



Hacettepe University
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of International Relations

**SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN AREA OF COOPERATION
AMONG WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES ON THEIR WAY TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Tarık ŞAHİN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2011

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
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
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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Emel G. OKTAY for her continuous support, encouragement, guidance and most important of all her enduring trust during the preparation of this thesis.

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Sencer IMER and Assist. Prof. Özlen ÇELEBİ for their guidance in finalizing my study.

Lastly I would like to thank my wife, Hatice ŞAHİN for being tolerant and supportive during my education period.

ÖZET

ŞAHİN, Tarık. Avrupa Birliği Yolunda Batı Balkan Ülkeleri arasında bir İşbirliği Alanı olarak Bilim ve Teknoloji, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2011.

Batı Balkan ülkelerinin 1990'lı yıllarda yaşamış oldukları savaşın sonrasındaki süreçte en büyük ihtiyaçları bölgede kalıcı barış ve istikrar olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Avrupa Birliği bu ihtiyacın karşılanmasına katkıda bulunmak için Batı Balkan Ülkeleri'ne üyelik perspektifi ile yaklaşmaktadır. Ancak, bu ülkelerin Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olabilmeleri için öncelikle kendi aralarında en üst seviyede işbirliğini gerçekleştirmeleri beklenmektedir. Bu işbirliğini gerçekleştirebilme ihtimalinin en yüksek olduğu alanlardan biri olarak Bilim ve Teknoloji bu sürece olumlu katkılar sağlamaktadır.

Bu kapsamda bu çalışmada ilk olarak Avrupa Birliği tarafından Batı Balkanlar'a yönelik olarak ortaya konulmuş olan Bölgesel İşbirliği Politikası'nın temelleri incelenmiştir. Bölgede işbirliği ihtiyacının ortaya çıkmasına neden olan yakın tarih ele alınmış ve Bölgesel İşbirliği Politikası'nı doğuran süreç ortaya konulmuştur. Daha sonra Bilim ve Teknoloji alanındaki girişimlerin Bölgesel İşbirliği'ne katkısı değerlendirilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak; Batı Balkan Ülkelerinin sürdürülebilir barış ve istikrar ortamını gerçekleştirebilmeleri için Avrupa Birliği'ne ve Avrupa Birliği tarafından uygulanan işbirliği politikalarına ihtiyaçlarının devam ettiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Bilim ve Teknoloji ise kendine has özellikleri ve artan önemi nedeniyle işbirliği politikalarının merkezinde yer almaya devam edecektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Bölgesel İşbirliği Politikası, Batı Balkan Ülkeleri, Batı Balkan Ülkeleri'nde Bilim ve Teknoloji

ABSTRACT

ŞAHİN, Tarık. Science and Technology as an Area of Cooperation Among Western Balkan Countries on Their Way to the European Union, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2011.

In the process after the war which was witnesses in the Western Balkan Countries in 1990's, most important need of the region emerged as sustainable peace and stability in the region. To contribute to the fulfillment of this need, the European Union approaches to the Western Balkan Countries with membership perspective. However, However, it is expected from these countries to realize highest level of cooperation among themselves to be prepared for the membership of the European Union. As one of the areas on which the possibility of realizing this cooperation is very high, Science and Technology, provides positive contribution to this process.

In this regard, basis of the Regional Cooperation Policy which was presented by the European Union towards the Western Balkans is examined in this study. Near history of the region which caused need to cooperation in the region is addressed and the process which created the Regional Cooperation Policy is introduced. Afterwards, contribution of the initiatives in the field of Science and Technology is evaluated.

As a result, it came through that the need of the Western Balkan Countries to the European Union to realize sustainable peace and stability environment is continuing. Because of its *sui generis* characteristics and increasing importance, Science and Technology will continue to take part in the center of cooperation policies.

Key Words

Regional Cooperation Policy, Western Balkan Countries, Science and Technology in Western Balkan Countries

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AVNOJ	The Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia
BiH	Bosnia- Herzegovina
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization
CEB	Council of Europe Development Bank
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA	The Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COST	European Cooperation in Science and Technology
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Communities
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EPD	Enhanced Permanent Dialogue
ERA	European Research Area
ERA-MORE	European network of mobility centers
EU	European Union
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission
FP	Framework Programmes
FP7	7 th Framework Programme of Research and Technological Development
FPRY	Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
G8	The Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GERD	Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
ICFY	International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICT-WEB-PROMS	Promoting ICT Cooperation Opportunities and Policy Dialogue with the Western Balkan Countries
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCO	International Cooperation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Contact Point
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
OBNOVA	Fund for the Reconstruction of Former Yugoslavia
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
R&D	Research and Development
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
ReP-SEE	The Regional Programme for Cooperation with South-East Europe
RTD	Research, Technology and Development
RTDI	Research, Technology, Development and Innovation
S&T	Science and Technology
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SANU	Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SECI	South East European Cooperation Initiative
SEE	South East Europe

SEECF	South East European Cooperation Process
SEE-ERA.NET	Further integrating key research institutions from South East Europe into the European Research Area
SEERA-EI	South East European Research Area for e-Infrastructures
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
TAIEX	The Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office
TF	Task Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USA	United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	United Nations
WBC	Western Balkan Countries
WBC-INCO.NET	Western Balkan Countries INCO-NET
WEU	Western European Union
WINS-ICT	Western Balkan Countries Inco-Net Support in the field of ICT
WW1	1 st World War
WW2	2 nd World War

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INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to evaluate the European Union (EU)'s policy of Regional Cooperation towards Western Balkan Countries (WBC). First, the regional focus of this study, that is Western Balkan Countries (WBC), needs to be clarified. The countries in the Western Balkans are the former constituent republics of Yugoslavia. However, Slovenia (which was also a constituent republic of Yugoslavia) is out of this classification since it is a member of the EU since 2004. On the other hand, Albania has been involved in this classification because of its geographical, political and economic proximity with the other countries of the region. Namely, WBC are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Political status of Kosovo which gained its independence in February 2008 will not be examined in this study. However, we can say that Kosovo is also a part of the Western Balkan Countries.

The other term which will be frequently used in the study is South East Europe (SEE). This term totally refers to the Balkan Peninsula. Two terms can be used interchangeably. Since it is a geographical definition, it is difficult to define borders of the region sharply. However, the term SEE is used by the EU as a political expression. In current time when someone talks about the SEE as a target region, most probably Romania, Bulgaria and Greece are not involved in that target group of countries. The EU expects these countries to be called as EU Member states. So, in the EU jargon, SEE refers only to WBC today.

WBC, as a geographical part of the Europe, have been trying to be involved in the political part of the Europe, the EU. The EU implemented some policies since their independence in early 1990's to provide their integration to the EU. Initial policies were implemented to provide peace up to 1995. After signing the Dayton Agreement in 1995, aim of the policies shifted to provide permanence of peace and integration of WBC to the EU. From the Royaumont Process which

started in 1995 to the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU policy towards the region has continued in a regular basis. The region has always been on the agenda of the Union. By giving these countries membership perspective in 2000, the EU obviously showed its intention to integrate these countries into the Union.

Regional Cooperation is the general policy of the EU towards the WBC. It is obvious that without providing peace and stability, it is very difficult for the countries to provide enough level of development and to meet the EU standards. So, the basic consideration is that the cooperation among each other will provide those countries to be more integrated inside the region first. Cooperation of recently fighting countries sounds a very hard task to realize. However, the history of the EU has some overlapping features with the WBC. Recently fighting countries succeeded to establish a cooperation which started with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community after the WW2. This initiation led the successful result of cooperation. EU's experience makes it behave differently from the historical examples of foreign intervention who had been involved in this region. The EU approaches in a constructive way to WBC. Regional Cooperation is essential at this point. The EU gives the perspective of membership to WBC however, membership is not guaranteed. Some of the WBC will be members of the Union earlier than the others. However, in any case, Regional Cooperation is expected to be realized by all WBC. It means that the basic aim of the EU for the WBC is their success in internalizing the EU norms. Consequently, By the Regional Cooperation, WBC are expected to establish a kind of common structure to achieve the ultimate goal of preparing themselves to the EU membership.

This study will focus specially in Science and Technology (S&T) in the context of Regional Cooperation. S&T, as one of the most important component of sustainable development, prosperity and economic growth, have started to be in the development agenda of the countries in recent years. To achieve development objectives, countries invest in S&T. It can be observed that economically and socially developed countries of the world also have strong

S&T visions which are compatible with their long life economic and social targets. On the other hand, S&T has also proved instrumental to enhancing and enriching many other policy areas with an impact on external relations: trade, development, environment, energy, telecommunications, etc. *Sui generis* features of S&T make countries more eager to cooperate than any other field.

From the perspective of the EU, to achieve the ultimate goal of playing a leading role globally in S&T, the EU needs a strong and coherent international S&T policy. In this regard, strategic partnerships with the non-EU countries is one of the main objectives of the Union.¹

On the other hand, if the infrastructure capacity of the WBC is considered, international cooperation in S&T is unavoidable for the region to achieve above mentioned development goals. These countries should invest in S&T in order to provide sustainable development of their societies. However, current situation of the countries of the region does not enable the governments of the countries to invest enough on S&T. The EU has a core role at this point. It has alternative mechanisms to contribute these countries under the umbrella of Regional Cooperation.

S&T has *sui generis* characteristics which can realize Regional Cooperation more than any other field. First of all, as it was mentioned above, the S&T infrastructure of the WBC makes cooperation with the EU a necessity. To benefit from the possible support mechanisms of the EU, Regional Cooperation, as the main policy of the EU, is imposed to the WBC. The other feature of S&T lies in the regional characteristics of the needs of these countries. For example, cooperation has to be realized in order to find solution to the common needs of WBC on energy, transportation infrastructures, agriculture or communication. Another feature of S&T is the most important one in terms of providing cooperation. The recent history of the WBC, which will be examined in the following parts, shows that there are many discriminatory characteristics of

¹ Community Research and Development Information Service. (2009). Available on: 08.05.2011, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/capacities/international-cooperation_en.html.

these countries which had already caused serious conflicts. However, S&T, is independent from all political, religious or ethnic discriminatory characteristics of WBC. Because of this reason, it is more possible to realize Regional Cooperation in S&T field than any other one. That is why successful cooperation attempts of the EU are observed in this field. They will be pointed out in the following parts.

After the end of Cold War, two group of countries emerged in Europe. The first group of countries (Central and Eastern European Countries - CEE)² successfully achieved to be the members of the EU. It is important to point that CEE countries also had some difficulties in the period of this transition. However, their experience is out of the scope of this study. On the other hand, the process for the WBC was very hard. The war up to 1995 made everything difficult for these countries and prevented these countries to achieve development in any field. The follow up process of the war was also difficult for these countries because the war caused a huge damage for the WBC.

When we look at the current situation of the relations of WBC with the EU, it is observed that the ones which were less affected from the war have closer relations with the EU. For example, Slovenia became a member of the EU in 2004. Croatia is about to finish the negotiation process which was started in 2005 at the same time with Turkey. Macedonia, on the other hand has obtained the status of candidacy. On the other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the most damaged country of the war, is very far from the membership. However, the EU also gave a perspective to the all WBC by calling them as "Potential Candidates" in 2000 by Santa Maria Da Feira European Council meeting.³ This was a result of a change in EU policy towards the region after 2000. There are some reasons of this change.

² The post Eastern Bloc countries in Europe are named as CEE countries. Resulting with a transition period after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, most of these countries achieved to be member states of the European Union in 2004. These countries are: (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. Slovenia also became a member state together with the CEE countries.)

³ Council of the EU. (26 February 1996). *Presidency conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira European Council*. Available on: 13.02.2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm.

First, with the democratisation of Croatia following the death of Franjo Tudjman in November 1999 and the victory of the democratic forces over Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in Sept. 2000, all countries in the Balkans had democratic governments with commitment of joining the European mainstream. In terms of democracy, which is the basic instrument of the EU, this was a positive development which made the Union more interested in the region.

Secondly, connected with the above reason, we can say that the shared interest between the European countries in the stabilization of the region came into the fore. Kosovo crisis, erupted in late 1990's has an important role in making the Union internalizing that for the stability of Europe, stability of the Western Balkans is important.

Another reason is related with internal developments of the EU. Different from the beginning of 1990's, the establishment of the position of the High Representative for the CFSP greatly enhanced the EU's capacity to respond rapidly to new developments and to engage with local actors and international partners. The EU also began to develop an operational capacity in civilian and military crisis management. It means that the EU owned an enhanced capacity for managing international problems.

Finally, during the 1990's the EU had great experience in terms of enlargement. Throughout the 1990s, the EU has accumulated vast know-how in promoting the integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries into European structures. This experience would strongly influence the EU for developing an approach to the Western Balkans.

Because of the *sui generis* characteristics of the region which will be mentioned later, peace and stability as the core prerequisite for the development of the region can be provided by the support of an external power. The EU seems to be the external power who will contribute to peace and stability in the region.

In this study, it will be argued that the Regional Cooperation policy of the European Union is an essential tool to provide peace and stability in the region

and to achieve integration of WBC to the EU. In this context, Science and Technology is presented as a strong contributor of this policy.

To support the argument, starting from the history of the region, the main purpose of the study is to give a picture of the importance of cooperation for WBC on their way to EU integration. The process from dissolution of Yugoslavia to the current situation will be examined from the perspective of the cooperation efforts of the EU. As an important part of the policy, some concrete measures taken in the field of S&T to bring conceptual cooperation in to reality will also be given.

Primary sources of the study are written documents such as books, articles, European Union documents, press releases and speeches of the EU officials. On the other hand, depending on the currency of some parts of the study, some secondary sources like the official websites of the European Commission, projects and institutions will also be used.

In the First Chapter, the geography of the region and its impact on the relations of the nations of the region will be examined. Geography has a special role constituting a reason for the nations of the region being apart from each other although they are very closely located. The lack of communication shows itself in every period of the history. The history of the WBC is very essential to understand the motives driving these countries into cooperation. So, first a general overview of the history of the region will be given. The most important part of this chapter will be the account of Wars of Yugoslav dissolution that started just after the Cold War. It is essential to know how difficult for the nations which had so bitter memories of war, killings, ethnic cleansing and destruction to come together and cooperate. The process towards independence of all countries will be examined. It is believed that, the recent historical background of the states in the Western Balkans will give us some ideas about the obstacles to cooperation in the region.

Second Chapter will basically analyze the EU policy towards the region during and after the war. The EU policy during the war in Yugoslavia was basically

nothing more than diplomatic mediation. The efforts of the Union to provide peace will be examined. The Regional Cooperation policy was established in the post-war period. After analyzing the basic instruments of regional cooperation, a brief information on the initial attempts of Regional Cooperation will be presented such as The Royaumont Process and The Regional Approach of the EU. Other initiatives like the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECF) and The South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) which were basically non-EU attempts will also be examined in this part.

In the Third Chapter, EU Policy towards the region after 1999 will be examined. The year 1999 can be regarded as a turning point in the EU policy towards the region. The Stability Pact for SEE was the first initiative of the Union after 1999. However, the main change in the policy started with declaring the WBC as potential candidates for the membership of the EU. On the way to membership, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was launched. SAP has been the basic instrument of the EU for the WBC after 1999. Each country has to finalize the process in order to apply for the EU membership. The components of the SAP are; Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), Economic and Financial Assistance: Community Aid for Reconstruction, Development and Stability (CARDS) and Autonomous Trade Measures. Each component will be explained in this chapter. The current status of the relationship of the WBC with the EU will also be pointed out. Finally, the last institutionalized cooperation initiative, Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) will be examined.

Fourth Chapter will concentrate on the EU driven cooperation initiatives in Science and Technology (S&T) field towards the WBC. In this chapter, concrete examples from S&T field, as being one of the most important cooperation areas will be examined. S&T is a very reasonable area to enhance cooperation among the WBC. Common problems of the region and possible common solutions to these problems make it more possible to provide cooperation among WBC. In this respect, EU driven cooperation examples esp. on S&T field will be presented. These examples will be examined by referring to the EU policy documents which emphasize the field in terms of cooperation.

Furthermore, future objectives for better cooperation in this field will be pointed out.

CHAPTER 1

WARS OF YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION

Before discussing the attempts for enhancing cooperation among WBC on their way to EU membership, recent history of the region since the end of the Cold War should be examined. Current political situation of these countries are closely related with their history.



1.1. LAND AND ITS INHABITANTS

Before getting through the history, it will be helpful to have a look at the geographic and the demographic situation of the region. Diverse structure of the countries of the region is closely related with the geography although these countries are located very close to each other.

⁴ European Environment Agency. (2007). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/western-balkans/?b_start:int=24&-C=.

Geographical structure of the region has always made transportation difficult in the region and this situation is one of the most important reasons of the differentiated structure of the people of the region. Although they were very closely located, people had very limited contact with each other. Mountains are the most important factor which shapes the geography of the region. They made communication difficult. In the history, Dubrovnik, for example, had stronger relations with Venetians than Belgrade because it was easier to get in contact with Venetians from the sea than passing the huge mountains of the region to reach Belgrade.⁵ Mountains also made building canals impossible. It means water transportation was not something easy to realize.⁶ In terms of land transportation, railways only began after 1880s but networks were far from being enough.⁷ Until mid 19th century, roads were also very poor.⁸

Creation of national identities has been another reason of the differentiated structure of the people of the region. Until the 20th century, much of the population had little consciousness of national identity basing on ethnic differences. According to Mazower, the Ottoman Empire provided the admissible environment for the coexistence of different religions, cultures and ethnicities while such coexistence was not seen anywhere else in Europe. The reason is, under the Sultan's rule people were not identified and separated according to the ethnic group they belong to.⁹ Religion was a more salient category. The population was categorized as Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslim communities were divided by their religion (millet system) and their religious authorities such as bishops and rabbis were responsible for their own millet. As long as Christians paid their taxes, they were self-governing within their communities.

⁵ Mazower, M. (2001). *The Balkans From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day*. London: Phoenix Press. p. 19.

⁶ Lampe, J. R. (2000). *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country (2nd edition)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 13.

⁷ Mazower, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

From mid 18th century with the rise of two great powers, Orthodox and Catholic relations worsened.¹⁰ Austria was representing the Catholic world and Russia was representing the Orthodox world. By effects of these great powers, together with the impact of the nationalist movement in Europe, Greek and Serbian nationalist movements raised against Ottoman rule in the 19th century.¹¹ Reaction to the intervention of the western powers provoked Muslims to behave more defensive and intractable. Ottoman forces tried to suppress the uprisings by using force. Although there was strong opposition to the new teaching, in the early 19th century, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian intellectuals defined themselves in terms of cultural communities for the first time.¹² Balkan states started to emerge after 1830, and national churches were created. "Religion became a marker of national identity in ways not known in the past."¹³

Another nationalist movement in the history of the region was observed in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia by the end of the Cold War. As it will be discussed later, the result of this movement created very hard conditions for the nations and this process contributed too much to make these countries apart from each other.

1.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA

Impact of the geographically, ethnically and religiously complex structure of Yugoslavia was reflected in its history. Its history is composed of unifications and separations. Since the very beginning, several external powers ruled the region¹⁴. It is obvious that the history of Yugoslavia witnessed developments which emerged parallel with the history of the powers ruling the region. For example, one of the important factors of differentiated structure of the Yugoslav nations is religious divergence. This divergence is closely related with the impacts of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Ottoman Empire. Catholicism,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹ Ortaylı, İ. (2009). *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. p. 92.

¹² Mazower, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁴ Jelavich, B. (1999). *A History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century Volume 2*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 1.

Orthodoxy and Islam deployed in the nations of Yugoslavia with the impacts of those powers. On the other hand, nationalist movements in Yugoslavia were seen very strong when the power of the ruling authority was weak. It may be a general inference for every nationalist movement in the world however; difference of Yugoslavia is in redundancy of these movements.

1.2.1. First Yugoslavia

For the first time, Western Balkan nations started to demand having independent states in the 19th century. Serbia firstly became independent in 1878.¹⁵ By the year 1914, Serbia and Montenegro were the only independent states of the region.¹⁶ At the same time, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were under occupation of Austria-Hungarian Empire¹⁷.

Increasing tension between Serbia and Austria-Hungaria resulted with the break out of the 1st World War (WW1). Austria-Hungarian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, during his visit to Sarajevo. This event caused clash between Serbia and Austria-Hungaria. Conflict spread over Europe immediately and previously established ally countries started to fight against each other. Finally, WW1 started.¹⁸ All of the south-Slav nations attended into the war.¹⁹

While the WW1 was continuing, the representatives of the Slav nations came together in July 1917 and they announced the Corfu Declaration. According to this declaration, an independent Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was established.²⁰ The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (known as the First Yugoslavia) existed during the interwar period between 1918 and 1941. It was formed on the

¹⁵ Bideleux, R., Jeffries, I. (a) (1998). *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change*. London: Routledge. p. 87.

¹⁶ Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁷ See Ünal, H. (1993). *Ottoman Foreign Policy During the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, 1908-1909*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Manchester University.

¹⁸ Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁹ See, Taylor, A.J.P. (1981). *The First World War*. Harmandworth: Penguin Books.

²⁰ Singleton, F. (1999). *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 127.

territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire together with the formerly independent Kingdom of Serbia.

On April 1941, Germany occupied Yugoslavia²¹ and the country was reorganized into four provinces under foreign rule.

Map 2: Yugoslav Occupation in WW2²²



Axis / fascist occupation and partition of Yugoslavia in World War II

- Internationally recognized borders
- Illegal Axis / fascist borders in occupied Yugoslavia
- Independent State of Croatia (German and Italian occupation)
- Serbia (German occupation)
- Banat, region with special status (German occupation and local German administration)
- Montenegro (Italian occupation)
- Occupied and annexed by Bulgaria
- Occupied and annexed by Nazi Germany
- Occupied and annexed by Italy
- Occupied and annexed by Italy (As a part of Italian protectorate of Albania)
- Occupied and annexed by Hungary

Note: Some scholars are suggesting that term "fascist" is not a proper description for all countries that participated in occupation of Yugoslavia. Other scholars (including those from former Yugoslavia) are using this term as a description for all these countries.

Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was declared just after the German occupation. The government of NDH was left to Ustasa Regime and the

²¹ Crampton, R. J. (2002). *The Balkans Since the Second World War*. London: Longman. p. 4

²² Common Media File Repository. (2010). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fascist_occupation_of_yugoslavia.png.

occupiers deployed in Serbia. The behavior of Nazi troops against Serbs in Serbia and the behaviors of Ustasa governors against Serbs in NDH were parallel. Serbs witnessed very hard behaviors in both region against them.²³

During the war, a royal government of the state was established in London. This government was firstly recognized by the United Kingdom and later by all the allied powers.²⁴ In 1943, the new country called Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was affirmed. The King was formally displaced by the Constituent assembly on 29 November 1945.²⁵

1.2.2. Second Yugoslavia

Resistance to the occupation of Yugoslavia was basically divided into two groups: Chetniks and Partisans. Chetniks were known as the conservative nationalist side of Yugoslavia. Partisans, on the other hand were propagating a pan-Yugoslav understanding. The leader of the communist led Partisan movement was Marshal Jozep Broz Tito²⁶.

The idea of Chetniks was to bring whole country together around the Great Serbia. On the other hand, strategy of the Partisans was basing on a federal republican structure. The aim of the Partisans was spreading the resistance to all over the country. This dual structure of resistance prevented Yugoslavs to be coordinated against the occupation.²⁷

Tito collected the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in 1942 which succeeded to provide resistance movement to have a political program under which the Yugoslav nations come together. Further on, partisans achieved to overcome Chetniks and entrenched their place. Increasing achievements of Partisans allowed them to gain support of the Axis

²³ Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 201-232.

²⁴ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

²⁵ Singleton, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

²⁶ Yılmaz Şahin, T. (1993). Yugoslavya'daki Gelişmeler (1991'e kadar). *GÜ İİBF Dergisi*. Vol:9 (No:2). p. 234-235.

²⁷ Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

Powers.²⁸ Furthermore, although he had been criticized by Stalin by acting in a neutral position, Tito visited Moscow and provided the coordination with the leading people of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he also started negotiations with the government in exile in London. The meetings provided Tito gain an important political role. He established a National Committee to act as the provisional government of the state.²⁹

Partisans, together with the Soviet troops captured Belgrade in October 1944 and the head of the government in exile, Ivan Subasic turned back to Belgrade. A provisional coalition was established and this coalition governed the country until the elections. All Yugoslavia was under the rule of the Partisans.³⁰

The first elections Yugoslavia after WW2 was held on 11 November 1945. The election results of 11 November 1945 were decisively in favor of The People's Front led by the communists, with an average of 90% of voters of each federal state.³¹ On 29 November 1945, second anniversary of the second session of The Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia declared the state as a republic. The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was converted to Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPR Yugoslavia, FPRY). The prefixes of the names of the six republics changed accordingly, from "Federal State" to "People's Republic".³² Tito was elected as the president.

Yugoslavia was ruled by Tito between the end of WW2 and his dead in 1980. This period of the history of Yugoslavia was called as "Second Yugoslavia". In this period, not only governmental structure and institutions, but also approach of the government to the nationality problem was different from the first experience. This period of the history of Yugoslavia and the policies of Tito can make us understand how to provide stability in the Western Balkans. He achieved to establish Yugoslav Federation by bringing all nations together.

²⁸ See, Maclean, F., (1951). *Eastern Approaches*. London: Jonathan Cape.

²⁹ Singleton, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³¹ Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³² Jelavich, *op.cit.*, p. 296.

Although Serbs had demands about Bosnia being a sub-region within Serbia like Kosovo and Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also recognized as one of the founder republics of the Federation. Bosnian Muslims were recognized as an ethnic group for the first time by Tito.³³ With this policy, he tried to make a balance between the Serbs and the Croats. Tito's system in Yugoslavia was depending on a very accurate balance between Serbs and the other nations. Weakness of Serbs meant strength of Yugoslavia. "Brotherhood and Unity" was the main slogan and main idea behind the great Yugoslav perspective of the Partisans. The slogan was also accepted as the official policy of the Tito regime. It was used to describe the peaceful coexistence of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia.

Six federal states of The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia were: the Federal State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FS Bosnia and Herzegovina), Federal State of Croatia (FS Croatia), Federal State of Macedonia (FS Macedonia), Federal State of Montenegro (FS Montenegro), Federal State of Serbia (FS Serbia), and Federal State of Slovenia (FS Slovenia).

Because of the ethnic complex structure of the country, Tito tried to determine the rights of all nations within the SFRY. Population of the country was divided into three groups.

- **Nations of Yugoslavia:** The peoples who had a home republic within Yugoslavia. Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenes and Serbs were the initial Nations of Yugoslavia. By the amendment in 1971 Muslims were also accepted as a Nation of Yugoslavia.
- **Nationalities of Yugoslavia:** This group of people were given cultural rights. The group was composed of Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Turks.
- **Other nationalities and Ethnic Groups:** The other groups living in Yugoslavia. Namely, Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, Poles,

³³ Gallagher, T. (a) (2005). *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789 - 1989 from the Ottomans to Milosevic*. London: Routledge. p. 229.

Russians, Ukrainians, Vlachs and others including those who classify themselves as “Yugoslavs”.³⁴

Apart from the federal classification, nations and nationalities were also determined in all republics. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Serbs, Croats and Muslims were determined as the constituent nations. In Croatia, Croats and Serbs were accepted as the constituent nations while the Hungarians who lived in Croatia were accepted as nationalities.³⁵

The main problems of this classification were seen in Vojvodina and esp. in Kosovo. Both of them were autonomous provinces within the republic of Serbia. Hungarians constituted a great portion of population in Vojvodina. In Kosovo, Albanians constituted 80% of the population of Kosovo. However, both of them were accepted nationalities because of the reason that their national home countries were out of Yugoslavia.³⁶

Two important turning points in the political and economic system of Yugoslavia that are the 1963 and 1974 Constitutions should be underlined. The former one, the new constitution which entered into force in 1963 changed the name of the country as Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).³⁷

According to latter one, 1974 Constitution, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina were accepted as the constituent republics of the SFRY³⁸, while, the autonomous provinces, ethnic Albanian majority populated Kosovo and the mixed-populated Vojvodina were given right to vote in the collective presidency of Yugoslavia.³⁹ They also gained right to have their own courts, police and territorial defense.⁴⁰ The difference

³⁴ Poulton, H. (1991). *The Balkans Minorities and States in Conflict*. London: Minority Rights Publications. p. 5.

³⁵ Osmançavuşoğlu, E.G. (2000). *The Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution and Britain's Role in Shaping Western Policy*. Ankara: SAM Papers. p. 13.

³⁶ Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁷ Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

³⁸ Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁹ Benson, L. (2001). *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 135.

⁴⁰ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

between the republics was the autonomous provinces were not given right to legally secede from Yugoslavia.⁴¹

In 1974, Serbia's influence in the country was significantly reduced and that of autonomous provinces were strengthened. This concession satisfied Croatia and Slovenia, but in Serbia and in Kosovo, reaction was different. Serbs saw the new constitution as conceding to Croat and ethnic Albanian nationalists. Contrarily, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were demanding to become a constituent republic with holding the right to separate from Yugoslavia. The demand of Albanians created tensions within the Communist leadership, particularly amongst Communist Serb officials who resented the 1974 constitution as weakening Serbia's influence and jeopardizing the unity of the country by allowing the republics the right to secede.

The structure which was created by the 1974 constitution was working when Tito was alive most probably because of his personal authority and ability to settle the disputes.⁴² Serious problems started to emerge after his death.

1.2.3. Yugoslavia after Tito

During the years, more autonomy was given to the republics especially in economic field by making rapid changes in the constitution. Tito's reflection to the libertarian and nationalist movements was establishing the collective Federal Presidency (Predsedništvo) and reestablishing the administrative structure of the state in favor of the representatives which come from the republics. "Predsedništvo" was composed of the representatives of six republics, two autonomous regions and Tito as the President for life of Yugoslavia.⁴³ The Federal Presidency was also expected to govern the state after Tito.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁴² Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴³ Gallagher(a), *op. cit.*, p.231.

⁴⁴ Meier, V. (2005). *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise* (S. P. Ramet, Translated by). London: Routledge. (1995). p. 6.

After Tito's death in 1980, single presidency was divided into a collective Presidency, where representatives of each republic would form a committee. Federal policy goals and objectives would be established by this committee. The head of the collective presidency was rotated between the representatives of different republics and the heading person was considered as the head of state of Yugoslavia. According to this new system, every Secretary General of the regional Communist Parties were planned to come to force for one year alternately. By this way, Vojvodina and Kosovo were accepted as equal to the republics. This system was one of the reasons of the problems occurred after Tito.

After death of Tito, a political leader who can keep the country together and try to provide the continuity of the federal administration of the state didn't come into force. After he came to force in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic put the autonomous regions out of this system.⁴⁵ This meant the end of constitutional organization of Yugoslavia. Albanians in Kosovo reacted sharply to this decision. Nationalist Albanian government officials quit working to protest this decision. It can be argued that raising nationalism and economic problems as well as the lack of powerful central government caused a rapid movement towards the end of Yugoslavia.

1.3. TOWARDS DISSOLUTION

1.3.1. Reasons of Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Since the beginning of the 19th century, reasons of many conflicts in the Balkans have had nationalist and religious characteristics. However, it is very difficult to make a difference between these two factors. In Yugoslavia nationality and religion was so much intertwined.

An unexampled system was foreseen for Yugoslavia to keep these ethnic groups together. The nations and the nationalities were benefiting from the

⁴⁵ Gibbs, D.N. (2009). *First Do No Harm Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. p. 177.

same cultural rights. This multinational and multireligious structure of the state broke down because of the politicians who came to power after Tito and their unsuccessful policies.

Since the 1974 Constitution reduced the powers of Serbia over its autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, nationalist sentiment in Serbia increased, primarily centered on Kosovo. Kosovo was administered mostly by Albanians. Serbian population in Kosovo increasingly put forth complaints of mistreatment and abuse by the Albanian majority. Together with the idea of reduced power of Serbia, developments in Kosovo provoked increasing anti-Albanian sentiments in Serbia. This inconvenience increased after the death of Tito and it reached to top level in the second half of the decade. In 1986 the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), published a controversial document known as the SANU Memorandum.⁴⁶ In it, Serbian academics expressed their support to Serbian nationalist grievances inflaming ethnic tensions even among moderate Serbs.⁴⁷ According to Poulton, the Serbian intelligentsia has played such a prominent role in whipping up ethnic tension which politicians like Milosevic have used for their own ends.⁴⁸

At this point, it is important to emphasize how effective were the policies followed by Milosevic who became the party leader of Serbia in 1986. He benefited from the feelings of Serbs who were thinking that they were sidelined within the federation. He specifically focused on Kosovo and tried to benefit as much as possible from the nationalist sentiment of Serbs. Before him, no communist leaders explicitly used nationalist sentiment of any of the Yugoslav nations.⁴⁹ His aim was to repair the damage done by the 1974 constitution and end the autonomy of the provinces of Serbia. In the 600th anniversary of the 1st Kosovo War, he made a speech to nearly one million Serbs in Kosovo.⁵⁰ He gave a highly nationalist speech and he emphasized that the province for long

⁴⁶ Bideleux, R., Jeffries, I. (b) (2006). *The Balkans A Post-Communist History*. New York: Routledge. p. 241

⁴⁷ Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁹ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵⁰ Benson, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

severed from mother Serbia restored.⁵¹ After this ceremony in Kosovo, he returned to Belgrade and decided to terminate the autonomous structure of Kosovo.⁵² This decision resulted with unavoidable chaos within the state.

As a result of the economic and political depression in the country, the relations among republics started to weaken in 1989. Developments in the Eastern Block also showed its effects in Yugoslavia and in 1990 multiparty system was accepted.⁵³ As a result of the elections in the same year, communist parties won the elections in Serbia⁵⁴ and Montenegro⁵⁵. On the other hand, nationalist parties won the elections in Croatia⁵⁶, Macedonia⁵⁷ and Slovenia.⁵⁸ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a coalition composed of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian nationalist parties was established.⁵⁹ The result of strengthening nationalism was disappearance of the “Yugoslav Identity”. The people who were representing themselves with this identity had to turn back to their national identities. This situation naturally divided the nations.

⁵¹ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵² Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵⁴ Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁵⁸ Ramet, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁵⁹ Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p.342.

1.3.2. Wars in Yugoslavia and Independence of Republics

Map 3: Former Yugoslavia⁶⁰



1.3.2.1. Independence of Slovenia

Slovenia had 8 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia.⁶¹ On the other hand, because of comparably stronger economic structure of the republic,⁶² Slovenian leaders had been trying to separate from Yugoslavia during 1980's. In mid 1989 transition from Communist Party to Social Democrat Party in Slovenia was the first example in Yugoslavia. This development paved the way to start of the end for Yugoslavia. Existing tension between the republics accelerated by the boycott of Serbian government against Slovenian goods.⁶³

⁶⁰ Wikipedia. (2007). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soubor:Former_Yugoslavia_Map.png.

⁶¹ Zhang, L. (2008). Analyzing the Causes of the Dissolution of the Former Yugoslav Federation from the Perspective of Ethnicity Relations. *International Education Studies*, Canadian Center for Science Education, May 2008, Vol: 1 (No:2). pp. 111 - 114.

⁶² Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁶³ Lane, A. (2005). Yugoslavia: The Search for a Nation State. Dunn and T.G. Fraser (Ed.). *Europe and Ethnicity The First World War and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict* (p. 29-44). London: Routledge.

Justification of the Serbian government to this boycott was their claim that Slovenians were supporting Albanians in Kosovo.

Right-wing parties which came into force in Slovenia and Croatia after the elections in 1990 tried to separate from the other “poor” republics and establish good relations with the EC. The government of Slovenia was trying to prepare the country to the EC. On this way, they made a last action by organizing a separation vote. Results were not surprising: 88,5% of the participants voted in favor of independence.⁶⁴ In June 25, 1991 Slovenia declared independence.⁶⁵

The existing barrack of Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in the country started to act for preventing separation of Slovenia with the instructions which came from Belgrade. By this way, the war started. However, Yugoslav military units left the country after only ten days. Previously predicted⁶⁶ independence of Slovenia was realized.

The peace was realized by the attempts of the EC. All parties came together and signed the Brioni Accords on July 8, 1991. However, it is now possible for us to say that, concentration of Milosevic to other republics (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) was more effective in terms of ending the conflict in Slovenia than the initiatives of the EC.

Separation of Slovenia was the first stage towards the way to dissolution of Yugoslavia. In terms of violence and conflicts, the case of Slovenia was not as dreadful as the other ones. We can say that ethnical homogeneity of the country was the main reason for this comparingly “peaceful” separation.⁶⁷ We will observe how difficult the situation was in more heterogeneous republics.

⁶⁴ Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁶⁵ Gallagher, T. (b) (2005). *The Balkans After the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*. New York: Routledge. p. 54.

⁶⁶ O’Shea, B. (2005). *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991–1995: Perception, Deception and Dishonesty*. New York: Frank Cass. p. 11.

⁶⁷ Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

1.3.2.2. Independence of Croatia

In Croatia, multiparty elections and the constitutional changes which enabled independence were realized in 1990 simultaneously with Slovenia. Croatia Democratic Union (HDZ) won the elections and provided the majority in the assembly. The leader of the party, Franjo Tudjman had also been elected as the president of Croatia in 1990.⁶⁸

Separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia also meant separation of Serbian population living in Croatia which comprised a sizeable number of population. Because of this reason, Belgrade's response to Independence of Croatia was much more than their response to Slovenia. The main reason for reaction of Belgrade was not separation of Croatia. Serbian minority within Croatia was the main reason for problematic relations of Croatia and Belgrade.

Independence was declared on the same day with Slovenia, June 25, 1991. However, during the Brioni talks, on 7 July the European Community persuaded both republics to accept a three month moratorium in order to allow negotiations. After this three months period, declarations were activated on October 8, 1991.⁶⁹

Against separation of Croatia from the Federation, Serbian population within Croatia established autonomous "Republic of Serbian Krajina".⁷⁰ Later developments showed that Serbian population had demands to unify with Serbia. However, Tudjman started to oppress Serbs because he didn't want to let lands of Croatia caught by someone else. Armed conflicts started between Serbs and Croatians. The following period made JNA to take position in the side of Krajina Serbs. By intervention of JNA, these conflicts spread to wider areas.

⁶⁸ Kollander, P. (2004). *The Civil War in Former Yugoslavia and the International Intervention*. J. S. Morton, R. C. Nation, P. Forage and S. Bianchini (Ed.). *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia* (pp. 3 - 22). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁶⁹ Bideleux and Jeffries(b) *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁷⁰ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

Fights were paused in January 1992 with the pressure which came from the European states and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops were brought into Croatia to build a buffer zone between the Republic of Croatia and Serbs in Krajina. UNPROFOR was created by UN Security Council Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992. The initial mandate of the UNPROFOR was to ensure conditions for peace talks, and security in three demilitarized "safe-haven" enclaves designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) located in the Republic of Croatia: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina.⁷¹

The behavior of Germany in this period will be examined separately however, it's important to emphasize that its support to Slovene and Croat independence was a major factor which shaped EC/EU policy towards the region.

1.3.2.3. Independence of Macedonia

Macedonia as the poorest and the smallest of the republics was not in a position to survive alone. After the elections in 1990, a coalition government in which communists were minority was established. Former Secretary General of the Macedonian Communist Party, Kiro Gligorov was elected as the president of the country.⁷²

Gligorov was aware of the sensitive ethnic balance within the country and he followed a cross-national policy. During the increasing conflicts in 1991 Macedonia generally followed a conciliator and moderator role. Common acceptance in the society was interests of Macedonia would be protected better by remaining in the federation. However it was obvious that Macedonia wouldn't remain unreactive against the developments. The conflicts which started after separation of Slovenia and Croatia from the federation created a concern in the Macedonian society that the country would go under Serbian Hegemony.

⁷¹ Ramet, S. P. (2005). *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 112.

⁷² Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p.412.

It was decided to hold a referendum to decide on the future of the country. A referendum which was boycotted by the Albanian minority was held on September 8, 1991. %95,3 of the participants voted in favor of independence.⁷³ Macedonian parliament declared independence on September 17, 1991.

After this development, the country provided entrance of UN forces to the country and withdrawal of JNA. Finally, in March 1992, Federal Army withdrew totally from the country.

1.3.2.4. Independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically complex republic of Yugoslavia. %44 of the total population of the republic were Muslims, %31 were Serbians, %17 were Croats.⁷⁴

Results of the 1990 elections were reflecting the deep division within the republic. Muslims got % 36, Serbs got % 30 and Croats got % 18 of the total votes.⁷⁵ Party of Democratic Action (SDA) won the elections however, the result was not enough for Muslims to constitute a government themselves. A triple coalition which composed of nationalist parties was established. Leader of SDA, Alija Izetbegovic was elected as the president of the republic.⁷⁶ However, it was impossible for these nationalist parties to have a common program. Programs of the parties were totally different from each other. This conflict between the parties was also seen in the governmental institutions.

Bosnian parliament adopted a “Memorandum of Sovereignty” on October 15, 1991. Basic idea behind this memorandum for the parliamentary majority was in Bosnia-Herzegovina to accept full sovereign independence or to be a part of Yugoslavia which also includes Slovenia and Croatia.⁷⁷

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁷⁴ Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

⁷⁵ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁷⁶ Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p. 342.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

Two referendums which were mostly boycotted by the Serbian population were held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. In the referendums, %92,7 of the participants voted for independence and the parliament officially declared independence on March 3, 1992.⁷⁸

Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina reacted to the decision of independence and its acceptance by Muslims and Croats. In January 1992, they declared the Serb Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina which would have close relations with Serbia.⁷⁹ It was obvious for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that declaration of independence was not acceptable for Bosnian Serbs in peaceful means.

First conflicts started by the murder of a Serb by a Bosniac⁸⁰ in a wedding ceremony on March 1, 1992. Bosnian Serbs started to build barricades inside Sarajevo. The sudden and quick reaction of Bosnian Serbs shows that events were not developing spontaneously.⁸¹

In March 1992, Serbian corps started to attack on Croats and Bosniacs in the north. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the EC/EU and the USA on April 6-7, 1992.⁸² The country also became a member of the UN on May 22, 1992.⁸³ These recognitions were reactions to these attacks. However, unlike it was predicted, Serbian and Yugoslav corps surrounded Sarajevo and the conflict spread to all country as small ones between Bosniacs-Serbs, Bosniacs-Croats and Serbs-Croats. These small conflicts increased and spread immediately.

⁷⁸ Benson, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁷⁹ Kollander, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-22.

⁸⁰ The term Bosnian refers to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Bosniac" refers to the Bosnian Muslims.

⁸¹ O'Shea, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁸² US Department of State Background Note: Bosnia Herzegovina. (2011). Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm>.

⁸³ Fabry, M. (2004). International Norms of Territorial Integrity and the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. J. S. Morton, R. C. Nation, P. Forage and S. Bianchini (Ed.). *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia* (pp. 119-145). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was different from Croatia and Slovenia. It created unexpected results. Milosevic's support to the leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic, (especially military and financial support) was a factor which increased the tension within the republic.⁸⁴

While the international intervention to the Bosnia-Herzegovina was delayed, the situation within the country was going worse. A systematic ethnic cleansing operation was being implemented against Bosniacs. In addition, nearly half of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina became refugees and international parties had now to take action also against the refugee crisis.

International action came concretely in April, 1992. The United States and Europe collaborated to field a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The UN Secretariat authorized a UNPROFOR to undertake a series of actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁵ This mission existed until the end of the war in 1995.

The UNPROFOR mandate for Bosnia and Herzegovina can essentially be divided into four phases, but it is important to note that the old responsibilities continued even as new tasks were added.⁸⁶

UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and its environs. In September 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In addition, the Force monitored the "no-fly" zone, banning all military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council around five Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in self-defense in reply to attacks against these areas, and to coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the use of air power in support of its activities. Similar arrangements were subsequently extended to the territory of Croatia. UNPROFOR also monitored the implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces in February 1994. In

⁸⁴ Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p. – 344.

⁸⁵ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information Former Yugoslavia United Nations Protection Force Profile. (1996). Available on: 06.02.2011, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm.

addition, UNPROFOR monitored cease-fire arrangements negotiated between Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs forces, which entered into force on 1 January 1995.

There had been some weaknesses of the UNPROFOR during the war which resulted with lengthening the conflict. For instance, The Security Council decided to pursue its authority to order all parties to the conflict to comply with the provisions of Resolution 771⁸⁷ or it would take further unspecified measures.⁸⁸ However, no development was seen on this way. On the other hand, UN Security Council decided to implement flight interdiction on air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁹ This ban was violated many times. UN also refused NATO's offer for using force to provide utilization of this regulation. We can observe the results of two-headed structure of NATO and UN in this event. UN couldn't be effective during this period because of conflict of interests between the member states. So, UN was accepted as the actor of this war which lost its plausibility. The event in Srebrenitsa supports this idea. Srebrenitsa was one of the regions which were declared as UN Protected safe area like Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Gorazde. However, international community witnessed a dreadful massacre in Srebrenitsa.

Between February and October 1994, the Contact Group (U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and Germany) made steady progress towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was known as a Contact Group plan, and a heavy pressure was put on Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan when Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed an embargo on Drina River. The plan of the contact group which offered Serbs turnover of the occupied lands to the federation was refused by Serbs. This plan was softened in December; however, this new plan was also refused by Serbs.⁹⁰

The process which ended the war started with the intervention of NATO in the conflict by air attacks to the Serbian locals in August 1995. This intervention

⁸⁷ NATO. (1992). Available on: 12.06.2011), <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920813b.htm>.

⁸⁸ O'Shea, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁸⁹ Burg, S. L., Shoup, P. S. (1999). *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. p. 250.

⁹⁰ Gallagher(b), *op. cit.*, p. 131.

paved the way to the Dayton Peace Agreement which was signed on November 21, 1995. Dayton was signed under the leadership of Richard Holbrook by the Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegovic), Republic of Yugoslav Federation (Slobodan Milosevic) and Croatia (Franjo Tudjman). Dayton Agreement will be evaluated in the following parts.

There were two basic functions of Dayton Accords: providing ceasefire and starting democratization process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dayton brought the parties of the conflict together to settle the disputes in peaceful means and it also anticipated equal rights to each side. Dayton Accords gives right of independence to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the country, by this way, is recognized by its signatory neighbors. There are critics to Dayton Accords however, providing peace is independently an important development which was introduced by it.⁹¹

⁹¹ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p.167.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARDS WESTERN BALKANS BETWEEN 1991-1999

2.1. EUROPEAN UNION POLICY OF DIPLOMATIC MEDIATION UP TO THE END OF WAR

The EU policy towards the newly emerged former Yugoslav states will be evaluated in the framework of the EU's response to the crisis in Yugoslavia up to the end of war. The EC/EU is commonly accepted as being very inactive during the Yugoslav conflict and EC/EU response to the crisis is conceived as a failure for the Union. However, we have to keep in mind that EC/EU has always been recognized as a "civilian power" and expectations from the Union in military terms would be exaggeration. In the first stage of the conflicts in Yugoslavia, basic argument among the EC countries was on the mechanism how to intervene in the conflict. First stages of the crisis coincided with the negotiations of Maastricht Treaty which is an important turning point in the development of the EC. Concentration of the Union and the European states was mainly on this treaty. Furthermore, Yugoslav crisis broke out at a time which the EC was dealing with other international issues like reunification of Germany and dissolution of Soviet Union. That is why rapid action couldn't be realized by the EC in the very beginning of the crisis.

On June 28, 1991, just in the beginning of the crisis Jacques Poos, Prime Minister of Luxemburg, declared to the press that "This is the hour of Europe, it's not the hour of the Americans."⁹² The EC in the first phase tried to make international actors to accept that the EC would deal with the crisis and they don't want any intervention outside Europe. However, developments showed that the crisis was much more serious than the EC predicted and it couldn't be finalized without intervention from the international actors like US, UN or NATO.

⁹² O'Shea, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

2.1.1. Brioni Agreement

After the conflict first started in Slovenia, the EC acted rapidly and the ceasefire in Slovenia could be provided by the initiatives of the EC (Brioni Agreement – July 8, 1991). However, it has to be emphasized that the EC's misconception of the increasing tension was the main reason for the relative success of Brioni. Importance of Slovenia with a total 2% Serbian population was less than Croatia and esp. Bosnia-Herzegovina for Serbia. This ceasefire let JNA to be more prepared for Croatia.⁹³

The Brioni Agreement also gave the first of the many peacekeeping missions European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) a mandate to deploy non-armed monitors to the Slovenian borders. The ECMM was intended to supervise implementation of the Brioni accord in both Slovenia and Croatia and was staffed by a small number of EC personnel (who numbered about three hundred by the end of the summer of 1991).⁹⁴

In the Brioni talks, on 7 July the European Community persuaded both Slovenia and Croatia to accept a three month moratorium in order to allow negotiations. The important point of the Brioni Agreement which has to be emphasized is it broke the initial idea of the EU to support to unity of Yugoslavia.⁹⁵

2.1.2. The Hague Meeting

Just after the JNA attack started against Croatia, the EC came together to discuss on the possible ways of intervening in the conflict. Different ideas came to the table. France was supporting to hold a UN meeting to discuss the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping force. On the other hand, the suggestion of Netherlands was further mediation through an enlarged group of parties. The possibility of military intervention was also supported by the small

⁹³ Cafruny, A. (1998). The European Union and the War in Former Yugoslavia: The Failure of Collective Diplomacy. A. Cafruny and P. Peters (Ed.). *The Union and the World: The Political Economy of a Common European Foreign Policy* (pp. 133 – 150). Hague: Kluwer Law International.

⁹⁴ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁹⁵ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

states who were not likely to contribute in any possible military action. And the German suggestion was recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. The result of the meeting was nothing more than some ideas on the table. However, the EC was still assumed as being at the heart of the crisis.⁹⁶

2.1.3. The EC Conference: Lord Carrington's Plan

While the conflict which had started by the attack of the Serbs with the support of JNA to Croatia was going on, the conflicting parties came together on September 7, 1991 on International Conference on Yugoslavia in the Hague by the efforts of the EC.⁹⁷ Lord Carrington, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain, was assigned as the mediator. Unfortunately, the Conference had to be closed in the first day.

At the end of a series of negotiations Lord Carrington followed with the Yugoslav leaders, he sent a proposal for the new arrangement on October 16, 1991. Although the plan was offering a wide range of individual, cultural and political rights this proposal was refused by the Serbs because of the reason that the Serbs in all Yugoslavia should come together under the single state of Yugoslavia.⁹⁸ Serbs refused the proposal despite the threat of the EC's about implementing serious economic sanctions. The EC imposed economic sanctions and suspended all trade relations on November 8, 1991.

At this stage of the events, Cyrus Vance, a US diplomat appointed by the UN Security Council was involved in the process. It meant that the process was shifting from the EU to the UN.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

⁹⁷ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁹⁸ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

2.1.4. Badinter Commission

The turning point for the EC in the Yugoslav crisis is fall of the Vukovar city. In Croatia, after the capture of Vukovar by Serbs, EC declared on December 16, 1991 that the republics which will separate from Yugoslavia can be recognized starting from January 15, 1992.¹⁰⁰ In this frame, a commission led by Robert Badinter was established to determine the competency of the republics for being recognized as independent states. The duty of this Arbitration Commission was to determine the situation of the republics which declared independence in terms of economic efficiency, human rights and democracy.¹⁰¹

Because of the behavior of Germany, the report of the Arbitration Commission was meaningless in terms of influencing the EU to decide on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

2.1.5. Germany's Attitude

Germany is a factor which initially shaped the EU behavior towards the developments in Yugoslavia. With the initiation of the conflict in Croatia, Germany started to put pressure on their allies towards recognition of independence of these countries. Against the insistence of Germany, French suggestion was in a different way. They suggested military intervention as a reflection to the increasing tension. In this regard, France made a call to the member states of Western European Union (WEU)¹⁰² to deploy troops under the flag of WEU. Basic function of this unit was foreseen as supporting the ECMM. However, this was an unsuccessful initiative of France because the WEU did not have any means to provide the logistical support and coordination

¹⁰⁰ Fabry, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-145.

¹⁰¹ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁰² In early 1991, French president François Mitterrand and German chancellor Helmut Kohl began exploring new ways of pooling Europe's military resources. The two leaders proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) should be established as a key element of an integrated foreign and military policy. The EU members approved this idea in 1992 at the historic Maastricht Conference.

that such a force required. Although Germany was eager to support this idea, Britain opposed such an initiative in Yugoslavia.¹⁰³

Germany decided to unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia on December 23, 1991 before the report of the Arbitration Commission.¹⁰⁴ This behavior gave no chance to the other countries to decide on recognition according to the Arbitration Commission. It can be assumed that dissolution of Yugoslavia was in an unreturnable position and the common foreign policy of the EC was very weak to make member states behave jointly. It can be argued that internal political issues and the German attitude to prove their global power may had forced Germany to behave in this way. It is important to keep in mind that Germany tried to increase its effectiveness within the EC by this behavior. German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher claimed that this recognition would end attacks of Serbs and a ceasefire can be provided.¹⁰⁵ However, developments showed that this claim couldn't be realized. Contrarily, the level of the conflicts in Yugoslavia increased and spreaded to wider regions.

2.1.6. Recognition of Republics by the European Community

The report of the Badinter Commission was proposing recognition for only Slovenia and Macedonia among the four republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).¹⁰⁶ The developments discussed above, changed the influence of the Badinter Commission and the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992 as independent states.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, the EC who was favoring unity of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the conflict started to recognize the republics separated from Yugoslavia. The report was proposing for Bosnia-Herzegovina to have a referendum before being recognized. After the referendum process which was mentioned above,

¹⁰³ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁴ Demirtaş Coşkun, B. (2008). An Analysis of Germany's Policy Toward the Balkans from the Past till Present: Change or Continuity. *Avrasya Dosyası (Balkanlar Özel)*, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2008, Vol: 14 (No:1). pp. 331 - 372.

¹⁰⁵ Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁰⁶ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁷ Gallagher(b), *op. cit.*, p. 66.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was also recognized by the EC on April 7, 1992,¹⁰⁸ Recognition of Macedonia took some time because of oppositions of Greece to the name of the country.¹⁰⁹

2.1.7. Carrington-Cutilheiro Plan

Before recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the EC, Lord Carrington started to spend his concentration on Bosnia-Herzegovina and together with the Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro organized a Conference in Lisbon on February 21-22, 1992 to discuss the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹⁰ After the period started with this conference, a plan for the Bosnia-Herzegovina was established. According to this plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina was being divided into three constituent units based on national distribution.¹¹¹

The Plan was signed by the representatives of Serbs, Croats and the Bosnian government on March 18, 1992. However Izzetbegovic withdrew his signature on the agreement. His claim was Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be divided based on the ethnic differences.

Recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the US and the EC came just after this development. And the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in the same period. As a reaction to the Serbian aggression, the EC member states decided to withdraw their ambassadors from Belgrade.¹¹² However, Serbs didn't have a tendency to stop the conflict. As a result of the failure in preventing the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC transferred the problem to the UN.¹¹³ As it was mentioned before, the UNPROFOR in Croatia started to act in Bosnia-Herzegovina from this point.

¹⁰⁸ Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p.344.


¹⁰⁹ Osmançavuşoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

Map 4: Carrington-Cutilheiro Plan¹¹⁴

2.1.8. London Conference

A joint EC-UN initiative of the London Conference was gathered on August 26-27, 1992. The conference created the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). The conference brought the joint action of the EC and the UN. The EC would follow the diplomatic part and the UN would handle the operations on the ground. As another change brought by the conference, Former Foreign Secretary of Britain, David Owen was assigned to co-chair the process with Cyrus Vance. The aim of ICFY was to handle the negotiations with the post-Yugoslav states however, the developments of that time made it focus basically on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the end of the Conference, the actions which have to be taken to end the conflict were determined and positive atmosphere was created. The principles agreed on were promising. However, after the conference, expectations couldn't be satisfied.

¹¹⁴ Wikipedia.(2006). Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Coutillier.GIF>.


2.1.9. Vance-Owen Plan

Another plan of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen was launched on October 1992. This plan was the most comprehensive of the ones which had been offered up to that time.

The proposal, which became known as the "Vance-Owen peace plan", involved the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions and it was proposing the governing structure in detail. However, the difference of this plan was it was offering a central government above the all sub-authorities.

Milosevic for the first time removed his support to Bosnian Serbs and tried to guide them through the acceptance of the plan. However, Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan.

Map 5: Vance-Owen Plan¹¹⁵




¹¹⁵ Wikipedia.(2006). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Vance-Owen_peace_plan.png.

2.1.10. The European Union Action Plan

Basing on the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, the French and German foreign ministers (Alain Juppe and Klaus Kinkel) tried to open the negotiations again. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan was presented by UN mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen. The plan was proposing a system of canonization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs were given 53% of the territories and 17% to the Bosnian Croats. Muslim Bosniacs were only given 30% of the territories. Izetbegovic declared the plan as unacceptable. Despite the discussions on the different versions of the plan, it was not accepted.

Map 6: Owen-Stoltenberg Plan¹¹⁶



The EU Action Plan was an effort to launch a fresh diplomatic initiative on the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. The partition of the Bosniacs was increased to 33% and Croats to 17,5% in this new plan. The parties came together to discuss this new plan in November 29, 1993 in Geneva. The parties rejected this new initiative of the EU.

¹¹⁶ Wikipedia.(2006). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Owen-Stoltenberg_peace_plan.gif.

The ethnically complex situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was basically a contributonal factor to the crisis. And it was also an obstacle to the initiatives to provide peace in the country.

Failure of the EC/EU in Yugoslav crisis was mainly because of lack of warning systems and preventive mechanisms within the EC/EU. In this respect, it was a big adversity for the EC/EU to face with this crisis in the time of transformation period of CFSP. Rather than lack of military power and infrastructure which will enable the EC/EU to intervene in the crisis, lack of common will about the behavior of the EC/EU was the main reason for EC/EU to be regarded as being inactive in Yugoslav crisis. Most active involvement was observed in the attitudes of individual states of the EU. UNSC Resolution 713, for example was accepted by the initiatives of Britain and France in September 25, 1991. The resolution was presenting implementing an arms embargo against whole Yugoslav Nations. This decision was criticized because most of the arm and arms factories were under the control of the Serbs. So, this decision was also one of the reasons of Bosniacs remaining unsecure.¹¹⁷

As a last point, it has to be emphasized that the idea behind the Regional Cooperation approach of the EC/EU which is tried to be implemented to the WBC lies in the history, esp. near history of these countries. The basic principle is that the nations of the Western Balkans must learn to overcome their differences with their immediate neighbors rather than bring their disputes for prosecution within the EC/EU.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Meier, V., *op. cit.*, p.219.

¹¹⁸ Seroka, J. (2008). Issues with Regional Reintegration of the Western Balkans. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 10 (No:1). pp. 15 - 29.

2.2. DAYTON AGREEMENT

In August 28, 1995 a bomb destroyed an open market in Sarajevo and 37 people died in the market. This development paved the way through Dayton Agreement.¹¹⁹

After the bomb, Serbs were ordered by the UN Officials to draw back their heavy weapons 20 km. outside Sarajevo. However, it was refused by the Serbs. Refusal of Serbs caused a serious intervention by NATO. Air forces of NATO started to bomb Serbian positions in Tuzla, Gorazde, Mostar and Sarajevo in August, 30. The attack of NATO ended in September 14, 1995. Main purpose of this intervention was to force Serbs to accept negotiations with the other parties. By this intervention of NATO, for the first time since 1991 Western Powers supported one side of the conflict against the other. This intervention made Bosniac and Croat corps to gain territory against the Serbs. However, NATO did not allow them to go further than the 49%-51% partition of the territory.¹²⁰ Because it would prevent possibility of peace after a serious conflict. It was now time for negotiations.

After a series of unsuccessful attempts of the international community to bring peace to the region, this new initiative was served as an American initiative. The parties came together on November 1, 1995 in Dayton, US. The meeting was headed by the US Deputy Foreign Minister Richard Holbrooke. In addition to Slobodan Miloseviç, Franjo Tudjman ve Aliya İzetbegoviç the representatives from the Contact Group and the representatives of the EU were also present in the Meeting. The conflicting parties agreed on a document on a general framework agreement to provide peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The document was paraphrased by the parties on November 21. This document was converted to Dayton Peace Agreement later and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Benson, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹²⁰ Gallagher(b), *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹²¹ O'Shea, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

Basic points of Dayton are as follows:¹²²

- *Bosnia and Herzegovina (as it then became) was to be preserved as a single state within its present borders and with international recognition.*
- *It was to be divided into two separate and largely autonomous territorial 'entities', with 51 per cent of the territory assigned to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the FBiH), whose predominantly Bosniak and Croat population in 1996 was estimated at 2.5 million, while the other 49 per cent of the territory was allocated to the Republika Srpska (RS), whose predominantly Serb population in 1996 was estimated to be 1 million.*
- *There was to be an 'effective' all-Bosnia central government, including a parliament, a three-member presidency, a constitutional court and single central bank.*
- *Refugees were to be allowed and encouraged to return to their old homes.*
- *Individuals charged with war crimes would be banned from participation in political and military life, and Bosnia, Croatia and the FRY would cooperate fully in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.*

One day after Dayton was signed, UN Security Council gave responsibility of guaranteeing the conditions of the Agreement to NATO. The multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a year period this force was substituted with the Stabilization Force (SFOR). On the other hand, responsibility of guaranteeing the political conditions was given to the UN Higher Representative in Sarejevo.¹²³

Dayton was a success however; it created one of the most complex state systems of the world. Since the Agreement was signed, Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot establish an actively running government. It is commonly pointed that state system of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be revised in order to make progress more for the country.

¹²² Bideleux and Jeffries (b) *op. cit.*, p. 254.

¹²³ Gallagher(b), *op. cit.*, p. 153.

Map 7: Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton¹²⁴

2.3. EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FROM DAYTON AGREEMENT (DECEMBER 1995) UNTIL 1999

The functionalist and neo-functionalist theories of the European Union integration acknowledge that after the WW2 the way to prevent conflicts in the Europe was to spread international cooperation in technical areas among the states. If the connection in technical fields gets stronger, cooperation among the states increase. In such condition, peace will naturally be dominant in the system. To establish this environment, first of all, functional institutions which aim to overcome the problems have to be established. States must accept

¹²⁴ World of Historic Maps. (2009). Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.history-map.com/picture/000/ceasefire-agreement-Dayton-and.htm>.

flexible models depending on the needs that the every new cooperation need brings. The important point is when the technical cooperation starts once; they may have a “spill-over” effect to the other fields. In this regard, the cooperation will spread to other fields beyond the technical areas. The possible problems and conflicts will be solved by establishing more cooperation in all fields. This continuous procedure will increase the dependency of states to each other. So, peace will be provided naturally.¹²⁵

In this frame, the own history of the EU has many overlapping features with the WBC position after the war. In the post WW2 period, cooperation efforts started to end possibility of any conflicts in the continent especially between France and Germany. With the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the process started and it spread to other fields and to a wider range of countries in the region. Finally these efforts created a very successful example of cooperation, the EU. Inspiring from its history, the EU started to implement policies towards WBC to increase cooperation among them after Dayton. The policies of the EU after 1995 have to be evaluated in this context. As it will be discussed later, S&T is a basic contributor to the policy of the EU.

2.3.1. Policy of Integration and Cooperation in South East Europe

As we have seen in the previous chapter, recent history of the region is far from providing the countries of the region to settle good neighborly relations. The history of the region shows that cooperation initiatives have always started after the time of conflicts. First Yugoslavia was established after the WW1. Second Yugoslavia was established after the WW2.¹²⁶ In this regard, It can be assumed that most important incentive for cooperation in this region is security. So, Dayton was expected to provide a chance for the WBC in terms of bringing peace and stability in the region after a serious conflict.

¹²⁵ Schmitter, P.C. (2005). Neo-Neofunctionalism. A. Wiener and T. Diez (Ed.). *European Integration Theory* (pp. 45-73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹²⁶ Anastasakis, Bojicic Dzelilovic, *op. cit.* p. 5.

By the Dayton Agreement, it is believed that peace could be provided in WBC. It was now time for transformation of these newly emerged post-communist countries to the EU norms. Difference between the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and WBC in terms of their ability to realize necessary transformation was observed here. CEE had already started the process and they had already signed the European Agreements. On the other hand, the EU had already given them the perspective of EU membership in 1993 while the conflict was in the middle in WBC. The only post-Yugoslav country who managed to catch this process was Slovenia. The situation of Slovenia was obviously related with the more peaceful independence of the country comparing with the other ones.

Because of the damage the war caused, for the WBC, their relation with the EU in terms of integration was proceeding slowly. This was also related with the EU approach to these countries. In the first phase priority of the Union was stability and peace in the region. In this regard its own history was an example for the WBC. The experience of the Union after the WW2 had many overlapping features with the situation of WBC. The European Coal and Steel Community was likely to make a French-German war not only unthinkable but materially impossible, it has been motivated by the premise that closer regional integration would reduce, if not eliminate at all, security crisis.¹²⁷ In this regard, cooperation emerged as a key concept for the WBC.

With the guidance of the EU for the first time in recent history, the countries of SEE have been able to identify a common goal around which they feel to be united and come closer to one another.¹²⁸ The main achievement for them is integration with and membership in the EU. EU integration was the most important motivation factor for recently fighting countries to develop cooperation among them. On the other hand, EU membership was a guarantee for these

¹²⁷ Çetin, Ö. (2005). *Europeanization and the Settlement of Ethno-Territorial Cross Border Conflicts: The Case of the Western Balkans*. Master's Thesis, Sabancı University, İstanbul. p. 54.

¹²⁸ Çeviköz, Ü. (1998). European Integration and Regional Co-operation in South East Europe. *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs*, December 1997-February 1998, Vol: 2 (No:4).

countries in terms of peace and regional stability.¹²⁹ However, the initial approach of the EU to the region was not satisfactory for the WBC because the EU was not promising membership to them. Even if the WBC met the necessary conditions, they would be rewarded with trade concessions, financial assistance and economic cooperation but not with a perspective for EU membership.¹³⁰

A new period for EU policy towards the SEE region started to emerge basing on the positive atmosphere which was created by Dayton. Despite the expectations from the EU, it cannot be said that this new period was satisfactory in international area. The initiatives of Regional Cooperation in 1990's did not let to any significant results however, the lack of Regional Cooperation has seriously undermined peace and stability in SEE contributing to armed conflicts in the region.¹³¹

Firstly, It has to be pointed out that regional cooperation and European integration are not the same terms. However, these two terms are complementary ones.¹³² Increasing regional cooperation results with more integration with the EU. The example is seen in the case of The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) experience of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Involving in CEFTA has not pushed these countries away from the EU, but has brought them closer to it. On the way to integration with Europe, countries of the region should also develop regional cooperation. So the policy of the EU first demands from the WBC to develop regional cooperation among them. Regional cooperation is a principle of the highest importance for the political stability, security and economic development of the Western Balkan countries. According to Anastasakis, the epitome of regionalism in South Eastern Europe lies, in its precarious and conflict-prone

¹²⁹ Delevic, M. (2007). Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans. *Chaillot Papers*, Institute for Security Studies, July 2007, No:104. p. 31.

¹³⁰ Özdemir, B. (2006). *Enlarging the EU Further Eastwards: The Prospective EU Membership of the Western Balkans*. Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara. p. 35.

¹³¹ Bideleux and Jeffries(b) *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹³² Çeviköz, *op. cit.*

character.¹³³ Many of the challenges WBC are facing are not only common to them but also have a cross-border dimension, which involves their regional neighbors. By their success in regional cooperation, the WBC are expected to be prepared for the EU membership. In the initial time of the policy, membership perspective was not given to the countries however, as it will be mentioned later, they became more motivated in Regional Cooperation with obtaining the membership perspective in 2000.

Integration with Europe is not an easy process and the process will not be same for all the countries of the region. For example, current developments show that Croatia which started accession negotiations in 2005 is about to be a member the Union. However, it cannot be assumed for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Democratization enhanced good neighborly relations and political and economic reforms seem to form the key elements in this endeavor.

To realize regional cooperation, there are some conducive factors for the countries of the region like common geography and immediate neighborliness, previous communist experience, shared and regional issues. On the other hand, lack of economic cohesiveness, disappointing economic performances, the informal sector, as well as delayed democratic transition and ethnic nationalism are the major obstacles to the process of regional cooperation.¹³⁴

To understand the Regional Cooperation better, we have to look over the rationale behind the idea of Regional Cooperation from the perspective of the target countries and the EU.

From the perspective of the region; firstly, regional cooperation will provide more contribution than integration with the EU because the former is easier to achieve due to the advantages of geographical proximity, and it would create better opportunities through enhanced communications, energy and transport networks.¹³⁵ Another factor is their common need of infrastructures which have

¹³³ Anastasakis, Bojicic Dzelilovic, *op. cit.* p.17.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. V.

¹³⁵ Çeviköz, *op. cit.*

regional characteristics. Transport and energy can be counted as the most important ones of this infrastructure needs. The infrastructure must also be evaluated together with the post conflict reconstruction needs. All countries of the region have common history in terms of the damage of the war. Regional cooperation will also promote increased trade and economic contacts which is also easier to achieve in the small region.

From the EU perspective, it can be argued that their expectations are mostly related with the basic characteristics of the EU. However, there are also expectations which are specific to the region.

Firstly, the EU expects from the countries to provide democratization, human rights, rule of law, and implementation of Dayton Accords. "SEE has a long-standing reputation as a region of turmoil and instability".¹³⁶ This has been confirmed once again with the tragic events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords has opened a new chapter of hope for stability and security in the region.¹³⁷ Preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multiethnic, multicultural, independent and sovereign state within its internationally recognized boundaries is one of the key elements for peace and stability in the region. Another expectation of the EU is solving the bilateral problems between the countries of the region. To establish sustainable peace, bilateral problems have to be solved as soon as possible. EU also forces these countries to cooperate in justice, freedom and security. Organized crime and border management are core security issues of the region which mostly have cross border dimension. It's obvious that these problems require strong cooperation among the countries. Removing all barriers to increase trade is also another part of the expectations of the EU.¹³⁸ By realizing these pre-conditions main purpose from the EU perspective for the region is to establish a kind of basic version of the EU. By this way, these countries will be prepared for the membership of the EU.

¹³⁶ Bilman, L. (1998). The regional Cooperation Initiatives in South East Europe and the Turkish Foreign Policy. *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs*, September-November 1998, Vol: 3 (No:3).

¹³⁷ Delevic, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

It is obvious that the SEE countries aim to be members of the EU. On the other hand EU aims to transform the countries into democracies and thriving market economies with strong and competent institutions, ensure the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection for minorities.¹³⁹

Within this context, two basic initiatives of the EU in terms of Regional Cooperation can be observed between 1995 and 1999.

2.3.1.1. The Royaumont Process

The EU's first comprehensive initiative aimed stabilizing Western Balkans was the Royaumont Process, launched in December 1995 in a small city in France called Royaumont with the aim to support the implementation of the Dayton Accords.¹⁴⁰ It focused on promoting regional projects in the field of civil society, culture and human rights. This process was also called as “An Initiative for Stability and Good Neighborliness in South-Eastern Europe”.

France organized the meeting of the Process of Stability and Good Neighborliness in Royaumont on 13 December 1995, one day before the Peace Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Paris.¹⁴¹ EU member states, Russia, US and SEE countries attended the meeting. At the end of the meeting participants issued a declaration and decided to establish a round table for the SEE. At the meeting of the EU foreign ministers in February 1996, the Royaumont Process was converted into an EU initiative to promote regional cooperation among the countries of SEE.¹⁴² Five follow-up meetings have been organized, the latest in Istanbul on 27 October 1997, where the participants decided to assign a coordinator to supervise the implementation of projects and who would also

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁰ Panebianco, S., Rossi, R. (2004). EU Attempts to Export Norms of Good Governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan Countries. *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics*, University of Catania, October 2004, No:53., p. 13.

¹⁴¹ Bilman, *op. cit.*

¹⁴² Türkeş, M., Gökgöz, G. (2006). The European Union's Strategy towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?. *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol: 20 (No:4). pp. 659-690.

coordinate contacts with other regional cooperation schemes.¹⁴³ Panagiotis Roumeliotis was charged as the coordinator of the Royaumont Process. Main target of the coordinator was to provide guidance in terms of Dayton to be operative.

However, the process could not be effective in the region. It did not have enough capability in terms of mechanisms which will solve the complex problems of the region. To increase the effectiveness of the process, it was included in the CFSP. And finally, the process was embedded to the Stability Pact.

2.3.1.2. The Regional Approach of the EU

The EU has developed a policy named the Regional Approach towards SEE one year after the initiation of the Royaumont Process. Regional Approach had two basic targets:¹⁴⁴ Political target which includes promotion of democracy and rule of law and economic target which includes restructuring of the economy of the region. We can say that the need for a new policy emerged from the ineffectiveness of the Royaumont Process.

On 26 February 1996, the EU launched the Regional Approach to the countries of SEE. It was emphasized in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council that;

*the regional approach should be directed primarily at those countries of the region for which the European Community has not adopted directives for the negotiation of association agreements.*¹⁴⁵

On 29 April 1997, the Council established political and economic conditions to be fulfilled by these countries, as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy

¹⁴³ Bilman, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ Türkeş, Gökğöz, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁵ Council of the EU. (26 February 1996). *EU General Affairs Council Conclusions*. Available on: 13.02.2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/028a0001.htm.

towards the development of bilateral relations in the field of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation, as well as of contractual relations.¹⁴⁶

Within the framework of Regional Approach, the EU offered Fund for the Reconstruction of Former Yugoslavia (OBNOVA) financial assistance programme, unilateral trade preferences and contractual relations in the form of bilateral cooperation agreements. It was assumed that access to internal market of the EU through these bilateral cooperation agreements would be an incentive for economic reforms and would increase regional cooperation. On the other hand, the development of bilateral relations was tied to strict political and economic conditionality.¹⁴⁷ Those conditions include respect for democratic principles, interethnic reconciliation, refugee returns, human rights, rule of law, and protection of minorities, market economy reforms and regional cooperation. Additionally, country specific conditions were applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), particularly with regard to these countries' co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The development on these specific issues were tried to be followed by the conditionality reports.¹⁴⁸

These were the criteria which were determined for EU accession in Copenhagen summit in 1993. However, for SEE countries these criteria were supplemented with the conditionality principles.¹⁴⁹ The importance of the EU conditionality policy lies in compliance of related countries with the democracy and human rights principles and an active participation in regional cooperation.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Council of the EU. (29 April 1997). *EU General Affairs Council Conclusions*. Available on: 13.02.2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/028a0057.htm.

¹⁴⁷ Özdemir, *op. cit.* p. 38.

¹⁴⁸ European Commission. (2010). Available on: 12.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/sap_en.htm.

¹⁴⁹ Anastasakis, O., Bechev, D. (2003). EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process. *South East European Studies Programme*, European Studies Centre, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. p. 7.

¹⁵⁰ Ilic, G. (2002). EU Stabilization and Association Process and South Eastern Europe. D. Lopandic (Ed.). *Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe: The Effects of Regional Initiatives (Conference Proceedings)*. (pp. 65-72). Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia.

2.3.2. Other Initiatives

Aside from the Initiatives of the European Union, some other initiatives were seen in the period after Dayton. Most important of them are The South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the The South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). Although these initiatives are not the EU directed ones, they still need to be pointed out because of their contribution to the Regional Cooperation process of the WBC.

2.3.2.1. The South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)

The South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was launched by Bulgaria's initiative in 1996. At the meeting in Sofia, the SEE countries laid the foundations for regional cooperation for the purposes of creating an atmosphere of trust, good neighborly relations and stability.

Participating countries are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia.

SEECP operates as a forum for diplomatic and political dialogue. The participating countries are open to cooperation for the development of the region, for defining common views and for sharing experience.¹⁵¹

A special characteristic of SEECP is that it is an original form of cooperation among the countries in the region launched on their own initiative, and not on the initiative of some other international organization or countries.¹⁵² In that regard, the SEECP seeks to define itself as an authentic voice of SEE.

The basic goals of regional cooperation within SEECP include strengthening stability, security and good-neighborly relations; economic development; humanitarian, social and cultural issues; justice, combat against organized

¹⁵¹ South East European Cooperation Process. Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.rspcsee.org/>.

¹⁵² Turkish presidency of SEECP. (2009). Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.seecp-turkey.org/icerik.php?no=16>.

crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, and terrorism.¹⁵³ It is the intention of the SEECP to enable its members to approach the European and Euro-Atlantic structures (mainly NATO) through the strengthening of good neighborly relations and transformation of the region into an area of peace and stability.

The following cooperation priorities are put forward for the period of 2011-2013:¹⁵⁴

- Economic and Social Development;
- Energy and Infrastructure;
- Justice and Home Affairs;
- Security Cooperation;
- Building Human Capital;
- Parliamentary Cooperation.

2.3.2.2. The South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI)

The South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) was formed in 1996 under the guidance of then, Senior Director for Eastern Europe in the United States National Security Council, Richard Schifter. His initial idea was modeled after the Marshall Plan of 1947 which was used to help rebuild Europe after WW2, and considering that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was coming to a close, he felt stability in the region would be immediately necessary. His initial plan, called the South East European Cooperative Development Initiative, was intended to focus on regional cooperation of the countries in SEE, and not be considered a financial assistance plan. The idea was to allow SEE countries access to resources that would help them rebuild and stabilize, but not to provide them directly with the money. The only assistance provided by outside organizations and countries, like the United States, would be in the form of technical assistance as well as providing experts on relevant subjects. Richard Schifter's hunch in the autumn of 1995 was realized on 14 December, when a

¹⁵³ South East European Cooperation Process. Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.rspcsee.org/>.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

cease-fire was announced and peace negotiations were signed in Dayton. The next step was to get all the countries in the region together and agree to join a cooperation initiative; an extremely difficult task considering the ethnic tension that dominates the regional culture.¹⁵⁵

Member countries of SECI are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey.

SECI accepts itself as a unique initiative which provides operative collaboration rather than political cooperation like the other initiatives offer. SECI operational activities are conducted within the frames of eight Task Forces (TF) addressing issues of drugs and human beings trafficking, stolen vehicles, smuggling and customs fraud, financial and computer crime, terrorism, container security and environmental and nature related crimes.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ South East European Cooperation Initiative. Available on: 12.06.2011, <http://www.secicenter.org>.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN UNION POLICY FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE AFTER 1999

The year 1999 brought Western Balkans again to the top of the international agenda. Although peace was provided in the region, Kosovo War which started in February 1999 showed that the region was still an area of conflicts. It was obvious that the Europe wouldn't be safe and stable unless the Balkans are stable. Rising conflict meant that the initiatives of the EU to provide stability in the region were not effective. The previous unsuccessful status of the EU in terms of bringing peace was also observed in Kosovo War. The developments showed that EU needs a more active new policy towards the SEE countries.¹⁵⁷

The basic change on the policy of the EU was declared in the Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira European Council meeting on June 19-20, 2000:

*The European Council confirms that its objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilization and Association Process, political dialogue, liberalization of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. **All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership.***¹⁵⁸

The WBC were for the first time declared as potential candidates for the EU. It meant the EU was giving the perspective of membership to the WBC in case they fulfill the necessary requirements.

¹⁵⁷ Türkeş, Gökgöz, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁸ Council of the EU. (26 February 1996). *Presidency conclusions of the Santa Maria Da Feira European Council*. Available on: 13.02.2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm.

The Stability Pact for SEE which was launched in 1999 emerged from the above mentioned need for a new approach as the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community.¹⁵⁹

3.1. THE STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Almost immediately after the end of the Kosovo war, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted as an initiative of the EU, in close coordination with the US, and the G8, in Cologne in June 1999.¹⁶⁰ More than 40 countries and organizations were involved in the initiative. At a summit meeting in Sarajevo in July 1999, the Stability Pact was officially launched under the political auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Stability Pact Partners¹⁶¹

- The countries of the region: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia
- The EU Member States and the European Commission
- Other countries: Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, USA
- International organizations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD
- International financial institutions: World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)
- Regional initiatives: Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), South East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI) and South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECOP)

¹⁵⁹ The Stability Pact for South East Europe. (2005). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.

¹⁶⁰ Türkeş, Gökgöz, *op. cit.*

¹⁶¹ The Stability Pact for South East Europe. (2005). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.

Based on experiences of crisis management worldwide, the Stability Pact identified three critical sectors for the long term success of conflict prevention and peace building in SEE: the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, the promotion of economic and social well being, and the creation of a stable security environment.¹⁶²

The Pact worked as a two-way street. To receive support from the international community, the recipient countries must implement appropriate reforms. SEE governments have thus embarked on a range of political and economic reforms: revising constitutions, restructuring local government, dismantling barriers to trade and investment, and fighting corruption and organized crime. In exchange, donors provide coordinate support to the reconstruction process through technical assistance and credits. Financial pledges are linked to concrete strategies and projects.¹⁶³

The basic documents of the Stability Pact explicitly recognized the aspirations of the SEE countries to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This was reinforced by the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, in June 2003, which reaffirmed a clear EU membership perspective for the Western Balkans. Ultimately, this was the key driving force for reform. The Stability Pact, with top-level support from the EU and NATO, had to constantly emphasize that regional cooperation was a key factor in enhancing EU and NATO membership prospects.¹⁶⁴ It was clearly emphasized by the Pact that Regional Cooperation is very essential for the region. The need for Regional Cooperation was given importance within the idea that many political, social, economic and security issues are not limited within the borders of a single country. Common problems such as environment, trade, migration, terrorism and organized crime can only be successfully overcome through regional cooperation.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Bendiek, A. (2004). Europe's Conflict Resolution: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. *Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session Workshop Uppsala: 13-18 April, 2004.* p. 16.

¹⁶³ The Stability Pact for South East Europe. (2005). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Although the Pact couldn't satisfy the great expectations, it caused some positive developments in the region. Undoubtedly, the most important of them is bringing an end to the nationalist governments in Croatia and Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁶ The Pact also brought the target countries and the international actors together on a common platform. By this way it tried to establish a systematic to the cooperation initiative of the international actors.

All programs under the Stability Pact were being implemented by the aids come from the donors. Because these sources were limited, Stability Pact was only able to direct these aids to infrastructure and to the strategic projects which would fasten the reforms.¹⁶⁷ So, private sector had little chance to benefit from these aids.

The possibility of another conflict in the region was also a threat for the external powers. So, EU and other actors tried to minimize the possibility of conflicts in SEE via Stability Pact. However, under the circumstances mentioned above, realization of this aim was very difficult. It was observed in the Macedonia crisis of 2002 that Stability Pact had little power to be effective in a possible conflict.

In 2006 it was announced that in early 2008 the Stability Pact should be succeeded by a more regionally owned cooperation framework, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) formed by the countries of the region themselves, but with continued support and advice from the international community.

3.2. STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS – SAP

The result of the change in the EU policy towards the region was observed in the new tool: Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The new tool has been offering a comprehensive approach to the WBC. The SAP was an attempt to determine the necessary measures that the WBC have to take. A new type of

¹⁶⁶ Anastasakis, Bechev, *op. cit.* p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Spassova, P. (2004). Regional Cooperation in the Balkans as an Essential Step towards EU Membership. *Institute for World Economics*, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, December 2004, No:148. p. 15.

contractual relationship was being developed between the EU and the WBC. The SAP for the WBC was offered in the Operational Conclusions of the Fourth Conditionality Report of 26 May 1999 by the European Commission. This proposal was accepted at the General Affairs Council Meeting on June 21-22, 1999.¹⁶⁸ The EU offered for the first time a prospect of EU integration. This was a historic turning point in the relations between the WBC and the EU. As it was mentioned before this prospect of EU integration was strengthened in 2000 by declaring the Western Balkan states as the potential candidates for the membership of the EU.

In its practical implementation, SAP involves a series of steps:¹⁶⁹

- establishment of a consultative task force,
- the feasibility study on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),
- the beginning, conclusion and finally the ratification of the agreement: The start of negotiations for SAA is conditional on the rule of law, democracy, respect for human and minority rights, free and fair elections, absence of discrimination and implementation of the first steps of economic reform-privatizations, abolition of price controls- and the readiness to adhere to good neighborly relations. The criteria for the conclusion of the negotiations are further: substantial results in political and economic reforms and a stable economic environment.

The next step is the application for membership, launching the candidate country on a similar process ultimately aimed at accession to the EU. At each of the steps of the SAP, progress is made dependent on the fulfillment of conditions determined by the EU. The process is followed by the annual reports of the Commission.

¹⁶⁸ Council of the EU. (21/22 June 1999). *EU General Affairs Council Conclusions*. Available on: 13.06.2011,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/09008.EN9.htm.

¹⁶⁹ Lopandic, L. (2002). Regional Cooperation in SEE - Towards a New Institutional Framework. D. Lopandic (Ed.). *Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe: The Effects of Regional Initiatives (Conference Proceedings)*. (pp. 46-59). Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia.

Basic elements of the SAP can be summarized as follows:¹⁷⁰

- Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA)
- Economic and Financial Assistance: Community Aid for Reconstruction, Development and Stability (CARDS), with a budget of 4,65 billion Euro for the period 2000-2006 to be used for four objectives;
 - reconstruction, democratic reconciliation and the return of refugees;
 - institutional and legislative development
 - sustainable economic and social development
 - Regional cooperation among the SAP countries and with the EU.
- Autonomous trade measures (EU granting free access to its markets)

The EU, started to approach in a more comprehensive way to the region. By giving the membership perspective, the EU aimed to realize two essential objectives for these countries. First, like it was done to CEE countries before, EU aimed to realize necessary transformations these countries need including defeat of possibility of any conflicts. Secondly, the purpose was to prepare them for the possible membership. So, stabilization and integration appears as the two main supplementary concepts of the new policy. These two processes would work separately, but in parallel to themselves.

The SAP has been the framework of EU negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. Basically, it aims:¹⁷¹

- stabilizing the countries and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy
- promoting regional cooperation
- eventual membership of the EU

¹⁷⁰ European Commission. (2010). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/index_en.htm.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Each country moves step by step towards EU membership as it fulfills its commitments in the SAP, as assessed in annual progress reports.

Rather than short term solutions, SAP is a long term project which aims to provide stability of the transformations made by the target countries. The necessary contributions which have to be fulfilled by the countries were determined separately for every single country.

3.2.1. Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA)

The SAA's are regarded as the instruments for the long term integration of Western Balkans into the EU. Moreover it should be emphasized that the agreements are tailor-made.¹⁷² In other words since a new kind of contractual relations would be built with the EU, the agreements have to take into account each country's economic, social and political conditions. It means SAA must have a country specific structure.

There are two phases in SAAs. In the first phase, namely the preparation phase, the countries included in SAP are expected to be prepared for the signing of the SAAs. The second phase is the negotiation and implementation of the reforms by countries included in SAP. It was declared that the EU would initiate SAA negotiations with a country which met relevant conditions, set out in the Council conclusions of April 1997.¹⁷³

3.2.2. Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS)

CARDS was launched in 2000 and implemented up to 2006 to be the financial tool of the SAP. Main function of the programme was to regulate the assistance

¹⁷² Radulovic, M. (2010). Western Balkans and the EU: Where to Go from Here?. Accession of the Western Balkans to the EU: Evaluating a Process, Bourgogne Balkans Association Workshop Series, 2010, Edition:3 (pp. 39-45).

¹⁷³ Elbasani, E. (2008). The Stabilisation and association Process in the Balkans: Overloaded Agenda and Weak Incentives?. EUI Working Paper, European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, No:2008/3. p. 10.

in Western Balkans. The objectives of the CARDS Programme were determined as;

*reconstruction, democratic stabilization, reconciliation and the return of refugees; institutional and legislative development, including harmonization with EU norms and approaches, to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy; sustainable economic and social development, including structural reform; promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation.*¹⁷⁴

CARDS assistance was being managed in a number of ways. The delegations of European Commission in Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina directly managed most national programmes and projects. In former-Serbia and Montenegro and in Macedonia European Agency for Reconstruction which was established in February 2000 delivers the assistance. Initially the focus was on emergency and humanitarian assistance. Later on, it concentrated on rebuilding infrastructure, fostering reconciliation and the return of refugees.

CARDS programme was replaced by Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) after 2007.

3.2.3. Autonomous Trade Measures

By offering autonomous trade measures, the EU has already opened its market to nearly all products originating from the Western Balkan countries. By doing so, the EU has been the region's largest trading partner, with over half of all exports going to the European market. Today more than 80% of all goods from the Western Balkan region enter Europe with no customs restrictions.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ European Commission. (5 December 2000). *Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000*. Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/general/2666_00_en.pdf

¹⁷⁵ European Commission. (2010). Available on: 13.02.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/milestone_en.htm.

3.3. THESSALONIKI SUMMIT

In advance of the Thessaloniki Summit, the Commission prepared a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the Western Balkans. In the Communication the Commission proposes to enrich the EU policy towards the region with the elements taken from the Enlargement process reinforcing the ultimate goal of extending EU membership to the Western Balkans.

In the final declaration of the Thessaloniki Summit which was organized on June 21, 2003, it was emphasized that the WBC would be members of the Union in case they fulfill the necessary conditions. It was emphasized by the Commissioner for External Relations of the EU, Chris Patten:

Thessaloniki will send two important messages to the Western Balkans: The prospect of membership of the EU is real, and we will not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined us. We in the European Commission will do all we can to help you succeed. But membership must be earned. It will take the sheer hard work and applied political will of those in power in the region. How far you proceed along the road towards European Integration, and how fast, will be up to you.¹⁷⁶

The conclusions of the summit were being wondered by the WBC with a high positive expectation. However, it can be said that the conclusions did not satisfy the countries. None of the concrete expectations were met by the Union. First, SAP remained under the Directorate General of Foreign Relations instead of moving to Directorate General of Enlargement as it was expected. The status of the WBC also remained same as potential candidates. Furthermore, although the countries demanded new aid programmes and new financial resources, EU replied only by 200€M increase in the CARDS budget.¹⁷⁷ Finally, accession date of Croatia was not declared as 2007 like Bulgaria and Romania.

On the other hand, Thessaloniki Summit had some gains for the Western Balkan countries. Firstly, despite the other international issues of the date, the

¹⁷⁶ European Commission. (2010). Available on: 13.02.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/milestone_en.htm.

¹⁷⁷ Türkeş, Gökğöz, *op. cit.*

Balkans remained at the top of the EU's agenda. EU also decided to embed new tools to the SAP in order to expedite the integration process. The new tools of the Agenda were explained as follows:¹⁷⁸

European Partnerships: *With this in mind, consideration should be given to introducing European Integration Partnerships for the countries of the Western Balkans. Inspired by the pre-accession process, these partnerships would identify priorities for action in supporting efforts to move closer to the EU. The purpose of these Partnerships would be to identify short and medium-term reforms which the countries need to carry out, to serve as a checklist against which to measure progress, and to provide guidance for assistance under the CARDS programme. They would reflect the particular stage of development of each country and be tailored to its specific needs.*

The priorities of the Partnerships would be based on the Commission's political and strategic priorities in the light of the assessments in the Annual Reports, with due consideration to the Copenhagen accession criteria and to issues particular to the Western Balkans. They would be drawn up following informal consultations with the countries concerned. The Commission would then present a proposal for a Council decision approving each Partnership.

Forum: *The countries of the Western Balkans should be invited to associate themselves with EU declarations, Common Positions and other decisions in the framework of the CFSP. This will reinforce the alignment of priorities and bring them closer to the EU in the political sphere.*

Political dialogue is an important element of the Stabilization and Association Process. As pointed out in the Commission's second Annual Report, many issues are common to the countries of the region or have a cross-border dimension. Political dialogue between the Union and all countries of the region could be developed further. The Summit in Thessaloniki is an important occasion for this. Dialogue should also be developed on a regular basis at other levels.

Twinning: *Twinning has proved to be an effective tool for institution building in the candidate countries and could be equally effective for the SAA countries. Twinning supports the secondment of civil servants from EU Member States to work as advisers to beneficiary institutions. It has been available for institution building in the SAP countries under the CARDS programme since October 2002. Twinning projects have been launched in Albania and Croatia and are under preparation for the rest of the region. Twinning will henceforth be incorporated in the CARDS programme, as a tool for transferring administrative skills to the SAP countries.*

¹⁷⁸ European Commission. (2003). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The Western Balkans and European Integration*. Available on: 13.02.2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=503DC0285.

TAIEX: *The Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) was set up as part of the pre-accession strategy to provide targeted technical assistance to the candidate countries on the acquis. Its services are also suited to the needs of the countries of the Western Balkans. Concrete modalities, including availability of human resources, for this TAIEX assistance are currently under discussion. Monitoring and assessing the countries' legislation will be developed further to ensure conformity with EU standards. The results of this assessment will be included in the Annual Reports and will lead to periodic revisions of the European Integration Partnerships.*

Education: *Considering the need to improve the knowledge and skills of civil service staff in the region, the Commission will encourage the founding of a regional school or institute for Higher Education on Public Administration Reform.*

The Thessaloniki Summit couldn't satisfy the expectations of the WBC. However, with its content, it is a proof that the WBC are still at the top level in the agenda of the EU.

The conclusion of the Thessaloniki Summit was followed by the Commission and the progress on the new tools was assessed by the Communication on the Western Balkans which was launched on 27 January 2006. In this Communication, the EU launched the new financial programme, IPA:

"The new Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which will replace the existing pre-accession instruments and CARDS from 2007 onwards, will cover assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries. It will thus simplify the transition of a country from one status to another, when this is decided by the Council. The instrument's components which finance transition and institution building as well as regional and cross-border cooperation will be open to potential candidate and candidate countries. The remaining three components (financing regional and human resources and rural development) are pre-cursors to the Community structural funds, require a high degree of financial administration capacity adapted to the EU system and are, therefore, reserved for candidate countries. Transition to the status of candidate country will open access to the three 'structural' components of IPA, although this will not automatically mean an increase in the level of support to the country in question."¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ European Commission. (2006). *Communication from the Commission: The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity*. Available on: 13.06.2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=506DC0027.

Since 2007, both candidate countries and potential candidates have received focused EU funding and support through a single channel: the IPA. The total pre-accession funding for the period 2007-2013 is € 11.5 billion.¹⁸⁰

In order to achieve the objectives of each candidate and potential candidate as efficiently as possible, IPA consists of the following five components:¹⁸¹

- **Component I (Transition Assistance and Institution Building)** provides financing for institution-building and associated investments. It supports measures to drive stabilization and the transition to a democratic society and market economy. Component I is open to all candidates and potential candidates and is managed by Directorate-General Enlargement.
- **Component II (Cross-Border Cooperation)** supports cross-border cooperation between candidates and potential candidates and with EU Member States. It may also fund participation in transnational cooperation programmes (under the Structural Funds) and Sea Basin programmes (under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument - ENPI). Component II is open to all candidates and potential candidates and is managed by DG Enlargement and DG Regional Policy.
- **Component III (Regional Development)** finances investments and associated technical assistance in areas such as transport, environment and economic cohesion. It is open to candidate countries only and is managed by Directorate-General Regional Policy.
- **Component IV (Human Resources Development)** aims to strengthen human capital through education and training and to help combat exclusion. It is open to candidate countries only and is managed by Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

¹⁸⁰ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/instrument-pre-accession_en.htm.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

- **Component V (Rural Development)** contributes to sustainable rural development. It provides assistance for the restructuring of agriculture and its adaptation to EU standards in the areas of environmental protection, public health, animal and plant health, animal welfare and occupational safety. It is open to candidate countries only and is managed by Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development.

Assistance through IPA can take the following forms:

- Investment, procurement, contracts or subsidies
- Administrative cooperation, involving experts sent from Member States (e.g. twinning)
- Action by the EU in the interest of the beneficiary country
- Measures to support the implementation process and programme management
- Budget support (granted exceptionally and subject to supervision)

The table here shows a summary by country in million Euros:¹⁸²

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Croatia	141.2	146.0	151.2	154.2	157.2	160,4
Macedonia	58.5	70.2	81.8	92.3	98.7	105,8
Turkey	497.2	538.7	566.4	653.7	781.9	899,5
Albania	61.0	70.7	81.2	93.2	95.0	96,9
Bosnia & Herzegovina	62.1	74.8	89.1	106.0	108.1	110,2
Montenegro	31.4	32.6	33..3	34.0	34.7	35,4
Serbia	189.7	190.9	194.8	198.7	202.7	206,8
Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244)	68.3	124.7	66.1	67.3	68.7	70,0
Multi-Beneficiary Programme	109.0	140.7	160.0	157.7	160.8	164,2

¹⁸² European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/planning-ipa_en.htm.

3.4. CURRENT STATUS OF THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES' RELATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.4.1. EU - Albania Relations

The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the country was signed on 12 June 2006 and entered into force on 1 April 2009. It supersedes the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related aspects, which entered into force in December 2006. The EU-Albania visa facilitation agreement entered into force in January 2008 while the readmission agreement entered into force in 2006.¹⁸³

Timeline of the EU – Albania relations:¹⁸⁴

- 1992: Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Albania. Albania becomes eligible for funding under the PHARE programme.
- 1999: The EU proposes a new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of the region, including Albania.
- 2000: Feira European Council states that all the SAP countries are "potential candidates" for EU membership.
- 2003: On 31 January, the Commission officially launches the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Albania.
- Between 1991 and 2004 the EU allocates a total of 1,273 million euro to Albania, mostly under the PHARE and CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programmes.
- Currently, the EU's main priorities in the country include strengthening public administration and the judiciary; developing police and public order; enhancing the customs service; developing public services and infrastructure; improving the system of education; and strengthening democracy and human rights.

¹⁸³ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁸⁴ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- The SAA is still being negotiated with Tirana. Talks began in January 2003.
- 2004: In June, the Council reaches a decision on the principles of a European Partnership for Albania.
- Dec. 2005: European Council decides on revision of the European Partnership for Albania.
- 12 June 2006: Albania becomes the third Western Balkan state to sign an SAA with the EU.
- Sept. 2007: EU signs visa facilitation agreement with Albania, which entered into force on 1 January 2008.
- June 2008: European Commission presents a roadmap identifying specific requirements for visa liberalisation with Albania.
- 1 April 2009: Entry into force of SAA.
- 28 April 2009: Albania submitted its application for EU membership.
- 14 Oct. 2009: The latest Commission progress report stated that it would return to the country's application once the Albanian election procedure had been completed. Albania needs to make progress, in particular regarding the rule of law and the fight against corruption, as well as the proper functioning of state institutions, especially the independence of the judiciary, the Commission paper says.

3.4.2. EU - Bosnia and Herzegovina Relations

On 16 June 2008 the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the SAA which will enter into force once its ratification process has been completed. An Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues, which was signed on the same day, entered into force on 1 July 2008. The European Commission launched a visa liberalization dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 May 2008. A new European partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted by the

Council on 18 February 2008. On 1 January 2008 the visa facilitation and readmission agreements entered into force.¹⁸⁵

Timeline of the EU – Bosnia-Herzegovina relations:¹⁸⁶

- 1995: The Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement brings the war to an end and establishes the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska.
- 1998: EU declaration establishes the EU/BiH Consultative Task Force (CTF), a joint vehicle for technical and expert advice in the field of administration, the regulatory framework and policies.
- 2000: The EU roadmap sets out 18 essential steps to be undertaken by BiH before work on a feasibility study for the opening of negotiations on an SAA can be begun.
- 2000: Feira European Council states that all the countries covered by the SAP are potential candidates for EU membership.
- 2001: First year of the CARDS assistance programme specifically designed for the SAP countries.
- 2004: In June, the EU decides on a European partnership for BiH.
- 2004: In December, EUFOR replaces SFOR ('Althea' operation).
- Oct. 2005: Commission recommends to Council to open talks on a SAA.
- Nov. 2005: Council gives green light to opening SAA talks with BiH.
- Jan. 2006: SAA talks formally open.
- March 2007: Commission warns that it will not conclude SAA talks unless the country makes progress on reforming its police and cooperates with the UN War Crimes Tribunal.
- July 2007: Miroslav Lajcak is appointed EU High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He left the post on 29 February 2009.
- Dec. 2007: EU initials talks on a SAA, considered a key accord towards future EU accession.

¹⁸⁵ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁸⁶ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- 16 April 2008: Bosnian parliament approves police reform plan, a key EU demand before signing SAA.
- 16 June 2008: The bloc's foreign ministers sign SAA.
- 31 July 2008: BiH and European Commission sign financing agreement for instrument for pre-accession assistance's (IPA) national programme for 2007.
- 26 March 2009: Valentin Inzko becomes new High Representative/EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3.4.3. EU - Croatia Relations

Croatia has been a candidate country for EU membership since June 2004. It was the second country to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 29 October 2001. This agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. On 3 October 2005 the Council decided to open accession negotiations with Croatia. On 12 February 2008 the Council adopted the new Accession Partnership for the country. The status in the accession negotiations is that there are 30 provisionally closed chapters and negotiations have been opened in 33 chapters.¹⁸⁷

Timeline of the EU – Croatia relations:¹⁸⁸

- 1992: EU established diplomatic relations with Zagreb.
- Oct. 2001: Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) signed.
- End 2001: Commission adopted country strategy for Croatia (2002-2006), providing assistance via the CARDS programme.
- 21 Feb. 2003: Croatia submitted its application for EU membership
- June 2004: Council gave a go-ahead to open membership talks.

¹⁸⁷ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁸⁸ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- Dec. 2004: EU said it would open accession talks in spring 2005, provided that the country co-operates fully with the international war crimes tribunal.
- 16 March 2005: EU postponed launch of accession talks, arguing that Zagreb had not met related conditions.
- Oct. 2005: EU formally opened membership talks with Croatia.
- The screening process started in October 2005 and was completed in October 2006.
- The negotiation chapter on science and research was opened and closed in June 2006.
- 29 March 2007: Negotiation chapter on intellectual property law was opened.
- 19 Dec. 2007: 4th EU-Croatia Accession Conference in Brussels opened negotiations on two more chapters: trans-European networks, and financial and budgetary provisions.
- 30 Oct. 2008: 7th meeting of the Accession Conference at deputy level: four negotiation chapters are provisionally closed, leaving the number of chapters open at 21.
- Nov. 2008-Sept. 2009: Croatian negotiation process comes to a halt due to border dispute with Slovenia.
- May 2010: European Commission submits draft negotiating position on accession chapter 23 - judiciary and fundamental rights - to the Council. The EU member states must endorse the position in order for the chapter to be opened

3.4.4. EU - Macedonia Relations

Macedonia was granted candidate country status for EU membership in 2005. On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted the Accession Partnership for the country, thus updating the previous European Partnership of January 2006. A visa facilitation agreement and readmission agreement with the EU has been in force since 1 January 2008. On 15 July the European Commission proposed to

grant visa liberalization to Macedonia. The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the country was signed on 9 April 2001 and entered into force on 1 April 2004. An Interim Agreement, covering trade and trade-related aspects, entered into force in June 2001.¹⁸⁹

Timeline of the EU – Macedonia relations:¹⁹⁰

- 1996: Macedonia, also called former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the insistence of Greece, with which the country still has to resolve a 'name dispute', becomes eligible for EU funding.
- 2000: Council adopts negotiating directives for an SAA under the 1999 SAP.
- 2001: FYROM becomes first country in the region to sign an SAA. It entered into force on 1 April 2004.
- A civil war was fought in first half of 2001 between the government and ethnic Albanian insurgents. It ended thanks to the intervention of NATO. Under the terms of the Ohrid Agreement, negotiated with Western mediation, the government gave greater political power to the Albanian minority.
- 2003: Mission 'Concordia', the first-ever EU military mission, started operations with a six-month mandate.
- 22 March 2004: Macedonia submits application for EU membership.
- Through the CARDS programme, the EU has allocated a budget of 173 million euro to Macedonia for the period 2001-2004.
- April 2005: Commission approves a 34.5 million euro CARDS aid package for Macedonia for 2005.
- 9 Nov. 2005: Commission recommends granting candidate member status to Macedonia.
- 17 Dec. 2005: Council decides to grant candidate status to the country. However, no date is specified for the start of membership talks.

¹⁸⁹ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁹⁰ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- Feb. 2006: Macedonia becomes member of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
- 2 April 2008: At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Macedonia's EU hopes suffer a setback following the country's failure to overcome Greek opposition to Macedonia joining the alliance as long as it does not change its name. Greece thinks the name 'Macedonia' should be reserved for a Northern Greek region.
- May 2008: Commission presents a roadmap setting out a number of benchmarks for visa liberalisation with Macedonia.
- June 2008: French EU Presidency indicated that Macedonia should solve its 'name dispute' with Greece.
- 16 July 2009: European Commission proposes to the Council to lift EU visa requirements for citizens of Macedonia.
- 14 Oct. 2009: European Commission recommends opening accession negotiations. However, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn says Macedonia must strive to develop friendly relations with its neighbours and finally settle its name dispute with Greece.

3.4.5. EU - Montenegro Relations

Montenegro is a candidate country for membership to the EU since 2010. On 15 October 2007 Montenegro signed the SAA and an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues. The latter entered into force on 1 January 2008.

A European partnership with Montenegro was adopted by the Council on 22 January 2007. The Montenegrin government adopted an action plan for its implementation on 17 May 2007. Agreements between the EU and Montenegro on Visa Facilitation and Readmission entered into force on 1 January 2008. On 30 November 2009 the Council decided to lift visa requirements for the citizens

of Montenegro (along with citizens Serbia and the Macedonia) with effect from 19 December 2009.¹⁹¹

Following ratification by all EU member states and Montenegro the SAA entered into force on 1 May 2010.

Timeline of the EU – Montenegro relations:¹⁹²

- 21 May 2006: Referendum on Montenegro's independence from Serbia (55.5% vote for separation of Serbia; 44.5% of voters want to remain with Serbia).
- 3 June 2006: Montenegro's declaration of independence formally adopted by Montenegrin parliament.
- July 2006: Council adopts Commission's mandate for negotiating the SAA, which was concluded in March 2007.
- 13 Nov. 2006, Commission opens negotiations on Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements, which are concluded in November 2007 and enter into force in January 2008.
- 22 Jan. 2007: Council adopts European Partnership for Montenegro.
- 15 Oct. 2007: Signature of SAA, along with an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters (IA), which entered into force on 1 January 2008.
- 19 Oct. 2007: Montenegrin parliament adopts a constitution, largely in line with European standards.
- 6 April 2008: Incumbent pro-European President Filip Vujanovic wins re-election in a vote seen as further affirmation of the country's march towards further EU integration.
- 15 Dec. 2008: Montenegro submits application for EU membership.
- 23 April 2009: Council invites the Commission to submit its opinion on Montenegro's application.

¹⁹¹ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁹² Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- 16 July 2009: Commission proposes to the Council to lift the visa requirement for citizens of Serbia.
- 14 Oct. 2009: Commission progress report states that work on the preparation of the opinion is ongoing, adding that Montenegro will need to demonstrate concrete results on consolidating the rule of law, and particularly on judicial reform and the fight against corruption.
- 17 Dec. 2010: Council confirms Montenegro as a candidate country.

3.4.6. EU - Serbia Relations

On 29 April 2008, the EU and Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). On 19 December 2009, visa liberalization for Serbian citizens travelling to the Schengen area entered into force. At the 14 June 2010 Foreign Affairs Council, Ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their parliaments for ratification. On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted the new European partnership for Serbia which sets out priorities for Serbia's European perspective.¹⁹³

Timeline of the EU – Serbia relations:¹⁹⁴

- In total, combining CARDS (previously OBNOVA), macro-financial and humanitarian assistance, EU funding for Serbia and Montenegro has amounted to more than 2.9 billion euro since 1991.
- In April 2005, Commission approves a 184 million euro CARDS aid package for Serbia and Montenegro for 2005.
- In April 2005, Council calls on the Commission to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement "as soon as possible".
- April 2005: Commission adopts a feasibility report which concludes that Serbia and Montenegro is prepared to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

¹⁹³ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁹⁴ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

- 1 March 2006: Adoption of a special law on the referendum on legal status for the state of Montenegro.
- 3 May 2006: EU suspends further talks on SAA with Serbia due to insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICTY) on the arrest of wanted war criminals, such as former general Ratko Mladic.
- Following the formation of a new pro-democracy government in Serbia on 15 May 2007, the EU concludes visa facilitation and re-admission agreements.
- Nov. 2007: EU initials a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which was ready for signature in February 2008 but had to be delayed due to disagreement within the coalition government whether its signature would imply recognition of Kosovo's drive for independence.
- 17 Feb. 2008: Kosovo declares its independence from Serbia, which immediately declares the act illegal. Violent protests break out in Kosovo. So far, 20 out of 27 EU member states have recognised Kosovo as a sovereign state.
- 9 March 2008: Serbian government collapses over different views regarding the country's further rapprochement to the EU, with the nationalist party of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica ruling out signing the SAA with the EU at all if it refuses to reverse its stance on Kosovo. President Boris Tadic calls for early elections in May.
- 29 April 2008: Just two weeks ahead of the elections, Tadic signs the SAA with the EU, ignoring calls from Kostunica and his nationalist party not to take any steps before a new government is in place. The EU had strongly pushed for the agreement, hoping to give a boost to the pro-European camp.
- Following a tough campaign which even saw President Tadic receive death threats over the signature of the SAA and polls showing the Tadic and Kostunica camps neck-and-neck, pro-EU forces unexpectedly emerged as the clear winners in the 11 May elections. However, they

were not able to govern alone and depended on the Socialist Party of former dictator Slobodan Milosevic to form a government.

- 23 June 2008: Pro-European forces around Tadic's Democratic Party agree to form a government with the Socialists of former dictator Slobodan Milosevic.
- 7 July 2008: Following 11 May parliamentary elections and the formation of a new government, Serbia sets European integration as a key priority.
- 21 July 2008: Serbian authorities arrest Europe's most wanted war criminal Radovan Karadzic and pledge to extradite him to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The step was hailed by EU leaders as a "milestone" on Serbia's road to EU membership.
- Feb. 2009: Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn advises Belgrade not to rush its formal application for EU membership. The main reason for this is that the SAA is yet to enter into force, mainly due to opposition from The Netherlands to giving its green light until war criminals Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić are captured and brought to justice.
- 16 July 2009: European Commission proposes to the Council to lift the visa requirement for Serbian citizens.
- 14 Oct. 2009: Latest Commission progress report praises Belgrade for its "ambitious programme" to join the Union and for possessing the administrative capacity to make "substantial progress towards the EU". Serbia is also asked to demonstrate a more cooperative attitude toward Kosovo's participation in formats of regional cooperation.

3.4.7. Kosovo (under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99)

The EU reiterated in 2008 that Kosovo has a clear European perspective in line with the European perspective of the Western Balkans region.¹⁹⁵

The EU helps ensure the stability of Kosovo through:¹⁹⁶

- EULEX rule of law mission in Kosovo
- Special representative in Kosovo
- Kosovo international civilian office.

Timeline of the EU – Kosovo relations:¹⁹⁷

- 17 Feb. 2008: Kosovo declares its independence from Serbia. Most EU states and the US are quick to recognise the new state, while Serbia and its main ally Russia consider this unilateral step a violation of international law.
- Feb. 2008: EU decides to deploy a rule of law mission to Kosovo, under the title 'EULEX Kosovo'. The motivation behind the launch of EULEX is highly political, with the Union determined to take over post-crisis management in a territory on the European continent.
- 15 June 2008: Kosovo's constitution enters into force.
- 11 July 2008: Commission secures €1.2 billion in financial assistance for Kosovo at an international donors conference held in Brussels.
- 14 Oct. 2009: Commission progress report criticises Kosovo's authorities for recent incidents which resulted in the damage of more than 20 vehicles belonging to EULEX. The report points out that major challenges remain, including the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, the strengthening of administrative capacity, the

¹⁹⁵ European Commission. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Euraktiv. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.euraktiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations-links-dossier-188295>.

protection of the Serb and other minorities, and enhancing dialogue and reconciliation between communities.

3.5. REGIONAL COOPERATION COUNCIL (RCC)

Basically, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is not a EU initiative however, as the successor of the former Stability Pact, a brief information about this new initiative will be given. The RCC is a regional cooperative framework for countries in SEE, with the stated goal of "promoting mutual cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of SEE in order to inspire development in the region to the benefit of its people".¹⁹⁸

The RCC succeeded the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on 27 February 2008. It is the operational side of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and functions as a focal point for cooperation in SEE through a regionally owned and led framework. It also acts as a forum for the continued involvement of the international community engaged in the region.

The importance of the RCC comes from its structure. It is the first initiative which emerged from the region and is also driven by the region itself. It is expected to be the only umbrella organization which coordinates the initiatives targeting the region.

The work of the RCC focuses on five priority areas:¹⁹⁹

- economic and social development
- infrastructure and energy
- justice and home affairs
- security cooperation
- building human capital and parliamentary cooperation

¹⁹⁸ Regional Cooperation Council. (2010). Available on: 13.02.2011, <http://www.rcc.int>.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

The RCC membership consists of 45 countries, organizations and international financial institutions. The organization has a Secretariat based in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by Secretary General Hido Biscevic, who has served since the founding of the Council and was appointed by the foreign ministers of the SEECP in May 2007.²⁰⁰ Apart from the Sarajevo headquarters, the Secretariat has a Liaison Office in Brussels.

The RCC meeting format consists of the Annual Meeting and meetings of the RCC Board, held quarterly. The RCC Board provides operational guidance and supervision to the organization. It comprises of those RCC members contributing to the budget of the RCC Secretariat as well as the EU, represented by the Troika consisting of the EU Presidency, the European Commission and the European Council Secretariat.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 4

EUROPEAN DRIVEN COOPERATION INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In the final declaration of the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), it was specifically emphasized that S&T is also a core part of the EU integration process of Western Balkan countries.²⁰¹ It is also a major cooperation tool for the countries of the region. In terms of regional cooperation, concrete actions and some concrete results can be observed in this field. So, in this chapter, an overview of what is trying to be done in the region in S&T field in terms of regional cooperation will be eliminated. By this way, concrete examples of the regional cooperation initiatives will be emphasized.

On the road to joining the EU, the WBC are striving to meet the standards and objectives that are prerequisites of this membership. The accession to the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) is an important step in this process.²⁰²

Firstly, brief information on the Framework Programmes (FP) which is the basic S&T structure of the EU will be given. Then, the place of WBC in this structure will be pointed out.

4.1. FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES (FP)

EU Framework Programmes is the main instrument to support multilateral research and technology development projects in the EU. Framework Programmes are multiyear programmes which have started in 1984. The allocated budget increases in every programme.

²⁰¹ European Commission. (2010). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm.

²⁰² *Science and Technology in the Western Balkans*. (2008). E. Dall (Ed.). Barrister & Principal. p. 4.

Strengthening scientific and technological infrastructure of Europe, supporting industrial competitiveness and promoting international cooperation among countries can be counted as the main purposes of the Framework Programmes.²⁰³

In the framework of the Lisbon Strategy²⁰⁴, EU targeted to be the most dynamic, competitive and knowledge based economy of the world. 6th (for the years 2002-2006,) and 7th (for the years 2007-2013) Framework Programmes were composed in parallel to this target.

The FP7 which has started in 2007 and will be finalized in 2013 targets to bring all research related EU initiatives under a common umbrella. FP7 was composed to step forward the successful initiatives of the former FP's which tried to establish the European Research Area (ERA)²⁰⁵ and to establish a knowledge based economy and society in Europe. FP7 is playing a key role in order to achieve the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy.

It is important to emphasize that the main precondition for all applications to Framework programmes is cooperation. The initiative targeting WBC must be evaluated within this frame.

²⁰³ TÜBİTAK FP7. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011,

<http://www.fp7.org.tr/home.do;jsessionid=F31C66DB42B7B92CD49BE6A748444008?ot=1&sid=3100>.

²⁰⁴ Lisbon Strategy is accepted by the EU Heads of States and Governments in March 2000, to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010. Some concrete targets were accepted to be implemented by the member states including %3 GERD (Gross Expenditure on R&D). Some of the targets were implemented and some others couldn't be realized. In 2010 the EU launched a new growth strategy for the Union: EU 2020.

²⁰⁵ *"The European Research Area is composed of all research and development activities, programmes and policies in Europe which involve a transnational perspective. Together, they enable researchers, research institutions and businesses to increasingly circulate, compete and co-operate across borders. The aim is to give them access to a Europe-wide open space for knowledge and technologies in which transnational synergies and complementarities are fully exploited. ERA consists of activities, programmes and policies which are designed and operated at all levels: regional, national and European."* (Available on: 13.02.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/understanding/what/what_is_era_en.htm).

Core of FP7 is composed of 4 specific programmes:

- **Cooperation:** The specific programme on 'Cooperation' supports all types of research activities carried out by different research bodies in transnational cooperation and aims to gain or consolidate leadership in key scientific and technology areas.²⁰⁶ The thematic fields of the programme are:
 - Health
 - Food, Agriculture and Biotechnology
 - Information and Communication Technologies
 - Nanotechnology
 - Energy
 - Environment (including climate change)
 - Transportation (including air transportation)
 - Social Sciences
 - Security
 - Space
- **Ideas:** The objective of the specific programme 'Ideas' is to reinforce excellence, dynamism and creativity in European research and improve the attractiveness of Europe for the best researchers from both European and third countries, as well as for industrial research investment, by providing a Europe-wide competitive funding structure, in addition to and not replacing national funding, for 'frontier research' executed by individual teams. Communication and dissemination of research results is an important aspect of this programme.²⁰⁷
- **People:** The 'People' Specific Programme acknowledges that one of the main competitive edges in S&T is the quantity and quality of its human resources. To support the further development and consolidation of the

²⁰⁶ Community Research and Development Information Service. (2009). Available on: 29.03.2011, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/home_en.html.

²⁰⁷ Community Research and Development Information Service. (2009). Available on: 29.03.2011, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ideas/home_en.html.

ERA, this Specific Programme's overall strategic objective is to make Europe more attractive for the best researchers.²⁰⁸

- **Capacities:** The Capacities programme aim to enhance research and innovation capacities throughout Europe and ensure their optimal use. The programme operates in seven broad areas:²⁰⁹
 - Research infrastructures
 - Research for the benefit of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
 - Regions of knowledge and support for regional research-driven clusters
 - Research potential of Convergence Regions
 - Science in society
 - Support to the coherent development of research policies
 - International cooperation

4.2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES IN 7th FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME (INCO)

International Cooperation in FP7 is mainly supported under the Capacities Specific Programme. However, research theme-oriented international cooperation is carried out under the Cooperation Programme and international actions in the area of human potential are supported under the People Programme.

International Cooperation activities of FP7 have three core objectives:²¹⁰

- support European competitiveness through strategic partnerships with non-EU countries in selected fields of science and by engaging the best scientists from such countries to work with and in Europe;

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ Community Research and Development Information Service. (2009). Available on: 29.03.2011, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/capacities/international-cooperation_en.html.

- enhance the production of knowledge and scientific excellence by enabling European universities, research institutions and firms to establish contacts with their partners in such third countries, thereby facilitating access to research environments outside Europe and promoting synergies on a global scale;
- address specific problems that third countries face, or that have a global character, on the basis of mutual interest and mutual benefit.

The Capacities Programme implements horizontal support actions and measures with a focus other than a specific thematic or interdisciplinary area. It also aims to support the coordination of national programmes on international scientific cooperation, and the various international cooperation actions under the different programmes of FP7.²¹¹ Bi-regional coordination of S&T cooperation, bilateral coordination for the enhancement and development of S&T partnerships and supporting the coordination of national policies and activities of EU Member States and Associated Countries²¹² on international S&T cooperation are the main components of this cooperation.

4.3. WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES IN 7th FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

On the way to the membership of the EU, WBC have been trying to make necessary transformations inside their countries to be more integrated with the EU. S&T, as being one of the most important tools to bring these countries together, is also a field of cooperation. European driven cooperation activities can be observed obviously in this field. Of course, final aim of the initiatives is

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² There are levels of participation in FP7. Associated countries are not EU member states. These countries have S&T cooperation agreements that involves contribution to the framework programme budget. All WBC except Kosova are associated to FP7. Namely, the associated countries to FP7 are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Israel, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Macedonia and Turkey.

complete integration of the WBC into the ERA and their active participation in the Framework Programmes.²¹³

Starting point of EU initiative in scientific and technological cooperation is the “EU – WBC Action Plan in Science and Technology” which was launched in 2003. The Action Plan was based on the “Shared vision on EU - WBC Cooperation in Science and Technology”. In this Shared Vision, referring to the Zagreb Summit (2000) and the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), it was pointed out that science, research and technological development are seen to be essential tools for future economic stabilization and growth in the region.²¹⁴ We can see that S&T was given a specific importance. Shared vision also pointed that necessary initiatives should be taken in the following areas:²¹⁵

- research infrastructure;
- the improvement of the Human Potential;
- institution building;
- the promotion of joint Research, Technology and Development (RTD) activities of mutual benefit and regional impact;

These specific areas and the actions which has to be started were detailed in the Action Plan. For example, in terms of joint RTD activities, information and communication technologies and services, energy, environment, agriculture – biotechnology – public health and cultural heritage were determined as the priority areas.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the tools for implementation were offered like meetings (brokerage events) or benefiting from the common programmes like FP, COST²¹⁷ or EUREKA²¹⁸.

²¹³ SEE-ERA.NET Consortium (2007). SEE-ERA.NET White Paper. *Transition Studies Review*, Vol: 14 (No:2).

²¹⁴ EU – Balkan countries Cooperation in Science and Technology – Shared Vision. (2003). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://www.internationales-buero.de/_media/final_document_shared_Vision_.pdf.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ “COST is an intergovernmental framework for European Cooperation in Science and Technology, allowing the coordination of nationally-funded research on a European level. COST contributes to reducing the fragmentation in European research investments and opening the European Research Area

Duration of this Action Plan was determined as three years.

4.3.1. The South East European Era-Net (SEE-ERA.NET)

The SEE-ERA.NET (Further integrating key research institutions from SEE into the ERA) project can be seen as a product of the initiatives which have started by the Action Plan. The project started on September 1, 2004.

SEE-ERA.NET is a networking project aims integrating South East European countries in the ERA by linking research activities within existing national, bilateral and regional RTD programmes.²¹⁹

The project is financed by the European Commission and managed by a consortium of 17 institutions from 14 European countries (Albania, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia).

The objectives of SEE-ERA.NET are,²²⁰

- to enhance research cooperation in Europe by fostering integration of SEE into the growing ERA
- to add value to existing bilateral S&T agreements through multilateral coordination
- to improve interregional research cooperation following the principles of the SAP in SEE

to cooperation worldwide. The goal of COST is to ensure that Europe holds a strong position in the field of scientific and technical research for peaceful purposes, by increasing European cooperation and interaction in this field. This research initiative makes it possible for the various national facilities, institutes, universities and private industry to work jointly on a wide range of Research and Development (R&D) activities.” Available on: 29.03.2011, http://www.cost.esf.org/about_cost).

²¹⁸ *EUREKA is an intergovernmental network launched in 1985, to support market-oriented R&D and innovation projects by industry, research centers and universities across all technological sectors. It is composed of 39 members, including the European Community. With its flexible and decentralized network, EUREKA offers project partners rapid access to skills and expertise across Europe and national public and private funding schemes. Available on: 29.03.2011, <http://www.eurekanetwork.org/faqs>, available on.*

²¹⁹ SEE-ERA.NET. (2009). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.see-era.net/start.html>.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

- to contribute to the EU-Balkan countries Action Plan in Science & Technology adopted at the Thessaloniki Ministerial Conference in 2003.

Within the project, a specific pilot joint call was launched. The aim of this call was to support scientists in determined research areas. Commonly agreed priority areas were:²²¹

- Food, Agriculture and Biotechnology: Sustainable production and management of biological resources from land, forest, and aquatic environments,
- Information and Communication Technologies: Applications Research,
- Environment (including Climate Change): Environmental Technologies.

To provide network with the WBC and integration of those countries a prerequisite for the researchers to submit proposals was determined: Projects shall be conducted by a project consortium with at least three participants from three different countries and at least one of them must be from a Western Balkan country.²²²

Among the submitted proposals, 26 Networking (NP) and Joint Research Projects (RP) in the fields mentioned above 5 Summer Schools were supported under the framework of the Pilot Joint Call of the SEE-ERA.NET Project.²²³

4.3.2. The Regional Programme for Cooperation with South-East Europe (ReP-SEE)

A Joint Action Plan was launched in 2007 basing on the results of the Pilot Joint Call of the SEE-ERA.NET. The Regional Programme for Cooperation with South-East Europe (ReP-SEE) was launched by this Joint Action Plan of SEE-ERA.NET.

²²¹ SEE-ERA.NET. (2009). Available on: 29.03.2011, <http://www.see-era.net/attach/1SEE-ERA.NETPilotJointCall.pdf>.

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ SEE-ERA.NET. (2009). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.see-era.net/pjc/results.html>.

ReP-SEE consists of four key elements:²²⁴

- First pillar: Joint Call for European research projects
- Second pillar: Accompanying Measures in order to facilitate joint research
- Third pillar: Young scientist Programme to foster the individual mobility of young scientists – men and women – between their home institutions and host institutions in the Western Balkan countries
- Fourth pillar: Innovation Programme with the aim of linking SMEs, technology/innovation centers and other innovation structures in the WBC to existing thematic innovation networks/clusters in the EU partner countries.

The programme is open to the Western Balkan Countries, Associated States and interested stakeholders from EU-Member States. The Programme also provides funding for public and private S&T institutions, innovation structures and individual young scientists situated in the participating countries from all over Europe.

SEE-ERA.NET PLUS project is started to be supported in 2009 as an output of the ReP-SEE. The success of the SEE-ERA.NET project needed a continuous action to be taken.

The SEE-ERA.NET PLUS project is the next step for further integrating the WBC and its key research communities into the ERA. This new Project brings more cooperation among the countries of the region. This project is more project oriented and main purpose of this project was to support the joint research projects of the researchers who are from or who deal with the region. A similar procedure with the SEE-ERA.NET was followed however, WBC were given more place in the projects supported: The consortium has to consist of at least two partners from the WBC (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and one from other participating countries

²²⁴ SEE-ERA.NET. (2009). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.see-era.net/pub/news/view?id=21990>.

(Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey). Within the Single Joint Call of SEE-ERA.NET Plus project, 23 joint research projects are being supported.²²⁵

4.3.3. Steering Platform on Research for WBC

By the proposal of the EU Commission the launch of the Steering Platform on Research for the WBC took place in 2006. The Platform was initiated by the European Commission and jointly organized with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in the frame of the Austrian EU Presidency. The platform is the continuous effort of the Action Plan of Thessaloniki.²²⁶

The Platform facilitates the interaction between the Western Balkan Countries, the EU member states, the candidate and potential candidate countries and other states associated to the Framework Programmes for RTD and the European Commission. Its main objective is to support the enhanced integration of the WBC in the ERA. It is a strategic body to deal with European, multilateral and regional issues of S&T policies in and with the WBC. It acts as an information exchange centre, clearing house for joint ideas and activities, and coordination forum for needs, suggestions and proposals of the WBC to the European Commission, the member states, candidate and potential candidate countries and the countries associated to FP7 and vice versa. In this spirit, the Platform continues and intensifies the progress achieved under the EU-Balkan Countries Action Plan on Science and Technology.²²⁷

Depending on the choice of the country holding EU Presidency, the Steering Platform Meeting can be organized in the own country or it can be organized in one of the WBC. Up to now 10 Platform Meetings were held:

²²⁵ SEE-ERA.NET-Plus. (2010). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://plus.see-era.net/pjc/index.html>.

²²⁶ SEE-ERA.NET. (2009). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.see-era.net/pub/news/view?id=4456>.

²²⁷ TÜBİTAK FP7. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.fp7.org.tr/home.do;jsessionid=CD0A24E80005B58F4036E797C6708798?ot=5&rt=1&sid=5051&cid=16168>.

1. Launch Event of the Steering Platform: 26 June 2006, Vienna.
2. 2nd Steering Platform Meeting: 29 March 2007, Berlin.
3. 3rd Steering Platform Meeting: 29 October 2007, Thessaloniki.
4. 4rd Steering Platform Meeting: 13 June 2008, Ljubljana.
5. 5th Steering Platform Meeting: 19 December 2008, Paris
6. 6th Steering Platform Meeting: 28 May 2009, Liblice (Czech Rep.).
7. 7th Steering Platform Meeting: 29 October 2009, Zagreb.
8. 8th Steering Platform Meeting: 24 June 2010, Belgrade.
9. 9th Steering Platform Meeting: 11 November 2010, Becici (Montenegro).
10. 10th Steering Platform Meeting: 26 May 2011 Ohrid.

EU member states, Regional and International Organizations, WBC and other related organizations attend the meetings and try to compose the S&T agenda of the WBC.

4.3.4. The Western Balkan Countries INCO-NET²²⁸ (WBC-INCO.NET)

WBC-INCO.NET started in 2008 as a new tool which emerged by the initiation of the FP7. SEE-ERA.NET was a project which was supported under FP6. This new project started with the core objectives of supporting the bi-regional dialogue between the EU, associated FP7 countries and the WBC and enhancing the participation of WBC researchers in European RTD projects by structural measures.

The consortium includes 26 partners. Participating countries are Austria, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Italy.

²²⁸ *An INCO-NET is a network of high-level institutions-nationally mandated authorities such as government agencies or ministries-aiming to boost science and technology (S&T) cooperation between the EU and different regions of the world. A new type of project which did not exist in past research and technological development framework programmes of the EU, INCO-NETs are an instrument of the FP7 Capacities Specific Programme. INCO-NET projects aim to establish coordination platforms bringing together policy-makers, researchers and various stakeholders of the EU and of third countries from a given target region. Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.caast-net.org/xwiki/bin/view/Main/What+is+an+INCO-NET>.*

*The political dimension at the bi-regional level is closely intertwined with the **Steering Platform on Research for WBC**. WBC-INCO.NET also supports the dialogue within the region and an information exchange with several EC Directorates General and international stakeholders, such as UNESCO or World Bank. The dialogues are substantiated with several analytical inputs. For this purpose, top European and regional S&T analysis institutions participate in WBC-INCO.NET. It is aimed, e.g., to identify research areas of mutual benefit in an inclusive and comprehensive manner. Moreover, WBC-INCO.NET monitors the take-up of identified research areas in forthcoming RTD programmes and the participation of WBC researchers in collaborative FP7 projects. Existing cooperation patterns will be analysed by social network methodologies and barriers of cooperation explored by empirical investigations.²²⁹*

The objectives of WBC-INCO.NET are:²³⁰

- to support the bi-regional dialogue on S&T by benefiting from and interacting with the Steering Platform on Research for the WBC
- to identify RTD potentials and priorities for take-up in FP7 and other European programmes in a transparent and methodologically sound way
- to enhance participation of researchers from the region in European projects of mutual interest and benefit by implementing capacity building measures and accompanying networking activities.
- to analyze innovation needs and barriers to innovation in the WBC, to exchange information and best practices on innovation policies and to prepare an Action Plan for further WBC cooperation in the field of innovation and
- to establish closer cooperation between research and innovation, to strengthen the intersectional dialogue and to support the training of innovation stakeholders.

To realize these objectives, some activities are being held under this project:²³¹

- setting of thematic regional S&T priorities,
- analysis of opportunities to access infrastructure, barriers to cooperation and cooperation patterns,

²²⁹ WBC-INCO.NET. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, http://wbc-inco.net/about/index_en.html.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ *Ibid.*

- analysis of the needs in innovation policy and innovation support and identification of policy measures to improve the framework conditions for innovation,
- organization of training workshops and learning groups (for innovation stakeholders), in addition to brokerage events and awareness raising sessions,
- organization of Innovation Dialogue Fora and establishment of a WBC Innovation Group of Experts,
- support to National Contact Points (NCP) and Research Information Systems and
- publishing of regular newsletters, a journal and the web-based information portal.

The WBC-INCO.NET Project was expected to end at the end of 2011 however, depending on the success of the project, the European Commission decided to provide more support to the project. In this regard, starting from October 2010, the project started to a new phase: WBC-INCO.NET ENHANCED. By the way, this project will be able be supported until the end of 2013.

4.4. OTHER PROJECTS TARGETING THE WBC

In addition to the initiatives in International Cooperation, there are also initiatives in specific thematic fields which specifically target the WBC in FP7. brief information on some of the successful projects in different thematic areas will be given below.

4.4.1. ICT-WEB-PROMS (Promoting ICT Cooperation Opportunities and Policy Dialogue with the Western Balkan Countries)²³²

The project ICT WEB PROMS aims at increasing capacity of stakeholders in the WBC to fully participate in the ERA by creating and supporting strategic partnerships between stakeholders in the EU and the WBC while providing

²³² ICT-WEB-PROMS. (2009). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.ict-web-proms.eu/>.

access to relevant knowledge. By encouraging participation of WBC stakeholders in European ICT research, they will gain access to ICT technologies already developed in the EU, and European stakeholders will be able to introduce their technologies into the West Balkan market, thus strengthening EU competitiveness.

Project Partner Countries: Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo.

4.4.2. WINS-ICT (Western Balkan Countries Inco-Net Support in the field of ICT)²³³

The WINS-ICT project intends to contribute to the Commission's priority to extend future EU-Western Balkan RTD co-operation by promoting WBC involvement in the ICT programme at multiple levels, comprising support to the regional and bi-regional dialogues, capacity building at the regional and national levels, and targeted dissemination strategies.

WINS-ICT ultimate aim is to fully integrate researchers from the region into networks of FP-active EU organizations and enable their related research organizations to submit their own project proposals as coordinating institutions.

Project Partner Countries: Austria, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Turkey, Belgium, Serbia, Romania, Germany, Croatia, Greece, CEI, Albania, UK.

4.4.3. SEERA-EI (South East European Research Area for E-Infrastructures)²³⁴

The South-East European E-Infrastructure initiatives aim to ensure equal participation of the region in European networking and Grid computing trends. Close collaboration of National Research & Education Networks and National Grid Initiatives in the region was crucial in materializing this vision.

²³³ WINS-ICT. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.wins-ict.eu/>.

²³⁴ SEERA-EI. (2011). Available on: 13.06.2011, <http://www.seera-ei.eu/>.

SEERA-EI will reduce fragmentation of national programmes, create a harmonized approach to national-level initiatives in e-infrastructures, ensure local commitment, and pave the way towards common regional vision, strategy and sustainable cooperation which will give the region a common voice on European and international stage and strengthen the ERA as a whole, enabling collaborative high-quality research across a spectrum of scientific fields.

Project Partner Countries: Greece, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey.

4.5. OBSTACLES AND APPROACHES TO THE FUTURE COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

As it is valid for every field, we cannot talk about a totally common policy for all WBC. However, the studies up to now show us that there are some common obstacles to the development of integration in the field of science technology in all of the Western Balkan countries. These obstacles can be counted as:²³⁵

- Low national R&D funding (GERD below 1% of GDP)
- Limited research institutions capacity
- Limited administrative capacity
- Limited involvement in ERA governance structures
- Low level of SME and industry participation to research activities
- Brain drain problem, mobility of researchers need improvement
- FP7 participation relatively low compared to EU Member States and other Associated Countries
- Lack of or less developed integrated research policy / strategy

²³⁵ European Commission. (2011). *Joint Position Paper on the Future RTD Programme in Europe by the EU Enlargement Countries Associated to FP7 – A Product of the Regional Dialogue of WBC-INCO.NET and An Initiative Led by TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey)*. Available on: 13.06.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/research/csfr/pdf/contributions/prior/joint_position_by_enlargement_countries_associated_to_fp7.pdf.

To keep these obstacles in mind, some future objectives are determined by the studies made under the SEE-ERA.NET Project. The objectives can be seen as a guide to the WBC on their way to integration to the EU.²³⁶

First objective is developing policy strategies in the WBC to optimize the potential of S&T cooperation. In this regard, it is recommended that an integrated national Research, Technology, Development and Innovation (RTDI) policy should be set up through the coordination of the various stakeholders, according to the priority setting in the region (such as economy, finance, energy, etc.). It was also emphasized that the WBC should aim EU Barcelona target and the Lisbon Strategy must be the purpose for them like the other European states.

Another point which was proposed for the WBC was strengthening the private sector through public policy measures such as awareness raising, direct subsidies, loans, tax incentives, creation of a favorable legal framework for investment and technological transfer in RTDI, etc.

Protection of intellectual property rights is also given as a priority target for innovation.

In order to provide particular attention to the regional dimension, effective cooperation between the actors (from science and universities to industry and SMEs, from SMEs to capital markets, etc.) is another point to be realized by the WBC. National and regional foresight initiatives should also be considered at the same point. Finally, policy measures should aim attracting foreign investment in RTDI to the WBC as part of the process of stabilization. It is pointed that attractiveness requires scientific strengths and a stable and conducive legal environment for foreign entities.

Secondly, fostering institutional reforms, institution building and S&T infrastructure development in the WBC is also essential for these countries.

²³⁶ Compiled from the SEE-ERA.NET White Paper.

SEE-ERA.NET Consortium (2007). SEE-ERA.NET White Paper. *Transition Studies Review*, Vol: 14 (No:2).

Firstly, to prepare necessary conditions, it is important to evaluate and benchmark existing institutions on a regular basis (research institutions, but also higher education institutions, national EU Contact Points and other institutions). Also, a debate on the establishment of Regional Centers of Excellence should be initiated and it is also advised to establish a joint centre of excellence in 1 or 2 priority areas where all WBC have a strong interest. The mapping of excellence is emphasized as a fundamental issue in the WBC, as it helps to define common areas and to gauge the research and innovation potential of the region's best research centers.

Furthermore, new service structures (e.g., a National Service Agency for International Relations) could foster the contacts with international institutions as well as attracting direct foreign investment. Agencies of this kind would play a leading role in the promotion of RTDI in the Western Balkan countries.

Another important point is capacity building in S&T and innovation indicators and statistics addressed to national statistical institutes should be initiated and fostered. The Instruments of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) should be used in a more efficient manner in order to help the S&T institutions of the WBC to attain EU standards. In meeting the needs of the ERA, updating and improving S&T infrastructure in the WBC so as to optimize the capacity of existing S&T infrastructures should be a central task. Furthermore, scenarios should be developed which provide the scientific community in the WBC with access to European and international S&T infrastructures.

Another important objective is improving human capacity building and international mobility. First of all, it should be commonly acknowledged that encouraging brain circulation is an opportunity for the Western Balkan countries. It is essential that Western Balkan scientists must have chance to move freely within Europe. The host countries should support Western Balkan researchers by simplifying their visa regimes. On the contrary, the WBC should provide an encouraging environment for visiting scientists from Europe and all over the world. In the same target, the "European network of mobility centres –

ERA-MORE” should be extended to the WBC and the opportunities for establishing mobility centers in all WBC should be examined.

On the other hand, location-specific action should be taken to raise awareness throughout the research institutions and universities of the Western Balkan countries. A high level of management skills within the S&T administration should be assured through the development of specific training measures for Western Balkans science managers.

Furthermore, particular training programmes for the staff of the NCP’s for European Programmes should be set up in close cooperation with the established NCP systems in EU Member States. Finally, particular attention should be given to visibility of women in science and research, particularly in managerial positions.

Fostering innovation potential in the WBC through academia-industry relationships is essential to provide sustainable development of the countries. The WBC should provide the exchange of personnel between the academia and private companies by establishing specific national programmes. In parallel, particular measures should be adopted to encourage scientists to build their own innovative businesses and develop their entrepreneurial activity. “Cluster policy” should also be recognized as an important element of national innovation policies. Clusters help to close the gap between business, research, and resources. Wider awareness in the target countries is required with regard to ongoing policy development and to the direction of Community innovation policies.

Keeping in mind the limited capacities of Western Balkan Countries, using the full potential of the EU Framework Programmes on Research and Technological Development for the integration into the ERA must also be an objective for the region. The Instruments of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is an important support for the WBC and in order to increase S&T capacities, it should become a national priority for these countries to harness fully the potential of IPA. The FP7 provides unique opportunities for European S&T cooperation for the WBC.

For those WBC which are associated to the FP7 (all except Kosovo), active participation of the institutions from the target countries should be provided.

Additional bilateral or multilateral funding schemes with coordinated calls should be developed by interested EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries. Even outside the scope of bilateral or multilateral funding schemes, the joint peer review of project proposals is also essential for the WBC to catch the European standards.

Establishing new mechanisms to allow the docking of Western Balkans institutions to established European consortia can be counted as a last objective. Accession of Western Balkan institutions to the currently ongoing projects should be provided by specific arrangements.

CONCLUSION

This study tried to make an evaluation of the Western Balkan Countries' integration to the European Union within the context of the Regional Cooperation policy of the Union. In this regard, as an integral part of the EU integration process of the WBC, the efforts in the field of Science and Technology (S&T) were elaborated.

Some important points of the region's history which made serious contribution to today's policies were given. The historical evolution of the EU policy towards the region and the creation of the policy of Regional Cooperation was also explained.

Starting from the history of the region, it was observed that due to the features of the region and the nations of the region, tension of the region is generally prone to conflicts. This tendency showed itself in concrete measures of conflicts during the history. Up to the end of Yugoslav War in 1995, conflicts in the region could be overcome by the other initiatives which tried to bring peace by negative means. It means peace was brought to the region by force. However, the policies which were implemented by the EU after the war were different from the former ones by its positive character. The aim of the policies was referring to a higher objective than terminating the conflicts in the region. The ultimate aim of these policies was integration of the WBC to the EU by strengthening Regional Cooperation in the region and providing peace and stability environment in a more sustainable way. The resemblance between the EU's own history and the history of WBC made the EU to implement policies enforcing WBC to increase cooperation among them.

From the perspective of the newly emerged countries of the continent, the only way to provide rapid developments was being integrated into the EU. It can be assumed that the destruction of the war also pushed these countries to increase cooperation with the EU. On the other hand, the EU showed a close interest in

the region because it was obvious that continuity of the conflicts in the Western Balkans was also a threat for the Union. Any conflict would eventually spring into the EU. Peace and stability in the Western Balkans meant peace and stability in the EU.

It was observed that the policies of the EU were developed parallel to the developments in the region. During the wartime, main target was ending the conflict and providing ceasefire. After the Dayton Agreement, the policies started to be implemented for guaranteeing the conditions brought by the Agreement.

Recent history of the region suspended the WBC from behaving jointly towards a common target. The expectations from the EU were high in terms of providing sustainable peace and stability environment in the region. The EU was supposed to bring a comprehensive approach to the countries of the region. It can be argued that although the expectation from the EU was very high, more comprehensive and effective policies started to be served after 1999. The expectations were not satisfied until the EU launched the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999. Soon after the presentation of the SAP, the EU gave the EU membership perspective to the WBC. After these developments, concrete results in terms of Regional Cooperation came true.

Closer regional cooperation must be promoted primarily in the interest of the WBC countries themselves, but also in the interest of all Europe. For WBC, there are no alternatives but to intensify regional cooperation and to facilitate future integration with the EU. On the other hand, the EU has shown its interest to support these countries in by giving them the perspective of membership to the EU. WBC are expected to realize Regional Cooperation at the highest level in all fields.

S&T, as one of the most important contributor to the development of the WBC, is also a field to realize cooperation. Like any other field, the war caused serious damage on the S&T infrastructure of the region. Furthermore, the economic development of the WBC does not allow them to provide adequate resources in

this field. So, the WBC are obligate to cooperate with the EU in this field and benefit from the support mechanisms of the EU. On the other hand, *sui generis* characteristics of S&T make it more possible for WBC to build cooperation. This structure of the S&T makes it possible to realize successful attempts in terms of Regional Cooperation.

It was obviously mentioned in the conclusions of the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit (2003) that S&T is an integral part of the EU integrations process. Concrete cooperation actions came in the field of S&T after this summit. From 2003 to the current date, the actions targeting the region are being implemented in a continuous way. The Framework Programmes as the basic S&T Programme of the EU, provide the environment for cooperation activities. It was observed that the projects targeting to increase the cooperation among the WBC have been implemented in a continuous way. As pointed above, the cooperation projects also paved the way for the thematic projects targeting the common needs of the region.

As a last comment, the WBC are the last countries of the EU enlargement process. They have to realize sustainable peace and stability in order to get membership of the EU. Main target of the Regional Cooperation Process of the EU is to support the WBC in providing this peace and stability environment. It is obvious that the EU gives a real support to the WBC by committing membership to these countries. Today, Croatia is expected to be a member of the EU in a very short time. Montenegro and Macedonia are also candidate countries. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania are also following strong policies to be more integrated with the EU. Making these countries to proceed towards a common target is independently a success of the EU. S&T will remain to hold its place as an important supportive of this target.

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