



**T.C.
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

**TURKEY’S BALKAN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR
IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS OF KOSOVO**

by

Mehmet Cem OĞULTÜRK

**Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Ph.D. of
Political Science and International Relations**

İSTANBUL, 2012



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
ACTORD	Activation Order
AD	Anno Domini
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AVNOJ	The Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia
BC	Before Christ
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Force
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CEC	Central Election Commission
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSP	Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
DEİK	Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu/Foreign Economic Relations Board
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DPMNE	Democratic Party for the Macedonian National Unity
DS	Democratic Party
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Commission
EC	European Community
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPOL	The EU Police Mission
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FY	Fiscal Year
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G-8	The Group of Eight
GDP	The Gross Domestic Product

HDZ	Croat National Union
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICR	International Civilian Representative
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia
IFOR	The Implementation Force
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
IMP	International Military Presence
IMRO/ VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization/ Vatreshna Makedonska Revolutsionna Organizatsia
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA/UÇK	Kosovo Liberation Army/ Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës
Kos-Met	Kosovo-Metohija
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
MRL	Movement for Rights and Liberties
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NLA	National Liberation Army
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PDP	Party of Democratic Prosperity
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
PKK	Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Workers Party
PMSC	Politico–Military Steering Committee
POSH	Democratic Party of Albanians

SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SEEBRIG	The South-Eastern Europe Brigade
SEECF	South East Europe Cooperation Process
SECI	The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SP	Stability Pact
SRSG	The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
TDU	Turkish Democratic Union
TEN-T	Trans European Network Transport
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UCPMB	Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Forces
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	The United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	The Western European Union

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ABSTRACT

In international politics, the evaluation of a region with multiple actors such as the Balkans is only possible by means of a many-sided and comprehensive study. The truths that are encountered in relation to the Balkans are the influences of demography, geography and external forces on Balkan geopolitics and history. Kosovo is also, because of its geographical location, constituting a crucial point in the Balkans, strategically in a very important region. Because of this fact, from past to present it has become a lot of countries' interest.

After the Cold War, with the help of revolutions of 1989, world witnessed the changing movements and democratization process with together the rebirth of nationalism in former communist regime of Central and Eastern Europe. Nationalism dominated the political discussion and analysis of the Balkans in the length of the time. Nationalism became an important instrument in order to activate the hostilities among the ethnic groups before and during the Balkan conflicts. However it is not the only source of the conflict in Balkans.

During the post-Cold War period, Turkish foreign policy gained several new aspects and experienced significant changes. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and breakup of the communist regimes in the Balkans, the Iron Curtain which divided Turkey and Balkan states disappeared and these developments brought out a renewed Turkish interest and connection in the region. However this early optimism gave way to stability and security concerns with the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new conflicts and wars in the Balkans. Turkey had to bring forth new approaches and policies in order to face the difficulties in this unstable geopolitical atmosphere.

Kosovo issue is also a multifaceted one that has historical foundation. Considering the plans of global powers over Balkans, Kosovo issue seems likely to effect the stabilization of all Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. By Kosovo's declaring its independence the issue became more complicated contrary to come to a solution. This thesis examines the Turkey's Balkan policy in the context of Kosovo issue with giving special emphasis to post-Cold War period and attempts to find out consequences of the Kosovo issue in international politics

ÖZET

Uluslararası politikada, Balkanlar gibi çok aktörlü bir bölgenin değerlendirilmesi, ancak çok yönlü ve detaylı bir çalışma ile mümkün olabilmektedir. Balkanlar ekseninde karşılaşılan gerçek, demografi, coğrafya ve dış güçlerin, Balkan jeopolitiği ve tarihi üzerinde ne denli etkili olduğudur. Kosova da coğrafi konumu nedeniyle Balkanlar'ın düğüm noktasını oluşturan ve stratejik bakımdan önemli bir bölgedir. Bu nedenle tarihsel süreç içinde birçok medeniyetin ilgi odağı haline gelmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası, 1989 devrimlerinin de yardımıyla, dünya orta ve doğu Avrupa'nın eski komünist rejimlerinde değişim hareketleri ve demokratikleşme süreci ile beraber milliyetçiliğin yeniden doğuşuna tanıklık etmiştir. Zamanla, milliyetçilik Balkanlardaki siyasi tartışma ve analizlere hâkim olmuştur. Balkanlardaki ihtilaflar öncesinde ve esnasında, milliyetçilik etnik gruplar arasında düşmanlıkları aktif hale getirmek için önemli bir araç haline geldi. Ancak, Balkanlardaki ihtilafların tek kaynağı da değildi.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Türk dış politikası yeni deneyimler kazanmış ve önemli değişiklikler geçirmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışı ve Balkanlar'da komünist rejimlerin çökmesiyle Türkiye'yle Balkan devletlerini ayıran demir perde ortadan kalktı ve bu gelişmeler Türkiye'nin bölgeye dair merak ve ilgisini arttırdı. Bununla beraber, Yugoslavya'nın kanlı biçimde parçalanması ve Balkanlar'da yeni çatışmaların ve savaşların çıkması bu erken iyimserliğin yerini istikrar ve güvenlik endişelerine bırakmasına neden oldu. Türkiye, bu değişken jeopolitik ortamda güçlükleri asabilmek için yeni yaklaşımlar ve politikalar ortaya koymak zorunda kaldı.

Kosova sorunu da tarihsel temelleri olan, çok boyutlu bir sorundur. Küresel güçlerin Balkanlar üzerindeki hesapları dikkate alındığında Kosova sorunu, tüm Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu'nun istikrarını doğrudan etkileyebilecek bir görünüme sahiptir. Kosova'nın bağımsızlığını ilan etmesi ile Kosova sorunu çözüme ulaşmamış, aksine daha da karmaşık bir hale gelmiştir. Bu tez Türkiye'nin Balkan politikasını Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme özel önem vererek Kosova sorunu kapsamında incelemekte ve Kosova sorununun uluslararası politikada yarattığı sonuçları anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Historically, the Balkans has always been remembered with wars, ethnic conflicts, political turmoil, and without stability and security. There is no surprise the noun related with the region is “Balkanization¹” which defines to break up into smaller and often hostile units.

Due to the strategic location of the region, for global players, the Balkans has always been the main gate to the Orient. The region was the crossing point of the Silk and Amber Road in ancient times. Today, it is oil and gas road, and illegal activities trafficking road of the international crime organizations.

The Balkans has a quite importance geographically, because the region has a few advantages to control and ensure hegemony over Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, Caucasus and Caspian Sea. Geography places the Balkans at an edge of Europe, but history puts it front and centre.

The 20th Century witnessed the two significant events in the Balkans. Beyond the Balkan War, first is the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo and beginning of the World War I, the Balkans had critical role about the collapse of Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary Empire. Second is the dissolution of Yugoslavia and violent ethnic nationalism.

Between these periods, the Balkans was divided ideologically in two polar blocks after World War II, like the other European countries. Bipolar block system prevented the ethnic, religious tensions and border disputes in the region. But this pressure created only temporarily stabilized and secure environment. Before and after World War II, Turkey tried to establish the stability and security with Balkan Entente and Balkan Pact, but they didn't provide the security and peace in the region.

After the collapse of communism, Slobodan Milosevic stirred the fires of Serbian Nationalism and used the Kosovo issue for his political career. The resurgence of Serbian nationalism became the cornerstone of Milosevic's rapid rise for gaining power. Milosevic revoked the Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 was followed by a Belgrade policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo.

¹ Maria Todorova, “*Imagining the Balkans*”, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 34-6.

At the same time, the world has transformed itself to adapt a new era after the end of the balance of power system. Due to the pioneering of the Serbs, civil war was emerged into the Balkans. The end of the Cold War brought about both opportunities and challenges to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey is not in a position to ignore Balkan developments in her foreign policy calculations; besides, the rapid domestic and external changes in the region urge Turkey to take a more active position.

After 1990's, international institutions, journalists and academicians declared warnings about the impending Kosovo conflict. There were some diplomatic initiatives, but international community failed to take sufficient preventive action. After the cold war, the process of Yugoslav dissolution was the first test for Turkish foreign policy of the new period. Initially, Turkey supported the Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. However, the break-up of Yugoslavia appeared inevitable; Turkey acted harmoniously with the EU and recognized the independence of new Balkan states.

The Bosnia War was the watershed of Yugoslav dissolution. After this war, the decision to exclude the Kosovo issue from the Dayton negotiations led many Kosovar Albanians to conclude that violence was the only way to attract the international community attention.

In 1997, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK) announced that it had gained popular support and was responsible for violence against the Serbs. Yugoslavia responded with deployment of the Serbian Army and paramilitary forces to Kosovo, and the conflict escalated rapidly. Finally, the systematic Serbian ethnic cleansing and violence created nearly half million refugees.

At first, most of the U.S. politicians had accepted to this conflicts were been solved by European countries and they were indifferent to issue in the Balkans. But European countries couldn't agree about the solution for stopping the armed-conflict. European institutions and states were not sufficiently qualified to prevent the hostility into the southeast part of the Europe. European Union showed herself in the mirror as a dwarf of the international political arena.

The Rambouillet meetings that were held in February 1999 and ended with a fiasco that proved how complicated the Albanian-Serbian hostility and distrust had become and how the situation led to an actual solution that triggered NATO air strikes. On March 24 1999, U.S.-led NATO attempted to stop the violence between KLA and Yugoslav forces in

Kosovo. Turkey supported the international air strike by NATO against Serbia. Turkey allowed the entry of large groups of people who escaped from violence during the Yugoslav disintegration process, Kosovo conflict and various other crises in the Balkans that occurred during the post-cold war era.

The NATO air strikes, the legality of which in terms of international law was questionable, lasted for seventy-eight days and at the end of this period, the Yugoslavia signed the peace treaty proposed by G-8 countries on June 3, 1999, also upon the efforts of Russia.

After Yugoslavia accepted the peace plan of the G-8 countries, the UN Security Council Resolution required the formation of the United Nations Transitory Administration in the region, in order to apply the principles included in the Peace Plan, which was signed in June 10, 1999. The G-8 Peace Plan that was agreed upon at the G-8 Foreign Ministers' meeting had three basic goals:

1. The retreat of all military, police and paramilitary forces from the region in order to stop the ethnic clashes in the region.
2. The settlement of international civil and security entities in the region under the patronage of the UN in order to establish a secure ground for all the peoples in Kosovo
3. The establishment of a transitory administration by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with the purpose of creating a temporary political framework that would guarantee peaceful and normal living conditions in the area and that would give significant autonomy to Kosovo, and to take into consideration the Rambouillet reconciliation and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and other surrounding countries in the region.

After Yugoslavia signed the G-8 peace plan, the UNSC accepted the Resolution No. 1244 that declared the establishment of a military and civilian presence in Kosovo, namely the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO-Led Forces (KFOR) that began their duty in the region on June 1999.

The 1244 Resolution was an international document that adopted the principles of the G-8 Peace Plan and set out the necessary regulations to realize with these principles. The main objective was to maintain peace and harmony in the region and to create a legal, constitutional, and political structure. On the other hand, the resolution did not bring a

definite solution to the final status of Kosovo. In the Resolution 1244, there were three basic reasons for the settle of the international administration in the region:

1. Clearing the region of Yugoslav military presence,
2. Providing a safe environment for all the peoples of the region,
3. Creating a basis for political formation.

According to the Resolution, Kosovo *de jure* stays a part of Yugoslavia, but will be under completely separated administrative, political and security arrangements, which will operate as a *de facto* independent state under international supervision. The process of the Kosovo's final status settlement started on 3 June 2005, when the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Ambassador Kai Eide, Permanent Representative of Norway to the NATO, as his special envoy to carry out a comprehensive review of Kosovo. On 7 October 2005, Kai Eide released his report. The report said the future process must be moved forward with caution, continuation of the status quo is unsustainable and all the parties must be brought together -and kept together- throughout the status process.

Despite Serbia's opposition during November 2005, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was selected as Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special envoy to guide the meetings on the future status of Kosovo. On February 2007, Ahtisaari released his plan for Kosovo's status. According to the plan, Kosovo will have the right to govern itself and sign international agreements, including membership in international bodies, with an international civilian and military presence supervising the new arrangements and helping to ensure peace and stability. Nevertheless, the executive summary of the plan did not specifically mention independence for the province. Under this proposal, a European Union Special Representative would act as an International Civilian Representative (ICR), with ultimate supervisory authority over civilian aspects of the settlement, including the power to end laws and remove officials whose actions are determined to be inconsistent with it².

Serbia repeatedly rejected the Ahtisaari's proposal any idea of independence for Kosovo, while some Albanians demonstrated for immediate self-determination. Both sides

² UN News Center, "Kosovo To Have Right To Govern Itself, Join International Bodies Under UN Plan", 2 February 2007, Available on site, <http://pfcm.com/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21425&Cr=kosovo&Cr> (accessed 02 November 2011)

interpreted Ahtisaari's plan as meaning independence supervised by the international community. Russia's representative at the Security Council blocked every resolution proposal that Western countries mentioned, demanding the extension of the negotiations. Since the EU and US could not convince Russia to approve the Ahtisaari's plan, six-nation Contact Group for Kosovo named a negotiating 'troika' of US, EU and Russian representatives to mediate new 120 days long new talks on the status of Kosovo.

The new process started on August and officially ended on 10 December without compromised solution for the future status of Kosovo. Despite Serbia's wishes for extending the negotiations, it does not seem realistic, since the EU and USA refuse new negotiations. The Troika, after 120 days of negotiations submitted its report to the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon. The report says that "after the 120 days of the intensive negotiation, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo's status; neither party was willing to concede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty on Kosovo". Additionally, the EU and USA said that attempt to strike a compromise was exhausted, which means that the "Western Block" does not support more negotiations. On the other side Russia, the Serbia's ally, pressures that it will not support any UN Security Council resolution that provides independence to Kosovo. The last 4-month talks proved that Serbia and Kosovo Albanians have completely opposite sights over the final settlement and agreement between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians about the future of Kosovo status is not possible³.

On 17 February 2008, in Pristine, the capital of Kosovo, the Assembly declared independence. Turkey, United States and most of the European Union (led by Britain, France and Germany) will recognize Kosovo quickly, Russia and its allies will not. Kosovo's eight-year run as the biggest-ever U.N. project will finish with big tension and a threat of violence that could extend to Bosnia.

For Turkey, being a Balkan state herself, the region has a great importance. Above all, Turkey has deep historical ties with the region stemming from a common past of 600 years. This has brought out cultural and humanitarian ties as well. Turkish minorities are present in most of the Balkan countries. Also in Turkey, a good proportion of the

³ Mirzet Mujezinovic, "*After the End of the Kosovo Status Negotiation: Way to the Peaceful Dissolution?*", Sedat Laciner, Mehmet Ozcan and Ihsan Bal (Eds.), USAK Yearbook, Vol 1, Year 2008, USAK Books, Ankara, 2008, pp. 525

populations have ancestors who immigrated from the Balkans. In addition to these historical ties, the Balkans is important from strategic and security points of view as well as being the route connecting Turkey to Europe. Ever since its foundation, the Republic of Turkey has shown special interest towards the Balkans. Improving relations with the Balkan countries on bilateral and multilateral basis by increasing cooperation, building stability and confidence has been one of the major goals of its foreign policy.

Upon the collapse of communism, Turkey has made every effort to create an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation among the countries of the region. Within this context, while Turkey establishing diplomatic relations with all the newly independent ex-Yugoslav republics. With the claim of being a regional power in the post-Cold War era, Turkey cannot close the eyes to the developments that occur in its periphery, like the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey aims to become an leading power in its region and this urges Turkey to play an dynamic and influential role in the fields of cooperation and/or difficult issues and crises. Since Yugoslavia appeared as one of the most important issues of the Balkans in the post-Cold War era, Turkey is expected to react effectively to the question since its outbreak. The Turkish and Muslim community living in Yugoslavia and the close regions in the Balkans expected that Turkey would take an dynamic position, both during and after the crisis.

Turkey took part in all the peace forces and allocated troops at the SFOR, KFOR and police officers at the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNMIK in Kosovo liaison teams at the EU-led Force in Macedonia. Moreover, there are Turkish personnel working at the NATO's headquarters in Skopje and Tirana.

As a result, the Balkans still prevents its importance and problems, and the international community has to reply the questions. Kosovo issue is also a multidimensional one that has historical bases. Considering the plans of global powers over Balkans, Kosovo issue seems likely to effect the stabilization of all Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. After Kosovo's announcing its independence the matter became more complicated contrary to come to a solution. The short term reflection of Kosovo's declaring independence had been seen at the developments after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Kosovo had not been a matter between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians anymore but a struggle area between

the big powers. While the USA and its allies constitute one side of the arena, the countries headed by Russia which are worried that Kosovo could precedent, are at the other side.

Taking into consideration that multifaceted crises such as that in the Balkans usually have their source in long-term conditions, it is logical that investigating the long-term, deep historical roots of a conflict is a key to describing the achievable solutions. The misunderstanding the character and the root of the Balkan conflicts from the beginning created a fragile structure in mutual relations.

The study focuses on the issue of Kosovo on the causes of the old disagreement between the Albanians and the Serbs, dealing with the history of the region, and explores Turkey's Balkan Policy from Ottoman Hegemony to post-Cold War periods with special emphasis on the question of Kosovo and evaluate to what extent Turkey was able to benefit from the opportunities provided by the new period.

In addition, This study aims to analyze to what extent Turkey's Balkan policy towards the issue of Kosovo has been influential in the post-cold War period. The dissertation tries to explore Turkey's domestic and external questions which are related to Kosovo and ex-Yugoslavia in the context of ethnic nationalism and self-determination. Some of these questions are; is Turkey's active diplomacy in the Balkans permanent or temporary? What was the view of Turkey to Kosovo's independence process from the 1990s to 2008? How is Turkey's policy towards the Balkans perceived in the region? How can "soft power" of Turkey influence the region? How will the relationship between the EU and U.S. with Turkey affect the Balkans' states policies? The dissertation combines two subjects: Turkish foreign policy and the issue of Kosovo.

This thesis is composed of seven chapters. The first chapter gives a brief and general introduction of the thesis. The second chapter analyzes theoretically analyze the sources of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the independence of Kosovo within nationalism and self-determination concepts as the main causes of conflict in the Balkans. Secondly, examine the determinants of Turkey's foreign policy within the context of the Balkan dimension from the beginning to the present and its changing after the Cold War. The third chapter gives the historical background of the Kosovo issue and Turkey's Balkan Policy from Ottoman Empire to end of the Cold War.

Chapter Four focuses on the sources of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Bosnia War with a special emphasis on nationalism and the approach of Turkey's to disintegration of Yugoslavia and Turkish diplomatic efforts towards the solution of the Bosnia. Chapter Five concentrates on Kosovo issue from Dayton agreements to NATO intervention and the developments after Kosovo war. On the other hand, examines the determinants of Turkey's approach to Kosovo issue within the context of international law and the minority rights of Kosovar Turks.

Chapter Six examines the road map of the independence of Kosovo and gives an idea about the supports and oppositions of the international community to declaration of independence. This chapter also examines the EU and U.S. efforts to integrate the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic structures which were accelerated after the end of the Kosovo war. In this context, the European Union's new concept of regional approach was discussed by giving reference to regional cooperation initiatives and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). Chapter Six also attempts to determine Turkey's approach to independence of Kosovo and Turkey's position in the new economic, political and security establishments in the region. Finally, in the conclusion part, I analyze the major findings of the thesis.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

In this chapter, I will establish my thesis onto two columns, first, the main elements of the disintegration of Yugoslavia that are the problem of nationalism and the self-determination, second, the Balkans perspective of Turkish foreign policy and its changing after the Cold War.

I will generally look at relations between nationalism and self-determination in order to develop an understanding of state building process in the Balkans. Initially, it is important to clarify some terms and ideas about nationalism, the right of peoples to self-determination and secessionist movements, which soon influenced the people of the Balkans and other conflict areas around the world. After that, I will analyze the Turkish foreign policy according to its Balkans perspective and effects of the consequences of the Yugoslavia break-up to Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

2.1. NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE COLD WAR:

Falling down of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the Cold War more than any other things. At the end of the Cold War, many predictions were optimistic about the future of the humanity and the prediction “the end of the history” became more popular⁴. On the other side, numerous societies were experiencing multidimensional crises in the post cold war period. Many analysts stated “rebirth of history”⁵ according to their realistic point of view to forecast various potential problems for the former Cold War arena of Central and Eastern Europe.

With the passing of the Cold War, a new international order emerged. An important feature of this new international order is hostility, power challenges, and the breakdown of order within states became more dangerous than conflicts between states. Most of these domestic

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *“The End of History and the Last Man”*, New York, Avon Books, 1993.

⁵ Misha Glenny, *“The Rebirth Of History: Eastern Europe In The Age Of Democracy”*, Penguin, 1993; John J. Mearsheimer, *“Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War”*, *The Atlantic*, August 1990, pp. 35-50.

threats come from separatist groups seeking to break away by force if needed, and create their own sovereign states⁶.

The causes for the expansion of nationalist secessionist claims are much debated. Some see nationalism as a reply to the forces of globalization. Others discuss that nationalism has its own independent history and is not an answer to globalization. But there is a general agreement about the disintegration of states as the result of nationalism and the pursuit for self-determination represent a major dispute to the existing international order and security which are based on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state is giving way to international disorder⁷.

The international community discussed and debated the problem of nationalist self-determination in the UN and EU platforms. The UN Secretary-General Ghali recognized the threat of the ethnic nationalism to the world's order, and claimed to statehood based upon the self-determination had to be subordinated to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of established states⁸. The UN has constantly insisted that secessionist conflicts could be resolved by a peaceful negotiation and without the use of force. However, this approach has been unsuccessful to restrain the use of force by the leaders in most secessionist conflicts. On the basis alone, the UN response to such conflicts must be seen as a disappointment.

Almost, the explanation for secessionist demand is always based on the right to self-determination of peoples. According to General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), on October 24, 1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, one of the means by self-determination is "the establishment of sovereign and independent state". Meaning of "peoples" is the critical question, because only a people have the right for the establishment of a sovereign and independent state. The dominant understanding of "people" has been a territorial since First World War. However, in the

⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, *"The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold Wa"r*, UK, Vintage Books, 2001.

⁷ Montserrat Guibernau, *"Globalization and the Nation State"*, Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Ed.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, pp. 244-48.

⁸ Boutros. B Ghali., *"As Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping"*, New York, United Nations, 1992, p. 7.

post-Cold War era territorial definition of a “people” has been broadened to comprise the population of a federal unit of an internationally recognized and independent state.⁹

As from 1990’s, the rising of nationalism and increasing tensions between ethnic identities have been witnessed especially in the sensitive multi-ethnic states. It was time to redraw the map; the collapse of the multi-ethnic and pluralistic states of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union led to return and rebirth of nationalism.

Nationalism dominated the political discussion and analysis of the Balkans. Nationalism became an important instrument in order to activate the hostilities among the ethnic groups before and during the Balkan conflict. At the 1980’s and 1990’s, ethno-nationalism based on the subjective belief of the people of an ethnic group in their common fall in Yugoslavia. Along with the death of Tito and socio-economic problems, defenseless elites in Yugoslavia had been influenced from the authoritarian regime and used nationalist demands to adhere to power. Identity politics drew boundaries, in an attempt to exclude the influence of a particular ethnic group, which was perceived as a threat to the other.

The dissolution of multinational communist federations and the armed conflicts that have emerged with their transformation into independent nation-states have returned the “national question” to the forefront of debates over international politics, law, and theory. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia, in particular, demonstrates the inability of the international community to rely on any solid legal principles, guidelines, or established mechanisms to avoid such chaos when constituent parts of these types of multinational states decide to go their own way. The international community on the basis has accepted secessionist demands from Yugoslavia’s republics that statehood was expressions, through referendum, of the right to self-determination of the populations of those republics. The consequence of this development is that if a national group is dominant within federal unit to proceed to independent statehood within the territorial limits of that federal unit, it enables the right to self-determination of peoples¹⁰.

If seeking self-determination supports right to secession, then critical aspect of (ethnic) nationalist view often arranges to redraw the borders, to create new countries or to restore

⁹ Peter Radan, “*Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law*”, USA, Routledge, 2001, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.4.

the old ones. It is unusual for this to happen without violent conflict. The critical question is “how politicians or scholars will overcome such disputes peacefully?”

In the post-Cold War period, the international community has depended on the principle of *uti possidetis*¹¹ in an effort to resolve this question. Historically the principle of *uti possidetis* in international law was used in the framework of decolonization. The principle of *uti possidetis* has two variations -*uti possidetis juris* and *uti possidetis de facto*¹². *Uti possidetis juris* is a concept of international law that defines borders of newly sovereign states based on their previous administrative frontiers. *Uti possidetis de facto*; national borders of newly independent countries agreed with the former colonial borders, leaving no terra nullius¹³ in that part of the world¹⁴.

In the secessionist conflicts of the 1990's, on the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, the international community emphasized that a federal unit of state wanted to become independent, the borders of a future state would be equal to the pre-existing borders of the federal unit. In the absence of agreement to the contrary between relevant federal units, these borders would be regarded as untouchable. At the same time, the principle of *uti possidetis juris* harmonized the territorial definition of a people with respect to the right to self-determination of peoples¹⁵.

The developments in the post-Cold War period in relation to the application of the territorial definition of a ‘people’ and *uti possidetis* has been recognition in international law of a right of a federal unit to secede from a federal state. The case of the secessionist wars of the 1990's in Yugoslavia provides the most important figure of the use of the territorial definition of a ‘people’ and the use of the principle of *uti possidetis juris* to

¹¹ *Uti possidetis*: (Latin for "as you possess") is a principle in international law that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless provided for by treaty. For more knowledge see Malcolm N. Shaw, “*International Law*”, Fifth Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 446-51.

¹² Steven Ratner, “*Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States*”, American Journal of International Law 90 (4), October 1996, pp. 594-595.

¹³ Terra nullius is a Latin expression deriving from Roman Law meaning 'land belonging to no one' (or 'no man's land'), which is used in international law to describe territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state, or over which any prior sovereign has expressly or implicitly relinquished sovereignty. Sovereignty over territory which is *terra nullius* may be acquired through occupation.

¹⁴ Enver Hasani., “*Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo*”, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 2003.

¹⁵ Peter Radan, p. 5.

determine the international borders of the seceding republics that gained international recognition as states.

The international community's acceptance of the *uti possidetis juris* principle with respect to the former Yugoslavia mirrored *balance of power* politics and the desire to balance forces within multi-national republics that existed at the time of independence. It was believed that this approach would prevent the use of force and help the division of Yugoslavia by means of arbitration and negotiation. On the contrary, the expectation was not realized. The bloody conflicts have increased during the 1990's within the former Yugoslavia. Four states have gained independence and international recognition. Whether this situation represents the end of the redrawing of maps remain uncertain.

The violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia, especially, demonstrates the inability of the international community to depend on any solid legal principles, rules, or established mechanisms to avoid such turmoil and mass suffering when component parts of these types of multinational states choose their own way.

The former Yugoslavia was an attempt to address three primary features of the “national question”;

1. The right of a nation acting to create its own state through demands for national self-determination,
2. The right of a national motherland (whether sovereign state or republic within a federation), or to demand national unification and the redrawing of borders, and,
3. The rights of members of national minorities to resist the majority's formation of a new nation-state either by seeking cultural or political autonomy or by seceding in order to unite with their own national homeland.

These questions have emerged in their extreme forms (secession, irredentism, or the expulsion of minorities) in the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration. From this point, the questions under discussion in this dissertation will start with an analysis of the meaning of nationalism and the theories of self-determination in this chapter.

2.1.1. The Origins, Roots and Development of Nationalism:

The term “nationalism” is the main factor to define and analyze in the terminology and political literature of the Balkans' ethnic conflicts. Nationalism is elusive, changeable and,

one of the most ambiguous concepts in the present day vocabulary of political and analytical thought. There is no consensus among them over a theoretical approach that might explain this foggy area, besides; nobody can make clear precisely that it is a modern or traditional phenomenon¹⁶. The same difficulty exists in the determination of some other relative concepts like “nation, nationality, ethnicity and, ethnic group”.

The authors and social scientists create a wide literature about these concepts, but it is hard to find a generally acceptable definition for these relative concepts among the academic world. It is not a useful method to consider the concepts from the definitions. “Moreover, some authors asserted that the term cannot be defined”¹⁷.

The philosophers who contributed to the formation of the German Romanticism, at the same time, they created the starting point of nationalist idea was a general acceptance. Nationalism is not a very old idea; the literature discussing it has all been written in less than two centuries. Kedouire explain nationalism in terms of a revolution in European philosophy, it all started with Kant. Kant held that man could only be free when he obeys the laws of morality, which he finds within himself, and not in external world. Thus, Kant equated virtue with free will. In addition, neither freedom nor virtue depended on God’s commands¹⁸. The ideas of Kant were accepted as one of the source of free will and the right to self-determination. Kant’s follower Johann Gottlieb Fichte was first attempted to solve the problems raised by his doctrine. Nevertheless, Johann Gottfried Herder (nationalismus) created the term in the late 1700s.

The emergence of the idea of nationalism is often connected with the coming out of the French Revolution in 1789 and its great thinker “Jean Jacques Rousseau”, when the first “nation-state” is said to have been created and, developing during the 19th century. John Stuart Mill and Ernest Renan have been recognized with writing the best works of that time. The concept of nationalism quite affected the world in the 19th century

¹⁶ Benedict Anderson, “*Introduction*”, Gopal Balakrishnan (Ed.), *Mapping the Nation*, London and New York, Verso, 1996, p.1; Debate between Anthony D. Smith and Ernest Gellner, “*The Warwick Debates on Nationalism*”, at Warwick University, on 24 October 1995 (E. Gellner's website at the London School of Economics p.1; Peter Alter, “*Nationalism*”, 2nd Ed., London-New York-Sydney-Auckland, ARNOLD a Member of the Hodder Headline Group, 1994, p. 3.)

¹⁷ Baskın Oran, “*Az Gelişmiş Ülke Milliyetçiliği, Kara Afrika Modeli*”, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997 p.20.

¹⁸ Umut Özkırımlı, “*Theories of Nationalism- An Introduction*”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 16.

Nationalism did not become a subject of academic investigation until the first half of the 20th century. The subject received increased attention ethically and philosophically at the end of First World War, as the ideas of *nationalism and self-determination* were used in redrawing the map of Europe. With the pioneering works of historians like Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn (the twin founding fathers) and Louis Snyder, nationalism became a subject of sustained academic inquiry in the 1920-1930s.

After the First World War, political doctrine “nationalism” has played a major role in shaping the face of the modern world. The theoretical literature on nationalism became much more diversified with the participation of sociologists and political scientists to historians. Nationalism has become most powerful concept with the rising of the decolonization and the proliferation of new states in Africa and Southeast Asia¹⁹.

With ascendancy of ‘nation-building’ model, most of the social scientists collaterally connect the nationalism with the modernization processes. Influence of modernization thought was perceived in many branches of social sciences. Karl W. Deutsch was the pioneer of modernist approach at this era. Deutsch’s work, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953), was the messenger of a new debate on nationalism. Elie Kedourie’s “*Nationalism*” was undoubtedly significant work of 1960s for modernist approach.

In many respects, 1980s is believed a turning point by nationalism specialists. With the publication of modernists, Ernest Gellner’s “*Nations and Nationalism*”, Eric Hobsbawm’s and Terence Ranger’s “*The Invention of Tradition*”, Benedict Anderson’s “*Imagined Communities*”, and ethno-symbolists, John Armstrong’s “*Nations before Nationalism*” and Anthony D. Smith’s “*Theories of Nationalism*”, the theories grew more sophisticated.

From 1990s to the present, witnessed the great debates about various nationalism trends and ethnic conflicts. Some works of this era interrogated and found a solution to lack of classic approach to nationalism²⁰.

At the beginning of this chapter, I asserted that nationalism dominated the political discourse and analysis of the Balkans. However, what does the term “nationalism” mean?

¹⁹ Ibid, pp.1-2.

²⁰ Ibid, pp 59-69.

How did the term originate and develop? What is a “nation”? What are the similarity and difference from “people” and “community”? What is the importance of meaning “people” to determine the right to self-determination? Why are the effects of nationalism unlike for each case? Why did the nationalism return to Yugoslavia after the Cold War?

All but the definitions are the best-known dilemma for every branch of social science. It is also valid problem in the case of nationalism. A number of definitions exist because every author focuses on a different characteristic of the phenomenon. It is the only shared opinion of the scholars who are interested in nationalism.

Nationalism is a *political principle*²¹, an *ideological movement*²², a *political doctrine*²³, *basic way of talking, thinking and acting*²⁴, *cultural creations*²⁵, and an *imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign*²⁶.

Stricter scientific definitions follow one of the two major approaches to nationalism. The first, an objective approach, is based on objective factors and nationhood is defined by observable characteristics such as common language, territory, culture, traditions and religion, for example. The second approach, which is subjective, stresses psychological and postural factors in its place. Thus, Gellner asserts, “two men are of the same nation only if they share the same culture and they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation”²⁷.

Smith draws five structural factors or features of nationalism, general for all definitions, which take into account both approaches to the phenomenon. These are:

1. A process of formation, or growth of nations;
2. A sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation;

²¹ Ernest Gellner, “*Nations and Nationalism*”, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p.1.

²² Anthony D. Smith, “*National Identity*”, University of Nevada Press, 1993, p.51.

²³ Elie Kedourie, “*Nationalism*”, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1960, p.1.

²⁴ Craig Calhoun, “*Nationalism*”, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p.3.

²⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, “*Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*”, Cambridge University Press; 2 ed. 1992, p.12

²⁶ Benedict Anderson, “*Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*”, Revised Edition, London and New York, Verso, 1991, p. 6.

²⁷ Liah Greenfeld, “*Nationalism and the Mind, Nations and Nationalism*”, Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 11, July 2005, p. 325.

3. A language and symbolism of nation;
4. A social and political movement on behalf of the nation;
5. A doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular.²⁸

Another important theoretical debate about nationalism, except definitions, is based upon nations and nationalism, modern phenomenon. There are two attempts to solve this critical question. One is primordialists and the other is modernists approach. It should be pointed out that a third category has been added to this classification in recent years. This category consists of “ethno-symbolists” who portray their position as a middle way between these two polar opposites.

Primordialism is the argument, which contends that nations are ancient, natural phenomena; that one has a nation as obviously as one has a measure of height. Primordialists consider nation and nationalism as ‘givens’.

The modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism. On the same side of the fence but more in a radical direction, one can find anti-realist views. According to one such view nations are just “imagined” but somehow still powerful entities; what is meant is that belief in them holds influence over the believers²⁹.

Ethno-Symbolists such as Anthony D. Smith and John Armstrong accept that the nationalism is a modern political movement, but reject the notion that nations are recent political formations, which represent a break with earlier ethnic communities³⁰. Rather nations are constituted by ethnic myths, memories, symbols, and cultures, and national formation must be understood in *la longue durée*³¹.

The last question concerns the varieties of the nationalism. A number of authors tried to bring some arrangements in the complex reality of nationalist ideologies and practices by

²⁸ Anthony D. Smith, “*Nationalism*”, Blackwell, 2003, p.5-6.

²⁹ Benedict Anderson, p.6.

³⁰ Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson., “*Introduction*”, Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Ed.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, p.3.

³¹ The *longue durée*, the “long term”, is an expression used by the French Annales School of historical writing to designate their approach to the study of history, which gives priority to long-term historical structures over events.

introducing categorizations of nationalisms according to various criteria³². However, their categorizations are different in many respects. While some authors present theoretically informed complex classifications, others often impose Manichean³³ division in two groups usually labeled as civic vs. ethnic, Eastern vs. Western nationalisms or Risorgimento vs. Integral nationalisms.

Kohn thought the difference between 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalism be supposed to be made. Western nationalism, as emerged in England, France, United States, is explained as connected to ideas of individual freedom, rational cosmopolitanism, without much sentimental connection to the past. On the other side, Eastern nationalism appeared in a 'backward state of political and social development', and developed in natural, mystic, authoritarian forms. The aim of Eastern nationalism is not to change existing states into people's state, but relatively to redraw political borders in agreement with ethnographic claims.

The division of nationalisms in civic and ethnic kind is often rooted in historical examination of different one-sidedly special cases and sources. This practice could be challenged with different reasons or regarding the superficial attention paid to the non-western European developments. Fortunately, a few authors present more varied descriptions of various nationalisms³⁴.

Mann includes in his definition of nationalism both ethnocentric and statist elements, and therefore is able to detect ethnocentric elements in, for example, English nationalism³⁵. Mann also argues that in the late 18th century France had existed also petty bourgeois radicals and cultural nationalists³⁶, not only civic nationalists. In similar way, Smith speaks about puritan ethnic nationalism in Britain. American nationalism contains also elements

³² Hans Kohn, *"The Idea of Nationalism"*, USA, Transaction Publishers, 2005; John Hutchinson, & Anthony D. Smith, *"Nationalism"*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; Liah Greenfeld, *"Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity"*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992; John A. Hall, *"Nationalisms, Classified and Explained"*, Daedalus, 1995; Anthony D. Smith, *"National Identity"*, London, Penguin Books, 1991.

³³ According to Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary; Manichean is a believer in religious or philosophical dualism.

³⁴ Bojan Todosijević, *"Dimensions of Nationalism: Structure of Nationalist Attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia"*, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.2 (2001), No. 6, pp. 171-2.,

³⁵ Michael Mann, *"The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism"*, John A Hall, & Ian C. Jarvie, (Eds.) *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

³⁶ Ibid., p.151.

of xenophobia, ethnocentrism and racism. Furthermore, it is not clear how the history of slavery and segregation is compatible with the tradition of democratic and civic nationalism.

Eastern nationalism is frequently condemned for its presumed violent character. However, Mann relates violence of nationalism to political factors, not geography³⁷. In his view, violent character of state-subverting nationalist movements is largely influenced by the authoritarian and repressive character of central authorities, not so much by supposed ethnic character of specific nationalist discourse or tradition.

According to Alter, we can classify nationalism into two main groups or basic types: Risorgimento nationalism and Integral nationalism. *Risorgimento nationalism* was the political movement, which upheld the principle of solidarity of the oppressed against the oppressors. It “united all nations against the tyrant – whether this be a single minor prince, a dynastic power or a multinational empire: the Holy Alliance of the peoples faced the Holy Alliance of the princes”³⁸. Risorgimento nationalism supported the European movements for national liberation and it even had several distinguished types (like liberal, reformist, political, cultural, linguistic and religious nationalism); all these various forms of nationalism were interdependent.

The term “Integral nationalism” was first used in around 1880s by the French writer Charles Maurras, who was one of the most influential intellectual founding fathers of this type of nationalism, to describe the counter-type of Risorgimento nationalism. Opposing the Risorgimento nationalism, which supports the idea of the equality of all nations and national movements, integral nationalism defines the one nation as the absolute³⁹.

The philosophical foundation of Integral nationalism is provided by Darwin’s theory of natural selection and the doctrine of the fittest. Integral nationalism asserts the interests of the one nation at the expense of others and everything can be justified as ethical and moral if it serves the nation and its power. Because of this distinctive characteristic of the

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Peter Alter, p. 21.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

“Integral nationalism”, many adjectives have been attached to the term, like radical, extreme, militant aggressive-expansionist, right wing, reactionary, or excessive⁴⁰.

Even if it is easy to distinguish between the two generic types of nationalism that are described in the previous paragraphs and to identify their substantial differences, and even if the Integral nationalism is a relative latecomer in the history of modern nationalism, Integral nationalism is the type that represents nationalism, as it is normally understood today⁴¹.

However, typologies are not peculiar to first generation studies. Arguing that no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible⁴², some scholars continue to support the view that the best way to deal with nationalism is to develop typologies. In their view, nationalism is a chameleon like phenomenon, capable of assuming a variety of ideological forms. It is not possible to express for all these varieties- reasons, developments, results- with a single grand theory. Consequently, typology studies that are determined the varieties of nationalism, provided advantage of simplicity to understand this complicated area.

Many other definitions of nationalism can be found in the literature and it is not expected that readers will automatically accept the definitions provided above. On the other hand, we cannot discuss nationalism without giving a definition assuming that readers will regard it in a similar with the author way. Thus, in this study I will use the term nationalism with the meaning of ethnic nationalism.

For a better understanding of nationalism developments and especially of its role in the Balkan nation states, I will first take a brief and overall look at the birth of nationalism in the Western Europe. After that I will briefly discuss the birth of nationalism in the Balkans as well.

2.1.1.1. Nationalism in Western Europe:

The political map of Europe was transformed during the 18th and 19th century with the dissolution of empires and the emergence of many new nation-states. This state formation was based mainly on nationalism, which usually implied an ethnic homeland or a sense of

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.26-27.

⁴¹ Ibid, pp.34-35.

⁴² John A. Hall, p. 1.

belonging to a common people. Nationalism was an extremely potent ideology in the procedure of state building in the modern era⁴³. The boundaries of Europe were redrawn many times in the past to give many nations their own state. This policy was legitimated by the ideology of national self-determination of the people. Nationalism as an ideology, which supports the right to self-determination and equality of people, supplied the demand for independent states and awoke enthusiasm, hopes and expectations for the people⁴⁴.

In Europe, two spheres of civilization emerged and developed after the division of the continent into a Western and Eastern Roman Empire. The Western cultural sphere was marked by the early divorce of the secular from the spiritual authorities and by a process of intellectual secularization featuring concepts like the Renaissance and Enlightenment and, because of such movements, sovereignty of people and democracy⁴⁵. In the eastern part of Europe - in Greek Byzantine and Russian Orthodox East- state and church were one and the same. The emperor was a holy figure standing over the heads of the patriarchs as God's vicar, and he was able to mobilize the forces of religion in the service of the state⁴⁶.

The empires were used to create a political roof over a large multiethnic population and often to promote the mixing of peoples. Much of the world's ethnic heterogeneity can be traced to movement of people under imperial regimes⁴⁷. In this multiethnic and culturally mixed environment, the ideology of nation building was born in Great Britain in the beginning of the 18th century, even if until the second half of the nineteenth century concepts like nation and ethnicity were domains of aristocratic circles and had nothing to do with the common people, who were excluded from politics⁴⁸.

In Great Britain, the "invented" British identity was formed in the eighteenth century. The invention of "Britishness" was forged by war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obvious enemy and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They defined themselves on

⁴³ İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu, "Milliyetçilik Ve Modernleşme İlişkisi Üzerine", İ.Ü.Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, No: 23-24, Ekim 2000-Mart 2001.

⁴⁴ Peter Alter, p. 16.

⁴⁵ Hagen Schulze, "*States, Nations and Nationalism*", Blackwell Publishers Inc., Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1996, p. xiii.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

⁴⁷ Rogers Brubaker, "*Nationalism Reframed*", Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 9-10.)

⁴⁸ Hagen Schulze, p. 229.

the basis of very powerful existing elements -Protestantism and hostility to Catholic Europe- and it was this that gave Great Britain much of its emotional and cultural force, despite their peoples' many cultural divergences⁴⁹.

Protestantism allowed the Scottish, the English and the Welsh to become fused together and to remain so, despite their many cultural divergences; it moreover helped them to overcome the ancient enmity between England and Scotland and to subsume both Scottish and English nationalisms. The central tenet of Linda Colley's *Britons* is that "Protestantism lay at the core of British national identity; religion was the most unifying force in most nations within Europe"⁵⁰.

The formation and establishment of nation and state in France lasted for a much longer period. As Eugene Weber argues "forty kings worked hard at the task, but it was the Revolution that finished the work in the end". The French Revolution completed the nation, which became one and indivisible (one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland). The French national unity is perceived as the expression of the general will of the French to be French, and the nation must be considered as a cultural unit⁵¹. The French elite believed that using the schools and the army as vehicles would dismiss the existence of any different ethnic group within the French nation and would finally lead to the French nation-state formation. As the French had no uniform conception of patriotism at the time of the Revolution or at any other time, the patriotic feeling on the national level had to be learned. It was learned at different speeds in different places, mostly through the later part of the nineteenth century⁵².

Other two example of western nationalism took shape in Germany and Italy at the second half of the 19th century. Many authors state that the origins of the nationalist doctrine are generally traced back to German romantic thought. Under the French Empire (1804–1814), popular German nationalism thrived in the reorganized German states. Due in part to the

⁴⁹ Linda Colley, *Britons- Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992, p. 5; John Breuilly, *"The State and Nationalism"*, Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Ed.) *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge, Polity, 2005, pp. 34-35.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 387-389.

⁵¹ Eugene Weber, *"Peasants into Frenchmen"*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1976, p. 95.

⁵² Ibid, p. 114.

shared experience, various justifications emerged to identify "Germany" as a single state. For the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte,

The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole⁵³.

A common language may serve as the basis of a nation, but, as contemporary historians of nineteenth century Germany have noted, it took more than linguistic similarity to unify several hundred polities. Habsburg Empire was the common enemy of them and, after 1850 Habsburg's power declined, especially with the Crimean War. Prussia and Piedmont recovered strength and confidence. With Napoleon III legitimizing his power in France on a national basis and wishing to undermine 1815 settlement, which had replaced the order established by Napoleon I, the national movements and the two leading states had a powerful external supporter⁵⁴.

The key factors in Italian unification were military and diplomatic support from France in the war of 1859 against Austria and the fragility of the smaller states. In Germany continued decline in Austrian power and increases in Prussian power led to straight conflict between them. France remained neutral and surprised by the rapid defeat of Austria. By 1870, France had become the enemy of the new unified powerful German states.

Unification nationalism promoted and legitimized the replacement of those political arrangements by the expansion of a regional state in combination with elite national movement. Finally, the German experience under different historical and geographical conditions formed a different nation-state. Using the conception of the imagined community of the nation, not as a nation of citizens, but as a "Volk nation" bound together by ties of blood, descent and culture Germans built another type of nation-state. The German understanding of nationhood revolved around an ethno-cultural community of descent, which was and it still is extremely resistant to the absorption of new members.

⁵³ Available on site <http://www.historyman.co.uk/unification/Fichte.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁴ John Breuilly, *"The State and Nationalism"*, p.39

The result was a conception of the nation, not as a nation of citizens, but as a Volk nation, bound together not by shared citizenship rights within the state, but by ties of blood and culture⁵⁵. This conception of the nation was also spread around in the neighboring countries and in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, affecting the creation of nation there.

2.1.1.2. Nationalism in the Balkans:

Nationalism is also political ideology and it has good and bad characteristics, as little as capitalism, socialism or imperialism has. This differentiation of nationalism is its two-sided characteristic of being both a unifying as well as a disintegrating force. Originally, nationalism was used only to join, as in when used in France to gathering the entire nation to fight its enemies in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Afterwards, depending on the conditions, it became either unifying, as in Italy and Germany, or disintegrating, as in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. But there was still no doubt that its unifying principle was the more valid one, and “Balkanization” clearly gained a negative implication.

Nationalism in the Balkans is traditional ethnic nationalism largely based on west European traditions, especially on the 19th century idea of the unification of nations and nation-states. Ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism where in the "nation" is defined in terms of ethnicity. The theorist Anthony D. Smith uses the term “ethnic nationalism” for non-Western concepts of nationalism as opposed to Western views of a nation defined by its geographical territory⁵⁶. Ethnic nationalism always includes some elements of descent from previous generations. It also includes ideas of a culture shared between members of the group, and with their ancestors, and usually a shared language. The central political principle of ethnic nationalism is that each ethnic group on earth is entitled to self-determination. In international relations, it also leads to policies and movements for irredentism to claim a common nation based upon ethnicity. In scholarly literature, ethnic nationalism is usually contrasted with civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism bases membership of the nation on descent or heredity, often articulated in terms of common blood or kinship, rather than on political membership. Thus, nation-states with strong

⁵⁵ Rogers Brubaker, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁶ William Safran, “*Language, Ethnicity and Religion: A Complex and Persistent Linkage, Nations and Nationalism*”, 14(1), January 2008, pp. 171–190.

traditions of ethnic nationalism tend to define nationality or citizenship by *jus sanguinis*⁵⁷ while countries with strong traditions of civic nationalism tend to define nationality or citizenship by *jus soli*⁵⁸. Ethnic nationalism is therefore seen as exclusive, while civic nationalism tends to be inclusive. Rather than allegiance to common civic ideals, then, ethnic nationalism tends to emphasize shared narratives and common culture.

In this context, The Balkans variant of nationalism does not differ in its basic ideas from the general trend of the 19th century European nationalism but it displays certain characteristics that set it aside from the main body of nationalist ideology. These specificities consist of several elements. First is the manner in which the national, ethnic and religious, as well as cultural differences. Another important factor is the level of influence the religious affiliation has upon the process of self-definition of the people in the region. The third important element is the peripheral character of the economic structure in the Balkans in comparison to the rest of Europe

The most vital feature to understand the historical evolution of Balkan nationalism is that national self-rule was the product of both secessionism and irredentism, unlike in all other non-Balkan countries. If one looks at the maps at first, autonomous and then independent Balkan states, and compares them to their maps in the 1990's, she or he will immediately notice that the first states included no more than half the territory these states rule over today⁵⁹.

The fact that the early modern Balkan states had to adopt an irredentist attitude would not by itself have inevitably led to the serious ethnic conflicts which have plagued the region in the last two centuries: witness the irredentist formation of Italy and Germany. However, in the Balkans, the unredeemed territories targeted by each new nation-state conflicted with those targeted by others states, because of the mixed populations and, usually, their lack of a clear national consciousness in these territories. The development of historical revisionism in the popular culture and the official policies of the Balkan states, as in almost all cases, the dream of a large state including all irredentists was appeared for a short period to be shattered soon after. Great Bulgaria, Great Romania, Great Serbia, Great

⁵⁷ *jus sanguinis*: The law of blood, descent from a person of that nationality.

⁵⁸ *jus soli*: The law of soil, birth within the nation-state.

⁵⁹ Panayote Elias Dimitras, "Writing and Rewriting History in the Context of Balkan Nationalisms", Southeast European Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2000, pp.45-46

Greece, Great Albania, Great Croatia; as for Great Macedonia, its creation was imagined during the post-WWI negotiations, but the idea was in the end rejected in Paris Conference. This led to the emergence of the concept of 'lost fatherlands' which explains why large majorities of the citizens of the Balkan countries today consider that their countries' frontiers are bad. Although they are not ready to fight wars to change them; repression of the remaining minorities, which survived ethnic cleansing, population exchanges or expulsion, and assimilation, more than in other European countries; this often means the refusal to recognize the presence of such minorities, just like the competing Balkan nationalisms had in the past refused to acknowledge each other's legitimacy⁶⁰.

Balkan historiographies suggest that the regional development of a distinct sense of national identity based on historical continuity is directly related to the political and cultural dynamics of European Enlightenment, in particular the 1848 revolutions. In addition, nationalism has been the most powerful force shaping the course of Balkan history from the nineteenth century onwards. Paralleling the political developments in central and eastern segments of the European continent, Balkan nationalisms flourished in the period of national awakening during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Similar to other instances of romantic nationalism, nationalist movements in the Balkans sought for histories of nationhood that pre-dated the establishment of independent states in the region.

In the 19th century, The Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires occupied the region of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Those empires were multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic and were criticized as *multinational* by the more compact, combined and integrated states of Northern and Western Europe⁶¹. However, the Ottoman reign that covered significant portions of the early-modern/modern Balkan history constituted a substantial obstacle for the establishment of uninterrupted continuities of national existence. As a way out, emphasis has been put upon the medieval or ancient past of the 'Balkan nations' at the expense of their more recent histories or rather a claimed lack of history under the supremacy of the Ottomans.

⁶⁰ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*, New York, Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003, pp.109-124

⁶¹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 3.

As mentioned above, there were differences in nation-building and in state-building between the Western Europe and Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Especially, in the Balkans; these differences mainly occurred due to five basic reasons: 1) the application of Ottoman “Millet” system, which was based on religion and tradition. 2) The “Timar” system was relied on indirect rule and which provided the economy and military of the Empire⁶². 3) The difference in relations between state and church, the absence of the Enlightenment ideas in this area. 4) The cooperation of non-Muslim population with Great Powers of Europe. 5) Geography played a critical role in this difference. Before the nineteenth century, geography usually determined the international borders, which were only approximately known and rarely controlled. The principle of self-determination of nations became linked with sovereignty, and created disputes and fights over territorial claims, especially where historical places or territories rich in natural sources were involved. In the nineteenth century, these multinational Empires were reorganized along apparently national lines, beginning with the regular erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans⁶³.

According to modernists, nationalism and the origins of the nations are generally considered as an invention of modernization that founded in the early phases of the growth of the modern state system in the 17th century. In contrast with the rest of Europe, nationalism came to the Balkans under conditions of uneven development and modernization, which was the result of the socio-economic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. The nearness of the Balkans to Central and Western Europe influenced the region, but the nationalist ideas penetrated first those areas or groups, which had closer contact with the rest of Europe⁶⁴.

However, rebirth of nationalism usually refers to the period after First World War, which many consider the highest point of nationalism and the demonstration of both its huge potential and limits. After the end of First World War, the victory of nationalism was the result of two different developments. First, the collapse of the Ottoman, the Habsburg, the Russian Empires and the coming out in their place of a number of sovereign states, which

⁶² Michael Hechter, “*Containing Nationalism*”, Oxford University Press, US, 2001, p.71-72

⁶³ Rogers Brubaker, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Neophytos G Loizides, “*Religion and Nationalism in the Balkans*”, Harvard University –The Kokkalis Program on Southeast Europe, available at <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW2/Loizides.PDF>

were often hostile to one another. Second, it was both the Russian Revolution of October 1917 and retreat the power of Germany that brought the communists to power and shaped the desire of the Allied forces to contain Russian power because of the threat it represented.

The principle of self-determination was very important in this respect, brought before the peace conference by US President Wilson and largely used as an basic principle in the new reorganization of Europe. However, it was not difficult to see that the principle was completely unrealistic as it created frontiers that coincided with the historical frontiers of nationality and language. Especially, the mixed populations in the Balkans, most of the new states that were built on the wrecks of the old empires were quite multinational. The main change was that states were now on the average rather smaller and the different ethnic groups in them were considered as minorities and were often oppressed⁶⁵.

These post-war territorial settlements influenced the future development of the region. Several major trends in the political and economic developments were preconditioned by this new ethno-territorial reorganization. The irredentist conflicts among the new states, the existence of minorities and ethnic tensions in most of them, the pressures they experienced from the Great Powers, their shift to authoritarian rule and to self-contained economic development, and the failure of their efforts to create “political nations” and to achieve internal regional solidarity.

In the Balkans, with their specific brand of language-based nationalism and the role of religion as a crucial cultural dimension that has hindered the development of civil societies, nationalism has reemerged in its most primitive form, while this return to usually rewritten history weighs more than elsewhere. Moreover, nationalistic rhetoric was crucial for the different evolution of the former communists in Central Europe on the one hand and in the Balkans on the other, the last communists mostly turned nationalists while among the former’s almost all transformed themselves into social democrats. Of course, there is no doubt that the return of nationalism is present in the West too⁶⁶.

In the non-secular, non-cosmopolitan Balkan societies, therefore, nationalism has a religious component. Neither Orthodoxy, nor Islam (the dominant religions in the Balkans)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.49.

have yet become compatible with cosmopolitan liberalism, thus, secular societies do not exist in these countries. These characteristics are independent of whether these societies have had a theoretically democratic tradition like Greece, or a totalitarian one like the post-communist countries. They also characterize all sectors of society, not only the Orthodox or Muslim majorities. In fact, in the Balkans, Catholics, Protestants and even Jews tend to show values more similar if not identical to the ones shared by the Orthodox or Muslims. They live with than by their fellow believers in the secularized Western societies. This helps understand for example the Croatian drift towards an undemocratic, intolerant society. It may have a Catholic majority but it had nevertheless developed until recently in an intolerant Orthodox-dominated Yugoslav world. To better understanding of the current impact of religion, one must look at the two dimensions of religiosity -spiritual and cultural- as well as at the two types of its manifestation private and public. When we say that nationalism has a religious dimension it is the cultural aspect of religion, which we have in mind, i.e. when people perceive religion as a *sine qua non* of their national culture. Now, with the return of primitive nationalism, there is a greater impact of religion in its cultural form, both in its private and in its public manifestation⁶⁷.

Language was perceived by practically all national and cultural leaders as the mightiest agent of unification. Another main pillar in which nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century was constructed around was the religious identities of the people. Ethnic identity was stronger whenever ecclesiastical institutions supported it, and the role of clerics in the formation of patriotic groups in Europe was significant and in some cases decisive. In spite of all these efforts, national states with a homogeneous population were hard to find in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, where the homelands of nations and nationalities are related until today. Additionally, none of these states was able to solve the problems adequately with the national minorities⁶⁸.

After years of the creation of the nation-states, problem remains unsolved and it is the main cause for conflicts between the countries and regional instability today, like the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. On the other hand, there are cases like the Hungarians and -Sanjak Bosniaks and other Muslims-, who undoubtedly still feel bitter over their loss after

⁶⁷ Panayote Elias Dimitras, pp. 48-49.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 79

the First and the Second World War, but they are unlike to fight, to demand unification or separation. Above all, they have not been willing to risk war over the minority issue during the Yugoslavian breakup⁶⁹.

During the time of nation-building in the Balkans, but more intensively at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, efforts for change and assimilation of the people took place. Strategies that remained to one of three alternative logics of assimilation, expulsion or liquidation were the result of the non-recognition of other ethnic groups⁷⁰. These actions were forced by all the dominant ethnic groups (Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs) against each other, in areas where the one group had the majority. Accordingly, forced conversions and assimilations, mass executions and the departure of tens of thousands of refugees were the consequence of this attempt to liquidate the remaining Ottoman provinces in Europe in accordance with the principle of nationality⁷¹. At the same time there were non-enforced or so-called “voluntary conversions” that can be viewed as the result of indirect pressure or coercion (mainly economic and social), with the goal of attaining social re-categorization and assimilation of the people. Ethnicity was as much the consequence as the cause of this unrest. The simple folk were concerned more to regain some stability in their lives than to die for nationalism.

Serbia had gained rights of internal self-government but not a fully autonomous regime since 1816. The Greece was the first state building in the Balkans. After many unsuccessful attempts in the past, finally a part of the Greek nation became independent after independence war with the helping of Great Powers, which started in 1821. Similarly, in the hundred years following the Greek liberation from Finland, through the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia came into existence by secession from the great Empires⁷². All the new states had their own “awakeners” and “the Golden Age of national history had begun”. Memories of heroic eras

⁶⁹ Hagen Schulze, p. 321.

⁷⁰ Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Stephen F. Larrabee, “*Democratization in South – Eastern Europe*”, Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (Eds.), *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 33.

⁷¹ Mark Mazower, “*The Balkans-A Short History*”, A Modern Library Chronicles Book, New York, 2000, p. 117.

⁷² See Barbara Jelavich, “*History of the Balkans – Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centurie*”s, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

were used in all these countries to bolster national consciousness. During this process, the boundary between scholarship and national mythology became fluid⁷³.

Nationalism has been both the cause and the effect of the great reorganizations of political space in the Balkans. The new states that emerged from the disintegration of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov Empires were all created not only as nation-states, but as nationalizing states as well, in which the core nation is understood as the legitimate “owner” of the state, which accordingly is considered as the state of and for the core nation⁷⁴.

In the Balkan countries, the people had begun much before the 19th century only the Greeks who had a kind of national identity drawn back in their long history. At the end of the 18th and in the beginning of the 19th century, the Balkans (mainly Greeks) intellectuals, who lived in European states among with their European counterparts, were the catalyst for starting the “national awakening”. These “awakeners” successfully asserted the nation’s claim to independence and self- determination and they started to rebuild the “national language”. They generally proceeded from the assumption that the existence of a nation was a function of a shared language, and that linguistic uniformity was the precondition of a nation state⁷⁵.

As in some other countries in Europe, the appearance of heroes and rebirth of ancestors and a type of mythological stories created mythical places, figures, and characters that became conspicuous, even dominant features of public discourse in the Balkans. They became the largest and most important components of the thematic of the language of ethnic nationalism. Balkan nationalists tried to endow their states with a long pre-statehood history of nationality and national assertion and sought to establish uninterrupted continuities of national existence since the remotest antiquity⁷⁶.

The Balkan nationalist histories portray the Balkan medieval kingdoms or empires as nation-states and as the direct antecedents of the modern Balkan states. All these stories in the modern Balkan national states that base their existence on medieval kingdoms and

⁷³ Peter Alter, p. 45.

⁷⁴ Rogers Brubaker, p. 27-83.

⁷⁵ Peter Alter, pp. 42-43.

⁷⁶ Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *“Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy”*, VARIORUM Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot - Great Britain, 1994, p. XI.

empires with borders the desired borders by the nationalist leadership of the new states. The problem is that the borders of all of the medieval states fluctuated widely over the years and always overlapped each other, as happened in the geographical region of Macedonia where all the neighboring states demanded territorial benefits during the liberating struggle against the Ottoman Empire. However, it is well known that the medieval Balkan kingdoms, as any other medieval kingdoms as well, were not "nation-states" and their inhabitants did not constitute "nations" in the post-nineteenth-century.

The following story was shared among all the Balkan people in an almost identical version. Each ethnic group believed that in the Middle Ages, their nation had a strong and wealthy state (or empire), then the Ottomans destroyed their state and subjected their nation to centuries of slavery and oppression. Finally, the national heroes rose and broken the state after a heroic war against the oppressors

These myths went advance and tried to influence the people that according to the genetic logic, the same blood has always run through the veins of the members of the people and their endless blood is the basis of ethnic identity, unity with the hereafter, and the destiny of the whole people. The most characteristic example in this mythological support of the national identity is the case of Serbian nationalism; the battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389 emerged throughout Ottoman rule and increasingly in the late nineteenth century as the fundamental mythical moment in the national past. The date on which the battle took place, Vidovdan (St Vitus's Day)⁷⁷, subsequently became a key marker on the Serbian national calendar.⁷⁸

In addition, other factors complicated the situation even further. The Balkan Peninsula has a geographic location such that the region was the border between the former empires and thus it was often subjected to conflicting and competing influences. The results of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles were not largely satisfactory for any one of the parties. Territorial

⁷⁷ On this day in 1914, the Bosnian Serb student Gavrilo Princip fired the shots that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Seven years later the newly founded first Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, received its earliest centralist constitution preserving the Serb dominance on Vidovdan. Stalin chose this date in 1948 for Comintern to expel Yugoslavia from the eastern bloc, leading to the independent development of Yugoslav communism. The wars of Yugoslav succession began only a few days prior to Vidovdan 1991 and finally the surrender of Slobodan Milosevic to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague matched with Vidovdan in 2001.

⁷⁸ Florian Bieber, "*Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering, Rethinking History*", 6:1, 2002, p. 95

problems in the region created an unhappy minority trouble, thus laying the foundation for future conflicts and tensions. However, the greatest challenge came from the artificial establishment of the state of Yugoslavia.⁷⁹

The Yugoslav idea had its origin both in Croatia and Serbia, and was part of the 19th century nationalist revolts against, on the one hand, arrogant Austrian and Hungarian authority and, on the other, Ottoman power. Elements within Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Serbia agitated for a form of union of South Slavs. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and was dismembered in 1918, this ideal of a Slavic state was to some extent realized with the creation of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in 1929 changed its name to Yugoslavia in a vain attempt to minimize nationalist antagonisms. However, the new state in 1918 was essentially a creation of the victorious powers, France and Britain. Their ally in First World War, Serbia, was rewarded with new territories, including the Hungarian Vojvodina and the Albanian Kosovo, and with a centralist constitution that ensured that all the important decisions were taken by a government in Belgrade dominated by Serbs. In effect, the new Yugoslav state was a Greater Serbia, and a major source of tension was the Croatian wish for some decentralization of power. These conflicting perceptions of the common state, with the Serbs favoring a Yugoslav nation, and the Croats seeing Yugoslavia merely as a necessary step towards a fully independent Croat nation-state, influenced the nature of Yugoslavia's collapse both in 1941 under Nazi attack and again in the 1990s.

Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia, there were fewer examples of the general problems with hostile minorities and irredentist claims by neighbors. Here, the real dispute was to unite in a single nation all the different ethnic and religious groups that had different cultures, several languages, legal systems, non-matching skill in state and political affairs, and historical hostility to one another. For this reason, the most important factor shaping the future development of the newly comprised state was Serbian domination in its political life, administrative and legal procedures and organization. This domination was based on four important arguments:

⁷⁹ Margaret Macmillan, pp..ix-x

1. Serbs gained and created an independent kingdom from Ottoman and they saw themselves the protector of the Southern Slav communities by Serbian army, reign and bureaucracy;

2. Serbia's government was undesired to accept the Western patronage idea of Yugoslavia and when it finally did so, it was with the belief that "whatever Southern Slavic state might emerge from the war would be regarded as but a chronological extension and a geographic expansion of old Serbia";

3. Serbs felt free to hold the control of the country because of their greater military and civil casualties and the greater loss of wealth during the war;

4. Serbia was alone which could supply to the new state with her political elite capable of ruling, a comprehensive government tools, military capability and a native dynasty⁸⁰.

However important as those Serbian arguments were, it was very difficult to bring together the other ethnic groups to this status quo. Croats who were particularly skeptical and obstructive about Serbian policy and, in fact, the political history of interwar Yugoslavia was largely a history of common mystification and disturbance of these two peoples. Yugoslavia was kept together by the ruling power of Tito that failed to unite the people into a single political nation. As an alternative, it created conditions in which each ethnic group indulged in its own nationalistic dreams. Not surprisingly then, the crucial evidence of this failure is seen through the fate of Yugoslavia, which was torn apart and devastated by these same manifestations of nationalistic ideology in the 1990s.

Given the manifestations of nationalism, it is important to highlight one characteristic feature that clearly distinguishes East Central European and Balkan nationalism from their Western European counterparts. It is a shared opinion among nationalism theorists that in Italy and Germany, for instance, nationalism was integrative, uniting the same peoples living in different states and principalities⁸¹.

In contrast, in Eastern Europe, nationalism was separatist. Dominated for centuries by big empires, the peoples hoped to overthrow their imperial rulers and establish their own nation-states. It seems, however, that nationalist and separatist characteristics have been

⁸⁰ Borianna Marinova – Zuber, p.7.

⁸¹ Ernest Gellner, "*Nations and Nationalism*", p. xxviii

preserved over time for if we look at the late 20th century manifestations of nationalism in East Central Europe and especially in the Balkans; the tendency is again for separation and independence rather than for unification. If we look now, more than 15 years later, what was once Yugoslavia has from present-day point of view disintegrated into almost as many sovereign states as pre- First World War units had existed?

Despite its turbulent history, and contrary to general belief, severe ethnic conflicts were not traditional characteristics of the region. Although Islam dominated Eastern culture for five centuries, it did not eliminate Orthodox Christianity. Tolerance within the Ottoman Empire enabled several specific ethnic and regional Islamic and Orthodox cultures to coexist⁸². Nevertheless, occasional ethnic conflicts existed as in every plural environment. The forces of nationalism, and religious and ideological intolerance in the Balkans had played itself out on the political scene only for the past hundred years or so. For example, openly expressed animosity between the Serbs and the Croats along ethnic, national, and religious lines could hardly be traced back in time to earlier than the 1900s. In the case of Albanians and their uneasy relationship with the Serbs, that time line could be pushed back to the late 1870s. Nationalist rebellions against Ottomans in the 19th century eroded the Ottoman Empire and permitted the creation of new Balkan states. The political map of the region changed after the First World War, during the Second World War and after it, again in the 1990s, and finally with the independence of Kosovo.

Until the 1980s, the former Yugoslavia was mentioned as a successful multi-national state that had managed to establish good ethnic relations⁸³. Even its citizens did not recognize Yugoslavia as a divided society or a fractured state. It did not match the typical model of a divided society characterized by prolonged conflicts among ethnic, linguistic or religious communities. Ethnic relations in Yugoslavia seemed good despite important ethnic diversity; ethnic conflicts that escalated occasionally in some regions were resolved successfully in a peaceful way. However, coincidental death of powerful leader Tito, unsuccessful democratic transformation efforts, and the war in the 1990s changed the situation.

⁸² Mitja Zagar, "*Ethnic Relations, Nationalism and Minority Nationalism in South-Eastern Europe*"e, Michael Keating, John McGarry (Ed.) *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.332.

⁸³ Ibid., p.331.

2.1.1.3. Rebirth of Nationalism in the Balkans after the Cold War:

After the Cold War with the help of revolutions of 1989, world watched the changing movements and democratization process with together the rebirth of nationalism in former communist regime of Central and Eastern Europe.

However, main argument is nationalist ideology did not vanish altogether during the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but was only covered up by the rulers. Marxist ideology predicted that the social class, the international proletariat, would be a major character of future socioeconomic and political developments, rather than ethnic groups or nations. This was based on the hypothesis that because of modernization, nationalism would disappear and provide proletarian internationalism. However, historical developments proved that this prediction to be wrong. Nationalist aspirations emerged on two stages in Eastern European communist regimes. On the one hand, following the mid-1950s, an often continuous trend aimed at more autonomy from Moscow was observed everywhere in the socialist camp. On the other hand, more important and more consequential for the future development of the region were the sparks of nationalist tensions between and within multiethnic states and among various nationalities, as well as the rise of expressed concerns about the mistreatment of co-ethnic populations living in neighboring states⁸⁴.

In the Balkans, there are several examples of such events. Although the Bulgarian Constitution of 1971, afforded equal rights to all citizens, the rights and cultural autonomy of the Turkish minority were systematically encroached. It was finally reached its highest point with the anti-Turkish campaign of 1984-1985⁸⁵.

In the Cold War, ethnic problems rarely developed to complete crises in communist Eastern Europe due to concerted efforts by local elites to avoid intra-bloc splits and to Moscow's great powerful political and military presence, which had a deterring effect. Yugoslavia was dominated by conflicts between the wealthy Slovenes and Croats, who struggled for more autonomy within the federation, and the Serbs who were economically poor but greater in number and were motivated towards increased centralism in the state.

⁸⁴ John Breuilly, "*Nationalism and the State*", Manchester University Press, 2nd Ed., 1993, pp.357-363.

⁸⁵ Ali Eminov, "*Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*", C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1997, p.51.

The collapse of Communism brought about important changes in the region and thus several factors appeared to have a synchronic causing influence on the return of nationalism. Among these are:

1. Most importantly, the losing ground Soviet influence and, as a consequence, its deterrent role,
2. The destabilizing political effect of mass media, which has been guaranteed freedom of expression and nationwide audience due to political liberalization,
3. Searching for a new ideology that ended with populist politicians employing nationalism to fill the empty area,
4. The economic poverties of the transition, which brought about disappointment and anger against those who were more successful in adjusting to market conditions,
5. The broader change to the political right,
6. The dissatisfaction of the older generations over their “wasted lives,” which was a likely momentum for seeking a new opening⁸⁶.

These factors emerge to be rational consequences of Communism’s end. On the other hand, ethnic tensions and conflicts may be the unavoidable result of the breakdown of any kind of dictatorial state. In other words, the process of democratization itself has a direct connection on ethnic issues, and depending on the conditions present, it is possible to either diminish or to worsen ethnic tensions.

If we developed a framework for evaluating which conditions resolve and which worsen ethnic problems in the Balkans, both the cases of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are the good examples that we can explain why ethnic tensions were improved, and why ethnic tensions exploded into conflicts. To begin with, ethnic tensions were relatively low in Bulgaria before the process of democratization started. The Turkish minority, which is about 10 percent of the population, never had secessionist claims. They required only equal civil rights and cultural autonomy, which were in effect provided by the democratic government. The ethnic issues were addressed early in the transition process and the Turks were permitted to create their own ethnic party, the Movement for Rights and Liberties

⁸⁶ Borianna Marinova – Zuber, p.8

(MRL), which represents them in the parliament. They received cultural and religious autonomy as well – studying Turkish in the local schools, receiving Turkish TV channels, practicing Islam freely and so on. Although an external ethnic ally exists, Turkey does not have any claims on this minority and Bulgarian-Turkish relations are not influenced by this question. Even more, Turks who wanted to leave Bulgaria had the right to do so. Moreover, indeed, as many as around 100,000 people did return to Turkey in the search for work and better life, however most of them retained their property in Bulgaria⁸⁷.

In the case of Yugoslavia, two extremely important factors are the existence of historical objections and the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes. Internal nationalism was certainly the most important political factor throughout the existence of Yugoslavia. The previous regime's identification with the Serb people and its attempts to manipulate the ethnic mix in parts of the country had also contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic objections. It was the Serbian drive to rule the other South Slavic nations under the label of a "federal" Yugoslavia that was one of the major causes of the country's breakup. Another set of factors that also proved to be decisive, were the ethnic ties across state borders and the support that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia received from Milosevic's government. The extreme positions of the leaders of all the ethnic groups, which were sometimes used as tools in intra-ethnic political competition, and the unwillingness of those leaders to agree on compromises were certainly a major reason for the conflicts to escalate and become so devastating. Last, the fact that the federal troops proved to be loyal to Serbian leadership in the decisive moment when Slovenia and Croatia opted for independence had a great impact. However, it can be argued that the first and foremost reason for the Yugoslav crisis was the fact that ethnic grievances were not addressed at all. Instead of accepting the proposal of Slovenia and Croatia to restructure Yugoslavia as confederation, which would have provided more autonomy for them, Milosevic resorted to direct military intervention using the federal army to keep control of both republics by force⁸⁸.

⁸⁷ Bernd Rechel, "*Bulgaria: Minority Rights Light*", Bernd Rechel (Ed.), *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, Taylor & Francis, 2009, pp.77-87

⁸⁸ Reno Lukic, R., "*Greater Serbia: A New Reality in the Balkans*", *Nationality Papers*, December 1991, p.49.

2.1.2. The Right to Self-Determination and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia:

In the second half of the twentieth century, although two great significant improvements, the disintegration of colonial empires and the collapse of the Eastern Blocks, principle of self-determination has been developed and find application areas under the supervision of the international community and the framework of international law. In cases such as the principle of self-determination is applied, the basis of the UN Charter and international law, respect for territorial integrity and the principle of non- intervention in the internal affairs have always priority, and the decision of International Court of Justice (ICJ) also supports this application.

In the first years of the 21st century, self-determination is the main source of some crises, which has experienced. By limiting, the use of the principle of self-determination has led to erosion of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity. This case has led to the principle of self-determination find an application area within the boundaries of existing states. Kosovo's independence and de facto separation of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia from Georgia is evaluated in this context.

Today, the principle of self-determination, also owes its existence, can be seen in a contravention development to the UN Charter and international law. Principle of self-determination is being widely interpreted than ever before, and the independence requests of many ethnic groups are whipped. The emergence of new microstates like Kosovo and South Ossetia raises big concerns in the international community.

Principle of self-determination (people's own destiny/future determination) is the most controversial concepts, which are debated by the international community since the beginning of the 20th century⁸⁹. Until recently, principle of self-determination has played a decisive role about integration or disintegration of many states. It is still basic international rule of law, which is argued by many ethnic, religious, cultural, and indigenous groups who in struggle for their independence or autonomy. Again, the principle of self-

⁸⁹ Karen Knop, *"Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law"*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.99

determination is the main driving force for process to participate in international community, such as the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Decolonization of a new state⁹⁰.

Historically, the development of concept of self-determination is followed; it is possible to read an important part of world history that accompanied the concept. After First World War, Second World War and the Cold War period, important changes that relating with the self-determination policy have occurred. Although, it was not located in the Covenant of League of Nations after the First World War, principle of self-determination has been included in the agenda of the international community as a political right, since the end of the war. However, the victorious nations could not create the necessary mechanisms of international peace, and they used the principle of self-determination for their interests. World witnessed the greatest destruction from the beginning of its history, First World War. International community learned lessons from the war; in order to establish perpetual world peace, principles of territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs and the self-determination has become significant rules of international law with taking place in UN Charter. Blowing with the Cold War wind, the right to self-determination experienced golden years. It ended the colonial empires, and the world map has changed greatly. The Soviet Union was the greatest advocate of the right to self-determination during the Cold War. But she could not escape from the biggest victim of this right in 1989. All republics allocated from Soviet Union and Yugoslavia claimed beneficiaries of this right.

The period of 20th century has been the dissolution of large empires and the establishment of relatively smaller states than before. When approaching the end of the century, all colonies gained their independence and it had that self-determination policy moving away from the international agenda. Before long, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and re-emerging nationalist movements in former communist countries moved the principle to the center of international relations.

2.1.2.1. Historical Background of the Right to Self-Determination:

Self-determination is a concept that can be traced back to the beginning of government. The right has always been kept hopes by all peoples, although history has a long record of

⁹⁰ Hurst Hannum, "*Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*", 2nd Ed. , University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p.49.

its denial to the weak by the strong. Both the Greek city-states and the earlier Mesopotamian ones were jealous of their right to self-determination⁹¹.

Self-determination has emerged as the right of the people to determine their own sect freely, after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe. During this lengthy sectarian war, the people changed hands many times and reaction has been formed against the monarchy. Monarchy could take or dispose of the country and the people such as the method "sale, exchange, marriage or inheritance".

The origins of the modern right to self-determination of peoples are established in the Enlightenment ideas relating to popular sovereignty. The principle of popular sovereignty had as its fundamental aim the transfer of sovereignty from the ruler to the ruled. Sovereignty and therefore political legitimacy were to be transferred from the absolutist monarch to the people. An individual's loyalty was to pass from the monarch to the state. Especially in Western Europe and in America, under the influence of enlightenment age, this understanding had been changed and, states began to base their legitimacy on the public living on own territory, instead of religious authorities. Under the influence of thinkers such as Milton, Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau; national sovereignty and representative government idea has been strengthened and individual rights started to create awareness. The principle of the self-determine was frequently mentioned in British Revolution in 1688 and the struggle of the independence of American colonies. The American Revolution and more significantly the French Revolution were defining moments in the emergence of the modern right of the peoples to self-determination⁹².

Principles of self-determination avoid having to stay at theory and entered permanently into the international community's agenda with the French Revolution. Immediately after the revolution in France, French Army used the principle in order to legitimate the seized places joined to their homeland. France National Assembly in 1792, declared to give a necessary support and assistance for liberating all the peoples. However, in the first appearance of principle of self-determination, it has been sacrificed to the interests of the

⁹¹ Betty Miller Unterberger, "*Self-Determination*", Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2002.

⁹² Martin Griffiths, "*Self-Determination, International Society and World Order*", Australia, 2003, MqLJ Vol 3, Macquarie Law Journal 29.

country. Some referendum that organized in order to legitimate the occupation was ignored, because of the results were against to revolutionists⁹³.

Idea of self-determination also affects American thinkers; it is used to legitimate the struggle for independence before the French revolutionary. The American people, published the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and reported no longer be ruled by Britain. As a result, they were the first colonial people to obtain the right of national self-determination⁹⁴. Despite all these flaws and deficiencies, contribution of the French Revolution to self-determination is never underestimated. A principle of self-determination has spread to other countries, which allow the suggestion as a political ripple for all nations to determine freely their own political status⁹⁵.

After the Napoleonic Wars, Poles, Italians, Magyars and Germans, as well as the ethnic minorities living among them, all advanced claims to self-determination. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 did not recognize self-determination as a source for redesigning the map of Europe, but parallel demands from the oppressed peoples of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires later received more favorable treatment⁹⁶.

The first wave showed itself in 19th century in Italy and it provided Italy's unification. Germany also passed through a similar process to complete the national unity and she came to the European scene as a nation-state. On the one hand, while nation-states emerge, other hand, multinational empires was on the edge of destruction with struggle for independence and the separatist movements. Emerging nationalism, independence movements, colonial struggles and the arms race led to blow the wind of war all over the world at the beginning of 20th century. Indeed, it was under the label of nationalism that claims to self-determination were usually sought until early in the 20th century.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, annexations of territory took place in most cases by means of force. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914, many small ethnic groups led to the movement for the right to self-determination. These groups wanted to have achieved independence with taking advantage of the confusion created by war. After

⁹³ Yael Tamir, *"Liberal Nationalism"*, Princeton University Press, 1995, p.91

⁹⁴ Thomas D. Musgrave, *"Self-Determination and National Minorities"*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.4

⁹⁵ Antonio Cassese, *"Self-Determination of Peoples"*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 13.

⁹⁶ Kalevi J. Holsti, *"The State, War, and the State of War"*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.53

First World War, however, when the former European system began to break up, the principle of self-determination rapidly acquired strong support. As a result, self-determination issue, as an important question, has begun to take up the international community's time during the war and after the war in the peace conference⁹⁷.

First, Lenin and Bolsheviks applied self-determination policy to people connected to the Russian Empire with taking a bold step and they gave the first examples of independence of the country based on the principle of self-determination in 1917. Lenin and other Russian Bolsheviks tried to gain the sympathies of the peoples of the Russian empire, guaranteed to recognize the right to self-determination, in accordance with their anti-imperialist program of action. Second, on January 8, 1918 President Wilson summarized to the American Congress his famous Fourteen Points as the basis of the post-First World War political settlement for Europe. At the heart of his outline was the principle of self-determination, which Wilson saw as an imperative principle of action⁹⁸.

Lenin believed to be the right of union, but he found voluntary participation accurately rather than union provided with force. Although he supported the right to self-determination, he thought, as all Marxist, that nationalism is a disease of capitalism, and he believed that they would be disappear together. Nevertheless, he saw the establishment of nation-states as a vital step on the road to socialism. Lenin and the other Soviet leaders after him did not defend the self-determination to protect the rights of people, only they decided to achieve their political and ideological ambitions. Indeed, the interest of socialism has always come before the principle. Marxists decided to self-determination as a tool of escalating the class conflicts. Although the ideological purposes were followed, Soviet Union strongly positioned against through the colonialism and the principle of self-determination took place in the UN Charter and became a rule of international law⁹⁹.

Even though Bolsheviks' attitude was very helpful, the principle on behalf of the legal update, but Wilson's influence enabled the principle to become even more comprehensive. After the U.S. joined the war in 1917, Wilson's comments on self-determination began to play a central role. In the beginning, his ideas about issue based on the idea of

⁹⁷ Thomas Musgrave, p. 15.

⁹⁸ Antonio Cassese, pp.14-20

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.18

representative government and reflected the thinking of Western Europe. Against the Bolsheviks, or Eastern Europe "each nation should establish its own state" idea, he advocated the Western Europe's "every nation should set its own management style and administrators" idea. Self-determination was "self-government" for him¹⁰⁰.

Together with the progressing of war, Wilson's concept of self-determination started to gain an external dimension. According to him, people must have been free to choose their government. He explained the reasons of U.S. to go to war with thought of "freedom, right to self-determination to peoples and the rights of free development of human". Wilson suggested four different forms of self-determination at international level. First, he emphasized that all people would have the right to choose the form of government of living in the administration. The second aspect of self-determination, restructuring of the Central European states in accordance with national demands. According to Wilson, "disintegration of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire and redrawn the map of Europe" should have become the guiding principle. Third, Wilson perceived the principle of self-determination as a criterion to be applied of the solution of the problem that countries to change in hands. Finally, not to contradict the interests of the colonial state, he accounted this principle for resolving the claims of the peoples under colonial rule¹⁰¹.

The importance of Wilson's supporting of self-determination was the first time that the great powers used the principle as the basis for reshaping the political map of Europe with a political settlement. "Self-determination of peoples" became the popular political slogan of that time. However, it was only applied, in practice, to the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and to the Polish population. Since then self-determination has possibly developed to the status of one of the absolute and non-derogable norms of international law (*jus cogens*¹⁰²). In 1995, the International Court of Justice ruled that the right of peoples to self-determination was an essential principle of contemporary international law and an *erga omnes*¹⁰³ obligation¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Musgrave, p.22

¹⁰¹ Antonio Cassese, p.21

¹⁰² A peremptory norm (also called *jus cogens* or *ius cogens*, Latin for "compelling law") is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted.

¹⁰³ *Erga omnes* (in relation to everyone) is frequently used in legal terminology describing obligations or rights toward all.

If Lenin and Wilson's views on issues of self-determination are compared, three points will be differentiated. First, the political and ideological foundations of the theory of self-determination are different. Second, Wilson has considered the internal size of the principle including with the international environment. The third difference can be seen in the implementation methods of principle of self-determination. If we focus on this point, according to Wilson, self-determination is not the right, which will start a violent revolution. Lenin, unlike the Wilson's, advocated the principle of self-determination could only be applied within a revolutionary nature¹⁰⁵.

We can bring some criticism against Wilson's explanation of self-determination. Wilson kept the concept of nation synonymous with all the peoples under foreign management and made a big mistake. Wilson defended the self-determination theory powerful and emotional in the international arena, but he could not predict the results on the world stage. Indeed, It could not be fulfilled the internal or external promise of principle by Great Powers. In fact, the difficulty is related with the concept, which has problems in itself. The most famous problem is which criteria will determine the people who have the right to self-determination. Wilson statements did not explain the people in his minds. What are the connections with race, territory or community? In practice, application of these principles, without the precise definition of a people, would bring chaos and instability.

Within a short period, it was understood that self-determination issue contains many intertwined problems. Wilson came the peace conference without full of understanding the ethnic problems were too complex in Central Europe. In a short time, he discovered the problem could not be done only by drawing political boundaries, because in many places people were living mixed in a state. However, difficulties in implementing the right to self-determination and the unwillingness of the allies caused the development of minority rights system. However, the minority rights system was very selective and only applied to Central and Eastern European states.

In the period after the First World War, even though the principle of self-determination became popular as a political proposition and ideological slogan but could not become the

¹⁰⁴ The International Court of Justice Official Web Site, *Case Concerning East Timor, Summary of the Judgment of 30 June 1995*, Available on site <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=430&code=pa&p=3&p2=3&case=84&k=66&p3=5> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁰⁵ Antonio Cassese, p.21

part of international law norms. First idea about these two important issues, the principle of self-determination was not included in the Covenant of the League of Nations, second, decision of the commission tasked with resolving the issue of the Aaland Islands. The heart of the Covenant of the League of Nations Article 10 declared:

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

By means of the principle of self-determination maintained the position before the peace conference. In the period after the First World War, self-determination principle is not enough care. It was only seen as a political principle, and conceded a great advantage to principles of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of a country. In the period of League of Nations, application of the principle of self-determination limited only Central and Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had gained independence by using this principle¹⁰⁶.

Until the First World War, the principle of self-determination involved a political understanding. Before the end of the First World War, principle of self-determination has been mentioned indirectly in Atlantic Treaty was signed by who fought against the Nazis and representatives government in exile. However, it was intended that state under the Nazi occupation regained their freedom before the occupation. Then, in the text of Dumbarton Oaks proposals was the core of the UN Charter did not mention the self-determination. Principle was able to enter the UN Charter in San Francisco talks with the Soviet Union's insistence.

Again, First World War changed the map of the world beyond recognition, but the principle of self-determination affected these changes very small degree. During the postwar period, self-determination slowly made the transition from a political principle to a right. The force behind the transformation was the development of human rights norms in general, and the need to create a legal vehicle for decolonization in particular.

¹⁰⁶ Mustafa Şahin, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Self-Determinasyon Politikası", 2. Baskı, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara, 2000, p. 17

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 marked the beginning of the second era of the self-determination idea. Unlike the League of Nations Covenant, the UN Charter mentions self-determination twice. The legal source of claims to self-determination originates from short references to the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” in Articles I (2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter. These provisions were developed in the General Assembly of the United Nations after a series of resolutions and declarations.

However, the term very clearly applies to states and not to peoples or groups. Yet, once the idea was written into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from a principle to a right. The UN continued to define self-determination in broad language but, again, it was never seen as an absolute or unlimited right. The central and most challenging problem of self-determination is the identification of the units, the “peoples”. It is widely accepted that a people is defined according to territorial criteria. A people are seen as the population or inhabitants of a defined territorial unit, irrespective of other identities and affiliations. In the literature on this issue, the word “nation” is commonly used as a synonym for people. The nation can mean the population of a certain territorial unit with classical theory of self-determination, or a cultural group based upon a common history and language with romantic theory of self-determination¹⁰⁷.

The most important document in the promotion of the right to self-determination, and one that provides a clear indication of its meaning during this era, was the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. The criteria underlying the right did not include possession of a distinct ethnicity, language, or culture; rather, self-determination was simply a more appealing term for decolonization. In fact, four principles characterize self-determination during this era¹⁰⁸.

First, self-determination referred only to decolonization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to territories. Third, self-determination was now considered an absolute right—though, again, for colonies only; this marked a significant change from the previous era. Finally, self-determination did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial integrity of existing states and most colonial territories was assumed. The essential quality of self-

¹⁰⁷ Peter Radan, pp.9-11

¹⁰⁸ Michla Pomerance, “*Self-Determination in Law and Practice*”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Nederland, 1982, p.11

determination during this era, it was not that all peoples had the right to self-determination, but that all colonies had the right to be independent¹⁰⁹.

The 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state the existence of a right to self-determination in their common first article. However, it has been through a series of resolutions of the UN General Assembly that the right has been most significantly developed and invested with meaning. Three resolutions have been of particular importance. General Assembly resolution 1514 contained the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. It stated that, ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination’¹¹⁰.

The implication is that self-determination applies in the colonial context, discussing a right upon the inhabitants of colonies to have independence. The resolution appears to defend against the disintegration of existing territories, stating, “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”¹¹¹.

Resolution 1541 is built upon by resolution 1514¹¹², which clarifies what are non-self-governing territories for the purposes of Article 73 of the UN Charter. The resolution states that such territories will have achieved a full measure of the self-government banned for them in Article 73 by either their emergence as sovereign independent states, free association with an independent state or integration with an independent state.

The Friendly Relations Declaration has perhaps greatest significance over debating of self-determination; the most problematic era in the development of the concept began with the end of decolonization in the late 1970s and continues to the present¹¹³. In this declaration, the General Assembly asserts again the importance of the right to self-determination, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights of minorities with the territorial absolutism of decolonization and to redefine self-determination to mean that every distinctive ethnic or national group has a right to independence. After restating, the means through which

¹⁰⁹ Patricia Carley, “*Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession*”, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 7, 1996, p.4

¹¹⁰ UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), para. 2.

¹¹¹ Ibid., para. 6.

¹¹² UNGA Res. 1541 (XV).

¹¹³ UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV).

colonial peoples may realize their self-determination set out in resolution 1541. Though self-determination has taken on this new meaning in a popular sense, it has not been accepted by any state or by international law.

Another point is that the principle of territorial integrity is referred to in several relevant texts addressing the right to self-determination such as the Helsinki Final Act, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990. The fact that the right to self-determination must be interpreted in the light of the right of territorial integrity of states, in the sense that possible means of exercising the right to self-determination are limited by the right of territorial integrity, must necessarily mean that subgroups within a state are envisaged as holders of the right to self-determination. If self-determination would only refer to nations as the subject of the right, this would make an emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity largely redundant.

From these historical events two theoretical versions of self-determination emerged. It is necessary to distinguish between internal and external self-determination. In fact, there is no any legal text about natural division or separation of right to self-determination has been adopted by the United Nations. In particular, no description has external and internal. Therefore, the concept of internal self-determination is not a part of the traditional self-determination type. However, Human Rights Committee which was established within the direction of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights gives a strongly importance to the internal side of the self-determination. Western countries also more prefer internal self-determination reflects the notion of democracy.

Internal self-determination refers to a people's right to determine the system of government, which they will live under it. It does not concern any changes to state borders, but simply how peoples concerning will be governed within the state that they belong to. External self-determination on the other hand concerns the question of which state a peoples' will belong to; this may involve the inhabitants of a particular territory choosing to secede from the state to which they belong and forming a new state or merging with another one¹¹⁴.

¹¹⁴ Gary Wilson, "Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo", Netherlands International Law Review, 2009, LVI, p.463,

The dramatic events in recent years have shown that, adoption of internal self-determination would be more useful instead of external self-determination for world people and community wants to use the right to self-determination. Should never forget that more than ninety percent of world states consist of ethnic communities are non-homogeneous. Because of this sensitivity the concept of self-determination should understand very well, and the truth about it has not only external dimension must be accepted by international community. Of course, we cannot evaluate all claims about self-determination in the same category to solve the problem standing in front of us. Discrimination between these claims will be ended dissimilar political and legal solutions.

Over more than half century of the UN Charter, debates and uncertainty surrounding on self-determination issue still exist. While every state under obligation to help the occurring of the right to self-determination and to respect those rights in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, achievement of all demands of self-determination can break up the current international order. Therefore, the scope, content and meaning of the concept of self-determination must be determined very well and must be exposed not to be permitted to misunderstanding.

Today, the main obstacles in front of the legal and political development in this area is the need of all the states just agreed and defined about the concept of the peoples, like the concept of minority. The point of different approach between theorists is over how to define the owners of the right to self-determination. The classical theory has defined the people in territorial terms. According to this theory, a “people” is formed by the population of particular territorial unit namely the state. The romantic theory of self-determination declares a people to be a group of persons forming a cultural group based upon a common history and language. In both theories, it is common to refer to the people as the “nation”¹¹⁵.

Considering closely to the documentation of international law and practice of state, the apparently observed that term "people" is understood to encompass all inhabitants within the country¹¹⁶. Accordance with this understanding in the process of decolonization, right to self-determination was given to all the people in the country who gained independence

¹¹⁵ Peter Radan, p.8.

¹¹⁶ Hurst Hannum, p.36

in the state. Right to self-determination is not just a right belonging to the colonial peoples. It is also applied to foreign yoke and racial ones of under pressure. Establishing with UN, the use of force has been started to ban in interstate relations, and thus, right to the self-determination of people was born for under foreign occupation.

In terms of concept of “people”, another problem is the definition of "minority" has not been done yet¹¹⁷. This leads to increase the tensions and uncertainty in different regions of the world. As long as the magic word “people” continues to express the minorities¹¹⁸, this kind of crisis will never end. In fact, the essence of the problem is; is it possible or not a portion of the population in the current state can separate from the state, by staying within the law?

Western states were opposed to the principle of rights to self-determination in the period of decolonization, but today, they support it after nearly losing all the colonies. European organizations such as Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deal with and contributes to the issue more than the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which in the focus of self-determination debate. In contrast, with the end of the Cold War, many of them are the former colonies of the third world countries and former Eastern Bloc countries has lost their interest to the subject.

On the one hand, Convention of Vienna Law of Treaties gained importance in the legal opinion; in contrast principle of self-determination due to take place in the most important contemporary international documents, the opinions that normative character of the principle of self-determination is the nature of *jus cogens* has increased recently.

Alternatively, when considering the self-determination applications documents, it will be also seen that is not exclusive right to only colonial peoples. As well, serious human rights violations against the communities in obvious difference have become a right to self-determination for the masses¹¹⁹.

If we deal with self-determination of the internal dimensions, it will be transformed into the right for all the people of the world. When some important international lawyers confront the idea of self-determination is a legal right, it may not be correct to suggest the

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.88.

¹¹⁸ Christian Tomuschat, “*Modern Law of Self-Determination*”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p..37

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.91

accuracy of the principle that in the nature of *jus cogens*. The most important point that supporting this view; in case of the principle of self determination is a principle in the nature of *jus cogens*, the provisions of the agreement is obliged to remain inoperative which conflict with itself¹²⁰. Therefore, the principle of self-determination, a controversial issue, is characterized as *jus cogens* is to open its doors to new dispute.

The real issue, which is concentrated on the debate about the right to self-determination whether, includes the right of secession or not. It is ambiguous that the right to self-determination right and the right of secession are the different sides of a coin or unlike principles from each other. Therefore, the right to self-determination, which includes the right of secession or not is discussed at all times. National self-determination has been generally accepted as positive a principle when the right to secession has been seen as negative and destructive a policy.

According to advocates of the right to secession, the right to self-determination without the right to secession has been likened to democracy without elections. They have fully opposed the notion of the concept of indivisibility of nation and integrity of the country. However, the following points should be known that this right is limited in the event of compulsory reasons by advocates of the right to secession. According to them, if the lives of people or cultural autonomy fall in danger or people feels exploited economically in poverty continuously, there will be legitimate reasons to secession¹²¹.

According to international law, right to self-determination, is valid within the boundaries of the principle of *uti possidetis juris*. Country is also the crucial requirement of the state, which draw the limits of sovereignty of state authority. Because of this importance of *uti possidetis juris* became a principle of international law in the 20th century. The acceptance of this principle as a general rule was carried out with 10th article of the Covenant of League of Nations. Thus, member states pledged to respect to each other's territorial integrity. Later, the same principle was repeated in the Charter of the United Nations Article 2 (4). Besides, this principle was included in Helsinki Final Act in 1975¹²².

¹²⁰ Antonio Cassese, p.173.

¹²¹ Allen Buchanan, “*Democracy and Secession*”, Margaret Moore(Ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.14-30

¹²² Hüseyin Pazarcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri-II. Kitap*, 2. Baskı, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara,1993, pp. 15-16.

According to this, all the people have the right to determine internal and external political arrangements without any external intervention and to orientation the social, cultural and economic development, freely at anytime. Here, although it mentions all the people, implied meaning is the whole population on the country. So, this right can be used in accordance with the principle of violating the rights of borders. Looking at the United Nations practice, this has been clarified in resolutions 1514 and 2625 by the General Assembly. Resolution 1514 has clearly forbidden to secession from current states. Even if resolution 2625 made larger arrangements in the same way, but main goal did not change.

During the preparatory work of the UN Charter, members focused on the debate of concept of people/nation regarding the right to secession. At last, during the signing of the UN Charter, the opinion about the right to self-determination cannot be applied to minorities and separatist movements dominated and the right to secession did not accept.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992, the implementation of principle of self-determination came into the agenda without colonies. The new independent states secession from the two states declared to rely on these principles. However, an important feature of the new states, they had created the federal wings of federal state before, and previous states constitutions had the right to self-determination. Therefore, it is not true to say with looking to these examples that contemporary international law accept the right to secession¹²³.

On the other hand, many authors are reported to the right to self-determination as a case may come before the principles of territorial integrity, if a states does not have government representing the whole nation, excluded people have the right to self-determination¹²⁴. This includes the right to resistance or rebellion. However, current implementation of UN documents does not accept the right to self-determination.

The right to secede always has been met with suspicion by international law. In very rare cases, a people have been allowed with establishing a new state by breaking away from another state. However, inhabitants who live within the boundaries many states are waiting for the solution of the right to self-determination. Irredentism involves self-determination

¹²³ Ibid, p.9.

¹²⁴ Allen Buchanan, "*A Principled International Legal Response to Demands for Self-Determination*", Igor Primoratz, Aleksandar Pavković (Ed.), Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006, pp. 139-153

by members of a single ethnic group who inhabit more than one state. Irredentist claims may arise in various ways. A state may lay claim to territory of another state or non-governing territory on the basis that the inhabitants of that territory of the same ethnic group as the population of the claimant state. Alternatively, an ethnic group may seek to secede from one state to join another with which it shares ethnic similarity. The population of a non-self-governing territory may seek integration with a neighboring state of the same ethnic group upon decolonization. Irredentist claims involve more than one state, and are therefore governed by international law¹²⁵.

When an irredentist claim threatens the territorial integrity of another state, international law protects the territorial integrity of the state. Ethnic groups on both sides of national frontiers therefore cannot normally achieve self-determination by unifying the entire group within one nation-state. The unification of two Germany is an example of state concurrence.

The unification of two states whose populations are essentially of the same ethnic group may not be possible if one of those states has a substantial ethnic minority, which opposes union. The case of Cyprus is a good example for illustrating this. The existence of significant ethnic minority within a particular state is therefore a factor that complicates the irredentist union of two states¹²⁶.

Problems of an irredentist nature may also arise when a state disintegrates because of ethnic conflict, as in Yugoslavia. The finding of the Badinter Commission that in such circumstances the internal boundaries of the constituent units of the former state must be maintained as the external frontiers of the new states did not resolve the problem of ethnic conflict, which had led to the disintegration of the state in the first place. Because, the communities living together for many years formed residential areas with never mind the limits. Except for some areas, most ethnic groups were intertwined. It would have been far better to avoid irredentist problems by allowing the frontiers to be readjusted so as to separate hostile ethnic groups. It is very clear that it did not conform to the principle of territorial integrity. However, there was not found a satisfactory way to keep apart the conflicting ethnic groups by the international community. This case was perceived as a

¹²⁵ Thomas D. Musgrave, p. 211

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.237.

double standard of the international community who remained faithful to the principle of *uti possidetis juris* until the end of the process of decolonization¹²⁷.

2.1.2.2. Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Right to the Self-Determination of Kosovo People:

2.1.2.2.1 Right to the Self-Determination of Constituent States of Yugoslavia

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded by Marshal Tito's communist partisans after the Second World War with a population of 23 million, consisting of six republics and twelve autonomous federations. Despite profound economic, religious, cultural and political differences, Yugoslavia, with Tito's charismatic leadership, became relatively successful to protect a complex ethnic and political balance in the Balkans until 1980. However, at the end of the 1980s, after the collapse of communism, dissolution of the bipolar structure began to dissolve blocks of Yugoslavia.

Experienced painful events in history, economic factors, and elements of different ethnic and religious identity have caused the separation of the people of Yugoslavia in a short time. The spring of 1991, during this period many things accelerated the break-up of Yugoslavia. Borisav Jovic, Serbian origin Federal President, whose presidency ended on May 15, 1991, after that the Croatian origin President Mesic's presidency was blocked by Serbia, thus it started the dissolution process. First, on December 1990, Republic of Slovenia held a referendum and preferred to be independent. On May 1991, Republic of Croatia followed the same path and confirmed the independence with 93% overwhelming majority of the people. On June 25, 1991, the Republic of Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence unilaterally. This situation shocked to Republic of Serbia and her supporters in Yugoslavia. Because of Yugoslav Federation actually began to disintegrate.

Federation of Yugoslavia was based on a complex system of mutual checks and balances, for that reason each secessionist state damaged all ethnic balance and pulls the others to the same way. Indeed, domino effect showed the consequences, Macedonia declared independence on September 10, 1991, after the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated on October 15, 1991. Shortly after, the results of this process evolved into an unforeseen dispute and a civil war.

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.238.

On January 1991, after Serbia agreed with Slovenia on the separation from the Federation of Yugoslavia, direction of the crisis shifted to Serbian population living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because it is impossible to live together, Serbs' only alternative to create ethnically homogeneous nation-state, it means the Greater Serbia. With this understanding, Serbs took action in order to change the layout in Bosnia- Herzegovina and borders of the state, and tried the policy of ethnic cleansing until Dayton Peace Agreement signed on December 14, 1995.

The essence of the problem underlie that, against the state which was insistent on territorial integrity and sovereignty, Republics desire for secession from the Yugoslavia, under the flag of the self-determination. In the framework of international law, six states of Republic of Yugoslavia had no right to external self-determination and such a right did not include in constitution of Yugoslavia¹²⁸. Whereas six republics had no constitutional right to secede, article five stated that the borders of the Yugoslav Federation can not be changed without the consent of all the republics and autonomous region

Against the first examples of state collapse, Yugoslavia crisis, in Europe since First World War, response of international institutions was applying *juris uti possidetis* principle which arising from decolonization era to quite different conditions of the post-communist transformation. However, the most severe and prolonged resistance against these policies occurred in Yugoslavia. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the old states borders suddenly became an international border which hosting the new minorities within new states. For example, Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina saw the former state had suddenly disappeared. These became unwanted citizens of the new states.

With the view of sanctity of internal borders as international borders also influenced the Badinter Commission to arbitrate between rival parties in Yugoslavia. Commission rejected the implementation of the principle of self-determination except current internal borders of state. Commission referred to the earlier decision of International Court of Justice and stated that the principle of *uti possidetis juris* is a general principle regarding with independence wherever it occurs, and the main purpose of the principle was to avoid using force and changing of the previous federal borders. Commission were not split from

¹²⁸ Antonio Cassese, p.269

the general principle with implementation of the principle of self-determination within current limits was required¹²⁹.

With the adoption of respect to the principle of territorial integrity, the commission only provided a method for regulating the state's secession, at the same time, it developed a mechanism in order to achieve for the dissolution of the states in federation structure.

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States was a treaty signed on December 26, 1933, during the Seventh International Conference of American States, revealed a number of factors about the recognition of new states. According to the convention, state as an international actor must unite some conditions in its presence; a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Also, the first sentence of article 3 obviously states that "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states."

On the other hand, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia's recognition as independent states in 1991, was tied to be fulfilled the conditions which were some principles identified by EU. For ensuring the fulfillment of these conditions, French jurist Robert Badinter was appointed by the European Community as a member of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia. Despite the absence of a referendum in accordance with international norms among the principles set by EU, the Commission insisted that it was essential. As a result of study, Badinter Commission handed down an opinion on Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had all the conditions of statehood; therefore, they could be recognized by the international community. On the other hand, the commission stated that the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be recognized, but it should not at the time, because unlike the other republics seeking independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet held a referendum on independence¹³⁰. Thus, the Commission identified the referendum as a basic requirement for legitimating the secession. In this context, despite a boycott of Serbian, on 29 February 1992, majority of the participants voted for independence in a referendum in Bosnia-

¹²⁹ Christian Tomuschat, pp.155-156

¹³⁰ Peter Radan, "Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission", Melbourne University Law Review, 2000, Available on site <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MULR/2000/3.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

Herzegovina, and on 6 April 1992, the EU, on April 7 the United States and Croatia, recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The most developed argument about the recognition of the separated republics from Federation Yugoslavia, the former state was already fragmented. The West with Germany's leadership accepted only the reality in the region. The concept of Yugoslavia was born at the end of the First World War, was begun to see as an artificial creation, and even a diplomatic failure of allies at the end of the First World War.

Another issue, taken into account by EU about recognition of the new states, was "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union" adopted by the European Council on December 16, 1991. However, the document didn't address about the right to secession, whereas the various criteria took part such as "especially the rule of law, democracy and human rights provisions of the UN Charter, respect of commitments adopted in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter" for the recognition of new states. These broad principles of recognition beyond the traditional set of standards revealed that EU's recognition policy did not adhere to the traditional international law. To date, according to the principles of international law, if a state arising from secede won the entire factors for being state, it would be recognized. Conditions were fulfilled without the recognition of early recognition constituted a breach of international law. Removal of this EU's application on developments in Yugoslavia from the traditional applications was very striking. Before the approval of external self-determination namely independence, it emphasize the rules of law, human rights, and rights of ethnic groups and minorities, so internal self-determination has become the prerequisite of the being state. Another violation of traditional international recognition could be considered that Western democracies did not accept the new Yugoslavia Federation which was formed by Serbia and Montenegro, as a successor of the former state. According to traditional rule, the regions are seceded from a state, even become large part of to the former state, the newly independent state applies to the UN in order to recognize, and the former state maintain its position at the UN as the legitimate successor.

Emerging from the results of the disintegration of the USSR and the former Yugoslavia, except the three Baltic States, came out from both traditional and outside the scope of international law. Nevertheless, during all of these secessions, greater role of the self-

determination, which was contained the international rules for secession could not be denied. The impact of this rule has emerged in two ways. First, the self-determination made legal the secession of the new state from repressive and centralized state structure. Second, self-determination provided the legal instruments for the demands of the people who wish to secede and to establish an independent state. Almost in all republics, in order to register the demands of the people about secession, referendum was made in this direction.

With the establishment of many states instead of the disappearance of the former states, especially EU put forward the new criteria for recognition of new states. Among these criteria; free will of the people put forward through a referendum, requested full respect for the rule of law, human rights and minority rights, thus, all requirements of internal self-determination were met. In addition, if these two conditions are not being provided, minorities will win the right to external self-determination was accepted indirectly.

A lot of blood was shed under the influence of the old enmity is a fact for the secession of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Becoming aware of the right to self-determination by these people, was expected to solve the deep problems and strengthening ties between ethnic communities, by firing the fuse of the bloody fighting, in fact, it endangered a conclusion contrary to essence and spirit of the principle of self-determination . The rules of the today's principle of self-determination are not shown guilty for incorrect results. Firstly guilty should be given to very big mistakes which existing in the past and ethnic communities were not approached to solve problems peacefully. In addition, we need to research how to operate better and to improve existing legal arrangements. Rising of the principle of self-determination, which began with disintegration of the former USSR and Yugoslavia, does not seem to decrease on the world agenda. The process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia has become one of the biggest and the most difficult problems after the Cold War in Europe. Part of the process of disintegration resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement, while the other difficult part of Kosovo has been waiting a long time for results¹³¹.

¹³¹ Gordon N. Bardos, "*Balkan History, Madeleine's War, and NATO's Kosovo*", Columbia University, Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 15(1), 2001, pp.77–102

Badinter Commission did not analyze the Kosovo issue, because there was no war in Kosovo and the political concerns about independence demand of Kosovar Albanians. Badinter Commission also noted that the boundaries of the republics, who declared its independence, may change with only "peaceful agreement of the parties". The disintegration of Yugoslavia has shown that the borders may be changed only through negotiations; otherwise the principle of *uti possidetis juris* will apply for determination of borders¹³². This situation caused that European states granted to the republics, which made up Yugoslavia, had right to secession from the federation; but they concluded that the autonomous governments did not have the same right, and thus, the Kosovo problem were not included in the Dayton Peace Agreement process. However, in recent years, the problem has grown steadily and become an international status.

2.1.2.2.2. Right to the Self-Determination of Kosovo and Legal Basis of Independence:

Historically, Kosovo has not always constituted part of Serbia. Only in the early thirteenth century did its whole territory come under the control of the Serbian empire¹³³. Serb rule was relatively short lived, and by the mid-fifteenth century Kosovo had become part of the Ottoman Empire, under whose rule it would remain until the early twentieth century. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which saw the Turks defeat the Serbs, is credited in Serb history and culture for elevating the symbolic importance of Kosovo as an integral part of the Serb physical and psychological landscape¹³⁴. However, several historians consider the significance of the battle to have been overstated, pointing out that the Serbian Empire was already in decline by this time, and that the battle simply marked one stage in this decline¹³⁵. From the time of Ottoman rule, beyond various events, among them the great Serb migrations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, contributed towards a gradual shift in the composition of the population of Kosovo from being predominantly Serb in the middle ages to being predominantly Albanian by the twentieth century¹³⁶. Kosovo's population is currently approximately 90 per cent Albanian.

¹³² Erhan Türbedar, Sadi Çaycı, Hasan Kanpolat, "*Kendi Kaderini Tayin Hakkı ve Ayrılıkçılık: Kosova Emsal Teşkil Eder mi?*", Stratejik Analiz Dergisi, Cilt 8, Sayı:97, Kasım 2007, p. 33.

¹³³ Noel Malcolm, "*Kosovo: A Short History*", London, Pan, 2002, ch. 3.

¹³⁴ Ibid, ch.4-13

¹³⁵ Tim Judah, "*The Serbs*, New Haven", Yale University Pres, 1997, pp. 29-32.

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 22

By the end of First World War, Kosovo had become a province of the new state of Yugoslavia, and although it fell under enemy occupation during the Second World War¹³⁷, it remained part of Yugoslavia after the war. In post-war Yugoslavia, Kosovo was afforded a high level of autonomy, particularly following the adoption of the Constitutions of 1963 and 1974, the latter of which effectively endowed the province with a status almost equal to that enjoyed by the six republics within the federation¹³⁸. However, Kosovo was stripped of its autonomous status by the increasingly nationalist federal regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1989, following a series of measures adopted to restrict Kosovo's previously enjoyed freedoms and liberties¹³⁹. Conflict between the federal authorities and Kosovo's predominantly Albanian population escalated in the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia during the 1990s, especially following the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1993, reaching a particularly serious level by 1998-1999¹⁴⁰, at which time the UN Security Council determined the situation in Kosovo to constitute a threat to international peace and security and called upon the two sides to resolve their differences peacefully¹⁴¹.

Following the Yugoslav regime's failure to agree to peace terms contained within the Rambouillet accords¹⁴², NATO launched a military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to bring about an end to the atrocities perpetrated against the Kosovar Albanians¹⁴³. With the end of the conflict, Kosovo was placed under UN interim administration¹⁴⁴.

Although proposals have been advanced in more recent years for resolving the question of Kosovo's future status, most notably former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari's draft

¹³⁷ Noel Malcolm, ch.15

¹³⁸ Articles 1-5, 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

¹³⁹ Noel Malcolm, ch.17

¹⁴⁰ William G. O'Neill, "*Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace*", Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2002, pp. 21-35.

¹⁴¹ UN SC Resolution 1160, 1199 and 1203 (1998).

¹⁴² Available on site www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_ambouillet_text.html. (accessed on 02 November 2011)

¹⁴³ The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 85-97

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 99-127.

settlement proposal which envisaged ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo¹⁴⁵, the two sides have been unable to agree on any terms¹⁴⁶, and ultimately Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on February 17, 2008. A new constitution for Kosovo came into force on June 15, 2008. By November 2011, 85 UN member states had formally recognized Kosovo’s statehood¹⁴⁷, although a majority of states has not done so. At the time of writing, a request from the UN General Assembly for an advisory opinion on whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence is in accordance with international law is until before the International Court of Justice, with hearings scheduled for December 2009¹⁴⁸.

There is some legal basis, which kept in mind about independence declarations of Kosovo, and that independence is usually adopted. Actually, some countries that reject the independence use this legal basis to defend their own arguments. The most important is UN Resolution 1244 was adopted in 1999. The operative paragraphs of Resolution 1244, which the Security Council had enacted as a framework for resolving the status of Kosovo, focus on the cessation of military and paramilitary activities by all parties and the commencement of demilitarization of armed groups, the establishment of an international civilian presence under UN auspices to assist in interim administration, the commencement of international financial assistance to Kosovo, and setting out ongoing reporting requirements. In addition, Annex 1 to the resolution lists "general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis" adopted by the G-8 foreign ministers in May 1999, and Annex 2 lists general principles on which there should be agreement in order "to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis."¹⁴⁹

Serbia and Russia have argued that Resolution 1244 would not allow the secession of Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia. In particular, they refer to the resolution's preambular language "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the

¹⁴⁵ Available on site www.unosek.org/unosek/en/docref.html (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁴⁶ M. Weller, “*The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo*”, International Affairs, 2008, p. 659.

¹⁴⁷ Available on site <http://www.kosovothankyou.com/> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁴⁸ UN Doc. A/RES/63/3 (A.63/L.2).

¹⁴⁹ Christopher J. Borgen, “*Kosova’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition*”, The American Society of International Law Review, Vol. 12, (February 2008), p. 2

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Moreover, the EU contends that 1244 did not predetermine the result of final status talks.

It appears that Resolution 1244 neither supports nor prevents Kosovo's secession. Although operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 1244 states that a political solution shall be based on the principles of Annexes 1 and 2, those annexes are silent as to the governmental form of the final status. The annexes only state that an "interim political framework" shall afford substantial self-governance for Kosovo and take into account the territorial integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Paragraph 11(a), states that the international civil presence will promote "the establishment, *pending a final settlement*, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo..." The substantial autonomy language is thus addressed to the interim status of Kosovo. Moreover, the references to the territorial integrity of Serbia are only in the preambular language and not in the operational language. The document is therefore silent as to what form the final status of Kosovo takes¹⁵⁰.

In addition to Resolution 1244, Kosovo's independence can be assessed under the international law of secession. International law does not foreclose on the possibility of secession, it does provide a framework within which certain secessions are favored or disfavored, depending on the facts. The key is to assess whether or not Kosovo meets the criteria for the legal privilege of secession.

The legal concept of self-determination is comprised of two distinct subsidiary parts. The default rule is "internal self-determination," which is essentially the protection of minority rights within a state. As long as a state provides a minority group the ability to speak their language, practice their culture in a meaningful way, and effectively participate in the political community, then that group is said to have internal self-determination. Secession, or "external self-determination," is generally disfavored¹⁵¹.

When discussing the question of secession, two basic legal principles are in tension: the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity and the right of peoples to self-determination. First, one of the cornerstones of the international legal order is the right of states to their territorial integrity, a right implied through out the United Nations Charter. Article 2 (4), for example, prohibits the threat or use of force against the "territorial

¹⁵⁰ Christopher J. Borgen, p.3

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.4

integrity or political independence" of states. Second, another right-- explicitly recognized in the Charter-- is the right of self-determination of peoples. Under Article 1 (2) of the Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations.

Although issues of secession seldom receive formal negotiation, state practice, court opinions, and other authoritative writings, point the way to categorizing what are the "extreme cases" and "carefully defined circumstances " under which the opportunity of secession exists. Any attempt to claim legal secession must *at least* show the following characteristics:

1. *Are the Kosovar Albanians a "people?"* According to Canadian Supreme Court's *Secession of Quebec* opinion, the meaning of "peoples" is "somewhat uncertain."¹⁵² At various points in international legal history, the term "people" has been used to signify citizens of a nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign power, or an ethnic group.

Of course, one may argue that the Kosovars are a "people", having inhabited Kosovo for centuries. However, the Kosovar Albanians are more generally perceived as an Albanian ethnic enclave, rather than a nation. This definition of the word "people" as "nation" has been criticized for being too restrictive. As a result, it remains an open question whether widespread support of Kosovo's independence would be signal a shift in the definition of "people" so that the term no longer represents a *complete ethnic nation* but can be used to refer to a *homogenous ethnic enclave* within another nation.

2. *Are there/were there serious human rights violations in Kosovo?* There is at least a credible argument that the Serbs were responsible for serious human rights abuses against the Kosovars, as Resolution 1244 notes, a "grave humanitarian situation" and a "threat to international peace and security". Mass human rights violence led to NATO's 1999 intervention. It should also be noted, however, that human rights violence have been reported to commit by Kosovar Albanians as well. Significantly, the international community considers it related whether human rights violence is continuing or historic, the situation in Kosovo is unclear. In relation to this question, one may argue that the current

¹⁵² Judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, S.C.R. 217, August 20, 1998, para 123, Available on site <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998scr2-217/1998scr2-217.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

international presence in Kosovo is legally related, as it is evidence of the international community's determination that the situation in Kosovo was and is highly unpredictable and that it cannot be solved completely by the use of domestic political structures.

3. *Are there any effective way under either domestic law or international law or is secession the only solution?* The political situation prior to the declaration of independence did not appear to offer any realistic alternatives to secession. As of December 2007, the two sides could not seem to resolve their differences and the Troika has declared the political negotiations a failure. It is unlikely that anything short of military intervention could have kept Kosovo within Serbia. Thus, it appears that most realistic options other than separation had failed. In difficult situations such as these, the issue of legality often changes from the question of the legality of secession, to the question of the legality of the recognition of secession¹⁵³.

Many Western governments had argued that 1244 referred to general principles that G8 foreign ministers had agreed in advance of the resolution, and these should be used as the basis for the acceptance of independence. These principles include the deployment in Kosovo of "international civil and security presences" and "facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status".

The European Union has drawn up, as it is required to do by EU procedures, a document to justify its own mission to Kosovo and the arguments deployed are the same as the ones used to justify recognition. The document argues that independence for Kosovo is within the spirit of 1244, if not strictly within the letter.

The EU memorandum on Resolution 1244 contends and gives approval to international recognition that "Generally, once an entity has emerged as a state in the sense of international law, a political decision can be taken to recognize it." This reflects the general understanding that recognition itself is not a formal requirement of statehood. Rather, recognition merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus, recognition is "declaratory" as opposed to "constitutive." Nevertheless, no state is required to recognize an entity claiming statehood.

¹⁵³ Daniel Thurer, "Self-Determination", R. Bernhardt, (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law , 2000, pp. 364, 367

The counter-argument by Serbia and Russia is simpler. It is that Serbia, the sovereign state, has not agreed to independence for Kosovo, that there is no Security Council resolution authorizing the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia and that therefore its independence is illegal. Serbia and Russia also say that 1244 itself gives no authority for independence. They point to article 10 of 1244 that authorizes "substantial autonomy with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" for Kosovo, meaning, in their view, that 1244 blocks independence. In addition, they argue that 1244 talks about international organizations being deployed in Kosovo "under United Nations auspices", which an EU mission would lack.

However, absent any qualification, that argument cannot be legally correct. Changing the boundaries of a sovereign state (Serbia) in and of itself would not make Kosovo's independence illegal, because as discussed above, the international community has come to accept the legality of secession under certain circumstances. Moreover, the self-determination analysis is very fact, such that absolute arguments of illegality become difficult. Moreover, state practice shows that, absent a clear indication of illegality, in matters of state recognition there is considerable deference to the political prerogatives of outside states to decide whether to recognize an aspirant state. There is no such resolution here, but rather a growing momentum to accept Kosovo's declaration. This does not make Kosovo's secession legal. But it does show that, in cases of secession, law and politics are especially strongly intertwined.

Given the doubt of the claim of a legal right of secession and the quite wide flexibility that states have to recognize Kosovo, should they choose to do so? Is the example of Kosovo of legal relevance to other separatist conflicts, such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria? Alternatively, is Kosovo *sui generis* and of no superior influence? In announcing the recognition of Kosovo by the United States, Secretary of State Rice explained Kosovo a special case¹⁵⁴.

By contrast, the Russian Duma issued a statement that read, in part: "The right of nations to self-determination cannot justify recognition of Kosovo's independence along with the simultaneous refusal to discuss similar acts by other self-proclaimed states, which have

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Washington DC, 18 February 2008), Available on site <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

obtained de facto independence exclusively by themselves”¹⁵⁵. Moreover, Bosnian Serbs had earlier stated that, should Kosovo declare independence, they would seek independence for "Republika Srpska," the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb ethnic enclave within Bosnia¹⁵⁶.

It can be argued that Kosovo is different from other secessionist claims because Kosovo has been under international administration as the international community considered the situation so volatile. Reintegrating such a territory is different from assessing a claim by a separatist group that, on its own, is seeking to overturn the authority of the pre-existing state and unilaterally secede. While secessions are primarily an issue of domestic law, Resolution 1244 internationalized the problem. It also moved Kosovo from being solely under Serbian sovereignty into the grey zone of international administration.

This is a highly controversial position. Various reactions to the "uniqueness" argument include that such a contention is "absurd" or that it is an esoteric legal point that will be forgotten in the rush of politics.

It may, however, be possible to argue that Kosovo is both unique and a source of precedent at the same time. Two reasons are cited for Kosovo's uniqueness: (1) Kosovo has been under international administration since 1999; and (2) the Kosovar Albanians are an ethnically homogenous enclave, physically separate and ethnically different from the Serbs.

Let us assume that the first point, international administration, is persuasive and makes Kosovo a special case. Nonetheless, Kosovo can still be cited by other separatists as precedent for the specific issue of how the international community defines a "people" for the purpose of self-determination. And it would be irrelevant whether or not Kosovo had been under international administration. As mentioned above, the term has been difficult to define, but modern state practice has tended to treat a "people" as a complete ethnic nation. However, those arguing that secession is legal in the Kosovo case seem to be defining people as a homogenous ethnic enclave. In other words, unless those recognizing Kosovo's

¹⁵⁵ Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers, "*Kosovo Is Recognized but Rebuked by Others*", NY TIMES (Feb 19, 2008) Available on site <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19kosovo.html?pagewanted=2&hp> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁵⁶ Bosnian Serb Nationalists Threaten Secession, Southeast Europe Times (Feb. 15, 2008) Available on site http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/02/15/feature-01 (accessed on 02 November 2011)

declaration claim that the Kosovar Albanians are an ethnicity, then they may change the most common definition as to who may claim the right of secession.

If that is the case, then the international community may be creating precedent that we will see mentioned by other ethnic enclaves seeking separation, like Russians in Abkhazia or Krajina Serbs. Previously, neither of these groups was viewed as having a strong claim for the privilege of secession, as neither of these groups is a "nation" in the ethnographic sense, but rather fragments of Russian or Serb ethnic groups. However, their arguments may be strengthened, and one of the barricades of international law against secessions may be weakened, if the facts of the Kosovo claim are not carefully and narrowly understood.

Despite the declarations and best intentions, just saying something is "unique" may not be enough. States and commentators may need to ask why one claim of independence is supposedly unique and then consider its downstream political and legal effects. In the end, we need to keep in mind that sometimes the most effective law in politically-charged situations may be the law of unplanned consequences.

Kosovo's independence not only led the world into a new wave of fragmentation, but also it brought some points to be discussed. First, it is a fact that Kosovo was not only the autonomous region of Serbia; it was also the autonomous region of Yugoslavia. This situation makes Kosovo different from the other problem areas. On the other hand, the Serbian regime applied a systematic pressure on Kosovo; NATO intervention was carried out for Kosovo in 1999 and, in this respect, it is true that there was no similar example in the world. But, at least, the principle of the integrity of territory in international law was guaranteed territorial integrity of Serbia over Kosovo. In this context, according to the principles of the existing international law, it is clear that, Kosovo has not right to self-determination. In this way, the independence of Kosovo represents a major exception within the international rule of law, which built over the years, and this matter will need to discuss.

The role of the UN should be discussed as a second issue about Kosovo's independence. A process without the UN rules determined the independence of Kosovo. Without UN Security Council resolutions, the new Yugoslavia Republic was bombed in 1999 and, Iraq was invaded in 2003. Despite UN Security Council resolution against to the proclamation of Kosovo's independence could not be blocked. Albanian armed resistance and de facto

independence after the NATO intervention was approved by Western countries, thus, they gave permission to Kosovo's independence was officially proclaimed. As a result, separatists in different parts of the world who follow this situation can believe that the armed struggle is main element of right to self-determination and sovereignty.

2.2. BALKAN DIMENSION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY:

The Balkans have always played a important role in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey has always been an significant political player in the region. The Ottoman Empire ruled the region for more than five centuries. While withdrawing from the Balkans, it left behind Muslim communities and Turkish minorities. A strong sense of kinship exists between the peoples of Turkey and the Balkan countries, which in outcome parallels Turkey's close notice in the region. Geographically, the Balkans are located in the area that connects Turkey to Europe. Approximately two and a half million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe, which also accounts for more than half of Turkey's foreign trade. Moreover, with Turkey's bid for European Union membership, the Balkans have increased importance. Turkey will continue to be sensitive to any major transformation in the region as they will have direct belongings on Turkey's long term interests in Europe.

2.2.1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy:

In transition to Republic of Turkey from Ottoman, many reforms were carried out in social life and state administration. In this transition, the Turkish foreign policy has been influenced and come from point of global claiming to modest and has just aimed to protect the borders of nation states for continuing its presence.

However, Turkey and Ottoman Empire was established, in the same geography, with the same people, as the continuation of each have common characteristics in foreign policy. Both have established their presence on two main elements: Carefully monitoring the balance of power and gaining advantages for own interests, and not to enter into wars between other states without invasion threat. On the other hand, the main difference of two states is the administrative philosophy. While Sublime Port was showing a resistance to change and tried to protect its presence, the New Republic made change in everything radically from the rest of Ottoman.

There are many tangible and intangible factors to shape the foreign policy of states. The main sources of the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are the historical experience of the Ottoman empire (balance of power); the nationalist Kemalist revolution and creation of the republic itself (isolationism); western orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization and modernization; the suspicion of foreign powers and interests (the Sevres syndrome)¹⁵⁷.

From another perspective, the psychological and physical environments become effective in the formation of foreign policy. Idris Bal, grouped the factors shaping foreign policy under three headings; structural factors, behavioral factors, developments in the outside world are determined the formation of foreign policy¹⁵⁸.

On the other hand, Baskın Oran determined the theoretical framework in three parts; 1) Basic essentials that affect Turkish foreign policy under the cultural, historical, strategically, domestic structural dimensions. 2) Military, political and economic background as a Middle Power State, 3) Fundamental principals of Turkish Foreign Policy under the status quo and westernization¹⁵⁹.

Ahmet Davudoğlu, academician and Minister of Foreign Affairs “Kissinger of Turkey”¹⁶⁰, argued, “What is the axis of Turkish foreign policy” and gave an answer to this question “There are only two permanent elements that the society cannot change: History and geography.” He defined all other factors as variables. Additionally he mentioned three methodological principles and five operative principals of Turkish foreign policy. These principles are; vision orientation; a systematic framework and, using soft power. Operative principals; 1) The balance between security and freedom, 2) Zero problems with neighbors, 3) Proactive peace diplomacy, not only with neighbors, but with all the regions, 4)

¹⁵⁷ Alexander Morinson, “*The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy*”, Middle Eastern Studies, November 2006 Vol. 42, No. 6, p. 945.

¹⁵⁸ İdris Bal, “*Türk Dış Politikasının 87 Yıllık Analizi*”, Stratejik Boyut, 22 Şubat 2010, Available on site <http://www.stratejikboyut.com/haber/turk-dis-politikasinin-87-yillik-analizi--31850.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

¹⁵⁹ Baskın Oran, “*Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği*”, Baskın Oran (Ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler ve Yorumlar Cilt I:1919-1980, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp.20-49.

¹⁶⁰ İbrahim Kalın, “*A New Era in US-Turkish Relations?*”, Today’s Zaman, 30 October 2008, Available on site http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=157272 (accessed on 02 November 2011)

Compatible global relations, and 5) active involvement in all global and international issues, in all international organizations¹⁶¹.

At this point, I would examine the Turkish Foreign Policy as Davutoğlu mentioned in the context of permanent elements, history and geography. Of course, history and geography does not determine all strategies of foreign and domestic policies but they present opportunities for policy makers and politicians. The case of Turkey also shows that usage of these opportunities depend on partner countries and – in broader perspective – general circumstances of the international order.

Turkey has several distinctive characteristics like having a legacy of a big empire, being a modern nation state at the crossroads of continents and having a rich cultural legacy. There is a duality of Turkey in terms of its geopolitical and geo-cultural legacy. The cultural and political characteristics that derive from this historical legacy appear especially in foreign policy.

Ottoman history made a deep impression in every area of modern Turkey's life. Also geography is one of the basic elements that Turkish foreign policy makers have had to take into consideration because of the strategic location of Turkey. Similarly, structural factors such as the cultural characteristics of the people, national character, and characteristics of the leaders are effective in the formation of foreign policy. In this context, Ottoman Legacy is one of the factors that must be addressed.

On the one hand, becoming a successor of a very large multi-national empire has been leaving a great potential to Turkey, on the other hand, misapplying this potential and the wrong policies have brought the risks about Turkey's security interests. For example, until recently, Turkey had troubled relations with all neighbors. It has a great importance that all neighbors of Turkey, except Russia and Iran, who lived under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for many years. These states made their independence struggle against the Ottoman Empire, and they often showed Ottomans as the source of the problem when writing their history. Ottoman-Turkish opposition in these countries is seen especially in their

¹⁶¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "*Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy*", SETA Foundation's Washington D.C. Branch, Washington D.C., December 8, 2009 Available on site <http://www.setav.org/document/FM%20of%20Turkey%20A.Davutoglu%20Address%20at%20SETA-DC%2012-08-2009.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

educational systems.¹⁶² Conversely, in terms of Turkish history and the perception of events, the independences of these countries and nation-building struggles are considered as an example of disloyalty, revolt and betrayal.

From this viewpoint, Turkish diplomacy is a natural extension of Ottoman diplomacy. Therefore, while establishing a new state's foreign policy, Turkey had experience contrary to the newly established state. Turkish diplomacy showed great strength and success against the Great Powers in Lausanne. In the first years of republic, it is not difficult to see a sense of meaningful inflexibility and empire pride in execution of Turkish foreign policy. Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences color a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system.

In this context, especially in Turkey's security perceptions and initiatives, it plays a negative role in terms of determination of Turkey's foreign policy. In addition, it should be kept in mind that Turkey can be effective in these countries or other countries and territories were dominated by Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Ottoman legacy installed the opportunities but also some of the risks and burdens on Turkey's shoulder.

The role of Turkey's geography has an important factor in determining Turkish foreign policy. This factor is the source of very significant data that affect Turkish foreign policy both good and bad. Geographic location of a country is affect not only by regional developments but also by worldwide systemic characteristics. This position shapes the contours of Turkish foreign policy at its broadest, including security complexes, defense policies, alliances, relations with international organizations and conflict-resolution¹⁶³.

It controls the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Turkey is also at the crossroads of major air, land, and sea routes of modern times, joining the industrially advanced lands of Europe with the petroleum-rich lands of the Middle East. Furthermore, the country possesses the sources for most of the water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. It holds the key to not only

¹⁶² Dimitris Keridis, *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization*, A NATO Fellowship Final Report, Cambridge, June 1999, p.41

¹⁶³ Leonard A. Stone, "*Turkish Foreign Policy: Four Pillars of Tradition*", *Perceptions: Journal Of International Affairs*, June - July 2001 Volume VI - Number 2 Available on site <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume6/June-July2001/stone02.PDF> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

the Turkish Straits but also lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf¹⁶⁴. It is a member of the NATO and most European organizations, as well as an associate member of the European Union. Its political association and exposed position give it an importance hardly matched by any other medium power.

With its geographical position, Turkey always has more bargaining points in negotiations with the great powers. In contrast, this land is the historical and current migration route also bring a sense of great insecurity to Turkey, and Turkish foreign policy overrates the safety factor exceedingly. During the Cold War, Turkey was also on the line of conflict between the zones of two military superpowers and their respective alliances. And from the north to the south, it was in a rather sensitive part of the Mediterranean, where both superpowers tried to expand their spheres of influence and counterbalance each other.

In terms of largely look to Turkey's geo-strategic location and its neighbors, Turkish foreign policy makers have to find a holistic solution to the state's security policy. According to Baskın Oran, Turkish foreign policy has five different perspectives about security problem and each perspectives has dilemma in itself for Turkey. These perspectives can be listed as; 1) European perspective, 2) Balkans Perspective, 3) Mediterranean Perspective, 4) Middle East Perspective and, 5) Caucasian Perspective¹⁶⁵.

Davutoğlu argues that Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey's diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs. Davutoğlu identified Turkish foreign policy in three significant geopolitical area of influence. These are: 1) Near Land Basin: Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasian; 2) Near Sea Basin: Black Sea, Adriatic, Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf Sea, and Caspian Sea; 3) Near Continent Basin: Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Middle and Eastern Asia¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs", Middle Eastern Studies, October 1999, Vol:35 No: 4, pp. 152—186, Available on site <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713673558> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

¹⁶⁵ Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği", p.25

¹⁶⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy Vision", p.78

In a few words, with regard of our subject, Balkans has a great importance for Turkey, because the Balkans acts as a “corridor” between Turkey and the European continent. It always has to be kept open. Turkey is not in a position to ignore Balkans development in her foreign policy calculations; besides, the rapid domestic and external changes in the region urge Turkey to take a more active stance¹⁶⁷. Stability in the Balkans is the main objective of Turkish Foreign Policy. I will examine the Balkans perspective of TFP in detail in the following chapters.

2.2.2. Changing Dynamics and Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War:

The end of the Cold War effectively signaled the end of a direct Soviet threat against Turkish security. Although the Soviet threat was the main reason for Turkey's alignment with the West, the fall of the Soviet Union did not result in Turkey's withdrawal from NATO and other Western international organizations. In contrast, Turkish commitment to modernization and economic liberalism as well as political and security challenges in the post-Cold War era required Turkey's active participation in European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian politics. The application for EU membership gave a new impetus in Turkey-EU relations, which culminated in the signing of a customs union agreement with the European Union. Simultaneously the first war against Iraq, the escalation of the Kurdish conflict both inside and outside of Turkey and improving Turkish-Israeli relations had a strong impact on Turkish foreign and security policy. The emergence of five Turkic republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are provided by Turkey with new political, economic and strategic opportunities, as well as risks, as the escalation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan denoted. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy had to become more complex and multifaceted in order to address emerging global and regional challenges. The end of the cold war, in other words, led to a search for a new “grand strategy”. The changes in the international system opened a new opportunities and brought to the forefront new threats for Turkish foreign policy¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁷ Baskın Oran, “*Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği*”, p.26.

¹⁶⁸ Yasemin Çelik Levine, “*Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*”, Westport, 1999, Praeger, pp.xiv-xv.

2.2.3. Determinants of Turkey's Balkans Policy:

Turkey is a Balkan country that has close relations with the Balkans that are deep-rooted in history and, its five percent of the territory in Thrace region at least in geographical terms. Despite the small territory in the Balkans, Turkey put forward the identity of Mediterranean and Balkans rather than the Middle Eastern, in order to emphasize its belonging to the West from the date of establishment. Therefore, Turkey always attaches an importance to the Balkans owing to its basic foreign policy orientation, strategic, and also human and cultural dimensions.

The importance of the Balkans for Turkey can be handled under the following headings: historical ties, population of Balkan origin in Turkey, geographical and strategic reasons, and the Turkish / Muslim minorities in the Balkans¹⁶⁹.

2.2.3.1. Historical Ties:

Historically, The Turks dominated the Balkans for more than five centuries and this presence makes the Balkans a specific area for Turkey. These long domination periods have influenced the region's religious, ethnic, economic and cultural structures, and it becomes the markers of the recent developments¹⁷⁰. In general, this development which is called the Ottoman Legacy or Pax Ottomana has been detected and interpreted in different ways in Turkey and in the region.

The nation-states that were founded on the remains of the empire in the Balkans where nationalism was powerful, the Orthodox Church was dominant and there was an excessive economic tension, had to deal with social and ethnic problems as well. Therefore, because of this cultural and ethnic diversity, there was no harmony among Balkan countries; they have always had one or more problems.

This historical background created mutual prejudices between Balkans people and Turks against each other. These prejudices remain particularly strong among the Slavs and Greeks. Turkey's Balkans policy had to be established on this historical background and,

¹⁶⁹ İlhan Uzgel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", Baskın Oran (Ed.) , Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği, Cilt II:1980-2001, p.167.

¹⁷⁰ Maria Todorova, "*The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans*", L. Carl Brown, Imperial Legacy, The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 45–47.

when Turkey applies an active policy in the Balkans, she will always meet with the neo-Ottomanism discourse¹⁷¹.

In terms of the Balkan nations, non-Muslims in the regions have negative opinions about Ottomans era. Orthodox-Slavs define the Ottoman reign as political, economic and cultural oppression period. They refer to their economic and political backwardness from Western Europe to Ottoman domination. The most fundamental cause underlies this approach; these peoples made national struggles against the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of 19th century and in the process of nation-states creation, while they were reconstructing their own histories they developed Ottoman/Turkish opposition and they tried to purify their Ottoman past.

Another negative effect of the Ottoman rule for Orthodox Balkans peoples is Islam were brought to Balkans by Ottomans. Muslim ethnic or religious groups as Albanians, Bosniaks, Pomaks and Torbeshes are also seen as a negative factor of Ottoman legacy by Orthodox Balkans peoples¹⁷². In addition, Turkish minority is seen as a direct inheritance of Ottoman Empire in primarily Bulgaria and Greece, also, Macedonia, Sandjak, Romania and Kosovo. Furthermore this minority, time to time, is exposed to pressure by region's states.

In terms of Turkey, the Balkans has some negative unique features from different aspects. In the 19th century, especially the rise of nationalism among the Balkan peoples, the experience of political-social chaos and the Ottomans' defeat in the wars caused to migration of the Turks / Muslims in masses from Balkans to Anatolia. Pressures and the migration led to gain strength of mutual prejudices in the Balkans. On the other hand, intellectual basis of Turkish nationalism and traditional political organizations was first developed in the Balkans. Nationalist ideology also affected the Ottoman intellectuals and the Committee of Union and Progress was founded in this cultural and social structure¹⁷³.

Since the establishment of the republic until the end of the 1980s, Balkans remained as a region carrying more negative features for Turkey. But, Turkey remained loyal to the principles of the National Pact of 1920 and did not claim any rights on its old lands in the

¹⁷¹ İlhan Uzgel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", p.167.

¹⁷² Ibid, p.168.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.169.

Balkans. It considered the maintenance of the status-quo, which was determined by the Treaty of Lausanne, as the basis of its Balkan policy. With the beginning of the “threat” of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy after 1933 and, accordingly, with the escalating tension between revisionist and anti-revisionist states, a Balkan Pact was prepared through the laborious efforts of Turkey. Despite Turkey’s good intentions and sincere efforts, Bulgaria, which had revisionist policies, and Albania, which was under the control of Italy, was not involved in the Balkan Pact¹⁷⁴.

During the cold war years, Turkish foreign policy was preoccupied with protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty under the Soviet communist threat just across its borders¹⁷⁵. Although Turkey had problems with its neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East, such disputes were only secondary in rank. Balkans, just like Central Asia, is a region that Turkey's active relations were restricted in the Cold War. Turkey had no chances to develop a normal relationship for more than 40 years. Also, confrontation with Greece on Cyprus issue made Turkey's relations with the region more difficult.

After the Cold War, the big states started a power struggle in the Balkans. Turkey’s historical ties with the Balkans and the dense Muslim-Turkish population in the Balkan geography constituted the avenue for Turkey’s foreign policy toward the region. For this reason, the stability of the Balkans was very important for Turkey.

Because of her historical, ethnic and religious ties, Turkey was closely interested in the problems of Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia that the Yugoslavian Federation had left behind after the end of the Cold War Period. From the early 1990s, Turkish governments have had a close interest in these problems. At the same time, the region was perceived as an area should be approached cautiously.

2.2.3.2. Population of Balkans Origin in Turkey:

The nation-building processes in the Balkans and Anatolia were accompanied by several consecutive waves of forced migration and ethnic cleansing. Generally, the rise of

¹⁷⁴ Dilek Barlas, “*Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-Power Activism in the 1930s*”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 441-464, Available on site <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036337> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁷⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee, “*Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges*”, F. Stephen Larrabee - Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in An Age of Uncertainty*, Washington D.C., 2003, ch.3, p.2.

nationalism resulted in a long-term migration of Muslim communities from the Balkans to Anatolia as well as a migration of Christian communities in the other direction¹⁷⁶.

Since the Balkan states were eager to remove the Muslim minorities from their territories, and since Turkey wished to compensate for tremendous wartime population losses, migration from the Balkans to Turkey was further encouraged. When Turkey signed a number of treaties of friendship with its Balkan neighbors (Bulgaria in 1925, Greece in 1930, Romania in 1936 and Yugoslavia in 1950), they always included provisions on migration. This resulted in the arrival of several major waves of Balkan immigrants in Turkey. Though not an official figure, between 5-7 million Balkan immigrants are estimated to live in Turkey.

A significant portion of immigrants continue the links with their kins in their country of origin and migrants living in Turkey care directly with their kin's status and problems. Notably, in the chaos and conflict eras and the time of pressure on Turks/Muslim minority, Turkish governments have to consider the Balkan immigrants responses. Balkan immigrants living in the city have reached a certain level of organization and established to Balkan lobby in Turkey. This demographic and political structure is one of the factors that contribute to Turkey play more active role in the Balkans¹⁷⁷.

2.2.3.3. Geographical and Strategic Reasons:

The Balkans is a priority for Turkey from the perspectives of geographically and strategically, as well as historic and human bonds. In this regard, importance of Balkans emerges in the following points.

1. Balkans is the opening way to the West. Turkey has strong and intensive economic and political relationship with Western European countries and Balkans locates on this access roads. Therefore, Turkey attaches great importance to two components in region.

- a. Stability of the Balkans is critically important to remain open the connection. Turkey was face with this problem in Bosnia War and in Kosovo War. More than half of Turkey's foreign trade is with the western European countries and event of the conflict in

¹⁷⁶ Sylvie Gangloff, "*The Impact of Ottoman Legacy on Turkish Policy in the Balkans (1991-1999)*", November 2005, p.10 Available on site <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁷⁷ İlhan Uzel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", p.170.

the Balkans stops this way. Also, it makes connections of Turkish workers in Western European countries difficult.

b. Turkey is afraid of the formation of an alliance between the two Balkan neighbors Greece and Bulgaria. Such a situation had been experienced in Papandreou government in Greece, and non-aggression pact was signed between the two countries in 1986. After 1990, Bulgaria has been well connected with Greece, but she has taken Turkish factor into consideration and avoid the policy to force own hands against Turkey.

2. Turkish Straits are separating the Balkans and the Anatolian peninsula, but also connects the two peninsulas. The Thrace region, the only land part of Turkey in the Balkans, has great importance for the defense of Istanbul and the Straits. Thrace do not have adequate "depth of the country" for a future attack from the Balkans and, therefore it is evaluated as a strategic defense area¹⁷⁸.

In general, Western Thrace, Marmara region and Turkey's Aegean coast are taken into consideration, it can be expressed that the Balkans is directly related to Turkey's defense and security. If closer geography of the Balkans to Turkey is controlled or influenced to enter into the number of hostile countries to Turkey, it will put Turkey into difficulty in terms of defense and security.

2.2.3.4. Turkish / Muslim Minorities in the Balkans:

The role of minorities in interstate relations has been a neglected subject in the literature of foreign policy studies. Although the treatment of minorities attracts attention to same extent, attempts at theorizing on the ways minorities influence foreign policy has not received the attention it deserves when the existing conflicts caused by the minority problems in the world are taken into account¹⁷⁹.

The existence of minorities in some cases enables other countries to interfere in the internal affairs of a country and sometimes to manipulate this minority. Minorities could be used as a foreign policy tool. A state that has unfriendly relations with another state can manipulate the minority whether they are co-nationals or not, in order to weaken its rival. This may

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p.170-1.

¹⁷⁹ İlhan Uzgel, "*The Role of the Muslim Minorities in Interstate Relations in The Balkans*", The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı) Sayı: 21, 1982, p.99; Available on site <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/682/8681.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

take the form of provoking this minority, providing material support and serving as a safe haven for their armed bands¹⁸⁰.

Ottoman domination and the settlement of Turks in these lands brought another legacy to the region. The Turkish people left in Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, compelled Turkey to be concerned with developments in these countries. In the neighboring countries, the rights and status of the Turkish minorities are guaranteed by international treaties as are those of the Greek minority in Turkey. Besides, the modern Turkish state has not been totally indifferent to the Muslims who were converted to Islam in the Balkans (such as Bosnian Muslims and Pomaks in Bulgaria). Their cultural affinity and their immigration in large numbers to Turkey strengthened the contact between Turkey and the Balkan Muslim populations. Turkey has been regarded as a protector by these Muslim peoples. In times of crisis, some peoples of non-Turkish origin declared themselves to be Turks as happened in Bulgaria and Macedonia.

Generally, almost all of the Muslim minorities have problems and complaints. The Balkan states have not been very tolerant in their treatment of minorities except the former Yugoslavia. This may be attributed to the peculiar characteristics of the region. The eventual dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and the collapse of the socialist regimes in itself created an atmosphere of instability and ambiguity that facilitated the rise of nationalism and ethnic tension which adversely affected minority issues¹⁸¹.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a noticeable increase in Turkey's interest and involvement in the Balkans. Ethnic conflicts in the region generated extensive interest and concern in Turkey due to the presence of large numbers of Turks/Muslims who had migrated from the Balkans to Turkey over the years. Broad public support within Turkey was another factor for the country's Balkan policy.

Turkey is a major Balkan country in the region and Balkan lobbies within country influences the attitude towards Balkans from time to time. Turkey has international and dual agreements on Turkish/Muslim minorities with Bulgaria and Greece. In case of any

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p.100.

¹⁸¹ Şule Kut, "*Eski Yugoslavya'da Savaş ve Barışta Azınlıklar, Ana Devletler ve Uluslararası Toplumun Rolü*", Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, Kasım 2005, pp.91-98.

violation of these agreements or pressure on minorities, give a right to protect of these groups right. But this is not just limited to only two countries, it is also applicable when pressures on Turkish/Muslims minorities in other region countries. The primary reason for this, without discrimination of ethnic origin, oppressed minorities are seeing Turkey as the protector of them. Moreover during substantially increased pressure periods, they consider Turkey as the first address to migrate with effect of this feeling and kinship.

3. KOSOVO ISSUE AND TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICY:

3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOSOVO ISSUE:

The origins of ethnic conflict¹⁸² are often claimed to date from hundreds of years. Migrations, epic battles and holy sites are essential elements of ethnic nationalism. The conflict over Kosovo is no exception. Although it is true that stories and myths surrounding Kosovo were kept alive for centuries in ballads and legends, it was only in the late 19th century that they were resurrected as part of narratives of rival Serb and Albanian national movements. The 20th century history of Kosovo has been bloody with experiences of mass expulsions and violence conducted by both Slavs and Albanians. Nevertheless, the latest round in violence cannot be explained only by reference to this history.

Kosovo represents one of the most difficult national issues of the Balkans. This difficulty stems largely from the attribution of mythical and mystical values to national cause by both sides using similar arguments. Having enormous economic difficulties with their damaged national prides and relying on outside powers, both Serbians and Albanians, in fact, like all other nations in the Balkans, suffer from similar kind of passionate nationalism. For this reason, historical background has a special importance to understand the issue¹⁸³.

Kosovo's primary importance to Serbia is symbolic. It is impossible to read much about Kosovo without learning that Serbs regard it as "the cradle of Serbian civilization"¹⁸⁴, their "Jerusalem"¹⁸⁵. It is the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the site of its most sacred places. It provides the setting for stories from Serbian history and legend – dramatized in epic poems handed down orally through the generations – which nineteenth century Serbian nationalists saw as the very essence of their nation. It has also been the home of a Serb and Montenegrin minority who came to be seen as historic remains. The manipulation of these symbols has been at the root of Kosovo's recent misfortunes.

¹⁸² David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, *International Security*", Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 41-75, Available on site <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539070> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁸³ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, "The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned", p.33.

¹⁸⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, "Human Wrongs in Kosovo", Ken Booth (Ed.), *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions*, Frank Cass Publishers, New York, 2001, p.115

¹⁸⁵ Available on site http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_world_0_25/01/2010_114310 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Albanians were later than Serbs in developing a national identity having had strong clan structures and being divided between two ethnic groups, the southern Tosks and northern (including Kosovo) Ghegs¹⁸⁶. Because of restrictions on Albanian-language education, they were later in developing a written culture than Serbs, and they had no unifying religion. Nevertheless, Albanians have their own myths. They claim descent from the ancient Illyrians, while Slavs did not arrive in Kosovo until the sixth and seventh centuries AD. The claim to be ‘autochthonous’ has particular importance because Serbian authorities, regarding this as an Austrian-instilled myth, treat Albanians as immigrants and twice in the twentieth century they have sought to “repatriate” Albanians to Turkey. Whatever their origins, Albanians and Serbs have coexisted in Kosovo for centuries¹⁸⁷.

The conflict in Kosovo also has to be understood in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was one of the eight constituent units of Yugoslavia; there were six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces in Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The removal of autonomy from Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to demands for independence from other republics, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and eventually Kosovo. The final settlement of the former Yugoslavia is still discussion subject of the world politics.

3.2. KOSOVO BEFORE THE OTTOMANS:

The territory of Kosovo has been inhabited for more than 8,000 years and its soil is rich with archaeological finds dating back to the Bronze and Iron Ages. By the 7th century BC Illyrian tribes, sharing a common Illyrian language emerged as the dominant force in area covering modern-day Albania, Kosovo and the Dalmatian coast. In 229 BC, the Roman Empire launched its first attack on the Illyrian territory. In 168 BC, the last Illyrian king, Genti, surrendered to the Romans. In 56 BC, Julius Caesar visited the province, Illyricum, on one of his campaigns to the east. All through antiquity, Kosovo has been an important trading crossroad. For centuries, Prizren was an important commercial center supplying the

¹⁸⁶ Available on site <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Albania> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

¹⁸⁷ Howard Clark, “*Civil Resistance in Kosovo*”, London, GBR: Pluto Press, 2000. pp. xvi-xvii

entire region. The Romans also mined silver in Kosovo's eastern region. In the 3rd century AD, Illyricum was a peaceful and prosperous Roman province¹⁸⁸.

The disintegration in the Roman world started in the third century. In 326 AD, Emperor Constantine moved his seat of government from Rome to the old Greek colony Byzantium on the European side of the Straits. This transfer of the capital to Constantinople increased the importance of the Balkan Peninsula and was decisive for its development. With the split of the Roman Empire in 395 AD, Kosovo stayed in the eastern half of the Roman Empire and under the Eastern Church. Constantinople then became the source of artistic inspiration. Under the reign of Emperor Justinian from 527 to 565 AD, the Balkan region was put under Byzantine control¹⁸⁹.

The Albanians, on the other hand, argue that they are the autochthon people in Kosovo and they trace their history back to Illyrians. In view of Albanians, Kosovo is the cradle of their national independence movement or what they call "Rilindji Kombatare" (national awakening)¹⁹⁰. Albanian scholars who studied the Albanian language in Kosovo reach the conclusion that the area was the primitive homeland of the Albanians. Some western writers too agree with the view that the same Illyrian-Albanian continuity in Kosovo characterizes the present day Albania and Kosovo¹⁹¹.

The 6th century AD is very important for the history of the Balkan Peninsula, because during that time the ethnography of the area changed dramatically. The all important development in the Balkans was the influx of the Slavic peoples in the area. The South Slavic groups (Slovenes, Croatians and Serbians) entered the Balkan Peninsula from the north during the 6th and 7th centuries AD pushed south by the Avars. These people had already been divided into tribes before they arrived in the area, but there was little variation from one group to the other. They settled in an arc from the head of the Adriatic, south and east to the Black Sea¹⁹².

¹⁸⁸ Gail Warrander, Verena Knaus, "Kosovo", Bradt Travel Guides, England, 2008, p.4

¹⁸⁹ Barbara Jelavich, "History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, Vol I", pp. 10-12

¹⁹⁰ Noel Malcolm, p.217

¹⁹¹ İlhan Uzgel, "Kosovo: Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International Intervention", p.205

¹⁹² Leften Stavros Stavrianos, "The Balkans Since 1453", C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2008, pp. 23-4.

The Slavic migration from the north and the Persian attacks from the east produced a declining period ("dark age") of the Eastern Empire in 600-800 AD. In the 7th century the territory of the Empire was reduced to its Greek heartland¹⁹³. During this transition period the migration of the Slavic peoples in the Balkan Peninsula began gradually from Central Europe. Slavs moved southward and as agriculturally minded people, they sank roots and took possession of lands, which remain theirs to the present. This Slav influx pushed the Illyrians south into the mountains (present-day Albania) and dispersed the Thracians in the eastern part of the peninsula (present-day Bulgaria). The Latin speaking provincials were forced to the uplands preserving a degree of individuality reflected to this day in modern Romania. The Greeks were forced south to modern Greece, where they held their own parts of the Balkan Peninsula¹⁹⁴. In the southern part of the Balkans two major groups were settled. The Serbs were settled in the central Balkans between the Adriatic and the Danube. The other group, "Bulgars", was settled in the remaining territory southeast of the Serbs to the Black Sea (See Figure 3.1. **Map of South Eastern Europe 650 to 700 A.D.**)¹⁹⁵.



Figure 3.1. Map of South Eastern Europe 650 to 700 A.D.

¹⁹³ Norman Davies, *Europe – A History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1996, pp.244-45

¹⁹⁴ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, p.24

¹⁹⁵ Available on site <http://www.fsmitha.com/h3/map05blk.htm> (accessed 2 November 2011).

As the Serbian version puts it, historically the Kosovo region has been the cradle of Serbian civilization, ‘the heart of Serbia’. It is even regarded as a ‘Serbian Jerusalem’. In the second half of the twelfth century, Stephen Nemanja united the Serbian people for the first time. In a series of successful wars with Byzantium and Bulgaria he established the territorial basis of the future Serbian kingdom. At that time, Kosovo became the centre of this rising state which reached its strongest period at the time of Prince Stephan Dusan the Mighty, Serbian Napoleon, in the first half of the 14th century. For two centuries, Prizren was the seat of the Serbian Empire, and it also became the capital for trade and cultural-religious life.¹⁹⁶.

Especially important in this context is that the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was founded by the King Stephan Nemanja’s younger brother and named after him as St. Sava, moved to Pec and acquired an autocephalous status in 1219. It must be emphasized that since then there has been created a very strong link between the Serbian State and the Orthodox Church¹⁹⁷. The Serb historians mention the existence of 200 churches and monasteries in this region. Even the term ‘Metohija’, meaning church property, is regularly used by Serbs together with Kosovo, denoting the religious identity of Kosovo.

Prince Stephan Dusan conquests were quite impressive and a modest development of Serbian culture started. The Serbian leader was also anxious to gain the imperial throne in Constantinople. He had proclaimed himself “Tsar of the Serbs and Autocrat of Greeks” and in 1355 AD, he marched on Constantinople with the aid of the Turks, the Italians and the Pope, but he died on the march¹⁹⁸. The death of Dusan in 1335 left the region in disharmony and coincided with the expansion of the Ottomans. Even if he failed to create the institutions, which would hold the Serbian Empire together after his death, he left behind a memory that inspired Serbian patriotism for centuries (See Figure 3.2. **Map of South Eastern Europe 1340 A.D.**)¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. p.28.

¹⁹⁷ Noel Malcolm, pp.44-46

¹⁹⁸ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, p.28.

¹⁹⁹ Available on site http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/se_europe_1340.jpg (accessed 2 November 2011)



Figure 3.2. Map of South Eastern Europe 1340 A.D.

The collapse of the Serbian Empire created a political vacuum in the Balkans. The Ottomans arrival brought about deep changes in the political, social, economic and religious life in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular. The Ottomans sealed the fate of the Serbian empire at the decisive battle of Maritsa in 1371 and in the more famous Serbian disaster at Kosovo in 1389.

3.3. OTTOMAN EMPIRE ERA:

The Ottoman Empire followed a methodical settlement policy in the Balkans. The Turcoman tribes migrating from Central Asia to Anatolia were headed to the Balkans. The Turkish people were generally settled in Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Macedonia and Thrace. Today, Turkish minorities are present in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Protection and the well being of these Turkish communities characterize one of the basic principals of Turkish-Balkan policy. In addition, the Ottoman retreat from the Balkans was attended by several waves of migration to Turkey from the late 19th century

and today about one fifth of Turkey's population is of Balkan origin²⁰⁰. These people are sensitive to the developments in the Balkans and support the government to take action.

3.3.1. Conquest of the Balkans:

The Ottoman Empire was established by Osman Bey in northwestern Anatolia in 1299. The small principality turned into a huge empire that sprawled over three continents and protected peoples coming from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The main reason for the Ottoman rise was not only the strength of its armies and its superiority in warfare, but also the political emptiness created by the decline of Byzantine and Seljuk Empires.

Western Europe was disordered and divided in the fourteenth century. The awful disease and the peasant revolts had caused major damage in European countries. England and France were fighting against each other in the Hundred Years' War. The two significant commercial powers, Genoa and Venice, were immersed in a deadly rivalry. The Christian kingdoms in the Balkans were not in a promising state either. The collapse of the Serbian Empire created a political vacuum on the peninsula and the Balkan peoples were too dispersed and weak to resist the Ottomans.

Another factor that contributed to the Ottoman success was religion. The magnetism of conquest of infidel lands enabled the Ottoman sultans to attract into their service the unsettled nomadic Turcoman tribes and this significant striking force aided them in their further march to the West. The dervishes and sheikhs –i.e. Sarı Saltuk- of the Bektashi order also played a great role in the Ottoman expansion. The Bektashi order did not appeal to the strict rules of Islam. It included many pre-Islamic religious and shamanic elements. Dervishes travelled throughout the region in advance of the Ottoman armies and established lodges that served as bases for the diffusion of Islam among the local people²⁰¹.

The Ottomans first crossed into the Europe in 1345 to help Orhan Bey's Byzantine father-in-law Cantacuzenus to gain the throne. The Castle of Çimpi was passed to the Turks in

²⁰⁰ Şule Kut, "Turkey in the Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self-Restraint", Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, 1996/1997 3, ISIS, Istanbul, p.42.

²⁰¹ Mesut Hakkı Caşın, "*Balkan Jeopolitiği ve Trajedik Bosna-Hersek Savaşı*", Avrasya Dosyası, Sayı: 3, Cilt:3, Ankara, 1996, pp.87-8.

1353. The advance of the Ottoman Turks into the Balkans began with their capture of Gallipoli in 1354²⁰².

One of the most important developments of early Serbian history and mythology was the defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo on 28 June 1389. This event while placing the entire region under Ottoman rule also left a deep impact in the historical consciousness of the Serbian people. Both Serbian King Lazar and Ottoman Sultan Murad (Hudavendigar) died in the battle. Especially, the murder of Sultan Murad by Milos Obilic has become the symbol of heroism and sacrifice in Serbian history²⁰³. It should also be noted that, at that time some Albanian tribes, which were Christian or converted to Christianity, fought against the Ottoman armies, side by side with the Serbs²⁰⁴.

In the declining Byzantine Empire the rest of the 14th Century was dominated by civil wars in which the Serbs and Turks were increasingly being used by both sides. The weakness of the Serbian and Bulgarian empires enabled the Ottomans to conquer the Balkans and leaving Constantinople isolated. By that time, there had been set the basis for the modern Balkan states, each of which had a counterpart in this period; Albania in Illyria, Bulgaria in the medieval Bulgarian empires, Serbia in the Serbian Kingdom and Greece in the Byzantine Empire²⁰⁵.

The Battle of Nicopolis (Niğbolu) in 1396, widely regarded as the last large-scale crusade of the Middle Ages, failed to stop the advance of the victorious Ottomans. With the extension of Turkish dominion into the Balkans, the strategic conquest of Constantinople became a crucial objective. The Empire controlled nearly all former Byzantine lands surrounding the city, but the Byzantines were temporarily relieved when Timur invaded Anatolia in the Battle of Ankara in 1402. He took Sultan Bayezid I (Yıldırım) as a prisoner. Part of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans (such as Thessaloniki, Macedonia and Kosovo) was temporarily lost after 1402.

²⁰² Roderick H. Davison, "*Osmanlı -Türk Tarihi*", Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2004, p.27.

²⁰³ Tim Judah, "*Kosovo: War and Revenge*", Yale university Press, New Haven and London, 2000, pp 4-7.

²⁰⁴ Noel Malcolm, p.62

²⁰⁵ Barbara Jelavich,, Vol I, p. 26.

Mehmed I came out as victorious and became the new ruler. He succeeded in restoring Ottoman control in Anatolia and in the Balkans²⁰⁶. Under the reign of Murad II, Ottoman troops crushed a coalition of crusading armies at Varna and Kosovo in 1444 and 1448, respectively, and confirmed the Turkish grip on the Balkans²⁰⁷ (See Figure 3.3. **South Eastern Europe 1444 A.D.**)²⁰⁸. This victory began a decade of successes for the Turks, ending in the capture of Constantinople by Mehmed II known as “the Conqueror”, in 1453. Constantinople would become the permanent capital of the Ottoman state until it’s demised.



Figure 3.3. Map of South Eastern Europe 1444 A.D.

Further expansion in the Balkans and Eastern Europe followed Serbia, except for Belgrade, Morea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldavia and Wallachia, were added to the Empire and

²⁰⁶ Lord Kinross, “*Ottoman Centuries: Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*”, Harper Perennial, New York, 1977, p.78.

²⁰⁷ Caroline Finkel, “*Osman’s Dream: the History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*”, Basic Books, New York, 2007, p.46-7

²⁰⁸ Available on site http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/se_europe_1444.jpg accessed 2 November 2011)

the Ottomans established undisputed control over the Balkan Peninsula. When Mehmed II died in 1481, he was the master of the Balkans from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the Carpathians to the southern tip of Greece. The Balkans, for the next century and a half, won breathing space only when the Turks were occupied on their eastern frontier²⁰⁹.

Throughout the 16th century, the political situation depended largely on which of Turkey's neighbors was best resisting the expansionist trends of the Ottoman Empire. Later a northern neighbor, Russia became new power. During the reign of Bayezid II, the Turkish force was mainly to the west. Herzegovina was occupied in 1483. The Venetians were driven out of Albania in 1501. Contrary to popular belief, the ground work for the spectacular rise to power under Selim I and Suleyman the Magnificent was laid in the reign of Bayezid II²¹⁰

During the reign of Bayezid's son, Selim I, the focus shifted to the east. After defeating the Persians in 1514, Selim embarked on a bold responsibility. Selim was followed as sultan, in 1520, by his son Suleyman I. Turkish attention returned to the west. In 1521, Suleyman captured Belgrade. In 1526, he crushed the Hungarians at Mohacs. In 1529, he even besieged Vienna, although unsuccessfully. In 1541, Hungary was completely annexed and proclaimed as an Ottoman province. Similarly a campaign in the west, from 1593, resulted in a peace of 1606 with Habsburg Austria. By this time, the Balkans, as far west as a line from Budapest down to the coast at Dubrovnik, were either under Turkish control or were paying annual dues to Istanbul as vassal states²¹¹. The Ottoman Empire reached its zenith under Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), who expanded the Empire throughout the Balkans and Hungary to the gates of Vienna²¹² (See Figure 3.4. **Map of Europe about 1560**)²¹³.

²⁰⁹ Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Vol.1*: 1300-1600, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.13

²¹⁰ Ibid, p.20.

²¹¹ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 1, Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp.87-111

²¹² Ibid, p.87

²¹³ Available on site http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/europe1560_shepherd.jpg (accessed 2 November 2011)



Figure 3.4. Map of Europe about 1560.

In the 16th and the 17th century the Islamization of the Albanians reached large proportions in the region²¹⁴. The reasons for these conversions were that the Ottoman Empire needed to strengthen its rule in the Balkans and these areas became strategically too important to leave the Christians. The Ottomans generally respected the Christians and Jews as “the people of the book” and their administrative organization to control the people in the empire was based on the religious communities known as millets. The main millets in the Balkans were the Muslim, the Christian (Orthodox) and the Jewish millet. In the Orthodox millet as well as in the Ottoman administration the Slavs had a good position, but soon their influence declined in favor of the Greeks.

The Islamization of the Albanians led to two interrelated developments. First, the Albanians turned to be the favorable millet of the Empire and secondly they gradually became a part of the ruling class. This fact manifested itself in the high number of Albanian origin pashas and even sadrazams in Ottoman history. Thus, the line which

²¹⁴ Nuray Bozboru, “Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Gelişimi, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1997; Miranda Vickers, “Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo”, Columbia University Press, London, 1998, p.27.

divided Albanians and Serbs gained religious and political character, Islam-non-Muslim and ruler-ruled (reaya)²¹⁵.

The Islamization was directly coupled with the mass exodus of the Serbs from the region causing further population change in Kosovo. Since the Serbs sided with the Austrians in the war in 1690s and in 1730s, in fear of punishment from the Ottomans they fled their homes, and their places were taken by the Albanians. Thus, the Serb historians try to explain the change in ethnic structure by forced Islamization of both Albanians and Serbs²¹⁶.

3.3.2. Decline of Ottoman Empire and Background of the Revolutions:

During the 17th and 18th centuries there were frequent adjustments in the Balkan frontiers between the Turks and the neighboring Austrian empire to the west. The extreme point of Turkish expansion was reached with the siege of Vienna in 1683. When Vienna was relieved, the Austrians regained the initiative - and gradually recovered the whole of Hungary during the next four decades (See Figure 3.5. **Map of Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire 1683-1923**)²¹⁷.

The Ottoman Empire could not sustain its power in the succeeding generations and started to retrogress at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Administrative, economic and military decline were coupled with the inability to extend further conquests. Moreover, the Empire had reached its natural borders. Iran in the east, Russia in the north and Austria in the west were powerful barriers that the Ottomans could not come up against easily. The turning point was the Treaty of Karlowitz, which was signed in 1699 after a long series of wars fought against a combination of European powers in the Balkans. With this treaty, Ottomans lost significant portion of its European territory. Further east, in Serbia, the changeability of the situation could be seen in the experience of Belgrade. The city was

²¹⁵ James R. Payton, Jr., "Ottoman Millet, Religious Nationalism, And Civil Society: Focus On Kosovo, Religion in Eastern Europe XXXVI", 1, February 2006, pp.18-19

²¹⁶ Noel Malcolm, pp.139-162

²¹⁷ Available on site http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ottoman1683_shepherd.jpg (accessed 2 November 2011)

as liberty, equality and nationalism generated with the French Revolution of 1789 changed the thinking style of the Balkan peoples entirely. It gave the Balkan peoples an ideology for revolt and a clear concept of nation. Another significant factor that should be taken into consideration during this process was the growing great power rivalry and intervention in Balkan affairs. While the Ottomans were retreating, countries, such as Austria, Britain, France, and Russia were expanding their zones of influence in the region²¹⁹.

In the 19th century, nationalism was infiltrated into the Balkans. The peasant Serbs had held some rights over the land they worked during the Ottoman occupation and this fact gave them the sense of freedom. Moreover, the Serbian church had kept alive the national idea of the independent and glorious past. Finally, their geographical position close to Europe and their trade links with the Habsburg Empire made them very willing to fight for independence²²⁰.

The French Revolution and the two Russo-Turkish wars had a great influence on the Balkan people and raised hopes for their freedom. The revolutionary ideas of Napoleon entered with different channels into the relatively isolated Balkan Peninsula. Merchants, mariners and students in Western universities absorbed revolutionary ideas, while they were abroad, and spread them with passion and enthusiasm among their unhappy countrymen. Many Balkan national leaders and intellectuals became influenced by the ideas of the Western Europe and they led their nations to the wars for national independence²²¹.

The rise of nationalism, especially among the Serbs, caused a more influence both upon the political and social relations between the Serbs and Albanians, and their relationship with the Sublime Porte. When the Serbian national awakening led to unsuccessful 1804-1805 uprisings, the Ottomans tried to hold their control over the region by supporting the Muslims, especially the Albanian pashas, to whom the Serbs simply refer as rebel²²².

Serbian historians claim that the rebellious Serbs were victimized by the Albanian pashas who wanted to protect their advantaged status. Although the Albanian aristocrats helped

²¹⁹ Barbara Jelavich, "*History of the Balkans Vol:1*", pp.45-47

²²⁰ Ibid, pp.91-92

²²¹ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, p.211.

²²² İlhan Uzgel, "*Kosovo: Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International Intervention*", p.206.

with the Ottoman rule for a certain time, they fell into disagreement with the Porte due to the reforms initiated by the reform-oriented Sultans, such as Selim III and Mahmud II. The reaction of the Porte was less than peaceful, and the Ottoman armies crushed the resisting Albanian beys²²³.

In the nineteenth century the first attempt for independence started in Serbia with the activities of Karageorge that had been ended in the rising of 1804-1813 and later with the second rising under Milos Obrenovic in 1815-1817. These attempts opened the way for international recognition of the Serbian nation. The Serbian uprising, which took place at the time of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, had received no support by any European Power not even from the Orthodox Russia, as it became part of the great diplomatic and military struggle between Napoleon and the Allies for the control of Europe. The first Serb uprising ended in defeat by the Turks after a nine-year struggle. The second Serb uprising earned the Serbs with an internal autonomy. After the Russo-Turkish war in 1828-29, it was possible to see Serbia as a separate state, even if the state only won its formal independence in 1878 (Congress of Berlin)²²⁴

However, the Kosovo region continued to remain under Ottoman rule. But the Serbs, besides their aim to reach a passage to the sea, also focused their attention on Kosovo and compiled a Serbian national programme, with the initiative of the Serbian Interior Minister Ilija Garasanin in the middle of the 19th century. The programme, called 'Nacertanija' (meaning Outline) inter alia envisaged the Serbianization of Kosovo²²⁵. The Serbs continued their interest in Kosovo throughout the second half of the 19th century and they opened a seminary in Prizren 1871, and two years later, a consulate in Pristine. These institutions became the basis for Serbian national operations, including the broadcasting of books, newspapers etc. But the Albanian reaction was quick to come and the Serbian

²²³ Dusan Batakovic, "*Kosovo-Metohija: The Serbo-Albanian Conflict*", Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade, p.4, Available on site <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/Kosovo-Background10.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

²²⁴ İlber Ortaylı, "*İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*", Alkım, İstanbul, 2006, pp.77-78

²²⁵ Dusan Batakovic, "*Ilija Garasanin's Nacertanije*", Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade, Available on site <http://www.batakovic.com/nacertanije.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

consul was assassinated in 1890²²⁶. An event shows the degree of hostility among the two peoples in the late 19th century. (Figure 3.6 **Map of Balkan Peninsula 1817-77**)²²⁷.



Figure 3.6 **Map of Balkan Peninsula 1817-77**

It is obvious that nationalism could not be confined to one nation in the region and the Albanians were influenced by the eager nationalism of the Serbians, Bulgarians and Macedonians. Nevertheless, Albanian nationalism can be distinguished from other nationalism in the region for certain reasons.

Firstly, Albanian nationalism was late in awakening, mainly because the majority of the people (almost 70 %) had been converted to Islam during the Ottoman occupation. Muslim community had a favored status compared to other religious groups within the Ottoman State, since majority of the population shared same religion within the Ottoman rulers. The Albanians benefited from this privilege and achieved administrative and military position within the state.

Secondly, while Other Balkan nationalist movements developed against Ottoman rule, however, Albanian nationalism has grown mainly against the Serbs, a factor which left a

²²⁶ Noel Malcolm, p.230

²²⁷ Available on site <http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/Balkans1877.jpg> (accessed 2 November 2011)

deep scar on the national mentality of Albanians. And thirdly, unlike other nationalisms in the Balkans, religion did not play an important role in the development of the Albanian nationalism. The Albanians were divided into three religious groups (Muslims 70%, Orthodox 20% and Catholics 10%), thus, any stress on religious element would have caused a split among the Albanians²²⁸.

Eventually, the strongest support for the Albanian national movement came from the Albanian emigrants in Italy and the United States²²⁹. When Serbian and Montenegrin forces invaded Kosovo by taking advantage of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, they came into open conflict with the Albanians for the first time on such a scale. Although the Serbian troops withdrew from Kosovo according to truce signed after the war, the Albanians who were deeply concerned by the fact that Albanian inhabited territories were almost defenseless. In 1878, on the eve of the Berlin Congress, the first Albanian national organization was founded under the name of “Central Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality” in Istanbul, which was commonly called the “League of Prizren”, after the town where it was formed under the leadership of a famous intellectual, Abdyl Frasheri (Brother of Şemsettin Sami) who was member of a well-known Albanian family.

Its aim was the continuation of the status quo and it demanded that Kosovo should remain within the Ottoman Empire. In the beginning, League was supported by the Porte but later on, the League started to rule Kosovo and its periphery as a de facto government. The acceleration of the League’s ruling power alerted the Ottoman rulers, and when it became a rival force to the Sultan’s authority in the region, it was crushed by Abdülhamid II²³⁰. Despite its dissolutions by force, it was a milestone in the development of Albanian nationalism. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Kosovo became the starting point of the nationalism of both the Serbs and the Albanians, and thus making the issue ever more complicated.

²²⁸ Dom Lush Gjergi, “*Would an Independent Kosova Be an Islamist State?*”, Anna DiLellio (Ed), *The Case For Kosovo: Passage to Independence*, Anthem Press, New York, 2006, pp159-164.

²²⁹ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, pp.502-6

²³⁰ Nuray Bozbora, “*The Policy of Abdulhamid II Regarding The Prizren League*”, *Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Annual 2006, 11, ISIS, İstanbul, p.45-67.

There are differences in the formation of Albanian and Serbian nationalism. The Albanians have been the last nation in the Balkans to gain national consciousness, but all the nations in the Balkans, including the Serbs themselves, sought foreign support, an age-long feature of the region. And as mentioned before, unlike other, religion has not played an important place in the development of Albanian nationalism.

The Balkans was far from peace and stability in the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. The Ottoman authority lost in this period against the hajduks²³¹ and bashibozuks²³². Under these circumstances, Young Turks and Albanians established a close ties with each other. But their hopes faded later because their expectations were not met by the new regime in Istanbul²³³.

The beginning of the 1910s witnessed a series of Albanian uprisings. Ironically, Albanian resistance against Ottoman rule slowed down when the state was almost totally declining in power. The downfall of the Ottoman rule brought further political upheavals and the emergence of nationalist movements consequently led to the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

3.3.3. Eastern Question:

The most insoluble and dangerous issue of European diplomacy during the 19th century acquired a broad name - the Eastern Question. It referred to the danger created by the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, with the sultans in Istanbul proving unable to control the huge empire assembled by their more warlike ancestors. The basic danger in the Eastern Question was not the internal threat posed to the sultans. It was the risk of war between the western European powers as each nervously tried to ensure that none of the others gained any advantage from the potential collapse of Ottoman Empire²³⁴.

²³¹ The etymology of the word "hajduk" is unclear. One theory is that hajduk was derived from the Turkish word *haiduk* or *hayduk*, which was originally used by the Ottomans to refer to Hungarian infantry soldiers. the Balkan word is said to be derived from the Turkish word *haiduk* or *hayduk* (bandit). Families of Croatian descent with the same oral traditions of "mountain banditry" use the surname Hidek, a derived form of "hajduk".

²³² Turkish; *başıbozuk*, literally "damaged head", meaning "free headed", "leaderless", "disorderly" was an irregular soldier of the Ottoman army. They were noted for their lack of discipline.

²³³ Noel Malcolm, pp.236-238

²³⁴ A.L. MacFie, "*The Eastern Question 1774-1923*", Addison Wesley Publishing Company, New York, 1996, pp.1-5

The greatest fear in western Europe was that Russia, Ottoman's nearest neighbor, would continue the process of expanding south in the Black Sea region and would possibly even reach Istanbul - a gateway of immense strategic importance between the Balkans and Asia. Russia was closely involved in the two Balkan liberation movements of the early 19th century, in Serbia and Greece. Russian imperial ambitions in this area benefited from a cover of idealism. The majority of Christians living under Ottoman rule were Orthodox rather than Catholic. As the leading Orthodox power, Russia could claim a natural right to their protection - a fact recognized by Ottomans in the 1774 treaty of Küçük Kaynarca²³⁵.

The weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire provide constant opportunity for western involvement. And the presence of Christians offered a permanent cause to take an active interest in Turkish affairs. To add to these other elements, it was only much-repeated means of achieving power in the region. It derives from the geographical features linking the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The Straits become the military and the diplomatic focal point of the Eastern Question. In 1833 Russia won a hidden advantage over the other European powers. In a secret part of a treaty signed at Hünkâr İskelesi the Turks grant an eight-year agreement that in a crisis the Straits will be closed to all warships except those of Russia²³⁶.

During the years following Greek independence, significant reform movements took place in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdülmecit signed and issued the Gülhane Charter in 1839 and proclaimed the principles of a reform movement called the Tanzimat (reorganization). This was a period of sustained legislation and reform that modernized the Ottoman state and society and contributed to the further centralization of administration. The political impact and diplomatic intervention of the West became much more evident during the Tanzimat era. Britain, Russia and France pursued their policies on the basis of claims to the right of protection over the Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic communities of the Empire. However, most of the time religion was used at the backdrop as a cover for power politics. In 1856, following the Crimean War, the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) was

²³⁵ Roderic H. Davison, "*Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi*", pp. 61-86.

²³⁶ A.L. MacFie, "*The Eastern Question 1774-1923*", pp. 21-23

issued by the Ottoman authorities and the legal and religious equality of the Christian subjects in the empire were guaranteed²³⁷.

However, by the 1870s misrule within the Balkans led to raise unrest, provoked by tension between the mainly Christian population and their Muslim overlords and by the nationalist hopes of the pan-Slav movement. Dissatisfaction had broken into open insurrection in Herzegovina in 1875. This was followed in 1876 by an uprising in Bulgaria. These events heightened the anti-Turkish feeling already evident in Herzegovina's revolt. In June, Serbia declared war on Turkey. With European public opinion inflamed against Ottomans, the Turks allowed a conference to be held in Istanbul on the Balkan issue. But they made no concessions. In March 1877, the Turkish parliament even declared there was no further need for the traditional Russian protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In April 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey. At first the Turks were able to resist the Russian advance through Bulgaria, holding them in an engagement at Plevna in July. But by December the Russians had taken Edirne and were in a position to threaten Istanbul itself²³⁸.

This success drastically changed the international situation, reviving the fears of the western powers at the prospect of Russia benefiting from the collapse of Ottomans. Public opinion in London in particular, orchestrated by the Prime Minister Disraeli, now swings violently against Russia. When the British fleet dropped anchor within sight of Istanbul, in February 1878, the Russian army was at the village of San Stefano just six miles west of the city. Rather than risk war with Britain, the Russians refrained from attacking Istanbul. Instead, they made a treaty at San Stefano with the Ottomans. An autonomous, big Bulgaria was created which had borders stretching from the Danube to the Aegean and from the Vardar and Morava valleys in Macedonia to the Black Sea. Moreover, Russia captured Bessarabia and Serbia and Montenegro gained further territory at Ottoman expense²³⁹.

The realization of the San Stefano Treaty would make Russia the dominant power in the Balkans. Britain and Austria were uncomfortable about expanding Russian penetration in

²³⁷ Roderic H. Davison, "*Osmanlı-Türk Tarihi*", pp. 119-123

²³⁸ Erich Jan Zürcher, "*Turkey: A Modern History*", I.B. Tauris, London, 2004, p. 74

²³⁹ Barbara Jelavich, "*History of the Balkans, Vol I*", pp. 350-8

the peninsula and convened the Berlin Congress in June 1878 in order to make some modifications to the San Stefano Treaty. With the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, Bulgaria was divided into three parts. Macedonia was returned to the Ottomans, southern Bulgaria, which was also called Eastern Rumelia, was given a separate status under Ottoman rule and the remaining territories made up the Bulgarian principality. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent. Austria acquired the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia gained Kars, Ardahan, Batum and southern Bessarabia²⁴⁰.

The Berlin Congress, on which the Great Powers met to redraw the Balkan map, left compact ethnic masses situated in the boundaries of their neighbor countries. From this moment on, the powder keg in the European Southeast corner was activated. *National reunification* was considered the only possible solution to the *national question*.

The war and the succeeding peace treaty were a complete disaster for the country. The Ottoman Empire had not only admitted extensive territory losses, but also large numbers of Turks and Muslims had to emigrate from Bulgaria to escape from the atrocities of Bulgarian and Russian troops. By 1879, seventeen percent of the Muslims of Bulgaria had died and thirty-four percent became permanent refugees²⁴¹.

3.3.4. Macedonia Question:

From Tanzimat period to the 1870s, Ottomanism as an ideology aimed at the formation of a “political nation”. The reforms of 1839, expanded through a formal sultanic proclamation of 1856, guaranteed Ottoman non-Muslim equal rights and, among other thing, employment in responsible positions within the developing Ottoman bureaucracy. On the other hand, from the perspective of Balkan nationalists, this situation involved considerable danger, as it meant that potential supporters of a variety of nationalist projects reaffirmed their ties to the Ottoman state²⁴².

The *Macedonian question* was also a part of the Balkan neighbors’ ambition to make their state boundaries equal to the national ones. In 1893 a secret revolutionary organization was

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p.359.

²⁴¹ Ali Eminov, pp.78-9

²⁴² Gül Tokay, “*Makedonya Sorunu ve Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri 1903-1908*”, Afa Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p.

founded in Salonika. Calling itself Vatrashna Makedonska Revolutsiionna Organizatsia (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) VMRO (IMRO), it stated its policy in the slogan "Macedonia for the Macedonians". The proposed revolution against Ottomans was to be a Christian one, so the Muslim Macedonians could be discounted, as could the thriving Jewish communities. But even the Christians themselves in Macedonia were variously Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian in origin. These three states were concerned not so much that Macedonia shall belong to the Macedonians as that parts of it shall belong to them. By 1900 each was sending secret rebel contingents into Macedonia to ensure that the VMRO inclined to their particular brand of national insurrection. The rival terrorists became a familiar part of the developing chaos in the Balkans.²⁴³

Albanian lands and people were also left in the Ottoman Empire sphere after the Berlin Congress. Although the Albanian national movement needed support, the revolutionaries did not establish connections with the other already independent Balkan neighbors, because they were afraid of their plans to take parts of Albania. Therefore, the Albanian national movement had both liberating and defending mission. The first was against the Ottoman rule, while the latter was against the claims of Montenegro, Greece and Serbia.

The three Balkan states also had designs on Albania, now at the western extremity of European Turkey. Serbia, in particular, hoped for a slice of Albanian territory to give access to the Adriatic. The sense of early crisis was heightened in 1908 with the revolution of the Young Turks in Istanbul. Austria-Hungary chosen this moment to annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete announced its intention of uniting with Greece on October 7. At the same time Ferdinand declared the independence of his Bulgarian principality and of Eastern Rumelia, proclaiming himself Ferdinand I as ruler of a united Bulgarian kingdom.

3.4. THE BALKAN WARS:

An extra chance seemed to be offered to the Balkan states when Italy went to war against Ottomans in North Africa in September 1911. The conflict lasted until October 1912. During that time, with Turkey troubled, plans were formulated in the Balkans for the division of Turkish land in Europe. Early in 1912 secret agreements were made between

²⁴³ Misha Glenny, *"The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999"*, Penguin Books, New York, 2001, pp. 195-200

Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece as to future boundaries (See, Figure 3.7. **Map of Balkan Aspirations 1912**)²⁴⁴.




Figure 3.7. **Map of Balkan Aspirations 1912**

The Balkan turmoil of 1912 starts in Albania. A national revolt against the Turks was successful that an Albanian militia had pressed far enough East to occupy the Macedonian city of Skopje. Albanians made stronger their movements for ongoing independence, refusing to be ruled by another Balkan state. The supporters of the Albanian resistance movement prepared the “12 Point Programme” and sent it to Istanbul in 1912, which was based on the “*Libri I Kuq* (The Red Book)” of the previous year. Finally Albanian leaders and Ottoman state agreed on autonomy for the Albanians²⁴⁵. This success stirred the Balkan states to action, for an independent Albania was not part of their plans. In October 1912 Montenegro, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria agreed secretly and went to war against Turkey.

²⁴⁴ Available on site http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkan_1912_1914.htm (accessed 2 November 2011)

²⁴⁵ Edwin E. Jacques, “*The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present*”, McFarland, North Carolina, 1995, p.270

The allies rapidly raided into Macedonia and Albania. The Serbian forces entered Pristine and Albanians were severely punished for their siding with the Ottomans which added another stone in the historically forged mutual hatred. The Serb victory was celebrated like a long-overdue revenge for its defeat in 1389. Conscious that its territorial acquisition required approval by the Great Powers, Serbia quickly set out to change the ethnic composition of the area to better strengthen its ethnic claim over the territory of Kosovo²⁴⁶.

Albanians declared their independence and set up their first national government. But the issue was taken into international hands. Austria-Hungary, in particular, was determined not to have a strengthened Serbia on her southern border. Ambassadors Conference of the relevant powers convened in London in December to discuss the issue. Albania proper was an international protectorate which was based on autonomous Albania, and German Wilhelm von Wied was appointed as Prince of Albania. But, the independent Albanian state had no fixed borders either north or south. Russian pressure on behalf of the Serbs resulted eventually in anomaly. The province of Kosovo was detached from Albania and fixed to Serbia. Thus, the fate of Kosovo was conserved to be a Serbian province under Serbian rule for the years to come²⁴⁷. Old Serbia had been recovered for the nation, the battle of Kosovo was avenged the Turk routed. It was agreed also in London (in a second conference in May 1913) that the western border of European Turkey would run from Enos on the Aegean to Midye on the Black Sea²⁴⁸.

Since Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece had made mutual agreements on this issue before the outbreak of war, this might be assumed to be easy. But, in June 1913, the king of Bulgaria decided upon military intervention. Bulgarian troops were not exactly where expected when hostilities in the Balkans had come to an end in April 1913. In particular many areas of Macedonia assigned for Bulgaria were occupied by Greek and Serbian troops who showed little inclination to relinquish them. This situation, and the hope of a quick victory to redress matters, prompted the Bulgarian king Ferdinand I to order his army to march

²⁴⁶ Noel Malcolm, pp.252-5

²⁴⁷ Nuray Bozbora, "Arnavut Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu, Gelişimi ve Günümüze Etkileri", ASAM, Avrasya Dosyası Cilt 14, Sayı 1, Balkanlar Özel, 2008, p.130;

²⁴⁸ Oral Sander, "*Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918'e*", 15. Baskı, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, pp.323-5.

into these disputed areas on 28 June 1913 (See Figure 3.8. **Map of the Balkans in 1913 after the Territorial Modifications**)²⁴⁹.



Figure 3.8. **Map of the Balkans in 1913 after the Territorial Modifications**

The result was disaster for Bulgaria. The invading army failed to achieve an immediate advantage against Serbs or Greeks in Macedonia. On July 11 the Rumanians invaded Bulgaria from the north. On the next day the Ottomans army marched into the new Bulgarian territory in Thrace. By 18 July 1913, the Bulgarians had agreed to a conference in Bucharest to settle the issue. The terms agreed at Bucharest were inevitably to Bulgaria's disadvantage. Romania was ceded valuable territory in the Dobruja, bordering the Black Sea. Ottomans recovered part of Thrace. Greece and Serbia acquired the largest and richest

²⁴⁹ Available on site http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkans_1913.htm (accessed 2 November 2011).

parts of Macedonia. The only meaningful Bulgarian accession was a short strip of the Aegean coast.

After the end of the Balkan Wars five hundred years of Turkish rule in the peninsula came to an end. These events left deep-seated enmities in the Balkans. But they were about to be submerged in a wider conflict - the First World War²⁵⁰.

3.5. THE FIRST WORLD WAR, ESTABLISHMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA (KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES) AND KOSOVO

The celebrations were short-lived in Serbia. Within a year, on a tour provocatively scheduled for the anniversary of Kosovo Field, 28 June 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot dead in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, in Sarajevo²⁵¹. Princip's motivation was clear – as he stated at his trial: 'I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free of Austria. On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, triggering the general European conflict which was to eliminate the second imperial barrier to South Slav unification.

The Great War destroyed Serbian power²⁵². A large number of Serb soldiers died and about 150.000 Serb soldiers were captured by the advancing Austrian Army. Bulgaria joined the Axis Power and occupied Kosovo's southeast. Serbia was totally expelled from Kosovo in 1915. Kosovo was separated from the other Albanian-inhabited lands in the Balkans during the First World War. Kosovo was divided into an Austrian zone of occupation, Prishtina and Prizren. During the war Albanians formed various national liberation organizations with the help of the Austrians. Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria had applied two different system of rule to Kosovo. Austria-Hungary collaborated with the Albanians by granting them certain rights. The Albanians participated in local administrations; they were allowed to use the Albanian language in governmental offices and open schools teaching in the Albanian language. But the conditions in the south were rather difficult. Bulgaria followed a strict policy and did not cooperate with the Albanians.

²⁵⁰ Misha Glenny, "*The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*", pp.243-8

²⁵¹ Tim Judah, "*The Serbs*", p.92.

²⁵² Barbara Jelavich, "*History of Balkans Vol.I*", p. 115.

Towards the end of the war, Austrian-Hungarian troops were ordered to withdraw north. Serbian troops occupied Kosovo for a second time in four years²⁵³. The greater part of the Yannina Province was handed to Greece whereas Kosovo was assigned to the newly found Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed under the new Serbian King Alexander Karadjordjevic as what was commonly called at the time a "Versailles state". King Alexander took an oath of allegiance to constitution on 28 June 1921, Vidovdan day, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the important date of Serbian history. In 1929 the kingdom was officially renamed Yugoslavia (See, Figure 3.9. **Map of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later Yugoslavia**)²⁵⁴.



Figure 3.9. **Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later Yugoslavia**

However, we should ask some questions about foundation of the new state. How did the founders of the new state come together? What were the reasons for making the decision to live together? How would the new government be organized?

²⁵³ Ibid, pp.260-3

²⁵⁴ Available on site <http://balkan.fabian-vendrig.eu/macedonia/history-of-macedonia/from-1914-to-8th-september-1991-macedonia-as-part-of-the-kingdom-of-serbs-croats-and-slovenes-and-later-yugoslavia/> (accessed 2 November 2011).

In the latter part of the 19th century some south Slavs had gained liberty and had their own states (Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro) while others (Croats, Slovenes and a large number of Serbs) lived under foreign rules, mainly Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. While Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had common ethnic roots and in large part a common language, religion and social differences were the main divisive factors²⁵⁵.

“Yugoslav dream” ideological roots lay in 19th century romanticism and nationalism. The principal proponent of Yugoslavism was Bishop Josip Strossmayer, who in establishing the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences in Zagreb in 1866, created the first institution ever to bear the Yugoslav name. Strossmayer’s vision was for a federal south Slav state, uniting the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Montenegro and Serbia. In the beginning, the variations on the south Slav idea were hazy and suggested no disagreements. When more specific proposals were made, differences began to appear. Territory like religion, historical experiences and social values could not be sound basis of south Slav unity. Despite all this, results of the First World War compelled the south Slavs to merge. Especially, Italian and Hungarian threat directed towards the Southern Slav population of the Dual Monarchy led to the unification of the Slav nations around the rather powerful Serb Kingdom. On the other hand, the Russian Revolution in 1917 shattered the Serbian dream of “Great Serbia” provided to strengthen of the Yugoslav idea.

Consequently, delegations of South Slavs, Serbian government and Yugoslav Committee, met in July 1917 and signed an agreement in Corfu. Most of Corfu Declarations fourteen points dealt with the organization of the future state. It declared that state should be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and was to be constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy headed by the Serbian ruling house, Karadjordjevic, in which there would be equality for the two alphabets, three national names and flags, and religious toleration²⁵⁶. This state was to be unitary and the constitution for the new union was to be framed by a constituent assembly and adopted “by a numerically qualified majority.” Corfu Declaration was an important move not only to Austria-Hungary but also Italian aspirations in the northern Adriatic²⁵⁷. On 29 October 1918, as Serbian troops marched to

²⁵⁵ Alex N. Dragnich, *“The First Yugoslavia: Search For A Viable Political System”*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1983, p. 2

²⁵⁶ Tim Judah, *“The Serbs”*, p.103.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 3-10

the Danube, the Sabor in Zagreb declared the union with Hungary to be severed²⁵⁸. From this date there was a state that united within itself Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but the state was not yet Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro had made no commitment to it.

The creation of the Yugoslav state was a common objective of the south Slav peoples, first manifested and articulated in the nineteenth century, and decades of struggle for self-determination followed before the objective was finally achieved²⁵⁹. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which lay to break the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman Empires, recognized and allowed the establishment of the state of Yugoslavia, together with those of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Albania. The desire for the formation of Yugoslavia emerged out of the realization that only a unified south Slav state could be viable in the face of competing regional economic and strategic interests.

In fact, Yugoslavia was the only possible solution to “Balkanization”, the division of the area into small hostile states, which would have no hope of real independence and self-determination. Serbia led the formation of this state, because Serbia was the largest south Slav community around which the other communities could come together. It had already liberated itself from Ottoman rule and established a nation state, and was struggling to free other south Slav peoples earlier to the First World War.

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires made the longed-for unification achievable and the situation at the end of the war made it desirable for the Great Powers that such a state should exist. While the nation states of Central and Eastern Europe were apparently founded on the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination, in fact, wider political and strategic issues were at risk. The containment of Germany, which would immediately seek to revise the conditions of the post-war peace treaty, was of crucial importance. A resurgent Germany was inevitable; therefore the stronger the west’s allies to its east, the better. A unified south Slav state, led by the Serbs who were war-time allies of Britain, France and the US, and implacably hostile to Germany, was a very positive option for the great powers. Furthermore, a viable state under strong leadership

²⁵⁸ Ferdinand Schevill, *“A History of the Balkans”*, New York, Dorset Press, 1991, p.497.

²⁵⁹ Raju G.C.Thomas, *“History, Religion and National Identity”*, Raju G.C.Thomas, H.Richard Friman (Ed.), *South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism*, Garland Publishing, New York and London, 1996, p.21

could help to defuse or suppress radical tendencies among peasants and workers in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the devastation wrought by the First World War. Yugoslavia under Serbian leadership could also help bring this type of stability to the region.

Yugoslavia could not have appeared without the support of the victorious great powers. Their basic aim in supporting the formation of Yugoslavia was the control of Germany. The Allies backed the creation of a single Yugoslav state, under Serbian leadership, as a more effective wall against a renewal of German aims in the Balkans than any collection of smaller states could possibly be. At the same time a larger unified south Slav state would be more economically viable and therefore less susceptible to any extension of the Russian revolution into south-east Europe. Nonetheless, in the context of the severe economic problems of the interwar period, Yugoslavia proved to be too weak to resist economic penetration by Germany in the 1930s.

The new state included the two independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia-Slavonia and the Vojvodina from the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovenia and Dalmatia from the Austrian part, Bosnia-Herzegovina from the joint Austro-Hungarian administration, and Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novipazar, which had been under Ottoman rule until the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913²⁶⁰.

The state census of 1921 indicated that approximately 84 per cent of the population was Slav, although from differing backgrounds, and the remainder of the population was drawn from German, Hungarian, Albanian, Turkish, Romanian, Vlach, Roma and other communities. Religious relationship cut across other lines of identity, so that the Slav community was not homogeneous on a religious basis: Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians tended to be Orthodox Christians, Croats and Slovenes to be Catholics, and Bosnians to be Muslim, following widespread conversion during the Ottoman period. In fact, the line dividing Orthodox and Catholic worlds cut through Yugoslavia, which comprised, in 1921, a population that was almost 47 per cent Orthodox and almost 40 per cent Catholic. A further complication was added by the fact that two different scripts were used within the new state: the Latin script was in use primarily in the former Austro-Hungarian territories, and the Cyrillic script in those lands previously under Ottoman

²⁶⁰ Kate Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, Pluto Press, London, 2003, pp.14

domination. So, by any measure, the new Yugoslav state was a diverse and complex entity²⁶¹.

The new Yugoslav state was organized on a pattern closely resembling that of prewar Serbia. Power was to be centralized in Belgrade and remain largely in the hands of Serbian political leaders. Serbian centralism had triumphed, but at a great price. The basic problem of the state, the Yugoslav nationality did not come into existence. The dispute of federation between centralizers and federalists was the main debate in the first years of the new state. On the other hand, nobody asked the thoughts of other people like Bosnian Muslims, Albanians or Hungarians over the new state. Different people of the new state never considered themselves one nation.

With the new state, the Belgrade government tried to strengthen its control over Kosovo and launched a policy of Serbian colonization in the region. After that a struggle took a direct form the Serbs as the ruler and the Albanians as the ruled. The Treaty for the Protection of Minorities signed in 1919²⁶² provided education in minority local languages. In contravention of the treaty, Serbs did not recognize Albanians as a national minority and did not grant the right to Albanian language education.

Invasion of Kosovo by Serbs in 1912-13 brought some questions in the mind. In terms of 1903 Serbian constitution; the frontiers of Serbia can be valid unless it has been agreed by the Grand National Assembly. However, no such Grand National Assembly was ever convened to discuss or ratify the extension of Serbia's borders to include Kosovo and Macedonia. The territories were properly annexed in terms of international law under the treaty-making powers of the king. Thus, Kosovo was not legally incorporated into Serbia by the standards of international law either. At the end of the Balkan War, Serbia did not ratify the London Treaty of 1913. Therefore had no legal force where the new Serbian territories were concerned. After the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman state was not party to it. Other treaties between Serbia and Ottomans could not be ratified, because of First World War, and such as Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which became null and void, or the Treaty of Ankara of 1925, which made no specific mention of the territories taken from the one by the other in 1912-13. The problem solved when both Yugoslavia and Turkey joined

²⁶¹ Ibid, p.15

²⁶² Yugoslavian treaties are referred to as Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye.

the League of Nations Pact to guaranteeing each other's territorial integrity. This legal case concerns Turkey's recognition that Kosovo was part, not of Serbia, but of Yugoslavia²⁶³.

3.6. THE INTERWAR PERIOD:

After all political debate and conflict over federalism or centralism, King Alexander found the answer of the nationalism problem. The alternatives were clear, the constitutional system was breaking-down and another system had to be adopted. On 6 January 1929, King Alexander ended the constitutional regime, abolished the political parties and dissolved the assembly. Thus, the national conflicts brought an end to constitutional government in Yugoslavia. With the establishment of royal dictatorship, it remained to be seen whether an able and experienced monarch could create a Yugoslav nation where a parliamentary system had failed²⁶⁴.

The 1920s were a period of comparative peace for the Balkans. The decade ended with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression. It is difficult to overestimate the effect of this crisis; it may have had a greater role in determining the future course of the European states than the national and international controversies. Economic conditions in Europe declined until 1933. Bad conditions were in the industrial countries made the situation even worse in regions that depended on agriculture. After the wars, revolutionaries and catastrophes changed the political status of the lands they inhabited. It was this society whose manner of living was so profoundly altered in the next half century²⁶⁵.

The Western financial crisis of 1929 had left Yugoslavia relatively untouched. Yugoslavia regularly was drawn into a more binding relationship with Germany, which began to recover under the Nazis. Favorable terms were extended to Yugoslav exports, and Yugoslav companies were incorporated into German cartels. By 1938 trade with Germany accounted for 53 percent of exports and 65 percent of imports²⁶⁶.

Far from attempting to create physical Greater Serbia, King Alexander launched into an attempt to create genuine Yugoslavia by force. He decided to abolish Yugoslavia's historic

²⁶³ Noel Malcolm, pp. 263-6

²⁶⁴ Barbara Jelavich, "*History of Balkans, Vol II*", pp.156-7

²⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 184-5

²⁶⁶ Serbia, In Encyclopædia Britannica, 18 Aug. 2010, Available on site Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-214081> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

regions. New internal boundaries were drawn for provinces or banovinas which apart from were mostly named after rivers. The effect of King Alexander's dictatorship was further to alienate the non-Serbs of the kingdom, because the country remained Serb dominated. The repression, however, also turned a good many Serbs against the king. In 1934 he was assassinated in Marseilles. King Alexander was succeeded by his 11 year old son Peter II and a regency council headed by his cousin Prince Paul.

In 1935, Serb Milan Stojadinovic became the head of the government with the support of the Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims. Stojadinovic became increasingly concerned with securing Yugoslavia's future. Throughout the interwar years the king had attempted to build diplomatic links, initially with France and Czechoslovakia and, after 1933, through the Balkan Entente with Greece, Romania, and Turkey intended to guarantee the signatories' territorial integrity and political independence against attack by another Balkan state. During the late 1930s, however, Yugoslavia found itself facing an embarrassing gap between its closest economic partners (Germany and the other Axis powers) and its diplomatic friends²⁶⁷.

After visiting Mussolini, Stojadinovic flirting with and showed applications about fascism. The 1938 elections were won by Stojadinovic's government party. However, Stojadinovic was soon removed from office, and by the end of the August 1939, Cvetkovic and Macek came to their historic Sporazum (Agreement). The Sporazum created an autonomous Croatia within Yugoslavia, to include not only Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, but a large part of Bosnia. The agreement was not supposed to be the end of the matter but rather the beginning of a thoroughgoing reorganization of Yugoslavia.

Stojadinovic's the Serb colonization programme, especially, had a political and a strategic military motivation. Political aim was the changing the demographic balance of the region in favor of Serbs and Montenegrins. Strategically, it was important to secure the main north-south Balkan communication route passing through eastern Kosovo and to settle Albanian border region with loyal Serbs.

In this period, Serbia suppressed the Albanian community in various realms of social life. For example, the Albanian language was forbidden in public places, education in Albanian

²⁶⁷ Ibid, p.58.

was prohibited, Albanian lands were annexed and thousands of Albanians were either expelled from Kosovo or sentenced to prison. Along with the Serb colonization policy, the Yugoslav government also pursued forced emigration of Turks and Turkish-speaking Albanians. In 1938, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed an agreement to repatriate Turks. According to this agreement, the newly founded Republic of Turkey would take 40.000 families, at a price of 500 Turkish pounds per family: a family was defined as “blood relations living under one roof”. Figures vary between 90.000 and 150.000 people are believed to have left Kosovo in the interwar period²⁶⁸.

The heavy Serbian oppression quickly created a resistance movement among the Albanians. An organization named Kaçak (from the Turkish word *kaçak*, meaning ‘fugitive’) was established by the Albanians with the covert help of Italy and was biggest threat to the Serbian colonization programme. The centre of Albanian resistance to Serbian rule was based in Shkodra, Albania. Kosovo Committee, under the leadership of Hasan Prishtina, main activity was to lobby internationally for the Albanian national issue and to direct the kaçak resistance movement inside Kosovo. The main targets of the Kaçak’s rebels were Serb and Montenegrin settlers, especially those who had been settled on properties of Kaçak rebels along strategically important routes. The Kaçak revolt was eventually crushed by the Yugoslav government with the help of Ahmet Zogolli- the later Albanian King Zog. All the leading figures of Kosovar revolt of 1912 were shot except on military leader²⁶⁹.

On the other hand, in foreign policy, Yugoslavia was compressed under pressure from German expansionism. World Economic Depression had caused to increase Germany’s influence over Yugoslavia economy, a member of the anti-German "Little Entente" led by France²⁷⁰.

By the year 1939, not only the Balkans but also the whole Europe came under German and Italian fascist threat. The Munich Agreement regarding the Germans of the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia), the German Anschluss of Austria, the Italian maneuvers targeting

²⁶⁸ Leslie Benson, “*Yugoslavia: A Concise History*”, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, pp.67-68

²⁶⁹ Noel Malcolm, pp.273-88.

²⁷⁰ Tanıl Bora, “*Yugoslavya: Milliyetçiliğin Provokasyonu*”, Birikim yayınları, İstanbul, 1991, p.42.

Mediterranean and the various assertive claims of these two powers signaled the outbreak of Second World War, which was to be much more destructive than the first.

After the fall of Stojadinovic's government in February 1939, the Italians decided to go ahead with full annexation. An ultimatum was presented to Zog in late March, and on 7 April Albania was invaded by Italian army. Zog quickly fled, a puppet government was installed. An Albanian Fascist Party was formed and found a political atmosphere to express their traditional demands of irredentist Albanian nationalism. In October 1940, Italian army launched its attack on north-western Greece, Çameria, which had a significant Albanian population. Six months later, Italy would become the co-conqueror of Kosovo²⁷¹.

3.6.1. Turkey's Balkan Policy during Interwar Period:

With starting the existing political and social flux in the Balkans, First World War had exploded in this area. After the Great War, borders were changed again, thus, the current political, geographical and ethnic division was deepened in the Balkans²⁷². Consequently, this situation had caused to the addition of new ones to the existing ethnic, minority and border problems in the Balkans.

After First World War, on the one hand, Balkan states dealt with external problems such as border disputes and to pressure from European states, on the other hand, struggled with domestic problems such as economic hardship and struggle for power. During this period, Turkey completed the National Independence War with the Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, Turkey ended the war with the Balkan states in the opposite block of Ottomans. However, the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty did not completely solve the problems of Turkey with Balkan countries²⁷³. It was a difficult and lengthy job to solve the long-standing historical problems.

In general, it is possible to examine Turkey's relations with the Balkan countries in two main periods: The period until 1930 and the period after 1930. From 1923 until the early 1930s, Turkey's foreign policy was dominated by the Treaty of Lausanne. Also, the period

²⁷¹ Noel Malcolm, pp.287-8.

²⁷² Barbara Jelavich, "*History of the Balkans, Vol II*", p. 134

²⁷³ M.Emin Çağiran, "*Lozan Barış Antlaşması, Türk Dış Politikası*", Haydar Çakmak (Ed.), Barış Platin Kitap, Ankara, 2008, p.140.

between 1923-1930 years is divided into two phase. Between the period 1923-1925, and the period after 1925.

Immediately after the War of Independence, the Turkish policy makers focused on domestic politics to give a shape to the new state. At the same time, they realized that they had to solve great problems with other countries in order to achieve political reforms at home. When Ankara decided to establish diplomatic relations with its neighbors, this was an important step for Turkey to consolidate its new frontiers. Within this context, in order to re-establish its relations with the Balkan countries, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship with Albania in Ankara on 15 December 1923, with Bulgaria on 18 October 1925, and a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Yugoslavia in Ankara on 28 October 1925.

The second half of the 1920s witnessed efforts by Ankara towards regional cooperation. Turkey aimed to prevent a Great Power intervention in the region. On the other hand, Ankara had to convince the other Balkan capitals that the motives of the Turkish foreign policy differed from those of the Ottoman Empire. The new Turkey would respect the national boundaries of its neighbors.

As for Greece, Athens mainly focused on its problems with Ankara rather than on the whole Balkan peninsula. Indeed, Athens first had to improve its relations with Turkey to have peace in the Balkans. Turkey and Greece was not solved the question of population exchange before 1930, however, the relations with Greece started to recover only after this year. In other words, a friendly state of relations had to be established between Athens and Ankara to achieve political stability in the broader Balkan region. The Treaty of Ankara signed between Turkey and Greece on 10 June 1930 had an important role in laying this basis. This was because, according to Atatürk, coming to an agreement with Greece was the first step in the Balkan policy that he would follow²⁷⁴.

After the War of Independence, Turkey felt obliged to fit into the new international system as a new nation-state. On the other hand, external factors affected the adaptation of Turkey and other Balkan countries into the system. Among them was the rivalry between the European powers in order to take the Balkans under their control. After Mussolini's

²⁷⁴ Mehmet Gönlübol, Cem Sar, "*1919-1939 Dönemi*", Mehmet Gönlübol (Ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 9. Baskı, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, pp.63-8.

coming to power in 1922, Italian revisionism became more obvious²⁷⁵. Mussolini's aggressive policy in the Balkans made the Italian-French rivalry even more inevitable.

In 1925, two important developments prompted the Balkan countries to launch a regional initiative for the cooperation. The Locarno Treaties signed between France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Belgium, entered into force²⁷⁶. As a result, the Turks presented their interest in the forming of a Balkan Pact with the idea of creating an "Eastern Locarno"²⁷⁷ in the Balkans. The Turkish project merited serious consideration at the conference of the Little Entente.

The World Economic Crisis of 1929 was the turning point for the realization of Balkan cooperation. The collapse of the liberal system pushed the Balkan countries to search for immediate solutions to the economic difficulties that they were facing. The Balkan leaders believed that only by regional cooperation they could improve their economies. Turkey, as the initiator the project, reconciled its differences with Athens before the First Balkan Conference convened.

The main obstacle to the regional cooperation was the Bulgarian opposition. Sofia which had claims on the territories of its neighbors was against preserving the status quo. The leaders of Balkan countries believed that a realization of Balkan entente could eventually convince the Bulgarians to join them. In fact, even though Bulgaria did not become a member of the Entente, it made an agreement of non-aggression with the members in 1938.

With the beginning of the "threat" of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy after 1933 and, accordingly, with the escalating tension between revisionist and anti-revisionist states, a Balkan Pact was prepared through the long and difficult efforts of Turkey. Despite Turkey's good faiths and sincere efforts, Bulgaria, which had revisionist policies, and Albania, which was under the control of Italy, were not involved in the Balkan Pact, which was signed by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on 9 February 1934.

In the interwar period, the main concern of the Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans was to guarantee a regional solidarity. As a reaction to the collapse of the existing world system,

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p.81

²⁷⁶ Mustafa Aydın, "*Locarno Antlaşmaları 1925*", Baskın Oran, Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I:1919-1980, İletişim Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2001, p.403.

²⁷⁷ Eberhard Kolb, "*Weimar Republic*", Routledge, New York, 2005, p.64.

Turkey and the other Balkan countries devoted attention to new strategies at the economic and political levels. The expectations in the formation of the Balkan Pact can be interpreted as the summary of Turkey's Balkan policy. On the other side, the pact has been the first multilateral defense cooperation treaty which Turkey signed. It was also the first regional alliance formed in that period having no direct support of or suggestion from the great powers²⁷⁸.

However, in terms of its formation, power and endurance, the Balkan Pact was not as effective as was expected by either Turkey or the Balkan people. However, the Balkan Pact put a stop to Bulgaria's expansionist desires, and its desire to gain access to the Aegean Sea. This pact, which was founded in a region where political balances and preferences could easily and quickly change, started to dissolve and came to an end with the involvement of all the Balkan states, except for Turkey, in the Second World War.

It would be useful to highlight the following points about Turkey's Balkan policy in the interwar period²⁷⁹:

- Turkish foreign policy showed a constant and regular development. The policy makers -Ataturk, İnönü, and Aras- hierarchy was central in carrying out this policy, and they worked in harmony. Since Ataturk's death, Turkey's Balkan policy maintained continuity.
- However, the interwar periods presented a chance to Turkey to emerge as a regional power. Turkey did not choose for isolationist diplomacy. On the contrary, the Turkish leadership believed that the condition was mature for them to take the initiative in regional politics.
- Turkey has had the fewest problems and the best dialogue some 15 bilateral agreements, protocols and extension protocols after the Treaty of Lausanne. Also, Ankara resolved its bilateral problems with Athens in order to achieve greater cooperation in the region. In addition, Turkey tried to guarantee the rights of the Turks who remained in the Balkan countries. Despite some interruptions, the same policy continued under different governments.

²⁷⁸ Gencer Özcan, "*Continuity and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy*", Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Kemali Saybaşı (Ed.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1995, p. 285.

²⁷⁹ Hikmet Öksüz, "*Turkey's Balkan Policy (1923-2007)*", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, İstanbul, Annual 2007, 12,

- Because of Turkey's need for population and for a homogenous population composition, providing lodging for immigrants from the Balkans was given special importance. Despite some interruptions, the same policy was carried out under different governments.

- During the Montreux Conference on the Straits in 1936, Turkey had the support of the states that signed the Balkan Pact, to which Turkey gave a great importance.

- The experience that Turkey had from the First World War and the socio-economic characteristics of the Republic of Turkey kept Turkey away from the notion of war. War would be considered only when a foreign intervention with the presence of the Republic of Turkey and its lands were in question. This careful approach was an important factor in Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War. The responsibilities of Turkish presidents on foreign policies and their roles on the process of decision-making continued up to the 1960s.

Ataturk's statement "Peace at home, peace in the world" was used as the motto of Turkish foreign policy and neutrality became the best way of securing Turkish interests before and during the Second World War. Despite the provocations, both domestic and external, Turkey managed to stay out of the war. It was not the indication of weakness or fearfulness; on the contrary, it was triumph of foresight of the decision-makers.

3.7. THE SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD:

Hitler had two alternatives where Yugoslavia was concerned. He could either compel it into becoming an ally, or defeat it by force. On 25 March 1941, the Yugoslav government unwillingly signed the Tripartite Agreement with Axis pact. Yugoslav Army, Serbs formed the majority, was boiled with the creation of autonomous Croatia, and they saw the federation against Serbian interests. They objected to join to Axis power and showed great reaction to agreement. On the night of 26-27 March 1941 Serbian officers in the Yugoslav Army put an end to the government. On 6 April Hitler bombed the Belgrade and the invasion of Yugoslavia began (See, Figure 3.10. **Map of Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, April 1941**)²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ Available on site http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkan_1941_april.htm (accessed 2 November 2011).



Figure 3.10. Map of Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, April 1941

The Axis powers launched a shocking *Blitzkrieg* against Yugoslavia. Resistance was weak and country surrendered on 17 April. The country was now divided up. The fascist Ustasha regime of the Croats swiftly initiated a program of ethnic violence against the Serbs, once it created its own state.

During the Second World War, both Yugoslavia and Albania were occupied by the Axis powers, and Kosovo was divided into three sectors. The Bulgarians were given a small part in the east. Mitrovica and the zinc and lead producing Trepca mines were attached to German occupied Serbia but the region was given a good measure of local control under Albanian leadership. The rest of the province, plus Albanian-inhabited areas of western Macedonia were attached to Albania which had been conquered by the Italians in 1939²⁸¹.

²⁸¹ Tim Judah, "*Kosovo: War and Revenge*", p.27.

During the Second World War, Kosovo was perceived as part of Albania proper and was put under Italian control. Later the Italians and the Germans agreed to join a large part of this Albanian-inhabited lands to Albania proper, still under the Italian control. The logic behind this compromise was to prevent the eruption of Albanian irredentist actions vis-à-vis the German forces of occupation²⁸². An interesting and vital outcome of inclusion of Kosovo in Albania proper during Second World War was that for the first maybe the last time Albanian-inhabited lands were united across the borders. From the Albanian point of view, this wartime phenomenon justified their cause that the Albanians should live as a united nation under a single flag, bringing the artificial division of the nation to an end.

These newly emerging political conditions changed the balances of power in the region, and as a reaction to the colonization policies of Serbs, it was now the Albanians' turn to control political developments in Kosovo and in parts of Macedonia. The unification of Albanian-inhabited lands brought two new facts to the agenda. Above all, creating a Greater Albania state had become a feasible target for the first time, since Albania achieved its independence. Second, the close contact that developed between the Albanian and the Yugoslav communists as wartime allies, who opposed the invasion s of fascist Axis power, shaped the future structure of Albanian political regime.

At the Bujan Conference in January 1944, the Yugoslav Communists in Kosovo declared the unification of Kosovo with Albania and Albanian population indivisibility according to the right to self-determination of nations. But this proposal was easier to make than to realize since there was a strong reaction to it, even in the Yugoslav Communist Party²⁸³. With the end of the foreign occupation, the status of Albanians in Yugoslavia was to be identified again, this time, according to the balances of power within the Yugoslav system.

Through this partnership, the status of the communists in Albania was consolidated by kicking out foreign powers from Albanian soil with the support of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This was materialized at the expense of giving Kosovo to Yugoslavia. Besides, the foundations of the long authoritarian rule of Enver Hoxha in Albania were laid. However, the Unification of Kosovo and Albania lasted only to the end of the war,

²⁸² Ibid, p.28

²⁸³ Noel Malcolm, pp.307-8.

and Kosovo was ceded to Communist Yugoslavia²⁸⁴. Losing Kosovo dashed the wartime hopes of establishing an all-inclusive “Greater Albania” state among the members of this nation.

3.7.1. Turkey’s Balkan Policy During Second World War Period:

The Second World War, which started with the invasion of Poland by Germany, had an immediate effect on the Balkan geography. When the German threat was imminent for the Balkans, Italy attempted to invade Greece on 28 October 1940. Turkey started to worry about the aggressive approach of Italy towards the Balkans and its attempt to invade Greece. According to the Balkan Pact, Turkey did not have to help Greece. However, if Bulgaria declared war on Greece, Turkey would help Greece. Bulgaria was informed of this. Turkey’s determined position made Greece feel at ease.

After the Italians, the Balkans became the target of the Germans. The project to revive the Balkan Pact had initiated by the British to stop the German progress failed. The German progress, which started in the spring of 1941, accelerated in a short time. Yugoslavia’s defeat in April and Bulgaria’s welcoming of the Germans put Turkey in a very sensitive position. Upon these developments, Turkey started to take some military measures, on the one hand, and kept the doors open for diplomacy, on the other, accepting the Germans’ offer of a nonaggression treaty. With this treaty, which was signed on 18 June 1941, Turkey felt at ease and escaped a possible German invasion²⁸⁵.

During the struggle between the “Axis Powers” and the “Allies” (the Allied Powers), which went on until 1945, Turkey followed a policy that kept her out of the war. While being the only Balkan state that was not part of the war helped Turkey avoid the destructive consequences of the war, it also drew her into a state of isolation in the international system.

During the war, İnönü came to the conclusion that Turkey’s biggest problem after the war would be the scene of facing alone with the more powerful Soviet Union. In fact, he was convinced that if Turkey entered the war, the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a

²⁸⁴ Tim Judah, Kosovo, p.31

²⁸⁵ Selim Deringil, “*Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*”, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, Temmuz 1994, pp.141-5.

member of the Axis or as a liberator²⁸⁶. Turkey felt this isolation more deeply during the San Francisco Conference convened on 25 April 1945 for the formation of United Nations Organization. Germany's defeat, Russia's advantageous position in the power equilibrium in Europe, and Russia's demands from Turkey marked the beginning of a very problematic period for Turkey. In a diplomatic note sent by Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, on 19 March 1945 to Turkey's ambassador to Moscow, Turkey was told that the USSR had abrogated the Friendship and Nonaggression Treaty signed between Turkey and Russia on 19 March 1945.

Although Turkey tried to find a solution in order to eliminate the danger without losing any of her rights of sovereignty and independence, she soon realized that it was very difficult to reach an agreement with the Russians. On 7 June 1945, Russia conveyed her demands (readjustment of the borders in favor of Russia, a base on the Bosphorus, and modification of the Montreaux Agreement) to Turkey, and then put an end to the Turkish-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty of 20 years. Furthermore, in order to increase the effect of her pressures on the issue of the Bosphorus, Russia demanded that the Kars-Ardahan region be given to her. Upon this, Turkey had some worries about her independence and unity; however, she did not abstain from declaring that she was determined to defend herself in case of an attack, even if she was left alone²⁸⁷.

Towards the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, which sent her troops to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria under the alleged reason of defending herself against German invasion, acted quickly to spread communism in these countries, which was her real purpose. Parallel to this, Russia started to put pressure on Iran, Turkey and Greece with the aims of spreading communism to these countries and reaching the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. During this process, Turkey started to struggle against communism, which influenced all the Balkan countries except for Greece and did her best not to let communism spread into Turkey.

²⁸⁶ Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2000, 36: 1, p.105

²⁸⁷ Selim Deringil, pp. 251-2

During the Second World War, Turkey's major foreign policy aim was to find a way to stay out of the war and not to endanger the weak balance of its relations with all parties²⁸⁸. Turkey managed to refrain from war and the policy makers protected their country's freedom from the pressure of Great Powers. Inonu and his colleagues knew that Turkey had no military and economic readiness against to warring parties. There was no ethic or moral concern of this policy but it was not only a "balance game". This war was the creation of European Great Powers and Turkey had a great experience from First World War. Of course, Ottoman history and tradition has a great role in this diplomatic success. Turkey was entirely obliged this success to its consistent stance which can be called the foreign policy philosophy

3.8. THE COLD WAR PERIOD:

The years immediately following World War II did not witness an end to conflicts in Western Balkans countries. Yugoslavia was involved in the civil war until 1947, when Tito's Communist regimes successfully took over the complete control of violence. The Greek civil war lasted from 1946 to 1949. The United States aid helped the victory of government and left Greece out of Soviet influence. Thus, with the Communist party in power in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, the Communist model of state, forming a solid and repressive dictatorship, achieved to suspend historical animation. Using Stalin's models of secret police and concentration camps, the Communist dictators in the Balkan countries were able to suppress all forms of ethnic nationalism. However, the bitter memories of ethnic conflicts were secretly passed from parents to children. This 'buried' legacy burst into with a brutal force when the communist regime collapsed in the 1980s.

3.8.1. Under the Rule of Tito:

Yugoslavia was divided into puppet states, with these new creations being placed under German or Italian zones of military control. A rump Serbia was set up under German military supervision. The Belgrade regime was established under General Milan Nedic. Serbs were radically divided in their responses to occupation, moving in any of three

²⁸⁸ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War*", p.106.

directions. First, the Nedic regime was tolerated by many Serbs and even received the active and enthusiastic support of some. Second, some loyal Serb units of the Yugoslav army set up a resistance movement under a former officer, Colonel Dragoljub Mihailovic. Adopting the label Chetnik (Cetnik) and appealing to a long history of Serb irregular forces, these units were for a time recognized as the Yugoslav Royal Army and Mihailovic named minister of war.

The third direction in which Serbs responded to occupation was support for the communist Partisans (Partizani). The Communist Party of Yugoslavia had developed into a significant political force after 1937, when its leadership had been entrusted to a former Zagreb metalworker, Josip Broz, who came to be better known during the war under his code name, Tito. In September 1941 the party led an uprising in the western Serbian town of Uzice. This Uzicka Republika (Uzice Republic) was short-lived, and communist forces were driven into Bosnia and Herzegovina. There the workers and intellectuals who had formed the core of the movement joined forces with communist units from Montenegro. They also recruited heavily among minority groups—including Serbs—who were suffering persecution by the Ustasha within the puppet Independent State of Croatia, which at that time incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina, was headed by the leader of the Ustashes, Ante Pavelic. The Croatian regime set about a policy of "racial purification" and open genocide that went beyond even Nazi practices in its extermination of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies²⁸⁹. From 1941 to 1945 more than million of Serbs were brutally exterminated in numerous concentration camps run by Ustashes²⁹⁰.

In 1942 the communists formed the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, a self-declared "temporary government," which linked the acknowledgment of the ethnic plurality of the peoples of Yugoslavia with the reconstitution of Yugoslavia as a federation. At that time communist forces in Serbia proper were relatively weak, but following their rout in 1941, they returned at the end of the war with the Western Allies and support from the advancing Soviet Red Army to conquer a basically anti-communist Serbia (represented by Nedic's forces and Mihailovic's Chetniks). Mihailovic himself evaded capture until March 1946; he was tried for treason and executed in July.

²⁸⁹ Tim Judah, *"The Serbs"*, pp.122-4

²⁹⁰ Dr. Ante Pavelic, *"Ustashi Fuehrer"*, 18 August 2010, <http://www.srpska-mreza.com/library/facts/pavelic.html>.

A new constitution establishing the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was promulgated on Jan. 31, 1946, replacing the monarchy with a federation of six republics and the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and the Vojvodina. It should be pointed out that the six republics and two autonomous units were not homogenous in their ethnic and religious composition. Although Slovenia and Montenegro had ethnic homogeneity; both in Croatia (Krajina) and a large number of Serbs were present, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multi-national state, including Serbs, Croats and Muslim Bosniak, whereas the province of Vojvodina hosted a large Hungarian minority and Serbian majority. Finally, the Kosovo province had a Muslim Albanian majority. The federal structure of Yugoslavia aimed to guarantee equal status to compounding republics. Article 1 of the 1946 constitution²⁹¹ protected the federal structure of the state by acknowledging the right to self-determination to the constituent nations. This article stated that Yugoslavia was “a community of equal peoples that have expressed their will to live together in a federal state” on the basis of self-determination, including the right to secession (See Figure 3.11. **Map of Yugoslavia 1941-1989**).



Figure 3.11. **Map of Yugoslavia 1941-1989.**

²⁹¹ Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 18 Aug. 2010 Available on site http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia_1946.txt (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Immediately after the war, Tito was trying to realize his grandiose plan of creating a Balkan Federation including Bulgaria and Albania, an age-long plan of the Balkan socialists. Thus the unification issue resurfaced and the new Yugoslav leadership took several measures in order to persuade Enver Hoxha for a socialist federation. The Albanians were treated favorably for a while for the sake of Balkan Federation project. The Serbs were not allowed to come back to Kosovo from where they have fled during war. However, the honeymoon between the two socialist leaders came to an end when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet controlled Cominform and both Enver Hoxha and Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian leader, sided with Stalin²⁹².

After the fall of the project of the Balkan Federation, the Yugoslav authorities took strong measures in order to restrain the nationalistic aspiration of both Serbs and Albanians, and this was resented by both. Neither the Serbs nor Albanians have become satisfied with the measures taken by Belgrade.

Political ideology became an instrument of national integration. "Brotherhood and Unity" the slogan of Tito evidenced this effort²⁹³; "Brotherhood" emphasized the common Slav origin of the constituent nations, and "Unity" symbolized the continuity of common interests and desire of these nations to live together. The Yugoslav Communist Party tried to establish a common national identity to stick various nations together in a single state.

This identity was known as "Yugoslavhood" (jugoslavanska identiteta). Yugoslavhood was a supranational identity. It did not replace the national identities of the compounding units; rather, it displayed the common will to live together in a single state. The charismatic Yugoslav leader Tito was able to keep these different nations together within the boundaries of common ideology and common will of freedom from foreign influence throughout his presidency (1946-1980)²⁹⁴.

Yugoslav communist movement and its leader Tito were under the influence of Soviet communism, two regimes developed close contacts particularly in 1945-47. They were both under German threat directed towards their territorial integrity and political

²⁹² Tanil Bora, p.55.

²⁹³ Leslie Benson, p.124

²⁹⁴ Cvijeto Job, "*Yugoslavia's Ruin: The Bloody Lessons of Nationalism*", A Patriot's Warning, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2002, p.60.

independence. This collaboration turned into an ideological split between the two countries in 1948. It should, however, be pointed out that the Soviet Red Army did not intervene in Yugoslavia and Albania, either during the Second World War or in the years that followed it because the British was there first. The communist movements in both Yugoslavia and Albania developed in a rather secure and independent environment from the influence and control of the Soviet Union compared to other Eastern communist regimes²⁹⁵.

The 1948 split was the result of a disagreement over different interpretations and implementations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology by the two states. The Yugoslav-Soviet split had two main repercussions for Yugoslavia²⁹⁶. Within the domestic realm, the "Yugoslav road to socialism" was created in politics and economics, which evolved gradually and reflected its genuine features in various constitutions of state. In the external realm, the independent attitude of Yugoslavia *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union was applauded by Western democratic states, which gave moral and material support to the former. Although Tito's Yugoslavia welcomed this foreign support, the state gradually created the "third way" in its external relations, which meant independence from both the communist (East) and the liberal (West) blocs. It was called the "non-aligned movement" in world history. This movement increased the popularity of the Yugoslav leader abroad, giving him more room for maneuver in the domestic sphere. Tito's charismatic leadership helped keep Yugoslav peoples together under a single flag throughout his presidency.

Within this composition, as for the Albanians, like the previous wars and settlements, the Albanian lands which remained within Yugoslavia were partitioned into four federal units: Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Opposing to the expectations that they would be combined with the Albania according to the Bujan Agreement, the Albanians took the ethnic partition as a disloyalty and resented the communist leadership for this situation. Placed under the Serbian Republic from the very beginning, the Kosovar Albanians did not feel a part of the Yugoslav Federation. Their existence within the federation was not their own choice but was a consequence of political conditions. According to the 1946 Constitution, of socialist Yugoslavia Kosovo was named Kos-Met (a shorthand for Kosovo-Metohija) and declared an "Autonomous Region" a status lower than was

²⁹⁵ Tanil Bora, p.54

²⁹⁶ Ibid, p.55

recognized for Vojvodina. The Serbians, on the other hand, regarded the Albanians as a distrustful element of the Federation²⁹⁷.

Because of their dissatisfaction with their situation at the end of the war, the Kosovar Albanians revolted again and nationalist forces like Bali Kombetar carried their armed struggle within Kosovo against the new regime. This was the first uprising the Kosovar undertook within the socialist Yugoslavia, a fact clearly shows that the Albanians were the most reluctant and alienated members of the Yugoslav nations/nationalities.

The opposition of the Albanians to the Yugoslav system had caused to find a different solution to the issue by Yugoslav regime. The period between 1948 and the mid-1960s can be described as a time when the Serbian minority in Kosovo dominated the province, represented by Rankovic's security police's forceful and sometimes cruel repression of Albanian nationalism.

Yugoslav authorities took unusually active measure to enable and encourage people in Kosovo and Macedonia to identify themselves as "Turks" by nationality. As a result, the number of people registered as Turks in Kosovo jumped 1,315 in the 1948 census to 34,853 in 1953. Turkish school was opened in the region and party leadership declared the Turks national minority. In 1953, the real aim of this policy was understood; Yugoslavia signed a new treaty with both Turkey and Greece and large-scale emigration of Yugoslav Turks to Turkey was permitted, it began to seem a long-prepared policy had been at work, aimed at the complete removal of large numbers of Turks, Albanians or other Muslim group. It has been estimated that 1945-1966 approximately 246,000 people immigrated to Turkey from the whole of Yugoslavia²⁹⁸.

According to Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, "after 1958 the migrations of Albanians between Kosovo and Macedonia were the most significant amongst all other migrations occurring inside ex-Yugoslavia. The difference in minority policies and their applications, as well as the different economic and political conjectures prevailing in Macedonia and Kosova after 1946, caused continuous Albanian movement between these two territories."²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ İlhan Uzgel, *"Kosovo: Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International Intervention"*, p.211.

²⁹⁸ Noel Malcolm, pp.322-3

²⁹⁹ Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, *"Albanian Migrations and the Problem of Security in the Balkans"*, OBIV, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, 6,Istanbul, 2001, pp.75-121.

The basic motivation for cooperation between Turkey and Yugoslavia was the requirements of the Cold War politics which led to the signing of the Balkan Pact of 1953 and later the Balkan Treaty of 1954. Other claim was Turkey needed to populate these newcomers in vacant areas of Anatolia³⁰⁰, however, Oral Sander saw it was unfounded, because Turkey had been faced forced emigration of Ethnic Turks from Bulgaria just three years ago³⁰¹. Halim Çavuşoğlu supported this knowledge in terms of Turkey's general migration policy beginning with the new republic³⁰².

Kosovo was under the strict rule of the Communist party leadership; on the other hand, Party gave certain national rights to Albanians. Also, Tito tried to gain the confidence of Albanians like other nationalities in the federation. Progress was achieved in the use of the right to education and the Albanian schools were opened, newspapers in Albanian language began to published, cultural life was riched. Centralization policy of the Belgrade was weakened after the removal of Rankovic, the Minister of the Interior³⁰³.

Albanian resistance in Kosovo has never been stopped, it has gained different characteristics all over the years, and Kosovo has always been a place of turmoil, political disturbance and trouble spot within Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of Second World War, resistance was through secret organizations; in the 1960s, public demonstrations, hunger strikes; in the 1980s, miner strikes and university students boycotts; and in the 1990s, civil disobedience and finally armed resistance again.

The autonomous status of Kosovo within the Serbian republic was protected through the Yugoslav constitutions, although this right never satisfied the Albanian majority in the region. The 1946 Yugoslav constitution established a centralized state structure in the realm of politics and economics. A rapid socialization of the means of production, collectivization of agriculture and the primacy of the Communist Party in administration were the main themes of this phase. In accordance with this constitution, Kosovo was established as a nominal "autonomous province" of the Serbian republic. The 1963

³⁰⁰ Miranda Vickers, "What Cost Kosovo, History Today", Vol.46, 12 January 1991, p.6.

³⁰¹ Oral Sander, "Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1966)", Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 1969, pp.74-82

³⁰² Halim Çavuşoğlu, "Yugoslavya-Makedonya'dan Türkiye'ye 1952-67 "Kitleli" Göçü ve Bursa'daki Göçmen Kesimi", Mülkiye Dergisi, Cilt:XXX, Sayı:251,p.151

³⁰³ Tim Judah, Serbs, p.151.

constitution changed the name of the state to the "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and put forward the concept of "self management" for the federation, the constituent republics and the autonomous units. But the turning point was the removal of Rankovic in 1966, which marked the beginning of decentralization and decrease of the Serbian influence in Yugoslavia. This clause highlighted the free will of the people in every part of the administration; from the smallest territorial unit to the federal system; it implied a tendency towards a more decentralized administration. This system defended the unified structure of the state, based on the sovereign right of the nations who would take responsibilities in the administrative system.

Albanian self-governance began to appear during these years and more links of the Kosovar Albanians with Tirana were also encouraged. At that time, Albania tried to repair its broken relations with Yugoslavia, and Belgrade reacted to Tirana's approach by tolerating closer cooperation between Kosovo and Albania. In general, the province felt a rapid Albanisation process which annoyed the Serbians both inside and outside Kosovo, but it was tolerated for the sake of keeping Serbia weaker in order to have a stronger Yugoslavia.

Arguments and oppose arguments resulted and both sides accused each other of cruelty in a climate of increasing ethnic violence in Kosovo. The first time that the slogan "Kosovo-republic" was heard in 1968 with student boycotts in Pristine and spread around Kosovo turning point into political demands for republican status. The federal police reacted forcefully, but certain concessions were given, from 1969 Kosovo Albanians were permitted to fly, as their national emblem, the Albanian flag and dropping the Serbian name Metohija, which had always irritated Albanians. However, at that time and later, this new status did not satisfy the Albanians. Their dissatisfaction had a double character: First, they were not allowed to be unified with Albania, and second, although the Albanians were numerically bigger than Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians, they were not given republican status³⁰⁴.

With the growing autonomy of the Kosovo Province, no doubt there were cases where Serbs and Montenegrins came under pressure from Albanian speaking officials or

³⁰⁴ Noel Malcolm, pp.325-6

policemen³⁰⁵. The Serbian colonization of the pre-war period was reversed. Considering the fact the Kosovar Albanians could not achieve independence, starting with the late 1960s, they tried to create a de facto republic where they could have nearly full control over the Province. If 1963 was the lowest point of Albanian national interests in Titoist Kosovo, then 1974 was the zenith at least where matters of constitutional theory was concerned. A major revision, however, came with the 1974 constitution, which did not make Kosovo a republic, made it the autonomous units (Vojvodina and Kosovo) as the "constituent members of the federation"³⁰⁶, although, unlike the republics, they were not granted the right to secede from the federation autonomous units simply because the majority of their population belonged to a nation living outside the borders of Yugoslavia.

This argument was based on the classification of "nation" and "nationality", which was common in Yugoslav communist rhetoric. According to this formulation, a "nation" comprised a group who had established a genuine state of its own that did not exist outside the borders of Yugoslavia; like the Serb, Croat, Montenegrin, Macedonian, Slovene and the Bosnian nations who established their nation-states in Yugoslavia. A "nationality", on the other hand, was a national group who had blood ties with the members of a nation-state founded outside the Yugoslav territorial borders.

In this respect, the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Albanian majority of Kosovo were not labeled as "nations" in the Yugoslav sense of the word and they were not allowed to determine their own future independently through the right to self-determination. This was also safeguarded by the Yugoslav constitutions. The autonomous status of Kosovo evolved with the 1974 constitution, but not to the level of a constituent republic. Since Kosovo was allowed to use its own flag and establish its communist party organization, parliament, police force and judiciary, it achieved a de facto republican status but it was still deprived of the right to self-determination or the right to secede.

Besides, Kosovo was allowed to take place in the Federal Chamber with a veto power. To the disillusionment of the Serbs, the Serbian Republic was prohibited from intervening in the provincial matters of Kosovo; hence the Province's authority was further enhanced.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, p.326.

³⁰⁶ J. A. Mertus, *"Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started A War"*, University of California Press, Berkeley, LA and London, 1999, p.291

The Kosovo Province had gained the right to have its own national bank, Supreme Court and could even pursue its own economic policy. The Federal funds which flowed to the region were also increased as to please the Albanians and as part of the decentralization programme.

Also, some reasons slowed down cooperation over Kosovo republican status. The Serbs were totally worried about the existence of the large Albanian population spread all over the Balkans. Separately from Albania, in neighboring Yugoslavia, a large group of Albanians lived in Yugoslav territories; mostly in Kosovo, Northern and Western Macedonia as well as Southern Montenegro. The Serbs feared that giving Kosovo republican status and the right to secede might finish with the unification of this province with Albania. The Serbs often remember the memories of the Second World War, when the Albanians joined forces with Germans, following the Italian withdrawal in 1943, to reach a larger Albanian state. After the establishment of Federal Yugoslavia in 1946, the Albanians were cruelly crushed, mostly as a sanction against their wartime partnership with the Axis Powers³⁰⁷.

The Serbian response sharpened with rising emigration from Kosovo but no one could openly raise the issue for the time being. The Serbian exodus had basically two implications for the future developments. First of all, those who left Kosovo brought horror stories of oppression, discrimination and even rape and beatings. These stories circulated around Serbia and further led to an protest among the Serbs, and supplied communal distrust. Secondly, together with the high birth rate of the Albanians, the ethnic structure of the region changed steadily. The Serbs claimed that the high birth rate among the Albanians is a decided plan to shift the ethnic balance in the province. The reasons for Serbian migration are controversial. Albanians argue that region's economic backwardness led the Serbs to move out from Kosovo while the Serbs obviously charge the Kosovar Albanians with repression³⁰⁸.

One should observe the position of Albania to the issue of Kosovo in order to calculate Serbia's fears of the unification of two Albanian-inhabited territories. It should be allowed

³⁰⁷ Owen Pearson, *"Did Albanians in Kosova breach their voluntary commitment to join Yugoslavia in 1945?"*, Anna Di Lellio (Ed.), *The Case For Kosova: Passage to Independence*, Anthem Press, London, 2006, pp. 77-83

³⁰⁸ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp.331-3

in mind that the Albanians of Kosovo demanded the promotion of their status to that of a constituent republic/nation. Their demands were restricted within the scope of Federal Yugoslavia. However, the republican status would symbolize the right to self-determination for Albanians. The Serbs always supposed that the Kosovo Albanians would use this right to join Albania.

However, the existence of close ties between the two Albanian populations of Albania and Kosovo is problematic. In Albania, Enver Hoxha ruled the state through his own version of communism. He was supported by a small cadre of communist party members and there was no political resistance. Hoxha's understanding of communism was so authoritarian that he even denounced the existence of a true communist regime in the world with the exception of Albania. Later, Albania totally cut off relations with the outside world. Albania aligned itself with no other country (communist and/or democratic) and in the sphere of economics, an autarchic self-sustained system was established. Within this configuration, the Albanians living in Yugoslavia and the political status of the autonomous province of Kosovo were supposed as an domestic matter of Yugoslavia. Thus, Albania followed a neutral position to the Kosovo issue during the era of Enver Hoxha³⁰⁹.

The Albanians of Kosovo, in contrast, never stopped their claims to be the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. They argued that they were ruled by the discriminatory policies of the Serbian administration, which paralyzed the region underdeveloped with their racial policies favoring the Slav population. Basically, the 1974 constitution raised the status of Kosovo to a *de facto* republic since the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were established equal rights with the six federal republics in the process of presidential elections³¹⁰. All of the eight administrative units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) had the right to participate in the presidential elections through secret voting. The presidency council had eight members with equal votes. Besides, a "system of rotation" in presidency was set up to present equal possibility for each unit to achieve top position within the political system that would come into perform after the death of Tito³¹¹.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, pp.323-6

³¹⁰ Tim Judah, "*Kosovo: War and Revenge*", pp.38-9

³¹¹ Noel Malcolm, p.327

Without a doubt, beginning from the 1970s, nationalism became a very strong force within all the republics. In Kosovo, too, while the Serbs celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, the Albanians were organizing celebrations in memory of the Prizren League. The party ordered reports and investigations about them, but no effective actions put in force.

3.8.2. After the Death of Tito:

The death of Tito in 1980 caused to a series of crises, which prepared the opinions for disintegration of Yugoslavia within ten years. Actually, the troubles of the state were remains of the charismatic Yugoslav leader's long rule and they were purely political, economic and ethnic. On the political scale, one-party rule of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) turned into an oligarchy of the LCY members, since the party had the monopoly of power in administration, and no civil and/or political opposition was allowed to exist. LCY members became the only beneficiaries of the system³¹². The Yugoslav public did not trust that the League would be able to manage the problems of the country. The loss of faith in the political cadre's capacity gradually led to the "problem of legitimization". The Yugoslav people believed that the self-management system was unsuccessful to function efficiently since there was no place for criticism and opposition in politics. It was not possible to advocate other methods to answer the political and economic problems in this monolithic system.

Economic insufficiency was another major problem in Yugoslavia. There were two groups who offered different solutions to accelerate the development of the economy. The liberal group defended a more decentralized system in which the constituent republics would be authorized for organization of the economy. The other group reinforced re-centralization of the economic system. According to this conservative group, the source of the existing financial problems was the delegation of decision-making power in the economic sphere to the republics through the 1974 constitution³¹³.

What lied at the core of the public dissatisfaction was the failure to develop economically up to the level reached by the contemporary Western European democracies? The economic changes, the Yugoslav state was required to implement, came from external sources, mostly international organizations, rather than domestic institutions. When the

³¹² Milovan Djilas, "*Yeni Sınıf*", İstanbul Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1982, pp.90-128

³¹³ Susan L. Woodward, "*Balkan Tragedy*", The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995, p.100

International Monetary Fund forced policies on Yugoslavia in the 1980s, bringing unemployment and double-digit inflation with them, central state polices shifted from protecting the people and the standard of living in general to attacking them³¹⁴. Thus, at a certain point it became “popular in the West to think negative about Yugoslavia’s future after Tito,” an approach justified by the re-emergence of the national issue that was always going to be hard to solve peacefully. Later, the death of Tito and the collapse of the Yugoslav bankrupt economy put the hegemony of Yugoslav ideology to the test.

Ethnic nationalist nature became the primary problem in every period of the Yugoslavia. However, Tito’s communist regime put pressure over the ethnic claims with iron fist. Various ethnic groups sought to establish their own nation-states, claiming that the Serbs were the predominant nation in Yugoslavia while the others came second in social rank. This view was descended from the failure to achieve social integration among the constituent nations of Yugoslavia. These nations always made the categorization of "we" and "others" in every field of social life. When the national problems were compounded with different levels of economic development in which roughly the northern republics (Slovenia and Croatia) improved rapidly in comparison to the southern republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia), the process of social disintegration started. The advanced republics put the burden of economic crisis on the less developed republics and this attitude sharpened inter-ethnic conflict³¹⁵

Albanians, who formed the majority of the population in the Kosovo (See, Figure 3.12. **Map of Ethnic Composition of Kosovo 1981**)³¹⁶, were displeased with the long rule of Tito and the communist regime, too. In the eyes of this ethnic group, Tito's rule had been dictatorial, and it was responsible for the backwardness of Kosovo, which had the lowest standard of living and highest rate of unemployment compared to the six constituent republics and the autonomous province of Vojvodina. The negative attitude of the

³¹⁴ Michel Chossudovsky, “*How the IMF Dismantled Yugoslavia*”, Available on site <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9904a/yugodismantle.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³¹⁵ Ilija Ika Todorovic, “*Regional Economic Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*”, Raju G.C.Thomas, H.Richard Friman (Eds.), *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism*, Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London, 1996, pp.165-7.

³¹⁶

Albanians *vis-à-vis* the Yugoslav system was displayed through riots and demonstrations even during Tito's times³¹⁷.




Figure 3.12. **Map of Ethnic Composition of Kosovo 1981**

Although the 1974 constitution enlarged the rule of self-management for Kosovo, the demand for republican status was not completely removed from the political agenda of the Albanians. After Tito's death in 1980 Albanian demands gained a new character. The year 1981 witnessed the second largest Albanian demonstration against the republic of Serbia.

Within the agenda of Yugoslavia's collapse, Kosovo had different place with two main characters, which separated it from any other part of Yugoslavia. The first signs of

³¹⁷ Ivo Banac, "Is it true that Tito's Yugoslav policies favored Albanians in Kosova?", Anna Di Lellio (Ed.), *The Case For Kosova*, pp. 64-7

discontent with the Yugoslav communist rule and movements of instability against the regime started in Kosovo. The 1968 movements of opposition rose to protest the Yugoslav constitution and achieve an independent status within the state and 1981 protests of the post-Tito political system came to the surface in Kosovo. Those movements were the early signs of the collapse that Yugoslavia slowly but surely went through.

In the development of Yugoslav dissolution, Kosovo was not the starting point; rather it was the product of a chain of troubles that had existed both in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia. The financial problems can be named as the most vital of such troubles, together with differences in the level of economic growth among the constituent republics. Economic problems worsened social dissatisfactions in the province³¹⁸. The financial disaster increasingly caused to a legitimacy crisis in Kosovo.

The establishment of the "University of Pristine" in 1970, where the language of education was Albanian and the achievement of enlarged autonomy through the 1974 constitution were beneficial. These came about as a result of Albanian demonstrations to display dissatisfaction with the regime and Tito's policy of balancing Albanian demands with the preservation of the federal state system.

It was expected that the student protests about living conditions at the University of Pristine converted to be a popular movement of resistance *vis-à-vis* the Serbs in 1981. The student revolt had a great effect and people that belonged to various social levels supported and even joined the resistance. Civil initiatives played an influential role in activating the Albanian population. Mass protest demonstrations finished with the slogan "Kosovo Republic". The Serbian regime declared a state of emergency in order to stop the unrest from spreading to other regions and punish those who had taken part in the uprising. It was the beginning of a period of harsh Serbian repression of the Kosovar Albanians. During that period, Albanians were fired from their jobs, imprisoned for no reason; they were discriminated against and suppressed by the Serbian regime³¹⁹.

After 1981, Kosovo symbolized the "decay of charismatic legitimacy," following the death of Tito and the rise of Serbian nationalism (irredentism) in comparison with other constituent nations in Yugoslavia. The attitude of the other republics toward the Kosovo

³¹⁸ Tanil Bora, pp. 100-102

³¹⁹ Noel Malcolm, pp.334-6

crisis of 1981 became clearer since then. Fearing Serbian dominance within Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia supported the Kosovar Albanians, while Bosnian Muslims lend indirect support.

Beginning from the second half of the 1980s, Serbia's reaction transformed to be a national movement against the Kosovar Albanians. Not only the statesmen and politicians, but also academic environments attempted to activate national emotions. The 1986 famous "Memorandum" that was prepared and declared by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAAS), had a critical role in the process. The Memorandum was about the Serbs of Yugoslavia, namely, their position *vis-à-vis* other nations within Yugoslavia. The Memorandum repeated similar arguments and claimed that the Serbians are economically and politically in a disadvantageous situation within the federation due to its commitment of assistance to underdeveloped regions and due to the constitutional organization of the country. It devoted lengthy space to the situation in Kosovo and this Memorandum has been considered by many observers laying the ground for the idea of "Greater Serbia"³²⁰. This tendency has transformed into a Serbian aggression that first started in Kosovo under the leadership of Milosevic who became the leader of the Serbian party in 1989 and then spread out to the other republics of the Federation³²¹.

As the position of the Serbs in Kosovo became widely publicized within Serbia, it provided the conditions more favorable to the rise of Serbian Party leader Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic took over from the Serbian Orthodox Church and liberal intelligentsia the role of the protector of the national interest. He was quick to understand the nationalist fervor among Serbs which has been suppressed for nearly half a century. Milosevic's critical visit to Kosovo in April 1987 was a turning point for the political future of issue in his public speeches and henceforth the Kosovo problem became an indispensable topic in Serbia in both political circles and in public life³²². The Kosovo rhetoric reached its peak with the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1989 which provided Milosevic with another opportunity to play the nationalist card.

³²⁰ Tanıl Bora, pp.103-4

³²¹ Nuray Bozbora, "*The Endurance of Uncertainty in Kosovo*", Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual 2002, 7, ISIS, İstanbul, p.196.

³²² Noel Malcolm, p.341.

When the miners started strikes and riots in the beginning of 1989, these were regarded as the continuation of the 1981 actions and were repressed cruelly. Thus, together with the nationalist enthusiasm in Serbia, in 1989 the ground for constitutional revision was ready to be implemented. In February 1989, the Serbian National Assembly approved the constitutional change which effectively caused the loss of autonomy in Kosovo. The Kosovo Communist leadership was eliminated from top to bottom³²³. This was a "radical" political change in retrospect. It was a symbol of the first step of Serbian irredentism. The new era had certain direct influence on the daily life of the Kosovar people and particularly the Albanians who were majority of the population. The 1980s started with Albanian demands for more autonomy. The end of the decade saw the abolishing of the autonomous rights of Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians who demanded and united around the slogan of "Kosovo Republic" lost their autonomous status and became subjected to what they call an Apartheid rule in Kosovo since then.

After the constitutional change of 1989 and the dismissal of the Kosovo Albanian leadership from power, Kosovo began to be ruled by Serbian officials. In contrast, mass movements against this political decision started in Kosovo. The Albanians started movements of protests. Then a "state of emergency" and "special conditions" came into being in February 1990. After that, many Albanians who dared to the protest movements either lost their jobs or they were deterred by the Serbian security forces. Many Serbs in Belgrade or any other part of Serbia made demonstrations in support of the new political situation created by the Serbian regimes. The Serbian movement continued with more restrictions on the life of Kosovar Albanians. Among such restrictions were the closing of the Albanian newspaper "Rilindja", the only Albanian-language newspaper in Kosovo, and the passage of laws through abolishing the previous laws that safeguarded the independent education system in Kosovo³²⁴. All these were quite harsh actions that limited the previous autonomous status, unless, abolish it altogether.

Three options appeared for the Kosovar Albanians after the autonomy of the province was abolished in 1989. The first was to support the political reform program that was started by

³²³ Tanil Bora p.111, Noel Malcolm, p.344.

³²⁴ Noel Malcolm, p.346.

the constitutional amendments of the Serbian regime. The second was to struggle for achieving independence of Kosovo, while the third was to join up with Albania.

The greater part of the Albanians preferred to resist for their independence through nonviolent ways. Within this political atmosphere, "Democratic League of Kosovo" (LDK), which was founded on 23 December 1989, emerged as the main political organization to occur that aim under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. This political movement gradually led to a system of self-rule that was to be recognized only by Kosovar Albanians and supported by Albania proper within the international context. The LDK later turned into an administrative body and established a *sui generis* parallel state structure in Kosovo to constitute a political alternative to Serbian rule, which had total control of the province through the constitutional coup. In July 1990, Albanians proclaimed the sovereign Republic of Kosovo and, in September 1990, adopted their constitution in Kacanik. The Albanians rejecting the measures taken by Serbia also boycotted the parliamentary elections and refused to have any kind of contact with Serbian officials.

After the promulgation of constitutional changes, the Serbian regime put into practice series of repressive actions just to threaten Albanians and provide obedience to this new state of affairs. Almost all cultural institutions and ministries, together with the Albanian language section in the University of Pristine, all Albanian-language secondary and elementary schools were closed down. Thousands of Albanian civil servants, doctors, teachers, and especially lawyers, judges, policemen were left unemployed. Heavy police oppression accompanied the economic difficulties caused by the forced unemployment. As a response, the Albanians declared the "Republic of Kosovo" on 22 September 1991.

Kosovar Albanians organized multi-party elections a year later in May 1992, which the LDK of Rugova got the majority of the votes. Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, as a prime minister, established a new government³²⁵. There were some major achievements of the new "state structure" instituted by the Albanians. Rugova earned international sympathy by following the peaceful way. During the 1992, London Conference met to find an answer to the process of Yugoslav disintegration with "Special Group on Kosovo"³²⁶. On the other hand, the unemployed teachers and doctors are employed by the Albanian organizations and an

³²⁵ Ibid pp.347-9

³²⁶ Heike Krieger, "*The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999*", Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 119-120

underground school and medical system began to activate. These activities are mostly financed by the Albanian Diaspora in USA to Rugova administration³²⁷.

3.8.3. Turkey's Balkan Policy During Cold War Period:

Second World War left Turkey vis-à-vis entirely new regional balance of power which had been created by “the return of Russians to the Balkans”. While all the Balkan countries adopted communism, Turkey and Greece managed to remain outside this formation. However, the communist states in the Balkans and the USSR spent a great effort in order to contain Greece in the communist block and caused a civil war in this country. This had an effect on Turkish foreign policy and forced the Turkish authorities to be more sensitive to the situation³²⁸.

The Russian pressure on Turkey and Greece, on the one hand, and her attempts to install communism by threat in countries under Soviet occupation, on the other, encouraged the USA to take action. In order to block the Soviet threat, the US put the Truman Doctrine³²⁹ into effect in March 1947 and the Marshall Plan³³⁰ in June of the same year. In 1952, Turkey and Greece became members of NATO. Turkey's membership in NATO marked a new era in her foreign policy. With diplomatic notes, Russia expressed its discomfort with Turkey's decision to take part in an organization which directly aimed at Russia. In this period, within the “Rimland theory³³¹” of the USA, creating an alliance against Soviet diffusionism, which was a threat to the Balkans, became a major issue at that time. In this way, this alliance would strengthen the right wing of NATO by covering some of the Balkans. During this period, attempts were made to include Yugoslavia, which had been expelled from Cominform, in this formation. This was a wise move designed to create a new region of stability in the Balkans. The positive course of Turco-Greek relations, upper

³²⁷ James Pettifer, Miranda Vickers, “*The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans*”, I.B.Tauris, London, 2007, p.146.

³²⁸ Selim Deringil, pp. 108-9

³²⁹ Harry Truman, “*Address Before A Joint Session of Congress*”, 12 March 1947, Available at Yale Law School Website, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³³⁰ George Catlett Marshall, The “Marshall Plan” speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947, Available at OECD Official Website, http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³³¹ Francis P. Sempa, “*Spykman's World*”, American Diplomacy Publishers, 2006, Available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/semp/sempa_spykman.html (accessed on 02 November 2011).

level visits by the politicians of the two countries, and their inclusion in NATO in 1952 had an important role in creating such an alliance in the Balkans. And with the inclusion of Yugoslavia in this formation, the infrastructure of the alliance was complete³³².

On 9 August 1954, a new Balkan Agreement was signed among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia; however, this agreement, just like the previous one, soon became ineffective. In accordance with the global perception, after 1955, following the shifting Western and Soviet strategic priorities from the near towards the Middle East, Turkey also started paying far more attention to the Middle East than to the Balkans. Turkey had the role to implement the “Northern Tier³³³” concept of the Eisenhower administration with Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, that would lead to the formation of the Baghdad Pact. Independently of this modification, emergence of the problems between Turkey and Greece, Stalin’s death and détente between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and finally Yugoslavia’s fervent position in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries caused the 1954 Balkan Pact to become weak and steadily ineffective in 1960.

1950-60 periods, Turkish foreign policy was determined in accordance with the interests of western states, especially USA. The Balkan Pact and other alliances occurred with the suggestion of the United States under the terms of the Cold War. Hereafter, both Turkey and Greece took their sides in the great power rivalry, they chose to use the 1930s jargon, “part of an alien arrangement” in the region and quit the motto of the late 1930s “Balkans belong to Balkan peoples.”

Turkey’s foreign policy priorities were radically modified in the 1960s era. During this decade, The Cuban Missile Crises, bilateral problems with the USA, France’s independent position within NATO, and the problem of Cyprus evolving into another stage. National problems such as Cyprus have been taken into consideration peculiarly with a flexible manner and some degree of pragmatism. Also, after the coup d’état in 27 May 1960, new constitution created more democratic environment and Turkish foreign policy was more affected from public opinion. This climate of flexibility led Turkey ease her rigid ideological position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and improve her bilateral relations with the

³³² Ibid, pp. 111-2

³³³ Time, “*The Eisenhower Doctrine: How It Was Born & What It Can Do*”, 18 March 1957, Available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,809174-2,00.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Warsaw Pact member Balkan states³³⁴. The rapprochement was displayed, for example, in an exchange of high level visits between Turkey and Bulgaria by the second half of the 1960's.

In the mid 1970s, détente seemed to reach to its peak. USA and Soviet Union agreed to reach a consensus on bilateral understanding of cooperation for status quo rather than competition for global superiority. However, détente brought a number of complications for Turkey's security policies. Her partners in the NATO thought that Turkey's role became controversial. Prime Minister Ecevit called for a revision of basic premises of Turkey's security policy questioning her role within these alliances. Nothing that détente is a very positive development for all nations, as well as Turkey³³⁵.

In accordance with this understanding, Ecevit's government gave more importance relations with the social democratic regimes of Scandinavia and of Western Europe, as well as towards the Warsaw Pact member countries in the Balkans; especially Romania in this diplomatic context, particular attention was given to the improvement of bilateral relations with Bulgaria. In this period, Turkey and USA had difficulties in their relationships about opium plantation, Cyprus and arms embargo era. Thus, Turkey had to establish and develop the security of her self by mutual trust and good relations with its neighbors instead of focusing on armaments.

The events in Cyprus in 1974 triggered important developments rendering profound impacts on the entire course of Turkish foreign policy. The developments immediately afterwards, Turkish foreign policy makers had to need a new foreign and security policy orientation, respectively called as multidirectional foreign policy and national security policy. All major political parties emphasized that Turkey should avoid being supplied with arms from a single source and become less dependent militarily on the United States³³⁶.

At the same time, a modification of threat perceptions provided further basis for the conceptualization of a new national security policy and indicated new set of foreign

³³⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "*Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War*", pp.103-9

³³⁵ Gencer Özcan, p. 289.

³³⁶ Mustafa Aydın, pp. 126-7

priorities. Dangers, such as “Aegean continental shelf, FIR line, armament on Aegean islands, Cyprus issue”, have come from Greece partially substituted the fear of the Soviet Union. Turkey revised her position within NATO in accordance with the principles of international cooperation and of interdependence. In May 1978 Ecevit announced that “Turkey could no more be content with being evaluated as the armored frontier guard of the Western alliance”³³⁷. However, coup d’état in 12 September 1980 affected Turkish foreign policy especially with United States and Greece³³⁸. Turkey did not vote the rejoin of Greek military participation in NATO’s. Also, in 1981 Greece became a member of the European Community (EC) and this event changed Turkey’s rapprochement to Europe.

During the last decade of the Cold War, Turkey realigned with the West because of the Iranian Revolution of February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. However, during the 1980s, Turkey mostly encountered problems with its two neighbors in the Balkans, namely Bulgaria and Greece.

As well as the struggle against the communist threat, another factor that guided Turkey’s Balkan policy during the Cold-War period was the preservation of the rights of the Turks in the region as a requirement of cultural and historical heritage. In fact, it can be said that this was so as an indirect result of Soviet threat and communism. During this period, Turkey received immigrants, especially from such countries as Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which was part of a policy to assimilate and get rid of Turks.

The problems of the Turkish minority in the region, which have been an important factor in Turkey’s Balkan policy, continued to increase in the Cold-War period. Although Turkey had problems with its neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East, such disagreements were only secondary in rank. With the establishment of the communist regime in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, Turks were exposed to pressures. Turkey’s position as a member of Western alliance as well as local Turks generally anti-communist disposition led the Yugoslav authorities to take an openly anti-Turkish stance in the post-war period. General antipathy towards the Turks as the symbol of Ottoman domination may as well be cited among the factors behind the anti-Turkish attitude in the new state of

³³⁷ Gencer Özcan, p.291.

³³⁸ Omer Goksel Isyar, “*An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy*”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No:3, Fall 2005, p.29

Yugoslavia. Hence, most of the ethnic Turks registered themselves as Albanians or Gypsies in the 1948 census to escape the unwanted consequences of being Turks³³⁹.

In the beginning, the Tito regime did not want to allow Turks to immigrate for fear that this would allow information to get out about the functioning of the regime and that this would be used as propaganda for the failure of communism. In contrast, most of the Turks, Albanians and Gypsies chose to declare themselves Turks in 1953. This was again for political reasons because 1953 was the year when Turkey and Yugoslavia concluded another “voluntary migration” arrangement. The two governments included in the Balkan Alliance a clause on voluntary emigration of Turks from Yugoslavia³⁴⁰.

The largest Turkish minority lives in Bulgaria, according to the 2001 census, there are 746,664 ethnic Turks in Bulgaria³⁴¹ and some Turks claim that their number is two million, it is estimated that there are around 1,5 million Turks living in that country. The presence of this huge Turkish minority in Bulgaria is the main area of relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. One of the most difficult times for the Bulgarian Turks was the fascist regime which toppled the relatively tolerant Stamboliski government in 1934.

The communist regime which seized power in 1944 severely condemned the practices of the previous order, and declared that the Muslim Turkish minority would be given their minority rights. But this policy did not last long. With the Soviet effect, Bulgarian government openly used the Turkish minority as a foreign policy tool in its relations with Turkey in the stressed atmosphere of the Cold War politics. The first immigration from Bulgaria to Turkey was started with the note of Bulgarian government in August 1950, accusing it of provoking the Turkish minority to immigrate to Turkey and called on Turkey to accept 250.000 Turks within three months. During this short time period, 154.393 Turkish people immigrated to Turkey³⁴².

At the end of the 1980s, Turkey experienced another crisis, this time with its other neighbor Balkan state, Bulgaria. From December 1984 through March 1985, the Bulgarian

³³⁹ Kut Şule, “Kosova Türkleri: Nasıl Bir Gelecek?”, *Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, Kasım 2005.p.228.

³⁴⁰ Ibid,p.228 .

³⁴¹ National Statistics Institute of Bulgaria, 01.03.2001 census results, Available on site <http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁴² İlhan Uzel, “*The Role of the Muslim Minorities in Interstate Relations in The Balkans*”, p.109-11.

government initiated country-wide campaign of forced assimilation, in which Bulgarian Turks were obliged to adopt Bulgarian names, like fascist Bulgarian regime in 1934. The Bulgarian authorities declared that those claiming to be minority Turks were actually ethnic Bulgarians who had been forced to convert to Islam by the Ottoman authorities and not the descendants of Turks who had migrated to Bulgarian lands during Ottoman times. By changing the names of people and through other means, the authorities said they were helping to restore these people to their proper Bulgarian roots. The aim of this national revival or rebirth process was to assimilate the Turks within the larger Bulgarian population and form an ethnically monolithic Bulgarian nation³⁴³.

The campaign of forced assimilation and oppression that was launched by the Bulgarian authorities against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria shook the bilateral relations between the two countries. However, the collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans opened a new scene in Turkish external relations. In Bulgaria, discriminatory policies applied by the old regime against the Turkish minority ended with the collapse of the communist party rule under the leadership of Jivkov in 1989 and conditions of the Turkish minority were improved³⁴⁴.

In conclusion, it can be said that Turkey's foreign policy had showed differences during the Cold War years. But the main determinants of her policy were Cyprus issue and the relations with the United States and Soviet Union. In 1950's, Turkey had close relationships with USA and the Soviet Union was the main threat against Turkey's existence. The détente and developments about Cyprus issue (Johnson's letter, Arms embargo) changed Turkey's viewpoint to NATO and the USA. The Balkans was under the direct penetration of the Soviet Union and Turkey did not attempt much to challenge the status quo. However, Turkey established good relations based on mutual trust and cooperation with Balkan countries. Only during the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 with Greece, Turkey strayed from its regular parameters and act unilaterally by giving priority to its national interests rather than the concerns of NATO and the Western alliance. Also, minority problem created a crisis between Turkish-Bulgarian relations. Turkey enforced the international institutions and allies against Bulgarian oppression over Turkish minority.

³⁴³ Ali Eminov, p. 85-91

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p.138-43

However, the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria solved the trouble of Turkish minority in Bulgaria. In a word, Cold War years did not permit to Turkey for following an active and independent Balkan policy like in Caucasia and Central Asia.

4. THE SOURCES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICY:

4.1. THE COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA:

A significant role of Tito in Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy is beyond any doubt. Of course, the era of Tito had several important problems and internal conflicts. The end of Yugoslavia did not come about over night; it was the result of a series of political, economic and ethnic problems, which turned into a snowball effect. The major actors of the communist regime, as well as Tito, could not eliminate the reasons of the collapse, since they ignored these issues and solved the problems on a temporary basis.

These problems drew a new picture in Yugoslav domestic politics of the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, the radical changes took place in Eastern communist regimes. Thus, the unsatisfied groups within the state started to speak with a louder voice. Those groups strongly criticized the federalism and self-management economic systems, as being the major reasons of current problems. A further development was the rising wave of "nationalism" among the Yugoslav people. Each and every constituent national group started to favor a nationalist solution to the existing problems, while continuously blaming the rest of the population. Among the constituent republics, Serbia was playing the leading role in giving primacy to national issues. Slobodan Milošević's rise to presidency of the LCY in Serbia by the year 1987, it was the first major catalyst for the rising nationalism in this republic. Milošević had manipulated nationalistic tendencies within the republic to be elected president, and later, he continued to take advantage of such feelings to preserve his position and materialize his aggressive policies about other republics. Nationalism legitimized the fanatic policies of Milošević who turned out to be a dictatorial presidency³⁴⁵.

In 28 June 1989 (Vidovdan Day), Milošević displayed a show of strength at Kosovo Gazimestan, on the anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo³⁴⁶. He successfully influenced the growing nationalistic feelings among the Serbs at the celebrations. Milošević addressed the Serbian crowd in an effective and provocative manner. During the

³⁴⁵ Tanil Bora, 106-7

³⁴⁶ Slobodan Milošević, "1989 ST. Vitus Day Speech", Gazimestan - 28 June 1989

speech, he stressed that the territory of Kosovo witnessed a great heroism of Serbs in 1389; thus the land belonged to the ancestors of this nation and it should stay like that forever. This long speech was important for two reasons; it demonstrated Milošević's understanding of politics and gave the first clues of the nature of his future political rule. Besides, he advised the Kosovar Serbs not to leave their homeland in order to any reason³⁴⁷.

Kosovo region had become the focal point of Milošević and he successfully directed the growing tensions between the Serbs and Albanians in order to legitimize his own status in Serbia. Milošević maintained his presidential position in Serbia with using nationalism. Under the leadership of Milošević, Serbia proposed strong "federalism" as a solution to the political crisis. The main idea was that decentralization of political power by the 1974 constitution, which strengthened the republican administrations and granted autonomy to the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina by raising them to the level of constituent republics, weakened the Yugoslav central administration and led to the current political deadlock³⁴⁸.

The Serb dream to achieve supremacy in Yugoslav domestic politics was the hidden agenda of Milošević's policy. This aim showed total divergence from "unification of Yugoslavs" an idea of the 1920s and "brotherhood and unity" idea of the communist regime. Thus, "Serbian supremacy" policy was developed as an alternative to "Yugoslav unitarism" under the influence of internal and external factors. Dissatisfaction with the communist regime became clearer in the 1990s and national conflicts which had been frozen by the regime under the conditions of the Cold War, dominated the political agenda of Yugoslavia. It was obvious that the South Slavs: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, who were supposed to constitute a single community of Yugoslavia, were no longer able to live peacefully under a single flag.

Milošević's announcements about unification of all the Serbs within the borders of Yugoslavia and abandonment of the autonomous status of both Kosovo and Vojvodina in

³⁴⁷ Available on site <http://www.slobodan-Milošević.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁴⁸ Kate Hudson, *Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, Pluto Pres, London, 2003, p.73

1989 alarmed non-Serbian Yugoslav³⁴⁹. The other republics did not share the Serbian view. Particularly Slovenia and Croatia supported an even looser federal system; or rather a "con-federal" system through which the republics would be bound only by common foreign policy. The rich northern republic of Slovenia supported a relaxed system of rule in the belief that the federal system was exploited by the poorer republics. Slovenia even proposed an "asymmetric federation" through which it would enjoy special administrative rights compared to other republics who had minor contributions to the Yugoslav economy. Thus, Slovenia considered sharing its riches with other republics only raising its role in politics³⁵⁰.

Slovenia and Croatia responded to Serbia's illogical practices by holding multi-party elections in April and May 1990 respectively. In both republics the victors of these elections were not reformist communists; rather the parties, which committed themselves to a "con-federal" solution to the Yugoslav political crisis achieved considerable success. In Slovenia, a coalition of Christian Democrats, Slovene Democrats and Social Democrats were the participants in the new government, although Milan Kucan, who had been a former communist leader, was elected president. In Croatia, the winner was the nationalist Croat National Union (HDZ) headed by Franjo Tuđman, a former general of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).

In the first years of 1990s, discussion on strong or weak federal state dominated Yugoslav politics. The dissimilarities among the republics opinion were reflected at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Congresses, too. The 1990 Yugoslav Communist Congress in Belgrade observed a Slovene-Serbian political conflict. The proposed constitution by Slovenes and Croats pictured a "minimalist" con-federal system, since the basic aim of the two republics was to strengthen the administrative structures of the constituent republics, while reducing the role of the federal centre.

According to this minimalist con-federal structure, the centre would have jurisdiction on matters like commerce, customs and agriculture whereas the constituent republics would have their own security system and armed forces. Slovenia and Croatia acted in harmony

³⁴⁹ Wm. Hamilton, "Commentary No. 16: Yugoslavia: Nations, Nationalities and Other Nationalities", Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, December 1991, Available on site <http://www.csis-scs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm16-eng.asp#tphp> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁵⁰ Kate Hudson, pp.74-7

in order to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia, which was about the future political structure of the state. Milošević totally rejected the Slovene-Croat proposal³⁵¹. In the end, the Slovene delegation, under the leadership of Milan Kucan, walked out of the Congress and the Croat delegation followed them³⁵². This was the collapse of the LCY.

The trauma between Serbia with Slovenia and Croatia resulted in a total split on 25 June 1991; finally, both Slovenia and Croatia declared the establishment of their own independent states. This was a shocking move for Serbia. In response, Milošević declared that all the Serbs living outside the boundaries of Serbia had the right to self-determination. Milošević's attitude; compounded with his earlier statements, had been provocative and pointed to the redrawing the boundaries of Serbia. By 1991, the Serbs living in the Krajina region of Croatia (where they constituted the majority) had already seceded from the republic by declaring Krajina the "Serbian Autonomous Region". In addition, Milošević sent the JNA forces both to Slovenia and Croatia, with the allegation to preserve Yugoslav territorial integrity. The Slovene national forces defeated the JNA within 10 days. In Croatia, the JNA succeeded in taking hold of one third of this state's territories³⁵³, which remained under Serbian control until 1995.

Serbia was only supported by Montenegro. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which were comparatively poorer, followed the line of Slovenia and Croatia and favored the idea of a "looser" confederation. However, when they realized that keeping Yugoslavia together was not possible, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia proclaimed their independence in 1991. The following year, Serbia and Montenegro got together to form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the absence of four of the former constituent republics. By the year 1992, Yugoslavia had totally collapsed

4.2. THE SOURCES OF DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA:

Yugoslavia disintegrated rapidly and painfully between 1991 and 1995 (See, Figure 4.1. **Map of Balkans in 1992**). During the doubtful and unstable political circumstances that

³⁵¹ Dejan Jovic, "*The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal: A Tactical Move or an Ultimate Solution?*", Available on site <https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/1893/1304/1/Jovic%20Chapter.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁵² Sabrina P. Ramet, "*The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation 1918-2005*", Indiana University Press, 2006, pp.371-2.

³⁵³ Tanil Bora, pp.187-214.

leaded and followed the collapse of the old Yugoslavia, two general and international principles were being discussed. The first was the right of ethnic groups who identify themselves as separate nations to political self-determination and secession from the existing state when they feel that their self-interest and potential prosperity demands it. The second principle was the right of states to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty through whatever diplomatic and military means available in the face of internal and external pressures to challenge it.



Figure 4.1. **Map of Balkans in 1992.**

There are different analysis and reason over why Yugoslavia collapsed. On touching and deep issues such as Yugoslavia, especially when the crisis is continuing or fresh, objective and fair explanations is not easy. There are great pressures to support one side or the other. Specialists and non-specialists following the crisis become sensitively or politically concerned with the crisis in changeable degrees. The media directly or indirectly shapes the result of the crisis by influencing the public and policy-makers in one direction or another.

In general, the selection of contemporary and historical records, the weight attributed to different events and crises related to problem, the sketch of absolute and relative moral judgments based on other crises and the analytical frameworks are mostly subjective and

often prejudiced. In this context, historical and contemporary analyses about former Yugoslavia can easily influence all or even some of the various ethnic groups, policy-makers, observers and other analysts.

In theoretical context, we can classify two arguments on the conditions that cause and support violent conflicts. On the one hand, the primordialist approach which puts the emphasis on the role of ethnicity as being a primary source causing violent conflicts. On the other hand, the instrumentalist (modernist) approach which tries to search for causes based on the economic, political, and ideological divergences (such as level of poverty, social class belonging etc.) rather than stressing the ethnicity issue³⁵⁴.

The violent conflicts in the Balkan region often have been explained only through ethnically-driven characteristics. That is, the primary cause of the conflict is the diversity of ethnic composition of the region. It is the way of explanations of the conflicts but this is very external and shortened analysis. The ethnicity argument can be considered as part of the reason, a path dependence problem connected with the uncompleted nation-state building process in the region. In analyzing the conditions of conflicts caused in Yugoslavia, it is important to add any long-term legacy problems resulting from previous historical experience. But stressing only these arguments, we accept a risk neglecting other equally influential and important conditions.

Generally, the literature on the collapse of Yugoslavia identifies the problem with the perspectives of domestic, international and economics³⁵⁵. Domestic elements are valuable of consideration for two reasons: first, due to their undeniable presence in any debate regarding the collapse, and second, because they are related to external factors on inclusive and influential roots. The domestic factors primarily focus on cultural diversities, state system, and role of personalities, nationalist movements and ethnic hatreds. The international factors insist on the importance of one or several factors on the international arena in the fall of Yugoslavia. The new world order after the Cold War and the approaches of external states and organizations such as EU, USA, UN, NATO and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) directly or indirectly influenced the Yugoslavia. Besides, the economic factors can be approached both from domestic and international

³⁵⁴ Michael Keating, John McGarry, "Introduction", Michael Keating, John McGarry (Ed.) *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.5-6.

³⁵⁵ Susan L. Woodward, p.16.

perspectives. With the economic crisis in the late 1970s - early 1980s, the IMF prescribed further doses of its bitter economic medicine periodically while the Yugoslav economy slowly failed into a coma³⁵⁶. Also, the enlarging gap between the developed and under-developed regions (republics, provinces) made the further existence of Yugoslavia impossible. The disintegration of Yugoslavia had many causes, not just one. All approaches offer useful elements for explaining the reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

4.2.1. Domestic Factors:

4.2.1.1. Nationalism Factors:

Although popular in current debates, the ancient ethnic hatred argument can easily be dismissed as insufficiency. However, it is certainly more difficult to oppose to the nationalism argument, which was commonly used in academic debates on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, nationalism does not always develop into ethnic hatred towards the other³⁵⁷. Obviously, we can talk about distrustful and skepticism between Yugoslav nations, but ethnic hatred did not exist (except the era of World War II) to any extent greater than other multi-ethnic states, nationalism was always present as a political doctrine in its many forms. After the fall of Communism, nationalism gained power and became more popular than liberalism for politicians in Yugoslavia³⁵⁸.

Undoubtedly, the nationalist movements were the most important issue among the sources of disintegration of Yugoslavia. In addition to rapid economic decline and the occurrence of violence in Kosovo, in the 1980s Yugoslavia experienced a real renaissance of nationalist ideologies. On the other hand, as a result of despotism of the mass national movement in Croatia in 1971³⁵⁹, the publication of any texts of unclearly nationalist content was effectively banned in all parts of Yugoslavia, without Kosovo³⁶⁰. The ban restrained

³⁵⁶ Criton Zaukos, “*IMF's Shock Therapy is True Culprit in Former Yugoslavia*”, Insight on the News, 14 June 1993, 04 October 2010, Available on site http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n24_v9/ai_13882200/ (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁵⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, p.166.

³⁵⁸ Dejan Jovic, “*Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away*”, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, 2009, p.19

³⁵⁹ Ante Batovic, “*The Balkans in Turmoil –Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav position Between the Cold War Blocs 1965 – 1971*”, LSE Ideas, London, 2009, p.13-8.

³⁶⁰ Noel Malcolm, p.325-7

nationalist polemics to the closely watched intellectual opposition in Yugoslavia. All intellectual oppositions tried mainly at the illegitimization of the existing communist regime in Yugoslavia. Nationalist opponents disputed the communist regime and each of the national ideologies claimed that the communist regime purposely disgraced and poor its nation. In the early 1980s, nationalists, Marxist academics and liberal political theorists and writers were active in Ljubljana, Zagreb and Pristina as well as in Belgrade. Although they often held opposing views, all of them were united in their refusal of the communist system³⁶¹.

As the communist system, after Tito's death, appeared to be losing popular support, the opponents were able to raise their public profile again. The Party officials reacted by banning the offending works and sometimes jailing opponents. But these actions brought much wider prestige to the opponents than they could have expected. Intellectual opponents, however contrary might have been their views, appeared to offer a fresh and different approach to the problems confronting Yugoslav society which the Yugoslav ideology of socialist self-management could hardly explain the solution.

Milošević started to reduce the Serbian communist elite from September 1987, the situation of most opponents totally changed in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. First they were allowed contact to the mainstream media and, then, their republican communist leaders and media started to use the rhetoric of the nationalist programs. This conquest of nationalist rhetoric undoubtedly was a challenge by the communist leadership in almost all republics to regain legitimacy through change in their ideological image. In this new field of nationalist politics, communists turned nationalists quickly faced difficult opposition from the opponents who first expressed nationalist ideologies³⁶².

In late 1989 and early 1990 opponents of all ideas turned into party politicians, becoming leaders and founders of new opposition parties. In the first multiparty elections of 1990, in all republics, except Serbia and Montenegro, former nationalists' opponents won power. In Serbia and Montenegro the communist parties were able to keep power. Retrospectively,

³⁶¹ Leslie Benson, p.140-1.

³⁶² Renaud De La Brosse, "*Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create 'A State For All Serbs:' Consequences of Using Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends*", January 2003 Available on site http://hague.bard.edu/reports/de_la_brosse_pt1.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

the 1980s in Yugoslavia could be viewed as a slow but constant walk of nationalist ideologies from opposition to power.

4.2.1.1.1. Albanian Nationalism:

The Kosovo Albanian uprisings of 1981 were the first high degree and brutal demonstration of nationalism in Yugoslavia since the Croat nationalist movement in 1971. Albanian nationalism is founded on Albanian historic rights derived from the supposed direct descent of Albanians from the ancient tribe of Illyrians, like Croat nationalism, who inhabited the Balkans before the settlement of the South Slavs. According the historical argument; Illyrians, namely, Albanians were the first conquerors and all the others- especially, Serbs- who do not belong rightly the region inhabited by Albanians. Within the framework of this ideological idea, the patriotic Albanian historians in Kosovo canalized in research trying to demonstrate the core basis of the argument since the early 1970s, that Illyrians or Albanians had gone to Kosovo and in Macedonia before the South Slavs. Also, Kosovar Albanian historians also wanted to demonstrate that the Kosovar Albanians role to the Partisan resistance and to freedom of Yugoslavia was balanced to the other nations of Yugoslavia. These two historical arguments were intended to prove the right of the Albanians to Kosovo and the right of Kosovo to be a republic separate from Serbia in Yugoslavia. Because of their historical precedence, Kosovo rightfully belongs to the Albanians; there is no reason for Kosovo to be part of Serbia. They fought for the liberation of their province and of Yugoslavia like all other constituent nations; they should form a constituent nation with its own homeland³⁶³.

Another characteristic of Albanian nationalism, the demand for the unification of all Albanians into one state, was confined to underground or opponents group. The demand for unification or for an integral Albania was considered in Yugoslavia as irredentism and separatism and was officially forbidden. But if one grant that Albanians are direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians then should not the whole territory, which they live, belong to Albanians and not to any supposedly later settlers like Serbs or Macedonians. If this is accepted, Albanians should have a historic right to their own state on their own land which would include Albania, Kosovo and western Macedonia.

³⁶³ Aleksandar Pavkovic, *"The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans"*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000, p.86-7.

This framework is an argument from the primordial settlers' right which one finds in almost all Balkan national ideologies. As it identifies the ownership of land with control of statehood and sovereignty until the early 1980s the most numerous part of Kosovo's Albanian population. Additionally, the argument aims to influence persons of the target nation that a denial of their "primordial settlers' rights", namely the denial of a sovereign state for the nation- personally humiliates them and makes them into second class citizens. In the context of Kosovo, the argument may also appear to justify any action taken to persuade the "later settlers (Serbs and Montenegrins) to leave Kosovo, their emigration may help the so-called primordial settlers to get control over their land as well as over their state³⁶⁴.

The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins and the increase of Albanian nationalism provided a motivation for the escalation in opponent Serbian nationalism. As Albanian nationalism was controlled to texts in Albanian, but it was hard to find to the great majority of Serbians. The extensive media coverage of the pressure in particular after the Kosovar Albanian uprisings, and hostility against Kosovo Serbs naturally demanded an explanation over these anti-Serb actions..

4.2.1.1.2. Serbian Nationalism:

On the contrary to Albanian nationalism which was officially sanctioned, the Serbian national and religious tradition was deliberately suppressed both in education and in state controlled media. In its early form, the Serb nationalist place was strongly anti-communist. According to patriotic Serb historiography, the communist administration defeated the Serbian dynasty and it took away from Serbia its medieval lands (Kosovo and Macedonia) which were regained "by Serb blood", as a result of military victories in the Balkan Wars and World War I. Serbs in these two wars liberated South Slavs from foreign occupiers. On the other hand, in communist historiography, Serbs transformed from liberators into tyrants and the World War II Chetniks resistance movement was often identified as collaborators and fascist as the Croatian Ustasha movements. In the process, communist historiography apparently disregarded the significance and weight of the Ustasha massacres of Serbs.

³⁶⁴ Ibid, p.87-8.

The major analysis of the Serbs who were the greatest losers and victims of the communist administration³⁶⁵ was strengthened by the terms of the 1974 constitution. Thus, it attributed virtual statehood to the republics and equal federal status to Kosovo. The Serbian nationalists claimed after 1974, were divided among three states (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia) and were virtually made into minority in their ancestral land of Kosovo-Metohija while this province had acquired a status equal to that of Serbia. The communist leaders also let the Albanian pressurize to Kosovo Serbs into leaving their land and thus helped build a significantly Albanian province “ethnically cleansed” of Serbs and Montenegrins³⁶⁶.

This systematic policy of revanchism against the Serbs was a result of a conspiracy of the top Yugoslav communist leaders, the Croat Tito and the Slovene Kardelj, against the Serbs. They simply continued the pre-1930s policy of the Comintern which identified the Serbs as the chief oppressor of the South Slavs. Moreover, the communists in fact worked together with the Vatican in the suppression of non-catholic and anti-communist Serbs by the Catholic nations (Slovenes and Croats) in Yugoslavia³⁶⁷. In this framework, the compulsory mass departure of Serbs from Kosovo was observed as a continuation of World War II genocide against the Serbs; just as Catholic Ustasha and their Muslim allies massacred and expelled the Serbs, and Muslim Albanians are forcing the Serbs from their ancestral home of Kosovo-Metohija.

The main document of revitalized Serb nationalism in the 1980s, the draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences involved on the two main nationalist themes; the victimization of Serbia and Serbs and the conspiracy of non-Serb communist leaders against Serbia. The document originally intended for the highest Yugoslav and Serbian party bodies, also proposed a return to the “integrative democratic” federation originally established by the AVNOJ (The Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia) assembly in 1943. Although it firmly rejected the constitution of 1974, the draft argued for the reunification of Serbs within reconstituted Yugoslavia still ruled by the Communist party. The assembly, at the end of the documents, conceded that if other

³⁶⁵ David Bruce MacDonald, *“Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and The War in Yugoslavia”*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002, p.ix.

³⁶⁶ Ibid, p.190.

³⁶⁷ Ibid, p.150.

nations in Yugoslavia do not accept this solution, Serbs should consider alternative options apart from the reintegration of Yugoslavia³⁶⁸.

In 1988 the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević and the new communist elite took over the memorandum's opinion of the Serb bad conditions and its proposed therapy. He promised to undo the consequences of the alleged anti-Serb revanchism and to unify the Serbs, once again, into one state, if possible, a "democratic integrative" Yugoslavia. However, in his mass mobilization of Serbs through a series of rallies and mass celebrations in 1988-89, Milošević used almost all available Serb nationalist themes and symbols, including religious rituals. A series of historical events, in particular the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle in June 1989, were officially celebrated with mass rallies, political speeches and religious ceremonies bringing together "the people, the state authorities and the church".

As the outcome of the unification of Serbs in an "democratic integrative" Yugoslav confederation would be a Serb mathematical large number over the other nations, many non-Serbs considered such demands as an understandable tactic for resulting Serb political dominance over other nations in Yugoslavia. Of course, it was not what most Serb opponents (both liberals and nationalists) demanded in the early 1980s. However, the Bosnian Serb academician Vojislav Šešelj in 1984 proposed a territorial division of Yugoslavia by its only three *true* nations, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This division would ensure Serb supremacy over large parts of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. This first open statement of dominant Serb nationalism earned its author almost two years in jail. But, in 1988 Slobodan Milošević's rhetoric of resurgent pride in Serb military glory and historic achievement appeared to express the traditional Serb nationalist belief in Serb superiority over other Yugoslav nations, the belief on which the Serb claims to political dominance in Yugoslavia had been based in the past³⁶⁹.

As communist Yugoslavia begun to disintegrate early in 1990, the unification of Serbs outside the Yugoslav federation appeared too many Serbs as the option. But it was being forced on the Serbs by the separatism of Slovenes and Croats and not chosen by Serbs

³⁶⁸ An English translation of the memorandum - Available at a Kosovo Albanian site http://www.trepca.net/english/2006/serbian_memorandum_1986/serbia_memorandum_1986.html (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁶⁹ Aleksandar Pavkovic, p.89-90.

themselves. At that point Serb national ideologues began to debate that the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 was a costly mistake involving the Serbs in a national conflict which could have been avoided creating in 1918, a Serb state out of the lands populated by the Serbs. This mistake forced the Serb nation at the end of the 20th century, to seek to establish a national state of its own while most other European nations already had such states for some time; in this view, it was not surprising that the other nations strongly opposed the delayed Serb moves towards Serb unification. It was a claim on a Serb unification in a national state excluding Croats and Slovenes. As communist Yugoslavia started to disintegrate, the Yugoslav ideas appeared to have finally lost its usefulness as a vehicle for Serb unification.

4.2.1.1.3. Slovene Nationalism:

Traditionally, the foundation for Slovene nationalism was the idea in the linguistic and cultural differences of the Slovene nations. This idea was shaped in the 19th century by the Slovene intellectuals who standardized the language and created a cultured person literature in the newly standardized tongue³⁷⁰. The present Slovene intellectuals often considered themselves as successors to the designers of Slovene nationhood, whose main tasks was to guard, carefully, its cultural and linguistic differences. From their point of view the federal republic of Slovenia and its legislative and political autonomy was the chief instrument in this task.

A return to an integrative Yugoslavia, as proposed in the leaked draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986, would show not only a threat to the autonomy of Slovenia but also to the differences of the Slovene nations. Partially in response to the draft, in 1987, Slovene intellectuals expressed their views on the Slovene national program and sovereign state of the Slovene nation³⁷¹. In addition to the traditional argument from the Slovene linguistic and cultural differences, various philosophical, historical, economic, social and even religious reasons were advanced in support of Slovenian statehood. As the clearest suggestion of the lack of Slovene sovereignty, several supporters pointed to the absence of Slovenian armed forces and argued for the need to emphasize Slovenia's sovereignty through its own armed forces.

³⁷⁰ Ervin Dolenc, "*Culture, Politics, and Slovene Identity*", Jill Benderly, Evan Kraft (Ed.), *Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1996, p.78.

³⁷¹ Peter Radan, p.168.

In the Slovene essays *Nova Revija (News Review)*³⁷² completely differed from the Serbian Academy's draft. They were mainly dealing with the future and not with past wrongs. Moreover, some of the Slovene authors expecting possibly their role as opposition politicians, offered surprisingly detailed political programs, outlining the type of civil society and liberal political institutions they would like Slovenes to develop. They all saw Slovenia more or less separated from Yugoslavia, evolving on its own as a sovereign state. In fact, this separatism appeared to be shared by all of these otherwise highly different contributions to the Slovene national program³⁷³.

Despite the first and expected disapproval of the document by the Slovenian Party leaders, within a year of its publication some of the arguments put forward by the supporters found their way into Slovenian Party press and became part of official party rhetoric and policy. Already in September 1988 the Slovenian party made the first move for new legislation to assert Slovenia's sovereignty and started transforming its territorial defense units into a state army. By 1989 most of the supporters to this question created their own political groups or parties which were devoted to making Slovenia a sovereign state. From April 1990, those supporters who became ministers in the first post-communist government in Slovenia were also given the opportunity to put their separatist national program into action and to create a sovereign Slovene state with its own armed forces³⁷⁴.

4.2.1.1.4. Croat Nationalism:

The Croatian political elite of the 1990s definitely did not have in mind the creation of a civic state, but the emerging Nationalist movements were typical examples of the so-called 19th century nationalism that attempted to create a political organization dominated by one ethnic group³⁷⁵. However, this was not the case with Croatia. The nation-building at that time was closely linked to the Croatian National Revival or Illyrian Movement, a movement for national renewal and unity of all Southern Slavs within the Habsburg Monarchy that started in the beginning of the 1830s. The unification of all the Southern

³⁷² The copy of issue published in January 1987, Available on site http://www.rtvsllo.si/files/novice/nr_57.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁷³ Aleksandar Pavkovic, p.91.

³⁷⁴ Ibid, p.92.

³⁷⁵ Edward H. Carr, "*Nationalism: A Report by A Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*", Oxford University Press for the RIIA, London 1939.

Slavs should have been facilitated through the adoption of a single literary language. The Illyrianists certainly succeeded in integrating the linguistically and administratively divided Croats. Nevertheless, the nation-building initiated in the nineteenth century was not completed, since Croatia joined firstly the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 and later the Yugoslav federation.

Like the Serbs, the Croats claimed that they had been the victims of expansionist powers throughout the history. Further, a long and terrible history of Serbian imperialism and danger was created, so that the contemporary Serbian nationalists would be seen as representatives of a typical age-old Serbian strategy and repression. That Serbs and Croats basically saw each other's history as a mirror image of their own should come as no surprise.

The ethnic mobilization on both sides, among the majority of Croats and on the side of the Serb minority, was conducted by political leaders who exploited "traits of history, myth and alleged ethnic difference in order to pursue their own power goals and to divert public attention from other pressing questions that could not be so easily resolved"³⁷⁶. The ruling elites had been "threatened by changes in the economic and political structures that sustained them from mid-1980s onwards"³⁷⁷. In order to preserve or to gain power, ethnic entrepreneurs started the ethnic mobilization.

On the side of the Serb population it was fuelled by the galloping nationalism manifested in Milošević's policy that was at that time wrapped into the idea of the preservation of the Yugoslav federation. The ethno-mobilization campaigns conducted by media as well as the use of mob rallies throughout Yugoslavia, predominantly in rural areas, and directed by Milošević's regime built the myth of the genocidal nature of other Yugoslav nations that were accused of threatening the integrity of the Serbian nation. The Kosovo Albanians for example were demonized as internal enemies. The Croats on the other hand were pointed at because of their collaborationist's past. With the aim of reminding and mobilizing the Serbs, both in Serbia but predominantly in Croatia the Second World War Ustasha atrocities against Serbs, Jews and Roma were recalled.

³⁷⁶ V.P. Gagnon Jr., *"The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s"*, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 2006.

³⁷⁷ V.P. Gagnon Jr., *"Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia"*, 19 (3) *International Security*, 1994/95, 130-166

In order to state the Croatian nation and strengthen its unity, President Tuđman pioneered the thought of national reconciliation or pan-Croatian reconciliation³⁷⁸ and encouraged the defeating of historical splits among parts of the Croatian nation that was ideologically fractioned in the Second World War among communists, pro-fascists and supporters of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Tuđman allowed himself to take strict nationalistic positions in public. In his chauvinistic statement from the time, President Tuđman arrogantly stated that he was married neither to a Serb, nor a Jew³⁷⁹. Some other highly ranking politicians of the Croatian Democratic Union were also using hatred speech in the beginning of the 1990s, particularly in pre-electoral campaigns.

Winning his election as president of Croatia, in May 1990, Franjo Tuđman and his government proceeded to complete the nationalist political program contained in his earlier writings. First, the Croatian government instituted a systematic cleanse of Serbs in legislative, administrative and media positions. Then it proceeded to adjust the constitution, removing the reference to Serbs as a constituent nation of Croatia and returning the historic symbols of Croatian statehood, also used by the Ustasha regime³⁸⁰. Finally, it began creating its own national armed forces while at the same time proposing, together with the Slovenian government, the transformation of Yugoslavia into a full confederation of sovereign states.

On the level of symbols, the newly proclaimed state required notions of self-identification. However, the rapid change of the symbols (e.g. the flag- a coat of arms, street names, names of public institutions, vocabulary etc.) contributed to nervousness among the Croatian Serbs, who feared revanchism that would resemble the one of the pro-fascist regime. Particularly because of the attempt of one part of media to rehabilitate the NDH (Independent State of Croatia), or at least improve its historical image. Among the Serbs this generated even greater apprehension and animosity.

Without a doubt, there were numerous examples where government employees of Serb origin were forced to resign or were dismissed or pensioned. Monuments erected in the

³⁷⁸ Lenard Cohen, *“Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition”*, Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (Ed.), *Politics, Power, And The Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 76.

³⁷⁹ Vuk Drašković, *“Knife”*, The Serbian Classic Press, New York, 2000, p.viii

³⁸⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet, *“Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About The Yugoslav Breakup And The Wars In Bosnia And Kosovo”*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p.7.

time of communism glorifying the Second World War heroes and anti-fascism was in numerous cases demolished or removed. At the same time, monuments glorifying Croatian history that had been removed by the communist regime were solemnly re-erected. The standard Croatian language was “purified”, particularly in the state controlled public broadcaster and print media. The only orthography that was taught in schools was the Latinic one, since Cyrillic was banned in 1992. In addition to this, discriminatory provisions in the 1991 Law on citizenship denied the population of Serb origin who were not residing any longer in Croatia the right to apply for and receive citizenship. Consequently, they lost the right to vote. Later, as a consequence of the international community’s pressure, such discriminatory treatment has been rectified³⁸¹.

In the second part of 1990s, after the occupied territories were liberated by Croatian forces and the exodus of the Serb population from Krajina took place in 1995, the government of that time was not interested in solving the minority question and in properly implementing the minority legislation. On the contrary, it allowed for the settlement of the refugees of Croatian origin from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the housings of the Serbs in Krajina. Due to the autocratic rule of President Tuđman as well as to the worsening of the rights of Serbs who were discouraged to return, the country was falling into international isolation.

The status of national minorities in Croatia, particularly the Serb minority, has improved significantly after the change of government in 2000, in comparison to the chauvinistic management to which they were exposed in the 1990s. It is undeniable that the European integration process has played a crucial role in the realization of the minority rights in Croatia since the official policy towards minorities has become more inclusive, and the government guarantees support for the realization of various minority associations and institutions.

4.2.1.1.5. Muslim Bosniak Nationalism:

A study of Yugoslavia’s Islamic movements has to first begin to define what is meant by Yugoslav Muslims. The term Yugoslav Muslims actually applies a great variety of groups of people, differing in ethnicity, language and degree of religiousness. This vagueness allows for a certain number of manipulations. On the other side, the national ideologies of

³⁸¹ Brad K. Blitz, “*Refugee Returns in Croatia: Contradictions and Reform*”, 23 (3) Politics, 2003, p.181-91.

all non-Muslim populations of Yugoslavia developed outside the realm of Islam. The members of both the Orthodox and the Catholic church regarded the Muslim of Bosnia-Herzegovina as “Turks”, assimilated to that ethnic group. With the creation of “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians” provided the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina rested on a forced choice between Serbian and Croatian nationality³⁸².

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim Bosniak national ideologies grew in two very different structures which are secular and religious³⁸³. The first was an officially approved non-religious (secular) ideology which explained and corrects the postponed recognition of the Muslim Bosniak nation as the sixth constituent nation in Yugoslavia in 1968. The second was a pan-Islamist (religious) national ideology which continued the tradition of the religious and political movement Young Muslims formed in March 1994 in Sarajevo. Different from the first, the second type was officially forbidden and its supporters imprisoned in the 1980s.

According to the officially approved ideology, the Bosniaks declared their socio-ethnic identity through the creation of a synthesis of religious traditions and new spiritual, mythical, political and cultural features. The process of confirmation ended in communist Yugoslavia with the recognition of Muslims, first through the introduction, in 1948, of the census category of “Muslims of undeclared nationality”, which was finally changed into the 1971 census category of “Muslims” under the “stated nationality” section. Without the support of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the official description implied, the Muslims of Yugoslavia would not have achieved their nationhood or the recognition it required. But since on Marxist account, the religious relationship could not be the key or persistent indicator of a national group, Islam could have only provide as an initial motivation in the birth of this nation³⁸⁴.

³⁸² Alexandre Popovic, “*Islamic Movements in Yugoslavia*”, Edward Allworth (Ed.), Muslim communities reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Duke University Press, 1994, p.322-5

³⁸³ Alexandre Popovic, “*Muslim Intellectuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Changes*”, Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi (Eds.), Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication, Routledge Taylor & Francis, New York, 2006, p.215

³⁸⁴ David Campbell, “*National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*”, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998, p.214.

In contrast to the official version, the pan-Islamist version of Muslim Bosniak nationalism considered Islam as the absolute core of Muslim national and political identity. From its beginning in 1941 in the Young Muslims, this ideology emphasized the education of Muslims in the correct Islamic spirit, the creation of a true Islamic society and the liberation and unification of the Islamic world. While the communist authorities were able to suppress the organization in the late 1940s by imprisoning and even executing some of its members³⁸⁵, two of them, Aliya Izetbegovic and Omer Behman, emerged in the late 1960s as leaders of informal discussion groups consisting mainly of students of Muslim seminaries. In 1970, Izetbegovic wrote and distributed among members of this circle a short dissertation entitled *The Islamic Declaration, a Programme of the Islamization of Muslims and Muslim Peoples*.

The objective of this program was to liberate Muslim peoples from foreign influences through a renewal of an authentic Islamic awareness. The main idea of the work is that Islam offers a broad and the different model of individual, social and political life which the Muslim faithful should adopt without having to look for any other non-Islamic models³⁸⁶.

According to 1971 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims formed a relative but not an absolute majority of slightly less than 40 per cent of the population. But as the Muslim Bosniaks birth rate was the highest of all three principal national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb and Croat rates of emigration from the republic were much higher than the Bosniaks one, the Bosniaks could be expected to reach an absolute majority in the foreseeable future³⁸⁷.

But despite of any demographic predictions, Izetbegovic's program connected Muslim Bosniaks national identity with politics in an easy and simply intelligible method. It is a person's Muslim religion which defines their national identity; and as it defines the core of their identity, it also defines their political preferences. In 1990, Izetbegovic and the

³⁸⁵ Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000, p.67

³⁸⁶ Aliya Izetbegovic, *The Islamic Declaration: A Programme of the Islamization of Muslims and Muslim Peoples* (Republished Version), Sarajevo, 1990, Available on site <http://www.angelfire.com/dc/mbooks/Alija-Izetbegovic-Islamic-Declaration-1990-Azam-dot-com.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

³⁸⁷ Demographic History of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_demographics_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#1971, Population By Ethnicity, By Censuses 1961-1991 (<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011)).

members of his circle founded the Islamic political movement. This was the Party of Democratic Action, which in elections of 1990 in Bosnia-Herzegovina won a relative majority in the parliament enabling its leader Izetbegovic to be elected the president of the republic's collective presidency³⁸⁸. While confirm Islamic values, this party avoided any obligation to the establishment of an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its aims were limited to the spiritual regeneration of the Muslim Bosniaks nation, its political and social organization and to the takeover of positions of power in all Muslim-populated areas of Yugoslavia. This "takeover of power" was to serve more affirmation of the Muslim Bosniaks nation and its Islamic values in all spheres of life. In terms of the Islamic Declaration, this is the preparatory to the creation of an Islamic society. The confirmation of Muslim religious and moral conceptions within a project for the creation of an Islamic society was, for many Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, associated with the Ottoman social order in which the Muslims held political power and owned most of the land. In this Islamic society, the non-Muslims were second-class citizens with no political and restricted civil rights. In this context, the affirmation of an Islamic religiously-defined identity in politics was viewed, by many Serbs and Croats, as a drive towards renewed political and economic dominance by the Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4.2.1.1.6. The Clash of Nationalisms in Yugoslavia:

One of the main goals of each of the opposite national ideologies was to confirm the hegemony of its nation over the territory that was declared. The Croat and Slovene national ideologues understood the evidence of sovereignty have need of the creation of national military power. On the other side, Muslim Bosniaks, firstly, was to be achieved through the reestablish of Islamic values in community life and politics and finally in the creation of an Islamic state. Albanian sovereignty, firstly, was to be accomplished in divided Yugoslav republic and next, possibly, in unification with Albania. Serb sovereignty was to be confirmed in the joining of all Serbs in a reorganized "democratic integrative" Yugoslav federation; if this establishment become impracticable in a Serb state without other Yugoslav nations³⁸⁹.

³⁸⁸ Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup, pp. 46-54

³⁸⁹ Aleksandar Pavkovic p.97.

All these agendas were unsuccessful highlighting the right of a single nation to dominate within its territory. Moreover, from the viewpoint of all non-Serb national ideologies, the suggestion to return to a “democratic integrative” Yugoslavia, within which Serbs would be in a relative majority, was viewed as a denial of their nation’s indispensable right to self-determination and independence. In fact, any unification of all Serbs in one state would appear to deny the Croat, the Albanian and the Muslim inhabitant of these lands the right to form their own state on the same territory³⁹⁰.

Consequently, the clash of national ideologies in Yugoslavia turned into a conflict over to keep under control of territory which each ideology demanded for its nation. The Croat, Albanian and soon after Bosniak ideologues declared Serb-inhabited regions by the based on their nations so-called historic rights; these lands which either was owned by the medieval kingdoms thought to be the ancestors of their national states or the territories, supposedly, established before the Serbs. In this historical perspective, their national rights clashed with the Serbian argument to the democratic right of national self-determination of the Serbs on territory, which they inhabited for centuries. This conflict of arguments was more complicated by the Serb ideologues’ arguments to lands from which Serbs had been forced out in modern history³⁹¹.

The Croat, Albanian and even Slovene “dominant nation ideologies³⁹²” saw the Serbs and their political demands were supposed as the major problem to the confirmation of sovereignty of these nations. This opinion then easily created a fear of Serb influence over other nations, the fear which also increased nationalist polemics in before World War II Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Serbs became the main actor of fear and hate once again. Under the ruling of the communist ideology, such concerns of hegemony were usually out of place from the resulting federal structure not permitted the hegemony of any single nation over others. With the collapse of the communist ideology and its equal nations understanding in the late 1980s, Pandora’s Box opened not only for the Serbs but also for other nations. These concerns were created by the dominant nation type of ideologies, and then effectively exploited for the mobilization of general support for nationalist parties in

³⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 98.

³⁹¹ Ibid, p.99.

³⁹² Sinisa Malesevic, “*Ideology, Legitimacy and The New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia*”, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, 2002, p.73-4

all republics of Yugoslavia. Nationalism was started as a revival of romantic or traditional within opponent illegitimizing ideologies in the 1970s, and then, became a powerful tool for political mobilization in the late 1980s³⁹³.

Once these ideologies won the multiparty elections of 1990 in their constituted states, the armed conflict among the nations in being considered highly expected in Yugoslavia. Each national ideology demands the supremacy of its nation over the territory which was challenged by at least one and sometimes two other nations. Thus, each national ideology denies the right of other national groups. Moreover, each national ideology asserts the right of its target nation to resist the territorial claims of other national groups by any means, including force³⁹⁴

4.2.1.2. Ancient Ethnic Hatreds:

The very well-known assumption based on "ancient ethnic hatreds" mainly argues that the former Yugoslav nations have hated each other since very old time and have always jumped down each other's throats. Its most well known advocate is Robert Kaplan³⁹⁵, whose ideas reportedly had important influence on former US President Bill Clinton and some members of his administration was, according to numerous press reports and even according to an insider like Richard Holbrooke, enormous³⁹⁶. The idea about the "ancient ethnic hatreds" found an interested viewers in the White House, where it formulated a view that outsiders can do absolutely nothing to stop the conflict but to wait for the "Yugoslavs" to get tired of fighting each other again³⁹⁷.

The preface of Kaplan's book, dedicated to Yugoslavia is packed with references to "communal hate, taking root with revenge," "ancient battles which never ceased to be fought" and "anger, frustration and violence"³⁹⁸. Strongly related to it is also Huntington's idea about "The Clash of Civilizations." According to this idea, the hostilities was almost rational and unavoidable, since the line unraveling the Western Catholic civilization from

³⁹³ Aleksandar Pavkovic, pp. 98

³⁹⁴ Ibid, p.99.

³⁹⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, "*Balkanlarda Kaynayan Kazan*", Yayınevi Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1995.

³⁹⁶ Richard C. Holbrooke, "*To End a War*", Modern Library, New York, 1999, p. 22

³⁹⁷ David Halberstam, "*Barış Zamanı Savaş: Bush, Clinton ve Generaller*", İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002

³⁹⁸ Robert Kaplan, pp. 7-24.

the Eastern Orthodox and Muslim civilizations, runs along the boundary between Croatia on one part and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia on the other part (See, Figure 4.2. **Map of Ethnic Composition of Yugoslavia**).

Huntington's theory is very important in clearing up the unseen motivations at the back of the Western European support for Slovenia and Croatia, the more or less total Russian support of Serbia and the backing of Islamic states to Bosnian Muslims. But these practices almost not propose any helpful approaching into the difficulties of the Yugoslav conflict. At different times through the conflict, each nation fought against others and in itself. On the other side, Serbs leaving other Serbs is also totally incompatible with the image Huntington presents.



Figure 4.2. **Map of Ethnic Composition of Yugoslavia.**³⁹⁹

The proposals repeatedly referred to ancient ethnic hatred are very popular in arguing that are not careful work as a firmly academic, such as examples was present in the media with politicians, writers and others comments, like Kaplan's. Consequently, the Yugoslav

³⁹⁹ Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997, pp.1-9.

conflict did not begin as an ethnic conflict⁴⁰⁰. Ethnic hostility was not very old in Yugoslavia, but it had to be produced and changed into an ethnic war. Without a doubt, it had appeared as a method of the separatism, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As an explanation of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is as inadequate as it is inaccurate assertion. Also, the proposal is the Yugoslavs have always disliked to each other provides as a right explanation for those who bothered stability and peace in this country. If different ethnic groups in Yugoslavia have always disliked each other, then it was unavoidable for this country to disintegrate. If something were expected, then political leaders were really powerless to stop it and thus should not be held responsible for the cost of the disintegration. Therefore such an explanation is rather acceptable for some political leaders of the post-Communist period who are fervent to charge other people for the violent character of the disintegration⁴⁰¹.

However, Huntington's and Kaplan's ideas cannot be completely unnoticed. In both Croatian and Serbian war propaganda, the terms as "always" and "inevitably" had a very important place. In the earlier years than the occurrence of conflict and during the war, media in both Croatian and Serbian published several books and booklets. Since they generally brought to life old, well-known historic documents, these publications apparently had nothing to do with nationalist propaganda.

Opinions that the other side has always been maneuverings against "us" with the aim of either absolute suppression (of Croats by Serbs) or total destruction (of Serbs by Croats) have been present in great numbers on both sides. Media and several politicians all guaranteed both the Croats and the Serbs that they were in threat, generating an atmosphere in which the happening of the war was possible. In this respect, Kaplan is almost right. Many Serbs and Croats believed in 1991, "Serbs" and "Croats" really disliked each other and this hostility had lived perpetually. The idea in the continual hatred of the "other" was surely a dominant motivator and made it probable to produce even more hate in turn. However, this hate was away from being "ancient." The "ancientness" of the Yugoslav hatred has very modern basis.

⁴⁰⁰ Ivo Banac, "*Nationalism in Serbia*", Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Kemali Saybaşı (Ed.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1995, p.133.

⁴⁰¹ Dejan Jovic, "*Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away*", p.18.

4.2.1.3. Cultural Diversities:

In different efforts to enlighten the end of Yugoslavia, it has been debated that the diversities of the ethnicity and cultures of the Yugoslav nations played a most important role on fiasco about to form a Yugoslav culture, nation and state. Cultural diversities, primarily based on spiritual and linguistic difference, made nations and encouraged their aspiration to live separately from others in their own states. Cultural, historical, linguistic, religious, and economic differences between the Yugoslav nations were obviously too outsized to agree to the creation of a Yugoslav nation, which permanently weakened the Yugoslav state. For this reason, disintegration of the country was seen unavoidable and even normal⁴⁰².

After the end of the Cold War, cultural difference was much used by nationalist politicians in the world, especially in the post-Yugoslav states, to legalize and rationalize not only the disintegration of Yugoslavia but newly conflicts among Yugoslav nations. The cultural factors have a great importance in Huntington's Clashes of Civilizations thesis⁴⁰³. However, it is not easy to explain why Yugoslavia which was the land of diversity stayed alive for at least 45 years after the Second World War, to collapse so rapidly after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, we can understand better the collapse of Yugoslavia with supporting the cultural diversity than several approaches⁴⁰⁴.

Another method to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia depending on cultural factors is to understand the relationship between the Yugoslav nation idea and the creation and disintegration of the Yugoslav state. The disintegration of multinational Yugoslavia was not the result of the fail of the political or economic structure of the Yugoslav state; rather, these fails, which obviously happened and have been documented from the regular damage of the concept of a Yugoslav nation⁴⁰⁵. On the other side, we need to understand how existing deep-rooted enmities and hatreds were at various times overcome and encouraged, and how they re-emerged again.

⁴⁰² Ibid, p.23.

⁴⁰³ Samuel Huntington, pp. 207-9

⁴⁰⁴ P.H.Liotta, "*Religion and War*", Raju G.C.Thomas (Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, Lexington Books, Maryland, 2003, p.91.

⁴⁰⁵ Andrew Baruch Wachtel, "*Making a Nation Breaking a Nation*", Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p.4.

Limited dependence on cultural problems often outcomes in miscalculate the related framework in which the concepts come out defeated or successful. While one should spot to the importance of the characters of a chain of events, also one should not neglect the fact that many reasons in real life powerfully influenced it. Constitutive concepts are not all permanent sets of beliefs and principles, but elastic compositions of factors. For this reason, one, cannot take the concept alone in attempting to explain action, always requests to see what objective factors influenced it and always needs to locate ideas in their realistic framework. At this point, it was exactly that the current constitutive concept was unable for providing a sufficient answer to the challenges of the objective factors that Yugoslavia finally collapsed. Thus, new constitutive concepts were formed in response to both economic and political disasters in the 1980s.

Therefore, it is not enough to scan the concept and its framework alone. The economic and political disasters were mainly the outcomes of efforts by the political leaders to observe their constitutive concepts executed at any price. However they were also vehicles for the advance changing and abandonment of certain fundamentals of the ideology. Nations are neither unchanging population identified once and for all by political, economic, linguistic, anthropological, etc. features, nor are they basically anticipated from nowhere by political and intellectual elites. If anyplace, at that time this is understandable in the Yugoslav problem. The efforts for Yugoslavia to generate or dream a nation despite the reality, by forgetting or taking too lightly the meaning of previously existing diversities, created political tensions, built a framework in which the disintegration of the state was possible⁴⁰⁶.

The cultural diversities argument is a good source in support of the analysis of the Yugoslav fragmentation but just when definite elements of other details are also applied in order to enlighten the framework in civilization process.

4.2.1.4. Weakening of Federal Institutional Structure:

Another feature used for analyzing the end of Yugoslavia is the weakening of federal institutional structure. The main claim is Yugoslav institutional or constitutional system which were either so problematical or simply so impractical. Thus, the structure made it impossible for an integrated and ordinary state to be formed. Especially, this approach

⁴⁰⁶ P.H.Liotta, p.91.

underlines the meaning of the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia. Most of the analysts stated that the constitution paralyzed the Yugoslavia unworkable for federal institutions to perform correctly and it aided the disintegration of the whole system. Not enough clear and already the result of conciliation with different nationalist groups in the republic and provinces, the constitution have often been described as “a plan for secession”⁴⁰⁷ as well as the most constructive legal framework for the establishment of a multi-national state⁴⁰⁸. Naturally, the nationalist secessionist forces in the late 1980s and in early 1990 found a support for their some actions in the content and spirit of the 1974 Constitution. Because other major regulations preserved constitutional logic, they also assisted to the disintegration.

The other major institutional damaging for union of Yugoslavia was the result of multi-party elections in 1990 were held for the first time and, in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, not at the level of the federation. These democratic elections brought to politicians into power who had requested to voters on nationalist basis⁴⁰⁹, although the core of nationalism varied broadly from one republic to another.

Constitutional and institutional regulations are vital for the states. Nevertheless, we should remember that constitutions are always an answer of a definite balance of power. Constitutions are the outcomes of political procedure and hardly ever are the main reason of political events. The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 has not any exception. Constitution of 1974 was the outcome after long and repeatedly very controversial discussions between republics and federal institutions over the future institutional and structural system for Yugoslavia. Of course it was possible to make a different constitution, but the constitution was written for a loose federation rather than stronger federal center, it was no more than an image of what was possible at that period.

In the case of the 1990 elections, the similar counterclaim has validity. The federal elections had not great importance before or after in republics and provinces. The fact that no elections would have saved the union of Yugoslavia- it was too late to be in agreement

⁴⁰⁷ Dennison I. Rusinow, “*Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights and Observations*”, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2008, p.359.

⁴⁰⁸ Dejan Jovic, *Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj*”, Dejan Djokic (Ed.), *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea*, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, London, 2003, 1918-1992 p.179.

⁴⁰⁹ R.Craig Nation, “*War in the Balkans*”, p.99.

on that solution. Briefly, rather than treating institutional system and constitutional regulations as a root of disintegration, they should be treated as direct result of the atmosphere created by the political leaders.

In a wider perspective, the Yugoslav model of “self-managed socialism” showed the results and limits of Yugoslav institutions and constitutional structure. The Yugoslav model, despite its many specific characteristics, basically remained within the framework of the Leninist model of socialism⁴¹⁰. At the end of the 1980s, Soviet empire demonstrated the first signal of collapse of this model. In Yugoslavia, we can explain the weakening of the institutions under the titles of communism, unsuccessful reform efforts and economic disaster.

In Yugoslavia, like in other socialist states, people became increasingly aware that communism had absolutely tired its progressing potential and become an impassable barrier, which had to be eliminated in order to defeat a rising systemic catastrophe, and bring the people into get in touch with the modernization process in the western world. Only in the late years of Tito’s life and, especially, after his death, the system absolutely failed and this happened very quickly when these processes spread through all European communist countries.

In Yugoslavia, like in other communist countries, market economics and pluralistic democracy was accepted as the solution of the crisis. Different from other communist countries, which decided to assume these changes mostly because of internal reasons, the movement for reform in Yugoslavia came from the out of the country. In this respect, communist Yugoslavia had perhaps gone the farthest on the road to reform until the wind of changes in Eastern Europe. Reforms in Yugoslavia between 1950 and 1980 showed that “conservation”, for example, inadequate reforms of state socialism cannot repair its structural errors. Despite many reforms, the system continued basically the unchanged more than the past forty years⁴¹¹.

The irregularity of economic and political changes, which as a rule blocked whenever they called in question the system’s main principle, caused chronic crises in reformative

⁴¹⁰ Predrag Simic, “*Civil War in Yugoslavia: The Roots of Disintegration*”, Martin P. van den Heuvel, J. G. Siccama (Eds.), Rodopi, Netherlands, 1992, p.93-4.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, p.94-5.

agendas and their critical abandonment. Even simple efforts at change, later than initial achievement, increased several problems, which the communist system was incapable to manage. The movement of reforms unavoidably weakened the system, even as efforts to keep changes within its structure eliminated the market system of its correct meaning. In Yugoslavia, this was indisputably showed by the rejection of reforms in 1960s and the failure of the reformative programs of the 1980s. Basically, the basis for the failure of market and democratic reforms was the structural disagreement of the communist and market system forms of social organization. The disaster of the model and the failure of efforts to change, it caused the final crisis of the whole system, which in Yugoslavia as well as in other European communist states started to collapse at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s⁴¹².

However, the end of the communist ideology in Yugoslavia did not cause the collapse of the system; it continued to live and just transformed its symbols to accord of political mobilization, propaganda and communism, and the majority of the former communist elite rapidly adapted to the new conditions. Reluctance to accept correct reforms, and in front of an increasing economic crisis, social protests and rising intellectual uncertainty, the new political forces could only preserve their position by a constant acceleration of ethnic hostility and political mobilization on national basis. Inescapably, this situation caused to open conflicts between nations, and, actually, the communist despotism was replaced by a new national despotism in each new state.

4.2.1.5. Role of Personalities:

Many authors highlight the role of personalities in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. In this perspective, two personalities, Josip Broz Tito and Slobodan Milošević, are often declared. On the other side, we need to enlighten the behind the scenes and learn other performers of the Yugoslav drama.

Briefly, the easy way to explain the disintegration of Yugoslavia is the importance of Tito for the harmony of Yugoslavia. Tito was the only real decision-maker, the real supreme ruler in Yugoslavia. The state was identified by him, and all real power was determined in his own hands. For the period of his administration, Tito was the main authority in political debates. It has often been disputed that, despite the formal decentralization of the country

⁴¹² Ibid, p.96.

following the 1974 constitution, Yugoslavia continued united and centralized because of Tito's personal role. He was beyond the law and outside the law. In 1974 constitution, Tito became the President of the Republic without limitation of office; therefore, any challenge to change him banned as long as he was alive. The main branches of state policy for example defense, foreign and internal affairs were conducted by Tito. When he died in May 1980, there was nobody to reunite the broken ties and to take decisions in the conflicts of interests within the state. Yugoslavia died together with its ruler⁴¹³.

Slobodan Milošević was the other person who has a significant effect on Yugoslav politics. Slobodan Milošević has definitely the leading role in the post-Yugoslav drama. Milošević started his political career as a radical socialist who decided that nationalism gave a better weapon than the class struggle and internationalism with which to defeat the liberal order. He took over all power in Serbia in his own hands and continued to destroy the Titoist agreement over the national issue. As president of the League of Communists of Serbia, he successfully obtained power against his Communists opponents in September 1987. He strengthened his authority by using all state's organs to activate a mass mobilization of the Serbian people over the Kosovo problem. A chain of mass nationalist meetings between October 1988 and February 1989 dismissed the governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro, changing them with ones devoted to Milošević, and compelled the Yugoslav Federal leadership to pass law about changing of Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy in constitution of 1974, then to organize the Yugoslav People's Army against the Kosovo Albanians. These meetings were creating his authority through masses and Milošević became President of Serbia on 28 May 1989⁴¹⁴.

Until spring 1990, the Milošević struggled to build a new centralized Yugoslav Federation under Serbian control. This completely became unsuccessful with the end of the Yugoslav Communists organization, and the occurrence of non-communist administrations in Slovenia and Croatia. In July 1990, Milošević established the "Socialist Party of Serbia", on 28 September 1990, declaring the Republic of Serbia's sovereignty and independence, and secede from Yugoslavia on 16 March 1991 when he announced that Serbia no longer recognized the authority of the Yugoslav presidency. This was immediately followed by

⁴¹³ Dejan Jovic, *"Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away"*, p.28.

⁴¹⁴ See, Louis Sell, *"Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia"*, Duke University Press, Durham NC, 2002

the start of terrorist actions by Serb radical in Croatia, opening a conflict of occupation for new Serbian borders that triggered in the summer of 1991 following Croatia's declaration of independence on 25 June and that was later extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, continuing until late 1995⁴¹⁵.

Milošević's regime in Serbia has been correctly described as a "soft dictatorship". The first multiparty elections in Serbia took place in conditions in which the regime had absolute control in the media and state institutions, and which were consequently far from free. Members of the regime who fell out of favor were frequently assassinated; the murders invariably remained unsolved. The regime's manipulation of elections provoked repeated popular protests, continuing until October 2000, when Milošević's refusal to recognize electoral defeat resulted in his removing from power in a popular revolution⁴¹⁶.

In the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, some intellectuals and leaders played an important role with their opinions and approaches to sovereignty and national self-determination. From the late 1960s, Yugoslavia began to liberalize and decentralize and Serbia lost both its *de facto primus inter pares* position in the Federation, and nearly the entire control over the Kosovo and Vojvodina. These factors generated the source for revanchist Serbian nationalist criticism against Tito's era. The intellectual father of this reaction was Dobrica Cosic, a former radical communist expelled from the Serbian leadership in 1968. Ćosić is a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and is considered by many to be its most influential member. While Cosic has been recognized with writing the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts⁴¹⁷. In 1989 he approved the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, and two years later he assisted to Radovan Karadzic to raise for the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. When war broke out in 1991, he support the Serbian effort. In 1992, Cosic would become President of Milošević's "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro.

Socialist Party and its leadership had close similarities with traditional fascist regimes; therefore, it did not have any effort to improve its fascist legacies. At different times, Socialist Party formed coalition governments with Chetnik movement parties which are the

⁴¹⁵ Marko Attila Hoare, "Yugoslavia And Its Successor States", R.J.B.Bosworth (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p.427-8.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, p.428.

⁴¹⁷ Craig Nation, "War in the Balkans", p.92.

“Serbian Renewal Movement” of Vuk Drašković and the “Serbian Radical Party” of Vojislav Šešelj. Drašković was a leader of the Serbian nationalist rebirth of the 1980s. He has been Milošević’s most obstinate political rival. However, Drašković’s idolization of the Chetniks was basically romantic and, sometimes, he condemned Milošević’s war hawks policies⁴¹⁸. On the other side, Šešelj was a real ultranationalist agitator. Šešelj’s “Chetnik” militia and another neo-fascist paramilitary force, the “Serbian Volunteer Guard” or “Tigers” of Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) fought under JNA command during Bosnia war and were centrally connected with the killing and forcing out of Muslim inhabitants⁴¹⁹. However, Arkan and the Tigers, different from Šešelj and the Chetniks, were attack dogs of Milošević.

Franjo Tuđman was another significant person who influenced the Yugoslav politics. The regime of Franjo Tuđman, in power from 1990 until 1999-2000, also had some similarities with fascism. Tuđman was a former Partisan general and an anti-Yugoslav Croat nationalist during his work as a historian. He had served to evaluate Croatia’s Second World War history more positively; this engaged highlighting Croatia’s role to the Partisans, but also undervaluing the Serbian total casualties in the Ustasha massacre. Dismissed as a director of a historical institute and expelled from the League of Communists for his nationalist deviations, Tuđman, like Cosic in Serbia, reinvented himself as a nationalist dissident in 1989⁴²⁰.

Tuđman and his party had power in 1990 elections, financed by right-wing and pro-Ustasha sections of the Croatian Diasporas. Tuđman and his party continued their own war of conquest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, directed primarily against the Muslims and involving massacres and expulsions of both Muslims and Serbs and the establishment of the concentration camps⁴²¹.

Tuđman’s government method was dictatorial; he turned Croatian television into a propaganda channel for the regime, under strict control independent newspapers and manipulated or unaccepted elections result. At the start, a mixed coalition including liberal,

⁴¹⁸ Louis Sell, *“Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia”*, p.126.

⁴¹⁹ Marko Attila Hoare, p.429.

⁴²⁰ Ibid, p.429.

⁴²¹ Ibid, p.430.

conservative and neo-Ustasha movement, and the party quickly changed into authoritarian-nationalist structure. Nevertheless, Tuđman was a moderately and more conservative person than Milošević. In spite of its anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav style, Tuđman's strategy was collaborationist in association to Milošević. The difference in political character may explain the different destinies of the two despots; unlike Milošević, Tuđman did not exceed limit for himself, he died quietly in office, after which his party was peacefully voted out of power.

The major Serb and Croat nationalist parties in Bosnia identified more honestly than the Milošević and Tuđman regimes with the Second World War comprador and collaborators. Karadzic identified Serb Republic with the Chetniks. The Bosnian Croat's party under Mate Boban, who was the leader the separatist Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna named units of militia, The Croat Council of Defense. Ironically, on the other hand, the Bosnian Croat's partnership with the Karadzic's party in dividing Bosnia directed it to invert Serb's anti-Croat policy, and to agree with the Serbs in killing Muslims. In the process, the Croats completely damaged the image of Croatia as a victim of Serbian violence⁴²².

President Alija Izetbegovic was authoritarian and nationalist leader of the Muslim Bosniaks during the war in Bosnia, but unlike Milošević and Tuđman, he did not use neo-fascist or observably chauvinist public speaking. Izetbegovic supported the Handschar SS divisions controlled by the Nazi during World War II. After the war, he was sentenced to three years in prison for his wartime activities. At the end of the 1990, Izetbegovic became president of Bosnia, but Yugoslavia was already disintegrating. Along with the president of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov, Izetbegovic attempted to support a solution plan to Yugoslavia's political deadlock by offering a loose confederal regime of the country. Izetbegovic worried during the war and in the course of the hundreds of summit and conferences. Many diplomats observed and found him sympathetic but mystical. He was a very special person, difficult to get to understand, and one who was hard to negotiate with him. It was very disputable that his rejecting the Lisbon Agreement with the encouragement of US Ambassador Zimmerman. In the end of the war, Izetbegovic was forced to sign Dayton Agreement in 1995 to Bosnia's partition⁴²³.

⁴²² Ibid, p.431.

⁴²³ Ibid, p.432.

It should be remembered that earlier than the tragedy came out, no political power in Yugoslavia believed the continuation of Yugoslavia. The aim was to change the federation. This would seem to suggest that unionist forces within Yugoslavia were definitely strong and the disintegration was not about to happen. But these were failing day by day and with each careless action of the political leaders.

It would be mistake to state that the nationalist leaders created the problems that directed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. But they enlarged them with their method. As in hysterical synthesis they brought the elements together, making a dangerous mass for the angry outburst. Powerless and unqualified to manage the questions in a democratic and civilized approach they selected to violent ethnic nationalism. Their personal manner unfortunately was strong and arrogant, contrary to tolerance and conciliation. With these manners complicated each and every problem unsolvable; disagreement became to conflict and conflict to war. The Yugoslav drama proves how simply common sense can collapse with a few unprincipled men to agitate hostilities.

4.2.2. International Factors:

4.2.2.1. Role of the New World Order:

The New World Order is an expression of President Bush voiced before the American Congress on Tuesday, September 11, 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. In contrast to the Roman Empire, which reigned under the Pax Romana during two centuries, the New World order has created more armed conflicts and interventions than from the period of the Cold War. There have never been in the whole humanity history so many changes of borders in such a short time, from the coasts of the Adriatic Sea up to the Great Wall of China. The three federal states of Eastern Europe: USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia collapsed and twenty new countries were born with disputed borders.

In the year 1989 we have changed one historical period with another. The collapse of the Soviet Union, reunification of two Germanys, end of the cold war and of the bipolar world have spotted the establishment of unipolar era, only one super-power, the United States of America. This is a unique point without an example in history. This is also the first time that on the earthly level there exists only one super-power⁴²⁴, which is focused in itself all

⁴²⁴ G.John Ikenberry, "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars", *Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001, p.20.*

the characteristics of power: strategic, political, economic, financial, military and even cultural.

The new world order has set up since from the Gulf War and is continuing through Yugoslavia. These two conflicts, in appearance are not presenting any general or similar characteristics⁴²⁵. On the other hand, it was a low probability to occur these conflicts without the disappearance of the Soviet Union. If the independence of Slovenia and Croatia had become unavoidable, the independence of Bosnia in April 1992 was forced and completed by the USA and continued at their self-control.

The fall of the Soviet Union and of Communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, removed a danger of the red army. Reunification will make Germany a leading power in Europe, both economically and financially, and also strong for controlling European Union and of enforcing its pressure on the former USSR protectorate countries⁴²⁶. If truth be told the existence of Yugoslavia is contrary with the "Greater Germany". It was born from the remains of Austro-Hungary; it was destroyed by Nazi Germany. After the World War II, Yugoslavia was born again with the German defeat; finally it has disappeared with the German reunification.

Without the end of the Soviet Union and the German reunification neither would have the disintegrating the Yugoslavia been probable and for a well understandable reason never would either the Soviet generals or leaders have accepted it. In the Yugoslav affairs, the German politics pro-Croat and anti-Serbian was less stated by reason then by an instinct for revanchism as if history was again stream directly to the geography. It is not a question of conspiracy, as the Serbs are inclined to accept as true. It is simply a question of a re-emergence of the geopolitical form of "Central Europe"⁴²⁷.

The end of Communism permitted the rebirth of the emergence of democratic forces in Eastern Europe. Thus, the desire of freedoms of all the peoples to recover their liberty was

⁴²⁵ Peter Hough, "*Understanding Global Security*", Routledge, New York, 2004, p.37.

⁴²⁶ Marie-Janine Calic, "*German Perspectives*", Thomas E. Halverson, Alex Danchev (Eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996, pp.53-4.

⁴²⁷ Gerard Baudson, "*The New World Order And Yugoslavia*", Part Three, Chapter XV, *The Lunacy of Unitarianism*, Available on site http://www.srpska-mreza.com/guest/Baudson/nwo_part3.html (accessed on 02 November 2011).

considered as legitimate in Caucasasia and Central Asia⁴²⁸. Why under these conditions Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina could not also get their self-rule? This dilemma was analyzed in an academic and idealistic manner, without the knowledge of history and interconnection of peoples, as if the three Yugoslav republics were having all the same population.

4.2.2.2. Role of International Community:

At the end of the 1980s, the international society attempted to continue the ancient regime instead of looking for to assist a peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia. Many authors have dissimilar views over what were the real targets of the world powers in Yugoslavia. Nearly all pro-Milošević Serb politicians' judgment about the break up of Yugoslavia, it was the final goal of the West. Against Milošević and supporters idea, it is improbable that any policy by the international community could have continued Yugoslavia in one part. On the other hand, it is potential that the disintegration procedure might have been less severe if the superpowers had taken long views and if they became less unaware. For example, United States policy about Yugoslavia was contradictory from the very beginning. The US, firstly, did not want to engage in a mainly European problem. Then the US began to intervene with its potential as a superpower in order to end the war, firstly by diplomacy and, finally by a military intervention⁴²⁹.

Domestic public opinion also determined the US foreign policy over Yugoslavia. The function of the US Congress in the Yugoslav disaster cannot be unseen, mainly the role of emigrant peoples from the former Yugoslavia that influenced the Congressmen and Senators, with the ethnic ties. While some politicians had an individual interest in the Yugoslav catastrophe, others were almost not responsive of the situation in Yugoslavia or did not want to be aware of it⁴³⁰.

⁴²⁸ Peter Hough, pp.30-1.

⁴²⁹ Stephen J. Blank, William T. Johnsen, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "*U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice*", Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, DIANE Publishing, 1995, pp. 4-8

⁴³⁰ Paul S.Schop, "*U.S. Policy Towards the Balkans: The Role of Domestic Factors and Lessons Learned*", Bernhard May, Michaela Hönicke Moore (Eds.), *The Uncertain Superpower: Domestic Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, VS Verlag, 2003

An October 1990, CIA National Intelligence Estimate, “Yugoslavia Transformed”⁴³¹ forecasted accurately the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This report is a fairly good study about the condition in Yugoslavia. CIA analysts predicted that neither the economic measures nor the Yugoslav National Army would be capable of keep the South Slavs together. CIA report was truthful and right with tables, maps and demographic information. The well-qualified report is very important historically because it shows the highest official level in the U.S knowledge about what caused to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Relying on this information, at the start, the US did not want to intervene and stated that it was a problem of Europe. According to the Slovenes and the Croats it was important to access to membership of the European Community as soon as possible as their national identity, not as Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav government and separatist Slovene and Croatian nationalist politicians wanted for open support from European organizations and governments for their national programs, but, against, EC/EU countries did not have a combined viewpoint towards this issue. Interestingly, in March 1991, The European Parliament accepted a declaration about the matter and declared it’s supporting the right to constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia of self-determination. At the same time, most European governments kept on to support the Yugoslav government and to press a claim that Yugoslavia remain together⁴³².

Germany’s choice to support the disintegration of Yugoslavia became an historical turning point. Germany’s one-sided recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence was understood by some western states as an obvious sign of changing from a restrained “foreign policy of responsibility” to a pro-active policy of “power politics”. After Germany’s quick recognition of these new states, the USA charged Germany firstly for contravention of the principle of the inviolability of national borders and secondly of manner partial responsibility for the beginning of the violence in the former Yugoslavia⁴³³.

⁴³¹ Available on site http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000254259/DOC_0000254259.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴³² Roland Rich, “*Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*”, Symposium: Recent Developments in the Practice of State Recognition, European Journal of International Law, Vol 4, 1993, pp.38-9

⁴³³ Britta Joerißen, “*The Balkans – On War, Peace and Europe, Compass 2020: Germany in International Relations Aims, Instruments, Prospects*”, January 2007, p.7.

As a response to Germany, the Soviet Union supported the continuation of Yugoslavia. Russians support was founded on the historical friendship and shared Orthodox religion with the Serbs. Likewise, the New World Order threatened the Soviet Union with similar reasons. However, Soviet Union could not continue this support because of economic and political decline of herself.

Except Austria, the neighbors of Yugoslavia did not support the disintegration⁴³⁴. They worried about what the future would be of their ethnic minorities who has a kinship and inhabiting in the territory of Yugoslavia, thus, it convinced most of these countries to support the status quo. Also, such countries, as France and Great Britain⁴³⁵, have historical ties and interests to support to Serbia about Yugoslavia.

The wars in Slovenia and Croatia deeply influenced European public opinion and thus also the following European and the US proposals in Croatia and Bosnia. All peace plans, from the Vance Plan, to the Z4 Plan, were ready to conciliation the opinion of sovereignty in any way and fired the subject of international recognition of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia. This finally guided to the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU, the US and other countries. This recognition had an observable result on how the catastrophe in Yugoslavia increased in the era between 1992 and 1995, and the result in the Bosnia crisis⁴³⁶.

The most of states, states organizations and diplomats aware of the Yugoslavia could not establish peace and entangled to more chaos. For example, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was criticized to slow down the effect of the UN by opposing air strikes on Serbian targets⁴³⁷. His determination need to examine clearly, because Boutros-Ghali

⁴³⁴ Matjaž Klemencic, "*The International Community's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis: 1989-1995*", EES Noon Discussion on 11 January 2006, Meeting Report 320, p.1

⁴³⁵ Olivier Lepick, "*French Perspectives*"; James Gow, British Perspectives, Thomas E. Halverson, Alex Danchev (Eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996, pp. 76-97.

⁴³⁶ Matjaž Klemencic, p.2

⁴³⁷ Raju G.C Thomas, "*Wars, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Law: Perceptions and Reality*", Raju G. C. Thomas (Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, Lexington Books, Maryland, 2003, pp.174-6; Adam Roberts, "*Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organisation*", Thomas E. Halverson, Alex Danchev (Eds.), *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996, pp. 180-7

knowingly or unknowingly assisted the cause of the Bosnian Serbs. Bosniaks accused Boutros-Ghali becoming too friendly with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević⁴³⁸.

The major point of the international community's reaction to the Yugoslav crisis was indecision, as it spent a long time before deciding on any movement. The international community, including the United States, did not develop a right strategy over Yugoslavia when the war started. The crisis was made difficult by states according to their strategic interests, which relied on historical sympathies or hostilities.

Without Bosnia-Herzegovina, for all secessions of Yugoslavia's republics, it was clearly argued that they were reasonable on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. The international community's answer to these separatist claims was to recognize the secessions of Yugoslavia's republics, except within the republics. Therefore, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were recognized, but Kosovo, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the Serb Republic, and the Republic of Western Bosnia were not recognized.

International recognition of the four seceding republics was seen by the international community as the application of the right of peoples to self-determination. This is obvious from the EC Guidelines on the Recognition of States issued on 16 December 1991 which were declared in a document that confirmed the attachment of the EC 'to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular to the principle of self-determination'. Besides, the importance that the Badinter Arbitration Commission attached to the share of plebiscites in the seceding republics to determine the 'will of the people' is indicative of self-determination being the basis upon which recognition was approved⁴³⁹.

Badinter Arbitration Commission underlined the international recognition of the right of the Yugoslav republics to their independence in several judgments within existing internal federal borders. These judgments bothered the question of whether Yugoslavia was the victim of secession or dissolution, the scope of the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle of *uti possidetis juris*⁴⁴⁰.

⁴³⁸ Matjaž Klemencic, p.2

⁴³⁹ Roland Rich, pp.42-44.

⁴⁴⁰ Kate Hudson, p.101.

The important feature of the international society's reaction to the Yugoslav catastrophe was indecision, as it exhausted most of the time before deciding on any action. There were many motivations for the resistance. Obviously, the international community, including the United States, would not have an understandable strategy if the war began. The problem became very difficult and complicated by states with using power politics that had their own strategic interests, which often depended on historical sympathies or hostilities.

Consequently, the people of the former Yugoslavia suffered the results of this indecision, however, nobody could know how many lives might have been saved if the international society had taken action differently.


4.2.3. Economic Factors:

In 1960s Yugoslavia was one of the important regional industrialized state and story of economic success of the socialist block. Annual GDP growth averaged 6.1 percent, medical care was free, the literacy rate was of the order of 91 percent, and the life expectancy was 72 years.⁴⁴¹ Between 1975 and 1980, the Yugoslav social product fell and inflation reached an annual rate of 50 percent. When the international oil shock of 1979 hit, policy makers realized they could not continue an economic development strategy based on heavy foreign borrowing and inefficient investment at home. As early as 1983, the government accepted a deep depression. The GDP fell 1,3 per cent in 1983 and average capacity utilization in industry was below 70 percent⁴⁴² (See **figure 4.3 Growth of GDP in Yugoslavia, 1979-91**).

⁴⁴¹ Michel Chossudovsky, "*How the IMF Dismantled Yugoslavia*", Albion Monitor, Available on site <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9904a/yugodismantle.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁴² Susan L. Woodward, "*Balkan Tragedy*", p. 52.

Percent change over previous years



Source: World Bank, *World Tables 1991* (Washington, 1991), pp. 624–25; and *World Tables 1992* (Washington, 1992), p. 653. The 1991 figure is an estimate from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1991–1992* (Geneva, 1992), table 3.2.2, p. 60.

Figure 4.3. **Growth of GDP in Yugoslavia, 1979-91**⁴⁴³

By the end of 1980s, no empirical studies performed to show disintegrative developments in trade and capital flow among federal republics. Respectively, inter-republic trade, expressed by the volume of goods and services transactions, was the more important factor than export and import, as shown in **table 4.1**. Dependence on domestic market was quite higher in underdeveloped federal units, than in most developed Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, data on hand shows that transactions made within the Yugoslav single market were extremely key factor supplied to GDP, both sales and purchasing side of economic transactions, Slovenia had a minimum and Montenegro had a maximum dependence to other republics among federal units⁴⁴⁴.

⁴⁴³ Susan L. Woodward, p.55

⁴⁴⁴ Zdravko Petak, “*The Political Economy Background of Yugoslav Dissolution, Conflict Resolution and Self-Governance in Africa (And Other Regions) Mini-Conference*”, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 3-5 May 2003, pp.3-4

	<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Macedonia</i>	<i>Montenegro</i>	<i>Serbia</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>
Personal consumption	1,550.8	2,517.2	647.2	240.1	3,875.0	1,571
Public consumption	245.3	461.0	77.1	41.0	688.3	342.1
Investments	960.3	1,981.9	386.7	219.1	2,439.6	1,175.6
Export	709.7	1,542.4	215.0	100.9	1,611.9	1,503.3
Sale to other republics	2,240.0	3,387.9	1,056.1	539.9	6,780.9	2,804.3
Statistical difference	281.8	63.9	137.8	32.3	609.7	235.2
TOTAL GDP	5,988.8	9,954.4	2,519.9	1,113.3	16,005.4	7,614.3
Import	656.3	1,334.7	311.3	77.1	1,633.3	1,383.1
Purchasing in other republics	2311.0	3,161.8	939.3	578.0	6,424.4	2,365.7
Percentage of sales to other republics	37.4	34.0	41.9	48.5	42.4	36.8
Percentage of purchasing from other republics	38.6	31.8	37.3	51.9	40.1	31.1

Source: Federal Bureau for Statistics, Belgrade, 1991.

Table 4.1. Structure of GDP and the Proportion of Inter-Republic Trade in 1986
(In Billion of Yugoslav Dinars)⁴⁴⁵

Inflation continued to spiral for the period of the 1980s. It reached 50 percent a year, and by more after 1984⁴⁴⁶, as shown in **figure 4.4**. At the same era, foreign debt increased, unemployment continued high, living standards fell, and regional economic inequalities enlarged. In 1988, Yugoslavia was the foremost country with the highest per capita foreign debt in Europe, approximately over US\$20 billion. In May 1988 the Yugoslav government signed an agreement with the IMF that provided new foreign credits and postpone the debt, in return for which the government agreed to reduce inflation by carefully restraining growth of domestic bank credits. It was the first initiative to use financial policy to control Yugoslav inflation⁴⁴⁷.

IMF demanded from the federal government to adjust the truth of great external debt, by reducing the costs of labor and public expenditure. The government tried to solve the

⁴⁴⁵ Zdravko Petak,, p.11.

⁴⁴⁶ Susan L. Woodward, "*Balkan Tragedy*", p.51.

⁴⁴⁷ Available on site <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/yugoslavia/yugoslavia121.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

troubles with economic mechanisms, but, there was no political leadership that would achieve to implement the economic stabilization program. In 1989, annual rate of inflation (consumer prices) reached 2714 percent, it went to zero in May 1990, bringing bright accolade for these results from Western creditors and governments. But in June economic trends took a turn for the worse⁴⁴⁸.




Figure 4.4: Annual Inflation Rate in Yugoslavia, 1979-91⁴⁴⁹

The other important indicator is unemployment rate about economic system of Yugoslavia in the route of disintegration. The unemployment in the former Yugoslavia was constantly existed, but it was not converted into a disastrous factor for the economic system in 1960s and 1970s. Before the end of 1970s, Yugoslav self-management regime started to lose its control over the tolerable level of employment. The unemployment rate increased to approximately 14 per cent; in 1960s and in the early years of 1970s, the average rate was between 6 and 9 per cent. Anymore, unemployment affected industrial employees and the children of publicly financed administration, generally with university diplomas as well as unqualified workers coming from rural areas.

⁴⁴⁸ Susan L. Woodward, "Balkan Tragedy", p.129.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid, p.54

In 1979, world recession enforced many Yugoslav guest employees to go back Yugoslavia, strong political pressure forced social sector enterprises to begin the slack by engaging extra workers. Since 1980, after the death of Tito, the unemployment began to generate negative political results, exacerbated by the extreme disparities in the level of economic development between constituent federal republics and illustrating great differences in its capacity. The unemployment rate (see **figure 4.5** and **table 4.2**) in federal republics followed sharp differences in own levels of economic development. The unemployment rate in the most industrial Slovenia was 3.2 percent, while in the same time Kosovo's rate was 38.4 percent⁴⁵⁰.

Socialist Yugoslavia was constructed on two opposing doctrine – socialism and federalism, where socialism needs centralization and strict political organization, while federalism accepts autonomy and free-thoughtness, eliminating socialism did not verify in the same time federalism was confirmed. Socialism left economic bankruptcy and the institutional arrangements generalized as an answer to the problem were connected with economic nationalism, because constituent nations were unwilling to accept the other nation's costs of impoverishment.




Figure 4.5. Yugoslav Rate of Unemployment⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ Zdravko Petak, pp.4-5

⁴⁵¹ Ibid, p.11.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Yugoslavia	13.8	13.8	14.4	14.9	15.7	16.3	16.6	16.1	16.8	14.9	15.9
Less-developed regions											
Bosnia-Herzegovina	16.6	16.7	17.9	20.3	23.0	24.4	24.3	23.1	24.1	20.3	20.6
Macedonia	27.9	29.0	28.1	26.4	26.7	27.6	27.7	27.3	27.1	21.9	22.9
Montenegro	17.5	18.1	19.3	21.6	23.5	24.6	24.6	23.6	26.3	21.6	21.6
Kosovo	39.0	39.1	41.0	44.5	49.9	54.2	57.1	57.0	57.8	36.3	38.4
Developed regions											
Slovenia	1.4	1.6	1.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.5	3.2	4.8
Croatia	5.7	6.1	6.9	7.4	7.7	7.9	7.9	7.8	8.5	8.0	8.6
Serbia (Proper)	18.9	17.7	17.9	17.3	17.0	17.4	17.9	17.8	18.1	15.6	16.4
Vojvodina	14.4	14.6	15.1	15.6	15.7	15.7	15.6	13.9	14.3	13.6	16.6

Table 4.2: **Unemployment Rate in Yugoslav Federal Units**⁴⁵²

Need of financial resources for covering the expenditure of increasing employment was even emphasized by necessities came from international creditors as IMF and World Bank, to reduce taxes on properties and services with the intention of opening Yugoslav single market to international competition. While republic governments together decreased taxes on company's earnings, due to efforts to encourage investments and increase productivity, the financial crisis of the federal state became the basic result of economic reforms.

Strict economic failure brought new institutional arrangements has been beginning to build up. With the notion of "economic nationalism", all institutional arrangements developed at

⁴⁵² Ibid, p.11.

the federal units' level to deal with the increasing problem of socialist unemployment. Two models presented for solving economic problems; "The Slovene model" and "The Foca model". The Slovene model heavily depended on free market competition and values in productivity, and could be described as a liberal approach to economic development. The second adjusted typically to socialization of productions expenditure, strong intervention to political framework in the method of production, and could be labeled as a state approach to economic development⁴⁵³.

On the other hand, Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) changed itself into a major advocate of the "The Foca model". JNA continued to expend high amount of public funds in spite of the end of the Cold War. One-sided introduction of federal taxes for direct financing of federal army expenditure give us an idea about as a beginning step in approaching to cruel war. The costs appropriated funds for JNA (see **table 4.3**) accounted for 48 per cent exceeding largely the expenditures for financing economic development in less-developed areas, agricultural subvention and covering the expenditure of structural reforms and social programs⁴⁵⁴.

In autumn 1989, Yugoslav federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic visited President George Bush in Washington to provide for a new economic aid package. In response for support, Yugoslavia accepted to bitter receipt in its broadest sense of economic reforms. "Shock therapy" was started to apply in January 1990. Although inflation had created erosion at earnings, the IMF demanded that salaries freezed at their mid-November 1989 level. Prices remained to increase unabated, and actual earnings collapsed by 41 percent in the first six months of 1990. Moreover, the IMF successfully restricted the Yugoslav central bank. Its tight monetary policy paralyzed federal Yugoslavia's capability to support its economic and social programs financially. The republics were mostly left to their own plans⁴⁵⁵.

⁴⁵³ Susan Woodward, *"Socialist Unemployment: the Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990"*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, pp.264-5

⁴⁵⁴ Zdravko Petak, *"The Political Economy Background of Yugoslav Dissolution"*, pp.8-9

⁴⁵⁵ Michel Chossudovsky, *"How the IMF Dismantled Yugoslavia"*, Albion Monitor; Available on site <http://www.albionmonitor.com/9904a/yugodismantle.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

<i>Types of expenditure</i>	<i>1990 Budget</i>	<i>1991 Budget*</i>
1. JNA (Federal army)	46.9	68.0
a. Current expenditure	39.8	57.7
b. Military pensions	5.1	10.3
c. Funds from previous year	1.9	-
2. Second world war veterans pensions and protection of disabled persons in that war	8.3	16.5
3. Federal administration	9.2	9.6
4. Financing less-developed republics and provinces	4.7	4.9
5. Social program	1.8	2.2
6. Economic transfers	25.3	34.7
a. Agricultural subsidies	4.0	7.0
b. Returns of custom and tax levies	7.5	7.7
c. Funds for covering bank bankruptcies	2.1	2.0
7. Current reserve deposits	0.2	0.7
8. Obligations from previous years	0.9	1.1

Table 4.3: **The Expenditure Structure of Federal Budget (In Billions of Dinars)**⁴⁵⁶

With the beginning of 1990s grouping for defending the institutional arrangements of “The Foca model” was established. Slovenia and Croatia were supporters of “The Slovene model” at one side, and JNA, Serbia and Montenegro were supporters of “The Foca model” at the other side. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were positioned between the two poles. One day after the declarations of independence announced by Slovenian and Croatian parliaments in June 1991, JNA attacked Slovenia. Therefore, the bloody circumstances in the former Yugoslavia were begun.

It was too late to debate which economic program would improve Yugoslavia anymore. The economic results of Yugoslav disintegration became catastrophic. Once, basic macroeconomic parameters turned back to twenty years before, in some regions even thirty years ago. The level of GDP in particular countries slope down for more than 50 per cent. The raise in unemployment figures for particular countries was shown in **table 4.4**.

⁴⁵⁶ Zdravko Petak, p.11.

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Bosnia and Herzegovina							37.0	38.0	40.0	40.1
Croatia	14.1	17.8	16.6	17.3	17.6	15.9	17.6	18.6	20.8	21.5
Macedonia	24.5	26.2	27.7	30.0	35.6	38.8	41.7	41.4	47.0	0
Montenegro	21.0	24.6	23.1	23.1	24.6	25.8	25.8	25.1	26.5	27.3
Slovenia	0	0	9.1	9.1	7.4	7.3	7.1	7.6	7.4	7.2

Table 4.4: **Unemployment Rates in Ex-Yugoslav Countries**⁴⁵⁷

It is undoubtedly fair to say in the sense of modernization processes; the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a simply pessimistic result. In terms of modernization, in spite of the main exacerbate of the economic and political crisis, socialist Yugoslavia was neither a catastrophic failure nor did it have to disintegrate.

Economically and also politically, Yugoslavia was highly sophisticated sample of East European civilization. Naturally, economic factors were not main reason for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but in perspective of political leaders who used them to argue that their ethnic and/or political group was disadvantaged in Yugoslavia. The economic factor exactly took an important place in causing separation among different parts of Yugoslavia which, finally, resulted in rising transforming demands from the politicians, elites and the population. However, economic decline can never enlighten political events totally, because it passes over the details of human organization, specifically, the choices and behaviors of political actors.

4.2.4. Turkey's Approach to Disintegration of Yugoslavia:

Rapid tempo of change in international system since 1989 has required deep revision in the framework of Turkish foreign policy. This revision has been one of the most radical changes during the seventy years examined here. In the new international perspective, Turkish foreign policy makes felt it necessary to adjust its governing principles, strategic priorities, categories of threats and national security documents.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, p.11.

The end of the Cold War signaled the end of ideological East-West divide and brought both opportunities and challenges to Turkish foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990s. Besides, Turkey –with its economic and political potential to play an active and determining role in its periphery- was perceived as an effective regional power by most analysts of international relations. Geographically, the Balkans acts as a corridor between Turkey and the European continent⁴⁵⁸. Turkey is not in a position to ignore any Balkan developments in its foreign policy calculations; also, the rapid domestic and external change in the region urges Turkey to take a more active stance.

During the Cold War era, Turkey's environment was more stable as Cold War had frozen the map to large extent in the region as well as in the globe. USSR was controlling Central Asia and Caucasus. There were socialist countries in the Balkans. Mainly because of Tito's hard rule and Cold War discipline Balkans were stable as well. With the end of the Cold War all the regions around Turkey have been destabilized. Religious and ethnic irredentism have found a suitable ground to flourish and problems began to emerge in Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East causing new tensions for Turkey.

The Gulf War of 1991 was a watershed in post Cold War Turkish foreign policy. In the past, Turkey had stayed away from inter-Arab conflicts, but she involved in the 1991 Gulf War by fully complying with the United Nations resolutions. One should not neglect the role played by president Özal, who acted in tandem with the Bush administration from the beginning of the crisis to help defeat Turkey. Özal saw the crisis, unlike foreign policy bureaucrats, military leaders and some politicians, as an opportunity for Turkey to gain both short and long term diplomatic and military advantages. At the end of the Gulf War, Turkey showed its geopolitical importance again, but close relations and alliance with Western countries could not bring economic and military advantages, in contrast, Turkey lost up to 7 billion dollars in revenue from exports, pipeline fees, tourism and contracts. Also, Kurdish problem in the region became more sophisticated and internationalized after the US-led intervention to Iraq.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁸ Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, “*Jeopolitik Koridorlar*”, Akşam Gazetesi, 26 Mayıs 2010 (http://www.aksam.com.tr/2010/05/26/yazar/17251/deniz_ulke_aribogan/jeopolitik_koridorlar.html)

⁴⁵⁹ Tozun Bahcheli, “*Turkey, the Gulf Crisis, and the New World Order*”, Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael (Ed.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, University Press of Florida, 1994, pp. 435-41

However, The Gulf War brought major changes to Turkish foreign policy, unlike the cold war era, to intervene and help solve the crisis taking place in neighboring countries. Thus, Ankara became increasingly preoccupied with the unstable new politics in the neighboring the Balkans and the Caucasus where Turkish involvement was requested by some of parties engaged in conflict⁴⁶⁰.

With the end of the Cold-War period in the early 1990s, which started after the Second World War and greatly affected the Balkans, and with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, the “Balkanization Process” started to accelerate again. The tension between Greece and Macedonia, the extension of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the spread of the war into Kosovo, and the chaos in Macedonia even made everyone think of the possibility of a 3rd Balkan war. The geography where border and minority related problems are the sharpest in the Balkans. This easily lays the groundwork for the appearance of hot conditions in the Balkans.

After the Cold-War, the big states started a power struggle in the Balkans. While Germany had an economic influence in Croatia and Slovenia, the USA increased her military influence especially in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Except Yugoslavia, almost all countries in the Balkans were attempting to liberalize and become members of Western organizations and institutions.

In the early 1990’s, Turkey was pleased about regime changes in the Balkans unless it led to instability. Before 1990, the formation of an alliance between the two Balkan neighbors Greece and Bulgaria and the Balkans is Turkey's gateway to Europe keep Yugoslavia required a strategic perspective in Turkey's agenda.

The economic and political priorities as well as security concerns have led Turkey to oversee the fragile balances in determining the fate of Yugoslavia and in a sense; it narrowed Turkey's strategic hinterland. Therefore, Turkey, in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, was very careful not to make choices to justify the dissolution and make the new balances complicated. This situation had brought to Turkey difficulty in relations with Serbia and other new independent states. Turkey did not want to face the accusation of the

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, p.443

country makes the disintegration process easy or did not want to be perceived its Balkans interest as creating a penetration policy, during the disintegration of Yugoslavia⁴⁶¹.

After decreasing USSR's influence in the region, peaceful cooperation and dialog possibilities could be developed with disappearing of ideological differences. According to President Özal, after the fall of USSR, former communist regimes entered the political and economic crisis, power gap in the Balkans arouse and Turkey decided to fill this gap politically and economically⁴⁶². Independent Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia requested to become closer to Turkey after fall of Yugoslavia. Albania straightened to develop the relations with Turkey and, even Bulgaria had to changes minority policy over Turks and tried to find a way for developing relations with Turkey⁴⁶³.

Turkey began to organize her economy in order to integration into the world free market economy from the Balkans' communist regimes before ten years ago. Also approximately 10 millions Muslim people in the Balkans created an important advantage to Turkey. However, Turkey's developing economy, emotional approaches of Turkish public opinion and prejudiced opinions of non-Muslims limited the development of relations.

In the field of foreign policy, Turkey tried to make a new project for Balkans in order to accord stability in the Balkans, to show Turkey's importance and to gain new economic opportunities. On 25 June 1992, the heads of state and government of eleven countries, some of them has not sea front with Black Sea, signed in Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)⁴⁶⁴.

Although Özal's active foreign policy understanding and his charismatic leadership was important in this changing style of Turkish foreign policy, there were other factors which forced Turkey to be active and look for possible alternative co-operations. Firstly, with the end of Cold War parameters in international relations have changed and regions around Turkey have destabilized and several conflicts took place. Because of her strategic position Turkey has been affected by these conflicts and had to act accordingly. Because of new

⁴⁶¹ Fuat Aksu, “*Kosova Krizinde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*”, YDÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt III, Sayı 1, Nisan 2010, p. 54

⁴⁶² Ibid, p.55.

⁴⁶³ İlhan Uzgel, “*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*”, p.483.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid, p.519

parameters of new era, Turkey had to reformulate and re-identify herself and her foreign policy. Secondly, with the end of Cold war the importance of Turkey for the West declined in terms of East-West confrontation. In the new era Turkey began to struggle to find new arguments to prove that she was still important in global politics and for Europe. Thirdly, cool relations between the European Community and Turkey played a role in Turkey's search for alternative areas of co-operation and relations with new partners. Lastly, lack of support for Turkish position in international circles on crucial issues such as the Cyprus issue, Separatism in South East Anatolia and the water conflict with Syria and Iraq, encouraged Turkey to look for new allies in the international community. All these factors forced Turkey to be more active in international relations and reformulate her policy according to new parameters⁴⁶⁵.

However, like ethnic conflicts, political instabilities, strengthening of transnational criminal organizations and PKK (Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Worker Party) activities in the region began to cause troubles. In other words, during the Cold War ended, the Balkans moved to the hot war and more instability came to the region. Naturally, these instability and ethnic conflicts influenced Turkey's Balkans policy.

With the end of Cold War all regions around Turkey have destabilized. Former Yugoslavia was disunited and wars break out between the ethnic and religious groups in Balkans. Turkey fell into dispute with New Yugoslavia particularly on Bosnia and Kosovo issues. In addition to this, news about formation of Orthodox axis in the Balkans and Serbian aid to PKK caused negative developments in relationships. Turkey worried about instability and succeeded of ethnic separatism in the Balkans in terms of her internal and foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey defended the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in the beginning of the crisis. In the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, Turkey's political choice for solving the problem was to act an active policy in accordance with the international organizations⁴⁶⁶. So it can be said that after the Cold War, Turkey showed great activity in the Balkans which was mentioned as a conflict and chaos region and its foreign policy was relatively most successful in this area. The reasons of this performance are:

465 Hüseyin Bağcı, İdris Bal, "*Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Opportunities and Handicaps*", Dirk Rohtus, Gerrit De Vyder and Veli Yuksel, (Ed.), Turkije: Springstof voor de Europese Unie?, Grant, Leuven/Apaldom, 2002, pp.3-4.

466 İlhan Uzgel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", p.490.

1. Turkey is familiar with Balkans better than Caucasus for example, and above all, Russia lost its efficiency over Balkans states.

2. Macedonia and Albania required economic and political support, also, tried to find allies against Greece. Turkey always becomes potential ally to supply the needs for these countries.

3. Turkish Foreign Policy in this region was aiming to protect the rights of an oppressed, weak and attacked people of the Balkans.

4. Turkey has principally avoided using religion as a factor, there were arguments of Muslim Arc in the region, but Turkey was against the revival of a Muslim-Christian dichotomy. Thus, she has showed an image of contemporary foreign policy.

5. Turkey has avoided using Turkish kins and Muslim minority in its relations with rival states. She has made suggestions to these minorities to become peaceful citizens of their countries and only making a diplomatic attempt about violations of determined rights in international documents and treaties.

6. Although she has criticized by various groups, generally, Turkey has set its policy in Western institutions always refrained from unilateral actions. Turkey's political influence and its military relations with some of the countries in the region are related with its strategic cooperation with the US. There is a similarity between Turkish and American policies regarding the region. Ankara's policies in the region were much in conformity with the US and this helped Turkey to be active in international operations.

7. Turkey's claim to be a regional middle power rested on its geographical position as much as its economic status and role in international organizations and it was also hoped that an active leadership in these problematic regions would help to revitalize Turkey's strategic value to the West and enhance its own economic, political and security interests.

4.3. THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT:

After the Gulf War and the victory against Saddam Hussein the President Bush declared the world a new era of permanent peace founded on the respect for international law⁴⁶⁷.

⁴⁶⁷ D.L. Cuddy, "*A Chronological History of the New World Order*", John Loeffler (Ed.) Available on site

The tragedy of Bosnia brings an alarming viewpoint on the future of the New World Order. After the end of the Cold War, the world is recombining its political elements in a chaotic way and nobody seems able to guide the unexpected event of ethnical self-declaration in several parts of the world.

In this confused international context, Bosnia could appear as a laboratory where could be proved that it was possible for different ethnic communities, that is Croats (Catholic), Serbs (Orthodox) and Bosniaks (Muslim), whose historical experience is founded on rivalry and distrust, to live together in peace without pressure of a totalitarian power and to cooperate to build up an open-minded and tolerant state. On the contrary, Bosnia appeared as an indicator of the permanence of the ancestral hatred and distrust in Yugoslavia.

Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, series of civil wars and inter-state wars among the newly independent states took place. The disagreements had attracted external interest and they had been internationalized through the participation of foreign states and international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Community and NATO in the conflicts. Among them, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which erupted in 1992, had been the longest and most destructive of all confrontations in ex-Yugoslavia.

Bosnia has the most complex mix of religious traditions among the former Yugoslav republics. According to the census of 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina's population consisted of 43.47 % Muslims, 31.21 % Serbs, 17.38 % Croats, 5.54 % Yugoslav and 2.38 % "other"⁴⁶⁸.

Bosnia-Herzegovina had a tradition of tolerance based upon the ideal of good neighborliness, but it was a tradition that reinforced rather than weak public relationship. The history of Bosnia was filled with ethnic hostility, the great Bosnian writer Ivo Andrić previously referred in "The Bridge on the Drina" to his country as "the land of hate". Suspect between communities was exploited during the civil war of 1941-45, and many of the worst violence of the period were carried out in Bosnia. Despite decades of peaceful cohabitation under Tito, the poisoned legacy of the war years remained alive. Ethnic mobilizations during 1990-91 reopened fault lines and heightened fear. The radical

http://www.constitution.org/col/cuddy_nwo.htm). (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁶⁸ Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_population_census_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina (accessed on 02 November 2011).

nationalist wing of the Bosnian Croat group made no secret of its desire to join with an independent Croatia. The Bosnian Serb leadership refused to accept association with what they perceived to be an aspiring Islamic state. Izetbegovic and his followers were not willing to approve a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would leave them with a small, land-locked territory that did not reflect their real weight within the population. They aimed to preserve a unitary state that the Muslim community, with its growing demographic weight, could eventually come to dominate. All sides were uncompromising and prepared to fight to achieve their goals⁴⁶⁹.

The European Commission's (EC) recognition of Croatian independence on 15 January 1992, under pressure from Germany, had virtually guaranteed war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in that it forced Bosnia to choose between remaining in Yugoslavia, which meant Bosnia's Croats and Moslems would stay under Serb domination, or claiming independence, which would take 1.3 million Serbs out of Yugoslavia against their will. Croatia was implacably opposed to the first alternative and Serbia to the second. The greatest fear of the non-Serb population of Bosnia was remaining in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Taken under the false impression that the western powers would guarantee Bosnia-Herzegovina's sovereignty, President Izetbegovic's steps towards independence, such as the referendum on 29 February, thus gave Serbia a pretext to attack⁴⁷⁰.

Shortly after the international recognition of the Bosnian state in 1992, Serbs living within the Bosnia declared their independent state entitled the "Serb Republic of Bosnia", on the model of the Serb Krajina. This was the implementation of Milošević's project to establish Greater Serbia with the inclusion of all the Serbs living in former Yugoslav territories. The international community believed that Bosnian Serbs could not take these steps without Milošević's direct involvement. The Croats, who received full support from the Tudman regime, had proclaimed their own independent state, "Herceg-Bosna", on the Bosnian territories where they constituted the majority, further destabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian and Croatian claims of independence started the "Bosnia War"⁴⁷¹.

⁴⁶⁹ R. Craig Nation, "War in the Balkans", Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2003, pp. 149-150

⁴⁷⁰ David Anderson, "The Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Background and Summary", Australia Parliamentary Research Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 22 November 1995, p.12.

⁴⁷¹ R. Craig Nation, pp. 151-2

The Bosnian state was unsuccessful to respond to the separatists effectively because it had no military power to prevent the war. Paradoxically, when the war began in Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia in 1992, many Croats and Bosnians thought the Yugoslav National Army would defend them. They rapidly learned that the national army—the fourth largest in Europe⁴⁷²—was clearly in the hands of Milošević and being used to create Greater Serbia. In addition, the United Nations "arms embargo" established in 1991 against Yugoslavia was still in life. Although Yugoslavia collapsed, the United Nations embargo was not end. The United Nations arms embargo had extended the Bosnia war for two reasons. First, the Serbs defeated militarily vis-à-vis other nations since the JNA was under full Serbian command. The FRY's (Serbia and Montenegro) claims of succession of ex-Yugoslavia enabled the Serbs to use the artillery and ammunition of the JNA. In addition, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs continued throughout the war to be supplied from their mother states of Croatia and Serbia. The Bosnians did not have the necessary heavy weapons and material to defend themselves against either the Serbs or Croats. When this weakness was combined with the arms embargo, Bosnians were left almost defenseless⁴⁷³.

A further problem for Bosnians was Western reluctance to intervene in the issue militarily since the Bosnia war was defined as a "civil war", thus an internal matter of Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴⁷⁴. Moreover, the United Nations peacekeeping forces "UNPROFOR" (United Nations Protection Force), which was sent in 1992, did not military intervene in the matter for worry that the lives of the United Nations personnel would be in danger⁴⁷⁵.

Throughout the Bosnia war, the Serbs displayed increased violence against the Muslims. A program of "ethnic cleansing" was put into practice in Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia. The world media broadcasted news about the Serbian detention camps, through which ethnic cleansing were materialized by rape, murder and torture. Serbian violence resulted in a major wave of exodus from the Bosnian cities under Serbian control and/or siege, leading to the problems of refugees and displaced people. The presence of United Nations forces did not prevent Serbian actions. On the contrary, their existence gave a free hand to

⁴⁷² Stephen Schwartz, "*Beyond 'Ancient Hatreds': What Really Happened to Yugoslavia*", Hoover Institution Stanford University, Policy Review No:97, Available on site <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7780> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁷³ Susan L. Woodward, p.365-6

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, 284-6.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, 286.

the Serbs in their actions when they realized that UNPROFOR constituted an impediment or just a verbal justification on the part of Western governments for European military intervention. The United Nations plan of establishing safe territories under its control did not work either. Even the "safe heavens" which were spared for Muslim civilians, including six Bosnian cities (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Goradze, Bihac and Srebrenica) could not be protected from Serbian attacks⁴⁷⁶.

The peace plans that were prepared by international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union failed to end the Bosnia war. The European powers were reluctant to provide this support by recognizing Bosnian independence without an agreement between the three major ethnic groupings. This was also the opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Commission⁴⁷⁷. The EC-led negotiations at Lisbon, in March 1992, led to an agreement on independence with minority groups protected by regional cantonisation and a high level of autonomy. A week later the Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, rejected the agreement after US encouragement to hold out for a greater say⁴⁷⁸. The US then moved the process of disintegration further by recognizing Bosnian independence in the face of European opposition. As in Croatia, recognition directly led to a higher level of conflict as negotiations between the republic and the rest of the federation broke down and all sides tried to strengthen their positions on the ground. This led to a rising casualty toll and refugee flows, 'ethnic cleansing', as Serb and Croatian separatists carved out areas under their own control.

The atrocities continued until the Croatian forces were finally persuaded by Croatia proper to fight on the side of the Bosnians against the Serbs. By the year 1994, the two parties formed the "Muslim-Croat Federation" and unified their military and manpower *vis-à-vis* the Bosnian Serbs. In 1995, Croatia made a sudden attack against the Krajina Serbs by successfully destroying their forces and re-establishing authority in entire Croatia. The unification of Muslim-Croat forces, the defeat of Krajina Serbs by Croatia and the small-scale NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs prepared the ground for peace in Bosnia

⁴⁷⁶ Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup, "*The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*", M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000, pp.171-188

⁴⁷⁷ Peter Radan, "*The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law*", pp. 204-7

⁴⁷⁸ Tom Gallagher, "*The Balkans After the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*", Routledge, London, 2003, p.84

war. The war finally ended with the acceptance of the Dayton Peace Agreement by all parties in November 1995⁴⁷⁹.

The Dayton Peace⁴⁸⁰ led to the establishment of a confederal state in Bosnia, which was made up of the "Muslim-Croat Federation" and "República Srpska" (Serb Republic) owning 51% and 49% of the territories respectively. The peace agreement allowed the federal entities to develop "parallel special relationships" with their neighbors. The Muslim-Croat Federation could establish close contact with Croatia whereas the Serb Republic could do the same with Serbia. This clause of the agreement was criticized to a large extent, since it enabled continuous divergence among the new constituent federal republics, whose establishment had already depended on ethnic and religious differences. However, the Bosnian confederation continued to survive to this date, although internal problems exist and the two federal entities could not integrate socially and economically (See, Figure 4.6. **Map of Balkans in 1995**).



Figure 4.6. **Map of Balkans in 1995**

The Yugoslav disintegration occurred in the post-Cold War framework, when the Western European states were busy with reforming and redefining the roles of Western

⁴⁷⁹ Raju G. C. Thomas, "Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Secession: Principles and Practices", Raju G. C. Thomas (Ed.), *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, Lexington Books, Maryland, 2003, p.10

⁴⁸⁰ Available on site <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

organizations that were established under circumstances of the Cold War. Initially, the European Union states failed to propose a rational policy toward Yugoslavia, which would persuade all the members. Instead, the European Union states declared that they favored the continuance of the status quo, ignoring the existence of independent states, which emerged from communist Yugoslavia. Germany supported the new states, whereas the British and the French were hesitant to react positively and swiftly. In the end, Germany legally recognized Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously by forcing other European Union members to accept⁴⁸¹.

The European Union members acted similarly and recognized the new republics. The United States, on the other hand, was busy with domestic issues and the campaigns for the 1992 presidential elections. The Bush administration was careful about not making foreign policy obligations on the eve of elections. The United States military intervention, which was made in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, had been compulsory for the Bush administration; thus Bush did not wish to make similar links in any other part of the world⁴⁸².

Yugoslavia had lost its strategic importance for the West, compared to the Cold War period. The Yugoslav alternative to the communist camp and the non-aligned foreign policy line was not supported by the Western states any more in the absence of ideological conflict between the two blocs. Still, the European Union and the United Nations worked for a possible peace throughout the Bosnia war. The Vance-Owen Plan⁴⁸³ of 1992, Owen-Stoltenberg Plan⁴⁸⁴ of 1993 can be listed as examples. The election of Clinton as president in the United States accelerated the efforts for peace since he was concerned with the matter more than the Bush administration that used to evaluate Bosnia conflict as "a matter of the Europeans". However, the response of Western Europe was unproductive and led to the escalation of the conflict. European states insisted on diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions, which were agreed upon under the support of the United Nations.

⁴⁸¹ Sonia Lucarelli, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of A Scholarly Explanation*, Kluwer Law International, Hague, 2000 pp.130-162.

⁴⁸² Susan L. Woodward, pp.395-400.

⁴⁸³ Available on site <http://sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/owen/boda/sp13a.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁸⁴ Steven L. Burg, Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1999, p.271-6

When the peace proposals⁴⁸⁵ were rejected by the aggressors in Bosnia, NATO air strikes were put into effect by the enforcement of the United States. Only after the realization of the NATO air strikes, the peace proposal put forward by the Contact Group (the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany and Italy) was enforced upon the Bosnian Serbs.

Fighting continued for some weeks until peace talks were finally convened at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on 1 November 1995. On 21 November the agreement was concluded, recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state comprised of two entities, the Muslim–Croat Federation, with 51 per cent of territory, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, with 49 %. Under the Dayton Accords⁴⁸⁶ the role of international supervision was a key in the development of the Bosnian state. Most scholars and historians argued that Western military intervention had been a late reaction to Serbian violence; the Western reluctance to get involved militarily had encouraged Serbian aggression and lengthened the Bosnia war.

With the beginning of war in Croatia and later in Bosnia, the international community directed its attention to this issue and the situation in Kosovo was ignored during this period. Even worse, the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia meant for the Kosovar Albanians the go again to the interwar period. The process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia presented a chance for the Kosovar Albanians to gain independence, but, despite the invitations from the Croats to open second front in the south against the Serbian forces, they did not choose such an opportunity. Instead, the Albanian leadership took a path of “civil disobedience” and apart from special events; Kosovar Albanians avoided violent actions and armed conflict with the Serbian forces. However, except for Albania, international community did not recognize the independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, the former allies of Kosovar Albanians, Slovenia and Croatia, lost attention in this region as soon as they gained their independence⁴⁸⁷.

⁴⁸⁵ Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_plans_offered_before_and_during_the_Bosnian_War (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁸⁶ The agreement is known as the Dayton Peace Accords. An official print version of the accords will be made available in the U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, Volume 7, Number 1., Available on site <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html>. (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁸⁷ İlhan Uzgel, “*Kosovo: The Politics of Nationalism*”, p.217-8

The Serbian despotism continued constantly and economic and social poverty of the Albanians increased during and after Bosnian war. The paramilitary Serbian groups like Arkan's Tigers⁴⁸⁸ who committed crimes in Bosnia found a new ground for their activities and spread terror among the Albanians. Besides, the Serbs who were expelled from the Krajina region in Croatia in August 1995 were sent to Kosovo for settlement. Most importantly, the Dayton Agreement which ended the war in Bosnia did not address the Kosovo issue. Although the issue of Kosovo was raised by USA during the negotiations in Dayton, Milošević emphasized that it was an internal affair of Yugoslavia. After the end of the war in Bosnia, the Kosovo issue was neglected and international community and world politicians were careless to the cruelty and difficulty in Kosovo.

4.3.1. Turkey's Approach to Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Balkans can safely be stated as a prime area of action, concern and interest for Turkey in post Cold War era. This, however, is more imposed by regional developments than being the free choice of Turkey. The whole Yugoslavian crisis in general, and the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, have drawn Turkey's attention to the Balkans more than ever and for multiple reason varying from humanitarian to historical, from political to security concerns⁴⁸⁹.

Turkey was deeply concerned about the conflict in Bosnia, and followed the longest and most active foreign policy process during the 1990s. Turkey acted as a responsible and reasonable regional actor: Turkey not only defended the morally correct position on the issue and succeeded in putting the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the agenda of international organizations, but also managed to refrain from a unilateral military involvement, and was successful in channeling the Islamic reaction into broader international reaction. Particularly, despite government was accused of not sufficiently active by Islamists, Turkey followed a very active policy during Bosnia War. The reasons of Turkey for taking active attitude on Bosnia are listed as follows⁴⁹⁰:

⁴⁸⁸ Available on site www.mrt-rrt.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/152/SRB36154.pdf.asp (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁸⁹ Şule Kut, "*Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina*", Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Kemali Saybaşı (Ed.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1995, p. 295.

⁴⁹⁰ İlhan Uzel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", pp.499-500

1. It was crucial to protect Muslim Bosniak's presence in Bosnia for Turkey. According to Turkey, Muslim Bosniaks are very close to and part of the European culture, if west refuse the Muslim Bosniaks, it will be difficult Turkey's acceptance into the western family. Thus, Turkey defended multi-ethnic and multi-religious structure in Bosnia.

2. After the Cold War, Turkey trying to improve reduced strategic importance as a regional power, and wanted to be closely involved with Balkans.

3. Turkey was worried about the instability in Balkans due to the interruption of physical connection with the west. Turkey's foreign trade lost great money because of increase in costs, also, Turkish employees and their families' road trips from Western Europe to Turkey was adversely affected from conflict in Bosnia.

4. Turkish policymakers opposed to fragmentation of Yugoslavia due to secessionism since they were concerned about its implications for Kurdish separatists and Turkey's territorial integrity. Bosnian Serbs separation using with arms and its recognizing by international area became a negative sample for developments in Turkey's domestic policy.

5. Almost every fraction of Turkey was agreed to be followed active policies about Bosnia. Especially, Islamists and Balkans immigrants wanted more effective active policy, even unilateral military intervention. Coalition government of Turkey used this public support in order to intervene in Muslim Bosniaks⁴⁹¹. Also;

6. Turkey's attempts to follow a more confident role in Balkan relationships in the post Cold War era also reflected the influence of Greek-Turkish competition and opposition for regional political and economic influence.

7. The support and understanding between the US and Turkey in their approach to regional security issues proved to be helpful for serving greater Turkish activism. The existence of important overlap in the policy objectives of two countries played an important role in Turkey's involvement in the Balkans through multilateral, rather than unilateral projects⁴⁹².

⁴⁹¹ Şule Kut, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkileri*, Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik, p.222.

⁴⁹² Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish Foreign Policy in The Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, October 2000

Consequently, Turkey could not remain a mere spectator of this war taking place in the middle of the Balkans. For this reason, Turkey followed an active policy during the 3-year war. In return for her effective policy during the Bosnian issue, Turkey received her award and showed that she is an important power in the Balkans.

During the most intense time of the war, Tansu Çiller and Benazir Bhutto went to Sarajevo, and this echoed greatly throughout the world. During this war, the American president Clinton exchanged ideas with the president of Turkey many times. Those who gave their names to the Vance-Owen plan were also contacted. Following the Dayton Agreement, Turkey joined the UN peacekeeping forces and sent a unit to the “The Implementation Force,” IFOR. As well as working for the security, this unit took on the task of the restoration of the destroyed buildings and, therefore, attracted the sympathy of the Bosnians. In the “Train and Equip” program initiated by the USA within the context of military relations, Turkey took on the responsibility of training soldiers and officers in the Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation military forces⁴⁹³.

On the other side, Turkey paid the cost of her active attitude in this war. First, Turkey had to cut the relations with New Yugoslavian Republic. Therefore, Yugoslavia became one of the supporter countries of PKK against Turkey. Secondly, Turkey couldn’t prevent the emergence of image of polarization in the Balkans. Finally, Turkey found herself in opposition to UK, France and Russia about this issue⁴⁹⁴.

Turkey has not been as active in the post-war period as she was during the war. Towards the end of the 1990s, Bosnia- Herzegovina improved its relations with the EU and Greece, which reduced the effect of Turkey. Turkey has struggled for the territorial unity of Bosnia since it declared its independence. Turkey has also supported Bosnia’s efforts to integrate with the European-Atlantic organizations. After the Dayton agreement, Turkish leaders quickly renewed their relations with Serbia. Turkish businessmen hastened to invest in this country and the agreements regulating trade between the two nations were rapidly concluded.

⁴⁹³ İlhan Uzgel, “*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*”, p.501.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid, p.500.

5. KOSOVO ISSUE AFTER THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CHANGING OF TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICY:

5.1. KOSOVO ISSUE FROM DAYTON AGREEMENTS TO NATO INTERVENTION:

5.1.1. Dayton Accords and the Impacts on Kosovo Issue:

The Dayton Accords finished the brutal war that raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. On 21 November 1995, the Dayton Agreement was accomplished with great efforts of Richard Holbrooke, recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state was composed of two nations, the Muslim–Croat Federation, with 51 percent of territory, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, with 49 percent. It was approved that the central government would have a Presidency, a two chamber legislature, and a constitutional court in Sarajevo. There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy. Sarajevo would be reunified and controlled by the Federation and would be open to all people of the country. Gorazde would remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation by a land corridor. Srebrenica and Zepa were to continue under Serb control. Freedom of movement within Bosnia-Herzegovina and the right to come back to their home and regain their lost property guaranteed with the Accords⁴⁹⁵.

The Agreements were signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 and a programme for withdrawal of forces and exchange of territory was agreed. IFOR, the 60,000 strong NATO-commanded implementation forces, was set up to implement the agreements, replacing UNPROFOR which withdrew at the end of January 1996⁴⁹⁶.

Under guidance of the Dayton Accords, the responsibility of international administration was result in the progress of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A transitional international administration was prepared to bring the country until the first general elections in September 1996, but actually, supervision continued following to the elections. The

⁴⁹⁵ US Department of State, “*Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina*”, 30 November 1995, Available on site <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bossumm.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁴⁹⁶ Kori Schake, “*The Dayton Peace Accords: Success or Failure?*”, Kurt R. Spillman, Joachim Krause (Eds.), *International Security Challenges in a Changing World, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy*, Vol.3, Bern 1999, p.282.

influences of the central state authorities were very narrow. International involvement was written into the Bosnian constitution – for example, it states that the first Governor of the Central Bank will be appointed by the IMF and may not be a citizen of Bosnia or a neighboring state. The entire process of democratization and reconstruction was to be organized by the foreign nominees of the OSCE, IMF, UN and similar international institutions. Legislative and executive power resides with the UN High Representative. The UN High Representative has the right to over-rule the governments of both the Federation and Republika Srpska.

This post-Dayton process has given rise to significant debate and analysis of the arrangements in Bosnia. Undoubtedly, the Western institutions have been extremely interventionist in their approach to post-Dayton Bosnia. With a Dayton Accords, a rebuilding program showed which completely ignored Bosnia-Herzegovina of its economic and political sovereignty. This program principally depends on developing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separated province under NATO military activity and Western supervision⁴⁹⁷.

The Dayton Agreement had a great importance in terms of the Albanians to determine their own future. However, the rigidity of the Belgrade regime slowed down any international efforts to deal with Kosovo; approximately nothing was done to respond to this rigidity up to late 1997. In contrast, during the fear to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo was intentionally unimportant. Dayton negotiations did not include Kosovo, because Tuđman and Izetbegovic did not concern to Kosovo and Milošević would have rejected to talk about it. Milošević was seen as a head player, and the international community would not like to put at risk the probability of success on agreement. The consequence of this warning, however, was ultimately to valid Milošević's role in Kosovo, and to send a clear signal to both Milošević and the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo was absolutely taken out of current international agenda.

This message sent three serious conflict-rising effects signal. It permitted the new Yugoslavia unrestrained in Kosovo; it demoralized and weakened the non-violent movement in Kosovo, which believed unprotected by the international community and started to suspicion the usefulness of its own policy; and it led directly to a decisive surge

⁴⁹⁷ Kate Hudson, pp. 120-2.

of support among Kosovars for the path of violent resistance as the only politically realistic path to independence⁴⁹⁸.

On the other hand, the Dayton Accords exacerbated the Kosovo crisis. Although it was very doubtful that Dayton would have been a solution for the Kosovo crisis, maybe it would have helped if the process had included a conversation of the condition in Kosovo as a minimum⁴⁹⁹.

In addition, no one can maintain that the international community was ignorant of developments in Kosovo. Although intelligence reports and media information, several well-known NGO's as well as UN Special Reporters for Human Rights were regularly monitoring the situation. Yet the international community reacted with a series of mixed signals. The non-violent movement accepted international supports and admire, but no solid commitments. US bureaucrats encouraged Rugova, but then Dayton unseen Kosovo. The West continued to grant Rugova post-Dayton, but there was no noticeable attempt to support the Rugova to improve a more helpful political position on the status of Kosovo, and there were no actions to put the issue back on diplomatic table. Milošević, meanwhile, who had been warned early about Kosovo, was later constantly guaranteed that its status within the new Yugoslav administration was beyond dispute and that its administration was an internal matter.

In this period, three general effects can be seen on conflict. Firstly, the failure to react sufficiently at the beginning phase of the development of the conflict created difficulties in later phases. The political alternatives lessened at each phase of the conflict. Ignore of Kosovo in the Dayton negotiations, supported to the enlargements that were to escalate the conflict in 1996-97. Secondly, in this period, it was more vital to support efforts to stabilize the condition than to find an answer to status problem. Any negotiation on status was bound to be very difficult since the Kosovars resisted for self-determination and the Belgrade authorities did not withdraw the integrity of Yugoslavia. Finally, most of Albanians began to believe that violence creates results and is a more useful political strategy to achieve targets. It would deeply influenced Albanians perspective for the post-conflict political culture.

⁴⁹⁸ Hüseyin Emiroğlu, "*Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kosova Sorunu*", Orient Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, pp. 108-9.

⁴⁹⁹ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report*, p.60.

5.1.2. KLA Actions and the Response of International Community:

Unending political tension between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo turned into armed conflict in 1996. In this year, KLA (UÇK) made several attacks on Serbian security forces. At the time, the Belgrade regime charged the LDK and its leader Rugova for establishing and supporting “terrorist” KLA. The LDK leadership refused the existence of such an organization and stated that attacks were the actions of Serbian provocateurs. Rugova argued the Serbian intelligence service was responsible for the terrorist actions, which were undertaken to lower LDK’s trustworthiness in the eyes of international community.

KLA was established in 1993 by a group of people and engaged in surprise attacks beginning from May 1993. It regularly increased its activities especially later than Yugoslavia was recognized internationally in 1996 before any settlement for the Kosovo problem was guaranteed and because of the loss of authority in Albania which led to looting of the army warehouses and pouring of the weapons into Kosovo⁵⁰⁰. The KLA members made their first public appearance in November 1997 at the funeral of Kosovar Albanians killed during a police raid to collect taxes⁵⁰¹. The KLA began to create “liberated areas”, to control vast areas and in late 1997, it closed the great reaction of the Serbian police force.

In 1998, a new era started in Kosovo. The armed rebellion of the KLA was cruelly replied by the Belgrade regime and the issue transformed to an armed conflict between KLA and Milošević’s security forces. Brutal actions used by the Serbian forces towards to the Albanians carried the Kosovo issue to the agenda of the international community. Interestingly, the tools applied by the Milošević regime, irrespective of all advices and warnings made by international institutions, in order to find an common answer to the issue within the Yugoslavia ended with the internationalization of the subject.

On the other hand, there was arm-wrestling between the KLA and the Rugova government. The developing of the Albanian movement from non-violence to armed resistance

⁵⁰⁰ Agence France Presse, “*Unknown Albanian 'Liberation Army' Claims Attacks*”, 17 February 1996.

⁵⁰¹ BBC News, “*World: Europe Analysis: 'The KLA's Armed Atruggle'*”, 21 September 1999, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/453897.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

restrained the maneuvering area of the Rugova leadership⁵⁰². Although the rise of the KLA located Rugova in a difficult place and formed a figure that he cannot manage his people, at the same time, it assisted him to show the world that his alternative is armed conflict, which the Western countries fear most.

In 1998, armed conflict between Serbian security forces and KLA bands increased. KLA had little chance of success in confronting the mighty Serbian forces with loosely connected and lacking a strong chain of command. Especially during the Serbian military operations in the summer of 1998, it had to retreat against the advanced and better-equipped Serbian forces⁵⁰³. Then the KLA determined to adopt guerilla tactics after these failures. Although showed to be not very successful on the ground, the KLA achieved some political credibility. The US mediators Richard Holbrooke and Robert Gelbard met with the KLA representatives in June 1998. This meeting was a serious blow to the unshakeable position of Rugova, who always disposed to control all the meetings with international representatives, but now the USA shifted its policy negotiating with the KLA⁵⁰⁴.

The fast but unsuccessful rise of the armed confrontation, while bringing about stronger international notice to the Kosovo issue, has produced a humanitarian disaster for the Kosovar Albanians. The Serbian reply to the actions of KLA had two main results in the Balkans. First, it produced a huge crisis of immigrants and internally displaced people. Albanians escaped from Serbian violence since the security forces attacked civilian targets as well, whom they supposed as collaborators of the KLA. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that in August 1998 there were 260.000 displaced people within Kosovo and another 200.000 outside of Kosovo. Large numbers of Albanians moved to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro to save their lives⁵⁰⁵. Mass exodus of Albanians brought about changes in the configuration of neighboring host states' populations and burden on their economies. The fear was that population movements would bring the question of security to the agenda of the Balkans. Clearly, the international

⁵⁰² Julie A. Mertus, p.6.

⁵⁰³ Tim Judah, "*Kosovo: War and Revenge*", pp. 169-70.

⁵⁰⁴ Dag Henriksen, "*NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in The Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999*", Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2007, p.141-2

⁵⁰⁵ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, "*the Kosovo Report*", p. 74.

community was alerted that the larger Albanian question in the Balkans might arise and create instability in the future. Second, international community focused on Serbian brutality in Kosovo more than ever and period of external enforcement was initiated in order to bring both sides to the negotiating table for a durable peace. It was realized that the Albanian move for independence and violent measures of Milošević regime to eliminate those demands could no longer be ignored for the sake of Dayton.

On the other hand, the outbreak of violence in Kosovo and Milošević's disproportional and cruel reaction produced problems for the Yugoslav Federation. First of all, the recent events in Kosovo brought about the question of Milošević' trustworthiness as the protector of stability; secondly, at a time economic troubles, the outer wall of sanctions⁵⁰⁶ is imposed again on Yugoslavia. More than that, the war itself in Kosovo has its own financial burden; thirdly, the Kosovo crisis has dealt another blow to the already negative Serbian image in the world⁵⁰⁷; and fourthly, the Kosovo crisis resurfaced and intensified the ongoing split between Montenegro and Serbia within the Federation⁵⁰⁸.

In late 1990s, new Yugoslavia appeared in a kind of violent circle of conflict engagement, international pressure, economic troubles and ineffective democratic organization which began to send signs of disintegration again. Briefly, Kosovo is where the dismemberment of Yugoslavia has started and it is where it will end.

5.1.3. Regional Effects of Kosovo Conflict:

The trickiest part of the Kosovo issue is its possible spreading to the neighboring countries and to destabilize the region. This has been the main concern not only of the regional countries but also of the outside great powers.

The developments in Kosovo, besides Yugoslavia, affect directly Albania, Macedonia, and indirectly Greece and Turkey. As the neighboring kin state, Albania recognized the self-

⁵⁰⁶ See details, Enver Hasani, "*The 'Outer Wall' of Sanctions and The Kosovo Issue*", *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, September-November 1998, Volume III-Number 3, Available on site <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume3/September-November1998/hasani.PDF> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁰⁷ See details, Scott Taylor, "*INAT: Images of Serbia and the Kosovo Conflict*", Esprit de Courpes Books, Ottawa, 2000.

⁵⁰⁸ Jacky Rowland, "*World: Europe: Montenegro Clashes with Belgrade over Kosovo*", BBC News, BBC Online network, 23 February 1999, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/284344.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011); The Economist, Montenegro: The Next Kosovo?, 12 August 1999, Available on site <http://www.economist.com/node/231833> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

proclaimed “Kosovo Republic”. Although Albania was apparently too weak to face its northern neighbor militarily, Albania sent strong warnings to Yugoslavia not to use of force in Kosovo. During the fighting in Kosovo, incapable of engaging in unilateral actions, Albania called for air strikes and tougher actions against Yugoslavia. Albania did not demand the alteration of the international borders and accepts the solution that Kosovo could become another republic in Yugoslavia having equal rights⁵⁰⁹. On the other hand, Albanian officials held Yugoslavia responsible for the conflict in Kosovo and called the Albanian armed resistance against the Serbs as self-defense.

Macedonia’s position was even more critical than Albania because the course of events in Kosovo would determine the future of this fragile country. Albanians officially constituted 23 per cent of the population but they claimed that their proportion was as high as 40 per cent. Macedonian Albanians live densely in border areas to Kosovo and Albania, and thus contributing to the fear of both Macedonians and the West alike that the conflict in Kosovo might spill over into Macedonia. Macedonia feared the “Kosovisation of Macedonia” and considering internal weaknesses, it had a point in its concern. The deterioration of the Kosovo crisis in 1998 forced Macedonia to take steps against Serbian actions. New government in Macedonia allowed its territory for future NATO missions⁵¹⁰.

As a regional country, Greece redirected its policy in the Balkans, starting from 1996 and adopted a more conciliatory policy in this region. In an attempt to gain, a better position in the Balkans, Greece solved most of its problems with Macedonia and eased tensions with Albania. During the Kosovo crisis, Greece maintained its traditional policy supporting Serbia and opposing military intervention.

5.1.4. The Internationalization of Kosovo Issue:

After the Drenica massacre, the Serbian argument that Kosovo was an internal issue of Yugoslavia became less realistic. Once the arms fired on such a scale, the situation became internationalized by both drawing the attention to the issue and posing the threat of spreading the conflict. The first signs of internationalization came with decision by The Hague War Crimes Tribunal to gather evidence in the Drenica affair. Then, the Contact

⁵⁰⁹ Heike Krieger, pp.12-3.

⁵¹⁰ Susan L. Woodward, “*Humanitarian War: a New Consensus, The Politics of Humanitarian Assistance: Debates, Dilemmas, and Dissension*”, pp.14-6.

Group (USA, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia) met on 9 March 1998 and decided to impose 10 measures⁵¹¹. While the US pressed hard for tougher measures, Russia, which has traditional ties, opposed such measures against Yugoslavia⁵¹². The Contact Group proposed a comprehensive arms embargo on Yugoslavia for the latter is excessive use of force against Kosovar Albanians. However, The Contact Group reiterated clearly that it did not support the Kosovar Albanian's claims for independence nor it accepted the maintenance of the status quo⁵¹³. Later, international organizations like the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO got involved similarly. With resolution 1160, UN Security Council supported implementation of the bilateral "Agreement on Measures to implement the 1996 Education Agreement" signed on 23 March 1998 by Serbian authorities and the representatives of Kosovar Albanians. With the same resolutions, UN Security Council repeated the earlier call of the Contact Group for an end to armed confrontations and commencement of negotiations to achieve "a substantial degree of autonomy and a meaningful self-administration" in Kosovo⁵¹⁴.

Later, UN Security Council adopted resolution 1199, which basically pointed to the worsening humanitarian situation in Kosovo. These were important moves since the wording of the UN Security Council resolutions prepared the legal ground for a NATO-led operation against Serbia in 1999⁵¹⁵. In both resolutions 1160 and 1199, The UN Security Council affirmed to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of UN, which covered particularly "actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and act of aggression". During this phase, a deep friction between Russia and the other members of the Contact Group over NATO's air strike option became apparent. A NATO strike was in no way tolerable to the Russian Federation, since this would have meant a further enhance of US influence and a precedent for a NATO attack on a sovereign state. Russia could not

⁵¹¹ The Contact Group Letter dated 11 March 1998 Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the president of the Security Council, Available on site <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s98223.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵¹² Christoph Shwegman, "*The Contact Group and Its Impact on the European Institutional Structure*", The Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Occasional Papers: 16, Paris, 2000, p.12 Available on site <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ016.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵¹³ The Contact Group Letter, pp. 2-5.

⁵¹⁴ Available on site <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵¹⁵ Available on site <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

agree on a Security Council Resolution which would go beyond Un Security Council Resolution of 1160 and 1199⁵¹⁶.

On 12 October 1998, North Atlantic Council authorized General Wesley Clark to issue an Activation Order (ACTORD) for air strikes on Yugoslavia. Despite having previously characterized the KLA as terrorists⁵¹⁷, the US administration now threatened to bomb Yugoslavia unless the government agreed to withdraw its forces from the province, verified by an OSCE mission. Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State, appeared to be eager for a confrontation with Milošević and urged President Clinton to bomb the Serbs. Holbrooke went to meet Milošević and the KLA. An agreement was reached on 15 October 1998, and over 1,000 OSCE verifiers went to Kosovo to oversee the withdrawal of government troops⁵¹⁸.

Those agreements constituted the basis of the UN Security Council resolution 1203, which emphasized the importance of materializing the said agreements by Yugoslavia and the necessity of ending armed fighting for a durable peace. Resolution 1203 brought two major issues to the fore. First, it demanded swift action and negotiation from Yugoslav authorities and Kosovo Albanian leadership for the “improvement of humanitarian situation and the conclusion of humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo. Second, it pointed to the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes by attributing the responsibility to the Yugoslavia to provide for safe conditions for their return⁵¹⁹.

A de-escalation of tension began, although there were some outbursts of violence, usually instigated by the KLA. Most critically, the agreement was only made with one side of the conflict and did not gain the support of the KLA. Indeed, the KLA, which had been almost totally crushed by the Serbian offensive, capitalized on the Serbian withdrawal to regroup their forces and to regain control of territory that had been vacated by the withdrawing Serb forces. Quite naturally, the Serbian police and military leaders bitterly complained to

⁵¹⁶ Christoph Shwegman, p.13.

⁵¹⁷ Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, p. 146

⁵¹⁸ Christoph Shwegman, pp. 13-4

⁵¹⁹ Available on site <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

the OSCE about these developments over which the OSCE, given its mandate and capabilities, was quite powerless to act⁵²⁰.

When, in retaliation to the KLA provocations, Serbian hostilities were resumed in December 1998, the West was again confronted by the same dilemmas and divisions over what action should be taken. However, now, after almost a year of prevarications and the issuing of empty military threats, Western resolve and credibility of NATO were being questioned. A decisive catalyst for more forceful action occurred with the evidence of a Serbian massacre of 45 Kosovars in Racak on 15 January 1999, which was immediately broadcast to the world by the head of the OSCE Verification Mission, William Walker⁵²¹. On the other hand, many observers at the time were unconvinced by the scene, and independent autopsy evidence showed that they were most likely fighters killed in combat and put in place later by the KLA to resemble a massacre⁵²². In the aftermath of this event, US convened her European allies and demanded that the time for uncertainty and talk had ended and that any further diplomatic demarches must be backed by the explicit and credible threat of force against Belgrade. This time, the reluctant European allies concurred and the French and the British, who were enjoying a new entente cordiale after the St. Malo agreement in October to strengthen the EU's defense capabilities, agreed to host a conference at Rambouillet where the Yugoslav and Kosovar delegation would be required to sign pre-prepared peace settlement. In the background, NATO's ACTORD for air strikes was reactivated.

5.1.5. Rambouillet Conference:

Following the Racak massacre, the Contact group met on 29 January and called for both the Serbian regime and the Kosovar Albanians to be present at the Rambouillet (France) talks in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem. This call for direct negotiations symbolized the end of unsatisfactory indirect talks of warring parties. The Contact Group demanded that the negotiations should end in 21 days starting from the date of the call.

⁵²⁰ OSCE Newsletter, "*Tense Christmas in Kosovo*", December 1998, Vol. 5, No.12, pp. 1-2, Available on site <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/documents/14699> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵²¹ Iain King, Whit Mason, "*Peace At Any Price: How The World Failed Kosovo*", Cornell University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 44-5.

⁵²² An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999, "*Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told*", Volume I, October 1998 - June 1999, Available on site <http://www.osce.org/files/documents/d/d/17772.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

However, both the first (6-23 February) and the second (5-18 March) rounds of the Rambouillet talks came to a deadlock, since the Serbian delegation refused to sign an agreement. In the following days both UN Security Council and North Atlantic Council made declarations, supporting the requirements for a peaceful solution put forward by the Contact Group. The rapid unwritten involvement of these organizations demonstrated both the emphasis given to the Kosovo issue and the possibility of coercive diplomacy in case the parties failed to reach a peaceful solution.

Rambouillet was an extraordinary conference because the terms of settlement were basically dictated by the organization states and the local parties to the dispute were given the option either to sign or to face military reprisal.

The two delegations came to Rambouillet with very different considerations in their minds. The Serbian delegation, which did not include any member of the ruling elite, acted very determinedly on two major issues. Maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia was a top priority for the Serbian regime, which still perceived Kosovo as an internal matter. Besides, Serbia was adamant in expressing its opposition to foreign troops to be located on the territories of Kosovo or any other part of Yugoslavia. Serbia insisted that the entry of foreign troops in any part of Yugoslavia was unacceptable since the matter touched upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The Albanians, on the other hand, favored foreign intervention in the conflict and supported international attempts to find a solution to the disagreement. The Albanians pointed out that the autonomous status established the legal roots of independence from Serbia and the new Yugoslavia since had the right to separate before 1989, just like any other constituent Ex-Yugoslav republic. They went even further and argued that they had never been a part of Serbia. For the Albanians, Yugoslavia was an artificial creation of the Great Powers and the Albanians never felt part of this multilateral political configuration.

A principally hot point was the secret Appendix B in the drafting of which Russia had not agreed, which stated that: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or

facilities as required for support, training, and operations”⁵²³. The terms offered to the Serbian delegations at Rambouillet were regarded as unacceptable and unthinkable. To many experienced observers, it seemed as a calculated challenge to provoke a Serbian refusal that would be legalized a NATO intervention that had been previously determined. In an interview, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that “The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.”⁵²⁴

With the stopping of the talks, the Albanian, US and British delegations signed the text on 18 March while the Serbian and Russian delegations rejected. Talks were canceled the next day. Actions continued quickly after the fiasco at Rambouillet. OSCE/Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) international monitors leaved on 20 March, for danger reasons in front of the expected NATO operation. On 23 March, the Serbian assembly declared the law of autonomy for Kosovo and the non-military part of the Rambouillet agreement. However, the Serbian delegations had resistance to the military part, Appendix B specifically, which it illustrated as ‘NATO occupation’. The Serbs described the full document as unfair because the military part had only been offered at the very end of the talks without room for negotiation, and because the other side directly refused to hold direct negotiations with and even to meet the FRY delegation. The following day, on 24 March, NATO’s bombardment began⁵²⁵.

A defining feature of the Rambouillet process was the fixed timeline combined with the bombing ultimatum. Arguably, this was a no-nonsense approach designed to convince Serbia that it could no longer get away with stalling or backtracking, or making concessions on paper that would then be withdrawn by action. Facing a fundamentally duplicitous negotiating partner like Milošević, Albright and others evidently saw the ultimatum force tactics as the only ones that could bring about change in Serb policy in

⁵²³ http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_ambouillet_text.html

⁵²⁴ Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1999.

⁵²⁵ Débora García-Orrico, Kosovo, Blanca Antonini (Ed.), Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII “Design, Implementation and Accountabilities The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone”, FRIDE, Madrid, 2009, p.123.

Kosovo. It was, however, a problematic strategy. International law formally outlaws the use of threat of force in international negotiations. The inherent risk-taking of the strategy is not an approach to resolve underlying problems or to make war of last resort. Unfortunately, in Bosnia and in the case of Kosovo, it turned out that only threat of force and deadlines could make negotiations possible.

5.1.6. Kosovo War and NATO Intervention:

The main objectives of the air strikes were to force Milošević ‘back to the negotiating table’ and thereby halt a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO’s expectation that this would simply take a few days was reflected in its willingness to only take limited actions and its decision to, for example, rule out the use of ground force⁵²⁶. However, Milošević immediately began a brutal policy of ethnic-cleansing that by the end of the seventy-eight day war had resulted in 850,000 ethnic Albanian refugees, between 300,000-400,000 internally displaced people within Kosovo, and approximately 10,000 killed.

Although it took much more time and effort than NATO had anticipated, by June 1999, NATO had managed to convince Serb commanders to withdraw military forces from Kosovo. Peace was formally instigated on June 10 by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO itself considered the war to have been a great achievement: a successful air campaign that achieved the original objectives, and low losses of life in terms of both civilian casualties and NATO personnel.

While end of hostilities and limited casualties are definitely commendable achievements, the Kosovo war was nevertheless deeply flawed in many respects. The most obvious failure was NATO’s inability to avert Milošević’s ethnic cleansing campaign, mainly the result of NATO doing too little, too late. Furthermore, there were some governments who were very wary of not only the fact that NATO went ahead with its mission despite no UN backing, but also that such activity could set dangerous precedents. However, the most major failure, and the one to cause the most serious repercussions, was the lack of attention paid to finding a political solution for the territory. Although NATO had planned to address governing arrangements following the war, no serious consideration during this time period was given to what the territorial status of Kosovo should be. This can be seen in the contradictory statements made by the American government, for example.

⁵²⁶ Javier Solana, “*NATO Sırp Halkına Karşı Savaş İlan Etmedi*”, *Hürriyet*, 27 March 1999.

In the week before the commencement of the NATO air strikes, then-US President Bill Clinton stated, “With our NATO allies and with Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-determination and government they need and to which they are entitled under the constitution of their government”⁵²⁷. This statement would seem to suggest American support for the self-determination of the ethnic Albanian people, and therefore their right to statehood. However, in numerous other addresses, the issues of self-determination and state status were altogether left out. For example, in Clinton’s speech to his country regarding the initiation of NATO bombing he said,

“Our strikes have three objectives. First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second to deter President Milošević from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities”⁵²⁸.

In one address to the Serbian people, in fact, Clinton declared, “the NATO allies support the desire of the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo as part of your country”⁵²⁹. And both during the war and immediately afterwards, Secretary of State Madeline Albright as well as State Department spokesman James Rubin claimed on behalf of the US that “we have always said we do not support independence for Kosovo, and we do not support independence for Kosovo now”⁵³⁰.

Such contradictory statements were echoed in UN Security Council resolutions, which had the tendency to stress ‘self-administration’ and ‘self-government’ for the Kosovar people, but not ‘self-determination’. Thus, in combination with the actions taken by the international community in the decade before the Kosovo war, together with the contradictory messages to the Kosovar people during the war regarding what their political status would be, an impression of an incapable and arbitrary international system was

⁵²⁷ Bill Clinton, William J. Clinton, “*Presidents News Conference*”, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 19 March 1999, p. 409.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, Remarks Announcing Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 24 March 1999, p. 449.

⁵²⁹ Ibid, Videotaped Address to the Serbian People, 25 March 1999, p. 455.

⁵³⁰ U.S. officials expect Kosovo independence, cnn.com, 24 September 1999, Available on site <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9909/24/kosovo.us/> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

allowed to develop. And indeed, the international system in this respect is arbitrary. Without a clear formula of how to address crises involving self-determination, nationality, and statehood, any action taken by the international community will both appear and will be illogical and two-faced. And the consequence of this confused system, for conflicts like Kosovo, is that no quick and adequate resolution will take place. This is demonstrated nowhere more obviously than in the time period immediately after the war and to the present day in Kosovo

5.2. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER KOSOVO WAR:

At the end of the bombardment on 9 June 1999 NATO AND Yugoslavia signed a peace agreement and only a day after the signing of an agreement, UN Security Council issued resolution 1244, which signaled the creation of new state affairs in Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo became a UN protectorate, while still formally under Yugoslav sovereignty. It was run by three bodies: the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was responsible for administration; the OSCE was responsible for lawmaking, organizing elections, and facilitating an independent media; and the KFOR military mission was in charge of security. The KLA was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) by the UN⁵³¹.

Resolution 1244 approved the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), to be headed by the Special Representative of The Secretary General as the most senior civilian official in Kosovo.⁵³² UNMIK was designed to collaborate with major international organization during the process of implementing resolution 1244. The basic responsibilities of UNMIK were described under four columns, which consisted of humanitarian aid and the return of refugees (led by the High Commissioner for Refugees), civil administration (under the patronage of the United Nations), democratization, human rights, rule of law and institution-building (guided by the OSCE) and reconstruction and development (managed by the EU). In addition, issue of security and policing were to be undertaken by NATO. The special security force, called “Kosovo Stabilization Force” (KFOR) would be established in accordance with the agreement by NATO and Yugoslavia and it would be deployed simultaneously with the departure of Serbian forces (20 June

⁵³¹ Kate Hudson, p.135.

⁵³² Available on site <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

1999) from Kosovo. KFOR consists of soldiers from various NATO countries and 50,000 troops are centered in five main areas of the province (see Figure 5.1. **Map of Kosovo Force (KFOR) Sectors [May 2002]**) with the responsibility of ‘keeping the peace’. KFOR’s mandate was to⁵³³:

- deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order;
- demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army;
- support the international humanitarian effort; and
- coordinate with and support the international civil presence.

However, the main duties of KFOR would be border controls and border-security as well as aiding the return of refugees and the displaced persons. Thus the process of peace implementation would be realized with the involvement of major international organizations, which had both the necessary means and experience.



Figure 5.1. **Map of Kosovo Force (KFOR) Sectors (May 2002)**

⁵³³ Available on site http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

While Resolution 1244 was important in that it provided for both a provisional method of governing Kosovo as well as a temporary means to ensure peace, it neglected to address the future final status of Kosovo. This has made UNMIK's governing of the province difficult, as well as KFOR's task of guaranteeing security and stability. Ultimately, this has proven to be the factor most responsible for the continuing unrest within the province.

UNMIK and KFOR did share some immediate success in providing for the safe return of nearly all of the 1.3 million ethnic Albanian refugees who had been displaced during Milošević's rule. However, neither of them proved capable of preventing the expulsion from Kosovo of over 250,000 non-Albanians - mostly Serbs and Roma – by KLA revenge attacks. Since 1999 the track record of both UNMIK and KFOR has been mixed at best. On the positive side, the level of violence within Kosovo has decreased tenfold since 1999, the province operates its own police force and judiciary, and Milošević was on trial for war crimes in The Hague.

5.2.1. Demilitarization of the KLA and Reactions:

On 15 December 1999, both Ibrahim Rugova and Hashim Thaci made an agreement with UNMIK in order to disperse their underground governments⁵³⁴. This agreement was the first step towards normalizing life in Kosovo after the end of NATO's operation and in the route of creation the features of the UNMIK. It should be kept in mind that demilitarization of the KLA was a vital part of the agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia, which aimed to create a truly running system of justice and security in Kosovo. Additionally, UNMIK decided to use the KLA for matters of internal security and transform its forces into "Kosovo Protection Corps" (TMK). Disarmament and transformation of the KLA was successful. During that process, UNMIK faced an extra obstacle; emergence of the "Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac" (UCPMB) in three provinces which were located at the southern part of Serbia, well-known as "Presevo Valley". In fact certain groups from the KLA, which rejected to join in TMK, attached the UCPMB increased its actions mostly at the "Ground Security Zone" between Serbia and Kosovo, which was established after the end of the peace agreement⁵³⁵. This was also part of the Albanian revenge actions which came to the agenda after the Operation Allied Force.

⁵³⁴ Available on site <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/press/pr115.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵³⁵ International Crisis Group, "Serbia: Maintaining Peace In The Presevo Valley", Europe Report No:186, 16 October 2007, Brussels, p.1

Interestingly, UCPMB activities decreased after Milošević removed. The period of political transition in Serbia created a suitable atmosphere for the UCPMB to become visible its declared aim of equal rights for the Albanians. The main thesis of the UCPMB was that the rights of the Albanians who resided in southern Serbian territories were also violated so these people should be granted their basic rights and join the future independent state of Kosovo.

5.2.2. Elections in Serbia and Kosovo after NATO's Operation Allied Force:

In the year 2000, two critical elections directly connected to Kosovo's future were held in Serbia and Kosovo. On 24 September 2000, presidential elections took place in Serbia, which brought an end to Milošević's rule, thanks to the opposition parties that met under the "Democratic Opposition of Serbia" (DOS) led by Vojislav Koštunica. Milošević declared the election results invalid once it became understandable that he would be expelled from the presidency. On 5 October, an opponent movement was triggered by the Serbs that protested Milošević's reactionary approach to the election results and called for respect to the majority votes. With the Serbian mass movement, Vojislav Koštunica and his allies from DOS got the chance to finally establish a new government and change the old regime⁵³⁶.

The election of Kostunica represented the opening of a new era in domestic and foreign policy orientations of Yugoslavia. But a series of problems wait for the new administration. The new government had to set up the rule of law and recover the economy and clean the impacts of authoritarian system by establishing a new one that would be respected both inside and outside. With the aim of reaching democratic standards in politics and having a working financial system, the "voted" had to collaborate with the international community, mainly with the West. In the first instance, Yugoslavia was in need of material aid in order to recreate the country after about ten years of wars. This, in turn, obliged the rulers of the Yugoslavia to work together with the external world on issues like the trial of Milošević by the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY had issued an indictment on Milosevic because of his cruel policies

⁵³⁶ Robert Bideleux, Ian Jeffries, *"The Balkans: A Post-Communist History"*, Routledge, New York, 2007 p.271-4

about the Albanian population in Kosovo, especially in the second half of the 1990s⁵³⁷. Handing over Milošević to the Court in The Hague would be a serious step taken by the new government of Yugoslavia. It would make easy the integration of the FRY with the international community.

In Kosovo, local elections, organized by OSCE were held on 28 October 2000. During the local elections of 2000, three parties contested. The first was the LDK of Rugova. Following the disarmament of the KLA, political heritage divided among different political parties, like the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) of Hachim Thaçi and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) led by a KLA commander, Ramus Haradinay⁵³⁸. Results of the elections showed significant support of Kosovar Albanians to Ibrahim Rugova, while the Serbs and some other minority groups, like the Turks, boycotted it. The result of the elections imposed the statement that the Albanians in Kosovo preferred stability in the region instead of disorder and armed confrontation.

Shortly after the results of the Kosovo local elections were made public, Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a press release through which concern about the withdrawal of Turks, together with other ethnic groups from the election procedure was put forward. In the official statement, it was stated that “Kosovar Turks have rightfully reacted to the fact that Turkish had been deprived of an equal status with Albanian and Serbian languages used in the forms for the registration process”⁵³⁹. In its statement, the Ministry put the burden on UNMIK as the major responsible for organization of the elections. In addition, it was demanded that the UN Special Representative of Secretary General for Kosovo should take the initiative to appoint members of the legitimate political party of Kosovar Turks: Turkish Democratic Union (TDU) to the Municipal Assemblies. Finally, Turkey’s hope of a final solution to the Kosovo issue “through negotiations” was pointed out without any reference to the proper method to realize that objective. Apart from mentioning the status and fundamental rights of the Turkish population, the statement included some general remarks regarding Kosovo and the need to find a peaceful solution to the conflict between

⁵³⁷ Ibid, p.284-8

⁵³⁸ Ibid, p.563-4

⁵³⁹ “Local Elections in Kosovo No:206 - November 4, 2000” Available on site http://www.mfa.gov.tr/local-elections-in-kosovo_br_no_206--_november-4_-2000.en.mfa (accessed on 02 November 2011).

the Serbs and Albanians⁵⁴⁰. What deserves attention regarding Turkish attitude is that policy was based on the protection of the rights of Turks in Kosovo, rather than an overall approach to the solution of this conflict from Turkey's perspective.

Although the winner of the October 2000 local election in Kosovo was the moderate LDK of Rugova, an overall evaluation of the facts in this problematic environment puts forward the fact that LDK was not the only influential political organization. The political arm of the KLA represented by Hashim Thaci and the Albanians who still perceive military power as a necessity for this province, all have a say on their own future.

5.2.3. The New Constitutional Framework for Kosovo:

In 15 May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Kosovo enounced the "The New Constitutional Framework" which put forward the principles of self-government in Kosovo, before the general elections took place in November 2001. The principles of the "New Constitutional Framework" can be listed as follows: The Assembly will consist of 120 members. The President will be elected by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly for a term of three years. The 'Presidency', elected by the Assembly, will consist of seven members determined by the rate of votes. However the Serbs and non-Albanian or non- Serb communities will have "one" reserved seat each in the Presidency appointed by the representatives of these ethnic groups. The "Government" will be presiding by the Prime Minister with nine Ministers who will be proposed by the President and approved by the Assembly. Although the New Constitutional Framework set the parameters of self-government in Kosovo, the functions of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Kosovo will continue with respect to administration and cohesion between various international organizations. This was due to the legal recognition of the resolution 1244 that acknowledged Kosovo as part of the FRY⁵⁴¹.

On 17 November 2001, general elections were held. The LDK was the prevailing party of the elections winning 47 seats of the 120 members Assembly, while the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci won 26 seats and the Alliance for the Future of

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ See details on Blerim Reka, *"UNMIK As An International Governance In Post-War Kosova: NATO's Intervention, UN Administration and Kosovar Aspirations"*, Logos-A, Skopje, 2003, pp. 246-72

Kosovo (AAK) got 8 seats. The Serb "Return" (Povratak) coalition became the third popular party winning 22 seats in the elections⁵⁴². Within this configuration, the Kosovo Assembly failed to elect a President following the end of the general elections. It was on 4 March 2002 when the Assembly finally succeeded to elect and Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK as Prime Minister through a compromise of the three Albanian parties: LDK, PDK and AAK⁵⁴³.

5.2.4. The Enlargement of the "Albanian Question" to Macedonia:

A small group of armed Albanians killed three Macedonian policemen in Tanusevci, located in the north of Macedonia, just across the border with Kosovo on 4 March 2001⁵⁴⁴. This was the beginning of a series of nationalist events in Macedonia, to unfold an organized armed rebellious Albanian group called "National Liberation Army" (NLA). Although the first attacks of the NLA were not taken seriously, the continuous actions of the group attracted foreign attention. The chaos later spread to Tetevo and Kumanovo⁵⁴⁵. The NLA and its supporters had concrete demands from Macedonia. Like the other ethnic Albanian groups in Kosovo and Presevo Valley, they demanded equal rights for every individual in Macedonia. Their claims particularly rested on an equal constitutional status for both the Macedonians and Albanians, acceptance of Albanian as official language of the state and equal job opportunities in state institutions.

The roots of problematic relations between the Albanians and the Macedonian administration go back to 1989, when an amendment was made to the Macedonian Constitution. By this amendment the republic was defined as the "national state of the Macedonian nation" by abolishing the previous designation of the statehood as the "state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities"⁵⁴⁶. Shortly after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Macedonia declared its independence on 17 September 1991.

⁵⁴² Marcus Brand, *"The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority From UNMIK to Local Self-Government"*, Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), Geneva, January 2003, pp.34-5

⁵⁴³ Ibid, p.37

⁵⁴⁴ BBC News, *"Tanusevci Flashpoint"*, 7 March 2001, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1206589.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁴⁵ BBC News, *"Macedonia Conflict Escalates"*, 14 March 2001, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1221085.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁴⁶ Sabrina P. Ramet, *"The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005"*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 2006, p.319.

Since Macedonia achieved its sovereignty in a peaceful manner the status of minorities in that ex-Yugoslav republic was not considered to be problematic by the international community that had later deployed the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in order to prevent the spread of Yugoslav wars of dissolution to the south. Macedonian state has a *sui generis* ethnic composition, which consisted of Slav Macedonians (64 %), Albanians (25 %), Turks (4%), Rhomas (3%), Serbs (2%) and others (2 %) ⁵⁴⁷. The ethnic configuration of the country is like a small picture of the Balkans, where the population is made up of multiple ethnic and religious groups.

Being the second largest ethnic group in Macedonia, the Albanians had certain demands from the rulers since the first multi-party elections, which brought Kiro Gligorov to the presidency in 1990. The Albanians mainly focused on access to language and educational rights, free media in their native language and equal opportunities in various state occupations". All these demands pointed to the achievement of equal status in both the state apparatus and Macedonian social life, since they felt that they were discriminated against. In 1995, the Albanian attempt to set up a private Albanian-language university in Tetovo was harshly repressed by the Macedonian police ⁵⁴⁸. Basically, the Albanians desired to play a more active role particularly after seceding from Yugoslavia and they wanted an "autonomous status for the northern and western parts of Macedonia, where a large group of Albanians lived. However, the Albanian demands were neglected by the Macedonian regime.

The flood of huge number of Albanians into Macedonia, following the Kosovo crisis in 1999, led to discomfort on the part of Macedonia. The fear was that increase in number of the Albanians who resided in Macedonia might change the balance in favor of the Albanians and stimulate long awaited uprising by that major ethnic group. A further cause for the 2001 uprising was the escape of former KLA and UCPMB paramilitaries to Macedonia. These extremist groups aimed to materialize their national objectives by simultaneous crises in states where large group of ethnic Albanians lived. This tendency repeated itself particularly after the Kosovo crisis of 1999.

⁵⁴⁷ CIA The World Fact Book, 12 January 2011, Available on site <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁴⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet, "*The Three Yugoslavias*", p. 575.

When the conflicts intensified in Macedonia, a "government of national unity" was established on 13 May 2001 to end the uprising and prepare the state for the early general elections of 2002. The new government was headed by Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). Democratic Party for the Macedonian National Unity (DPMNE) and Democratic Party of Albanians (POSH) and the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) made up two Albanian parties of the coalition government⁵⁴⁹. However the coalition failed to implement the necessary measures to satisfy the Albanian insurgents and to stop atrocities which resumed in the northern part of the state.

Later the "Ohrid Agreement" was signed between the Albanians and the Macedonians on 13 August 2001⁵⁵⁰. Furthermore, NATO implemented "Operation Essential Harvest", which continued from 22 August to 26 September 2001⁵⁵¹. Upon this operation, 3500 NATO troops were sent to Macedonia for providing logistical support to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. Following the termination of this, NATO started its "Operation Amber Fox" with 700 troops⁵⁵² with a specific mandate to provide protection for international monitors who would observe the adoption of the Ohrid Agreement. On 15 September 2002, general elections were held in Macedonia. The most vital outcome was the overwhelming victory of the Albanian party of "Democratic Union for Integration" led by the famous figure Ali Ahmeti. Since this party had a great victory at the elections, its participation in the new government became possible.

5.2.5. The Issue of Montenegro and Its Impact on Kosovo:

As a result of the ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities between Serbs and Montenegrins, one would suppose that the new federation would be more harmonious than the previous one, which included six different nations. However, the cultural familiarity between the Serbs and Montenegrins makes relations between these two political communities (federal units) very fragile. The political interests of the two are not automatically or constantly friendly with their cultural and religious closeness. Because of

⁵⁴⁹ Robert Bideleux, Ian Jeffries, *"The Balkans"*, p.432.

⁵⁵⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet, *"The Three Yugoslavias"*, p. 580.

⁵⁵¹ Available on site <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁵² Available on site <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/home.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

its similarities with the Serbs and its full integration into Serbian society, the Montenegrin community in Serbia is definitely opposed to the independence of Montenegro. It goes the same for the Serbian community living in Montenegro. For example, Milosevic's family reflects well this dual identity of many Montenegrins. Milosevic's father was Montenegrin, but Milosevic himself was born in Serbia and it has made his whole political career in Serbia. His brother Branislav, former FRY ambassador to Russia, declared himself Montenegrin and made his diplomatic career as a cadre from Montenegro, climbing the ranks of League of the Communists of Yugoslavia⁵⁵³.

From 1988 to 1996, two politicians, Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic, controlled Montenegrin politics. Both men were connected with Milosevic's "anti-bureaucratic revolution" and strongly collaborated with the Serbian management for the period of the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Splits between Serbia and Montenegro that had been carefully concealed during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina became visible in 1996. The new delicate peace in the Balkans has exposed differences between the national interests of Montenegro and Serbia. With war-time harmony disappeared, Montenegro realized that Serbia as ruled by Milosevic continued an exile state within the international area despite the Dayton accord. Montenegro believed that the "outer wall" of international sanctions imposed on the FRY, vetoed it from connection in international economic organizations, and was damaging its own economy and global status. The difference of the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro is mainly political and does not have an ethnic dimension, as was the case with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina⁵⁵⁴.

Djukanovic's main goal was the economic growth of Montenegro through cooperation with and finally integration within Western European international institutions such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and others. While Bulatovic supported Milosevic's assertive policy towards neighbors even after the signing of the Dayton accord, Djukanovic supported rapid normalization of diplomatic relations with former Yugoslav republics, now independent states. At the end of 1996, Djukanovic argued that Montenegro should

⁵⁵³ Reneo Lukic, *"From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro"*, Sabrina P. Ramet, Vjeran Pavlaković (Eds.), *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosević and After*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2005, pp.63-4

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 64-5

distance itself from Serbia in both foreign and economic policy. The long conflict over politics and personalities between Djukanovic with Bulatovic and Milosevic came to a head in March 1997. In the summer of 1997 Djukanovic decided to challenge Bulatovic in the presidential elections scheduled for October 1997. After becoming president of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic sought to strengthen his power.

Under Djukanovic's leadership, Montenegro wanted to assume essential state skills at the expense of the federal institutions. This political strategy was forced upon Montenegro by the openly hostile attitude of Milosevic and the Montenegrin elite led by Bulatovic. Milosevic considered the federal state to be in the service of Serbian state interest. He simply ignored Montenegro's attempts to create separate interests, to which it was entitled as an equal member of the federation.

Disagreement between the two republics came to the surface again, particularly during the Kosovo crisis of 1998. The Montenegrin regime criticized Milosevic's brutal manner towards the Albanians. Montenegro intensified demands for an independent statehood after 1999. The "cohabitation" between Milosevic and Djukanovic was troubled, particularly after the Montenegrin government submitted to the federal government a document, "The Basis for defining the New Relationship between Montenegro and Serbia," the aim of which was to restructure the FRY and completely transform it into an asymmetric federation with elements of confederation. The proposal called for the creation of "two sovereign states" linked by a common currency and the exercise of some joint responsibilities in defense and foreign affairs. The sovereignty of the republics as defined in the "Platform" implied the exercise of internal sovereignty only. This is why the proposal envisaged the preservation of a *single* state, with one UN seat. The FRY, the document suggested, should be renamed the "Association of the States of Serbia and Montenegro." The "Platform" was presented on 5 August 1999, after NATO's occupation of Kosovo⁵⁵⁵.

NATO's Operation Allied force against the Serbian targets and international disapproval of Milosevic regime created a convenient environment for the Montenegrin demand for independence for one thing, the West seemed to be a voluntary supporter of any political

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 66-9

and economic initiative which would weaken the Serbian state and help overthrow Milosevic from the presidency.

During the year 2000, the issue of Montenegro was neglected particularly because Kosovo's future status attracted most foreign attention, although the Montenegrin rulers did not give up their demands for independence. Moreover, Milosevic was ousted from the presidency and replaced by Kostunica. Once Milosevic was ousted from his post, the West was no longer interested in and supportive of movements, which would destabilize the Balkans and change the existing borders. Thus the victory of pro-separatists at the end of 22 April 2001 general elections did not pave the way for Montenegrin independence given the lack of external sympathy for such a change. In fact, the election results displayed an almost evenly division of electoral votes: those who favored independence and those who demanded reinforcement of close ties with the Kostunica regime. Still, Milo Djukanovic and his supporters insisted on equal footing between the two republics on administrative facilities.

The new Serbian administration of Kostunica was highly praised by the international community since it handed over Milosevic to the ICTY at The Hague shortly after his arrest on 1 April 2001⁵⁵⁶. Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement that brought a special status to their administration on 15 March 2002⁵⁵⁷.

Only one year later, on 4 February 2003, two constituent republics of the FRY signed an agreement, which changed the name of the state to the "Republic of Serbia and Montenegro". This last step brought a special status to the relationships of the two republics. Although it was stated that the agreement which was signed by an initiative of the European Union, did not mean the independence of any of the republics, the future status of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro is unknown. The unresolved issues of Kosovo's final political status and Montenegrin demands for eventual independence are directly related to each other. In case Montenegro achieves independence, this will display the official end of the state since one of two constituent republics will no longer exist. This

⁵⁵⁶ BBC Home, "2001: Ex-Yugoslav Leader Arrested after Siege", 1 April 2003, Available on site http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/dates/stories/april/1/newsid_2464000/2464667.stm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁵⁷ BBC News, "Text of Serbia-Montenegro Agreement", 15 March 2002, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1874523.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011)

in turn, may open the way for the Albanian demands for independence, because the legal base of the 1999 agreements and accords, which depended on the integrity of the FRY will no longer be valid in the absence of Montenegro. Similarly, independence of Kosovo may accelerate Montenegrin actions for the common end.

5.3. DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY’S APPROACH TO KOSOVO ISSUE:

The Kosovo Issue has been one of the most difficult problems for Turkey in the Balkans, dating back to the First Kosovo War in 1389. In the post-cold war era, the postponed and problematic nature of Kosovo’s condition continued to influence regional and global affairs, including those with Turkey. While Turkey acted with a rather clear rational approach towards the crises in Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, the crisis in Kosovo maintained definite troubles as it was based on demands of secession and irredentism. For Turkey, whose foreign policy attaches significance to the territorial integrity of countries was a big question. After the Bosnian experience, the path Turkey would follow would not be based on neutrality or assuming a pro-Serbian stance⁵⁵⁸.

When compared to Bosnian issue, it seemed that Turkey chose a low profile in the Kosovo crisis. Although Turkish authorities condemned the violence and violation of human rights openly they did not launch any major diplomatic initiatives. Government was criticized by many members of parliament in terms of a cautious policy on Kosovo⁵⁵⁹. There were several considerations behind Ankara’s cautious policy.

Turkey’s Kosovo policy is based on two principles. The first was that Turkey supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. This clearly shows Turkey’s concern about the principle of the non-violability of borders. Secondly, Turkey called for the re-establishment of the autonomy as stipulated by the 1974 Constitution or a similar arrangement which would satisfy both sides. Later on, considering the Turkish minority

⁵⁵⁸ Didem Ekinçi, “*Turkey and Kosovo: A Chronicle of Post-Cold War Bilateral Relations*”, ASAM, Avrasya Dosyası Cilt 14, Sayı 1, Balkanlar Özel, 2008, p.285.

⁵⁵⁹ TBMM Tutanakları, Cilt 63, Birleşim 4, pp. 375-378; available on site http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/td_v2.sayfa_getir?sayfa=375:378&v_meclis=1&v_donem=20&v_yasama_yili=&v_cilt=63&v_birlesim=004 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

there, Turkey added that any solution to the problem should take into consideration the rights of all the nationalities in Kosovo⁵⁶⁰.

In the process of Yugoslavia break-up, Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent and sovereign state that was recognized by the international community and accepted to the membership of the UN. However, Kosovo was part of the Yugoslavia although it had been granted political autonomy by the 1974 Constitution. The Turkish government was strongly committed to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state⁵⁶¹. Turkey which had been fighting against a separatist movement in its own territory for nearly fifteen years could not provoke or support separatist tendencies in the region.

It is repeatedly said that one of the motives for Turkey's watchful Balkan policy is depended on Ottoman past. Turkey performs a realist policy that does not cause a suspicion of Turkey hoping to reunite its former Ottoman territories. There is also Turkish minority living in Kosovo. There is no confirmed data about the number of citizens with Turkish origin in Kosovo, because no census is conducted since 1991. However, taking into account the 2004 and 2007 elections, the number is estimated approximately 25.000 - 30.000. Also, the number of Turkish speaking citizens of Kosovo is around 300.000.

At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey did not support the Kosovar Albanians separatist policies and it evaluated as a positive approach in terms of the Turks of Kosovo. In the period of ex-Yugoslavia, the relations between the Albanians and the Turks in Kosovo were far from ideal. Turks were disturbed about the claims of the radical Albanians that there was no Turkish minority in Kosovo⁵⁶². The Belgrade government, which wanted to prevent any kind of Albanian-Turkish harmony in the province, had treated its Turkish minority quite well. When most of the Kosovar Albanians lost their jobs after the events in 1991, the Turks had kept their positions. Besides, the Serbian authorities that had banned the Albanian broadcasting of Radio Television Pristine in July 1990 allowed Turkish language broadcasting. These developments deepened the splitting up between the

⁵⁶⁰ İlhan Uzgel, "*Kosovo: Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International Intervention*", p.230.

⁵⁶¹ Fuat Aksu, "*Kosova Krizinde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*", p.58.

⁵⁶² Ibid, p.59.

Albanians and Turks in Kosovo and the Albanians charged the Turks of being in alliance with the Serbs⁵⁶³.

The Turkish authorities were also worried about the possibility of the conflict extending to Macedonia, where there is a large Albanian community. Turkey had developed close ties with Macedonia and attached this country a special importance for the preservation of the regional balance in the Balkans. If Kosovo became an independent state this could provoke a separatist movement in Macedonia and give rise to political turmoil in the entire peninsula.

After Dayton Agreement, Turkey tried to establish the connections with New Yugoslavia. But, the beginning of armed conflicts had caused another setback to the betterment of relations with Belgrade. Also, Turkey was squeezed between its Albanian/Balkan origin citizens' pressure to act more actively and its cautious approach to an armed movement which apparently seeks independence. However, Turkey selected to support Kosovar Albanians for many reasons against Serbs after March 1998. The reasons are:⁵⁶⁴

1. Primarily, Kosovar Albanians are Muslim and Turkish public supported them against Serbs. Moreover, Serbs image was extremely bad from Bosnia War and no Turkish government would be based on neutrality or assuming a pro-Serbian stance.

2. Turkey established close military and political ties with Albania since the regime change in this country and Albania appeared as the reliable ally of Turkey in the Balkans in context of relations with Greece.

3. Yugoslavian government was involved in serious human rights violations in Kosovo and she had no prestige in international area.

4. For Turkey, International communities' response, especially USA's, was critically important and Washington was in favor of harsh actions in the Kosovo issue against Yugoslavia.

Turkey's first official connection with the issue of Kosovo took place, as early as 1992, when Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovar Albanians visited Ankara and requested from Turkey to recognize the independence of Kosovo, he was rejected by the Turkish

⁵⁶³ Şule Kut, "*Kosova Türkleri: Nasıl Bir Gelecek?*", *Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik*, p.230-3

⁵⁶⁴ İlhan Uzgel, "*Balkanlarla İlişkiler*", pp.508-9.

officials. President Demirel also had declared many times that if Kosovo proclaimed its independence, this would not be approved by the international community. However, Turkey gave to guarantee for political support to Kosovar Albanians. When it is compared with Turkey's energetic and active diplomacy during the conflict in Bosnia, Turkey's policy vis-a-vis the conflict in Kosovo has been rather passive and ineffective. In terms of Turkey's Balkan policy, difficulties of Kosovo issue were as follows⁵⁶⁵:

1. Issue was transformed to armed conflict from the beginning of 1998 and Turkey was worried about the instability in Balkans due to the interruption of physical connection with the west again.

2. Kosovo issue made tense relations between Macedonia and Albania, two countries relations was in good condition with Turkey, and Turkish diplomacy was placed in difficult position.

3. Turkey aimed to be closely involved with this issue as a regional power in the Balkans. But, in the final stage, secessionist demands of Kosovar Albanians created dilemma about supporting Kosovar Albanians because of Turkey's domestic problem. As a country which is paying a heavy price to fight against separatism, Turkey preferred to remain mostly silent and to act consistent with the international community. While Turkey had pressed for effective NATO action including air strikes against the Serbs in Bosnia, she did not call for air strikes or military measures concerning Kosovo.

4. Kosovo issue has been a very important development concerning the controversy over state sovereignty. The issue of humanitarian military intervention is important not only for the course of developments in Kosovo, but it would be a test case for further events and would set a precedent for the military action by the international community without UN Security Council mandate. Turkey, as a NATO member, joined the NATO bombing campaign and send troops in support of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo for humanitarian necessity. But, on the other side, Turkey worried about new approach to state sovereignty, nationalism and right to self-determination of peoples.

When the violence increased in Kosovo, Turkey chose to advocate an international intervention. During Kosovo crisis, President Demirel stressed that Turkey was ready to

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid, pp.509-10

take part in the activities of the international community for Kosovo. President Demirel had a more active attitude than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards Kosovo. According to him only NATO could stop Milošević⁵⁶⁶.

After NATO Intervention; Turkey's post-2000 policies toward Kosovo were primarily framed around the Turkish minorities in Kosovo and the protection of their rights; refuting arguments which claimed similarity between the situation of Kosovo and Turkey's southeast; preserving its position for a just and sustainable solution for the Kosovo issue within framework which would replace Resolution 1244, while trying not to string with Serbia and Russia.

5.3.1. Turkey's Participation to Peace Implementation Process in Kosovo:

During NATO attacks against Serbia, Turkey seemed to intensify its efforts in the Balkans in order to end the military operation. For example; President Demirel visited Macedonia and Albania, and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, attended a meeting of the EU foreign affairs ministers and representatives of international charity organizations in Luxembourg that was planned to provide humanitarian aid to Kosovo⁵⁶⁷. President Demirel appointed an ambassador to Belgrade, Ahmet Acet, as the special representative on Kosovo in charge of the refugee crisis. The Turkish ambassador was given the special task of communicating President Demirel's message to the presidents of Macedonia and Albania about the supply of aid to Albanian refugees in those countries. In addition, he was to prepare a report about the latest developments in Kosovo⁵⁶⁸. However, such efforts came too late and too little, given the ongoing military operation of NATO. Turkey's low profile attitude was limited to observing and reporting the events in Kosovo. Ankara provided humanitarian aid to Albanian refugees, together with Germany, Britain and the US and offered sanctuary to Albanian refugees who escaped from armed clashes in Kosovo⁵⁶⁹.

During the NATO Intervention; Ankara sent first 11, and then 18 F-16 airplanes, and 1,000 troops and opened its two airbases for the use of NATO with permission of Turkey Grand

⁵⁶⁶ Sedat Ergin, "*Demirel ve Kosova Krizi*", *Hürriyet*, 13 April 1999

⁵⁶⁷ *Hürriyet*, "*Balkanlar'a Demirel Damgası*", 8 April 1999.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁹ Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/311717.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

National Assembly to government⁵⁷⁰. As a result of Turkey's contacts with NATO, these troops were stationed in Prizren where ethnic Turks live, Mamusa where the Kosovar Turkish community predominantly resided, and Dragas. A unit of 163 soldiers were also sent to Albania in order to provide security and participate in the safe transfer of humanitarian aid to Albanian refugees, who escaped from Serbian violence and found shelter there during the fighting between Serbs and Allied forces. Turkish aircrafts initially took part in the control flights, but then participated in bombing. After the NATO intervention, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ismail Cem and later President Demirel went to Kosovo. Ismail Cem opened the "Turkish Coordination Offices" in Prishtina and Prizren. Those offices were designed to coordinate the distribution of Turkish humanitarian aid and participate in the reconstruction process in Kosovo. During his visit, Ismail Cem met the Head of UNMIK, the commander of KFOR, Kosovar Albanians leaders, Tachi, Bukoshi and Surrori, who acted as delegates during the Rambouillet talks⁵⁷¹.

An overall evaluation of Cem's and Demirel's visits to Kosovo shows the consistent stance of Turkey in acting harmoniously with its allies and with the international community. Turkey particularly dwelled upon the importance of returning the acquired rights to all inhabitants of the region, including the Turkish community. No emphasis was made to independence of Kosovo at the end of the interim administration in the official Turkish declarations.

Although an agreement was reached between NATO and Serbia, which ended NATO's air operation against Serbia, there was a long way towards finding a political solution to the conflict in Kosovo and the prevention of further confrontations between the Serbs and Albanians. However, the EU aspired to bring the minimal stability to the Balkans, but the Kosovo conflict showed that it was not adequate. The changing of the EU's policies towards the Balkans launched in 1997. Thus, the EU again attempted to change its policy established the Stability Pact (SP). The Royaumont Process seen in 1996 was laid under the SP structure.

On 10 June 1999, the EU members, together with the participation of Turkey, USA, Russia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania

⁵⁷⁰ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 63. Cilt, Birleşim 4, p.380.

⁵⁷¹ Available on site <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1999/07/18/dunya/6.html>, 18 July 1999 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Macedonia, and Ukraine (observer) met in Cologne and announced the formation of the “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”⁵⁷², based on a German proposal.

The basic principles of the SP were “to achieve to lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern Europe”. In addition, there were three Working Tables, which operated under the Regional Table which consisted of “Democratisation and Human Rights”, “Economic Reconstruction, Co-operation and Development” and “Security Issues (with two Sub-Tables: Security and Defence, and Justice and Home Affairs)”⁵⁷³.

SP directs the South Eastern European countries to collaborate with each other. In this context, an understandable meaning is given to them: they could not enter the EU until they cooperate and collaborate among themselves and forget former enmities. The target of the SP is to bring peace, stability and economic development to the region. As a result of the Kosovo conflict, it can be easily understood that stability needs peace and economic development. Stability Pact is complementary to the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).

Turkey participated in the Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference in Cologne on 10 June 1999 that organized in order to accept the SP. The Turkish president joined the constituent meeting of the SP in Sarajevo in July 1999. Turkey was successful in adding a paragraph about giving reconstruction awards in the Balkans to the South Eastern European countries, and an article on combating terrorism into the Concluding Declaration. Turkey joined the Stability Pact’s many projects not as a receiver but as a contributor. It undertook the responsibility of a co-chairmanship of the Working Table II of the Stability Pact for July 2000-December 2000 period. Turkey demanded to give importance to the regional initiatives started by regional countries, such as the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP). It is clear that Balkan countries give the utmost importance to NATO and the EU.

It can be said that the Stability Pact is the synthesis of all the regional cooperation initiatives, which were launched after the Dayton Agreement. The agreements for trade liberalization and refugees and internally displaced persons were the major achievements of the Pact.

⁵⁷² Available on site <http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

5.3.2. The Attempts of Turkey for the Turkish Minority in Kosovo after the NATO Intervention:

In 23 February 1999, the Rambouillet Agreement did not deal with Turkish minority. Later, as a result of Turkey's attempts, their name was used in official. In 2001, some degrees of linguistic rights were given to the Turkish minority, but Turkish language was not accepted again as an official language. Kosovar Turks lost their rights in the 1974 Constitution⁵⁷⁴, and Turkish has been accepted as a semi-formal language. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Turkish was the third formal language along with Serbian and Albanian. In 1984 identity cards were written in three languages⁵⁷⁵.

Turkey showed that she would never abandon the Turks in Kosovo to their fate. To make this clear, İsmail Cem in his visits to this region met local and international officers in Kosovo and expected the protection of the status of Turkish language in the new constitution. During his visit, Cem reminded Turkey's serious concerns about the rights of Kosovo Turks to UNMIK Chief Administrator Hans Haekkerup⁵⁷⁶.

As a result of demands from Turkey, some linguistic rights were given to Turkish minority. Turkish will no longer be an official language under the UNMIK administration, so English became an official one. Turkish is an official language in Prizren and some municipalities but not in Pristine. Therefore, Turkish is regarded as a minority language. Municipalities generally uses Turkish and other languages in tax receipt but they were reluctant to use in identity cards and marriage certificate⁵⁷⁷.

In this new era, new TV stations have emerged but many of them broadcast in Albanian. Meanwhile, Turkish broadcasting in Pristine TV has been reduced to one hour per day, and its region of broadcasting is now limited to the immediate surroundings of Pristine. According to UNMIK authorities, the use of Turkish language diminishes day by day, and it is only spoken by approximately 1-2% of the population. In contrast, many people in

⁵⁷⁴ Nazif Mandacı, "*Turks of Kosovo and Protection of Minority Culture At The Local Level*", Turkish Ministry of Foreign Policy Journal of International Affairs, Volume IX, June-August 2004, pp.7, Available on site www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June-August2004/nazif.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁷⁵ Heike Krieger, p.28.

⁵⁷⁶ Available on site <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1999/07/18/dunya/6.html>, 18 July 1999 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁷⁷ Nazif Mandacı, "*The Turks of Kosovo and the Protection of Minority Culture at the Local Level*", Perceptions, Cilt 9, No 2, 2004, pp. 59-74.

Kosovo watches Turkish televisions which broadcasts from Turkey and children can speak fluent Turkish without any language education.

With regard to the Turkish minority, officials of Kosovo said that there is no pressure on them, and as a result of mixed marriages and lack of clear statistics, the real number of Turks is not known but the results of the Statistical Office of Kosovo that, in 1991, there are 10445 Turks living in Kosovo⁵⁷⁸. The UNMIK Chief Administrator stated that “Turkish language will not be included among the official languages in Kosovo, Meanwhile Turks will be able to benefit from the implementation of many rights that are included in the Legal Framework regarding the communities. Among these rights is the right to have all parliamentary decisions in Turkish, usage of Turkish in maps, guaranteed primary and secondary schools where the Turkish community is in larger number and the release of all municipal documents in Turkish”⁵⁷⁹.

Finally, the ethnic hatreds did not disappear in Kosovo until 2004. The UNMIK aims to implement UNSC Resolution 1244, and therefore it has done its best to construct and implement democratic institutions. However, there is no sympathy for the UNMIK and Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo. Turks and Serbs did not participate in the first local elections after the NATO operation in 1999. The administration of Kosovo was to be controlled by UNMIK according to the UNSC resolution in the post-intervention period. 50,000 KFOR soldiers are located in Kosovo. Neither the Serbs nor the Albanians or any other minority groups are pleased with the result and the new condition of Kosovo.

5.3.3. Regional Aspect of the NATO Intervention to Kosovo and Turkey’s Policy:

Although Turkey's dynamic position gained sympathy in the Balkans during the Bosnia crisis, Greece opposed to Turkey's policies by arguing that Turkey tried to construct an Islamic axis in the Balkans against Orthodox Christian states, particularly against Greece⁵⁸⁰. With regards to the disputes with Turkey, Greek response to the Turkish actions was not unexpected. Besides, Greece followed an aggressive stance in the Balkans until

⁵⁷⁸ Statistical Office of Kosovo, Demographic Changes of the Kosovo Population 1948-2006, February 2008, Available on site http://esk.rksgov.net/eng/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=521&Itemid=8 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁷⁹ Available on site <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/mon/lmm140501.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁸⁰ Şule Kut, “Turkey and Macedonia: A Curious Alliance in the Balkans”, Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Annual 1998/99 4, ISIS, İstanbul, pp.191-2

1995 and this was the scene for an active and dominant Turkish diplomacy. For example, Greek support given to the Serbian regime during the process of Yugoslav dissolution and the Kosovo crisis of 1999 was not respected. In addition, Greece rejected to recognize Macedonia with its official name and started a dispute within the United Nations for an official recognition of the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) instead of "The Republic of Macedonia"⁵⁸¹. Turkey, however, recognized "the Republic of Macedonia" with its constitutional name after Bulgaria and became the first state to open an embassy in Skopje⁵⁸².

As a result of the Kosovo issue, new conflicts came into view in Southern Serbia and later in Macedonia. In Southern Serbia, Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya and Buyanovac started its actions by setting demand to this region, which formed Eastern Kosovo separated from Kosovo in 1947. NATO formed a five kilometers buffer zone that separates Kosovo from Serbia in June 1999⁵⁸³. Albanian militants used the buffer zone to launch attacks on the Macedonian border and on the Serbian forces in the south of Serbia. For the purpose of ending these events, NATO gave permission to Serbian forces to enter the region close Kosovo⁵⁸⁴. Thus Serbian troops were sent to the Presevo valley in March 2001. In response, Albanian militants began to go towards Macedonia⁵⁸⁵. Kosovo proved that the conflicts in the Balkans could widen to the south and this was a great worry for Turkey just because Macedonia and Albania were in a dangerous condition, so stability and security in the Balkans had been risked. Additionally, this conflict could worsen Albanian-Macedonian relations, but Turkey has friendly relations with both of them.

⁵⁸¹ Othon Anastasakis, *"Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?"*, Ali Çarkoğlu, Barry M. Rubin (Eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in An Era of Détente*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.51

⁵⁸² Available on site http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-republic-of-macedonia.en.mfa (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁸³ Agence France Presse, *"NATO Troops Close Kosovo-Serbia Frontier Post as Rebel Attacks Continue"*, 24 November 2000; Available on site <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=12164> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁸⁴ R. Jeffrey Smith, *"Kosovo Rebels' Serbian Designs Concern NATO"*, The Washington Post, Monday, 28 February 2000; Available on site <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/monitor/koskss/kss62.incl> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁸⁵ Vesna Peric Zimonjic, *"Serb Forces in Low-Key Return to Buffer Zone"*, The Independent on Sunday, 15 March 2001; Available on site <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/serb-forces-in-lowkey-return-to-buffer-zone-687404.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

When Milošević mined Albanian border, it was stated that because of this development, the UCK would turn towards Macedonia and this could cause the instability in this part of the Balkans. In 2001, conflicts began between Macedonian security forces and Albanians in border towns of Macedonia near Kosovo. Due to fears of a possible internal war, the Macedonian government demanded the active involvement of NATO and the UN. Skopje recognized Taiwan in 1999, for this reason China, one of the five permanent members of the UNSC, vetoed its renewal of UN Preventive Deployment Forces (UNPREDEP) from Macedonia⁵⁸⁶. As a response to the clashes, Turkey declared their support for the territorial integrity of Macedonia. Turkey behaved in accordance with the EU and NATO during the conflict in Macedonia.

After the NATO intervention, the Ohrid Agreement was signed. It guarantees the rights of Albanians to take a full and active part in public life, and a university in which the medium of education is Albanian language; moreover, Albanians can actively participate in Macedonian security forces⁵⁸⁷. Following this, a NATO force consisting of 700 soldiers was stationed in Macedonia⁵⁸⁸.

The Turkish minority in Macedonia expressed their desire for Turkey to be more sensitive about the Balkans. Furthermore, it is stated that in the next local elections, some provinces have been united, so Turks will lose some of their acquisitions. For this reason, Turks may lose their majorities where they have Turkish mayors. Another problem is the danger of losing official language status of Turkish in some provinces. According to the Macedonian Constitution, if a minority has more than 20% of votes in a province, the language of this group will become the second official language. Hence, Albanian is the official language all over the country.

Turks who have graduated from Turkish schools face a hard decision because in high schools the medium of education is Albanian or Macedonian. At present, if a Turk wants to go to university, he or she is compelled to study in Albanian or Macedonian language. One of the main problems for Turkish minority is education. In eastern part of the country,

⁵⁸⁶ Available on site http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_r.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁸⁷ Ali Dikici, *Introducing Multi-Ethnic Policing in Macedonia: The Role of the OSCE*, USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law Vol.1, Sedat Laciner, Mehmet Ozcan and Ihsan Bal (eds.), USAK Books, Ankara, 2008, pp.263-284

⁵⁸⁸ Available on site <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/2001/t010927a.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

living conditions are very low and for this reason, compulsory education is limited to four years⁵⁸⁹. Thus, Turkish population influences on the community decreases due to their lack of education.

5.4. IMPACTS OF EU AND NATO ON BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY'S BALKAN POLICY (2002-2004):

After the Dayton Peace Accords was signed, the awareness that the main international organizations should do more in order to encourage the multilateral cooperation in the Balkans has grown constantly. NATO has attempted to encourage the regional activities within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). EU has encouraged the multilateral activities among its partners and has supported the existing regional initiatives. The international organizations have become aware that such cooperation is contributing to reinforcing of the security and progress and therefore they have supported the existing and promoted new regional initiatives.

5.4.1. The Importance of NATO Membership for Balkan Countries:

The brutal collapse of former Yugoslavia has changed the political framework and the guidelines of the global strategy of NATO for this part of the world. The Partnership for Peace was first offered as an American proposal at the summit of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, on 20–21 October 1993, and officially started on 10–11 January 1994 in NATO Brussels summit⁵⁹⁰. Together with the preparations of the countries for attachment to the Alliance, it should have taken the benefit of the security cooperation as a vehicle for political and economic changes and to form new zones of security and stability. It was considered as a means for avoidance, specifically well-organized fight against threats, such as terrorism for example, as a result guaranteeing collective security.

The Dayton Peace Accords signed in Paris in 1995, which was accessed with the support of the USA, presented to the international institutions, mainly to NATO, an appointing role in the Balkans with an enlarged regional dimension. Within the PfP, NATO has enlarged

⁵⁸⁹ Şükrü Haluk Akalın, “*Makedonya’da Eğitim Dili Olarak Türkçe*”, TDK Türk Dünyası Dil ve Edebiyat Dergisi, Sayı 13, Bahar 2002, pp.7-13.

⁵⁹⁰ Fact Sheet: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S. Department of State, 95/05/19 Fact Sheet: NATO Partnership for Peace Bureau of Public Affairs; Available on site <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/eur/releases/950519NATOPartnership.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

its activities and it has worked together with Balkan states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania. NATO has tried to reduce the bilateral character of the PfP by heartening the multilateral PfP activities in the Balkans as a means for constructing confidence and cooperation in the region. This understood managing military exercises that contained different Balkan countries and NATO members, other types of multilateral training, defense education and similar activities. The regional cooperation in the Balkans has been one of the major regions of discussion within EAPC ever since it was created⁵⁹¹.

Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic became NATO members in 1998 and they took place in the NATO Summit which commemorated its 50th year of existence, in Washington, D.C., on 23-25 April, 1999. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was constituted for Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, FYROM, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) was organized for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO started the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Consultative Forum on Security Matters after the Washington Summit.

At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO's extension to Central and Eastern European Countries was on the agenda and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia became new members. Interestingly, for the first time in NATO history a summit was held in a former Eastern Bloc country. The fact that Romania and Bulgaria are now NATO members is important for Turkey because that means Turkey is not a "broken flank country" anymore. On 1 April 2009 Albania and Croatia signed the accession protocol at Brussels. Especially Albanian accession is very important for Turkey. Because, Turkey is the most important supporter of the Albania in NATO and Turkey sees Albania as a strategic partner in the region⁵⁹².

5.4.2. The Possibility of the Membership to EU:

After the collapse of the Iron Curtain regimes, ex-communist states felt to need integration with the West. The option of the membership to EU and NATO offered to East and Central European countries in 1991⁵⁹³. Several decisions were taken by the European Council at

⁵⁹¹ Available on site http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁹² Available on site <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/48519/arnavutluk-bolgede-stratejik-ortagimiz.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁹³ Michael Lake, "*The European Community and the Balkans Today*", Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Kemali Saybaşı (Ed.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, p.328.

Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991 on the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and by the member states of the Western European Union on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance (set out in the Maastricht Declarations). These decisions were welcomed by the North Atlantic Council when it met in Ministerial Session on 19 December 1991⁵⁹⁴.

Because of the high cost of economic integration, the West gave priority to integration in the security area, thus NATO transformation began. Economic integration would be realized step by step. European Agreements have been signed with some of the Central and Eastern European states and they are supported to develop Free Trade Areas with the EU⁵⁹⁵.

The positive message was given to the Central European countries (Visegrad states) long before the other two groups. At the 1997 Luxemburg Summit, the EU sent the same message to the South Eastern Europe (SEE) countries. Although, they are geographically in the third group, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria signed Association Agreements with the EU and they get rid of being called the Western Balkan states⁵⁹⁶. On this route, there was a necessity for common strategy and action within these groups, but this could not be seen in the Western Balkans. Besides, the hostilities and conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia affected the future of Western Balkans. Therefore, this group took the last place in the EU membership line, but the EU was conscious of the fact that elimination could cause new divisions and conflicts. Therefore, these divisions and conflicts will be a great risk to the EU's security.

In 1999, the EU explained that it had started to use a new approach towards the Balkans, and in the long term it will invite Western Balkan states to integrate with the EU⁵⁹⁷. The

⁵⁹⁴ NATO Handbook, Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional Framework for Security, The Western European Union (WEU); Available on site <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁹⁵ Stephen Woolcock, "European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements", ECIPE Working Paper, No: 03, 2007, p. 3.

⁵⁹⁶ Presidency Conclusions, The European Council Meeting in Luxembourg on 12 and 13 December 1997; Available on site http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁵⁹⁷ Presidency Conclusions, The European Council Meeting in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1997; Available on site http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#intro (accessed on 02 November 2011).

2002 Copenhagen European Council confirmed Western Balkan countries as potential candidates⁵⁹⁸ and then the EU would support their efforts to move closer to the Union. The EU explained that the implementation of the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements are key elements in the EU's policy. In addition to this, it was explained that Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia would enter the EU in May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania will become members in 2007. This sent a very significant message to Western Balkan countries.

With the implementation of the Thessaloniki Agenda⁵⁹⁹ in 2003, the European Union confirmed all the Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo under the resolution 1244, as potential candidates. It was stated that the progress of each country strongly depended on its own merits in meeting Copenhagen criteria, the conditions set for the SAP and the conditions confirmed in the final declaration of the November, 2000 Zagreb Summit. It was stressed that Albania, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia were parts of the "European Family"⁶⁰⁰. The Thessaloniki Summit made it clear that the EU's doors are open to the Balkan states, but also stated that the length of the qualifying period for membership time is bound to the performance of the countries in achieving the reforms in economies, standards of democracy, human rights, good governance and rule of law demanded by the EU.

Three candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and five Balkan countries attended the closing session of the Thessaloniki Summit. After the meeting, it was stated that EU aid for the Balkans would continue with the aim of economic reconstruction of this region. The programme, under the title of Thessaloniki Agenda, was approved in the Summit⁶⁰¹. Besides, these countries should immediately find a solution for some serious problems such as organized crime and human smuggling. Greece has problems with

⁵⁹⁸ Europa Publications Limited, "*Central and South-Eastern Europe 2004*", Routledge, London, 2003, 4th Edition, p.14

⁵⁹⁹ Available on site http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁰ Final Declaration of European Commission, Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000; Available on site http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/zagreb_summit_en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰¹ Available on site http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Albania on Northern Epirus and with Macedonia on the name of the country, but it supports their EU membership due to solving these problems within the EU.

Some other elements of Thessaloniki Agenda are that the Balkans will be a part of united Europe, and that Bulgaria, Romania and Western Balkan countries should implement the free trade agreements network among themselves. Western Balkan states should apply lifting visa requirements on travel within these countries. During the Summit, it was considered that Croatia had been the most fortunate when compared to the other five Balkan states in the EU membership process⁶⁰².

The European Commission accepted the South-Eastern Europe Stability and Partnership Process on 27 May 1999⁶⁰³. Besides, EU officials stated that the EU would form a new approach to the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia) and these states would be invited to join the EU in long-term process. The EU explained that Turkey and Western Balkan countries could not be take place in the same category. Central and east European countries, which are currently EU members, have expressed their support for Turkey's accession to the EU and added that they want to share their experiences with Turkey.

Although the Pan-European Networks⁶⁰⁴, containing transport, telecommunication and energy, were created for the idea of forming a domestic market, they became tools for the transformation of Ex-Communist countries to a free market economy and the EU membership route.

As a result of preparing the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU membership, 10 transport corridors have been shaped by the EU for the aim of connecting these countries to Trans-European Networks (Ten-T) that are in Western Europe⁶⁰⁵. Stability in the Balkans is definitely necessary for the future of these corridors. Thus, the great value of the energy resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is critical for the EU to widen the

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ Özlem Terzi, "*Avrupa Birliği'nin Balkanlar'ın Geleceğine Yönelik Vizyonu*", Balkan Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği; Available on site <http://www.balturk.org.tr/content.asp?CategoryID=401&contentID=618>. accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁴ See detail in http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/networks_eu/networks_eu_en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁵ See detail in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-European_corridors (accessed on 02 November 2011).

European Networks to these regions. Therefore, the EU constructed Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)⁶⁰⁶ that was initiated in Brussels in May 1993. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Ukraine and Moldova join in this project. By the way, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey applied to the European Commission for taking part in TRACECA in March 2000 and they became members.

5.4.3. The EU Missions in the Balkans:

The EU relieved the task of training the Bosnian police force from the UN Mission on 1 January 2004, thus this task became the first formal mission. As at 30 June 2004 EUPM numbered 879 personnel of whom 476 are seconded police officers, 67 international civilians and 336 Bosnia and Herzegovina national staff⁶⁰⁷. This task was accepted as the first significant movement in the agenda of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU Police Mission, code-named EUPOL PROXIMA, operates in the FYROM in line with the objectives of Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001⁶⁰⁸. The mission was launched on 15 December 2003. On 29 September 2003, the EU Council adopted Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)⁶⁰⁹ on the EU Police Mission in the FYROM. According to the Joint Action, 3rd states maybe invited to participate in PROXIMA mission. The EU Council adopted a decision concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the EU and Turkey on the participation of Turkey to PROXIMA⁶¹⁰.

On 31 March 2003, the EU launched a military operation, CONCORDIA that used NATO assets and capabilities, in the FYROM. The core aim of CONCORDIA was, at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable secure environment

⁶⁰⁶ See detail in <http://www.traceca-programme.eu/en/home/> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁷ <http://www.eupm.org/Documents/Report%20to%20UNSC%20Jan%20-%20June%202004.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁸ EUPOL PROXIMA Factsheet, 15 December 2003; Available on site <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ProximaBrochure.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁰⁹ Available on site <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Council%20Joint%20Action%20003%20681%20CFSP.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶¹⁰ Available on site [http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22004A1130\(04\):EN:HTML](http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22004A1130(04):EN:HTML) (accessed on 02 November 2011).

and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement⁶¹¹. Turkey is one of the 14 non-EU member countries in the framework of Concordia. The Operation was completed on 15 December 2003 and it was replaced by the EU Police Mission named Proxima. On 2 December 2004, EU's operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina started⁶¹². 7,000-strong European Union Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR) replaced SFOR of NATO. The Operation includes 22 countries and 11 of them are non-EU member. Turkey took part in Althea.

A few people claim that Turkey-Greece tension postponed the deployment of the EU Forces in Macedonia because they did not agree with each other on the use of NATO facilities. This is one of the problematic issues for Turkey. It does not want to lose its power in the decision-making process of NATO operations. The EU's military missions concerning Turkey by using NATO assets will be so risky for Turkey. For this reason, Turkey has tried to join the decision-making process of such operations. In addition to this, the effectiveness of Greece increases in the Balkans because the EU has entered this region in cooperation with Greece. According to EU decisions of 5 March, 1995, it is possible for Turkey to take its place on some technical committees. The Luxemburg Summit of 1997 expressed the possibility of Turkey joining some community programmes such as education and research and PHARE programme and some community bodies⁶¹³.

5.4.4. Turkey's Efforts to Protect Its Influence on the Balkans:

In a new established Balkans, Turkey aims to continue its Balkan policy within the perspective of existing regional and international schemes. It can be supposed that just behind the ending of the Eastern Bloc, Turkey had the opportunity of creating its policy. Since the EU and the USA have not shown much attention in this area they have not yet taken a decision about ultimate policy. On the other hand, this uncertainty vanished at the end of the Bosnian War, and the Kosovo and Macedonian conflicts. Since then, Turkish foreign policy has shown the outcomes of these events. Additionally, while Turkey's

⁶¹¹ Available on site <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=594&lang=fr> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶¹² Available on site <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=745&lang=fr> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶¹³ Available on site http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/e50004_en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

influence in the 1990s was weakened, Greece has turned out to be a more strong power in this region with the aid of EU's mechanisms.

The agreements, which ended human suffering in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, caused a reformulation of the policies of the USA and the EU. The Western world realized the great significance of the Balkans. Common summits and bilateral relations gained speed in the Balkans after the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. To bring stability to the Balkans will solve the region's problems. In this regard, several initiatives have been started in the Balkans. For example, the EU, NATO and regional initiatives reached to high numbers, but certainly the existence of many initiatives could not solve the problems. The attitudes of Greece and Turkey toward the initiatives for the Balkans are different. When Greece puts its weight behind the EU-led plans, Turkey focuses on NATO or regional ones. Furthermore, Balkan countries have chosen another way; they try to take advantage of all these stability initiatives by considering them as a step toward membership in the EU and NATO.

Turkey gives great weight to regional cooperation plans, which assists Balkans be a more secure and peaceful area. In the 1990s, it made an effort to stabilize its relations with the recently independent states and gave support to multilateral initiatives and regional cooperation⁶¹⁴. The Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of South Eastern European Countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) was held in Istanbul in June 1998. For the duration of the meeting, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, made a call to take an immediate result to all kinds of aggression in Kosovo. Due to the opposition by Yugoslavia, the Kosovo problem was not mentioned in the Istanbul Declaration⁶¹⁵. Meanwhile, DEİK (Foreign Economic Relations Board) organized a conference with the participation of Turkish, Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Greek and Romanian government representatives and businessmen. Following this, presidents and prime ministers of the South-Eastern European Countries met in Antalya on October 1998. This Summit was held during Turkey's period of chairmanship, and Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Macedonia,

⁶¹⁴ Hikmet Öksüz, "*Turkey's Balkan Policy (1923-2007)*", pp. 149-177.

⁶¹⁵ Available on site http://www.mfa.gov.tr/final-meeting-of-the-ministers-of_-foreign-affairs-of-south-east-european-countries-istanbul-declaration-on-good-neighbourly-relations_-stability_-security-and-cooperation-in-south-eastern-european-countries_br_09-june-1998.en.mfa (accessed on 02 November 2011).

and Yugoslavia joined the meeting and Croatia while Bosnia-Herzegovina sent observers. Both meetings were held under the shadow of the future Kosovo crisis. The ministers invited the FRY and the Kosovo Albanians to enter a dialogue to work out a solution based on the twin principles of territorial integrity and autonomy. Although they could not convince the FRY's Foreign Minister, Zivadin Jovanovic, to accept the insertion in the final Declaration of a paragraph in this sense, the meeting nevertheless provided a good opportunity to express unequivocally their views on a question seriously affecting peace and stability in the region. Obviously, it was an opportunity lost for the FRY to rally the regional countries behind reasonable positions⁶¹⁶.

The Balkan Political Club was created as a result of several meetings in Sofia in 2001 with the participation of 40 founding members from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It aimed to get cooperation and peace to the Balkans. Turkish President Demirel is one of the founders of this Club. In the fourth International Conference of the Club in 2003, government officials and former politicians of the Balkan countries focused on the need for the maintenance of the multi-cultural status of the Balkans⁶¹⁷.

After the end of the Cold War, the coming out of several newly sovereign states, the wars in former Yugoslavia and the problems created by transition to democracy and free market economy caused the occurrence of Balkanization together with Europeanization. As a result, nationalism climbed, and the condition of minorities, border disputes, and defense of national unity caused a variety of problems. In the end, Balkan countries began to try to find for regional and continental support to guarantee their safety.

5.4.5. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Other Initiatives in the Balkans:

In the long years of the Cold War, the Black Sea stayed a backwater where two hostile blocks maintained a troubled balance. The collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 was a tectonic political result generated global revolutionizes of historic magnitude. The most

⁶¹⁶ Ali Hikmet Alp, “*The South-East Europe Co-Operation Process: An Unspectacular, Indigenous Regional Co-Operation Scheme*”, Perceptions, SAM Papers, Vol.5, September-November 2000, pp.1-2; Available on site [http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume5/September-November2000/VolumeVN3Ali HikmetAlp.pdf](http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume5/September-November2000/VolumeVN3Ali%20HikmetAlp.pdf) (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶¹⁷ Available on site <http://www.balkanpoliticalclub.net/docs.php?page=34> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

remarkable transformation happened in the region enlarging from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. At the center of this region is positioned the Black Sea basin where the continents meet and the land routes and sea paths linking east and west and north and south intersect. This is the region that includes the Balkan Peninsula, the Caucasus and the northern and southern shores of the Black Sea linking the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas as well as the Middle East and Balkans. Located at this strategic spot, it was natural for Turkey to take the initiative in the early 1990s and offer a regional cooperative arrangement that would guarantee that the Black Sea becomes a region of peace, stability and prosperity.

The foreign ministers of ten countries (Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) met in Istanbul on 3 February 1992. On 25 June 1992, the Istanbul Declaration was signed; Albania and Greece also participated in this process. The Secretariat became active on 15 March, 1994 and is located in Istanbul and the Development Bank is in Thessaloniki ⁶¹⁸. In 1998, the Yalta Summit; BSEC Charter was signed⁶¹⁹, adapting it into a regional organization.

Technically, BSEC is an initiative for a gradual effort toward the free circulation of capital, services, goods and labor. Its economic aims are as follows⁶²⁰:

- To revitalize the Black Sea littoral and its hinterlands which had so long been marginalized in the global economic activity and lost its economic balance.
- The transfer of the Turkish experience in free market economy to the state-controlled economies of the Caucasians, Balkan and Central Asian countries and exchange of information regarding banking and investment planning.
- The rational exploitation of existing opportunities regarding tourism, fishing and transportation through joint programmes and ventures.
- The political aims of BSEC may be summarized as follows⁶²¹:

⁶¹⁸ Available on site <http://www.bsec-organization.org/Information/Pages/testt.aspx> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶¹⁹ Available on site <http://www.bsecorganization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/statutory/charter/Download/CHARTER%20web%20080630.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶²⁰ Oral Sander, “*The Balkan and the Black Sea Cooperation*”, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 49 Sayı: 3, p.396; Available on site <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/465/5341.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

- To take advantage of the new international conjecture created by the European detente.
- To strengthen political understanding and cooperation after realizing the necessary economic infrastructure.
- To facilitate the active participation of the member countries in the integration process in Europe through regional cooperation.

The complexity of the Balkan crisis forces Turkey to follow a more active, independent and balanced foreign policy in the Balkans. Within the atmosphere of instability, although there is a great need for improved bilateral relations, there are still hopes for a novel restructuring in the Balkans on multilateral cooperation in the fields of politics and economy like the BSEC. Without such endeavors, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to expect long-term peace and stability to settle in the peninsula. Turkey is the most likely candidate to embark upon such a course of restructuring in the Balkans.

The BSEC has been criticized on the grounds that the regions it intends to develop and unify are technologically not very advanced, face economic backwardness and most importantly need capital accumulation. Although these views seem realistic, it has to be remembered that in the past it proved to be very difficult to improve economic cooperation among the countries neighboring the Black Sea because of the artificial political and military obstacles which existed in the Cold War years. Today, however, the existing condition and anticipation are quite different since Moscow and Ankara are not rivals but partners in the Black Sea cooperation. The influenced feelings mostly taken from the past, the troubles of making the transformation by ex-Eastern Bloc members, and their harsh economic problems, all of which restrained the effectiveness of the BSEC.

Turkey put the initiative for a Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) on the agenda at the second Meeting of Naval Forces Commanders in Bulgaria, 1998. The six countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and the Ukraine) on the Black Sea coast signed the BLACKSEAFOR Agreement in Istanbul on 2 April, 2001. This builds cooperation among the naval forces of the coastal states. In the framework of the agreement, the Call Force is established for search-and-rescue, humanitarian aid and

⁶²¹ Ibid.

provisions for mines⁶²². Command of the force was given to Turkey and maneuvers will be held every year. The Agreement does not include the Straits.

The South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was established at Bulgaria's initiative in 1988 at a meeting in Sofia in which the states of South-Eastern Europe laid foundations for regional cooperation aimed at creating a climate of trust, good neighborliness and stability. Founding members are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Serbia, Croatia, Moldova and Montenegro joined later.

SEECP tries to grow into a cooperative process that will complement the Stability Pact (SP), the South-East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) or the EU Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the states in the region. "It is a forum for political consultations at highest level comprises all SEE countries. Its charter is a comprehensive Code of Conduct on the model of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Document." Many projects in the SEECP framework could not be achieved due to the lack of funding and some of these have been transferred to the SP. Turkey gives utmost importance to SEECP because it is the only organization that formed by regional countries. Turkey first chaired the SEECP in 1998-1999. 10 years after its first chairmanship, Turkey assumed the Chairmanship-in-Office of the SEECP once again on 5 June 2009. The SEECP encompasses the strengthening security and political cooperation, intensification of economic relations, expanded cooperation in human dimension, democracy, judiciary and struggle against illegal activities for enhanced regional cooperation⁶²³.

The SEECP strives to bring its members closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures through transformation of the region into an area of peace and stability. The third Summit of the Head of State and Government of the SEECP countries was held. The Balkan Charter which was proposed by Turkey in Antalya Summit in 1998 was signed in Bucharest on 11-13 February 2000. The Charter included the integration of regional countries to Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the EU.

⁶²² Available on site <http://www.blackseafort.org/english/homepage.php> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶²³ Available on site <http://www.seecp-turkey.org/index.php> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

The South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) was established by seven participating nations in order to contribute to the regional security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to foster co-operation among Southeastern European countries. There are seven participating and three observer countries. Turkey is a member of this organization. The SEEBRIG is to be employed, on a case-by-case basis, following a political decision in accordance with its own procedures. The brigade will be available for possible employment in the UN or OSCE-mandated NATO or WEU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations, including peace-keeping, peace-building and humanitarian operations. It can also participate in “Coalition of the willing” type international initiatives. The brigade will also function “within the spirit” of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Units allocated to the SEEBRIG will remain at their permanent home base locations and will be committed under a task force principle for exercises and operations upon the decisions of the participating nations and appropriate joint direction and coordination of the “Politico–Military Steering Committee (PMSC)”. SEEBRIG Headquarters are located in Constanta, Romania. Until June 2003 it was in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. It will be then deployed to Istanbul, Turkey, in 2007, and Larissa, Greece, in 2011⁶²⁴.

The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) was established in December 1996. It was formed by the USA in the framework of the OSCE and it is an economic cooperation. The Participating States of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative held an inaugural meeting in Geneva on December 5-6, 1996 and formally adopted the SECI Statement of Purpose on December 6, 1996. The SECI Participating States include: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, FYROM and Turkey and, as of December 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The SECI aims to develop regional cooperation in economic and environmental problems. The impetus behind SECI is encouraging cooperation among its Participating States and facilitating their integration into European structures⁶²⁵. SECI is not an assistance program. It does not interfere with, but rather complements existing initiatives. SECI endeavors to

⁶²⁴ Available on site <http://www.seebrig.org/page.asp?showmaster=menu&ID=8> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶²⁵ Available on site http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guneydogu-avrupa-isbirligi-girisimi-_seci_.tr.mfa (accessed on 02 November 2011)

promote close cooperation among the governments of the region and to create new channels of communication among them. Furthermore, SECI attempts to emphasize and coordinate region wide planning, identify needed follow-up and missing links, provide for involvement of the private sector in regional economic and environmental efforts, help to create a regional climate that encourages the transfer of know-how and greater investment in the private sector, and assist in harmonizing trade laws and policies.

6. THE ROAD MAP TO INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO:

6.1. INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT AND STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS:

In October 2000, the entire issue of Kosovo emerged to assume a new meaning when Milosevic was obliged from power by a coalition of opponent parties. The realistic nationalist Vojislav Kostunica, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), became president of Serbia. By the way, following parliamentary elections in December 2000, the leader of the Democratic Party (DS) Zoran Djindjic was selected to prime minister of Serbia. His liberal and pro-Western preferences⁶²⁶ and determined to rebuild ties with the Western powers, he showed importance to Kosovo under the requirements for the integration into Europe. But mostly, he focused his concentration on more vital issues, for example economic development and diminishing poverty. At the same time, the Kosovar Albanian leaders emphasized that the new Serbian government in Belgrade has little difference from the previous administration. Independence was seen the only rational result by Albanians. In the meantime, the risk of further conflict still continued. In early 2001, aggression erupted across the area in both Macedonia and the Presevo Valley, a part of southern Serbia that was mostly populated by ethnic Albanians.

In opposition to this scenery of unending stresses, in May 2001, and after four months of talks, the UN declared a Constitutional Framework creating the Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo⁶²⁷. In the agreement, a full range of powers governing a wide range of areas, including economic policy, were defined the assembly, the presidency, the executive and the judiciary - the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). Notably, on the other hand, the Constitutional Framework had no position on the future status of Kosovo, nor did it give any clue such a resolution would be adopted. However, while the Kosovar Albanians understand the agreement as a new march towards independence, UNMIK blocked definitely to the corner that the document did not leave control over areas and the sovereign rights of Belgrade. Kosovo officially remained an

⁶²⁶ Bojana Barlovac, “Zoran Djindjic-The Visionary”, Balkan Insight, 05 October 2010, available on site <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/zoran-djindjic-the-visionary> (accessed on 02 November 2011).; The Economist, “Charlemagne, Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s Other Big Man”, 04 January 2001, from the print edition, available on site <http://www.economist.com/node/466553> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶²⁷ Available on site http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf; <http://www.trepca.net/politike/010515-constitutional.framework.in.kosova-eng.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as written in Resolution 1244 - a point again and again stressed by Hans Haekkerup, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) and head of UNMIK. This analysis emerged to be further confirmed when Haekkerup signed an agreement with Nebojsa Covic, the moderate deputy prime minister of Serbia, which not only set up a more official procedure of discussion between UNMIK, the PISG and Belgrade, but also confirmed that UNMIK would not take any steps towards resolving Kosovo's final status. Not surprisingly, the Kosovar Albanian leadership was irritated by the document⁶²⁸.

The idea that Kosovo's path towards statehood was left in abeyance only raised after 11 September 2001. After US interest became focused on the Middle East, there was an obvious unwillingness to cope with the Kosovo's status question in Europe for Serbia's democratic transformation could be weakened. Basically, independence was not on the agenda. This point was emphasized in May 2002, when the Kosovo Assembly passed resolution invulnerability of the borders of Kosovo that had been between Yugoslavia and Macedonia border agreement of January 2001- despite calls from the EU and UN not to do so. Although the new SRSG, Michael Steiner, had been a strong believer of NATO intervention in 1999, and was known to support 'conditional independence', he could not agree to such an obvious confrontation to Resolution 1244. Thus, he canceled the resolution and forced a ban of Kosovar Albanian representatives from attendance to several international meetings⁶²⁹.

The confrontation produced the most serious crack between the UN and the Kosovar Albanians since the establishing of the UN supervision of the province. However, it was also an essential warning sign of the level to which demands for a status decision was now on the rise. In order to reduce some of the pressure, the UN had to give some signal that the decision would not be suspended without end. Steiner did this by presentation what

⁶²⁸ Besnik Bala, "*The Haekkerup-Covic Document under Fire*", AIM, 18 November 2001, Pristine, available on site <http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200111/11118-011-trae-pri.htm>. (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶²⁹ "*Kosovar and Macedonian Politicians Duel Over The Border*", 31 May 2002, ReliefWeb, Briefing Kit for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia + 2002, May, Compiled on 25 July 2011; Available on site http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/briefingkitb13020e1fb56028dac28156331092c77.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

would become known as the 'Standards for Kosovo'⁶³⁰ (Standards before Status)' guidelines. Under this guidelines progress would need to be made in eight key areas before the province could possibly start to think about its final status.

These were set out as follows:

1. The existence of effective representative and functioning democratic institutions;
2. Enforcement of the rule of law;
3. Freedom of movement;
4. Sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of communities;
5. Creation of a sound basis for a market economy;
6. Fair enforcement of property rights;
7. Normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and
8. Transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate.

Although the plan was much-admired internationally, it did not lead to the expected results. The international community has a very brief window in which to learn from its mistakes and regain control of the agenda. The implementation of a greatly ambitious set of standards before status talks begins is seen as inaccessible⁶³¹. In Pristina, negotiations continued in the shadow of the holding a referendum as a start to a unilateral declaration of independence. In response, Djindjic, who had been calling a moderate manner on Kosovo, reacted in unexpectedly strong terms, suggesting that if this happened the Serbian community in Bosnia could reply in accordance with reciprocity principle⁶³². Rather than a new, hard-line policy, the statements instead seem to have been directed to the domestic audience in advance of early elections. In reality, many supposed him to continue to follow

⁶³⁰ "Standards for Kosovo", 10 December 2003, Pristina, UNMIK, PISG, January 2004, Available on site <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶³¹ Jure Vidmar, "International Legal Responses to Kosovo's Declaration of Independence", *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 42, May 2009, p.795.

⁶³² The Economist, "Kosovo's Final Status, Asking the Unanswerable", 13 Feb 2003, from The Economist Print Edition; Available on site http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=1580112 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

a moderate line after the polls, possibly by following some form of partition⁶³³ - an idea that appeared to be gaining ground internationally. However, we shall never know if this was really the line he planned to follow. On 12 March, Djindjic was assassinated as he entered the Serbian Government offices in Belgrade. Despite the shocking result his death had on Serbian politics, it appeared to change the route of considerations over the future of Kosovo.

Meanwhile, in Kosovo, four years of international administration had produced only limited results in terms of the standards. Many of the Serbs who had left Kosovo had still not returned, fear was also spoken about ongoing attacks against the Kosovar Serbs and other minority communities. In a report issued in April 2003⁶³⁴, Amnesty International highlighted a very troubling condition in Kosovo, noting that the minorities faced daily acts of threats that restricted their freedom of movement. Even those who had not faced attack expressed, 'fear, frustration and isolation. On the other hand, there were some signs of well development. In October 2003, one sign was the opening of direct technical negotiations between Belgrade and Pristine in Vienna. The following month, the Contact Group declared that a review of the standards would take place in mid-2005. If 'sufficient' progress had been made by then, a process to determine the final status of Kosovo could then begin.

6.2. MARCH 2004 RIOTS AND THE EIDE REPORTS

At all advances had been made towards progressing inter-ethnic relations were efficiently canceled in early 2004 when Kosovo suffered its terrible war since 1999. Definitely, a number of actions led the riots, with a bomb dropping on Kosovar Albanian ministers, the exploding of a grenade outside President Rugova's home, and the placing of an explosive mechanism close to UNMIK headquarters. There was a provocation by killing of a

⁶³³ Sabrina Ramet, *"The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005"*, p.547.

⁶³⁴ *"Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova): 'Prisoners in Our Own Homes'":* Amnesty International's Concerns for the Human Rights of Minorities in Kosovo/Kosova, Amnesty International, 28 April 2003, Available on site <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

seventeen-year-old Serb in south of Pristine. In reprisal, Serbs constructed barricades on the two main roads south from Pristine that impeded all traffic for three-four days⁶³⁵.

After that, on 16 March 2004, three young Albanian boys died in the Ibar River. Although there was no proof to support the event, within hours the media, including the national broadcaster RTK, were reporting that they had been pursued into the river by dogs owned by Kosovar Serbs. That same day a series of demonstrations were happening to protest about the accusation of many KLA leaders for suspected war crimes committed in 1999. Riots broke out from beginning to end of Kosovo on 17-18 March 2004 (See, Figure 6.1. **Map of Distribution of Ethnic Albanians and Serbs**)⁶³⁶..




Figure 6.1. **Map of Distribution of Ethnic Albanians and Serbs.**

The influence of the riots was dramatic. By the time the fighting was controlled, on 19 March, it was estimated that nearly 51,000 people had taken part in at least 33 separate events across the province. As a result, 19 people had been killed, 8 Serbs and 11

⁶³⁵ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989", Cambridge University Press, 2010 p.368.

⁶³⁶ Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249909.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Albanians, and over a thousand injured. Over 550 homes had been burned, along with 27 monasteries and churches. This had left approximately 4,100 people displaced⁶³⁷. This number included not just Kosovo Serbs, but also members of the other minorities, including the Roma (See, Figure 6.2. **Map of Ethnic Diversity in Kosovo**)⁶³⁸. Also, many UNMIK vehicles were damaged and UNMIK was a main target of their anger and frustration⁶³⁹.




Figure 6.2. Map of Ethnic Diversity in Kosovo.

As expected, the riots of March 2004 had an extremely negative result on inter-communal relationships. Whatever trust that may have been developing between Serbs and Albanians was severely damaged. The events also caused to an end in contacts between Belgrade and Pristina. Following results of the aggression, the technical dialogue between the Kosovo

⁶³⁷ James Ker-Lindsay, "From Autonomy to Independence: The Evolution of International Thinking on Kosovo, 1998-2005", Journal Of Balkan and Near Easter Studies, Vol.11, No.2, June 2009, p.

⁶³⁸ Available on site <http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/ethnic-diversity-in-kosovo> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶³⁹ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989", p.369.

PISG and the Serbian Government were stopped. However, the riots also showed the catastrophic situation of UNMIK and KFOR. For a start, after five years of effort, they emphasized just how little enhancement had been made towards ethnic reunion between Serbs and Albanians. Kosovo was undeniably not on the way to becoming a peaceful multiethnic democracy. It also had a deep impact on the relationship of both communities. The Kosovar Serbs, and the other minorities, had lost trust to the UN over to protect them.

Meanwhile, reports and news of peacekeepers weakening to stop attacks, or escaping in the face of aggression, coupled with reports that the Kosovo Police Service had participated in events, had seriously weakened the weight of the UN in the eyes of the Kosovar Albanians. As a report⁶⁴⁰ by Human Rights Watch noted several months later, "The international community has lost tremendous ground in Kosovo as a result of the March violence: ethnic Albanian extremists now know that they can effectively challenge the international security structures, having demolished the notion of KFOR and UNMIK invincibility; and ethnic minorities have lost almost all of the remaining trust they had left in the international community. Time is running out for both the international community and minorities in Kosovo, and now is the time for resolute and transparent action to rectify the all-too obvious shortcomings of the international community's security structures in Kosovo."

The moral status of Albanians was injured, and many international institutions believed that their effort had been unsuccessful. Inter-ethnic contact had not made a large difference. However simultaneously, the riots of March 2004 were alarm for international and local structures similarly. PISG provided with money for urgent needs of Serb churches and houses. The SRSG fired the international head of privatization. And the Secretary General of the UN proposed Norwegian ambassador Kai Eide to go to Kosovo and report back on the implications of the riots⁶⁴¹.

The Eide Report⁶⁴² noted the strength of disappointment of the greater part of population with the international supervision and the weakness of the Serb minority. It found that the

⁶⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, "*Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo*", March 2004, July 2004, Vol.16 No.6 (D), pp.3-4.

⁶⁴¹ Sabrina P. Ramet, "*Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*", p.369.

⁶⁴² Available on site <http://www.ico-kos.org/pdf/KaiEidereport.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

standards-before-status policy needed trustworthiness and should be replaced by a 'priority-based and realistic standards policy'. In addition, it guessed that the condition in Kosovo was possible to be unsuccessful rather than improved. The UN should then initiate contacts with key government officials on this issue. In the meantime, the process of transferring power to the local actors should be accelerated. Advance evaluations of the performance of the Kosovo institutions should be accomplished until mid-2005, when it was hoped that the comprehensive evaluation that had been predicted might open the way towards the beginning of status talks.

The UN Secretary-General discussed with governments, NATO and the OSCE before issuing his own recommendations, generally in line with the Eide report. However, these primary recommendations centered on increasing the capability of UNMIK and the responsibility of the local Kosovo institutions, not on the probable status process itself. However, with the Eide report, the good judgment broadened in Kosovo that by mid-2005 a comprehensive review of implementation of the simplified standards would lead for status discussions.

After the reconfiguration of the standards before status process had taken place, the UN Secretary-General did certainly request an advance comprehensive evaluation of the conditions in Kosovo. On 7 October 2005, Ambassador Eide reported to the Security Council that the record of standards implementation was uneven, but that nevertheless the time had come to move on status. In his report Ambassador Eide added⁶⁴³:

“The future status process must be moved forward with caution. All the parties must be brought together—and kept together—throughout the status process. The end result must be stable and sustainable. Artificial deadlines should not be set. Once the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion.”

This last observation was vital for the design of the status process. It appeared to be expected that final status would have to show the way to some type of independence, or as a minimum masked independence for Kosovo. Such a result, on the other hand, would hardly be satisfactory to Belgrade. Thus, there was already a sense at this early phase that an agreement could not be 'blocked', if it was to come about at all. A process would

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

therefore need to be planned that would offer every opportunity for an agreement, but that might lead to an agreement in the absence of Serbia's approval.

On 24 October, the Security Council approved the beginning of the status process⁶⁴⁴. The Council strongly supported the Kosovo leadership to raise their efforts to guarantee implementation of standards. However, the policy of standards before status had now lost all credibility and the argument was made instead that Kosovo would want to comply with relevant standards in its likely future proposal to seek Euro-Atlantic integration.

The Council urged the Secretary-General's aim to start a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, as anticipated in Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Reaffirming the framework of the Resolution, the Council welcomed the selection of the Special Envoy to direct the process. The Council also supported the Contact Group to continue strongly connected in the political process and to support the Secretary-General's Future Status Envoy⁶⁴⁵.

In agreement with the Council, the Secretary-General appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of Finland who had assisted talk at the end of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, as his Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo⁶⁴⁶.

6.3. THE ISSUE OF FINAL STATUS OF KOSOVO:

After Annan declared the name of Martti Ahtisaari, he started his task with visits to Kosovo and Serbia in late November 2005. His intention was to find a way that the two sides would have the same opinion to face-to-face meetings in early 2006. Before his arrival in Pristina, he echoed the views of other UN officials who have said that the talks cannot be prolonged indefinitely⁶⁴⁷.

Earlier to the launch of negotiations, the contact group was in agreement on several principles to lead the status procedure. About the status result, the contact group

⁶⁴⁴ Available on site <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20SPRST%202005%2051.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Available on site <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20S2005%20708.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁴⁷ BBC News, "UN Mediator Begins Kosovo Mission", 22 November 2005; Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4460332.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

declared⁶⁴⁸ that there should be no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 circumstances, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country. It also called for the agreement to guarantee sustainable multi-ethnicity in Kosovo, successful local self-government and multi-ethnic life through the process of decentralization, and protections for cultural and religious locations. The Contact Group stressed that “all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in the course of 2006.”

6.3.1. Vienna Talks:

On 20-21 February 2006, the status negotiations organized in Vienna were being overseen by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, acting as UN mediator. The first tours of the talks took in hand “technical issues” that were implied to organize the method for dealing with the determination of future status. These contained decentralization, the issue of Mitrovica, minority rights, the cultural and religious heritage and the economy. Ahtisaari and his delegates avoided from advancing specific proposals, in its place permitting the Serbian and Kosovar delegations to present and discuss their own thoughts. The positions of the two sides continued to far away from each other on most issues, and little progress toward negotiation solutions was reported⁶⁴⁹.

One of the most central questions dealt with in Vienna negotiations was the decentralization of Kosovo, especially on the divided Mitrovica. Serbs have planned the establishment of many Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo, based on the Serb population of Kosovo before most Serbs escaped from the region in 1999 and the Serbian cultural and religious places. The Serbs also sought the formal division of Mitrovica which is already *de facto* divided, separating its Serb-majority part north of the Ibar River from the ethnic Albanian-dominated southern part. These municipalities would be ruled by local Serb authorities with their own police, and would be strongly related with each other and with Serbia. On the contrary, the Kosovar Albanians proposed to permit the establishment

⁶⁴⁸ “*Statement by The Contact Group on The Future of Kosovo*”, London, 31 January 2006; Available on site <http://www.unosek.org/docref/fevrier/STATEMENT%20BY%20THE%20CONTACT%20GROUP%20ON%20THE%20FUTURE%20OF%20KOSOVO%20-%20Eng.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁴⁹ “*Balkans: UN Mediator Urges Kosovo Talks To Move Fast*”, Agence France-Presse, 28 February 2006. ReliefWeb Report, Briefing Kit for Serbia + 2006 February, Compiled on 28 Jul 2011, p.15; Available on site http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/briefingkit-1be96b7e0e435acd95540c9e53baf1af.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

of only one or two Serb municipalities, based on current Serbian population of Kosovo, and have claimed that Mitrovica become as a minimum technically united⁶⁵⁰.

On 24 July 2006, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim Ceku made contacts with Serbian officials Boris Tadic and Vojislav Kostunica to argue the status question, in the first direct interview between the two sides at the leadership. Both sides repeated their views on status, and little development toward a negotiation was reached.

At the end of the eighth round talks on the future status of Kosovo were cancelled on early August 2006, with the Serbian delegates from Kosovo rejecting to attend the session for arguing their rights with delegations from Serbia and Kosovo authorities. After the decline of Vienna talks, two sides negotiating teams accused each other of blocking decentralization talks.

6.3.2. Ahtisaari Proposal:

U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was anticipated to submit his proposal for Kosovo's status to the contact group and the U.N. Security Council in late 2006. After guiding technical discussions and status negotiations with the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian sides in Vienna since early 2006, Ahtisaari could report no major development in achieving an agreed settlement upon status but he said that he was still organized to offer about a status proposal. The contact group and especially the United States had underlined a preference to end the Kosovo status negotiations in 2006. On November 10, however, Ahtisaari declared⁶⁵¹ that he would reschedule releasing his status proposal with the purpose of avoiding an undesirable effect on early elections in Serbia. He added that he would present his proposal "without delays, after the parliamentary elections in Serbia."

After the 21 January 2007 election in Serbia, which produced questionable outcomes, Ahtisaari presented a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement⁶⁵² to representatives of the contact group on 26 January 2007, in Vienna, and to the Serbian and

⁶⁵⁰ Rogelj Peter, "*Serb Proposal for Decentralisation*", Trepca.net, 01 July 2002; Available on site http://www.trepca.net/2002/07/020_701-peter.rogeljSERB-PROPOSALS-FOR-DECENTRALISATION.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵¹ B92, Beta, "*Status Solution is Postponed*"; Available on site http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2006&mm=11&dd=10&nav_category=92&nav_id=37881 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵² Available on site http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Kosovar Albanian sides on 2 February 2007. The United States, European Union, NATO, and other organizations rapidly approved the proposal, although Russia called for more time to think about it. After another short postponement, Ahtisaari opened extra-discussions with the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian sides on 21 February 2007, in Vienna. A final Vienna talk with the leadership in March eliminated the discussion period without coming closer to shared agreement on Kosovo's status.

Ahtisaari has described his status proposal a "foundation for a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo in which the rights and interests of all members of its communities are firmly guaranteed and protected by institutions based on the rule of law."⁶⁵³ The last part aims to provide for a multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo that is practical, sustainable, and secure. The plan's general principles and twelve annexes draw lines of the wide governing authority and organization of the Kosovo government. New general and municipal elections are to be applied within nine months of the agreement becoming into law. Special representational and voting privileges in the government and assembly would be granted to Kosovo's minority communities.

The plan presents for wide minority protections through stated rights, structural protections in governance, especially about decentralization at the local level, and through international supervisory authority. Serb municipalities in Kosovo are to have enlarged responsibilities and authority above local affairs, as well as the right to cooperate directly with and accept financial aid from Serbia. Today, divided northern city of Mitrovica would become two municipalities under a joint board. The proposal consists of protection of religious and cultural heritage sites and repeats the right of return for refugees and displaced persons. The settlement calls for a restored security zone under major local ownership but keeping some international supervision.

The terms of the Ahtisaari proposal emerge to form somewhat of a negotiation between the highest positions of two sides. The proposal shifts beyond the status quo with its broad requirements for self-governance in Kosovo, including the right to sign international agreements and seek membership in international institutions, as well as the right to have symbols of statehood such as a flag, national money, and an army. Although the terms of the proposal do not use the term "independence," Ahtisaari also specified his

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

recommendation for independence in his accompanying report to the Security Council on 26 March 2007. However, Kosovo's sovereignty would be restrained by supervisory international civilian and military missions.

On 26 March 2007, Ahtisaari and U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon submitted the comprehensive proposal on Kosovo to the U.N. Security Council. With the proposal, Ahtisaari presented a concise report on Kosovo's future status that summarized his conclusions that "the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community."⁶⁵⁴ He stated that he was disappointed about the parties were unable to achieve a negotiated result.

6.3.3. Further Negotiations before Declaration of Independence:

The Security Council started discussion over the Ahtisaari's 63 page proposal on 3 April 2007. After proposal of Russia, Council agreed to appoint a fact-finding mission to Kosovo in order to access direct knowledge and news about the circumstances in Kosovo from all parties concerned with Kosovo issue⁶⁵⁵. As a result, the mission delegates agreed that the status quo could not be continued in Kosovo.

In early May 2007, new efforts were shown with the aim of change to Resolution 1244 by preliminary drafts of new U.N resolution. According to western officials, the new resolution was to lay the basis for Kosovo's independence and support mandates for new international missions in Kosovo under a Chapter VII authorization. Russia called for extra discussions between the parties in an opposing draft. A revised U.S.-backed draft resolution circulated in late May to include parts dealing with Russian and Serbian worries, but was also rejected by Russia⁶⁵⁶.

Russia's negative reaction of further draft revisions brought the Security Council procedure to a deadlock. Russian leaders made normal declarations opposing an imposed arrangement for Kosovo with no Serbian agreement, supporting further negotiations, and

⁶⁵⁴ UNSC, Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status (S/2007/168), 26 March 2007, ReliefWeb report; Available on site http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-229344.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵⁵ Security Council Report, April 2007 Kosovo; Available on site http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2620595/k.8BAE/April_2007BRKosovo.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵⁶ Julie Kim, Steven Woehrel, "*Kosovo and U.S. Policy: Background and Current Issues*", CRS Reports for Congress, 24 October 2007, p.20; Available on site <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/96482.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

loading the option of using a Russian veto in the Security Council. Some Russian representatives have also advised that a result for Kosovo could provide as an example for other territorial clashes, such as in the Middle East and Caucasus. On the contrary, U.N., U.S., and European representatives argue that Kosovo's position is unique and that a status result in Kosovo would not have any consequence to other parts of the world⁶⁵⁷.

Although some expectations of an agreement, following summits at the highest levels among U.S. and European governments did not give way any step forward about issue. At the G8 meeting in Germany, Putin declared honestly to other G8 members that Russia's opposed position continued. France's new president Sarkozy offered to rearrange the Kosovo status process by six months to allow for further talks, but to locate the Ahtisaari plan as a final solution⁶⁵⁸.

Following the UN Security Council was not capable to agree on resolution support supervised independence, the six-nation Contact Group's 'Troika' (U.S. Russia and the EU) began a new round of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. Talks ended on 10 December without a compromise status settlement. At a 14 December summit, EU leaders argued planning to continue towards supervised independence based on the Ahtisaari plan and the deployment of a 1,800-strong EU security and rule of law mission⁶⁵⁹.

6.4. KOSOVO'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE- SUPPORTS AND OPPOSITIONS:

With no more achievement in the U.N. Security Council, Kosovo's officials planned to announce a declaration of independence in early 2008 as an element of a procedure directly synchronized with the global society. With the pressing of the global society, Kosovo officials waited the convenient time after Serbia had finished both rounds of presidential election. Kosovo's representatives had declared worries about continual postponements in

⁶⁵⁷ Security Council Report, May 2007 Kosovo; Available on site http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2701389/k.8A68/May_2007BRKosovo.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵⁸ Bertrand Benoit, Neil MacDonald, "*Putin Dashes Hopes for Kosovo Breakthrough*", Financial Times, 8 June 2007; Available on site <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2834af4e-15d0-11dc-a7ce-000b5df10621.html#axzz1TP65bFiA> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, "*Kosovo Conflict History*", Available on site <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/kosovo.aspx> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

the status procedure, but a few people in Kosovo resisted to the Ahtisaari plan's identified restrictions on Kosovar sovereignty.

On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo assembly approved a declaration of independence "in full accordance with the recommendations of U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement". It stated Kosovo to be a democratic, secular, and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law and accepted the fully obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari plan⁶⁶⁰.

On the following day, a number of states (Turkey, the United States, Albania, Austria, Croatia, Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Australia and Poland) officially recognized independence of Kosovo. At present, 77 UN states recognize the independence of Kosovo and it has become a member country of the IMF and World Bank as the Republic of Kosovo⁶⁶¹.

Among U.N. Security Council members, Russia, China, together with Serbia and some other states condemned the declaration as a violation of international law. A majority but not all of the EU's 27 member states support Kosovo's independence — Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Greece have announced strong reservations⁶⁶². Meanwhile, without EU harmony over Kosovo's status has not stopped or delayed EU joint actions on deploying new taskforce to Kosovo. The United Nations, temporarily, has continued a solid "status neutral" position on Kosovo's status.

Obviously, Kosovo's officials have welcomed international support for Kosovo's democratic improvement through international presences. After the declaration, the Kosovo assembly has taken rapid action to pass new laws consistent with the Ahtisaari plan, together with ratifying a new constitution which came into effect on 15 June 2008⁶⁶³.

After the independence, stresses have been peak in the northern part of Kosovo, where many ethnic Serbs are concentrated. The most terrible conflict so far happened on 17

⁶⁶⁰ Available on site <http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶¹ Available on site <http://www.kosovothankyou.com/> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶² Available on site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo#States_which_do_not_formally_recognize_Kosovo_as_independent (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶³ ConstitutionNet, "*Constitutional History of Kosovo*", Available on site <http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-kosovo> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

March 2008 in the aftermath of a Serbian effort to capture a government building in northern Mitrovica; UNMIK and NATO catches of the occupiers provoked clashes with protesters which resulted in the casualty of a U.N. police officer and several injured. As said by UNMIK and NATO officials, some Serbian administration security personnel got involved in starting this and other confrontations⁶⁶⁴. It is still vague how the Kosovo government aims in the future to establish its authority in northern parts of Kosovo.

6.4.1. Serbian Viewpoint on Status and Reaction to Independence:

The Serbian administration and Kosovo's Serbian population have always claimed that Serbia conserve sovereignty over Kosovo; this sight is supported by nearly all political parties in Serbia. During the U.N. negotiation process, Serbia's ruling parties continued hard-pressed for talks to maintain. Serbian officials summarized their position on status with the statement "more than autonomy, but less than independence" and opened different interpretations on "highest" autonomy for Kosovo other than full independence⁶⁶⁵. Kosovo Serbs joined to the status negotiations as part of the Serbian representatives. Before declaration of Kosovo independence, Belgrade regarded it as invalid. Soon after, Serbian officials and activists have highlighted that "Kosovo is Serbia." Serbian President Tadic has recalled for a new round of internationally mediated talks on Kosovo's status.

Following declaration of Kosovo independence; Belgrade temporarily downgraded diplomatic affairs with Turkey, the United States and other countries that recognized Kosovo. However, these relations were mutually later restored. Serbia supported a wide protest meeting in Belgrade on February 21, which gathered together thousands of peaceful protestors to the streets. In the evening, a few hundred persons attacked the missions of Turkey, U.S. and some other countries⁶⁶⁶. Serbia's President and Prime Minister condemned the aggression and guaranteed to keep foreign missions in Belgrade safe,

⁶⁶⁴ UNMIK, KFOR: MUP Officers Were in K. Mitrovica Court, B92.Net, 18 March 2003, Available on site http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&dd=18&nav_id=48576 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶⁵ B92.Net, "*Priština: Nothing But Independence*", 25 September 2007, Available on site http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=09&dd=25&nav_id=44028 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶⁶ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, "*Rioters Attack U.S. Embassy In Belgrade After Kosovo Protest Rally*", 21 February 2008, Available on site <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079512.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

although some other officials stated that the United States was responsible for the aggression behind Kosovo's independence.

Without the knowledge of harmonic resistance to Kosovo's independence, Serbia's political leadership is deeply fragmented. Later than the January 2007 parliamentary elections, President Tadic of the DS and Prime Minister Kostunica of the DSS reached an agreement on founding a new coalition government, with Prime Minister Kostunica remaining unchanged. President Tadic succeeded a key electoral triumph in early 2008 presidential elections over Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic. However, the coalition was divided on how the Kosovo circumstances should influence Serbia's affairs with the EU, and finally disrupted the coalition, with early parliamentary elections scheduled for May 11, 2008. Tadic's DS party was successful with an important victory in the vote, and may form a coalition with the small Socialist Party.

While Serbian administration has not accepted a military solution to the independence of Kosovo, observers are intimately examining the degree of Serbian realization of its "action plan" of reprisal actions to independence declaration of Kosovo. Several observers asserted that Serbia is concentrated on toughening the soft partition of Kosovo, with the Serbian-dominated northern parts of Kosovo declaring their own independence or demanding to join to Serbia, and using pressure on all Kosovar Serbs not to collaborate with Kosovar Albanian government. Confrontations at the border between Serbia and Kosovo with repeated demonstration in northern Mitrovica show this tendency.

Serbian officials rejected to join in regional and other international conferences and meetings when Kosovar Albanians are called as representatives of an independent state. Serbia succeeded a remarkable diplomatic triumph when the U.N. General Assembly voted on 8 October 2008, to appeal the issue of the legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Conversely, the attempt finally became unsuccessful. In July 2010, the ICJ judged that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not breach international law.

Despite its resistance to independence of Kosovo, Serbia has showed some conciliatory gestures toward EULEX. The Serbian administration approved to a Ban Ki Moon's six-point plan that authorized the EULEX mission with the power to be deployed throughout the territory of Kosovo. At the same time, if the plan was realized it would provide Serbia

an extra political control in the Serbian-dominated regions in Kosovo⁶⁶⁷. According to EULEX, arrangements for police cooperation with Belgrade, supported by 27 EU member states, pertain to a technical nature and as such will be to the benefit of the all the citizens of Kosovo. Despite Kosovar leaders expressed opposition, EULEX signed a police cooperation agreement with Serbia in September 2009⁶⁶⁸. However, the Kosovo administration stopped the negotiations as a violation on their country's sovereignty. With rising cooperation with EULEX, Serbia may anticipate to progress its affairs with the EU.

In a November 2010 report on Serbia's democratic and economic development on the road to becoming a possible EU membership candidate, the European Commission emphasized the boundaries of such collaboration. It noted that Serbia persisted in going on its own regime institutions in northern Kosovo. It organized its own local elections in Kosovo and tried to prevent Serb participation in the November 2009 local elections organized by the Kosovo administration. The report stated Serbia did not show a positive policy in the return of Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian judges and prosecutors back to the local court in northern Mitrovica. The report also touched that Serbian police cooperation with EULEX should be enhanced⁶⁶⁹.

Although the condition is not as hard as in the period immediately after independence, when aggression was very big and common, violent conflicts still happen in Serb-dominated regions northern Kosovo. This violence contains assaults on different ethnic character and EULEX personnel. EULEX and the Kosovo Police Service have a narrow authority in this region, because of resistance from local Serbian structuring. Kosovo officials have accused that this has caused to a security weakness in which organized crime groups and radicals have increased.

A few Kosovar Serbian may be disappointed with Belgrade's permanence on refusing the cooperation with the Kosovo government. During the November 2009 local polls,

⁶⁶⁷ Blerta Foniki-Kabashi, "UN Security Council Approves Ban's Six-Point Plan", SETimes.com, 27 November 2008, Available on site http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/11/27/feature-02 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶⁸ "EULEX: In Search of an Identity", Balkan Policy Institute, Pristina, 27 December 2009, p.13, Available on site http://policyinstitute.eu/images/uploads/Eulex_report_final_English.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁶⁹ European Commission, "Serbia 2010 Progress Report", Brussels, 9 November 2010, Available on site http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/sr_rapport_2010_en.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

significant amount of Kosovo Serbs from different regions participated in the poll. For example, Serbs were successful in the three newly established municipalities. Voter attendance in these municipalities' elections was two times higher than in 2007. More precisely, the election attendance in Gracanica was % 23 percent, in Ranilug % 12.4 and in Klokot % 25.2. While this attendance was in minimum where ethnic Albanian-majority areas, it should be remembered that the Serbian administration strongly supported Serbs to boycott the election⁶⁷⁰. The turnout may define displeasure among Serbs who are encircled by ethnic Albanian-dominated areas, that Serbia is not presenting them sufficient aid about their difficult economic and social conditions. On the contrary to some Serbs in the enclave, Serbian leaders in Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo consider that they can live without assistance of Pristina regime, as they can be sure of current support with Serbia.

In response to Belgrade's rigid approach on northern Kosovo, the EU has found a pragmatic solution by changing its approach. The EU has begun to work with local leaders in the north on problems such as economic growth and democracy while avoiding the status question. The EU has opened an "EU House"⁶⁷¹ to explain the EU to local people in the north. Other thoughts in the north to show local people the advantages of cooperation with the EU. This approach has been observed with intolerance by the Kosovo administration, which want the international society to take more powerful steps to assist it claim Kosovo's sovereignty over these regions.

Behind the ICJ judged on Kosovo's declaration of independence did not breach international law in July 2010, the EU puts pressure on Belgrade to agree to use EU-brokered talks chance with Kosovo on technical subjects. The fall of the Kosovo government in late 2010 and the need for new votes postponed the talks, which began on 8-9 March 2011. The first round of the talks argued such problems as air traffic, Kosovo's membership in regional projects, freedom of movement, and trade.

⁶⁷⁰ György Hajnal - Gábor Péteri, "*Local Reform in Kosovo- Final Report*", Forum 2015 - Kosova Foundation for Open Society, February 2010, pp.27-30, Available on site http://afroditi.uom.gr/olympia/site_2010/files/Paivi%20Nikander/local_reforminKosovoKFOS2010.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁷¹ Petrit Collaku, "*EU House Opens in Mitrovica*", BalkanInsight, 26 March 2010, Available on site <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-house-opens-in-mitrovica-north> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Both sides stated the negotiations under way in a positive atmosphere. Kosovo's chief representative for the negotiations has again and again declared that Kosovo's status will not be debatable question for talks. However, Belgrade's representative asserted that he was ready to find solutions that would not negotiate to position of either side on status. Serbia may want to show her positive side at the negotiations with the aim of influencing the EU to accept Belgrade membership candidate status⁶⁷².

6.4.2. U.S. Policy:

Kosovar Albanians profess a great esteem for the United States, especially; presidents Clinton and Bush are widely appreciated. Clinton for leadership NATO's military operation that liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule and Bush for guiding coordinated declaration of independence of Kosovo. This special connection spreads to the Albanian-American society, which has significant relations with the U.S. Government and Members of the U.S. Congress, with the inclusion of the Albanian Issues Caucus⁶⁷³.

U.S-led NATO intervention finished Milosevic's destructions in Kosovo, but it left many difficult issues to international society, including remaking the order for the continuation of a normal life in Kosovo, establishing autonomous governing organizations, and starting rebuilding of the war weary province. The problematic issue of Kosovo's final status also emerged as dangerous uncompleted situation, with significant effects for stabilization in the entire western Balkan area.

The United States played a key role since 2005 in pushing for a solution to the issue of Kosovo's status. After years, U.S. politicians started to highlight the need to overcome this situation in the Balkans with a practical political agreement for Kosovo. In 2006 and 2007, U.S. spokespersons made repeated declarations against continuing an uncertain status quo and in support of resolving Kosovo's status in order to reach U.S. targets. Since 2007, U.S. officials have openly declared U.S. support for Kosovo's independence.

Over the years, U.S. moral obligation in Kosovo has sometimes been disputed. Instability in Kosovo could have a harmful effect on the stability of the Balkans and for that reason

⁶⁷² Claire Rosenberg, "*Serbia, Kosovo Tip-Toe to Reconciliation*", AFP, 9 March 2011, Available on site <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j27ITwOm-OUFha2tIPDcctVCBHvQ?docId=CNG4d0972a5d5ba233b46fb820a5ebf0e0c.761>(accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁷³ Available on site <http://engel.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=143> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

peace in whole Europe as a vital interest of the United States. Instability in the Balkans could create positive atmosphere to criminal organization and terrorism and weaken Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation. The ongoing participation of the United States with resources and highest trustworthiness in the region is vital to guarantee this stability⁶⁷⁴.

Some critics of U.S. engagement in the Balkans say that the situation in Kosovo does not have great influence on vital U.S. interests like other problems. Reflecting international focus on the global anti-terrorism campaign and other priorities, there has appeared a strong interest in “finishing the job,” including an eventual “exit strategy” for the international civil and military administration of Kosovo. However, an international civilian and military role with an ongoing NATO and U.S. presence is likely to stay on for some time after independence to assist with and supervise Kosovo’s transition.

The United States recognized Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008, one of the first countries to do so. The United States has urged other countries to extend diplomatic recognition to Kosovo. After the independence, Kosovo and U.S. top leaders made mutual visits to Washington and Pristina. After these meetings United States declared to continue U.S. support for Kosovo, together with encouraging Kosovo’s international recognition and membership in international organizations. Also they expressed opposition to any partition of Kosovo.

The Obama administration provides valuable political, diplomatic, and economic support to Kosovo. The U.S. is one of the largest donors to Kosovo, contributing \$120.9 million for political and economic reform in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 and \$100 million in FY 2010. The U.S.-led rescue of Kosovo, whose population is mostly Muslim, is an important statement to the broader Muslim community at a time when the Obama administration is restoring America’s image global⁶⁷⁵.

Vice President Joseph Biden visited Kosovo on 21 May 2009; Kosovo made him a hero’s welcome and he declared that the “success of an independent Kosovo” is a U.S.

⁶⁷⁴ Tayyar Ari, Ferhat Pirinççi, “*Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında ABD’nin Balkan Politikası*”, *Alternatif Politika*, Cilt. 3, Sayı. 1, Mayıs 2011, p.5, ⁶⁷⁴ Available on site <http://www.alternatifpolitika.com/page/docs/mayis-2011-sayi-1/tam-metin/tayyar-ari-ferhat-pirincci.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁷⁵ David L. Philips, “*Kosova*”, *Western Balkans Policy Review 2010*, Janusz Bugajski (Ed.), Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2010, Washington D.C., p.77., ⁶⁷⁵ Available on site http://csis.org/files/publication/100917_Bugajski_WesternBalkans_WEB.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

“priority”⁶⁷⁶. In October 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Kosovo and got a rapturous welcome from large pro-American crowds in Pristine where she reaffirmed U.S. support for the independence and territorial integrity of Kosovo. She said “From the start, the United States supported Kosovo’s right to exist as a sovereign, independent state within its existing borders. We welcomed the International Court of Justice’s recent advisory opinion affirming Kosovo’s legal right to declare independence. And now we will continue to support Kosovo as it does the hard work of building a stable, prosperous and democratic country that is at peace with its neighbors and increasingly integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community.” She expressed strong U.S. support for upcoming talks between Serbia and Kosovo⁶⁷⁷. Although strongly supporting the Serbia-Kosovo talks, U.S. officials have said the United States will not play a leading role in them. In this new period, U.S. role at the talks between Serbia and Kosovo would be as a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator.

The ICJ opinion will surely galvanize greater global recognition of Kosovo. As before, the United States is taking the lead, urging countries to establish diplomatic relations. However, the case for recognition would be stronger if Kosovo improved its governance and cracked down on corruption. The Balkan wars of the 1990s started in Kosovo. If there is a continuation of conflict in parts of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo is the possible trigger. A secure, peaceful and rich Kosovo that supports democratic governance and minority rights is necessary to stability in Southern Europe. Transparent and responsible authority is wanted for the development of a free market economy, as well as regional anti-crime and counter-terrorism attempts.

6.4.3. EU Policy:

The response of the EU to the Kosovo’s declaration of independence could have been sign of the post-independence events. The reactions of the international community to independence divided into three sections. The first group, United States, France, Germany and other powerful actors including Turkey and mainly Western powers recognized

⁶⁷⁶ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, “U.S. Vice President Makes 'Historic' Visit to Kosovo”, 21 May 2009, ⁶⁷⁶ Available on site <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/77663/-u-s-vice-president-makes-historic-visit-to-kosovo.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁷⁷ The Washington Times, “Clinton Pays Visit to Support Kosovo”, 13 October 2010, Available on site <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/13/clinton-pays-visit-to-support-kosovo/> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Kosovo within one or two days. The second group, the EU loyalty factor might have defined members' attitudes: some of the member states that are US allies and were in the process of Kosovo from early on shared the view that independence was unavoidable. The rest has chosen to either support this understandable idea, or to follow the doubtful path of Kosovo waiting an international protectorate. A large part of Asia, Latin America and Africa have remained to observe how Kosovo dilemma would be solved and what implications the recognition might comprise for their citizens. A third group has obviously described its position in resistance to the political agenda of Kosovo, and with Russia rejection Ahtisaari proposal in the Security Council efficiently continues to challenge any steps forward in the issue. Finally, Greek Cypriot State was the most powerfully opponent, but Spain, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania all stated reservation about the potential effects for separatist-nationalist movements elsewhere, and concerned about their own separatist minority groups would not recognize Kosovo⁶⁷⁸.

Greater parts of the international society have the same opinion that Kosovo is a *sui generis (unique)* case that does not represent a model for any other case. The EU declared this conclusion at Brussels European Council on External Relations in December 2007⁶⁷⁹. There are several extra causes for the difficulty of the recognition procedure of Kosovo. Normally, no decision from an institutional authority, specifically the UN or the EU, agreed on the strategy that should be taken. Absence of homogeneous position in the EU reduced the speed of recognition process in Europe. Secondly, uncertainty can be referred to the lack of diplomatic relations and influential actions from the Kosovo government. Otherwise the causes for resistance can be classified in three basic arguments: Serbia's opposition to independence of Kosovo, general anti-American feeling and individual explanations of different states.

⁶⁷⁸ Stephen Castle, "Behind the Scenes, EU Splits over Kosovo Independence", New York Times, 18 February 2008, Available on site <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18iht-diplo.5.10161693.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁷⁹ European Council Presidency Conclusion, Brussels, 14 December 2007, pp.20-1, Available on site http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/97669.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

The EU's policy towards Kosovo was clarified in the Council Conclusions on 18 February 2008⁶⁸⁰: "Members states will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on relations with Kosovo." We can understand that despite the EU effort at presenting obvious picture of common foreign policy, EU has not reached to the point what is good governance on supranational level. Generally, the EU gives up effectiveness and influence it could manage by presenting a model political approach when it keeps repeatedly adjusting to the realities on the ground.

The conception of the EU that Kosovo cannot live re-united into Serbia, and its choice to support Kosovo's independence in respect to democratic political representation, legislative reforms and civil society, was critical for Kosovo to begin on the road to the European integration. All the state-building attempts collapsed the 2008 political developments. The EU has supported the independence not by announcing what the correct status should be and trying to impose it, but by setting stability and peace as the broader objective of its foreign policy on the Western Balkans.

The European Union produced such conditions in Kosovo that it was ready to believe statehood or supervised independence and the UN management could be changed by a stable sovereign administration. Together with the UN, the EU tried to settle a negotiation between Serbia and Kosovo and solving the problem, but this just caused approval of the Comprehensive Plan for the Status Settlement by Kosovo and created a policy of ongoing the status quo by Serbia.

With guaranteeing the maximum possible level of minority rights in the Ahtisaari proposal and the Kosovo constitution, with EU responsibility to supervise the transition, and by activating the member states to establish their affairs with Kosovo, the EU obviously planned on useful results of independence with circumstances that would make it a acceptable and well-built solution for all sides. Using all these policies and signing the SAA with Serbia over full cooperation with the ICTY, the EU has followed a step-by-step policy for democratization of Serbia, an independent and sovereign Kosovo and stability in the Balkans. Thus, the EU completely gave its support to Serbia's shift to pro-European

⁶⁸⁰ Press Release, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 18 February 2008, p.7, Available on site http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/98818.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

leadership and presented accelerating the membership process in consideration of better agreement with its requirements.

Leading players of the EU recognized Kosovo's independence; however the EU was unsuccessful to show a comprehensive foreign policy about the status. The mixed record of the UN administration and European integration in Kosovo gives us an idea about the boundaries of power that external actors have in controlling political results on the national level. Generally, the integration process of Serbia and Kosovo shows how the EU plays a role about the stability and development along its periphery, but cannot successfully perform its pre-accession conditionality in sensitive regions discussing independence where homogeneous loyalty from its members and from the regional partners cannot be guaranteed.

6.4.4. Positions of International Missions after Independence:

6.4.4.1. KFOR:

KFOR had a vital responsibility behind the NATO Air campaign of 1999 which was keeping the security condition and presenting the safety for the civil government to function. It began to activate under the resolution of UN 1244 and presently still keeps on to control as “the third” receiver after Kosovo police and EULEX police, however currently its existence synchronized in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) annex XI as an International Military Presence (IMP)⁶⁸¹. IMP is under the authority and control of NATO and is responsible to guarantee the defense of Kosovo from external threats. After the declaration of independence, NATO took a decision that the continuation of KFOR to protect the security with the aim of sustaining Kosovo government was very critical. Although military existence of NATO maintained to be located after independence, NATO leaders decided to decrease the amount of troops which currently is 8454⁶⁸² of which are 479 Turkish soldiers. According to KFOR commander General Erhard Buehler, in remarks to the Kosovar press in February, a further decrease to nearly 5,000 soldiers was due to be done by the beginning of March 2011. The amount of

⁶⁸¹ Available on site http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁸² Available on site Security Council Report, February 2011 Kosovo, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6524795/k.14E4/February_2011brKosovo.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

troops which currently is 5872 of which are 426 Turkish soldiers⁶⁸³. Kosovar Albanian leaders have not stated warning at the KFOR reductions. They would like to see the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) slowly undertake task for Kosovo's security, with ongoing support from the Alliance to organize the state for possible NATO membership. On the contrary, Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia criticized the KFOR reductions, declaring that they would weaken the security of the Serbian inhabitants in Kosovo.

6.4.4.2. UNMIK:

UNMIK was the most significant mission in Kosovo, as KFOR, after the NATO's operation which shaped all states roles. The authorization of UNMIK was founded on the UNSC resolution 1244 possibly permitted to by the ex-Yugoslavia. Mostly there was no role of institutions in Kosovo behind the war while UNMIK with the assist of EU and OSCE controlled its activities in many fields, for example, democratization process, civilian rule, economic reform and justice. Following the independence, UNMIK firstly was considered that would be transformed, however UNMIK still use several tasks in Kosovo with the continuing into UN resolution 1244. In the report of 10 June 2009 by Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on the subject of administration mission in Kosovo was determined to decrease the amount of personnel of UNMIK from almost 5.000 to 500. As said by this report, the explanation of these personnel cut is the organization of EULEX and the function of this new mission in the rule of troubled region⁶⁸⁴. In a report published one year before by SRSG were summarized the capabilities of UNMIK which will maintain after the independence too. According to this report, UNMIK was tasked to have a responsibility in talking to entities which are non-recognized. A new task of UNMIK after the independence is the organizations for Kosovo's attachment in international agreements and possible improvement of dialog between Kosovo and Serbia⁶⁸⁵.

⁶⁸³ Available on site http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁸⁴ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2009/ 300, 10 June 2009, Available on site <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/360/78/PDF/N0936078.pdf?Open+Element> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁸⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/354, 12 June 2008, Available on site <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/377/90/PDF/N0837790.pdf?Open+Element> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Although EULEX is the direct liable in justice system, UNMIK continues some external relation in this area such as partnership with the INTERPOL and the ICTY. The function of UNMIK still continues to carry weight in the North of Kosovo where EULEX had troubles to control the region⁶⁸⁶. In the last report of SRSG published in July 2010 is stated that UNMIK is a critical dynamic which assists collaboration between Pristina and Belgrade on missing persons' subjects. Despite EULEX as the mission who would assist establishments of Kosovo for improved management, UNMIK still persists to become main mission⁶⁸⁷.

6.4.4.3.OSCE:

Even though OSCE mission was launched in Kosovo before the NATO air campaign, after the war this mission has been supported by UN resolution 1244 to be active in UN framework. Later than the independence of Kosovo, the authorization of mission must be refreshed every month by Permanent Council, because of not all member states have recognized Kosovo. According to CSP⁶⁸⁸, OSCE is included in international presence in order to "support the democratic development of Kosovo and the work of the International Civilian Representative (ICR)". Like in many other countries currently OSCE Mission in Kosovo performs supporting and protecting individual rights, promoting stability and democratic development and supervises the elections.

Overall, reports of OSCE are very significant for the accession of Kosovo into Euro-Atlantic organizations. A positive report from OSCE can become Kosovo closer to Euro-Atlantic societies or the contrary.

6.4.4.4. ICO/ICR:

Another key international mission which has a significant position in Kosovo is International Civilian Office (ICO). The International Civilian Office (ICO) assists the International Civilian Representative (ICR) in the fulfillment of his mandate and the aims

⁶⁸⁶ S/2009/300, 10 June 2009.

⁶⁸⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2010/401, 29 July 2010, Available on site

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/464/08/PDF/N1046408.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁸⁸ Available on site http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

of this office is to ensure full implementation of Kosovo's status settlement and to support Kosovo's European integration by advising Kosovo's government and community leaders. According to CSP⁶⁸⁹, ICO/ICR has broad authority such as;

1. Be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of civilian aspect of settlement,
2. Ensure effective implementation of the Settlement through the execution of specific tasks accorded to the ICR in other parts of the Settlement,
3. Take corrective measures to remedy, as necessary, any action taken by Kosovo authority that the ICR consider to be a breach of Settlement,
4. In case of serious or repeated failures to comply with the letter or spirit of the Settlement, ICR have the authority to sanction or remove from office any public official or take other measures, as necessary, to ensure full respect for the Settlement and its implementation,
5. Monitoring the reporting mechanism established by CSP in order of implementation all civilian aspect of Settlement.

In addition these large authorities, ICR have a power to appoint directly, or provide his approval for the appointment of certain positions such as the international judges, the Auditor General and the Director General of the Custom Service. According to these rights which ICR has, the Kosovo independence can be basically clarified that is very narrow but only if ICR in reality assume often these broad authorities, or else can be explained that ICR has only in theory these authority. The tasks of Kosovo's administration toward ICR/ICO are well explained in the last article of IX annex of CSP⁶⁹⁰ where is pointed out that Kosovo authorities shall fully to cooperate with ICR/ICO. Until Kosovo has accomplished all conditions of CSP, ICR/ICO mission will maintain to stay in Kosovo.

6.4.4.5. EULEX:

After the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the most important mission of international representatives which was founded is European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). EULEX is the major civilian mission launched by EU under the

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

Common Security and Defense Policy. The main aim of EULEX is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in three subjects; judiciary, police and customs. The current mandate of EULEX is until 14 June 2012 and the current head of EULEX is Xavier Bout de Marnhac⁶⁹¹. Because of the non-execution of CSP in the UN Security Council, another legal basis was needed to create the EULEX. To resolve this problem a long talks between UN, EU and Serbia occurred. In conclusion, the cooperation was constructed with Serbia and the EULEX launched to work under the UN resolution 1244 framework. After the independence of Kosovo not all EU member states supported it, but all 27 members supported EULEX completely⁶⁹².

In contrast, UN also decided to establish international civil administration in Kosovo, created by EU under the UN umbrella⁶⁹³. This question made the crack between Kosovo and Serbia about the EULEX authorization while Kosovo officials allow that mandate is effective in line with the CSP and its constitution, on the other side, Serbia authorities judge that the mandate is under the UN resolution 1244. The third part which is EULEX considers that UN resolution 1244 only presents the legal root for its presence⁶⁹⁴. Establishment of EULEX influenced annoyance of Serbian minority in Kosovo which were also agitated and encouraged by Belgrade. Serbs in northern Kosovo were supported by Serbia to renounce from organizations of Kosovo and to provoke the police with the aim of threatening the situation there. In addition, Belgrade managed local elections in Kosovo Serbs resides in Kosovo on May 11, but these voting were declared as illegal elections by UNMIK and International community⁶⁹⁵. Currently the circumstances appear to be absolutely different evaluating with the destabilized condition which was formed during the earliest year of establishment of EULEX. Various central political parties in

⁶⁹¹ Available on site <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁹² International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Independence*, Updated February 2009. Available on site <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/keyissues/kosovos-independence.aspx> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁹³ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. S/2008/ 354.12 June 2008

⁶⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, *"Kosovo's Independence"*, Updated February 2009.

⁶⁹⁵ Ilir Deda, *"UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency Nations in Transit 2009 – Kosovo"*, 30 June 2009, Available on site <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a55bb3e37.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Serbia have invited the Serbian minority in Kosovo to participate in parliamentary elections in Kosovo which will occur in December 2010⁶⁹⁶.

Generally, guiding, observing and advising are the tasks of EULEX in Kosovo, but in reality, the staff of this organization is superior authority which controls the major establishments in Kosovo. Although this superior authority is governing Kosovo, the missions plan is not being superior authority above Kosovo's government, but the intention is to build legitimate and effective structures crucial for a well-designed state.

6.5. THE PROBLEMS OF KOSOVO AFTER DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:

Many observers have named Kosovo is officially divided, regions of northern part of it joining Serbia, already under its de facto governance, and the rest is an independent Kosovo. Serbia has not openly announced the partition until now, as Serbian officials declared that all of Kosovo belongs to it without reserve, but developments show that Serbia is getting ready the opinion for such offer⁶⁹⁷.

Naturally, the Kosovo government strongly resists any separation. For transforming their opinions, Kosovars should accept that Kosovo has no real opportunity of expanding its control over the northern regions, and that it could consolidate its position in exchange for renouncing its demands there. Most probably, this would have to contain diplomatic recognition from Serbia, or new way of stopping the Kosovar-Serbian diplomatic "war" that would permit Kosovo to become member of the U.N. and to open its cooperation with the EU and its neighbors. Besides, Kosovo might request the separation of ethnic Albanian-majority areas of southern Serbia. In February 2010, Jakup Krasniqi, currently Chairman of the Assembly of Kosovo, declared such an exchange of region⁶⁹⁸.

⁶⁹⁶ B92, "*Kosovo Serbs Should Follow Govt. Advice*", 10 December 2010, Available on site http://b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=12&dd=10&nav_id=71441 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁹⁷ Aleksandar Vasovic, "*Serbia Plays Kosovo Partition Card*", Balkan Insight, Belgrade, 19 April 07, Available on site www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-plays-kosovo-partition-card (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁶⁹⁸ KosovoNews, "*Kosovo Official: South Serbia Would Join Kosovo*", 11 February 2010, Available on site <http://www.mykosovonews.com/2010/02/kosovo-official-south-serbia-would-join.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

The United States, most of the EU countries, Russia and Turkey also are against partition. A key reason is that they fear it could regenerate other attempts to change borders in the Balkans, such as in Bosnia and Macedonia. On the other hand, although de jure separation is doubtful in the near future, Serbia will aim to maintain to reinforce its control of Serbian-dominated regions, making an uncertain and de facto partition.

Kosovo confronts difficult challenges as a sovereign state as well as those posed by its great effort for international recognition and the condition of its ethnic minorities. Kosovo suffers from the similar troubles as other states in the region. Kosovo's difficulties are mainly bitter as it has had fresh experience in self-governance, having been administered by Serbia in the 1990s and by the international community from 1999 until 2008. According to October 2009 European Commission report on Kosovo, the institutions are weak, including the judiciary and law enforcement. Kosovo has higher officials of government bribery and corruption and powerful crime networks organizations such as organ trafficking⁶⁹⁹.

The November 2009 local elections, the first held since the country's independence and the first managed by Kosovo's own election establishment, showed a complicated portrait of Kosovo's democratic progression. The elections were watched by monitoring institutes and non-governmental organizations. In general, they evaluated the elections in the international standards, and found isolated problems of misconduct and the requirement for development in such areas as the reliability of voter-registration rolls⁷⁰⁰. However, correspondents from several newspapers and networks declared their witness about few serious events of electoral fraud, including distortion of results, stuffing and threats of many voters and election observers. By reason of serious denunciations of widespread irregularities in the second round of voting on 13 December 2010, Kosovo's Central Election Commission (CEC) invalidated elections in Prizren, Lipjan, and Gjilan⁷⁰¹.

On 27 September 2010, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu stepped down from post of president after the Kosovo Constitutional Court stated that he was violating the

⁶⁹⁹ Available on site <http://balkanopen.com/categoryarchive.php?id=8> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰⁰ Helsinki Bulletin, "*Kosovo Elections: A Test of Maturity*", Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade, No:46, November 2009, pp. 1-6, Available on site <http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB-No46.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰¹ Ilir Deda, "*UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, Nations in Transit 2009 – Kosovo*", p.9.

constitution⁷⁰². In reply, the Kosovo parliament dissolved itself and new parliamentary elections were held on 12 December 2010. As in the case of the local elections, the vote was fraudulent and repeated in some districts in January 2011.

After long talks, a new government was established in February 2011. Hashim Thaci, leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), was selected as prime minister once again. The same day the parliament of the Republic of Kosovo chose Pacolli as the President of the Republic. Most of the remaining coalition parties represent Serbs and other ethnic minorities. As part of the agreement to establish the government, Pacolli was elected president of Kosovo by the parliament in February 2011⁷⁰³. On 30 March 2011, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo stated that during the election of President, constitution was violated and he is no longer President of the Republic of Kosovo⁷⁰⁴. Pacolli decided to resign and the Constitutional Court's opinion was that he did nothing wrong. He declared he would contest for presidency again in the immediate election. Later, he agreed to have Atifete Jahjaga elected as president⁷⁰⁵ until 2012 when a constitution reform would mandate new direct presidential elections

After the election, coalition government formed on a relatively narrow majority and heterogeneous in composition. The possible fragility of the government could restrain its ability to successfully conduct talks with Serbia on technical issues, particularly if opposition groups take a strongly negative view toward them.

A lack of economic opportunity, unemployment and Poverty are severe troubles in Kosovo. According to the World Bank⁷⁰⁶, with a GDP per capita of € 1.850, Kosovo is one

⁷⁰² Guardian, "*Kosovo's President Resigns after Constitution Court Ruling*", 27 September 2010, Available on site <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/27/kosovo-president-resigns-court-ruling> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰³ Reuters, "*Kosovo Elects Businessman Behgjet Pacolli President*", 22 February 2011, Available on site <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/kosovo-president-idUSBYT24187220110222> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰⁴ Reuters, "*Kosovo President Quits after Ruling, to Run Anew*", 30 March 2011, Available on site <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/kosovo-president-resignation-idUSLDE72T0L920110330> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰⁵ Reuters, "*Kosovo Elects Policewoman as New President*", 7 April 2011, Available on site <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/07/kosovo-president-idUSLDE7361J120110407> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁰⁶ World Bank, "*Kosovo Partnership Program Snapshot*", March 2011, p.2, Available on site http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KOSOVOEXTN/Resources/Kosovo_Snapshot.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

of the poorest countries in Europe. Poverty remains persistent and widespread: The high unemployment rate translates directly into a high poverty rate with slightly more than one-third of the population living below an absolute poverty line of €1.55 per day in 2009 and 12 % living below the extreme poverty line of €1.02 per day. Young people are disproportionately poor with 40 % of the poor being below the age of 20, and 60 % of the poor being below the age of 30. Unemployment is a large factor in poverty, with about 30 % of the poor being unemployed⁷⁰⁷.

The country has little large-scale industry and few exports. However, Kosovo does have significant deposits of metals and lignite, which could lead to a revival of the mining sector. Kosovo has to improve its investment climate in order to stimulate growth and attract foreign investment, according to the European Commission and World Bank⁷⁰⁸.

Since 1999, Kosovo has been totally in need of international support and controlled expenditures by international organization in Kosovo. After declaration of independence, these sources of income level have decreased. Besides, Kosovo is reliant on worker's remittances from the diasporas located mainly in Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries are estimated to account for about 13-15% of GDP, and donor-financed activities and aid for another 7.5%., according to the 2011 CIA World Factbook⁷⁰⁹. According to the World Bank, the global financial crisis has had a negative effect on remittances and exports. However, Kosovo economy was one of the very few in the Europe and Central Asia region to develop during the global financial crisis; growth slowed from 5.4 % in 2008 to about 4 % in 2009 and 2010 in the wake of the global economic crisis, a much better outcome than in the rest of Southeast Europe, which mostly suffered declines in output⁷¹⁰.

After the independence, especially the donor states that support the declaration of independence of Kosovo pledged a total of 1.2 billion Euros for the period 2009-2011. The EU pledged 508 million Euros, while EU member states pledged another 285 million Euros. The United States pledged \$402.9 million, which granted allowance previously

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid, p.7.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid, pp.13-4.

⁷⁰⁹ CIA The World Factbook, "Kosovo", Updated July 2011, Available on site <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹⁰ World Bank, "Kosovo Partnership Program Snapshot", p.2.

appropriated with the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2009 request⁷¹¹. The international aid will go toward improving Kosovo's infrastructure links toward the rest of the region, improving Kosovo's educational system, developing Kosovo's democratic institutions, and funding for debt obligations that Kosovo may inherit. Donor governments have raised concerns about whether Kosovo can effectively absorb this aid, given the inefficiency of its governing institutions and a substantial problem with corruption⁷¹².

Kosovar leaders disappointed the EU's a July 2009 decision⁷¹³ to admit visa-free travel to the EU for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia from January 2010, while continuing to necessitate visas for Kosovo with Albania and Bosnia. In addition to the practical difficulties involved, Kosovars may consider the decision as a heavy blow to the status of their state. Also, the integration of Kosovo to Europe may be slowed down if Kosovars, mainly young people, view it hard to travel to the EU and see how the EU runs directly. Despite this concern, without agreement on Kosovo's status within the EU may continue a severe problem to the resolution of this crisis.

6.6. DOMINO EFFECTS TO THE OTHER CONFLICT REGIONS:

As said by the Macedonian Minister of Foreign Affairs the solution of the Kosovo status is the last step towards normality in the Balkans. "The dissolution of Yugoslavia started in 1981 with the Kosovo crisis and will come to an end with a solution of the Kosovo problem. With this the domino effect will find its end."⁷¹⁴

Although a significant part of the international community's recognition of Kosovo's independence from proclaimed on 17 February 2008, has been presented in the discourse as a sui generis case, which therefore does not establish an international precedent for other separatist movements in the world, however many analysts seems it to have opened a

⁷¹¹ Steven Woehrel, "*Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*", Congressional Research Service, 9 March 2011 p.7, Available on site <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21721.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹² Kosovo Donors Conference Conclusions of the Chair, Brussels 2008, Available on site <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/kdc/conclusions.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹³ The Schengen White List Project Compendium, The Commission Proposal for Visa-Free Travel, 15 July 2009, Available on site http://www.novisa.md/uploads/2011/04/schengen_white_list_project_compendium.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹⁴ Ulrich Kleppmann, "*Nation Building and Democracy Key Factors for Peace in the Western Balkans*", Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, What can NGO's contribute to the European Security and Defence Policy?, 18 September 2007, Skopje, p.3

Gates of Hell or Pandora's Box to ambitious expansionist states and proxy radical movements. The political analysts say that we enter a period of creation of new micro national states. Kosovo is a signal that the geopolitical holiday the world had enjoyed since the end of the Cold War is now finally over.

With the effect of the Kosovo's declaration of independence, the people have separatist rhetoric all over the world; have begun to claim their rights to independence more than from Kosovo. Kosovo's declaration of independence has created a difficult situation for the countries which have separatist thoughts and actions. Kosovo's independence means a new wave of hope and the new era for separatist regions all over the world. Micro-nationalism wave of that surrounds the world gave birth to the Republic of Kosovo. The sovereign Kosovo will be the new styling model for all the peoples of various regions of the world who dream of independence⁷¹⁵.

Today, with the addition of South Sudan on 14 July 2011, there are currently 193 United Nations member states, including all fully recognized independent states⁷¹⁶. About five thousand racial, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic groups are living in these states. Currently, about 500 and 700 groups have different demands related to self-government all over the world. Today, in different parts of the world, there are different communities, peoples and regions are under the sovereignty of the state who demands independence. For example, the Quebecois in Canada, Catalans and Basques in Spain, Flanders in Belgium, the Scots in Britain, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, South Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia, Chechens in the Russian Federation, Padania in Italy and South Brazilians in Brazil want to be independent states within the framework of right to self-determination⁷¹⁷.

Obviously, way to Kosovo's independence was opened as a result of an armed struggle. Western countries approved the armed resistance of the Albanians and the creation of independence status after the NATO intervention. Moreover they emboldened the Kosovar Albanians to declare independence. Some secessionist groups in different regions in the

⁷¹⁵ Gözde YAŞIN, "Dünya'nın Yeni Kosovaları: Kıbrıs Kosova'nın Neresinde?", 2023 Dergisi, Atılım Yayıncılık, Ankara, Sayı 83, Mart 2008.

⁷¹⁶ Available on site <http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹⁷ Erhan Türbedar, Sadi Çaycı, Hasan Kanbolat, "Kendi Kaderini Tayin Hakkı ve Ayrılıkçılık: Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı Emsal Teşkil Eder mi?", p.25.

world want to use this situation as an example and they convince that armed struggle will bring a definitive solution to their demands.

Countries that support Kosovo's independence claim that Kosovo's terms is in a different location within the world separatist movements and it will not affect other troubled regions around the world. They also argue that Kosovo is a unique case and does not set a model for any analogous entity in the future.

However, there has been pessimist approach to issue. Russia has definitely opposed to the western powers viewing Kosovo as a special case, and expected the chain reaction that would follow it. Russia sees the Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence as destabilizing and against international law.

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, stated "The illegal acts of the Kosovo Albanian leadership's and of those who support them set a dangerous precedent. They are fraught with an escalation of tension and inter-ethnic violence in the province, destructive consequences for interstate relations that took decades to build"⁷¹⁸ at the meeting of the Security Council on the Kosovo Settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin charged that Western support for the newly declared state is "immoral and illegal" behavior that will provoke a global storm of separatism and explode the international order. Russian media have publicized a list of far-flung separatist conflicts that could be affected by the Kosovo events, including Taiwan, northern Cyprus, Spain's Basque region, Quebec, the Kurdish zone in Iraq, Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and Tibet. But, most Russian experts admitted, their neighborhood concerns them most⁷¹⁹.

Russia strictly opposed the Kosovo's independence. However the biggest reason is the possibility of repeat the Yugoslavia scenario in Russia is still valid, rather than protecting the interests of sister Serbia. Russia may be the world's ultimate glass house, with 20 autonomous ethnic republics. One, Chechnya, is still in ruins after its independence bid was put down by Moscow in two brutal wars.

⁷¹⁸ Available on site http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga_docs/Statement180208en.htm (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷¹⁹ Fred Weir, "Kosovo Independence: Russia Warns of Separatist Storm", The Christian Science Monitor, 20 February 2008, Available on site <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0220/p06s01-woeu.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

The most fragile Balkan construct is Bosnia, followed by Macedonia. Encouraged by Belgrade and allegedly by Russian money, Bosnian Serb politicians threaten to follow Kosovo with their own independence declaration for Republika Srpska. With an untested EU military force on the ground in Bosnia, NATO must have contingency plans to redeploy in an emergency. Macedonia's Albanians who took up arms in 2001 aren't as restive, but could be should things get messy again in the Balkans⁷²⁰.

Spain is one of five EU countries that have rejected Kosovo's independence. Spain's negative vote in this issue paralleled the Basque problem it has faced for decades. Against the central government rejection of Kosovo's secession from Serbia as an 'illegal unilateral declaration', the Basque government, seeking greater autonomy if not independence, welcomes the move⁷²¹. After the announcement of International Court of Justice Spain has not changed the position and declared that Spain would not recognise Kosovo as an independent state, despite the UN's International Court of Justice (ICJ) backing for its unilateral breakaway from Serbia, and continue to appeal for dialogue and an agreement between the different parties⁷²².

Cyprus, which is issue of Turkish foreign policy agenda for years, perhaps the most important area may be established in connection with Kosovo. Greek Cypriot Administration is also against such a move, fearing the precedent it might set for Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus. But, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots say the Kosovo decision does not mark Turkish Cypriots' future and is not seen as an alternative initiative to end the isolation of northern Cyprus.

However, after the recognition of Kosovo's independence; TRNC would expect more equitable approaches to emergence than Annan Plan, resulting in a fiasco at the UN. And the Turkish side can forward the UN in this direction by carrying out studies. An atmosphere of tension in eastern Mediterranean can create a conflict and can provide an

⁷²⁰ Available on site <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120216172877542227.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²¹ William Chislett, "*Inside Spain*", Real Institute Elcano, 12 March 2008, Available on site <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/e578b8004f0189d79375f73170baead1/Chislett031208Newsletter.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e578b8004f0189d79375f73170baead1> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²² Available on site <http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/international/121253-spain-rejects-kosovo-independence.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

initiative for Turkey on TRNC. Such an initiative which will be brought on the agenda of the United Nations is possible by considering such factors as Turkey's domestic political stability and economic development provided in recent years.

Kosovo's move emerged as an acid test of approaches in Asia and in a different place on the way to secession from mainland. Russian fears have been repeated by China, India Indonesia and Sri Lanka. China condemned Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia while Taiwan welcomed it. China is concerned about similar action by Taiwan, which has recognized Kosovo. China is also worried about its western Xinziang area, where Uyghur Muslim secessionists are struggle for over thirty years. The Tibet issue too has the possible of troubling Beijing again⁷²³.

Also western media have emphasized that ethnic and tribal groups in the northeast are also keen to secede from India. India noted that as Kosovo does not meet all three conditions for recognition, namely "a defined territory, a duly constituted government in charge which is accepted by the people and which has effective control over an area of governance," India is not offering recognition and would prefer the issue to be "resolved through peaceful means and through consultation and dialogue."⁷²⁴

Sri Lanka has expressed concern out of apprehension that the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam might go behind the Kosovo model and might even be recognized by some states. Indonesia has already lost East Timor and is concerned about the Aceh region, where rebels want to secede from the mainland regime.⁷²⁵

More generally, to accept Kosovo's independence would show that secessionism upon violence is effective. Then, the international community should organize itself according to seeing the Kosovo "strategy" applied in another place. Firstly, ethnic secessionists assault civilians and police force. Not knowing where the enemy is concealed within the inhabitants and defense forces react haphazardly. Human rights violations create an international protest and condemnation climate, followed by intervention and occupation

⁷²³ Available on site <http://www.sify.com/news/why-india-must-oppose-kosovo-s-independence-news-columns-kgdjT7jejh.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²⁴ Available on site <http://www.tamilcanadian.com/article/5425> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²⁵ Available on site <http://www.sify.com/news/why-india-must-oppose-kosovo-s-independence-news-columns-kgdjT7jejh.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

by foreign military forces. And, finally, the state loses control of its province as the secessionists declare independence.”⁷²⁶

We can not say that we are not familiar such a situation. Is this a precedent, as a little fear and others expect? Certainly, it is. South Ossetia and Trans-Dniester leaders are speaking harshly with supporting Russia about pursuing the model of the American-backed Kosovars. Basque and Catalan secessionists are keeping note, and the Spanish government has reacted against the declaration of independence with startling sharpness. Kosovo is an important member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, which has 50 members, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar⁷²⁷.

6.7. THE ICJ ADVISORY OPINION ON KOSOVO’S INDEPENDENCE:

As from 2005, the Final Status Negotiations were started as prescribed in resolution 1244; however, no result was obtained from this process and the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence was adopted on 17 February 2008 in a meeting of the Assembly of Kosovo. Serbia tried to find international confirmation and support for its position that the declaration of independence was unlawful and Kosovo is part of its territory. On 30 September 2008, in a trial vote, the Serbian initiative was backed by 120 member states. In the real vote, the United Nations General Assembly adopted this proposal as Resolution 63/3 on 8 October 2008 with 77 votes in favor, 6 votes against and 74 abstentions⁷²⁸. On 9 October 2008, the UN Secretariat informed the ICJ that it had begun the preparation of a dossier containing all documents relevant to the legal question before the Court, representing the body of international law on the question. Serbia requested the UN General Assembly to ask the advisory opinion of the Hague-based International Court of Justice on the declaration of independence of Kosovo with this question “Is the unilateral

⁷²⁶ Raju G.C. Thomas, “*The Case Against Kosovo Independence*”, The Japan Times Online, 3 January 2008, Available on site <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20080103a1.html> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, “*The Kosovo Precedent*”, Los Angeles Times, 21 February 2008, Available on site <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ash21feb21,0,6880108.story> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷²⁸ BBC News, “*UN Seeks World Court Kosovo View*”, 9 October 2008, Available on site <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”⁷²⁹

On 22 July 2010, by a majority of ten to four, the International Court of Justice issued that the Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence did not violate the International Law Security Council resolution 1244 or the Constitutional Framework, because international law contains no “prohibition on declarations of independence”⁷³⁰. It identified only two very limited exceptions⁷³¹:

- where the declaration stemmed from an illegal act, such as the use of force or acts contrary to *jus cogens*⁷³², and
- where the UN Security Council decided that the declaration was illegal (for example northern Cyprus and the Republika Srpska).

The Court also took note to interpret the UNSC Resolution 1244 drawing attention to many paragraphs where the Yugoslavian/Serbian sovereignty had been suspended in Kosovo for a temporary period of time pending the final political status. The ICJ thought that resolution 1244 was considered for humanitarian ideas, stabilization and restoration; to replace the Serbian legal order; and to build only a temporary administration. For that reason it included no particular ban on an independence declaration. In any event, thus the court said, the writers of the declaration of independence were not doing something as one of the new establishments but were outside the UN structure⁷³³.

After the summary of the decision we need to learn the legal scope of advisory opinion. First of all, it is not a compulsory verdict but an advisory opinion. The ICJ’s aim is not to resolve inter-state disagreements, but relatively to present lawful advice. The UN General

⁷²⁹ Available on site <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15022.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷³⁰ “*Accordance with International Law of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence In Respect of Kosovo*”, International Court of Justice, General List No:141, 22 July 2010, Available on site <http://www.webcitation.org/5rRB9e3bz> (accessed on 02 November 2011).; Kosovo Independence Move not Illegal, Says UN Court, BBC News, 22 July 2010, Available on site <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10730573> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷³¹ “*International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence*”, House of Commons Library, 4 May 2011, p.3

⁷³² *Jus cogens*: a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted

⁷³³ “*Accordance with International Law of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence In Respect of Kosovo*”, p.36

Assembly demanded the advisory opinion is free to give effect to the opinion, or not. On the other hand, advisory opinions are consulted by international organizations and by states, and can help to the development of international law.

Secondly, the opinion tells simply to the declaration of independence itself. It specifically states that it is not about the penalty of the declaration or about whether Kosovo has achieved statehood. It is not attached with self-determination, secession, statehood or international recognition. Therefore the ICJ keeps away from all the prime questions opposing the international community in this area.

Finally, it asserts only that declarations of independence are “not prohibited”. Some disagree that it does not mean that they are allowed by international law. On the other hand, other analysts have defended that the court was incorrect about who prepared the declaration, saying that the original documentation making the declaration was obviously under the heading of institutions established by Resolution 1244.

Serbia had expected that an ICJ opinion would change the issue of Kosovo’s status from the political to the legal field. But the narrowness of the opinion produced plenty of possibility for politics⁷³⁴. Generally words, the ICJ has not refrained from opinions on critical and politically hot subjects; but, the ICJ has been reluctant to present an Advisory Opinion.

Without a doubt, international law draws the terms of being a state; but a critical issue is political recognition by other states. In giving a realistically narrow judgment that could simply be much more commonly translated as supporting Kosovo’s independence and giving permission to secession, the ICJ has possibly considered its opinion to be used politically.

The ICJ opinion appears to have produced different options that would end in different or unexpected political results in the Balkans. It seems to present the option to states that did not recognize independence of Kosovo on the basis of the International Law may adjust their understanding, at the same time, it present the opportunity to Serbia to change its approach.

⁷³⁴ International Crisis Group, “*Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion*”, Europe Report No:206, 26 August 2010, p.4, Available on site http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D5FE65E656223858C125778B0043D831-Full_Report.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

In contrast, Kosovo is observed to be in better position after the ICJ opinion, more recognition was expected in the near future, however, only 8 states has recognized since the opinion was issued⁷³⁵. Nevertheless, the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the remaining opposite members of the EU seems to be vital for an open and a smooth road for Kosovo to EU integration. Without recognition from the all members of EU, the integration of Kosovo to EU does not appear to be possible.

Following to the opinion, new period starts in Serbia-Kosovo relations. Serbia, under strong pressure from the EU, agreed to discontinue the provocative speech from a draft UN resolution on Kosovo which was adopted on 9 September 2010⁷³⁶, and agreed to hasten its argument of Serbia's application for EU membership. Direct talks, mostly technical rather than status talks, between Kosovo and Serbia, assisted by the EU, started in March 2011.

Today, 86 UN states support Kosovo's independence and the majority of them defend that Kosovo issue is a unique and not an example for other problematic regions in the world. However, the ICJ's opinion that international law does not prohibit the unilateral declarations of independence is likely to hearten other secessionists to put in practice. The opinion is only about the legality of independence declarations and does not imply that separatist regions will be recognized as states. Thus, further unilateral declarations of independence will be easily open a road to conflict.

The ICJ's opinion may also endanger the UN peace-keeping operations⁷³⁷. Five dissenting judges of ICJ said that the Security Council was the only UN body concerned with Kosovo; as a result, the Security Council has right the termination of the provisional administration, not the General Assembly, nor the ICJ, nor the Kosovars unilaterally. The dissenting judges' distress may have been that their verdict will possibly imply peace-keeping operations might show the way to separatist movements in the future. If this opinion became the general rule in international law, probably states would never permit to such operations on their region.

⁷³⁵ Available on site <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/> (accessed on 10 February 2012).

⁷³⁶ Available on site <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10980.doc.htm> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷³⁷ *"International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence"*, House of Commons Library, p.5-6.

The effect of the ICJ judgment is not as much of that it will cause new declarations of independence than present support to those already given to such a policy. And even if an advisory opinion will not guide in immediate or dramatic changes to Kosovo in terms of recognition or membership in international organizations.

6.8. TURKEY'S APPROACH TO KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE:

Political medallion of Kosovo has two faces: independence and the recognition by the international community. The heads side of the medallion appeared after the Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008. The other side of the medallion for Kosovo is to protect and to grow recognition of international community. Only by way of recognitions, Kosovo can become a full member to international institutes and undertake a responsibility.

At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey did not support the Kosovar Albanians separatist policies. Turkey's Kosovo policy is based on two principles. The first was that Turkey supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Secondly, Turkey called for the re-establishment of the autonomy as stipulated by the 1974 Constitution or a similar arrangement which would satisfy both sides. Later on, considering the Turkish minority there, Turkey added that any solution to the problem should take into consideration the rights of all the nationalities in Kosovo.

Turkey's first official connection with the issue of Kosovo took place, as early as 1992, Rugova visited Ankara and requested from Turkey to recognize the independence of Kosovo, it was not acceptable by the Turkish officials at that time. It would not be approved by the international community too. However, Turkey only gave to guarantee for political support to Kosovar Albanians.

However, Turkey selected to support Kosovar Albanians for many reasons against Serbs after March 1998. When the violence increased in Kosovo, Turkey chose to advocate an international intervention. After NATO Intervention; Turkey's post-2000 policies toward Kosovo were primarily framed around the Turkish minorities in Kosovo and the protection of their rights. Refuting arguments which claimed similarity between the situation of Kosovo and Turkey's southeast; preserving its position for a just and sustainable solution

for the Kosovo issue within framework which would replace Resolution 1244, while trying not to line with Serbia and Russia.

During the independence process of Kosovo, Turkey did not give very clear and strong support to Kosovo's independence. On the other hand, Turkey also called Serbia retreat to create a confrontational environment. The Turkish government's perspective was that to reach perpetual peace in the Western Balkans the final status of Kosovo required to be resolved through all possibilities. However, after the declaration, Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo's independence. The decision may also be considered as a surprise when taking into account Turkey's traditional reluctance to take quick action in comparison with regional and international problems. This time Turkey acted rapidly for recognition, implying that it preferred active participation. Several reasons may be cited for Turkey's recent decision, which might be viewed as an exception.

Skeptics also criticized the decision on the grounds that recognition of Kosovo's independence was incompatible with Turkey's best interests in the region, further recalling that countries which currently deal with separatist movements opposed Kosovo's recent move. The recognition of secessionist state by the Turkish government can be thought of a paradoxical judgment due to Turkey's own Kurdish problem⁷³⁸.

Of course, this decision needs to be well examined. Today, with globalization, micro-ethnic nationalisms widespread and threaten nation-states such as Turkey. Skeptics refer to Turkey's current problem in connection with Kurdish ethno-nationalism, highlighting that Turkey should not have recognized Kosovo's independence because this would set a precedent for the secessionist Kurds. The autonomy of northern Iraq and the consideration of similarities with Kosovo have also risen to impact on Kurds who lives in Turkey, Iran and Syria.

Many analysts have found similarities and differences between the Kosovar Albanians in Serbia and Kurds in Turkey. Similarities in both cases; these two ethnic groups, Kosovar Albanians and Kurds in Turkey, live in particular region of the current states and they have been influenced from ethnic nationalist feelings. These ethnic groups are scattered in different countries, the ethnic secessionist movements have been observed, central governments struggle to these ethnic secessionist movements with different methods,

⁷³⁸ Didem Ekinci, p.286.

Kosovo in Serbia and southeastern of Turkey are economically backward region of both countries.

When we examine the differences between the two issues; Albanians are just living in Kosovo in Serbia, and they did not choose to live in other parts of Serbia. However, Kurds in Turkey has scattered to other parts of the country and especially in Istanbul. Kosovar Albanians have kin state (Albania) but Kurds have also kin autonomy in northern Iraq. Kosovar Albanians are significantly different in language, in religion and culture from the Serbs. However, there are many similarities between Turks and Kurds in Turkey in terms of especially religion, sect, and culture. Ex-Yugoslavia was a federal state and Kosovo had autonomy in this structure, but Turkey has always been a unitary state and the Kurds are the equal citizens of this framework. Especially during 1989-99, Serbs oppressed Albanians in Kosovo, at work and in public. Including a large number of Albanian especially teachers, police, public officials such as judges were dismissed collectively. As a result, the Kosovo Albanians have developed their management, education, health and tax systems. Such a state policy like this has never been implemented in Turkey⁷³⁹.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the ICJ's decision on Kosovo does not seem to change the fundamental principles prevalent in the international system; it is not a threat to the state system based on the understanding of territorial integrity and the preservation of sovereignty; it does not justify claims of ethnic and micro-nationalist groups. However, undoubtedly, it is a threat and a source of concern for states engaging in brutality against their own people.

However, it was a rational rather than a bold decision. Turkey accepted that the independence declaration of Kosovo is a unique case and it is the finest answer in order to reach regional peace and stability in the Western Balkans. The comprehensive target of Turkish foreign policy in the Western Balkans is to guarantee circumstances and conditions for sustainable peace and development. For that reason, it is not a controversial decision in terms of Turkish foreign policy to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina while defending the right of self-determination of Kosovar Albanians. Both policies serve to enhance peace and enforce Turkey's existence in the region.

⁷³⁹ Ibid, p.291-2

The other part of the political dilemma in Kosovo is the recognition of its independence by the international community. 86 UN countries recognized the independence and Kosovo has not yet made a formal application for UN membership. Moreover such an act doesn't seem possible in a short-term. The UNSC continues separated over the issue. Russia and the People's Republic of China have veto power in the UNSC and they do not seem to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Turkey chooses to concentrate on formulating a possible and realistic resolution of the recognition problem. Turkey appears to leave the international recognition campaign to the newly emerged diplomatic service of Kosovo.

Turkey expects that the advisory opinion of the ICJ marked the end of the legal discussions on Kosovo. However the officials of Turkish foreign policy are capable that the way of Kosovo's membership to international organizations is just probable with positive conversations between Kosovo and Serbia. On 9 September 2010 recommendation of the UN General Assembly Resolution, Turkey strongly supports the strengthening of democratic structures and institutions in Kosovo, which will develop and bring peace, stability and prosperity to Kosovo's all people. Turkey believed that Kosovo should be integrated into regional structures, and the future of the region lay with the European Union and European-Atlantic integration⁷⁴⁰.

As Turkey benefits from friendly affairs with both sides, it has a very important position to encourage contact prior to and for the period of the future negotiations under the supervision of EU between Belgrade and Pristina recommended by the UNGA Resolution. The signing of the Free Trade Agreement with Serbia and the agreement to abolish visa requirements is transformed to Turkey a significant trading partner of Serbia with \$314 million according to EU 2010 economic report data's⁷⁴¹. Turkey is currently one of the Kosovo's major export partners with \$222 million in trade volume⁷⁴². Visas have been abolished between the two countries with mutual agreement. The trade volume doubled between 2007 and 2008 and will plan to increase to \$1 billion in one year. Turkey-Kosovo

⁷⁴⁰ Doğu Ulaş Eralp, "*Kosovo and Turkey: What Lies Ahead?*", SETA Policy Brief, November 2010, Brief No:50, p.6. Available on site <http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/52482.pdf> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁴¹ Available on site http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁴² Ibid.

Business Council under the umbrella of DEIK could conduct studies in order to identify potential cooperation areas⁷⁴³.

In the last few years; Turkey has increased its presence in the region, particularly among the more sympathetic, substantially Muslim populations of Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Kosovo Embassy in Ankara, currently about 1000 Kosovar students registered for higher education in Turkish universities⁷⁴⁴. The well-known Middle East Technical University is making a preparation for opening a campus in Kosovo⁷⁴⁵. Turkish broadcasters have increased their output in the Balkans.

Compared with EU's Kosovo policy; Turkey's policy is very understandable. Turkey's finest position in the mediated negotiations would be to give support to EU upon the question of recognition. Without doubt, Turkey can perform a much more dynamic character on procedural problems such as trade, customs, energy, transportation, and communications with experience and proficiency. Turkey can also be useful in search of creative options on cooperation between two sides. The United States, which is generally troubled about finding an exit plan from Afghanistan and Iraq, would be pleased a more energetic Turkey in the talks on Kosovo. Turkey's participation could reduce pressure on the U.S.' shoulders already over-crowded foreign policy agenda.

Throughout the mediated negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo some remarkable decisions could put on the table such as a probable land exchange between the Serb-dominated regions of Northern Mitrovica in Kosovo with the Albanian dominated regions of Serbia in the Presevo valley. Although mutually Kosovar and Serbian representatives formally resist to such a decision, it stays behind an option of negotiation. On the other hand, Turkey's point of view would be to support the principle of Kosovo's territorial integrity. Any other position on this subject would weaken Turkey's hand in Bosnia Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other crisis regions where separatists are in view of secession from constituent country which Turkey strongly opposes.

⁷⁴³ Available on site http://www.deik.org.tr/Pages/EN/DEIK_HaberlerDetay.aspx?hDetId=68&IKID=10 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁴⁴ Available on site http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/06/29/feature-03 (accessed on 02 November 2011).

⁷⁴⁵ Available on site <http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=34880> (accessed on 02 November 2011).

Turkey has developed its relationships with Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the principles summarized in Davutoglu's book "Strategic Depth", where he draws the need for Turkey to construct relations with countries that were part of the Ottoman Legacy⁷⁴⁶. However, the foreign policy introduced by Davutoğlu presents a pink table of the Ottoman experience in the Balkans, which is contrary to what people in these countries (including Kosovo) believe. It seems that Turkey focuses on the cultural and economic soft-power characteristic to enlarge its influence in Kosovo, and this might increase further skepticism, given that Turkey treats Kosovo's rival Serbia as a mutual partner, especially in defense co-operation. However, relations should be based on mutual understanding of the past, as well as on mutual interests. A one-sided view does not help in this regard.

Consequently, Turkey is now a strong supporter of Kosovo in its path to sovereign independent state. Turkey does not want any parallel institutions or secessionist developments in Kosovo and want Kosovo to exercise sovereignty throughout its territory. Turkey sees it as the natural right of Kosovo and evaluates the developments in Kosovo in this context, and states its position on respecting the sovereignty of Kosovo.

⁷⁴⁶ Mustafa Türkeş, "*Türkiye'nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim*", ", ASAM, Avrasya Dosyası Cilt 14, Sayı 1, Balkanlar Özel, 2008, p.271-5

7. CONCLUSION:

Each country has specific conditions arising from the foreign policy of its own. Historical and geographical structure, culture and national characteristics shaped by this culture over time; the political authorities, regimes and ideologies, social, political, economic and military structure are the basic factors in determining the foreign policy of states. In this context, foreign policy is representing a dynamic process of the legacy of the past combined with the conditions of today, and it would be correct to describe as a product of the country's geopolitical and geo-cultural elements.

The result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact on Turkish Foreign policy was impressive. The analysis generally shows that the transforms occurred in Turkish policy came out from external dynamics rather than internal ones. In this respect, the dissolution of Yugoslavia has an important role in reformulation of Turkey's Balkan policy. This thesis examined Turkey's Balkan policy in general and relations with Kosovo from the beginning of the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular historically, geographically and cultural frameworks under thorny issues of international law such as nationalism and self-determination.

Hence, from the beginning to present, it can be said Turkey's Balkans policy is progressing in an appropriate axis, which is mentioned above with general comments. The Balkans, as a region, always protects its priority in terms of geographical, political and economic aspects as well as the historical, cultural and humanitarian ties for the foreign policy makers. The architect of the Turkey's recent era foreign policy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu defines this region as our "strategic depth" and it forms an integrated parts of Turkey's closed land basin. In this context, all formations and developments in this region which known as one of the regions of the crisis in international relations during the 20th century, has been one of the main factors both in general terms that shape the Turkish foreign policy as well as approach towards the region.

When we analyze the Balkans in terms of historical turning points, the spark ignited in the region that triggered the First World War and the Ottoman Empire was cleared from the history stage at the end of the war, the settlement of the Turks from Europe was realized. Balkans could only find a place in the new Republic of Turkey's foreign policy agenda after the balance had been established in Lausanne, gradually fallen into position in this

era. The primary concern was to keep the newly formed state alive and to preserve the independence during this period. Relations with the Balkan countries were formed within the framework of the polarization that had begun to show itself in the international arena increasingly. During this period, revisionist and nationalistic movements began to rise again in Balkan countries and it was one of the important reasons to repress the cooperation and to become close to.

After the Second World War, with the increasing influence of the Soviet Union, Balkan geography had become a serious source of concern for Turkey. The compelling arguments for concessions to Turkey in Yalta and Potsdam Conferences had inflicted troubled periods in both domestic and foreign policy to the government as well as Turkish diplomats. In parallel with this development, "to ensure the security policy by establishing good relations with neighbors " was put on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy and in this context, diplomatic contacts were intensified in the region.

With the end of the Cold War, the most intense conflicts took place in the Balkans. "Balkanization" is a geopolitical term, which was used in literature to describe the process of fragmentation or division of a region or state into smaller regions or states that are often hostile or non-cooperative with each other. At this period, region countries had made a transition to democracy and free market economy with the change of regime and Turkey was confronted with a new Balkans truth, but this situation has brought opportunities and risks. Turkey has followed a deliberate policy at this new period. It primarily has believed the need of establishing stability in the region and it has envisaged improving collaboration opportunities only by this way. Thus, Turkey took a positive action both during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War, and during the Kosovo crisis. On the other hand, it has been sought to develop to act concurrently with the international community and to produce multi-solution mechanisms with regional actors when managing the process as much as possible. Despite all this, the Balkans witnessed serious tragedies in the 1990s, and behind, it has left unsolved serious issues with a nested borders from past to the present.

After NATO's Kosovo intervention in 1999, from early 2000s to the present time, it can be said that the Balkans relatively has reached peace. On the other hand, developments such as, growing and shape-shifting security perceptions with the 9 / 11 events, situation of the

world states which are led from financial crisis to overall global economic crisis, has led to change international public attention in different directions. In this period, international community has lost the interest to the Balkans; Turkey has increased its efforts to develop special relations with countries in the region, including Serbia. In addition, Turkey has endeavored to change the settled paradigms of its foreign policy, within the framework of "zero problems with neighbors" policy set the foundation for Turkey's pro-active stance in the Balkans.

Recently, one of the issues that preoccupied world agenda related with Turkey in national media and foreign press is the discussion of more active foreign policy in other words "axis shift". Turkey has increasingly expanded fields of action about issues such as Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus that is related with its closed geography, and it gives impetus to regional cooperation and dialogue. In this context, recently, Turkey has developed a constructive relationship with most of the countries of the region especially Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina; diplomatic channels has been renewed; basis of cooperation are formed in various fields such as trade agreements and friendship and cultural treaties.

It is obvious that policy makers and academicians of Turkey are in a dilemma on the issue of Kosovo's independence. The main reason of this dilemma is the concern for Turkey to become a new Yugoslavia. However, at intervention processes in both Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, we can say that to provide remaking of stability in the Balkans is the main policy of Turkey. Peace and stability in Balkans has always been main objective of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey's recognition of Kosovo, which has been a matter of international law, without any reservation is the result of a realistic viewpoint to the developments in the region. Historically, sociologically and culturally, kinship ties with Turkish minority in Kosovo as well as Kosovar Albanians living in Turkey are also the result of effect in shaping Turkey's Balkan policy.

Turkey, like many countries, evaluates independence of Kosovo as a unique case. Despite the decision of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, many states recognized Kosovo's independence. ICJ's decision on the independence of Kosovo is far from being a decision that changes the rules of general international law. It is vague and leaves the politicians to solve the issue. The independence of Kosovo showed obviously that the issue

of recognition depends on the interests of states and international conjuncture. It is possible to say that Kosovo can continue its independence with only support of USA and EU. Under the current condition, to be recognized by USA and the majority of EU states is a very important support for Kosovo. With this decision, we can also say that the separatist demands will show diminution against the principle of territorial integrity. Therefore, Turkey's interests in the Balkans and international conjuncture shows us Turkey's early recognition of Kosovo's independence is right.

On the other hand, although they have deep disagreements over Kosovo, Turkey and Serbia are successful in improving a good relationship. In fact, Turkey also repaired the relations with Milosevic's Yugoslavia after Dayton Agreement, but after a short period, relations were interrupted with the outbreak of Kosovo conflict. After the declaration of Kosovo's independence, although Serbia reacted to Turkey, like other states, for recognizing the independence, after a while it mitigated the level of its reaction. After this period, especially, it is possible to see that the Turkish government increased activities for developing confidence, welfare and peaceful environment in the Balkans.

In this context, Turkey-Serbia relations have started to draw attention especially with economic and military cooperation agreements. Serbian support on Turkey's non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, Turkey's support on Serbia's NATO membership and Turkey's mediation efforts on Bosnia issue are the indicators of close relationships between two states. The new tensions in Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs or in Bosnia between Bosniaks and Serbs seems to be the most important factor that cool the relatively warm relationship.

On the other hand, Serbia took over the yearlong SEECP rotating chairmanship from Montenegro on 30 June 2011. Turkey is balanced to use its' enhanced relations with Serbia as a means of assisting Serbia rapidly manage political transformations that hearten better relations with both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, two states where Turkey gives special importance. However, the most important assistance of Turkey will be to produce protective policies from potential conflicts in the region. Looking objective to issue and equal distance to both sides will enhance the persuasiveness and improve the influence of Turkey in the Balkans.

Although Turkey has a good relations with Kosovo government, minority problems of Kosovar Turks and some special cases (anti-Ottoman discourse in history books etc.) resulting from Albanian nationalism can create problems in relations. However, Kosovo is a new state and the effects of the war are still seen on citizens' behavior. Along with the development in economic and social structure and settlement of democracy in a literal sense will weaken the ultra-nationalist thinking in Kosovo.

Kosovo and Serbia are the two significant countries and the shortest route for Turkey to reach Europe economically. Although Turkey has more sympathy to Kosovo, a relation with Serbia is also indispensable. However, generally, there are still prejudices against Turkey regarding to Ottomans period. Turkey needs to be clear of these traumatic footprints of Ottomans and to create common opportunities and benefits for the future. Together with countries in the region, Turkey should effort to build a region, which is known by prosperity not by blood and tears. Especially using USA's and EU's positive interests to the region and working together to become members to EU and NATO can be efficient for the generation of the prosperity in the region.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and after the independence of Kosovo processes have been more widely debated subjects in terms of the thoughts of self-determination and the nationalism. In particular, these discussions are followed by the countries under the threat of ethnic nationalism with interests and disturbance. On the other hand, it should be noted that the ICJ's decision on Kosovo does not seem to change the fundamental principles prevalent in the international system; it is not a threat to the state system based on the understanding of territorial integrity and the preservation of sovereignty; it does not justify claims of ethnic and micro-nationalist groups. However, undoubtedly, it is a threat and a source of concern for states engaging in brutality against their own people.

Turkey is one of the troubled countries in context of Kosovo and ethnic nationalist movement. Turkey needs to analyze correctly the process of Kosovo's becoming an independent state and mistakes of both Serbs and Albanians in the name of ethnic nationalism, because of its own Kurdish issue. Although it has few similarities between the Kosovar Albanian movement and PKK's secessionism, there are many politicians and academicians engaged this analogy in international area.

Although ethnic nationalism was an important factor about disintegration of Yugoslavia, the economic, political, and ideological divergences (such as economy, weakening of federal institutional structure and international factors, etc.) were more influential rather than stressing the ethnicity issue. Unlike Yugoslavia, Turkey has chosen to solve the problem within freedom and security balance. Especially, efforts to enlarge cultural rights with individual rights and freedoms, reorganization of the civil-military relations, and rapid development in economy weaken the possibility of Turkey to become a new Yugoslavia. In this context, Grand National Assembly of Turkey has started to prepare a new constitution with good intentions. By the way, it should be remembered that the 1974 Yugoslav constitution had been enacted also with good intentions but it became one of the factors to accelerate the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Turkey has to make the most of this opportunity to live in prosperity and unity.

Another factor about Turkish foreign and internal affairs is the blockage on road to membership talk to EU accession. Domestic support for EU membership is in decline as the issues seem increasingly difficult to resolve. The Turkish public is getting growing more and more tired of the negotiation process. On the other hand, when global economic crisis hit the EU especially Greece, Portugal and Italy, Turkey has moved from being the 27th largest economy in the world to 16th place in ten years, without becoming a member of the EU.

In this context, Turkish foreign policy is becoming more attached to the liberal understanding of international politics, which gives more importance to the role of better economic relations. However, this methodology is not specific that is used by only Turkey in recent history of the Balkans. Greek foreign policy was also economic diplomacy in the late 1990s. Thus, Turkey has been taking advantage of its new economic muscle to increase its influence. With French and German companies increasingly withdrawing, Italian and Austrian banks restraining in lending, and Greek investment weakening, the global financial recession left a vacuum that Turkey aims to fill.

However, Turkey has to be more realistic in the economic sense. Turkey is still far from being a top economic power in the region. Turkey cannot export a capital; in contrast, it needs to import capital. Although it recorded an important point of economic development in the recent decade and even became part of the G-20, it can hardly be said that it is a core

country in the world economy. Even though Greece has been particularly hit by the global financial crisis, Athens continues to play an important economic role in the region. In addition, Ankara has waited at aiming strategic sectors, being weakened by Russian plans in the energy industry, and entering too late in the field of telecommunications, already dominated by Greek and German companies. Consequently, Ankara's tactical positioning has been determined to increase its influence on the financing of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and globally improved its power on the region's economic health.

From the beginning of its NATO membership, Turkey has been a part of many military missions to the region, including the 1999 bombing of Belgrade. In addition, Turkey currently maintains hundreds of troops in the region as part of NATO peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia and Kosovo. For example, Turkey represents the Organization of Islamic Conference on the steering board of the Peace Implementation Council, which implements the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia. During this platform, Turkey has supported for a stronger institutions in Balkan states like Bosnia, including better regional cooperation. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as named Turkey as one of its member countries that is actively contributing to assist the organization to realize their goals in the region. In the Balkans, Turkey has acted as a private force of the OECD, which tries at civilizing democracies, reforming economies, and raising standards of living in developing countries.

Turkey has also geopolitics card and the officials and scholars always state that Turkey can help Europe to become a major player on the international stage if it is admitted to the club. Mirroring the EU goals, Turkey has advocated for more Balkan countries to become members of NATO, with Albania and Croatia only making the cut so far. The Balkans members of EU including Greece repeatedly expressed full support for Turkey's EU membership bid. In this regard, other Balkan states' including Serbia and Kosovo accession to EU and NATO is important for Turkey. It is observed that Turkey's developing economy in the crises period can create a gravitational field in the Balkan region. Today EU discusses to change treaty for economic reasons, but EU needs to devise a new form of membership, if it moves in the direction of 35 to 40 member states.

In the near future, it is seen that Turkey will continue the close cooperation with the United States in the Balkans. Especially, continued stability in Kosovo and Bosnia and

Herzegovina is the common interest of both states. Turkey's support in Afghanistan and Libya for NATO operations and stance on democracy and human rights against Syrian administration has improved its relations with USA.

In recent months, tensions between Turkey and Israel and behind the Arab spring in the Middle East, has created change of the tide in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has acted in concert with its western allies in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Above all, Turkey has followed a pragmatic policy in order to protect its economic interests in Libya. In addition, Turkey has begun to support the democratic aspirations of the peoples of the authoritarian regime. This meant problems with the governments of similar countries, as long as they remained in power. Even in the Arab League, those authoritarian or traditional governments that are seemingly supporting popular currents are quite disturbed about Turkey's support for popular movements in the region. This change of sides brought much resistance from the autocracies that are abundant in the region.

In this context, when the first winds of Arab Spring were blowing, Turkey tried to encourage the Syrian Government for reforms by making commitments and emphasized that it was essential to take steps and implement the reforms in line with the demands and expectations of the people. Unfortunately, the Syrian Government gave more priority to security measures that falls into the spiral of violence than democratic openings, in spite of Turkey's warnings. Finally, the Syrian issue has now become the issue of the entire region. Even Syria has been seen as the Arab Yugoslavia of Middle East. However, it is doubtful whether the change of the regime in Syria will bring security and stability to the region; on the contrary, it will open a regional Pandora box, which has closely related with Turkey, Iran and Israel.

Additionally, Turkey and Egypt signed "High Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement" at Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 3 day's official visit to Egypt on 12 September 2011. He underlined the Turkish support and discuss the opportunities for cooperation in his Arab spring tour with a delegation consist of ministers, higher officials, 280 businessmen and journalists. A week after he left, Ahmet Davutoğlu proclaimed his vision of a strategic alliance between Egypt and Turkey which he described as an "Axis of Democracy". Of course, this situation has disturbed the Israeli officials and expressed their

fears that Egypt and Turkey becomes together a pole against it, and then it will be in isolation for Israel.

Despite rising hostility from autocratic or oligarchic regimes in the neighborhood, it seems Turkey will be responsive of popular aspirations in these countries and will refrain from siding with despotic governments. Otherwise, it cannot be recognized as a democratic country and a role model for countries that aim to bring together Islam with democracy.

With these developments, Turkey is also monitored by Balkan states with more interest, because of improving its economic power and strategic importance in Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. It is a significant fact that according to the latest information, Turkey, even leaving China behind, has been the fastest growing economy of the world while Europe's big economies are undergoing following crises. In addition, it should be noted that Turkey comes first among the rising powers according to a report of London School of Economics (LSE) that was published in June 2011.

In Balkan region, Ottoman legacy created good and bad memories on the minds of people. Regional nationalistic circles have developed rhetoric of neo-Ottomanism with the arguments that the Turkish involvement in the Balkans is of ideological nature and that is related to historical and religious dimensions. In its republican history, Turkey has never had neo-Ottoman ambitions towards Balkans. Fears of so-called Turkish neo-Ottoman aspirations in the Balkans are irrational and unjustifiable. However, neo-Ottoman rhetoric shows that suspicion against Turks still exists in Balkans. Not only Balkans but also EU itself should not suffer of prejudice, as it only can benefit from dynamic, developed and democratic country such as today's Turkey.

Given the generally negative character that the slogan 'neo-Ottoman' symbolizes, the term has been used in an angry mode towards Ankara and its' rehabilitated interest is in not only the Balkans, but also Central Asia. Although Davutoğlu rejects such claims in this quasi-ideological war, it is no coincidence that Turkey has used cultural connections of the past to cover paths of regional cooperation for the future. It is a normal process, parallel to regular modern day cooperation between Western countries and their former colonial territories. Ankara now finds itself walking along a fine boundary towards strengthening its' regional interests, and it is lined with critics both within and outside of the targeted regions.

Islam is the most important tie between the Muslim communities living in the Balkans and Turkey. Especially, right-conservative religious discourse has increased the effectiveness in Bosnia politics and the Bosniak officials has declared the great importance of Turkey for Bosniak Muslims in Islamic references. On the other hand, many secular Bosniaks complaint from this effectiveness. In a word, Islam and historical ties should not be the only testament to relationships in the Balkans between Turkey and Muslim communities. Turkey should display her friendship to all the ethnic and religious groups in Balkans with the same sensitivity and sincerity.

For Turkey, ‘catching more flies with honey than vinegar’ has been the main goal to its renewal in the Balkans. Understanding the trauma that the region has experienced, Ankara is making strides in gaining the support throughout the Balkans, with the strongest support coming from largely Muslim states like Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia. In hopes of controlling general outside suspicion, Ankara is re-envisioning its’ Ottoman legacy, and redefining the phrase as one of “pro-active” measures, using its’ once strong presence in the Balkans as a foundational basis for political legitimacy for hosting mediation and investment talks.

In addition, there is no demand for a greater Turkish role in such a form of Neo-Ottomanism from the Turks/Muslims of the Balkans. This group would benefit the most if Turkey became the main regional actor in the Balkans, so its standpoint towards such a neo-Ottomanist project in the region means a great deal. For instance, Kosovars certainly want Turkish support for their independence, but at the same time, they do not want a serious increase in any Turkish involvement in their other affairs. In other words, their main goal is independence –and Turkish support in this area is welcome–but not beyond that. They do not want to become dependent on Turkey outside of this sphere, for such dependence would be highly unfruitful while seeking independence so ardently.

As one of the most stabilized states in its region and as being the 16th greatest economic power in the world, Turkey is striving for development on the one hand and making efforts for democratization, on the other. Enduring even the most unacceptable matters on its quest for EU membership, Turkey, as its national power increases, and she has an available history and cultural bonds in the geography it once belonged to, she becomes a significant political power in the region.

In parallel with the increase in Turkey's national power and the rise in its significance in the region, its desire to get involved in the regional problems also increases. When necessary, Turkey, as the playmaker in the region, put in place its soft power with the purpose of eradicating the problems faced during its leadership in opening these means. This should not be perceived as the implication of Turkey's desire for an "Empire" and the country should not be offended with the accusations of the Neo-Ottomanism. At this point, the hardest task goes for the decision-makers. It should also be remembered that any sayings that have been carelessly developed under an excessive self-confidence would serve for nothing but for those who are in search of an Ottoman ghost in Turkey's growth.

Turkey's idealistic goal of having 'zero problems with neighborhood' has become an unexpected reality with social and political relations greatly improving particularly with their neighbors in the Balkans while creating frustration in Middle East, especially with Syria. With various negotiation successes under their belt, Turkey attained herself a unique geopolitical position for refining its neighborhood and challenging previous regional alliances with friendly political re-introductions. Turkey will also need to beware of her image in the region, and whether or not it holds favoritism over the region's Muslim populations. One of the ways to achieve this balance is by serving as a coordinator of international political and development efforts in the region. While the EU has lost steam in the Balkans regarding accession due to various internal economic crises, Turkey has stepped up with her commitment to the region, proving itself as a reliable trade and development partner with an integrated goal of an economically strong and socially unified Balkan neighborhood. If Turkey continues to use her membership in regional organizations effectively, she will gain a more significant status within the Balkan politics.

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