

**T.C.
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**THE IMPACT OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS ON U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE OBAMA-
TRUMP ERA**

Master Thesis

MUSTAFA CANAYDIN

ISTANBUL, 2021

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**GLOBAL AFFAIRS MASTER'S PROGRAM
GRADUATE SCHOOL**

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ADVISOR: ASSOC. PROF. BURAK KÜNTAY

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE OBAMA-TRUMP ERA

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Regardless of the opinion of the presidents of the United States, who appeared to be Israel's primary ally from before its establishment to the present, its importance in foreign policy continued. Both the world public opinion and different voices within the Cabinet have not been able to cast a shadow over this commitment. Israel's confidence in the United States in its steps has always remained solid and, with a few exceptions, has not been shaken. Even the sharp difference in opinion between Obama and Trump against the Israeli government has not distanced the United States from Israel's interests in foreign policy. Regardless of the views of the two countries' leaders, the alliance between the United States and Israel has shown that it is independent of the international conjuncture. It is worth noting that lobbying and social perception, which are of great importance in US politics, serve as catalysts for the strength of these relations. This study aims to shed light on the meaning of US-Israeli relations in the field of foreign policy, events that occurred during the second presidencies of Trump and Obama.

Keywords: U.S., Israel, Lobbying, Foreign Policy, Allies

ÖZET

ABD-İSRAİL İLİŞKİLERİNİN ABD DIŞ POLİTİKASINA ETKİSİ: OBAMA-TRUMP DÖNEMİNİN İNCELENMESİ

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İsrail'in kuruluşunun öncesinden bugüne birincil müttefiki olarak görünen ABD'nin başkanlarının fikri ne olursa olsun dış politikada önemi devam etmiştir. Gerek dünya kamuoyu gerekse kabineler içerisindeki farklı sesler bu bağlılığa gölge düşmesini sağlayamamıştır. İsrail'in attığı adımlarda ABD'ye duyduğu güven hep sağlam kalmış ve birkaç istisna dışında sarsılmamıştır. Obama ve Trump arasındaki İsrail hükümetine karşı sahip olunan keskin görüş farklılığı dahi dış politikada ABD'yi İsrail'in menfaatlerinden uzaklaştırmamıştır. İki ülke liderlerinin görüşleri ne olursa olsun ABD ve İsrail arasındaki ittifak uluslararası konjonktürden bağımsız bir şekilde baki olduğunu göstermiştir. ABD siyaseti içerisinde büyük önem teşkil eden lobi faaliyetleri ve toplumsal algının bu ilişkilerin mukavemeti açısından katalizör görevi gördüğü dikkat çekmektedir. Bu çalışma ABD-İsrail ilişkilerinin Trump ve Obama'nın ikinci dönem başkanlıkları süresince meydana gelen olayların dış politika alanında anlamlandırılmasına ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: ABD, İsrail, Lobıcılık, Dış Politika, Müttefik

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, Israel's relations with the United States have been the focus of attention of those working in the field of international relations. Although there are a lot of different interpretations and ideas brought into the relations at this point, the relationship between the two countries has been the subject of scrutiny in many studies in which it has a direct or indirect effect on U.S. foreign policy. The unquestionable weight of lobbies in US domestic politics has created a different window of work on this issue. The Israeli lobby's work in the United States has, from time to time, contradicted the views of the presidents, but has made its presence felt on both domestic and foreign politics. The study aims to examine whether the reflection of U.S. foreign policy on relations with Israel is as serious as thought. The question of whether U.S. foreign policy can be influenced or shaped by its relations with a state will be answered.

The White House policies against Israel have been subject to attention and scrutiny in many ways. The differences created by presidents in the way they manage this relationship were investigated. No matter how different the rhetoric of US presidents during election campaigns, their influence on bilateral relations remains limited. The major factor in this issue is the separation of powers and balance control system in the United States. Although the president wields executive power, he cannot be competent in changing customary policies, independent of legislative and judicial control.

US-Israel relations represent the relations of the two countries, which are key not only between the two countries but also the major focal point of the world's crises. In this context, the policies produced can have consequences that concern not only the two countries' areas of responsibility but the majority of the world. In this study, the context of the relations between the second term of the 44th President of the USA, Barack Obama (2013-2017) and the 45th President of the USA, Donald Trump (2017-present) with Israel will be examined. Based on the foreign policy decisions arising from the relations of these two presidents with Israel, the impact of Israel on foreign policy will be observed.

In the first chapter of the study, US-Israel relations will be examined from a historical perspective in terms of military, economic, demographic, and sociological values. At this point, the depth of the relations of the two states will be observed and whether a serious change has occurred will be examined. The first chapter will also explore how the development or undermining of relations between the two countries by the presidents. Development of bilateral relations in temporal context will be examined and its change will be observed. The first chapter will also focus attention on the key agreements between the two states in economic and military terms and examine the impact they have on the international dimension.

The second chapter will examine the extent of the Israeli lobby's influence on the relations between the two countries. The emergence, purpose and practices of the Israel lobby will be examined and its structure taken into account. Its effectiveness in US politics will be observed in cases where it has a say in many political issues. The impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy will be examined from a historical perspective and its impact area will be discussed. The role of the Jewish community in the Israel lobby will be discussed and its place in the mechanisms of influence will be examined. While the Israel lobby aims to bring Israel and the United States together on common interests, different organizations can follow different paths. For this reason, their stance on foreign policy will be examined by taking into account powerful Israeli lobby organizations.

In the third chapter, Obama's views and rhetoric in the campaign process will be discussed by briefly addressing the Israeli relations after he became president. The differences between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will be examined and the differences of opinion created by the political differences will be taken into account. In this context, the impact of the president's rhetoric on foreign policy will be discussed and the extent of its impact will be considered. There are tides created by the relationship between the two countries on a multidimensional international relation.

The changes Obama is trying to make in Israel's policies as of his second term will be considered and its effects examined. Obama's new appointment of the secretary of state may be considered an indication of that, but his success and impact are controversial. His

stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue is important in context and is the basis of many problems and processes between the two states. Thus, Obama's approach to the Hamas and Palestinian Authority always be a subject of criticism according to the Israeli Government.

Another important issue between the two states is the Iran issue. Every moderate policy Obama has produced against Iran is a threat to Israel in the region, so Obama's policy toward diplomacy is met with dismay by the Israeli government. Therefore, the Iran policies that Obama produced during his second term will be considered and will continue to be examined in the third. Another milestone in the process is the Hamas-Israel war in 2014. In this context, changes in bilateral relations will be discussed by considering before, during and after the war.

The fourth section will examine Trump's reflection on his policies, taking into account his rhetoric about Israel during the campaign. This review is important in terms of understanding how cohesive the rhetoric and political agendas of presidents are. The fourth section will examine Trump's reflection on his policies, taking into account his rhetoric about Israel during the campaign. This review is important in terms of understanding how cohesive the rhetoric and political agendas of presidents are. Trump's policies, contrary to many of the decisions taken by previous President Obama in foreign policy, has been closely related to relations with Israel.

In this context, the termination of the P5+1 agreement with Iran plays a key role in bilateral relations. The reflection of both personal and political differences between the two presidents on U.S.-Israeli relations and therefore on U.S. foreign policy has been concrete. However, the extent of the differences between presidents in state policy will be questioned in this study.

In the fifth chapter which is the conclusion and discussion section, the results of the differences between the two leaders will be examined and compared. How dependent U.S.-Israeli relations differ on the president's change will be investigated and their repercussions in foreign policy will be taken into account. The hypothesis that the balance

control mechanism resulting from the US separation of powers works effectively will be attempted to be reached. Whether U.S. relations, strongly built to this day from Israel's founding, diverge from a primary ally is subject only to a change of President will be debated.

Studies on this subject will be used and historically produced books and articles will be used as examples. In this context, newspaper and internet sources will be taken into account when examining recent events. For the consistency of the sources, both US and Israeli-based news and information sources will be examined, and secondary data scanning will be the main method (Gürbüz & Şahin 2015, p.167). The information collected through secondary data scanning will be interpreted in the light of the agenda information and will be evaluated impartially. Historical perspectives will be combined with today's arguments to establish a cause and effect relationship. As a hypothesis of this study, the reflection of the change in the presidency on foreign policy will be tested and tried to be answered. This study was conducted to help understand U.S.-Israeli relations on a multidimensional international level.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

U.S.-Israeli relations have been the subject of many studies. It is quite important to use unbiased research data and interpret accordingly, avoiding conspiracy theory when approaching these relationships. When considering concepts such as Zionism, the United States, Israel and the Middle East, attention should be paid to avoid prejudice. It is noteworthy in some studies that the imperial policies of the United States are called an empire, but it is not useful for an informed study.

Nevertheless, some historians have attempted to research larger facets of the history of the Middle East and America. David Finnie gave a colorful narrative in his 1967 *Pioneers East* about Americans in the late 18th and 19th centuries who work, travel, and pray in the region (Finnie 1967). Two years later, in 1776–1882, James A. Field took the increasingly famous research of Finnie into the scientific scope and rendered America and the Mediterranean global (Field 1969). Following De Novo's thesis, Joseph L. Grabill published his bottom line *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*, a religious impact on American diplomacy during the time between 1810 and 1827, accompanied Field with his American ambitions and interventions in the Middle East, from 1900-1939 (Grabill 1971). Thomas Bryson's *American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975*, was the last of such comprehensive reviews written 40 years ago (Bryson 1977)

Historians have also concentrated on the post-World War 2, particularly the diplomatic and economic dimension of America's ties with the Middle East. *The Other Arab-Israeli War* is also a part of Quandt's *Peace Process* (Quandt 2010). *The Arabists* by Robert D. Kaplan, another book of considerable significance, covers a broader spectrum of chronology and primarily discusses the effect of the State Department on US strategy in the Middle East (Kaplan 1995).

According to John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, U.S. policies in the Middle East after World War II have taken on a different dimension. Its strong relationship with Israel in particular has put these policies in a more special position. In this context, the specific

gravity of the Israel lobby in the United States also stems from a strong financial structure. Israel's interests are considered by candidates of higher authorities (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). In addition, Michael B. Oren In his book "Power, Faith and Fantasy," mentioned the political influence of AIPAC, one of the most powerful organizations in the Israel Lobby. In the 1970s, AIPAC was able to change President Gerald Ford's idea of "reassessment" U.S. policies on Israel with financial pressure provided by Congress (Oren 2007).

As Avi Shalom underlined in his book *The Iron Wall*, U.S.-Israeli relations were cared for by every president and required the appointment of Special Representatives. For presidents, the restoration of relations required a special effort, and no outcome other than success was acceptable (Shlaim 2015).

According to David Makovsky, since bilateral ties are rarely sustained over many decades, the recent experience of the US-Israeli ties since 1948 has not been chronological. Nevertheless, the strength of this partnership is essentially indicative of it and it was crucial to promoting stability in the region. The Middle East peace process has not only helped the US to expand its leverage on the Middle East over the past few decades but has also successfully prevented conflict over time and provided global stability. The US-Israeli partnership is that. Since 1973, there has been no international conflict owing to the intensity of the US-Israeli alliance (Makovsky 2018, pp. 22-35).

When we came to the Obama era, differences between leaders were reflected in policies. But there were certain points of Obama's role in these relationships. According to Robert O. Freedman, first of all, the Obama administration dedicated itself to the defense of Israel. Secondly, the administration of Obama refused to endorse Israeli demands for the assault on Iran's nuclear facilities by the United States and also declined to accept intervention by Israel on Iran, while Iran had become a significant factor in US-Israeli relations by early 2011. Third, Israel was funded as a Jewish state by the Obama administration (Freedman 2018, pp. 36-78).

During the comparison of the Obama and Trump eras, a lot of newspaper sources and current articles were used. As in Frank Musmar's study, Donald Trump is an admirer of Benjamin Netanyahu, partially because of the ability of the Israeli Minister to stand up to Barack Obama. Obama's solution to the dispute between Israel and Palestine was to support the Palestinians at the detriment of Israel. Trump's was the very reverse (Musmar 2020).



3. U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS AND DIMENSIONS

In 1776, after the United States proclaimed its independence, it lacked the defense of the British army and faced the pirates of Barbary by themselves (Oren 2007, p. 98). The United States has been active in the Middle East since the Republic's early days, with much action focusing on developmental projects or humanitarian service. For others, a Bible-inspired obsession The Holy Land and the role of Judaism in its history contributed to the notion of returning the Jewish community to their homes, a concept supported by some faith figures and, in fact, by some US lawmakers (Ballaster 2008, pp. 8-33). Yet seeing this tradition of modest and largely private involvement as the taproot of America's position in the area after World War II, and particularly its remarkable partnership with Israel today is a mistake.

Between the Barbary pirates routing two hundred years earlier and World War II, the U.S. had no major defense role anywhere in the world, and U.S. officials did not strive to one. Woodrow Wilson signed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (which articulated Britain's desire for a Jewish state in Palestine), but Wilson did almost little to further the aim. Nonetheless, the most important U.S. intervention during this time — a fact-finding mission dispatched by the Paris Peace Conference to the area in 1919 under the guidance of Americans Henry Churchill King and Charles Crane — found that the local community resisted further Zionist inroads and advised against the creation of an autonomous Jewish homeland. But, as author Margaret MacMillan states,

"Nobody paid the least notice." The idea of a U.S. intervention on areas of the Middle East was quickly discussed, but never followed, and Britain and France wound up breaking up the appropriate areas of the Ottoman Empire (MacMillan 2007, pp. 422-423).

Since World War II, the United States has played an important and steadily increasing role in Middle East security issues, initially driven by oil, then anticommunism and, over time, its growing relationship with Israel. America's first significant intervention in the region's foreign strategy was a fledgling relationship with Saudi Arabia in the mid-1940s

(intended by both sides to counter British interests in the region), and the first concrete coalition agreements were Turkey's participation in NATO in 1952 and the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact in 1954 (Safran 2018, pp. 60-68; Walt 1990, pp. 58-59).

U.S. officials, had supported Israel's establishment in 1948, sought to pursue a compromise stance between Israel and the Arabs and deliberately avoiding rendering any clear pledge to the Jewish state for fear of jeopardizing more significant geopolitical objectives (Forrestal & Millis 2015, p. 357). That dynamic slowly improved in the ensuing decades in reaction to incidents including the Six Day War, Soviet weapons shipments to numerous Arab states, and the increasing presence of pro-Israel organizations in the U.S. considered this drastic change of America's position in the world, it makes no sense to attempt to justify present U.S. policy -especially the generous assistance now offered to Israel- by pointing to previous American moral convictions or dramatically different ways of past involvement.

A unique connection between the United States and Israel was created rather than imposed. It has been widely accepted, with Israel since the Six-Day War in 1967, and continues to be now, that the stability of the Middle East is an important issue for U.S. Indeed, throughout the past four decades, the United States has supplied Israel with an order of magnitude of magnitude greater material and diplomatic support than what it offers to others (Cohen & Liebman 2000). This aid is only dependent on the actions of Israel: whatever Israel does, the United States remains steadfastly supportive. In particular, the United States has always favored Israel over the Palestinians, and seldom presses the Israeli government to cease its construction of settlements and highway constructing in the West Bank. While President Bill Clinton and President Bush publicly advocated for a viable Palestinian state-building, none of them was ready to utilize American influence to create this outcome.

3.1 PUBLIC VIEW ABOUT ISRAEL IN U.S.

Israel proceeded to flee to the Soviet Union following its foundation. Using strong relations with Moscow, the military leadership embraced diplomacy and obtained

weapons from Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia during the War of Independence, Israel. Yet that quickly shifted as Israel's political establishment distanced itself from Russia, expanding its ties to the Western world. Russia started armament of its surplus stores in 1955 and 1956, then eventually with new MIG fighting aircraft, rockets then tanks. This opened the way for the turn of the Middle East into another Cold War in arena, where Israel was still aligned with the West. The US started supplying Israel with arms to equilibria for Arab countries in the Middle East, beginning in the early 1960s, with the Soviet military assistance.

After the end of the Cold War, Israel maintained its essential position as the sole state in the Middle East, a partner in the Middle East, and then the war against fundamentalist Islam. For much of the time after its formation, the Americans regarded Israel as an friend and embraced the two countries' close ties. Although a plurality of Americanos (42%) did no longer know in 1952 whether the Israeli Government was either on the side of Russia or on the side of the United States, 35% felt that Israel "was on the American side," compared with 4% who felt that Israel was on the Russian side. Only since 1977 have more oriented and reliable statistics been accessible on the ties between the two nations when pollsters regularly started questioning Americans if they regarded Israel as a partner of the USA, a friendly nation, an unfriendly nation, or an American adversary (Sharp 2015, p. 2).

Israel's opinion gradually dropped to almost 60% in the late 1980s, then rose again because of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Beginning in the late 1990s, Israel became a big partner of the USA, touching nearly 50 percent of the country in total. It shows the importance of US attitudes towards Israel – a relation that has always been close and reinforced when the United States began to confront threats and stepped up its involvement in the Middle East. Attitudes towards military assistance reflect more strongly the US-Israel link. Through the passage of time, it has remained the greatest custodian of U.S. assistance following the Second World War, providing substantial strategic and economic help from the U.S. Israel has been the highest annual provider of U.S. foreign funding from 1976 to 2004 and has since been surpassed by Iraq. The US has been giving Israel about \$3 billion a year since 1985. Support was given largely to

retain the strategic balance, discourage violence in the Middle East, and to facilitate peace arrangements and negotiations. Although Americans traditionally have high international aid concerns, they have demonstrated clear approval for Israel's security assistance. As reported, in 1948, the overwhelming majority of Americans refused either side of the Palestinian war to accept the selling of weapons (Sharp 2015, p. 3).

Also after the Soviet-Egyptian peace treaty in 1955, 50 % of Americans felt the US was not providing Israel with weapons relative to just 24% of the population who claimed the US was providing Israel with peace. Three-quarters of those who provided Israel with weapons acknowledged that imperialism is in danger of spreading weapons. ¹

This impression shifted early, however. The American public started to understand the need to help Israel to preserve peace in Middle Orient and defend Israel from the Arab invasion and Soviet extension during the 1967 war and in the reaction to the war of attrition and the huge Soviet buildup of the Egyptian and Syrian military forces. Throughout and during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, popular interest was further increased. In 1975 pollsters regularly questioned whether respondents felt that Israeli military assistance would stay constant, be raised, reduced, or removed (Mark 2004, p. 8).

3.2 U.S. - ISRAEL MILITARY BASED RELATIONS

While embedded in a confluence of cultural affinities and geostrategic ambitions, the relationship between the two countries has been cemented by drastic tactical measures taken to ensure that their military forces maintain frontline dominance over possible enemies. Political pronouncements and verbal guarantees, for all their symbolic importance, provide observers of the US-Israeli relationship with little more than a general framework for analyzing its dynamics.

¹ Foreign Affairs Survey, January 1950, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago; based on 1,284 personal interviews of national adults. Question: "How important do you think it is for the United States to cooperate closely with . . . Israel—very important, only fairly important, or not important at all?"

The strategic aspects of the partnership between the United States and Israel are also complicated by their fairly limited boundaries. There are definitely not any conventional indicators of a collaborative alliance. It is accurate that since mid-1980, Haifa was the main Mediterranean port for the American Sixth Fleet, US army materials were kept on Israeli land, and army units used the training facilities of each other. As is seen below, both sides have a long sharing tradition (Rogers & Pound 1992).

Ideas and details and procedures now institutionalized, for example through permanent U.S. military preparation liaison officers, the Israeli Armed Forces Headquarters and Control of the Policy. Nevertheless, Israel has never held a greater long-term US army operation, unlike any other large American ally. Between the Iraq wars of 91 and 2003, Patriot rocket crews stationed around Tel Aviv returned to their position in Germany at the time of cease fires (Zakheim 1996, pp. 256-257).

Additional forms of practical US-Israeli co-operation have also been intermittent, and usually limited to ad hoc arrangements regarding the development of high-tech combat systems, the best-known being the Arrow anti-missile system, the Nautilus high-energy Laser and, most recently, the Iron Dome rocket defensive system (Ruebner 2016 pp. 50-64). Even joint military exercises are recorded quite patchy. Of course, the ballistics interoperability test, Juniper Cobra, has been growing steadily since it was first established in 2001, so that by the autumn of 2009 more than 1,000 U.S. troops reportedly were deployed to this end. The inclusion of IDF units assigned to practice with their counterparts in the United States-European Command was equally noteworthy (Clarke & Cohen 1986).

This two events highlight the determination of the United States government to maintain the qualitative strategic advantage of Israel which was in effect enshrined in the 2008 harmless Naval Vessel Transfer Act (Marandola 2015, p. 38). Nevertheless, what is important is that no single company can compare with the Bright Star exercise conducted since 1983 by the United States with the Egyptian forces, and even worse, with the establishment during the Desert Storm of joint command centers between the USA and Egypt (and even between the USA and Syrians) (Shapiro 2010).

Nonetheless, the primary distribution of arms and defense systems were the other way around. In the last fifty decades, the US has now become Israel's main source of numerous military articles, providing supplies across a range from the M-16 rifle to supersonic Jet Fighters and Patriot missiles in the late 1970s, which became a short period of time the personal weapon of nearly every Israeli soldier . The cash flow direction was even more clearly pronounced. Overall, Israel has received almost \$100 billion from the US government, much as outright subsidies, to buy any orders. In 2010, it was announced that Israel receives \$3 billion a year, more than all the other disbursements put together, as part of its Foreign Military Financing Program (Puschel 2011, pp. 18-20).

3.3 U.S. - ISRAEL ECONOMY BASED RELATIONS

The USA becomes the first nation to accept Israel on 14 May 1948. But the connection slowly evolved. The United States received limited military or economic assistance years after Israel's liberation in 1948. It improved in the early 1970's when assistance rose significantly, and the Camp David peace deal was concluded in 1979 with a one time donation (Lieber 1998 pp. 18-20). U.S. aid has averaged 3 billion dollars annually since the 1980's. Trade has been a significant aspect of US-Israeli international ties since the negotiation in 1985 of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Migdalovitz 2010)

After the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Israel in 1985, The assistance was supplemented by commerce. So that became the key characteristic of the trade alliance between the USA so Israel. In 1985, for instance, Israel's \$2.7 billion in US exports equated to about 34% of the \$3.7 billion in economic and military assistance provided by Israel. Trade surpassed assistance by 1990. By 1990. In 2009, the volume of strategic assistance it earned in Israel's exports to the US was 7-fold. Israel also became a \$10 billion export market for goods and services produced by the US (Sharp 2015, p. 1).

After World War II Israel has been the greatest regional beneficiary of US foreign assistance. Israel became the world's main cumulative beneficiary of US foreign aid from

1976 to 2004, and in 2005 it just surpassed Iraq. The total volume of US assistance to Israel has been nearly \$ 3 billion a year since 1985 (Sharp 2010).

US assistance to Israel totaled \$63 million annually between 1949 and 1965 and more (Levey 1995). Economic development and food were given over 95 percent. In 1959 there was a limited program of military loans, which brought annual support to some US\$ 100 million and increased military loans by nearly half (Organski 1990, p. 161).

While Israel was given U.S. economic aid loans, France was at the point the largest provider of sophisticated combat hardware and technologies. Israel purchased the first sophisticated armaments program (Hawk anti-aircraft rockets) from the US in 1962. This selling was the start of US help for the standard military advantage (QME) of Israel over their neighbors (Powers & Mark 2002, p. 1).

After the 1967 Six-Day War, the United States saw Israel as a sovereign nation and a Western democracy. Washington was pessimistic about Arab governments' long-term relations with the USSR from that time, and estimated that they would end up getting approximately \$11.2 billion in future military aid. So far as the Six-Day War against Israel has advanced, Anwar Sadat took his place as a prospective president of Egypt after that conflict. It would be nearly impossible to overcome Israel. This led to the formation of a path for the Egyptian-Israeli accord and Israeli CBE (q.e.d. as both a.o.) acts of peace; it enhanced military might in Israel as well as political stability. In 1968, Lyndon Johnson, who had the support of Congress, approved the sale of the F-4 Phantom fighter jet to Israel, then Yom Kippur War occurred, the US chose an ambiguous policy towards Israel's QMEs' recommendations to vigorously preserve Israel's military superiority (Wunderle & Briere 2008).

The first decade of the 1970s witnessed a tremendous 80% drop in market share price. Borrowing more money for the Gulf War: One significant reason for boosting spending on the war in the Middle East is U.S. financial help. Foreign military expenditures in the war has been radically reduced; a major result of the U.S. departure from Vietnam was an increase in American military support to Israel, from \$2.7 billion to \$5 billion (1982).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, increased amounts of money, in the Middle East signaled the beginning of long-term help for long-term initiatives (Sharp 2015, pp. 19-20).

The US Congress worked hard to enhance Israel's security and commerce while taking a more active role in international assistance. as well as an example, in 1970, Israel had given \$30 million in assistance. in 1971, it went up to \$545 million, and in Israel, the first aid grant to the Israeli defense forces was given. We were quite eager to return the favor to the favor given to France by President Charles de Gaulle's (who in reaction to the Six Day War opted not to give arms to Israel), moved in when President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his offers (Organski 1990, p. 167).

What factors led America to increase aid to Israel in 1971? The first one in terms of US foreign policy, the answer is straightforward: Armed Israeli opponents. The second explanation is because of the Arms sales were and remain a US foreign policy tool. The United States of America Simultaneously provides large quantities of Israel and Arab states Arms in exchange for their interests. Israeli objections the sale of American weapons to Arab states was assured arms sales would not change the region's power balance, and The U.S. claimed Israeli QME would be maintained (Sharp 2015, p. 21).

One result of Israel's expanded assistance in the early 1970s was that the United States used it to persuade Israel to back certain policies that Israel would not have supported unless aid was promised. The trend started during the Yom Kippur War when several Arab nations looked to the U.S. for aid after being defeated by Israelis. The U.S. also used its leverage with Israel to convince the Israelis to surrender the land they gained in battle. Indeed, large increases in aid have rewarded each Israeli withdrawal.

The second war occurred before the Yom Kippur had been over. This is an example of how assistance may be utilized in a more proactive manner as a result of this year sees the US shifting its priorities in the Near-East and Africa in the latter half of the decade. All of the expense involved in the Yom Kippur had doomed the Soviet Union, and all of the weaponry in the US available to them has allowed the Americans to continue fighting

in the region in spite of it. The U.S.S. invested several times more than the Soviets did in the majority of the years before to this, with regards to military aid. Many means of military superiority. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger agreed that the U.S. must not permit Soviet allies to win by relying on the Soviets for their own military superiority (Freedman 1991).

After the Camp David's peace agreement with Egypt, the United States helped provide \$7.3 billion in aid to Israel in 1979. Israel and Egypt has agreed to offer military and economic aid to Ethiopia, to date from the Camp David Accords of 1978. There was an influx of money from outside and military aid in the intervening years, each time for the same goal, to help Israel's economy grow. the beginning of official US collaboration with Israel in 1981 with regard to security began Minister of Defense of Defense and Caspar Wein signed a Memorandum of Understanding that acknowledged the existing connection of friendship between the United States and Israel, while Caspar expanded on the subject of Israel's Defense Minister of Defense and Caspar Wein, who spoke about friendship and military collaboration between the two countries Supports have increased, and maintenance facilities have become easier to use, thereby facilitating cooperation in commerce (Nathanson & Mandelbaum 2018, pp. 130-131).

In 1984, US aid to Israel increased fourth and final quarter. In 1985, the explanations for the fourth rise were largely fiscal. At the same year, Israel suffered a severe economic crisis characterized by over 400% hyperinflation, high public debt, and budget deficits. To address the crisis, Shimon Peres' national unity government launched the Economic Stabilization Program in 1985. The plan was a common effort government, Histadrut (business unions), and Manufacturers Association. The policy included a variety of drastic initiatives, including but not restricted to aid cuts and the lowering of interest rates, costs, and private-sector salaries.

The plan was considered satisfactory by the U.S. government, who therefore decided to give Israel a \$1.5-billion grant in addition to the annual international assistance already provided. Additionally, the fourth increase was driven by Israel's military need to buy arms to keep up with what the Soviet Union gave Arab nations.

Although the United States has not terminated any of the state of Israel's obligations, the loans made to Israel have not been repaid. Following the Yom Kippur, Nixon did what he could to seek financial aid for Israel, which included an eventual cancellation of the debt forgiveness. The purpose of this request for US assistance is to reduce Israel's reliance on US aid, which will allow Israel to avoid making political or economic decisions regarding their finances. Additionally, military aid is deemed a loan, but in practice, such that it functions as a form of help.

relative to its strategic assistance (less) to the amount that of money the US government gives to Israel in comparison with the National Security Transfer Hypothesis, which put forth in place in place in 1984 aimed to lend strategic (not less) financial support to aid in the following to demonstrate America's concern for Israel's obligation to pay their own debts (principal and interest). ESF conducted more than \$1.2 billion of debt service payments on behalf of the United States, in 1998, resulting in a \$328 million owed by Israel (Nathanson & Mandelbaum 2018, p. 132).

4. ISRAEL LOBBY IN US FOREIGN POLICY

Lobbying groups in the United States, always look to advance their own causes, trying to sway the population on matters of general interest as well as influence government representatives and presidents on policies they would want to see enacted. For a long time, conflicting interest groups have been identified as being essential to the formulation of American foreign policy decisions, and the country's international relations, especially in the construction of the federal government and during the founding of the republic, have been described by James Madison. When a single group exerts especially great or persistent pressure, their policies adversely influence the country as a majority of groups are powerless to oppose them. Certain companies will benefit from tariffs that are only for the few, but, there will be a lot of people paying more for the goods they are made from this one particular sector will be harmed by them.

The strength of the National Rifle Association (NRA) has been in pushing to have legislation to control guns, but that has mostly served the benefit of making society more people exposed to the firearms violence perpetrated by their consumers. one might reasonably assume that one former APCO public relations staffer was still works at the White House, and may try to protect its interests in an unethical ways (unexploitative) ways when doing so. This is worrisome because we are all aware of the correlation between global warming and greenhouse emissions, and may have expected him to see those reports in the press favorably whereas they would be deliberately modified if working for the American Petroleum Institute (Revkin 2005).

4.1 DEFINING THE “LOBBY”

Use the word "Israel lobby" itself is quite deceptive because all the people and some of the organizations in this informal alliance do not partake in organized lobbying (direct attempts to convince government officials). Instead, the different elements of the campaign function in numerous directions to manipulate U.S. politics, as do many political organizations. Some could more appropriately call this "pro-Israel culture" or

even "support Israel campaign," since the variety of actions conducted by various organizations goes beyond mere lobbying. Nevertheless, as all of the main organizations' lobby and since the word "Israel lobby" is widely used (along with terms such as "land lobby," "insurance lobby," "weapons lobby" or other ethnic lobbies), we choose to use it here. In the opposite, advocacy organizations and entities work freely and in the same manner that other political groups do (Smith 2000, p. 2).

There are no rites of passage for the group. This group exists to convince the U.S. government and the American public that U.S. help for Israel is vital, and worthwhile. Still, lobby members may receive some assistance from other parties that are motivated to see the U.S. continue its support, especially during particularly high-energy crises when they see international pressure on Israel (Said 1975, p. 72).

These sort of 'Middle East exponents' are thus appearing in the center. Additionally, certain Middle East commentators or pro-Israeli organizations may be asked to write letters for local newspapers, where the organizations that hire them as media representatives (American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, andpointer organisations, and Anti-Defamation League) make contributions to newspapers. This message is meant to leave the broad public with the impression that anyone with a positive disposition toward Israel is a leader.

In other terms, to be part of the lobby, one would consciously seek to shift US foreign policy against Israel. This goal will be an integral component of an organization's purpose and a considerable proportion of the energy and strategy must be absorbed. The degree and particular actions of these organizations will, of course, vary, and not all topic that concerns Israel can be accepted by all various parties and individuals.

4.2 ROLE OF JEWS

Very few Jewry wanted to abandon the United States to migrate to Israel after its establishment in 1948, which was originally opposed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and others. However, for many American Jews, a deep devotion to Israel quickly

became an essential part of identification. It seemed remarkable, above all in the post-Nazi Holocaust, to create the Jewish state in historical Palestine. Israel's successes in "making the flourish of the desert" became a strong source of accomplishment and Israel's near identity offered the new framework for a culture that gradually assimilated into American society, yet at the same time grew more and more secular (Rosenthal 2005, p. 211).

American Jews have created a remarkable number of community groups that have, in many ways, shaped US foreign policy by seeking to support Israel. The main groups are the AIPAC, American Jewish Congress, ZOA, the Israel Policy Forum, ADL, Religious Action Center, Americans for Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, Mercaz-USA and Hadassah. The lobby often includes policy tanks including the JINSA, the MEF, and WINEP, as well as individuals employed in academics and in academic organizations. These include the Jewish National Security Agency (JINSA). Dozens of pro-Israel PACs are now able to channel funds to pro-Israel election parties or to politicians who either deem their rivals weak or hostile to Israel (Kolsky 2010).

AIPAC is probably the most significant and well established of the various Jewish groups, which have a foreign policy as a core component of their agenda (Cohen & Bell 2005). AIPAC was second behind the AARP but was ahead of the high-weight lobbies like the AFL-CIO and the NRA when Fortune magazine invited Congressmen and their employees to name the most influential lobbies in Washington in 1997. A report from the National Journals of March 2005 concluded likewise, bringing AIPAC in Washington's "muscle lists" in the second position (tied with AARP) (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007, pp. 117-118).

This did not appear immediately that influential organizations like AIPAC could benefit. During early Zionism and also after the establishment of Israel, lobbying for Israel seemed to take place quietly in the background and relied generally on informal connections between powerful government officials, especially the president, and a limited group of Jewish representatives, pro-Zionist advisors or Jewish associates. Woodrow Wilson, for example, endorsed the 1917 Balfour Declaration partially because

of the influence of his Jewish colleagues, Justice Louis D. Brandeis, and Rabbi Stephen Wise, in the Supreme Court. Likewise, Harry S. Truman was motivated (though not determined), by intercessions of Jewish associates and advisors, in his decision to accept Israel's existence and acknowledge the new state (Tivnan 1987).

4.3 THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY TODAY

The Israeli Lobby has fractured politically by disputes over the national interests of Israel and the position of American Jews in Israel. Indeed, the pro-Israel lobby is not really a single lobby because of these divisions but consists of different lobby groups that each advocate different policies for Israel and the United States towards Israel. Three pro-Israeli lobbies are much more accurate: the main lobby, a left-wing lobby, and a right-wing one. The moderate movement includes several of the most prominent, well-established organizations: AIPAC, the Conference of Presidents, the JPO, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League. The centrist movement is primarily geared towards what could be termed "coordination tactics." Consensus tactics are focused on the idea that a single front between Congress and the White House is the most successful way of manipulating voters. It attempts therefore to reflect most of the Jewish community in America (the unified Jewish community of the United States, more specifically), where there is such a majority. If conflicts in view occur, these disagreements are addressed privately behind closed doors, so a prevailing viewpoint is embraced in public. Consequently, the moderate group is seeking not to take a straightforward, firm stance on divisive and polarizing topics (Holsti 2004).

Therefore, pro-Israel organizations barely consent nowadays. While they seek to advance the values of Israel, they vary considerably from the Israelis regarding the nature of those priorities (just like the Israelis). Many organizations condemn the continued Israeli occupation of territory captured during the 1967 War; others strongly endorse Israel's ownership of these territories for purposes of health, tradition, or religion (or a combination). Others remain deeply opposed to the creation of the Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Others oppose unconditional American support of Israeli politics and promote a more equal role for the US in Arab-Israeli pacification. And the

word "pro-Israel" teaches us precious little regarding the individual strategies which numerous organizations, in general, are following (Oren 2007).

Thanks to disparities in the United States' pro-Israel culture, pro-Israel political organizations never work together; they are most frequently in disagreement. Although left-wing and right-wing lobbies sometimes have sufficient common ground with centralist groups to allow them to work together, in view of their radically different political orientations and views, the left-wing and right-wing lobbies do not cooperate each other. Therefore, US lawmakers hear several separate voices more frequently than not, each pretending to be 'pro-Israel' and to express the interests of American Jews.

Nevertheless, the different pro-Israel groups are not all the same. Their composition (membership and staff), assets, and political power differ considerably. Others are only "one-man shows" directed by a single individual; even others actually operate out of a central office and rely on volunteers. Only a handful of them has an excellent staff with nice offices and huge sums of capital.

AIPAC is the growing, most stable, and powerful. It tends to exert a great deal of power in Congress, and while it has fewer control within the White House, it cannot easily restrict the US government's space for maneuver on Israel-IP matters. it favors Israel and promotes frequently gain nearly universal support in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. At its policy conference in Washington, DC, AIPAC flexes its political power every year; a gigantic event that attracts thousands of campaigners (more than 7,000 participants attended the 2010 conference) and more than half Congressmen to their gala dinner. The case reveals the continuing strength and importance of this pro-Israel movement in US domestic politics (Thouin 2010).

4.4 NEOCONSERVATIVES AND ISRAEL LOBBY

Neoconservatism is a political ideology that has different views both on domestic and foreign policy but only on the latter. Many neoconservatives admire America's values – and often also an Imperial empire's notion – and claim that Imperial influence will be

used to foster global spreads and deter future competitors from attempting to contend with the USA. In their view, the only path to creating sustainable stability is to promote prosperity and preserve US domination (Boot 2002). Neoconservatives often want the political structure in America to ensure that it is viewed by most people as a benevolent hegemon and to support the US leadership if it is firmly practiced. We seem to be wary of foreign bodies (especially the United Nations, which we find both to be anti-Israel and a limitation on America's freedom of action) and to be fearful of other allies (especially Europeans who view themselves as idealist peacekeepers in the Pax Americana region).

Mainly, neoconservatives think the military is a very effective weapon to influence the environment to America's advantage. When the US reveals its strategic strength and is able to employ its force, so the allies follow the example, and future enemies understand that it is pointless to fight and may agree to "bandwagon" the U.S. Taken brief, neoconservatism is a conservative philosophy especially hawkish (Kristol 1984).

Virtually all the neoconservatives dedicate themselves firmly and publicly to Zionism. they stress this. According to Max Boot, a prominent neoconservative scholar, Israel's protection is "a central concept of neoconservatism" and he believes to be "simple democratic rights." Benjamin Ginsberg, a political scientist with comprehensive published on American politics and anti-Semitism, suggests firmly that one of the key causes of neoconservatives' right movement was "the" "competence. For starters, the "Clean Break" report for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 was published by a community of eight Neoconservatives (lead by Richard Perle, including Douglas Feith and David Wurmser). This report called on Israel to leave the Oslo peace agreement and to take audacious measures — including armed force — in order to overturn oppressive Middle-Eastern governments and thereby resolve the rivalry between the Arab and Israel.

The neocons are necessary to guarantee the long- or long-term existence of the United States and Israeli national interests. Therefore, they believe all countries have long-term benefits from implementing their proposals. These claims can be countered by, as "traditional conservatives, sometimes known as paleoconservatives, in the 1980s have asserted that neoconservatives only have interest in America, not in Israel." Some serious

disagreement developed between the Neoconservative factions developed as a decade of strong contention was met with regard to the assertion that they were isolationists. For example, it, it can be said that neoconservative advocates exist because of Israel's need to survive, as an Israel advocacy group claims: They all serve the existence of Israel. At the root of everything are lies. Yet the friction between the two conservative movements does not go away completely; rather, it shifts to a different problem (Ginsberg 1993, p. 231).



5. U.S. - ISRAEL RELATIONS DURING OBAMA'S SECOND TERM

5.1 OBAMA'S LEGACY IN TERMS OF MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

G.W. Bush's presidency, which would end in 2009, the Republican's conservative nominee, Senator of Arizona; John McCain and the Democrats' left-center liberal nominee, Senator of Illinois; Barack Hussein Obama were competing. When Barack Obama was elected as president of the United States in November 4th, 2008, he was intent on changing the foreign policy course the country had. The most accurate region in which he could demonstrate this intention was undoubtedly the Middle East.

The problems of the Middle East have been complicated throughout history, and the approaches and policies developed, although well-intentioned, may not have paid off politically or economically. However, the policies developed by the United States especially in the Middle East after the Second World War (September 2, 1945) and even with the establishment of Israel (May, 14, 1948) are of great importance globally. The free flow of oil from the Middle East to the global economy, the Prevention of terrorism emanating from the region, Israel's security, and political transitions in key states such as Egypt directly influence and shape U.S. foreign policy.

There were two main problems for Middle East policies during President Obama's first term. The first of these were arguments produced without regard to the interests of the United States by producing policies of response to the policies of the previous president, which we are used to seeing in the United States. Obama's predecessor, George W. Bush left a huge military mark in the Middle East after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, so Obama was determined to reduce that mark, even if he could withdraw military forces from the region in countries like Iraq and Libya, regardless of whether U.S. interests were met.

Obama has sought to maintain traditional relations with authoritarian states in the region, as opposed to Bush's goal of spreading democracy in the region. Two years after Obama

abandoned Bush's policies, anti-authoritarian riots broke out in the region. In contrast to Bush's relatively late and low-profile stance against Israeli-Palestinian peace, Obama has made attempts to negotiate a peace process between the two sides since he took office. But Obama's approach has been diplomatically driven to a stalemate, with Prime Minister Netanyahu refusing to halt settlement construction and Arab states refusing to contribute to the peace process without taking that step.

The second problem with Obama's first-term policies was that the president wanted to take bold positions on difficult issues, but his cabinet failed to develop effective strategies to implement them. In his first term, Obama made clear that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, that Egypt should get rid of the authoritarian regime, that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad should leave his post, and that Israel should stop settlements in the West Bank.

5.2 OBAMA'S LEGACY IN TERMS OF ISRAEL RELATIONS

One of the very first steps Obama took after becoming president was to appoint former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, who was mediate the Northern Ireland peace treaty and play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Clinton administration, as special envoy for the Arab-Israeli peace process. This was an important indicator of the president's attention to the Arab-Israeli peace process. President Obama has been so quick and eager to make this appointment, thus announced this on the second day of his presidency. Even though Obama was willing to make high-profile attempts at the process, the elections in Israel, about a month after the inauguration ceremony, changed the picture. Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as Israeli Prime Minister during Clinton's term 1996-1999, became prime minister again on February, 10 2009 and there were concerns about the possibility that the conflicts that occurred during Clinton's term would resurface.

Obama was the Democratic Party's left-liberal candidate, and, to admit, he and Benjamin Netanyahu had views that were fundamentally different. Benjamin Netanyahu had the image of a center-right conservative leader, taking a different position from Obama as his

worldview. First, Obama's opposition to Israeli settlements in Jewish neighborhoods in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank was the first in which the two names were separated. In this context, Obama was producing policies that were contrary to the statement of support for Israeli settlements made by the previous President Bush in April 2004.

In reference to Bush's statement in the past, Israeli leaders have continued to hold their positions on the settlement issue. But Obama's stance on the issue has been met with dismay in Israel for the state of bilateral relations. Indeed, despite disagreements, a short-term construction halt was announced in November 2009. Despite this decision, the dispute between the two countries peaked in Jerusalem in March 2010 when Israel announced it would add 1600 houses to Ramat Shlomo at a meeting that would kick off peace talks between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. The fact that US Vice President Joe Biden was in Jerusalem for those talks has shown that the timing of the announcement was deliberate.

“Let's be clear: America is committed to Israel's security and will always support Israel's right to defend itself against legitimate threats,” Obama said on the day after the swearing-in ceremony. And he continued: “For years, Hamas has fired thousands of rockets at innocent Israeli citizens. No democracy can tolerate such danger to its people, neither the international community nor its interests only for the Palestinian people themselves, who have been withdrawn by acts of terrorism.”

The quartet made it clear that in order to be a genuine peace partner, Hamas must adhere to certain conditions, including recognition of Israel's right to exist, renunciation of violence, and adherence to previous accords. Going forward, the outline for a sustainable truce is clear: Hamas must halt rocket fire; Hamas cannot modernize Israel's withdrawal from Gaza; and the US and its partners must have a credible anti-smuggling strategy and support for the sanctions regime's completion.

“I spoke with President Mubarak yesterday and expressed my gratitude for Egypt's critical role in achieving a truce. And we look forward to Egypt's leadership and collaboration in

setting the framework for a larger peace through its commitment to eliminate cross-border smuggling,” Obama stated.

In addition to Obama statements:

“Just as the terror of rocket fire against innocent Israelis is unbearable, it is hopeless for the Palestinians,” he added. “Our hearts go out to Palestinian civilians who need urgent food, clean water and basic medical care.” “It would be the policy of my administration to actively and aggressively seek a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”

in his words, he expressed his position to the process and the necessity of a bilateral solution (Freedman 2018, p. 53).

However this statements could not be helpful in order to build a healthy process between U.S. and Israel for example another issue that raises problems between the two countries is that President Obama have visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in his first year and did not travel to Israel.

Despite differences of opinion between Obama and Netanyahu and contrasts on some world issues, ties between the United States and Israel have remained close, especially in terms of security. Despite the economic crisis, Obama continued to pursue the U.S.-Israeli military assistance program initiated by previous President Bush. As part of the ten-year plan, it added \$ 3 billion in annual military aid, as well as a quarter billion dollars to contribute to Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system (Freedman 2017, p. 256).

Bilateral ties have remained tight not just in a security environment. The United States and Israel maintained frequent information exchanges and coordinated military exercises. Simultaneously, Obama reaffirmed former President Clinton's commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative military supremacy over Arabs during a March 2013 visit to Israel.

On a global scale, the US continued to defend Israel's interests by vetoing an Arab-backed resolution condemning Israel that was put to a vote in the United Nations Security Council in February 2011. That resolution prohibited Israel from engaging in any activity in the region (Indyk et al. 2012, p. 131).

Obama's conspicuous first step was that giving the Secretary of State seat after Hillary Clinton to John Kerry, who would reduce Obama's deliberate distance from Israel in his second term. Secondly, he decided to visit Israel, which he did not visit in his first year, this time at the beginning of his second term, in March 2013.

During his visit, he used many positive phrases including words referring to Israel's national anthem, Hativka (hope). Therefore, it was essential for Jews to live in peace and security in their own state, which, according to Obama, was what a free Israeli people deserved. Not only did Obama refer to the national anthem, but he also expressed that he would always be ready to support Israel, and he clinched it with "Atem Lo Levad"² (you are not alone), a Hebrew phrase.

Although Obama wants to bring his policies on Israel to a warmer point, it is unclear whether he has achieved this. After nine months of peace diplomacy, John Kerry, who was in the office at the State Department, had to stick to previous Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's December 2010 plan. As an outcome of this return, he stated that his solution was necessary by restating the problems that had been expressed in the past (Booth & Eglash 2014).

Given issues such as refugees, borders, security, water, and Jerusalem, Kerry had a tough fight ahead of him. The ongoing disagreements on these issues could not be resolved simply because the Foreign Minister had changed. Although Kerry began shuttle diplomacy with urgency, a development that made it difficult to establish trust between Netanyahu and Obama occurred in the summer of 2013. In mid-August, it emerged that the use of chemical weapons, the "red line" that Obama specifically stated a year ago, had been violated by Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Freedman 2017, p. 256).

Instead of carrying out a military move on top of that, Obama adopted a Russian bill calling for Assad to surrender his chemical weapons. The fact that the surrender of chemical weapons was in the process made it necessary for Assad to remain in the

² Obama, B. (2013, March). Remarks of President Barack Obama to the people of Israel. In remarks, Jerusalem International Convention Center, Jerusalem (Vol. 21).

administration. This caused concern about whether Obama's red lines could be easily violated (Gilboa 2013, p. 21). In fact, many countries, especially Israel, were questioning the outcome of the line on whether Iran could obtain nuclear weapons. These concerns began to materialize when the United Nations Security Council and Germany brought into discussion the easing of Iran's partial sanctions under the P5+1 and its involvement in the renegotiation process.³

Netanyahu was concerned about a decision that would allow Iran to step up its uranium-enriching activities. While the P5+1 deal deserves praise for the success of diplomacy in reaching a solution in Obama's eyes, it was met with unpleasant statements by Netanyahu:

“The decision taken in Geneva is not a historic decision, but rather a historic mistake. The world's most dangerous state has reached an opportunity to produce dangerous weapons” (Mahapatra 2016).

Later, that tension continued to escalate as Kerry commented on how long Israeli troops would remain in the Palestinian territories if a peace deal were signed. The one who harshly criticized this comment was Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon in January 2014. Though statements by Ya'alon, who stated that Kerry was obsessive and considered himself like the Messiah, damaged the relationship, it did not remain in the long-running spotlight (Ravid 2014).

Ya'alon's statements did not end with this alone. Two months later, when Russia annexed Crimea and began threatening Ukraine, it criticized US foreign policy for showing weakness. Ya'alon expressed disappointment that the United States was not giving its allies as much confidence as it should. According to Ya'alon, the U.S. position of avoiding responsibility was not only a concern for Israel, but also for other allies in Europe and the Middle East.

³ Ironically, in his 21 March 2013 speech in Israel, Obama stated: ‘We will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people.’ In the same speech he asserted that ‘I’ve made the position of the United States clear: Iran must not get a nuclear weapon’

The Israeli Defense Minister's comments were interpreted by senior U.S. officials as unwarranted and unfortunate remarks intended to undermine relations. So much so that, from their point of view, such comments were unrealistic when it came to the unprecedented security support given by the United States to Israel.

In fact, one of the major problems between the two states was due to Russia's activities in Crimea and Ukraine. In March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and threatened Ukraine's territorial integrity, the United States drafted a condemnation resolution and moved the matter to the United Nations General Assembly.

The vote on this resolution took place on March 27, 2014. However, Israel did not vote for that bill, citing a strike by workers at the Foreign Ministry. This move, which was met with consternation on the part of the White House, was not credible in the sense of justification. The reason for the disbelief was perhaps due to statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Liberman following the incident. According to Liberman, Israeli involvement was not necessary in this particular issue. As a matter of fact, he believed that Israel could maintain positive relations with both the United States and Russia in this way (Ravid 2014).

Why this issue could become a problem became clear as we saw the US side's approach to the situation. U.S. officials felt that the fact that every anti-Israel Bill in the United Nations Security Council is vetoed by the United States and in return, Russia approves every anti-Israel resolution that made the situation contradictory. Although Liberman's Soviet birth was thought to be eager to improve relations with Russia, in the eyes of the United States, Russia was a state that weaponized Israel's enemies. In this context, the United States interpreted the move as unfair in the face of its security support for Israel.

The reaction of the United States was that it described Ukraine not only as a problem between Russia and the United States but as a crisis that concerned the world at large. Therefore, it was interesting that Israel, its most important ally, did not join, whereas not only the United States but all the other countries that voted.

John Kerry's 9-month initiative, which began with the hope of solving many problems, came to an end shortly after the voting event at the United Nations General Assembly. Israel's criticism of the United States in the process was that the White House was choosing to see about Israel's constructions instead of the Palestinian uncompromising attitude. So much so that Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas rejected a U.S. call for peace talks in March 2014 (Kershner & Rudoren 2014)

The Netanyahu government was trying to figure out which side the Obama administration wanted to take a side the peace process with. The Palestinian Authority's participation in the peace talks depended on Israel not continuing its settlements. The statements made by the United States at this point were far from choosing sides but contained tentative statements aimed at calming the violence (Waxman 2012, pp. 71-87).

Israel's frustrations with the US position were made concrete by statements from the authorities to the press. Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement in an interview with the Associated Press that he was deeply disappointed by the U.S. stance was one of the top examples of this. At the same time, Ron Dermer, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, expressed the disturbing level of tolerance that the United States had shown to the Palestinians, prompting a backlash to the United States.

A senior U.S. administration official told the Haaretz newspaper that it was contradictory for Israeli leaders to criticize the relationship between Palestine and the United States. Israel continued to work in coordination with the Palestinian security forces (Juneau 2020).

The traffic of criticism between the two states flared again when Israeli Housing Minister Uri Ariel made the announcement for about 1,500 new settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which the United States did not see as particularly appropriate in terms of the peace process. Secretary Ariel described this announcement as an appropriate Zionist response to Palestine becoming a state of terror, while US State Department Assistant spokeswoman Marie Harf said it was disappointing that these actions did not

serve a two-state solution. Another point of note was that Harf's statements, such as her "deep disappointment," were like those of Netanyahu's previous criticisms.

The abduction and killing of three Israeli teenagers have brought Hamas and Israel back into the hotline of fire as the tense weather continues. The fact that Hamas took the credit for this action meant a serious response by Israel. Indeed, Israel has taken serious steps to imprison Hamas officials. Hamas responded by firing rockets from Gaza. Israel's airstrikes on Hamas bases in Gaza were a harbinger of the Gaza war in 2014.

5.3 US-ISRAEL RELATIONS BEFORE & DURING 2014 GAZA WAR

Unlike in previous years, Hamas did not have many allies who supported this war against Israel. Indeed, Hamas had lost the diplomatic position it had in 2008-2009 and 2012. But more importantly, it was in an isolated position in the Middle East for other states. Hamas's stance against the Assad regime in Syria has made its relations with Iran even more powerless against Israel. On the other hand, the coup of General Abdel-Fattah Sisi against Mohammed Mursi who is another important ally of Hamas due to the politically and ideologically ties with Muslim Brotherhood was another issue. Even Mursi had played a crucial role in the truce signed between Hamas and Israel in 2013. One of the issues that should not be forgotten is that Hamas is seen as the Palestinian pillar of the Muslim Brotherhood. Because of this, Egypt could not be expected to take part in the Hamas side, at least under the Sisi administration. Thus, only Qatar and Turkey were allies that could give support to Hamas against Israel (Guzansky 2014)

After the Hamburg rocket landed in the neighboring city of Yehud on 22 July, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) directed US planes to avoid Israel's Ben Ghuron Airport. The Israeli government was incensed by the arrangement, which it viewed not only as 'rewards for strikes' despite its lack of faith in the Obama administration, but also as a tactic to coerce Israel into recognizing a truce it did not support.

Republicans in Congress recognized that President Obama previously used a government administrative agency to economically sanction Israel in order to compel our buddy to

fulfill his foreign policy needs, linking the FAA's decision to denounce the administration to Senator Ted Cruz, a prospective 2016 presidential candidate. Cruz asserted that Israel's \$11 billion tourism economy posed a crippling threat to the flying suspension. Although Harf, the State Department's spokesperson, described Cruz's remarks as "stupid and disrespectful," one of Cruz's spokeswoman stated that the administration's policies were "ridiculous and insulting." 2014 (Kibrik & Sher)

The restriction on flight was suspended fewer than two days later, but it was then a matter of Republican strategy interfering in the government to cope with the Israeli / Palestinian problem, not just representing the mistrusts between Netanyahu and the Obama Administration.

The second big US-Israeli conflict after the war was the initiative by Kerry to negotiate a cease-fire. Egypt had developed a truce agreement that Israel had approved, but Hamas had refused, within the war's first week (prior to the arrival of Israel's ground troops in Gaza). The Egyptian cease-fire strategy called for a halt to the war and opening of frontier crossings for citizens and products "when stability is on the ground secure." Hamas also demanded even more for a truce including the building of an airport, the restoration of the boundary barrier and the release of Israeli prisoners. Of note, Israel has refused airport and seaport requests, so it will be far harder for Hamas to smuggle weapons and long-distance rockets to attack Israel. When Hamas denied a cessation of the flames, IDF troops were deployed to Gaza, primarily in the tunnels built by Hamas for Israel's infiltration (Dickstein 2014, p. 10). Improved desperately in Kerry's cease fire attempts and he continued to meet with Turkey, and Qatar, much to the discomfiture of both Israel and Egypt by supporting the ground forces – with a concomitant threat to Gazan civilians. In the wake of Kerry's suspension of the fire initiative, Netanyahu criticized the program as a "reward to violence," after the meeting of the secretary of state with Qatari and Turkish negotiators, because the proposal contained several of Hamas' requests, which his government refuses (Aljundi & Katman 2020, pp. 4-9).

Although Obama and Netanyahu had differences of opinion, their disagreements rarely reflected on the agenda. But it was at this point that Kerry became the target of criticism

from Israeli public opinion and politicians. John Kerry's remarks were publicly criticized for guaranteeing Hamas ' security rather than protecting Israel's interests.

Kerry found himself in the circle of criticism, even when commenting on an Egyptian-proposed ceasefire plan and was thought to have ignored Israel's security while voicing his concerns.

Obama and Netanyahu conveyed their views on the issue to ambassadors in their countries. But according to Ron Dermer, Israel's ambassador to the United States, the criticism directed at Kerry would be insufficient to mention the dysfunctionality of the two states' relations. The break-up of the short-lived ceasefire and the strict statements to halt the operation led to comments that Israel and the United States did not see Hamas threats from the same window.

Meanwhile, the administration blamed its losses on the escalation of Israel's ground offensive in Gaza. The Israeli army did an amazing job during the battle of minimizing Palestinian civilian losses, according to General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Joint Staff Committee. Yet US outrage increased following the war, particularly as Palestinian civilians huddling at UN installations became targets of Israeli bombardment and the administration appeared to disregard. This could be explained by both Obama's genuine concern for human life — he had warned Israel earlier in the battle that civilian losses should be kept to a minimum — and US efforts in late July to build up an anti-Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) alliance (Petras 2014, p. 169). It could have been the administration's fault that photographs of dead Gazans were circulated. Civilians may hinder its efforts to form a coalition, but the extent to which this is an issue is debatable, as significant members of the Anti-ISIS alliance-Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Jordan (as well as covert US ties against the ISIS regimes of Syria and Iran)-are well positioned to blunt.

Another apparent issue for the government was fear of the Cisjordan, which had remained largely relaxed throughout the war, complicating efforts to construct the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that Obama desired for so long. In any case, the press

noted that Israel acquired US armaments stockpiled in Israel in anticipation of needing weaponry resupplies during the battle, obviating the requirement for a US airlift similar to that used during the October 1973 confrontation (Armstrong 2018, p. 115). The administration was taken aback by the reports and promptly halted the production of Hellfire missiles, which the Israeli government required in order to approve any possible weapons shipments. By taking this action, the Government demonstrated that reservations about the once-sacrosanct security cooperation with Israel remained. Nonetheless, Congress approved a bill signed by Obama after the conflict to grant Israel with an additional \$4 billion in funding for the Iron Dome anti-missile system, which had demonstrated such efficacy in rocketing Hamas before to the fighting (Robinson 2014, p. 91).

Israel increased its assault of Gaza in mid-August and also targeted high-rise structures holding Hamas top leadership over US opposition. With the damage increasing, despite the fact that it was the one proposed in Egypt's first week of the conflict, it appears as though Hamas members in Gaza have convinced Hamas chairman Khalid Mashall, who is currently residing in Qatar, to favor a ceasefire burn. In either scenario, the conflict exacerbated already poor relations between the Obama administration and the Israeli state. Regrettably, post-war developments would almost certainly exacerbate tensions between the USA and Israel.

5.4 GAZA WAR'S EFFECTS ON US-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Netanyahu has wasted no time since the fight, enraging the cabinet. Perhaps because his right wing was strategically vulnerable and was being accused for not being more active throughout the struggle, the prime minister resurrected his settlement-building agenda with a passion. One week after the battle, Israel announced the seizure of roughly 1000 acres of West Bank land between Bethlehem and Hebron, describing the move as revenge for the murder of three Jewish adolescents in the Hebron area, and several days later announced the tender for 283 new homes in Elkana's West Bank community. Israel's actions drew the expected US rebuke, with State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki

describing the move as sending a 'very worrisome letter' that runs "contrary to Israel's professed goal of a two-state solution and a Palestinian peace deal" (Ravid 2014).

US-Israeli relations were strained further when, in response to US-European Union efforts to impose sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine, Israeli Agriculture Minister Yair Shamir claimed in an interview with a Russian news agency that Russia's counter-sanctions on the EU, which suspended all agricultural imports, provided an incentive for Israel to enhance its yearly agricultural production. Although Shamir justified his bid by stating that Israel should disregard Russia's EU boycotts as long as the EU continued to boycott West Bank settlements, his words may only serve to aggravate US-Israeli relations.

Elsewhere, Israel's relations with the Palestinian Authority appeared to be deteriorating when Abbas, who had previously withdrawn from diplomatic negotiations with Israel initiated by the Oslo peace initiative, not only urged the UN in its annual General Assembly address to support a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital against this initiative, but also urged the UN to support a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. Netanyahu, for his part, initiated a campaign to link Hamas to ISIS, possibly in order to prevent the PA from talking with Israel as long as Hamas was included in a national unity coalition. Nonetheless, the Obama administration disregarded any connection between ISIS and Hamas (Ravid 2015)

Faced with the deterioration of their relationship, Obama and Netanyahu scheduled a White House meeting for late September, while the prime minister was in the United States for the United Nations General Assembly. Obama stated in his own General Assembly address, during a pre-summit motion:

Iraq, Syria, and Libya's current situation will dispel the myth that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the region's primary source of contention. That has frequently been used to shift attention away from domestic problems.

Simultaneously, Obama asserted, in what had become a near-rhetorical statement of his presidency, that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza was not permanent and that the Middle East and the world “would be fairer and healthier with two states coexisting in peace and stability.” Obama also stated, potentially to the consternation of Ya'alon and other right-wing elements inside the Israeli government, that "as daunting as the world appears, America will not abandon [the Middle East] settlement."

With all the issues that had accumulated over the preceding year and a half, it was clear that the Obama-Netanyahu White House meeting would generate more tension than it would resolve. Nonetheless, just prior to the summit, another huge irritant surfaced when it was disclosed that the Israeli government had granted approval for the construction of 2600 new housing units in East Jerusalem's Givat Hamatos (Airplane Hill), close above the 1967 border. One might believe that Netanyahu would have halted such a huge construction project prior to seeing Obama. This could indicate that he was more concerned with the threat to his domestic political function (the risk posed by his right wing) than with the US-Israeli alliance. The plan was to cast a pall over the White House gathering and make it into another major scandal once Netanyahu left Washington (Ravid 2014).

Both Obama and Netanyahu spoke publicly for approximately three minutes apiece at the White House event, before speaking privately for about two hours. Netanyahu stated in his remarks:

Everything has changed in the Middle East, creating a new area of joint interest for Israel and the key Arab states, and I believe we will work closely together to capitalize on these shared interests and establish a constructive approach toward a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful Middle East.

Along with praising the US and Israel's "continuous link of collaboration," the Prime Minister used his public remarks at the White House meeting to warn against a nuclear deal with Iran as the 24 November deadline for striking an accord approached: 'Iran desires an agreement that eliminates the harsh sanctions you have been attempting to

impose for so long and leaves it as a threshold nucleus. Obama then on to advocate for an Israeli-Palestinian peace solution, in addition to praising the 'unbreakable bond' between the US and Israel:

They should study ways to enhance the status quo so that all Israeli residents are protected from missile fire in their houses and children in their classrooms, but we avoid the tragedy of Palestinian infanticide. Thus, we will confront the situation comprehensively, not just in terms of recovering Gaza, but also in terms of how we should pursue a more enduring partnership between Israelis and Palestinians.

When the meeting concluded, the administration wasted no time in denouncing Israel's proposed housing scheme, with White House spokesperson Josh Earnest noting that the US was "profoundly concerned" about the project.

Such a measure would invite worldwide condemnation, isolate Israel from even its closest allies, and contaminate the environment not just with Palestinians, but also with the very Arab governments with which Prime Minister Netanyahu stated he desired relations. Netanyahu reacted angrily to the accusation, claiming it was counter to American ideals that Earnest answered (Freedman 2017, p. 261).

“The truth is, when it comes to American ideals, the American principles owe Israel the unwavering embrace. It is American values that guided us to advocate for and gain support to tangibly improve Israeli defense ... It is American values that guided us to finance and create an Iron Dome network that secured the life of countless innocent Israelis”

When the discussion on “Western principles” escalated, opposition leader Yitzhak Herzog openly criticized Netanyahu for undermining US-Israeli relations (Ravid 2014):

“Netanyahu, maybe you can clarify how reckless blows you share with the American Administration represent our national interests. There is no hole in Netanyahu's alliance with the United States. Once again, the Prime Minister triggers a foolish and risky conflict with the American Administration and [is] hurting the most important values of the State of Israel and its people”

As soon as the fallout from the "American ideals" incident subsided, two other occurrences occurred that harmed US-Israeli relations, revealing that the administration's

tolerance for Netanyahu and his cabinet was fairly limited. In the first instance, Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon was denied access to Kerry and Biden on a late October visit to Washington to meet with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hegel. According to a "senior US representative" quoted by Haaretz, "it should come as no surprise, notwithstanding some of his previous words, that he was refused many meetings." (2016, Troy).

The second development, which came immediately after the Ya'alon event, was considerably more consequential. Former and current 'Senior Obama Administration Officials' expressed their discontent with Netanyahu and his policies in conversations with Jeffrey Goldberg, an Atlantic magazine journalist with significant ties to the White House. They expressed 'red hot outrage' at the prime minister for his settlement activities. This mingled our uneasiness with his unwillingness to take harsh measures. It is now too late.

While the administration emphasized that the sentiments made by senior officials in the report did not reflect its views and were "inappropriate and unhelpful," the damage had been done. However, by the end of October 2014, relations between the administration and Netanyahu had reached a new low, and it appeared as though they would not improve much more.

5.5 THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEAL AND THE MARCH 2015 ISRAELI ELECTIONS

The first half of 2015 was characterized by increased instability in both the United States and Israel's domestic ties. Thus, Republican House Speaker John Boehner invited Netanyahu to speak at a combined House-Senate conference on the dangers confronting both the US and Israel as a result of the tentative Iran-P5+1 deal, without approaching the Democratic-controlled White House. Netanyahu's talk, which was boycotted by more than 50 Democratic senators, also demonstrated how support for Israel has become a political issue in American politics—a development that could jeopardize Israel's long-term relationship with the US (Freedman 2017, pp. 264-265).

When Netanyahu delivered the speech two weeks before the Israeli elections on 17 March 2015, many analysts in both the United States and Israel interpreted it as an election strategy aimed at reinforcing his role as a close opponent to Herzog's Zionist Union Party and ex-Likud / Kadiman politician Tzipi Livni. Although it is unclear whether Netanyahu's strategy worked (he earned a momentary boost in pre-election surveys), in comparison to the Zionist Union's 24, Likud won 30 members in Israel's Knesset, allowing Netanyahu to create a new government. Nonetheless, Netanyahu's action throughout the election campaign weakened Obama's government by rejecting the Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution, which he had previously openly endorsed, and by attempting to rally his supporters to vote against the Israeli Arab community being "in a circle." (Freedman 2019, pp. 2-3).

While the prime minister endeavored to renounce his campaign stance on the two-state solution and even sought to appease Israel's Arab community during the election, his post-election pronouncements left the US administration skeptical. Nonetheless, Obama informed reporters at a post-election press conference that he and Netanyahu had a "genuine strategic divide" on the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state. Obama continued by asserting that "this confrontation would have ramifications for US policy toward the Middle East peace process." Wendy Sherman, Under-Secretary of State, issued the following warning:

"We will closely monitor developments on this [Palestinian] issue following the establishment of the new [Israeli] government. When the present Israeli leadership appears to abandon its commitment to a two-state solution, it complicates our diplomatic task... It would be simpler if we could avoid internationalizing the issue.

Sherman indicated that France and other governments were attempting to enact a two-state solution through a UN Security Council Resolution. Previously, Washington discouraged the use of these steps, preferring quick Israel-Palestinian discussions. Obama appeared to imply, however, that if an Israeli government hostile to a two-state solution came to power, his administration would be powerless to oppose such a decision. Regrettably for Netanyahu, that is precisely the type of coalition government he felt

compelled to form on May 7, 2015. With a bare minimum of 61 legislators (which was increased to 67 in 2016 with the addition of Liberman's Yisrael Beiteinu), Netanyahu's cabinet became heavily reliant on the Jewish Home faction, which was not only guaranteed to intensify settlement expansion on the West Bank, but also provided ministries to do so. While Netanyahu continued to court the Zionist Union, the election resulted in a narrowly-based right-wing government committed to settlement construction that appeared to be on a collision course with the Obama administration at a time when negotiations on a new US arms supply agreement had not yet begun.⁴

5.6 THE 10-YEAR ARMS AID AGREEMENT

Although the issue of settlement expansion became a source of controversy during the Obama administration, the relationship between the US and Israel saw its most substantial implementation in September 2016, when his government announced a fresh aid package to put those concerns aside. to end the talks while Hillary Clinton appeared to be a strong candidate for the President may have been simpler than during Netanyahu's tenure of office since he was feeling threatened by Clinton, particularly in the general election in the discussions in office. For Clinton and the first term of President Obama's presidency, the Clinton family had fond memories of using the Republican-led Congress as a shield to prevent Bill Clinton from moving the peace process forward. before to the election, offered significant help to Hillary, who had been considered a safe, in the eyes of the pro-Israel community, and planned on being safe, earlier in order to accommodate his previous support for Israel (Ross 2016, p. 128).

The foreign aid grant to Israel entailed a total of \$38 billion in support at a cost of \$3. 5.8 billion over a ten-year period, of which \$1.5 million was set aside for Israel's missile defense. However, it featured other conditions which had infuriated the Israelis, such as a limitation on the total money Israel can claim each year (to \$3.8 billion) and prohibitions on Israel making purchases from its own suppliers. facilities to modernize and plans to build or significantly expand [military] infrastructure. Needless to say, Netanyahu's

⁴Ravid, B. (2015). US: It Will Be Harder to Support Israel in UN If It Steps Back from a Two-State Solution. *HAARETZ (Online)* <https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-pm-i-support-2-states-but-things-must-change-1.5340025> [accessed on 29 July 2020].

detractors, including former Minister of Defense and Military Affairs, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and former Chief of Military Intelligence, Yoav (Yelton) Yadin, are critical of the 10-year deal because had Israel's connection to the agreement with Iran made unreliable, and Israel would have received sufficient funding to enhance/maintain its military infrastructure or significantly expand (Freedman 2017, p. 266).

Presidential candidate Barack Obama was shocked by the results of the [of the arms deal] when the transaction didn't materialize as anticipated since he assumed the weapons contract would be good for Clinton. Together with other friends of Israel, especially the conservative newspaper editor and publisher David Friedman, David pledges to move the US embassy to Jerusalem in Israel to maintain his campaign promise to support Israel, which includes, according to the day after the inauguration, also for the first time, fulfilling the American voters' call to move the American diplomatic institution's place of responsibility to Israel's capital. Israel might also pointed out that, further, to note that Israel was permitted to seek \$3.8 billion in funds even though it could not do so under the conditions laid forth in the agreement Since Trump came to power, Bennett's members of the Jewish Home party have started to argue that the United States is no longer promoting a two-state solution, which might be construed as settlement freeze on settlement growth and the United States is instead supporting an Israeli policy of further settlement growth in the West Bank. However, in February of 2016, Trump called for the United States to remain neutral in the conflict between Israel and the State of which doesn't match his wishes as evidenced by his apparent desire to sign "the ultimate deal," an Israeli-Palestinian agreement with Jared Kushner, who he said is a Jewish son-in-law but yet supports him on this issue. The solution to this problem will have two parts: one which enables to "expand" the meaning of each state. However, as has been the case with other policies in the past, Trump and his advisors have issued various conflicting statements and no one knows exactly how they want to address the Israeli-Palestinian situation. A great opportunity to revisit the relations between the United States and Israel during Obama's second term was the fact that Trump's election victory provided.

6. US-ISRAEL RELATIONS UNDER TRUMP'S 4 YEAR

6.1 TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN PROCESS

Trump was widely believed to be focused on the Likud government of Israel, unlike its predecessor Barack Obama, during the presidential campaign in 2016. As a New York resident, Trump had large access to the leadership and the passion of wealthy and affluent supporters of the US-Jewish group regarding the status of Israel and their religious conviction. The daughter of Trump, Ivanka, marries Jared Kushner, an observant Jew, and has become a Judaist by herself, which is said to be practiced in the Orthodox Tradition (Vasile 2017, p. 26).

From a political standpoint, Trump aligned himself with the right on Iran's nuclear program and the US's desire to retain connections with regional authoritarian decision-makers. He vowed that if elected president, he would 'immediately see Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu on the day Israel's second-class citizens were treated as citizens. He stated that he would "break the cataclysmic deal" with Iran, referring to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). "I would therefore be willing to work closely with the United Nations and the rest of the world in order to bring Israel's unity and peace." According to him, Obama was the "worst thing that ever happened to Israel" and announced that the US would "relocate the US embassy to the eternal capital of the Jews, Jerusalem." (2017) (Nusem 2018).

On one hand, he was even-handed in the peace process; on the other, he was partisan, declaring that he 'would love to see an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians' and warning that he would 'keep it as neutral as possible, because if you are not something neutral, the other side will never be. In his campaign fact sheet on US-Israeli relations, he emphasized the importance of strengthening the US-Israeli alliance and US-Palestinian Authority connections, while downplaying existing US policy priorities on the territorial compromise between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which were centered on growing US military assistance to Israel.

On 23 December 2016, Trump launched a series of tweets criticising his government's inability to veto the resolution following the US's abstention from UN Security Council Resolution 2334 condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Palestinian incitement to violence. "He assured me that the transition would be painless—NOT!" "I make every effort to disregard Obama's numerous provocative words and actions" (Baker 2017).

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted with unprecedented hostility in reaction to the United States' absence from UNSCR 2334. His allegation was that Obama was colluding with other Security Council members, highlighting Obama's strong personal hostility. He responded enthusiastically to Trump's message: "Trump, President-elect, I want to express my gratitude for your warm friendship and unwavering support for Israel! Netanyahu's son's Facebook profile included a flag emblazoned with the phrase "Bye Bye Obama" (Nusem 2018).

6.1.1 Trump's Team on Israel

The Trump administration's Israeli staff appeared to bolster the faithful prediction. His Israeli ambassador, David Friedman, a New York-based bankruptcy lawyer, is a West Bank donor, a wealthy supporter of Israeli rights, and a Jerusalem property owner. He is a vehement opponent of the center and center-left and refers to pro-Israel advocates of a two-state solution as "kapos" – a slur derived from Nazis' order to herd Jewish death camp victims into gas chambers. In December 2015, he remarked, "Under Trump, the US will never coerce Israel into adopting a two-state solution or any other solution that runs opposed to the views of the Israeli people." The United States' ambassador to Israel referred to it as "a vast deep settler state envoy" (Nusem 2018).

Jason Dov Greenblatt is the White House Special Representative for International Negotiations. He previously served as Executive Vice Chairman and Chief Legal Officer of The Trump Organization. He lacks political experience but is in close contact with the President – an indisputably huge political advantage – as a product of traditional Jewish education in New York and the West Bank. It supports a two-state solution, but one that necessitates settlements in the West Bank. As with Trump, he views a peace agreement

primarily as an economic transaction. "Is it an enterprise transaction, if you remove the emotional and historical components?" he said. "The country's borders will be negotiated, water rights will be negotiated, and security concerns will be discussed" (Thompson 2018).

You then have to recommend to them, 'Hear, we want to address these two points this year, and then in this area, you can have an assessment and address these two points, followed by the examination.' I believe that negotiating partially and then hoping for the best is not a viable strategy.

Given the conflict between Israel and Palestine's immensely rich historical and emotional context, it appears as though Trump and Greenblatt are taken aback.

Kushner rounds out the team, whom the president has described as a "liaison" with the Israeli regime. Which includes the Government, from which US-Israeli Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has not yet been expelled. Defense Secretary James Mattis, who maintains close ties with his Israeli military colleagues, has spoken of the danger of settlement development transforming Israel into an apartheid state. This will almost certainly limit his involvement in US-Israeli relations to solely military considerations.

6.1.2 Trump's First Year in Terms of Israel Relations

On February 2, 2016 Trump visited King Abdullah of Jordan, who was at the time the head of the Arab League. while we do not believe the location of new settlements or the expansion of existing ones will be a problem, the president made a statement indicating that while the administration "is not considering new settlements or future expansions of existing ones to be a hindrance to peace."

The president telephoned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu two days later about Iran's nuclear program and the "global menace"terror threat" presented by the Islamic State. On February 15, 2017, the Premier of Ontario, Donald Trump, hosted him at the White House. in response to a summit with the President canceled his prior promise

to a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian disputes by holding a joint news conference with the Prime Minister where he reiterated "I'm only considering one settlement and the other are illegitimate: a deal is one of just one possibility." Donald Trump later signalled his intention to help building in Israel while saying that he wants to see peace negotiations begin between Israel and the Palestinians to start anew (Nusem 2018).

At a summit meeting with Netanyahu, Trump asked him to desist from his plans to expand Israeli settlements in disputed territories. Prior to the meeting with the White House, the Israeli government had told White Israel to postpone any fresh settlement projects. As we understand, as part of the peace. The White House said that expanding settlements or creating new settlements beyond their current bounds is unlikely to advance the goal of ending violence in the Middle East, but it has not ruled out the possibility (Aswar 2018, pp. 134-135).

The White House agreed to meet with PA President Mahmoud Abbas on May 3rd of this year

on May 15th, it was disclosed by the Washington Post that Trump had released information pertaining to American intelligence agents to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ambassador to the US Sergey Kislyak only five days before to the official divulging of information. Later, the origin of the data was discovered and it was revealed that an Israeli informant was working with ISIS in Syria. A major concern that arose for Israeli officials was that the leak would expose Israeli intelligence and put them in danger was that intelligence officers would be exposed. Furthermore, the government proclaimed May of 2017 as the month to be dedicated to the heritage and identity of American Jews (Elgindy 2019, p. 107).

On May 19, President Donald Trump launched his first foreign travel abroad tour with a visit to Saudi Arabia, to the Vatican, and on his way home to Italy he stopped in a number of other European nations for a few days. On his arrival in Tel Aviv on the 21 May, 2017, President Trump was met by a wave of red carpets and applause at the airport by the locals, who welcomed him to the city with traditional welcoming rites of carpets and

applause in Saudi Arabia. Following his talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump took him on a visit to the historic area of Jerusalem, where he laid a wreath at the Western Wall and visited the Jewish heritage sites with his Israeli President Reuven and his entourage. On May 21, 2017, Donald Trump became the first president in history to deliver a speech at the Western Wall, a first action at the nation's origin of all others that would follow (Karolyi 2017, p. 135).

6.2 TRUMP – ISRAEL RELATIONS AS PRESIDENT

At the end of 2017, just one year after the presidential election, the US embassy was moved to Jerusalem to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The policy has been strongly condemned both in the United States and internationally. During his official speech at a diplomatic reception on Jerusalem, the former Presidents said Trump did not bring the Parties closer to a lasting peace agreement among Israeli-Palestinian peoples by refusing to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, believing that it would advance the cause of peace. As a "long-awaited measure to accelerate the path of reconciliation and move for a negotiated solution," the president launched his proposal, although he remained unclear on whether acceptance of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel would help the cause of reconciliation. For some debate regarding the Palestinian refugees, whose communities had been expelled by the Israeli invasion for 1948, the Trump administration followed a common stance. The UN envoy claimed that, inside the pre-1967 boundaries, Palestinians remained out of table hoping to return refugees and their descendants (Bard 2018, pp. 155-177).

In 2018, the Trump Administration stated that it had scaled back all the funds received by the U.S. to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) to offer essential humanitarian facilities in Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to nearly five million Palestinian refugees. The US administration stated, in its official statement, that the agency must appeal to renew peace talks with Palestinians. The removal of the US aid from UNRWA has been considered to be one of the stumbling points in the peace efforts to remove the Palestinian right of return. Some observers noticed that the Trump government might attempt to delegitimize Palestinian refugees' refugee status.

Furthermore, in the West Bank and Gaza, the US has stopped all USAID aid to Palestinians. These movements were widely perceived as leveraging for Palestinian officials in peace talks with Israel and the White House before the official announcement of the Middle East peace plan (Kaltenthaler 2020, pp. 39-41)

Likewise, the Trump Administration declared the closure of the PLO office in September of 2018, saying that the PLO had made no substantive steps to facilitate bilateral talks with Israel and that the PLO leadership rejected the U.S. peace initiative and declined to enter into reconciliation attempts with the U.S. government. The US State Department formally said this decision "aligned the Palestinian government and Congressional reservations regarding the efforts of the International Criminal Court to trigger an inquiry into Israel" (Zanotti 2018, p. 688). The US government clearly took punitive action against the PLO leadership who attempted to initiate an international investigation into Israel. The US administration has claimed in its declarations that the PNA is disciplined as long as it does not cooperate with the United States on any forward-looking peace strategy.

Trump also has publicly recognized Israel's control over the Golan Heights, and before Israel seized and confiscated the Golan Heights in 1967. The annexation was not recognized in the 1981 UNSC, which adopted Resolution 497, by which it stated that "the Israeli decision, in accordance with UNSC resolutions, to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Height is null and void without any international legal effect." Trump's statement that he recognizes the Golan Heights as under Israeli sovereignty set a precedent for Israel's various forward-looking land claims and expansionist policies (Kattan 2019, pp. 82-83). Netanyahu, emboldened, recently vowed that he would re-elect the Jordan Valley and the North Dead Sea and the Jewish colonies in the West Bank.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo indicated a shift in the US stance toward Israel's activities on November 18, 2019. "Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank do not violate international law," he continued.

Pompeo acknowledged a court ruling that Carter-era payments were unlawful. He recalled Ronald Reagan rebutting this assertion. Pompeo also mentioned that his employer believed they were unconstitutional, but Trump's government concurred with Reagan's assessment (Kattan 2020, pp. 51-52).

Sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) were put in place in June of the following year (ICC). willing to use military force if North Korea violates international norms "very alarmed by the possible harm it might do to Israel's security Israel has also been accused of committing war crimes by the ICC of examining alleged war crimes conducted by its own forces and civilian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well. Even though Israel has comprehensive civil and military legal frameworks, as well as international criminal ones, and a long history of investigating and punishing corruption in the military, the ICC has imposed unprecedented and undue sanctions on the state for clear geopolitical purposes. It is an extreme oversimplification of the moral justification for judging people.

The letters sent to Secretary of support to Pompeo from 69 senators and 262 House members urge him to halt all "politically motivated" court probes into Israel and the US call for the International Criminal Court to stay out of Israeli-Palestinian issues. "That's exactly what the US will do," Pompeo declared, "I promise you it's absolutely correct," "She's a dependable, fantastic companion and an excellent American security guard. The act of our valued partner or the US representative putting themselves in danger by agreeing to forfeit their right to self-defense only adds to the victim's pain and humiliation. mass notification capabilities (Nusem 2018).

6.2.1 Military Relations During Trump Administration

In December 2019, Trump accepted the 2020 budget providing the US \$3,8 billion for Israel's defense aid and US\$ 500 million in the 2016 US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding for Missile Defense Cooperation.

In March 2020, the Defense Ministry announced that it will export aircraft KC-46 Pegasus to Israel. In July, the Trump administration agreed to supply Israeli gasoline, petrol and jet fuel to land vehicles for 990 million gallons and aircrew fuel for \$3 billion. U.S. aid funds allocated to Israel must fund petroleum costs (Sharp 2018).

6.3 TRUMP AND THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY

On 28 January 2020, Trump and Netanyahu revealed their peace plan during a White House news conference at which no Palestinian official was invited. The strategy, which is designed to meet all of Israel's needs, can be assessed on three fronts: political, economic, and defense (Newman 2020, p. 29).

The plan establishes a diplomatic concept of Palestinian statehood and is accompanied by an extensive set of prerequisites that Palestinians must meet during a four-year period. These include the disarmament of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; recognition of Israel as a Jewish State; abstaining from any attempt to join an international organization without the consent of the State of Israel; and abstaining from any action before the International Criminal Court or other tribunals against the State of Israel or the US (Asseburg 2019).

Israel cannot reclaim its 1967 land under the terms of the "Deal of the Century." Israel may annex 97 percent of West Bank settlements and extend its sovereignty over the Jordan Valley to its borders under this agreement. According to the agreement's concept, the Palestinian State would cover roughly 70% of the West Bank and Gaza. In summary, while the resolution is intended to weaken the two-state solution, it appears to favor a Greater Israel with a significantly smaller Palestinian authority.

On the economic front, the accord will invest more than \$50 billion over the next decade in the Palestinian economy, society, and governance (House 2020). Additionally, the plan calls for a low-tariff system with fewer trade barriers and strategic infrastructure investment to spur private sector growth and resolve a persistent unemployment issue.

However, the deal stipulates that a channel of entry via Israel will connect the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian State may possess a port without endangering Israel.

On the security front, the agreement requires the State of Palestine to be completely demilitarized. The State of Palestine would have security forces capable of preserving internal security, preventing and maintaining public order, and enforcing laws against terrorist attacks in Palestine and against Israel. Israel would be able to manage highways that extend outside the Palestinian Territories as a result of the accord. Israeli security of its borders from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would be totally reasonable.

The Trump Administration's one-sided peace plan also establishes legal legitimacy for apartheid's permanent rule. In the context of "land for peace," in the context of the "deal of a century," Israel receives nothing they desire, including the annexation of illegal settlements and the Jordan Valley, without preconditions, in contrast to the Oslo process, which required Israel to withdraw from the occupied areas in order to achieve Palestinian independence (Malley and Miller 2018). Ironically, the Palestinians should adhere to the list of prerequisites for the right to a non-sovereign, demilitarized state that would subsist on less than 15% of ancient Palestine, divided into multiple Israeli fortified settlements.

6.3.1 The Deal of The Century Trump and Netanyahu Perspective

Netanyahu was facing corruption and bribery charges while he campaigned for the March 2020 elections. Netanyahu faces three different charges in a November 2019 indictment, including taking inappropriate gifts from a millionaire and engaging in unethical relationships with media moguls to improve his press coverage. Bribery, extortion, and breach of public trust are all legal offenses in Israel, with bribery being the most severe. Jail term is not ruled out: former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert got entangled in a bribery investigation during his tenure in the late 2000s and ultimately served over a year in prison (Erdoan & Habash 2020).

The arrest occurred during a critical period in Israeli politics: the post-referendum period. Neither Netanyahu's right-wing Likud party nor its chief rival, Benny Gantz's centrist Blue and White coalition, were able to form a legislative partnership.

The parties were in talks to build a government of national unity, but Netanyahu remained a key stumbling block. He makes every effort to retain the top job, despite the fact that Blue and White parliamentarians have resolutely refused to encourage him to do so while an indictment is pending.

That is why Israel should hold its third coalition referendum in less than a year, with both Netanyahu's and Gantz's parties in the lead. Netanyahu cried out for assistance as a result of this international and legal position.

“Netanyahu and his Washington supporters clearly orchestrated the timing of the unveiling of this proposal. This presents a combative prime minister with a sizable pre-election gift — possibly a life raft,” Ziv explains. "This shifts the focus of Israel's electoral campaign away from an imprisoned prime leader to a proposition seen to be extremely beneficial to Israel."

"So, it's the most overt intrusion we've seen in domestic Israeli politics," he added.⁵

6.3.2 Abraham Accords and Effects on The Region

In August 2020, the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, along with Israel and the United Arab states, signed a statement declaring their intentions to begin discussions towards full diplomatic relations and normalization of ties between the two countries. Around the month of September, a month after 9/11, Bahrain announced its intention to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel, which was also assisted by the United States. While some observers found the "Abraham" decrees to be surprising, they were just as pleased to highlight the advancement of Arab-Israeli ties since the turn of the

⁵ Cook, J. (2020). The Trump Plan Is Just a Cover for Israel's Final Land Grab, *Middle East Eye*, <https://bit.ly/2HDDJUZ> [accessed on 30.07.2020]

century. Also in light of mutual fear of Islamic terrorism and military force as well as well as developing concerns about the US Middle East strategy and their tacit formation as an implicit protection arrangement, this is as good as saying a "perpetty defense partnership."

Prior to the movement after the period of maximum support in the mid-to-late '90s, the two parties worked together in a de facto to keep information out of the public spotlight Bahrain's growth in cooperation with the Arabian neighbors in addition to Oman and Saudi Arabia has come about over time as a result of the promotion of contacts at the strategic level of a "subsurface". While these pragmatically connected ideas and interactions have grown through time, as well as intercultural communication has taken place between the UAE and Jews, they are now just as relevant in trade, and security- and intelligence-related relations. There is reason to believe that this process would not have transpired if the Israeli government had not wanted to control disputed areas of the West Bank land, with the support of the Trump administration.

After over two decades of observance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) treaty terms, Arab Gulf states largely adhere to the normalization of ties between Israel and the Palestinians with a self-Palestine as the conditions set forth in the API, which requires the establishment of a Palestinian state with all its territories, then included East Jerusalem, as the ultimate goal. Nonetheless, from the early 2000s, the Israeli government has prioritized deepening its relationship with Arab states rather than resolving the status of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For their part, the Palestinians have used the war on terror to preserve the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab governments as a means to try and futilely bargain for the world to maintain a "As a final solution to the potential for peace".

6.3.2.1 Bahrain's position

Normalization with the Bahrain was one of the US and Israel's next priorities following the UAE's accomplishment. Bahrain, a small Shiite majority-majority nation that is valuable to Washington since it is where the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is located, as well as

the US Command Headquarters, is important to the United States for CENTCOM and where American military operations against a broad-ranging adversaries like Iran are conducted (CENTCOM). There is an intimate tie between the people of the country and the Saudis. It seems probable that the Bahrainis agreed to a return to the status quo once receiving the permission of Riyadh.

Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have both has substantial, though secret, intelligence contacts with Israel. Since 2005, Manama has moved from a position of opposing Israel to support for Israeli self-Arab negotiations, especially with the steps taken toward resuming talks. pushed into (admission to) and felt the need to (do this as well). Ariel Sharon"sponse. according to leaked emails from the ArabLeaks is publicly claims, during the year of reign of King Hamad of Bahrain, the King decided that Israel would henceforth not be referred to as "the Zionist entity".

Bahrain reacted favorably to the Israel's agreement with the AEYE, and the fact that it was the first one. Shanghai, on the other hand, rejected the notion of moving towards the normalization of living conditions. he met with the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who emphasized that his country is ready to uphold the principles of the ASEAN on equal development. It appears that the king had a change of heart when his country announced the next month that it was going to follow in the footsteps of the UAE's and introduce month-based salaries. Although American pressure may have hastened the decision-making on the matter, the Americans played a part in persuading the people of Bahrain to come to accept it as well.

There has been a range of reactions from the Bahraini citizens to the business proposition. Al-The deal has been rejected by the country's biggest opposition party, al-Waq, and demonstrations have occurred in favor of its non-expansion have caused. Furthermore, a joint communique on the creation of peaceful and friendly relations has been made with the United Arab states. The outcome of this means that Bahrainis have become more cautious as a result of local monitoring.

6.3.2.2 Insecurities in the gulf as a motivating factor

It was critical to the cause of the development of the Abraham agreements that the Accords came at the right time. For starters, the three reasons, the three-way agreements worry that if elected, Joe Biden would seek more restrictive policies on human rights and regional exports; as well as a different policies towards Iran, they are seen as tending towards restraint compared to the possible Trump government. These are two main points raised concerns regarding America's presence in the Gulf today: (the second and the first), after Obama tried to cut US troop numbers in the first, Trump has tried to do the same, and, and now people are asking whether the United States intends to decrease or maintain them. A third factor that has hindered progress in Gaza and the West Bank is the divide between Hamas and the PA; the differences in policy and priorities between the two groups has led in growing opposition and even non-cooperation between them. As a general rule, many donors have shown their support for the Palestinian initiatives, but also varied in how they have used the aid money, with some promoting and advancing causes while others pursuing their own interests. fourth, the Agreement on non-Alignment helps indicate the level of cooperation certain Arab governments are willing to reach in fighting against Tehran's regional power and global aspirations Anwar Gargash, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has said that Iranian provocations have made Emirati[s] reassess their alignment with Israel, to a point of their being wary of a relationship that existed prior to these events.

Many nations are holding their ground until a diplomatic resolution has been reached to the problem in the UAE and Bahrain, when it is anticipated that other countries would follow suit. This is simply one example of Saudi Arabia's strategy: Saudi Arabia has yet to change its strategy, but also remains interested in advancing Palestinian perspectives on crucial topics, particularly when it comes to negotiation. For this reason, in addition to Kuwait, along with other Gulf governments, the Israelis adamantly refuse to endorse any suggestion of Israeli control over West Bank territories because this is seen as a breach of both of the Palestinian cause and international law. The Foreign Ministries in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are also stating their support for the formation of a Palestinian state, as well as for the retention of eastern Jerusalem as the capital.

6.3.2.3 Potential advantages

If we look into the future, the oil and gas installations built by the United Arab Emirates and Israel are foreseen to lead to an overall improvement in relations between Israel and the two neighbors, which it now enjoys. There are no conflicts in or problems of national/political issues between them, and neither do their leaders or peoples have any outstanding debts to resolve. Hope comes from the three governments' previously expressed willingness to maintain or resume a long-term, regional view of environmental security and concerted action, which has kept them working together closely despite geopolitical changes. It is feared that all three countries (Iran, Turkey, and Arab states) are weary of the larger Iranian and Turkish designs, and respectively, which are aimed at regime change and territory expansion, both in these twofold. These beginning relationships, which are pragmatically kept in the background, could eventually warm to the most intimate of friendships with Arabs if followed responsibly and away from the spotlight. Other Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia, appear to be largely content to undertake a slow transformation to another form of reformation strategy, and therefore can serve as an example for the rest of the region, where conflict is present, which means conflict in the likelihood of complete normalization is not exists A recent research by the Israeli Ministry concluded that normalization agreements with Oman and Saudi Arabia could result in very quickly entangling the countries in financial and trade ties between the two. Additionally, it was surprising to discover that Bahrain was a viable option.

Moreover, upon the declaration of the Israel's agreement with the Arab states, considerable protests were noted in large Arab sectors of the population. It was supported by both the general population and the authorities in Bahrain, and by the government officials of both Egypt and Oman. 19 Many other countries, including the ones that have protested against the accord, have been forced to adjust their attitudes. Prime Minister Saïd Othman backed back his earlier claims, as an individual, rather than on behalf of the government, adding, "In fact, I did this on my own." Some people, such as the Kuwait, have made it clear in public that they would not follow in the footsteps of other Middle Eastern countries that normalized relations with Israel is an anomaly and would not recur.

Like later, Qatar ruled against the possibility of normalization of reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel as long as the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is not resolved.

6.3.2.4 Potential consequences

US involvement was undoubtedly advantageous to both to both of the countries and to their citizens, but came with inherent costs for the latter as well. Turkey's policy is most apparent due to this is the increase in the gap between its Islamic monarchs, such as the Saudis and the Saudis, and the ultra-secular monarchy of the AI-led emirates such as the UAE and Bahrain. At that point, the accords put Israel squarely in the position of either dealing with the danger of a risking its economic ties with Turkey, or legitimizing the position of Hamas by alleviating the issues in Gaza. Because of the change in the status quo in the region that has occurred since Israel sided with the Arab states, Israel will face less international opposition and have greater freedom to further expand their activities in the Middle East. It was for example, in late 2009 when the Emirati Air Force went to help the Eastern Mediterranean country of Greece in its energy conflict with Turkey.

the concern that the change in the increased connections between Israel and the United Arab Emirates would not translate into improved collaboration in tackling the Iranian challenge is also pertains to the lack of such unity around their views on this problem There's going to be much contention over whether the 2020 is a suitable year for the announcement of the proposed settlement, two rising countries, Iran and Turkey, may have foreseen by some to begin with. We mustn't underestimate the danger that Iran could be motivated by anti-Israel hostility that has now been heightened by the discovery of the likelihood of a military action against both the UAE and Bahrain. We may have benefited economically and technologically from the day we established diplomatic relations with Israel, but at this time it does not appear to be expedient to further expand the relationship because of these possible benefits."

Because of the volatility of the region's conditions, there is a concern about the ability to undergo substantial and rapid changes. states in the region have suddenly declared

support for Israel might reconsider their relations with Israel because of its recent annexation of the G-donly Mountain Both Iran and Turkey have demonstrated this before, as well, although Dr. Michael Koplow of the Israel Policy Group has said this is something of a newer phenomenon. Some argue that since the rise of Morsi in Egypt following the Arab Spring, the Israeli government was concerned about how the new relationship between Israel and the country may impact the ties with the rest of the Arab world.

another matter of concern is that Saudi Arabia is one Many of these [American and Israeli] officials desire an Israeli-Saudi peace treaty and believe that present geopolitical circumstances will-both the improvement of the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia as well as well as that would make this accomplishment-riskier for Israel as for them, as it is-are more attributable to the issue of the Iranian conflict. Another red flag that should be waved in front of Saudi Arabia is their plans to expand their nuclear program, and the call for it is their objection to nuclear regulation or enrichment of uranium. 25 Thus, the Trump administration has also been assisting the monarchy in obtaining nuclear materials and resources without the American people being made aware of it. Since it is up to Israel to Israel whether to or not to have a nuclear weapons, nobody would argue that the Saudis would keep advancing their nuclear program with additional weapons from Israel. advocates and scholars and practitioners of current policies in the Middle East must take notice that prior US and Israeli collaboration resulted in a tragic example in Iran's nuclear program in the Ayatollahs, whose design was heavily influenced by American scientists and technicians who assisted the Shah from the 1950s onward, had dangerous and long-term consequences. Despite Riyadh's present alliances with the United States (and, to a lesser extent, with Israel), the breakdown of this alliance might cause a great deal of unrest.

The deal grants sovereignty over Israel to the Emirates (as well as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries) over the refueling of the aircrafts. as well as we've already granted normalization in return for a return to annexation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank previous steps by Israel to this condition had disastrous effects on the situation, therefore, before Israel does anything more, they must exercise caution itself against future

consequences Israel would very definitely have to commit to increasing the conflict's complications before the Arab states (or Saudi) governments and/regimes would be willing to even consider a scaling back their support.

6.3.2.5 What is in store for the future?

Despite the promise of widespread enthusiasm, the Jared Kushner and American and Israeli experts believe that the agreements with the Arab states would happen if the Abraham Agenda was completed, this news has thus far has shown to be premature. For his part, Kushner has vowed that Israeli-Palestinian peace treaties would be signed with the next several Muslim countries during the course of 2018, and relations between the 22 member countries of the Arab League would improve by a great deal. Mr. Trump claimed that he was confident that seven countries, including Saudi Arabia, would go along with him in expanding the NATO alliance. since the initial reports of continuous negotiations between the Arab nations, there is still strong reason for those who refuse to identify themselves as Arab leaders to have to doubt the viability of peace accords and business partnerships. Less than days after the Israel and the agreement with the United Arab Emirates was struck, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Farhan made a demand, asking that Israel return to API boundaries of pre-based borders with the Palestinians. In keeping with the remarks above, the governments of Kuwait and Qatar have consistently and vehemently opposed the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until it is settled. Pompeo did not effectively apply pressure on the countries of change, and the crossing of the two more sanctions lines was unnecessary. These are the things to look out for. His trip in Bahrain, though, was a good.

Khartoum attempted to continue its effort to convince the United States to remove it from the list of being a terrorist state regardless of the American efforts to encourage Khartoum to comply with normalization efforts. The pledges of investment from the United States, Israel, curiously, and the United Arab Emirates came with extra resentment of American economic expansion in the region. According to Sudan, the administration's top concern was the instability of the interim government, which was maintained together by players from various ideological and political backgrounds. normalization could be a

destabilizing in the region, as in other countries that have recently become unstable After they turned down all of the invitations from Khartoum, the request was being down by the US, Khartoum switched its attitude and normalized relations with Israel following the formal procedure of withdrawal from the blacklist.

There are many considerations for the current regional realignment in the Arab world, especially when so many of the Arab countries are actually work in alliance with Israel. One way for them to test if an Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Bahraini plans for a settlement details are likely to succeed or fail is to be settlement itself—that is, if Israel will be able to establish clear any lasting settlement conditions on the territory they are envisioning and whether it's possible to complete implementation or considerable resistance from either in the two or both sides are factors.

The deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates recently faced criticism in reference to the conclusion of the sale of the F-35 jets since it was believed that one news outlet said it would result in the opposite of dropping of Jerusalem's objection to the F-16 purchase. Some have argued that Israel would be notably stands to benefit from not receiving the F-35 because of the country's military establishment, as indicated by Defense Minister Benny Gantz's statement that it would be "unidealarms" if other countries received them. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in public that he did not approve of the delivery of fighters, but The New York Times claimed that he was secretly behind them. This unsubstantiated statement was validated in late October, when Netanyahu and Gantz publicly said they were willing to consider reversing their previous stance on the F-35 contract. The story goes on to say that the F-35s will be delivered in addition to the EA-18Gs, which is not surprising, given that they are both made by the same manufacturer. Both of these weapons place major threats to Israel's military freedom of action are protected by US law. There are several impediments if the State and/barriers to further expansion if the U.S. Department of State or Congress find out that Israel's QME has been compromised since the mandatory reviews are completed. Even members of Congress with democratic allegiances are still wonder if the F-35 deal will go through. and on all things concerning the proposed, Congressman Gregory Meeks (D-NY), who has made known his hostility to all talks on foreign-policy, has ruled himself out as a

possibility for being chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee One of the Senate's leading members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Senator Jim Risch of Idaho and Democrat Senator Menendez of New Jersey, has also questions the planned a major arms transaction The current response of the Democratic politicians is also reflects formal government action. When it became apparent that the Trump administration was moving ahead with its plans to ship more F-35s to the United Arab Emirates in late October, a bipartisan proposal was introduced in Congress to attempt to prohibit those exports.

An authority given to the President to unilaterally provide his approval of trade deals does so run the risk of being overridden by Congress that, but Trump is highly unlikely to go with such a measure, which poses grave constitutional questions. This could be an alternate approach for the United States to deal with the Emirates: either give the UAE a less sophisticated version of the F-35 or make some additional capabilities available to Israel that would keep the QME intact. According to reports from the Times of Israel, officials in the United Arab country are asking the US to deliver a “narrowed” version of the F-35 to the UAE. whatever strategy the United States decides to follow, will be several years ahead of others in the region when it comes to fighter aircraft acquisition; in September, U.S. Ambassador David M. Friedman commented that the UAE will have the jets in “by then.”

Even after the new president takes office, the Arab countries are interested in watching the outcome of the next US administration's policies, and foreign responsibilities that will be played by the United States. Even if the general elections turn out in favor of one of the other, Arab regimes, they are all still keen to know what the United States and Israel will give in return for their aid regardless of who gets elected. An incredible power realignment in the Middle East is threatening to propel several Arab-Israeli coalitions, and so ushering in an age of new possibilities for the Arabs as well as the Israelis.

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

President Obama's policies in the Middle East have proved ineffective in retrospect. Upon his leave of service, the chances were much more remote for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal than before he became president in 2009. He misunderstood the situation in Iraq, withdrawing US troops prematurely and decided not to engage in Syria, even though the struggle there cost 400,000 lives and millions of refugees. The capacity of ISIL, taking over vast areas of Syria and Iraq, he even misjudged seriously. He succeeded in securing a nuclear agreement with Iran, but his aspirations for stronger ties between the United States and Iran remain unsuccessful. He also undermined confidence in two US allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, both in their efforts to strengthen relations with Iran and in the feeling of the US retreating into the Middle East.

The styles of Obama and Trump could not be more different on every issue of diplomacy and decorum. Obama once described his foreign policy guiding principles as "Do not foolish shit." Trump appeared to be proud of the misleading behavior and rhetoric that has been shown by his international and national rivals (North Korea, Iran, Middle East, Europe and Mexico). Some of Obama's first actions was to appoint Mahmoud Abbas Chairman of the Palestinian Authority nearly directly after he was sworn in. Trump had been waiting for this call almost two months after its opening. Trump also made a deliberate attempt to increase the strain on Abbas to bring about reconciliation, including freezing US support for UNRWA.

When Trump won the election, there was concern whether Israeli relations, which were strained during the Obama era, would become a major issue of U.S. foreign policy in the new era. Contrary to popular belief, Donald Trump has signaled that relations with Israel will go better than hoped, both with his cabinet and with his messages.

The strategy and interpretation of the Palestinian issue was one of the most critical gaps between the government of President Obama and Trump. Obama thought like the only option was to defeat Israel and give it up to the Palestinians. Trump, however, wants to

understand that the stock is declining from the Palestinians. The goal is to elicit more concrete plans from the Palestinian leadership.

In May 2009, Netanyahu tried to get Obama and his team to help reduce the isolation of Israel in the region. Hillary Clinton requested State Secretary to urge Gulf representatives to personally visit him and show the normalization of Middle Eastern ties. Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz refused to see a leader of Israel and US officials were skeptical of Israel's claims for years that the relations with the Gulf States could be expanded. Trump announced with Kushner a \$50 billion Palestinian investment and development package, dubbed "the bargain of the century," in the goal of promoting peace and eventually settling the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The initiative was expected to provide a total of a million new opportunities to Palestinians. Projects for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are set for \$27.5 billion, for Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon for \$9.1 billion, \$7.4 billion, and Palestinians \$6.3 billion. The schemes are developed in the sectors of safety, education, energy, power, high technology, tourism, and agriculture. (Naturally, before ever seeing it, the Palestinian leadership dismissed the plan.)

However, although there were two different rhetoric of two different presidents, concrete differences were not observed in the reflection of relations on the field. One of the main reasons for this was that the long-term cooperation agreements were not dared to be broken even if they did not coincide with the policies of the president within the framework of the alliance relationship. Not long after the criticism of Obama's policies which aimed at peace in the Middle East for not taking enough responsibility, the new President Trump put the United States as a party to almost every crisis where Obama has favored the path of diplomacy. Trump's active support of Israel in the international arena has been hailed as a highly anticipated development in the Israeli public and government. Netanyahu's apparent support by Trump in the 2015 election was an indication of how well the two leaders got along.

A longstanding promise of all other US presidents had ignored for decades has been fulfilled by President Trump being the first to keep his word practically every other presidential candidate from back during the elections: he announced that he would move

the US embassy to Jerusalem on that date in every one of his speeches after taking office, for example. Additionally, he dedicated the groundbreaking for a new town called “Trump Heights” on the Golan Heights to his daughter, referring to it as a result of his lifetime of dedication.

Moving the embassy to Jerusalem was not a decision Trump found but one he dared to implement. The fact that the decision was not implemented by previous presidents was described as a move not to raise tensions in the region. As a result, Trump had turned the icebergs that Obama had failed to melt with the Israeli government into a cascade of praise from the Israel. But the remarkable point is that despite the differences with Netanyahu during the Obama era, we can say that U.S.-Israeli relations did not deteriorate, at least in bilateral terms. The two states were able to remain each other's closest allies during the Obama era. But what is the system that has not set this relationship back beyond a certain point even though Obama has produced policies that confront Israel in places?

The first is, no doubt, the long-term cooperation decisions taken by previous presidents. The second is the support that these resolutions have found by Congress, whether they are passed or renewed. In this context, it is possible to say that the Israeli lobby is strong in Congress and even has direct representation on the ground. This is not only a relationship between presidents, but it is also the work of an inter-communal relationship from the day it was founded. The support of Israeli lobbying organizations in the United States during election times is undeniable. Senators and representatives who care about this support in both quantitative and financial terms are also interested in the restoration of relations.

For this reason, it is customary for researchers like us to have the United States side with Israel in international matters where Israel is a party in US foreign policy. Both the United Nations Security Council resolutions and the United Nations General Assembly votes have never been used to the detriment of Israel.

Trump has shown the side of the United States at key points compared to Obama. The developments with Iran have taken place in the direction Israel wants and Iran has been

isolated in the region in a sense. These and similar developments have led to a presidential term in which Israel has achieved more than it had hoped for in U.S. foreign policy. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Trump's steps were based on legalizing all Israeli policies. Although Trump's unilateral approach is not internationally accepted, it is an important indicator of the warmth of relations. Indeed, for the future of the region, Trump has lost the support of the international public while making binding decisions during his presidency.

During the course of the study, it was observed that the relations, which were especially riveted in the military and economic field, were not affected by the political tensions.

In this context, it would be incomplete to describe the influence of a US president in the foreign policy of being too close or too far personally with Israel as one hundred percent. The parameters of politics in the United States have not been read through one person throughout history and will not be read without taking into account the necessary variables. A president can neither advance nor restore relations with a state over a certain point. Because all the wheels of the system must work in the same direction for such a situation.

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