

**TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY  
(ESDP): ANATOMY OF A PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP**

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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP): ANATOMY OF A PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP**

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This study examines Turkey' position in the newly emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Turkey maintains that its level of participation in the ESDP mechanisms has to be increased covering the decision-making procedures, commensurate with its previous achievements within the WEU and NATO frameworks. Moreover, Turkey considers itself entitled to enjoy such a high profile role in the ESDP because of its geo-strategic position and its mission as a 'security producer' as far as European security is concerned.

Lacking military capabilities necessary for the implementation of the operations within the Petersberg Tasks, EU has demanded an automatic and assured access to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities. Turkey, on the other hand, as a NATO member, raised its veto to the EU-NATO cooperation due to the low level of participation foreseen for Turkey within the ESDP framework.

Although British-US initiative to find a breakthrough to this stalemate has been regarded as a viable basis both by Turkey and the EU, Greek veto prevented its realization within the EU framework. Given the traditional Greek position towards Turkey, it is more likely that the current problem will endure in the near future.

While emphasizing the strategic considerations, Turkey does not pay due attention to the relationship between ESDP and the 'European Identity'. As the ESDP is considered to be the vehicle to project values inherent in the European identity to the periphery of the EU, participants in this project would have internalized those values. Thus, it is argued that the most satisfactory level of participation for Turkey in the ESDP can only be realized through full membership to the EU, which can be achieved by the adoption of the value system, among other political and economic conditions, embodied in the Copenhagen Criteria.

Keywords: European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), Petersberg Tasks, Washington Summit, St. Malo Summit, non-EU NATO members, security producer country, security consumer country, decision-making process, decision-making autonomy,

## ÖZ

### TÜRKİYE VE AVRUPA GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI (AGSP): SORUNLU BİR İLİŞKİNİN ANATOMİSİ

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Bu çalışma, yeni ortaya çıkmakta olan Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP) içerisinde Türkiye'nin konumunu incelemektedir. Türkiye, AGSP mekanizmalarındaki katılım düzeyinin, karar alma süreçlerini de kapsayacak şekilde ve BAB ve NATO içerisinde daha önceki kazanımları oranında artırılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Üstelik, Türkiye, jeo-stratejik önemi ve 'güvenlik üreten' rolü nedeniyle kendisini bu derece yüksek profilli bir role layık görmektedir.

Petersberg Görevlerinin gerektirdiği operasyonları yapabilmek için gerekli askeri imkanlardan yoksun olan AB, daha önceden belirlenmiş NATO imkan ve yeteneklerine otomatik ve garanti edilmiş erişim hakkı talep etti. Öte yandan, bir NATO üyesi olarak Türkiye, AGSP çerçevesinde kendisine öngörülen düşük düzeyli katılım düzeyini öne sürerek, AB-NATO işbirliğine karşı veto hakkını öne sürdü.

Bu duruma bir çıkış yolu bulmayı amaçlayan İngiliz-ABD ortak girişimi, hem AB hem de Türkiye tarafında makul bir çerçeve olarak değerlendirilse de, Yunanistan'ın tutumu bunun AB içerisinde gerçekleşmesini engelledi. Yunanistan'ın Türkiye'ye karşı takındığı geleneksel tutum gözönüne alındığında, AGSP konusunda halihazırdaki sorunun yakın gelecekte de devam edeceği olası görülmektedir.

Stratejik düşüncelere önem veren Türkiye, AGSP ile 'Avrupa Kimliği' arasındaki yakın ilişkiye gerekli dikkati göstermemektedir. AGSP 'Avrupa kimliği' içerisinde varolan 'değerleri' AB'nin çevresine yansıtmanın bir aracı olarak görüldüğünden, bu projede yer alacak katılımcıların da bu 'değerleri' içselleştirmiş olmaları beklenmektedir. Bu yüzden, Türkiye'nin AGSP içerisinde en tatmin edici katılım düzeyini hayata geçirmesinin tek yolunun, diğer siyasi ve ekonomik şartlar yanında Kopenhag Kriterlerinde vücut bulmuş olan 'değerler sisteminin' benimsenmesi ile elde edilebilecek olan AB tam üyeliği ile mümkün olabileceği öngörülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP), Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği (AGSK), Petersberg Görevleri, Washington Zirvesi, St. Malo Zirvesi, AB üyesi olmayan NATO üyeleri, güvenlik üreten ülke, güvenlik tüketen ülke, karar alma süreci, karar alma özerkliği.

**EMEL**

*iyi ki*



**VAR SIN**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS.....	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF.....	Combined Joint Task Force
EDC.....	European Defence Community
EEC.....	European Economic Community
EMU.....	European Monetary Union
EPC.....	European Political Cooperation
ESDI.....	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP.....	European Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
GAC.....	General Affairs Council
MBT.....	Modified Brussels Treaty
MC.....	Military Committee
MS.....	Military Staff
NAC.....	North Atlantic Council
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC.....	Political and Security Committee
SDI.....	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEA.....	Single European Act
UK.....	United Kingdom
US.....	United States
WEU.....	Western European Union

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Turkey's participation in the institutional and operational dimensions of the newly emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) has been one of the most contentious issues of the Turkish foreign and security policies during the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Efforts of the EU countries to attain an independent presence in the security and defense as an institution is not a matter confined to the last decade or so. Establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 through a process initiated by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the unfruitful initiative to create the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1950 have been the initial examples of such a desire. Although Cold War years marked the dominance of the two superpowers in the European security environment through respective institutions, of which North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the one operating in Western Europe; the second half of the 1980s witnessed the efforts of Europeans to revitalize the WEU as a platform to discuss and raise issues in European security. Revitalization of the WEU was largely due to the growing scepticism on the reliability of the United States (US) guarantee and the fear of unilateral US policy in areas related with European security. The end of the Cold War and the successful adoption of NATO to the new security environment in Europe led once again to the dominance of NATO as the institution capable of responding to the changing

security perceptions in Europe. Thus, European efforts to increase their standing in security and defense was channelled to the NATO framework under the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) project, which paved the way for a possibility of a European initiative, still with NATO assets and capabilities, in certain cases where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This was, on the one hand, a response to the burden-sharing demands from the US in order to shoulder the responsibilities of the post-Cold War European security context and, on the other hand, a middle way for the Europeans in the wake of the suspicious national positions of some European states towards the realization of an autonomous European security and defense policy and insistence on the preservation of the trans-Atlantic cooperation.

Development of the process under the NATO framework was advantageous for Turkey since it had the ability to shape and determine the evolution of the process as a NATO full member and WEU Associate Member. However, with the Franco-British St. Malo Summit meeting of December 1998, the path towards the realization of an autonomous EU security and defense policy and creation of a military capability has been opened, which was made possible by the removal of the negative British attitude towards such an initiative. This process evolved, through subsequent EU Council meetings, to the formation of an ESDP which made the Turkish position problematic especially after the integration of the WEU into the EU because of the Turkish non-membership in the EU.

Turkey maintains that, as a non-EU European NATO member, it's left in a disadvantageous position in the ESDP when compared to its previous achievements in other contexts such as WEU and NATO. Especially after the inclusion of the WEU into the EU in line with Amsterdam Treaty provisions, Turkey has found its status deteriorated. Turkey demands certain rights in the newly emerging bodies of

the ESDP ranging from full participation in decision-making of the operations with NATO assets to enhanced consultation in peace-time and crisis time and finally the right to raise its concerns in the decision-making mechanisms of EU-only operations in Turkey's geographic proximity and areas of national interest, such as the Aegean and Cyprus.

EU, on the other hand, has made a distinction between operations using NATO-assets in which the six non-EU NATO members would participate automatically in preliminary discussions "if they so wish", and EU-only operations when the invitation to participate would be decided by the Council of Ministers on a case-by-case basis. EU in this respect has offered Turkey full participation in the decision-shaping process and the operational planning, i.e. the day-to-day management of an EU-led operation. The EU is willing to engage in "deep consultation" with Turkey during the decision-shaping process, although the latter's position would not be binding. It is also willing to accept Turkey's involvement in the operational planning stage following a decision, provided it assigns forces to the task force. Turkey, as a non-EU member, has not been offered participation in decision-making. Turkey would have no say at the critical juncture in which the EU's General Affairs Council would decide on where, when and how to intervene. There are certain considerations of the part of the EU in general and some of the members in particular which play an important and decisive role in the determination of the EU policy towards Turkey as far as Turkey's participation in the European security system in general and in the newly emerging ESDP mechanism in particular is concerned.

This thesis is an attempt to explore, discuss and analyze the different aspects of Turkish position in the ESDP. While doing this, after an introduction into the nature of the problem, Chapter 2 will identify and discuss the respective security cultures of Turkey and EU as far as their relevance to the problematic relationship between EU and Turkey in terms of the ESDP project is concerned. Chapter 3, while laying the major turning points in the development of the ESDP process to the ground, is an attempt to put forward the main aspects of the ESDP, namely the institutionalization and operationalization phases, which play an important role in the evolution of the Turkish position. Chapter 4, on the other hand, will shed a light on the essence of the problem first and then try to evaluate the basis of the Turkish position with an analytical perspective. Furthermore, determining factors of the EU policy towards Turkey in the ESDP matter will be discussed in length. Proposals for a solution to the issue of participation of the non-EU European NATO allies in general and Turkey in particular in the ESDP will be introduced and the British-US joint initiative and the final document adopted thereof, which constitute a significant achievement towards the attainment of a breakthrough in this problem, will be discussed in Chapter 5. The last stage of the issue and future prospects, as far as Turkish-EU relations in the framework of the ESDP project is concerned, will be the subject matter of the concluding Chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 2

### EVOLUTION OF THE RESPECTIVE SECURITY CULTURES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY

The nature of the 'security culture' is one of the most important factors in the determination and analysis of a particular entity, be a state or an organization, in a given issue concerning security. In this respect, security cultures of the European Union (EU) and Turkey respectively play a significant role in their standing vis-a-vis each other in the current discussions on Turkey's position in the newly emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

#### 2.1 Evolution of the Security Culture in Europe

Europe, in general is contemplated as 'a security complex' i.e. a group of states whose securities are sufficiently interdependent to make them a type of sub-system within the overall pattern of international security.<sup>1</sup>

European security culture can be investigated by making a four-pillar categorization in terms of its historical evolution in the post-war era. The first period covers the years between the end of the Second World War (WWII) until the mid-1980s. The period beginning from the mid-1980s and ending up with the end of the

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<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan *et al.* (eds.), *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p.14

Cold War constitutes the second one. Developments in the European security culture in the post-Cold War era till the Franco-British St.Malo Summit can be identified as the third period, while the St. Malo Summit meeting marks the beginning of the last period, which is going on.

### 2.1.1 First Period and Dominance of the Transatlantic Cooperation

Traditional European security complex collapsed after the WWII and was overlaid<sup>2</sup> by the two superpowers. United States and Soviet Union were decisive in the management of European security to such an extent that indigenous European actors such as Britain, France and Germany were not able to shape the developments in the security sphere in line with their independent positions.

This was apparent in the failure of the EDC project and the inability of the WEU to play a significant role in European security due to its marginalization by NATO.

Efforts to establish an only-European presence in the fields of security and defense can be traced back to the end of the WWII. The threat coming from Soviet Union and fear of Germany were the main driving force behind the attempts to concert security and defense arrangements in Europe. The Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self – Defense, which was signed in March 1948 among France, Britain, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, marked the creation of a regional defense organization in Europe. However, there were major setbacks in front of this project. Firstly, there were important differences of opinion among the members. For instance, Britain favored US to remain the linchpin of the defense of Europe whereas others, especially

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<sup>2</sup> See Ibid., p.15 for details of the condition of 'overlay'.

France, were skeptical about the long-term reliability of the US. As a second factor, military weakness of the members undermined the effectiveness of the organization. Thirdly, economic conditions further exerted pressure on these countries resulting in the major cutbacks in defense expenditures. Last but not least, signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949 and the establishment of NATO marked a milestone in European security, which led to the fading away of the WEU from the European security realm for a long period.

In 1950s, Korean War and nuclear threat from Soviet Union led to the need to increase European security and defense capacities, which could only be achieved through adding German military power. This raised a major dilemma for the Europeans i.e. the rearmament of Germany. The initial attempt to solve this dilemma came from France with the proposal for the establishment of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1952, which became unfruitful due to the rejection of the French parliament. Then came the British effort to modify the Brussels Treaty and the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in September 1954 by including Germany as a member. However, with the inclusion of Germany into the NATO in 1955, WEU became increasingly peripheral to the management of security in Europe since NATO was fulfilling the functions which had been originally conceived of for the WEU. Thus, WEU became a political platform, leaving security and collective defense in the European continent to NATO.

Attempts to endow the then European Economic Community (EEC) with a foreign and security policy dimension through the introduction of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) towards the end of the 1960s has been unfruitful due to the divergent national positions of the EEC members and the lack of a fertile ground

for such an initiative in the face of the sensitivities concerning the primacy of the US involvement and the NATO framework for the European continent.

During this period, European security arena is dominated by two superpowers to such an extent that neither the individual actors nor the organizations established for that purpose were able to be effective in managing security and defense in Europe.

### 2.1.2 Second Period: Revitalization of the WEU

In the wake of the suspicious US efforts in the beginning of the 1980s, such as the initiation of the Star Wars project and the insufficient response of US to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Europeans began to question the reliability of the US guarantee in the European affairs. Together with the pressures for closer European cooperation, this resulted in the European attempts to revitalize the WEU as a European forum to discuss European issues independent from the NATO framework.<sup>3</sup>

However, the primary goal of the Europeans in the revitalization of the WEU throughout the second half of the 1980s was not the replacement of the Alliance but rather to address the concerns over the trans-Atlantic burden-sharing.<sup>4</sup> It was not conceived as an anti-NATO project but rather as a suitable platform to remedy the deficiencies in the trans-Atlantic relations.

Motives behind the revitalization of the WEU can be put forward as :

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<sup>3</sup> G.Wyn Rees, *The Western European at the Crossroads* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p.131

<sup>4</sup> Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy* (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), pp.81-85

- to remedy the weakness of the European countries within the Atlantic alliance which will also constitute a response to continuous US demands for burden-sharing.

- the questioning of the relations with the US due to the growing concerns on the part of the Europeans over the reliability of the US guarantee arising from the renewed Cold War hostility and the reluctance of US to consult with Europeans on certain foreign policy initiatives such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).<sup>5</sup>

It was hoped that the WEU might have become a more effective instrument for building a European security policy. However, WEU, rather than being an organization capable of managing security issues relevant to Europe, has been relatively successful in overcoming differences and reaching agreements in the multilateral Europeanization process.<sup>6</sup>

As a result, WEU has not been more than a political forum in the years marking the end of the Cold War. It has performed limited military roles such as the one in the Iran-Iraq War and has been a secondary organization as far as the management of the European security affairs is concerned, when compared to NATO.

Efforts within the European Community to develop a foreign and security policy has also continued in the second half of the 1980s with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987, which obliged member states to compose and apply a European

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<sup>5</sup> Rees, *op.cit.*, pp.23-24

<sup>6</sup> Robbin Laird, *The Europeanization of the Alliance* (Colorado:Westview Press,1991), p.34

foreign policy. Nevertheless, 'security' was referred as only limited to the political and economic dimensions, as far as the scope of the SEA is concerned.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.1.3 End of the Cold War and The Beginning of a New Period

The end of the Cold War has initiated a new process in Europe as far as security and defense is concerned. Changing security perceptions and the new security environment after the fading away of the bipolar rivalry have resulted in the perception of an existence of a fertile ground for an initiative, which can lead to the introduction of a foreign, security and defense policy dimension for the European integration process. The security framework in Europe has radically changed after the end of the Cold War. Security has not been regarded as confined to the military security but focus shifted to more diffuse security challenges, such as international crime, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, spread of nuclear weapons as well as humanitarian and environmental crises.<sup>8</sup>

This conceptual transformation in European security has made the institutional transformation inevitable, which led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within EU. Maastricht Treaty, i.e. the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) formulated the CFSP and proclaimed that the Union shall "*assert its identity on the international scene in particular through the*

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<sup>7</sup> Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000) p.146 and Esra Çayhan and Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney (eds.), *Avrupa'da Yeni Güvenlik Arayışları: NATO, AB, Türkiye* (İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1996), p.111

<sup>8</sup> Helene Sjursen, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: An Emerging New Voice in International Politics?", *Arena Working Papers* (WP 99/34), pp.3-4 Source: [www.sv.uio.no/arena/publications](http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/publications)

*implementation of a CFSP which shall include the eventual framing of a common defense policy”.*<sup>9</sup>

The rationale behind the initiation of the CFSP project in its initial periods can be put forward as follows:

The integrated Europe faces an inevitable global role. The EU cannot escape from its sensitive location in world politics. For the first time in its history, extended Western Europe directly borders the Russian Federation and will become immediately affected by the developments inside the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], it is highly committed to the success of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, two more of the “hot spots” in international affairs are located in the immediate vicinity of the EC and the EU has become the target of the major migratory movements around the world. Against the background of the new political, geopolitical and economic situation of Europe, however, CFSP is but a first attempt to equip the EU with adequate tools.<sup>10</sup>

At Maastricht, the three pillar structure was accepted as the architecture for the newly created European Union. The second pillar was dedicated to a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a distinction was drawn between security and defence issues. Security was considered to be a legitimate topic in the second pillar whilst defense was kept within the purview of the WEU. In this respect, Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has been a turning point by its identification of the WEU as the defense arm of the European Union (EU). Apart from the security dimension, EU has begun to be an organization with a defense dimension but through WEU. In this initial period, WEU was kept out of the EU machinery and defense was not included directly in the EU treaties, due to the reservations of some European

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<sup>9</sup> Treaty on the EU, 1992, Title I, Common Provisions, Article B quoted in Meltem Müftüçer-Bac, “Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies”, *Security Dialogue* (Vol.31, Iss.4, 2000),p. 491

<sup>10</sup> Josef Janning, “ Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Challenges, Constraints and Options for Reform” in Franco Algieri *et al.* (eds.) *Managing Security In Europe: The European Union and Challenge of Enlargement* (Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 1996), p.234

countries, especially United Kingdom (UK). UK insisted on the preservation of the trans-Atlantic link, embodied in NATO and regarded the inclusion of defense into the EU, as a threat to the continuation of the involvement of NATO in the affairs of the European continent. In the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, WEU laid out three categories of tasks, namely humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and crisis management including peacemaking as legitimate boundaries for the WEU mandate.

CFSP, however, has not been successful in meeting the expectations of the EU circles in its initial times. Three factors can be identified regarding the weakness and failure of the CFSP to become a reliable foreign and security policy tool for the EU. First, national interests of the main EU players diverge. CFSP has not been instrumental in reconciling the different national interests and concerns over sovereignty. Second, there is a lack of strategic clarity. The scope of the CFSP and possible instruments at its disposal has either not been identified or done in an improper manner. Third factor is institutional weakness. There has been a lack of relevant institutional bodies that will realize the goals of the CFSP.<sup>11</sup>

Failure of the CFSP project became apparent after the lack of an initiative on the part of the Europeans to take a lead in the efforts to find a solution to the war in the territories of former Yugoslavia.

With the failure of the CFSP in mid-1990s and in the wake of the successful efforts of NATO, such as the introduction of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, to adopt itself to the changing security environment in the post-Cold War

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<sup>11</sup> Stefan A. Schirm, *Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Politics of Necessity, Viability and Adequacy* (Harvard:Center For European Studies,1996), p.70 See Stelios Stravridis, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Why Institutional Arrangements Are Not Enough" in Howard Machin *et al.*(eds.), *New Challenges to the EU:Policies and Policy Making* (Vermont:Ashgate Publishing,1997), p.113 and Emil Kirchner, and James Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a ESDI", *Contemporary Security Policy* (Vol.21, No.1, April 2000) p.23 for an analysis of the shortcomings of the CFSP.

European context, prospects for a European-only security and defense policy became invisible and the process was channelled into the NATO framework under the umbrella of ESDI.

The end of the Cold War presented an unprecedented opportunity for the development of the ESDI. With a transformed external environment, the US preoccupied with reassessing its post-Cold War role and the pressure in Europe for deeper integration; there had been a fertile ground for the ESDI to come of age.<sup>12</sup>

ESDI represents the efforts on the part of NATO to respond to the post-Cold War security environment in the European continent, by giving the Europeans within the NATO structure an independent presence in security and defense matters.

ESDI was an attempt to endow the European countries within NATO with the necessary military capabilities needed for the requirements of the European-only operations within the framework of the Petersberg tasks due to the inability of the Europeans to do so which has become apparent especially after the Yugoslavia experience. ESDI within NATO ensured the use of NATO assets and capabilities by a group of European countries. Naturally the political and strategic control of these operations would be under NATO responsibility. Effectiveness of the ESDI has been instrumental in the dominance of the NATO as the institution capable of meeting the challenges posed by the end of the Cold War in the European security environment.

#### 2.1.4 EU As a True Security Actor

The main characteristic of the process of European security and defense integration in the period leading to Amsterdam and St. Malo was marked by the realization of European efforts within NATO.

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<sup>12</sup> Rees, *op.cit.*, p.38

The main speciality of this period right after the end of the Cold War, i.e. the weakening of an imperative for a European identity in world affairs through the realization of a foreign and security policy and the failure of the communitarization of a European foreign and security policy, can mainly be ascribed to the attachment of EU states to NATO due to the failure of CFSP.<sup>13</sup>

The new process beginning with the Amsterdam Treaty can be regarded as a prolongation of the past efforts towards the development of a security and defense role for the EU. The significant character of the European security process in the 1990s is the establishment of a security and defense policy primarily through the evolutionary changes rather than a radical transformation.<sup>14</sup>

The evolution of a stronger and more independent Europe is both desirable and inevitable. It is desirable because Europe's current level of strategic dependence on the US can not be sustained. It is inevitable because as Europe becomes a more formidable economic entity, it will aspire to a level of influence commensurate with its economic power.<sup>15</sup>

Kosovo experience was a catalyst for a new transatlantic bargain and a more autonomous European role. The size of the military and leadership gap between US and its European allies that Kosovo revealed has led the Europeans to reconsider the half-a-century long efforts to establish a European-only security and defense policy with necessary military capabilities.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Fulvio Attina, "The European Union and the Global System: Internal and International Security" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.131

<sup>14</sup> Cengiz Okman, "AGSK ve NATO Üzerine: Radikal Dönüşüm İkilemi", *Karizma* ( Vol.2, No.6, April-May-June 2001), p.103

<sup>15</sup> Charles Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe", *National Interest* (Iss.56, Summer 1999), pp.5-6 Source: EBSCOHOST

<sup>16</sup> Elizabeth Pond, "Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe", *Washington Quarterly* (Vol.22, Iss.4, Autumn 1999), p.3 Source: EBSCOHOST

Discussions regarding the introduction of a security and defense dimension to the EU has been regarded by some scholars as a natural step in the European integration process after trade, economy and monetary union.<sup>17</sup>

Gradual integration of the EU, esp. with the introduction of a single currency and European Monetary Union (EMU), and the steady enlargement of the EU brings security and defense increasingly into the orbit of EU activities. Moreover, this coincides with the changing nature of security policy in which non-military aspects are growing in stature, and in which EU through its civilian power image feels it has a natural advantage.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, there were suspicions regarding the adoption of a security and defense aspect to the EU because of its traditional projection of a 'civilian power' role, while others argue that the notion of a civilian power is no more valid.

For instance, Duchene and Galtung in the 1970s have outlined the EEC as a civilian power and maintained that it could only serve as a non-military model of international power and influence, while Bull, on the other hand, argued that the notion of a civilian power is a contradiction. "To be a real power and therefore to be an effective actor in world politics", according to Bull, "requires the acquisition of military capabilities".<sup>19</sup>

In line with this argument, the period after the Kosovo experience has been the witness of a gradual evolution of the European Union towards obtaining a full security and defense role of its own. Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for the integration of the WEU into the EU and introduced certain reforms to remedy the weaknesses in the CFSP mechanisms, which opened the path for a security and

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<sup>17</sup> See Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey's Role in European Security and Defence Policy", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.3, July-September 2001), pp.41-42

<sup>18</sup> Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a ESDP", *Contemporary Security Policy* (Vol.21, No.1, April 2000), pp.23-24

<sup>19</sup> White, *op.cit.*, p.152

defense role for the EU. Franco-British St. Malo Summit opened the prospect of the realization of this ideal by removing the long-lasting veto of Britain for a true defense role and autonomous military capability of the EU.

The process beginning with Amsterdam Treaty and the St. Malo Summit marked the beginning of a period in which EU evolves towards becoming a true security and defense actor in world politics with its own institutional mechanisms and operational capabilities.

## **2.2 Evolution of the Security Culture of Turkey**

Since the beginning of the institutionalization process of European affairs after the end of the World War II, Turkey has consistently showed its desire to join the institutions that were set up in the European political sphere. This is a reflection of the Western element in its foreign policy, having its roots in the Ottoman Empire dating back to the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>20</sup>

### **2.2.1 Cold War Perceptions**

During the Cold War period, Turkey has continually aimed to locate itself in the western sphere of political activity by raising its resolve to be a member of the organizations such as NATO, Council of Europe or the EEC/EC/EU.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey" *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. 54, Iss.1, Fall 2000), p. 206 in which Turkish integration with Europe is conceived as an Ottoman legacy.

<sup>21</sup> Adam Bronstone, *European Security into the Twenty-first Century: Beyond Traditional Theories of International Relations* (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), p.188.

During this period, Turkey continued to play an important strategic role in the southern flank of NATO's defense strategy vis-a-vis Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Turkey together with Greece, has been the indispensable element of NATO policies in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. However, aside from its membership in NATO, Turkey has not been accepted as a full member into the other European security organizations such as WEU.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, NATO has enjoyed an unchallenged primacy in Turkish security perceptions, which is emphasized in an official document as follows:

From the very first day of its entrance into NATO, Turkey has found NATO important for its own security and the stability of the world in general and provided the Alliance with a large number of forces as an active member. By this way, Turkey has made a great contribution to the security of the Alliance and Western Europe especially during the Cold War as well as to the creation of the positive conditions in the contemporary Europe.<sup>24</sup>

Apart from strategic considerations and the existence of the Soviet threat, one can not underestimate the determining factor of the aim of adopting certain values in Turkey's ideal to integrate into the Western institutions. In this respect, Turkey's resolve to be a member of NATO in the aftermath of the World War II was also a reflection of its confidence in Western values and in the virtues of political systems. NATO membership is a concrete sign of Turkey's Western orientation by means of the establishment of an enduring institutional and functional link.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p.188 and Engin Oba, "Turkey and Western Security in the New Era of International Relations: A Political and Sociological Appraisal", *Foreign Policy*, p.54

<sup>23</sup> Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (London:MacMillan Press,1994), p.282

<sup>24</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap* (Ministry of Defense, White Book) (Ankara: Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, 2000), pp.9-10

As Bernard Lewis pointed out;

The Turkish alignment with the West is not limited to strategic and diplomatic considerations. It is the outward expression of a profound internal change extending over a century and a half of Turkish history and sustained attempt to endow the Turkish people with those freedoms, economic, political and intellectual, which represent the best that our Western societies have to offer.<sup>25</sup>

### 2.2.2 Post-Cold War Perceptions

The end of the Cold War, however, has exerted a growing pressure on security relations of Turkey with the West as a result of the expansion of Turkey's foreign and security policy agenda together with that of Europe. Western engagement with Turkey, on the other hand, has not kept pace with changes in the security environment. The West has long been interested in Turkey as a 'barrier' in strategic terms during the Cold War but in the post-Cold War era Turkey began to describe itself as a 'bridge'.<sup>26</sup> Turkey has gained new roles in the emerging European security framework. Turkey is characterized as a '*trans-regional actor*' in European security in the new era.

.....Turkey's new geopolitics is inherently trans-regional, an approach that reflects concrete changes in the strategic environment and avoids the somewhat artificial tension between the country's future role as a bridge or a barrier. Turkey is most directly affected by a key trend shaping Western security: the erosion of traditional distinctions between the European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian theaters. Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country's future role will be strongly influenced by it.<sup>27</sup>

The nature of the new trans-regional role stems from the fact that "Ankara began to exert influence in Central Asia, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, the

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<sup>25</sup> Cited in, Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit.*, p.209

<sup>26</sup> For a detailed discussion of these terms see Ian O. Lesser, "Beyond Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West", in Graham Fuller, and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), "Turkey's New Geopolitics" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp.205-206

Middle East and the Balkans, which constituted a significant shift from its previous policies of non-involvement".<sup>28</sup> Turkey has become one of the most active and significant actor not only in steering the developments in the regions around its territory but also in serving as a model for those countries in their bid for being a member of the Western world.

However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been an absence of a consensus between Turkey and EU on a new paradigm for strategic cooperation. Although there are contending views on Turkish role in European security in the new era, some scholars argue that Turkey may play a more important role than it did during the Cold War while others foresee a diminishing significance of Turkey.<sup>29</sup> Turkey's participation in the Gulf War, once again, emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey for any Western project in its region.

In this respect, with the attempts to reinvigorate WEU in the mid-1980s, Turkey has applied to be a full member of the organization in line with its traditional policy to align itself within Western security framework. Turkey became an Associate Member in 1995 and played an important role though limited to the scope of the success of the organization.

During this period, as a NATO member, Turkey actively contributed to the realization of the ESDI project both politically and militarily within the NATO framework in proportion to its involvement in the process going on within the WEU and the EU.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.207

<sup>28</sup> Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit*, p.210

<sup>29</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, "Turkey's Strategic Relations with its Western Allies" paper presented to the Conference on The Changing Environment of Turkish Foreign Policy, Washington, February 2000, p.1

By this way, Turkey has been more or less an influential actor of the process of the evolution of European security since the whole process had been realized within NATO under the project of ESDI.

Despite its continuing role in NATO, the end of the Cold War raised questions about where Turkey fits into the overall European security architecture. The creation of the ESDP, which threatens to increase Turkey's isolation from Europe in terms of security perspectives, is a reflection of the negative attitude towards Turkey.

Beginning with the Amsterdam Treaty and becoming concrete at the St. Malo, European security and defense began to evolve outside NATO as an independent European-only process which led to the erosion of the Turkish position attained through NATO and the WEU, resulting in a less influential role for Turkey vis-a-vis the EU.

With these facts in mind, Turkey's current position vis-a-vis the emerging project of ESDP does serve neither for the interest of EU nor Turkey.

The exclusion and marginalization of Turkey from the emerging European security architecture introduces substantial stumbling blocks. If the Europeans pursue the strategy of complementing a stable European security architecture by a politically and economically stable regional neighbourhood, Turkey and its future relations with the EU have to be included in the design. For the EU it should be clear that without a resolution of Turkey's status, Europe's security can not be sufficiently planned since the post-Cold War European security is marked rather by uncertainty which entails considering the concept of security in its entirety.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and the European Security and Defense Identity: A Turkish View", *Studien und Berichte Zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Oktober 2000), p.15

## CHAPTER 3

### FORMATION OF THE ESDP : INSTITUTIONALIZATION & OPERATIONALIZATION

By means of ESDI, the main aim was to give the European countries a more valid and reliable security role within the NATO framework. Positive attitude of NATO towards ESDI has initiated the chain reaction which ended up in the creation of the ESDP starting with the Franco-British St.Malo Summit and going on with Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice EU Summits. While ESDI had been initiated as a NATO project, ESDP is institutionally limited to the EU framework only.<sup>1</sup>

The basis of a true security and defense role for the EU can first be noticed in the Amsterdam Treaty, which brought the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks - humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making - into the EU framework and stated that the EU can 'avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the Petersberg Tasks'<sup>2</sup> making security and defense a legitimate concern of EU. By this way, a strong relationship between EU and WEU was formed through the establishment of an organic link between the two organizations and naming the

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<sup>1</sup> Cengiz Okman, "AGSK ve NATO Üzerine: Radikal Dönüşüm İkilemi", *Karizma* ( Vol.2, No.6, April-May-June 2001), pp.109-110

<sup>2</sup> Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

WEU as the defense arm of the EU, as far as matters having a security and defense dimension are concerned.

Significance of the Amsterdam Treaty can be put forward as follows:

.....Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in October 1997) ..... on the one hand furthered the CFSP by placing stronger emphasis on projecting the EU's values and interests and establishing the post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; on the other hand, .....strengthened the ties between the EU and the WEU and increased the EU's responsibilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks by incorporating the Petersberg tasks.<sup>3</sup>

Amsterdam Treaty has taken certain steps in order to remedy the deficiencies inherent in the Maastricht Treaty as far as the second pillar i.e. the CFSP is concerned, introduction of the qualified majority voting being the most important one.

All in all, the institutional arrangements agreed upon at Maastricht and further developed at Amsterdam in 1997 certainly provide the basis for the EU becoming more state-like in the field of foreign and security policy.<sup>4</sup>

The outcome of this process has been the establishment of a common security and defense policy in the framework of the CFSP as defined by the union treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. Accordingly it is limited to the Petersberg Tasks agreed upon in 1992 by the WEU and inscribed into the Amsterdam Treaty.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Meltem Müftüçler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue* (Vol.31, Iss.4, 2000), p.491

<sup>4</sup> David Allen and Michael Smith "The European Union's Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator or Manager?" in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), *The EU in the World Community* (London: Lyenne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.46

<sup>5</sup> Lothar Rühl, *Conditions and Options for an Autonomous Common European Policy on Security and Defence in and by the EU in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999*, p.4

### 3.1 St.Malo: The Real Turning Point

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage..... This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP..... To this end, the Union must have the *capacity for autonomous action*, backed up by credible military forces, the *means to decide to use them*, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises..... In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means - European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework.<sup>6</sup>

However, the real turning point for the initiation of a true security and defense policy for the EU came only after the Franco-British St.Malo Summit of December 1998. At St.Malo, France and Britain decided to push the EU's role in security and defense further and questioned the need for the existence of WEU as an independent organization.

St.Malo is a real turning point in the sense that the efforts towards the realization of ESDI in the framework of NATO has been replaced by policies aimed at the creation of a European-only presence in the fields of security and defense apart from NATO. Until this date, Europeans felt themselves obliged to take NATO into consideration and regarded efforts to take initiatives independent from NATO as diminishing the involvement of US and thus undermining the trans-Atlantic cooperation. After the St. Malo Declaration, discussions regarding the European security and defense have begun to be channeled into the EU framework. ESDI has been replaced by ESDP, former representing the general understanding while the latter signifying the creation of a policy inside the EU. By this way, all of these

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<sup>6</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, See Kori Schake, Amaya Laine Bloch and Charles Grant "Building a European Defense Capability", *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999), pp.23-24 for the full text of the Declaration.

efforts have been put into a legal framework, when compared to the ESDI, which is rather an abstract phenomenon without a solid structural and institutional basis.

Historic steps taken at St. Malo have been largely due to the policy change on the part of Britain. Traditionally Britain has always been objecting to the realization of an autonomous security and defense role for the EU, which is pioneered by France. On the contrary, Britain had insisted on the relevance of the trans-Atlantic framework for the management of security and defense issues of Europe. Thus, creation of an independent European-only presence in security and defense would be harmful to the European security by undermining the trans-Atlantic security cooperation maintained by NATO under the leadership of US.

The reasons of the policy change of Britain can be found in the experience of Kosovo and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's ambition to become a more influential member inside the EU.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the arrival of economic and monetary union (EMU) prepared a fertile ground for this initiative by increasing the political will of the Europeans to coordinate their foreign and security policies.<sup>8</sup>

For the first time in the EU history, St. Malo has made reference to the necessity of "an *autonomous capacity* for conducting its [EU's] objective of a common foreign and security policy".<sup>9</sup> While emphasizing the continued commitment to NATO, it left open the possibility of a European military action outside NATO framework.

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<sup>7</sup> Charles Grant, "From St.Malo to Washington", *World Link* (March/April 1999), p.2  
Source:EBSCOHOST

<sup>8</sup> Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch Laine and Charles Grant "Building a European Defense Capability", *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999), p.25

<sup>9</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, See Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch Laine and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defense Capability", *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999), pp.23-24 for the full text of the Declaration

It is possible to say that the use of the term “*autonomy*” means that the intention of the EU is to act separately from NATO and there is an impression that this terminology is chosen not to use the term “independently” which is much stronger than “autonomy”. This is a clear sign of abandoning the concept of ESDI.<sup>10</sup>

In the mean time, however, EU aspiration to take the responsibility of cases is limited to the ones falling under the purview of the Petersberg tasks and will do so only when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. Therefore, crisis management mission of the EU will not constitute an alternative to NATO but rather would mean the beginning of the realization of the burden-sharing between the two parts of the Atlantic.

Petersberg tasks include humanitarian operations such as humanitarian aid and rescue tasks, peacekeeping operations in the form of monitoring and facilitating a peace process and finally peace enforcement which is, by definition, coercive in nature and undertaken without the consent of the parties. However, there are still gray areas in the determination of the boundaries of the Petersberg tasks. Some authors point to the lack of a clear-cut definition of the scope of the Petersberg tasks. It is argued that the EU would have to guess at the precise definition of the Petersberg tasks, which hold such a prominent place in the formulation of the ESDP. The narrow interpretation is the original meaning of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces including peace making”. The new broad interpretation goes much further than the original intentions. All sorts of

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<sup>10</sup> Çınar Özen, “Consequences of the European Security and Defense Policy for the European Non-EU NATO Members”, *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi* (Cilt 1, Sayı 1, Güz 2001), p.144

operations including the most demanding with the clear exception of collective defense are covered by this interpretation.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, St.Malo is defined as the beginning of the final stage of the European integration and the first step in a long road leading to the European defense. St. Malo process has been instrumental in achieving the goals set forth in the Franco-British summit. The success of the St. Malo is ascribed to:

- the excellent timing by catching the wind of popular support needed after the realization of the EMU,
- its being a Franco-British initiative, which are the ideal pair for such an initiative because of their joint commitment to both NATO and Europe,
- the German support to the process,
- the positive US attitude.<sup>12</sup>

### **3.2 Institutionalization of the ESDP**

One of the challenges for the ESDP is the establishment of an institutional framework, which may effectively translate the political resolve of the EU member states into swift and sound decisions to launch military operations. .... EU deliberately has chosen the second pillar as the launching platform for their new European defense capacity. It is argued that a close link with the CFSP and the EU's single institutional framework may increase the new capacity's effectiveness and may also strengthen the CFSP with the presumed legitimacy of the EU.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Alfred Van Staden *et al.* (eds.), *Towards a European Strategic Concept* (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2000), p.21

<sup>12</sup> Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense", *Washington Quarterly* (Vol.22, Iss.4, 1999), p.5

<sup>13</sup> Van Staden, *op.cit.*, p.9

Cologne EU Summit of 3-4 June 1999 has initiated the institutionalization stage of the ESDP by identifying four main bodies to be set up within the EU. These bodies will form the core of the decision-making mechanism of the future ESDP.

In order to realize the effective functioning of the institutional mechanism and the achievement of the goals; Cologne Presidency Conclusions put forward the need for:

.....regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers; a permanent body in Brussels ( Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with political/military expertise; an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; an EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre and other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, at the ministerial level the General Affairs Council (GAC) will be in charge. Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be the key body to prepare ministers' decisions. A Military Committee (MC) will formulate advice on military matters. An EU Military Staff (MS) of more than 100 officers will inform and prepare the deliberations of the Military Committee and PSC on defense-related issues.<sup>15</sup> These bodies correspond to the respective institutional mechanism of NATO, which was conceived to be an influential factor in facilitating the effective functioning of the bilateral cooperation between NATO and the EU.

One of the most significant aspects of the Cologne Summit is the decision of the full integration of WEU into the EU. With this decision, WEU has fulfilled its mission and put an end to its functionality in May 2000.

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<sup>14</sup> Cologne EU Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

<sup>15</sup> Gilles Andreani, "Why Institutions Matter", *Survival* (Vol.42, No.2, Summer 2000), pp.85-86

With the establishment of the institutional bodies responsible for the EU policies on security and defense and the disintegration of the WEU, status of the non-EU European NATO members, which are Associate Members to the WEU, has become more problematic.

However, Cologne EU Presidency Report on the ESDP put an emphasis on the significance of the development of “....*satisfactory arrangements* for European NATO members who are not EU Member States to ensure their *fullest possible involvement* in EU-led operations, *building on existing consultation arrangements within WEU.*”<sup>16</sup>

We [EU members] want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations. We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent in this endeavour.<sup>17</sup>

During the Feira Summit, further progress has also been achieved in designing a framework for structural consultations between the EU and the various relevant non-EU countries, particularly European NATO-members and EU candidate member states.<sup>18</sup>

Modalities for the participation of the non-EU members are classified under two broad categories. In the routine non-crisis phase there has been a mechanism for a regular dialogue. Operational phase, on the other hand, includes two stages. In the pre-operational phase, options for action are considered, dialogue and consultations will be intensified. Operational phase starts when the Council takes the decision to

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Cologne European Council Declaration On Strengthening The Common European Policy On Security And Defence, Annex III, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

<sup>18</sup> Van Staden, *op.cit.*, p.14

launch an operation and an ad hoc Committee of Contributors is set up during this stage.

Principles laid down in the Feira Summit foresee a minimum of two meetings with the EU candidate countries as a whole in EU+15 format in each Presidency on ESDP matters. Within this framework, a minimum of two meetings will be organized with the six non-EU European NATO members, in EU+6 format, in each Presidency.

Operational phase is divided into two sub-categories:

a) Pre-operational phase

In the event of a crisis, dialogue and consultation will be intensified. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, these consultations will provide a framework for exchanges of views and discussion on any related security concerns raised by the countries concerned. Where the EU recourse to NATO assets is under active consideration, particular attention will be given to consultation with the six non-EU European NATO members.

b) Operational phase

When deciding on the military option, the EU will address participation of non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates to accession to the EU according to the provisions agreed in Helsinki:

“Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, *be invited* to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.”

Those non-EU European NATO members and countries candidates for accession which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day to day conduct of that operation. An ad hoc committee of contributors will be set up comprising all EU Member States and the other participating countries for the day to day conduct of the operation.

While the European Council together with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation, the military day to day conduct of the operation, functions and roles of the Military Committee (MC) and of the operation commander will be set out in the relevant arrangements such as the Committee of Contributors. Decision to put an end to an operation will be taken by the Council after consultation between participating states within the ad hoc committee of contributors.<sup>19</sup>

Institutional features of the ESDP has been developing through an evolutionary process within the scope of the decisions taken at the ensuing EU summit meetings in Helsinki, Feira, Nice, Goteborg and Laeken. A functioning mechanism among four bodies is aimed to be set up and relevant meetings are held in order to perform the roles foreseen for these bodies in the Presidency Conclusions.

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<sup>19</sup> EU Feira Presidency Conclusions, Annex I - Presidency Report On Strengthening The Common European Security And Defence Policy, Appendix 1 - Arrangements To Be Concluded By The Council On Modalities Of Consultation And/Or Participation That Will Allow The Non-Eu European NATO Members And Other Countries Which Are Candidates For Accession To The EU To Contribute To EU Military Crisis Management, <http://www.europa.eu.int>

### 3.3. Operationalization of the ESDP

Operationalization of the ESDP has been a more painful process when compared to the relatively smooth process of institutionalization.

St.Malo, has for the first time referred to the development of the relevant autonomous military capabilities for the EU in order to fulfill its functions within the scope of the Petersberg tasks. Cologne EU Presidency Conclusions has apparently emphasized the desirability of the development of such a capability for the EU.

Helsinki EU Summit of December 1999, on the other hand, has taken a major step when it introduced the principles and guidelines for the formation of a European military capability by the year 2003.<sup>20</sup>

Feira EU Summit of June 2000 has been instrumental in its attempt to respond to the demands of the non-EU European NATO members towards a greater degree of participation in the ESDP mechanisms, be it institutional or operational, by taking steps to streamline decision-making procedures and introducing guidelines for the management of military operations with the involvement of the relevant countries.

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<sup>20</sup> "The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.", reads the 27<sup>th</sup> Article of the Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int) and Art.28 goes on as follows ".....cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework; and modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States." and refers to the position of non-EU European NATO members in the 28<sup>th</sup> Article as "appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management"

At the Feira Summit, the EU members announced that these decisions will be taken within the *single institutional framework* and will respect the European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence. This indicates that the ESDP is developing in the framework of the EU juridical order and within the *acquis communautaire*.<sup>21</sup>

The EU showed its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises during the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Nice in December 2000. The formation of the military capability is initiated by the identification of forces that will be assigned to the new formation by the interested countries which will realize the Headline Goal.

However, EU's declared goal of being able to deploy 60,000 soldiers – the kind of force that could serve as peacekeepers in hot spots like Bosnia and Kosovo – will require up to 200,000 soldiers because of rotation needs. Yet the European allies, with 2 million soldiers on paper, had trouble fielding 40,000 for peacekeeping in the Balkans and the allies lack the huge transport planes required to project military power beyond their borders. Aside from man-power, EU countries lacked the relevant capabilities needed for an effective implementation of the Petersberg Tasks.

The main shortfalls are known i.e strategic lift and tactical transport, surveillance, command, control, intelligence and sophisticated combat capabilities<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Özen, *op.cit.*, p.143

<sup>22</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "Defence Spending in Europe: Is Europe Prepared to Pay for Improved Capabilities?" paper given at the Conference on ESDP organised in Paris on 13-15 December 2001 by the Cicero Foundation, [www.iss.eu.int](http://www.iss.eu.int)

and creating a pool of that size is a long and costly task, implying a major budget re-ordering<sup>23</sup>.

In this respect, recourse to the NATO assets has become indispensable. At this point the contribution offered by the six non-EU European NATO members to the EU's new Rapid Reaction Force gains a special importance.<sup>24</sup>

The EU in this context wants that *pre-identified NATO capabilities* and common assets are to be made available to the EU for the duration of the EU-led operations and that it will have a *guaranteed permanent access* to the planning capacities of NATO.

This is the point where EU and Turkey diverges. Turkey, unlike EU, insists on a case-by-case permission in return of an acceptance of the full inclusion of the contributing countries into the decision-making process of the ESDP operations. However, decisions taken at various levels concerning the utilization of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU and the institutional and operational participation of the non-EU European NATO members have not been sufficient to meet Turkey's demands.

Nice Summit, for instance, does not include fully the European non-EU NATO members in the European security decision-making process. EU clearly demonstrates its will to keep the strategic and political control of an operation, while allowing the six to participate only in the day-to-day management of an operation.

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<sup>23</sup> Alpo Rusi M., "Europe's Changing Security Role" in Gartner, Heinz *et al.* (eds), *Europe's New Security Challenges* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p.118 see the quotation from James P. Thomas for a future projection regarding EU capabilities: "The EU is unlikely to achieve a truly autonomous defense capability in the next 10-15 years which would allow it to carry out medium-sized combat operations such as Kosovo without the US"

<sup>24</sup> Gülnur Aybet, "NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security", *Sam Papers* (Vol.4, 1999), pp.4-5 source: [www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)

Committee of Contributors, does not involve the participation of the countries in the decision-making mechanisms of the operations but rather planned to be only a platform ensuring exchange of views and cooperation between the EU member contributors and the non-EU member contributors.<sup>25</sup>

June 2001 Goteborg EU Summit has taken further steps in the operationalization of the ESDP but at the same time assigned this issue to the next presidency i.e. Belgium, due to the problems arising from the issue of the participation of the non-EU European NATO members, especially Turkey, in EU crisis-management operations. The EU once again emphasized that “ it [the EU] attaches particular importance to the *close involvement in the ESDP* of non-EU European NATO Member States and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, within *the single inclusive structure* provided for in Nice.”<sup>26</sup> but failed to develop mechanisms that satisfy Turkey.

Although a deal was reached after a British-US initiative concerning Turkey’s position in the ESDP, operationalization of the ESDP was not fully realized due to the Greek veto of the British proposal in the EU Laeken Summit (December 2001). Therefore, in Laeken, Europe's leaders were able to declare their common security and defense policy operational only ‘to conduct some crisis management operations’, not the whole scope of the tasks foreseen in Petersberg tasks.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Özen, *op.cit.*, p.150

<sup>26</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Göteborg European Council Presidency Report On The European Security And Defence Policy, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

<sup>27</sup>“Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it and following the military and police Capability Improvement Conferences held in Brussels on 19 November 2001, the Union is now capable of *conducting some crisis-management operations.*” reads the Laeken EU Presidency Conclusions, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int).

Since 1987 (signing of the SEA), the '[S]ecurity' was accepted only insofar as it was limited to the economic aspects of security. With Maastricht and Amsterdam it has gained ground but mostly as an extension of the '[F]oreign policy' and insofar as it stopped short of the '[D]efense' proper. After St. Malo, Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice, Goteborg and Laeken, it finds itself in a pivotal position to shape the role of the Union as an international actor.<sup>28</sup>

This process started as an attempt to increase the standing of the European states in the security and defense issues of Europe by participating in the burden-sharing mechanism with US. However, it evolved into a process by which, an independent European presence in security and defense through the initiation of the ESDP and the creation of a military capability, is aimed, necessitating the cooperation of NATO and EU.<sup>29</sup> Apparently, this shift in the evolution of the process has brought about certain problems and questions, as far as Turkey is concerned.

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<sup>28</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *Kluwer Law International* (Vol.6, 2001), p.184

<sup>29</sup> Turan Morali, "European Security and Defence Identity and Turkey", *Perceptions* (June-August 1996), pp.138-139

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM: BASIS OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF TURKEY & THE EUROPEAN UNION**

#### **4.1. Essence of the Problem**

Roots of the problem concerning the position of Turkey in the ESDP lies very much in the attempt of the EU to endow itself with a crisis management capacity. Although this is not a finished job yet, EU has taken considerable steps towards the realization of this ideal. Starting with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the EU and forging of an organic link with the WEU in the Amsterdam Treaty; EU has initiated the institutionalization process of the ESDP through Franco-British St.Malo and Cologne EU Summit meetings. Decisions taken at the Helsinki Summit paved way for the operationalization of the ESDP by assigning a target concerning military capabilities named as the 'EU Headline Goal'. This involves the establishment of a European crisis management capability which will be able to carry the military operations within the scope of the Petersberg tasks.

The primary motive behind the ESDP project is not only the burden-sharing with US but beyond that it involves the establishment of the EU-only decision-making procedures. In order to attain an international identity and become an

autonomous actor, EU has to develop a sui-generis foreign, security and defence policy of its own.<sup>1</sup>

Both institutional and operational developments of the ESDP pose challenges for Turkey as far as its foreign and security policies in general and its place in European security in particular are concerned.

Turkey maintains that a coherent security policy for a region, and especially for a continent, can only be established with the inclusion of all the significant security actors in the region. A holistic approach to European security, therefore, requires the participation of all European security actors in a framework such as the one established by the WEU.<sup>2</sup>

EU, on the other hand, does not respond to Turkish demands towards participation both in the institutional dimension as regards to the decision-shaping, decision-making and implementation phases and of the operational phase in a proper manner satisfactory for Turkey.

As for the institutional dimension of the ESDP, Turkey maintains that, as a non-EU European NATO member, it's left in a disadvantageous position in the new project when compared to its previous achievements in other contexts such as the WEU and NATO. Especially after the inclusion of the WEU into the EU in line with Amsterdam Treaty provisions, Turkey has found its status deteriorated. Turkey demands certain rights in the newly emerging bodies of the ESDP ranging from full participation in decision-making of the operations with NATO assets to enhanced consultation in peace-time and crisis time and finally the right to raise its concerns in

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<sup>1</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", *Doğu Batı* (Sayı 14, 2001/1), p.160

<sup>2</sup> Münevver Cebeci, "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations With Special Reference To Turkey" *Occasional Papers* (Brussels: Western European Union, 1999), p.2 source: [www.weu.int](http://www.weu.int)

the decision-making mechanisms of the EU-only operations in Turkey's geographic proximity and areas of national interest, such as the Aegean and Cyprus.

Cologne European Council promises to '...put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to *the fullest possible extent in this [ESDP] endeavour.*'<sup>3</sup> which represented an attempt to address the discrimination against non-EU NATO members such as Turkey.

Helsinki European Council, on the other hand, maintains that "..... appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, *while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy*, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to the EU military crisis management."<sup>4</sup> which puts Turkey, as a non-EU European NATO member, into the same basket with other states such as candidates for full membership to the EU.

However, Feira Council meeting in June 2000 concluded that the EU, in the final analysis, would seek "a single inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned ... can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU"<sup>5</sup>. EU proposed regular meetings between the EU and 15 non-member states (15 + 15) together with the EU+6 format. Turkey does not favor to be put into the same basket with the other states who has made a little contribution to the European security when compared to that of Turkey.

Turkish dissatisfaction with the EU+15 format and the participation level introduced in the Feira Summit is expressed in the following official declaration:

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<sup>3</sup> Cologne EU Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

<sup>4</sup> Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, [www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

<sup>5</sup> EU Feira Presidency Conclusions, Annex I - Presidency Report On Strengthening The Common European Security And Defence Policy, Appendix 1

The participation issue of the European Allies to the EU-only operations is dealt within the same category with the non-EU and non-NATO third countries and the Washington Summit decisions determining the NATO-WEU framework as the basis for future cooperation is not taken into consideration. EU does not respond to the developments in the Washington Summit in the same manner. It is utmost important that Turkey is included into the deliberations of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff as soon as possible. Feira decisions are far enough to satisfy Turkey especially in the issue of participation to the crisis-management.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, Turkey declared that it will consider the demands of EU from NATO on a case-by-case basis and in line with its national interests and European security. Automatic availability of the NATO assets and capabilities to EU is thought to be unacceptable for Turkey. Feira decisions is not regarded as a viable basis which can lead Turkey to change its current opinions.<sup>7</sup>

When it comes to the functioning of the institutional mechanisms of the ESDP in case of an operation, first of all it worths mentioning that there are three different types of probable military operations in which EU may involve i.e. NATO-led operations, EU operations using NATO assets and finally as an EU-only operation if NATO as a whole is not engaged.

According to the principles laid down at Feira for the participation of the non-EU European allies; in EU operations undertaken with NATO assets, non-EU European NATO members would participate automatically, "*if they so wish*", whereas in the EU-only operations, they would simply "*be invited*" to be involved, if the Council see it as appropriate.

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<sup>6</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap* (Ankara: Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, 2000), pp.10-11

<sup>7</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by EU Council at the Feira Summit in July 2000 on ESDI and CESDP ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr))

Concerning the details of the initiation of an operation, participation mechanisms are developed according to the necessities of the institutional and operational dimensions.

1. If a potential crisis situation arises, the political consultations with all partners involved will be stepped up (15+6) and “*deep consultations*” will be initiated with non-members of the EU. Turkey finds this ambiguous since the boundaries of the term “*deep consultations*” is not drawn properly and the scope of these consultations is not very much clear from the beginning.

2. In a crisis situation, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) asks the EU Military Committee (MC) to issue an Initiating Directive to the Director General of the EU Military Staff (MS) to draw up and present strategic military options.

3. The EU MC evaluates the strategic military options developed by the EU MS and forwards them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice.

4. With a view to launching an operation, the PSC sends the Council a recommendation based on the opinions of the Military Committee in accordance with the usual Council preparation procedures. On that basis, the Council decides on the preferred strategic option and decides to launch the operation within the framework of a joint action. This emphasizes the existence of “*the autonomous capacity to decide*” used by the Council on behalf of the EU, which naturally excludes the participation of non-members in the political control and strategic direction of an operation.

5. On the basis of the military option selected by the Council, the EUMC authorises an Initial Planning Directive for the Operation Commander.

6. The Operation Commander prepares the Concept of Operations and drafts an Operation Plan. These are evaluated by the MS, then sent on to the EU MC, which provides advice and recommendations to the PSC.

The boundaries between decision-shaping and decision-making have to be drawn clearly in order to understand the Turkish position. In this respect; stages 1, 2 and 3 are considered the “*decision-shaping*” stages; stage 4 is the “*decision-making*” stage; and stages 5 and 6 are the operational planning stages.<sup>8</sup>

In the emerging ESDP, all non-EU members would be involved ‘up-stream’ i.e. in decision-shaping which entailed information, consultation and pre-planning and ‘down-stream’ i.e. implementation, but decision-making proper and political control would pertain exclusively to the EU members.<sup>9</sup>

An additional institution that can be activated is the “Committee of Contributors”. This committee will consist of “third countries”, including Turkey, and will play a key role in the day-to-day management of an operation and will have consultations with the Operation Commander, the EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee. However, this level of participation in only the day-to-day management of an operation does not satisfy Turkey which looks for further rights in all phases of decision-making leading to the ESDP operations, including the peace-time arrangements, especially in those cases where Turkey has a vital interest.

All in all, participation of the non-EU European NATO allies in EU crisis-management operations can be evaluated under two broad categories as peacetime and crisis-time. Peace-time arrangements involve permanent and regular

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<sup>8</sup> Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, “Accommodating Turkey in ESDP”, *CEPS Policy Brief* (No.5, May 2001), pp.2-3

<sup>9</sup> Antonio Missiroli, “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP”, *Security Dialogue* (vol.33, no.1, March 2002), p.15

consultations. Non-EU allies can propose meetings and agendas. Forces offered by them will be treated in the same way as the force offers of EU member states. Crises period, on the other hand, is divided into two phases:

- a) In the pre-operational phase, consultations will be intensified and will cover the concerns of the non-EU allies related with their security interests.
- b) Operational phase involves these Allies' automatic right to participate in operations where NATO assets are used. They can also be invited to operations where there is no recourse to NATO assets. All troop contributors will have the same right in the Committee of Contributors which will be responsible for and will play a crucial role in the day-to-day conduct of operations.<sup>10</sup>

Concerning the operationalization of the ESDP, EU lacks many of the assets and capabilities needed for the fulfilment of the Petersberg tasks and there is neither prospect of the development of them in the near future given the current level of defense spending in the EU countries nor the will to do so due to the concerns of duplication. This makes the reliance of EU on NATO assets and capabilities inevitable and essential.

In order to avoid duplication of forces, the EU requests the authorization to have *automatic and uninterrupted access* to the military assets of NATO. However, the NATO Charter requires unanimity amongst members in order for such an authorization to be given to the European Army. At this point, Turkey, as a non-member of the Union, has made it clear that it would not give its unconditional approval to such a request, which would mean losing its control over the use of NATO assets in the future military operations of the EU. This is because Turkey fears that EU-led operations may well contradict its supreme national interests.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Lord George Robertson, "Turkey and ESDP", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.1, January-March 2001), pp.49-50

<sup>11</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.4, No.1, January-March 2002), p.51

Ever since the main obstacle to an arrangement between the two organizations allowing the EU to have assured access to NATO planning capabilities has been Turkey's attitude.<sup>12</sup>

The considerations arising from the ESDP have reinforced the importance of NATO in Turkish eyes. NATO still provides the main multilateral vehicle for achieving Turkish security interests. Ankara thus opposes any weakening of NATO's role or effort to transfer greater planning and decisionmaking over defense matters to the EU. In addition, Turkey has insisted that non-EU allies must be involved in the planning and decisionmaking if the EU is going to draw on NATO assets in a crisis.

With the onset of the ESDP and the de facto withering away of WEU, the issue has become a bilateral one between EU and NATO. The controversial points have remained more or less the same, but the political and legal contexts have changed.

The formula employed for operations not involving NATO assets and capabilities and its subsequent elaboration in an annex to the Nice Presidency report, led to objections of marginalization from Turkey and resentment that it will be denied 'any real voice in the EU's new military role'. As a consequence Turkey blocked any automatic access to NATO planning facilities for the EU to prepare blue-prints for EU-led crisis management operations. The price for lifting the blockade is a greater say for Ankara in EU deliberations that may lead to a decision to launch military operation especially if the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean are under discussion.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p.9 and see Sami Kohen, "AB NATO'laşacaksa...", *Milliyet*, March 10, 2000 for an exhibition of the Turkish position.

<sup>13</sup> Simon Duke, "CESDP: Nice's Overtrumped Success?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *Kluwer Law International* (Vol.6, 2001), p.161

When it comes to the Turkish demands, rather than the dialogue consultation and cooperation offered at Feira and repeated at Nice, Turkey, at the initial stages of the evolution of the ESDP had sought a decision-making role akin to that of full member states in the preparation and execution of any EU crisis exercise or crisis operation in which its forces take part.<sup>14</sup> Turkey argued that the arrangements under discussion did not comply with Alliance deliberations and did not offer adequate guarantees to non-EU European allies compared with those awarded by the WEU.

Due to the insufficient means of participation arrangements offered by the EU, Turkey has intended to use its position in NATO concerning the operational phase of the ESDP. In this respect, Turkey vetoes the deal between EU and NATO aiming to realize the automatic access of the EU to the pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities for the EU-only operations.

Turkey's position in the ESDP is so important because exclusion of such an integral actor from the European security structures would carry significant risks, while its inclusion would enhance European military capabilities and allow the EU to exploit Turkey's geopolitical value.<sup>15</sup>

The new European security system will need an anchor of stability which should best be provided by the EU. To be able to fulfil this role the Union will have to develop and act in close partnership with the US but also with countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, thus providing the EU with a vital transatlantic and all-European dimension.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Terry Teriff *et al.* (eds.), "European Security and Defence Policy after Nice", *Briefing Paper* (No.20, April 2001), p.4

<sup>15</sup> Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue* (Vol.31, Iss.4, 2000), p.499

<sup>16</sup> Fraser Cameron, "The Role of the EU and WEU in European Security" in Bredow and Kummel (eds.), *European Security* (New York:St.Martin's Press,1997), p.144

All in all, the essence of the problem is the negative attitude of Turkey in the NATO framework towards the operationalization of the ESDP largely due to the unsatisfactory level of participation offered to Turkey in the institutional and operational aspects of the ESDP.

#### **4.2 Basis of the Turkish Position**

Turkish position and its ensuing veto within NATO can be explained by the cumulative effects of a number of factors such as Turkey's position in the WEU; decisions taken at the NATO framework and the EU's attitude towards Turkey. One has to view Turkey's position and veto in the light of the major discrepancy between Turkish demands and EU's offers.<sup>17</sup>

However, in defending its position, Turkey relies on some more diverse basis ranging from legal to operational and geographical considerations. Main basis of Turkey's concerns can be classified under the following sub-headings:

- matter of principle i.e. respecting and honouring agreements
- institutional i.e. preserving the integrity of NATO
- national i.e. protecting its national security interests
- substantial i.e. how to strengthen European security<sup>18</sup>

Legacy of the WEU, Turkey's geostrategic importance, Turkey's role in the European security as a 'security provider', preservation of the NATO framework and strength of its military capabilities constitute the concrete sub-headings under which Turkey's arguments for its participation in the emerging ESDP project can be categorized.

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<sup>17</sup> Tocci and Houben, *op.cit.*, p.3

<sup>18</sup> Onur Öymen, "Turkey and Its Role in European Security and Defence", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.1, January-March 2001), p.57

#### 4.2.1 Legacy of the WEU

One of the main pillars of Turkish position in the ESDP is based on its previous status in the WEU. As an associate member of the WEU Turkey was entitled to participate in the institutional and operational mechanisms of WEU to a high extent. Turkey maintains that previously reached agreements have to be respected and honoured and therefore, even in the wake of the fading away of WEU and integration of its functions into the EU, Turkey's status in WEU has to be transferred to the EU framework. This concern is repeatedly emphasized in official Turkish declarations as is the case in the White Book of the Ministry of Defense, which puts the matter as follows;

Turkey has always been defending its position to participate in the ESDP initiative effectively and play an active role as a result of its desire to preserve the already achieved rights. In this respect, one of the most important aspect is the preservation of the acquisitions within the WEU and put it into an institutional framework which will provide the full participation of the non-EU European allies in the new project inside EU.<sup>19</sup>

When it comes to the detailed analysis of the WEU acquis concerning the participation of the Associate Members, one can see that the roots of the associate membership status lies in the Declaration on WEU attached to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which called for the non-EU but NATO Member States to become WEU Associate Members, becoming effective in 1995.

However, Associate Members are not signatories to the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT), constitutive treaty of WEU; therefore, they are not endowed with the full membership rights designed by that treaty. Their status only consists of non-

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<sup>19</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap* (Ankara: Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, 2000), p.12

Article V activities; meaning that they are neither under Article V guarantee nor held responsible for Article V missions. However, they have the right to participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies unless their participation do not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the MBT; and at the request of a majority of the Member States, or half of the Member States including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members, excluding the Associate Members.

Associate Membership status has evolved through subsequent ministerial meetings of WEU member states and decisions taken in those contexts paved the way for the development of the modalities of the participation of Turkey in the WEU activities together with other associate members. Kirchberg Declaration, in this respect, involved a separate part for Associate Membership - Part III called 'Declaration Following from the "Document on Associate Membership" of 20 November 1994'. The Noordwijk Declaration (14 November 1994), the Birmingham Declaration of 7 May 1996, the Brussels and Erfurt Declarations of the WEU Ministerial Councils, issued on 22 July and 18 November 1997 equally included references to Associate Member status, contributing to the further involvement of Associate Members in WEU activities.<sup>20</sup>

Erfurt Declaration worths mentioning which enables Turkey to participate in the decision-making mechanism of an operation undertaken by WEU, without recourse to NATO assets, with the rights enjoyed by full members after the acknowledgement of its will to do so to the WEU Council.

Turkey strongly believes that the *acquis* which was accumulated within the WEU should be preserved and further developed on a contractual basis so as to

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<sup>20</sup> Cebeci, *op.cit.*, pp.6-7

ensure full participation of non-EU European allies in the new structures to be established within the EU.

In this respect Turkey asks for

- the participation, on a regular basis, in day-to-day planning and consultations on matters related to European security as is the case within WEU.
- full and equal participation in the process leading to decision-making on all EU-led operations drawing on collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation
- participation in the decision shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.<sup>21</sup>

Since Turkey lacks the prospect of full membership of the EU and located in a geostrategically difficult region close to the major areas of crisis which might constitute potential zones for the exercise of Petersberg missions, Turkey apparently has different concerns, which makes the participation issue more complicated as far as Turkey is concerned.<sup>22</sup>

With the integration of the WEU into the EU, Turkey's favourable status within the WEU has been evaporated. Being aware of this risk, Turkey has preferred the absorption of the WEU into the EU to take place in a new 4<sup>th</sup> pillar, whereby WEU will be absorbed as it is with all its *acquis* and with an opt out clause for EU

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<sup>21</sup> Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the ESDI, 14 February 2000 ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr))

<sup>22</sup> Cebeci, *op.cit.*, pp.17-18. For a detailed analysis of the WEU *acquis* concerning the participation of the Associate Members see Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Newly Emerging European Security Architecture: Implications for Transatlantic Relations", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001)

members who do not wish to participate similar to EMU and Schengen.<sup>23</sup> However, WEU has been integrated into the second pillar, thereby, making it an exclusive right only to the 15 members of the EU. Previous mechanisms between WEU and NATO are to be carried out under EU-NATO framework and there are numerous references to the preservation of the positions of the non-EU European NATO members acquired in the WEU, the most significant one being the Washington Summit Communique of NATO.

Thus, Turkey insisted on the validity of its previous achievements under the WEU. Since WEU was included into the EU, Turkey maintains that its position in the WEU has to be transferred into the EU realm.

#### 4.2.2 Significance of the NATO Process

Turkey consistently emphasizes the *acquis* developed within the NATO framework as far as the emerging ESDP project and its relationship with the transatlantic security cooperation is concerned. Moreover, Turkey consistently makes reference to its contribution to the European security in all phases of the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War era under the NATO umbrella.

Washington Summit Communique of April 24, 1999 occupies a significant place in Turkish arguments and makes an important contribution to the strength of the Turkish case vis-a-vis the EU.

After welcoming ‘the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defense by the Amsterdam Treaty’ and ‘acknowledging the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action’; Washington Summit Communique emphasizes the importance of ‘ensuring the

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<sup>23</sup> Gülnur Aybet, ‘NATO’s Developing Role in Collective Security’, *Sam Papers* (Vol.4, 1999), p.7  
source: [www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)

*fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.*<sup>24</sup>

Decisions taken at Washington Summit have been repeatedly stressed in the ensuing North Atlantic Council meetings. For instance, the Declaration adopted at the end of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting of July 2000 contained certain articles, which are very significant as far as the position of the non-EU European NATO members and thus that of Turkey in the ESDP is concerned. The NAC meeting once again emphasized that the highest level of involvement of these countries have to be ensured and their positions must rely on their relevant status in the WEU framework. It also established the future basis for the EU-NATO cooperation by introducing guidelines governing the relationship between the two organizations. It's agreed that any further EU request will each be taken up by a new Council decision, which means that EU demands will be evaluated on a 'case-by-case' basis. Therefore, there will be no automatic access by the EU to NATO assets and capabilities and that any request will have to be considered by the members of the Council including Turkey.<sup>25</sup>

Turkey maintains that since many of the members of the EU are also the members of NATO, they have to respect the decisions that they have taken in NATO framework which stress the importance of the availability of proper mechanisms that will ensure the fullest possible level of participation of non-EU European NATO members in EU-led crisis management activities.

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<sup>24</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Washington Summit Communiqué, Art.9, "The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington", NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium, p.16

<sup>25</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, North Atlantic Council Decision on CESDP, 17 July 2000 and Turkish view on it, ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr))

Two salient points emerge from Washington Summit: firstly, this is an interesting example of inter-institutional behaviour, in that NATO decisions are being made on behalf of the EU on the need for the latter to arrange the involvement of non-EU European allies based upon the “*existing arrangements within the WEU*”. The second point is that at the time the EU did not (could not) signal to Turkey that this format for the inclusion of non-EU states in ESDP decision-making would be problematic.<sup>26</sup>

In accordance with the relevant stipulations of NATO’s Strategic Concept and Washington Summit Declaration, Turkey proposes that its position be maintained in order to ensure the fullest possible level of involvement in EU crisis management mechanisms. Washington Summit Communique makes reference to the previous mechanisms within the WEU as a viable basis on which future participation of non-EU European NATO members in the relevant EU mechanisms can be developed. While EU members have been currently stressing the institutional autonomy and does not take these points into consideration, they did not raise their objections during the Washington Summit and issued their approval to these decisions.

#### 4.2.3 Geo-strategic Importance of Turkey and Its Role as a ‘Security Producer’

Turkey has been presenting its geo-strategic position as an asset in its deal with the EU concerning the ESDP. Turkey proposes that its geo-strategic position makes it different from other non-EU NATO states and entitles Turkey to enjoy a more favourable position in the ESDP.

Given such prevalent representations of Turkey as a ‘burden’, and not an ‘asset’ for building security in Europe, Turkish policymakers spent the 1990s trying to find Turkey a niche in the evolving post-Cold War environment. With the European Union’s move to become a ‘military power’ in its own

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<sup>26</sup> Cebeci, *op.cit.*, p.14

right, they seem to have finally found that niche. The EU's 1999 decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country is viewed by some, as an evidence of its recognition of Turkey's value as a producer of security in Europe. It has been suggested that an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey's status to that of candidate country is the EU's evolving security role. The estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU's policies towards Turkey.<sup>27</sup>

Post-Cold War era witnessed a restructuring process in the European security environment. Classical security considerations have been replaced by new, diverse and broad range of security risks emanating from within Europe and more importantly from its periphery. However, Turkey does not lose its strong interest in European security arrangements and is attempting to ensure for itself a continuing pre-eminent role in Europe in the post-Cold War era.<sup>28</sup>

Turkey has been the country most adversely affected by this restructuring process. Turkey is located in a volatile region. Turkey is surrounded by 13 of the 16 hot spots" which are prone to an outbreak of conflict that could affect European security.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, six of these scenarios require direct involvement by Turkey, which means that the inability of Turkey to participate both in the planning and operational phases of such operations severely damages Turkey's interests and threatens its security. This can also lead to a weakness, as far as EU's credibility as an international actor in these areas is concerned.<sup>30</sup>

Turkey's main concerns are the danger of the undermining of the NATO and the transatlantic link together with the possibility of EU-initiated operations

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<sup>27</sup> Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey & The EU: Yesterday's Answers To Tomorrow's Security Problems" in Herd, Graeme P. and Huru, Jouko (eds.) *EU Civilian Crisis Management* (Surrey: The Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2001), p.38

<sup>28</sup> Yilmaz, *op.cit.*, in note 22, pp.146-147

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.146 See Appendix I for a map and detailed analysis of the 16 'hot-spots'.

<sup>30</sup> Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, p.51 See also Teriff, *op.cit.*, p.4 for a similar argument.

adversely affecting Turkey's security.<sup>31</sup> Turkey is particularly concerned about the possibility that escalating tensions in the Aegean or in Cyprus may result in a confrontation between the EU and Turkey.<sup>32</sup> In this respect, Turkey has a high stake in maintaining the institutional status quo achieved through its advantageous positions within NATO and WEU especially since the more exclusionist attitude of the Europeans towards Turkey in the new ESDP mechanisms is taken into consideration. These considerations has led Turkey to adopt and apply a demanding policy towards the EU as far as Turkey's participation in the ESDP mechanisms is concerned.

For a security arrangement which would enhance Western security without causing major fault-lines in the NATO alliance, EU operational objectives and strategic goals need to take into account the aims, contributions and strategic significance of the non-EU participants. Turkey has a great potential to contribute to military and non-military crisis management missions. European powers require a politically and economically stable neighbourhood to supplement their security architecture. By excluding Turkey they would be missing a major pillar, thus dooming it to collapse.<sup>33</sup>

There is a widely accepted consensus that Turkey's strategic importance has increased in the post-Cold War era and there is an increased perception of its strategic importance today as opposed to a few years ago or even in the Cold War.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Yılmaz, *op.cit.*, in note 22, p.148

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p.150

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151

<sup>34</sup> Nicholas Williams, "Europe's Perspectives" paper presented to the conference titled Questions of Security and Strategic Relationship, Mexico, 1999 and see Şadi Ergüvenç, "Turkey: Strategic Partner of the European Union" in Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, *Turkey and European Union: Nebulous Nature of Relations* (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, 1999) Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's Role in European Security: Turkey's Perspectives" paper presented to the conference titled Questions of Security and Strategic Relationship, Mexico, 1999 Armağan Kuloğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ve Türkiye", *Stratejik Analiz* (Cilt 2, Sayı 15, Temmuz 2001) Engin Oba, "Turkey and Western Security in the New Era of International Relations: A Political and Sociological Appraisal", *Foreign Policy*, Thomas Schieb, "Turkey and ESDP: Current State of Affairs", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.3, July-September 2001) François Heisbourg, "European Defense takes a leap forward", *NATO Review* (Spring/Summer 2000) and Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and the European Security and Defense Identity: A Turkish View", *Studien und Berichte Zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Oktober 2000) for an analysis of the increasing geostrategic importance of Turkey.

Emerging trends in Western strategy also encourage the portrayal of Turkey as a key actor in a trans-regional security environment. Security relations with Turkey will loom larger for the simple reason that Turkey is the best way to reach key areas of concern. In strategic terms the real tensions began earlier and were highlighted by the experience of the Gulf War, in which Turkey's cooperation paradoxically reinforced the notion of Turkey as an extra European ally.<sup>35</sup>

As far as Turkey's geographic value for European security is concerned, four specific aspects can be identified, among others:

- The first one involves Iraq, which has shown how much the security of Europe could be harmed by turmoil in the Gulf area especially during the Gulf War in which Turkey played an important role.

- The second aspect of Turkey's place and role in the Middle East that carries implications for the European Union involves its closeness to and alliance-building with Israel. With these assets, Turkey can play an important role in the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or the Barcelona Process).

- The third aspect of Turkey's geo-strategic weight is related to its role in Southeast Europe and the Balkans, the region that in the 1990s posed the most serious challenges to European security and stability. Due to its political, historical and cultural relations with the regional countries, Turkey has great potential for contributing militarily, politically, and economically to the EU's Balkan policies.

- The fourth aspect of Turkey's potential geopolitical contribution to European security is related to its role in the Caspian region. Turkey has for years played the role of an energy corridor for Europe, as some of the oil from

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<sup>35</sup> Ian O. Lesser, "Beyond Bridge or Barrier: Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West", in Graham Fuller, and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), "Turkey's New Geopolitics" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p.212

the Middle East is transported through its territory. This role will increase massively when the energy resources of the Caspian area reach the world markets via transportation routes passing over Turkey especially the realization of the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Project will put Turkey in a vital position as far as energy security of the European states is concerned.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, Western Europe has an undeniable interest in preventing instabilities in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and in maintaining the region's free flow of oil, on which Europe and the West will become progressively more dependent, to the year 2000 and beyond, as it was the case during the Cold War years.<sup>37</sup>

These considerations, according to Turkey, points to the reality that Turkey's inclusion into the EU orbit will bring additional benefits for the Union's foreign and security policies through Turkey's capabilities and its ties in the regions around it. At the same time, its exclusion would be problematic and even risky due to Turkey's ability to influence EU military operations and decisions through its vote in the NATO Council.<sup>38</sup>

The gravity of the threats affecting European security has also changed in the years accompanying the end of the Cold War. Security challenges have shifted from the center of Europe to the periphery. Mediterranean Europe became more European in almost every sense including defense policy, with a result that makes Turkey's strategic position more unique and more complex as far as European security is

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<sup>36</sup> Müftüler-Bac, *op.cit.*, pp.496-498 and See Lesser, *op.cit.*, pp.207-213 for a similar approach to Turkey's new geopolitics.

<sup>37</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects" in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington: The National University Press, 1991), p.544

<sup>38</sup> Müftüler-Bac, *op.cit.*, p.498 . See also Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", *Doğu Batı* (Sayı 14, 2001/1) for a detailed analysis of Turkey's significance for European security in the post-Cold War era.

concerned.<sup>39</sup> This makes the states in the southern region of Europe indispensable for European security and necessitates the integration of those states to the newly emerging security frameworks in the European Union. Turmoil in Yugoslavia, in addition to the Gulf War, has also alerted security analysts to the critical strategic importance of this area, especially Turkey, which is concerned about ethnic conflicts spilling over its borders.

Turkey's post-Cold War security environment, as that of Europe's, has also experienced a big transformation which resulted in a change in the character of Turkey's post-Cold War foreign and security policies towards *trans-regionality*. Since Turkey enjoys a certain level of legitimacy in these regions due to its half-a-century-long multi-regional foreign and security policy, Turkey was the most probable beneficiary of this new opportunity.

Trans-regionality refers to the blurring of the traditional boundaries between the regions, creating an opportunity for Turkey to play an important role in European security in this new setting because Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country's future role will be strongly influenced by it.<sup>40</sup>

Turkey's security environment has long been characterized by a certain multi-regionality referring to the fact that Turkey is both a European and a Middle Eastern country as well as a Balkan, a Black Sea, a Mediterranean and a Eurasian state. As such Turkey's geographic location alone assures central prominence.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (London:MacMillan Press,1994), pp.282-284 and Lothar Rühl, *Conditions and Options for an Autonomous Common European Policy on Security and Defence in and by the EU in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999*, pp.11-12 See Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.), *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Towards a Strategic Plan* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000) for a detailed analysis of Turkey's new geopolitical significance for the West.

<sup>40</sup> Lesser, *op.cit.*, p. 207

<sup>41</sup> Şadi Ergüvenç "Turkey In the New European Security Context: Turkey's Role & Expectations In the TransAtlantic Partnership" *Foreign Policy* (Vol.21, No.1-2, 1997), p.24. See Lesser, *op.cit.*, for an analysis of Turkey's trans-regional foreign and security policy setting

The importance attached to the trans-regional role played by Turkey, in its position vis-a-vis the newly emerging security frameworks in Europe, is reflected in the White Book of the Ministry of Defense as follows: “The goals of the maintenance of the European security in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Caucasus, and strengthening of peace and cooperation can only be realized by the participation and concrete contribution of Turkey.”<sup>42</sup>

Some authors argue that if the Europeans seem to be indifferent to the threats facing Turkey, then Turkey might revert to a renationalization of its defense which would not be desirable for NATO or a future ESDI since Turkey has demonstrated over the years that it is in fact a reliable ally at times of crisis in a turbulent region.<sup>43</sup>

Turkey’s geo-strategic position together with its working and mature democratic institutions enables it to play a ‘*security producer*’ role in the new European security environment by undertaking important roles in countering the newly emerging security threats and thereby making a contribution to the EU in its fight against these threats. In this respect, Turkey attempts to use its alleged role of a ‘*security producer*’ as an invaluable asset in its bid for a more equitable role in European security.

Turkey’s military strength is another important source of its security producer role. Turkey is the second largest military force in NATO and takes active part in not only NATO operations but also in other UN mandated operations in the European security environment. Given the current level of defense spending in

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<sup>42</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap* (Ankara: Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, 2000), p.5

<sup>43</sup> Aybet, *op.cit.*, p.5

Turkey<sup>44</sup>, this trend will continue in the coming years especially with the diminishing percentage level of national budgets left for defense in the EU member countries.

Moreover, with a long experience of unconventional guerilla warfare, Turkey's military best suits to the low-intensity warfare necessities of an EU-led crisis management operation. The large young population is another valuable asset when compared to the aging European population.

It's argued that, with the positive aspects of its military capability in mind, Turkey's participation in the EU's possible military operations could contribute significantly to their success and could determine their feasibility.<sup>45</sup>

Turkey has a lot to contribute to an EU led operation on both transport and sustainability of troops i.e. projection of military power. Turkey would be more easily inclined to field army personnel even for the more risky operations than some of her European partners. From a strategic perspective Turkish involvement may bring added credibility to EU efforts especially if the theatre of operations is to be the eastern Balkans or in the longer term the Middle East. Turkey's historical ties and political, cultural and religious affinities with some of the states and peoples of the region may be an invaluable asset. Turkish involvement would eliminate the perception of the EU force as a crusader army.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Turkey maintains the second largest army in the Alliance after US, with more than 800.000 active-duty troops. From 1980 to 1989 Turkey allocated an average of 4.3% of its GDP and 24.2% of its budget to defense. Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit.*, in note 37, p.541

<sup>45</sup> Müftüler-Bac, *op.cit.*, p.495

<sup>46</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey's Role in European Security and Defence Policy", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.3, July-September 2001), p.44

### 4.3 EU's Response to Turkey

EU has been trying to develop mechanisms to meet the demands of non-EU European NATO members concerning their participation in EU-led crisis management operations in general and that of Turkey in particular.

EU lacked the security dimension during the Cold War years but presence of a common existential threat made EC to keep the arrangements as they were. However the post-cold war world has exposed the deficiencies. Especially in the Bosnian war, the lack of a European security dimension was painfully demonstrated and Kosovo reinforced, for the Europeans, the urgency of the need to establish a European security and defense policy together with its operational dimension.. Because it become apparent that not every regional conflict would necessarily engage the strategic interests of the US the same way as that of the Europeans, solution could only lie in a stronger security role by the Europeans and esp. by the EU.<sup>47</sup>

It was clear for the Europeans that such a strong and reliable role can only be ensured by the establishment of relevant institutions that will foresee the proper functioning of that role and the achievement of a military crisis management capacity capable of carrying out the type of missions within the scope of the Petersberg tasks i.e. humanitarian operations, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations.

Institutions that are formed through Feira and Nice EU Summits and further developed by the subsequent Presidency meetings, namely General Affairs Council (GAC), Political and Security Committee(PSC), Military Committee (MC) and Military Staff (MS) do not foresee a satisfactory level of participation for the non-

EU European allies in general and Turkey in particular. While having full rights in operations undertaken by NATO assets, EU has only been able to offer a certain level of participation in the decision-shaping mechanisms of EU-only operations. As for the operational phase, given the current level of defense spending in EU member countries and largely due to the concerns over duplication, EU aims to utilize NATO assets and capabilities in crisis times. While EU proposes to enjoy automatic access to pre-identified NATO arsenals; Turkey, due to its concerns over the unsatisfactory level of participation in the institutional and operational phases of those operations, insists on the availability of such assets and capabilities on a case-by-case basis and with the approval of the NATO Council in each case.

The dispute centers on whether the six should be regarded as a distinct category that benefits from standing institutional relations with the EU or whether the relevant group of to be associated with it should rather be the larger group<sup>15</sup> recognized candidates for the EU. The latter view is being held by France and the former by the six states concerned, with British and US support. They insist that since NATO's support is critical to ESDP, and the six are in a position within NATO to withhold that support, it would be futile to exclude it from the EU debate..... Some middle ground can be found that allows the EU to continue conducting an independent CFSP, while reassuring NATO and the six that they will be consulted in a formal framework whenever the EU approaches a decision impinging on their interests- or possibly leading to military intervention.<sup>48</sup>

There are different aspects of EU's attitude towards Turkey, which sheds a light on the current situation as far as the ESDP is concerned. EU's general approach towards Turkey has for a long time been in a negative manner, underestimating Turkey's value as a strategic asset. Turkey was regarded as a security consuming

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<sup>47</sup> Robertson, *op.cit.*, p.43

<sup>48</sup> Gilles Andreani, "Why Institutions Matter", *Survival* (Vol.42, No.2, Summer 2000), pp.91-92

country which will make EU a neighbour to the problematic regions such as Middle East and Caucasus.

However, with the Helsinki Summit decisions, official position of EU has begun to change. While emphasizing the will of the EU to become an international actor capable of preserving its own interests through institutionalization and operationalization of the ESDP; Helsinki is, on the other hand, can be regarded as the confirmation of the potential contribution of Turkey to such an EU by declaring Turkey as eligible for full membership, thereby making the boundaries of the European identity clear.<sup>49</sup>

Developments after Helsinki has been perceived as a reflection of the positive attitude of the EU towards Turkey in general and its participation in the ESDP in particular, which introduced new mechanisms to make Turkey get rid of its concerns regarding the institutional and operational functioning of ESDP. There are even arguemnts among the Turkish political elite that one of the reasons behind the renewed interest in Brussels in integrating Turkey into the Europe is the potential role that it may play in the ESDP.<sup>50</sup>

However, Turkey's participation in the ESDP has still been consituting one of the most problematic issue areas in Turkish-EU relations. There are certain considerations of the part of the EU in general and some of the members in particular which play an important and decisive role in the determination of the EU policy towards Turkey as far as Turkey's participation in the European security system in general and in the newly emerging ESDP mechanism in particular is concerned.

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<sup>49</sup> Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit.*, in note 38, pp.161, 163-164

<sup>50</sup> Pinar Tank, "Turkey as a Special Case for the EU: Will The Generals Retreat from Politics?", *Security Dialogue* (Vol.32, Iss.2, 2001), p.224

#### 4.3.1 Decision-making autonomy

EU favours that a distinction between members and non-members is inevitable and the decision-making autonomy of an organization has to be respected by all.

According to this line of thinking, WEU mechanisms can not be carried directly to the EU realm. Especially the differentiated membership status, which is considered as the main reason behind the inability of the WEU to perform its functions in a proper way and may also lead to a similar paralysis in the EU framework should it be directly transferred.<sup>51</sup>

Moreover, an important aspect of Turkey's role within WEU framework arises from the fact that those arrangements were not treaty-based and never give a shared political control, but rather limited to operational components.<sup>52</sup> WEU granted the associate membership status only through a Council decision and it was not integrated into the WEU Founding Treaty. Accordingly, this makes Turkish position weaker and EU regards itself entitled to neglect the associate membership status.

WEU was regarded by many as an organization whose autonomy vis-a-vis NATO was questionable. The EU has an altogether entirely different standing, with a strong emphasis on institutional autonomy, and any relation it undertakes to establish with NATO will naturally be on a much more equal footing.

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<sup>51</sup> See Mary M. McKenzie "The Construction of the European Pillar: Beyond the Status Quo?" in Mary M. McKenzie, and Peter H. Loedel, (eds.), *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests and Institutions* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp.107-108 Simon Duke, "CESDP: Nice's Overtrumped Success?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Kluwer Law International (Vol.6, 2001) and Charles Grant, "From St.Malo to Washington", *World Link* (March/April 1999) for the elaboration of the implications of the differentiated membership status of WEU and its transfer to EU.

<sup>52</sup> Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p.12

The EU has no choice but to tell the Turks that the new arrangements will inevitably discriminate against them since they can not become full participants in the defense policy of an institution to which they do not belong. The longer they block arrangements which would allow the EU to draw on NATO's planning expertise, the stronger becomes the case for the EU building up its own equivalent of SHAPE. A more constructive attitude from Turkey would win it friends in Europe and assist the cause of its EU candidacy.<sup>53</sup>

It's advised that, with the perception of the inevitably of a discrimination against non-members, Turkey has to take certain steps in order to diminish the negative consequences of this situation instead of trying to eliminate it entirely.

Non-EU members need to recognize that the EU is not simply a trading bloc or merely a particularly tight international organization. The process of European integration is of a quasi-constitutional nature. It is fated to develop a security and defense dimension and some discrimination between members and non-members is by definition inevitable. The objective should therefore be to reduce the negative impact of discrimination rather than pretending that it can be eliminated entirely.<sup>54</sup>

According to the EU, preservation of the decision-making autonomy of the union is a matter of principle and Turkey's desire to fully participate in the decision-making mechanisms of operations undertaken with or without recourse to NATO assets in areas of national concern for Turkey and its immediate neighbourhood, is unacceptable in this respect.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Gilles Andreani *et al.* (eds.), *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000), p.34 See Anders Oljelund, "NATO-EU Relations and the Future of European security and defence", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.3, July-September 2001), p.12 for a parallel reasoning

<sup>54</sup> François Heisbourg, "European Defense takes a leap forward", *NATO Review* (Spring/Summer 2000), p.10 See Thomas Schieb, "Turkey and ESDP: Current State of Affairs", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.3, July-September 2001), p.37 for a similar argumentation

<sup>55</sup> Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, p.52

Turkey, on the other hand, has insisted on the irrelevance of the elaboration of ESDP only as an institutional mechanism. For Turkey, security in Europe is indivisible and require a concerted approach extending beyond the realm of a certain organization and necessitating the involvement of all of the important actors.

What Turkey would urge is that the idea of ESDP should not be contemplated solely on the logic of integration and institution building but as a genuine and realistic response to the strategic facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment. Turkey believes that security is indivisible and confirmed its readiness to support ESDI in operational as well as political terms.<sup>56</sup>

Turkey maintains that harmonious inter-state relations in Europe can best be achieved through widening participation in political, security and economic frameworks. If security, stability and prosperity must be projected eastward in Europe then the solution is more than ever in variable geometry and broad congruence of memberships, including Turkey.<sup>57</sup>

Instead of emphasizing the decision-making autonomy of the EU and institutional priorities; elaborating on the nature of the joint decision-making mechanisms will be more useful.<sup>58</sup>

Since ESDP is not about European strategic independence but about a more coherent European contribution to crisis management, it is utmost important that all the significant actors in Europe have taken part in this project to the fullest possible extent.<sup>59</sup> In this respect, ESDP endeavour must not be a particular project limited by

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<sup>56</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the European Security and Turkey ([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr))

<sup>57</sup> Turan Morali, "European Security and Defence Identity and Turkey", *Perceptions* (June-August 1996), p.39

<sup>58</sup> "Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisi", [www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/uluslararası/guvmimarisi.htm](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/uluslararası/guvmimarisi.htm)

<sup>59</sup> Robertson, *op.cit.*, p.47

the institutional boundaries of EU but rather has to be embracing all the interested actors in the European security environment who aspire to make a contribution.

EU's insistence upon institutional autonomy when it comes to decision-making for ESDP can be legitimate in terms of principles but the price may be that the EU member states must be prepared to provide for complete autonomy in the Union's ability to provide for the full range of Petersberg tasks.<sup>60</sup>

Another important aspect of irrelevance of the insistence on decision-making autonomy and low level of participation for the non-EU European allies is the likelihood of "an EU military intervention going out of control at one point during the conflict and paving the way for an Article V contingency, which would pull the non-EU members of NATO including Turkey into the conflict"<sup>61</sup>. Such a development will make the discussions on the institutional autonomy of EU obsolete, which will require NATO to take the lead in an operation originally thought to be EU-only. This means that Turkey will be pulled into the center of a conflict in which it had no means to shape the decision-making process in the initial stages.

For all the perhaps unhelpful insistence on the "autonomy" of EU decision-making, political realities are also likely to substantially blur the distinction between EU members and non-members in practise. Particularly those states whose security interests are most affected by a developing crisis or who are willing to actively contribute to and participate in an EU-led mission will be feel themselves forced to participate in the mechanisms developed in order to handle the issue at hand.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Duke, *op.cit.*, p.162

<sup>61</sup> Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, pp.51-52

<sup>62</sup> Park, *op.cit.*, p.322

#### 4.3.2 ESDP As An Integral Part of the EU Integration Process: Role of the 'Identity'

Western Europe has become in Karl Deutsch's terms a 'pluralistic security community' where there exist long-term expectations of 'peaceful change' among its members. The Western security community has acquired legitimacy in terms of a Gramscian hegemony, and it has been able to project this through a system of interlocking institutions. But the reign of this hegemony has little to do with the projection of force rather the strategic culture of this hegemony reigns through values. Those values are democracy, human rights, free markets and overall stability in the sense of a lack of violence instigated by social/domestic forces that could disrupt the functioning of these values.<sup>63</sup>

European Union may be characterized as a 'security community', a concept initially introduced by Karl Deutsch to denote a transnational region distinguished by a growing we feeling and common role identity between its members.

Post-Cold War European security context has witnessed a change in the definition and scope of security. In response to the end of the Cold War, European integration has begun to be perceived as an enhancement of multiple identities.<sup>64</sup>

According to the adherents of this line of thinking, ESDP process can not be confined to strategic and military considerations, as far as Turkey's emphasis on its strategic importance and military strength in supporting its position in ESDP is concerned. ESDP is not limited to within the boundaries of a military tool but rather it enjoys a legitimacy as a vehicle to project the values inherent in the European identity to the regions within the scope of the crisis-management operations in the areas concerned.

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<sup>63</sup> Cited in Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy* (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), p.35

<sup>64</sup> Quoted in Lisbeth Aggestam, "A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), pp.91-93

From this point of view the breakdown of the Cold War order entails above all a possibility of spreading Western, liberal values and ideas to the newly liberated countries in Eastern and Central Europe. In this respect, the question of which countries belong to Europe has to be answered but geographical location in itself can not provide the answer to a question of cultural identity and belonging.<sup>65</sup>

The broadening of the security studies agenda away from its previous focus on states and military dimension has led to a growing concern with *cultural and societal determinants of security*. These debates have tended to revolve around the issue of 'identity'. Barry Buzan argues that security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to *maintain their independent identity* and functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile.<sup>66</sup>

The emphasis on the determinant role of the values and identity formation in the general European integration process and the particular ESDP project leads to the importance of societal security as an important factor putting stress on the values shared by the society in general rather than individual states.

Order among European states was generated by agreement on not only international values but also domestic values of a social and cultural nature. This alternative source of order operates at the societal level rather than the level of the independent sovereign state. It is the cultural logic of us and them of collective identity of group consciousness. Buzan posit the concept of 'societal security' alongside that of 'state security'. Whilst the latter has 'sovereignty as its ultimate criterion' the former they see as being 'held together by concerns about *identity*'.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Andreas Behnke, "Re-cognizing Europe: NATO and the Problem of Securing Identities" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), pp.52-56

<sup>66</sup> Cited in Adrian Hyde-Price, "Reflections on Security and Identity in Europe" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.26

<sup>67</sup> Quoted from I. Neumann and J. Welsh (1991) "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society", *Review of International Studies*, (Vol.13, No.4), p.328 in Adrian Hyde-Price, "Reflections on Security and Identity in Europe" in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000)

EU's main motive, according to this line of thinking, behind the initiation of an ESDP project is not the military considerations alone but rather the maintenance of the European identity by responding to the emerging threats within the European security environment, both inside and in the periphery, together with the attempt to enlarge the boundaries of this security community by exporting the values inherent in the European integration project.

In coining the term "integration as security", Ole Waever has convincingly argued that peace and stability in Europe is not outcome but the very process of European integration in itself. EU exercises a disciplining function in its periphery, without resort to the traditional instrument of security policy – the use of military force. In the EU context security is built on internal affinities, as well as on shared norms and values, rather than on external threats and it is in this conceptual transformation of security that is reflected in Copenhagen Criteria.<sup>68</sup>

In this respect, they point to the inability of Turkey to understand and evaluate these developments in European integration process in general and ESDP in particular, which led to Turkey's attachment to traditional line of policies stressing only the country's strategic and military importance for a greater role and place in this project, neglecting the relevance of *identity* in the ESDP project. Furthermore, Turkey has certain problems concerning the acquisition, internalization and the projection of the values inherent in the European identity.

The idea of exploiting the military capabilities and the geopolitical assets of a country in exchange for full membership essentially misses the core rationale behind the process of European integration.....The mechanisms for establishing peace and security in Europe have drastically changed. They still view the EU through the classical lenses of an alliance of states. The military focussed security discourse that has characterized Turkish-European relations for so long. It is argued that EU aims to exploit Turkey's strengths i.e. NATO membership, military capability and geo-strategic position.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?", *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute* pp.6-7

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p.5

As a natural prolongation, proponents of this point of view proposes that the participants of the European integration process in general and the ESDP project in particular, has to enjoy the same level of responsibilities as the members, concerning the ability to acquire and project those values such as democracy and human rights.

There are arguments that Turkey shares the same level of awareness as to the importance of the values<sup>70</sup> in the European integration process. However, Turkey has not been able to reflect this understanding into reality either by legislative amendments needed to integrate those principles into the Turkish legal system or by taking the necessary steps towards the implementation of the already accepted ones.

The existence of the term 'identity' in the terminology used in the European security, for instance the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), has also attracted a certain degree of attention. According to the adherents of this line of thinking, discussions in Turkey regarding ESDP have been neglecting the close relationship between the ESDP and the 'European Identity'. The issue is dealt only within the scope of decision-making processes and the level of Turkish participation in this processes. The essence of the problem, on the contrary, arises from the relationship between the 'legitimacy of the ESDP' and the 'European Identity' and Turkey's being unprepared to accept and internalize the 'European Identity'.<sup>71</sup>

Unlike NATO, where strategic considerations outweigh the democratic criteria; identity and legitimacy issues enjoys a primary position in the EU

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<sup>70</sup> Şadi Ergüvenç, "Turkey: Strategic Partner of the European Union" in Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, *Turkey and European Union: Nebulous Nature of Relations* (Ankara: Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, 1999), p.12 See \_\_\_\_\_, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, *Beyaz Kitap* (Ankara: Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, 2000), p.4 for a reflection of the official standing in the issue of value projection.

<sup>71</sup> Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit.*, in note 38, pp.157,163

integration process. The main goal of EU is to form a democratic, peaceful and stable community of states and individuals. ESDP will be a primary actor in this respect by reflecting this identity, comprised of liberal and democratic values, to the unstable regions. While being aware of Turkey's geostrategic importance, military strength and huge potential in its region; EU prefers to keep Turkey in the threshold of ESDP due to the democratic deficits. Therefore the real concern for EU is not the participation of Turkey in the ESDP decision-making mechanisms but rather an issue of 'European Identity' and 'legitimacy'.<sup>72</sup>

However, there are some concerns on the part of the Turkish intellectuals as to the validity of the arguments concerning the role of the European security formation as a vehicle to project values to those countries to the east of the EU, which adopts a critical approach towards the dominance of the elements of 'identity' in the formation and development of the ESDP. Accordingly, the objective of preserving and promoting the western security community to the post-communist states is considered as a myth lost by 1993 with the former-Yugoslavian experience.<sup>73</sup>

Although there are concerns that Turkey wants to be a member of the EU without seriously sharing the essential tenets of what has become European identity<sup>74</sup>, with these point in mind, it's apparent that there is no way that Turkey will achieve the highest level of participation in the ESDP mechanisms and the desired EU membership via a security bargain.

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 166

<sup>73</sup> Aybet, *op.cit.*, in note 63, pp. 93 and 227

<sup>74</sup> Jung, *op.cit.*, p.10

### 4.3.3 Turkey as a Security Consumer

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to present Turkey as a 'consumer' and not 'producer' of security in Europe. In the absence of a Soviet threat to contain, Turkish policymakers had, in the aftermath of the Cold War, adopted the role of a 'staunch ally'. Turkey's geopolitical location no longer seems to justify the kind of military, as well as economic and political support it received during the Cold War. Second, the Turkish military capability, which was considered an asset at a time when NATO strategy assigned a significant deterrent value to ground forces, has lost its centrality to Western strategy. Third, its proximity to unstable regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East means Turkey is faced with military threats and could embroil the EU in its own problems.<sup>75</sup>

Turkey has been identified, by some circles in Europe, as a 'security consumer' since it is neighbouring certain areas of concern for the European security, which makes Turkey a liability for the EU by serving as a platform to export those problems and instabilities into the EU realm.

Many of the issues of Turkish foreign and security policy may pose a threat should it be internalized by the EU. Thus, there are remarks supporting to keep Turkey in the threshold of the emerging ESDP project. By this way these problems will not be taken into the European security framework and more importantly, Turkey will serve as a barrier in preventing the dissemination of these security threats into the European realm.

There exists a dilemma as far as Turkey's role in European security is concerned. While on the one hand it is an asset for Europe as a security producer role, on the other hand, Turkey is perceived as a threat to the European security due to its geographical proximity to the problematic regions.

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<sup>75</sup>Bilgin, *op.cit.*, p.38. See Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "Will Form Lead to Function? Institutional Enlargement and the Creation of a ESDP", *Contemporary Security Policy* (Vol.21, No.1, April 2000), p.36 and Jung, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8 for an analysis of the reasons behind fear of Turkey as a security consumer.

According to these circles, Turkey's uneasy relations with the Arab states in general and its neighbors in particular, its direct involvement in the Cyprus problem and the remaining potential of a new escalation of tensions with Greece, considerable stakes in Central Asia, and direct exposure to the instabilities in the Caucasus may bring new security headaches to the Union.<sup>76</sup>

Turkey's more assertive foreign policy towards the Middle East stands in contradiction to the Barcelona Process. The precarious nature of Turkish-Israeli alignment has also become self-evident. Turkey's domestic problems shows that Turkey was more often a problem for than an answer to European security concerns, in particular the Kurdish question. From an EU perspective there's then no necessity for Turkey to perform this military role from within the EU. It has been argued that Turkey as a "*security insulator*" between the EU and the Middle East can perform this role best as a non-member... Instead of being an anchor of stability as a EU member-state, Turkey could rather turn into a pronounced insecurity provider.<sup>77</sup>

The point about Turkey having become more a consumer than producer of security in Europe has to do with not only Turkey's own dynamics but also the evolution of the European Community/Union during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>78</sup>

What Turkey has been unable to do until now is to 'seek new ways of reinstating Turkey's value for building security in Europe'. Turkey has failed to adopt a broad understanding of security and became stuck to the significance of military security.

The main reason why the EU policymakers view Turkey as a consumer of security is because it has failed to learn how to produce the kind of security the project of European integration has thrived upon. An attempt to play the military card is unlikely to reinforce Turkey's candidacy in the long run if it continues to lag behind in the production of non-military security whilst producing insecurity by exporting some of its domestic problems through the diaspora in Western Europe.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Müftüler-Bac, *op.cit.*, p.490. See Lesser, *op.cit.*, for a similar analysis of threat of Turkish-Greek relations for EU.

<sup>77</sup> Jung, *op.cit.*, pp.8-9

<sup>78</sup> Bilgin, *op.cit.*, p.39

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p.42

This is why during the 1990s it has become increasingly difficult to present Turkey as an 'asset' to this 'civilian power' EU. Turkey has also failed to become a producer of economic and political security as a result of various stalls in the democratization process and its underdeveloped economy.<sup>80</sup>

While EU puts greater emphasis on the non-military dimensions of security, Turkey continues to adopt a more strategic way of thinking. For instance, illegal immigration is conceived as one of the most important issue that threatens stability and security within the European Union. In this respect, Turkey has been considered as the country that serves as a corridor for the flow of great masses from the Middle Eastern and Asian countries to Europe. Many circles within the EU, British PM Tony Blair being the most significant one, have been accusing Turkey for being unable to take the necessary precautions in order to prevent illegal immigration. This can be regarded as an example for the idea that Turkey currently is unable to produce the kind of security that EU looks for.

The strategy of selling Turkey's EU membership by stressing the country's role as a security provider is neither new nor very original. This strategy reflects the historical environment in which Turkish-Western relations have unfolded.....Turkey's integration in NATO and other Western institutions was essentially based on the geo-strategic assets the country could offer in the light of Western security concerns..... While Turkey's geo-strategic position substantially changed with the end of the Cold War, its political elite has partly continued to follow this mode of interaction with the West.<sup>81</sup>

However, unlike NATO, EU's main strength in security realm, as it was the case during the Cold War years, lies in the management of nonmilitary dimensions of security rather than the military realm.

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p.48

<sup>81</sup> Jung, op.cit., p.4

The context in which Turkey became a NATO member is significantly different from the environment that Turkey today finds itself in..... Turkish policymakers could choose to present Turkey as an asset in the EU's relations with its southern periphery. Turkish policymakers would do well to try and find Turkey an edge in strengthening their profile vis-a-vis the EU i.e. by stressing the role Turkey could play in constituting a multi-cultural European identity that is not anti-Muslim.<sup>82</sup>

Unlike NATO, the primary agenda of EU is to project the values inherent in European integration process to the east, but not only through the utilization of military force but rather by means of political, social and economic instruments of security. With these facts in mind, Turkey has to proceed further in order to overcome the boundaries of Cold War and try to find ways to reinstate the potential of Turkey for European security management in this new era. In fact, Turkey has the potential to play a key role in this new framework but it failed to present its position leading to the perceptions of Turkey as a security consumer country in certain circles. Continuous emphasis of its importance as a security producer in terms of military security will not be to the advantage of Turkey in the light of the current trends in European integration process in general and European security project in particular.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Bilgin, *op.cit.*, p.46

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.47-48

## CHAPTER 5

### PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

#### 5.1 Alternative Basis for a Solution

Numerous proposals have been put forward which aim to find a solution for the participation issue of the non-EU European NATO members in general and Turkey in particular in the institutional and operational phases of the newly emerging ESDP project of the EU.

These proposals vary in a range from the incorporation of the differentiated membership status of the WEU into the EU to a precise agreement governing only the second pillar of the EU like that of Schengen for the third pillar.

From the very beginning, Turkey favoured the establishment of a framework agreement between EU and NATO which will be the basis of a structural relationship responding to the particular needs of non-EU European allies.<sup>1</sup>

There has been even arguments that EU should find new ways of involving these countries [non-EU European NATO members] in defense cooperation perhaps

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<sup>1</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the ESDI, 14 February 2000  
([www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr))

by offering them de facto membership in defense while they await full EU membership.<sup>2</sup>

With the integration of the WEU into the EU, Turkey proposed that the European NATO members should be associated formally and institutionally with the CFSP as an interim measure before the full membership.<sup>3</sup>

Turkey has consistently emphasized that the goal must be a unitary system for crisis management, covering non-EU allies as well as non-NATO EU members, a unitary structure, which could prevent the creation of dividing lines in ESDP.<sup>4</sup> According to Turkey, inclusiveness must be the general rule. A European operation will have the greatest chance of success if it has political and practical support from non-EU allies not least Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

Helsinki decisions, while certainly marking a turning-point in Turkish–EU relations, with the designation of Turkey’s eligibility for a full membership, can also be seen as a compromise which ensures Turkey an associate status in the EU’s developing security role.<sup>6</sup>

Others emphasize the importance of the attainment of a large overlap in membership between NATO and EU, a key principle for the maximization of

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<sup>2</sup> Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, “Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense”, *Washington Quarterly* (Vol.22, Iss.4, 1999), p.6 Source EBSCOHOST

<sup>3</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the European Security and Turkey (www.mfa.gov.tr)

<sup>4</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, “Turkish General Staff View on ESDP”, *Insight Turkey* (Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001), p.95

<sup>5</sup> Alexander Vershbow, “ESDI: Berlin, St.Malo and Beyond”, *Joint Force Quarterly* (Iss.21, Spring 99), p.3 Source:EBSCOHOST

<sup>6</sup> Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies”, *Security Dialogue* (Vol.31, Iss.4, 2000), p.500

influence and achievement of a stable division of labour necessitated for the realization of the successful security architecture.<sup>7</sup>

Although the only way of a satisfactory alternative for Turkey towards the realization of the ideal of full enjoyment of participation rights in ESDP mechanisms is the full membership, there has to be a transitory framework in which Turkey find answers to its concerns and thereby opening the path for a cooperative relationship between EU and NATO.<sup>8</sup>

Different alternatives put forward in the attempt to find a viable basis for the participation of non-EU European allies can be classified under a number of meaningful categories:

#### 5.1.1 Transfer WEU Acquis into the EU

One scenario for Turkey's integration without membership that was considered in EU circles was to include this non-member in the CFSP, the second pillar of the EU, thereby guaranteeing its role in security policymaking, which should allow for Turkish participation in operations that implement CFSP decisions and should guarantee Turkey's approval in NATO Council decisions.<sup>9</sup> This scenario fits into the complex 'concentric circles' and 'variable geometry' structure of European integration, where Turkey would act as a full member in certain issues such as security but not in others.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Michael Rühle and Nick Williams "The Greater Union's New Security Agenda: NATO and EU" in Franco Algeri et al. (eds.) *Managing Security In Europe: The European Union and Challenge of Enlargement* (Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 1996) p.96

<sup>8</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler" in Bal, İdris (ed.), *21.Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım Ltd. Şti, 2001),p.611

<sup>9</sup> Müftüler-Bac, *op.cit.*, p.494

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p.500

By this way, Turkey could participate in all working groups apart from the Security Committee, could appoint officers to the Planning Cell and participate on the same basis as full members in EU-led operations.

'Carry[ing] the WEU Art.V commitment into the EU but allow[ing] only those EU members which are also in NATO to be full participants in defense policy-making' would sustain the current WEU categories of membership, through which Turkey could join the EU's defense discussions as associate members. Moreover, these arrangements might encourage the convergence of EU and NATO memberships and diminish tension between NATO and EU in the long run.<sup>11</sup>

Compared with the rigid membership structures of EU and NATO, WEU's flexible membership status has constituted an example of further participation of all European security actors in the decision-taking mechanisms in this field. In this respect, this alternative should enable all Associate Members to continue to enjoy the full rights that they acquired in WEU and be more closely tied to the CFSP if they cannot be fully integrated in this pillar.

The transfer of the WEU acquis can be realized through three different ways, offering different levels of satisfaction from the minimal to the maximal:

1) *A unilateral decision by WEU Associate Members:* WEU Associate Members can unilaterally associate themselves with the decisions taken within the CFSP framework on a case-by-case basis.

2) *A new Associate Membership within the EU/CFSP framework:* The ideal solution to the problem would undoubtedly be the establishment of an Associate Member status - similar to that of WEU - within the new EU/CFSP

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<sup>11</sup> Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch Laine and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defense Capability", *Survival* (Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999), pp.33-34

framework, to be offered to WEU Associate Members. The phrase repeatedly referred to in both the Presidency Report adopted by the Cologne European Council, NATO's Washington Communiqué and the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, "*building on existing consultation arrangements within WEU*", gives significant clues as to the future nature of relations between the EU and the non-EU European Allies.

It can be said that the first option seems a favourable transitional solution to the problem of inclusion of WEU Associate Members in EU-led WEU operations, undertaken without the use of NATO assets, or operations made in the CFSP framework after WEU's demise. The second option, on the other hand, may be regarded as the most favourable, especially for Turkey, since it proposes the establishment of an association between the EU and WEU Associate Members and, thereby, constitutes a long-term solution.<sup>12</sup>

A solution to the issue of participation of WEU Associate Members in the new European security and defence framework will not only serve the interests of the non-EU Allies concerned, but also the interests of EU members. This will obviously be a significant step towards the achievement of a *genuine* ESDI: *genuine* in the sense that it would involve all European security actors (NATO and EU) through a holistic approach.

However, negative attitude of the EU towards the transfer of the WEU mechanisms concerning the participation of the non-EU European allies into the EU realm has resulted in the inability to put these proposals into application.

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<sup>12</sup> Münevver Cebeci, "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations With Special Reference To Turkey" *Occasional Papers* (Brussels: Western European Union, 1999), p.2 source: [www.weu.int](http://www.weu.int)

### 5.1.2 A “virtual” veto

A virtual veto is not a real or formally accepted veto, but it has the appearance of a real one. The virtuality of the veto is that the member states in the GAC can and will not *neglect* the Turkish veto, they will act as if it were a *real* veto. This may sound artificial but it is not. The Turkish Foreign Minister would have the right to speak and the possibility to present proposals. The effect and the consequences of this spoken word are real, because they cannot be neglected.<sup>13</sup> European Union members are concerned not to give Turkey a degree of right which can mean a veto power concerning the ESDP mechanisms which made this alternative unacceptable.

### 5.1.3 Bilateral Agreement

Others argue for the conclusion of a bilateral agreement between non-EU European NATO allies in general and Turkey in particular and EU on the ESDP issue, possibly either through a WEU-EU or an EU-Turkey Security Agreement, as an initiative to respond to the particular concerns of Turkey.<sup>14</sup> When the issue is the participation of WEU Associate Members in EU-led Petersberg operations that WEU would conduct, an arrangement is to be made between the EU and WEU on the issue. This option presents an institutional solution, confined to operations that could be conducted by the EU with the use of NATO assets and capabilities.<sup>15</sup> This option does not meet Turkey’s concerns regarding its participation in EU-only operations in its geographical proximity and in regions of national concern for Turkey.

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<sup>13</sup> Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, “Accommodating Turkey in ESDP”, *CEPS Policy Brief* ( No.5, May 2001), p.10

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

#### 5.1.4 Conventional option

Another option would be to include Turkey and the other European non-EU NATO members at the *decision-making* phase, if the crisis concerns a region directly affecting the country's national interests and when a military intervention is being considered.

This entails the previous designation of certain areas of national concern for the interested country and involve its full participation in ESDP operations to these regions. However this is a problematic option because both Turkey's national security interests and the location of hot spots may change over time. Explicitly including specific regions and hot spots in Treaty-like agreements would eliminate the necessary flexibility in EU decision-making arrangements.

This option is conventional in so far as it begins and ends with existing EU procedures. It would put Turkey in the cockpit as if it were a full EU member state when the considered operation would touch a geographical area in Turkey's national interests. However, Turkey would not have the right of decision or veto. Following the stages of ESDP policy-making, we would see the following Turkish involvement.<sup>16</sup>

British-US initiative and the resulting Ankara Document takes this line of thinking as a starting point and foresees Turkey to be able to participate in full to the ESDP mechanisms in operations in its geographic proximity and national interest. Given the positive receipt of this initiative and the accompanying proposal, it can be argued that Turkey's position evolves in line with this line of thinking.

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<sup>15</sup> Cebeci, *op.cit.*, pp.19-20

<sup>16</sup> Tocci and Houben, *op.cit.*, p.9

### 5.1.5 A Security Agreement like Schengen

The Schengen Agreement was an intergovernmental agreement concluded outside the EU framework. In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the agreement was included in the EU *acquis*. Its purpose is to remove all controls at internal land, sea and airport frontiers. In order to maintain internal security, a variety of measures have been taken, e.g. coordination of visa controls at the external borders of the Member States through a common approach to visa policies and asylum procedures. On 26 March 2001, the five Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) entered the Schengen Agreement and thus officially entered part of the EU. This will enable these countries to maintain the Nordic Passport Union, which allows their citizens to move freely across their borders. However, Norway and Iceland remain non-EU members. They are not allowed a veto within the Council of Ministers and if a decision were taken by the Council that was then rejected by their national parliaments, the agreement would collapse.

This model of an inter-governmental agreement either outside or within the EU Treaties perhaps offers the most interesting prospect. One could foresee a European intergovernmental agreement on external security. Two variants are possible either EU member states engage can in such an intergovernmental agreement with Turkey or the EU itself can agree upon a bilateral agreement with Turkey.<sup>17</sup>

However, given the national and institutional sensitivities on the part of the European capitals and the EU, the likelihood of such an intergovernmental agreement with a non-member on the issue of security and defense is very low, if not exists.

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp.10-11

## 5.2 Ankara Document<sup>18</sup>: A Major Breakthrough ?

British-US joint initiative to reach a favourable solution to the problem of participation of the non-EU members of NATO in general and Turkey in particular in the ESDP, which will lead to the removal of Turkish veto towards the access of EU to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities and thereby initiate the process of operationalization of the ESDP, has matured through the year 2001 and became fruitful in December 2001.

US and UK are two countries that approach security cooperation from a more strategic point of view than an issue of identity formation or projection. Thus, US and UK evaluates the ESDP project as a strategic cooperation initiative, rather than an integral part of the European identity, that must involve all the significant actors in that security environment. In this respect, Turkey, which exhibited its staunch support to the war against international terrorism in its participation in the ISAF, should not be alienated from a security cooperation project that aims to manage European security issues.

The US, on the other hand, urged Turkey not to follow a stubborn policy against the claims of the EU on the grounds that such inflexibility by Turkey might force the Union to head its own way, which would end up with the dissolution of the Alliance. More positive attitude of the military wing in Turkey has also paved the way for the achievement of a breakthrough.<sup>19</sup>

Although whether UK formally represented the position of the EU was not very much clear from the very beginning, there exists a consensus within the Union,

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<sup>18</sup>Official content of the Document has not yet been made public.

<sup>19</sup> The understanding that the military circles in Turkey blocks the agreement regarding ESDP is a common attitude widespread in European circles esp. Greece. See, for instance, \_\_\_\_\_, "Tensions Between Turkey-EU Increasing", *Il Sole 24 Ore*, January 13, 2001 and \_\_\_\_\_, "Turkish Military Reluctant on EU", *La Croix*, January 16, 2001

supporting the solution reached with the UK-US efforts, with the exception of Greece- which opposed the agreement that was reached and also successfully prevented it from becoming the EU's official position.

When it comes to the details of the Ankara Document, it can be said that a solution was found by paying due attention to Turkey's serious concerns and to its supreme interests, primarily in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was given guarantees by the US and the UK that the European crisis management missions could not be used in contingencies involving the Aegean as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, bilateral issues between NATO allies will not be a legitimate concern of EU i.e. EU would not intervene in problems between Turkey and Greece, both in the Aegean and in Cyprus.<sup>20</sup> Ankara Document is carefully worded:

- Turkey is not mentioned individually but rather there is a reference to all non-EU European allies in general in order not to attract Greek objection.
- ESDP is not to be used against any NATO ally or in an issue involving two allies which refers to the Turkish-Greek conflict although not mentioned openly due to the Greek factor.
- Regarding the operations in geographic proximity and national security interests of a certain country, EU intends to engage in dialogue and consultation and take into consideration the respective positions of these countries arising from their national security considerations. This is also a reference to Turkish position which will enable Turkey to raise its concerns in those operations.

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<sup>20</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq", *Insight Turkey* (Vol.4, No.1, January-March 2002), pp.52-53

- More frequent consultations with non-EU European NATO members will be made in peace-time arrangements, which can be regarded as an attempt to respond Turkish demands concerning a higher level of coordination and cooperation between EU and non-members.<sup>21</sup>

In return, British paper accepted the concept of assured access for the EU to some pre-determined NATO assets. Turkey has long been opposing the assured access of EU to NATO assets and capabilities but a breakthrough could be achieved by finding a middle ground. NATO assets and capabilities that can be utilized by EU is classified under two broad categories namely strategic and non-strategic. Thus, EU has been given the right to an automatic access to those assets and capabilities in the non-strategic category whereas demands by the EU to use strategic ones will be dealt by the NATO Council on a case-by-case basis.

Turkey has defined the outcomes of this trilateral initiative as a *concrete and valid basis*, which will pave the way for the further development of EU-NATO relations in all aspects of security.<sup>22</sup> One of the most significant outcomes of the agreement reached through Ankara Document is that Turkey's participation in ESDP mechanisms is no more a problem between EU and Turkey but rather a problem between EU-Greece .However, there are concerns in Turkish circles that without the issuance of any formal approval by the EU and the relaxed approach of Turkish politicians, the significance of the deal may soon evaporate.<sup>23</sup>

Ankara Document appears to be a viable basis for a final deal although there are some points that are ambiguous such as the determination of the term

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<sup>21</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", *Security Dialogue* (vol.33, no.1, March 2002), pp.21-22

<sup>22</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Türkiye'den AGSP'ye Destek", *Finansal Forum*, December 3, 2001

<sup>23</sup> Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, p.53

'geographic proximity' and the difficulty in putting the boundaries between political vs. military control.<sup>24</sup> The US-British proposal to find a middle ground between EU and Turkey has been fruitful as far as Turkish position is concerned. In return for certain acquisitions, Turkey intends to withdraw its veto on NATO-EU cooperation on capabilities.

However, this agreement has not been realized through EU legal mechanisms yet due to the Greek opposition inside the EU. Greek position stems from its opposition to the nature of the Ankara Document as a whole. Greece, while emphasizing once again the decision-making autonomy of the EU, rejects any discriminatory attitude towards one of the non-EU European allies. Although there is no individual reference to Turkey, Greece maintains that the document is actually prepared to eliminate the particular concerns of Turkey. Furthermore, according to Greek position, any guarantee to be given has to be reciprocal i.e. EU must not be the only side to assure Turkey but rather Turkey has to give certain assurances for not to use these rights as a means to affect the inner functioning of the EU in a negative manner as far as the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP is concerned.

We [Greece] reject the one-sided Ankara text. Without amendments which satisfy our aims and secure our interests, no text will be accepted," Simitis said. "The security of the EU, and even more importantly the security of our country, cannot be the subject of ... uncertain regulations."<sup>25</sup>

If Greek position continues to persist, as an initial step in line with its continuing attitude towards EU-NATO cooperation, Turkey will block the transfer

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<sup>24</sup> Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p.22

<sup>25</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, "Greek barrier to ESDP causes disappointment in Brussels", *Turkish Daily News*, 17 May 2002

of the command of NATO forces in Macedonia to the European Union if the dispute the EU has with Greece over the ESDP has not been overcome by that date.<sup>26</sup>

Ankara Document is a satisfactory basis for Turkey and EU since it offers, Turkey, on the one hand, an enhanced consultation in peace-time and an active participation in the operational phase in the operations where NATO assets are used together with paying attention to its national concerns in areas of geographic proximity and where Turkey has a national interest and on the other hand does not prejudice the decision-making autonomy of the EU. A quotation from a senior US diplomat put the acceptability of the Ankara Document for the two sides as follows:

We [US] think that the Ankara text not only addresses Turkey's legitimate concerns but also does not harm the autonomous nature of decision-making mechanisms within EU. We think and were told by other EU member states that the Ankara text does not violate the autonomy of the club.<sup>27</sup>

### 5.3 After September 11?

The 11 September disaster has revealed the disparity and broadness of threats. Far more instruments are needed in effectively countering any of these threats than have even been discerned thus far.... Security and defence have now become global and thus the European focus on its "near abroad" looks increasingly anachronistic. Counter-terrorism should become a legitimate part of the ESDP, with a global focus and increased emphasis on crisis prevention. As is widely recognised, the EU has the potential to play a significant role here, especially as regards the broadness of its gamut of instruments, not least economic, and fill a gap in this "redefined security" in this "reconfigured strategic environment".....[which requires] acquiring the necessary military and civilian tools as well as more financial input: in short, the EU still needs to decide if it wants to exist or not as an international actor.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Semih İdiz, "Turkey set to block transfer of command to EU in Macedonia" *Turkish News* 4 April 2002 and see Kerin Hope, "Greece adds to dispute on Turkey's role in EU force", *Financial Times*, May 28 2002 for a similar reference to possible repercussions of the Greek attitude on EU plans in Macedonia

<sup>27</sup> Quoted in Selçuk Gültaşlı, "US: EU should approve Ankara text on ESDP as soon as possible", *Turkish Daily News*, May 2, 2002

<sup>28</sup> Maartje Rutten, "Stagnation of the ESDP" *ISS-EU Newsletter* no 1, February 2002, Institute for Security Studies, [www.iss.eu.int](http://www.iss.eu.int)

EU has to reach its declared goal regarding the military capabilities but sooner and try to develop more in the wake of the increasing security concerns after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks. New contingencies may force the boundaries set out by Petersberg Tasks and EU may come up with more demanding situations. EU countries, on the other hand, are not see very much eager to respond to the challenges posed by September 11 concerning the need for increased and differentiated capabilities together with a sensitivity on international terrorism.

.....A proposal to push for increased national spending on the ESDP in the wake of the terrorist attacks was rejected on 12 October 2001, during the informal Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels. No revision of the Headline Goal or reconsideration of the Petersberg tasks are planned either and no consensus has been reached on a suggestion to include the fight against terrorism as an ESDP mission. The Declarations of the Police Capabilities Conference and the Capabilities Improvement Conference, issued on 19/20 November 2001, did not even contain one word on 11 September.<sup>29</sup>

Regarding the possible implications of post-September 11 developments on Turkey's position in ESDP; some scholars maintained that there can be a change in Turkey's position.

According to this line of thinking, as US interests shift away from the Balkans, to the Caucasus; Europe will need to fill the vacuum, and it is very likely that in order for the Europeans to be successful, the US will pressure Turkey to lift its veto. The US needs the EU to act in the Balkans and this is one of the reasons why Turkey's leverage and strategic importance have completely changed as well since 11 September. A second reason is that, with US deployments further eastwards, Turkey is no longer the only strategic gateway to the East. Many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia such as Pakistan are willing to

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

cooperate and have offered use of their facilities which lead Turkey's strategic relevance to diminish in relative terms.<sup>30</sup>

Antonio Missiroli, on the other hand, adopts a more cautious policy and avoids giving clear-cut definitions for the post-September 11 Turkey.

As for *Turkey*, it seems too early to predict what medium/long-term effect the present international crisis will have on its strategic position and domestic orientation. At all events, given a) its candidacy to join the EU, b) its role in Cyprus (including that country's EU bid), c) its present position on the issue of EU-NATO military cooperation, it would not be inappropriate for the Union to try and make use of its multiple policy tools and take a comprehensive political initiative towards Ankara - an initiative, that is, capable of covering all those aspects and of preventing a major crisis in bilateral relations.<sup>31</sup>

British-US initiative, on the other hand, has been intensified especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks. This can be regarded as a reflection, on the part of the Europeans, of the understanding of the growing strategic role of Turkey due to its consistent participation in the 'War Against Terror'.

Post-September 11 developments further increased Turkey's strategic significance with its open support to the coalition against international terrorism and showed that speculations on decreasing strategic importance of Turkey, like that of the post-Cold War era, has been baseless.

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<sup>30</sup> Maartje Rutten, "The EU's Military and Civilian Crisis Management Instruments after 11 September", October 2001, EU Institute for Security Studies, [www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)

<sup>31</sup> Antonio Missiroli, "Enlargement and European security after 11 September", September 2001, [www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

Turkey's insistence on its participation in the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a reflection of the traditional Western element inherent in the Turkish foreign and security policy. Turkey, which aims to be a part of the Western world since mid-19<sup>th</sup> century through membership in the institutions set up in the European context, aspires to play a significant role in the latest effort to set up a security and defense policy in order to respond to the growing security challenges in the European security environment in the post-Cold War era.

After a painful process, the issue of Turkish participation in the ESDP has come to a certain point thanks to the British-US initiative and the Ankara Document, which laid the grounds for an understanding between Turkey and EU. However, due to the Greek opposition towards such a deal with Turkey; this agreement has not yet been adopted by the EU through relevant institutional mechanisms.

Although the issue is resolved in terms of Turkey and it is rather an inner problem of the EU to get the Greek acceptance; from a historical point of view, past experiences of the traditional Greek attitude towards any matter related with Turkey, lead to the conclusion that the current impasse regarding the agreement reached between Turkey and EU on the ESDP matter will not be overcome in the near future.

Substantial, institutional and legal basis of Turkish position in ESDP is very much strong enough to attain a certain degree of rights in the ESDP. Turkish

emphasis on the indivisibility of security in the European security environment, relevance of NATO as the vehicle for the preservation of the transatlantic link, the reference to the *acquis* already achieved within the WEU through the associate membership status and subsequent references in the NATO framework to the validity of the WEU mechanisms as a basis on which current EU-NATO relations has to be developed, have all played for the hands of Turkey in its bid for a more significant role in the ESDP.

Further analysis of the Turkish position in the issue of participation of Turkey in the institutional and operational dimensions of the ESDP reveals the dominance of the strategic outlook in Turkish foreign and security policies towards Europe. While trying to legitimize its demand for a greater involvement in the ESDP institutions and operations; Turkey relies on a more strategic line of thinking. Thus, Turkey presents its geo-strategic position and the level of its military capabilities as an invaluable asset for the EU in terms of ESDP, which, according to Turkey, legitimizes the need of a greater role for Turkey in the ESDP. Although strategic considerations are still relevant in the European security environment, it does not suffice to reflect the whole of the picture. By insisting on the dominance of strategic considerations, Turkey neglects and does not pay the necessary attention to the determining role of '*identity*' in the European integration process in general and ESDP project in particular. European Union is regarded as a 'security community' in which peaceful change is accepted as the only legitimate way of transformation and the members share certain values, as an important factor of the formation of the institutional identity. In this respect, EU members consider the adoption and internalization of certain values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights as an integral part of the European integration process.

Right after the end of the Cold War, main objective of EU has been thought as to project the values inherent in the EU project to the post-Communist states in the East and Central Europe, as an attempt to realize peaceful and stable transformation of these countries. ESDP, in this respect, is regarded as the vehicle through which such a projection can be realized by means of crisis-management activities in the problematic and unstable regions. In order to enjoy a satisfactory level of participation in the ESDP, therefore, Turkey should present its willingness to adopt and internalize those values inherent in the European integration process.

This brings to the agenda the close linkage between the issue of participation of Turkey in the ESDP and the general membership process to the EU. It is apparent that the only way to achieve the full and most satisfactory level of participation in the ESDP is to realize the full membership ideal to the EU. The path towards these twin objectives is one, however, i.e. the adoption, internalization and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, which can be regarded as the manifestation of the elements of the 'European identity', among other principles.

Even if the latest agreement reached between Turkey, Britain and US, agreed by means of a strategic attitude, is to be ratified by the EU, Turkey will not be enjoying the fullest possible level of participation in the ESDP. Turkish participation will be confined to strategic and contextual considerations, which can change in the long run, from time to time and according to the necessities of the situation at hand, having the risk of leaving Turkey in a disadvantageous position. Thus, ultimate goal of Turkey has to be the full membership to the EU, which will also ensure the fullest possible involvement of Turkey in the ESDP. Turkey should take the necessary steps towards the adoption and implementation of the values inherent in European integration process, which will, not only open the way for the full membership but

also reflect its desire to be a subject of the 'European identity' and legitimizing its current position as far as ESDP is concerned.

On the other hand, one of the most important aspect of the European integration process is the significance of the dynamic center-periphery relationship and the importance of the stability of the periphery, which is directed to the center. However, concerning Turkey, on the contrary, EU exhibit certain attitudes that can cause instability and force Turkey away from the periphery.<sup>1</sup>

EU, therefore, has to acknowledge the linkage between the so-called harsh position of Turkey and the full membership process to the EU. The absence of a clear cut and well-defined membership perspective for Turkey may well be a determining factor in the current Turkish position in the ESDP. Therefore, instead of raising concerns over the prospect of giving Turkey a back-door guarantee to the EU through its role in ESDP; EU had better take a more constructive attitude towards Turkey by giving it a membership perspective, which will destroy the psychological dimension of imminent exclusion from the European Union in general and European security arrangements in particular. Although giving such a perspective will lead to the elimination of many of the barriers towards a more acceptable relationship between Turkey and EU, the prospect of Turkey's full membership in the next ten years, makes it imperative, for the EU, to develop interim mechanisms to keep Turkey attached to the EU in general and to the ESDP in particular. The latest agreement achieved through the diplomatic efforts of UK and US can be a reliable ground for the formation and development of such an interim framework as far as Turkey's role in the ESDP is concerned.

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<sup>1</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", *Doğu Batı* (Sayı 14, 2001/1), pp.165-166

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
# APPENDIX

## FLASH POINTS\*



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\* I owe the idea to prepare such a map and information note to K. Taner Akçakaya, who has done so in Akçakaya, K. Taner "The Various Levels of European Security and Defense Cooperation: Turkey's Position in the Emerging European Security Architecture", Unpublished Masters Thesis, Bilkent University, July 2001. These informations are based on a newspaper article, \_\_\_\_\_, "Türkiye'nin Çevresi Ateşten Gömlek", Cumhuriyet, 17 December 2000. This is not an official nor a final list but only a projection of the flash points.



MAP 1 – FLASH POINTS

- 1) **CYPRUS:** Cyprus conflict constitutes one of the most important elements of Turkish foreign and security policies. Not only the possibility of the future intervention of EU through ESDP to the island but also the Greek Cypriot Republic's full membership process to the EU cause tensions in Turkey-EU relations.
- 2) **SYRIA:** Turkish-Syrian relations have been traditionally conceived to be conflictual due to the divergent policies on water issue and Syria's support to PKK.
- 3) **NORTHERN IRAQ:** Turkey has always concerned about a power vacuum in this region which can led to the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state. Turkey has been implementing military operations against terrorists located Northern Iraq until 2000.
- 4) **IRAN:** Iran has been perceived, by some circles in Western world, as a country exporting radical Islam which cause concerns. Turkey has always declared its unhappiness due to terrorist incursions into Turkey from Iranian territory.
- 5) **Nagorno-Karabagh:** Turkey always declared its support for a peaceful resolution of this territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey has historical and cultural ties with Azerbaijan whereas its relations with Armenia is not at a high level due to Armenian insistence on the so-called genocide.
- 6) **Georgia-Abkhazia:** The inner problems in Georgia affects Turkish foreign and security policies since Georgia is a close partner of Turkey in the transportation of the energy resources of the region to Western markets.
- 7) **Georgia-South Ossetia:** Turkey is concerned about this conflict because of the reasons mentioned above i.e. Art.6

- 8) **Chechnya:** Russian-Chechen conflict is a matter of concern for Turkey, not only because of its historical and cultural ties with Chechnya but also because of the vitality of this region in the transportation of energy resources.
- 9) **Albanian-Macedonian Border:** Turkey has historical and cultural ties with these two countries which have problems due to the incursion of Albanian rebels from Albania to Macedonian territory and there are concerns on the part of Macedonians that Albania has been supporting ethnic-Albanians in Macedonia.
- 10) **Kosovo:** Although NATO-led operation led to the resolution of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians, this area has a potential to affect European security due to its status within the Serbian-Montenegro Republic. Turkey has historical and cultural concerns over this region.
- 11) **Bosnia-Herzegovina:** The status-quo achieved after Dayton Agreement continues but this region has been regarded as a potential conflict point in European security environment. Turkey has historical and cultural ties with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 12) **Sandjak:** Another potential for conflict between Serbs and Muslims due to its current status in the Serbian-Montenegro Republic. Turkey has historical and cultural ties with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 13) **Albania:** Instability in this state had caused Western intervention in 1990s in order to prevent social and economic unrest. Turkey has considerable security interests in this region.
- 14) **Vojvodina:** Turkey has no direct security interests in this region.
- 15) **Privlaka:** Turkey has no direct security interests in this region.
- 16) **Belarus:** Turkey has no direct security interests in this region.