

**T.C.  
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**EXAMINING CHALLENGES TO DURABLE PEACEBUILDING:  
A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

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**Department of Political Science and International Relations  
Political Science and International Relations Program**

**OCTOBER, 2021**



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# ONAY FORMU



## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare with the respect that the study “EXAMINING CHALLENGES TO DURABLE PEACEBUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA”, which I submitted as a Master thesis, is written without any assistance in violation of scientific ethics and traditions in all the processes from the project phase to the conclusion of the thesis and that the works I have benefited are from those shown in the Bibliography. (.../.../2020)

Fiqi Abdirizak OMAR

## **FOREWORD**

In the name of Allah, the most gracious and the most merciful. First and foremost, i am thankful to Allah, the Almighty, for blessing me with the strength, knowledge, and patience to be able to finish this thesis.

I would also like to express my indebtedness to my family for their guidance, unwavering support, appreciation and keen interests in my academic achievements. This is for my beloved parents, who always motivated me to pursue my dreams, including the completion of this academic research project. And to my brothers Gure, Jibril, and Omar, for their the moral support and unconditional love.

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Any omission in this brief acknowledgment does not mean a lack of gratitude.

October, 2021

Fiqi Abdirizak OMAR

# **EXAMINING CHALLENGES TO DURABLE PEACEBUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA**

## **ABSTRACT**

The Somali State collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somalia has been in a perpetual conflict driven by internal actors and an external intervention with varying degrees of interests and objectives. Almost fourteen years later, since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007 and the full engagement of the international community to stabilize and build peace and reconstruct the Somali state, Somalia remains an unfinished project. Despite the significant involvement and renewed interests by the international actors, the intervention fell short of changing the conflict dynamics, and the political and security landscape remains unchanged. A significant point of departure in the peace and state-building agenda in Somalia has been the predominant practice of a top-down liberal peace framework pursued by the international actors that failed in aligning the peace and state-building efforts with the prevailing conditions on the ground

In this research study, an explanatory approach, which is a qualitative research methodology is used to answer the two research questions. It does so by analysing the conflict through the lenses of the conflict resolution approach. The study further evaluated the external actors' approach to peace and state-building by critically examining the intrinsic weaknesses and contradictions of the "one-size-fits-all" top-down liberal peace framework. Moving Somalia out of the current quagmire it finds itself deeply entangled is still possible through the conflict resolution approach as an alternative to the liberal peace framework.

Moreover, despite the involvement of the international actors, al Shabaab remains to be a formidable force to push around and acts as a de facto government by raising taxes and exerting its authority in territories under the control of the federal government of Somalia. Despite the challenges posed to peacebuilding in Somalia by

al Shabab, defeating al Shabab militarily is not possible, thus, a peacebuilding approach that recognizes al Shabab as a political actor in the Somali conflict would be a viable option to end the war of attrition. Additionally, a genuine reconciliation that transforms the relationships of Somali clans is critical to address grievances and heal deep-rooted wounds created by the clan conflict in Somalia.

**Keywords:** Peacebuilding, Clans, Al-shabab, Higher AMISOM, Civil War



## **DAYANIKLI BARIS INSASININ ZORLUKLARININ INCELENMESI: SOMALI ORNEGI**

### **ÖZET**

Somali Devleti 1991'de çöktü. O zamandan beri Somali, iç aktörler ve değişen derecelerde çıkar ve hedeflere sahip bir dış müdahale tarafından yönlendirilen sürekli bir çatışma içinde. Neredeyse on dört yıl sonra, AMISOM'un 2007'de konuşlandırılmasından ve uluslararası toplumun barışı istikrara kavuşturmak ve inşa etmek ve Somali devletini yeniden inşa etmek için tam katılımından bu yana, Somali bitmemiş bir proje olarak kaldı. Uluslararası aktörlerin önemli katılımlarına ve yenilenen çıkarlarına rağmen, müdahale çatışma dinamiklerini değiştirmede yetersiz kaldı ve siyasi ve güvenlik ortamı değişmeden kaldı. Somali'deki barış ve devlet inşası gündeminde önemli bir hareket noktası, barış ve devlet kurma çabalarını ülkedeki mevcut koşullarla uyumlu hale getirmede başarısız olan uluslararası aktörler tarafından izlenen yukarıdan aşağıya liberal bir barış çerçevesinin baskın uygulaması olmuştur.

Bu araştırma çalışmasında, iki araştırma sorusunu yanıtlamak için nitel araştırma yaklaşımı, derinlemesine görüşme, odak grup tartışmaları ve ikincil kaynaklardan veri toplamak ve araştırma bulgularını çıkarmak için kullanılmıştır. Çalışma, "herkese uyan tek beden" yukarıdan aşağıya liberal barış çerçevesinin içsel zayıflıklarını ve çelişkilerini eleştirel bir şekilde inceleyerek dış aktörlerin barış ve devlet inşasına yaklaşımını daha da değerlendirdi ve bu çerçeveye alternatif olarak önerilen çatışma dönüşümü yaklaşımı. liberal barış çerçevesi Somali'yi kendisini derinden dolaşmış bulunduğu mevcut bataklıktan çıkarmak hala mümkündür, ancak liberal barış destekçileri tarafından savunulan yukarıdan aşağıya "herkese uyan tek beden" modeline değil, yerel bağlama uyarlanmış bir model gerektirir.

Ayrıca, uluslararası aktörlerin katılımına rağmen, El Şebab hala ortalıkta dolaşmak için müthiş bir güç olmaya devam ediyor ve vergileri artırarak ve Somali

federal hükümetinin kontrolü altındaki bölgelerde otoritesini kullanarak fiili bir hükümet olarak hareket ediyor. El Şebab'ın Somali'de barış inşasına getirdiği zorluklara rağmen, El Şebab'ı askeri olarak yenmek mümkün değildir, bu nedenle, El Şebab Somali ihtilafında siyasi bir aktör olarak tanıyan bir barış inşası yaklaşımı, yıpratma savaşını sona erdirmek için uygun bir seçenek olacaktır. Ek olarak, Somali klanlarının ilişkilerini dönüştüren gerçek bir uzlaşma, Somali'deki klan çatışmasının yarattığı şikayetleri ele almak ve köklü yaraları iyileştirmek için kritik öneme sahiptir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Barış İnşası, Klanlar, Al-shabaab, AMISOM, Milli Savaş



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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AIAI</b>	: Al-Itihad Al-Islamiyah
<b>AMISOM</b>	: African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AU</b>	: African Union
<b>FMS</b>	: Federal Member States
<b>GO</b>	: Government Organization
<b>HOF</b>	: Horn of Africa
<b>IC</b>	: International Community
<b>ICU</b>	: Islamic Courts Union
<b>NFD</b>	: Northern Frontier District
<b>NGO</b>	: Non-Governmental Organization
<b>SNA</b>	: Somali National Alliance
<b>SNM</b>	: Somali National Movement
<b>SRC</b>	: Somali Revolutionary Council
<b>SRRC</b>	: Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council
<b>SSDF</b>	: Somali Salvation Democratic Front
<b>STP</b>	: Security Transition Plan
<b>SYL</b>	: Somali Youth League
<b>TFG</b>	: Transitional Federal Government
<b>TNG</b>	: Transitional National Government
<b>TPLF</b>	: Tigray People's Liberation Front
<b>UN</b>	: United Nations
<b>UNITAF</b>	: Unified Task Force

**UNMEE** : United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

**UNOSOM II** : United Nations Operation in Somalia II

**UNSOS** : United Nations Support Office in Somalia

**USA** : United States of America

**USSR** : Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

**WSLF** : Western Somali Liberation Front



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## I. INTRODUCTION

Post-war peacebuilding is a very intricate process with disappointing outcomes. Despite the many challenges that impede peacebuilding, the internationally facilitated peacebuilding efforts in Somalia are characterized as a top-down approach that focuses on a preconceived narrative of engaging in small groups of state political elites considered 'moderates' and only at the top leadership level. It is critically important to approach the Somali conflict from a peacebuilding perspective that involves a bottom-up approach, in which the affected communities at the grass-root level are engaged, consulted, and participate in the process of crafting the post-war peace and state-building agenda.

The Somali conflict has evolved since the civil war in 1991, with different actors at play in different conflict phases. During the initial phase, the conflict progression was localized and dominated by clan militia warlords. In 1992 UN forces were deployed in Somalia, but withdrew in 1995 after the death of 19 US rangers in Mogadishu, after the US marine fought with one of the parties to the conflict General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Ken Menkhaus (2006: 87) explains that "armed conflict continued to affect much of Somalia, but since 1995 the nature of the conflict, duration, and intensity have changed significantly, becoming more localized, fighting sub-clans against one another, in an increasingly fragmented political environment." Subsequently, from 1995 to 2006, clan warlords contested for the control of the capital city of Mogadishu, each one controlling different parts of the city to extract resources.

In the context of Somalia, the political actors to the conflict must be engaged in genuine negotiation that leads to a lasting resolution that ends the protracted conflict. This however entails considering one of the antagonists to the conflict- that is al Shabab to be recognized as a political actor, rather than labelling it as a terrorist organization; that is if the international actors are seriously interested in ending the war of attrition that lasted for more than two decades. Al-Shabab have been labelled a terrorist organization, thus excluded from participating in the national political

negotiations. According to the Life and Peace Institute (2014, 10) report, "the sanctioning of al-Shabab was merely based on assumptions that isolation of a given actor labelled as a terrorist would ultimately lead to its weakening and defeat." In fact, the opposite has happened, the blacklisting has led to an exponential growth of al-Shabab.

Al-Shabab remains a formidable militant to defeat, despite the deployment of 22,000 strong African Union forces (AMISOM) since 2007. Fourteen years later, al-Shabab is strong and controls vast territory in Somalia acting as de facto government by levying taxes even in cities controlled by the federal government of Somalia.

### **A. Background of the Study**

The post-conflict peace and state-building in Somalia led by the international actors have encountered a multitude of intricate challenges, including the nature and behaviour of internal political actors, and the parties to the conflict, as well as, the 'one-size-fits-all' approach of the external actors, which draws its core argument from the western liberal peace theory. Peace and state-building is a very complex undertaking and requires a bottom-up approach that utilizes indigenous knowledge and not a top-down approach that discounts the invaluable contribution local populations add to the process of post-war peace and state-building.

Somalia collapsed as a functioning state in 1991 following the military regime's oppression against its own people in the northwest of Somalia in 1988 and the subsequent emergence of clan-based militia in both the north and south-central Somalia with the intention of fighting against the military regime. As a result, intra-clan conflict engulfed the country in 1991. The international community tried to salvage the Somali state by deploying a UN-led multinational peacekeeping force, The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) acting under chapter VII of the charter. Under UNITAF, the United Nations (UN) deployed 37,000.0 UN peace enforcement in the south and central Somalia (Patman, 1997: 6).

UNITAF succeeded in improving the humanitarian relief operations, but the overall security remained the same, and the ceasefire agreement signed by the two actors in the Somali conflict failed to hold. Since then, the international community was trying to reconstruct the Somali state and in 2007 deployed regional forces

composed of neighbouring countries under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

## **B. Literature Review**

This part presents a literature review of the topic in question, which is the challenges that impede building a durable peace in post-conflict Somalia. Many scholars and practitioners concur that the nature and characteristics for contemporary conflict is complicated, and needs to be understood with clarity to transform relationships between antagonists. This is an important factor to overcome the challenges and dilemmas for peacebuilding. John Paul Lederach (1997: 17) asserts that the majority of protracted conflicts are located in developing countries that struggle with poverty, inequities, and underdevelopment. According to Lederach, in these settings, "peacebuilding" does not start and stop with, say, the launch and the termination of a UN operation, or with the establishment of political parties or the holding of elections. Rather, "peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships" (Lederach, 1997: 17).

Similarly, Oliver Wils et al (2006: 1) states that "Peacebuilding concepts and approaches must take account of this high level of complexity. The now widespread recognition of the need for "holistic" and "integrated" approaches and adherence to the principles of coherence, cooperation and complementarity are important in this context". In other words, the need for a multipartial, inclusive peacebuilding approach that acknowledges and includes all stakeholders in conflicts, from the top to the grassroots level. This approach can constructively transform relationships between all conflict actors, which grants room for the promotion of positive peace.

Kevin P. Clements (2020: 97) states that "In working with local groups, it is highly desirable for an outsider proposing interventions to bring everyone into the discussion of the problems and their solutions. If local stakeholders feel excluded, they may sabotage the work. This substantiates the importance of engaging with an indigenous community when searching for a solution for peace.

Additionally, John Paul Lederach asserts that the grassroots level and their community should be given the opportunity to work on issues of peace and conflict resolution (Lederach, 1997: 55). Peacebuilding efforts should target the grassroots level and their communities since it's the indigenous people that are directly affected by war and trauma. Subsequently, enemies at the local levels should be the force that drives settlements, negotiations, and agreements. For example, the Grand Boroma Peace Conference was a reconciliation initiative that brought together several hundreds of Somali elders mediating between clans (Lederach, 1997: 55). The conference lasted for 6 months and resulted in the establishment of a peace framework, this local initiative minimized the cycle of violence in Somaliland making it significantly safer than southern Somalia, particularly the capital, Mogadishu. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland would achieve stability and lasting peace, in stark contrast to Somalia.

In *An agenda for peace*, former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992: 5) proposed the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, describing it as interventions aimed restoring peace in the aftermath of a violent conflict and requires actions “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” and to prevent “the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples”. However, Boutros-Ghali also states, in another more detailed article, that post-conflict peacebuilding should also assist post-conflict nations in developing democratic systems and holding democratic elections (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). The problem with this approach is that external actors, nations, and other international institutions, such as the UN and EU, begin the process of post-conflict reconstruction then give responsibility back to the local community once they see “progress and stability” (Tanabe, 2017: 448). The notion that external actors, such as the UN, EU, and AU can establish lasting peace without indigenous consultation has had questionable results in countries like Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria to name a few.

Contemporary peacebuilding is often interconnected with liberal peacebuilding. Moreover, Edward (2009) asserts that “peacebuilding activities are not neutral in their normative orientation or impact, and this raises important questions concerning the role of international organizations in attempting to end civil conflict through the promotion of certain political and economic models”. Another

critique about liberal peace buildings, aside from its top-down approach, is that it views local communities' culture, traditions, norms, and religion as inferior to democratic governance. It's a hegemonic agenda, and Eurocentric in its approach, which views the grassroots communities as lacking the capacity to rebuild on their own in the aftermath of conflict. Liberal peacebuilding's legitimacy has been questioned and critiqued, whether it be the intentions and motivations of actors that engage in peacebuilding activities, the impact it has on post-conflict societies, or the scope of contemporary peacebuilding (Edward, 2009).

In the Somali conflict, liberal peacebuilding has been implemented and has failed to bring lasting peace to the East African nation. International interveners have not produced a productive solution for the violence that plagues the country. However, other peacebuilding approaches should be applied to try and end the two-decades-long protracted conflict.

Many academics view the situation in Somalia as an unavoidable dilemma in regards to the questions of clan politics. They believe it is the underlying cause for creating an environment where violence prevailed, and therefore instability became the outcome. World Bank (2005) states that clan cleavages are the reasons for the majority of the conflicts that arose and caused a division among Somalia's never-ending cycle that endures within the environment. Albrecht, P., & Lambo (2015: 1) hold the notion that misrepresentation among clans in the political and social sectors triggers violence and is the root cause of the conflicts in the country. Elmi (2010) believes clans challenged each other to gain the monopoly of violence causing the state to collapse, the remanence of it still being felt today. Patman (1997) slightly differs from this paradigm and views the situation in Somalia arising from inter-state conflict, and concludes that it led to an increase in foreign intervention in Somalia which caused greater harm than good.

However, historically, research is dominated by western scholars who write about the less developed communities in generalized terms, which means research that is context-specific to a particular indigenous or country is applied universally. As western scholars generate most of the dominant knowledge, their state-building and peacebuilding approaches are influenced by this generalization mind-set of a 'one-size-fits-all' narrative drawn from western liberal peace scholarship. The issues

have deeper roots that need to be addressed, and therefore, my research would provide a framework for better understanding in regards to this topic.

### **C. Research Question**

Why did international peacebuilding plans not work in the case of Somalia?

What is the appropriate approach to resolve the protracted conflict in Somalia?

### **D. Research Objective**

The objectives and importance of this research study are:

1. To investigate the main challenges that hinder peacebuilding goals in Somalia's intervention undertaken by the multinational actors for the past two decades.
2. To contribute to the existing knowledge base of the context-specific community in Somalia.
3. Eliminate any preconceived notions and misconceptions that many people have about Somalia as a "failed state".

### **E. Research Methodology**

The study employs a qualitative approach. The reasoning is that the topic is quite complex, it needs detailed examination and critical thinking from different viewpoints for the work to be well articulated. This research study is descriptive and explanatory and tries to analyse the issue regarding conflict resolution theories, and addresses a particular phenomenon that is unique to Somalia.

The mode of inquiry will be unstructured as the purpose of the research study is primarily to describe a situation, phenomenon, problem, or event (Kumar, 2011: 38). This research study will be descriptive, as its focus is limited to the challenges of peace and state-building in Somalia. "A qualitative study is to describe the variation and diversity in a phenomenon, situation or attitude with a very flexible approach" (Kumar, 2011: 38).

Instrumentation is an important part of qualitative methodology. The secondary sources include literature reviews, government publications, and

government archives. Additionally, the main source of data collection has been done through interviews with government officials. The research instrument is important to test the reliability of research findings. For instance, an instrument is considered reliable when collecting the same set of information more than once and getting the same results under the same, or similar conditions. Therefore, reliability is the degree of accuracy or precision in the measurements made by a research instrument (Kumar, 2011: 186).

## **F. Structure of the Thesis**

Chapter I: This chapter introduces the study and includes the background of the study, research objectives, research methodology, research question, research significance, and the structure of the thesis. Furthermore, it includes a literature review about the Somali conflict.

Chapter II: This chapter discusses the theoretical framework to be used in this study. It focuses on the various approaches to peacebuilding.

Chapter III: Discusses International responses to peacebuilding in Somalia, the limitations of the liberal framework, and alternative approaches and strategies that could be useful to end the protracted conflict in this fragile nation.

Chapter IV: This chapter provides an overview and a concise history of Somalia and the conflict.

Chapter V: This chapter discusses the major challenges for peace in Somalia. It focuses on the African Union Mission to Somalia and International Intervention, Clan Grievances, AMISOM, and lastly the Role of Neighbouring States.

Chapter VI: This chapter concludes the study and contains the recommendations and conclusion.

Chapter VII: This chapter contains the references used for the study

## **II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This chapter offers an in-depth discussion on the various theoretical approaches that are broadly used for peacebuilding and are relevant to this research study. The study explores several pertinent conflict theories. Theories such as Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict transformation theory.

Moreover, another pertinent theory that is relevant to the research topic is examined. It is the liberal peace theory, which also explored and contextualized its relevance to peacebuilding and the reconstruction of the Somali state. This theory is critically important to the study in order to understand the core principles, models, and theories that influence and guide the international actors' peace and state-building approaches in countries emerging from conflict and fragile states like Somalia.

### **A. Liberal Peace Theory**

Post-cold war policies and practices have been heavily characterized by the need to intervene in international conflicts and to reorient the structure of governance in developing countries in order to establish lasting peace. Since the 1980s, advocates of the theory have been emphasizing the need for global democracy and liberal marketization to “minimize the risks of war”. It is a hegemonic system excessively concerned with applying liberal practices and norms to rescue developing nations from their own ills. Additionally, it has also become an agenda set to establish western values and dominance across the globe.

The central thesis of liberal peace theory is the assumption that countries that are liberal democracies do not fight- that is democracy restraints them from fighting. Thus, its approach to peace and state-building aims at implementing a liberal democratic state in countries emerging from conflicts. Therefore, the international community's intervention and approach to post-conflict peace and state-building is rooted to a liberal peace framework. It holds the view that liberal democratic states

do not fight, therefore countries emerging from contemporary conflicts are introduced to political and economic liberalization. However, the assumption that liberal democracies restrain from fighting among themselves was proved wrong by WWII, as economic interdependence and liberal democracy among the western nations failed to prevent WWII.

Moreover, the intervention approach of the liberal peace framework is top-down and fails to engage in consultations with the indigenous people. The flawed assumption of liberal peace is the hubristic belief that the indigenous in war-torn countries lack the capacity to rebuild on their own in the aftermath of conflict, and is Eurocentric in its approach. Based on this flawed assumption, international interveners in Somalia have excluded locals from contributing to identifying project initiatives they view as their priorities. Dominik Zaum (2012) argues that “the perceived lack of local ownership has been central to most criticisms of liberal state-building”. Without much input from the locals, the external state makers have put their efforts in the areas of building effective government institutions, promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, justice, security sector reform, electoral reform, and market-based economic reform. The objective is to create a liberal democratic order, which is presumed to be critical for setting conditions for durable peace.

However, it is vital to note that the liberal democratic governance advocated by proponents of liberal peace is not compatible with the prevailing conditions in post-war countries. For instance, the governance institutions in most countries emerging from contemporary conflicts, such as Somalia are dysfunctional or do not exist at all

At the heart of the liberal peace theory lies the assumption that liberal states do not engage in wars. However, the notion that liberal states restrain from wars is misleading, when in reality “wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars” (Doyle, 2012: 150).

Therefore, a more democratic and liberal world does not always mean “a more peaceful world.” For instance, liberal democracy did not restrain the USA from its unilateral invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. For instance, the colonization of Africa and imperial expansionism by western countries have escalated conflicts, subsequently leading to the formation of liberation movements in Africa to resist colonial powers. In the context of Somalia, the British, French and Italian colonized and divided the country into five territories resulting in the formation of the Somali Youth League (SYL) as the liberation movement that fought against the colonial powers. From that viewpoint, western democratic nations were colonizers only interested in resource exploitation and imperial expansion and contributed to wars and conflicts.

## **B. Conflict Management Theory**

There are many different theories in use among different schools of thought and practice in the field of conflict and peacebuilding. Two such “theories” are the Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution Theories. With respect to the conflict management theory, conflicts are viewed as intricate and ineradicable consequences of deep-rooted differences of values and interests within and between communities. Therefore, the existence of such deep-rooted differences among the conflicting parties makes resolving such conflicts very difficult.

Conflict management views conflict as an unresolvable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities. Resolving such conflicts is widely viewed as unrealistic. Thus, the best approach to address such intractable conflicts is to manage and contain them, and sometimes to reach a compromise in minimizing the spill over of the conflict. It involves intervention by third parties through peacekeeping deployment. Conflict management is the art of appropriate intervention to achieve political settlements, particularly by third-party actors having the power and resources to put pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle.

Conflict Management refers to both strategies and approaches of containing or managing the conflict from escalating to undesirable levels, and the strategies and methods of resolving it (Thakore, 2013: 12). The only possible and realistic option in

finding a resolution to such conflicts is to contain them. To manage and contain such conflicts, this theory contends that there must be third-party actors to pressure the conflicting parties to reconcile and any agreement reached must be within the framework of containing the conflict. Such a top-down approach was widely used in containing and managing interwar conflicts, where UN peacekeepers were deployed to contain disputes from escalating and spreading to other parts of countries. For example, the United Nation's deployment of a peacekeeping force between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had 3,300 peacekeepers to maintain a ceasefire between the conflicting parties to contain the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. Similarly, in 1992, the UN deployed multinational peacekeepers under United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in Somalia to contain the conflict and deliver humanitarian aid to internally displaced people in Somalia.

### **C. Conflict Resolution Theory**

Conflict Resolution Theory envisions contemporary conflicts as communal and identity-based conflicts. Therefore, in such intra-war conflicts, intervention by third-party actors is applied to facilitate the conflicting parties to reconcile in resolving their dispute.

In contrast to conflict management, conflict resolution theory rejects this notion of power political view of conflict- that is to view the conflict as a political power contestation between the political elites, as advocated by the supporters of conflict management theory, arguing instead that in communal and identity conflicts, people cannot compromise on their fundamental needs. However, they argue that it is possible to transcend conflicts if adversaries can be helped to explore, analyse, question, and reframe their positions and interests (Miall, 2004: 3). Conflict resolution, therefore emphasizes intervention by skilled neutral third parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships.

Proponents of conflict resolution theory put emphasis on exploring and investigating the root causes of the conflict and identifying creative solutions that the parties to the conflict may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions. The conflict resolution theory emphasizes the need to make the process open and

inclusive because the aim is to develop a process that is acceptable to the parties in the conflict (Miall, 2004: 3). An open and inclusive process also allows the parties to express grievances, show commitment to the process, and contribute solutions to the outcome of the process.

Additionally, for the conflict resolution process to yield a positive outcome, third party interveners and practitioners need to grasp the issues; intervening in a specific conflict requires specific knowledge about the conflicting parties, their social and cultural contexts, their aspirations, their conflict orientations, the social norms, and so on (Deutsch, 2014: 50). Conflict Resolution uses third-party mediation to intervene in a conflict. Mediation differs from other forms of third-party intervention in conflicts- and that it doesn't use force and is not aimed at helping one of the parties to win. It is also different from negotiation, which aims at converging viewpoints to reach for a common agreement. I William Zartman points out that the purpose of mediation is "to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable to both sides" (Zartman, 2008: 155). For instance, in 2000, a reconciliation process was convened in Arta, Djibouti for Somali clans to reconcile, after months of a horse-trading reconciliation process, the first Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000. However, underlying grievances was not addressed, resulting in the transitional national government collapsing within a few years.

#### **D. Conflict Transformation Theory**

A third and distinctive theory that draws on many of the concepts of conflict management and conflict resolution is the conflict transformation theory, which argues that peacebuilding is a process of slow transformation of conflicts through relationship building among hostile parties and communities that would move them to a desirable future. Hugh Miall (2004: 3) contends that this theory is not a wholly new approach, but rather a re-conceptualization of the field of conflict and peacebuilding in order to make it more relevant to contemporary conflicts.

Conflict transformation theory argues that the very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict (Miall, 2004: 4). Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests,

discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. In the Somali context, it entails building trust through genuine negotiations between clans with deep animosity that will remove grievances and lead to transforming relationships for lasting peace. Despite the initiative by third-party interveners to reconcile the parties to the conflicts in Somalia, their efforts did not address the root causes of the conflict, thus failed to address the core issues that contributed to the conflict and caused the deep enmity between clans and grievances held by clans towards each other.

Moreover, conflict transformation aims at making structural changes in the conflict. Structural transformations refer to changes in the basic structure of the conflict, that is to the set of actors, their issues, incompatible goals and relationships, or to the society, economy, or state within which the conflict is embedded (Miall, 2004: 4). Structural transformation of conflict can be done gradually when there is a power balance between conflicting parties.

Key to this framework is building of relationships through reconciliation, as contemporary conflicts are internal in nature, and conflicting groups live in close proximity to each other, and in deep-rooted internal conflicts, such as the Somali conflicts, parties to the conflict develop animosity, hatred, and enmity as the conflict progresses over time. Therefore, for effective reconciliation to be achieved the relationships between communities involved in the conflict must be built through a transformative process. Relationships are the centrepieces, the beginning and the endpoint for understanding conflict (Lederach, 1997).

One of the reasons that the past Somali reconciliation attempts have failed was due to grievances held by the conflicting parties against each other. The external interveners also failed to address these grievances that existed between the parties to the conflict, to the extent that some faction leaders have refused to sit and have an open dialogue with their opponents. The deep animosity that exists between the parties due to death and physical violence experienced during the conflict requires the application of restorative justice to redress grievances and reconcile the perpetrator and the victim. Deutsch (2014: 70) points out that “if the processes or outcomes of a conflict are perceived to be unjust, the resolution of a conflict is likely to be unstable and give rise to further conflict.”

In essence, in the context of the Somali conflict, it is critical to approach the conflict through the lenses of peacebuilding, as ending the conflict militarily has failed to bring peace to Somalia. Hence, the conflict transformation approach is the most suitable conflict resolution theory in the context of the Somali conflict. It is essential to transform relationships between communities by healing the deep-rooted grievances held by clans.

Generally speaking, the widely used approach to peacebuilding is top-down and is deductive in nature, where the contents of peacebuilding are deduced from the existing practices, capacities, and mandates of international agencies and organizations (Cousens et al., 2001: 5). In most conflicts, external actors apply a top-down approach deduced from an existing generalized inventory of peacebuilding to every post-conflict situation. The approach by the UN and external actors in resolving the Somali conflicts mainly viewed peacebuilding as a short-term political objective, such as reconciling the hostile parties, democratization, promotion of justice and rule of law, constitution makings and monitoring of elections- a perspective that is rooted to the western liberal peace scholarship.

In contrast to other conflict resolution approaches, the conflict transformation theory views conflict as intractable and takes a distinctive approach in resolving it. The conflict transformation approach to peacebuilding is “inductive” in nature, where the process of peacebuilding is determined by the needs of the affected people. This requires investigating the root causes of the conflict and then addressing them effectively as each conflict is unique and different from other conflicts, thus requiring its own unique prescription (Cousens et al., 2001: 8)

### **III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA**

Building peace and ending armed conflict in war-torn societies has long been a concern for practitioners in the field of international relations. As new wars emerge, post-Cold war liberal peacebuilding has been widely endorsed and supported by international organizations and external actors in resolving, containing, and or managing these conflicts. There is still no specific definition of peacebuilding as the concept continues to be the subject of intense debate in global politics. Yet, the United Nations (UN) “Adopted a broad definition of peacebuilding” mostly from the views of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali (United Nations, 2010: 49). Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 first introduced the concept of peacebuilding to the UN in his report titled *an agenda for peace*- defining it as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 2010: 5). Subsequently, the UN Secretary-General Policy Committee holds the notion that “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (United Nations, 2010: 5). Paradoxically, the UN’s liberal model for peacebuilding has had a poor record in conflict-affected nations. The failure of their approach can be seen in countries where armed conflicts relapsed to war: Somalia, Iraq, Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere. When peacebuilding fails, antagonists cause greater chaos and violence than the previous war attested by the 500,000 people killed in Somalia since the failed international intervention began in 1991 (Call et al., 2008: 1-21). Kofi Annan, who served as UNSG from 1997-2006, emphasized the idea of creating a new architecture of preventive and pro-active policies for peace - designed not for wars that happened in the past, but for the wars that may come in the future. He further adds that it is necessary to find new ways to

“prevent instability from any source” and to stop the all-too-frequent relapses into war and violence in post-conflict societies (1999). Kofi Annan witnessed some of the worst peacekeeping failures in modern times, he noted that “if peace agreements had been successfully implemented from the start in just two of those war-torn countries - Angola and Rwanda - [they] could have prevented millions of deaths” (Deen, 2015).

However, nearly thirty years later, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's views in *an agenda for peace* continue to influence the organization's responses to conflict prevention and peacebuilding despite the continuing failures. It is necessary for third-party interveners to re-evaluate their strategies and approaches for building peace in conflict zones, as the current top-down model has failed to reconcile warring parties, prevent violent conflicts, and create sustainable peace in places like Somalia.

### **A. Democratic Expansion**

The origins of the liberal peace thesis can be traced back to early liberal thinkers, and most notably the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. It was in his essay *perpetual peace*, originally published in 1795, he stated that citizens of a democratic republic are reluctant to support or give consent to their government to engage in wars, unless in self-defence, because of the misery and disaster it brings to the ordinary people's welfare. Ever since, the notion has evolved beyond Kant's initial arguments, as modern liberal theorists now argue for the spread of democracy globally- believing that a single international liberal order would help promote peace, security, and economic stability. Subsequently, they also contend that liberal democracies are less likely to fight each other because of shared values, rule of law, and economic interdependence- making it unreasonable to engage in wars, especially against one another. This is briefly reflected in Levy's argument that the “absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1989: 270). In short, Levy's argument joins a list of other prominent liberals who echo that a more democratic world is a more peaceful world. However, spreading democracy around the world comes at a cost, and is usually not a peaceful one. In recent years, the United States and its allies uttered the rhetoric of fighting the “war on terror” to try and impose democracy in countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan- they then invaded and left them in

ruins, the ramifications of these illegitimate acts to “advance peace and global security” can be seen as these nations continue to struggle to transition from war to peace. This substantiates the fact that democratic states are just as prone to wars as non-democratic states, and in most cases act as the aggressors.

Liberal peacebuilding has been fascinated with the idea of spreading democracy across the globe, and usually through illegitimate ways- such as military force. The spread of democracy by unjust wars almost always fails to achieve its goal- this does not help promote democracy, but rather undermines it. Western neo-colonialism and the facade of democracy across the globe has done more damage in post-conflict states than imaginable. Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan have all become victims of the wars of democracy. The spread of democracy should not come at the expense of war, but rather from encouragement by institutions like the European Union and the United Nations, and not individual states.

## **B. Top-Down Approach**

The liberal peacebuilding approaches have come under increasingly heavy criticism over the last two decades- having been accused of being imperialistic, state-centric, authoritarian, and neglecting communities that are most vulnerable to armed conflicts, violence, and inequalities (Donais et al., 2013: 1). Contemporary peacebuilding processes and practices have failed in promoting durable peace and ending violence in “fragile”, “failed” or “collapsed” nations- the current liberal peace framework, which is a top-down model, implemented by “international mediators” in post-conflict zones has yet to succeed in Somalia.

Contemporary peacebuilding theories and practices have acknowledged the value of engaging at multiple levels of society. This new understanding of peacebuilding has emerged as a critique of the ‘top-down’ model, which has only engaged with the top-level leadership and left local agents on the side-line. In John Paul Lederach’s book *Building Peace*, published in 1997, he characterized the 3 levels of building peace as 1.) the elite, 2.) the middle-range, and 3.) the grassroots (Lederach, 1997: 38). Lederach views peacebuilding in terms of a pyramid, he reasons that it is a simple way to understand the people involved at all levels.

The top-level leadership, or the elites, include military, political and religious leaders. They are considered to be the key actors of their societies, and therefore, granted more decision-making capacity (Lederach, 1997: 43). The top level is where third-party interventionists focus their peacebuilding efforts on. They do so by trying to pressure high-level figures engaged in violence to reach a negotiated settlement that would contain or end a conflict. The first objective of a negotiated settlement is to create a ceasefire or halt violence between conflicting parties. Next, external actors try to implement a political framework that incorporates the democratic procedures for national transition, this happens through the process of democratic elections (Lederach, 1997: 44). Peacebuilding at the top level is usually a short-lived process because the elites are reluctant to make compromises, this is in part due to leaders of rival parties trying to maintain an image of strength to their constituents. A settled agreement hardly ends conflicts, a more strategic and comprehensive framework needs to be assessed for a peace process to achieve a positive outcome. It is noteworthy to mention that these high-profile figures are less likely to suffer from the consequences of the decisions concluded. On the contrary, it may affect the day-to-day life of the grassroots level. Therefore, it is equally, if not more important, to include the grassroots communities in any peace initiative. Neglecting the grassroots level serves as one of many complications for the implementation of a constructive peace process.

The middle-range level consists of government organizations (GOs), Non-Government organizations (NGOs), and other parties who are not formally connected with governments such as opposition figures. They also have influence and serve as the bridge between the top-level and the grassroots (Lederach, 1997: 41). Many hold the notion that individuals at the middle-range level can play an effective role in establishing sustainable peace. This is because of the relationship they've fostered with the elites and the grassroots that allows them to work through conflict and create space for interaction to happen between them, they have the ability to lay the foundation for long-term transformation.

Lastly, the grassroots represent the majority of the population and includes local communities, health officials, and other organizations focused on improving the conditions of the indigenous population.




Figure 1 Lederach Peacebuilding Pyramid (Lederach, 1997: 38)

It is evident that the implementation of a top-down approach has been unsuccessful in many divided societies. And in the case of Somalia, the international community still struggles to find a solution to end the protracted conflict and create durable peace. As Burgess states “Somalia could be the most difficult of all failed states to reconstitute with a top-down security approach, so a bottom-up peacebuilding approach seems to be a viable alternative”. Burgess further argues that Somalia has “experienced considerable difficulties in achieving security, representation, and renewal through a top-down security approach” (Burgess, 2012: 3). External actors and international government organizations approach the Somali conflict from a top-down perspective due to the unwillingness to engage with the local communities in Somalia. As a result, failing to deal with the issues and disputes at the grassroots level that prolongs the conflict. State political elites should not be the only actors in the limelight; the grassroots should have the right to be involved in any and every peacebuilding process. Critics of the top-down measure argue that it is critical to learn and understand the “Somali clans, inter-clan dynamics and power balances” to construct an alternative framework that fits the needs of the Somali people, stems the violence, and brings lasting peace to Somalia (Burgess, 2012: 5). The UN and other NGOs need to adopt appropriate responses and measures to resolve the local conflicts “that underlie civil war” in this fragile nation. Foreign

peacebuilders' approaches are state-centered, which means they almost exclusively interact with national and international actors at the macro-level (Auresserre, 2010: 43). In Roy Licklider article, "Obstacles to Peace", he contends that the reason why peacebuilding efforts fail to end civil wars is that they do not target the problems that caused the civil war to emerge in the first place (2012: 713). This argument is relevant in the Somali case, as the civil war was caused by a power struggle between rival clans, unequal distribution of resources, and misrepresentation in the government. Academics, scholars, and practitioners need to abandon the practice of searching for the causes of war at the national level and look towards the realm of the local population.

Even if the Somali Federal Government, AMISOM, and the international community are able to defeat al-Shabab, clan structure will still exist, and their militias will resist the top-down measures being implemented. It is, therefore, necessary for international actors to adopt a bottom-up solution to achieve constructive results.

### **C. A Bottom-up Approach as an Alternative Strategy**

One of the current implications and limitations of the top-down approach to peacebuilding in Somalia is the alienation of the local population. Bottom-up peacebuilding, otherwise known as "peacebuilding from below", recognizes the importance of engaging with domestic actors at all levels. According to Severine Autesserre, in her book titled *'The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World'*, she states that:

*"Contrary to what most politicians and interveners preach, outside experts, national leaders and top-down approaches are not the only means to re-establishing peace. Bottom-up initiatives also make a difference and ordinary people have the capacity to address some of the deeper roots of their country's problems."* (Auresserre, 2021: 44).

Similarly, Nuredin Netabay describes a true bottom-up approach as being people-centered and focusing on building peace from within the affected societies- he emphasizes the need to change the hearts and minds of the indigenous people to

get them involved in the reconciliation process wholeheartedly. He then states that a pure bottom-up approach needs institutions to be developed from the grassroots level, strengthening local capacity for self-government, and promoting equal representation among all clans (Netabay, 2007).

The bottom-up approach was experimented with and proved successful in Somalia's Northern region, Somaliland. The initiative was pioneered by local clan elders, known as "Gurti" who adopted their traditional method of arbitration to end disputes amongst hostile parties and bring peace and stability in the self-governing region in 1992. Starting at the grassroots level by the traditional political leaders, the peace process was able to progress to the regional and national levels with the launch of the Boroma National Conference (Farah et al., 1997: 350). This peace conference had a positive outcome for a number of reasons:

1. It was a bottom-up approach that focused on the restoration of peace in the region through dialogue and consensus which allowed space for genuine reconciliation between elders of hostile clans.
2. All clans that inhabit the region of Somaliland were represented throughout the whole process.
3. The conference produced an Interim Peace Charter and a National Charter. The Peace Charter formed the basis for the rule of law in accordance to Somaliland's tradition and religious belief in Islam. The National Charter focused on the political and institutional structure of government for a transnational period, that period was to last three years until a constitution could be adopted (Bradbury et al., 2003: 90).
4. Lastly, the reconciliation conference was self-driven and the costs were financed by the community. This is in stark contrast to the highly praised UN and other reconciliation forums that pour millions of dollars into peace initiatives that conclude with nothing to show for. Somaliland was able to establish sustainable peace with little external contribution. The credibility of the "Somali Solution for Somali Problems" has elevated a few notches just by using Somaliland as an example (Farah et al., 1997: 350).

Southern Somalia took a similar path in 2000, Djibouti's president Ismail Omar Guelleh took the role of hosting the Somali National Peace Conference to help guide the peace talks. The 'Arta process', named after the Djibouti town the talks were accommodated in, produced a power-sharing agreement that established the new Transnational Federal Government (TNG), "with a Transnational Charter for government", and a low degree of national legitimacy (International Peacebuilding Alliance, 2009: 15). The difference between the Arta Process and other prior peace initiatives is that it was more innovative that included actors beyond the typical faction leaders. The process addressed the Somali society as a whole and included business men and women, clan elders, and civic leaders. However, the peace conference did not achieve its desired goals because (International Peacebuilding Alliance, 2009: 16):

1. Clan warlords occupying the capital city perceived that the establishment of a federal system would undermine their power and interests.
2. Opposition figures were aligned with different governments (most notably Ethiopia and Egypt) that were rivals in regional politics and had conflicting interests in Somalia. Addis Ababa did not back the peace process because they were concerned about the role that Hassan Dahir Aweys who was the former head of the Islamist militant group Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, and as an Islamist made irredentist claims to the Somali lands that Ethiopia occupies, had in the TNG. Ethiopia supported the establishment of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) who directly opposed the TNG. Ethiopia's support for SRRC proves that neighbouring countries' interests are a hindrance to Somalia's peace process.
3. In light of the points mentioned above, the TNG would transform to become associated with powerful clans and the business class in the capital city, Mogadishu. Additionally, officials of the TNG would be accused of being corrupt and only in office for their personal interest to exploit and acquire wealth from the public coffins. The hopes of national unity eventually died down.

The autonomous region in Northern Somalia was able to avoid the majority of turmoil since the military regime collapsed in 1991 due to the process of genuine reconciliation and inclusive engagement - which played an important role in the Somali-led peace talks. Farah argues that the distinction between the relatively safer North and the South is that “the social upheaval in the South appears to have degenerated into a war of attrition” (Farah et al., 1997: 350). However, clan conflict still remains as one of several underlying sources of insecurity present in Somalia. A number of reconciliation conferences have been convened as an attempt to resolve the crisis in Somalia. To date, none has succeeded. So what can be done? Firstly, externally funded peace projects are liable and may not serve the interest of the Somali community. Therefore, peace initiatives should be locally-driven so actors can show commitment to the processes, this will help generate legitimacy and ownership by the support of the local communities. The Life and Peace Institute along with John Paul Lederach contend that external actors should play very minimal roles in the process (Paffenholz, 2003: 59). Secondly, Somalia should stop being used as a geo-political playground from both the African states and the Arab world. Competing regional interest and the lack of honest brokers undermines reconciliation among the local actors. Competing agendas by external actors is an issue that needs to be addressed to allow space for reconciliation amongst key stakeholders of the crisis. And lastly, international mediators should abandon the quick-fix approach that favours “state-building at the expense of peacebuilding- it undermines grassroots ownership, the traditional methods of reconciliation, and reinforces the general public’s fear about the return of an authoritarian regime (International Peacebuilding Alliance, 2009: 68).

With the emergence of al-Shabab in 2006, resolving the Somali conflict evolved into a more complex situation. Al-Shabab is a non-state actor that must be included in reconciliation talks for the Somali nation to progress forward. They continue to remain the principal security challenge by conducting attacks in Somalia and neighbouring nations. This proves that the military approach is not the solution to eradicating al-Shabab. The counter-terrorism strategy of relying on military actions has not been effective nor has it been efficient. It is time the Somali government, the African Union, and third-party mediators bring al-Shabab to the negotiating table.

Conflict transformation should be used as the alternative approach to peacebuilding in Somalia. The liberal peace framework has failed to provide any constructive strategies for direct engagement with those who are most vulnerable and affected by violence. A bottom-up approach addresses the root causes of social conflict, while acknowledging that not all conflicts are resolvable unless fundamental arrangements are changed (Coy, 2003: 5). It advocates for social and structural changes. The goal of this framework is to assist nations and societies to transition from violence to peace “through building up local capacities and indigenous conflict skill sets” (Coy, 2003: 5). Additionally, peacebuilding in Somalia should enhance the role of local-leaders from all levels of the (Lederach) triangle to create social and political space where a solution to end the protracted conflict can be achieved.

#### **D. Role of the United Nations**

Peacebuilding has been a concept frequently used by the United Nations along with, for example, peacemaking and peacekeeping, to provide security, stability and peace in some of the world's most war-torn nations. The United Nations describes peacemaking as diplomatic efforts to help transition “violent conflicts to nonviolent dialogue” between hostile parties in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 5). Forms of peacemaking include negotiations, agreements, and other reconciliation mechanisms intended to resolve disputes and end violence between warring factions. Peacekeeping on the other hand, in chapter VII, is considered are actions taken by the UN and their allies to provide and maintain security globally. The United Nations defines peacebuilding as actions to help fragile and failed states transition from war to peace, and to also reduce their risks of relapsing into war and violence by “strengthening national capacity for conflict management” (Ipek, 2021: 155). In practice, peacebuilding emerges in the final stage of a violent conflict focused on developing solutions to prevent further disputes, building and establishing sustainable peace, and institution-building. Volkan Ipek asserts that “peacebuilding consists of peacemaking and peace enforcement missions that intend to secure local civilians and international governmental and non-governmental bodies operating in war-torn territories” (Ipek,

2021: 156). In short, both peacemaking and peacekeeping are interconnected with peacebuilding.

The issue with the contemporary liberal peacebuilding implemented by the UN and its allies is that it is top-down and state-centric in its approach, which consequently neglects the input, contribution, and participation of the indigenous communities in conflict-affected nations. Instead of only intervening to achieve the goal of ending violence and war in failed or collapsed nations, peacebuilding efforts come alongside with trying to implement a liberal democratic framework that advocates for social, political, economic, and institutional changes. Establishing “durable peace” in post-conflict states is the ultimate goal for liberal peacebuilding, however they believe it cannot be reached without a transformation to democracy, democratic processes, and free market economy. Therefore, their efforts are rarely endorsed by the grassroots because it does not serve the needs or interests of the local population. Critics believe liberal peacebuilding is a text-book example of neo-imperialism.

#### **E. African Union Mission to Somalia and International Intervention**

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is a peace operation mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council in early 2007. AMISOM was created by the African Union to restore stability, provide security, and to combat and degrade al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa. The peace support operation consists of more than 20,000 ground forces, with major troop-contributing countries being Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. To date, AMISOM remains to be the largest, costliest, and deadliest peacekeeping mission in the African continent.

AMISOM has adopted a “liberal peace” framework in its involvement in Somalia’s post-conflict reconstruction and development. The approach is based on liberal peace tenets, which is directed at the creation of liberal values, practices, and norms in war-torn nations so that lasting peace can be achieved. In short, AMISOM’s state-building goals and objectives have focused on trying to transform Somalia into a liberal state.

Advocates of liberal peace hold the notion that liberal democracy and market liberalization is the foundation for peace. It, however, is top-down and Eurocentric in its approach and is not seen as a priority by the indigenous community, as it fails to deal with the root causes of the protracted conflict. The liberal peace paradigm has not produced a constructive outcome nor sustainable peace in Somalia. Spoilers and violent non-state actors continue to undermine any international top-down approach of peacebuilding and state-building in order to maintain the status quo. The imposition of a liberal state framework has not succeeded and should be rethought.

The reason peacebuilding plans have been futile is that it needs reconciliation that brings together the main actors of the conflict, including Al-Shabab. Military actions, such as AMISOM's current approach should not be the solution, but rather the development of alternative strategies that focus on the implementation of political peacebuilding and genuine reconciliation in Somalia.

The international intervention is also posed to internal and external challenges, in particularly AMISOM is confronted with various internally intrinsic challenges, as Paul Williams points out, and these problems include;

“Misconduct, a lack of enablers and capabilities, and command control and coordination; the major limitations and failings of AMISOM's principal local partner, the SNA; and, most fundamental of all, the lack of an overarching political settlement setting out how Somalia should be governed. These challenges must be addressed if AMISOM is to pursue a successful exit strategy (Williams, 2016).”

The command-and-control problem impeded AMISOM operations to be effective. The AMISOM mission is extremely complex, requiring coordination across a broad range of actors, including the AU, UN, EU, bilateral donors to AMISOM such as the US and UK, United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the five TCCs and six police-contributing countries, and of course the Federal Government of Somalia and its five federal member states.

Moreover, in an assessment report of its ten years of operation AMISOM identified the intrinsic coordination challenges that impedes its operational effectiveness. AMISOM contends that “it's partners did not always share the same

vision for how to stabilize Somalia. Sometimes the lack of a shared vision, wasted time, and resources. On other occasions it also undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Mission” (AMISOM, 2017).

In addition to coordination problems between AMISOM, Somali National Army (SNA) and the UN, AMISOM has also encountered operational problems related to communications, logistical support and lack of intelligence gathering capabilities (Williams, 2016). Moreover, the absence of an effective local partner with a relatively less military capacity poses a major problem for building peace in Somalia. The Somali security force is not a reliable partner in the fight against al-Shabab that can be relied on for the offensive joint operation with AMISOM.

Another major challenge posed to AMISOM mission effectiveness is the lack of operational capability, such as lack of mission enablers. AMISOM’s offensive operations were consistently negatively affected by a lack of force enabling units, despite force enablers being authorized by the UN Security Council for years. Key persistent gaps in the Mission’s enablers included aviation assets, medical facilities, combat engineering, special forces as well as night-fighting capabilities (AMISOM, 2017).

Another important element that poses a major security challenge to AMISOM is the behaviour of internal actors. The political disagreement between the leadership of the federal government and federal member states have had a profound impact on the effectiveness of AMISOM operations in Somalia as well as the successful implementation of security transition plan (STP) that would help ensure for AMISOM to transfer security responsibility to the Somali security forces and pave the way for AMISOM exit from Somalia.

Moreover, the disagreement between the federal government and federal member states (FMSs) due to contestation on constitutional provisions regarding resource sharing is rooted to clan mistrust and grievances held against the central government. Consequently, the al Shabab militant, one of the antagonists to the conflict, has capitalized on the internal political squabble between the federal government and federal member states (FMSs) by escalating its attacks against the Somali security forces, AMISOM, and the civilian population

The liberal peace framework applied in Somalia by the external actors is problematic and poses a challenge in achieving durable peace in Somalia. The process and approach of peace building in Somalia used by the international interveners is a top-down process with little or no input from the local population. For peace building to be effective, indigenous knowledge, values, culture, and tradition of the local population must be recognized and incorporated into the peace building initiative. The external intervention in Somalia also encountered coordination challenges, as each country pursued its own interests and goals, which impeded the peace building efforts.

In the context of Somalia, and in most extreme cases, where the proposed political democratization from top-down contradicts the Sharia law, leading the local population to consider the interveners' post war democratization and liberal governance order as an anathema to their beliefs. It generates tension and resentment towards the political democratization promoted by the international actors.

Hence, the underlying principle that guides the international interveners in their peacebuilding initiative should be based on the principle of reciprocity; one that strikes the right balance between international support and the priorities of the host country's local communities and their contribution to the process of building peace. Samuel Ewusi (2014: 15) explains the importance of providing space to the locals in the process of peace and state-building and foreign action must only play “a complementary role in the creation of local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local actors to flourish in the definition and consolidation of durable institutions and policies which are responsive to the needs of the population.”

In light of the above, it's obviously necessary to engage locals with indigenous knowledge and garner local contributions to the process of building sustainable peace. However, this requires a conflict transformation approach that aims at building relationships. In the context of Somalia, where a protracted conflict had created clan animosity and deep-rooted hostility, healing grievances and rebuilding trust is a vital component for long-term sustainable peace in Somalia.

## **IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA**


### **A. Postcolonial Period in Somalia: 1960-1969**

To understand the dynamics of any conflict one must analyse and identify the characteristics that caused the events to emerge. It is important to use history as a source of knowledge to unveil the causes and get a good grasp of the issues at hand. In the case of Somalia, this means highlighting the conundrums and focusing on the socio-political processes that were taken to try and end the decades-long instability. For years, Somalia has been a poster child of a fragile state that is conflict-ridden and suffering from the likes of terrorism, piracy, poverty, and famine.

The Somali Republic was founded on July 1, 1960, when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland merged to form the Somali Republic. The Somali people, who had battled for their independence and against European imperialism, had finally received their independence. The birth of the Somali Republic allowed the nation to be hailed as the first democracy in Africa with Aden Abdulle Osman Daar being elected by the parliament as the president of the first republic; democratic practices and principles were to replace the traditional system of dialogue and consensus amongst clan elders (Samatar et al., 2008). Aden Abdulle Osman was considered a visionary leader and statesman who worked tirelessly to reform public institutions and strengthen governance in a nation deeply divided by clan cleavages. He was politically mature and led the liberation struggle against the colonial powers. He served as president of the Somali Youth League (S.Y.L) which was a nationalist movement founded before independence in 1943. The movement aimed at unifying all Somali territories in the Horn of Africa (HOF) and emphasizing the idea of Somali nationalism (Turton, 1972: 135). After becoming president, Abdulle ran the country according to the constitution, earning him as the first African leader to democratically hand over power to his successor. Samatar (2016: 85) notes “Osman

and the group around him who led the SYL were as devoted to independence as any other African leader; however, they believed that the democratic process was the essence of liberation and consequently practiced it. The combination of these two qualities set Somalia apart from other African nations and gave the country a chance to deepen its democracy after independence”.

President Aden Abdulle has been underappreciated and neglected in many critical Somali literatures, his leadership qualities enabled him to become one of the founding fathers of a democratic Somalia.



1967 was a crucial year that would test Somalia’s young democracy for the

Figure 2 British Rule over Somalia (Stamp Domain, n.d) first time since proclaiming independence. Somalia’s first civilian president, who held power since July 1st, 1960, would be battling his former premier Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in a free and fair democratic election. The date was set for June 16, and on that day, Abdulle’s former premier would be elected as the second civilian president and participate in the nation’s first peaceful transfer of power, which was a vital tenant in maintaining Somalia’s democratic experiment (Mealy, 2012, 123).

The new President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke continued to share similar visions to that of his predecessor by admiring the concept of “Greater Somalia”, the

notion was to unify the territories that the Somali nomads roamed. These territories included the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, the Ogaden Region in eastern Ethiopia, and French Somaliland (now known as Djibouti) (Mealy, 2012: 123). Many leaders in the region viewed him as perpetuating the idea of “expansionist nationalism”, and therefore saw him as a threat to African unity.

President Abdirasid Ali Sharmarke’s tenure was cut short due to an assassination that took his life. On October 15, 1969, while on an official visit to the nomadic grazing lands of Las Anod in Northern Somalia, he was shot multiple times at close range by one of his bodyguards who ironically came from the same tribal clan (Ingiriis, 2017: 3). Till this day the murder of Sharmarke remains a mystery and questions arise as to whether the assassin was politically motivated, acted on behalf of neighbouring nations who felt threatened by his politics or was a part of the cold-war politics being played in the region. Although no independent and effective investigation into the killing of such a prominent political figure has been fulfilled, many scholars believe that a Somali Major General named Mohamed Siad Barre was the main culprit involved in the murder of the President and may have also colluded with the Soviet Union to undermine the Pro-West Somali administration (Ingiriis, 2017: 3). After the death of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the status quo was challenged and the civilian government would dissolve and become a military dictatorship. Siad Barre, who admired the soviet style politics, would bloodlessly take power and illegitimately become president.

Prior to the coup, Sharmarke’s government had signed a detente that the United States was eager to uphold to keep the peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, slow down the arms race in the region, and minimize the chances of war between Somalia and its neighbours over territorial issues (Department of State, 1967). Siad Barre, who was intelligent yet vicious by nature, would reject the detente and directly act to reunify the Somali people who were split by colonial powers into five ways. This national humiliation of dividing Somalia would cause Barre to react by military means at one point during his reign to try and achieve the notion of “Greater Somalia”, and in his words he states:

*“Some of the colonizers do understand and quickly retreat, while some, because they are stupid, continue colonizing others, increasing the suffering, deaths, injuries, defeat, and humiliation. The people colonized by Abyssinia will be free. Eritrea will be free, and they cannot refuse to let them be free. Western Somalia will be free, and they cannot refuse to grant it freedom. The numerous Abo will be free because this is history, and no one can prevent the sunshine from reaching us.” (Barre, 1978)*

## **B. Siad Barre and the Cold War Era: 1969-1990**

“Jalle” Mohamed Siad Barre was born in 1919 and grew up in Italian Somaliland as an orphan. He joined the Somali Police Force in the early 1940s and had done military training in Italy in the 1950s. In 1960, after Somalia’s independence, he joined the newly formed Somali National Army (SNA). By 1969 he was ranked as a Major General and rose to the post of commander in chief of the SNA. Siad Barre adhered to the ideology of scientific socialism, he would also declare the nation as a Marxist-Leninist one-party state as soon as he took power (Britannica, 2021).

In 1969, a coup d’état coincided 5 days after the death of President Abdirashid. The mastermind, Mohamed Siad Barre, became the country’s first dictator who ruled with an iron fist since its inception in 1960. Soon after taking power on October 21, 1969, he arrested the country's Prime Minister and other key members of the cabinet, suspended the constitution, banned any political activities, and dissolved the parliament and institutions of civilian government (Moolla, 2018). The Somalia Revolutionary Council (SRC), which consisted of 25 high-level security officials, was established to replace the Cabinet and parliament: the administrative reconstruction allowed the SRC to act as the new executive committee.

Siad Barre’s autocratic rule over the republic was characterized by the strategic use of repression, political violence, and human rights violation. He introduced scientific socialism to Somalia and signed a defence pact with the USSR. He used tactics such as torture and execution to instil fear in the public and to avoid citizens from engaging in anti-state protests. To further elaborate, in 1975 Barre

introduced a family planning law that granted equal rights to women in cases of divorce, property, and inheritance. The new law faced social resistance and was perceived by many Somalis to have intervened with religious affairs and contradict Islamic values and principles (Abdullahi, 2011). Somali Islamic figures protested, criticized, and opposed the family planning law. In response, Barre expelled, imprisoned, or murdered those who held conflicting views. He would go as far as publicly executing ten Islamic scholars for “exploiting religion to create national disunity” that same year (Abdullahi, 2011). This further substantiates the fact that Mohamed Siad Barre was willing to use violence against anyone accused of inciting state subversion.

Somali scholars, from different academic disciplines, often portray the Siad Barre’s era as only being defined by violence and cruelty, leaving very little room to highlight the beneficial policies he implemented for social and economic development. Soon after the bloodless coup in 1969, Barre made it his primary objective to boost the literacy rate in Somalia, and in particular, the rural communities that suffered greatly from educational disadvantages and inequalities. Before his literacy campaign, Italian was the primary language used in educational institutions since the Somali language had no agreed written form and could not be taught. In 1972, Barre would take the opportunity to stimulate nationalism by introducing a writing system that accepted the Latin Script for the Somali language, shortly after, the new Somali Latin alphabets would be used to promote literacy and develop the Somali educational system. During that year, the literacy rate in Somalia was only 5%, the SRC tasked eight thousand teachers and government employees to teach the populace how to read and write in urban areas within two years. By 1974, a rural program was also launched with more than twenty thousand state employees recruited; this initiative was an effort to make the nomadic community literate. By the end of the campaign, hundreds of thousands of Somalis knew the new reading and writing systems. With the implementation of free education at all levels, including higher education, Somalia would see a massive increase in school enrolments (Nelson, 1982, 54).

By the time the SRC took control of the country, Somalia was listed as one of the ten poorest countries globally with a GDP of roughly eighty United States

dollars. Nearly 50% of Somalia's exports heavily relied on the livestock trade with Saudi Arabia and 25% were related to Banana which was the main crop export. Since independence, Somalia lacked the capabilities to manage and fulfil its economic needs, therefore, depending on foreign aid and economic assistance from big powers like the United States. The SRC vowed to prioritize economic development, Siad Barre who planned for a socialist-orientated economy would adopt the doctrines of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. He advocated for State ownership of the means of production, nationalizing the majority of assets, and implementing a land law that granted the State ownership of all land in the country. He criticized the previous regime for being dependent on foreign aid and rather emphasized the importance of self-reliance when dealing with issues such as poverty reduction and resource development. In 1974, the SRC revealed a 5-year program to increase agricultural productivity for the export market, other programs including the building of schools, mosques, sports facilities, highways, and other important infrastructures that would increase the standards of living (Nelson, 1982, 55). Although Somalia's GDP went to roughly 130 USD by the 1980s, the United Nations still categorized it as one of the least developed nations in the world.

In 1977, the cold war intensified in the Horn of Africa (HOF) that resulted in a full-scale war between Somalia and its neighbour Ethiopia. Somalia, which at one point openly advocated for the exportation of Socialism across the globe, would call on the United States for assistance and support. At the time Siad Barre was witnessing the warming relations between the USSR and Ethiopia's President Mengistu Haile Mariam, he realized the growing ties between the two nations would halt any progression made to achieve the notion of "Greater Somalia". Therefore, Barre would take the chance to exploit the Cold War competition and demand the United States support for Somalia in exchange for its allegiance. When Siad Barre was asked about how he viewed the relationship between Somalia and the USSR, he stated that:

*"It is the worst way that big power could act, it is arrogance, it is proudness, it is measuring of one's decision in accordance to his bigness, unfortunately, therefore lack of any wisdom..."*

## **1. The Ogaden War: 1977-78 & Opposition Movements**

The Ogaden War was considered one of the biggest inter-state conflicts in contemporary African history that took place in Eastern Ethiopia in the Ogaden region. The region is named after a Somali sub-clan of the greater Darood tribe, the nomadic Ogaden Somalis inhabit the territory that the British colonial power gifted to Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) during the decolonization period. The move was seen as a betrayal by the Somali people, whose territory was relinquished and granted to a historical enemy in lands that are predominantly ethnic Somalis who share and speak the same language, religion, culture, and history as their kins in Somalia.

In 1977, an ethnic Somali separatist rebel group known as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), would begin their political struggle through armed conflict to undermine Ethiopia's imperial system and gain their long-awaited freedom and independence (Tekel, 1989). The Ethiopian regime rejected the WSLF liberation struggle and directed the root cause of conflict to Siad Barre and his belief in "Somali expansionism". But on the contrary, the root of the conflict can be traced back to the colonial history in the region that led to the division of Somalia into five regions in which the Western Somalia served as one of the components along with French Somaliland (Djibouti) and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. Omar (2001) states "The land and the people were partitioned into five domains under three European and one African colonial power". Haile Selassie's expansionist ambitions were able to gain sympathy and support from European and American leaders because of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, the false narrative of 'historic rights' was used to make claims to the Ogaden region and according to Hess (1962, as cited in Samatar, 2016: 42) "Immediately after the war, Emperor Haile Selassie had stressed Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea and Somalia 'as territories incontestably belonging to the Ethiopian Empire since before the Christian era and stolen through Italian aggression.'"

Although Barre's vision of greater Somalia added fuel to fire in 1977, it is important not to neglect the Abyssinian empire's role in signing treaties with colonial powers which proceeded with the annexation of lands the Somali people had cultural and historical claims to. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of Somali expansionism was

a red herring argument, in fact, the colonial borders marked without consideration for ethnic and cultural similarities have always been the main cause for contentions that date back to the birth of the Somali Republic in 1960.

A paradigm shift would occur in 1969 that would undermine the United States' unchallenged presence in the HOF. Siad Barre, who was an advocate for scientific socialism, would align himself with the regime in Moscow and return would be granted millions of dollars in military aid. On the other hand, before the emergence of socialism in Ethiopia, the United States' goal was to use the country as a proxy to deter communism from spreading to the HOF and Africa as a whole. Growing relation between the administration in Washington and their counterpart in Addis Ababa would result in economic assistance and military aid that would restructure Ethiopia's army to become one of the most sophisticated on the continent by acquiring M-41 light tanks, M-113 armoured personnel carriers, and US manufactured supersonic military jets (Ayoob, 1942, 11). The United States would later end all support and assistance to the nation in 1976 as their new president, Mengistu Haile Mariam, would consolidate power through a bloody internal war and later declare the country a socialist state. By adopting the Marxist-Leninist doctrines into his policies, Mengistu would gain the Soviet Union and Cuba as an ally which greatly influenced the results of the 1977-78 Ogaden War.

In 1977, Siad Barre would intensify the effort to regain the lost territory that he believed was occupied by the Ethiopian regime in the Ogaden region. The Somali population became more aware of national and international issues because of the success the literacy campaign had before the war. Therefore, the people of the Somali republic gathered in hundreds of thousands to support that cause and free the people of "Western Somalia" (Ogaden).



Figure 3 Image of the Ogaden Region (Osman, 2017)

The war was a disaster for Siad Barre as the Soviet Union and Cuba came to the aid of Ethiopia. On the other hand, Somalia was left isolated since the world viewed its attack as violating the norms and principles of international law. Siad Barre's only support came from the separatist group Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) backed by his military who were inferior to Cuban and Soviet weaponry. The 1977-78 conflict would weaken the structure of Siad Barre's regime and cause great humiliation and defeat in the eyes of Somali society. A failed coup by senior military officers was crushed that same year, but the officers that escaped being prosecuted would form movements to undermine the autocratic government. Opposition movements such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) would emerge after the war and further weaken Barre's grip on power. His autocratic rule would become violent and oppressive as he would use the military to try and exterminate these movements, but despite his efforts to suppress them, throughout the 1980s there was a drastic increase in protest and anti-Barre sentiments due to the abuse of power and rising levels of poverty.

Throughout the 1980s Barre atrocities continued and the worst was yet to come. Barre now turned his focus towards the Somali National Movement (SNM) and their bases in former British Somaliland. The group, who were mainly of the greater Isaaq Clan, were from the north-western part of the country and wanted to topple Barre's government due to unfair economic practices, oppressive conditions, and the implementation of repressive policies that targeted the Isaaq clan. To silence the SNM, the Somali army would launch a full-scale offensive that would transform the populated city of Hargeisa into dust and rubble. Ingiriis (2016, 243) asserts that;

“The year 1988 was the turning point. The Siad Barre regime involved the Somali air forces in the genocidal campaigns to conduct aerial bombardments on Hargeisa, the center of the Isaaq region. The bombardment was done with mercenary pilots transported from South Africa and Zimbabwe”

The atrocities and clan-targeted killings led to the massacre of roughly 200,000 people, this genocidal campaign resulted in the Somali National Movement (SNM) gaining overwhelming support from the Isaaq civilians for succession. In 1991, the northwest part of Somalia would self-declare independence and dissolve the union (Kennard & Einashe, 2018). The weakened regime in Mogadishu along with the growing numbers of rebel groups led to the total collapse of the Somali State in 1991, creating a power vacuum for warlords and Islamic fundamentalists to fill.

The Somali/Ethiopia war of 1977-78 over the Ogaden region has played a pivotal role in the disintegration of central authority in Somalia and its ultimate collapse. Additionally, while the Ogaden war had huge political and financial implications; the crisis was heightened by other intertwined factors, including the formation of armed opposition fronts in the north and the south of the country. Similarly, the end of east-west competition that provided Barre’s regime with financial and military support during the cold-war had huge implications on the regime to undertake state functions. Moreover, the informal patrimonial system of governance during the cold-war that sustained the military regime in power from 1969-1991 could not be sustained, as western support to Somalia was suspended.

### **C. State Collapse and Interventionism: 1991-2009**

In 1991, the Somali state would descend into chaos as rival clan-based factions would storm the capital and plunge the country into civil war. Faction leaders who were interested in taking power would deploy their loyal supporters to loot, kill, and demolish any remnants of a peaceful society. These warlords and their treacherous acts caused displacement throughout the country and also awakened extreme ideologies such as Islamic fundamentalism that destroyed Somalia’s traditional culture. Groups such as al-Shabab, a strong affiliate to Al-Qaeda, would

coerce the people into adhering to a strict interpretation of Islam that was imported from Saudi Arabia and known as Wahhabism.

The international community had abandoned Somalia and left the fragile nation to deal with its own domestic affairs without a functioning central government after the US humanitarian intervention backed by the United Nations, "Operation Restore Hope", failed miserably in 1993. In late 1992, George W. Bush would send more than 25,000 troops on a peace-keeping mission and to accompany NGOs in delivering relief supplies to the Somali communities that suffered greatly from the conflict (Britannica, 2020). Previous supplies from humanitarian organizations were targets of looting by clan militias which further increased starvation. Two main rival factions and their leaders, Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aidid would be blamed for the insecurity humanitarian workers suffered as they fought for control of power.

As the violence continued, 24 Pakistani soldiers fighting as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission were killed as they searched a weapon storage site (Press, 1993). The finger was pointed at General Mohamed Farah Aidid for the murders and casualties which included 2 Americans, the US would respond with a military operation to kill or capture Aidid. This would lead to the famous "Black Hawk Down" event that took place in the largest open market in the capital known as Bakaara in 1993. On the final mission to capture Aidid, a Black Hawk helicopter hovering around Olympic Hotel in Bakaara was shot down by a militia man with a Rocket-propelled Grenade (RPG). This would be the start of a disastrous battle that lasted for hours. A second Black Hawk would be downed an hour later and the US forces would be trapped by hundreds of Somalis who viewed their presence as a threat. By the end of the battle, 18 US soldiers would be killed in action along with scores of Aidid's loyal supporters and civilians (Britannica, 2020). This was a textbook example of a humanitarian intervention gone wrong, and although the US saw it as success, it was a paradox of America's endless war that disregarded civilian casualties and the loss of human life. United States President Clinton would soon withdraw all troops after the event, and the United Nations would take similar measures. Somalia was once again left as a playground for violence and clan politics.

After the United States “Operation Restore Hope ” failed, Somalia was still at the crossroads of extreme poverty, conflict, and humanitarian disaster. Violence and scarcity of food would cause forced migrations and the displacement of millions of Somalis. The world neglected to address the issue of justice by directly interacting with those responsible for the atrocities committed on non-combatants in Somalia. The UN and international actors would try to resolve the conflict through peace and reconciliation conferences with no other alternatives. These conferences often hosted warlords and faction leaders which implied international legitimacy for their use of force, creating a notion that militia leaders who utilized violence were representatives of the Somali populace (Khayre, 2016, 7). The Addis Ababa agreement which was organized by the United Nations in 1993 was signed by 15 warring factions (UN Security Council, 2000). The United Nations organized another conference in Nairobi in 1994, this meeting included two of the most powerful warlords in Mogadishu, Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi of the Somali Salvation Alliance. Kenya hosted another meeting in 1996 which included Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto, and the son of Aidid who inherited the SNA after his father’s death (Salaax et al., 2010). The trio agreed to a nine-point deal, however, it dissolved as the violence and fighting continued in the country.

This displayed the ramifications of negotiating with warlords, an effort that provided them with impunity for their crimes regardless of their magnitude. The International community would avoid the persecution of these criminals by justifying it as the only means for reconciliation between parties that would ensure long-lasting peace. In the words of Corazon Aquino, “Reconciliation should be accompanied by justice, otherwise, it will not last. While we all hope for peace it shouldn’t be peace at any cost but peace based on principle, on justice” (Corazon Aquino, N.D). Similarly, Haile Selassie states that “Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted, the indifference of those who should have known better, the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most, that has made it possible for evil to triumph”(Goodreads, N.D). Equally, Desmon Tutu emphasized that “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse, and you say that you are neutral, the

mouse will not appreciate your neutrality” (Chowdhury, 2012). The issue is that instead of condemning and taking actions against the systematic violence and human rights violations against non-combatants, the IC and the UN legitimized the use of force by warlords as long as they attended peace conferences that always produced no valuable outcomes. However, the false narrative that reconciliation mechanisms such as conferences were the only method for conflict prevention proved false. Instead, the cost of anarchy and maintaining its status quo in Somalia would generate new phenomena that would directly affect the world and global markets.

### **1. The emergence of Piracy: 2005**

During 2005, Somalia was still without a functional central government. Several countries viewed the years of instability and insecurity as an advantage to exploit the rich marine life off its coastal areas. Without a coast guard or navy, the country was left without protection against European and Asian trawlers that often overfished without consideration for marine stocks. To add insult to injury, Somalia’s water had also become a dumping site for radioactive and nuclear waste along with other toxins that greatly damaged the country's marine ecosystem. The combination of illegal fishing and marine pollution would be the factors behind the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean. Fishermen who initially acted to protect Somalia’s territorial waters against economic terrorism had now found a booming business in hijacking vessels and demanding ransom for their release.

Before the threats to maritime security in one of the busiest trading routes in the world (Indian Ocean), Somali fishermen tried to resolve their issues through legal mechanisms that would enforce international law such as the UN, but their outcry would be continuously ignored until picking up arms became the last resort (Kabukuru, (n.d.). The international community's negligence of the violations committed on Somali waters gave fishermen a reason to legitimize their actions. These men would justify taking ransom as legal taxes that a functional Somali government would have taken ( Duda, 2009, 346).




Figure 4 Attacks by Somali Pirates from 2008-2017 (Sow, 2017)

In 2004, only two piracy-related cases were recorded, the following year there was an increase to 34. And by 2008, roughly 111 foreign vessels were attacked by pirates and 286 people were held captive. The number heavily increased up until 2011 until maritime security along Somalia's coast was prioritized to counter the threats. And as the graph above shows, piracy-related activities were zero in 2015. International action and measures taken by NATO, European Union, and other partners would successfully deter the illegal activities that greatly impacted trade in the Indian Ocean.

## 2. Ethiopian Invasion & Islamic Fundamentalism: 2006-2012

In 2006, Somalia witnessed foreign powers being drawn into its internal conflict under the pretext of fighting the "war on terror". During this period, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) regime in Ethiopia would act as a puppet to protect US security interests in the Horn of Africa. To say the least, Ethiopia's intervention on the basis of fighting terrorism had done very little to postpone the war and state collapse, but rather created greater instability to the already complexed situation.

The rise of the Islamic Court Union (ICU) was celebrated by many solely because it was the first organization to restore order, provide security, fight against warlords, and have a semi-working judicial system since the collapse of the regime

in 1991. The group emerged as a remnant of Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAD), a militant movement formed in 1984 that adhered to the Salafi belief. Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya was short-lived as leadership failure and military defeat would force members to go underground and halt their goals of establishing an Islamic State in the Horn of Africa.

However, the ability to transcend clan politics and unite the people under the scope of religion would play a major role in ICU's success in stabilizing its power, this was an issue Al-Itihad failed to achieve. During the ICU's ruling period, the warlords who violently ruled for over a decade would be targeted and expelled from the capital one after the other. Although the EU wanted to maintain the peace and stability that Somalia had not experienced for many years, the US and Ethiopia would take any measures to undermine the new found stability by funding and supporting the very same warlords that engaged in human rights abuses to fight the "war on terror" (Morgan, 2006). The ICU would only rule for 6 months as the support from the Somali population decreased due to the strict interpretation of Islam that was applied near the end of its rule (Ingiriis, 2018). In late 2006 the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian ground forces accompanied with logistical and intelligence support by the United States crashed the relatively less capable ICU and captured the capital city in December of 2006. The TFG, which was formed in Nairobi in 2004, would finally be able to relocate its government and institutions back to Somalia's capital (Menkhaus, 2005, 73). The defeated ICU leadership fled from the country. However, the youth wing of the ICU vigorously fought against the invading Ethiopian forces. Hence, the emergence of Al Shabab and its subsequent allegiance to the international jihadist organization -Al-Qaida was the result of the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia.

During the ICU's control of Mogadishu, another group known as al-Shabab Al Mujahideen was also operating within the organization. Al-Shabab, which in English translates to "The Youths", would consist of young fanatics who are brainwashed with no basic education and no religious background, who often misinterpret verses from the Islamic holy book to justify their violent and destructive methods. These methods often include assassinations and targeted killings, suicide bombings, and the use of Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED).

Their detachment from the ICU would coincide with the Ethiopian Invasion in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union defeat by a historical enemy would cause al-Shabab to resort to guerrilla warfare for their survival. The group shared similar ideological beliefs and goals with Al-Itihad Al-Islamiyah, and have expressed their objective for an Islamic caliphate not only in the horn of Africa region, but across the African continent. They've showcased their ability to organize and carry out coordinated attacks in Somalia, and in neighbouring countries.

In 2007, the United Nations adopted resolution 1744 which authorized the African Union to establish a peacekeeping mission. Ethiopia would welcome the resolution and start withdrawing its troops from Somalia's territory in 2009. The Security Council would reiterate its support for Ethiopia decision by stating "Welcoming the decision of Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia, taking note of the fact that Ethiopia has already started withdrawing its troops, and underlining that the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will help avoid a security vacuum and create the conditions for full withdrawal and the lifting of emergency security measures currently in place" (United Nations, 2007). This decision would provide al-Shabab the opportunity to make advancements and gain control of most of Somalia's Southern regions including the capital, Mogadishu.

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) would send its first contingent of roughly 1600 Ugandan soldiers that year to help the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) fight the radical insurgency. To date, there are roughly 20,000 soldiers from 5 main troop contributing countries which include Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, and Djibouti. This would become the African Union's (AU) largest, most expensive, and most challenging peacekeeping operation. AMISOM was tasked to provide stability, restore order, and counter the al-Shabaab insurgency to enable Somalia's State-building process (Sigatu, 2016). However, al-Shabab routinely issued threats to the reliable and committed partners of the AU who assisted to facilitate the processes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia. Threats would soon become reality as they started to target peace contributing countries who threatened their expansion, directly on their soil.

Al-Shabab's first major international attack would take place in Uganda's capital Kampala. In July 2010, a simultaneous twin bombing would target fans watching the World Cup and kill more than 75 people.

Kenya's capital Nairobi would become the next terror target. 4 members of the Al-Qaeda affiliated group would siege the WestGate shopping mall and cause havoc in 2013, the event would leave more than 65 dead.

In 2014, al-Shabab was responsible for an attack on a restaurant that was popular amongst westerners by a male and a female suicide bomber. The attack would kill foreign nationals from Turkey, Spain, France and the Netherlands.

In 2015, al-Shabab again carried out an attack on Kenyan soil, this time targeting a university in the Garissa administrative county. 4 armed members of al-Shabab stormed the university compound and singled out non-Muslim individuals, they then proceeded to execute them in cold blood. 148 people were killed in the attack, 142 of the deceased being students who were attending classes that day.

Al-Shabab would strike again in a country further south. In 2015, a number of al-Shabab affiliates ambushed a military convoy and killed 8 soldiers.

In 2017 they carried out their biggest attack in their place of origin, Somalia. On a Monday morning, a truck filled with explosives would detonate in a busy junction in Mogadishu. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, many hold the notion that al-Shabab is the only organization capable of executing such a large-scale attack that left nearly 600 dead and hundreds of injured.

To say the least, al-Shabab was able to grow into a global terror threat by targeting and conspiring against those trying to eradicate the insurgency. Al-Shabab was able to thrive in the power vacuum caused by the civil war and the group of young hardliners would take advantage of the insecurity to try and establish an Islamic State not only in Somalia, but also across Africa. Between the period of 2011-2013, al-Shabab was able to control the majority of Somalia's central regions including the capital city of Mogadishu. And as they became more sophisticated, the organization were able to perpetrate cross-border terrorism which Kenya became the biggest target and a victim.

However, optimism arose for Somalia as state-building and peacebuilding became a priority for the new administration under the newly elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his cabinet. The Federal Government of Somalia was formed in 2012, and for the first time since the government collapse in 1991, they would gain international recognition and support from the globe.

#### **D. Hope For a Better Future: 2012**

A milestone was reached when talks of establishing a legitimate Federal Government were welcomed by international actors who viewed the move as a way to exit fragility and conflict. The ending of the transitional period coincided with the Garowe Process, it was a meeting held in 2011 between Somali stakeholders which included the TFG, federal member states, and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (a powerful Sufi paramilitary group) to discuss the structure of the new government, principles of federalism, and the ending of the transition process. Dialogue and consensus led to a roadmap and agreement that 135 elders (selected by a controversial "4.5" system that gave equal representation to the 4 major clans and half a point to the remaining minority clans) would select the members of parliament who would later elect the speaker, his deputies, and then the president through elections.

Among the presidential candidates was a man whose name was not known to politics, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Before entering politics, Hassan Sheikh worked with numerous NGOs, UN bureau, and other developmental programs. He was also an academic and one of the co-founders of the Somali Institute of Management and Administration Development, also known as SIMAD university. What made Hassan stand out from the other candidates was that albeit never leaving Somalia throughout the twenty-one years of chaos, he was never violently associated with the civil war and had a clean reputation unlike the rest of the candidates. His clean resume led to a victory that the majority did not foresee.

As soon as Hassan Sheikh was elected, he appointed civil servant, economist, and businessman Abdi Farah Shirdon as his Prime Minister. Their new cabinet consisted of 10 ministers who were technocrats, well educated, and professional. This marked a change from the transitional period of appointing warlords and inept politicians who very often utilized their positions to gain wealth from cronyism or

corruption. This political transition would also give Somalia a new provisional constitution and a new parliament. Both the President and the Prime Minister would make commitments to enhancing a transparent and an accountable judicial system; eradicate financial management issues such as corruption; and bring the state back to normalcy with the help of the African Union (Bryden, 2016, 7).

### **1. The 6 Pillar Framework**

Soon after Hassan Sheikh came to office, he outlined a comprehensive policy framework to address the challenges that hinders the peacebuilding and state-building efforts. The strategy put emphasis on 6 priorities that would represent a complete paradigm shift from the old models that failed to produce any substantial results. The six pillars Hassan Sheikh outlined to prioritize during his tenure included (Bryden, 2016, 7);

1. Bring stability back to the nation.
2. Key focus on economic recovery.
3. Peacebuilding and eliminating the perpetrators of armed-conflict.
4. Improving service delivery to the Somali people.
5. Strengthening ties with international partners and neighbouring nations.
6. Bringing back national-unity, by opening dialogue with Somaliland- the semi-autonomous north-west region of Somalia.

The six-pillar policy framework had its strengths and its weaknesses, security was one of the key elements the newly elected president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud's government heavily focused on. However, most agencies within the security sector remained relatively weak when dealing with domestic threats due to the lack of military equipment, delayed payments, and having an undermanned army. These conundrums would allow al-Shabab to penetrate and launch attacks against civilians and government institutions, and wage asymmetrical warfare despite losing major territories (Ali, 2014). To rejuvenate the security sectors, Hassan's administration would introduce the Somali National Security Architecture in early 2017 before the new president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo), was selected. This

initiative would highlight a long-term goal for the national security forces to provide security, stability, and take responsibility back from the AU over a period of time.

Hassan Sheikh's government excelled in international affairs by strengthening diplomatic ties with international partners and allies. His government was successful in partially lifting the outdated UN arms embargo on Somalia, allowing the country to purchase light weapons, which was pivotal for reforming the security sector and rebuilding the Somali National Army to strengthen and enhance its capability to counter the Al-Shabaab insurgency.

Hassan Sheikh also strengthened the bilateral ties between Somalia and other nations. An example was the growing diplomatic engagement between the Administration in Mogadishu and Ankara would serve as a political and economic milestone. In late 2014, Turkey and Somalia signed a military agreement that would boost Somalia's security sector with assistance in logistic, humanitarian relief, and counter-piracy operations. The security pact also led to Turkey setting up its largest military base overseas in Somalia's capital, camp TURKSOM, which was constructed as a defence university and training base for Somali soldiers (Daily Sabah, 2020). To date, the Turkish government has spent nearly a billion dollars in Somalia's peacebuilding efforts by contributing heavily in the sectors of security, health, infrastructure, and social institutions.

Somalia continues to work on transitioning from war to peace since the collapse of Siad Barre's dictatorship that plunged the country into a devastating civil war. With fragile stability and poor security, Somalia continues to work on rebuilding its war-torn society.

## **V. MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR PEACE IN SOMALIA**

Somalia has been labelled as a “failed state” since it remained an ungoverned space for many years since the civil war in 1991. Failures of peacebuilding, failures of social structure, failures to cooperate with humanitarian intervention, failures of political reconciliation, all these forms of “failure” and more were persistently read into the Somali sphere. And now the failure of the multinational AU force to defeat al-Shabab and pacify Somalia is added to the designation of “failed state”. In the context of Somali conflict, there have been a number of obstacles to peace and state-building, including challenges posed by both internal dynamics and external actors with divergence of priorities, mandates, goals and approaches. Therefore, it is vital to investigate the challenges to peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia, in order to effectively address them.

### **A. Al-Shabab**

There are a number of challenges that impede building a durable post-conflict peace in Somalia. Al-Shabab is an internal actor that has effectively challenged the international intervention to achieve its intended objectives of creating post war stability in Somalia.

Al-Shabab controls a vast territory in Somalia, mainly South-Central Somalia using asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare tactics against Somali National Army and African Union Forces (AMISOM). In areas where it has territorial control, it has sought to provide its particular governance, setting up political structures and justice through al-Shabab courts and policing functions, while also recruiting members of the local population, sometimes by force, to further its military and political goals.

Abdulkadir (2012: 1) notes that “al-Shabab’s emergence is significant for at least two reasons. As an Islamist group espousing Wahhabism, the group aims to

establish an Islamic state in Somalia; but the Wahhabist-inspired methods of achieving this goal are in direct conflict with traditional peace-making mechanisms that are key aspects of conflict resolution in Somali society.” Hence, al-Shabab’s strict version of Sharia undermines the traditional method of conflict resolution. The Somali method is a non-western resolution process based on customary laws - referred to as “*xeer*” in Somali- to settle disputes amongst conflicting parties. Traditional elders (*Oday*) act as the judges, legislators, and mediators by applying *xeer* for justice and social cohesion. They are also responsible for guaranteeing that the compensations (*Diya payments*) are honoured by the perpetrators of criminal acts (Le Sage, 2005: 14). *Xeer* serves as a customary dispute resolution that is practiced in the nomadic communities/urban areas because of the Somali kinship structure and respect for the tribal elder’s position in resolving clan conflicts. Although not perfect, since the system focuses on community-based justice and downgrades individual culpability, It still proves to be a viable strategy in establishing a lasting peace between opposing clans in Somalia. It is a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding from the grassroots level, it concentrates on the indigenous group rather than external actors (Netabay, 2007). However, in territories under al-Shabab’s control, the strict interpretation of Sharia law is implemented as an alternative to the traditional method of *xeer*. The Sharia Law is usually applied through force and intimidation, often leading to gross violations of international human rights law. Therefore, al-Shabab’s method of justice is alien to Somali society, and directly in contradiction with the traditional Somali model for peacemaking.

According to the World Bank report in 2017 “al-Shabab had active fighters in the range of 5,000-8,000 under its command, including 300 Muhajirin (foreign fighters) operating out of its primary territorial havens, with 35 training camps in southern and central Somalia” (World Bank, 2017). Al-Shabab generates millions of dollars of revenues every month through taxation. It collects taxes even in areas under the government control including the major port in the capital city of Mogadishu. It uses coercion to force people to pay taxes and Zakawat. Hence al-Shabab acts as a de facto government by levying taxation and enforcing sharia law and providing public services, such as justice to the population under its control. The domestic revenue it generates sustains its operations.

Al-Shabaab continues to radicalize vulnerable youth through religious rhetoric and financial motivations. Al-Shabab's objective is to rule the country through Islamic Sharia law and considers the federal government of Somalia an apostate. However, despite the religious posturing of al-Shabab, its objective is political and uses violence as means to achieve its political goals.

The difficulties with military approach are that even the US and AMISOM with relative capabilities are not achieving a decisive victory over al-Shabaab, because military might alone cannot defeat an organization that is extremely adaptable and uses asymmetric warfare against its adversaries. Paul Williams (2020: 5) contends that for outside parties that are engaged in stabilizing Somalia, "the principal objective should be framed as political reconciliation rather than military victory." As the war against al Shabab is one of attrition and neither side can win militarily.

Al-Shabab controls a significant area of Somalia, mainly South-Central Somalia using asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare tactics against Somali national army and African Union Forces (AMISOM). In areas where it has territorial control, it has sought to provide its particular governance, setting up political structures and justice through al-Shabab courts and policing functions, while also recruiting members of the local population, sometimes by force, to further its military and political goals. Al-Shabaab's annual revenue in 2011 was estimated in the range of \$70–100 million per year (Keatinge, 2014: 1). Thus, allowing it to act the de facto government in vast territory in Somalia

## **B. Clan Grievances**

Somalia is one of the most homogenous countries in the world with the majority of its population sharing the same culture, language, and religion. An ethnically homogenous society is perceived to be more peaceful and productive than a heterogeneous society because the similarities they share can foster unity and deter violence and conflict from arising. However, it is extremely different in the Somali case. The Somali people have been divided along clan lines causing division and setting the stage for violence to erupt. The structure of the Somali society became based on a clan system where the major and larger clans (Hawiye, Isaaq, Darood,

Rahanweyne) would dominate over the minority clans making them subjects to segregation, marginalization, discrimination, prejudice, and discrimination. As minorities living in a conflict zone they tend to experience more violence and discrimination, hence they seek safety and security from al-Shabaab who address their grievances.

In the Somali context, political or clan grievances against the government is one of the significant factors that push youth to join al-Shabab. Mohamed H. Ingiriis (2020, 365) explains that “the most powerful reasons for young, dispossessed men to join al-Shabab are grievance-based motivations, especially areas around Mogadishu. Therefore, in addition to the prevalence of youth unemployment and the use of coercion and threats by al-Shabab militants against the population, it’s clear that political and clan grievances by the marginalized clans plays a significant role in recruiting youth to join the al-Shabab militants.

A study by seven European organizations, under the umbrella of Support, Advanced Learning and Training Opportunities for Youth (SALTO) asserts that the existence of grievances or perceived injustice by a group or subgroup of people as the cause of youth radicalization and extremism (SALTO, 2016, 8).

Thus, al-Shabab exploits the growing grievances against the government’s failure to provide an effective and fair justice, as well as the government’s incapability to distribute power and economic resources equally among the Somali clans. Even in areas where the federal government is in control, it is often functionally ineffective and is incapacitated by political in-fighting and extremely high levels of corruption, it can hardly even perform essential functions of providing basic political, justice, and economic services (Goldner-Ebenthal, K. 2019,6).

Consequently, marginalized and minority clans who do not get fair justice and equitable political and economic services from the government feel they are not treated equally and are excluded from economic opportunities. Thus, they seek justice from the al-Shabab court system. Subsequently, al-Shabab courts treat them fairly by offering swift enforcement and impartial justice. This is also al-Shabab's strategy to garner the support of minority and marginalized clans. Ostensibly, the marginalized clans with grievances collaborate, support and sympathize with al-Shabab and its cause. The perception of inclusiveness due to services offered by al-

Shabab motivates the youth from marginalized clans to join al Shabab in large numbers. Erica Harper in her working theory on violent extremism argues that identity politics contributes to radicalization, for instance the Sunni feelings of marginalization as something to fight for. For example, “footage of civilians killed by US drone attacks, rights violations against detainees under the US practice of extraordinary rendition, Shia militias in Iraq, and the corpses of tortured Syrian children — and provides an opportunity to invoke redress.” (Harper, 2018: 12). In essence, the grievances perceived by marginalized community in Somalia as a result of political and economic exclusion motivates youth from minority clans to join al-Shabab, thus self-perpetuate the conflict in Somalia

Al-Shabab has been able to exploit clan conflicts and local grievances to recruit vulnerable youth, thus, by joining al-Shabab, marginalized clans with political and economic grievances form the largest part of al-Shabab’s foot soldiers and are a source of instability and an impediment to peace in Somalia.

Additionally, clan grievance is a major contributor to the political disagreement between the federal government and federal member states (FMSs) and hinders progress on post-conflict institution building in Somalia. It also hampers rebuilding the Somali national army, thus stalls the fight against the al-Shabab militants. In essence, it's critically important to take confidence building measures to build relationships between clans, through the conflict transformation process for durable peace. Genuine reconciliation that addresses the root cause of the civil war and heals the deep wounds of the civil war is critical and conditional before embarking on development and institution rebuilding.

### **C. Role of Neighbouring States in the Somali Conflict**

With state collapse in 1991, various external actors have been involved in Somalia’s peacebuilding and state-building processes. However, with the increased interest of these actors, their intentions and involvement in the reconstruction of Somalia has been in question. Ever since the disintegration of the state, externally sponsored political engineering has been increasingly characterized by foreign military presence, competition between foreign states, and the pursuit of their interests. Somalia has become a playground for foreign influence, at times

undermining each other's progress and efforts causing greater instability in an already fragile nation.

Neighbouring states, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia, with deep historical enmity as a result of border disputes have been closely following the developments in Somalia. Firstly, Somalia and Ethiopia had previously gone to war over a territorial dispute caused by the colonial demarcation of boundaries. Consequently, the perceived feeling of injustice triggered nationalistic sentiments among the Somalis. It was due to the concept of irredentism "Greater Somalia," a nationalist project aimed at uniting the Somalis that inhabit the "lost territories" across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia and Kenya's primary concern is what a strong Somali state would do in the foreseeable future- especially Somalia having previously acted to take back the Ogaden and having already made claims to the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya (Møller, 2009: 20). Additionally, the notion that Somalis are living under Ethiopian and Kenyan colonialism has never been forgotten. Therefore, it's in both nation's interest to keep a certain level of instability and state weakness within Somalia. Their actions have been 'justified' by their national security concerns. The rhetoric of prioritizing national security has often been used to influence, militarily intervene, and to an extent, dictate Somalia's political processes. An example is Ethiopia's military incursion into Somalia territory to fight the "war on terror" as a U.S proxy in 2006. Similarly, Kenya would later on invade Somalia in 2011 under the same pretext, albeit the illegal incursion into Somalia to create a buffer-zone, the AU recognized the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) as part of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

Secondly, colonial powers, exclusively Great Britain, left an enduring legacy of endless tensions between Somalia and its neighbours (Thomas, 2016: 11). The colonial boundaries that were marked by European powers with little to no regard for keeping ethnic groups together have been a source of conflict and threat to peace in this region. The 1977 Ogaden war is an example, Somalia would send troops into Ethiopia to free their kins under "foreign occupation". The move gained overwhelming support by Somali nationalists who resided in both Ethiopia (groups such as the ONLF) and Kenya. Therefore, it's in the interest of both regional governments to keep Somalia in a weakened state that is dependent on their aid and

support rather than see Somalia as a stable and strong nation- as that would be perceived to bring future security implications in the region. This explains the interest of maintaining the current status quo. From 1991 onwards, both nations have taken counterproductive measures to try and keep Somalia as a state governed only by anarchy. They supported various warlords fighting for power, militarized their foreign policy, and violated international humanitarian and human rights law while fighting the “war on terror” (Thomas, 2016: 12).

Another regional actor, Eritrea, emerged in the conflict in 2006. Since Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993, both nations have been entangled in a devastating inter-state conflict and rivalry that caused greater instability in the HOF. The impact of this conflict would spill over causing particular problems in Somalia, especially in 2006. Eritrea’s involvement in the Somali conflict was characterized by acting as a counterbalance to Ethiopia, undermining their security interests, and also supporting anti-Ethiopian groups in the country. This approach aligned Eritrea with the Islamic Courts Union, a U.S designated terrorist group, who also shared the same anti-Ethiopian sentiments (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). Eritrea would also be accused of aiding al-Shabaab, one of the most violent and vicious groups in the Somali conflict. And according to the United States Department of State in 2018 “ Eritrea has been subjected to UN Security Council’s (UNSC) sanctions since December 2009 due to past evidence of support for al-Shabab and other activities that have contributed to regional instability” (United States Department of State, 2018).

Neighbouring states have been dedicated to a destructive policy to advance their interest in the region and gain hegemony over Somalia. They have been accused of having a nefarious agenda that encourages unrest and purposely destabilizes the country. Consequently, Somalia has become a victim of geopolitics played by neighbouring states who act as “agents of destruction”. Regional intervention has been an abject failure. Thus, Somalia’s neighbours need to abandon the unnecessary and unwarranted interference in its political affairs to achieve lasting peace from the long protracted civil conflict. That would be in the best interest for Somalia to strive for state-building goals, and it's also in the best interest for the region to have peace

and stability and to focus on regional development for the interest of their population.



## **VI. CONCLUSION**

This chapter summarized the preceding chapters and offers conclusions and recommendations of the research study. The conclusions and recommendations are drawn from second source review and the themes generated by responses from discussions with research participants, particularly by analysing data generated from one-on-one in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.

This research has evaluated the challenges and obstacles posed to post-conflict peace and state-building in Somalia by examining internal and external actors' involvement in the Somali state's post war peacebuilding in Somalia. The functions, objectives, priorities, and interests of targeted external actors in the Somali conflict and their intervention on Somalia's peacebuilding initiative were examined. The scope of this research focuses on the conventional top-down approach of peacebuilding by the international actors in Somalia that fails to engage with the local population to contribute to the process of peacebuilding. In the context of this research peacebuilding refers to action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting.

This study further argues that the current top-down approach being implemented in Somalia's peacebuilding and state-building process, which replicates the liberal peace framework, has not succeeded. Therefore, alternative strategies and approaches are mentioned below in the recommendations that could be useful, if applied by the elites and international actors, to end the more than two decades of civil strife and bring lasting peace to the Somali nation. In addition, external actors should adopt a more comprehensive and coherent approach, since the current engagements have failed to produce a constructive outcome. Subsequently, it is necessary for international interventionists to rethink and redefine the peacebuilding models, plans, and practices in the Somali case. A paradigm shift is critical to effectively address the problems and to produce a viable, sustainable, and durable solution. The current state reconstruction and reconstitution projects have all failed, it

is time for a more inclusive process towards peacebuilding and state-building that is Somali led.

The first chapter of the thesis is the introduction, background to the research study and research methodology. The first chapter is the general introduction to the study and provides a broad background to the study. It lays out the chronological patterns of the Somali conflict and the root causes, and the approach taken by external interlocutors to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, the chapter presents the general objective of the thesis. The research methodology provides a broad background to the study, including what it sets out to investigate, and how it intended to achieve the set goals

The second chapter offers an in-depth discussion on the various theoretical frameworks that are broadly used for peace building and are relevant to this research study. The study explores a number of pertinent conflict theories. Theories such as liberal peace, conflict Management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation theories.

The third chapter articulates the problem statement and contextualizes the Somali conflict by putting the Somali conflict into a historical context. The chapter argues that the 1991 Somali conflict was in the making since independence. Hence, the chapter presents the historical linkage of the conflict to the system of governance inherited from the colonial powers, and the subsequent neo-patrimonial system of governance that kept greedy political leaders in power, particularly, the military regime that ruled the country for more than two decades. Furthermore, the chapter articulates the collapse of the military regime and the subsequent 1991 intra-clan conflict in Somalia. Similarly, this chapter examined the Cold War's impact and other underlying causative factors such as colonial legacy, territorial contestation, the weak state administrative capacity, and governance problems. Additionally, the chapter addresses the emergence of al-Shabab militants in Somalia and its perpetuation of the conflict.

Chapter four presents the main challenges to peacebuilding in Somalia. There are a number of challenges that impede building a durable post-conflict peace in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is an internal actor that has effectively challenged the international intervention to achieve its intended objectives of creating post war

stability in Somalia. Moreover, other challenges include, the approach of international actors in resolving the conflict and the capacity of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to defeat al-Shabaab and the divergence of objectives and interests of troop contributing countries (TCC) to AMISOM.

The study found that the broadly used top-down liberal peace framework is not compatible with the prevailing conditions of countries like Somalia that have traditionally used indigenous methods of conflict resolution. Moreover, the process and approach used by the international interveners is top-down processes with little or no input from the local population. Peacebuilding to be effective and yield a desirable outcome must incorporate, indigenous knowledge, values, beliefs, and culture into the process of conflict resolution.

In the context of Somalia, an indigenous system of law known as 'Xeer' has been used for centuries as a conflict resolution mechanism to address disputes and intra-clan conflicts. It has sustained a peaceful coexistence among clans, and whenever dispute arises between clans, 'Xeer' is applied as a method of conflict resolution.

Moreover, in Somalia, Sharia law is also widely used to settle disputes and resolve clan and territorial conflicts. Apparently, the top-down approach is not considered in broader consultation with the local population, and the top-down liberal peace framework applied to post war peacebuilding is not compatible with the indigenous beliefs, values, and traditional way of living. Thus, the local population resists changing their indigenous values with an alien top-down model imposed by outsiders.

The research also found that the internal dynamics at play posed challenges to the post war peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a major antagonist that perpetuated the Somali conflict and despite the international efforts to defeat, al-Shabaab remains a formidable force that acts as a de facto government by collecting taxes from areas under the control of the federal government.

Similarly, Somalia's neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia and their inclusion into AMISOM peace operation force in Somalia is perceived negatively by the vast majority of the Somali population, mainly due to the unresolved border

dispute between Somalia and its neighbours. Notwithstanding the deep-rooted historical animosity between Somalia and its neighbours, the inclusion of neighbouring countries' troops into AMISOM is cited as a significant contributing factor to the failures of AMISOM to defeat al-Shabab for the last fourteen years.

This research study would not be complete without recommendations, particularly in light of the above-mentioned challenges that pose major obstacles to peacebuilding in Somalia. The recommendations presented are drawn in part from secondary literature, academics, and other secondary sources and partly from the study participants' data sources. The recommendations are to offer a set of practical resolutions to the challenges posed to building durable peace in Somalia.

It is recommended, therefore, in order to overcome the challenges of "one-size-fits-all" and the top-down approach commonly imposed on by the international interveners to consider local context. The underlying principle that guides the international interveners in their peacebuilding endeavour should be one based on the principle of reciprocity. Hence, the study recommends a bottom-up model that seeks the contribution of the local population to the process of building a durable peace.

The general public's perception is that the inclusion of Kenya and Ethiopia in the troop-contributing countries (TCC) of AMISOM has contributed to the failure of AMISOM in defeating al-Shabab. The study recommends excluding Kenya and Ethiopia from the troop-contributing countries (TCC) by reviewing the AU resolution and UNSCRs that authorized their inclusion to AMISOM.

Furthermore, it is clear that the military approach to end the conflict in Somalia has failed so far. In light of this, the study recommends a nuanced political approach that encompasses conflict reconciliation as the best approach to end the war of attrition with al-Shabab. Thus, it is vital to recognize al-Shabab as a political actor, and engaging with them through negotiation would be the quickest option to end the protracted conflict in Somalia.

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