

# **To What Extent Did Hegel Rescue The Ontological Argument From Kant's Criticisms?**



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**Abstract**

This dissertation places a re-evaluating account of Hegel's criticism of Kant's objection to the ontological proof for God's existence forwards. In this sense, the dissertation aims to investigate Kant's objection to the ontological argument in the context and limits of Hegel's critique of Kant's objection account, considering the relevant epistemological and metaphysical background. The initial contention attests that the common state of concepts is that they essentially incorporate numerous predicates but not the predicate of presence. Be that as it may, the Concept of God fundamentally includes existence as a predicate, and thus God exists. Kant's supposition, on the opposite, is that presence, in common, cannot be predicated by the exceptionally nature of concepts. Hence, indeed the Concept of God cannot incorporate presence. God in this way exists as it were as a plausibility. On the other hand, Hegel contends that Concept incorporates presence. Then again, to put the matter in Hegelian terms, the Concept is essentially invalidated as a subject and gets to be objective out of itself, which is genuine of the Concept of God. However, viewed in this way, the Concept of God is now not just a concept of God but self-consciousness as something genuine: it could be a created Concept. In addition, the Concept involves self-creation, which in turn involves the move of subjectivity into objectivity. It is concluded that Hegel's critique has had considerable success in eliminating Kant's objections to the ontological argument. Thus, the dissertation suggests that the ontological argument can still be defended.

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## Introduction

One of the most important questions in the human mind is the existence of God. Despite being as old as the history of humanity, different arguments were put forward in this debate, which did not lose its first-day enthusiasm. While some of these arguments try to prove the existence of God based on various experiences related to the external world, unlike these, the ontological argument tried to prove the existence of God, based on the conceptual analysis of the concept of God, independent of experience. It is possible to classify the arguments presented to prove the existence of God as *a priori* in terms of their independence from experience, and *a posteriori* in terms of their derivation from experience. Since the cosmological and teleological argument proceeds from experience, it has a *a posteriori* character, whereas the ontological argument occupies a privileged place among theistic arguments being characterised by its distance from experience. It is possible to perceive the ontological argument as an attempt to demonstrate God's existence through a deductive *a priori* premise.

The majority of those who advocate the ontological argument no longer conclude that God exists as defined. That is, the criticism directed at this argument is that one can transition from propositional necessity to ontological necessity. In short, the basic insight into the ontological argument, which can be defined as an attempt to prove God's existence *a priori*, claims that, unlike other theistic arguments, taking God as the point of departure and starting from the definition of God alone, we can ascertain its existence, without reference to anything other than God.

Because of the different methods used, there have been many critics of the ontological argument with many advocates. The most serious criticism of the ontological argument is that of Immanuel Kant, who, in Hegel's words, is famous for the universal scale. The thesis of the

impossibility of proving the existence of God by reason alone, which is one of the main criticisms of the ontological argument, became well-systemised with Kant. Hegel, on the other hand, is one of the first and most important proponents of ontological arguments, who devoted himself to refuting Kant's radical objection and demonstrating its failure. Although Hegel does not develop or clarify the premises of the argument and does not clarify what the argument's success will be, it is claimed that his entire philosophical system contains the ontological argument. By the nature of philosophical thought, refuting and overcoming Kant's objection in the effort to solve the philosophical problems of Hegel's age and to reckoning with the previous philosophical systems and to overcome them constitutes an important threshold for Hegel to establish his unique philosophical system.

Trying to overcome the philosophical systems before him with a critical approach, Kant's epistemological thesis, which he theorised especially in the context of hanging classical metaphysics, forms the basis for his objection to the ontological argument. On the other hand, Hegel's enterprise to criticise Kant's objection necessitates for Hegel to reckoning with Kant's epistemological propositions which constitutes the ground laying to refute the claim by dogmatic metaphysics. Therefore, this thesis examines Kant and Hegel's approaches to ontological proof by emphasising that their epistemological and metaphysical assumptions and theses are conditioned on the acceptance or rejection of the ontological argument.

The doctrine of the impossibility of a priori propositions, which is the main motivation of Kant's theory of knowledge, paves the way for Kant's attempt to transcend classical metaphysics, which is his great philosophical project. Kant's ontological argument objections are obvious implementation of this project. The essence of Kant's objections is based on the claim that Concept does not include being. Kant's thesis that existence is not a predicate and

that no being can be analytic, which is an epistemic formulation of the objection of the ontological proof of God's existence, is an effort to show that the premises of the proof are inconsistent and therefore Kant claims that the ontological proof's validity is untenable from the rational perspective. At this point, the aim of this thesis is to state that the epistemological formulation of Kant's objection to the ontological argument is inconsistent in terms of the internal integrity of his claim's philosophical framework. Furthermore, the logical premises of his objections raise contradictions when it comes to God.

On the other hand, the ontological argument occupies a central position in Hegel's philosophical system. It is possible to see the traces in all of his works that God can be known by the *a priori* method independent of experience and that he has made an effort to dispel objections against it. The role of Hegel for our thesis is that his philosophy is primarily motivated to transcend Kant's philosophical system. Therefore, Hegel's critique of Kant's objection to the ontological argument also allows Hegel to overcome the limitation that Kant brought to *a priori* knowledge and his attempt to destroy metaphysics. Hegel criticises the epistemological ground that forms the basis of Kant's objection based on the doctrine of the concept. Contrary to Kant, Hegel assumes that the possibility of *a priori* knowledge is possible with the meaning he ascribes to the Concept of conception. Hegel claims Kant's objection to the ontological argument is a flaw because he did not correctly evaluate the meaning of the Concept. In terms of this thesis, the discussion at this point is that Hegel provides a solid ground for his criticism of Kant's objections. Because, just as in Kant's works, the ontological argument in Hegel's thought is highly related to epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. The main axis of Hegel's criticism of Kant's objections is the thesis of the unity of the concept and existence. In this context, Hegel's critique of Kant is shaped around the thesis that the ontological argument includes the predicate of the concept of God in the proposition that God

exists since the concept includes existence.

At this point, it is noted that this thesis focuses on Hegel's critique of Kant's objections and its relevant background rather than presenting a comprehensive discussion of the ontological argument in Hegel's system of thought. First, I will describe the background on which Kant's critique is based, referring to the epistemic foundations and metaphysical justification relevant his critique, and then I will discuss its main objections considering the totality of the inner argumentation of Kant's philosophy and question whether these objections are consistent. Later, I investigate the problems of Kant's critical philosophy which constitute the ground laying Kant's objection, in the context of Hegel's conception of the Concept for providing the groundwork to Hegel's critique of Kant's objection. Following this, I will analyse Kant's objection to the ontological argument in light of Hegel's critical approach to overcoming Kant's objections.

## CHAPTER 1 – Background of Kant’s Objection to The Ontological Argument

Whether God can be known by reason in context, various theistic arguments and the possibilities associated with these arguments are among the most important issues debated in the philosophy of religion. One renowned philosopher who explored this subject is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), whose philosophical system could be perceived as an attempt to limit the purview of knowledge. Kant’s critique of the ontological argument is very closely related to his philosophical system, especially with regard to the philosophy of knowledge. At this point, it is vital to investigate Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics. Criticising the ontological argument in the final chapters of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1998), Kant presents a philosophy of knowledge that serves as a foundation of these criticisms in his previous chapters. This attempt provides a central ground for questioning the claims about the possibility that metaphysical knowledge can be known only through reason. Therefore, at this point, it might be argued that Kant’s critical project of limiting knowledge is conditioned to overcome, in particular, traditional metaphysics. On the other hand, in order to evaluate Kant’s objection fairly and in the context of Hegel’s criticism, the scope of this thesis requires the examination of Kant’s epistemology and its relationship to the critique of metaphysics, which it is argued, comprises the groundwork for Kant’s refuting of the ontological proof of the existence of God.

### 1.1 The Epistemological Grounds of Kant’s Objection

Kant reached a number of different conclusions when drawing on the work of the rationalists, who base their knowledge on concepts, and of the empiricists, who base their knowledge on perceptions associated with the senses. Pointing out that knowledge has two different aspects, Kant famously expressed this idea as “Perceptual concepts

(thoughts without content) are empty, perceptions without concepts are blind” (Kant, 1998, p.193-194, [B75-A51]).

According to this, not only do concepts express knowledge, as rationalists claim, but concrete perceptions are also necessary for the formation of knowledge. Kant proposed two conditions, namely those of “matter” and “form”, to realise perception. While matter can only arise *a posteriori*, form exists in the mind *a priori* (Ibid, p.155-156, [B34-A20]). By accepting an *a priori* aspect to perception, Kant also distinguished himself from the empiricists, who defined perception as a collection of sensory data received from the sensory field.

According to Kant (1998), “space” and “time” are two basic forms of perception. These forms are the preconditions of perception that precede all other perceptions. According to Guyer (1987, p.346), these are Kant’s *a priori* forms of intuition as well as pure forms of intuition. To Kant, the world as it exists in time and space is just a world of appearance. Time and space are also general and compulsory forms associated with this world, which depend upon the senses. This philosophical system, which Kant described as ‘transcendental idealism’, is based on the thesis that there is a reality that we perceive through the senses, but the generality and basis of this reality arises from a system of conditions that proceed from the knowing subject (Allison, 1983, p.110). Therefore, Kant has an anti-realist point of view, as objects must fit the mind and the mind acts as the determinant, sharing a point of view that arose during the Copernican Revolution.

Another factor relating to Kant’s thesis that experiences have an *a priori* aspect is his doctrine of categories. Kant (1998) discussed this in his chapter ‘Transcendental Analytics’ (p. 201).

Categories, which have been a matter of serious debate since the time of Aristotle (384–322 BC), took on a new dimension with Kant. While in the case of Aristotle the categories belong to *being*, in Kant they are only the property of *thought*; that is, they belong to the mind (Heidemann 2011). They are present in the mind prior to experience, and only knowledge can be obtained through them. In a sense, the categories that we can define as the laws governing thought can be grouped under the titles of quality, quantity, relationship, and modality (Kant, 1998, p. 206, [A70-B95]). Viewing categories as the condition to facilitate knowledge, Kant proposes a rather controversial view. Accordingly, such categories can only be applied to phenomenal, or namely sensible areas. It is not possible to provide information about the *noumena* field, that is, the non-sensible area (Kant 1949, p. 252). In Kant's words, 'the understanding can make only empirical use of all its *a priori* principles' (Kant 1998, p.340, [A238]).

Arguably, Kant, who said that knowledge is possible thanks to cooperation with concepts and experiments, verified both traditions by creating a type of synthesis. However, it is not possible to state that he truly accorded the rationalist tradition its due. While the concepts give life to the experiment; the experiment does nothing but limit the concepts. Moreover, the categories are not inherited in the sense accepted by rationalist tradition. Kant affirmed the rationalist view that necessity cannot be obtained from experimental data in any way, and developed a doctrine of categories for this purpose. He was thus unable to make any concrete claims illustrating the source of the categories (Guyer 1992).

One of the most important bases of Kant's philosophical system is his effort to limit knowledge via the noumena-phenomena distinction. As Cleve described, from an etymological standpoint, these may be distinct as follows: 'A phenomenon is something that appears to the

senses, and noumenon is an entity knowable by nous or pure intelligence'. (Cleve 1999, p. 134). What Kant refers to as noumena are things in themselves that exist independently of the human mind, whether we grasp them or not. What he describes as a phenomenon is the experiential world; i.e., appearances. Therefore, we can conclude that Kant (1781) conceptualises the phenomenon as something that happens in time and space, with the noumenon being the opposite, as he stated, 'When we consider objects as appearances or in terms of our sensation, they have a temporal and spatial form, and when we consider them (personally) they lack this temporal and spatial form' (Ibid. p. 8).

Later, Kant, who separates noumena in positive and negative terms, states that he is interested in noumena in a negative sense. Meanwhile, he defines the positive noumena as 'an object of non-sensible intuition', and negative noumena as 'something that is not the object of our sensible intuition' (Kant, 1998, pp. 360-361, [B307]). While noumena in the positive sense is something that can be known in a non-sensory sense, it is unknowable in a sensory sense. Thus, Kant believes that a field outside the realm of appearances exists that is empty for us. Therefore, the concept of noumena becomes a "limiting concept", constraining the claims of sensitivity (Ibid. p. 362, [B311]).

Therefore, we must ask if Kant has a basis for justifying the separation of objects into noumena-phenomena, and separating the world into a sense world and mind world. The argument used by Kant (1781) on this point is worthy of note. For him, the very concept of appearances provides the reality of the noumena and justifies our separation of objects into noumena-phenomena (Ibid. p.347, [A249]). However, it is clear that Kant here tries to prove the existence of noumena by something that needs to be proved, namely the phenomenon, and inevitably a circularity occurs. As Walsh stated, 'Why should we have to use the concept of

phenomena, or what is the basis for having such a right?' (Walsh, 1997, p. 163).

Kant's (1998) attempt to justify the existence of the noumena field also contradicts his expressed understanding of categories. As mentioned, Kant suggested that categories could only be applied to the phenomenal domain. Therefore, if so, it could be said that Kant himself has thereby undermined his own discourse on noumena. This is due to the possibilities associated with talking about noumena, and the associated cognitive claims, which will also cause it to disappear. Indeed, if our concepts cannot be applied beyond the world of appearance and experience, that is, noumena, they cannot be applied to God, who is a noumena, and so it will not be possible and meaningful to talk of God (Plantinga, 2000, p. 10). However, it is clear that Kant (1998) himself made many judgments about noumena, applying various categories to this. When discussing the existence of the noumena, he applies the category of "being", the category of "negation", which he says is not in time, and applies the additional categories of "possibility" and "negation" even when these categories cannot be applied to the noumena. Thus, it is arguable that noumena comprises something contradictory (Priest 1995, pp. 90-91). When applying categories beyond the phenomenal world, Kant must either ignore the comprehensible relationship between the two worlds, namely between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, or abandon the concept of unknowns altogether (Howe, 1968, p. 83).

One of the cornerstones of Kant's philosophy is his analytical-synthetic and *a priori-a posteriori* distinction. Having carried out a thorough literature survey, it can be argued that Kant is one of the first to have articulated this distinction explicitly. According to Kant, an analytic proposition is a proposition that is 'already implicitly included in the subject of its predicate', while a synthetic proposition is, on the contrary, the proposition 'not included by the subject even though the predicate is related to the subject' (Kant 1998). For example, within

the proposition 'All objects take up space', the concept of "occupying space" is analytical, as it is contained by the concept of "object"; anyone who understands the content of the concept of "object" knows that the "occupancy" is part of its definitive content, and therefore these two things cannot be detached from each other. However, 'All objects are heavy', since the concept of "weight" in Kant's proposition is not a part of the concept of "object", and thus this proposition is a synthetic proposition.

Nevertheless, some problems arise with regard to this distinction. First, the concept of "object" is an empirical concept and so it is impossible for us to define it in its fullest sense since we cannot say what it does, or does not contain. According to Walsh, it is possible to conclude that the weight is a component of the object, or that the "occupying space" is not a part of the object (Walsh, 1997, p. 163). Moreover, Kant's explanation of analytics and synthetics in the context of the subject-predicate has been found to be very narrow and inadequate by his successors, and the separation of the analytical and synthetic is only evident in the subject-predicate propositions. It has further been suggested by Swinburne (1975) that this is not present in the broader set of propositions.

In truth, the *a priori-a posteriori* distinction is more of an epistemological distinction. *A priori* expresses known judgments independently of experimentation, while *a posteriori* expresses the opposite - that is, knowability through experimentation. According to Kant (1998), *a priori* judgment has two basic characteristics, those of "universality" and "necessity". Asserting that the best example of these judgments are mathematical judgments, Kant argues that their accuracy is completely independent of experimentation. However, although judgments are necessary, they are synthetic rather than analytical, as analytics and necessity are not always mutually dependent. In the case of mathematical judgments, the predicate is

not included in the subject. For example, in the “ $7 + 5 = 12$ ” proposition, it cannot be said that 12 is included in  $7 + 5$ ; thus, it is not possible for a person to reach  $7 + 5$  as a result of analysing the number 12 conceptually (Kant 1998, p. 144, [B15-B16]).

The type of judgments Kant emphasises in particular, are synthetic *a priori* judgments. As can be understood from the definitions given previously, these judgments are compulsory and universal, both of which broaden our knowledge independently of experimentation. However, the question of whether synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, does in fact create controversy. According to Kant (1998), synthetic *a priori* judgments arise in three important areas of knowledge: these are mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Undoubtedly, judgments in physics and mathematics are synthetic *a priori*, but this is not so in the case of metaphysics. According to Kant (1781), metaphysics necessitates synthetic *a priori* judgments, in order to realise its claim to be secure knowledge (Guyer, 1992). The thesis that metaphysics does not fulfil the requirement of synthetic *a priori* judgment also formed the basis of Kant's metaphysical critique (1781).

Well, can it be said that Kant is consistent in his understanding of synthetic *a priori* judgment? The criticisms made of Kant in relation to the synthetic *a priori* jurisdiction mostly focused on the fact that Kant was not clear at this point and did not fully address the issue. Here, as Strawson (2006, p. 43) points out, it can be argued that Kant has never given us a clear and general definition of synthetic *a priori*. Therefore, it seems quite difficult to say that Kant has made a justified defence of the synthetic *a priori*.

Kant's understanding of God proceeds from his suggestion that we cannot make any inferences about God based on reason alone. At this point, Kant, who opposed rationalist

philosophy, argued that in the metaphysical field, the mind can easily reach both theistic evidences and atheistic conclusions, that human beings are free beings and embody determinism. The existence of antinomies in these fields led Kant to criticise the functioning of pure mind in the metaphysical field.

## 1.2 Metaphysical Justification of Kant's Objection to Ontological Argument

The reason for Kant's challenge to metaphysics is obvious; for according to Kant, metaphysics has become the 'fighting ground of endless conflict' (Kant, 1998, p. 99, [Aviii]) and, in the face of the advancement of the sciences of the age, has found no other way but to always ask the same questions and engage in similar, recurring discussions. It is debatable whether or not Kant's (1998, p. 99, [Aviii]) aim here is to completely eliminate the foundations of metaphysics or to reconstruct it on new foundations. In stark contrast to such an attempt, Kant makes the following determination for metaphysics in Prolegomena:

“My object is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment and, disregarding all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary question, “Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?” (Kant 2004, p. 1)

Firstly, in building upon this argument, there is the critical, negative aspect of metaphysics, in Kant's own words, 'not the critique of books and systems, but the critique of the intellect, which, in terms of all knowledge in general, can strive independently of all experience' (Kant 1998, p. 101, [Axi]). It is critical to take consider that this information cannot be inferred from experimental experience. Ordinarily, information autonomous of experience is the essential aspire of metaphysics in agreement with the initial meaning of arriving on the

further side of physicality. It is crucial to note that Kant does not repudiate the true possibility of this kind of metaphysics, rather, instead merely sought to specify how possible such information is. This is a kind of inquisition of how much 'one can hope to achieve through reason when all the materials and assistance of experience are taken away' (Kant, 1998, p. 102, [A xiv]). For Kant, prior to utilizing rationale within the constructive venture of metaphysics, its inside boundaries and accreditations ought to be inspected. The cause itself takes up the toughest challenge ever, namely self-knowledge, 'a court to justify its legal claims' (Kant, 1998, p. 100, [A xi]). Accordingly, Kant's project (1781) 'examines the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and generally determines its source, scope, and boundaries in accordance with principles' (Kant, 1998, p. 101, [A xii]).

It can be said that since Aristotle, the most fundamental and dominant subjects of metaphysics, (vaguely classified as *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*), are divine things, especially God. In this sense, theistic arguments that constitute the proof of God's existence are metaphysical propositions that include the onto-theological character. If we consider from Heidegger's (1969) point of view, Kant is the first man who traditionally challenged the onto-theological tendency that metaphysics has contained from its inception. But here it is worthwhile noting that Kant attempts to divide the metaphysics as general and special, rather than ignore all aspects of metaphysics. As we observed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* itself, the transcendental analytic as a theory of pure conceptual understanding stands for general metaphysics, while the possibilities of special metaphysics are refuted in the transcendental dialectic (Kant, 1998).

Within the Presentation to *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant (1781) recognized the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in conjunction with the possibility of metaphysics.

He expressed: “The genuine issue of pure reason is included up within the question: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” (Kant, 1998, p.146). He at that point states: “The question emerging from the above general issue is: how is metaphysics possible as a science?” (Kant, 1998, p.148). If metaphysics is to be a science, it must first provide a solid ground for its own questions, that is, criticise what existence is. In this context, synthetic a priori judgment can be possible only bases precisely on this specification.

According to Heidegger, ‘Kant diminishes the question of the possibility of ontology to inquiry into the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments’ (Heidegger, 1990, pp. 9-10). Then he states, ‘the main issue in synthetic *a priori* judgments are that this synthesis reveals something that does not arise from experience of the being. This disclosure, which determines the Existence, is the primary step of reference to the presence. This immaculate reference (synthesis) primary determines the direction and horizon of what exists can be experienced in empirical synthesis’ (Ibid. 1990, pp. 9-10).

To understand this point, it is necessary to return to the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments. As it is known, at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant (1998, p. 102) recognizes between analytical judgments in which the predicate is comprised within the subject and does not require going out of the concept, and synthetic judgments in which the predicate is not included in the subject and needs the mediation of experience. To the first type of judgment, Kant gives the following example: ‘If I say “all objects take up space” it would be an analytical judgment’ (Kant, 1998, p.130). In this judgment, the notion of “object” includes the predicate of “space occupation” because the notion of “space occupation” is section of the description of the notion of “object” and is therefore included in it “analytically”. When we divide (so when we analyse) the concept of the object, we

certainly arrive at the concept of space occupation. Just like the concepts of “triangle” and “have three sides”.

The example Kant gives to the second type of judgments is as follows: “All objects are heavy” (Kant, 1998, p.130). In this judgment, we need to get out of the concept to understand that the “object” is “heavy” because the predicate is not included in the notion of the subject. Therefore, there is an obligation to resort to experience. Such synthetic judgments are *a posteriori*.

According to Kant (1998), it is easy to explain how we learn from synthetic a posteriori proposition, but the probability of synthetic a priori proposition is stand as a genuine question. At this point, this critical question emerges: *How are synthetic a priori judgments conceivable on the off chance that they don't require the intercession of experience?* Now it becomes clear why the possibility of metaphysics depends on *a priori* synthesis if all metaphysical judgments are synthetic *a priori*. As Kant puts it, ‘In synthetic a priori judgments, there is no benefit from experience’ (Kant 1998, p. 131). If so, then when I go beyond the concept of A and reach the concept B associated with it, what do I rely on if not experience? Thanks to what, was the synthesis here made possible? The answer is none other than the transcendental imagination because it is that which provides us with pure *images*, the pure determinations of time and space before any empirical phenomenon. The quality that Kant ascribes to *a priori* synthesis is simply *transcendence*. Contrary to what is supposed, this transcendence has nothing to do with the transcendence of God, as it has more to do with the finitude structure that requires the human mind to turn to the given. With this context, transcendence is the horizon on which objects can stand. For Heidegger’s (1990) view, this structure reflects Kant's new form of ontology and paved the way to demolish the

onto-theological qualification contained in metaphysics.

In spite of the fact that he annihilates the onto-theological character of traditional metaphysics, Kant cannot totally lay it aside; he re-put forwards its fundamental thoughts through the back entryway, so to talk. Despite the fact that the trinity of soul, universe, and God may never be known as things in themselves, Kant contends that it would be preposterous not to explore them. At the very least, 'it is possible to think of them as things in themselves' (Kant, 1998, p.115) According to Kant, although these ideas can never be used constructively as definitions of reality as in themselves, they can still have a regulatory or practical use (Kant, 1998). If one accepts these ideas hypothetically, 'as if they were true, without claiming any constitutive information about their concrete reality, they can still guide the person in formulating true hypotheses' (Kant, 1998, p. 605). The extraordinary thoughts of the intellect are significant for the solidarity of information. Assorting out precepts, they grant the solidarity of the utilize of concepts of understanding in experience. This is often their legitimate intrinsic application as contradicted to the imaginary transcendental one. Analogously, it is significant to note that these thoughts are essential to supply extent for the cosmical, practical precepts requisite by intellect from moral perspective.

Kant (1986, p.43) explains the concept of God, which is a transcendent concept, with the phrase the most real being (*ens realissimum*). The truest being is also the source of all (*ens originarium*), the supreme being (*ens summum*), and the existence of beings (*ens entium*), as the essence of all things. This conception of God is necessarily an idea present in the mind, because it forms the basis of all things. However, we must question if this idea has an objective reality; that is, whether there is a being that corresponds to the concept of God in our minds. Kant postulates that the absence of any contradiction in the concept of God only proves the

logic for the possibility of this concept (Kant, 1986, pp.44-46).

In his work *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines knowledge as that which is observable, that is, the phenomenal field, before criticising the theistic arguments. This is after the thesis that the metaphysical propositions put forward to prove the existence of God in the context of hanging classical metaphysics, are impossible by pure reason alone. Then, Kant introduces his main thesis, which states that God is not the subject of knowledge, since he is beyond the sensible world. Although the concept of a supreme being is beneficial in many ways, Kant (1998) argues that it is not possible to prove the existence of Him with pure reason, and so believing in Him is entirely a matter of faith. Kant expresses this explicitly with the words 'I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' (Kant, 1998, p.117/Bxxx).

## CHAPTER 2 – Kant’s Objection of The Ontological Argument

After highlighting the importance of epistemological ground and metaphysical reasons that are underlying in relation to the criticism of ontological argument, it is necessary to explore Kant's refutation of the ontological argument. The fundamental point informing Kant's (1998) repudiation of the ontological argument is that existence is not a real predicate, and the judgment of existence is not an analytic judgment, because existence is determined by experience and not by concept. Thus, existence cannot be determined from concept in an *a priori* way because the concept is necessarily linked to perception in order to be considered to exist in the context of experience. Consequently, it is possible to evaluate Kant's (1998, pp. 563-568) criticism of the ontological argument, according to two stages:

### 2.1 No Existence Claims Can Be Analytical

The thesis that the real existence of a thing cannot be determined by performing a conceptual analysis of that thing is one of the foundations of Kant's (1998) critique of the ontological argument. Accordingly, if we are to ascribe to a concept, we must move beyond the conceptual plane. Only through experience can we determine whether the qualities we envision to belong to something do so in reality. It is never possible to detect this in an *a priori* way. According to Kant (1998) the concept of essential existence is one of pure mind, and it is not possible to demonstrate the objective reality of this idea with mere reason. Kant asserts that concepts serve to limit the mind, rather than expanding its capacity to encompass new objects, and so perceive the opposite proceeds from the ontological argument, prompting us to identify the rules of the mind (Kant, 1998).

When stating that all the propositions of geometry, such as ‘the triangle has three angles’ are vital, Kant argues that this is derived not from their existence but from the propositions, and that the absolute necessity of the propositions is not the same as the absolute necessity of things (objects). Accordingly, ‘The absolute necessity of propositions is only the conditional necessity of objects or just a predicate of the proposition’ (Ibid. p. 564, [A594/B622]). This means: the proposition does not tell us that three angles are absolutely necessary, but rather only that if a triangle exists, all three angles will necessarily be present (Ibid. p. 564, [A594/B622]). In other words, Kant equates the necessity associated with propositions as conditional necessity, and the necessity of objects with absolute necessity. Thus, what is logically necessary becomes ontologically necessary, if and only if the thing at issue exists. Therefore, angles are only necessary if there is a triangle. The same is therefore valid in reference to God (Harrelson 2009).

In connection to the above example, according to Kant (1998) when positing an identical or analytical proposition, rejecting the predicate without rejecting the subject can create a contradiction, but when both the subject and predicate of the proposition are rejected, nothing remains to cause a contradiction. As Kant points out in his famous example of the triangle (which is a response to Descartes [1641]), it is contradictory to both accept the triangle's existence and deny its angles; however, if both the triangle and its angles are rejected, the contradiction then disappears. This contradiction also arises with regard to the existence of God. For example, the proposition “God is almighty” is a necessary proposition. Thus, when the subject of God is accepted, it must be admitted that he necessarily has absolute power. However, when denying the existence of God and his attributes, there is no inherent contradiction in the proposition that “there is no God” (Kant 1998, p. 565, [A595/B623]).

Consequently, there is only one analytical proposition for existence, and this constitutes an exceptional case due to a feature inherent in the concept of God. There is only one concept that contradicts itself when its absence is defended or the object of its concept is cancelled, and that is the concept of “God”. As Oppy (1995) argued, Kant's first objection was concluded to be unsuccessful. This was because no reasonable explanation was provided to counter the theists' belief about the analytical proposition and this concerns the existence of God (Oppy 1995, p. 31).

Kant is aware of the future of such an objection and focuses on either accepting that it is a tautology or that all propositions about existence are necessarily synthetic. When asked whether the proposition “There is something” is analytical or synthetic, Kant (1998) states that if the proposition is analytical, then saying that something exists does not add anything to it. He declares that the existence of that thing has been separated from its internal possibility, and therefore it is a tautology. If the proposition “There is something” is synthetic, it cannot be claimed that denying the predicate of its existence will generate a contradiction, because this only applies with analytical propositions (Kant 1998, pp. 565-566, [A597/B625]).

Mackie (1982) finds Kant's presentation of his critique of ontological argument under the heading ‘The impossibility of ontological argument’ to be very assertive, and criticises some of his points. According to Mackie (1982), Kant's critique of the ontological argument is not successful: if both the subject and the predicate are rejected in an identity proposition, then there will be nothing to contradict. Meanwhile, when Kant (1998) finds the proposition “God is non-existent” contradictory, he notes that there is no contradiction in the proposition “There is no God”. On the other hand, Mackie (1982) states that Kant should not be too certain that

no negative existential propositions in the form of 'There is no X' contradict him, or that no positive existential propositions in the shape of an 'There is an X' could be analytical (Mackie, 1982, p. 44). This criticism of Kant also opposes the logical necessity of existential propositions, because if all existential propositions are synthetic, it would also be meaningless to prove them on the basis of the negation of their claim to existence as advocated in the ontological argument, since the predicate is not necessarily included in the subject.

There are certain points relating to Kant's view that existential propositions cannot be analytical/ necessary, which also contradict his own system. This is because, according to Kant(1781), many truths of mathematics are existential. For example, “There is a prime number between seventy and twenty” and “The number after six is greater than five” are both existential propositions. Necessary propositions, then, do not only comprise analytic propositions in the Kantian sense. As Kant stated (1998), some propositions may be necessary, although their role is to express existence.

Conversely, there is no obstacle to the necessity of God's existence or to its inclusion in non-analytical necessary realities. *Analyticity* is a difficult and controversial concept to explain, as it provides the only explanation of necessity. God's existence is a necessary reality for a believer. However, this imperative is not only a logical imperative. The necessity of God's existence should not be confused with the necessity that ideas about God exist. According to Hughes (1995), necessity is not a quality associated with claims about God, but rather is a quality attributed to God. Therefore, it is not our thoughts that necessitate the statement “God exists”, it is rather to question if God's existence is really necessary.

According to Kant (1998), the question over whether an entity exists as the highest reality with no flaws, as in the ontological argument, remains unanswered. To respond to this question would require arguing whether or not God exists within the realm of the world of experience. An obvious answer to this question would be that God does not exist in this way. God is not part of this world, and also is not an object of experience. This simply means that God lacks *contingent* being. However, this is not a deficiency in God's situation, because if God had a *contingent* being, he would not then be God or what is understood by this term in general (Engel 1963, p.34).

However, many people echo Kant on this issue. For example, Alston (1960) argues that it is okay to describe a perfect being that exists in the mind as eternal, scholar, just, merciful - but the situation is not the same when "really exists" is added to the mix. According to Alston (1960), when such a being's existence is not asserted, then God remains within the domain of ideas or concepts, but when real existence is put forward, a step is taken beyond this field. It is not possible to do this only by examining content, but there is also an obligation to look outside in order to perceive what exists there. Studying what is in the mind does not reveal what is actually happening. According to Alston, this is similar to discussing the contents of dream analyses, or staring at a lock in order to open a door (Alston 1960, p. 462).

Likewise, according to Alston, the proposition that Anselm presents as necessary is true about a being in the mind. Moreover, because it exhibits the logical properties of propositions, it is based on the presupposition of there being mental existence, with the following features: (I) Can only be tested by thought; and (II) Being in the mind shares the following characteristics with other unreal modes of being: Two types of real existence modes can be specified for both beings in the unreal mode. Thus, when there is something that exists in

dreams, there is a true awareness of the dream state. To say that the mountains in the dream have very sharp peaks does not signify anything about geographical terrain. Likewise, adding a predicate to something in the mind offers no indication of the real world reality, except that that person has access to it or to certain thoughts (Ibid, pp. 467-468).

It is possible to oppose such thoughts with objections to Gaunilo's (1998, p.108) criticism of the island. If the argument were to be based on the conceptual analysis of entities other than God and the proof of non-essential beings, then Alston's (1960) dream analogy would be valid. However, in its absence, the only concept perceived to constitute a contradiction is the concept of God, and only God has the privilege of being proven in this way.

As can be seen, the thesis that the existence of something can only be proved in the real world by exploring beyond its conceptual state, constitutes the basis of these criticisms. However, not everything can be proven by this method, as it is only truly valid for concrete entities that can be perceived with the senses in the outside world. The thought that there are no entities we can perceive in this way, or that we do not know them, is open to strong criticism, as shall be examined.

## 2.2 Existence Is Not A Real Predicate

The ontological argument aims to prove that God must exist, starting with the definition of God. However, Kant (1998) claimed that there cannot be a situation in which existence is a defining feature of God, because to “exist” is not a “real” or “determining” predicate. It is possible to see the foundations of Kant's (2004) criticism in the work of Hume, who Kant describes as ‘the person who awakens himself from his dogmatic slumber’. According to

that:

“The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin’d with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.” (Hume. 2000, p.48)

As Shaffer (1962) rightly expresses, it is apparent that Hume here confuses ‘*the existence of understanding*’ with ‘*the existence of what is conceived*’. Another claim by Hume (2000) that only the idea of that thing is thought of vividly and actively when making judgments about the existence of what happens, has led him to state that the idea of being cannot extend above or beyond what we can think of, and therefore it will lead to the saying ‘*Whatever exists can be thought of is thought to exist*’. Such a doctrine creates greater uncertainty about what negative existential judgments might arise. If the definition of something has to include the notion that that thing exists, denying that it exists is paradoxical, just like denying any of its other defining properties. If our conception of things involves existence as the necessary attribute of things, then none of the aspects of the denial of existence will make sense. Hume is mistaken in his thinking, ‘*Whatever we think is, we think it exists*’, because it is possible for a person to think of something as non-existent (Shaffer, 1962, p. 316-317). As it has been seen, Hume's perception of existence as nothing, is an impediment to making sense of the proposition expressing nothing.

In saying this, Hume did not explicitly comment on Anselm (1077-1078) or his ontological argument. However, according to some thinkers, there is a direct relationship here to Anselm's claims. Accordingly, what Hume (2000) said can be interpreted in two ways. The

first interpretation offered is that the idea of existence confirms the idea of everything, and not just the idea of God. In other words, it is possible to think of God, and to think of things that are known to *not* exist, such as the mythical unicorn. According to Hume, when anything is thought of, it is considered to already exist. It does not follow from this that it really exists. Here, thinking of God is exactly parallel to thinking of unicorns. And if Anselm's argument is held to prove the existence of God, it likewise would also prove the existence of unicorns.

There is a second interpretation of this that could explain Hume's (2000) intended meaning. It may be that Hume contends that the idea of *being* is not an idea that can be added to all other ideas, but is rather an idea that is *not* added to any other idea. One might think that an idea that does not add up is by no means a real idea. If thinking "as existing" does not add to the notion of the most perfect being, then explicitly thinking of it as existing will also be the same as thinking it simply. Anselm (2000) sought to use the notion "as being" to serve as a bridge from mere thought to the true existence of the most perfect being. But if Hume's interpretations are handled in this way, then what he shows is that it is a bridge, not only to God's presence in thought and his real existence, but that everything we can think of is a bridge that connects God's presence in thought to God's real existence. In another way, according to Everitt (2004, pp.35-36), everything we can think of is a bridge that cannot connect anything, even the real existence of God in thought.

"Being" is a term that can then be used in multiple senses. For example, the usage of the word "being" in the sentence "Man is a thinking being" and the usage in the sentence "there are people who think" is not the same. While in the first usage "being" means thing or object, in the second usage it functions as a predicate. In English, this distinction is delineated by the words "being" and "existence". In Kantian thought, "being" was used not to mean "thing"

or “object”, but rather to mean *predicate*. However, what Kant meant by *predicate* should be understood more as a quality than a semantic and syntactic statement (Kant 1998, p.567).

Kant confuses and weakens the force of the verb “to be” denoting existence by discussing the word “(is)”. In addition, according to Everitt (1995, p.396), Kant offers no explanation of what “assuming the subject” relates to. In the absence of such an explanation, it is scarcely possible to convey the meaning: “assuming the existence of the subject”.

So what are Kant’s intentions when he refers to the “real” predicate that forms the basis of his criticism? Kant (1781) identified this as ‘anything that adds something to the concept of the subject, [or] expands it’ (Kant 1998, p. 567, [A599/B627]). Therefore, in order to be considered a true predicate, a statement must go beyond what is stated in the subject concept. So, if I were to say: ‘Circles are round’, the words “are round” are used only as a logical predicate, and the subject concept does not extend beyond the word “circles”. But if I were to say ‘Plates are round’, the words “are round” are used here as the real or determining predicate, because we cannot determine whether the plate is round or not simply by examining the concept of a plate, which is the subject concept.

To support the claim that “being” is not a true predicate, Kant (1781) asserted that a predicate adds something to the concept of the subject. If “being” were a genuine predicate, the tautology of propositions expressing existence, and the denial of propositions expressing existence would be self-contradictory. That is, all positive existential statements would be viewed as logically necessary, and all negative existential statements would be rationally impossible. In this view, according to Allen (1961, pp. 59-60), an entity is a logical predicate rather than a real predicate; i.e., it is a predicate of predicates, rather than a predicate that qualifies objects.

Again, according to Kant (1998), when we claim that certain things exist, we change our conceptualisation of those things, which would then result in a very different concept from that which we started with. In this case, we could not then claim the existence of the original subject because we have a new and different concept. Thus, if “being” were a real predicate, we would not be able to say the real object associated with my concept exists. However, we can clearly state that when we say that the subject exists, we do not add anything to the concept of the subject, and so “being” is not a real predicate.

For Kant (1998), a predicate that does not belong to the subject does not convey the quality of the thing - that is it has no real existence and so it is not an actual predicate. This relatedness of the concept to the existence of that which is envisioned is shown by Kant in the relationship between one hundred *possible* dollars as a concept, versus one hundred *real* dollars that are present and available. In fact, there is nothing added to the hundreds that I have than the hundreds that I envision in my mind (Kant 1998). The present hundred dollars, when considered alone, do not result in an increase in its value. Of course, when one hundred dollars added to my bank account, my wealth increases relative to the wealth perceived when this was merely an idea.

Kant (1781) believes that the hundred dollars that exists, and the hundred dollars that does not exist, are notions of the same amount of money, although they arise as seemingly different concepts. In fact, there is only the *concept* of a hundred dollars, and adding the predicates of existence or nonexistence to it does not affect any change in the concept. From this standpoint, the thought that Hume (2000) expressed as ‘we only think of something as existing’ are similar thoughts to those Kant (1998) expressed in regard to this hundred dollars

example. However, this argument is far from convincing, as Hume acts according to a psychological assumption that we can only think of anything “as being”. Kant's (1998) example of one hundred dollars is also relatively inadequate, because nobody has advocated the view that *being* adds something in this way. Kant's (1998) argument is also self-refuting, since he believes that the economic situation is affected by the real hundred dollars more than when it is just held in mind as a concept (Barnes, 1972).

Kant's hundred-dollar example is imperfectly conceived, because comparing objects and concepts ensure the former does not comprise anything more than the second. Thus, a proper comparison would be between the *concept* and the *concept* (Everitt 1995). Also, for instance, in the proposition that “Socrates is tired”, there is talk of Socrates and something new is said about him. Likewise, the *hundred dollars* is not just a simple thought, but the assumption that it is in the bag also references a hundred dollar, and again this says something new about it. This neither adds more dollar to what is being spoken about, nor gives a complete description of it, but says more about them, that they exist (Hughes 1995, p.10-11).

Hughes (1995, p.10-11) criticism links to Kant's belief that being is not a true predicate, since it contradicts his other important doctrines discussed above, i.e., the notion that existential propositions are generally synthetic. Synthetic propositions add to the concept of the subject in that something that is not thought of by any means in it. And if existential propositions are generally synthetic, then “being” must be a real predicate that contributes to the definition of the subject. In this case, according to Everitt (2004, p. 52), Kant's (1998) problem is that he needs to reconcile the following three incompatible claims:

- 1) “Being” can only be used as a logical predicate, and therefore can neither add to nor

extend upon the concept of the subject;

2) “being” only makes synthetic judgments; and

3) In synthetic judgments, the predicate is always added to the concept of the subject.

Thus, although Kant's thesis relates to the claim that “being” is not a real predicate, it is difficult to find a convincing defence of this. In fact, Kant's own words show he denies this thesis as much as he defends it.

In addition, according to Hartshorne (1970), there is confusion in Kant's objections to the ontological proof for the existence of God. For Hartshorne (1970), the main issue of concern arises independently of the question of whether being provides a general predicate. That being is only a predicate in the context of divine nature is not a premise but a consequence. To state this as a general rule, an entity is not a predicate (qualifier). However, God sits outside of this. Anselm (1077-1078) clearly stated the reason for this; i.e., that God is not like other beings (Hartshorne 1970, p. 62). The critical foundation of the ontological argument is that God has the privilege of different proof because he is not like other beings. An objection that existence is not a predicate may be raised in cases where there is proof of contingent existence in this way. That is because even if the being is not a predicate, the *necessity* of the being is a predicate.

Mackie (1982) is among those who see existence not as a predicate, but as an existential quantifier. For example, according to Mackie (1982), when the expression ‘without bodies spirits exist’ is used instead of ‘there are spirits without bodies’, it expresses that this predicate is realised or exemplified (Mackie 1982, p.46). The result of this view is that being is a

secondary attribute, resulting from the existence of everything that exists in the same set, rather than an attribute to be possessed. Therefore, it does not then seem possible to prove the existence of God without going beyond these concepts, and to claim that the set of these concepts necessarily has an element, based on descriptive contents such as “necessary existence” or “perfect being”. In this case, what needs to be questioned in the ontological argument is not whether existence qualifies God, the perfect being - but whether the most perfect being is modelled in the set of beings. According to those who express this view, the grammatical predicate and the real predicate, the conditional being and the real being have thereby been confused in the ontological argument (Palmer, 2002, p. 15).

As can be seen from the above discussion, the question of whether existence is a predicate or not is open to discussion. If being is not a predicate, it will not be possible to give meaning to propositions expressing the existence or non-existence of something. Likewise, if being is not a predicate, the difference between fictional entities and real entities will be ignored and all categories of entities (necessary, possible, impossible) will then be considered equal. It is evident that God is not a predicate like other predicates. Moreover, what might be expected from Kant (1781) at this point is not to criticise the ontological argument with a general judgment that existence is not a predicate, but for him to demonstrate there is no special condition placed upon existence by the proposition “God exists”.

## CHAPTER 3 – Background to Hegel’s Criticism of Kant’s Objection of The Ontological Argument

Hegel’s system (1813-1817) of philosophy can be viewed as being focused on overcoming the limitations of Kant’s work (1781) with regards to the issue of knowledge. In particular, Hegel’s critique of Kant’s objections to the ontological argument forms a fundamental critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy on the separation between thought and being which exhibits Kant’s attacks to special metaphysics. Furthermore, Hegel’s criticism of Kant, in relation to both the structure of antinomies and the ontological proof of the existence of God, affords important clues concerning Hegel’s view of the Concept. On the other hand, the ontological proof of the existence of God (i.e. the process of deducing God from the relevant concept) is, on the basis of the inconsistency principle, related to the understanding of the Concept in Hegelian thought. At this point, it can be considered that the Concept doctrine and the ontological argument are mutually intertwined, or provide possibilities to explain to each other in Hegelian thought. Thus, this part proposes that Hegel’s understanding of Concept provides us with a transition ground for plausibly evaluating Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s refutation of ontological evidence.

### 3.1 Hegel’s Criticism of Kant’s Understanding of The Concept

Hegel criticised Kant’s critical philosophy (1781, 1787) in both the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (1817) and in *The Science of Logic* (1813), on the grounds that it is not possible to grasp the Concepts, namely the Absolute, and the nature of the God (Hegel, 2010a & 2010b).

Hegel (2010a, p. 82) considered that empiricism's restriction of itself to the sensory field, including taking experience as the only foundation of knowledge, formed aspects he compromised when it came to Kant's Critical Philosophy (1781,1787). However, Critical Philosophy treats experience solely as the knowledge of phenomena, rather than of things in themselves. Hegel stated that this philosophy commences by distinguishing elements encountered during the analysis of experience, i.e. the sensory material and its universal correlations (Hegel 2010a, p. 82). One of Hegel's (1813 & 1817) intersections with Empiricism is that no further aspects are capable of being captured through perception than the particular and the existing. However, Critical Philosophy also places universalism and necessity as essential determinations and components of experience, even though they are not acquired empirically, but rather belong to the spontaneity of thought, i.e. they are *a priori*. According to this philosophy, the determination of understanding (i.e. categories) constitutes the objectivity of knowledge (i.e. perception), from which emerges experience. They give synthetic *a priori* judgments, generally by comprising correlations (Lauer, 1982).

In questioning the validity of the concept of understanding, Critical Philosophy can be seen as alien to Classical Metaphysics (Longuenesse, 2007). However, Hegel viewed Critical Philosophy as approaching this question in terms of subjectivity and objectivity, (Bristow, (2007) rather than considering the contents of these thoughts and their specific relationship to each other, as can be seen in Hegel's (1817 & 1813) *Encyclopaedia* and *the Science of Logic*. This opposition is related to the separation of the elements encountered in the analysis of experience, i.e. the determinations of thought that are stated to be *a priori* when expressing the elements of objectivity, universalism, and necessity. However, subjectivity contains the whole of experience (both sensory material and its universal relations), in a way that there remains nothing left of itself on the other side (Lauer 1982).

According to Hegel, the investigation of the validity of the thought determinations by Classical Metaphysics is an important development. For in this way, it is questioned to what extent the determinations of thought can access the knowledge of truth, or whether they can access its knowledge itself. Hegel considered this questioning to be in terms of whether the determination of thought can be seen as subjective, or objective (Ross, 2015). In Kant's (1998) theory of knowledge, on the other hand, he viewed determinations (i.e. categories) as being objective. However, Kant did not consider the term "objectivity" in relation to its everyday meaning, i.e. to express aspects external to the "I", and awarded by means of feeling. Categories belong to the thought itself, and to the spontaneity of the thought, and are considered subjective in the sense that the thought is that of the "I". Hegel viewed Kant as considering aspects that were appropriate to thought (i.e. the universal and the necessary) in an objective manner, while the feeling (or what is felt) was seen as experienced subjectively (Ross, 2015). However, although thoughts are universal and compulsory determinations, they are also subjective in terms of being the thoughts of the "self" in their distinction from the "thing". Moreover, Hegel's philosophy considers the objectivity of thought as residing not only in the "I", but in every aspect as the true essence of things, i.e. the Concept (Longuenesse, 2007).

Critical Philosophy gives the original identity of the "I" in thought (i.e. the transcendental unity of the self-consciousness) as the basis for understanding concepts (Hegel, 2010a). In this respect, the determinations of thought have their sources in the "I", which is seen as determining universality and necessity. The *a priori* forms of the feeling of the "I" consist of space and time, with these being viewed as manifestations of the self. In addition, the manifestations are also of the "I" in the sense that they are subject to the conditions of space

and time. Categories are simply entities in which this diversity is correlated, synthesised (Hegel, 2010a). The “I” is originally identical to itself. According to Hegel, in Kant's philosophy, the “I” is an abstract relation to the self, with its influence resulting in unity. Thus, the “I” reduces the diversity of feeling to unity, which, at the same time, is an activity belonging to the “I”. Moreover, Hegel (2010a) stated that Kant’s explanation was an accurate estimation of the nature of consciousness, adding that an absolute unity to diversity is not offered by the subjective unity of self-consciousness, but rather identity (Hegel, 2010a). Accordingly, Hegel acknowledged that categories cannot be attained through feeling, being simply determinations of thought (Hegel, 2010a). However, this does not infer that they belong only to the “I” as the knowing subject, with categories also being considered determinations of things.

Hegel noted that while categories elevate those concepts arising from feeling to objectivity and experience in Critical Philosophy, their position as simple unions of subjective consciousness are conditional on the material given through feeling. These concepts are, in themselves, empty, with their application and use being limited by their empiricity. The determinations of feeling as the further component of experience are also subjective, as are the categories awarding objectivity.

Therefore, Hegel considered categories to be insufficient determinations of the Absolute, i.e. unable to know things as they are (things in themselves), since this is not established through absolute feeling (McCumber, 2013). Hegel (1817) thus considered Critical Philosophy's thing in itself (i.e. that God and Spirit are contained under the thing in itself) as abstracted from consciousness, including all the relevant thought and determination of feeling (Hegel, 2010a p.89). What remains is a complete abstraction and emptiness, which is determined as

the otherside of sight, representation, and particular thought. The thing in itself is the product of the “I”(i.e. the mind), which makes its abstract identity the object itself.

Hegel (1813) considered Kant's achievements to include his distinction between understanding and the mind. While the object of the understanding is finite or conditional, the object of mind is the “infinite or unconditional” (Hegel, 2010b). Therefore, the finite quality of knowledge or perception gained by understanding as experience is based on the content of such perceptions, known as phenomena. Furthermore, reason (as the faculty of the unconditional) views knowledge contained in experience as being conditional, while that expressed as the object of the mind (i.e. the infinite and unconditional), is considered self-identity, or the original identity of the “I” in thought. According to Hegel, Critical Philosophy reduces the infinity and unconditionality of reason to a simple abstract identity with itself, i.e. one that is absolutely indeterminate and excludes distinction. While it is assumed that such a reduction allows the mind to go beyond the finite and conditional nature of the principal, it also ensures it becomes finite and conditional, essentially due to the infinity and unconditionality of the mind being limited by the finitude and conditionality of the principal. However, Hegel did not view the true infinite as being the other side of the finite, due to true infinity containing the finite within itself, which is neglected by means of preserving and hiding (Lauer, 1982).

Bristow (2007) noted that Hegel viewed Kant as justified in validating the Idea for the mind, apart from the abstract determinations of the understanding and the representations for which the name Idea is generally considered appropriate, including its association with the faculty of the mind (Bristow 2007, p.26). However, Hegel viewed Critical Philosophy as failing to establish the true meaning of Idea, as a result of considering items of knowledge as forming

only phenomena for the “I”, with and their own forming the other side that the “I” cannot reach. While Hegel agreed with Kant that phenomena constitute the content of immediate consciousness, Hegel also viewed them as phenomena in themselves. According to Hegel, such finite aspects do not find the ultimate ground of their existence in themselves, or conditionality with each other, but in the universal divine Idea in which they are the phenomenon, i.e. their appearance (Hegel 2010a, p.90).

However, Kant (1781) considered the activity of understanding to focus on establishing objects within the jurisdiction by synthesising the diversity of feeling to bring it under the realm of categories. This highlights the task of establishing the connection between various judgments and drawing conclusions (Kant, 1998). Reason gives a systematic unity and integrity to experience by linking together the concepts of *a priori* (i.e. judgments coming from understanding through ideas) on the basis of integrity (Kant, 1998, p. 400/[B379]). Ideas are therefore seen as pure concepts of the mind, which (since they are subject to conditions) are not subject to the categories of time, space, and understanding - but rather correlate conditional concepts on the basis of wholeness.

The concepts of pure mind are thus seen as focusing on the unconditional synthetic unity of all conditions (Kant, 1998, p. 400/[B379]). As discussed above, Hegel (1817) viewed Kant (1781) as taking the mind to be the faculty of the unconditional, while at the same time reducing it to the abstract identity of the “self”. Hegel considered such an identity as both belonging to, and emerging from, the understanding (Kant, 1998, p. 405/[B391]). Since abstract identity belongs to the understanding, the reduction of the mind to an abstract identity results in the cancelling of its unconditionality, resulting in it only forming the principal. Kant considered the activity of the mind as making inferences by linking together judgments

of understanding (Hegel, 2010a). On the other hand, Hegel (2010a, p.103) stated that Kant's theoretical mind consisted of the 'negative faculty of the infinite', since the mind performs its activities on finite and conditional contents originating from the understanding, with its field of activity being limited to this content. This infers that, in itself, the mind contains no positive content, due to being limited solely to discerning the finitude of knowledge of experience. However, Hegel (2010b) considered the mind as not being externally limited nor determined by any foreign content, with its unconditionality residing in its self-determination and ability to relinquish all content.

In Critical Philosophy, the determination of the understanding belongs to finitude, because that which is experienced is limited to phenomena. Hegel (2010a) agreed that finite thought was related to phenomena, although his philosophy assumed that the knowledge provided by the determination of the finite is capable of achieving the truth, i.e. infinity. This is therefore viewed as being insufficient to grasp the Concept, namely God (Hegel, 2010a).

### 3.2 Hegel's Approach on Kant's Overcoming of Metaphysics

First, it is noteworthy that, as Guyer (1993, p.171) said of Hegel's critique of Kant, Hegel's critique of Critical Philosophy is not internal, that is, it is an external critique, not in terms of Kant's own argumentation. Nevertheless, this should not read as Hegel entirely denying Kantian thought. Even we can argue (Heidegger, 1990) that Hegel attempted to overcome Kant's destruction to the ontotheological character of classical metaphysics, with Kant, again despite Kant.

Hegel's (1817) division of the Encyclopedia as: Logic, Nature and Spirit is actually a

rethinking of the dual structure of metaphysics, which is divided into *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis* (Hegel, 2010a). Hence, Hegel's attempt to unite ontology and theology does not remove any part of metaphysics, but only changes its direction and way of perception. From Heidegger's (1969) standpoint, Hegel's effort can be assessed as making the inherent structure of metaphysics as "onto-theology" more evident. In this context, Hegel's criticism of Kant's objection to the ontological argument consists of a significant part of his project in which Hegel ventured to overcome Kant's attack on metaphysics.

Unlike Kant, Hegel believed that *a priori* synthesis contains a metaphysical meaning and potential with regards to providing new ground to enable ontology and theology to come together. Hegel (1802) states *a priori* synthesis as the absolute unity of being and thought in his very early studies. As follows:

"How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? This problem expresses nothing else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the *a priori* way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical." (Hegel, 1988, p. 69).

The most premise of ontology is the theoretical solidarity of the two modes of the frame, that's, the frame of the being (substance) and the frame of the logos (judgment). The "Idea" develops from the argumentative combination of subject and predicates in both judgment and objective reality, which decides the Thought as the reality of being. According to Hegel (1802), pure images determine the true nature of ideas as analysed by Kant. Hegel stated:

“We must acknowledge Kant for putting the idea of authentic *a priori* into the form of the transcendental imagination because in this way he paved the way for the Idea of reason to take root in the capacity of understanding. Then he goes on as follows: It is the imaginary *true speculative idea*” (Hegel, 1988, p. 79).

The speculative meaning of *a priori* synthesis is that it reveals and realises the unity of opposites and emerges as an absolute concept. Hegel claimed that the judgments Kant called synthetic were actually analytical: *a priori* synthesis is the true statement of identity, and identity of difference. Compared to this, mathematical examples such as ‘all objects take up space’ or worse, ‘ $7 + 5 = 12$ ’ given by Kant are insufficient in expressing this dialectical identity. Kant confused collection with genuine synthesis, juxtaposition of forms with truth (Hegel, 2010b). Moreover, as Hegel puts it, the idea of “synthetic judgment” is self-contradictory. The forms of judgment are not synthetic unity - but separation, alteration, and division. Only analogies, not simple and discrete propositions, have genuine synthetic unity. In other words, Kant again covered his own discovery with the examples.

According to Hegel (1813), Kant (1781) failed to fulfill his original promise (Hegel, 2010b). Indeed, even the expression of synthesis itself evokes an outside unity and mere coexistence of things that are actually apart. Therefore, it can be said that the Kantian synthesis is, after all, doomed to remain analytical.

### 3.3 In Hegel’s Thought, Concept and Its Relation to Being

As Cunningham (2001) observes, in Hegelian thought, the Concept forms the unity of being and essence, i.e. a being that has mediated itself through its essence. Thus, the Concept consists

of the cancellation of the mediation that the being enters with the essence by being preserved and concealed. Furthermore, within the Concept Oneself, it expresses the annulled immediacy of this mediation. It therefore implicitly includes the concepts (i.e. categories) belonging to existence and essence. The Concept has not yet been determined in terms of being a direct (i.e. abstract) universal, but since it implicitly contains determinations as the annulled immediacy of mediation, it is determined by itself by means of a simple relation to itself. This point separates the Concept from the designated entity as not being completely determined. Since this discussion took the Concept as its starting point, it is viewed as existing in itself, i.e. as being direct and undetermined, as well as devoid of distinction and universal abstraction. However, Hegel (1817) commenced with the Being, which does not contain any determination or mediation as cancelled, and arrives at the Concept by deriving the categories from each other dialectically, i.e. demonstrating that they necessarily emerge from each other (Hegel, 2010a). Thus the Concept is a self-mediated being, including various determinations (i.e. categories) of being and essence, thus becoming the richest asset in terms of determinations. But it is also the annulled immediacy of these determinations, not yet being self-determined.

Hegel stated that any opposition to the invalidity of ontological proof consists of the opposition between thought and being (Hegel, 2010a). Kant, (1998) on the other hand, considered that experience cannot be present in the assertions of the mind, due to ideas of the mind not being given by experience, particularly if they are not contained within such experience. Thus, the unconditional (like the universal) is not given empirically, i.e. the universal in the empirical is not found unconditionally and does not include that which is determined in the universal (i.e. the unconditional). Moreover, Hegel stated that the aspect determined here concerns that which is meant by existence (Hegel 2010a).

However, according to Lauer (1982, p. 63), Hegel also considered that when the question focuses on the issue of God, there is a concept (object) that differs from any particular concept in terms of species. Thus, when finite and particular concepts are considered in terms of themselves, their existence (*dasein*) is separate from the concept. But, when it comes to God, his concept (i.e. the Concept) includes Being. Therefore, according to Lauer (1982, p. 150) Being is, in Hegelian thought, pure thought, and therefore simple, undetermined, and unmediated, i.e. the being is determined to be undetermined. Therefore, the indeterminacy of being is not overcoming determination by cancelling, it is the absence of determination before all determination and the immediacy of this absence. The concept thus cancels both the being and essence by preserving and hiding them, therefore including them implicitly within itself as their unity.

This indicates that for Hegel (2010b), Concept is entity (i.e. it being). However, Concept is not just being (i.e. an undetermined entity); the concept is the one that determines itself as the essence, the one who reveals itself as determined, and it is the unity of the being and the determined being (*dasein*) (Lauer, 1982). For this reason, presenting the Concept as only consisting of being (i.e. it exists) is a one-sided, abstract, and incomplete expression of the Concept. To say that God is only entity - exists - is, according to Hegel (2010b), to indicate that God is abstract and undetermined, that he is the other side of this world, in opposition to the world of determinate things. Precisely due to this being in opposition, it is limited to its own opposite (i.e. the other) being indeterminate and abstract, as well as limited and finite. Therefore, in the non-Hegelian sense (i.e. from the non-mediating concept) the thought (i.e. that God is being) will remain within the knowledge that God is just being. However, according to Lauer (1982, p. 279), Hegel considered such knowledge of God to be incomplete. This

implies that those claiming that God can only be known unmediated, may consider that there can be no mediate knowledge of God, due to knowing mediately forming a conceptual knowledge of the conditional, i.e. discursive knowledge. In this respect, when the knowledge of what God is constitutes a mediate knowledge (since indirect knowledge concerns the conditional): God is thus reduced to the conditional. Therefore, God can only be known as non-mediated, so as not to be reduced to the conditional. As noted above, Hegel considered that non-mediated knowledge of God remains in the thought that God is only being, i.e. existing (Williams, 2017, p. 49). On the other hand, there is no place for immediacy in Hegel's system: God conditions himself and conditionally preaches himself, but also establishes unity by mediating his abstract, unconditional being and conditional being, i.e. his existence. This makes such aspects the content of his thought as thoughts, and thus returns to his unconditioned existence as mediated. He is, therefore, no longer abstract unconditioned at the end of the process, but concrete unconditioned itself.

In Hegel's view, the Concept is a being that determines itself and places itself into determination by leaving the immediacy, abstraction, and indeterminacy of existence, as well as being (i.e. existing). Thus, when considered conceptually, the most real being with the richest determinations is the Concept.

Hegel's criticism of the fundamental objection of Kant's theoretical philosophy to the separation of thought and being can therefore be seen to arise from a radically divergent philosophical sensibility. Guyer (1993) pointed out that, in this aspect, Hegel's work deals with identical issues to those considered by Kant, although it remains unclear in his assessment of Kant's objections according to the same standards whether Hegel's criticism of Kant should be regarded as an outright rejection (Beiser, 1993, p. 171).

Furthermore, Taylor (1987) notes that the concept has been used in a different sense from Hegel's view of Concept in Kant's philosophy, i.e. in accordance with common sense (Taylor, 1987, p. 298). Therefore, from the standpoint of absolute idealism, Hegel attributed a separate meaning to thought and concept than that found in Kant's theoretical philosophy. The Idea corresponds to a Reality (truth) independent of design, as well as concrete objects, but at the same time being more than actual reality: "the Idea is Real in itself and for itself. It is the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity. Its ideal content is nothing but the Concept in its determinations" (Hegel 2010a, p. 275).

Thus, unity of concept and reality is contained in the Idea. When the concept coincides with its reality (or when reality rises to the level of concept in its external determinations), Being is identified with the Idea, since the Concept is the unity of reality or objectivity. The incompatibility of actual things with the Idea concerns the appearance of their finitude and untruth (Hegel 2010b, p.757). Moreover, according to Cunningham (2001), the Idea constitutes the absolute total reality: this wholeness is the Idea, that is, it is not only the ideal unity and subjectivity of the Concept, but also its objectivity.

This indicates that, in Hegel's thought, the Concept is based on the identity of thought and being, thus gaining an objective and concrete determination. Furthermore, Guyer (1993) states that Hegel established the identity of the relationship between being and thought by means of the Concept. However, Hegel also established this relationship by assigning a significant, and quite different, function to the 'Concept' (Notion) from the conventional tradition of thought (Beiser, 1993, p. 189).

As can be understood from all the determinations related to the concept, in Hegel, "*Begriff*" (Concept), in the sense that Kant understands, the intellectual design of the subject is not a form without content, but a concrete one. All of Hegel's opposition to Kant's subjective approach is directly related to the kind of meaning he attributes to the 'Concept'. In addition, as well as the traditional philosophical understanding, Hegel adds determination to the term Concept, which he uses in a manner corresponding to the Concept or Notion, and attributes an objective content that goes beyond the substantive and the concrete. Hegel therefore sees the Concept as the essence of concrete existence and Reality, i.e. the Concept includes Being and Essence within itself. At the same time, it corresponds to the stages of the logical Idea, absolute, with these stages (or determinations) being defined as a concept (Hegel, 2010a, pp. 224-225).

This suggests that, for Hegel, the Concept acquires a concrete meaning, along with other concepts within the unity of a particular intellectual system. Therefore, Hegel does not consider the Concept to form an abstraction universally present, or as the imagination or design uniting the common properties of objects, but rather the inner essence of things. For, in Hegel's own determination, although the Concept is the expression of a unity, this is not a unity or an abstract unity that stands in place of an object, as opposed to the real existence and distinctions of an object, in which its essential qualities are momentarily combined. On the contrary, according to Cunningham (2001), the Concept (i.e. the unity of specific distinctions) forms a concrete unity or integrity. In addition, Hegel (2010b) emphasised the concreteness of the Concept, which he therefore briefly defined as the concrete mediated unity of specific distinctions and oppositions.

It can therefore be seen that, in Hegel's view, being and thought come together in Concept,

which forms the unity of the subjective and the objective. It is thus necessary to evaluate Hegel's understanding in terms of this identity. He viewed concept as thought awarding a determination to existence, but being also realised as a factual or concrete entity. Therefore, in Hegel's text, the Concept contains the concrete as well as abstract, due to considering thought and the Concept in a medial relationship with the being or with the logical Idea, instead of separating it from existence. The concept, on the one hand, is an entity that has not received abstract determination, on the other hand, it is essentially inherent in being, just 'like a plant is in a seed' (Taylor, 1987, p.299). Being is therefore shaped through the concept, gaining determination and reality, while the concept does not have a reality apart from the actual being.

Thus, contrary to Kant, the 'I' for Hegel is (like all individual and finite beings) a concept that realises itself as a concrete entity, and therefore evolves, rather than being the source and ambiguous carrier of the concepts of an understanding. In this way, the I (as a substantial being) gains its own reality and becomes suitable for its concept, with Hegel noting that:

“When the concept develops in concrete existence by making itself independent, it is nothing but the I or pure self-consciousness. In reality, I have concepts in the sense of defined concepts; but I have come into being as a pure Concept in itself” (Hegel, 2010b, p. 583).

The Concept thus includes subjectivity and objectivity as a totality in itself. Hegel (2010b) argued that the existence gains determination through the concept, and that it comes true in time by adapting to its own concept. In addition, Hegel noted that: 'reality is objectivity correspond(ing) to the Concept, not external things correspond(ing) to my designs' (Hegel

2010a, p.275). This realisation also enables the immediate (i.e. the Concept) to acquire determination and become reality. In this way, the subject or concept noted in Hegel's text can be associated with a concrete content. The self that has taken determination is the realised concept. Furthermore, in his criticism of Kant, Hegel attempted to destroy the belief (widely accepted in modern thought) that thought and reality should be seen as separate entities.



## CHAPTER 4 – Hegel’s Critique of Kant's Objections to The Ontological Argument

It was inevitable that Hegel would settle accounts with Kant’s critical philosophy that advocated the rational impossibility of metaphysical propositions in order to overcome Kant'sdestruction of classical metaphysics. This consists of ontotheological characters that is Kant's reason to critique ontological proof for the existence of God. Furthermore, Hegel had to face Kant’s project of limitations of knowledge, also because of his against position towards the philosophical course of his era. As previously observed, Hegel developed his approach to the ontological argument throughout the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (1832) from the *Science of Logic* (1813). This current thesis focuses on Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s rejection, with his critique discussed in three stages, according to the progression of Hegel’s works.

### 4.1 Hegel’s First Criticism to Kant’s Objection

According to Bubbio (2017), Hegel interpreted Kant's objection to the ontological argument that ‘Being is not a real predicate’ in stating that being differs from concept or thinking. Hegel therefore attempted to clarify that the analogy on which Kant based his argument was fundamentally defective, due to a confusion on the relationship between finite (i.e. determinedthings) and infinite (i.e. things-in-themselves) (Ross, 2015; Oppy, 2018). This infers that the essence of ontological proof lies in the thesis that it is possible to separate the concepts of finite things from their existence, but, when it comes to the issue of God, the concept cannot be separated from His existence.

Hegel thus endeavoured to establish the error of the analogy on which Kant’s objection was

based in relation to his belief that when it comes to the definition of God, there is no distinction between existence and concept. Kant claimed that, if a hundred potential thalers (i.e. silver coins) display a content identical to those that are real, it is possible to abstract the content of the hundred thalers by isolating them from all their relationships, thereby identifying them only with themselves (Kant, 1998). This is due to Kant considering that a concept is related to other concepts only to the extent that it is taken as a reference to existence, i.e. not only as a concept (Williams, 2017). It can be argued that an individual's financial situation is improved (or worsened) by gaining (or losing) a hundred thalers, but not that this causes the thalers themselves to change. These add only to the concept of an individual's legacy, i.e. from the standpoint of someone who is wealthier or poorer than a hundred dollars, these form a determinant of person's monetary circumstance. Thus, the hundred dollars and an individual's financial circumstances are separate aspects, i.e. they differ from their concepts. This leads to the deduction that a potential concept is only identical to real content as a result of such abstraction.

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Hegel viewed a concept as being determined (Hegel, 2010b). Hence, the concept of a hundred thalers can be seen as a determination of an individual's financial circumstances and therefore the loss of someone's one hundred thalers becomes a determination of his/her legacy. Therefore, the deprivation of a hundred dollars is nothing, i.e. nothing is determined. Since a legacy is something that has continually been associated with a particular individual, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the possession or non-possession of a hundred thalers on the one hand, or not having (or imagining or not imagining) them on the other, infers a difference in content. In this way, if the owner of a hundred thalers has a content that differs from an individual who is not in possession of such a sum, this can be seen to determine the existence or absence of such coins. These are not

then abstract, but linked to a particular individual's financial condition. This infers that the existence or nonexistence of such coins makes a considerable difference.

By contrast, from Kant's (1998) perspective, such a sum can be seen as being related to an individual by being, which is precisely why the existence of the hundred dollars is external to their concept (Williams, 2017). This leads to the conclusion that Being does not instrumentally belong to the concept, as Kant did not view every relationship as a predicate of the concept, due to its remaining outside of, and unnecessary for, the relevant terms. Thus, from this perspective, Kant can be considered to view a concept as an isolated thought, and Being as existing in relation to something else. This is where Hegel's (1817) thinking departs from Kant's. Nevertheless, Hegel states that a notion specified as one content, or the notion of something, presents in relation to another (Hegel, 2010b). The relation of a concept to another thing therefore differs according to whether or not the concept exists.

Hegel therefore considered that Kant's (1998) analogy confused a number of issues, including viewing Being as meaning to be in context (i.e. in connection to something else), while content is self-identity. Hence, Kant considered the relationship of the hundred dollars to an individual's financial situation as being only feasible if the hundred dollars are actually present, i.e. to exist and be attached to the individual's heritage and therefore in touch with him/her. However, from an alternative point of view, as a specific content, a hundred thalers can be seen as having nothing to do with anything.

Hegel argued that ownership of a hundred thalers can be seen as related to a person's pecuniary situation, not in response to the coins' existence or absence, but because of a concept, i.e. money. This approach determines these to be in connection to something else, not simply

their own existence. In this way, their reality is included in the idea of the hundred dollars, as their presence brings them into a relationship with an individual bequest that differs from one created by their absence. This infers that, as it expands the concept, existence is a predicate, which leads to the collapse of Kant's argument. This is due to the inability to derive a hundred thalers from the imagination, and so Kant only determines them through their notion. Likewise, the God's existence cannot be inferred from His concept. At this point, Hegel takes his claim to a further level, stating that the uncertainty of a specific aspect determines its subjectivity, i.e. imagination is less determined than an actual concept and thus more subjective. Thus, an imaginary hundred dollars is associated with the individual imagining their existence, but they are, in truth, more indirectly related to a person's wealth, i.e. they are subjective, inasmuch as they are imaginary, they cannot be present, because nonexistence is the essence of the imagination (Bubbio, 2017).

Finally, Hegel (2010b) drew attention to the fact that, although there are some differences between notion and being, there are more noteworthy differences between aspects that are finite (i.e. the hundred fanciful dollars) and God who is interminable. According to Oppy (2018), this suggests that the example of the one hundred dollars is defective for refuting the ontological proof, due to the definition of finite aspects differing from the existence of their concepts. However, in their situation, notion and reality are distinguishable (Oppy, 2018), and hence finite and flimsy, with no need to show their differences in order to refute the ontological argument, as to this difference has been accepted by the advocates of the argument. Therefore, as the concept and existence of God are considered inseparable, it is the abstract definition of God that is placed in opposition to finite things, i.e. the definition of ontological proof. However, Kant's objection did not extend to this definition, due to his analysis of the concept of God being through a finite example.

Following his assessment of this issue, Hegel (2010b) attempted to criticise Kant by focussing on the epistemic ground on which Kant's claim was based. It ought to be noteworthy that, the notion of God as utilized by Hegel when criticising Kant ought to not be befuddled with Hegel's possess understanding of God, but instep comprises of the notion of God in connection to the ontological proof.

#### 4.2 How God's Existence Mediates as The Essence

Hegel's another comment about Kant's objections shows up in *The Doctrine of Essence* (Hegel,2010b), which contains the ontological argument alongside Hegel's further proofs of God's existence. Although Hegel's approach is fairly complex, it appears that it is the ontological argument itself that forms its primary preoccupation. Hegel thus examined the meaning of existence in Kantian philosophy, putting forward the ontological argument according to Kantian (1781) criteria. From this point, Hegel's intention is to indicate that the Kantian refutation can be seen as void, indeed in connection to Kant's self presumptions. It can sole be legitimized within the setting of a more progressed frame of information. In other words, presence isn't really a predicate, but for causes other than what Kant suggested in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

As examined in first chapter, Kant's (1998) refutation was based on a definition of presence inside the setting of experience as an entire. Hence, in Hegelian terminology, presence is related to something other than itself, that is, to an interceded Being. According to Kant (1998), the existence of anything means that it depends on its relationships, while a concept is immediate and independent of its relations, consisting purely of self-identity. That is to say,

as Oppy (2018, p.106) stated, a logical, rather than a real possibility. However, the ontological evidence assumes the notion of God to be mediated, for the notion is proven by means of evidence-mediated information. Thus, it is “the consciousness of the correct movement of the object within itself” (Hegel, 2007, p.45) that expresses the object as its self-mediated. When it comes to ontological argument, God is defined as grasping all realities, including presence. God is encompassed by His universal reality, with the ontological proof being logically arranged as follows: (I) God is all the reality; (II) Being is a reality; (III) therefore God exists.

This deduction concludes that reality mediates between God and existence. This results in God being mediated as essence, whereas to be interceded is to be in connection to something else, to be sited in a precise context. However, the other aspect consists not only of the only institution of interceding. If that was the case, God would be cancelled, because if His presence depends on the other (as understood by Kant) then God would not be in Himself. However, God is not interceded by anything else, because the interceding agent (reality) is included in a God-like presence. Mediation is thus “assimilated” in God, which is ultimately immediate. Since the essence of God is motion, God is not static, just as he cannot be divided. This is self-mediation, which involves the transition from one determination to another, i.e. God is in a state of constant change. In like manner, at the starting of the authentic improvement of the ontological proof, God, having been conceived as an immediated and indivisible being, is finally once again taken as immediated though the divisible, i.e. as mediated within himself. This indicates that in terms of the ontological argument, existence is mediated. As noted previous chapter, the idea of mediation arose while logically ordering the argument. Thus, in ontological argument, information of presence is considered only possible if interceded. Faith, conversely, is interceded and is not viewed as information by advocates of

the ontological argument. This kind of purely indirect knowledge is therefore not considered to infer knowledge of a particular aspect, because the thing itself is direct.

In his *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* (1832), Hegel contends that faith does not contradict information and science, faith shows up as a shape of information, since the object of faith is known (Hegel, 2007, p. 52-56). Therefore God, as the object of Faith, has been mediated, as a result of having an existence separate from the world he created, i.e. he exists within, and for, himself. On the other hand, pure information and faith are seen as completely intangible, i.e. self-identities. Presence is, therefore, neither solely nor entirely immediated, but is rendered immediate by the annulment of mediation.

This may be seen to certify that Kant is accurate in claiming that 'presence isn't a predicate of substance' (Kant, 1998). However, this is not due to existence being mediation and essence self-identity. Therefore, Kant's claims concerning this matter can be considered to be inappropriate. This particularly arises from Hegel's approach to existence as being a mode of a core being, and therefore already essentially inherent, i.e. in a state of substance. Thus, presence is substance as motion from one determination to another, being the autonomy (or self- mediation) of the notion.

Therefore, as has previously been considered, according to Hegel a proof is a self-mediation (Hegel, 1984c), and in this manner can be seen as consciousness of the right motion of the object inside itself. In addition, this merging between information and object does not happen in outside information (i.e. science), where movement is subjective and the question isn't a development. Hence, since information of God is information of His activity, it is objective, not outside and subjective, because God's existence can only be grasped by thought, not by

the senses or the imagination (Hegel, 2007, pp. 42-43). Accordingly, in essence, God is an object of knowledge, and thus it is possible to infer that God's process of knowledge is identical to the movement of the object.

This second critique focuses on the substance of inconsistency, in differentiate to the common-sense see that treats inconsistency as a imperfection. Hegel's criticism is hence concerned with indicating out the consistent imperfection in both the Kantian objection of the ontological evidence and the imperfections within the ontological evidence that shape highlights of the logical phase of the argument itself, as well as Kant's objection itself. The point to be considered here is that, when Hegel focuses the proof in connection to presence in common, the arguments of God's presence are taken by God as cases of the passage from substance to presence. Additionally, Hegel points out that such a passage is impossible on the premise of the Kantian supposition that presence is only mediation and substance, i.e. self-identity.

Therefore, from Hegel's (2010b) perspective, presence is a mode of the being of the substance, i.e. the movement of the essence by itself from one determination to another. Thus, Hegel views both unilaterally in his critique of scientific and religious consciousness. Hence, scientific consciousness requires knowledge to be completely medial and religious consciousness to be completely unmediated. This indicates that scientific knowledge cannot claim that an object exists, because it is only hypothetical, and religious knowledge has no known content.

### 4.3 The Transition from Concept to Existence

This final section considers Hegel's perspective on the essence of the ontological argument related to the transition from subjectivity to existence, particularly (as discussed in the previous chapter) that this can only be arrived at following a clarification of the concept of Concept (Hegel, 2010b). The examination of the move from notion to presence (i.e. objectivity) can as it were be embraced after tending to the theme of the subjectivity of notions. The method of joining the address of the presence of God into the framework of notions contained in Hegel's rationale highlights the quintessence of the contention as shaping a move from concept to being, and from subjectivity to objectivity.

In Hegel's thought a concept does not remain subjective to the extent that it is thought, rather than mere imagination, but becomes objectivity, thus invalidating its subjectivity (Hegel, 1995/v3). Hegel construed God's perfection as being an affirmation of human worth, particularly due to Hegelian thought considering God as Soul or thought (Hegel, 2007), with thought going through a preparation of improvement in which each phase of information is comprised of reasons for self-dissolution and the move to the higher level of information. And thought goes through a stage of improvement in which each arrangement of information contains grounds for self-dissolution and move to a better grade of information. Typically the nature of the human soul, as long as man is characterized by thought as the stage of upgrade to higher stages of self-knowing until the ultimate phase of "taking over the Divine" is come to (Hegel, 1995/v3, p. 454-455).

The passage from subjectivity to objectivity is inferred spontaneously from the nature of the concept, rather than that of eternity, and therefore cannot be limited to the concept of God alone

(Bubbio, 2017). Hegel thus confirmed the direction of the ontological proof regarding the passaging of a notion from subjectivity to objectivity, but, at the same time, argued that this transition cannot occur in Kant's system, because the ego is strictly separate from external things, particularly in terms of intellect or perception. Therefore, every action reduces subjectivity at the stage at which the concept is made objective. To dream of a hundred dollars is therefore definitely to not have them, although it is necessary to have a conception of a hundred dollars in order to acquire them (Hegel 1995/v3, p. 454). This applies exclusively to a genuine notion, which is the as it were illustration in which the move takes put from subjectivity to objectivity (Bubbio, 2017). As an alternative, incorrect concepts are viewed as relating to traditional formal logic and so encountering no improvement, thus becoming fixed self-identities. Thus, the relationship between an incorrect concept and the external neither derives from, nor constitutes it, i.e. an incorrect concept is related neither to existence or objectivity.

However, the notion of Concept put forward by Hegel considers that, within the scope of Subjective Logic, it does not form a self-identity but a subject, i.e. the concept increasingly determines itself (Hegel, 2010b). Thus, in contrast to the classical idea, substance is considered the transformation of Being into an active subject (i.e. a concept). This activity has three aspects, carried out through judgment as universal, particular, and singular. The judgment constitutes the original implicit part of the concept made clear in the judgment. In this way, the universal, the particular and the individual are (by means of the connection to which all three eventually converge) related to each other as subject and predicate, whereas intervention accepts a task isolated from subject and verb. Hence, in the absence of mediation, the opposite subject and predicate are combined to form a comparison. In this advance, the notion is not exterior the substance (i.e. the object), but place of symbolises the improvement

of the object, and is transformed by means of this reference (Lauer, 1982). As noted previously, within each context, ontological proof traces the logical principle of the concept's transition to objectivity. Nevertheless, Hegel claimed that content alone can move from notion to presence. However, substance can be actualised within the predicate, remaining subjective, since, in it, the notion does not however rise from itself. However, the subjective realisation of the subject within the predicate does not compose a situation for the move to objectivity where subjectivity is unthinkable (Lauer, 1982). Therefore, it cannot be expressed that presence may be a predicate of God, as is expected within the ontological argument. To claim that something exists as it were within the verb is indistinguishable to saying that something exists as it were hypothetically.

For this reason, it appears that something is actualised (or not) in the predicate. If it is not carried out in the predicate, then it is simply a name in terms of thought, while it remains subjective and not objective if it occurs as an alternative option in the predicate. In other words, it is content only (i.e. solely a circumstance of being objective) and cannot be seen to represent a true passage to objectivity. Despite the fact that real content is required to involve objectification, because its predicates are an actualisation of the concept (i.e. a negation of the notion) they form the notion. Otherwise, if predicates are not components of the notion, then this is an empty (rather than a real) concept, as opposed to a real form. At this point, logical assumptions can be exceptions. Hence, in connection to the question "presume I have a hundred real dollars?", reality is not set forth from the start as a rationale presumption.

Hegel set out his critique of Kant with the taking after illustration. In the event that "I am hungry is to have an actual ingredient, instead of being as it were an occurrence of jurisdiction, so it has to be repeated as perusing: I am truly hungry'. Hence the 'I' is actualised in 'hungry'

and gets to be objective as a result of the exertion to delight starvation. Hence, this criticism of Kant includes Hegel demonstrating that a concept passes to objectivity through its actualisation” (Hegel 1995/v3, p. 454).

However, the contention utilized against ontological prove was that an unaccompanied title is incapable to move into objectivity. Hegel takes this as correct, due to the concept of “I”, which is taken as a title as it were and without reference to its predicates, being incapable to supply the move to objectivity.

Likewise, when it comes to the issue of God, the passage to entity was achieved through the whole realities. However, this extent should be avoided, and thus the true notion of God is, on the opposite, obtained by taking His activity into account. God, as the vital and absolute spirit, is known only by his doings, which led to human beings previously being directed to know God through his works, because it is only from these that the determinations (which are said to be his ownerships) can proceed (Hegel, 2010b, p.626). In other words, if accept the assumption that the universe is a predicate of God possible association between God and the universe is identical between subject and predicate. Hence, God is not Himself, but the subject, in so far as he is attributed. Nevertheless, due to the predicate being the subject, the latter occurs as a twice repudiation. Therefore, God is, as the object of faith, the Originator of the universe, but is also being in, and for, Himself (Hegel, 2007, p.54). As stated earlier, faith is immediate information, being not just a name, but also a notion. Moreover, a notion has its indications, which become clear in predicates. Therefore, for the purpose of directing the passage from the notion of God to His being, God is necessarily comprehended initial in His predicates, i.e. in His actualisations and His doings. It is only then that God's being can be inferred from His realisations.

The postulation of both the ontological evidence and Kant's objection is that entity comes into existence solely as an aspect outside the concept. In addition, proponents of ontological evidence consider the transformation from notion to existence as unique to God. Yet Kant argues that, even in this matter, it is out of the question. The ontological evidence hypothesis states that the changeover from notion to being is God-specific, with the space between thought and reality expanded through a being that recognises that there is no difference, including when it comes to thought and existence. Thus, when existence is accepted as being outside of thought, it becomes easy to accept the Kantian critique. Then all that remains is to demonstrate that, without exception, existence is outside of thought, including when it comes to the case of God.

The essence of Hegel's critique of the ontological evidence is that the proof put forward that the passage of the notion to being is specific to the notion of God, because the notion is acknowledged to be one-sided and non-existent (Williams, 2017). On the other hand, Kant took a more extreme attitude when it came to his claim concerning the one-sidedness of the notion (and hence the one-sidedness of being), arguing that being can solely be incorporated in, not inferred from, thought. Hegel considered it vital that the passage of the notion to being should be grasped as a course of self-actualisation, i.e. the passage to objectivity. As noted above, the subject is the concept, and what takes place when aligning it with the predicate is the object, due to it being in relation to the subject.

It should here be recognised that existential judgments are neither analytical nor synthetic. The farthest terms are neither completely similar, nor completely different, but the connection between such terms is composed externally to the concept. On the contrary, it is a

developmental act, outcoming from the subject's relationship to him/herself, with this self-reference inferring that the concept alters, i.e. consciousness is changed through self-reference. Thus, the ontological evidence formulated by Hegel in his *Science of Logic* emerges as an implementation of the passage from thought to reality, or from concept to being. Therefore, for Hegel, the significance of the ontological proof in his Logic is that it enables the potential implementation of the move from subjectivity to objectivity. Thus, if the presence of God was characteristic of the basic explanation, then it should be treated as the Idea (Hegel 2010b, p.627). In any case, the description of God as "the whole of all non-contradictory substances," makes Him a theoretical being that falls flat to travel into objectivity within the way the concept exists, or within the sense of a shape of self-existence. Therefore, the notion of God does not undertake the position of the thought in ontological proof. Ontological proof is generally considered the apex of Hegel's overall philosophical system.

Kant's central objection to the ontological argument concerns the nullification of the passage from notion to presence. A demonstration of the invalidity of the Kantian approach depends on correctly locating Kant's denial, as follows: Kant's notion is abstract and an abstract notion does not come into presence (Williams, 2017). According to Hegel's thinking, the flaw in Kant's refutation is the presupposition that (as a general concept) the Concept will not be compulsorily realised, and in this case clearly does not arise spontaneously. Nevertheless, according to Hegel, the opposition between Kant and ontological evidence arises not only from the contradiction of these positions, but from the contradiction with themselves. This indicates that Kant's critique of ontological evidence must therefore be understood, not only as an external criticism, but also as the development of the internal contradiction of ontological evidence.

On the other hand, evidence is demanded accurately because there is an empty space between notion and presence. Kant's initial presumption is the same, because refuting the evidence clearly illustrates that the notion of God is pre hypothesized in Him. The exception to this is the principle that the notion of God must necessarily move from itself to presence, whereas, in the argument made at the beginning this thesis, a notion cannot make such a passage. However, in Hegel's view, the notion of God is an implementation of the principle that the notion enforcedly transforms from subjectivity to objectivity, i.e. Hegel's notion of God is subject to the same principle that infers that the original proof becomes an exception.



## Conclusion

The ontological argument developed to prove the existence of God continues to attract attention today as it has done in the past, because it contains many complicated issues of philosophy. This argument, which is closely related to whether God's existence can be known clearly and distinctly with reason, has been criticised by many philosophers. Kant's criticism, which can be regarded as the most important of these criticisms, is an objection to the proof of God's existence in *a priori* ways only by reason. Acting with the assumptions quite different from the assumptions of classical theism, Kant also opposed the understanding of "innate knowledge", which has an important place in the theist tradition, which is partly a source of ontological evidence, and therefore God can be known clearly and distinctly.

It is possible to see Kant's philosophical system as an effort to limit knowledge. One of the most important pillars of Kant, who argues that knowledge should be limited to the sensory field, is the numen-phenomenon distinction. According to Kant, who named the area outside the sensory area as *numen*, it is not possible to reach the information of this area. Since God is also included in this field, it is not possible for us to know about God. The concept of God is a very useful concept, but it is a matter of faith, not reason. Whether Kant has sufficient grounds to limit knowledge to the sensory sphere or whether he has such a right is a matter of serious debate.

Here, Kant's critique of ontological argument is fundamentally based on the assumption of God's unknowability. According to Kant, the fact that there is no contradiction in the concept of God, which is the claim of the ontological argument, is only the logical proof of its

possibility. The real problem is whether there is an objective correspondence to the concept of God, and it is impossible to deduce the real existence of something from the conceptual analysis of that concept, it must be proven in the real world by breaking that concept. However, it is not possible to prove the existence of everything with this method. With this method, it is possible to prove concrete entities that we can only perceive in the outside world. In this way, removing the opportunity to talk about entities that we cannot perceive does not seem right.

Kant's objections are based on the thesis that no claims of existence can be analytical, and that existence is not a real predicate. According to Kant, concepts serve to set limits to new objects rather than expanding our minds to new objects. But Kant, who thinks that the opposite is done in the ontological argument, argues that it is impossible to move from logical necessity to ontological necessity. According to Kant, what is logically necessary is ontologically necessary if that thing exists in the real world. Also, a contradiction may arise when we reject the predicate without rejecting the subject in an identical proposition, but the contradiction disappears when we reject both the subject and the predicate. This is also true for God's condition. When we accept the subject of God in the proposition that "God is almighty", we necessarily admit that he is omnipotent. However, when we deny the existence of God with his attributes, that is, there is no contradiction in the proposition "There is no God".

It should be pointed out that there is only one concept that will create a contradiction when its absence is defended or the subject is cancelled, and that concept is the concept of "God". What is claimed in the ontological argument is that God is the exception in this matter. Therefore, the point that Kant should criticise should be why the proposition about the existence of God cannot be analytical. In addition, it does not seem very accurate to explain

necessity only with analytics. It is possible to include the existence of God in non-analytical compulsory realities.

The second thesis that has become a slogan in Kant's critique of ontological argument is that existence is not a real predicate. According to Kant, if existence were a real predicate, the propositions expressing being would be tautology, and all negative existential propositions would be logically wrong. Also, when we say that certain things exist, we would change our concepts of those things. In the case of the famous existent one hundred thaler and non-existent one hundred thaler, Kant argued that the former contained nothing more than the second. However, it is obvious that Kant confuses objects and concepts here. It is quite erroneous to make a comparison between object and concept.

Kant's two fundamental criticisms of the ontological argument - that existential propositions are synthetic and existence is not a real predicate - actually contradict each other. Because if the existential propositions are synthetic, then "exist" must be a real verb that adds something to the subject. Therefore, Kant's thesis that the famous being is not a predicate is rejected by Kant himself.

In his to begin with criticism, Hegel managed with Kant's fundamental contention in his negation, to be specific that presence isn't a genuine predicate. Kant's contention is based on the personality between the plausibility of something and its reality. Hegel demands that this contention obscures the qualification between unique and decided Being by applying the categories of unique creatures (the move to nothingness) to settled Being. This disarray leads to the invert blurring of categories, that's , to the move from the finite to the boundless. It shows up within the case of one hundred dollars, which Kant employments to appear by relationship

that God will be characterized as the whole of all substances within the unique. Hegel does not recognize between decided Being, limited entity and notion, or once more between presence and being, since these refinements are not managed with by Kant.

The second criticism concerns the basis of inconsistency, as contradicted to common sense that inconsistency may be an imperfection. In this manner, Hegel's feedback can be summarised as takes after: He contends that they don't contain preconditions. Be that as it may, the concept of God essentially incorporates presence as a predicate, and thus God exists. On the opposite, Kant's see is that by the nature of concepts in common, presence cannot be maintained a strategic distance from. In this manner, indeed the concept of God cannot incorporate presence. In this manner, God exists as it were as plausibility.

At the last stage, Hegel claim that the notion includes existence. Or, to put it in Hegelian terms, the concept as subject is necessarily invalidated and automatically becomes objective, and this also applies to the concept of God. However, viewed this way, the concept of God is no longer just a concept of God, but self-consciousness as a real thing: it is a developed concept. Therefore, for Hegel's Logic, God is a concept. And the concept requires self-creation, which requires the transition of subjectivity to objectivity

As a result, considering Hegel's critique, Kant's objections can be evaluated as follows: the elemental theory of Kantian refutation emerges from the qualification between presence and concept. Existence as it were makes sense within the setting of encounter. It is not a concept, hence the space between them does not permit for the move from one to the other so the concept cannot be actualised. The truth of the presence or non-attendance of a question associated with a concept does not alter the concept, and bad habit versa. That is, the concept plays no

part in deciding presence. In any case, in spite of the fact that the concept and presence do not “affect” each other, the qualification between them stems from the identity of their substance, and in this way the distinction is cleared out. To relate this to information, and the completeness of encounter, produces an external distinction. Hence, each claim for the presence of something is basically simply a projection of awareness. Specifically, usually a utilisation of awareness past the scope of which it can authentically be worked out.

In this manner, there is no genuine idea of “creation” beginning from the concept, since character and contrast stay partitioned. In terms of substance, the idea of character between the concept and its question is outright. Be that as it may, inside methodology, likelihood is totally inverse to reality, and this implies they are completely distinctive. The distinction is totally outside of, and disconnected to substance, with respect to which they are indistinguishable.

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