

ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL

**EVOLUTION OF CONTENT MODERATION IN TURKEY: LEGAL-
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS**

M. A. THESIS

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**Department of Science, Technology, Society
Science, Technology, Society Programme**

Defence Date: 01.02.2022

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

**TÜRKİYE’DE İÇERİK DENETİMİNİN GELİŞİMİ: HUKUKSAL - SOSYAL
PERSPEKTİFLER VE GELECEK PROJEKSİYONLARI**

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*To my mother, the teacher that taught me the most,
En çok öğrendiğim öğretmenime, anneme,*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xi
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xvii
SUMMARY.....	xix
ÖZET.....	xxi
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1. 1 Motivation.....	1
1. 2 Research Question and Hypotheses.....	2
1. 3 History of Censorship in Roman Empire	3
1. 4 History of Censorship in the Ottoman Empire.....	5
1. 5 History of Censorship in the USSR.....	7
1. 6 History of Censorship in the Republic of Turkey.....	10
1. 6. 1 Censorship in Radio, Cinema and Television.....	11
1. 6. 2 Censorship of the Internet.....	13
2. INTERVIEW.....	15
3. CODING CENSORSHIP.....	19
3. 1 Summary of the Overall Findings.....	20
3. 2 Statistical Tests of the Hypotheses.....	26
4. CENSORSHIP OF THE DIGITAL.....	31
4. 1 Communication	31
4. 2 Autonomous Technology.....	34
4. 3 La Technique.....	37
5. CONCLUSION.....	45
REFERENCES	49
APPENDIX	53
CURRICULUM VITAE	185

ABBREVIATIONS

RTÜK	: Radio and Television Supreme Council
SKAAS	: Digital Record Archive Analysis System
AC	: Algorithmic Censorship
N	: National
I	: International
S	: Social
P	: Political
C	: Current
H	: Historical
KAVTAM	: Concept Recognition
AI	: Artificial Intelligence
BTK	: Information and Communication Technologies Authority

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 3.2.1: T test of Social Cases with Conservative Ideology.....	26
Table 3.2.2: T test of Political Cases with Conservative Ideology.....	27
Table 3.2.3: T test of Social Cases with Non-Conservative Ideology.....	28
Table 3.2.4: T test of Political Cases with Non-Conservative Ideology.....	28

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 3.1.1: Distribution of the Censored Mediums (1930-2020).....	20
Figure 3.1.2: Distribution of the Censored Mediums (2008-2020).....	21
Figure 3.1.3: Number of Netflix Subscribers (URL-4)	22
Figure 3.1.4: Distribution of the Agencies Imposing Censorship	23
Figure 3.1.5: Distribution of Political and Social Cases.....	25
Figure 5.1: Relationship among the four categories of actions of dataveillance..	46

EVOLUTION OF CONTENT MODERATION IN TURKEY: LEGAL-SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS

SUMMARY

In the old paradigm *ensorship* is used in a manner in which the citizen is *aware* of the *aim* of censorship, namely, it is common knowledge that there is a socially frowned upon item behind the pixelated flower or that the appearance of a light blue screen when trying to access a website that is blocked, it is within the understanding of the populace that the website they are trying to access has been deemed harmful by the government. However, in the new paradigm, differing methods of censorship are being utilized. If a content is deemed as harmful, it is removed from the search engine, hence the access is erased rather than blocked. Furthermore, the entirety of a private conversation (IM) is subjected to instant control which suggests a departure from ex post censorship to ex-ante censorship. Considering the evolution of censorship technologies into algorithmic censorship, the extent of the latter method is quite significant. If censorship is divided into two components in the 21st century, namely, the *Censorship of the Analog* (Visual, Print) and the *Censorship of the Digital* (ISP & OSP based, Algorithmic), an analogous setting can be found between the two in order to determine the difference.

This thesis will analyze the historical progression of censorship law in Turkey by categorizing cases of content moderation into political and social categories by applying a search string to newspaper articles from 1930 to 2020 in order to convey progression of Censorship of the Analog and later compare it to the recent developments in the area of censorship. Winner's insight on using *Technological Luddism* as a method of analyzing the effect of a given technology, the analog and the digital can be compared to each other in order to provide a deeper understanding of the social effects of censorship technologies in the 21st century. Furthermore, with the advent of streaming services, the content consumed by the Turkish public is not monitored by regulatory bodies in Turkey and in the last decade there has been several legal acitons taken in order to normalize this structure. The thesis will look into the possibility of a hegemonic relationship between the ever-increasing nature of global streaming services.

TÜRKİYE'DE İÇERİK DENETİMİNİN GELİŞİMİ: HUKUKSAL VE SOSYAL PERSPEKTİFLER VE GELECEK PROJEKSİYONLARI

ÖZET

Eflatun'un Devlet'inden günümüze toplum sözleşmesini kabul etmiş bütün politik yapılanmalar belirli kültürel ve ahlaki prensiplere göre halkın tükettiği içeriğin denetimini yapmaktadırlar. Günümüzde negatif bir algıya sebep olsa da Eflatun'dan bu yana sansür, devletin bir fonksiyonu haline gelmiştir. Kültürel korunma ve ahlaki prensiplerin korunması adına önemli bir fonksiyonu vardır. Bu tezde ilk olarak bu kelimenin tarihi yolculuğundan bahsedip, Osmanlı dönemindeki halini belirtip, asıl Cumhuriyet döneminden nasıl bir gelişime uğradığı analiz edilecektir. Bunun yapılabilmesi için 1930'dan itibaren içinde sansür kelimesi geçen gazete makaleleri kategorize edilip bunun faillerinin kim olduğu ve hangi alanlarda uygulandığının tespiti yapılacaktır. 1930-1970 arasındaki bütün makaleler kodlandıktan sonra, 1970 sonrası dönemde ise Basın Kanunu, RTÜK Kanunu ve Sosyal Medya Yasası'nın kabul edilmiş tarihleri ve değişime uğradığı tarihler göz önünde bulundurularak bu tarihlerden sonra uygulanan denetim politikalarının sosyal ve ya politik içerikli olup olmadıklarının tespitleri yapılacak ve hükümet ideolojilerinin bu denetim politikalarına nasıl bir etkisi olduğu tespit edilecektir.

Sayın RTÜK Başkanı Ebubekir Şahin 'in de konu ile ilgili görüşlerini bildirdikten sonra , Analog Sansür olarak tanımlanan ilk kısmın sonuna gelinecektir. Analog Sansür olarak tanımlanan sansür tipi şu ana kadar aşına olduğumuz sansür anlayışından pek farklı değildir. En önemli özelliği bu denetim mekanizmasının halk tarafından bilinen bir mekanizma olmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle analog sansürün bir konunun zararlı veya tehlikeli olduğunun bilincine sahip bir toplum anlayışına yönelik yapılmasıdır. Vatandaş sansürün gerçekleştiğinin farkındadır ve sansürlenmiş içeriğin dönemin otoritesi tarafından tehlikeli veya zararlı olduğunun bilincindedir. Bu denetim mekanizmasının otoriteye sahip olan yönetim tarafından şekillendirildiği farz edilir, bu yönden demokrasinin bir fonksiyonu olarak yorumlanabilir. Halkın seçtiği hükümet cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca kendi belirttiği konularda denetim yapmakta serbesttir ve hükümetlerin ideolojileri değiştikçe sansürlenmiş içerik de buna uygun bir şekilde değişim göstermektedir.

Bu değişimi belirtmek adına 24 Aralık 1963'te yürürlüğe giren, ve 11 Kasım 1983 ile 26 Haziran 2008'de güncellenen Radyo Televizyon Kanunu, 9 Haziran 2004 tarihli Basın Kanunu, 13 Nisan 1994'te yürürlüğe giren ve 15 Şubat 2011'de güncellenen Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu Kanunu ve son olarak 29 Temmuz 2020'de yürürlüğe giren Sosyal Medya Yasası'nın tarihleri baz alınarak bu tarihlerden önce gerçekleşmiş ve kategorize edilmiş 50 sansür vakası ve sonra gerçekleşmiş ve kategorize edilmiş 50 sansür vakasının sosyal veya politik bir değişime uğrayıp uğramadığı hükümetlerin ideolojilerine göre istatistiksel bir t testine tabi tutulduktan sonra muhafazakar

hükümetlerin sosyal denetim politikalarını daha çok benimsediği ve muhafazakar olmayan hükümetlerin siyasi denetim politikalarını daha çok benimsediği hipotezleri test edilecektir. Bunun amacı belirtildiği üzere hükümetlerin ideolojik değişimlerinin denetime uğrayan içerikler bazında farklılıklara yol açtığı ve denetime uğrayan içeriklerin demokratik temsiliyet değıştikçe, değışime uğradıklarını anlamaktır. Bu testin akabinde özellikle son 10 senede Türk halkının tükettiği içeriklerin değışimi ve bütün dünyada iletişim portallarının denetimindeki değışimler tespit edilecektir.

Tezin ikinci kısmı olan Algoritmik-Dijital sansür anlayışında , Analog Sansür anlayışından nasıl farklılıklar gösterdiği araştırılacaktır. En önemli farklılıklarından birinin farkındalık olduğu bu teorik ayrımın en kritik noktasıdır. Eski veya Analog sansür anlayışında sansüre uğrayan konu bellidir ancak algoritmik sansürün dünyada milyarlar ve ülkemizde milyonlar tarafından kullanılan iletişim portalları üzerindeki etkisi ve bunun hakkında farkındalık gibi bir lüksümüzün olup olmadığı araştırılacaktır. Teknolojinin her alanda hegemonik evriminin sansür bazında nasıl bir sosyal anlayışa evrildiğini anlayabilmek için Langdon Winner'ın Otonom Teknoloji metni baz alınarak, bunun hem sosyopolitik hem de bürokratik yapılarıdaki tahribatı, Durkheim metinleri ile desteklenecektir. Bu literatür analizi teknolojinin gelişimi ile ilgili belirli noktaları gösterecek olsa da , algoritmik sansür anlayışının çok yeni bir teknoloji olduğu gerekçesi ile günümüze daha yakın bir literatür araştırmasının yapılması gerektiği aşikardır ve bu temelde Cambridge Üniversitesi'nden Dr. Jennifer Cobbe'un algoritmik sansür hakkındaki makalesi baz alınarak yapılacaktır.

Dijital sansürün başka bir özelliği olan küresel platformların içerik tüketimimizde nasıl bir rol oynadığı ve günümüzdeki hukuksal yapılanmanın bu yenilikler karşısında nasıl tepkiler verdiği önem arz etmektedir çünkü Cumhuriyet tarihimizde ilk defa milyonlarca vatandaşımızın tükettiği içerikler hakkında bir söz sahibi olmama ihtimali doğmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle bahsedilen içeriklerin hangi kültürel ve etik prensiplere dayandığının kararı ilk defa Ankara'da değil, uluslararası mecralarda veya şirketlerde alınmaktadır ve bunun kültürel hegemonya kavramı ile ne kadar pekiştiğinin tespiti yapılmaya çalışılacaktır.

İki kategorizasyon arasındaki farklardan biri Jeremy Bentham'ın Panoptikon teorisidir. Panoptikon teorisi son yüzyıllarda insan hayatının bir çok alanında karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Mimariden, iletişimin denetlenmesine, sansürden teknolojiye kadar aynı psikolojik prensip uygulanır. Bu prensip vatandaşın denetimde olduğu inancı, daha doğrusu, denetimde olabileceği ihtimalinin varlığı, denetime uğramasından daha çok önem arz etmektedir ancak bu Analog sansürün bir özelliğidir. Algoritmik sansür ile böyle bir inancın gerekliliği kalmamıştır çünkü yazdığımız her metin anında denetim mekanizmasının eline geçmektedir. Bu sansür bazında ciddi bir paradigma değışikliği yaratmaktadır.

Hegemonya tabirinin ön koşullarından biri olan gönüllülük veya razı olma prensibinin Dijital sansür anlayışında nasıl cereyan edeceği göz önünde bulundurulması gereken bir konudur, çünkü belirtildiği üzere Dijital sansür paradigmasına farkındalık ortadan kalkmaktadır. Farkında olmadan razı olabilmek mümkün mü, bu hegemonya tanımının sınırları içerisinde midir? Bu sorulara cevap getirilmeye çalışılacaktır.

INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Motivation

Content moderation has been a part of the state mechanism since the Roman Empire and has managed to survive since the modern-day era. The Analog content moderation has protected its function throughout the centuries and the first chapter of the thesis will focus on the evolution of it in the Turkish Republic while giving an insight on the historical progression of it in Europe and the Ottoman Empire since both has affected the impact and scope of content moderation in the Turkish Republic. As the first chapter is concluded the legal structure surrounding Radio, Cinema, Television and the Internet will be illustrated. Winner stated that as technology progresses, the sociopolitical system is adversely affected by it and “upsets our system of checks and balances in government” (Winner, 1978: 151). The thesis will argue that a similar occurrence has happened with the progression of content moderation technologies as they need to balance the changes in our content consumption. As these changes occur it will be argued that the paradigm of Analog censorship will morph into a new one, categorized as Digital Censorship which necessitates more expertise for moderation and the lack of awareness as seen by the imposée.

The differences between the sociopolitical upset of the Analog censorship and the Digital Censorship will be illustrated. In order to convey how the Turkish sociopolitical bodies cope with content moderation two methods will be used. First is the second chapter of the thesis, through the interview with the President of the Radio Television Supreme Council Ebubekir Şahin and the categorization of censorship cases as reported by the Turkish press in the third chapter. Third chapter is the analysis of the dataset constructed by categorizing cases of censorship from 1930 to 2020. It is the first chapter in which the hypotheses of the thesis will be put to t test in order to conclude the analysis of the Analog Censorship.

The fourth chapter of the thesis will focus on the Digital Censorship and the differences between it and its Analog counterpart. In order to do this, literature review will be imposed which is the bulk of the fourth chapter in which Winner’s Autonomous

Technology and Jacques Ellul's La Technique will provide an insight regarding the general transformation of technology and the expertise necessitated by this transformation. The upsets to the sociopolitical bodies will be conveyed through Durkheim's illustration of how these bodies should function as opposed to how they are currently functioning. As the advent of algorithmic censorship is considerably a new phenomenon, which is the imminent imposition of the guidelines imposed by the corporation who is providing an Instant Messaging service, the consideration and analysis of this significant shift in what we perceive as censorship will be conclusion of this chapter. In light of these progressions in the medium, it is my belief that the effects of the recent developments concerning content moderation should be initially compared and contrasted to the old paradigm of content moderation to understand how it differs prior to taking precautions to normalize the upsets it poses to our governance and sociopolitical bodies.

1. 2 Research Question & Hypotheses

There are four hypotheses and four working hypotheses in this thesis. Hypotheses are;

- 1) As any other, censorship technologies are evolving, becoming more sophisticated.
- 2) There is a need for understanding technology from inside, both as a body of knowledge and a social system.
- 3) The authority of governments is linked to expertise.
- 4) Differing censorship policies are utilized when government of different ideologies deems the subject issue as harmful to society.

The working hypotheses are;

- 1) Technological luddism is applicable even if it is a choice or not.
- 2) Algorithm based filtering is a form of censorship.
- 3) There is a correlation between censorship as a policy and ideology of the authority imposing that policy.
- 4) The evolution of censorship necessitates a lack of awareness of the censorship.

The research questions are;

- 1) What are the censorship technologies used in the Republic of Turkey?
- 2) What are the differences in the social implications within analog and digital censorship?
- 3) How is censorship technology evolving in the digital age?

Lastly the methodology I will be pursuing is mixed methods research, with an Exploratory design. Hence the qualitative research will guide the quantitative research. While systematic literature review will initially be used to inform broader

questions such as what censorship is, the qualitative research will guide the rest of the thesis. The main tool that I will be using in my Primary Research will be interviews. Which will inform me especially on the expertise necessary for censorship, while providing basis for the other two variables. After this I will be moving on to the Secondary Research Method in which I will be using quantitative statistical data from Cumhuriyet archives in order to understand if the aim of the censorship has been accomplished through a correlational study (t-test). Once all the data have been collected, I will be comparing the results for each in order to reach my conclusion.

1.3 History of Censorship in the Roman Empire

The word censor, is rooted in Latin from the verb *censere*, meaning to appraise, value and judge. This meaning derives from the Roman officials which will be analyzed shortly. However, the term changes its meaning on 1590 to “official judge of morals and conduct” and then it comes to its modern meaning in mid-17th century as "official empowered to examine books, plays (later films, etc.) to see they are free of anything immoral or heretical." (URL 1) Censorship and authority have a close relation. Ever since the initial social contract was established, we can see the premise of compromising freedom in order to establish security and cooperation. It is not a surprise that early evidence of censorship can be found in more advanced historic societies such as the Ancient Greece and the Zhou Dynasty. In Plato’s Republic there are several passages in which necessity and targets of censorship has been mentioned. In the Book II of the Republic, it is stated that;

“Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad.” (Plato, 1945: 65)

The irony here must be mentioned since the label of censorship is also attributable to the demise of Plato’s mentor, whom was also been sentenced to drinking poison for corrupting the Athenian youth. Regardless this rule has been justified in order to avoid the corruption of the Athenian youth. A similar approach has been used by modern day governments in order to justify censorship. As societies evolve and the centrality of authority increases, we see institutional forms of censorship such as the Magistrate of Censor in ancient Rome. While Plato suggested eventually in Book VII that poets should be excluded from the ideal state, the magistrate functioned in a much more extensive manner. Robert Vincent Cram’s detailed study provides the actions taken by the magistrate of censor until the office was in control of the emperor after 22 BC. The magistrate of the censor had an overabundance of power in which no other magistrate in the Roman Empire could oppose the actions of the Censor. The function of the magistrate was to supervise public morality and secure the census in the Empire. The moral of the public, *regimen morum*, had to be protected and if there is a citizen who disobeyed the call for census or have breached the *regimen morum*, that citizen would be sold as a slave in the times of the Republic. Prior to the foundation of the Republic the penalties varied from death to imprisonment. The capacity in which the censor operated can be understood in the time of the historian Titus Livius (Livy), describing the censor Diodorus, in which

“During this censorship the tibicines were forbidden to hold their festival in the temple of Jupiter. This resulted in the migration of the entire college from Rome. Appius made an innovation in the religious domain by transferring the cult of Hercules at the public altar from the family of the Potitii to the public slave.” (Cram, 1940: 83).

Here we see the effect of religion and unorthodox social groups to the public moral and how it is perceived as a threat by the censor. The extent of the jurisdiction of the censor even goes into decisions regarding architecture, war, debauchery, extravagance and many more.

However, class issues also played a dominant role in the decisions of the censor as well, in 570 BC the censor made the ruling that “to check luxury by placing a high tax

on feminine finery and on favorite slaves under twenty.” (Cram, 1940: 92). While the example of the Roman Censor conveys topical resemblances on the issue, the modern term of censorship which will be referred to as Analog Censorship in this thesis, will be truly formed following the development of print culture. While the ethical foundation for the necessity of censorship will be similar throughout its history the function of it will be determined following the advent of the press and will be preserved up until the 21st century. Censorship is a political tool, a process in which social & political control consolidates into a centralized understanding of the truth. More importantly it is also a gauge, illustrating the effects of the political climate and the level of state modernization.

1. 4 History of Censorship in the Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman Empire the control of the books and periodicals were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1857. The first instance of a decree that can be categorized as an early attempt to introduce control to the printed material dates to a communique from 1849 in which it is ordered “that every embassy to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before publishing books and periodicals.” (Yosmaoğlu, 2003: 17). While the Ottoman Empire did not impose a strict regulation on the press in the mid-19th century, the situation in France was drastically different. Following the upheaval in June 1848, Napoleon III imposed drastic measures to control the press, the legislation was fully in motion after the establishment of the Second Empire in 1852. The 1852 Press Law was introduced months after the establishment of the Second Empire. Vantine describes the newly introduced Press Law of 1852 as allowing strict surveillance of the press as similar to the First Empire. There were two practices that fueled the control of the press. The first is *the cautionnement* which was a substantial sum of money that a newspaper director was obliged to pay in with the state to establish a periodical or a journal to discuss political issues. This money was used to finance the legal disputes if the State decided to sue the journalists or the editors. “Hence, the government could financially drain a newspaper and force it to disappear by dragging it from trial to trial”.(Vantine, 2014: 50). Vantine describes the second measure was the *timbre fiscal* which disproportionately raised the cost of political journals or gazettes in order to make them less accessible for the public.(Vantine, 2014: 50) Furthermore it was declared illegal

to publish any material anonymously. Only five years later following the news coming from the French, Abdulmecid I, decreed that Ottoman citizens were to apply to the Council of Education and the Ministry of Police in order to get the permit to publish and eventually in 1862, Matbuat Müdürlüğü, Administration of Press Affairs was formed. Yosmaoğlu suggests that this institution was formed to keep a closer eye on two private newspapers, namely Tercüman-ı Ahval (Interpreter of Conditions) and Tasvir-i Efkâr (Depiction of ideas) in which “criticism of the government was increasing. The 1864 Press Regulation was in effect an adaptation of the 1852 Press Law of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte.” (Yosmaoğlu, 2003: 18). The 1864 regulations also listed what would constitute an offence in journalism, however they were made in an encompassing vague manner in order to give the censors full discretionary capacity.

On March 8th, 1867, for the first time in Ottoman history, the gazette called Muhbir (The Informer) was closed down by the state. Following this, an ordinance was published in which it was stated that the state “wants to allow a certain extent of liberty to the press but it could not permit the dissemination of mind confusing lies.” The Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha would elevate the degree of control by instituting the “certificate of approval” on April 17, 1876, which required examination on all foreign publications. Three weeks following the same principle was applied to the publications within the Ottoman Empire. Also similar to the French timbre fiscal, a stamp fee was imposed on the published newspapers. The next step in the Ottoman censorship would come through Abdulhamid II. Referred as Hamidian Censorship, it is the first analogous situation to a panopticon. The political turmoil had reached its acme during these times of the Ottoman Empire, and this marks the introduction of the infamous “Journals” which were extensive reports were sent to the Yıldız Palace in order impose surveillance upon the society. Press was de-politicized. However, there was a low amount of legislation passed regarding censorship. The centralization of censorship agencies occurred following Abdulhamid II, with the Committee of Union and Progress. The law of 1909 provided the legal framework for a more expansive style of censorship and Ministry of the Interior has been placed at the center of it. It defined the situations that would constitute an offense. These were calumny, publishing information about secret court sessions, publishing issues declared contrary to morals by courts, offending any of the recognized religions, sects, or ethnicities, and

publishing false information. It also authorized suspension of any periodical without due process. Furthermore the 35th article of the law of 1909 proposes the banning of the importation of periodicals from abroad. “In March 1913, the Press Law underwent extensive modification, which made it even more restrictive.” (Yosmaoglu, 2003: 34). During the First World War, a censorship guideline (sansür talimatnamesi) was distributed which explained how military censorship would be applied to telegrams, post, books, theatre play and the press. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu recounts his days at another newspaper, İkdam as such;

“My exhaustion while working at İkdam was not only physical, but also mental. A two edged, military and civilian censorship found even in the simplest news reports qualities that were "perturbing public opinion" and because of this I was constantly called to the press regulation office or the Police. The head of the press regulation office was at that time Nazım Hikmet's father, Hikmet Bey. Despite being my neighbor and friend, he subjected me to threats. The head of Police would interrogate me standing for hours.” (Baykal, 2012: 95).

In addition to military and civilian censorship making foes out of neighbors, there is another good example of how rigidly the military censorship effected not just the Ottoman Empire but the World in general. The reason why it is called the Spanish Flu, was not because the flu originated in Spain but rather because they remained neutral during the First World War. Since they were neutral, they were not subjected to military censorship hence the newspapers were free to mention the flu, whereas in other nations they were not. Eventually people believed that it originated in Spain since they were the only ones reporting the cases in the newspaper. In Spain, it is referred as the French flu. (Martini et al, 2019).

1. 5 History of Censorship in the USSR

In the first decade of the Soviet Union, there were numerous pressing concerns regarding the transformation of the Union, economy being the most crucial one. Hence in the first years of the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1929 the state of the censor was rather open and public. (Richmond, 2000) However with the turn of the decade,

in 1930s the situation accelerated quickly into a more oppressive one. One of the initial campaigns pursued by the Soviets was to ensure the qualifications of the chief censors, namely three figures were deemed worthy of the office of the Chief Censor, these were I.P Trainin, a senior Bolshevik, his successor R.A Pelshe who has more seniority and “cultural-administration experience” than his predecessor, and lastly V.I Blum who has risen in the ranks by being the chief theatre censor of Glavrepertkom and the chief editor of the Union’s popular artistic journal, *Novyi zritel*. (Richmond, 2000)

From the initial days of the founding of the office of the Chief Censor, the Soviets were concerned regarding the qualifications of the person who holds this office, and the central authority was insistent of the fact that these people were “ individuals of great literary experience” (Richmond, 2000: 8) which is in tandem with the notion that expertise is a fundamental issue especially when it comes to censoring of the arts. This supposed experience was challenged by the Bolshoi theatre which was seen as the bourgeois of the artistic left and many of their plays ranging from Shakespeare to Moliere were forbidden to be played by the chief censor. (Richmond, 2000) The expertise of the head censors was constantly under scrutiny which paved the way for a collective body in which all of the main parties involved in theatre politics to be invited to State Academic Council of Narkompos (Richmond, 2000) The tension regarding the questioning of the expertise of the chief censors were tried to be dismissed by switching the blame to the categories of the censor rather than the qualifications of the censor. These categories were;

- a) comprised of agitation against Soviet power
- b) which expose military secrets of the Republic
- c) inciting public opinion by means of spreading false information
- d) inciting nationalistic and religious fanaticism
- e) of a pornographic character (Richmond, 2000: 15)

As the complexities of the content consumed by the public whether it be works of literature or theatre enhanced so did the scope of these categories. The Russian artistic scene was a complex and fruitful one, hence the attempts of moderating this medium had to necessitate more expertise and specifically more detailed categories. As Pelshe was rising through the ranks to become the chief censor of the USSR, he suggested a more comprehensive list which included 19 different categories. The categories were;

1) class appeasement

2) pacifism

3) anarchic-individualism

4) banditism and romantic criminality

5) idealization of hooliganism and trampism

6) apologia for alcoholism and drug addiction

7) vulgarity (cheap "sensationalism," the savoring of romantic esca

pades and the adventures of "high" society, the poeticization of the life of night cafes [shantany] and so forth)

8) meshchanstvo (the idealization of the "sanctity" of the meshchanskaia

family, of the comfort, of the slavery of woman, of private property and so forth)

9) decadence (upadnichestvo), the reign of the fox-trot and psycho

pathology (the Erenburg-like Kurabotavshchina, the cult of Esenin [Esen iniada\ and so forth)

10) crude Sovietization which gives an opposite effect

11) malicious ignoring and perversion of Soviet everyday life and

cultivation of bourgeois salon life

12) hack work-speculative "tsarist" plays

13) kulak - nationalistic plays

14) adventurist-charming plays

15) bourgeois-revolutionary plays

16) revolutionary-democratic plays

17) revolutionary-pathological plays

18) revolutionary-domestic (bytovye) plays

19) kulak – populist plays (Richmond, 2000, p.42)

1. 5 History of Censorship in the Republic of Turkey

Following the First World War, the first Press Law (Matbuat Kanunu) of the newly formed Republic of Turkey was published in the Official Gazette on August 8th, 1931. More requirements for being an editor and establishing a periodical were introduced. Some of these measures include not serving a foreign entity during the First World War, not serving as a politician or a member of the Turkish army actively or in the past. The first requirement is very symbolic in which it states that you need to be a Turk in order to form a gazette or a periodical as the nation state of Turkey is being newly formed, the legislation surrounding the Press Law once again signifies the newly established norm of Turkey in which nationalism played a considerable role. Furthermore, the Press Law of 1931 marks the first instance of “positive reinforcement in which in Clause 14 it can be seen that if a periodical is informing the public on scientific and moral values, the University of Istanbul which was named as Darülfünun prior to 1933, would be obliged to give a letter of commendation to the periodical. Following the 1931 Press Law, the legislation would remain the same until 1950. The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) would mark the end of the 27th year of the single party government of Turkey. The following periods in Turkey can be summarized as such; “1950-60 dual party politics; 1961-80 a moderate multi-party system; 1983-91 moderate multi-party politics with a dominant party; 1991-2001 extreme multi-party

politics with no dominant party; and since 2002 Turkey has experienced a multi-party system with a dominant party, the Justice and Development Party.” (Turkan, 2012: 24). The reign of DP would last for a decade in which the first half of the decade signals a much more open and unrestricted press in Turkey as marked by Press Law number 212, which is referred as Press Law number 5953 today. As political turmoil leads to the 1960 coup d'état, these newly introduced freedoms would perish leading towards the coup. Following the coup Press Law number 212 was amended and changed in 10th of January 1961, which received heavy criticism from the owners of periodicals resulted in a three-day hiatus of all periodicals in Turkey, since it was received as overly protective of the employees of the periodicals. However, the result was in favor of the employees in which freedom of speech prevailed.

1.6.1 Censorship in Cinema, Radio & Television

The first instance of censorship in Turkish cinema dates back to 1919 in which the film adaptation of Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar's Mürebbiye novel in which the infidelities of the French character “Anjel” has been noticed by the French general Franchet d'Esperey. In 1919 Istanbul was occupied and the French general had the authority to impose censorship on the movie, which he did regarding the scenes of Anjel. Öztürk states that A decade after, in 1932, the Central Agency of Censorship (Merkezi Sansür Teşkilatı) was founded and the function of it stayed relatively same until the 70s. (Sönmez, 2010, p 144) In the 1970s cinema was gaining more and more popularity in Turkey, in which highly erotic films marked the second half of the decade. Even though censorship was in place, the producers of the movie would send the “clean version” of the movie, with erotic scenes cut from it were sent to the censor and were later added to the movie following the approval of the censor. The existence of the movies helped to further legitimize the institution of censorship. The new censorship regulation was introduced in September of 1977, with this regulation articles requiring the banning of movies were increased and aggravated. Three members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were included in the censorship board and 10 copies of every movie were asked to be sent to the ministry. Following these measures more than 300 movie workers who gathered around the Taksim Monument on November 5, 1977, protested the newly introduced censorship law and they demanded that November 5 be declared as' Cinema Workers' Day. Under the leadership of one of the most popular movie

actors of the time, Fatma Girik, who said they were on their way to end the exploitation of cinema workers and to gain social economic rights. Many other prominent figures in the industry joined the protest. Three days of this silent march at the beginning of 1978 provided a basis for the establishment of two separate unions: Workers' Union of Turkey Movie, Cinema Workers Union. These unions joined DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions) in 1978 and merged under the name of Sine-Sen. These unions were helpful to increase the weekly wages in the sector and to pay for overtime work. The legislation that was prepared following the protests on 1978 will function as the backbone of the 1983 Regulation of Movies and Movie Scripts in which it is stated that all movies that fits the following criteria would be censored.

- i) Having an endangering effect on the existence of the State and the Republic, the indivisible integrity of the State with its Country and Nation,
- ii) Endangering the principle of national sovereignty, fundamental rights and freedoms, democratic, secular and social rule of law,
- iii) Propaganda for the administration of the state by a person or group or to ensure the domination of a social class over other social classes, for this purpose, praising a state, a party, a legal entity, a community or persons,
- iv) Propaganda for the purpose of basing the social political, legal and economic basic order of the state, in part, to religious feelings, exploiting religious feelings or things that are considered sacred to religion,
- v) Aiming to disrupt national unity and integrity by creating language, race, religion and sectarian discrimination,
- vi) Propaganda against Atatürk's principles and revolutions,
- vii) Encouraging and enforcing the drinking, gambling and drug addiction habits,

- viii) Violence and brutality that negatively affect the mental health of the society,
- ix) Providing provocative and encouraging effect on crime
- x) Breaking the dignity of military service, propaganda against it, damages the dignity of the Turkish Armed Forces and has a detrimental effect on the defense of the country.
- xi) Damaging the reputation of the security forces, making propaganda against them, affecting the peace and security of our country in a harmful way
- xii) Propaganda of foreign states in a way that could be against our country and national interests,
- xiii) Having an impact on the international relations of the state

While this detailed list may seem quite extensive and encompassing, in the following decade the scope and centrality of control would exponentially increase. The coup d'état of 1980 marked a rather dire page in Turkish history in which the newly formed Council of National Security (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) imposed strict censorship in which over 2000 lawsuits were filed to censor periodicals and movies. The current state agency responsible for monitoring and sanctioning radio and television broadcasts is the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu) which was formed in 1994. The protocols of this agency will be analyzed in depth following the interview chapter.

1.6.2 Censorship of the Internet

The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu) was founded on 29th of January 2000. The legal structure is as follows, in the 8th article of the Law No. 5651, it has listed the crimes that can be prevented from being cataloged. It is decided to block access in relation to the publications made on the internet and whose content causes sufficient suspicion that it constitutes the following crimes,

In the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 dated 26/9/2004;

- i) Suicide (article 84),
- ii) Sexual abuse of children (article 103, first paragraph),
- iii) Facilitating the use of drugs or stimulants (article 190),
- iv) Supply of dangerous substances for health (article 194),
- v) Obscenity (article 226)
- vi) Prostitution (article 227)
- vii) Providing space and opportunity for gambling (article 228), and crimes included in the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk No. 5816 dated 25/7/1951. (URL 5)

Harris claims that while there is not an official number as to how many websites have been blocked in Turkey, a digital activist group has formed the “Blocked Web” database which claims that “over 40,000 websites have been blocked from the web” (Harris, 2015: 41)

Considering that we have established the historical lineage of the current legislation concerning censorship in Turkey, it is clear that the current legislation has been formed through decades of experience and as a result of clash of ideas, between the public and the centralized authority. In order to gather the insight of the most recent stance of the organization that the general Turkish public refer to regarding censorship, an interview with the President of The Radio & Television High Council, Ebubekir Şahin was conducted on 10th of May 2020.

2. INTERVIEW

The interview was conducted through email, since face to face meeting was considered risky due to the pandemic. Initially I tried to establish contact with Vice President Dinser Şahin, who was also the acting head of department of TV& Radio Audience Measurement, Audit, Public Opinion Researches and Surveys, who also has an academic background on the subject and was willing to share his insight on the subject matter, following our correspondence he stated that the President of the RTÜK himself would be able to answer my questions. I sent the questions in May 2020 and received the answers in the following week. The interview was done to seek an answer to my research questions, specifically regarding the expertise necessary for the agency.

What kind of technological expertise is required to apply censorship? (How many years of education and what software is used?)

I would like to say a few words and clarify the mission of my institution before getting into the issue of whether RTÜK implements censorship.

As The Radio & Television High Council we have been tasked with the supervision and regulation of Radio and Television broadcasts within the scope of the relevant articles of the Law No. 6112 and secondary regulations (Regulations and Guidelines) issued based on these articles. As RTÜK, we have established a specific standard implementation framework by acting together with some organizations that we are a member of both in the world and in our region while conducting our regulation and auditing activities. For example, while preparing our law, we considered the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Of course, not only this, but also based on the genetic codes of our country. Thus, we have created a regulation and control structure unique to our country.

If we come to the subject of censorship, first of all, I would like to state that the word censorship means “protecting the society from what is harmful for the society” in its essence. But today, unfortunately, instead of its real meaning, it is widely engraved in the memory of people with meanings such as "prohibitive, evil, waiting with a stick in hand." It is more difficult to explain to the public the content that needs to be censored, especially in the field of audiovisual media. I think the reason for this is

that we are seeing the harm of bad content in our industry directly and instantly in the society, maybe a generation later. Normally, an electrically charged bare cable is harmful to someone who doesn't recognize it. If you tell him that he should not be touched and should not be left in the middle, no one will be fooled and appreciated. Because it is a dangerous thing that instantly kills the one who touches it. But if our children and teens are poisoned with harmful media content, we will see the result of this only twenty years later and it is even more deadly because it kills the society, not the individual. However, you cannot easily impose this damage on society.

As RTÜK, are we a censoring organization? The answer is 100% no. Because, as prescribed by our law, we never intervene before publication. However, at the end of its publication, we apply it to the sanction prescribed by the legislation in line with the reports prepared by the experts in accordance with the relevant Law and Regulation article. While making this practice, we decide with the votes of our nine members who were chosen from the quotas of political parties with the criteria of parliamentary arithmetic. Unfortunately, society thinks the opposite. It is believed that RTÜK has a switch in every room of a room, that RTÜK turns these channels on and off at any time.

So how do we check the compliance of media institutions with the legislation? We have a system called SKAAS (Digital Record Archive Analysis System) which is not found anywhere else in the world. With this system, we record the broadcasts made in our country or in our country and ensure that they are monitored and supervised by experts. Our experts are like analog practitioners you mentioned in your thesis. They watch the programs minute by minute and listen and report them. In addition to this traditional method, we also have a system that we call “Kavtam (Concept Recognition)” that is still under development. You can think of this system as a databank of the words that need to be followed in the programs with the taught algorithms. If the program encounters a word in the database, the expert reports it.

What do you think about the transition from old-style direct (analog) censorship to new-type (digital, hypothetical) applications?

It is not possible to stand against their technological development. It is obvious that if you resist technology instead of keeping pace, it will leave you and the society behind. For this reason, I advocate that technology should be used in a controlled manner, as in all areas of life, in censorship - I find it more appropriate to call

filtering in terms of our own application. I think we have to use the technological possibilities and make it suitable for us, even though it is not very suitable for the methods we are used to, or it does not fully fulfill our wishes in its immature form.

To what extent are the public aware of these censorship practices?

Perhaps this is the subject we suffer most. Unfortunately, as I said in my first sentences, our people know us as a censoring organization. But as RTÜK, we never apply censorship. Within the scope of self-regulation, broadcasters are censoring things such as images, products, etc. that they should censor themselves.

How can algorithmic censorship be applied in governance? Should it be applied?

I do not think that this is an answer we can give in terms of our business practice.

Is there any literature you want to like to recommend?

There are, of course, recommendations, reports and many documents on how to eliminate harmful content with the auto control method in the media area. However, as stated in the answers, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive is a leading official document in this regard and can be benefited from.

3. CODING CENSORSHIP

The selected period of analysis is from 1930 to 2020. The articles are gathered from the Cumhuriyet newspaper for two major reasons. The first one is that digital accessibility between the mentioned period is readily available through the Harvard Eastview Global Press Archive interface. The second is that currently Cumhuriyet newspaper is the only publication to allow a search string process. The search string used is “sansür*” in which every article that contains the word censorship is available for coding. Unfortunately, the system does not allow the AND or OR functions which would have eliminated the false positives significantly. This search string yielded 7095 articles from 1930 to 2020. Five categories in which two are used to identify the false positives. If an article mentions the censorship regulations in another country than Turkey it is coded as I (International) and becomes a false positive. If an article mentions the censorship regulations in Turkey it is coded as N (National). Furthermore, if an article relates to a foreign censorship in an occupied area of Turkey then it is regarded as national as well, i.e. the French censorship in Antioch. The second category in which if it mentions a historic anecdote on censorship it is coded as H (Historic) and becomes a false positive. The true positives are N & C, meaning that they are both national and current. If an article is identified as a true positive then 3 other categories are introduced. First one is to determine whether the nature of the censorship is Political or Social. The Political codification is identified as a censorship policy that is imposed in order to benefit the top of the vertical power relationship, i.e., the government or the military. The Social is identified as censorship regulations imposed to benefit the public such as censorship to benefit mental and physical health i.e. Ethical censorship on nudity or censorship on consumption of cigarettes. These are within the boundaries of Social Censorship. The next step is to identify the medium, such as whether the imposed censorship is on the newspaper, literature, communication, cinema, theatre, internet or the media. The last category is to identify which body is implementing the said censorship in order to clarify the power structure of the mentioned censorship. The notes section brings further detail on the article.

From 28.02.1930 to 03.06.1970 every true positive article has been codified. In order to eliminate the false positives and more importantly in order to focus on the instances in which the legislation has been changed, seven points has been selected. These are points in Turkish Legal history in which the said legislation has been formed or has been significantly updated. 7 distinct legislative acts and updates have been selected as relevant legislation. These are the Turkish Radio and Television Law which was initially proposed on 24.12.1963, changed on 11.11.1983 and then later 26.06.2008. The Press Law which was changed on 09.06.2004. RTÜK Law which was formed on 13.04.1994, then has been extensively updated on 15.02.2011 and lastly the Social Media Law which was accepted in 29.07.2020. For these seven points in Turkish legal history 50 articles will be codified that precedes the said legislation and 50 articles following the legislation will be codified in order to illustrate the social and political changes the said legislation provided.

3. 1 Summary of the Overall Findings

In total 1371 relevant articles were categorized from 1930 to 2020. Out of these 1371 articles we obtained 618 True Positive cases in which the article reflected a case of both national and current cases of censorship. The Figure 3.1.1 reflects on the distribution of these mediums.




Figure 3.1.1 Distribution of the Censored Mediums (1930-2020)

Here we see that the medium in which censorship cases were imposed the most is press, followed closely by cinema. The other category includes cases less than five instances of censorship articles. The other is composed of Academia, Advertisement, Ankara Chamber of Medicine, Assembly Records, BluTV, BDP, Books, Caricature, Constitutional Court, Digital Press, Education Unions, Ergenekon Trials, Evrensel Magazine, Expression of Women, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, HDP, Judicial Records, Literature, Music, Opera, Sports and Religious Script. For the most part the social case of censorship is imposed on cinema and arts. Theatre and Literature has their specific category since most of the cases in these mediums were actually political rather than social. With press, the majority is political however with the advent of e-press or digital press, cases of social censorship increase in these mediums. The first case of reported censorship in the Internet dates to 2008, and considering that the dataset stretches back nine decades, the three percent is more significant than it seems. Figure 3.1.2 represents the entirety of the cases coded from 2008 to 2020




Figure 3.1.2 Distribution of the Censored Mediums (2008-2020)

Press is still the most censored medium, the change in overall categories is very significant. If we sum up the categories that were previously absent, and now present due to the dawn of the digital age we see that there is an aggregate of 24% of the cases in the last 12 years are related to technology. The content consumption habits of the Turkish people are changing similar to the rest of the world, and it is getting

increasingly digitized. The drastic drop from 25 percent of the censorship imposed on cinema to only 3.7 percent in the last 12 years, it is also inferable that the censorship habits are trying to match the content consumption habits of the Turkish public. The following Figure 3.1.3 illustrates the global rate of increase of Netflix subscribers.




Figure 3.1.3 Number of Netflix Subscribers (URL-4)

The exponential increase in the subscriber number of Netflix corresponds directly with the exponential drop on censorship cases in cinema. Furthermore, the founder of Netflix, Reed Hastings stated that there are 3 million subscribers to Netflix in Turkey (Reuters, 2019) and it is important to remember that subscriber count mostly corresponds to household not individual hence the total number of people who consume the media content of Netflix in Turkey is well beyond three million. Whereas in the previous decades it was more feasible to cut of tape from a tangible object in order make sure that the media content (movie) was in accordance with the legislation surrounding it, lately the question became a much more complex one. Even with the act of 2020 regarding content moderation with the social media law which included Netflix, the only resolution is to call for a representative from companies such as Netflix in order to make sure that the broadcasted content if found against the legislation would be physically in bounds of the Turkish Republic however the company is not bounded to the law of Republic of Turkey. There is currently no mechanism in place to stop broadcasting, besides imposing financial penalties to the

company. However, Netflix did apply for a license under new Turkish Broadcasting rules (Reuters, 2019). When asked about the situation regarding censorship Netflix declined to comment about potential censorship concerns beyond its statement. It is also significant that in 2019 prior to the application of Netflix for Turkish licenses, there were no cases of attempted censoring of Netflix however after 2019, it consists 1.1% of the censorship cases as illustrates above. The following Figure 3.1.4 reflects on the agencies imposing censorship.




Figure 3.1.4 Distribution of the agencies imposing censorship

Here we see the agencies that impose censorship from 1930 to 2020 in which the agency that imposed censorship the most is the Committee of Censorship with 13.8% the first instance of the committee of censorship dates back to 1936 and the last instance dates back to 1994. Within these years, in the newspaper articles, the committee was pinpointed as the imposer of the censorship however with conservative governments especially in Democrat Part and Ak Party the government is usually pinpointed as the imposer of the censorship. The other category consists of agencies that reported less than 5 cases of censorship which are; (Referred to as only) Censor, AK Party Pendik Municipality, ANAP and ANF, Academia, Ak Party Bilecik Municipality, Aliğa Municipality, Ankara Film Censorship Commission, Ankara High Censorship Committee, Ankara Martial Law Commandry, Antalya Directorate

of Education, Antalya Regional Directorate, Bein Sports, Board of Cinematic Censorship, Board of protecting the youth, Boards of Newspapers, Bonn Theatre Festival Jury, Book Publishers, Commission of Justice, Commission of the Assembly, Conservative Newspapers, Corporate, Council of Higher Education (YÖK), Council of State, Council of State (Danıştay), Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Customs, Doğan Publication, Earth Products Office, FETÖ, Federation of Athletics, French authority in Antioch, Galatasaray Sports Club, Government, Government of Greece, Governor of Ankara, Governor of Tekirdağ, Governorship of Ankara, Greek Government, Greek Military, Head Prosecution of the Republic, High Court, Hisar Short Film Jury, Information and Communication Technol., Interministry Commission, Istanbul 4th Criminal Court of Peace, Istanbul Municipality, Istanbul Press Directorate, Istanbul Technical University, Literary Board Chamber, Martial Commandry, Media, Military, Military Administration, Military Government, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of State, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of the Interior(Dahiliye), Muğla Ortaca Highschool Principle, NATO, National Committee, National Newspaper, National Protection Department, No vertical power relationship, PKK, PTT, Police, Presidency of Religious Affairs, President of the Republic, Press Commission of the Party, Press General Directorate, Press Release & Tourism Directorate, Press Release Directorate, Prime Minister, Prime Minister Press Advisor, Radio TV High Committee, Rector of Istanbul University, Rectorate of Celal Bayar University, Sabah Newspaper, Secret Police, Self Censorship, Self-censorship, Show TV, Sivas Municipality, Social-censorship, Staff of the PM, Star TV, State Planning Department, State Security Court, Supreme Council of Justice, Sıfır Magazine, TBMM Records Office, TDK, TRT, TSK (Turkish Armed Forces), Telecommunication Communication Presid, Trabzon, Van Education Directorates, Turkish Government (CHP & AP), Turkish Government (CHP & YTP), Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish Sports Writers Association, TÜBİTAK Science Board, USSR, Zaman Newspaper, İzmir County Directorate. The CHP and AP on the graph does not include cases in the times of coalition governments which are coded separately. The last figure, Figure 3.1.5 concerns the differences in political and social cases by selected decades and dates.




Figure 3.1.5 Distribution of Political and Social Cases

Here we see the distribution of political and social cases of censorship by decades until 1970 and following 1970 6 different instances in which censorship legislation changed in Turkish history. The next section will provide an in-depth statistical analysis of the selected 6 periods however the significance of this graph shows the difference in each government's attitudes towards censorship. The hypothesis is that conservative governments impose social censorship more and non-conservative governments impose political censorship more. That hypothesis will be tested however in order to convey the distribution prior to 1970, this graph has been used. We see that 1940-49 period has the most amount of political censorship and in the following decades the military government also poses the most amount of political censorship which is to be expected. In more recent times we see that after a brief period in 04-05, the current government steadily imposes more social cases of censorship than the previous governments with the exception of the 30s.

3. 2 Statistical Test of the Hypothesis

In order to convey the difference between censorship policies pursued prior to and after the change in legislation 4 different paired t tests were conducted. 4 different tests were needed in order to differentiate the ideological significance of the governments and also in order to analyze both political and social aspects of the cases. For the first t test concerned 4 legislative acts namely, the Press Law change in 2004, Turkish Radio and Television Law change in 2008, RTÜK law change in 2011 and the Social Media Law which was accepted in 2020. All of these changes occurred by during the administration of the AK Party, which falls into the ideological umbrella of conservatism. The hypothesis is that the conservative ideological parties would lean on social change. Hence the difference between the number of censorship cases that is categorized as social, prior to the legislation act and then following the legislation act was determined and the t test was run to determine the significance of the difference as can be seen on Table 3.2.1

Table 3.2.1 T test of Social Cases with Conservative Ideology

Paired t test

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. err.	Std. dev.	[95% conf. interval]	
Before_~n	4	10.75	1.75	3.5	5.180719	16.31928
After_~n	4	17.25	1.973787	3.947573	10.96853	23.53147
diff	4	-6.5	.8660254	1.732051	-9.256079	-3.743921

mean(diff) = mean(Before_Legisla~n - After_Legislat~n) t = -7.5056
H0: mean(diff) = 0 Degrees of freedom = 3

Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0025 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0049 Pr(T > t) = 0.9975

Here we see the results of the first test which confirms the initial hypothesis. The null hypothesis can be rejected since the obtained p value for the null hypothesis is less than alpha level of 0.05 and we see that there is a high statistical significance (0.9975) in the changes of legislation and increase in the social censorship cases. The same procedure was followed with the same legislations but with political cases of censorship in Table 3.2.2.

Table 3.2.2 T test of Political Cases with Conservative Ideology

Paired t test

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. err.	Std. dev.	[95% conf. interval]	
Before_~n	4	14.75	1.887459	3.774917	8.743264	20.75674
After_~n	4	17.5	5.330729	10.66146	.5352427	34.46476
diff	4	-2.75	4.049177	8.098354	-15.63629	10.13629

mean(diff) = mean(Before_Legisla~n - After_Legislat~n) t = -0.6792
H0: mean(diff) = 0 Degrees of freedom = 3

Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.2729 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5457 Pr(T > t) = 0.7271

Here the p value for the null hypothesis is greater than alpha level of 0.05 hence we cannot the reject the null hypothesis, meaning that we cannot state there is a statistical significance in changes in political censorship cases following a change in legislation with conversative ideologies.

In a similar manner the third t test was run with three different changes in censorship legislation in which non-conservative governments were in power. These dates are the initial Turkish Radio Television Law in 1963, and later the changes in the same law in 1983 and lastly the initial RTÜK law in 1994. Two different t tests each for differences in political and social censorship cases after the change in legislation.

The following Table 3.2.3 reflects on the social cases with governments that does not have a conservative ideology.

Table 3.2.3 T test of Social Cases with Non- Conservative Ideology

Paired t test

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. err.	Std. dev.	[95% conf. interval]	
Before~n	3	6.666667	3.179797	5.507571	-7.014897	20.34823
After_~n	3	13.66667	.8819171	1.527525	9.872084	17.46125
diff	3	-7	3.05505	5.291503	-20.14482	6.144821

mean(diff) = mean(Before_Legisla~n - After_Legislat~n) t = -2.2913
H0: mean(diff) = 0 Degrees of freedom = 2

Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0745 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1490 Pr(T > t) = 0.9255

Here while the third hypothesis shows statistical significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis since the p value of the $\Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1490$ is more than the alpha level of 0.05. In terms of changes in social censorship cases in non-conservative government we cannot state that there is a statistical significance because we cannot reject the null hypothesis. In the last t test the Table 3.2.4 illustrates that political cases with governments that do not embody a conservative ideology.

Table 3.2.4 T test of Political Cases with Non- Conservative Ideology

Paired t test

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. err.	Std. dev.	[95% conf. interval]	
Before~n	3	20.66667	.6666667	1.154701	17.79823	23.5351
After_~n	3	10.66667	3.179797	5.507571	-3.014897	24.34823
diff	3	10	2.516611	4.358899	-.8281052	20.82811

mean(diff) = mean(Before_Legisla~n - After_Legislat~n) t = 3.9736
H0: mean(diff) = 0 Degrees of freedom = 2

Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9711 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0579 Pr(T > t) = 0.0289

The hypothesis for non-conversative governments was similar to that of conservative governments with only one significant change, that we expected to see higher cases of political censorship following the change in legislation however the result did not support this hypothesis. Here we see that we can barely reject the null hypothesis since the alpha level is almost identical to the null, 0.0579 so we cannot reject it however the first and the third hypothesis results show the exact opposite of our

hypothesis regarding the expected rise in political censorship cases following the change in legislation. The initial hypothesis value of $\Pr(T < t) = 0.9711$ shows that in non-conservative governments of İnönü government of 63, military government of 83 and Çiller government of 94 shows higher amounts of political censorship cases prior to the changes in censorship legislation.

While our initial hypothesis of higher social censorship cases following legislation change in conservative governments is supported by these findings, the expected change in political censorship in non-conservative governments is not supported. However, the crucial point still stands. The elected governments, except for the military government, impose different policies when it comes to censorship. After seizing power, these governments act upon their ideologies and censor content according to these ideologies. In clearer terms we see the changes in censorship policies as a continuation of the changes in democratic representation for the entirety of the history of the Turkish Republic. This has changed in the last decade. The following chapter of the thesis concerns exactly this problem.

4. CENSORSHIP OF THE DIGITAL

4.1 Communication

The extent of analysis is concluded for the Analog Censorship, the rest of the paper will try to focus on Digital Censorship. As aforementioned Digital censorship differs from the Analog with regards to the expertise necessary to impose it and also it differs with respect to the awareness of the censorship imposed. As technological mediums advance their social significance advance as well, and the literature analysis will focus on what happens when a technological medium advances, how does that affect the sociopolitical structure surrounding it, and how it is utilized in terms of power dynamics. That literature analysis will mostly focus of Andrew Feenberg, Langdon Winner and Jacques Ellul. After pointing out the said sociopolitical mediums, the classic literature from Durkheim will be utilized in order to understand how these sociopolitical should function in order to reveal the disruption.

The advent of algorithmic censorship is considerably a new phenomenon, the insights of Dr. Jennifer Cobbe will be used to illustrate details as to how these ISP and OSP based filtering mechanism's function and to see if they actually correspond with the upset mentioned in the literature obtained previously.

The two hermeneutic dimensions posed by Andrew Feenberg will be used to analyze the medium of communication. Albeit communication is not a technical object however the parallels are relevant enough for Feenberg's two dimensions, to illustrate a clear path whilst distinguishing the role technological development on communication mediums. Feenberg describes need for a subversive rationalization in the technological development process. He claims that "If authoritarian social hierarchy is truly a contingent dimension of technical progress, as I believe, and not a technical necessity, then there must be an alternative way of rationalizing society that democratizes rather than centralizes control." (Feenberg, 1992: 303). Here let us take democracy under scrutiny. Democracy consists of two concepts, Demos meaning the public and Kratos meaning power. In short it can be summarized into the rule of

people. However, it can also be understood as the rule of the majority. There are instances in which the rule of the majority can be turned into the tyranny of the majority. Stripped from the norms of liberalism, democracy in itself is under the sole directive of the majority. Feenberg furthers his point by, as aforementioned, distinguishing two hermeneutic dimensions of technical objects, namely, the social meaning and the cultural horizon. While explaining the social meaning Feenberg states that “This is the view of most engineers and managers; they readily grasp the concept of 'goal', but they have no place for 'meaning'.”(Feenberg, 1992: 307). The goal of the recently developed communication methods such as Facebook and Twitter can be found in the statements of their founders. While the facebook team is still working on their “manifesto”, Mr. Zuckerberg has stated that “By giving people the power to share, we're making the world more transparent.” and “When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the system usually ends up in a really good place. So, what we view our role as, is giving people that power.” Although both of these points are subject for discussion, it is still valid that the goal of facebook was to make the world transparent and giving the power to the people. As people do not have a unilinear notion of ethics, the transparency of the medium is exactly for this purpose, to multiply opinions to its’ social extreme. The social meaning of facebook is difficult to pinpoint however, rest assured, it concerns its utility regarding multiplying opinions, thoughts, and voices, whether those thoughts are maleficent or not is not an issue that the meaning of facebook can resolve.

The cultural horizon is explained by Feenberg as “This second hermeneutic dimension of technology is the basis of modern forms of social hegemony; it is particularly relevant to our original question concerning the inevitability of hierarchy in technological society...The term 'horizon' refers to culturally general assumptions that form the unquestioned background to every aspect of life.” (Feenberg, 1992: 309). Following his description of the cultural horizon, Feenberg furthers by Marcuse’s critique of Weber in which the same point is being echoed, that the central hegemonic power structure is present within the technological development. This is where the issue branches into two dimensions. First one is the global hegemonic implementations within communication mediums, data gathering, manipulating public opinion, identifying the opposition and many more. The second concerns the

implementation of the unquestioned background to every aspect of life, this is important because it concerns local vertical power structure. Hence, the cultural horizon of these communication mediums can be discerned into two dimensions, global and local. The majority can use the malleability of these communication methods to incite their will more effectively than any other medium. This is significant.

As aforementioned, globalization is notably bringing groups of people in close proximity with each other, and the communication mediums are playing a significant role in this. The age of globalization emphasized the notion of risk, to a degree that it is ever present in our lives. Ulrich Beck states that “Determination of risks are the form in which ethics, and with it also philosophy, culture and politics, is resurrected inside the centers of modernization.” (Beck, 1992: 28). Since communication mediums play such a significant role in globalization, they can be categorized as one of the “centers of modernization”, the politicization of these mediums, as Beck recognized in 1992, is a factor that enhances the risk imposed by it. The usage of propaganda has been implemented for a long time in human history, and politicization can lead to propaganda in many cases, this is not a new phenomenon, however the new improvements to it can be found in the jointly written article of Sugarman and Willoughby. They state that “Through the Internet, hate groups can now join together, prompting a collective identity, the sharing of information and action plans.” (Sugarman & Willoughby, 2013: 2). The internet in itself is a very general platform, the communication mediums however are not, it is this author’s belief that what they meant by the internet is precisely these communication platforms, if it had not been the case studies would have to concern blogs and other aspects of internet rather than communication platforms such as facebook and twitter directly, which it does. Nevertheless, their paper touches on different aspect of these communication mediums, concerning the aftermath of violence. They state that “Although new technology can serve as new arenas for violence, advanced technology can also aid researchers and practitioners in their efforts to investigate violent behavior and develop potential forms of intervention and prevention.”(Sugarman & Willoughby, 2013: 4-5). While this is a new development caused by the technological advancements in communication, it can be inferred that

the inciters and followers of violent actions can be identified in a more practical manner as well.

Feenberg emphasized that the difference between goal and meaning of a technical object. When applied to modes of communication the issue is still problematic. The idealistic goals of technological decision makers are subject to the harsh reality of social dynamics. As globalization furthers, more and more groups will be able to interact with one another and that interaction and in some instances, these tend to turn into violent confrontations. The technological advancements have made this confrontations possible in the virtual world however the virtual can turn into reality very quickly. In Beck's notion of reflexive modernity, the political dimensions are amplified in a manner that has no precedence. Old methods of communication such as the newspaper and radio are being replaced by mediums in which the impact can be much quicker and more viral. While in the Sugarman article it is stated that the increased amount of data will aid academics in identifying the problems, it was also surmised that it would be easier to identify the instigators however as can be seen in the latter case study, that is not necessarily the case. Democracy, in societies that has not embraced the norms of liberalism can be tricky. If the technological pioneers of communication mediums are keen on giving voice to the people, they may not be pleased as to what those people are saying occasionally.

4.2 Autonomous Technology

Langdon Winner goes into an in-depth analysis regarding the role of technology in the current era. In order to bypass a specific categorization with his work, *Autonomous Technology*, Winner is giving weight to a myriad of differing approaches into the issue, intricately analyzing prominent voices from both sides of the spectrum. The spectrum consists of technological determinists on one side and social constructivists on the other. Both are absolutist approaches, determinists believe that technology dictates all aspects of human life, while constructivists claim that it is still humans that give meaning to technology. It is made clear that Winner does not belong in either of the categories however it is evident that the remarks of Jacques Ellul has been favorably echoed by Winner. Whilst echoing Ellul's remarks, Winner is able to utilize more tools and opinions on the subject matter since Winner does not limit himself to Ellul's *La Technique*, in which Ellul rejects any input from the medium of sociology or economics. Winner is utilizing many prominent voices

regarding the issue, including likes of Marx, Weber and many more. Winner's intricate analysis covers many grounds regarding the relationship between technology and society, while presenting a fluent thesis with the occasional use of humor and wit.

Prior to the notion of technology running amok, through reverse adaptation of the means and the ends, Winner questions the necessity of controlling our habitat, nature. The urge to control it is a rather contemporary element in human history in which many other cultures emphasized the co-habitation and adaptation to nature in order to ensure their survival. While the "Western culture, however, has long believed that its continued existence and advancement depend upon the ability to manipulate the circumstances of the material world." (Winner, 1978: 19) After the exponential influence of Western Culture and its magnum opus; capitalism, following the globalizing effect of imperialism, this notion of manipulating the circumstances of the material world has been adopted dearly by all the nations of the world and indeed technology played a prominent role in utilizing it. However, this represents the old paradigm in which technology served as a means to an end, the end being, most notably, capital growth. Nevertheless, this is still technology as an isolated medium, being used to accomplish a human need, and as Winner notes this will be subject to change.

As the system grows, it necessitates more expertise and alienation. "*The loss of mastery manifests itself in a decline of our ability to know, to judge, or to control our technical means. It is in this general waning of intellectual, moral, and political command that ideas of autonomous technology find their basis.*" (Winner, 1978: 30)

Winner questions the specifics of our control in technology, further asserts that we have very little of it. The loss of mastery spanning from micro details of our daily life such as using a cellphone, to macro systems such as logistics of petroleum shipment is ever present. However, without furthering with technology, the same process happened with the process of producing a product. In the pre-capitalist era, a person had complete control over the product that person was producing. Whether it be a pair of shoes, or a pistol, the manufacturer had the ability to personally control each and every aspect of the product. With the invention of the assembly line that changed drastically. The laborer has mastery only on a specific part of the product, never reaching the entirety of it. This is the basis of the new paradigm, human detachment

from production. This detachment is not simply the loss of human agency but also it is the loss of human values from production, such as ethics and morality. This situation is aptly illustrated by no other than Karl Marx, in which Winner utilizes to conclude the first chapter. “Marx believed that under the conditions of nineteenth-century capitalism, technology had taken on an independent, malevolent, lifelike existence and stood opposed to man as an alien and even monstrous force.” (Winner, 1978: 36) The distinction between alienated technology and autonomous technology is significant. Since with Marx, alienated technology was a portion of a systematic argument which has its foundations on class struggle and the advent of surplus value in industrial economics. With Winner’s *Autonomous Technology* the spotlight is solely on the subject matter, which has been emphasized with Jacques Ellul’s technique. Ellul’s technique is a “sensing, thinking, deciding , demanding subject” which “pursues its own course; advocates the entire remaking of life; tolerates no judgment from without.” (Winner, 1978: 41-42) As Pinch and Bijker stated “There is a need for understanding technology from inside, both as a body of knowledge and a social system.” (Bijker, Pinch, 2012: 15) This is exactly the center of Winner’s approach. By utilizing differing approaches that share similar observations on the issue, Winner is encompassing the medium of social sciences before going into the medium of positive sciences, namely, the determinists in the next chapter.

There are several attempts of creating an all-encompassing theory on human history based on notions in natural sciences such as Seidenberg’s Thermodynamic approach to human history, in which it is concluded that it is only a futile attempt to control technology since as the second law of thermodynamics suggests, entropy is always increasing hence it is impossible to control a universe headed for absolute chaos, or the adoption of Darwinism into technology which de-emphasizes the human agency since human mortality does not matter and it is the immortal technology that matters. Besides carefully critiquing these approaches, Winner makes an interesting note of the -izations in the modern era. Intrinsically, if a physical process has been deemed as an -ization, such as modernization, industrialization and such, the process adopts an in-built momentum meaning that it becomes a self-generating, self-feeding process. Technology functions in a very similar way. Similar to Rostow’s Plane metaphor, “After the “takeoff,” industrial societies enter a period of sustained development in which growth feeds upon growth in an ever-expanding, ever-

accelerating upward curve” (Winner, 1978: 50) Hence the difference between the modern and the un-modern starts to rest entirely on obedience to the immeasurable world of potential and development of technology. Winner identifies two clashing schools of thought on this issue. First one is the Critics of Technological Society and the second is Scholars of modernization. While the difference between them is rather straightforward, one believes that technological change is a curse and the other believes that it is a blessing, one approach of the scholars of modernization is a rather astounding one. Their claim is that “costs in human wreckage to be unavoidable and, on the whole, worthwhile.” (Winner,1978: 53) This is completely astounding and makes the initial remark of Winner, claiming the dynamo to be the new cross, much more logical. It is quite difficult to imagine that the brightest minds of the West, of a civilization that has its fundamental in humanism can believe that the unknown potential of progress can outweigh cataclysmic results for human life. Furthering in their approach, another major issue of importance is the issue of choice, of free will. Once again, the notion of free-will has an astounding importance in the basis of the norms of liberalism in which science found the medium to flourish, however currently determinists suggest that we do not have free-will in matters of technology, even more, we do not need it. Fortunately, the collective of the Voluntarists bases their premise on this issue. Their claim is “that people have lost any of their ability to make choices and lack any control over technological change is unthinkable. Behind the process of transformation, one finds a realm of human motives and conscious decisions in which actors at various levels determine which kinds of apparatus, technique, and organization are going to be developed and applied.” (Winner, 1978: 54) One would assume that this school of thought would be considered as common sense however the mere fact that they identify as such, shows the necessity of their ideas in the medium of technopolitics. Unfortunately, the main difference between the two approaches can be summarized by two questions; What is? & What Ought to be? Jacques Ellul’s insight on the issue reveals answers to both of these questions.

4.3 La Technique

The Self Augmentation of technique acts as a denial of voluntarism in which the collective human effort has lost its importance and now has been replaced by the anonymous accretion of conditions for the leap ahead. Furthermore, as self

augmentation occurs, it encompasses an automatic growth and branches out to condition other forms. Winner claims that “His (Ellul’s) law states that technical progress tends to act not according to arithmetic but according to geometric progression. It is not education or socioeconomic condition that determines progression today, it is the technical progression alone that is the sole determinant.” (Winner , 1978: 61) While this answers the question of “What is?”, Ellul also adds an insight on what ought to be by stating “the implicit presupposition that if man does not pull himself together and assert himself (of if some other unpredictable but decisive phenomenon does not intervene), then things will go the way I describe.” (Winner,1978: 56) Following Ellul’s remarks Winner utilizes Weber and Marx in order to visit the issue of free will and autonomy. It is Weber’s claim that society is more than the sum of individuals, that the collective takes on a new identity, distinct and separate from the individuals that consists in it.

Vindu Goel and Nick Wingfield of The New York Times report that Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, has promised to donate 99% of his shares in the company to charity over the course of his lifetime. What prompted this idea was the birth of his new child. He and his wife wrote a letter to the child in which they asserted that they “have a moral responsibility to all children in the next generation”. The letter goes on to mention that Zuckerberg with his billions hopes to focus on “two ideas: advancing human potential and promoting equality” (URL-6). Zuckerberg’s Facebook post went viral in the media, and the report by Goel and Wingfield discusses the practical arrangements of the new organization, which they note will be an LLC—not a typical charitable organization; thus, the two (Zuckerberg and his wife Dr. Priscilla Chan) “will be able to go beyond making philanthropic grants. They will invest in companies, lobby for legislation and seek to influence public policy debates, which nonprofits are restricted from doing under tax laws” (Goel, Wingfield, 2015: 2). Building on the theory of Adam Smith regarding society and the division of labor, Durkheim notes in *The Division of Labor in Society* that solidarity in society has two parts—mechanical and organic. Organic solidarity comes about as a result of a certain complementary process on the part of the different individuals (Durkheim, 2004: 25). Of the two he asserts that organic solidarity is the more efficacious. Durkheim states that “not only does mechanical solidarity generally bind men together less strongly than does organic solidarity, but,

as we mount the scale of social evolution, it becomes increasingly looser” (Durkheim, 2004: 19). What Durkheim means by this is that as a society becomes more organic and individualized due to modern integration, its laws and rules and collective consciousness all change from the rigid, punitive and mechanical structure to a more person-focused society, in which the role of the individual replaces that once given to ritual.

This theory of organic solidarity fits into Durkheim’s larger theoretical framework by fleshing out the socio-evolutionary theoretical aspect of Durkheim’s thought.

Through an increased and ever-more complex web of interrelations and dependence within society, the division of labor accrues interest, so to speak, as a sense of collectivity and collective consciousness is reduced due to the total reliance upon integration of the whole. For example, as society becomes more organic, the individual becomes more important and takes a more central position in society—because it is understood that his or her contribution is what keeps society functioning (remove one gear and the whole thing falls apart). Essentially, the individual replaces the esteem once given to religion, and as the individual rises, culture (as that which is mechanical like a society with a collective view towards religion) decreases and so too does the collective consciousness.

The nuance of Durkheim’s theory is seen in the fact that it relates the modern society to the society of the Old World and sees the difference in outlook as relating primarily to religion, which in the Old World served as a kind of social adhesive. Religion played the fundamental role of binding people together because society was less integrated at the time and people were not as dependent upon one another as they are in a modern society, where all groups and sectors essentially feed off one another, each producing some aspect of the grid that the whole relies upon, whether it is energy, money, food, government, entertainment, military, education or more relevantly communication, each is intricately interconnected. A good example is the role of the banks, which were deemed “too big to fail” in 2008: taxpayers were obliged to bail them out when they started going bust because of bad investments. The rationale was completely based in the theory of Durkheim on socio-evolution: if the banks were allowed to fail, all of society would fail. That is one simple example of the nuance to this idea.

The limitation of this theory, however, is rooted in its simplistic approach towards the Old World and the modern society by viewing religion simply as a binder. It does not approach the subject from the Platonic perspective of truth, which is how the medieval scholastics approached it. Instead, it is approached from the perspective of the Enlightenment ideologist—like Dewey, for example. What is fostered is a spirit of empirical science in which all that matters for the advancement of knowledge and understanding is that observable facts be recorded and used to develop a theory of society. What is missing is the Platonic or Aristotelian concept of what makes man happy—what virtue is—where knowledge comes from (for Plato it came from the soul’s communion with God), and these questions were not used to “bind” society but rather to lead individuals towards a more transcendental outlook on life. Durkheim views the Old World through the lens of the new instead of viewing the new through the lens of the Old to question his own theory of society. Thus, his theoretical framework is limited in that he does not turn the telescope around, so to speak, to see how one from a different perspective might view his own ideas.

However, this aspect could also be turned around and viewed more mechanically: essentially, they are acting as the new adhesive of society, holding the collective consciousness in the palm of their hands—the collective consciousness being the materialistic happiness or wealth associated with the vertical mobility. Durkheim views modern society as integrated and interdependent but with the collapsing economy and cities going bust, that integration is quickly revealing itself to be superficial: society as a whole still functions while certain groups are marginalized and the whole marches to the tune of middle-class prosperity (in the sense that this is what they strive towards). Zuckerberg’s donation therefore could be seen as the carrot in front of the donkey, guiding the collective with the lure of gold. Thus, this evidence could be interpreted two ways. However, the focus of the Initiative bears out the Durkheim approach, showing how it will emphasize individualism, which is an important aspect of the theory of organic solidarity. “Personalized learning” will be given much attention by the Zuckerbergs, as well as “connecting people and building strong communities”—both of which impact the interrelatedness of the modern society that has organically evolved. True to Durkheim’s assessment, the

organic development is one in which the individual displaces the formal guiding religious principle of the Old World.

Yet, again, this interpretation may be reversed, and it could be argued that it is not the consciousness of the collective that has diminished in favor of interconnectedness and individualism but rather the concept of happiness, as Plato might have defined it. From this perspective it could be argued that Durkheim's theory incorrectly explains the evolution of society in the modern era, that it delegitimizes the function of the free will and the intellect as defined by the scholastics and the classical philosophers. It prefers an Enlightenment approach which is particularly Rousseauian (nature is good) rather than Old World (nature is fallen). The fact that Zuckerberg's focus will be on providing cures to the ills of society implicitly suggests that there is more to the Old-World viewpoint (nature being fallen) than there is to the modern, materialistic viewpoint (nature is good, society is advanced). The question arises regarding how to amend the fallen nature. The technological determinists are increasingly moving towards an implementation of algorithms and autonomous intelligence in order to fix these problems however the problem itself requires attention. If we are unable to communicate with each other without imminent censorship of the algorithms, if we are to regulate locally what we should consume in terms of media, we are within the boundaries of our fallen nature. However, that is our right, rather a sacred one. Bloch Wehba stated that *Each of the foregoing examples of the regimes surrounding online content implicates user privacy, expressive freedoms, the free flow of information, and countervailing interests. Platforms play varying roles in governance in each of these settings, and each reflects a different approach to adopting public law norms or including public institutions within these governance arrangements.*" (Bloch Wehba, 2019: 57) Instead, it is quite likely that it will benefit a few of Durkheim's "individuals" but do little in the way of socio-evolution towards the utopian dream. More evidence needed to evaluate the explanation in this section might include a detailed guide to Zuckerberg's own sense of himself in society and his role as well as a detailed guide through survey and interview of the "common man" in society and whether he feels that his society is driven more by integration or more by a shared collective consciousness or goal.

This does help to explain this event but only partially—that is, it has limitations in the sense that it views it mainly from a materialistic perspective that is modern. It explains Zuckerberg’s emphasis on “connectedness” and community-building as well as on the personalization of the gift by identifying the important role of the individual in the modern society (as a result of organic solidarity). However, it fails to engage the topic from any other perspective.

Similarly, it is Winner’s approach that the same principle can be used to support the self-augmentation of technique by Ellul. Winner also critiques Ellul’s approach to identifying technology and science as the same to be incorrect. However, by unifying them in the umbrella of “la technique” Ellul is trying to create this everlasting notion in which all systems depend on. Similar to Hegel’s Historical Geist, Ellul has conveyed the understanding of a Technological Geist which rests on three of Ellul’s Contingencies. These are:

- 1)the universal willingness of people to seek and employ technological innovations
- 2)the existence of organized social systems in all technical fields
- 3)the existence of technical forms upon which new combinations and modifications are based. If all of these elements are present the rapid expansion of technique is assured. (Winner, 1978: 65)

Considering that these conditions have been met in the modern era, it is safe to assume that Rostow’s plane has taken off. The question lies in what should be do with it. In an attempt to re-visit the issue of free-will in a self-guiding plane, Winner utilizes Marx’s insight on means of production and free will. Winner makes the claim that Marx states that means of production does not depend on free will, however it is important to note that there are several inconsistencies with this claim. So, while the prole does not have free will on the production due to the lack of his means of production, the opposite can be argued towards the bourgeoisie. As is bizarrely affirmed by Winner where it is stated that “Inventors or those in today's business of research and development do have the opportunity to choose among a variety of possible paths that technics might take. A selection can be made between a new automobile assembly line run by automation or by a predominance of manual labor.” (Winner,1978: 85) Even though the matter of free will can be revisited, another important aspect is the creation of “need” with respect to technological progress. Evolving beyond serving human needs as a tool, the concept of

technological imperative shows us that technology is creating and servicing its own needs. It demands the restructuring of its environment. Since it is also ever expanding into new networks of systems, the ground for restructuring is also ever expanding. Ellul describes this phenomenon very aptly by stating that “Technique cannot be otherwise than totalitarian.” (Winner,1978: 104). Including the insight of Hannah Arendt to support this claim, the autonomy of technology is self-assured since it is impossible to predict the consequences of an action to tame it.

In order to sustain the needs of technology the Western civilization followed several paths, which granted the expansion of technology. The Scientific Estate, in which the checks and balances rely on scientific truth and expertise. This is separate from a conventional understanding of checks and balances which rely on legal structures. Don K Price identifies three problems the scientific revolution imposed on the sociopolitical system, namely it; moved the public and private sectors closer together, brought a new order of complexity to the administration of public affairs, and upset our system of checks and balances in government. (Winner, 1978: 151). This is exactly what has been happening concerning censorship. While in the Durkheimian sense, the need of censorship can be considered as an ill part of society, it is still one of the utilities of democracy, another manifestation of power, that grants itself to the winner of the democratic will. The checks and balances in this medium are completely switched from the old paradigm and entered into the new one without the consent of the people. John Kenneth Gailbraith, with the notion of technostructure adds to the problems caused, most significant one being the necessity of the autonomy of technostructure to the industrial system. Winner claims that neither of the authors are dealing with the political backlash of these systems in place. Through technopolitics it is clear that the new paradigm imposed through technology is incompatible with existing political institutions. Winner claims that “technology is now a kind of conduit such that no matter which aims or purposes one decides to put in, a particular kind of product inevitably comes out. This state of affairs is not well suited to political theory in any traditional sense.” (Winner,1978: 278)

5. CONCLUSION

So, what is the connection between technology and censorship. In terms of the old paradigm which has been categorized as “censorship of the analog” in this thesis, the function of it has stayed relatively same throughout history, similar to the function of education. In Ancient Greece, there was a teacher teaching multiple students taking notes on a tablet, which is very similar to the function of it today. Censorship of the analog, as Mr. Şahin explained with the usage of SKAAS, is still remarkably similar to Plato’s suggestion in *The Republic* in which the censor collects the works of fiction to decide whether it is good or bad. With the increasing multiplicity of data and the necessity of centralized control, technology was adopted in order to ease the process that has been reciprocated for centuries. However, with the advent of “algorithmic censorship” the function of it is changing. Let’s think about Feenberg’s cultural horizon as described as the second hermeneutic dimension of technology. In which it was divided into two components, local and global. The global hegemonic adaptation of this technology does not leave room for local power structure. There is not a conversation to be made on the local side regarding what it subject to regulation and what is not. Furthermore, entirety of control is given to companies and their goal differs heavily from their social meaning. In the current age communication is digital, we create social connections through using digital media. Social platforms such as facebook, google, twitter mediate communication in private messaging and content feeds. These companies are moving away from their original position regarding providing a free communication medium to accept content moderation (Cobbe, 2020). The content moderation was being done in a manner in which if people who read the content deem it to be harmful to a code of ethics than the content gets reported and the platform erases or censors it. This method is named as *an ex-post* approach to content moderation which is similar to how the censoring bodies in Turkey and pretty much everywhere else operated. The content can be evaluated after it has been introduced to the public. That is the reason why Mr. Şahin does not refer to RTÜK as a censoring body because they do not have the capacity to stop and censor a content before it is produced. The content producers have the responsibility to provide content that is in accordance with the legislation. If it not in

accordance they would be fined and removed only after the matter. While the ex-post approach may or may not be suitable for social platforms that claim to be propagating freedom of speech is a subject for another discussion, the most recent adoption of algorithmic censorship signals a direct opposition to freedom. Using machine learning systems to automate content moderation would allow far greater quantities of information to be assessed far more quickly than moderation by humans, potentially encompassing all communications carried by a platform. “Although content moderation still largely relies on user reporting, platforms may increasingly use algorithmic processes which involve the analysis of all (or substantively all) content. These may involve a shift towards ex ante forms of moderation; identifying and suppressing prohibited content as it is posted... the emergence of extensive algorithmic censorship on social platforms would be an unwelcome development that would give rise to new forms of corporate societal authority.”(Cobbe, 2019: 4). The following Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship of certain aspects of dataveillance as it has a close relationship of the corporate societal authority as described above.




Figure 5.1 Relationship among the four categories of actions of dataveillance (Esposti, 2014)

This transition from ex post to ex ante censorship suggests a radical power change in what Foucault called the *dispositif*. “The strategic function of it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction,

blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc.” (Foucault, 2014: 196). Now the corporations that mediate digital communications has the capacity to block, stabilize and utilize every correspondence on the internet, which is the norm of communication in the 21st century. Deleuze identified the transition from disciplinary form of power mentioned by Foucault to a society of control in which societies of control would adopt flexible, malleable, “free-floating” means to modulate behavior (Deleuze, 1992). This mode of control is very consistent with ex-ante censorship. Deleuze claimed that this happened because Western societies were moving away from a Bentham-ian notion of panopticon. Panopticon is essentially centered on the principle that if a subject knows that it can be watched or surveilled at any given time, that subject will self-discipline even when there no one to watch them. In explaining Foucault’s approach to panopticon Haggerty states that “Michel Foucault’s analysis of the panopticon provides the other dominant metaphor for understanding contemporary surveillance. In part, Foucault extends Orwell’s fears, but his analysis also marks a significant departure, as it situates surveillance in the context of a distinctive theory of power.” (Haggerty, 2000: 607) Panopticon is a psychological trick so to say, that has been implemented in many areas of life that varies from 18th century British prison architecture to 19th century Hamidian journals. The problem we face today is that with the advent of algorithmic censorship there is essentially no need for a panopticon because the psychological trick seized to be a trick. People do not need to consider the possibility if there is a central authority surveilling them or not in a world where every word that they utter online is automatically subject to control. Going back to the first of Ellul’s three contingencies, which is the universal willingness of people to seek and employ technological innovations, seen from this aspect does not just make technique as Ellul calls it, totalitarian, but more so it makes it hegemonic. The hegemonic structure of algorithmic censorship and the drastic change to global notion of media consumption de-legitimizes national, or local control over the culture, which inhibits the rationalization of democracy. As seen on the third chapter of the thesis, the hypothesis of whether the censorship policies change if the ideology of the authority changes yielded a positive correlation. This is significant in that ideologies do not change censorship policies as such but rather the change reflects upon what to be censored. For example, conservative ideologies lean towards more social change in censorship policies in Turkey. When non-conservative ideologies take hold of the

authority they tend to find a balance between the political and social censorship policies. This signifies that the change in the democratic representation reflects upon the policies of censorship in the local power structure. However, in the current age the changes in policies regarding what is to be subjected to censorship is posing an upset to the local socio-political bodies since it has become a global phenomenon. Nations, that inhabit millions of citizens who consume the content filtered by actors who does not belong to the democratic representation of their respective states, are at a crossroads trying to re-purpose their legal structure to normalize this situation however the pace of progression in these mediums far out-speed the pace of changes in the legal structure. Hence adaptation becomes more and more challenging and the disruption to the local sociopolitical structure increases.

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Interview conducted with RTÜK President Ebubekir Şahin on 10th of May 2020

