

T.C

**HASAN KALYONCU ÜNİVERSİTESİ
LISANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**SİYASET BİLİİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI**

A STUDY OF RAQQA TRIBES IN SYRIA

SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROFILES

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

HAZIRLAYAN

AMAR ALHAMD

GAZIANTEP – 2021

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TEZ ETİK VE BİLDİRİM SAYFASI

Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduğum “**A STUDY OF RAQQA TRIBES IN SYRIA: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROFILES**” başlıklı çalışmanın tarafimca, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu ve bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanmış olduğumu belirtir ve onurumla doğrularım. 12/07/2021.

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ABSTRACT

This study starts from the premise that a clan or tribe is a political phenomenon first and foremost. Of course, the clan is a social entity it was formed within the social life of human beings and to achieve social needs. It could also be an economic entity or a security institution whose tribal men exchange services and benefits and protect each other in the face of all forms of external danger; The clan is often an ethnic entity as well, because it is based on blood kinship or lineage in origin. Kinship here may be real, or it may be hypothetical, which tribesmen imagine in response to a specific situation. This research aims, through its six chapters, to clarify the tribal structure in the province of Raqqa and explain the basic concepts and differences between tribe and clan, as well as other terms that are often used in their incorrect locations. This research also aims to discuss social changes and tribal customs and traditions that have developed over time, in addition to researching the policies of states, governments and authorities that have successively controlled the province of Raqqa. And exploring the implications and results of these policies on the relationship that linked the state and the tribe since before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and passing through all the authorities and governments that ruled this region up to the 2011 Syrian uprising, which is still going on to this day, and discussing their very large effects on the structure of the tribe and the relationship of tribe members between them and the relationship with them. Other tribes and the relationship of the tribal community as a whole with the authority and the state

ÖZ

Bu çalışma, bir klan veya kabilenin her şeyden önce siyasi bir fenomen olduğu önermesinden yola çıkar. Elbette klan, insanoğlunun sosyal hayatı içinde ve sosyal ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için oluşturulmuş sosyal bir varlıktır. Aynı zamanda, aşiret adamlarının her türlü dış tehlike karşısında hizmet ve menfaat alışverişinde bulunduğu ve birbirlerini koruyan bir ekonomik varlık veya güvenlik kurumu da olabilir; Klan genellikle etnik bir varlıktır, çünkü köken olarak kan akrabalığına veya soya dayanır. Buradaki akrabalık gerçek olabilir veya kabile üyelerinin belirli bir duruma tepki olarak hayal ettikleri varsayımsal olabilir. Bu araştırma, altı bölümü aracılığıyla Rakka vilayetindeki aşiret yapısını netleştirmeyi ve aşiret ve aşiret arasındaki temel kavram ve farklılıkların yanı sıra yanlış yerlerinde sıkılıkla kullanılan diğer terimleri açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırma aynı zamanda Rakka vilayetini peş peşe kontrol eden devletlerin, hükümetlerin ve yetkililerin politikalarını araştırmanın yanı sıra zaman içinde gelişen toplumsal değişimleri ve aşiret gelenek ve göreneklerini de tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ve bu politikaların Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşünden önce devlet ve kabileyi birbirine bağlayan ilişki üzerindeki etkilerini ve sonuçlarını araştırmak ve bu bölgeyi yöneten tüm otorite ve hükümetlerden gereken 2011 Suriye ayaklanmasına kadar bu bölgeyi yönetmek. günümüze kadar gelen ve aşiret yapısı üzerindeki çok büyük etkileri ve aşiret üyelerinin kendi aralarındaki ilişkileri ve onlarla olan ilişkileri tartışılmaktadır. Diğer aşiretler ve aşiret topluluğunun bir bütün olarak otorite ve devletle ilişkisi.

TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT	i
TABLE OF CONTENT	iii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Problem Statement.....	3
1.3. Research Questions	3
1.4. Research Objectives.....	3
1.5. Significance of the Study	4
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY	6
2.1. Scope of the Study	6
2.2. Research tools:	6
2.3. Research Period	6
2.4. Limitations of the study	7
2.5. literature reviews.....	7
2.6. Theoretical framework.....	8
2.6.1. Some general anthropological visions	8
2.6.2. An overview of the kinship system in the Arab community:	9
CHAPTER III: Ecological pattern, Economic activities and population	11
3.1. Ecological pattern of the tribal system in Raqqa governorate	11
3.1.1. Environment and the tribe.....	11
3.1.2. Area, location and administrative division of Raqqa governorate.....	11
3.1.3. Climate.....	12
3.1.4. Rain	13

3.1.5. Water.....	13
3.2. population	13
3.3. Economic activities.....	14
3.3.1. Agriculture	14
3.3.2. Industry	14
3.3.3. Trade	15
CHAPTER IV: Tribe's network and its traditional structure in Raqqa Governorate.....	16
4.1. Basic definitions.....	16
4.2. Tribal Mapping	17
4.2.1. Abu Shaban tribe:	18
4.2.2. Aniza Tribe:	20
4.2.3. Al-Baggara Tribe	21
4.2.4. Al-Dolem Tribe.....	21
4.2.5. Al-Joboor Tribe:.....	22
4.3. The expansion of the clan	23
4.4. The clan and its internal ranks:.....	25
4.5. The need for a clan.....	26
4.6. Changes in the marriage system:	28
4.7. Change in social position:	28
CHAPTER V: Tribes in Raqqa and State.....	30
5.1. Raqqa tribes and state in Ottoman period (1840 until world war1).....	30
5.2. From World War I until French Occupation (1919).....	36
5.3. Tribes and French Occupation (1919-1946):.....	37
5.4. Arab tribes and the rise of the nation-state in Syria from 1946 until 1970:.....	44
5.4.1. Tribes and the Independent State 1946-1958:	45

5.4.2. Tribes and the Baath Party after it seized power in 1963:	51
5.5. Hafez al-Assad and new policies towards the tribes:.....	55
5.5.1. The use of tribes to help Assad to confront the Muslim Brotherhood:.....	56
5.5.2. The site of the sons of the tribes in the regime's military and security institutions:	57
5.5.3. The Baath Party and the tribes under the rule of Hafez al-Assad:.....	58
5.5.4. Tribes and their representation in the Syrian Parliament during the era of Hafez Al-Assad:	58
5.6. Bashar al-Assad ant Tribes from 2000 until Now:	60
5.6.1. From 2000-2011.....	60
5.6.2. Tribes in Raqqa and the position on the Syrian revolution:.....	63
5.6.3. ISIS and Tribes in Raqqa:	66
5.6.4. USA and Tribes in Raqqa:	69
5.6.5. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Tribes in Raqqa:	70
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION	74
Bibliography	77
ANNEXES	84
Annex A	84
Annex B	85
Annex C	86

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The presence of the tribe in the life of the Arab community in general and in the life of a large part of the Syrian community in particular is not born today. Rather, its roots go back hundreds of years. What explains the continuation of this presence in the era of modernity and the era of industry and technology is the inability of the Arabs in modern history to present an advanced civilizational model similar to the industrial Western model that was able to dismantle the traditional cultural structure in industrial European society after a major political, economic, cultural and social struggle with the launch of the Industrial Revolution in England, As well as the intellectual revolution in France.

What we mean here is that the Arabs continued to live their traditional conditions under the control of the Ottoman Empire, despite all the influences of the Western European civilization that began to grow in the Arab world through some of the reforms that took place, as in the reforms of Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt and the reforms of Medhat Pasha in Iraq up to The influences that occurred after the beginning of the European colonial campaigns on Arab countries, such as Napoleon's campaign on Egypt.

Despite all this, the Arabs did not invent anything that can transfer them to the era of modernity through personal capabilities, and in this sense, the tribe continued to have its importance in Arab society in general, including the Syrian society. However, it must be said that the period that followed the First World War witnessed the entry of European industry products into the Arab countries, and with the birth of the Syrian state in the forties of the last century, new concepts began to circulate in the Syrian society such as democracy, patriotism, nationalism and other concepts after the prevailing culture in the Islamic world in general, including the Arab world the saying of the land of Islam for Muslims.

These deep and fundamental transformations that occurred in the Syrian society and the society of a tribal nature from the beginning of the twentieth century until the current period give a very clear indication that the society has become adopting modernizing ideologies as a result of its influence with Western modernity, it was mainly represented through the transfer of ready-made

Western technology to society and in various uses, and from here the Syrian society began, and here we always mean the Syrian society, including the tribal community, is witnessing a social and cultural development.

Despite this, the tribe continued to have a strong presence in the Syrian society, and its presence increased and decreased according to the strength and weakness of the state (Abd, 2012). However, tribal life did not remain in its traditional form and pattern. Rather, it changed many of its social life styles, especially after the increase in the pace of its connection with the city. The traditional structures no longer govern the way of Tribes' life after their sons became involved in education, work, housing, and residence in cities and the beginning of their adaptation to the new life, then the emergence of new tribal leaderships and presidencies that derived their existence from the state's support first, so that sometimes every three or four families have a sheikh.

After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, starting from Dara'a Governorate and then spreading to all Syrian regions, from the beginning the Syrian's regime used light and then heavy weapons against those who rose up against him, many officers and individuals in the Syrian army and the regime's security institutions began to defect from him, at the same time, international isolation began against the Syrian regime, and here, armed groups began to form that took upon themselves the fight against the Syrian regime, which took many areas out of the regime's control to the control of the opposition (Saleh, 2019). The countries supporting the opposition and then the factions controlling the land, which changed many times over the past years, began to try to invest all of the areas outside the control of the Syrian regime for their benefit, and among what was invested were the tribes. Since the first months of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, attempts to polarize the clans began, as the Syrian opposition called the Friday of the Syrian Tribes on one of the days of the Friday in which the demonstrations against the regime were taking place, on June 10, 2011, and on the same day in the city of Raqqa, a conference for the Syrian tribes was organized, and then it followed. After that, attempts to attract the clans by all regional and international powers, and even the armed organizations present on the Syrian land, starting with the Free Army, passing through ISIS, and ending with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are very much supported by the international coalition led by the United States of America.

The tribes in Raqqa Governorate have always preserved their culture with great ability to manage their internal affairs, but despite this, the new challenges that began to threaten the tribal

structure and also threaten the traditional way of tribal life cannot be ignored. In this regard, we can say that there are two distinct time periods in contemporary Syrian political history if we want to highlight the relationship between the state and the tribe. The first time period is the period that preceded Hafez al-Assad's control of power in Syria since 1970, and then the period that followed his control of power, and from it is noticeable that the relationship between the state and the tribe ranged between confrontation with the state and an attempt to integrate with the entity of the state.

1.2. Problem Statement

Ignoring the developments and changes that occurred in the tribe's structure in Raqqa, as well as ignoring the major change that affected the authority of the clan in general and the authority of the clan's sheikh in particular, led to social fragmentation and caused a vacuum, and this void is easy to fill from any group that has a minimum level of authority. Thus, the societal rift between the tribe or the clan itself is increasing.

1.3. Research Questions

- 1-What is the traditional structure of the tribe in Raqqa?
- 2- What changes have occurred to the tribe's structure in Raqqa?
- 3- What kind of policy did the authority or the state pursue towards the tribes in Raqqa, and what was the tribal response to these policies?
- 4- What kind of relationship exists between the state or the authority with the tribes in general and with the tribal leader in particular?
- 5- How have the successive authorities affected the political role of the tribes up to the present time?
- 6- How did the integration of tribes and their administration by the authority facilitate the consolidation of regime and the establishment of the state?
- 7- What is the role played by the tribes of Raqqa in the current Syrian uprising?

1.4. Research Objectives

- 1-Knowing the traditional structure of the tribes in Raqqa governorate, and the changes that occurred in it at the current stage.
- 2-Understanding the changes that have occurred in the authority of its sheikhs today.

3- understanding the relations between the tribes and the state from 1840 until now.

1.5. Significance of the Study

Since the beginning of the 2011 Syrian revolution, international attention has focused on the fighting in western Syria, especially in urban areas, unaware that the dynamics in eastern Syria will be of great importance in determining the future of the country.

In the east of the country in general and in Raqqa in particular, an international coalition led by the United States of America was formed to fight the Islamic State, and this coalition succeeded in expelling the organization from all the areas it controlled.

On the other hand, Turkey is fighting its own battle against the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are closely linked with the PKK, the main enemy of the Turkish state, in addition to the presence of the Syrian regime in several areas east of the Euphrates, which is supported mainly by Russia and Iran.

There is a need to understand the social structure of this vast geographical area, in the light of the intersection of the various Syrian and regional interests in that region, as an entry point for exploring the prospects for outcomes the politics of the future is there. Tribes, as they were usually understood, no longer form the basis of political projects in Syria. Although its structures have not changed, it has ceased to occupy the highest position in the political and social life of local communities. Moreover, the relationship between the traditional leaders of the tribe and its members, just as the relationship between these leaders and the state authorities, is based to a large extent today on the interests of each party and not on the official rules of tribal behavior.

There is another, no less important point here: the conflict that erupted in 2011 had devastating repercussions on local communities across the length and breadth of Syria, especially the societal entities of tribal origins in eastern Syria. Extremist groups such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra took root in these areas, often adding a tribal dimension to their formations. Thus, the fighting in which these groups plunged involved tribal identities and loyalties, damaging antisocial cohesion and isolating local communities from one another.

The importance of the study comes due to the lack of anthropological and social studies on the tribe and the changes that have taken place in it at the present time, in order to provide descriptive material about the tribal society in the study area, It is a goal consistent with general goal

anthropology seeks to provide theoretical knowledge about the tribal systems in Raqqa's society in the current stage, On the other hand, the research not only seeks to provide descriptive material about the phenomenon but also seeks to know the nature of the tribal system in the province of Raqqa and the changes that occurred in it, in order to provide applied knowledge about the kinship systems and the changes that occurred in the Raqqa's society in the current stage, and an attempt like this does not only stop describing the changes and effects that have occurred but rather seeks to address and analyze those changes and the effects resulting from them. The tribes have always continued to influence many issues related to governance and the struggle for power and stability. After the outbreak of the Arab Spring, it became accompanied by some phenomena such as sectarianism, extremism and other social phenomena, among these phenomena that have re-emerged are tribalism, which has not been studied in depth by political scholars who focus in their studies and research on state institutions, state policies and parties, unlike anthropologists who focus in their studies on segments of society and tribal affiliations. We will try through this research to do the two things. By connecting the local community to the larger system.

CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

I started my research with this, although not in an academic way, a long time ago, since I am from the province of Raqqa and belong to a clan from the Raqqa tribes and I have relatives who have broad interests in the field of tribal origins and their social and political history, I attended a lot of those discussions and arguments that were taking place. In general, my methodology in this research includes an extensive review of a large number of written literatures on the tribes and their political, economic and social history, and some books on the development of Syria during different time periods in addition to academic texts and what is published by the media, in addition to what is published on social media, websites and others.

2.1. Scope of the Study

This research will include the Arab tribes and clans that now reside in Raqqa, in addition to some tribes that had a great history in this region before they migrated to other regions or other countries, such as the large Al Fada'an tribe.

2.2. Research tools:

2.2.1Observations :It is the anthropological method that was used, as the researcher is from Al-Raqqa Governorate and permanently resides in it, where a lot of information was collected, classified and arranged and then presented in a systematic way.

2.2.2 review and analysis: I did an in-depth review followed by a focused analysis of most of what was written on the subject of tribes, whether in published books, academic articles, or what was written and published on social media, whether Facebook, Twitter, or what was published on YouTube, which contains a lot of materials related to our research.

2.3. Research Period

From the year 1840 with the beginning of the Ottoman reforms in the state, through the period of the French mandate, then the post-independence nation state, up to the era of the father and son al-Assad until the present day after the Syrian uprising.

2.4. Limitations of the study

Because of the Covid-19 epidemic and the closure of the borders, I was not able to go to Syria to hold meetings with some tribal sheikhs, and because of the security chaos that Syria is experiencing due to the ongoing war now, it is not easy for me to publicly declare the content of my research, this poses a security risk to me in addition to the fact that the tribal sheikhs are now divided In their support for several regional and international countries, therefore, their speech and opinion will not be neutral in the interest of the study, In addition to that, it is impossible to access official documents and statistics in the Syrian state's institutions because a large part of them was lost as a result of the destruction of many government buildings in Raqqa and the change of control during the years of war, Therefore, my main dependence was on what is published on the official websites of the regime's institutions via the Internet, in addition to books and publications, and my knowledge of the status quo, given that I am from Raqqa.

I left Turkey to Syria in mid-May, trying to conduct some interviews with some tribal sheikhs and some researchers from Raqqa who are interested in the issue of tribes, some tribal leaders were contacted in order to conduct interviews with them. They had great doubts about the purpose and objective of the research, especially that the research was for the benefit of a Turkish university, and this raised their concerns because of the very tense relationship between the Turkish government and the ruling authority of Raqqa. Because I do not have much time to research, the idea of conducting interviews has been canceled, especially in light of my presence in Raqqa, and this may pose a great security risk to my life.

There are a lot of documents related to Raqqa in the National Museum in Istanbul, but due to the Corona conditions, I was not able to directly access them, Therefore, I resorted to some books whose author studied these documents at an earlier time, such as the researcher Ahmed Al-Salama.

2.5. literature reviews

The review of previous literature began by focusing on academic publications on the Syrian tribes in general and on what is related to Raqqa in particular, such as the book of the German scholar Obenham (1939), Haian Dukhan (2018) and Khalaf Suleiman (1981), in addition to some publications in Arabic such as Jamal Parrot (2013) and Hanna Patatu. (2014) and Abbas Al-Azzawi (1941).

2.6. Theoretical framework

Because most of the previous research that studied the clan in Syria was economic and linked in some way to politics, sometimes ignoring the natural development of societies, which is mainly and effectively based on kinship relations and blood ties between tribal members. In our research, great importance was given to anthropology in studying the development of tribes in Raqqa.

2.6.1. Some general anthropological visions

The most important opinions related to the topic will be discussed, the most prominent of which is related to the kinship system. This system mainly consists of blood ties and In-laws marriage ties. Affiliation to one of the two parents in the Patrilineal Descent gives the Gang kinship and relatives whose lineage appears in the Patrilineal Descent, as is the case for Arab tribes (Abd, 2012). Affiliation may be in the female line, in matrilineal societies, as is the case in a number of West African tribes (Abd, 2012). As Raymond Firth says that the principle of kinship determines the decline of life. When children are born, they must integrate into the group on a specific basis, and when a person dies, his possessions must be transferred to other members of the group according to established and agreed upon rules called the method by which a person obtains His membership in the name of lineage or descent, as the way in which a person obtains rank or privileges is called the name of the caliphate (AbdulMooti, 1998). As the owners of the classic anthropological evolutionary theory, such as Louis Morgan, Bachofen, Henry Maine, McClellan and others, had formulated their anthropological theories on family and kinship systems according to an evolutionary system influenced by Darwin's theory of development in the nineteenth century, and each of them had practical results in this regard, so Louis Morgan was He believes that mankind has gone through three main stages: brutality, barbarism and civilization, and during which man moved in his technical and organizational life from simple forms to complex ones, while Bachofen reached the conclusion that the first affiliation system in the human family dates back to the mother, while Henry Maine reached an opposite conclusion, by returning lineage to the father while McClellan concluded that external marriage was the prevalent form at the time when internal marriage in the tribe was forbidden (Abd, 2012). This trend has been subjected to severe criticism by the functionalist constructivist trend in the twentieth century on the grounds that this theory lacks certain evidence to prove its hypotheses. And it relied on information reported by non-specialists, as it relied on guesswork.

2.6.2. An overview of the kinship system in the Arab community:

The nature of the kinship regimes in the Arab community is still effective in Arab life, as the Arabs are divided into the Arabs of the South, who are the Qahtani, and their geographical area in Yemen, and the Arabs of the North who are the Adnanis and their geographical area in the north of the Arabian Peninsula, the facts of history confirm that the Arabs of the south were the widest civilization and left traces of their social life, unlike the northern Arabs who left nothing in writing (Farouj, 1972). Regarding the nature of the kinship structure, Ibn Khaldun is considered one of the first social thinkers who spoke about social solidarity and cooperation based on the kinship structure derived from the unity of lineage, Ibn Khaldun believes that the kinship tendency is innate in humans, and he believes that the kinship structure is based on two main sources: The first is the natural instinct and the second is the ecological and social needs that feed the individual's sense of belonging to his clan, which guarantees the satisfaction of these needs. In this sense, Ibn Khaldun preceded the anthropological point of view in the modern era, they are the lineages that lead individuals to the fusion function that necessitates the connection of wombs. He believes that descent outside this position is a fictitious matter that has no reality. This means that the large tribes branch into many branches and divisions, meaning the expansion of the kinship range. After long periods of time have passed, what leads to the loss of lineage and the people forgetting their lineage due to poor memory and lack of documentation, which makes the effect of lineage weak and this explains the consideration of lineage in simple societies, whether tribal or primitive, a social factor that supports cooperation between members of the tribe and limits their loyalty within the lineage, which makes the relationship of its individuals narrow do not go beyond the circle (al-Nori, 1991). Accordingly, Ibn Khaldun believes that in order for the political system to fulfill its functions in managing the affairs of society, whether in the Bedouin style or the urban pattern, there should be a strong social bond that protects the pillars of the system, the strongest of these ties is the blood bond and kinship that arises between people. It is responsible for cooperation, and that is why the state system is based on the idea of asabiyyah that is generated from kinship and based on lineage (Mohammad, 1990). Ibn Khaldun also affirms that the change in the economic system can be followed by structural changes in the social and cultural conditions of the people, the change of the profession helps to change the social lifestyle of the people, the pastoral profession requires a mobile lifestyle in most cases represented in agricultural production and the achievement of surplus production with a change in the form of ownership. It changes people's

social life, and so if a person moves to trade, crafts and other professions, it helps to change their cultural and social lifestyle (Farouj, 1972).



CHAPTER III: Ecological pattern, Economic activities and population

3.1. Ecological pattern of the tribal system in Raqqa governorate

The ecology of the tribe in the province of Raqqa is addressed with the aim of understanding the interactive relationship between the natural environment and the human being, and such an attempt will give us a clear idea of the nature of the tribe's life and its interactions with the patterns of the desert, agricultural and urban environment.

3.1.1. Environment and the tribe

The relationship between human being and the environment is an interactive relationship throughout history. Through this understanding, the natural geographical factor affects the form and content of the nature of social relations within the tribal system, whether this tribe lives by grazing or farming, its economic entity is mainly dependent on soil fertility and the availability of grass and water, If a clan finds a barren or low-fertile land, then in this case it will take from grazing the first means to earn a livelihood, then it is forced to move from one place to another seeking water and grass, and this causes it to clash with other clans who own fertile land, and the result is the struggle for survival (Abd, 2012). Therefore, this harsh environment produces a fighting tribe or clan and is characterized by a coherent internal social system in which the authority of the clan leader or tribe appears clear, strict and interacting with the members of the clan. Water and climate are a necessity required by an integrated functional study, not in and of itself, but because it affects the formation of social life.

3.1.2. Area, location and administrative division of Raqqa governorate

The province of Raqqa is located in the northeastern region of Syria, between two latitudes (35.15° - 36.45°) and two longitudes (38.00° - 39.35°). Its area is 19,620 square km and it constitutes 10.6% of the area of Syria. Raqqa Governorate is one of the modern and rising governorates, and it is bordered to the north by Turkey, to the east by the governorates of Deir Ezzor and Hasaka, to the south by the province of Homs, and to the west by the provinces of Aleppo and Hama. Al-Raqqa

Governorate, with its location, constitutes a key region linking the governorates of the island with the northern and central governorates (Committee, 2007).

Raqqa is divided administratively into three districts: Tell Abyad, Al-Thawra and Al-Raqqa, and these areas are divided into 10 sub-districts: Mansoura, Al-Jarniya, Al-Thawra, which belongs to Al-Thawra district, Tal Abyad, Ain Issa, Suluk, which belongs to Tal Abyad, Al-Sabkha, Maadan, Al-Raqqa, and Al-Karama, which belong to the district of Raqqa, and there are 709 locations in these areas and sub-districts, between a village, a town and a city.

3.1.3. Climate

Raqqa governorate is dominated by two of the prevailing climate models in Syria:

A- The moderate Mediterranean climate: It is characterized by significant thermal differences between summer and winter, night and day, in the north of the governorate (Committee, 2007).

B- The semi-arid Mediterranean climate: It is characterized by the existence of a large temperature difference between summer and winter, as well as between night and day.

In recent years, the expansion and extension of the Al-Assad and Ba'ath Lakes have become a new moderating factor for the governorate (Committee, 2007).

Temperature: The average temperature in the summer ranges between (35 ° C - 40 ° C), while in the winter it ranges between (3 ° C - 9 ° C). The city of Raqqa recorded a maximum temperature in the month of August of 1963, reaching / 44 / degrees Celsius, and the temperature may decrease in some winter nights to below zero (wikipedia, 2020).

Wind: westerly and southwestern winds prevail in the governorate in winter, but in summer, these winds blow over the governorate due to the emergence of light pressures and moderate the intense summer heat (Raqqa's climate, 2019).

3.1.4. Rain

The following table shows the average rainfall in the governorate according to the rain stations during the period (1998/1999 - 2006/2007):

Statement	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average
Raqa	229	177.7	192.3	215.8	123	168	129.5	74.5	105.8	90.1	97.7	145.7
Tell Abyad	286	184.9	244.3	297.6	272.7	204.2	182.5	171.3	179.5	198	167.9	217.1

3.1.5. Water

The governorate depends on the Euphrates River, which has a permanent flow, in addition to the Balikh River, which draws its water from the tributaries of the valleys and springs located in the north of the governorate. This governorate depends on the water of the Al-Assad and Al-Baath lakes, which are the largest and largest water source in Syria, and they enrich underground water, springs and wells. The availability of these water sources helped expand the area of irrigated agricultural lands (Committee, 2007).

3.2. population

The population of Al-Raqa governorate has reached 944,000 people, according to the December 2011 statistics (Raqa governorate, 2011). All the residents of the governorate trace their origins to the tribes and clans that have inhabited this region a long time ago or have fled to it during the last hundred years from other governorates, and most of them have a tribal background and those who are not from a tribal background are very few. They came to the governorate either to work or teach and settled in the governorate. For the overwhelming majority, they are Arabs, in addition to the Kurds, Turkmen, Armenians and Circassians, whose percentage is around 10%. The majority are Sunnis, and there are about 2,000 professing the Christian religion, also a few

hundred converted to the Shiite sect after attempts to spread the Shiite sect in Raqqa from the 1980s to the opening of the Awais al-Qarni shrine in the late nineties of the last century. In teaching there or to work in the Euphrates Dam or oil fields, and those who left for their governorates at the beginning of the Syrian uprising.

3.3. Economic activities

About 75% of the population work in agriculture, while the rest work in trade, industry and various crafts (Committee, 2007).

3.3.1. Agriculture

-Raqqa governorate is characterized by the presence of large areas of land distributed between private and public properties. These lands are divided into irrigated lands and rainfed lands and are invested in the cultivation of strategic crops (cotton - wheat - sugar beet ...), vegetables and some types of fruit trees, in addition to the lands that are Includes swamps and river islands. The arable land constitutes about 42% of the province's land.

-The expansion of land reclamation projects, soil washing operations and salinity resistance contributed to the increase in the area of agricultural lands in the governorate (Al-Ojeli, Al-Hasson , Fakhouri, Al-Hamad, & Al-Ali, 1993).

3.3.2. Industry

In the last three decades of the last century, the governorate witnessed the emergence of modern industries, foremost among which are the sugar plant, flour mills, the cooling and storage unit, the yellow corn drying plants, the fire bricks factory, the gypsum and glass plant, carbonated water, the filling of butane gas, the spinning and weaving plant, and the agricultural machinery and tools workshops, in addition to the presence of many Private industrial service and consumer

establishments, as well as the traditional industries of popular costumes and local tools (Al-Ojeli, Al-Hasson , Fakhouri, Al-Hamad, & Al-Ali, 1993).

3.3.3. Trade

In addition to relying on the preservation of agriculture mainly, the popular and handicraft industries were known and some manufacturing industries were established as blacksmithing workshops. Modern industries began to appear through the huge facilities, foremost of which is the sugar factory that was established in 1978 (Al-Ojeli, Al-Hasson , Fakhouri, Al-Hamad, & Al-Ali, 1993). As well as the Rashid Mill, the yellow corn drying plant, and other factories.

The distinguished geographical location of the governorate gave it a commercial role between the Jazira region and the Euphrates basin on the one hand, and the governorates of the interior and the coast on the other hand. And the markets of Raqqa scattered in their regions have a role in activating the movement of commercial exchanges, especially in the field of trade in grain crops, wool, leather, milk and their derivatives, the most important of which is margarine (Al-Ojeli, Al-Hasson , Fakhouri, Al-Hamad, & Al-Ali, 1993). Because of these factors, internal and external trade witnessed a remarkable activity through commercial exchange and meeting the needs of the new society of all kinds to cover all aspects of life.

In the southeastern side of the city there is a market for the wholesale trade of agricultural products, with an area of 20 / dunum and consisting of 63 / stores with a daily capacity of 300 / ton, and in the northeastern side of the city there is a livestock market with an area of 30-35 / dunum with a capacity of about 1000 / head of sheep (Committee, 2007).

CHAPTER IV: Tribe's network and its traditional structure in Raqqa Governorate

4.1. Basic definitions

Household(Al-Bayt): The household is considered the origin of the tribe, and this term is still in circulation until the present time in the tribal community, for example in Raqqa it is said Bayt Al-Hamad or Bayt Al-Issa and other names, and it brings together the family in terms of its name and consists mainly of a husband and wife and what results from them from the solidarity relations Living and other things, when the sons get married, they will be a new home, with the first house preserving its authority over the new home, and on this basis, the more members of the house increase and multiply, they create new homes so that the name of the first house is preserved and the rest have independence in their names and solidarity is often on five grandfathers and from here originated the thigh(Al-Fakhd), and then the clan, and then the tribe (Al-Azawi, 1942).

The thigh (Al-Fakhd): The researcher Abbas Al-Azzawi indicates in his book, The Tribes of Iraq, to the Thigh (Al-Fakhd) that the thigh originally had several households from a close grandfather barely surpassing the fifth grandfather and it follows the large number of individuals, and the leadership in it is for those who are distinguished by a high position among his people and who obtains personal ability and talents in order to be the head of the house. The solidarity and correlation between the houses of the thigh appears, then the solidarity diminishes and the link between these households diminishes when it rises, and the solidarity at that time is in the interest of the clan or tribe and on this basis, the thigh is one of the components of the clan, which is originally made up of several thighs, as the tribe itself consists of several clans and so on (Al-Azawi, 1942).


The clan: the clan consists of several thighs and households, and each thigh is headed by a chief, and the presidency is in that family and remains known throughout the history of the thigh, Abbas Al-Azzawi indicates in the context of his talk about the clan that the thigh may branch into several thighs, and at that time what was called the thigh or the household is called the clan (Al-Azawi, 1942).

Tribe: Arabs have arranged classes of lineages on the structure of the human body symbolizing the tribe cohesion that resembles the cohesion of the human body organs So they made the thigh after the belly, because the thigh is from the human after the abdomen, and they made the platoon

after the thigh because the lowest proportions that separate the man are like the leg and the foot, since what is meant by the platoon is the members of the lower tribe, this is what the classes of lineages and kinship were about. As for the Syrian tribes and the clans close to them, they have their divisions that differ slightly from that. Abbas Al-Azzawi points out that the Arab community consists of several clans, but gains a great size and broad in its composition, and then it is called the tribe (Al-Azawi, 1942). This does not differ from the clan to the general presidency, in that the chiefs of the clans are referred to the chief of the tribe. The expression may be correct if we say that the tribe is an extended clan and has a large extent of branching (Al-Amri, 1991). It differs in its status from the clan, and at that time the word is one and if every clan is managed internally by its leader, then the chiefs here are the same as the heads of the thighs in the clan (Al-Amri, 1991). Thus, the tribe is the system that gathers a group of clans, and each clan includes a group of thighs, and each thigh includes a group of households.

4.2. Tribal Mapping

Most of the clans in Raqqa belong to the Arab Abu Shaban tribe, these clans acquired their tribal characteristics from the Bedouin life and the agricultural stability on both sides of the Euphrates River. The process of shifting from the nomadic type to the agricultural type has had cultural, political and economic indications for the structure of the clan, the tribe and its position, and its internal solidarity and political relations, especially its relations with the central authority in different periods and with the local authority within its geographical borders (Al-Ojeli, Al-Hasson , Fakhouri, Al-Hamad, & Al-Ali, 1993). Also, the population expansion that the tribe witnessed led to its splitting into many clans and many sub-clans, and this increase in the size of the clan resulted in the emergence of new tribal leaders taking advantage of the change of concepts and urban transformations that the Raqqi community witnessed in recent decades, under political circumstances, new leaderships emerged, some of which did not follow the hereditary method of succession for the leadership of a tribe or clan.



4.2.1. Abu Shaban tribe:

The largest tribe in Raqqa is found throughout the governorate, and there was no traditional leader of the Abu Shaban tribe, which includes 11 clans. Three of these clans are large and are divided into sub-clans. The largest of the Abu Shaban clans are:

Al-Waldah clan: which includes 10 sub-clan, and Al-Waldah sub-clans are spread mostly in Al-Jarnieh, Al-Tabqa, Al-Mansoura and Raqqa sub-districts, and the traditional leadership of the Al-Waldah clan is confined to Al-Faraj Al-Salama from Al-Nasir's sub-clan, 1974 A large part of Al-Waldah's clan was deported to Al-Hasakah governorate after their villages were flooded with water as a result of construction Euphrates Dam and there are historical kinship relationships to the Al-Waldah clan in Iraq.

Al-Affadlah clan: which includes 5 sub-clans, and Al-Affadlah sub-clans are spread mostly in Al-Karamh and Raqqa sub-districts, and the traditional leadership of the Al-Affadlah clan is confined to Al-Huwidi from Al-Medlij al-Daher sub-clan. there are historical kinship relationships to the Al-Waldah clan in Turkey.

Abo Sbee'a clan: which includes 5 sub-clans, and Abo Sbee'a sub-clans are spread mostly in Al-Sabkha and Maadan sub-districts, and the traditional leadership of the Al- Abo Sbee'a clan is

confined to Al-Sefira from Al- Abo Sbee'a al- sub-clan and Al-Olio from Al-Sabkha sub-clan. there are historical kinship relationships to the Abo Sbee'a clan in Iraq and Lebanon.

Bo-Sha'aban	Al-Waldah	Al-Ali Fares
		Al-Amer
		Al-Eli
		Al-Hwewat
		Al-Jaa'bata
		Al-Nasir
		Al-Saa'b
		Al-Turn
		Al-Wardat
		Bo-Msrah
Al-Affadlah	Al-Affadlah	Al-Ahawas Al-Daher
		Al-Baryach Al-Daher
		Al-Ganem Al-Daher
		Al-Medlij Al-Daher
		Al-Mousa Al-Daher
Al-Bosbee'a	Al-Bosbee'a	Al-Bohamad
		Al-Bosbee'a
		Al-Ghanem Al-Ali
		Al-Gharaween
		Al-Sabkha
Al-Omerat	Al-Omerat	
	Al-Shafrat	
	Al-Shebl	
Bo-Assaf	Bo-Assaf	

	Bo-atij
	Bo-daher-Jamassa
	Bo-hmed
	Bo-jarad
	Bo-rajab
	Bo-rmdan

4.2.2. Aniza Tribe:

which includes 2 clans, and the traditional leadership of the Aniza tribe is confined to Al-Mhed from Al-Fada'an clan. there are historical kinship relationships to Aniza tribe in Arab Gulf. The clans of Aniza:

Al-Fada'an: which played a major and pivotal role during the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate period. We will discuss the role played by the Al-Fada'an clan in the coming chapters. In the fifties of the last century, Al-Nuri bin Mhed, Sheikh Al-Fada'an, moved to Saudi Arabia, and after that, members of Al-Fada'an began to migrate to Saudi Arabia, the culmination of this move to Saudi Arabia was in the mid-seventies, when a large number of them immigrated to Saudi Arabia and after the 2011 Syrian uprising, only a very small number of them remained in the Raqqa governorate, where they left for Saudi Arabia, the members of the Al-Anza clans live mainly in Suluk and Ain Issa, the traditional leadership of the Al-Fada'an clan is confined to three houses: Al-Mhed, Al-Ghobain and Al-Kashish. There are historical kinship links to the Fada'an in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf.

Omarat: Most of the Omarat members live in the Ain Issa district, and the traditional leadership of the Omarat clan is confined to al-Mayouf. There are historical kinship links to the Omarat clan in Iraq and the Arab Gulf.

Tribe	Clan	Sub-clan
	Fada'an	

Aniza	Omarat	Bo-Debsh
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4.2.3. Al-Baggara Tribe

which includes 2 clans, Al-Mashhor and Bo-Shams, and the traditional leadership of Al-Baggara tribe is confined to Al-Basher there are historical kinship relationships to Al-Baggara tribe in Turkey and Iraq. The clans of Al-Baggara:

Al-Mashhor: Most of Al-Mashhor members live in Tell Abyad district, and the traditional leadership of Al-Mashhor clan is confined to al-Tuhri. There are historical kinship links to Al-Baggara clan in Iraq and Turkey.

Bo-Shams: Most of Bo-Shams members live in Tell Abyad district. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Shams clan in Iraq.

Tribe	Clan
Al-Baggara	Al-Mashhor
	Bo-Shams

4.2.4. Al-Dolem Tribe

which includes 4 clans, Al-Shebl Al-Salama, Bo-Manee'a, Bo-Khamis, Bo-Issa. the traditional leadership of Al-Dolem tribe is confined to Al-Ali Al-Soliman in Iraq. There are historical kinship links to Al-Dolem in Iraq. The clans of Al-Dolem:

Al-Shebl Al-Salama: Most of Al-Shebl Al-Salama members live in Raqqa City, and the traditional leadership of Al-Shebl Al-Salama clan is confined to al-Saeed. There are historical kinship links to Al-Shebl Al-Salama clan in Iraq.

Bo-Khamis: Most of Bo-Khamis members live in Al-Mansora and Al-Thawra sub-Districts, and the traditional leadership of Bo-Khamis clan is confined to al-Hamshar and al-Rashed. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Khamis clan in Iraq.

Bo-Manee'a: Most of Bo-Manee'a live in Sabkha sub-district. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Manee'a in Iraq.

Bo-Issa: Most of Bo-Issa live in Al-Karama sub-district. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Manee'a in Iraq.

Tribe	Clan
Al-Dolem	Al-Shebl Al-Salama
	Bo-Khamis
	Bo-Manee'a
	Bo-Issa

4.2.5. Al-Joboor Tribe:

which includes 4 clans, Al-Mojadma, Al-ojel, Bo-Jaber and Bo-Rashed. the traditional leadership of Al-Joboor tribe is confined to Al-Muslt in Hasaka. There are historical kinship links to Al-Joboor in Iraq and Turkey. The clans of Al-Joboor:

Al-Mojadma: Most of Al-Mojadma members live in Raqqa sub-District, and the traditional leadership of Al-Mojadma clan is confined to al-Kasha. There are historical kinship links to Al-Mojadma clan in Iraq and Turkey.

Al-Ojel: Most of Al-Ojel members live in Raqqa and Al-Thawra sub-Districts, and the traditional leadership of Al-Ojel clan is confined to al-Zoietr. There are historical kinship links to Al-Ojel clan in Turkey.

Bo-Jaber: Most of Bo-Jaber members live in Raqqa and Al-Thawra sub-Districts, and the traditional leadership of Bo-Jaber clan is confined to al-Deef. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Jaber clan in Iraq.

Bo-Rashed: Most of Bo-Rashed members live in Karama sub-District. There are historical kinship links to Bo-Jaber clan in Iraq.

Tribe	Clan
Al-Joboor	Al-Mojadma
	Bo-Jaber
	Bo-Rashed
	Al-Ojel

4.3. The expansion of the clan

Tribes have expanded in Raqqa province a significant expansion, especially during the eras that followed the Second World War until the present time, refers one Alakhbarren to this expansion by saying in the past was the number of members of the same clan exceed a few hundred individuals, but today the number of some clan have reached tens of thousands of Persons)This indicates the large size of the clan and the subsequent change, whether in its traditional functions or in changing the activities of its members after many of them became involved in the life of the city after they left agriculture and worked in government jobs and other activities.

In record time, especially during the 1960s, after the land reform laws Also, its thighs and divisions have expanded a lot day after day, and what followed that of the emergence of new leaders, some of them have nothing to do with the leadership based on the principle of inheritance, and we have noticed during the field work that many of the thighs that are known as one thigh have divided and each thigh has a special leadership, during our study of the Al-Afadla clan ,we found that there are divisions that occurred in some of its thighs, for example the al-Medlj al-Dahir clan ,which consisted of several thighs, some of these thighs separated from it, for example Dhiab thigh, of whom the House of al-Huwaidi became the heads of the great al-Afadla clan, and thus the old buildings began to disintegrate from their traditional clan that It used to extend to five backs or grandparents.

and today it is witnessing a kind of dissolution and this is reflected in the authority that is no longer effective towards its members, especially the youth among them, as the leadership of the thigh or the family has become in most Sometimes it is related to the money and status of the person running for the presidency, as well as the nature of its relationship with the members of his

clan or his relatives whom he seeks to co-opt them in various ways, taking advantage of the ignorance of many young people in the genetic sequence of the presidency, for this issue needs someone who knows the origins and history of the clans and has mixed Some information between the expansion that the clans witnessed on the one hand and the harsh economic conditions that society went through, so that their members became more concerned with themselves and their livelihood more precisely with their interest then of their clans, as prevalent in past eras, and this rapid transformation in the structure of the clan had deep cultural connotations.

Changing and changing many of the traditional functions and roles of the clan. After kinship relations were at the top of the priorities, they became on their side and were dominated by interests and personal relationships in most cases, and this had a great impact on the clan's orientation .

During a lengthy interview conducted with one of the researchers and those interested in tribes and their origins, he confirmed that the changes that occurred in Raqqa after 1958 with the application of the Agrarian Reform Law ,which worked to dismantle the structure of the clan ,and that the development movement that reached advanced levels during the post-1990s era has reduced interest in the tribes to a degree Especially large, especially since the expansion of cities and the vast migration from the countryside to it has contributed to this, and when asked about the extent of the clan phenomenon in that period, he said that the clan as a social system existed and the kinship relations played a pivotal role in people's lives, especially in their dealings in institutions of the state.

However, the clan system influences social life as it was in the past, and it changed when the law became the one that separates people's problems, especially in cities, and the extension of party organizations to the countryside has created other forces competing with the authority of the clan, and thus some of the tribal sheikhs did not deal positively with these changes because they believed that this would happen at the expense of the clan. However, the strength of the kinship relations continued to play their roles, so the influence of the tribal person shifted with its influence J Harnessing the law to serve his relatives ,as happened with Ibrahim Huneidi from the Ajil clan, who graduated from his positions in the state until he reached a member of the Qatari leadership and contributed to the arrival of many of his relatives to important positions in the state .

As for the political aspect, the tribal phenomenon was highly influential among its members And individuals joining their clan always took place in difficult times, so the previous authority, when

a member of a clan rebelled or rejected state policy at the time, was not punished alone, but his relatives and perhaps his distant clan members were punished when they were excluded from government and other jobs, and we found during field work The large number of sheikhs in the post-Hafez al-Assad era to power is due to the state's encouragement of the tribes for political goals and their service after they had distanced themselves from them in past eras, and with this there are tribal personalities who have emerged in the arena through their relationship to power and not on the basis of the inheritance principle recognized in the transfer of power in Clan custom, and this confirms the disintegration that occurred in the structure of the clan, whose social roles have become more formal than real. Rather, the new sheikhs have become concerned only with receiving aid and gifts from the authority more from their interest in the affairs of their clans, and such an issue is validated by other cases that occurred in other areas of the governorate, and it has been shown through field work that there are cultural changes that have occurred in the concepts and rules of the tribe.

4.4. The clan and its internal ranks:

The situation has changed from what it was under the traditional structure of the tribe, which was divided into clans, then into thighs known as the presidency, and then into families or households directly linked to the presidency in the thigh, and the thing that changed (according to the opinions gathered from the field study) is that each clan today tries to divide into several departments, and each section tries to have a presidency or sheikh from among its members without concern for the original presidency in the clan or tribe so that, the leaderships in one thigh have become many and many. So that some families merely meet with a third grandfather found themselves a personality and took the name of its grandfather and her new sheikh. Thus, the lineage sequence today, and according to what we have seen in the field, began to appear in the form of a family go back to two grandparents or three forming a kinship group headed by a person, and this was due to the expansion in the structure of the clan, which became more than dozens of divisions and families. The new (hierarchy) in the clan has produced more horizontal organizations than it has produced in vertical hierarchy, and this is a new phenomenon in the structure of the clan today, which made controlling the behavior of the clan or the thigh difficult under these circumstances, and some may see that the economic factor is one of the factors that help the emergence of such a social hierarchy Within the clan, as many families achieved large sums of money from agriculture during the 1990s,

and that some families have sold a small part of their agricultural lands when prices rose in a rapid manner, forming some households that are described as rich and the presence of other poor families, which made some members of rich families form local sheikhs who have often played a role in solving problems that occur within their areas or Some of them involve themselves in solving other problems for neighboring areas. Thus, this new hierarchy began to take up its space, and upon meeting one of the sheikhs from this hierarchy, he began to confirm that his presidency was supported by relatives, and he sees in that acceptable and legitimate conditions for his leadership over them, and when it was discussed on the principle of heredity, he began to say that the sons of those first sheikhs were no longer fit to lead the clan because of their fatigue and lack of interest in its affairs, or that they became far from such matters, and when we studied the conditions of some of the sons of the original sheikhs, we found that some of them suffer from poverty. And the issue of returning to the first traditions is difficult, especially since the economic factor has begun to control this. The sheikhdom needs many expenses and social aspects, the clan has often become unwilling to offer its assistance or contributions to the Sheikh in order to fulfill his duties, what made it possible for those who volunteered to undertake such appropriate expenses to lead the presidency, but at the local level and not at the general level, and the general level is the other, not less affected by the economic aspect, but it is less severe than that which appears in the new tribal hierarchy.

4.5. The need for a clan

The need for the clan appears as a source of strength and support for its members, especially in times of crisis and also as a social solidarity group for its members when they need help, For example, to this day there is still a tradition prevalent in the clans of Raqqa when a dispute occurs between two people from two different clans and this dispute ends with the death of one of the parties, the whole clan is obligated to pay a sum of money to the family of the murdered, and this is called blood money (compensation), one of the sons of the Al-Afadla clan mentions that in the past the clan was like a one family, and if someone needed help, the clan would provide it to him, and it was an integral part of its duty, just as the clan stood with its sons in good times and bad and in solving their internal problems and their problems with others from other clans, However, in some situations that contradict the laws of the tribes, such as rape, theft and others, the issue in such matters is borne by the individual and he is punished, rebuked and condemned by relatives

before others, When studying the people's need for the clan in Bo-Daher clan, some of them live in the countryside and the others in the city, we found that those who live in the countryside have a constant need for their clan to support them in their many positions, whether in terms of protecting them on their land or raising their status with other clans, and when this need was studied in the city of Raqqa on the urban population, we found that the people's need for their clans is more often symbolic, and that this need is not very high, that is, it is not of a continuous nature in their daily movements, but it appears when they find no way to solve their problem except the clan, and when the logic of force is required. Upon an in-depth discussion of this issue, one of the residents mentioned in Raqqa City that the need for the clan is limited to matters in times of crisis and that our commitment to it is nothing more than a symbolic issue related to lineage and status.

We have noticed during the field work in the city of Raqqa and some urban areas in Raqqa that many of its residents have long been in the city and have migrated from the countryside to the city for forty years or more, so that they became urban in clothing, food and many behaviors, and they see themselves as distinguished over the rural ones.

However, their need for their clan is not an actual need as much as it was a moral need when they try to prove their lineage by affiliation with that clan. One of the residents of the city (Al-Raqqa) sees this fact, but they found themselves in real need of their clan when violence intensified and some people attacked its members by force of arms Thus, they returned to their clan as if they were actually inhabiting the countryside.

Many of the sons of the clans who live in rural and urban areas agreed on their need for the clan in two broad matters. The first is that they need it when they encounter problems, and they need someone from their relatives and clans to stand by their side.

They turn to it for support, or they need it to solve their problems through their sheikh negotiating with others on the issue of one of their sons, and he is able to judge between the clan members internally, or he is a strong party when there is another party of the opponent to solve the issue, relying on the wisdom and strength of the Sheikh as a way to take their right as for the second matter, they need the clan to prove their lineage and raise their status among the clans. Such a matter appears more in the cities than in the countryside, because the matter of lineage is settled and known to everyone in the countryside, as well as what is related to social status.

4.6. Changes in the marriage system:

The traditions in the system of engagement, marriage and family form are no longer the same as it used to be in the past. Engagement is not often the duty of the family, although there were signs on this issue that emerged during the field study when we found that some young men are still dependent on their families to find the right wife, but this seems Just in terms of shape, we found a case of this kind, but he referred to the family from which the engagement will be made, while many cases no longer follow the traditional way of marriage, as this was observed during the field work from the opinions of some girls who had the opportunity to speak with them in the city who confirmed their refusal The traditional engagement, however, there are real tendencies towards openness in this aspect and when we studied the situation in the countryside, we found a kind of openness in taking the opinion of the boy and the girl about the issue of marriage, but this does not mean that they allow a young man to marry the girl he chooses in a broad way, except in a narrow range. One of them told us that an educated young man wants to marry his relatives, but he faces strong opposition from her father and brothers, and the situation has been going on for years, and at the same time this young man sits with the girl's brother at other times and interacts positively in different situations and this is exciting. At a time when the girl's father stands against marriage his daughter from that young man, we find the latter dealing with that girl's brother in an automatic way, especially what is related to her in this matter. He even told him jokingly, why is your father still opposing? This talk passed easily, which is almost unacceptable in light of the traditional life of the clan. In this sense, internal marriage is no longer valid as it was in the past, especially in the city, while in the countryside, such a marriage takes place on an ongoing basis, and such marriage takes place with the consent of the parents and perhaps with the consent of the girl, but it is no longer forced as it was previously, the tendency to form a new family of cousins no longer receives the attention of the clan family in the city to the extent that there is such a trend from the clan family in the countryside, and the latter has witnessed changes in this aspect and religion has been a factor of awareness, especially among educated, educated youth who do not see it as necessary that the marriage be internal or from relatives unlike the elderly who still prefer internal marriage.

4.7. Change in social position:

The transformations and exchanges in the traditions of the clan were accompanied by other changes related to the criteria by which the social position is measured inside and outside the tribal

community, after the status was calculated according to the social lineage from which the individuals descended, especially with regard to the tribal leaderships based on the status generated through inheritance, which no one among the clan members can cross, it also has the respect and appreciation of other clans. Presidency on the basis of heredity is decisive in the traditional structure of the clan, but this matter has changed relatively and with many clans at the present time, especially those who lived in or near the city, the traditional sheikh of the clan, especially the poor sheikhs, is no longer highly effective in the vicinity of the clan except on the side of moral and formal privileges. The researcher noticed that this presidency in many cases had come out of a family that used to alternate among themselves over the presidency to other people with close relatives who had an economic position and a distinctive relationship with the authority. Measures became measured on the basis of material consideration and close relations with the ruling authority. This emerged when Rural life is getting closer to city life, and after many urban patterns crept into the countryside, especially with regard to technology for construction, clothing, food, etc., when incomes rose in the countryside, the rural people themselves, especially those who migrated to the city, have changed many of their customs, traditions and ways of life, and this has happened at a time when those affirm their values rural, However, the movement of reality confirms the opposite, as the city's life has come to affect them and their assessment of people, which have become more measured according to the economic dimension than on the basis of proportion and proportions. It is also related to the emergence of new laws among the members of the clan. Agriculture and animal husbandry are no longer the profession that the rural knows. Rather, he became a doctor, a university professor, a merchant, an engineer, a technical worker, a lawyer, an accountant and others.

CHAPTER V: Tribes in Raqqa and State

5.1. Raqqa tribes and state in Ottoman period (1840 until world war1)

Modernization policies from 1840 to Sultan Abdul Hamid:

After 1840, serious attempts began to bring about profound reforms within the Ottoman Empire, which was called “Tanzimat” at the time of those reforms and changes. Interest in Arab subjects began to increase and this is due to the Balkan crisis in that period in addition to the Berlin Agreement, which caused the Ottoman Empire to lose part of its lands, which were estimated at about 1/5 of its territory (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).

The Ottomans realized the danger that the secession movements posed to the stability and future of the empire. That is why the Ottomans sought to preserve their empire and turned to European advisers in order to start implementing these reforms, the main goal of which was to introduce the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century (Demirel, 2013).

Here it was necessary to attract the tribes that live on the outskirts of the state and merge them with the rest of the population in the center of the state in order to ensure the stability of the state, and accordingly the Ottomans took decisions with the aim of calming the Arab tribes, using various methods, especially at the beginning of this process.

In the beginning, the Ottomans used excessive force to subjugate the tribes and carried out many military campaigns. In 1843, the Mawali tribe cut off the road leading to Aleppo and its surrounding villages, and accordingly the governor of Aleppo sent a large military campaign to punish them and arrested a number of their sheikhs, in return, the Mawali arrested a senior official and demanded the release of their sheikhs as a condition for the official's release (Dukhan, 2018). Years before this incident, specifically in the year 1832, Ibrahim Pasha announced a military campaign against the sabkha led by the military ruler of Al-Raha and seized 9,000 sheep and 1,000 goats and fined them 30 sacks of gold that went to the state treasury, the reason for this campaign is the refusal of the Sabkha sheikhs to pay taxes to the Ottoman Empire (Al-Hamad, 2003).

The main threat in Raqqqa has been the Al-Fada'an tribe, which settles in the summer along the desert road on the Euphrates, and considering that the Ottoman army stationed in permanent points was very little in the desert, military garrisons were established along the desert line (Maere, 2020).

In fact, these garrisons were able to achieve safety along the desert line, but the high cost of these garrisons made them very useless, in addition to their exposure to attacks in many cases.

Divide and govern

In addition to the Ottomans' attempt to subjugate the tribes by military force, they followed a second method, which is to exploit the differences that existed between the tribes and feed these differences, most of which were due to conflict over grazing fields or because of disagreement and struggle for leadership, and thus these parties become weak as a result of the continuous fighting (Shoup, 1990).

One of the ways enclosed provocative strife between rival factions inside one tribe. For example, in 1851, Muhammad Qureshi pacha, governor of city endowed tribal sheikh Jad'an ibn Mhed of Fad' AN as a chief of the Aniza tribes then visited his camp in person between lake Jabbul and Jabal alohas wherever he was received with honor and also the tribesmen announced their submission to the ruler, this created public the very fact that the governor favored Jad'an, one in every of the 2 leading Sheikhs of the Fadd'an then his rival, Daham Ibn Kashish, was antagonized. Previously, Daham had been appointed because the chief of the Aniza (Dukhan, 2018). This made him rebel against the ruler's decision and stir up trouble in the desert and on the desert road, which is of strategic importance, and therefore he was attacked by the forces supported by Jad'an (Dukhan, 2018).

Among the tactics used by the Ottomans in this policy is to support their friendly tribes with weapons to secure the desert roads established by the Ottomans. An example of this is supplying the Hadidiyin tribe with rifles to fight the Fadd'an who looted thousands of sheep heads from the Hadidiyin (Rae, 2001). Where the Hadidiyin succeeded in retrieving their sheep from the Fadd'an who were still fighting with swords in exchange for the rifles of the Hadidiyin among the other tactics in this policy is to strike deals with certain tribes and employ them as desert police after the

policy of subjugating these tribes failed for many years as the deal the Ottomans concluded with the Fadd'an in order to secure the road and monitor it between Damascus and Aleppo (Parot, 2013).

In fact, the policy of divisions and conquerors proved successful as it was able to calm the general opposition to the state and secure the Aleppo-Damascus road, but on the other hand it created conflicts and conflicts between the tribes, and these conflicts will continue for a long time even after the departure of the Ottomans and the start of French colonialism, as we will see in the coming chapters.

Inducement and Privileges policy

The Ottomans, like those who preceded them from other empires, followed a policy of granting privileges and inducements to tribal leaders such as bribes and other inducements. For example, they encouraged tribes to take and adopt an attitude of absolute loyalty towards the state by giving them a stake in the orderly behavior of administration and commerce (Douwes, 2000).

The incentives policy followed by the Ottomans in appealing to the tribes has proven its usefulness in many cases, and the incentives policy is intended to grant concessions to the tribal leaders, such as granting them money or land, the concessions reached the point of granting some tribes the right to collect taxes in exchange for a share of these taxes, the Ottomans granted large payments to the tribes that monitored the Hajj road and provided protection for pilgrims, such as the Al Fada'an tribe, which used to do this (Parot, 2013).

In addition, the Ottomans granted agricultural lands to some tribal sheikhs who were permanently collecting taxes from members of their tribes or from other tribes, Upon the arrival of Abdul Majeed to rule the Sultanate, he supported the sheikhs of the sabkha and gave them fallow lands for their reconstruction, and the members of the clan were granted legal attribution, and the sheikhs of the sabkha became the owners of the property and agricultural lands, Upon the arrival of Abdul Hamid to rule the Sultanate distributed plowing tools and seeds to them, and most importantly exempted the sheikhs from military service and all royal taxes (Al-Hamad, 2003).

The services provided by the tribal sheikhs to the Ottoman state did not stop at protecting the desert roads and collecting taxes, but at times they supported them with fighters from their tribes. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire granted the title of Agha or Pasha to many tribal leaders, which is an honorary title, and one of the examples in Raqqa is the awarding of one of the sheikhs of Al-Sabkha the title of Agha, as well as granting one of the sheikhs of Al-Afadla the title of Agha, and his name became Ajil Agha (Zakaria, 1945).

Settlement Policy

Most of the attention of the Ottoman governments was focused on the policy of settling the nomadic clans and encouraging them to practice agriculture with the aim of obtaining their tax returns and recruiting their sons after knowing their place of residence (Abd, 2012). Its efforts succeeded after the advent of the governor, Midhat Pasha, who succeeded in the settlement policy after implementing the Ottoman land law, providing the farmers with a guarantee of land tenure, according to which they are granted Tabu (Al-Hamad, 2003).

As we saw in the previous section, the Ottomans granted the tribal leaders' large tracts of land in order to convince them to settle. For many sheikhs, the title deeds of the land transferred them to wealthy private landowners who began to hire peasants to work the land as farmers.

The Ottomans sought by granting lands to some tribal sheikhs as a means to make the Bedouin tribes which were permanently migrating more stable and persuade them to settle. Indeed, some tribes responded with this step and began to cultivate and establish villages (Dukhan, 2018). As in the previous example about the sheikhs of the sabkha, who were granted agricultural lands and became owners of the capital. These tribes were classified among the herding tribes of sheep and camels, so their cultivation was sporadic and they did not have a strong connection to the land, there is a very important matter that was raising the fears of tribesmen, which is the fear of being recruited into the Turkish army if they became known where they live (Zakaria, 1945).

The settlement option, which the Ottomans sought to convince the tribes with, did not attract tribes to a large extent because migration was always an economic and social attraction to the tribes more than the option of stability (Nelson, 1973).

In short, there was no strong reason to persuade the tribes to settle, especially with regard to the economy, as the market for trading in sheep and camels was still satisfactory for them. Also, continuing to migrate from one place to another was a source of strength for the tribes, as it gave them freedom to work as well as independence.

Break through the bureaucratic system:

The Ottomans, when they began to implement reforms, began to introduce these reforms on the periphery of the state first, and the first of these steps was the introduction of an institutional bureaucratic system run by employees of a civil background who were brought from central provinces (B.Toth, 2006). For example, the Ottomans established the Sahara Governorate in the eastern Syrian desert in 1868 on the banks of the Euphrates River between Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, which was governed and administered by the governor of Aleppo (B.Toth, 2006). We believe that the main goal of establishing this province was for two reasons. The first is for this region to be a major producer of wheat after the tribes in the hill of the region were calmed down, which the Ottoman Empire began to need in other regions as a result of successive crises.

The Ottoman Empire at that time was feeling miserable by the horror of all that population void extending from the borders of the Levant coast and its inner cities to the depth of the cities of Iraq. The region was hit by a great population shortage, and it was marked by the dashing and emptiness of towns, villages, and residents, except for the nomads and transients who were fleeing, so it remained a playground for monsters and a breeding ground for mobile shepherds with their tents, and a safe haven for outlaws and bandits, and those fleeing forced conscription (Al-Hasson, 2017).

The Ottoman Empire began to encourage the more populated clans in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor to fill the void of this vast geography devoid of villages and cities, and ensured for them a relatively safe life, with some advantages in ownership, sheep rest and simple services, and the Ottoman state had taken this spot from the place is a small desert outpost, called “Qara Qul,” in Turkish, and became abbreviated as “al-Qul”. From this Ottoman outpost, “al-Qul,” the name was withdrawn to all those new residents and those living next door. then it was called “al-Qul” clans (Al-Hasson, 2017).

The second of these steps was the establishment of the tribal school in Istanbul with the aim of consecrating and strengthening loyalty in the peripheral societies for the benefit of the Ottoman

state in order to transform the members of the tribes into individuals who owe loyalty to the Ottoman state in societies that enjoy self-rule to some extent (Douwes, 2000). Also, there was a basic purpose, which was to keep records of the tribes in general in order to facilitate dealing with them in various cases.

School for Tribes

One of the important measures taken by Sultan Abdul Hamid II is the establishment of the Kabyle School, and the main goal of these schools was to ensure the loyalty of the Arab tribes to the Ottoman state, the sons of prominent Arab tribal leaders were the main targets of establishing this school, the first school was established in Istanbul to ensure the residence of students In it, in the capital, Istanbul, for a period of up to four years (Demirel, 2013).

Muhammad Nuri Pasha was assigned to prepare the project for the tribes' School, and the school was announced in 1892, and the most important foundations included in the school project are the following (Demirel, 2013):

1-Graduates from these schools will be employed in the areas from which they came and thus this will contribute to the development of their tribes.

2-Students in these schools must be between 12-16 years old and enjoy good mental and physical health, and that the teachers speak both Arabic and Turkish.

3-The goal is that every year 40-45 students graduate from these schools.

4-The school will be a boarding and the students will wear a uniform.

Among the students who graduated from this school is Sheikh Nawaf, the son of the leader of the Hadidiyin clan, who completed his studies at the Military Academy and graduated with the rank of captain in the Ottoman army, and Issa Al-Alewo, from the Sabkha tribe, who graduated in 1902 with the rank of lieutenant (Al-Hamad, 2003).

As a result, it can be said that the reform attempts largely failed, as the Ottoman Empire was at that time on the verge of collapse, and the Sahara Governorate failed to impose the law in the Euphrates Valley, and thus the attempt to make this region a major producer of wheat and other crops in order to support the whole empire with wheat failed. Then the tribal school was closed in

1907 and the main reason for its closure was the lack of the authority to have the funds necessary for the continuation of this school, or rather the continuation of this project (Al-Hasson, 2017).

5.2. From World War I until French Occupation (1919)

In addition to what we mentioned above about the failure of the reforms undertaken by the Ottomans, which often created a sense of injustice among the tribes, the drought that afflicted the Levant in general in addition to the locusts that invaded this region and its effects became very large due to the siege that was imposed with the starting of the First World War. This blockade prevented the arrival of food imports from Egypt, which was a major source contributing to the food security of the Ottoman Empire (Douwes, 2000). All these factors combined created hostility towards the Ottoman Empire and facilitated its accession to the Arab revolution.

Just before the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the concept of Arab nationalism began to float on the surface, and in this period the Arab national identity began to form and emerge (Chatty D. , 1977). There are many Arab thinkers who began writing a lot on this topic, such as Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi, Boutros Al-Bustani and others. These writers were seeking to promote the cause of Arab independence from the Ottomans. Here they began with their writings and literature by transforming the tribes from outlaws and from the stereotype taken from the tribes as rebels and barbarians into heroes and victims of the Ottoman regime and all this in order to benefit from the great human power of the tribes as well as benefit from the military power that the tribes possessed at that time (Kuran, 2017).

In June 1916 Sharif Husayn called for a comprehensive revolt against Ottoman rule. With the spark of the Arab revolution, the Ottoman authorities in Syria tried to belittle and underestimate the importance of the Arab revolution, and they flirted with tribal leaders and granted them honorary titles and decorations in order to gain their support and thwart the call of Sharif Hussein (Chatty D. , 1977). At the same time, the Ottomans in Syria arrested and sometimes executed anyone suspected of sympathizing with the Arab revolution, and they attempted to recruit members of the tribes into the Ottoman army, most of which were desperate attempts, while Sharif Hussein and his British successors succeeded in communicating with the tribal leaders and won their support and support, and in the end, Sharif Hussein managed to form an army of more than 30,000 fighters (Parot, 2013).

Among the tribes that lived in Raqqa and responded to the call of Sharif Hussein and joined the Arab revolution, the Anza tribe, whose sons were known to be fierce fighters, and what encouraged them to join the Arab revolution was the joining of their relatives in the Arabian Peninsula to the Arab revolution.

Sharif Hussein, with the help of the British, was able to defeat the alliance that was established between the Ottomans and some tribes in Jordan first, and thus Sharif Hussein was able to link his army with the Arab tribes in Syria and in September 1918 Sharif Hussein entered Damascus accompanied by some Arab tribal leaders such as Nuri al-Shaalan, and this encouraged the tribes in the regions. Where Ibn Mhed, the leader of the Al-Fadd'an tribe, in cooperation with Ramadan Al-Shalash of the Al-Aqeedat tribe, defeated the Ottomans in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor (Dukhan, 2018).

5.3. Tribes and French Occupation (1919-1946):

After the French imposed their full control, they immediately began serious attempts to impose order and apply the law in all regions of the country, and this required subjugation of the tribes that the Ottoman experiences proved that it is difficult to rule the tribes. For this purpose, the French established two military units in order to pacify the tribes and subjugate them. Each unit had specific tasks, while the first one was called Bedouin Control. Its function was to maintain security along the desert roads. The second unit was called Maharisites. The customs, leadership, genealogies and other information about the tribe, and with the passage of time it became very clear to the French that the use of force alone would not be able to subjugate the tribes and impose security. In next we are going to explain the French policy in dealing with the tribes.

Trying to subjugate the tribes

At the beginning of the twenties, rebellions against the French took place in different parts of Syria, from the successive revolutions of Ghouta to the Druze in southern Syria to the Alawites on the coast, to Hanano rebellion in Aleppo, the French faced these rebellions with military force and

used air war. The most prominent rebellion that occurred at this stage was Hajim Ibn Mhed one of the Sheikhs of Al-Fadd'an declaring his independent state in Raqqa, with direct support from the Turks (Lewis, 1955). The Turks were frustrated and upset about their loss of Syria. Therefore, they supported any rebellion against the French.

The Turkish government issued a declaration in support of those protests against the French occupation of Syria, and the Turkish government provided the rebel groups with modern weapons, but the massive French force was able to eliminate this rebellion when it attacked the rebels from the ground and the air and forced them to withdraw to the Syrian-Turkish border (Dam, 1979).

Hajim Ibn Mhed's State in Raqqa:

The leaders of the Anza tribe - the al-Fada'an clan in the interval between the end of the Arab rule and the beginning of the period of the French occupation at the clan level were divided over the attitude towards the French. The division took place at the level of the clan between "Al-Weld" led by the Al-Mhed family and the Kharsa, led by Ibn Kashish, and the "Al-Weld" themselves were divided between Mjhem and Hajim. While Mjhem allied with the French, Hajim allied with the Kemalist Turks, while Ibn Kashish was against the French, but his rivalry with Hajim Ibn Mhed prevented him from joining him in their resistance (Obnham, 1939). In fact, the division between Al-Fadd'an goes back to a further time. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, they lost the unified leadership, and this division was great (Obnham, 1939). As a large mass of the boy went with Hajim, while the number of Ibn Kashish's tents reached 2,500, and the number of Mjhem's tents reached 3,000.

Hajim bin Mhed had reached an understanding in the last days of Arab rule with Jaafar al-Askari to impede the French advance towards the island, and help the Turks sabotage the Jarablus Bridge to hit the French transport lines (Parot, 2013). The agreement with the Kemalists was in exchange for a salary paid by the Kemalists to Hajim Ibn Mhed, which was 3000 dinars per month, and to provide him with large quantities of wheat, 600 guns and two machine guns.

Hajim Ibn Mhed announced on August 10, 1920 the establishment of the independent state of Raqqa under the Arab banner, in cooperation with Ramadan Shalash, its old Arab military ruler Who was associated with the Deir Ezzor revolution against the British at the end of 1919 (Parot, 2013).

Hajim Pasha formed a national council composed of 16 figures, and this state derived its military strength from the support of the Kemalist forces that were fighting the French in Cilicia, where Muhammad Nihad Pasha, commander of the Kemalist forces in the Mesopotamia region, reinforced it with a regular Turkish company from the Fifth Division of the Turkish Army in Urfa (Parot, 2013). To besiege the Millia clans allied with the French.

On October 20, 1921, the Treaty of Franklin Boyun, or the first Ankara Agreement, was signed between the French and the Kemalist Turks. According to this agreement, France ceded 18 thousand square kilometers of the lands that were under its control, which included Cilicia and a large part of the island (Maraş, Urfa, Mardin, Kilis and Antep). In the course of these negotiations, the Kemalist units left Raqqa, leaving Hajim's forces alone, After the two revolutions of the Syrian coast and north were put down due to the French forces' exploitation of the armistice and then the agreement to stop the Turks support for it.

Hajim refused the terms of surrender and refused to dispense with his weapons and continued to resist the French, but his resistance was desperate after the Turkish forces withdrew from Raqqa Hajim's forces collapsed in December 1921 and French forces occupied Raqqa, and Hajim demobilized his army (Zakaria, 1945). The French tried him in Aleppo, but his nephew Mjhem interceded for him with the French, He was released and returned to live in Hama until he died in 1927.

The elimination of the state of Ibn Mhed encouraged the French to continue their campaign in the other tribal areas, where large forces were sent to Deir Ezzor in order to eliminate the rebellion carried out by the great tribe of al-Aqeedat (N.Lewis, 1987). They were bombed from the air and besieged until finally Deir Ezzor was subjugated to the French.

Ghafaniya state and Sheikh Mohammad Faraj Al-Salama

On July 4, 1941, Ghafan al-Turkan, from the Al-Afadla tribe, declared his rebellion against the French occupation, and established the government of Raqqa, the "Ghafaniya state" for one day, and this year is called the Year of Chaos (Feltah), Ghafan, along with his men, burned documents in the old Saraiya, then proceeded to storm the barracks, and the French defenses confronted him and pushed him away from Raqqa, and he crossed the Euphrates towards the villages of Kasrat, so

the French forces attacked the villages facing the city of Raqqa (Doeis, Figures of Raqqa, 2008). The French arrested fifteen women from the region, and were placed in the Saraiya prison to put pressure on Ghafan and his men. Al-Salama stormed the prison and released them in defiance of the French occupation forces.

On July 6, 1941, Sheikh Mohammad Faraj Al-Salama refused to supply the armies of the French colonialist "the Gaul's" and the English, who came from Iraq to liberate Syria from the "Vichyites" with Wheat "Myrrha" and then participated in moving the revolution against French colonialism in Deir Ezzor, and he was shot by French soldiers while he was sitting next to the District Commissioner, a man from Deir Ezzor who was sitting near him was martyred, and the people of Deir Ezzor opened fire, and one of the French officers was killed (Doeis, Figures of Raqqa, 2008).

In 1942, he was placed under house arrest in Beirut, for more than a month until he was allowed to enter Syria, and he was imprisoned in Damascus for a month, then he was transferred to the Lod Prison in Palestine for a period of three months, and transferred to Egypt, then by sea to Qumran Island at the entrance to the Red Sea off the coast Yemen, where he remained in exile for three years (Doeis, Figures of Raqqa, 2008).

In general, the military campaigns carried out by the French to subjugate the tribes, put down rebellions, and eliminate inter-tribal differences, have generally led to good results in terms of imposing security and law enforcement to some extent. But despite all this, we cannot ignore the advice of a French researcher (Muller Victor) who lived for a long time with the Syrian tribes.

Muller Victor provided advice to the French state, as he thought that tribes could not submit to force, and the best was to lead these tribes with flexibility, and he said that as long as the goal of raiding the tribes against each other is to seize the herds of hostile tribes, it is better to allow them to continue, as the result is harmless to the French, he warned the French state of the consequences of putting down tribal wars, as such repression and imposing peace on the tribes may lead to their unification under one banner against the French, as happened before by those who unite the tribes under the banner of the Arab revolution against the Ottomans, and he used to say I do not mean to completely stop military operations, but what I mean is a suspension Military operations and use only when necessary (Dukhan, 2018).

Feeding tribal conflicts:

In the early years of the French mandate, wars between tribes were very common for several reasons, either because of the dispute over lands that were registered in the names of some of the sheikhs as a result of the services they provided to the Ottomans or because of the dispute over the water resources needed for their livestock. Accordingly, the weak and small tribes had to pay sums. Regular financial means called "al-khwa" for the benefit of larger and stronger clans in order to protect them (Dukhan, 2018).

In the twenties of the last century, that is, at the beginning of the stability of the matter in favor of the French, the French resorted to the use of force to subjugate the rebellious tribes. For example, the French used excessive force to end the bloody war that raged between the great Mawali and Hadidiyin tribes where the French intervened using military force against the two sides, and thus the two tribes were forced to Surrender as they were forced to sign a peace-keeping agreement in the region (S.Khoury, 1982).

In the last decade of the French rule of Syria, when things began to turn against them, they used to fuel such wars, for example what happened between the Al-Waldah and Al-Fadd'an tribes in Raqqa, which were two large tribes, but the Al-Waldah tribe had to pay Al-Khwa to the Fadd'an. Al-Waldah" was fighting with (Al-Fadd'an), and at the end of the 1930s, Al-Nasir clan, who were the leadership of the Al-Waldah tribe, refused to pay the jizya (Al-Khwa) to Al-Fadd'an, and Ismail Al-Hajim was killed by one of the Al-Waldah men, in 1941 the famous battle between them took place, and it was called the year of the "Al-Waldah massacre", after which the Sheikh "Shaukh Al Borsan" confessed with killing of 114 men and one woman, while Sheikh Mjhem bin Mhed confessed with killing of 15 men of Al- Fadd'an (Al-Saber, 2018). The reason that the French fueled this war and stood with Al-Fadd'an is the position of Sheikh Al-Waldah, Sheikha Al-Borsan, in 1922 against the French with the men of his tribe from "Al-Waldah", so he started his war against them by sabotaging the railway on the Turkish-Syrian border in the "Ain Al-Arab" region. In the 1922 the French forces struck the homes of "Al-Nasser" in the village of "Shams El-Din", with artillery that was installed on the mountain of "Arouda", The aircraft were bombed for a whole day and had it not been for the French soldier, of Moroccan origin, whose name is "Salah", the date of the attack was not disclosed, and all of them would have been killed. A plane was shot

down, and its pilot and assistant were killed on the mountain of "Al-Sen", located on the outskirts of "Shams El-Din (Al-Saber, 2018).

Administration of tribal areas:

In 1923, it was agreed between the British and the French to establish oil pipelines that would pass through the Syrian desert to link these pipelines between Kirkuk in Iraq to Tripoli and Haifa in Lebanon and Palestine. At the same time, a highway was opened that passes through the Syrian desert and connects between Damascus and Baghdad.

Based on the above, the tribal areas in eastern Syria, including Raqqa, formed a region of great strategic importance for the French in order to ensure safe travel to Baghdad, as well as the continuation of trade without exposing it to great risks. At the same time, this region posed a danger to the French not to be underestimated because this region contained about 20,000 fighters armed with somewhat advanced weapons that they acquired during World War I (Lewis, 1955). Most of these weapons were German-made.

Since the French were exerting a great effort to achieve social and political stability in the tribal areas, relations between tribes across the borders were an obsession for the French, fearing that these tribes would migrate to their relatives in other countries (Chatty D. , 1977). For example, the powerful Al-Fada'an tribe in Raqqa has had strong ties with their relatives in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as Al-BoSha'aban tribe, which has strong close ties in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iraq. Such a migration, if it had taken place, would have dealt a heavy blow to the French plan aimed at encouraging the tribes to settle and move them from a life of nomadism and herding to a life of stability and agriculture. Here, the French concluded that all issues must be resolved by politics and not by coercion.

Based on the above, the French took several steps, the first of these steps was to define specific areas for each of the Syrian tribes in the east, and through their cooperation with the British, they held several meetings and conferences for the tribes in Syria, Iraq, as well as Jordan (Dukhan, 2018). As a result of these conferences, recognized tribal sheikhs were obligated to guarantee the desert roads and to ensure the safe passage of goods in the lands they controlled. They were also obligated to impose peace on all tribes in their areas.

The French divided the country into urban and desert areas, and tribes were not allowed to arrive urban areas without the approval of the French authorities (Parot, 2013). In order to solve the ongoing conflicts over the pastures, which were causing bloody wars between the tribes, the French drew the lines of direction of the tribes during their seasonal migration and they were monitoring the tribes 'commitment to these drawn lines (Neep, 2012). In return, the tribes were given the right to resolve their private disputes and manage their daily lives based on their customs, traditions and customs without imposing the law that is applied in other regions.

Among the other things that the French did to encourage the tribes to settle, were digging new wells, repairing old water networks, increasing the number of schools and health centers in the tribal areas, and introducing a special system for Bedouin hobbies that guaranteed them to register their weapons, their marriage, births and deaths.

The French followed the same incentive system that the Ottomans had used before them, they chose well-known sheikhs or installed others as sheikhs and began granting them land, money and power (Kark & Franzman, 2012). All this is for the sake of the work of these sheikhs under the command of the French, in a manner that guarantees the preservation of the tribal areas under the control of the French, and because of these grants, many tribal sheikhs became wealthy, meaning wealth in return for loyalty.

Using the tribes as a counÍenveighÍ to the nationalist movement

The French began to sense the danger of the nationalists who had a great impact in mobilizing the tribes against the Ottomans, and therefore they followed the same policy that the Ottomans used by them, as the French failed to calm the tribes and subjugate them by using force, they resorted to a divide-and-rule policy where their goal was to create tribal havens that you would later use against the nationalists (S.Khoury, 1982).

In implementation of the policy of divide and rule, the French divided Syria into six regions that enjoy to a large extent self-rule, which is a region for the Druze, Alawites and Turks in Iskenderun, which was still under the control of the French, the region of Aleppo and Damascus, in addition to a completely separate administration for the tribes in the Badia region and the Syrian steppes (Rae, 1999).

The tribes were allowed to manage their own affairs and enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, and the goal was to make these tribes a parallel and counterweight to the national movement, the tribes were treated with respect by the French and the tribe's leader was the mediator between the authority and the tribe's members (Rae, 1999). The French began to support tribal leaders with money and weapons to ensure their loyalty. The Sheikhs of the tribe were given the absolute right to resolve any dispute between members of their tribe, and they were considered the legitimate representative of the tribe's sons in front of the authority (Neep, 2012). Indeed, the effectiveness of this policy appeared from the beginning of its implementation, as Mjhem Ibn Mhed, one of the Fadd'an sheikhs, supported the French in entering Aleppo in 1920.

The Great Arab Revolt that erupted from As-Suwayda in southern Syria in 1925 and spread to all Syrian regions, especially cities of population, economic and political weight, such as Aleppo and Damascus. Most of the Arab tribes took a neutral stance towards them and did not play any major role in the revolution, and here the French realized the success of their policy that they had previously followed in order to win over these tribes (Neep, 2012). This reaction by the tribes encouraged the French to continue their generous policy with the tribes, as they increased their gifts and granted them to the tribal sheikhs, especially in eastern Syria (Rae, 1999). The Al-Fadd'an and Al-Bouchaban tribes were represented in the Syrian Parliament through Mjhem Ibn Mhed, Muhammad Al-Huwaidi and Sheikh Al-Sabkha.

5.4. Arab tribes and the rise of the nation-state in Syria from 1946 until 1970:

During this period of time, a lot of interactions took place between the different tribes and governments that ruled Syria during this period, as the economic power and military power of successive governments were on the increase. During this period, as a result of the economic and military strength, the tribes were subjected to great pressure from the government.

These tribes were considered a cause of ignorance and a failure to keep pace with civilized nations, and harsh measures were taken against them, such as the confiscation of lands that were granted to the tribal leaders at the time of the Ottomans and the French, as well as fighting many of the customs and traditions of the tribes.

5.4.1. Tribes and the Independent State 1946-1958:

Before leaving Syria in 1946, the French handed over the file of clans to the Ministry of Interior in the government of the emerging country, and this government considered the autonomy that the French granted to the tribes as a betrayal of the rest of the national and liberal forces (N.Lewis, 1987). The dispute appeared between the national bloc and the tribal bloc since its beginnings and there is a famous story in this regard, as Akram Al-Hourani, who was one of the founders of the Baath Party, presented with a bill to the House of Representatives and it was proposing through this project to cancel all the privileges that were granted to the tribes in the time of the French, Because of this suggestion, a verbal altercation occurred between Al-Hourani and Sheikh Trad Al-Melhem, which ultimately led to Al-Melhem aiming his weapon at Al-Hourani before the police intervened and after a few days Al-Melhem was assassinated in Damascus (N.Lewis, 1987).

The aim of the newly formed government was to convert the tribes from rebels who were used by the French against the national bloc to citizens ruled by state law, from the beginnings this government took a hostile policy towards the tribes aimed at the end to strip the tribes of all the privileges they had previously obtained (Chatty D. , 2010). This is supported by what was stated in the state's constitution in 1950, as this constitution stipulated that the settlement of the Syrian tribes is a key part of the state's strategy, and a special budget must be allocated in order to achieve this goal (Awad, 1959).

The government began to cancel all the laws that had been issued by the French and that contributed to giving the tribes a kind of autonomy. For example, the tribes law issued by France in 1940 was canceled and replaced by a new decree stating that only tribes classified as nomadic tribes are entitled to arms and only in the desert (Awad, 1959). The 1950 constitution also stipulated that special provisions and laws should be included that suit tribal circumstances to enable them to choose their delegates in the House of Representatives. At the same time, the number of seats allocated to tribal sheikhs in the House of Representatives was reduced from 9 seats to only 6 seats (Chatty D. , 2010). In response to the reduction in the number of seats, the tribal leaders organized a conference in 1954 in Damascus and elected a committee to follow up with the government in order to force it to withdraw from this law, but without benefit. And between 1952 and 1953, several laws were issued, the aim of which was to limit the power of the growing sheikhs who controlled large areas of land without the approval of the state. One of the

laws stipulated that lands that are not used for agricultural or grazing purposes are considered state property (Daher, 1986). Among other measures was the establishment of private internal schools in order to teach the children of tribes in several regions of Syria, with the aim of encouraging them to settle down. Finally, the government deployed military forces to enforce the law and prevent the continued flow of weapons to the remote tribal areas.

The emerging government faced great difficulty at first in implementing the policies mentioned above for several reasons, including the many and frequent changes that were taking place in successive governments and their coincidence with the Palestinian cause and others, although the government was able to theoretically impose its authority on the tribal areas. But it failed to understand the strong ties that bind the tribesmen. In practice, government measures had only a limited and very weak effect on the independence of the tribes. On the contrary, some tribal areas flourished and their sheikhs became wealthy because their areas became one of the most important agricultural areas. It supplies the country with more than half of its need for strategic crops such as wheat and barley.

Agricultural revolution and tribal stability:

Until the forties of the last century, agriculture in Syria was primitive agriculture that used old equipment to cultivate the land, and many tribes were more interested in raising camels and sheep, but by the 1950s, many tribal sheikhs began to use modern equipment and tools in agriculture and their interest in agriculture exceeded their interest in agriculture and animal husbandry (N.Lewis, 1987). What prompted many tribes to turn to agriculture was the great rise in wheat prices after the Second World War, which continued to rise even after the end of the war. This can be considered the first agricultural revolution while the second agricultural revolution occurred with the start of the rise in cotton prices with the outbreak of the Korean War and on Considering that the cotton crop requires continuous irrigation, the tribes that were on the Euphrates River are the most beneficiaries of this agricultural revolution (N.Lewis, 1987).

The big merchants from the governorates of Aleppo and Damascus in particular did not want to waste this opportunity to increase their wealth, so they went to the sheikhs of the Jazira region, including Raqqa, and they pledged to provide tractors, modern plows, water pumps and the application of modern agriculture in exchange for giving the sheikhs a quarter of the profits and with the passage of time the sheikhs were able to acquire all this equipment From the money they

made during the previous year's applying the principles of modern agriculture (Ababsa, ben Meiem, & Ireton, *Agrarian Transformation in the Arab World*, 2009). As a result of what we talked about above, the tribal leaders became the owners of wealth and very large areas of land conglomerated under the ownership of the tribal sheikhs who used to employ the children of their tribe or other tribes as farmers in exchange for a percentage of the crop, the sheikhs tried to invest all the land in agriculture, except for the bad lands that were left for grazing (Ababsa, ben Meiem, & Ireton, *Agrarian Transformation in the Arab World*, 2009). This development began to generate dissatisfaction with the sheikhs on the part of the sons of their clansmen who believed that they had dismantled their traditional life system in favor of a new system. The greatest benefit in it is for the sheikhs.

This great transformation in the lifestyle and the wealth of sheikhs transformed many of them into feudal lords, so they went beyond the previous traditional patterns that imposed on them social interaction with the members of their tribes, and they were in dialogue with the tribe members in every matter that concerns them, as the tribal sheikhs no longer depend on their tribe members for their social and political support., or even financially, as they became able to secure their own resources (Chatty D. , 2010). In addition, the new situation changed the balance of power between the tribes, and some tribes that had always been the strongest and wealthiest recognized the authority and power of other tribes, and this is what happened when Mjhem Ibn Mhed, the sheikh of the Al Fada'an tribe with a past and great power, married his daughter to Faisal Al Huwaidi, the sheikh of the Al Afadla tribe, this is acknowledgment that the Al-Afadla tribe is no longer less than Al Fada'an (Chatty D. , 2010).

With the increase in the wealth of the tribal sheikhs, they developed strong relationships with notables, big merchants and influential people in the cities. Because of the fear of some forces from the growing political activity of tribes and their cooperation with the capitalists, some of these forces represented in the Syrian Parliament, such as the Ba'ath Party and the People's Party, began to fight this growing political and economic force that is getting stronger and stronger. In 1956, these forces presented a bill in the Syrian Parliament. Calls for making tribal sheikhs subject to strict administrative and financial control (Andrew E, 1980).

Thanks to their cohesion in Parliament, and with the support of the Nationalist Party, whose members were mostly merchants and the elite of cities, tribal sheikhs were able to negotiate

changes in the draft law submitted to Parliament and were able in the end to preserve the power that they possess as they were able to preserve their economic freedom (Andrew E, 1980). Until 1958 the year of unity with Egypt, and this unity was the final blow to the authority and influence of the tribal sheikhs.

Gamal Abdel Nasser and the tribes

United Arab Republic:

The union between Egypt and Syria was signed in 1958, and it was known as the United Arab Republic. It began to unify the Arab countries, with the signing of its charter by the Syrian presidents "Shukri al-Quwathi" and the Egyptian "Gamal Abdel Nasser", and Cairo was chosen as its capital, during which the parliaments of the two countries were unified in the National Assembly. In Cairo, the regional ministries were abolished in favor of a unified ministry in Cairo.

Reasons for union:

The unity came as a result of the constant demand of a group of Syrian officers for it, at a time when the leaders of the Syrian Socialist Ba'ath Party had campaigned for union with Egypt, considering that they were the most liberated countries than other countries, in addition to presenting Egypt as a model of the revolution that all Arabs aspired to (Medht, 2017). Time, and there became a kind of polarization of the Nasserite leadership.

In that year, a Syrian military delegation came to Cairo secretly without the knowledge of the Syrian government, demanding immediate unity. Nasser and Field Marshal Hakim Amer negotiated for long days, until an agreement was reached on unity, with the arrival of Syrian Foreign Minister Salah al-Bitar to sign the initial letters of the Unity Charter between Syria and Egypt (Mensfeld, 1996).

Egypt and Syria agreed to establish a unified military command centered in Damascus, and external factors played the first role in strengthening this rapprochement. In 1956, the Soviet Union began a wide diplomatic campaign to acquire the countries of the Middle East, and Syria and Egypt accepted Soviet arms deals (Medht, 2017).

In 1957, the Syrian House of Representatives and the Egyptian House of Representatives met in a joint session and unanimously issued a statement in which they invited the governments of the two

countries to meet and report the union between the two countries (Mensfeld, 1996). The two heads of state and the staff of their governments met and issued another statement in which they declared the unification of the two countries into one state under the name “United Arab Republic.” ”

The members of the Ba'ath Party were clearly and massively hostile with the tribal leaders and tried a lot, as we saw in the previous chapter, to defeat them, but they failed to defeat them on their own, so the unity with Egypt, which was by a great arrangement and pressure from the Baathists, was a great opportunity for the Baath Party to settle its problems with its opponents from the tribal leaders in particular, and his political opponents in general. The United Arab Republic was declared between Syria and Egypt in 1958, and the socialist system was established in Syria, the period of the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties of the last century witnessed the implementation of very strict measures in all political, social and economic aspects against the tribal system that was strong at that time (Dukhan, 2018). Abdel Nasser and his supporters believed that the tribe was an enemy of the peasants and a stumbling block as for Arab unity, as he believed that liberating the farmers and ending feudalism were the first steps necessary for social, political and economic progress in Syria and Egypt.

Abdel Nasser visited Syria only three days after the declaration of the United Arab Republic, and among the areas visited by Hasakah, which has a tribal background, and it was natural for him to meet with tribal leaders in Hasakah, so he went to visit Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Muslt, the sheikh of the large Jabour tribe, who ordered the slaughter of more than 300 heads Sheep to celebrate the visit of President Abdel Nasser, who comes from a poor peasant family, was shocked at the luxury and luxury experienced by the tribal leaders (Al-Jabri, 2011). In contrast, ordinary tribesmen lived in extreme poverty.

On September 28, 1958, President Abdel Nasser abolished the tribes law issued in 1956 and amended from the tribal law issued by the French in 1940, as it was confirmed after this abolition that the tribes no longer possess a separate legal identity, and therefore the role of the tribal bloc in the Syrian Parliament was suspended, the new law emphasized that the tribes and their leaders must submit to the Syrian civil law applicable to other Syrians (N.Lewis, 1987). Thus, members of the tribes have the same rights and duties, and as a result of this amendment, tribal leaders no longer have any effective authority over their tribesmen and they are prohibited from exercising

any legal functions. In addition, boarding schools were closed for the sons of the tribes, and the sons of the tribes had to go to the same schools that other Syrians attend (Daher, 1986). There are other measures regarding the agricultural and grazing system, which we will discuss later.

The most important decree issued during the time of the United Arab Republic, which caused a major change in the tribal system, and which was a fatal blow to the tribal sheikhs, is the Agrarian Reform Law, which was issued on September 4, 1958 (Khalaf, 1981). According to this law, the lands of many tribal leaders were confiscated and redistributed among the poor peasants. To some extent it can be said that discrimination against the tribal leaders was made, as the vast areas they owned were confiscated and small areas that they owned ranging from 10 to 50 hectares were kept for them and their families (Khalaf, 1981).

After implementing the measures mentioned above, a tribal delegation traveled to Egypt and met with Abdel Nasser and tried to convince him that the agrarian reform law that stripped them of their property is inappropriate, but their attempts were unsuccessful and they were unable to persuade him to backtrack on these laws (N.Lewis, 1987). There was an attempted rebellion against the United Arab Republic, headed by al-Nuri bin Mhed, who had received weapons and money from Iraq, but the rebellion attempt failed, but the Iraqis had provided a safe haven for al-Nuri bin Mhed if the plot was exposed (N.Lewis, 1987).

Because of the protests against Gamal Abdel Nasser's decisions, a number of tribal sheikhs were arrested, accompanied by a drought in the region, and it continued for several years. Here, tribesmen began to either migrate towards cities for work, while some tribesmen with kinship links outside Syria began to migrate, as happened with the Bedouin tribes. Which began to migrate towards Saudi Arabia.

secession of Syria from Egypt:

The separation from Egypt occurred in 1961 after a coup that was supported by the Ba'athists who were the first to encourage and strive to achieve unity, as well as by the industrialists who were affected by the nationalization laws that were issued at the time of unity, as well as the tribal sheikhs who were severely affected by the land reform laws (Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social conflict, 1946-1970, 1999).

The separation was a source of relief for tribal leaders and major landowners. Indeed, the new government began to amend the Agrarian Reform Law issued during the time of unity, whereby the maximum number of irrigated or cultivable lands that a person can own was increased as the area of land owned by one person was increased to 200 hectares for irrigated lands and 600 hectares for arable lands and the same area for the sons and wives of the sheikhs (Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social conflict, 1946-1970, 1999).

Parliamentary elections took place in 1961 and in these elections the tribal sheikhs were able to return to the Syrian parliament as members. It was striking that there were changes that began to govern the tribal system, as the tribesmen no longer had confidence in their sheikhs and leaders. This forced the sheikhs to buy the votes of their tribesmen in order to succeed and enter the parliament, as it is said that Sheikh Faisal Al-Huwaidi, Sheikh of Al-Afadla, from Raqqa, paid approximately 350 thousand Syrian pounds in bribes to the sons of the tribes in order to elect him (Khalaf, 1981).

5.4.2. Tribes and the Baath Party after it seized power in 1963:

Since its inception, the Baath Party has sought to build a popular base for it in rural areas, and after the entry of many tribesmen into the Baath Party during their studies in Aleppo or Damascus because of their belief in what the Baath Party was declaring of the principles of freedom, justice, and equality in exchange for their anger against their tribal leaders. and indeed, it began Opening branches of the Baath Party in the tribal areas, where Jalal Al-Sayyed opened the first branch of the Baath Party in a tribal area in Deir Ezzor, and on the grounds that he was from the large Bakkara tribe and because of his relations with the tribal elites, he was able to place a large number of tribesmen in the ranks of the Baath Party (Dukhan, 2018).

The Ba'ath Party took advantage of the increase in its popularity among the various groups of people, especially its increasing popularity among workers and peasants, and began to incite against the new government due to the failure to implement the socialist principles that the Ba'ath Party was calling for. Indeed, a large demonstration occurred at the end of 1962 (Al-Akhras, 1971). The demonstrators accused the government of reactionary and the Ba'ath Party exploited these demonstrations to stage its famous coup In March 1963, it seized power in Syria from that date, and here began new policies for the Ba'ath Party in dealing with tribes, which we will discuss in the next pages.

The site of the tribes in the ideology of the Baath Party:

The Baath Party was established in the early forties by Michel Aflaq and Salah Al-Bitar, who came from the educated middle class in Damascus. After returning from their studies at the Sorbonne in Paris to their home city of Damascus in 1933, the two professors began the process of evangelization. Aflaq and Al-Bitar formed a political movement organized under the name of the Arab Revival Movement, which issued its statement in February 1941 (Awad, Ideology of the Baath Socialist Party, 2015).

The Baath movement fought in the general elections in Syria in (1943) to announce its principles on the widest scale, and Michel Aflaq nominated himself in a statement that carried the party's first and oldest slogans: 'One Arab nation with an eternal message'. Aflaq and Al-Bitar had resigned from teaching to devote themselves to leading the party, and in 1946 the Al-Baath daily newspaper was issued as an official newspaper for the Baath Party.

In its ideology, the party relied on the slogan of uniting all Arab countries in one state and by adopting the socialist approach, which required it to implement this ideology (Awad, Settlement of Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes in the Middle East, 1959). The party suffered from three problems that shook its entity and its credibility.

The absence of a clear-cut scientific method and program of action that could implement its ideas on the ground, so it remained captive to its goals, which remained slogans that could not find anyone to implement them despite their simplicity and ease of realization, noting that the Iraqi Baath Party split from the main Syrian party, contrary to its principles (Awad, Ideology of the Baath Socialist Party, 2015).

People who do not believe in the party's ideology have overpowered its organizational and official leaders after assuming power more than once and in more than one Arab country, as the ruling party in Iraq has occupied an internationally recognized Arab country.

Its adoption of the method of organizing communist parties, which is more similar to intelligence organizations than to political organizations (Medht, 2017).

The main slogan of the Baath Party was one Arab nation, and through the study of the literature of the Baath Party, the party's rejection of the concept of tribes and tribes clearly shows, considering

the tribe a major obstacle to the achievement of the party's goals (Khalaf, 1981). It was found in one of the official documents of the Baath Party that the party considers any regional, sectarian, or tribal conflict as a conflict that will threaten the lives of the Syrians and threaten their existence (Awad, 1959). Therefore, the party was emphasizing that the Arab bond is the link that is supposed to bind people and any other loyalty, and it is a major deviation from nationalism, which the party considers the only guarantee for the progress of the Arab peoples.

Regarding the Ba'ath Party, it was believed that the path to freedom needed a struggle against the political and economic power of the big landowners and the big industrialists, along with businessmen, in order to help people and enable them to continue their lives and livelihoods without interference from the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords (Dukhan, 2018). The leaders of the Baath Party viewed the tribal leaders as people who exercised political and economic hegemony and control over their tribesmen after the tribal leaders began to emerge as a new class with money and influence since the 1950s (Lewis, 1955). The tribal leaders now have slaves, servants and a lot of money and land in return for extreme poverty in which they live Members of their tribe. Therefore, from the party's perspective, standing against feudalism and ending the enslavement practiced by tribal leaders is the first step in the struggle for the freedom of the Syrian people.

Agrarian reform projects:

As we saw in our previous explanation, the Agrarian Reform Law was applied somewhat harshly, as tribal leaders were stripped of the large areas that they owned before these measures were subsequently modified, but we can say that at the beginning of the fall of the United Arab Republic tribal leaders felt something of Comfortable. They began to hope that their lands that were confiscated during the time of the United Republic would return to them in the hope that the new government would cancel all previous laws. When the Ba'ath Party took control of the government in 1963, it immediately began taking measures against the landowners and accelerated the

implementation of measures to confiscate and redistribute lands, and the culmination of these confiscations and redistribution was in 1966. We will see later in detail how these measures had a major impact on the restructuring of the tribal system.

With the Baath Party's effective access to power, it sought directly to transfer the balance of power from the major merchants, industrialists, and landowners to rural areas, where a strong popular base began to form there to be reckoned with, and for the authority of the Baath Party, reforming the status of lands is one of the most important tools in order to achieve the desired change, therefore, committees were formed in order to put down laws regarding land ownership (Douwes, 2000). The Baathist government did not show any sympathy with the tribal leaders, as most of the lands they owned were confiscated and the government redistributed it. In Al-Raqqa governorate, the government confiscated all the lands owned by the Al-Fada'an sheikhs, and at the same time most of the lands owned by the Al-Afadla Sheikh were confiscated (Khalaf, 1981). The effect of these confiscations began directly on the economic and social position of the sheikhs, which is what the Baath Party wanted, as its ultimate goal is to isolate them politically, but in order for them to be isolated politically, they must be isolated economically and socially.

As for the sons of tribes who are not leaders, some of them were fully connected with their leaders and worked with them in advanced positions and benefited from the authority of the leaders in the past, For those who acquired lands as a result of redistribution, a future appeared in front of them that promises more stability since they no longer work for the sheikhs, meaning that they are no longer at their mercy, and there is a third group that has not dispensed with the profession of herding and remained in its basic profession not concerned with agriculture (N.Lewis, 1987). Based on the foregoing, it can be said that these measures have contributed to the stability of a large number of tribesmen, and they no longer care about traveling as before.

The tribes have been using since the dawn of history what is called custom "Urf", which is an alternative law that was needed in regions far from the centers of power or in places where the influence of the authority is not strong enough and is used to solve problems and disputes (Bailey, 2009). The unity government abolished tribal laws and subjected the tribes to the unified law applied throughout Syria. Apparently, the aim of this decision was to merge the identity of the tribes with the identity of the state, which contributed to the establishment of security and peace in the tribal areas that the unity government saw as nothing but an example of chaos and insecurity.

But in fact, the goal was further than this, as Abdel Nasser, and with him the unity government, were concerned that the Urf would continue in the tribal areas in Syria it will maintain its strong relations with their relatives in Iraq and the Gulf states, and consequently with the governments of Iraq and the Gulf, which may cause problems for the Abdel Nasser project, which was in great conflict, especially with the Gulf governments that were seen as reactionary governments.

It was not easy for the tribes to submit to a civil law at the expense of the Urf that ruled the affairs of the people for hundreds of years. There are great contradictions between the understanding of the civil law of some issues and the understanding of Urf. For example, the process of revenge, which is an honorable and great matter for members of the tribes, has been classified as a crime that deserves the most severe penalties from the point of view of civil law, and there are many examples of this contradiction. Therefore, despite the promulgation of a law abolishing the work by Urf, the tribes continued to manage their affairs through Urf, but with state control and supervision in one way or another, with flexibility shown by the tribes towards this law. As the tribes have become receptive to abandoning habits that were considered authentic and cannot be abandoned, such as the habit of carrying weapons openly and everywhere without fear of any punishment, the tribes also began to deal with some other customs with greater flexibility, for example, they accept the need not to protect thieves and criminals as soon as they enter a house, even if it is the house of the tribe's leader. In return, the government left the tribes to work with some tribal laws that they used to use in managing their affairs, such as the issue of compensation the family of the dead man, with an amount of money, which is called blood money for tribes and other laws as long as it does not affect the state.

5.5. Hafez al-Assad and new policies towards the tribes:

The national governments that ruled Syria after the French mandate sought to remove the tribal character of Syria and transferred power from the tribal areas to the state, as they considered that these policies are necessary in order to establish a civil society characterized by modernity.

After Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria, his reliance on the Baath Party was not only to expand his popular base, but rather began to use the traditional relationships that already exist in the Syrian society, and among these relationships is the tribe and began to manipulate the tribe's networks in order to exploit them for his benefit (Dukhan, 2018). The following policy has been marked:

The first thing that Hafez Al-Assad did was to invite tribal leaders who left Syria to other countries due to the arbitrary measures that were implemented against them. Among these sheikhs was the leader of the Hadidiyin tribe and Sheikh Daham al-Jarba, the leader of Shamar, and other leaders (Chatty D. , 2010). In order to obtain the support of the leaders of the large tribes, Hafez Al-Assad directed state officials to follow an open-door policy for these leaders in order to discuss their problems and the problems of their clans at any time and at any level (Dam, 1979).

From the economic point of view, Hafez al-Assad realized from the beginning the great economic importance of the tribes in supporting the state's economy, especially that the areas inhabited by the tribes support the national economy for the largest proportion of the agricultural output, which is considered a basic pillar of the Syrian economy (Potato, 2014). He also provided, through state institutions, fodder for sheep and camels in order to ensure that the remainder of them is not deported out of Syria, as happened before when the Bedouins transferred a large part of their livestock to the Arabian Gulf and Iraq.

From the social point of view, Hafez al-Assad was keen to keep the channels of communication with the tribal sheikhs continuous, so the sheikhs were invited to attend national events with senior officials in the state. Representatives of the president were also sent personally to attend some funerals in the event that a leader of large tribe died, the media that the regime fully controls began to show the customs and traditions of the tribal areas to make them acceptable to other Syrians.

5.5.1. The use of tribes to help Assad to confront the Muslim Brotherhood:

In general, since the Arab tribal society was established, loyalty to the tribe has mostly been at the expense of religion. In modern Arab history, there are many examples and, in many countries, where the confrontation between Islamic groups and the tribe appears, especially in countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as well as in Syria to some extent.

We also mentioned above that the Baath Party, since its inception, relied on expanding its popular base in the countryside more than its interest in the popular base in major cities, this interest in the countryside increased after Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 since in the seventies more than two-thirds of the government came from the countryside and the less important cities (Potato, 2014). Hafez al-Assad tried to gain the loyalty of the countryside in general and the tribal areas in particular by paying more attention to public services in the countryside, including electricity and

health facilities, and more attention to education, in addition to the great interest in agriculture, which is the main source of livelihood for the people of the countryside (Abdullah, 1984). The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria were predominantly urban in nature, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who had a wide popular base in the countryside, although the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria tried to get close to the tribes, but their attempts were unsuccessful (Abdullah, 1984). In fact, the tribal leaders in Syria for the most part did not support the Muslim Brotherhood because they were concerned about losing the gains, they had gained from Hafez al-Assad's regime at that time. Despite the power that the merchants of Aleppo and Damascus had on the tribal areas such as Dara'a, Deir Ezzor, and Raqqa, tribal divisions in the end were in the interest of the Syrian regime.

Jamil al-Assad, brother of Hafez al-Assad, visited the Hadidiyin tribe in 1981 and provided great support to the Hadidiyin and asked them to be on the side of the regime in its battle against the Muslim Brotherhood and asked them to monitor the flow of weapons to the Muslim Brotherhood from Iraq, whose regime at that time was one of the biggest supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (Rae, 1999). In the documentary *A Flood in the Baath*, Sheikh Dhiab Al-Mashy, the leader of the Abu Bani clan, said that he sent men from his clan to Aleppo to fight the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s (Amerlay, 2003). Dhiab Al-Mashy was awarded a permanent seat in the People's Assembly until he died in 2009.

5.5.2. The site of the sons of the tribes in the regime's military and security institutions:

Tribes historically refused to join the national armies of their countries, for they used to consider that serving in the army was a restriction of their movement, which they were accustomed to, which is to move with their livestock in search of water and grass, In 1953 the government imposed compulsory conscription on members of the tribes, and in 1954 the government allowed all tribes in the border areas to possess weapons and consider them as belonging to the national defense system (Al-Faour, 1968). Hafez al-Assad was the first president to come from a peasant background, so he had his own strategy that he followed in organizing the army, and it proved successful with the passage of days, his strategy was summarized in making sensitive and higher positions in the army and security institutions under the control of his relatives from the Alawite sect and handing over other, less important positions to tribesmen (Potato, 2014). Some tribes found working in the army and security institutions a job opportunity that could not be forfeited, as those who were once marginalized found work and a position that would help them reach higher

ranks in the state, while other tribes such as the Anza tribe thought it was a shame to join by the army (Khalaf, 1981).

The successive authorities in power in Syria have used the tribes as an important source of intelligence information, especially those tribes that live in the desert and have varied terrain. Even the clans who saw joining the army and security forces as something of shame were an important source of information for the authority (Taylor, 2004).

5.5.3. The Baath Party and the tribes under the rule of Hafez al-Assad:

Since its inception, the Baath Party has been active in the tribal areas, especially in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Dara'a. Although the tribal sheikhs did not join the ranks of the party directly, they were encouraging their tribesmen to join the party, as joining the party allows elevation to high positions in the state and thus obtaining great benefits for the person and his clan (Khalaf, 1981). The regime's policy of granting members of the tribes' higher positions in the state had its own policy, as it was intended that these positions be for the sons of the tribe less important than the leaders of the tribe. For example, in Raqqa, most of the leaders of the party, which is the highest position ever in every governorate, were not sons of the leaders or their families, but were among the common people of the tribe (Hinnebusch, Peasant and bureaucracy in Bathist Syria: The political economy of rural development, 1989). For example: Ibrahim Hindi from the Al-Ajeel clan is not from the sheikh family. Nevertheless, he rose to the top positions in the state, becoming head of the party branch in Raqqa, then governor of Suwayda, and then a member of the Qatari leadership in the Baath Party, and this position is considered one of the most prestigious positions in Syria.

5.5.4. Tribes and their representation in the Syrian Parliament during the era of Hafez Al-Assad:

From the beginning of the formation of the Syrian Parliament in 1936 until the Ba'ath Party took power in 1963, tribal representation did not exceed 12%, and there has always been a great struggle between liberal and nationalist forces and other forces with tribal leaders regarding reducing, increasing, or even canceling tribal representation in parliament, When the government was controlled by the Ba'ath Party, the previous parliament was dissolved and a new parliament was formed consisting of 95 members, none of whom was a tribal leader (Al-Abd, 2013).

In 1971, Hafez Al-Assad appointed 172 in the People's Assembly without elections, among them a number of tribal leaders, with the aim of restoring confidence between the party and the tribes, but the tribes' representation was only 3%. The first parliamentary elections took place in Syria in 1973, and then the elections started every 4 years (Potato, 2014). In the 1971 and 1973 elections, Sheikh Faisal Al-Huwaidi, the sheikh of the Al-Afadla clan, was the tribal representative for the Raqqa governorate. Until 1977, tribal representation in the People's Assembly did not exceed 4%, and the rest of the seats were shared between the Ba'ath Party and other parties allied with it in the so-called National Progressive Front, and independent candidates would not have had a chance to succeed in the elections if they did not have a good relationship with the party and the state (Dukhan, 2018). Like Sheikh Ali Anwar Al-Borsan, from the Al-Walidah clan, who was in constant conflict with the regime. In 1977, tribal representation became about 10% of the members of Parliament, in 1990 the entire parliament became 250 and the number of independents was 80, including a third of the tribes (Chatty D. , 2010).

Given that if the state is strong, then the tribes will necessarily be weak, and no one denies that the Syrian regime during the reign of Hafez al-Assad was very strong, as the security system was almost complete, and therefore the tribal system must be weak. Despite the military and security strength of Hafez al-Assad's regime, the Syrian state did not possess the popular legitimacy necessary to support the Assad regime after Hafez al-Assad launched his military coup in 1970. Hafez al-Assad realized from the beginning that the Alawites alone would not be able to maintain his rule. Therefore, from the beginning, he sought to integrate the tribes with state institutions and exploited the negative feelings that the people of the countryside in general and the tribesmen in particular had towards the people of the cities who used to look at the people of the countryside with an inferior look and contempt. Accordingly, as we have seen, Hafiz Al-Assad used the tribes on more than one occasion to reinforce his authoritarian regime, as in suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The migration of many sons of powerful tribes that had a great political history in the Ottoman era and after that the French mandate, such as the Anza tribe and the Shamar tribe, greatly contributed to Hafez al-Assad's ability to implement the policies that we talked about above, which resulted in the tribe's alliance with the regime.

5.6. Bashar al-Assad and Tribes from 2000 until Now:

5.6.1. From 2000-2011

Bashar al-Assad came to power in Syria after the death of his father, Hafez al-Assad, in 2000. Contrary to the policies of his father, which weaved threads of patronage and satisfied tribal leaders in order to ensure the continuation of his authoritarian regime by linking the system to society (Hinnebusch, ResearchGate, 2012). Bashar al-Assad pursued a completely different policy from his father's policies, as in order to appease the bourgeois class, he revived the private sector at the expense of the public sector and turned to liberal policies to try to integrate into the global system, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the nineties of the last century had a great impact on the economy of Syria, which was Its regime is closely linked to the former Soviet Union. The liberalization of the economy pursued by Bashar al-Assad led to the creation of a new economy, and the regime was transformed into an authoritarian regime linked to the bourgeoisie more than its connection to the popular base, ignoring the rural base that was the cornerstone of Hafez al-Assad's reliance in building his authoritarian regime.

In general, Hafez al-Assad had a triangle of basic pillars in order to link the regime's head to al-Qaeda. The three pillars are the Ba'ath Party, the security and military apparatus, and the popular organizations. But Bashar al-Assad's policies after he took control of the government struck these pillars with a major imbalance, as there has been a major shift in the balance of power in favor of the elite against the people of the countryside (Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the The Arab world, 2013). Bashar al-Assad gave his relatives from the Al-Assad and Makhlof families wide powers, especially in the economy, and at the same time he removed important Sunni figures from the tribes from power on charges of corruption and embezzlement, such as accusing Mahmoud al-Zoubi of corruption and then claiming that he committed suicide.

By tracking Bashar al-Assad's dealings with tribesmen, we found that he appointed some of the tribes 'sons to high positions in the state, but these were not members of large tribes. For example, Ibrahim Hunyadi, from the Al-Ajeel clan in Raqqa, is not considered one of the large tribes like Al-Walidah and Al-Afadla, and the same thing happened in Deir Ezzor with the appointment of Riyad Hijab as prime minister, who defected from the regime with the start of the Syrian uprising, Riad Hijab belongs to the Al-Sakhani clan, and it is not one of the large clans in Deir Ezzor compared to the Al-Bakkara and Al-Aqeedat clans.

The economic openness pursued by Bashar Al-Assad has benefited certain governorates such as Aleppo, Damascus, Tartous and Latakia at the expense of the rest of the governorates. The most affected were the people of the countryside, who mostly depend on agriculture for their livelihood, which as a result of the economic openness was greatly affected, and this created instability in the countryside and among the tribes (Khatib, 2011).

After five years of Bashar al-Assad's control of power in Syria, a number of Syrian opponents signed the Damascus Declaration statement, which was calling for more political openness and greater freedom (Sabra, 2019). Among these opponents was the Sheikh of the Bakkara tribe who hosted an opposition conference at his home and was arrested two months later in the regime's prisons.

The economic situation became very bad in rural areas, and what made the situation worse were the droughts that struck Syria at that time, and consequently, internal migration from the countryside to the city increased. Poverty increased in tribal areas in Syria, especially in the eastern region, including Raqqa, where poverty in tribal areas was much worse than poverty in urban areas, as according to the United Nations Program, poverty in rural areas reached a rate of more than 60% (UNDP, 2010). In 2008, Syria was hit by a very severe drought, which required the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid to millions of people in the tribal areas, especially Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir Ezzor, which after the arrival of Bashar Al-Assad became the poorest, as mentioned above (UNDP, 2010). During the period between 2005 and 2009, more than one million people from the tribal areas were affected and lost their basic resources on which they depended for their livelihoods, as a result of the drought, the production of the main crops of wheat and barley decreased sharply (Salamandra & Stenberg, 2015). This disaster caused a large migration from the tribal areas to the outskirts of cities, which led to the emergence of poor neighborhoods surrounding the cities.

Bashar Al-Assad's economic liberalization policies affected the agricultural sector, especially after the privatization of state property from agricultural lands in 2000 (Ababsa, The End of a World Drought and Agrarian Transformation in Northeast Syria, 2015). After this decision, lands were distributed to people who did not work in agriculture at all, and the criteria in which the land was distributed were unfair criteria, and the lands were subsequently sold to whomever desires, and this is a clear contradiction with previous decisions that set a ceiling for the possession that a

person can own. This caused the emergence of wealthy classes in some tribes, unlike other tribes who did not benefit from their previously confiscated lands.

Exploitation of tribes in Bashar Al-Assad's policy towards the Iraq war:

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power, Bashar Al-Assad decided to support the Iraqi resistance that arose immediately after the American control of Iraq. Bashar Al-Assad supported the resistance because he was afraid that the government in Syria would be overthrown and the Ba'ath Party removed from power. To achieve this goal, Bashar Al-Assad exploited the kinship relations between the Syrian and Iraqi tribes in order to facilitate the entry of weapons and fighters into Iraq.

There are several things that facilitated the task of the Syrian regime to destabilize the situation in Iraq by sending fighters, the first of which is the historical ties of kinship between the Syrian and Iraqi tribes, especially in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Hasakah, the second of these factors is the love of the tribes of Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hasaka to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Salamandra & Stenberg, 2015). The Mufti of Syria called on Muslims to join the jihad in Iraq, as well as mosques openly calling for jihad, and as a result of this mobilization by the religious and media institutions of the Syrian regime, a large number of young Syrians in general and tribal youth in particular went from Raqqa and Deir Ezzor And Hasaka to fight in Iraq. Iraq fell after 21 and America occupied Iraq, many Syrians were killed in this war, and mourning gatherings in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hasaka were too many.

As we mentioned above, the Syrian regime did not want the stability of Iraq because it feared a similar threat to its regime. When Saddam Hussein's regime fell in Iraq, the Syrian regime encouraged resistance and rebellion against the US army in Iraq. The resistance against the US army took an Islamic character, Nevertheless, the regime supported this resistance, so Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hasaka were major transit points for fighters who wanted to fight in Iraq, as well as supporting armed groups in Iraq with weapons (Dukhan, 2018). The relationship that existed between the Syrian tribes and the Iraqi resistance is clearly evident if we know that the percentage of Syrians among the fighters in Iraq was the highest among the other nationalities, where the percentage exceeded 8% and most of the Syrians were members of the tribes from the three governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Hasaka. (Felter & Fishman, 2007). Ali Musa al-Shawakh, from the Ajeeb tribe from Raqqa, is a lawyer who was one of the most important people in Raqqa

who used to facilitate the passage of Syrian and foreign fighters to Iraq, He continued his role in facilitating the passage of fighters from 2005 to 2008, and the Syrian regime knew that, but they left him and provided him with facilities for his work. In 2008, the Syrian regime was subjected to great pressure from the United States to stop the flow of fighters into Iraq. The Syrian regime arrested Musa al-Shawakh in 2008 and released him in 2011 with the start of the Syrian uprising, and his name later became Abu Luqman, who led the Islamic State (ISIS). in Syria. We will talk about this stage in detail in the next pages.

The new policies that Bashar al-Assad pursued towards the tribes endangered the social balance that his father was keen to exist, and later it was proved that the liberal policies pursued by Bashar al-Assad in Syria had a great impact on the rural areas inhabited by tribesmen .What made matters worse was the droughts that struck Syria during that period and the reduction of the state's support for farmers, so agricultural production decreased and tribal societies began to collapse, and the countryside began to migrate to major cities, which increased the anger of tribesmen against the Syrian regime, who created a new rich bourgeois class at the expense of Countrymen. The regime continued to support tribal leaders whose political and economic interests were linked with the regime. These sheikhs no longer care about their tribesmen, and this further divided the Syrian society in general and the tribal community in particular, causing the beginning of the erosion of the internal balance of the Syrian society that Hafez al-Assad built over decades All this created the conditions for the Syrian uprising that began in 2011.

5.6.2. Tribes in Raqqa and the position on the Syrian revolution:

The Syrian revolution started from popular, spontaneous and peaceful protests in the marginalized Syrian regions in 2011 calling for freedom, dignity and emancipation, and an end to oppression, corruption and dictatorship, but it soon spread to most of Syria. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad suppressed peaceful demonstrations with weapons, causing hundreds of thousands of victims, and millions were displaced inside Syria and sought refuge in various parts of the world, and Syria has turned into an international crisis and an arena for conflict between regional and international powers (Syrian Revolution, 2016)

The 2011 uprising revealed the degree to which tribal power structures had become. Whereas society was divided between opponents and defenders of the regime, tribal leaders were forced to choose between standing with one of the two parties or removing themselves from the equation (Unknown, 2020). While some of them bet on the rebel movement, others strengthened their relationship with the authority, leaving their areas to move to the regime-controlled areas in Damascus or Hama. Others, especially the elderly faces of the clans, have resorted to protecting themselves and their immediate families by leaving Syria completely and heading to Turkey or the Gulf states. Only a few could organize their clans (Unknown, 2020).

The Al-Afadla clan shows a clear explanation for the tribal sheikhs 'crisis. The family that leads the tribes, al-Huwaidi, has been known to have distributed their notables among the various conflicting parties to increase their access to protection. While Muhammad Faisal al-Huwaidi is currently residing in Damascus as a former member of Parliament and a close ally of the regime, his brother remained in Raqqa throughout the war years. The latter received exceptional respect in Raqqa for his ability to deal pragmatically with the conflicting parties such as ISIS and the Syrian Democratic Forces, without being fully affiliated with them. Sheikh Bashir was assassinated in late 2018, and the opinions of observers varied between accusing ISIS, the regime, or the Autonomous Administration (Al-Alwash, 2018).

The Tribes and the peaceful phase of the revolution:

The conflict between the Syrian regime and the coordinators of the Syrian revolution reached its climax in order to polarize the clans on Friday 10-6-2011, the day the coordinating organizations called the "Friday of the tribes," and the governor of Raqqa also organized the "tribal conference" on the same day (Security forces used helicopter gunships to quell the "Friday of Clans" demonstrations, 2011).

The coordinating organizations of the revolution wanted the "Friday of the tribes" to encourage the tribal leaders to take positive positions on the revolution's activities, which would increase the pressure on the regime. Especially since the participation of the tribal-majority areas in the demonstrations, especially in Raqqa and Hasaka, was limited compared to the rest of the regions at the time (Saleh, 2019). Indeed, that day witnessed massive confrontations and demonstrations,

and large numbers of demonstrators took to the streets, and Hama witnessed the largest number of demonstrators on that day, just as it participated in the Friday tribal demonstrations in Dara'a, Deir Ezzor, Rural Damascus, Raqqa, Qamishli, Idlib and other areas. Around thirty demonstrators were also killed by Syrian regime security forces on that day, including 11 protesters in the town of Maarat al-Nu`man in Idlib, and 6 protesters in Lattakia. However, the matter did not have a significant impact, as the leaders who attended the conferences of the clans supporting the regime were many and of clear tribal weight.

As for the Syrian regime, on Friday of the tribes, a conference for tribal sheikhs in Raqqa was banned by a large number of tribal leaders in Raqqa and some other regions, including leaders and notables from the "Sabkha", "Al Majdma", "Al Nasser", "Al Afadala" and "Al Boassaf" tribes. "Al Bukhamis", "Al Naim", "Jess" ... , in order to invest their social status among the members of their clans, especially since the secret regime was concerned about the increasing number of demonstrators (Saleh, 2019). In fact, the tribal sheikhs in Raqqa tried to prevent the tribesmen from demonstrating against the regime, but the tribesmen increased their participation in the demonstrations gradually.

Eight months after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Bashar al-Assad visited the city of Raqqa on Eid al-Adha and met with a large number of tribal leaders in an attempt to calm the demonstrations in Raqqa, among the most prominent sheikhs who met with Bashar al-Assad, Sheikh Muhammad Faisal al-Huwaidi, Sheikh of the Al-Afadala tribe as well as Sheikh Abdul Al-Mohsen Anwar Al-Rakan, Sheikh of the Albu Sbaie tribe (Doeis, President al-Assad greeted the people of Raqqa, 2011). But the people of Raqqa on the same day went out in demonstrations in the city of Raqqa against the Assad regime, refusing Bashar al-Assad's visit to their city in an attempt to convey a message that tribal sheikhs do not represent the position of the tribes 'sons (Raqqa 6-11-2011, 2011).

The date (03/15/2012) was an important event in the history of the city, as the young man, Ali Babansi (born in 1996), was killed when he went out with some of his friends to commemorate the start of the demonstrations in Syria, and to commemorate the next day in one of the largest demonstrations that took place in Syria. More than 50 people were killed during the demonstration, which the Syrian army responded to, and it was called (the Saa'a massacre) because it took place in the middle of the city at the famous Clock Tower (Al-Mahmoud, 2017).

Armament stage:

After the hourly massacre that we referred to earlier, the peaceful phase in Raqqa ended and moved to the stage of military combat against the Syrian regime, With the revolution moving to the military stage, tribal relations began to dominate the formation of the fighting military factions, so several factions were established on the basis of kinship relations regardless of the extent of their support for the Syrian uprising. The Abdul Aziz Brigades, nearly all of its members from the Al-Fada'an clan, were receiving their support directly from Saudi Arabia (The formation of the King Abdulaziz Brigade in Raqqa countryside, 2013). While the Thuwar al-Raqqa Brigade was from the Al-Walidah clan, the Ahrar al-Tabqa were also from the Al-Walidah clan and other factions from the Al-Mashhour clan and other brigades formed on the basis of kinship.

5.6.3. ISIS and Tribes in Raqqa:

In March 2013, the Assad regime was expelled from the city of Raqqa, and the entire province of Raqqa was outside the control of the Syrian regime, with the exception of two military sites besieged by the military factions. In the first months of the liberation of the city from the Assad regime, the city of Raqqa lived for a period of time in a somewhat democratic climate, but soon the situation began to change with the declaration of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on April 9, 2013 and the appointment of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Muslims (team p. , 2015). and here the entire governorate moved to a new dark stage that led to a change of alliances and affected the tribal structure a major change that will continue for a long period of time.

After ISIS prepared for its fight against the Free Army factions, ISIS began assassinating and kidnapping many Syrian activists. In addition, a large number of civil society activists were arrested, and the head of the local council, Abdullah Khalil, was kidnapped (Rights, 2014). Which increased tension and unrest in the city, with the increase in youth fleeing from Raqqa, as it became a danger to them. On 01/09/2014, the city of Raqqa caught fire with battles between ISIS and the Free Syrian Army, which lasted for three days, during which ISIS was able to control the city, leaving dozens of the free fighters' dead, in addition to the dead from the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic movement (team p. , 2015).

Attracting clan leaders and dignitaries:

ISIS has realized from the beginning that the traditional tribal structure has changed with the days and the many incidents faced by the tribes, and that there is a new generation of young people who no longer see the traditional leaderships as their representatives, so ISIS has given wide powers to a number of young people in order to obtain support the young generation in the clans. For example, the leader of the Islamic State in Syria was a young man of no more than 35 years(Ali Mousa Al-Shawakh) from the Al-Ajeel clan, a former prisoner of the Syrian regime for more than 3 years, who released him in 2011 (unknown, 2019). In addition, ISIS appointed Ali Al-Sahw, a young man from the Al-Musa Al-Zahir clan, under the age of 23, as the head of its security office, which is the most important office in the structure of the organization, this helped to control security and cause terror, and many tribesmen were recruited into the organization (Hamza, 2015). In order to tighten its control over the tribes, ISIS established a tribal office headed by a Saudi man assisted by a Syrian from Al-Bureij clan named Tobad, and the tribal office had a major mission, which was gathering information about the tribes in Raqqa and their daily activities.

ISIS began to weave a network of interests that included sheikhs and tribal leaders, from which the phenomenon of allegiances began. As happened in the famous allegiance of Raqqa, in which fourteen clans pledged allegiance to the sheikhs and their delegates, we mention among them: Sheikh Hassan Al-Bureij and Sheikh Ali Al-Khabur (the Al-Bureij clan), Sheikh Abdul Karim Al-Rakan (Sheikh Al-Sabkha), Sheikh Mustafa Al-Khalaf Al-Issa (Al-Boassaf clan) Sheikh Khalil Al-Hindawi Al-Hanada, Sheikh Huwaidi Shalash Al-Mjhem (Al-Afadala) (After Aleppo, 14 a clan in Raqqa pledged allegiance to ISIS, 2013). There are three main factors that pushed tribal leaders to declare loyalty to ISIS, the first factor is the economic benefit and protection provided by ISIS to them, the second factor is the fear of ISIS as ISIS can use the fear factor with great skill, the third factor is the injustice that tribes were feeling on the part of the system (Hawat & Haian, 2014).

In order to understand the first factor, which is the benefit and protection factor, we must go back before 2011, as it is necessary to take into account the developments of events during different periods. During the rule of Hafez al-Assad's regime, the tribes were employed and used by the regime as tools of control indirectly through the regime's official institutions and affiliated companies, as it used the tribes to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned earlier. The

tribes were part of the enormous popular forces that underpin the regime. But after the economy opened up to the global market, the Ba'athist ideology was abandoned and the state's existence and services receded among the tribal communities in the periphery (Hinnebusch, ResearchGate, 2012). ISIS tried with all its efforts to fill the big gap that emerged after the withdrawal of state institutions, and established an alternative entity and a strong system of patronage, and ISIS supported some tribal leaders and gave them the opportunity to be opinion-holders and influential in their surroundings again (Hawat & Haian, 2014). This prompted many tribal leaders in Raqqa to switch allegiance from the Syrian regime to ISIS in exchange for giving them some power. In addition to this, ISIS obtained a lot of money through its control of the oil and gas fields in eastern Syria, and these funds helped it provide services to the local community, such as electricity projects, agricultural irrigation projects, drinking water and other services of interest to the local community. On the other hand, during the rule of Bashar Al-Assad and his regime, the tribes in these areas were marginalized and they saw how the natural resources available in their areas were being stolen and plundered.

The second factor that pushed many tribal leaders to declare allegiance to ISIS is the method of terror used by ISIS in Raqqa. There is no statistic about the number of people who were executed by ISIS in various ways in Raqqa governorate, but the number is very large and with a simple tour on YouTube or social media pages between 2013 and 2014, we will find hundreds of videos that show the brutality used by ISIS to subjugate society, this is excluding the executions that were not published, and some of it was done for very simple reasons, but its main purpose was to create terror and this is what happened. And the massacre of the Shaitat clan carried out by ISIS in Deir Ezzor on 15 August 2014, aroused terror in the hearts of all tribesmen, as ISIS, after a 22-day fight with the Shaitat clan, managed to control all the villages of the clan and issued an order to execute everyone over the age of 13, and killed more than 1500 people from the Shaitat clan within a few days (Al-Mahmoud, 2017).

Grievances played an important role in the process of inter-tribal interconnectedness during the Syrian revolution and provided the necessary impetus for the general movement. Many writers wonder about how society is bound and revolts against a government. Some writers believe that there must be economic motives to push people to be part of a revolutionary movement, and grievances for these writers are not a sufficient motive to mobilize people for revolution (Hawat

& Haian, 2014). Achieving justice and getting rid of injustice is a general need that suffers from a problem of utilization, as individuals are reluctant to move, given the high cost of participation in the event of their participation, and in turn tend to wait for others to move to benefit from their movement. This problem impedes collective political mobility in dictatorial regimes, where the cost of participating in the revolution is very high (such as being imprisoned or even killed) (Hawat & Haian, 2014). In such circumstances, people tend to refrain from starting the revolution because the rational choice for the individual is to distance himself from danger, waiting for the movement to succeed and then reap the benefits. Accordingly, Collier argues that there must be economic benefits to convince people to engage in a revolutionary movement, otherwise it will not take place. But the tribal community presents a counter-argument to Collier's idea through the principle of kinship, which constitutes a dominant organizational formula for the tribes, and motivates individuals to rally to defend their relatives who are members of the tribe, and the ties between the Syrian Badia families were very important in organizing the first protests in the region.

After nearly four years of repression, kidnappings, arrests, murders and deaths resulting from the bombing of the International Coalition for ISIS, the local community in Raqqa has become completely exhausted, so many tribesmen have joined the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are sponsored and supported by the international coalition to expel ISIS as we will see in Next pages.

5.6.4. USA and Tribes in Raqqa:

When the United States made its decision to fight ISIS on the ground, it began vigorous attempts to mobilize tribes in northeastern Syria in order to lead the fight against ISIS. Several meetings were held between some Arab tribal leaders and officials from the international coalition in 2015, including talks with representatives of the state. Western and representatives of the Arab Gulf states. The goal of the United States in these meetings was to find a Syrian equivalent for the "Sunni Awakening", a movement that rearranged the ranks of the Iraqi Sunni tribes to fight on the side of the United States in its battle against Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups in Iraq between 2005 and 2008 (Al-Hamd & Dukhan, 2021). But the end result was reliance on the Syrian Democratic Forces formed by the United States of America, which are mainly composed of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in addition to some small Arab factions with a marginal role such as the Al-Sanadid Forces, which are composed of elements from the Shamar tribe in addition to other factions such as the tribal brigade, the component is mostly from the sons of the

Waldah clan (Al-Hamd & Dukhan, 2021). After the international coalition defeated ISIS and its main ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces, managed to control all the areas that were controlled by ISIS, the United States of America began to return to holding meetings with a number of tribal leaders in Raqqa, with the aim of legitimizing the Syrian Democratic Forces.

On several occasions, the US presidential envoy to Syria, McGurk, met with Arab tribal leaders, and the United States, through an official statement, acknowledged the Shaitat massacre that we talked about above and these actions show that the United States of America is striving to create a good and unified tribal position under the leadership of the forces Democratic Syria in Raqqa and the rest of northeastern Syria (team E. , 2017). For this purpose, US officials held several meetings with some tribal sheikhs since the announcement of the defeat of ISIS, without realizing the consequences that these sheikhs would face, especially those known for their opposition to the SDF. Such as Sheikh Bashir Al-Faisal, Sheikh of Al-Afadala, who was assassinated in 2018, as well as Sheikh Obaid Khalaf Al-Hassan, Sheikh Al-Boassaf, who was assassinated in 2019. Both leaders are known for their strong opposition to the Syrian Democratic Forces, and this behavior by the United States of America undermined the confidence of local residents and tribal leaders in the ability of the United States. American and the Syrian Democratic Forces to provide them with protection (Al-Hamd & Dukhan, 2021). In addition to this, President Trump's repeated statements about his intention to withdraw from Syria are causing the people of the region, especially the tribal leaders, a state of anxiety and making them consider the United States a power that cannot be relied upon in the region in the long term.

5.6.5. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Tribes in Raqqa:

The establishment of the Syrian Democratic Forces was announced in the city of Qamishli, northern Syria, on October 10, 2015. These forces issued a statement introducing themselves, saying, "It is a unified national military force for all Syrians that brings together Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs and all other components. "The announcement of the formation of these forces came after the United States announced its intention to provide weapons to a select group of armed forces for the purpose of fighting what is known as the Islamic State. The statement stated that these forces include the following military forces: "The Syrian Arab Alliance, the Revolutionary Army, the Euphrates Volcano Operations Room, the Sanadid Forces, the Jazira Brigades, the Syriac Military Council, the Kurdish People's Protection Units and the Kurdish Women's Protection Units" (Team,

About the Syrian Democratic Forces, 2017). The People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women Protection Units (YPJ), which are armed forces affiliated with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, form the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces, known by the acronym as "SDF" (Team, About the Syrian Democratic Forces, 2017).

The Syrian Democratic Forces did not differ from other authorities who preceded them, as they followed the same policies, which can be summed up by supporting some tribal leaders with money and power or with intimidation of arrests, and the last point is the exploitation of the position of some tribes towards the Syrian regime and the Iranian militias.

With the Syrian Democratic Forces taking control of Raqqa, they began trying to show that the Arab tribes and their leaders were standing by the SDF, in announcing the so-called declaration of the liberation of Raqqa from ISIS. The Syrian Democratic Forces invited a number of tribal leaders to attend the declaration of victory over ISIS on 10-20-2018 in the Municipal Stadium in the center of the city of Raqqa (Team, The Syrian Democratic Forces "praises the victory and is preparing to hand over the city of Raqqa to a civilian council, 2018). The ceremony was attended by a large number of tribal leaders, headed by Hamid Al-Faraj Al-Salama, leader of the Al-Walidah clan, but on the other hand, some leaders refused to attend the ceremony due to the great destruction that befell the city of Raqqa due to the operations of the International Coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa, the most important leader who refused to attend was Sheikh Bashir Al-Huwaidi, one of the sheikhs of the Al-Afadala clan. As the 2019 report of the United Nations Institute for Research and Training recorded 12,781 destroyed homes, of which 3326 were completely destroyed, in the absence of any real efforts or intentions for reconstruction or compensation for those affected so far (UN, 2019).

The SDF is trying to place the leaders and notables of large clans in high positions in their administrations to gain legitimacy in front of the international community. Most of the councils have real representation in terms of the percentage of components in them, but it is ironic that Laila Mustafa, the co-chair of the Raqqa Civil Council (executive), who is from the Kurdish component, has held her position since the establishment of the Raqqa Civil Council on April 18, 2017 despite Four joint presidents of the Arab component have succeeded so far, and they are respectively from the oldest to the most recent: Mahmoud Al-Borsan(Sheikh of al-Waldah), Hamed Al-Mehbashi(Afadla), Mishlab Al-Darwishi(Afadla),, and Muhammad Nur Al-Hajjo (Afadla) (Kasab, 2020).

The same is the case for Khaled Barkal, the co-chair of the Raqqa Legislative Council, who has held his position since January 10, 2018, despite the succession of two co-chairs from the Arab component, namely: Nadia Al-Hamada and Rehab Al-Nafi Everyone in Raqqa knows that the one who holds the reins of administrative matters in the city is Laila Mustafa, without any central role mentioned for any person from the Arab component, regardless of his job position or social position, as the tasks of Arabs are limited to casting statements and being pictured within these bodies and bodies (Kasab, 2020).

The SDF also refuses to have the tribal component of any military influence on the public scene, unless they are subordinate to it. At the beginning of its establishment, the Syrian Democratic Forces included many brigades and brigades formed from the people of Raqqa, who fought the battles against ISIS in January 2014, and refused to surrender to the Islamic State, to complete what they started in other areas such as Sarin and Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in the countryside Northeastern Aleppo. Among the most famous of these brigades and brigades at the time: the Thuwar Al-Raqqa Brigade and the Tribal Brigade (a former one of the Free Tabqa Brigades), which participated in the battle for control of the city of Raqqa in 2017, and many of its affiliates died at the hands of ISIS (Kasab, 2020). After the Syrian Democratic Forces took control of Raqqa and defeated ISIS, it began to marginalize all the Arab factions that fought with it and kept them away from decision-making and kept them symbolically only in order to market the SDF at the local and international levels.

These actions began to anger the members of the tribes in the fighting factions, as well as the Arab military leaders, as they considered that such actions had the main purpose of excluding the Arab component from the circle of decision-making. Ahmed Al-Aloush, nicknamed Abu Issa, the commander of the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade, who considered these actions as a clear and explicit exclusion of the Arab component within these forces (Edotionalteam, 2018). As a result, military skirmishes took place between the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade and units of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the neighborhoods of Rumaila and Al-Sina'a, east of Raqqa, supported by protests by the people calling for equality between the components and non-exclusion and unilateral decisions. This state of tension lasted for nearly a month, and after that, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) imposed their siege on the headquarters of the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade on June 24, 2018, and two days later, they stormed the brigade's headquarters and took

those who were there to prisons (Edotionalteam, 2018). Since then, "Abu Issa" is still under house arrest, and dozens of the brigade's members are still in the Syrian Democratic Forces' detention facilities.



CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

- 1- Tribes are no longer monolithic and highly effective bodies due to structural changes within the tribal community, and this means that it is not necessary for all tribe members to follow their leader or follow tribal instincts at any time, because tribal identity has become just one identity among the multiple identities carried and armed by tribesmen and in the end, this means that the cohesion among the tribesmen has become low.
- 2- The weakness of the state, its authority, and its power further enhance belonging to the tribe, as the tribe becomes a safe haven for tribesmen when chaos reigns and the state's authority weakens, and thus the concept of tribal solidarity emerges a lot in times of wars and conflicts.
- 3- The tribes and clans do not have a high ability to coordinate militarily outside their small geographical area, and this is clearly evident in the tribal army, which consists mainly of fighters from the Al-Walidah clan, as well as with the Al-Sanadid forces from the sons of the Shamar tribe.
- 4- Traditional tribal leaders do not represent the younger generation of tribes, and ISIS and later the SDF were able to capture this idea. ISIS invested in the twenty-year-old (Ali Al-Saho) through it, it was able to ensure that a large number of tribesmen joined ISIS, as did the Syrian Democratic Forces when they began to bring the young generation closer and place them in higher positions for the same purpose as ISIS.
- 5- The disintegration of the traditional clan structure, whether on the level of kinship relations or the clan leadership, as the relationship has affected many weaknesses, so that personal interests and ambitions appear in their place besides kinship, Likewise, the clan presidency branched out and became a real political crisis when many of the tribal sheikhs became from the new generations that emerged because of the authority's support for them or through the exploitation of the current circumstances and the silence of many traditional sheikhs about what is happening.
- 6- The disintegration of the traditional clan structure, whether on the level of kinship relations or the clan leadership, as the relationship has affected many weaknesses, so that personal interests and ambitions appear in their place besides kinship.

- 7- The natural structure of Raqqa governorate greatly influenced the formation of the tribal structure, as many of the tribes in it tended to solidarity and agglomeration based on the values of an association similar to the Bedouin clan, due to the influence of the desert on this structure, especially some of the tribes that live on the desert or on its edge.
- 8- The natural environment, especially what is related to the existence of the Euphrates River, has also affected the creation of rural settlements that have resulted in agricultural tribes that depend on an export-oriented agricultural economy, which increased their income and made them build modern housing equipped with advanced technology. This affected its social and cultural life and contributed to its transformation from her traditional Bedouin style to a new agricultural style.
- 9- It emerged through the study that the personality of the tribal sheikh today differs from his character in the traditional environment in terms of power and influence on individuals, as the clan sheikh today plays a political role depending on his relations with power and on what he has of money. The sheikh who does not have money does not enjoy much support.
- 10- Successive phases produced new leaders, who emerged through their political role and the authority's support for them to achieve political goals and this led to the production of the clan to suit the circumstances of each phase, one of the most important results of the clan's production is the production of new leaderships who are ignorant of many of the tribes' customs and traditions.
- 11- The state's endeavor to reproduce the clan had clear political purposes, which made this directly reflected on its social and political functions in society, as well as on the behavior of its men and their relationship, which became based on personal interests and benefits, Especially in the pledge of allegiance to individuals who have strong ties to the authority and those who possess large funds to lead their kinship group or the entire sheikhdom of the clan without paying attention to the first origins of the selection process, in terms of lineage or the traditional social position of those who are historically more entitled to it. What increased the disintegration and change of the internal organization of the clan.
- 12- The emergence of a state of social duality between individual values resulting from cultural and economic change and the collective interests of the clan, which made many individuals use the clan as a means to achieve political and economic benefits, whose relations with the clan became more symbolic than articulate.

13- There are social changes that have taken place in the marriage system. Inward marriage is no longer the dominant form in clan society, as the openness of the clan to the city led to the emergence of internal marriage.



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ANNEXES

Annex A




The Ottoman police station in Raqqah was built in 1863

Annex B

Sultan Abdul Hamid I issued 1777 orders to discipline some outlaw tribes and clans, including Al-Bu Shaaban and Al-Jamasa from the tribes of Raqqa.

Annex C



A decision by the Syrian government in 1966 to confiscate the money and lands of Abdul Aziz Al-Maslat, the leader of the Jabour tribe in Al-Hasakah.