

T.C.
ANTALYA BİLİM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF POST GRADUATE EDUCATION
GLOBAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THESIS PROGRAM

CITIZENSHIP PERCEPTIONS AND MIGRANT EXPERIENCES
OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN HUNGARY

DISSERTATION

PREPARED BY
HANDE KARS

ANTALYA – 2022

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Date of Defense	: 05.01.2022	

PREFACE

First of all, I would like to state that I had to make the most painful revision to my thesis in this acknowledgement part. Initially, I had written that I would like to express my endless thanks to my dear grandfather who has been the biggest supporter in all areas of my life. Unfortunately, I had to revise this sentence as “my dear grandfather, whom I lost very recently.” He had been the mountain I leaned on. Anymore, he is not with me in life, but he is always in my mind, in my memories and in my heart. Although words are not enough, I send my endless gratitude and love to him, to my dear grandfather Mehmet Ümran Kars.

Of course, I am very grateful to my beloved grandmother Gülten Kars, who is supporting me by always being by my side with her prayers. I can never thank my grandparents enough for their unconditional love and never-ending financial and emotional support.

I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my advisor Didem Çakmaklı İşler who has always encouraged and supported me during my thesis writing process. With heartfelt praise, I acknowledge her efforts to guide me and thank her sincerely.

Finally, to all my professors, Tarık Oğuzlu, Mesut Uyar, Nermin Aydemir Çavuş, Işıl Cerem Cenker Özek and those I am unable to mention all your names here, I express my sincere regards to all of you for your support, care, motivation, and guidance at any step throughout my academic career.

...to the immigrants who have to seek a better life

HANDE KARS

ÖZET

Bu araştırma, Başbakan Viktor Orbán öncülüğünde göçmen ve Müslüman karşıtı siyasi söylemlere ev sahipliği yapan Macaristan'da Müslüman göçmen grubu olan Türkler'in aidiyet duygusu, vatandaşlık algıları ve göçmen deneyimlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma Macaristan'a ve onun liberal olmayan popülist rejimi ile Avrupa Birliği'nin liberal değerleri arasındaki konumuna odaklanan bir vaka çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışma, liberal olmayan popülist rejimin bu göçmenlerin algı ve deneyimleri üzerindeki etkisini keşfetmeye çalışmaktadır. Macaristan'da yaşayan yirmi Türk göçmen ile aidiyet, vatandaşlık ve göç alanlarındaki duygularını, algılarını ve deneyimlerini anlamak için derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın ampirik bulguları, *i*) Türklerin vatandaşlık algılarının, Türk vatandaşlığının milliyetçi duyguları tarafından şekillendirildiği, *ii*) Türklerin Macaristan'daki diğer Müslüman göçmen gruplarından ayrılan özel bir grup olduğu, *iii*) Orbán'ın göçmen karşıtı ve Müslüman karşıtı siyasi söylemlerinin Türk göçmenlerin durumu üzerinde olumsuz bir etkisinin olmadığıdır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türk göçmenler, vatandaşlık algıları, göçmen deneyimleri, Macaristan, populizm

ABSTRACT

This research analyzes the sense of belonging, citizenship perceptions and migrant experiences of Turkish migrants in Hungary. Turks who comprise a Muslim immigrant group in Hungary which is a host country of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim political rhetoric under the leadership of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. This is a case study which focuses on Hungary and its setting between the illiberal populist regime and liberal values of the European Union. This study explores the potential impact of the illiberal populist regime on the perceptions and experiences of these immigrants. In-depth interviews were conducted with twenty Turkish immigrants who live in Hungary in order to understand their perceptions and experiences in terms of belonging, citizenship and migration. The empirical findings of the research demonstrate that *i*) citizenship perceptions of Turks are shaped by their nationalist sentiments towards Turkish citizenship, *ii*) Turks are a particular group separate from other Muslim immigrant groups in Hungary, *iii*) Orbán's anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim political rhetoric does not have a negative impact on the experiences of Turkish immigrants in Hungary.

Keywords: Turkish immigrants, citizenship perceptions, migrant experiences, Hungary, populism

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EMN	: European Migration Network
EU	: European Union
FIDESZ	: Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats)
JOBBIK	: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (The Movement for a Better Hungary)
TEU	: Treaty on European Union
TFEU	: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This research will focus on whether and how and in-betweenness of Hungary between liberal European values and illiberal populist government may shape the sense of belonging, citizenship perceptions, and migrant experiences of Turks in Hungary. Turkish migrants in Hungary represent a Muslim minority group that could be affected by the anti-migrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric of the illiberal populist government. Although Hungary is a member of European Union which promotes a liberal, cosmopolitan, multiculturalist citizenship and, in principle, an inclusionary migration understanding; Hungary is challenging the liberal values of EU with its illiberal populist government that supports a communitarian, particularistic, exclusionary citizenship and migration understanding within anti-migrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric. It is important to explore the perceptions and experiences of Turkish immigrants on the topics of belonging, citizenship, and migration, since the Hungarian leader claims that they do not want to see “Muslim invaders” in both Hungary and Europe.

The rise of illiberal populist regimes in Europe is a trend that has increased since the 2000's and the contradiction in the nature of liberal values of EU and illiberal values of illiberal populist regimes has created a space that should be researched in political science. Two opposite citizenships understanding of EU and national illiberal governments can create a situation of in-betweenness for these EU member states. The setting of this betweenness can be evaluated from the perspectives of immigrants living in an illiberal populist country.

The research uses qualitative in-depth interviews with Turkish immigrants in Hungary to understand their sense of belonging, citizenship perceptions and migrant experiences. This study aims to understand to what extent the Turkish minority group in Hungary is affected from the rising exclusionary citizenship and migration rhetoric in Hungary. Citizenship perceptions include a multi-level citizenship context examined at different levels as Turkish, Hungarian and European citizenship. Migrant experiences comprise any kind of behavior and attitude encountered in their daily life

as immigrants in Hungary. Moreover, this research also tries to understand the feelings of belonging of Turkish immigrants in Hungary and the extent to which they attribute themselves to Hungarian, European, or Turkish society.

The Hungarian political discourse dominated by the current ruling party, FIDESZ has been characterized by anti-migration narratives (Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2019). The illiberal populist regimes are known for their exclusionary, particularistic, anti-migrant and anti-multiculturalist nature against minority groups. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán often states that “Hungary does not want Muslim invaders” (Shulthei, 2018; Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2018). Orbán also condemns diversity and states that “Hungarians do not want their colours mixed” (Novak, 2018; Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2018). The media, that is highly controlled by ruling government, labelled migrants as a threat to national identity and security, and Orbán supports xenophobic attitudes by demonstrating himself as the protector of Christianity and the Hungarian nation (Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2019). Islam and Muslism are labelled by Fidesz as existential threats to both Hungary and Western culture (Sereghy, 2017).

According to a PEW Research Center study conducted in 2016 2016, Hungarians are the most fearful of refugees in the EU and highest in Europe in negative perceptions towards Muslim immigrants; 76% of the Hungarian participants of research think that “refugees increase the risk of terror attacks”; 76% of them think that “Muslims are unwilling to integrate and wish to lead a life distinct from the country’s customs and way of life”; 72% of them “has an unfavorable view of Muslims in general” (Sereghy, 2017, p.262).

Hungary is chosen as a case country because of two reasons. First of all, as it is mentioned before, Hungary is an example of illiberal populist regime in Europe, and it is important to conduct interviews with Turkish living in Hungary in order to analyze their feelings and experiences under the illiberal populist environment. Secondly, Hungary is one of the countries where there is gap in the literature waiting to be filled in the context of Turkish immigrant living in Hungary. The literature on Turks living in mainly Germany, Netherlands, France and Austria is extensive. Turkish immigrants are studied for three reasons. First, Turkish immigrants make up a case of Muslim immigrants and the effects of anti-Muslim rhetoric of illiberal populist government of Hungary on this minority population is an important area to be examined. Since they

are also Muslim, their perceptions play important role to understand the environment where xenophobic attitudes are potentially high. Secondly, Turks in Hungary area small but important minority group. There is an increasing Turkish immigrant population in Hungary. Although the increasing Turkish population in Hungary is still less in comparison to the other majority immigrant groups, this increase cannot be denied. Although previous studies in the literature that give place to Germany, Netherlands, France or Austria focus on the larger Turkish population; this study will focus on a small Turkish population. The existence of small Turkish immigrants, being a minority immigrant group in Hungary can affect the feeling of belonging, citizenship perceptions or integration level of them. As a result, this research can demonstrate different outcomes from other studies. Thirdly, the researcher is Turkish who has relatively easy access to Turkish immigrants living in Hungary.

Since large-scale migration began in the 1960s, Turkish community has expanded to wider Europe (Hoffman et. al, 2020). According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021), there are more than 6.6 million Turkish immigrants living in Europe and approximately 5.5 million of them are settled in Western European countries. Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium have the highest Turkish population in Europe. Erdoğan (2015) states in his study that statistics show that more than 80% of Turkish immigrants all over the world live in Europe and more than half of the European Turks are now EU citizens (p. 110). This statistical outlook has brought to light some important problems. As Hoffman et. al (2020) clarify, with the establishment of Turkish communities in Europe, the questions of immigration, citizenship, integration, assimilation, and social exchange have been triggered.

Citizenship studies have emerged as a field very recently in 1990's with the claims of new rights by many different groups. Işın and Turner (2002) explain the emergence of citizenship studies as a topic with the assistance of "the articulation of rights for various groups" (p, 1). The subject of citizenship studies is a newly emerging area as a result of new social movements that changing political global dynamics like the increase of flows of immigration, refugees, and claims for different rights of marginalized groups. Some excluded or marginalized groups, including minorities and immigrants demand the extension and protection of their rights. With the emergence of new and different claims by marginalized groups, citizenship as a subject emerged

and citizenship studies have heightened. Since citizenship is about the ability to make claims and demand rights; the approach of articulation of rights in a country that struggles between the understanding of EU as the rights granted to all and the understanding of Hungarian government as the narrowing of the space for rights claims in Hungary is significant to be studied under the citizenship studies.

The Western European countries in which main Turkish population live in Europe have the history of labour migration after the Second World War. In the post-war period, especially by 1960's, the influx of Turkish labour migration to Europe started (Soysal, 1998). Since the main Turkish population in Europe intensified in Western Europe; there are plenty of studies with the topic of Turks living in Europe in the literature including both qualitative and quantitative research, mainly in Germany, France, Netherland, and Austria. However, studies which include research about some other countries in Europe, apart from Western European countries is lacking.

Hungary is one of the cases where Turkish immigrants have not been studied sufficiently. Although there is a rising Turkish population in Hungary, I find the literature weak in the case of Hungary. According to the data from Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office), Turkish immigrants have a growing population in Hungary. The graph below shows that generally, the numbers of Turkish citizens who immigrate to Hungary are increasing. I suppose that this study will be unique with the focus on Turkish population in Hungary.




Figure 1. Turkish Citizens Immigrating to Hungary

Source: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2020

As Merkel and Scholl (2018) claim, the emergence of right-wing populist parties in almost all advanced democracies in Europe has brought to light the rising illiberal populism, and Hungary and Poland are two extreme cases where liberal democracy is in danger the most. Migration, especially from Muslim majority countries, is perceived as threat to national homogeneity, internal security and societal peace by these countries (Zúquete, 2008, Merkel and Scholl, 2018). Hungary as a case of illiberal populist regime in Europe is significant to be studied. Since there are many studies on Hungary in the literature, these studies are lacking from the qualitative interview research conducted by immigrants. This research can be valuable to understand the perception of immigrants who are non-European and Muslim.

Although Muslims are almost invisible as a minority group who are very low number of followers in Hungary, Islamophobia is the current political discourse and causes xenophobic attitudes. (Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2018). In this case, “Islamophobic and xenophobic rhetoric is at odds with the number of migrants and Muslims who reside in the country” (Manevich, 2016; Jones-Gailani and Göbl, 2019,

p. 392). The fact that Hungary is a different host country in this respect also makes it an interesting country for research.

This empirical study of citizenship and migration in Hungary contributes to the literature with a case where Turkish immigrants have been paid little attention. A second contribution of this study is its examination of citizenship perceptions at multiple levels including perceptions of citizenship in general, and perceptions of Turkish, Hungarian and EU citizenship. It examines possible relationships and effects between these multiple levels. Thirdly, this research questions and empirically investigates a subject that has been discussed more theoretically in the literature, that is the effect of illiberal politics on migrants.

This study centers its contributions around three main findings. Firstly, the perception of Turkish immigrants living in Hungary towards citizenship is dominated by the feeling that Turkish citizenship is above all other citizenships and nationalistic feelings. Secondly, Turkish immigrants living in Hungary are a different group that differs from other immigrant groups there for various reasons. Turkish-Hungarian political, cultural and historical ties and the status of the Turks there made the Turks different and special, separating them from other migrant and Muslim-migrant groups in Hungary. Thirdly, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim illiberal populist discourses in Hungary do not adversely affect the immigration experiences of this particular Muslim immigrant group of Turks.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Illiberalism and Populism in European Union

The rising trends of illiberal democracies and populism in Europe is one of the areas that occupy a large space in the literature. Many scholars criticize that Europe is confronted with illiberal values that are opposed to liberal democratic values, and that this is a major threat to the European Union.

There is a perspective in the literature which supports that democracies face crisis within the form of certain defects today, especially in the form of illiberal democracies in which the freedom of civil liberties and political rights are limited. The democratic rules with authoritarian governance are the most widespread political systems since the beginning of the 21st century. Especially, in the post-Cold War era, hybrid political regimes which “combine democratic rules with authoritarian governance” are seen (Levitsky and Way, 2002). These are the democracies that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. According to Levitsky and Way (2002), most of current democracies are not fully functioning, they have some features of authoritarianism such as deny and harassment of opposition; rejected checks and balance; decline of rule of law; direct control of media; violation of liberties; political hegemony of dominant party; arrestment of journalists and academicians; concentration of personal power; intolerance towards minorities. This can be seen as the erosion of liberal democratic values. Levitsky and Way (2002) state that these regimes lack four essential criteria of modern democratic regimes: free and fair elections; right to vote; political rights and civil liberties; elected government authority. If one of these criteria is violated, the regime could not be defined as democratic. Today in many countries there can be these four criteria, however these are corrupted by some tools such as manipulations of election results, denying of opposition, prosecutions as a result of freedom of expression, and political hegemony as four defects of these criteria. In this case, the characteristics of democracies are mixed with democracy and autocracy.

To identify this kind of democracies with certain defects, different typologies have been created by different scholars such as defective democracy, hybrid regime, semi-democracy, virtual democracy, electoral democracy, illiberal democracy, liberalized autocracy, competitive authoritarianism, semi-authoritarianism or partly free. (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Carothers (2002) explains these neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracies within the term of “grey zone” in-between democracy and autocracy as “hybrid regimes” (p.9). These regimes have some attributes of democratic political life, but they suffer from serious democratic deficits such as limited political space for opposition, poor representation of citizens, abuse of law. Moreover, Bogaards (2009) describes these regimes with the terms of “defective democracies” or “electoral authoritarianism” between liberal democracy and dictatorship which explain the phenomenon that electoral contests are subject to state manipulation (p.5). In addition, Levitsky and Way (2002) defines these regimes but using the terms of “competitive authoritarianism” which formal democratic institutions are viewed as the principle means of obtaining and exercising political authority (p.52). Hence, these regimes could not provide the full demands of democracy, they have some certain deficiencies. Since this kind of regimes can be also named as illiberal democracies, this paper uses the term of illiberal. As mentioned, these types of regimes have been called by different terms that depict different aspects of weakness in the literature, and this research focuses on illiberal regime in order to name Hungary.

The existence of such regimes in Europe is a situation that jeopardizes the common values of the European Union, because it is contrary to basic European Union values. According to Lorenz and Anders (2021), the illiberal trends in Europe that can be seen in different forms such as the weakening of judiciary by elected majority, limited minority rights, restricted media and NGOs are the examples of “democratic backsliding” that can risk the EU’s fundamental principles (p.1). Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explains the essential liberal democratic values of the EU:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the

Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” (TEU, 2012).

It would be problematic for the EU if these key liberal values, which are among the aims and conditions of the establishment of the EU, are damaged by the illiberal regimes of Member States. Lorenz and Anders (2021) support that one of the most serious problems can be undermining the EU’s legal system and integration achievements. The failure in adaptation of European norms and values by all member states may undermine the union. Moreover, illiberal trends in the EU can “undermine mutual trust among member states and alter relations between the EU” (Lorenz and Anders, 2021, p.2)

Populism is also seen as important risk for EU by several scholars. Populism polarizes society into two parts. Mudde (2004) defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (p. 543). The pure people are ordinary people that are disregarded by the powerful elites. Hence, populism is based on the conflict between the elite and the people, and it is a movement of speak and act in the name of people and against the elite. (Mudde 2004; Brubaker 2017). Brubaker (2017) analyzes populism within vertical and horizontal dimensions and describes vertical dimension as the conflict between the people and the elite, whereas horizontal dimension is between the people and outside groups. In horizontal dimension, national populism draws a line between the insiders and outsiders and indicates the internal outsiders as the threat of their way of life (Brubaker, 2017). This approach can polarize the society and creates a hostility against foreigners which brings xenophobic attitudes, anti-Islamism, anti-migration and anti-multiculturalism in the way of thinking. This “horizontal antagonism between the native and the aliens” creates anti-immigrant sentiments in the society (Amantini, 2020).

It has been emphasized by many researchers that a common feature of populist parties is anti-immigration. Amantini (2020) states that xenophobic rhetoric of populist leaders promotes illiberal the anti-immigrant sentiment in the society which are “at

odds with fundamental liberal values and challenge the implementation of any liberal ethics of migration” (p.221). Besides, Karataş (2019) is one of the advocators of this opinion who states that the rise of populism is threat to EU that can create xenophobia, racism, corruption and intolerance to other religions. Karataş (2019) explains populism as a racist type of thought and evaluates it as a perspective that is based on ethnic grounds and excludes immigrants and favours a pure and homogeneous country. Populism is seen as a threat to liberal democracy by several scholars (Mudde, 2004). Alkan (2015) shows the positive correlation between rising populist parties and rising xenophobia in Europe. Today, far right and populist parties in many European countries have increased their voting rates day by day by influencing a large part of the society and this paved the way for the spread of issues such as xenophobia, racism, Islamophobia and marginalization of immigrants in Europe, especially Muslim immigrants. (Alkan, 2015).

Rupnik (2018) denotes about the populist turn and the rejection of liberalism in several countries in Europe by giving example of Hungary and Poland as the most extreme countries and explains this trend within violation of the rule of law, the recourse to nationalism, and culture wars. Illiberal populist regimes disfavor the separation of powers, media independence, and the political neutrality of the civil service (Rupnik 2018). Moreover, the recourse to nationalism and culture wars are the factors that creates anti-migrants’ image in the society that promotes closed, particularistic and communitarian society based on the protection of the traditions, identity, religion and the history of the community.

Populist movement in Europe has appeared mainly with the illiberal, authoritarian populist regimes in Hungary and Poland; the rise in the support of the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom and other populist parties; and emergence of new populist forces in Spain, Greece, Italy (Brubaker, 2017). The nationalist challenges, political restrictions on media, attacks on opposition parties and independent judiciary, decreasing trust in democratic institutions, occurring uncivil society are the new features of several countries in Europe that damage liberal democratic project of Europe and give rise to illiberal turns (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017).

With their characteristics explained above, illiberal and populist regimes damages liberal values of European Union. Ideological differences between liberal and illiberal countries within EU countries can cause some contradictions and disagreements. Rupnik (2018) emphasizes the disagreements between illiberal populist Visegrád Group countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and liberal Germany in the migrant wave of 2015. The leaders of the four countries of Europe were against the migration influx due to its threat to national security and national identity to their countries and Europe; while European values which are supported by mainly German chancellor Merkel suggest the admission of migrants in the name of European values, from the context of universality of human rights and multicultural model (Rupnik, 2018). Likewise, Ilikova and Tushev (2020) highlight the opposition between the Visegrád Group and the EU migration regulations. The opposition to the EU migration regulation by Visegrád Group has created increase in xenophobia and revival of nationalism in these countries (Ilikova and Tushev, 2020). In the same line, Vadhanavisala (2019) also mentions the different ideologies between the illiberal Visegrád Group and liberal countries of Europe which are led by Germany. According to Vadhanavisala (2019), after EU offers quota scheme as a result of huge influx of immigrants and refugees due to the Arab Spring, and the countries with different ideologies act differently. Germany under the leadership of Merkel answered this offer positively and implement welcoming policies to the immigrants and refugees, however Visegrád Group refused to accept immigrants and refugees into their countries (Vadhanavisala, 2019). In this case, these four illiberal populist countries violate the European liberal thinking and its fundamental liberal values.

2.2. Illiberalism and Populism in Hungary

In the literature, Hungary is mentioned as the one of the clearest examples of illiberal populist regimes in the EU. Several scholars analyze the illiberal democracy and the populist characteristics of the regime in Hungary, ruled by the governing party Fidesz and led by prime minister Orban. Besides, the evolution of Hungarian politics

from liberal to illiberal type, democratic backsliding or roll back of liberal democracy are the topics that are significantly criticized by several researchers.

Bozóki (2015) is one of the influential researchers who explains the evolution of Hungarian democracy from a liberal to illiberal characteristics. As Bozóki (2015) explains, Hungary was a functioning liberal democracy between 1990 and 2010. There was a liberal democracy with “a multiparty system, free elections, representative government, strong opposition, free media, strong and respected institutions that protected the rule of law and independent courts” (Bozóki, 2015, p.258). In this era, Hungary is claimed as “*Musterkinder* of European integration and compliance with the EU values and law” with Poland (Pap and Śledzińska-Simon, 2019, p.65). *Musterkinder* means ‘Model Kids’ in German and it was used because they were adopting liberal EU values and becoming successful in democratic consolidation. Hungary was a success story of democratic consolidation, and it joined the European Union in 2004 for this reason.

However, with the victory of Fidesz in 2010; the movement of democratic consolidation changed its direction. The right-wing, conservative, and populist Fidesz government has changed the political, social and legal structure of country (Bozóki, 2015). The election of Fidesz has brought dramatic changes in the attitudes of democratization. Vadhanavisala (2019) supports that Hungarian politics has evolved since 2010 under the Orban from a liberal party to “deeply conservative” party by time (p.103). Orban and his party supports illiberal democracy where there are democratic institutions and democracy, however these are quite limited such as restricted civil society, restricted freedom of speech or majoritarian logic to reject minorities (Vadhanavisala, 2019). Fidesz leads weakening the balance of power; constraining public and commercial media; restriction of people’s initiatives, the freedom of press, social rights, and civil liberties; personalization and centralization of power in the hands of Orban; and marginalization of democratic opposition (Bozóki, 2015).

The contrast of Hungary's illiberal stance with the liberal stance of the EU, of which it is a member, has brought them against each other. Bozóki and Simon (2010) refer the democratic backsliding and situation of Hungary in between the liberal European values and illiberal values after joining European Union as “sober mood of

post accession trauma” (p.221). This confrontation is a mismatch of Hungary’s opposition against the liberal European principles. The EU is a union that has cooperated politically as well as economically and was established based on the common values and principles. According to Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, there are some essential conditions for all candidate state must have and, in the case of political criteria all member states must have “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Commission, 1993). However, there is confrontation of these liberal principles of EU and the illiberal image of Hungary that put Hungary against the EU values.

“It is Hungary that at the moment, in the context of the European migration crisis, has taken one the most (if not the most) tough positions in relation to migrants and refugees” (Ilikova and Tushev, 2020, p. 327). The ideological disagreement and political conflict between the EU and Hungary were most clearly seen in the migrant crisis of 2015. Hungary challenged the decision of EU on mandatory quotas for accepting migrants and refugees in 2015 (Ilikova and Tushev, 2020). According to Ilikova and Tushev (2020), rather than the ideas of “multiculturalism and tolerance” of the liberal Europe, Hungary implemented “national-oriented movements” and it denies European liberal values by doing so (p.327).

2.3. Dimensions of Citizenship

As it is stated by Carr (1991), citizenship is a contested concept which can be explained within different notions and practices. There is not only one definition of citizenship and there are multiple citizenship models which are undergirded by different ideological assumptions (Durzewska, 2016). The different models of citizenship have different precedence and understanding to evaluate the term of citizenship. Different traditions demonstrate different perspectives by focusing particular ideas about citizenship (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Stewart (1995) clarifies citizenship as a legal status, a membership of a political community and entitled rights. From this formalistic understanding, citizenship is defined as the rights, privileges and obligations (Stewart, 1995). It is the formal dimension of citizenship that explain

citizenship within the legal status and rights and obligations. One of the good formal explanations of citizenship is below:

“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall, 1963, 87; Stewart, 1995, p.68).

Moreover, Bellamy (2008) defines citizenship as membership and belonging; citizenship as participation; citizenship as rights and duties. According to Bellamy (2008), traditionally, there are two defining features of citizenship which are membership within a nation state, and rights and obligations. Citizenship as membership and belonging are different terms. Belonging is mainly a feeling that is attached to some kind of cultural, ethnic, communal grouping whereas membership is a status that determines who to include and who to exclude. Citizenship as rights and obligations defines some obligations that what citizens have to the states, and some rights entitled to citizens by states. According to Bellamy (2008) rights are defining criterion of citizenship. In order to obtain some rights, citizens fulfil certain obligations. Citizenship is the relationship between the state and the citizen within political relationship. These rights also may be the rights what citizens claim which is not provided by the state. Thus, there is a reciprocal negotiation between citizens and states. Işın and Turner (2002) discuss citizenship emerges as a topic with the new claims and articulation of rights for various groups. With the emergence of some different claims of citizenship expanded the concept from a status within a nation-state based on a particular border to broader concept. With political or social struggles as right claims and the extension of rights move to very different issues. Citizenship as participation identifies citizenship with participation to the society. Citizens need to regulate and shape their social, economic or political lives by participation. Participation is at the core of democratic politics because in the democracies people choose who governs. The most crucial task of citizen is involvement in democratic

process such as the practices of voting, campaigning, and standing for office (Bellamy,2008).

As there are different meanings and interpretations of citizenship in the literature, different types and models of citizenship have also been used to explain them. Citizenship has been studied from different aspects by various scholars with different focuses, characteristics and features. For instance, Banks (2008) has developed his own typology to analyze types of citizens by four levels of participation. He categorizes citizenship as legal, minimal, active and transformative citizenship.




Figure 2. Types of Citizens

Source: Banks, 2008, p. 137

In the first type of citizenship, legal citizens are the legal members of a nation-state who has specific rights and obligations. This type is the most superficial level of citizenship according to him. The second type which is minimal citizenship emphasizes participation of the legal citizens to voting procedures such as voting in

elections. It is a more developed version of the most superficial meaning of legal citizens. The third model which is active citizenship underlines the more participation beyond voting such as lawful demonstrations and protests. The fourth model as the top level of citizenship where the citizens are fully participating civic actions to promote and protect some values and moral principles such as social justice is a transformative citizenship requires the more participation beyond lawful demonstrations and protests. Within these four types, the level of participation increases by going the first to the last type.



Figure 3. *Hung's Typology of citizens*

Source: (Hung, 2010, p. 494).

Hung (2010) has categorized citizenship within three types: conventional, transformative and affective citizenship. He developed this model by using Banks' types of citizenship paradigm, interpreted it and made some additions. Hung combined the legal citizen and the minimal citizen that Banks had explained, putting these two in the same category and calling them conventional citizens. Conventional citizenship

is explained by Hung (2010) as the basic, mainstream concept that defines citizens conventionally as members of a nation-state with certain rights and duties. From his point of view, the term of minimal citizenship of Banks also belongs to conventional model because voting is one of the duties that are drawn within the certain rights and duties of conventional citizens. Likewise, he combined the active and transformative citizens that Banks mentioned and called the two transformative citizens. He believes active citizenship of Banks can be added to and unified with transformative citizenship because both of them stress the participation of civic society by judging and acting independently for the wellbeing of society. Additionally, the latest type of citizenship describes a different meaning of citizenship as the affective citizen. Hung (2010) defines affective citizen as “the citizen with tears as a person who not only thinks and acts rationally, but also feels and cares affectively and sensitively” (p.493). Affective citizenship is the most holistic and comprehensive type of citizenship that explains both involving citizens to actions due to critical thinking and moral values; and “emotions, feelings and sensitivity in terms of personal particularity” (Hung, 2010, p.497).

In addition, Delanty (1997) evaluates citizenship in terms of four features: rights, obligations, participation and community. The rights model emphasizes the rights as dimension of citizenship as it seen in the liberal understanding of citizenship in which Locke emphasizes that private property is a necessary condition for individual freedom and describes property as ‘lives, liberties and estates’ (Schuck, 2002, p. 133). According to Bellamy (2008) rights are defining criterion of citizenship. Rights is easy way to establish citizenship in building EU citizenship with some special rights such as passports, free mobility, economic advantages, right to vote in EU level. Citizenship in liberal thought is explained with the primacy of rights of individuals. The liberal model emphasizes rights and individual autonomy (Rawls 1993; Heater 1999; Thun, 2016). The main focus of liberal citizenship is individual and achieving human dignity is one of the aims of liberalism. The modern liberal idea of citizenship has rooted in the notions of freedom and equality (Ivic, 2011). Besides, the conservative model is based on the notion of duties and responsibilities. Some duties such as taxation and military service are the duties that should be done by citizens to serve community. The emphasis of obligations of this model is related with republican

citizenship in which citizens should hold a position of public responsibility and they are expected to engage in civic affairs (Dagger, 2002). Republican citizenship emphasizes the sense of obligation and citizenship develops within a public-spirited and responsibility-based understanding. Moreover, the participatory model emphasizes the active involvement of citizens. In this model, participation is not duty or to served community as in the republican approach. This model is related with neo-republicanism and democratic radicalism. From this approach, participation is the main feature of democracy. In addition, the communitarian model stresses the issue of identification and having the sense of being community and it is related with the ideology of communitarianism. The communitarian model stresses the issue of identification and having the sense of being community and it is related with the ideology of communitarianism. Citizenship is related to the culture and national identity from the communitarian model and nationality and cultural cohesiveness are important elements of this model (Delanty, 1997). In this model, citizens are connected emotionally, and they share collective interests and common public goals for the good of society (Etzioni, 2011).

By evaluating the four features of citizenship, Delanty (1997) differentiates the formal and substantive dimension of citizenship. Formal citizenship is more based on the rights and duties, whereas the substantive form of citizenship is more about participation and community. The issue of rights and participation is defined by more civic understanding of citizenship, whereas the issue of duties and identity is defined by the ethnic conception of citizenship (Delanty, 1997). The civic understanding is thin conceptualization of citizenship, whereas ethnicity-based citizenship is thick conceptualization.

2.4. Hungarian Citizenship Policies

The citizenship in Hungary is based on the principle of *jus-sanguinis* which means that citizenship is acquired from Hungarian parents. Foreign nationals can also acquire citizenship within naturalization process.

“The general conditions for a foreign national to acquire citizenship are the following: continuous residence in Hungary over a period of eight years prior to the submission of the application; clean criminal record of the applicant; the applicant has sufficient means of subsistence and a place of abode in Hungary; the naturalization is not considered to be a threat to the public order or to the national security; passing the citizenship test in Hungarian language” (European Migration Network (EMN), 2019, p.3).

Moreover, a person who has lived in lawful marriage in the household of a Hungarian citizen; has a minor child who is a Hungarian citizen; has been adopted by a Hungarian citizen; has been recognized as a refugee; or is stateless can be naturalized after three years of residence (Toth, 2018). In addition, Hungary allows dual citizenship.

Some changes in citizenship policies in Hungary were seen after the election of Orban in 2010. After Orban won the general elections in April 2010, the Act on Hungarian Nationality with new modifications was submitted in May 2010. There were some major changes in the citizenship law from more conservative and ethnicity-based understanding of citizenship with the 2010 amendment of the Hungarian Nationality Act.

Before the 2010 amendment of the Act on Hungarian Nationality, non-Hungarian citizens who apply for naturalization process should not have been considered as threats to the public order or national security of Hungary. However, according to the new Citizenship Law (2010), non-Hungarian citizens should not have been considered as threats to the interest of state, anymore. “A non-Hungarian citizen may be naturalized upon request if his/her naturalization is not considered to be a threat to the public order or national security of the Republic of Hungary – replacing the formula of ‘a threat to the interest of the state’ in the previous version of the law” (Hungarian Citizenship Law, 2020, p.1).

Second change was also in the naturalization policies. It simplified naturalization for ethnic Hungarians. According to Citizenship Law (2010), non-Hungarian citizens could acquire Hungarian citizenship, if they have origin from Hungary with Hungarian ascendant and if they have Hungarian language knowledge, clean criminal record, and if they are not threat for the national security and public

order of Hungary. These people are not required some of the basic requisitions unlike other people. In this case, they are given simplified naturalization. According to EMN (2019), “Applicants of simplified naturalization (ethnic Hungarians with foreign nationality, family members of Hungarian citizens) - no continuous residence in Hungary is requested and the applicant also does not need to have sufficient means of subsistence and a place of abode in Hungary” (p.11). Toth (2018) evaluates this new simplified naturalization by stating 2010 amendment of the Act on Hungarian Nationality aimed at persons of Hungarian descent residing outside Hungary. After the introduction of this new law, millions foreign nationals who has Hungarian origin, majority of Romanian citizens, acquired citizenship. Those who has Hungarian ancestry could acquire citizenship easily, even if they have never lived in Hungary. Having Hungarian ascendants are more important than having residency or subsistence in Hungary. Although there are flexible conditions for ethnic Hungarians, the acquiring citizenship is much more restrictive and difficult for non- ethnic Hungarians. As Moricz (2013) claims, the citizenship process for third-country nationals has become lengthy and restrictive. For instance, the period of acquiring citizenship is extended from eight years after receiving the permanent residence permit to eleven years.

With the changes in citizenship law, Hungary implemented more cultural, and ethnicity based, thick concept of citizenship. After this law, Hungarian citizenship is not acquired by only birth, also it is acquired by the descent. In terms of citizenship policies, new government emphasizes thicker and conservatist understanding with the primacy of ethnicity-based approach.

Batory (2010) claims that ethnicity, national identity and political community are at the center of citizenship policy of Hungary. According to Batory (2010), there is link between ethnicity and citizenship and ethnic-cultural definitions of nationhood in Hungarian society. Within this mentality, Hungary implements kind- state politics which behaves internally towards the co-ethnics outside Hungary. Kind-state is explained within the sense of responsibility towards Hungarian’s outside Hungary’s borders (Batory, 2010, p.46). Likewise, Kovács (2006) also argues about the strong relationship between the ethnicity and citizenship in Hungary by

emphasizing the Hungary's citizenship offer to extra-territorial and non-resident ethnic Hungarians living in neighbor states such as Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine.

2.5. Hungarian Migration Policies

While Hungary's immigration policies are ethnically based and have positive attitudes towards ethnic Hungarians, there is a general consensus that it has exclusionary and even anti-immigrant attitudes towards non-ethnic Hungarians. According to Moricz (2013), Hungarian migration policy is based on three main characteristics, currently: the free movement within the EU; a strict and non-supportive policy toward third-country nationals of non-Hungarian origin; and supporting the immigration of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries.

As Gozdzia (2019) mentions, Hungary had been a multicultural country for many years, for instance the Habsburg Empire was an example of multiculturalism. However, with the illiberal populist leader Orban, there are significant changes in migration policies. In terms of migration policies, the new government aims to fight against immigration to protect the culture, ethnicity, religion and identity of Hungary. Contemporary migration policy in Hungary, moved from its multicultural past to recent attempts to criminalize migration and activities of those who aim to help migrants and asylum seekers (Gozdzia, 2019). Orban has implemented anti-immigrant actions and policies with xenophobic attitudes towards refugees.

Orban can be defined as anti-globalist and anti-multiculturalist leader, against to pluralism and universalism. He very much emphasizes the importance of national unity and preserving the identity, ethnicity, language, religion or other communal vales of Hungary.

“We do not want to see among us significant minorities that possess different cultural characteristics and background than us. We would like to preserve Hungary as Hungary.” (Orban, January 11, 2015, speaking to Hungarian Television reporter while in Paris to attend the Republican Marches against terrorism).

In this statement of him, Orban states that he is clearly against multiculturalism, and his aim is to protect Hungary from immigrants. Orban quotes that Hungary does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the population to sustain itself; migrant influx into Europe is a poison because every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk in EU (Kroet, 2016). Orban supports that the migrants threaten the identity, culture and religion of both Hungary and EU.

“Our borders have come under danger, our lifestyle built upon respect for the law is in danger, Hungary and all of Europe are in danger.” (Orban, September 21, 2015, during speech before the open of the fall session of the National Assembly)

Orban targets the migrants as an enemy and offers to unite for fighting against this enemy. He states that “We are fighting an enemy that is different from us. Not open but hiding; not straightforward but crafty; not honest but base; not national but international; does not believe in working but speculates with money; does not have its own homeland but feels it owns the whole world” (Walker, 2020). With his explanations, he is very much against internationalism, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and globalization similar to the features of any illiberal populist leader. Orban presents the migration issue within a binary framework, with an inside-outside logic (Mendelski, 2019). He acts in a very much particularistic and communitarian implementation of migration politics. His anti-migrant rhetoric has become effective to create division within society, since he divides the nation as the term of “us” representing Hungarians; and “they” are representing non-Hungarians. As Gozdziaik (2019) claims, Orban reshapes migration policy of Hungary which was built on cultural diversity to anti-migrant dimension.

“We want no more people to come. Those who are here, go home!” (Orban, May 8, 2015, speaking about the refugee camp in Debrecen, the largest in Hungary)

According to Verseck (2019), Hungary’s migration policies break international human rights conventions and EU regulations. This situation can be seen clearly with

the migrant crisis in 2015. Hungary had a sharp and negative response to migration crisis in 2015, after EU offered a quota system to the members as a solution to the refugee crisis. Hungary was asked to accept 1294 refugees and Hungary strictly rejected it (Goździak 2019). During this period, the Orbán continued to pursue policies to limit humanitarian arrivals, while welcoming those of Hungarian ancestry (Goździak, 2019). In 2015, the Criminal Code was amended to make unauthorized migration punishable by three to ten years imprisonment (Goździak, 2019). In 2016, Hungarian police and soldiers with specific mission called as border hunters started to control borders with razor wire barriers to keep refugees out (Goździak, 2019). The EU has violated its liberal foundational principles such as equality, freedom and human rights with the case of migrant crisis and EU exhibits dissemination of relations between some EU member states towards migrant crisis. (Cehulić 2016; Ratković, 2017). The basic principles of EU which underline the EU's foundation have been questioned with the different policies that are implemented as opposed to EU's liberal policies (Ratković, 2017). Hungary is one of the countries that refuses the liberal solution of EU, and it perceives it as an invasion of foreigners rather than protecting the foreigners. Later, Hungary has implemented an anti-immigrant law which criminalizes assistance to unauthorized migrants by the public or civil-society organizations which even limit the basic human rights (Goździak, 2019). In 2018, "Stop Soros law" was introduced to prohibit any kind of assistance to undocumented immigrants from individuals or organizations (Vadhanavisala, 2019).

The opposition between Hungary and EU in the context of migration has reflected on the Orbán's speeches and referendum in Hungary in 2016. Orbán perceives EU as Brussels elite and introduces himself as a savior (Vadhanavisala, 2019). By doing it, Orbán has affected his nationals by using his populist characteristics. Orbán expresses his euro-sceptical understanding by stating:

"The European Union's proposal is to let the migrants in and distribute them in mandatory fashion among the Member States and for Brussels to decide about this distribution. Hungarians today considered this proposal and they rejected it. Hungarians decided that only we Hungarians can decide with whom we want to live. The question was 'Brussels or Budapest and we decided this issue is exclusively the competence of Budapest.'" (Goździak, 2019).

To summarize, Hungary presents some cases that refuse EU's liberal foundational principles by restricting them. Its migration politics is based on quite exclusionary and anti-immigratory attitudes. The anti-immigrant rhetoric and campaigns of Orban could create negative attitudes towards immigrants in Hungary (Vadhanavisala, 2019).

There are some factors that are mentioned in the literature that may affect the migration experiences of immigrants. For instance, Koopmans (2010) relates migration experiences and the policies of countries with the example countries. He states that the immigrants who live in the countries which have more restrictive and assimilationist integration policies such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France exhibit better integration results. On the other hand, the immigrants who live in the countries with more inclusive and multicultural policies such as Sweden, Belgium and Netherlands have poor integration process during their migration experiences. Hence, according to Koopmans (2010), the less inclusive policies to immigrants can cause the better integration process of immigrants in the host country.

Furthermore, Zafer (2016) evaluates some factors that affect the migrants' experiences, especially their acculturation process such as "characteristics of the countries abandoned and settled; attitudes of citizens towards immigrants; social support provided to immigrants; similarities and differences between cultures of two countries; reasons and motivations to migrate; new positions of immigrants and their personal characteristics" (p.76). These factors play important role in migration experiences of immigrants in their host countries. For instance, attitudes of citizens towards immigrant are one of the areas on this research to be analyzed. Hospitality of the host society determines the level of acculturation of immigrants positively or negatively (Zafer, 2016). The host society can perceive immigrants as a threat to themselves and exhibit exclusionary negative attitudes such as discrimination or they can welcome them with positive and embracive attitudes. These attitudes directly affect the process of adaptation of migrants to the host society. Likewise, characteristics of the country of origin and settled are also the essential factors of this research because this study emphasizes the particular characteristics of host country - Hungary- within its illiberal populist political feature. At the same time, it analyzes the

characteristics of the country of origin -Turkey- within its particularistic and communitarian political understanding. Zafer (2016) mentions these characteristics within the economic and political dimension, and he criticizes that if the economic and political situation of the settled country is worse than the country of abandoned, this may cause difficulties in the integration process of immigrants. Besides, similarities and differences between the country of origin and host country can shape the migration experiences while adaptation may decrease as differences between two cultures increase (Zafer, 2016). Moreover, immigrants' position in the country of their new settlement can affect their migration experiences. If the position of migrant group is weak, they may be more inclined to assimilate in the new society (Zafer, 2016).

2.6. European Union Citizenship

European Union citizenship refers to the citizens of members of European Union. “Under Article 9 of the TEU and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union” (Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2020). According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union (2012), “The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values”. EU citizenship is complementary to nationality but does not replace national citizenship. Nationality is related to the national state which is the member of EU; however, they are also EU citizens, at the same time. In this case, EU citizens are not only the citizens of the nation, which is one of the Member States but also, they are multinational citizens of EU (Aron, 1974; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2018).

“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice” (Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union, 2012).

As it is mentioned above, the core understanding of the EU citizenship is based on the freedom, security and justice of the citizens of Union. “EU citizenship comprises a number of rights and duties in addition to those stemming from citizenship of a Member State” (Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2020). Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament, right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections, right to good administration, right of access to documents, right to petition, freedom of movement and of residence, diplomatic and consular protection are the rights of EU citizens that is held in Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union (2012).

The member countries have their own nationality, and they try to create European sense of identity and community. However, EU aims to create EU nationality and belonging to a community national. EU citizenship as post national citizenship tries to promote integration, harmony, and unity of the European members with their diversities. In the case of EU citizenship, the approach is beyond the national understanding of citizenship. Shore (2000) states that in order to achieve the common feeling of community and identity at the EU level, EU has created some mechanism such as symbols including the flag, anthem, passport, currency, or awards. In addition, Shore (2000) mentions that EU has made use of European history and culture in order to provide commonness, togetherness, and sameness.

There are some critiques on EU citizenship in the literature. One of the most famous question about EU citizenship is lack of duties and obligations of EU citizenship. Kochenov (2014) questions the lack of duties in EU citizenship by stressing the term of “EU Citizenship without duties” (p.482). Although there are several rights given to the EU citizens, “there are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship” (Kochenov, 2014, p.482). EU citizenship is centered on the rights with less importance to duties and for this reason, Ferrera (2018) calls EU citizenship as “duty-free citizenship” (p. 182). This duty-free type of EU citizenship creates some problems such as the weakness of sense of solidarity and accountability of the union (Ferrera, 2018). Hence, it proposed that EU citizenship should impose some duties to its citizens in order to promote bonding between the citizens and the union by Ferrera (2018). Besides, Delanty (1997) also analyzes that EU citizenship focuses more the formal procedures of citizenship, it has more civic understanding and legal framework

of citizenship, as he calls “formalistic nature of law-making” (p.285). EU citizenship is based on more about the rights given to individuals and constitutional relationship between the state and individuals and the duties which are very limited comparing the rights. However, the sense of community, identity and loyalty are also needed to create EU citizenship which can be promoted by substantive citizenship. The issue of rights and obligations is easy to define EU citizenship. However, to create a communitarian feeling and common cultural identity, the substantive citizenship understanding is also needed. Formal dimension means law, status, rights, and duties. But citizenship means much more than them. Citizenship also requires participation, interaction, and involvement. The formal citizenship does not entail all levels and dimensions of citizenship; citizenship is also matter of substantive dimension (Delanty, 1997).

Another criticism of EU citizenship is that the concept of post national citizenship of EU is in danger because of its exclusivist supranationalism which have brought low level of participation due to its more inclusiveness. Delanty (1997) supports that the more inclusiveness causes the less participation in the case of EU. The more inclusiveness would create the less opportunity to participation. The participation could decrease in the larger arena while the smaller group is more aware of the issues. Linklater (2002) also stressed this issue by supporting that there is no global public sphere which brings all cosmopolitan citizens together at the global level.

Moreover, EU citizenship is problematic in the context of exclusivist conception of European identity (Delanty, 1997). While EU tries to create a common identity and it facilities specific rights to the members; it may exclude the non-EU-members and migrants. As Parekh (2000) claims, multiculturalism requires to hold together community within diversity. To providing both diversity and unity is the challenging issue in EU, as well. The construction of the idea of cultural project within the EU can cause exclusion of non-EU members (Urzi and Williams 2017). In a comparison of the experiences of Tunisian and Romanian migrants in Italy, Urzi and Williams (2017) find that as EU member migrants, Romanians even without formal contracts of employment have greater sense of security and protection than the third country migrants Tunisians who have formal work contracts. The purpose of cultural policy of EU is to promote unity in diversity. However, this cultural project can be evaluated as discrimination, isolation, regional block to the non-members of EU. For

instance, EU can be analyzed as a “Christian Club” by Nelsen (2005). This can build obstacle for the Muslim migrants who live in EU and face discrimination. As Işın and Turner (2002) mention, globalization process produces transnational dimension of citizenship, and this creates difficulty for nations that have seen themselves as ethnically or racially homogenous. While EU is building integration for the members by including, it can disintegrate the non-members by excluding them to the EU society. Non-EU people do not benefit from the same rights of EU, and this can cause xenophobic exclusion. In addition, the national level would not work at the transnational level. The importance of citizenship, identity, community at the national level can be interpreted for EU as a multi-layered formality. Global human rights regime has to be the part of the EU citizenship. As Delanty (1997) states, the transnational idea of citizenship is based on the idea of global human rights which is beyond nations in the global level. Transnational rights cannot operate within national constitutions, universal rights a universal personhood should be the basis of transnational citizenship of EU (Delanty, 1997). Sassen (2002) also explains this transformation as a shift from the national citizenship towards post-national or denationalized types of citizenship and supports that people are recognized as individuals rather than citizens of nation state within more universalistic perspective. Hence, EU should focus the transnational mentality for also non-members. Urzi and Williams (2017) emphasize the importance of national sense of identity and reject the notion of citizenship as unitary by stating that national citizenship is still more significant factor than the universal individual-based rights for immigrants. If EU implements this mentality, it cannot reach to be an integrative body with different nations and different ethnical, racial, religious migrants inside the member nations.

To sum up, EU citizenship can be criticized because there is a common opinion that EU has reached the citizenship in terms of formal citizenship emphasizing more on the rights. There may be lack of the sense of obligations which creates the feeling of loyalty, sense of being part of community. Secondly, there may be the problem about participation of citizens, since participating in larger area is quite difficult comparing the national level. Third, EU citizenship can create exclusionary and discriminative barriers between non-EU immigrants and EU citizens.

2.7. Turkish Citizenship

Turkish citizenship is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* where the citizenship is acquired by the parents. Children from Turkish mother and father is automatically Turkish citizen by birth. According to Turkish Citizenship Law (2009), “Turkish citizen shall refer to the person who is bound to the Republic of Turkey through the bond of citizenship. “Foreign citizens can also acquire Turkish citizenship through naturalization.

In the literature, there are some arguments support that Turkish citizenship is related with Republican and Communitarian model of citizenship. According to republican citizenship, true citizens should commit to the common good and actively participate in public affairs which are their public responsibilities (Dagger, 2002). Hence, republican citizenship emphasizes the sense of obligation and citizenship develops within a public-spirited and responsibility-based understanding. Within the similar approach, Aristotle (1958) defines citizen as a person who actively participate in government, justice or common good. Kadioğlu (1998) supports the more republican approach of Turkish citizenship by stating that “the notion of Turkish citizenship evolved within the civic republican tradition by emphasizing practices that were viewed as duties” and relatively Turkish citizenship is based more on duties than on rights” (p.40). Besides, Güney (2021) also agrees the republican model of citizenship is more dominant in Turkey with the significant emphasis on duties and obligations such as paying taxes, military service, maintaining public order rather than the rights that is the core emphasis of liberal model. For instance, in educational textbooks in secondary schools’ curriculum, republican model of citizenship is taught with the points on duties and patriotism (Üstel, 2004; Güney, 2021). These duties are sacred duties in Turkish society. For instance, military service is one of the sacred national services. Similarly, Kardam and Cengiz (2011) also states that Turkish citizenship is clearly different from the liberal model and its model is much more the republican. Citizenship in republican though is explained with the primacy of the sense of obligations and participation.

The second striking feature of Turkish citizenship in the literature is about its ethnicity-based emphasis. As it is stated by Kirişçi (2000), Turkish descent, ethnicity and culture are the key elements of Turkish citizenship. Güney (2021) also supports that the essential elements of Turkish citizenship are kinship and ethnicity. Turkish citizenship is identified within communitarian practice with the focus on the community-based social structure where the Turkish people have their traditional kinship, ethnic and religious ties with national society (Baban, 2005; Kardam and Cengiz, 2011). Etzioni (2011) explains the model of citizenship within the focus on the national ethos that includes particularistic values, norms, traditions, identity, and characteristics of a particular community. The communitarian model stresses the issue of identification and having the sense of being community and it is related with the ideology of communitarianism. Citizenship is related to the culture and national identity from the communitarian model and nationality and cultural cohesiveness are important elements of this model (Delanty, 1997). In this model, citizens are connected emotionally, and they share collective interests and common public goals for the good of society (Etzioni, 2011).

Güney (2021) believes that this communitarian and ethnicity-based dimension of Turkish citizenship creates the ground of citizenship within nationalism and chauvinism. Patriotism in Turkish citizenship is important characteristics of Turkish citizenship which is promoted by cultural and ethnic sensitivity; and kinship feelings (Üstel, 2004; Güney, 2021). Nationalism plays important role in Turkish political history from Ottoman to Republic (Aydın, 2019). Therefore, nationalism is very influential in creating Turkish national and patriotic sentiments. Turkish nationalism is about loyalty to the community and connection between the notion of state and motherland (Aydın, 1995). Correspondingly, the loyalty and sentimentality of Turkish citizenship are related to Turkish nationalism. In addition to the ethnic nationality that is mentioned above within communitarian model of Turkish citizenship, there is also a type of territorial nationality based on loyalty and patriotism that has played effective role in Turkish society (Kılıç, 2007). Territorial nationalism emphasizes the importance of concept of homeland based on a sacred geography and it is explained as the acceptance of a certain homeland by the members of the community with which

they will identify and feel a sense of belonging and it can also be called as *memleketçilik* (patriotism) (Kılıç, 2007).

In the literature on Turkish migration, Turkish migratory movements to Europe concentrates on the Turkish labour migration to certain European countries. As Fassman and İçduygu (2013) claim, Turkish migration to Europe has fastened with large-scale labour migration in 1960's from Turkey to some receiving countries such as Germany, Austria, France and Netherlands. This movement has affected the migratory movements of Turks in many years because labour migration has caused family unification in following years and these countries have become new homeland of thousands of Turks (Fassman and İçduygu, 2013). Likewise, Çil et. al (2011) also express the labour migration of Turks after the World War II within the demand of labour force of Western European countries and Turkish workers meet this demand in European markets. Turkey signed some labour agreements with Germany in 1961, with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, with France in 1965 and, today around 5 million Turks are still in these countries (Çil et. al, 2011). According to data collected in 2014, Turks generate the 3.4 percent of Germany's population and about the half of Turks living in Europe live in Germany (Zarzatçioğlu, 2014; Ulucak, 2017).

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Selection of Research Design

A qualitative research design is developed to collect and analyze data in this study. Qualitative research enables the discovery and interpretation of meanings of social phenomena in order to understand the social world without using numerical examination (Babbie, 2014). In qualitative research, the researcher focuses on learning the meaning and insights of the social reality of the individuals. “Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world” (Merriam, 2009, p. 13; Guest et. al, 2013, p.2). Lewis-Beck et. al (2004) indicate that qualitative research aims to produce richly and relevantly detailed descriptions and particularized interpretations of people (p.893). In order to understand the particular phenomena through the interpretation of these phenomena by the participants are the main purpose of qualitative research. “Qualitative research is a form of interpretive inquiry in which researchers make an interpretation of what they see, hear and understand” (Creswell, 2009, p.176). The researcher plays significant role in qualitative research as an interpreter of the social world. In qualitative research, the researcher as the key instrument that collects and examines data focuses on learning the meaning of the issues from the participant’s view (Creswell, 2009, p.175).

According to Creswell (2009), the research problem in the study is one of the important elements for the choice of research design. The qualitative study method is compatible with the purpose of this research because the main purpose of this study is to understand and explore the perception and experiences of the sampling group. The research questions of this study are “What are the citizenship perceptions and migrant experiences of Turkish immigrants in Hungary? Has the illiberal populist regime had an influence on these experiences?” These questions aim to understand the perceptions and experiences of Turkish immigrants under the illiberal populist regime, which is a

special case in which Hungary dresses. As discussed in detail below, through the use of open-ended semi structured interviews, this study allows interviewees to share their perceptions of citizenship on the multi-layered citizenship that defines them as Turks, Hungarians or Europeans and to share their migration experiences under a illiberal populist regime, which describes immigrants as a threat. As Guest et. al (2013) claim, qualitative research methods focus to answer the “whys” and “hows” of human behaviour, opinion, and experience (p.1). Based on this statement, this study focuses the insights and meanings of the interviewees in terms of citizenship and migration.

This study utilizes a case study research method to explore these questions. Case studies present perspectives through analysis of a specific case or particular unit to generate a more comprehensive context. Creswell (2007) specifies case study as “a type of methodology, a type of design in qualitative research, or an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry” in which the researcher explores a bounded system that is a case or cases through detailed data collection. (p.73). Case study is used in order to explore a specific event, process, activity, region, society, group or individuals in a particular institution (Lewis-Beck et. al, 2004; Sagadin, 1991; Mohajan, 2018). Researchers can use qualitative case study approach to explore complicated phenomena in their surroundings (Baxter and Jack, 2010). Case studies include a detailed and elaborated synthesis of given cases.

This research will be a case study since it focuses on a specific group of individuals, Turkish immigrants in a single country case. This study focuses on the setting in Hungary with its illiberal and populist regime. Hungary is a country that experienced a transition from liberal democracy towards democratic crisis (Bozóki, 2012). Hungary had a functioning liberal democracy until 2010, however with populist and illiberal turn, Hungarian democracy has experienced a transition to an autocratic system (Bozóki, 2012). The process of transition from a liberal to illiberal democracy has affected many layers of the Hungarian society. Relatively, the experiences, feelings, perceptions of immigrants are important issue under this specific event of a case country. Moreover, Turkish immigrants also possess particular features that make them a relevant group of immigrants to study. Turkish immigrants are non-European and having an origin from a majority Muslim country. For this reason, they are from the groups of immigrants that can be heavily affected from Hungarian exclusionary

politics. The case presents a specific setting in which the dynamic of liberal and illiberal policies and rhetoric on citizenship and migration interact. It is a setting in which the experience of a small, Muslim minority group can be explored as potential targets of the illiberal rhetoric. As Muslim Turks with Turkish or Hungarian and European citizenship, this provides a unique opportunity to explore the multiple layers of citizenship.

There are several purposes of social science research; exploration, description and explanation are the main purposes that are used most commonly (Babbie, 2014, p.94). The social research with the purpose of exploration are exploratory studies that are conducted to explore a topic and generally done for “to satisfy researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding; to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study and to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study” (Babbie, 2014, p.94). “Exploratory research is often conducted in new areas of inquiry”, where the goals of the research are to inspect the extent of a particular phenomenon, behaviour, or event; generate some initial ideas about that phenomenon; test feasibility for more extensive study about that phenomenon (Bhattacharje, 2012, p.5).

This research will be exploratory research with the aim of scrutinizing a specific phenomenon which is the impact of a specific situation in Hungary on the citizenship perceptions of Turkish immigrants. Exploratory research is important in social science because a researcher breaks new ground and provides new insights into a research subject (Babbie, 2014). This study is exploratory because it tries to explore new areas that have not been mentioned much before in the literature. The studies on Turkish immigrants in Europe have not given a place to Turks in Hungary and the literature has looked primarily at large minority groups versus small groups. In this study, the researcher has reasons to explore the perception Turkish immigrants in Hungary because as mentioned in the introduction of the research, the reasons for conducting the research are to investigate the perceptions of immigrants living in a country like Hungary where there are many anti-immigrant discourses and policies; the lack of research in the literature on Turks living in Hungary; and the reasons such as the fact that Turks are small minority compared to other immigrants in Hungary made the researcher feel that it was worth exploring.

3.2. Sampling

The sample of the research includes Turkish migrants in Hungary. In order to draw this sample, this research utilizes snowballing and quota sampling methods which are the types of non-probability sampling. Unlike probability sampling in which each element has probability to be chosen and sample is selected within probability methods which includes some “random-selection mechanism” (Babbie, 2014, p.203); it is the opposite in non-probability sampling because some elements are excluded, and they have not probability to be chosen.

Snowball sampling which is also called chain sampling, or referral sampling refers asking participants for their recommendation of other suitable participants (Robinson, 2014, p.37). Besides, quota sampling is a method of selecting participants of the research based on the characteristics of the sample which match demographic characteristics (Lewis-Beck et. al, 2004, p.905). Snowball sampling will be used because the advantages of snowball sampling will be beneficial for this study which is to meet “hard-to-find groups” (Shaw et. al, 1996; Lewis-Beck et. al, 2004, p.1044). Snowball sampling is useful “when the members of a specific population are difficult to locate” (Babbie, 2014, p.200). Since it is difficult to reach the sampling as the Turks in Hungary, the advice of some interviewees will be useful and the source of the way of sampling process.

Moreover, quota sampling will be used in this research because the interview participants as the subjects of this research will be chosen based on their specific characteristics. As Babbie (2014) clarifies, the specific characteristics of the target group in quota sampling may include age, educational level, ethnic groups, nationality (p.201). Turkish migrants with different ages and different educational levels can reflect different outcomes to interpret. In order to explore subject area with more details, the research will choose the sample based on different educational level and age. Moreover, having the Hungarian citizenship or Turkish citizenship is another important factor of the quota sampling in order to compare the effects of having different citizenship and the developing perception and experience based on this distinctive feature. The research can be more explorative, if it includes some

differences between different characteristics of people. Quota sampling can reveal the differences between the different categories, and this can be explored through the research (Lewis-Beck et. al, 2004, p.905). Quota sampling will allow for comparison of variables of age, education, gender, and citizenship status in analyzing sense of belonging, citizenship perception and migration experiences.

The differences between the people with different ages and educational level are studied in several research. Civic Voluntarism Model that is created by Verba et al. (1995) demonstrates that education as one of the personal sources and age as one of the demographic attitudes are two of the main factors which influence participation (Potgieter, 2013). Educational attainment of the people is important factor that affects participation because education helps for developing skills such as information about governmental and political issues, the knowledge of how to cope in organizational settings; and education also encourages attitudes such as civic responsibility or political efficacy that promote political involvement (Verba et, al, 1993). Age can also be a determining factor that affects the perceptions of people. Studies about participation underline the factor of age. Some authors support that people may participate more when they grow older due to their economic and social responsibilities (Dalton, 2008; Potgieter, 2013). However, younger citizens also can be more enthusiastic for participation towards rebellion and activities (Potgieter, 2013). The differences of the citizenship perception between younger and older migrants can be revealed within the scope of this study.

The sampling group consists of twenty participants from different gender, education level, age and citizenship status. The group evaluated as educated includes university level and above. As Ritchie and Roser (2019) states, there are common three age groups to divide population as children and young adolescents (under 15 years old); the working age population (between 15-64 years old); elderly population (65 years and older). However, there is no children and young adolescents' group and there is lack of elderly population group in this study. For this reason, it will categorize people into two group as the younger and older. Since the oldest participants near the age 55, it will categorize the participants as elderly group who are above 50 years old. Citizenship status includes Turkish immigrants with Hungarian citizenship and Turkish immigrants living in Hungary who are Turkish citizens without Hungarian

citizenship. Eleven of the twenty participants are female and nine of them are male. Sixteen of the twenty participants are highly educated and four of them are less educated. Eighteen of the twenty participants are young, and two are old. Lastly, six of them have Hungarian citizenship and fourteen of them do not have Hungarian citizenship.

Providing the numerical balance of the sampling group between demographic values was one of the most challenging parts of the study. Quota sampling is wanted to use to look at demographic variables, however the balance could not be achieved in age, education, citizenship status. Most of the participants were young, the elderly was almost non-existent. Likewise, most of them were highly educated. This event may be due to the fact that the profile of Turkish immigrants living in Hungary consists of young and educated people. Another issue was to reach a balance in the number of Turkish immigrants who have Hungarian citizenship and Turkish immigrants who do not. However, despite living there for many years, few Turks were found to obtain Hungarian citizenship. Maybe this is a show about Hungary's strict and tough citizenship policies.

3.3. Data Collection

In this study, interviews are used as a tool to gather data. As Lewis-Beck et. al (2004) remark, interviewing as one of the most frequently used research methods in the social sciences includes a special kind of conversation between an interviewer and an interviewee or interviewees on the particular topics (p.521). Since interviews gives a chance to participants for deep explanation of their opinions and experience, it is possible to discover different realities. Bryman (2012) adverts that qualitative interviewing highly focuses on the interviewees' own perspectives and gives insight into what interviewee sees where the researcher wants rich and detailed answers (p.470). For this reason, this study will benefit from interview method with the main purpose of learning the ideas, opinions, perceptions and the experiences of the respondents. Interview will be useful for this research since interviews provide a useful way for researchers to learn about the world of others (Qu and Dumay, 2011, p.239).

This research follows the semi-structured interviewing method. The semi-structured interview involves prepared questioning guided in a consistent and systematic manner to reach more elaborate responses (Qu and Dumay, 2011, p.246). Semi-structured interview is the most effective means of gathering information (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Qu and Dumay, 2011). Because “it allows interviewer to modify the style, pace and ordering of questions to evoke the fullest responses from the interviewee” (Qu and Dumay, 2011, p. 246). During the interview, the interviewer can control and organize the flow of interview. With the follow up on questions, semi-structured interviews can address better the main problems and issues that should be focused. Lewis-Beck et. al (2004) also mention about the semi-structured interviewing as the most interpretivist, interactionist, constructionist tradition in the social science (p. 1020). In this research, in order to conduct interviews, semi-structured interviews are preferred due to the need of researcher a structure in order to manage interview and ensure the clear focus of the purpose of the study with more specific issues that is addressed by the research.

Due to the Outbreak of Covid-19, rather than face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews were conducted. I completed the interviews within a period of two weeks in total by making an appointment with the participants. The average duration of twenty interviews with twenty people in total was thirty-five minutes. One of the challenging parts of the study was the internet connection weakness experienced during phone calls. The disconnections experienced during the phone calls interrupted the flow of the interviews.

My interview consisted of questions under themes. The part of the interview began with questions regarding “belonging”. For the belonging theme, I focus on the feeling of belonging of participants. I ask, “Where do you feel like you belong?” I ask their ties with homeland, Turkey and host society, Hungary. The next part of the interview focuses on questions regarding perceptions on the concept of citizenship. For the theme of citizenship perception, I ask them to elaborate on their perceptions of Hungarian, European and Turkish citizenship, and their general understanding of citizenship. In order understand their perception of general citizenship, I ask “How do you define citizenship? “What does citizenship mean for you?” Then, I ask questions about their perceptions of Hungarian, European and Turkish citizenship. For instance,

I ask “How do you define Hungarian citizenship?”, “What does Hungarian citizenship mean for you?”, “Do you feel like a Hungarian citizen?”, “To what extent and in which sense do you feel like a Hungarian citizen?” help to evaluate their perception to Hungarian citizenship. As a last point and theme, I ask about their experiences. I will ask that whether they have experienced racist, exclusionary or positive attitudes in Hungarian society. I explore some changes with Orban’s politics. The questions such as “Did the policies of Orban have any impact on your daily life?”, “Have you felt the effects of Orban's immigration and citizenship discourses and policies?” can lead to answers to understand the scale and effects of Orban’s populist discourse.

3.4. Data Analysis

After conducting interviews which are all recorded, they are transcribed for deeper analysis process. Later, a coding frame is used to analyze the transcripts of interviews. According to DeCuir-Gunby et. al (2011), researchers must engage in the process of coding data in order to make sense of interviews and gain clearer insights about the interview data. Coding is a systematic way to analyze gathered data which derived from conducted interviews within categories that are created by the researcher. As Lewis-Beck et. al (2004) claim, “Coding requires the researcher to interact with and to think about the data with creation of some categories and concepts derived from the data” (p.137). Coding helps reducing data to simple broad categories and it helps for interpretation of data and reaching conclusions based on the interpretation (Lewis-Beck et. al, 2004).

In this research, the coding process is applied in order to analyze raw data systematically. The codes are outcome of examination of interview transcripts. Hence, both data-driven and structural codes are used. If the codes are created from the raw data, they are called as “data-driven codes” and if the codes are created from the research goals and questions, they are called as “structural codes” (Ryan and Bernard 2003; DeCuir-Gunby et. al, 2011, p.138). The codes are created from the research questions based on the research purpose and they will be derived from the raw data of

interview transcripts. The coding is done manually due to the small size of the project, the research goals and the inclination of researcher to the manual coding. Manual coding is conducted by discovering data with “traditional writing materials by touching the data and puts on additional data out of memory and into the record” (Graue and Walsh, 1998; Saldaña, 2013, p.28).

Prior to analysis of interviews, I created codebook with the key concepts. The codes are created from concepts and the raw data which is derived from interviews, and they are explained in the codebook. DeCuir-Gunby et. al (2011) define codebook as a set of codes and their definitions as a guide to help analyze interview data (p. 138). Please see the full codebook in the Appendix which is the initial and structural codebook, and the analysis of data will lead to a revised codebook. The first theme as the feeling of belonging is important focus of the research. The feeling of belonging to Hungary, Europe or Turkey can present us different interpretations. For instance, if an interviewee feels belong to Turkey more and the reasons of it are explained by him/her; I can code the reason of belonging Turkey more as “the intensive ties to homeland” or “the negative approach to Hungarian society”. The reasons are important because they inform us about the source of their feelings. The feeling of belonging can be related with the in-betweenness of Hungary. The specific political situation of Hungary between the illiberal and liberal values can affect their feelings of belonging. The participants may feel belonging themselves to their origin society or they feel belonging to European Union, or they feel belonging to Hungary much. Secondly, the theme of citizenship perceptions is the main part of study because the specific situation of Hungary can shape the citizenship perceptions. According to their answers, the general definition of citizenship can be coded as “Formal citizenship” or “Substantive citizenship”. Relatively, their understanding from Hungarian citizenship also can be coded as “Formal dimension of citizenship” or “Substantive dimension of citizenship”. These answers can be evaluated as the citizenship understanding on paper or on practice. For example, they may see Hungarian citizenship as rights and obligations, but the participation and identity part of citizenship can be missed. Moreover, the experiences can be coded as “positive and negative experiences” due to their exclusionary, racist, anti-migrant attitudes in the host society or more positive, inclusionary and embracive approach. This can reveal the features of host society

under the effect of illiberal populist regime. Also, the change by time also can be coded as “positive and negative changes”. Especially, with Orban regime, the changes in the society towards more positive or negative experiences of them can be coded.

The real names of the participants were taken during the interviews, but in the study their real names were hidden and used by giving them another name due to confidentiality reasons. The female names were replaced with different female names and the male names were replaced with other male names. As Surmiak (2018) states, in small communities whose members know each other, there may be exist the problems in the confidentiality of the participants. Therefore, the names mentioned in the study are the names given by me to each of the participants in order to protect confidentiality of the respondents.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

4.1. The Sense of Belonging of Turkish Immigrants in Hungary

The increasing migration movements in recent years has brought different interpretations to the concept of belonging and has caused immigrants to question their sense of belonging to their homeland or the new country they have migrated to. Sense of belonging can be explained as a sense of being part of a social group in which individuals can attribute themselves as at home (Amit and Bar-Lev, 2014; Black, 2002). According to Sözer (2019), “belonging is defined as a fundamental human urge and it is functional desire to build, develop and sustain inter-individual relations” (p.418). Even in the early stages of human societies, individuals felt that they belonged to a tribe or family and defined themselves according to their roles in that group to which they belonged (Bilgin, 1999, p.83; Çağırkan, 2019, p.560).

Sense of belonging is complex for immigrants in transnational communities with mixed cultural forms and hybrid identities (Amit and Bar-Lev, 2014; Clarke et al. 2007). We witness immigrants who feel that they belong to their homeland and cannot feel part of the receiving country they live in; immigrants who feel completely belonging to the host country and have lost their identity from their original country; immigrants who feel that they belong both to their original country and to the host country; immigrants who cannot feel they belong to their original country nor to the receiving country. Uysal (2015) explains that multidimensional sense of belonging of migrants can be caused the “being both in here and there”, “being neither in here or there” and “being a citizen of the world”. (p.61).

Understanding the sense of belonging of immigrants may have a significant role to evaluate the integration and harmony of them to the host community. Lack of the sense of belonging of the immigrants in the host countries may raise questions of a “deficit of social capital” in which there is a lack of social bonds and networks between the newcomers and the host community (Amit and Bar-Lev, 2014, p.5). This

can cause bridging social capital, weakening social network in the community (Amit and Bar-Lev, 2014; Putnam 2000). Çağırkan (2019) also underlines the importance of belonging to ensure the harmony and integration of the new members of the society. Individuals get rid of loneliness in the society where they feel themselves belong to and it would be destructive for them, if they do not have the sense of belonging (Çağırkan, 2019). It is extremely important for individuals to integrate with society and maintain their existence in harmony in accordance with the social structure. While individuals build a sense of belonging to a community, they internalize the basic qualities of that community and maintain their existence more easily in social life. (Çağırkan, 2019, p.569).

In their research, Hou et al. (2016) analyzes the sense of belonging of Canadian immigrant to both receiving country as Canada and their source country. According to their results, 69% of all immigrants have a strong sense of belonging to both Canada and their source country; 24% of immigrants have a strong sense of belonging to Canada only; 3% of them have a strong sense of belonging to their source country only; and 4% of them have a weak sense of belonging to both Canada and their source country. In this research, the majority of the immigrants have strong sense of belonging to both receiving and the source country; and very few of them have strong sense of belonging to their source country. In fact, many immigrants feel more belonging to receiving country than to their source country. Hou et al. (2016) stresses the important determinants that are constituent for the sense of belonging such as source-country attributes, immigration entry status and post-migration experience and demographic characteristics. The features of source-country are driven factors for the assessing the sense of belonging. For instance, immigrants from countries with lower life satisfaction, and less favorable socioeconomic environment are more likely to feel belong to Canadian society. Also, the positive or negative migration experiences in the host country can shape their sense of belonging as well. These determinants are the evaluations of Hou et al. (2016) as factors shape the sense of belonging of immigrants in Canada.

In his study, Uysal (2015) investigates the sense of belonging of the Turkish immigrants in London and indicates that the meaning that immigrants attribute to the concept of belonging is very diverse and as in every immigrant community, there is a

complex structure among Turks in London. In his study, the answers were grouped under three different headings. Firstly, a group of Turkish immigrants defined their affiliation and belonging to Turkey and described Turkey as the only homeland with their roots. Turkey is the homeland for Turkish immigrants with roots, memories, and deep ties. This group defines belonging with the root idea and authentic feelings. The second group is the group that belongs to many places, not just one place. It is the immigrants who have developed a sense of belonging in two places, both in Turkey and London that explain the situation of being both there and here. The third group is the group that has gained a new identity later and defines itself as a Londoner. It is the immigrants who re-create their own characteristics and shape them according to the place where they live.

As it is seen from some example studies on the sense of belonging of immigrants, there are various explanations and answers of immigrants on this topic. There are some immigrants who feel belong more to their origin country or host country under the effects of several reasons such as the characteristics of source country or host country, in addition to the demographic features of the immigrants. In the light of the previous studies, this research analyzes the type of regime of the host country and its effect on the sense of belonging of immigrants. In this section, the sense of belonging of Turkish immigrants in Hungary will be interpreted and related with the affectability of illiberal populist host country on their belongingness.

Understanding the sense of belonging of Turkish immigrants living in Hungary is an important part of the study because of two reasons. Firstly, belonging of immigrants will be analyzed to contribute to the literature on migrants' sense of belonging with potential new perspectives on the complex nature of belonging. Secondly, the study aims to comment on whether and how Hungary's illiberal populist regime affects sense of belonging. The features of the receiving country may be a factor shape the sense of belonging of immigrants, differently from the previous studies. The source-country attributes have been previously researched but receiving country attributes may be another determinant on this topic. I expect that the immigrant groups living in an illiberal populist host society would have less of a sense of belonging to the host society, and this type of regime may be a reason that prevents them from feeling fully part of this society. Hence, I expect that Turkish immigrants

will have deeper sense of belonging to Turkey rather than the Hungarian society. As Uysal (2015) states, when a person is asked where she/he feels herself/himself to belong, the answers given give information about the concept of belonging. For this reason, during the in-depth interviews, I ask the interviewees a general question as “Where do you feel you belong?”.

According to the answers of the sense of the belonging that are given, I have categorized the answers within four subtitles: Turkey; both Turkey and Hungary; European; and global. The answers ranged from whether they feel themselves to belong to Turkey, both Turkey and Hungary, Europe, or the globe. I also tried to learn the reasons for their answers. In this section, I will analyze the sense of belonging of Turks in Hungary within the four different answers given.

4.1.1. Turkey is our origin that we cannot change, and it is our motherland

The majority of the interviewees state that although they lived in Hungary for years and lived the Hungarian society, they can never disconnect from their original ties and that they definitely belong to Turkey. This answer category is very similar to the research of Uysal (2015) which is mentioned at the beginning of belonging section. In his study, a group of Turkish immigrants in London claim that they feel they belong to Turkey and define Turkey as the only homeland with their roots, memories, deep ties, and authentic feelings. Uysal (2015) has associated this group of immigrants with the concept of “topophilia” and expressed it as a bond that explains that a person's attachment to a place comes with deep emotional roots such as meanings, images, and memories. (Brown and Perkins, 1992; Relph, 1976; Tuan; 1974, 1977). Topophilia is a concept that explains the affective ties between people and place, and it is related with this group who attribute themselves within the intensive emotional bonds to their homeland (Tuan, 1977). It is the general opinion which is seen from the answers of the interviewees. They attribute a meaning to Turkey that is a “special” and “blessed” homeland and emphasize the intensity of their attachment via linkage.

“Turkey is my place of birth I have links and codes there and it is not possible to lose or abandon these codes”. (Burak, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Burak who has lived in Hungary for twenty years and has Hungarian citizenship defines himself as Turk and his belonging to Turkey is more dominant. He clarifies that “I cannot say I am a Hungarian because maybe I should have been born here to say it”. He supports that if he was born in Hungary, he would feel like he belongs to Hungary. However, when he came to Hungary, he was twenty-five years old, and it is very difficult to develop that feeling later. The strong ties to the homeland, to their own ancestry and to their roots, which are thought to never be broken, are the reason why the Turks in this group feel themselves to belong to Turkey. Like Burak, there are also two more participants who define the roots of belonging within the place of birth. Sedat is one of them who has lived in Hungary for thirty years and who is very pleasant to live in Hungary.

“I like both of the sides. However, even though I have Hungarian citizenship, I still feel I belong to my motherland. I set my life here, I was married with a Hungarian, I am quite integrated to society; however, it is impossible to feel Hungarian. I am a Turk. I was born in Turkey”. (Sedat, Hungarian citizen, tradesman).

“If I put Turkey and Hungary on a scale, Turkey will be slightly heavier because it is my origin. My roots are in Turkey, my branches are in Hungary” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Süleyman who lives in Hungary for twenty-one years also states that he likes to live in Hungary more than Turkey because he thinks that Hungary is better place to live. He also adds that when he has visited to Turkey for six months, he did not find the serenity that he finds in Hungary. However, he still declares that his belonging to Turkey is more dominant due to his origin. He established a life in Hungary, but he cannot break his roots which are in Turkey. Süleyman thinks that to belong to a nation, one must be born there. He mentions that Hungarians call the Hungarians who become later as "artificial Hungarians". He also stresses that they could not adopt the traditions and family structure in Hungary because he was not educated within this tradition.

Although most of interviewees stress that they like Hungary, they are happy and comfortable there, they conclude the answer with we are Turk and we feel belonging to Turkey because it is our motherland. One of the best expressions of this:

“Hungary is a very beautiful, green country, the people are also very good. But you know we have a saying: *Bülbülü altın kafese koymuşlar, ille de vatanım demiş* (They put the nightingale into a golden cage, it still moaned for its home).” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager)

4.1.2. I belong to both Hungary and Turkey equally

In addition to the interviews in which interviewees state their sense of belonging is to Turkey, there are some interviewees who feel they belong to both Hungarian and Turkish society equally. This group of respondents are like the Turkish immigrants in London who feel themselves both Turkey and London in the Uysal (2015)’s study. Uysal (2015) explains this situation as “being both there and here”.

“I have a blood tie with Turkey and a life link with Hungary. For this reason, I feel I belong 50%-50%”. (Serkan, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Serkan who has lived there for fourteen years and has Hungarian citizenship supports that “The places where human beings are born, and the places of blood are actually the places where they feel belonging primarily. I think this is unquestionably the way it is for everyone.” Hence, despite his claim of feeling 50/50 he also emphasizes blood and birth and that he feels belonging to Turkey dominantly. However, he adds that he also develops a sense of belonging to Hungary as well. He spent years in Hungary, he got married with a Hungarian, established his family there and is earning his income from Hungary. Similarly, Sami also asserts that he defines himself through his family. He is married with a Hungarian and his child is half-Hungarian. Hence, he also feels that he belongs to Hungary and Turkey.

These two interviewees show a sense of belonging to Hungary as well as to Turkey. For this reason, they exhibit that the constructing a sense of belonging to a receiving country is also possible. Like Martin (1995) supports, sense of belonging is “a series of social processes” that can be reproduced and transformed (Çağırkan, 2017, p.5). As a result of their social interaction and family unification with a Hungarian wife and kids; they have produced a new belonging to the country that they migrate to.

4.1.3. I feel I belong to Europe

Differently to the majority, one of interviewees answered the question as feeling belong to Europe and feeling more European. Hazal explains that she does not like the traditional culture and norms in Turkey, she likes European social structure more. For this reason, she feels better in Europe with European values. She expresses her hatred to Turkish traditional and conservative mindfulness as follows:

“There is always an old aunt in the apartment in Turkey. She controls and spies on everything, such as who entered your apartment, who left, what you did, when you came home and why you came late. There is no such thing here and it makes me feel very comfortable” (Hazal, Turkish citizen, graduate student)

As it is stated in the study of Hou et. al (2016), the features of source-country play role to shape the sense of belonging. In their study, they mention the characteristics of the country of origin within its socioeconomic and cultural environment, including civil liberty and average life satisfaction. They support that less favorable socioeconomic environment such as low level of life satisfaction in their source countries has caused the more exposure to host society. While Hou et. al (2016) focus the socio-economic feature of source country, this research underlines the socio-cultural feature of source country. A Turkish immigrant in Hungary feels herself more European because of the less favorable socio-cultural structure in Turkey. She explains her feelings by stating that the cultural feature of Turkey has forced herself to be closer to European open and free sociocultural mindset.

4.1.4. I do not feel I belong to a specific place; I feel global.

Moreover, another different answer has come from Emine who feels herself as global and she does not have a dominant belonging to a specific place. She explains that she has always been in various places, even in her homeland. This may be the reason of her feelings, in her opinion:

“I am from Kayseri, normally I was born and raised there; but I went to high school in Izmir; I studied at university in Istanbul. I worked in Antalya. My family moved to Maraş for a while. I've always been to different places, different cultures. When I meet so many different cultures, I don't feel like I belong to one place.” (Emine, Turkish citizen, call center agent)

This sense of belonging is explained by Uysal (2015) in his study. He gives a place to the Turkish immigrants in London who feel “being neither in here nor there” or “being a citizen of the world”. Uysal (2015) relates this situation with globalization and increasing reliance on other places. As a result of globalization movements, the sense of belonging can be evolved through more cosmopolitan level over the nation states. Sense of belonging may come from only national states in modern global era. This situation is mentioned by Parekh (2003) in his article. He also underlines that cosmopolitan citizen with the mentality of belonging to the whole world has no political home and they have lack of special attachments to their communities. Sassen (2002) also claims about the evolution of the concepts of citizenship with the transformation from the national citizenship towards post-national or denationalized types of citizenship in her article. The author states that privatization, deregulation, increased prominence of human rights which are the outcomes of globalization and emergence of multiple actors, groups, communities which are unwilling to identify themselves with a nation-state cause this process of transformation. As a result, importance of nationality and national grip of citizenship has been weakening and national citizenship has becoming less important. In accordance with this cosmopolitan, global, and universal understanding; there may be a group of immigrants who attribute themselves to global world rather a specific nation-state.

To summarize, most of the interviewees defines themselves as Turkish rather than Hungarian or European and they state that they have the feeling of belonging to their homeland dominantly due to their blood tie and origin that they cannot change. Although there are the participants who live there for a long period of time such as twenty or thirty years, even if they have official Hungarian citizenship; they still define themselves as Turk and still claim belonging to Turkey. Out of twenty interviewees, sixteen of them state that their Turkish belonging is more dominant, whereas two of them feel that they belong to both Turkey and Hungary; one of them feels more

European; and one of them states that she feels global. Hence, the majority emphasize their belonging to Turkey rather than the other alternatives.

There are several important implications of these findings. First, citizenship and the sense of belonging reflect different forms of attachments and are not necessarily parallel. Even though there are Turkish immigrants who have Hungarian citizenship, they state that they feel belong to Turkey rather than Hungary. Thus, having official citizenship does not mean having sense of belonging to the country of citizenship. Secondly, unlike studies in the literature, there is no interviewee in the sample of this research that said they feel they belong to the host country. Although the sample consists of different demographic variables - different gender, different education levels, different period of life in Hungary - no one said they feel Hungarian, and they feel belong to Hungary. There were two people who said that they feel belong to both Hungary and Turkey, but the answers do not include belonging to only Hungary. Although I expected that the illiberal populist regime of Hungary affects negatively the immigrants' sense of belonging to Hungary, findings show that the main reason why Turkish immigrants do not feel belonging to Hungary is their stronger ties and feelings to Turkey. Because when the participants were asked “why” in regard to their sense of belonging, no one mentioned issues such as negative attitudes in Hungary. They mentioned their strong attachments and emotions to Turkey. However, there may be another reason for it: no one in the sample group was born in Hungary. This situation is also mentioned by some interviewees. They state that if they were born in Hungary, maybe they can feel belong to Hungary. The place of birth can be also a determinant that can affect the sense of belonging. To search it, Turkish immigrants born in Hungary can be added to the sample group in further studies.

4.2. Citizenship Perceptions of Turkish Immigrants in Hungary

This study examines the multi-layered nature of citizenship and citizenship perceptions of the immigrants including their general, Hungarian and EU, and Turkish citizenship understandings. A helpful frame to evaluate citizenship perceptions is Delanty's (1997) frame which emphasizes different dimensions of citizenship. He

focuses on the rights, duties, participation, and identity as the four components of citizenship, and he develops four different models of citizenship.

Type of citizenship Historical form	Formal	Substantive
Civic citizenship	Rights	Participation
Ethnic citizenship	Duties	Identity

Figure 4. The Core Components of Citizenship

Source: (Delanty, 1997, p.292)

Firstly, the rights model of citizenship has a specific focus on the rights granted to citizens. This model is largely based on a formalistic conception of such rights” that are “formal entitlements” (Delanty, 1997, p.289). Secondly, the conservative model of citizenship has a specific focus on the duties of citizens and emphasized the responsibilities and obedience of citizens to state. Thirdly, the participatory model of citizenship stresses the participation component of citizenship and “involvement of citizens in the building of society” (Delanty, 1997, p.290). Fourthly, the communitarian model of citizenship explains citizenship within the issue of identification. After he explains his four models of citizenship, he categorizes these models within two different types of citizenship as formal and substantive. Delanty (1997) expresses formal type of citizenship within the rights and duties; and substantive type of citizenship within participation and identity (p.292).

By considering the Delanty’s models of citizenship, I analyze the responses of the interviewees on their understanding of citizenship within these two different dimensions of citizenship: formal and substantive. The responses of interviewees are categorized within the four different components of citizenship as rights, duties, participation, and identity.

Apart from Delanty, there are important studies examining different factors that affect citizenship perceptions. According to Brubaker (1992), there are distinctive models of nationhood and national self-understanding between countries. Each country may have different definitions of citizenship and understanding of nationhood because they develop their own understanding. This affects naturalization policies and citizenship policies towards immigrants. In his study, Brubaker (1992) compares the citizenship perception and the policies in France and Germany in 1992. There is more political and legal understanding of citizenship in France whereas there is more communitarian and particularistic understanding of citizenship in Germany. For instance, although both German and French citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, French citizenship law includes some elements of *jus soli*. Hence, German citizenship is ascribed based on descent, whereas the French citizenship is ascribed at birth to most persons born on French territory of foreign parents (Brubaker, 1992). The more ethnocultural and differentialist understanding of nationhood in Germany based on the national feelings has caused the different citizenship policies than France in which the more legal dimension of citizenship is underlined. As an outcome of their different citizenship understanding, German naturalization policies are more restrictive than those of France. Based on the assessment of Brubaker (1992), it is noted that citizenship policies are much more restrictive and acquiring citizenship is more difficult in the countries which have the thick citizenship understanding related with the substantive dimension of citizenship; whereas citizenship policies are much more flexible and acquiring citizenship is easier in the countries which have the thin citizenship understanding related with the formal dimension of citizenship.

In addition, Yanaşmayan (2015) conducts important research on the factors that affect the citizenship perceptions of immigrants and analyses on how the citizenship policies of the host country can shape their citizenship perceptions. She relates the citizenship perception of immigrants and the citizenship policies of the countries by comparing the Netherlands and the UK as two countries with different citizenship policies and understandings, and she compares the citizenship perceptions of Turkish immigrants living in these two countries. While the UK allows immigrants to be dual citizens, the Netherlands is a stricter country in terms of citizenship policies by not allowing dual citizenship and requiring immigrants to renounce their original

citizenship. Yanařmayan (2015) interprets this situation as an obstacle for Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands to develop emotional bonds with the Netherlands because they must denounce their Turkish citizenship and they perceive Dutch citizenship as only legal status on the paper. This may cause them to perceive Dutch citizenship and general citizenship formally without a substantive point of view. On the other hand, the citizenship policy is more flexible in the UK since it does not impose a condition to renounce Turkish citizenship. This situation may cause Turkish immigrants to attribute an emotional meaning to citizenship and even to develop a substantive understanding by attributing an emotional attachment to British citizenship. As it is noted by Yanařmayan (2015), in the Dutch case, the immigrants foster “thin understanding of citizenship where emotional and legal bonds are separated” due to the strict Dutch citizenship policies (p.13). Unlike, in the British case, the flexible British citizenship policies may be a factor for immigrants to develop a thick citizenship understanding by developing sentimental value for both British and citizenship in general. Consequently, the immigrants have formal citizenship understanding in the Netherlands, whereas they have substantive citizenship understanding in the UK.

4.2.1. General Citizenship Perceptions

The perception of citizenship in general of the majority of the interviewees makes reference to the substantive dimension of citizenship. Out of twenty interviewees, sixteen of them define citizenship in terms of membership and participation, whereas two of them perceive citizenship in terms of rights and duties and two of them express citizenship with its both formal and substantive evaluation.

When the interviewees are asked to define citizenship to learn their understanding of citizenship, majority of them related citizenship to feeling as a member of a community. They define citizenship as more about emotional ties attributed to a community, unlike the legal dimension of citizenship. They think that having an official passport is not enough to be a citizen because it is more about to a process of being adapted to society by practicing as a member of it. For instance, Eda believes that citizenship is more than the legal statements on the paper issue. She

supports that the people cannot feel citizenship without having satisfied knowledge about the culture, society, and the language of a community; even they have the official citizenship. She states:

“If I marry my Hungarian boyfriend and become a citizen, if I don't know the language or if I haven't spent a certain amount of time here, I will not feel belonging here, I will not feel myself citizen. I would have citizenship on paper, but I wouldn't wear it like that and say I'm a Hungarian citizen. That would be a little pointless, unrealistic. But if I stay here for a long time, learn the language of this place, develop communication and interaction with people here in Hungary- which I think for a minimum of five years to really acquire it- or if I establish my own family here, then there will be a sense of belonging. Citizenship is not something that is acquired with a lot of paper. Yes, there are many legal rights on paper, but I think citizenship is a stronger thing. It must have a spiritual meaning.” (Eda, Turkish citizen, kindergarten teacher)

She states that she cannot feel like a Hungarian citizen without amalgamating the society and getting familiar with their culture. She asserts that one cannot feel belonging to society without spending time there, learning the language and having intensive interaction of the other members in the community. This expression evaluates citizenship above the legal issues by highlighting the practical side of feeling citizenship which is close to substantive dimension of citizenship. Citizenship for many interviewees is parallel to the sense of belonging. Buket also explains citizenship based on having a sense of belonging to a community in every sense by detecting the culture, norms, customs, rules and living in the community by protecting the national values, history, and ties:

“Citizenship is to be completely connected to the country in which we live in with a sense of belonging. Citizenship is seeing yourself as an individual of that country and to feel that country belongs to you in every sense. For example, Hungarian citizenship is to perceive the culture, customs, rules and laws of this place as a real Hungarian and to live like a real Hungarian and see the world through the eyes of real Hungarian” (Buket, Turkish citizen, civil servant)

Likewise, Sedat also supports this point of citizenship by emphasizing that it is necessary to enter a society and live with its members. He denotes that the side of formality on the paper is not enough to be a citizen, it is necessary to feel part of that society. By supporting to the substantive citizenship perception, Burak also clarifies that a citizen must be a harmonious part of the society. In his perception, if a citizen can participate in the community by being useful and productive, and adding value to that society; he becomes a real citizen and feels belonging to that society. For instance, Burak states that he donates to some research centers and hospitals, and he contributes the social life by being part of it. Along the same line, Aysel expresses citizenship as a social project that includes the practices of helping for the poor and children such as food aid or education grant. She also emphasizes that it is significant to learn the culture and language of the society to be more interactive and participant.

Apart from the substantive understanding of citizenship, two interviewees stress the formal dimension of citizenship dominantly. They have the right-based citizenship perception which lays on the legal foundations. Serkan relates citizenship with the rights in the country and defines citizenship as “acquiring some rights”. Another explanation of citizenship within official and formal features:

“Being a citizen means that being treated equally with other citizens. Frankly, I would prefer to be a citizen here and be treated like a normal Hungarian citizen. Because I am suffering from being a foreigner officially.” (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer)

The perception of two interviewees contains both formal and substantive dimension of citizenship. Meral describes citizenship as “a matter of belonging as well as complying with the laws and responsibilities of a country.” (Turkish citizen, architect). Similarly, Sami explains that “citizenship has neither purely formal nor purely emotional meaning; it has both of them.” (Hungarian citizen, hotel manager). Thus, they stress the legal, formal, and emotional, practical side of citizenship at the same time.

Consequently, the more emphasis on substantive dimension of citizenship by the sampling group verifies my expectations. Since the interviewees are Turks and they come from a communitarian, ethnicity-based society; the substantive perception

of them is more dominant and the feature of the origin country can shape the general citizenship perception of the immigrants.

4.2.2. Hungarian and European Citizenship Perceptions

After participants were asked to discuss their perceptions on citizenship in general, they were also asked about their perception of Hungarian and European citizenship. Mostly formal and pragmatist understandings emerged from the data. Most of them define Hungarian or European citizenship in terms of rights that they can enjoy. Hence rather than more substantive dimension, they have more formal, especially right-based understanding of citizenship. The following quotations will summarize the general ideas of majority about the Hungarian and European citizenship. One of the clear explanations:

“Non-citizens have less rights than the citizens. Having Hungarian citizenship, relatively European Union citizenship, means that enjoying the rights. So, it is more advantageous to have Hungarian, European citizenship. Of course, when you are a foreigner, the rights are less and there is no one to tell your troubles. When the rights of a citizen of country are violated, they apply to the state and there are many ways to it for them. But for example, if you, as a foreigner, want to apply for a violation of rights, this is related to the country's policy towards foreigners. So, they don't get involved in this situation much. Therefore, it makes sense to me to be a citizen of wherever I live, of course, and to take advantage of all kinds of rights.” (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer)

She does not have Hungarian citizenship and she does not feel as secure as a citizen of Hungary. She even has some troubles when she faces about violation of her rights. She feels that even they will not be interested in her. Her understanding of having a citizenship of the host country in which she lives means that taking advantages of all kinds of rights given to the citizens. Similarly, Sami also believes his understanding of Hungarian citizenship within the right-based evaluation in following:

“Hungarian citizenship is having equal rights with other Hungarian citizens and carrying a Hungarian passport has many advantages by comparing Turkish passport.” (Sami, Hungarian citizen, hotel manager)

As Sami believes, the rights provide equality among citizens. Equality is an important theme that is highlighted by Sami and perception of receiving country and EU citizenship is also about equality, in addition to rights. Besides, the general opinion is also based on the comparison between Turkish and Hungarian passports. Because of the advantages and opportunities of Hungarian, relatively European passport, Turkish passport is seen as a weak. Another quotation supporting this idea:

“Hungary is stronger than Turkey in terms of passports because it is a European country. You are treated more flexibly and comfortably when you have a Hungarian passport.” (Aytekin, Turkish citizen, financial advisor)

Also, Aysel who has not Hungarian citizenship clarifies her wish of having Hungarian citizenship due to the advantages that are acquired by the people and states that “Being a Hungarian citizen, a European citizen, means no visa problem, no paperwork, and provides very important opportunities for education.” (Turkish citizen, front office manager). For this reason, she would like to have citizenship, although Turkish citizenship is a priority and indispensable for her.

Out of twenty interviews, nineteen of them define Hungarian citizenship and European citizenship as “advantageous” with several rights and benefits. They strongly mention that having Hungarian and European passport means that having extra rights that Turkish citizens do not have such as freedom of movement and of residence, employment opportunities, business transactions, other specific privileges such as the discounts given for European citizens in every aspect of daily life including an education price, insurance prices and even for the entrance to museum. There is a general perception of Hungarian citizenship as Hungarian passport. Hence, they detect the citizenship in a matter of documents that provides several opportunities to them. Also, they believe that within the same logic, having Hungarian passport means that having European Union citizenship with the wider and comprehensive rights and advantages inside or outside Europe. I categorize these advantages of having Hungarian and European citizenship as freedom of movement and residence; employment opportunities; business transactions; other specific privileges in the following sections.

Freedom of movement and residence

The majority of interviewees explain the meaning of Hungarian and European citizenship within the benefits of having these passports. According to interviewees, the freedom of movement and residence are two most common benefits of having Hungarian and European citizenship. Serkan expresses his understanding from Hungarian and EU citizenship as “There are more materialistic approaches rather than sentimentality in my head such as having the free movement right” (Hungarian citizen, businessman). In addition, Hazal explains her pragmatic sense of having Hungarian citizenship by stating “The important thing for me is getting a residence permit and removing my travel restriction. It is enough if I can get them, it would be okay if I do not get citizenship.” (Turkish citizen, graduate student). Eda also emphasizes the similar points and underlines the unfair between a citizen and non-citizen with unequal treatments:

“EU citizenship means a huge advantage. It means a right to travel without presenting millions of papers or documents. The one takes a lot of effort to travel, while the other can easily enter and exit between countries. This is very uncomfortable and unfair. I think this is the biggest benefit of EU citizenship”.
(Eda, Turkish citizen, kindergarten teacher)

In this sense, EU citizenship is evaluated as a comfort by several interviewees, like Sami who claims that:

“The citizenship of the European Union is travelling freely without any barriers inside and outside the continent. Also, if you have citizenship as a migrant, it means that you do not have to deal with many documents at the Immigration Office. It is a comfort not to deal with such things. In other words, citizenship can mean a lot as an official, it can be a great comfort, not having to deal with these documentary issues.” (Sami, Hungarian citizen, hotel manager)

Ufuk also supports the same ideas and explains Hungarian citizenship as “not to take care of the residence permit process, to travel freely, to feel comfortable when the police control” (Hungarian citizen, businessman). He asserts that when police see that

he is carrying Hungarian passport, they do not judge him and ask for more details in comparison to non-citizens. Hence, he understands having Hungarian citizenship as easiness.

Employment opportunity

Having right to work in both Hungary and Europe is the other advantages that are explained within the Hungarian and European citizenship. The interviewees also mention the inequality between a citizen and non-citizen in case of employment opportunities. A good explanation:

“Right to work is one of basic human rights, but non-citizens do not have them. If you have a Hungarian citizenship, you work permit and you benefit from lots of advantages”. (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer)

Similarly, after he mentions about free movement, Furkan emphasizes that “working in the other European countries is the advantage and increases the options” for him. (Hungarian citizen, translator). Furkan also proves that he has a self-interested and pragmatist understanding of Hungarian citizenship as follows. If Turkey's advantages were better, staying in Turkey and having only Turkish citizenship would be wanted by him. But Hungarian citizenship is more advantageous, so although 99% of his heart belongs to Turkey, he prefers Hungarian citizenship

Business transactions

Burak, a businessman and officially Hungarian citizenship, says that it is a great advantage for a Turk to have a Hungarian passport. Freedom of mobility without barriers, having equal rights with others and solving the problem of bank loans are the benefits of Hungarian citizenship for him. Burak said that European citizenship helped him to do business more comfortably in commercial terms.

“When the company's business progressed and you started to deal with banks, problems began to arise in loans, large loans, corporate loans. So even if the company was financially sufficient, it came and got stuck with the fact that the owners of the company were not citizens. Therefore, I said that I live in this country, I pay the taxes in this country, for years, not a short time, but half of

our lives have been spent here. Then I decided to apply citizenship. I applied and got it. The problem of bank loans is solved.” (Burak, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Even, the benefit of having citizenship in business transactions is the main reason of his citizenship application. Although he is an owner of company in Hungary, and he contributes Hungarian economy positively by paying for taxes; he complains about not being able to lend loans from the banks just because he is not a citizen. Having citizenship is the solution of his problems with the loans and it facilitates easiness in his business transactions.

Other specific privileges

Apart from these common advantages are mentioned above, some interviewees touch upon different examples that are the benefits of having Hungarian and European citizenship that are not granted and benefited by the non-citizens. Hungarian and European citizenship are seen as a privilege in many fields such as education.

“The European Union has very good funds and supports for young people and these are very advantageous. For example, while European citizens pay 2000 Euros to European schools, a Turkish citizen pays 10000 Euros. I also want my son to benefit from these privileges in the future.” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager)

Aysel believes that having Hungarian citizenship will be beneficial for her son in the future who was born in Hungary and will have Hungarian citizenship in the future. Meral also says that having Hungarian citizenship means that her daughter's future choice palette is wide. The citizenship of Hungary means that European citizenship and it presents them several opportunities. Especially, she gives too much attention to her daughter's education, and she believes that if her daughter has the Hungarian passport, it will be more advantageous in the future with several education offers.

Moreover, Gözde who is not a Hungarian citizen mentions another different point which is a privilege for EU citizenship. She gives the example of the prices of entrance to museum. The prices are different for EU citizens and non-E U citizens and non-

citizens pay extra expensive price. It is also another daily life example that she notices and feels as an unequal treatment because she could not benefit from it.

Unlike the majority who define Hungarian and EU citizenship based on more formal and rights-based dimension, Süleyman perceives Hungarian citizenship based on substantive dimension. He is the only one person who attributes to Hungarian citizenship his emotional ties and internalizes it. He states that “For me, Hungarian citizenship is not a formality, but a passport that I will carry with pride that I really want to acquire. Because I don't think there is much difference between Hungarian and Turkish society” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman). Süleyman connects Hungarian and Turkish society with common ties coming from Central Asia, with Hun history and identifies himself as a Hun. In this case, he connects emotionally with Hungarian citizenship because he sees a common identity. Hence, there is an element of blood and ethnicity under his substantive understanding of Hungarian citizenship. He also says that his aim is not to take a Hungarian identity and have more privileged rights. He says that since he had a permanent residence permit before acquiring citizenship, he had rights such as free movement of residence permit. He says that there is no need to obtain citizenship for such rights. At the same time, he presents different ideas about EU citizenship. He supports that he does not believe the term of EU citizenship and it does not make any sense since the world has evolved to more nationalistic approaches.

Therefore, the more formal and the less substantive perception of Hungarian and European citizenship of Turkish immigrants in Hungary can confirm the discussions on the literature. The more formality of EU citizenship which stresses the right-based evaluation of citizenship can cause the more formal perception of EU citizenship with the lack of substantive dimension. Since the participants underline the rights and benefits of EU citizenship at the first rank, it can be criticized that EU has achieved the formal type of citizenship with some special rights entitled to EU citizens; however, it is lack of the substantive dimension of citizenship.

4.2.3. Turkish Citizenship Perceptions

In the last part of citizenship perception, the participants are analyzed in terms of their perception on Turkish citizenship. All the answers are related to nationalistic feelings, pride, loyalty, emotional ties, and holiness. They do not define Turkish citizenship whether formal or substantive dimension, however they express the question with their emotional senses. Emotions can be associated with nationalism which is rooted in community and identity. These two elements of nationalism as community and identity are the essential complements of substantive dimension of citizenship. In this part, the benefit of in-depth interview method is quite useful because the tones of voices of interviewees reflected their pride, excitement, and emotions on Turkish citizenship.

“Turkish citizenship is a term that means to have the political and national interests of Turkey, to know its historical roots and to protect its national values...to be able to live like a Turk, to think, to be connected to its history, national ties and values” (Buket, Turkish citizen, civil servant)

Many people interpret Turkish citizenship as knowing its roots and origin that can be evaluated as ethnicity. In this case, their roots and ties drive their loyalty to Turkish citizenship. Sedat states “Even though we are EU citizens, our essence is Turkish.” (Hungarian citizen, tradesman). Serkan also emphasizes his loyalty within his origin by claiming that “Turkish citizenship means the land I belong to.” (Hungarian citizen, businessman). Differently, Burak explains his loyalty by relating Turkish community, “I am happy to be a Turkish citizen because I like Turkish community” (Hungarian citizen, businessman). Below are some examples of the nationalist definition of Turkish citizenship:

“When it comes to Turkish citizenship, holiness comes in. It cannot be comparable with any other citizenship” (Ufuk, Hungarian citizen, businessman).

“Turkish citizenship as very important for me and I have nationalist ideology. It means pride” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman).

“Although I have Hungarian citizenship, my Turkish citizenship is my essence.” (Sedat, Hungarian citizen, tradesman).

“It is indispensable and prior” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager).

“Even if I have Hungarian citizenship or the citizenship of all countries, this does not change my nationality, my loyalty to my homeland and Turkishness.” (Buket, Turkish citizen, civil servant)

After they claim the priority and proud senses of Turkish citizenship they start to a new sentence with “however” and mention about the difficulties in living in Turkey and life conditions. “However, I search for better conditions” (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer). “However, the life conditions are very difficult in Turkey” (Dilan, Turkish citizen, passenger services officer). “However, it means a visa torture” (Meral, Turkish citizen, architect). “However, Hungarian passport is more powerful” (Emine, Turkish citizen, call center agent). Like Buse says, “Our country is very beautiful like paradise, however unfortunately living conditions are bad” (Turkish citizen, housewife), most of them share this belief. Furkan summarizes their points of view by stating that he wishes the conditions of Turkey were more advantageous and he would live there; however Hungarian citizenship is more advantageous, and he acquired Hungarian citizenship. This evaluation can also show the pragmatic perception to Hungarian citizenship. The better life conditions and better opportunities in Hungary force them to live and try to acquire Hungarian citizenship. Their opinion show that their Hungarian citizenship perception only based on formality, while their Turkish side is more dominant. One of the best quotations:

“...I think from time to time, what would happen if I became a citizen here. I honestly think that the Turkish side in me will never go. So, no matter that how many problems we have in our own society, I think that is my real hometown. For this reason, I think acquiring Hungarian citizenship will be something on the paper”. (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer)

She implies that if she acquires another citizenship, the Turkish side of her would always remain more dominant. Hence, the Hungarian citizenship of her will remain on the papers and legal documents, but she will maintain her deep ties and emotions with

Turkish citizenship. Her statement explains that she sees Hungarian citizenship something comes from paper, whereas Turkish citizenship is something that comes from the heart.

Nineteen interviewees out of twenty share the same emotions about Turkish citizenship. Differently, Eda evaluates that Turkish citizenship is a disadvantage. She has a negative understanding from the Turkish citizenship, unlike the positive and emotional attachment of the other interviewees. She expresses about her negative experience just because she has a Turkish passport. She is treated as a terrorist. She tells about the story when she enters The United States, the police asked her directly that she was a terrorist or not.

The general understanding of the Turkish immigrants in Hungary on Turkish citizenship can be verified the literature. As it is mentioned in the literature about Turkish citizenship as the communitarian model of citizenship which highly emphasizes some particularistic values, norms, traditions, identity, and characteristics of a particular community (Etzioni, 2011); this is seen in the interviewee's emotions and senses. Etzioni (2011) points out the community-based model of citizenship where the citizens are connected emotionally to the society. This is very clear from the expressions of the interviewees. After stating how sacred and proud Turkish citizenship is for them, they say that they want to have Hungarian citizenship because of the benefits that Turkish citizenship cannot provide, and Hungarian or European citizenship provides. In their point of view, what makes Hungarian and European citizenship valuable is the formal and right-based dimension of them. Their experiences in Europe cause them to view Turkish citizenship more critically. The sentimental emotional attachment to Turkish citizenship followed by critiques of the lack of formal advantages and how European and Hungarian citizenship is seen as a citizenship that closes this gap is the key finding of this section. Turkish immigrants see citizenship as having two roles: the first is citizenship is an attachment a loyalty to the place where they were born. But citizenship is also supposed to provide equality, particular living standards, life satisfaction, economic and educational advantages. In this dimension, the immigrants feel that Turkish citizenship does not provide them.

4.3. Migrant Experiences of Turkish Immigrants in Hungary

The issue of migration has been one of the most controversial issues since the Syrian crisis. Some leaders have securitized the migrant crisis and presented migration as a threat and have taken various restrictions and measures to prevent the migration wave. Hungary is one of these countries in which “new security measures, such as border controls and detention, and a discourse that employs anti-migration themes have become visible” (Canveren and Durakçay, 2017, p.870). According to Tok (2018), “Orban has become the staunchest anti-migrant leader of Europe” (p.90). Orban securitized migration by labelling it as a threat to existence with terrorism, violence, fear and it dangers identity of the community. He supports that this movement should be stopped with several restrictions (Canveren and Durakçay, 2017).

Orban is at the forefront on the anti-migrant rhetoric by using “inflammatory statements against asylum seekers and migrants defining them as “poison” and “not needed” (Tok, 2018, p.88). Orban insults the immigrants as being terrorists, as a source of fear and insecurity, and destroyers of the identity of Hungary and Europe. Examining immigrants living in a country where immigrants are not wanted and targeted as a security threat contributes with the analysis from their perspective. For this reason, this research will take the sample group as the main data and interpret the data obtained from them. Hence, it examines their experiences as immigrants and how these experiences can be affected by Orban's policies and discourses.

I expect that Turks, who are a Muslim migrant group in Hungary, have negative immigration experiences because of the increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies. This group may have encountered situations such as discrimination, hostility and being unwanted by the Hungarian society due to the increasing anti-immigration discourse or by the state institutions due to anti-migrant government policies. To analyze migration experiences of the sample group, their evaluation of migration experiences, whether they encountered any negative positive situations are asked specifically and their stories are listened. In the first part, their general experiences regarding migration in Hungary are analyzed. In the second part, specifically Orban’s impacts on their migration experiences are asked. I expected a negative migration

experience with some levels of discrimination and hostility; and negative impact of Orbán's policies and rhetoric on their social life as migrants.

4.3.1. General Migration Experiences

Out of twenty interviewees, nineteen of them state that they have quite positive experiences in the Hungarian society as migrants and they have not experienced negative attitudes such as racism, discrimination or exclusionary behaviors from both Hungarians and the agencies of Hungarian state authority. After their migration experiences were asked to them, seventeen of them immediately and directly responded that they have “never and ever” experienced any kind of negative experiences. Two of them stress about some difficulties of being migrants there. There is only one interviewee who states her negative experiences as a migrant.

The majority rejects any negative experiences. The statement of “I did not experience any kind of negativity in any way” are repeated by seventeen respondents. They mostly find Hungarians quite sympathetic, friendly, affectionate, and warm blooded. Rather than any discrimination and racism, Hungarians treat them very kindly, and they display positive behaviors and manners in their daily communication.

“Hungarians are very affectionate and cordial towards the Turks. They like Turks. I have not never encountered any kind of racism in any city and wherever I go in Hungary.” (Sedat, Hungarian citizen, tradesman)

Sedat is one of the immigrants who is quite happy and comfortable to live in Hungary as a migrant. Furkan also evaluates Hungarians by stating that Hungarians are good, kind, and honest people. He says that Hungarians love him and appreciate his mistakes even when he tries to speak Hungarian with them. By contributing their opinions, there is another expression:

“I think Hungarian society is one of the best societies to live in Europe. There is absolutely no racism in Hungarian society. They are not self-righteous. It is an open society who accepts you.” (Burak, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

The positive attitudes of Hungarians and the acceptable, tolerant feature of the Hungarian society are mentioned by the majority.

“Hungary is the most comfortable society for Turks in Europe because Hungarians are much more like people in our society than other Europeans and their prejudice is minimal. In other words, I can say that Hungary is the most comfortable and unprejudiced society that can live in among the countries I have seen.” (Sedat, Hungarian citizen, tradesman)

In a very similar vein, Aysel also points out that “Hungarians have no prejudices against Turks. Hungarians are very warm blooded” (Turkish citizen, front officer manager). By supporting them, Süleyman expresses that “There is absolutely no antipathy towards strangers. Especially not against the Turks.” (Hungarian citizen, businessman). In addition to the behaviors of Hungarians, also the behaviors of state agencies were mentioned positively. Aysel experienced that the officers in state agency were quite helpful for the translation of Hungarian documents.

The reasons of high positive migration experiences and pleasure in Hungarian society as a migrant can be analyzed within several perspectives. The interviewees denote the reason of their good migration experiences in Hungary by relating them to the good image of Turkish immigrants; the relatively smaller number of the Turkish migrant population; and the sympathy as results of the commonalities based on history, culture, political culture; and Turanism.

The positive migration experiences as a result of positive Turkish image

The most striking reason that may contribute to Turkish affection and respect in Hungary can be analyzed within a Turkish profile that is drawn by the mostly educated, high skilled, white-collar professionals.

“The Turks that the Hungarians deal with are educated and expat Turks here. They don't see the Turkish population as immigrants. Turks generally work as senior executives or intermediate managers of large companies in Hungary. Turks in Hungary are very different from the Turkish profile in other European countries.” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager)

Aysel differentiates the Turks as an expat group of Turkish immigrants like in Hungary and guestworker (*gurbetçi*) type of Turkish immigrants like mostly seen in Germany, Austria, Netherland or France. In her point of view, *gurbetçi* (guestworker) type of

immigrants as opposed to expat group are perceived as uneducated and unskilled blue-collar workers who do not actively participate in Hungarian civil society. The characteristics of Turkish immigrants in Hungary as an expat –dominated is also underlined with another expression:

“There is a disgusting Turkish image in Western European countries but not here. There are many Turkish expats in Hungary unlike the guest worker (gurbetçi) mode of Turks in the most European countries. For this reason, there is nothing negative about the Turks in Hungary”. (Gözde, Turkish citizen, lawyer)

The modes of Turkish immigrants in Europe are quite differentiated by the interviewees as an expat group and guest worker (gurbetçi) groups. They state that due to the expat dominated groups in Hungary rather than the guest workers Turkish, the Turks are treated more positively, even in a respectful due to the high positions that they hold. Eventually, the good condition and well-established Turkish profile in Hungary affect the mindset of Hungarian people within positive mentality and this can affect the more positive experiences of Turks in Hungarian society.

Turkish immigrants are small and not in the target group

One of the reasons for the positive migrant experiences in Hungary may be that the Turks are very few in numbers there, and therefore they are a group that does not pose a threat.

“Turks are very few in Hungary and this is one of the reasons that feed the Hungarians' lack of prejudices against the Turks.” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager)

The factor of a small size of Turkish migrants there can shape the outcome of less bias that makes them as a target group. The Hungarians can have bias for the other major immigrants, for instance the Romanians are stressed by some interviewees that are under the hostility in Hungarian society.

“Gypsies have a large population, and they are not liked in Hungary. I as a Turk do not feel that I am targeted. I see them (Romanians) as a target group but not myself”. (Meral, Turkish citizen, architect)

Meral explains that the Romanians are ones who are treated more negatively, and Turkish are not considered as a foreigner group due to their small and negligible population. Romanian gypsies are also mentioned by Buket who claims that there are they are not liked much in Hungary. As Buket explains in her story, the child in the street shouted gypsy to her mother because he thought that her mother was a gypsy. Since Romanian gypsy population is the large and target group of more negative feelings or behaviors in Hungary, this situation may cause the focus to be on them. As a result, Turks may therefore be underestimated and ignored without attention.

Positive attitudes to Turks due to the several commonalities

“Being a Turk is even an advantage here because they have the sympathy to Turks”. (Burak, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

It is the general belief of the majority of interviewees as Turkish immigrants in Hungary. As mentioned by many participants, one of the reasons for the positive experience of the Turks there may be the commonalities between the Hungarian and Turkish society include history, culture and some characteristics. The common history is stressed by most of the interviewees that is based on the Ottoman history in Hungary which consists of 150 years and the origin based on the Central Asian ancestry. Aysel supports that Hungarians are close to Turks because they may think that we share the common origin and descendants. As Burak demonstrates, there are many historical symbols such as monuments and mosques that were built under common culture in Hungary from the Ottoman period. In addition to Ottoman history, there is an older past before Ottoman based on the period that denotes the Hungarians are descendants of the Huns which have a common descent. This factor may have been influential in creating a society where there is tolerance and closeness between two nations. Süleyman emphasizes the common history of the Turks and Hungarians, and he perceives the Turkish-Hungarian history within a good memory and based on the foundation of friendship. According to his ideas, their friendship in the past has

contributed to building good interaction and image between two nations. He expresses the historical relationship as follows:

“The common Turkish-Hungarian history affects the relationship and feelings between two societies in a good way. Both communities have experienced immigration from Central Asia to Europe for ages, and then have common ties during the Ottoman Empire's time here which have become stronger later... The Hungarian nation has helped us a lot. For example, the founder of the old Istanbul fire brigade is a Hungarian. Of course, this solidarity was mutual. We also helped Hungary during the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. Turks also helped in their national independence movements, such as the Hungarians' revolt against Austrian hegemony. When the Hungarians fought for independence in such rebellions, they always received support from Turkey.” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Besides, several interviewees point out the common characteristics of Turkish and Hungarian society.

“The temperament and sense of humor of Turks and Hungarians are very similar, and I find Hungarian culture close to Turkish culture. For example, when there is a joke, other foreigners do not understand it, while the Hungarians laugh at this joke like the Turks.” (Eda, Turkish citizen, kindergarten teacher)

She believes that Hungary is closer to Turkey than Western Europe because Hungary is culturally caught between Balkan countries and European countries. She says that “The further west, the greater the difference. For this reason, she does not want to live in Western Europe. She finds Hungarian society as close to Turkish society. Fadime also explains the cultural resemblance of two societies by stating:

“Turkey and Hungary are similar in terms of cultural structure, especially in terms of family structure. There is a collective understanding of society in Turkey. Rather than the individualism created in America and Europe, a collective understanding of society prevails in Hungary as in our society. They interact and intertwine with each other just like we do”. (Fadime, Turkish citizen, research assistant)

Positive attributes to due to political reasons and Turanism

In addition to natural characteristics and cultural closeness of Turks and Hungarians; the political similarity of Turkey and Hungary is also stated as a common political culture. Gözde says that “Hungary is similar to Turkey unlike Western Europe in case of politics.” (Hungarian citizen, lawyer). The strong similarities between the leader of Turkey and Hungary, Erdoğan and Orbán is mentioned by several interviewees. They evaluate that the similarities of our leaders show that how the two countries rule similar.

“Think like Hungary is Turkey's speaker in Europe...They have stand on the same perspective most of the time and the political relations between Hungary and Turkey is very good” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

Fadime analyzes the sympathy to Turks in Hungary by relating with both soft power and political relations. She claims that Turkish TV series, Turkish language courses and Turkish research on history are very common in Hungary. For example:

“Turcology studies are widely used to investigate whether Hungarians are of Turkish origin because Orbán has some statements such as we are of Turkish origin. One of the Turkish associations, Yunus Emre Institute in Hungary works there and opens language courses. In addition, Erdoğan and Orbán's personal bilateral relations also trigger these efforts.” (Fadime, Turkish citizen, research assistant)

In her point of view, these contribute to the general sympathy of the people towards the Turks. The strong political relationship is emphasized within Turanism¹. Two of the interviewees describe the term of “Turanism” to relate close political ties between Turkey and Hungary. Aysel indicates that “Turanism has been accepted by the state

¹Turanism is an ideological phenomenon that advocates the unity of the Ural-Altai tribes. Hungarian Turanism is a significant ideology in political history of Hungary and currently the main focus of the Jobbik party, one of the major political parties in Hungary. “According to the ideology of Turanism, Hungarians are related to Altaic peoples, such as Turks, Azeris, Tatars, Kazakhs, Mongols, and even Tibetans and Japanese” (Kowalczyk, 2017, p. 49). This ideology based on the idea of cooperation of these people and states.

authority here”. She presents some examples related with Turanism such as the activities organized by Hungary called as Türk Kurultayı (Turkish Assembly) held in every year in Hungary in which many Turkish states participate, and Hungary hosts it.

“We went there, I was very proud, and I liked it. There were people who came by car even from Turkey. It is very enjoyable from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan because they feel themselves in that Turkish society. I think it is beautiful, so we are lucky, because we live here. I can say that we cannot be so comfortable in other European countries, as an immigrant.” (Aysel, Turkish citizen, front office manager)

Moreover, Fadime also examines the closeness of Hungary towards Asian societies within its foreign affairs called as “The Eastern Opening”. According to her, the foreign policy of Hungary helps the development of the positive attitudes on Turks.

“With the Eastern Opening process of Hungary, it has tended to create an alternative to the European Union in terms of merging and integrating with the Turks in Asia, cooperating with them in political, commercial, and economic terms, and strengthening these ties. This trend has caused it to shift from the European axis and turn towards the Asian side.” (Fadime, Turkish citizen, research assistant)

Negative experiences explicitly

Only one of the interviewees talked about her negative experiences in her daily life. She described two experiences that affected her negatively, and she feels like she was directly hated and unwanted. Firstly, while there were walking down the street, a child shouted at her mother as gipsy because her mother was wearing a headscarf. Her mother was humiliated. Also, while they were speaking Turkish at a picnic with her family, an old Hungarian woman belittled them and said something angry like “Did you come from Arabia?”

Negative experiences implicitly

In addition to her negative experiences, two interviewees who advert that they have more positive migration experiences also claim that there are some challenges in

their migration experiences. Rather than direct experience of discrimination, they notice the indirect kind of discrimination which is seen in the forms of difficulties in their migration experiences such as the time consuming and demanding producers of extending the residence permit and the hardship of naturalization process. Meral specifies that she has never experienced any negative attitudes from Hungarians in person, but her family was exposed to exclusionary conditions of the rules commanded by state authority while they were applying for residence. She claims that “The state authority creates an obstacle to residence permit and makes difficulties with several excuses in Migration Office” (Turkish citizen, architect). Likewise, Hazal also concerns that “The state makes life difficult for immigrants by making things much more difficult and impossible”. She gives the examples that she could not have a work permit, even if she gets married with a Hungarian and gets residence permit. Also, while she extends her residence permits due to the extension of her university; the state let only three months period her. Then when the three months were completed, she applied again for other three months period. Later, she applied again for three months period. She believes that:

“This can be a kind of racism which does not show itself directly but indirectly...The state cannot be directly against to migration, because it will be a real racism, but it does it differently with several obstacles on migrants’ lives.” (Hazal, Turkish citizen, graduate student)

The difficulties in the naturalization process are mentioned by the hardship of the exams that is needed. Sedat tells his memories when he takes the written and oral exam in the Consulate, and he states that he works very hard to get the citizenship because the exam is very much difficult, and it limits people to have Hungarian citizenship. According to him, there are difficult and detailed questions about Hungarian laws and constitution and few people could be successful in this exam. He explains as in the followings:

“For example, there are very difficult and detailed questions such as working systems of the police in Hungary, which armed forces are the forces that provide internal security, which are the forces that provide external security, which courts are there, which criminal courts are there, who are in the courts,

the prosecutor, the defendant, the plaintiff. Or what is the mayorship, who performs the duties of the mayor, what is the working order, the mayor is the mayor, the mayor of the system working under it has official law offices. There are cultural bureaus, there are vice presidents... They asked each of them separately... It's so hard to know these details... We took the exam with 30-33 people or something, I think 13-14 people passed the exam. Of course, it's not easy.” (Sedat, Hungarian citizen, tradesman)

To summarize, although most of the interviewees state that they have quite positive migration experiences in Hungary without any discrimination due to the factors of good Turkish image in Hungary, the small and unheeded Turkish population, commonalities between Turks and Hungarians, the political reasons and Turanism. There are also others who claim that they have experienced some kinds of discrimination whether explicitly or implicitly. Although there is one direct hostile experience, there are some indirect discrimination forms within the reflection of difficulties and barriers that can prevent the comfort of immigrants by the state authority. Some of the interviewees feel that rather than they are explicitly targeted, they are implicitly targeted and there is different mechanism to it such as the hardship of naturalization exam and the difficulties of having residence permit.

4.3.2. The Effects of Orban’s Discourse and Policies

The interviewees are also asked about the effects of Orban's policies and discourses on their daily lives. Since they are also migrants and Muslims who are the subjects of Orban’s discourses, whether and how they are affected is analyzed. Hungary has gained a reputation in Europe for adopting a hostile position towards international immigration, especially with the problems in 2015. (Bocskor, 2018, p.551). As it is stated by Medelski (2019), Orban is prone to implement some xenophobic policies towards foreigners and he labelled immigrants, especially the Muslim groups as a threat to Hungarian Christian peaceful identity. A Muslim group of immigrants in Hungary is important to see the realities from their eyes. Their opinion and experiences can reveal the effects of political situation on social and daily lives. I expect to see the negative effects of Orban’s policies on immigrants lives in such environment where the Orban’s exclusionary, anti-migrant, anti-Muslim

speeches exist. I think that the group of Muslim immigrants living in a country with a prime minister and an administration with anti-migrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric face many difficulties in their daily lives. I also believe that living in such exclusionary and communitarian environment can damage the immigrants with several difficulties.

After conducting the interviews, the analysis shows that out of twenty interviewees, nineteen of them assume that Orban's politics and discourse do not affect their daily lives negatively. Unlike the majority, one interviewee explains that she feels the difficulties of Orban's nationalist politics. In addition, out of nineteen interviewees who argue that they are not affected by Orban's discourse, also claim some difficulties that they experience due to Orban's politics. However, they do not personalize these difficulties and they believe that they are not the targets of Orban's speeches. When the interviewees are specifically asked about their feelings and impacts of the Orban's discourses; nineteen people answered that they do not feel and experience any negative effects of them. Firstly, most of them emphasize that Orban is not against migration, rather he is against illegal migration. They quite agree with Orban and support his statements at this point. Secondly, they believe that they are not the targets of Orban's discourse because Turks are differentiated from the other immigrants. Significantly, two more points can be drawn from the analysis of the interviews. The older Hungarians and the rural Hungarians may have been more affected by Orban and they may be more prone to the negative ideas and attitudes towards immigrants.

Orban's image is the delusion of media, he is not anti-migrant

First of all, majority of the Turkish immigrants in Hungary state that they are not affected negatively from the Orban's policies, they support that the negative image about Orban that is drawn by media is not true. Even some of them claim that they support Orban's speeches, and that he is quite right. As some of the interviewees emphasize the oversight and misdirection of the media in this case which shows Orban as anti-migration.

“There is a huge delusion by the media. Orban clearly says that he does not want illegal immigration, but the word illegal is not in the press.” (Süleyman, Hungarian citizen, businessman)

He also supports that Hungary is a place that receives a lot of immigration. It is not an anti-immigrant country and there is no antipathy towards immigrants if they come legally. Likely, Sami also says that what the Orban is against is illegal immigration and he supports Orban in this point.

“Orban is against illegal immigration. How can something illegal be defended? He is against those who want to enter by forcing the borders of his country, normally. He is quite right.” (Sami, Hungarian citizen, hotel manager)

Clearly, the participants do not feel themselves as the subject in question and they do not take Orban's negative statements as directed at them. As Sedat clarifies, “This is something that is said against illegal people, not us.” (Hungarian citizenship, tradesman). Moreover, one of the reasons Turkish immigrants are not taken to Orban's negative discourses is that Turks say that their status is different from other immigrants and that they are separated from them. They say that the target group is not themselves but other immigrant groups. Therefore, Orban's discourse does not make sense for them.

“As a foreigner, I do not think we have suffered much from the authoritarian regime of Orban. Because Turkish immigrants differ from others. Maybe the immigrants with lower socioeconomic status are affected, but Turkish immigrants are viewed on a more economic and educational basis. So, these two groups are separated.” (Fadime, Turkish citizen, research assistant)

Also, they do not believe that Orban is anti-migrant and anti-Muslim. They have no problem in Hungary, although they are migrant and Muslim. Sami is one of them who proves that the Turkish immigrants are not negatively affected from the Orban's exclusionary rhetoric.

“If Orban is an enemy of Islam and Turks, what is he doing in the Turkish Council? They have no such hostility. He is not anti-Muslim or anti-Turkish.” (Sami, Hungarian citizen, hotel manager)

Similarly, Gözde advocates that there is no negative attitude towards Turks because Turks are in the form of an expat group and their profile is better than other immigrants.

Besides, Meral also believes that Turks are different, and they are not targeted by stating that:

“As a Turk, the place that is positioned as education level and income level is not illegal immigrant status. That's why I don't think he is targeting me... The Afghan or Syrian immigrants, who are mostly illegal immigrants, are targeted. Also, Gypsies in Hungary can be also a target because they are not liked”
(Meral, Turkish citizen, architect)

Orban may affect the rural and older Hungarians

Furthermore, the interviewees also stress that Orban may affects the rural Hungarians who are uneducated more and they do not experience the reflection of Orban's incitement because they do not live in rural regions. Yağmur who lives in Budapest state that “I did not feel this situation, perhaps because I am in a more international environment” (Turkish citizen, pharmaceutical representative). Her Hungarian friends also do not support or like what Orban says. She claims that generally, the voter of Orban is not from Budapest but from the countryside. Sami also notes that Orban's statements found different repercussions in the mostly ignorant part of the villages. Orban's opposition was illegal immigration, but they interpreted it as more extreme. He presents an example that there are also such people in Turkey who are against Syrian immigrants. Fadime gives the example of her friends who live in more rural part in Hungary, and they feel the negative attitudes of the people there who are inspired from Orban's discourses.

Besides, two interviewees think that the older Hungarians are more effected from Orban's speeches, and they are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. Ufuk tells his story about the elderly father of his closest Hungarian friend who needled him because he was a Muslim. Serkan explains that about 30% of Hungary are older and this ratio is very high with a population of 10,000. He claims that retired older who spend their time watching television are under the influence of Orban's statements and they are more likely to be manipulated. For this reason, he believes that older Hungarians can contribute to make Orban's anti-immigrant rhetoric a problem.

Feeling the negative effects of Orban in explicit way

Unlike the majority who did not experience the negative impacts of Orban's politics and discourses, Emine replied to the question as yes, she feels the negative reflection of his politics. She gives an example and explain the negative impacts of Orban's politics in her daily life. She is married with a Hungarian and pregnant. She explains that to give her child a foreign name, she must get an approve and bring a paper from the Consulate which makes the process difficult. She feels like that they force her to choose Hungarian names. She perceives this event as a discrimination of foreigners and the effect of Orban's nationalistic politics.

Feeling the negative effects of Orban in an implicit way

One interviewee claimed that she is affected negatively by Orban's anti-migrant polices explicitly but not implicitly. Aysel states that she does not see the reflection of negative impacts of Orban directly, but the challenging conditions in citizenship and immigration policies are also form of discrimination by quoting that "To apply for citizenship, you have to live for eight years with a permanent residence. At first it was three years, then five years, then eight years. It will take another year, maybe ten years." She emphasizes that although she does not face a problem personally, the citizenship and residence processes have been made difficult.

The final point that should be mentioned in the analysis section is that the demographic differences are not very noticeable. Different demographic variables such as age, education level, gender did not make an important difference. At the same time, general perceptions and experiences were similar within the group with and without Hungarian citizenship. The most crucial contribution of the variable of having Hungarian citizenship was to learn which advantages different from each other between the Turks Hungarian citizenship and Turks without Hungarian citizenship.

DISCUSSION

5.1. Turkishness of the Turks

One of the most striking parts of the interviews was the excitement, pride, sanctity and longing that Turkish immigrant feel when they were talking about Turkey, Turkishness and Turkish citizenship. The sacred and deep meaning that Turkish immigrants in Hungary ascribe to Turkishness emerges as a very important factor affecting their sense of belonging and citizenship perceptions.

In terms of belonging, the predominance of the feelings of Turkishness causes them to feel they belong to Turkey. Their perception, feelings, and sentiments on belonging to the country of origin or receiving country or other places can open some discussions to evaluate. This section evaluates the findings regarding sense of belonging, citizenship perceptions and migrant experiences. As it is mentioned before, the sense of belonging developed by the Turks in Hungary can lead to different results because Turks are a Muslim minority group in an illiberal populist country in Europe. The results show that most of the participants feel a belonging to Turkey, with a small minority of the participants who feel they belong to both Turkey and Hungary, another small minority of the participant who feel European and a very small minority who feel global have showed the deeper attachment to country of origin and very slight belongingness to receiving country.

Interestingly, none of the participants said that they feel belonging to only the host country. In this study, the lack of belonging of the participants to Hungary was interpreted primarily as the result of their strong feelings towards Turkey. It was not specifically asked whether the illiberal populist regime affected their belonging or not. But no such or similar comment about negative attitudes of Hungary as a source reason of the weak belonging to Hungary emerged among the answers. Participants did not complain or share negative attitudes they were subjected to in Hungarian society or in illiberal populist regime. This points to the possibility that the lack of sense of belonging to Hungary does not originate from Hungary but the strong emotions to

Turkey. It can be noted that the sacred meaning attributed to Turkishness makes them feel they belong to Turkey more than any other nation.

Apart from the issue of belonging, citizenship perceptions have also been an important area affected by Turkishness. In the second part, the perceptions of Turkish immigrants living in Hungary towards citizenship were examined within formal (*rights and duties*) and substantive (*identity and participation*) types of understanding. A multi-level analysis examined citizenship perceptions in general, Hungarian and European Union citizenship perceptions, and Turkish citizenship perceptions. As mentioned earlier, the majority perceive citizenship around its substantive features, Hungarian and European Union citizenship around formal features, and Turkish citizenship around substantive features of citizenship.

The more substantive perception of citizenship in general and Turkish citizenship can be related with the substantive perceptions of citizenship in Turkey. Citizenship in Turkey is characterized as republican, communitarian, and particularistic. Hence, the immigrants of Turkish origin are expected to be under its influence. These immigrants may have adopted substantive general citizenship perceptions because they experience a substantive sense of citizenship in their homeland. The education system as well as the political rhetoric regarding citizenship in Turkey is very much rooted in nationalistic, communitarian formulations which is reflected in the answers of most interviewees. These individuals were raised in an environment in which citizenship is defined around identity and community. In this case, country of origin can be effective to shape citizenship perceptions of immigrants. Those immigrants that come from an origin country which has more formal, legal, political understanding of citizenship may reflect a formal understanding of citizenship in general; as opposed to the example of Turkey which has more ethnocultural and communitarian understanding of citizenship. Different sampling groups from different countries or the more sampling groups from the same country can be analyzed in future studies. Moreover, the substantive understanding of Turkish citizenship may cause them not to have a substantive understanding of any other citizenships. A more formal approach towards Hungarian and European citizenship can also be explained by their deep substantive attachment to Turkish citizenship. For this reason, they may have

more formal understanding to Hungarian and European citizenship due to the excessive substantive attribution to Turkish citizenship

In addition, one of the most important discussions of this study is the issue of citizenship on paper and citizenship at heart, which is significantly affected by strong feelings of Turkishness. Although most of the participants in the study are Hungarian citizens and EU citizens, they consider these citizenships on paper and do not fully feel they belong to Hungary or Europe, or they have difficulty considering themselves as a part of either Hungary or Europe. The majority of the Turkish immigrants who have Hungarian citizenship attribute emotional ties and holy feelings to Turkey as homeland and to Turkish citizenship. They highlight the advantages of having Hungarian and EU citizenship, whereas they state their strong attachment to Turkey and the spiritual meaning of Turkish citizenship which they do not extend to Hungarian and EU citizenship. Most respondents' assessment of EU citizenship in terms of advantages and benefits may indicate that EU citizenship is viewed in a formal way and lacks emotional attachment. During the interviews, one participant referred to the naturalized immigrants as "Artificial Hungarians". Likewise, the general judgment of the study is that Turkish immigrants, who later acquired Hungarian citizenship, feel themselves as artificial Hungarians or artificial Europeans and *naturally* Turkish. Therefore, this study claims that although Turks living in Hungary are Hungarian and European citizens, this citizenship is not a citizenship from the heart, but rather a status that is meaningful depending on the rights and advantages gained.

Although they have very spiritual feelings about Turkishness, they also underline the material benefits of being a Hungarian or European citizen. They criticize Turkish citizenship for not offering the rights and privileges that Hungarian and European citizenship offer them. They state that they were in favor of Hungarian and European citizenship, which provided them with rights and privileges that Turkish citizenship did not provide, although they had a very strong bond of love to Turkishness. Therefore, the emotional attachment provided by Turkishness and the formal advantages of being a Hungarian and European citizen are the reasons why they are in a dilemma. The lack of Turkish citizenship in terms of advantages causes them to look more formally towards Hungarian and European citizenship.

5.2. Turkish-Hungarian Relationship

Another striking point is that, contrary to expectations, the immigrants living in Hungary are not exposed to negative experiences in Hungary and they feel very satisfied there. Almost all of them mentioned that Hungarians are very friendly and very positive towards them. The last section in this study analyzed the experiences of Turkish immigrants living in Hungary. This was effective for understanding the role of the illiberal populist Hungarian regime. A key aim of this research was to understand how illiberal populism is felt in the society by immigrants while listening to and analyzing their experiences directly as an immigrant group targeted by illiberal populism. This part evaluates the findings regarding the effect of the illiberal populist regime, its rhetoric and policies on Turkish immigrants in Hungary. Very different from my expectation, this immigrant group is not affected by the illiberal populist regime of Hungary and Orban's discourse and policies in their daily lives as migrants.

Based on the perceptions and comments of the participants, this study asserts that Turkish immigrants living in Hungary may not be a target group of the impact of rising illiberal populism in Hungary. Turks can be an exceptional and privileged group among immigrant groups living in Hungary. The factors including relations between Turkey and Hungary that get closer from time to time; the warm feelings towards Turkey rooted in Turanism in Hungary; the sympathy of the Hungarian society for the Turks due to common history or structural similarities; the economically and socially prestigious position of the Turks in Hungary; and being a small minority group of Turkish immigrants which cause them not to attract much attention by the exclusionist regime, may be the reasons that make the Turkish immigrant group exceptional. For these reasons, perhaps the Turks living in Hungary may be an inadequate or incomplete group to understand the effects of Hungary's illiberal populist regime.

5.3. The Effect of Illiberal Populism

Before I started the research, I expected Turkish immigrants living in Hungary to be negatively affected by the illiberal populist regime in their sense of belonging, citizenship perceptions and migrant experiences. However, after conducting the study,

I observe that it seems that illiberal populism is not very effective in these areas. The feelings that home country has on them and their positive experiences in Hungarian society can be seen as the main determinants that shape their sense of belonging, citizenship experiences and migrant experiences. While the effects of illiberal populism on migration experiences were directly asked to the interviewees in this research, its impact on citizenship perceptions and sense of belonging was not directly asked. After analyzing the responses to sense of belonging and citizenship, illiberal populism does not affect their sense of belonging and citizenship perception, as the participants do not mention the effects of illiberal populism through related issues such as exclusion based on ethnic or religious preferences or the inability to belong or be a citizen in an environment that is not embracing. Further, when discussing their migration experience, the participants openly stated that the illiberal populist regime did not have a negative effect.

Although there is not a clear finding regarding whether illiberal populism shapes the perceptions of citizenship or not, I would like to add my comments and evaluations of their citizenship perceptions. Firstly, the more formal understanding of Hungarian citizenship attributed by the participants may be in fact be related with the illiberal populist regime. The more formal understanding of Hungarian citizenship may result from the lack of substantive perception of Hungarian citizenship: identity and participation. It is expected that Turks would not feel complete in terms of identity however the illiberal populist nature of Hungarian politics, Turks may lead them to feel incomplete in terms of participation as well. Hence, they may not associate the substantive understanding with Hungarian citizenship. For example, when Orban says about no need of immigrant children, but need of Hungarian children in Hungary; Turks may feel secondary in society. Since the illiberal populist regimes favors the ethnic or particularistic dimension of citizenship, this may affect the immigrants to get further away from the identity components of Hungarian citizenship. This emphasis on particularistic features of Hungarian citizenship may prevent them from identifying alternative points of reference to develop an attachment to citizenship in Hungary. This might even enhance their perception of Turkish citizenship in substantive forms. The question of identity of Hungarian citizenship for Turkish immigrants may have caused them to not regard their Hungarian citizenship as substantive because they are ethnically Turkish, not Hungarian. They may have felt this emphasis in the words and

policies of Orban, and since illiberal populist regimes are generally prone to foreign exclusion, they may not have been able to integrate themselves with Hungary as an identity. At the same time, they may see themselves as inadequate in Hungarian society in terms of participation, and therefore they may not be able to associate Hungarian citizenship as substantive. The extent they are able to participate and their level of willingness to participate would be an interesting point of further study.

In addition, the more formal understanding of EU citizenship, with a significant emphasis on the given rights which are identified as advantages by the immigrants, may verify the discussions in the literature about the weakness of EU citizenship in terms of other components of citizenship. As most of the interviewees mentioned, the several advantages and privileges that are endowed by EU citizenship can cause the feeling that EU citizenship consists of formal rights and enjoying from the legal status. The more emphasis on the rights-based understanding of EU citizenship is also highly underlined by the participant. This may pave the way for the discussion on the emphasis the formal procedures of citizenship by EU and the lack of the substantive dimension of community and identity. In accordance, it assumes that the construction of EU citizenship does not attribute the substantive elements of citizenship which are participation and identity. At the same time, this study relates the failure of substantive dimension of EU citizenship with illiberal populism in EU. Due to the increased exclusionary and particularistic tendency in the regimes in EU, the rising importance of community and identity has gained importance. This may lead several problems to maintain the substantive dimension of citizenship for the immigrants. They may feel incompetent themselves in the matter of identity and participation, thus they can develop more formal understanding to citizenship of the host country or EU. The more exclusionist regimes can promote more polarization in community and identity, and this may induce the difficulty to reach in communal sense of citizenship and to provide equal chance of participation between the “insider” and “outsider”.

In the future studies, it may be important to diversify the sample and cases. First of all, it is possible to research different immigrant groups other than Turks living in Hungary. Turks may be an immigrant group with positive discrimination due to the positive image they have created in Hungary and their political, cultural and historical ties in Hungarian society. Therefore, the Turks may not have felt the illiberal populist

political structure in Hungary much. Perhaps other immigrant groups could be significantly affected by this illiberal populist rule in Hungary. Although the Turkish immigrant group in Hungary showed us different and important results, as the participants mentioned, some Syrian, Afghan or North African Muslim immigrant groups can also be an important sample for future studies. As an example, the weak affiliation of Turks to Hungary is an area that needs further research that should be conducted on the belonging of other minority groups different from the Turks living in Hungary to also investigate their sense of belonging to Hungary. The further studies which can be conducted with other minority groups can reveal that the strong or weak sense of belonging to Hungary. In case of weak belonging to Hungary, the reason of it should be searched in detail: is this lack of belonging to Hungary due to excessive loyalty to the mother country or are there some problems in providing this in Hungary? In addition, apart from the diversification of the sample with other immigrant groups other than Turks, the characteristics of the Turkish immigrant group may also vary. For instance, there were no Turks born in Hungary in this study. This situation may have caused none of the participants to feel that they belong to Hungary. In future studies, immigrants born in Hungary or second-generation immigrants could be included in the research group because this can be one of the important factors affecting belonging.

Moreover, this study can also be examined in different illiberal populist countries other than Hungary to observe the similarities and differences between illiberal populist regimes or their effects on their migrants. On the contrary, it can be applied in countries which follows more liberal immigration policies that oppose to illiberal populist countries in terms of immigration policies, and a comparison can be made. This study recommends deeper analysis in the further studies by comparing illiberal populist countries among themselves or by comparing illiberal populist countries and liberal countries.

CONCLUSION

This is an empirical study on citizenship and migrant experiences in an EU country where Turkish immigrants have not been extensively studied. One of the important findings of this study is that the Turks living in Hungary are separate from other immigrant groups living there. Empirical analysis allows us to compare between rhetoric towards Muslim migrants versus experience of a particular Muslim migrant group. The fact that the Turks are quantitatively few and qualitatively an expat immigrant group in Hungary distinguish them from other immigrant groups. Because they are a small group of immigrants, they differ from the larger immigrant groups in terms of quantity, and this may give the impression that the Turks are not a significant group that could pose a threat. In addition, the fact that Turks, unlike other Muslim groups such as Syrians, Afghans or North African immigrants are not refugees, and they are mostly located in expat positions contribute to being viewed positively. Yet, the most important thing that distinguishes the Turks in this respect is the historical, cultural and political ties between Hungary and Turkey. The political closeness, cultural similarities and historical partnerships of Turkey and Hungary make Turks more special than other immigrants. These reasons may even lead to positive views towards Turks rather than negative attitudes. Turks living in Hungary have not felt the negative effects of the illiberal populist regime of Hungary, on the contrary, they have had positive experiences. Politically, the closeness of the Hungarian and Turkish states in bilateral relations, Hungary's desire to keep good relations with Turkey as a result of Eastern Opening policies and the influence of Turanism, may have also affected the Hungarian society. Historically, both the debates about Hungary being one of the Turkish tribes in Central Asia and the fact that Hungary was in the Ottoman lands during the Ottoman period connects Turks and Hungarians in terms of history and origin. The discussions about the Hungarians as descendants of Attila the Hun causes the belief of Hungarians as descendants of Turks. This can contribute to the intimacy and brotherhood between the two societies. Culturally, the fact that the Hungarian and Turkish communities are similar to each other in terms of conservative societies and that they have similar cultural values depending on the Hungarian-Turkish common history can bring the two communities closer to each other.

The second main finding is that for Turks, Turkish citizenship is above all other alternative citizenships. This study looks at citizenship perceptions in a multilevel dimension: the citizenship perception towards host country, home country and transnational EU citizenship. This research also investigates the potential interaction between these levels. Their national and emotional ties to Turkish citizenship makes alternative notions of citizenships secondary despite significant benefits. Their commitment to Turkish citizenship affects their perceptions of Hungarian and European citizenship. It causes them to interpret Hungarian and European citizenship as more pragmatic and advantageous in terms of acquired rights, and not to develop a substantive understanding of other citizenships other than Turkish citizenship.

Finally, the third main finding is that political rhetoric and experiences are not always parallel. As seen in the Hungarian case, political rhetoric may not always affect the real-life experiences of society. While it was expected that a Muslim immigrant group living in a country of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric would have negative experiences, the opposite situation occurred. This Muslim immigrant group living in Hungary is not affected by these discourses and claim to live in Hungarian society without discrimination and exclusionary attitudes. Turkish immigrants were not affected by this illiberal populist environment, and on the contrary, they had positive experiences. This is an indication that what Orban said in political rhetoric is not reflected on the ground. This rhetoric may be effective on different immigrant groups, but this expectation is not reflected in the case of Turkish immigrants in Hungary.

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ANNEX

Mülakat Soruları

Genel Bilgiler:

Ad/ Soyad:

Yaş:

Meslek:

Medeni durum:

Vatandaşlık:

Eğitim durumu:

Nerede doğdunuz?

Kaç senedir Macaristan'da yaşıyorsunuz?

Macaristan'a göç etme nedeniniz neydi?

Aidiyet

1. Kendinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? Türk/Macar/Avrupalı?
2. Kendinizi nereye ait hissediyorsunuz? Türkiye/Macaristan/Avrupa?
3. Türkiye ile/ Macaristan ile bağlarınız nasıl?

Vatandaşlık Algıları

4. Size göre vatandaşlık ne demektir, ne anlama geliyor?
5. Size göre Macar vatandaşlığı ne ifade ediyor? Macar vatandaşlığını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Macaristan'da vatandaşlık nasıldır?
6. Kendinizi Macar vatandaşı hissediyor musunuz? Kendinizi hangi anlamda/ hangi açılardan Macar vatandaşı olarak görüyorsunuz?
7. Sizin için AB vatandaşlığı ne ifade ediyor? AB vatandaşlığını nasıl tanımlarsınız?

8. Kendinizi AB vatandaşı hissediyor musunuz? Kendinizi hangi anlamda/hangi açılardan AB vatandaşı olarak görüyorsunuz?
9. Türk vatandaşlığı sizin için ne ifade ediyor? Türk vatandaşlığını nasıl tanımlarsınız? Türkiye’de vatandaşlık nasıldır?

Deneyimler

10. Orada yaşadığınız süre boyunca edindiğiniz deneyimlerden bahseder misiniz? Paylaşmak istediğiniz günlük hayat deneyimleriniz, karşılaştığınız olaylar var mıdır?
11. Orada bir göçmen olarak size tutumları nasıldır? Yıllara göre değişiklik var mıdır?
12. Herhangi bir ırkçılığa maruz kaldınız mı? Ya da olumlu yaklaşım?
13. Gündelik hayatınızda Orban dönemi politikalarının herhangi bir etkisi oldu mu? / Orban’ın göç ve vatandaşlık söylemleri ve politikalarının etkilerini hissettiniz mi?
14. Orada yaşadığınız göçmenlik sürecini değerlendirecek olursanız oraya göçmekten memnun musunuz?

Interview Questions

General Information:

Name/ Surname:

Age:

Occupation:

Marital status:

Citizenship:

Educational status:

Where were you born?

How many years have you lived in Hungary?

What was your reason for migrating to Hungary?

Belonging

1. How would you describe yourself? Turkish/Hungarian/European?
2. Where do you feel you belong to? Turkey/Hungary/Europe?
3. How are your ties with Turkey/Hungary?

Citizenship Perceptions

4. What does citizenship mean to you, what does it mean?
5. What does Hungarian citizenship mean to you? How would you define Hungarian citizenship? What is citizenship like in Hungary?
6. Do you consider yourself a Hungarian citizen? In what sense / aspects do you see yourself as a Hungarian citizen?
7. What does EU citizenship mean to you? How would you define EU citizenship?

8. Do you feel like an EU citizen? In what sense / aspects do you see yourself as an EU citizen?

9. What does Turkish citizenship mean to you? How would you define Turkish citizenship? What is citizenship like in Turkey?

Experiences

10. Can you tell us about the experiences you had during your time there? Do you have daily life experiences or events that you want to share?

11. How is their attitude towards you as an immigrant there? Are there any changes over the years?

12. Have you been exposed to any form of racism? Or the positive approach?

13. Did the Orban period policies have any effect on your daily life? / Did you feel the effects of Orban's immigration and citizenship discourses and policies?

14. If you evaluate the immigration process you have experienced there, are you satisfied with immigrating there?

CV