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Presupposition and Text Organization

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

BATI DİLLERİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI

Presupozisyon ve Metin Yapısı

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YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

DANIŞMAN

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ SAVUNMA SINAV TUTANAĞI



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Arkan Adnan Hamdy HAMDY
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ÖZET

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Bu çalışma söylevde uyumun sürdürülmesinin önemini ele almaktadır. Önvarsayım dil teorisinde önemli bir yere sahip olmasına rağmen sistematik olarak ele alınmamıştır. Önvarsayım 20 yüzyılın ikinci yarısında ciddi bir şekilde ele alınmaya başlanmıştır. Önvarsayım ciddi olarak ele alınmaya başlandıktan sonra konteks duyarlılığının çok önemli bir unsuru olmuştur. Önvarsayım zamanı ve enerjiyi etkin kullanmada çok etkin bir araçtır. Bu çalışmada iletişim açısından önvarsayımların etkinliği cümle çözümlemeleriyle ele alınmıştır. Önvarsayım türleri verilmiştir. Metin organizasyonunda çok önemli olan önvarsayımların potansiyel gücü ortaya konulmuştur. Cümle organizasyonunda uyum önvarsayımlar ışığında incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma İngilizce metinlerde kelime bağlamındaki önvarsayımların çok önemli olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Bir metnin ekonomik ve etkin oluşturulmasında önvarsayımlar ve metin organizasyonunun ne kadar önemli olduğunu da ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Önvarsayım, Anlamsal Önvarsayım, Pragmatik Önvarsayım, Metin Organizasyonu, İma, Kıyas

ABSTRACT

Presupposition and Text Organization

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyinağa RZAYEV

This thesis studies presupposition as an important device for the maintenance of coherence in discourse. Though central to the theory of language, the phenomenon of presupposition did not become the subject of systematic study till the second half of the twentieth century. When it did, it quickly became one of the wedges that helped to prise open the hitherto intractable mysteries of context-sensitivity in language. Moreover, it is one of powerful devices for the saving (economizing) of time and energy. In this study, we'll investigate how presuppositional potential of sentences plays essential role in developmental aspect of communication. Types of presuppositions with their varying functions in text organization are among the major goal of the research. The textual communication helps to build ground depending on the assumption that all ideas are hanged together (coherence). Result indicates that English texts rely heavily on existential and lexical presuppositions as well as lexical and personal reference cohesion which contribute effectively in economoizing the text as well as estblishing its continuity.

Keywords: presupposition, semantic presupposition, pragmatic presupposition, text organization, implicature, entailment, syllogism.

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List of Symbols

Symbols

$\exists$	existential quantifier means “there exists”
x / y	propositions
$\wedge$	conjunction (and)
$\rightarrow$	conditional (if/then)
$\forall$	universal quantifier means “for all”,
$\neg / \sim$	negation (not)
$\models$	entails
$\sim \models$	doesn't entail
$>>$	presupposes
$\sim >>$	doesn't presuppose
$+>$	con conversationally implicates
$\sim +>$	doesn't conversationally implicate
$+>>$	conventionally implicates
$\sim +>>$	doesn't conventionally implicate
$< >$	there is deleted information
$=$	Identical with

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Introduction

1. The Aim and The Goals

The paper studies presupposition as an important device for both creating and maintenance of coherence in discourse. Though central to the theory of language, the phenomenon of presupposition did not become the subject of systematic study till the second half of the twentieth century. When it did, it quickly became one of the wedges that helped to prise open the hitherto intractable mysteries of context-sensitivity in language. Moreover, it is one of the powerful devices for the saving (economising) of time and energy.

There are two kinds of presupposition, according to Keenan (1971), logical (semantic) presupposition and pragmatic (speaker's) presupposition. In semantic presupposition, the presupposition concentrates on the literal meaning of the sentences. On the other hand, pragmatic presupposition concentrates on the non-literal meaning of the sentence, i.e., "a relation between the utterance of a sentence and the context in which it is uttered".

The aim of the study is to show how presuppositional potential of sentences plays an essential role in the developmental aspect of communication. Types of presuppositions with their varying functions in text organization are the major goal of the research. The textual communication helps to build ground depending on the assumption that all ideas are hanged together (coherence).

2. The Scope / Limitation

In this study, presupposition is viewed in the context of (a) its interrelationship with other types of inference-implicature, entailment and syllogism, (b) its contribution to text organization in English.

3. Methodology / Methods / Techniques

In this study, we use the so-called critical analysis (in its broadest sense) in combination with the elements of logic which enable us to benefit from some techniques of pre-suppositional analysis in establishing the boundary line between "given/new" information polarities. To achieve the best results, the explanatory method was used.

4. Structure of The Study

This study consists of three chapters: the first chapter introduces the history of presupposition showing the scholar's theories in philosophy, logic and linguistics. Moreover, it proposes presupposition as one type of inference alongside with implicature, entailment, and syllogism, and show the comparison between them. The second chapter, in turn, divides into two parts: the first part presents the types of presupposition which identifies semantic, pragmatic, functional, and conditionalized one while the second part talks about presupposition referring to the past, present, and future tense. The third, final, chapter is divided into three main titles: the first deals with interplaying of presupposition with proposition, the second show the role of presupposition in text organization and the third shades light on presupposition and given-new information.

5. Implication and Perspectives

The conclusion part consists in the generalized findings of the study, whereas the pedagogical implications suggest how presupposition in English can improve the process of teaching. The perspectives indicate further potential of the study in the examined part, the main emphasis being made on (a) the presupposition in English and (b) the role of presupposition in text organization.

Chapter One

History of Presupposition

1.1 Presupposition in Logic and Philosophy

1.1.1 in Philosophy

Now a days and during a long history, many philosophers refuse(d) different accounts of philosophical foundation for many reasons. One of these reasons is/was to develop a persuasive account of foundational commitment, but all their efforts ended in complete failure. So some philosophers and scholars relinquished the search for foundations. Smith, for instance, (2003: 8-9) indicated how and why foundationalism could hardly be neglected by saying that everyone can realize that the sense of the cosmos has been shaken by an encyclopedic skepticism. The obvious proof of this is the collapse of what historically has been philosophy's central discipline: "objective metaphysics, the attempt to discover what reality consists of and the most general principles which describe the way its parts are related..." That trend has been away from faith is the feasibility of such undertakings. And throughout philosophy as a whole, this is a revolutionary development. For twenty-five hundred years philosophers have argued over which metaphysical system is true. For them to agree that none is, is a new departure".

Philosophers who preceded Socrates were interested in the essential reasons which point us to the world or the framework of the world. Socrates preferred the conversational method in encouraging people to question everything while Plato indicated the necessity of being committed to the reality of the form. Plato's doctrine of the form was attacked by Aristotle who defined mind as " the part of the soul by which it knows and understands", while Hellenistic philosophers supported Plato's doctrine and considered it essential in both the "Diving Mind" and in "human minds". Augustine referred to a Diving Light that reveals the necessity of commitments inside the soul. Hume's left a great concept and principles which couldn't be ignored. Kant stated the importance of prior presupposition of experience and knowledge (Macomber,1967: 20). Husserl showed

interest to the "prior transcendental phenomenology" which defines basic concepts. Russell preferred to use the type of analysis to discover "logical atoms". Wittgenstein argued that the essential structure of the facts indicates more or less the fundamental structure of the world. (Holtzman, 1997:2)

Some philosophers claim that there was no concern on the nature of presupposition, e.g., Cooper (1974:7) says "I think it is fair to say that no adequate account of presupposition has been given by logicians or philosophers, even for their own purposes.". And Sosa (1986:87) having found a convincing account of how empirical knowledge relies on presupposition, argues that there is inadmissible ambiguity in the notion of presupposition and adds some questions asking about whether they are necessarily explicit or implicit beliefs related to the subject. Collingwood (1940:23) confirmed that logicians are interested in some types of connections between thoughts, not caring of any others. One of these phenomena is presupposition on which the theory of metaphysics depends and which remained in unsatisfying condition. Robert agrees with Collingwood that philosophy has always neglected the presupposition and suggests that the philosophers reexamine it. "Philosophy today lacks, yet must develop, a methodology for the criticism of its ultimate notions if its progress is not to suffer permanent arrest.... In short, it is time that we looked to the nature of presupposition."

Unfortunately, philosophers who worked on presuppositions tried to differentiate them from the angle of telling; propriety-conditions; meaning-condition; truth-value conditions; existence-conditions while some even didn't admit its existence. Some other philosophers identified presuppositions with entailment; considering unique logical relation; ontological relation; premises; pragmatic relations, etc. (Holtzman, 1997:6)

Sandywell (2011: 484) states that the first philosopher in the English-speaking world dealing with presuppositions seriously and making the problem explicit is R.G. Collingwood (1889–1943) who in turn refers to 'relative presuppositions' as cultural suppositions widely applied in everyday experience and 'absolute presuppositions' essential in framing the reality.

1.1.2. What is logic? Why is it important?

The term refers to logic as a science in which a reasonable conclusion could be developed depending on the given idea. In other words, it studies the general nature of reasoning and differentiates the acceptable from unacceptable beliefs, truth from falsity (Fonseca, 2003:1). “Logic” is Greek word which can be interpreted as discourse, reason, sentence, and rule. It is established as a formal field by Aristotle who elevated it to be a branch of philosophy. Aristotelian logic became widely accepted in science, mathematics and remained in wide use in the West until the early 19th century and since the so-called hypothetical syllogism, temporal modal logic, and inductive logic, as well as corresponding terms such as predicables, syllogisms and propositions were introduced. The main efforts of the Medieval age concerned the compatibility of the Aristotle’s ideas to Christianity (Lyons, 1981: 238)

The syllogism is now taught in undergraduate philosophy departments in terms of the last development of Aristotle’s ideas, which were reformed at the hands of Medieval and modern logicians. Here, we concentrate on Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism (Groarke, 2016: n.p.).

Syllogism, as a relation to its logical form, is an argument which consists of three categorical propositions, two of them premises which specify the proof, and a conclusion which, logically, holds from the premises. These propositions are consisted of three terms a *subject term*, a *predicate term*, and a *middle term*. The subject one is the (grammatical) subject of the conclusion; the predicate term adjusts the subject in the conclusion, and the middle term connects the subject and predicate terms in the premises. The subject and predicate terms appear in different premises while the middle term has only once in each premise. The place of the predicate and the middle terms is named as *major premise* and the place of the subject and the middle terms is named *minor premise*. Since syllogisms rely on the accurate order of terms, syllogistic logic is sometimes referred to as logic (Groarke, 2016: n.p.). For example:

- (1) All men are mortal
- Socrates is a man
- Therefore, Socrates is mortal

Seuren (2010: 1) refers to the importance of logic and its role in the language studying by saying that (i) there is a similarity between the syntactical forms of different predicate-logic systems and semantic analyses that lie behind the sentences. The semantic analysis-syntax has confirmed special device in natural language to put a general theory of syntax of exceptional clarifying ability. (ii) the formal concept of consistency has effectiveness and necessity for the semantic feature of human linguistic interaction, not only of single sentences but also of text and discourse. Since the presupposition is the anchoring device which makes a discourse coherent, so presuppositional logic is absolutely necessary for natural language semantics.

1.1.3. Presuppositional Logic

Seuren (2010: 312) adopts the idea that presupposition constitutes a threat to Aristotle's principle which is called Principle of the Excluded Third (PET) (if there are two conflicting assumptions, one of them is true and the other is false) from his older contemporary Eubulides of Miletus whose work was a teacher of philosophy at Megara. Eubulides was well known in his personal dispute with Aristotle in the four paradoxes: The Liar, the Sorites, the Electra, and the Horned Man. No one understood their importance in the logic until the twentieth century when Russell and mathematical logicians discovered the Liar again. But, unfortunately, the historians of logic had lost the connection with the modern mathematical logic and thus they failed to renew the Liar paradox.

Kneale and Kneale (1962:114-15) state that "Megarian study of the paradoxes" is not mere intransigence, it is an earnest issue and Eubulides had been "trying to illustrate some theses of Megarian philosophy". They indicate that the programme of twentieth century semantics includes "the problems of vague predicates (Sorites), intentional contexts (Electra), and presuppositions (Horned Man). So the important paradox of Eubulides is the Horned Man. It is mentioned as:

- (2) What you have not lost you still have. But you have not lost your horns.
So you still have your horns.

(Kneale and Kneale, 1962:114)

Seuren (2010: 314) states that this paradox relies on presupposition. If we refer to the statement "You have lost your horns" as B and A for the statement "you had horns", B presupposes A, since there is indication that the predicate "have lost" has a precondition that losing something means that it was possessed. Eubulides indicates tacitly to presuppositional entailments assuming (similar to Strawson's view) that they are preserved under negation: $B \vdash A$ and $\text{NOT}(B) \vdash A$ in which A would be logically necessary truth. What is against Aristotle's viewpoint in spite of Aristotle not being able to illustrate the Eubulides' mistake by saying that it is silly (*átopa*), there is a blemish in the paradox because of assuming entailment in the first premise' 'What you have not lost you still have". This premise shows that one who has nothing can give nothing. We can say that "Eubulides' Paradox of the Horns was related to the phenomena of presuppositions, but Eubulides himself was unaware of that fact" (Seuren 2010: 314).

There was not outspoken indication to the phenomena of presupposition until 1892 when Frege said:

"If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound proper names used have a reference. If one therefore asserts 'Kepler died in misery' there is a presupposition that the name 'Kepler' designates something."

(Levinson, 1983: 169)

In (1950, 1952, 1954) Strawson follows in Frege's footsteps concerning the existential presuppositions and with precisely logical view. Frege shared the Strawson view, but from a different angle. In the example below

(3) The unicorn ran for its life.

There is no referent in the real world for the subject although the existence of this referent is presupposed in terms of the verb "run" which makes it impossible to check the truth of this example because there is no existing subject (unicorn), and hence there is no way to check it whether it actually ran or not (Seuren 2010: 316).

This posed a great problem for standard logic and the two theories developed by Russell and Frege-Strawson look to solve this problem.

1.1.3.1 Russell's Theory

The main connection between Frege and the world of spoken English was Bertrand Russell in his article "On Denoting" (1905). Frege and Russell were a specialist in mathematics concentrating on the basis of mathematics, but Russell, unlike Frege, studied the sense with other philosophers trying to show that some terms are expressive and they are meaningful in virtue of direct reference. These expressions are complex and aim to pick out a certain referent by providing a description. For instance, "the President of the USA," or "the tallest person in this room right now". In the example below, Russell analysed it as "there is an individual x such that x is now king of France and x is bald, and for all individuals y , if y is now king of France, y is identical with x " (Wolf, 2015).

- (4) (a) The present King of France is bald.
(b) $\exists x [\text{KoF}(x) \wedge \text{Bald}(x) \wedge \forall y [\text{KoF}(y) \rightarrow x=y]]$

Instead of ancient subject-predicate analysis, Russell used definite description (the present king of France) because it doesn't represent the logical analysis of the sentence, but dissolved into quantifiers and propositional functions. Then he formed the negation of the sentence above as

- (5) $\exists x [\text{KoF}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Bald}(x) \wedge \forall y [\text{KoF}(y) \rightarrow x=y]]$

This analysis was adopted by logicians and philosophers of language and called Russell's Theory of Descriptions. The singularity clause in " $\forall y [\text{KoF}(y) \rightarrow x=y]$ " indicates that there is only one King of France which is expressed by the definite article. But the definite article indicates that there is no claim to the singularity of existence except to discourse-bound uniqueness of reference. Hence, this analysis restricted to definite descriptions and does not include other kinds of presupposition (Seuren, 2006: 591).

Another objection is that presupposition could be cancelled if there is a separated word in construction with a finite verb. So the sentence like "Not only Sam jumped" keeps presupposition because of "Only". In addition, the sentence that start with that-clause maintains the presupposition even though the negation is built with the finite verb (ibid: 591). For example:

- (6) That Sam left astonished Natalia. >> Sam left.

(7) That Sam left did not astonish Natalia. >> Sam left.

As well for cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences:

(8) It was Sam Who left / the person who left was Sam >> someone left.

(9) It wasn't Sam Who left / the person who left wasn't Sam >> someone left.

The sentences

(10) (a) All philosophers are mortal

>>There exist philosophers.

(b) Not all philosophers are mortal

>>There exist philosophers.

Show that, according to standard Predicate Calculus, the sentence (a) doesn't entail (and hence cannot presuppose) that there exist philosophers, while (b) entails because 'not all F is G' equals 'some F is not G,' and thus entails the existence of at least one F (Ostertag, 2006:152).

Some philosophers tried to change Russell's analysis into:

(11) $\exists x [KoF(x)] \wedge Bald(he)$

Which means that 'there is a king of France, and he is bald'. This indicates that he is an anaphoric pronoun (not bound variable). This analysis (according to Kamp, 1981; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) can be applied to all categories of presupposition. "A sentence B_A is now analysed as A and B_A , and Not (B_A), though normally analysed as A and Not (B_A) with a small scope not, can also, forced by discourse conditions, be analysed as Not (A and B_A), with a large scope not". This analysis of presupposition is called the Conjunction Analysis.

However, the Conjunction analysis cannot show reason for the fact that the sentence(a) is coherent while the sentence(b) is not:

(12) (a) There is a bird and it is yellow, and there is a bird and it is not yellow.

(b) !!There is a bird and it is yellow and it is not yellow.

The sentence (a) indicates that there are two birds because of repetition "*there is a bird*" while the sentence (b) refers only to one bird. And thus Conjunction Analysis cannot

differentiate between these sentences because the repetition of “*there is a bird*” does not provide any logical or semantic difference (Seuren, 2010: 321)

1.1.3.2 Frege-Strawson’s Theory

In 1950, Strawson argued against Russell’s theory by saying that Russell combines sentences and uses sentences. This combining occurs between sentences and utterances where only utterances refer to propositions. According to Strawson, the sentence “The King of France is bald” doesn’t denote proposition and hence it is neither true nor false. However, when this sentence is uttered in context, the utterance created from the sentence-context denotes proposition which is either true or false. If this sentence referred to the 19th century when France was ruled by a King, the utterance would carry a proposition. This proposition would be true iff it consorts to the outside world. But if the sentence is uttered now, when there is no King of France, the proposition that the utterance creates is neither true nor false, hence we cannot talk about its truth-conditions (Beaver and Geurts, 2014). In this sense, there are two definitions:

The first definition: “One sentence presupposes another iff whenever the first is true or false, the second is true.” This definition belongs to Frege (1892) and

The second definition: “One sentence presupposes another iff whenever the first sentence is true, the second is true, and whenever the negation of the first sentence is true, the second sentence is true” (Beaver and Geurts, 2014). Which indicates that negation is presupposition-preserving? Strawson’s definition of presupposition is strictly logical (Seuren, 2010: 326):

$$(13) B \gg A =_{\text{Def}} B \models A \text{ and } \text{Not}(B) \models A.$$

Wilson (1975) and Boër and Lycan (1976) criticize Strawson, offering examples of presupposition-cancelling under negation: the sentences from (a-c) are coherent, though they require some sort of emphatic, discourse-correcting accent, normally both on NOT and on the finite verb of the correcting sentence:

- (14) (a) The present king of France is NOT bald: there is no king of France!

- (b) Natalia has NOT forgotten that Sam is her student: Sam isn't her student!
- (c) Smith is NOT divorced: he never married!

1.2 Presupposition in Linguistics.

In linguistics, we differentiate the sentences that are well-formed like "The president of Germany is kind" from those which are not "The sand grows" (Macagno, 2015: 468). Dilts (1998:1) states that linguistic presupposition happens when particular information or relations are accepted as true to convey the meaning of the statement. For example:

(15) As soon as you stop trying to sabotage our therapeutic efforts, we'll be able to make more progress.

This example presupposes that someone who the statement is indicated to has been attempting to sabotage the therapeutic attempts efforts, As well as there is an assumption that there are a curative efforts and kind of progress has been fulfilled.

According to Soames (2009:75), there are three approaches to the presupposition: The first one is about theories of logical presupposition which are inferred from Frege's work. In this theory, presupposition is a relation between propositions "A proposition *P* logically presupposes a proposition *Q* iff for all possible circumstances *w*, if *P* is true or false in *w*, then *Q* is true in *w*." For example:

(16) The queen of England is (isn't) popular. >> England has a (unique) queen

According to Frege (1892), the proposition can be divided into two parts: the first part is the sense of the subject and the second one is the sense of predicate.

The second approach is inferred from Peter Stawson and consists of theories of what might be called "expressive presupposition". These theories adopted the idea that presupposition is a relation between the sentence or a use of a sentence and the proposition, i.e., "A sentence (or use of a sentence) *S* can be said to expressively

presuppose a proposition *P* iff the truth of *P* is a necessary condition for *S* (or a use of *S*) to express a proposition.” (Soames, 2009:75)

The third one is composed of pragmatic presupposition introduced by Robert Stalnaker (1973: 452). In this approach, presuppositions are requirements that sentences, or utterance of sentences, depend on background supposition constructed by conversational participants. In this sense, the source of pragmatic presuppositions differs from one state to another, such as logical presuppositions, expressive presuppositions, conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures. So theories of presuppositions are not confined to pragmatic or semantic, but need the coordination of their information (Soames, 2009: 81).

1.2. Semantic Presupposition

During the 1970s, semanticists define presupposition as a logical concept tied up with truth-conditional semantics. Truth-conditional semantics is an approach to semantics of natural language which studies propositional meaning of sentence and the logical condition for establishing their truth or falsity (Finch, 2000: 184)

According to Lyons (1981:171), formal semantics is a general concept which refers to many approaches to the study of meaning. This concept is called "truth-conditional semantics" by which the truth of a proposition can be distinguished from the truth-condition of a sentence. Propositions can be asserted and denied; they can be known, doubted or believed and they have constancy under negation, paraphrase and translation. Therefore, truth or falsity of a proposition, unlike sentence, depends on its truth-value. For example:

(17) My friend has just arrived

Truth and falsity of this sentence are subject to a number of factors like time, place and persons. Therefore, the sentence could be decided as true or false, not by truth-value, but, by truth condition. This truth-condition decides truth value of propositions by sentences when they are used to make statements. This means that the truth of the statement is related to the world in which proposition is conveyed (Lyons, 1981:171).

Semantic competence is an ability of interlocutor to make a decision about properties like “synonymy, redundancy, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomaly...etc.” (Cresswell, 1988:12). There is a relation between the language and the world. Accordingly, if you want to know the truth and falsity of sentence, you should be familiar about the situation under which the sentence is said (Cresswell, 1988:113). For example:

(18) Sam is a footballer.

The speaker decides this sentence to be true in the case that ‘Sam is a footballer’ and false in case that ‘Sam is not (Lyons, 1988:13). In the same sense, Wardhaugh (1976:176) states that semantic presupposition is related to the world in which the sentence is said to decide whether the sentence is acceptable or not.

Frege (1892) states that any assertive sentences should have a presupposition. He discusses "if anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that any simple or compound proper names used have a reference. If one therefore asserts ‘Kepler died in misery’, there is a presupposition that the name ‘Kepler’ designates something". So, the understanding of the name ‘Kepler’ as designating something, is just a presupposition of the assertion that ‘Kepler died in misery’. A sentence or an assertion to be true or false, its presupposition must be true or satisfied (Levinson, 1983:169-70).

Palmer (1981: 27) indicates that Frege raised a question of how the sentence that lacks the proper referent can be false. For example:

(19) The king of France is wise.

To avoid this problem Frege distinguishes between sense and reference. Sense refers to intra-linguistic relations which hold between the linguistic elements themselves. The reference refers to the relations between the linguistic elements (words, sentences, etc.) and the non-linguistic world of experience. Therefore, sentences keep their meaning or sense even if they lack referents, and thus fail to have a truth-value (Palmer, 1981: 27).

In 1905, Russell disproved Frege's theory of reference by describing it as 'simply wrong' and he came to quite different conclusions. For him, the meaning of the sentence ‘the king of France is wise’ consists of some assertions in which a conjunction of propositions is expressed such as: (i) there is a king of France; (ii) there is only one king of France; (iii) this person is wise. So, the sentence should have these three elements to be

true. If it lacks one of them, it will be false. In other words, the sentence emphasizes that there is a king of France who is wise and if there is no king of France or there is more than one king of France the sentence should be false (Levinson, 1983: 170-171)

In 1950, Strawson suggested a quite different approach. He pointed out that Russell confuses sentences and use of sentences. The confusing of sentences and utterances occurs where only utterances denote propositions. For instance, the sentence below doesn't manifest any proposition, therefore, the sentence is neither true nor false.

(20) The King of France is bald.

When this sentence is uttered in a context, the utterance that is formed from the sentence-context pair manifest proposition and this proposition is either true or false of the world in the given context (see Lyons, 1981; Creswell, 1988; Wardhaugh, 1976). This sentence could be true if and only if it has been uttered in 1675 when France actually had a King. It would match to the then outside world. But if the sentence is uttered now, in 2016, when the France doesn't have a King, the situation is different from 1675. Because the proposition can't be true or false. Therefore, we can't assess its truth-conditions. This leads to another cause to suppose that if the sentence is uttered these days, the proposition will be false. Though the proposition is false, but the negative is true. Then the sentence below is true because it corresponds to the outside world when there is no King of France.

(21) The King of France is not bald.

Finally, Strawson (1950) defined presupposition as a semantic phenomenon because the truth-conditions of one proposition relates to the truth-value of another. Strawson's definition is:

"Let ϕ and ψ be two propositions: ϕ presupposes ψ if and only if ψ is a precondition of the truth or falsity of ϕ . i.e., if ϕ is true or false, then ψ is true."

The Strawson's semantic account of presupposition rests on the linguistic relations. The presence of presupposition triggers which don't effect on the truth and falsity of utterance leads Stalnaker to adopt his vast account of pragmatic presupposition as opposed to the semantic one (Stalnaker, 1973: 452).

1.4. Pragmatic Presupposition

As seen above, the semantic account of presupposition can hardly embrace the contextualized aspects of communication. In this sense, there is something more which could be inferred only due to its relationship with the context in which it is used.

Soames (2009: 86) indicates that Stalnaker (1970), (1974), (1978), (1998), (2002) introduced the term "pragmatic presupposition" in an influential article where he establishes the fact that the context is necessary to infer an utterance considering its truth and falsity. The concept relies on the observation that sentences are used in communication to contribute to an already existing conversational record, which contains a set of common background suppositions built up among conversational participants. In other words, the basic observation is that the communication needs a background of shared information. Pragmatic presuppositions related by the contributors in the conversation are called a common ground. The common ground is described as a set of worlds called the context set. The context set is the set of worlds w such that for all the propositions p in the common ground, p is true in w (Stokke, 2010: 16). Therefore, it is normal for the speakers to develop conventional means by referring what assumptions they are making about the common background to which their utterances contribute. For example:

(17) The cat is on the mat.

(Mey, 1993: 202)

This utterance, regardless whether it is true or false (whether or not there is a certain cat on a certain mat), presupposes that there is a cat and a mat, the speaker is referring to. The context in which the sentence is uttered might be the pragmatic presupposition that the speaker is complaining about the cat's dirtying that mat.

Yule (1996:3) defines pragmatics as:

Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or readers). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves.

Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning. This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. Pragmatics, in this sense, is the study of contextual meaning.

One of the internal components of pragmatics is context. The first shaping of Context Principle (CP) is: "(N)ever to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence"(Morris, 2007 :24). He arises the question " why should we accept (CP)?" and adds that if Context Principle is not accepted, the idea that words convey the meaning will arise and force to look inside the mind to connect the words with something out of language. The backbone of the meaning is the sentence not the words.

The sentence is basic in our understanding of the relation between language and what is outside language: it is only in whole sentences that we get language to engage with the world. But the word is basic in our understanding of the relation between each sentence and the rest of the language to which it belongs. Each sentence means what it does in virtue of its connections with all of the other sentences which can be constructed in the same language; and those connections are embodied in the words which are found in those sentences.

(Morris, 2007: 26)

Portner (2013:157) defines indexical as words whose semantic meanings depend on in a direct way on the context of use like I, you, here, and now. For instance, "I came here before." In this sentence, there are two indexical words, the pronoun "I" indicates to the speaker and the word "here" indicates to the place where the sentence is spoken. There is another term which is called deixis. This term, as Yule (1996:9) defines, is "a technical term (from Greek) for one of the most basic things we do with utterances. It means 'pointing' via language" the meaning of which relies on the context of use. These two terms, deixis and indexicality, are often interchangeable. Deictic expressions depend on the interaction between "speaker and hearer sharing the same context". For instance, "I'll put this here". This sentence could be understood iff Sam was telling Sue that he will put the spare house key in one of the kitchen drawers, but it may need a translation for a person not right there.

When a word or phrase picks up its meaning from some other piece of language nearby, the relationship between the two is called anaphora. A word which gets its meaning in this way is an anaphor, and the piece of language which gives the anaphor its meaning is its antecedent. (Portner, 2013:157)

For instance, " That girl is beautiful. She is playing tennis with John." In this sentence we have some components whose meaning relies upon each other.i.e. the pronoun 'she' is anaphor whose meaning depends on 'that girl' the antecedent. When the anaphor and the antecedent occur in different sentences, this anaphora is called 'discourse anaphora'. "Indexicality and presupposition are aspects of pragmatics which mostly have to do with the relationship between context of use and semantic meaning" (ibid: 157-58). Contextual presuppositions concern the situations of the utterance of a sentence whereas semantic presuppositions concern the circumstances of evaluation of the sentence. Only the sentence which contains deictic words will include contextual presuppositions and the sentences that don't have deictic words will not (Mönnich, 1981:172).

Presupposition, as the other components of pragmatics, "is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions" (Yule, 1996:25). Portner (2013:158) and O'Grady et al. (1997: 271) maintain that reliance presupposition on the speaker's choice of words shows that he/she is choosing for granted. For example:

- (23) a.Nick admitted that the team had lost.
b. Nick said that the team had lost.

Choosing the verb "admit" in the sentence (a) shows that the speaker presupposes the truth of the claim that the team lost while the verb say, in the sentence (b), indicates that the speaker reports Nick's statement without taking part in this utterance (O'Grady et al., 1997: 271).

1.5. Types of Inference: Presupposition, Entailment, Implicature and Aristotle's Syllogism

1.5.1. Implicature

Implicature, as an internal component of pragmatics, was first presented in 1967 in Paul Grice's William James lectures at Harvard, and then appeared in the paper *Logic and Conversation* (Grice 1975) (Brézillon, et al., 2014: 419).

1.5.1.1. Conversational Implicature

The main idea of H. P. Grice's theory of conversational implicature is that the meaning depends on the speaker's intention. When the speaker says something, he/she doesn't mean what words literally convey, i.e., there is a difference between the speaker's meaning and semantic meaning. Grice shows how speaker's meaning can be determined in such cases by presenting a Cooperative Principle in which "speaker's meaning can be calculated on the basis of semantic meaning and the assumption that speakers are behaving rationally and cooperatively" (Portner, 2013:158).

The basic assumption of conversation is that the members should be committed to the cooperative principle and the maxim rules in a conversation (Yule, 1996:40). Martinich (2005: 17) notes that since communication is a co-operative enterprise in which the speaker attempts to get the hearers to understand what he/she has in mind and the hearers do their role to understand the speaker, certain maxims standardly operate. For example:

- (24) John: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese
Smith: Ah, I brought the bread.

The answer of Smith makes John automatically realize that Smith only brought the bread. He didn't bring the cheese. That is, Smith only said that he brought the bread without saying that he didn't bring the cheese to make John assume that he didn't bring the cheese.

According to Yule (1996:37), Grice (1975) divided the cooperative principle into four conversational maxims to show what rationality and cooperativeness are:

1. Maxim of Quality

- Don't say what you believe to be false
- Don't say that for which you lack adequate evidence

For example:

(25) Background: A friend's father considers whether or not to buy your friend a new car, and you are aware that the old car has broken down before.

A : should I buy my son this new sport car?

B improper: I do not know if that is such a good idea, his car runs fine.

B proper : yeah, that sounds like a good idea, his car has broken down before. (Wafa. n.d.)

2. Maxim of Quantity

- Make your contribution as informative as is required
- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

For example:

(26) Background: A man stops his vehicle in the middle of the road to briefly ask you for directions.

A : where is the post office?

B improper : There are two in town, but the closest one is brand new. Down the road, about 50 meters past the second left. Also, you should not stop your car in the middle of the road anymore

B proper : continue on, and make the second left up there. You will see it. (Wafa. n.d.)

3. Maxim of relation

- Be relevant

For example:

(27) A : ugh, I wonder what time it is.....

B improper : it is 6.30

B proper: it is 6.30. So, you have the whole night ahead of you! Have you eaten at Hardy's before? (Wafa. n.d.)

4. Maxim of Manner

Be perspicuous

- Avoid obscurity of expression.
- Avoid ambiguity

For example:

(28) A : can you take out the trash?

B improper: well, it is probable that I would take out the trash more often if someone were not flagrantly wasteful, such that, the majority of trash was not always coming from that person.

B proper: Sure, but we need to talk about how we are assigning the chores around here when I get back. (Wafa. n.d.)

These maxims are no more than *assumptions* which we use to make sense of what speakers say. That is, we assume that speakers use these maxims when they speak and this helps us know what they mean (Portner, 2013:160).

1.5.1.1.1. Properties of Conversational Implicatures

1. Defeasibility/ Cancelability

Potts (2012:10) states that the most sufficient property of conversational implicature is cancelability which can be presented in three situations:

- Direct cancellation: in this situation, the speaker utters linguistic content which carries its negation of implicature. For example:

(29) Some, indeed all, of the passengers are sleepy.

- Suspension: the speaker says lexical content which is not relevant to the implicature or its negation. For example:

(30) Some, maybe all, of the passengers are sleepy.

- Lack of contextual support: conversational implicatures are cancelled when they “run contrary to what the immediate linguistic context of utterance tell us”. For example:

(31) Smith: This watch is twenty dollars, and I haven't got any money on me.

Natalia: Don't worry, I've got twenty dollars.

~+> Natalia has got only twenty dollars.

This example shows that, the immediate linguistic context of utterance, Natalia's answer doesn't produce the usual conversational implicature that she has got only twenty

dollars because the required information is Mary has/ doesn't have enough money for Smith to buy the watch rather than the exact amount of money she might have (Huang, 2011: 32-3).

2. Re-inforceability

Levinson (2000:15) mentioned that "It is often possible to add explicitly what is anyway implicated with less sense of redundancy than would be the case if one repeated the coded content" that is, conversational implicature doesn't need to present a lot of sense of redundancy to be explicit because conversational implicatures are not part of the conventional import of an utterance. For example:

- (32) (a) The weather is warm.
 +> the weather is not cold.
 (a) The weather is warm, but not cold.

3. Indeterminacy/ Universality

Some of the conversational implicatures tend to be indeterminate because it can convey open-ended implicature from the same utterance (Cummings, 2010: 207). For example:

- (33) Mark is a doctor
 +> Mark is kind.
 +> Mark is precise.
 +> Mark is intelligent.
 +>

4. Non-Conventionality

This property relates to the speaker and utterance but not part of the linguistic expression (not proposition or sentence) (Huang, 2011: 34). For example:

- (34) I'm leaving.
 +> we together leave because we earlier have agreed on this.

5. Calculability

Blackwell (2003:20) says that it is "clearly a characteristic of pragmatic coreference and of reference in general". That is the ability of hearer to calculate the appropriate inference. For example:

- (35) A: *Will John play football?*
B: *He has English exam.*
+> John will not play football.

6. Non-detachability

This property means that any linguistic expressions have the same semantics which gives rise to the same conversational implicature (Blackwell, 2003:19). For example:

- (36) +> Smith is a genius.
+> Smith's an enormous intellect.
+> Smith's a big brain.

1.5.1.2. Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicatures are non-truth-conditional inferences that are not “derived from superordinate pragmatic principles like the maxims, but are simply attached by convention to particular lexical items or expressions” (Levinson, 1983:127). For example:

- (37) a) Smith is short but strong. (contrast)
b) Natalia and Jack are divorced. (conjunction)
c) He jumped on his horse and rode away. (sequence)
d) I fell down the cup and it broke. (consequence)

From the traditional perspective, conventional implicature has five essential properties: (i) Conventional implicatures are not inferred from cooperative principle and its component maxims, but are attached to the particular expressions or lexical items. (ii) Conventional implicatures lack to the property of calculability. (iii) Conventional implicatures are not cancellable. (v) Conventional implicatures are detachable because they rely on the particular lexical expressions and/or linguistic constructions used. (vi) Conventional implicatures do not tend to be universal (Levinson, 1983:127).

Potts (2005: 211-2) tried to revive the concept of conventional implicature. He stated four basic properties of conventional implicature. (i) Conventional implicature is part of the conventional meaning of the expressions included. (ii) Conventional implicature is a commitment, so it generates entailment. (iii) Conventional implicature is speaker orientation, i.e. the “commitments are made by the speaker of an utterance”. (v) Conventional implicature is independence, i.e. they are “logically and compositionally

independent of what is said”. Another development of Conventional implicature notion is posed by Feng (2006: 184). He mentioned six properties for the conventional implicature which are (i) non-truth-conditionality, (ii) speaker orientation, (iii) infallibility, (iv) occurrence, (v) dependency, and (vi) context-sensitivity. But, unlike Potts’s view, he stated that “conventional implicature has both a semantic and pragmatic character”. Likewise, Horn (2007:50) said that conventional implicature is “semantic insofar as it involves an aspect of the conventional meaning of a given expression rather than being computable from general principles of rational behaviour or communicative competence, but it is pragmatic insofar as it involves considerations of appropriateness rather than truth of the sentence in which it appears”.

1.5.2. Entailment

The term ‘entailment’ came from formal logic. It indicates to a semantic relation which can be defined in terms of truth.

“A proposition p entails a proposition q iff the truth of p ensures the truth of q ”

This definition shows that if p entails q , then q is logically depending on p , i.e., the function of entailment is to distinguish truth value of proposition from those which are false. For example:

- (38) (a) All Butchart’s flowers are beautiful.
 (b) $\models$ some Butchart’s flowers are beautiful.

In this example, if the Butchart in question has flowers, then (a) entails (b), but not vice versa because we cannot overlook the inference that it is also true that some of Butchart’s flowers are beautiful. Notice that entailment is emerged from our knowledge of the language. This means that it relies on the elements of relevant sentences rather than context. Consequently, an entailment is not defeasible, that is, it cannot evaporate in any linguistic or non-linguistic context. This is why it must be seen as semantic in nature (Huang 2011: 16–17).

Fauconnier (1975) and Israel (2004), However, state that there is pragmatic entailment which an inference can be default or defeasible. Consider the following examples:

- (39) (a) Mark can jump high 2.4m.
(b) $\models$ Mark can jump lower 2.4m.
- (40) (a) Mark can't jump high 2.4m.
(b) Mark can't jump higher 2.4m.

These examples show that they are pragmatic entailment. They are entailment because they are default, i.e. automatically understood and being pragmatic because the inferences can be defeated.

The semantic entailment is important in semantics and especially in formal semantics which specifies essential semantic relations (see Katz, 1977: 30). For instance, two sentences could be propositionally equivalent iff they have the same entailment. The example below shows the equivalence of proposition.

- (41) (a) The letter was gotten by Jack.
(b) The letter was received by Jack.

On the other hand, if one sentence entails the negation of the second, this means that the first is true and the second is false as shown in example below:

- (42) (a) No one likes reading in the afternoon.
(b) At least someone likes reading in the afternoon.

However, we have problems in the core of semantic entailment. This problem concentrates on the failure of a semantic entailment in a referentially mysterious context (Huang, 2011: 397, cited in Bublitz & Norrick). For example:

- (43) (a) Barack Obama is a popular politician.
(b) The first African-American President of the United States of America is a popular politician.

Now at this time, we have equivalent extensions which are represented by *Barack Obama* and *the first African-American President of the United States of America*. These indicate the same person and exchanging of these extensions gives the same truth-

condition of the sentence. But in a referentially mysterious context truth is not maintained when the co-referential extensions are exchanged. Consider the following example:

- (44) (a) I want to dine with Barack Obama.
(b) I want to dine with the first African-American President
of the United States of America.

In these sentences, there are different truth conditions since in the extension, the first African-American President of the United States of America, the speaker doesn't care that the person. What he wants is to dine with THE FIRST African-American President of the United States of American.

1.5.3 Presupposition

Presupposition, like other types of inference, has two properties: constancy under negation and defeasibility/ cancellability.

1.5.3.1 Properties of Presupposition

There are two important properties of presupposition: constancy under negation and defeasibility.

1.5.3.1.1. Constancy under Negation

This feature of presupposition indicates that the sentence maintains its truth-condition of the proposition under negation (Huang, 2011: 403, in Bublitz & Norrick). For example:

- (45) (a) Jack's friend is a teacher.
(b) Jack's friend is not a teacher.

Both (a) and (b) presuppose that Jack has a friend (Palmer, 1981: 169; Huang, 2011:67).

Keenan (1971: 45) describes the notion of semantic presupposition as "a sentence S logically presupposes a sentence S1 and just in case S logically implies S1 and the negation of S, ~S also logically implies S1", i.e., the truth of the sentence is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of it.

1.5.3.1.2 Defeasibility/ Cancellability

The second important property of presupposition is defeasibility. Presupposition can be defeasible if it is not consistent with (i) background assumptions, (ii) conversational implicatures, and (iii) certain discourse contexts. Moreover, it can be cancelled in certain intra-sentential contexts, some of them lead to projection problem for presuppositions (Huang, 2011: 68).

(i) Background Assumptions: Presupposition can be vanished when there is no coherence with real-world knowledge. Consider the following examples

(46) Jack got the results of project before he participated in the conference.

>> Jack participated in the conference.

(47) Jack died before he participated in the conference

~>> Jack participated in the conference.

The sentence presupposes that “Jack participated in the conference” because of the temporal clause, while the second doesn’t presuppose any proposition (Huang, 2011: 404, in Bublitz & Norrick).

(ii) Conversational Implicatures: A second case in which presupposition can be defeated by conflict conversational implicatures. For example:

(48) (a) Natalia will be furious that Jack is organizing a stag night

>> Jack is organizing a stag night.

(b) If Jack is organizing a stag night, Natalia will be furious that he is doing so.

+>> perhaps Jack is organizing a stag night, perhaps he isn’t; the speaker does not know.

~>> Jack is organizing a stag night

The use of the factive predicate furious in (a) should give rise to the potential presupposition that Jack is organizing a stag night. However, there is also a Q-clausal conversational implicature, in (b), because of using the conditional which indicates that “perhaps Jack is not organizing a stag night. So, the presupposition is cancelled because of the contradictory conversational implicature (Huang, 2011: 404, in Bublitz & Norrick).

(iii) Certain Discourse Contexts: Presupposition can be cancelled when it is not related to the proposition mentioned in the discourse context, i.e. there is conflict in the discourse context. For instance

(49) (a) The king of France isn't bald.

>> There is a king of France.

(b) There is no king of France. Therefore, the king of France isn't bald.

~>> There is a king of France

The sentence, in the example (a), presupposes that there is a King of France. But the sentence(b) doesn't, because the presupposition is not consistent with the preceded proposition. Hence, the presupposition was cancelled (Huang, 2011: 405, in Bublitz & Norrick).

Moreover, presupposition can be cancelled in certain intra-sentential contexts which can be classified into three places. The first one is that the presupposition can be defeated in a co-ordinate clause without any explicit confliction (Huang, 2011: 405, in Bublitz & Norrick). For example:

(50) Jack doesn't regret beating his wife because in fact he never did so!

~>>Jack beat his wife.

The second place is that presupposition cannot be fulfilled because of If-clause that follows. Consider the following example

(51) Sandra doesn't regret being a singer if she actually ever was one.

~>> Sandra was a singer.

Finally, there are two groups of verbs in which presupposition can be defeated:

(a) Verbs of saying (say, mention, tell, ask and announce)

(52) Jack said that Natalia managed to speak with a broad Irish accent.

~>> Natalia tried to speak with a broad Irish accent.

(b) Verbs of propositional attitude (believe, think, imagine, dream and want)

(53) Mr. Smith believes that he is the emperor of China.

~>>There is an emperor of China

1.5.4. Syllogism

Syllogism is “a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.” In logic, syllogism is an instrument which is used by the speaker or the writer to determine the universal truths in specific situation (Aristotle and Barnes, 1995:40).

Syllogism, as a relation to its logical form, is an argument which consists of three categorical propositions, two of them premises which specify the proof, and a conclusion which, logically, holds from the premises (Broadie, 1993: 171).

Aristotle and Barnes (1995: 39) state that proposition is a statement which confirms or denies something of something. This proposition could be universal, particular or indefinite. Universal proposition states that “something belongs to all or none of something”; while particular proposition refers to statement which “belongs to some or not to some or not to all”, and indefinite proposition the statement of which does or does not belong, without any mark to show whether it is universal or particular. For examples:

(54)contraries are subjects of the same science.

(55)pleasure is not good.

1.5.4. 1. The Basic Structure of Syllogism

To understand syllogism, it is important to know its basic structure which is represented by three parts: major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Each part has two categorical terms which are linked by is /are. Each premise is related to conclusion by term in common. The major premise relates with predicate of the conclusion, the minor premise connects with the subject of conclusion, and “the middle term”, as called by Aristotle, is in common with the premises but absent from conclusion (Cohen, 2007: 1). For example:

(56) **Major premise:** All men are wise.

Minor premise: John is a man.

Conclusion: John is wise.

In this example, “wise” is the major term because it relates to the predicate of conclusion, “John” is the minor term because it relates to the subject of conclusion, and there is common term (middle term) relates the two premises which is “man”.

1.5.4. 2. Categorical Syllogisms

Copi et al. (2014: 211) state that there are four types of categorical propositions. Arguments that depend on A, E, I, and O propositions have two premises and conclusion. The table below shows these propositions with example

Type	Symbol	Link	Idiomatic	Abbreviation	Example
universal affirmatives	a	is/are	Every/All <i>A is/are B</i>	AaB	All men are wise.
universal negatives	e	is/are	No <i>A is/are B</i>	AeB	No mammals are bird.
particular affirmatives	i	is/are	Some <i>A is/are B</i>	AiB	Some humans are intelligent
particular negatives	o	is/are	Some <i>A is/are not B</i>	AoB	Some men are not clever

Table 1.1. Types of categorical propositions (Copi et al., 2014: 211)

1.5.4. 3. Syllogisms' Figures

Copi et al. (2013: 213-14) and Patzig (1968: 109-17) state that syllogism can be one of four figures which is specified depending on the position of the middle term (as subject / predicate in the premises). Figures are adopted from (Copi et al., 2013: 213-14)

First Figure: in this figure, the subject in the major premise and predicate in the minor premise are shared by the same middle term. It can be clarified by the table below:

Table First of	First Figure			1.2. figure
	Parts	Example	Code	
	Major premise	<i>All birds</i> are animals	M-P	
	Minor premise	All parrots are <i>birds</i>	S-M	
	Conclusion	All parrots are animals	S-P	

syllogism

Second Figure: this figure shows that the predicate of premises is shared by the middle term. See the following table:

Second Figure		
Parts	Example	Code
Major premise	No foxes are <i>birds</i>	P-M
Minor premise	All parrots are <i>birds</i>	S-M
Conclusion	No parrots are foxes	S-P

Table 1.3. Second figure of syllogism

Third Figure: it indicates that the position of the middle term is represented by the subject of both premises as shown in the table below.

Third Figure		
Parts	Examples	Code
Major premise	<i>All birds</i> are animals	M-P
Minor premise	<i>All birds</i> are mortals	M-S
Conclusion	Some mortals are animals	S-P

Table 1.4. Third figure of syllogism

Fourth Figure: this figure adopts the idea that the predicate term of the major premise and the subject term of the minor premise are shared by the middle term (Copi et al., 2013: 214). The table below clarifies this idea:

Fourth Figure		
Parts	Examples	Code
Major premise	No birds are <i>cows</i>	P-M
Minor premise	<i>All cows</i> are animals	M-S
Conclusion	Some animals are not birds	S-P

Table 1.5. Fourth figure of syllogism

1.5.4. 4. Validity of Syllogism

Cohen (2007: 2) states that there are 256 forms of syllogism, only 19 of them are valid. To identify whether the syllogisms are valid or not, we must check their correspondence with one of the four figures. Syllogism is valid if and only if the premises are followed by the conclusion. That is, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true (see Patzig, 1968). All examples are copied from the web, 16 January. 2016 (<http://www.wikihow.com/Understand-Syllogisms>)

First Figure:

Barbara (AAA)	Celarent (EAE)	Darii (AII)	Ferio (EIO)
All birds are animals. All parrots are birds. All parrots are animals.	No birds are foxes. All parrots are birds. No parrots are foxes.	All dogs are animals. Some mammals are dogs. Some mammals are animals.	No dogs are birds. Some mammals are dogs. Some mammals are not birds.

Table 1.6. The forms of valid syllogism which correspond to the first figure

Second Figure:

Cesare (EAE)	Camestres (AEE)	Festino (EIO)	Baroco (AOO)
No foxes are birds. All parrots are birds. No parrots are foxes.	All foxes are animals. No trees are animals. No trees are foxes.	No restaurant food is healthy. Some recipes are healthy. Some recipes are not restaurant foods.	All liars are evil-doers. Some doctors are not evil-doers. Some doctors are not liars.

Table 1.7. The forms of valid syllogism which correspond to the second figure

Third Figure:

Darapti (AAI)	Ferison (EIO)	Datisi (AII)
All men are fallible. All men are animals. Some animals are fallible.	No lepers are allowed to enter the church. All lepers are human. Some humans are not allowed to enter the church.	All books are imperfect. Some books are informative. Some informative things are imperfect.
Felapton (EAO)	Bocardo (OAO)	Disamis (IAI)
No snakes are good to eat. All snakes are animals. Some animals are not good to eat.	Some websites are not helpful. All websites are Internet resources. Some internet resources are not helpful.	Some books are precious. All books are perishable. Some perishable things are precious.

Table 1.8. The forms of valid syllogism which correspond to the third figure

Fourth Figure:

Fresison (EIO)	Camenes (AEE)	Dimaris (IAI)
No dogs are birds. Some birds are pets. Some pets are not dogs.	All trees are plants. No plants are birds. No birds are trees.	Some evil doers are lawyers. All lawyers are human. Some humans are evil doers.
Fesapo (EAO)	Bramantip (AAI)	
No meals are free. All free things are desirable. Some desirable things are not meals.	All pigs are unclean. All unclean things are best avoided. Some things that are best avoided are pigs.	

Table 1.9. The forms of valid syllogism which correspond to the fourth figure

Studying presupposition, conversational and conventional implicature, semantic entailment, and Aristotle's syllogism in the light of negation, semantics versus pragmatics, conventionality, defeasibility, and truth condition, we come to conclude that semantic entailment, syllogism and conventional implicature are not defeasible while most cases of presupposition and all conversational implicatures are defeasible. A hierarchy is set up to rank various types of inference as defeasible, nonmonotonic, default, probabilistic, and plausibilistic. An inference is cancellable when it has the possibility of error. with negation, while presupposition is constant under negation, syllogism and entailment are not. Likewise, conversational and conventional implicatures are more complex under negation and requires more study. Conventionality, entailment and syllogism are most conventional which, in turn, relates to semantics. Presupposition is

more conventional than conversational implicature but less conventional than conventional implicature. Therefore, it straddles the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, but more on the side of pragmatics. Treating conventional implicature as semantic or pragmatic depends on how the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is placed. If the conventional implicature is concerned on the truth condition, it will fall on the pragmatic side because semantics doesn't contribute to truth condition. On the other hand, if pragmatics is conceived of as dealing with those inferences that are non-conventional, hence cancellable, then conventional implicature falls within the province of semantics but outside that of pragmatics, since it cannot be defeated (Huang, 2011: 414-5, in Bublitz & Norrick).



Chapter Two

I. Classification of Presupposition

There are different classifications of presupposition. In this part, I'll classify presuppositions into semantic, pragmatic, conditional, and functional.

2.1. Semantic Types of Presupposition

Before studying semantic types of presupposition, it is necessary to shed light on the semantics and looking at semantics from various perspectives. Semantics is the study of the meaning of morphemes, words, phrases and sentences. Therefore, in this section, we'll see that implicit meaning can be expressed by words, phrases, and structures. These linguistic constructions are considered by the linguists as a source of presupposition called as a presupposition or lexical triggers. In other words, the term triggers indicates to the "presupposition-generating linguistic items" (Levinson, 1983: 179).

Levinson (ibid:181) indicates that Karttunen collected thirty-one kinds of presupposition triggers, whereas Keenan (in Fillmore and Langendoen, 1971: 46-7) has proposed only nine kinds of these triggers called as "logical presuppositions". Huang (2011:65-6) shared Keenan with some kinds by indicating to eleven kinds of presupposition. However, Yule (1996: 28) classifies them into six types: (1) existential. (2) lexical. (3) structural. (4) factive. (5) non-factive. and (6) counter-factual which represent the core of the phenomenon. According to Karttunen, (cited in Levinson 1983:181-4), Keenan (1971: 46-7), Huang (2011:65-6), and Yule (1996: 28), the semantic triggers are classified into three major types:

Existential: definite descriptions (proper names, possessives, and NPs).

Lexical: implicative verbs; factive verbs, change of state verbs/ aspectual verbs; counter-factual verbs, conventional items, presuppositional quantifiers and iteratives.

Structural: cleft constructions; Wh-questions; adverbial clauses; comparative constructions; counter-factual conditionals; and non-restrictive clauses.

2.1.1. Existential:

Seuren (1997: 359) indicates to the importance of existential presupposition by stating that it is the main starting point for presupposition theory in philosophy. Existential presupposition refers to the assumption that there is an existence of relation between the entity and the mentioned expression. The class of existential presupposition involves proper names, possessives, and definite description.

Frege (1952: 69) states that any assertion always carries presupposition which is represented by the simple or compound proper names. Frege says that in the example

(1) Kepler died in misery. >> there exists someone called “Kepler”

“Kepler” is a presupposition that refers to something. Therefore, proper names in a sentence carry the presupposition that they refer to something in the world. However, non-definite names do not trigger a presupposition since they lack reference.

It is clear that the possessive constructions give rise to a presupposition of existence; furthermore, the existential presupposition is not restricted in possessive constructions but also more generally indefinite noun phrase, i.e. definite description in which the interlocutor is supposed to be committed to the existence of the entities named (Yule, 1996: 27). For example:

- (2) a. How is your brother? >> you have a brother. (possessive)
- b. Paul married Smith’s sister. >> Smith has a sister. (possessive)
- c. I didn't get the message. >> There is a message. (definite description)
- d. Natalia read the book. >> there is a book. (definite description)

2.1.2. Lexical Presupposition:

Lexical presupposition means that “the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood” (Yule, 1996: 28). Lexical types of presupposition are:

2.1.2.1. Implicative Predicates

Implicative predicates are the verbs which evoke presupposition. These verbs show that the subject tried to do the state or event characterized by the complement sentence (Levinson, 1983: 181). Consider the following example

- (3) Mark managed/ didn't manage to read the book.>> He tried to read the book.

The verb “manage to” presupposes that Mark faces some difficulty in reading the book. In the example

- (4) Sam forgot/didn't forget to write a message. >> He ought to have written, or intended

The verb ‘forget’, like the verb remember, presupposes that there is something that obligates the subject to do the state or event described by the complement sentence.

- (5) Other implicative predicates: ‘*happened to*’ presupposes ‘didn't plan or intend to’; ‘*avoided*’ presupposes ‘was expected to or ought to’, etc. (Levinson, 1983: 181)

2.1.2.2. Factive Verbs

Crystal (2008: 184) argues that factive term is used in the classification of verbs, which have a complement clause, where the addresser evokes the truth of the proposition conveyed in that clause. These verbs are *know*, *agree*, *realize*, *regret*, as well as phrases including “be” with *aware*, *odd*, *glad*, *sorry*, *proud*, *indifferent*, *sad* that; etc. consider the following examples.

- (6) Mark *knows/doesn't know* that Maria passed the exam. >> Maria passed the exam.
(7) David *realized/didn't realize* Mary was ill. >> she was ill.
(8) Sue *regrets/doesn't regret* telling Natalia the truth. >> Sue told Natalia the truth.
(9) I *was/wasn't aware* that Sandra was married. >> Sandra was married.
(10) It *is/isn't odd* that he walks slowly. >> He walks slowly.
(11) I'm/'m *not glad* that I met John. >> I met John.

2.1.2.3. Change of State Verbs/ Aspectual Verbs

Change of state (also called aspectual) verbs is another type of lexical presupposition. Saeed (2009:108) states that the change of state verbs has a property of switching a presupposition that “the new state is both described and is presupposed not to have held prior to the change”. These verbs are *start*, *finish*, *carry on*, *cease*, *leave*, *enter*, *go*, *arrive*, *quit*, *resume* etc. Consider the following examples

- (12) Natalia *began/didn't begin* to ski. >> She hadn't been skiing.
(13) Sue *continued/didn't continue* to care of cats. >> She had been caring for cats.
(14) Tom *stopped/didn't stop* writing on walls. >> He had been writing on walls.

2.1.2.4. Counterfactual Verb

McCawley (1976: 400) mentions that the verb “pretend” was suggested in Karttunen (1970b) and G. Lakoff (1971) as a counterfactual presupposition in which the addresser of a sentence assumes that the complement of “pretend” verb is false. For example:

(15) Jane pretended that she passed the exam. >> she didn’t pass the exam.

2.1.2.5. Presuppositional Quantifiers

Keenan (1971:47) refers to presuppositional quantifiers by using “everyone, and “only”. Moltmann (2006: 180) states that there are two kinds of quantifiers triggering presupposition. The first one is called “strong quantifiers” like *every, the, most and* etc. The second one is called weak quantifiers which is used in there-sentences like *no, few, and several*. Consider the following examples

(16) Only John goes to Paris. >> John goes to Paris

(17) There are a few men in the mall. >> there are men in the mall. (weak)

(18) Mark might write six books, and he might publish every book (strong)

In the last example, the quantifier “every book” is anaphorically connected to the previous linguistic components like “six books”.

2.1.2.6. Iteratives

Iteratives indicate to those verbs, words, or expressions which implicitly refer to the repetition. The speaker uses these verbs; words or expressions to presuppose unstated concepts like *another, again, anymore, returned, another time, to come back, restore, repeal*, etc.

(19) Mary bought/didn’t buy another pen.>> She had bought at least one.

(20) Natalia returned/ didn’t return to London. >> she was in London.

(21) Sue left/didn’t leave Rome again. >> She left Rome before.

2.1.2.7. Conventional Items

Levinson (1983: 206) and Palmer (1981:170) share that presupposition of sentence can be evoked as part of the conventional meaning of lexical items. For example:

(22) Sue cleaned the room. >>the room was dirty

The sentence carries the presupposition that the room was dirty because of the verb “clean”. Conventional meaning of lexical items also appears clearly in the following example in which the deer was alive because of the verb “killed”.

(23) The hunter killed the deer. >> the deer was alive

2.1.3. Structural Types of Presupposition

2.1.3.1. Cleft Sentences

Levinson (1983: 182) and Huang (2011: 66) state that there are two types of cleft constructions of presupposition trigger. According to Levinson, both types give rise to the same presupposition.

a) Cleft

(24) It was Sandra who helped the old man. >> someone helped the old man.

b) Pseudo-Cleft

(25) What David played was tennis. >> David played something.

2.1.3.2. Wh-Questions

The second type of structural presupposition is “wh-question” constructions. This type conventionally triggers that the information after the wh-form is true (Yule, 1996: 228-29). Consider the following examples

(26) When did you meet Sue? >> you met Sue

(27) Where did you play Bing-Bong? >> you played Bing-Bong.

(28) Who broke the window? >> someone broke the window.

2.1.3.3. Adverbial Clauses

Biber et al. (1999: 194-5) state that adverbial clauses are used as adverbials in the main clause and it is common if they come at the beginning or end of the sentence. For example:

(29) When the lecturer was speaking Sam wrote the notes.>>The lecturer was speaking.

- (30) The smoker threw the cigarette where the car stopped.>> The smoker threw the cigarette

2.1.3.4. Comparative Constructions

Levinson (1983: 182) states that comparative and contrastive constructions give rise to presupposition. Consider the following examples

- (31) Smith is a better journalist than Mark. >> Both Mark and Smith are journalists.
(32) The procedures are as easy as in London. >> The procedures are easy in London.

2.1.3.5. Counterfactual Conditionals

Crystal (2008: 120) and Yule (1996: 29) state that the term counterfactual (or unreal statements) used to refer to hypothetical situation which means the contrary or opposite of the truth. For example:

- (33) If she had taken the train, she would have arrived on time. >> he had not taken the train.

2.1.3.6. Non-Restrictive Clauses.

Levinson (1983: 183-4) indicates that there are two types of relative clauses which are clauses restrictive and non-restrictive clauses. Non-restrictive one can add more information that is not affected by the negation of the main verb outside the relative clause and hence it triggers presuppositions. Consider the following examples

- (34) The people, who play volleyball, are professionals. >> The people play volleyball.
(35) Chomsky, who wrote the syntactic structure book, is a linguist.>> Chomsky wrote the syntactic structure book

2.2. Pragmatic Types.

In chapter one, we stated that the presupposition is a relation between sentence and the world. However, the semantic account of presupposition is originated for restricted purposes. Since semantics deals with the literal meaning of words and is not affected by the speaker's intentions. So, the meaning of words remains firmly established in spite of the context (the physical and social environment in which the utterance takes place). In this sense, there is another information which can be inferred from a given sentence

depending on the relationship between that sentence uttered and the context in which it is used. Pragmatics is less concerned with the literal meanings of words and more concerned with the context, intentions behind utterances and the way they are interpreted (Wardhaugh, 1976:176).

Stalnaker (1973: 387) states that "any semantic presupposition of proposition expressed in a given context will be a pragmatic presupposition of the people in that context". Moreover, Finch (2000: 175) indicates that in any communication there is a certain amount of presumed knowledge independent from purely semantic knowledge. The degree of this assumed knowledge depends on a wide range of factors that are named context. Finch (2000: 175) states that if one asks a friend whether he wants "a cup of coffee" and receives the answer "It will keep me awake", it is assumed that the addresser knows whether or not his friend wishes to stay awake. So, this background presupposition cannot be recovered from the form of the answer itself, but it must necessarily be there to account for an appropriate response.

Similarly, Bates (1996: 22) states that there are other types of information which can be inferred from the given sentence and which give the presupposition's sensitivity to context. Consider the following examples:

- (36) a) Mr. Smith, can I get your coat?
- b) Do you want your din-din?
- c) I simply love your tie.

The utterance(a) refers that the addressee is "an adult male", and may also indicate that the addressee is "either socially superior or distant acquaintance of the addresser". The purpose of the sentence(a), either with a child or a close friend, is for humor. The utterance(b), also, suggests that the addressee is a child or possibly a pet, moreover, the child has a din-din. The utterance (c) shows that the speaker is either female or male expresses the female's opinion. However, none of these conditions in any way affect the truth or falsity of the propositions contained in these sentences. Instead, they are pragmatic presuppositions (Bates, 1996: 22).

Keenan (1971: 49) defines pragmatic presupposition as "a relation between the utterance of a sentence and the context in which it is uttered". Utterance of a sentence, according to him, refers to a real act of speaking and by the context of an utterance he

refers to the interlocutors involved in the speech act, as well as the physical and cultural setting of a speech act. He indicates that the context of an utterance consists of, at least, the addresser, the addressee if any, the audience if any, the physical environment of the utterance, and the cultural environment of the utterance.

Semantics may infer presupposition in terms of existential, lexical, or structural meaning, but there is need to pragmatic knowledge to help in creating and understanding presupposition. This is because some sentences may not have semantic meaning (may not have truth value), but reflect the speaker's view on the world (Patel, n.d.: n.p.). For example:

(37) John doesn't know that Shakespeare wrote the scenario of *Titanic*.

It is clear that this statement doesn't have semantic meaning because it doesn't have truth value. However, it may have pragmatic meaning because it can be related to the world of the speaker. Moreover, pragmatics can be presented when the addressee and the addresser do not share the same presupposition. In the example below, the addressee does not know that the addresser has daughter before he says:

(38) Can you please wait for me? My daughter still needs to be dropped off at school.

The addresser takes the presupposition for granted and he expects that the addressee will be able to do so. This proves that a presupposition does not necessarily have to make sense semantically. The meaning of a presupposition also depends on what the speaker assumes about the hearer, what the hearer assumes about the speaker, the context and intentions.

Yule (1996: 25) defines pragmatic presupposition as "something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions". Consider the following Yule's example:

(39) Mary's brother bought three horses.

In producing this utterance, the addresser is normally expected to have the presupposition that there is someone called Mary and she has a brother. The speaker may also presuppose, more specific, that Mary has only one brother and he is rich. All of these presuppositions are the addresser's and they can be wrong. Thus, a presupposition is some

set of proposition that addressers believe to be appropriate background which is drawn from the context of discourse itself or from their commonplace knowledge which varies from one person to another (Yule, 1996: 25).

Tyler (1978: 32) indicates that pragmatic presupposition (sometimes called “utterance presupposition”) relies on the extra-linguistic information. He classifies the contextual factors which affect the inferring of utterances into two types: linguistic and extra-linguistic. The linguistic type specifies a sentence's relation to other sentences in the context of discourse, and the relation between what a sentence states and what it implies. Extra-linguistic context is concerned with how understanding is facilitated by taking into account not only what is said, but who said that (the addresser) and to whom (the addressee), how, when, where, and why. In other words, it should contain enough information about the conversational situation to determine what is expressed by a sentence as well as enough information about what the interlocutors in a speech situation commonly assume about the subject matter of the conversation to determine whether or not what is said by an addresser is appropriate (Tyler, 1978: 32).

Most of philosophers and linguist, like Van Der Sandt (1988:50;70), believe that presupposition can be explicated in terms of Grecian principles. He claims the idea which considers most of the paradigmatic cases of presuppositions as conventional implicature, while Thomason states that presuppositions are those conversational implicatures which are related with positive sentences and its negative counterparts. He defines presupposition as “Sentence ϕ pragmatically presupposes χ relative to a context c and $\neg\chi$ conversationally implicates χ relative to c ” (Thomason 1973, as cited in Van Der Sandt 1988:74).

Grice (1975: 43) states that there is distinction between what is said by a speaker and what he means or implicates. He gave an example “Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been in prison yet.”. He comments by saying “I think it is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant, etc., in this example, is distinct from what B said, which was simply that C had not been in prison yet”. Here, Grice uses the verbs “implied, suggested, meant” to indicate what addresser intended to convey.

According to Sadock (1978: 283), the general picture of Grice's theory of meaning can be schematized as shown in the figure (1):




Figure 2.1. Types of implicatures (Sadock, 1978: 283)

The pragmatic meaning of any expression is represented by conversational implicature (generalized or particularized). Sadock (1978: 284) summarizes Grice's dividing the conventional aspect of meaning between semantics and pragmatics. He refers that "there is an important distinction between the conventional and the nonconventional aspects of the import of what we say". Conventional implicature is subdivided into semantic and non-semantic content while non-conventional is subdivided into general and particular meaning. non-semantic, general, and particular meaning are subsumed under pragmatics field- this is what I'll confine myself to in this section- and what semantically conveyed is subsumed under semantics field as shown in figure (2):




Figure 2.2. Implicatures, semantics and pragmatics (Sadock, 1978: 284)

Sadock (1978: 288) indicates that it is possible to assume that the sentence below is true if most politicians are dishonest.

(40) Since birds have hair, most politicians are dishonest.

That is, “ what the clause *since birds have hair* contributes to the sentence is a set of conventional implicatures; that clause is not part of the semantic content of the sentence, not part of what is said.”

Another example can be considered here:

(41) Since Bill and Harry are left, most politicians are dishonest.

The relationship between an utterance of the sentence above and the conveyed information that “the utterer believes Harry to have left”. The purpose of the sentence is not to deal with a conversational implicature, but rather with a logical deduction based on non-semantic content or, in Gricean terms, conventional implicature. This sentence presupposes that there were politicians called “Bill and Harry”. Those politicians are left and there are other politicians who are still in the government. Moreover, the addresser presupposes that there are influential ‘dishonest’ politicians. Those dishonest’ politicians forced “Bill and Harry” to leave the government (Sadock, 1978: 288).

2.2.1. Generalized Implicature

Generalized implicature is a conversational implicature that can be inferred without referring to a special context, i.e., we don't need special knowledge to deduce the additional meaning (Grice, 1989: 37; Levinson, 1983: 126). This means that the generalized conversational implicature does not depend on particular features of the context, but it is, instead, related to the proposition expressed. For example:

(42) Mark: Did you send a bouquet to Natalia and Sue?

John: I sent a bouquet to Natalia.

+> he didn't send a bouquet to Sue.

This sentence presupposes that there is a celebration (like birthday, graduation, etc.) for "Natalia and Sue" and John didn't know that Sue has a celebration too. So, He sent the bouquet only to Natalia.

(43) Sam: Will Sally be at the meeting this afternoon?

Jane: Her car broke down.

+> Sally won't be at the meeting.

This example presupposes, semantically, that there is an important meeting and Sally is an important member in this meeting, and she has a car. Pragmatically, the example presupposes that the place of the meeting is very far from Sally and something forces her from going to the meeting. Therefore, Jane's answer implicates that Sally won't be at the meeting.

(44) Maria walked into a house last week and saw a tortoise.

+> This expression implies that the house is not Maria's house.

This example presupposes, semantically, that there is someone called Maria. She went to the place. This place is a house. This house is not hers. Pragmatically, the sentence presupposes that the house, Maria walked to, was not far. Moreover, it seems that seeing a tortoise is unfamiliar in the way and hence the speaker and Maria surprised of seeing a tortoise (for more information, see Levinson, 1983: 126).

2.2.1.2. Scalar Implicature

Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expressed one value from a scale of values. These values particularly clear in terms of expressing quantity. Consider the scales below listed from the highest to the lowest value (Jacques, 2012: 417).

<All, most, some, few>

<always, often, sometimes>

<certain, probable, possible>

<do badly, progress, do well>

The main idea of the scale is that any form in a scale is asserted, while the negative of the higher forms is implicated (Yule, 1996: 41). For example:

(45) Most of the students passed linguistics exam.

+>Not all the students passed the linguistic exam.

This sentence presupposes, semantically, there are students and there is an exam. The subject of the exam was linguistics. Pragmatically, the sentence presupposes that the exam may be so difficult. Therefore, not all the students passed the exam.

(46) The classes are sometimes interesting.

+> the classes are not always/ not often interesting.

This sentence presupposes, semantically, that there are classes and these classes are sometimes interesting. The sentence implicates that these classes are not always/ not often interesting (Yule, 1996: 41).

2.2.2. Particularized Conversational

Particularized Conversational implicature occurs when a conversation takes place in a very specific context in which locally recognized inferences are assumed (Grice, 1989: 37; Levinson, 1983: 126). For example:

(47) A: Where is my book?

B: Your young sister is drawing something.

This example presupposes that the (A) has a book, but he doesn't know where it is, and he has a young sister. His sister is drawing the book because she was arranging the room. Moreover, the (A) wants to read, but the action "draw" of young sister would ordinarily not convey anything about her bag, so implicature, in this case, depends on the context as well as the utterance itself.

(48) John: Hey, coming to the wild party tonight?

Smith: My parents are visiting.

+> Smith can go to the party.

This sentence presupposes that there is a party and there will be a lot of people (Smith's friends) who wishes Smith to be with them to celebrate together. Smith's answer presupposes that he has parents and his parents are on their way to visit him. Moreover, he lives far from his parents and he hasn't seen them for a long time. Therefore, he cannot go to the party.

(49) Tom: What time is it?

Mark: Well, the milkman has come.

+> Mark implicates that the time is too late.

This example presupposes that Tom wants to do something which should be done in a specific time. Moreover, there is a milkman. This milkman usually comes in specific time and all the people know that time. Therefore, Mark's answer implicates that Tom couldn't do his work at the time.

2.3. Conditionalized Types.

Conditional sentence consists of independent (main) clauses or dependent (subordinate) clauses. The dependent clause usually starts with "if" which expresses a condition while the independent clause expresses a result of the condition. The adverbial clauses of the condition have some freedom of position. Thus, substitution of clauses doesn't affect the meaning of the sentence (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 8). For example:

(50) If he goes to the market, he will buy a banana.

(51) He will buy banana if he goes to the market.

Rzayev et al. (2007: 148) state that “Adverbial clauses of condition are introduced chiefly by subordinators ‘if (positive condition), in case, on condition that, supposing (that), provided/ providing (that), unless (negative condition) and answer the question ‘under what condition?’”. Conditional Adverbials convey the conditions which hold on the proposition of the main clause, involving both positive and negative conditions. For examples:

- (52) a. If I have a luck with the papers, I shall pass the examination.
 b. In case you pick wild- flowers, they may never grow again.
 c. A piece of glass cannot cause a fire unless the sun shines on it.

In the sentence (c), the conditional clause means ‘if the sun doesn’t shine on it.’ Unless-clause has the more exclusive of ‘only if...not’ or except on condition can see that there is a slight difference between an ‘unless-clause’ and a negative “if clause”.

Rzayev et al. (ibid: 149) draw our attention to six points which should be remembered:

1. The form “if + will/ won’t” can be used in a polite request in which the auxiliary “will” doesn’t indicate to the future, rather it shows “willing to” or “ready to”. For example:
 (53) If you will pass me the book. I’ll be grateful to you.
 (54) If you won’t help me. I’ll kill myself.
2. Using stressed ‘will’ in the form “If + will’ expresses the idea of insistence.
 (55) If you will smoke a lot, it’s not surprising you will have cancer later.
3. The form “if + will” can be used to refer to “later result rather than condition (i.e. it is true that...)”. For example:
 (56) I’ll give you three hundred dollars if you quit drinking. (quitting drinking is a condition of getting you ‘three hundred dollars’- it must happen first)
 (57) I’ll give you three hundred dollars if it will help you to participate in Olympics. (the help is a result- it follows giving money).
4. We can use “if” clause to state that someone “admits a fact and gives a reason for it”.
 (58) If I am a bit tired, it’s because I was working all the night.

5. “if” clauses can be used to interpret “the purpose of a remark to suggest ‘I’m saying this in case...’”

(59) There is a good book in the library if you want to read.

6. “if” clause gives the meaning of “that” when it comes after the words referring “disappointment”, “pleasure”, “sorrow”, etc. For example:

(60) I’m sorry if you were disturbed by my children.

Quirk (1985: 1091) indicates that conditional sentences can be either an open condition or a hypothetical condition. Whereas Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999: 341) propose that there are three types of conditional sentences which can be, semantically, expressed. All of them, Quirk & Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, concentrate on the way the speaker views the fulfillment of the condition expressed in the sentence.

Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman (1999: 341) introduce the classification of conditional sentences as follows:




Figure 2.3. The classification of conditional sentence (Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman, 1999: 341)

2.3.1. Factual Conditional Sentences:

Factual conditional sentences are used in everyday speaking and writing. Grammarians say that factual conditional sentences are subdivided into timeless and time-bound. Timeless conditional sentences are further subdivided into generic and habitual factual conditional sentences. Whereas time-bound factual conditional sentences are

subdivided into implicit inference and explicit inference (Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman, 1999: 341; Declerck and Reed, 2001: 8).

2.3.1.1. Timeless

2.3.1.1.1. Generic Factual Conditionals

Generic factual conditionals express the true and unchanging relationships and use the simple present tense in both clauses. They are frequently used in scientific writing or to relate with absolute relationships (Quirk, 1985). For example:

(61) If you heat water to 100C, it boils.

Rzayev et al. (2007: 150)

The sentence presupposes that the water has a generic factual feature. This feature is that it can be boiled, but there is a condition to boil the water. This condition is that the water should be heated up to 100C to boil.

(62) If you boil water. It vaporizes.

The sentence also presupposes that the water can be vaporized, but there is a condition to vaporize the water. This condition is that the water should be boiled to vaporize.

2.3.1.1.2. Habitual Factual Conditional

Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman (1999: 341) state that habitual factual conditionals, as in generic factual conditionals, express the relationship in a habit and not bounded in time. However, the relationship depends on habit instead of physical law. This type of condition is often used in conversation. When these conditionals express habit, both clauses use the same tense, i.e., simple present in both clauses when the relationship refers to the present time. Whereas past tense is used in both clauses when the relationship refers to a past time (see Rzayev et al., 2007: 150).

(63) If I make the food, Jane washes the dishes. (Present)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Jane and there are dishes. Jane washes the dishes, but there is a habitual condition. This condition is that the speaker should make the food then Jane washes the dishes.

(64) If my father said, “Jump!” Sam jumped. (Past)

The sentence presupposes that the speaker has a father and there is someone called Sam, and moreover, he is obedient. Sam has the ability to jump, but there is a habitual condition. This condition is that when the father says, “Jump!” Sam jumps.

Note: in both generic factual conditionals and habitual factual conditionals “if” can be substituted by “when” or “whenever”.

2.3.1.2. Time-Bound

2.3.1.2.1. Implicit Inference Conditionals

Implicit inference conditionals, like habitual conditionals, are conversational, and like generic and habitual factual, they tend to keep the same tense and aspect or the same modal auxiliary in both clauses even though they make use of a much wider range of tenses and auxiliary verbs (Jimaima, 2014: 46). For example:

(65) If smog can be licked in LA, it can be licked anywhere.

The sentence presupposes that there is a smog and there is a city called LA. Moreover, smog has a feature to be licked. Therefore, we can implicitly infer that if smog can be licked in LA, it can be licked anywhere.

(66) If there was a happy man in the world that night, it was John Tunney.

The sentence presupposes that there was a happy man and there is a world. Moreover, there was someone called John Tunney. We can infer that John Tunney was a happy man “if there was a happy man in the world that night”. (Schachter, 1971:70).

However, they differ from generic or habitual factual in that they are used for specific and time-bound relationships and conditions. Therefore, “if” cannot be replaced

by “when” or “whenever” without changing the meaning and often making the sentence ungrammatical or awkward. For example:

(67) When(ever) smog can be licked in LA, it can be licked anywhere.

(68) When(ever) it’s raining out there, the people are getting wet.

“The ungrammaticality or awkwardness here is due to the fact that this type of conditional is expressing an inference rather than a generic or habitual relationship” (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 342).

2.3.1.2.2. Explicit Inference Conditionals

Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999: 342) state that explicit inference conditional sentence is the only type of factual conditional in which “there’s no strict parallelism of tense, aspect, or modal in both clauses. This is because the conditional sentence is used as the basis for making an explicit inference; the result clause thus contains an inferential modal – typically must or should.” For example:

(69) If his apartment has been stolen, the burglars must have done it. (Past)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone who has an apartment and there are the burglars. Moreover, the sentence presupposes that the burglars have the ability to steal the apartment. Therefore, the speaker directs the addressee to infer that if the apartment has been stolen, the burglars must have done it.

(70) If his apartment has been stolen, we need to be careful of safety of our cars.
(Present)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone who has apartment and the speaker has a car. This sentence leads us to infer that there is a threat. This threat is definitely confirmed with “if his apartment has been stolen”. Therefore, we should be cautious of our cars (Rzayev et al., 2007: 151).

2.3.2. Future (or Predictive) Conditional Sentences

Quirk (1985: 1091) refers to this type as open condition and considers it as part of factual conditional sentences because it “leaves unsolved the question of the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition”. However, Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999: 342) states that they express a different kind of semantic relationship. They refer to future or predictive conditionals because they express future plan or contingencies. For example:

(71) If it is cold, I’ll wear some heavy clothes.

Future (or predictive) conditionals are divided into two types, the first one is the strong condition and result and the second one is degrees of weakened condition or result.

2.3.2.1. The Strong Condition and Result

The common form of this type of conditionals is simple present tense in the if-clause and some explicit indication of future time (like “will” or “be going to”) in a result clause (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343). For example

(72) If you pass the TOFEL. I’ll take you to Disney Land.

The sentence presupposes that there is a test called TOFEL and there is a place called Disney Land. The speaker has the ability to fulfil promise. The result will definitely happen if the condition is fulfilment (Rzayev et al., 2007: 151).

(73) I’ll tell father if you don’t behave yourself.

The sentence presupposes that the addressee’s behavior is not acceptable and the father has ability to control the addressee’s behavior. Therefore, the speaker threatens addressee that he will tell father. The result is sure to happen if the condition is realized (Rzayev et al., 2007: 151).

2.3.2.2. Degrees of Weakened Condition or Result

When the speaker wants to express uncertainty (weak prediction) in the result clause, he may use the modal such as ‘may’ or ‘should’.

(74) If Mark returns the grammar book, I may lend him the syntax one.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Mark and there are two books grammar and syntax. Moreover, the sentence presupposes that the speaker lent Mark the grammar book, but Mark hasn't returned it yet.

Moreover, we use the modals 'should' or the verb 'happen' or both of them to express weakened prediction in the if-clause of future conditional sentences (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343). For example:

(75) If it should rain, I will take my umbrella.

(76) If it happens to rain, I will take my umbrella.

(77) If it should happen to rain, I will take my umbrella.

2.3.3. Imaginative Conditional Sentences

Celce Murcia and Larsen Freeman (1999) use the general term "imaginative conditional" and Quirk (1985) uses the term Hypothetical to refer to conditional sentences that express either an unlikely (Hypothetical) or impossible states or events (Counterfactual).

2.3.3.1. Hypothetical Conditionals

This type of conditionals generally indicates to "unlikely" situations, but even when the state or event is not real in the present (contrary to present), it may become real in the future. Hypothetical conditionals can refer to the future as well as the present (Quirk, 1985: 1091). For example

(78) If Sue had the time, she would go to London. (Present)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sue and there is a time, and moreover, there is a city called London. This sentence expresses imagination that Sue would go to London, but there is a condition. This condition is that she should have a time.

(79) If Sue were to have the time, she would go to Mexico. (Future)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sue and there is a time, and moreover, there is a city called Mexico. This sentence expresses imagination that Sue would go to Mexico, but there is a condition. This condition is that she should have a time.

Note: the “if” clause is not strongly negated here. The negation of “if” clause can be further weakened so that the possibility of the result occurring becomes stronger:

(80) If Sue should have the time, she would go to Mexico.

(81) If Sue happened to have the time, she would go to Mexico.

(82) If Sue should happen to have the time, she would go to Mexico.

(Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343).

2.3.3.2. Counterfactual Conditionals

Counterfactual conditionals indicate to an impossible event or state in “if” clause and they can refer to the present or the past. The “if” clause is strongly negated here (see Yule, 1996: 29). For examples:

(83) If my grandfather were alive today, he would face a very different world.
(Present)

(84) If my grandfather had been alive in 2010, he would have been 100 years old.
(Past)

The most common problem with imaginative conditionals is the relationship between the unusual shape (which tenses are used) and meaning. The past tense refers to the present and the past perfect tense refers to past time. Another problem is that the use of “were” (not “was”) with singular first and third person subjects (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343). For example:

(85) If I were you, I would not do that.

The sentence presupposes that the speaker wishes to be in place of the addressee to do something, but it is impossible.

(86) If it were raining, the streets would be wet.

The sentence presupposes that there is street and this street can be wet, but there is a condition. This condition is that “if it were raining”, but the condition is impossible to be fulfilled (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343)..

Krause (2001:307) defines conditional presuppositions as presuppositional inferences which have the form of a conditional. This presuppositional inference has the form of a sentence “If S_1 , then S_2 , where S_2 is the content of the presupposition and S_1 closely corresponds to another part of the sentence”. Presupposition can be evoked in conditional form already. For example:

(87) Sam knows that if the door is being opened, then the home will be cold.

This example shows that the predictive (or future) conditional sentence which has conditional proposition subsumed under the factive verb (knows) surfaces as a presuppositional inference of the whole sentence “if the door is being opened, then the home will be cold.” (Rzayev et al, 2007: 153)

Rothschild (2008:475-6) states that If A (if clause) hasn’t a presupposition and B (main clause) is an expression with a presupposition P(B), the dominant form is: “ $A \rightarrow P(B)$ ”. He provides his assumption by two evidences. The First one is that “if A entails P(B)”, then there is no presupposition for the entire sentence. Consider the following example:

(88) If Mark got Sue pregnant, Mark knows Sue is pregnant.

In this example “if A” is represented by “Mark got Sue pregnant” and “B” is represented by “Mark knows Sue is pregnant”, and, thus “P(B)” is represented by “Sue is pregnant” then the presupposition of the sentence corresponds to the form “ $A \rightarrow P(B)$ ”. Therefore, the sentence has no presupposition despite of containing an expression with a non-trivial presupposition. The second one is that “if A does not entail P(B), what is taken for granted often seems to be $A \rightarrow P(B)$ (Rothschild, 2008:476). For example:

(89) If Smith tested positive, then he knows he has the disease.

In this example “A” is represented by Smith (tested positive) and “P(B)” is represented by Smith (has the disease). The sentence seems to presuppose the non-tautologous proposition if John tested positive then he has the disease, which is what condition predicts.

Karttunen (1973: 172) indicates that presupposition can be embedded under the antecedent and consequent of conditional sentence. For example:

(90) If John has quit beating Sue, then John no longer resents Sue's infidelity.

In this example, the antecedent clause, "John has quit beating Sue", presupposes that John used to beat Sue. And the main clause, "John no longer resents Sue's infidelity", presupposes that she has been unfaithful. When we consider the conditional sentence as a whole, we find that it presupposes both that John used to beat Sue and that she has been unfaithful. The conditional thus seems to have all the presuppositions that its antecedent and consequent have independently (Karttunen, 1973: 172).

Hatakeyama (2005) makes a comparison between two theories “the presuppositions-as-anaphora theory” and “the satisfaction theory”. He states that the complex sentences include presuppositions which do not necessarily come from a subset of the elementary presuppositions, rather they carry “presuppositions resulting from conditionalized elementary presuppositions”. For example:

- (91) a. If Smith takes a shower, Mary will be surprised by the fact that
there is no more water.
b. If the meeting is a dead-end, Obama will regret that there is
political deadlock.

The example (91) uses the second type of adverbial conditional sentences (predictive or future) in which the result will definitely happen if the condition is fulfilled. Moreover, it contains conditional presuppositions which are exemplified as follow:

- (92) a. If Smith takes a shower, there will be no more water.
b. If the meeting is a dead-end, there will be political deadlock.

The presuppositions-as-anaphora theory wrongly predicts that the most preferred readings to the sentences (91a) and (91b) are the ones where they carry the following unconditional presuppositions:

- (93) a. There is no more hot water.
b. There is political deadlock.

On the contrary, the satisfaction theory predicts that the sentences in (91) carry the conditional presuppositions exemplified in (92). Therefore, the presuppositions-as-anaphora theory is inferior to the satisfaction theory. However, the satisfaction theory often expects presuppositions that are too weak. For example, the satisfaction theory expects that the sentences in (94) carry the conditional presuppositions in (95).

- (94) a. If Smith wants a shower, Mary will be surprised by the fact that there is no more hot water.
b. If The Independent criticizes Obama, he will regret that there is political deadlock.
(95) a. If Smith wants a shower, there will be no more hot water.
b. If The Independent criticizes Obama, there will be political deadlock.

This discussion shows that the presuppositions-as-anaphora theory doesn't have device for weakening elementary presuppositions and, on the other hand, the satisfaction theory doesn't have device for strengthening conditional presuppositions (Hatakeyama, 2005).

2.4. Functional Types of Presupposition

Every language, as well as English language, is a set of words and these words are combined with each other by a set of rules. Understanding the meaning of language requires more than knowing these rules and memorizing words, but it requires knowing the speaker's/writer's intention as well as the culture and convention of that society.

Habitually, language is purposeful and has function. The speaker/writer employs words to convey certain message. The reality of this message is in the mind of the speaker/writer, not in the words. For example:

(96) Close the door.

This sentence is a statement sentence but reflects different meaning, here, the addressee presupposes that the weather is cold out; or may warn that there is a threat. Hence, the same sentence can show different meanings. In other words, the same content presupposes various meanings (illocutionary force).

On the other hand, Yule (1996: 55) claims that different structures can give rise to the same basic structure. In the sense, that the same illocutionary acts can be functioned by different syntactic structures. For example:

- (97) a. Move out of the way!
b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?
c. You are standing in front of the TV.
d. You'd make a better door than a window.

(Yule, 1996: 55)

The main idea of all the examples above is in the sentence (a). The sentences presuppose that there is something important on TV (news, programme, show, etc.). Therefore, the speaker can use different structures to achieve the basic function of the speech act of command/request. The sentence (a) is a direct speech act, and the other sentences are indirect speech acts, but they are used to achieve the basic function (command/request). The sentence (b) is interrogative, whereas (c-d) are declarative (Yule, 1996: 55).

There is a relationship between the three syntactical forms (imperative, interrogative, and declarative) and the three communicative functions (command/request, question, and statement). The nature of this relationship can be presented directly or indirectly. If there is direct correspondence between form and function, the relationship is direct speech act (Akmajian et al., 2001: 368). For example:

- (98) a) You write a short story. (declarative)
b) write a short story. (imperative)
c) Do you write a short story? (interrogative)

From the above three examples, we can see that a direct speech is acted by literal meaning of the word/words uttered. In sentence (a), the speech act of statement is achieved directly via a declarative sentence. In sentence (b) the speech act of command/request is directly noted by the imperative sentence. In sentence (c), the speech act of question is directly realized through an interrogative sentence (Yule, 1996: 54).

On the other hand, if there is no correspondence between form and function, the relationship is indirect speech act expressing a request, offer and suggestion. In such cases of speech act, the speaker/writer uses forms which are typical to perform a definite function. For example:

- (99) a) Can you give me an apple?
b) there is noise outside.
c) Why don't you read Mary's book?

(Radford et al., 2009: 395)

The sentence (a) presupposes that there is an apple and this apple is near to addressee. The speaker does not ask about the ability of the hearer to give him an apple, he asks the hearer to pass him an apple. In other words, it is an imperative sentence in an interrogative fashion. The sentence (b) presupposes that there is a noise and it disturbs the speaker because the door is opened. The sentence is recognized as declarative sentence, but the speaker uses it as a request when he asks someone to close the door. The sentence (c) presupposes that there is someone called Mary and Mary has a book. Moreover, the speaker thinks that the book can be used by the hearer. Therefore, he uses a speech act in which the sentence seems to be interrogative, but it is commonly used as suggestion (Radford et al., 2009: 395).

From what have been mentioned above, we come to conclude that the illocutionary act makes the addressee presuppose what the addresser wants to achieve. According to Searle (1979: 12-7) and Yule (1996: 53-4), we classify illocutionary acts into five types: assertive(representative), directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.

2.4.1. Assertive/Representative

Searle (1979: 12) states that the main purpose of this category is to "commit the speaker (in varying degree) to something being the case, to the truth of expressed proposition.". (Searle 1979: 12) and Yule (1996: 53) shared the viewpoint according which assertive/representative acts enable the speaker to fit the world according to his belief. It can be exemplified as statements of facts, assertions, conclusions, deduction, boasting, complaining, and descriptions. For example:

- (100) a. The earth is flat.
b. Chomsky did not write about peanuts.
c. It was a warm sunny day.

(Yule, 1996: 53)

The sentence (a) presupposes that there is earth and this earth is not zigzag. The sentence (b) presupposes that there exists someone called Chomsky. Chomsky is a writer, but he is not specialized in writing peanuts. The sentence (c) presupposes that there was a cold weather before that day. All the sentences represent facts, conclusions, and description respectively.

2.4.2. Directives

In this class, the speaker tries to direct the addressee to do something. It shows the speaker's desire. The speaker tries to make the world fit the words by the addressee. The sincerity condition refers to desire, hope, or wish. Consequently, the propositional content guides the hearer to do something in future. They are requests, orders, commands, suggestions, beg, plead, pray, entreat, invite, permit, and advise (Huang, 2007: 107). For example:

- (101) a) Gimme a cup of coffee. Make it black.
b) Could you lend me a pen?
c) Don't touch that. (Yule 1996: 54)

The sentence (a) presupposes that the hearer has the ability to prepare a cup of coffee and there are many types of coffee besides black. Therefore, the speaker directs the hearer to give him a black one. The sentence (b) presupposes that the speaker doesn't

have a pen and the hearer has an extra one. The speaker directs the addressee by using request. The sentence (c) presupposes that there is a threat. Therefore, the speaker advises the addressee to be careful and avoid touching that because it is dangerous (Yule 1996: 54).

2.4.3. Commissives

Searle (1979: 14) states that this class makes the addresser commit himself to some future events. They show the speaker's intention and his attempting to make the world fit his words. The sincerity condition refers to the speaker's intention and the propositional content shows that the speaker does something in the future. Yule (1996: 54) states that commissives are promises, threats, refusals and pledges.

(102) I will be back.

The sentence presupposes that the speaker went to another place far from the hearer. Therefore, he commits himself with hearer by promising him.

2.4.4. Expressives

The speaker, by using this class of speech act, expresses his thinking and feelings toward the proposition. Propositional content should be associated with speaker or hearer. The expressive category can be seen as a pleasure, pain, sorrow, like, dislike, joy, apologize, condole, deplore, and welcome (Huang, 2007: 107). For examples:

(103) I'm really sorry.

(104) Congratulations

The sentence (103) presupposes that the speaker did something regrettable and he expresses regret. Therefore, he apologizes for doing that. The sentence (104) presupposes that the addressee has a happy occasion. Therefore, the speaker expresses his pleasure and congratulates the addressee.

2.4.5. Declarations

In this class, the speaker can change the reality of the world by words or utterances. He should have an authority in a specific context to perform the change. This performance is in accord with the proposition of declaration (Yule, 1996: 35). For example:

(105) Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife

(106) Jury Foreman: we find the defendant guilty. (Yule, 1996: 35)

The sentence (105) presupposes that there are a man and a woman who want to marry and the speaker has the authority to declare them as a husband and wife. The sentence (106) presupposes that there is a defendant person waiting for the decision of jury foreman and only the jury foreman has the authority to declare the decision.

II. From the Point of Time Reference

The timeline is divided into three domains: present, past, and future. One can direct a hearer's brain to go to the past, the present, and the future by using verb tenses, adverbs, adjectives and prepositions. In this section, I'll show how the speaker uses presupposition to direct the hearer's brain to the past, the present, and the future.

2..5. Referring to the Past

One of the common problems that encounters us in dealing with the tense is that the tense shows the variability in meaning, depending on the context of use. Maienborn et al. (2012: 2433) state that "to call presuppositional expressions "conventional" or "semantic" is not necessarily to imply that the presuppositions, they trigger, don't depend on the context in any way. For example, although "this" may be viewed as a conventional/semantic presupposition trigger, its interpretation very much depends on the context, obviously". Consider the following example

(107) Charles Babbage invented the computer.

(108) Sue went to the club yesterday.

The sentence (107) shows that the speaker doesn't know the exact time when Charles Babbage invented the computer, and he knows only who invented the computer. we can see that the sentence (107) makes a sense even in this situation. It refers that there exists a past time at which Charles Babbage invented the computer, which is certainly indefinite, while sentence (108) has the meaning that Sue went to the club at a time which is included in the day before the utterance time. Since temporal adverbials like yesterday

refer to a specific time, the past tense in the sentence (108) makes reference to a definite time. The difference between the sentences (107) and (108) shows that the interpretation of tenses might be different from one context to another (Maienborn et al., 2012: 2433).

Song (2005: 28) states that according to the presuppositional treatment, also discussed in Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Song (2004), if the presupposition arising due to a certain expression were satisfied, then we would be able to calculate the semantics of the sentence, and if not, the sentence would be uncalculatable. That is, the sentence would not have truth values. Consider the following sentence

(109) The president of our social club knows something about semantics

The definite description “the president of our social club” in the sentence above presupposes that there exists a president in our social club. If the presupposition evoked by the definite description is felicitous, then the function denoted by “president of our social club” would be in the domain of the function denoted by the definite article “the”, which is assumed to be a partial function. Therefore, we can apply the function “the” to the expression president of our social club, thus, it would be possible to get one unique entity that is a president of our social club. Whereas, the function denoted by “president of our social club” would not be in the domain of “the”, when the presupposition failure takes place. What we thus end up would be that we are unable to continue calculating the meaning (Song, 2005: 28).

Similar to the definite descriptions, tenses trigger presuppositions as well. For example, the past tense presupposes that the time of the eventuality picked out by the sentence in question precedes the utterance time, and the present tense presupposes that the time of an eventuality coincides with the utterance time, and so on. For example:

(110) Martians attacked the earth.

This sentence presupposes that the event of Martians attacking the earth happened before the utterance time. As we saw above in the presuppositional treatment of the definite descriptions, if the presupposition evoked by the past tense is felicitous, then the function denoted by the temporal predicate past would be in the domain of the choice function, which is a partial function. Consequently, we would be able to assign a meaning to this sentence. Whereas, if the presupposition of the sentence above were infelicitous,

the function denoted by the temporal predicate past would not be in the domain of the choice function-i.e. the domain of the choice function is empty. Thus, the choice function would not be able to apply to the function denoted by the temporal predicate past. Consequently, the sentence would not be able to be assigned a meaning (Song, 2005: 28).

Past tense can be referred to by semantic, conditional and functional presuppositions. In the light of semantic types of presupposition, past tense can be identified in the following types:

(a) Implicative Predicates

(111) Sam forgot/didn't forget to write a message.

The sentence presupposes that Sam ought to have written, or intended. This means that the presupposition of the sentence refers to the event before the time of utterance (in the past) (Levinson, 1983: 181).

(b) Factive Verbs

(112) Mark knows/doesn't know that Maria passed the exam.

This sentence presupposes that there is existential represented by Maria and Mark, and moreover, there is an exam. The sentence refers that Maria passed the exam before the utterance time (in the past).

(c) Change of State Verbs/ Aspectual Verbs

(113) Natalia began/didn't begin to ski.

This sentence presupposes that there is someone called Natalia and She hadn't been skiing before the time of utterance (Saeed, 2009:108).

(d) Counterfactual Verb

(114) Jane pretended that she passed the exam.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Jane and there was an exam before the utterance time. Moreover, she claims that she passed the exam, but she didn't.

(e) Iteratives

(115) Mary bought/didn't buy another pen.

This sentence presupposes that there is someone called Mary and there is a pen. She had a pen before buying this pen.

(f) Conventional Items

(116) Sue cleaned the room.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sue and there is a room. This room was dirty.

(g) Cleft Sentences

(117) It was Sandra who helped the old man.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sandra and there is an old man. She helped the old man before the time of utterance.

(h) Wh-Questions

(118) When did you meet Sue?

This question presupposes that there is someone called Sue and the addressee met Sue before the time of question.

(i) Adverbial Clauses

(119) When the lecturer was speaking Sam wrote the notes.

The adverbial clause presupposes that there is a lecturer and there is someone called Sam. The events of speaking and writing refer to the past.

In the sense of conditionalized types of presupposition, past tense can be identified in the following points:

(a) Habitual Factual Conditionals, sometimes, refer to the past tense. For example:

(120) If my father said, "Jump!" Sam jumped. (Past)

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sam and he is obedient. Moreover, he has the ability to jump, but there is a habitual condition. This condition is that when my father said, "Jump!" Sam jumped. The event of this habit refers to the past (Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman, 1999: 341).

(b) Implicit inference conditionals, sometimes, refer to the past tense. For example:

(121) If there was a happy man in the world that night, it was John Tunney.

The sentence presupposes that there was a happy man and there is a world. Moreover, there was someone called John Tunney. We can infer that John Tunney was a happy man. The event of the sentence refers to the past before the utterance time (Schachter, 1971:70).

In the light of functional presupposition, past tense can be recognized in the following points:

(a) Assertives /representatives type, sometimes, refers to the past tense. For example:

(122) Chomsky did not write about peanuts.

The sentence presupposes that there exists someone called Chomsky and Chomsky is a writer, but he is not specialized in writing peanuts. Moreover, he didn't write about peanuts before the time of utterance.

(b) Expressives, sometimes, refer to the past tense. For example:

(123) I'm really sorry.

(124) Congratulations.

The sentence (123) presupposes that the speaker did something regrettable in the past (before the time of apologizing). Therefore, he expresses regret for doing that. The sentence (124) presupposes that the addressee has a happy occasion in the past (before the time of Congratulations). Therefore, the speaker expresses his pleasure and congratulates him.

2.6. Referring to the Present

Tense has a role in the actualization of predictions. The meaning of tense is, in fact, a special case of definite reference, where the definite feature occurs within a modifying prediction of time (Leech, 1985 :164). In this section, I'll show how the present tense presupposes that the time of an eventuality coincides with the utterance time by concerning on some types of presupposition. Present tense can be referred to by semantic, pragmatic, functional and conditionalized presupposition.

In the shade of semantic types of presupposition, present tense can be identified in the following:

comparative construction

(125) Smith is a better journalist than Mark.

This sentence presupposes that there are existential presuppositions represented by Smith and Mark. Moreover, they are journalists. The tense of comparison is present- it coincides with the utterance time (Levinson, 1983: 182).

In the light of pragmatics presupposition, present tense can be identified in the following examples

(126) Do you want your din-din?

The sentence presupposes that the addressee is a child or possibly a pet and this child has a din-din, moreover, the speaker is his father/mother or his eldest brother/sister who offers him to wear it at the time of utterance (Bates, 1996: 22).

(127) Can you please wait for me? My daughter still needs to be dropped off at school.

This example of pragmatic presupposition presents when the addressee and the addresser do not share the same presupposition. The addressee does not know that the addresser has a daughter before the utterance time. Therefore, the addresser takes the presupposition for granted and he expects that the addressee will be able to do so at the utterance time.

(128) Since Bill and Harry left, most politicians are dishonest.

This sentence consists of two parts. The first part has a past tense in which the clause presupposes that there were politicians called “Bill and Harry”. Those politicians are left and there are other politicians who are still in the government. The second part has the present tense because it refers to habit in which the addresser presupposes that there are influential ‘dishonest’ politicians. Those dishonest’ politicians forced “Bill and Harry” to leave the government (Sadock, 1978: 288).

According to implicature, particularized conversational implicature can be referred to present tense.

(129) A: Where is my book?

B: Your young sister is drawing something.

This example presupposes that the (A) has a book, but he doesn't know where it is, and he has a sister. Moreover, he has only one young sister. His sister is drawing the book at the time of asking the question (Levinson, 1983: 126).

In the light of conditionalized presupposition, present tense can be referred to by the following points:

(a) Generic factual conditionals express the true and unchanging relationships and use the simple present tense in both clauses. For example:

(130) If you heat water to 100C, it boils.

(Rzayev et al., 2007: 150)

This sentence presupposes that the water has a generic factual feature. This feature is that it can be heated and boiled, but there is a condition to boil the water. This condition is that the water should be heated up to 100C to boil. The presupposition refers to the present tense because the sentence refers to the fact.

(b) The habitual factual conditional sentence is often used in conversation. When these conditionals express habit, both clauses use the same tense. This type of condition, sometimes, uses the present tense. For example:

(131) If I make the food, Jane washes the dishes.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Jane and there are dishes. Jane washes the dishes, but there is a habitual condition. This condition is that the speaker should make the food then Jane washes the dishes. Since the sentence refers to habit, the present tense can be used (Celce-Murcia and Larsen Freeman, 1999: 341).

In functional type of presupposition, the present tense can be identified by using:

(a) assertive/representative

(132) The earth is flat.

The sentence presupposes that there is earth and this earth is not zigzag. Since the sentence expresses/asserts the fact, therefore, the present tense is used (Yule, 1996: 53).

(b) Declarations

(133) Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.

This sentence presupposes that there are a man and a woman who want to marry and the speaker has the authority to declare them as a husband and wife. Since the sentence uses the adverb “now”, it refers to the present tense (Yule, 1996: 35) .

McCawley (1971: 106) indicates that the conditional range of quantifier includes the present related to the question of presupposition of present perfect. For example:

(134) Frege has visited Turkey.

He contends that the false proposition that Frege is alive is not presupposed by the sentence but inferred from its presupposition and factual knowledge that he should be alive to visit Turkey. Moreover, the presupposition has nothing to do with the matter of the surface subject (McCawley, 1971: 106). In the following example, although the sentence is in the present perfect, they commit the speaker belief that the subject refers to someone whose being alive depends on the rest of the sentence.

(135) Aristotle has contributed a lot to my thinking.

(136) Aristotle has been denounced by many people.

(137) Aristotle has been frightened by many people.

Aristotle has to be alive for people to frighten him, but he doesn't have to be alive for people to denounce him.

McCawley (1971: 106) states that the topic rather than subject is directly related to presupposition. For examples:

(138) Frege has visited Turkey.

(139) Turkey has been visited by Frege.

In the sentence (138), the speaker is talking about events of visiting Turkey not just events of Frege visiting Turkey, but in (139), the speaker is talking about events of Frege visiting- in the sentence (138) the events can still happen since Turkey still exists, but in the sentence (139) cannot happen because Frege is no longer alive.

“The presupposition in an existential present perfect appears to be that the range of the variable which the existential quantifier binds is a period during which the event or state designated by propositional function in the scope of quantifier can happen or be the case. Since the present perfect can only be used if the range includes the present, the presupposition is that the present is included in the period in which the designatum of the propositional function in question can happen or be the case” (McCawley, 1971: 106).

2.7. Referring to the Future

It is well known that future tense in English is encoded as a category of mood. Lyons (1977:677-8) indicates that “the future tense sentences are sometimes used to refer to non-factals as hypotheses, wishes, etc. These facts reflect the debate among philosophers whether to treat sentences in future as declarative statements like sentences in past-tense, or as modalized propositions. He claims that we must analyze future sentence intentionally and a subjectively modalized utterance expressing a prediction rather than as a statement. But later Lyons himself shows that a future sentence can be embedded in a factive predicate”. For example:

(140) John knows that it will snow

Present tense can be referred to by conditionalized and functional presupposition.

(a) One type of conditional sentences is future (or predictive). These sentences express future plan or contingencies. For example:

(141) If you pass the TOFEL. I'll take you to Disney Land.

The sentence presupposes that there is a test called TOFEL and there is a place called Disney Land. The speaker has the ability to fulfil promise. The result will definitely happen if the condition is fulfilment(Rzayev et al., 2007: 151).

(b) Hypothetical conditionals generally indicate to “unlikely” situations, but even when the state or event is not real in the present (contrary to present), it may become real in the future. For example:

(142) If Sue were to have the time, she would go to Mexico.

The sentence presupposes that there is someone called Sue and there is a city called Mexico. This sentence expresses imagination that Sue would go to Mexico, but there is a

condition. This condition is that she should have a time. The result part of the sentence refers to the future (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 343).

(c) In directives type of speech act, the speaker tries to direct the addressee to do something. The sincerity condition refers to desire, hope, or wish. Consequently, the propositional content guides the hearer to do something in future. For example:

(143) Gimme a cup of coffee. Make it black.

This sentence presupposes that the hearer has the ability to prepare a cup of coffee and there are many types of coffee rather black. Therefore, the speaker directs the hearer to give him a black coffee. The events of making and giving a cup of coffee follow the utterance time (future).

(d) The use of commissives types of speech act reveals that the addresser commits himself to some future events. For example:

(144) We will not do that.

The sentence presupposes that there is more than one person, and moreover, there is something to do in the future. Therefore, they pledge themselves that they will not do that.

Chapter Three

Presupposition and Text Organization

3.1. Presupposition and Proposition.

3.1.1. Proposition

Aristotle and Barnes (1995: 39) state that proposition is a statement which confirms or denies something of something. This proposition could be universal, particular or indefinite. Universal proposition indicates to “something belongs to all or none of something”; while particular proposition refers to statement that it “belongs to some or not to some or not to all”, and indefinite proposition indicates to the statement may/may not belong, there is no indicator of being universal or particular.

Crystal (2008: 392) defines proposition as a term derived from philosophy which is used in linguistics as part of grammatical or semantic analysis. He adds that truth value can be specified because it is comprehended “to refer to the sense of a declarative sentence, with all ambiguity, vagueness and deixis resolved”.

Rzayev et al. (2007: 243) define proposition as “a unit of meaning which constitutes the underlying representation of statement in the form of simple declarative sentence. In linguistics, the interest is primarily in the way how a single meaningful form can be analyzed in term of several propositions”. For example:

(1) Those young colored girls play tennis.

The sentence expresses the propositions: (i) The girls play tennis. (ii) The girls are colored. (iii) The girls are young. They add that “the term is also often used to explain how two different sentences logically mean the same. For example, ‘He is easy to please’ and ‘it is easy to please him’ can be said to have the same propositional meaning.” (Rzayev et al., 2007: 243).

Hurford et al. (2007: 20; 22) define proposition as a part of the meaning of the utterance which can be represented by declarative, interrogative or imperative sentence. The difference between the proposition of declarative sentence and the proposition of

interrogative and imperative sentence is that, in the declarative sentence, the addresser asserts the proposition while, in the interrogative and imperative sentence, the addresser can “mention a particular proposition, without asserting its truth”. Consider the following examples

(2) Smith can swim.

(3) Can Smith swim?

In uttering, ‘Smith can swim’ the addresser asserts the proposition that Smith can swim. Whereas in uttering ‘Can Smith swim?’ the addresser gives the same proposition but questions its truth. We say that corresponding declaratives and interrogatives (and imperatives) have the same propositional content.

3.1.2. Surface Structures and Underlying Representations:

“Each sentence has two levels of structure: (i) surface structure which represents its linear arrangement of clauses, phrases, and words. (ii) underlying representation indicates to its meaning which consists that are interrelated in a particular way. Loosely speaking, the surface structure says how the sentence is to be spoken, and the underlying representation says how it is to be understood or what it means” (Rzayev et al., 2007: 192; Clark and Clark, 1977: 12-3). For example:

(4) The fresh young troops defeated Napoleon's army.




Figure 3.1. A Hierarchical Tree (Clark and Clark, 1977: 12)

In this example, there are two levels of structure. The surface structure of the sentence is represented in hierarchical tree, as in figure above, which shows how each large phrase consists of one or more smaller phrases. The example divides into noun phrase (The fresh young troops) and a verb phrase (defeated Napoleon's army). The NP, in turn, subdivides into an article (the) and a nominal (fresh young troops) which itself further divides into two adjectives and noun. The VP divides into main verb (defeated) and a NP (Napoleon's army), which subdivides into a genitive and a noun. The underlying representation of the sentence, in contrast, consists of the four propositions expressed in a particular arrangement (Rzayev et al., 2007: 192).

- (5) a. The troops were fresh.
 b. The troops were young.
 c. The army belonged to Napoleon.
 d. The troops defeated the army

“The main idea of the whole sentence is expressed in (d) and the other proposition (a-c) restrict its elements in (d) to make it clear what troops and what army are being talked about. Sentences (a) and (b) specify that the troops were fresh and young, and (c)

specifies that the army belonged to Napoleon. Thus, "The fresh young troops defeated Napoleon's army" seems to consist of four simple sentences-propositions packed into a single sentence" (Rzayev et al., 2007: 192).

3.1.3. Propositions as Units of Meaning

"In the sentence "The fresh young troops defeated Napoleon's army", there are four different things can be expressed, while each sentence in it expresses only one of them. But what are those four things?" (Rzayev et al., 2007: 193).

They are "clearly not sentences or even clauses, for the whole sentence is made up of "sentence" or "clause" (a), (b), (c) and (d). Rather, they are units of meaning called propositions". When these propositions are put together in just the right way, they constitute the meaning of a whole sentence. As a next step, one can think that each proposition matches to a unitary idea. Thus, in sentence there are four ideas represented by its propositions- about the freshness of troops, the youth of the troops, the possession of the army by Napoleon, and the defeat of his army by the troops (Rzayev et al., 2007: 193; Clark and Clark, 1977: 11-2).

What makes this analysis so important is that it shows that meaning units have a relatively simple form. Propositions distinguish only a few different types. The main ones are illustrated below:

	Sentences	Verbal Unit	Nouns
(6)	a. John walks.	Walks	John
	b. John is polite.	is polite	John
	c. John eats apple.	eats	John, apple
	d. John is in Washington.	is in	John, Washington
	e. John gives Rex to Molly.	gives	John, Rex, Molly

"These examples show that each proposition consists of a verbal unit plus one or more nouns. Proposition expressed by a. and b. have a verbal unit plus one noun; those expressed by c. and d. have a verbal unit plus two nouns; and the one expressed by e. has a verbal unit plus three nouns. Although the verbal units are expressed by single and simple form verbs (walks, eats, and gives), it can also be expressed by "be + adjective"

(is polite) or by “be + preposition” (is in)”. The important point is that each proposition describes an elementary state or action-spelled out in the verbal unit and one or more entities (i.e. nouns) involved in that state or action. Thus "John eats apple" describes the action of eating and specifies that the entities involved in this action are "John" and "apple” (Rzayev et al., 2007: 193; Clark and Clark, 1977: 11-2).

3.1.4. Combination of Propositions

Speech would be very odd if people had to speak in sentences expressing only one proposition each. Every sentence would be “short and unrelated to its neighbours and it would take a long time to say anything. Languages, therefore, have systemic ways of relating propositions to each other in order to economize speaking and listening time. On the one hand, they have different ways of combining propositions to form complex surface structure” (Rzayev et al, 2007: 194) . For examples:

(7) John speaks English.

(8) Ahmed speaks Arabic

The propositions expressed in these sentences can be combined to form ‘John speaks English and Ahmed speaks Arabic’. On the other hand , languages have methods for condensing complicated surface structures into neater, more concise ones, without any changes in meaning. For example ‘John speaks English and Ahmed Arabic’ (Clark and Clark, 1977: 13-4).

The same can be said of (a-d) the meaning units of which can be combined in different ways to yield surface structures and underlying representations that differ from those of the sentence ‘The fresh young troops defeated Napoleon’s army’ . consider the following propositions:

- (9) a. The young troops that defeated Napoleon’s army were fresh.
b. The fresh troops that defeated Napoleon’s army were young.
c. The army that the fresh young troops defeated belonged to Napoleon.
d. The troops that were fresh and young defeated the army that belonged to Napoleon.

Although these sentences all express the same four propositions, “they do it in different ways. The main idea in the sentence a. is that the troops were fresh. The rest of proposition is to restrict or qualify parts of this idea. We can see that all the sentences have the same proposition, therefore, they can paraphrase each other because they refer to the same objective proposition” (Rzayev et al, 2007: 194).

Dividing sentences into proposition shows how paraphrases like these are related to another and what factors interact in pointing to links between sentences.

Propositions or sentences “combine in different ways benefiting from the elements of coordination technically called deletion or ellipsis, substitution and indirect answering” (Rzayev et al, 2007: 194). The function of these processes is fundamentally different. Speaking, generally, coordination links ideas through the process which:

1. A constituent of some underlying structure is omitted from the surface structure (deletion).
2. We omit in order to avoid repetition.
3. While substitution refers to the process or result of replacing one item with another at a particular place in a sentence structure.

These three processes seem to cover the basic ways people have for thinking of one idea in relation to another. Indirect responses, in their turn, play an essential role in fulfilling the so-called effective function of language economically” (Rzayev et al, 2007: 194-5).

3.1.5. Interplay of Presupposition and Proposition

There are two types of presupposition “logical” (or Linguistic) and “pragmatic” presuppositions. A logical presupposition treats presupposition as a relation between propositions, defined in terms of their truth and falsehood. Whereas pragmatic presupposition treats presupposition as a question of the status of speech act in relation to the speaker’s or hearer’s belief (Leech, 1974: 154).

In the logical form “X presupposes Y”, the logical presupposition assumes that X and Y are propositions. If they are not propositions, presupposition cannot be defined in terms of truth-value condition. But this is unfortunate limitation because the relation

between X and Y intuitively seems to be much the same, whether X is a proposition or some other type of semantic entity (Leech 1974: 280). Consider the following examples

- (10) a. The book you borrowed from the library is valuable. (proposition)
b. The book you borrowed from the library is not valuable. (negative proposition)
c. Is the book you borrowed from the library valuable? (yes-no question)
d. When did you borrow the book from the library? (wh-question)
e. See that you return the book you borrowed from the library. (command)
f. What an interesting book you borrowed from the library! (exclamation)

Although only (a) and (b) are propositions, “all these carry presupposition ‘you borrowed from the library’ or at least they do if we take presupposition in a broad and readily interpretable sense of ‘the speaker of X purports to take for granted the truth of Y’. It would be very artificial, in particular, to separate(c) from (a) and (b), and to say that only the first two, as propositions, have presupposition—the view we have to take if we restrict presupposition to its logical sense” (Leech 1974: 280).

Stalnaker (1970: 279) states that to presuppose a proposition is “to take its truth for granted, and to assume that others involved in the context do the same”. Stalnaker (2002: 701) analyzed “taking a proposition for granted” as a propositional attitude which can be interpreted as an action of a kind:

Speaker presupposition is a propositional attitude of the speaker, but I and others who have emphasized the role of speaker presupposition in the explanation of linguistic phenomena have been vague and equivocal about exactly what propositional attitude it is. To presuppose something is to take it for granted, or at least to act as if one takes it for granted, as background information—as common ground among the participants in the conversation.

Therefore, presuppositions are inferred by the addresser, in the sense that presupposing a proposition is a form of decision made by the addresser to treat some information as already known by the addressee. Kempson developed this idea by providing that presupposing a proposition amounts to treating it as belonging to the common knowledge, or universe of discourse. For example, the use a definite noun phrase

in the utterance of sentence (used as a topic) indicates that “(a) that the speaker believes that there is an object to which the noun phrase refers, (b) that the speaker believes that the hearer believes that there is an object to which the noun phrase refers, and (c) the speaker believes that the hearer knows which object is referred to” (Kempson, 1975: 17).

We can say that presupposition is when a proposition’s truth regarding background information of an utterance is taken for granted. For instance, in the utterance

(11) Mark’s cats are white and furry.

It presupposes that Mark has cats. As has been mentioned before, presuppositions may be seen from a logical and pragmatic viewpoint. But we can also consider them as having a combination of both semantic and pragmatic properties. It is the interaction between the logic (semantics) and the extra-linguistic world (pragmatics) that helps us to extract a presupposition from an utterance.

3.2. Cohesion and Propositional Development

Widdowson (1978: 25) states that sentences are textually appropriate when they express propositions in such a way as to fit into the propositional development of discourse as a whole. For example:

- (12) A: Well, did you talk to him?
 B: Yes, I did (talk to him).
 A: When did he say the book would be returned?
 B: (He said that the book would be returned) tomorrow.
 A: Good. I’ll meet him in the library.
 B: He said that his friend would return it.

This fragment of discourse shows that the question of ‘A’ refers what he wants to know and the answers of ‘B’ organize the information he has to impart in such a way as to satisfy A’s need. Therefore, the propositions expressed by ‘A’ are related up with those expressed by ‘B’ to form a continuous propositional development. Consequently, we can say that the forms of utterances of ‘A’ and ‘B’ are contextually appropriate and so ensure that their exchange is cohesive (Widdowson, 1978: 25).

3.3. Cohesion, Presupposing and Presupposed Items

Halliday and Hasan (1976: 4) state that “cohesion occurs where the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one presupposes the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by recourse to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up, and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are thereby at least potentially integrated into a text”. This means that cohesion is proved in the relations that exist within text between a presupposed item and a presupposing item. For example:

(13) Mark plays football. Yesterday, he played volleyball

In this sentences, the pronoun "he" is the presupposing item and "Mark" is the presupposed item. Another example which adopted from (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:4)

(14) Wash and core *six cooking apples*. Put *them* into a fireproof dish.

We can note that, in the second sentence, the pronoun ‘them’ indicates, anaphorically, to the ‘six cocking apples’ in the first sentence. This anaphoric function of the pronoun ‘them’ gives cohesion to the two sentences. Johnson and Jonson (1998: 55) add that in this example, the interpretation of the pronoun ‘them’ presupposes the meaning 'six cooking apples'. Consequently, there is a cohesion between the presupposing and the presupposed elements.

3.4. The Role of Presupposition in Text Organization

In this section, we’ll analyze three texts adopted from Carter (2001:143-4) to show the role of presupposition in text organization.

Text (1) : Romantic Narrative

(1) Melodie Neil and Jed Martin were old friends. (2) She knew that he loved her-in a calm settled way rather than any grand passion—and that he would make her a good, kind husband. (3) In short, when she became engaged to him she knew exactly what she was doing. (4) So she hated it when that infuriating Keith Scott seemed to go out of his way to suggest that her heart wasn’t in the affair.

Presupposition	Form of trigger	Type of Trigger	trigger
There are two persons called Melodie Neil and Jed Martin.	Definite description	Existential	Melodie Neil and Jed Martin
The narrator refers that Jed Martin loved Melodie Neil	Factive	Lexical	knew
The narrator refers that there are two (or more) types of passion.	Comparative	Structural	settled way rather than any grand passion
The narrator refers that Jed Martin would make her a good kind husband	Factive	lexical	knew
She had not been engaged to him before.	Change of state verbs	lexical	became engaged
she was doing something	Factive	Lexical	knew
There is someone called Keith Scott.	Definite description	Existential	Keith Scott



Table 3.1. Analyzing Presupposition Triggers in Text 1.

Presupposing Item		Presupposed Item		Type Of Cohesion
Item	Sentence No:	Item	Sentence No:	
old friends	1	Melodie Neil and Jed Martin	1	Lexical cohesion

loved	2	Melodie Neil and Jed Martin	1	Lexical cohesion
She	2	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
He	2	Jed Martin	1	Personal reference
her	2	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
grand passion	2	a calm settled way	2	Comparative reference
he	2	Jed Martin	1	Personal reference
a good, kind husband		Jed Martin	1	Lexical cohesion
She	3	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
him		Jed Martin	1	Personal reference
became engaged to	3	Melodie Neil	1	Lexical cohesion
She	3	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
she	3	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
was doing	3	Melodie Neil	1	Lexical cohesion
She	4	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
hated	4	Melodie Neil	1	Lexical cohesion
go out of his way	4	Keith Scott	4	Lexical cohesion
his	4	Keith Scott	4	Personal reference
suggest	4	Keith Scott	4	Lexical cohesion

her	4	Melodie Neil	1	Personal reference
heart	4	Melodie Neil	1	Lexical cohesion
in the affair	4	Melodie Neil	1	Lexical cohesion
Melodie Neil, Jed Martin, friends, husband, Keith Scott	1; 2; 4	humans	-----	Lexical cohesion
Loved, in a calm, passion, hated, heart, the affair.	2; 4	Emotions	-----	Lexical cohesion
Past tense verbs	1-4	Narrative	-----	Gramatical cohesion

Table 3.2. Analysing of Cohesion, Presupposing Item and Presupposed Item in Text 1.



Text (2): Advertisement for a Financial Investment Product

(1) Do you feel that you never get a fair slice of the capital cake? (2) We do, too. (3) That's why we created 'Portfolio', a brand new concept in saving. (4) Portfolio is a high interest investment account that makes your money work for you, while still giving you instant access to your capital. (5) So that way, you can have your cake and eat it too.



Presupposition	Form of trigger	Type of Trigger	trigger
They feel that they never get a fair slice of the capital cake before.	Iteratives	Lexical	too
There is something called 'Portfolio'	Definite description	Existential	'Portfolio'
They created 'Portfolio'	adverbial clauses	Structural	That's why we created 'Portfolio'
This concept was not found in saving.	Iteratives	Lexical	new concept
There is something called 'Portfolio'	your money	Existential	'Portfolio'
The addressee has money	Definite description	Existential	your money
The addressee has capital	Definite description	Existential	your capital
The addressee has cake (metaphorically)	Definite description	Existential	your cake

Table 3.3. Analyzing Presupposition Triggers in Text 2.

Presupposing Item		Presupposed Item		Type Of Cohesion
Item	Sentence No:	Item	Sentence No:	
you	1	heares	-----	personal reference
you	1	you	1	reiteration
we	2	advertisers	1	personal reference

we	3	advertisers	1	personal reference
we	3	we	2	reiteration
that	3	we never get a fair slice of the capital cake	1	demonstrative reference
capital cake (metaphorically)	1	portfolio	3	lexical cohesion
do	2	we never get a fair slice of the capital cake	1	substitution
new concept	3	portfolio	3	lexical cohesion
saving	3	portfolio	3	lexical cohesion
portfolio	4	portfolio	3	reiteration
investment account	4	portfolio	3	lexical cohesion
that makes your money work for you	4	portfolio	3	lexical cohesion
capital	4	capital	1	reiteration
you can have your cake and eat it	5	win	-----	lexical cohesion
capital cake (metaphor), portfolio, saving, money.	1, 3, and 4	financial investment	-----	lexical cohesion

Table 3.4. Analysing of Cohesion, Presupposing Item and Presupposed Item in Text 2.



Text (3): Recipe for Baked Apples in Mulled Wine

(1) Wash and core the apples, taking care to remove all pips. (2) Slice finely. (3) Put them into a fireproof dish with the water, and a tablespoon of the sugar. (4) Ensuring that the lid is tightly sealed, put the dish into a preheated oven, Gas Regulo 6. (5) Reduce temperature to 3 after 10 minutes. (6) Allow the fruit to steam in its own juice for a further 15 minutes. (7) Spoon out the cooked apples and arrange them attractively in rounds on a serving plate. (8) Mix juice with the brandy, mulled wine, and rest of the sugar. (9) Pour over the top, and serve with double cream.

Presupposition	Form of trigger	Type of Trigger	trigger
There are apples.	Difinite description	Existential	the apples
The apples are not clean	Conventional	Lexical	wash and core
	Difinite description	Existential	pips
There are pipes on the apples	Conventional	Lexical	remove all pips
The final step is slice.	Conventional	Lexical	finely

There is something called fireproof dish	Difinite description	Existential	fireproof dish
There is something called the water.	Difinite description	Existential	the water
There is something called sugar.	Difinite description	Existential	the sugar
There is something called lid.	Difinite description	Existential	the lid
There is something called dish.	Difinite description	Existential	the dish
There is something called oven.	Difinite description	Existential	oven
There is something can be measured	Difinite description	Existential	temperature
Not alloweded before	Change of state verbs	lexical	Allow
There is something called fruit.	Difinite description	Existential	the fruit
The fruit has juice	Difinite description	Existential	its own juice
There are something called cooked apples.	Difinite description	Existential	the cooked apples
when the cooked apples spoon out, they are not arrange	Change of state verbs	lexical	arrange
There are rounds shapes.	Difinite description	Existential	rounds
There is something called juice.	Difinite description	Existential	juice



There is something called brandy and mulled wine.	Definite description	Existential	the brandy, mulled wine
There is something called sugar.	Definite description	Existential	the sugar

Table 3.5. Analyzing Presupposition Triggers in Text 3.

Presupposing Item		Presupposed Item		Type of Cohesion
Item	Sentence No:	Item	Sentence No:	
the	1	Apples	1	Demonstrative reference
and	1	Additional information	-----	Lexical cohesion
taking care to remove all pips< >	1	taking care to remove all pips< from apples>	1	Ellipsis
Slice < > finally	2	Slice < apples> finally	1	Ellipsis
them	3	The apples	1	Personal reference
and	3	Additional information	-----	Lexical cohesion
the	2	Sugar	2	Demonstrative reference
the	4	the lid of fireproof	4	Demonstrative reference
the lid< >.	4	the lid<of the fireproof>	3	Ellipsis
The	4	The fireproof dish	3	Ellipsis

Gas Regulo 6	4	Regulator of oven	4	Lexical cohesion
Reduce temperature to 3 after 10 minutes	5	Regulator of oven		Lexical cohesion
the	6	the fruit	6	Demonstrative reference
Its	6	its	6	Personal reference
The	7	The apples	1	Demonstrative reference
and	7	Additional information	-----	Lexical cohesion
Them	7	The cooked apples	7	Personal reference
juice	7	juice	6	reiteration
and	8	Additional information	-----	Lexical cohesion
Pour < >over the top	9	Pour<juice>over the top	8	ellipsis
and	9	Additional information	-----	Lexical cohesion
Imperatives verbs	1-9	Instruction/directive	-----	grammatical cohesion
ingredients with measurements, food items, cooking terms, timing	1-9	kitchen equipment	-----	Lexical cohesion

Table 3.6. Analysing of Cohesion, Presupposing Item and Presupposed Item in Text 3.



Analysis of presupposition of three texts shows that existential presupposition has ranked the first scoring 28.57 for the first text and 62.5 and 76.19 for the second and third texts respectively followed by lexical presupposition which has scored 57.14 for the first text and 25 and 23.8 for the second and third texts respectively. The analysis of cohesion devices shows that lexical cohesion has ranked the first scoring 50 for the first text and 43.75 and 34.78 for the second and third texts followed by personal reference which has scored 45.83 for the first text and 18.75 and 13.63 for the second and third texts respectively.

Analyzing of three different texts shows that English texts rely heavily on existential and lexical presuppositions which play the main role in developing the propositions from the beginning of the text till the end. According to Halliday and Hasan's definition, "cohesion occurs where the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one presupposes the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by recourse to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up, and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are thereby at least potentially integrated into a text". In other words, the analysis of three texts that have been discussed shows that any text consists of a set of elements. These elements are linked with each other by a set of rules. The combination of these elements and rules plays essential role in developmental aspect of the text. The nature of these elements is

represented by the cohesive devices and presupposition triggers which in turn contribute effectively in economizing the text as well as establishing its continuity. This leads us to conclude that economy and continuity of text contribute in making textual communication which in turn help to build ground depending on the idea that each idea is hanged together (coherence).

3.5. Presupposition and Communicative Organization of Text/ Clause/ Sentence (Theme (Old) – Rheme (New)).

The given (old)-new information is a distinction in which the speaker is obliged to make choice between given (old) information and new information. Chafe (1970: 210-11; 1976: 30) states that declarative sentences convey two kinds of information: (i) Information which the addresser and addressee already knows and accepts as true, and (ii) information which the addresser introduces to the addressee for the first time (see Clark and Haviland 1977). Linguists refer to this distinction in terms of its function. Halliday (1967) used the terms "given" and "new," Chafe (1970) "old" and "new," and Akmajian (1973), Chomsky (1971), and Jackendoff (1972) "presupposition" and "focus".

Lyons (1968: 334-5) states that the 'theme' of the sentence indicates to the part which is already known or given in the context-what is talked about, whereas the 'rheme' indicates to the part which introduces new information-what is being said about it. Accordingly, he distinguishes between theme and rheme, a distinction which has been closely related to the distinction between subject and predicate where a subject is defined as 'a person or thing about which something is said'-referred as a topic, and the predicate as 'the statement made about that person or thing'-referred as the comment.

Noordman (1978: 289) refers to Clark's opinion that the speaker is cooperative if he communicates information he thinks the addressee already knows as given information and information he thinks the listener doesn't know as new information. He can do this by using a certain syntactic construction or a certain stress pattern. The addressee, in turn, divides incoming information into given (old) and new information, he then checks his memory for a unique antecedent that corresponds the given information; the new information is integrated into memory by linking it to that unique antecedent.

Akmajian, et al (2001: 450) refer to the importance of distinction information that is given, unfocused, or presupposed, from information that is asserted, new, or focused. There are many devices which can be used by the speaker to mark this distinction such as the definite article (the), passive voices, repeating adverbs (again), cleft constructions, and various topicalization constructions to make the focus of their thoughts clear. Consider the following examples

- (15) a. A girl came for the money.
b. The girl came for the money.
- (16) a. A friend of ours met John at the airport.
b. John was met at the airport by a friend of ours.
- (17) a. This valentine Mark got drunk.
b. This valentine Mark got drunk again.
- (18) a. Mark got drunk at valentine.
b. It was Mark who got drunk at valentine.
c. What Mark did was to get drunk at valentine.
d. As for Mark, he got drunk at valentine.

Thus, in (15b) the addresser may take the identity of the girl as known. In (16b) John is already the focus or a topic of conversation. In (17b) it is assumed that Mark has been drunk at valentine before. In (18b) it is assumed that someone got drunk at valentine. In (18c) it is assumed that Mark did something, and in (18d) Mark is the focus or a topic of conversation.

Clark and Haviland (1974: 105-6) proposed that the addresser and addressee have given-new strategies: (i) the addressee must try to correspond the information of found in the presuppositions of a sentence with some aspect of his background knowledge. If the presuppositions of the sentence do not correspond to something the addressee already knows, the strategy will fail, and he will have to use a different procedure by which he treats the presuppositions as new information and set up a new structure in memory essentially unrelated to facts he already knows. Thus, if the presuppositions overlap with previous knowledge, the sentence should be easy to comprehend; if the presuppositions do not correspond, or correspond only in some rather oblique way, the sentence needs

longer time to be comprehended. (ii) the given-new strategy leads the addressee to believe that the presuppositions of a sentence contain given information and the assertion new information. If, in fact, the assertion contains given information, this strategy should fail badly. The addressee will be obligated to change his strategy and take more time in comprehending the sentence. Moreover, he will find sentences with such inversions relatively unacceptable. For example:

- (19) a. It was David who fell.
 b. Given: Someone fell.
 c. New: That person was David.

The ‘b’ and ‘c’ portions refer to the given-new information of the sentence. Moreover, the sentence presupposes that someone fell, indicating that the speaker of the sentence presumed that the addressee already knew this fact. It asserts that the someone was David, indicating that the addresser presumed that the addressee did not already know that fact.

Presupposed information can be evoked by restrictive relative clauses. For example:

- (20) a. The student who passed linguistics exam was intelligent.
 b. Given: There was a student, and he passed linguistics exam.
 c. New: He was intelligent.

English sentences start with definite noun phrases because indefinite noun phrases presuppose that the addressee doesn’t know its referent yet, therefore, it should be part of new information. The definite article in specific constructions can be thought of as a type of restrictive relative clause. Consider the following examples

- (12) a. The student passed.
 b. Given: There is a student.
 c. New: He passed.
- (22) a. A student passed.
 b. Given: Nothing
 c. New: There is a student, and he passed.

Given-new information can arise from particular lexical item like “too, either, again, still, yet, only, and any more. consider the following examples

- (23) a. John is sleepy too.
b. Given: Someone besides John is sleepy.
c. New: John is sleepy.
- (24) a. I drink only orange juice.
b. Given: I drink orange juice.
c. New: I don't drink anything else.

The example (23) the 'too' presupposes that someone else is sleepy-someone the addressee presumably already knows about. The example (24) presupposes that 'I drink orange juice' - the addressee presumably already knows that I drink orange juice.



Conclusion

1. Presuppositions can be described in terms of either pragmatics or semantics. However, the most successful definition of presuppositions comes from the combination and interaction of both of these fields of inquiry.
2. If the presuppositions correspond with previous knowledge, the sentence should be easy to comprehend; if the presuppositions do not correspond, or correspond only in some rather oblique way, the sentence need longer time to be comprehend.
3. Pragmatic meaning relies on semantic content, but it obtains it through the actual use of a linguistic expression in a specific situation.
4. Semantics may infer presupposition in terms of existential, lexical, or structural meaning, but there is need to pragmatic knowledge to help in creating and understanding presupposition. This is because some sentences may not have semantic meaning (may not have truth value), but reflect the speaker's view on the world.
5. English texts rely heavily on existential and lexical presuppositions as well as lexical and personal reference cohesion which contribute effectively in economizing the text as well as establishing its continuity
6. The illocutionary act makes the addressee to presuppose what the addresser want to achieve

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