

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE PROGRAM

**CHANGING PATTERNS OF GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY'S
ACCESSION TO THE EU: 1960'S TO THE PRESENT**

Master's Thesis

Müslime İlhan

Ankara - 2015

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Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal

Ankara - 2015

ACCEPTION AND APPROVAL

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
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- I prepared this thesis in accordance with Atılım University Graduate School of Social Sciences Thesis Writing Directive,
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18.09.2015,

Müslime İlhan



ÖZ

İlhan, Müslime. Alman Siyasetinin Türkiye'nin AB'ye Katılımı Sürecindeki Değişimleri: 1960'dan günümüze. Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2015.

Alman ikinci dünya savaşı öncesi ve sonrası, Soğuk Savaş öncesi ve Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılmasıyla simgeleşen Soğuk Savaşın sonu sonrası birçok siyasi paradigma geliştirmiştir. Almanya'nın Osmanlı Devleti döneminden beri Türkiye ile siyasi ilişkileri bulunmuştur. Avrupa Birliği'nin ilk nüvesi olan Avrupa Çelik ve Kömür Topluluğundan beri Almanya'nın AB siyasetinde önemli değişiklikler yaratabilecek gücü olmuştur. Türkiye de 1959 yılındaki başvurusundan beri AB ile sıcak ilişkilere girmiş, girmiş olduğu bu ilişkide Almanya siyasetinin tavrı çok belirleyici olmuştur. Bu tezde Alman siyasetinin bu önemli belirleyici rolünün zaman içerisindeki izlerine temas edilmiş, özellikle 1960 sonrası dönemine odaklanılmıştır. Bu odağı belirginleştirmeye çalışırken ilkin Avrupa Birliği fikrinin ve varlığının tarihi süreci ele alınmış, Avrupa Birliği siyasetini oluşturan temel kurumların durumu ve rolü ortaya konulmuştur. İkinci bölümde Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne dâhil olma isteği ya da yerine göre zorunluluğu ve serüveninin tarihi özellikleri açıklanmıştır. Son bölümde ise Almanya ve Türkiye ilişkilerine yoğunlaşmış, güncel temasa kadar Alman siyasetinin Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerine ve Türkiye'nin AB'ye katılım sürecinde izlediği siyaset irdelenmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Almanya, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Üyelik Süreci, Siyasi Etki

ABSTRACT

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Germany developed many political paradigms before and after the Second World War, before the Cold War and after with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany has political relations with Turkey since the Ottoman Empire era. Since the first core of the European Union the European Coal and Steel Community Germany was able to make significant changes in EU politics. Turkey also entered into friendly relations with the EU since its application in 1959, the tone of politics in Germany have been very decisive in this relationship. This thesis touches upon the important decisive role of German politics and particularly focuses on the post 1960 period. Trying to highlight this focus, first the idea and history of the European Union's presence is approached and the situation and role of the basic institutions that constitute the politics of the European Union are introduced. Second the desire of Turkey to join the EU or accordingly the obligation and the historical features of this adventure are explained. Finally in the last chapter it is focused on German-Turkish relations and the German politics' relations with Turkey until currently and course in the EU accession process of Turkey are examined.

Keywords

Germany, Turkey, European Union, Accession Process, Political influence

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ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
AKP	Justice and Development Party of Turkey
ANAP	Motherlands Party of Turkey
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE	Council of Europe
CoR	Committee of the Regions
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSU	Christian Social Union of Germany
CU	Customs Union
ECB	European Central Bank
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EECS	Economic and Social Committee
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMS	European Monetary System
EP	European Parliament

EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JPC	Joint Parliamentary Commission
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUC	National Unity Committee
OECD	Organization for European Cooperation and Development
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SEA	Single European Act
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

“Wer sich selbst und andere kennt, wird auch hier erkennen:
Orient und Okzident sind nicht mehr zu trennen”

“He who knows himself and others, will also recognize here:
Orient and Occident, can no longer be separated”

Wolfgang von Goethe

The Turkish-German friendship goes far beyond the establishing of both countries far back in the era of the Ottoman Empire. The relations were always rather good but when it comes to the Accession of Turkey to the European Union then Germany has shown different approaches towards this decision.

It is important to look at the German Turkey-European Union policy because Germany's policies have a big influence on the other member states. So the European Union's Turkey politics are always in parallel to the German point of view. Therefore it is important to look closer at Germany's steps and reasons for acting in order to understand the differing attitudes of the Union.

In the First Chapter of the thesis I wanted to reconsolidate the establishment of the organization so that one is able to see under which circumstances the decisions about Turkey were taken. The organs of the Union are important to understand the functioning of the organization.

The Second Chapter tries to explain the ambition of Turkey to join the European Union. The interest grew already in the Ottoman Empire where Western policies and laws were adopted and went on after the founding of Turkey. The political and economic reasons and conditions of that time are mentioned.

The Third Chapter contains the core of this work. The relations between Turkey and the European Organization is described in chronological order and the point of view and argument of Germany is described. Sometimes events in the Turkish – German relations are given to compare them later with the politics of Europe as in the most time they follow the same line and are therefore parallel.

In the Conclusion part it is tried to analyze the political attitude and pattern of Germany policy towards the Accession of Turkey to the European Union from the 1960s to the present.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) is an international organization that promotes cooperation in many fields from a common single market up to the exchange of criminal records or the recognition of school diplomas whose number of members rose with the years. This cooperation is continued in different ways and is presented in three pillars. The European Community which has a supranational structure, the joint defense and security policy that is intergovernmental and justice and home affairs that is also intergovernmental.

The European Union was founded in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht as an umbrella organization that has now twenty eight member states. It wasn't an easy way to build this Union as you will see in the first Chapter of the thesis.

1.1. History

1.1.1. The First Steps

Even though many philosophers and statesman throughout the centuries uttered the need for the unification of Europe, especially after severe wars and devastations,¹ the economic and political integration of Europe that paved the way to the European Union was founded in the political and strategically conjuncture created after World War II.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schumann, also known as one of the founding fathers of the European Union presented a speech on 9 May 1950 that

¹ M.Serdar Palabıyık and Ali Yıldız, **Avrupa Birliđi**, Ankara, ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2006, p.4

was later called the Schumann Doctrine and led to the Treaty of Paris. One of the key quotes of his speech is stated as follows:²

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity." R.Schumann³

His suggestions of the Franco-German coal and steel production to be inspected by a higher authority came true with the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that was signed on 18 April 1951 and entered into force on 23 July 1952. The parties were France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux-States. The treaty was limited to fifty years and expired in 2002. Its aim was to control the armed forces of the countries, so that they couldn't mobilize them unnoticed. A High Authority, an Assembly, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice were created with that treaty. The Community had now a legal personality.⁴ The first President of the High Authority was no one else other than one of the founding fathers of the Union, Jean Monnet himself.⁵ He was elected on 10 August 1952.

1.1.2. European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic Community

In 1955 the foreign ministers of the six countries gathered in Italy and decided that the unification should go on and that cooperation in other fields like economy and nuclear energy should be considered as well. A committee under Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, the foreign affairs minister of Belgium designated to work on the provisions of the cooperation released the Spaak report two years later in 1957.⁶ It suggested the institutionalization and unification for more effective results, because the countries had not enough capital to follow the last nuclear technologies. Another key idea was to lift

² Robert Schumann, **The Schumann Doctrine**, 1950, (Retrieved from) http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm, 14 March 2015

³ Schumann, Ibid,

⁴**ECSC Treaty**, 1951, (Retrieved from) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0022>, 14 March 2015

⁵ M.Serdar Palabiyik and Ali Yıldız, Ibid, p.9

⁶ M.Serdar Palabiyik and Ali Yıldız, Ibid, p.11-12

customs. In this framework the six met in Rome and signed two treaties which are called the Rome treaties.⁷

One of the treaties established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The purpose of the community was to develop and produce nuclear energy for the member countries and sell the excess to third parties.⁸ The EURATOM is still a part of the European Union and is now under the roof of the European Commission's Directorate General for Energy and the Treaty was consolidated last in 2012.⁹

The other treaty established the European Economic Community (EEC). The success of this community lied with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France. The two competed and fought against each other for years but now it was really important that the two strong countries had an opportunity to merge their powers because otherwise the community would fail altogether.¹⁰

The aim of the European Economic Community is, according to the treaty, as follows. Establish a common market by approximating their economic policies and a customs union for goods, a common agricultural strategy and the free movement of labor and the most important one economic development. The economic growth should be stable and balanced. The relationship between the countries should be tied closer as well.

To reach these goals the treaty foresaw a transitional period of 12 years. The customs should decrease step by step every year and were finally lifted in 1968. Also institutions like the European Parliament, Council, Commission and the Court of Justice were established so that the community could function. The European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European

⁷ Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994**, 22.baskı, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2013, p.346

⁸ Consolidated version of the **EURATOM Treaty** , 2012, (Retrieved from) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012A/TXT>, 14 March 2015

⁹ Website of DG Energy, (Retrieved from) <http://www.euratom.org>, 14 March 2015

¹⁰ Oral Sander, *Ibid*, p.346

Atomic Energy Community would be soon part of the European Communities, which came into existence in 1965 with the Merger Treaty.¹¹

1.1.3. The Merger Treaty

Soon some organizational problems appeared. Each community had its own facilities, institutions and costs regarding those. The functionality was not as efficient as expected and so the parliaments of each community were united under the name Common Assembly in 1962.¹²

The Merger Treaty was signed in 1965 and came into force in 1967 which included the unification of the European Coal and Steel Communities, the European Atomic Energy Communities and the European Economic Communities executive powers. The council and commissions of each community merged together.¹³ A single budget was created and alongside the staff was also united. And the three were called the European Communities. They were the first organization to be based on supranational integration.¹⁴

1.1.4. The First Enlargement

The next step towards the European Union's creation was the First Enlargement. There were several states like the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark applied in the year 1961 and the Kingdom of Norway a year later in 1962, for membership in the European Communities. The applicants were refused twice but finally could join the organization in 1973. Norway called for a referendum for the

¹¹ n.a. , **AB ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Temel Kavramlar Rehberi**, İstanbul, İKV, 2005, p.35-36

¹² M.Serdar Palabıyık and Ali Yıldız, *Ibid*, p.12

¹³ n.a. , **AB ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Temel Kavramlar Rehberi**, İstanbul, İKV, 2005, p.60

¹⁴ CVCE, **The European Communities**, Luxembourg, 2012, (Retrieved from) http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_european_communities-en-3940ef1d-7c10-4d0f-97fc-0cf1e86a32d4.html, 14 March 2015

membership and the citizens of Norway voted against the membership in the European Communities.

With the membership of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark on 1 January 1973 the number of members rose to nine from six. With this First Enlargement the common market and the influence of the European Communities grew.¹⁵ The ties between the states became tighter but they began to take a lively interest beyond economic integration. On the political side they were weak and had still a long way to go.¹⁶

1.1.5. European Monetary System and Lomé

The Treaty of Rome foresaw full economic cooperation across and between Europe and overseas countries as well in Article 131. As a result of that the Community signed the Lomé Agreement in 1975 with seventy-one developing African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) which came into force a year later. The cooperation was mainly between the former colonies of some member states like Britain or France. It had two functions, of which one was based on trade and the other on aid.¹⁷

In the year 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) with different economical mechanisms like the European Exchange Rate Mechanism came into force. Its main purpose was to regulate currency fluctuations and with time move towards a single currency, the European Currency Unit (ECU) and an economic and monetary union.¹⁸

¹⁵ M.Serdar Palabıyık and Ali Yıldız, Ibid, p.15

¹⁶ Duncan Watts, **The European Union**, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008, p.27

¹⁷ Christopher Piening, **Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs**, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p.169 - 172

¹⁸ Mark Gilbert, **European Integration: A Concise History**, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2012, p.90

1.1.6. Mediterranean Enlargement

The First Enlargement was followed by further enlargements. The Republic of Greece wished for a long time to join the Community. Therefore it signed an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1961, Athens agreement. The accession was suspended as a result of a military coup that happened in 1967 and came back into rolling in 1979 with the Accession Treaty and became a full member in 1981. The Community had now ten members.

But not all members were satisfied e.g. Greenland a Danish territory called for a referendum held in 1982 and the result was that the Greenlanders wanted to leave the Community. The Community's fishery policy was not effective for them so they left officially three years after the referendum.¹⁹

Spain and Portugal applied for a membership in 1977 but again were not accepted until January 1986. The European Community was too busy with internal matters like budget issues and so on. Now with this Third Enlargement the Communities' members increased to twelve.²⁰ The Third Enlargement is also called the Iberian Enlargement while some count Greece in it as well and name it the Southern or Mediterranean Wave.²¹

1.1.7. The Single European Act

In the early 1980s the members were faced with recession and other economic problems. They took a step back and concentrated on national economic policies. This time is also called the "Eurosclerosis". It is attributed to the growth deficiency and the slow processing of the system. Also following reports of that period, the authors saw

¹⁹ Watts, *Ibid*, p.31

²⁰ Watts, *Ibid*, pp.30-31

²¹ Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, **The Enlargement of the European Union**, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 2001, p.22

the existence of the European Community really threatened and that the aim of the Community was drifting apart.²²

To spice up the progress again, the White Paper titled “Program for the Completion of the Internal Market” was prepared in 1985. It set goals for the European Community that should be reached by 1992. The main goal was the four freedoms which included the freedom of capital, goods, movement of people and services around the member states in the borderlines of a Common Market. Therefore important changes had to be introduced at judicial level as well.²³

In the papers conclusion part which by the way was written by Lord Cockfield who was appointed by Margaret Thatcher as commissioner for trade it was stated as follows:

“Europe stands at the crossroads. We either go ahead – with resolution and determination – or we drop back into mediocrity. We can now either resolve to complete the integration of the economies of Europe; or, through a lack of political will to face the immense problems involved, we can simply allow Europe to develop into no more than a free trade area.” F. A. Cockfield²⁴

The Rome Treaty wasn’t enough anymore to define the judicial structure, and as the first important amendment to it the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986. The aforementioned paper worked as a groundwork for the amendment. The scope of the Community grew immense.

To complete the single market, barriers like technical, physical and fiscal ones had to be lifted. And this should be handled until 1992 as well as the four freedoms. Due to different ratification processes of the member states the Act came into force in 1987. The amendment included the creation of a single market for banking, credit, insurance and security services and a common legal framework for general business. Different national technical and other requirements had to be standardized. Taxes had

²² William Wallace and others?, **The European Community: Progress or Decline?**, London, Royal Institute of Int. Affairs, 1983, p.1

²³ James B. Steinberg, **An ever Closer Union**, Santa Monica, RAND, 1993, pp. 10-11

²⁴ Francis Arthur Cockfield, **Completing the Internal Market**, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Brussels, 1985, p.57 (Retrieved from) http://europa.eu/documents/common/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf, 14 March 2015

to be lifted at least at the borders and for the proper living and working conditions in another state the recognition of qualifications and education had to be standardized, too.

The amendment also changed the Community on political level but was quite modest in comparison with the economical aspect. The voting system was changed. The EC was authorized in new working fields like energy, environment, health, technology, regional and social policies. The Parliament gained stronger powers as well. Now it could give or refuse consent regarding entry of new members and other issues relating to that topic.²⁵

1.1.8. East Germany

Besides the changes in the Community, Europe itself went through several phases of changes, too. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated much earlier than expected and communism collapsed. The German Democratic Republic, also called East Germany joined the Community in 1990, but not in the usual way. A year after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reunited. East Germany was not just attached to Germany. It was divided into its five historical states and joined West Germany as separated states. Now Germany's state number grew to sixteen. As Germany was already a member state and now East Germany was incorporated in it no legal amendments had to be arranged.²⁶

So far so good but even before the unification other member states like the Republic of France and the United Kingdom were concerned that a united Germany could cause problems. They feared that a new domination of Germany in Europe which could unbalance the Community, and they were quick to emphasize this at several platforms.

²⁵ Watts, *Ibid*, pp.34-37

²⁶ Watts, *Ibid*, p.38

Another problem was that Eastern Germany was not as developed as West Germany and had to be financially supported. The alignment would not be easy. This concern of the member states was more down-to-earth than the first one.²⁷

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's famous speech in Bonn on 28 November 1989 about his ten-point plan for the reunification included a passage under point six to allay the concerns on these matters of worried member states:

“The development of German internal relations remains embedded in the overall European process and in East-West relationships. The future architecture of Germany must be fitted into the future architecture of Europe as a whole.” H. Kohl²⁸

Meanwhile the Community had other issues to deal with as well. Like the global effects of the Gulf War held between Iraq and Kuwait, new revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe with the fall of the USSR and the formation of new political structures.²⁹

1.1.9. Maastricht Treaty

1.1.9.1. Founding of the European Union

The wish for a Union was set early with the Treaty of Rome. Right in the preamble we could find the sentence “[...] DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe [...]” (Treaty of Rome).³⁰ The circumstances of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, as the end of the Cold War and Germany's reunification led to two intergovernmental conferences (IGC) in 1990. One was concentrated on the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the other on a political one. Important decisions were shifted to the Council meeting that took place in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991. Finally the Treaty of the European Union also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and ratified

²⁷ Desmond Dinan, **Ever Closer Union**, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.89-91

²⁸ Helmut Kohl, **Deutschlandpolitische Rede in Bonner Haushaltsdebatte am 28.11.1989**, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 November 1989, p.19

²⁹ Watts, *Ibid*, p.91

³⁰ **Treaty of Rome**, ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf

by 1993. The Treaty renewed the European Communities name to European Union and also founded new institutions e.g. the Ombudsman, the European Central Bank or the Committee of Regions. A new co-decision procedures was introduced that gave the Parliament more power, the voting system in the Council changed to qualified majority voting and the Court of Justice (ECJ). With the introduction of two new pillars the activity range of the Union was broadened as well.

The Union was built after a temple structure similar to ancient Greek ones. It has three pillars on which the European Union was based. The first pillar contains the European Communities (the EEC, EURATOM and ECSC). The second pillar is about the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third one about Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).³¹

1.1.9.2. Convergence Criteria

Another reform was the establishment of economy related criteria which are also referred to as the Maastricht Criteria. Members who wish to join the EMU had to fulfill certain requirements. The annual budget deficit has to be less than 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the public sector debt can not be more than 60% of GDP, the interest rates have to be not more than 2% above the average of the lowest three members, their fixed exchange rates have to be stable for two years against other member states' currencies and the inflation rate has to be kept under 1.5% above the average of those member states whose inflation levels are the lowest.³²

1.1.10. Further Enlargement and Copenhagen Criteria

The former European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members the Republic of Austria, Republic of Finland, Kingdom of Norway, the Swiss Confederation and the

³¹ David Phinnemore, **Towards European Union**, *European Union Politics*, (Ed.) Michelle Cini, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 31-35

³² Alex Warleigh, **The Basics: European Union**, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2004, p.64

Kingdom of Sweden who already were a part of the European Economic Area (EEA) aspired to join the Union as well. The European Council agreed on certain requirements that had to be met before a state could accede to the European Union.³³ These requirements were called the Copenhagen Criteria which were the following. The first criteria is the political one. The institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, minority rights and the rule of law have to be stable. The economic criteria consider a market economy that works and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces. And the last the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*.³⁴

Switzerland called for a referendum about the membership in the European Union and the results were negative and therefore it withdrew its application not only from the EU but also from the EEA. The negotiations started with others and the memberships were set for 1 January 1995. Again the last step was to hold referenda in all states that resulted positive except for Norway. Again like in 1972 the people of Norway had voted against a membership. So all Western European states except for Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland were now members of the European Union.³⁵

1.1.11. Euro-Launch and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice

Other treaties draw less attention than the Maastricht but are as important. The Treaty of Amsterdam which was signed on 2 October 1997 broadened the EU's competence in security, justice and freedom matters. One of the aims was to change the European Union into a more citizen friendly organization. Therefore transparency and subsidiarity was now valued more. The treaty issued some institutional reforms, too.³⁶

³³ Watts, *Ibid*, p.50

³⁴ **Accession Criteria**, Website of the EC, (Retrieved from) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm

³⁵ Watts, *Ibid*, pp.50-51

³⁶ Phinnemore, *Ibid*, pp.36-38

In parallel the operations on the Eurozone went on. Eleven member states created the Eurozone and abrogated their national currencies in 1999. The previously as European Currency Unit called Euro (€) started circulating and replacing national currencies in 2002.³⁷

On 26 February 2001 the Treaty of Nice was signed and ratified in 2002. It established e.g. the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), extended the scope of the qualified majority voting (QMV) and balanced the votes in the Council of Ministers in favor of the main actors. It also reduced the Commission's size and the number of MPs in the Parliament. Reforms related to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance were initiated and Brussels got more in the focus as the European Union's de facto capital.³⁸

Another major change was about the admission to the European Union especially for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs): there were structured meetings and cooperation. And a more prospective than current preparedness approach was used for the CEECs because the European Union wanted to include those states in the Union as soon as possible for the sake of a Pan-European idea.³⁹

1.1.12. Eastern Enlargement

With the fall of the Berlin Wall new democracies were formed in Eastern Europe. Most of them approached the European Union with an association agreement first but then in the European Council meeting in Copenhagen the member states agreed on that ten of these states will be members by the year 2004. So this is the fifth step of the enlargement and is also called the Eastern Enlargement or Central and Eastern Enlargement Part I. The states which joined the European Union in March 2004 are the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Malta, Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Slovenia. The

³⁷ Watts, *Ibid*, pp.54-55

³⁸ Phinnemore, *Ibid*, pp. 40-41

³⁹ Ulrich Seidelmeier, **Eastern Enlargement**, *Policy-Making in the European Union*, (Ed.) Helen and William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.401-426

Republic of Bulgaria and Romania were part of the Fifth Enlargement as well but joined the Union together in the year 2007.

The Eastern States' idea of the European Union is quite similar to the British aspect which is to benefit from the liberal economy but not to transform into one super state.⁴⁰

1.1.13. Lisbon Treaty

After the Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 on 7 March the debates about the Future of Europe started and resulted with the Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 December 2007. It showed a new approach to European Union's treaty reforms. It is an important step towards the Constitution of Europe. A lot of diplomatic arguments clashed during the preparations and debates.⁴¹

Actually the Lisbon Treaty's predecessor was the Constitution for the European Union whose main purpose was to combine all treaties except the EURATOM one and form a single document. It was signed in October 2004 but yet it failed in the ratification process as some founding member states' voters rejected the Constitution via referendum.

With Germany's efforts towards a new treaty the process was rolled again but actually they wanted to keep as many parts of the Constitution as possible. After long debates they finally agreed on an amending treaty that embodied new reforms. A permanent European Union President, a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acting as the foreign minister of the Union, less commissioners, the option to leave the Union and a full legal personality were kept and reforms like state recalling terminology like constitution or symbols like anthem, flag and motto or the legal documents name changing to laws were excluded.⁴²

⁴⁰ Watts, *Ibid*, p.55

⁴¹ Clive Curch and David Phinnemore, **The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Treaty**, *European Union Politics*, (Ed.) Michelle Cini, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p.50

⁴² Watts, *Ibid*, pp.56-58

The Lisbon Treaty is very important in that it clarifies the power borders between the national states and the European Union. How much can the Union interfere in national politics or the other way round?⁴³

The later relations and European Council Summits are going to be further in Chapter three. As to the enlargement the final one happened in 2013 with the membership of Croatia on 1st July 2013. The European Union now consists of 28 member states.

1.2.Organization

The structure of the European Union is quite complex if one looks at the organization. The main actors are the member states which follow rather their national interest, the second most important are the institutions: they have their own priorities more related to the European Union policies. The Union relies also on variables that come from the outside like civil society, private interest groups or nongovernmental organizations.⁴⁴

To simplify the structure it may be useful to take again a look on the pillar structure of the Union. The first pillar is the European Community which has a supranational structure and which is responsible for the single market and the member states are not independent anymore because the institutions of the European Union can exercise their full power. The second pillar is called Common Foreign and Security Policy and, as its name indicates it is responsible for defense policies and a common foreign policy. Last but not least the third pillar Police and Judicial Co-operation in criminal matters deals with anti-terrorism and crime beyond national boundaries. The

⁴³ **Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty Brochure**, Luxembourg, European Communities, 2009, p. 14 (Retrieved from) http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/more_info/your_guide_to_the_lisbon_treaty_en.pdf 15.March 2015

⁴⁴ Warleigh, Ibid, pp. 35-38

last two pillars are not supranational so the member states have their final word.⁴⁵ A closer look at the institutions themselves should make the Unions structure more clear.

1.2.1. Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union also called the Council of Ministers of the European Union has its seat in Belgium's capital Brussels. It is the strongest among all the institutions. The member states are represented by the Council on highest level via their national ministers. It is a main actor when it comes to legislation, so without the Council's consent nothing is possible in that matter. Another main subject of the Council is the budget. The responsibility is shared with the Parliament.

The Council has no permanent members. Depending on the issue that has to be discussed the related ministers take part. So e.g. when agricultural agenda items are at hand than the agriculture ministries' ministers take part and the Council is referred to as the Agriculture Council. The same applies to other topics as well except for general affairs. In this case the member states' foreign ministers gather together so as one can see the Council doesn't have permanent delegates.

Another feature of the Council is the rotating presidency system. The presidency is passed every six months to another member state. The votes in the Council are distributed according to the population size of each member state. The decisions are taken by consensus between the states but nowadays especially after the signing of the Single European Act qualified majority voting was initiated, which is now used regularly. This option really enabled the Council to move forward with policies as no member state was able to disturb or sabotage the process now as before.

National civil services or separate preparatory bureaus of the European Union prepare the work for the Council in advance. The most common one is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Diplomats of the highest level solve most

⁴⁵ Alex Warleigh-Lack, **European Union: the basics**, 2nd ed., Oxon, Routledge, 2009, pp.37-41

of the issues and try to pass only the most difficult ones to the Council. The Council's bureaucracy is managed by the Council Secretariat.⁴⁶

1.2.2. European Commission

The Commission of the European Union is settled too in Brussels like the Council. The Commission is like no other institution is has its own political rights but also functions like the civil service body of the Union. It represents the European Union on external level and it initiates proposals for the legislation. It also guards the treaties by monitoring the member states. The Commission follows the interest of the European Union rather than separate national interests. This for it is seen as the friend of those who have not many votes in the Council.⁴⁷

The Commission was originally designed as the government of the European Union but this idea didn't came true. The President of the Commission is chosen by the Council but yet has to be accepted by the majority of the members of the European Parliament. He has five Vice-Presidents. The Commission has a Commissioner from every member state who form together a College. Each one is responsible for a certain Directorate General (DG). The Commission has 40 DG's parallel to the *acquis communautaire* that also consists of as many chapters.

As the Commission's main power is related to financial and economic issues like external trade, Directorate Generals related to this area are the most prestigious and sought ones. The staff of the directorates are not politicians as many suggest but are e.g. civil servants or bureaucrats.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Warleigh-Lack, *Ibid*, pp. 41-46

⁴⁷ IKV, *Ibid*, pp.27-28

⁴⁸ Warleigh-Lack, *Ibid*, pp. 42-43

1.2.3. European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) is established in Brussels and also in Strasbourg where it's dealing with the legislation and budgetary issues. The European Parliament is consisting of representatives (MEPs) of circa 370 million EU citizens. It is the only directly elected organ in the European Union. The number of the members for each member state is arranged according to its population size. Now in 2015 it has 751 MEPs who act in favor of certain political groups, parties or independent rather than in favor of their national states. E.g. for such parliamentary groups is the European People's Party (EPP) or the second big one the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D).⁴⁹

Its duties are first of all in cooperation with the European Council the agreements on the EU budget, the election of specific positions. The EP has several committees consisting of different MEPs. Each committee deals with a different policy issue. The EP analyzes the proposals of the Commission and joins the legislation making process. Another important duty of the EP is that it also appoints the Ombudsman of the Union that is sufficient for keeping up the transparency with EU citizens.⁵⁰

The plenary sessions of the EP are held in Brussels and once a month in Strasbourg despite the fact that the European Parliament doesn't want to proceed this tradition supported by the French government, because it's exhausting and costs also money.⁵¹

1.2.4. European Central Bank

The European Central Bank (ECB) is a rather young institution. It was founded just in 1998 mostly because of the Euro launch. The institution is located in Frankfurt

⁴⁹ **Website of the European Parliament**, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en>

⁵⁰ IKV, Ibid, pp.45-46

⁵¹ Warleigh-Lack, Ibid, pp. 43-44

and its main objection is the managing of the Union's single currency. It regulates the monetary policies of EU states.

The ECB has organs that can take decisions e.g. one of them is the Governing Council that has 25 members. Their main job is to administrate a system that consists of the national central banks, make foreign exchange transactions, secure and manage the reserves of the member states and so on.⁵²

1.2.5. European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) or just called the Court is established in Luxembourg and maintains the laws of the European Union. Again each member state has one judge but the judges are expected to be neutral. Depending on the procedure either all judges, the Grand Chamber with 13 judges or smaller Chambers of three to five judges come together.

The Court has two types of cases dealing with adjudication or interpretation. During the first one it has to judge if the act or proposal is or is not legal or whether the implementation of determined policies is correct and complete. The second case type demands the Court to give assistance to the judiciaries of the member states to apply the European Court of Justice's case law properly and correct.

The Court of First Instance that started working in 1998 is assisting the European Court of Justice. It acts like a filter and reduces the cases that have to be heard by the Court. I also has a judge from each member state except the Advocate Generals that the Court has in addition and it concentrates on cases filed by individuals and legal entities rather than cases brought by national courts.⁵³

⁵² IKV, Ibid, p.44

⁵³ Warleigh-Lack, Ibid, pp.45-46

1.2.6. Other

The European Union has other institutions besides those mentioned above. The Economic and Social Committee (EESC) that foremost brings together employers and trade unions and can have an impact on EU institutions as an advisory committee.

Another advisory committee like the EESC is the Committee of the Regions (CoR) which was established with the Treaty of the European Union, where delegates from regional and or local governments are meeting.

Although both committees can effect EU policies most of the interest groups don't want to waste time with them and prefer it to go lobbying directly at the bigger institutions themselves.

The Court of Auditors is independent in financial matters. It audits the finances and how the European Union runs it. It gives reports on the budgets that can have serious consequences as e.g. the resignation of the EC in 1999.⁵⁴

Another important body of the European Union is the Ombudsman which was also established with the Treaty of the European Union. The European Parliament appoint the Ombudsman. The proper administration of the Union is the main goal of that body. Citizens can directly apply to this office and it can give responses to those request or complaints, can open inquiries and transfer the issue to the competent institution.

But the institution is facing problems like low resources and the question how to define the term maladministration. Despite that for the citizens the administration of the Union has changed for the better thanks to the Ombudsman office.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Warleigh-Lack, Ibid, pp. 46-47

⁵⁵ Dinan, Ibid, p.256

CHAPTER TWO

TURKEY'S EUROPEAN VOCATION

In the new formation of the world order after World War II Turkey tried to find its place close to Europe. It already had historical ties to Europe and other economic and political reasons that are going to be further explained in this second chapter.

2.1. Ottoman Empire

Turkey's European vocation started far before its actual founding in 1923. In the era of the Ottoman Empire the sultan's powers were limited first with the charter of alliance in the year 1808. This is regarded as the first step of Turkey towards a state of law.

The second step towards a state of rule of law and maybe the most important one was the 1839 dated Imperial Edict to Reorganization also known as the Rescript of Gülhane which closed a period and opened a new one in the Empire's history.⁵⁶ The Imperial Edict granted new rights like security of life and property and renewed regulations related to taxes and military service. The Edict was not declared as a result of a grassroots movement like during the French Revolution. It contained single-sided given fundamental rights offered by the ruler. The Edict shows that the ideas that came up in Europe in the first half of the 19th century not only reached the Ottoman Empire but also its central authority.

After the Crimea War from 1853 to 1856 the Edict of Reform was announced together with the Paris Peace Treaty. With this Edict the French principle of equality (égalité) entered the Empire. The Edict of Reform is like the Imperial Edict based on foreign demands. It granted everybody in the Ottoman Empire a citizenship, everybody was equal before law irrespective of his/her religious affiliation. With this

⁵⁶ Prof. Dr. Haluk Günuğur, **Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri**, Ankara, EKO, 2008 p.3

changes the Western world's liberal thoughts circulated in the Empire the works of Montesquieu or Jean Jacque Rousseau were translated into Turkish.⁵⁷

With the signing of the Peace Treaty of Paris the Ottoman Empire was accepted as the sixth member of the Concert of Europe and some academicians like e.g. İlber Ortaylı consider Turkey already a member of Europe since that date.⁵⁸

The Western World or Europe was one of the role models for newly establishing states because it was on political, economic and cultural level higher. With the end of the Ottoman Empire young Turkey's role model was too Europe.⁵⁹

2.2. Republic of Turkey

The Republic of Turkey was founded after the Turkish War of Independence officially in 1923 and leaned on the Western World in line with the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's objectives of a contemporary level of civilization. Atatürk Reforms are efforts to reach the current social, cultural, economic, political and jurisdictional values of the West. Reforms made in this framework include e.g. secularism, adoption of the Latin alphabet, equality of women and men and many others.⁶⁰

Legal reforms are another proof of Turkey's orientation to Europe as it adopted the code of civil law from Switzerland in 1926, the penal code from Italy, the commercial code from Germany and the administrative procedural law from France.⁶¹

Since the founding of the Republic Turkey observed the developments in Europe really closely and tried to be part as founding member on every possible occasion. As for this it is for example one of the founding members of the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD). Turkey joined the European Council in 1949 right two months after its creation. Turkey also joined the North Atlantic Treaty

⁵⁷ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2012, pp. 305- 306

⁵⁸ İlber Ortaylı, *Avrupa ve Biz, İstanbul*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008, pp. 92-93

⁵⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2013, pp. 29-30

⁶⁰ Günuğur, *Ibid*, p.4

⁶¹ Ortaylı, *Ibid*, p.2

Organization (NATO) and was a party of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since the very beginning in the year 1947.

Turkey regarded itself in this period always as part of the democratic pluralist Western World. Turkey's efforts to accede the European Economic Community in 1959 demonstrates that it regards the EEC as an important part of the European Organizations Chain. In short Turkey's target in political and cultural matters was and still is Europe and it is out of question for Turkey to stay outside the utopic idea of a United States of Europe idea that will maybe become true long years later. Turkey could have joined the EFTA but after some evaluations it choose the EEC because its goals were much bigger.

Membership in the EEC would bring Turkey lots of benefits in economics and agricultural trade as it was a typical agricultural state. The EEC supported its members and Turkey didn't wanted to miss this opportunity.

Turkey applied for membership at the EEC on 31 July 1959 right six weeks after the application of Greece. It tried to join every union or organization in which Greece was or would be involved because in this way it could balance the political and economic level with its neighbor within the Western World. Another example for this is the application of Greece for a full membership at the European Communities in 1975 and Turkey's following around the 1980s.⁶²

In the Cold War years the US embarked on liberalism and the USSR on communism. Turkey was on the plate about to be a meal for either of the systems. Turkey wanted to be integrated in the European system that also is a liberal one and therefore to flee the soviet threat it had to approach itself to Europe and the best way for this were the different European Institutions.

⁶² Günuğur, Ibid, pp. 4-8

CHAPTER THREE

TURKISH-GERMAN AND EU RELATIONS

The Republic of Turkey's official application to the European Economic Community was made in 1959 and in the framework of article 238 of the Treaty of Rome negotiations began.⁶³ But soon after the military intervention in 1960 the negotiations were suspended and with the National Unity Committee's (NUC) declaration that the application was still valid, the negotiations resumed. Turkey insisted from the beginning that the accession agreement should be based on the Customs Union (CU) exactly like the accession agreement of Greece which was to be signed in 1961. In 1970 an additional protocol was signed but ratified a year later because of another military intervention. And finally the Additional Protocol came into effect in 1973. The negotiations resumed but at the 1980 military intervention Europe reacted different than in the former situations and shouted out for democracy and took measures therefore.

With Turgut Özal coming to power in Turkey things began to change. He launched an economic liberalization program and stated that the purpose of this program was mainly the full membership in the European Community. In 1987 Turkey applied formally for a full membership under Özal and the application was accepted by the Council of Ministers in 1990. Then came the Cyprus Crisis and the negotiations were postponed to 1993. Turkey finally joined the Customs Union in 1996. Three years later Turkey gained officially the title candidate member state and Turkey started new reforms to meet the European Union's membership criteria. With fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria in 2005 the accession negotiations started which are still going on.

Now in this chapter it is important to go step by step through the development of this relationship and see how the Republic of Germany reacted politically to the

⁶³ **Treaty of Rome**, Ibid,

event. Was the German point of view always the same like in the beginning? Is there a change or could it be that it even became the quite opposite and if then why? ⁶⁴

3.1.Relations from 1960's – 1987

3.1.1. The Beginnings

The Turkish delegation contacted the European Economic Community first between 28 and 30 September 1959 and declared its idea of the membership process. They indicated that it was their desire that the membership should aim for the Customs Union. Turkey should be given enough time and resources to introduce the necessary reforms to bring itself closer to the EEC in general to adopt customs union with the latter. They made it clear that economical and technical assistance shall be given to support the economic development of Turkey. The EEC responded by saying that the Customs Union would take more time than it was foreseen in the Treaty of Rome because of Turkey's poor economic conditions. They suggested that Turkey should lift its customs already in the preparatory stage by 50% and another 50% during the transitional stage.

Further details were discussed in the second meeting between 2 and 4 December 1959, and in the third between 14 and 21 October 1960 were following. During this conferences ideas and economic data was exchanged between the delegation of Turkey and the EEC. Turkey accepted again to reduce its customs for industrial goods for the first twelve years by 20%. The third conference was important because the commission had gained new powers from the Council of Ministers on 11 May 1960 to discuss and finalize in detail the future partnerships structure and form. It planned to open the official negotiations in the first week of June but unfortunately with the revolution of

⁶⁴ Hale, Ibid, pp. 127-180

1960 in Turkey the meeting was cancelled until the National Unite Committee wanted to continue on 14 November 1960.⁶⁵

German Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein back then the President of the European Economic Community's Commission addressed a speech at the joint session of the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) on 24 June 1960. He underlined the European solidarity and that the so called forgotten countries are not forgotten by the Community and brotherly support is essential eventough problems are present. The community has a positive approach towards the negotiations with Turkey and hopes for comparable progress like it took with Greece.⁶⁶

Ludwig Erhard the Chancellor of Germany between the years 1964 and 1966 had an idea of a free and equal Europe already as Federal Economy Minister. His Europe was more liberal on economic and geographical level He mentioned this often and even started an aid campaign in big German newspapers in late 1960. His formula was $6 + 7 + 5 = 1$. The first six were the EEC member states the other seven the EFTA members and the last five consisted of the states Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Turkey and all together should form one Europe.⁶⁷

He also criticizes the EEC as an unnatural construct. The thought of Europe as the incarnation of only six states is unthinkable for him and it would be quite an arrogance if that small group would claim to be Europe itself. In his opinion it is obligatory that Europe should be expanded sooner or later.⁶⁸

The fourth conference was held on between 2 and 3 May 1961 and before the conference the EEC was almost ready with Greece's association agreement and European politicians remarked on various occasions that the privileges given to Greece would not be granted to other candidates. The Athens Agreement was signed on 9 July

⁶⁵ Günuğur, Ibid, pp. 8-10

⁶⁶ Walter Hallstein, **Address to the joint session of the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe** on 24 June 1960, Document Number: X/3564/60-E

⁶⁷ Corina Schuhkraft, **Die Anfänge deutscher Europapolitik in den 50er und 60er Jahren**, *Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder*, Opladen, Leske-Budrich, 2002, pp. 44-46

⁶⁸ Hohmann, Karl (Hrsg.): Ludwig Erhard. **Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten. Reden und Schriften**, Düsseldorf-Wien-New York 1988, p.797

1961 by the way.⁶⁹ During this meeting the delegations again exchanged various details e.g. about export good and so on but then the EEC remained silent for almost a year.

The European Economic Community's Commission President met with the US President John F. Kennedy in May 1961. The Community printed a special bulletin about this meeting and included an article of Mr. Hallstein that was based on his policy speech at the NATO's defense college in Paris earlier that same year, in which the following is stated:

“At this moment we are engaged in negotiation with two of our other NATO partners, Greece and Turkey. We hope that before long these two nations will be associated with our Community, cemented to our union.” W. Hallstein⁷⁰

Mr. Hallstein aims to present the Union at his speech and therewithal underlines the position of Turkey and the Community, which is a quite positive one around the 60s as you can see in this article.

The Idea of Europe was according to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein also not that one of a melting pot. Of course differences should be preserved and later he states in his book *The European Community* that “Europe is diversity. We want to save the richness and diversity of characters, conceptions, confessions, customs, traditions and the taste.” (Hallstein).⁷¹ His ideas are important because he is the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community which later in time became the European Union.

Later that year on 27 September 1961 the EEC' Council of Ministers suspended the negotiations with Turkey until democratic and free elections were hold. The main reason for this decision was the execution of the prime minister Ali Adnan Ertekin Menderes and his ministers Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan.

⁶⁹ CVCE; **The accession of Greece**, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/61a2a7a5-39a9-4b06-91f8-69ae77b41515/publishable_en.pdf p.2

⁷⁰ Walter Hallstein, **Nato and the European Community**, Bulletin from the European Community, No 46, Washington, EC Information Service, May 1961

⁷¹ Walter Hallstein, **Die Europäische Gemeinschaft**, Düsseldorf-Vienna, Econ, 1979, p. 14

Also the EEC was busy with the Athens Agreement and didn't wanted to sign another agreement before this one was finished. Despite that, some member states e.g. the Netherlands wanted a more plain relationship with Turkey until it reached a higher economic level. So their suggestion was working towards a framework agreement what Turkey didn't wanted at all. The NUC President Cemal Gürsel always pointed out that the aim is to join the common market.⁷² The Republic of France worried about competition in agricultural matters with Turkey and was in doubt if a membership would be beneficial for itself. France even tried to undermine the association agreement's conclusion part.⁷³ Italy had similar concerns like France it saw Turkey as a rival in exporting agricultural goods to the EEC states.⁷⁴

Despite the fact that the other member states were distant to the Republic of Turkey's membership Germany supported it for various reasons. In the 60s the German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) happened. The economy grew so fast that labor became short especially in low skilled positions like on assembly lines in factories, or miners in the coal industry, in the cleaning sector and in agriculture. Another reason for the shortage was the construction of the Berlin Wall, which cut manpower from East Germany. As a solution Germany draw up bilateral recruitment agreements. The first one was signed with the Republic of Italy in the year 1955. And soon as more need arouse others like with Greece and Spain five years later, with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal a year after and in the following with Tunisia and finally in 1968 with Yugoslavia followed. Germany signed the recruitment agreement with Turkey more exactly on 30 October 1961. The movement of the Turkish workers was already regulated in this agreement so Germany had no problem to support the same idea on European level as well as it was for its benefit.

Germany had a very good economic status and so it was able to support Turkey financially to achieve Turkey's economic development. It provided the most aid right

⁷² Günuğur, Ibid, pp. 14-15

⁷³ Matthias M. Mayer, **Germany's preferences on the Ankara Agreement: Ministerial actors between Cold War security concerns, Turkish European ambitions and the Wirtschaftswunder**, Paper, Riga, University of Latvia, 25-27 September 2008, p.14

⁷⁴ Mayer, Ibid, p.5

after the USA's 175 million US dollar aid with an amount of 58.5 million US dollars before the association.⁷⁵

Another reason for Germany's support was its position during the Cold War. After World War II Germany had almost no armed forces and dependent on military support from the USA. The USA however was in a Cold War against the Soviet Union. So Germany automatically depended on them. The threat was present during the annulation of the four powers in Berlin by the Soviets that led to the Berlin Crisis and the building of the Berlin Wall and later on for many years.⁷⁶ The East was soon influenced by the communist ideologies of the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic of Germany was no super power anymore and wanted to avoid a war on his own land so it tried to act in the framework of US policies. It had to take the United States of America's interest serious while developing foreign policies. The demand to integrate Turkey to the Western World effected Germany and it had to support the Ankara Agreement like it did the US for political reasons. The integration was an important goal for the US according to the Truman Doctrine of 1947.⁷⁷

The Marshall Plans aim was to build a strong economic system by supporting the European states that were weakened after the war. In this framework the USA also included Greece and Turkey into the Plan. The reason was to strengthen Turkey so it won't fall under the influence of the USSR. Also this move is a part of the US's containment policy that tries to cut the influence of the Soviets with military, economic and diplomatic measures. As an example for military one can mention e.g. the establishing of the NATO.⁷⁸

It would also diminish the financial aid costs if the EEC would support Turkey financially. So the US had two reasons to support Turkey's EEC membership of which the first was on financial reasons and the second to strengthen a NATO partner against the Soviet threat and Germany hat to act in line with these policies.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Mayer, Ibid, pp. 8-15;18-19

⁷⁶ Sander, 2013, pp. 248-252

⁷⁷ Mayer, Ibid, pp. 15-17

⁷⁸ Burcu Bostanoğlu, **Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası**, Ankara, İmge, 2008, pp.270-285

⁷⁹ Mayer, Ibid, p.17

The German foreign policy was mostly formed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in those years.⁸⁰ The Foreign Office dealt mainly with the Ankara Agreement in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Economics for economic issues. The Federal States and the general public were not involved and despite everything Chancellor Adenauer had the last word. So directly Chancellor Adenauer's thoughts are reflecting the German point of view.⁸¹

If we look at his campaign speech in 1947 you can see the US impact with blank eyes:

“I can remind you further that during the Moskva Conference the President of the United States, Truman, sent the historical message in the world to support Greece and Turkey.”
K. Adenauer

Or on 17 September 1954 during a speech with the American Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles Konrad Adenauer stated the following according to his notes about a possible NATO crisis:

“Among the European countries I consider the following totally reliable: the Benelux-States, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Germany. And in limited ways England, too.”
K. Adenauer⁸²

With Germany's huge supports the silence of the EEC was broken on 18 June 1962. France and Italy had to retreat because of reasons related to security policies.⁸³ The negotiations continued on various dates the last conference was on 20 June 1963. Five days later the Accession Agreement and its amendments were initialized in Brussels. The amendments were a provisional and another financial protocol, a notice of intent about raisins, a comment about the value of the account unit, a note about the definition of the term active parties, a note of the Federal Republic of Germany and a

⁸⁰ Sena Ceylanoglu, **Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei: Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich (1959-1963)**, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004, p.195

⁸¹ Mayer, *Ibid*, p.15

⁸² Konrad Adenauer, **Die Demokratie ist für uns eine Weltanschauung, Reden und Gespräche 1946-1967**, Köln, 1998, pp. 27-40.

⁸³ Ceylanoglu, *Ibid*, pp. 198-207

letter exchange regarding Turkish manpower. The initialized agreement was signed in Ankara on 12 September 1963 by the İnönü government and the EEC.⁸⁴

As Walter Hallstein stated around September and October of 1963 that the wish to, tie the already existing relationship between Turkey and its European partners closer helped to overcome big questions that emerged during this process.⁸⁵

By the way during all these contacts no member state contested the “europeanness” of Turkey like today. If you look closer at the Treaty of Rome it is stated in the first sentence of article 237 that “Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community.”⁸⁶ And Turkey applied in the context of this particular article and with that application it is already settled lawfully that Turkey is considered as a European state according to European laws.⁸⁷

3.1.2. Ankara Agreement

After long negotiations Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in the capital of Turkey Ankara on 12 September 1963. The agreement was signed by Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein the President of the Commission of the European Economic Community and Feridun Cemal Erkin the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey. Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein held a speech on the occasion of the signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey the so called Ankara Agreement.⁸⁸

In this speech he underlines more than once, to be exact quite three times that ‘Turkey is part of Europe’. He stresses that both the European Commission and the Republic of Turkey share the same spirit like the “attitude of openness and solidarity”

⁸⁴ Günugur, Ibid, 15-17

⁸⁵ Walter Hallstein, **Bulletin of the European Commission**, September and October issue, 1963, p.22

⁸⁶ Treaty of Rome, Ibid, Article 237

⁸⁷ Udo Steinbach, **Die Türkei im 20. Jahrhundert. Schwieriger Partner Europas**. Bergisch Gladbach, Gustav Lübke, 1996, p.233

⁸⁸ Günugur, Ibid, p.23

which is also reflected in the Treaty of Rome. Despite geographical and historical facts it's a truth that Turkey is a part of Europe he goes on.

He also draws attention to the work of Marshal Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his stupendous personality and how he was influenced by the European culture and politics. The relationship between Turkey and the European Community is tied by a constitutional establishing. It is also remarked in the end that this Association not only is for the benefit of Turkey but also for the Community itself. The Republic of Turkey and the European Community are according to Prof. Dr. Hallstein equal partners and the final step of the negotiations is the full membership of Turkey.

The speech is closed by the statement that the full membership “is the strongest expression of [the] community of interest” (Hallstein 1963).⁸⁹ With this agreement the Republic of Turkey became officially an associate member state and was eligible for a full membership in the European Commission.

Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert Luns Foreign Affairs Minister of the Netherlands and the term president of the Council of the European Economic Community at that time who later worked as the Secretary General of the NATO for long years, also held a speech on the same occasion in which he is underlining that Turkey is one of the first European countries that understood the importance of partnership methods, to improve cooperation in Europe and to ensure the novation of the old world.

It is again not out of question that Turkey is a part of Europe. Again when it comes to differences Joseph M.A.H. Luns remarked that Europe's character is defined by diversity and the European integration movement was born serving this idea and this will go on like that. It would even take away the shine and impact of Europe if they give up and unite without diversity.

⁸⁹ Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, **Address on the occasion of the signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey**, 1963

The agreement was sent to the national parliaments of the member states for ratification and after exchange the agreement finally entered into force on 1 December 1964.⁹⁰

The Association Council that was established with the Ankara Agreement was an effective institution that had the power to take decision by meeting on foreign ministers level. The decisions taken in this Council are binding for both sides the member states of the EEC and Turkey and helped moving forward to the Customs Union.⁹¹

The Council was also able to found other institutions and organs if necessary. In this way the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) was established in 1965. This Committee is composed of equal member numbers and meets every six months either in Europe or in Turkey.⁹²

3.1.3. Preliminary Stage

The preliminary stage was planned to be five years long but could be extended on Turkey's wish up to ten years. During this stage not only Turkey but also the EEC had duties to fulfill. The Community had to grant tariff discount on four main agricultural products of Turkey that were dried figs, hazelnut, raisins and tobacco and the second duty was to issue credits for five years. Turkey could benefit from the first duty as it could export with less or sometimes no custom costs at all. The product range grew larger with time.

The financial credits were a big relief for Turkey, because it was in need of capital in those years. For example the first Bosphorus Bridge was financed with this loan. So the EEC fulfilled their obligations. Turkey's obligation was to use these loans properly to make the country ready for the transition period. In 1968 Turkey didn't

⁹⁰ Günuğur, Ibid, p.25

⁹¹ Günuğur, Ibid, 29-31

⁹² **Website of the European Parliament**, EU-Turkey,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-tr/home.html>

wanted to extend the first stage no longer and requested to start negotiations as it was foreseen in the Ankara Agreement. Upon this request the negotiations started and resulted in the Additional Protocol that was signed on 23 November 1970 by the Süleyman Demirel government but came into force not earlier than 1973. To start the obligations that would arise from the protocol an interim agreement was signed in 1971 that was positive for Turkey. The Additional Protocol was more like an implementation agreement and for this it replaced more or less the Ankara Agreement itself.⁹³

With the change of the political atmosphere under Necmettin Erbakan the now more Islamite politicians were against further movements and other political groups brought forward their doubts as well. But after the military intervention in 1971 the Parliament ratified the Protocol and it came into force in early 1973 as mentioned before.⁹⁴

The reason why Turkey wanted to move straight forward to the transitional period can be summarized as follows. The Greece factor was essential as Turkey didn't want to fall back in the challenge with that state and the 1967 coup in Greece that led to the suspension of the accession progress was the opportunity for Turkey to integrate closer to Europe by benefiting from the enlargement conjuncture.⁹⁵

By joining the Customs Union Turkey would benefit from the economic provisions and would export goods to the European Market without customs that would help burst the economy of Turkey. Because the I. Financial Protocol was going to expire on 30 November 1969 it would be better to start as soon as possible to negotiate for the second one. The schedule for the tariff discounts given in the Ankara Agreement would only be determined with the Additional Protocol and therefore to benefit from these discounts it would be better to fasten things a little bit more.

⁹³ Günuğur, Ibid, pp. 21-24

⁹⁴ Hale, Ibid, p.129

⁹⁵ Hacı Can and Çınar Özen, **Türkiye - Avrupa Topluluğu Ortaklık Hukuku**, Ankara, Gazi Kitabevi, 2005, p.30

3.1.4. Transition Stage

3.1.4.1. Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol that led the path for the membership in the Customs Union consisted of 64 articles and marked the end of the preliminary stage and at the same time the beginning of the transition stage.⁹⁶ The main content of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol is the step by step movement towards the fundament of economic integrity that are the four freedoms i.e. the free movement of capital, goods, people and service. We will come to the freedoms later.

The oil crisis of 1973 caused severe recession, inflation and unemployment increased immense. The Cyprus-conflict was another military expenditure.

Greece won his democracy back in 1974 and applied for full membership and became a full member on 1981. All this together made the relationship to the EEC worse.⁹⁷ From 1980 on Greece would block all financial aid and support from the Community because of reasons related to inner political reasons and the disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus.⁹⁸

The number of Turkish migrant workers and their families grew day by day and their money transfers to Turkey reached circa one thousand million US dollars per year. According to the Additional Protocol that included the four freedoms the free movement of workers should start by 1976 but the European Economic Community took a step back and improved the freedom of those workers who already were present in the Community. They also granted to prefer Turkish workers if labor was needed, but this were just empty promises.

In his government statement on 16 December 1976 the Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was for the Enlargement of the Community with Greece, Portugal Spain and

⁹⁶ Günuğur, Ibid, pp. 33-34

⁹⁷ Didem Ozan, **Parteiliche Kommunikation am politischen Wendepunkt**, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2010, p. 97

⁹⁸ Dietrich Kyaw, **Grenzen der Erweiterung-Die Türkei ist ein Teil des Projekts Europa**, Internationale Politik, Heft3/2003, pp. 47-54

Turkey he stated that Germany is interested to include these states in the Community to support their economic development and to develop and stabilize democratic order (Schmidt 1976).⁹⁹

During the Chancellorships of Willy Brandt who started in 1969 and Helmut Schmidt in 1974 the progress for a full membership was not decisive. Even though the Association Agreement was a benefit for the Turkish Economy to join the East European market the Association wasn't filled with much life and on the contrary the relations got worse towards the years.

Almost at the same time with the Additional Protocol Germany was in an economic crisis and had to stop recruit workers from non EC-states. This effected the free movement of the Turkish labor and Turkey claimed that the spirit of the Association Agreement was violated by Germany.¹⁰⁰

Walter Hallstein remarks in his book the European Community that after difficult negotiations finally a package of measures was adopted in December 1976 that should improve agricultural preferences, further enhancement of the Association in trade matters and the implementation of the freedom of workers from Turkey in stages. He mentions the political problems between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. How the United States of America lost the Greek politician Karamanlis by giving Turkey credits approved by the American Congress.

It is important for him that despite all the negative events and political tensions in the area the "finalité politique" the political ultimate goal is only important in the case of the membership itself. Also because of many historical, economic and political reasons the participation of the Mediterranean states could hardly be denied according to his opinion. He states as well that if the Community wants to be credible for the developing countries, advanced expenditures are a requirement for a high developed area like in the Community.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Nicole Leuchtweis, **Deutsche Europapolitik zwischen Ausbruchstimmung und Weltwirtschaftskrise: Willy Brandt und Helmut Schmid**, Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, Opladen, Leske-Budrich, 2002, pp. 187-189

¹⁰⁰ Leuchtweis, Ibid, 107-108

¹⁰¹ Hallstein, 1979, Ibid, pp. 373-375

Mustafa Bulent Ecevit the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1978 followed a more neutral and pro-state politic. Some even assume that his approaches almost collapsed the state. Because of severe economic problems he decided to suspend the obligations of the state that were imposed by the Protocol. No progress was reported until late 1979. Süleyman Demirel started the process again but his move didn't last for long because on 12 September 1980 one of the biggest military interventions occurred. ¹⁰²

3.1.4.2. Military Intervention of 1980

How did it came to the military intervention? After the 1973 elections a new era of hope but also conflicts began. The ideological conflicts got out of hand and even university lecturers were murdered ascribable to long hit lists so the country openly slid into a civil war. The Parliament on the other side wasn't even able to elect a President after 120 tries yet to form a national government that could stop these events so the military intervened.

The reactions to these intervention were different then to those before. Even in Europe the media was all about the coup. Turkish workers and the youth stated in various interviews that it was about time already and opposite ideas were not mentioned first. The reactions were positive at the beginning.

But with time the policies got more rigid the political parties were closed and the parliament was dissolved. A few weeks later the statements of General Kenan Evren the President of the National Security Council provoked protests not only in Turkey but also in Europe that led to the suspension of the negotiations with the EEC in the following years. ¹⁰³

¹⁰² Hale, Ibid, pp. 133-134

¹⁰³ İlber Ortaylı, **Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi, İstanbul**, Timaş, 2012, pp. 129-137

The European governments regarded Turkey's membership as a burden for the inner security and political condition of the European Communities because of the latest developments and another reason was the expected migration flow to the area.¹⁰⁴

The attitude of the NATO and the EC states towards the military government contributed to the stabilization of the country and the Western World allowed Turkey this winter break of democracy. The most support got Turkey from the Federal Republic of Germany only few German politicians from the SPD requested political consequences from the Federal government. The first reaction to the intervention came a day later from the Federal Minister of Finances Hans Matthöfer who also had coordinated the billion credit for Turkey. He stated that he hopes this shock will be healthful and that an arrangement would come out in which both democratic powers and the military cooperate.¹⁰⁵

Bonn the capital city of Germany back then mobilized the Turkish army with 600 million Marks two months after the coup.¹⁰⁶

The first agreement that the new military government signed was with the socio-liberal ruled Germany for police forces, arms, munition and vehicle and the worth was around 15 million of German Mark. The police cars were already delivered by December.¹⁰⁷ The argument therefore was that police could so work more effectively against drug trade even if e.g. Karsten Voigt from the SPD said the following:

“Nobody can exclude that this financial aid for the police force won't be raising the effectiveness of the police force in other matters as well” K. Voigt

And then Turkey asked for more money at least 1, 16 billion US-Dollars as NATO-partner. But concerns about the deaths in the prisons rise day after day. But the Spiegel assumes that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wants to impress the new American President Ronald Reagan during a visit in Washington and wants to proof Germany's loyalty to the alliance.

¹⁰⁴ Steinbach, Ibid, p. 257

¹⁰⁵ Hans Matthöfer, no titel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 September 1980

¹⁰⁶ No author, **Kollektiver Mief**, Der Spiegel, 6/1981, 02.02.1981, p.46

¹⁰⁷ Nick Brauns, **Der NATO-Putsch**, Junge Welt, 11 September 2010,

But then Minister Matthöfer decides after all that before the aid it should be clarified if the military government endorses the human rights violations or punishes them. After exchanges with the German Ambassador in Ankara, Germany is decided to explore the situation on its own.¹⁰⁸

A delegation from the German Parliament composed of Alois Mertes from the CDU, Karsten Voigt from the SPD and Helga Schuchardt from the FDP was sent to Turkey in March 1981 to find an answer to the aforementioned question. The result was that they claimed that Turkey was in no way like a dictatorship and the Junta is supported by the contentment of the citizens. After a visit at a prison they also approved that there was no sign of systematic torture and the widely read *Hürriyet* newspaper thanked the German politicians for disproving the “enemies of Turkey”.¹⁰⁹

Since the intervention no EC-member countries’ government visited Turkey and behaved rather restrained. But the first politician who was seen in Ankara was Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher from Germany and his opinions would decide if money from the EC-states would keep flowing into Turkey. At the dinner hosted on the occasion of Mr. Genscher’s visit the Turkish side warned that Turkey wouldn’t accept any political criteria when it comes to receiving financial assistance.

It is known that Turkey even threatened Europe that if they would intervene in internal affairs then Turkey would orientate itself in a different way. Either towards their Islamic brothers or like in the 50s towards the United States of America because both of them are not so picky when it comes to human rights issues.¹¹⁰ After all the negotiations were still suspended.

3.1.4.3. Accession of Greece

Greece won his democracy back in 1974 and applied for full membership and became a full member on 1981. All this together made the relationship to the EEC

¹⁰⁸ Der Spiegel, **Kollektiver Mief**, Ibid, p.48

¹⁰⁹ Brauns, Ibid.

¹¹⁰ No author, **Mit dem Messer**, Der Spiegel 46/1981, 09.11.1981, pp. 23-25

worse.¹¹¹ From 1980 on Greece would block all financial aid and support from the Community because of reasons related to inner political reasons and the disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus.¹¹²

The Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community started with the membership of Greece and later on Portugal and Spain in 1986, all states that freed themselves from the military dictatorships. This was not positive for Turkey because it fall back in the race with Greece.¹¹³ And after it joined the Community Cyprus declared itself immediately independent and the conflict went on.¹¹⁴

3.1.4.4. Turgut Özal

In 1983 free elections were hold again and the Motherlands Party (ANAP) won with 45% of the votes. Halil Turgut Özal who also was the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economy during the military government was the leader of ANAP and he became the new Prime Minister of Turkey. He tried to find a middle way between being close to the West and maintaining Islamic basic ideas in which he got successful as the inner political situation was stable for the time being. He changed the image of Turkey totally. He wanted to change Turkey's economy by liberalization with or without the EC.

He kept applying the provisions of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol and removed the trade barriers step by step. The most important event in the EC-Turkey relations happened when he applied right away for a full membership without having finished the transition stage on 14 April 1987 that underlined the economic potential of the country. Before the official application Turgut Özal gave an Interview to the weekly Der Spiegel magazine from Germany. Where you can also see

¹¹¹ Ozan, Ibid, pp. 96-97

¹¹² Dietrich Kyaw, **Grenzen der Erweiterung-Die Türkei ist ein Teil des Projekts Europa**, Internationale Politik, Heft3/2003, pp. 47-54

¹¹³ Adrea K. Riemer, **Die Türkei und die Europäische Union. Eine unendliche Geschichte? Politik und Zeitgeschichte** 10/11, 2003, p. 40

¹¹⁴ Claus Leggewie, **Die Türkei in die Europäische Union? Zu den Positionen einer Debatte, Die Türkei und Europa**, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2004, p.12

the possible reaction of the European Community and Germany with his own words as follows.

“There is only one way for us: We have to make an application. According to the Treaties of Rome is such a application of an European country by all means correct. Of course the EC can slow down our application but it can’t reject it. I don’t understand what the member states are afraid of. Sure Germany is frightened of Turkey’s membership the most- because of the many Turkish guest workers. But I told the Germans that we can discuss this problem during the membership negotiations, provided that the Federal Republic supports our application.” T. Özal ¹¹⁵

The Community didn’t answer directly instead it released an opinion but two years later after the official application.¹¹⁶

3.2. Relations from 1988 – 1999

3.2.1. Opinion of the European Commission

The answer that the Community gave Turkey in early 1990 was just an opinion that politely didn’t approved Turkey’s membership yet. The German Press underlined that it won’t be easy for the European Community to deal with this application. Turkey was considered an ally, a friend that was now knocking on the door but the EC countries couldn’t say welcome. There were three main reasons why the EC couldn’t greet Turkey with open arms.

The European states had all financial downs and didn’t know how to stand up again and only the size of the Turkey’s problems was frightening for them. For the first time questions if Turkey was a European state were asked because only European countries could apply for membership. But it was decided fast that the will of Turkey to integrate in the West was the core issue.

¹¹⁵ Kostas Tsatsaronis and Hans Gerhard Stephan, **Wovor haben die Europäer eigentlich Angst?**, Der Spiegel 12/1987, 16.03.1987

¹¹⁶ Ozan, Ibid, p.97

Germany that operated mostly as the interceder of Turkey in the European Community relying on traditional German-Turkish friendship can do this in a limited way now for the interest of the Community. The Community wants Turkey to improve itself in three different areas before it can join the European Community.¹¹⁷

First of all only democracies are tolerated in the European Community this is essential for an area of freedom and rights. And this should be the same for Turkey. As long as human rights are violated, political parties, press and labor unions are adjusted the admission criteria are not met. Only if Turkey that had three military interventions since 1960 can provide democratic circumstances can it fit in the West European frame and if it's guaranteed that there is no Islamic fundamentalism.

The second problem is the bilateral conflict between Turkey and Greece about Cyprus that even almost escalated in a war. It is impossible to think that these two rivals can sit in peace on the same table in Brussels at the moment. So that what the German and French did is also expected from those two countries. It has to come to peace between Turkey and Greece and hate and the readiness for conflict has to end.

The third concern of the European Community is the unripe economy of Turkey. Even in comparison to Portugal which is the poorest of the EC Countries Turkey falls behind. Yet Turkey hasn't even fulfilled the requirements of the Association Agreement the industry is still not ready for the lifting of tariffs. The bad financial situation of the EC wouldn't be able to help out Turkey in this matter. The living conditions would be extremely different in the EC but that is against the standardization of this institution.¹¹⁸

“Progressive completion of the customs union will give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey more closely with the operation of the single market, while taking into account the constraints imposed by the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community. This requires a strengthening of the machinery for agreeing concerted

¹¹⁷ Dieter Buhl, **Heikler Antrag - Die Türkei in die Europäische Gemeinschaft?** Die Zeit, 24 April 1987

¹¹⁸ European Commission, **Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community**, 20 December 1989, (Retrieved from) <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf>

economic and social policies between the Turkish Government and the Community institutions.” European Commission¹¹⁹

Towards the end of the opinion it is stated as you can see in the citation above that the European Community is still willing to complete the customs union by 1995 as agreed in the Association Agreement. And on page three the Commission suggests that the Community should not consider taking new members until 1993 as it would be too much for the EC. ¹²⁰ Turkey kept working towards the Customs Union.

Germany’s attitude towards the Turkey changed from 1990 on and remained almost the same until 2010.

3.2.2. Copenhagen Criteria

In 1993 the European Community became the European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht. The same year the European Union decided upon the Copenhagen Criteria for the future candidate member states that they should also be valid for Turkey. You can take a look at them in 1.1.9. and 1.1.10 again. Turkey pointed out that it already had filed an application years ago and that those criteria couldn’t be valid for Turkey’s accession but the EU didn’t change its mind and so the Maastricht and Copenhagen criteria are both essential for Turkey as well.¹²¹

3.2.3. The Customs Union

On March 6 of 1995 the Çiller government signed the treaty for the Customs Union that came into force a year later on 1 January 1996. Since that day on the European customs legislation is applied to in Turkey that has to adapt and apply this

¹¹⁹ European Commission, Ibid, p.9

¹²⁰ Hale, Ibid, p.131

¹²¹ Center for Applied Policy Research at the LMU (CAP), **Chronologie der EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen**, (Retrieved from) <http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/tuerkei/eu/>

legislation with third countries, too. The Customs Union doesn't foresee any co-determination rights in the Parliament or other institutions.¹²²

Necmettin Erbakan started as Prime Minister on 28 June 1996 and was an Islamic orientated politician. Turkey's relations with Arabic and other Islamic states enlarged during that time. The Turkish Armed Forces didn't welcome this policies at all and began interfering in politics again. After the military's increasing warnings and pressures on the Islamic Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan saw himself forced to resign from his position as Prime Minister.¹²³

3.2.4. Luxembourg Summit

As a reaction to the military pressure the country was suspended from the accession process in the first place. Under this impression the European Council in Luxembourg decided to refuse the candidate member state status for Turkey and accepted eleven other countries. The accession perspective was again confirmed but Turkey was separated from the accession process of the Middle and East European countries. Instead strategies to prepare Turkey for a membership in the European Union were agreed on.¹²⁴

Turkey was very disappointed upon this news and didn't join the Summit of London the year after and the government of Mesut Yılmaz froze the relations to the European Union between his terms of office from 1997 to 1998.¹²⁵ On official statements he underlined that the European Union was building up a cultural Berlin Wall that leaves Turkey outside the Union and the reasons for that are religious differences between the institution and the country.¹²⁶

¹²² CAP, Ibid,

¹²³ Ozan, Ibid, p.97

¹²⁴ Ümit Yazıcıoğlu, **Erwartungen und Probleme hinsichtlich der Integrationsfrage der Türkei in die Europäische Union**, Berlin, Tenea, 2005, p.408

¹²⁵ CAP, Ibid,

¹²⁶ Mütfüler-Bac, Ibid, p.242

But just at the beginning of the year the tone of Germany was quite different the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Roman Herzog stated the following:

“Turkey belongs to Europe! And Germany supports Turkey on its way towards it. We stick hard to the Association Agreement of 1963 and the included accession perspective. This is an integral part of German politics. Europe is not a Christian Club!” (R. Herzog)¹²⁷

Then after the meeting of the Christian Democrat European Party leaders Helmut Kohl known supporting Turkey was stamped as the political enemy from Bonn in the Turkish media.¹²⁸ Because Helmut Kohl and other Christian Democrat Party leaders all over the EU countries remarked on 4 March 1997 that Turkey isn't regarded as a candidate for a European Union membership but a strong cooperation is welcome. Also it was pointed out that the civilization of Turkey is not the same as in Europe and the design of Europe was built upon a certain civilization in that Turkey has no place.¹²⁹ Kohl also notes that the Union is built upon Christian principles and isn't able to incorporate states that don't agree with this opinion.¹³⁰

But because the Federal Republic ruffled to join Turkey in the European Union it got problems with the United States. The USA even threatened publicly via foreign minister Madelaine Albright to pave the way for Turkey's membership. And a short time later the Carey Cavanaugh the Cyprus Commissioner of the US government declared his worries how the European Union handles with Turkey.¹³¹

3.2.5. Helsinki Summit

1999 changed the relations between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey because Turkey was granted the candidate member state status in Helsinki that was longed for years. But the date for the start of the negotiations was not set.¹³²

¹²⁷ Theo Sommer, **Europa ist kein Christen-Club**, Die Zeit, 12/1997 14 March 1997

¹²⁸ Der Spiegel, **Wurst vor der Nase**, 13/1997, 24.03.1997

¹²⁹ Tolga Karayel, **Historical Evolutions of Turkey in the Scope of European Union Process:1959-2011**, Finland, University of Torku,

¹³⁰ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, **The never ending story: Turkey and the European Union**, Middle Eastern Studies, London, Routledge, 1998, p.240

¹³¹ Der Spiegel, **Wurst vor der Nase**, Ibid,

¹³² Ozan, Ibid, p.97

It is said that the new red-green Federal government made this change possible after Helmut Kohl's refuse to grant the candidate status to Turkey last but not least because of the CDU's pressure on him in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. Gerhard Schröder the new Chancellor made quite positive statements about Turkey on 3 December 1999 in his government declaration before the Helsinki Summit that was held on 10 – 11 December 1999. He underlined that Europe can't keep stressing the strategic importance of Turkey for Europa again and again and attribute her as a regional power and expect European standards from it, if we on the other hand are not ready to give her a clear European perspective that goes far beyond the Customs Union. The Federal Republic therefore with emphasis stands up for giving the Republic of Turkey the candidate member state status he adds and in the end even notes determined that Germany wants to have a European Turkey.

But also Gerhard Schröder clarified that the status is no blank check for the membership in the European Union and that Turkey is obliged to fulfill the political criteria like other candidate states in order to begin the membership process. Those criteria are the protection of human rights, respect and protection of minorities, a stable state order that is based on the law.

The decision in Helsinki had the exact same tone. In his government declaration on 16 December 1999 Schröder once again referred to Turkey and the EU. He mentioned how important it is for the people living in Germany that are of Turkish origin to possibly hope the land of their fathers is going to be a democratic part of Europe and that another rejection of Turkey would rise a bad crisis in the relations with Ankara as before and Germany doesn't has any interest in such a situation.

Schröder also feels the urge to explain why the policy is different from the previous German attitude. He sums up that his government doesn't regard the European Union as a Christian Club of the Western world but as a union of values that is based upon respect for law, democracy, tolerance, humanity and solidarity. And a Turkey that not only espouses itself to these principles but also applies them would be welcome as a member of the European Union. Schröder also didn't miss the opportunity to attack the opposition party consisting of Christian democrats that rejected the Turkey-decision.

But the concern of the opposition parties was not only a cultural or religious one. Wolfgang Schäuble the CDU/CSU floor leader wanted to know where the end of Europe starts and where the borderlines should be. And with what arguments e.g. in the future Europe could reject the membership of a democratic Russia if it were granted to Turkey? Another problem is the population of the Republic of Turkey that was 57 million large back around 1999 and would grant Turkey many seats in the European institutions which describes a really problematic perspective for the functioning and progress of the European Union in the eyes of the oppositional parties in the Federal Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany.¹³³

3.3. Relations from 2000 – 2015

3.3.1. Relations under Gerhard Schröder

On 7 December 2000 Turkey signed the Partnership for the Accession with the European Union. For the first time since 1963 the true perspective towards a membership was given. Also the membership in the Customs Union that improved the Turkish economy was another good point that brought the idea of becoming a European Union member state much closer.¹³⁴

After elections in Turkey the AKP the party for Justice and Development run the government and changed the laws in Turkey almost from the roots. E.g. the death penalty was abolished, equality was improved, international laws were superior to national law such as the European Convention on Human Rights or the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and broadcasting in traditional languages and dialects was allowed from now on. But in the progress report of 2002 these changes are not yet enough to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria because according to the Commission of the

¹³³ Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, **Deutsche Leadership in der Europäischen Union? Die Europapolitik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung 1998-2002**, *Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder*, Opladen, Leske-Budrich, 2002, pp. 187-189

¹³⁴ **Accession Partnership with Turkey**, <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/140403.pdf> 14 April 2003 Council of the EU, State Planning Organisation

European Union there were still deficiencies in areas like freedom of expression, freedom of association, civil control over the military, prevention of torture and maltreatments.¹³⁵

But after several other law changes and reforms the Commission stated in its opinion from 6 October 2004 that the accession negotiations could start finally because Turkey has almost fulfilled its political reforms that were required to meet the criteria of Copenhagen. In general the outcomes of the Helsinki Summit were reaffirmed.¹³⁶

The high potential of a positive answer of the European Union led to disputes in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as well as in the Federal Parliament. The debates in the TGNA were held on 7 October 2004 and the German one on 28 October 2004 both before the EU Summit that would possibly take a positive decision about the accession.

There is no point to look closer at the Turkish debates as the thesis is focused on Germany's policies towards the accession. So about that the opposition fraction of CDU/CSU tries to weaken the arguments of the German government. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Josef Fischer are for the full membership of Turkey which they mentioned on various occasions before as well also on international level. The opposition wants a believable deal of the European Union for the Republic of Turkey and request the government to vote against the accession at the voting of the Council.¹³⁷

At the end Germany supports Turkey and the European Council decides to start the accession negotiations with the Republic of Turkey a year later on 3.10.2005.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ **2002 REGULAR REPORT ON TURKEY'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION**, Brussels, 9.10.2002, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf

¹³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, **Turkey-EU Relations**, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹³⁷ Ozan, *Ibid*, pp.97-99

¹³⁸ Mette Buskjaer Christensen, **EU-Turkey relations and the functioning of the EU**, Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2009

3.3.2. Relations under Angela Merkel

In the autumn of 2005 Angela Merkel's CDU won the early elections and she became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. Her views and opinions about Turkey are already known from her oppositional speeches and statements in the Federal Parliament during the Gerhard Schröder government or in the European Parliament. As you can guess it's not a really welcoming one. Already in 2004 she declared in the meeting of the European People's Party (EPP) that it was wrong to give Turkey false promises for the last 40 years while it is obvious that a full membership won't happen at all.¹³⁹

After that the President of the European People's Party Mr. Wilfried Martens declared that he was for a special relationship with Turkey and on other occasions during his career he mentioned more than once that Turkey is no part of Europe and never will be.¹⁴⁰

Merkel didn't hesitate to suggest her idea of a privileged partnership to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan herself during her first visit in February 2004. She again remarked that the European Union is not a club of Christians and nobody wants to shut the doors of the EU but at the same time she refuses the start of the accession process and prefers a privileged partnership. Erdoğan turned down this privileged partnership and said that this will never be in the agenda of Turkey.¹⁴¹

Despite Angela Merkel's opinions the negotiations with Turkey started as decided on 3 October 2005 alongside with Croatia and the screening process began. Now Turkey had to adopt the *acquis communautaire*.

In 2006 another crisis happened as Turkey didn't apply the final act of the Ankara Agreement relating to Cyprus and the Council decided to freeze eight

¹³⁹ Kâşif Kaya, **Die kalten 20 Jahre in den deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen nach dem Zerfall des Ostblocks (1990–2010)**, Wien, 2012, p.140

¹⁴⁰ The Economist, "Turkey and Europe. Just Not Our Sort" March 15, 1997; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, **Ankara besteht auf der Perspektive eines EU-Beitritts EVP-Vertreter schließen Mitgliedschaft der Türkei mittel- und langfristig aus**, Politik Ressort, p.1, 05.03.1997

¹⁴¹ Hürriyet, Erdoğan: **İmtiyazlı ortaklık asla olamaz**, 17.02.2004, (Retrieved from) <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/02/17/414333.asp>

important chapters and not to close chapters temporary. In March 2007 new chapters were opened in February a year later the Accession Partnership document was updated and adopted. In 2010 the accession negotiations could make progress even if only rather slowly. The number of open chapters by the year 2010 was only thirteen.¹⁴²

At the same time Europe faced an economic crisis and the financial situation in states like Greece, Ireland and Portugal got worse. As those countries couldn't pay back their debts to the German banks, Germany was directly affected from this circumstances.¹⁴³ Turkey's economy stand stable during this crisis in fact it was actually booming. The dominance of Germany is weaker now because of the economic crisis that results in lowering of tension and more cooperation between Germany and Turkey.¹⁴⁴

3.3.3. Relations after 2010

Turkey's policy changed with a new foreign policy strategy of the political scientist Ahmet Davutoğlu who was the consultant of Erdogan from 2003 – 2009 then Minister of Foreign affairs and since 2015 he is the Prime Minister of Turkey. He had a specific strategy called strategical depth that considers to broaden the one dimensional foreign policy of Turkey to a multidimensional one so that Turkey becomes an indispensable actor in regional and international politics as well as to establish Turkey as a trade and energy centrum. Turkey's impact in the area grew remarkably.¹⁴⁵

In this framework Turkey's relations got much better to Syria and Greece and the other neighboring countries. Well but today in 2015 the relations to Syria are almost at zero. Also the relations to Russia grew bigger day by day as common energy politics and projects were started. The German-Russian relations were at its best, too.

¹⁴² Kaya, Ibid, p. 145

¹⁴³ Landeszentrale f. Politische Bildung B.W. (LPB), **Die Euro Krise**, https://www.lpb-bw.de/euro_krise.html

¹⁴⁴ Kaya, Ibid, p.156

¹⁴⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, **Stratejik Derinlik**, İstanbul, Küre, 2011

So that the relations between Turkey and Germany got better as well, but not only because of Russia. The Iranian relations were also improved and Turkey concentrated really on its economy. If we take a look at the Balkans you can see an active Turkey here, too. Turkey even took the mediating role in the conflict between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia successfully.¹⁴⁶

Turkey still wants to work close with the European Union but not as much as in the years before as a member of the European Union. Turkey doesn't need the EU because it is stronger now thinks a huge part of the Turkish citizens according to public surveys.¹⁴⁷

The relations with the European Union improved immense with the Constitutional Reform in 2010 via referendum that was accepted by 58% of the votes. It changed 26 points of the Turkish Constitution. An important change is the introduction of the Individual application to the Constitutional Court that gives citizens the opportunity to secure human rights and freedoms.

By 2010 Turkey is an important trade partner of Germany so the political relations had to be better in this matter. Angela Merkel's visit in March 2010 marks the turning point of the Turkish German relations. Merkel gave Erdogan a present from a little girl that she met at the weekend in Germany. It was a handmade white clay pigeon and became the symbol towards good relations of the two countries.

Merkel admits during her visit that she now understands, that the privileged partnership has no good connotation or vibe in Turkey. About Turkey's accession she also added that she knew that the EU Accession is a big thing in Turkey, and that the full membership was rather handled controversial the last time she visited the Republic of Turkey. But now she is sure that despite some differences it would be better to think pragmatically. And that would mean to continue the negotiation process.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Kaya, Ibid, p.147-153

¹⁴⁷ Nebahat Koç, **Anket sonucu: AB'ye ihtiyacımız yok**, Haber 7, 11 Şubat 2011 (Retrieved from) <http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/707807-anket-sonucu-abye-ihtiyacimiz-yok>

¹⁴⁸ Robin Alexander, **Merkel hat eine Friedenstaube für Erdogan dabei**, Die Welt, 29.03.2010

Gerhard Schröder the then former Chancellor welcomed the change of mind of Chancellor Angela Merkel and wished that the term privileged partnership would vanish completely from political debates. The foreign affairs politician of the SPD party group Johannes Kahrs commented that the Chancellor was called back from the German economy and industry. The German companies like ThyssenKrupp, Telekom Rheinmetall or other ones that advertise in Turkey for their products showed her that serious atmospheric disturbances can become expensive very fast, the board members of the aforementioned companies accompanied Merkel during her visit. So she was influenced by them.

Again towards the end of the visit Merkel said that Germany and Turkey have to do a lot more and the future is open. Turkey and Germany have a lot in common and especially in the economy will she work more. ¹⁴⁹

Another surprising change came from Ruprecht Polenz a MP from the CDU, who released a book about the accession of Turkey that Turkey is a part of Europe and really important to strengthen the Union. He remarks that how Europe will survive next to the giants China, India or North America and that the economic potential and energy bridge function of Turkey between Europe and Central Asia or the Middle East is of utmost importance strategically. Yet Europe has to realize that looking from the outside it is seen as an old, shrinking and a not dynamic continent which could change with the membership of Turkey. ¹⁵⁰

Also you can see a positive move towards the religion conflict and that on the part of the CDU:

“Despite that we would show the world that Europe doesn’t want a battle of cultures and that our imagination of the rule of law and human rights is also compatible with the Islam.” (R.Polenz)¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Robin Alexander, **Kanzlerin Merkel zielt aufs deutsche Publikum**, Die Welt, 30.03.2010

¹⁵⁰ Kaya, Ibid, pp.170-168

¹⁵¹ Oliver Hoischen, **Unsere Werte sind mit dem Islam kompatibel**, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.05.2010

Also optimistic are the statements of the Federal President Christian Wulff who even mentions that the Islam is a part of the German reality.

3.3.4. Latest Relations

The Screening process is still ongoing now in 2015 but really slow in comparison to e.g. Croatia who already is a member state now but began the process at the same time with Turkey.

The positive tone of 2010 is long gone. There were no special events in the Turkey – EU Relations in the last time. In the 2014 elections the CDU took its old course and stated that it is against a full membership of Turkey because the European Union won't be able to digest Turkey as it is facing major economic crises in the last years. Other reasons for the negative tone are is the political situation in Turkey. The freedom of expression and press is in need of improvement they allege and that the membership criteria aren't met by Turkey.¹⁵²

As a whole the world politics is concerned about the Islamic State threat in the Middle East and recently the refugee problem holds the European Union really busy as the people from the Middle East and especially from Syria try to flee to Europe in masses.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, **CDU will EU-Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei verhindern**, 03.02.2014

¹⁵³ Patrick Kingsley, **10 truths about Europe's migrant crisis**, The Guardian, 10.08.2015

CONCLUSION

At the very beginning the Federal Republic of Germany supports the accession of the Republic of Turkey to the European Economic Community and there is no question if Turkey is European or not. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard supports a free and equal Europe.

During a visit in the USA Hallstein mentions to John F. Kennedy that he wants to see his NATO partner Turkey as cemented in the European Organization.

The first military intervention has no negative effect for a long time. Germany even supports Turkey. The Wirtschaftswunder is happening and Germany is in need of labor. Turkey is financially supported. The cold war situation demands Turkey's integration into Europe and therefore the USA is supporting Turkey. That policy has to be adopted by Germany as well because as it is still weak on military level it is depending on the USA and follows his foreign policy to be at the same side in case of any conflicts.

Konrad Adenauer supports Turkey again mostly under American influence. While telling the US the European countries that could be relied on he mentions Turkey among those European ones.

After the military intervention the communication was off and with Germany's efforts, again because of reasons mentioned above, the Accession Agreement was signed in Ankara. Walter Hallstein held his famous speech that underlines that Turkey is a part of Europe.

Because of Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic policies the second military intervention happened and the European dialogue came into stagnation but continued again with the additional protocol but the relations were not much filled with life.

The oil crisis, the growing number of immigrants and the Cyprus issue formed a tense atmosphere and the process was slowed down. Germany decided to take labor only from European States from now on. That caused the first conflict with Turkey as it regarded itself as betrayed. Germany's policy change was based on financial grounds. But the politicians for example Chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Willi

Brandt were officially still for a membership of Turkey. But many accuse them of hiding behind the veto of Greece and not telling their real thoughts about Turkey's Europe Accession.

After the third military intervention Germany supports the politics of the military and this time Europe keeps the process continuing. Turkey is even able to threaten Germany that it will become more Islamic or communist if they don't support Turkey with financial aid. Germany gave in again because it doesn't want to set up the USA. Foreign Minister Genscher visits Turkey in the name of the European Community and after his visit the EC decides to suspend the negotiations because violation of rights and freedoms are immense.

In the Turgut Özal era Turkey files an application for a membership before finishing the foreseen steps and gets back an answer two years later. The negative opinion is also supported by Germany. The cultural differences are starting to play a role in the relations, Germany is busy with the reunification and achieves more power. A stronger Germany doesn't have to follow the steps of the USA as much as before.

From now on the relations got worse with the Christian Democrats in charge of the Federal Parliament Helmut Kohl's ideas are coming into force. He underlines that Europe is based on Christian principles. The Wirtschaftswunder is over and with the reunification Germany has increased costs and higher unemployment rates so it isn't into supporting Turkey financially or having more and more migrants. The European Organization's policies are in the same way.

Then again with the change to social politics under Gerhard Schröder, guess what the tone of Europe changed in parallel. The relations were really good as you can look up again above. The reason for his policy are described as trying to reach out to the Turkish origin grass root level.

Then the big turn came with the Angela Merkel Chancellorship in 2005. You can divide her policy in three: In the first period she is against a membership as in her oppositional days and even advocates a privileged partnership again based on various cultural and economic reasons. After the Eastern Enlargement Europe is exhausted as well. Then with financial crises the membership is seen as a burden and the population

of Turkey is a fear factor regarding the voting system in the European Union institutions.

Then with Turkey's major reforms and economic boom Merkel admits to have made mistakes and being pragmatic by continuing the membership process would be the best. And the screening process continued and is still not over now.

If we look at the situation now in 2014 during the German elections it is stated that the CDU doesn't want a full membership of Turkey and prefers a privileged partnership because of the latest incidents on political and economic level in Turkey that is going down the hill.

If Turkey wants to be effective in the European Union it has to first compromise with Europe, as you can see that Germany's Turkey – EU policy is directly influencing the Union's policy you can see that with blind eyes by comparing the Luxembourg and Helsinki EC Summits.

But in general according to the full membership a no would be better than a yes that actually means no already. An honest no could lead to a special constructive Partnership.¹⁵⁴ That would maybe be better than waiting for years at the doors of the European Union for the sake of old given promises.

As a result one can see that often rational thoughts win over political relations and that the balance between geopolitical, economic and political conjuncture influenced the changes in the German policy towards Turkey's Accession to the European Union.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Hasan Ünal, **Turkey would be better off outside the EU**, Financial Times, 17.12.2014

¹⁵⁵ Kaya, Ibid, p.172

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ANTI-PLAGIARISM REPORT

Turnitin Orijinallik Raporu

Tez Müslime İlhan tarafından

ÖDEV 2 (SBE TEZ 1) den

20-Oca-2016 14:21 EET' de işleme konu

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