THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF REFUGEES IN TURKEY'S LYNCHING REGIME

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The Discursive Construction of Refugees in Turkey's Lynching Regime

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Abstract

This study examines the relationship between discourse and collective violence targeting refugees in Turkey. Employing the theoretical framework provided by van Dijk, the study analyzes three distinct genres of discourse: political, academic and media. While attempting to show the blurred lines between these different genres of discourse, the study also aims to illuminate their separate and collective contribution to the so-called "the lynching regime of Turkey." A regime which has been tolerated, legitimated and even furthered by the authorities in Turkey that is now targeting refugees. The study also examines the legal conundrum that makes the refugees vulnerable and therefore easy targets for such a regime. The Critical Discourse Analysis therefore helps the study to illuminate the role of political, media and academic discourses in contributing to such a regime and illuminate the way refugees are made to be targets of increasing collective violence in Turkey.

Keywords: *Elite racism, refugees, immigration,lynching regime, discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis*

Sources:

BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014.

WODAK, RUTH and POHL, WALTER: "The Discursive Construction of 'Migrants and Migration'." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 205-213. Springer. 2012.

WODAK, RUTH and POHL, WALTER: "The Discursive Construction of 'Migrants and Migration'." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 205-213. Springer. 2012.

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1. Introduction

Even though majority of the world is only occasionally reminded of it by images of horror and destruction, we are now witnessing the biggest human suffering since the World War II. There are millions of people who have been uprooted from their lands and have been forced to live a life that requires constant mobility, offers a bleak future if any and have made them even more vulnerable to further suffering, exploitation and many horrible scenarios. Remembering that the numbers are not only statistics but they represent a human being who each has feelings, dreams and expectations, the number of forcibly displaced people provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) becomes even more depressing. According to UNHCR, there are currently 65.6 million people around the world who have been forcefully uprooted from their lands and have been forced to leave their homes.[1] Out of 65.6 million displaced people, only 22.5 million of them are regarded as refugees. As it is merely a political and legal technicality and out of the scope of this paper, the remaining number of people who are not considered refugees is quite horrifying because at least being identified as a refugee means having certain rights under international law. Out of above 22.5 million refugees, Turkey currently hosts 2.9 million refugees mostly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. It makes Turkey the number one refugee hosting country in the world.

Although it has been a national pride being the top refugee hosting country in the world for many in Turkey and especially for those who are pro-government, life has not been easy for refugees in Turkey. This study focuses on only one aspect of plights of refugees in Turkey, namely the attacks against them fueled by xenophobic and racist discourses. Accordingly, the study's main question is: *in what ways increasing attacks on refugees in Turkey are related to the ways they are represented in different genres of discourse?* As it can be seen in the above question posed by the study, the concept of discourse has a key role in the investigation. Therefore, Critical Discourse Analysis and especially Teun A. Van Dijk's theory of "elite racism" constitutes the theoretical framework of the study. By utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis, the role of discourse in the production/reproduction of xenophobic and racist attitudes and their connection to increasing attacks on refugees in Turkey is aimed to be illuminated. Through the tools provided by van Dijk's theories, the study will analyze three different genres of discourse:

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[1] UNHCR: Figures at a Glance. http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html . June 15 2017.

media discourse, academic discourse and political discourse. Although analyzed separately, the study aims to show that these different genres of discourse are in fact complementary and each of them equally contribute to the production and reproduction of xenophobic and racist attitudes in society. To summarize, there is a clear relationship between the ways the refugees are constructed in dominant discourses –media, academic and political discourses- and the increasing attacks targeting them in Turkey.

2. The Life of Refugees in Turkey and "the Lynching Regime of Turkey"
2.1. The Law and the Immigration

Before going on further with Critical Discourse Analysis, it is important to clarify the situation of asylum seekers in Turkey. Their legal status and the schematic of their current lives are important for establishing a relationship between the discourse and "the lynching regime of Turkey"[2]. Due to its geographical location, Turkey has always been considered as a transit country. Kirişçi states that Turkey has always been known as a transit country mostly for people –also known as "irregular migrants"- from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. However he argues that Turkey hasn't been merely a transit country but a country of emigration and immigration. He concludes that *"from 1923 to 1997, more than 1.6 million people immigrated to Turkey, mostly from Balkan countries."*[3] This period coincides with the foundation of new Republic and most of the people immigrating to Turkey were those of Turkish origin and/or Muslim minority who stayed there after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This pattern of immigration between 1923 and 1997 has shaped Turkey's immigration policy and it is still the same for the most part of it to this day.

Although up to this point, the people of interest for this study are referred as "refugees", in reality and in Turkey they are not legally considered as such. However the

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[2] BORA, TANIL: Armenian and Turkish Identity Today. Repair Future. May 14 2014. http://repairfuture.net/index.php/en/identity-standpoint-of-turkey/being-unable-to-face-the-past-causes-damages-in-the-identity-armenian. 2017.08.17; BORA TANIL, interview by GÖKTAŞ, KEMAL: Erdoganism is on the Rise. January 20 2017.
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/english/663367/Tanil_Bora__Erdoganism_is_on_the_rise.htm. 2017.08.17
[3] KIRISCI, KEMAL: Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration. Migration Policy Institute. November 1 2003. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/turkey-transformation-emigration-immigration. 2017.09.12.

study takes a normative stand[4] and will continue referring these people as "refugees", it is important to look in detail to the legality of this issue. This is a necessary look as it can shed light on the confusion that will be observed while analyzing different genres of discourse. In that analysis, we will see that concepts of "refugee", "asylum seeker", "immigrant" "guest" and "Syrian" will be used as replacing one another. Although it might also show underlying ideological stance towards refugees, such confusion is mainly caused by Turkey's laws with regards to immigration. As a relatively young nation-state, Turkey tried to be integrated as much as possible to the Western block of newly brewing Cold War. With this goal and the reality of becoming a transit country more and more each day, Turkey signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which came into effect in 1961. However, even though Turkey was one of the original signatories of the convention, it also adopted a "geographical limitation".[5] Through this limitation, Turkey adopted a narrow margin for accepting who can be a refugee: *"Under Turkish law, only asylum-seekers fleeing persecution in Europe qualify as 'refugees'"*[6] Therefore considering the current situation and most of the people fleeing persecution are originated from countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, they do not qualify for a refugee status under Turkish law. However they do qualify for other statuses for international protection: conditional refugee status, humanitarian residence permit (subsidiary protection) and temporary protection. Although each of these statuses have different implications and transfer varying degrees of obligation to Turkey, their common point is that they are all temporary. In other words, those people who are fleeing persecution and have non-European origins are expected and required to find solutions outside Turkey in the long-term.[7] It is for this reason, the UNHCR regards these temporary statuses as non-durable solutions and work towards durable ones so that refugees can ultimately rebuild their lives. Despite of the UNHCR's works towards durable solutions, the purgatory nature foreseen for the refugees as a result of Turkey's immigration laws in relation to those of non-European origin did not change. Although in 2013 Turkey adopted Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) which was described as *"the first inclusive and updated act*

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[4] Therefore the study adopts the motto: "No human being is illegal." For more on this issue: https://www.scribd.com/document/108590424/1-Word-Statement .

[5] RSN: Refugees and Asylum in Turkey. December 2016. https://www.refugeesolidaritynetwork.org/about-refugees-in-turkey . 2017.08.12.

[6] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey. 2016.
https://amnesty.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EUR4438252016ENGLISH.pdf . 2017.07.12. p.6.

[7] RSN: Refugees and Asylum in Turkey. December 2016. https://www.refugeesolidaritynetwork.org/about-refugees-in-turkey. 2017.08.12.

about migration-related issues,"[8] it is still far away from providing durable solutions. It is what followed LFIP that matters today: *"On 22 October 2014, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey issued a regulation on temporary protection, as per Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. According to Provisional Article 1 of the Temporary Protection regulation, the regulation applies to Syrian nationals, as well as stateless persons and refugees from Syria."*[9] In order to avoid getting lost among legal and political technicalities, it'll be wise to follow the sheet prepared by the UNHCR for providing answers to frequently asked questions about this latest regulation to LFIP. In this sheet, "temporary protection status" is defined as *"a protection status granted to foreigners, who were forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country they left, arrived at or crossed our [Turkish] borders in masses or individually during a period of mass influx, to seek emergency and temporary protection and whose international protection request cannot be taken under individual assessment."*[10] In this definition several points are important for further inspection. The emphasis on "mass influx" is especially important as it correlates with Turkey's open-door policy. During this mass influx, it proved impossible to assess individually the refugee status of each person arriving at or crossing the borders of Turkey. Although it is closely related to the level of atrocities committed in Syria and other affected regions which forced people to flee in masses, it is also argued that Turkey's inability to assess the situation and ill prediction of the political evolution of the situation contributed to the situation which hundreds of thousands people arrived at its borders. The UNHCR defines this situation as *"procedurally impractical"*[11] and recognizing the situation Turkey resorted to this regime of "temporary protection". The regime of temporary protection is especially vital since it grants those under temporary protection certain rights: *"The rights applicable to Syrian refugees, whether they are residing in or outside of the camps, are also enumerated within the temporary protection regulations. These cover, broadly: access to health, access to education, access to social assistance and access to labor market."*[12] Although whether or not these rights can be enjoyed by refugees is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to keep in mind that

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[8]LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: Refugee Law and Policy: Turkey. June 21 2016. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/turkey.php. 2017.06.15

[9]UNHCR: Frequently Asked Questions, Syrian Refugees in Turkey. January 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/turkey/uploads/root/frequently_asked_questions.pdf. 2017.05.31. p.1.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11]UNHCR: Frequently Asked Questions, Syrian Refugees in Turkey. January 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/turkey/uploads/root/frequently_asked_questions.pdf. 2017.05.31. p.2.

[12] *Ibid.*

these rights granted to the refugees can commonly be observed in xenophobic and racist discourses that will be analyzed in following chapters.

The last aspect of the purgatory life of refugees in Turkey is the highly criticized Turkey and European Union deal struck on March, 18, 2016. This deal is criticized by Human Rights Watch[13] and Amnesty International as they argued that it endangered the safety of refugees who are trying to cross into Europe even further. The parties of the deal explained the necessity of the deal by mentioning horrors of human trafficking and safety of the refugees who are trying to cross into the European Union in an "irregular" manner. Remembering the horrifying photograph of Aylan Kurdi, no one in their right mind could argue against such a claim but one can sincerely question whether or not this deal ensures the safety and welfare of refugees. Amnesty International rightly argues that such an agreement following the failed Joint Action Plan adopted by Turkey and the EU on October, 15, 2015, is more about securing the borders of "Fortress Europe" rather than ensuring the safety and the welfare of refugees.[14] In such an attempt the EU seeks cooperation with Turkey; a country that seriously violates the EU and international law that are mentioned as the safeguards[15] for the refugees that this deal is concerned with. In this line of thought, the Director of Refugee Rights Program at the Human Rights Watch Bill Frelick asks; *"Does Turkey qualify?"* as *"a 'safe third country' and a 'first country of asylum' as countries to which asylum seekers can be returned with less than full examination of their asylum claims."*[16] Frelick continues by examining the situation in which the refugees are fated in constant purgatory. Because in this deal, the EU and Turkey has agreed that any irregular immigrant who managed to cross to the Greek islands from Turkey will be returned to Turkey and from Turkey asylum-seekers will request a refugee status. But as Frelick rightly argues and as discussed above, Turkey does not grant refugee status to those of non-European origin and therefore any request for such status will be considered "inadmissible".[17] In light of this conundrum, Amnesty International sets

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[13]FRELICK, BILL: Is Turkey Safe for Refugees? Human Rights Watch. March 22 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/turkey-safe-refugees. 2017.07.14.
[14]AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey. 2016. https://amnesty.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EUR4438252016ENGLISH.pdf. 2017.07.12. pp.8-9.
[15] Eu- turkey statement 18 march 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/
[16]FRELICK, BILL: Is Turkey Safe for Refugees? Human Rights Watch. March 22 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/turkey-safe-refugees . 2017.07.14.
[17]AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey. 2016. p.10.

some criteria to determine whether or not Turkey can be considered either as a "first country of asylum" or a "safe third country": *"1) fair and efficient procedures for the determination of their refugee status; 2) timely access to a durable solution such as integration or resettlement; and 3) access to means of subsistence sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living."* Thanks to the legal framework examined until this point, one can answer whether or not Turkey can be considered either as a "first country of asylum" or a "safe third country". First of all, refugees that have been returned to Turkey will not have the possibility to have their refugee status claim determined as Turkey restricts such status to those of European origin. Secondly, there is no viable plan or possibility in the horizon that can provide durable solution to refugees in Turkey. In fact in the following chapters one can easily see that refugees are still widely referred as "guests" therefore their presence is considered to be temporary. Lastly, the standard of living and daily lives of refugees require a further and an extended research. And this study only focuses on the daily struggle encountered by the refugees specifically those that are racist and xenophobic.

2.2. The Plight of the Refugees in Turkey and the Lynching Regime

Even in Western societies that are considered to be democratic, egalitarian and open to differences, one can observe xenophobic and racist discourses aimed at refugees and/or minorities. What makes racist and xenophobic discourses particularly dangerous and therefore require their critical study in Turkey is what prominent Turkish philosopher Tanıl Bora calls *"the lynching regime of Turkey"*. But, what is it? Before going on to explain "the lynching regime" in Turkey, Bora provides us with the definition of lynching by quoting from a "Turkish dictionary expert": *"[lynching] is the killing of someone who are considered to be a criminal or who are considered to have committed an act that is deemed criminal by using means like stoning, clubbing, beating by a crowd of people."*[18] But Bora argues that even though killing of that person who are seen as criminal might be the ultimate aim, for an act of collective violence to be considered lynching, it does not have to result in killing. What is vital in Bora's definition of lynching is that mostly the ordinary people take part in this act of collective violence. He argues that: *"Ku Klux Klan was not a marginal [terrorist] cell but an organization of thousand consisting of ordinary*

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[18] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.7.

people."[19] In examining the presence of a regime of lynching in Turkey, Bora focuses on modern history and therefore fails to acknowledge the fact that existence of such a regime goes back to late Ottoman era coinciding with the preceding days of the Armenian Genocide.[20] However the incidents he chose for his examination provides the reader with a picture that shows the common features of such a regime. Although there were many minor incidents[21], "the Istanbul Pogrom", "the Sivas Massacre" and "the murder of Ali Ismail Korkmaz"[22] share the same common features. First of all they show that how easily the people in Turkey can be agitated[23] into resorting to lynching. For example in the Istanbul Pogrom also known as "6-7 September Events"[24], all it took for people to lynch and rape non-Muslims openly on the streets and loot their stores and houses was the headlines of a fake news; *"Our Father Atatürk's house has been bombed."* It was the starting point of two days long horror under the eyes of Turkish authorities: *"According to the press, 11 people died in the riots. [...]Officially 30 people were injured, unofficial numbers amount to 300. The number of raped women is estimated to be above 200. 4.214 house, 1.004 offices, 73 churches, one synagogue, one monastery, 26 schools and 5.317 other places such as hotels were attacked."*[25] In similar vein, on 1993 the people were easily agitated by the simple fact that Aziz Nesin who was an openly atheist intellectual was giving a speech at a hotel. Recorded in the history books as "the Sivas Massacre" where mostly Muslim-Sunni mob that surrounded the hotel in which intellectuals and activists were invited to take part in a traditional Alevi celebration and in which thirty seven of them were burned to death by the mob. Although happened nearly four decades apart from one another, Bora argues that they share the same features. He argues that in Turkey political and public authorities are inclined to *tolerate* and *legitimize* lynching.[26] The toleration and legitimization of these horrifying acts of collective violence are usually

[19] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.8.

[20] KEVORKIAN, RAYMOND: The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. I.B. Tauris. 2011.

[21] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. pp.21-25.

[22] URAS, UMUT: The Killing of Ali Ismail Korkmaz. February 7 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/killing-ali-ismail-korkmaz-20142681450320113.html. 2017.09.09.

[23] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.7.

[24] GUVEN, DILEK: Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the context of demographic engineering. European Journal of Turkish Studies 12. 2011. http://ejts.revues.org/4538. 2017.08.15.

[25] KORKUT, TOLGA: What Happened on 6-7 September? September 6 2009. http://bianet.org/english/minorities/116914-what-happened-on-6-7-september. 2017.08.09.

[26] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.9.

done by referencing *national reflexes* and/or *national sensibilities.* By referencing these concepts, Turkish authorities usually interpreted these collective violence acts by saying: *"our people have shown their justified reactions."*[27] Such an attitude does not only legitimize the acts committed but also invite future acts of collective violence. But why would the authorities of a state that claims to uphold rule of law adopt such an attitude? Gambetti argues that looking at the victims of lynching, one can find the answer. Even in the examples provided by Bora, one can see that majority of the targets of lynching are those who are considered to be traditionally in opposition to the state. Depending on the context, they can either be Kurds or leftists or Alevis or non-Muslims.[28] Both Bora's and Gambetti's analysis of this regime of lynching also point to two defining features; the relations of power and the role of discourse. Bora argues that in Turkey, the media presents lynching in a *pornographic* way. This tendency is especially almost true when the lynching is apolitical. He gives the example of a news which presented the lynching of a pick-pocket as *public beating*[29] which leads the audience to think vigilant justice has been served. Furthermore and what prompts Bora to call such a representation as *pornographic* is that the news also featured a video that displays the lynching uncensored.[30] The danger of representing lynching in this way, Bora argues, that it normalizes these collective act of violence and seriously undermines the principle of rule of law. Also as it will be seen in the analysis of news regarding refugees, act of lynching is also seriously underplayed by the media in Turkey by simply calling these collective acts of violence as *tension* between the attackers and the attacked.[31] Bora sums up all that is related to lynching in Turkey and concludes that there is indeed a *lynching regime* in Turkey: *"How easily lynching takes place, how it goes unpunished, how the public and even authorities legitimize lynching and how all of these are internalized in Turkey. Due to this almost regular practice I think one can talk about the existence of a lynching regime in Turkey."*[32] Agreeing with Bora,

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[27] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.31.

[28] GAMBETTI, ZEYNEP: Linç Girişimleri, Neoliberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti (Lynching Attempts, Neoliberalism and the Security State). Toplum ve Bilim (109): 7-34. 2007. p.1; BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. pp. 31,65.

[29] In fact such news are very common in Turkey titled as "meydan dayağı". In a recent news, a lynching of tourists from Lebanon who allegedly harrassed a young woman was presented in the same way: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/lubnanli-turiste-taciz-iddiasiyla-meydan-davagi-40515074

[30] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.60.

[31] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. p.66.

[32] BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. pp. 66-67.

Gambetti argues that in Turkey preceding the actual act of lynching a person or a group of person first are depicted as *"legitimate targets"* and such a process is conducted through utilization of different genres of discourse.[33]

How does the lynching regime of Turkey target the refugees then? Serving many ends as discussed above, the lynching regime in Turkey also serves an end that is closely related to minorities and refugees. Bora argues that the collective violence may also serve the lynching mob *"for defending their superiority and their sovereignty over a city/town/neighborhood where [the lynching mob] regard themselves to be its 'genuine natives'.*[34] Therefore "we are the natural hosts" of said city, town, neighborhood or the country and all "the others" are guests who are expected to behave in a certain manner compatible with their status of being a guest. This is the point where the lynching regime in Turkey starts to target refugees: *"This 'guest' status, which includes legal gaps and does not have any international validity, also causes racist and discriminatory discourses in the society against Syrian asylum seekers apart from the restrictions on their access to basic rights. Claiming that there has been enough number of privileges given to Syrian asylum seekers and that they have to go back now, the local community attempts to lynch Syrians in several cities of Turkey."*[35]

Although it is not possible to pinpoint the first instance of collective violence on refugees in Turkey, during our analysis of media discourse we have come across several news on collective violence targeting refugees. In this analysis, we have come across forty-seven instances of lynching are reported by the media. What all of these coverages have in common is that they include normalization of lynching, denial and mitigation of racism which are the underlying causes for the lynching and excusing and/or legitimating vigilante justice. Şimşek argues that the attacks on refugees have spread to cities like Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, İzmir, Kayseri, Adana and Antalya. He also states that the attacks begin by seemingly minor causes such as the assumed effect of refugees to increasing rent prices, increasing unemployment and even traffic jams: *"Since the spring 2014, there have been racist attacks against Syrian asylum seekers in many Turkish cities. [...] In Ankara,*

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[33]GAMBETTI, ZEYNEP: Linç Girişimleri, Neoliberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti (Lynching Attempts, Neoliberalism and the Security State). Toplum ve Bilim (109): 7-34. 2007. p.9.
[34]BORA, TANIL: Türkiye'nin Linç Rejimi(The Lynching Regime of Turkey). Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. 2014. P.14.
[35]SIMSEK, DOGUS: Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Unheard Voices. Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey) V (1). 2016. 6-13. http://researchturkey.org/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-unheard-voices/ . 2017.06.13.

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there have been marches protesting the Syrian asylum seekers while their houses were burnt. They have been subject of the attacks by the racist groups in Gaziantep too. Following the murder of a Syrian asylum seeker by his/her landlord from Turkey, the local community attacked the Syrians in the streets and parks with sticks and knifes, and 10 Syrians got injured. In İstanbul's İkitelli neighborhood, after the claim that a woman was harassed, local residents damaged some cars, apartments and offices belonged to the Syrians."

It is accurate to state that minor incidents seem to start these incidents of collective violence. For example in one of the latest incidents which took place in Ankara, the reports stated that "the tension" started because of "a girl issue".[36] Another incident that took place in Sakarya started because of a conflict between a worker and his employer but quickly escalated into a lynching campaign which targeted the houses, shops and cars of the refugees. It is important to mention that in this instance as well "protecting our women" is also stated to be the reason for this "reaction". One of the lyncher explains the situation like this: *"Syrians started a fight and attacked our cars. They were also verbally abusing women. That's why so many of us gathered here. We beat the Syrians wherever we saw them. And then we moved onto a place called slaughterhouse and beat many Syrians over there as well."*[37] After this instance we have found no record of custody or arrest of anyone from the lynching crowd.

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[36]For Turkish version of the news report: http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1551093-son-dakika-ankara-da-suriyeli-gerginligi

[37]For Turkish version of the news report: http://gazetekarinca.com/2017/06/sakaryada-suriyelilere-saldiri-evlere-baskin-yapip-linc-ettiler-yoldan-gecenleri-dovduler/

3. Critical Discourse Analysis and "Elite Racism"

The study finds itself in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis. Before going on to explaining Critical Discourse Analysis, a very important question stands out; what is discourse? One of the leading researchers in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis, van Dijk provides a clear and a short answer for this question: *"One of the most crucial social practices is discourse that is, socially situated text and talk."*[38] Although Critical Discourse Analysis is a vast literature, one of the common points for these different researchers is that they all agree on one aspect of discourse; *that it is a social practice.*[39] As Wodak explains, discourse is vital for social actors in the process of constituting knowledge through which they attribute meaning to the situations and events around them as well as constructing their identities. Along with discourse itself being a social practice, it has further power as *the discourses have power because they result in social action.*[40] The discourse as social practice then requires further elaboration to the simple definition provided by van Dijk above: *"[...] discourse, seen as a form of language use and communication, as social meaning and action as a sociocultural, political and ideological practice defining societal systems and structures."*[41] Furthermore, Wodak& Reisigl provides a multi-dimensional definition of discourse; *"We consider discourse to be; a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action, socially constituted and socially constitutive, related to a macro-topic, linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view."*[42]

Analyzing a phenomena like discourse therefore illuminates many other aspects in society. However for such illumination, a critical perspective is required and this is precisely the way Ruth Wodak explains the critical nature of Critical Discourse Analysis: *"'Critical' means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging*

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[38]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012. p.16.

[39]VAN LEEUWEN, THEO, and WODAK RUTH: Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis. Discourse Studies 1 (1): 83-118. 1999. p. 92.

[40]WODAK, RUTH and MATOUSCHEK BERND: `We are Dealing with People Whose Origins One can Clearly Tell Just by Looking': Critical Discourse Analysis and the Study of Neo-Racism in Contemporary Austria. Discourse and Society 4 (2): 225-248. 1993. p. 226.

[41]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism." In Hate Speech, R. K. Slayden and D. Slayden(Ed.), 1-27. Newbury Park: Sage.1995. p.4.

[42]REISGL, MARTIN and WODAK, RUTH: Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism. Routledge. 2000 p.89.

reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-reflective in my research, and through these processes, making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest."[43] In Wodak's explanation one can grasp the defining characteristics of Critical Discourse Analysis namely the manifestation of power relations and ideologies. Even though there are many different approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis field[44], this study compares and contrasts two main approaches in the field; "Discourse-Historical Analysis" and "Socio-Cognitive Approach". The reason for comparing these two approaches and eventually adopting one of them mainly stems from the concepts they analyze commonly. Both of these approaches give precedence to concepts like power, dominance, group relations and racism.

Discourse Historical Approach also known as "the Vienna School" in the field Critical Discourse Analysis is an approach in which researches like Wodak, Menz and Gruber critically analyze discourse and its relations with national identity building, discriminatory practices and functioning of different ideologies within a society.[45] In an article in which Wodak and van Leeuwen analyze the way immigration control is legitimized through discourse, she also provides the reader with a clear definition of Discourse Historical Approach: *"The approach centers on political issues and seeks to integrate as many of the genres of discourse referring to a particular issue as possible, as well as the historical dimension of that issue."*[46] As its name suggests historical background of the issue analyzed through discourse analysis is vital for Discourse Historical Approach. As the Discourse Historical Approach falls within the confines of Critical Discourse Analysis, critique is vital for the approach. Wodak argues that the critique for the Discourse Historical Analysis has three dimensions.[47] First dimension is "text- discourse immanent critique" through which text and discourse are critiqued internally so that any inconsistencies and paradoxes are manifested. Second dimension is "socio-diagnostic critique" in which discursive practices are analyzed so that they can be demystified. It is in this dimension that Wodak argues contextual knowledge for discursive practices come into play. This dimension is also the one in which interdisciplinary

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[43]WODAK, RUTH, interview by KENDALL, GAVIN: What is Critical Discourse Analysis? May 2007 http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/255/561. 2017.06.09.
[44] *İbid.*
[45]*İbid.*
[46]VAN LEEUWEN, THEO, and WODAK RUTH: Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis. Discourse Studies 1 (1): 83-118. 1999. p. 91.
[47]REISGL, MARTIN and WODAK, RUTH: Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism. Routledge. 2000. p. 88.

character of the Discourse Historical Approach can be seen. This is especially important since Wodak considers interdisciplinary focus and implementing interdisciplinary tools for analyzing discursive events are the specific contribution of Discourse Historical Analysis to the field of Critical Discourse Analysis.[48] Third dimension is "prospective critique" in which future related critique is conducted. In this dimension, the researcher makes future recommendations thanks to the illumination of discriminatory, sexist or racist character of discursive practices. These dimensions of critique also shape the method of Discourse Historical Approach. The method of the approach includes; *the content of the data, the discursive strategies employed and the linguistic realization of these contents and strategies."* [49] Taken together along with its theoretical orientation, this is what Wodak argues that make the Discourse Historical Approach distinctive in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis; *"The DHA is distinctive both at the level of research interest and theoretical and methodical orientation (where it displays an interest in identity construction and in unjustified discrimination and a focus on the historical dimensions of discourse formation) and with respect to its epistemological foundation- that is, with respect to its being oriented toward the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and in particular with Habermas's language philosophy."*[50] Even though it is not possible to discuss neither the Frankfurt School nor Habermas's theories in this study, it is important to state the influence of Habermas's theories on the Discourse Historical Approach as it shapes the approach's definition of power, language and ideology.[51] The concepts of "public sphere" and "deliberative democracy" are the most influential ones. These concepts imply that citizens are guaranteed free and equal participation to debate and decision-making processes so that the norm of democracy can be satisfied.[52] Even though Wodak and Reisigl argue[53] that these are important for the Discourse Historical Approach, one can see that they are also important for van Dijk's theory especially taken together

[48]WODAK, RUTH, interview by KENDALL, GAVIN: What is Critical Discourse Analysis? May 2007 http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/255/561. 2017.06.09.

[49]VAN LEEUWEN, THEO, and WODAK RUTH: Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis. Discourse Studies 1 (1): 83-118. 1999. p. 91.

[50]WODAK, RUTH: "Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach." In The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction, 1-14. John Wiley& Sons, Inc. 2015. p.2.

[51] Forchtner, Bernhard. "Critique, the Discourse-Historical Approach and the Frankfurt School." Critical Discourse Studies 8 (1): 2011. 1-14.

[52]WODAK, RUTH: "Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse-Historical Approach." In The International Encylopedia of Language and Social Interaction, 1-14. John Wiley& Sons, Inc. 2015.p.3.

[53]Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism. London,UK:Routledge 2001

with the concept of "manipulation" which will be examined in detail in the following pages.

One of the many approaches within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis is van Dijk's "Socio-cognitive Approach". As the name suggests, the relationship between discourse and social cognition is the defining feature of van Dijk's theory. And also what makes this study to adopt van Dijk's approach to discourse analysis is the interplay between various concepts like power, dominance and racism with the concept of social cognition. Van Dijk's "elite racism" is the combination of this interplay and it captures all the essential aspects of this study. First of all we need to clarify what van Dijk means by racism. Van Dijk's conceptualization of racism is similar to Balibar's "new racism". In their book in which they inquire on the specific features of contemporary racism with Immanuel Wallerstein, Balibar defines contemporary racism as "racism without races": *"It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions"*[54] From this definition one can easily conclude that in the era of unprecedented number of people who have been displaced are on the move, refugees are one of the main targets of this kind of racism. If that is the case, how can one study such a racism which van Dijk rightly argues to be so subtle?[55] Balibar formulates this conundrum in a question like this; *"is there a neo-racism?"* The answer is yes and one can detect and critically study this form of racism by looking at the everyday practices of subtle neo-racism: *"Racism -a true 'total social phenomenon' inscribes itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve 'one's own' or 'our' identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata of otherness (name, skin color, religious practices)"*[56] This is where van Dijk and Balibar connects; racism and discourse. Acknowledging that discourse is not the only form of social practice through which racism manifests itself, van Dijk argues that it has a vital role in terms of racism. He

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[54]BALIBAR, ETIENNE: Is There a 'Neo-Racism'? In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, by Immanuel Wallerstein and Etienne Balibar. London: Verso. 1991. p. 21.
[55]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.7.
[56]BALIBAR, ETIENNE: Is There a 'Neo-Racism'? In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, by Immanuel Wallerstein and Etienne Balibar. London: Verso. 1991. p. 17.

argues that discourse serves as a basis for most of other racist practices in society simply by allowing its reproduction.[57] Van Dijk argues that this kind of discourse serves to express, convey, legitimate and even conceal negative attitudes and beliefs towards different groups that are considered to be "the other".[58] This is where social cognition comes into play in van Dijk's examination of neo-racism. Before looking at the relationship between racism and social cognition, what van Dijk means by social cognition is needed to be explained. Although it is described much more complex by van Dijk, social cognition with regards to new racism can be summed as *prejudice, stereotyping* and *ideologies*. Van Dijk established the link between social cognition and racism as follows: *"We have argued above that ethnic group dominance has two complementary dimensions: those of social action and those of social cognition. Thus, control is enacted through social practices of oppression, suppression, exclusion, or marginalization of out-group members by in-group members. However, such practices are specifically racist—or perpetuate the system of racist power—only if they are also cognitively informed, for instance by prejudiced attitudes or ideologies"*[59] Remembering that new racism operates beyond physical characteristics like skin color, prejudices, categorization and stereotypes are vital in its functioning in the society. The functioning of new racism in the society is closely related to group relations. And in fact, cognitive features like stereotyping and prejudices are also important for group identity: *"A first important dimension of racism is its intergroup nature. Categorization, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination affect Other People primarily because they are thought to belong to another group, that is, as group members and not as individuals. Negative properties attributed to the group as a whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially alike and interchangeable. And vice versa, negative characteristics attributed to a group member in a particular situation may be generalized to those holding for the group as a whole."*[60] Therefore prejudices and attitudes like stereotyping are important social and mental representations which are commonly shared by group members which in turn define the group through this sharing.[61] Mentioning of groups naturally refers to an existence of hierarchy within society that is made of such groups. In Van Dijk's theory, this leads to critical concepts that is vital for the functioning of racism through discourse in society;

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[57]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.13.
[58]VAN DIJK, TEUN A. 1992. Discourse and the Denial of Racism. Discourse and Society 3 (1): 87-118. 1992. p.88.
[59]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.24.
[60]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 20.
[61]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 39.

power and *dominance*. These concepts are especially important as they lead van Dijk to define *racism as a system.*[62] This is a system of *domination* in which a dominant group – usually European, white and/or "Europeanized[63]- exercise a social power abuse. But what does it mean? From his critical studies on media and discourse, van Dijk provides a definition of social power. He defines it as follows: *"social power here will be summarily defined as a social relation between groups or institutions, involving the control by a (more) powerful group or institution (and its members) of the actions and the minds of (the members) a less powerful group. Such power generally presupposes privileged access to socially valued resources, such as force, wealth, income, knowledge, or status."*[64] Through this power, one group establishes and maintains a dominance over another group. Therefore it is important to note that for van Dijk dominance is the result of abuse of social power. It is through this frame that van Dijk defines racism as a form of dominance.[65] Discussing this type of dominance, van Dijk utilizes the word *"illegitimate"*[66] on purpose implying the importance of equal access to social resources in an ideal democracy. At this point, another question arises; how is all connected together? Up until this point, van Dijk's theory of "elite racism" has established first; there is a new form of racism in the very society we live in. Second, this racism is socially learned[67] and in fact serves the purposes of one group for dominating another group. Third, as a tool of dominance, racism serves to those above who holds such a power to establish and maintain dominance over others.[68] If these are to be true, where do *cognition* and *discourse* fit in? Van Dijk answers: *"dominance defined as social control has both a cognitive and a social dimension. Besides their control over the access to valued social resources, dominant groups may indirectly control the minds of others. They may do so through persuasive discourse and by other*

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[62]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. p.27; VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012.p. 15.

[63]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism." In Hate Speech, R. K. Slayden and D. Slayden(Ed.), 1-27. Newbury Park: Sage.1995.p.5.

[64]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Power and the News Media." In Political Communication in Action, David L. Paletz(Ed.), 9-36. New Jersey: Hampton Press. 1995. p. 10.

[65]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 21.

[66]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. p.27; VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012. p.15.

[67]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism." In Hate Speech, R. K. Slayden and D. Slayden(Ed.), 1-27. Newbury Park: Sage.1995. p.3.

[68]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism." In Hate Speech, R. K. Slayden and D. Slayden(Ed.), 1-27. Newbury Park: Sage.1995.pp.4-5.

means (biased news reporting, bad education) that limit the acquisition and the use of relevant knowledge and beliefs necessary to act freely and in one's own interests. "[69]

From this definition, one can safely conclude that the powers of *manipulation* and *persuasion* of the elites function through discursive practices. Therefore, going back to Wodak, analysis of discursive practices may very well illuminate the relations of power within a society. But how manipulation and persuasion function through discourse? Although manipulation might refer to the passivity of masses for racist attitudes, persuasion might imply active participation that balances the scales. What does van Dijk mean by manipulation? In an article that is specifically about the relationship between discourse and manipulation, van Dijk also explains the necessity of discourse analytical approach for studying manipulation. First of all, he argues, manipulation that serves the interests of those above occurs through text and talk. And contrary to original meaning of the verb, manipulation does not need to include physical interaction with the manipulated. Those who are manipulated, are almost always manipulated through processes that influence and control their minds. Therefore, van Dijk argues that a discourse analytical approach with a cognitive aspect is required for studying manipulation. Lastly, he argues that manipulation has an important social aspect as it is about social power abuse therefore related to the power relations within a society.[70] Van Dijk argues that as a form of dominance, manipulation ultimately aims to *"control the shared social representations of groups of people."*[71] This aim is realized through different strategies which will be analyzed in detail in the study but one can conclude that through manipulation of social representations, the dominance of one group over another can be established, maintained and legitimized. Although manipulation might refer to passivity in terms of lack of control of its objects, van Dijk also mentions *persuasive power of the elites.*[72] From the readings of van Dijk, it is clear that he gives more importance to this persuasive power and active participation of in-group members for shaping and continuing social representations. While discussing about persuasion, one detects frequent referrals to "consent", "truth", "knowledge" and "reconstruction" in van Dijk's works. All of these refer to the power of elites in being able to control knowledge through various genres of discourse. This is also

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[69]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993.p.21.
[70]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse and Society 17 (2): 359-383. 2006.pp.359-360.
[71]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse and Society 17 (2): 359-383. 2006.p.369.
[72]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism." In Hate Speech, R. K. Slayden and D. Slayden(Ed.), 1-27. Newbury Park: Sage.1995.pp. 4-5.

what defines the elite group in terms of their social power: *"Control of knowledge crucially shapes our interpretation of the world, as well as our discourse and other actions. Hence the relevance of a critical analysis of those forms of text and talk, e.g. in the media and education, that essentially aim to construct such knowledge."*[73] Different from manipulation, being able to control knowledge invites active participation of those who are subjected to it. In order to explain that van Dijk invokes a well-known phrase associated with Herman and Chomsky; *"manufacturing consent".*[74] Defining elite power as *having some type and amount of control over the minds and actions of other people*, van Dijk argues that one of the defining feature of such power is having an access to public discourse: *"Through this special active and passive access to public discourse, elites also have special access to the public mind, according to the complex processes of social cognition formation and change outlined above. That is, they produce self-evaluations, definitions of the situation, and selections of problems, and agendas that may have significant public impact."*[75] This is in fact can be seen as having the power to define and construct "facts". One can especially see in liberal media that discriminatory and racist discourses can find their way in different outlets with the claim of *publishing the truth.*[76] Thanks to this claim of merely giving voice to the truth, the media along with other genres of discourse legitimizes prejudices. As van Dijk argues; *"Prejudiced attitudes not only show in discriminatory action but also need to be communicated to other group members within a wider framework of an ideological 'ethnic' consensus. Their efficacy lies in their persuasive 'normalization': we only know what 'everybody' thinks or does when we hear or read about it."*[77] Therefore this process of normalization means constant reconstruction of "truth" and repetition is vital in this sense.[78] This is where reader/audience becomes an active agent: *"Once such fundamental patterns of knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies are firmly in place due to repeated news reporting and other forms of public discourse (e.g., in education), they will further act on their own when people have to evaluate news events. [...]. Once given the (carefully selected) facts, although presented in a seemingly objective*

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[73]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society 4 (2): 249-283. 1993.p. 258.
[74]HERMAN, EDWARD S. and CHOMSKY, NOAM: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media. Pantheon. 2002.
[75]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. pp.44-45
[76]VAN DIJK, TEUN A. 1992. Discourse and the Denial of Racism. Discourse and Society 3 (1): 87-118. 1992. pp.92-93.
[77]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "How 'They' Hit the Headlines: Ethnic Minorities in the Press." In Discourse and Discrimination, Geneva Smitherman and Teun A. van Dijk(Ed.), 221-262. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1988. p.222.
[78]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991.pp.236-238.

fashion, the readers will themselves produce the preferred models of the elites and may even act accordingly: An active consensus will replace passive or tacit consent. "[79] Here one can also see the cognitive aspect of van Dijk's approach to discourse analysis. Lastly, van Dijk discusses various genres of discourse through which manipulation and persuasion operates. These different genres of discourse are important in that the elite racism is the combined effort and result of these different genres of discourse. Van Dijk lists five genres of discourse; "political discourse", "corporate discourse", "academic discourse", "educational discourse" and "media discourse". The common point for these genres of discourse is the discursive strategies they employ for achieving a determined end. Here, Van Dijk lists eight discursive strategies utilized by the elites for persuading their audience in line with their own interests and ends. Although Van Dijk talks about them in terms of political discourse, persuasion as their end game make these discursive strategies to be common instruments for other genres of discourses as well. These discursive strategies are as follows: *positive self-representation, disclaimers and denial of racism, negative other-representation, "the firm but fair" rhetoric, "the for their own good" rhetoric, vox populi or white racism as threat, the numbers game* and *anti-racism, resistance.*

As it is very frequent in all the texts analyzed in this study, the discursive strategy of positive self-representation is very important. Van Dijk categorizes positive self-representation under national rhetoric. He argues that positive self-representation of in-group members and the group itself is achieved through *pride, self-glorification* and *positive comparisons with other countries.*[80] Every time such means of positive self-representation are employed "us vs. them" rhetoric is also present. What is specific to this study is Van Dijk's argument on the functioning of positive self-representation with regards to immigration and ethnic affairs in general. In these matters, positive self-representation is aimed towards establishing that "our country", "our nation", "our government", "our people" are the most tolerant, the most hospitable and the most empathetic. By establishing "us" in this way, Van Dijk argues that positive self-representation may also serve as a self-defense tactic in case "our hospitality" or "our tolerance" are doubted and questioned.[81] The positive self-representation of "our" positive features serves this end by constructing these features as *"the inherent national virtues of a*

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[79]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Power and the News Media." In Political Communication in Action, David L. Paletz(Ed.), 9-36. New Jersey: Hampton Press. 1995. p.16.
[80]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.72.
[81]*Ibid.*

long tradition.[82] In his analysis of statements from Dutch parliamentary representatives, Van Dijk draws attention to constant referrals to rather secular themes like homage to the principles of French Revolution[83] but it is important to note in analyzing texts from different genres of discourses from Turkey, the referrals also contain "our Muslim etiquette" and/or "our Ottoman legacy". The second discursive strategy is utilization of disclaimers and the denial of racism. When and if "our virtues" are questioned or doubted, disclaimers and denial of racism come in handy. According to Van Dijk, there are four types of denial: *act denial, control denial, intention denial* and *goal denial*. Though different in their means, these different types of denial of racism ultimately aim to reject, justify and/or excuse "our negative attitudes". Therefore the denial of racism may at least serve to mitigate "our negative actions" based on racist and xenophobic presuppositions.[84] In fact Van Dijk argues that "our virtues" might not necessarily be questioned or doubted but can very well serve as disclaimers for following racist and xenophobic statements. After mentioning our positive features like being hospitable and tolerant, a negative statement about minorities or championing for restrictive policies on immigration may follow: *"such disclaimers are often a clear symptom of underlying prejudice or antagonistic attitudes, if not a sure sign of subtle or not so subtle racism".*[85] The denial of racism also operates through emphasizing the exception of certain incident or individual whose actions might shed negative light on our positive features.[86] As it is also the case for attacks on refugees in Turkey, such acts of collective or individual violence are said to be exceptions to otherwise tolerant and hospitable character of Turkish people. Furthermore, for the denial of racism, the refugees themselves may be portrayed to be responsible for increasing xenophobia and racism in certain regions and neighborhoods. In this way while *"we" are kept as clean as possible*[87], "they" are the ones with "their" high numbers, with "their" disrespect for the local population who are responsible for increasing "reactions" and "tensions" in the hosting group.[88] Another discursive strategy in the functioning of elite racism is *negative other-representation*. Representing "the other" negatively is the operating system of racism. As well as boosting "our" positive representation, negative representation of "them" also justify certain attitudes and actions targeting "the other". Van

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[82]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.74.
[83]*Ibid.*
[84]VAN DIJK, TEUN A. 1992. Discourse and the Denial of Racism. Discourse and Society 3 (1): 87-118. 1992. pp. 91-94.
[85]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.77.
[86]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.82.
[87]*Ibid.*
[88]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.79.

Dijk argues that while in the past such negative representation of others are more explicitly done, in the era of symbolic racism it has become much more subtle. He argues that the change of negative representation of the other has caused by the changing international moral attitude thanks to the minority resistance and the influence of Third World countries. However, despite such a change he also argues that *ethnic attitudes* have not radically changed and underlying prejudices, stereotypes and so on still exist.[89] Remembering that he argues racism to be a system of domination, the negative representation of the other plays an important role for *"reproducing the system of ethnic inequality"."*[90] The negative representation therefore focuses on the negative properties of minorities and refugees. Through this focus, cultural differences and the assumed negative consequences caused by the existence of minorities or stay of refugees are emphasized: *"More generally, we have found in conservative elite discourse that the consequences of immigration and civil rights are portrayed in terms of social, economic, and cultural catastrophe, and hence as a fundamental threat to white society."*[91] This can especially be observed in the statements of opposition politicians in Turkey. Accusing refugees for being disrespectful to the local population, being "freeloaders" or at the very least for "being burdens on our back" and therefore calling for measures to be taken while criticizing the government to be too incompetent for handling the process. Though Van Dijk does not necessarily add it to his arguments regarding negative self-representation, the use of metaphors are also important for such representation. For furthering the cognitive impact of the negative representation, "metaphors of fluidity", "bio-social metaphors" and/or "metaphor of hygiene" are employed. Pohl and Wodak argues that the metaphor of fluidity impact the discursive construction of the refugee by associating her arrival and existence with destruction: *"Metaphors of fluidity are a familiar part of it; migrants first trickle in, then turn into streams and at last flood a peaceful country and drown it in a mayhem of general destruction."*[92] In the analysis of racist and xenophobic discourse targeting refugees, the metaphors of "flood", "wave" or "stream" are frequently used. The metaphor of hygiene is more about implying cultural differences and how "these people" are not welcome to our "hygienic environment": *"Such utterances are characteristic of a relatively coded exclusionary rhetoric in which one standard metaphor is cleanliness: Refugees are*

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[89]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.84.
[90]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.85.
[91]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.90.
[92]WODAK, RUTH and POHL, WALTER: "The Discursive Construction of 'Migrants and Migration'." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 205-213. Springer. 2012. p.206.

indirectly depicted as being dirty people, not civilized, and thus not welcome."[93] For this end, it is important to note that pictures accompanying the news are also important for depicting "them" as dirty. Lastly, what Musolff calls "a bio-social metaphor" also serves for negative representation of others: *"The target meaning of social parasitic behavior, i.e. "scrounging", "taking advantage of" and "abusing" the hospitality of a "host" person or society, has been a long-standing theme of public debates about immigration in post-war Germany alongside flood or invasion imager.*"[94] Coincidentally, Musolff shows the early utilization of "the parasite metaphor" in late Ottoman era and therefore we can conclude that describing minorities or in general others in this way has a long tradition dating back to "Major Osman Bey".[95] Another discursive strategies for the elite racism are "the firm but fair" rhetoric and "for their own good" rhetoric. Due to their paternalistic character, it would not be far fetching to group these strategies together and analyze them so. Both of these strategies are paternalistic for that they are usually accompanied by a call or a suggestion for harsher policies to be adopted and stricter measures to be taken so that "they" can stand up on their feet. Van Dijk compares such "firmness" to the firmness of *"the stern father or the wise doctor whose firmness only benefits his children or his clients."*[96] What is specifically important for this study is the reminder on "limits of hospitality". In this line of argument, it is usually assumed that increasing numbers of refugees are straining the hospitality of "our" otherwise hospitable nation and that is why limitations or regulations proposed to immigration are for keeping "the tensions" at a low level between the host and the guest.[97] And it is important to emphasize that the regulations or the restrictions proposed are always assumed to be only fair.[98] Such regulations or limitations are also assumed to benefit "them" and teach them to stand up on their own feet. In case of immigration, Van Dijk cites a common statement: *"A standard argument, heard in everyday conversations as well as in racist propaganda about immigrants, is that*

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[93] WODAK, RUTH and POHL, WALTER: "The Discursive Construction of 'Migrants and Migration'." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 205-213. Springer. 2012. p. 209.

[94] MUSOLFF, ANDREAS: "Immigrants and Parasites: The History of a Bio-social Metaphor." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 249-261. Springer. 2012. p.251.

[95] MUSOLFF, ANDREAS: "Immigrants and Parasites: The History of a Bio-social Metaphor." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 249-261. Springer. 2012. p.252.

[96] VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.93.

[97] VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. pp.94, 97.

[98] VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.93.

they should go back to their own (poor) country, and help to build it up. "[99] In our analysis and especially in terms of political discourse, it is quite frequent that call for return of refugees to "go back to their country and fight for it". Another discursive strategy for elite racism is the claim to be speaking for the people or what Van Dijk refers as *vox populi or white racism as a threat.* For functioning of this strategy politicians usually claim to be speaking for those at grassroots and therefore merely passing on their genuine "feelings" and "resentments" in terms of ethnic affairs and immigration. Such a strategy also serves for denying the racism of elites by attributing such feelings and resentments to lower class and claim that if things keep on going as they are, there might be racism and xenophobia in our society.[100] Through this strategy, Van Dijk argues that the elites are resorting to "the routine pretense of all racists" by claiming to only vocalize what everybody thinks.[101] Another strategy Van Dijk argues which is fundamental for the elite racism is "the number games". Similar to metaphors, the numbers games help to strengthen the negative representation of the others while concealing behind the universality of numbers and statistics: *"This rhetorical use of quasi-objective figures, convincingly suggesting how many "come in" every day, week, month, or year, is one of the most compelling scare tactics in the formation of public opinion. Figures need not be lied about or exaggerated. It is the way they are presented or extrapolated that makes them impressive. For instance, they are always given in absolute numbers, so that thousands or even hundreds of thousands of refugees or immigrants arriving each year appear to be quite impressive.* "[102] Through use of numbers and statistics, the assumed impact of minorities and refugees are transferred onto irrefutable way and emphasize lack of control.[103] Although Van Dijk focuses on the role of the numbers game for negative representation of the other, in our analysis we have also come across this strategy to be serving for positive self-representation of "us". By referring to the amount spent on refugees or the number of refugees "being hosted" in "our country", the numbers game helps drawing a positive picture of "us". And of course, the numbers game is also employed to draw attention to the way "those people" are burden to us and/or threat to us by emphasizing high fertility rates, crime involvement rates and so on.

[99]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993.p.95.
[100]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. pp.99-102.
[101]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 103.
[102]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.107.
[103]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.108.

Although each one is equally important in Van Dijk's theory of elite racism, the study will focus on a triangle model in which "political discourse", "academic discourse" and "political discourse" interacts with each other. The reason for such a model stems from pragmatic reasons such as the limited scope of the study, the difficulty of obtaining examples for corporate and educational discourses as well as much more complementary relationship between media, politics and academics for the construction of attitudes towards refugees in Turkey.

3.1. Academic Discourse

What power does an academic have so that it requires a critical studying of academic articles or academic reports in terms of racist and xenophobic discourse? Van Dijk argues that academia can also be considered as an important extension of relations of power in a society. It is well known that access to production and control of knowledge is what defines a person or a group as powerful. Therefore van Dijk argues; *"if knowledge is power, then knowledge of other people may be an instrument of power over other people."*[104] As van Dijk describes racism as relations of domination and domination as abuse of power, academia as one of the main sources of knowledge is vital for relations of power. Van Dijk defines the place of academia within the relations of power through the concept of influence. While acknowledging that the scientific achievements further advance and strengthen the State and corporate institutions, in terms of ethnic relations their research, their teaching and their reports have a degree of influence even determining policies like refugee, housing and employment policies: *"As the producers, managers, or brokers of knowledge, scholars are among the most prominent symbolic elites of contemporary society."*[105] The role of scholars in terms of ethnic relations has the utmost importance for this study because the process of defining "the Other" is usually carried out by scholars. In order to support this point, van Dijk examines the role of scholars for legitimizing colonialism. But how can scholars legitimize a process of exploitation and domination like colonialism? This is more of a question of means rather than a question of ethics which is beyond the scope of this research. Van Dijk argues that it became possible by the invention of race: *"The very notion of race is of their making, and resulted from the desire to classify and categorize as much as from the will to dominate. Thus, philosophers*

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[104]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.158.
[105]*Ibid.*

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of the eighteenth century, historians of the nineteenth century, and anthropologists, biologists, psychologists, and other social scientists of our century all contributed to the fabrication of a web of facts, myths, and half-truths whose ideological impact is felt even today. "[106] Since then, racism has operated through construction of "positive WE" in relation to "negative THEM" though, Van Dijk argues, it was more explicit at that time that such a construction of "positive WE" was achieved through "their" inferiority, non-humanity and non-Christianity. But such explicit manifestations of racism disappeared especially after the World War II according to Van Dijk and what replaced was more subtle forms of construction of "positive WE". The inferiority and superiority of races has been replaced by *"cultural difference"* which according to van Dijk translates into *"cultural incompatibility"*.[107] Here, van Dijk provides a compelling argument and he argues that although the forms of construction have changed, the ultimate tool for hierarchy of races has remained the same: *"self-interest, in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism"*. Having such *"an ideological layer"* as van Dijk describes it therefore inevitably leads to contrasting "their" negative features with "our" positive features. Such a tendency can easily be noted in the articles and reports analyzed below.

In order to examine academic discourse in contributing to the lynching regime in Turkey which also target refugees, the study analyzes twelve articles and reports carefully chosen to reflect different political orientations. Therefore they are chosen to include those that are considered to be pro-government, nationalist, conservative and mainstream opposition. Unfortunately many of the articles examined are in Turkish however accurate translation of the sentences and words analyzed will be provided along with their Turkish counterparts. Also for the sake of the study, the articles written in English will be analyzed in a more detailed way. Instead of analyzing each article separately, it would be better to analyze them in terms of common discursive strategies they all seem to share such as rhetoric of burden and threat, positive representation of in-group and utilization of metaphors for negative representation of out-group and emphasis on cultural differences. The most commonly shared theme of the articles examined is the positive representation of in-group. In fact, all the articles examined contain in one way or another such positive representations without exception despite their political orientations. In an article that claims to be critically studying the representation of Syrian refugees in Turkish media, one

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[106]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 159.
[107]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. P.160.

can see such positive self-representation. Authored for the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research(SETA) which is known to be pro-government, the author praises "Turkey's generosity": *"Compared to other host countries, Turkey has been more generous[cömert] and more successful[başarılı] by adopting an 'open door policy' and accepting all those who seek asylum, by ability to organize camps for sheltering of refugees and by providing humanitarian aids, education, health and occupational education services hence also providing for the social needs of the refugees."*[108] Continuing in the same vein is the report prepared by Hacettepe University's Migration and Politics Research Center. Unlike the report for SETA, this report portrays Turkey as the victim of open-door policy: *"Turkey and other neighboring countries have been the victims [mağdur] of universal 'open-door policy'"*[109] and along with the victim statement, the report also suggests that Turkey is being constantly *targeted* by irregular, mass immigration.[110] As a hospitable nation, despite of *being targeted* and *being the victim of 'open-door policy'*, Turkish society has *made enormous financial and humanitarian sacrifices [fedakarlık].*[111] Here, one can see that refugees are depicted as burdens that requires Turkish society to make sacrifices for. Out of this victim-target discourse, the report manages to construct a positive in-group representation by stating that *"despite occasional and exceptional xenophobic and racist attitudes, Turkish society has tremendously high level of acceptance of Syrian refugees."* and warns the reader that *Turkish hospitality* has its limits.[112] The limited nature of Turkish hospitality even becomes a title for another report. As this article is written in English, the pattern of choice of words is more noteworthy. While constructing positive in-group representation, the report also contains a warning: *"The Turkish people and the government, mainly through the Prime Ministry's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), responded generously to the refugees, offering them sanctuary and hospitality. But as the conflict intensifies – with no end in sight – and as the resources of the Turkish government and*

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[108]EFE, IBRAHIM: Türk Basınında Suriyeli Sığınmacılar(Syrian Asylum Seekers in the Turkish Media). Istanbul: SETA. 2015. p.13.
[109]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. p.5.
[110]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. p. 15.
[111]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. p. 5.
[112]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. pp.5,9.

society are stretched thin, questions arise about the limits of Turkey's hospitality. "[113]This statement translates that despite the good intentions of Turkey and undoubting efforts made by Turkish government, refugees are becoming a burden for Turkey. In order to mitigate this racist discourse and strengthen the positive in-group representation, the report also compares Turkey's generosity with "developed countries".[114] To demonstrate further "the generosity" and "the sacrifices" of Turkey, the report notes the "cost" of Syrian refugees and emphasizes the refugee camps as well: *"It is a source of pride for the Turkish government and stands as an example to the world of the actions of a strong national government response."*[115] Depending on the date on which the article or the report written, "the cost" of refugees to Turkey changes but it still constantly mentioned as it is important for the positive representation of Turkey. For that end, the refugee camps are also a recurring theme both in political discourse and media discourse as well as academic discourse.

More common than explicit construction of positive in-group representation is the rhetoric of burden. As mentioned above it also serves for such construction by showing "the generosity" of Turkey in terms of the money spent. Out of twelve articles and reports examined, seven of them contain explicit emphasis on the burden of refugees to Turkish society. As it will be seen in the political discourse, Turkey is usually portrayed as being left alone by the international community for bearing the burden and therefore have been making *tremendous sacrifices*[116]. For that end, numbers also help. Emphasizing the amount spent on refugees increases the effect of burden rhetoric. Although the numbers may change due to several reasons such as date of publication and inclusion or exclusion of certain spending, they still serve the same end. A study that aims to assess the public opinion with regards to Syrian refugees and Turkey's immigration policy, the burden rhetoric even finds itself in the main question which was posed to the surveyed: *"As you know, because of the conflict in Syria 500.000 people have come to Turkey as refugees so*

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[113]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013. p.2
[114]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013. p. 25.
[115]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013. P.26.
[116]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. p.5.

far. It has been estimated that the expenditures for Syrian refugees have reached to 2 billion dollars. How do you think Turkey should proceed from now on with regards to refugees?"[117] What could be the point of including the numbers of refugees arrived and the amount of money spent on refugees in a question that aims to investigate the public opinion on refugees? One can easily argue that the aim of posing the question this way is nothing but manipulation. By posing the question in such a way creates the image of burden in the minds of the surveyed, the surveyor manipulates them in such a way so that the answers would be in a desired pattern. Such an argument is also supported by van Dijk as he argues that manipulation and elite discourse have close relationship: *"Obviously, in order to be able to manipulate many others through text and talk, one needs to have access to some form of public discourse, such as parliamentary debates, news, opinion articles, textbooks, scientific articles, novels, TV shows, advertising, the internet, and so on. And since such access and control in turn depend on, as well as constitute, the power of a group (institution, profession, etc.), public discourse is at the same time a means of the social reproduction of such power."*[118] Although in his argument he gives the example of use of headlines, one can argue that the same applies here. In this question, manipulation is also achieved by *drawing attention to information A rather than B* therefore aiming to have the understanding of the surveyed either be partial or be biased.[119] Wherever the numbers are not present for the sake of the burden rhetoric, one can see either explicit statement of refugees as burdens or implicit connections between "the cost of refugees" and its impact on Turkish economy. In an article with a title that explicitly relates the presence of refugees with risks, the cost of refugees is argued to be multiplied as their stay is prolonged: *"It is obvious that arrival of this much refugees to a country will cause important security, economic and political problems in that country. Therefore as the immigration process extends so does the costs [maliyet] for that country that are caused by refugees."*[120] Such a statement naturally leads to the conclusion that *even though Turkey is doing its best*[121] to provide for the refugees, they are becoming more burden for Turkey the longer they stay. Therefore even though how hospitable Turkish society has been which

[117]EDAM: Türk Kamuoyunun Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Bakış Açısı (Turkish Public Opinion Regarding Syrian Asylum Seekers). EDAM. 2014. p.2.
[118]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse and Society 17 (2): 359-383. 2006 .p.362.
[119]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse and Society 17 (2): 359-383. 2006. p.366.
[120]CANYURT, DILEK: Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler (Syrian Refugees after Developments in Syria: Risks in Turkey) Akademik Bakış Dergisi (48): 2015. 127-146. p. 128
[121]CANYURT, DILEK: Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler (Syrian Refugees after Developments in Syria: Risks in Turkey) Akademik Bakış Dergisi (48): 2015. 127-146. p. 132.

can be observed in the official referral of refugees as *guests*[122], İçduygu argues that *"Syrians might be overstaying their welcome"* in Turkey.[123] Another article that aims to study refugee behaviors and their effects on the society takes the burden rhetoric one step further by associating "the costs" of refugees with their assumed lack of education: *"Another weak aspect of economic impact of Syrians is that most of them are from low income levels [alt gelir seviyesinde] and are less educated [düşük eğitim seviyesi]."* The concern of Tunç in this argument is that because they have low income level and are less educated they will not be able to contribute to the Turkish economy in the future.[124] Therefore she claims that although at first they were *the affected [etkilenen]* by the war and they have become *the affecting [etkileyen]* by their "negative" impact on Turkish society in general but on Turkish economy specifically.[125] The impact on economy rhetoric is also utilized in a more subtle manner by another report. In an article that foresees that Syrian refugees are here in Turkey to stay, Ferris and Kirişçi implicitly connects Turkish economy's recent poor performance with the arrival of Syrian refugees: *"The economic and political costs of caring for Syrian refugees together with Iraqi ones are rising, while there is growing recognition that refugees are in Turkey for the long run and that there is an urgent need for a comprehensive integration policy. This is occurring at a time when the Turkish economy is significantly slowing down. The growth rate for the Turkish economy when Syrian refugees first began to arrive in 2011 was almost 9 percent, among the highest in the world. In 2014 it had fallen below 3 per cent."*[126]

Another shared theme in the articles and reports examined is the emphasis on cultural differences and therefore naturalizing and mitigating the lynching tendencies directed towards refugees. Through the claim of reflecting the public opinion, one report debunks the commonly shared notion that Turkish and Syrian cultures are alike. The report argues that despite such wide belief, *"only 17.2%"* of those interviewed agree with this

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[122]ICDUYGU, AHMET: Syrian Refugees in Turkey: the Long Road Ahead. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. 2015. p. 7.
[123]ICDUYGU, AHMET: Syrian Refugees in Turkey: the Long Road Ahead. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. 2015. p.11.
[124]TUNC, AYSE SEBNEM: Mülteci Davranışı ve Toplumsal Etkileri: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme (The Refugee Behaviour and Its Social Effects: An Evaluation Regarding the Syrians in Turkey). Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy 2 (2): 29-63. 2015. p. 48.
[125]TUNC, AYSE SEBNEM: Mülteci Davranışı ve Toplumsal Etkileri: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme (The Refugee Behaviour and Its Social Effects: An Evaluation Regarding the Syrians in Turkey). Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy 2 (2): 29-63. 2015. p.44.
[126]KIRISCI, KEMAL and FERIS, ELIZABETH: Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey - and the International Community. the Brookings Institute. 2015. p. 14.

statement while a crushing majority believes that "we" are nothing alike.[127] Reports and articles that state the cultural differences between refugees and Turkish society focus on "Turkish family structure". The report that studies "the effects" of Syrian refugees on Turkey shifts the agency of assumed negative actions to Syrian refugees as it can also be observed in its title. Examining "their" social effects on Turkey, the report argues; *"The issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey is primarily one of social adaptation. The difference in culture, language and living style is one of the main reasons for various reactions from the local communities. Besides, the increase in polygamy, a higher divorce rates because of polygamy, women and child abuse, social and sectarian polarization and urban sprawl can be listed as the social effects of Syrian refugees in Turkey."*[128] It is also important to note that how racist attacks and lynching tendency of local communities are presented as *"various reactions from local communities"*. In an article, it is explicitly stated that Syrians has had negative impacts on Turkish social structure: *"It is observed that refugees has had negative impacts on Turkish social structure. For example, because of the arrival of Syrian families in which polygamy is widespread, it has been observed that Turkish men in border towns have taken Syrian women as second wives."*[129] These arguments and especially those who put great emphasis on the negative impacts of refugees on Turkish family structure fail to acknowledge the fact that refugee women lack any kind of social security and are being traded like things for marriage.[130] In fact, the same article that argues that the issue with Syrian refugees is an issue of social adaptation goes one step further and includes an anecdote which has been presented with no disclaimer whatsoever: *"Also, the women of these cities blame Syrian women for deceiving their husbands."*[131] Including such a statement without any disclaimer like a fact does nothing but to feed into the stereotypes about refugees.

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[127]ERDOGAN, MURAT M.: Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması (Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research). Ankara: HUGO Yayınları. 2015. p.31.
[128]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015. p16.
[129]CANYURT, DILEK: Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler (Syrian Refugees after Developments in Syria: Risks in Turkey) Akademik Bakış Dergisi (48): 2015. 127-146.p. 139.
[130]LETSCH, CONSTANZE: Syria's refugees: fears of abuse grow as Turkish men snap up wives. September 8 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/08/syrian-refugee-brides-turkish-husbands-marriage . 2017.08.12; ERDEM HOLLAND, Yesim: Syrian Refugees Are Becoming Second Wives in Turkey. June 23 2016. https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/ppvyjn/syrian-refugees-second-wives-turkey. 2017.05.14.; NAWA, FARIBA and SEBZECI OZGE: Activists Condemn Turkey's Polygamous Marriages Targeting Syrian Refugees. July 25 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/polygamy-in-turkey_us_57964212e4b01180b52fae27. 2017.05.14.
[131]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015.p. 16.

Lastly, almost all of the articles and reports examined contains in one way or another the presentation of refugees as a threat. In doing this, most of them choose to refer to metaphors to increase the effect of rhetoric of threat. Without mentioning the relationship of Turkish government with several Syrian "opposition" fighters, the same article that feeds into social anxiety by claiming refugees to be "future citizens of Turkey", draws attention to security aspect of their presence in Turkey: *"An evaluation regarding the Syrian refugees in Turkey should not ignore the security aspect of the matter. The explosion at the Cilvegözü border on February 11, 2013 and death of 50 people at Reyhanlı on May 11, 2013 point to security threat posed to the domestic and border security [of Turkey] by illegal groups travelling with Syrian refugees into Turkey.* "[132] Such argument that creates a suspicion by associating refugees with armed groups has a great appeal especially in political discourse as well. Although it has been documented numerous times, another article rejects the relationship between Turkish government and armed groups[133] and adopts rhetoric of threat through petty crime as the article argues that especially in border towns like Kilis petty crime is on the rise and something should be done about it.[134] Another report takes it one step further and claims that as refugees live in uncontrolled, illegal neighborhoods they are in an environment that nourishes criminal activity and claims that because of the harsh conditions they find themselves in men end up being involved with drugs while women end up being victims of prostitution.[135] The same article also employs use of metaphors for its arguments. While discussing the pattern of movement of refugees within Turkey, it argues that at first while refugees started living in border cities, they then began to *spread around the country.*[136] The using of the word "spread" implicitly creates the image of a disease that spreads around the body.[137] As it will be seen to be common especially in media discourse, the same report shares utilization

[132]KAP, DERYA: Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'nin Müstakbel Vatandaşları (Syrian Refugees: Turkey's Future Citizens). Akademik Perspektif 30-35. 2014. p.33.
[133]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013. p.7.
[134]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013. p.28.
[135]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015.p .17.
[136]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015. p. 16.
[137]MUSOLFF, ANDREAS: Migration, Media and 'Deliberate' Metaphors. metaphorik.de 21: 7-19. 2011.

of "flood metaphor"[138] with the report prepared by İçduygu. However İçduygu goes one step further and employs the flood metaphor more sophistically while discussing the irregularity of early refugee movements: *"While early arrivals ebbed and flowed, inflows of refugees gained enormous momentum in 2012 as efforts to negotiate a ceasefire failed."*[139] The utilization of the flood metaphor has cognitive functions like all other metaphors such metaphor of disease, metaphor of dirtiness and so on. In the case of the flood metaphor, it immediately brings in mind the possible consequence of *being drowned* and therefore amidst the flow of refugees, the reader is called upon imagining being drowned in the sea of refugees.

Although it is limited due to the scope of this study, the academic discourse examined so far illuminates the importance of it. As the academia produces knowledge, it may also serve as basis for legitimization for other genres of discourse. As it can be seen in the analysis of above mentioned articles and reports, they claim to simply to speak the truth, speak the "as-it-is". Under such a claim and by referring to either "the experts" or "the public", academic discourse may include a call for stopping the influx of refugees[140] or a statement that the public is running out of patience[141] or a claim that *"there is no open racism directed toward refugees in Turkey"*[142] or a claim of voicing the public opinion with "negatively connoted metaphors"[143] such as that refugees should be contained and isolated.[144]

[138]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015. p. 20.
[139]ICDUYGU, AHMET: Syrian Refugees in Turkey: the Long Road Ahead. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. 2015. p. 6.
[140]EDAM: Türk Kamuoyunun Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Bakış Açısı (Turkish Public Opinion Regarding Syrian Asylum Seekers). EDAM. 2014.p.3: *"The study shows that 71% of foreign policy experts agree that admission of Syrian refugees must be stopped while 34% of them think that along with stopping the admission of new refugees, refugees that are already in Turkey must be returned to their countries."*
[141]KIRISCI, KEMAL and FERIS, ELIZABETH: Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey - and the International Community. the Brookings Institute. 2015 p. 6.
[142]CANYURT, DILEK: Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler (Syrian Refugees after Developments in Syria: Risks in Turkey) Akademik Bakış Dergisi (48): 2015. 127-146.p.136: *"In fact, even though criminal incidents increase and Syrian refugees roaming the streets as beggars bother the society, we cannot talk about an open racism towards Syrians until this day."*
[143]CLARY-LEMON, JENNIFER: Irish Emigration in the 1970s: The 'Problem' Discourse of Political Elites. Discourse and Society 25 (5). 2014. 619-639. p. 628.
[144]ASLAN, CAHIT: Zorunlu Ev Sahipliği Sürecinden Komşuluk İlişkisine: Yerel Halkın Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Karşı Yaşantı, Algı, Tutum ve Beklentilerinin Tespiti- Adana Örneği. Adana (From Obligatory Hosting to Relationship of Neighbors: Determination of Perception, Behavior and Expectations of Local People from Syrian Refugees: Adana Case). Çukurova Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Koordinasyon Birimi. 2015. p. 29: *"The local population has no positive thought [regarding immigration policies] other than that the government should establish 'tent cities' [for refugees]."*

3.2. Political Discourse

Political discourse is another aspect of role of elite discourse in the (re)production of racism in a society. Before going on further explaining political discourse, it is important to answer a simple question: why examine politics and political discourse? First of all, as it is discussed above, Critical Discourse Analysis studies power relations within a society[145] and more specifically, the abuse of power for creating dominance of one group over another and for creating inequalities: *"Their critique of discourse implies a political critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality.[...] In this sense, critical discourse scholars should also be social and political scientists, as well as social critics and activists."*[146] But why politics and politicians matter in the (re)production of dominance and inequality. Here, van Dijk also provides an answer in his article that is appropriately titled to show the relationship between knowledge, discourse and domination. As it is also the case for academic discourse, political discourse is another important realm of knowledge production through which prejudices, stereotypes and attitudes are created, shaped and manipulated. In such a process of (re)production of knowledge, van Dijk argues that credibility of the actor is important: *"Knowledge can only be efficiently and reliably reproduced through discourse if speakers are found to be credible."*[147] Therefore as it is also true for academics and media outlets, politicians are considered to be credible as they often claim to be "telling the truth" and "speaking for the people". Also, in terms of politics, politicians do not always need to be actively involved in the (re)production of discrimination within a society. Van Dijk argues that they also participate in *default reproduction* of discrimination in a society by simply failing to act against it or by simply contributing to its reproduction out of different "good" motivations.[148] He also argues that remembering the subtle character of contemporary racism, politicians often conceal their discriminatory, xenophobic and racist discourses behind the veil of several reasons such as economics and security: *"They do so in many apparently innocent and impeccable ways. Thus, they may legislate against further*

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[145]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society 4 (2): 249-283. 1993. pp.254-255.

[146]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society 4 (2): 249-283. 1993. pp.252-253.

[147]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Knowledge, Discourse and Domination. In Pragmaticizing Understanding: Studies for Jef Verschueren, Michael Meeuwis and Jan-Ola Östman(Ed.), Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2012. 151-196.pp. 157-158.

[148]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. pp.59-60.

immigration because of unemployment, serious housing shortage, or other "good" socioeconomic reasons."[149] Though these motivations look benign, van Dijk argues that they may have more negative impact on one group than the other one.

In examining political discourse, another question is where to look and what to look for? Although in his book van Dijk limits his analysis on political discourse to parliamentary debates, this study also looks at election manifestos and statements of politicians out of the parliament. However the scope of examination does not lead this study away from van Dijk's focus of attention. This study also looks at the passages examined in the following way; *"For those passages, we focused primarily on the persuasive dimension of text and talk, that is, on argumentative strategies, style, and rhetoric."*[150] Keeping in mind the strategies of elite discourse provided by van Dijk and discussed above, the qualitative nature of this approach is also explained by him: *"Unfortunately, there is no straightforward method to prove that either such a selection or our analyses are representative. Our qualitative approach, however, does not aim at such quantitative proof. We are interested in what Members of Parliament (Congress) say, and how they do so, but not how often. As we may expect, based on our analysis of other forms of elite discourse, most politicians, most of the time, will not engage in explicitly derogatory remarks about minorities or immigrants. However, occasionally, more or less implicitly or indirectly, some remarks will show what politicians actually think of minority groups, or which statements they think are politically warranted or opportune in their persuasive rhetoric."*[151] Such an approach thus enables us to illuminate *the properties of text and talk about other ethnic or racial groups or peoples* rather than whether or not the individual is racist or xenophobic. Through such an approach, as van Dijk argues racism as a system of domination can better be analyzed by focusing on *the social system, processes, activities and cognitions* that contribute to the reproduction of racism within a society.[152]

Van Dijk's argument is also important for this study when it is thought together with the above discussed reality of tolerance in Turkey towards lynching. By simply failing to act against lynching and lynching attempts —when they are not actively promoting, excusing and legitimating it- politicians contribute to the lynching regime in Turkey. In light of the role of politics and politicians in (re)production of discrimination, xenophobia

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[149]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.59
[150]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 64.
[151]*Ibid.*
[152]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993.p. 65.

and racism targeting minorities and refugees, the study examines political discourse in Turkey from a wider scope by not only focusing on parliamentary debates. The study examines election manifestos and statements from politicians which found their way on the media. Though the examined reports and statements are from those who have different political ideologies, the study aims to show that each of them contribute to the lynching regime in Turkey with regards to refugees. It is therefore important look at the discourse of each of the major political parties in Turkey regarding refugees.

In order to do that, the study first examines the election manifestos provided by the parties for November, 1, 2015 elections. The analysis of election manifestos includes the manifestos of four major political parties as they appeal to most constituents in total. Although the statements are from two years ago, the framework they provide for party discourses are still valid to this day. The first manifesto that will be analyzed is the election manifesto of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which has been governing Turkey for more than a decade and has almost always been the sole legislator since thanks to their majority in the parliament. Also Erdogan's party, AKP is the governing party that has adopted open door policy since 2011 and they have been the one adopting and reproducing the guest discourse about refugees. Envisioning Turkey as "a visionary and pioneering country", AKP talks about refugees and immigration in terms of foreign policy. Defining their ultimate approach to foreign policy as "being just and distributing justice"[153], it can easily be noted that AKP approaches refugees and immigration assuming the role of a savior and a protector. It is argued that thanks to their approach to foreign policy, Turkey has become "a beacon of hope for oppressed people" all around the world.[154] In this light, the AKP manifesto goes one step further by assuming to be "the voice of Syrians": *"AKP governments, out of humanitarian and conscious responsibility, will continue to mend the wounds of Syrians and Iraqis who have escaped the terror of ISIS and cruelty of the regime and sought refuge in Turkey by providing aid to them and by standing with our Syrian and Iraqi brothers in their hard times. Turkey will do its best for making sure that Syrian refugees are heard by the world and will be the voice of Syrians at all concerned*

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[153]AKP: AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. October 4 2015. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/iste-ak-partinin-secim-beyannamesi/78619#1. 2017.07.12. p.251.
[154]AKP: AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. October 4 2015. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/iste-ak-partinin-secim-beyannamesi/78619#1. 2017.07.12. pp. 251-252.

international institutions. "[155] It is obvious in this quote that there is a clear hierarchy established between "us" and "them" as "we" being the "savior", the "voice" of those who are "victims", "helpless" and "voiceless". On this hierarchy, the AKP manifesto goes on to establish the guest discourse: *"Number of Syrian refugees that we are hosting in our country has exceed two million as of today."* [156]After clearly defining refugees as guests in a host country, the manifesto goes on to provide a positive self-representation by drawing attention to the lack of support from international community and implying that despite of such lack of support from international community, Turkey provides for refugees thereby contributing to "the discourse of sacrifice" for providing for refugees.[157] It is important to note that as a governing party with almost a complete monopoly on immigration policy, the discourse of the election manifesto has wider implications than those of opposition parties. In order to illuminate the influence of the discourse of AKP, it is important to look at the reflection of such discourse on state institutions which are tasked with "providing for refugees". One of these institutions is "Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)" which has been founded in 2009.[158] AFAD is an important institution because currently it is the sole institution that is responsible for establishing and managing refugee camps in Turkey. As of December 12, 2016, AFAD reports that "there are 258.333 Syrians in AFAD Temporary Protection Centers".[159] Its operations also extend beyond Turkey into Syria, AFAD seems to be adopting the exact same discourse analyzed in the AKP Election Manifesto. Before going on to analyzing one of the reports prepared by AFAD, one can easily note the discourse on AFAD webpage on which the response of Turkey to Syria Crisis is summarized.[160] For example, in the following statement, one can note the sacrifice discourse along with positive self-representation: *"Since 2011, Turkey allocated at least $12 billion to humanitarian relief efforts, whereas the international community's contributions remain at $512 million."* And the positive self- representation is further strengthened by emphasis on Turkey being "the most generous country" and having the "best public services" for refugees. More detailed analysis of a report prepared by AFAD

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[155]AKP: AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. October 4 2015. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/iste-ak-partinin-secim-beyannamesi/78619#1. 2017.07.12. p. 255.
[156]AKP: AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. October 4 2015. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/iste-ak-partinin-secim-beyannamesi/78619#1. 2017.07.12. p. 258.
[157]*Ibid.*
[158]AFAD: AFAD- About Us. https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2572/About-Us. 2017.08.02.
[159]AFAD: 2016. Current Status in AFAD Temporary Protection Centres. https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2602/Current-Status-in-AFAD-Temporary-Protection-Centres . 2017.08.02
[160]AFAD: November 30 2016. Turkey Response to Syria Crisis, https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis. 2017.08.01

reveals even more correlation between the discourse of the AKP Election Manifesto and the discourse which has been adopted by AFAD. Prepared in 2014, the AFAD Report is appropriately titled as "Syrian Guests in Turkey". Comparing this title with the official statements from AFAD in 2016 reveals that there is a continuity of the guest discourse despite the changing circumstances both in Turkey and Syria. At the inception of the report, it can easily be noted that "the numbers game" is employed in a way that it supports the positive self-representation as well as the sacrifice discourse.[161] In the following pages, the positive- self representation and the sacrifice discourse is even furthered: *"The Republic of Turkey is making efforts at extreme lengths so the Syrian citizens can sustain their lives. These camps are often pointed out to be the best in the world by the UN officials and foreign statesmen and in addition to the basic humanitarian needs, services such as education, healthcare, banking, translation, and psychosocial counseling are provided above the world standards at these camps."*[162] The positive self-representation is also supported by comparison with the world standards and by emphasizing the appreciation and the testimony of well-known figures: *"UN Secretary-General Ban KI-MOON, UN Under-Secretary General Valerie AMOS, former US Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON, UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria Lakhdar BRAHIMI, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio GUTERRES, Former UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria Kofi ANNAN, UN Special Envoy and Goodwill Ambassador Angelina JOLIE, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development Rajiv SHAH, and the President of Germany Joachim GAUCK thanked AFAD and Turkey for the hospitality demonstrated to the Syrians and for the camps providing services far beyond world standards."*[163] The report goes on in the same vein by emphasizing *"the gratitude of the Syrians to Turkey and Turkish people"*[164] along with occasional paternalistic remarks such as *"reminding the people[the Syrians] the importance of democracy"*[165] through elections conducted inside the refugee camps. The AFAD example is also important for revealing the mutual relationship between academic discourse and

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[161]AFAD: 2014. Syrian Guests in Turkey. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency.pp. 6-15.
[162]AFAD: 2014. Syrian Guests in Turkey. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. pp. 44-45.
[163]AFAD: 2014. Syrian Guests in Turkey. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. pp.46-47.
[164]AFAD: 2014. Syrian Guests in Turkey. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency. p. 55
[165]AFAD: 2014. Syrian Guests in Turkey. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency.p.54.

political discourse for reproduction of certain discourses. Almost half of the texts analyzed for academic discourse in the study explicitly mention either the AFAD or the camps that are established and run by the AFAD. Similar to the AFAD report, the emphasis of "the exemplary conditions"[166] of the camps by referring to third parties[167] and how they praise the conditions of camps in Turkey: *"It can be stated that under the coordination of AFAD, Turkey set an example for the world in the manner it establishes and manages camps in such a dire situation."*[168]   Another institution which adopts a highly similar discourse with the AKP Election Manifesto is "Turkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV)". Although the institution is associated with "the Presidency of Religious Affairs", it is still very much involved in AKP government's immigration policy. Though the implications of such involvement is out of the scope of this study, the report prepared by TDV clearly reveals the underlying ideological motivations of the discourse analyzed in the AKP Election Manifesto. First of all, the report adopts a discursive strategy employed by Erdogan and his party that is mainly associating negativity with a specific way of pronouncing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's name. In Turkish, his name is written as "Esad" and pronounced as such however since the collapse of Turkey- Syria relations, Erdogan, his party and pro-government academics[169] and media started pronouncing the same name as "Esed".[170] TDV which is a state institution that is supposed be autonomous, adopts such discursive strategy and refers the Syrian president as "Esed" throughout the report.[171] The report also follows the suit and describes Syrian refugees as *guests* while emphasizing the ways Turkey has been *providing for* them.[172] Describing refugees as *victims of oppression*[173] , the report also resorts to "number game" by providing the exact numbers

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[166]DINCER, OSMAN B., FEDERICI, VITTORIA, FERRIS, ELIZABETH, KARACA, SEMA, KIRISCI, KEMAL and OZMENEK CARMIKLI, ELIF: Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality. Washington& Ankara: Brookings& USAK. 2013.p.26.

[167]KIRISCI, KEMAL and FERIS, ELIZABETH: Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to Turkey - and the International Community. the Brookings Institute. 2015. p. 10; KAP, DERYA: Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'nin Müstakbel Vatandaşları (Syrian Refugees: Turkey's Future Citizens). Akademik Perspektif 30-35. 2014. p.31.

[168]ORHAN, OYTUN and SENYUCEL GUNDOGAR, SABIHA: Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Ankara: ORSAM& TESEV. 2015.p. 10

[169]CANYURT, DILEK: Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler (Syrian Refugees after Developments in Syria: Risks in Turkey) Akademik Bakış Dergisi (48): 2015. 127-146. pp. 128-129.

[170] Such a strategy can also be considered as marking a breaking point between the era of heightened relations between the two countries and collapse of relations after Turkey's increasing support to armed opposition groups as well as its increasing military involvement in Syria. For more on the subject; http://mepc.org/turkish-syrian-relations-friend-esad-enemy-esed

[171]TDV: Suriye Raporu. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. 2014. pp.5-9.

[172]TDV: Suriye Raporu. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. 2014. p. 15.

[173]TDV: Suriye Raporu. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. 2014. p. 20.

and amount of "the aid given" to the refugees.[174] Analysis of ruling party's election manifesto along with the reports prepared by two different state institutions reveal the influence of political discourse employed by AKP elites. It is also worth mentioning that remembering the examples analyzed in academic discourse, "the guest discourse" and "the sacrifice discourse" also prevail in academic articles and reports.

The second election manifesto examined is the main opposition party's manifesto. The Republican People's Party (CHP) has assumed the role of main opposition party for more than a decade. Although it might be assumed that their discourse appeal only to their constituents, the frequent referral to nationalist and xenophobic discourse especially with regards to refugees appeal a wider base than their constituents and contribute to the lynching regime in Turkey. First of all, it is important to mention that CHP entered the process of elections with a slogan that resembles the slogan of National Front in France: "Önce Türkiye! (Turkey First!)". The importance of this slogan is that it establishes a hierarchy in terms of the priorities of the party. The assumption of such a priority is confirmed further along the report where it is stated that: *"Our foreign policy aim is to increase the welfare and the security of citizens of Turkey. "*[175] Although it is positive that the policies regarding Syrian refugees are proposed under a separate title, it has been described as a problem: *"The immigration problem, decrease of foreign trade and foreign investments and security threats continue to hurt our citizens. "*[176] Defining immigration as a problem and grouping it together with more serious problems contribute to the xenophobic and racist attitudes and hence the lynching regime. It also shows that even though millions of people are forced to leave their homes, it is "our" citizens who are depicted as the real victims. In fact, the manifesto also states that *"along with the refugees, further victimization of our citizens will not be allowed anymore "*.[177] The manifesto further contributes to negative presentation of refugees by discursive strategy of "blaming the victim" and by emphasizing the cultural differences as a threat. In terms of "blaming the victim" strategy, the manifesto blames refugees of "unfair competition": *"In order to avoid unfair competition to local businesses, we will make sure that Syrians participate business*

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[174]TDV: Suriye Raporu. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. 2014. pp. 22-26.
[175]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf. 2017.07.13. p.22.
[176]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf. 2017.07.13. p.197.
[177]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf. 2017.07.13. p.207.

life under equal circumstances."[178] By ensuring "fair competition", the manifesto refers to the abolishment of tax incentives provided to Syrian small businesses[179] and preventing the employment of uninsured, illegal and therefore "cheap" workers in businesses. Although the manifesto also states humanitarian motivations for the policies proposed, it still conceals the agent of wrong-doing which is "we" and therefore fails to acknowledge the fact that it is "our" citizens that employ children, avoid paying for insurance and pay low wages. In terms of cultural differences, the manifesto describes the existence of refugees as a potential for damaging the local economy, social and cultural fiber: *"By ensuring the equal distribution of refugees to different cities, we will prevent damages to economic, social and cultural fiber of the regions and will decrease the burden on local administrations.*"[180] The most striking aspect of the manifesto is that even though CHP is the main opposition party, it seems to adopt "the guest discourse" which AKP has been utilizing since 2011. Although discussed under a separate title, the title regarding the refugees reads as: *"Syrian Refugees: Modern Hosting"*[181] and clearly depicts refugees as *"guests who are being hosted by municipalities"*.[182] Although the election manifesto of CHP proposes more concrete plans for increasing the welfare of refugees[183], it still depicts refugees as guests and therefore dependent on "our" goodwill. It also emphasizes the assumed negative impact of refugees stemming from cultural differences, "their unfair participation" to workforce thereby contributing to the lynching regime targeting refugees.

The third election manifesto to be examined is of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Their manifesto includes the most blatant xenophobic and racist discourse among all the manifestos examined and therefore can be seen as explicitly contributing to the lynching regime in Turkey. Similar to the CHP slogan, the MHP adopts the slogan of *"My Country and My Nation First"*[184] thereby assuming a hierarchy of priorities for the party. Also, similar to the AKP, the MHP manifesto argues that *"it is our historical mission and*

[178]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf . 2017.07.13..p.208.
[179]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf . 2017.07.13..p.83.
[180]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf . 2017.07.13..p.209.
[181]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf. 2017.07.13. p.206.
[182]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf . 2017.07.13. p.209.
[183]CHP: CHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 2015.
https://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder/52608.pdf . 2017.07.13. pp.206-209.
[184]MHP: MHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 2015.
http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.pdf . 2017.07.11.p.5.

our sacred duty to stand with the all oppressed people."[185] After assuming the role of savior and therefore the position of superiority, the manifesto lists the aims of the party. Among these, the immigration finds a place: *"To adopt measures in line with our country's interests and security against immigration and uncontrolled flow of refugees stemming from international and regional crises.* " [186] The emphasis on "uncontrolled" and employing "the metaphor of liquidity" clearly suggest that the MHP regards the issue as a threat. The threat discourse becomes more explicit further in the manifesto. Unlike the other manifestos examined which looked at the immigration from a foreign policy perspective, the election manifesto of the MHP approaches the from a security perspective and proposes policies under the topic of "security and defense policy" and argues that the policies proposed are aimed at *restoring the public order.*[187] Proposing to adopt a preemptive approach for combating crime, the manifesto explicitly links refugees with crime: *"Due to existence of considerable number of refugees in our country and along with the high economic cost, Turkey faces important social problems like robbery in the cities, pillage, riots, begging, spreading of contagious diseases, drug use, prostitution, underage marriage, illegal working and uncontrolled increase in rents.*"[188] The manifesto goes on by providing an apparent concession in the form of the effects of above mentioned "problems" and then conclude that; *"it has come to a point that these are starting to impact the economic, social and psychological life of Turkish people".*[189] As can be seen from this excerpt, the party attributes these problems to a specific group and therefore have a degree of appeal to some: *"The racist parties' attributing virtually all socioeconomic problems to minorities or immigrants is the illusionary solution voters may be attracted to.*"[190] In order to avoid being labelled as xenophobic and racist, the manifesto argues that these policies ultimately aim to ease the plight of refugees and goes on by adopting "the guest discourse" by saying that *"they are considered as the guests of Turkish people".* Though the manifesto claims that the policies proposed are aimed at easing the plight of refugees in previous pages, it reveals the ultimate aim of the party as being *"ensuring the*

[185]MHP: MHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 2015. http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.pdf . 2017.07.11.p.6.
[186]MHP: MHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 2015. http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.pdf . 2017.07.11.p. 58.
[187]MHP: MHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 2015. http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.pdf . 2017.07.11.p.238.
[188]MHP: MHP Seçim Beyannamesi. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 2015. http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.pdf . 2017.07.11.p.239.
[189]Ibid.
[190]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.60.

return of the refugees to their countries". Although the word "kavuşmak (rejoin)" is used in this context, it does not assume any form of volunteerism. The analysis of the MHP election manifesto brings mind the argument of Van Dijk on extremist right-wing parties: *"These parties formulate blatantly derogatory opinions about minorities and immigrants, especially those of a different color or culture; promulgate involuntary repatriation; want to abolish many of their elementary civil rights, and so on."* [191]

Lastly, in order to be objective and also provide a contrasting image, the election manifesto of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) will be examined. HDP's claim of being *a democratic party, a party of freedom and equality, a pro-peace party, a pro-labor party*[192] and so on is also reflected and supported in the election manifesto. Unlike the manifestos of other three major parties examined, the HDP manifesto places refugees under the topic of "human rights". Therefore the manifesto approaches to the situation in which the refugees find themselves in from human rights perspective and challenges "the aid approach" observed in other parties' manifestos. The manifesto argues that unlike what the government claims, the unclear status of refugees leave them vulnerable to exploitation and therefore deteriorate their lives. In line with this approach, the manifesto proposes radical policies including the removal Turkey's reservation regarding the origin of refugees which prevents refugees of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghani origin to legally obtain refugee status.[193] The election manifesto of the HDP proves that the party does not contribute to xenophobic and racist discourse and in turn to the lynching regime in Turkey. For that reason, unless there is an explicit xenophobic and racist remarks from the representatives of the HDP regarding the refugees, the analysis of statements from its representatives will not be included in the study.

The analysis of election manifestos reveals similarities among three major parties. First of all, each of them adopt "the guest discourse" therefore present refugees as open to the grace of the host. As it was seen in the statements from those who have participated to the lynching of refugees in different regions of Turkey, such representation of refugees leave a space to "the gracious hosts" to erupt by running out of "their patience". Secondly, each of the three major parties examined, it is clear that they also adopt "the sacrifice

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[191]*Ibid.*
[192]HDP: Who We Are. http://www.hdp.org.tr/en/who-we-are/peoples-democratic-party/8760. 2017.07.09.
[193]HDP: HDP Seçim Beyannamesi. Halkların Demokratik Partisi. 2015. http://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP%20Seçim%20Bildirgesi%20Tam%20Metin .pdf . 2017.07.09.pp.15-16.

discourse" to varying levels. By referring to the lack of support from international community and Turkey's effort to "provide for refugees" despite the lack of support from international community are the building blocks of this discourse. The downside of such discourse is that it invites the image of taking away from Turkish citizens and giving it to the refugees.[194] As it was noted above in the analysis of several lynching incidents targeting refugees, the lack of interest of the government to "our own poor" is a recurring statement from the participants of these incidents. Another discourse that is mostly shared by the MHP and the CHP is the association of refugees with threatening incidents such as crime, drug use and damaging the local fiber of the region. In this discourse, the agency of "we" is concealed when the negative actions like employing of illegal and child workers by local businesses or like being "the buyers" of women in marriage markets or like marrying underage girls. Such discourse therefore dangerously contribute to the prejudices and stereotypes and therefore fueling the xenophobic and racist discourses and actions. The analysis of media discourse will reveal the reproduction of such discourses through their way of presenting the statements of politicians from these political parties.

3.3. Media Discourse

The analysis of media discourse is especially important for this study for two reasons: existence of phenomena called "pool media" in Turkey and the reality that media discourse analysis constitutes the bulk of van Dijk's theory on elite discourse and racism. Starting with "the pool media" phenomena, it can be regarded as the perfect example between the media and politics. Revealed to the public after leaking of phone conversations between several important public figures including Erdogan himself, his son and key members of the cabinet at that time, "the pool media" phenomena points at the level of corruption in Turkey: *"certain of the conversations released after December 17 involve the owners of major construction firms that were seeking to win contracts to build Istanbul's multibillion-dollar third airport. The leaked conversations show that the owners were directed by a government minister to contribute hundreds of millions of dollars of their money to a "pool" to buy one of the country's largest and most important media*

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[194]ASLAN, CAHIT: Zorunlu Ev Sahipliği Sürecinden Komşuluk İlişkisine: Yerel Halkın Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Karşı Yaşantı, Algı, Tutum ve Beklentilerinin Tespiti- Adana Örneği. Adana (From Obligatory Hosting to Relationship of Neighbors: Determination of Perception, Behavior and Expectations of Local People from Syrian Refugees: Adana Case). Çukurova Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Koordinasyon Birimi. 2015. p.18.

companies, Sabah-ATV. The owners would then be expected to provide positive coverage of the government. This has created the expression in Turkish "havuz medyası" – literally "the pool media" – to describe corporate owners whose media properties are in service of the government"[195] Although the relationship between the business, the media and the politics is not new, "the pool media" era constitutes a new period in such a relationship in Turkey. In the past and especially after the 1980 coup d'état, the owners of media outlets used their media power in order to influence usually weak coalition governments for their own ends.[196] Tunç argues that such trend has ended in 2002 when the AKP came to power as a majority party. Especially after changing the law that prohibited the conglomerates from other sectors to own assets in the media and enabling them to own media outlets under very "opaque" terms[197], the trend of influencing governments for their own business agenda changed radically: *"In simple terms, every major newspaper or television channel is owned by a large conglomerate operating in various sectors, such as construction, energy, mining, banking, telecommunications. These conglomerates compete in public tenders and get contracts from the government. Thus, they use their media arm to promote government interests by making propaganda and manipulating facts. In return for the promotion, the government awards the contracts to the conglomerates. These clientelist relations of media companies with the political establishment are definitely the greatest risk to media integrity, disregarding the democratic role of the media."*[198] Although it has served to the AKP government until now, why did they change a law that has paved the way for such an outcome in the first place? A respected journalist Mustafa Sönmez explains the inclination of the AKP government for such a change by referring their now-ended partnership with the Gülen Movement. He argues that even though the media is not a profitable business, these actors showed interest and committed themselves in the media business because they grasped the power of media for manipulating public opinion.[199] Even though the ownership of media outlets proved to be a losing venture, in the long run their owners have profited massively. Tunç describes this situation as "media ownership as

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[195]FREEDOM HOUSE: "The Future of Turkish Democracy." Freedom House. July 15 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/article/future-turkish-democracy . 2017.08.12. p.2.
[196]TUNÇ, ASLI: Media Integrity Report: Media Ownership and Financing in Turkey. South East European Media Observatory. 2015. pp.9-10.
[197]TUNÇ, ASLI: Media Integrity Report: Media Ownership and Financing in Turkey. South East European Media Observatory. 2015. pp.3-4, 10-15.
[198]TUNÇ, ASLI: Media Integrity Report: Media Ownership and Financing in Turkey. South East European Media Observatory. 2015. p.2.
[199]SONMEZ, MUSTAFA, interview by AKGUL, ELIF: Map of Media Ownership in Turkey. October 29 2015. http://bianet.org/english/media/168745-map-of-media-ownership-in-turkey. 2017.06.06.

a business expense": *"Media owners consider their companies as a business expense in order to win lucrative public contracts. They compensate their losses in the media sector by enhancing their financial profits in other business sectors where their conglomerates are active. The price to pay for this quid pro quo is to please the ruling party and politicians by manipulated news coverage and biased editorial line."*[200] It is important to note that therefore providing an uncritical support for the government which in turn has been rewarded by public contracts or public advertisements illuminate the cozy relationship between the elites. Also remembering Sönmez's remarks on the power of media for manipulation together with van Dijk's arguments on dominance in society proves the importance of "the pool media" phenomena in Turkey.

The second reason that makes the analysis of media discourse in contributing to the lynching regime in Turkey that also targets refugees is that van Dijk pays a great deal of attention to it. But why that is the case? Van Dijk argues that the media plays a prominent role in the (re)production of xenophobic and racist discourse. In fact he goes even further and argue that *the mass media are currently the most influential source of racist bias, prejudice and racism.*[201] Having such an influence, the media plays an active and a passive role in the reproduction of racism and xenophobia. In terms of its passive contribution to such reproduction, he argues that the media is more interested in alleged *minority crime, minority deviance or cultural differences* which are considered to be a threat for the majority.[202] The perception of such a threat therefore creates *a panic among the political and cultural elites soon led to a media panic, which in turn inspired large scale popular resentment.*[203] As it can be seen in the above examples, such a panic in turn contribute to collective violence which often turns bloody when it is combined with the tolerance of politicians for such acts of collective violence. At this point one might wonder that among other genres of discourse that has been studied so far, why does the media have such an influence on the reproduction of racism? Here, van Dijk refers to the defining aspect of his theory and relates to the relationship between the media and social cognition. Most importantly by having the power to define a situation[204], the media shapes the social

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[200]TUNÇ, ASLI: Media Integrity Report: Media Ownership and Financing in Turkey. South East European Media Observatory. 2015. p.10.
[201]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012. p.17.
[202]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.1.
[203]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. p.4.
[204]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. pp.41-42.

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cognition: *"Our basic assumption about the powerful role of the media in the reproduction of racism in Western societies is far from tenuous. It presupposes, among other things, that the media play a central role in shaping the social cognitions of the public at large, if not of other influential elites "*[205] As seen in the analysis of other genres of discourse, by claiming to simply "telling the truth"[206], the media influence its audience on how to talk and most importantly how to think about ethnic affairs.[207] How does the media achieve such an end? Although the minorities might be depicted in other roles as well such as the victim, what van Dijk calls "the ethnicization of crime" proves his point the better: *"[...] one of the most frequent topics associated with minorities and immigrants is crime and violence. This may begin with the emphasis on "illegal" immigration and residence and the activities of mafias (even if immigrants are victims of such mafias!), but soon is a major topic describing their activities in the country. Crime reporting more generally thus becomes "ethnicized," and specific forms of delinquency typically and selectively attributed to "foreigners," even when the majority of such crimes are committed by nationals: drugs and holdups.*"[208] By associating minorities with limited and negative recurrent topics like crime, violence and deviance, the media therefore forms an image in the minds of its audience. Along with its influence as having a communicative role[209], the fact that people often base their perceptions about "the other" on the media representation rather than personal experiences.[210] Van Dijk argues that it is most evident in the way that the media representations about ethnic affairs are considered to be providing legitimization for prejudiced attitudes towards minorities.[211] Through his extensive research on the everyday conversation and reproduction of prejudiced discourse, van Dijk argues that the power of the media in legitimizing the prejudiced discourse lies in its "normalization" of such negative discourse and therefore attitudes. In everyday conversations among majority group members, these negative discourse is reproduced merely by referring to it as "this is

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[205]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p. 242.
[206]VAN DIJK, TEUN A. 1992. Discourse and the Denial of Racism. Discourse and Society 3 (1): 87-118. 1992. p.12.
[207]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. p.246.
[208]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012. p.23.
[209]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Elite Discourse and Racism. Sage Publications. 1993. p.243.
[210]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: 1992. Racism, Elites and Conversation. Revista de la Asociacion española de estudios anglo-norteamericanos 14 (1/2): 201-257. 1992. pp.243-244.
[211]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "The Role of the Press in the Reproduction of Racism." In Migrations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Ruth Wodak, Michi Messer and Renée Schroeder(Ed.), 15-31. Springer. 2012. p.27.

what everyone thinks/does".[212] Although the audience is manipulated and might have been depicted as passive agents until this point, Van Dijk clears such confusion. The influence of the media on social cognition multiplies itself by inviting the active participation of the audience for the reproduction of prejudiced discourse. As the UN Report argues though the media has power to set agendas and frame the debate and therefore provide framework for its audience for making sense of the world[213], after some point, the audience began to construct their own perceptions regarding minorities: *Once such fundamental patterns of knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies are firmly in place due to repeated news reporting and other forms of public discourse (e.g., in education), they will further act on their own when people have to evaluate news events. After some time, there is little need for conspicuous manipulation of specific knowledge and opinions of the readers for each case. Once given the (carefully selected) facts, although presented in a seemingly objective fashion, the readers will themselves produce the preferred models of the elites and may even act accordingly: An active consensus will replace passive or tacit consent. Ideological control in that case is virtually total, or hegemonic, precisely because persuasive text and talk are no longer seen as ideological but as self-evidently true "[214] In other words, after receiving biased information from different genres of elite discourse, people eventually construct their own views around these prejudiced views and began to think, talk and act accordingly to social, cultural and political context.[215]*

In light of the reality of the media in Turkey and the importance of media in influencing social cognition in general, the study continues with the analysis of online edition of several newspapers. The reason that the study is limited to the analysis of written news stems from the scope of study. Because of such a limitation, newspapers are carefully chosen to reflect as wide as political spectrum as possible. For that end, online archives of *Sabah, Sözcü, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet* and *Yeni Şafak* newspapers are searched by using three keywords: "mülteci(refugee)", "Suriyeli(Syrian)" and "misafir(guest)". The use of Turkish keywords for this search is due to scarce numbers of news on each journal's English editions. In this analysis, 480 news have been examined between the period of

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[212]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "How 'They' Hit the Headlines: Ethnic Minorities in the Press." In Discourse and Discrimination, Geneva Smitherman and Teun A. van Dijk(Ed.), 221-262. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1988. p.222.
[213]BERRY, MIKE, GARCIA-BLANCO, INAKI and MOORE, KERRY: Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 2015. p.5.
[214]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: "Power and the News Media." In Political Communication in Action, David L. Paletz(Ed.), 9-36. New Jersey: Hampton Press. 1995. p.16.
[215]VAN DIJK, TEUN A.: Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 1991. p.228.

31.12.2016 and 31.07.2017. The period is chosen randomly for establishing any existing commonality between newspapers. The outcome of such analysis correlates with the conclusion of several studies. Yıldırım and Yurtdaş's study outlines seven different discourses on refugees. Though their study focuses on the discourses observed in the social media, it is also applicable to the discourses found in the newspapers analyzed. Expanding on Tolay's argument in which she argues that there are six discourses on refugees and they each influence the immigration policy differently. She lists following discourses on refugees: *hospitality rhetoric, pity rhetoric, multiculturalism rhetoric, "the why here" rhetoric, economic conditions rhetoric and security rhetoric.* [216] Yıldırım and Yurtdaş formulate these rhetorics as "interpretative repertoires". In this line, the seven interpretative repertoires regarding refugees is as follows: *threat repertoire, other repertoire, Muslim repertoire, empathy repertoire, normative refugee repertoire, administration problem repertoire and finally repertoire of economic burden.* They argue that the threat repertoire operates in two ways; first, through constructing the refugees themselves as threats and second through constructing the refugees as easily manipulated tools of violence.[217] The other repertoire functions through construction of "them vs. us". Remembering van Dijk, the other repertoire itself can also serve as the defining character for determining "the in-group" and "the out-group". Also the other repertoire attributes negative characteristics to out-group members and thereby legitimates the ill-treatment of "them".[218] The Muslim repertoire operates through reference to "the brotherhood of religion" and therefore constructs refugees as part of family which is tied by religion. In this repertoire, "the Ansar and Muhajir" reference is frequently made: *"'Ansar' is used in this quote to describe the people who became Ansar (the people of Medina) and shared their belongings with the ones who came during the migration from Mecca to Medina in the first days of Islam. In this last quote, it has been emphasized that assistance should not be anticipated from only the public, as was the case of Mecca and Medina, but also from*

[216]TOLAY, JULIETTE: "Türkiye'de Mültecilere Yönelik Söylemler ve Söylemlerin Politikalara Etkisi.(Discourses on Refugees in Turkey and Their Effects on Policies)" In İltica, Uluslararası Göç ve Vatansızlık: Kuram, Gözlem ve Politika, Özlen Çelebi, Saime Özçürümez and Şirin Türkay(Ed.) , 201-214. Ankara: Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği. 2011.
[217]YILDIRIM, SUMEYYE and TEKDEMIR YURTDAS, GOKLEM: Social Construction of Syrian Refugees in Daily Speech in Turkey: Interpretative Repertoires and Social Media. Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1): 103-122. 2016. pp.111-112.
[218]YILDIRIM, SUMEYYE and TEKDEMIR YURTDAS, GOKLEM: Social Construction of Syrian Refugees in Daily Speech in Turkey: Interpretative Repertoires and Social Media. Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1): 103-122. 2016. p.112.

the state." [219] Although Yıldırım and Yurtdaş doesn't include such an argument, "the Ansar- Muhajir" reference also implies being a good host and making sacrifices for "them". While the Muslim repertoire appeals to the religious connection, the empathy repertoire appeals to "the humanity". However such appeal to humanity does not mean rights oriented empathy but rather invites audience to imagine what it would be like to be in a same situation as a refugee.[220] In the normative refugee repertoire, Yıldırım and Yurtdaş makes the connection between being a refugee and being a guest which is very important for discourse on refugees in Turkey. In this repertoire, the refugees are expected to be and behave in a way as guests in the host country. Analyzing the statement that argues that if refugees "cause problems" they should be embarrassed for causing it : *"The author has constructed the criteria for being a refugee as being slightly embarrassed and living invisibly some place without drawing any attention. Hence, "to be a guest" can be defined as sitting at home in the room reserved for them, using the available space with the landlord's permission, and standing in permitted spaces when possible."[221]* The administration problem repertoire is closely associated with government policies.[222] In this repertoire, along with the discoursive strategies provided by Van Dijk and our own analysis, while the government's immigration policy is criticized, the issues of containment and registration is frequently emphasized. Also such emphasis may implicitly construct refugees as a security threat that should be observed, controlled and contained if necessary. Lastly, the economic burden repertoire constructs refugees as being a burden on the economy that otherwise would be alright.[223] Our own analysis shows that the economic burden repertoire is frequently utilized for scapegoating refugees for the bad turn of the economy.[224] Through these "repertoires" or discourses, there are several ways that the refugees are depicted in the media. Arguing that the discourses which construct refugees in

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[219]YILDIRIM, SUMEYYE and TEKDEMIR YURTDAS, GOKLEM: Social Construction of Syrian Refugees in Daily Speech in Turkey: Interpretative Repertoires and Social Media. Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1): 103-122. 2016. p. 113.
[220]*Ibid.*
[221]YILDIRIM, SUMEYYE and TEKDEMIR YURTDAS, GOKLEM: Social Construction of Syrian Refugees in Daily Speech in Turkey: Interpretative Repertoires and Social Media. Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1): 103-122. 2016. p. 114.
[222]*Ibid.*
[223]YILDIRIM, SUMEYYE and TEKDEMIR YURTDAS, GOKLEM: Social Construction of Syrian Refugees in Daily Speech in Turkey: Interpretative Repertoires and Social Media. Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (1): 103-122. 2016. pp. 114-115.
[224]GOKER, GOKSEL and KESKIN, SAVAS: Haber Medyası ve Mülteciler: Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türk Yazılı Basınındaki Temsili(News Media and Refugees: Representation of Syrian Refugees in Turkish Written Media). İletişim ve Kuram Araştırma Dergisi 41: 229-256. 2015. p. 230.

the US media affect the *very social climate refugees face in their everyday lives*[225] as well as the immigration policy of the government, Steimel also concludes that there are prominent roles for refugees in the media coverage: frauds and victims. Depiction of refugees as frauds is built upon attribution of negative features to them: *"Initially, refugees are often depicted in news coverage as deviants or frauds, requiring that the State act to protect local communities from the instability and vice brought by refugees."*[226] The fraud/deviant depiction also constructs the image of threat in the minds of the audience. The threat posed by the refugees might target the very physical safety of "us" as well as "our" cultural life. Another role for the refugees to be depicted in the media is as victims. In terms of victimized depiction of refugees, an appeal to humanity is employed. Steimel calls such a strategy as *putting a human face* to the refugees.[227] Although Steimel fails to acknowledge it, the victimization of refugees also help for positive self-representation as it is observable in our own analysis below. For example, in their analysis of representation of refugees in the written Turkish media, Göker and Keskin argues that the agency is almost always attributed to the authorities.[228] In our analysis such a tendency can be observed in the news that depicts authorities –whether they are the police, the gendarmerie or politicians- as agents who "saves", who "helps", who "embraces" or who "hosts" refugees. The passivity attributed to the refugees even cut between ideological lines, Göker and Keskin argue. They call it *ideological compromise* of newspapers on which they meet each other for depicting refugees as *passive* and *victim*.[229]

	Mülteci (Refugee)	Suriyeli (Syrian)	Misafir (Guest)	Total
Sabah	21	37	8	66
Sözcü	43	75	18	136
Cumhuriyet	33	50	4	87

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[225]STEIMEL, SARAH: Refugees in the News: A Representative Anecdote of Identification/Division in Refugee Media Coverage. The Kentucky Journal of Communication 28 (1): 55-75. 2009.p. 56.
[226]STEIMEL, SARAH: Refugees in the News: A Representative Anecdote of Identification/Division in Refugee Media Coverage. The Kentucky Journal of Communication 28 (1): 55-75. 2009.p.58.
[227]*Ibid.*
[228]GOKER, GOKSEL and KESKIN, SAVAS: Haber Medyası ve Mülteciler: Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türk Yazılı Basınındaki Temsili(News Media and Refugees: Representation of Syrian Refugees in Turkish Written Media). İletişim ve Kuram Araştırma Dergisi 41: 229-256. 2015. p.244.
[229]GOKER, GOKSEL and KESKIN, SAVAS: Haber Medyası ve Mülteciler: Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türk Yazılı Basınındaki Temsili(News Media and Refugees: Representation of Syrian Refugees in Turkish Written Media). İletişim ve Kuram Araştırma Dergisi 41: 229-256. 2015. p.251.

Hürriyet	47	48	9	104
Yeni Şafak	43	37	7	87
Total	187	247	46	480

In our analysis of 480 news[230] from five different newspapers, we found that most frequently recurring discursive strategies are positive self-representation, associating refugees with crime and threat, scapegoating, reproduction of explicit racist and xenophobic discourses, denial and/or mitigation of racism and lastly depiction of the refugees as deviant and/or fraud. The table below shows how often the newspapers analyzed refer to such strategies.

Newspapers	Positive Self-Representation	Crime/Threat	Scapegoating	Explicit Racism/ Xenophobia	Positive Refugee Image	Denial and Mitigation of Racism	Fraud& Deviance
Sabah	21	39	x	x	x	1	5
Sözcü	32	87	1	6	2	2	6
Cumhuriyet	21	49	2	2	3	2	8
Hürriyet	34	54	4	3	3	2	4
Yeni Şafak	50	13	1	x	11	11	1

The table above shows that the positive self-representation constitutes "the ideological compromise" of newspapers. While for papers like Sözcü and Cumhuriyet who takes an opposing stance to government policies –although they are different from each other in that matter as well- positive self-representation includes attributing positive

[230] Categorized under its respective newspapers, each news that have been analyzed is provided in a seperate attachment.

features to "our nation" or to "our culture", for papers like Sabah, Hürriyet and Yeni Şafak that are considered to be pro-government such a positive self-representation includes attributing positive features to "our correct policies" as a government or to "our generosity" as a nation. Most common strategy for achieving positive self-representation is through construction of the refugees as those who are in need of saving. The news in this regard are mostly comprised of stories in which the refugees are saved from human trafficking and/or from drowning after their attempt to cross into the EU failed. Another interesting point for this matter is that those who are saved by "us" are usually called as "asylum seekers (sığınmacı)" instead of "refugees (mülteci)" or "immigrants (göçmen)". The search for asylum is therefore presented along with being vulnerable and helpless. Another way of representing "ourselves" in a positive manner is through emphasizing the gratitude of the refugees. Such an emphasis is mostly made in newspapers like Sabah, Hürriyet and Yeni Şafak because the gratitude is usually paid to the government, to Erdogan, to Turkey and in some instances to the Turkish nation. In this positive representation, the comparison mostly with the EU for their lack of support and hospitality is usually made and therefore hospitality, tolerance and "the sacrifice" of Turkey is paid gratitude. The emphasis on "the sacrifices" made by Turkey and Turkish nation as a whole is also an important way of achieving positive self-representation. Again, such discourse is found mostly in pro-government newspapers but it is not surprising to come across to such discourse in other newspapers as well. In pro-government newspapers, the sacrifice discourse is almost always constructed via reference to the lack of support from the EU and how the EU has broken its promise of financial support to Turkey under EU-Turkey refugee deal. After such references the sacrifice discourse functions through employing "despite of this lack of support" and emphasizes that Turkey and Turkish nation will keep providing for "our brothers" even if it means "sharing our bread" with them. In newspapers like Sözcü and Cumhuriyet –and especially Sözcü- the sacrifice discourse is usually employed to emphasize that "we are the real victims". In this emphasis, it is implicitly stated that although the government ignores "our own" poor and needy, it is in "our nature" to help those in need even if it means sharing "our limited resources". Lastly, the most preferred way of positive self-representation for pro-government papers is through references to "our history" and to "our historical mission". Such reference is employed through referencing the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim etiquette. In terms of the Muslim etiquette reference, above mentioned "the Ansar and the Muhajir" example is usually made implying that being a good host is paying tribute to those "good people" who opened their

homes to Muslims in time of need. In terms of the Ottoman Empire reference, the myth of exemplary hospitality and tolerance of the Ottoman Empire is always mentioned. As the region in which Syria and Iraq are in was used to be an Ottoman domain, it is "our historical mission" to help those in need as now Turkish Republic should respect the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

Another line of discourse is crime and threat. In fact in our analysis, associating refugees with crime and threat is even more recurrent and common in the newspapers than positive self-representation. While out of 480, only 158 news employed positive self-representation, the number of crime and threat association is at 197. The frequency of associating refugees with crime and threat is therefore contributes more to the lynching regime due its nature. The most employed way of associating crime and threat with refugees is through what van Dijk calls "the ethnicization of crime". Especially in Sözcü newspaper, even petty crimes are covered by emphasizing the nationality of the suspect. Therefore, topics like "Syrian thief", "Syrian murderer" and "Syrian sex offender" are often employed. In contrast to positive self-representation, when those who attempt to cross into the EU are "caught", they are often referred as "immigrants (göçmen)", "fugitives (kaçak)" and/or "refugees (mülteci)". Accompanied by photos of people crammed into tight places, the illegality of their journey is thoroughly emphasized while making them into illegals, criminals who are "caught" by "our security forces". The association of refugees with threat is especially frequent in papers like Sözcü, Cumhuriyet and Hürriyet. In fact, the more the papers takes an opposing stance to government's immigration policies the more the refugees are represented as a threat. For that end, metaphors of "flood" and "disease" are usually employed. Criticizing the government's inability to register and control "the refugee flood", they are usually presented as threat which flood "our cities", "our beaches" or spreading to "our cities". It is important to mention that the disease metaphor does not stop there and sometimes covered as "Syrians spreading disease or bringing disease with them". In fact a column writer on Sözcü newspaper goes even further and claims that "the outbreak" caused by "the Syrians" might very well end up like the mass extinction of Native Americans after contacting with the viruses brought by European colonizers.[231] Along with being "disease-ridden" and "uncontrollable like a flood", the refugees are also represented as being a threat for "us"

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[231]TURAN, PINAR: Suriyelilerin Getirdiği Salgın!(The Epidemic Brought by Syrians!)
http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/yazarlar/pinar-turan/suriyelilerin-getirdigi-salgin-1756271/ . 2017.07.17.

because "they are mostly uneducated", "unwilling to learn Turkish" and "backwards". Remembering the features of modern racism, this kind of representation implies that due to cultural differences, "they" pose a threat to "our culture", "our way of life". Lastly, as we have seen in the examples of academic discourse, the possibility of permanent stay of refugees and the possibility of them being naturalized are also covered as a threat. While newspapers like Sabah and Yeni Şafak cover these possibilities as "inevitable" and might even benefit us, papers like Sözcü, Cumhuriyet and sometimes Hürriyet pose these possibilities as problematic. The debates about these possibilities coincided with the period preceded the April 16 referendum in Turkey. In terms of reproducing political discourse, papers like Sözcü and Cumhuriyet gave space to the statements of CHP representatives who claimed that "the Syrians" will be used as pawns for boosting the votes favorable to Erdogan and his party. In other instances, the possibilities of permanent stay and eventual naturalization were represented as threats to "our demography", to "our democracy" and to "our economy". Here also, the discourse of "we are the real victims" is often referred to.

Although it is not as frequent as expected, features of being deviant and fraudulent are also attributed to "them". Such attribution is also employed for scapegoating purposes. Reminding Van Dijk's analysis in terms of refugee scapegoating, the refugees are blamed for being "freeloaders". For that end, the papers like Sözcü, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet reproduce political discourse through covering their statements that blame refugees for "their leisure while we are the ones paying the bills and fighting for their countries". Giving space to explicit racist and xenophobic statements, such statements are usually accompanied with calls for "involuntary repatriation" or "obligatory conscription". For example, a former MHP representative Ogan claims that *"the Syrians are checking out our girls at the beach while my Mehmetçik[232] is dying for their country. I don't have to feed these people with my money. Why are there refugees at the beach? The refugee is supposed be at a camp. Even if they are naturalized, we will send them back to their countries [once we are in the power]"[233]* Such statements usually follow the claim that "they cheat the welfare" provided by "us". Another way of associating refugees as being deviant and fraudulent is through coverage of beggars on the streets. Such news almost always imply that even though they are begging on the streets, when they are "caught" a significant

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[232] "Mehmetçik" is a name used in Turkey for referring to soldiers. It's a derivative from the name of Mohammad the prophet implying that "Mehmetçik" is fit for the praise of the prophet.
[233] For Turkish version of Ogan's statements: http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/sinan-ogan-suriyeliler-sahilde-turk-kizlarini-dikizliyor-1712208/

amount of money is found on them. Also "the beggars caught" news are usually accompanied by "dirty/clean" contrast. Such news include statements like "the beggars disrupting the traffic" or "the beggars causing visual pollution" are "collected" by the authorities and sent to the camps.

Explicit racist and xenophobic discourses and denial and mitigation of racism are also found to be existing in the newspapers analyzed. It is worth noting that papers that focus on constructing the image of positive "us" are more concerned with the denial and the mitigation of racism. In the example of Yeni Şafak paper, not only explicit racist or xenophobic statements are carefully avoided but also any accusation of racism in Turkey is gravely denied. In our analysis, we have coincidentally found that such denial is more apparent when a lynching or an attempt at lynching refugees are mitigated to be "some angry crowd protesting". Such denial is especially important for it serves for normalizing lynching as well as legitimating such act of collective violence in some instances. For that end and especially in pro-government newspapers like Yeni Şafak, "the disturbances" that might escalate into lynching are explained to be caused by outside agitators or by some foreign agents who wish nothing but to smear the hospitality of Turkish people. For this reason, the newspapers often give space to warnings from the authorities "not to be played" by these agitators. Along with conspiracy theories, the claim of exception is also employed for denial of racism. In our analysis, this is observed more frequently after the horrible incident in Sakarya in which a young refugee woman who was also nine months pregnant was raped and murdered together with her ten months old child. These views rejected that the murder of Emani Arrahman was not the result of racist and xenophobic discourse aiming refugees but the act of an exceptionally cruel person. These views ignored how the refugees have been represented as threats with "their high fertility rates" and focused on "monstrous nature" of "this monster".

Among the genres of discourses examined, we can conclude that the media discourse is the one which contributes the most and in a most effective way to the lynching regime in Turkey targeting the refugees. Through limiting the refugee representation to several topics, employing metaphors of threat and catastrophe, by claiming to be "publishing the truth" and so on the media shapes the cognitive image of refugee in the minds of its audience. This is especially important because many members of the audience construct their way of thinking about the refugees through these representations in the media rather than personal experiences. Therefore, along with the downplaying and

excusing the acts of collective violence, the media discourse establishes, supports and reproduces "the other" image which is almost always the main target of the collective violence in Turkey.

4. Conclusion

It's a rare human misery that each of us might be moments and instances away from being a refugee. However, despite of such an inspiration for empathy, already vulnerable refugees are one of the main targets of racism and xenophobia all over the world. In this study, we have focused on Turkey; the country that hosts the most refugee in the world. Although such "title" might appeal for those who are concerned with the positive image of a country, a closer look to Turkey proves that the life of refugees are not as qualified as the title suggests. Being a refugee itself invites a certain level of vulnerability and yet because of the legal and political technicalities in Turkey, the refugees are made even more vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, racism and xenophobia. Being referred as "guests" since the day they have arrived, the refugees in Turkey are therefore left to the grace of the host. Thus it is only natural that the relationship between a refugee and the state of Turkey is a relationship of a benefactor and a recipient. This is the very nature of this relationship which prompts screams of ungratefulness at the first sign of disgruntlement on behalf of the refugee. Since "we are being good hosts", it is only natural that "we can expect them to be good guests". As we have seen in our analysis, those who are not "good guests" are therefore vilified, criminalized and taken to the altar of the collective violence.

The collective violence is perhaps as old as "the modern Turkey" in Turkey. For many years Armenians, Jews, Kurds, leftists, anarchists, homosexuals, transsexuals, women any many more have been at its altar. Despite of being a country that has been familiar with immigration, the refugee wasn't among those at the altar of collective violence. Because the immigrants were mostly "our brethren", those who were fleeing European lands. They were "Turkish", "Sunni", "modern" and most importantly they were "close to us" in terms of their ways of life. However after the Middle East has started getting bloodier than it usually was, many displaced people with different ethnic origins found themselves at the borders of Turkey and eventually in the borders of Turkey. The elite panicked and the rest followed. Each day, the place of the refugee at the altar of the collective violence becomes more permanent. As racism and xenophobia is being reproduced by politicians, the academia and the media, more and more refugees are being

targeted with the screams of "We've had enough of them!" Although there might be other forces at play for such reproduction, without any doubt, it is discourse that is more evasive, more daily and more practical in this reproduction.

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