the task was deemed suitable for males. Specifically, when both participants were male, rewards were distributed according to the equity principle, whereas if one participant was female, the equality principle was preferred. It was also observed that female tended to distribute rewards equally, regardless of gender. When the task was more suited to female, both male and female adhered to the equity principle without gender bias.

Sinclair and Mark (1991) explored how emotional states influence the distribution of resources or rewards. Their study found that individuals in a negative emotional state preferred distribution based on contribution, while those in a positive emotional state were more inclined to perceive equal distribution as fairer. This suggests that the emotional state at the time of decision-making can affect the preferred principles of fairness.

Having explored the relationship between moral hypocrisy and micro-macro justice, it is equally important to examine the connection between moral hypocrisy and state self-esteem. This relationship is crucial because moral hypocrisy may influence how individuals perceive and evaluate themselves in specific situations. Understanding this connection can provide valuable insights into how moral hypocrisy affects state self-esteem and help deepen our understanding of the psychological outcomes of moral hypocrisy.

1.9. State Self-Esteem

The question of whether the self is a stable structure or can be shaped over time has attracted considerable interest from researchers (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Some argue that the self is permanent and stable, while others suggest that situational factors can induce momentary changes (Baumgardner et al., 1989; Greenwald, 1980; Markus & Kunda, 1986; Rosenberg, 1986; Swann, 1985; Wylie, 1979; Tesser, 1988). For instance, forming a close relationship with a successful person may contribute to one's self-improvement temporarily. Conversely, comparing oneself to a successful other may decrease self-esteem. Both theoretical explanations and this example indicate that situational factors can influence self-esteem positively or negatively, even if temporarily (Cialdini et al., 1976; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Tesser, 1988).

The study by Cialdini et al. (1976) examines how individuals enhance their self-esteem through associations with successful groups or people, a phenomenon known as Basking in the Glow of Reflected Glory (BIRGing). This concept explains that people derive pride and a sense of self-esteem by affiliating with the successes of others. For instance, fans of a winning sports team experience a boost in self-esteem despite not directly contributing to the victory. Similarly, individuals feel a sense of accomplishment when their friends achieve significant success, enhancing their own self-image. Conversely, social comparison can negatively impact self-esteem. When individuals compare themselves to more successful others, it can lead to feelings of inadequacy and decreased self-worth. Festinger (1954) explained this in his social comparison theory, noting that comparing oneself to others, especially those who are better off, negatively affects one's self-perception. This "contrast effect" leads to reduced self-esteem and feelings of inferiority. For instance, a person may feel less competent when comparing their professional achievements to those of a highly successful colleague.

Understanding the concepts of social interactions and comparisons is crucial for comprehending how they impact self-esteem. While BIRGing can provide a temporary boost to self-esteem, making comparisons can negatively affect it. This highlights the importance of strengthening the internal sources of self-esteem and increasing resilience against negative comparisons.

People may encounter feedback that is inconsistent with their self-concepts. However, everyone has an average sense of self. Studies on self-esteem fluctuations have found that while self-esteem is generally stable, minor fluctuations can occur (Savin-

Williams & Demo, 1983). Changes in stable self-esteem have also been observed based on interactions (Wells, 1988). For example, mothers have lower self-esteem when with their infants but higher self-esteem when with other adults. Overall, self-esteem is emphasized as a relatively stable construct that can exhibit some fluctuations (Rosenberg, 1986). These findings suggest that situational manipulations of self-esteem have an effect to some extent (Rosenberg, 1986; Wells, 1988).

Many researchers have reported changes in participants' moods following the manipulation of self-esteem (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Brockner & Elkind, 1985; Kernis et al., 1989; McFarland & Ross, 1982; Shrauger & Lund, 1975; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977). For instance, Shrauger and Sorman, (1977) found that individuals who experienced failure after a performance felt more anxiety and lower overall satisfaction compared to those who experienced success. This finding illustrates the negative impact of failure on individuals' emotional states and self-assessments. Failure can lead to situational frustration and sadness, reducing general feelings of satisfaction and potentially causing long-term negative effects. This study is important for understanding how individuals react to failure and the emotional and performance-related consequences of these reactions, as increased anxiety and decreased overall satisfaction can undermine self-esteem.

It is well-known that situational manipulations of self-esteem result in mood changes. Brockner and Elkind (1985) supported this phenomenon in their study within the success-failure paradigm. They investigated participants' emotional responses to varying levels of failure. The findings indicated that participants reported significantly higher levels of frustration after experiencing major failure compared to minor failure or no failure at all. This suggests that the magnitude of failure plays a critical role in determining the intensity of emotional responses, revealing more intense affective reactions.

Baumeister and Tice (1985) found that failure in the success-failure paradigm resulted in changes in specific emotional elements, such as feelings of humiliation, rather than broad mood changes. In other words, failure may lead to particular emotional responses rather than a wide range of mood alterations. Similarly, Kernis et al. (1989) discovered that individuals experiencing academic failure reported significantly more negative moods across various dimensions. These findings indicate that poor academic performance can have a substantial impact on emotional states.

McFarland and Ross (1982) also found that failure and success generated a range of emotional outcomes, including feelings highly related to self-esteem (e.g., pride, confidence, shame, or stupidity). Conversely, Baumgardner et al. (1989) observed that individuals with

low self-esteem showed an increase in self-esteem-related moods when they openly complimented the source of positive feedback or derogated the source of negative feedback. These results support the notion that ego-threatening manipulations produce various emotional responses. Such momentary changes highlight a concept distinct from general self-esteem: state self-esteem.

State self-esteem refers to how an individual's self-respect and self-worth fluctuate in response to specific situations or events. Unlike global self-esteem, which encompasses one's overall and enduring feelings and evaluations of self-worth, state self-esteem focuses on the changes in self-esteem triggered by particular circumstances.

Heatherton and Polivy (1991) emphasize that state self-esteem differs from global self-esteem and is more functional in understanding and evaluating an individual's emotions, thoughts, and behaviors in specific contexts. For example, an individual's evaluation of their academic performance significantly impacts their state performance self-esteem, while feelings of adequacy or inadequacy in interpersonal relationships affect their state social self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Thus, global self-esteem is useful for understanding overall self-satisfaction, whereas state self-esteem is better for assessing satisfaction with specific performances or events. Understanding the nature and differences of state self-esteem from global self-esteem is crucial to avoid conceptual confusion. These differences are summarized below.

1.9.1. Characteristics of State Self-Esteem

1. **Dynamic and Variable:** State self-esteem can change in response to specific events, social interactions, or environmental changes. For example, a person's self-esteem may decrease after a failure at work but increase when receiving positive feedback at a social event (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).
2. **Context-Dependent:** State self-esteem reflects an individual's self-perception in a particular context. For instance, a student may have high self-esteem after succeeding in an exam but feel lower self-esteem when facing difficulties in social relationships (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
3. **Short-Term:** Unlike global self-esteem, state self-esteem is more short-lived and temporary, changing with specific events (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).

Crocker and Wolfe (2001) suggest that state self-esteem can vary based on how individuals evaluate themselves in specific areas such as achievements, relationships, and

acceptance. This highlights the extent to which individuals' self-assessments depend on external factors and situational variables. Experiences of social acceptance or rejection can lead to fluctuations in state self-esteem. For example, being excluded from a friend group can negatively impact one's immediate self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001), while fulfilling the need to belong can increase state self-esteem (Leary, 1990; Leary et al., 1995).

Heatherton and Polivy (1991) emphasize that state self-esteem reflects the positive or negative feelings individuals have about themselves at a particular moment. This is influenced by their current psychological state and environmental factors. For instance, a student's exam results can directly affect state self-esteem, with successful outcomes increasing it and failures decreasing it (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).

Ultimately, state self-esteem is an important concept for understanding how individuals' self-perceptions change in response to specific situations. It contributes to understanding psychological health and emotional balance and helps develop strategies for individuals to feel better about themselves. The dynamic nature of state self-esteem reflects individuals' continuously changing emotional evaluations of themselves, shaped by environmental factors and personal experiences (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). One significant factor influencing these ever-changing self-assessments is the immoral or dishonest behaviors individuals may engage in following momentary decisions, such as moral hypocrisy.

In daily life, people may behave unethically to profit from their dishonest behaviors. To cope with the strain between dishonest behavior and their moral self-image, they minimize the importance of their unethical actions, as this helps maintain a positive self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008). Similarly, people also seek to protect their moral self-image in situations of moral hypocrisy. These explanations demonstrate that individuals prioritize protecting their self-esteem regardless of their prior actions (Ayal & Gino, 2012).

According to the self-concept maintenance theory by Mazar et al. (2008), there are two ways to positively reinterpret unethical behavior: the behavior's degree of malleability and the saliency of ethicality at the moment the behavior is performed. Both methods are useful for understanding moral hypocrisy. The ambiguity of hypocritical behavior makes moral hypocrisy easier, as it does for any dishonest behavior. However, the saliency of moral principles, such as fairness and purity, makes moral hypocrisy more difficult (Ayal & Gino, 2012; Batson et al., 1999a; 2002b). If the morally hypocritical behavior is ambiguous and the individual is unaware at the moment—indicating weak saliency of ethicality—then morally hypocritical behavior may be easier to manifest (Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010;

Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). Additionally, ambiguity provides an opportunity to reinterpret their dishonest act and conceal it from others. Through these methods, people can preserve their self-image while maximizing their benefits. Ayal and Gino (2012) also pointed out that individuals apply less strict norms to their own dishonest behavior while imposing stricter norms on others in the same situation. This hypocritical evaluation serves to shield themselves from perceived weakness and protect their self-esteem.

This effort to restore self-image or self-esteem can be seen as an indicator of fluctuations in general self-esteem. After engaging in unethical behavior, an individual may experience negative emotions, leading to a temporary decrease in self-esteem. The relationship between these variables can be understood through the success-failure paradigm. It can be assumed that a person exhibiting moral hypocrisy, who fails to act morally, experiences a situational drop in self-esteem similar to that following a poor performance. This momentary decrease or damaged self-image may drive the individual to compensate for the situation.

On the other hand, a person exhibiting moral hypocrisy does not want to be socially excluded but rather seeks acceptance from their group or community. Engaging in behavior that hinders social acceptance can create a sense of social failure. Even if such behavior is done secretly or goes unnoticed by others, it can still cause fluctuations in self-esteem (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Leary, 1990; Leary et al., 1995; McFarland & Ross, 1982). These explanations facilitate predictions about the relationship between state self-esteem and moral hypocrisy.

In summary, state self-esteem is crucial for understanding how individuals' self-perceptions change in specific situations. It aids in understanding psychological health and developing strategies for well-being. The dynamic nature of state self-esteem reflects individuals' continuously changing emotional evaluations, shaped by environmental factors and personal experiences (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). One significant factor influencing these ever-changing self-assessments is the immoral or dishonest behaviors they engage in following momentary decisions, such as moral hypocrisy. After such unethical behavior, individuals may experience a temporary drop in self-esteem due to feelings of guilt and shame.

1.10. Present Studies

The study employed a quantitative research method with a quasi-experimental design. Researchers have examined moral hypocrisy behavior through various variables, such as moral responsibility, emotions, and moral integrity (Greene, 2014; Monin & Merritt, 2012; Tamming, 2017). Notably, these studies often focused on indirect analysis of moral hypocrisy behavior (Batson et al., 1997a, 1999b). Current study, however, designed and tested a new method (envelope method) to directly assessing moral hypocrisy doers, addressing a limitation of Batson's original coin toss method, which primarily facilitated indirect analysis. Consequently, a statistical comparison was conducted to determine whether the envelope method could more effectively detect the moral hypocrisy individually. The findings demonstrated that the newly designed method was more effective than Batson's method in individually detecting moral hypocrisy behavior. In the second study, moral hypocrisy was treated as a dependent variable to evaluate the effectiveness of moral self-licensing in the context of moral hypocrisy. The group subjected to moral self-licensing manipulation was also compared with a control group, focusing on various variables such as materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation. In the third study, moral hypocrisy was considered an independent variable, and its potential influence on situational changes, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioral variables, was explored. The hypotheses, research questions and their rationale are outlined below.

1.10.1. Study 1

In the first study, as previously mentioned, Batson's original method (coin method) was compared with the newly developed experimental method (envelope method) using a chi-square test. The validity of Batson et al.'s (1997) method for detecting moral hypocrisy in a Turkish sample was evaluated and found to be unsuitable for examining its causes and consequences individually. Therefore, this study aimed to develop a new method that enables the investigation of moral hypocrisy individually across a broad range of variables. This new approach not only enables the identification of individual instances of moral hypocrisy but also facilitates the analysis of its causes and consequences, with the newly developed method producing statistically significant results. Additionally, as in Batson's original study, participants were asked various questions regarding how moral they

perceived their behavior and their chosen method. Findings aligned with those of the original study.

1.10.2. Study 2

As previously noted, there has been a lack of studies focusing on individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy to investigate its causes. Therefore, this study also aimed to examine the effect of moral self-licensing on moral hypocrisy using envelope method (the newly developed method). Drawing from previous research findings and the existing literature, it was anticipated that participants in this study will display a heightened likelihood of morally hypocritical behavior. This expectation was rooted in the concept that performing a prior moral action may lead to subsequent less ethical behavior, driven by mechanisms such as moral compensation and moral credentialing. Thus, we hypothesized that moral self-licensing can elevate moral hypocrisy, as prior good deeds may serve as a justification for subsequent unethical actions. Based on this premise, the following hypothesis was proposed: Participants whose helpfulness trait was activated through the moral self-licensing mechanism exhibited a higher tendency to engage in moral hypocrisy compared to participants whose helpfulness trait was not activated (Hypothesis 1).

Secondly, the research questions were proposed whether the group exhibiting moral hypocrisy differed from the non-moral hypocrisy group in terms of materialistic values, with an expectation that the moral hypocrisy group prioritized these values more highly (Research Question 1). This research questions were based on the notion that emphasizing materialistic values often aligns with self-interest, a trait frequently associated with individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy. According to the moral self-licensing mechanism (MSL), individuals who engage in good deeds may feel justified in subsequently engaging in negative behavior. Thus, individuals with a materialistic orientation who have previously acted in a prosocial manner may later use this as justification for morally hypocritical behavior. Batson et al.'s (1999) study supported this idea by showing that people often experienced discomfort when prioritizing personal gain over fairness, which can harm their self-image. To alleviate this discomfort, they may later engage in prosocial acts to preserve their sense of self-integrity. This research, therefore, aimed to explore whether, when given the opportunity to help and influenced by moral self-licensing, individuals who place a high value on material possessions were more inclined toward moral hypocrisy. The primary research questions were set forwarded: Do participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy differ in materialism

tendencies than participants do not exhibit moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 1). In the study 2, moral self-licensing is also manipulated along with moral hypocrisy. Thus, another research question is: Does the tendency toward materialism change depending on the interaction between moral licensing conditions and moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 2).

Another variable examined was self-monitoring. Research has shown that individuals with high self-monitoring levels have a greater tendency to engage in deceptive behavior (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy and possess high self-monitoring skills are particularly attentive to the impressions they make on others. They are adept at adjusting their social behavior to fit the context and controlling their verbal and non-verbal expressions. This allows them to behave in ways that align both with social expectations and their own interests. Consequently, their consistency between attitudes and behaviors—or between what they say and what they do—tends to be low (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Miller & Thayer, 1988; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982).

In the related literature, individuals with low self-monitoring characteristics have been shown to exhibit significant consistency between their attitudes and behaviors. These individuals tend to act based more on their genuine feelings and beliefs (Aktaş, 1997; Bacanlı, 1990; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Conversely, this consistency is notably lower in individuals with high self-monitoring characteristics (Bacanlı, 1990; Snyder & Cantor, 1980). Another indication of this phenomenon is that individuals with high self-monitoring skills are found to be more prone to unethical behaviors (Hypothesis 2). For instance, Tsang (2002) found that unethical behavior is strongly associated with situational factors, while Norris and Zweigenhaft (1999) identified a link between high self-monitoring and lower levels of honesty. Kapıkıran (2007) further observed an inverse relationship between high self-monitoring and marital fidelity. Additionally, Snyder (1974) highlighted that the primary objectives of self-monitoring behavior include the ability to conceal emotional states that do not conform to social expectations or situations and to exhibit appropriate emotional responses in various circumstances. Individuals with high self-monitoring tendencies also have higher levels of dopamine and serotonin. The resulting inclination towards reward-seeking behavior (Kraus et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2011) suggests that such individuals may exhibit higher levels of moral hypocrisy.

In conclusion, the literature highlights significant parallels between moral hypocrisy and high self-monitoring behavior. Based on this understanding, the following hypothesis and research questions were set forwarded: Participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy will be

higher in their levels of self-monitoring compared to those who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 2). In the study 2, moral self-licensing was also manipulated along with moral hypocrisy. Thus, another research question is: Does the level of self-monitoring change depending on the interaction between moral licensing conditions and moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 3).

Thirdly, the influence of religious orientation was examined, focusing on whether a relationship exists between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy (Research Question 4). According to the literature, individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy are more likely to display an external motivation for religiosity. This is because individuals with externally motivated religiosity often view religious behaviors primarily as a means to achieve certain goals, rather than as an end in themselves. These goals may involve gaining benefits from others rather than seeking closeness to a higher being. This phenomenon is also referred to as "functional religiosity" and can manifest in various domains such as politics, economics, and belief systems. Individuals with externally motivated religiosity may engage in behaviors aimed at obtaining prestige, social status, or material gains (Okumuş, 2002).

In this context, the typology of religiosity defined by Al-Ghazali (which includes denial, ostentatious-deceptive religiosity, imitative religiosity, scholarly religiosity, and hedonistic religiosity) offers a clear conceptualization for understanding this phenomenon. Specifically, ostentatious-deceptive religiosity involves using religion for worldly benefits and behaving piously among believers while acting differently among non-believers (Okumuş, 2006). In this regard, the concepts of ostentatious-deceptive religiosity and externally motivated (functional) religiosity are quite similar. As such, it can be inferred that both tendencies significantly parallel the concept of moral hypocrisy. In other words, individuals with a tendency toward ostentatious-deceptive or externally motivated religiosity may be associated with moral hypocrisy (Research Question 4). In light of current literature, the primary research questions were set forwarded: Do participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy differ in religious orientation than participants do not exhibit moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 4). In the study 2, moral self-licensing is also manipulated along with moral hypocrisy. Thus, another research question is: Does the religious orientation change depending on the interaction between moral licensing conditions and moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 5).

1.10.3. Study 3

In the third part of this study, the aim was to identify the emotional (self-conscious emotions), behavioral (donation as a helping behavior), and cognitive (micro-macro justice perceptions, state self-esteem) outcomes of moral hypocrisy among participants.

Firstly, in the context of emotional outcomes, self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt, and pride) were studied. We assumed that self-conscious emotions differed between individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy and those who do not (Hypothesis 3). The relevant literature provides evidence of a relationship between self-conscious emotions and moral hypocrisy. Among these emotions, shame is characterized by an intensified urge to withdraw and is perceived as distressing and ominous (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). It is a potential emotional response experienced after violating a social rule or norm (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Based on this understanding, we conclude that individuals may experience feelings of shame following acts of moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 3).

Guilt often emerges as a significant emotion for individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy when they attempt to make amends for their actions, as it motivates individuals to address and rectify the harm they have caused. This study suggests that compensatory behavior may manifest as increased financial contributions (such as donations) to affected parties. Individuals who act in self-interest through hypocritical or harmful means may also experience guilt (Hypothesis 3). This emotion arises when one breaches moral standards or obligations, leading to harm (Hoffman, 1982; Lazarus, 1991). Guilt can prompt empathy and efforts to repair damaged relationships (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Those experiencing guilt are expected to demonstrate higher levels of prosocial, helping behavior, as guilt drives action-oriented efforts aimed at correction and compensation. Engaging in reparative behaviors to rectify past wrongs can alleviate the burden of guilt (Lewis, 1995). This pattern was consistent with Batson's findings, which highlighted guilt as a common emotional response among individuals who displayed moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 3) (Batson et al., 1999a, 2003b).

Pride can be considered the antithesis of shame. From this perspective, an individual who does not engage in hypocrisy may experience pride following the honest expression of their intentions and actions (Hypothesis 3). Such individuals may perceive that they have aligned their actions with their ideal self. Consequently, the degree of altruistic behavior they exhibit is likely to be comparatively limited due to the absence of intrinsic motivation to assist others (Babcock & Sabini, 1990; Lewis, 1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).

As indicated by the findings, participants who assigned positive tasks to another participant as a result of the lottery experienced greater feelings of pride and lower levels of guilt and shame. In contrast, those who assigned positive tasks to themselves while giving negative tasks to others demonstrated higher levels of guilt and shame, along with reduced feelings of pride (Batson et al., 1997). Based on literature, the primary hypothesis was set forwarded: Participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy experience higher levels of shame and guilt, and lower levels of pride compared to others who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 3).

Secondly, we suggested that individuals may engage in charitable acts, such as making donations, as a means of atoning for prior immoral behaviors, including moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 4). Such behavior may represent an effort to alleviate moral debt, ease their conscience, or restore their moral integrity (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). This behavior can also be seen as a strategy to maintain moral integrity while simultaneously seeking to enhance or solidify one's social status or public image (Grace & Griffin, 2009). In some cases, individuals may justify negative or unethical actions by referencing their past positive or morally commendable behavior. For example, after performing a morally praiseworthy act, such as helping others or making a donation, an individual might feel entitled to engage in future unethical conduct. In essence, displaying moral virtue may grant an individual a perceived legitimacy to act immorally. This pattern can become self-reinforcing; when individuals use such justifications to engage in unethical behavior, the resulting emotional state or discomfort may drive them to exhibit subsequent acts of good or moral behavior (Hypothesis 4) (Merritt et al., 2010).

Similarly, Batson et al. (1997) examined the influence of moral hypocrisy on individuals' helping behavior. Their findings indicated that people often prioritize their own interests while assisting others but attempt to justify their actions through moral reasoning. Similar patterns have been observed in other studies. For instance, research conducted by Gino and Bazerman (2009) supports this conclusion. Additionally, experiencing a negative emotional state, such as guilt, can increase helping behavior. Feelings of guilt, sadness, or unhappiness resulting from previous negative actions may prompt individuals to employ a balance or compensation mechanism as a coping strategy (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981; Wegener & Petty, 1994). In accordance with current literature, the primary hypothesis was set forwarded: Participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy donate more compared to those who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 4).

Thirdly, we hypothesized that individuals engaging in moral hypocrisy would exhibit a higher perception of micro justice, as this perception aligns with a more individualistic outlook compared to macro justice. According to the related literature, individuals with a strong independent self-construal tend to prioritize micro justice principles, emphasizing personal effort, achievement, performance, and merit over macro justice principles, which focus on the collective distribution of resources (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). For these individuals, personal preferences and goals take precedence over societal objectives, often leading them to distinguish themselves from others through their talents and characteristics (Miller, 1994). In moral decision-making, they prioritize their own preferences, rights, and desires, often favoring conflict resolution methods that align with their interests over the needs of others.

Despite their individualistic tendencies, these individuals are also mindful of how they are perceived and evaluated by their social groups. Their sensitivity to fairness is influenced by their relationships within these groups, as deviating from group norms can evoke negative emotions. To maintain group cohesion, they may adhere to norms of consistency, impartiality, and morality (Leventhal, 1980; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, while they often prioritize their own interests, they may also adopt macro justice principles when social expectations necessitate conformity, portraying themselves as though they value societal welfare.

Based on this literature and these findings, it can be inferred that individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy—prioritizing their own interests over the needs of others—are likely to favor micro justice principles. This is because micro justice emphasizes individual effort, performance, and personal needs over societal needs (Batson, 2002; Oetzel, 1998). In other words, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy are thought to lean towards micro justice rather than macro justice principles. Therefore, the primary hypothesis was set forwarded: Participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy have higher microjustice orientation compared to those who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 5).

Lastly, it is predicted that individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy will experience an immediate decline in state self-esteem compared to the control group due to their behavior. The relevant literature emphasizes that state self-esteem plays a critical role in understanding how individuals' self-perceptions fluctuate within specific contexts. It provides valuable insights into psychological health and informs strategies for enhancing well-being. The dynamic nature of state self-esteem reflects how individuals' emotional evaluations continuously adapt, shaped by environmental influences and personal

experiences (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). One significant factor influencing these fluctuating self-assessments is engagement in immoral or dishonest behaviors, such as moral hypocrisy, which often stem from momentary decisions. Such unethical actions can lead to a temporary decline in self-esteem, driven by feelings of guilt and shame. Based on current literature, the primary research question was set forwarded: Do participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy differ in state self-esteem than participants do not exhibit moral hypocrisy? (Research Question 6).



2. STUDY 1. A COMPARISON OF BATSON'S CLASSIC METHOD AND A NEW METHOD (ENVELOPE METHOD) FOR IDENTIFYING MORAL HYPOCRISY BEHAVIOR AND TESTING THE NEW METHOD

The present study aimed to test a new method (i.e., the envelope method) and investigate individuals' moral hypocrisy behaviors via two approaches: the envelope method proposed by the primary researcher and the coin method suggested by Batson. Within this framework, comparisons between the new method (i.e., the envelope method) and Batson's proposed method were conducted using the causal-comparative model, a quantitative research approach.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

The demographic characteristics of the participants in Study 1, where Batson's coin method was applied to a Turkish sample, were summarized in Table 2.1. This study included 50 participants, of whom 28 (51.9%) were female, and 22 (40.7%) were male. The participants' ages ranged from 18 to 24, with a mean age of 20.22 (SD = 1.67). The demographic statistics regarding the participants' income levels were as follows: 34 participants (63%) reported an income of 0-4000 TL, 5 participants (9.3%) reported an income of 4001-8000 TL, and 11 participants (20.4%) reported an income of 8001 TL or above. All participants were university students enrolled in various departments at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University.

Table 2.1. The percentages and frequencies of the socio-demographic information of the Turkish sample, where Batson's coin method was applied.

	Categories	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Female	28	56
	Male	22	44
	Total	50	100
Income	0-4000 TL	34	68
	4001-8000 TL	5	10
	8001 TL above	11	22
	Total	50	100
Age	18.00	8	16
	19.00	12	24
	20.00	10	20
	21.00	8	16
	22.00	7	14
	23.00	3	6
	24.00	2	4
	Total	50	100
	Total	50	100

The demographic characteristics of the participants in Study 1, where the newly designed method was applied to a Turkish sample, were summarized in Table 2.2. This study included 51 participants, of whom 31 (60.8%) were female, and 20 (39.2%) were male. The participants' ages ranged from 18 to 24, with a mean age of 20.35 (SD = 1.72). The demographic statistics regarding the participants' income levels were as follows: 16 participants (32%) reported an income of 0-4000 TL, 26 participants (52%) reported an income of 4001-8000 TL, and 8 participants (16%) reported an income of 8001 TL or above. All participants were university students enrolled in various programs at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University.

Table 2.2. The percentages and frequencies of the socio-demographic information of the Turkish sample, where the newly designed method was applied.

	Categories	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Female	31	60.8
	Male	20	39.2
	Total	51	100
Age	18.00	8	15.7
	19.00	11	21.6
	20.00	9	17.6
	21.00	10	19.6
	22.00	6	11.8
	23.00	5	9.8
	24.00	2	3.9
	Total	51	100
Income	0 - 4001 TL	16	32
	4001 - 8000 TL	26	52
	8001 TL ve üstü	8	16
	Total	50	100

2.1.2. Procedure

In the present study, the experimental rooms were set up in male and female dormitories affiliated with the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS) in Ankara, as well as at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University (AYBU) and Ankara University (AU). Participants were directed to these experimental rooms by one of the male or female research assistant, who were students in the psychology and psychological counseling and guidance departments at AYBU and Ankara University (AU). These two research assistants were trained by the primary researcher. The procedure followed the method employed by Batson et al. (1997) (Appendix D).

The participants were greeted by the experimenter, who escorted them to the experimental room within the university building and explained that the study involved two participants, with each participating in the same study under the guidance of different experimenters, noting that the participants had not met and were located in separate rooms (in reality, there was no other participant). Each session with a participant lasted approximately 30 minutes, resulting in a total of around 25 hours dedicated to this part of the study.

After testing Batson et al.'s (1997) classic coin method, we tested the new method (i.e., the envelope method) specifically developed for the present study. The procedure for the new method was as follows:

During participant recruitment, the assistant researchers invited participants by explaining that they were conducting a study for an international company where they worked part-time, emphasizing that the study included questions offering potential rewards and asking if they would like to participate. Participation was arranged through individual appointments, with participants being met by a research assistant who accompanied them to the study room. During this escort, the assistant casually inquired whether the participant considered themselves luckier with odd or even numbers to implicitly gauge their preference, which was then communicated to the researcher via text message. Although the researcher already had some insight into the participant's potential choice, this question helped to explicitly confirm the preference by asking them once more if they felt luckier with odd or even numbers. This approach allowed the participant's preference for odd or even numbers to be subtly determined without directly asking, which might otherwise influence their response. The researcher then informed the participant that there were two participants in the study, emphasizing that it was important they did not see or meet each other and that they were participating in separate locations (in reality, there was no second participant.) Once seated at the table in the study room, the participant left alone to read the instructions, which explained that the purpose of the study was to evaluate the nature of rewarded and non-rewarded questions as perceived by the participants.

Before beginning the task, 50 numbers, from 1 to 50, was placed one-by-one into 50 envelopes with the participant present, reducing any doubts about the contents. The envelopes then arranged according to the participant's preference for odd or even numbers, with the opposite set placed in the envelopes (e.g., 50 even numbers if the participant prefers odd numbers). Thus, the participant encountered the opposite of their chosen set, allowing us to observe their decision-making process in response to this arrangement.

2.1.3. Instruments

The original content used by Batson et al. (1997) was utilized to prompt participants to indicate what they consider to be the most moral method for assigning tasks with or without rewards. Additionally, consistent with Batson's original study, this study aimed to

measure participants' perceptions regarding the moral appropriateness of the method employed for assigning rewarded and non-rewarded tasks via some questions (Appendix F).

2.1.4. Data Analysis

In line with the research objective, chi-square analyses was conducted to compare the two methods. Data analyses were performed using the SPSS software package (version 25), with a statistical significance level set at .05.

2.1.5. Results

To address the research objective, the effectiveness of the coin method in determining moral hypocrisy behavior was first examined. The first dataset included 50 participants to assess the effectiveness of the coin method. Participants were asked about their participation in the lottery, and statistical differences between those who chose to participate and those who did not were analyzed. The findings are presented in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Comparison of lottery participation status and preference categories in the coin method

		Preference Status				χ^2 (df)
		To Self By Lottery	To Others By Lottery	To Self Without Lottery	To Others Without Lottery	
Coin Method	Lottery Participants	20 (40.0%)	17 (34.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	46.97 ^{1*} (3)
	Non-Lottery Participants	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (14.0%)	6 (12.0%)	
	Total	20 (40.0%)	17 (34.0%)	7 (14.0%)	6 (12.0%)	

*p < .05; 1: Fisher's Exact Test

As indicated in the Table 2.3, statistical significance was observed in participants' lottery participation status using coin method ($p < .05$). When the coin method was applied, participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy differed from those who did not. The percentage

of moral hypocrisy displayed was 40% with the coin method. This suggested a reasonable level of detection for moral hypocrisy using the coin method.

To address the research objective, the effectiveness of the envelope method in determining moral hypocrisy behavior was secondly examined. The second dataset included 51 participants to examine the effectiveness of the envelope method. Participants were asked about their participation in the lottery, and statistical differences between those who chose to participate and those who did not were analyzed. The findings are presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4. Comparison of lottery participation status and preference categories in the envelope method

		Preference Status				χ^2 (df)
		To Self By Lottery	To Others By Lottery	To Self Without Lottery	To Others Without Lottery	
Envelope Method	Lottery Participants	26 (51.0%)	13 (25.4%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	45.74 ^{1*} (3)
	Non-Lottery Participants	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (11.8%)	6 (11.8%)	
	Total	26 (51.0%)	13 (25.4%)	6 (11.8%)	6 (11.8%)	

*p < .05; 1: Fisher's Exact Test

As indicated in the Table 2.4, statistical significance was observed in participants' lottery participation status using envelope methods ($p < .05$). When the envelope method was applied, participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy differed from those who did not. The percentage of moral hypocrisy displayed was 51% with envelope method. This suggested a high detection rate of moral hypocrisy with the envelope method.

As depicted in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, a statistical significance was observed in participants' lottery participation status using both coin method and envelope methods ($p < .05$). Regardless of the method employed, participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy differed from those who did not. The percentage of moral hypocrisy displayed was 40% with the coin method, increasing to 51% with the envelope method. This suggested a higher detection rate of moral hypocrisy with the envelope method.

To address the research objective, the allocation of rewarded questions based on the coin method was compared across 50 participants. Participants were asked about their

participation in the lottery, and statistical differences between those who chose to participate and those who did not were analyzed. The findings are presented in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5. Comparison of rewarded question allocations based on the coin method

		Preference Status				χ^2 (df)
		By Lottery to Self	By Lottery to Others	Without Lottery to Self	Without Lottery to Others	
Coin Method	Allocated to Self	20 (40.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (14.0%)	0 (0.0%)	57.64 ^{1*} (3)
	Allocated to Others	0 (0.0%)	17 (34.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (12.0%)	
	Total	20 (40.0%)	17 (34.0%)	7 (14.0%)	6 (12.0%)	

*p < .05; 1: Fisher's Exact Test

As indicated in Table 2.5, whether a lottery was drawn or not, there was a statistically significant difference in participants' decisions to allocate winning questions to themselves (p < .05). Specifically, 54% of participants opted to keep the rewarded questions for themselves in the coin method.

To address the research objective, the allocation of rewarded questions based on the envelope method was compared across 51 participants. Participants were asked about their participation in the lottery, and statistical differences between those who chose to participate and those who did not were analyzed. The findings are presented in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6. Comparison of rewarded question allocations based on the envelope method

		Preference Status				χ^2 (df)
		By Lottery to Self	By Lottery to Others	Without Lottery to Self	Without Lottery to Others	
Envelope Method	Allocated to Self	26 (51.0%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (11.8%)	0 (0.0%)	56.40 ^{1*} (3)
	Allocated to Others	0 (0.0%)	13 (25.4%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (11.8%)	
	Total	26 (51.0%)	13 (25.4%)	6 (11.8%)	6 (11.8%)	

*p < .05; 1: Fisher's Exact Test

As depicted in Table 2.6, whether a lottery was drawn or not, there was a statistically significant difference in participants' decisions to allocate winning questions to themselves ($p < .05$). Specifically, 62.8% of participants opted to keep the rewarded questions for themselves in the envelope method.

As depicted in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, whether a lottery was drawn or not, there was a statistically significant difference in participants' decisions to allocate winning questions to themselves ($p < .05$). Specifically, 54% of participants opted to keep the rewarded questions for themselves in the coin flip method, whereas this rate increased to 62.8% with the envelope method. Therefore, participants in the envelope method showed a higher tendency to allocate winning questions to themselves compared to the coin method.

To address the research objective, it was aimed to compare the allocation of rewarded questions to oneself versus others using the lottery system within the coin method. The findings are presented in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7. Comparison of allocating rewarded questions to self versus others by drawing a lottery in the coin method

		Preference Status		χ^2 (df)
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Coin Method	Allocated to Self	20 (54.1%)	0 (0.0%)	37.00 ^{1*} (1)
	Allocated to Others	0 (0.0%)	17 (45.9%)	
	Total	20 (54.1%)	17 (45.9%)	

* $p < .05$

Table 2.7. revealed a statistically significant difference in the display of moral hypocrisy among participants who entered the lottery using coin method ($p < .05$). Specifically, 54.1% of participants who joined the study via the coin method exhibited moral hypocrisy. This result indicated that, regardless of whether the rewarded questions were assigned to them through the coin draw, the majority of participants preferred to keep the rewarded questions for themselves rather than sharing them with the other participant.

To address the research objective, it was aimed to compare the allocation of rewarded questions to oneself versus others using the lottery system within the envelope method. The findings are presented in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8. Comparison of allocating rewarded questions to self versus others by drawing a lottery in the envelope method

		Preference Status		χ^2 (df)
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Envelope Method	Allocated to Self	26 (66.7%)	0 (0.0%)	39.00 ^{1*} (1)
	Allocated to Others	0 (0.0%)	13 (33.3%)	
	Total	26 (66.7%)	13 (33.3%)	

*p < .05

Table 2.8. revealed a statistically significant difference in the display of moral hypocrisy among participants who entered the lottery using envelope method ($p < .05$). Specifically, 66.7% of participants who joined the study via the envelope method exhibited moral hypocrisy. This result indicated that, regardless of whether the rewarded questions were assigned to them through the envelope method, the majority of participants preferred to keep the rewarded questions for themselves rather than sharing them with the other participant.

Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 revealed a statistically significant difference in the display of moral hypocrisy among participants who entered the lottery using both methods ($p < .05$). Specifically, 54.1% of participants who joined the study via the coin method exhibited moral hypocrisy, compared to 66.7% of those who participated through the envelope method. This higher rate of moral hypocrisy observed in the envelope method suggested that this approach might be more effective in identifying participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy. In other words, the envelope method appeared to be more effective than the coin method in detecting instances of moral hypocrisy.

After comparing both methods, an analysis was conducted to determine which method was perceived as the fairest by individuals who participated in the lottery using the envelope method. The findings from this analysis are presented in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9. Comparison of lottery participation status according to envelope method

		The Fairest Method		χ^2 (df)
		Fair with Lottery	Fair without Lottery	
Preference Status	To Self by Lottery	21 (80.8%)	5 (19.2%)	0.09 (1)
	To Self by Lottery	11 (84.6%)	2 (15.4%)	

*p < .05

As shown in Table 2.9, among those who selected rewarded questions for themselves by drawing lots through the envelope method (i.e., exhibiting moral hypocrisy), 80.8% regarded the lottery as fairer, while 19.2% did not consider it as fair. Meanwhile, among participants who allocated rewarded questions to others through the lottery, 84.6% considered the lottery method fairer, while 15.4% did not. Thus, the majority of participants identified as exhibiting moral hypocrisy with the new method (80.8%) perceived the lottery method as fairer. Likewise, a majority of those who did not exhibit this behavior (84.6%) also viewed the lottery method as fairer. The non-significance of the chi-square statistic and the similarity in both distributions were likely due to the tendency of participants displaying moral hypocrisy to respond similarly to those not displaying such behavior. However, a closer look at the statistical distributions revealed that a small portion of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy held views more aligned with participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy.

After examining the perceptions of participants who displayed moral hypocrisy according to the envelope method regarding the fairest method, their perceptions of fairness toward the method they applied (or chose) were analyzed, and the results are presented in Table 2.10.

Table 2.10. Comparison of perceived fairness between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the envelope method

		Fairness Perception of Own Method					χ^2 (df)
		Not at All Fair	Unfair	Neutral	Fair	Completely Fair	
Preference Status	To Self by Lottery	0 (0%)	1 (3.8%)	8 (30.8%)	8 (30.8%)	9 (34.6%)	3.41 (4)
	To Other by Lottery	0 (0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (15.4%)	8 (61.5%)	3 (23.1%)	
	Total	0 (0%)	1 (3.8%)	10 (46.2%)	16 (92.3%)	12 (67.7%)	

*p < .05

Table 2.10 revealed that approximately 65.4% of participants displaying moral hypocrisy considered their chosen method to be fair or completely fair, while 3.8% perceived their own method as unfair. Among participants not displaying this behavior, around 85% viewed their chosen method as fair, with 0% considering it unfair. No statistically significant difference was found, likely due to the tendency of those displaying moral hypocrisy to view their actions as fair in a similar way to those who did not display moral hypocrisy.

2.1.6. Discussion

In this study, the primary goal was to evaluate the effectiveness of a newly designed method (envelope method) in identifying participants who display moral hypocrisy individually, and to compare this method with Batson's (1997) coin method using independent samples and the Chi-Square (χ^2) test. The research included 50 university students to examine the effectiveness of Batson's method in a Turkish sample, while the new method (i.e., envelope method) was tested with 51 university students. Batson's study in 1997, which included 20 participants, yielded intriguing results. In the initial experiment, 16 out of 20 participants assigned themselves to the rewarded questions by drawing lots. In a second experiment, 10 out of 20 participants drew lots, and 9 claimed that the reward was

assigned to them. Given a 50% probability, these results were suspicious and suggested that the participants behaved in a self-serving manner. The current study aimed to investigate this behavior further in a Turkish sample with more participants. In both methods, participants who claimed that they won the reward after the random draw were categorized as engaging in moral hypocrisy. According to the findings, both methods (the coin and the envelope methods) were effective in detecting moral hypocrisy. The coin method identified moral hypocrisy in 40% of the participants, whereas the envelope method identified 51%. This indicated that the envelope method was more effective tool for detecting moral hypocrisy individually.

The findings from Batson et al.'s (1997a, 1999b) studies were consistent with the results of this study. Previous research also focused on university student samples. In one such study, out of 40 participants, only 2 reported that assigning themselves to the rewarded tasks was moral, while only 6 assigned other participants to the rewarded tasks—surpassing the 50% probability by a significant margin. Similarly, Batson's (1999) study showed that 11 out of 13 participants assigned themselves to positive tasks, while only 2 assigned the positive tasks to others. These findings highlighted the prevalence of moral hypocrisy, as the majority of participants tended to favor themselves in these moral dilemmas, demonstrating how common this behavior was in experimental settings.

Another research question involved the comparison of both methods regarding participants' tendencies to assign rewarded tasks to themselves. According to the findings, the vast majority of participants chose to take the rewarded tasks for themselves. In the coin method, this percentage was 54%, while in the envelope method, it was 62.8%. These results indicated that, regardless of whether they used a random assignment method or not, individuals tended to assign the rewarded tasks to themselves. This finding aligned with previous studies in the literature (Batson et al., 1997a, 1999b; Batson, 2002), which also demonstrated a prevalent tendency for individuals to act in self-serving ways during moral dilemmas.

One of the subtopics of the present study involved comparing the coin flip and envelope methods to examine the tendency to assign the rewarded tasks to oneself after using a random assignment to the coin or envelope method. This analysis excluded participants who took the rewarded tasks without flipping a coin or using the envelope. The findings showed that in the group using the coin flip method, the incidence of moral hypocrisy was 54.1%, whereas for the group using the envelope method, the incidence rose to 66.7%. These findings highlighted the envelope method's effectiveness in identifying individuals engaging

in moral hypocrisy, as it offered a more nuanced way to capture such behaviors. This suggested that the envelope method was effective tool for detecting moral hypocrisy does individually. Thus, it provides a valuable approach for examining moral hypocrisy in relation to other individual-level variables, making it a potentially robust method for future studies in this area.

Additionally, an attempt was made to determine how fair participants perceived the envelope method to be. According to the findings, 80.8% of those who claimed to have drawn the rewarded questions by chance (i.e., those displaying moral hypocrisy) stated that drawing lots was fairer, while 19.2% indicated that drawing lots was not fair. Similarly, 84.6% of the participants who chose to assign the prize questions to the other participant through drawing lots also stated that this method was fairer. Therefore, there was no significant difference between the two groups in this regard, which was particularly intriguing. This was because, regardless of whether they engaged in moral hypocrisy or not, both groups stated that drawing lots was fair, though those displaying hypocrisy acted contrary to their claim. These findings were consistent with those obtained in the studies by Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b). The results of these previous studies could be summarized as follows: out of 10 participants who flipped a coin, 8 believed that flipping the coin was the most moral course of action. The remaining 2 participants indicated that it would be more moral for the experimenter to assign tasks. Of the 10 participants who did not flip a coin, 6 evaluated flipping the coin as the most moral action, while 2 considered assigning the positive outcomes to the other participant to be the most moral choice. One of these participants evaluated assigning the positive outcomes to themselves as the most moral action, while another indicated that there was no morally correct way to assign the tasks (Batson et al., 2002). Overall, we observed that those who chose to flip the coin perceived their behavior as significantly more moral compared to those who did not flip the coin, even though they had favored themselves. This result was highly consistent with the findings of the aforementioned studies (e.g., Batson et al., 2002; Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Monin & Merritt, 2022).

Another comparison was in relation to the degree of fairness that the participants perceived the method they chose, focusing on those identified as displaying moral hypocrisy through the new method (i.e., envelope method) by drawing lots and those who assigned the rewarded questions to the other participant by drawing lots. According to the results of the Chi-Square (χ^2) analysis, 65.4% of those displaying moral hypocrisy believed that the method they used was moral, while 3.8% stated that the method was not moral. Among those

not displaying moral hypocrisy, 85% believed the method they used was moral, and 0% considered it immoral. In other words, both groups exhibited similar views regarding the method used, as evidenced by the non-significant result of the Chi-Square (χ^2) test.

The findings of the studies conducted thus far indicated that both the newly designed envelope method and the coin method designed by Batson were effective in detecting moral hypocrisy. Both methods showed significant similarities, ranging from the proportion of individuals displaying moral hypocrisy within an experimental group to perceptions of the moral nature of the method used. However, it was important to note that the envelope method, designed for the Turkish sample, had appeared to be more effective in detecting moral hypocrisy compared to the coin flip method. The most significant difference between the two methods was that the envelope method could detect moral hypocrisy doers individually. In the second part of the study, variables that may contribute to moral hypocrisy (e.g., moral self-licensing, materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation) were examined using the newly designed envelope method due to its effectiveness in detecting moral hypocrisy doers individually.

3. STUDY 2: EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MORAL SELF-LICENSING MANIPULATION AND THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF MORAL HYPOCRISY BEHAVIOR

As noted earlier, we have not been able to find any study that has specifically investigated the causes of moral hypocrisy by identifying moral hypocrisy doers individually. To address this gap, the present study examined the impact of moral self-licensing on moral hypocrisy using envelope method (a newly designed method). We hypothesized that moral self-licensing would increase moral hypocrisy, as prior good deeds could serve as licensing for subsequent unethical actions (Hypothesis 1).

Furthermore, in this section, we hypothesized that the moral hypocrisy group would differ from the other group in terms of materialism, with the prediction that individuals in the moral hypocrisy group placed greater importance on material values than those not exhibiting group (Research Question 1). This assumption was grounded in the notion that prioritizing material values was aligned with individual self-interest, a characteristic also attributed to participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy. Another variable examined in relation to moral hypocrisy was self-monitoring, as previously suggested that individuals with high self-monitoring levels had a greater tendency to engage in deceptive behaviors (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Based on this evidence, we assumed that participants displaying moral hypocrisy would also exhibit higher levels of self-monitoring (Hypothesis 2). The final variable explored in the second study was religious orientation, with the aim of investigating whether a relationship existed between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy (Research Question 4).

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants

The scales measuring variables thought to potentially contribute to moral hypocrisy (e.g., materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation scales) were administered to a total of 381 participants. The participants were university students from AYBU, AU, and dormitories affiliated with the MOYS in Ankara. Of the 381 participants, 227 were female

(59.6%) and 154 were male (40.4%). The participants' ages ranged from 17 to 25, with a mean age of 20.37 (SD = 1.83). Among the participants, 138 participants (30%) reported an income of 0–4000 TL, 188 participants (40.9%) reported an income of 4001–8000 TL, and 50 participants (10.9%) reported an income of 8001 TL or above. 66 participants who assigned rewarded tasks to themselves or to others without using the lottery were excluded from the analysis due to their small sample size.

Table 3.1. An overview of the demographic characteristics of the respondents

	Categories	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Female	227	49.3
	Male	154	33.5
	Total	381	82.8
Age	17.00	4	0.9
	18.00	62	13.5
	19.00	87	18.9
	20.00	58	12.6
	21.00	55	12.0
	22.00	51	11.1
	23.00	49	10.7
	24.00	14	3.0
	25.00	1	0.2
	Total	381	100
Income	0-4000	138	30.0
	4001-8000	188	40.9
	8001-Above	50	10.9
	Total	376	100

3.1.2. Procedures

In the second part of the study, the same experimental procedure was applied as in the first part; however, due to the specific nature of the second study, certain additions were included. As noted earlier, this section aimed both to determine the effects of the moral self-licensing manipulation and to investigate potential differences across various variables between the group that received the manipulation and the group that did not. To test this effect thoroughly, a research assistant approached a group of participants, explaining their part-time role in an international company's study involving questions with potential rewards and highlighting the importance of reaching a required number of participants to avoid risking their job, asking for help in a way that emphasized the urgency of the situation. After

the participant agreed to join and while entering the experiment room, the assistant expressed sincere gratitude, thanking them warmly for their kindness. This approach was designed to trigger a sense of "helpfulness and goodwill" in participants, as previous acts of kindness might serve as justification for subsequent immoral behaviors. Subsequently, the relevant procedure was implemented (Appendix E).

In contrast, to observe the manipulation effect more clearly, participants in the non-manipulated group were given a seeded pen as a gift after agreeing to participate. The subsequent process proceeded in accordance with the standard instructions (Appendix E). The only difference here was that the scales for variables thought to potentially contribute to moral hypocrisy (i.e., materialism, self-monitoring, religious orientation) were administered prior to the study. Each individual session lasted approximately 30 minutes, totaling 191 hours of work across all participants.

Participation was conducted via individual appointments. Each participant was greeted by an assistant researcher and escorted to the study room. While accompanying the participant, the assistant discreetly asked, "Do you feel luckier with odd or even numbers?" This indirect question revealed the participant's numerical preference, which the assistant communicated to the primary researcher via a text message. Although the researcher already had an indication of the participant's likely choice, they verbally confirmed it again in the study room by asking the participant directly whether they felt luckier with odd or even numbers. This approach facilitated a more nuanced identification of the participant's preference, avoiding a direct question about their choice and ensuring their comfort in making an authentic decision. Consequently, the preference for odd or even numbers in the lottery was established indirectly and with greater clarity.

To create a sense of confidentiality and independence in decision-making, the researcher informed the participant that the study included two participants who were participating in separate locations and would not meet or see each other (in reality, there was no second participant). Once seated at the desk in the study room, the participant left alone to read an instruction sheet, which stated that the study aimed to evaluate participants' perceptions of the nature of tasks with and without rewards.

In preparation for the task, the numbers 1 to 50 was placed individually in 50 envelopes in front of the participant, with the participant present, reducing any doubt about the content. Following this, the envelopes relevant to the study's objective was arranged according to the participant's odd or even preference. Specifically, 50 envelopes containing only odd or only even numbers (opposite to the participant's choice) was presented (these

envelopes were pre-prepared by the researcher). In this way, the participant encountered the opposite of their initial preference, allowing the researcher to observe their behavior in the decision-making process. At the end of the study, participants were informed about the true purpose of the study through a debriefing form (Appendix Q).

3.1.3. Instruments

Participants completed a set of questionnaires, including the Material Values Scale (MVS), the Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS), and the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Information on each of these scales was provided below in the respective order.

3.1.3.1. Material Values Scale

To assess participants' materialism-postmaterialism tendencies, the Material Values Scale (MVS) developed by Richins and Dawson (1992), an 18-item scale, was utilized. This scale uses a 5-point Likert response format (ranging from 1 - strongly disagree to 5 - strongly agree). It comprises three subdimensions: success, centrality, and happiness. The success subscale reflects the use of possessions as an indicator of life achievement; the centrality subscale emphasizes the importance of acquisition and possessions; and the happiness subscale relates to the perception that possessions are essential for happiness. Higher scores on the scale indicate a higher tendency toward materialism. The scale contains 8 reverse-coded items. Widely used in numerous studies, this scale demonstrates acceptable psychometric properties (e.g., see Christopher & Schlenker, 2004; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Alpha coefficients for the centrality, success, and happiness subscales range between .71 and .75, .74 and .78, and .73 and .83, respectively. For the combined scale, alpha coefficients range between .80 and .88 (Richins & Dawson, 1992). To evaluate the structure of the Turkish version of the (MVS), principal components analysis with oblique rotation was applied. Factor analysis revealed four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. These four factors could be categorized under the headings of happiness, centrality, and success, as in the original scale; additionally, a new subdimension related to the desire for acquisition seemed possible. This four-factor solution accounted for 54.1% of the total variance. Although the factor analysis initially resulted in four factors, it was observed that items typically loaded onto two factors, diverging from the original scale structure. Consequently, a principal components analysis with oblique rotation, constrained to three factors, was

conducted. A cutoff point of .32 was set for item loadings (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Except for two items, all items loaded onto the expected factors. One problematic item (Item 9) likely posed an issue due to its reverse-coded nature. Another item (Item 12) cross-loaded onto both success and its original factor, centrality. Therefore, the decision was made to retain the original factors and items in this study. The three-factor structure explained 47.38% of the total variance. Based on the findings obtained in the current study, the Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficient of the scale in question is $\alpha = .81$ for the entire scale (Appendix H).

3.1.3.2. Self-Monitoring Scale

The Self Monitoring Scale (SMS) developed by Lennox and Wolfe (1984) was adapted into Turkish by Özalp et al. (2004). The Turkish version consists of 12 items and is composed of two subdimensions: the ability to modify self-presentation ($\alpha = .79$) and sensitivity to expressive behavior of others ($\alpha = .75$). The ability to modify self-presentation dimension includes 6 items, as does the sensitivity to expressive behavior of others dimension. The scale includes one reverse-scored item (item 9). According to Özalp et al. (2004), subdimension scores can be used to calculate a total score. In another study by Türetgen and Cesur (2006), Cronbach's alpha values were found to be $\alpha = .79$ for the ability to modify self-presentation, $\alpha = .75$ for sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others, and $\alpha = .80$ for the total reliability of the scale. In the current study, the Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for the scale was found $\alpha = .88$ for entire scale (Appendix I).

3.1.3.3. Religious Orientation Scale

The original Religious Orientation Scale (ROS), developed by Allport and Ross (1967), was adapted into Turkish as the Religiosity Orientation Scale by Kayıkılık (2000). Kayıkılık's adaptation, based on Allport and Ross's original 20-item, two-factor structure, resulted in a 10-item, single-factor scale for the Turkish cultural context. All items on this single factor had factor loadings of .35 or higher, with the single factor explaining 36% of the variance. The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for the scale was reported as .78. The response options on the Religiosity Orientation Scale are "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Disagree," and "Strongly Disagree," with each item scored from 1 to 4. The scale's minimum score is 10, and the maximum score is 40. Items 4, 5, 7, and 10 are reverse-coded.

Higher scores indicate an intrinsic religious orientation, while lower scores reflect an extrinsic religious orientation (Kıraç, 2007). In the current study, the Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient for the scale was found $\alpha = .84$ for entire scale (Appendix J). The descriptive statistics of the scales used in this section are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Reliability analysis of the scales of religious orientation, self-monitoring, and materialism

Scale	M	Sd	Cronboch's Alpha
Religious Orientation	18.31	5.53	.84
Self-monitoring	46.17	8.5	.88
Materialism	28.72	9.11	.81

The following section will present results regarding the effectiveness of the moral self-licensing manipulation, as well as whether the manipulated group differs from the non-manipulated group across various variables.

3.1.4. Results

To achieve the research objectives, chi-square analyses, independent samples t-tests, and binary logistic regression were conducted to compare the two groups. Data analyses were performed using the SPSS software package (version 25), and the significance level was set at .05.

Initially, among the 381 participants, 315 individuals who participated in the lottery were identified, while the remaining 66 individuals (those who assigned the rewarded questions to themselves or to the other participant without using the lottery) were excluded from the study. Of the 315 participants who participated in the lottery, 174 participants (55.2%) received a moral self-licensing (MSL) manipulation, whereas no manipulation was applied to the remaining 141 participants (44.8%). Consequently, the first analysis examined whether there was a significant difference in moral hypocrisy behavior between the group that received the moral self-licensing manipulation and the group that did not. The findings are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. Comparison of the effect of moral self-licensing manipulation on moral hypocrisy

Preference Status			χ^2
Moral self-licensing	To Self by Lottery	To Other by Lottery	
Yes	103 (59.2%)	71 (40.8%)	5.37*
No	65 (46.1%)	76 (53.9%)	

*p < .05

Table 3.3. indicated that the proportion of participants displaying moral hypocrisy was 59.2% in the group subjected to MSL manipulation, compared to 46.1% in the group with no intervention. This difference was found to be statistically significant (Hypothesis 1) ($\chi^2 = 5.37$; $p < .05$). Among participants who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy, 40.8% belonged to the manipulated group, whereas this proportion was 53.9% in the non-manipulated group. These results indicated that the moral self-licensing manipulation had an effect on moral hypocrisy and increased its level. Following the full-sample analysis based on the presence or absence of moral self-licensing manipulation, a gender-based comparison was conducted to determine whether the manipulation produced a significant difference between male and female participants. The findings are presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. Comparison of moral self-licensing manipulation by gender

Preference Status			χ^2 (df)
Female	Moral Self-Licensing	Help (MSL)	4.17*(1)
		Gift (No-MSL)	
Male	Moral Self-Licensing	Help (MSL)	0.99 (1)
		Gift (No-MSL)	

*p < .05

Table 3.4. revealed that among females who received the MSL manipulation, 62.3% exhibited moral hypocrisy, while 37.7% did not. In contrast, in the group of females without

the manipulation, 47.5% displayed moral hypocrisy, and 52.5% did not. This distribution difference between the two female groups was statistically significant (Hypothesis 1) ($\chi^2 = 4.17$; $p < .05$), indicating that females in the manipulated group showed significantly higher levels of moral hypocrisy compared to those in the non-manipulated group.

Following the MSL manipulation, 53.3% of male in the manipulated group displayed moral hypocrisy, while 46.7% did not. In contrast, among male in the non-manipulated group, 44.3% exhibited moral hypocrisy, with 55.7% not displaying this behavior. Although the proportion of moral hypocrisy among male in the manipulated group (53.3%) was higher than in the non-manipulated group (44.3%), this difference did not reach statistical significance ($\chi^2 = 0.99$; $p > .05$). Therefore, while no significant difference was found between the manipulated and non-manipulated male groups, a statistically significant difference was observed between the two female groups (Hypothesis 1). In other words, the moral self-licensing manipulation was effective for females but not for males. A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine whether participants in the non-moral self-licensing condition exhibited statistically significant gender differences. The findings are presented in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5. Comparison of preference status by gender among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition

		Preference Status		χ^2 (df)
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Gender	Female	38 (47.5%)	42 (52.5%)	0.15 (1)
	Male	27 (44.3%)	34 (55.7%)	

* $p < .05$

Table 3.5 showed that the display of moral hypocrisy among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition did not differ significantly by gender ($\chi^2 = 0.15$; $p > .05$). This indicated that the distribution of moral hypocrisy behavior was similar between male and female participants in the non-moral self-licensing condition. An analysis was then conducted to assess whether the distribution of moral hypocrisy behavior differed by gender among participants in the moral self-licensing condition. The findings are presented in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6. Comparison of preference status by gender among participants in the moral self-licensing condition

		Preference Status		χ^2 (df)
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Gender	Female	71 (62.3%)	43 (37.7%)	1.30 (1)
	Male	32 (53.3%)	28 (46.7%)	

* $p < .05$

Table 3.6 depicted that the display of moral hypocrisy among participants in the moral self-licensing condition did not differ significantly by gender ($\chi^2 = 1.30$; $p > .05$). Thus, the distribution of moral hypocrisy behavior was similar between male and female participants in the moral self-licensing condition. Although females exhibited higher rates of moral hypocrisy compared to male, this difference was not statistically significant. Subsequently, an analysis was conducted to assess whether the distribution of moral hypocrisy behavior among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition differed according to socio-economic status. The findings are presented in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7. Comparison of preference status by socio-economic level among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition

		Preference Status		χ^2 (df)
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Income Level	Low	34 (52.3%)	31 (47.7%)	2.64 (2)
	Medium	26 (41.3%)	37 (58.7%)	
	High	3 (30.0%)	7 (70.0%)	

* $p < .05$

Table 3.7 indicated that participants not assigned to the moral self-licensing condition did not exhibit statistically significant differences in moral hypocrisy behaviors across income levels ($\chi^2 = 2.64$; $p > .05$). While the proportion of participants displaying moral hypocrisy was higher among those with lower income levels, this proportion decreased

among those with medium and high income levels; however, this difference did not reach statistical significance. Additionally, an inverse relationship was observed, with the proportion of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy decreasing as income level increases. The distribution of moral hypocrisy behaviors among participants in the moral self-licensing condition was also analyzed to assess whether it varies by socio-economic status. The findings are presented in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8. Comparison of preference status by socio-economic level among participants in the moral self-licensing condition

		Preference Status		χ^2
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Income Level	Low	34 (66.7%)	17 (33.3%)	3.70
	Medium	56 (60.2%)	37 (39.8%)	
	High	13 (44.8%)	16 (55.2%)	

* $p < .05$

Table 3.8 revealed that, among participants in the moral self-licensing condition, the tendency to exhibit moral hypocrisy did not differ significantly by income level ($\chi^2 = 3.70$; $p > .05$). Although participants with low and medium income levels in the moral self-licensing condition exhibited a higher proportion of moral hypocrisy behaviors, this proportion was lower among participants with higher income levels; however, this difference was not statistically significant. Furthermore, a trend was observed whereby the proportion of participants displaying moral hypocrisy decreases as income level increases. Individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-moral self-licensing condition were compared with those in the moral self-licensing condition in terms of materialism, and the findings are presented in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing materialism tendency between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those not this condition

Dependent Variable	Group	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Materialism	Moral Self-Licensing (Yes)	103	33.83	9.13	166	0.19	.848	--
	Moral Self-Licensing (No)	65	34.10	8.88				

*p < .05

Table 3.9 revealed that materialism tendency among participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition was lower than that of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy outside of this condition; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{166} = 0.19$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, there was no statistically significant difference in materialism tendency between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy within the moral self-licensing condition and those outside of it (Research Question 2). To compare the materialism tendency of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy outside the moral self-licensing condition with those who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy within the same condition, an independent samples t-test was conducted, and the findings are presented in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing materialism tendency based on preference status among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference Status		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Materialism	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		65	36.85	8.39	139	0.85	.394	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		76	35.64	8.36				

*p < .05

Table 3.10 showed that materialism tendency was higher among participants not in the moral self-licensing condition who exhibit moral hypocrisy compared to those who do

not exhibit moral hypocrisy; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{139} = 0.85$; $p > .05$). Thus, there was no statistically significant difference in materialism tendency between those exhibiting moral hypocrisy and those not exhibiting it within the non-moral self-licensing condition (Research Question 2). A comparison of materialism tendency was also conducted between participants in the moral self-licensing condition who exhibit moral hypocrisy and those who do not, and the findings are presented in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing materialism tendency based on preference status among participants in the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference Status	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Materialism	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	103	33.83	9.13	172	0.69	.493	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	71	32.84	9.71				

* $p < .05$

Table 3.11 showed that materialism tendency among participants in the moral self-licensing condition who exhibit moral hypocrisy was higher than that of participants who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{172} = 0.69$; $p > .05$). Thus, there was no statistically significant difference in materialism levels between participants exhibiting and not exhibiting moral hypocrisy within the moral self-licensing condition (Research Question 2). A comparison of self-monitoring levels was conducted between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-moral self-licensing condition and those exhibiting it within the moral self-licensing condition, with the findings presented in Table 3.12.

Table 3.12. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing self-monitoring levels between participants displaying moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those displaying moral hypocrisy outside this condition

Variable	Group	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Self Monitoring	Moral Self-Licensing (Yes)	103	49.28	8.13	166	0.10	.923	--
	Moral Self-Licensing (No)	65	49.40	7.02				

* $p < .05$

Table 3.12 revealed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy within the moral self-licensing condition had lower self-monitoring levels than those exhibiting moral hypocrisy outside of this condition; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{(166)} = 0.10$; $p > .05$). Thus, we determined that the self-monitoring levels of participants displaying moral hypocrisy were similar regardless of whether they were in the moral self-licensing condition (Research Question 3). To compare the self-monitoring levels of participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy outside of the moral self-licensing condition with those who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy, an independent samples t-test was conducted. The findings are presented in Table 3.13.

Table 3.13. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing self-monitoring levels based on preference statues between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy outside the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference statues	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Self Monitoring	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	65	49.40	7.02	139	4.29	.000	0.12
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	76	45.07	5.11				

* $p < .05$

Table 3.13 showed that participants displaying moral hypocrisy outside of the moral self-licensing condition had higher self-monitoring levels compared to those who did not display moral hypocrisy, with this difference being statistically significant ($t_{(139)} = 4.29$; $p < .05$). The effect size for this difference was calculated and found to be of medium magnitude. Thus, we concluded that participants outside the moral self-licensing condition who exhibit moral hypocrisy demonstrated higher self-monitoring levels than those who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 2). A comparison of self-monitoring levels between participants within the moral self-licensing condition who display moral hypocrisy and those who did not display moral hypocrisy was conducted, with the findings presented in Table 3.14.

Table 3.14. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing self-monitoring levels based on preference statues among participants in the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference statues		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	df	t	p	η^2
Self Monitoring	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		103	49.28	8.13	172	2.18	.031	0.03
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		71	46.83	5.89				

*p < .05

Table 3.14 revealed that participants in the moral self-licensing condition who display moral hypocrisy had higher self-monitoring levels than those who did not display moral hypocrisy, with this difference being statistically significant ($t_{(172)} = 2.18$; $p < .05$). The effect size for this difference was calculated and found to be low. Thus, we concluded that, within the moral self-licensing condition, participants displaying moral hypocrisy demonstrated higher self-monitoring levels than those not displaying moral hypocrisy (Research Question 3). A comparison of religious orientation between participants displaying moral hypocrisy within and outside the moral self-licensing condition was conducted, with the findings presented in Table 3.15.

Table 3.15. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing religious orientation between participants displaying moral hypocrisy within and outside the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Group		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Religious Orientation	Moral Self-Licensing (Yes)		103	19.08	5.12	166	1.31	.192	--
	Moral Self-Licensing (No)		65	18.02	5.12				

*p < .05

Table 3.15 showed that participants displaying moral hypocrisy within the moral self-licensing condition did not statistically differ in religious orientation than those displaying moral hypocrisy outside of this condition ($t_{(166)} = 1.31$; $p > .05$). Thus, we concluded that participants displaying moral hypocrisy had similar religious orientation regardless of

whether they were within or outside the moral self-licensing condition (Research Question 5). To compare the religious orientation of participants displaying moral hypocrisy outside of the moral self-licensing condition with those who did not display moral hypocrisy, an independent samples t-test was conducted, with the findings presented in Table 3.16.

Table 3.16. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing religious orientation based on preference statues between participants displaying and not displaying moral hypocrisy outside the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference statues		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Religious Orientation	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		65	18.02	5.12	139	0.18	.857	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		76	17.86	5.38				

*p < .05

Table 3.16 showed that participants displaying moral hypocrisy outside the moral self-licensing condition did not statistically differ in religious orientation than those not displaying moral hypocrisy ($t_{(139)} = 0.18$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, we determined that participants outside the moral self-licensing condition who display moral hypocrisy had similar religious orientation to those who did not display moral hypocrisy (Research Question 4). A comparison of religious orientations between participants displaying moral hypocrisy within the moral self-licensing condition and those not displaying moral hypocrisy was conducted, with the findings presented in Table 3.17.

Table 3.17. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing religious orientation based on preference statues among participants in the moral self-licensing condition

Variable	Preference statues		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Religious Orientation	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		103	19.08	5.12	172	0.73	.469	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		71	18.46	5.94				

*p < .05

Table 3.17 revealed that participants in the moral self-licensing condition who display moral hypocrisy did not statistically differ in religious orientations compared to those who did not display moral hypocrisy ($t_{(172)} = 0.73$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, we determined that individuals in the moral self-licensing condition who display moral hypocrisy had similar religious orientation to those who did not display moral hypocrisy (Research Question 5). In the final part of this section, a binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to identify variables influencing individuals' preferences statues.

Table 3.18. Binary logistic regression analysis of the influence of religious orientation, self-monitoring, and materialism tendency on individuals' preferences statues

Dependent Variable		B	Wald	p	Exp(B)
Preference statues	Religious Orientation	0.01	.07	.787	1.01
	Materialism	0.00	.05	.830	1.00
	Self-monitoring	0.07	15.99	.000	1.08
	Constant	-3.67	13.09	.000	.03
Omnibus Test		Cox& Snell R ²	Nagelkerke R ²	Hosmer – Lemeshow test	
Chi-square (df)	18.75 (3)	.06	.08	Chi-square (df)	38.53 (8)
p	.000			p	.000
Overall Classification Accuracy (%)					63.2

Reference Group: Those Who Gave to Others by Lottery

Table 3.18 indicated that the self-monitoring variable significantly influenced individuals' preferences statues compared to the reference group (those who gave to others by lottery, i.e., participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy) ($p < .05$). Reviewing the Exp (B) values showed that a one-unit increase in self-monitoring raises the likelihood of exhibiting moral hypocrisy by 1.08 times. An Exp (B) value greater than 1 suggests a higher likelihood of the event occurring, while a value less than 1 indicates a lower likelihood (Gujarati, 2006). Furthermore, the Omnibus test, the model itself, and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test were found to be statistically significant, meaning that the model showed an adequate fit to the data.

The Cox & Snell R² and Nagelkerke R² values, calculated to determine the proportion of variance explained by the independent variables, were found to be low, suggesting that religious orientation, materialism, and self-monitoring accounted for approximately 8% of

the variance in individuals' preferences statues. Examining the overall classification accuracy revealed that, without any variables included, the model initially classified at 52%; this accuracy increased to 63% with the inclusion of the variables. Although the variables improved classification accuracy, this rate was not considered acceptable.

3.1.5. Discussion

In the second part of the study, there were 381 university student participated. Of these, 66 individuals (those who assigned the rewarded questions to themselves or to others without drawing lots) were excluded from the study. The research group consisted of 315 participants (those who either took the rewarded questions for themselves by drawing lots and were identified as participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy or those who gave the rewarded questions to others by drawing lots). One of the key variables in the second study was moral self-licensing, owing to the fact that one of the central questions was whether there would be any differentiation between groups and conditions as a result of the moral self-licensing manipulation and what kind of results might emerge. To answer this, 174 participants (55.2%) were included in the moral self-licensing manipulation, which involved receiving a small gift (i.e., a seeded pen), while 141 participants received no manipulation. For the group that received the manipulation, the following standardized statement was used: "Hello, a private company is conducting a study to evaluate its employees. Your thoughts and feelings are important for this study. I work part-time for this company. As part of my duties, I need to reach a certain number of participants for this study. Could you help me with this? You would be doing me a great favor." Additionally, when the study began, the participants were reminded of the favor they had done and were thanked for it. For the group that received no manipulation, the previously mentioned standard instructions were read, they were told about the possibility of winning a prize in the study, and they received one seeded pen as a gift. The selected gift was a small item of minimal value, ensuring that it would not influence the main manipulation.

Throughout the study, one group was subjected to the moral self-licensing manipulation, while the other was not. This quasi-experimental method was used to yield stronger results. According to the findings, moral hypocrisy behavior increased in the manipulation group. In other words, there was a significant variance between the manipulated and non-manipulated groups. These results were consistent with the existing literature. The moral self-licensing phenomenon has suggested that people justify immoral

behaviors based on prior good deeds. Individuals may feel as though their past good actions grant them moral “credit,” allowing them to engage in following immoral behaviors.

Similar experimental findings were observed by Merritt et al. (2010). Their findings indicated that merely recalling past good deeds increased the likelihood of participants engaging in immoral behavior. This was explained by the positive boost in self-image that these good deeds provided. In another study, Miller and Effron (2010) investigated the dynamics of moral self-licensing in adults from various racial and ethnic groups, focusing on diversity and bias. Their results showed that participants who had previously supported a Black presidential candidate were later more likely to express racially biased views. This shift was attributed to their belief that they had been granted some form of permission through their earlier behavior. Sachdeva et al. (2009) examined the impact of moral self-licensing on charitable behavior and found results consistent with the present study. In their research, participants were asked to write about their positive traits on a sheet of paper. When comparing participants who wrote about their positive traits with those who wrote about their negative traits, an interesting result emerged: participants who wrote about their positive traits were less likely to donate to a charity afterward.

Ferguson and et al. (2024) recently conducted a meta-analytic study on experimental research investigating how sequential moral behaviors were shaped. The findings provided a range of evidence regarding whether previous moral or immoral actions resulted in moral balancing or moral consistency. Their first meta-analysis ($k = 217$ effect sizes, $N = 31.24$) revealed that engaging in an initial positive behavior generally resulted in moral self-licensing; an initial positive action could lead to subsequent immoral behavior. Their second meta-analysis ($k = 132$ effect sizes, $N = 14.44$) found that engaging in negative behavior typically resulted in moral balancing, or an increased likelihood of performing a subsequent positive action. Other previous findings also were consistent with the results of the present study (Merritt et al., 2010; Miller & Effron, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009).

A Chi-Square (χ^2) analysis was conducted to determine whether the moral self-licensing manipulation differed by gender. The findings showed that the moral hypocrisy rate among manipulated females (62.3%) was significantly higher than that of non-manipulated females (47.5%). Among manipulated male, the moral hypocrisy rate was 53.3%, compared to 44.3% in the non-manipulated group. This variance was not statistically significant. However, the proportional difference between the two groups was noticeable. In both genders, the findings suggested an increase in moral hypocrisy behavior following the moral self-licensing manipulation.

The interaction effect between moral self-licensing and gender calls for further investigation in the literature. For instance: Khan and Dhar (2006) investigated gender differences in moral self-licensing and found distinct patterns. Male were more likely than female to use moral self-licensing as a justification for behaviors such as excessive spending and engaging in risky activities. In contrast, female were more likely than male to use moral self-licensing to justify behaviors in line with caregiving or nurturing roles (e.g., taking a break from caregiving responsibilities). Similarly, Mullen and Monin (2016) examined the situational impact of moral self-licensing on male and female and found that in competitive environments, males were more prone to moral self-licensing, owing to societal expectations related to success and outperforming others, while females were more likely to use moral self-licensing in relation to self-compassion and taking breaks from their responsibilities. Clot et al. (2014) also found that males and females differed in the domains where they employed moral self-licensing. For example, males were more likely to use moral self-licensing to justify aggressive actions, while females used it more often to justify behaviors related to self-care and relaxation, a finding consistent with traditional gender roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002). However, in a significant meta-analysis, no substantial gender differences in moral self-licensing were found (Blanken et al., 2014).

In the present study, a significant increase in moral hypocrisy was found among females after the moral self-licensing manipulation (from 47.5% to 62.3%), while the increase in males was not statistically significant (from 44.3% to 53.3%). Although the increase in the female's group was significant, and in the male's group it was not, both groups showed a noticeable rise in moral hypocrisy. The significant increase in the female's group might be due to characteristics of the sample, which consisted of young female university students. The significant increase observed in the female group might be attributed to females' heightened sensitivity to economic stressors and their tendency to perceive resource-related needs as more urgent (Diener & Oishi, 2000; Furnham, 1984). Furthermore, societal norms that position female in supportive and dependent roles could have amplified this increase (Eagly, 1987). In contrast, the relatively lower increase in the male group might be explained by males' propensity for more strategic and long-term approaches to resource allocation and utilization (Vugt & Park, 2010). Studies in the relevant literature also supported this assumption with similar findings (Hager, 2022; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mullen & Monin, 2016; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007).

Another demographic variable examined in relation to moral hypocrisy was the reported income level of participants. We investigated whether there was a significant

relationship between income level and moral hypocrisy. Our findings revealed that participants did not significantly differ in terms of their socio-economic status (i.e., low, middle, or high income). The literature also suggests that wealthier individuals or those in higher economic brackets are more likely to engage in moral hypocrisy. For example, Rustichini and Villeval (2014) found that those in positions of power were more likely to engage in hypocrisy compared to those with less power. Other researchers have also confirmed that wealthier individuals are more likely to engage in selfish or morally questionable behaviors (e.g., prioritizing their own interests) compared to those with lower incomes (Dubois et al., 2015; Galperin et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2012). While the literature generally suggests that individuals with higher socio-economic status are more likely to engage in immoral behaviors such as moral hypocrisy, there are also studies with opposite findings. For example, Piff et al. (2012) found that individuals in lower social classes were more likely to engage in immoral behaviors compared to wealthier individuals. This could be due to the desire of economically disadvantaged individuals to escape their circumstances. The reasons for higher-income individuals engaging in immoral behaviors may differ from those for lower-income individuals, as the former may be driven by motives such as acquiring more resources, independence, and freedom. Although there is evidence suggesting that wealthier individuals are more likely to exhibit greed, some studies have failed to confirm this. For example, Trautmann et al. (2013) found no such relationship among higher socio-economic individuals. Similarly, in the study by Piff et al. (2012), no significant difference in immoral behavior between high- and low-income groups was found. The same study also investigated whether high-income individuals were more likely to engage in immoral behaviors related to money. The findings indicated no significant difference between the two groups. Similarly, Trautmann et al. (2013) suggested that the relationship between income level and immoral behavior is complex, noting that other studies have found that lower-income individuals are more likely to engage in immoral and selfish behaviors (Blau & Blau, 1982; Daly et al., 2001). In the context of the current study, the lack of a significant difference between the two groups may be due to the small number of participants in the higher-income group. For instance, in the group without the moral self-licensing manipulation, there were only 3 participants, while in the manipulated group, there were 13 participants. That is, ensuring a sufficiently equal and large number of participants in each income group might have led to different results.

Another key variable in the second part of the study was materialism. In the literature, materialism are often defined as placing high value on material possessions (Bilgin, 2009).

The most common association with materialism is a greater attachment to material needs and desires and a tendency to prioritize material interests (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Materialism can also be described as a mindset characterized by valuing worldly goods or an interest in acquiring and spending (Belk, 1984; Rassuli & Hollander, 1986). Due to these mental differences, some individuals may be content with a minimalist lifestyle, while others may resort to criminal activities to obtain more material possessions (Richins & Dawson, 1992). The primary assumption related to materialism is that post-materialists value aesthetic and intellectual values more than materialists, while materialists prioritize economic security (Bean & Papadakis, 1994).

Studies have shown that individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy tend to be more selfish and prioritize their own interests (Batson et al., 1992a, 1997b, 2003c). Similarly, excessive attachment to materialism is an indicator of egocentrism. Concern over acquisition and possession may influence one's motivation to share with others due to selfishness (Richins & Dawson, 1992). A negative correlations between these variables and well-being and happiness and positive correlations with anxiety have been found previously (Chang & Arkin, 2002; Turan, 2007). In other words, materialist participants may feel anxious due to a lack of financial security, which could lead them to place more importance on material possessions.

Similarly, individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy may also experience heightened anxiety, as they are concerned about the potential damage to their social image. Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b) found that those who engaged in moral hypocrisy tended to experience higher levels of guilt, a finding that might support the current study's results. This link between guilt and moral hypocrisy aligned with the idea that individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy might feel inner tension between their actions and their self-presentation, leading to increased guilt or anxiety about social image.

In the context of the relationship between moral self-licensing and materialism, it is plausible that individuals with stronger materialist tendencies may be more likely to engage in immoral behaviors, such as moral hypocrisy, after utilizing moral self-licensing as a justification for prior good deeds. In other words, individuals with a materialistic outlook might take advantage of previous opportunities to do good or engage in moral actions by later rewarding themselves through materialistic behaviors (Merritt et al., 2010). Materialist individuals may also use moral self-licensing as a way to maintain a positive self-image while continuing to act selfishly. Batson's (1999) study showed that individuals often felt uncomfortable when gaining financially, as this negatively impacted their positive self-

perception. Consequently, individuals may be more likely to engage in prosocial behavior afterward to compensate for this discomfort and maintain their self-integrity. Additionally, Richins and Dawson (1992) found that individuals with higher materialism were more prone to moral hypocrisy and might use their past good deeds to justify engaging in actions aligned with their materialistic desires, further strengthening their selfish tendencies.

In light of the previous findings, the present study sought to determine whether individuals who inherently place greater value on material possessions, owing to the nature of materialism, were more likely to exhibit moral hypocrisy by claiming the reward questions for themselves. This exploration aimed to investigate whether there is a heightened tendency for materialistic individuals to engage in behaviors that prioritize personal gain over ethical consistency.

An initial comparison was made between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those not in this condition, in terms of materialism. The findings revealed no significant difference between the two conditions, suggesting that materialistic tendencies were similar among those exhibiting moral hypocrisy, regardless of the manipulation. This result was inconsistent with the literature findings, which suggested that materialistic tendencies increased moral hypocrisy with the effects of moral self-licensing (Batson, 1999; Merritt et al., 2010; Richins & Dawson, 1992). The lack of a significant difference in the current study could be because these two concepts operated within different motivational frameworks. Moral self-licensing is a mechanism that motivates individuals to engage in immoral behaviors after having performed moral or good actions in the past to maintain a positive self-concept. In contrast, materialism is driven by external rewards and social comparisons, focusing on the importance placed on material possessions. Accordingly, it could be argued that valuing material possessions did not differentiate between participants in the present study. Furthermore, while moral self-licensing focuses more on moral decision-making, self-regulation, and prosocial behavior, materialism is more concerned with consumer behavior, life satisfaction, and financial priorities. Therefore, studying the relationships between these two concepts using other measurement tools, taking into account culture-specific sensitivities, might lead to different results (Blanken et al., 2014; Richins & Dawson, 1992).

The inconsistency between these results and the literature could also be due to the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants. The participants in this study were university students who had come from rural areas of Türkiye and presently residing in larger cities who shared a similar lower economic background. The challenging economic

conditions in the country might have caused the participants to exhibit similar levels of materialism, as they likely shared a common sense of financial insecurity.

We also explored whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-manipulated group differed in materialism from those who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy in the same condition. The findings showed no significant difference between the two groups. This finding was also inconsistent with the literature. Once again, this could be explained by cultural variations. Most previous studies have been conducted with American and European samples. Therefore, the differing findings could be attributed to the varying socio-demographic structures of the study samples. In Türkiye, individuals may place similar levels of importance on material possessions, regardless of whether they engage in moral hypocrisy. This could be due to socio-cultural norms that emphasize the significance of material wealth and status. As a result, both those who display morally inconsistent behaviors and those who did not might give equal importance to material values. This suggested that the societal focus on economic and social status might influence both groups similarly, which could explain the lack of significant differences between them in terms of materialism (Belk, 1984; Richins & Dawson, 1992). The relationship between moral hypocrisy and materialism appears to be complex. That is individuals may attribute similar levels of importance to material values, independent of their moral stance.

The final research question related to materialism was whether there was a difference in materialism between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the same condition. Similar to the previous findings, there was no significant difference between the two groups. This result was also inconsistent with previous studies revealing a significant relationship between materialism and moral hypocrisy (Batson, 1999; Blanken et al., 2014; Merritt et al., 2010; Richins & Dawson, 1992). Once again, this might be due to participants in the Turkish sample assigning similar levels of importance to material values, regardless of their moral stance, due to economic or societal norms.

Self-monitoring was another variable examined in this part of the study. Self-monitoring theory emphasizes how individuals manage and present their social image to gain approval from others. This process involves deliberately shaping behavior to influence others' perceptions, in which individuals actively monitor and adjust their actions to align with their desired social image. By carefully guiding how others view them, individuals may strategically enhance their social standing and relationships (Briggs & Cheek, 1986;

Carpenter et al., 2023; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray, 1999; König et al., 2022).

When examining the relationship between moral self-licensing and self-monitoring, similarities between the two variables are apparent. Individuals with high self-monitoring levels are concerned with how their actions are perceived by others and may use moral self-licensing to justify their behavior in line with social expectations. In other words, they may rationalize their actions by referring to past moral or good deeds to maintain their positive social image. Additionally, high self-monitoring individuals are skilled at adjusting their behavior based on social feedback, which may make them more open to using moral self-licensing (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Merritt et al., 2010).

In the context of moral hypocrisy and self-monitoring, individuals with high levels of moral hypocrisy may also exhibit high self-monitoring as a personality trait. Like participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, individuals with high self-monitoring are sensitive to rewards, capable of acting in ways that benefit themselves, and attentive to environmental cues. Bacanlı (1990) noted that self-monitoring was an effective social skill for managing others' impressions, a characteristic that also applied to participants engaging moral hypocrisy. Participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, like high self-monitors, strived to appear moral and high standing in social settings (Batson et al., 1999a, 2002b). High self-monitoring individuals also exhibited greater inconsistency between their attitudes and behaviors (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Miller & Thayer, 1988; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Additionally, high self-monitors were more likely to engage in immoral behavior. More specifically, the strong relationship between immoral behavior and situational factors, as well as the negative relationship between high self-monitoring and honesty, supported this hypothesis (Norris & Zweingehinft, 1999; Tsang, 2002). Furthermore, individuals with high self-monitoring tended to have a higher propensity for seeking rewards, potentially due to elevated levels of dopamine and serotonin. Based on these factors, there would be a positive relationship between high self-monitoring and moral hypocrisy. The aim of this part of the present study was to investigate whether individuals with high self-monitoring also exhibited higher levels of moral hypocrisy. The analysis revealed the following findings.

There was no significant difference between the self-monitoring levels of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those not in the condition. In other words, the moral hypocrisy levels of the group subjected to the moral self-licensing manipulation did not increase. While there was a significant difference

between participants engaging moral hypocrisy and participants who did not engage moral hypocrisy, there was no significant difference between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those outside of the condition. This might be because both groups of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy shared similar behavioral motivations (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Merritt et al., 2010). For example, both groups might have been similarly motivated by a tendency toward self-benefit, sensitivity to rewards, and a desire for a positive social image. These similarities might explain why the two groups did not differ following the manipulation, giving that they might have been equally motivated to achieve their desired outcome.

Additionally, both groups of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, whether in the moral self-licensing condition or not, might have been similar in terms of social and economic expectations. Moral self-licensing might not have been a sufficiently strong variable to differentiate between the two groups of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy. Furthermore, both moral self-licensing and high self-monitoring might contribute to moral hypocrisy in similar ways. Both variables could lead to similar outcomes due to shared characteristics, which might explain there is no significant difference between the two groups. Lastly, the similarity in dopamine and serotonin levels between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in both groups might have also contributed to the lack of difference (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Merritt et al., 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009). All of these similarities might contribute to explain why the moral self-licensing manipulation did not produce a significant difference.

A second analysis aimed to determine whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-moral self-licensing condition differed in self-monitoring from participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the same condition. The findings showed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-moral self-licensing condition had significantly higher self-monitoring levels than participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy. The effect size of this difference was found to be moderate and this result is consistent with the literature. That is individuals with high self-monitoring levels and those who exhibit moral hypocrisy tended to have greater inconsistency between their attitudes and behaviors (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). In another study, individuals with high self-monitoring were found to be more likely to engage in immoral behavior (Tsang, 2002). Similarly, Norris and Zweingehaft (1999) found that as self-monitoring increased,

honesty decreased, and Kapıkıran (2007) found that high self-monitoring could reduce marital fidelity. As seen, the present findings were consistent with the previous literature.

Another research question of the present study was whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition differed in self-monitoring. The findings, similar to those in the previous analysis, indicated that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy had higher self-monitoring levels than participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy. As noted earlier, no significant difference was found between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those outside of the condition. In other words, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy exhibited higher self-monitoring levels regardless of whether they were in the moral self-licensing condition. This consistency with both research questions supported the overall findings. The result was also consistent with the literature (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982).

Moral hypocrisy occurs when individuals behave immorally while presenting themselves as moral. These individuals are confident that they will not be caught and succeed in maintaining a moral appearance. The process of maintaining a moral appearance also involves managing others' impressions, as self-monitoring helps individuals regulate social situations and expectations (Batson et al., 1997; Snyder, 1974). Therefore, the findings from the present study aligned with researchers' hypothesis and the literature. For example, Gangestad and Snyder (2000) suggested that individuals with high self-monitoring were more likely to exhibit moral hypocrisy due to their concern with maintaining a positive social image. Their ability to adjust their behavior in response to social feedback makes it easier for them to engage in hypocritical actions when it benefits their social standing (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000).

Self-monitoring allows individuals to justify morally questionable actions by aligning their behavior with socially acceptable or expected norms in different situations, potentially leading to moral hypocrisy. Evidence supporting this could also be seen in the studies on marital fidelity discussed earlier (Kapıkıran, 2007). One reason for the distinct difference between individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy and those who did not might lie in the concept of self-monitoring. This concept involves managing a public persona, which may diverge from personal values or behaviors. This disconnect can result from individuals focusing more on how they are perceived by others rather than adhering to moral norms, ultimately leading to moral hypocrisy (Snyder, 1974). Supporting evidence for this

explanation could be found in the previous findings. For example, Gangestad and Snyder (2000) found that individuals with high self-monitoring were more likely to engage in behavior that is advantageous in social settings but potentially at odds with their personal moral values, increasing the likelihood of moral hypocrisy. Kapıkıran (2007) also found that individuals with high self-monitoring might exhibit lower fidelity in personal relationships, which can reflect broader ethical flexibility.

In the present study, the relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy was also one of the key areas of interest. Accordingly, the religious orientation of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the non-moral self-licensing condition were compared with those in the moral self-licensing condition, and it was explored whether the manipulation caused any differences. The findings indicated that religious orientation did not differ between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition and those outside of it. In other words, whether or not the manipulation condition was included, the level of moral hypocrisy did not change according to religious orientation.

Although findings in the literature regarding the relationship between moral self-licensing and religious orientation are mixed, religious orientation is generally expected to promote a consistent moral framework. As such, religious beliefs may deter individuals from engaging in immoral behaviors, regardless of situational influences that could serve as justifications. This consistent approach found in religious beliefs may encourage people to align their behaviors more closely with their religious values, reducing the likelihood of moral self-licensing. In other words, consistency in religious beliefs may have the effect of minimizing the effects of these manipulations even if various manipulations are made such as the moral self-licensing manipulation in this study (Allport & Ross, 1967). The present study showed that being in the moral self-licensing condition or not did not result in any difference, which was also consistent with the previous literature.

While moral self-licensing focuses on balancing ethical and unethical actions, religious orientation typically advocates for a holistic approach to moral behavior, emphasizing continuous moral development and repentance. Religious belief or religious orientation may override the cognitive processes that lead to moral self-licensing (Merritt et al., 2010). These findings could explain why no relationship was found between moral self-licensing and religious orientation in the present study. Similarly, subsequent analyses examining whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy differed in religious orientation yielded no significant results. The following research questions were explored: Whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the

non-moral self-licensing condition differ in religious orientation from participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the same condition and that whether participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition differ in religious orientation from participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the same condition. In all three analyses, no differences were found between the groups. This may be related to the explicit use of moral or religious concepts during the manipulation. In future research the potential outcomes of incorporating more ambiguous words or concepts in the manipulation process may be explored. This approach may provide deeper insights into the subtle effects of linguistic uncertainty on participant responses and behavior.

Additionally, no significant relationship was found between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy. The literature findings were not consistent on such relationship. Individuals with high intrinsic religious orientation are sincerely committed to religious teachings and apply them without seeking personal gain. These individuals tend to exhibit more tolerant, mature, and unbiased attitudes. In contrast, extrinsic religious orientation views religion and its teachings as a means to personal gain (Allport & Ross, 1967). Moreover, they may use religion instrumentally for reasons such as security, status, forgiveness, social standing, or self-preservation (Genia & Shaw, 1991; Kahoe & Meadow, 1981).

Carpenter and Marshall (2009) investigated whether intrinsic religious orientation and experimental religious reminders (i.e., priming) could reduce moral hypocrisy. Their findings confirmed the hypothesis that religious reminders would decrease moral hypocrisy among participants with high levels of intrinsic religious orientation. In their study, 142 Christian university students completed a religious orientation scale (ROS-R). To test the moral motivation paradigm, participants were asked whether they would act in accordance with their moral beliefs when there was a cost involved. Half of the participants received a religious reminder (i.e., priming) before the procedure. More specifically, after reading a short Bible verse, participants who scored high on intrinsic religiosity on the ROS-R exhibited behavior more consistent with their moral standards. This consistent behavior involved voluntarily giving the positive task outcome, a ticket for a \$30 prize drawing, to another participant or flipping a coin and, after losing, giving the prize to someone else. Participants believed their actions were anonymous, which made it easy for them to secretly take the prize for themselves. The results showed that intrinsic religiosity only reduced moral hypocrisy when religious reminders were present. The findings supported Allport's view of intrinsic religious orientation and emphasized not only motivational processes but also cognitive ones.

Alternatively, intrinsic religiosity may involve a self-deceptive exaggeration of one's commitment to religious values (Burris & Navara, 2002). This possibility highlights the need to approach the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and moral hypocrisy more critically. If intrinsic religiosity were largely based on self-deception (Burris & Navara, 2002; Maclean et al., 2004; Yonker et al., 2012), scores on the ROS-R scale would be unrelated or negatively related to moral consistency, leading to the conclusion that religious individuals might violate their moral standards for personal gain. However, the finding that intrinsic religiosity only predicted moral consistency when religious reminders were present suggested that this effect might depend on situational prompts that trigger comparisons between attitudes and behavior. This finding was also consistent with previous research (Batson et al., 1999; Eliot & Devine, 1994). Allport's theory, as well as recent research on priming self-relevant constructs, shows that intrinsic religiosity reduces moral hypocrisy when religious standards are presented explicitly to intrinsically religious individuals. The question remains, however, what happens when these religious standards are presented ambiguously or not presented at all.

In another study, Elçi et al. (2011) examined the effect of morality and religiosity on workers' diligence in the context of work ethics with 715 workers in Istanbul, Ankara, and Kocaeli. The results showed that both morality and religiosity had a positive and significant effect on diligence. According to the regression results, morality and religiosity were important components of diligence. This finding could be considered evidence of the negative relationship between moral hypocrisy and religiosity, as there was a positive relationship between morality and diligence (Elçi et al., 2011).

In contrast, Akyürek (2022) found a positive relationship between religiosity and moral integrity. In other words, as religiosity increases, so does moral integrity. This finding suggested that there might be an inverse relationship between religiosity and moral hypocrisy, as the negative relationship between moral hypocrisy and moral integrity supported this conclusion. For example, Batson et al. (2002) found in their experimental study that adults were more motivated by moral hypocrisy than by moral integrity. This was because individuals could appear moral to their social networks while engaging in selfish or immoral behavior to protect their own interests. These findings suggested that people were more influenced by external motivations such as social approval and visibility than by moral integrity.

McCullough and Bono (2004) investigated the relationship between forgiveness, religiosity, and age in adults. They found that religiosity increases with age. Given that

intrinsic religiosity increases with age, that the present study sample consisted of younger individuals might explain the lack of significant differences. Piazza and Sousa (2014) examined the relationship between religiosity, political orientation, and moral behavior. Their findings suggested that more religious people were less comfortable violating abstract moral rules and making decisions based on profit and loss calculations. Based on these findings, the likelihood of engaging in moral hypocrisy might decrease with increasing age and intrinsic religiosity. However, the similarity in age among participants in the current study might have eliminated this effect, leading both groups to exhibit similar behavioral patterns.

In intrinsic religious orientation, religious beliefs are deeply integrated into a person's life and lead to genuine moral behavior, reducing the likelihood of moral hypocrisy. In contrast, extrinsic religiosity may be used for external benefits such as social status, which can increase the likelihood of moral hypocrisy (Allport & Ross, 1967). The presence of different motivations within the concept of religiosity may have obscured the clear relationship between religiosity and moral hypocrisy in the present study. Religious individuals may attempt to justify certain behaviors that conflict with general moral principles in accordance with their beliefs. This reasoning process could blur the relationship between genuine moral behavior and hypocrisy (Batson et al., 1997). In light of this information, the present findings are inconsistent with some previous studies. In addition to those explanations, another reason for this situation may be that the participants in the study exhibited similar patterns of religiosity. Different religious traditions emphasize different moral standards. A behavior that is considered hypocritical in one context may be seen as acceptable in another due to differing interpretations of religious teachings. This variability can make it difficult to establish a direct relationship between moral hypocrisy and religiosity.

The findings showed that the religious orientation of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition were different than those of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy outside of this condition, but the difference was not statistically significant. In other words, consistent with the literature, moral hypocrisy levels did not change based on religious orientation in the moral self-licensing condition. As previously discussed, this could be due to participants sharing similar levels of secularity or being situated at similar points on the intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation spectrum.

Similar results were observed in the analysis comparing the religious orientation of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in

the non-moral self-licensing condition. The findings indicated that without the moral self-licensing manipulation, which had no significant effect in the context of religious orientation, there was no significant difference in religious orientation between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy. This suggested that individuals behaved similarly when it came to moral hypocrisy, regardless of whether their religious orientation was intrinsic or extrinsic.

Religiosity may not be seen as an important criterion for individuals when personal interests are at stake. Additionally, Allport and Ross's (1967) classification of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation could provide further insight. The young participants in this study might be situated closer to the middle or extrinsic end of the intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation continuum. Also this group could be described as secular. Secularization is becoming increasingly common among young people in Türkiye, as it is worldwide (Cengiz, 2020). In other words, religious references are not as widely used as they once were. Secularization refers to the extent to which individuals project their beliefs and lifestyle into their daily lives, rather than how religious they are in their inner world (Batur, 2015; Ertit, 2019). The lack of difference between the two groups in terms of religious orientation in this study might be due to the similar religious orientation and secularity of the participants.

The final research question regarding religious orientation explored whether there was a difference in religious orientation between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition. According to the t-test results, there was no significant difference between the groups, similar to the previous findings. While this result was not consistent with the general literature, it was consistent with the other findings of this study. As noted earlier, no significant difference was found in religious orientation between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy, regardless of whether they were in the moral self-licensing condition. Additionally, no significant difference in religious orientation was found between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy in the moral self-licensing condition in the present study. This similarity might be due to the participants sharing similar needs (Cengiz, 2020), as all participants were young university students with similar economic backgrounds.

In the final part of the second study, binary logistic regression was conducted to examine the impact of three variables, religious orientation, self-monitoring, and materialism, on moral hypocrisy. According to the findings, of the three variables, only self-

monitoring had a significant effect on moral hypocrisy, while materialism and religious orientation did not. As previously mentioned, when viewed through the materialism-post-materialism framework, highly materialistic individuals are driven by economic concerns and seek to ensure their financial security (Bean & Papadakis, 1994). Research findings showed that those who engage in moral hypocrisy and those who were highly materialistic tended to share common traits such as selfishness (Batson et al., 1992a, 1997b, 2003c). Concern over acquiring and possessing can influence one's motivation to share with others, as materialistic individuals may give less importance on prosocial behavior such as sharing with others due to their selfish tendencies (Richins & Dawson, 1992). In the literature, moral hypocrisy and materialism are negatively correlated with well-being and happiness and positively correlated with anxiety (Chang & Arkin, 2002; Turan, 2007). In other words, materialistic participants may feel anxious due to financial insecurity, which may cause them to place greater importance on material possessions. Additionally, Richins and Dawson (1992) found that individuals with higher materialistic values were more prone to moral hypocrisy and might use their past good deeds to justify engaging in actions aligned with their materialistic desires, further strengthening their selfish tendencies.

Thus, based on findings from the literature, a significant relationship between materialism and moral hypocrisy might be expected, but no such relationship was found in the current study. The relationship between these two concepts could be explored further in future studies using different measurement tools that take cultural sensitivities into account (Batson et al., 1999; Blanken et al., 2014; Richins & Dawson, 1992). The inconsistency between these results and the literature could also be due to the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants. Most previous studies have been conducted with American and European samples, so differences in findings could be attributed to the different socio-demographic structures of the samples. In Türkiye, people may place similar levels of importance on materialism, regardless of whether they engage in moral hypocrisy. Socio-cultural norms may impose high value on material goods, which could explain why there was no relationship between the two variables in this study (Belk, 1984; Richins & Dawson, 1992). In summary, the relationship between moral hypocrisy and materialism may be complex, as individuals may assign similar levels of importance to material values, independent of their moral stance.

The lack of a relationship could also be due to the different focal points of materialism and moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy involves a conflict between moral beliefs, values, and behaviors. People engage in rationalization to resolve this conflict and justify

their actions in some way (Batson et al., 2002). However, materialism is characterized by the pursuit of material wealth or possessions and does not necessarily involve moral dilemmas. Materialistic individuals are more focused on personal gain and less concerned with self-presentation (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Therefore, the lack of a significant relationship between these two variables may be because materialism is not directly related to the cognitive dissonance at the core of moral hypocrisy.

We also found that religious orientation did not have a significant effect on moral hypocrisy. The literature on the relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy presents mixed findings. For example, extrinsically motivated religious individuals were found to be more likely to act in their own self-interest compared to intrinsically motivated religious individuals, who were more likely to act altruistically and aligned their behavior with their religious beliefs (Allport & Ross, 1967; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Kahoe & Meadow, 1981). Similarly, Carpenter and Marshall (2009) primed religious terms (reminders) and found that participants with high intrinsic religiosity who were primed with religious terms exhibited lower levels of moral hypocrisy, supporting their hypothesis.

In another study, Aktay (2021) aimed to determine whether there was a relationship between cognitive flexibility, empathy, moral maturity, and religiosity in moral dilemmas. The findings showed that participants' levels of cognitive flexibility, empathy, moral maturity, and religiosity differed according to their educational background. The study primarily examined the relationship between participants' decisions in moral dilemmas and their levels of cognitive flexibility, empathy, moral maturity, and religiosity. The results showed that decisions in the self-sacrifice moral dilemma differed according to participants' levels of cognitive flexibility and moral maturity. In the Heinz dilemma, participants' decisions differed significantly according to their levels of empathy, moral maturity, and religiosity. In the prisoner dilemma, decisions differed significantly according to moral maturity and religiosity. These findings indicated a significant relationship between decisions in moral dilemmas and cognitive flexibility, empathy, moral maturity, and religiosity. It needs to be noted that religious orientation and moral maturity are significantly related in moral dilemmas is an important findings for understanding the relationship between these variables in the present study as well. In contrast, Tolunay (2001) found no significant relationship between religiosity and moral reasoning.

In the present study, religious orientation did not have a significant effect on moral hypocrisy, which is inconsistent with some of the previous findings. As noted earlier, the relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy was complex. For example,

some studies found that religious individuals could justify immoral behavior by aligning it with their religious beliefs (Batson et al., 1997). This did not suggest that religiosity supported moral hypocrisy, but rather that the complexity of the relationship between the two variables stemmed from how individuals reconcile conflicting motivations. Additionally, various contextual and personal factors might contribute to this complexity (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009).

According to the binary logistic regression analysis, self-monitoring was the only variable that significantly affected moral hypocrisy. This finding was consistent with the literature. In general, individuals with high self-monitoring, like participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, are sensitive to rewards, capable of acting in ways that benefit themselves, and attentive to environmental cues (Bacanlı, 1990; Batson et al., 1999a, 2002b; Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Additionally, several studies have found that immoral behaviors are strongly associated with situational factors and that individuals with high self-monitoring exhibit lower levels of honesty (Norris & Zweingehaft, 1999; Tsang, 2002). Other studies have also shown that the inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors is higher in individuals with high self-monitoring and moral hypocrisy, and that individuals with high self-monitoring are more likely to engage in immoral behaviors such as moral hypocrisy (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982; Tsang, 2002). Additionally, both individuals with high self-monitoring and those who exhibit moral hypocrisy are highly motivated to maintain a positive social image (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Thus, the finding that self-monitoring significantly influences moral hypocrisy in the present study is consistent with the previous findings.

4. STUDY 3. MORAL HYPOCRISY BEHAVIOR: COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL, AND BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES

In the final part of this study, we explored the cognitive (micro- macro justice, state self-esteem), emotional (self-conscious emotions) and behavioral (helping behavior) outcomes of moral hypocrisy behavior. We hypothesized that micro justice perception was higher in individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy, since micro justice perception included a more individualistic tendency than macro justice perception (Hypothesis 5). In addition, we expected that the state self-esteem levels of individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy would instantly decrease compared to the other group due to their behavior (Research Question 6). When viewed in the context of emotional outcomes, we also expected that the feelings of guilt and shame would be higher in the participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy compared to the other group, and the sense of pride would be at a lower level (Hypothesis 3).

Finally, in terms of helping behavior as a behavioral outcome, we predicted that participants who engage in moral hypocrisy would tend to donate more and be more helpful (Hypothesis 4). This prediction was based on the compensatory mechanism. That is, when immoral act was committed that must be followed by a moral act so that the individuals could maintain their self integrity.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

The study was conducted among 196 university students residing at AYBU, AU, and dormitories affiliated with the MOYS in Ankara. The participants comprised 114 females (58.2%) and 82 males (41.8%). The age of the participants ranged from 17 to 24, with a mean age of 20.59 (SD = 1.83). Among the participants, 70 participants (35.4%) reported an income of 0–4000 TL, 93 participants (47%) reported an income of 4001–8000 TL, and 31 participants (15.7%) reported an income of 8001 TL or above.

Table 4.1. An overview of the demographic characteristics of the respondents

		Frequency	Percent
Gender	Female	114	57.6
	Male	82	41.4
	Total	196	99.0
Age	17.00	2	1.0
	18.00	25	12.6
	19.00	43	21.7
	20.00	28	14.1
	21.00	31	15.7
	22.00	26	13.1
	23.00	33	16.7
	24.00	8	4.0
	Total	196	99.0
Income	0-4000	70	35.4
	4001-8000	93	47.0
	8001-Above	31	15.7
	Total	194	98.0

4.1.2. Procedures

In the third part of the present study, the same experimental procedure used in the first two parts was applied (Appendix E). However, due to the specific nature of this third study, certain additions were included. As noted earlier, this section aimed to identify the state cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects of moral hypocrisy behavior on participants.

During participant recruitment, one of the two assistant researchers invited participants by explaining that they were conducting a study for an international company where they worked part-time, emphasizing that the study included questions offering potential rewards and asking if they would like to participate; the process then followed standard instructions (Appendix E).

The only difference in the this part was that the relevant scales were administered to participants after completing the study. This section focused on cognitive (i.e., micro-macro justice and state self-esteem), emotional (i.e., self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt, and pride), and behavioral (i.e., donation as a helping behavior) outcomes that might arise following moral hypocrisy behavior. Each individual session lasted approximately 30 minutes, totaling 100 hours of work across all participants.

Participation was conducted via individual appointments. Each participant was greeted by an assistant researcher, who escorted them to the study room and discreetly asked, while accompanying them, whether they felt luckier with odd or even numbers. This indirect question was expected to reveal the participant's numerical preference, which the assistant communicated to the primary researcher via a text message. Although the researcher already had an indication of the participant's likely choice, he verbally confirmed it again in the study room by asking the participant directly whether they felt luckier with odd or even numbers. This approach facilitated a more nuanced identification of the participant's preference, avoiding a direct question about their choice and ensuring their comfort in making an authentic decision. Consequently, the preference for odd or even numbers in the lottery was established indirectly and with greater clarity.

To create a sense of confidentiality and independence in decision-making, the researcher informed the participant that the study included two participants who were participating in separate locations and would not meet or see each other (in reality, there was no second participant). Once seated at the desk in the study room, the participant was left alone to read an instruction sheet, which indicated that the study aimed to evaluate participants' perceptions of the nature of tasks with and without rewards.

Before beginning the task, the numbers from 1 to 50 were placed one by one into 50 envelopes in front of the participant and together with the participant to minimize any suspicion about the contents of the envelopes. Afterward, envelopes corresponding to the participant's odd or even number preference were presented, aligned with the study's objective. Specifically, 50 envelopes containing either all odd or all even numbers (opposite to the participant's stated preference) were used (these envelopes were prepared in advance by the researcher). In this way, the participant encountered the opposite of their initial preference, enabling the observation of their behavior during the decision-making process. At the end of the study, participants were informed about the true purpose of the study through a debriefing form (Appendix Q).

4.1.3. Instruments

Participants completed a set of questionnaires which were Micro-Macro Justice Scale, State Self-Esteem Scale, Emotional Labor Scale, Helping Behavior Scale.

4.1.3.1. Micro-Macro Justice Scale

Micro-Macro justice was measured using scenario below:

“Ahmet and Hüseyin are two employees working for the same company. When the company experiences a profitable season, it rewards its employees with a bonus (i.e., monetary reward) as per their contracts. This year, the company has made a profit and needs to decide how to distribute a bonus of 6000 TL. Ahmet belongs to a lower-income group, has a lower income than Hüseyin, has never received this bonus before, and is in greater financial need. Additionally, Ahmet has more limited performance and skills. On the other hand, Hüseyin is more skilled and has better performance at work. He has also received this bonus in the past. Considering the characteristics of Ahmet and Hüseyin, how much of the bonus would you allocate to Ahmet? Similarly, how much would you allocate to Hüseyin? Please select the option that best reflects your decision.”

Participants were provided with a form containing distribution options regarding how the bonus could be shared. Options 1, 2, and 3 on the form reflected a micro justice tendency, while options 5, 6, and 7 reflected a stronger macro justice tendency (The form structured can be seen in the Appendix K).

4.1.3.2. State Self-Esteem Scale

The scale, developed by Heatherton and Polivy (1991), was designed to measure temporary changes in self-esteem and has been found highly effective for detecting self-esteem manipulations in laboratory settings. This 20-item scale consists of three subfactors—performance, social, and appearance—and is a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Higher scores on the scale indicate higher levels of state self-esteem. The performance subscale consists of 7 items, the social subscale also consists of 7 items, and the appearance subscale contains 6 items. The internal consistency coefficient of the original scale was reported as .92, with subscale internal consistency coefficients of .76 for performance self-esteem, .81 for social self-esteem, and .77 for appearance self-esteem.

In the literature, the social and performance dimensions of the scale have been particularly utilized in studies examining variables such as social exclusion, stereotypes, and academic success. These studies show that the scale is sensitive to measuring changes in self-esteem following interventions (e.g., Arslan, 2018; Ayyıldız, 2018; Balkıs & Duru,

2010; Başbay, 2018; Burnette et al., 2013; Hoyt & Blascovich, 2007a, 2010b; Hoyt & Simon, 2011; Latu & Schmid, 2016). The validity and reliability of these dimensions have been consistently high in such studies (e.g., Hoyt & Blascovich, 2007, 2010). In this study, the social dimension, emphasizing how participants are perceived by others, was highlighted. Item scoring was conducted by reversing the scores of certain items. In the Turkish literature, reliability coefficients for this scale range between .75 and .87 (e.g., Ayyıldız, 2018; Balkıs & Duru, 2010; Başbay, 2018).

The findings from the reliability analysis of the scale are as follows (Cronbach alpha reliabilities): the internal consistency coefficient for the first factor (performance state self-esteem) was .74, for the second factor (social state self-esteem) it was .79, and for the third factor (appearance state self-esteem) it was .73, and for the entire scale, the internal consistency coefficient was .87, with all values being significant at the .001 level. These results indicated that the scale was highly reliable for the sample group. As demonstrated, the findings from both the original version of the scale and those obtained in other studies align with the results of this study. We observed that item 6 could potentially fit under two factors; however, after consultations with field experts and in consideration of the original scale data, it was agreed to retain the original structure, placing item 6 under the appearance state self-esteem factor (Appendix L).

4.1.3.3. Emotional Labor Scale

This scale was designed by Çukur and Doğan (2019) in three sections. The first section focuses on the emotions felt by individuals at work, using the statement: “Please consider the events you have experienced in the workplace and the emotions you feel about these events; indicate how frequently you feel each of the emotions listed below.” This section is labeled as “actual emotions.” The second section aims to assess whether individuals outwardly display their emotions, even when they genuinely feel them, with the prompt: “In the previous section, you indicated how often you experience different emotions at work. Now, even if you feel these emotions at work, we would like to know the extent to which you reflect these emotions or share them with others (customers, colleagues, managers). Please indicate how often you keep the following emotions to yourself.” This section is referred to as “down-regulating (suppression).”

Finally, individuals are encouraged to consider their regulation of emotions. Therefore, the following description were provided: “Above, you indicated how often you

experience various emotions and keep them to yourself at work. Now, even if you do not genuinely feel these emotions at work, we would like to know to what extent you attempt to feel or display (share) them with others (customers, colleagues, managers). Please indicate how often you try to present the following emotions at work.” This section is called "up-regulating (amplification)."

The same 14 positive and negative emotions are presented as items across these three sections. The most common emotions, such as anger, happiness, fear, pride, anxiety, sadness, interest, embarrassment, boredom, calmness, guilt, disgust, surprise, and love, were selected. To enhance clarity, each emotion is accompanied by three near-synonyms in parentheses. This measure was structured as a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from never (0) to always (4), to assess the frequency of these emotional experiences and expressions. Cronbach alpha reliabilities were found as follows; .82 for negative affect felt, .85 for positive affect felt, .92 for negative affect suppressing, .87 for positive affect suppressing, .88 for negative affect amplifying and .89 for positive affect amplifying. According to the reliability analysis conducted on the data from this study, the Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficient for the entire scale was .75 (Appendix M).

4.1.3.4. Helping Behavior Scale

In this section, helping behavior was examined as a state characteristic. To measure helping behavior as a state characteristic, a two-item measurement tool was used (Appendix N). Additionally, a single-factor helping behavior scale was developed and utilized by drawing on items from various researchers' helping behavior scales (e.g., Ayten, 2009; Demirci, 2017; Erken, 2009; Tekeş, 2015) (Appendix O).

Table 4.2. The exploratory factor analysis result of helping behavior scale

Items	Factor Loadings
1.Arkađasımmın işini yetiştiremediğini görürsem ona yardım etmek isterim.	.65
2.Yerde bulduğum eşyanın sahibini bulmak isterim.	.65
3.Soğukta kapıda kalan komşu çocuğı için elimden gelen yardımı yaparım.	.76
4.Ağlayan/Üzgün bir arkadaşımı gördüğümde yanına gidip üzüntüsünü paylaşırm.	.66
5.Markette kasada iken acelesi olan birine sıramı vermem.	.39
6.Kantinde ihtiyacı olanlar alsın diye askıda (askıda yemek/askıda içecek) uygulamasına para bırakırım.	.58
7.İhtiyacı olan insanlara elimden geldiğince yardım ederim.	.80
8.İnsanlara karşılık beklemeden yardım ederim.	.67
Eigenvalue:	3.42
Explained variance (%):	42.75
Cronbach's alpha:	.78

The exploratory factor analysis revealed that the scale, with an eigenvalue greater than 1, explained 42.8% of the total variance and had a single-factor structure. To test the reliability of the scale, the Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficient was calculated and found to be .78. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principal axis analysis and Oblimin rotation. The resulting KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) coefficient was .81, indicating that the sample size was within acceptable limits for factor analysis. Additionally, factor loadings for the scale items ranged between .39 and .80, demonstrating that the loadings were within an acceptable range. The descriptive statistics of the scales used in this section are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Reliability analysis of the scales of religious orientation, self-monitoring, and materialism

Scale	M	Sd	Cronboch's Alpha
State Self-Esteem	18.31	5.53	.84
Sub-factor 1 (Performance)	30.88	6.83	.74
Sub-factor 2 (Social)	27.83	7.53	.79
Sub-factor 3 (Appearance)	24.38	6.18	.73
Emotional Labor	46.17	8.5	.88
Helping Behavior	28.72	9.11	.81

*p < .05

4.1.4. Results

To achieve the research objectives, chi-square test, z ratio test, and independent samples t-test analyses were conducted to identify differences between groups engaging in moral hypocrisy and those who did not. Data analyses were performed using the SPSS software package (version 25), and the significance level was set at .05.

The study was conducted with 196 university student participants residing at AYBU, AU, and dormitories affiliated with the MOYS in Ankara. The participants comprised 114 females (58.2%) and 82 males (41.8%). The age of the participants ranged from 17 to 24, with a mean age of 20.59 (SD = 1.83). Initially, the levels of shame between participants displaying moral hypocrisy and those not displaying it were compared, with the findings presented in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Comparison of shame levels based on participants' display of moral hypocrisy

		Preference statuses		χ^2
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Shame	Low	54 (45.8%)	64 (54.2%)	21.97*
	Medium	25 (92.6%)	2 (7.4%)	
	High	3 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	

*p < .05

Table 4.4. revealed a statistically significant difference in participants' shame levels based on their display of moral hypocrisy ($\chi^2 = 21.97$; $p < .05$). Specifically, as participants' shame levels increase, the likelihood of displaying moral hypocrisy also rises. In other words, participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy experienced higher levels of shame compared to others (Hypothesis 3).

The guilt levels of participants displaying moral hypocrisy were then compared with those not displaying it, with the findings presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5. Comparison of guilt levels based on participants' display of moral hypocrisy

		Preference statuses		χ^2
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Guilt	Low	72 (53.3%)	63 (46.7%)	2.67
	Medium	32 (76.9%)	28 (23.1%)	

*p < .05

Table 4.5 showed no statistically significant difference in guilt levels between participants displaying moral hypocrisy and those who do not ($\chi^2 = 2.67$; $p > .05$). Thus, it was determined that the guilt levels of participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy were similar to those who did not. Although not statistically significant, there appeared to be a trend suggesting that as guilt levels increased, the likelihood of displaying moral hypocrisy also increased (Hypothesis 3). The pride levels of participants displaying moral hypocrisy were then compared with those not displaying it, with the findings presented in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6. Comparison of participants' levels of pride based on their display of moral hypocrisy

		Preference Status		χ^2
		To Self by Lottery	To Others by Lottery	
Pride	Low	41 (65.1%)	22 (34.9%)	4.69
	Medium	20 (52.6%)	18 (47.4%)	
	High	21 (44.7%)	26 (55.3%)	

*p < .05

Table 4.6 depicted that participants' levels of pride did not differ significantly based on whether they exhibit moral hypocrisy ($\chi^2 = 4.69$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, the pride levels of participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy were found to be similar to those who did not. Proportionally, as pride levels increase, the likelihood of participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy decreases, whereas this rate increased among those who did not exhibit moral

hypocrisy (Hypothesis 3). However, this difference was not statistically significant. A comparison was also made between participants' tendencies to help others, based on whether or not they exhibited moral hypocrisy, with the findings presented in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7. Independent samples t-test results comparing participants' state helping behavior based on preference statues (exhibiting or not exhibiting moral hypocrisy)

Variable	Preference statues	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Helping Tendency	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	36.37	5.30	146	0.16	.876	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	36.52	6.35				

*p < .05

The findings in Table 4.7 showed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy displayed lower tendencies to help others compared to those who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{(146)} = 0.73$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, we determined that participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy had similar helping tendencies to those who did not (Hypothesis 4).

To determine whether the state-level helping behavior (donation to others) differed between participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy and those who did not, a comparison was conducted between the two groups, and the findings are presented in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing participants' state helping behavior (donation to other) levels to others based on preference statues

Variable	Preference statues	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Donation to Other	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	18.16	7.10	146	5.71	.001	0.18
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	14.47	5.20				

*p < .05

Table 4.8 showed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy had a higher level of donation to other compared to those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy, and this difference was statistically significant ($t_{(146)} = 5.71$; $p < .05$). The effect size for this significant difference was calculated, indicating that moral hypocrisy had a large impact on donation behavior toward others. In other words, participants displaying moral hypocrisy were found to donate practically higher amounts to others than those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy (Hypothesis 3). A comparison was also conducted to assess participants' levels of donation to the university based on whether or not they exhibited moral hypocrisy, and the findings are presented in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing participants' donation levels to the university based on preference statues

Variable	Preference statues		N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Donation to university	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		82	15.24	6.88	146	0.25	.802	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy		66	15.55	7.67				

* $p < .05$

In Table 4.9, we observed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy had lower levels of donation to the university compared to those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{(146)} = 0.25$; $p > .05$). Accordingly, we determined that participants who exhibit moral hypocrisy were similar to those who did not in terms of their donation levels to the university (Hypothesis 3). A comparison of the micro-macro justice perception levels between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and those who did not was conducted, and the findings are presented in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10. Comparison of participants' micro-macro justice perception levels based on whether they exhibit moral hypocrisy

		Preference statues				χ^2
		To Lottery	Self by	To Lottery	Others by	
Micro-Macro Justice Level	1. Ahmet0Hüseyin6000	5 (100.0%)		0 (0.0%)		42.47 ^{1*}
	2. Ahmet1000Hüseyin5000	26 (92.9%)		2 (7.1%)		
	3. Ahmet2000Hüseyin4000	21 (52.5%)		19 (47.5%)		
	4. Ahmet3000Hüseyin3000	20 (50.0%)		20 (50.0%)		
	5. Ahmet4000Hüseyin2000	9 (50.0%)		9 (50.0%)		
	6. Ahmet5000Hüseyin1000	0 (0.0%)		13 (100.0%)		
	7. Ahmet6000Hüseyin0	1 (25.0%)		3 (75.0%)		

*p < .05; ¹ = Fisher's Exact test

Table 4.10 revealed that participants' micro-macro justice perception levels differed significantly based on their engagement in moral hypocrisy ($\chi^2 = 42.47$; $p < .05$). To identify the source of this difference, a z-ratio test was conducted. According to the z-ratio test results, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy displayed statistically significant behavioral patterns compared to those who did not in the first and second scenarios. Specifically, those displaying moral hypocrisy were more inclined to allocate the larger portion of the reward to Hüseyin rather than Ahmet, a difference found to be statistically significant. In the third, fourth, and fifth scenarios, participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy showed behavioral patterns statistically similar to those who did not. In the sixth scenario, however, a statistically significant difference was found, with participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy displaying distinct behavioral patterns from those who exhibited moral hypocrisy. Specifically, participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy tended to allocate a larger reward to Ahmet. In the seventh scenario, participants not exhibiting moral hypocrisy also tended to allocate more to Ahmet compared to participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, though this difference was not statistically significant. Based on scenarios 6 and 7, it can be inferred that participants who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy tended to have a higher level of macro justice perception (Hypothesis 5). A comparison of participants' levels of state self-esteem

and its subdimensions based on their engagement in moral hypocrisy is provided in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11. Results of the independent samples t-test comparing participants' state-level self-esteem and its subdimensions based on preference statues (exhibiting vs. not exhibiting moral hypocrisy)

Variable	Preference statues	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	Df	t	p	η^2
Performance	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	31.63	6.06	146	1.71	.089	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	29.74	7.38				
Appearance	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	25.16	6.24	146	1.07	.289	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	24.06	6.17				
Social	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	25.30	6.39	146	3.14	.002	0.06
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	29.05	8.12				
State self-esteem (Total)	Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	82	82.10	15.64	146	0.27	.785	--
	Not Exhibiting Moral Hypocrisy	66	82.85	17.68				

*p < .05

Table 4.11 depicted that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy had lower levels of state self-esteem compared to those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy; however, this difference was not statistically significant ($t_{(146)} = 0.27$; $p > .05$). Based on this result, we determined that state self-esteem levels were similar between those exhibiting and not exhibiting moral hypocrisy (Research Question 6).

When examining the subdimensions of the state self-esteem scale, we found that the *performance* and *appearance* subdimensions were statistically similar for both groups. However, in terms of the *social* subdimension, those exhibiting moral hypocrisy showed significantly lower levels compared to those not exhibiting it ($t_{(146)} = 3.14$; $p < .05$). The effect

size for this significant difference was calculated and found to be moderate, indicating that, in practical terms, the social subdimension level of those exhibiting moral hypocrisy had a moderate effect when compared to those not exhibiting it (Research Question 6).

4.1.5. Discussion

In the third and final phase of this study, the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive outcomes of moral hypocrisy were thoroughly examined. This section specifically focused on self-conscious emotions, which differs from basic emotion in that they are directed inwardly toward oneself rather than toward others (Kitayama et al., 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Self-conscious emotions serves as a regulatory mechanism in challenging situations, such as when individuals engage in hypocritical behavior, by helping them navigate these circumstances and assess their own actions (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Consequently, the present study primarily investigated the emotions that individuals directed toward themselves. In what follows, previous findings will be briefly discussed to provide a conceptual framework.

Landmann and Hess (2017) investigated whether moral transgression elicits specific emotions. To test this hypothesis, a sample of 195 participants was asked to rate their emotional responses to situations involving moral violations. A five-by-seven repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the emotion ratings. The results revealed that the emotional responses exhibited by participants varied in accordance with the specific type of moral transgression involved. Moreover, compassion and disgust demonstrated a robust correlation with care and purity, while exhibiting a relatively less significant association with fairness and authority. Also, anger and rage were found to be caused by transgressions of care, fairness, and authority, though not to the same extent as those of loyalty and purity. Resentment was found to be caused by transgressions of care and fairness, though not to the same extent as transgressions of authority, loyalty, and purity. These results demonstrated the existence of a complex relationship between moral emotions and moral violations, characterised by varying degrees of strength.

Some postulate that emotions play a crucial role in decision-making processes (Schwartz, 2000). In line with this perspective, unethical behaviours can evoke both positive and negative emotions, which stem from the decision-making context (Ruedy, 2010). Immoral choices are often linked to adverse emotional reactions, such as guilt, shame, and anxiety, which may serve as a deterrent against future unethical behaviors (Bandura, 2001).

In this context, emotions such as guilt and regret can lead to constructive or positive outcomes, including efforts to avoid repeating immoral acts. For instance, guilt might lead to compensatory actions and reduce the likelihood of engaging in similar immoral behaviors in the future (Baumeister et al., 1995).

People tend to evaluate themselves after engaging in unethical behavior. For instance, liars are often aware of their moral obligation to tell the truth, and as a result, they seek justifications for their dishonesty. They may recognize that they have violated their own standards of moral integrity, as well as the risks and potential costs associated with such violation. Such transgressions may trigger negative emotions, including shame, guilt, and anxiety (Lewicki, 1983; Ruedy, 2010). In this scope, Bandura (1999) examined the concept of moral disengagement, which he defined as "the avoidance of actions or means that could potentially violate moral norms" (p. 17). He argued that individuals tend to experience self-directed negative emotions, such as self-condemnation, comprising guilt and shame unless they engage in moral disengagement. The avoidance of negative emotions following unethical decisions can be shaped by emotional responses that arise following the commission of unethical behavior. For example, the experience of guilt following an unethical act may motivate individuals to restore damaged relationships or reduce the likelihood of repeating such behavior (Baumeister et al., 1995).

The aversive emotions, including guilt, shame, and embarrassment (i.e., self-conscious emotions), that arise as a result of immoral behaviors such as moral hypocrisy can be understood as outcomes of this psychological process. Nonetheless, these emotions can also be considered as mechanisms that function to inhibit immoral conduct. In other words, the aversive emotions experienced following an immoral act may serve as a deterrent against future immoral behaviors (Ruedy, 2010). Therefore, the present study explored whether individuals who engaged in moral hypocrisy subsequently act in a more morally acceptable manner to avoid or alleviate aversive self-conscious emotions.

Following a moral transgression, individuals who experience intense feelings of shame may resort to various coping mechanisms, including compensation, humor, or denial, in order to mitigate the emotional discomfort. This suggests that individuals may engage in compensatory behaviors in response to negative self-conscious emotions such as shame, particularly in the context of moral hypocrisy (Harper, 2011; Lewis, 1995). In this with this perspective, individuals tend to experience feelings of shame after engaging in moral hypocrisy behavior. This is because a person who feels shame perceives that there is

something fundamentally flawed with their true self (Babcock & Sabini, 1990; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney et al., 1996).

In the present study, given that the emotions experienced by individuals as a result of engaging in moral hypocrisy were examined, self-conscious emotions were selected as the primary focus. The present findings revealed that among the self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and pride, only shame was found to be significantly related to moral hypocrisy. In other words, when examining the emotional outcomes of moral hypocrisy, participants who engaged in moral hypocrisy experienced significantly higher levels of shame compared to others. This finding was consistent with the literature in that the emotions most likely to arise after moral hypocrisy included guilt, shame, and pride (Batson et al., 1999a, 2002b, 2011c). However, the conceptual distinction between shame and embarrassment needs to be clarified. In the literature, these terms are often used interchangeably, although there are significant subtle differences between them. These emotions relate to the individual's internal response to the violation of a social rule or norm (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The experience of shame and embarrassment can be triggered when an individual violates cultural norms in front of others or when they perceive a high risk of being held accountable for such a violation. These emotions can also be triggered even if the violation occurs in private and even when the individual believes the act was secret as shown in research on moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 1999; Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Wolf et al., 2010). In the present study, shame was identified as the primary emotion experienced by individuals who engaged in moral hypocrisy, which was highly consistent with the existing literature.

In another study, Yousaf and Gobet (2014) investigated the emotional and attitudinal consequences of religious hypocrisy. The researchers argued that individuals who were aware of their religious hypocrisy were significantly more prone to experiencing guilt and shame. To test this hypothesis, three experimental studies were conducted. The results of experiment 1 revealed that the experience of hypocrisy was associated with the emergence of guilt and shame, while no significant evidence was found for emotions such as upset, distress, or irritability. In the present study, however, significant results were found only for shame among the three self-conscious emotions. Shame particularly arises when negative behavior threatens one's social identity (Tangney et al., 2007). Therefore, in the present study, when moral hypocrisy is considered a threat to social identity, shame is expected to be more significant.

One may argue that guilt should be more prominent following moral hypocrisy. Batson et al. (1997) found partially overlapping results with the current study. In Batson's study, participants who assigned positive, rewarding tasks to others through a lottery reported higher levels of pride and lower levels of guilt compared to those who kept the tasks for themselves. However, Batson et al. (1997) did not examine the emotion of shame in his study. In the present study, guilt, shame, and pride were considered together. When compared with Batson's study, the sample size in the present research was larger. The larger sample size and the inclusion of a broader range of emotions might have contributed to shame yielding more statistically significant results than guilt.

It is important that guilt and shame are not fundamentally distinct emotions. Scherer and Ekman (2014) posits that the experiences of guilt and shame are essentially similar, differing primarily in their respective antecedents and consequences. While both emotions are associated with feelings of unease, distress, moral violations, guilt is typically linked to moral violations, whereas shame is more commonly associated with feelings of inferiority, and tends to focus more on the individual's self-perception and their sense of worth. In other words, shame may reinforce negative evaluations of an individual's overall sense of self worth, and these negative evaluations can be attributed to factors outside the individual's control (Weiner, 2006). The reason significant results were obtained for shame rather than guilt in this study might stem from the inherent similarity between these two emotions. Given this close relationship, participants might have experienced and reported shame more prominently, as it encapsulated a broader reflection on their overall self-concept, particularly in the context of moral hypocrisy (Weiner, 2006). On the other hand, the emergence of shame rather than guilt following moral hypocrisy in the present study might be explained by participants employing the key factor of the rationalization mechanism. For instance, these participants might have anticipated compensating for their behavior by using the rationalization mechanism, thereby experiencing less guilt, but higher levels of shame.

The predominance of shame over guilt in the Turkish sample could also be explained by cultural factors. As in many collectivist cultures, in Türkiye, which has a relatively collectivist culture, social reputation and conformity to one's group or community are highly valued. Cultural emphasis on honor, dignity, and social perception, especially when there is a risk of moral transgressions, may heighten feelings of shame. Actions that evoke shame can negatively impact not only the individual but also the social group they belong to (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2017). Moreover, in collectivist cultures, individuals' heightened sensitivity to social judgment may lead them to engage in moral hypocrisy as a way to protect their

positive self-image while avoiding social condemnation. For instance, Wong and Tsai (2007) found that shame was more prevalent in collectivist cultures. This was likely due to the greater emphasis on social norms and concerns about how one was perceived by others in these societies. Moral hypocrisy may arise when individuals attempt to present themselves as adhering to societal and moral expectations while privately violating those values, thereby, avoiding internal conflict and external judgment. In other words, in collectivist cultures, individuals may seek refuge in the secrecy of moral hypocrisy as a way to avoid experiencing shame.

Kağıtçıbaşı (2017) suggested that shame served as a socially regulatory function, which became more pronounced when an individual engages in immoral behavior. The feeling of shame, which emerges when one acts in violation of societal norms, leads to internal conflict. Guilt is an emotion that focuses on individual and internal evaluations, while shame is concerned with social consequences, thus sociocultural pressures in Turkish society may cause shame to be a more dominant emotion. This is because the fear of negative judgment by others can be more distressing than the discomfort stemming from one's own internal evaluations (Wong & Tsai, 2007).

Furthermore, Fessler (2004) found that the fear of social exclusion triggered a more intense sense of shame in collectivist cultures. This contrasted with findings from individualist cultures, where guilt tended to be more prominent due to a stronger emphasis on personal responsibility and internal moral standards. Therefore, in collectivist cultures, the significance placed on social perception and the reputation of the group to which one belongs might cause immoral behavior to have a more detrimental effect on the group, resulting in a heightened sense of shame.

Pride has been another self-conscious emotion that has been extensively studied. It arises when individuals achieve personal goals and fosters a sense of self-worth. These goals also align with societal standards and norms that are widely accepted (Muris & Meesters, 2014). Pride can be considered the antithesis of shame. From this perspective, individuals who do not exhibit moral hypocrisy may experience pride following an honest reflection of their intentions. Additionally, people may perceive that their actions align with their own ideal self. As a result, the degree of altruistic behavior exhibited by such individuals may be relatively limited, as the intrinsic motivation to help others is lessened (Babcock & Sabini, 1990; Lewis, 1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).

The present findings suggested that although the level of pride among those who exhibited moral hypocrisy was proportionally lower than those who do not, there was no

statistically significant difference between individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy and those who did not. This similarity contradicted findings in the existing literature. For instance, Batson et al. (1997) found that participants who did not engage in moral hypocrisy experienced significantly higher levels of pride compared to those who did. The absence of a significant difference in this study might be due to both groups justifying their behaviors based on self-created standards. Those engaging in moral hypocrisy might have believed that they were acting in accordance with moral values through mechanisms such as rationalization or self-deception. Thus, they might have experienced similar levels of pride as those who acted in line with their moral values and did not engage in moral hypocrisy (Batson et al., 1997). In other words, pride might be more related to personal perceptions of morality rather than objective moral consistency.

Participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy perhaps did not perceive their behavior as inconsistent because they rationalized their actions to maintain a positive self-image. Furthermore, these individuals might have utilized the mechanism of moral self-licensing, justifying their immoral actions by referencing previous moral behavior. The phenomenon of past moral actions serving as a perceived "moral buffer" for later unethical behavior was demonstrated in studies by Monin and Miller (2001) and others. Similarly, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1954) suggested that individuals might change their perception of events to alleviate the discomfort of acting contrary to their values, leading to similar levels of pride between participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy and those not exhibiting moral hypocrisy. Consequently, they experienced feelings of pride similar to those who did not engage in moral hypocrisy (Steele, 1988). In other words, despite their contradictory behavior, individuals might maintain a positive self-image in line with the concept of self-affirmation.

In the analysis on whether participants generally perceived themselves as charitable, the results revealed that both groups of participants (those who engaged in moral hypocrisy and those who did not) did not significantly differ. Similarly, in the analysis comparing the two groups in terms of their willingness to donate to the university, no significant differences were found. However, in addressing one of the key research questions—whether situational helping behavior varied between the two groups—the findings revealed that participants who engaged in moral hypocrisy were more inclined to donate to another person (their supposed opponent, who, in fact, did not exist) compared to those who did not engage in moral hypocrisy. These findings were consistent with the previous literature. Specifically, the emotional state (mood) of the helper was a key factor influencing helping behavior, as

internal moods played a significant role in determining prosocial actions (Xiao et al., 2021). In the present study, participants' moods were manipulated to induce negative emotional states (i.e., they were expected to experience guilt or shame), and their subsequent behaviors were assessed.

When individuals experience negative emotional states such as sadness or guilt, they may engage in helping behaviors to alleviate these feelings. This compensatory mechanism operates on the principle that performing positive actions can counterbalance prior negative behaviors or emotions. Altruistic actions, such as donating, can help alleviate emotional discomfort, including feelings of guilt and shame (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981). When individuals experience negative emotions like sadness, grief, or unhappiness, they may engage in helping behaviors with the aim of mitigating or reversing these aversive feelings. Thereby, individuals may attempt to offset feelings of guilt by engaging in prosocial behaviors, such as donating (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981; Wegener & Petty, 1994). Consequently, when individuals engage in moral hypocrisy behavior, the negative emotional state that follows—characterized by discomfort or irritation—may prompt them to exhibit helping behavior.

Research on mood and moral behavior consistently shows significant relationships between situational emotions, such as guilt and shame, and perceptions of injustice or immoral actions (Mikula et al., 1998; Scherer, 1997). According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, individuals rely on their emotional states as a source of information when making judgments and decisions regarding events and situations (Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This hypothesis posits that emotions guide both evaluations and moral decision-making processes, including instances of moral hypocrisy. Similarly as emotions influence judgments in everyday moral decisions, they may also shape individuals' behavior when engaging in moral hypocrisy. In such cases, individuals may justify unethical behaviours by rationalizing their emotions or using emotional states (e.g., guilt or shame) to either defend their behavior or motivate corrective, prosocial actions. Thereby, emotions play a critical role in navigating the complexities of moral hypocrisy.

Both negative and positive moods have been found to serve as influential cues in the process of decision making (Forgas et al., 2005). In many studies, participants are typically not confronted with high-cost situations that could threaten their moral integrity or lead to social exclusion. Consequently, individuals tend to make decisions that align with their changing emotional states (Clore et al., 1994). Based on these findings, it is evident that

temporary (i.e., situational) mood significantly influences moral judgments and decision-making processes. This finding is also highly consistent with the results of our study.

Additionally, the previous findings supported the significant relationship between negative emotional states and helping behavior. For example, Olthof (2012) asked the participants to imagine themselves bullying a friend with an objective of examining the relationship between guilt, shame, and prosocial and antisocial behaviors. The results indicated that guilt was positively related to prosocial behavior, whereas shame was negatively related to antisocial behavior. In other words, feelings of guilt increased helping behavior, while feelings of shame reduced antisocial behaviors. This finding aligned with the results of our study. Specifically, in collectivist cultures, shame can sometimes replace guilt. In the present study, the higher tendency of participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy to help others might be attributed to feelings of guilt or shame. Furthermore, Aronson et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between helping behavior and culture and findings revealed that in collectivist cultures people tended to be more inclined to help others. Additionally, people in collectivist cultures are more likely to help individuals outside of their own group. This finding also supported the results of the present study in that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy donated more to a person they did not know.

As noted earlier, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy might be more inclined to help others due to feelings of guilt or shame. One reason for this behavior could be their greater ability to access emotions and thoughts that were consistent with their internal emotional state. In other words, these individuals (i.e., participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy) can more readily access material composed of emotions, thoughts, and attitudes that align with their immediate mood (Clark, 1986; Scheier & Carver, 1977). The emotional or cognitive material accessed during mood shifts may lead these individuals to engage in helping behavior.

For individuals experiencing negative emotions, helping others can serve as a rewarding tool to restore a positive mood (Niesta, 2010; Salovey et al., 1991). Similarly, Cialdini et al. (1973) found that adults were more likely to help another individual when they were in a negative emotional state (e.g., shame and guilt), thereby enhancing positive affect and facilitating a return to a positive mood.

As noted earlier, individual exhibiting moral hypocrisy might experience guilt or shame depending on their cultural background and might seek opportunities to compensate for their negative actions. Therefore, self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) played a significant role in moral decision-making (Batson, 2002; Franzoi, 2006). As a result of this

decision-making process, individuals might demonstrate increased prosocial behavior as a way to alleviate these emotions. In such cases, people might use a balance/compensation mechanism to cope with their emotional state (Baumeister et al., 1994; Cialdini et al., 1981; Wegener & Petty, 1994). In other words, negative emotional states might function as triggers for helping behavior, driven by the need for compensation or balance, and individuals might make decisions in line with their current emotional state.

Batson et al. (1997) showed that when engaging in helping behavior, individuals tended to act in their self-interest, but often attempted to justify this through moral reasoning. Similar results were found in the work of Gino and Bazerman (2009). According to these findings, individuals might engage in helping behaviors, (e.g., donating) to compensate for previous immoral actions. Such behaviors can be viewed as attempts to repay a moral debt or alleviate one's conscience. These behaviours can also be interpreted as efforts to preserve moral integrity or as attempts to strengthen social status or personal image (Grace & Griffin, 2009). At times, individuals may justify immoral or negative behaviors by referencing their past positive or moral actions. For instance, a person may feel entitled to engage in future immoral behaviors after having completed a praiseworthy action such as helping or donating (Merritt et al., 2010). The findings of the present study were consistent with these observations, showing that the increase in helping behavior following moral hypocrisy was aligned with the cyclical relationship between moral hypocrisy and helping behavior.

The findings of the present study can be also interpreted in the context of self-evaluation. That is individuals may experience self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt or shame after encountering a negative situation that they are responsible for. Conversely, they may experience pride or happiness after encountering a positive situation within their control. Also, individuals self-evaluation cognitions can be either positive or negative, depending on the alignment between the individual's identity and self-image. When internal norms conflict with external norms, negative emotions such as guilt and shame may arise, creating tension, owing to the fact that this misalignment is inconsistent with the individual's ego ideal state. On the other hand, when people act in a way that aligns their internal norms with external ones, they may experience pride, as this harmony is consistent with their ideal ego state (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney & Tracy, 2012; Tracy & Robbins, 2006; Wolf et al., 2010). For example, as seen in the present study and several others, the prevalence of moral hypocrisy is notably significant, with individuals attributing the positive outcomes they achieve to what they perceive as a fair process (e.g., a random draw). These individuals are later found to engage in prosocial behaviors like donating to a charity. This process

highlights a conflict that emerges when internal norms do not align with societal expectations. Consequently, these individuals engage in prosocial acts such as donations, to compensate for the negative situation they have experienced, aiming to reconcile internal and external norms and restore psychological balance during the self-evaluation process.

Self-conscious emotions typically involve feelings about oneself as a result of social comparison, a cognitive process occurring within a social context (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Similarly, self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride take place in a social and relational context (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). To achieve this, individuals tend to use certain internal moral standards, which they then apply to the situation at hand. This process involves considering their social positions based on these internal standards. As a result of these cognitive evaluations, feelings of guilt, shame or pride may be experienced. Emotions that arise from a particular behavior may influence how the individual will behave and think in the future (Campos et al., 1994). That is individuals who feel guilt or shame after engaging in moral hypocrisy may subsequently exhibit more prosocial behaviors (e.g., helping others).

One of the key hypotheses in the present study was that individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy would demonstrate a stronger tendency toward micro justice. The current findings supported this hypothesis. Specifically, while macro justice emphasizes fairness at the societal level by advocating for equal distribution of resources without regard to individual characteristics (e.g., ensuring minimum outcomes for everyone), its primary focus is on the overall fairness of resource allocation in society. The main goal of macro justice is to enhance the collective welfare of society (Brickman et al., 1981; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). In contrast, micro justice is based on individual merit and effort, rewarding individuals based on their performance and contributions. Also, while macro justice promotes equality in rewards, micro justice emphasizes fairness at the individual level, in which rewards are proportional to one's contributions (Anderson et al., 2015). That is the micro justice orientation focuses on distributing rewards or resources based on an individual's contributions, effort, and abilities. According to this view, a just society ensures that individuals are compensated in proportion to their service or input into the system. Fairness, in this sense, means aligning rewards with actual individual contributions. This perspective assesses individuals based on their performance and effort, taking into account personal characteristics, and ensuring that the distribution system is merit-based (Anderson et al., 2015; Brickman et al., 1981; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011).

The concepts of micro and macro justice have been central to research examining how resources or assets should be distributed in a society. For instance, Murphy-Berman et al. (2002) explored how participants addressed dilemmas involving judgments of macro and micro justice. They investigated whether sensitivity to macro justice principles changed when resources were allocated at a group versus an individual level. This effect was only observed when no information was provided about the recipient's in-group or out-group status in relation to the monetary allocation. The presence of additional information about in-group/out-group relationships appeared to reduce the salience of the framing manipulation. Consequently, the framing effect was not strongly supported. The allocation task was further influenced by contextual features, which was believed to weaken the framing effect.

Based on the aforementioned findings, when the allocator was aware of whether other group members belong to an in-group or an out-group, there was a stronger tendency towards micro justice rather than macro justice. In our study, participants who engaged in moral hypocrisy were informed that the other person involved was an unfamiliar out-group member. In this context, individuals displaying moral hypocrisy exhibited a stronger preference for micro justice. Thus, these findings suggested that those who engage in moral hypocrisy tended to prioritize individual merit-based fairness over a broader, societal-level approach to justice.

In another study, Markus and Kitayama (1991) found that individuals with a strong independent self-construal tended to prefer micro justice principles over macro justice principles. These individuals placed greater emphasis on personal effort, achievement, performance, and merit. For them, personal preferences took priority over societal goals. As a result, they did not support macro justice principles, which disregarded individual differences in the distribution of resources (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). Another study also revealed that such individuals distinguished themselves from others based on their talents and characteristics, prioritizing personal goals over group objectives. In their moral decision-making processes, personal preferences, rights, and desires appeared to take precedence (Miller, 1994). When faced with moral dilemmas, individuals often prioritize their own interests over those of others. Despite acting in self-interest, they remain concerned with how they are perceived and evaluated by their social group. This concern is largely rooted in their relationships within the group, as violating group norms can trigger negative emotions. To avoid these emotions, people tend to adhere to norms of consistency, impartiality, and morality (Leventhal, 1980; Tyler & Lind, 1992). That is when given the

opportunity, individuals may invoke micro justice principles to justify prioritizing their own interests.

Additionally, there was evidence suggesting a connection between independent self-construal and moral hypocrisy. Individuals with a strong independent self-construal tended to prioritize personal goals, autonomy, and self-direction. This emphasis on individualism might lead them to prioritize personal benefits over collective norms, thereby increasing the likelihood of moral hypocrisy. Individuals with an independent self-construal might also show greater tolerance for discrepancies between their moral beliefs and self-serving actions in certain contexts (Monin & Jordan, 2009). Monin and Jordan's (2009) study highlighted that independent self-construal was associated with a higher likelihood of justifying actions that served personal interests while maintaining a moral facade, thus increasing the potential for moral hypocrisy. Furthermore, when individuals with a strong independent self-construal engaged in moral decision-making, they tended to focus more on individual outcomes and less on social expectations, which might also contribute to moral inconsistency (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011).

The findings from present study were consistent with the above results. Specifically, we found that individuals who engaged in moral hypocrisy tended to exhibit higher tendencies towards micro justice, as similar to those with high levels of independent self-construal, they prioritized personal benefits over collective interests and exhibited higher levels of autonomy. Moreover, our findings aligned with those of Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011), who observed that micro justice principles were associated with stronger meritocratic beliefs. Interestingly, they found that although meritocratic beliefs were related to performance and the ability to act independently, such individuals also tended to exhibit more selfish and self-serving behaviors. Batson (2002) and Oetzel (1998) also obtained similar results, showing that micro justice emphasized individual effort, performance, and personal needs over societal needs. Therefore, based on these findings, individuals who exhibited moral hypocrisy—prioritizing their own interests over the needs of others—were likely to favor micro justice principles.

Research on the relationship between independent self-construal and moral hypocrisy suggested that individuals who prioritized autonomy and personal achievement might display different levels of moral hypocrisy compared to those with a more interdependent self-construal. Furthermore, individuals with an independent self-construal, who perceived themselves as autonomous and self-reliant, have been found to be more likely to justify their own moral transgressions when making decisions that benefited themselves,

rather than evaluating the actions of others (Miller et al., 2009; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). Additionally, individuals with an independent self-construal engaged in more abstract reasoning, which might facilitate moral disengagement or self-serving biases, thus increasing the likelihood of moral hypocrisy (Eyal et al., 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010). This implied that independent individuals might apply less stringent moral standards to their own actions, allowing for greater cognitive flexibility in justifying behaviors that might be perceived as a person engaging in moral hypocrisy by others. Moreover, individuals with an independent self-construal were more likely to prioritize personal outcomes over collective ones; consequently, their moral hypocrisy might increase in situations where personal interests conflict with ethical principles (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Brickman et al., 1981). In such cases, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy might rationalize their actions to maintain a positive self-image, even while violating the moral standards they advocated for others (Effron & Monin, 2010).

The relationship between microjustice and moral hypocrisy could be further explored through studies that examined fairness and inconsistent moral behavior. Batson et al. (1999) demonstrated that individuals rationalized self-serving actions, even when they professed to value fairness. In contexts where microjustice was salient (such as situations involving merit-based rewards) people might still exhibit moral hypocrisy behavior by prioritizing their own benefit while outwardly adhering to norms of fairness. For instance, in an experimental study by Batson et al. (1997), participants were tasked with assigning positive rewards to themselves or others based on fairness principles. Many participants favored themselves and justified their actions by claiming that superficial mechanisms, such as flipping a coin, were fair. This behavior exemplified moral hypocrisy, where individuals endorsed fairness principles but acted in self-serving ways when given the opportunity.

Finally, based on the findings regarding participants' state self-esteem and its subdimensions, no significant relationship was found between those who exhibited moral hypocrisy and those who did not. However, a significant difference was detected between the two groups in terms of the "social" subdimension. In other words, while there was no differentiation in overall state self-esteem, a significant difference was observed in the social subdimension of the scale. Specifically, participants who displayed moral hypocrisy had lower levels of social state self-esteem compared to those who did not.

Social state self-esteem is related to individuals' beliefs about how others perceive them. People experience high social state self-esteem if they believe that others, particularly significant others, value and respect them. Individuals with low social state self-esteem often

experience social anxiety and heightened public self-consciousness (i.e., the awareness of the self as a social and public object). They are highly attentive to their image and are concerned about how others perceive them. Based on this information and the findings, the observed difference in state self-esteem between the two groups can be explained by the nature of moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy involves situations where individuals try to appear moral without fully internalizing or acting according to moral norms, while also encompassing a disconnect between a person's public image and their actual behavior (Batson et al., 1997). Thus, individuals may feel less confident about how they are perceived by others, knowing that their behavior do not fully align with social expectations or personal moral standards. This could lead to lower levels of social state self-esteem among those who engaged in moral hypocrisy.

Leary (1995) found that individuals who did not engage in moral hypocrisy might feel more confident in their social interactions because their moral beliefs and norms aligned with societal standards of justice and honesty. In individuals exhibiting moral hypocrisy, discomfort arising from the misalignment between their public image and personal actions could lead to lower social self-esteem, as they were more sensitive to how they were perceived and judged by others (Leary, 1995). On the other hand, Tangney et al. (2007) demonstrated that moral hypocrisy could trigger self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) as it involved violating both societal and personal moral norms. These emotions might result in reduced confidence and self-worth in social settings for individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy. This could explain the observed difference in social self-esteem between the two groups. The relevant literature also aligned with the findings of the present study. For instance, individuals engaging in moral hypocrisy might experience significant internal conflict related to their self-perception and concerns about how they were perceived by others. Inconsistent or deviant behavior might provoke anxiety due to the potential for social disapproval or rejection. This fear of social rejection or exposure could contribute to a decline in social situational self-esteem. The findings of this study aligned with theories that associated self-esteem with the need for social approval (Leary & Baumeister, 2000).

Research on self-monitoring demonstrates that individuals who are strongly focused on impression management are particularly sensitive to how their actions are perceived by others (Snyder, 1974). Similarly, individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy may also be acutely aware of the need to maintain a positive social image. However, due to insecurities in relation to their ability to successfully uphold this image, they may experience lower levels of social self-esteem. Other studies have also shown that individuals who engage in moral

hypocrisy tend to score lower on the social dimension of state self-esteem compared to those who do not exhibit hypocritical behavior. This discrepancy may arise because social state self-esteem is closely tied to public self-consciousness and social anxiety (Baumeister, 1982; Scherer, 1997). That is individuals who are preoccupied with their social image may experience discomfort or diminished self-worth when their behavior reflects moral hypocrisy.

In contrast, in the present study, we did not find significant variance between those who engage in moral hypocrisy and those who did not on the performance and appearance dimensions of state self-esteem. These dimensions reflected how individuals assessed their abilities and physical appearance. This finding could be attributed to the idea that immoral behavior was more strongly associated with concerns about social evaluation rather than self-assessments of competence or appearance (Baumeister, 1982; Scherer, 1997).

5. GENERAL DISCUSSION

There is extensive research on the causes of immoral behaviors. Some researchers attribute these behaviors to an individual's internal processes, while others emphasize environmental variables (Bandura, 1977; Batson et al., 1999; Burton & Kuncze, 1995; Rosati, 2006). However, owing to the abstract nature of morality, the measurement methods has long been a subject of inquiry. Furthermore, moral principles and norms serve as the foundation for behaviors while also potentially giving rise to immoral behaviors adds another layer of complexity to the studies of morality. Thus, it is challenging to distinguish between individuals who genuinely internalize moral principles and norms from those who do not. Among morally transgressive behaviors for which this distinction is challenging, one notable example is moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy is pervasive behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Batson et al., 1997; Gino et al., 2009; Rabi et al., 2006). This raises an important issue: how to compare individuals whose words do not align with their actions to others, making it a significant topic of study. To address this distinction, Batson et al. (1997a, 1999b, 2002c) introduced the concept of moral hypocrisy, defined as acting as though one adheres to moral principles when an opportunity arised to avoid detection, while still pursuing self-interest and evading the costs associated with moral behavior. Batson designed an experimental framework to examine moral hypocrisy through various variables. This method effectively demonstrated the presence of moral hypocrisy, in which the experimental approach involved determining how a participant would distribute questions with rewards and non-rewards by flipping a coin. The results revealed that nearly 90% of participants who conducted the coin reported that the rewarded questions fell to themselves—a figure significantly higher than the 50% probability expected by chance. The fact that this 90% result was substantially above the 50% benchmark was taken as strong evidence of moral hypocrisy. Despite its effectiveness, this method only provided evidence of the existence of moral hypocrisy behavior. It did not explore the causes and consequences of moral hypocrisy behaviour individually.

As reviewed above, the existing studies have predominantly focused on either the causes or the consequences of moral hypocrisy behavior. In fact, research addressing the consequences of moral hypocrisy has remained relatively scarce. Moreover, these studies have neither identified individuals who exhibit moral hypocrisy nor simultaneously compared them with those who do not exhibit such behavior in terms of causes and effects

(e.g., considering cognitive, emotional, and behavioral variables). Previous research has been limited to variables such as the emergence of certain emotions at the group level (without identifying participants who individually display moral hypocrisy), the perceived moral strength of a particular method, moral weakness, and moral responsibility. Since identifying moral hypocrisy doers individually is quite challenging, other researchers have often refrained from studying the causes and outcomes of this behavior in relation to individual variables (Batson et al., 1997a, 1999b, 2002c; Bian et al., 2020; Chvaja et al., 2020; Lammers et al., 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Sie, 2015; Yousaf & Gobet, 2014).

To address this gap, the current study aimed to identify moral hypocrisy doers individually while investigating both its causes and consequences. A new method, referred to as the "envelope method," was developed and shown to be at least as effective as Batson's original method. This novel approach for identifying moral hypocrisy individually would encourage researchers interested in this topic and enable the exploration of a broader range of variables. In this study, the new method was first used to examine the causes of moral hypocrisy, including moral self-licensing, materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation. Subsequently, state cognitive (i.e., micro-macro justice, state self-esteem), emotional (e.g., self-conscious emotions), and behavioral (e.g., helping behavior) variables that might arise following moral hypocrisy were examined.

In the process of developing a novel method that a new method to explore moral hypocrisy doers individually, Batson et al.'s (1997) original method (i.e., the coin method) was first tested on a Turkish sample. The findings confirmed that the coin method was effective within this sample. Next, the newly developed method was applied to the same Turkish sample. A comparison of the findings from both methods revealed that the new "envelope method" demonstrated a significantly higher rate of detecting moral hypocrisy. Furthermore, participants identified as participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy by the new method were found, similar to those in the original study, to perceive themselves as behaving as morally as the participants who did not exhibit moral hypocrisy. The key advantage of this method has lain in its functionality in individually identifying participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy.

To the best of our knowledge, there was no study that have explored the causes of this behavior by identifying moral hypocrisy doers individually. Therefore, it was initially hypothesized that participants in the study would have a high likelihood of engaging in morally hypocritical behavior, owing to the fact that engaging in a prior moral act was expected to lead to less moral behaviors in subsequent actions through the mechanism of

moral compensation. In other words, we hypothesized that moral self-licensing could increase moral hypocrisy behavior, as past good deeds could serve as a justification for engaging in subsequent immoral behavior. To investigate this effect, the impact of moral self-licensing on moral hypocrisy was examined using the newly designed method. When comparing groups with and without moral self-licensing manipulations, the findings revealed that the manipulation significantly increased moral hypocrisy behavior. Specifically, among females who received the manipulation, the rate of moral hypocrisy was significantly higher than those who did not receive it. While the level of moral hypocrisy also increased in the manipulated males group compared to the control group, this increase was not statistically significant. These findings supported our hypothesis. Furthermore, future studies could design additional research based on the different interests of genders, as males are more likely to engage in moral self-licensing in high-risk situations, whereas females tend to do so in caregiving and nurturing contexts (Khan & Dhar, 2006). Replicating gender-based comparisons in subsequent studies could further elucidate this relationship.

Regarding socio-economic status comparisons, participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy rates generally decreased as income levels increased, although this difference was not statistically significant. The literature also indicated mixed findings on this topic (Dubois et al., 2015; Galperin et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2012). This variability might be related to cultural characteristics as well as the specific attributes of the studied sample.

Overall, there were no significant differences between the manipulated group and the non-manipulated group in relation to the variables of materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation. In other words, the moral self-licensing manipulation did not create significant differences between the groups. This outcome might be attributed to the manipulation method itself. For instance, the instructions used in the manipulation could be more explicitly tailored to trigger individual characteristics depending on the situation.

Although no significant differences were observed as a result of the manipulation, statistical analyses revealed some differences among the groups on these variables independently of the manipulation. For example, according to the literature, post-materialists value aesthetic and intellectual pursuits more than materialists, who prioritize economic security (Bean & Papadakis, 1994). Therefore, given the expected significant relationships between materialism and moral hypocrisy, we hypothesized that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy would display higher levels of materialism compared to the participants who did not engage in such behavior. Findings indicated that, on average, the level of

materialism was higher among participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, although this difference was not statistically significant.

The inconsistency between these results and the literature might also be explained by the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants. The participants in the current study were university students who were originally from rural areas of Türkiye while sharing similar relatively low socio-economic backgrounds. The challenging economic conditions in the country might have contributed to participants exhibiting similar levels of materialism due to a shared sense of financial insecurity. Additionally, most of the previous studies focused on American and European samples, which might account for the differences in findings due to varying socio-demographic structures across study populations. In Türkiye, individuals might place similar emphasis on material possessions regardless of their engagement in moral hypocrisy, potentially influenced by socio-cultural norms emphasizing the value of material wealth and status. As a result, examining the relationships between these concepts using other measurement tools while considering culture-specific nuances could yield different results (Blanken et al., 2014; Richins & Dawson, 1992).

Another variable examined in the present study was self-monitoring. Individuals with high levels of self-monitoring tend to exhibit a greater propensity for deceitful behaviors (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). Accordingly, We hypothesized that participants engaging in moral hypocrisy would exhibit higher levels of self-monitoring. The findings supported this assumption, as the self-monitoring levels of participants displaying moral hypocrisy were found to be higher. This result aligned with previous research findings (Giray & Ergin, 2006; Kumru & Thompson, 2003; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Larkin & Pines, 1994; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982). This consistency might be attributed to the inherent characteristics of both concepts, as individuals with high self-monitoring and those exhibiting moral hypocrisy displayed greater inconsistency between their attitudes and behaviors.

Participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy tend to be confident that they will not be caught and succeed in maintaining a moral appearance. This process of maintaining a moral appearance inherently involves managing others' impressions, similar to how individuals with high self-monitoring levels adapt social expectations and situations to suit themselves (Batson et al., 1997; Snyder, 1974). Findings from the present study suggested that self-monitoring was a crucial variable in the study of moral hypocrisy. Interestingly, there was a notable scarcity of research that explored the interaction effects of these two variables. Future research could fill this gap. For example, there are various classifications related to

self-monitoring behavior (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; Snyder, 1974). These classifications could be considered as sub-dimensions and explored further in-depth studies.

The religious orientation was the final variable investigated in the second study. According to Fromm (1997), individuals may claim to be religious while internally feeling and behaving in contradictory ways. When examining the literature on religious orientation, the dimensions of intrinsic versus extrinsic religious orientation come to the forefront. Individuals with a high tendency toward extrinsic religious orientation may use religion as a tool to achieve specific worldly goals. At this juncture, a question arises regarding whether there is a relationship between levels of extrinsic religious orientation and moral hypocrisy, who are primarily driven by self-interest. Such individuals are not motivated by a desire to approach or connect with a transcendent being, but rather seek to derive benefits from others. Therefore, the potential relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy was also explored in the current study.

The findings revealed no significant relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy. The existing literature also presents mixed findings on this relationship. Some studies suggest that intrinsic religious orientation reduces moral hypocrisy, while others propose that it has no effect (Akyürek, 2022; Burris & Navara, 2002; Elçi et al., 2011). One potential reason for the lack of a relationship between religious orientation and moral hypocrisy could be that religious orientation might not serve as a meaningful criterion for individuals when personal interests are at stake. Moreover, the younger participants in the current study might be positioned closer to the middle or extrinsic end of the intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation continuum. This group could be described as secular, indicating the extent to which individuals projected their beliefs and lifestyle into their daily lives, rather than the degree of religious orientation they experienced internally. Secularization has been increasingly observed among young people in Türkiye, as is the case globally (Cengiz, 2020). In other words, religious references may not carry as much weight or influence as they once did. Therefore, one possible reason for the lack of differences between the groups could be a similar perspective on worldly and religious matters. Future studies could further elucidate the relationship between these variables by comparing different age groups.

In the third part of this study, the aim was to determine the cognitive (i.e., micro-macro justice, state self-esteem), emotional (i.e., self-conscious emotions), and behavioral (i.e., donating as a helping behavior) outcomes of moral hypocrisy among participants.

One of the key hypotheses in this study was that individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy would have a higher perception of micro justice, as this perception aligned more closely with individualistic tendencies compared to macro justice perception. According to the literature, individuals with a strong independent self-construal are more inclined to favor micro justice principles, emphasizing personal effort, achievement, performance, and merit. For these individuals, personal goals often take precedence over societal goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a result, they are less likely to support macro justice principles that overlook individual differences in resource distribution (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). These individuals distinguish themselves through their unique talents and characteristics, prioritizing personal over group goals, with their preferences, rights, and desires guiding their moral decision-making processes (Miller, 1994). When confronted with moral dilemmas, they often employ conflict resolution methods that favor their own interests over the needs of others.

The findings from the current study aligned closely with those reported in the literature. Specifically, it was found that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy had a higher tendency toward micro justice compared to those who did not exhibit such behavior. This might be due, in part, to the fact that when individuals experienced a negative emotional state and were tasked with distributing rewards or material resources, they might prefer to allocate them based on contribution. Conversely, when the distributing individual was in a positive emotional state, they might be more inclined to favor equal distribution of resources or rewards.

Another important hypothesis in this study was that the state self-esteem levels of individuals who engaged in moral hypocrisy would decrease immediately compared to the other group. Findings from the current study revealed that participants who engaged in moral hypocrisy exhibited lower levels of state social self-esteem than others. Theoretical explanations supported this finding, as situational factors (specific situations or events) could temporarily influence self-esteem either positively or negatively (Cialdini et al., 1976; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Tesser, 1988). Experimental manipulations conducted in laboratory settings have similarly shown that changes in participants' self-esteem can occur (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Brockner & Elkind, 1985; Kernis et al., 1989; McFarland & Ross, 1982; Shrauger & Lund, 1975; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977). Immoral behaviors, such as moral hypocrisy, are among the primary factors influencing state self-esteem. The literature also indicates that engaging in unethical behavior can result in negative emotions and a temporary decrease in self-esteem, prompting individuals to seek ways to restore their self-

image. This notion was validated in the present study, as participants identified as engaging in moral hypocrisy demonstrated a higher rate of charitable giving compared to other participants. This might reflect a compensatory mechanism whereby individuals with decreased situational self-esteem seek to improve their self-perception.

When considering the relationship between moral hypocrisy and state social self-esteem, individuals with low social self-esteem often experience social anxiety and heightened public self-consciousness (the awareness of oneself as a social object in public settings). Such individuals are sensitive to how they are perceived by others. This difference in situational self-esteem between the groups can be understood through the nature of moral hypocrisy. Moral hypocrisy involves acting in a manner that appears moral without genuinely internalizing or adhering to moral norms, leading to a disconnect between public image and actual behavior (Batson, 1997). Because individuals engaging in moral hypocrisy are aware that their behavior does not fully align with social expectations or moral standards, they may feel less confident about how they are perceived by others, resulting in lower social self-esteem.

Moral hypocrisy can trigger self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and shame, because it involves violating both societal and personal moral norms. These emotions can lead to diminished confidence and self-worth in social settings for individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy. Based on this understanding, examining the mediating role of emotions (especially self-conscious emotions) and cognitive factors in the relationship between moral hypocrisy and state self-esteem would be valuable for future research.

Based on related literature, in the context of emotional outcomes, we assumed that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy would experience higher levels of guilt and shame compared to the other group, while their sense of pride would be at a lower level (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 1996; Tracy & Robbins, 2006). In the present study, self-conscious emotions were examined; however, no significant relationships were identified except for shame. Nonetheless, given their inherently inward-oriented nature, focusing on self-conscious emotions was considered appropriate. Furthermore, the literature has supported this hypothesis. Findings from the present study indicated that shame emerged prominently among participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy, with statistically significant results. Although guilt, which tends to motivate individuals more strongly toward compensatory actions than shame, was not found to be statistically significant, it was still observed at a higher level among participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy when viewed proportionally. This result might be explained by cultural differences. For instance, in relatively more

collectivist cultures such as Türkiye, shame tended to be more prevalent, whereas in individualistic cultures like the USA, guilt was often more dominant. Thus, repeating such studies using culturally sensitive emotion measurement tools might provide further insights.

Pride is the most probable emotional state to be experienced by individuals who do not engage in moral hypocrisy and who act honestly. Pride enables individuals to positively evaluate themselves, their relationships, and their behaviors through cognitive appraisal processes in various situations, which may be describe as the antithesis of shame. In line with this perspective, it can be inferred that individuals who do not engage in hypocrisy may experience pride after expressing their authentic intentions. Findings from the current study also aligned with previous results concerning pride, as individuals who acted consistently with their values and did not engage in moral hypocrisy exhibited higher levels of pride.

Overall, the findings revealed that individuals who assigned positive tasks to others through the lottery exhibited greater feelings of pride and lower levels of guilt. Conversely, those who assigned positive tasks to themselves while giving negative tasks to other participants showed increased levels of guilt and reduced pride. Although the difference was not statistically significant, the proportional difference was noteworthy.

When considering the behavioral outcomes of moral hypocrisy, helping behavior emerges as a relevant variable. That is when individuals commit a morally questionable act, they often feel compelled to follow it with a good deed to maintain their self-integrity. This prediction is rooted in the compensatory mechanism inherent in human behavior. Thus, it is anticipated that participants exhibiting moral hypocrisy will be situationally more inclined to donate. Such behavior can be interpreted as an effort to repay a moral debt, ease one's conscience, or restore and preserve moral integrity. It may also serve as a way to enhance or reinforce social status or image (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Grace & Griffin, 2009).

Given that moral hypocrisy often leads to negative self-conscious emotions, these emotions may mediate the relationship between moral hypocrisy and helping or charitable behaviors. This connection can be explored further in future studies. Additionally, it would be interesting to examine whether the emotions mediating this relationship differ between collectivist and individualist cultures, as cultural orientation may shape how individuals respond to feelings of guilt, shame, or other self-conscious emotions in the context of moral hypocrisy.

5.1. Limitations in the Current Studies and Implications for Future Studies

As noted earlier, the second part of the study focused on exploring the causes of moral hypocrisy, specifically examining moral self-licensing, materialism, self-monitoring, and religious orientation as independent variables, with moral hypocrisy serving as the dependent variable. The findings indicated that, following the moral self-licensing manipulation, females exhibited a significant increase in moral hypocrisy behavior, while males also demonstrated an increase, though not to the same extent as females. Future studies could further investigate this by modifying the content of the moral self-licensing manipulation. Given that males and females might be affected differently by moral self-licensing in varying contexts or situations (Khan & Dhar, 2006), experimental designs that take gender differences into account could yield more nuanced findings.

From a socio-economic perspective, the current study found no significant differences in moral hypocrisy behavior between those who exhibited it and those who did not. To better explore this relationship, future research could involve larger and more diverse samples. Similarly, the effectiveness of different expressions or triggers in moral self-licensing manipulations could be tested by employing instructions designed to evoke specific associations with the studied variables. By incorporating contextually relevant triggers, these expressions could serve as stronger stimuli, thereby enhancing the robustness of future experimental designs. This approach would facilitate a clearer and more robust demonstration of the effects and potential outcomes of manipulations involving various moral variables on non-moral behaviors such as moral hypocrisy, ultimately providing deeper insights into the interplay between these factors.

The present study was limited to university students in Ankara, and therefore, the findings may not be generalizable to all age groups. The sample selection was one of the limitations of this study. Future studies could achieve more generalizable results by including different age groups and socio-economic backgrounds. Additionally, the self-monitoring variable is a complex construct with different classifications. Future studies could explore various aspects of self-monitoring by taking these classifications into account. Similarly, certain subdimensions come to the forefront in religious orientation measures. Evaluations using culturally specific instruments that reflect the unique subdimensions of the culture in question could yield meaningful insights.

Regarding the micro-macro justice variable, the question is: if individuals who engage in moral hypocrisy do not experience negative emotions such as guilt or shame, how

do their tendencies toward micro or macro justice shift? This gap could be addressed by exploring the cognitive processes that contribute to such outcomes. In this context, researchers could design new studies incorporating critical social variables such as perceived justice and justice sensitivity. Additionally, the exploration of whether independent/interdependent self-construal acts as a mediating variable in the relationship between micro-macro justice and moral hypocrisy may be a worthwhile area of inquiry. Investigating the mediating role of self-conscious emotions in the relationship between moral hypocrisy and state self-esteem would also contribute significantly to the literature. Moreover, the mediating influence of cognitive processes such as cognitive evaluation, self-evaluation, self-deception strategies, rationalization mechanisms, and empathy would be valuable topics for further study. Future research could also investigate the manifestations of moral hypocrisy in different life domains, such as in the workplace, educational settings, and family relationships. Considering individualistic and collectivist cultural differences in these processes could yield more refined insights.

In the present study, comparisons were made exclusively between participants who exhibited moral hypocrisy and those who did not. The other two group of participants were not considered. Future studies could address this limitation by including such other groups. Individuals engaging in immoral behavior, such as moral hypocrisy, often rely on precursor affective alarms that allow them to avoid moral standards. The question arises as to whether other neuropsychological mechanisms accompany this process, which could be explored in future research (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Batson et al., 1999).

In the context of moral hypocrisy, environmental factors such as parental attitudes could also be explored. Additionally, referencing reward-punishment mechanisms, the biological inhibition and activation systems (BIS and BAS) could be investigated. Finally, moral hypocrisy has different forms, although this is not a focus of the current study, future research could examine these different forms (Monin & Merit, 2010).

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7. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Bu çalışmanın amacı insanların çeşitli durumlara ilişkin yorumlarını değerlendirmektir. Çalışmadaki soruların doğru ya da yanlış cevapları yoktur, sadece konuyla ilgili sizin deneyimlediklerinizle ilgilenilmektedir. Lütfen her bir soruyu dikkatlice okuyup işaretleyiniz. Formları okuduktan sonra anlamadığınız bir şey olursa araştırmacıya bildirebilirsiniz.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllük esasına dayalıdır. Çalışmaya katılmama veya katıldıktan sonra herhangi bir anda çalışmadan çıkma hakkına sahiptir. Çalışmayı yanıtlamanız, araştırmaya katılım için onam verdiğiniz biçiminde yorumlanacaktır. Size verilen formlardaki soruları yanıtlarken kimsenin baskısı veya telkini altında olmamaya özen gösteriniz. Bu formlardan elde edilecek bilgiler çalışmanın amacı kapsamında kullanılacaktır.

Yukarıda yer alan ve çalışmadan önce katılımcıya/gönüllüye verilmesi gereken bilgileri okudum ve katılmam istenen çalışmanın kapsamını ve amacını, gönüllü olarak üzerime düşen sorumlulukları tamamen anladım. Bu koşullarda söz konusu araştırmaya kendi isteğimle, hiçbir baskı ve zorlama olmaksızın katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Evet

Hayır

APPENDIX B. ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM



ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ) ETİK KURULU PROJE ONAY BELGESİ



Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji bölümü öğrencilerinden Hüseyin ŞEKERLİ'nin UNPACKING MORAL HYPOCRISY: DIFFERENTIATING THE EFFECTS OF MORAL SELF- LICENSING, COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES OF MORAL HYPOCRISY, adlı araştırması değerlendirilmiştir. (Bu kısım başvuru sahibi tarafından doldurulmalıdır)

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur.

Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır.



AYBÜ ETİK KURULU KARARI (Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)	
Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	2019 - 587
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	26.12.2019
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	27.12.2019 - 93
Yer	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

KURUL BAŞKANI, BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI VE ÜYELER:

İMZA

Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak ÇUKUR

Üye

Prof. Dr. Tekin AKDEMİR

Üye

Prof. Dr. Muharrem KILIÇ

Üye

Doç. Dr. Özge GÖKBULUT ÖZDEMİR

Üye

Doç. Dr. Behlül TOKUR

Üye

Doç. Dr. Birgül ÖZKAN

Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şule KAYA

Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ertuğrul DEMİRDEL

Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Nimet YILDIRIM TİRGİL

Üye

APPENDIX C. PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN DORMITORIES UNDER THE MINISTRY OF YOUTH AND SPORTS



T.C.
GENÇLİK VE SPOR BAKANLIĞI
Eğitim, Araştırma ve Koordinasyon Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : E-36592570-604.02-1160253

20.10.2021

Konu : Araştırma İzni

DAĞITIM YERLERİNE

İlgi : a) 17.09.2021 tarihli ve E-13983731-300-76897 sayılı yazınız.
b) Bakanlığımız 27/07/2020 tarihli ve 754387 sayılı Araştırma İzni Genelgesi.

İlgi (a) yazı ile başvurusu yapılan "Ahlaki İkiyüzlülüğün Çözümlemesi: Ahlaki Özgerekçeleştirilmenin Etkilerinin Ayırdedilmesi, Ahlaki İkiyüzlülüğün Bilişsel, Duygusal ve Davranışsal Çıktıları" başlıklı araştırma izni talebi Gençlik ve Spor Bakanlığı Bilimsel Araştırma ve Yayın Etiği Kurulu tarafından ilgi (b) Genelge çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiş ve söz konusu araştırmanın ilgili kurumlarda yürütülmesi uygun bulunmuştur. Tüm araştırma uygulamaları ilgi (a) yazı ile başvuruyu gerçekleştiren **araştırmacılar tarafından** yürütülecek olup, anket vb. uygulamalar **kurum yetkilileri** tarafından yürütülmeyecektir. Kurum yetkilileri araştırmalara, gönüllülük esasına göre, katılımcı olarak destek verebileceklerdir. Buna göre;

a) Araştırma kapsamında veri toplama ile ilgili her türlü iş ve işlem ilgi (b) Genelge doğrultusunda araştırmacı(lar) tarafından yürütülecektir. Araştırmacı(lar) tarafından araştırmalarda elde edilen veri setlerinin uygulama tamamlandıktan sonra 30 (otuz) gün içerisinde Bakanlık tarafından istenilen formatta, araştırmaların sonuç raporlarının ise çalışma bitiminden itibaren 30 (otuz) gün içerisinde Eğitim, Araştırma ve Koordinasyon Genel Müdürlüğüne ulaştırılması, araştırma raporlarında kurumsal gizliliğin korunması, üretilen bildiri, tez, makale ve benzeri yayınlarda Bakanlık isminin verilmemesi gerekmektedir.

b) Araştırma sürecinin gözetim ve denetimi, ilgili kurum müdürlükleri ile Gençlik ve Spor İl Müdürlükleri tarafından gerçekleştirilecektir. Bu çerçevede; (1) örneklemedeki kişilerin reşit olmamaları durumunda velilerin yazılı izinlerinin alınması, (2) onay verilen araştırma faaliyetleri kapsamı dışında hiçbir uygulama ve etkinlik yapılmaması, (3) araştırmanın uygulanması esnasında öncelikle kurum faaliyetlerinin aksatılmaması, (4) tüm araştırma süreçlerine katılımda gönüllülüğün esas alınması, (5) Eğitim, Araştırma ve Koordinasyon Genel Müdürlüğü tarafından mühürlenmiş veri toplama araçları dışında bir araç ya da form kullanılmaması, (6) araştırmanın kurumlarda uygulanmasından kaynaklanabilecek her türlü fiziksel zararın araştırmacı(lar) tarafından karşılanması, (7) araştırmada ticari amaç güdülmemesi ve katılımcılardan ücret talep edilmemesi (8) araştırmanın ilgi (b) Genelgeye uygun yürütülmesi hususlarında gerekli **gözetim ve denetim** ilgili kurum müdürlükleri ile Gençlik ve Spor İl Müdürlüklerinin yetki ve sorumluluğundadır.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.

Dr. Mehmet Ata ÖZTÜRK

Bakan a.
Genel Müdür

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Doğrulama Kodu: 21C3CF3C-FD33-4B10-B5B3-02AF12001EEC

Doğrulama Adresi: <https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/gsb-ebys>

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Bilgi için: Aysegül ACAR
Gençlik ve Spor Uzman
Yardımcısı



APPENDIX D. BATSON'S COIN METHOD FORM

Çalışma Yönergesi -1

Bu çalışmada, sonucunda ödül kazanabileceğiniz görevlerle, sonucunda ödül kazanamayacağınız görevlerin duygular ve tepkiler üzerindeki etkilerini değerlendiriyoruz. Verilen görevlerin sonuçları olumlu, olumsuz ya da nötr olabilir. Bu çalışmada özellikle sonucunda ödül olan görevlerin etkilerine odaklanıyoruz. Sonucunda ödül kazanabileceğiniz görevlerde, doğru cevaplarınız ödüllendirilirken, yanlış cevaplarınızın bir sonucu olmayacaktır. Bu çalışmada nötr görevlerin de sonuçlarını değerlendiriyoruz, ancak nötr görevlerin sonucunda herhangi bir ödül yoktur, yalnızca vereceğiniz cevaplara ilişkin geribildirimler verilecektir.

Çalışmada 2 katılımcıdan 1'i ödül kazanabileceği görevlere atanacakken, diğeri ödül kazandırmayan/ nötr görevlere atanacaktır. Nötr görevler size çıkarsa yalnızca cevaplarınıza geribildirim verilecektir. Çalışmamızda 2 katılımcı da seçildikleri görevi birbirlerinden bağımsız şekilde yapacaklar ve birbirleriyle asla karşılaşmayacaklar.

Performansınızın sonuçlarını önemseniz için elde edeceğiniz sonuçların da gerçekçi olması gerekmektedir. Elde edebileceğiniz sonuçlar şöyledir: Eğer ödül kazandıran görevlere atanırsanız, yanlış cevabınız için olumsuz herhangi bir durumla karşılaşmayacaksınız. Ayrıca her doğru yanıtınız için bir adet ödül kartı kazanacaksınız. Toplam kazanacağınız ödül miktarı 30 TL' lik alışveriş çekidir. Bu alışveriş çekini tercih ettiğiniz bir alışveriş merkezinde kullanabilirsiniz. Bu hediye çekini yalnızca bu çalışmaya katılanlar kullanabilmektedir. Eğer birkaç tane ödül kartı kazanırsanız, 30 TL' lik alışveriş çeki kazanma şansınızı arttırmış olursunuz.

Eğer, ödül kazandırmayan/nötr göreve atanırsanız, sadece size verilen görevi yerine getireceksiniz ve performansınız hakkında size yalnızca geribildirim verilecek. Vereceğiniz cevapların herhangi bir sonucu ya da ödülü olmayacak. *(Şunu bilmenizde fayda olabilir: Ödül kazandırmayan/nötr göreve atanan çoğu katılımcı bu görevi sıkıcı ve sıradan bulmaktadır. Bu görev size çıkarsa umarız ki bu görevi çok kötü bulmazsınız.)*

Çalışma Yönergesi- 2

Bu çalışmanın daha önce bilinçli olarak açıklamadığımız ancak şimdi sizin bilmeniz gereken bir yönü vardır. Verilen görevlerin (ödül kazandıran görevler ya da ödül kazandırmayan görevler) duygular ve tepkiler üzerindeki etkisini araştırmanın yanı sıra, insanları farklı görevlere seçmenin etkileriyle de ilgileniyoruz. Bu amaçla, bazı çalışmalarda 2 katılımcıdan 1'inden her iki katılımcıyı (siz ve diğer kişi) görevlerine yerleştirmesi istenmektedir. Diğer katılımcı bu durumdan tamamen habersizdir ve ona bu görevlerin basitçe şans eseri belirlendiği söylenmiştir.

Şimdiye kadar muhtemelen sizin de tahmin ettiğiniz gibi, bu çalışmada görevlere atamayı siz yapacaksınız. İkinizden birini -kendinizi ya da diğer katılımcıyı- ödül kazandıran göreve, diğerini de herhangi bir ödülün olmadığı göreve atayabilirsiniz.

Çoğu katılımcıya göre bu görevlere atama yapmanın en adil yolu herkese eşit şans vermektir (örneğin, yazı-tura atmak gibi). (Eğer isterseniz yazı tura atmanız için size bir madeni para verilecektir. Bu madeni paranın bir yüzünde “ödüllü sorular kendime (K)”, diğer yüzünde “ödüllü sorular diğer kişiye (D)” yazmaktadır. Ancak, karar tamamen size aittir. Kendinizi ve diğer katılımcıyı kendi seçiminize göre atayabilirsiniz. Diğer katılımcı bu görevlere seçme işinin sizin tarafınızdan yapıldığını bilmiyor ve bilmeyecektir. Görevlere seçilmenin tamamen şans eseri olduğunu düşünecektir. Bundan dolayı ve ikiniz asla karşılaşmayacağınızdan, sizin gizliliğiniz garanti altındadır.

APPENDIX E. ENVELOPE METHOD FORM (A NEWLY DESIGNED METHOD)

Çalışma Yönergesi-1

Merhaba, bu çalışma kurum sorumlusundan izin alınarak yapılmaktadır. Çalışma, özel sektörde faaliyet gösteren uluslararası bir şirketin kendi personelini değerlendirmek için hazırladığı sınav soru havuzu ile ilgilidir. Şirket bu çalışma için bir miktar bütçe ayırmıştır. Bu nedenle soru havuzunda hem ödül kazanabileceğiniz sorular hem de maalesef ödül kazanamayacağınız sorular vardır. Bu çalışmanın asıl amacı ödüllü ve ödüksüz soruların niteliğinin sizler (katılımcılar) tarafından değerlendirilmesidir.

Çalışmada 2 katılımcıdan 1'i ödüllü soruları cevaplayacakken, diğer katılımcı ödüksüz soruları cevaplayacaktır. Size ödüllü sorular çıkarsa, her doğru cevabınız bir adet ödül kartı ile ödüllendirilecektir, ne kadar çok ödül kartı kazanırsanız 30 TL'lik nakit para ödülünü kazanma şansınız da o kadar artacaktır. Yanlış cevaplarınız için ise ödül kartı alamayacaksınız.

Eğer, size ödüksüz sorular yani cevaplarınız karşılığında herhangi bir ödül kazanma şansınızın olmadığı sorular çıkarsa, verdiğiniz cevaplara ilişkin sadece geribildirim verilecektir ve sorulara ilişkin değerlendirmeleriniz alınacaktır (Çoğu katılımcı ödüksüz soruların sıkıcı olduğunu düşünür. Bu sorular size çıkarsa, umarız ki sizin için çok kötü bir deneyim olmaz).

Bu çalışmaya katılan kişiler rasgele seçilmişlerdir ve birbirleriyle karşılaşmaları söz konusu değildir. Diğer katılımcı farklı bir okulda öğrenci olduğundan, çalışmaya orada katılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmada her bir katılımcı birbirinden bağımsız bir çalışma yürütecektir.

Lütfen bu kısmı okuyup anladığınızdan emin olduktan sonra çalışmaya devam etmek için araştırmacıyı çağırınız.

Çalışma Yönergesi- 2

Bu çalışmanın daha önce size açıklanmayan ancak şu an açıklanması gereken bir yönü vardır. Bazen bu çalışmanın ilk aşamasında, 2 katılımcıdan 1'i ödüllü sorularla, ödüksüz sorulara kimin cevap vereceğine karar verir. Çünkü, bu çalışmanın diğer bir amacı da karar verici olarak belirlenen katılımcıların, ödüllü ya da ödüksüz soruları cevaplarırkenki motivasyonlarını değerlendirmektir.

Bu çalışmada tahmin edeceğiniz gibi ödüllü sorular ya da ödüksüz sorulara kimin cevap vereceğine siz karar vereceksiniz. Diğer katılımcı, bu kararın sizin tarafınızdan verildiğini bilmeyecek ve kendisine ödüllü ya da ödüksüz soruların çıkmasının şans eseri olduğunu düşünecektir.

Hangi sorulara, kimi nasıl atayabilirsiniz? : Çoğu katılımcı kimin hangi sorulara cevap vereceğini belirlerken, kura çekmenin adil bir yol olabileceğini düşünmektedir. Kura çekmek sizin karar vermenizi kolaylaştırabilir. İsterseniz kura çekerek kimin hangi sorulara cevap vereceğine karar verebilirsiniz. İsterseniz kura çekmeden de karar verebilirsiniz. Kura çekmek isterseniz içinde 50 adet zarfın olduğu sepeti çalışma masasında göreceksiniz. Sizin de bildiğiniz gibi bu zarfların her birinin içinde 1 den 50 ye kadar sayılar vardır. Tek ya da çift sayı çekme durumunuza göre kendinizi ya da diğer katılımcıyı ödüllü ya da ödüksüz sorulara atayabilirsiniz. “Ödüllü soruları, tek sayı mı çıktığında siz kazanacaksınız yoksa çift sayı çıktığında mı siz kazanacaksınız?” Bunu aklınızdan siz belirleyiniz. Belirlediğiniz sayıyı sadece siz bileceksiniz, şirket çalışanına söylemeyiniz. Ayrıca kurada çıkan sonucu da söylemeniz gerekmiyor. Bundan dolayı çektiğiniz sayıyı tekrar zarfa koyup sepetin içine atınız.

Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi kimi hangi sorulara atayacağınıza ilişkin karar tamamen size aittir. Çünkü biz şirket olarak sizin sadece ödüllü ya da ödüksüz sorulardaki performansınızı değerlendireceğiz. Ödüllü sorulara mı yoksa ödüksüz sorulara mı cevap vereceğinize ilişkin kararınızı size verilen form üzerinde işaretleyiniz. Diğer okuldaki katılımcı ödüllü ve ödüksüz sorulara seçilmenin şans eseri olduğunu düşünecek, seçim işinin sizin tarafınızdan yapıldığını bilmeyecektir.

**APPENDIX F. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE MORALITY OF THE
METHOD USED FOR TASK ASSIGNMENTS**

1. Size göre ödüllü ya da ödölsüz görevlere atama yapmanın en ahlaki yolu nedir?

.....

2. Ödüllü ve ödölsüz sorulara atama yaparken kullandığınız yöntem ahlaki olarak
doğru mudur?

(Kesinlikle Hiç Ahlaki Değil) (Hiç Ahlaki Değil) (Ahlaki Değil) (Kararsızım) (Ahlaki)
(Tamamen Ahlaki) (Kesinlikle Tamamen Ahlaki)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX G. PREFERENCE FORM

Kura İle <u>(Kura çektiyseniz aşağıdaki seçeneklerden birini tercih ediniz)</u>	Kurasız <u>(Kura çekmediyseniz aşağıdaki seçeneklerden birini tercih ediniz)</u>
Ödüllü Sorular Kendime ()	Ödüllü Sorular Kendime ()
Ödüllü Sorular Diğer Kişiyeye ()	Ödüllü Sorular Diğer Kişiyeye ()

APPENDIX H. MATERIAL VALUES SCALE

Bölüm-I: Aşağıda verilen ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı yandaki 0'dan 4'e kadar olan ölçek üzerinde belirtiniz. <i>(0: Hiç katılmıyorum, 1: Katılmıyorum, 2: Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum, 3: Katılıyorum, 4: Tamamen katılıyorum)</i>	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
1. Pahalı evleri, arabaları ve kıyafetleri olan insanlara hayranlık duyarım.	0	1	2	3	4
2. Hayattaki en önemli başarılarından bazıları mal-mülk edinmeyi içerir.	0	1	2	3	4
3. İnsanların sahip olduğu maddi şeylerin miktarını bir başarı göstergesi olarak pek önemsemem.	0	1	2	3	4
4. Sahip olduğum şeyler, hayatımı ne kadar iyi yürüttüğüm hakkında çok fikir verir.	0	1	2	3	4
5. İnsanları etkileyen şeylere sahip olmak hoşuma gider.	0	1	2	3	4
6. Diğer insanların sahip olduğu maddi varlıklara fazla dikkat etmiyorum.	0	1	2	3	4
7. Genellikle sadece ihtiyacım olan şeyleri satın alırım.	0	1	2	3	4
8. Mal-mülk bakımından hayatımı sade tutmaya çalışırım.	0	1	2	3	4
9. Sahip olduğum şeyler benim için o kadar da önemli değildir.	0	1	2	3	4
10. Kullanışlı olmayan şeylere para harcamak hoşuma gider.	0	1	2	3	4
11. Bir şeyler satın almak bana çok zevk verir.	0	1	2	3	4
12. Hayatımda birçok lüks olmasından hoşlanırım.	0	1	2	3	4
13. Maddi şeylere, tanıdığım çoğu kişiden daha az önem veririm.	0	1	2	3	4
14. Hayattan zevk almak için gerçekten ihtiyacım olan her şeye sahibim.	0	1	2	3	4
15. Eğer bende olmayan belirli şeylere sahip olsaydım, hayatım daha iyi olurdu.	0	1	2	3	4
16. Daha güzel şeylere sahip olsaydım, daha mutlu olmazdım.	0	1	2	3	4
17. Daha fazla şey satın alabilme imkanım olsaydı daha mutlu olurum.	0	1	2	3	4
18. İstedğim her şeyi satın alamamak, beni bazen oldukça rahatsız eder.	0	1	2	3	4

APPENDIX I. SELF MONITORING SCALE

Bölüm-II: Aşağıdaki ifadelerin size ne kadar uygun olduğunu yandaki 0'dan 5'e kadar olan ölçek üzerinde işaretleyiniz. (0: Kesinlikle, her zaman yanlış, 1: Genellikle yanlış, 2: Yanlış sayılır ama bazı istisnalar var, 3: Doğru sayılır ancak bazı istisnalar var, 4: Genellikle doğru, 5: Kesinlikle, her zaman doğru)	Kesinlikle, her zaman yanlış	Genellikle yanlış	Yanlış sayılır ama bazı istisnalar var	Doğru sayılır ancak bazı istisnalar var	Genellikle doğru	Kesinlikle, her zaman doğru
1. Sosyal durumlarda başka bir şeyin istendiğini hissettiğimde, davranışımı değiştirme yeteneğim vardır.	0	1	2	3	4	5
2. İnsanların gerçek duygularını gözlerinden doğru olarak okuyabilirim.	0	1	2	3	4	5
3. Vermek istediğim izlenime bağlı olarak insanların karşısına çıkma biçimimi kontrol etme yeteneğim vardır.	0	1	2	3	4	5
4. Biriyle konuşurken, karşımdakinin yüz ifadesindeki en ufak değişikliğe bile duyarlıyım.	0	1	2	3	4	5
5. Diğer insanların duygu ve isteklerini anlama konusunda sezgisel güçlerim vardır.	0	1	2	3	4	5
6. İnsanlar inandırıcı bir şekilde gülseler bile, bir şakayı kötü bulduklarını anlayabilirim.	0	1	2	3	4	5
7. Sergilediğim imajın işe yaramadığını hissettiğimde, bunu kolaylıkla işe yarar başka bir imajla değiştiririm.	0	1	2	3	4	5
8. Söylediğim bir şeyin uygunsuz olduğunu, dinleyenin gözlerinden anlayabilirim.	0	1	2	3	4	5
9. Davranışlarımı farklı insanlara ve farklı ortamlara uyacak şekilde değiştirme konusunda sorun yaşamam.	0	1	2	3	4	5
10. Davranışımı, içinde bulunduğum herhangi bir ortamın gereklerini karşılayacak şekilde ayarlayabildiğimi fark ediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5
11. Eğer birisi bana yalan söylüyorsa, bunu o kişinin davranışlarından hemen anlarım.	0	1	2	3	4	5
12. Ortamın gerektirdiklerini bildikten sonra davranışlarımı buna göre düzenlemek benim için kolaydır.	0	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX J. RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION SCALE

Bölüm-III: Aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı yandaki 0'dan 3'e kadar olan ölçek üzerinde işaretleyiniz. (0: Hiç katılmıyorum, 1: Katılmıyorum, 2: Katılıyorum, 3: Tamamen katılıyorum)	Hiç Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen Katılıyorum
1. Dinimin gereklerini hayatımın her alanına uygulamaya çalışırım.	0	1	2	3
2. Allah 'ın varlığını her zaman güçlü bir şekilde hissedirim.	0	1	2	3
3. Hayata ilişkin bütün düşüncelerimi dinsel inançlarım belirler.	0	1	2	3
4. Ahlaki bir hayat yaşadığım sürece neye inandığım o kadar önemli değildir.	0	1	2	3
5. Dinimin gereklerini yerine getirmeme rağmen dinsel düşüncelerimin günlük işlerimi etkilemesine izin vermem.	0	1	2	3
6. Herhangi bir engel olmadığı sürece ibadetlerin aksatılmaması gerektiğini düşünürüm.	0	1	2	3
7. İnanan bir insan olmama rağmen hayatımda dinden daha önemli şeyler olduğunu düşünürüm.	0	1	2	3
8. Özellikle dinin benim için önemli olmasının nedeni hayatın anlamına ilişkin birçok soruya cevap vermesidir.	0	1	2	3
9. Kişilerin diniyle ilgili çeşitli yayınları takip etmesi çok önemlidir.	0	1	2	3
10. Toplumsal ve ekonomik statümü koruyabilmek için yer yer dinsel uygulamalarımın taviz vermem gerektiğini düşünürüm.	0	1	2	3

APPENDIX K. MICRO-MACRO JUSTICE TENDENCY FORM

Bölüm-I: Aşağıdaki senaryoyu dikkatle okuyunuz. Sizden bu duruma ilişkin bir seçim yapmanız istenmektedir. Lütfen seçiminizi ilgili seçeneğin yanına işaretleyiniz.

Ahmet ve Hüseyin aynı şirkette çalışan iki işçidir. Çalıştıkları şirket karlı bir sezon geçirince sözleşmeleri gereği bu kardan prim (para ödülü) vererek işçilerini ödüllendirmektedir. Bu yıl şirket kara geçmiştir ve 6000 TL’lik primin nasıl dağıtılacağına ilişkin karar alması gerekmektedir. İşçilerden Ahmet düşük gelir grubuna dahildir, Hüseyin’e göre geliri daha düşüktür, daha önce bu primi (para ödülü) hiç almamıştır ve ekonomik olarak daha çok ihtiyacı vardır. Ayrıca Ahmet’in hem performansı hem de yetenekleri daha sınırlıdır. Hüseyin ise daha yeteneklidir ve iş yerindeki performansı daha iyidir. Aynı zamanda geçmişte bu primi (para ödülü) kazanmıştır. Ahmet ve Hüseyin’in özelliklerini düşündüğünüzde, siz olsaydınız Ahmet’e ne kadar ödül verirdiniz? Aynı şekilde Hüseyin’e ne kadar ödül verirdiniz? Lütfen size en uygun seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

Prim’in (para ödülü) alternatif dağılım seçenekleri.	Ahmet	Hüseyin
1. ()	0 TL	6000 TL
2. ()	1000 TL	5000 TL
3. ()	2000 TL	4000 TL
4. ()	3000 TL	3000 TL
5. ()	4000 TL	2000 TL
6. ()	5000 TL	1000 TL
7. ()	6000 TL	0 TL

APPENDIX L. STATE SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

Bölüm-II: Aşağıdaki ifadeler ne ölçüde katılıyorsunuz? Lütfen her bir ifadeyi dikkatle okuyup size ne kadar uygun olduğunu 0'dan 6'ya kadar olan ölçek üzerinde işaretleyiniz.	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Biraz Katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum
1. Yeteneklerime güveniyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Başarılı veya başarısız görüneceğimden endişeliyim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Şu an vücudumun görünümünden memnunum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Performansım hakkında gergin ve endişeliyim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. Okuduklarımı anlama konusunda zorluk çektiğimi hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Başkalarının bana saygı ve hayranlık duyduğunu hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. Kilomdan memnun değilim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. Yapıp ettiklerimden huzursuzluk hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. Diğerleri kadar akıllı olduğumu hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. Kendimden memnun değilim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. Kendimle ilgili iyi hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. Şu anda görünüşümden memnunum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. Başkalarının benimle ilgili ne düşündüğü konusunda endişeliyim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. Etrafımda olup biteni anlama konusunda kendime güvenirim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. Diğerlerine göre kendimi şu an daha önemsiz hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. Kendimi çekici bulmuyorum	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. Bıraktığım izlenim konusunda endişeliyim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. Şu an akademik açıdan diğerlerine göre daha az yeterli hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. İyi değilmişim gibi hissediyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. Gülünç görünmekten endişeliyim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX M. EMOTIONAL LABOR SCALE

Bölüm-III: Lütfen, aşağıda verilen duyguların her birini dikkatle okuyup, <u>SU AN hangi duyguyu ne kadar yoğun (ne derecede)</u> hissettiğinizi 0'dan 4'e kadar olan ölçek üzerinde işaretleyiniz.	Hiç Hissetmedim	Çok Az Hissettim	Hissettim	Yoğun Hissettim	Çok Yoğun Hissettim
1. ÖFKELİ (Sinirli, Çileden Çıkmış, Kızgın)	0	1	2	3	4
2. MUTLU (Sevinçli, Coşkulu, Neşeli)	0	1	2	3	4
3. KORKU (Tehdit Edilmiş, Dehşete Düşmüş, Ürkmüş)	0	1	2	3	4
4. GURURLU (Kıvançlı, Başarılı, Mağrur)	0	1	2	3	4
5. KAYGILI (Endişeli, Gergin, Stresli)	0	1	2	3	4
6. ÜZGÜN (Depresif, Hüzünlü, Kırgın)	0	1	2	3	4
7. İLGİLİ (İstekli, Hevesli, Alakalı)	0	1	2	3	4
8. UTANMIŞ (Mahcup, Yüzü Kızarmış, Aşağılanmış)	0	1	2	3	4
9. SIKILMIŞ (Canı Sıkılmış, Bunalmış, Bıkkın)	0	1	2	3	4
10. SAKİN (Rahat, Huzurlu, Dingin)	0	1	2	3	4
11. SUÇLU (Pişmanlık, Sorumlu, Kusurlu)	0	1	2	3	4
12. İĞRENMİŞ (Tiksinme, Midesi Kalkmış, Nefret)	0	1	2	3	4
13. ŞAŞKIN (Hayrete Düşmüş, Sürpriz, Şaşırmış)	0	1	2	3	4
14. SEVGİ (Sevgi Dolu, Şefkat, Duygusal Yakınlık)	0	1	2	3	4

APPENDIX N. STATE HELPING BEHAVIOR (DONATION) FORM

Bölüm-IV: Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeleri dikkatle okuyunuz ve SU AN bağışlamak ya da yardım etmek istediğiniz size en uygun gelen miktarı boşluklara yazınız.

- 1. Eğer bu çalışma sonucunda para kazanırsanız, ne kadarını diğer katılımcıya bağışlamak isterdiniz?**

Yardım etmek isteyeceğiniz miktar (0 TL ile 30 TL arasında):.....TL

- 2. Üniversite yönetimi ekonomik zorluk çeken öğrencilere yemek ve giysi yardımı yapmak için yardım kampanyası düzenlemiştir. Bu kampanyaya ne kadar yardım etmek isterdiniz?**

Yardım etmek isteyeceğiniz miktar (0 TL ile 30 TL arasında):.....TL

APPENDIX O. HELPING BEHAVIOR SCALE

Bölüm-V: Aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katılıyorsunuz? Lütfen her bir ifadeyi dikkatle okuyup size ne kadar uygun olduğunu 0'dan 6'ya kadar olan ölçek üzerinde işaretleyiniz.	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Biraz Katılmıyorum	Kararsızım	Biraz Katılıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum
1. Arkadaşımın işini yetiştiremediğini görürsem ona yardım etmek isterim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Yerde bulduğum eşyanın sahibini bulmak isterim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Soğukta kapıda kalan komşu çocuğu için elimden gelen yardımı yaparım.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Ağlayan/Üzgün bir arkadaşımı gördüğümde yanına gidip üzüntüsünü paylaşıyorum.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. Markette kasada iken acelesi olan birine sıramı vermem.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Kantinde ihtiyacı olanlar alsın diye askıda (askıda yemek/askıda içecek) uygulamasına para bırakırım.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. İhtiyacı olan insanlara elimden geldiğince yardım ederim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. İnsanlara karşılık beklemeden yardım ederim.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX P. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM

KİŞİSEL BİLGİ FORMU

1) Cinsiyetiniz? _____

2) Doğum yılınız ve yaşıınız? _____

3) Eğitim durumunuz nedir?

Yüksekokul mezunu (2 yıllık) (...) Üniversite öğrencisi (...) Üniversite mezunu (...)

Yüksek lisans derecesi (...) Doktora derecesi (...)

a- Eğitim gördüğünüz üniversiteyi belirtiniz:

b- Okuduğunuz bölümü belirtiniz:

.....

c- Okuduğunuz sınıfı belirtiniz:

.....

4) Babanızın eğitim durumu nedir?

☐ Okur-yazar değil

☐ Okur-yazar

☐ İlkokul mezunu

☐ Ortaokul mezunu

☐ Lise mezunu

☐ Yüksekokul mezunu (2 yıllık)

☐ Üniversite mezunu^[L]_[SEP]

☐ Yüksek lisans derecesi

☐ Doktora derecesi

5) Annenizin eğitim durumu nedir?

☐ Okur-yazar değil

☐ Okur-yazar

☐ İlkokul mezunu

☐ Ortaokul mezunu

☐ Lise mezunu

☐ Yüksekokul mezunu (2 yıllık)

☐ Üniversite mezunu^[L]_[SEP]

☐ Yüksek lisans derecesi

☐ Doktora derecesi

6) Tüm gelirlerinizi düşündüğünüz zaman birlikte yaşadığınız ailenizin ortalama aylık geliri nedir?

_____ (TL)

7) Hanenizin maddi durumunu ne kadar tatmin edici buluyorsunuz? (Seçtiğiniz rakamı yuvarlak içine alınız)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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Hiç tatmin edici değil

Son derece tatmin edici

8) Şuan yaşadığınız evde siz dahil kaç kişi var? _____

9) Yaşamınızın büyük bölümünü nasıl bir yerde geçirdiniz?^[L]_[SEP]

☐ Köy ☐ Şehir ☐ Kasaba ☐ Büyükşehir ☐ İlçe ☐ Diğer:.....

10) Bugünlerde genel olarak mutlu olup olmadığınızı söyler misiniz?^[L]_[SEP]

☐ Çok mutluyum ☐ Mutluyum ☐ Orta

☐ Pek mutlu değilim ☐ Hiç mutlu değilim

11) Din hayatınızda ne kadar önem teşkil ediyor?(Seçtiğiniz rakamı yuvarlak içine alınız)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Hiç önemli
değil

Kesinlikle
çok önemli

12) Siyasi konularda “sol”dan ve “sağ”dan bahsedildiğini sık sık duyuyoruz. Aşağıda 10 puanlık bir sol-sağ cetveli var. Burada “1” en solu, “10” ise en sağ gösteriyor. Sizin kendi görüşleriniz bu cetvelin neresinde yer alır? (Seçtiğiniz rakamı yuvarlak içine alınız)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Sol

Sağ

13) Çalışma durumunuz:

Çalışıyor iseniz mesleğiniz nedir?_____

14) Medeni Haliniz? _____

APPENDIX Q: DEBRIEFING FORM

Çalışma Başlığı: Ahlaki İkiyüzlülüğün Nedenleri ve Sonuçlarının Araştırılması

Araştırmacı: Hüseyin Şekerli

İletişim Bilgileri:

Çalışmamıza katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz! Aşağıda, bu araştırmanın amacı ve kullanılan yöntemler hakkında önemli bilgiler bulabilirsiniz. Sorularınız varsa lütfen araştırmacıyla iletişime geçmekten çekinmeyin.

Çalışmanın Amacı: Bu çalışmanın amacı, ahlaki ikiyüzlülüğün nedenlerini ve sonuçlarını araştırmaktır. Özellikle, bireylerin ahlaki ikiyüzlülük davranışında bulunmasına neden olan faktörleri ve bu tür davranışların bilişsel, duygusal veya davranışsal sonuçlarını incelemekle ilgilendir. Çalışma sırasında, yanıtlarınızın etkilenmemesini sağlamak için çalışmanın amacı veya yöntemleri hakkında bazı bilgiler paylaşılmamış olabilir. Bu yaklaşım, psikolojik araştırmalarda tarafsız sonuçlar elde etmek için yaygın olarak kullanılmaktadır. Şimdi, çalışmanın amaçlarını ve tasarımını tam olarak açıklamak istiyoruz.

Neler Yaptık?: Bu çalışmada, sizden ahlaki karar verme ve davranışları ölçmeye yönelik bazı görevlere katılmanız istendi. Bu görevler, ahlaki ikiyüzlülüğün hangi koşullarda ortaya çıkabileceğini ve bireylerin bu tür davranışları nasıl gerekçelendirdiğini veya bu davranışlara nasıl tepki verdiğini değerlendirmek için tasarlanmıştır.

Bu Neden Önemli?: Bu araştırma, ahlaki karar verme ve sosyal davranış konularında ahlaki ikiyüzlülüğü daha iyi anlamaya katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bulgular, ahlaki ikiyüzlülük gibi etik olmayan davranışları azaltmayı ve çeşitli bağlamlarda dürüstlüğü teşvik etmeyi amaçlayan müdahalelerin geliştirilmesinde değerli olabilir.

Yanıltma Beyanı (varsa): Çalışmanın amaçlarına ulaşmak için bir miktar yanıltma veya eksik bilgi kullanılması gerekmiştir. Örneğin, bazı görevlerin gerçek amacı belirtilmemiş olabilir. Bu durumun etik kurallar çerçevesinde yapıldığından ve [Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Etik Kurulu] tarafından titizlikle incelendiğinden emin olabilirsiniz. Yanıltma, yanlışlığı önlemek ve sonuçların bütünlüğünü sağlamak için gerekliydi.

Haklarınız: Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi edindikten sonra katılımınız konusunda rahatsızlık duyarsanız, verilerinizi geri çekme hakkına sahipsiniz. Bunun için lütfen bizimle iletişime geçin.

Gizlilik: Bu çalışma sırasında toplanan tüm bilgilerin kesinlikle gizli kalacağını ve yalnızca araştırma amaçları için kullanılacağını garanti ederiz. Yanıtlarınız kimliğinizi korumak için anonimleştirilecektir.

Sorular veya Endişeler: Bu çalışma veya katılımınızla ilgili daha fazla sorunuz varsa lütfen [Hüseyin Şekerli] ile iletişime geçmekten çekinmeyin. Araştırmamıza değerli katkılarınız için bir kez daha teşekkür ederiz!

Katılımcı

İmzası

Yukarıda sağlanan bilgilendirme metnini okudum ve anladım.

Ad (isteğe bağlı): _____

İmza: _____

Tarih: _____