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**BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**WHAT MAKES PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN  
PALESTINE AND ISRAEL TO BE IN IMPASS**

**Master's Thesis**

**MOHAMMED ZAINO**

**ISTANBUL, 2021**



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BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**GRADUATE SCHOOL  
GLOBAL AFFAIRS MASTER PROGRAM**

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**Supervisor: ASST. PROF. DR. DENİZ TANSI**

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GRADUATE SCHOOL**

25/5/2021

**MASTER THESIS APPROVAL FORM**

<b>Program Name:</b>	GLOBAL AFFAIRS
<b>Student's Name and Surname:</b>	MOHAMMED ZAINO
<b>Name Of The Thesis:</b>	WHAT MAKES PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL TO BE IN IMPASS
<b>Thesis Defense Date:</b>	25th MAY 2021

This thesis has been approved by the Graduate School which has fulfilled the necessary conditions as Master thesis.

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## ABSTRACT

### WHAT MAKES PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN PALSTINE AND ISRAEL TO BE IN IMPASSE

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May 2021, 55

In the history of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, many rounds of peace talks conducted, and still the peace process seems to be in impasse. In my thesis, and through studying each round of peace process between Palestine and Israel, I am questioning the obstacles which faces peace process. I found three major factors that made peace process to be in impasse. First, the leadership of each party and to which extent they represent the interests of their people, and the role of the opposition and the changes in the leadership. Second, the sensitive role of mediator in the process due to specialty of the conflict, and the US monopoly over the mediation. Third, the imbalance of power between the parties and how that makes the peace process to be based on the interests of the party who has the power.

**Keywords:** Palestine, Israel, US, Peace Process, Conflict

## ÖZET

### FİLİSTİN VE İSRAİL ARASINDAKİ BARIŞ SÜRECİNİ ÇIKMAZA SOKAN NEDİR

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Filistin-İsrail çatışması tarihinde birçok barış görüşmesi yapıldı ve hala barış süreci çıkmaza girmiş gibi görünüyor. Tezimde ve Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki barış sürecinin her turunu inceleyerek, barış sürecinin önündeki engelleri sorguluyorum. Barış sürecini çıkmaza sokan üç ana faktör buldum. Birincisi, her partinin liderliği ve halkının çıkarlarını ne ölçüde temsil ettikleri ve muhalefetin rolü ve liderlikteki değişiklikler. İkincisi, arabulucunun bu süreçte hassas rolü, çatışmanın uzmanlığı ve arabuluculuk üzerindeki ABD tekeli ile ilişkilidir. Üçüncüsü, taraflar arasındaki güç dengesizliği ve bunun barış sürecini iktidara sahip olan tarafın çıkarlarına nasıl dayandırdığı.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Filistin, İsrail, ABD, Barış Süreci, Çekişme

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## ABBREVIATIONS

EU	: European Union
ICC	: International Criminal Court
IDF	: Israel Defense Forces
PFLP	: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLA	: Palestine Liberation Army
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	: Prime Minister
PNA	: Palestinian National Authority
UN	: United Nations
US	: United States of America
UNRWA	: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The studying of Arab-Israeli conflicts is important to understand the dynamics in the Middle East, and to draw the lessons from one of longest and bloodiest modern conflicts in the world. Palestine as the central of these conflicts consider the most critical case here. Its importance comes from its status for the three heavenly religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) (Bliss, 2011). And of course, it has a central location in Afro-Eurasia. Beside to that, it has along coast in the Mediterranean Sea, and it connects between Red Sea and Indian Ocean form one side with the Mediterranean Sea on the other side (Biger, 2004). This importance made this land coveted for all Empires and superpowers through the history.

The conflict between Palestine and Israel is worth researching for political sciences and international relations researchers due to its significance in post-World War II era. This conflict costed the world many years of political and economic instability. And it made millions of people to suffer from the displace, poverty, illness and death. The conflict was exploited form superpowers in the world which engaged directly and indirectly in the conflict to protect their interests in the region. The history and religion exploited too in this conflict. Many wars and confrontations took place in this conflict and caused ten-thousandths of casualties and damages.

Through these long years, there were many attempts for conflict resolution, but it always faces many obstacles and Vetoes. I think it is very important for conflict resolution researchers to study these attempts. Many parties engaged in this conflict and peace process. Different tools have been used in conflict resolution for this case. This process and for long time is considered from the top cases in all International entities, groups and organizations .

In my thesis, I am studying the obstacles that face the peace process between Palestine and Israel. It is important to understand what made peace process between Palestine and Israel to not accomplish significant progress. In my study, I am trying to give a comprehensive view for the most negatively effective factors on the peace process. I think the study searches the issues from inside which is close to the people needs and vision rather than considering just the politics and academy, that's because I am from this environment.

As being form inside the environment of the study, I have passion to study the history of the conflict and peace process, especially the studies searching the problems that complicate the peace process. I also have interests and expertise in security studies and conflict resolutions.

In the first chapter, I will give a background for history of the conflict between Palestine and Israel. I will discuss the question of the success or fail of the diplomacy between Palestine and Israel, I will go through the history of the negotiation between the two parties since 1993, then I will discuss the current situation, and I will take a look at the future of this diplomacy.

I assume that the diplomacy between Palestine and Israel seems to be at an impasse, and there is no future for making peace between the parties under the same circumstances. In my discussion, I will try to examine these hypotheses:

- i. The lack of people's goals and needs representation in Oslo accords made it less acceptable.
- ii. The failure of peace talks between Palestine and Israel changes the public opinion negatively in both sides toward the whole peace process.
- iii. People dissatisfaction from Oslo accord increased the popularity of the opposition of Oslo accords in both Palestinian and Israeli side.

- iv. Mediator's bias obstructed the settlement between Palestine and Israel
- v. Oslo accords might be more acceptable in the Palestinian public opinion if it met at least what international law granted for them
- vi. More sanctions or rewards might make Israel to accept the settlement with Palestine.
- vii. The involvement of most of the political parties in each side and their consensus is the key for sustainable peace

The discussion will be about three factors which I will discuss separately in three chapters:

First: The leadership and representation of people. In this part I will discuss, to which extent the peace process present the interests and needs of people in both sides, And do the interests and needs of people lead to peace or not? Also I want to study the formation of mindset of people in both sides and how this mindset changes over the time and how that affects the peace process. In addition to that, I want to study the leadership in peace process, do the leaders in both sides really present their people and how the changes in leadership affect the peace process? I also want to discuss about the future of the mindset of people and the future of leadership which will affect the future of the peace process. I used the election outcomes from both sides to measure the changes in public opinion and leadership.

Second: The mediator: I will discuss here the problem of the mediation in peace process between Palestine and Israel. I will discuss the problem of single mediator in the peace process between Palestine and Israel, and how the mediation of US in the process increase the imbalance between Palestine and Israel though the empowerment of Israel. I will study the changes in US administration and how that affect the peace process between

Palestine and Israel, and I will study the attitude of each administration in the peace process From Bill Clinton to Donald Trump.

Third: the imbalance of power between the parties: I will study the nature of the peace process between Palestine and Israel, and I will explain how the imbalance of power between them make the peace talks does not work. And how that makes peace process to go in one direction which meets the more powerful side. I will argue about role that should be played by outsider mediator to balance the process between the parties through the tools of empowerments and sanctions.

Since entire my study is about history, and I almost used historical research method, so I relied on collecting data form its primary resources in the first and some secondary resources of course. As primary resources, I found a very primary source of the data, which are leaks from the office of Palestinian Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat. The leaks are about 1700 documents related to the negotiations between Palestine and Israel with the involvement of United States. The documents contain meeting minutes, e-mails, memos, diplomatic correspondences, maps, strategy papers and Power Point presentations too. These leaks had been released by Aljazeera Media Network in January, 2011 and contain details of the peace talks form 1999 to 2010.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

I searched for the literatures that discussed issues similar to my research questions which are: What made each round of peace talks between Palestine and Israel to fail? What are the explanations for the freezing of negotiations between Palestine and Israel? What are the obstacles that might face the peace process between Palestine and Israel in the future?

Most of the literatures that studied the failure of peace process between Palestine and Israel didn't take inconsideration the wellness of people. Most of the researches studied the general issues and factors and major events but little studied the base, the people and their goals, interests and needs. Most of the studies ignored the role of People and the real representations for their interests, in the Palestinian side especially. And I think this is the flame of the conflict and the base for any settlement.

I tried to study the literatures that studied the case comprehensively and viewed most of the aspects of the case. And I didn't take inconsideration the literatures which studied just the action and reaction in a specific events.

I will list here the summaries of three article that I chose and I will write my review in the end of each summary.

(Thrall, 2017) The writer stated that many international summits, secret negotiations, peace plans, UN resolution and state building programs have been failed in finding a proper solution for Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The writer assumes that there is a shortage

in the explanation of why each round of the talks failed. Some observers see the negotiation rounds effected by some events led to its failure. So, Oslo Accords affected by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and The Wye River Memorandum and Israeli Withdrawals from west bank did not implement because of the coalition of Israeli Labor Party with Netanyahu, Camp David talks in 2000, Taba talks 2001, and road map to peace 2003 failed because it was dissatisfying for the Palestinians and followed by the second Intifada, beside the power in US and Israel moved to the right wing. So the writer was not satisfied by theses explanations, so he searched for a comprehensive reasons to understand the case.

For the Palestinians, they won't accept to set for talks unless the talks meet the minimum offers supported by International law, which mean an independent state in pre-1967 borders with the Capital of East Jerusalem, and return of the refugees not to their homes but to the new born state of Palestine.

For Israel, the cost of the deal is higher than the cost of no deal. Losing the control over the holy place of Jerusalem, and west bank may result for Israel a clash with the some Jewish groups, and may cause terrible security issues with the Palestinians in west bank, so it become a threat like Gaza. Beside of losing nature resources of west bank especially the water. And also cause them a financial cost of relocation of the settlers. And in return they only get to normalize their relations with other nations in the region like Saudi Arabia and Emirates. And receive additional financial support form US and Europe.

So the writer sees that for Israeli decision maker's mind, it is irrational to make a deal with these extensive cost in return with small benefits, even they got some of it without making the deal. They receive a real financial and security support from US, and some of nations in the region start to take inconsideration to normalize the relation with Israel without agreement about the Palestinian case. So the writer suggested two options that

make the agreement is more attractive to Israel. First option: offering Israel full normalization of the relations in the region with more financial and security support, which has been tried extensively. Second option: making the fallback of the agreement worse. And that can be done through many things, which he suggests:

- i. Sanctions from US toward Israel.
- ii. Cut or reduce the financial and security support
- iii. Empowerment of Palestinians, especially in the international institutions.
- iv. UN taking a role against the occupation of west bank.

The writer in this article suggested that the only language that could advance the settlements between Palestine and Israel, is the US sanctions against Israel. The writer ignored that fact that Israel is the most strategic ally for US in Middle East. And this alliance is very essential for the both sides. So I think US would not sacrifice this alliance in favor of pushing the settlement with Palestine. The alliance with Israel is top priority in the American policies in Middle East, and all the other issues is more secondary including the settlement of Palestinian cause. The writer didn't discuss the alternative for the mediation, which I think is the right view for fixing this problem.

(Slater, 2001) Talking about the history of the conflict between Palestinian and Israelis, the writer argues that Israel primarily responsible of the 1948 war and its consequences. And by refusing to acknowledge its role in the conflict beside not willing to take the moral responsibilities of these consequences, Israel missed a number of opportunities to settle the conflict with the Palestinians. When we talking about responsibilities of Israel toward the consequences of the conflict we mainly means the responsibility of refugees issue and end the occupation of the lands that occupied in 1967 and dismantling the settlement in west bank, which are the main issues of the final-status of the negotiations.

Another reason why the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis collapsed is the imbalance of power between the parties, he argues. Israeli party is much more powerful than the Palestinian side and the former mostly has the power in the ground and could manipulate the peace process through this power, by creating facts in the ground that help their interests and make the deal between the parties impossible. The writer discussed the role of United States in empowering Israeli part by giving financial and security support and that led to increase the imbalance between both of the parties.

The writer talked about the role of Zionism and how its thoughts contradict with the existence of Palestinian state. And how the Israeli leaders -not just the rightist leaders but the leftists as well- committed to these thoughts in their speeches, actions and election promises. The writer took the example of Barak.

The writer discussed the responsibility of United States in the collapse of the peace process between Palestinians and Israeli. Instead of taking the role of fair mediator, United States collaborated with Israel in blaming the Palestinians. And through the entire history of the conflict, United States provided nearly unconditional moral, diplomatic, economic, and military support for Israel. And how that make the imbalance between both parties which made Israel stronger in the ground, and motivated Israel for creating facts in the ground which later became obstacles for settling. The Writer discussed in detail the role of President Clinton, who is by the way democrat, in supporting Israel both in the ground and in the negotiation especially in the case of settlements in West Bank. The writer thinks that the reason why United States give unconditional support to Israel is the threats that the former faces from some Islamic and Arab states. The writer suggest that United States should separate between its interests in supporting Israel and use the support to force Israel to settle with the Palestinians, and they had previously done that during war against Egypt in 1956.

In this article too, the writer suggested more direct role for US in pushing Israel to the settlement with Palestinians. And I think this is not possible regarding to the strong relationship and the strategic alliance between US and Israel.

(Barak, 2005) The writer illustrated the failure of Oslo process by showing how an inter-group conflict between Palestinians and Israelis treated as inter-state conflict, and how this way of framing the conflict was an obstacle for making an agreement between the parties. So, the writer assumes that these two groups, Zionist Movement representing the Israeli party and Palestinian National Movement representing the Palestinian party, both of them as all human groups have needs, interests and goals for identity and security which is unfulfilled. And the goals of the two groups are contradictory, and here where the conflict raised.

Since we are talking about groups not a state, we need some caution when we use the terms of decision making and Negotiation. For Negotiation in inter-group conflict, it does not produce a formal agreement, rather than that it is informal and just produce joint understanding and formulations. Second: decision making within the groups is more fluid and lack of legitimate authority, which is very clear in our case. Where I will present instead the problem of leadership and representation in both parties.

The writer again illustrated that “final-status issues could suggest that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was, in effect, an intergroup conflict, became 'taboos' that could not be addressed” . Where Jerusalem represent an identity-based conflict and territorial dispute. And Refugees issue represent need of diaspora for Palestinians. And settlement represent the issue of “facts in the ground” and all these three issues is clue for inter-group conflict.

Also the writer argued about the leadership's needs and goals of each party, and how it was extremely criticized by other leadership within each group by saying how these needs do not present the real needs of the entire group. For the Palestinians, the opponent of Oslo accord was not just from Islamic and leftist parties, but also some members of FATAH (whose leader Arafat signed the accord) and some of opponent of the accord tried to obstruct the agreement by launching attacks on Israeli side. And for Israeli side, the right wing totally refused the agreement which signed by the leader of Labor party Rabin. Further than that, in 1994, Israeli settler massacred 48 Palestinian in Hebron mosque in order to derail the peace process. More than that, in 1995 Rabin himself has been assassinated by a rightist group in order to eliminate the peace process. And not long after that, the right wing came to power and didn't leave it since then.

The writer talked about the ideal way of peace process where two parties are bargaining by giving up items in return of other items, so the process is interest-based negotiations. And the process sustains by the Balance of power between the parties, and third-party commitments. And that was not presented in our case, where we have an imbalance of power between the parties.

The writer argued that the aim of Oslo Accord was to build a trust between the parties which can let them discuss in steps the outstanding issues. But also, the accord failed to bring that because of the misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict which discussed earlier in the article. The accord differentiated between the issues of the conflict, issues to be resolved during the interim period, and final status issues which were postponed. And the misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict make both parties to utilize the interim period to affect the final status issues. So, the settlements in west bank more than doubled, and the Palestinians too tried to defy the green line by launching attacks within Israeli proper, he argues.

Lastly, the writer talked about the role of outsiders, he illustrated the sensitive role of the mediator to assist and help the parties especially where there is no recognition between the parties like in our case. And the need of mediator to guarantee the accomplishment of the agreement in the case of imbalance of power between the parties like in our case. He described how the mediator become an obstacle to peace by being biased to one of the parties. He gave example of US president when he blamed the Palestinians for the failure of camp David summit. Since the article published in 2005, many things can be discussed about the mediation like the lack of brave of the role of President Obama, and the irresponsible actions of President Trump to eliminate the peace process.

The writer illustrated how both sides, Palestine and Israel, treated as states in peace process and suggested looking form group view rather than state could be more effective in conflict resolution process. I agree with him to some extent, but he gave less attention to the fact that there is a huge gap between the power of the parties. Israel is an independent and globally recognized state, considered form the most powerful States in the region, has nuclear weapon, and supported by very strong allies like US. Unlike Palestine, which is not a state yet, disarmed authority, and doesn't have full control over its entities. And I think this gap is the key for understanding the obstructed peace process.

## **2.1 HYPOTHESIS:**

- i. The lack of people's goals and needs representation in Oslo accords made it less acceptable.
- ii. The failure of peace talks between Palestine and Israel changes the public opinion negatively in both sides toward the whole peace process.
- iii. People dissatisfaction from Oslo accord increased the popularity of the opposition of Oslo accords in both Palestinian and Israeli side.
- iv. Mediator's bias obstructed the settlement between Palestine and Israel

- v. Oslo accords might be more acceptable in the Palestinian public opinion if it met at least what international law granted for them
- vi. More sanctions or rewards might make Israel to accept the settlement with Palestine.
- vii. The involvement of most of the political parties in each side and their consensus is the key for sustainable peace



### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1 EFFECTIVE MEDIATION

The guidance of United Nations for mediation define it as voluntary process “whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements”

There are three approaches for mediation which are:

Facilitative mediation: the role of mediator here to focus on organizing and facilitating communication between the disputed parties in a non-directive manner. The mediator here avoids making recommendations and suggestions.

Formulative mediation: the mediator here plays more directive role. Besides making the structure of the peace process, the mediator offers solutions and drafts for the agreements.

Power-based mediation: the mediator encourages the parties to make agreement deploying his power and uses different tactics to achieve the agreements. The tactics include threats of punishments and sanctions, and promises of reward and support (carrot and stick approach)

### 3.2 STATEHOOD:

According to International law, sovereign state is a political entity practicing sovereignty in a defined geographical area, has a permanent population, represented by a government and has the capability to enter into relations with other sovereign states.

This definition is combined between the two theories of sovereign state; constitutive theory of State hood and declarative theory. In constitutive theory, a state considers a sovereign only if it gets the recognition by at least one other state. On the other hand, and according to declarative theory, state can exist if it has: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government and a capacity to make relations with other states. So, in declarative theory, a sovereign state can exist without the recognition of other states.

#### *De jure and de facto States*

According to International Law, if a political entity is recognized as being the legitimate government of a territory where they have no actual control then it is a de jure state. And if a political entity actually controls a territory but it lack to international recognition then it is a de facto state.

## 4. BACKGROUND

### 4.1 THE CONFLICT

The story of the conflict between Jewish people and Palestinian people started in Basel city where the First Zionist Congress located in 1897. The congress was the first step in building a state for Jewish people in Palestine. The congress founded the Zionist Organization, called for the emigration of Jewish people to Palestine, created “People Bank” to finance the emigration, and put agenda to remove any political obstacle to achieve this goal (Slater, 2001). Ottoman Empire -the actual ruler of Palestine at that time- realized the political goals behind the emigration of Jewish people to Palestine, so The Sultan put restrictions to this emigration of Jewish People to Palestine. This was the case till the end of World war I, when Ottoman Empire defeated in the war and Palestine fall to the British Mandate (Oke, 1982).

During the World war I, British Government through its Prime Minister gave a promise to Zionist Organization to ease the emigration of Jewish people to Palestine and help them to establish their own state, which known as Balfour Declaration. British Government fulfilled its promise to Zionist Organization during its mandate to Palestine after the war. The number of Jewish people in Palestine in 1918 was around 50,000 people, at the end of British Mandate in 1947 the number jumped to be more than 600,000 people. This made huge changes in the demography of Palestine. And later this led to conflicts between the militia of the new Jewish immigrants and the Arab indigenous (Lubbad, 2007). In 1936, Palestinians made a strike all over the country to resist against the biased Mandate and against the Zionist movement. The strike made British Mandate to think about two

state solution for the first time. These thoughts matured in 1947 by the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, known as Resolution 181.

### *United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine*

A resolution by the general assembly of United nation suggested the elimination of British Mandate to Palestine and recommended the partition of the land of Palestine to three parts:

- a. Arab State: the places which had Arab majority (West Galilee, West Bank and southern coast) which was almost 42% of Palestine.
- b. Jew State: the places which had Jewish majority (the coast from Haifa to Tel Aviv, East Galilee and Negev) which almost 57% of Palestine.
- c. Corpus Separatum in Jerusalem: a international regime to control the holy places in Jerusalem due to its importance to the three religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism)

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations after getting 33 votes with and 13 against. The Palestinian and Arab leaders refused the resolutions because it is against the self determination of the Palestinian people which guaranteed by the law of the League of Nations. The Jew leaders accepted the resolution and mostly satisfied with its outcomes (Sinanoglou, 2009).

The resolution used to be a reference in the peace talk, because its importance by being a United Nation resolution, besides being the first proposal for the resolution of Palestine-Israel conflict based in two-states.

### *1948 War*

The real outcome of the resolution was the end of British mandate to Palestine, so the absence of British role in the conflict between the Zionist armed group and Palestinian revolutionists. These fights caused what known as 1948 War. The fights started almost in November 1947 between the Palestinians and Jew Groups (Hagenah, Irgun and Lehi) and later after the withdrawal of British Forces the coalition of Arab countries joint the war. The war considered the first war between Arab and Jew (Said, 2001)

#### *Results of the 1948 war:*

- i. Jew Militia took over the land of Palestine except West Bank and Gaza Strip
- ii. Foundation of Israel State in these lands
- iii. West Bank became under the control of Jordan
- iv. Gaza Strip became under the control of Egypt
- v. More than 700,000 Palestinian became displaced, fled from their home in the occupied land to West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and other neighboring countries.

In December 1948, UN imposed 194 resolution to guarantee the right of return for the refugees or giving compensations for who won't return. The importance of this resolution is considered a base in the following negotiations (Rempel, 2020).

#### *Foundation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):*

So, as we see, Israeli State was founded, and the authority over the rest of the Palestinian territories distributed between Jordan and Egypt, Jordan took the control over West Bank and Egypt took the control over Gaza Strip, so there is not a Palestinian State neither a Palestinian authority. In 1964, Palestine Liberation Organization was founded from Cairo

and recognized by Arab States as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian People. The Organization contained most of the active Palestinian Movements at that time, but mostly dominated by FATAH Movement. The goal of The Organization was to liberate Palestine through armed struggle (Becker, 2014)

### *6 Days War 1967*

In 1967, Israel reunited the historical land of Palestine by occupying the rest of the Palestinian Land, West Bank and Gaza Strip, besides, Sinai from Egypt and Golan highest from Syria, during six days war, which is initially started by Israel after the threats of Egyptian president Nasser. UN imposed 242 resolution, which required Israel to withdraw to 1967 borders. And obligated Arab states to accept the right of Israel to live in peace. The resolution never implemented but it considered a base in the negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis. The borders of two-state resolutions mostly refer to this resolution (Quigley, 2007)

### *KARAMEH Battle*

One year later, Palestine Liberation Organization fought its first war beside the Jordanian Army against Israeli Army. The later tried to occupy the village of Karameh at the east of Jordanian Valley, for purpose of eliminating the Palestinian Liberation Army which located in a camp around Karameh village. PLA is the armed wing of PLO, based in Jordan, started to target Israeli soldiers and settlers in West Bank. The war lasted in 15 hours by the withdrawal of Israeli Army without achieving their goals. For the Palestinians and Jordanians, it was a victory that they for the first time stopped the Israeli Army from occupying more lands (Al-Bashatawi, 2020)

This victory strengthened the Palestinian movement, and that made the officials in Jordan to worry from PLO to be a state within a state. This worry turned to a civil war between both of them which known as The Black September. The war lasted by the departure of PLO forces to Lebanon in 1971 (Al-Bashatawi, 2020)

### *PLO in Lebanon*

PLO forces moved to Lebanon where there is a border with the occupied Palestine and started to launch attacks toward Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and launched an operation against the existence of PLO in Lebanon. After a long embargo on Beirut and more than 50 days of fights, the war lasted with an agreement of the withdrawal of PLO forces to Tunisia through a ship. So, Israel achieved the goal of the war, and PLO fighters were distanced from Occupied Palestine (Shiblak, 1997).

### *The First INTIFADA*

In 1987, Four Palestinian workers had been mowed to death by Israeli forces truck in Gaza. This incident made the Palestinians to protest and strike all over the country, which called the first Intifada “uprising”. The First Intifada had its significance because of many reasons:

- a. First, being civilian movement where mostly all the Palestinians engaged in, not just the armed groups.
- b. Second, Being a movement inside Palestine, not like the armed movement which launched in Jordan and Lebanon.
- c. Third, it gave a hope for the desperate Palestinian movement which had broke after the withdrawal from Lebanon.
- d. Fourth, being another tool for the struggle beside or instead of the armed movement.

The Intifada arise the organized and militarized groups who started to resist against Israel. Hamas Movement had been founded during the first days of the Intifada and played a role in leading the Intifada, and later became one of the big roles in the Palestinian resistance and politics (Said, 1989).

## 4.2 PEACE PROSESS

In Oslo 1991, Group of PLO officials and Group of Israeli officials set secretly and directly face to face for the first time to negotiate. So, what changed in the ideology of PLO, made peace talk to replace armed struggle for liberation?

First, the defeat of PLO in Beirut after long siege which lasted in more than 50 days with the withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut to Tunisia. That made the leaders of PLO desperate form solving the Palestinian case through armed struggle.

Second, first Intifada made the leaders to reconsider the voice of people and the power of popular struggle through peaceful means like strikes. So, there was a need for a true and legitimate representation of the people through an authority, which would present them in the global institutions as well.

Third, the defeat of Saddam in the Gulf War. Saddam considered as the last military supporter for the PLO in its armed struggle with Israel, and with his defeat PLO lost an important supplier of weapons and money. In addition to that, PLO lost many of its supporters in Gulf countries because it took a position beside Saddam in his invasion to Kuwait. And That made the Organization isolated and stand alone in its struggle with Israel (Barnett, 1996-97).

Fourth, the rise of Pragmatic wing of PLO in the contrast of the military wing. Israel assassinated Khalil al-Wazir Abu Jihad the military leader of FATAH in 1988. Three years later, Salah Khalaf Abu Iyad, another military leader in FATAH was assassinated too. Yasser Arafat, the pragmatic leader, became to some extent, the one and the only

leader in the Organization. So he became a small dictator in the organization. Arafat himself tried to open negotiation lines with Israel in the early of 1970s (Barghouti et al., 1994)

We can also talk about the rise of left wing in Israel too, and the rise of calls for settling with Palestinians after long years of struggle. But it is not more than a personal observation, and I didn't find resources to build on this observation.

### *Oslo Accords*

It was the result of the first face to face negotiations between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israeli Government in Oslo, which started secretly in Madrid conference 1991 and lasted with signing of Oslo Accords in White House September 1993. The Accords was not a final agreement, rather than that it was a framework for settling the disputed issues through two stages, interim and permanent.

At the first place, the accords called for mutual recognition between Israeli Government and PLO. It was not really mutual, PLO was obligated to recognize the right of Israel state to exist, and in return Israeli government was obligated to recognize PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian People.

The accords called for the creation of Palestinian National Authority to be the executive administration for the Palestinian People. The first task for Palestinian National authority was to build the institutions of interim self-government in Palestine. The accords also called for the creation of Palestinian Council to be the legislative part of the Palestinian Authority which should be democratically elected by the Palestinian people. The accords

also called for the creation of Palestinian police to keep the security in Palestinian Territories with the cooperation with Israel Forces (Quigley, 1997).

Oslo II accord explained in detail the transfer of power from Israeli Forces to Palestinian National Authority during the interim stage which should long for five years and last with the agreement about final status issues. Interim self-government rules in parts of Palestinian Territories which defined in the annex of the agreements. The agreement divided the land of West Bank for three categories which are A, B and C.

In A areas, PNA has the full control over civil and security issues. These areas have a large Palestinian population which mainly concentrated in eight cities (Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and parts of Hebron) which is almost 18% of West Bank. Israeli citizens banned from entering these areas.

In B areas, PNA has the control over Civil issues, PNA and Israel have joint control over security. These areas mainly concentrated in more than 400 small Palestinian Villages, which is almost 25% of West Bank.

The rest of West Bank considered as C areas which is more than 60 % of West Bank. These areas fully controlled by Israel. C areas considered the most important areas for the negotiation of Final-Status issues because of two reasons. First, all of Israeli settlements located in these areas. Second, these areas have most of West Bank natural resources and open areas (Rubenberg, 2003).

In Gaza, the division of lands was obvious than West Bank. There was a Palestinian Cities, where the control was similar to A areas. And the settlements, where the control was similar to C areas.

The people in both sides divided about the Accords. But we can say the accords born dead, it was refused by main players in both sides, In Palestinian side, all parties that not presented in PLO Like Hamas and Islamic Jihad didn't accept the outcome of the accords, even some parties presented in PLO refused it as well like Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Israeli right-wing parties didn't accept the outcomes of the accords which signed by Labor Party with the sponsor of left wing. Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud chairmen at that time, compared this accord to Chamberlain agreement with Hitler and furiously said in his speech to PM Yitzhak Rabin at Knesset "We will use all legitimate means at the disposal of a democratic opposition to stop this foolish process, which endangers the very future of the country." The refusal expresses also in hard way with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by right-wing extremist for signing Oslo Accords (Mor, 1997).

### *Camp David 2000*

Bill Clinton US president invited both Yasser Arafat the chairman of Palestinian Authority and Ehud Barak Prime Minister of Israel to negotiate the permanent issues of the peace process. According to the agreement, and since five years passed after implementing the first stage of Oslo Accords, the framework of the accords suggested to negotiate final-status issues which are; Jerusalem, Refugees, settlements, resources and security. The three leaders stayed in Camp David for three weeks to negotiate these issues and didn't reach any agreement. The negotiations in Camp David took the approach of all or nothing. Both Bill Clinton and Ehud Barak blamed Yasser Arafat for the failure of Camp David talks. The talks in Camp David were mostly a proposal from Ehud Barak about the final status issues which did not meet with any meaning of negotiation the

Palestinian demands. Here we will discuss the proposal of each party on final-status issues in Camp David (Pressman, 2003)

*Jerusalem:*

Palestinian delegates proposed a Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem including the Muslim and Christian Quarter and Israel gain authority over Western wall and Jewish Quarter. Israeli delegates proposed Israeli sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem including the old city and religious places of Muslims and Christian, and Palestinians can have their capital in the villages around Jerusalem like Abu Dis and al-Eizariya, and can gain a custodianship on Haram al-Sharif. Ehud Barak warned Americans that he won't give any sovereignty for Palestinians over East Jerusalem. Abbas challenged the Americans if they can find any Palestinian would give up upon the holy places in East Jerusalem (Hanieh, 2001)

*Settlements and borders:*

Palestinian delegates proposed a full sovereignty over Gaza Strip and West Bank with East Jerusalem according to UN 242 resolution which calls for the Israeli withdrawal from the land occupied in six days war 1967. Israel proposed to keep its sovereignty over the settlements with large populations within green line, and keep the sovereignty over Jordan valley. Palestinians think the Israeli proposal make West Bank a canonization to three blocks and create barriers between Palestinian cities. Israelis saw the sovereignty of Palestinian over West Bank as a strategical threat (Pressman, 2003)

### *Refugees:*

Palestinian delegates proposed the implementing of the right of return which granted for the refugees, and agreed to put with Israelis a mechanism to regulate the movement where no more than 150,000 people return each year. Israel proposed not to take the responsibilities for refugee problem and agreed the return of 100,000 at most which specified for humanitarian causes and family reunions. And offered to help in resettlement of the others in their residential countries. Palestinian Delegate think that Israeli offer did not fair the problem of almost half of Palestinian population. And Israelis see the Palestinian proposal as a demographical threat (Peters & Newman, 2013).

### *Security:*

Israeli delegates proposed a demilitarized Palestinian State in West Bank and Gaza and allow just light weapon for police and guards, and also demanded to have a radar over Palestinian territories to have a remotely spy, and demanded that IDF to be allowed to enter Palestinian territories in emergency cases, and have observation over the cross borders. And that clashes with the demand of full sovereignty of PNA over Palestinian territories (Shamir, 2005).

### *Al-Aqsa Intifada (Second Uprising):*

Since Jerusalem was the big title of the failure of Camp David talks, Ariel Sharon, Likud Party candidate for Israeli Prime Minister, visited al-Aqsa Mosque and stated that “the place is in our hands and will remain”. This visit made him to win the election and made the Palestinians to uprising against this provocative action (Khalidi, 2001)

The uprising spread all over Palestine, especially in Jerusalem and other main cities in West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians expressed their anger and desperate from the failure of

the talks in Camp David through the demonstrations blaming the unfair proposals of Ehud Barak. Actions of Israeli forces reflected the dissatisfaction from the refusal of Palestinian delegates to the proposals in Camp David through suppression the uprising.

Through the ongoing of the uprising and increasing the violence actions and reactions, many Palestinian militant group arise to confront the militant actions of IDF in West Bank and Gaza, and the uprising converted to militant confrontations to some extent.

### *Separation Plans of Sharon*

In March 2002, Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel ordered Israeli Forces to invade West Bank including A areas. Israelis called it operation defensive wall; Palestinians called it occupying A areas. The Israeli goal of the operation to stop the second intifada. The operation started with the invasion of Ramallah and entering the Mukataa, Presidential compound of Yasser Arafat, and forced a siege over his place and didn't allow to travel until his illness when he allowed to get medical assistance in France, then he died after few weeks.

The policy of Ariel Sharon was the unilateral separation with Palestinians, he achieved that with different tools in West Bank and Gaza. In West Bank, he proposed the instruction of separation wall barrier in 2002, which isolate Palestinian populations. In Gaza, Ariel Sharon proposed unilateral withdrawal and removing the 21 settlements in Gaza Strip, and also isolate Gaza through the direct control over the cross borders, air, maritime, and also control water, electricity, telecommunication and other utilities (Shukrallah et al., 2002).

### *Beirut Summit:*

In 2002, Arab League announced the Arab peace initiative, which was a plan for ending the Arab- Israeli conflict. The plan called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from All Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Golan heights, accepting an independent and sovereign Palestinian in the territories occupied in 1967, finding a just solution for Palestinian refugees according to 194 resolution of UN General assembly. And In return, Arab countries declare the end of the conflict, and normalize the relations with Israel. The Palestinian leaders welcomed the plan, Israelis too but expressed many concerns especially about the refugee's issue which presents a demographical threat, settlements in West Bank. The plan became an important reference in Arab-Israeli peace process, because it was the first comprehensive peace proposal from Arab countries whose Israel concerns to normalize the relations with (Teitelbaum, 2007).

### *Road Map for Peace:*

Proposed by the quartet on the Middle East (US, EU, Russia and UN) in 2002 to save Palestinian-Israeli peace process after the violent escalation during the second Intifada. The highlights of the plan to ceasefire the conflict, halt the settlement, Israeli withdrawal to the position before Second Intifada, reform Palestinian Authority institutions which mostly damaged during the wall defensive operation by IDF, and find a final settlement for the permanent issues. The plan called for a sovereign Palestinian State. US administration refused to have a negotiation with the chairman of Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat because he did not do enough to stop the second Intifada and asked him to appoint a Prime Minister to be the representative in the negotiations. United States Administration announced the Road Map for Peace in Middle East in April 2003 without the quartet. The new appointed first-ever Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas accepted the Road Map for peace. Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon rejected it, and later the Israeli Cabinet suggested 13 changes in the plan to accept it, initiated with the rejection of halting the settlement (Nabulsi, 2004).

### *Big Changes:*

In response to Road Map for Peace plan, the Palestinians obligated to reform the institutions of PNA. The reform started with appointing a Prime Minister and followed by conducting Presidential and General Elections. In 2005, Mahmoud Abbas elected as Palestinian President, successor of Yasser Arafat who died in 2004 (Usher, 2005). Mahmoud Abbas considered more serious for Peace process in the mind of Israelis and US administration. A year later, 2006, General Election took place in Palestinian Territories, Hamas won the majority of Palestinian council seats, almost 63% of the seats, and formed the tenth Palestinian Government, which was not accepted by Israeli government and US administration. Israeli Government besieged the new elected government and made obstacles for its functions (Usher, 2006).

Beside the siege, there was a clash between the Palestinian Authority and the new elected government about the powers. The authorities granted to each party was not clear. These clashes developed to a civil war between Hamas and Fatah, and ended with the Palestinian division in June 2007, where the Government present by Hamas controls Gaza, Palestinian Authority present by Fatah controls West Bank (Hilal, 2010)

Hamas in Gaza became more militarized and that escalated the situation with Israel. The following year witnessed a three major conflict between Hamas and Israeli forces 2009, 2012 and 2014, and the siege over Gaza became worse and worse (Winter, 2016).

### *Olmert and Abbas:*

Between 2007 and 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas met more than 30 times. And they both had a productive talk, where Olmert agreed to withdraw from the less populated settlement in West Bank and approved a Palestinian Capital in Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and Abbas accepted the Israeli

sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The talks didn't produce any agreement because the escalation in Gaza 2009. In addition to that, Olmert lost the leadership over Kadima Party during an internal election to Tzipi Livni, and later on his party lost the general election to the right-wing parties (Birnbaum, 2013)

#### *Netanyahu Vision:*

Netanyahu came to power by the coalition of right-wing parties in Knesset in 2009 and still in power until now. He openly announced a new condition for any future Palestinian State. First, Palestinians must recognize Israel as nation-state for Jewish people. Second, any future Palestinian state must be demilitarized and guarantee the security of Israeli borders. Third, United Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Palestinians must renounce the right of return of the refugees. Finally, the right of expansion of Israeli settlements in West Bank. Palestinian leadership considered these conditions as back stab for the peace process. Although, many efforts done by Obama administration through both secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, the Israeli delegates in the negotiations did not give up the conditions of Netanyahu (Anziska, 2018).

#### *Abbas Threat:*

In 2014, Abbas proposed a plan to resume the peace process, he demanded a freezing of settlement building as condition for resumption the negotiations. He called for nine months of direct talks followed by three years of implementing. The first three months of the talks to discuss the issues about the borders and swaps of lands, and the following six months to talk about Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and security. And if Israel rejected the plan, he threatened to join international agreements starting with International Criminal Court to sue against Israeli crimes in Gaza during 2014 escalation. In addition, he threatened to go to UN Security Council to claim a recognition for a Palestinian State.

Israeli Government and US Administration rejected the proposal of Abbas. Palestinian Authority joined ICC and many other international agreements in return (Jaouni, 2015).

*Trump Initiative Plan:*

During his presidential campaign, Trump made many promises to Israel, He promised to move the embassy of US in Israel to Jerusalem and recognize Jerusalem as United capital of Israel, which he fulfilled in his first anniversary in the office. He also promised to put a comprehensive plan for resolution between Israel and Palestine. Since he came to power, He formed a team led by his son in law, Jared Kushner and his ambassador to Israel David Friedman, who both have pro-Israeli vision. Palestinian leadership refused to take part in the plan because the plan based on United capital of Israel in Jerusalem. And Trump in return closed PLO office in Washington and cut US contribution to UNRWA which aimed to aid Palestinian refugees.

The vision of the plan is to solve the permanent issues in the conflict. The plan authored and announced by US and Israeli delegates without the representation and agreement of Palestinians. The Plan presented the Israeli demands through the history of peace process between Palestinians and Israelis with no concessions form Israeli side and imposed too big requirements from Palestinians regarding the lands and sovereignty. Here is the main outline of the plan:

Jerusalem is the union Capital of Israel and the plan reject Capital of Palestine in East Jerusalem and instead Palestinians could have their capital in villages around and they can call it Jerusalem. Israel has the right to annex Jordan Valley and the settlements in West Bank, beside East Jerusalem. No right of return for the refugees and the settlement of their issue in the countries where they are. Demilitarize the state of Palestine, and Israel keep control over the borders and crossing points. Netanyahu called it Plan of the century and Abbas called it Slap of the century (Erdogan & Habash, 2020)

### *The Impasse*

In my thesis, I assume that the peace process between Palestine and Israel failed and does not have future in the current circumstances. My assumption supported by many evidences which are:

First: Oslo Accords born dead, most of the active parties in both sides refused its results. In the Israeli side, all right and extreme right parties refused the result of Oslo Accords. In the Palestinian side, the parties which is not presented in PLO like Hamas and Islamic Jihad refused the results of Oslo Accords, even some parties inside PLO also refused it, like Popular Front. And right after the assigning of Oslo Accords, seemed no one agrees about it but the ones who signed it (Kristianasen, 1999).

Second: the assassination of both godfathers of Oslo accords in both sides, Yitzhak Rabin in Israeli side and Yasser Arafat in Palestinian side, and by their assassination the deal had been assassinated. And the right wing in both sides raised. The Israeli voters expressed their refusal for Oslo accords by giving the power to right and extreme right parties, Ariel Sharon gained the trust of Israeli voters through his visit to al-Aqsa mosque after the failure of Camp David summit (Khalidi, 2001). Benjamin Netanyahu gained the trust of Israeli voters in four rounds (mainly by coalition of right and extreme right parties) through his vision toward the peace process which gives nothing to the Palestinians (no sovereign states, nor capital in East Jerusalem, nor right of return) (Anziska, 2018).

On the other side, Palestinians expressed their despair from the failure of Camp David summit through the uprising, and the uprising raised Hamas, and Hamas won the general election in 2006 by the great majority of the seats (Usher, 2006).

Third: Failure of Camp David summit, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak did not come up with agreement about the final-status issues which scheduled to be discussed 5 years after Oslo Accords. Both of the parties found a huge gap between each other requirements on these issues especially on Jerusalem status which was the title for the coming Israeli election in 2001, and the title of Palestinian uprising in September 2000. So, Peace Process did not pass the interim stage until today, 26 years after Oslo Accords which supposed to end in 5 years with agreement about the permanent issues (Pressman, 2003).

Fourth: Israel reoccupied West Bank in 2002 during the Operation of Defense Shield including A areas where Oslo Accords granted a full control for PLO. After that, Settlement in West Bank expanded more than ever. And now, Israel with the American green light, is planning to unilateral annex these settlements beside annexing Jerusalem and Jordan Valley (Shukrallah et al., 2002).

Fifth: Oslo Accords and UN resolutions is no more a base for the coming negotiations. Trump initiative Plan was coup de grace for Oslo accords. Trump administration formed a team included of Kushner, Friedman and Greenbelt who are all very pro-Jew and they just consulted Israeli experts and eventually they came up with a plan simply formed to present Netanyahu view for the settlement, by ignoring the Palestinians demands. Palestinians refused to participate in the plan because the bases of the plan eliminate their rights in big issues like Jerusalem and Jordan Valley. Now, both Israeli side and the American Mediator ask to make the plan a base for any coming negotiations, ignoring the previous agreements like Oslo Accords which consist of that the settlement of permanent issues should be negotiated in the base of UN resolutions (Erdogan & Habash, 2020).

So, what did bring peace process to this impasse? I assume that there are three main reasons to explain the failure of peace process and make obstacles for its developing, which I will discuss in the coming three chapters.

## 5. LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION PROBLEM

A I assume that the people was not satisfied with the outcomes of Oslo Accords and all the peace process as well, and this dissatisfaction changed the leadership in both sides through the time and brought a new leadership which to some extent does not believe in peace process. I think the action and reaction on peace process from both sides affected the mindset of people which somehow believed their leaders on their peace journey but eventually their despair from the failure of peace process, made their mindset changes to move toward the right and extreme right.

I think the leaderships face dilemma when it comes to make peace. On one hand, they are willing to bring peace for their people. And on the other hand, they want to fulfill the aspirations of their people and make them satisfied. And the dilemma to balance between these contradicts, where they can be persuasive to their people when they present their achievements in peace process. In our case, I think the leadership in both sides succeeded to balance these dilemmas in the beginning but in the first faltering of the negotiations they lost the control. In the beginning, there was a big chance to make peace during the rise of left and center wings in both sides, which believed in peace. The leadership invested this chance and achieved imperfect step, which meant to be completed unless the interactions in the ground changes everything.

We will talk about the interactions between the parties before, during and after Oslo Accords. We will discuss the actions of the authorities in both sides and the position of oppositions in both sides as well.

## **5.1 CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP AND MINDSET OF PEOPLE IN PALESTINE**

The term of leadership and people representation in Palestine is complicated to some extent. Internationally, PLO is recognized as the legitimate representative for Palestinian People. The Palestinian National Council is the legislative part in PLO. This council representing Palestinians inside Palestine and in diaspora as well. And the way of allocating the representatives in this council is quotas for the entities where the Palestinians exist, quotas for the institutions and Unions, and quotas for minorities and groups. Most of the representatives here appointed by the agreement of the parties inside the Organization, and not elected. Previously, all the active Parties in Palestine were represented in Palestinian National Council but from the beginning of 1990s there was a veto inside the organization for Islamic parties to join the Organization. And that, in my opinion, make the Organization suffer from the lack of legitimacy, and make the appointing way of choosing the representative more undemocratic (Barahmeh, 2014).

On the other hand, Oslo Accords suggested the foundation of Palestinian Legislative Council to represent the Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza, to be the legislative part for the Palestinian entity in the interim period, and to approve the Palestinian Government. The way of choosing the representatives in this council is by general election where all the people have the right to participate and there is no veto for being candidate (Quigley, 1997).

So, when I refer to the changes in the leadership, mainly I mean the representatives in Palestinian Legislative Council, where there is a democratic election and the voice of people is represented.

In the Palestinian side, Arafat made huge efforts through the organizations and institutions inside PLO to persuade the representatives of people into peace process whom by their role persuade the people. Arafat believed in peace since 1970s and took him this long to go through peace journey because of the opposition inside PLO beside other factors. This opposition weakened through the time because the armed revolution was exhausted in Beirut and many of its armed wing leader assassinated like Khalil El-Wazir Abu Jihad and Salah Khalef Abu Iyad. In the mid of 1970s, many Arab Nations convinced Arafat to negotiate Israel in the base of International Law and United Nations resolutions which mainly give the Palestinians the right of self-determination in the land occupied in 1967 and obligate Israel to withdraw from these areas and guarantee the right of return for Palestinian Refugees. Secretly, Palestinian negotiation team met an Israeli team without the informing of most of PLO parties neither other Palestinian Parties outside the organization. Since then, many internal conferences among PLO institutions held to discuss this option. Arafat used all the means to persuade the leadership of PLO and the Palestinian people, through soft power like conferences, newspapers, magazines and etc., and hard power as well like Financial allocations (Barghouti, et al., 1994).

On the other hand, there was an opposition growing through the interaction of peace discussion among the organization like Popular Front to liberate Palestine and of course outside the organization like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This opposition did not have a notable effect on the atmosphere which was prepared for peace. But we can say there was no consensus supported peace process, contrariwise the political opposition was majority. Arafat and his team politically seemed alone, but they did not face a hard opposition because the people and the other parties wanted to give a chance for peace talks (Barghouti, et al., 1994)

PLO was a revolutionary movement, where the democracy has different interpretation. From the beginning, PLO was recognized to be the legitimate representative of Palestinian people through the Arab league in 1964, not by the Palestinian People. The Organization gained the public legitimacy through the revolution, resisting Israel and

defending Palestinians interests. The representatives in PLO were chosen through internal elections where just the members vote, not the public. PLO tried to gather and represent the people through giving all the political parties and civil institutions right to be represented in the organization. But in the beginning of 1980s, the organization lost this privilege, because it made a veto against the joining of Islamic Parties to the organization like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and that is the case until today. In turn, Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not want to join the organization in its current form, they asked for some changes in the way of representing and required some changes in the constitution of the organization as conditions to join (Barahmeh, 2014).

We can sum up that PLO made a very strategical move in the peace process neither with the consensus of all the Palestinians, nor the agreement of all political Palestinian movements. I suppose that to guarantee the success for strategical path like peace process for people who is resisting the occupation for many years, it must be supported by the consensus of all national parties, movements and people if possible.

Basically, the Palestinians demands was the right of return for the refugees, and self-determination in the historical Palestine where they are secure and protected by state that represent them. PLO admitted to the de facto that the State of Israel made through the time, and accepted to negotiate in base of 1967 borders and that seemed a big concession in the Palestinian mindset. And at the end, PLO signed an agreement which fully recognized the existence of Israel State but did not clearly guarantee the basic rights of Palestinian people like right of return and full sovereignty over 1967 borders including Jerusalem which guaranteed by the international law. Instead, they gained a limited self-governance in parts of Gaza and West Bank. And according to the agreements, they postponed negotiation about the most important issues for the Palestinians like right of return, sovereignty, and Jerusalem status to be discussed 5 years after achieving first stage of Oslo accords. So the demands of Palestinian people was not represented in Oslo accords but postponed and later most of Israeli leaders didn't want to make any notable concession in these issues (Mor, 1997).

In conclusion, I think neither Palestinian people was fully represented in PLO team in the negotiation with Israel, nor Oslo Accords outcomes guaranteed their basic rights and demands. Palestinian people gave a chance of the five years that stated in the framework of Oslo Accords for peace process to bring them their rights fairly.

In Camp David talks, Palestinians shocked with the obstinacy of Israeli leadership in the negotiations of final-status issues, so they didn't give a fair concession in refugees case and Jerusalem Status. They expressed their refusal through Al-Aqsa Uprising in September 2000. This Uprising made the people to represent them by themselves. This representation embodied by the protests and armed resistance as well. At this point, people lost hope in peace, and turned to believe in the power of armed resistance as a way to get their rights (Hanieh, 2001).

Palestinian Leadership's attitude was to keep up with these changes, they supported the Uprising and got involved in it. Arafat tried to use the uprising to maneuver in the table during the negotiation with Israel, not personally but through his delegates, because Israel and United States refused to negotiate with him directly due to his role in the Uprising. United States Administration started to talk openly about changing Palestinian Leadership, they forced Arafat to assign a Prime Minister and delegate authority related to peace process to him. Shaul Mofaz the Defense Minister in Ariel Sharon Cabinet mistakenly told Sharon in a close meeting during the uprising that it is our chance to get rid of Yasser Arafat. Few years later, Yasser Arafat was assassinated by poisoned food (Anziska, 2018).

The opposition, mainly Hamas, found a chance in the Uprising to express their refusal for the outcomes of peace process, so they strongly got involved in the Uprising. Hamas's

big role in the Uprising beside its rejectionist position to peace process increased its popularity among Palestinian People (Usher, 2006).

This anger of the Palestinians that exploded in the Uprising was a result of the agreement that gave them nothing and made them to give big concessions. So, in other words, this agreement in the Palestinian mindset was a defeat agreement. They saw the peace process is an agreement between the winner strong side who dictates his conditions, with the loser weak side who just gave up. So, this anger beside the reaction of Israeli forces toward the protest mainly in Jerusalem and Gaza in September 2000 escalated the situation to become big and armed Uprising. This Uprising reformed the Palestinian mindset toward the struggle generally, so we see the armed resistance growing and spreading, and enthusiasm to Peace of the Braves faded.

The coming years witnessed huge changes in the leadership in Palestine. These changes increased the division in the Palestinian politics. On one side, Mahmud Abbas was elected President of Palestine Authority and chairman of PLO succeeding Yasser Arafat. Although these changes in the ground during the uprising and after the failure of Camp David, Abbas was more committed to Peace process than Arafat. On the other side, Hamas and other resistance movements were more committed to the resistance approach. Hamas won the general election in 2006 with the majority of the seats of Palestinian council, 63% of the seats. This division in the leadership increased the polarization in the Palestinian mindset, and that increased the clashes between these two sides which evolved to a civil war ended with the Palestinian division in 2007 where elected government of Hamas took the control over Gaza, and Palestinian Authority which controlled by Fatah, kept ruling parts of West Bank (Shikaki & Shamir, 2010).

This division in the leadership of Palestinian people reflected in the ground, so Palestinian territories divided to two parts and ruled by two authorities with two visions. In West

Bank, Palestinian authority kept the security cooperation with Israel to keep the security and prevent any escalation. In Gaza, Hamas developed its military capabilities and that led to escalate the situation in Gaza with Israel in 3 major war (2009, 2012 and 2014). This division weakened the chances of making peace, Hamas as elected party in general election and ruling Gaza refuses to negotiate with Israel due to the history of peace process (Usher, 2016). Fatah as the dominant party in PLO the globally recognized organization to represent the Palestinians, still believe in peace approach. This division is reflecting a real gap between Palestinian representatives in the mindset of international community and in the mindset of Palestinian people. Moreover, International Community did not accept the result of Palestinian general election which brought Hamas to the power.

Hamas announced in 2017 a new charter that included a big change in its vision for the struggle with Israel. The most important one that Hamas accepts a Palestinian State in the border of 1967 and won't be an obstacle for such solution (Hroub, 2017). This charter decreases the gap between Hamas and Fatah visions for the struggle with Israel, and that may help in accelerate the peace process. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Hamas is trying to fool the world by its new charter and didn't see it as a new starter.

My conclusion to this discussion that the people rights and interests must be presented in any agreement to guarantee its success. Leaders must get at least the minimum of people demands to persuade their people with the outcomes of the agreements. The leaders must balance between representing their people interests in the negotiation and persuading their people to the outcomes of the negotiations, I think these two factors is very important to make a sustainable peace. To guarantee that, people must be fully represented in the negotiation through their legitimate representatives and concusses of active parties. Otherwise, unsatisfied people would obstruct the peaceful solution and the unsatisfaction will be expressed in the opposite direction like the armed Uprising and kill any chance of peace.

## **5.2 CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP AND MINDSET OF PEOPLE IN ISRAEL:**

Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister who signed Oslo Accords, made his people to hope for peace. Unlike the very polarizing atmosphere in Israel, Yitzhak Rabin used in his speech the logic to persuade his people to peace, and it was hard in that atmosphere. His logic was to end the war, to stop the blood and to live peacefully with Palestinians. His view to peace process was to give Palestinians right of governance, which relieves Israeli government from the cost of control the Palestinians. He also had two red lines in peace process, first Israel keeps the control over Jordan Valley and the borders. Second, Jerusalem is the united capital of Israel. And his vision for the Palestinian state was an entity that is less than a state, and which independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority (Makovsky, 1996).

His view for peace considered the leftist vision in all over the history the State of Israel. So his vision faced a very hard opposition, to the extent that he was called a big traitor for Israeli nation. Politically he faced a opposition in Knesset, particularly from Benjamin Netanyahu who said Rabin agreement with Arafat is like the Chamberlain agreement with Hitler. Eventually, Yigal Amir came and expressed the hardest opposition to Oslo Accords by assassinating Yitzhak Rabin ( Pundak, 2001). The opposition of Rabin movement in peace process strengthen the right and extreme right wings in Israel which led this opposition. This opposition increased the wave of polarization, which mainly targeted the peace process.

Netanyahu was the most prominent in this opposition, his position made him to win the general election in 1996 against Shimon Peres, the successor of Yitzhak Rabin. Netanyahu vision was clear, he represented the most aggressive opposition against Oslo Accords, so peace process was going badly during his governance. The Centre-left which lost the election in 1996 with nuance, made it difficult to Netanyahu to make something

radical toward the peace process. An early general election took place in May 1999 brought back the Centre-left to power. Ehud Barak the new prime minister in Israel, failed to make an agreement on the permanent issues with Arafat in Camp David (Quigley, 1997). I think the reason why Ehud Barak couldn't make a notable concession on permanent issues particularly Jerusalem status, is the wave of polarization in Israel at that time. This wave made the right and extreme right form one side and Centre-left from another side not to pass each other. The popularity of each wing was very close to each other, so that why neither Netanyahu could do something radical against Oslo, nor Barak went forward in peace process.

During this polarization and after the failure of Camp David talks, Ariel Sharon wanted to prove himself in this politics, so he visited Al-Aqsa mosque, the main topic of the failure of Camp David talks, and said it is on our hand and will remain. This movement considered the most polarized and provocative for the Palestinians. This visit was the spark that ignited the Second Uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada). The Palestinian Uprising was faced by the hard power of Israeli forces and that was also a response for the wave of polarization in Israel (Khalidi, 2001).

The Uprising in the Palestinian side increased the polarization in Israeli side, the popularity of right and extreme right wings in Israel increased against the Centre-left wing and Ariel Sharon won the general election in February 2001. Ariel Sharon considered the most aggressive general who fought in all the major wars with Arabs, and led the most serious ones especially invading Beirut in 1982 and West Bank 2002. In the Arab mindset, Sharon was general of war not peace, so peace process was frozen during his period in governance. Moreover, he violated Oslo Accords by invading A areas of West Bank which supposed to be ruled by Palestinian Authority (Shukrallah, 2002).

Ehud Olmert succeeded Sharon after his illness. For the Palestinian leadership, Ehud Olmert was the most open minded for the negotiation about the permanent status issues. However, Aljazeera leaked documents of the head of Palestinian negotiation team Saeb Erekat which were drafts of the negotiations, showed that Olmert offered nothing different than his predecessors for the Palestinians. He emphasized through his Minister of foreign affairs Tzipi Livni that Jerusalem will be the united and undivided capital of Israel, no refugees will return, and Israel will keep control over borders and Jordan Valley beside annexing the settlements in West Bank (Zayani, 2013). However, there was an advanced talk between his administration and the Palestinian leaders about lands swap which meant to be developed unless Olmert escalated the situation in Gaza 2008-2009 (Glick, 2006).

In 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected again as prime minister representing the right and extreme right parties in Israel, and he openly announced his new conditions to be a base for any further negotiation with Palestinians. First, Palestinians must recognize Israel as nation-state for Jewish people. Second, any future Palestinian state must be demilitarized and its borders control by Israel. Third, Jerusalem is the united capital of Israel. Fourth, Palestinians must renounce refugees right of return. Finally, the right of Israel to annex and expand in the settlements in West Bank. During his governance, peace process witnessed the worst period since 1993, because the conditions almost froze the negotiations (Sachs, 2015).

To conclude, the leadership in Israel are ruled by many redlines in the negotiations with Palestinian leaders, these redlines were repeated in each round of the negotiations during each administration in Israel. This redlines clearly stated by Yitzhak Rabin during his speech in Knesset Oct. 5, 1995, Ehud Barak gave them as offer for Arafat in Camp David talks, Ariel Sharon acted in the ground in the time to keep these redlines, the leaks of Aljazeera showed that Olmert too didn't pass these redlines, and finally Netanyahu openly announce them as conditions to be accepted by the Palestinian leadership before holding any further talks. These redlines are the same with permanent status issues, Israeli

leadership postponed it in Oslo, and temporized it through the time to draw new status quo in the ground to erase these issues.

I think the commitment of all Israeli leaders to these redlines means that none of them was really serious to the peace process or it means that none of them could go forward in the peace of the braves. Here are some factors to explain how the mentality of Israeli leaders and the mindset of people in Israel formed to come up with these redlines in peace process with Palestinians:

First: Israel was established as an implementation of Zionism ideologies. Zionist leaders used all the means to ease the immigration of Jewish people to Palestine, and transfer of indigenous people from their home. These means include committing massacres and destroying villages. These actions were from the history but still exist in the mindset of people and the psychology of leaders. Zionism dream still exists in the elections campaign and leaders' speeches. So Israeli leaders use the history to feed the propaganda in the Israeli mindset.

Second: Knesset passed the Law of nation-state for Jewish people in July 2018. This was a real implementation for Zionism first principle, regardless to Arab population lives there and refugees who have the right guaranteed by international law to return to this state. Israeli leaders though this law and other policies threaten their people by the Palestinian demography. This law increases the racism in the mindset of people and make peace process less acceptable to them (Jabareen & Bishara, 2019)

Third: Most -and perhaps all- Israeli politicians and leaders come from military background, most of them had a bloody history against the Palestinians. These leaders aren't just responsible for making strategies of war and peace but also, they are forming

the mindset of their people. Leaders in Israel used the military operations as a campaign in several elections. The 2009 Israeli general election preceded by an escalation in Gaza end of December 2008. The 2014 general election as well, preceded by escalation in Gaza (Galai, 2019). I think the military background of Israeli leaders make them promote the war not peace to their people, beside to that it makes them deal with peace process as a war field.

To conclude, I think Israeli leaders didn't do enough to promote the peace for their people, in contrast they fed the remnant of Zionism propaganda in the people mindset to achieve personal interests in the elections. I think true leadership work to change the mindset of people for the public good and peace in the long term, not using it and feed it with propaganda to achieve personal interests in the short term.

## 6. MEDIATION

The role of mediator considers important in any conflict resolution, and this importance differ from conflict to other according to many factors like the nature of the conflict and the disputed parties. The Mediator in intra-group conflicts plays more direct role than in interstate conflicts. The role of mediator takes many levels. First, the indirect role where the mediator just organizes the talks and facilitate the communications between the parties. Second, the direct role where the mediator offers solutions and drafts for the agreements for the parties. Third, the control role where the mediator observes the implementation of the agreement and use tactics through his power on the parties to achieve the agreements; threats tactics like punishments and sanctions, promises tactics like reward and support (Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, 2017)

In Palestine-Israel peace process, the role of the mediator takes more significant position for many reasons. First, the conflict extended for long time. Second, the conflict is political but fed by many other factors like the ethnicity, religion and history. Third, the conflict is not just about the geography, but it is also about demography, religious places and nature resources. Fourth, the conflict took bloody and hard shape, many wars and massacres committed through the history of the conflicts and that increased the psychological gap between the people in each party. Fifth, the nature of the conflicts seems more intergroup than inter-state conflict. We do not just see parties that have contradictory goals and interests and fight each other over them, but the conflict is deeper than that touch the community's identities and human group's needs. Lastly, the imbalance of power between the parties.

These all factors make the role of outsider mediator very essential. And I think the mediator in this case should take more direct and power-based approach in mediation. That means the role of mediator shroud extend the role of organizing and communication to be directly involved in making the agreement, drawing the process and control the implementations through rewards and sanctions.

Historically, British mandate to Palestine played the first mediator role in the history of the conflict. The role of British Mandate was catastrophe. British Mandate created this conflict through Balfour declare and then by easing the immigration of Jewish people to Palestine and eventually empowering Jewish groups over the indigenous people. Later, British Mandate failed to be a effective mediator between the groups in Palestine and ended its mandate in very critical time when the groups were rallying for the war (Biger, 2004).

After then, United States and through its successive administrations monopolized the mediation in the resolution of the conflicts between Arabs and Israel. Starting with Egypt-Israel peace agreement and Jordan-Israel agreement, last not least the Palestine-Israel peace process. US chose to mediate in all these cases to stand with Israel and defend its interests more than being a real mediator. This support in peace process was one of the reflections of “the special relationship” between United States and Israel. I assume that the Mediation of United States and its monopoly over the mediation impeded reaching a settlement between Palestine and Israel. United States played an obvious biased role in the mediation through the empowerment of Israeli side and adopting Israeli views in the negotiation, and that increase the gap between the parties (Anziska, 2018).

United States through the history was the biggest supporter for Israel. United States supported Balfour declaration and spent many efforts in the establishment of Jewish State in Palestine. United States supported the new emerged state with all the efforts, financially, military and politically. United States is providing Israel annual financial aid exceed US\$ 3 billion and that makes Israel the largest recipient of American aid. United States also offers about US\$ 8 billion of loan guarantees. Military, United States provided US\$ 3.8 billion in military aid to Israel in fiscal year 2019. United States and through this intensive military support want to make Israel the first power in the region. United States in this point sees Israel as American military base, late Senator Jesse Helms called Israel “American’s aircraft carrier in the Middle East”. This aid is unconditional and expresses the deep relationship and the strategic alliance between Israel and United State. Although, Obama and Netanyahu were not harmonious in many cases and even Netanyahu used to

harshly criticize Obama actions, especially in his speech in the US Congress, but the financial aid never been cut (Friedman, 2012).

Politically, United States used the power of Veto 42 times out of 83 time in total to protect Israel from Security Council's resolutions. In its Veto, United States refused to make Security Council to condemn any of Israeli actions against the Palestinians, also the Veto used to prevent Palestinians from self-determination and state-building. Almost all-American leaders use their achievements toward Israel in the election campaigns to help them get the satisfaction of Jewish lobbies in the States ( Mitelpunkt, 2018).

Bill Clinton clearly blamed Yasser Arafat for the failure of Camp David talks, where the talks were about the almost nonnegotiable Ehud Barak's offer. In Road Map for Peace, the plan was supposed to be drafted by the Quarter in Middle East (United States, European Union, Russia, and United Nations) But United States again wanted to push its own view by putting aside the European Union draft for the plan, ignoring the position of the Quarter in favor of Israeli interests. Trump Initiative Plan for peace was totally representing the Israeli right views for the peace process, where no right of return, no Palestinian Capital in East Jerusalem and the right of Israel to annex the settlements, Jordan Valley and Jerusalem. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian President, clearly announced after imposing Trump initiative plan that United States is no longer accepted by Palestinian side to be the only mediator in peace process with Israel (Anziska, 2018).

Therefore, United States cannot be an effective mediator in any peace process including Israel as one of the disputed parties. We are not just talking about strong alliance between Israel and United States, we have here almost a total match in the interests and views about the Palestinian case. I think this is one of the most important reasons that the peace process didn't reach a settlement. And if the two parties did not agree about changing the mediator to a new and internationally accepted one who can guarantee the implementation of the talks, then peace process is facing a real problem.

I think the solution for mediation problem is the Quarter in Middle East, which supposed to draft Road Map for Peace in 2003. First, it could end United States monopoly to peace

process. Second, it might be unbiased for both of the parties. Third, it would reflect an international view for the settlements of the case. Finally, it could guarantee the implementation of the agreements through its power over the parties.



## 7. THE INBALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE PARTIES

“Power makes allies, power makes friends, power make peace” Benjamin Netanyahu during his speech in Abraham Accords signing ceremony September 2020.

Generally, parties choose to eliminate a conflict and set for negotiation for many reasons: First, if the party sees cost of making concession for the other party is less than the cost of ongoing the conflict. Second, if they are forced to set through resolutions of international organization like United Nations. Third, if they are forced through sanctions or rewards. Finally, the surrender option, which is not taking in consideration to bring peace but end the conflict.

In ideal negotiation, the parties that have conflict based on contradictory interests, bargain each other, where each party gives up items of less importance in return of items with greater value. The negotiation bases on interests of each party, where each party underline its people interests, and they attempt to meet a mutual interest through brainstorm different options. Each party pose his power cards in the table and defend its interests through this card.

I assume that peace process between Palestine and Israel facing a terrible future because the imbalance of power between the parties. I think Israeli side, the party with the greater power, believes that the cost of status-quo is less than the cost of making concession to the Palestinian side. I also think the imbalance of power made the Palestinian side, the party with minor power, to make a big concession by giving up in demanding the right of Palestinians in the borders before 1948, and in return they got nothings due to the lake of power cards they have in the table.

Israel is one of the greatest powers in the region, supported by international strong allies like US. United States tries to keep Israel as the greatest power in the region through providing it with the military aid and funds. This unconditional aid embodies the

strategical alliance between them. Politically, United States used more than half of its Veto in United Nation Security council to support Israel. Militarily, Israel gets the most technological military equipment through United States and Western allies. Israel, itself participate in the industry of military equipment, it produce some parts of F-35 and drones. In 2007, Israel had 10% of world shares of military market, and considered 6th largest arms exporter in the world in 2014. Financially, as mentioned in the last section, Israel is the largest recipient of American aid with almost US\$ 3 billion (Friedman, 2012).

Israel through this power and support created a status-quo by occupying the Palestinian land and building intensive settlement among the Palestinian cities. This status-quo guarantees Israeli strategical interests through the tight control over nature resources, water and borders. Beside the full security control over the Palestinian cities to prevent any resistance. Israel sees the interest of keeping this status-quo is greater than its cost, and this cost is less than the cost of giving it up as a concession in sake of peace process. This cost includes the resettlement of Israeli settlers, losing nature resources and risking the security of Israel. So, in the normal condition, Israel won't give any concession to the Palestinians, except giving Gaza Strip, where the value of the land is low to Israel and demographical cost is very high (Gaza is about 2% of the historical Palestine and have almost 40% of Palestinians lives in Palestine) (Thrall, 2017).

On the other hand, Palestinians faced a discrimination in armament, since British Mandate till today. British Mandate allowed and helped the Jewish group to arm and train and at the same time prevented the Palestinians to do so and issued a law of execution for the Palestinians who had arms. In Oslo accords, Palestinian Authority in the interim stage must be demilitarized, and each Israeli draft for the final-status issues emphasize on this condition for the future State of Palestine. A Palestinian attempt of arming in Gaza by Hamas and other resistance parties faced harshly by Israeli escalations. Moreover, Israel collectively punishing the people in Gaza by inhuman siege as a respond to this attempt. International, United States classifies any state, which helping to arm the Palestinians, as terrorism sponsor state (Winter, 2016).

The empowerment of Israel and the weakening of the Palestinians created an imbalance of power between them. The Israel superiority in power gave it the upper hand in the negotiations, so we see all the crucial points in the talks are about Israeli interests and security, regardless to the Palestinian fundamental rights. In Refugees issues for example, Israel refuses to let the people who live in camps for more than 60 years to return home because of demographical risk.

The only way to bring peace in Netanyahu view is the power, as he said in his speech in Abraham accords signing ceremony “power makes allies, power makes friends, power makes peace”. So, I think there is two ways to bring peace in Palestine. First, the empowerment of Palestinians. Second, making the cost of status-quo is higher for Israel through the sanctions.

## 8. CONCLUSION

Neither tenths of year of confrontation could settle the conflict between Palestine and Israel, nor many rounds of peace talks. Although many years of conflict passed and many international parties engaged in, but the conflict has not been settled. In all these years, neither Israel could pass the Palestinian existence and rights, nor the Palestinians empowered to have their self-determination.

Almost three decades have been passed since the first direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Since then, many rounds of peace talks have been conducted, many agreements have been signed, but still the peace did not come.

As I assumed in my thesis, Palestine-Israel' peace process seems to be in impasse, I tried in my thesis to give answers for the reasons.

First and most important one, the problem of leadership and representation of people. People was the first obstacle to peace process. First, people in both sides were not satisfied with the outcomes of Oslo Accords, and they expressed their dissatisfaction through changing the leadership, mostly in the elections. so, the opposition of Oslo accords came to power and tried to satisfy their people needs. This made both of the parties more obstinate in the negotiations. Camp David talks were a turning point in the mindset of people form the left to right. The despair from the failure of Camp David talks expressed by the uprising and armed confrontations. And that empowered the right and extreme right wings in both sides.

Many lessons should be learned from our case in this section: the leadership should invest in any chance of peace and should not miss any chance for making peace because the circumstances may change, and the chance may not happen again. The leadership should not give up on at least the basic rights and needs of their people. And the leadership must be persuasive to their people while promoting the achievements of peace talks. The good leader who can balance between these factors to achieve a sustainable peace.

Second factor is the mediation. I think US mediation in the case impeded reaching a settlement through empowering Israeli side over the Palestinian side. US support Israel politically, economically and militarily. US has a special relationship with Israel and consider it a strategic ally in the region. Different US administrations almost agree and have same vision over the relation with Israel and the mediation in Palestinian case. So, I think the position of US in this case is biased and cannot be an effective mediator. I suggested to invest more in the quarter in Middle East, which supposed to propose road map for peace in 2003, to be mediator instead of US monopoly.

Third factor is the nature of the parties and the imbalance of power between them. Israel is one of the greatest regional power in Middle East, and Palestine is still entity and less than a state. This difference makes peace process match with Israel interests and pass over the Palestinian rights. Because of that Palestinians gave a big concession by giving up on demanding the rights on the Historical Palestine, and in return Israel gave nothing. The price of making peace for Israel is high comparing with keeping the current status-quo. That makes the role of mediation essential in this case, where sanctions and rewards could solve the problem of power imbalance. Sanctions are to make the price of not making peace higher than the price of making peace. And rewards are to encourage the parties for peace.

Without taking inconsideration these three factors, I think the future of peace process between Palestine and Israel facing an uncertainty. The current status-quo, that Israel trying to implement in the ground, threatens the future of two-states solution, because the

entities in Palestine territories have been separated between each other by the illegal settlements in West Bank. Borders, sovereignty and security have been taken from the Palestinian authorities. Final-status issues, which are very essential for the coming Palestinian state, like refugee's case and Jerusalem status have been eliminated unilaterally by US in favor of Israel. So, the future of Palestinian state is uncertain and so the two-states solution.

The killing of two-states solution makes us think again about the other scenarios and options like one-states solution or federation option. The basic and simple one is the one state solution, where the small lands will not be separated, and Jerusalem will not be divided. In 2016, US vice president and the new elected-president Joe Biden "because of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's policy of steady expansion of settlements, an eventual "one-state reality" with Israeli Jews no longer in the majority was the likely outcome". This scenario is also a nightmare for Israel because of the demographical threat, and that explains why Knesset passed the law of Nation-State for Jewish People. Officials in Palestine see this option as an alternative if Israel would not respond to the requirement of two-state solution. In 2009, Senior Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat suggested the option of binational state or one-state option if Israel continues in constructing settlement in West Bank.

This solution is a real implication for democracy and equality, that's why most of left groups and activists support and adopt this option. The Palestinian activist, who considers the theorist of binational state, wrote "After 50 years of Israeli history, classic Zionism has provided no solution to the Palestinian presence. I therefore see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way with equal rights for all citizens". I think the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is inspiring in this case.

I recommend the academicians and political Science students to make more studies and researches about this option. And I also recommend the officials in both sides and politicians of the world to take this option inconsideration for the values of democracy and equality. And for saving people's lives, rights and needs.



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