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HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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# HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A Master's Thesis

by

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Ankara

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*To my parents*

HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
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by

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## **ABSTRACT**

# **HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

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The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, once viewed as a successful example of peaceful, multi-ethnic state, turned into a site of devastating wars in the early-1990s. Among these wars that resulted in the country's painful disintegration, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended mainly with international mediation. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 ended armed clashes. The Dayton Agreement, at the same time, provided the blueprint for establishing new sets of political and administrative structures as the basis of building the social conditions of durable peace. Preserving and enhancing the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted a significant aspect of the construction of the new structures envisioned in the Dayton Agreement. The emerging political order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to some peacebuilding scholars, represents a hybrid structure where internationally introduced liberal democratic institutions, norms and practices are combined with existing traditional structures. In

this thesis, I examine the roots of this hybrid political order in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina from the perspective of the “local turn in peacebuilding” scholarship that is premised on the ‘hybridity’ approach. I investigate the current conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and hybridity patterns in the current political and societal order. Then, I investigate the periods in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. I study the similarities of both historical periods with the current conditions. Thus, in this thesis, I tried to investigate the continuities in different historical periods of time and found that hybrid patterns in current conditions have their roots in the past, namely in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods.

**Keywords:** Bosnia and Herzegovina, hybridity, the local turn in peacebuilding, Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire

# ÖZET

## HİBRİT SİYASİ DÜZENLER: BOSNA HERSEK ÖRNEĞİ

Çobanoğlu, Ecenaz

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bir zamanlar çok etnik yapılı, barışçıl bir devlet örneği sunan Yugoslavya Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti, 1990'ların başında yıkıcı bir savaşa sahne olmuştur. Federasyonun zorlu dağılma süreciyle sonuçlanan bu savaşlar arasında Bosna-Hersek'teki çoğunlukla uluslararası arabuluculuk faaliyetleri ile nihayete ermiştir. 1995 yılında imzalanan Dayton Barış Antlaşması, silahlı çatışmaları sona erdirmiştir. Dayton Barış Antlaşması aynı zamanda ülkede devamlı barışa dayalı sosyal koşulların oluşması için yeni siyasi ve idari yapıların da temel çerçevesini sunmuştur. Bosna-Hersek'teki çok etnik yapılı, çok dinli ve çok kültürlü yapıları korunması ve desteklenmesi, Dayton Antlaşması'nda öngörülen yeni yapıların önemli bir unsuru haline gelmiştir. Barış inşası üzerine çalışan kimi akademisyenlere göre, Bosna-Hersek'te ortaya çıkan bu siyasi yapı uluslararası camia tarafından tanıtılan liberal demokratik kurumlar, normlar ve uygulamaların mevcut geleneksel yapılar ile kombine, hibrit bir yapı ortaya koymaktadır. Bu tezde, Dayton sonrası Bosna-Hersek'te mevcut hibrit siyasi düzenin köklerini “melezlik” yaklaşımı üzerinde temellenen “barış inşasında yerele dönüş” perspektifinden incelemektedirim. Bosna-

Hersek'teki güncel koşulları ve günümüz siyasi ve sosyal düzenlerindeki hibrit unsurları değerlendirmekteyim. Daha sonra, Bosna-Hersek'in Osmanlı ve Avusturya-Macaristan dönemlerindeki durumunu arařtırmaktayım. Mevcut koşullar ve bahsi geçen iki tarihi dönem arasındaki benzerlikleri incelemekteyim. Böylece, bu tezde farklı tarihi dönemler arasındaki devamlılıklar incelenmeye çalışılmış, bu güncel hibrit unsurların köklerinin özellikle Osmanlı ve Avusturya-Macaristan dönemlerinde bulunduğu sonucuna erişilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Bosna-Hersek, melezlik, barış inşasında yerele dönüş, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1. Research Setting - What is Peacebuilding and Statebuilding?

Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the most commonly examined cases in the study of contemporary peacebuilding interventions in conflict-affected states or regions that are conducted with the efforts of international agencies. The objectives of international agencies while conducting these peace interventions are based on their wish to establish a long-lasting, sustainable state system or government in conflict-affected regions (Paris, 1997, p. 55). “Peacebuilding” has provided the guiding policy framework in these efforts which sought to eradicate the “root causes of a conflict with a view to establishing a sustainable peace” (Chetail, 2009, p. 1). It aims at managing existing conflicts and preventing future ones, and it covers all kinds of activities including economic, political and social ones that aim reconstruction, development and democratization in the post-conflict society and state (Fjelde & Höglund, 2011, p. 13; Paffenholz, 2010, pp. 49–50). The term has its origins in Johan Galtung’s writings (Galtung, 1976). It was incorporated into the international policy guidelines through the “Agenda for Peace” prepared under the leadership of former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 in the immediate post-Cold War era (Chetail, 2009, p. 2; Paffenholz, 2010, p. 46; Sabaratnam, 2011, p. 1; United Nations General Assembly, 1992).

Peacebuilding is often performed through state building, such as the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International actors aim to reconstruct systems in post-conflict regions or societies through “state building”, which Chandler discusses as a “vital package of policy measures to prevent these post-conflict states from sliding into

economic and political collapse”, as the “Agenda for Peace” also points out preventive measures for future conflicts such as the introduction of new institutions and capacity development to prevent the recurrence of future conflicts (Chandler, 2010, p. 1; Paffenholz, 2010, p. 46). As Paffenholz discusses, peacebuilding is nowadays seen as equated with state building (i.e., construction and capacity development of government institutions) since peacebuilding measures have centred is on the establishment of security, democratic political structures and economic reforms which together constitute the characteristics of a “state” (Paffenholz, 2010, p. 47). Through building liberal democratic states (by creating liberal, democratic government instruments and institutions), international actors, from this perspective, aimed to prevent any similar conflict in the future and create self-sustaining, peaceful socio-political orders in post-conflict societies. Development, in other words, was associated with peace and security (Chetail, 2009, p. 6). The case of “peacebuilding through statebuilding” is discussed in the Chapter 2.

## **2. Peacebuilding through Statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “peacebuilding laboratory” has been among the most discussed cases in international relations, peacebuilding, and international intervention literature since the region received international assistance in post-war reconstruction process. The region has always been a place where different societal structures were together, and it had always been on a frontier of the “west” (i.e., during the Ottoman rule, Austro-Hungarian rule, or period under Yugoslavia). Therefore, this distinct character of the region had an impact on the policies throughout different periods. Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until the latter’s disintegration began in the 1990s. It

was consisted of peoples from three religious groups (i.e. Orthodox Christianity, Catholic Christianity and Islam), which also defined themselves as distinct ethnic groups based on their religion (i.e. Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims) (Burg & Shoup, 2000, pp. 4–5; Friedman, 2018, p. 183). The mixed societal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus an important factor for the war during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which is discussed in following parts of this thesis. Therefore, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early-1990s has had many different dimensions, such as social, political, ethnic, and religious ones.

During and after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1990s, all the international interventions and peacebuilding efforts to solve the conflicts and prevent future problems were based on the reconciliation between these ethnic groups which were parts of this complicated societal structure in the region.

Therefore, peacebuilding policies and interventions in the region had to be multi-dimensional, as well.

The most concrete outcome of the international efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide peace and stability after the disintegration is the “Dayton Agreement” which was signed in 1995. The Agreement was based on the ethnic, religious and societal conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it had to include these aforementioned societal conditions (i.e., the ethnic and religious conditions). For example, the new political structure was planned to include these three “constituent” ethnic groups (i.e., Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims) (Banović et al., 2021, p. 4).

As one of the core reasons of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, secessionist movements based on an aim of independence, were tried to be mitigated. However, the peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina presented uneven, mixed outcomes, again, due to these societal circumstances.

The problems with the implementation of the post-Dayton procedures, the lack of effectiveness of the newly established government structures and the reflections of the societal complexities in the decision-making procedures presented uneven outcomes of the peacebuilding policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The multifaceted, long-term and complex nature of peacebuilding indicates the necessity of a multi-dimensional, multi-sectoral, multi-levelled and multi-staged peacebuilding process (i.e., the levels, time and the extent of the involvement of the international community) (Chetail, 2009, p. 8). The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990s demonstrated a similar case. As the necessity of including the “local” conditions in many levels and dimensions of peacebuilding processes is very important, the civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina also contributed to the peacebuilding process (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010, p. 129; Paffenholz, 2010, p. 59). They have taken part in post-conflict mediation and civic initiatives which supported the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina alongside with international actors such as the NATO, the EU, the UN, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010, p. 129).

The mixed political background in the region, the existence of the local and international actors in post-conflict reconstruction and the complicated characteristics of the society were all important elements of the peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, a “hybrid” approach towards the peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina that included every dynamic was necessary to understand these uneven, mixed conditions. Even after years of signing the Dayton Agreement, there are still discussions about the extent to which the Agreement succeeded to solve. Some of the recent studies that focus on the aftermath and evaluation of the Dayton Agreement still point out the deficiencies and problems deriving from the

conditions created by it. For example, a study points out the continuing ethnic tensions after fifteen years from the signing of the Agreement (Aggestam & Björkdahl, 2011, p. 37). Another study suggests that the political system established with the Dayton Agreement is creating political stalemates, and is deepening ethnic divisions even after twenty years from the signing of the agreement (Kartsonaki, 2016, p. 499). And one study argues that the Dayton Agreement creates political deadlocks and difficulties which are obstacles to Bosnia and Herzegovina during its Euro-Atlantic integration process, even twenty five after the agreement was signed (Fazlić, 2020, p. 166). In short, some fundamental problems are being experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to Dayton Agreement falling short of grasping the local conditions, and there is the need to consider both the international and the local aspects of the reconstruction, development and integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Uneven results and the mixed outcomes of the post-Dayton process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed in the parts below.

### **3. Historical Background**

#### ***3.1. Disintegration of Yugoslavia***

Yugoslavia was a country that was formed after the end of World War I in 1918 with the name “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”. The name was changed to “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929. Then, following the end of World War II in 1945, the state was renamed as “Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia”, and in 1963, as “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 141). For more than seven decades, the country had existed in the south-eastern frontier of Europe with six constituent states, namely Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro today. Kosovo was not then defined as a constituent state of the Federation, but today, it is the seventh country that has been a part of Yugoslavia. Following the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, all Yugoslav republics experienced war (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 142).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia began with the war Slovenia in 1991 (Paris, 2004, p. 97). All European Community members recognized the independence of Slovenia in early-1992, and the country became a part of the United Nations in mid-1992. This war in Slovenia was the least bloody and the shortest war among the set of wars that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Macedonia also declared independence in late-1991, and began to be recognized immediately, firstly by Bulgaria in 1992 (Mandaci, 2014, p. 243). In Croatia, the Croatian War of Independence began in 1991 and ended in 1995. Even if the war officially ended in 1995, states such as Germany, Italy, and Sweden recognized Croatia's independent status right after it declared independence in late 1991, and the country was recognized by the United Nations in 1992 (Arman & Arman, 2014, p. 224). In 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to monitor the cease-fire conditions in Croatia, which was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Katayanagi, 2002, p. 185; Paris, 2004, p. 97; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2003, p. 62). The disintegration of the rest of Yugoslavia continued until the secession of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006 and the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 (Ağır, 2014, pp. 292–293; Durakovic, 2014, p. 170). Each of these cases are distinct on their own and would be out of scope of this study which specifically focuses on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### ***3.2. The Specific Case of the Disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia and the Dayton Agreement***

Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a part of Yugoslavia, declared sovereignty in 1991 (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 71; Sitkowski, 2006, p. 128). Following this declaration, a referendum was held for independence in 1992, and Bosnian Muslims (which consist of 44% of the population) and Bosnian Croats (which consist of 17% of the population) voted for independence from Yugoslavia, whereas the Bosnian Serbs (31% of the population) boycotted the referendum since they were against the independence (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 74; Paris, 2004, pp. 97–98). Paramilitary forces from each ethnic group soon began to fight, and later, conflicts grew to a civil war. Attacks from the Yugoslav National Army controlled by Serb forces began right after, and the armed conflict continued until 1995 (Paris, 2004, p. 98). In 1992, the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an extension of the UNPROFOR forces in Croatia. However, the peacekeeping efforts could not prevent massacres such as the one in Srebrenica that took thousands of people's lives (Paris, 2004, p. 98; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2003, p. 62).

In 1995, “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, also known as “Dayton Agreement”, was signed as a result of the mediation between Serb, Croat, and Bosnian parties of the conflict (Aggestam & Björkdahl, 2011, p. 28; Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 143). It was signed with the help of the international community, especially with the mediation of the United States of America, since it was highly encouraging Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout its independence declaration process in 1992 (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 361; Chandler, 2000, p. 42; Paris, 2004, p. 99). As other parties of the Agreement, Serbia was facing the risk of

international sanctions, and Bosnian Croats were acting according to their connections with Zagreb, and Croatia's integration with Europe (Chandler, 2000, p. 43). The Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, and it concluded the war between Bosnian Croat, Serb, and Bosnian parties.

### **3.3. *Outcomes of the Dayton Agreement***

Dayton Agreement framed the conditions at which the war was to be concluded and designed the political structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina after its independence. Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement was also the constitution of this newly established country. Two entities named Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), which consisted of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and Republika Srpska, which consisted of Bosnian Serbs, were established (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 367; Chandler, 2000, p. 16). Each entity was to have its own democratically functioning political system (Paris, 2004, p. 99). Multiparty elections were introduced, a pan-Bosnian parliament was established, and division of powers between entity-level and national government structures was designated (Paris, 1997, p. 72, 2004, p. 99). A three-member Presidency Council was established and one Bosnian Muslim, one Bosnian Serb and one Bosnian Croat member of the council were designed to serve as the president in turns, and each member had the right to veto a decision, thus had the ability to stop any political procedure if they wished (Chandler, 2000, pp. 67–68). Additionally, parliaments and ministries at the national and entity levels were established (Chandler, 2000, pp. 68–75). Additionally, international experts were appointed to the newly-constituted institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Belloni, 2012, p. 26). The Agreement established institutional mechanisms to include

decisions of all ethnic parties in Bosnia in decision-making processes (Paris, 1997, p. 84).

As another important part of the Bosnian politics, “The Office of High Representative” was established in Bonn in 1997, and “the High Representative” was going to be elected by the “Peace Implementation Council” that consisted of major international powers at the time, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia (Belloni & Hemmer, 2010, p. 133; Chandler, 2017, p. 109; Keskin & Aydın, 2014, p. 190). The purpose of the Office of the High Representative was to investigate the functioning and sustainability of the internationally brokered peace conditions in the post-war politics, and they had extensive decision-making capabilities, including removing entity presidents from power, just as in the case in 1999 with the High Representative Carlos Westendorp and the Republika Srpska president Nikola Poplašen (Keskin & Aydın, 2014, p. 190; Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 143).

In the annexes of the Dayton Agreement, each area of action and the international institution that was responsible for the implementation of related policies were specified (Chandler, 2000, p. 44). For example, the responsible institutions for military and inter-entity boundary matters were NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), for regional stabilization matters, was the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), for the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for refugees and displaced persons, was the European Court of Human Rights, and for the Commission to Preserve National Monument, was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Chandler, 2000, p. 45). Some authors discuss that the whole Dayton process is based on externally

decided and imposed political strategies (Chandler, 2000, p. 36; Hameiri, 2011, p. 196).

Even if there were extensive efforts to build a sustainable, democratic order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the outcomes of these efforts were mixed. Complicated results of the post-Dayton political structure lie in the ethnically, politically, and historically complicated conditions in the region. This new post-Dayton order was not built on a fresh start, and the ethnic-based parties still existed. Even after two decades, the implementation of post-Dayton conditions is still in question today, about whether the agreement mitigated all the core reasons of the war between 1991-1992 or not. However, this thesis does not try to discuss the failures or successes of the Dayton Agreement, but to investigate the conditions in the past which affected the creation and implementation of Dayton Agreement. The societal, political, and administrative foundations in Bosnia and Herzegovina today have hybrid patterns that consist of mutually accommodated “local” and “external” dynamics, and this thesis argues that these patterns can be traced back to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods in the region. For this investigation, the conditions after the Dayton Agreement and the perspectives on the outcomes of this agreement should be discussed first.

#### **4. Literature Review**

The disintegration of Yugoslavia, Bosnian War, and international efforts to mitigate the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been extensively studied in the literature. The involvement of the European Union, The United States of America, and The United Nations in the process in Bosnia and Herzegovina also have a substantial place the literature. Having been discussed in different perspectives,

discussions about hybridity and the local turn in peacebuilding make up a significant part of the studies on this subject (Belloni, 2007, 2012; Chandler, 2000, 2017; Jarstad & Belloni, 2012; Kappler & Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, 2016; Paris, 2002, 2004). The “liberal” conditions introduced by the international actors and the existing “illiberal” practices within Bosnia were examined in the literature. Additionally, the literature discusses the blended, hybrid outcomes of interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dayton Agreement was aiming to transform Bosnia and Herzegovina into a liberal, democratic state in which further ethnic conflicts or secessionist claims would be mitigated. The preamble of the Bosnian constitution addressed these concerns clearly with the statement “democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society” (Paris, 2004, p. 99). In the post-Dayton reconstruction process, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The United Nations, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) promoted “the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (Paris, 1997, p. 62). In order to introduce a liberal, democratic, functioning state structure, the most common practices in the peacebuilding literature include the introduction of democratic election systems, rapid liberalization and transformation of political and societal structures, or establishment of new government institutions that would support the permanence of the liberal conditions (Chetail, 2009, p. 1; Fjelde & Höglund, 2011, p. 13; Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 20–28; Paffenholz, 2010, pp. 49–50). Consequently, the international organizations that took part in the post-war reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina promoted market democracy, which would bring economic sustainability, introduced elections, and established a new government system that is based on democracy (Paris, 1997, p. 62,

2004, p. 99). However, peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended up in mixed, blended results and there have been many inconsistencies.

Mac Ginty suggests that the post-Dayton structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not built on fresh foundations, so that the new establishments were in a hybrid nature that reflected past experiences, boundaries, norms, demography, and such (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 134–135). The most important cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the complicated governance structure, the existence of three constituent nations that are represented in the political arena in proportion to their population, and the presence of “supra-national” actors in the government (namely the High Representative). As one of the immediate examples for the post-Dayton complications in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mac Ginty discusses the local resistance to international peace interventions and efforts, non-engagement with the institutions and structures that the Dayton Agreement introduced, and remnants of nationalist and socialist legacies (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 155–156). The structure of new political and administrative institutions that consist of numerous levels of political representation at canton, entity, and republic levels and the decision-making procedures make political deadlocks possible. Public response to these complicated structures is another factor that makes this case more difficult, as discussed by Mac Ginty.

A group of authors argue that the “internationally guaranteed” political systems that are introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the “macro”, “top down” approach towards the reconstruction of the state raise questions about the extent to which these efforts are “truly hybrid” and consist of the “local” as well. They discuss that the extensive role of the international community might diminish the amount that the “local” takes part in reconstruction (Kostić, 2011, p. 106; Mac Ginty & Richmond,

2016, p. 233). Kappler and Richmond, similarly, argue that the role of the European Union in the reconstruction efforts fell short of “taking the diversity of Bosnia’s local voices seriously” (Kappler & Richmond, 2011, pp. 273–275). Another group of authors discuss that the Dayton Agreement neglected the two groups of people within Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Aggestam and Björkdahl argue that the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina being represented by a Bosnian Muslim leader, then President Alija Izetbegović alongside Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and Croatian president Franjo Tuđman for the signing of the Dayton Agreement, presented an “elite-focused” perspective that neglected the need for broad participation of Bosnians from each group (i.e., Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs) (Aggestam & Björkdahl, 2011, p. 29). In short, there are also discussions regarding the inclusiveness of the Dayton Agreement and post-Dayton conditions.

There have also been discussions about the extent of the international community's role. As quoted by Hameiri, the international administration structure that was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina could meet the “externally decided needs of good governance”, but they could not establish government institutions that function properly (Hameiri, 2011, p. 196). Aggestam and Björkdahl, on the other hand, argue that the internationally designed structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be sustainable and durable if the international community withdraws (Aggestam & Björkdahl, 2011, p. 42). As a supporting case, Kostić states that western diplomats are still engaged in forming political coalitions that help Bosnian politics function (Kostić, 2011, p. 105). Aggestam and Björkdahl suggest that many Bosnians believe that the political structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot continue to function without international supervision since the initiatives to solve deadlocks or problems

are suggested by international powers or actors, even if they are helpful or not (Aggestam & Björkdahl, 2011, p. 41). From a different perspective, however, Chandler argues that external involvement of international actors such as the EU should be increased to create a “strong outside pressure” to solve these political deadlocks (Chandler, 2010, p. 95).

On a different side of the discussions about post-Dayton structures, Paris argues that the election system introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina reinforced the separation and distinctiveness among the ethnic parties while the main purpose of the introduction of the system was to create a self-sustainable, functioning, democratic political order (Paris, 1997, p. 56). As an example, as Paris discusses, the post-Dayton pan-Bosnian parliament could not convene for two years until January 1997, because Bosnian Serb parties rejected to swear allegiance to a “united Bosnia” (Paris, 1997, p. 73). This rejection and tendency to secede any time is still seen today, and divisions among ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still discussed. Keskin and Aydın, on the other hand, argue that the veto right that politicians have might create deadlocks in election, decision-making, or governance procedures. They discuss that the 16-month process of forming a government after the elections in 2012 is an example of these deadlocks (Keskin & Aydın, 2014, p. 192). They also argue that the extensive power that the High Representative holds is significant, because either the very active or the very inactive use of these powers might contribute to the problems. Keskin and Aydın discuss High Representative Valentin Inzko’s term that began in 2009. Referring to the case of Inzko being unable to extend the term of international judges appointed for investigating war crimes in Bosnia, they suggest that the role High Representative is not as effective as it was planned to be (Keskin & Aydın, 2014, p. 194).

In sum, the discussions about the post-Dayton conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the challenges that are experienced in this environment are still mostly related to the root causes of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are mostly studied within the context of the Bosnian War and Yugoslav disintegration, the conquest of the Ottoman Empire of the region in 1463 and first the occupation in 1878, then the annexation in 1908 by Austro-Hungarian Empire can also be evaluated in a similar framework. Thus, these periods and conditions under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire can also be investigated through a perspective that assesses the hybrid nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to understand the hybrid peacebuilding efforts in the 1990s, the conditions and patterns that reflect a hybrid nature can be examined with a focus on these two specific periods. Since the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods also consisted of distinct ethnic and religious groups and conditions, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s was already a hybridized country due to this past, and new “hybrid” politics were being built on these “already-hybrid” conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the root causes of the hybridization.

## **5. Research Question**

All the complicated conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina which were discussed in parts above underlined the importance of a hybrid approach to peacebuilding that focuses on the combination of “local” conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and internationally promoted norms and institutions. The roots of these “hybrid” conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are visible throughout the history of the region, even since the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Since the conditions in the 1990s are results of

long historical processes, the foundations of these conditions need to be examined as well. In the light of these, this thesis revolves around the question “*How can we examine the roots of the emergence of hybrid patterns in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina with an investigation of the rule of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in Bosnia and Herzegovina?*”. The importance of studying such question will help examining the current conditions and the roots of such conditions that lay in the past.

## **6. Research Design**

In its common definition, a case study includes in-detail examination of historical episodes that enables us to develop or test historical explanations that are generalizable to other events (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5). Among the various ways of conducting case studies, “single case” research is the one that fits the method that this study used. While conducting this research, the similarities and the continuities throughout the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina were assessed and the presence of hybrid patterns were investigated. As suggested by Robert K. Yin, longitudinal single case studies tend to examine a single case at two or more different points in time, and changes in conditions over time can be specified this way (Yin, 2002, p. 42). In the light of these information, this thesis is based on a qualitative single case study that aims to investigate the similarities in Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of hybrid patterns of society and governance.

Investigating a single case of “the existence of hybrid patterns” in different time periods in a specific region, namely the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the thesis tries to assess the continuities and changes in the

political order of the country from the 15<sup>th</sup> century to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The thesis aimed at exploring the dynamics of the creation and the functionality of the newly introduced institutions and structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. While exploring these dynamics, both the current conditions and the historical data were examined. For this investigation, literature on peacebuilding, hybrid peacebuilding, Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule, and works on international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s have been examined.

Secondary sources that include historical data from the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian periods in Bosnia and Herzegovina were used for this study. The collection of data and information for the examination of historical periods was conducted through a research of secondary sources. For the chapter that focuses on hybrid political orders, the literature on peacebuilding, “the local turn in peacebuilding” and hybridity were investigated. After defining the research question that aims to investigate historical conditions and continuities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the literature review was conducted. After obtaining data from different sources, the interpretation of this data was conducted. For this, the literature on peacebuilding, post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, hybrid political orders were first examined, and then an investigation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods were conducted similarly. The aim was to examine whether there were the conditions that laid the foundations for the political processes and uneven outcomes in the post-Dayton era in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## **7. Organization of the Thesis**

This thesis consists of five chapters. As the first chapter, Introduction chapter tries to point out the main foundations of this thesis and aims to frame the research question. Additionally, the introduction chapter tries to refer to the current literature on international intervention and peacebuilding policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The need for the investigation of the continuation and the similarities between the contemporary conditions and the past periods is tried to be explained under the introduction chapter, as well. In the second chapter, Hybrid Political Orders, the literature on the local turn in peacebuilding and hybrid political orders is investigated. The introduction of the “hybridity” concept is studied, and three main pillars of hybridity are tried to be examined. These three pillars are studied as the “Organization of Power: Structures”, “Actors: The Authority and the Public”, and “Identity: Norms and Values”. In the third, “Bosnian Muslims under the Ottoman Rule, 1463-1878” and the fourth, “Bosnian Muslims under the Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1914” chapters, political conditions and specific cases that include hybrid patterns are examined under the three main pillars mentioned in the second chapter. Organizational, political, and administrative structures, significant actors in the politics and administration, and construction and transformation of identities in both periods are investigated.

## CHAPTER 2: HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS

### 1. Introduction: the concept and its origins

The concept of “hybrid political orders” or shortly “hybridity” has, over the past two decades, become a widely used framework to examine the sustainability and the effectiveness of institutions-centric, internationally supported restructuring processes in conflict-affected societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Timor-Leste. Most basically, the idea of hybridity is based on the mutual instrumentalization and accommodation of international and “local” governance procedures and entities at the same time (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771). Throughout the chapter, the origins of the concept, the criticisms that had brought this concept into existence, and the examination method used throughout this thesis will be illustrated. Additionally, the current conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the hybrid elements in its political structure are going to be examined.

#### *1.1. Post-Cold War Period and Introduction of “Peacebuilding”*

First of all, it should be stated that the introduction and expanded use of the hybridity framework to investigate the emerging political and institutional outcomes in conflict-affected societies should be understood against a background of international policy developments concerning the construction of sustainable peace and the prevention of the recurrence of violent conflict in the early post-Cold War era. As the most common discussions of these years, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, we see attempts to “democratize” states and societies to many different extents (Paris, 2004, pp. 18–20). International organizations such as

NATO, the UN, the EU (then the European Communities), the OSCE have taken responsibility to participate in these efforts (Fjelde & Höglund, 2011, p. 11). The end of the superpower rivalry that has gone on for decades then had come to an end at that time. From then on, the absence of one of the main actors of the superpower rivalry was thought to provide space for the United Nations to prove its capacity to maintain international peace and security. Additionally, the emphasis on perspectives such as “endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution” or “Western liberal democracy as the final form of governance” in Fukuyama’s words was discussed in the international arena due to abovementioned developments in world politics (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xi; Paris, 2004, p. 20). However, even after the Soviet Bloc’s collapse, in the international arena, which was thought to be calmer and more stable afterward, the outbreak of many violent conflicts necessitated to work on different methods to promote peace and security, especially in these conflictual or post-conflict areas.

Around the first part of the 1990s, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, new literature on state fragility and failure was emerging due to the conflict outbreaks. The literature in question was also pointing out the state fragility as a threat to the international order. The most critical dynamics about evaluating the failed and fragile states tend to form around a lack of state function and conditions such as political, economic, or humanitarian crises (Bøås & Jennings, 2005, pp. 386–387). Third World countries that lacked state tradition and effective self-governance apparatuses, some other states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Liberia, and Somalia that were thought to be prone to failure due to their current conflictual circumstances, and former Soviet states were seen as examples of such failed or fragile states are among the most studied cases in this sense (Helman & Ratner,

1993, p. 5). From a general perspective, those areas needed to be restructured or transformed into states that operate democratically with the help of international actors who would introduce such norms to these areas and assist them in reconstructing such orders. The most feasible way to do this seemed to be introducing democratic, liberal norms through institutions, as it was put into words by the United Nations, “peacebuilding” (Belloni, 2012, p. 22; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1997, pp. 11–15; United Nations General Assembly, 1992). Consequently, there was now more room for the United Nations to present itself and fulfil its capacity to provide peace, security, and stability for the world through the proposed ways of “building peace”. These new policies are discussed about their focus on “institutions”, which will be addressed in the following part.

To realize efforts to build peace and maintain international security and stability, first, post-conflict states that were prone to experience conflicts again were going to be restructured by introducing new institutions. In its basic definition, as defined by North, institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, which structure human exchange and interaction. This approach towards institutions was mostly built around the “formal” forms of institutions, rather than taking both informal (conventions, codes of behaviour, etc.) and formal (organizations, rules, etc.) forms into account (North, 1990, pp. 3–4). It was thought that this attention paid to introducing new institutions would support the sustainability of a peaceful international order.

As a significant example of the introduction of new structures and institutions, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be discussed. After the Dayton Agreement that concluded the Bosnian War in 1995, new institutions and structures were introduced.

The introduction of election systems, a new constitution, new decision-making procedures, and new institutions that were going to be led by internationally-appointed experts were among the institutional initiatives that the international community took in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler, 2017, pp. 109–112).

Throughout the process, the emphasis was on international solidarity and global management of conflicts and restructuring efforts. These reconstruction policies were mainly underlining the importance of economy, development and having functioning state apparatus. The causes for conflicts in such countries were assumed to be the lack of institutional capacity. Thus, this was considered a fundamental threat to international peace and security.

### ***1.2. From “Peacebuilding” to “Hybridity”***

Even if the peacebuilding policies and interventions aimed to resolve conflicts through a set of policies and steps, mixed or uneven results of peacebuilding interventions were inevitable since there were countless dynamics in each region and country (Zuercher et al., 2009, pp. 1–2). Examples such as the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine, Kosovo, and Afghanistan are where the emphasis on the “local” is claimed to be not “totally understood”, and it shows that the introduction of liberal democratic principles for self-sufficiency of these societies do not always succeed (Belloni, 2012, p. 24; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). Thus, a new way to reconstruct the post-conflict areas was introduced, and “the local turn in peacebuilding” was brought into the agenda. The fundamental thinking behind this “turn” was the criticism of the former policies of peacebuilding which demonstrated uneven results since they were based on the direct transfer of certain democratic, liberal policies and institutions to conflictual areas.

In the literature based on the abovementioned turn in policymaking, the significance of “local” orders and the existing “traditional” bodies as well as the governance structures on the ground were underlined. Rather than imposing a thinking of building institutions and policies that only focus on democracy, which would mean less to the public of the post-conflict society, the “local, traditional” conditions of the “local” were tried to be brought into action through engagement and revision, hence, to correctly address the issues which were being tried to be dealt with (Belloni, 2012, p. 24; Jarstad & Belloni, 2012, p. 4; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 764). The concept of “hybridity” originated in the post-colonial literature, and later on, was used in the peacebuilding and state building literature. It addressed the conditions in post-conflict societies such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, which effective, long-lasting, and sustainable institutions to maintain peace and stability were introduced. Similarly, the framework of the idea included aims towards constructing stability and peace in post-conflict societies. It principally points out how the “local”, “traditional”, or “customary” institutions and governance structures are paid attention to in reconstruction efforts. Here, contrary to what former policies of peacebuilding suggested, such as introducing internationally promoted institutions or organizations to prevent any further conflict or creating a sustainable system through these methods, it can be seen that both formal and informal institutions of the “local” actors and “external” actors were going to be parts of the reconstruction process.

As discussed by Hameiri, defining a state as failed and needing to be “reconstructed” is most of the time assessed from a perspective that focuses on state capacity (Hameiri, 2007, p. 122). Concerning the discussions of hybridity literature in state building, peacebuilding, and intervention literature mentioned before, most of the

time, when a state needs to be “assisted for reconstruction” for matters of development, stability, or security, they are seen as “incapable” of providing such qualities themselves. Hameiri discusses that the neoliberal institutionalist and neo-Weberian approaches towards state building and intervention are mostly based on the criticism of state capacity while fulfilling the institutional needs. The institutions in question are expected to comply with the needs of an “ideal” state. State building and intervention practices and policies of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries that focus on introducing democratic, liberal norms, methods, and institutions for “reconstruction” should be based not only on the will to improve capacity but also on understanding the realities of problematic regions. The acknowledgment of conditions in social spheres alongside the critical structural deficiencies of conflictual regions that take a great part in the current situation is critical.

Throughout this chapter, the concept of “hybridity” is going to be examined under three main sub-headings, namely “structures”, “actors”, and “identities”. Under the “structures” part, the concept is investigated based on the administrative and governance structures that consist of hybrid political orders, the “actors” part analyses actors and notables which have significance for the establishment and the sustainability of hybrid political orders, and the “identities” part investigates the importance that identities and qualities have for hybrid political orders.

## **2. Main Pillars of Hybridity: Structures, Actors, and Identities**

This question posed by Francis Fukuyama can be assessed as the foundation behind the mentality of hybridity: “Can informal institutions embedded within social norms be made to work more effectively for development outcomes in the absence of a functioning Weberian state system?” (Clements et al., 2007, p. 46). In hybrid

political orders, contrary to the Weberian definition of a state, statehood is not directly connected to the central governance structure's responsibility. Instead, matters such as providing security and performing other statehood activities are suggested by hybrid orders as the shared principal duties of “traditional” bodies and the central state power to be constituted or reconstructed. The understandings regarding legitimacy, representation of the central state, and statehood capacity are not in line with the commonly accepted concept of a “state” in the case of hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2009, pp. 17–19).

In hybrid cases, there is an extraordinary understanding of the statehood and fulfilment of state capacity. Hybrid political orders consist of a shared governance structure by the “local” and “exogenous” powers. The construction of these orders can be described as having “local” and “exogenous” factors both acting jointly in cases where “fragile, weak, or incapable” state systems are on the “local” level, but one must acknowledge that such assessments are on thin ice. First and foremost, as Mac Ginty and Richmond suggest, these orders are not to be “crafted in a laboratory (...) as part of a peacebuilding, stabilization or development programme”. Thus, hybridity does not offer instrumentalizing the “local” for the sake of peacebuilding operations, but rather there exists a complex relationship, and the focus must definitely be beyond “institutions” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, pp. 220–224). Hence, seeing the “local” being taken into account in reconstruction processes as a legitimizing machinery that would only help the peacebuilders is definitely not on the same page with what hybridity tries to underline.

Hybridity is suggested to be an emancipatory act that frees our perspective from binaries such as “local and international” or “modern and traditional”, as Mac Ginty and Richmond propose. Achieving a balance between the ambitions of the

“international” and the conditions of the “locals”, hybridity is suggested to emancipate our analysis from such binaries and is against a reductionist approach, refraining from strict categorizations such as “local” and “international” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, pp. 228–232). Through the explanations above, it is seen that the “exogenous” powers, e.g., state builders, have to co-operate with the “local”, “traditional” structures to deliver more effective, better functioning, and legitimately accepted policies (Clements et al., 2007, p. 48). Additionally, as Jones suggests, as much as the goals and policies of “exogenous” powers intersect with the ones of the “local” powers, the success rate in these post-conflict reconstruction processes is thought to be higher since both sides are actors on the ground (Jones, 2010, p. 552). Thus, it would not be right to classify the “external” and the “local” as the legitimate versus the illegitimate, the modern versus the traditional, or through any such binarization. Throughout this study, references to the “local”, “international”, “external”, “exogenous”, “indigenous”, or such terms are going to be made, but the purpose here is not to binarize the two sides in the formation of hybrid political orders, but rather to present the impact of the sides of this relationship that end up in this hybrid, mutually accommodating political orders that are not to be binarized.

To summarize shortly, a combination of state and non-state bodies, “traditional” and legal structures, “exogenous” and “indigenous” powers as well as the integration of customs and traditions with democratic law and order can be seen as the key points of hybridity (Boege et al., 2008b, p. iii, 2009, pp. 17–19). However, it is critical to underline that hybridity is not a kind of transition or conversion process from an underdeveloped structure to a developed one (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 228). Instead, it is the simultaneous instrumentalization of “indigenous” and “exogenous” characteristics. Both the “local” and “international” sides of this hybrid

order benefit from their counterparts and embrace each other's practices to reach the most effective governance status that they would both benefit and opt for (Boege et al., 2008b, p. 5). To this extent, the term "hybrid" is used because such political orders do not draw lines between distinct characteristics, but rather include them all and offer a combination. They do not isolate the two different sides of the hybrid orders, but rather bring them together in a unique system (Boege et al., 2008a, p. 10). The ultimate aim to realize hybrid political orders can be seen as the same as all other state building and peacebuilding policies: to constitute stable, sustainable, and effective governance structures in post-conflict, fragile, or weak states by building policies on the existing political orders on the "local" level (Hoehne, 2013, p. 199; Krasner & Pascual, 2005, p. 155).

Especially after the collapse of the communist Soviet bloc, democratic, liberal understandings regarding states and governance have become the most legitimate and apparent norms for the approval of "how a state should be", as it was discussed before (B. Sahin, 2015, p. 7; Paris, 2002, p. 641). Thus, this type of governance model was perceived as the most effective one for post-conflict resolution attempts along with considerations about the existing characteristics. In addition to the abovementioned background, it is suggested that both "local" and "exogenous" powers feel encouraged to take part in hybrid forms mostly because of governance for their own security concerns. Fragile, failed, or unstable states are seen as threats to national and international security as it was discussed before. Additionally, there is this understanding that fragile, failed, or unstable states affect their neighbouring countries as well as international stability and security through spill over effect (B. Sahin, 2015, p. 3; Boege et al., 2008a, pp. 2–4, 2008b, p. 1; Krasner & Pascual, 2005). Engagement with such states is seen as an attempt to create a peaceful, stable

environment from the peacebuilders' point of view (Boege et al., 2009, p. 13; Krasner & Pascual, 2005; Paris, 1997, pp. 55–56). By meeting the needs in the “local” level, emphasizing the strong sides of “traditional” bodies, filling the gaps those bodies are unable to fill, and mitigating the possibility of further instability through interacting with “locals”, “external” powers may be highly motivated to take part in the hybrid organization of power. The case is similar for the “local” bodies: they are somehow kept intact regarding their existence in the governance sphere. The “local” does not get eradicated by the “exogenous” powers but rather becomes a part of the new order and maintains the respect and reliability that it holds. Thus, the self-interests of both constituent parts of the hybrid regimes can be seen as a driving force behind hybridity.

In following sections, three main pillars of hybrid political orders are going to be demonstrated. These main pillars are going to be assessed under the headings “Organization of Power: Structures”, “Actors: The Authority and the Public”, and lastly “Identity: Norms and Values”. The part on organizations is going to investigate the relationship between the peacebuilders and the “local” bodies, and discussions on the extent to which the institutions or structures that are introduced by peacebuilders are able to function. The part on actors is going to investigate the importance of family ties, kinship, and traditional roles of authority. Finally, the part on norms, values, and identities will try to touch upon the importance of characteristics of the “local” that affects the constitution of hybrid political orders. All of the three pillars tend to highlight the importance of the reciprocity between the “traditional” and the “exogenous” that creates the very nature of hybrid political orders.

## ***2.1. Organization of Power: Structures***

Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, which structure human exchange and interaction (North, 1990, pp. 3–4). Peacebuilding operations, as mentioned before in this chapter, aim to restructure a weakly functioning state system into a functioning, capable one through the introduction of institutions, norms and policies shared by the democratic, liberal states, and paving the way for conflictual or post-conflict states which lack capacity to self-function through such norms (Belloni, 2012, p. 22; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1997, pp. 11–15; United Nations General Assembly, 1992). In a nutshell, state’s power was thought to be exercised mostly over its power on institutions that enabled it to function, thus, the introduction of such norms to regulate the state capacity was seen as critical in post-conflict peacebuilding. The significance of institutions and the discussions about it were presented in the parts above. In the light of these information, it would not be wrong to state that the peacebuilding policies and efforts of the post-Cold War period focused largely on institutions which will be examined through the classification named “structures” under this study alongside other discussions.

Regarding the structures, some points must be clarified to understand the case better. First of all, the “state” concept should be clarified since the core of discussions on structures is mostly shaped around what a “state” is and what is the ideal form of it that is tried to be reached. Even if there are a number of mainstream definitions and a consensus on several characteristics of a “state”, most of the hybridity literature is based on criticizing the Weberian concept of the state. These discussions cover the difficulty of imposing such a concept and the necessity of harmonizing Weberian fundamental features of statehood and “local” characteristics, and they suggest that

the Weberian state is not a universally accepted model of political organization. All the similarities, as well as the differences of hybrid regimes compared to the usual understanding of a state, are mostly defined regarding that specific viewpoint (Boege et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Clements et al., 2007; Hoehne, 2013; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016).

Focused on the functions and governance methods while assessing how an “ideal” state must be, the Weberian concept of state is defined as such: having the legitimate monopoly of the use of force in a defined territory, centralizing the tools and means of rule, distributing the power among organs of the state, implementing an administrative, legal order that binds everyone within the defined territory, having the force to use means of legislation and organization while applying all those characteristics, and regulating the order and the political competition within the framework of the rules of the state. As stated above, according to Weber, the state is a human community with the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a defined territory. Who will have the capacity to use force is only determined by the “state” itself since it is the sole source of force (Dusza, 1989, pp. 75–76; Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 78).

Defined through the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the state has a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (League of Nations, 1936). Mentioned by Boege et al. (2008a, pp. 3–4), Ghani et al. define statehood through ten fundamental features.

These ten features tend to point at states' functional capacities, and discussions regarding capacity will be unfolded throughout this chapter. These features are administrative control, sound management of public finances, investment in human capital, creation of citizenship rights and duties, provision of infrastructure, market

formation, management of the state's assets, effective public borrowing, and maintenance of the rule of law. Even if this is a definition that applies mainly to the modern state structures of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, some of the essential points remain significant for all periods, such as administrative control and performing primary state duties, e.g., managing finances or providing order. By considering the abovementioned perspectives and acknowledging the variety in terms of governance practices worldwide and throughout time, the “state” concept might be accepted as applicable for many different cases.

In many cases where hybrid political orders come into existence, it would not be favourable to abolish all the existing structures that have had a significant impact on the society and governance up until that time. A complete adoption of democratic norms and an immediate construction of an ideal state may not be appropriate to prevent future conflicts, either since such attempts may fail. If there are institutions at the “local” level, they must be transformed through the framework of the modern ones, and if there are none, new ones must be created to this end by taking the norms and characteristics of the “local” into serious consideration (Paris, 2002, pp. 639–655). The only way to make those internationally accepted norms and new forms of administrative and social organizations not draw negative attention or any type of resistance from the “local” actors and bodies is suggested to be through the utilization of what is existent on the “local” sphere, e.g., “traditional” structures and kin-based networks. For the newly introduced policies to succeed, receiving a high level of support from the “local” actors is crucial. The resilience of “local”, “traditional” methods and structures is a great challenge against “exogenous” powers in this case.

To not draw negative attention and not reinforce the existent “local” bodies’ resilience against themselves, “exogenous” powers have to find less risky and less striking practices. They have to find ways to engage with “local” structures modestly to this end. Since ways of engaging with “local” actors are somehow standardized to a certain extent (e.g., introduction of law systems, establishing similar types of institutions, attempting to meet the abovementioned “ideals”), this “orthodoxy” of peacebuilding and state building operations might be intimidating for “local” powers, thus, they might feel irritated by the norms which are being tried to be applied on their daily lives (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 777). Hence, attention paid to the instrumentalization of “local” bodies should be increased. If “traditional” structures and their operation methods are ignored, “ideal” norms and values would be much harder to implement (Boege et al., 2009, p. 16). This is why “exogenous” powers should calculate everything on the ground regarding the structures, understand every dynamic of the “local” balances, and take steps wisely to build their impact gradually. “Exogenous” powers can sometimes be considered the “challenged one” throughout the implementation process of hybrid political orders because they try to integrate with a society used to “traditional” procedures. To be accepted as legitimate political actors by “locals”, “exogenous” actors have to consolidate their power alongside the conventional governance structures (Boege et al., 2008b, p. 2).

Another essential discussion is about “capacity”, which is the basic state capacity regarding providing basic services and support (e.g., providing security, health, or education services). Under hybrid regimes, this can be seen as the responsibility of the legal or the “traditional” bodies as well (Clements et al., 2007, p. 54). For all governing structures, the main aim is to become a fully functioning administering body by providing their people's essential needs. Even if there is no definite

framework for “traditional” societies and bodies, they have similar responsibilities towards their people. This is why hybridity suggests state builders co-operate with “traditional” structures to have state capacity to its greatest extent (Boege et al., 2008a, p. 7, 2009, p. 16). Either to fulfil needs for being a state or maintain trust and reliability in society’s eyes, “local” and “exogenous” bodies might prefer to work together or combine their structures with the existent bodies, structures, and powers on the ground. Mutual exercises of statehood in a defined territory are necessities for hybrid political orders.

## ***2.2. Actors: The Authority and the Public***

One of the defining features regarding the hybrid political orders is the attention paid to the “local” sphere through asking questions such as “who are the locals?”, “which locals are to be worked with?”, or “to what extent co-operation with those locals are possible?”. The necessity of asking those questions lay in the case that, most post-conflict states have strong traditional actors or bodies that greatly impact the functioning of the state. As discussed above, the introduction of institutions based on liberal, democratic norms and ideas were seen as key to reconstruct post-conflict states, and hybridity suggested that this was not enough for an adequate reconstruction. Hence, getting to know the structures of the “local”, introducing structures along with the “local” perspective, and caring about the presence of “local” bodies were expressed as fundamental preconditions for successful reconstruction. In some post-conflict or conflictual states, actors such as tribe leaders, religious leaders, or similar figures are as much important as the bodies. Therefore, “local” actors too are not to be neglected since they are as much important as the structures and institutions for the functioning of the state.

Discussions on “legitimacy” and “capacity” are critical while assessing the “local” perception and the relationship between the “local” and the “international”. A group of scholars suggest that to be seen as legitimate bodies of governance, both components of hybrid political orders tend to rely on each other to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Boege et al., 2008b, p. 5, 2009, pp. 17–19; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 774–776). Regarding public acceptance, the “new” political representative might be a legal leader, elected through the ways of the newly implemented political order, or a “traditional” leader who has been respected as such for a long time. Depending on the level of acceptance and the public's response, identification of who is going to represent the hybrid state might change (Clements et al., 2007, p. 54). Most of the time, the legitimacy of one side depends on the other under hybrid regimes: sometimes the “external” has to comply with the “traditional”, and sometimes it is the other way.

One must touch upon the discussion of “local perception” since it forms a great part of the debates about hybridity. Even if terms “legitimacy” and statehood “capacity” are discussed and often criticized by the implementers of hybrid political orders, they might sometimes find themselves in cases where they must utilize these terms for the sake of stabilization. Such cases are often based on the relationship between two actors: the “international” and the “local”. As discussed before, political legitimacy and capacity to perform basic state duties are often seen as the central state's responsibilities, which complies with certain norms. Even if hybrid political orders were introduced to break such norms and enable a different kind of governance structure to be functioning, they might be bound by the mainstream norms, as mentioned above. It must not be forgotten that both the state building literature and the hybrid political orders aim at the same ends. The most important concern and the

immediate target is “stabilization”. Here is the puzzling part: implementers of hybrid political orders might have to try to fulfil “capability” and “legitimacy” sometimes just because they can “stabilize” more effectively this way.

Illustrating such a case will bring a clearer understanding of it, and the emphasis on “actors” will be made through this way. To stabilize a post-conflict state, an “external” power introduces policies to the region. It gets to know what the “local” norms, policies, and values are, at the same time. Let us assume that the post-conflict society in question is politically organized in the form of a tribe with a respected “tribe leader”. In a place where a tribe leader has been seen as the ultimate, unquestionable leader, a democratic system that leaders serve for definite terms would not be easy to embrace. So, the tribe leader might take part in the governance structures introduced by the external power, the respect that he/she receives would be maintained, and the democratic order would still be constituted. Here, asking three questions would bring the discussion of hybrid political orders, legitimacy, and capacity to an explanation:

1. Can the region be considered “stable” now? If a new system is introduced and functioning decently, even if the former governing figures are still on stage, it would be wrong to answer this question with a “no”.
2. Is the new hybrid order considered “legitimate”? If the democratic election process and political order were introduced singlehandedly, the answer to this question could be “no”. However, as the legitimate leader of people of the post-conflict region, the tribe leader, takes place in new structures, there is a higher chance of being considered legitimate in the public's eyes.
3. Is the new hybrid order “capable” to perform state duties? An order that can mitigate conflicts, soothe the disputes on the ground, perform basic state duties such

as public administration, and provide decision-making procedures can be considered "capable" in the eyes of those who have a high opinion of such concepts.

Just as "exogenous" powers have to strive to justify their actions through many different ways as mentioned above, "local" authorities also face challenges in the process of hybridization. One of them is the harsh reaction that the "local" actors might get upon their engagement with the "exogenous" powers. There is always the possibility of receiving an adverse response from the public, and the size of this reaction might damage the country's stability and security. Creating duality on "local" structures might provide basis for forming criminal groups, militias, or such entities that are not satisfied with the new order (Boege et al., 2008a, p. 9). This reaction might either be towards the "traditional" bodies which engage with "exogenous" powers in an unwanted way, or towards the "exogenous" bodies which are seen as outsiders. Another problem that might be brought to the surface can be the intensification of the existing public disorder. As the hybrid political orders are thought to be introduced for peaceful and stabilizing purposes, they are not supposed to bring adverse results as such.

As an additional discussion, implementing hybrid practices in a "local" order where ethnic enmities are being experienced might be very dangerous. Hostile groups might find gaps in any period of turmoil during the implementation, and violent results may be seen as a result. Paris mentions this case as the "perverse effects" of peacebuilding missions (Paris, 1997, p. 57). To conclude, it can be summarized that just as it bears great importance for the institutional relationships between the "local" and the "exogenous", public relations is a great matter of concern, as well. Thus, this discussion can be seen as the fundamental point of the analyses to be conducted in further chapters.

### ***2.3. Identity: Norms and Values***

Lastly, as another essential side of hybrid political orders, we see the need to attach importance to the values, norms, and existing systems of the “local” side of the discussion. Just as it is going to be illustrated through the third and fourth chapters of this thesis, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an administrative and societal structure that was based on the identity of the public was constructed and had been operating for a long time. Within the scope of the following chapters which assess the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the significance of the identification of Muslims of Bosnia, their values and shared norms acquired throughout time, and the critical importance that these values have in the administration of society are going to be examined. The case here that will be highlighted is that the distinct “Muslim” identity acquired by the Muslims of Bosnia had an impact on their way of land administration, societal administration, and the socio-political structure of the region. The norms that the Muslim people in Bosnia held, the directions that socio-political conditions took shape in accordance with these norms, and the challenges that they faced throughout the Austro-Hungarian period which came after the centuries-long Ottoman rule that both shaped these norms and whose administration and politics were shaped by these norms will better illustrate the importance of the identities.

As mentioned before, the “traditional” ideas, practices, or norms play a great part in the newly constructed political orders in post-conflict societies. Concepts such as “respect”, “kinship”, or “hierarchy” are significant matters for most of the post-conflict areas in question, and each of these matters should be paid attention to while constituting a successful, sustainable hybrid political order that stabilizes and later

reconstructs the order. In many cases, the “local” sides of hybrid regimes are considered underdeveloped and lacking basic statehood elements. In “local” societies, the sense of belonging to a nation, the role of citizenship, or such feelings or obligations are often non-existent. Even if this is not the case for most of the time, the highest reliability is towards the “local” leaders in “traditional” systems. To obtain a commitment for themselves, “exogenous” powers might choose to utilize the society's commitment towards their “local” governors, such as tribe leaders, religious leaders, or chiefs. By working in parallel with such “local” figures, they try to obtain the commitment that they could not receive on their own (Boege et al., 2008a, pp. 9–10, 2008b, pp. 4–5, 2009, pp. 17–19; Clements et al., 2007, p. 54). Hence, instrumentalizing “local” and “exogenous” bodies together through hybridity is favourable for newly imposed regimes in terms of the obtainment of loyalty. Thus, neither the “exogenous” legal structure is ignored, nor the “local” powers feel left out, and the characteristic features of the identity of the “local” is maintained to a certain extent.

While co-operating with “local” forces can be useful, there are also some concerns. One of the most important challenges that “exogenous” powers might face in trying to imply hybrid political orders while engaging with the “local” structures is the high amount of strength and effectiveness of the existing “traditional”, customary, and “local” qualities and characteristics. Chiefs, religious leaders, or such people in top positions might somehow remain more effective on the society, and the connection between the members of a society might create a dichotomy for identification such as the “local” and the “other” (Boege et al., 2008b, p. 4; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 769). Those figures and strong connections among the individuals of a society exist for a long time. The roles of the top people in those societies are mostly based

on crucial issues that matter much to those “local” people, e.g., religion, “local” administrative hierarchy, kinship. For example, it is known that sometimes a “local” religious authority has more influence on people than a “local” judge. This is because religion is sacred for those people and “novel” concepts such as law or order might not make as much sense since they are introduced much later (Boege et al., 2008a, pp. 7–8). Thus, there is a great challenge for those trying to establish a modern state structure while some customary practices, norms, and values are still in effect. Here, new policies were tried to be implemented through “hybridity”. Aware of the difficulty of challenging those long-lasting “local” bodies, “exogenous” powers brought them into key positions of the newly introduced state structures. Co-existing with the “traditional” power elites, new structures were reacted to more positively by the society than the case where those elites were tried to be undermined. There might a good cause for this, as it is going to be illustrated in the fourth chapter that investigates the Austro-Hungarian era in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Muslim elites are the ones seen as the representatives of the “Muslim identity”. “Mutual accommodation”, as suggested, is sometimes the best option to maintain stability and foster further development on grounds of each side complementing the other, substituting in case of need and better investigating which norms of one side incompatible with the other side (Boege et al., 2009, pp. 19–20; Clements et al., 2007, pp. 51–52). So, rather than perceiving the local's strength, how this strength can be used should be considered.

Shortly, it can be stated that any action conducted by “exogenous” powers to create a hybrid political order aims to fulfil the needs of the “highest form of political order”, which is the modern state structure. However, there are some standard ways and methods that are applied while trying to make this happen. There is the need to

acknowledge what “matters” to the public at the same time. Embracing the needs, nuances, and realities of the “local” order is among the most critical things that “exogenous” powers should consider. Additionally, they should consider stretching the limits of this standardized manner more often (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 777).

### **3. Post-Dayton Conditions and the Hybrid Patterns in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been extensively discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. As discussed, peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina is defined within the same context as statebuilding most of the time (Donais, 2005, p. 54). Thus, peacebuilding through statebuilding (i.e., introducing sustainable state structures) was thought to end the conflict in Bosnia and prevent future ones. However, as Bose suggests, even if the war was concluded in 1995, the political structure afterward could be described as “the continuation of the war” (Bose, 2002, p. 6). For this, ongoing economic, religious, and political problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina were investigated in the former chapter as well. Here, a discussion on the hybrid nature of the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement will be presented, and the elements that consist of the hybrid nature of post-Dayton Bosnia are going to be examined.

#### ***3.1. Religion and Religious Figures***

One of the factors that help define the current order in Bosnia and Herzegovina is religion in political matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, matters related to religious issues were defined as “vital” and “vital

national” interests (Seibert, 2018, p. 98). Considering the constitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious structures are defined as “pseudo-state structures” regarding their historical and current role in politics (Seibert, 2018, p. 99). The existence of religious bodies in political spheres during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in this thesis. But in the current context, Seibert discusses that since today’s politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina revolve around ethnic lines rooted in religious lines, religion in contemporary politics is a significant case (Seibert, 2018, p. 99). It is suggested that during the Yugoslav period, religion was used mainly by radical nationalist, sectarian groups to increase their visibility and legitimacy (Friedman, 2004, p. 84). Mentioning the discussions by Bardos, Friedman argues that there is a “de-secularization” in Bosnia and Herzegovina since clergy from all religious communities are becoming more active in political, cultural, and social spheres (Friedman, 2004, p. 84).

From another perspective, Odak argues that due to the high affiliation with religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious leaders have great importance for society and a significant role in the peacebuilding processes (Odak, 2021, p. 315). Accordingly, Odak discusses the reasons for religious authorities to have substantial roles. For this, he argues that religious leaders and figures are moral authorities that may find additional support for peacebuilding actions, make use of religion as a “separate supra-national system,” may reach higher numbers of people since they encounter with many people in a religious community in a daily basis. They continuously interact with people for many different occasions (Odak, 2021, pp. 315–317).

Friedman, from another point, discusses that the extensive amount of aid received by Bosnia and Herzegovina is coming from Muslim countries. This aid is mainly used for mosques and adds that the society thinks that these kinds of support do not help

the development and what is needed is the promotion of employment, which is a more crucial matter (Friedman, 2004, p. 84). Thus, religious figures have had an essential role in both post-conflict and post-Dayton processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### **3.2. *Illegal Criminal Groups and Corruption***

Another feature, or rather a “challenge” faced in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement, is the continuing corruption. Friedman argues that ethnic control of political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina creates an environment feasible for political corruption. The author also discusses the corrupt conditions of police, judicial systems, and increasing societal and religious segregation (Friedman, 2004, p. 84). One of the foundations of corruption can be seen as the emergence of paramilitary groups, which impacted the political economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a long time (Donais, 2005, p. 68). As much as the society relied on paramilitary groups from their own ethnic identification during wartime, paramilitary groups needed public support to continue their black market, smuggling, or fraud activities (Donais, 2005, pp. 68–69). As another case related to corruption, Friedman discusses a study by the US General Accounting Office that shows the smuggling, tax evasion, and trafficking crimes continued by wartime crime networks. It is argued here that the complex interrelationships between organized crime networks and politicians, nepotism, bribery, and such connections are the main reasons for the corruption. In addition, Donais argues that the current system loses a great amount of money to tax fraud and evasion (Donais, 2005, p. 55).

The World Bank report in 2021 addresses similar issues as well: difficult politics and lack of international integration of investments and exports are among the

greatest challenges for the Bosnian economy (World Bank Group, 2021, p. 58). The post-war economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina struggled with corruption for a long time due to the lack of financial transparency and accountability of budgetary matters (Friedman, 2004, p. 103). According to the same World Bank report in 2021, Bosnia and Herzegovina, today is known as a country with one of the highest rates of youth unemployment, which is around %34 (World Bank Group, 2021, p. 60). Hence, unemployment and economic difficulties remain as some of the biggest challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Friedman, again, points out the interconnectedness with ethnic parties, political figures, and crime networks while discussing these challenges. It is also argued that these crime networks have extended relationships with politicians, private sector firms, and companies. Thus, they indirectly affect foreign investment and development (Friedman, 2004, pp. 85–86). As a significant case, in 2002, a customs scandal took place in the Republika Srpska entity, which resulted in the resignation of the entity finance minister. In return for bribes, goods were undervalued up to 90% by the customs officers. It was then evaluated that this “customs mafia” could not operate without the knowledge or cooperation of entity political authorities, and there were speculations about the illegal incomes obtained from this fraud used by the Serb Democratic Party to protect war criminal indictee Radovan Karadzic (Donais, 2005, p. 66). As Donais discusses, the immunity of criminal groups from prosecution and collusion between the state authorities and illegal groups are some of the realities of the post-Dayton period (Donais, 2005, pp. 74–76). Additionally, the current functioning of the economy also has these illegal, criminal groups as an implicit, integral part of the system.

### 3.3. *Ethnic Baselines of Post-Dayton Politics*

The political structure which was established after the Dayton Agreement was indeed a very complex one, as discussed many times in Chapter 1. As Bose mentioned, “Bosnia has been the site of internationally sponsored political engineering on a remarkable scale” (Bose, 2002, p. 3). However, the corrupt, sectarian nature of the politicians in Bosnia creates conditions where ethnic and religious concerns remain crucial problems and confrontation areas (Bose, 2002, p. 7). As Önsoy discusses, ethnic affiliation is one of the main determinants of the future conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the entity-level decision-making procedures make consensus much more difficult (Önsoy, 2011, p. 129). The creation of “Republika Srpska” as one of the two entities of the country led to the emergence of “a state within the state,” and the “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” which is consisted of cantons that have their political functioning is just a part of this very complex system in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bose, 2002, p. 23; Önsoy, 2011, p. 131). As Donais suggests, the post-Dayton process is characterized by the power struggle between these two entities (Donais, 2005, p. 50). Each entity and each ethnic group continued to pursue their aims from the wartime. They see elections as means to consolidate their power and as even more important than their commitment to peace, development, sustainability, and democracy (Donais, 2005, pp. 52–53).

The current political order in Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed as an “artificial” state, and it is also argued that the “national” divisions created within the state are based on artificial psychological and territorial constructions. It is also discussed that in a society that is this much fragmented along communal or ethnic faultlines, it is nearly impossible to have sustainable democratization (Bose, 2002, p. 42). Friedman discusses that the lack of options other than following a nationalist political agenda,

politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a zero-sum game where when one ethnic group “wins,” the other one “loses” (Friedman, 2004, p. 85). Additionally, Önsoy argues that these ethnic baselines of post-Dayton politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina might also result in economic and social problems (Önsoy, 2011, p. 134). Regarding all this information about the current problems and deficiencies of the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, it can be claimed that the gap between expectations and realities about the peacebuilding operations is significant. As the Dayton Peace Agreement, with the help and the introduction of international democratic norms and policies was expected to establish the conditions for a sustainable democracy that is supported by a strong economy. However, the corruption, dysfunction, and complexity in politics and economy, and the complicated political system based on a multi-ethnic settlement make things much more difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the complexities in the country in terms of economy and governance, the “consociational” state structure is another significant element that is a part of the hybrid nature of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### **3.4. *Arend Lijphart’s “Consociationalism” Theory and Power Sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina***

Under the light of all the political and societal conditions, Arend Lijphart’s “power-sharing” (also known as “consociationalism”) is one of the prominent perspectives regarding the political structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This “consociational” model of government is suggested to be formed as presenting equality among parties or segments in a country. This settlement is argued to provide a more sustainable political resolution (Bose, 2002, p. 43). Lijphart first introduced this term in a 1969

article, and the concept of “consociationalism” was used as a synonym for “power-sharing” and “consensus democracy” often (Lijphart, 2008, p. 6). For consociational settlements to succeed, Lijphart suggests that there are four factors: namely the ability of the elites to accommodate divergent interests of the subcultures, the ability of the elites to transcend splits in the society to a common, joint effort, the elites’ commitment to the maintenance of the system and increase the conditions for its stability and finally, the ability of the elites to understand the perils of fragmentation of the society and the politics (Lijphart, 2008, p. 32).

Regarding the power-sharing system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Keil discusses that the state can be characterised as a “multinational federation” since this political system in operation is based on regionally concentrated nations that are parts of the federal system (Keil, 2013, p. 122). Also, Keil adds that the nature of Bosnian constitutional design combines two political-historical traditions. The first one is named the traditional political and national structures and power-sharing policies in function during the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Yugoslav periods. The second one is the more contemporary tradition that underlines the importance of law, democracy, freedom, and human rights. Keil discusses that this second characteristic of the Bosnian constitution is mainly due to the presence of the United States and other international actors that promote such norms (Keil, 2013, p. 123). This liberal tradition was thought to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to perform statehood by such norms. However, establishing the new state and introducing this new constitution fell short of doing so.

Similarly, Bose argues that the consociational model in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not as successful as it thought it would be since the deep ethnic. Societal fragmentations in the country made the case more difficult (Bose, 2002, p. 43).

Similarly, as discussed by Belloni, in post-settlement contexts, all groups that consist of the society need to be included and represented in politics. Still, in deeply divided societies, political systems created on this basis may lead to polarised ethnic political parties (Belloni, 2007, p. 76). Bose suggests that two features related to consociationalism were evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those two features were defined as allocating political and representative seats for each constitutive group or party and each national group having the right to veto (Bose, 2002, p. 63). These cases and their complexity were also discussed in the introduction chapter while examining the outcomes of the Dayton Agreement.

As the third feature, which can be assessed from the same perspective of a consociational settlement, we see the “central decision-making procedures by a coalition of representatives of each group” (Bose, 2002, p. 63). As Article 5 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina points out, the Council of Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three Council Members: one Bosnian Croat and one Bosnian Muslim representative elected in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one Bosnian Croat elected in Republika Srpska (Nystuen, 2005, p. 76). A coalition is elected for a 4-year term, and the presidency rotates among these three members every eight months. The lack of a permanent president also presented some challenges in informative matters, such as the European Union’s struggles with the circulation of information between its representatives and the Bosnian authorities (Juncos, 2013, p. 71). In short, as cited from Sartori by Belloni, consociational resolutions that aim at a proportional representation of all major groups in society comes with “the expense of governability and effective decision-making,” and proportionality in political matters may end up in consensus-breaking rather than consensus-making (Belloni, 2007, p. 78).

In sum, the hybrid nature of the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war can be evaluated as established on the main features discussed above. Shortly, it can be discussed that the multi-ethnic political system that allocates power along with different nationalist, ethnic parties, the existence and increasing role of religious figures in politics, relationships between the crime networks and politicians, and this relationship having a direct impact on the economy, and all these complex conditions affecting the employment, foreign investments or development in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a political order that has hybrid patterns in every level.

Additionally, the matters related to corruption and the lack of the Bosnian Government's capability to provide welfare or services to the public (such as the failure to provide employment for the Bosnian youth) discussed are very significant factors related to the current conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, examined from the perspective of the local turn in peacebuilding, it can be addressed that the post-conflict peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina includes hybrid elements since this post-Dayton structure today includes local networks, religious elites, ethnic and national components, the joint operation of illegal and legal structures as well as a legitimate political structure based on power-sharing among constituent ethnic groups.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Hybridity is a concept that brings the "local" and the "exogenous", the "traditional" and the modern, and the underdeveloped and developed together. Having found its roots back in post-colonial literature and progressed in post-Cold War period, hybridity is now a more comprehensive theory for post-conflict state building and

peacebuilding processes. Assessments made about hybridity under this chapter were framed under three main pillars, namely “the organization of power through structures”, “the relationship between “local” and “exogenous” actors”, and “the necessity of taking identity values of the public into account”. In light of these three main examination topics, the framework regarding hybrid political orders and how it will be an effective approach to understand Bosnia and Herzegovina's case during the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire’s rule were tried to be explained. Throughout the chapter, it was tried to be stated that under hybrid political orders, “exogenous” powers try to engage with the dynamics and characteristics of the “local”, attempt to meet them on mutual grounds while maintaining their own goals and interests. While doing this, they do not try to abolish all of the existing structures on the ground to build their institutions and bodies. On the contrary, they try to achieve “mutual accommodation”. Both actors of hybrid political orders try to become legitimate political actors as a part of the newly established post-conflict governance, which has the capacity and characteristics of a state built through “democratic, internationally accepted” norms and values. To do this, they have to instrumentalize the “local” bodies because the commitment towards the “local” figures becomes an essential part of the post-conflict reconstruction processes. However, while doing this, there are also things that challenge the “exogenous” powers as much as the factors which encourage them; “local” bodies' strength be challenging for the impact that they try to build, and they might have to engage with them by considering the “local” bodies’ concerns cautiously. To have a successfully implemented hybrid political order, all the realities, characteristics, and details of a “local” existence should be completely internalized and examined. Additionally, the

current cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina were discussed from a hybrid perspective, and the hybrid elements of the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina were illustrated.

As it was framed, the concept of hybrid political orders is an invention of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. However, the general framework of the mentality behind hybridity can be applied to many different periods and cases. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s makes up a significant part of the literature on state building and hybridity. As suggested before, the roots of this case can be found centuries back. Since there are many overlapping features of hybridity with the Ottoman Empire's and the Austro-Hungarian Empire's policies, Bosnia's case under both Empires can be examined through this perspective.

## CHAPTER 3: BOSNIAN MUSLIMS UNDER THE OTTOMAN

### RULE 1463-1878

#### 1. Introduction

Islam emerged as an important factor in the region, especially after the Ottoman Empire's conquest in the mid-1460s. This process of conversion is perceived through different viewpoints. Some scholars see this as an opportunistic move to benefit from the Ottoman policy that favours its Muslim subjects. Bosnians becoming Muslims has been examined by many scholars, and many different ways of analysis are available in the literature. Most scholars have tried to find the critical turning point that encouraged Bosnians to practice Islam. They also tried to find out how the political, administrative, and religious conditions of these years in which the conversion took place impacted the Bosnians' path towards making a collective move to become Muslims (Donia, 1981, pp. 3–4; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 37; Imamović, 2006, pp. 109–110; Karpat, 2004, p. 20; Lopasic, 1981, p. 115; Poulton, 1997, pp. 16–17). The most important event during the period under the rule of the Ottoman Empire was this collective act of conversion and Bosnians becoming Muslims and creating a new community which has gone on ever since and, even in today's conditions, has great importance in the politics of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Throughout this chapter, the administrative structure and main patterns of Ottoman Rule in Bosnia will be examined. The Ottoman rule in the region is most of the time associated with societal changes, namely the conversion of local people as mentioned above. Thus, religion made up an essential part of the policies, issues, and events that

are going to be covered throughout the chapter. The points that are going to be illustrated through historical data will provide a clearer picture of what had happened during the critical turning points under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which has lasted more than four centuries, and how to evaluate these events from the perspective of hybridity. As suggested throughout the theory chapter, hybrid political orders of the post-cold war era were based on the mutual instrumentalization of the local and exogenous powers for a more sustainable development for post-war societies. For the case of Bosnia under Ottoman rule, the assessment of such course of events will be made with a focus on certain kinds of developments. Examined under three main parts, namely the structures, actors, and identities, the hybrid nature of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Bosnians will be illustrated. As they are among the most critical developments in Bosnia under the Ottoman rule, the territorial administration method named “timar”, the establishment of religious-charitable organizations named “vakuf”, the prominent political actors of the era named “spahis”, “kapetans”, and “ayans”, these actors’ relationships, and the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards these actors, the impacts of the conversion of Bosnians to Islam, the reasons and the results that this conversion brought to the identity of Bosnians are going to be examined. This chapter is going to illustrate the foundations that led to the emergence of the national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims later.

## **2. Administrative Structures of Bosnia during the Rule of the Ottoman Empire**

It is possible to examine Ottoman Empire’s administrative structure on two foundations that are the most visible in the Balkans: territorial administrations known

as the “timar” and “chiflik” systems, and religious administration known as the “millet system” (Babuna, 2012, pp. 17–18; Malcolm, 1996, p. 47; Stavrianos, 1958, pp. 89–90). Even if there are other aspects regarding the economic, societal and such cases, territorial and religious methods of administration were the bases of the Ottoman administration in the Balkans. The “territorial” administration refers to the local administrative bodies and structures, whereas the “religious” administration refers to the management procedures applied towards the administration of all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Rather than focusing on the administration in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, the specific case of Bosnia will be examined under this part in more detail. In this part, the territorial administration model in Bosnia under the Ottoman rule and how groups of people belonging to different religious faiths were treated will be illustrated. This land management system was one of the essential characteristics of the Ottoman Empire’s administrative practices. It had greater importance for Bosnia since the Empire’s attitude towards the people of Bosnia was hybrid.

### ***2.1. Land Management System under the Ottoman Rule***

The “timar system” was one way that the Ottoman Empire went about the management of its territory. Since the Ottoman Empire had large lands, central government of all its lands was difficult. Therefore, a combination of land and military management called “timar” system was important for the Ottoman Empire. In addition to that, since Bosnia was located at the westernmost frontier of the Ottoman Empire, its security was important. This is why the land management combined with military administration was very much important for Bosnian region. Some parts of the lands of the Ottoman Empire were administered by the appointed

military men who were receiving direct orders from the central administration, and the lands which those people were administering belonged to the Sultan (Malcolm, 1996, p. 47; Stavrianos, 1958, pp. 138–140). Those lands were mainly very fertile and strategically located places, and administrators of those lands often received privileges from the Empire such as becoming local governors. The people who administered those lands were named “spahis” and they administered the land, the agricultural activities, and the money gained from these activities. These spahis also contributed to the military system of the Empire through providing military training to people on the land they administered. Their contribution to the empire was mostly based on them carrying arms and horses, exercising military duty, managing the military organization and payment of the salaries of other soldiers, and paying an annual tax to the Sultan called the “land tax” (Malcolm, 1996, p. 48).

The timar system was both an administrative and agricultural system. “Spahis”, the Muslim soldiers appointed by the Sultan, were designated to reside on specified lands, collect taxes for the Empire, and provide military services in times of need (Stavrianos, 1958, p. 86). As a unique practice in Bosnia, most of the spahis were the Bosnians that were born and raised in this region, contrary to the spahis appointed by the central government elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire (Okey, 2007, p. 4). The administration of agricultural lands was in the hands of Bosnia originated spahis. These spahis were strictly directed by the central government by the sandzak begs who were appointed directly by the Sultan (Malcolm, 1996, p. 90). Even if this administrative system went on for a while, it began to weaken due to several factors. During the weakening of the central government of the Ottoman Empire, spahis began to benefit from this system by exploiting the people living on the lands they administered. A new aristocratic class emerged throughout the late 16<sup>th</sup> century

because of the timar system, and the people selected as the administrators of these lands managed in such a way. Personal and family honour and power of the land administrators were rooted in the privileges brought with this system, and they became part of the “noble” class (Andrić, 1990, pp. 18–19; Malcolm, 1996, p. 93). Secondly, territorial losses of the Empire caused some spahis to lose territories under their control, and remaining territories had to be shared among spahis, which meant that there were fewer lands for more spahis now (Babuna, 2012, pp. 17–18; Malcolm, 1996, p. 93; Stavrianos, 1958, pp. 138–140).

In 1831, the timar system was abolished entirely, and most of the Bosnians reacted strongly to this change since they faced the possibility of losing their privileges. After the timar system was changed into “chiflik system”, the rather privileged status of spahis seemed to continue since most of the privileges obtained from their landholdings such as their position and income were maintained. During the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, following the weakening of the timar system, the chiflik system took effect gradually. This system was acknowledged as an official land management method in 1859 with the Safer Decree. Similar to the timar system, a part of the crops was still taken as tax. The remaining part was divided between the landowner and the tenants of the land (Babuna, 2012, p. 18; Stavrianos, 1958, p. 236). Again, contrary to the rest of the Ottoman lands, administrators of chifliks were predominantly Muslim Slavs from the region. In other words, local Bosnians were selected to manage local administrative bodies (Stavrianos, 1958, p. 236). Through the chiflik system, they were somehow able to keep their privileges by turning their estates into chifliks, agaluks, or begliks as other land classification ways (Malcolm, 1996, p. 122; Stavrianos, 1958, pp. 138–139). The chiflik system was in effect

throughout all Balkans, and now the land administrators could transform their lands into inheritable properties.

Here, it is seen that the Ottoman Empire's policies in Bosnia include hybrid patterns in terms of land management. As mentioned before, most of the timar and landholder spahis were Bosnian Muslims who lived in the region. The land management system was based on the Ottoman practices of "timar" and "chiflik", but the agricultural lands were under the administration of the Bosnians from the region which was controlled by sandzak begs, and thus the central government (Babuna, 2012, pp. 17–18). There are a couple of driving forces behind this. First of all, Bosnia was located on the frontier (uc beglik) of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it was relatively distant from the central government. The primary method of administration of the widespread Ottoman lands was through land administration, as mentioned before. Most of the time, the most preferred method was the appointment of governors from the central government (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 44–45). However, in Bosnia, local administrators were appointed as the land administrators since it was somewhat distant and carried a different character than the rest of the imperial lands elsewhere.

## **2.2. *Vakuf System: Endowments***

Another point that should be made concerning structures is the "vakuf" system of the Ottoman Empire. As a religious-charitable foundation, the vakuf system was considered vital for the development and sustainment of the Ottoman cities since most of the income and monetary administration of cities were being conducted via vakuf endowments (Malcolm, 1996, p. 68). In its most basic definition, vakuf endowments are built on the properties of, or capital donated by Muslim people, whose income or revenues obtained through these donations are used for the public.

Its constitution and components are specified through Sharia law: the property or capital donated should be owned completely by a single person, and that person should have full possession of these entities (Donia, 1981, p. 22). Most of the vakufs were established through agricultural lands or buildings that would produce incomes or revenues. Additionally, the vakuf bodies were established also through the endowments of commercial facilities such as mills, bazaars, shops, etc. Financial incomes obtained from such entities were used for the public benefit.

As a widespread practice throughout Bosnia, most Bosnian cities were operated, especially financially, through vakufs. Salaries of mosque workers, maintenance costs of mosques, schools and hospitals, construction of buildings such as bridges, or roads, were all financed through the earnings from vakuf endowments (Donia, 1981, p. 22). By improving the living standards through schools, religious buildings and trade practices, Bosnians enjoyed this system to a great extent. Vakuf endowment bodies under the control of Isa-Beg Ishakovic and Gazi Husrev Beg were the most important ones for the development of the region (Malcolm, 1996, p. 68). Those two Bosnian people who directed their vakuf structures contributed to the development and growth of the Bosnian city Sarajevo. The hybrid essence of this vakuf system was this: the system was an Ottoman system, but it was bringing Bosnian local figures into action to build a self-sustainable financial and urban practice. For instance, the founder of a vakuf endowment organization could appoint the first administrator and decide on future administrators of vakuf bodies. They could act as “ayans”, which are local administrators (Ortaylı, 1983, p. 56). These founders would mostly appoint themselves and this office could be inherited by their sons (Donia, 1981, p. 22). Thus, a family could benefit from this administrative leadership for generations. Additionally, it was common for prominent and wealthy Muslim

families to donate their properties for vakuf endowments. This way, they could maintain their social status. It is estimated that one-third of Bosnian usable lands in Bosnia were classified as vakufs in the year 1878 (Donia, 1981, p. 23). Hence, vakuf systems appear as significant institutions in Ottoman Bosnia.

However, the lack of regulation of vakuf affairs and the hereditary nature of such institutions posed some problems during the Ottoman rule in Bosnia. People could obtain personal benefits from the vakuf endowments. For example, donating a property to a vakuf endowment could eliminate the possibility of sharing this land between other family members in future. Additionally, since families could be the founders or administrators of vakuf bodies, they could determine the rate of financial benefits that they would receive while creating the vakuf charters. Because the bookkeeping of vakuf bodies were also conducted by these very administrators, the financial conditions of vakuf endowments were visible only as much as these administrators wanted them to be (Donia, 1981, p. 23). A vakuf commission was established in the following years under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to manage these institutions better.

In short, there are a couple of cases to mention in terms of the hybrid patterns in the Ottoman administration towards the Bosnian elites and the public about the structures which were in effect throughout the Ottoman Empire's rule over the region. The military-land management system called the timar system appears to be the most critical structure to which hybridity patterns can be traced. Regardless of the practices of the timar system elsewhere, Ottoman Empire selected Bosnian local authorities and figures to sustain this land management system in Bosnia. The reasons for this, as mentioned above, were mainly based on the distance of Bosnia from the central government in Istanbul and the strategic importance of the location

of Bosnia which was the westernmost frontier of the Ottoman Empire at that time. For strategic, security, and stability concerns, it is seen that the Ottoman Empire selected local figures which were thought to be the best for the interest of the region and the Empire itself. Additionally, vakuf structures that were going to be more significant from the perspective of hybridity were established in the Ottoman period, which will be examined more in-depth in the following chapter.

### **3. Actors: Local Notable Bosnians and the Ottoman Empire**

Regarding the process of Bosnians converting into Islam, several motivations can be identified through creating a categorization based on their material expectations and considerations, cultural motives that drove them to convert, the institutional conditions, and lastly, their concerns related to security and well-being. Among the number of factors that encouraged conversion in Bosnia, prosperity concerns had a critical space. Receiving administrative and military privileges such as being vakuf administrators or landowners under the rule of the Ottoman Empire was most of the time only possible if one was Muslim. The possibility of reaching the highest positions in the Ottoman administrative system was depended on being a Muslim as well. A Muslim was more likely to have a more prosperous life under the rule of the Ottoman Empire since they received a lighter burden of taxes and liabilities towards the Ottoman Empire. Besides the possibility of receiving benefits, one other reason for Bosnians' conversion to Islam being relatively easier was that their religious practices were already fairly like those of Muslims. As stated in Pinson's work, some factors can be seen as the causes of having a more intense Islamization process in Bosnia. For this, four crucial factors are to be stated: Bosnians' weak religious status (i.e. the Bosnian Church) which left them fragile to any change that might come from

outside (i.e., the process of conversion to Islam), the “devshirme” system which was used to provide soldiers and administrative staff for the Ottoman Army (which can be seen as the eagerness to reach high positions of the Ottoman administration as it was stated before), Bosnians’ willingness to set themselves free from the burden of high taxes that non-Muslims pay under the Ottoman Empire, and lastly, their desire not to be converted forcibly by the Orthodox Christians (Pinson, 1994). Here, two of the four suggested reasons appear to be material motivations.

As a point that is important for conversion, we see the “devshirme” system. The “devshirme” system was among the most critical factors in the Ottoman Empire's security. The system was a method to acquire soldiers or people to provide services for the Ottoman Empire by collecting the young Christian boys up to 20 years old from their families (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 44–45; Stavrianos, 1958, p. 82). They were recruited as “janissaries,” which were the members of the standing Ottoman army. In fact, this was favourable for those kids at one point since this way, if they converted to Islam, they had the chance to get to the highest administrative and military positions of the Ottoman Empire. A prominent example for this case is Bosnian-originated Sokullu Mehmet Pasha (Mehmet Sokolović) which has served several Ottoman sultans. Thus, this possibility can be considered among the most important motives for conversion. By converting to Islam, Bosnians could obtain higher ranks in offices and become actors in the Ottoman government system.

### ***3.1. Kapetans and Ayans***

During the Ottoman period in Bosnia, offices of “ayans” and “kapetans” as prominent actors of the era have significance. In terms of actors who were the prominent figures of Ottoman-era Bosnia, we see the authorities who work for the

offices established by the Ottoman Empire. These offices were also very important because Bosnia was along the westernmost frontier of the Ottoman Empire and security of this frontier had crucial importance for the Ottoman Empire's security. Appointment of strong figures that would effectively manage these lands that were very distant from the central government was thus very important. As the representatives of the central government, ayans, and frontier military administrators, kapetans were very important for the Ottoman Empire's security.

The most influential figures in the era are kapetans and ayans. Kapetans were the military officers appointed in regions located at frontiers of the Ottoman Empire (Malcolm, 1996, p. 90). Ayans, on the other hand, were another group of local administrators which were mostly selected from landowners or vakuf administrators (Ortaylı, 1983, p. 56). These administrators were regional representatives of the central government (Babuna, 2012, p. 18). Like the military, administrative and legal officials, kapetans and ayans were selected from the notable Bosnian people and acknowledged seniors from the region. The importance here is that both figures were among the highest authorities in Bosnia. They were again selected from the local elites and people that were thought to be capable of serving the region's interests best.

The office of kapetans was established in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century. Like spahis that managed lands, kapetans also simultaneously raised troops within the defined forces that they led, performed as the region's administrators, and later on even collected taxes. Additionally, as it was for spahis, kapetans were also a part of the distinguished socio-political structure. Most kapetans were selected from prominent, timar holder, Bosnian notables (Imamović, 2006, p. 143). The office of kapetan was inheritable. Thus, certain families and groups could be privileged under this role.

They were part of the Ottoman government structure led by the central government, but they were selected from the local figures to address better the needs and the problems of the local people and the region. The central government was mostly concerned with the stable collection of taxes. To a certain extent, they could check the actions of kapetans with the centrally appointed political and administrative officials (Malcolm, 1996, p. 90). The Ottoman Empire abolished the office of kapetans in 1835, which evoked a greater reaction than the abolition of the timar system. Kapetans enjoyed greater freedoms and were even planning to reach an “autonomous Bosnia” within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

Ayans, on the other hand, were another group of administrators in the Ottoman Empire. The office was established gradually throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> – 17<sup>th</sup> centuries and they represented the central government at the local level. These people were the Bosnian elite, landowners, prominent people who worked with vakufs, senior officials such as janissaries, spahis, and similar people. During the first years of the establishment of this office, people with distinguished ranks were selected for this office and they could be Christians (Imamović, 2006, p. 144; Malcolm, 1996, p. 92).

Ayans were from the families of the first converts to Islam after the region’s conquest by the Ottoman Empire and they had a good relationship with the central government of the Ottoman Empire. However, similar to kapetans and spahis, they took control of the local structures, and their way of thinking about governing the region shifted from loyalty to the central government to a more personal perspective (Ortaylı, 1983, p. 56). Even if they were considered closer to the central government, ayans were also enjoying privileges and they also wanted to keep personal benefits they obtained through their role (Babuna, 2012, pp. 18–19).

As mentioned before, ayans and kapetans as the prominent figures in the administration of Bosnia had benefits and privileges gained through their roles and offices. However, the central government of the Ottoman Empire had some problems with the growing authority of these officials. In the first part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the central government was planning to implement changes regarding the janissary corps, the standing army of the Ottoman Empire, and the status of kapetans and ayans. As a result of the assertive reforms implemented by the central government throughout the early 19<sup>th</sup> century to limit the autonomy and authority of the local governments to increase the power of the central government, ayans and kapetans' reaction grew bigger. Following this, a revolt took place in 1831. Kapetan Husejin Gradiscevic, a young kapetan from the northern part of Bosnia, gathered his forces and led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire's reforms (Andjelic, 2003, p. 8). After gathering with other local authorities and governors, they presented a couple of points to be accepted by the Empire. Among their demands, there was the removal of the centrally appointed governor from the office. Bosnia was requested to be allowed to have its own type of "autonomous body". This request paved the way for wishes for autonomy and the central government to not intervene in Bosnia's local authorities and their appointments. Rejection of these demands by the central government did not stop Kapetan Husejin Gradiscevic. He continued on his actions, which later resulted in him declaring himself the vizier (an office that corresponds to the prime minister, the first rank officer after the Sultan). His self-appointment was not recognized (Imamović, 2006, pp. 144–147; Malcolm, 1996, p. 120). This revolt led by Kapetan Husejin Gradiscevic is seen by a group of Bosnian scholars as the emergence point of the Bosnian group consciousness, which was seen to be

developing under the Austro-Hungarian rule that is going to be examined in the next chapter (Okey, 2007, p. 5).

This course of events led to the abolishment of the kapetan office in 1835 (Malcolm, 1996, p. 122). After their abolishment, kapetans were to be replaced with “musselims”, officials that represent the governor and are appointed by governors, thus, by the central government itself in actuality (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 91, 122). Most musselims were going to be selected from the former kapetans, but kapetans were not happy with this change, still. The main reason for the disappointment of the kapetans about this decision is that their freedom and the extent of their sovereignty were going to be limited. Additionally, the inheritance of this office would have no longer been possible (Imamović, 2006, p. 147). However, since similar figures from similar families or groups of people continued to work as musselims, who replaced kapetans or ayans, it would not be wrong to claim that Bosnians resisted the Ottoman Empire’s authority and did not let them limit their sovereignty. The hybrid patterns here to be seen are mainly shaped around the local appointments for central government-connected offices. As the Bosnian locals had been in the region more than the Ottoman Empire, their presence for the region's administration could not be neglected. Thus, the fact that the Ottoman Empire found itself obliged to make such appointments reflects the hybrid nature of their approach.

#### **4. Identities: Transformation of the “Bosnian” Identity & Bosnians**

##### **Converting to Islam**

Religion can be considered among the constitutive elements of group identities, and it carried great importance for the Ottoman Empire. It was evident that Muslims were provided with some economic and administrative privileges under the rule of the

Ottoman Empire such as being landowners, land administrators, or public authorities. Additionally, the central government of the Ottoman Empire needed a loyal upper class to manage matters of the region easier (Imamović, 2006, p. 143; Malcolm, 1996, p. 48). Thus, as an element of group identity, religion was rather more important for the Bosnian region under Ottoman Rule. Many people in Bosnia converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule to gain economic, administrative and social privileges. Those people became the actors of the political stage as discussed in part above. Here, matters related to the identity formation and the characteristics of Bosnians are going to be discussed.

#### ***4.1. Religious Administration under Ottoman Rule: Millet System***

Besides the territorial administration of the Ottoman Empire, administration of the peoples through religious classification was very important. With the millet system in force, the Ottoman Empire divided its subjects into groups of religions and requested different kinds of liabilities such as different amounts of tax or rent payments or benefits. The system ensured that “People of the Books,” which were people who believed in religions that had holy books, i.e., Christians and Jewish people, were the protected minorities under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. They exercised autonomy in their affairs, protection, and other privileges. Also, under this system, non-Muslim people had the freedom of being administered by their community leaders. Additionally, since only Muslim people could reach the higher positions in the administration of the Empire, being a Muslim was considered something beneficial (Donia, 1981, pp. 3–4; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 37; Imamović, 2006, pp. 109–110; Karpat, 2004, p. 20; Lopasic, 1981, p. 115; Poulton, 1997, pp. 16–17). The main driving force behind the implementation of this system was the

great amount of diversity that the people of the Ottoman Empire comprised regarding their ethnicity, culture, language, and such matters (Stavrianos, 1958, p. 82).

The essence of the millet system is debated among a group of scholars especially about whether the system segregated the ethnic groups or not (referring to the ethnic groups based on their religious classification). For example, Imamović suggests that the millet system was the Ottoman way to deal with the administration of an extensive group of people living under an Empire which had spread to several continents (Imamović, 2006, pp. 109–110). This emphasis on religion and religious classification of people is also seen in the foundations for nationalism which would emerge later on, since religiously based organization of the society formed the bases of national movements.

#### **4.2. *Material Motivations for Conversion***

While thinking about the factors behind the part of Bosnians who converted into Islam during the Ottoman Empire's initial years in the region, scholars suggested several factors. From one perspective, it is upon the Ottoman Empire's arrival to South-eastern Europe, i.e., Bosnia, and the following introduction of the Ottoman administration systems and structures (Friedman, 2018, p. 29; Malcolm, 1996, p. 93; Sugar, 1996a, p. 367). The administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire was established mainly on religious and territorial bases, as discussed above. Societal administration and the policies for subjects were applied through the "millet system", and administration of lands was being conducted through timar and chiflik systems based on local actors as subsidiaries and implementers of the central administration of the Empire. Both administrative methods were examined in previous parts of this chapter. Both types of administration were favouring the Muslim subjects since the

religion of the Empire was as such. Regarding the conversion as a process, as suggested by Adanır, most scholars imply that the speed of the conversion process differed from one region to another, and the acceptance of Islam was slow throughout the region as a whole (Adanır, 2002, pp. 337–347). On the other hand, according to most of the perspectives within the literature, the idea that the process of getting used to the Ottoman administration system being indissolubly linked with conversion to Islam is popular.

There are different perceptions on the speed, voluntariness, and intensity of the conversion. Here, Andrić suggests that there was pressure towards the Bosnian people by the Ottoman Empire since Christian subjects under the Ottoman Empire could not hold properties as much as they could if they were Muslims. Most of the rather prosperous part of people in Bosnia decided to convert to Islam just to hold their possessions intact (Andrić, 1990, pp. 17–18). However, most of the scholars reject the claim of the existence of a pressure for a forced conversion applied by the Ottoman Empire, and they claim that rights and privileges were not taken forcefully from any subject, Muslim or non-Muslim, of the Empire. They imply that neither all conversions were from Christianity to Islam but also from one church of Christianity to another, nor this process was an overnight process but a gradual one that spread over a long course of time, and most importantly, the whole conversion process was based on voluntary actions of the people (Donia & Fine, 1994, pp. 35–37; Fine, 1975, p. 381; Lockwood, 1979, p. 210; Malcolm, 1996, p. 93; Sugar, 1996b, p. 27). Also, the same group of scholars cited above mention that such forced conversions would not be favourable for the Ottoman Empire itself. The main reason for this is that such mass conversion would bring great damage to the Ottoman Empire since the taxes collected from non-Muslims were the most important assets of the

economy. No authority would force its subjects into conversion considering the economic expense it would bring about.

According to the tax registers of the Ottoman Empire, which were called “defters”, categorization of people and their properties was made according to their religions. The earliest defters from the 1460s show that there were around 37.000 Christian households and only 332 Muslim households, which approximately gives the number of Christian people as around 185.000, whereas Muslim people were numbered around 1600. On the other hand, later defters from the 1520s show that there were around 98.000 Christians and 84.000 Muslims (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 52–53). So, these records show that it was not the case that all people in the region converted into Islam overnight. The earlier years of Ottoman rule in the region are seen as the years in which conversions took place the most, and Muslims only made up less than half of the population, even under these circumstances.

#### **4.3. *Non-material Motivations for Conversion***

Besides the material reasons and results which Bosnians could obtain in a relatively shorter time span, there were some features that made things much easier for them to convert into Islam and start to perform the practices of this religion which is new to the region and to the people. First of all, the Bosnian Church, which was accepted as affiliated with Bogomilism, had many features which were indeed similar to Islam. Before Islam became the prominent religion in the region, people of the Bosnian region were a part of the “Bogomils” and the members of the “Bosnian Church”. The religious practices of Bogomils and the Bosnian Church had been very much similar to the ones of monotheistic religions: the belief in the creation of humankind, the idea of afterlife, and such (Friedman, 2018, pp. 10–20). Adanır suggests that the

conversion “instinct” was actually voluntary after the beginning of the Ottoman rule by stating the similarities between Bogomilism and Islam (Adanır, 2002, p. 329). Additionally, Fine suggests that the vital, dynamic faith of the Ottoman Empire captured the attention of Bosnians (Donia, 1981, p. 3). There was also the absence of a single, strong church structure in Bosnia, different than other Balkan states where Christianity remained as the religion of the majority.

There was a division between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in the region, besides the unique body of the Bosnian Church itself. Even if most of the people in the region were Christians, it is suggested that they did not have a sense of unity or sense of belonging regarding their religious institutions, especially with the sectarian divisions of Christianity and each Church having their own structures. It is suggested that the poor logistic capacities of the churches in the region and the lack of ability of priests and churches to gather members were also obstacles to the conception of this sense of unity. This was suggested mostly for the Bosnian Church to which most converts belonged before. Therefore, it is seen that this absence of organization might have been one of the crucial reasons for Bosnians converting to Islam: the Bosnians would of course like to have a stronger religious structure which could reinforce their sense of belonging besides benefitting them materially and morally (Donia & Fine, 1994, pp. 42–44; Fine, 1975, pp. 396–387; Lockwood, 1979, p. 210).

In light of all the information mentioned above, it would not be wrong to say that Muslims were indeed the privileged group under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. They had beneficial positions in most cases: They could become a part of the administration, were obliged to pay less rent, fewer taxes, and were likely to be more favoured in any case. Thus, it is not surprising that they did not have any major

attempts to either have more extensive rights and freedoms or to revolt against the Ottoman Empire to secede. This is why the position of the Islamic community only became a matter of question after the 1878 occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: until that year, all Muslims were directly connected to the religious and administrative centre of the Empire, located in Istanbul. Muslims in Bosnia had no need to establish their own administration, especially a religious one (Imamović, 2006, p. 218). Regarding hybridity patterns here, it can be stated that keeping the rights and privileges that the non-Muslims had while providing the Muslims with other ones can be seen as a part of the hybrid policy of the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, for the assessment of the conversion process, it is seen that the most agreed perspective on this case is that there was not a forcible conversion but the realities on the ground encouraged the locals (Bosnians) to accept the religion of the exogenous (the Ottoman Empire).

## **5. Conclusion**

The main point to be made in this chapter is that for every case and every different matter, “exogenous” and “local” powers might choose to act differently for their benefit. For example, as it was examined throughout the part on identities, contrary to the case for structures and actors, Bosnians try to get in line with the Ottoman Empire and its way of operating. For structures, the case was as such: as the exogenous power, the Ottoman Empire and as the local power, Bosnians tried to cooperate with each other in a mixed, hybrid manner. Structures were in forms that were suggested by the Ottoman Empire, but the people who implemented these structures and rules of the Empire were the local people. For the actors part, the case was similar: the prominent actors of the Ottoman administration practices

implemented in Bosnia were the local people. The Ottoman Empire designated the offices and ranks of officials but the people to practice force in these offices were the Bosnian locals. However, for the identity part, it is visible that Bosnian locals tried to get in line with the religious practices of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of a number of benefits explained. As it was suggested throughout the theoretical background, under hybrid political orders, local and exogenous powers meet at a point where it is the most feasible for both sides. They may agree on the exogenous power or the local power norms, but both sides will benefit at the end and at current conditions. This will possibly be seen as the most beneficial way for both. The events and developments that took place under the centuries-long Ottoman rule laid the grounds for the Austro-Hungarian Empire's relatively shorter rule in the region, and hybridity patterns in the latter period are going to be examined in the following chapter.

## **CHAPTER 4: BOSNIAN MUSLIMS UNDER THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RULE, 1878 – 1914**

### **1. Introduction**

As a result of the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire between 1877-1878, the complete structure of the Balkans changed (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 135–136). As the finalizing document and a milestone, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 concluded the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an Austro-Hungarian “occupied” land under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 113; Ramet, 1988, p. 308). In 1908, the status of “occupation” was changed into “annexation”, and it remained as such until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the World War I that began in 1914 (Adanır, 2002, p. 313; Donia, 1981, p. 2). The reason for including Bosnia and Herzegovina within the borders of the Empire in 1878 was to prevent the creation of any south Slav state neighbouring Austria-Hungary to maintain the peace and stability in whole Europe as well as self-protection from such possibility (Imamović, 2006, pp. 184–185). The main cause here was that any south Slav land that could be established in the Balkans would pose a great danger to the great powers of the time. The region as a buffer zone between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and any development in the region would be critical for the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s security.

Following the occupation in 1878, it was possible for the Austro-Hungarian Empire to implement administrative and modernizing reforms and manage the region to this end, but the ultimate sovereignty over the region was still the Sultan’s, and all Ottoman laws, especially the ones regarding the Muslims, were going to remain until

further changes by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian power over the region was limited. Novi Pazar (Istanbul) Convention which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1879 pointed the case out clearly: “The fact of occupation does not violate the sovereign rights of the Sultan over Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The Convention guaranteed the freedom and security of person and property as well as their right to maintain Muslims’ link to their spiritual leader in Istanbul (Adanir, 2002, p. 310; Babuna, 2012, p. 72; Donia, 1981, p. 7; Imamović, 2006, p. 189; Okey, 2007, p. 30; Pinson, 1994, p. 100). This was very important in the eyes of the Bosnian Muslims: they did not feel isolated under a Christian rule. It was one of the purposes behind the decision for recognizing the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire especially on religious matters. For Muslims’ legal concerns and matters, sharia courts were going to remain in place, the Ottoman land management system was also retained only through changing the names to terms in Austro-Hungarian language (Babuna, 2012, p. 122; Imamović, 2006, pp. 181–187; Karpat, 2004, p. 130; Malcolm, 1996, pp. 133–138; Pinson, 1994, pp. 86–87, 119; Stavrianos, 1958, pp. 393–412).

Additionally, the region was neither going to be administered by the Austrian nor the Hungarian sides of the Empire. Bosnia was going to be ruled as a “crown land” that was neither under Austrian nor Hungarian sides of the Empire, and the “Joint Finance Ministry” was going to be responsible for the administration of the region (Malcolm, 1996, p. 137; Okey, 2007, p. 30; Sked, 1992, p. 213). Joint Finance Ministry was among the three ministries in Austro-Hungarian administration that owed allegiance directly to the crown and acted as a shared ministry (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 96). By administering Bosnia and Herzegovina under this joint ministry, a constitutional struggle that could affect the region over territorial interests of two

sides of the Empire was thought to be eliminated, and policies in the region would reflect the ones of the crown and not the competing sides of the Empire (Donia, 1981, p. 11; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 96; Imamović, 2006, p. 248; Malcolm, 1996, p. 137; Pinson, 1994, p. 92).

It was stated that the Austro-Hungarian mission in Bosna and Herzegovina was somehow a “cultural” or “civilization” mission: in 1895, the Joint Finance Minister who was also in charge of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Benjamin von Kallay (also known as Beni Kallay) stated that “Austria is a great occidental empire charged with the mission carrying civilization to oriental peoples” (Donia, 1981, p. 14). The many modernization and reform moves, such as the introduction of democratically operating commission systems or the establishment of representative offices for people, that the Austro-Hungarian Empire took in the region are shown as the most significant indicators of these claims. The modernization process did not take place overnight but continued for a long course of time. Changes in the land management, taxation, political representation, and the introduction of new rules and procedures for daily matters indicated the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the region (Donia, 1981, p. 34).

The Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia is mostly known for its policies that considered the particular interests of both the Empire and the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Babuna, 2012, pp. 24–30; Lopasic, 1981, p. 118). For example, regarding public inquiries, The Empire received complaints from the public. The Empire tried not to “intimidate” the public or “trigger” national uprisings in the region since the nationalist tendencies were arriving at the region in the meantime. Any problem that could occur in the political decisions could lead to revolts and even worse, the disintegration of the imperial lands or different ethnic groups seceding to

other states. As the people that held the most critical place in the region due to their position in administrative offices, the lands that they owned and the prominence that they gained throughout the Ottoman rule in the region, Muslim elites and landowners were most of the time the main focus of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, since these members of the upper class were the administrative, public authorities since the Ottoman rule (Babuna, 2012, p. 26). Most of these elites and landowners also had roles in the government such as spahis, kapetans, ayans (Imamović, 2006, p. 143). Taking the existing conditions on the ground seriously, Austro-Hungarian Empire did not want to intimidate the Muslim elites, which could have resulted in revolts or actions against the imperial rule. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to keep especially the Serb and Muslim Bosnians on balance. The biggest parts of the Bosnian society, Orthodox Serbs and Muslims were the most critical people in the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for the regional politics (Babuna, 2012, p. 83). The significant connection with the hybridity lies in this very case of keeping the balance. The Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to keep the prominent part of the society pleased. As much as they wanted to implement imperial policies, they retained what these people had been practicing. Important patterns of hybridity under the forty-year-long Austro-Hungarian administration are going to be examined throughout this chapter.

As it was formed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this chapter as well examines the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina under three thematic sub-chapters, namely structures, actors and identities. For the structures part, the land management, vakuf systems, and religious administrative offices that were introduced are going to be assessed through underlining the hybrid attitude that the Austro-Hungarian Empire held towards the Muslims of Bosnia. Under the actors part, prominent actors

of the time, Muslim landowners and their role in the relationships with the Empire are going to be studied. Here, as the prominent actors, the religious administrators of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Sultan and Austro-Hungarian officials are going to be reviewed. In the latest part, the part about identities, the religious privileges that the Muslims held, the connection between their religious and material privileges, and the importance of the “Muslim” identification under the Austro-Hungarian rule are going to be examined. The chapter will then end with concluding remarks.

## **2. Administrative Structures: Vakufs, Reis-ul-Ulema Office, and Muslim National Organization**

Austro-Hungarian Empire was very well aware of the importance that agricultural structures held for Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of economy and administration. Thus, one of their main concerns was based on agricultural improvements since any change in these conditions were directly related to the landowning class, hence the central administrators (Malcolm, 1996, p. 142). This way, introduction of any new policy that would affect the people that obtained their power from the agricultural and administrative roles could be assessed better. The land management system was still using the rules established by the Safer Decree of 1859, which was proclaimed during the Ottoman period, and which introduced the “chiflik” system through the transformation of “timars”. What the Austro-Hungarian Empire did in this case was the introduction of bookkeeping measures, which involved keeping records of the land taxes collected from Christians and organized the usage of the taxes collected (Babuna, 2012, pp. 209–210; Friedman, 2018, p. 63). On the other hand, even if the Austro-Hungarian Empire consistently tried to implement new agricultural measures,

the existing operation systems in the region regarding agriculture was maintained (Babuna, 2012, p. 46). Since the Austro-Hungarian rule abstained from bringing any problems that could lead to public unrest, they tried to maintain the existing order in the structural matters.

### **2.1. *Vakuf Structures***

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the vakuf structures of the Ottoman Empire were crucial for the economy and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were the most important dynamics of the economic sustainability in the region. Since the region was going to self-finance its economy under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the strength and importance of the vakuf structures were very critical (Babuna, 2012, p. 59). Imperial rule was very careful about maintaining the functioning structures in any form, and vakuf structures were indeed one of them. Thus, they brought new forms of bookkeeping for vakuf structures. Prominent Muslims were going to be appointed to vakuf administration, but they were going to be under the control of the Empire (Donia, 1981, pp. 23–24). Austro-Hungarian Empire was going to both retain the old system of vakuf endowments and implement its own financial standards by modernizing the functioning of these institutions. In 1883, a vakuf commission was set up with an imperial order (Imamović, 2006, p. 220). Senior Muslims and prominent people among the Muslim society were selected for this commission, and it nearly operated in all the places where Muslims lived and vakuf structures operated (Babuna, 2012, pp. 62–63; Malcolm, 1996, p. 146). Here, hybrid patterns can be underlined as such: the structure was retained, and people who participated in the organization of this structure were still from the prominent group of Bosnian notables, elites, and landowners that operated the vakuf

endowments for centuries before. A blend of the existing conditions with newly introduced methods enabled a “traditional” system to function through “modern” ways. However, the last word for the appointment of these people was said by the Empire. Thus, it can be stated that both the prominence of the existing order was tried to be maintained and the power of the new order was tried to be enhanced here. The Empire reissued and revised the organizational structure of vakufs, introduced new and more reliable accounting systems, and established a commission that would make the administration of vakufs easier. The Austro-Hungarian objective here was based on the centralization of vakuf structures, the appointment of vakuf officers and authorities by the Empire, and keeping a balance between the Empire and the Muslims (Donia, 1981, pp. 23–24; Pinson, 1994, p. 95).

## **2.2. *Reis-ul-Ulema, Medzlis-ul-Ulema and Religious Administration***

Austro-Hungarian Empire also created a new office for the administration of the religious affairs. “Reis-ul-Ulema” office and the “Medzlis-ul-Ulema” assembly were established in 1882. These bodies were established to administer all the religious affairs and related matters centrally. The Reis was going to be the religious head of Bosnian Muslims under Austro-Hungarian rule, and the Medzlis was going to act as the religious assembly to govern religious matters. Religious decisions were going to be made through discussions between the Medzlis and the Reis. The Reis was going to be appointed by the Austro-Hungarian Emperor, and the appointment would not be completed until the Sultan confirmed the appointee (Adanır, 2002, pp. 311–313; Babuna, 2012, pp. 58–59; Bougarel, 2017, p. 1; Donia, 1981, p. 21; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 107; Friedman, 2018, p. 72; Malcolm, 1996, p. 144; Okey, 2007, p. 47; Ramet, 1988, pp. 309–310). This post was expected to cover up much of the

complaints and religious inquiries coming from the Bosnian Muslims. However, the authority of the office was not appreciated by the target audience. The main reason for this was the appointment style for the office: as it was established as a tool for Austro-Hungarian control over Muslims' religious affairs, Reis-ul-Ulema was appointed by the Empire and not selected by the Muslims themselves. This was perceived as an act of Austro-Hungarian sovereignty over the religious affairs of the Muslims. Therefore, the Reis' decisions and orders were not taken into full consideration by the Muslims. Also, since the Ottoman Empire was expected to have full control over religious affairs as it was stated in the Novi Pazar (Istanbul) Convention of 1879, Bosnian Muslims expected the office to be directly connected to the Caliphate in Istanbul, which was the centre of all the world's Muslims (Babuna, 2012, p. 22; Pinson, 1994, pp. 93–94). But this also did not happen: Reis and the Medzlis were completely distant from the Caliphate in Istanbul. They were only seen as tools of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to keep Bosnian Muslims under control (Pinson, 1994, p. 95). Thus, although the establishment of the office was expected to be successful, the plans did not match the reality and the Austro-Hungarian ambitions about it were not met.

### ***2.3. Constituting a Political Body: Muslim National Organization (MNO)***

Another significant development that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is the social transformation they experienced. Lacking any political representative in Austro-Hungarian politics that legitimately stood for them in any legal matter, Bosnian Muslims were heavily relying on the elites and landowners as the upper class during the Austro-Hungarian rule, since these people were the traditional authorities that

managed the administration up until that time. The most important reason for this was the structures that were retained from Ottoman-era Bosnia. Muslim National Organization (Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija, abbreviated as MNO) was established in 1906 after a series of negotiations and attempts from the Bosnian Muslims to find themselves a place in the political sphere of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The organizations that were later going to be considered the machinery of the party were established around the year 1900 (Donia, 1981, p. 160; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 108; Pinson, 1994, p. 110). Rather than using the term “Bosnian”, the term “Muslim” was preferred in the name of this organization. Austro-Hungarian Joint Finance Minister Beni Kallay’s “Bosnianism” policy led to the introduction of identification as “Bosnian”. Kallay tried to address the concerns that could rise based on ethnic or national self-definitions, and insisted on the idea of being of “Bosnian” origin only, which all Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the regions would define themselves as (Babuna, 2012, p. 139; Pinson, 1994, p. 103). Thus, the distinct status that the Muslims in Bosnia held was tried to be reflected in the name of the political organization.

After the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia in 1878, the Muslims had been administered through relying on the religious bodies they had and they were trying to be administered through the offices created by the Empire such as the Reis-ul Ulema office. Since there was no such representative body up until the year it was formed, Muslim National Organization (MNO) could be considered as the most legitimate body that Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina had for their representation (Donia, 1981, pp. 169–172, 185). It had a structure very similar to a modern political party, such as having an executive committee. Among the party's demands were the autonomous administration of vakuf bodies, autonomous administration of the

religious affairs and political autonomy. Even if MNO received support from most of the Bosnian Muslims, they had some counterparties, namely the Muslim Progressive (Independent) Party which was supported only by a small group of Muslims who were pro-western, reform-minded intellectuals that called themselves “progressive Muslims”. However, they received very little support from the public. (Donia, 1981, p. 175; Imamović, 2006, pp. 230–233). The most important cause for this little support was the very narrow foundations that political parties had in the public, but Muslim Progressive Party was still among the biggest political movements of the era (Donia, 1981, pp. 175–176). But in any case, MNO can be seen as the first official step taken towards the existence of a distinct Bosnian Muslim identity. Up until that time, the only prominent ties that the Muslim society had were based on their personal networks and relationships, family ties and kinship. The roles that upper class, noble Bosnians held were due to their privileges gained through their landowning positions, and most of the time, these roles were inheritable by their families (Donia, 1981, p. 7; Pinson, 1994, p. 96). This case of family ties and kinship is most visible in kapetans’ and ayans’ offices since these authorities were represented by the members of prominent families that were landowners (Imamović, 2006, p. 143; Ortaylı, 1983, p. 56).

The representatives of MNO were at first mostly active about economic requests from the Empire since most of them were landowners or economically privileged people under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for the last few centuries. What the MNO representatives wanted was closely matching with what the landowners wanted since most party members and officials were landowners themselves. Their demands were mostly based on cultural, religious, and agrarian matters that are discussed as “vakuf-mearif autonomy movement” in the literature. This religious and

cultural autonomy movement, which is later on called “vakuf-mearif autonomy movement”, was the most important and fundamental policy focus of the political organization. MNO, as the sole representative of the Muslims, was committed to maintaining the rights of the landowners and worked for the autonomy of Muslims. Robert Donia suggests that they were struggling for such causes as “autonomy” because they knew that if autonomy for Muslims were granted, they would obtain greater political and administrative roles. Additionally, the Sultan would reassure his ties with the Muslims in Bosnia since he was the sole and ultimate leader of the Muslims around the world as the “Caliph”. Thus, establishing relationships with the Sultan would be much easier and in addition, the connection between the Bosnians and the Sultan could be created mainly on religion. If Bosnian Muslims had increased religious freedom or autonomy, they could build connections with the Sultan/Caliph more easily (Friedman, 2018, p. 71).

The autonomy statute which was finally governed in 1909 was among the greatest political leaps that the Bosnian Muslims took up until then. A number of bodies and assemblies were established for the Muslims’ self-governance. A provincial assembly as the supreme administrative organ was established, the Reis-ul-Ulema and Medzlis-ul-Ulema bodies were retained, and still, the people who would perform duties under these bodies were going to be selected by the Austro-Hungarian Emperor. As a result of the autonomy movement which began with a focus on vakuf-mearif (education) issues, elites of the Bosnian Muslims found themselves with legitimate political representatives in the end. Again, the hybridity pattern is clearly visible here. The Empire introduced their “democratic” models of political representation and administration for the modernization and transformation of the region, Muslims were eager to take place in the structures introduced by the

exogenous power for the continuation of their benefits, and both sides were making concessions to each other and taking what they desired at the same time.

Throughout the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia, administrative and political structures have had a great change along with the acknowledgement of existing conditions and structures. Muslims in Bosnia were a politically and administratively important group. And as mentioned by Imamović, as long as the Ottoman laws did not run contrary to the Austro-Hungarian principles of civic equality and public governance, there was no problem with retaining them (Imamović, 2006, p. 206).

Thus, the hybrid nature of Austro-Hungarian period relies on the case that it was equally important to retain what was functioning and what had to be introduced to develop what existed. Traditional government structures were as much important as the introduction of Austro-Hungarian methods and practices in these organizations. Blending the existing conditions with reforms was the most favourable method to eliminate the possibility of distraction in governance.

### **3. Actors: Landowners' Transformation from Elites to Legitimate Representatives**

It was possible to examine the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina under three classifications: “elites” such as landowners and prominent, senior figures, religious authorities, or entrepreneurs, “peasants” and “urban lower classes”. The most powerful ones, namely the elites, derived their power from the lands they hold (Babuna, 2012, pp. 57, 170–176; Donia, 1981, pp. 5–6). Landowners later on became the political representatives after the first political party of Muslims was established, which was discussed above. Hence, it would not be wrong to state that landowners were among the most prominent actors, especially under the conditions in which

ayans and kapetans, who were the officials under the Ottoman rule, were no longer in effect. They wanted to maintain the privileges they had for the last centuries (Donia, 1981, pp. 178–180; Okey, 2007, p. 47). As a response, Austro-Hungarian elites did not neglect the role that these Bosnian nobles and elites obtained. Bosnian elites were considered a part of the political order by the imperial rule as long as they maintained good relations with the Empire (Poulton, 1997, pp. 21–22). Austro-Hungarian Empire preserved the ethnic group leaders, in this case Muslim landowners, since they were sympathetic towards the imperial rule. As Donia suggested, the Austro-Hungarian government entered into a tacit alliance with the prominent, leading people among the Muslim society for mutual gains. In this way, both the existing figures of the local order were going to maintain their privileges and roles, and the imperial rule was going to be legitimized through gaining the support and trust of the prominent people of the local bodies, hence the trust of the population (Donia, 1981, p. 16).

Not only the landowning, upper class Bosnian Muslims were considered prominent actors in the society, but they were also the ones who were going to take place on the political stage as well (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 100; Imamović, 2006, p. 111). In the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian government, throughout the process where the bureaucracy was being centralized and new structures and bodies were being introduced, if one looked for the key figures from key administrative offices, there were Bosnian upper-class Muslims (Donia, 1981, p. 35). In cases where these figures were going to be replaced with Austro-Hungarian appointees, these new appointees must not have drawn negative attention. Thus, a balance between the new appointees and former Muslim officials had to be maintained, as it was the same for nearly every Austro-Hungarian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was actually

the will of the Ottoman Empire as well: contrary to wanting the masses to emigrate to Ottoman lands after the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the Ottoman government actually preferred the Muslims of Bosnia to remain in place so that the Ottoman Empire could maintain its impact over the region (Adanır, 2002, p. 313). As long as the Ottoman Sultan remained as the ultimate religious head for all Muslims, the connection between the Bosnian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire was thought to be secured. This is why the Austro-Hungarian rule feared the intensification of relationships with the Ottoman state: they did not want to risk their sovereignty over the region (Babuna, 2012, p. 88).

In the time of the creation of the Muslim National Organization (MNO), which was examined in detail in the previous sub-chapter, landowners were undisputedly the major figures of the Muslim society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and now they became the legitimate representatives of all Muslims and were intermediary figures between the public and the imperial rule (Donia, 1981, p. 178; Friedman, 2018, p. 75). As mentioned before, the formation of MNO was based on the actions and policies of the Muslim upper-class at the time. Even if their main concern was to retain the material, administrative privileges they had, they later represented the whole Muslim population politically and legitimately since they became the sole representative of Bosnian Muslims in Austro-Hungarian politics (Donia, 1981, p. 175). Additionally, their role was intensified since the line between the economic, religious, and personal ties of the Muslims was very difficult to draw and they had to focus on each one of them. Therefore, they bore much more responsibilities (Babuna, 2012, p. 53). The MNO leaders were seemingly pleased with the privileges they retained or gained under the Austro-Hungarian rule. As long as their specific demands, such as maintaining their privileged role or administrative offices, were

met, they were happy with co-operating with the imperial rule (Donia, 1981, p. 194). One other important examination about how the landlords became politically prominent figures lies in the vakuf-mearif autonomy movement. As it was studied in the sub-chapter above, the autonomy movement pointed out the requests and needs of the Muslim society as a whole. Thus, since the MNO representatives were the political, legitimate representatives of the Bosnian Muslims, their role was enhanced through the autonomy movement as well because they now were also in charge of the affairs after autonomy was granted.

After the formal declaration of the annexation of Bosnia on October 8<sup>th</sup>, 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Empire imposed some changes to create a legitimate political base for the future policies about Bosnian and Herzegovinian regions. However, after such drastic change, realities on the ground had to adapt themselves to the new structure as well. At the time, Serbian and Bosnian Muslim nationalist movements were among the strongest ones in the region (Imamović, 2006, p. 212). There was also the Serbian National Organization which was established in 1907 for the political representation of Serbs in Bosnia (Donia, 1981, p. 175; Malcolm, 1996, p. 151). Serbian nationalist movements outside Bosnia for an independent Serbia were simultaneously effective for the Serbs within Bosnia throughout the late 1870's. Any development that occurred for Serbs outside was internalized by Serbs in Bosnia, and the sense of being a "Serb" was being intensified, as Friedman argues (Friedman, 2018, p. 32). Hence, Muslims and Serbs appeared as the most unwilling groups to recognize the formal annexation of the lands due to their political strength. However, the only way for them to be a part of the new political structure after the annexation was to recognize it. By this time, a number of Muslims have already emigrated to Istanbul to continue to live under Ottoman rule. Muslim leaders were reluctant to

recognize the annexation immediately since they enjoyed the privileges retained from the Ottoman period. However, the prerequisite for the MNO to continue operating under the Austro-Hungarian rule was to recognize its authority and autonomy first. Thus, they recognized the annexation in 1910 (Donia, 1981, p. 174; Imamović, 2006, p. 242). As a political party and a significant part of society, Muslims wanted to remain on the stage since they were satisfied with their gains so far. They wanted to benefit from the constitution introduced the same year.

In 1910, the introduction of an Austrian constitution assured a system that would provide representation for political parties and aimed to have more moderate, ethnically-based political structures that would make matters easier for the Empire to govern (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 100). Thus, they had included the Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian Muslim ethnic groups' representative political parties in the newly formed assembly after the constitution. In this way, they would also discourage the Bosnian Muslims from their will of either connecting with the Ottoman Empire, and the Serbs or Croats from forming an independent state. This is another reason for their reluctance to be broken in 1910 and the recognition of the annexation (Donia, 1981, p. 174). A similar attitude was visible on the Austro-Hungarian side of the story as well: as long as the Muslim practices retained from Ottoman laws did not conflict with the principles of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they were acceptable and they could take place in political affairs (Imamović, 2006, pp. 202–203).

Another gain of the Muslims due to all these developments was the immediate politicization of the Muslim nationality that they would make use of during the Yugoslav period (Babuna, 2012, p. 81). In the end, even if World War I shattered all the existing conditions, the gain of the Bosnian Muslims was this organized party structure, bureaucratic experience, and a sense of political and national unity through

becoming the sole representative of Bosnian Muslims in the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Babuna argues that, the policies that the Austro-Hungarian Empire implemented can be presented as pro-Muslim or pro-Bosnian, and as a successful administration by the Empire (Babuna, 2012, p. 26; Friedman, 2018, p. 63). The prominent figures from Muslim society were selected or were admitted to the Austro-Hungarian methods of administration. In this way, both the local elites were pleased, and a more “legitimate and effective” administration was achieved (Imamović, 2006, pp. 202–203). Thus, from the perspective of hybridity, it can be claimed that the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted to maintain balance and tranquillity through gratifying the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims maintained the roles that they acquired during the Ottoman rule and the benefits that they gained for their political and national stance. The transformation of Bosnian Muslim landowners and upper-class elites into political figures is another important case here. Since hybrid political orders do not aim to transform what is existent, but to blend “the existent” and “the sought”, Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia reflects this very nature in numerous cases. The elites remaining as the upper class that politically represents all Bosnian Muslims is still another important case here. Maintaining their roles or administrative duties at the same time as acquiring new political roles was a significant development for Bosnian Muslims under the Austro-Hungarian rule. The give and take relationship between the two sides can be seen as the indicators of the hybridity patterns.

#### **4. Identities: Being a Muslim under Austro-Hungarian Rule**

As the prominent part of the society, upper-class Muslims spent centuries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire that privileged its coreligionists. This is why the Bosnian Muslims' willingness to maintain their privileges were examined more than once throughout this chapter. Under this subchapter, the connection between their religious identification and material gains will be examined, and the Austro-Hungarian response to matters related to their self-identification is going to be assessed.

##### ***4.1. The Importance of Religion in Identity Construction***

Austro-Hungarian authorities have taken Bosnian Muslims into consideration when they were concerned about their positions or privileges. As claimed before, the hybrid attitude that the Empire held towards its prominent society made a give and take relationship between two sides possible, and thus, the case between the two sides was the result of both sides' ambitions to protect their benefits. Starting to rule a region that consisted of many different societies with different identities was indeed a great challenge for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the only way to get into the affairs of these local communities was having an impact on its local authorities and community leaders, which were formed based on religion. In the meantime, keeping the Muslim-specific institutions and structures intact was necessary for the Austro-Hungarian authorities to comfort the Muslim society (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 143–144). The creation of Reis-ul-Ulema and Medzlis-ul-Ulema offices was thus very critical. Since Muslims were reluctant to embrace the new imperial rule, the Empire had to take this way to make an impact on them through instrumentalizing their self-identification. The fundamental distinctive

characteristic of the Muslims of Bosnia was religion since it was the feature that they relied on while distinguishing themselves from Serbs and Croats (Malcolm, 1996, p. 165). The main thinking behind this can be found in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which was based on the confessional classification that affected the ideas of people about belonging to a group on religious bases (Babuna, 2012, p. 173). The millet system was examined in detail under Chapter 3.

As suggested by Ramet, religion is a constitutive element of the group and national identities in the Balkans. It constitutes the centre of the culture of society throughout its evolution from a group to a nation; it helps people to distinguish themselves from others that belong to other confessions; it is the core of historical and linguistic accumulation of a nation; as it is the case for Bosnians, clergy takes up a great space in the leading positions of the religious community, and besides the inter-nation relations, inter-religious relations also carry great importance (Ramet, 1988, p. 299). As Sugar suggests, the combination of several factors related to religion is the most important cause for the constitution of the national consciousness of Bosnian Muslims. He suggests that even before the Ottoman era, then Muslims of Bosnia were distinct since they were even then not a part of the Orthodox or Catholic churches but were of their own “Bosnian” Church. They had a distinct characteristic when the Ottoman rule began, then they converted and still were distinct as Muslims. And during the Austro-Hungarian rule, they were a separate part of the society with the characteristics and privileges they obtained until then (Sugar, 1996a, p. 367).

With a combination of their characteristics before the Ottoman era, the ones they obtained during the Ottoman era, and the ones they gained throughout the Austro-Hungarian rule, Bosnian Muslims were indeed a nation-in-making throughout centuries. The end of the Austro-Hungarian rule marks great progress in this sense.

However, the case of Bosnian Muslims until the 21<sup>st</sup> century and their national consciousness is another case on its own. Bosnian Muslims' will for being equally treated alongside other national groups, and their rising nationalist awareness established on the formation of MNO and autonomy movements were important factors for the process of the existence of Bosnian Muslim group awareness. Their distinctiveness in terms of identification, their identity which is based on religion, and the possibility of the Muslim movement to turn into an extreme nationalist movement was thus a significant concern for the Austro-Hungarian Empire which sought peace and stability in its buffer zone before the Ottoman Empire. Bosnian Muslims' distinct characteristics about the "Bosnian Muslim" group identity were not in line with the ethnic/identity based nationalist understanding in Europe at that time. Hence, it was somewhat difficult to assess the policies regarding them precisely (Babuna, 2012, pp. 81–82; Pinson, 1994, p. 89).

#### **4.2. Beni Kallay's "Bosnianism" Policy**

One of the most significant cases about identities under the Austro-Hungarian rule is Beni Kallay's "Bosnianism" policy. This term of identification created by an Austro-Hungarian minister was thought to address the rising nationalist tendencies in the region which could sooner or later threaten the Empire, and was based on being of "Bosnian" origin only (Babuna, 2012, p. 139; Pinson, 1994, p. 103). As the habitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats all had their nationalist ambitions, ranging from autonomy to secession to their fatherlands. The promotion of nationalism and the spread of such ideas were the most apparent under the Austro-Hungarian rule (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 73; Imamović, 2006, p. 213). It was evident that the existence of independent Croatia and independent Serbia at the time was the

fundamental element of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat aims. However, lacking such a fatherland, Muslims of Bosnia were the critical part of the society in the eyes of the Empire. It would not be wrong to state that Muslims of Bosnia were the least nationally conscious group at the time of occupation since they were already the privileged group under the Ottoman rule, and there was no driving force for them to establish such identity (Ramet, 1988, p. 308). That being said, the prominence of Muslims in the region has been discussed more than once throughout this study, and with the matter related to the fatherland mentioned earlier, “Bosnianism” policy was fundamentally aiming at the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 97; Malcolm, 1996, pp. 148–149). This policy implemented by Austrian authorities aimed to have Serbian and Croat nationalists under control and to prevent any uprising that they could start since Serbian nationalism was seen as the most probable one to start such an uprising as the strongest one, as well as their will to prevent the “Muslim” national identity from the formation (Adanır, 2002, p. 318; Donia & Fine, 1994, p. 97; Imamović, 2006, p. 212). Introducing an identity which is above all confessional or national tendencies, but aiming at only belonging to the lands where they live, Bosnianism was tried to be used to appease any unease that could rise on secessionist ambitions (Donia, 1981, pp. 17–18; Friedman, 2018, p. 64; Ramet, 1988, p. 309).

However, Muslims of Bosnia kept seeing themselves as a part of the Muslim ummah rather than a part of the Bosnian nation (Adanır, 2002, p. 316; Friedman, 2018, p. 64). Cases such as their willingness to re-establish ties with the Sultan as the ultimate leader of Muslims, and their autonomy requests based on their religious practices are the indicators of this. One other case that the identities are seen to make an important issue is the conscription law of 1881 that obliged all males in Bosnia to be

conscripted in Austro-Hungarian army. Before the Austro-Hungarian rule began, only Muslims or “devshirme” Christians were serving for the army. However, this time, a Christian empire was pressuring all its people to take place in its army. The immediate response from the public was revolts and unrest. The revolt against the conscription law was pacified by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the reaction this decision drew posed a great challenge against them (Babuna, 2012, p. 30; Donia, 1981, p. 33; Malcolm, 1996, p. 138).

## **5. Conclusion**

The Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be identified as the era that the hybridity patterns are the most visible. As suggested through the theoretical background, the relationship between the indigenous and exogenous sides of hybrid political orders can be examined on some bases, such as the presence of traditional leaders in new political systems or the attribute attached to the values, norms, or traditions of the local public. In this chapter which examined the Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the specific cases suggested by the theory are visible. The maintenance of the traditional administrative structures, the continuity in the prominence of local elites and figures, the cautious attitude of the exogenous imperial power regarding the existing order, and the advantages drawn by both sides while they comply with the other side’s preconditions or ambitions are the indicators of hybridity. Thus, the hybrid nature of the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austro-Hungarian rule was tried to be specified throughout the chapter. A regime that was tried to be built after the centuries-long Ottoman rule in the region, which created its own elite class, Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, can be defined as a successful period with many misfortunes. Taking

into consideration the existing political conditions between 1878-1914, Austro-Hungarian Empire had to take care of the region, modernize it, introduce reforms and bureaucracy, and had to keep itself away from the rising nationalism which brought the end of its rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1914. Until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the World War I, which began in 1914, the Austro-Hungarian rule and the Bosnian Muslims maintained a progressive, mutually fruitful relationship that both sides have benefitted. And one of the most important takes from this era is the construction of Bosnian national identity.



## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The Bosnian society has experienced the rule of several empires and authorities, and the identification of the constituent nations (i.e., Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims) today has been gradually shaped throughout centuries. In this thesis, the extent of the involvement, the role, and the authority of ethnic groups in the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been discussed. And it can be argued that nearly in all periods, as much as the authorities at the time allowed, ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to take place in politics, and the political structures have always been complicated under such circumstances. The periods covered in this study (i.e., the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire) includes critical events regarding the increase of national self-identification and the emergence of ethnic groups as constituent nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, these two specific periods are seen as the roots of the “already hybridised” conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

### 1. Findings

This thesis aimed to investigate the historical patterns of socio-political order in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and current periods in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a part of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was concluded with the help of international efforts. Additionally, the presence of international powers and their impact in the reconstruction process were examined. It was seen that the discussions about Bosnia and Herzegovina in the literature mostly revolved around the mixed, uneven results of the peacebuilding processes after the

Dayton Agreement. It was also found that the causes of these results of peacebuilding process and the war in the region were very similar.

As one of the causes of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the pursuit of independence of distinct ethnic groups within a state can be discussed. The background about the case was presented in Chapter 1. Principally, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a series of wars in which each republic in the Federation aimed to secede and gain independence. While some of the countries such as Croatia and Slovenia were able to declare independence peacefully and immediately, some of the countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced deeper and longer lasting conflicts. As a significant case, Bosnia and Herzegovina was examined in this thesis in detail.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was studied in many different ways in the contemporary literature, especially after the Dayton Agreement, but a connection between the past and the contemporary was not extensively studied. The cases which were mostly examined in the contemporary studies were the relationship between the “international” and “local” in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the shortcomings of the post-Dayton conditions in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina related to this relationship. Hence, this thesis aimed to investigate if there was any similar relationship in the past periods of the region. Through this investigation, periods under the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were found to be periods containing similar features. The most important commonalities between the historical and the contemporary periods were the multi-ethnic, multi-religious conditions in society, and the challenges that these conditions brought to the governance and administration.

Hybridity was the main concept that helped conduct this study and it was discussed in detail in Chapter 2. The main reason for this was the extensive literature that exists

on Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war and post-Dayton Agreement reconstruction processes. The concept of "hybridity" itself was introduced after the peacebuilding policies of the post-Cold War period fell short of creating long lasting, self-sustainable orders in post-conflict societies. It underlined the necessity to consider the local dynamics in the reconstruction processes and the need to create a hybridized political order during the reconstruction to better address the problems. The connection between examinations on the current-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and findings on hybrid patterns in the post-war reconstruction and the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule that carried similar characteristics helped in creating the outline of this thesis. The most important reason for this was the very similar societal structure that each period held and the challenges that each period experienced due to this structure.

In the part that elaborated on hybridity and the "local turn in peacebuilding" in Chapter 2, this thesis aimed to evaluate the concept under three sub-chapters that focused on structures, actors, and identities. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods were also assessed with the same tripartite classification under the third and fourth chapters. The concepts and features studied under the chapter on hybrid political orders were thus easier to follow in the chapters that evaluated historical information. Therefore, the analysis was conducted in a more orderly manner that helped demonstrate the whole case within a defined framework. Throughout the Chapter 2 that focused on the hybridity concept, the transformation from peacebuilding, the evaluation of the shortcomings of peacebuilding policies, and the ways that hybrid political orders gained significance were examined. Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the 1990s was investigated regarding hybrid

patterns, and similar patterns were investigated again in the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian periods.

Throughout this thesis, it was found that one of the most critical components of the hybrid political orders that were implemented in the 1990s' Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the ethnic classification of people, had their roots in the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian periods, which were examined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The studies showed that the conversion of Bosnians to Islam under the Ottoman rule provided them with certain administrative, economic, and societal benefits. Living in such a way for centuries, the identity of the Bosnian Muslims started to emerge under such conditions. As a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, the Ottoman Empire experienced challenges in the administration of peoples and lands. Under the third chapter that focused on the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the administrative structures, the significant political and societal actors, and the concerns related to identity were examined. It was found that through the land management system "timar", and the endowment system "vakuf", the Ottoman Empire tried to accommodate local noble Bosnians in its own administrative system. As the most prominent actors, these noble Bosnians converted to Islam and were again given significant duties for the implementation of the rules of the Empire: they were selected as local governors that represented the Empire. The religious administration of the Ottoman Empire and the conversion of Bosnians to Islam were also discussed under the same chapter and it was found that there were both material and non-material motivations for the local Bosnians to convert to Islam.

In sum, within the chapter that focused on the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was found that, just as in the case of international community that tried to introduce its systems and norms, the Ottoman Empire tried to introduce its

characteristic structures to the region. One of the hybrid patterns that was found in this specific period was the appointment of local Bosnians in Ottoman administrative offices, preventing most of the conflicts that could occur due to the Empire imposing its own structures, norms, and institutions. The connection with the contemporary, post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen through the similarities of this introduction of institutions and structures to the “local” from an “external” power and the emergence of a combination of these two powers in both periods.

Hybridity patterns were even more visible during the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when Bosnian Muslims acquired political representation. The period was examined in Chapter 4. It was demonstrated in the chapter that the Austro-Hungarian rule in the region aimed at maintaining some of the existing political, societal, and administrative conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the sake of its stability and development. In the meantime, they introduced several new policies and structures to the region to the greatest extent where these new policies would be accepted and get responded to by the public.

The thesis tried to demonstrate that, as suggested by the literature on hybrid political orders, there was no more a “local” and “external” order during the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather, there was a new combination of Bosnian and Austro-Hungarian practices. This indicated that under that period, the conditions were very similar to the ones that are in effect in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. The features examined under this chapter were the issues related to vakuf endowments that emerged under the Ottoman rule and the establishment of new offices regarding the administration of the region. It was found that the Austro-Hungarian Empire acknowledged the conditions and the importance of the religious characteristics the people carried, hence their attempts to create offices that would

address the concerns of the public regarding the extent to which religion guides administration. This is why a new office called Reis-ul-Ulema was established by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to address the religious concerns of Muslims in Bosnia. Additionally, it was stated that the first political party that represented Muslims, namely the Muslim National Organization, was founded during the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The similar patterns with the contemporary conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina today were found especially in these cases under the Austro-Hungarian rule, which were investigated in Chapter 4. Just as the Bosnian Muslims were considered as a constituent nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and were a part of the new political structure, they also took part in administration under the Austro-Hungarian rule. Moreover, Muslims in Bosnia were represented with political parties and thus took part in the newly introduced political systems under the Austro-Hungarian rule. This is also relevant for Muslims in Bosnia in the contemporary period as they also participate in government and politics through the ethnic-based political parties. Regarding the actors, it was found that under the Austro-Hungarian rule, similarly to the Ottoman rule, prominent actors in the society, namely the noble Bosnians, took part in the administrative structures and were considered among the actors in the political stage. The landowners and nobles of the Ottoman period, a part of Bosnian Muslims became the political representatives of their group. And lastly regarding the identities, “Bosnianism” policy that the Austro-Hungarian Empire tried to implement was examined. It was found that to prevent future conflicts that might emerge as a result of ethnic backgrounds of people, Austro-Hungarian Empire tried to introduce an “identity” that would involve every person that lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is also similar to the contemporary conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since

today, regardless of their self-definition, all people that live in Bosnia and Herzegovina hold the “Bosnian” citizenship and are part of a “Bosnian” society that are represented by a “pan-Bosnian” parliament.

Finally, as for the further research opportunities that this thesis can present, the case of “Herzegovina” can be discussed first. Herzegovina and Bosnia were distinct regions under the Ottoman rule, and most of the cases covered in this thesis took place in Bosnian region. Thus, a detailed investigation on Herzegovina in a similar way could enrich the existing literature. Additionally, other studies on the specific periods defined in this thesis might cover the cases of Bosnian Croats’ and Bosnian Serbs’ separate national movements could supplement the existing literature. In both cases, further research on hybrid patterns in governance, administration, and public order would create supporting studies that would contribute to the literature. Since the continuities that were investigated in this thesis were based on the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods and today; a study that investigates the period under Yugoslavia would provide the literature with a fruitful study, as well.

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